Citizens' Report on Governance and Development 2007

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The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 1

Citizens’ Report on

Governance and Development 2007

2 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA

ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS Parliamentary advisory committee

Civil society advisory committee

Nilotpal Basu Madhusudhan Mistry Pyari Mohan Mahapatra Sandeep Dixit

Amitabh Kundu, Jawaharlal Nehru University Vinod Vyasulu, Centre for Budget and Policy Studies P.V. Rajagopal, Gandhi Peace Foundation Rajesh Tandon, PRIA Maja Daruwala, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative

Media advisory committee Lalit Surjan, Deshbandhu Pamela Philippose, The Indian Express Gowridasan Nair, The Hindu

Contributors Ajay K. Mehra — Parliament Videh Upadhyay — Judiciary Atul Sood — Policies and Practices Manoj Rai — Local Self-Government

Editors Amitabh Behar John Samuel Jagadananda Yogesh Kumar Prof. Madhava Menon’s contribution is acknowledged for meticulous review of the chapter on Judiciary and for providing some useful suggestions and insights.

Research and report coordinating team Himanshu Jha Santosh Kumar Patra

Administrative support Shubhro Roy Bhairav Dutt We acknowledge the support of Concern Worldwide (India) for their generous support towards research and publication of this Report. We also acknowledge the support of NOVIB, The Netherlands, for their generous support in the Social Watch process. We express our deep sense of gratitude and acknowledgement to the members of National Social Watch Coalition who provided valuable insights and case studies from the states. The list of the state partners is given at the end of the Report. Feedback: [email protected] Visit us at www.socialwatchindia.net

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 3

Citizens’ Report on

Governance and Development 2007

SOCIAL WATCH INDIA

4 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA

Copyright © National Social Watch Coalition (NSWC), New Delhi. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. First published in 2007 by Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd B1/I1, Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044 www.sagepub.in Sage Publications Inc 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320 Sage Publications Ltd 1 Oliver’s Yard, 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP Sage Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd 33 Pekin Street #02-01 Far East Square Singapore 048763 Published by Vivek Mehra for Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, typeset in 10/13 pt Minion by Star Compugraphics Private Limited, Delhi and printed at Chaman Enterprises, New Delhi. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Citizens’ report on governance and development 2007 / Social Watch India. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. 1. India—Politics and government—21st century. I. Social Watch (Organisation) JQ231.C63

320.954—dc22

ISBN: 978-0-7619-3641-1 (PB)

2007

2007021787

978-81-7829-806-1 (India-PB)

The Sage Team: Ashok R. Chandran, Parikshit Bhardwaj, Rajib Chatterjee and Sanjeev Sharma

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 5

Contents List of Figures, Tables and Boxes Preface 13

9

INTRODUCTION 15 The Indian Parliament and the Grammar of Anarchy 15 Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 18 Access to Justice: State of Indian Judiciary 20 Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 23 Looking Ahead 26 1. THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT AND THE ‘GRAMMAR OF ANARCHY’ 27 Introduction 27 Institutional Dimension 28 Inside the Parliament 29 The Scheduled Tribes and Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006— Recognising Historical Injustice 33 Whose Questions, Whose Answers 35 Parliamentary Protocol 38 Office of Profit 39 Cash for Questions 42 Operation Chakravyuh 44 Criminalisation of Politics 46 Conclusion 47 2. DEEPENING DISPARITIES AND DIVIDES: WHOSE GROWTH IS IT ANYWAY? 61 Uneven Impact of Growth 61 Policy or Absence of Strategic Goal 62 Employment—How Inclusive is the Growth? 64 Trends in Employment 64 The National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme 67 Agricultural Marketing Reform and Commodity Futures Market: The Growth Strategy of Indian Agriculture Performance of Indian Agriculture 72 Farmers’ Suicides 74 Reforms in Agriculture Markets and Commodity Futures Markets 75 Health Inequities in India—Are We Closing the Gap 77 Health Status 77 Health Infrastructure and Utilisation of Health Services 79 National Rural Health Mission: A New Step towards Health for All 82 Some Observations on National Rural Health Mission 82

71

6 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Right to Information Act—Has It Worked? 85 Reforms and Regional Development: The Changing Nature of Centre–State Fiscal Relations 88 The SEZ Policy: One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward 94 Civil Society, Private Business and Government—The New ‘Mantra’ 95 3. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: STATE OF INDIAN JUDICIARY

108

I. Mapping Judicial Response through Court Verdicts 108 Civil Rights, Political Accountability and the Courts 108 Rights of Children of Women Prisoners: SC Urges—‘Revamp Jail Manuals, Pass Necessary Legislations’ 108 Custodial Torture of a Tribal: Indictment of Police Authorities and Award of Compensation 109 Preventive Arrest: Balancing National Security with Individual Freedom 109 Direct Prosecution of Public Servants, Including Ministers 110 Education and Establishing Educational Institutions: Scope of Fundamental Rights 111 Gram Panchayats and Functionaries Appointed by Government 112 Labour Rights 113 Social-Economic Rights and the Courts 114 No Constitutional Guarantee of Employment 114 ‘Foundational Value’ of All Fundamental Rights Asserted 115 Socialism a ‘Basic Feature’, Privatisation in Policy Domain!: Supreme Court 115 No Preferential Public Employment for the Displaced 116 Legality of SHGs’ Involvement in ICDS Upheld 116 The Mumbai High Court Judgement on Farmers’ Suicides: Some Open Questions 117 Environment, Development and the Courts 117 Aravalli Hills’ Case: Court-appointed Committees at the ‘Business-end’ 118 Reconciling Competing Claims of Protecting Tanks and Housing 118 The Supreme Court Explains the ‘Public Trust Doctrine’ Further 119 A Decision in Compromising Context: The DDA Case from Delhi 119 Women’s Right to Forest Produce: Madras High Court 120 Enforcing Water Supply in a City: Kerala High Court 120 II. The State of the Judical System 121 Specific Issues on Judicial Accountability 121 National Judicial Council on the Anvil 121 Judicial Corruption and Whistleblower Policy 122 Dealing with Abuse of PILs 122 Arrears, Delay and Dealing with Them 124 Alternatives to Court Adjudication 124 Status of Fast Track Courts 125 Justice for All and the Need for ‘Demand Orientation’ 125 Gram Nyayalayas being Set up through a New Law 126 The Launch of the ‘Project Combat’ 127 Making Legal Aid Work: History Suggests the Need for a Decisive Will

127

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Contents Anarchy’ 7

4. INSTITUTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE: HOPES, PROMISES AND PERFORMANCE 134 People’s Participation: People’s Council and Elections to Local Governments 135 Gram Sabha 135 Elections to Local Governments 137 Building Capacities of People in Panchayats 139 Institution Building: Trinity of Local Institutions 143 Devolutions to Panchayats and Municipalities 147 Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas Act (PESA) 151 State-level Initiatives 152 Central-Government Level 153 Delivery of Development: NREGA and JNNURM 153 Conclusion 158 Annexures

175

8 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 9

List of Figures , Tables and Boxes Figures 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8

Head Count Ratio (HCR) and Growth of GDP Variability in Growth and IMR Trends of Public Expenditure on Rural Development by Central and State Governments at a Percentage of NNP Factor Cost Rural–Urban Differential in Infant Mortality Rate, 2005 Male–Female Infant Mortality Rate, 2005 Male–Female IMR Differential in Rural and Urban Areas, 2005 Source of Treatment Type of Services Used per 1,000 Cases

4.1 4.2

JNNURM Process Project Proposal, Sanction and Fund Flow

62 62 75 79 80 80 82 82 155 157

Tables 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 1.11

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4

Number of Days and Sittings Adjournments and Prorogations Time Lost on Adjournments due to Interruptions Time Distribution for Legislative, Financial and Non-Financial Business in the Two Houses Bills Passed: 2001–06 Time Spent on Bills Working of the Standing Committees in the 14th Lok Sabha (2005–06) Working of the Committees other than Financial and Standing Committees in the 14th Lok Sabha (2005–06) Starred and Un-Starred Questions of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha— Budget Session 2006 Time Spent on Question Hour in Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha— Budget Session 2006 Ministry-wise Distribution of Starred and Un-starred Questions— Budget, Monsoon and Winter Session, 2006

29 29 30 30

Percentage Distribution of Female Workers by Social Group and Education Level, 2004–05 Employment and Output Growth in Organised Manufacturing Sector Status of Implementation of NREGA Performance of States on the Basis of Sample Household Survey (as on 31 August 2006)

65

30 31 35 36 36 37

37

66 69 70

10 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8

Cultivators and Agricultural Workers as a Proportion of Total Workers Agriculture Growth Rates Annual Average Growth Rate at Constant Prices Percentage Share of Agriculture Including Allied Sectors of Forestry, Logging and Fisheries in the Total GDP 2.9 Investment in Agriculture 2.10 Number of Farmers Suicides from 2001 to 2006 2.11 Estimated Number of Indebted Farmer Households 2.12 Report on Monthly Disposal of Cases 2.13 Transfer from Centre to State as Percentage of Gross Revenue Receipts of the Centre 2.14 Transfers Recommended by Finance Commissions 2.15 Trends in Expenditure to GDP Ratio 2.16 Relative Share of Centre and State in Total Expenditure: 1979–80 to 2000–2001 2.17 Relative Share of Centre and States in Combined Revenue Receipts: 1979–80 to 2001–02 2.18 How has the Adjustment Come About?

74 75 76 76 76 77 77 86 90 91 91 92 92 93

3.1

The Judges (Inquiry) Bill, 2006

123

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

Functions Assigned to Gram Sabhas in Different States Percentage of Women Representatives in Panchayats as on 1 November 2006 National Finance Commission and the SFCs: A Comparison Chart Statement Showing Release of Grants of 12th Finance Commission as on 20 July 2006 Constitution of District Planning Committees (DPCs) States/UTs Current Status of Activity Mapping in Different States Status of MoU in Rajasthan, as on 3 December 2006 Funding Pattern under NURM for Urban Infrastructure and Governance

135 137 145 146

4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8

147 149 150 156

Boxes 1.1 2.1 2.2

SEZ Act

Reservation in the Private Sector The NREGA Provides for a Multi-tier Structure of Authority for Implementation and Monitoring of the Scheme 2.3 Findings of the Survey 2.4 Considerable Job Cards—Not Enough Work! 2.5 Implementation of NREGA—Story from Rajasthan 2.6 Some Critical Concerns of NREGA in the Context of Orissa 2.7 NREGA—Some Realities from Gujarat 2.8 Field Notes: Oil Seeds in Sehore, MP 2.9 What Does Agricultural Marketing Reform Mean?—Some Questions 2.10 Core Strategies of National Rural Health Mission 2.11 RTI an Instrument for the Poor to Demand 2.12 Salient Features of RTI Act 2.13 Accountability of Panchayat: Demand of a Poor 2.14 Progress of Right to Information in 12 States 2.15 Zilla Panchayat Seeking Information from Agriculture Department

33 67 68 68 71 71 72 73 78 81 83 85 85 86 87 88

The Indian Parliament the ‘Grammar Anarchy’ Listand of Figures, Tablesof and Boxes 11

2.16 2.17 2.18

Union Budget 2007–08: Highlights The Experience of User Charges and Health Sector Reforms in Punjab PPP—the Concept

3.1

The Right of Minorities to Establish and Administer Educational Institution of Their Choice: Supreme Court Centre Ready with Bill to Probe Judges New Provisions for Speedy Trial of Criminal Cases: Statement of Minister of State, Ministry of Law and Justice National Legal Services Authority Launches Project Combat for the Disadvantaged People

3.2 3.3 3.4

4.1 Nomads Fighting Their Way into Panchayats 4.2 Samras in Panchayat is Somras to Kill Grass-roots Democracy 4.3 Lady Councillor of Sehore Municipality finds a Helping Hand! 4.4 The Conditionality to Contest Panchayat Election: A Saga of Toilet Politics 4.5 Zilla Panchayats to Handle Primary and Non-formal Education 4.6 Salient Features of Backward Region Grant Fund 4.7 Reservation Effectively Void without Representation 4.8 Panchayati Raj and Lower Caste Politics: A Debate over Equality 4.9 Tribesmen Ask for More Representation 4.10 Village Forest Make the Main Agenda

94 97 98 112 122 125 127

138 139 140 141 141 142 144 147 152 152

12 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 13

Preface More than half a century after the setting up of democratic institutions and a decade and a half after the major change in the development paradigm, the institutions of governance are faced with multi-layered paradoxes of different kinds. Management of democratic politics and of the developmental processes pose serious challenges before the institutions, which on the one hand have to cope with the promises and on the other hand have to adjust to the developmental framework, and this adjustment is never easy because the institutional process itself is faced with crisis situations. Institutions have to balance the rising expectations of ever increasing number of demands from various social groups, with the requirements of economic developmental policy, especially in the era of neo-liberal policy framework. While new institutions and new policies have been created from time to time, the sections of population clamouring for greater share in the developmental pie and greater say in decision making have proved never ending. The challenge before the institutions and processes of governance remains in the realm of ensuring that the fruits of development reach the farthest corners of society and at the same time meet the requirements of economic prudence. Institutions, which are the mechanisms of actualising both democracy and development, need even drastic reforms in the light of aberrations that have been visible in their working as also due to the new challenges. There has been no dearth of serious concern, debate and proposals, often quiet elaborate and specific about reforms, be it the parliament, the judiciary, the executive or the local governance. But more often than not they have remained unimplemented at worst and half-heartedly implemented at best. Such situations raise questions about the intentions of the governing elite. An all-out effort in the form of pressure from below expressed by the civil society initiatives is the call of the day to give a serious jolt to bring the reform agenda to the forefront. This year as well, Social Watch India remained committed in its endeavour to ‘democratize knowledge’ by putting this valuable information in the public domain. While we continue with our previous focus on the performance of the four nodal institutions of governance namely the Parliament, the Judiciary, the Policy making and the institutions of Local Self Governance, we have also critically examined some new issues and policies like the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNURM), the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act, etc. We are hopeful that by putting the citizen back in the centre of the governance agenda in this country we will be able to help the marginalised and empower them. It is heartening to see that the Social Watch Process has taken root in the 13 states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Kerala, Karnataka and Chhattisgarh. While many states like Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh have come out with their own state Social Reports, many others like Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan are in the process of preparing for it. We are glad to note that eventually all these states will be able to contribute in some way or the other in the National Social Watch Reports as well. This year a crucial micro link has been established with these states by including some insightful and interesting case studies from the grassroots. In continuation of our earlier efforts of translating the

14 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA summary of the Report in regional languages, we endeavour to publish the summary in as many regional languages as possible. At this point we would like to express our indebtedness to Ajay K. Mehra, Atul Sood, Videh Upadhyay and Manoj Rai for taking pains to work incessantly on their respective sections within the time frame. Thanks are also due to Manshi Asher, NCAS; Prakash Gardia, NCAS; Sandeep Sharma, Ph.D Scholar, JNU; C.V. Madhukar, Parliamentary Research Services; K.A. Sidiqqui and P.K. Ghosh for their contributions in the Report. Vishal Ranjan’s contribution is acknowledged for meticulous editing of the chapters. Our special thanks to late Minu Jose of Social Watch, Maharashtra for putting together an insightful piece on urban reforms in Mumbai. Her untimely demise has deeply saddened all of us. Above all the Social Watch Coalition partners deserve our deep appreciation for their support and encouragement without which this process would not have been successful. Jagadananda National Social Watch Coalition

Introduction 15

Introduction

Democracy, development and governance, it seems are at the crossroads, caught in the contradictions, some of which are new while older ones continue. Admittedly, India has joined the countries with faster economic growth evident with the rising GDP mainly in the growing services and manufacturing sectors. The slackening growth of agricultural sector on the other hand points towards a deeper malaise. The question however is the sustainability and the wider reach of economic growth from the point of view of the desired level of social development. To what extent is the high economic development compatible with unsatisfactory social development? Credible sources like the HDR 2006 indicate that India lags behind from the point of view of a number of indicators of human development. While the processes and institutions of democracy have existed for quite sometime and deepened, they have not been accompanied by social and economic empowerment, often giving rise to volatile situations of protests and even eruptions. This mismatch between the political environment on the one hand and the socio-economic on the other has proved to be the main challenge to make democracy more meaningful and participatory. Another development has been the ascendancy of civil society consciousness and organisations that have created a heightened sense of citizen’s rights and their forceful articulation. The contradictions and crises that the institutions of governance are faced with at the present juncture are quite complex. They have to contain and carry the demands coming from the people as well as from the civil society organisations which is not always easy and so find themselves unable to

perform at their fullest potentiality because of their own contradictions. Demands from three directions, that is, the political, the people’s rights’ consciousness and the civil society have resulted in some positive initiatives (such as RTI aimed towards transparency in governance) that in a sense are aimed towards evaluating the institutions which are responsible for the administration of such initiatives. There are also some institutional initiatives that have almost been traced to the system of governance (PRI, NREGA) by the conflicting forces and situations. The reluctance of the ‘managers of the system’ is evident at all levels of the working of these institutions. This is the contradiction that is often reflected in remarks like the ‘lack of political will’ (one may add administrative to it as well) in the working of new institutions and other policy initiatives.

I. THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT AND THE GRAMMAR OF ANARCHY The section on Parliament looks at the institutional dimension, explores the question of parliamentary protocol in the wake of ‘opposition-speaker standoff ’, the issue of the Office of Profit, while taking further our previous emphasis on criminalisation and deep-seated corruption among the MPs manifested in the ‘cash for questions’ controversy. The actual working of both the Houses is analysed from the point of view of the time lost, number of sittings, attendance of the MPs, the question hour and the working of the Committees. The section also undertakes a close scrutiny of the way some of the important Bills have been passed in the Parliament in the year 2006, e.g., the SEZ Act and the Forest and Land Owners Act.

16 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Parliament is an institution that not only legislates but also creates a sense of representation across several layers of a multicultural and diverse society that is of critical importance, as the ‘revolution of rising expectations’ is increasingly turning out to be the ‘revolution of rising frustrations’. Parliament is a crucial link between the Executive and the people and, in the process, has the crucial responsibility of keeping the popular mandate alive. The discussions on the role and functioning of the Indian Parliament have been dominated by the questions raised on the issue of representation arising out of criminalisation, assured gender representation through one-third quota and increasing absenteeism of the MPs, as well as the use of protest politics inside the Houses.

Parliamentary Protocol Parliamentary protocol, so essential for the democratic functioning, is concerned with the question of respecting and adhering to the accepted norms of protocol with regard to the Chairs of both the houses of Parliament. The recent stand-off between the Lok Sabha Speaker Somnath Chatterjee, a veteran parliamentarian and front ranking leader of the CPM, and the opposition NDA led by the BJP is important in this light. The Speaker was alleged to be biased against the Opposition, which led to the exchange of words between the two (Speaker Somnath Chatterjee and former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee). As a result, the Opposition boycotted the House and the Speaker pondered resignation at this slur on his impartiality. The letter written to the Speaker by the Opposition leader evoked considerable criticism by the UPA partners. It is perhaps the first time in history that the institution that the Speaker represents has been questioned in such a straightforward and blatant fashion. It is perhaps because partisanship and contestations even within the Parliament have risen very high. Slogan shouting, trooping into the well of the House, walkouts, boycotts, etc., have become an everyday affair. It is of utmost

importance to keep the Speaker’s office as a priority item on the agenda of parliamentary reform, so that a healthy consensus emerges on this issue among the political parties across the board.

Office of Profit The Office of Profit (OoP) issue proved to be the legendary genie that had remained in the bottle of Articles 102(1)(a) and 191(1)(a) of the Constitution and was almost inadvertently let out by an innocuous looking court case instituted by a littleknown Congress leader from Kanpur. The Constitutional provision debarring any representative ‘holds (ing) any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State, other than an office declared by Parliament by law…shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State’, had remained a little-known provision at least in the public domain. A Court case resulting into the disqualification of Jaya Bachchan from Rajya Sabha created a flurry of activities in the Parliament and across the parties. The chain reaction brought ever-new names of MPs and members of legislatures in the states, including Ms Sonia Gandhi herself, from almost all the political parties, putting the Parliament and the Election Commission under pressure. The controversy brought forth the tendency of seeking fruits of power in executive offices, beyond being people’s representatives in legislatures and Parliament. In spite of this ‘expose’, parties across the country unabashedly joined hands in introducing the amendments in the Act (enlarging the list). When the Bill was referred to the President for his assent, it was sent back with most rational and valid questions. Instead of addressing these questions in a rational manner, the Parliament sent it back to the President for his assent without any changes. The issue shows that instead of tackling a serious ethical question in a systematic and realistic manner, the Parliament resorts to a

Introduction 17

quick, ad-hoc solution using the force of parliamentary majority to maintain the status quo.

Cash for Questions The ever-pervasive tendency of corruption among the parliamentarians surfaced again by means of two sting operations, namely, Operation Duryodhana and Chakravyuh. During the Operation, 12 MPs were caught on camera receiving cash for raising questions in the Parliament in the interest of the fictitious North Indian Small Manufacturers’ Association (NISMA). Operation Chakravyuh exposed the MPs accepting bribes for giving work contracts under the MPLAD scheme. Both these cases were referred to the Joint Parliamentary Committee resulting in the expulsion of the tainted MPs. The details of the sting operation, however, starkly brought out corrupt and criminalised mindset of some of the persons elected as people’s representatives to the country’s highest representative-legislative body.

Criminalisation The three dimensions to criminalisation of politics that have to be kept in mind are the increasing compulsions of retaining political power at any cost with increase in corrupt practices for self-perpetuation and selfaggrandisement; the consequent blurring of the line between criminality and political goals; and some politicians becoming tainted with criminality with an increasing tendency of high profile ‘dons’ with political connections getting acceptance. The debate on criminalisation of politics received a new dimension with the convictions of Shibu Soren (life term), the high profile leader of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha and the Union Minister for coal (resigned since then), for allegedly conspiring to murder his secretary and of Navjot Singh Sidhu, the high profile ex-cricketer and a BJP MP (resigned since then), by the Punjab and Haryana High court (three years rigorous

imprisonment). While in the first case, since the UPA constituent JMM was a small State party, the Congress maintained silence and a safe distance from the whole episode; in the other, BJP’s willy-nilly damage-control justified the ex-cricketer’s boisterous behaviour leading to the death of a person. Another issue which came up during the round tables in states on the Social Watch Report 2006 was regarding the data on criminalisation of politics, based on affidavits. Some observers felt that in ‘most cases’ the MPs in the list belonged to either the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes, against whom false criminal cases were registered. Social watch proposes to explore this further in the coming years.

Parliamentary Functioning The Houses of Parliament met for 146 days for 85 sittings during 2005 and for 82 days (Rajya Sabha for 80 days) for 57 sittings during 2006. In aggregate terms, the Lok Sabha lost 13 per cent of its time and the Rajya Sabha 20 per cent. Non-financial business consumed the bulk of the time in both the Houses, followed by financial and legislative matters in the Lok Sabha and legislative and financial in the Rajya Sabha respectively. In effect, it consumed nearly 40 per cent of the Lok Sabha time and over 50 per cent of the Rajya Sabha time. In 2006, over 40 per cent of the Bills were passed in Lok Sabha with less than one hour of debate. Further, in the two sessions in 2006, only 173 MPs in Lok Sabha actually said anything on the floor of the Parliament on legislative issues. Sadly, almost 65 per cent of MPs said nothing in Lok Sabha on a legislative issue. SEZ Act, for instance, was unanimously accepted by all the members with little to say on the quality and coverage of the debate in the Parliament. Functioning of the Committees other than Financial and Standing Committees presents a dismal picture where average attendance in 19 such Committees has varied between 33 per cent and 86.6 per cent.

18 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA

Question Hour A cursory reading of the questions pertaining to the social sector shows that most of the questions were for mere statistical derivations, the information which could have easily been derived from the administrative channels, and the time of the question hour could have been used for some more substantive and important issues. This could also mean that the time of the Parliament which costs Rs 26,035 per minute, was not properly utilised. Some of the questions which were selected in the question lists were concerned with information about the schemes which were already stopped long back. For instance, a question was raised on the allocation of money for ‘Operation Black Board’ in 2005–06, whereas the scheme had ended in the year 2001–02. Yet another question was asked regarding a scheme on agro and rural industries which does not exist! These kinds of questions show the ignorance and complete lack of homework of our esteemed parliamentarians on the one hand and the casual treatment of the important instrument of Parliament on the other.

II. DEEPENING DISPARITIES AND DIVIDES: WHOSE GROWTH IS IT ANYWAY? Policy orientation since the early 1990s has raised some serious concerns and questions in the social and environmental realms impacting employment and distribution of income, the emergence of new forms of vulnerability, weakening state regulation, deteriorating governance patterns, paradoxical poverty statistics, imbalanced demographics with inter-regional disparities and often dismal human development indicators. There is an absence of a strategic goal and it seems that there is no specific long-term or medium-term goal that is being pursued. No strategic objectives are pursued. In the case of agriculture, the whole sector is in crisis which is evident in supply side constraints, food scarcity, import of food

often at higher rates than domestic production costs, agriculture becoming unviable, declining public investment and overall neglect of agriculture such that it has become a constraint on future growth. Added to that is the plight of farmers across the states who are forced to commit suicides facing indebtedness, depressing real wages in agriculture, frequent failure of crops and increasing vulnerability in agriculture. The total numbers of cultivators across the country have declined from 110.7 million in 1991 to 103.63 million. The agricultural sector has grown at a mere average of 2.3 per cent yearly during the Tenth Five-Year Plan. The share of agriculture (including the allied sectors of forestry and fishery) in total GDP has seen a constant decline over the years from 25.3 per cent in 1999–2000 to 19.9 per cent in 2005–06.

Infrastructure In case of infrastructure we seem to have come full circle, where private players did not come into power generation as had been hoped, the success of private players in transmission and distribution has not been phenomenal. Private players have not played the commensurate role in urban infrastructure, provisioning of basic services has still remained a dream and we are all now led to believe that the panacea lies in ‘public-private partnership’.

Employment Over the two decades of 1983–1994 and 1993–2004, the overall employment growth declined from 2.01 per cent to 1.84 per cent. National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme launched in September 2005 is perhaps the most talked about national level employment generation programme. So far the response to this programme has been mixed with varied experiences of the states in terms of its performance—for instance, Registration Percentages of ‘eligible’ households vary from 14.1 per cent in Madhubani (Bihar) to 100 per cent in

Introduction 19

Shivpuri (M.P.). In a recent survey, it was found that close to 80 per cent of the rural households were not aware of the fact that after getting the Job Card, one had to apply for getting wage employment. Less than 50 per cent of elected representatives of Panchayats, on an average, have received any input on their roles in implementation of NREGA. In terms of the share of Central government budget, the NREG scheme has made no difference to government expenditure on rural employment programmes. The enrolment for the scheme far exceeds the number of BPL households in most states. Even the fund utilisation ratio remains as low as 51 per cent even after one year of operation of the NREGA.

Health India’s performance in reducing health inequalities has remained a matter of concern. There are intra-state differences, income based variations, and caste and gender based differences in availability of health services, performance of health institutions and health outcomes. Disparity persists not only regionally but also across socio-economic groups. A caste-wise break-up of incidences of infant and child mortality clearly shows that it is scheduled caste and the tribe households that are deprived the most. This is true for both rural and urban areas. Gender differences in health status are the most noticeable aspects of health inequality in India. Although female child is biologically stronger than the male child, the IMR figures across some states suggest differently. Rural urban disparities prevail even in the case of availability of health services. Most of the specialised health centres like district hospitals or community health centres are located in urban or semi-urban areas. The National Rural Health Mission (2005–12) seeks to provide effective healthcare to rural population throughout the country with special focus on 18 states, which have weak public health indicators and/or weak infrastructure. Although the programme has finished one year, it is still

characterised by limited awareness level and the confusion regarding the role to be played by different agencies. The health plans have remained more or less centralised. As a result of which the entire funds meant for sub-centre at the village level have remained unutilised.

The Changing Nature of Centre– State Fiscal Relations The elements of fiscal re-structuring that are particularly discernible after the initiation of economic reforms in India are—transfers based on mobilisation of own resources; economic sustainability appearing as the chief criterion for ‘success’ of programmes, schemes, grants; the dominant concern with efficiency in financial allocations, even in the social sector, leading to privatisation via public-private partnership; and the attempt to usher in such institutional reform that creates enabling environment to attract outside funds in support of development efforts. There is an inherent process of centralisation in place with increasing control of the Centre as reflected in the nature of grants, decline in overall transfers, increasing expenditure responsibilities of the states, increase in committed expenditures, and increase in relative command over total resources by the Central government in relation to its expenditure. In terms of fiscal federalism this implies that, overall, there is accentuation of both vertical and horizontal imbalances especially during the period of economic reforms. The objective of fiscal transfer mechanism is to correct vertical imbalances (asymmetric assignment of functional responsibilities and financial powers between different levels of government) and horizontal inequalities (disparities in revenue capacity across constituent units of federation due to differences in level of income). The principal reason for increasing inequality is the very mechanism of federal transfers, the nature of restructuring of public finances and the single-minded obsession with sustainability or efficiency of financial allocations.

20 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA The Right to Information Act 2005 (RTI) that came into effect on 12 October 2005 is a welcome policy initiative that fills the ‘accountability gap’ that existed between the mechanisms within the system. However, there are some issues which should be sorted out with reference to its operation and its implementation. The related problems with the Act are the appointment of the Information Commissioners, the fee for the processing of the application, penalties imposed on the concerned department or officer and the amendment of the Act itself, especially from the point of view of ‘file notings’. Since the introduction of the Act, the CIC has received 4,404 appeals and complaints of which 2,646 have been disposed of and penalties have been imposed on 10 officers in eight cases ‘for not acting in accordance with the provisions’ of the Act. The RTI Act has had some notable impact on making governance more accountable, transparent and participatory. However, in order to make the Act more meaningful in terms of its delivery and effectiveness, greater interaction between the citizens and government is necessary in its process of evolution. The Act has galvanised the government as well as citizens with a renewed sense of alertness and pro-activeness.

Public Private Partnership Many policy initiatives in the last one year, especially the ones that involve creation of infrastructure, like Bharat Nirman, Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme (NREGP), NRHM are all based on active and participatory role of civil society actors, local representative organisations, government departments and private investors. However, neither the Central government nor the state government has tried to set up the necessary institutional framework as has been done in other countries. Where PPPs function in non-competitive environment, statutory regulatory bodies need to be set up. Bringing about model concession agreement is not sufficient as has been done by the Planning Commission.

III. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: STATE OF INDIAN JUDICIARY The review of the most important judgments of both the Supreme Court and the High courts in the year 2006 begins with some verdicts on civil rights and liberties or what is also referred to as the ‘first generation’ rights. The verdicts involve the rights of children in jail, custodial torture of tribals, the rights of detenue before preventive arrest and the need to balance social security with individual freedom in this regard, the cases relating to right to education and to administer educational institutions, customary rights of religious chiefs in a tribal society, the rights of functionaries working with Gram Panchayats and cases relating to political accountability and finally, the labour rights.

Entitlements of Children of Women Prisoners: SC Urges—‘Revamp Jail Manuals, Pass Necessary Legislations’ In an important case relating to the children in jail with their mothers, the Chief Justice of India in his decision held that children of women prisoners who were living in jail required additional protection and those children should not be treated as undertrials or convicts. More importantly, the Court made it clear that the Executive and the Legislature need to take quick action to frame relevant laws and guidelines and report compliance to the Supreme Court within four months which can be seen as performance of the legislative function.

Custodial Torture of a Tribal: Indictment of Police Authorities A petition was filed by a poor tribal girl in the Supreme Court against the erring Police Officers (specifically named in the petition) including the State for her wrongful detention in police custody, false implication in serious offences, custodial torture and for violation of her fundamental and human rights under various laws. After thorough

Introduction 21

survey of the facts, the court concluded that the State had acted in violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution, the Juvenile Act of 1986 and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, with the officials having committed offences punishable under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, and for which the State was bound to compensate the victim. The Court also directed the submission of the Action Taken Report within a period of six months from the date of judgment.

Preventive Arrest for National Security: Balancing Social Security with Individual Freedom In the context of the rights of a person arrested for terrorism or other offences, the Gauhati High court in an important verdict in 2006 also laid down minimum standards before any preventive arrest for such offences, such as, a detenue has two rights under Article 22(5) of the Constitution: to be informed, as soon as possible, the grounds on which the order of detention is passed, and to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. The detaining authority is under the constitutional obligation to inform the detenue of his right to make such a representation. The failure to inform the detenue of such right to make representation by the detaining authority vitiates the detention order.

Direct Prosecution of Public Servants, including Ministers In a landmark decision towards the end of 2006, the Supreme Court said that public servants, including Chief Ministers, MPs and MLAs, can be prosecuted without any prior sanction and that sanction under Code of Criminal Procedure which has been used to delay and shelve many prosecutions, is not necessary for prosecuting corrupt public servants.

Education, and Establishing Educational Institutions, as Fundamental Rights In a case related to regularisation of schools and their management in the states of Bihar and Jharkhand, the Supreme Court observed that ‘imparting of education is a sovereign function of the State under Article 21A of the Constitution of India’. Interestingly, the Court also suggested that standards of educational qualifications of the teaching staff could be different in both urban and rural areas while adding that there could be relaxation in the rural areas as decided by the state government. In another important decision in the year, the Supreme Court responding to the question that whether State can interfere in unaided minority or non-minority institutions with regard to matter relating to admission of students, fixation of quota and fee structure made it clear that establishment of educational institution comes within the right to occupation which being a fundamental right is duly protected. While emphasising the need to devise an appropriate mechanism for the purpose, the Supreme Court also ended up virtually goading the Governments to enact legislations for the purposes of regulating admission procedure and fee structure.

Gram Panchayats and Functionaries Appointed by Government The Supreme Court’s observation regarding the transfer of the services of the employees of eight Departments to the Gram Panchayats could be a serious roadblock for the devolution of Functions, Funds and Functionaries, so essential for the working of Panchayats. In the course of its judgment, the Supreme Court made it clear that there was no dispute that while working under Gram Panchayats, these employees continued to be paid salaries by the Irrigation Department. They were under the disciplinary control of the Irrigation Department and

22 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA also got promotions in the same department. Hence the overall control lay vested with the respective departments.

Labour Rights: Is the Supreme Court Behaving Differently from Labour Courts? The Supreme Court’s stand on Labour Rights in a particular case can be dubbed as, ‘Anti worker’. A demand was made for the regularisation of temporary workers and the case went to the labour court, then to the High court and was finally appealed in the Supreme Court. The Apex Court in its judgment made clear that these workers had no right to the post and further added that there was no right vested in any daily wager to seek regularisation. The SC further declared that it is only a permanent employee who has the right to continue in service till the age of superannuation; for a temporary employee, there is no age of superannuation because he has no right to the post at all. Another matter of great public concern was the SC’s statement in another case regarding the constitutional Guarantee of Employment. The Supreme Court commented that ‘.... although this Court would be very happy if everybody in the country is given a suitable job, the fact remains that in the present state of our country’s economy, the number of jobs are limited. Hence, everybody cannot be given a job, despite our earnest desire. It may be mentioned that jobs cannot be created by judicial orders, nor even by legislative or executive decisions.’

‘Foundational Value’ of All Fundamental Rights Asserted An observation was made by the SC in another case when the court interpreted the fundamental rights thus, ‘It is a fallacy to regard fundamental rights as a gift from the State to its citizens. Individuals possess basic human rights independently of any constitution by reason of basic fact that they are members of the human race.’

The Court also emphasised that ‘Socialism’ is integral to the Indian Constitution, which, becomes important from the point of view of neo-liberal policies adopted by recent governments. In the specific context of employment for the displaced persons due to an Indian Oil Corporation Ltd (IOC) project, the Delhi High court held that no Preferential Public Employment for the Displaced should be given. This is being contrary to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, is illegal and consequently unenforceable. Besides, the High court also added that grant of public employment on the ground that the land of a person or his family has been acquired for a public purpose, would amount to grant of preferential treatment in the matter of public employment which would again be contrary to the Constitution of India. The Legality of Self-Help Groups’ Involvement in Integrated Child Development Service (ICDS) was upheld by the SC. In a specific order, the Supreme Court made it clear that ‘The contractors shall not be used for supply of nutrition in Anganwadis and preferably ICDS funds shall be spent by making use of village communities, Self-Help Groups and Mahila Mandals for buying of grains and preparation of meals....’ Mumbai High court’s judgment on the farmers’ suicides in Maharashtra has done a great service in bringing this issue to the fore and in making the state government act on it. Responding to the PIL, the court took the help of Tata Institute of Social Sciences and called for a report from State and the Union Ministry of Agriculture. The Court suggested fixation of support price for a group of states and not at national level. The Court also directed the government to immediately implement the package it had announced for the farmers. Regarding the issues on environment, the court’s appointment of monitoring committees again surfaced in the litigation on the protection of parts of Aravalli Hills in Rajasthan. The case shows that when it comes to handling environmental litigation, it is the Court appointed Committees—with

Introduction 23

monitoring, advising and investigative roles—which are in the business end of deciding disputes. Another case related to the development projects by Delhi Development Authority being implemented in the Vasant Kunj area, brings into question the issue of Public Trust. In the said case the Court pointed out the lack of transparency in the way DDA had put a site for auction by creating a false impression that all necessary clearances had been obtained where actually there was scope for litigation. The Court notices the lapses of the DDA but doesn’t go further to term it as gross negligence that would have invited penalty from it. Instead, it allowed the MoEF to take a decision on the whole matter ‘to avoid unnecessary delay’. In another case, Tribal women’s right to the forest produce was upheld and facilitated by the Madras High court. Recently, Kerala High court intervened when a PIL was filed in it regarding the plight of people of West Kochi who had been clamouring for supply of potable drinking water to them, for the last more than three decades. The Court directed the state governments to take and complete all steps necessary for supplying drinking water to the people of West Kochi within six months from the judgment. In a significant move to ensure Judicial Accountability, the Central Government is contemplating the setting up of National Judicial Council where the supremacy of the Chief Justice of India and the judiciary would be maintained in the matter of judicial appointments through the Council. The Judicial Council will consist of representatives of the judiciary while selecting candidates for judicial posts. The aim of setting up of a National Judicial Council is to fix the accountability of the judges of the High court as well as of the Supreme Court.

Judicial Corruption and Whistleblower Policy The Ministry of Law and Justice had admitted in the Rajya Sabha that ‘[c]omplaints

are received by Government from time to time regarding corruption in judicial system.’ This assumes significance in light of the fact that a Whistleblower’s protection policy for the judiciary is being contemplated. At present there are 33,635 cases in the Supreme Court and 34,24,518 cases in High courts reported to be pending. The Government also admitted in Parliament that more than 50 lakh civil cases were pending in various courts of the country. The extent of pendency of cases in the High court is exemplified by the number of cases pending in one High court—Allahabad High court. The government stated in the Parliament that in the Allahabad High court, ‘out of a total 10,53,794 cases pending as on 31 March 2006, which includes 7,75,583 main cases and 2,78,211 miscellaneous cases, 3,42,135 cases are pending for more than 10 years.’

IV. LOCAL GOVERNANCE: HOPES, PROMISES AND PERFORMANCE Fourteen years after the inauguration of the institutions of local governance, the institutions are in place in almost all the states with 27 lakh more elected representatives of whom 37.5 per cent are women, 16 per cent belong to the SC and 11 per cent to the ST categories. While the democratic expectations from the institutions are ever increasing, their role and responsibilities remain ambiguous. Dovetailing programmes for development under the Centrally sponsored schemes and those that form part of the Common Minimum Programmes of the government with the functioning of the Institutions remain an unfulfilled task. The Gram Sabhas in the rural areas and the Ward Sabhas in the urban areas remain victims of governmental apathy as well as some amount of indifference from the civil society at large. Programmes of development in different fields introduced from time to time have mostly created their own institutions running parallel to the PRIs, creating problems of overlapping and conflicts in implementation. If the Gram Sabhas have to

24 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA really function as institutions of local governance, it is important to make different development delivery structures accountable to the Gram Sabhas. Many states like Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, Himachal Pradesh and Tamil Nadu completed their third phase of elections to local bodies. There are 1,042,282 women representatives at the three levels of PRIs, which works out to be 37.23 per cent of the total number of representatives in the year 2006, exceeding the 33 per cent statutory reservation. The state of Bihar took the lead in reserving 50 per cent of all seats in PRIs to women candidates during the second phase of elections to local bodies, with 54.6 per cent of elected representatives being women; the corresponding percentage in Maharashtra and Sikkim are 43.7 and 40.4 per cent respectively. Studies (conducted in West Bengal and Rajasthan) have negated the usual negative stereotypes about the leadership qualities of women representatives and have concluded that there are definite indications that reservation of electoral seats has proved to be an ‘effective tool’ to safeguard the interests of the weaker groups. The state of Jharkhand however remains outside the general picture of resurgence of leadership at local level and has not been able to complete the election process. As a result, the state is losing more than Rs 800 crores per annum of rural development funds from the Central government (because of not holding Panchayat elections). While the democratic upsurge in the form of local elections and the large scale emergence of new leadership at these levels is in sight, certain conditionalities on qualifications to contest Panchayat elections are in a way putting limitations on giving full fledged democratic rights to the citizens, for example, two-child norm, basic education, availability of toilets in candidate’s house. Questions can also be raised about undemocratic nature of programmes like Samras Gram Yojana in Gujarat which provide monetary incentives to those village panchayats where members and chairpersons are selected by consensus.

Pre-Election Voters Awareness Campaign (PEVAC) is an effective civil society initiative making people aggressively conscious about their participation in the election process both as voters and the contestants. Capacity Building, though much talked about, remains an unfulfilled task. Each election brings about 60–70 per cent new faces in local governments. About two-third of these new members are from the marginalised sections of the society. Making them conscious of their legitimately outlined rights and duties as elected representatives is a part of enhancing their capacities but a more important part is to train them in the techno-bureaucratic details. The absence of skills continues to be used as an alibi for nondevolution or dis-empowering Panchayats and Municipalities. All this is in spite of the fact that MOPR released a sum of Rs 62,09,200 and Rs 25,91,55,238 for the years 2004–05 and 2005–06 respectively. As for the Trinity of Institutions, the State Election Commission (SEC); the State Finance Commission (SFC) and the District Planning Committees (DPC) themselves require strengthening before they can fulfil their constitutional obligations. While the SECs have largely been performing their functions, the SFCs have to be effective in terms of proper coordination with the Central Finance Commission (CFC) and making their Reports effective at the governmental level. The reluctance of the state governments is also visible with regard to the utilisation of grants released under the recommendations of central Finance Commissions for augmenting ‘the consolidated funds of the states to supplement the resources of the panchayats on the basis of the recommendations of the SFCs. The grant of Rs 8,000 crore for the period 2000–05 and Rs 20,000 crore for the period 2005–10 was provided in the 11th and 12th Finance Commissions respectively. Moreover, grants made by the Central Finance Commission do not reach the local bodies ‘in full and in time’ because of bureaucratic bottlenecks. DPCs have not been constituted in all the states; so far only 16 states have constituted the DPCs in all the districts. Even in those states where

Introduction 25

DPCs have been constituted, they have been made dysfunctional with the hijacking of real powers from local governments. Kerala, however, stands apart with effective functioning of the DPCs. Trinity of Institutions, so important for effective and efficient local governance needs to be institutionalised in order to make decentralisation a reality. Devolution to Panchayats and Municipalities remains a point of concern. The devolution of the funds, functions and functionaries to the urban local bodies have been tardy. The state government has retained direct control over all the aspects of these bodies which makes governance framework really diffused. The system of finances and accounting at the municipality level is also considerably muddled. Most of them still maintain their account in a single entry system which limits their capacity to take stock of the municipal assets or to explore revenue generation potentials. Activity mapping at the local level is important for a well defined devolution. However, only Kerala and West Bengal so far have completed activity mapping in full sense of the term. The MOUs signed between the MOPR and different states have not been followed or implemented in its true spirit and form. So far the MOPR has entered in MOU with 15 states for time-bound and concrete action. Certain gaps continue to exist in the functioning and implementation of Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas Act (PESA). Most states are yet to amend the subject laws and rules, such as those relating to money lending, forest, mining and excise to harmonise with PESA. Powers statutorily devolved upon the Gram Sabha and Panchayats are not matched by the concomitant transfer of funds and functionaries resulting in the nonexercise of such powers. States have, over the years, been repeatedly urged to expedite this process, but progress has been slow and often, only symbolic, with no real intention to operationalise the provisions in spirit. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 guaranteeing 100 days of employment in a financial year to any rural

household within the 200 backward districts identified by the planning commission clearly mentions that PRIs at the District, the Intermediate and the Village levels shall be the principal authorities for planning and implementation of the schemes undertaken under this Act. This will help in enhancing the devolution further. However, the functioning and implementation of NREGA can be questioned from many aspects—for example, a recent survey conducted by PRIA in 16 states clearly shows that majority of the households and individuals in those states are unaware of such a programme. Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) was launched in December 2005 and Government of India started to implement it from April 2006. The GOI committed a sum of 50,000 crore over a period of seven years beginning from 2005–06 for Urban Governance and Infrastructure (UIG), and Basic Services to Urban Poor (BSUP) which will be implemented in 63 identified cities. However, on probing deeper into the investment patterns, a lopsided approach towards UIG is markedly clear which can be seen from the fact that Rs 4,430.23 crore were sanctioned (as on 22 September 2006) for UIG whereas only Rs 1,003.27 crore (as on 14 September 2006) have been sanctioned for BSUP. The conditionalities attached to the urban governance reform agenda has been a point of controversy from the point of view of the current scheme of decentralised local governance as also of their compatibility with the Indian socio-economic realities. The design and its implementation in the selected cities has brought in many critical issues that need to be emphasised. The UIG allocations for the infrastructural development have got their own problems in terms of the size of the cities they are meant for. Smaller cities seldom have local capacities for such huge infrastructural schemes with the result that contracts are cornered by the ‘big fish’ from bigger cities who in turn sub-contract the actual work to the local level. As a part of urban reforms agenda, there is a rapid movement towards privatisation of

26 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA public utilities like water supply and power. A case in point is the Delhi government’s move towards privatisation of certain activities of Delhi Jal Board (DJB) largely on the basis of the blueprint provided by the World Bank, USAID and ADB.

LOOKING AHEAD The review of the performance of the institutions of governance (the Parliament, the Judiciary, the institutions of Local Self Governance and the Policy making) gives out mixed signals and is in fact a symptom of how the patterns of governance and governance accountability are going to take shape in the coming years. A detailed review shows a continued dilemma between growth and

equity, intentions and reality, programmes and performances, which again brings us to the question of ‘rhetoric vs reality’. The policy formulation and its performance vacillate between cross-cutting objectives indicating their indubitable impact on effective governance. While such ambiguity is perhaps understandable in the existing socio-economic realities, a continued sense of ambiguity certainly leads to some imponderable difficulties in the area of governance. The need of the hour is to work out the strategies and tactics for tackling the vexing problems in a manner that has a clear cut direction. The governance and democracy can become meaningful only when they touch the lives of millions of marginalised and the poor still existing on the periphery.

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 27

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’

If we wish to maintain democracy not merely in form, but also in fact, what must we do? The first thing in my judgment we must do is to hold fast to constitutional methods of achieving our social and economic objectives … where constitutional methods are open, there can be no justification for these unconstitutional methods. These methods are nothing but the Grammar of Anarchy and the sooner they are abandoned, the better for us. —Dr B.R. Ambedkar on 25 November 1949, Constituent Assembly Debates, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1989, vol. XI, p. 978.

INTRODUCTION Dr B.R. Ambedkar made a long concluding statement, full of thought and meaning, at the penultimate session of the Constituent Assembly, a day before ‘We the people of India’ ‘adopted, enacted and gave to ourselves’, a constitution that has been the ‘cornerstone of the Indian nation’ for the past 57 years. He raised several issues in that speech and made reflective and ruminant observations on past strategies and future prospects. If his observation on bridging the hiatus between political and social democracy was one contemplative statement, his reflections on the dangers of dependence on charismatic leadership as well as constitutional and unconstitutional methods are other pieces of gems in that introspective oratory. While it questions the approach and tactics of protest politics in independent India, which have varied from being boisterous if moderate to downright violent and destructive when out of control and frustrated (excluding the insurgent, terrorist and Maoist movements),

it raises even bigger questions on the gambit of political parties to drag in protest politics within the haloed precincts of the Indian Parliament and 30 Legislative Assemblies, even if it means stalling the legislative business of, as well as diminution of, the majesty and sanctity of the legislatures. Are these ‘Grammar(s) of Anarchy’, as Dr Ambedkar described them, or simply methods of protest and appeal to constituency in the era of ‘virtual politics’ visible on television screens in the manner of a ‘reality show’, or are these harming the cause of the Indian parliamentary democracy, nay of democracy per se, is the question that begs an immediate answer from ‘we the people of India’ and their representatives conducting business in the parliamentary institutions. Equally important is the question whether such virulent political behaviour within the legislatures is merely a ploy to embarrass the ruling party/combination, or is it a compulsion due to the ‘undemocratic behaviour’ and ‘unresponsive and irresponsible’ method of working of the ruling party? It is worthwhile raising these questions in the context of the Indian Parliament given the fact that the incidences of disruption of parliamentary business have transcended from being exceptions to becoming the rule. The media reports are full of analyses before the opening of each session of the Parliament about strategies of the opposition to ‘corner’ the government on one issue or the other, which is justified to the extent that the methods employed are ‘democratic’, making the government account for its actions, particularly of omissions and commissions, and not ‘anarchic’, which let the real issue drown

1

c hap te r

28 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA in the din of protests. Since Indian politics today has reached a very contentious stage wherein the struggle for power is intense both politically and socio-economically and the parties and alliances are too impatient to wait for five years given the fragility of the political formations, both discrediting the treasury benches within the two houses of Parliament and visibly and virtually presenting oneself as the champion of people’s interests and a worthy successor are strategies that all parties have begun to employ unabashedly on the floors of the legislatures. However, do these ‘cornering’ exercises lead to better conduct of parliamentary business and serve people’s interest better, or are they causing institutional trivialisation and decline? Are the well-calibrated and, at times, spontaneous pandemonium, which are normally so high-pitched that they go out of hand invariably, a short cut to political mobilisation at the cost of politics of substance, or are they seriously thought-out theatrics meant to serve any serious political purpose, irrespective of their impact on the institution? Have the parties conducted any political and social audit of their strategy in terms of the objectives achieved? Have the parties and leaders given any thought to the institutional aspects of Indian democracy? These and many such questions beg for answers as we evaluate the functioning of the main pillar of the Indian democracy as the 14th Lok Sabha crosses the mid-term mark.

INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION Parliament is not merely an institution that legislates, it is an institution that creates a sense of representation across several layers of a multi-cultural and diverse society that India is, which is a task that is becoming of critical importance as the ‘revolution of rising expectations’ of the 1960s and 1970s is increasingly turning out to be the ‘revolution of rising frustrations’. This role of Parliament in India is, aside from its other designated roles of giving a credible government and keeping that government

accountable and responsible to the people of the country, getting highlighted more and more. Parliament indeed is a crucial link between the executive and the people and in the process it has the crucial responsibility of keeping the popular mandate alive till the country goes to the poll again. In probing the minds of the founding fathers on the rationale for preferring the parliamentary system and delineating the role of Parliament in the Indian context, we had contended in the earlier report that the stress on daily accountability had been significantly highlighted in the debate while opting for the British parliamentary system. We had also contended in the report that the ‘pandemonium’, despite taking away legislative time of the Parliament, appeared neither inadvertent nor thoughtless. Despite spontaneity in many of the instances of pandemonium in both the houses of the Parliament, it is obvious that having included boisterous protests in their parliamentary behaviour, the parties have made them as their first weapon of offence use them both in planned and spontaneous fashions. The pertinent question is whether it helps the Parliament in ensuring the executive’s responsibility to the representative body and its accountability to the people, and if yes, in what manner it does so. Since the role and functioning of the Indian Parliament has been marred over the years by discussions on representational questions arising out of criminalisation of the political space and an assured gender representation through one-third quota on the one hand, and increasing absenteeism of the MPs as well as use of protest politics in the Houses of Parliament at the cost of designated legislative functions of the institution on the other; these criteria continue to be relevant. For the convictions of Shibu Soren (life term), the high profile leader of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha and the Union Minister for coal (resigned since then), for allegedly conspiring to murder his secretary and of Navjot Singh Sidhu, the high profile ex-cricketer and a BJP MP (resigned since then),1 by the Punjab & Haryana High court

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 29

(three years rigorous imprisonment), clearly highlight the pervasive mindset of criminality afflicting celebrities and the wielders of power and the institutional support for this mindset and action. How else could Soren ascending ministerial throne despite murder charges and Sidhu getting unequivocal and vocal support from the BJP be explained? Obviously, the phenomenon of criminalisation of politics comprehended from the data on criminal cases against the MPs and legislators deserves an understanding from a wider perspective. While in the first case, because of the UPA constituent JMM being a small state party, the Congress maintained silence and a safe distance from the whole episode, in the other, BJP’s willy-nilly damage-control exercise justified ex-cricketer’s violent behaviour leading to death of a person. The cash for question and office of profit controversies reveal further degeneration within the haloed body and question both its representational and accountability functions. Obviously, these questions deserve review in continuity and in the context of the emerging cloud over the Parliament’s legitimacy, for unless attended, this could be a severe blow to the credibility of the democratic politics in India. These issues notwithstanding, let us first look at the working of the Parliament.

TABLE 1.1 Number of days and sittings Session

Duration

Sittings

Days

14th Lok Sabha --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4th

25 February 2005 to 13 May 2005

38

78

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5th

25 July 2005 to 30 August 2005

24

37

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6th

23 November 2005 to 23 December 2005

23

31

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7th

16 February to 22 March 2006 and 10 May to 23 May 2006∗

35

49

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8th

24 July 2006 to 25 August 2006

22

33

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

142

228

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rajya Sabha --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

204th

25 February 2005 to 13 May 2005

38

78

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

205th

25 July 2005 to 30 August 2005

24

37

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

206th

23 November 2005 to 23 December 2005

23

31

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

207th

16 February to 22 March 2006 and 10 May to 23 May 2006

35

47

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

208th

24 July 2006 to 25 August 2006

22

33

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

142

226

Source: Annual Report 2005–06, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. Note: ∗ The Lok Sabha (Seventh Session) was not prorogued after it was adjourned sine die on 22 March 2006. Under Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, the Speaker reconvened its sittings from Wednesday, 10 May 2006 for the second part of the session.

Table 1.2 Adjournments and prorogations Session

Date of adjournment sine die

Prorogation

14th Lok Sabha --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4th

13 May 2005

17 May 2005

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5th

30 August 2005

1 September 2005

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6th

23 December 2005

28 December 2005

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7th

22 March 2006 and 23 May 2006∗

25 May 2006 (IInd session of 7th session)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

INSIDE THE PARLIAMENT Both the houses met for 146 days for 85 sittings during 2005 and for 82 days (Rajya Sabha for 80 days) for 57 sittings during 2006, which means that as compared to 2004, when the 13th Lok Sabha was first dissolved and then the newly elected fourteenth Lok Sabha reassembled resulting in far fewer sittings, 2005 and 2006 witnessed normal sitting of the two houses of Parliament (see Table 1.1). However, whether the normal sittings resulted in normal conduct of business or not, is another matter. The adjournments and prorogations of the two houses do not give a clue to the extent of conduct of business by them and increasing use of the ‘grammar of anarchy’ by the parties and the MPs. As compared to 2004, the time management was better in 2005 and 2006, as both

8th

25 August 2006

30 August 2006

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rajya Sabha

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

204th

13 May 2005

17 May 2005

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

205th

30 August 2005

1 September 2005

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

206th

23 December 2005

28 December 2005

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

207th

23 May 2006

25 May 2006

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

208th

25 August 2006

30 August 2006

Source: Annual Report 2005–06, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. Note: ∗The Lok Sabha (Seventh Session) was not prorogued after it was adjourned sine die on 22 March 2006. Under Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, the Speaker reconvened its sittings from Wednesday, 10 May 2006 for the second part of the Session.

session-wise as well as in terms of the aggregate, much less time was lost due to interruptions causing the stalled proceedings, which essentially indicates increasing partisanship leading to fierce contestations on major or minor issues even on the floor of the two houses. In aggregate terms, the

30 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Table 1.3 Time lost on adjournments due to interruptions Session

Total time

Time lost in adjournments Percentage of time due to interruptions, etc. lost in adjournments due to interruptions, etc.

Lok Sabha --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hours

Hrs. Mins

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4th

228

29.43

13

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5th

144

09.35

6.6

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6th

138

26.17

19

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7th

194.55 (Both 1st and 35.42 (Both 1st and 2nd Session) 2nd Session)

18.21 (Both 1st and 2nd Session)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8th

124.30

36.49

29.19

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

828.85

136.86

16.42

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rajya Sabha

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

204th

190

43.02

23

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

205th

120

16.56

14

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

206th

115

25.02

21

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

207th

180.56

NA

NA

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

208th

113.41

NA

NA

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

718.97

85 (Excluding 207th and 208th session)

20 (Excluding 207th and 208th session)

Source: Annual Report 2005–06, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi.

Table 1.4 Time distribution for legislative, financial and non-financial business in the two houses Item

Lok Sabha

Rajya Sabha

Legislative

26

28.41

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Financial

35.62

18.41

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Non-Financial

38.38

53.18

Note: Figures in percentages.

Table 1.5 Bills passed: 2001–06 Bills Passed in Indian Parliament 2001–06

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

61

86

64

18

59

59

Lok Sabha lost 13 per cent of its time and the Rajya Sabha 20 per cent. The fifth session of the Lok Sabha witnessed loss of only 6.6 per cent of its time, which is one of the lowest in recent years. The 11th Lok Sabha (1996–98) lost 5.28 per cent of its time due to pandemonium, the 12th Lok Sabha’s (1998–99) 10.66 per cent time was lost in disruptions and the 13th Lok Sabha (1999–2004) lost 22.4 per cent. The 14th Lok Sabha, which commenced only in June 2004 during which it witnessed a delayed budget session (due to

the parliamentary elections) and the Monsoon and Winter sessions, lost 26 per cent of its time in interruptions arising out of various political controversies. It appears to be an obvious improvement, but other indicators need a closer scrutiny. Non-financial business consumed bulk of the time in both the Houses, followed by financial and legislative businesses in the Lok Sabha and legislative and financial in the Rajya Sabha respectively. Non-financial business is a broad category and it is not easy to determine what all has been included in that for categorisation. However, it consumed nearly 40 per cent of the Lok Sabha time and over 50 per cent of the Rajya Sabha time. Even if the two houses of the Parliament have to attend to other businesses, being legislatures, legislative business has to be their primary task. If we juxtapose the use of time with the bill passed, the neglect of the legislative business becomes even starker. The performance during the past two years has not been bad, even though it clearly shows a decline. Even if we exclude 2004 as the year of transition, though even that should not have led to such a few number of bills being passed, the next two years should have been the years when the UPA government (and the Congress party in particular), in order to wrest the political initiative, should have gone ahead with important legislations. However, time loss is not entirely due to lapses of the treasury benches, the opposition too plays an important role. Clearly, as a collective entity, the people’s representatives did not take their legislative tasks too seriously. In 2006, over 40 per cent of the bills were passed in Lok Sabha with less than one hour of debate. Further, in two sessions in 2006, only 173 MPs in Lok Sabha actually said anything on the floor of the Parliament on legislative issues. Sadly, almost 65 per cent of MPs said nothing in Lok Sabha on a legislative issue.2 Obviously, time saved due to colossal disinterest of parliamentarians on substantive issues, particularly the legislative ones, is diverted to other issues which brings the opposition frequently into the well of the house and leads to conduct of Parliament in a manner that has virtually led to its deinstitutionalisation.

