Cliffs Notes on Locke's Concerning Human Understanding

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LOCKE'S ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING Notes including • • • • • • •

Life and Background of the Author Introduction to the Novel A Brief Synopsis Critical Commentaries Glossary Essay Topics and Review Questions Selected Bibliography

by Charles H. Patterson, Ph.D. Department of Philosophy University of Nebraska

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LIFE AND BACKGROUND OF THE AUTHOR It has often been said that a person's philosophy is merely a reflection of personal temperament and the peculiar circumstances that have shaped the course of life. While this statement may not be regarded as a complete explanation, no one can reasonably doubt that the activities in which a person has been engaged throughout the greater portion of his life will have a considerable bearing on the views expressed in his later and more mature years. This is especially true in the case of John Locke, for he was a man who was deeply involved in the affairs of his country, as well as one whose judgment was held in high esteem by the more prominent scholars of his day. It is for this reason that some familiarity with his life and the times in which he lived is essential for an understanding of his philosophical works. Information concerning the early years of his life is rather meager, but we do know that he was born on August 29, 1632, in the village of Wrington in Somersetshire, not many miles from Bristol, England. He was the elder of two sons in a family that was known for its sympathies with the Puritans and the Roundheads at a time when political affairs in England were characterized by internal strife and uncertainty with reference to the future. The father of the family became a