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 31

Table 1.6 presents time spent on various bills that have been presented before Parliament by both the houses in three sessions— Winter 2005, Budget 2006 and Monsoon 2006. The three sessions sampled here are quite revealing. Most bills were passed with only a few minutes of discussion which in-

cluded some appropriation bills and even the railway budget. In fact, at times, more than one bill was disposed of altogether in a few minutes. Indeed some bills did attract the attention of the Parliament and were discussed for only an hour or more, some for up to about seven hours. A look at those bills

Table 1.6 Time spent on bills Winter 2005

Lok Sabha

Rajya Sabha

Name of Bill

Hrs Mins

Hrs Mins

The Punjab General Sales Tax (As in Force in the Union Territory of Chandigarh) Repeal Bill, 2005

0.35

0.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The National Tax Tribunal Bill, 2005

2.56

1.46

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2005∗ 1.24 1.27 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------∗ The State Emblem of India (Prohibition of Improper Use) Bill, 2005 1.25 1.27 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Disaster Management Bill, 2005

3.31

4.49

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Manipur University Bill, 2005

1.48

1.23

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Appropriation (Railways) No. 5 Bill, 2005

0.4

3.26

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council Bill, 2005

2.23

2.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2005

2.30

1.29

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Appropriation (No. 5) Bill, 2005

0.4

2.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Bill, 2005

0.47

0.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Constitution (One Hundred and Fourth Amendment) Bill, 2005

6.14

6.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Bill, 2005

3.17

2.46

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, 2005

2.45

3.59

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Chartered Accountants (Amendment) Bill, 2005∗

0.4

0.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Cost and Works Accountants (Amendment) Bill, 2005∗

0.4

0.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Company Secretaries (Amendment) Bill, 2005∗

0.4

0.1

Budget Session 2006

Lok Sabha

Rajya Sabha

Name of Bill

Hrs Mins

Hrs Mins

The Contempt of Courts (Amendment) Bill, 2006

0.52

1.33

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Chartered Accountants (Amendment) Bill, 2006

0.3

0.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Company Secretaries (Amendment) Bill, 2006

0.3

0.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Cost and Work Accountants (Amendment) Bill, 2006

0.3

0.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Government of Union Territories and Government of NCT of Delhi (Amendment) Bill, 2006

0.39

0.11

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Appropriation (Railways) Vote on Account Bill, 2006

0.3

0.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Appropriation (Railways) Bill, 2006

0.3

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Appropriation (Railways) No. 2 Bill, 2006

0.3

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions (Amendment) Bill, 2006

4.12

3.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Khadi and Village Industries (Amendment) Bill, 2005

1.5

1.56

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Appropriation Bill, 2006

0.3

0.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Appropriation (No 2) Bill, 2006

0.3

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Appropriation (Railways) No. 3 Bill, 2006

0.3

1.42

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 1.6 continued )

32 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA (Table 1.6 continued ) Budget Session 2006

Lok Sabha

Rajya Sabha

Name of Bill

Hrs Mins

Hrs Mins

The Appropriation (No. 3) Bill, 2006

0.3

1.34

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulation Board Bill, 2005

2.4

3.44

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Finance Bill, 2006

8.2

2.15

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Delhi Special Police Establishment (Amendment) Bill, 2006

0.2

0.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Delhi Laws (Special Provision) Bill, 2006

1.39

2.40

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2006

0.42

0.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Amendment Bill, 2006∗

3.21

4.34

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Cess Laws (Repealing and Amending) Bill, 2006

–

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Reserve Bank of India (Amendment) Bill, 2006

1.12

1.25

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Amending Bill, 2006

0.57

0.44

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2006

0.55

1.14

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Constitution (Ninety Fourth) Amendment Bill, 2006

–

0.33

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Bill, 2006

2.3

1.24

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The National Institute of Fashion Technology Bill, 2006

0.51

0.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Union Duties of Excise (Electricity) Distribution Repeal Bill, 2006

0.12

Monsoon Session 2006

Lok Sabha

0.2

Rajya Sabha

Name of Bill

Hrs Mins

Hrs Mins

The Produce Cess Laws (Abolition) Bill, 2006

0.1

0.17

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Government Securities Bill, 2004

0.14

0.49

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Actuaries Bill, 2005

2. 7

1.53

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Spirituous Preparations (Inter-State Trade and Commerce) Control Repeal Bill, 2006

0.47

0.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Food Safety and Standards Bill, 2005

4.10

4.13

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Amendment Bill, 2006

6.24

3.59

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Cantonments Bill, 2003

7.21

3.14

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Pondicherry (Alteration of Name) Bill, 2006

0.47

0.37

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Central Silk Board Amendment Bill, 2005

1.33

1.15

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Salary, Allowances and Pension of Members of Parliament (Amendment) Bill, 2006

1.41

0.35

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Wildlife (Protection) Amendment Bill, 2005

1.24

3.20

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Appropriations (No. 4) Bill, 2006

0.3

0.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Appropriations (Railways) No. 4 Bill, 2006

0.3

0.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Protection of Human Rights (Amendment) Bill, 2005

3.7

4.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Amendment Bill, 2005

2.46

2.48

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Assam Rifles Bill, 2006

1.50

1.20

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) and Financial Institutions Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2006 ∗ The Bills were discussed together.

reveals something, but does not reveal a lot, that can perhaps be found out by content analysing the debates. The Constitution (one hundred and fourth Amendment) Bill, 2005, which became 93rd Amendment Act, dealing with educational advancement of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the

2.57

2.22

Other Backward Castes, understandably consumed over six hours in the Lok Sabha. The issue was politically contentious and we know from the media analysis that it predictably raised quite a political dust. It is also understandable that the Minority Institution Bill was discussed for over four hours. The Parliament

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 33

Prevention of Disqualification Bill presented in the aftermath of the Office of Profit controversy was also discussed for over six hours and the Cantonment Bill for a surprising over seven hours. In the absence of details of the parliamentary debate, we have no clue as to why this one was discussed for such a long duration. Clearly, politically hot issues have invited greater attention of the members, because they help them score a point against the government.3 Some have argued that the declining interest of the MPs in the proceedings of Parliament and lack of debates is reflective of increasing efficiency of the Committee system, where each bill is thoroughly looked into before it is legislated. However, a look at the working of the committees reveals a different story. The average attendance in 16 Standing Committees in the 4th, 5th and 6th sessions of the 14th Lok Sabha varied between 33 and 62 per cent. The committees met for a minimum of 20 minutes to a maximum of 29 hours and 5 minutes. While one committee did not meet at all during a session, another had a maximum of 13 sessions.

The Scheduled Tribes and Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006—Recognising Historical Injustice The year 2006 will go down in the history of Indian Parliament for the creation of a landmark legislation—THE SCHEDULED TRIBES AND TRADITIONAL FOREST DWELLERS (RECOGNITION OF FOREST RIGHTS) ACT, 2006. This Act, which was passed after a consistent country-wide struggle and campaign, recognises forest rights and occupation in forest land of tribes and other forest dwelling communities who have been traditionally residing on these lands. These communities for decades now have been facing the threat of being evicted from lands that were not legally in their possession as a result of various factors. Amongst these,

Box 1.1 SEZ Act The Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act, 2005 inspired by the experience of the success of SEZs in China, introduced in 1980 sought to provide internationally competitive environment for exports. Instead of the policy being implemented through various notifications and circulars issued by the concerned Ministries/Departments as was being done, the Act aimed at providing a long-term stable policy framework with a minimum regulatory regime and expeditious single-window clearance facilities. It sought to ensure a fiscal regime for developers of SEZs, so as to provide single window clearance mechanism at zone level, to establish an authority for each SEZ set up by the central government with greater administrative autonomy and to designate special courts and single enforcement agencies in order to ensure speedy trial and investigation of cases relating to the zones.The Bill was introduced on 10 May 2005 at the fag end of the sitting of Lok Sabha (the day was almost occupied by long debates and discussions on Right to Information Act) and attracted about little less than two hours of discussion during which hardly any serious criticisms were expressed by members and it appears that in principle, the house was unanimous in approving the Bill. But as is often mentioned, ‘the devil is in details’ and while the policy was accepted with much euphoria, its fallout effects started appearing as soon as it was implemented. It was questioned not only by independent observers and social activists but also by ministries and groups within the UPA government, the left parties and by the nodal agencies like the Reserve Bank of India. The main concerns were on the grounds of key concessions, land use and the future of existing export oriented units. The RBI expressed its doubts about the tax concessions bringing about any dramatic change in giving an impetus to the export growth. The second issue was about acquiring of huge tracts of prime agricultural land for the SEZ units. Then, there was the question of land use and most importantly exemption from labour laws. The euphoria with which the SEZ policy and the Act was launched, ran into serious problems as soon as the Act was implemented. Besides the objections raised by the Finance Minister Mr P. Chidambaram and the RBI, serious doubts were expressed by no less a person than the UPA chairperson Mrs Sonia Gandhi and some other central ministers like Mr Sharad Pawar and Mr Raghuvansh Prasad Singh mainly on the issue of acquiring of agricultural land. The SEZ Act is the prime example and perhaps a reflection on the quality and coverage of the debate in the Parliament where such an important Act is passed without going deeper into the processes and consequences of the implementation and its repercussions on the poor and the marginalised.

the most prominent factors include—Forest Laws that continued state ownership of forests after independence; inability of the forest and revenue department to follow existing notifications and settle rights of communities in forest areas; conservation laws that labelled communities as forest ‘destroyers’; and widespread alienation of forest dwelling communities due to acquisition of land for development and industrial projects. Thus over a century, millions of forest dwellers in India had been living as ‘encroachers’ on their very own ancestral lands. The process of drafting of this bill was preceded by a long and consistent campaign by forest dwellers and people’s groups across the country. This campaign picked up pace in 2002 when the Ministry of Environment and Forests directed all states to evict ‘encroachers’ from forestlands. Based on this order, the

34 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA forest department machinery brutally carried out eviction drives over lakhs of hectares. In response to the evictions, a nationwide campaign was launched and a coalition of community-based organisations from 10 states came together against the forced evictions. By February 2004, before parliamentary elections were held, consistent lobbying pressure to regularise the rights of forest dwellers had already been built up on the political parties contesting the elections. The UPA government’s Common Minimum Programme called for a halt to evictions and spoke of recognition of forest rights. In the same year, in an affidavit filed in the court, the MoEF finally admitted that during the consolidation of forests, ‘the rural people, especially tribals who have been living in the forests since times immemorial, were deprived of their traditional rights and livelihood and consequently, these tribals have become encroachers in the eyes of law’. Through sit-ins and nation-wide demonstrations, tribals and peoples’ groups continued to pressurise the government in power for some action till the Prime Minister directed the Ministry of Tribal Affairs to draft a legislation for forest rights. On 3 June 2005, the MoTA put up its much widely debated draft of the Scheduled Tribes (Recognition of Forest Rights) Bill 2005 on the Website inviting comments from the public. What followed was relentless debating on the bill based on facts and counter-facts but largely on misinterpretation of facts related to forests and forest dwellers in the country and the implications of the bill. Those involved in the debate included both the ministries of Forests and Tribal Affairs, forest rights activists, conservationists, academicians, intellectuals, and bureaucrats. While most people were demanding changes in the bill, the wildlife conservation lobby in particular was completely against the bill itself. In the 2005 Winter session, the bill was introduced in the Parliament and a Joint Parliamentary Committee comprising of 30 Ministers of Parliament from various parties was formed for reviewing the Bill and

admitting submissions from concerned parties. The JPC received comments and had meetings with several groups, experts and activists. The Bill was presented in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha on 23 May 2006. Some of the most contentious and debated issues of the bill included the inclusion of other forest dwelling communities along with scheduled tribes as beneficiaries; the cut-off date for regularisation of rights; and the role and powers of the Gram Sabha in identifying bona fide residents and in management of forest resources vis-à-vis the government departments. During this entire period, the people continued campaigning for the legislation. Jail bharo andolans were held in several states. The left parties, as partners of the UPA, played a critical role in supporting people’s groups and maintaining the pressure on their coalition parties. It was finally, after a year of its introduction, on 15 December 2006 that the bill was passed in the Parliament. This was considered a victory for people’s long struggle. However, there has been a major disappointment over some serious changes that were made in the draft bill before it was passed. Some important recommendations of the JPC were not taken into consideration, the most critical being the dilution of powers of the Gram Sabha and deletion of the part dealing with rights of the forest dwellers to fuel wood. On 29 December the Act received Presidential assent and now the indigenous people are awaiting the implementation of this Act in a just and participatory manner. The functioning of the Committees other than financial and Standing Committees (Table 1.8) tells a similar story. Average attendance in 19 such committees has varied between 33 per cent and 86.6 percent. The Joint Committee on salary and allowances of MPs was most attended (sic!). The Business Advisory Committee has not only been consistently highly attended, it also had more sittings, and it put in more hours of work and produced more reports. However, a look at their work does not inspire enough confidence about the committees’

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 35 Table 1.7 Working of the standing committees in the 14th Lok Sabha (2005–06) Committee on

Agriculture

No. of sittings

Duration (Hrs. Mins)

4th

5th

6th

5

1

1

4th 7.33

5th 1.19

Average attendance (%)

Reports presented original/action taken

6th

4th

5th

6th

2

45.16

39

38

4th 4/4

5th

6th

0/3

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Defence

13

2

5

22.3

2.30

6.55

51

52

33

2/2

0

2/0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Energy

4

3

4

6.10

3.55

8

14.70

51

33.34

2/2

2/1

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

External Affairs

6

1

6

12.20

1.15

12.20

44.50

45.10

44.50

2/2

0

2/2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Committee on Finance

9

4

2

24.15

5.25

2.15

50.17

62.09

41.93

10/0

2/1

3/5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Food, Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution

4

–

3

12

–

1.10

43.20

–

32.22

2/2

0

1/2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Labour

7

1

3

11.45

0.55

3.30

47

60.71

38.09

1/1

0

2/2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Petroleum & Natural Gas

3

2

1

5.30

1.15

1.30

45.20

45.16

44.80

1/1

2/0

1/1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chemicals & Fertilizers

4

1

3

4.45

1

3

42.43

53.84

36.36

2/1

0

2/2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Railways

7

5

1

12.10

5

1.15

44.07

39.35

45.16

3/2

3/1

1&1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Urban Development

7

3

1

10.30

4

2

47.91

46.03

38.70

2/2

2/1

0/2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Coal & Steel

3

2

2

7

1.20

1.50

65

42

46.71

3/2

0

0&3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Information Technology

9

4

5

29.5

7.30

8

39.56

11

36.77

6/4

0

2&6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Water Resources (2004–05)

3

1

1

5.55

1

1.10

53

60

60

1/ 0

0

0/1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Social Justice & Empowerment

4

1

1

7.15

20

1.30

51.60

34.40

41.37

2/3

0

3/0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rural Development

7

1

1

11.45

30

1

62.07

52

Source: http://www.loksabha.nic.in/

role as a substitute for the work by the two houses in the regular sessions.

WHOSE QUESTIONS, WHOSE ANSWERS The question hour of the Indian Parliament is one of the important instruments provided in the parliamentary procedures. As a tool for generating information about government’s programmes and policies, it carries 7 to 8 thousand questions (Starred and Un-starred) both from Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha in a given session. It is one of the most authentic ways of deriving information from the government. In a democratic set-up where the institutions of governance are directly accountable to the people, it becomes pertinent to analyse their performance. The total number of questions raised in both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha in the three sessions in the year 2006 is given in Table 1.9. It is worth mentioning here the actual time the Parliament devotes to the question hour (Table 1.10). The biggest casualty in the event

of an uproar in the house is the question hour. As being the first business of the day, any small upheaval encroaches upon the time of the question hour. The ministry-wise allocation of the questions gives some food for thought. It is particularly interesting to see how many questions are coming from the social sector ministries, which belong to the marginalised sections of the society. A ministry wise break-up of questions of major ministries is given in Table 1.11. A cursory reading of the questions pertaining to the social sector shows that most of the questions were for mere statistical derivation, the information which could have easily been derived from the administrative channels, and the time of the question hour could have been used on some more substantial and important issues. This could also mean that the time of the Parliament which costs Rs 26,035 a minute, was not properly utilised. If this could be seen from the marginalised people’s point of view, such precious time was wasted, in which there

40

4/4

0/1

0/4

36 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Table 1.8 Working of the committees other than financial and standing committees in the 14th Lok Sabha (2005–06) Committee on

No. of sittings

Business Advisory

Duration (Hrs Mins)

4th

5th

6th

6

5

3

4th 3.0

Average attendance (%) 5th

6th

2.35

1.20

4th

5th

67.78

72

Reports presented original/action taken 6th

4th

5th

6th

62

6/0

0/5 ∗

3/0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Privileges

1

2

3

0.45

0.50

2.45

33

50

31

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ethics

0

0

1

0

0

0.50

–

–

46

0

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Absence of Members from the Sittings of the House

2

0

3

1.0

0

0.30

60.& 40

–

66.6

2/0

1/0

1/0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Government Assurances

1

1

3

0.30

1

2.20

53

47

49

1/0

1/0

5/0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Papers Laid on Table

3

1

1

2.40

0.45

1.10

38

40

46

2/0

0

2/2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Petitions

4

0

1

3.10

0

1.45

35

–

56

2/0

2/0

1/0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Private Members Bills & Resolutions

5

3

4

3.25

2.30

2.30

49.33

53.33

51.78

5/0

3/0

4/0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Joint Committee on Offices of Profit

1

0

–

0.30

0

0

46.6

–

–

0

0

2/0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Welfare of SCs and STs

3

1

1

7.15

1.30

0.30

54

46.6

53.3

1/0

0/2

1/1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rules

0

0

–

0

0

0

–

–

–

0

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

House

1

0

–

1.30

0

0

45

–

–

0

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Subordinate Legislation

2

1

1

1.30

1.45

0.45

56

66

43.3

2/2

0

2/2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Joint committee on Salaries & Allowances of MPs

1

0

–

1.40

0

0

86.67

–

–

0

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

General Purpose

0

0

–

0

0

0

–

–

–

0

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Railway Convention

3

1

3

3.10

0.40

2.55

42.59

61.11

37.03

1/0

1/0

1/0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Joint Committee on Food Management in Parliament House

2

0

–

2.30

0

0

40.& 46.66

–

–

0

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To inquire into allegations of improper conduct on the part of some members –

–

8

–

–

11.10

–

–

97.5

–

–

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Joint Committee on installation of portraits/statues of national leaders and parliamentarians in Parliament house complex

–

–

1

–

–

0.40

–

–

67

–

–

–

Source: http://www.loksabha.nic.in/ Note: ∗ First Report of the Committee of privileges presented to the Lok Sabha on August 2005, laid on the table on 25 August 2005, and adopted by the house on 29 August 2005.

Table 1.9 Starred and un-starred questions of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha— budget session 2006 Parliament Session

Questions (starred and un-starred) Lok Sabha

Budget Session 2006

5,493

Rajya Sabha 4,664

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Monsoon Session 2006

4,114

3,625

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Winter Session 2006

4,381

3,433

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

13,988

11,722

Source: Resume of work (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha)—Budget Session 2006, Resume of work (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha)—Monsoon Session 2006 and Question Lists of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha—Winter Session 2006.

could have been some worthy questions about their concerns. Some of the questions which were selected in the question lists were regarding information about the schemes which were already stopped long back. To cite a few examples of these questions from the Budget Session 2006, in one of the questions in Lok Sabha an inquisitive parliamentarian was asking about a scheme which never existed.4 In another question, it was asked from the Minister of Agro and Rural Industries, that ‘whether any scheme existed for the benefit of the rural poor so that they do not take a

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 37

bank loan’ to which the minister aptly replied, ‘there is no such scheme operated by the Government in the Ministry of Agro and Rural Industries’.5 However, the quality of questions is more or less the same in the Rajya Sabha too. A member asked a question on education, which is one of the basic development indicators, that how much grant had been provided to the Madhya Pradesh Government under the Operation Black Board Project for the year 2005–06, to which the minister replied, ‘[t]he scheme “Operation Black Board” ended in the year 2001–02.’6 These types of questions on the one hand show the ignorance and complete lack of homework by our esteemed parliamentarians and on the other hand also show that this important institution of Parliament is treated in a very casual manner. It should not be overlooked that the parliamentarians get an additional allowance to keep some personnel, who can help them in their work. From the accountability point of view, the treasury benches would be more than happy to face these kind of shabby questions and get away without providing any substantive answers. Though more number of questions show the inept use of this tool, it should not be discounted that some of the members raised some very important questions of public concern, and brought the much needed information out in the public domain. One such example is questions on Special Economic Zones (SEZ). When the whole nation was scurrying for information on this concept, seeing the rapid pace of its implementation, the members demanded from the government the much needed information through the question hour.7 Similarly, one member was asking a question on corruption in armed forces, which is considered to be a very sensitive issue.8 People’s aspirations have also been reflected in many questions, which show that the aware members do put up questions which the people want them to raise. In one such question, a member was asking about a large gathering of tribals and other forest dwellers against displacement.9 In terms of the issues of the marginalised, in one of the

Table 1.10 Time spent on question hour in Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha—budget session 2006 Session

Time spent on question hour Time spent∗ (In Hrs.) Lok Sabha Number of questions

Budget Session 2006

18.48

Rajya Sabha Percentage of the total time 9.65

Number of questions

Percentage of the total time

19.32

10.70

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Monsoon Session 2006

13.12

10.60

14.27

12.59

Source: Resume of work (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha)—Budget Session 2006, Resume of work (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha)—Monsoon Session 2006. Note: ∗ The time spent on the question hour in the Winter Session 2006 is not given in the table as the same was not released till the time of the preparation of this paper.

Table 1.11 Ministry-wise distribution of starred and un-starred questions— budget, monsoon and winter session, 2006 Important ministries

Questions raised (starred and un-starred) (budget, monsoon and winter session 2006) Lok Sabha

Agriculture

Rajya Sabha

Number of questions

Percentage of the total questions

Number of questions

730

5.21

562

Percentage of the total questions 4.79

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commerce & Industries

634

4.53

470

4.00

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Defence

409

2.92

264

2.25

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Environment & Forest

343

2.45

333

2.84

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finance

571

4.08

764

6.51

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Health & Family Welfare

592

4.23

657

5.60

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Human Resource & Development

346

2.47

797

6.79

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Labour and Employment

246

1.75

232

1.97

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mines

115

0.8

91

0.7

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Panchayati Raj

33

0.2

52

0.4

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Planning

157

1.12

109

0.9

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rural Development

275

1.96

295

2.5

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Social Justice & Empowerment

177

1.26

175

1.4

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tribal Affairs

75

0.5

139

1.1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Water Resources

252

1.80

239

2.0

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Women & Child Development

150

1.0

169

Source: Resume of work—Rajya Sabha—Budget and Monsoon Session 2006. Question Lists of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha—Winter Session 2006. Number of Lok Sabha questions accessed from the Lok Sabha Website http://www.loksabha.nic.in

questions the minimum wages of garbage removal workers/sweepers/scavengers was asked.10 This is significant, as this not only tells about their minimum wages, but a whole lot of issues related to that in so many ways.

1.4

38 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Moreover, the raising of question itself marks the presence, though in a very limited manner, of the marginalised in the question hour. The question hour is a good instrument provided by the Parliament to bring the information related to the government into the public domain. Thus, the question hour can also be termed as an instrument of transparency in the Parliament. The question hour is evolved not only for mere exchange of statistical information. It is an important tool provided especially to the opposition and other parties in the Parliament to demand substantive and real information from the government. It can be said that the larger objective behind the question hour is to crosscheck the government’s work with people’s aspirations, and if it is found to be contradictory, to hold the government accountable. Thus, it is expected from the members who are raising questions to raise questions which are important to people, especially the marginalised people. On the part of the answering ministers, it is highly expected that instead of providing mere statistical numbers, they should put the real picture in the Parliament. It is also urged that the information derived in the question hour should not end there, but should usher more constructive works on social issues in favour of the oppressed and the common man.

PARLIAMENTARY PROTOCOL The essence of democratic functioning of an institution such as the Parliament, which is the pivot of representative democracy, is respect for and strict adherence to protocol by the parliamentarians. Indeed, in an emerging democracy like India, where contestations for rights, and hence for power, are taking place at various layers of society and at each level of the polity, parliamentary protocol, though laid out constitutionally as well as in various rules and procedures emanating from the Constitution for smooth running and nonpartisan functioning of the two Houses of Parliament, too is ever evolving. On the one hand, issues of special nature come up demanding special attention of the Parliament,

necessitating adjustments and adaptation of the parliamentary rules, and, on the other, a high-level partisanship of the contestatious society overflows into the representative body affecting both its functioning and institutions. Howsoever necessary these adjustments and adaptations may be, they must be formalised for a healthy functioning of the institution. The chair in both the Houses (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha) comes under immediate scrutiny as far as functioning of the institution is concerned. The chair of Lok Sabha has often been in the eye of political storm and the subject of constitutional and academic debate. The Chairman of the Rajya Sabha (who is also the Vice President of the country), however, has generally been free of controversy. The recent stand-off between the Speaker Somnath Chatterjee, a veteran parliamentarian and front ranking leader of the CPM, and the opposition NDA led by the BJP, therefore deserves attention from institutional perspective. The controversy and the war of words as well as action began in August 2006, obviously after a long period of discontent over Speaker Somnath Chatterjee’s alleged ‘partisan behaviour’ against the opposition NDA, which was repeated in December 2006. The Speaker’s decision on 7 August not to allow the opposition NDA’s Privilege Motion against the Prime Minister led to uproar in the Lok Sabha with the opposition members trooping into the well. The Speaker, however, decided to carry on with the business, which angered the opposition even more and they decided to boycott the House the next day. Speaker Somnath Chatterjee appealed to the former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to help avoid the boycott, to which Vajpayee replied, ‘This morning I read out your letter (to his MPs), and what a flood of reactions it evoked. Everyone who spoke agreed that the Opposition’s contribution to Parliament proceedings was crucial. But there was unanimity also that the proceedings can be smooth and constructive only if the presiding officer is able to inspire as much confidence in the Opposition as he is able to do in the ruling parties. A stark reality is that this situation is

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 39

totally absent in our House.... All sections of the NDA feel deeply disappointed at the manner in which the House is being presently run. I may add that confidence in one’s fairness and objectivity has to be commanded, it cannot be demanded.’ (Emphasis added)11 While Somnath Chatterjee pondered resignation at this slur on his impartiality, the letter evoked widespread criticism. A resolution supported by the Congress, CPI(M), CPI, RSP, Forward Bloc, DMK, RJD, TDP, BSP, SP, National Conference, Muslim League, NCP, PDP, Kerala Congress, Telangana Rashtra Samithi and Jharkhand Mukti Morcha stated: The letter (written by Mr Vajpayee) is more painful because it emanates from the pen of a person who has himself struggled to uphold the dignity of the House over several decades and is known for his commitment to parliamentary values. The Speaker is more of an institution rather than a person and any aspersion on the keystone of Parliamentary democracy is an indictment upon all its constituents, who have faithfully served the people of India for five decades and more. Large numbers of leaders, including parties belonging to the UPA and outside, feel strongly that under no circumstances and provocation should there be any reflection on the conduct of the Chair in any form or manner. The above parties and leaders unequivocally condemn such design.12

The Lok Sabha has had 14 Speakers (including Mr Chatterjee) since it came into existence in 1952 and each has had his own style of functioning. While the earlier Speakers—G.V. Mavalankar, M.A. Ayyangar and so on—commanded respect, some did make the eyebrows of the purists rise with controversial rulings. Some, in recent past, like Shivraj Patil and P.A. Sangma, attempted institutional (committee system) and procedural reforms in the house too. However, matters did not come to this low between the Speaker and the opposition party perhaps because partisanship and contestations even within the Parliament had not risen to this level. Slogan shouting, trooping into the well, walkouts, boycotts, etc., were not resorted to

on a daily basis. With political stakes rising high for every party and leader in the era of coalition politics, no issue is small for the opposition to put the government on the mat. Both parliamentary decorum and parliamentary time have been victims in the process. Obviously, the Speaker’s office must be a priority item on the agenda whenever parliamentary reform emerges as a consensus issue with political parties across the board.

OFFICE OF PROFIT On a complaint made by Madan Mohan Shukla, a Congressman from Kanpur in 2004 against Jaya Bachchan, a Rajya Sabha MP (Samajwadi Party, UP), for holding an office of profit (OoP) in UP (chairperson of the UP Film Development Council), the Election Commission of India (ECI) recommended under Article 102(1)(a)13 to the President of India to disqualify her with retrospective effect, who signed an order to that effect in March 2006. This opened a can of worms, as it were; for the SP did not take it lying down and received support from other opposition parties as well. Aside from re-nominating Jaya Bachchan for re-election to the same seat, other cases from the ruling combine, including that of Congress President Sonia Gandhi holding the position of the chairperson of National Advisory Council of the United Progressive Alliance, came under the scanner. In a short while, the ECI received complaints about over 40 cases of MPs and over 100 cases of MLAs holding OoP inviting disqualification under Articles 102(1)(a) and 191(1)(a)14 of the Constitution of India at the Centre and in States, indicating pervasiveness of the tendency of seeking fruits of power in executive offices, beyond being people’s representatives in legislatures and Parliament; revealing a pronounced craving for executive office of some sort or the other, rather than attaining satisfaction with the representative, legislative and accountability functions that their role primarily assigns them. During the next few months, it became a blazing issue, with sparks flying all around and everyone blaming the Congress for

40 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA disturbing the status quo. As was expected, Samajwadi Party and the BJP did not lose a moment in dragging Sonia Gandhi’s position as the Chair of the National Advisory Council of the UPA into the controversy. Other prominent leaders from the entire political spectrum whose names figured were Amar Singh (SP), Dr Karan Singh (Congress), Lok Sabha Speaker Somnath Chatterjee (CPM), T. Subarami Reddy (a Union Minister), Prof. Vijay Kumar Malhotra (BJP) and so on. Several leaders at the State level too came in for scrutiny for holding an OoP. Obviously, whosoever might have prompted Madan Mohan Shukla to lodge the complaint, it became clear that this phenomenon affected all the parties, who have used such offices to please their legislators and MPs; and since every legislator took enjoying executive offices for granted, no one ever thought that any provision of the Constitution was being violated. The reactions at the turn of events varied from dismay to finding a convenient way out to protect everyone’s interest. None of the parties or the leaders was apologetic about it; most of them aggressively blamed the Congress for creating the controversy and defended the privilege of executive office for the legislators. In order to deflect the opposition onslaught, Sonia Gandhi resigned her Lok Sabha seat from Rae Bareli (UP), to be hailed for her second ‘renunciation’, and sought re-election, which she convincingly won in May 2006.15 In the meantime, the UP government as well as the government of India tried desperately to promulgate an ordinance to prepare a fresh list of offices to be kept out of the OoP purview. While the UP government pushed through a legislation in the Legislative Assembly on 9 March 2006 excluding 79 posts from the list of OoP, the Union Government reportedly first attempted bringing in an ordinance when the budget session was on a three-month recess and when faced with criticism, adjourned Parliament sine die, saying ‘there was no government business for the remaining part of the Budget Session.’16 As the Monsoon session approached, the anxiety and scramble for expanding the list

of offices to be exempted from the purview of the OoP in order to save over 40 MPs cutting across party lines increased.17 The confusion over the issue further confounded as President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam returned the Office-of-Profit Bill passed by the Parliament sent to him for assent for reconsideration on three grounds: • It could not be applied in retrospect from 1959. • There was need to define a set of transparent criteria. • Why not have a comprehensive Bill that applied to all states? This expectedly heightened politics and politicking on the issue and its handling gave the opposition NDA a stick to beat the UPA in a situation of highly contentious politics. Though the President gave assent when the Bill was sent back to him unaltered following reconsideration, the questions raised by the whole episode remained unanswered. The Parliament too moved ahead to set up a Joint Parliamentary Committee under senior Congress MP Iqbal Ahmed Saradgi to provide clarity on the issue by giving generic and comprehensive definition of what entailed OoP that could be acceptable and implementable across the country.18 It would be worthwhile watching whether a fresh definition and a fresh set of criteria attempted by the JPC would resolve this issue for all time to come. However, since the issue of executive offices bestowing ‘profits’ upon our legislators at the national and state levels has been emerging from time to time since the Constitution came into operation, the criteria fixed by the Supreme Court (SC) from the very first case on the subject in 195419 and reiterated through the 1960s till date20 is the ‘settled law’. As per these SC guidelines, an office of profit means when a job raises following questions: • Whether Government exercises control over the appointment and removal from the office and over the performance and functions of the office.

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 41

• Whether the holder draws any remuneration other than the ‘compensatory allowance’ (like conveyance bills, telephone calls, travel expenses, and so on). • Whether the body in which office is held, exercises executive, legislative or judicial powers or confers powers of disbursement of funds, allotment of lands, issue of licences, etc., or gives powers of appointment, grant of scholarships. • What are the functions of the holder? Does he perform them for the Government? • Whether the job enables the holder to wield influence or power by way of patronage.21 If the reply to any of the above criteria is yes, then the holder of office in question incurs disqualification.22 It is apparent that the criteria applied does not necessarily imply direct monetary benefits flowing out of an office, but even privileges that entitle an incumbent to undue influence and bring a legislator under the influence of the executive is an Office-of-Profit. While opportunism and yearning for power have clearly been reflected in the current contentious debate on OoP, it is worthwhile putting it in perspective, constitutionally as well as internationally. B.N. Rao, Advisor to the Drafting Committee, suggested that the disqualifications be put in the Constitution itself and not left to Parliament. That was shot down by the drafting committee on the ground that Parliament must retain total flexibility.23 Interestingly, the Constituent Assembly (CA) did not debate this question in detail. In fact, while debating Article 102 (draft Article 83), clause 1(a) relating to this issue was not discussed at all. The debate on Article 191 (draft Article 167) took up clause 1(a), similar to the one in Article 102; Prof. K.T. Shah moved an amendment further clarifying the OoP. The amended clause read: (a) if he holds any office of profit or contract or of supply of any article, or is a shareholder in any joint stock company which has such contract of building or of supply of any article under Government, etc.24

However, the clause eventually amended and put in the Constitution read precisely like the one in Article 102, albeit in the State’s context. The raising of the issues in the proposed amendment and their discussion in the context of the states, while it was completely missed while debating the national scenario, is puzzling, to say the least. In any case, the CA did not consider going into the details of the issue, leaving it to the Parliament and the State legislatures to sort them out in due course. Parliament has exercised its role and authority several times: in 1950, 1951, 1954, 1959, 1960, 1977, 1993, 1999 and 2000, to explain the OoP. In April 1959, it enacted the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959 (see Annexure I), which repealed the earlier Acts, explaining what the term meant and listed the exempted offices. Each following additions of offices to be exempted from the OoP list have been made under this Act. Even though the list has been expanded by the Parliament five times since this Act came into existence and state governments too have added to this, there have also been interventions by the Supreme Court as referred above, but there has never been a contentious controversy of this kind before in which both the ECI and the Supreme Court have had to step in and adjudicate on the status of so many offices under Articles 102 and 191. The concept, however, has been discussed by constitutional experts. D.D. Basu, for example, has opined that the real test in determining whether an office accrues ‘profit’ is whether there is any possibility of conflict between duty and personal interest and not whether the function of the office is big or small.25 In a similar vein, David Annoussamy, a former judge of the Madras High court, feels that in the scheme of the Constitution the MPs should not accept any office of profit under the government which in one way or the other is likely to hamper their functioning in a free and efficient manner. However, some offices that may not have influence on the conduct of the MPs, they could be exempted.26 The recent controversy has further clarified that even if the incumbent has

42 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA declined to accept the remuneration, an office does not cease to be an office of profit. It is worthwhile comparing the situation with that in the UK where the law lists 250 odd disqualifications, leaving all other posts open for the UK MPs to assume. ‘The universe of possible disqualifications is thus immeasurably larger in India than in UK, the country of origin of OoP.’27 In Canada, the Lortie Commission recommended abandonment of OoP. In Australia, two Royal Commissions have demanded its repeal. Obviously, the Indian law too needs to be more specific that clears the cobweb of confusion around it. There are two ways of looking at it. First, the Constitution lays down the basic framework for it, the Prevention of Disqualification Act, 1959, that draws its sanctity from the Articles 102 and 191 of the Constitution which needs to be made more coherent in laying down principles, based on the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of India and the ECI. There is merit in the suggestion made by Singhvi that principles should be unambiguously stated and the offices that fall in the category of the OoP should be specified. The rest should not be considered under OoP. There is a catch here though. Politicians everywhere, but more particularly so in India, display propensity and craving for offices that give them power and patronage resources, which is not satisfied with the influence that they get as a legislator. Naturally, in the parliamentary system, particularly in a coalition situation where numbers have at times to be conjured up for survival, existing or new executive offices at the disposal of the State are good baits to keep the existing flock together and entice the new ones. The political compulsion to reward the loyal ones and accommodate influential parliamentarians and legislators left out of ministerial race for such offices has been growing over the years. The question is whether such newly invented offices would stick to the principles

drawn or violate the stated principles. The current controversy also indicates that in the current contentious politics of the country, the possibility of some party or the leader going to court on this issue is not ruled out. Representation, accountability and responsibility, the governing principles of representative democracy, will continue to remain issues under such circumstances. It is, therefore, essential that a satisfactory definition of the OoP as well as a widely accepted norm regarding keeping the legislative and executive functions separated are developed and encoded in order to keep the controversies as well as constitutional and legal anomalies at bay.

CASH FOR QUESTIONS Operation Duryodhana, a sting operation with hidden cameras and tape recorders, conducted by a Cobrapost28 Aaj Tak29 team for nearly eight months in 2005 led to broadcast of news bulletins with video footage on 12 December 2005, which showed that 11 MPs, 10 from the Lok Sabha and one from the Rajya Sabha, belonging to four parties had accepted cash for asking questions in the house. During the operation, 14 MPs were contacted through middlemen,30 which were assorted persons, some on the staff of the MPs and the Parliament, with requests of raising questions and offers of money to be paid from representatives of a fictitious body called the North Indian Small Manufacturers’ Association (NISMA) for asking certain questions in the Indian Parliament relating to NISMA’s interests. While three declined, 11 (seven belonging to the BJP, two to the BSP and one each to the RJD and Congress) accepted money: some even made proposals for doing it on a regular basis on an annual price to be paid monthly and some bargained on the price being paid. In all, more than 60 questions were submitted by 11 MPs of which 25 questions (at last count) were tabled in the Parliament. The MPs who took money for putting questions in the Indian Parliament were:31

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 43

Narendra Kumar Kushwaha (BSP) Anna Saheb M.K. Patil (BJP) Dr Chhattrapal Singh Lodha (BJP) Y.G. Mahajan (BJP) Manoj Kumar (RJD) Suresh Chandel (BJP) Raja Ram Pal (BSP) Lal Chandra Kol (BSP) Pradeep Gandhi (BJP) Chandra Pratap Singh (BJP) Ramsevak Singh (Congress)

Rs 55,000 Rs 45,000 Rs 15,000 Rs 35,000 Rs 35,000 Rs 30,000 Rs 35,000 Rs 35,000 Rs 55,000 Rs 35,000 Rs 50,000

Expectedly, the Lok Sabha immediately constituted a ‘Committee to Inquire into Allegations of Improper Conduct on the Part of Some Members’ chaired by Pawan Kumar Bansal and consisting of Vijay Kumar Malhotra, Mohammad Salim, Ram Gopal Yadav and C. Kuppusami, which submitted its report to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha on 21 December 2005 and it was tabled in the House the next day. The Lok Sabha, on the recommendation of the Committee, which earlier heard the representative of the Cobrapost.com and the 10 of its accused MPs, expelled all the 10. Vijay Kumar Malhotra of the BJP was the lone member of the committee who did not concur with the recommendation for he thought that as per the procedure established by law: 1. No member of the House can be expelled except for the breach of privileges of the House. 2. The matter must, therefore, be dealt with according to the rules of Privileges Committee. 3. So, the matter must be referred to the Privileges Committee on a motion moved in the House, or the Committee adopted the rules of Privileges Committee. 4. In the Privileges Committee the tainted members will have a right of cross examination, arguments, defence, etc., which is necessary for Natural Justice.32

He was in favour of the matter being referred to the Privileges Committee. The Rajya Sabha too expelled its member involved in this scandalous activity. Questions have been raised about the Committee coming to conclusion and submitting its report within a week and recommending expulsion of the members. The details of the sting operation, however, starkly bring out corrupt and criminalised mindsets of some of the persons elected as people’s representative to the country’s highest representative-legislative body. One was even reported to be making suggestive and lewd passes at the lady journalist impersonating as the representative of the fictitious NISMA. Equally disturbing were the comments made by some of the MPs regarding their colleagues in the House and by the middlemen about the MPs.33 Though the accused MPs were not given a chance to cross-examine the sting operation team, who were questioned by the Committee, a detailed reading of the 140-page report exposes the thin defence presented by each of them. The first case of cash for question came to light nearly five and half decades back, in the provisional Parliament with H.D. Mudgal’s dealings with a Bombay Bullion Association, which included canvassing support and making propaganda in Parliament on certain problems on behalf of that association, in return for alleged financial and other business advantages, rocking the Parliament and conscience of the nation even when the Indian republic was just finding its feet with the first general elections under India’s republican constitution still a few months away. The pertinent question, therefore, is not whether some MPs or legislators have been caught in this unsavoury affair, or whether smaller fishes have been caught and the bigger have got away scot free, but whether any institutional mechanism has been devised to strengthen probity in public life at the highest level in a sustained manner and to resolve such issues to optimum satisfaction of the public in a non-partisan fashion. An absence of such an institutional mechanism, either as a parliamentary organ, or as a

44 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA statutory body, is likely to encourage such deviance from parliamentary norms. Interestingly, the matter did not end with the expulsion of the erring MPs. On the one hand, some of the expelled MPs appealed against the expulsion, challenging the power of either House of the Parliament to expel any member, to the Supreme Court of India, on the other, in response to a letter written by V.K. Malhotra, BJP deputy leader in the Lok Sabha and the dissenting member of the Lok Sabha’s ‘Committee to Inquire into Allegations of Improper Conduct on the Part of Some Members’, the leading political parties had a meeting with the Lok Sabha Speaker Somnath Chatterjee in August 2006 and decided to set up a Review Committee if the MPs withdrew their petitions in Supreme Court challenging the decision of the House. In September 2006, 10 months after the expulsion, however, the petition came up for hearing in the Supreme Court before a fivejudge Constitution Bench headed by Chief Justice Y.K. Sabharwal, where it was argued that the Article 105(3)34 of the Constitution did not confer on either House of the Indian Parliament all the privileges which the British House of Commons exercised at the time of the coming into force of the Constitution of India and that the Indian legislatures were not superior courts and their non-speaking warrant of contempt was subject to judicial scrutiny under Article 22635 or other appropriate proceedings. The counsel argued that disqualification of members had to be governed by law and not by the resolution of a single House, in other words, the Parliament or State legislatures did not have the powers to expel their members even if they thought that an act of the member(s) had brought the house under disrepute. However, maintaining that provisions of the Representation of the Peoples Act create disqualifications, Ram Jethmalani, a leading criminal lawyer and an MP, said, ‘the disqualifications created by these sections are not merely disqualification for being chosen as member but also produce a post-election termination of membership’. Supporting the Centre’s stand that Parliament has power to expel its member for

abusing the privileges, the Attorney General justified before the Supreme Court the expulsion of MPs for their involvement in cashfor-query scam. However, on 28 September 2006, the Supreme Court reserved its verdict on the power of Parliament to expel MPs. While the situation on the constitutional and judicial debate on the issue rests with the reserved verdict of the Supreme Court, which, if in favour of the MPs, would open a fresh debate not only on parliamentary privileges and corruption but also on standards in public life. The tolerant stand of political parties and the political class on corruption and probity in public life nonetheless became clear with the moves to review the expulsion following V.K. Malhotra’s (BJP) letter to the Lok Sabha speaker Somnath Chatterjee.

OPERATION CHAKRAVYUH The Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme (MPLADS) has continued to make news year after year since it came into existence. Our previous evaluation of the scheme showed a mixed performance— under-utilisation, corruption, incomplete work, inefficient implementation and supervision and so on.36 We are therefore not using the data of the performance of the scheme for the following years, for it is unlikely to unravel anything more than what has already been said on this scheme by us earlier, or by other analysts so far. Instead, we are using the consequences of and the events following ‘Operation Chakravyuh’, a sting operation conducted on similar lines as the ‘Operation Duryodhana’ by the same people, for analysing the scheme, because it also offers a continuity in trend with the analysis on the ‘Operation Duryodhana’. On 20 November 2005, the Star News in collaboration with Detective Intelligence Guild (DIG) aired the sting operation on six MPs, capturing the MPs on camera seeking commissions while allotting funds under the scheme for developmental works in their respective constituencies. The six MPs (three from BJP and one each from Samajwadi Party, Congress, BSP and Rashtriya Kranti Dal) on

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 45

‘Operation Chakravyuh’ were: former Union Minister and BJP Lok Sabha member from Madhya Pradesh’s Mandla constituency Faggan Singh Kulaste, former Goa Chief Minister and south-Goa Congress Lok Sabha MP Churchill Alemao, former UP Minister and Samajwadi Party Lok Sabha MP Paras Nath Yadav from Jaunpur constituency, BJP Lok Sabha member from Madhya Pradesh’s Sidhi constituency C.P. Singh, BJP Lok Sabha member Ramswaroop Koli and Samajwadi Party member in the Rajya Sabha Sakshi Maharaj. The Saidpur (UP) Lok Sabha MP Toorfani Saroj refused to accept any commission. Shockingly on camera, Churchill Alemao was shown asking the DIG reporters to open a bag full of money as commission for a project and the personal secretary of a BJP MP was shown taking money on behalf of two MPs of the party. One of these MPs was also exposed in the cash-on-camera ‘Operation Duryodhana’. The sting team was shown discussing the commission with a BJP MP at his house. The audio recorded the transaction to establish that money had been paid and that the MP would get Rs 20,000 for a Rs 5 lakh job. The SP MP was approached by the reporters and a 20 per cent commission was agreed upon for a Rs 10–15 lakh project, but when the team offered him only Rs 50,000, the MP threw a tantrum. A Rajya Sabha member from UP openly discussed the commission and promised to take the sting team, posing as NGOs, to some other MPs, including one person who had been suspended in the wake of the cash-on-camera operation. The RKD MP justified accepting such commissions saying it would be difficult to contest the Lok Sabha polls if one did not take such money. The BSP MP said the issue of commissions on the MPLADS would be worked out after consultations with colleagues. Both the Houses instituted inquiries to look into the matter. Though expressing reservations about such sting operations, they were unsparing about the lure of money for people’s representatives. The Rajya Sabha Committee headed by Dr Karan Singh felt

that ‘there is an imperative need to bring about some kind of regulatory mechanism for under-cover operations which have the potential of encroaching upon the right to privacy of an individual.’37 The Lok Sabha Committee expressed ‘concern over the fact that the media has been indulging in a race to achieve viewership through denationalisation on a competitive basis.’ However, that came as no respite to Rajya Sabha member Dr Swami Sakshi Ji Maharaj, who ‘expressed his regrets and displayed a feeling of shame for his utterances’, because the Committee observed that ‘[t]he facts and circumstances of the case leave no doubt that the Member has not only committed gross misdemeanour but by his conduct he has also compromised the dignity of the House and its Members and has acted in a manner which is inconsistent with the standards which the House is entitled to expect of its Members.’ The Committee recommended his expulsion from the House. The Lok Sabha Committee too found that ‘the conduct of none of the four members was above board and they need to be handed out appropriate punishment.’ They were not expelled, but suspended for varying periods. Both the committees further recommended that Union Government may suitably revise the guidelines governing MPLADS with a view to plug various loopholes. The controversy also brought the MPLADS under judicial scrutiny when some voluntary organisations, including Lok Sevak Sangh, challenged the constitutional validity of the scheme, because it was breeding corruption in the absence of accountability, monitoring and checks and balances usually applicable to governmental expenses. Prashant Bhushan, the counsel for Lok Sevak Sangh, pointed out that the CAG report too discovered several shortcomings in the scheme. Appearing for another petitioner, senior counsel K.K. Venugopal termed MPLADS as unconstitutional, saying Parliament could not appropriate funds from Consolidated Fund of India except in accordance with Article 282 of the Constitution. He said it was a peculiar situation where there was no

46 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA monitoring, no accountability and no criminal offence under Prevention of Corruption Act for the irregularities committed in the implementation of the Scheme.38 The apex court has not given any verdict on the case as yet. The MPLADS continues to be caught in controversy. It is a unique scheme, a creation of the Indian Parliament and replicated in legislatures too. However, the only control mechanism attached to it has been that money is not directly given to the MPs; it is only sanctioned by them against development schemes and specific work in their constituencies, to be released and the work to be completed by the district administration, which in many cases is not above corruption. Operation Chakravyuh has only revealed what has long been believed about corruption prevailing in the MPLADS scheme. Under-utilisation of the scheme, which has committed nonlapsable fund drawn from Consolidated Fund of India, also indicates the keenness with which the MPs look at it. Even if far fetched conclusions to link the underutilisation of the MPLADS to the tendencies reflected in the Operation Chakravyuh are avoided, it is clear that lack of transparency and prevailing corruption and criminalisation have plagued the scheme over the years. It also gives an undue advantage to the sitting MP.39

CRIMINALISATION OF POLITICS We had pointed out three dimensions to criminalisation of politics relating to the issue of representation, the key issue in the present context, in the previous assessment of the Parliament. First, with the increasing compulsions of retaining political power at any cost as well as due to increase in corrupt practices for self-perpetuation and selfaggrandisement amongst the political class, political transgressions into criminality have become visible and brazen. Second, since the line between criminality and political goals blurred as a consequence, the use of criminals not only to win elections with strong

arm methods, but also to serve other political goals became prevalent. Third, not only some politicians became tainted with criminality, high profile dons with political connections succeeded in getting acceptance for their political stakes and entered representative institutions like Parliament and state legislatures. The debate on criminalisation of politics in India, which over the past decade and a half has shifted from the use of criminals in politics to the entry of criminals into politics indicating a paradigm shift,40 deserves assessment, analyses and conceptualisation afresh in the light of the current developments. We shall not present here any fresh data, which remains the same for the present Parliament, but raise some fresh questions that deserve to be debated. During our round tables in states on the previous Social Watch Report, questions were raised on the data on criminalisation of politics, based on affidavits by each member regarding criminal cases pending against him. Some observers felt that in ‘most cases’, the MPs in the list belonged either to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, against whom false criminal cases were registered. Since we could not put together data on the caste profile of the tainted MPs and the nature of cases registered against them, we shall refrain from saying anything on the issue. This, however, is an issue to be probed more incisively to understand the nature and processes of ‘criminalisation’ in politics. We made attempts but could not get data on caste composition of the ‘tainted’ MPs. Once such data is at hand, it will also be necessary to look into the details of the cases, including the circumstances under which the cases were filed and the persons who filed them. Here, we would like to underline the critical importance of such an analysis. The debate on criminalisation of politics received a new dimension with the conviction of Shibu Soren, the unquestioned and highly respected leader of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, for involvement in the alleged murder of his secretary (sentenced to life imprisonment) and Navjot Singh Sidhu, a former cricketer and a BJP MP from Punjab,

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 47

for causing death of an old person by thrashing him in a case of road rage in 1988 in Ludhiana (three years rigorous imprisonment). His sentence has been stayed since by the Supreme Court, which also thought it wise to praise him. Though Soren has been involved in other controversies as well, he is not a typical criminal-politician. He was in the news for receiving bribe to save the Narasimha Rao government in the 1990s, the money which led to the ‘compulsion’ of the killing of his secretary, who appeared to know too much and reportedly asked for a larger share in the booty. He was again in the news when he went absconding when the BJP-led Jharkhand government dug up a 30-year-old case of political protest resulting in rioting and killing of 11 people in Chirrudih in (the undivided) Bihar, to put him behind the bars. Violent protest politics, even at the cost of loss of innocent lives, is a legitimate instrument of politics in India, not surprisingly for Soren too, a typical politician representing the exploited and poor tribal communities of Jharkhand, for whom ends are important, not the means. His understanding of morality would also perhaps differ, for money required to compete in the modern game of politics does not come easily. He would perhaps also have his own definition of democracy, not shared by others. Yet, bribes, riots, violence and murders are acts of criminality, and rather serious ones if persons in power at the national level are involved, deserving stern remedies. Similarly, Navjot Singh Sidhu, a past cricketer known for his maverick wit and comments, would not fit the typology of a typical criminal or criminally-oriented politician. A late entrant into the world of politics, he allegedly committed the heinous breach of law as a young cricketer, signifying the tendency to take the celebrity status too seriously to claim privilege over a ‘common citizen’s’ rights. That is only one part of the worrisome tendency. Even worse from the perspective of the political institutions in the country, particularly from the point of view of parties and Parliament is that he was

considered for an important party position by a national (and claiming to be nationalist) party and given a party ticket. Worse still, despite his conviction for his criminal misadventure by a court of law, he was defended by the party with weak and flimsy arguments. That such a defence would perpetuate criminality, was not considered at all. The issue of criminalisation of politics and its shadow over the institutional and democratic sanctity of Parliament obviously deserves debate beyond partisanship and a strait-jacketed view. Clearly, criminality could be encouraged even by those who could not traditionally be branded as criminals.

CONCLUSION We had argued in the previous analysis of the Parliament in the Social Watch Report that rising contentious party politics of the country is increasingly being reflected in the proceedings of the Parliament. The parties and leaders, cutting across the entire political spectrum, consider protestations, which go much beyond what Ambedkar described as the grammar of anarchy, as the legitimate parliamentary activity and a genuine and desirable extension of party politics outside the precincts of Parliament. This is a rational political activity from their perspective and not a deviation from the parliamentary norm. Thwarting legislative activity of Parliament forcefully, not necessarily persuasively, proving a point as well as projecting a militant image of a crusader for people’s cause is what really matters to them. For, the voters who matter understand this better than a legislation passed. The trend continues. Politically contentious issues, like the OoP controversy, Operations Duryodhana and Chakravyuh, the spat with the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, etc., were given precedence over legislative functions of Parliament. The stalling of the functions of the two Houses was not intended even on a single occasion to develop a norm on any issue that created a blot on the MPs and on the sanctity of Parliament, each one was meant to score a political point. Even if

48 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA contemporary politics creates a compulsion for protest politics in Parliament, whether this ‘grammar of anarchy’ should continue as the first instrument of politics, deserves a countrywide debate. None of the nagging and contentious issues of the past were taken up for an informed debate, even if in a partisan fashion, let alone making an effort for their resolution. The women’s reservation bill was not placed before the Parliament. The issue of criminalisation of politics continues to be dealt with in a blatantly partisan fashion by each of the parties. In fact, fracas in the Lok Sabha on 24 August on a remark against Railway Minister Lalu Prasad Yadav by Janata Dal (U) member Prabhunath Singh, in which members of the RJD and JD (U) virtually came to blows, reflects total contempt for norms and civility and a tendency that nourishes criminality. Unlike the British Parliament, the two exposé did not lead to institutional norms or standards for parliamentary behaviour. The Soren and Sidhu affairs are serious blots on the representative aspect of India’s apex legislature, though the data on tainted MPs deserves a serious review from the caste perspective.

4

5

6

7

8

9

NOTES 1

2 3

The Supreme Court stayed Navjot Singh Sidhu’s conviction by the Punjab and Haryana High court and allowed him to contest the Amritsar Lok Sabha seat vacated by him on moral grounds in the ensuing byelection. The apex court also surprisingly showered praise over Sidhu, who continues to be an accused till the Supreme Court gives the final verdict on his appeal. See, The Hindu, 24 January 2007. C.V. Madhukar, ‘House This for Debate?’, The Indian Express, 3 January 2007, p. 10. The Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act, 2005 introduced on 10 May 2005, at the fag end of the sitting of Lok Sabha (the day was almost occupied by long debates and discussions on Right to Information Act) attracting about little less than two hours of discussion during which hardly any serious criticisms were expressed by members, is one stark example of the lack of interest of most parties and MPs towards serious issues of public

10

11 12 13

14

concern. The storm that the issue of SEZ has created with serious questions regarding farmers’ interests as well as displacementrehabilitation hiatus it has raised recently, is an example of the problems that an indifferent Parliament can create. Lok Sabha, Un-starred Question No. 1541, dated 6 March 2006, asked by Manvendra Singh, answered by Prof. Saif ud din Soz, Minister of Water Resources. Lok Sabha, Un-starred Question No. 343, dated 21 February 2006, asked by Sanjay Shamrao Dhotre and Bapu Hari Chaure, answered by Mahabir Prasad, Minister of State in the Ministry of Small Scale Industries and Agro & Rural Industries. Rajya Sabha, Un-starred Question No. 3048, dated 15 May 2006, asked by Maya Singh, answered by D. Purandeswari, Minister of State in the Ministry of Human Resource Development. Lok Sabha, Un-starred Question No. 358, dated 21 February 2006, asked by Santosh Kumar Gangwar, Karunakara G. Reddy, Jyotiraditya Madhavrao Scindia, Tukaram Gangadhar Gadakh and Harikewal Prasad answered by Jai Ram Ramesh, Minister of State in the Ministry of Commerce and Industries. Rajya Sabha, Un-starred Question No. 2604, dated 10 May 2006, asked by Dr Gyan Prakash Pilania, answered by Pranab Mukherjee, Minister of Defence. Rajya Sabha, Un-starred Question No. 2005, dated 10 March 2006, asked by Kalraj Mishra, answered by Namo Narain Meena, Minister of State in the Ministry of Environment and Forest. Rajya Sabha, Un-starred Question No. 988, dated 1 March 2006, asked by Penumalli Madhu, answered by Chandra Sekhar Sahu, Minister of State in the Ministry of Labour and Employment. M.L. Kotru, ‘The Warm within Parliament’, Sify.com, 30 August 2006. Neena Vyas, ‘Anguish Over Vajpayee’s Letter’, The Hindu, 12 August 2006. The Article reads: 102. Disqualification for membership— (1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament: (a) if he holds any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State, other than an office declared by Parliament by law not to disqualify its holder. The Article, a replica of Article 102 in the State context, reads:

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 49

15

16 17 18

19 20 21

22 23

24 25 26

191. Disqualification for membership—(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State: (a) if he holds any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State specified in the First Schedule, other than an office declared by the Legislature of the State by law not to disqualify its holder. Sonia Gandhi’s resignation elicited different reactions. While the opposition was critical of this ‘drama’, the treasury benches and the press described it as her second renunciation, which politically deflated the opposition criticism. Her nominating Dr Manmohan Singh as the Prime Minister in 2004, when she was elected leader of the Congress Parliamentary party, amidst the opposition onslaught on her foreign origin, was her first renunciation. See, ‘Queen’s Side Castle’, Outlook, pp. 22–23; and ‘Smart Move’, India Today, 3 April 2006. ‘To Bring in Ordinance, UPA Winds up Session’, The Indian Express, 23 March 2006. ‘To Save MPs, Office-of-Profit to be Expanded’, The Indian Express, 10 May 2006. ‘OoP Definitions to be Tabled in Next Session of Parliament’, The Indian Express, 20 September 2006. Ravanna Subanna v. G.S. Kaggeerappa, AIR 1954 SC 653. Umrao Singh v. Darbara Singh; A.K. Subbaiah v. Ramakrishna Hegde. These criteria have emerged in various Supreme Court judgments over the years. Important among them are: Satrucharla Chandrasekhar Raju v. Vyricherla Pradeep Kumar Dev, Guru Govinda Basu v. Sankari Prasad Ghoshal, 1964, Madhuker G.E. Pankakar v. Jaswant Chobbildas Rajani, Maulana Abdul Shakur v. Rikhab Chand and another, Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana, Karbhari Bimaji Rohamare v. Shankar Rao Genuji Kolhe, Surya Kant Roy v. Imamul Hai Khan. See, Shashank Krishna, ‘The Office of Profit Bill’. http:// 202.71.128.135:5/bc/focusdetails.asp?ID=75. The Indian Express, 18 March 2006. Abhishek Singhvi, ‘Office of Perplexity & Pandemonium’, The Indian Express, 3 June 2006. CAD, VIII, p. 569. D.D. Basu, Constitutional Law of India, 2003, p. 743. David Annoussamy, ‘Office of Profit Revisited’, South Asia Politics, December 2006, p. 8.

27 Abhishek Singhvi, op. cit., p. 13. 28 A Web-based news site. 29 A Hindi news channel of the India Today group. 30 The eight middlemen Cobrapost–Aaj Tak team met were Harish Badola, M.K. Tripathi (Chotiwala), Chandrabhan Gupta, Dinesh, Vijay, Sudeep Mishra, Ravinder, Ajay Singh. See http://www. cobrapost.com/documents/ mm.htm. 31 http://www.cobrapost.com/documents/ fdec%20.htm. 32 See, ‘Report of the Committee to Inquire into Allegations of Improper Conduct on the Part of Some Members’, Fourteenth Lok Sabha, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, December 2005. http://164.100.24.208/ls/ Inquiry/IReport.pdf. 33 http://www.cobrapost.com/documents/ mm.htm and http://www.cobrapost.com/ documents/fdec%20.htm. 34 Article 105(3): In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of each House of Parliament, and of the members and committees of each House, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by Parliament by Law, and, until so defined, [shall be those of that House and of its members and committees immediately before the coming into force of Section 15 of the Constitution (Fortyfourth Amendment) Act, 1978]. 35 Article 226: Power of High courts to issue certain writs.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without—

50 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated. (4) The power conferred on a High court by this Article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32. 36 See, Ajay K. Mehra, ‘Parliament Under Social Watch: Representation, Accountability and Governance’, in National Social Watch Coalition, Citizens Report on Governance and Development 2006, New Delhi: Pearson Education. 37 Parliament of India (Rajya Sabha), Committee

on Ethics, Eighth Report, New Delhi: Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 2006. 38 www.http://outlookindia.com 39 The scheme which began with allocating Rs 10 million annually to each of the 795 MPs, was later raised to Rs 20 million per annum per MP, thus allocating nearly Rs 80,000 over a five year period. Given the prevailing corruption in the scheme almost since it came into existence, it is open to two levels of corruption—of MP and the district administration. Further, it has been rightly pointed out that ‘it takes away some of the responsibility for development activity from both the state and local initiative and makes it a matter of individual patronage. It is politically unfair because it gives an advantage to the incumbent (of whatever party) over his rivals by giving him a discretionary expenditure purse of Rs 50 million (when it was 10 million, now 100 million) over a term.’ E. Sridharan, ‘Parties, the Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections: A Comparative Perspective on Possible Options’, in Peter Ronald deSouza and E. Sridharan (eds.), India’s Political Parties, New Delhi: Sage, 2006, p. 336. 40 Ajay K. Mehra, ‘Criminalization of Indian Politics’, in K.M. de Silva, G.H. Peiris and S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe (eds), Corruption in South Asia: India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Kandy, Sri Lanka, 2002, pp. 99–138.

ANNEXURE I The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959 (10 of 1959) [4 April 1959] (Corrected up to Act 18 of 2000) An Act to declare that certain offices of profit under the Government shall not disqualify the holders thereof for being chosen as, or for being, members of parliament. BE it enacted by Parliament in the Tenth Year of the Republic of India as follows: 1. Short title—This Act may be called the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959. 2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—

any conveyance allowance, house rent allowance or travelling allowance for the purpose of enabling him to recoup any expenditure incurred by him in performing the functions of that office; (b) ‘Statutory body’ means any corporation, committee, commission, council, board or other body of persons, whether incorporated or not, established by or under any law for the time being in force; (c) ‘Non-statutory body’ means any body of persons other than a statutory body.

(a) ‘Compensatory allowance’ means any sum of money payable to the holder of an office by way of daily allowance [such allowance not exceeding the amount of daily allowance to which a member of Parliament is entitled under the 1Salaries and Allowances and Pensions of Members of Parliament Act, 1954 (30 of 1954)],

3. Certain offices of profit not to disqualify— It is hereby declared that none of the following offices in so far as it is an office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State, shall disqualify the holder thereof for being chosen as, or for being, a member of Parliament, namely:

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 51 (a) any office held by a Minister, Minister of State or Deputy Minister for the Union or for any State, whether ex officio or by name; 2 [(aa) the office of a Leader of the Opposition in Parliament;] 1 [(ab) the office of Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission] 3 [(ac) the office of each leader and each deputy leader of a recognised party and a recognised group in either House of Parliament;] (b) the office of Chief Whip, Deputy Chief Whip or Whip in Parliament or of a Parliamentary Secretary; 1 [(ba) the office of chairperson of (i) the National Commission for Minorities constituted under section 3 of the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992; (ii) the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes constituted under clause (1) of Article 338 of the Constitution; (iii) the National Commission for Women constituted under section 3 of the National Commission for Women Act, 1990] (c) the office of a member of any force raised or maintained under the National Cadet Corps Act, 1948 (31 of 1948), the Territorial Army Act, 1948 (56 of 1948), or the Reserve and Auxiliary Air Forces Act, 1952 (62 of 1952); (d) the office of a member of a Home Guard constituted under any law for the time being in force in any State; (e) the office of sheriff in the city of Bombay, Calcutta or Madras; (f) the office of chairman or member of the syndicate, senate, executive committee, council or court of a university or any other body connected with a university; (g) the office of a member of any delegation or mission sent outside India by the Government, for any special purpose; (h) the office of chairman or member of a committee (whether consisting of one or more members), set up temporarily for the purpose of advising the Government or any other authority in respect of any matter of public importance or for the purpose of making an inquiry into, or collecting statistics in respect of, any such matter, if the holder of such office is not entitled to any remuneration other than compensatory allowance; (i) the office of chairman, director or member of any statutory or non-statutory body other than any such body as is referred to in clause (h), if the holder of such office is not entitled to any remuneration other than compensatory allowance, but excluding (i) the office of chairman of any statutory or non-statutory body specified in Part 1 of the Schedule, and (ii) the office of chairman or secretary of any statutory or non-statutory body specified in Part II of the Schedule.4

(j) the office of village revenue officer, whether called a lambardar, malguzar, patel, deshmukh or by any other name, whose duty is to collect land revenue and who is remunerated by a share of, or commission on, the amount of land revenue collected by him, but who does not discharge any police functions. 5

Explanation 1—For the purposes of this section, the office of Chairman, Deputy Chairman or Secretary shall include every office of that description by whatever name called. 6 Explanation 2—In clause (aa), the expression ‘Leader of the Opposition’ shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Salary and Allowances of Leaders of Opposition in Parliament Act, 1977 (33 of 1977). 4. Temporary suspension of disqualification in certain cases—If a person being a member of parliament who immediately before the commencement of this Act held an office of profit declared by any law repealed by this Act not to disqualify the holder thereof for being such member, becomes so disqualified by reason of any of the provisions contained in this Act, such office shall not, if held by such person for any period not extending beyond a period of six months from the commencement of this Act disqualify him for being a member of Parliament. 5. Repeals—The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1950 (19 of 1950), the Parliament Prevention of Disqualification Act, 1951 (68 of 1951), the Prevention of Disqualification Act, 1953 (1 of 1954), and any provision in any other enactment which is inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed. THE SCHEDULE [See section 3(i)] PART I BODIES UNDER THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT •

•

• • • • •

Air India International Corporation established under section 3 of the Air Corporations Act, 1953 (27 of 1953). Air Transport Council constituted under section 30 of the Air Corporations Act, 1953 (27 of 1953). Board of Directors of the Export Risks Insurance Corporation 7*** Limited. Board of Directors of the Heavy Electricals 7 *** Limited. Board of Directors of the Hindustan Cables 7 ***Limited. Board of Directors of the Hindustan Insecticides 7***Limited. Board of Directors of the Hindustan Machine Tools 7***Limited.

52 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA • • • •

• • • • • •

•

•

• • •

•

•

•

•

•

•

Board of Directors of the Hindustan Shipyard Limited. Board of Directors of 8 [Hindustan Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited]. Board of Directors of the National Coal Development Corporation (Private) Limited. Board of Directors of the National 9 [Industrial] Development Corporation 10 *** Limited. Board of Directors of the National Instruments 10 *** Limited. Board of Directors of the National Small Industries Corporation 10*** Limited. Board of Directors of the Neyveli Lignite Corporation (Private) Limited. Board of Directors of the Sindri Fertilizers and Chemicals 10*** Limited. Board of Directors of the State Trading Corporation of India 10***Limited. Central Warehousing Corporation established under section 17 of the Agricultural Produce (Development and Warehousing) Corporations Act, 1956 (28 of 1956). Coal Board established under section 4 of the Coal Mines (Conservation and Safety) Act 1952 (12 of 1952). Coal Mines Labour Housing Board constituted under section 6 of the Coal Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1947 (32 of 1947). Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta. Committee for the allotment of land in the township of Gandhidham. Company Law Advisory Commission constituted under Section 410 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956). Cotton Textiles Fund committee constituted under the Textile Funds Ordinance, 1944 (Ordinance 34 of 1944). Dock Labour Board Bombay, established under the Bombay Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme, 1956 made under the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act 1948 (9 of 1948). Dock Labour Board, Calcutta, established under the Calcutta Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme 1956, made under the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948). Dock Labour Board Madras, established under the Madras Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme 1956, made under the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948). Forward Markets Commission established under section 3 of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 (74 of 1952). Indian Airlines Corporation established under section 3 of the Air Corporations Act, 1953 (27 of 1953).

•

•

• •

•

•

• • •

Industrial Finance Corporation of India established under section 3 of the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948 (15 of l948). Licensing Committee constituted under rule 10 of the Registration and Licensing of Industrial Undertakings Rules, 1952, made under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (64 of 1951). Mining Boards constituted under section 12 of the Mines Act, 1952 (34 of 1952). National Co-operative Development and Warehousing Board established under section 3 of the Agricultural Produce (Development and Warehousing) Corporations Act, 1956 (28 of 1956). Rehabilitation Finance Administration constituted under section 3 of the Rehabilitation Finance Administration Act, 1948 (12 of 1948). Tariff Commission established under section 3 of the Tariff Commission Act, 1951 (50 of 1951). Trustees of the Port of Bombay. Trustees of the Port of Madras. Trustees or Commissioners of any major port as defined in the Indian Ports Act, 1908 (15 of 1908), other than the Port of Calcutta, Bombay or Madras. BODIES UNDER STATE GOVERNMENTS

Andhra Pradesh • Agricultural Improvement Fund Committee constituted under section 3 of the Hyderabad Agricultural Improvement Act, 1952. • Co-operative Agricultural and Marketing Development Fund Committee. • Livestock Purchasing Committee. Assam • Adhi Conciliation Boards constituted under section 2A of the Assam Adhiars Protection and Regulation Act, 1948. • Assam Evacuee Property Management Committee constituted under section 12 of the Assam Evacuee Property Act, 1951. • Assam Text Book Committee. Bihar • Mining Board for Coal Mines. • Text Book and Education Literature Committee. Bombay • Allocation Committee (Allopathic) under the Employees State Insurance Scheme. • Allocation Committee (Ayurvedic) under the Employees State Insurance Scheme. • Board to conduct over-all supervision of the business and affairs of the Narsinggiriji MillsSholapur.

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 53 •

•

•

• • •

•

•

•

Bombay Housing Board constituted under section 3 of the Bombay Housing Board Act, 1948. Bombay State Electricity Board constituted under section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948). Bombay State Electricity Consultative Council constituted under section 16 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948). Medical Service committee under the Employees State Insurance Scheme. Pharmaceutical Committee under the Employees State Insurance Scheme. Regional Transport Authority for Ahmedabad, Aurangabad, Bombay, Nagpur, Poona, Rajkot and Thana constituted under section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939). Saurashtra Housing Board constituted under section 3 of the Saurashtra Housing Board Act, 1954. State Transport Authority Constituted under section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939). Vidarbha Housing Board Constituted under section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Housing Act, 1950.

Kerala • Board of Examiners appointed under rule 8 of the Travancore-Cochin Boiler Attendants Rules, 1954. • Panel of Assessors constituted under rule 63 of the Travancore-Cochin Boiler Attendants Rules, 1954. • Panel of Assessors constituted under the Travancore-Cochin Economiser Rules, 1956. Madhya Pradesh • Madhya Pradesh Housing Board Constituted under section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Housing Board Act, 1950. • Mahakoshal Housing Board. Tamil Nadu • Committee to select Books for Study for S.S.L.C. Examination. Landing and Shipping Fees Committees for Minor Ports. • Local Committee constituted under regulation 10A of the Employees State Insurance (General). • Regulation, 1950. • Madras Board of Transport. • 12 [TamiI Nadu Electricity Board] constituted under section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948). • Madras State Electricity Consultative Council constituted under section 16 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948). • Port Conservancy Boards.

• • •

Port Trust Boards of Minor Ports. State Board of Communications. Text Books Committee.

Karnataka • Board of Management, Mysore Iron and Steel Works, Bhadravathi. • Board of Management of Industrial Concerns. Orissa • Appeal Committee under the Board of Secondary Education. • Orissa Board of Communications and Transport. • Regional Transport Authority Constituted under section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939). • State Transport Authority constituted under section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939). Punjab • Punjab State National Workers (Relief and Rehabilitation) Board. Rajasthan • City Improvement Trust, Kota, Constituted under the City of Kota Improvement Act, 1946. • Excise Appellate Board, Ajmer. • Rajasthan State Electricity Board constituted under section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948). • Urban Improvement Board, Jaipur. Uttar Pradesh • Government Cement Factory Board. • Local Committees for Agra, Kanpur. Lucknow and Saharanpur appointed under section 25 of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948). West Bengal • Licensing Board constituted under the regulations made under rule 45 of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1956. • West Bengal Housing Board constituted under the West Bengal Development Corporation Act. 1954. BODIES IN UNION TERRITORIES •

•

Delhi Development Authority constituted under section 3 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 (61 of 1957). Delhi Electricity Power Control Board constituted under section 5 of the Bombay Electricity (Special Powers) Act, 1946, as applied to Delhi.

54 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA •

Delhi State Electricity Council constituted under section 16 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948). Part II BODIES UNDER THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Advisory Committee for the Air-India International Corporation appointed under section 41 of the Air Corporations Act, 1953 (27 of 1953). Advisory Committee for the Indian Airlines Corporation Appointed under section 41 of the Air Corporations Act, 1953 (27 of 1953). Central Silk Board constituted under section 4 of the Central Silk Board Act, 1948 (61 of 1948). Coffee Board constituted under section 4 of the Coffee Act, 1942 (7 of 1942). Coir Board constituted under section 4 of the Coir Industry Act, 1953 (45 of 1953). Development Council for Acids and Fertilizers established under section 6 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951). Development Council for Alkalis and Allied Industries established under section 6 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951). Development Council for Bicycles established under section 6 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951). Development Council for Drugs, Dyes and Intermediates established under section 6 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951). Development Council for Food Processing Industries established under section 6 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951). Development Council for Heavy Electrical Engineering Industries established under section 6 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951). Development Council for Internal Combustion Engines and Power Driven Pumps established under section 6 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951). Development Council for Light Electrical Engineering Industries established under section 6 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951). Development Council for Machine Tools established under section 6 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951). Development Council for Non-ferrous Metals including alloys established under section 6 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951). Development Council for Oil-based and Plastic Industries established under section 6 of

the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951). Development Council for Sugar Industry established under section 6 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951). Development Council for Textiles, made of artificial silk including artificial silk yarn established under section 6 of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951 (65 of 1951). Development Council for Textiles made of wool including woollen yarn, hosiery, carpets and druggets established under section 6 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1931 (65 of 1951). Durgah Committee, Ajmer, constituted under section 4 of the Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955 (36 of 1955). Indian Central Areca nut Committee. Indian Central Coconut Committee constituted under section 4 of the Indian Coconut Committee Act, 1944 (10 of 1944). Indian Central Cotton Committee constituted under section 4 of the Indian Cotton Cess Act, 1923 (14 of 1923). Indian Central Jute Committee. Indian Central Oilseeds Committee Constituted under section 4 of the Indian Oilseeds Committee Act, 1946 (9 of 1946). Indian Central Sugarcane Committee. Indian Central Tobacco Committee. Indian Lac Cess Committee constituted under section 4 of the Indian Lac Cess Act 1930 (24 of 1930). Rubber Board constituted under section 4 of the Rubber Act, 1947 (24 of 1947). Tea Board constituted under section 4 of the Tea Act, 1953 (29 of 1953). BODIES UNDER STATE GOVERNMENTS Andhra Pradesh • Market Committee constituted under section 4 of the Hyderabad Agricultural Market Act No II of 1339 F. • Market Committee constituted under section 4A of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act, 1933. Bihar • Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, Bihar Subai Majlis Awqaf. • Bodh Gaya Temple Advisory Committee constituted under section 15 of the Bodh Gaya Temple Act, 1949. • Bodh Gaya Temple Management Committee constituted under section 3 of the Bodh Gaya Temple Act, 1949.

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 55 Kerala • Administration Committee for Coir Purchase Scheme. • Malabar Market Committee constituted under section 4A of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act, 1933. • Tapioca Market Expansion Board. Tamil Nadu • Area Committee for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments constituted under section 12 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951. • Madras State Waqf Board constituted under section 9 of the Waqf Act, 1954 (29 of 1954). Punjab • State Marketing Board Constituted under section 3 of the Patiala Agricultural Produce Markets Act. PART III15 BODY UNDER THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT [Planning Commission.]16

NOTES 1.

Subs./Ins. by Act 54 of 1993 (w.e.f. 19.7.1993) & [Cl.(a)&(ab) w.e.f. 27.8.1993].

2. Ins. by Act 33 of 1977, s. 12 (w.e.f. 1.11.1977). 3. Ins. by Act 18 of 2000. 4. Subs. By Act 54 of 1993 (w.e.f. 19.7.93). [Expln. 1 w.e.f. 27.8.1993). 5. Explanation numbered as Explanation 1 thereof by Act 33 of 1977, s. 12 (1.11.1977). 6. Ins. by s. 12, of Act 33 of 1977 (w.e.f. 1.11.1977). 7. The brackets and word ‘(Private)’ omitted by Act 58 of 1960, s. 3 and Schedule. II. 8. Subs. By Act 58 of 1960, s. 3 and Schedule II, for ‘Nangal Fertilizers and Chemicals (Private) Limited’. 9. Ins. By s. 3 and Schedule II, ibid. 10. The brackets and word ‘(Private)’ omitted by s. 3 and Schedule II, ibid. 11. Subs. By the Madras State (Alteration of Name) (Adaptation of Laws on Union Subjects) Order, 1970, for ‘Madras’ (w.e.f. 14.1.1969). 12. Subs., ibid., for ‘Madras State Electricity Board’. 13. Subs. By the Mysore State (Alteration of Name) (Adaptation of Laws on Union Subjects) Order, 1974, for ‘Mysore’ (w.e.f. 1.11.1973). 14. Subs. By the Madras State (Alteration of Name) (Adaptation of Laws on Union Subjects) Order, 1970, for ‘Madras’ (w.e.f. 14.1.1969). 15. Ins. By Act 20 of 1992. 16. Omitted by Act 54 of 1993 (w.e.f. 19.6.93).

ANNEXURE II The MPs in Cash-for-questions Scandal 1. Narendra Kumar Kushwaha

2. Lal Chandra Kol

Constituency: Mirzapur, Uttar Pradesh Political Party: BSP

Constituency: Robertsganj, Uttar Pradesh Political Party: Bahujan Samaj Party

Questions tabled: 5

Question tabled: 1

1. SSIs becoming defaulters in paying back loans when the government does not pay back to them on time after buying goods for wholesale shops. 2. The steps taken for simplification of visa procedures by India for SSI owners in Pakistan to facilitate trade between the two countries. 3. Details of exports of SSI products to SAARC countries and China. 4. Infrastructural facilities for handloom sector and areas covered by the IIDS for small-scale apparel units. 5. Steps taken to promote sericulture in J&K.

1. Details of exports of SSI products to SAARC countries and China.

Total money paid Rs 55,000.

Total money paid Rs 35,000 3. Anna Saheb M.K. Patil Constituency: Erandol, Maharashtra Political Party: Bhartiya Janata Party Questions tabled: 3 1. On the de-reservation of items for production by SSIs.

56 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA 2. Scheme on the performance and credit rating of Small Scale Industries. 3. Details of exports of SSI Products to SAARC countries and China.

7. Suresh Chandel

Total money paid Rs 45,000

Question tabled: 1

Constituency: Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh Political Party: Bhartiya Janata Party

4. Chhattrapal Singh Lodha

1. Whether the Government had taken steps to protect SSIs in the post Gatt era.

Constituency: Kurda (RS) Orissa Political Party: Bhartiya Janata Party

Total money paid Rs 30,000

Questions tabled: 4

8. Ramsevak Singh

1. Whether fresh notification issued to accord the benefits of the Target Plus Scheme had been issued; number of applications received; reasons responsible for keeping scheme in abeyance. 2. On the state governments faltering at making timely payments to SSIs after buying products to be sold through their wholesale shops. 3. Contemplating implementing the single window clearance system; raise limit of those units from Rs 5 crore that they may continue to be covered under the small scale. 4. Biopiracy of Traditional Indian Medicines.

Constituency: Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh Political Party: Indian National Congress

Total money paid Rs 15,000 5. Manoj Kumar Constituency: Palamau, Jharkhand Political Party: Rashtriya Janata Dal Questions tabled: 3 Total money paid Rs 35,000

Questions given: 5 1. On the trade relations between India and Pakistan and other SAARC countries. 2. Steps the government is taking to make timely payments to SSIs to avoid them from defaulting on loans. 3. Promotion of SSIs in militancy-hit areas like J&K. 4. On the benefits, schemes and facilities for welfare of SSIs in small towns. 5. On the various problems facing SSIs like dereservation, lack of bank credit, Inspector Raj. Total money paid Rs 50,000 9. Pradeep Gandhi Constituency: Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh Political Party: Bhartiya Janata Party Question given: 5

1. Whether any review model had been developed by NSIC and the time frame for its implementation; 2. On the Geographical Landmark, Registration and Conservation Act; 3. Whether the government will permit the opening of foreign banks in small towns.

1. On the SEBI inquiry into the stock market scam of 2004; 2. The rationale behind increasing the investment limit and the omission of the word ‘tiny’ and other features from the SME bill of 2002, yet to be passed. 3. On the trade relations between India, Pakistan and other SAARC countries and the steps taken to ease visa formalities between them. 4. The reason for allowing BCCI certain benefits and concessions which has led the autocratic nature of the body. 5. On the rationale behind merging and grouping small industries with medium industries.

Total money paid Rs 35,000

Total money paid Rs 55,000

6. Y.G. Mahajan Constituency: Jalgaon, Maharashtra Political Party: Bhartiya Janata Party Questions tabled: 3

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 57 10. Chandra Pratap Singh

11. Raja Ram Pal

Constituency: Sidhi, Madhya Pradesh Political Party: Bhartiya Janata Party

Constituency: Bilhaur, Uttar Pradesh Political Party: Bahujan Samaj Party

Questions given: 5

Questions given: 5

1. The impact of VAT on the Indian Pharmaceutical industry. 2. Statistics of money coming in through the FCRA route. 3. Monitoring of health care in the private sector. 4. Status of NRI FII investors in the Indian small-scale sector. 5. Status of purchase orders of the Yossarian Electro-Diesel engine by the railway ministry. Whether government is aware of the report given by the Tom Wolfe committee in Germany resulting in the halting of the engines in the Euro rail system.

1. On the action taken report on the non performing assets in the economy. 2. The steps taken for simplification of visa procedures by India for SSI owners in Pakistan to facilitate trade between the two countries. 3. On the amount of trade generated between India and Pakistan. 4. Record of trade generated within SAARC countries. 5. On the induction of the Yossarain ElecroDiesel engine of Germany and whether government was aware of the Tom Wolfe committee’s report resulting in halting its induction in the Euro rail system.

Total money paid Rs 35,000

Total money paid Rs 35,000

ANNEXURE III Table 1A The details of State-wise release of MPLADS funds in 2004–05 and 2005–06 Amount released (Rs in crore) Sl. No.

State

2004–05

2005–06

1

Andhra Pradesh

112

101.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2

Arunachal Pradesh

6

6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

Assam

43

35

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4

Bihar

84.5

100.05

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5

Goa

4

7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

Gujarat

55.5

70

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7

Haryana

26.5

27

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8

Himachal Pradesh

13

17

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9

Jammu & Kashmir

12

23.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

10

Karnataka

65

85

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11

Kerala

21.5

39

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12

Madhya Pradesh

79.5

78

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

13

Maharashtra

110.5

117

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

14

Manipur

6

6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

15

Meghalaya

6

7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

16

Mizoram

4

4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

17

Nagaland

3

5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

18

Orissa

52.5

61

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

19

Punjab

34

37

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

20

Rajasthan

66.5

71

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

21

Sikkim

5

4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

22

Tamil Nadu

117.5

103

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 1A continued )

58 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA (Table 1A continued ) Sl. No. 23

State Tripura

2004–05 6

2005–06 6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

24

Uttar Pradesh

207

215.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

25

West Bengal

65.5

91.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

26

Andaman & Nicobar Islands

2

2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

27

Chandigarh

4

1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

28

Dadra & Nagar Haveli

1

3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

29

Daman & Diu

2

2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

30

Delhi

17

17.05

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

31

Lakshadweep

1

2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

32

Pondicherry

1

1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

33

Chhattisgarh

30

32

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

34

Uttaranchal

18.5

16

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

35

Jharkhand

27.5

41

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

1,310.00

1,433.90

Source: Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1087 (Annexure referred to in the reply to part (d) of Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1087 for reply on 2.8.2006) Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.

ANNEXURE IV Table 1B Status of assurances in Lok Sabha from 1996–2005 Year

Total number of assurances

1996

1,696

Number of assurances fulfilled 1,633

Number of assurances dropped 06

Total implemented 1,639

Balance

57

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1997

1,388

1,359

02

1,361

27

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1998

1,228

1,179

02

1,181

47

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1999

725

684

06

690

35

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2000

1,638

1,552

07

1,559

80

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2001

1,231

1,131

03

1,134

97

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2002

1,431

1,322

06

1,328

104

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2003

1,371

1,140

05

1,145

228

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2004

671

516

04

520

379

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2005

1,337

368

05

373

964

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

12,716

10,884

46

Source: Annual Report 2005–06, Government of India, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, New Delhi.

Figure 1A Status of assurances in Lok Sabha from 1996–2005

Source: Annual Report 2005–06, Government of India, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, New Delhi.

10,930

2,018

The Indian Parliament and the ‘Grammar of Anarchy’ 59

ANNEXURE V Table 1C Status of assurances in Rajya Sabha from 1996–2005 Year

1996

Total number of assurances 738

Number of assurances fulfilled

Number of assurances dropped

728

Total implemented

—

Balance

728

10

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1997

773

753

—

753

20

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1998

757

726

—

726

31

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1999

564

536

02

538

26

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2000

1,943

850

07

857

1,086

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2001

1,082

863

05

868

214

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2002

1,323

1,279

23

1,302

21

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2003

1,391

1,341

40

1,381

10

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2004

718

640

12

652

66

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2005

487

293

71

364

123

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

9,776

8,009

160

8,169

1,607

Source: Annual Report 2005–06, Government of India, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, New Delhi.

Figure 1B Status of assurances in Rajya Sabha from 1996–2005

Source: Annual Report 2005–06, Government of India, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, New Delhi.

ANNEXURE VI Table 1D Summary of funds released under MPLADS for 2006–07 State

Lok Sabha 1st instalment

Nominated

2

Rajya Sabha 2nd instalment 0

1st instalment 4

Total funds 2nd instalment 0

Total no. 6

Rs in crore 6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Andhra Pradesh

36

4

13

2

55

55

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Arunachal Pradesh

2

1

1

1

5

5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Assam

13

3

7

1

24

24

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bihar

24

1

11

4

40

40

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Goa

1

0

1

0

2

2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 1D continued )

60 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA (Table 1D continued ) State

Lok Sabha 1st instalment

Gujarat

18

Rajya Sabha 2nd instalment 0

1st instalment 5

Total funds 2nd instalment 0

Total no. 23

Rs in crore 23

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Haryana

9

1

2

0

12

12

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Himachal Pradesh

3

1

2

1

7

7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jammu & Kashmir

1

0

2

0

3

3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Karnataka

16

1

8

5

30

30

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kerala

4

0

2

2

8

8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Madhya Pradesh

23

3

9

5

40

40

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maharashtra

22

0

9

1

32

32

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Manipur

2

2

1

1

6

6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Meghalaya

2

1

1

0

4

4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mizoram

1

0

1

0

2

2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nagaland

1

0

1

0

2

2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Orissa

16

4

9

1

30

30

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Punjab

11

3

6

1

21

21

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rajasthan

23

5

6

1

35

35

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sikkim

1

0

1

0

2

2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tamil Nadu

37

5

17

4

63

63

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tripura

2

0

1

0

3

3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttar Pradesh

74

20

26

13

133

133

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

West Bengal

14

2

10

5

31

31

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Andaman & Nicobar Islands

1

0

0

0

1

1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chandigrah

0

0

0

0

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dadra & Nagar Haveli

1

1

0

0

2

2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Daman & Diu

1

0

0

0

1

1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Delhi

3

0

1

1

5

5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lakshadweep

0

0

0

0

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Pondicherry

0

0

0

0

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chhattisgarh

7

3

4

1

15

15

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttaranchal

5

1

3

0

9

9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jharkhand

9

3

2

0

14

14

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

385

Source: http://www.mplads.nic.in/s2006-2007_htm

65

166

50

666

666

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 61

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway?

If Globalisation were a sport, it would be the 100-yard dash, over and over and over. And no matter how many times you win, you have to race again the next day. And if you lose by just a hundredth of a second it can be as if you lost by an hour∗ You dare not be a globalizer today without being a social democrat∗

Health Mission, Agriculture Sector, Right to Information Act and the recent amendments to the Hindu Succession Act, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, the changing nature of Centre-State fiscal relations; and the new mantra of ‘public private partnership’.

This section reviews the performance and policy stance of the Indian State in the last one year. Given the inherent continuity of all actions of the State, no review of policy is possible at one point of time. Therefore, the policy stance is reviewed within the larger context of the nature of state, the mandate of the current regime as reflected in the social (electoral) consensus and the overarching global context in which the policy framework is operational. The principles of sustainability, social and economic equality, especially gender, caste and ethnicity, and accountability are used to evaluate specific policy initiatives. Attention is given to the framework, structure and essence of policy as well as its implementation. The objective of the policy review is also to provide informed input for the social activists, strategists, lobbyists, opinion makers and the policy designers. It deals with the uneven impact of growth and the characteristic features of policy making in India, some of the policy initiatives or sector stories that are discussed below are—Employment Performance and the Employment Guarantee Act, Health and Rural

UNEVEN IMPACT OF GROWTH The reforms undertaken since the 1990s though resulting in a high economic growth have also given rise to a number of interrelated concerns in the social and environmental realms. This leaves us wondering whose growth is it anyway. These include its impact on employment and distribution of income, the emergence of new forms of vulnerabilities, weakening state regulation, deteriorating governance patterns, paradoxical (and often disputed) poverty statistics, imbalanced demographics with inter-regional (or sub national) disparities and often dismal human development indicators. That the growth has brought with it ‘divide’ is now widely recognised. The Approach Paper to the 11th Plan, perhaps, for the first time, gives a separate section on ‘Disparities and Divides’. It talks about the need to restructure policies ‘that are much more broad based and inclusive, helping to bridge the divide’. The growth performance in the last decade or so has been impressive to say the least (see Figure 2A). However this growth has not necessarily benefited everyone equally.

2

c hap te r

62 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA • Employment has declined overall after reforms (see Figure 2B). Casualisation of work has occurred for the most vulnerable households (SC and ST households); after the reforms, their share as casual workers is much more in comparison to the casual workers amongst others (see Table 2A). • The disputed poverty numbers suggest that in spite of high growth at an all India level, the number of poor still stood at 315 million which is not very different from the 321 million poor that India had in 1973–74 (Figure 2.1). Figure 2.1 Head count ratio (HCR) and growth of GDP HCR

60

GDP Growth

7

321

6

329 50

HCR

301

40

4 320

3 2

315

30

251 20

1973–74

1977–78

1983

1987–88

1993–94

2004–05 2004–05*

Notes: Numbers on top of the bar indicate number of poor in million ∗ Estimates of pverty based on 365 days MPCE.

1 0

GDP Growth

5

323

The change in per capita consumption expenditure during the reform period suggests that for a large number of states, the Percentage Change in Real Monthly Per Capita Consumption Expenditure (PCMCE) has declined, especially for SC and ST households in both rural and urban areas (Table 2B). This has happened to SC and ST households even in some of the faster growing states like West Bengal, Rajasthan and Haryana. On the literacy front, the 1990s have done well; literacy has grown and both rural-urban gap and gender gap has closed in (Figure 2C). The higher growth rates have also positively influenced the literacy outcomes (Figure 2D). • The gains of this increase in literacy, however, have been very unevenly distributed (Tables 2C, 2D and 2E). At higher levels of education, the percentages shift very strongly towards non-SC and ST households. For example, at secondary level, the percentages for SC and ST households are nearly half of the non-SC and ST households. Education beyond primary level is availed by 15 to 20 per cent of STs and SCs, while amongst others 30 per cent are educated beyond primary stage. • The high growth strategy has resulted in greater variability in growth across states (coefficient of variation across states has increased in the 1990s and first five years of 2000 compared to the 1980s) and this variability has poorer outcomes at least in terms of HDI indicator like IMR which can be seen from Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2 Variability in Growth and IMR

The experience of distributive justice in India in the last 15 years poses challenging questions for policy in terms of addressing key development concerns such as the environment, equity, poverty and the building of human capacities for sustainable development.

POLICY OR ABSENCE OF STRATEGIC GOAL! Source: CSO and SRS Bulletin.

After the wholesale debunking of the Stateled nationalist capitalist project in the 1990s

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 63

much of the policy initiatives in India have been reactive. The iterative nature of the reform process has meant the absence of pursuit of any specific long-term or mediumterm goal or any strategic objective; let alone the pursuit of national dreams. Take the case of agriculture. The early reform talk was to focus on manufacturing and service sector; within agriculture the issues were—too much food stocks, high costs of holding them, restrictive market to sell agricultural goods, non-competitive environment within agriculture, need for bringing the private players in agricultural trade, need for greater diversification from food crops to other commercial crops and so on. The talk in 2007 included—supply-side constraints, food scarcity, import of food often at higher rates than domestic production costs, agriculture becoming unviable, declining public investment and overall neglect of agriculture such that it has become a constraint on future growth. Among these concerns, the vast number of farmers’ suicides, the depressing real wages in agriculture, the frequent failure of crops and the increasing vulnerability in agriculture do not even find a mention. The other big reform agenda in the early years was infrastructure, encouraging the private players in the sector and withdrawal of public provisioning for it. Where do we stand now? We have gone the full circle, private players did not come into power generation as had been hoped, the success of private players in transmission and distribution has not been phenomenal, private players have not played the commensurate role in urban infrastructure, provisioning of basic services has still remained a dream and we are all now led to believe that the panacea lies in ‘public-private partnership’. Consider health, here again ‘disinvesting’ in health was the favourite slogan of the early reformers. The private provisioning of health services must be encouraged. Introduce user charges and structure health delivery on commercial lines were the usual refrain. Statelevel health sector reforms were initiated. Take the case of Punjab, the government unbundled the health department and formed

the State Health Sector Corporation in 1999. In 2003, government’s own Disinvestment Commission recommended the closure of this corporation. The outcome of this ad hocism is a defunct two-tier system, large sophisticated equipment lying unutilised in State Health Corporation hospitals and dilution of the already thin public services. The much talked–about, FDI-friendly export growth strategy of Special Economic Zones is another example. Acquiring large amounts of land to make ‘export cities’ is the crux of this strategy, but there was no accompanying policy for either land acquisition or resettlement. With hindsight, now there is a talk of framing a land-use policy and a fully worked out rehabilitation policy. Thus, the approach paper for the 11th Plan lists improving Rehabilitation and Resettlement Practices as one of the ‘targets’ for the coming five years.1 The examples can be numerous but the point is that the policies of the last 15 years are mostly reactive or supportive policies, reactive to either an extreme outcome of existing polices (like suicides) or policies that are part and parcel of the reform process (disinvestments, privatisation) or policies that are classified into initiatives for better governance (administrative reforms, tax reforms, reform of public health administration, police reforms, judicial reforms, and so on), which in essence are policy measures that feed into the on-going economic reform process in one way or the other. The latter measures lay down the institutional and social context within which the former initiatives operate or work. As a nation we are at crossroads; there is no medium or long-term strategy, no pursuit of long-term goals, or as mentioned earlier, no dreams are being followed. We say this in spite of the ‘big policy shift’— the shift towards ‘reforms’. Therefore, any review of policy has to keep the above limitation in mind. This is not to say that policies have no meaning, or are not worth reviewing. Poverty, destruction and vulnerabilities are constantly being created and recreated by the larger institutional framework of capitalism that is in place in India, but at the

64 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA same time it is worthy to have aspirations to crack an assault on numerous dimensions of poverty, perhaps through ‘development partnerships’ (MDGs), or by attempting to build a more ‘socialistic-oriented’ development plan.

EMPLOYMENT—HOW INCLUSIVE IS THE GROWTH? ...while employment growth has grown faster than before, with the demographic dynamics and higher labour force participation, rate of unemployment [] also went up marginally ... slowing down of the growth in agriculture could be one of the main reasons for the growth in unemployment rate (page 14, paragraph 1.46, Economic Survey, 2000–07) ...putting more people in productive and sustainable jobs lies at the heart of inclusive growth. But such success, primarily, will depend on the success in achieving and maintaining high growth (page 15, paragraph 1.56, Economic Survey, 2006–07) Given the sheer magnitude of workers currently tied to land, as compared to those in the organised sector, this issue could really dwarf the ones usually raised in discussions regarding labour market flexibility (page 59, Approach Paper to the 11th Plan).

The significance of employment creation in contemporary India can be seen in the very formation of the UPA government, where the promise of national employment guarantee became the flagship programme. At the start of the reforms, the ‘mantra’ was that since the controlled market economy had restricted investment, growth potential had not been fully realised and building a modern, export-oriented, globally-competitive economy would bring in the best of employment opportunities for every one. In recent times, the government’s approach towards employment has not been clear. The three statements quoted above reflect this confusion. We are told that unemployment may have increased because of the slowing down of agriculture but the Approach Paper to the 11th plan tells us that the most important

challenge for the 11th plan vis-à-vis employment is to shift around 10 million agricultural work force into non-agricultural activities. The fact is that the hope of growth has not brought with it the fruits of enhanced earning for a larger number of people. Employment opportunities have come, but for a few. After more than a decade of reforms, the latest Economic Survey on employment says—‘In what follows, we will review the employment trends in the last two decades and bring out some of the challenges for the recent policy initiatives on employment.’

Trends in Employment Over the two decades of 1983–94 and 1993–2005, • The overall employment growth declined from 2.01 per cent to 1.84 per cent. • The growth in employment of males is faster in both decades. Interestingly, though the male employment growth has declined from 2.19 to 1.87 per cent. • The female employment growth has in fact increased from 1.64 to 1.78 per cent per annum overall. The female employment growth has increased in rural areas (1.39 to 1.55 per cent) while in urban areas; it has declined from 3.36 per cent per annum to 3.08 per cent. • In urban areas, the employment growth of males has been faster in1993–2005 compared to 1983–94. • Men are growing faster in urban jobs and females are getting more into rural occupations with employment growth much faster in urban areas compared to rural employment • Urban job growth is being maintained at 3 per cent in the two sub periods with rural employment declining from 1.72 per cent to 1.46 per cent per annum between 1983–94 and 1993–2005. • Women are getting a proportionately larger share of employment in the nowadays receding segment of the economy.

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 65

The story is similar in terms of participation rates as well.2 Another significant feature of the growth in employment in the recent decade is the growth of subsidiary status of workers and fall in number of formal full-time workers. There has been growth of regular salaried workers in subsidiary status (subsidiary status workers are non-workers or unemployed engaged in an economic activity for part of the year) in urban areas for both men and women (Unni, p. 196). Now, what has been the nature of labour absorption within principal status employment across social groups and educational levels? Results from the NSSO 55th employment round, 1999–2000, and 61st round, 2004–05, suggest that in spite of the closing of gender gap in literacy, the gains of employment between men and women are starkly unequal. For example, within the illiterates, 53 per cent self-employed amongst STs are women. Amongst the self-employed in other groups like SCs, OBCs and others, women are between 42 to 47 per cent. The situation changes drastically, even for middle level education. Self-employed women are as low as 15 to 23 per cent across all social groups amongst those who have studied till middle level. Only 9 to 16 per cent of women have regular salaried jobs with middle level education across various social groups. On the type of employment across social groups, the employment story is once again not very encouraging. As Table 2G suggests, casual work absorbs 40 to 50 per cent of ST and SC workers compared to just 17 per cent for others. Regular salaried work absorbs 24 per cent of others but only 7, 14 and 13 per cent of ST, SC and OBC workers respectively get regular salaried work. With such difficult reality on employment that is facing us, what is the strategy of the government? The future of employment in the coming years is seen by the government sectorally in labour intensive manufacturing (food processing, textiles, tourism, hotels, catering, entertainment and construction) and in self-employment programmes.3 What can we say about the potential of employment

Table 2.1 Percentage distribution of female workers by social group and education level, 2004–05 ST

SC

OBC

Others

Total

Illiterate --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self Employed

53.31

42.04

47.54

41.90

46.36

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regular Salaried

40.50

43.54

35.67

30.70

37.35

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual Labour

49.58

43.86

47.33

35.35

44.94

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

51.21

43.18

46.95

38.99

45.32

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Below Primary

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self Employed

28.07

14.42

21.46

22.56

21.54

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regular Salaried

20.18

19.97

22.87

21.14

21.43

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual Labour

22.61

21.09

24.85

15.87

21.90

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

25.36

18.57

22.73

20.71

21.66

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Primary

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self Employed

24.87

16.43

21.71

20.63

20.96

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regular Salaried

20.88

18.89

13.83

10.07

14.13

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual Labour

24.95

15.01

21.65

15.49

18.84

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

24.63

16.14

20.80

17.98

19.42

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Middle

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self Employed

23.31

14.92

15.31

16.56

16.25

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regular Salaried

16.17

11.11

11.56

9.07

10.79

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual Labour

20.72

12.89

15.68

11.90

14.49

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

21.69

13.29

14.82

14.45

14.88

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Secondary

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self Employed

18.40

9.72

12.61

10.13

11.46

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regular Salaried

14.78

13.18

13.84

13.36

13.56

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual Labour

13.73

11.76

11.56

10.41

11.48

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

16.75

11.43

12.75

11.07

12.02

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Higher Secondary

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self Employed

15.49

12.76

9.89

8.31

9.49

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regular Salaried

17.11

19.23

17.12

18.03

17.80

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual Labour

18.97

10.59

7.41

7.23

9.42

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

16.78

14.93

12.53

12.35

12.88

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Graduate & Above

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self Employed

6.82

9.66

6.29

8.09

7.63

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regular Salaried

20.34

15.39

20.08

22.65

21.32

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual Labour

23.81

5.90

4.64

6.49

6.18

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

15.41

12.75

13.53

16.31

15.24

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

All

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self Employed

40.61

27.74

28.97

21.07

27.46

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regular Salaried

23.40

21.47

18.47

17.77

18.93

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual Labour

40.38

31.59

33.58

23.51

32.28

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

39.27

Source: NSSO 61st Round data, 2004–05.

28.81

28.87

20.71

27.60

66 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA in manufacturing? And which policy instruments will turn the manufacturing sector towards ‘labour intensive manufacturing’? The Table 2.2 below provides us a synoptic view of the role of manufacturing growth vis-à-vis employment across the Indian states. In the post-reform period, that is, from the early 1990s to 2003–04, 8.30 per cent organised manufacturing growth at an all India level has given 1.11 per cent growth in employment. Even in the prereform period, a 7.3 per cent output growth contributed to marginal decline in employment. Across states, even amongst the best industrially developed states, like Haryana and Gujarat, close to a 12 per cent output growth has given an employment growth of 4 and 2 per cent respectively. Across many states there has been a decline in employment in the post-reform period in spite of good growth performance in the post and even pre-reform period. How will a 12 per cent manufacturing growth (the number provided by the Approach Paper) help in addressing the problem of increasing unemployment in India? Are we going to have Table 2.2 Employment and output growth in organised manufacturing sector States

Pre-reform Employment

Andhra Pradesh

1.25

Post-reform Output 9.58

Employment 0.84

8.21

1.65

10.65

0.15

7.96

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Karnataka

0.73

8.65

3.14

9.26

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Haryana

2.15

9.40

4.14

11.94

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gujarat

–0.96

5.93

1.94

11.38

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bihar

0.15

5.70

–2.58

3.84

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Assam

0.06

11.21

–0.62

6.32

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tamil Nadu

1.64

7.13

1.97

7.86

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rajasthan

2.33

10.41

1.95

8.93

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Punjab

4.27

10.00

1.34

6.07

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Orissa

1.40

10.17

–0.06

2.97

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maharashtra

–1.37

6.73

1.64

8.03

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

West Bengal

–3.46

1.98

–1.54

4.44

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttar Pradesh

0.15

11.16

–1.63

5.93

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kerala

–1.83

4.97

1.37

9.86

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

All India

–0.01

7.35

1.11

Labour intensive mass manufacturing based on relatively lower skill levels provides an opportunity to expand employment in the industrial sector. Confederation has done exceptionally well industrial sector.... A key issue in this context is the need for greater flexibility in some of the labour law[s]. In particular, there is the need to consider appropriate amendments in Section V-B of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, to facilitate Exit and Contract Labour (Abolition and Regulation Act) to give to the industry the flexibility necessary to compete in international markets.

Output

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Madhya Pradesh

a completely new strategy for growth in manufacturing the coming year and will that be much more labour intensive? Notwithstanding the responsibility that is being transferred to the state governments, the more important issue is—what will the role of market be in this employment creation vis-à-vis the role of the State? Or rather, what role will the State play in regulating the market? The significance of policy appears to be most crucial here and there is nothing in the government documents so far to give us hints about the instruments or the framework. What the Approach Paper says about the labour intensive manufacturing is the following—

8.30

Source: Pankaj Vashist, Organised Manufacturing Sector in India: An Inter State Analysis, Unpublished M. Phil Dissertation, Centre for the Study of Regional Development, JNU, 2006.

So greater freedom for the private sector to hire and fire the labour is the only concrete suggestion that the government has to ‘promote’ labour intensive manufacturing. To what extent will it facilitate the desired objective is anybody’s guess. In response to the differential job opportunities across social groups, the policy of reservation in the public sector has been used for some time as a strategy to overcome discrimination and as a compensatory exercise. A large section of the society in India was historically denied the right to property, education and business, in addition to the civil rights, because of the practice of untouchability. In order to compensate for the historical denial and to have safeguards against discrimination, the reservation policy was introduced. In fact, the policy exists precisely because of the discrimination in the

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 67

private sector in terms of civil and political rights, discrimination in land and capital markets, and in education and social services. Some kind of an anti-discriminatory policy for the private sector, therefore, appears to be a necessity. Evidence suggests that the reservation policy in the public sector has benefited a lot of people.4

The National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme The most visible and most talked about governmental initiatives of the last one year are the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) and National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme (NREGP). NREGP is also listed in the Approach Paper by the Planning Commission as one of the strategies for creating employment. This is somewhat contrary to government’s own understanding earlier of NREGA, as an act for providing ‘income security/support to agricultural worker during the lean season’.5 It is more to tide over a crisis and not a strategic tool for meeting ‘employment targets’.6 NREGP, as a programme for income support, is also seen as a mechanism for channelising resources for development of land and water and promoting rural connectivity in conjunction with Bharat Nirman, the Backward Region Grant Fund and various other infrastructure oriented projects. The premise is that the projects are to be selected by the Panchayats so that they are relevant to the needs of the community. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act NREGA was passed in September 2005; the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) was implemented from 2 February 2006 in 200 identified districts of the country with the objective of providing 100 days of guaranteed unskilled wage employment to each rural household opting for it. The ongoing programmes of Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY) and National Food for Work Programme (NFFWP) have been subsumed under NREGS in these districts. NREGS is a demand-driven scheme, has its focus

Box 2.1 Reservation in the private sector* Corporate sector support for the disadvantaged groups has been on the agenda of the government of India for many years. The corporate houses have been given an assurance by the government that it would not resort to legislative action to impose a statutory obligation of reserving jobs for the disadvantaged groups (affirmative action or employment equity) on them. At the same time, the government has sought support from the private sector in government-private sector partnership on social justice. Indian business houses and organisations on their part have either questioned the government’s suggestion of extending the job reservation policy for India’s Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST’s) to the private sector or have asked for tax breaks. The industry in general has expressed its commitment to the concept of affirmative action by asking for the implementation of various social justice schemes for these sections of the population. The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) response has been that there would be a loss in competitiveness if the ‘quota system’ were thrust upon the private sector since merit will be compromised. Therefore, they are opposed to any idea that will hamper competitiveness (Twenty–two of India’s top business houses wrote to the Minister of Social Justice and Empowerment assuring the government that they would expand their activities for SC/STs like scholarships, vocational training and company-run schools. (Source: ‘Corporate India Rejects Caste based Reservation’ at http://www.infochangeindia.org/index.jsp, in the section on Corporate Social Responsibility). CII has asked companies to create opportunities for backward and forward linkages, implying corporate-funded training programmes for the weaker classes. In clear terms the nature of response from the industry suggests that it has rejected the government’s understanding that merit is not a natural phenomenon but shaped by social circumstance. Since there is caste-based discrimination in jobs, reservation in jobs is a different story compared to the question if an economically well off Scheduled Caste should be given economic benefits like scholarships and other economic concessions. Perhaps, it is also a gross misunderstanding that the reservation policy is based on less merit. The entire reservation policy in India and elsewhere is based on the premise that it would recruit people with required qualifications. It is mentioned in the constitution that reservations for discriminated groups is subject to efficiency and that efficiency is judged by required qualifications. Therefore it is not fully convincing for the private sector to suggest that reservation will affect merit and efficiency. The present discussion on private sector reservation and the private sector response is very limited and biased. There is only a talk of labour market reservation and employment in certain sectors of the private sector economy. There is no discussion over capital market, private housing, land market and government contracts to the private sectors. From the point of view of social equity, the focus should in fact be beyond the labour market alone. (*Excerpts from ‘Political Economy of Corporate Social Responsibility in India’, UNRISD TBS Programme Paper No. 18 November 2006, page 26.)

on works relating to water conservation, drought proofing (including afforestation, tree plantation), land development, flood control, drainage in water-logged areas and rural connectivity in terms of all-weather roads. The outcome of the scheme so far, as shared by the government in the Economic Survey is not very encouraging. The numbers provided suggest that 60 per cent of the total budgeted money was released till January, 98 per cent of households who demanded employment have been given employment, and nearly 40 per cent of persondays of work created was for women. What does the grass-roots experience tell us about the NREGP? The experience with NREGP

68 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Box 2.2 The NREGA provides for a multi-tier structure of authority for implementation and monitoring of the scheme The agencies involved are—Central Employment Guarantee Council; State Employment Guarantee Council; District Programme Coordinator; Programme Officer appointed by the State Government and Gram Panchayats for identification, execution and supervision of projects as per the recommendations of the Gram Sabha (village assembly). For accountability and transparency, Gram Sabhas are given power to conduct a regular social audit of individual schemes. Coordination between various levels of Government (vertical coordination) and across departments for programme identification and execution (horizontal coordination) are crucial for the success of the programme.

Box 2.3 Findings of the survey • Significant variations among States, Districts and Blocks in terms of Performances. Registration Percentage of ‘eligible’ households vary from 14.1 per cent in Madhubani (Bihar) to 100 per cent in Shivpuri (M.P.); Increasing Trends everywhere. • Overall percentage of Registered HH receiving Job Cards is 60–70. But variations range from 3.5 per cent of registered HH in Mahendragarh (Haryana) to 100 per cent of registered HH in Pakur (Jharkhand). • On an average, about 80 per cent of all Households are not aware that after getting the Job Card, one has to apply for getting wage employment. • Gram Sabha meetings (70–90 per cent) held for registration, but fewer Gram Sabhas (30–50 per cent) for identification and planning. More than 50 per cent of works under NREGA relate to Rural Connectivity, instead of peoples planning more expert driven or contractual planning. • Exclusive officials at Block and District levels for NREGA only in A.P. and Kerala. Lack of Technical Staff adversely affects Planning and Implementation of work. 25–50 per cent GPs across the States say that often Junior Engineer or other Technical Staff are not available to measure their works. So delayed and/or even under-payment of wages. • Less than 50 per cent of Elected Representatives of Panchayats, on an average, have received any input on their roles in implementation of NREGA. • Employment Guarantee Assistant not available to Gram Panchayats in most of states. Exceptions are A.P., Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Proactive Intermediate and District Panchayats provide support. • At most 20 per cent Gram Panchayats proactively display Information; About 10 per cent of Households are aware of the existence of Grievances Redressal Mechanism at Block levels; Less than 25 per cent of GPs across the States have formed Monitoring and Vigilance Committees; On average, less than 25–35 per cent GPs conduct Social Audit (if it could be said social audit at all). • Pressures on Panchayats are building up to deliver. In the absence of support systems, Panchayats find it difficult to respond and instead of strengthening the institutional role of panchayats, role of sarpanch is becoming the focus of attention.

so far is very mixed. What follows is an evaluation of the scheme based on the report of grass-roots organisations.7 The study covered 16 of the 27 states that come under the programme. These 16 states cover as many as 175 out of total 200 districts covered by NREGA under the current phase-I. These districts have 649 million rural population out of total 743 million as per Census of India 2001. The survey was conducted in 24 districts, 74 blocks and 563 Gram Panchayats between September and October 2006.

One major limitation of the NREGP so far is the complete disconnect between rural infrastructure plans and the NREGP-related creation of infrastructure. What does NREGP mean for employment? First, ‘in the past without the NREGA, the government had allocated a higher amount of resources in terms of proportion of GDP for rural employment programmes in India’.8 In terms of the share of central government budget, the NREG scheme has not made much of a difference to governmental expenditure on rural employment programmes. Furthermore, ‘NREG scheme has not been able to provide the employment that one would have expected in poor states that has largely to do with implementation and funding’. 9 The enrolment and provisioning story is provided state-wise in the table below, made available by the government. It is evident from Table 2.3 that EG enrolment for NREGS varies across states, the enrolment for the scheme far exceeds the number of BPL households in most states, except Bihar and Jharkhand. NREGS enrolment as a percentage of number of applicants is very low in Maharashtra, Karnataka, Bihar and Jharkhand. Enrolment falls far short of demand and EG provisioning is very low compared to the enrolment; just 24 per cent for all states put together. Even the fund utilisation ratio remains as low as 51 per cent even after one year of operation of the NREGA. However, the picture provided by the government in response to a Lok Sabha question in November 2006 is quite different. As Table 2.3 suggests, the actual employment provided nearly fulfils the demand for employment in most states. The reality on the ground, that is, the performance of the states on the basis of the household survey done by PRIA, is provided below in Table 2.4. On the basis of responses from sample households, a state with percentage of registered households more than and equal to 65 is categorised as good, districts with percentage ranging from 30 to 65 have been categorised as average and rest are under the category below average. The parameters on which the

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 69 Table 2.3 Status of implementation of NREGA Sl. No.

State

1

Andhra Pradesh

Districts

13

No. of rural HH (2001 census)

Estimated rural BPL families

Job cards issued

Demand for employment

Employment provided

Number

HH

Individual

67,15,598

7,42,074

43,80,650

15,46,503

21,19,916

HH

Individual

15,46,503

21,19,916

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2

Arunachal Pradesh

1

7,878

3,154

16,926

16,926

NR

16,926

NR

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

Assam

7

8,17,286

3,27,241

5,23,209

2,04,640

2,40,072

2,05,086

1,18,550

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4

Bihar

23

77,55,942

34,35,882

20,37,604

5,25,843

7,18,141

4,77,832

7,14,828

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5

Chhattisgarh

11

20,23,402

7,49,873

17,26,855

6,95,642

13,02,463

6,88,524

12,70,589

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

Gujarat

6

13,88,048

1,82,806

6,14,343

1,00,698

2,06,084

1,00,698

2,06,084

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7

Haryana

2

2,57,304

21,279

88,818

28,056

34,758

28,056

34,758

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8

Himachal Pradesh

2

1,50,715

11,967

88,056

41,960

44,307

39,320

41,303

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9

J&K

3

2,40,978

9,567

1,59,158

NR

20,261

NR

20,261

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

10

Jharkhand

20

33,95,640

15,04,269

19,14,800

5,81,689

8,17,934

5,78,343

8,13,672

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11

Karnataka

5

12,82,966

2,22,979

6,06,436

2,35,009

4,59,364

2,29,185

4,47,715

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12

Kerala

2

6,16,309

57,810

11,958

3,854

NR

3,750

NR

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

13

Madhya Pradesh

18

35,50,273

13,15,731

43,81,801

19,79,844

23,04,137

19,96,375

22,25,679

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

14

Maharashtra

12

37,13,013

8,80,727

24,67,037

1,91,272

4,35,861

1,91,272

4,35,861

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

15

Manipur

1

16,149

6,466

17,880

17,880

43,700

17,800

43,700

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

16

Meghalaya

2

1,01,657

40,703

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

17

Mizoram

2

21,661

8,673

22,918

20,801

12,100

20,801

12,100

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

18

Nagaland

1

31,939

12,788

27,884

NR

8,950

NR

8,950

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

19

Orissa

19

38,36,278

18,41,797

22,61,284

3,20,938

5,39,387

2,61,121

4,28,662

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

20

Punjab

1

2,21,815

14,107

37,326

37,326

40,310

30,715

NR

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

21

Rajasthan

6

12,94,087

1,77,808

14,93,628

9,27,890

12,46,742

9,27,890

12,46,742

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

22

Sikkim

1

10,649

4,264

4,323

3,611

4,336

3,611

4,336

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

23

Tamil Nadu

6

20,67,689

4,24,910

13,09,462

2,99,860

3,97,505

2,99,860

3,97,505

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

24

∗Tripura

1

57,788

23,138

64,587

73,971

1,15,696

72,348

1,13,159

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

25

Uttaranchal

3

2,06,059

64,332

1,91,657

40,153

40,345

40,008

40,198

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

26

Uttar Pradesh

22

71,62,466

22,36,122

34,14,000

17,18,544

19,84,778

16,11,342

18,97,582

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

27

West Bengal

10

70,64,480

22,50,037

41,16,470

14,98,036

23,99,698

13,51,840

23,34,565

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

TOTAL

200

5,40,08,069

1,65,70,504

3,19,79,070

1,11,10,946

1,55,36,845

Source: Response to Lok Sabha Starred Question 41, answered on 24 November 2006. Notes: NR—Not Reported. ∗ In the State of Tripura, demand for employment and employment provided are higher than job cards issued. Clarification has been sought from the State Government.

states have been categorised are registration, issuance of job cards, time slab in issuance of job cards, dissemination of provisions of NREGA, awareness level, timely payment of wages, prescribed wage payments, role of Gram Sabha and the role of elected representatives. Besides the general implementation and utilisation issues raised above, devolution of

genuine powers to Panchayats has not happened. They are institutions of local selfgovernance, not mere implementers of NREGA. The survey suggests that there is a need to strengthen Gram Sabha and match its responsibilities with resources and build capacities of Panchayats as a whole, not of Sarapanches only. There is also a need for recruitment and deployment of exclusive

1,07,39,206

1,49,76,715

70 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Table 2.4 Performance of states on the basis of sample household survey (as on 31 August 2006) Sl. Parameters No.

Good

Average

Below average

1

Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttaranchal

Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala

Haryana, Jharkhand, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal

Registration

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2

Issuance of Job Cards

A.P., Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, M.P., Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttaranchal

West Bengal, H.P., Uttar Pradesh

Haryana, Kerala, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

Time Lag in issuance of Job Cards

Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal

Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Orissa

Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4

Dissemination of Provisions of NREGA

Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttaranchal

Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh

Gujarat, Jharkhand, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5

Awareness of 100 days employment guarantee

A.P., Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Himachal, Pradesh Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, UP, West Bengal

Gujarat, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Uttaranchal

Jharkhand, Kerala, Tamil Nadu

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

Awareness of the need to apply to get job

Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, West Bengal

Bihar, Himachal Pradesh

Gujarat, Jharkhand, Kerala, M.P., Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, U.P., Uttaranchal, W. Bengal

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7

Timely Payment of Wages

A.P, Bihar, H.P., Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Uttaranchal, W. Bengal

Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh

Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Orissa

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8

Prescribed Wage Payments

A.P., Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Haryana, H.P., Maharashtra, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Uttaranchal, West Bengal

Gujarat, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh

Rajasthan

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9

Gram Sabha for Registration

A.P., Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, H.P., Maharashtra, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, W. Bengal

Haryana, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Haryana, Kerala Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

10

Gram Sabha for Perspective Planning

Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu

Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Uttaranchal

Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, Kerala, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, W. Bengal

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11

Gram Sabha for Social Audit

Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu

Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, H.P., M.P.

A.P., Haryana, Jharkhand, Kerala, Orissa, Rajasthan, U.P., W. Bengal

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12

Participation in Gram Sabha for NREGS

Maharashtra

Bihar, Chhattisgarh, H.P., Orissa, Tamil Nadu, U.P., West Bengal

Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, Kerala, M.P., Rajasthan, Uttaranchal

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

13

Availability of Exclusive Staff for NREGA

A.P., Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Kerala

Bihar, Maharashtra, Rajasthan

H.P., Jharkhand, Uttaranchal, W. Bengal, U.P., Orissa and M.P.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

14

Worksite Facilities

None

Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu

Rest of States

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

15

Orientation of Elected Representatives about provisions of NREGA

Kerala, Haryana, Gujarat, Chhattisgarh, Uttaranchal, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu

A.P., Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh

Bihar, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan

Source: PRIA, 2006.

officials for NREGA as ‘additional workadditional staff ’ attitude affects spirit and implementation of NREGA. Furthermore, centrally-sponsored scheme for establishment of Panchayat Resource Centres may be needed so as to provide a sustainable support

system for Panchayats. Furthermore, there is a pro-active need to address gender, caste, disability and region-specific issues. Notifying a comprehensive list of works under category (ix) of Schedule I (1) of NREGA will also help overcome the disconnect and create

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 71

a more people-oriented infrastructure besides creating jobs. Thus, overall the strategy of high growth has not been accompanied by high growth of employment. The existing strategy to bring about more ‘inclusive growth’ does not have much potential to deliver what is being promised. Even though the idea of employment guarantee is a laudable objective in an age and time when the focus in most countries is to withdraw all kinds of state guarantees, except guarantees on behalf of investors to lenders, the programme is experiencing many challenges that need to be addressed even before the minimalist objectives of this programme can be met. NREGP is more of an income-support programme which is intended to help people face the current drought of work and is not an instrument of generating employment in the medium to long run.

AGRICULTURAL MARKETING REFORM AND COMMODITY FUTURES MARKET: THE GROWTH STRATEGY OF INDIAN AGRICULTURE One of the major challenges of the 11th Plan must be to reverse the deceleration in agricultural growth from 3.2 per cent observed between 1980 and 1996–97 to a trend average of only 1.5 per cent subsequently. The deceleration is undoubtedly at the root of the problem of rural distress that has surfaced in many parts of the country. What is more, the problem is also not a purely distributional one, arising out of the special problems of small and marginal farmers and landless labour. In fact, the deceleration is generally affecting all farm-size classes. To reverse this trend, corrective policies adopted must focus not only on the small and marginal farmers, who continue to deserve special attention, but also on middle and large farmers who too suffer from productivity stagnation arising from a variety of concerns.

Agriculture has been the most discussed sector in recent months. In the current policy discourse, agriculture is being identified as

Box 2.4 Considerable job cards—not enough work! 1. In February 2006, 600 job cards were issued in the Raghunathpur Panchayat of Bihar. Though job cards were issued among 55 families of the panchayat but only two days of (that is 11th and 12th September 2006) work was assigned to them. The situation took a new perspective when the wage was distributed by the government employees as 25–36 rupees per day and no labourer claimed their wages. When the question was raised against the amount of the wages, the claim was that the work done in these days was not enough to get the Government-declared minimum wage as Rs 68 per day. All the NREGA and Minimum Wage scheme has come into a new debate when the supposed beneficiaries were asked about the schemes. All responses from the particular village, including those of their village headman Dr Ramchandra Prashad, were reflected as the situation should reconsider and reveal the conditionalities attached in these schemes by the government Babus and village politicians. 2. Though the job cards had been issued in the Baji Bujurg Panchayat of Bihar but no one could get employment out of that. In February 2006, six hundred job cards were issued in the Panchayat but there are a number of irregularities found in it. In most of the cases, the registration number and the photo of the concerned individual are found missing. The irregularities related to the missing of both registration number and photo are found with Mr Premchand Ram and Mr Sanjay Ram and some other card holders have their card with the registration number but those without the photo are Mr Sivaji Ram, Mr Pahalu Ram, Mr Arjun Ran and Mr Krushna Dev Ram. The registration number of the concerned individuals are 133, 233, 241, 249 and 135 respectively. If the mere number counts the achievement of a programme or event, then we could say that 600 individuals of Baji Bujurg Panchayat benefited from the scheme of NREGA, but it is mere callousness of the system and the procedure of implementation, which makes it a number game of issuing job cards without any employment. This is not the only Panchayat to face such type of crises in achieving the fruits of NREGA. Like Baji Bujurg, other Panchayats are Bishnu Bhabnagari, Machhahi, Rupannpatti, Mathurapura, and so on, which are continuously facing such type of crises, though a good number of job cards have been issued in all of these Panchayats. The headman of Bishnu Babhnagari Panchayat mentioned that ‘NREGA has become the hope against the hope of people of our Panchayat. We are very happy to get the job cards but nothing came out of that in the long year of getting job cards. Rather the situation became more horrible when the people of our Panchayat were offered a very low amount of wages per day’. Source: Wada Na Todo Abhiyan, Public Hearing on NREGA, India Social Forum, November 2006.

Box 2.5 Implementation of NREGA—story from Rajasthan To be employed and earn a livelihood has been a distant dream among the rural unemployed masses. But a sign of hope was found when the National Rural Employment Scheme came into force in February 2006 in Rajasthan. Again the question of its practicality echoed more frequently in the voices of the people who were dreaming to make it out from the traps of hopeless poverty. Jhalawar is one of the six districts of Rajasthan in which the scheme has been operating from February 2006. To consider a particular case of Mr Permanand Lodhi of Jhalarpatanam Samiti, against the fruits of the policy, he responds as follows: He survives with his wife and one kid and daily wage is the only source of his livelihood. To get out from the traps of the vulnerability, he registered in the employment list of the Panchayat. In spite of all his initiatives, he could not get a job card. So it all resulted in debarring him against his hopes of getting a job out of the government initiatives. Finally the National Rural Employment Scheme has become a distant dream for Permanand to get a job and support his small family to lead a life. Source: CECOEDECON, Jaipur, Rajasthan, 2006.

a sector that has ‘slowed growth’, ‘increased unemployment’, ‘shows rigidity’ and is acting as a ‘dampener’ to the euphoria of reforms.

72 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Box 2.6 Some critical concerns of NREGA in the context of Orissa The much talked about National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is being implemented in 19 backward districts of Orissa. The prime objective of this Act is to provide at least 100 days of wage employment to every household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual jobs. Orissa government has formulated Orissa Employment Guarantee Scheme in accordance with the NREG Act. Unlike other wage employment programmes, this is unique in the sense that it guarantees employment and it can be looked upon in the right perspective. So the civil society organisations that are working to improve the lives of the poor can take it as a wonderful opportunity to monitor their effectiveness. In the context of 47 per cent of total population living below the poverty line, this Act is supposed to benefit a large mass of rural populace. The districts, which have been selected, are mostly backward and inhabited by tribal population. There is acute poverty and rampant unemployment situation prevailing in these districts. The concentration of poverty is as high as 84 per cent in Kalahandi to 18 per cent in Gnajam as per 1999—2000 poverty estimate. So the Act is expected to benefit a large mass if it is implemented in its true spirit. There are many difficulties, which the people as well as government officials encounter while implementing the scheme. Some of our observations are listed below. • Current registration is based on 2002 BPL list. Those villages and the households, which are not covered under BPL list, are excluded from the registration process. • It is also found that tribal populations are mostly absent during the visit of the officials. The people in the village have gone either to the field or the forest to collect forest produce for their livelihood. The Panchayat Offices remain closed for most of the time in the tribal pockets like Koraput, Malkanagiri, Kalahandi and the rural people face difficulties in registration. So the mismatch in timing creates a lot of difficulties in the registration process. • The executive officers of the Panchayats are also overburdened with various activities such as maintaining beneficiary list, Panchayat accounts and executing various developmental activities of the block. So the Panchayat Executive Officers in tribal districts consider it as an additional burden and the problem is compounded with many uneducated elected representatives in these areas. There is a delay in registration and issue of job cards due to lack of manpower such as technical assistance and computer professionals at Panchayat offices. In many cases, one Panchayat Executive Office is in charge of more than 2 to 3 Panchayats as a result of which he cannot rationale the time. (For example, in Koida Block of Sundargarh district, one VLW is in charge of 3 GPs namely Kalta, Malda & Koida.) • In some Panchayats, registration is made on the basis of target given by a competent authority. So the Gram Panchayat is in a hurry to register the families as per the target, without considering the actual needs of the community. (For example, in Sumura Panchayat of Hemgir Block of Sundergarh district, out of 939 eligible households only 535 households have been registered. In Malda GP of Koida Block, they have even registered the migrant families to achieve the target.) • People are not interested in registering in the current period as they are involved in agricultural activities. So the timing of the implementation of the programme is a critical issue. • It is also found that the implementing authorities emphasise on construction activity and infrastructure building, which neglect livelihood plan of the Panchayats. Durable assets are not created in this scheme. Since there is flow of resources, the authorities take up activities like construction of kachha road, digging of ponds or repairing of ponds. These activities are not likely to create durable assets in rural areas, which benefits the rural poor in the long run. • People are not aware of the schemes and provisions in inaccessible areas of Koraput and Sundergarh. The government officials are not willing to visit these areas as a result of which people of some selected Panchayats are yet to avail these facilities. PRI representatives at local level are not fully aware of NREGS activities due to which they are not able to guide people properly. • A delay in payment is marked in two Panchayats such as Nanpur and Kandapasi in Keonjhar district due to lack of technical expertise in measurement of work. It is found that the junior engineer cannot give time for this. Similarly the wage paid in Banddhabahal Gram Panchayat in Sundergarh district is Rs 45 in spite of the fact that the state government has fixed a wage rate of Rs 55. (Box 2.6 continued )

In the early years of reform, agriculture was part of the policy debate at two levels—the agreement on agriculture in WTO and its developed-country bias and reforms within agriculture domestically, including issues like ‘too much’ food stocks, high costs of holding them, restrictive market to sell agricultural goods, non-competitive environment within agriculture, need for bringing the private players in agricultural trade, need for greater diversification from food crops to other commercial crops and so on. The approach paper in 2006 suggests—doubling the growth of irrigated area, improving water management, effective extension, diversifying into high value outputs, ensuring food security, promoting animal husbandry, providing easy access to credit, improving functioning of markets, and refocusing on land reforms— as a part of the ‘holistic’ framework for agricultural growth. It is worthwhile asking how 2006 strategy is different from early 1990s in its thrust. If the current concerns in agriculture are supply-side constraints, food scarcity, import of food often at higher rates than domestic production costs, agriculture becoming unviable, declining public investment and overall neglect of agriculture—then how are they related to the last 15 to 20 years of strategy in agriculture? Have the increasing number of farmers’ suicides, the depressing real wages in agriculture, the frequent failure of crops and the increasing vulnerability in agriculture anything to do with the agricultural policy or rather ‘absence’ of policy since reforms? And all this, when the agreement on agriculture has not been imposed on us from the international institutions.

Performance of Indian Agriculture It is an important sector supporting close to 115 million families across the country and providing employment to around 58.2 per cent of all workers in the country. It was admitted by the Finance Minister in his budget speech in 2007 that agriculture remained the main challenge and he devoted the last 20 minutes of his budget speech to

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 73

agriculture. He admitted that ‘[T]here is no dearth of schemes; there is no dearth of funds. What needs to be done is to deliver the intended outcomes’ and further conceded that ‘[S]adly, the extension system (read administration) seems to have collapsed’. According to the 59th Round Survey Report of National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) submitted on July 2005, 40 per cent of the farmer households do not like farming as a profession as they consider it unprofitable, risky, lacking social status and so on. While 27 per cent of the farmer households consider agriculture being not profitable, 8 per cent consider it as a risky venture. Remaining 5 per cent dislike it for some other reasons, which also include lack of social status.10 It is important to mention here that the cultivators and agricultural labour still remain a very significant part of the workforce across states of India. In fact in most states, they constitute more than 50 per cent of the workforce (Table 2.5). The agricultural sector has grown at a mere average of 2.3 per cent yearly during the Tenth Five-Year Plan, which was no improvement on the yearly growth of 2.2 per cent during the Ninth Five-Year Plan. According to the draft approach paper for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, achieving the planned 4 per cent growth rate for agriculture would not be an easy task in the light of the fact that actual growth of agricultural GDP was only 1 per cent per annum in the first three years of Tenth Plan, which would limit this below 2 per cent for the complete five-year period. Table 2.6 clearly indicates that growth actually fell short of the targeted growth rates in certain years of the Ninth Plan and in the first four years of the Tenth Plan (2002–06) in agriculture and allied sectors. A national consensus needs to be formulated on agricultural development which becomes even more important keeping in mind the fact that while most of the schemes and programmes originate from the Centre, agriculture is a State subject and falls under the purview of the states.

(Box 2.6 continued ) • There is also a huge difference between the families registered and the job cards issued. (For example, in Kudeikela GP of Lahunipada Block of Sundergarh district, out of 448 registered families, only 35 families are given Job Cards as on 31 March.) The following table describes the real picture in some selected Panchayats of Koraput district. Job cards issued vary from as low as 8 per cent in Haladikunda Panchayat to 64 per cent in Dandabadi Panchayat. The average percentage of household received job cards in case of 6 sample Panchayats is 34, which is significantly less than the district average of 93 per cent. Source: CYSD, Bhubaneswar, 2006.

Box 2.7 NREGA—Some realities from Gujarat 1. Shantaben Raisingbhai Chauhan (35 years), is a resident of Dhandhalapur village of Sehera Panchayat, Panchamahaal, Gujarat, told that work started after collective demand from people, but since it was a work of road construction, wages were low. As there are a number of difficulties faced by the people of a particular village, he pointed out that the facility of drinking water, first-aid, crèche and shade were not made available and grains (on food grain coupons issued towards wage payment) were not available for more than three months. The dissatisfaction on the NREGA scheme were reflected by Shantaben as he mentioned that ‘work stopped mid way; when asked for the reason, Taluka Development Officer and the NREGA staff informed that the works have been stopped in the entire Taluka due to onset of monsoon, demand for work was made again in writing, but it did not start even after repeated follow up at village as well as Taluka level.’ 2. Leelaben Rumalbhai Patel, (35 years), is a resident of Mangalpur village of Sehera Panchayat, Panchamahaal, Gujarat, who mentioned that no Gram Sabha was organised for sanctioning the village plan and Rs 2 was charged for the NREGA registration but no attention was given to sanction any work with repeated demand for it. In a number of attempts to point out the setbacks of the NREGA, Leelaben mentioned that, ‘there is a lot of discrimination going on in granting work; those who were not holding job cards or did not have their names in the job cards were given priority, some hamlets were dropped purposefully and work was stopped within eight days of starting’. 3. Manuben Parmabhai Parmar, (40 years), a resident of Gangadia village of Sehera Panchayat, Panchamahaal, Gujarat, expressed his disheartedness over NREGA as he pointed out that ‘job cards were issued after 3 months of registration and wages were paid later than 15 days of works done. But the problem became more acute when the work stopped without adequate notice under the pretext of onset of monsoon and the wage paid for the work was as low as Rs 19 per day and violated all norms of minimum wages and human rights.’ It is the common complaint of all people that the facility of drinking water, first-aid crèche and shade were not made available and grain (on food grain coupons issued towards wage payment) was not available for more than two months. Source: Wada Na Todo Abhiyan, Public Hearing on NREGA, India Social Forum, November 2006.

Growth in the agricultural sector does not present a very favourable picture in spite of the fact that numerous special programmes have been announced for this sector. In recent years, the agricultural sector has witnessed low growth, reduction of the share of agriculture in the GDP, inflationary pressure on some primary products and reduction in the potential growth of other sectors by dampening of demand.11 A moderate annual growth rate of 3 per cent in the

74 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Table 2.5 Cultivators and agricultural workers as a proportion of total workers Cultivators India

31.7

Agricultural workers 26.5

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jammu & Kashmir

42.4

6.6

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Himachal Pradesh

65.3

3.1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Punjab

22.6

16.3

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chandigarh

0.6

0.2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttaranchal

50.1

8.3

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Haryana

36.0

15.3

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Delhi

0.8

0.3

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rajasthan

55.3

10.6

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttar Pradesh

41.1

24.8

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bihar

29.3

48.0

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sikkim

49.9

6.5

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Arunachal Pradesh

57.8

3.9

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nagaland

64.7

3.6

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Manipur (Excl. 3 sub-divisions)

40.2

12.0

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mizoram

54.9

5.7

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tripura

27.0

23.8

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Meghalaya

48.1

17.7

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Assam

39.1

13.2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

West Bengal

19.2

25.0

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jharkhand

38.5

28.2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Orissa

29.8

35.0

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chhattisgarh

44.5

31.9

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Madhya Pradesh

42.8

28.7

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gujarat

27.3

24.3

10 per cent with and 6 per cent in the year 2005–06.12 However, the annual growth rate of agricultural and allied sectors is a cause for concern, which can be seen in Table 2.7. ‘Low level of public investment, exhaustion of the yield potential of new high yielding varieties of wheat and rice, unbalanced fertiliser use, low seeds replacement rate, an inadequate incentive system and post-harvest value addition’,13 indicate the structural weakness of the agricultural sector. The share of agriculture (including the allied sectors of forestry and fishery) in total GDP has seen a constant decline over the years from 25.3 per cent in 1999–2000 to 19.9 per cent in 2005–06. This declining trend can be seen clearly in Table 2.8. One of the structural weaknesses of agricultural sector has been the constant decline in the public expenditure in agriculture over the years, which has been one of the areas of concern. Public expenditure in rural development for instance has declined from 3.6 per cent during the Sixth Plan to a mere 2.4 per cent by the Tenth Plan (Figure 2.3). The problem becomes even more acute in the absence of any considerable private investment in the agricultural sector. Government has to step in with matching budgetary allocations to fill this gap (Table 2.9).

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Daman & Diu

5.5

1.8

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dadra & Nagar Haveli

34.6

12.9

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maharashtra

28.7

26.3

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Andhra Pradesh

22.5

39.6

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Karnataka

29.2

26.5

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Goa

9.6

6.8

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lakshadweep

0.0

0.0

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kerala

7.0

15.8

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tamil Nadu

18.4

31.0

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Pondicherry

3.2

21.1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Andaman & Nicobar Islands

15.8

3.8

Source: 2001 Census.

first six years of the millennium starting from 2001–02 is a cause of concern. There were some encouraging signs in 2003–04 when the sector witnessed the annual growth rate of

Farmers’ Suicides Statistics notwithstanding, the conditions of farmers themselves is no better, with alarming increase in their suicide rates. The plight of the farmers can be gauged from the fact that close to 40,000 farmers have committed suicide since 1997. The situation has gone from bad to worse and the Prime Minister expressed his concern in no uncertain terms in his Independence Day Speech on 15 August 2006 that ‘[w]hen I visited Vidarbha, the plight of the farmers there made a deep impact on me. The agricultural crisis that is forcing them to take the desperate step of committing suicide needs to be resolved. We need to think about how we can provide a decent livelihood to our farmers.’

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 75

Interestingly, the Prime Minister’s visit, along with the agriculture minister, to the Vidarbha region on 30 June and 1 July 2006 was followed by an increase in the number of farmers’ suicides in the region. ‘Well over 150 of these (suicides) have occurred between July 2 and August 21, that is, in 51 days after the PM visited Vidarbha. This means the rate at which the suicides are occurring has risen, from two a day in the pre-visit period to roughly one every eight hours.’14 This happened in spite of the fact that a special package for mitigating the stress of the farmers was announced by the government. Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh expressed his inability and ‘air of injured innocence’ at a press meet in Nagpur after the increase in suicides. The Chief Minister said that ‘[H]e was baffled. Why did people insist on killing themselves? That too, when his government and the Centre had worked so hard to make their relief “packages” work? Neither the Central nor the State measures address a single major cause of the distress. No cotton prices, no debt waiver or duties against dumping or anything else.’15 Table 2.10 below shows the trend in the suicide of the farmers in different states from 2001 onwards. It has been pointed out on numerous occasions that the major reasons for the suicide by these farmers are crop failure, indebtedness, drought conditions and social and economic insecurity. However on 18 May 2006, the minister of agriculture admitted in the Rajya Sabha that investigations on agrarian distress in different states show that the leading cause for the suicide among farmers is indebtedness. NSSO in its survey report on ‘Indebtedness of Farmer Households’ (May 2005) reveals that out of 89.35 million rural households engaged in farming, 43.42 million farmers or 48.6 per cent of the farmer households are indebted (see Table 2.11).

Reforms in Agriculture Markets and Commodity Futures Market Two areas of agricultural strategy need to be carefully evaluated in response to the crisis

Figure 2.3 Trends of public expenditure on rural development by central and state governments at a percentage of NNP factor cost

Source: Budget 2007–08: Dream or Dispair, Centre for Budget Governance Accountability, March 2007.

Table 2.6 Agriculture growth rates Year

Targeted average annual growth Rate (%)

Actual annual growth rate (%)

Ninth Five-Year Plan --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1997–98

3.9

–2.4

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1998–99

3.9

6.2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1999–2000

3.9

0.3

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2000–2001

3.9

–0.03

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2001–02

3.9

6.17

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tenth Five-Year Plan

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2002–03

4.0

–6.9

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2003–04

4.0

10.0

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2004–05

4.0

0.7

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2005–06

4.0

Source: Central Statistical Organisation of India, Government of India.

being experienced in agriculture and we need to see their impact on the farmers and the sector at large. These are agriculture marketing (the PPP approach) and commodity futures market. Ministry of Agriculture has formulated a ‘model law’ (page 175, Survey 2006) on agricultural marketing in consultation with the State/UT Governments to bring about reforms in marketing. This law enables establishment of private markets, direct purchase centres, consumer-farmers markets for direct sale, and promotion of

3.9

76 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Table 2.7 Annual average growth rate at constant prices (%) Five year plan

Overall GDP growth rate

Seventh Plan (1985–90)

6.0

Agriculture & Allied sectors 3.2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Annual Plan (1990–92)

3.4

1.3

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Eighth Plan (1992–97)

6.7

4.7

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ninth Plan (1997–2002)

5.5

2.1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tenth Plan (2002–07)

7.6

2.3

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2002–03

3.8

-7.2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2003–04

8.5

10.0

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2004–05 (P)

7.5

0.0

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2005–06 (Q)

9.0

6.0

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2006–07 (A)

9.2

2.7

Source: CSO, Government of India. Notes: P: Provisional, Q: Quick estimates, A: Advance estimates. Growth rates prior to 2001 based on 1993–94 prices and from 2000–2001 onwards based on new series at 1999–2000 prices.

Table 2.8 Percentage share of agriculture including allied sectors of forestry, logging and fisheries in the Total GDP Year

Percentage share of GDP

1999–2000

25.3

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2000–2001

24.3

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2001–02

24.4

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2002–03

21.9

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2003–04

22.2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2004–05

20.8

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2005–06

19.9

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2006–07 (April–June)

19.2

Source: Central Statistical Organisation, Government of India.

Table 2.9 Investment in agriculture Year

Investment in agriculture (in Rs crore) Total

1999–2000 43,473

Total Investment in agriculture as a per cent of GDP at constant 1999–2000 prices

Public

Private

7,716

35,757

2.2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2000–2001 38,735

7,155

31,580

1.9

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2001–02

47,043

8,746

38,297

2.2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2002–03

46,823

7,962

38,861

2.1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2003–04

45,132

9,376

35,756

1.9

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2004–05

48,576

10,267

38,309

1.9

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2005–06

54,539

13,219

41,320

1.9

Source: Economic Survey of India, 2005, CBGA, 2007.

public–private partnership in management and development of agricultural markets in the country. So far 15 states and 5 union

territories have amended their Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee Act in line with the MoA strategy. The Economic Survey presents ITC e-choupal, as perhaps its flagship initiative (says ‘novel private sector initiatives to improve the marketing channels in agriculture’) on agricultural marketing (pp. 175–76, Economic Survey 2006). This ITC initiative is considered a model for interface between farmers and global markets. Our field study (see Box 2.8) to understand the e-choupal initiative in Sehore district of Madhya Pradesh to link the oilseeds farmers of Sehore with the port of Chicago in USA provides an interesting insight into these marketing reforms and some of the questions that need to be answered to understand the full meaning of such ‘reforms’ for the large mass of small and medium farmers. The influence of the private players in making a difference to the seed variety that is used provides an interesting peep into the privatisation of extension services that has been initiated as a result of market reforms. In any case, as the approach paper suggests, the government is more than willing at this point to hand over the extension services also to the private sector. The experience of agricultural marketing reforms in Madhya Pradesh suggests that monopoly in agricultural markets is created; small and marginal farmers become more vulnerable because of increased control of big farmers and big companies that trade in agriculture products leading to market volatility and uncertainty; and there is increased indebtedness of farmers. Commodity futures market has grown manifold in India. Rice, wheat, jute, gur, cotton, coffee, major pulses, groundnut oil, edible oilseeds, and spices are all traded in the futures market and their share is increasing over the years. As a proportion of GDP, the commodity derivative trading turnover was only 4.7 per cent in 2003–04; it increased to 18.3 in 2004–05 and then to a whopping 76.8 per cent in 2005–06 (p. 77, Survey, 2006). In terms of value, gur seed and chana constitute more than 10 per cent of the market value in the commodity futures market today. A temporary ban has been imposed

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 77

on futures trading in urad and tur dal to ensure what the government calls ‘orderly market conditions’. Simply put, what the futures market does in general and for agriculture sector in particular is to provide an institutional role for speculators to influence prices. Government recognises this but believes that this influence is a mere aberration and not a long term systemic influence.16 The possibility of speculators taking the nation for a ride is also recognised by the government when it says that ‘an effective architecture for regulation of trading and for ensuring transparency as well as timely flow of information to the market participants would enhance the utility of commodity exchanges in efficient price discovery and minimise price shock triggered by unanticipated supply demand mismatches.

Table 2.10 Number of farmers suicides from 2001 to 2006

HEALTH INEQUITIES IN INDIA—ARE WE CLOSING THE GAP?

Source: Response to Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No.1809 on 11 August 2006.

Education and Curative health are available in the market to those who can afford to pay. However, quality sources of supply are costly and beyond the reach of the common man (sic), and other privately provided services are of highly variable quality. In our situation, access for the mass of our people can only be assured through a substantial effort at public financing of these services. In most cases, this means public provision though there is obviously room for partnership with private entities, including especially nonprofit bodies and civil society involvement.17

Andhra Pradesh 2001–02 2002–03 267 313

2003–04 393

2004–05 1,126

2005–06 300

2006–07 (Up to 31.5.2006) 11

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Karnataka* 2001–02 2,505

2002–03 2,340

2003–04 708

2004–05 271

2005–06 152

2006–07 (Up to 31.5.2006) 7

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maharashtra 2001 2002 50 122

2003 170

2004 620

2005 572

2006 (up to June 30) 746

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Punjab The Punjab government has recently intimated that between 1997 to September 2005, 179 farmers committed suicide because of various reasons, but without giving year-wise break up --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kerala 2001 56

2002 69

2003 74

2004 135

2005 120

2006 (Up to June) 52

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Orissa 2001–02 2

2002–03 1

2003–04 Nil

2004–05 Nil

2005–06 (1.3.05 to 30.9.2005) 5

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gujarat 2001 13

2002 6

2003 Nil

2004 4

2005 1

Note: *In Karnataka, the figures for the years 2000–2001 to 2002–03 are based on the records with the state Crime records Bureau and for the subsequent years on the basis of records maintained by the state agriculture department.

Table 2.11 Estimated number of indebted farmer households State

Andhra Pradesh

Estimated no. of rural households 1,42,512

Estimated no. of farmers’ households 60,339

Estimated no. of Percentage of indebted farmers’ farmers’ households households indebted 49,493

82.0

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Arunachal Pradesh

15,412

1,227

72

5.9

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Assam

41,525

25,040

4,536

18.1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bihar

1,16,853

70,804

23,383

33.0

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chhattisgarh

36,316

27,598

11,092

40.2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gujarat

63,015

37,845

19,644

51.9

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

India’s performance in reducing health inequalities has remained a matter of concern. Disparities and differentials in health are a recognised feature of the existing health situation in the country. There are intra-state differences, income-based variations, and caste and gender based differences in availability of health services, performance of health institutions and health outcomes.

Haryana

31,474

19,445

10,330

53.1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Himachal Pradesh

11,928

9,061

3,030

33.4

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jammu & Kashmir

10,418

9,432

3,003

31.8

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jharkhand

36,930

28,238

5,893

20.9

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Karnataka

69,908

40,413

24,897

61.6

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kerala

49,942

21,946

14,126

64.4

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Madhya Pradesh

93,898

63,206

32,110

50.8

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maharashtra

1,18,177

65,817

36,098

54.8

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Manipur

Health Status • Inter-state comparison in terms of Life Expectancy clearly shows that states like

2,685

2,146

533

24.8

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Meghalaya

3,401

2,543

103

4.1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mizoram

942

780

184

23.6

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 2.11 continued )

78 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA (Table 2.11 continued ) State

Nagaland

Estimated no. of rural households

Estimated no. of farmers’ households

973

805

Estimated no. of Percentage of indebted farmers’ farmers’ households households indebted 294

36.5

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Orissa

66,199

42,341

20,250

47.8

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Punjab

29,847

18,442

12,069

•

65.4

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rajasthan

70,172

53,080

27,828

52.4

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sikkim

812

531

1.74

38.8

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tamil Nadu

1,10,182

38,880

28,954

74.5

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tripura

5,977

2,333

1,148

49.2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttar Pradesh

2,21,499

1,71,575

69,199

40.3

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttaranchal

11,959

8,962

644

7.2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

West Bengal

1,21,667

69,226

34,696

•

50.1

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Group of UT’s

2,325

732

372

50.8

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

All India

14,78,988

8,93,504

4,34,242

48.6

•

Source: Response for Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 2068 on 12 August 2005 (derived from NSSO Survey Report on ‘Indebtedness of Farmer Households’, May 2005).

Box 2.8 Field notes*: Oil seeds in sehore, MP • Oilseeds (Soyabean in particular) were introduced in MP in the early 1970s. They were considered then ‘trouble free crops’, adaptable to all water conditions and helped overcome the problem of Kharif fallow in the region. • Soyabean was expected to succeed because of its commercial worth and the immense potential for exports of DOC (Deoiled Oil Cakes) to the developed countries. • Area under Soyabean increased from early 1980s in the region. The major problem before the take-off of Soyabean in the region before 1980s was of marketing. The crop had no domestic consumption, no local processing, and no domestic market. The only use known to locals was for cattle feed. • Oil Fed (cooperative of Oilseed producers) filled this gap in early 1980s all over the state. The crop was successfully entrenched in the region with the help of extension services provided by agriculture universities and their local centres. Indigenous varieties adaptable to local conditions evolved over time. • Rough estimates given by locals are that in early 1980s only 3,000 hectares were under Soyabean; now it is around 45 lakh hectares. • Oil Fed developed local network of co-operative societies for procurement and established own processing plants ensuring stable prices through the local market system (the exact system of marketing then and now needs to be documented). • Oil Fed network grew between 1980s and 1990s. At its peak, Oil Fed (1992–93) was procuring and processing around 10 per cent of the produce in the state of Madhya Pradesh. Amongst private players, Ruchi Soya, Indore has around 10 to 12 per cent of the market. Rest of the market lies with other smaller players. • The downhill for Oil Fed was clear by 1997–98 (the year in which the crop of Soyabean was devastated because of rains). Oil Fed’s decline started from mid-1990s and reached substantial proportions by 1997–98. • The ITC took over the network and structures of Oil Fed since late 1990s and filled in the vacant space in the market leftover by Oil Fed. • ITC entered the Soyabean market in the mid 1990s because of high export potential of Soyabean products and byproducts. • ITC has now plans to venture into the Oilseed market in a big way. They have introduced their new business plan in Sehore very recently. They have opened the first Rural Departmental Store of India in Sehore on 15 August 2004. This store will sell all possible goods to the farmers, will also be the centre that will buy Soyabean, will also be the (Box 2.8 continued )

•

•

Kerala, Punjab and Maharashtra are better performers; both males and females in these states have a life expectancy of more than 65 years whereas Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa are yet to cross the 60-year mark (see Figure 2E). In case of Infant Mortality Rate (IMR), Kerala, Goa, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal and the Northeastern states like Manipur, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram have done well whereas states like Uttar Pradesh, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh have more than five times mortality rates than those of better performing states. There is a considerable difference in ruralurban IMR. Rural areas still have very high IMR compared to urban areas. Disparity persists not only regionally but also across socio-economic groups. Castewise break-up of incidences of infant and child mortality clearly shows that it is the Scheduled Castes and tribal households that are deprived the most. This is true for both rural and urban areas (see Figure 2F). Health outcomes are also differentially distributed across income groups. The association of standard of living index and neonatal mortality, postnatal mortality, infant mortality, child mortality and under-5 mortality are all biased in favour of the better-off households (see Figure 2G). In terms of environmental sanitation associated with housing conditions and access to sources of drinking water, the differentials are alarmingly different between Scheduled Caste and Tribe households on one hand and other households.

Gender differences in health status are most noticeable aspects of health inequality in India. Although the female child is biologically stronger than the male child, but the IMR figures across some states suggest differently. Punjab, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Uttaranchal, Jharkhand and Maharashtra have very high female infant mortality (Figure 2.5). A similar pattern is seen when we look at the male-female gap in infant mortality rates across both rural and urban areas (Figure 2.6). Although there has

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 79

been some improvement in male-female gap in IMR, inter-state differences suggest that female children are still neglected. Maternal mortality is another health concern that the country faces.

Health Infrastructure and Utilisation of Health Services Rural-urban disparities prevail even in case of availability of health services. Most of the specialised health centres like district hospitals or community health centres are located in urban or semi-urban areas. In the rural areas where the major chunk of population lives, the main source of health care is the government health centres, traditional healers, quacks and the private practitioners. The government health centres that include primary health centres and sub-centres are the first contact available for the rural masses. But in recent years, the quality of government services in the rural areas has deteriorated to a great extent making these health centres dysfunctional due to lack of medicines and medical staff. A recent study by

(Box 2.8 continued ) institution to provide extension services to farmers, and will also provide medical and educational facilities to farmers and their families. ITC wants to be one-stop centre for the rural market and for the diverse needs of the rural population. Re-skilling and training the local women for various skills is also part of the ITC plan for Sehore. • Initially ITC was procuring Soyabean in the district and in the state of MP through the various hubs (collection centres) created for a group of 15 to 20 villages. The government is entitled to get 2 per cent tax on the total transaction in the market for agricultural produce. As a result, ITC has to go through the local market, buying the auctioned produce in the market through its appointed middlemen. • After the change in the APMC Act, ITC has now entered the market as a direct buyer and it need not go through the local market. Such licenses are being given to companies that promise to pay the government for the procurement of at least 100,000 tonnes per season. ITC plans to capture around 70 per cent of the Soyabean market in the coming years. With this change, the mandi tax will no longer reach the local mandi (an important source of local tax), rather the money will get transferred directly to the State government in the form of a license fee. • The price for Soyabean is closely integrated with the Chicago Board of Trade prices. ITC has established ‘Choupals’ all over the state that have access through the Internet to the international prices. The local co-ordinator of these Choupals is supposed to keep the farmers informed about the international trends in Soyabean prices. * Notes from the field visit for the study on ‘Globalisation and the Poor: Sustaining Rural Livelihoods In India’ Shastri Applied Research Project, JNU and University of Guelph, September, 2006.

Reproductive and Child Health Survey (RCH, IIPS 2003) has evaluated the functioning of health centres up to the district level. It was found that there existed a huge inter-state gap in the quality of the health centres. Some of the better performers in

Figure 2.4 Rural–urban differential in infant mortality rate, 2005

Source: Statistical Report, Registrar General of India, October 2006.

80 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA terms of availability of health professionals are Andhra Pradesh, Tripura, Maharashtra, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. In terms of infrastructure, more than 80 per cent PHCs in Figure 2.5 Male–female infant mortality rate, 2005

Source: Statistical Report, Registrar General of India, October 2006.

Figure 2.6 Male–female IMR differential in rural and urban areas, 2005

Source: Statistical Report, Registrar General of India, October 2006.

Gujarat, Maharashtra, Sikkim and Tripura are well equipped. More than 70 per cent of the PHCs in Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and Tripura have adequate supply. In contrast, in states

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 81

such as Orissa, West Bengal, Rajasthan and Bihar, less than a quarter of their PHCs have adequate medical staff. Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Bihar and Jharkhand have less than 10 percent of their PHCs with adequate infrastructure and Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have less than 20 per cent of their PHCs with adequate supply. In case of availability of doctors, amongst those who are posted in Primary Health Centres in rural areas, in most of the states and union territories they were found to be available. In case of specialists working in rural areas, there is a great dearth across the country. Although specialists are very important, the first level of health care is delivered though different paramedical staff working in the rural areas. Even in case of paramedical staff, there is a shortage. In case of morbidity, people resort to various kind of services. The range is from use of primary health centres to use of specialised hospitals located in the urban areas. The health sector in India is a mixture of public health institutes and private players. As elaborated earlier, there are considerable socio-economic inequities in terms of health in India. With uneven economic development in the country and rapid rise of private services, in what way people are able to meet their basic health needs is an important question that has not been resolved. Healthcare strategy in India has been changing considerably; especially so after the liberalisation policy of the government, wherein the role of government has been limited to a great extent and health care is losing its essence of being a public good. With the increase in demand for health care, the presence of private players in the country has increased considerably. The economic reform process initiated in the country in the late 1980s has led to a decline in State’s expenses on health care making it more opportune for the private players to have higher stakes in the health care of the country. If we look at the distribution of health care, in case of outpatient care the private players are predominant in both rural and

Box 2.9 What does agricultural marketing reform mean?—some questions • The very nature of marketing reform has created conditions for emergence of monopoly in agricultural markets and thereby exposing the large mass of peasants involved in Soyabean production in MP to the ‘profit’ needs of large private players. • The impact of volatility of prices on Soyabean cultivation across farms of different sizes is an important question in the overall context of increasing vulnerability of farmers. • In a situation of indebtedness where the small and marginal farmers’ output is tied to the local moneylender even before the crop reaches maturity, the question is who will really benefit from the global linkage? • The role of Oil Fed is considered important by the local actors (its decline today is portrayed as a negative outcome) even though at its peak it was procuring not more than 10 per cent of the produce. Can the big private players fill in this gap with the decline in the ‘cooperative sector’? Does it not mean increasing control of private players on small farmers? • Does it not mean increasing control of ‘rural life’ by private corporations like ITC and marginalisation of State services (extension services, seeds, State-regulated markets for agriculture produce)? • There is an inherent politics of seed in the creation of monopoly markets in agriculture. ITC is now talking about introducing ‘new’ seeds of Soyabean (Genetically Modified) that are supplied by multinationals and replacing the local variety. The new seed will be sold at the ITC store. • Participation of women in agricultural production in Sehore is very significant. However, they are totally marginalised in the marketing of the produce or in taking decisions related to cultivation. The co-operative movement had made some difference. With deeper integration of private corporations with agricultural production or of increasing volatility in production as a result of closer links with the global markets, there are implications for the livelihood of women.

urban areas. In rural areas, their presence has been more than 70 per cent. Hospitalisation or relatively longer-term treatment also shows similar patterns as the share of hospitalisation in government institutes has been declining with time (Figure 2.7). The increasing use of private care has lead to increase in medical cost, which in return will have had its impact on the household economy (Figure 2.8). The latest estimates available from NSSO for the year 2004 show that 28 per cent of respondents have identified financial reasons for not availing health services and it has increased from 20 per cent as reported in 1995–96. Moreover there is absence of proper monitoring of the private services, so the quality of health services also remains a big question. The existence of private health care does not ensure better quality of care. Surveys on the prescribing behaviour of physicians show that doctors practicing in the private sector prescribe excessive, expensive and more risky medicines. These findings imply that quality of care in this sector is a serious problem (Ramesh Bhat, 1993).

82 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Figure 2.7 Source of treatment

Source: NSSO (2006), Report No. (507), ‘Morbidity, Health care and condition of Old Age’ and R. Duggal (2006), Utilisation of Health Care Services in Securing Health for All, Dimension and Challenge, edited by C. Sathyamala and S. Prashad.

Figure 2.8 Type of services used per 1,000 cases

to 2–3 per cent of GDP. It has as its key components—provision for a female health activist in each village; a village health plan prepared through a local team headed by the Health & Sanitation Committee of the Panchayat; strengthening of the rural hospital for effective curative care; integration of vertical health & family welfare programmes and strengthening the delivery of primary health care (see Box 2.10). It seeks to revitalise local health traditions and mainstream AYUSH into the public health system. It aims at effective integration of health concerns with determinants of health such as sanitation & hygiene, nutrition and safe drinking water through a district plan for health. It seeks decentralisation of programmes for district management of health. The flagship programme of the NRHM is the Reproductive and Child Health-2 Programme that promises to address crucial issues like maternal mortality, family planning and child mortality through sustained intervention.

Some Observations on National Rural Health Mission

Source: NSSO (2006), Report No. (507), ‘Morbidity, Health care and condition of Old Age’.

National Rural Health Mission: A New Step towards Health for All? National Rural Health Mission is considered as one of the comprehensive plans after Bhore Committee report and aims at improving the overall health situation. The National Rural Health Mission (2005–12) seeks to provide effective healthcare to rural population throughout the country with a special focus on 18 states which have weak public health indicators and/or weak infrastructure. The Mission is an articulation of the commitment of the Government to raise public spending on health from 0.9 per cent of GDP

National Rural Health Mission has been initiated and so far there have been mixed reactions on the project. A field-based review on NRHM in a few states has been provided by the Centre for Health and Social Justice, New Delhi.18 Accredited Social Health Activist (ASHA) was selected for most of the states and the Rural Health Centres were upgraded as per Indian Public Health Standards (IPHS). Also joint account between sub-centre and Panchayat has been opened and to some extent there has been an attempt to decentralise health planning. Although this programme is now complete, limited evidence suggests that awareness level has been minimal, as there exists a confusion regarding the role to be played by different agencies. Already there is a vast chain of health personnel operating in the rural areas like ANM and Anganwadi workers but their coordination with ASHA is not clearly demarcated. Although new schemes like Janani Swastha Yojana (JSY) have been floated, they have hardly been

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 83

implemented. There is a minimal participation at the village level in formulating health plans. And the health plans have remained more or less centralised, as a result of which the entire fund meant for sub-centre at the village level has remained unutilised. Although there has been upgradation of health centres as per IPHS, there is still a dearth of manpower as well as rural health infrastructure. In Bihar, village health functionaries are not very familiar with NRHM. VHCs are not formed in many villages and many of them do not know what they mean. Women are not getting benefits under JSY as ANMs are yet to receive money to distribute under JSY. Similarly there is lack of awareness about family planning insurance for the women who undergo abortion. Target-based sterilisation is still being followed and ASHA has not received the due attention in the state. Moreover, there has been hardly any decentralisation of health programme with little participation at the Panchayat level and the untied funds meant for sub-centres have remained unutilised. In the case of Chhattisgarh, there was a system of Mitanin (community health worker) whose main purpose was improving health awareness, utilising health services and enhancing the community’s capacity to plan for and cater for its own basic health needs. Primarily, a Mitanin’s role was to articulate the village community’s right to health. Since she was selected from the community and acted as the first contact for health care, her main focus was to actualise for the community their right to health. With the introduction of NRHM, these Mitanin were given the role of ASHA; with their training for a new role they began to be rooted more in healthcare delivery system and much lesser in the community itself. In Jharkhand, there exists a lack of awareness about this new programme. There is a lack of information about the different programmes under NRHM and role of ASHA is hardly understood. The Supreme Court’s guidelines are being flouted everywhere with the target approach to family planning being still prevalent.

Box 2.10 Core strategies of national rural health mission • Train and enhance capacity of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) to own, control and manage public health services. • Promote access to improved healthcare at household level through the female health activist (ASHA). • Health Plan for each village through Village Health Committee of the Panchayat. • Strengthening sub-centre through an untied fund to enable local planning and action and more Multi-tasking Workers (MTW). • Strengthening existing PHCs and CHCs, and provision of 30–50 bedded CHC per Lakh population for improved curative care to a normative standard (Indian Public Health Standards defining personnel, equipment and management standards). • Preparation and Implementation of an inter-sectoral District Health Plan prepared by the District Health Mission, including drinking water, sanitation & hygiene and nutrition. • Integrating vertical Health and Family Welfare programmes at National, State, Block, and District levels. • Technical Support to National, State and District Health Missions, for Public Health Management. • Strengthening capacities for data collection, assessment and review for evidence-based planning, monitoring and supervision. • Formulation of transparent policies for deployment and career development of Human Resources for health. • Developing capacities for preventive healthcare at all levels for promoting healthy life styles, reduction in consumption of tobacco, alcohol and so on. • Promoting the non-profit sector, particularly in under-served areas. • Regulation of Private Sector including the informal rural practitioners to ensure availability of quality service to citizens at a reasonable cost. • Promotion of Public–Private Partnerships for achieving public-health goals. • Mainstreaming AYUSH—revitalising local-health traditions. • Reorienting medical education to support rural-health issues including regulation of medical care and medical ethics. • Effective and viable risk pooling and social-health insurance to provide health security to the poor by ensuring accessible, affordable, accountable and good quality hospital care.

Jharkhand also reported that upgradation of health centres has been satisfactory as a result of which they are flooded with doctors. In the case of MP, there exists a doubt on the spirit of the programme as there is confusion on selection of ASHA. As per the national norm, an ASHA should be eighth class passed but this may leave out representation from the marginalised communities. The fund in MP has remained unutilised and there has not been participation at the village level ignoring decentralisation in the process of health planning; similar were the observations in Rajasthan. Inputs from rural areas were not taken into account and planning was based on the state plan. Similar were the observations in Orissa as lack of information still persists along with lack of coordination among various agencies like AWW, ANM, ASHA and PRI. ASHA is seen more as an assistant to ANM and is isolated from the real health needs of the community.

84 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA In Uttaranchal, JSY is yet to be implemented on full scale and many women who have undergone sterilisation have not received any benefit. Even in UP there is confusion regarding the role of ASHA and there exists a lack of coordination among different agencies at the village level making the programme ineffective. Moreover, there are reports of corruption in the selection process for ASHA in UP. The Mission categorically states that the National Disease Control programmes for Malaria, TB, Kala Azar, Filaria, Blindness and Iodine Deficiency, the massive Family Welfare Programme and Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme shall be integrated under it for improved programme delivery. However, the actual delivery of services under the National Disease Control Programmes retains their ‘essential verticality’, as envisaged in the original documents of these vertical programmes. These find mention in the Annexures 1–5 of the draft guidelines given in the Indian Public Health Standards (IPHS) for Community Health Centres (CHC) prepared by the NRHM.19 The other issue related with NHRM is that of financing. Since universal access to comprehensive primary healthcare and referral services, which the 1982 National Health Policy committed, is not stated clearly as a goal, the financing strategy for NRHM also falls into the trap of being selective for targeted populations.20 The Mission mentions separate schemes like Rs 10,000 for untied funds for the sub-centres, Rs 1,00,000 for rural hospital maintenance if Rogi Kalyan Samitis are formed, Rs 7,50,000 per block for training of ASHAs, and so on, instead of determining what resources the proposed package of services would require in order to implement it. For 2005–06, the mission document states that Rs 6,713 crores have been allocated for NRHM. If we look at the 2005–06 Central Government Budget, we do not see NRHM figuring as a separate budget item. In fact, NRHM is going to use funds of existing programmes like RCH-2, NDCP, Integrated Disease Surveillance Project and the AYUSH

programme. NRHM is being seen as an omnibus for the above programmes. Thus in effect, NRHM is only a label for selected activities from amongst existing programmes. The only ‘new’ component is the ASHA scheme, which is actually a revival of the erstwhile CHV scheme of 1978, which had become defunct in the 1990s in most states. The experience of large-scale employment with one Community Health Volunteer (CHV) for every 1,000 people, along with the placement of a trained dai in every village by the Janata Party government, which came to power in the wake of withdrawal of the Emergency is important for the Mission, which it has ignored. The CHV Scheme, which at one stage had more than 4,50,000 workers, could not be sustained because of the nature of the power structure in the villages. If anything, the class-caste equation has deteriorated much further since then. Those in decision-making positions at the Centre and State levels feel that increased resources in the rural areas will not help because there is limited ‘absorption capacity’. Hence there is unwillingness on behalf of these decision makers for fiscal devolution to the district and Panchayat levels. This business of absorption capacity is a façade. If autonomy is given to districts and Panchayats to use resources as per their local needs and demands within a defined framework that is open to social audit, then one will see a wide range of innovations in setting up local healthcare delivery systems and provisioning of healthcare for the people. The above observations suggest that although the National Rural Health Mission is quite holistic in nature which is based on assumptions of integrating the various facets of health care, its success to a great extent depends upon the strategy and training of health personnel. In the era of targeted approach, health functionaries were mostly focussed on reaching targets and activating various family planning programmes, overshadowing the real health needs of the people. Population stabilisation is still one of the goals (targets) of NRHM and how it will influence the overall health framework remains to

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 85

be seen. Special emphasis is given in the programme to reduce maternal mortality and the strategy sought is through provision of trained birth attendants. We need to remember that gross gender discrimination prevails in a society like India which manifests in the form of lack of reproductive choices and inadequate nutritional intake by women. And the causes of maternal mortality are very much rooted in the existing social system, and they require a strong intervention beyond the ‘training of attendants’. Whether the NRHM will be able to deal with the complex social reality of this country is yet to be seen. Improvement in environmental sanitation is another core area of healthcare that has been neglected to a great extent. Although there is a mention of it in the mission document, there is ample evidence to show that nothing has been done as the public health work at the PHC level has remained almost dysfunctional. NRHM has mentioned about the provision of insurance for the poor; it is a positive move as the out of pocket health expenditure is one of the important factors leading to indebtedness. The overall NRHM strategy needs a drastic makeover and reorientation into a universal access framework for which financial resources need to be determined on the basis of needs and demands of people, and this would be best met if resource allocations are based on an assessment of such needs and demands and given to local governments to plan their use autonomously. NRHM should be used as an opportunity to work out a new health financing strategy, which devolves financial resources to local governments and uses a social audit framework to monitor its implementation.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT: HAS IT WORKED? The Right to Information Act 2005 (RTI) that came into effect on 12 October 2005 is a welcome policy initiative which fills the ‘accountability gap’ that existed between the mechanisms within the system. It has rightly been hailed as a democratic tool in the hands

of the citizens, which will increase participation, realisation of rights, governmental accountability and transparency. While the Act is a definite improvement on the Freedom of Information Act of 2002 and the existing Acts in eight states (Tamil Nadu, Goa, Rajasthan, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir along with Delhi), some of the other issues within and around the RTI Act become important

Box 2.11 RTI an instrument for the poor to demand On 16 March 2005, Kshetramani Samantray, a resident of village Nakhaura in the outskirts of Bhubaneswar, Orissa purchased 0.38 decimal of land (Plot No.-152, Khata No.-43) at Rs 8,000 from Sobha Behera, a resident of the same village. Karunakar Swain, authorised notary in the District Sub-Registrar’s Office, prepared the sale deed and submitted it at the Sub-Registrar’s Office in Bhubaneswar. However, though a year and half has passed since submission, Kshetramani is yet to receive her sale deed. Despite her several visits to the concerned office, she had to face harassment from the office bearers every time. The reason behind non-issuance of sale deed is that the land was undervalued. But it is noteworthy to know from the Sub-Registrar’s Office that land valuation for that particular village has not been done so far. This shows that Kshetramani is being harassed for some other reason. She was asked by the official of the office to deposit extra money as per new evaluation (done in nearby villages) or to pay bribe to the officials who would help her settle the case and issue the sale deed in her name. Distressed and harassed, Kshetramani again came to the Sub-Registrar’s office on 13 July 2005 and fortunately she came to know about the RTI camp being organised in the office premises. She approached the camp and the volunteers, after listening to her case, accompanied her to the concerned government official. The official was adamant on not issuing the sale deed and was sticking to his point where Kshetramani had to pay an extra amount as per new evaluation. Undeterred by the official’s adamant attitude, the volunteers told him to use RTI and ask how the land was undervalued on that particular day and it was found that the concerned office had agreed for sale of the particular land at Rs 8,000. Thereafter, without further argument the concerned official issued the sale deed to Kshetramani. Thus the issue, which lingered for more than a year was solved within no time. This case is a testimony to the power that RTI gives to the powerless and voiceless people. Source: CYSD, Bhubaneswar, Orissa 2006.

Box 2.12 Salient features of RTI Act • • • • • •

Ask any questions from the government or seek any information. Take copies of any government documents. Inspect any government documents. Inspect any government works. Take samples of materials of any government work. The Central RTI Act extends to the whole of India except the state of Jammu and Kashmir. All bodies, which are constituted under the Constitution or under any law or under any government notification or all bodies, including NGOs, which are owned, controlled or substantially financed by the government are covered. • Section 22 of the RTI Act 2005 clearly says that RTI Act would override all existing Acts including Officials Secrets Act. • A PIO can refuse information on 11 subjects that are listed in section 8 of the RTI Act. These include information received in confidence from foreign governments, information prejudicial to security, strategic, scientific or economic interests of the country, breach of privilege of legislatures, and so on.

86 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA from the point of view of its operation and implementation. The main features of the RTI Act indicate the structures at the Centre, the States, the districts and the block levels. While one of these levels can be approached by the citizens for gaining information relevant to that level, there is also provision for appeals from lower to the higher levels. A Chief Information Commissioner heads the Central Information Commission (CIC) set up to implement the RTI Act and there is a provision for appointment of a maximum of 10 Central Information Commissioners. A Committee consisting of the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition and a Union Cabinet Minister (nominated by the PM) is responsible for appointing the CICs. According to the Act, the Information Commissioner is at par with the Election Commissioner in terms of privileges. At

Box 2.13 Accountability of panchayat: Demand of a poor Jhallu Prasad is an ordinary labourer earning his daily wages by working in the Panna district of Rajasthan. One day he saw that a road was being built right across his house. Jhallu Prasad sensed that there were problems with the construction of the road. The quality of the construction was poor. He decided to use RTI instrument to get the clear picture. He obtained the form from the district office. He sought information on the budget allocated, and the labour employed in the construction of the road. Within a period of 10 days, he got the information he sought. He verified the facts and it was amply clear that the muster rolls were fudged and the material mentioned was of substandard quality compared to the budget allocated. Jhallu Prasad has filed a petition in court using the data collected through RTI application and a hearing of the same is awaited. Source: CECOEDECON, Rajasthan 2006.

Table 2.12 Report on monthly disposal of cases Year 2006

Month April

Opening balance 489

Receipt 248

Disposal 97

Closing balance 640

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2006

May

640

414

203

851

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2006

June

851

495

257

1,089

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2006

July

1,089

509

283

1,315

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2006

August

1,315

492

374

1,433

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2006

September

1,433

486

324

1,595

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2006

October

1,595

349

280

1,664

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2006

November

1,664

513

293

1,884

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2006

December

1,884

731

565

2,050

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2007

January

2,050

608

297

2,361

Source: Central Information Commission, Government of India, http://cic.gov.in/

the state level, the State Information Commissioners have powers of a civil court, that includes ‘requisition of public records, issue summons of witnesses and documents; receive evidence on affidavits and summons and enforce the attendance of persons and compel them to give evidence on oath’.21 Public information Officers (PIO) at the Centre and in the states appointed by every public authority are responsible for providing information on the matters of enquiry. Assistant Public Information Officers (APIO) are also supposed to play a similar role at the sub-divisional and sub-district levels. The procedure prescribed for gaining information requires filing of an application with the PIO or the APIO on the payment of a ‘reasonable fee’, though there is no such charge for applicants belonging to BPL categories. The PIO has to provide information (or refuse it on valid grounds) within 30 days. There is a 30-day limit for filing appeal to higher levels. PIOs may face stringent penalties for their failure to provide infor-mation within the stipulated time. Certain categories of papers are exempted from being disclosed. This provision particularly overrides the provisions of the Officials Secrets Act of 1923. Since the introduction of the Act, the CIC has received 4,404 appeals and complaints of which 2,646 have been disposed of and penalties have been imposed on 10 officers in eight cases ‘for not acting in accordance with the provisions’ of the Act.22 Though the structures and procedures are in place, many of the issues, problems and questions have to be cleared in order to make the Act more effective. The initiative as suggested by the National Advisory Committee (NAC) on 16 August 2004 emphasised on four fundamental principles— ‘the principle of maximum disclosure and minimum exemptions consistent with constitutional provision; the principle of different penalties for failure to provide information as per the law; the principle of independent appeal; and the principle of wide and easy accessibility’.23 The Bill recommended by the NAC made a long-winding journey to the Department of

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 87

Personnel, Department of Law and then to the Union Cabinet for approval. But surprisingly the Bill which was tabled in the Parliament on 23 December 2004 was ‘shockingly different’ from the earlier drafts in terms of the ‘penalties that were no longer a credible threat, minimum disclosures and maximum exemptions, dilution of independence of appeal and inaccessibility’. 24 For example, NAC had extended the Act to the violations of human rights, life and liberty of the human beings and allegations of corruption. Surprisingly, the Bill tabled had only one provision of ‘allegations of corruption’ retained in the draft. Yet another significant dilution in the original draft was the replacement of the Chief Justice of India as a member of the Committee meant for the selection of the Information Commissioners by a ‘Union cabinet minister to be nominated by the PM’.25 A significant departure from the NAC draft was the dilution of the provision regarding the disclosure of ‘file noting’ which was conspicuously absent in the definition of information in Section 2(f). This became a point of controversy and led to another amendment in the law at a later stage. A clear point of conflict can also be seen in the way the Central Act and the State Acts co-exist without clearly outlining the functions of the State Information Commissions. Citizens can apply under either of the Acts and in case of a conflict, the Central Act would prevail. It is therefore important to clarify the way in which the central and the state machinery will operate without getting entangled in the dynamics of the Centre– State relations. An early symptom of the likely ineffectiveness is apparent in the appointment of the Information Commissioners (IC). All the positions for the ICs are being held by retired or serving bureaucrats, whereas the law clearly specifies that ‘the CIC and ICs shall be persons of eminence in the public life with wide knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance’. The whole spirit and focus of the RTI law is in danger

Box 2.14 Progress of right to information in 12 states Constitution of State Information Commission (SIC) and its Role • The SICs were not provided adequate infrastructure for their efficient working. • The SICs were reluctant to penalise PIOs for dereliction of duty, that is, denial of information to the public. • People in rural areas feel that the appeal process is very expensive. • Application fee is high in some states like Haryana and photocopying fee is high in some states like Himachal Pradesh. Role of Nodal Agencies • While agencies in some states have initiated the process of training of PIOs, training of some officials is not sufficient, for example BDOs. • How the nodal agencies are planning to take up the training of BDOs and Panchayat Secretaries is unclear. • Learning materials on RTI are not reader-friendly at the grassroots. • Directories of PIOs of different departments/districts are not always available. Appointment of PIOs • While PIOs have been appointed in most public authorities in states, the process of accessing information by the people is slow. • There is confusion about the definition of Public Authority where PIOs have to be appointed, with the result that in some states PIOs for important institutions like schools, colleges, cooperative banks and high courts (in Haryana and Punjab High Court) are not in place. • Sometimes officials/persons who do not have easy access to information are appointed as PIOs, for instance in Uttaranchal, Sarpanch is the PIO; in Himachal Pradesh the BDO is the PIO even for the Gram Panchayat. • PIOs are normally junior officers in the departments and they find it difficult to find information from senior officers. • Appointment of the PIOs is not in accordance with the requirements of the authorities, for instance in Kerala the Department of Post and Telegraph has 42 PIOs but Kerala Water Authority has only one PIO. Experience of seeking information from PIOs • Most of the PIOs at the state and the district levels are not cooperative and they sometimes threaten applicants to withdraw applications. • The PIOs do not always have access to information about some important items such as the head where the application fee has to be deposited. Mandatory Disclosure Under Section 4 of RTI Act • Self disclosure by Ministries and Directorate-level offices in some states is poorly presented. • Self disclosure at district, block and Panchayat levels have not started in the states that were surveyed. Poor Reach of the Act • Nearly 90 per cent of the people in the 12 states that were surveyed are not aware of the Act. • RTI is restricted to educated sections, specifically to government officials. • Urban–rural differential in the utilisation of the Act. Source: PRIA, Tracking the Progress of Right to Information in Twelve States, August 2006.

88 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA of being affected by ‘bureaucratic culture and legacy into the very offices that hold primary charge of overseeing enforcement’.26 When the Bill reached the President for final assent on 15 June 2005, a communication was sent to the PMO expressing that ‘notes government officials make on files should remain classified or else bureaucrats will feel too many obstacles in taking crucial decisions’. Making its tardy journey from the PMO to the Department of Personnel and Training and back to the Cabinet which approved the amendments to the RTI, the final version indicated watering down the RTI Act. This is clearly in contradiction with the UPA government’s claim in the Common Minimum Programme to make the RTI Act ‘[m]ore progressive, participatory and meaningful’. An ambiguity creeps in with the lack of clear definition of the word ‘substantial social and development’, issues that are covered by the Amendment relating to filenotings. Activists like Arvind Kejriwal point out that in order to argue that the point of enquiry is relating to ‘substantial social and development’ issues, a citizen would perhaps need to engage an advocate to argue the case! Another provision that will lead to lack of transparency is the omission of the names of the officers or reference to any individual with regard to the information contained in the file-notings. A study was conducted by PRIA on the progress of RTI in the 11 States of Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Chhattisgarh, Box 2.15 Zilla panchayat seeking information from agriculture department Nasrulla Ganj is a block in Sehore district and Ajay Patel is a Zilla Panchayat member. Being the member of Zilla Panchayat, he had access to official meetings of Agriculture Department. During the departmental meetings, he had been hearing that hundreds of farmers had been benefited by the Agriculture Department’s schemes. He knew that it was not true; so he filed an RTI application in the agriculture department for the list of 200 beneficiaries given grants for construction of NADEP and Vermicompost from the department. The reluctance of the department was handled through SIC. Later the information was provided to Ajay Patel. He verified the information and found that the scheme fund worth approximately Rs 1,78,000 was swindled by the Gram Sevak and some of the senior officials of the Agriculture Department. He filed a case in the court. The matter is sub-judice and one of the Gram Sevaks has been suspended. Source: Samarthan, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh 2006.

Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Gujarat and Bihar. The findings of the study are summarised in Box 2.14. The RTI Act has had some notable impact on making governance more accountable, transparent and participatory. However, in order to make the Act more meaningful in terms of its delivery and effectiveness, greater interaction between the citizens and government is necessary in its process of evolution. The Act has galvanised the government as well as citizens with a renewed sense of alertness and proactiveness.

REFORMS AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE CHANGING NATURE OF CENTRE–STATE FISCAL RELATIONS The fiscal adjustment at the Centre has meant absence of real policy choices with financial allocations at the provincial government level. The renewed focus on regional development as reflected in the approach to the 11th plan and mid-term appraisal of the 10th plan reflects an indirect method of centralisation, implementation of the economic reform across states and squeezing the policy options for the state. Why should we be looking at regional development at all? It is interesting to note how there is now an implicit policy framework that influences policy choices at provincial level very significantly and therefore any discussion on policy, especially social policy (most of which is a state subject) has to bring the implicit regional development policy into consideration. In the earlier policy regime, there was an incentive and disincentive system that notionally tended to favour the lagging, un-industrialised, nonmetropolitan regions. This has now been largely discarded; the new system (after economic reform) professes to have little geographical orientation. Two views are prevalent in the literature on this issue: the current regime is more biased towards advanced

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 89

metropolitan regions or alternatively the opening up of the economy is likely to break the monopoly power of highly concentrated production and trading centres, weaken the traditional forward and backward linkages and lead to a more even development. The phase of economic reforms and the ‘official’ decline of the planning process has brought with it a general belief that the dynamics of market and the process of growth will ultimately ‘even out’ development. However, in the 10th plan and the 11th plan, widening disparities between the states have been identified as a major concern. The instrument that is suggested by the government to address regional inequalities is ‘targeted investment accompanied by governance and institutional reforms’. Decentralisation, strengthening peoples’ participation and of civil-society organisations and innovative-delivery mechanisms are all linked to institutional reforms. Additional grants to backward regions under RSVY are to be made only if the concerned state government undertakes ‘an agreed set of reforms’; reforms in administrative and fiscal structure. Getting grants under RSVY works as an incentive mechanism for states to take up reforms where all states are eligible. The major instrument of reform is called ‘fiscal and other reforms’— which if read carefully, and elaborated below, implies ‘tampering’ with the Federal/Fiscal structure. The policy for balanced regional development is embedded in the larger framework of reforms and more particularly in the fiscal reform process that has been put in place since the 1990s. There is a clear effort that is visible to lay down the necessary conditions in order to achieve ‘homogenised development’. The uneven nature of growth (not the uneven rate of growth) is seen more as a ‘problem’ for the overall paradigm of growth that has been put in place since the early 1990s. Mid-term appraisal clearly recognises how fund transfers from the central government should be linked with the larger objective of economic reforms when it says that ‘[w]hile the targeting of funds to certain identified most backward districts and

certain conditionalities on good administrative practices have been operationalised, the economic reform linkage has not’ (p. 511). The mid-term appraisal goes on to say that ‘[t]hese reforms may be desirable in themselves, they may not necessarily help redress inter- and intra-state disparities’. The approach of the Planning Commission is clear that preferential funding should be strictly conditional on reforms. On regional development, it suggested that existing flows be re-oriented to support regional balancing initiatives since the total central assistance was likely to increase only incrementally. Since non-discretionary flows cannot be easily altered, the focus for ‘balanced regional development’ is towards sectorspecific schemes of special central assistance. This point gets further reinforced if we examine the various mechanisms of resource transfer from the central government to the state governments. There exist three institutions for federal transfers in India. First is the Finance Commission, which is involved in tax sharing and grants from the Centre to the states. There is statutory sanction behind these transfers. Then there are plan grants covering central assistance for state plans. Plan grants constitute the single largest component of grants transferred from the Centre to the states in recent years and the priorities in plan expenditure are reflective more of what can be called ‘national priorities’ in comparison to the regional or local priorities. Then, finally, there are the non-statutory discretionary transfers by Central Government Ministries to states on non-plan side in the form of centrally sponsored schemes (CSS) that are conditional specific purpose grants. The aggregate picture of transfers, as given by the 11th Finance Commission, over the last few finance commissions is as follows in Table 2.13. As is noticeable from the Table 2.13, plan grants are the largest amongst the three types of grants that are used for financial transfers from the Central government. The share of Finance Commission grants has declined from the eighth to the tenth Finance Commission, during the first 15 years of reform.

90 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Table 2.13 Transfer from Centre to State as percentage of gross revenue receipts of the Centre: Finance commission period average Year

Finance commission transfers

Other transfers

Share in central taxes

Grants

Total transfer through finance commission (2+3)

Grants through planning commission

Non-plan grants (non-statutory)

1

2

3

VII FC

22.39

1.96

4

5

6

24.35

12.11

1.66

Total other transfer (5+6)

Total transfers (4+7)

7

8

13.77

38.11

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII FC

20.25

2.52

22.77

13.56

1.54

15.10

37.86

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IX FC

21.37

3.42

24.79

14.48

1.06

15.54

40.33

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

X FC

21.40

2.34

23.75

10.57

0.63

11.19

35.79

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

XI FC (first two years)

20.93

5.20

26.13

10.39

0.82

11.21

37.20

Source: 11th Finance Commission Report, Government of India.

This implies that the statutory transfers were to some extent replaced by discretionary transfers since the initiation of economic reforms. This is especially noticeable between the eighth and ninth Finance Commission even when the total transfers had increased. Between the two components of transfers from the Finance Commission, the share of grants has substantially increased in the reform period, suggesting a declining access to the collective pool of national tax resources by the provinces or put differently, greater access of revenue to the central government. The Finance Commission grants are basically grants to meet the non-plan revenue deficits of the states. The non-plan revenue deficit reflects the additional resource need of a particular state to provide essential public services. Per capita non-plan revenue expenditure (excluding interest payments and pension) reflects the capacity to provide public services by the provinces. Evidence at the state level suggests that higher the per capita real non-plan expenditure, higher is the level of HDI. These finance commission grants have a unique characteristic as an instrument of fiscal transfer. They are determined in absolute amounts known and are therefore targeted better. They account better for cost disabilities and re-distributive considerations in a way that tax devolution cannot. These

grants to states are projected on a normative basis—post devolution non-plan revenue deficit in any year is normatively assessed and the deficit can be provided for. As Table 2.14 shows the relative share of grants to tax devolution has increased over the years. It is not only the quantum of grants that has increased but the normative approach for non-plan deficits has undergone an important change over the last few finance commissions. The shift reflects the changing nature of Centre–State fiscal relations. The essence of this shift is the increasing emphasis on higher generation of tax revenue by the states (read user charges) and also implicit prioritisation of expenditure that is imposed by the Central Government (through the recommendations of the Finance Commission) in areas of expenditure that are actually states’ prerogative. For example, the 11th Finance Commission suggests that in order to work out the deficit, tax-GDP ratio should increase by 0.9 per cent points over the forecast period. Own nontax revenues should follow the principle of recovery of borrowing costs, cost recovery of irrigation receipts and the principle of cost recovery on other social and economic services. It is suggested that the non-plan revenue expenditure should be adjusted in the following way: interest payments should be 7.5 per cent instead of 18.2 per cent; growth in pension should be around

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 91

10 per cent and not more; expenditure on education and health increase should be such that growth of 6/5 per cent in salary and 30 per cent in non-salary; and maintenance expenditure on irrigation, roads, bridges should be around 5 per cent. These shifts in transfers and changes in norms of transfers have to be seen in conjunction with the expenditure and revenue trends of states and the Centre. The Central Government expenditure has declined and states’ expenditure share has increased (see Tables 2.15 and 2.16 below on relative share of expenditure). There is some amount of downward inflexibility of state government expenditure due to high share of committed expenditure of state governments and also due to increased expenditure responsibilities of the provinces as a result of fiscal correction at the Centre. On the revenue side (see Table 2.17), revenue mobilisation by the central government as a percentage of GDP has declined from 10.1 in 1990–91 to around 8 to 9 per cent in the last few years. States’ tax-GDP ratio has increased; it was 6.12 per cent between1993–96 and has gone up to 6.79 per cent in 2000–03. The relative command over total resources by the Central Government in relation to its expenditure has increased over the years. With expenditure’s responsibilities nearly equal between the Centre and the states and given the unequal command over resources, the sharp vertical imbalance (imbalance arising due to asymmetric assignment of functional responsibilities and financial powers between different levels of governments) in the fiscal federalism in India becomes evident. If we examine the dynamics of fiscal consolidation at the level of Central Government, we find a clear connection between the fiscal targets and the changing dynamics of Centre– State fiscal relations. How has the fiscal adjustment taken place so far? The changes between 2001 and 2006 in taxes, transfers and expenditures as shown in Table 2.18 reveal the story. During this period, there was an increase in tax revenue by 3.2 points (from 8.2 to 11.4 per cent of GDP); reduction in non-tax revenues by 1.1 points, increase in

Table 2.14 Transfers recommended by finance commissions Grants 1974–84

Share in taxes

7.72

92.28

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1984–89

9.55

90.45

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1989–95

9.96

90.04

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1995–2000

8.96

91.04

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2000–2005

13.47

86.53

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2005–10

18.87

81.13

Source: 11th Finance Commission Report.

Table 2.15 Trends in expenditure to GDP ratio (in per cent) 1990–91

Combined

Centre

States

26.83

17.74

14.3

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1991–92

26.3

16.52

14.84

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1992–93

26.11

16.37

14.43

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1993–94

25.89

16.49

14.21

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1994–95

25.03

15.27

14.37

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1995–96

24.2

14.66

13.78

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1996–97

23.38

14.13

13.46

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1997–98

24.16

13.64

13.76

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1998–99

25.19

14.27

14.06

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1999–2000

26.26

14.79

14.95

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2000–2001

26.1

14.5

14.8

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2001–02

28.1

15.2

Source: Indian Public Finance Statistics (IPFS), various issues.

central transfers to states by 0.95 points and transfers to state/district level autonomous bodies by 1.1 points. Centre’s own expenditure was reduced by 2.3 points to achieve the revenue deficit to GDP target of roughly the same magnitude. Thus, overall the elements of fiscal restructuring that are particularly discernible after the initiation of economic reforms in India are—transfers from the Central Government to the state governments based on mobilisation of own resources by the state governments; economic sustainability appearing as the chief criterion for ‘success’ of programmes, schemes, grants; dominant concern with efficiency in financial allocations, even in the social sector, leading to privatisation via public–private partnership; and the attempt to usher in such institutional reforms that create enabling environment to

15.8

92 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Table 2.16 Relative share of Centre and States in total expenditure: 1979–80 to 2000–2001 Year

1979–80

State

55.9

Centre Centre’s expenditure excluding net lending but including interest receipt from states and grants

Interest receipt from states to centre

Grants to states from centre

Centre’s expenditure after transfer

54.3

1.7

8.4

44.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1980–81

55.6

54.9

2.6

8.0

44.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1981–82

55.0

54.5

2.3

7.2

45.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1982–83

55.0

55.1

2.2

7.9

45.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1983–84

54.6

55.9

2.3

8.2

45.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

VII FC

55.1

55.1

2.3

7.9

44.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1984–85

52.9

57.6

2.5

8.0

47.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1985–86

52.6

59.2

2.5

9.4

47.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1986–87

50.2

61.4

3.1

8.6

49.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1987–88

53.0

59.3

3.1

9.2

47.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1988–89

52.0

60.1

3.3

8.8

48.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII FC

52.1

59.7

3.0

8.8

47.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1989–90

50.2

59.4

3.2

6.4

49.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1990–91

52.8

59.2

3.4

8.0

47.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1991–92

56.0

56.9

3.8

9.1

44.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1992–93

55.1

58.1

4.0

9.2

44.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1993–94

54.7

59.0

4.3

9.4

45.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1994–95

57.2

55.2

4.4

8.0

42.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IX FC

54.7

57.7

3.9

8.5

45.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1995–96

56.7

55.2

4.5

7.5

43.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1996–97

57.3

54.7

4.7

7.3

42.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1997–98

56.7

56.2

4.7

8.2

43.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1998–99

55.6

55.0

4.8

5.8

44.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1999–2000

56.8

53.9

4.9

5.8

43.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

X FC

56.6

54.9

4.8

6.8

43.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2000–2001

56.1

55.7

4.9

6.9

43.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2001–02

57.9

53.2

4.4

6.7

42.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

XI FC

57.1

54.4

4.7

6.8

42.9

Source: Indian Public Finance Statistics (IPFS), various issues. Note: Centre’s expenditure is not of lending to states and interest receipt from states.

Table 2.17 Relative share of Centre and States in combined revenue receipts: 1979–80 to 2001–02 Year

Centre

State

Revenue receipts before transfers

Transfer (statutory– Revenue receipts non-statutory) after transfer (2–3)

Revenue receipts before transfers

Transfer (statutory– Revenue receipts non-statutory) after transfer (5–6)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1979–80

66.0

27.5

38.5

34.0

27.5

61.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1980–81

65.1

27.9

37.2

34.9

27.9

62.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1981–82

64.8

24.9

39.8

35.2

24.9

60.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 2.17 continued )

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 93 (Table 2.17 continued ) Year

Centre

State

Revenue receipts before transfers

Transfer (statutory– Revenue receipts non-statutory) after transfer (2–3)

Revenue receipts before transfers

Transfer (statutory– Revenue receipts non-statutory) after transfer (5–6)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1982–83

64.3

25.2

39.1

35.7

25.2

60.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1983–84

64.2

26.1

38.1

35.8

26.1

61.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

VII C

64.7

26.2

38.6

35.3

26.2

61.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1984–85

65.0

25.8

39.2

35.0

25.8

60.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1985–86

65.6

28.4

37.2

34.4

28.4

62.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1986–87

65.7

27.5

38.1

34.3

27.5

61.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1987–88

65.2

28.2

37.0

34.8

28.2

63.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1988–89

65.4

26.9

38.6

34.6

26.9

61.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII FC

65.4

27.4

38.0

34.6

27.4

62.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1989–90

66.2

23.9

42.4

33.8

23.9

57.6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1990–91

64.3

27.8

36.5

35.7

27.8

63.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1991–92

63.0

27.1

35.9

37.0

27.1

64.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1992–93

64.1

28.4

35.7

35.9

28.4

64.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1993–94

60.6

29.6

31.0

39.4

29.6

69.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1994–95

59.3

25.5

33.8

40.7

25.5

66.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IX FC

62.5

27.2

35.3

37.5

27.2

64.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1995–96

60.7

24.4

36.2

39.3

24.4

63.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1996–97

62.7

25.1

37.5

37.3

25.1

62.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1997–98

60.8

26.6

34.2

39.2

26.6

65.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1998–99

61.0

23.7

37.3

39.0

23.7

62.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1999–2000

61.6

22.7

38.9

38.4

22.7

61.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

X FC

61.4

24.4

37.0

38.6

24.4

63.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2000–2001

61.4

25.3

36.1

38.6

25.3

63.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2001–02

60.7

24.6

36.1

39.3

24.6

63.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

XI FC

61.0

24.9

36.1

39.0

24.9

63.9

Source: Indian Public Finance Statistics (IPFS), various issues.

Table 2.18 How has the adjustment come about? Percentage point changes to GDP 2006/2001 Gross Tax Revenue

3.16

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gross Total Revenue

2.07

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Transfers to States (Shared taxes + Grants)

0.95

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Transfers to State/District level autonomous bodies

1.09

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Centre’s Direct Expenditure

–2.33

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Interest Payments

–1.16

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Revenue Deficit

–2.36

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Fiscal Deficit

–2.48

94 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Box 2.16 Union Budget 2007–08: Highlights • The increase in the outlay on the social sector is almost 36 per cent. • Defence expenditure has increased from Rs 89,000 crore in 2006–07 to Rs 96,000 crore in 2007–08. • Education spending up 34.2 per cent to INR 323.5 billion for FY 2007–08. As compared to the UPA government’s commitment to allocate 6 per cent of GDP towards education, the increase has been a mere 1 per cent of the cess. Currently it stands at 3 per cent. On the contrary, the allocation for government’s flagship, Sarvya Siksha Abiyan decreased from Rs 11,219 crore (2006–07) to Rs 10,671 crore (2007–08). • Increase in provision for Bharat Nirman by 31.6 per cent from Rs 18,696 crore to Rs 24,603 crore but the overall increase has not been significant over the years against the promise of the UPA government. • Thirty more districts have been covered under NREGA with an additional allocation for Rs 12, 000 crore. However, the current allocation does not seem to be sufficient keeping in mind the fact that the NREGS is supposed to be extended to another 130 districts, making a total of 330 districts. • National Rural Health Mission: In 2007–08, allocation to health sector increased from Rs 82.07 billion to Rs 99.47 billion. Increase in allocation for NRHM from Rs 8,207 crore to Rs 9,947 crore. This significant increase in the allocation for health sector, however, doesn’t match UPA government’s commitment to increase public spending on health to at least at 3 per cent of the GDP. It may be noted that WHO has recommended an allocation of 7.5 per cent of the GDP. • The plan outlay on agriculture for 2007–08 has been enhanced by 15.7 per cent and FY 2007 farm credit seen Rs 1.9 trillion v/s Rs 1.75 trillion target, farm loan target at Rs 2.25 trillion in FY 2008. • Pilot project for weather based crop insurance scheme at Rs 1 billion. • Farm insurance scheme stays in FY 2008, gets Rs 5 billion. • FY 2007 fertiliser subsidy seen at Rs 224.52 billion. World Bank lent 21.8 billion rupees to renew 5,763 water bodies. 100 per cent subsidy for small, marginal farmers, 50 per cent subsidy for small farmers for water management. Irrigation FY 2008 outlay at Rs 110 billion v/s Rs 71.21 billion. Allocated 18 billion rupee to NABARD for farmer subsidy. Panel on farm sector indebtedness to submit report soon. Social Security: New scheme called ‘Aam Admi Bima Yojana’ to be introduced for death and disability insurance cover through LIC to rural landless households. • The total allocation for gender budget has increased to Rs. 31,177 crore from Rs. 22,251.41 crore for 2006–07. • Allocation of Rs 3,271 crore has been made for schemes benefiting only SCs and STs, and Rs 17,691 crore for schemes with at least 20% of benefits earmarked for SCs and STs. Source: Union Budget 2007–08, http://indiabudget.nic.in Response to the Union Budget 2007–08, CBGA 2007.

attract outside funds in support of development efforts. There is an inherent process of centralisation in place with increasing control of the Centre as reflected in the nature of grants, decline in overall transfers, increasing expenditure responsibilities of the states, increase in committed expenditures, and increase in relative command over total resources by the Central Government in relation to its expenditure. In terms of Centre–State fiscal relations, the above discussion implies that, overall, there is accentuation of imbalances both

vertically and horizontally, especially during the period of economic reforms. The objective of fiscal transfer mechanism is to correct vertical imbalances (asymmetric assignment of functional responsibilities and financial powers between different levels of government) and horizontal inequalities (disparities in revenue capacity across constituent units of federation due to differences in level of income). Increase in these inequalities means that the balancing act the constitutionally mandated transfer mechanism had to do, has not been achieved. Relatively poor states should have received more resources from the Central Government so that they could catch up with the developed states, but this has not happened. And all the states put together should have received an increasing share of resources from the Central Government. The Central Government collects most of the taxes but the bulk of the expenditure responsibilities lie with the state governments, especially in the social sector. Once again the mechanism of transfer of resources from the Central to the state governments has not been able to achieve this. The principal reason for increasing inequality is the very mechanism of federal transfer, the nature of restructuring of public finance and the single-minded obsession towards sustainability or efficiency of financial allocations that have been instituted after the economic reforms.

THE SEZ POLICY: ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACKWARD27 The Special Economic Zones (SEZ) policy, motivated mainly by the Chinese experience, was adopted by the government to promote exports in some designated regions. Initiated by the Act28 of June 2005 and the Rules for setting them up elaborated in February 2006, the number of SEZs by the beginning of 2006 was 117 in 15 states and 2 Union territories. By June 2006, the Ministry of Trade and Commerce had approved 150 SEZ proposals and in spite of the suggestion made by the Empowered Committee of

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 95

Ministers that only 150 proposals be approved during a year, 181 proposals were approved by September 2006, and the number increased to 237 by October 2006. While the government created the usual kind of euphoria about the growth potentiality of the SEZs, several questions can be raised about the advisability and efficacy of the policy from the point of view of the well-being and livelihood of the farmers who would be further pushed to the periphery. The warning signals came rather early when it was found that SEZ is not an economically viable policy as it was originally projected to be. Between August 1996 and July 1997 a study of seven SEZs discovered that out of 2,333 units approved, only 513 units were actually in operation and among the approved units only 58 per cent were successful. On a calculated estimation, RBI has pointed out that the country will lose Rs 1,60,000 crores in the form of subsidy given to the SEZs. Perhaps one of the most disturbing pitfalls of this policy has been the acquisition of prime agricultural land and the eviction of the farmers, directly affecting their livelihoods. It is estimated that 1,25,000 hectares of land would be under acquisition for the 400 SEZs approved so far, bulk of which is prime farm land. Moreover, farmers have not been paid appropriately for their land and there is absence of proper compensation and resettlement plan. This has led to considerable public outrage and opposition to the policy witnessed in public protests at Singhur, Nandigram and Kakinara. The most surprising element of the Central Act is that it is silent on the issue of land acquisitions, which has hitherto become a central point of opposition to the Act. The policy also lacks in addressing the question of well-being of labour and its effect on the environment. Under the SEZ Act, these zones are declared ‘Public Service regions’ and the provisions for labour and factory rules are non existent, formation of unions are banned, right to go on strike is denied and working conditions are bad. The policy reached a flashpoint after Singhur and Nandigram and the UPA

government has almost been forced to introduce serious revisions in its SEZ policy. The Empowered Group of Ministers has enforced certain guidelines in April 2007. For example, 5,000-hectare ceiling on the size of SEZs, barring states for getting into land acquisition and developers will have to do it on their own, developers to devote at least 50 per cent of the area to core activities like manufacturing. The guidelines also said that the list of non-manufacturing activities may be reviewed. It added that at least one member of each displaced family will be given a job in the SEZ.29 The shortsightedness and ad hocism of policy making in the country is again reiterated by the way the SEZ policy was introduced with great euphoria, without taking into consideration the repercussions and the fallouts. In the light of the cracks appearing in the policy at the ground level, the government backtracked on this policy, yet again introducing ad hoc changes in the policy. It would be interesting to see how the policy shapes up in future.

CIVIL SOCIETY, PRIVATE BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT— THE NEW ‘MANTRA’ Many policy initiatives in the last one year, especially the ones that involve creation of infrastructure, like Bharat Nirman, Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), NREGP, NRHM are all based on active and participatory role of civil society actors, local representative organisations, government departments and private investors. The Right to Information Act provides a backbone for such policy initiatives. The approach here is that the identification of felt need, accountability of services and transparency in implementation is done by civil-society institutions; the business provides the resources for investment and the government does the coordination and facilitation. On the face of it, the approach looks interesting and appears to be a win-win situation for all. But is it really so?

96 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Bharat Nirman is a time-bound plan for rural infrastructure (2005–09) by the Government of India in partnership with state governments and Panchayati Raj Institutions. While the agenda of electricity, drinking water, roads and telephones for each village is not new, the idea behind it is to provide a sense of urgency to these goals and make the efforts time-bound, transparent and accountable and unlock the growth potential of rural India. The definition of coverage in Bharat Nirman involves a strong notion of access, especially to SC and ST households and individuals. Another important initiative in the last one year has been the National Rural Health Mission. The goal of the mission is to improve the availability of and access to quality healthcare by people, especially for those residing in rural areas, the poor, the women and the children. It talks about community ownership of health programmes, integration of sanitation, hygiene, nutrition and drinking water issues. This mission explicitly talks about public–private partnership. Notwithstanding the partnership aspect, private provision of health services instantly evokes the image of user charges. The Economic Survey clearly recognises this: In a developing country, private healthcare tends to be too expensive for common citizens, especially the poor, while public health systems tend to suffer from inadequate resources and poor service delivery. Reforms of the public health system in a developing country often include the introduction of user charges to respond to the challenge of augmenting resources of and removing inefficiency in public health delivery system (p. 220).

The experience of privatisation and health sector reforms tells us a useful story on the limitation and difficulties of this approach to make health accessible to all and the dangers inherent in this approach to make things worse than what they are at present (see Box 2.17). The experience of health sector reforms in Punjab and the attempt at public–private partnership tells us that the approach to create two parallel systems does not work very well in the Indian

context and how it makes even the existing system worse than what it is today. JNNURM was launched in December 2005 for developing urban infrastructure (water supply, sanitation, solid-waste management, road network, urban transport) and provisioning of basic services to the urban poor. JNNURM is for a seven-year period from 2005–06 and has two main components—basic services to the urban poor (BSUP) programme and the integrated housing and slum development programme (IHSDP). BSUP was launched to assist cities and towns in taking up housing and infrastructure facilities for the urban poor in 63 selected cities while IHSDP for taking up housing and slum upgradation programmes in non-BSUP cities. Both were launched in December 2005. One of the strategies of the mission is to incorporate ‘private sector efficiencies’ through PPP arrangements. The mission hopes to achieve ‘financially selfsustaining agencies for urban governance and service delivery through reform of major revenue instruments’. What this ‘reform of revenue instruments’ implies for small towns has been critically looked at by many scholars.30 The management of urban infrastructure and the supporting financing system changed significantly during the second half of the 1980s and 1990s. The Eighth Plan (1992–97) envisaged building cost recovery into the municipal finance system. This is being further reinforced with a substantial reduction in budgetary allocations for infrastructure development. The metropolitan and other large cities are expected to make capital investments on their own, besides covering the operational costs for their infrastructure services. The costs of borrowing have gone up significantly, and as a consequence, they can no longer lend money at a rate below that is prevailing in the market. This has come in their way of taking up sociallydesirable schemes that often turn out as financially un-renumerative. Projects for the provision of water and sanitation facilities, improvement of slum colonies, and so on, that generally require a substantial component of subsidy have thus received a low priority in this changed policy perspective.

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 97

The idea that urban local bodies can generate resources from the market does not work well for small municipalities. Among the urban infrastructure projects in India, which have been perceived as commercially viable, few can have municipal bonds issued in the market. The weak financial position and revenue sources of the urban local bodies make this even more difficult. To generate resources from the market, the local bodies need to be rated. The rating of municipal bodies and other agencies at local level are mostly done on the basis of (a) functions and managerial capabilities including the legal and administrative framework, (b) existing financial position and (c) the economic base of the service area, as well as aspects relating to the project under consideration. These criteria have their own difficulties. The financial position of an agency at the local level in no way reflects its strength or managerial efficiency. There could be several reasons other than administrative efficiency for the per capita revenue income, expenditure and budgetary surplus of certain local body to be high. Even the amount collected under a specific tax that exists in most states cannot be a basis for cross-sectional comparison since the rates determined by the state governments may vary. Unfortunately, the indicators selected for these dimensions and the weightages assigned to these leads to a situation where the cities with a strong economic base that are attracting private sector investment both from within as well as outside India, are able to get a disproportionate share of the subsidised funds and also fulfil the requirements of the capital market for issuing bonds. Only these few cities will be able to mobilise resources and make it extremely difficult for small and medium towns to stand up as potential beneficiaries. Further, financial intermediaries including credit rating agencies are trying to ensure that infrastructure investment takes place in projects with assured cost recovery and they want to introduce an appropriate legal and administrative restructuring, at the state and city level, for their commercial viability. This

Box 2.17 The experience of user charges and health sector reforms in Punjab Punjab was one of the first States to initiate Health Sector Reforms. Punjab Health Systems Corporation (PHSC) was created as a statutory corporation vide Punjab Act No. 6 of 1996. The purpose to form the corporation was to ‘expand, improve and better administer curative and preventive secondary’ healthcare. It was launched through the World Bank aided State Health System Development Project with an outlay of Rs 421.88 crore. The activities of the corporation included • Comprehensive development of the dispensaries and hospitals and purchase equipments and drugs. 150 hospitals at the level of Community Health Centres, sub-divisional hospitals and district hospitals were brought under PHSC and 86 medical institutions in rural and 64 in urban areas. • Provide services of specialists and super-specialists; enter into collaboration for super specialties with health institutions both within the country or abroad. • Plan, construct and maintain commercial complexes, paying wards and provide diagnostic services and treatment on payment basis and utilise the receipts for the improvement of hospital and dispensaries. • Run public utility service and undertake other activity of commercial nature for the delivery of health care within or without the hospital premises directly or in collaboration with private or voluntary agency on contract basis. Financial Performance of PHSC On user charges PHSC removed monthly income slabs for user charges on availing of hospital services. User charges were levied only for those whose income was above 2,000 p.m. The higher income groups did not pay any differential fee. Fees were increased for delivery, for blood transfusion and tests, with no exemptions for childbirth, bleeding complications or severely anaemic mothers in labour. Realisation from user charges increased over the years but remained a miniscule percentage of the total outlay of this project, giving only 0.7 per cent of the total outlay at the end of the third year. The increase in realisations over the years (1998–2001) was due to imposition of user charges on a greater number of services and not an outcome of rationalisation of user charges. Financial Outlay Of the total Financial Outlay till 2001, only 70 per cent was spent out of which 50 per cent was on renovation and construction and 15 per cent on salaries. Failed Experiment Based on the performance review of the PHSC, within five years of the formation of the corporation, the State Public Sector Disinvestment Commission of the government itself recommended the cclosing down of PHSC as soon as the entire funds of this project stood utilised. It suggested that Directorate of Health Services & Family Welfare should consolidate the gains made by PHSC and the assets and liabilities be taken over by the Department of Health Services & Family Welfare. Independent Assessments of PHSC Independent Assessment of PHSC suggests that two parallel systems of health (state department and corporation) have added to the prevailing chaos in the health services and the ills of the earlier system (corruption, poor administration, favouritism) continued in the new set up. The administration and management of PHSC remained the same. There are remote chances of self-sustainability of such experiments without continued budgetary support. Overall, now when the loan instalments are almost over and the closure of PHSC is recommended, the state has ended up with more debt and worsened health services. See for details: Report on the project titled ‘Impact of Liberalisation and International Trade Regimes on Access to Medicines and Health Services’, SHARP project, New Delhi, 2005.

would seriously restrict the choice of projects, rendering the launching of schemes that yield a low rate of return, such as provision

98 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Box 2.18 PPP—the concept Based on the PPP experience across countries, the IMF study tells us the following: 1. An essential requirement for PPP to become an effective instrument of delivery of infrastructure services is the existence of an appropriate institutional framework and a system of fiscal accounting and reporting of PPPs. 2. The key concern with PPP is whether the efficiency gains in a PPP more than offset the higher private sector borrowing costs. 3. PPP cannot be viewed as substitutes for good governance. Rather good governance is a pre-requisite for the success of PPPs. 4. PPPs are perhaps more appropriate for economic infrastructure projects that yield high returns, rather than purely social infrastructure projects. 5. PPPs should not be viewed as off-budget vehicles merely to evade expenditure controls and cover budget deficits as has happened in India with PSU disinvestments. 6. In lieu of the various types of risks that the private player faces in a PPP (in case of public investment these risks are borne by citizens), the private partner quotes a price. If the risk were to be over-priced, the cost of service would go up and make PPP unviable and counter-productive. If the risk were to be under-priced, the government would be forced to extend a guarantee to cover the price differential. The government then ends up incurring implicit costs of the guarantee by way of a substantial liability in the long-run. The cost of guarantee could turn out to be much more than the price differential that the government was unwilling to pay initially. 7. Citizen’s interests are best safeguarded in PPPs that function in a competitive environment. In case of natural monopolies, there is a need of independent and professional regulation to oversee and monitor the functioning of the PPP. 8. PPP agreements are generally complex in nature and the transaction costs of designing and implementing PPPs are quite significant. As such PPPs do not suit smaller public sector projects.

of water and sanitation facilities for the poor, slum improvement, and so on, virtually impossible. Bringing private sector efficiencies through PPP under JNNURM is not likely to make any difference to this urban reality. Marketing reforms in agriculture also involve promotion of PPP in the management and development of markets in the country (p. 175, Economic Survey, 2006). PPP is also the preferred mode of construction and operation of infrastructure services. The government recognises that there is risk of PPP becoming subservient to the private interests since it involves dealing with and attracting private capital, especially in infrastructure projects. Transparent process, competitive bidding and consultation with the stakeholders are the three ways in which government believes that this risk can be overcome. As is often said, PPP should be seen as a way of attracting private money for public projects and not putting public resources into private projects. In all these programmes, the mantra of Public–Private Partnership is somehow

invoked that symbolises better access, efficient financing, fulfilment of needs of people, provision of avenue for good returns to private capital and in doing all this, simultaneously contribute to the ongoing dynamics of growth. Is this possible? A recent paper on Public–Private Partnership, Government Guarantees and Financial Risk by the IMF Study Team led by Richard Hemming gives us the advantages, limitations and pitfalls of the concept of PPP (see Box 2.18). We began the economic reforms with great euphoria about privatisation, especially in provisioning of infrastructure services. The Rakesh Mohan Committee on infrastructure told us of all the virtues of privatisation in infrastructure. A decade and a half later, we have enough empirical evidence to suggest that the initial euphoria of privatisation has not been well founded. It is also too early to say that the experience of distribution of power in Orissa and Delhi and the experience of Dabhol has been forgotten. The experience with privatisation has in fact accentuated the suspicion about privatisation and in the absence of competition when regulation is absent or weak, the pitfalls of privatisation could easily outweigh the inefficiencies of public sector. It appears that after the wholesome privatisation project failed, the PPP is the next best option of privatisation that is being sold to us. While several states in India have taken the lead in using PPP approach, neither the Central Government nor the state governments have tried to set up the necessary institutional framework as has been done in other countries. Where PPPs function in a non-competitive environment, statutory regulatory bodies need to be set up. Bringing about model concession agreement is not enough as the Planning Commission is currently doing. Much more needs to be done on the PPP concept, risk allocation, designing of PPP agreements and choosing the right areas in which PPP approach is valid. The state of preparedness has to be immense to draw any benefits, if at all, from the PPPs. PPP is different from participation by

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 99

grass-roots actors; it requires governance reforms, experience with all programmes that require grassroots participation having achieved limited success confirms just that— the ex-perience with NREGP discussed in the earlier pages reinforces this conclusion. The experience of user charges on health in Punjab also adds to the list of experiments using the public–private partnership approach that have achieved limited success.

NOTES ∗

1

2

3

4

5 6

‘A Manifesto for the Fast World’, New York Times, 28 March 1999 and The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas L. Friedman 1999. Towards Faster and More Inclusive Growth: An Approach to the 11th Five Year Plan, Planning Commission, Government of India, December 2006, p. 8. For the aggregate story on employment over the last 20 years see Jeemol Unni and G. Raveendran, ‘Growth of Employment’, Economic and Political Weekly, 20 January 2007. Towards Faster and More Inclusive Growth: An Approach to the 11th Five Year Plan, Planning Commission, Government of India, December 2006, p. 60. The reservation policy in the public sector has benefited a lot of people. The Central Government alone has 14 lakh employees. The proportion of Scheduled Castes in class III and IV is well above the quota of 16 per cent and in class I and II, the proportion is around 8–12 per cent. So, the middle and the lower middle class that we see today from the Dalit community are because of reservation. With no reservation, the entry of these people in government services would have been doubtful. It is also perhaps not true to say that the benefits of reservation have been appropriated by the relatively better off sections of lower Castes, an argument often made not to support favourable discrimination. Out of the 14 lakh government employees, class III and IV accounts for approximately 65 per cent of the total employees. This discussion is based on ‘Reservations for Dalits as CSR?’, Sukhdeo Thorat, 10 November 2004 at http://southasia. oneworld.net/article/view/97600/1/5339. Ibid, p. 61. Out of 200 districts coming under the scheme, 119 fall in seven states which rank low in socio-economic development, and are predominantly rural and around 68 per cent

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18

19 20

21 22 23 24 25 26

27

28 29 30

of BPL households reside in these 119 districts. The distribution pattern of districts in terms of rural BPL households evidently reflects the intentions of NREGA to attack poverty-stricken regions of the country first. For details see ‘Role of Panchayati Raj Institutions in Implementation of NREGA’, PRIA, December 2006. Pinaki Chakraborty, ‘Implementation of Employment Guarantee: A Preliminary Appraisal’, Economic and Political Weekly, 17 February 2007, p. 548. Ibid, p. 549. Response to Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 2596 on 16 December 2005. Economic Survey of India, 2006–07. Ibid. Ibid. P. Sainath, ‘Withering Lives’, Frontline, Vol. 23, Issue 17, 26 August–8 September 2006. Ibid. Economic Survey, 2006–07, GOI, p. 82. Towards Faster and More Inclusive Growth: An approach to the 11th Five Year Plan, Planning Commission, Government of India, December 2006, p. 5. ‘One year of NRHM—A Review Survey and Consultation Report by Centre for Health and Social Justice, New Delhi’, 2006. See, Debabar Banerji, Politics of Rural Health in India. See, Ravi Duggal, Financing the National Rural Health Mission, Centre for Enquiry into Health and Allied Themes. Frontline, Vol. 22, Issue 12, 4 June 2005. Response to Lok Sabha starred question no. 309 on 13 December 2006. Sivakumar, ‘A Bill and a Half ’, Frontline, Vol. 22, Issue 3, 29 January–11 February 2005. Ibid. The Hindu, 14 May 2005. Subramaniam Vincent, ‘Sunshine Law arrives, has muddy landing’, http://www. Indiatogether.com, October 2005. Acknowledgement is due to ‘Vishesh Arthik Shetra: Loktantra per Ghatak Hamla’, Working Paper No. 25, National Centre for Advocacy Studies, February 2007. Please refer to the Parliament section to know more about the Act. The Times of India, 6 April 2007. See in particular the work by Amitabh Kundu, Urban Development, Infrastructure Financing and Emerging System of Governance in India: A Perspective, MOST, Discussion Paper No. 48 , Volume 4, Number 15, April 2001.

100 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA

ANNEXURES Figure 2A Growth in real GDP

Source: Central Statistical Organisation, Government of India.

Figure 2B Employment growth

Source: J. Unni and G. Raveendran, ‘Growth of Employment’, Economic and Political Weekly, 20 January 2007.

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 101 Table 2A Employment status Social group

Occupation

1993–94

1999–2000

ST

Self-employed

53.1

47.4

2004–05 52.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Salaried

7.4

7.3

7.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual-labour

39.5

45.3

40.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SC

Self-employed

46.0

32.0

36.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Salaried

11.2

11.2

13.6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual-labour

42.8

56.8

49.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Other

Self-employed

53.2

56.0

59.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Salaried

16.6

17.5

17.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual-labour

30.1

26.5

23.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

All

51.9

Self-employed

50.1

54.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

14.7

Salaried

15.1

15.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

33.5

Casual-labour

34.8

30.3

Source: Employment and Unemployment Surveys, National Sample Survey Organisation, Various rounds.

Table 2B Percentage change in real monthly per capita consumption expenditure (at 1993–94 prices) State

Percentage change in 1999–2000 over 1993–94 Rural ST

Andhra Pradesh

–10

Urban SC 3

Other

Total

ST

–3

–3

7

SC 7

Other

Total

17

14

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Assam

8

5

4

5

–7

–10

6

3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bihar

10

13

14

15

3

3

5

5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gujarat

6

9

16

15

4

9

21

18

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Haryana

21

22

20

22

–12

–9

17

11

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Himachal Pradesh

76

32

36

36

0

8

–8

–5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jammu & Kashmir

32

3

10

13

–34

5

–7

–5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Karnataka

6

14

11

12

22

28

33

33

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kerala

29

32

25

26

–25

26

10

10

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Madhya Pradesh

1

2

–4

–1

5

–7

5

4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maharashtra

1

15

10

9

19

11

5

6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Orissa

–2

0

6

2

–6

–24

–6

–9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Punjab

–3

7

15

12

–48

–11

0

–5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rajasthan

3

16

11

10

–2

11

24

20

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tamil Nadu

–5

11

10

9

19

6

28

26

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttar Pradesh

–8

15

10

10

78

29

12

14

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

West Bengal

3

12

–1

4

–31

–15

2

–2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Delhi

–45

–13

–3

–4

18

16

–5

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

4

10

Source: NSSO 50th and 55th Round, CSO, Government of India.

9

9

9

7

14

13

102 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Figure 2C Growth in literacy

Source: A Handbook of Population Statistics, Census of India, 1998 and Census of India, Final Population Totals.

Figure 2D GSDP growth and literacy rate

Source: CSO and Census of India.

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 103 Table 2C Education within social groups—1999–2000 ST Illiterate

SC

59.49

Other

55.33

Total

40.44

45.06

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Below Primary

17.20

17.94

18.53

18.29

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Primary

9.44

10.83

12.56

11.94

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Middle

7.56

8.93

12.37

11.26

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Secondary

3.27

3.92

7.85

6.67

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Higher Secondary

1.83

1.77

4.05

3.41

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Graduate and Above

1.12

1.17

4.10

3.26

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Education Not Specified

0.09

0.12

0.10

0.10

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total Population

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

Source: NSSO, 55th Round, 1999–2000, Government of India.

Table 2D Education within social groups 2004–05 ST

SC

OBC

Others

OBC & others

All

53.32

48.94

42.12

28.60

36.34

40.26

Illiterate

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Below Primary

19.50

18.61

18.50

17.10

17.90

18.17

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Primary

12.09

13.28

13.89

14.51

14.16

13.81

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Middle

8.64

10.52

12.79

14.30

13.43

12.46

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Secondary

3.11

4.37

6.25

10.10

7.89

6.80

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Higher Secondary

2.11

2.75

4.04

7.55

5.54

4.70

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Graduate & Above

1.22

1.52

2.42

7.85

4.74

3.81

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

Source: NSSO, 61st Round, 2004–05, Government of India.

Table 2E Female education 2004–05 ST

SC

OBC

Others

OBC and others

Total

56.78

60.12

62.55

57.18

57.61

58.25

Illiterate

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Below Primary

39.97

47.71

48.25

48.55

48.52

47.76

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Primary

36.97

40.42

44.06

49.72

49.15

46.30

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Middle

31.97

39.22

44.98

44.62

44.66

43.07

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Secondary

35.18

27.07

35.75

42.55

41.76

39.14

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Higher Secondary

67.99

19.02

27.51

32.94

32.52

31.79

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Graduate & Above

16.19

29.25

31.71

36.20

35.92

35.07

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

48.41

48.68

48.02

49.14

49.04

48.91

Source: NSSO, 61st Round, 2004–05, Government of India.

Table 2F Level of education within males and females (2004–05) Illiterate

Below primary

Primary

Middle

Secondary

Higher secondary

Graduate & above

Total

Male ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ST

11.6

9.6

8.0

6.2

4.1

3.7

2.8

8.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SC

24.2

20.6

20.3

18.1

13.7

12.1

8.4

19.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 2F continued )

104 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA (Table 2F continued ) Illiterate OBC

42.3

Below primary

Primary

42.4

Middle

42.1

43.1

Secondary 38.6

Higher secondary 36.7

Graduate & above 28.5

Total 41.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Others

21.8

27.5

29.6

32.7

43.6

47.5

60.3

30.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

All Male

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Female

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ST

10.8

8.4

6.5

5.4

3.4

3.9

2.4

8.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SC

23.8

19.7

17.3

14.5

11.0

10.5

6.9

19.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

OBC

43.6

41.3

40.6

41.1

36.6

33.0

21.8

41.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Others

21.8

30.6

35.6

39.0

49.0

52.6

69.0

30.6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

All Female

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Source: NSSO, 61st Round, 2004–05, Government of India.

Table 2G Percentage distribution of workers within social groups and education Level—2004–05 ST

SC

OBC

Others

Total

Illiterate ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self-employed

56.7

48.5

39.6

22.6

37.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regular Salaried

23.9

20.5

13.0

6.4

12.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual Labour

66.0

56.5

50.4

45.1

53.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

58.1

48.7

39.1

22.6

38.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Below Primary

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self-employed

12.7

11.8

11.7

10.6

11.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regular Salaried

9.0

10.3

7.5

5.0

7.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual Labour

13.0

12.6

14.7

15.2

13.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

12.5

12.0

12.0

10.1

11.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Primary

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self-employed

12.9

14.1

15.0

14.9

14.6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regular Salaried

11.4

16.1

12.7

9.0

11.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual Labour

11.0

13.3

15.2

17.0

14.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

12.0

14.0

14.8

13.9

14.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Middle

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self-employed

11.0

13.9

16.9

19.0

16.6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regular Salaried

15.5

19.6

19.4

13.9

16.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual Labour

7.7

12.4

13.8

15.7

12.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

10.0

13.9

16.4

17.3

15.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Secondary

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self-employed

4.1

5.9

8.7

14.1

9.6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regular Salaried

12.9

13.1

14.6

15.9

14.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual Labour

1.4

3.5

4.1

5.1

3.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

3.6

5.7

8.2

13.0

8.6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Higher Secondary

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self-employed

1.5

3.7

5.0

9.2

5.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regular Salaried

13.7

10.3

16.3

17.7

15.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 2G continued )

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 105 (Table 2G continued ) ST Casual Labour

SC

0.8

OBC

1.4

Others

1.4

Total

1.5

1.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

2.1

3.5

5.5

9.9

6.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Graduate & Above

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self-employed

1.1

2.1

3.1

9.5

4.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regular Salaried

13.6

10.1

16.5

32.1

21.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual Labour

0.1

0.4

0.3

0.5

0.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

1.6

2.3

4.1

13.3

6.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

All

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Self-employed

52.2

36.4

59.0

60.0

54.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regular Salaried

7.3

13.6

13.1

23.4

15.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Casual Labour

40.5

49.9

27.9

16.6

30.3

Source: NSSO, 61st Round data, 2004–05.

Table 2H Enrolment and provisioning: State-wise comparison States are in ascending order of per capita income

EG enrolment as per cent of Rural households

Rural BPL households

EG provisioning as per cent of Number of applicants

Rural households

Rural BPL households

Number of households enrolled

General Category States ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bihar

22.20

50.11

66.05

5.47

12.35

24.65

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttar Pradesh

40.81

130.73

95.28

13.30

42.61

32.60

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Orissa

57.16

119.5

79.38

NR

NR

NR

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jharkhand

35.49

80.12

64.14

NR

NR

NR

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

MP

123.42

333.03

99.06

44.19

119.23

35.80

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chhattisgarh

82.41

222.37

95.05

24.88

67.14

30.19

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rajasthan

109.96

800.31

98.57

65.39

475.94

59.47

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

West Bengal

48.34

151.77

75.88

13.46

42.25

27.84

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Andhra Pradesh

64.98

583.08

100.00

6.64

50.44

15.09

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Karnataka

24.58

141.45

48.62

NR

NR

NR

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tamil Nadu

49.55

241.14

98.97

3.76

18.28

7.58

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gujarat

44.02

334.25

100.00

6.64

50.44

15.09

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kerala

36.61

390.27

99.36

NR

NR

NR

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Punjab

16.81

264.34

92.51

NR

NR

NR

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Haryana

31.34

378.98

96.89

6.47

78.18

20.63

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maharashtra

29.48

124.29

26.44

2.54

10.71

8.62

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Special Category States

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Assam

50.40

125.28

63.51

10.90

27.22

21.62

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Manipur

110.72

276.52

29.49

NR

NR

NR

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jammu & Kashmir

66.05

1,663.61

85.20

NR

NR

NR

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttaranchal

92.89

297.54

67.64

9.99

32.00

10.76

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Meghalaya

NR

NR

—

NR

NR

—

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 2H continued )

106 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA (Table 2H continued ) States are in ascending order of per capita income Andhra Pradesh

EG enrolment as per cent of Rural households NR

Rural BPL households NR

EG provisioning as per cent of Number of applicants NR

Rural households NR

Rural BPL households NR

Number of households enrolled —

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tripura

121.77

279.14

91.93

125.20

312.68

112.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sikkim

40.60

101.38

92.06

NR

NR

NR

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nagaland

87.30

218.05

100.00

NR

NR

NR

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mizoram

35.13

87.74

100.00

9.34

23.33

26.58

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Himachal Pradesh

52.78

664.68

96.65

23.74

298.93

44.97

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

All States

51.19

166.85

79.15

12.06

39.32

23.57

Source: (Basic Data), http://www.nrega.nic.in Notes: Household numbers pertain to census, 2001. Thus in some states EG Enrolment to rural household ratio is more than 100 per cent. NR: Not reported.

Figure 2E Life expectancy across major states in India 2003

Source: Economic Survey, 2006.

Figure 2F Mortality across social groups

Source: NFHS 2 1998–99.

Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway? 107 Figure 2G Standard of living index and mortality

Source: NFHS 2 1998–99.

108 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA

Access to Justice: State of Indian Judiciary

3

c hap te r

The review of the state of the Indian Judiciary continues to be of great significance especially in the context of the fact that the higher courts in many ways are involved in facilitating the governance of the country. The continuous expansion of judicial power in recent times means an ever greater need to examine closely its performance. In other words judicial power and judicial accountability need to be seen and understood in this context. Keeping these aspects in mind the chapter is divided into two parts. The first part seeks to map the judicial response

through significant judgements of both the Supreme Court and the High courts during the year. This is done in three separate sections relating to civil rights and political accountability, social and economic rights and areas relating to environment and development concerns. The second part of the chapter assesses the state of the judicial system wherein some specific issues on judicial accountability, the arrears in the courts concerns on access to justice for all and legal aid including some recent initiatives are all discussed.

PART I MAPPING JUDICIAL REPSONSE THROUGH COURT VERDICTS This first part of the chapter is divided into three parts as below:

discussion on each of these issues is presented hereunder.

1. CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE COURTS

Rights of Children of Women Prisoners: SC Urges—‘Revamp Jail Manuals, Pass Necessary Legislations’

The review of the most important judgements of both the Supreme Court and the High courts in the year 2006 can begin with some verdicts on civil rights and liberties or what is also referred to as the ‘first generation’ rights. The verdicts include the right of children in jail, custodial torture, the rights of persons involved in preventive detention, the right of minorities to administer educational institutions, customary rights of religious chiefs in a tribal society, the rights of functionaries working with Gram Panchayat and the labour rights. The

In an important case relating to children living with their mothers in jail, the Supreme Court held that the children of women prisoners required additional protection and that they should not be treated as under trials or convicts. It was further held that children should be entitled to food, shelter, medical care, clothing, education and recreational facilities as a matter of right.1 Notably, the Union of India, in its affidavit, had pointed out that it had taken several measures for the benefit of children in general, including

Access to Justice: State of Indian Judiciary 109

children of women prisoners.2 However, not surprisingly, the Supreme Court said that ‘on the basis of various affidavits submitted by various state governments and Union Territories, as well as the Union of India, it becomes apparent that children of women prisoners who are living in jail require additional protection.’ The Court then went on to issue directions to lay down the minimum standards in this regard. More importantly, the Court made it clear that the Government needed to take immediate steps towards framing relevant laws and guidelines and to report compliance to the Supreme Court within four months. The Court said that (a) Jail Manual and/or other relevant rules, regulations, instructions and so on shall be suitably amended within three months so as to comply with the above directions. (b) Schemes and laws relating to welfare and development of such children shall be implemented in both letter and spirit. State Legislatures may consider passing of necessary legislations, wherever necessary, having regard to what is noticed in this judgement. (c) The State Legal Services Authorities shall take necessary measures to periodically inspect jails to ensure that the directions regarding children are complied with in letter and spirit and finally (d) the Courts dealing with cases of women prisoners whose children are in prison with their mothers are directed to give priority to such cases and decide their cases expeditiously.3 The Courts’ insistence on framing ‘relevant laws and guidelines and reporting compliance to it’ can be seen by some as performance of a legislative function. Nonetheless, in delivering justice to children, the judgement is a welcome step forward.

Custodial Torture of a Tribal: Indictment of Police Authorities and Award of Compensation In another case, the Supreme Court was petitioned by a very poor Gond tribal girl for conducting an inquiry against the erring Police Officers (specifically named in the petition) including the State for her wrongful detention in police custody, false implication

in serious offences, custodial torture and for violation of her fundamental and human rights under various laws.4 After verification of the facts and appraisal of earlier judgements on the subject, the Court arrived at the conclusion that the State had acted in violation of Articles 215 and 226 of the Constitution of India and the Juvenile Act of 1986 and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and its officials had committed offences punishable under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and for those reasons, the State was bound to compensate the victim. Taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration, the Court awarded a sum of Rs 5,00,000 (Rs Five lakh) as compensation and further directed the State to conduct a thorough and impartial inquiry by setting up a Special Investigating Team of the State CID.7 It also added: ‘We will highly appreciate if an Action Taken Report is submitted to this Court within a period of six months from the date of judgement and order, and for this limited purpose the petition will remain pending on the file of this Court.’

Preventive Arrest: Balancing National Security with Individual Freedom In the context of the rights of a person arrested for terrorism or other offences, the Gauhati High court in an important verdict in 2006 also laid down minimum standards to be followed before any preventive arrests made for such offences. In a batch of petitions before the High court, the question was whether the detinue under the National Security Act, 1980, has a right to make representation to the detaining authority in addition to his right to file representation under the Act to the appropriate Government and also whether the Constitution of India confers any such additional right? The High court in this context pointed out: While the need for society to protect itself against acts of terrorism today is self

110 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA evident, it remains all the greatest importance, that in a society which upholds the rule of law, if a person is detained, that individual should have access to all the guaranteed rights so that the question of whether the detention is lawful or not can be evaluated. If it is not lawful, then he has to be released.8

It further suggested the Courts’ larger role in this regard adding that ‘[s]ecurity may require the Executive should have power to make preventive arrest, but individual freedom requires that a man should have protection from unlawful detention. The principles so far laid down suggest that it is the duty of the Courts to balance the conflicting interest.’9 The Court after reviewing most important court verdicts in this area held that: 1. A detinue has two rights under Article 22(5) of the Constitution: (i) to be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds on which the order of detention is passed, that is, the grounds which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, and (ii) to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. The twin rights are available to a detinue whether they are provided for or not in the preventive detention laws. 2. The right to make representation to the detaining authority by a detinue in addition to his right to file representation to the Central Government or appropriate Government is also guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution which forms part of the package of guaranteed fundamental rights. No distinction as such could be made in this regard in respect of the detention orders made either under Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (COFEPOSA), Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycotrophic Substances Act (PITNDPS) or National Security Act, 1980, as the case may be.

3. The detaining authority is under the constitutional obligation to inform the detinue of his right to make such a representation to the detaining authority. 4. The failure to inform the detinue of such right to make representation to the detaining authority vitiates the detention order made even under the provisions of the National Security Act, 1980. In the specific cases before the High court, the detaining authorities did not communicate to the detinue of their right to make representation to the detaining authority in addition to their rights to make representation to the appropriate Government. The detention orders were therefore set aside and quashed by the Court.

Direct Prosecution of Public Servants, Including Ministers In a landmark decision towards the end of 2006, the Supreme Court has said that public servants, including Chief Ministers, MPs and MLAs can be prosecuted without any prior sanction and that sanction under the Code of Criminal Procedure which has often been used to delay and shelve many prosecutions, is not necessary for prosecuting corrupt public servants.10 Note here that Code of Criminal Procedure requires that a sanction of the competent authority should be there before a court can take cognisance of an offence committed by a public servant. This requirement was insisted upon even after a person ceased to hold any office and was no longer a public servant.11 The Court clarified the point that it was obvious to common sense that taking bribe while in office clearly does not constitute discharging of official duty.12 Indeed by this verdict the Supreme Court has cleared the way for criminal prosecution of corrupt political leaders by waiving the need for sanction of the government. In another ‘high-profile’ case of the year, Union Coal Minister, Shibu Soren was convicted by a Delhi High court in November

Access to Justice: State of Indian Judiciary 111

after it held him guilty of conspiracy in the kidnap and murder of his former private secretary 12 years ago. Additional Sessions Judge found him guilty of kidnapping and hatching the conspiracy to kill his secretary and in doing so it has been the first time that a sitting Union Minster has been convicted of murder. These cases mark a departure from the past in the sense that the Courts including the Supreme Court and the High courts have found it difficult in the past to convict political leaders for corruption and other crimes. Historically speaking and generally put, the reach of Public Interest Litigation had not gone so far as to ensure political accountability. Will this year mark the beginning of reversal of this history?

Education and Establishing Educational Institutions: Scope of Fundamental Rights Moving on to cases relating to education as a right and right to administer educational institutions, in a case relating to regularisation of schools and their management in the states of Bihar and Jharkhand, the Supreme Court, while recognising the discretion available to the state government in this regard observed that: ‘imparting of education is a sovereign function of the State. Article21A of the Constitution of India envisages that children of age group 6 to 14 have a fundamental right of education. Imparting education is the primary duty of the State.’ It went on to add later that ‘Although establishment of High Schools may not be a constitutional function in the sense that citizens of India above 14 years might not have any fundamental right in relation thereto but education as a part of human development, indisputably is a human right.’13

Interestingly the Court also suggested that standards of educational qualifications of the teaching staff could be different in both urban and rural areas while adding that there

could be relaxation in the rural areas as decided by the state government. Thus the Apex Court said: So far as educational qualification of the teaching staff is concerned, we are of the opinion that having regard to the fact that the limited number of teachers were to be appointed with a view to accomplish a constitutional goal of spreading literacy in the villages, particularly amongst the girls, the standard adopted in Zila Schools or Government schools constituted in urban areas may not be insisted upon, as was observed by the High court, but keeping in view the fact that it is essentially a Government function, the question as to whether some teachers having B.T. training or training in Physical Education would be allowed to continue in the said Project Schools or not is left to the State, wherefor a decision in accordance with law may be taken.14

In another important decision in the year the Supreme Court responding to the question that whether state can interfere in unaided minority or non-minority institutions with regard to matters relating to admission of students, fixation of quota and fee structure made clear that establishment of an educational institution comes within occupation which being a fundamental right is duly protected. The Supreme Court also laid down that (a) setting up a reasonable fee structure is also a component of ‘the right to establish and administer an institution’ within the meaning of Article 30(1) of the Constitution; (b) the charging of capitation fee by unaided minority and non-minority institutions for professional courses is just not permissible. Similarly, profiteering is also not permissible. (c) If capitation fee and profiteering is to be checked, the method of admission has to be regulated so that the admissions are based on merit and transparency and the students are not exploited. It is permissible to regulate admission and fee structure for achieving the purpose just stated. While emphasising the need to devise an appropriate mechanism for the purpose, the Supreme Court also ended up virtually

112 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Box 3.1 The right of minorities to establish and administer educational institution of their choice: Supreme Court The right to establish an educational institution, for charity or for profit, being an occupation, is protected by Article 19(1)(g). Notwithstanding the fact that the right of a minority to establish and administer an educational institution would be protected by Article 19(1)(g), the founding fathers of the Constitution felt the need for enacting Article 30. The reasons are too obvious to require elaboration. Article 30(1) is intended to instil confidence in minorities against any executive or legislative encroachment on their right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. Article 30(1) though styled as a right, is more in the nature of protection for minorities. But for Article 30, an educational institution, even though based on religion or language, could have been controlled or regulated by law ... and so, Article 30 was enacted as a guarantee to the minorities that so far as the religious or linguistic minorities were concerned, educational institutions of their choice would enjoy protection from such legislation. However, such institutions cannot be discriminated against by the State solely on account of their being minority institutions. The minorities being numerically less qua non-minorities, may not be able to protect their religion or language and so their cultural values and educational institutions will be protected under Article 30, at the stage of law making. Source: Supreme Court in State of Bihar and Ors. v. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh and Ors. at Para 94.

goading the governments to enact legislation for the purposes of regulating admission procedure and fee structure. Note the words that the Court uses to drive home the point: It is for the Central Government, or for the state governments, in the absence of a Central legislation, to come out with a detailed well thought out legislation on the subject. Such a legislation is long awaited. States must act towards this direction. Judicial wing of the State is called upon to act when the other two wings, the Legislature and the Executive, do not act. Earlier the Union of India and the State Governments act, the better it would be.15

Gram Panchayats and Functionaries Appointed by Government The transferring of three Fs—Functions, Funds and Functionaries—to the Panchayats as an essential path ahead for devolution of power is now well understood.16 However there could be serious legal road blocks in making this happen was clear from a case that was decided by the Supreme Court this year. In that case, by specific Government Orders (GOs) the services of the employees of eight departments were transferred to the

Gram Panchayats. The employees, so transferred, were to serve the Gram Panchayats (GPs) as multitasked workers or Gram Panchayat Evam Vikas Adhikaris (GPVAs). These orders were challenged by filing Writ Petitions on the grounds of (i) arbitrariness and (ii) (executive) interference with the statutory rights of Government employees under Service Rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution. The basic grievance raised was that whereas in the parent department, they were governed by respective Service Rules framed under the Constitution, they were being transferred to Gram Panchayats where there were no Service Rules governing the service conditions and their services became insecure.17 In the course of its judgement, the Supreme Court made clear that: The 73rd Amendment to the Constitution of India represents ‘an enabling provision and the State is empowered either to eliminate, modify or cancel by exercising power under the enabling provision. Article 243G enables the Panchayats to function as institutions of self-government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Panchayats, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, with respect to the implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule. The enabling provisions are further subject to the conditions as may be specified. Therefore, it is for the State Legislature to consider legal conditions and make the law accordingly. The devolution of exercise would also be open to the State to eliminate or modify ....’

The Court then went on to say that there was no dispute that while working under Gram Panchayats, these employees were continued to be paid salaries by the Irrigation Department, they were under the disciplinary control of the Irrigation Department where they also got their promotions.18 Thus the Court concluded that ‘[t]he over all control was vested in the respective Departments ... it is clear that the employees of various Departments were sent to [G]ram

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[P]anchayats on deputation pure and simple. They kept their lien in their respective [d]epartments.’ The Supreme Court’s conclusion that the employees were sent to the Gram Panchayats purely temporarily and on deputation formed the basis for its directive that the employees were to go back to their parent department and resume duties within two weeks. The case offers useful light in a critical field and should be of particular concern for all the proponents of democratic decentralisation and Panchayat Raj for rural parts of the country. In another judgement relating to civil rights, the Kerala High court made it clear that if one wanted his/her name to be part of the electoral rolls for election to the Panchayat, the onus was on the individual to get the remedy under appropriate registration rules applicable to the Panchayat. The High court thus made it clear that: ‘The right to be included in an electoral roll and to challenge the exclusion are, entirely, rights of the individual and if the individual has not initiated the prescribed statutory procedures, no right will lie in any one else to challenge the same.’19

Labour Rights A comment on the way the Apex Court dealt with labour issues in 2006 indicates a change in approach vis-à-vis labour rights. Perhaps the largest number of judgements delivered this year were on one subject; the demand for regularization and absorption of casual or temporary workers. It is no secret that even government agencies are now outsourcing their work and employing contract workers on daily wages with little security of tenure. The labour courts have gone strictly by the timehonoured laws and asked the employers to confirm those who were in their posts for considerable time. The High courts tended to uphold this view. But the trend in the Supreme Court is not quite in favour of such workers. In several judgements, the Apex Court has reversed the orders of the labour courts and the High courts.20

Whether the labour cases in 2006 reflect a larger trend of the Supreme Court not being in favour of such workers is an open question. Perhaps a closer examination of one such case can throw further light on the issue. Notice below how a case finally decided by the Supreme Court has moved through the Labour Court and the High court before it came to the Apex Court. In this specific case, the workers were appointed on purely casual and daily-rate basis for reasons that they were dependents of employees dying in harness. Subsequently, the union started pressing for regularisation of such employees.21 On reference, Labour Court held that although the persons were employed as ‘casual daily rated employees’, in view of their having continued for a long time, they were entitled to regularisation. On appeal, the High court held that the respondents were not entitled to regularisation. However, the High court directed that such employees would continue in service till their superannuation and they would be paid wages like regular employees of the company. The judgement of the High court came in appeal to the Supreme Court. The Apex Court in its judgement made clear that these workers had no right to the post and added further that there is no right vested in any daily wager to seek regularisation. It also clarified the logic saying that Rules of recruitment cannot be relaxed and the Court/Tribunal cannot direct regularisation of temporary appointees in disregard of the rules, nor can it direct continuation of service of a temporary employee. It is only a permanent employee who has a right to continue in service till the age of superannuation; for a temporary employee, there is no age of superannuation because he has no right to the post at all.22 The Court added: Creation and abolition of posts and regularization are in purely executive domain and the Court cannot arrogate to itself the powers of the executive or legislature. Orders for creation of posts, appointment on these posts, regularization, fixing pay scales, continuation in service, promotions, etc. are all executive or legislative

114 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA functions, and it is highly improper for Judges to step into this sphere, except in a rare and exceptional case.23

The way the judgement in the above case unfolds and the manner in which the Supreme Court eventually turned over the effects of the judgement of the Labour Court and also the High court would seem to lend support to the observation that the Supreme Court had an ‘anti-worker’ stance. However whether it is a part of a continuing trend especially in the era of privatisation and liberalisation is a matter of further enquiry. A case by case examination alone can help us get closer to the answer. As far as the earlier case is concerned, the Supreme Court also had its larger justifications. It thus said: The appellant is a sick company which has been running on huge losses for many years and is practically closed down. There are no vacancies on which the respondents could have been appointed. While we may have sympathy with them, we cannot ignore the hard economic realities, or the settled legal principles.

The case also threw up some larger issues and concerns which are discussed in the section below.

2. SOCIAL–ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE COURTS No Constitutional Guarantee of Employment While giving the larger justifications for the judgement on labour rights discussed earlier, the Supreme Court added a few more words, which perhaps were not needed for the specific case before it, but which for our present purposes helps throw light on an issue of great public concern. Note what the Supreme Court says: ... [A]lthough this Court would be very happy if everybody in the country is given a suitable job, the fact remains that in the present state of our country’s economy, the number of jobs are limited. Hence, everybody cannot be given a job, despite our

earnest desire. It may be mentioned that jobs cannot be created by judicial orders, nor even by legislative or executive decisions. Jobs are created when the economy is rapidly expanding, which means when there is rapid industrialization. At present, the state of affairs in our country is that although the economy has progressed a little in some directions, the truth is that this has only benefited a handful of persons while the plight of the masses has worsened. Unemployment in our country is increasing and has become massive and chronic.... Large scale suicides by farmers in several parts of the country also show the level of unemployment. These are the social and economic realities of the country which cannot be ignored. One may be very large hearted but then economic realities have also to be seen. Giving appointments means adding extra financial burden to the national exchequer. Money for paying salaries to such appointees does not fall from the sky, and it can only be realized by imposing additional taxes on the public or taking fresh loans, both of which will only lead to additional burden on the people.

The above is a hard-hitting articulation of apprehensions of the Court. To us, the apprehensions seem misplaced. The assertion of the Court that ‘everybody cannot be given a job’, and that ‘jobs cannot be created by judicial orders, nor even by legislative or executive decisions’, are all open to question from many standpoints. If these issues were not ‘in issue’, that is, not material for deciding the dispute, why did the Court engage in the above ‘hard talk’ on the state of economy and its capacity to provide employment? Besides, while one can understand that jobs cannot be created by ‘judicial orders’, is it fair to club these with ‘legislative or executive decisions’ in the same breath? If that is the case, then how can the introduction of the National Employment Guarantee Act be explained? While these questions inevitably come up, the Supreme Court went ahead in clarifying that there is indeed no Constitutional Guarantee of Employment. Its legal position on the issue is worth quoting in full: No doubt, Article 41 provides for the right to work, but this has been deliberately kept by the founding fathers of our Constitution in the Directive Principles and hence

Access to Justice: State of Indian Judiciary 115 made unenforceable in view of Article 37, because the founding fathers in their wisdom realized that while it was their wish that everyone should be given employment, the ground realities of our country cannot be overlooked. In our opinion, Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be stretched so far as to mean that everyone must be given a job. The numbers of available jobs are limited, and hence Courts must take a realistic view of the matter and must exercise self-restraint.

In coming to this position, the Court relied on two earlier Supreme Court judgements from the 1990s where it had held that ‘[T]he right to livelihood was found not feasible to be incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution and therefore employment was also not guaranteed under the Constitutional scheme.’ One wonders whether this was also the position a little earlier—in the 1980s? Perhaps not! In fact, in a wellknown case dealing with the pavement dwellers of Bombay two decades ago, the Supreme Court had declared that the right to livelihood was part of the fundamental right to life.24 One feels constrained to add: The Constitution—and Article 21 in it—has not changed at all unlike perhaps its judicial interpretation over these years.

‘Foundational Value’ of All Fundamental Rights Asserted The interpretation of the Fundamental Right to life in terms of the fact that whether the right to livelihood is part of it, may change through various judicial verdicts but in principle there is something wrong with it when you understand that all fundamental rights have a foundational value and the fact that they are not a ‘gift from the State to its citizens’—gifts that can be given or taken back at will. The point was also made clear by the Supreme Court in a separate case in these words: It is a fallacy to regard fundamental rights as a gift from the State to its citizens. Individuals possess basic human rights independently of any constitution by reason

of basic fact that they are members of the human race. These fundamental rights are important as they possess intrinsic value. Part-III of the Constitution does not confer fundamental rights. It confirms their existence and gives them protection. Its purpose is to withdraw certain subjects from the area of political controversy to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. Every right has a content. Every foundational value is put in Part-III as fundamental right as it has intrinsic value. The converse does not apply. A right becomes a fundamental right because it has foundational value. Apart from the principles, one has also to see the structure of the Article in which the fundamental value is incorporated. Fundamental right is a limitation on the power of the State....25

Socialism a ‘Basic Feature’, Privatisation in Policy Domain!: Supreme Court In the earlier case, the Court also emphasised the fact that there are certain essential features in the Constitution of India which are part of its ‘Basic Structure’ and being so, they cannot be taken out of the Constitution and in this sense ‘The basic structure concept ... limits the amending power of the Parliament.’ In this context it added: The point which is important to be noted is that principles of federalism, secularism, reasonableness, socialism, and so on are beyond the words of a particular provision. They are systematic and structural principles underlying and connecting various provisions of the Constitution. They give coherence to the Constitution. They make the Constitution an organic whole.26

It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court again correctly emphasised that ‘Socialism’ is an inseparable and integral part of the Constitution. Given the fact that through the last decade, in a number of cases, the Court has made it clear that issues that impinge on privatisation and liberalisation fall in policy domain and are thus beyond the Courts’

116 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA purview, a recognition of ‘Socialism’ as a basic structure may appear odd. See for example what the Supreme Court said in a case more than ten years ago: Privatization is a fundamental concept underlying the question about the power to make economic decisions. What should be the role of the State in economic development of the nation? How the resources of the country should be used?... All these questions have to be answered by a vigilant Parliament. Courts have their limitations—because these issues rest with the policy makers of the nation. No direction can be given or is expected from the Courts unless while implementing such policies, there is violation or infringement of any Constitutional or statutory provision.27

In fact, the presence of the word ‘socialism’ in the preamble of the Constitution of India today throws up a big Constitutional challenge—one that as a nation we have not been able to take up head on. The passing observation of the Supreme Court in the case quoted earlier was a ringing reminder of that.

No Preferential Public Employment for the Displaced In the specific context of employment for the displaced persons due to an Indian Oil Corporation Ltd (IOC) Project, the Delhi High court held that the promise made by the IOC to give employment to a member of the family of a land loser on the request of the Government of West Bengal being contrary to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, is illegal and accordingly unenforceable. 28 In coming to this conclusion, the High court cited with approval a previous case relating to acquisition for a steel plant where the Supreme Court had observed, ‘Even if the Government or the steel plant had not offered any employment to any person it would not have resulted in violation of any fundamental right.... Even otherwise, the obligation of the State to ensure that no citizen is deprived of his livelihood does not extend to providing

employment to every member of each family displaced in consequence of acquisition of land.’ In other words, the Supreme Court said that if a citizen has been deprived of his right to land upon following the procedure established by law, the State acquires no obligation to ensure that such a citizen is employed.29 Besides, the High court also added that grant of public employment on the ground that the land of a person or of his family has been acquired for a public purpose, would amount to grant of preferential treatment in the matter of public employment which would again be contrary to the Constitution of India.

Legality of SHGs’ Involvement in ICDS Upheld Integrated Child Development Service (ICDS) programme is perhaps the largest of all the food and supplementation programmes in the world which was initiated in the year 1975. Under this programme, the Supreme Court has been concerned over the use of contractors for procurement of grains. 30 In a specific order a couple of years ago, the Supreme Court made it clear that ‘[t]he contractors shall not be used for supply of nutrition in Anganwadis and preferably ICDS funds shall be spent by making use of village communities, self-help groups and Mahila Mandals for buying of grains and preparation of meals ....’31 In accordance with the Court’s order, the Delhi Government framed a detailed scheme. The objective as it appears from the scheme is—involvement of Self-help Groups (in short, the ‘SHGs’). The Scheme envisaged that within 27 months, the SHGs would be formed and would completely take over the running of the Anganwadis from the NGOs. In a specific case, the Apex Court upheld in July 2006 the legality of certain terms in inviting offers for implementation of ‘the scheme for Capacity Building of Self-help Groups to Prepare and Supply Supplementary Nutrition under the Integrated Child Development Service Programme.’32

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The Mumbai High Court Judgement on Farmers’ Suicides: Some Open Questions In a Public Interest Litigation, the Petitioner apprised the Chief Justice of the Mumbai High court about the increasing number of suicides in the district of Jalna.33 The Court took the assistance of Tata Institute of Social Sciences and called for a report from both State and Union Ministry of Agriculture. In these reports, agricultural indebtedness was found to be the prime reason behind the suicides. The High court took note of the fact that in spite of a 25 per cent share in gross domestic product, the Indian agriculture accounted for a negligible share in world imports and exports and also that the investment in agriculture was declining. The Court noted that the fundamental problem identified was—increase in the cost of cultivation as a result of higher input prices, without corresponding increase in the prices realised by farmers for their agricultural produce. In this context the Court suggested fixation of support price for groups of states and not at national level. Notably, the Union of India had filed an affidavit through its Deputy Secretary in the Department of Agriculture and Cooperation which according to the Court fairly accepts the prevalence of farmers’ suicides in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra. The reasons for such occurrences are stated to be—(i) crop losses; (ii) indebtedness; (iii) mono-cropping; (iv) non-remunerative prices; (v) increased cost of inputs; (vi) lack of alternative employment opportunities, and so on. While having thus closely looked at the problem, the Court felt constrained to record: At the same time, while this Court discharges its obligation of interpreting and expounding upon constitutional precepts, it is necessary not to transgress upon those areas that are left by the Constitution to the other organs of the State. The doctrine of separation of powers requires that matters of legislation and issues of defining policy be left to the executive. By a long line of precedent it is now well settled that

price fixation is essentially a part of the legislative function.34

Referring to ‘the comprehensive package announced by the Government’, the court added that ‘[w]e expect that these measures shall now be adopted and implemented with vigour and expedition. This should not remain an ornate scheme, impressive on paper but deficient in implementation. The State shall take all measures to ensure that benefits reach those for whom they are intended.’ There are people who feel that the Mumbai High court had done a great service in bringing this issue to the fore and in making the state government act upon it. There is considerable truth in this. But then there are others who have felt that the Court went only up to a point and should have gone further and here it was constrained by self-imposed limits based on the doctrine of ‘Separation of Powers’. The extract from the verdict quoted earlier shows that there may be truth in this argument too. Indeed there are still some unanswered questions from the verdict. When both the Court-appointed Committee and the Union of India identified the problem and the State’s package did not seem to be doing anything about it, was it right for the Court to merely invoke the Separation of Powers? Why has the ‘fundamental problem’ identified by the Court-appointed agency which is wholly approved by the Court been left unaddressed when similar courtappointed expert bodies have had a greater say especially on environment matters? For the cash strapped farmers these are ‘million dollar’ questions.

3. ENVIRONMENT, DEVELOPMENT AND THE COURTS The constraints that the higher courts experience when dealing with cases pertaining to social and economic rights—as evidenced in the farmers’ suicides case discussed earlier—are not normally seen in the cases pertaining to the protection of environment.

118 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA A review of some important environmental and developmental cases from the year 2006 is presented below.

Aravalli Hills’ Case: Courtappointed Committees at the ‘Business-end’ The recourse by the Supreme Court to Committees appointed by it to resolve those environmental disputes where the facts were not clear to it was again obvious in litigation on protection of parts of Aravalli Hills in Rajasthan. Even if there was apparent environmental impact of an extractive industry, the Supreme Court showed that matters cannot proceed without an independent report and a closer look. Note the circumstances below which form the Aravalli Hills case: From the reports and affidavits including the affidavit filed on behalf of state government, it appears that in Sirohi and Khori Jamalpur area, approximately 2,000 trucks of metal and masonry stone operate every day but what impact it has on environment and whether necessary precautions are taken, deserves to be examined.... In the present case, however, at this stage, we do not think that merely on the basis of photographs or plying of large number of trucks per day, a direction deserves to be made for stopping the mining activity. At the same time, it is necessary to obtain an independent report to determine the impact of mining activity on environment, the safeguards, if any, that are taken and whether it is possible to continue mining by strictly complying with the requisite safeguards to save the environment from degradation and if not, to consider the issue of directions prohibiting the mining activity.35

The Supreme Court then went ahead and asked a Monitoring Committee to inspect the mining activity being carried out in the villages concerned and report the impact, if any, of continuing mining activity on environment. It also asked the Committee to look into the safeguards, if any, adopted to minimise the adverse effect on environment, and any other suggestions relevant to the

issue of impact of mining activity on degradation of environment. Note that Supreme Court entrusted this task to the same Monitoring Committee which was appointed by it two years back with a view to monitor the overall restoration efforts in the Aravalli Hills and to provide technical support to the implementing organisations and also to monitor implementation of recommended remedial measures.36 The case again shows that when it comes to handling environmental litigation, it is the Court-appointed Committees—with monitoring, advising and investigative roles—which are in the business of deciding disputes.

Reconciling Competing Claims of Protecting Tanks and Housing In a case relating to the preservation and restoration of status quo ante of two tanks, historical in nature being in existence since about 1500 AD in the suburbs of Tirupathi, a world renowned popular pilgrim centre, the Supreme Court said ‘It is true that the tank is a communal property and the state authorities are trustees to hold and manage such properties for the benefits of the community and they cannot be allowed to commit any act or omission which will infringe the right of the Community and alienate the property to any other person or body.’37 Taking into account the above principle and after considering the competing claims of environment and the need for housing, the Apex Court held: On the facts of the present case, it seems that the respondents intend to build residential blocks of flats for High and Middle income families, institutions as well as infrastructure for the TTDS. If the proposed constructions are not carried on, it seems unlikely that anyone will be left homeless or without their basic need for shelter. Therefore, one feels that the right to shelter does not seem to be so pressing under the present circumstances so as to outweigh all environmental considerations.38

The Court then noted that one particular feature of this case was the competing nature

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of claims by both the parties on the present state of the two tanks and the feasibility of their revival. The Court thought that it would be best, therefore, if it placed reliance on the findings of the expert committee appointed by it which had considered the factual situation and the feasibility of revival of the two tanks. Thus in pursuance of a study by that committee, this Court passed specific directions for revival of the two tanks.39 Much like the case discussed before, the Court-appointed Committee helped the Court in taking a decision when it was asked to re-concile competing claims of protecting the water bodies and addressing the needs for housing. The case also showed that any reconciliation of environmental and developmental needs can only take place on a close appreciation of the local context.

The Supreme Court Explains the ‘Public Trust Doctrine’ Further In its earlier judgements in 1997 and then in 1999, the Supreme Court had held: [Our legal system] includes the public trust doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. [...] The State as a trustee is under the legal duty to protect the natural resources.40

In the year 2006, the Supreme Court in separate cases made it clear that the above represents ‘an articulation of the doctrine from the angle of the affirmative duties of the State with regard to public trust.’ What it added after that is important for all those concerned with environment and ecology and is worth quoting in detail: Formulated from a negatory angle, the doctrine does not exactly prohibit the alienation of the property held as a public trust. However, when the state holds a resource that is freely available for the use of the public, it provides for a high degree of judicial scrutiny upon any action of the Government, no matter how consistent with the existing legislations, that attempts to restrict such free use. To properly

scrutinize such actions of the Government, the Courts must make a distinction between the government’s general obligation to act for the public benefit, and the special, more demanding obligation which it may have as a trustee of certain public resources.41

According to Prof. Sax, whose article on this subject is considered to be an authority, three types of restrictions on governmental authority are often thought to be imposed by the public trust doctrine: 1. the property subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purpose, but it must be held available for use by the general public; 2. the property may not be sold, even for fair cash equivalent; 3. the property must be maintained for particular types of use (i) either traditional uses, or (ii) some uses particular to that form of resources.’ There are many who wanted to know more about the exact content of the Public Trust Doctrine and its applicability for ascertaining State’s liability and in protecting environment. The Supreme Court above has provided just that.

A Decision in Compromising Context: The DDA Case from Delhi If the State holds Property in Public trust, consider the role of the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) in a case from Delhi below. The DDA had proposed the development of an International Hotel Complex on 315 hectares of land situated in the Vasant Kunj area after the same area was identified in the Master Plan for Delhi 2001 for urban use. According to the applicants, the said area under the earlier Master Plan 1962 was identified as a green area but there was a change of user to urban area under the latter Master Plan, that is, Master Plan 2001. DDA planned to develop the said area for construction of Hotels, Convention Centres, and such like.42 The Counsel for the DDA had pointed out in

120 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA the case that a notification in respect of the land in question had been issued which was never challenged and that both the EPCA and the Expert Committee’s report under consideration of the Court only referred to the land as ‘similar to ridge area’. Significantly, the EPCA in its report has taken note of the fact that there is no statutory definition of ‘ridge’. Also note that the Expert Committee appointed by the Court had concluded that: In hindsight, it is evident that the location of large commercial complexes in this area was environmentally unsound. Now many proponents have constructed very substantially, and really speaking, awarding clearances even with conditions is largely a compromise with de-facto situation. The Expert Committee is of the opinion that at this stage only damage control is possible by strict implementation of effective EMP and resource conservation measures in the project construction and operational stages.

In the light of these facts, the Supreme Court concluded that the confusion arose because DDA all through gave an impression to the parties participating in auction that all requisite clearances had been obtained.43 It then added: We are prima facie satisfied about the bona fides of the respondents but at the same time it needs no emphasis that DDA should have been more transparent in ensuring that it was not putting a site for auction where there was scope for litigation. It had definitely created an impression that all necessary clearances had been obtained, though it does not appear to be so. Let the MoEF take a decision within a period of 2 months from today to avoid unnecessary delay....

The extracts from the case have been produced for the reader to know the set of compromising circumstances in which the decision was ultimately taken. The Court notices the lapses of the DDA but does not go further to term it as gross negligence that would have invited penalty from the Court. Instead, it allowed the MoEF to take a decision on the whole matter ‘to avoid unnecessary delay’.

Women’s Right to Forest Produce: Madras High Court The fact that the Courts have not only been concerned with protection of forests and environment but can also play a role in protection of the interest of the people dependent on the forest and forest produces for their survival and livelihood is obvious from the following case of the Madras High court. The petitioner is a Women Self-help Group comprising Scheduled Tribe women who solely depend upon the minor forest products. The state government in order to help the Scheduled Tribe women, created the Village Forest Council and gave the right to sell and control the minor forest products to such councils. The lease was granted in favour of the petitioner to sell the minor forest products at the fair price fixed by the respondents. The petitioner sought for an extension of the permit. Accordingly, the lease was extended by the 3rd respondent but the 2nd respondent has not permitted the petitioner to carry and transport the minor forest products and therefore, this writ petition has been filed.44

Enforcing Water Supply in a City: Kerala High Court A public interest litigation was filed in the High court ventilating the grievances of the people of West Kochi who have been clamouring for supply of potable drinking water to them, for the last more than three decades. Noting that the petitioners ‘have approached this court as a last resort’, the court felt that ‘the grievances ventilated by the petitioners representing the people of West Kochi is a genuine and eminently deserving appropriate orders from this court.’ The court further said that since April 2000, the government authorities have been submitting before this court that steps are being taken to complete projects for the supply of water to people of West Kochi, but ‘nothing concrete in the form of actual supply of water has emerged so far’. Even the latest statement

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made under the court’s directions ‘also does not give any concrete proposal as to when exactly the people of West Kochi would actually get regular supply of drinking water.’ In the light of these facts, the court observed: When considering the priorities of a Government, supply of drinking water should be on the top of the list. However, for the past more than three decades, successive Governments who have ruled this state have given scant attention to the need for potable drinking water of the residents of West Kochi. This is indeed a callous and deplorable attitude of the Government, which needs to be deprecated in very strong terms. We have no hesitation to hold that failure of the state to provide safe drinking water to the citizens in adequate quantities would amount to violation of the fundamental right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India and would be a violation of human rights. Therefore, every Government, which has its priorities right, should give foremost importance to providing safe drinking water even at the cost of other development programmes. Nothing shall stand in its way whether it is lack of funds or other infrastructure. Ways and means have to be found out at all costs with utmost expediency in-stead of restricting action in that regard to mere lip service.45

In the above circumstances, the court directed the state governments to take and complete all steps necessary for supplying drinking water to the people of West Kochi within six months from the judgement and added, ‘We categorically make it clear that on completion of six months from today, the people of West Kochi should be getting potable water in sufficient quantities through an efficient water supply system without fail.’ The case fits well into a pattern where the higher courts after applying right to water largely for pollution prevention in an urban context for a long time, have felt the urge to take it further. Thus the access to clean drinking water is being increasingly pronounced as a fundamental right. The categorical and specific pronouncement of the Kerala High court above has the capacity ‘to let the cat loose amongst the pigeons.’ Most critically however the court saw through the standard plea of unavailability of resources while mak-ing clear that ‘[n]othing shall stand in its way whether it is lack of funds or other infrastruc-ture.’ The case again affirms that the resource basket can be augmented and can indeed be shaken to prioritise funding in areas, which are more fundamental to our existence.

PART II THE STATE OF THE JUDICAL SYSTEM 1. SPECIFIC ISSUES ON JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY National Judicial Council on the Anvil The concerns relating to judicial accountability led to a lot of discussion relating to appointment of the National Judicial Commission throughout the year. However towards the end of the year, it was increasingly clear that the Central Government was moving towards creation of a National Judicial Council. The essential difference between such a Council as opposed to a Commission was that the supremacy of the Chief Justice of India and the judiciary would be maintained in the matter of judicial

appointments through the Council. The Judicial Council will consist of the representatives of the judiciary while selecting candidates for judicial posts. Thus the Law Minister made it clear in November that the Judicial Council would consist of the representatives of the judiciary while selecting candidates for judicial posts. He rejected a recommendation that the National Judicial Council should be headed by the Vice-President of India and the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha should also be included as a member of National Judicial Council.46 Speaking at the Supreme Court lawns, the Union Minister of Law and Justice added that laymen cannot decide on the appointment of judges and that he has already

122 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Box 3.2 Centre ready with bill to probe judges The Government has given final touches to the Judges (Inquiry) Bill which will put into place a National Judicial Council to inquire into acts of ‘misbehaviour’ and ‘incapacity’ of judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. The bill has been introduced in Parliament and is receiving attention of the Select Committee of Members of Parliament. Significantly, while Chief Justice Y.K. Sabharwal, who had earlier expressed his reservations against the Government putting in place such a mechanism to probe judges, is now known to have given his approval for the Bill. Officials say, a list of ‘clauses’ have been incorporated in the Bill on the recommendations made by the Chief Justice. The conditions are: • In the case of an inquiry against a Supreme Court judge, no High Court judges will form part of the Council. • The Council will not have powers to hold an inquiry against retired judges. • In case the inquiry is against a member of the National Judicial Council, he will be excluded from the proceedings. Source: 19 October 2006, The Indian Express. (http://www.indianexpress.com/story/ 14953.html).

consulted two former Chief Justices as well as the present Chief Justice of India on the issue.47 The aim of setting up of National Judicial Council is to fix the accountability of the judges of the High court as well as the Supreme Court. The decision of the government to bring a bill to amend the Judges Inquiry Act and to provide for the constitution of a National Judicial Council to inquire into complaints against errant judges has not enthused all. A senior lawyer in the Supreme Court feels that ‘judicial council will not usher in any real judicial accountability, though for some time, till its import is properly understood, it may create an illusion of that. That in fact appears to be its main purpose, judging by the statements of the ministers and judges, who say that this bill will go a long way to restore public confidence in the judiciary.’48 This criticism is made because it is felt that for an unbiased enquiry, a full-time body that is independent of both the government and the judiciary is needed. Inasmuch as the proposed judicial council does not address that concern, it will be vulnerable to questioning and criticism.

Judicial Corruption and Whistleblower Policy The Ministry of Law and Justice admitted in the Rajya Sabha that ‘Complaints are

received by Government from time to time regarding corruption in judicial system.’49 This assumes significance in the light of the fact that a whistleblower protection policy for the judiciary is being contemplated. In reply to another question in the Rajya Sabha in July 2006, the Ministry pointed out that: ‘[t]he Law Commission in their 195th Report on Judges (Inquiry) Bill, 2005, suggested that a whistleblower’s provision may be incorporated in the proposed Bill. They have further recommended that if a complainant under the ‘complaint procedure’ is apprehensive of reprisals, he should have the right to request the Counsel that his name is to be kept confidential.50 It has also been recommended that every complainant and every person including a witness and a lawyer who participates in the investigation and inquiry, whether or not he seeks confidentiality about his name, must undertake before the Judicial Council that, he shall not reveal his own name, the name of the Judge complained against, the contents of the complaint or any of the documents or proceedings to anybody else including the media without the prior written approval of the Judicial Council and it will be for the Judicial Council to decide when and to what extent the contents of the complaint shall be disclosed. The Ministry added that ‘the recommendations of the Law Commission are being examined with a view to setting up of National Judicial Council, the modalities for which are being worked out in consultation with all the stake holders.’51 The adoption of the provisions can mark the birth of a Whistleblower Policy for the Judiciary and can potentially lead to greater judicial accountability and especially help in a big way in tackling corruption in the Judiciary.

Dealing with Abuse of PILs In an interesting question in the Parliament, the Government was asked as to whether it was aware that ‘PILs on flimsy grounds are being filed in the Supreme Court/High

Access to Justice: State of Indian Judiciary 123 Table 3.1 The Judges (inquiry) Bill, 2006∗ Key ingredients of the bill

Summary of the Judges (inquiry) Bill, 2006

Preliminary

(1) This Act may be called the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 2006. (2) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint.

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Machinery for Preliminary Investigation and Inquiry

(1) With effect from such date as the President may, by notification appoint, there shall be established a National Judicial Council. (2) The National Judicial Council shall consist of the following, namely: • The Chief Justice of India—Chairperson; • Two senior most Judges of the Supreme Court, to be nominated by the Chief Justice of India—Members; • Two Chief Justices of the High Courts, to be nominated by Chief Justice of India—Members. (3) The Council shall, for the purpose of assisting it in the discharge of its functions (including verification, preliminary investigation and inquiry in respect of allegations) under this Act, appoint a Secretary and such other officers and employees as the President may determine, from time to time, in consultation with the Council.

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Complaint Procedure

(1) Any person may make a complaint in writing involving any allegation of misbehaviour or incapacity in respect of a Judge to the Council: Provided that no such complaint shall be entertained and inquired into with respect to any act or conduct constituting misbehaviour which has taken place before the commencement of this Act: Provided further that no such complaint shall be entertained and inquired into with respect to any act or conduct constituting misbehaviour which has taken place two years prior to the filing of the complaint: Provided also that no complaint shall be entertained and inquired into against a person who has demitted the office of a Judge.

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Reference Procedure

(1) If a notice is given of a motion for presenting an address to the President praying for removal of a Judge, on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity, it must be signed: • in the case of a notice given in the House of the People, by not less than 100 members of that House; • in the case of a notice given in the Council of States, by not less than 50 members of that House; then the Speaker or, as the case may be, the Chairman may, after consulting such persons, as he thinks fit and after considering such materials, if any, as may be available to him, either admit the motion or refuse to admit the same.

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Procedure for Inquiry in Judge Cases of Physical or Mental Incapacity of a Judge

(1) Where it is alleged that the Judge is unable to discharge the duties of his office efficiently due to any physical or mental incapacity and the allegation is denied, the Council may arrange for the medical examination of the Judge by such Medical Board as may be appointed for the purpose and the Judge shall submit himself to such medical examination within the time specified in this respect by the Council.

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Procedure for Inquiry

(1) Every such inquiry shall be conducted in camera by the Chairperson and the Members of the Council sitting jointly. (2) The Council shall hold every such inquiry as expeditiously as possible and in any case complete the inquiry within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the complaint: Provided that the Council, for reasons to be recorded in writing, may complete the inquiry within a further period of six months. (3) The Central Government may, if requested by the Council, appoint an advocate to conduct the case against the Judge.

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Procedure after Conclusion of Inquiry

(1) If, after inquiry in respect of a complaint, the Council is satisfied that: • No charges have been proved, it shall dismiss the complaint and no further action shall be taken against the Judge and the Judge and the complainant shall be informed accordingly. • All or any of the charges in regard to misbehaviour or incapacity have been proved and the Council is of the opinion that the charges proved do not warrant removal of the Judge, it may impose all or any of the following minor measures, namely: I. issuing advisories; II. issuing warnings; III. withdrawal of judicial work for a limited time including cases already assigned; IV. request that the Judge may voluntarily retire; V. censure or admonition, public or private.

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Offences and Penalties

(1) Whoever intentionally offers any insult, or causes any interruption, to the Council while the Council or any of its Members is making any verification or conducting any preliminary investigation or inquiry under this Act, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.

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Miscellaneous

(1) A Judge aggrieved by: • an order of removal passed by the President; or • a final order passed by the Council imposing one or other ‘minor measure’ on the basis of a complaint; may, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Source: http://rajyasabha.nic.in/legislative/amendbills/personal_law/97_2006.pdf Notes: Statement of Objects and Reasons: A suitable legislative framework is the need of the hour for empowering a judicial forum to deal with the complaints against Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. On the basis of the recommendations made in the 195th Report of the Law Commission of India on the Judges (Inquiry) Bill, 2005, the Bill, namely, the Judges (Inquiry) Bill, 2006 has been prepared. ∗A Bill for establishing the National Judicial Council to undertake preliminary investigation and inquire into allegations of misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court and to regulate the procedure for such investi-gation, inquiry and proof, and for imposing minor measures; and for the presentation of an address by the President to the Parliament and for matters connected therewith. (Shri H.R. Bhardwaj, Minister of Law and Justice) MGIPMRND-4264ls(S5)—12 December 2006.

124 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA courts on subjects like broadband service providers’ accountability, reduction in VAT on catering and similar services, banning construction of shopping malls, and so on, which take a lot of time of the courts, where the arrears of cases are already very large’ and further that if so, whether the Government will initiate measures, in consultation with judiciary, to admit PILs only on specified subjects?52 The Minister of Law and Justice replied that whether or not the grounds on which a PIL is filed in the Supreme Court/ High courts are frivolous is a matter to be decided by the Supreme Court or the High court, as the case may be. He pointed out that the Supreme Court itself has cautioned in the past that ‘No litigant has a right to unlimited claim on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes and that easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions’.53 Much like earlier years, in 2006 too the Court had occasion to comment on the misuse of PILs. Thus it said in one case: Howsoever genuine a cause brought before a court by a public interest litigant may be, the court has to decline its examination at the behest of a person who, in fact, is not a public interest litigant and whose bonafides and credentials are in doubt. In a given exceptional case where bonafides of a public interest litigant are in doubt, the court may still examine the issue having regard to the serious nature of the public cause and likely public injury by appointing an Amicus Curiae to assist the court but under no circumstances with the assistance of a doubtful public interest litigant. No trust can be placed by court on a mala fide applicant in public interest litigation.54

The Minster of Law and Justice also made it clear in the Parliament that ‘there is no proposal before the Government to curb the PIL jurisdiction forming part of the writ jurisdiction of the Courts which is one of the basic features of the Constitution.’ This affirmation from the Minister that the PIL Jurisdiction was one of the basic features of the Constitution was important especially in light of the fact that the alleged misuse of PIL had prompted the legislators to introduce a bill not

very long ago regulating the practice of filing public interest litigations in the higher courts.

2. ARREARS, DELAY AND DEALING WITH THEM In the beginning of 2006, there were 33,635 cases in Supreme Court and 34,24,518 cases in High courts reported to be pending.55 The Government also admitted in Parliament that more than 50 Lakh civil cases were pending in various courts of the country. To a further question as to whether the Central Government would extend any assistance/ advice to the states for early disposal of the pending cases, the Ministry of Law and Justice replied that ‘Matters pertaining to disposal of cases pending in the courts is in the domain of the Judiciary. Insofar as filling up of vacant posts of judicial officers that would facilitate disposal of cases, the Central Government has already written to the Chief Ministers of all States. Further, the Central Government has extended the scheme of operation of Fast Track Courts for a further period of five years from 1 April 2005 and is ex-tending central assistance to the states for this purpose.56 The extent of pendency of cases in High court is exemplified by the number of cases pending in one High court— the Allahabad High court. The Government stated in the Parliament that in the Allahabad High court, ‘out of a total 10,53,794 cases pending as on 31 March 2006, which includes 7,75,583 main cases and 2,78,211 miscellaneous cases, 3,42,135 cases are pending for more than 10 years.’57

Alternatives to Court Adjudication One of the ways to decongest the Courts is to look for alternatives to adjudication like Arbitration, Mediation and so on. The Ministry of Law and Justice stated in the Parliament that in this regard ‘[t]he National Legal Services Authority has proposed to start training programmes for lawyers and judicial officers in all the 22 High courts and 22 selected District Courts. After imparting training to the lawyers and judicial officers, Mediation Cells shall be established in the selected districts.’ As an example of successful

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mediation, it was pointed out that the Mediation Cell at Tees Hazari Courts Complex in Delhi had disposed of 100 cases in the month of November and December out of 217 cases received.58 In another statement this year, the Ministry had also stated that it was alive to creation of as many Lok Adalats as possible and there are success stories now showing that Lok Adalats can also provide significant help in decongesting the Courts.

Status of Fast Track Courts On another Parliamentary question about whether the Government proposed to constitute more Fast Track Courts for the speedy disposal of cases, the Minister of Law and Justice replied that ‘Government has extended the scheme of Fast Track Courts (FTCs) (at sessions level) in respect of 1,562 FTCs in the country for a period of five years beyond 31 March 2005. There is no proposal, at present, with the Government for constituting more FTCs.’ Note here that as discussed in the last Citizens Report, the Supreme Court of India is monitoring the functioning of FTCs.59 Notably, only those 1,562 FTCs which were already made functional by State Governments were taken into consideration for extending their term. The state governments in default in setting up of requisite number of Fast Track Courts are Bihar, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab and West Bengal.60 The Supreme Court in its order dated 21 November 2005 has directed the High courts and state governments to furnish affidavits to know as to how many FTCs are required to be continued having regard to the pendency.61 Note here that as per the information available with the Department of Justice, the Fast Track courts have disposed of 10.09 lakh cases out of 17.78 lakh cases transferred to them.62

3. JUSTICE FOR ALL AND THE NEED FOR ‘DEMAND ORIENTATION’ In a significant question in Rajya Sabha, the Minister of Law and Justice was asked:

Box 3.3 New provisions for speedy trial of criminal cases: Statement of minister of state, ministry of Law and Justice With a view to facilitate speedy trial of criminal cases and to give justice to the innocents, the Code of Criminal Procedure has been amended by an Act of Parliament called Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005 which contains following essential provisions: i) The powers of First Class and Second Class Magistrates to impose fines have been enhanced. ii) Use of modern and scientific techniques has been allowed in the examination of the accused. iii) Magistrates have been empowered to direct an accused to subject himself to identification by any person. iv) Magisterial inquiry has been made mandatory in case of death or rape during custody. v) Magistrates have been empowered to order a person to give specimen signatures or handwriting. vi) No person can be detained during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial for more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said offence under that law. vii) A provision relating to Plea-Bargaining has been made operative. Through PleaBargaining, the criminal cases can be finalised in a short time while at the same time the victims can be compensated by the accused. Source: Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice; Rajya Sabha, Question No. 350, Answered on 21 August 2006.

whether it was a fact that, ‘Justice for All’ was much easier said than done. The answer by the Minister of State was instructive and worth quoting in full here: In order to reach justice to the people, the Government has taken various steps to improve the productivity and efficiency of the judiciary which include periodically monitoring the pendency position in courts, grouping of cases involving common question of law, constitution of specialized benches, timely filling up the vacancies of judges, increasing the judge strength, organizing Lok Adalats at regular intervals, encouraging alternative modes of disputes resolution like negotiation, mediation and arbitration and setting up of special tribunals like Central Administrative Tribunals, State Administrative Tribunals, Income Tax Appellate Tribunals, Family Courts, Labour Courts, and so on. The Government has also set up Fast Track Courts in States and has extended their term upto 31 March 2010 for clearing pending cases at District level.

The above represents a typical response that the Ministry has been giving to questions of such nature in the last few years. However each of the initiatives suggested above are in the nature of ‘supply-driven’ solutions to a much larger problem. Especially if it is understood that most people do not have

126 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA the means, capacity or willingness to access the legal system and that any search for ‘Justice for All’ has a critical ‘demand side’ problem. In that sense, the judicial system needs a demand-orientation. However to make any headway here, the understanding of law from the standpoint of poor and the disadvantaged people is critical. The Ministry could do well to ask some threshold questions here: What exactly do law and justice mean to the poor and the disadvantaged? What obstacles do they face in living a dignified life and do laws have a role in mitigating some of them? What are the strategies that they have adopted to fight injustices in their lives and for sheer survival in many cases?63 How effective or ineffective has the ‘developed legal system’ been in their efforts? The searches for these are important. This is especially so because far from getting the answers, these are all questions that have never been closely understood by the best of legal luminaries and generally, the intellectual fraternity.64 A few more words on why the above posers make sense are in order here. There are really two ways to understand the legal system. The first one is from the above with a clear focus on formal law sources including codified legislations and judicial opinions. The other way is from below when the focus is on ‘the lived experience of the ordinary people.’ While the law from the above genre is dominant, indeed all pervasive and the obvious favourite of the Bar and the Bench, the need to develop and understand law from below is non-existent and that explains the scarce socio-legal research around the lives of the poor and the disadvantaged in India. There are people who believe that unless popular resistance is written into the very text of law, realising rights and accessing justice would remain more of a pipedream.65 It is difficult see how that can happen in the Indian context in the foreseeable future, given the reality of the dominant legal culture in this country.66 The response of the Ministry to the question on ‘Justice for All’ represents a dominant culture of applying only the supply side correctives, ‘In order to reach justice to the people’.

While what is said above is the larger reality, there are two specific areas where the Ministry of Law and Justice have shown signs of improving the judicial system especially from the standpoint of those who need this system the most. These two areas are (a) efforts at creating Gram Nyayalayas and (b) the proposed legal literacy campaign of the National Legal Literacy Mission especially for the disadvantaged people. These are briefly discussed below:

Gram Nyayalayas being Set up through a New Law The Minster of Law and Justice stated in the Rajya Sabha that ‘[t]he Government is examining various aspects relating to setting up of Gram Nyayalayas (Village Courts) in the country and for this purpose to introduce a Bill in Parliament at the earliest possible.67 In fact the Government of India had come up with the Gram Nyayalayas Bill 2005 last year. The National Advisory Council also commented on each of the sections of the proposed Bill. The preamble of the Bill says that it aims ‘to provide for the establishment of Gram Nyayalayas for the purposes of providing access to justice both civil and criminal to the citizens at the grass-root level and to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of social, economic or other disabilities’. The Minister of Panchayati Raj has also recently stated that a Commission to finalise the law is to be constituted. It is hoped that the Government in its endeavours takes into account the history of such village courts in independent India to incorporate the lessons learnt from it and hopefully also tries to understand the present experience on the ground from existing village courts in various states. The functioning of Gram Nyayalayas from Madhya Pradesh under a recently enforced state legislation can provide useful insights in this regard. A particularly significant work on Gram Nyayalayas has been that of the Law Commission of India in mid1980s which assumes significance in the context of the present decision of the Union

Access to Justice: State of Indian Judiciary 127

Government.68 The Law Commission sought to explore the effectiveness of ‘Alternative Forum for Resolution of Disputes at Grass Root Level’. The Commission’s recommendation for the constitution of Gram Nyayalaya or Nyaya Panchayats and especially its suggestion of making a start in the right direction with one or two such bodies being constituted on an experimental basis to assess the feasibility and rationale of such bodies deserves closer scrutiny in this regard.

The Launch of the ‘Project Combat’ On another front, the proposed Legal Literacy Campaign of the National Legal Services Authority also represents an ambitious plan to take justice to the poor and the needy. The details of this proposed campaign can be seen from the statement in Box 3.4. However it is notable that there is no separate provision of the funds made for the purpose of spreading legal awareness programme in remote rural areas—a fact admitted by the Government in the Parliament. This is significant in the light of the fact that most legal-aid schemes and legal-literacy programmes in the past have failed to take off only due to paucity of funds. Given that fact, how much Project Combat makes inroads in the near future remains to be seen.69 The Government however maintains that the funds allocated by the Government are utilised for implementation of legal-aid programmes and schemes which also include the spreading of legal awareness programme in the remote rural areas, framed under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. See Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Rajya Sabha, Question No 3077-Answered on 15 May 2006.

Making Legal Aid Work: History Suggests the Need for a Decisive Will There is a history of legal aid and there is a history of its post-mortem. For making project like the ‘Project Combat’ over and above the Government, the legal fraternity and the

Box 3.4 National legal services authority launches project combat for the disadvantaged people As a part of the initiative of the National Legal Literacy Mission, the National Legal Services Authority has launched Project Combat for protecting the Dalits and the Disadvantaged, Women in Religious places and Tourism in the States of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Goa, Tamil Nadu and Orissa. The object is: Sensitisation and Effective Implementation of Prevention of Devdasi and other related Legislations Pertaining to Organised and Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Women and Girl Children. The said Project is proposed to be implemented soon in all States and Union Territories. (The Project has a role for the law students.) The role of law students would be to generate awareness on the protection of rights of such vulnerable groups to save them from degeneration of their mental health and socio-economic crises leading to the threat to their basic survival. The law students will be associated and involved in the activities of State Legal Services Authorities/District Legal Services Authorities. Source: Statement of the Union Minister of Law and Justice in Rajya Sabha; Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice; Rajya Sabha, Question No. 3077- Answered on 15 May 2006.

larger civil society need to draw lessons from that history. Some of these are mentioned briefly here. A 1973 Report of the Government of Gujarat did not regard litigation as playing a significant role in the life of the poor. It suggested instead that the focus needed to be on preventive services including legal advice, education, representation, research and innovation, institutional changes and last, but not the least, insisting upon changes in the laws themselves ‘to tilt the balance in favour of the poor’.70 Two years after the above report, a Government of India report while recommending a network of legal-aid institutions at the national and state levels, wanted complete autonomy of these institutions from government interference. A Madhya Pradesh Report hoped that the State Bar Council would ‘make obligatory on the part of every lawyer to render services in the shape of giving legal aid to the poor whenever a necessity arises’.71 There was also a Rajasthan Report suggesting formation of an autonomous statutory organisation for legal aid in the state and which also spoke of a committee identifying issues of public interest and undertaking PIL by instituting and pending cases.72 While most of the reports have been appreciated for providing sound ‘legal philosophical constructs’, they have been criticised for lack of programmatic content with a judge in the Delhi High court finding that

128 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA ‘each successive report sounded repetitive.’73 Nevertheless, an obvious result of these reports have been that a number of laws have been passed at the central and state levels laying down a categorical mandate for legal aid at all the levels. Generally speaking these provisions have been sparingly used given the need and the numbers behind that need. In any case, the fact that the legal-aid bodies at all levels continue to be ultimately controlled financially by the executive, limits the role of legal aid especially as most critical cases from the standpoint of the poor and the disadvantaged typically are against the executive, particularly at the state and sub-state levels. The point made above should suggest that the battle to make legal aid work requires a decisive and sustained political will with sound programmatic content and resources to back it up. Just launching projects and appealing to law students’ philanthropy may not be enough.

NOTES 1 See for more details the decision in R.D. Upadhyay v. State of A.P on 13 April 2006 and reported in 2006(3)ALD42(SC). 2 These measures include ‘Sarva Shiksha Yojna’, Reproductive and Child Health Programme, and Integrated Child Development Projects and passing of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 for the welfare of children in general. Union of India also pointed out that the Swadhar scheme has been launched by the Department of Woman and Child Development with the objective of providing for the primary needs of shelter, food, clothing, care, emotional support and counselling to the women convicts and their children. See para 19 in R.D. Upadhyay v. State of A.P. 3 The Court then added that ‘Compliance report stating steps taken by Union of India, state governments, Union Territories and State Legal Services Authorities shall be filed in four months whereafter matter shall be listed for directions.’ 4 Parbatabai Sakharam Taram v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. and reported in 2006CriLJ2202. 5 Article 21 reads as Protection of life and personal liberty: No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.

6 Article 22 reads as Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases (for more details refer to Annexure). 7 It is unfortunate that though the petitioner being a tribal girl with no access to justice was being prosecuted under the provisions of TADA (P) Act, 1987 along with other offences of serious nature under the Indian Penal Code and Arms Act. 8 See the judgement of the Gauhati High court in Konsam Brojen Singh v. State of Manipur and Ors., Decided On: 27 February 2006 (2006)2GLR452. 9 Konsam Brojen Singh v. State of Manipur and Ors., at para 35. 10 The court passed this order while dismissing a bunch of appeals filed by Railway Minister Lalu Prasad Yadav, his wife Rabri Devi, former Punjab Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal, former Kerala Chief Minister K. Karunakaran and several former Ministers. 11 See Section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure. 12 The court held, ‘It (“prior sanction”) is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act.... It is the quality of the act which is important, and protection of this section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty.’ 13 State of Bihar and Ors. v. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh and Ors., reported in 2006(1)SCALE122. 14 State of Bihar and Ors. v. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh and Ors., at para 84. 15 Supreme Court in State of Bihar and Ors. v. Project Uchcha Vidya, Sikshak Sangh and Ors., at para 152. 16 The fact that this is obvious to the Present Union Minister of Panchayat Raj is obvious from Mani Shanker Iyer, ‘Four-Fold Path to Devolution of Power’, The Economic Times, 21 December 2006. See also the section on local Self-Governance in this report. 17 See Uttar Pradesh Gram Panchayat Adhikari Sangh and Ors. v. Daya Ram Saroj and Ors. in Civil Appeal Nos. 6090 of 2001 and associated matters and Decided On: 11 December 2006. 18 See para 36. The Court also added that ‘there is also no dispute that their service conditions were governed by the Service Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution.’ 19 See Muhammad Ali v. State Election Commission reported in MANU/KE/0226/2006 and in particular, see para 8.

Access to Justice: State of Indian Judiciary 129 20 See M.J. Antony, ‘Fast-track in the affirmative lane’, 27 December 2006, Business Standard. The Author adds, ‘The law-makers are allowing the confusion to continue by turning a blind eye to these fundamental issues affecting labour.’ 21 Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workman, Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd, 2006(12)SCALE1. 22 See the judgement in Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workman, Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd, 2006(12) SCALE1. 23 The Supreme Court added: ‘The courts must, therefore, exercise judicial restraint, and not encroach into the executive or legislative domain.’ 24 See Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180. 25 The Court added: ‘A Constitution, and in particular that of it which protects and which entrenches fundamental rights and freedoms to which all persons in the State are to be entitled is to be given a generous and purposive construction.’ See M. Nagaraj and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., Decided On: 19 October 2006 26 M. Nagaraj and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (Supra.). 27 See Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India and Another, AIR 1996 SC 1356. 28 Smt. Anju and Ors. v. National Thermal Power Corporation, MANU/DE/8570/2006 29 See Smt. Anju and Ors. v. National Thermal Power Corporation, MANU/DE/8570/2006 at para 9. 30 Thus in 2004 the Supreme Court observed as under: ‘We have gone through the fifth (August 2004) report of the Commissioners ....’ Further, the problem of using contractors for procurement has also been mentioned in the report suggesting that it should be done by agencies and officers at the government level. 31 Order dated 7 October 2004 in Writ Petition (C) No. 196 of 2001 (People’s Union for Liberties v. Union of India and Ors.). 32 See Ekta Shakti Foundation v. Respondent: Govt. of NCT of Delhi, Order dtd. 17 July 2006. 33 The Secretary, All India Biodynamic and Organic Farming Association v. The Principal Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra and Ors., Public Interest Litigation No. 164 of 2004 and reported in MANU/MH/0185/ 2006. 34 The Secretary, All India Biodynamic and Organic Farming Association v. The Principal Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra and Ors. (Supra.)

35 See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., IA No. 1785 in IA No. 22 in Writ Petition (C) No. 4677 of 1985, Decided On: 13 April 2006. 36 See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors. Writ Petition (C) No. 4677 of 1985 and reported in MANU/SC/0247/2004. 37 Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi v. State of A.P. and Ors., 2006(2)SCALE494. 38 See Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi v. State of A.P. and Ors., para 71–74. 39 Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi v. State of A.P. and Ors., at para 75. 40 See the cases of M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath and M.I. Builders V. Radhey Shyam Sahu reported in MANU/SC/0999/1999. 41 See Joseph L. Sax, ‘The public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention’, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 68 No. 3 (January 1970) pp. 471–566 as quoted in Intellectuals Forum, Tirupathi v. State of A.P. and Ors., 2006(2)SCALE494. 42 See T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., Decided On: 17 October 2006 with Civil Writ Petition No. 202 of 1995 and I.A. No. 1156 in WP (C) No. 202 of 1995 with I.A. Nos. 1192, 756, 1463, 1501 and 1532 in WP (C) 202 of 1995. 43 The Counsel for the various parties thus argued that ‘Had such parties inkling of an idea that such clearances were not obtained by DDA, they would not have invested such huge sums of money. The stand that wherever constructions have been made unauthorisedly, demolition is the only option cannot apply to the present cases, more particularly, when they unlike, where some private individuals or private limited companies or firms being allotted to have made contraventions, are corporate bodies and institutions and the question of their having indulged in any malpractices in getting the approval or sanction does not arise. Some of the allottees were the National Book Trust, School of Planning and Architecture, Shri Ram Vithala Sikha Seva Samiti, International Centre for Alternate Dispute Resolution and Institute for Studies and Industrial Development. In most of these cases the constructions are already complete and have become functional.’ 44 See Annai Indira Women Self-help Group represented by its Co-ordinator Mrs Palliammal v. The District Forest Officer, Sathyamangalam Division, The Member Secretary cum Forest Ranger Bejalletti Village Forest Council, Bhavani Sagar Forest Range and the President Bejalletti Village Forest Council in W.P. Nos. 22962/2006 and M.P. No. 1/2006, Decided On: 8 August 2006.

130 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA 45 Vishala Kochi Kudivella Samrakshana Samithi v. State of Kerala, 2006(1)KLT919, at para 3. 46 See UNI news, 17 November 2006, available at indlaw.com. 47 Notably the former Chief Justice R.C. Lahoti was totally opposed to the idea of setting up of National Judicial Commission. 48 He concludes by saying that ‘It might end up essentially as a confidence trick’, see Prashant Bhushan, Judicial Accountability or Illusion, Economic and Political Weekly, 25 November 2006. 49 Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice; Rajya Sabha, Question No 3866Answered on 22 May 2006 50 It has also been recommended that every complainant and every person including a witness and a lawyer who participates in the investigation and inquiry, whether or not he seeks confidentiality about his name, must undertake before the Judicial Council that, he shall not reveal his own name, the name of the Judge complained against, the contents of the complaint or any of the documents or proceedings to anybody else including the media without the prior written approval of the Judicial Council and it will be for the Judicial Council to decide when and to what extent the contents of the complaint shall be disclosed. 51 Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice; Rajya Sabha, Question No 3859Answered on 22 May 2006. 52 Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Rajya Sabha, Question No 349Answered on 21 August 2006. 53 He quoted this from the Supreme Court verdict in Dr B.K. Subbarao V. K. Parasaran, 1996 (7).JT 265. 54 See the decision of the Supreme Court dated 13 April 2006 in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., IA No. 22 in Writ Petition (C)No. 4677 of 1985. 55 This is as per the Statement of the Minister of State of Ministry of Law and Justice in the Rajya Sabha. See Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice; Rajya Sabha, Question No 2206- Answered on 13 March 2006. The Ministry adds: ‘The main reasons leading to accumulation of arrears are:population and litigation explosion, frequent adjournments, delay in disposal of old cases, delays in filling up of vacancies.’ 56 Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice; Rajya Sabha, Question No 1400Answered on 7 August 2006. 57 Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Rajya Sabha, Question No 626Answered on 31 July 2006.

58 Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Rajya Sabha, Question No 3858Answered on 22 May 2006. 59 See Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India in the Transfer Case 22/2001. 60 As per the reply of Ministry of Law and Justice, Rajya Sabha, Question No. 2205Answered on 13 March 2006. 61 Thus the Minister added in his reply that the matter is, therefore, sub judice. The Supreme Court in its orders dated 29 April 2004 and 29 July 2005 in Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India had observed that many State Governments did not file their replies despite Apex Court’s direction about setting up of Fast Track Courts. 62 Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice; Rajya Sabha, Question No. 33Answered on 24 July 2006. 63 These questions were all part of the only initiative in the country known to the author which was trying to look into the questions of Access to Justice form the standpoint of the poor and the disadvantaged people, See Access to Justice for the Poor and the Disadvantaged People in India: Lessons from Specific Case Studies, UNDP, 2004. 64 See Videh Upadhyay, ‘Justice and the Poor: Does the Poverty of Law Explain Elusive Justice to Poor?’, in Arnab Hazra and Bibek Debroy (eds), Judicial Reforms in India: Issues and Aspects, Academic Foundation, 2007. 65 See for example Rajgopal Balalkrishnan, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance, Cambridge University Press and Foundation Books, 2005. Quoting another author Rajagopal points out that the substance of democratic agitations of mass movements ‘is not taken seriously as constituting alternative conceptions of territory, autonomy, rights or identity’. 66 See Videh Upadhyay, ‘Justice and the Poor: Does the Poverty of Law Explain Elusive Justice to Poor?’ (Supra.) 67 Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Rajya Sabha, Question No 1395Answered on 7 August 2006. 68 The 114th Report on Gram Nyayalaya, Law Commission of India, August 1986. 69 The Government however maintains that the funds allocated by the Government are utilised for implementation of legal-aid programmes and schemes which also include the spreading of legal awareness programme in the remote rural areas, framed under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. See Government of India, Ministry of

Access to Justice: State of Indian Judiciary 131 Law and Justice, Rajya Sabha, Question No 3077- Answered on 15 May 2006. 70 Report of the Gujarat Committee, Government of Gujarat, 1971, Report of the Expert Committee on Legal Aid: Processual Justice to the People, Government of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, (1973) as quoted in S. Muralidhar, Law, Poverty and Legal Aid Access to Criminal Justice, Butterworths, New Delhi, 2004.

71 Report of the Preperatory Committee For Legal Aid Scheme: A Protecting Arm of the State, Government of Madhya Pradesh, 1981 as quoted in Muralidhar (Supra.). 72 Report of the Rajasthan Law Reforms and Legal Services Committee, Government of Rajasthan, 1975. 73 S. Muralidhar, Law, Poverty and Legal Aid Access to Criminal Justice, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, New Delhi, 2004.

ANNEXURES Table 3A Pendency in High courts as on 7 August 2006 Sl. No.

Name of the High court

As on

1

Allahabad

30 June 2006

Civil cases

Criminal cases

5,84,499

2,07,651

Total 7,92,150

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2

Andhra Pradesh

30 June 2006

2,16,433

21,239

2,37,672

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

Mumbai

31 May 2006

3,20,840

37,191

3,58,031

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4

Kolkata

30 June 2006

2,27,485

37,887

2,65,372

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5

Delhi

30 May 2006

95,589

30,923

1,26,512

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

Gujarat

31 December 2005

1,00,488

30,897

1,31,385

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7

Guwahati

30 June 2006

52,418

6,900

59,318

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8

Himachal Pradesh

30 June 2006

19,034

5,993

25,027

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9

Jammu & Kashmir

31 December 2005

39,529

2,444

41,973

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

10

Karnataka

30 June 2006

77,697

1,37,32

91,429

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11

Kerala

30 June 2006

1,01,374

24,677

1,26,051

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12

Chennai

30 June 2006

3,39,157

31,754

3,70,911

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

13

Madhya Pradesh

31 December 2005

1,30,259

55,759

1,86,018

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

14

Orissa

30 June 2006

1,93,186

17,254

2,10,440

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

15

Patna

31 December 2005

66,549

25,033

91,582

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

16

Punjab & Haryana

31 December 2005

2,01,151

42,320

2,43,471

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

17

Rajasthan

31 December 2005

1,58,318

47,867

2,06,165

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

18

Sikkim

30 June 2006

47

11

58

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

19

Uttaranchal

30 June 2006

31,518

7,422

38,940

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

20

Chhattisgarh

30 June 2006

52,355

24,038

76,393

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

21

Jharkhand

30 June 2006

47,066

2,31,031

2,78,098

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

Source: http://lawmin.nic.in/justice/rti.htm (Department of Justice). Note: Information furnished under Right to Information Act, 2005.

30,54,992

9,02,024

39,57,016

132 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Table 3B Pendency position in district and subordinate courts as on 7 August 2006 Sl. No.

Names of states/UTs

1

Andhra Pradesh

As on 30 June 2006

Civil cases 5,01,335

Criminal cases 4,74,843

Total pendency 9,76,178

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2

Arunachal Pradesh

31 December 2005

847

6,410

7,257

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

Assam

31 December 2005

49,633

1,41,195

1,90,828

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4

Bihar

30 June 2005

2,30,195

10,47,533

12,77,692

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5

Chhattisgarh

30 June 2005

49,557

2,10,045

2,59,602

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

Goa

31 December 2005

20,644

13,671

34,315

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7

Gujarat

30 June 2006

7,83,662

31,62,284

39,35,946

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8

Haryana

31 December 2005

2,02,525

3,04,323

5,06,848

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9

Himachal Pradesh

31 December 2005

64,336

1,13,080

1,77,416

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

10

Jammu & Kashmir

30 December 2004

48,132

83,812

1,31,944

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11

Jharkhand

30 June 2005

52,709

2,43,316

2,96,025

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12

Karnataka

30 June 2006

5,69,322

5,16,736

10,86,058

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

13

Kerala

30 June 2006

4,20,549

5,06,746

9,27,295

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

14

Madhya Pradesh

31 December 2005

1,94,240

7,58,738

9,52,978

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

15

Maharashtra

31 December 2005

7,48,760

25,79,121

33,27,881

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

16

Manipur

31 December 2005

3,304

1,812

5,116

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

17

Meghalaya

31 December 2005

4,193

6,979

11,172

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

18

Mizoram

30 June 2005

1,935

5,952

7,887

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

19

Nagaland

31 December 2005

1,018

3,076

4,094

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

20

Orissa

30 June 2005

1,80,632

7,99,404

9,80,036

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

21

Punjab

31 December 2005

2,47,927

3,12,529

5,60,456

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

22

Rajasthan

31 December 2005

2,93,220

7,57,154

10,50,374

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

23

Sikkim

30 June 2006

187

437

624

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

24

Tamil Nadu

30 June 2006

4,38,488

4,36,450

8,74,938

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

25

Tripura

31 December 2005

6,983

25,899

32,882

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

26

Uttar Pradesh

31 December 2005

11,88,440

35,52,101

47,40,541

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

27

Uttaranchal

31 December 2005

26,222

99,634

1,25,856

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

28

West Bengal

31 December 2005

5,12,947

14,28,280

19,41,227

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

29

Andaman & Nicobar Islands

31 December 2005

12,91

46,385

47,676

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

30

Chandigarh

31 December 2005

20,472

59,522

79,994

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

31

Dadra & Nagar Haveli

30 June 2004

550

2,457

3,007

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

32

Daman & Diu

30 June 2004

752

860

1,612

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

33

Delhi

30 June 2006

1,40,462

7,88,064

9,28,526

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

34

Lakshadweep

30 June 2004

75

45

120

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

35

Pondicherry

30 June 2006

12,827

7,698

20,525

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

Source: http://lawmin.nic.in/justice/rti.htm (Department of Justice). Note: Information furnished under Right to Information Act, 2005.

70,18,335

1,84,86,591

2,55,04,926

Access to Justice: State of Indian Judiciary 133 Box 3A Right to Freedom: Articles 21 and 22 Article 21: Protection of life and personal liberty: No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Article 22: Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. (1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice. (2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of 24 hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate. (3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply: (a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or (b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. (4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless: (a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention: Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or (b) Such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by the Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7). (5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. (6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose. (7) Parliament may by law prescribe: (a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (4); (b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention; and (c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under subclause (a) of clause (4). Source: The Constitution of India, http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/coifiles/part.htm

134 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance

chapter

4

It has been almost 14 years when the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts 1992 were enacted to provide constitutional status to Panchayats and Municipalities. Except in the state of Jharkhand, two rounds of elections have been completed for rural and urban local governments in most of the states. Several states have even completed three rounds of elections to Panchayats and Municipalities. Today, more than 27 lakh representatives stand elected to the three levels of Panchayats, of whom more than 37.5 per cent are women, 16 per cent belong to the Scheduled Castes and 11 per cent to the Scheduled Tribes. The Panchayats today provide a diverse, widespread and strong political foundation for an inclusive and participative growth. Peoples’ support to local governments and their expectations from these bodies are ever increasing. But ambiguities regarding their roles and responsibilities are still widespread. Despite many declarations and political statements, nothing significant has been achieved so far at the all-India level. Progress on devolution of Functions, Funds, and Functionaries to Panchayats in different states is uneven and deliberately slow. While Panchayats have at least generated politico-bureaucratic interests at all levels, urban local governments remain neglected. It seems that urban governance has been squeezed to push infrastructural development of cosmopolitan cities only. Smaller and medium towns,

unfortunately, do not receive even those political promises which Panchayats often get from different quarters. People often raise questions about real attention of state and Union Governments, who have been mandated by the Constitution to ensure that Panchayats and Municipalities are strengthened to function as units of local selfgovernance. All the states, including the state of Jharkhand, have passed Conformity Acts in compliance with the Constitutional demand. But the disaggregated activities under different functions listed in the 11th and 12th Schedules to Panchayats and Municipal governments respectively have not yet been devolved in most of the states. Formal legislative transfers, not devolution of functions have not been matched by the concomitant devolution of funds and functionaries for the effective performance of these functions. There has also been very little change in the first decade after the 73rd and 74th Amendments in the design of Central ministries’ programmes dealing with the mandates of Panchayats. When Central ministries, which send down substantial funds for implementation of Centrally-Sponsored Schemes, ignore Panchayats and Municipalities, it leaves very little incentive for states to go ahead with real devolution. The Prime Minister in his speech at Vigyan Bhavan on 22 November 2006, once again emphasised the importance of devolution to

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 135

local governments. He even suggested for Activity Mapping of different Central ministries vis-à-vis their activities for Panchayats. In the Common Minimum Programmes of the government and in governmental statements, it has been often reiterated that enabling deepening of democracy is one of the topmost priorities of Union and state governments. Electoral statistics and political realities at the grass roots reflect deepening of democratic processes. But what has been done by governmental initiatives and what has happened otherwise, needs to be discussed. The present chapter takes a stock of progresses made at different levels.

view. The proposals are lying with the states for their comments.1 Moreover, there is a clear difference of opinion as to whether consultative processes are to be given priority or some more responsibilities are to be assigned to the Gram Sabhas (Table 4.1). In some States, Table 4.1 Functions assigned to Gram Sabhas in different states Sl. No.

Functions

States

1

Examine annual statement of accounts and annual report

Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Sikkim, A&N Islands

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2

Discuss report on the administration of the preceding year

Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, A&N Islands

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

PEOPLE’S PARTICIPATION: PEOPLE’S COUNCIL AND ELECTIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Gram Sabha Article 243A of the Constitution provides for the establishment of Gram Sabhas, Peoples’ Councils, to exercise such powers and perform such functions at the village level as the legislature of a state may, by law provide. Powers assigned to the Gram Sabha thus vary from state to state. Functions assigned to the Gram Sabhas by most of the state legislations include reviewing all development programmes of the village, selection of beneficiaries for beneficiary-oriented programmes transferred to the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and preparing plans for local development including minimum needs, welfare and production-oriented programmes. The Sabha, according to the Act, may exercise such powers and perform such functions at the village level as the Legislature of a State may by law, provide (Article 243A). It follows that there is little uniformity in the actual functions assigned to the Gram Sabhas in various states. A UNDP-initiated study on Jurisprudence of PRIs examined the question of empowering the Gram Sabhas to hold ‘Panchayats Accountable’, carrying out social audits and examining the state acts from this point of

Review programme of work for the year or any new programme

Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Sikkim, A&N Islands

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4

Consider proposal for fresh taxation or enhancement of existing taxes

Andhra Pradesh, Bihar

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5

Select schemes, beneficiaries and locations

Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Karnataka, Kerala, Punjab, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

Mobilise voluntary labour and contributions in cash and kind for community welfare programmes

Bihar, Karnataka, Kerala, Punjab, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7

Render assistance in the implementation of development schemes

Assam, Bihar, Karnataka, Kerala, Punjab, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Uttar Pradesh

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8

Undertake programmes for adult education, family welfare within the village

Bihar, Karnataka, Kerala, Punjab, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Uttar Pradesh

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9

Promote unity and harmony among all sections of society

Bihar, Karnataka, Kerala, Punjab, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

10

Seek clarifications from the head and members of the Gram Panchayat about any particular activity, scheme, income and expenditure

Bihar, Punjab, Rajasthan

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11

Examine last audit note and replies made thereto

Bihar

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12

Consider the budget prepared by the Gram Panchayat and future development programmes and plans for the Sabha area

Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

13

Consider and scrutinise the existing schemes and activities of the Panchayat

Haryana, Kerala

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

14

Maintain a complete register for all development works undertaken by the Gram Panchayat or by any other government department

Haryana, Kerala

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

15

Scrutinise the completed works and all kinds of activities of the Gram Panchayat

Haryana, Kerala

Source: http://www.Panchayats.org/downloads/SALR%20Situation%20Analysis.pdf.

136 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Gram Sabhas also prepare lists of all ablebodied persons to whom employment is to be provided under locally taken up wage employment schemes. In a few states, Gram Sabhas consider annual statements of accounts, administration’s reports, audit notes and the replies of Gram Panchayats. In addition, they also monitor reports submitted by GPs. While Panchayats are organs of representative democracy, the Gram Sabha is an important forum for participative democracy. Meaningful participation of citizens, especially of the women and the marginalised castes, in a meaningful Gram Sabha meeting is one of the necessary and sufficient conditions for vibrant democracy. Seminars after seminars, commissions after commissions have emphasised this point. The Central Government declared 1999–2000 as the year of Gram Sabha. In the same year, the Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India under the chairmanship of the Panchayat Minister of Karnataka, constituted a subgroup towards this end. Bharat Jan Andolan and PRIA were the other two members. The report by this group has raised important issues and suggested ways to address them. Similarly, the 1st Roundtable of Ministers of Panchayats from all the states, convened by Union Ministry of Panchayati Raj in Kolkata in July 2004, has also expressed concerns over the status of Gram Sabha. It has also suggested ways to strengthen Gram Sabhas structurally and in terms of resources. Unfortunately, structures and systems have not changed and Gram Sabha or Ward Sabhas have long been victims of mischievous apathy from Governments and to an extent, indifference from the civil society at large. In practice, Gram Sabhas have been converted into mere Beneficiary Sabhas, Paper Sabhas, Sabhas without Women and Dalits and so on. The Government already knows, agents of change know and the citizens also feel about what ails Gram Sabhas in our Gram Panchayats. But even then the old mistake of bypassing or undermining Gram Sabhas carries on. There is an urgent need to implement, if need be, by

legislations across all states, pro-Gram Sabha policies and acts. And we must remember, in mathematical tone, that legislations are necessary but not sufficient steps. Civil Society must pro-actively support strengthening of Gram Sabhas by ensuring (i) widening the Scope of Functions and Powers of Gram/Ward Sabhas, (ii) enabling Regular Meetings of Gram/Ward Sabhas, and (iii) emphasising effective participation of women and other marginalised sections of society in Gram/Ward Sabhas. The Ministry of Panchayati Raj (MOPR) constituted an Expert Group to consider planning at the grass-roots level and in its report of March 2006 recommended several steps relating to participative planning at the Gram Sabha level, such as, ‘advance notice of meetings, mobilization of special interest groups such as Self-help Groups for attending the ward and Gram Sabhas. Campaigns through National Survey Scheme and Nehru Yuvak Kendra volunteers, nominations of facilitators for each ward sabha and having a proper structure for the gram and ward sabha with scope to break up into smaller groups for discussion.’2 Because of their own conveniences, different agencies create different structures to undertake developmental initiatives in villages. Some of them are unnecessary and undermine the roles of Panchayats. In order to emphasise the importance of Gram Sabhas in ‘selection of beneficiaries and works, monitoring of programmes and approving the utilization certificates and so on’ for the Centrally-Sponsored Schemes of various ministries, the MOPR has signed Statement of Conclusions with the Chief Ministers of 14 states and two Union Territories highlighting ‘the key points of action which the states would move to operationalise the recommendations of the roundtable’. In 2006–07, the Panchayat Empowerment and Incentive Scheme is being implemented but the grants will be released to the state governments ‘only when they agree to give a commitment to undertake reforms through the joint statement of agreement with the ministry’.3 Assigning powers to the Gram Sabha

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 137

‘to approve plans, select beneficiaries, authorize utilization certificates, be consulted for land alienation and so on and to ensure that the meetings are conducted with due procedures’4 are some of the other needed reforms. But some of these structures are required because of local realities. While there is no harm in developing multiple institutional options for improving rural development delivery, it is necessary that they should be made accountable to the Gram Sabha. There must, as a rule, be sub-committees of the local Panchayats so that they can draw up and implement need-based local-level plans. They should also be made accountable to the Gram Sabha right from their inception. The following programme approaches therefore have to be strictly eschewed in the design of development strategies and CentrallySponsored Schemes.

Elections to Local Governments Many states completed their third phase of elections during 2005–06. They include Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, Himachal Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. The second phase of Panchayat elections were also held in Bihar. The state of Bihar, in fact, compensated its women citizens by reserving 50 per cent of seats at all levels in Panchayat elections. It may be recalled that during the first phase of elections, seats were not reserved for the post of chairpersons. It was argued, against Articles 243D(4) and 243T(4) which provide for reservation of seats of chairpersons in Panchayats and Municipality respectively, that since the post of chairperson in a body is a single one, it could not be reserved. The matter was finally referred to the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court of India which advised the state government to hold election in 2001, till it decided on the constitutional validity of the petition. However, the judgement of the highest court is still awaited. But the Government of Bihar brought an ordinance to conform to constitutional affirmative mandate for

Table 4.2 Percentage of women representatives in Panchayats as on 1 November 2006 Panchayat level

Women (%)

District Panchayats

38.2

Number 539

Elected representatives 15,231

Elected women representatives 5,817

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Intermediate Panchayats

37.4

6,103

1,56,150

58,418

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Village Panchayats

37.5

2,33,886

26,10,912

9,78,047

Source: Lok sabha Unstarred Question No. 83, answered on 22 November 2006.

reserving some seats of chairpersons for the still marginalised sections of society. It is indeed heartening to see the impact of reservation of the seats for women in the PRIs which has brought in 10,42,282 women representatives at the three levels of PRIs, which works out to be 37.23 per cent of the total number of representatives in the year 2006, exceeding the 33 per cent statutory reservation. In the states of Maharashtra and Sikkim, this percentage is as high as 43.7 and 40.4 respectively. Bihar tops with 54.6 per cent of the elected representatives being women. (State-wise distribution of women representatives is given in Annexures 4B to 4D.) Another heartening feature is that in some states women have been elected even on nonreserved general seats. A study in West Bengal and Rajasthan5 questions the usual negative stereotypes about the leadership qualities of women representatives. The study found that ‘women invest more in goods that are relevant to the needs of local women: water and roads in West Bengal and water in Rajasthan. Participation of women in Gram Samsad in West Bengal is significantly higher when the pradhan is a woman.’ Also, ‘the effects of the policy are indeed due to the gender of the pradhan rather than other aspects of reservation policy.’6 There are definite indications that reservation of electoral seats (for the women as well as for the SCs) have proved to be an ‘effective tool’ to safeguard the interests of the weaker groups. Voting percentages in Panchayat elections in most of the states show an increasing trend, as against a universal trend of declining participation of voters in some other elections. A crude estimate suggests that such

138 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Box 4.1 Nomads fighting their way into Panchayats India’s nomadic communities are heading towards being part of the democratic process with some women getting elected to Panchayats in Rajasthan. Last year, women from nomadic communities—Nat, Bawaria, Banjara and Bhopa—were elected for the first time to Panchayats. But, they often face opposition from upper castes and are still struggling to gain acceptance that has long been denied to them. Their demands for development of their communities are seldom considered. When Vimala, 32, belonging to the Nat community, decided to contest for the post of deputy Sarpanch of Pilkhudi Panchayat, she faced stiff opposition. People from other castes declared that they will not give a senior post to a Natini (dancer). People blocked her way, boycotted her, but she managed to win the election by 17 votes. After her victory, her first priority was to solve the problem of water shortage in her village. After much effort, she secured the sanction for a handpump. She is now trying to get the approval for a tarred road. Sheela, is a ward Panch from Kesroli Panchayat and belongs to the Bhopa community, which sings songs and narrates stories. Like Vimala, she is also fighting to be heard and to get her demands fulfilled. There are many such cases of disappointment and struggle. However, the road to empowerment has opened, and that is something for the nomads, who have been denied even basic civil rights until now. Source: Panchayatiraj updates, Institute of Social Sciences.

percentages have been in the range of 70–80 in Panchayats of most of the states. More than 10 per cent of ‘unreserved’ seats have been contested and won by women and dalits.7 While democracy is deepening through participatory Panchayat and Municipal elections in rest of India including Bihar which also included newly carved out Jharkhand earlier, citizens of Jharkhand have once again been excluded from the process of exercising their democratic rights. The High court of the state had asked the state government many times to hold elections immediately. However, when the state government finally gave the green signal, much-awaited election processes in this state were initiated by a very proactive State Election Commission in the latter half of 2005. Multiphased polling dates were announced and thousands of nominations for the first phase of Panchayat elections were filed. But all the excitement and hopes came to a standstill when the issue of reservation for tribes in Schedule V areas was brought to the notice of High court. This matter has once gain been referred to the Supreme Court. The state government and the Union Government are also party to it. The Honourable court has yet to decide on the issue. Till then the people of Jharkhand have to wait for what is called ‘grass-roots democracy’ in their lands. His Excellency, Governor of Jharkhand, in a public function

in Ranchi on 5 December 2006, to celebrate PRIA’s 25th anniversary, said that the state was loosing more than Rs 800 crores per annum of rural development funds from Central Government on account of not holding Panchayat elections.8 While the Jharkhand issue is still in Court, Supreme Court in its landmark judgement in the case of Kishansing Tomar v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and 2 Others passed on 19 October 2006 in Appeal (Civil) 5756/2005, has observed that elections to local governments should not be deferred under any circumstances except in case of natural calamities. It has also asked the State Election Commission to approach the High court or the Supreme Court if it does not receive the required support from the state government in discharging its constitutional obligations of holding the elections to the Panchayats or Municipalities within the time mandated in the Constitution. But following in the footsteps of many state governments and despite the above-mentioned judgement of the highest court of the land, Government of Goa provided flimsy grounds for postponement of Panchayat elections in 185 Gram Panchayats of the State. The Task Force on Jurisprudence set-up by the MOPR under the chairmanship of Smt V.S. Ramadevi has submitted its report suggesting certain effective measures with regard to elections and other related issues.9 (Details of the recommendations can be seen in Annexure 4A.) It is disappointing to note that the same state governments that advocate for further decentralisation between Union and state governments, are not very supportive of the processes of decentralisation when it comes to devolution of powers and authorities to local governments. Such reluctance is also visible in the context of other aspects of the working of decentralised governance, for example, for the transfer of grants by the 12th Finance Commission for the local bodies. Elections to local governments are not only postponed on insignificant grounds but state governments also try to influence the

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 139

democratic processes by putting too many conditionalities on qualifications to contest Panchayat elections, for example, two-child norm, basic education, availability of toilets in the potential candidate’s house and so on. Besides the issue of putting limits to democratic rights, policies with regard to the conditionalities also have an added dimension. This leads to another level of contradiction with lack of overall consensus about the policies resulting in contradictions across states. The two-child norm for example has been adopted by some states while others are still indecisive about implementing the norm. Absence of policy consensus which is problematic in itself, also results in differences among states. In November 2006, Government of Gujarat revived its Samras Gram Yojna (Consensus Village Scheme, see Box 4.2 for details) to provide monetary incentives to those village Panchayats where members and chairpersons are selected by consensus, that is, without a democratic election. In a village where power equations are so uneven, such practices favour rich and powerful ones. Moreover, can it be ever imagined to have a scheme involving taxpayers’ money to select MPs and MLAs by consensus? The election process for the local bodies has to be critically examined on specific issues such as delimitation of constituencies for the election of these bodies. A typical case in this regard is of Chankyapuri colony of Sehore municipality in Madhya Pradesh (see Box 4.3 for details). Pre-Election Voters Awareness Campaign (PEVAC), an effective civil society initiative has a place of special importance with regard to making the people aggressively conscious about their participation in the election process both as voters and as contestants. A notable impact of PEVAC was witnessed in the district of Sehore, Madhya Pradesh, where an analysis of the updated data from the voters’ list suggests an increase of around 5.5 per cent in the number of voters in the preliminary lists and the final list for the town of Sehore. Similar figures for the towns of Aashtha, Icchawar and Nasrullaganj stand

Box 4.2 Samras in Panchayat is somras to kill grass-roots democracy Article 243E(1) of the constitution says: ‘every Panchayat, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its meeting and no longer… (3) An election to constitute a [P]anchayat shall be completed (a) before the expiry of its duration specified in clause (1), (b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution. When the Gram Panchayat elections were finally set in motion in December 2001 in Gujarat after the delay of one-and-a-half years, the State Government came up with ‘Samras Gram Yojna’ (‘Consensus’ Village Scheme), which according to state government, was launched to gift direct monetary assistance to those villages that unanimously selected their village councils without fights or contests. Under this scheme, the Samras villages according to the population size were given cash awards ranging from Rs 60,000 up to Rs 1,00,000. ‘Samras’ though on the face of it, tries to promote harmony in villages but takes away what our Constitution has given to every citizen—the right to contest and the right to vote. The Sarvodaya leader, Chunibhai Vaidya, had remarked in 2001 that pressing for unanimous elections was dangerous because it permitted the dominant communities to take control of the village Panchayats. In one of the workshops organised by PRIA in 2001, ex-Chief Election Commissioner Mr Lyngdoh termed Samras and similar initiatives as ‘manufactured consensus’ and totally unconstitutional in nature. Samras is against the very ethos of democracy and takes away the right of the marginalised to participate in their process of governance. Gujarat or for that matter most of Indian states have glaring inequalities. In such circumstances Samras will only oppress the voice of women, poor, dalits and minorities. During the last Panchayat elections in Gujarat, 27.2 per cent (total 3,761 village Panchayats) were declared as Samras. Again after five years when Gujarat Panchayat elections are taking place, it is heard that Gujarat government is mobilising its machinery to promote and press (or manipulate) for Samras. Development administration from Secretary to State to village-level officials like Talati have been asked to ensure that most of villages go without Panchayat election and opt for Samras. There is fear among the supporters of grass-roots democracy that any opposition by them will invite the ire of the government. Samras is illegal and unsocial. It is illegal because it goes against Article 243-E of the constitution as it is nothing but pushing consensus in favour of rich and the powerful resulting in the exclusion of marginalised and less privileged from the grass-roots governance. Source: PRIA, 2006.

at 1.9, 7.6 and 4.4 per cent respectively. Interestingly, these figures are in direct correlation with the intensity of the Urban Voters’ List Updating Campaign in District Sehore.10

Building Capacities of People in Panchayats Panchayats and Municipalities require guidance and support in fulfilling their constitutional obligations. Each election brings about 60–70 per cent new faces in local governments. About two-thirds of these new members are from marginalised sections of society. They are expected to play the roles of leaders of their governments as well as enforcers of various schemes. The affirmative constitutional provisions have provided for

140 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Box 4.3 Lady councillor of Sehore municipality finds a helping hand! Chankyapuri colony, which until the last term of the municipality, came under ward No. 04 of Sehore Municipal Council, District Sehore, suddenly found itself nowhere—neither in the boundaries of a Gram Panchayat nor under the jurisdiction of the Nagar Palika, Sehore; after the delimitation of wards for the Urban Elections 2004–05 in Madhya Pradesh. Strange as it seems, but it is true! The people of Chanakyapuri vouched their worst fears, ‘we feel that we are not part of India.’ Till the last elections, the Nagar Palika recognised this ward and its voters used to vote in every election. Its Councillor, Mamta Tripathi, was elected from this ward in the last election; this time she did not even have her name in the voters’ list. All this happened despite the fact that Nagar Palika itself had given the No Objection Certificate (NOC) to the settlers and collected tax from the ward. It had also constructed roads in the ward; besides this, it had also provided house numbers to the residents of that ward. In all, around 300 voters were in danger of possibly being denied their voting rights. The issue was first recognised as Ms Mamta Tripathi, the sitting lady councillor of the ward approached Samarthan’s office at Sehore with the details of the seemingly gross anomaly. The plea of the councillor was first put in front of the District Officials at Sehore and then forwarded to the State Election Commission, Bhopal for suitable action. The Commission then deputed an independent inquiry commission for verification. It was stringently argued by the District Administration, Sehore, that it was an anomaly during the last delimitation process when Chankyapuri was wrongfully included in ward number 04 of Sehore Municipality, and that the fault was corrected this time. As a final resort, the lady councillor put up a writ petition before the Jabalpur High Court, Madhya Pradesh which directed the postponement of Sehore Municipality elections during the announced phase of polling, till further orders. Most importantly, the State Election Commission ordered a strict scrutiny of all doubtful cases, and as a consequence anomalies in delimitation of Betul Bazar municipality, Madhya Pradesh and Ambedkar Nagar locality of Sehore Municipality were also unearthed and suitably resolved. Source: PEVAC Study, Samarthan, Bhopal.

the women, the dalits and the tribals to participate in the Panchayat and Municipal governance as elected representatives. Many of them are serving in public life for the first time and are unaware about their roles and responsibilities as elected representatives. Some of them who are courageous to take on the responsibilities are smothered by the techno-bureaucratic details. The societal imperfections are also reflected in these institutions in the form of discrimination based on caste and gender. The institutional capacities to respond to the constitutional obligations and citizen aspirations are very limited. However these institutions have the potential to become the fountainhead and practice ground of political leadership, which can fill up the political leadership vacuum at the level of grass roots democracy. The absence of skills continues to be used as an alibi for non-devolution or for disempowering Panchayats and Municipalities. However, it is a well-grounded fact that the exercise of responsibilities is, in itself, the

optimal mode of training. There is hardly any strategy and planned intervention to enhance the capacities of numerous elected representatives in Municipalities. But the Union Ministry of Panchayati Raj prepared a ‘National Capability Building Framework’ (NCBF), based on the action points of the 7th Round Table of State Ministers of Panchayati Raj held at Jaipur in December 2004 relating to training and capacity-building of Panchayat-elected representatives, office bearers, chairpersons of Standing Committees and officials. A scheme of Panchayat Development and Training aimed towards capacity building of elected representatives and functionaries of PRIs is in operation for which MOPR released a sum of Rs 6,20,9200 and Rs 25,91,55,238 for the years 2004–05 and 2005–06 respectively.11 However, the basic orientation of all elected representatives about their roles and responsibilities is yet to take place in Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. In these states, however, some training programmes have been organised in some pockets. It means most of the elected representatives, for the last one or two years, are struggling with their constitutional roles and responsibilities without actually learning about them from formal training programmes, facilitated by either state or Union Governments. Though the national framework prepared by Government of India advocates for dovetailing of sectoral training into the programme, it intends to cover ‘programme planning and implementation, with an added emphasis on service delivery.’ The role of Panchayats as local self-governments and central to planning and implementation would be a crosscutting theme. While all matters listed in the 11th Schedule can be ideally included, it is proposed to prioritise major sectors and Centrally-Sponsored Schemes like Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, Total Literacy Campaign, Drinking Water Mission, Total Sanitation Campaign, National Rural Health Mission, Integrated Child Development Services, National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (including SGRY),

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 141

Swarnajayanti Grameen Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY), Indira Awas Yojana (IAY), Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY), Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana, Remote Village Electrification Programme, Tribal Sub-plan and Haryali and Watershed schemes of Agricultural Ministry. The argument about lack of capacity and skills becomes handy when committees are created for the implementation of the CentrallySponsored Schemes. This creates a structural conflict because while the committees report to their respective parent departments, it is the PRIs who are supposed to be the actual implementing agencies. The Ministry of Panchayati Raj sources have informed that the ministry has recommended setting up of at least one extension centre at the level of each Intermediate Panchayat, so as to cater to the training requirements of all Panchayats within that area. These extension centres or Panchayat Resource Centres would provide space for training activities, hosting Field Resource Persons and for Panchayat members to conduct mutual consultations and networking. The Satellite Training Reception facility can be physically located at the PRC. Panchayat members would be facilitated for congregating at these resource centres for smaller-level meetings and mutual support. Each Extension Centre would be staffed with resource persons who would provide technical support to the Panchayats, given as follows: • An engineer to technically review Panchayat-level infrastructure construction projects and provide support for preparation of estimates, procurement of tenders and monitoring of quality. • An accountant to assist Gram Panchayats to follow prescribed financial guidelines, to provide assistance where needed, and to collate Panchayat accounts at the block level for transfer to the district. • A social sector specialist to assist Panchayats in conducting decentralised participatory processes for planning and mobilising the poorest and vulnerable groups to attend Gram Sabha and Ward Sabha.

Box 4.4 The conditionality to contest Panchayat election: A saga of toilet politics Women Sarapanch removed for not having flush latrine: Finally, the government of Madhya Pradesh has begun to act on the amendment in the Panchayat Act that makes it mandatory for elected Panchayat representatives to have flush toilets in their houses within one year of being elected. The first victim of the amended law was Mangobai, who was removed from the post of president of Chandankheda Gram Panchayat for failing to construct a flush toilet in her house. So far, only 76,114 of the state’s 3,24,167 Panchayat representatives have constructed such toilets in their houses. The defaulters are facing show-cause notices. Panchayat representatives with no toilets face disqualification: The Chhattisgarh government is collecting details of Panchayat representatives who have failed to construct toilets in their houses within one year of their election. Under Section 36 of the state’s Panchayati Raj Amendment Act, 2004, candidates seeking election to Panchayat bodies have to construct toilets in their houses within a year of getting elected. All candidates promised to abide by the new law in their affidavits filed along with nomination papers in March 2005 Panchayat elections. It is alleged that more than a year has passed since the elections, but many Panchayat representatives, including Sarpanchs, are yet to construct toilets in their houses. Those who are found to flout the law may be disqualified. Apprehending loss of their seats, some Panchayat representatives have rushed to get the toilets constructed. In Raipur district alone, about 9,000 of the 19,000 Panchayat representatives constructed toilets in the past one month, Raipur Zilla Panchayat president Ashok Bajaj said. Over two lakh Panchayat representatives in the firing line: About 2.5 lakh elected Panchayat representatives in Madhya Pradesh face disqualification if they fail to construct flush-toilets in their houses by the end of March 2006. The Madhya Pradesh Panchayati Raj and Gram Swaraj Act, 1993 was amended last year to make it compulsory for Panchayat representatives to have flush-toilets in their houses within one year of their being elected. The Act even provides for a grant up to Rs 2,000 for constructing such a toilet. However, only 76,114 of the state’s Panchayat representatives have so far availed of the facility. Those in the firing line include 252 Zilla Panchayat members, 3,660 block-level representatives, 14,497 Sarpanchs and 2,29,642 Panchs. District Collectors of at least 10 districts have issued showcause notices to errant Panchayat members. The common explanation given by them is ignorance of the rule. Source: Panchayatiraj Updates, Institute of Social Sciences.

Box 4.5 Zilla Panchayats to handle primary and non-formal education The Chief Minister of Orissa announced that primary and non-formal education would be handed over to Zilla Panchayats. Also, functionaries like para-teachers and junior teachers would be appointed on contractual basis and permanent primary teachers would be made accountable to PRIs. While para-teachers would be selected by village education committees, appointment of junior teachers and their regularisation would depend on the recommendations of respective school management committees constituted by Zilla Panchayats. Primary teachers and para-teachers would be asked to ensure that no fewer than 90 per cent students attend their classes and the dropout rate does not dip below 10 per cent. Source: Panchayatiraj Updates, Institute of Social Sciences. (http://www.localgovernmentindia.org Panchayat_newsdetail.asp?newsid= 29&month=2&year=6)

Telephone helplines are also proposed to be set up to provide a speedy channel of clarification and information to trained persons and to link the help seekers with the providers. In most states, Gram Panchayats

142 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Box 4.6 Salient features of Backward Region Grant Fund The Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF) is designed to redress regional imbalances in development. The fund will provide financial resources for supplementing and converging existing developmental inflows into 250 identified districts, so as to: • Bridge critical gaps in local infrastructure and other development requirements that are not being adequately met through existing inflows. • Strengthen, to this end Panchayat and municipality-level governance with more appropriate capacity building, to facilitate participatory planning, decision making, implementation and monitoring, to reflect locally-felt needs. • Provide professional support to local bodies for planning, implementation and monitoring their plans. Improve the performance and delivery of critical functions assigned to Panchayats and counter possible efficiency and equity losses on account of inadequate local capacity. Integrated development will commence with each district undertaking a diagnostic study of its backwardness by enlisting professional planning support. This will be followed by preparing a well-conceived participatory district development perspective plan to address this backwardness during 2006–07 and the period of the 11th Five-Year Plan. The Panchayats at the village, intermediate and district level, referred to in Part IX of the Constitution, will undertake planning and implementation of the programme, in keeping with the letter and spirit of Article 243G, while the Municipalities referred to in Part IXA will similarly plan and implement the programme in urban areas in conformity with the letter and spirit of Article 243W, read with Article 243ZD of the Constitution. The Programme has two components, namely, a district component covering 250 districts and Special plans for Bihar and the KBK districts of Orissa. A total provision of Rs 5,000 crore has been made for the two components in the Budget of 2006–07. Out of this allocation, Rs 1,250 crore has been provided in the Demand for Grants of the Ministry of Finance for the Special Plans which are dealt with by the Planning Commission. The remaining amount of Rs 3,750 crore has been placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Panchayati Raj for the District Component, covering 250 districts. The allocation of Rs 3,750 crore consists of two funding windows: (a) a capacity building fund of Rs 250 crore and (b) development grants of Rs 3,500 crore for the financial year 2006–07. The existing Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana (RSVY) has been subsumed into the BRGF Programme. The erstwhile districts under RSVY will receive their full allocation of Rs 45 crore per district as per norms of RSVY. Thereafter, they will shift to the BRGF mode of funding. An amount of Rs 1,365 crore has been released so far during the financial year 2006–07 to districts under RSVY. Many states may not get backward region fund • Funds transfer is based on plans drawn by Panchayats and DPCs • Panchayati Raj Ministry expected to launch scheme in October Several states are unlikely to receive money under the BRGF for this financial year as they have failed to set up district planning committees (DPCs). The transfer of funds to districts under the scheme is based on district development plans drawn by Panchayats and the DPCs and approved by the State Governments. The Union Panchayati Raj Ministry is expected to launch the BRGF scheme in October. It is expected that the guidelines, being finalised in consultation with the Planning Commission, will specify that all approvals of district plans be done at the state level. The Planning Commission will ensure that the annual and perspective plans of the states are harmonised with the district plans. Of the 27 states eligible to receive the funds under the BRGF scheme, 11 were yet to constitute the district planning committees till August-end. In effect, 130 backward districts will lose out on funds. The worst losers will be 36 districts in Bihar, 34 in Uttar Pradesh, 13 in Andhra Pradesh and 12 in Maharashtra. The other states where the DPCs are yet to be constituted are Arunachal Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, Punjab, Tripura and Uttaranchal. Bihar has a special Rs 1,000-crore package under the scheme. (Box 4.6 continued )

lack basic infrastructure for office space. Increased responsibilities will require office space, meeting halls, storage godowns, record rooms, libraries, housing for the computer centre, the Village Knowledge Centre (Gyan Chaupal) and Village Resource Centre recommended for establishment in every Gram Panchayat by the high-powered National Farmers Commission and so on. The Working Group recommends that this requirement of Panchayats should be met in full from a basket of funding options including Central support so as to enable the Panchayats to develop their own plans for infrastructure upgradation tailored to suit their particular requirements in consonance with certain minimum standards and requirements prescribed. The Mahatma Gandhi Backward Region Development Fund (MGBRDF) was launched by Prime Minister in February 2006 with a Rs 3,750-crore fund, providing resources for supplementing and converging existing developmental inflows to 250 districts across the country. The scheme aims to bridge critical gaps in local infrastructure and other development requirements that were not being adequately met through existing allocations. To improve the performance and delivery of critical functions assigned to Panchayats, a need was felt to strengthen Panchayat and municipality-level governance with more appropriate capacity building to facilitate participatory planning, decision making, implementation and monitoring, the sources said. The scheme for the 250 backward districts was conceived and piloted through the Cabinet by the Planning Commission as the successor to the earlier Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana (RSVY). This was done with the view of rectifying deficiencies in the conceptual framework of RSVY. The key difference between RSVY and MGBRDF is the focus on district planning as provided for in the Constitution. A sum of Rs 3,750 crore for the current year has been placed at the disposal of Panchayati Raj ministry to administer the scheme, particularly because of the centrality of Panchayats in the planning and implementation of the

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 143

fund. Details about the release of funds for the BRGF and BDI schemes are presented in the Annexures 4G and 4H respectively.

INSTITUTION BUILDING: TRINITY OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS The Constitution has visualised institutional arrangements to energise and sustain vibrancy in local governments by creating a Trinity of Institutions: 1. State Election Commissions (SECs), 2. State Finance Commissions (SFCs) and 3. District Planning Committees (DPCs). But these institutions themselves require strengthening before they could fulfil their constitutional obligations to promote (i) periodically free, fair and regular elections, (ii) devolution of functions, finance and functionaries and (iii) bottom-up planning process beginning at Gram-Sabha level for preparation of draft district plan. The experiences in the functioning of the SECs and conduct of elections so far seem to indicate that the system is now working in a reasonable manner. However, several discrepancies and infirmities have been noted in the manner in which some states have operationalised their constitutional obligations. One of the common difficulties is in relation to splitting up the overall responsibility of SECs in a manner that the executive wing of the government in some states is responsible for delimitation of seats, reservation of seats and notification of elections. As a result, elections have been delayed in some states (notably Jharkhand and most recently Goa); partisan considerations influence delimitation of seats, causing delays and confusions in the nomination process and, decisions about rotation and reservation of seats become contested and cause further delays. Another major problem experienced by SECs in conduct of Panchayat elections is the preparation of electoral rolls. In many states, two different sets of electoral rolls are being prepared—one by the Election Commission of India for assembly and parliamentary elections, and the other by

(Box 4.6 continued ) Catalysing development The BRGF is aimed at catalysing development in the backward areas by providing infrastructure, promoting good governance and agrarian reforms. It provides for an annual assistance of Rs 3,750 crore to 250 selected backward districts. There are special plans for Bihar and the Kalahandi–Bolangir–Koraput (KBK) districts of Orissa. The total annual allocations under this head for them are Rs 1,000 crore and Rs 250 crore. At the Central level, the scheme is to be implemented by the Panchayati Raj Ministry. In the KBK districts and Bihar, the Planning Commission will be the implementing agency. The constitution of the DPCs for drafting district plans is mandatory under the 73rd Amendment. In the 11th Five-Year Plan, the Commission has made district planning compulsory for receiving funds. The total allocation for 2006–07 is Rs 3,750 crore and the grant will continue for the entire 11th Plan (2007–12). Of this, Rs 250 crore per annum at Rs 1 crore a district is for capacity building and the balance is an untied development fund. In 147 of the 250 districts, where the Rashtriya Sam Vikas Yojana is being implemented, funds will be given to complete the ongoing programmes and in the remaining 103 districts, the BRGF scheme will start straight away. Source: The Hindu, Sunday, 1 October 2006.

SEC for Panchayat and municipality elections. It is essential that the two systems be aligned and a common set of electoral rolls be prepared to reduce ambiguities and costs. This may entail changes in the legislative provisions of some states as well as the system of defining wards by Election Commission of India. One of the perpetual irritants in the constitution of SECs is the status and resources accorded to it. Different states have formulated different modalities. The tenure and conditions of service of State Election Commissions vary greatly across states. The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC) had recommended in 2002 that the Commissioners in State Election Commissions should be accorded the status of the Judge of a High court in the same manner as the Commissioners in Election Commission of India are accorded the status of a Judge of the Supreme Court.12 It will strengthen the SECs if the state governments amend their provisions to ensure that the Commissioners in SECs are accorded the status and privileges equivalent to the Judge of a High court in all manners of appointment, service conditions and so on. Most of the states have constituted two State Finance Commissions so far and some of them have also constituted 3rd State Finance Commissions. However, experiences

144 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Box 4.7 Reservation effectively void without representation The four Panchayats in Tamil Nadu, which are reserved for dalits, are not the only ones to have been deprived of their elected representatives for more than a decade (12 Years). Two wards of Davtada and Kajnaoo Gram Panchayats in Jodhpur district have also met the same fate. Here, the reason is different. The two Panchayat wards have been reserved for SC candidates since 1996, but since not a single person belonging to this category lives there, no nominations were filed in the 22 elections and by-elections held for these two constituencies in the past 12 years. Source: Panchayatiraj updates, Institute of Social Sciences.

and also findings of different studies and reports, including 12th Finance Commission report, find serious gaps in the functioning of SFCs across almost all states of India. It has been observed that SFCs are not constituted in one stroke. Their reports are not available to Central Finance Commissions in the desired time frame. It has also been found that secretary-level officials of state governments are assigned ‘additional’ charge of the SFC-Secretariat. SFCs in some states are given several extensions and they do not submit their reports on time and those that are submitted are usually not based on exhaustive, systematic and updated data. In the absence of human and financial resources and lack of continuous support from state governments, most SFCs have to rely on limited data, which are available in different places. Moreover, delays and adhocism by state governments in taking decisions on the recommendations of SFCs are very common. With regard to finances for local institutions, the reluctance of the State governments is also visible with regard to the utilisation of grants released under the recommendations of Central Finance Commissions for augmenting ‘the consolidated funds of the states to supplement the resources of the Panchayats on the basis of the recommendations of the SFCs’. The grants of Rs 8,000 crores for the period 2000–05 and Rs 20,000 crores for the period 2005–10 were provided for in the 11th and 12th Finance Commissions respectively. But the Minister of Panchayati Raj pointed out in the Lok Sabha on 26 July 2006 that ‘the Twelfth Finance Commission grants

not reaching the local bodies in full and in time…the instalments have not been secured by the state governments as the requisite details about the allocation of grants to PRIs have not been provided to the Ministry of Finance’.13 He also indicated that ‘all the state governments are being impressed upon to operationalise a fund transfer software developed by NIC unit of the MOPR by the use of which funds can be transferred to Gram Panchayats electronically through the banking and treasury channels without delay or diversion’.14 Such measures will certainly bring in transparent mechanisms of quick transfers of funds bypassing the intermediary bottlenecks. The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act made revolutionary provision for the Municipalities to undertake the town and development planning process. However, almost all the state governments have retained their control over the urban planning process in nearly 5,000-plus towns and cities through an archaic institution called Town and Country Planning Organisation. These municipal bodies continue to be dependent on the archaic colonial practices of town and country planning. The Municipalities have been denied from acquiring appropriate capacities to undertake a development-planning exercise on their own. In fact, many state governments have created and continued to strengthen many para-statal institutions, which take planning and infrastructure development activities in the towns and cities. These para-statal bodies have created problems for the municipal governments, because there are points of confusing overlap in their respective jurisdictions and functions. The state governments have not only vested technical capacities in these State Urban Development Authorities, but also facilitated accessing private capital from the market as loans. In most cases the loans are then transferred to the Municipalities for servicing, fuelling discontent among the municipal authorities. The functioning of these para-statal institutions is completely non-participatory and non-transparent. Relationships of accountability with the Municipalities are

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 145 Table 4.3 National Finance Commission and the SFCs: A comparison chart Sl. No. Characteristics

National finance commission

State finance commission

1.

President of India appoints one Chairperson, other members, and secretary in pursuance of Article 280 of the Constitution of India.

While composition of NFC has well established conventions, this is not the case in many of the SFCs.

Composition

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2.

Tenure

As per the notification—normally it is two years.

Adhocism at SFC level.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3.

Terms of Reference (This is issued in continuation of the order with reference to the appointment of the Commission)

Nature and Functions of the Commission. Time frame for different kinds of activities. Area of Recommendations shall be made.

Unlike NFC, SFCs are required to first generate data and then analyse it, which is beyond the capacity of SFCs in their present form.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4.

Major Areas of Assessment

a. Assess the existing state of distribution between the Union and the states. b. Assess the principle that governs the grant-in aid. c. Measures taken to augment the Consolidated Fund and also to supplement the resources of the Panchayats and Municipalities. d. Review the state of finances of the Union. e. Review the present arrangements with regard to disaster management with reference to national calamity relief fund. f. Review of shares between the state and the Union on profit from non-tax income. g. Assess the debts of the states.

SFCs’ terms are clearly non-specific; hardly any previous norms are available. Hence they may have to grope in the dark.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5.

Areas of Recommendations.

a. Measures to enhance resources of the Union Government by means of changes in the context of tax revenue and non-tax revenue. b. Measures to generate surplus and reduce fiscal deficit. c. Resource allocation between the states and the Union. d. Measures to maintain a balance between the receipts and the payments. e. Taxation efforts by the Union Government. f. Steps for expenditure on non-salary component. g. Restructuring of Public Finance and balancing economic stability and debt reduction.

Focus on resource allocations between state and local governments. But lack of capacity laden with ambiguity in TOR results in adhoc recommendations by the SFCs.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6.

Mode of Assessment

a. b. c. d.

Review of reports and documents. Almost same as NFC. Meetings and Discussions. Acquire relevant data and information from the concerned. Call for Suggestions.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7.

Nodal Departments in the Government

a. b. c. d. e. f.

Finance Rural Development Commerce and Industry Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation Agriculture Planning Commission

a. b. c. d.

Finance Rural Development Municipal Administration State Planning Commission

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8.

Period of implementation of the recommendations

Five years

Five years

Source: http://fincomindia.nic.in/

either blurred or non-existent. In most states, constitutionally mandated two institutions— District Planning Committee and Metropolitan Planning Committee either have not been formed or have remained defunct where they have been formed.

District Planning Committees (DPCs) though are very important bodies but most of the states have not constituted these bodies. A report of Expert Group in the Ministry of Panchayati Raj finds that only 16 states have so far constituted the District Planning

146 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Table 4.4 Statement showing release of grants of 12th Finance Commission as on 20 July 2006 (in lakh) State

Total allocation

Amount of one instalment (6-monthly)

2005–06 Amount released 1st Instalment

Andhra Pradesh

1,58,700

15,870

15,870

2006–07 Amount released

2nd Instalment 15,870

1st Instalment 0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Arunachal Pradesh

6,800

680

680

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Assam

52,600

5,260

5,260

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bihar

1,62,400

16,240

16,240

16,240

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chhattisgarh

61,500

6,150

6,150

6,150

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Goa

1,800

180

180

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gujarat

93,100

9,310

9,310

9,310

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Haryana

3,880

3,880

3,880

3,880

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Himachal Pradesh

14,700

1,470

1,470

1,470

1,470

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jammu & Kashmir

28,100

2,810

1,762∗

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jharkhand

48,200

4,820

0

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Karnataka

88,800

8,880

8,880

8,880

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kerala

98,500

9,850

9,850

9,850

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Madhya Pradesh

1,66,300

16,630

16,630

16,630

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maharashtra

1,98,300

19,830

19,830

19,830

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Manipur

4,600

212∗∗

460

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Meghalaya

5,000

500

500

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mizoram

2,000

200

200

200

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nagaland

4,000

400

400

400

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Orissa

80,300

8,030

8,030

8,030

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Punjab

32,400

12,300

12,300

12,300

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rajasthan

1,23,000

12,300

12,300

12,300

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sikkim

1,300

130

130

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tamil Nadu

87,000

8,700

8,700

8,700

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tripura

5,700

570

570

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttar Pradesh

2,92,800

29,280

29,280

29,280

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttaranchal

16,200

1,620

1,620

0

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

West Bengal

1,27,100

12,710

12,710

12,710

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

20,00,000

2,00,000

1,93,884

1,79,730

1,470

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Grand Total

3,75,084

Source: Response to Lok Sabha Starred Question No.55, answered on 27 June 2006. ∗After deducting Rs 1,048.03 lakh which is the share of PRIs where elections have not been held. ∗∗Excluding share of PRI Grants pertaining to hill areas amounting to Rs 248.40 lakh.

Committees in all districts the details of which can be seen in Table 4.5. Many of the states where DPCs have been constituted, have either made them ‘dysfunctional’ by hijacking real powers from local governments or have not done anything to encourage horizontal and vertical planning linkages for the vibrancy of these

bodies. Perhaps Kerala is the only exception where DPCs are functioning and bottom-up planning processes take place regularly. In all other states, wide gaps exist on what DPCs have been defined on paper and what actually they are doing. It has been suggested that some concrete steps could be taken to establish and strengthen participatory planning

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 147

during 2006–07, the last year of 10th FiveYear Plan and the period for the 11th Plan from 2007 to 2012, keeping in mind the provisions of Article 243G of the Constitution, which envisages Panchayats as local self-governments planning for economic development and social justice. It has also suggested to reform guidelines for important Centrally-Sponsored Schemes to link them with plans of DPCs. But all these things can happen only when Panchayats at all levels and Municipalities become vibrant units of local self-governance. Some concrete steps that have been suggested are: • A clear and unambiguous activity mapping. • Engagement of all stakeholders (especially women and dalits) in participatory planning and implementation. • Devolution of adequate funds in an untied manner. • Streamlining and consolidation of schemes to ensure flexibility and measure of autonomy. • Assignment of significant revenue raising powers and building capacity of local governments to arise revenue from sources assigned to them. • Maintenance of proper Management Information System (MIS) for local governments. The Trinity of Institutions has potential and the constitutional mandate to strengthen Panchayats and Municipalities as institutions of Local Self-Governance for which there is an urgent need to ‘institutionalise’ the efforts related to strengthening of Local Governments. The Constitution of India has already created these three institutions to institutionalise the system of local selfgovernance in the country. However, unfortunately, these institutions have not received the type of attention which they deserve. Unless these institutions are provided sufficient capacities and ample autonomy in transparent and accountable ways, it may not be possible to sustain institutionalisation of local democracy at the grass roots.

Table 4.5 Constitution of district planning committees (DPCs) states/UTs States where DPCs have been constituted

Have not been constituted

Assam, Chhattisgarh, Goa, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Orissa, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Daman & Diu, Lakshadweep

Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Punjab, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Chandigrah, Pondicherry

Source: Response to Lok Sabha Unstarred question No. 1139, answered on 2 August 2006.

Box 4.8 Panchayati Raj and lower caste politics: A debate over equality An elderly dalit Mukhiya, Sughar Ram, was booed, heckled and manhandled by some uppercaste youth while he was presiding over a special Gram Sabha meeting at the Panchayat Bhavan in Haswadih village under Akaruan block in Bhojpur district of Bihar on 5 July 2006. The meeting had been convened to cross-check the list of below poverty line (BPL) beneficiaries. Infuriated on seeing him sitting in a chair, the upper-caste youth said, ‘Saala dusadh ho kar kursi par baithega? Tumhara shaan hum log mita denge.’ (How dare you sit on a chair being a Dusadh? We will destroy your dignity.) The mukhiya went to lodge a complaint at Piro Police Station. The officer-in-charge accepted his complaint but refused to register an FIR. Sughar Ram, a retired schoolteacher, was elected Mukhiya of the village Panchayat, reserved for Scheduled Castes, in the elections held in May-June this year, securing 475 out of 2,100 votes. Now, he feels insecure as the Panchayat is dominated by upper-caste people. The former Deputy Mukhiya is one of the three accused Sughar Ram has named in his complaint. Justifying the manhandling of the Mukhiya, some upper-caste residents of the village stated that he was trying to include the names of only Scheduled Caste families in the list of BPL beneficiaries, while the youth wanted him to include the names of poor upper-caste people in the list as well. Source: Panchayatiraj updates, Institute of Social Sciences.

Institutional capacity-building of SECs, SFCs and DPCs on one hand and devolution to local governments on the other hand should go hand in hand. Ultimately these constitutional institutions would become custodians of constitutional democracy at local levels.

Devolutions to Panchayats and Municipalities Despite the enactment of 74th Constitutional Amendment Act brought in 14 years ago and the subsequent enactment of state legislations, the progress on devolution of functions, functionaries and funds to the urban local bodies either has not been made or it has been too slow. The extent of real fiscal devolution is still very dismal. The state governments have retained direct control over the municipal bodies in various forms.

148 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA The governance framework is diffused and the state government freely encroaches on the functions and finances of the municipal bodies. The state governments permit the local governments no autonomy in fixing tax rates and user charges. To add to the confusion, there are very wide variations in the power structures and functions of Municipalities in different states. There has been neither political will nor much civil society pressure towards greater devolution and decentralisation. Recent policy and programmatic initiatives of Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) by the national government encourages the state governments to implement 74th Constitutional Amendment Act as one of the mandatory reforms to be able to access resources from this programme. However, the programme is too new and without civil society activism and political mobilisation, even the conditionalities may remain far from realisation. The financial governance and accounting in most of the Municipalities are in complete disarray. Most of them maintain their accounts in single entry system, which does not allow them to take stock of municipal assets created and to explore revenue generation potential. The Municipalities are almost fully dependent on state transfers of resources either in the form of grants-in-aid or occasional extraordinary transfers. Property tax is the only viable source of own income for Municipalities. However, due to lack of political will, inappropriate assessment and inefficient collection mechanism, the revenue generation is too low leaving no option but to remain dependent on the State government. Historically, the power vested with the Municipalities to collect various taxes has been withdrawn by various State governments at different intervals leaving few options for self-reliance. The budget-making process within the Municipality is completely alien to the citizens, let alone participation of the poor and the marginalised. The creativity of the citizens, elected representatives and municipal administration is severely restricted as the budget allocations

are pre-determined by the state governments. Conversely, the Municipalities, being used to depend on the state government for financial bailouts, have neither developed a sense of responsibility nor incentive for discipline and financial prudence. The condition of Panchayats is not very different in many ways. However, unlike Municipalities, there is a well-defined plan to devolve Functions, Functionaries and Finances on the basis of Activity Mapping, undertaken in a participatory manner. Activity Mapping can become a trigger for ensuring that Panchayats are on a sound footing. When Panchayats are assigned clear tasks, devolved funds and made accountable for the performance of these newly assigned responsibilities, they have a big incentive to demand the capacity required for effective performance. It was agreed during the 1st Round Table of State Ministers of Panchayati Raj in Kolkata that all States and UTs would undertake activity mapping by the end of 2004–05, using the activity mapping model as evolved by the Ministry of Rural Development in the Report of the Task Force on Devolution of Powers and Functions upon Panchayati Raj Institutions. Though this target has not been achieved in all states, there has been considerable progress. Only Kerala, Karnataka and West Bengal have completed activity mapping in the full sense of the term. Haryana and Orissa have also undertaken the exercise in respect of a limited number of matters and issued notifications in this respect. Maharashtra and Gujarat are states with a long history of devolution of powers to Panchayats and they claim that they have delineated the functions clearly in the Panchayati Raj legislation itself. They are also joined by Goa, which has detailed provisions in the law that spell out the functions of each level of Panchayat. In Manipur, Uttaranchal, Assam, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh and Punjab, the groundwork for a detailed activity mapping to give life to their strong Panchayati Raj legislations has been undertaken and what is required is its acceptance at the highest level.

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 149

In this series of suggestions and promises, Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, in his speech on 22 November 2006, at a function organised by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj at Vigyan Bhavan, New Delhi, fully supported devolution of Functions, Funds and Functionaries on the basis of Activity Mapping undertaken by states. He went one step further by suggesting that all Central Ministries should do their activity mapping vis-à-vis their programmes for Panchayati Raj Institutions. The Union Minister, Mr Mani Shankar Aiyar, as a follow-up of series of seven Round Table conferences of Panchayat Ministers of States during July–December 2004, began to visit different states to convince state governments and build pressure on them for time-bound devolutions, as agreed during the round-table deliberations. Till date, he has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Chief Ministers of 15 States for time-bound and concrete action to empower Panchayati Raj Institutions in those sates. These states are Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Rajasthan and Uttaranchal. But the status of these MoUs is quite disappointing in many states. For example, an MoU was signed between the Chief Minister of Rajasthan and Union Minister of Panchayati Raj on 4 December 2005. A review of progress on this MoU can be seen in Table 4.7. There is a need for urgent action on such good initiatives by political leaders. But politico-bureaucratic machinery has not responded appropriately to either Activity Mapping or anything else which is necessary for strengthening of Panchayats. To improve the provision of public services at the local level, there needs to be (i) a clear activity mapping based on comparative advantage in implementing expenditures and devolution of functions to the Panchayats on that basis; (ii) provision of appropriate revenue handles to Panchayats; (iii) guidance of Panchayats to raise taxes, particularly on land and property, and efficiently provide public services; (v) unbundling of state sector schemes and

Table 4.6 Current status of activity mapping in different states Sl. No.

State

Transfer of subjects through legislation

Subjects covered under activity mapping

1

Andhra Pradesh

17 subjects

9 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2

Assam

29 subjects

29 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

Arunachal Pradesh

3 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4

Bihar

25 subjects

25 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5

Chhattisgarh

29 subjects

27 subjects, except forests and drinking water supply

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

Goa

6 subjects

18 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7

Gujarat

15 subjects

14 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8

Haryana

29 subjects

10 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9

Himachal Pradesh

26 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

10

Karnataka

29 subjects

29 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11

Kerala

26 subjects

26 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12

Madhya Pradesh

23 subjects

23 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

13

Maharashtra

18 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

14

Manipur

22 functions

22 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

15

Orissa

25 subjects

7 Subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

16

Punjab

7 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

17

Rajasthan

29 subjects

12 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

18

Sikkim

28 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

19

Tamil Nadu

29 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

20

Tripura

29 subjects

21 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

21

Uttar Pradesh

12 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

22

Uttaranchal

14 subjects

9 subjects

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

23

West Bengal

29 subjects

15 subjects

Source: Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India, 2006 (http://Panchayat.nic.in/).

consolidating central sector schemes to enable greater flexibility and autonomy to Panchayats in implementation; (vi) Professionalisation of SFCs and reforms in the state transfers to make them adequate, rule based, equitable and incentive compatible; and (vii) Setting up of an up-to-date information system comprising of fiscal, demographic, geographical and economic data for the village, block and district Panchayat jurisdictions. Effective fiscal decentralisation demands that finances should follow functional assignments. This necessitates looking at both (a) raising of one’s own revenue and (b) devolution of funds from higher levels of government to local bodies. Ideally speaking, revenues raised locally ought to cover the

150 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Table 4.7 Status of MoU in Rajasthan, as on 3 Decemebr 2006 Sl. No. Statement made in MoU 1

Progress made (So far)

Art.

Statement

3.6

For capacity building of elected PRI representatives and officials, regular training programmes are organised. All the Officials and newly elected PRIs members have been trained within three months after their elections by Indira Gandhi Panchayati Raj and Gramin Vikas Sansthan (State Institute of Rural Development).

Only the Zilla Pramukhs of Zilla Parishads, Pradhans of Panchayat Samitis and Sarpanches and Ward Panchs of Gram Panchayats have been oriented till date. Approximately 5,996 members (5,020 members of Panchayat Samitis and 976 members of Zilla Parishads) are yet to receive any training-related to their roles and responsibilities in the PRIs.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2

3.7

For ensuring better support services to the PRIs, it has been decided to create a Rural Development Service and Rural Engineering Service.

The Rural Development Service has been formed; however, till date not a single posting has been made under this cadre. The Rural Engineering Service is yet to be formed. This delay has placed an extra burden on the engineers posted in NREGA districts. Huge amount of work is being undertaken in these districts which do not possess adequate staff to administer these works resulting in delays and reduced efficiency.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

4.2

In continuation of the exercise of devolution already undertaken as described above, Rajasthan has already completed the process of Activity Mapping for 16 departments, aimed at effectively devolving functions, funds and functionaries to Panchayats. The Government of Rajasthan would endeavour to reform Activity Mapping Notification by the end of April 2006 in the joint presence of the Chief Minister of Rajasthan and the Union Minister of Panchayati Raj. In furtherance of this, specific steps will be undertaken.

Though the process of Activity Mapping has been completed in the state, despite several discussions, the government has not taken any steps to notify them. Till date, Government Orders (GOs) have not been issued in this regard by the state government. Though the MoU specifically mentions that notifications are to be undertaken by the end of April 2006.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4

4.3

For effectively performing the functions devolved to them through Activity Mapping, the Panchayats would need a matching transfer of funds in respect of the devolved functions. This will require the entrustment of all budget allocations pertaining to the activities devolved upon Panchayats to the respective levels, through the creation of a Panchayat sector in the state budget. The Government of Rajasthan hopes to complete this process in the budget document of 2006–07.

In the absence of any notification on Activity Mapping, no progress has been observed with respect to this issue.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5

4.4

For Panchayats to effectively plan and implement the No progress has been made on this issue so far. functions that have been devolved upon them, it is necessary that funds pertaining to these schemes are transferred to them without delay or diversion. As a part of this process, the Government of Rajasthan agrees to put in place systems that are capable of tracking transfers of funds to Panchayats, both through banks and treasuries. This process will be put into operation to track the transfer of local body grants recommended by the 12th Finance Commission from the Consolidated Fund of the State to the Panchayats.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

4.6

Rajasthan undertakes to put in place detailed operational guidelines to ensure that District Planning Committees (DPCs) function in accordance with Article 243 ZD of the Constitution.

DPCs are not functional. Existing members of the constituted DPCs lack awareness about their roles and responsibilities.

Source: Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India, 2006 (http://Panchayat.nic.in/).

provisioning of services by Panchayats— only this can fully ensure efficiency as well as direct accountability in the provision of local services. However, in practice, the revenue bases assigned to Panchayats for

collection and use are clearly inadequate to meet their expenditure requirements, for two reasons. First, while Panchayats may have a comparative advantage in implementing local service delivery due to their lower

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 151

transaction costs, they have a comparative disadvantage in raising revenues as all broadbased, mobile and redistributed taxes can be effectively levied only by higher-level governments. Second, there are significant differences among different local bodies in their capacity to raise revenues and their actual costs of providing public services. It is essential, therefore, that such vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances are offset through a system of intergovernmental transfers. The system of transfers to local governments should comprise of a combination of general-purpose unconditional transfers to enable them to provide public services according to the activities assigned to them, and specific purpose transfers to ensure prescribed minimum standards in services considered to be extremely important. Assigning revenue bases to Panchayats and providing them adequate powers to effectively enforce the collection of tax has been neglected immensely, resulting in abysmally low volume of revenues raised by Panchayats at all three levels—just 0.07 per cent of GDP or 0.36 per cent of the total revenues collected in the country in 2002–03, as noted by the 12th Finance Commission (TFC). Panchayats alone are not to be blamed for this pathetic situation. In fact, the onus is on the states to undertake policy reforms and other steps to vitalise own revenue collection at the Panchayat level.

Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas Act (PESA) PESA extends Part IX of the Constitution to Schedule V areas, subject to certain exceptions and modifications, in nine States— Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa and Rajasthan. The Act defines a village as ordinarily consisting of a habitation or a group of habitations or a hamlet or a group of hamlets comprising a community and managing its affairs in accordance with traditions and customs. It stipulates that every village will have a Gram Sabha, which will be competent to

safeguard and preserve the traditions and customs of the people, their cultural identity and community resources through the customary mode of dispute resolution. The Gram Sabha will approve of plans, programmes and projects before they are taken up for implementation by the Panchayat at the village level; it would also identify beneficiaries of poverty alleviation and other programmes and issue certification of utilisation of funds by the Panchayat at the village level for the above programmes. Planning and management of minor water bodies will be done by the Panchayats. Before acquiring land in Vth Schedule Areas for development projects and before resettling rehabilitated persons affected by such projects, Gram Sabha or the Panchayat at the appropriate level shall be consulted. The recommendation of the Gram Sabha or the Panchayat at the appropriate level is mandatory prior to granting of prospecting license or mining lease for minor minerals. Similarly, prior recommendation is required for granting of concession for the exploitation of minor minerals by auction. A duty has been cast upon State Legislatures to ensure that Panchayats at the appropriate level and the Gram Sabha are endowed specifically with such powers and authority as to enable them to function as institutions of selfgovernment. The Act prohibits Panchayats at the higher level to assume the powers and authority of any Panchayat at the lower level. It also provides that any provision of any law which is inconsistent with its terms shall cease to be in force at the expiry of one year from the date on which the Act receives the assent of the President. While all states have enacted requisite compliance legislations by amending the respective Panchayati Raj Acts, certain gaps continue to exist. Most states are also yet to amend the subject laws and rules, such as those relating to money lending, forest, mining and excise to harmonise with PESA. Though the provisions in such laws are legally invalid after 12 December 1997, they continue to be followed by departments and their functionaries in the absence of clear

152 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Box 4.9 Tribesmen ask for more representation Adivasi Panchayat presidents, on 20 February 2006, in Tamil Nadu, called on the government to increase the representation for tribesmen in the Legislative Assembly and to increase the number and powers of Tribal Panchayats in accordance with the spirit of the 5th Schedule of the Indian Constitution. At a day-long seminar on ‘Self-Governance for Adivasi Panchayat Presidents’, an election manifesto was released and 14 resolutions were adopted. Speaking on the occasion, tribal chiefs called for reorganisation of Assembly Constituencies in the state giving fair representation to tribal voters in 42 Assembly Constituencies. According to government census, the population of tribesmen in the state is 1.09 per cent. But their representation in Panchayats amounts to only 0.79 per cent. Hence, the representation for Adivasis must be raised to four seats in the Assembly, and prior to this, a fresh census on the tribal population must be done. Adivasi Panchayat presidents complain that the 2001 National Census Exercise left out a large number of tribesmen. As against a total population of 15 lakh in the state, the census report has listed only 6.51 lakh. A large number of Adivasi sects have been removed from the census list in order to ‘reduce’ the tribal population. Asking for necessary corrections, Panchayat presidents opposed alienation of tribal land in the name of forest development, leasing of lands in the hills to private parties, WTO agreement and globalisation. They demanded that tribal pockets in Tamil Nadu, which lie fragmented, must be demarcated as homogenised administrative entitles so as to fulfil the tribal sub-plan criteria for special schemes, which stipulate the presence of 50 per cent tribal population in each Panchayat. As per the 5th and 6th Schedules in the Constitution, Tribal Panchayats are entitled to more powers and autonomy. In Tamil Nadu, successive governments over the years have not declared the tribal areas as Scheduled Areas on the ground that they are fragmented. Source: Panchayatiraj updates, Institute of Social Sciences. (http://www.localgovernmentindia.org/Panchayat_newsdetail.asp).

Box 4.10 Village forest make the main agenda Gram Van (village forest) would be grown in an area of 47,615 hectare in 9,523 Gram Panchayats in 18 districts of the state under the NREGS, which has been named Madhya Pradesh Gramin Rozgar Guarantee Scheme in the state. For this purpose, a seven-year scheme in the state has been chalked out. An amount of Rs 4,20,97,86,000 would be spent on implementing this scheme in the state. It is proposed to grow forests in an area of five hectares in each Gram Panchayat. Source: Panchayatiraj updates, Institute of Social Sciences.

instructions and guidelines. Powers statutorily devolved upon the Gram Sabha and Panchayats are not matched by the concomitant transfer of funds and functionaries resulting in the non-exercise of such powers. States have, over the years, been repeatedly urged to expedite this process, but progress has been slow and often, only symbolic, with no real intention to operationalise the provisions in spirit. As in the case of state laws, a critical issue in the implementation of PESA is to harmonise its provisions with those of the Central legislations concerned and also recast relevant policies and schemes of Central Ministries/Departments. Among the

laws, which warrant particular attention in this regard, are the following: • The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 • Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 • The Indian Forest Act, 1927 • The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 • The Indian Registration Act Insofar as Policies and Central Schemes are concerned, policies pertaining to wastelands, water resources and extraction of minerals from lands in Schedule V Areas do not seem to reflect the intent and purpose of PESA. These policies, as interpreted and implemented, have given rise, on occasions, to confrontations between the tribal people and the administration. The National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation of Project Affected Persons, 2003; National Water Policy, 2002; National Minerals Policy, 2003; National Forest Policy, 1988; Wild Life Conservation Strategy, 2002; Reforms in Tribal Sub Plan (TSP) and National Draft Environment Policy, 2004, would require detailed examination from the viewpoint of ensuring compliance with the provisions of PESA. While people should be made aware about progressive provisions of PESA, following initiatives should be taken at state and Union levels: State-level Initiatives 1. Analysis of State Laws and identification of gaps therein vis-à-vis PESA. This analysis should have bottom-up approach to also find out ways to harmonise existing subject laws and rules related to Indian Penal Code, Money Lending, Forest, Mining, and so on. 2. Prime Minster, while speaking at a function at Vigyan Bhavan to release Status Report of Panchayats on 22 November 2006, suggested for activity mapping of not only Panchayats but also line departments. Analysis of subject laws, as mentioned earlier, would help in preparation of Activity Mapping for line departments in PESA areas.

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 153

3. Preparation of Annual Status Report by the state on current status of implementation of PESA in the state. 4. Framing rules/conditions for use of resources under BRGF to catalyse implementations of PESA in the state. 5. Continuous Capacity Building of different stakeholders on the issue of implementation of PESA. State should create/ utilise Capacity Building Resources in all departments concerned to enhance capacities of its officials in this regard. Central-Government Level 1. Issuing of specific directions to states for implementation of PESA in letter and spirit on the basis of Governor’s report on Schedule V areas. Ministry of Panchayati Raj could provide the format for Governor’s report for each state. 2. Incorporation of suggested changes in Tribal Rights Bill, 2006 to further strengthen implementation of PESA. It requires an institutional mechanism for coordination between MOPR and Tribal Ministry. 3. Coordination of Monitoring of Implementations of PESA and Backward Region Grant Fund (managed by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj) by a Task Force led by Planning Commission. This multi-member, multi-sector Task Force with clear-cut terms of reference (Activity Mapping) should have its Secretariat in the Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India. 4. PESA States should have a cell to monitor its implementation and to provide support towards these, a small annual budget (Rs 5 crore per annum per state) in states (Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa and Rajasthan) should be allocated.

DELIVERY OF DEVELOPMENT: NREGA AND JNNURM The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 guarantees 100 days of employment

in a financial year to any rural household whose adult members are willing to do unskilled manual work. The Act has come into force in 200 districts of India from 2 February 2006. This Act is an important step towards the realisation of the right to work. It is also expected to enhance people’s livelihoods on a sustained basis, by developing the economic and social infrastructure in rural areas. This guarantee of work can also serve other objectives: generating productive assets, protecting environment, empowering rural women, reducing rural– urban migration and fostering social equity among others. The Act has clearly mentioned that PRIs at the District, the Intermediate and the Village levels shall be the principal authorities for planning and implementation of the schemes undertaken under this Act. The functions of the Panchayats at District level are to finalise and approve block-wise shelves of projects to be taken up under a programme under the Scheme; to supervise and monitor the projects taken up at the Block level and District level; to carry out such other functions as may be assigned to them by the State Council. The functions of the Panchayats at Block level are to approve the Block level plan for forwarding it to the Panchayat at the District level for final approval; to supervise and monitor the projects taken up at the Gram Panchayat and Panchayats at block level; to carry out such other functions as may be assigned to them by the State Council. The Gram Panchayats shall be responsible for identification of the projects in the Gram Panchayat area to be taken up under a Scheme as per the recommendation of Gram Sabha and the Ward Sabha and for executing and supervision of such works. A Gram Panchayat can take up any project under a Scheme within the area of the Gram Panchayat as may be sanctioned by the Programme Officer. Every Gram Panchayat shall, after considering the recommendations of the Gram Sabha and the Ward Sabha, prepare a development plan and maintain a shelf or possible work to be taken up under the Scheme as and when

154 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA demand for work arises. The Gram Panchayat shall forward its proposals for the development projects including the order of priority among different works to the Programme Officer for scrutiny and preliminary approval at the commencement of the year in which it is proposed to be executed. The Programme Officer shall allot at least 50 per cent of the works in terms of its cost under a Scheme to be implemented through the Gram Panchayat. The Programme Officer shall supply each Gram Panchayat with (a) the muster rolls for the works sanctioned to be executed by it and (b) a list of employment opportunities available elsewhere to the residents of the Gram Panchayat. The Gram Panchayat shall allocate employment opportunities among the applicants and ask them to report for work. NREGA has raised high level of expectations from the programme and Panchayats. As some of the findings of sample surveys undertaken by PRIA in 16 major NREGA states of the country during September–October 2006 suggest, because of specificities of roles of Panchayats in the Act itself, the Schemes under NREGA have piggy backed on the potential and presence of Panchayats. A negligible percentage of households and individuals in the study reported that they were not aware of NREGA and the role of Panchayats in it. In fact most of the respondents felt as if they were integral to each other. While the rate of holding Gram Sabha for registration is high, such rate for perspective planning is low and for social audit is very low. High percentages of attendance have been reported, but low percentage of respondents reported high participation in these Gram Sabhas. Though in general Panchayats are quite excited with implementation of NREGA, the pressure on Panchayats is building up. In the absence of suitable support system as well as Sarpanch centric de facto delivery mechanism of NREGA, a sense of dejection has been noticed in many Panchayats. Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) was launched in December 2005 and Government of India started implementing it from April 2006.

The GOI committed a sum of 50,000 crore over a period of seven years beginning from 2005–06, against an amount of Rs 100,000 crore of proposed investment. Rs 834 crore and Rs 4,953 crore have been allocated for the years 2005–06 and 2006–07 respectively.15 The programme adopted a two-track approach. Track One included two components: (i) Urban Infrastructure and Governance (UIG), and (ii) Basic Services to Urban Poor (BSUP) which will be implemented in 63 identified cities. Track Two included another two components: (i) Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme in Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT) and (ii) Integrated Housing and Slum Development Project (IHSDP) for the small and medium towns to be identified by the state governments. The Government of India for the first time made an explicit commitment to provide much-awaited investment capital to the city governments for improving the infrastructure and basic service delivery. An explicit mention to earmark resources for urban poor and marginalised was considered to be a step forward in addressing the issues of urban poverty. However, on probing deeper into the investment patterns, a lopsided approach towards UIG is markedly clear which can be seen from the fact that Rs 4430.23 crore were sanctioned (as on 22 September 2006) for UIG whereas only Rs 1,003.27 crore (as on 14 September 2006) have been sanctioned for BSUP.16 The conditionalities attached to the urban governance reform agenda has been a point of controversy from the point of view of the current scheme of decentralised local governance as also of their compatibility with the Indian socio-economic realities. The design and its implementation in the selected cities has brought in many critical issues that need to be emphasised. The UIG allocations for the infrastructural development have got their own problems in terms of the size of the cities they are meant for. Smaller cities seldom have local capacities for such huge infrastructural schemes with the result that contracts are cornered by the ‘big fish’ from bigger cities who in turn sub-contract the

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 155 Figure 4.1 JNNURM process National Steering Group

Central Level

Central Sanctioning & Monitoring Committee

Central Sanctioning & Monitoring Committee

Mission Directorate Urban Infrastructure & Governance

Mission Directorate Basic Services to Urban Poor

Support/Advice Technical Advisory Group

State Level

State Level Steering Committee (SLSC)

State Level Nodal Agency

Urban Local Body (ULB)

Policy Directive Flow

ULB Level

Project Proposal Flow

Administrative Section Urban Local Body

Source: Ministry of Urban Development, GOI, 2006.

actual work to the local level. This creates an unnecessary middle level whereas the need is to encourage the local capacities. States are supposed to provide 10 per cent of matching funds towards these programmes which have resulted in certain problems at the local level. For example, in some cities, the slum dwellers have been rehabilitated at places which are far away from their places of livelihood and the vacated lands are then used to generate the remaining 10 per cent. This raises the question at what and whose cost the urban renewal is taking place? The implementation of 74th Constitutional Amendment by the state government, which was the driving force for many civil society organisations to undertake urban governance interventions found a

prominent place in the conditionalities described in JNNURM. Implementation of Community Participation Laws and Proactive Disclosure are other important provisions. The programme also envisaged preparation of City Development Plans and Detailed Project Reports/Plans on various items with citizen participation. The other motivating factor for civil society organisations was the formation of National Technical Advisory Group (TAG) by involving eminent civil society actors. The TAG was empowered to suggest strategies and to facilitate civil society and citizen participation in the planning, implementation and monitoring of JNNURM. All the funds for NURM have got conditionalities attached. The reforms are linked by the states and the ULGs to funding grants

Support/Advice

156 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Table 4.8 Funding pattern under NURM for urban infrastructure and governance Grant

Cities with 4 million plus population

ULB/parastatals/loan from financial institution

Centre

State

35%

15%

50%

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Cities with million plus but less than 4 million population

50%

20%

30%

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Cities in North Eastern States and J&K 90%

10%

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Other Cities

80%

10%

10%

of public utilities like water supply and power. A case in point is the Delhi government’s move towards privatisation of certain activities of Delhi Jal Board (DJB) largely on the basis of the blueprint provided by the World Bank, USAID and ADB. Citizens and citizens’ groups have raised concerns about the logic, the arrangement and implementation from the equity point of view:19

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Setting up de-salination plants

80%

10%

10%

and loans. The adoption of such a mechanism indicates a highly ‘coercive method’ and is in contradiction to the ‘subsidarity principle’ which was clearly outlined and proposed in the Report submitted by the National Advisory Council. Such imposition of schemes with conditionalities is in clear clash with the provisions and the spirit of the 74th Constitutional Amendment.17 The City Development Strategic Plans (CDSP) are to be prepared by the local governments in compliance with the NURM guidelines. However, CDSPs are developed without any interface with the citizens. In the absence of any public information, awareness or consultations, the development of these CDSPs are almost silent in their implementation. A case in point is the development of Bangalore CDSP where the Bangalore Nagar Palike went ahead with integrated land use with services, urban transport and environment management without any public hearings or consultations.18 One of the biggest obstacles encountered was nearly total ignorance of municipal elected representatives, officials, citizen groups and civil society about the detailed provisions in JNNURM. Most of the stakeholders have been oblivious of the preparation of CDPs, DPRs and related governance reform agenda. Although, many of the reforms would be carried out at the municipality level, they had little knowledge and understanding about their significance, let alone their developing a political consensus on how these reforms would be carried out and what their implications would be. As a part of urban reforms agenda, there is a rapid movement towards privatisation

• The difficult task of cost recovery is with the DJB and municipal authorities of the MCD, NDMC and Cantonment Board. • The process of privatisation has resulted in the DJB to undervalue the assets and overvalue the services so that multinational companies take over the assets and various other utilities of Jal Board. • Resentment against the diversion of Ganga water from western UP and the ensuing loss of livelihoods because of substantial land going out of cultivation, pushing up the rehabilitation costs and compensation which is to be paid by the Delhi Government. • The World Bank intervening at every stage of the implementation of the project such as deciding the eligibility and selection criteria for bidders and awarding of the consultancy for drawing up the blueprints of reforms (showing a clear preference for Price Waterhouse Coopers). • A debate has ensued regarding the ‘Sonia Vihar water project which was the main priority of the DJB over other projects such as Bawana water treatment plant’. This shows a clear preference for the ‘rich’ over the ‘poor’ because while the Sonia Vihar project caters to the posh south Delhi clientele, Bawana plant will mainly cover the outer Delhi and the rural areas. Citizens’ participation in urban governance needs to be emphasised and concrete action must be taken in this direction. An example of such initiative is the ‘Bhagidari’, the citizen-government partnership initiated by the Delhi Government in January 2000. Aimed towards better service delivery, it is to ensure clean and green Delhi in which partnership and participation of the citizens is assured. The rural counterpart has at least

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 157 Figure 4.2 Project proposal, sanction and fund flow MoUD/MoUEPA Recommendation on Release of Funds

Recommendation on Release of Funds

5

Central Level

4

4

Central Sanctioning & Monitoring Committee MD: UI and Governance

Central Sanctioning & Monitoring Committee MD: Basic Services to Urban Poor

3

3

State Level

State Level Steering Committee 2 State Level Nodal Agency 1

6 Urban Local Body (ULB)

ULB Level

Proposal Flow: 1–4

Investment in Projects

7

7

Funds Flow: 5 & 6

Source: Ministry of Urban Development, GOI, 2006.

an opportunity to participate in the localrural governance through Gram Sabha but no such mechanism exists for the urban citizens. The provision for Ward Committees in cities with more than three lakh population has not been implemented across the states and they remained ineffective in the states even where they came into existence. In the absence of any institutional obligation to involve the citizens in the planning and implementation of development programmes, an interface between civil society and municipal governance depends on the ‘good intentions’ of elected representatives and officials. The proposed Citizen Participation Law under JNNURM is one step forward, but it envisages only a truncated version of citizen participation and relies on proxy participation. It does not take into

account the possible role of existing citizen formations and civil society, let alone engaging in active encouragement. An important element which is perhaps missing in the urban governance is the lack of gender-sensitive approach towards urban planning. ‘Gender-sensitive urban partnerships must recognize the different approaches that women and men often adopt in organization, negotiation and planning as a result of their socialization and experience of public life.’ For example, women forge informal neighbourhood networks in their daily lives which can be utilised effectively in urban planning and decision making. It makes ample sense to forge new partnerships between the planners and the people, the state and the civil society and above all between men and women.20

Capacity Building Component

158 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA

CONCLUSION The institutions of local governance that have come into existence since the 1990s have given rise to high expectations of local institutional initiatives and many of the developments have even been encouraging. Various rounds of elections to local bodies have been held by most of the states and union territories and institutions like SFCs are in place, though the picture is not so encouraging with regard to the setting and the effectiveness of the DPCs. The problem, however, lies in the fact that the PRIs have come into existence mainly because of the initiatives of the Centre (like many other policy initiatives since the 1990s), but in terms of the federal set up of the polity, the actualisation of the initiatives have to take place at the state level. The success of implementation of policies, after all, depends upon the effectiveness of the state machinery, but it is precisely the state machinery that is usually most reluctant to devolve powers further to local institutions. This is indicated repeatedly with regard to the transfer of powers (enumerated in the 11th Schedule under Article 243G and the 12th Schedule under Article 243W), holding of elections to Panchayats and to the municipal bodies, transfer of grants by the Centre under the recommendations of Finance Commissions and utilisation of those funds. The state has proved to be a bottleneck in the working of local institutions in many respects. Local institutions have indeed brought hopes and aspirations for the grass roots and the marginalised, which of course have to be galvanised through some local initiatives towards development with an extensive involvement of civil society. If the current trend of mere promises and more offloading goes on, a sense of disillusionment may creep in amongst the people, the Panchayats and the Municipalities, which would have an unhealthy effect on democracy. Political seriousness and unambiguous initiatives for time-bound action are required to strengthen institutions of local self-governance and

to fine-tune the implementation process. Ways are already known, discussed, deliberated and agreed publicly. Now the time has come to seriously move forward. Looking back in the last 14 years of the coming into existence of the new PRIs and municipal bodies, a feeling persists that there are certain gaps and loopholes in the existing structures and processes. Structures and processes are in place and it is time to enhance the institutional capacity of these bodies so that they are able to handle and deliver the increasing number of responsibilities passed on to them for the implementation of new programmes. Institutions of governance at the lowest level, their success and effectiveness really depends upon effective and efficient delivery of programmes. In case there are lapses in this respect, the blame will squarely fall on the local bodies which will further dampen the spirit and popular base of the institutions. Capacity building therefore is urgently required to strengthen these institutions.

NOTES 1 2 3 4 5

6

7 8 9

10 11 12 13

Response to Rajya Sabha Starred Question no. 67, answered on 27 July 2006. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Raghbendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo, ‘The Impact of Reservation in the Panchyati Raj: Evidence from the Nation Wide Randomized Experiment’, IIM Kolkatta and MIT study, mimio, November 2003. Raghbendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo, ‘Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India’, mimio, MIT, 2003. Annual Reports, PRIA. Prabhat Khabar, 6 December 2006. Response to Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 2479, answered on 24 December 2006. PEVAC Report, Samarthan, Bhopal. Response to Lok Sabha Unstarred Question no. 1148, answered on 29 November 2006. www.ncrwc.nic.in. Response to Lok Sabha starred Q no.55, answered on 26 July 2006.

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 159 14 Ibid. 15 Response to Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question no. 1905, answered on 9 March 2006. 16 Mini Jose, ‘World Class cities—for whom and at what cost’, Focus on Global South, November 2006. 17 ‘For the People, by diktat’, Vinay Baindur, http://www.indiatogether.org/2005/sep/govnurm.htm, September 2005. 18 Ibid.

19 The points have been summarised from – • Amit Bhadhuri, ‘The Blueprint for Water Privatisation in Delhi’, October 2005. • Varupi Jain, ‘Delhi Water Project Soaked in Controversy’, www.indiatoghether.com, September 2005, • Lalit K. Jha, ‘It’s “Swadeshi” vs “Videshi” at DJB’, The Hindu, January 2005. 20 Jo Beall, ‘Urban Governance: Why Gender Matters’, UNDP Gender in Development Programme, 1996.

ANNEXURE Recommendations and Suggestions of the Task Force on Jurisprudence set up by the Ministry of Panchayati Raj under the Chairpersonship of Hon’ble Smt V.S. Rama Devi

Elections Panchayat elections are very contentious. Regularising them in a five-yearly period will help avoid the judicial ill will. A uniform procedural pattern throughout the country, with similar officials having similar powers with regard to the conduct of the elections. The powers of the SEC are sacrosanct and the state governments should not tinker with their powers, lest such tinkering violates the constitutional mandate. The Returning Officers should be aware of their powers and responsibilities. Since a large number of cases pertain to recounting, countermanding and so on, the returning officers should know where to interfere and where to ask for help from the SEC. The election tribunal’s powers should be as close to that of a ‘court’ under the CPC as possible. This will prevent litigation regarding the jurisdiction of the tribunal, which are quite unnecessary. Now it is well settled that Article 243(O) cannot oust the writ jurisdiction of the HC. However, once the election process starts, the High courts will be too cautious to interfere. This is evident from the stay given by the Division Bench of the AP High court on the Single Bench decision, on the grounds that election process has already started. For deciding the quorum, if the total elected members are being considered, then the state legislature should make it clear how the majority is to be calculated. This means that they should put down precisely in the statute/rules whether only the valid votes would be considered or otherwise. As far as reservations to the Chief Functionary’s post are concerned, we tend to go with the Kerala High court’s view, to the effect that the office of the president of a Gram Panchayat can

be reserved for women belonging to SC/ST, as it is perfectly within the constitutional mandate and not because of the decision of the Calcutta High court. Though the electoral rolls prepared by the Election Commission of India for general elections may be adopted, updating the same for Panchayat elections shall be the sole responsibility of the SEC. It constitutes the backbone of any democratic process and has to be carefully done. In many parts of rural India, where people are unaware of the need to get their names included in the voters’ list, it is imperative that traditional methods like ‘Tom-Toming’ be employed. Also, they may take the assistance of social organisations to make the people aware of their duty to get themselves enrolled.

Suspension/removal Since both suspension and removal lead to temporary or permanent displacement of an elected functionary, it should have more stringent criteria and these criteria have to be strictly followed. On a trial basis, Panchayats may be given the power to do both these by a resolution. The majority required and other procedural stipulations for these resolutions may be different from that of a no-confidence motion, to the extent of avoiding confusion. If required, it could be provided in the statute that the collector or similar official may suspend/remove a functionary, but only after a resolution to the effect has been passed by the Panchayat. This would ensure that the process remains participatory without excessive intervention by executive authorities. The efforts made by some states like Orissa to completely take away a Collector’s power to suspend may be closely monitored and adopted if it succeeds.

No-confidence motion Specific provisions have to be given for removal and no-confidence motion. Both should not be bundled up.

160 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA The notice for the motion may ideally be given to the Chief Functionary or his deputy. If he does not call the meeting within a specified period, then the members must themselves be able to call the meeting. The quorum for such a meeting may be ‘1/3rd of the total elected members’ or a near-about figure. There should be a provision where the Collector or any other official should be intimated about the meeting. In the alternative, the Assam model may be resorted to if the state governments find it more conducive. The Assam model provides for a hierarchical Panchayat supervision pattern. Whatever mode is employed, the executive’s hold over Panchayat resolutions and motions has to be reduced. A revision/appeal provision may be included. The only other remedy would be to file a writ petition. Sometimes it is necessary to make a procedural provision mandatory so as to ensure effective functioning of the system. In such cases, it is suggested that a consequence be prescribed for the violation of the provision. So long as this consequence is prescribed, the court would construe the provision to be mandatory. Or else there is always a possibility of the court overlooking any non-compliance with a procedure. A gap of six months should be the maximum statutorily-stipulated period for the presentation of a fresh no-confidence motion, after the rejection of the first motion.

Disqualification Disqualification for non-attendance of meetings— it has to be provided in the Panchayat statute that the three consecutive meetings should be sufficiently spaced out to entail disqualification for nonattendance. The spacing may also be clearly indicated. For the two-child norm, states which have a provision to the effect should also clarify the position regarding the birth of twins, and such like, to avoid any conflicting decisions on the issue. The disqualification for violation of party whip is totally antithetical to the concept of Panchayati Raj. It was believed that the Panchayats would not suffer from party-based politics. Though party politics has become institutionalised at the

Panchayat level, we strongly recommend that Panchayat elections at all the three-tiers should not be held on party basis. This would automatically take out the need for whip and defection provisions from the statutes. Non-party elections would be conducive to stability and development in the Panchayat framework. Further, it would also avoid the rift between the state government and the Panchayat administrations especially if different parties are in power.

Miscellaneous Notification of villages/ delimitation of constituencies These should be done, as far as possible, during the tenure of a Panchayat, but much before elections are notified. This would help to avoid accusations of gerrymandering. These should be applicable only from the term of the next Panchayat. Though the state government has the final word, it is advisable that the people of the Panchayat be given the opportunity to give their views on the issue. This will give the whole process a sense of greater transparency driven by popular support. The power to delimit should be vested in the SEC. Power of Panchayats Panchayats should be given greater autonomy and there should be minimum interference by executive authorities. The resolutions passed by the Panchayats should be made non-reversible by executive authorities. An efficient social auditing mechanism will help to make the Panchayats more accountable to the people. This will also make the State Government a lot more relaxed while devolving funds and functions to the Panchayats. Parallel bodies like Village/Rural Development Committees, and so on, should be abolished and every development work should be undertaken by and through Panchayats. All the welfare projects should be executed through Panchayats. Source: Rajya Sabha Unstarred Q. No. 2479, answered on 14 December 2006.

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 161 Table 4A Number of Panchayats, elected representatives and elected women representatives in three-tiers of Panchayati Raj System—state-wise as on 1 November 2006 (Gram Panchayats) Sl. No.

Name of states

1

Andhra Pradesh

No. of Panchayats 21,913

No. of elected representatives 2,08,291

No. of elected women representatives 68,736

Percentage 33.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2

Arunachal Pradesh

1,639

6,485

2,561

39.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

Assam

2,487

23,453

8,977

38.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4

Bihar

8,463

1,17,397

64,152

54.6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5

Chhattisgarh

9,820

1,57,250

53,045

33.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

Goa

189

1,450

438

30.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7

Gujarat

13,819

1,09,209

36,403

33.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8

Haryana

6,187

66,256

23,897

36.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9

Himachal Pradesh

3,243

25,352

8,483

33.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

10

Jharkhand

3,746

NA

NA

NA

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11

Karnataka

5,652

91,402

39,318

43.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12

Kerala

999

16,139

6,020

37.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

13

Madhya Pradesh

23,051

3,88,829

1,31,671

33.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

14

Maharashtra

28,553

1,77,646

77,548

43.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

15

Manipur

165

1,707

625

36.6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

16

Orissa

6,234

93,781

33,602

35.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

17

Punjab

12,443

88,132

30,875

35.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

18

Rajasthan

9,188

1,13,637

40,044

35.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

19

Sikkim

166

905

366

40.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

20

Tamil Nadu

12,618

1,09,308

36,824

33.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

21

Tripura

513

5,352

1,852

34.6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

22

Uttar Pradesh

52,000

7,03,294

2,73,229

38.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

23

Uttaranchal

7,227

53,988

20,482

37.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

24

West Bengal

3,354

49,545

18,150

36.6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Union Territories

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

25

A&N Islands

67

759

261

34.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

26

Chandigarh

17

162

53

32.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

27

D&N Haveli

11

114

45

39.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

28

Daman & Diu

14

77

30

39.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

29

Lakshadweep

10

79

30

38.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

30

Pondicherry

98

913

330

36.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

2,33,886

26,10,912

Source: Response to Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 83, answered on 22 November 2006.

9,78,047

37.5

162 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Table 4B Number of Panchayats, elected representatives and elected women representatives in three-tiers of Panchayati Raj System—state-wise as on 1 November 2006 (Panchayat Samiti) Sl. No.

Name of state

No. of Panchayats

1

Andhra Pradesh

1,095

No. of elected representatives 14,617

No. of elected women representatives 4,919

Percentage 33.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2

Arunachal Pradesh

136

1,639

577

35.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

Assam

203

2,148

791

36.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4

Bihar

531

11,537

5,671

49.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5

Chhattisgarh

146

2,977

1,005

33.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

Goa

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7

Gujarat

224

4,161

1,394

33.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8

Haryana

119

2,833

962

34.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9

Himachal Pradesh

75

1,667

559

33.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

10

Jharkhand

211

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11

Karnataka

176

3,683

1,519

41.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12

Kerala

152

2,004

748

37.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

13

Madhya Pradesh

313

7,164

2,393

33.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

14

Maharashtra

349

2,877

1,407

48.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

15

Manipur

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

16

Orissa

314

6,227

2,188

35.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

17

Punjab

140

2,760

922

33.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

18

Rajasthan

237

5,494

2,108

38.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

19

Sikkim

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

20

Tamil Nadu

385

6,570

2,319

35.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

21

Tripura

23

299

106

35.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

22

Uttar Pradesh

820

65,668

24,673

37.6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

23

Uttaranchal

95

3,152

1,133

35.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

24

West Bengal

341

8,483

2,953

34.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Union Territories

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

25

A&N Islands

7

67

25

37.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

26

Chandigarh

1

15

6

40.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

27

D&N Haveli

–

–

–

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

28

Daman & Diu

–

–

–

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

29

Lakshadweep

–

–

–

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

30

Pondicherry

10

108

40

37.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

6,103

1,56,150

Source: Response to Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 83, answered on 22 November 2006.

58,418

37.4

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 163 Table 4C Number of Panchayats, elected representatives and elected women representatives in three-tiers of Panchayati Raj System—state-wise as on 1 November 2006 (Zilla Parishad) Sl. No.

Name of state

No. of Panchayats

1

Andhra Pradesh

22

No. of elected representatives 1,095

No. of elected women representatives 364

Percentage 33.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2

Arunachal Pradesh

14

136

45

33.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

Assam

21

390

135

34.6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4

Bihar

38

1,157

577

49.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5

Chhattisgarh

16

321

109

34.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

Goa

2

50

15

30.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7

Gujarat

25

817

274

33.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8

Haryana

19

384

135

35.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9

Himachal Pradesh

12

251

86

34.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

10

Jharkhand

22

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11

Karnataka

27

1,005

373

37.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12

Kerala

14

339

125

36.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

13

Madhya Pradesh

48

884

304

34.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

14

Maharashtra

33

1,423

658

46.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

15

Manipur

4

61

21

34.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

16

Orissa

30

854

296

34.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

17

Punjab

17

315

103

32.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

18

Rajasthan

32

1,040

391

37.6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

19

Sikkim

4

100

32

32.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

20

Tamil Nadu

29

656

227

34.6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

21

Tripura

4

82

28

34.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

22

Uttar Pradesh

70

2,698

1,122

41.6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

23

Uttaranchal

13

360

119

33.1

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

24

West Bengal

18

720

246

34.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Union Territories

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

25

A&N Islands

1

30

10

33.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

26

Chandigarh

1

10

3

30.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

27

D&N Haveli

1

11

4

36.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

28

Daman & Diu

1

20

7

35.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

29

Lakshadweep

1

22

8

36.4

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

30

Pondicherry

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

539

15,231

Source: Response to Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 83, answered on 22 November 2006.

5,817

38.2

164 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Table 4D Share of states in allocation of the first instalment of funds released by the 12th Finance Commission State

Panchayat Percentage

Andhra Pradesh

7.935

Municipalities Rs in crore 1,587.00

Percentage 7.480

Rs in crore 374.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Arunachal Pradesh

0.340

68.00

0.060

3.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Assam

2.630

526.00

1.100

55.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bihar

8.120

1,624.00

2.840

142.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chhattisgarh

3.075

615.00

1.760

88.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Goa

0.090

18.00

0.240

12.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gujarat

4.655

931.00

8.280

414.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Haryana

1.940

388.00

1.820

91.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Himachal Pradesh

0.735

147.00

0.160

8.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jammu & Kashmir

1.405

281.00

0.760

38.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jharkhand

2.410

482.00

1.960

98.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Karnataka

4.440

888.00

6.460

323.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kerala

4.925

985.00

2.980

149.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Madhya Pradesh

8.315

1,663.00

7.220

361.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maharashtra

9.915

1,983.00

15.820

791.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Manipur

0.230

46.00

0.180

9.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Meghalaya

0.250

50.00

0.160

8.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mizoram

0.100

20.00

0.200

10.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nagaland

0.200

40.00

0.120

6.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Orissa

4.015

803.00

2.080

104.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Punjab

1.620

324.00

3.420

171.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rajasthan

6.150

1,230.00

4.400

220.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sikkim

0.065

13.00

0.020

1.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tamil Nadu

4.350

870.00

11.440

572.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tripura

0.285

57.00

0.160

8.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttar Pradesh

14.640

2,928.00

10.340

517.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttaranchal

0.810

162.00

0.680

34.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

West Bengal

6.355

1,271.00

7.860

393.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

100.000

20,000.00

100.000

5,000.00

Source: Response to Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 4452, answered on 22 December 2005.

Table 4E Allocation of grants (in crore) to states for Panchayats (PRIs) recommended by 12th Finance Commission (2005–10) States Andhra Pradesh

Panchayats’ allocation for the period 2005–10 1,587.00

Annual allocation 317.40

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Arunachal Pradesh

68.00

13.60

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Assam

526.00

105.20

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bihar

1,624.00

324.80

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chhattisgarh

615.00

123.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Goa

18.00

3.60

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gujarat

931.00

186.20

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 4E continued )

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 165 (Table 4E continued ) States

Panchayats’ allocation for the period 2005–10

Haryana

Annual allocation

388.00

77.60

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Himachal Pradesh

147.00

29.40

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jammu & Kashmir

281.00

56.20

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jharkhand

482.00

96.40

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Karnataka

888.00

177.60

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kerala

985.00

197.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Madhya Pradesh

1,663.00

332.60

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maharashtra

1,983.00

396.60

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Manipur

46.00

9.20

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Meghalaya

50.00

10.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mizoram

20.00

4.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nagaland

40.00

8.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Orissa

803.00

160.60

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Punjab

324.00

64.80

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rajasthan

1,230.00

246.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sikkim

13.00

2.60

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tamil Nadu

870.00

174.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tripura

57.00

11.40

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttar Pradesh

2,928.00

585.60

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttaranchal

162.00

32.40

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

West Bengal

1,271.00

254.20

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

20,000.00

4,000.00

Source: Response to Lok Sabha Starred Question No. 28, answered on 22 November 2005.

Table 4F Statement showing state-wise release of grants as per EFC’s recommendations and their utilisation by Panchayati Raj Institutions Eleventh Finance Commission State

Andhra Pradesh

Allocation

76,024.15

Grants Shortfall released to SG (2000– 2005) as on 16 February 2005

60,819.32

15,204.83

Desired utilisation (Grant released along with desired matching contribution by State Govt.) 76,024.15

Matching contribution by State/ PRI as reported by SG

15,029.00

Released to PRIs by SG

46,690.00

Utilisation reported by State Government

53,293.27

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Arunachal Pradesh

2,784.25

1,948.97

835.28

2,436.21

IA

IA

IA

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Assam

23,344.75

11,672.37

11,672.38

14,590.46

IA

2,334.00

IA

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bihar

543.75

38,062.5

16,312.5

47,578.13

54,37.50

42,855.00

20,288.12

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chhattisgarh

21,001.95

21,001.95

0

26,252.44

5,000.00

2,24,500.20

2,23,2114

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Goa

927.25

463.63

463.62

579.54

IA9,833.53

IA

IA

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gujarat

34,804.35

32,607.39

2,196.96

40,759.24

2,941.75

34,196.57

33,823.61

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Haryana

14,708.75

14,708.75

0

18,385.94

1,200.00

14,708.75

14,708.75

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 4F continued )

166 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA (Table 4F continued ) Eleventh Finance Commission State

Himachal Pradesh

Allocation

Grants Shortfall released to SG (2000– 2005) as on 16 February 2005

6,566.9

5,910.21

656.69

Desired utilisation (Grant released along with desired matching contribution by State Govt.)

Matching contribution by State/ PRI as reported by SG

7,387.76

IA

Released to PRIs by SG

IA

Utilisation reported by State Government

5,918.92

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jammu & Kashmir

7,440.7

1,488.14

5,952.56

1,860.18

IA

IA

IA

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jharkhand

24,128.8

0

24,128.8

0.00

4,492.00

19,705.00

IA

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Karnataka

39,411.75

31,529.4

7,882.35

39,411.75

8,177.00

34,547.82

26,841

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kerala

32,962.9

32,962.9

0

41,203.63

12,477.20

57,967.70

43,444.51

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Madhya Pradesh

5,054.5

45,490.5

5,054.5

56,863.13

13,134.98

78,553.11

57,967.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maharashtra

65,672.9

59,105

6,567.29

73,882.01

42.08

546.00

51,667.58

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Manipur

1,877.15

92,560. 8

938.58

1,173.21

IA

628.00

546

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Meghalaya

2,560.8

2,048.64

512.16

2,560.80

157.12

785.55

189.73

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mizoram

785.55

706.99

78.56

883.74

IA

IA

785.55

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nagaland

1,286.65

643.33

643.32

804.16

8,639.70

42,574.90

IA

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Orissa

34,558.8

27,647.04

6,911.76

34,558.80

49,100.00

2,037.35

23,950.7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Punjab

15,463.55

9,278.13

6,185.42

11,597.66

6,136.85

30,684.25

1,472.77

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rajasthan

49,094.8

44,185.32

4,909.48

55,231.65

85.98

307.62

30,419.07

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sikkim

529.25

423.4

105.85

529.25

9,580.71

44,793.42

326.78

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tamil Nadu

46,611.8

41,950.62

4,661.18

52,438.28

357.60

1,422.97

44,793.67

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tripura

2,845.95

1,707.57

1,138.38

2,134.46

13,222.85

78,581.85

1,698.57

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttar Pradesh

1,16,713.35

93,370.67

23,342.68

1,16,713.34

2,129.93

10,851.77

71,292.62

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Uttaranchal

15,200

12,160

3,040

15,200.00

5,450.31

35,272.97

10,633.39

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

West Bengal

57,772.95

34,663.77

23,109.18

43,329.71

29,400.94

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

8,00,000.00

6,27,495.69

1,72,504.31

7,84,369.61

1,73,226.16

6,08,363.72

5,45,784.65

Source: Response to Rajya Sabha Starred Question No. 647, answered on 10 May 2005. Note: IA means Information Awaited.

Table 4G Payment of central assistance under backward region grants fund (BRGF) to states for annual plan 2006–07 Sl. No.

State/district

1

Andhra Pradesh

Instalment number

Amount (in rupees)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

i

Nalgonda

2nd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii

Mahboobnagar

2nd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii

Vijainagaram

2nd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

22,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2

Assam

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

i

Kokrajhar

2nd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii

N.C. Hills

2nd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

15,00,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 4G continued )

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 167 (Table 4G continued ) Sl. No.

State/district

3

Bihar

Instalment number

Amount (in rupees)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

i

Jehanabad

2nd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii

Kaimur

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii

Gaya

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

iv

Rohtash

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

v

Aurangabad

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

vi

Darbhanga

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

vii

Madhubani

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

viii

Muzaffarpur

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ix

Nalanda

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

x

Samastipur

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

xi

Patna

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

xii

Bhojpur

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

xiii

Vaishali

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

xiv

Katihar

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

xv

Nawadah

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

xvi

Purnea

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

xvii

Lakhisarai

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

xviii

Supaul

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

xix

Araria

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

xx

Jamul

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

150,00,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4

Chhattisgarh

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

i

Rajanandgaon

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii

Kanker

4th

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

15,00,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5

Himachal Pradesh

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

i

Chamba

4th

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii

Sirmaur

4th

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

15,00,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

Jharkhand

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

i

Simdega

4th

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii

Ranchi

4th

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii

Dhanbad

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

iv

Saraikela

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

v

Bokaro

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

vi

Hazaribagh

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

vii

Godda

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

viii

West Singhbhoom

2nd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

60,00,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 4G continued )

168 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA (Table 4G continued ) Sl. No.

State/district

7

Karnataka

Instalment number

Amount (in rupees)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

i

Gulberg

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii

Davengere

2nd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

15,00,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8

Kerala

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

i

Waynad

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9

Maharashtra

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

i

Gadchiroli

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii

Chandrapur

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii

Dhule

2nd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

22,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

10

Meghalaya

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

i

West Garo Hills

2nd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11

Nagaland

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

i

Mon

4th

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12

Rajasthan

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

i

Jhalawar

5th

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

13

Sikkim

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

14

Uttar Pradesh

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

i

Barabanki

4th

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii

Hamirpur

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii

Unnao

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

iv

Mahoba

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

v

Chandauli

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

vi

Pratapgarh

3rd

7,50,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

45,00,00,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Grand Total

3,97,50,00,000

Source: Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India (Letter No. N-11019/21/2006-Pol.1, Dated 19 October 2006).

Table 4H Backward districts initiative—release of funds As on 16 January 2007 (Rs in crore) Sl. No. State/district

1

Total amount to be released

Amount released in 2003–04

Amount Amount Amount Total released released released amount in 2004–05 in 2005–06 in 2006–07 released

Cumulative expenditure reported by State Govts.

UCs received

Andhra Pradesh (10)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Adilabad

45.00

12.50

2.50

7.50

7.50

30.00

19.50

19.50

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Warangal

45.00

12.50

10.00

7.50

7.50

37.50

27.10

27.10

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chittoor

45.00

5.00

2.50

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.50

7.50

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Karimnagar

45.00

5.00

10.00

7.50

7.50

30.00

21.11

21.11

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Khammam

45.00

5.00

10.00

0.00

7.50

22.50

13.54

13.54

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nizamabad

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

16.93

14.58

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 4H continued )

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 169 (Table 4H continued ) Sl. No. State/district

Nalgonda

Total amount to be released

45.00

Amount released in 2003–04 0.00

Amount Amount Amount Total released released released amount in 2004–05 in 2005–06 in 2006–07 released 7.50

0.00

7.50

15.00

Cumulative expenditure reported by State Govts. 7.55

UCs received

7.55

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mahboobnagar

45.00

0.00

7.50

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.62

7.62

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Vijainagaram

45.00

0.00

7.50

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.54

7.54

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Medak

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

12.37

12.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

450.00

40.00

72.50

37.50

75.00

225.00

140.76

138.41

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2

Gujarat (3)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dangs

45.00

12.50

10.00

7.50

7.50

37.50

27.87

23.06

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dahod

45.00

5.00

2.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

12.06

12.06

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Panchmahals

45.00

0.00

7.50

0.00

7.50

15.00

5.54

4.55

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

135.00

17.50

20.00

15.00

22.50

75.00

45.47

39.67

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3

Haryana (1)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sirsa

45.00

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.50 7.50

37.50

20.54

20.54

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4

Karnataka (4)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gulbarga

45.00

7.50

7.50

0.00

7.50

22.50

13.68

11.66

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bidar

45.00

5.00

2.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

13.56

13.56

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chitradurg

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

13.78

13.66

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Davengere

45.00

0.00

7.50

0.00

7.50

15.00

13.62

13.62

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

180.00

12.50

25.00

15.00

30.00

82.50

54.64

52.50

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5

Kerala (2)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Pallakad

45.00

15.00

7.50

15.00

7.50

45.00

36.00

36.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Wayanad

45.00

5.00

10.00

0.00

7.50

22.50

12.59

0.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

90.00

20.00

17.50

15.00

15.00

67.50

48.59

36.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6

Madhya Pradesh (10)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mandla

45.00

7.50

7.50

15.00

7.50 7.50

45.00

34.66

34.55

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Barwani

45.00

7.50

15.00

15.00

7.50

45.00

37.50

22.58

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Khargone

45.00

7.50

15.00

15.00

7.50

45.00

36.61

29.86

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Shahadol

45.00

0.00

22.50

15.00

7.50

45.00

37.45

27.27

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Satna

45.00

0.00

15.00

15.00

7.50

37.50

34.27

29.11

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sidhi

45.00

0.00

15.00

15.00

7.50 7.50

45.00

29.39

24.20

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Umaria

45.00

0.00

15.00

15.00

7.50 7.50

45.00

28.27

28.27

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Balaghat

45.00

0.00

15.00

15.00

7.50 7.50

45.00

27.23

19.54

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Seoni

45.00

0.00

15.00

15.00

7.50 7.50

45.00

27.17

27.17

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dindori

45.00

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.50 7.50

37.50

28.97

28.97

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

450.00

22.50

142.50

150.00

120.00

435.00

321.52

271.52

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 4H continued )

170 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA (Table 4H continued ) Sl. No. State/district

7

Total amount to be released

Amount released in 2003–04

Amount Amount Amount Total released released released amount in 2004–05 in 2005–06 in 2006–07 released

Cumulative expenditure reported by State Govts.

UCs received

Maharashtra (9)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gadchiroli

45.00

7.50

7.50

0.00

7.50

22.50

20.64

20.64

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bhandara

45.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

0.00

22.50

15.37

6.76

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chandrapur

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

13.62

13.62

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gondia

45.00

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.50

30.00

14.99

10.53

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dhule

45.00

0.00

7.50

0.00

7.50

15.00

6.49

4.56

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nanded

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50 7.50

30.00

21.91

21.91

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nandurbar

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

0.00

15.00

10.53

10.53

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hingoli

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

12.20

14.16

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ahmednagar

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

12.20

12.20

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

405.00

15.00

67.50

60.00

60.00

202.50

127.95

114.91

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

8

Rajasthan (3)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dungarpur

45.00

15.00

15.00

15.00

0.00

45.00

34.86

34.86

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Banswara

45.00

15.00

15.00

15.00

0.00

45.00

34.53

34.53

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jhalawar

45.00

5.00

17.50

7.50

7.50 7.50

45.00

35.60

28.73

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

135.00

35.00

47.50

37.50

15.00

135.00

104.99

98.12

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9

Tamil Nadu (5)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tiruvannamalai

45.00

15.00

15.00

15.00

0.00

45.00

36.00

36.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dindigul

45.00

5.00

17.50

15.00

7.50

45.00

35.27

35.27

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Cuddalore

45.00

0.00

15.00

15.00

0.00

30.00

27.26

27.26

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Naggapattinam

45.00

0.00

15.00

15.00

0.00

30.00

19.84

15.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sivganga

45.00

0.00

15.00

15.00

0.00

30.00

24.88

24.88

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

225.00

20.00

77.50

75.00

7.50

180.00

143.25

138.41

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

10

Uttar Pradesh (21)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sitapur

45.00

7.50

7.50

15.00

7.50

37.50

27.27

27.27

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Unnao

45.00

7.50

0.00

7.50

7.50

22.50

18.61

14.10

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rae Bareli

45.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

7.50 7.50

37.50

19.60

13.99

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sonbhadra

45.00

7.50

7.50

15.00

7.50

37.50

27.22

20.98

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hardoi

45.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

7.50

30.00

19.62

10.67

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Barabanki

45.00

5.00

10.00

7.50

7.50

30.00

19.50

18.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Fatehpur

45.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

7.50

37.50

27.68

22.71

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Banda

45.00

5.00

10.00

7.50

7.50

30.00

12.50

11.51

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chitrakoot

45.00

5.00

10.00

7.50

0.00

22.50

20.01

20.01

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mirzapur

45.00

5.00

10.00

7.50

7.50

30.00

19.50

15.54

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gorakhpur

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

12.01

11.37

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Azamgarh

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

14.06

14.06

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kushinagar

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

11.69

11.69

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 4H continued )

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 171 (Table 4H continued ) Sl. No. State/district

Jaunpur

Total amount to be released

45.00

Amount released in 2003–04 0.00

Amount Amount Amount Total released released released amount in 2004–05 in 2005–06 in 2006–07 released 7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

Cumulative expenditure reported by State Govts. 17.28

UCs received

17.28

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chandauli

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50 7.50 7.50

37.50

22.57

22.57

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kaushambi

45.00

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.50 7.50

37.50

19.62

18.05

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hamirpur

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50 7.50

30.00

26.26

26.26

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mahoba

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50 7.50

30.00

19.50

19.50

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lalitpur

45.00

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.50

30.00

20.26

13.70

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Pratapgarh

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

13.67

13.67

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jalaun

45.00

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.50

30.00

19.67

14.72

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

945.00

62.50

162.50

202.50

195.00

622.50

408.10

357.65

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11

West Bengal (8)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Purulia

45.00

12.50

2.50

7.50

0.00

22.50

20.26

20.26

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jalpaiguri

45.00

12.50

2.50

7.50

7.50

30.00

20.78

20.78

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

24 South Parganas

45.00

5.00

10.00

0.00

7.50

22.50

12.08

10.86

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Midnapur West

45.00

5.00

10.00

0.00

7.50

22.50

12.29

12.29

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

North Dinajpur

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

13.45

13.45

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

South Dinajpur

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

12.32

12.32

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bankura

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

15.00

15.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Birbhum

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

14.71

13.46

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

360.00

35.00

55.00

45.00

52.50

187.50

120.89

118.42

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12

Chhattisgarh (8)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dantewada

45.00

15.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

37.50

30.37

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bastar

45.00

15.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

37.50

27.26

27.26

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kawardha

45.00

5.00

2.50

15.00

7.50

30.00

19.69

19.69

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rajnandgaon

45.00

5.00

10.00

0.00

7.50 7.50

30.00

19.97

20.79

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jaspur

45.00

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.50

30.00

21.28

19.81

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bilaspur

45.00

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.50

30.00

22.88

22.50

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kanker

45.00

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.50 7.50

37.50

21.73

20.23

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sarguja

45.00

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.50

30.00

22.50

22.48

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

360.00

40.00

57.50

90.00

75.00

262.50

185.68

152.76

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

13

Bihar (21)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jehanabad

45.00

0.00

7.50

0.00

7.50

15.00

12.02

6.29

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kaimur

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

19.64

0.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gaya

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

21.01

21.01

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rohtash

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

21.24

21.24

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 4H continued )

172 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA (Table 4H continued ) Sl. No. State/district

Aurangabad

Total amount to be released

45.00

Amount released in 2003–04 0.00

Amount Amount Amount Total released released released amount in 2004–05 in 2005–06 in 2006–07 released 7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

Cumulative expenditure reported by State Govts. 19.75

UCs received

0.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Darbhanga

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50 7.50

30.00

19.54

19.54

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Madhubani

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

20.71

14.80

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Muzaffarpur

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

20.25

0.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nalanda

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

19.53

0.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Samastipur

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

19.57

19.57

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Patna

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50 7.50

30.00

21.57

21.57

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bhojpur

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

19.68

13.17

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Vaishali

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50 7.50

30.00

19.56

19.55

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sheohar

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

0.00

15.00

12.14

0.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Katihar

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

19.51

19.51

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nawadah

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50 7.50

30.00

21.33

19.49

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Purnea

45.00

0.00

7.50

0.00

7.50

15.00

19.55

19.55

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lakhisarai

45.00

0.00

7.50

0.00

7.50

15.00

20.18

20.18

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Supaul

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

19.76

19.76

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Araria

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

12.07

0.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jamui

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

19.58

5.66

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

945.00

0.00

157.50

135.00

180.00

472.50

398.19

260.89

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

14

Jharkhand (16)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Simdega

45.00

7.50

15.00

0.00

7.50 7.50 7.50

45.00

34.85

34.85

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gumla

45.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

7.50 7.50 7.50

45.00

27.35

27.35

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lohardagga

45.00

7.50

7.50

15.00

7.50 7.50

45.00

29.06

29.06

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Palamu

45.00

5.00

2.50

15.00

7.50 7.50 7.50

45.00

34.60

34.60

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Latehar

45.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

7.50

37.50

19.65

15.71

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bokaro

45.00

5.00

2.50

7.50

7.50 7.50

30.00

19.56

14.99

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chatra

45.00

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.50

30.00

27.82

27.82

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Koderma

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

12.38

4.68

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ranchi

45.00

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.50 7.50

37.50

27.30

27.30

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dhanbad

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50 7.50 7.50

37.50

27.14

27.14

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 4H continued )

Institutions of Local Governance: Hopes, Promises and Performance 173 (Table 4H continued ) Sl. No. State/district

Hazaribagh

Total amount to be released

45.00

Amount released in 2003–04 0.00

Amount Amount Amount Total released released released amount in 2004–05 in 2005–06 in 2006–07 released 7.50

7.50

7.50 7.50

30.00

Cumulative expenditure reported by State Govts. 27.17

UCs received

27.17

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Godda

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50 7.50

30.00

20.09

20.09

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Garhwa

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50 7.50

30.00

22.12

22.12

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Giridih

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

12.15

12.15

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Saraikela

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50

45.00

27.18

20.40

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

West Singhbhum

45.00

0.00

7.50

0.00

7.50 7.50 7.50

30.00

19.55

19.55

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

720.00

37.50

120.00

142.50

262.50

562.50

387.97

364.98

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

15

Orissa (5)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mayurbhanj

45.00

5.00

10.00

7.50

7.50

30.00

25.78

21.72

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ganjam

45.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

7.50

37.50

28.85

20.07

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gajpati

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

15.56

6.09

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Keonjhar

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

12.87

9.50

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sundargarh

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

19.11

13.38

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

225.00

10.00

42.50

45.00

37.50

135.00

102.17

70.76

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

16

Punjab (1)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hoshiarpur

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

16.31

14.21

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

17

Arunachal Pradesh (1)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Upper Subansiri

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

0.00

15.00

7.50

6.40

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

18

Assam (5)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kokrajhar

45.00

5.00

2.50

0.00

7.50

15.00

6.48

6.48

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

North Lakhimpur

45.00

5.00

2.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

12.47

12.47

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dheemaji

45.00

0.00

7.50

0.00

0.00

7.50

0.00

0.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

N.C. Hills

45.00

0.00

7.50

0.00

7.50

15.00

6.21

0.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Karbi-Anglong

45.00

0.00

7.50

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.50

7.50

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

225.00

10.00

27.50

7.50

30.00

75.00

32.66

26.45

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

19

Himachal Pradesh (2)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chamba

45.00

5.00

10.00

7.50

7.50

30.00

19.98

0.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sirmaur

45.00

0.00

15.00

7.50

7.50

30.00

20.52

0.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

90.00

5.00

25.00

15.00

15.00

60.00

40.50

0.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

20

Jammu & Kashmir (3)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Doda

45.00

5.00

10.00

7.50

7.50

30.00

20.03

20.03

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kupwara

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

13.69

13.69

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Poonch

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

0.00

15.00

12.94

12.94

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

135.00

5.00

25.00

22.50

15.00

67.50

46.66

46.66

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(Table 4H continued )

174 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA (Table 4H continued ) Sl. No. State/district

21

Total amount to be released

Amount released in 2003–04

Amount Amount Amount Total released released released amount in 2004–05 in 2005–06 in 2006–07 released

Cumulative expenditure reported by State Govts.

UCs received

Manipur (1)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tamenglong

45.00

7.50

7.50

15.00

7.50

37.50

27.45

27.45

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

22

Meghalaya (1)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

West Garo Hills

45.00

0.00

7.50

0.00

7.50

15.00

7.50

0.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

23

Mizoram (1)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lawngtlai

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

15.00

15.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

24

Nagaland (1)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mon

45.00

0.00

15.00

7.50

7.50 7.50

37.50

30.00

30.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

25

Tripura (1)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dhalai

45.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

7.50

30.00

20.87

20.87

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

26

Uttaranchal (3)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Champawat

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

12.00

12.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chamoli

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

12.21

12.21

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tehri Garhwal

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

22.50

12.09

12.09

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

135.00

0.00

22.50

22.50

22.50

67.50

36.30

36.30

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

27

Sikkim (1)

45.00

0.00

7.50

7.50

7.50 7.50

30.00

21.44

21.44

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

28

NABARD

9.30

0.00

1.08

3.24

1.65

5.97

0.00

0.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total

6,624.30

402.50

1,241.08

1,210.74

1,314.15

4,168.47

Source: Backward Region Grant Fund, Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India, www.Panchayat.gov.in.

2,912.90

2,480.32

Annexures 175

Annexures

TABLE 1 Human and income poverty in South Asian countries HDI rank

93

Countries

HPI-1 rank

HPI-1 value (%)

Sri Lanka

38

17.7

Probability at birth of surviving to age 40a (% age of cohort 2000– 2005) 4.3

Adult illiteracy rate (% ages 15 and older 2004)b

9.3

Population without sustainable access to an improved water source (% 2004)

MDG children under weight for age (% under age 15 1996– 2004)c

21

29

MDG PBIPL % $1 per day 1990– 2004c

5.6

MDG PBIPL % $2 per day 1990– 2004c

MDG PBIPL national poverty line 1990– 2003c

41.6

25.0

HPI-1 minus income poverty rankd

10

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

98

Maldives

36

16.9

11.4

3.7

17

30

–

–

–

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

126

India

55

31.3

16.6

39.0

14

47

34.7

79.9

28.6

–14

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

134

Pakistan

65

36.3

16.1

50.1

9

38

17.0

73.6

32.6

10

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

135

Bhutan

71

39.0

18.0

–

38

19

–

–

–

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

137

Bangladesh

65

44.2

15.9

–

26

48

36.0

82.8

49.8

5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

138

Nepal

68

38.1

17.6

51.4

10

48

24.1

68.5

30.9

4

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2006. Notes: Human Poverty Index (HPI-1). Population Below Income Poverty Line (PBIPL). a Data refer to the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40, multiplied by 100. b Data refer to national literacy estimates from censuses or surveys conducted between 2000 and 2005, unless otherwise specified. Due to differences in methodology and timeliness of underlying data, comparisons across countries and over time should be made with caution. For more details, see www.uis.unesco.org. c Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified. d Income poverty refers to the share of the population living on less than $1 a day. All countries with an income poverty rate of less than 2 per cent were given equal rank. The rankings are based on countries for which data are available for both indicators. A positive figure indicates that the country performs better in income poverty than in human poverty, a negative the opposite.

176 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA TABLE 2 Commitment to health: Resources, access and services in South Asian countries HDI rank

Countries

93

Sri Lanka

HE public (% of GDP 2003)

1.6

HE private (% of GDP 2003)

1.9

HE (per capita PPP US$ 2003)

MDG OYOFI against tuberculosis (% 2004)

MDG OYOFI against measles (% 2004)

Children with diarrhoea receiving oral rehydration and continued feeding (% under age 5 1996– 2004)b

MDG contraceptive prevalence ratea (% of married women ages 15–49 1996– 2004)b

MDG births attended by skilled health personnel (% 1996– 2004)b

Physicians (per 1,00,000 people 1990– 2004)b

121

99

96

–

70

96

55

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

98

Maldives

5.5

0.7

364

98

97

–

42

70

92

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

126

India

1.2

3.6

82

73

56

22

48d

43

60

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

134

Pakistan

0.7

1.7

48

80

67

33c

28

–

74

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

135

Bhutan

2.6

0.5

59

92

87

–

19

c

37

5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

137

Bangladesh

1.1

2.3

68

95

77

35

58

13

26

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

138

Nepal

1.5

3.8

64

85

73

43

39

15

21

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2006. Notes: HE: Health Expenditure. OYOFI: One Year Old Fully Immunised. a Data usually refer to women aged 15–49 who are married or in union; the actual age range covered may vary across countries. b Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified. c Data are from UNICEF 2005. Data refer to a period other than that specified. d Excluding the state of Tripura.

TABLE 3 Water, sanitation and nutritional status in South Asian countries HDI rank

93

Countries

Sri Lanka

MDG MDG PSAS PSAS (% 1990) (% 2004)

69

91

MDG PSAIWS (% 1990)

68

MDG PSAIWS (% 2004)

79

MDG PU (% of total 1990– 92)a

28

MDG PU (% of total 2001– 03)a

22

MDG children under weight for age (% under age 5, 1996– 2004)b 29

Children under hight for age (% under age 5 1996– 2004)b 14

Infant with low birth weight (% 1996– 2004)b

22

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

98

Maldives

–

59

96

83

17

11

30

25

22

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

126

India

14

33

70

86

25

20

49

45

30

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

134

Pakistan

37

59

83

91

24

23

38

37

19

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

135

Bhutan

–

70

–

62

–

–

19

40

15

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

137

Bangladesh

20

39

72

74

35

30

48

43

30

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

138

Nepal

11

35

70

90

20

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2006. Notes: PSAS: Population with Sustainable Access to Improved Sanitation. PSAIWS: Population with Sustainable Access to Improved Water Sources. PU: Population Undernourished. a Data refer to the average for the years specified. b Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified.

17

48

51

21

Annexures 177 TABLE 4 Commitment to education: Public spending in South Asian countries HDR Countries rank

93

Sri Lanka

PEE as % of GDP 1991

PEE as % of GDP 2002– 04

PEE as of total government expenditure 1991

PEE as of total government expenditure 2002–04

CPEEL prepreliminary and primary 1991

CPEEL CPEEL presecondary preliminary 1991 and primary 2002–04

CPEEL secondary 2002– 04

CPEEL tertiary 1991

CPEEL tertiary 2002– 04

3.2

–

8.4

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

98

Maldives

7.0

6.1

16.0

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

126

India

3.7

3.3

12.2

10.7

–

–

–

–

–

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

134

Pakistan

2.6

2.0

7.4

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

135

Bhutan

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

137

Bangladesh 1.5

2.2

10.3

15.5

–

39.0

–

49.5

11.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

138

Nepal

2.0

3.4

8.5

14.9

–

53.4

–

27.5

–

12.4

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2006. Notes: PEE: Public Expenditure on Education. CPEEL: Current Public Expenditure on Education by Level (percentage of all levels).

TABLE 5 Priorities in public spending in South Asian countries HDI Countries rank

93

Sri Lanka

Public expenditure on health (% of GDP 2003–04)

Public expenditure on education (% of GDP 1991)

Public expenditure on education (% of GDP 2002–04)

Military expenditure (% of GDP 1990)

Military expenditure (% of GDP 2004)

Total debt service (% of GDP 1990)

Total debt service (% of GDP 2004)

1.6

3.2

–

2.1

2.8

4.8

3.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

98

Maldives

5.5

7.0

8.1

–

–

4.1

4.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

126

India

1.2

3.7

3.3

3.2

3.0

2.6

2.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

134

Pakistan

0.7

2.6

2.0

5.8

3.4

4.8

4.5

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

135

Bhutan

2.6

–

–

–

–

1.8

1.8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

137

Bangladesh

1.1

1.5

2.2

1.0

1.2

2.5

1.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

138

Nepal

1.5

2.0

3.4

0.9

1.7

1.9

1.7

MDG seats in parliament held by women (% of total) lower or single houses 2006

MDG seats in parliament held by women (% of total) upper house or senate 2006

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2006.

TABLE 6 Women’s political participation in South Asian Countries HDI Countries rank

93

Sri Lanka

Year women received rights (to vote)

Year women received rights (to stand for election)

Year first women elected (E), or appointed (A) to parliament

Women in government at ministerial level (% of total 2005)

1931

1931

1947 E

10.3

MDG seats in parliament held by women (% of total) lower or single houses 1990 5

4.9

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

98

Maldives

1932

1932

1979 E

11.8

6

12.0

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

126

India

1935, 1950

1935, 1950

1952 E

3.4

5

8.3

11.2

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

134

Pakistan

1935, 1947

1935, 1947

1973 E

5.6

10

21.3

17.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

135

Bhutan

1953

1953

1975 E

0

2

9.3

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

137

Bangladesh

1935, 1972

1935, 1972

1973 E

8.3

10

14.8

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

138

Nepal

1951

1951

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2006.

1952 A

7.4

6

5.9

16.7

178 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA TABLE 7 The present situation of poverty in South Asian countries Countries

Bangladesh

BCI GINI Index ranking (out of 162 countries) Year %

Population living with less than USD 1 a day Year

%

Year

%

Year

%

Year

%

159

2000

36.0

2000

82.8

2000

49.8

2000

9.0

2000

31.8

Population living with less than USD 2 a day

Population below the national poverty line

Share of poorest quintile consumption index

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bhutan

139

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

India

128

2000

32.5

2000

34.7

2000

79.9

2000

28.6

2000

8.9

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maldives

113

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nepal

157

2004

47.4

2004

24.1

2004

68.5

2003

30.9

2004

6.0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Pakistan

152

2002

30.6

2002

17.0

2002

73.6

1998

32.6

2002

9.3

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sri Lanka

–

2000

33.2

2002

5.6

2002

41.6

1995

25.0

2000

8.3

Source: Social Watch Report, 2006. Note: Basic Capabilities Index (BCI).

TABLE 8 Food security in South Asian countries Countries

Bangladesh

BCI ranking (out of 162 countries)

159

Undernourishment

1990–92 (%)

2000–2002 (%)

35

30

Estimated low birth weight

Progress or regression –>

Under-5 children malnutrition (weight for age)

During 1998–2004 (%)

1990 (%)

36

66

2004 (%) 52

Progress or regression ––>

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bhutan

139

–

–

–

15

–

–

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

India

128

25

21

–>

30

64

47

––>

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maldives

113

–

–

–

22

–

–

-

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nepal

157

20

17

–>

21

–

48

-

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Pakistan

152

24

20

–>

19

40

38

–>

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sri Lanka

–

28

22

–>

Source: Social Watch Report, 2006. Notes: Basic Capabilities Index (BCI), –> Slight progress, ––> Significant progress.

22

37

29

––>

Annexures 179 TABLE 9 Education in South Asian countries Countries

BCI Literacy 15–24 ranking years old out of 162 countries 1990 2005 Progress (%) (%) or regression

Bangladesh 159

42.0

51.5

–>

Primary education enrolment ratio (net)

Children Secondary education reaching enrolment ratio 5th (net) grade

1991 (%)

2004 (%)

Progress or regression

2003 (%)

1991 (%)

2004 Progress 1991 2004 Progress (%) or (%) (%) or regression regression

–

–

–

52.6

42.7

48.0

–>

Territory education enrolment ratio (gross)

5.8

6.5

–>

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Bhutan

139

–

–

–

–

–

–

91.0

–

–

–

–

–

-

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

India

128

64.3

76.3

––>

83.3

87.4

––>

83.8

–

–

–

6.0

11.5

–>

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Maldives

113

98.1

99.4

–>

98.3

89.7

<–

–

31.7

51.3

––>

–

0.2

–

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nepal

157

46.6

66.0

––>

–

65.7

–

64.9

-

–

–

5.6

5.6

!!

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Pakistan

152

47.4

61.3

––>

33.4

66.2

––>

–

–

–

–

3.4

3.0

!!

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sri Lanka

–

95.1

97.4

!!

–

98.6

–

–

–

–

–

4.3

–

–

Source: Social Watch Report, 2006. Notes: Basic Capabilities Index (BCI), –> Slight progress, ––> Significant progress, <– Slight regression, <–– Significant regression, !! Stagnant.

180 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA

INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED Centre for Youth and Social Development (CYSD) works with the deprived and the underprivileged towards the goal of people-centred development. Its participatory development action enables people to pursue their need fulfilment through their own institutional means. Its training and capacity building support to development organisations produced a cascade of effective learning at the grass roots and increasing professional efficiency in development action at all levels. By building up alliances with agencies of shared intent, it attempts to bring on a pro-poor agenda in the mainstream of development policies and practices. National Centre for Advocacy Studies (NCAS) is a membership-based organisation that has been working on various people-centred advocacy initiatives across the country. NCAS has a decade-long history of training people on advocacy and undertaking people-centred advocacy initiatives. NCAS works on various socio-economic rights essentially from the perspective of the marginalised. NCAS is also involved in Media Advocacy initiative, Advocacy Learning and Praxis and Governance and Advocacy. The theme in NCAS work is bridging people and building ideas. NCAS sees the Social Watch Process as an essential component towards this end. Samarthan Centre for Development Support promotes participatory governance and development. The organisation is committed to strengthen democratic processes, building leadership of Women, Dalit, Tribals and other disadvantaged section. Civil society organisations have a critical role as social change agent, therefore promotion support and strengthening civil society institutions in development is also key endeavour of Samarthan. Samarthan also believes in building examples of participatory development and governance, therefore, is actively involved in field action at the grass roots to build people’s institutions.

SOCIAL WATCH INDIA 181

NATIONAL SOCIAL WATCH COALITION PARTNERS Madhya Pradesh: Samarthan, Bhopal and Madhya Pradesh Voluntary Action Network (MPVAN), Bhopal. Samarthan promotes participatory governance and development thus encouraging leadership of Women, Dalit, Tribals and other disadvantaged sections of the society. Orissa: Centre for Youth and Social Development (CYSD), Bhubaneshwar works towards achieving people-centred development for the deprived and under privileged through direct intervention as well as building up alliances with agencies of shared intent. Maharashtra: Youth for Voluntary Action (YUVA), Mumbai, implements its development agenda by engaging with local, community-based organisations strengthening existing organisations to respond effectively to local development issues. Vikas Sahyog Pratisthan (VSP), Mumbai, is a group of voluntary organisations working for the upliftment of poor and deprived sections of society with its area of expertise being in nature farming, water conservation, promoting role of youth in village governance and cooperatives. Karnataka: (Karnataka Social Watch) Rejuvenate India Movement (RIM), Bangalore, which is a conglomerate of 11 non-government agencies. It works towards effecting positive changes by generating actions that are practically effective and morally compelling while upholding the principles of participative democracy, genuine volunteerism and self-empowerment. Community Development Foundation (CDF), Bangalore, believes in collective efforts to bring about meaningful change and sustainable development in adult literacy, children and human rights, gender issues, education and health aspects. Tamil Nadu: Tamil Nadu Social Watch (TNSW), Chennai, is a resource-cum-research centre involved in social public policy monitoring and lobbying at the state level. The major contributions have been Dalit budgeting and in budget awareness in civil society along with the Tamil Nadu Social Development Report 2000. Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), Gandhigram Rural University, Dindigul district, Tamil Nadu People’s Forum for Social Development (TNPFSD), Chennai. Andhra Pradesh: (AP Social Watch) Centre for World Solidarity (CWS), Hyderabad, is a support organization with partners in nearly five states working with a rights-based development approach towards Panchayati Raj, Minorities, Tribal Rights, Education, Forestry, Alternative Agriculture and Natural Resource Management, Human Rights Issues and women’s rights and gender mainstreaming. Dalit Bahujan Shramik Union (DBSU), Hyderabad, working with Dalit organisations on Dalit issues and rights. Uttar Pradesh: Uttar Pradesh Voluntary Action Network (UPVAN), Lucknow, is a conglomerate of nearly 225 vibrant civil society organisations of UP. It operates through the advocacy resource centre, networking and alliance-building centre, gender resource and information resource centre and takes up issues for advocacy which affects the voluntary organisations and their struggle to ensure justice and equity for the marginalised.

182 SOCIAL WATCH INDIA Bihar: (Bihar Social Watch) Vidyasagar Samajik Suraksha Seva Evam Shodh Sansthan, Asian Development Research Institute. Chhattisgarh: (Chhattisgarh Social Watch) Mayaram Surjan Foundation (MSF), Raipur, runs a research and documentation centre and conducts programmes to build up grass-root democratic values and practices, promote value-based and development-oriented journalism and prepare youth to take lead in building and safeguarding a pluralistic society. Gramin Yuva Abhikram (GYA), Raipur, works in the areas of community empowerment, campaign for people’s right to water, campaign for accountable governance, media advocacy, women empowerment apart from networking with like-minded agencies and policy research. Rajasthan: (Rajasthan Social Watch) Centre for Community Economics and Development Consultants Society (CECOEDECON), Institute of Development Studies, Pratham and so on in Jaipur. West Bengal: Institute for Motivating Self Employment (IMSE) along with Forum of Voluntary Organisations, Kolkata, West Bengal. The Forum is comprised of 98 voluntary organisations representing Christian Missionaries, Leftist Social Action Groups, Human Rights Groups and so on. The Forum apart from supporting the achievement of food sovereignty of the people and their rights over land, water, forest and seed also opposes imperialist globalisation. Kerala: Representatives of the Kerala Sastra Sahitya Parishad, Centre for Development Studies, Indian Institute of Information Technology and Management, led by C. Gouridasan Nair, Special correspondent, The Hindu, Thiruvananthapuram. Jharkhand: Currently coordinated by National Social Watch Coalition supported by APWAD, SPAR, Gene Campaign, Agragati and so on in Jharkhand. SANSAD: (South Asian Network for Social and Agricultural Development), aimed at making South Asia free from hunger and poverty and taking global and regional initiative for sustainable agricultural and rural development and human dignity aimed at putting collective pressure on policy making. Concern Worldwide (Bhubaneshwar): We acknowledge the support of Concern Worldwide (India) for their generous support in production of this report. Concern’s core focus in India is on sustainable livelihood and disaster responses, mitigation and preparedness in ensuring concrete and tangible benefits to poor and marginalised communities in collaboration with international and local partners who share the vision to create just and democratic societies where the poor can exercise their fundamental right. We acknowledge the support of NOVIB, the Netherlands, for their generous support in the production of the report.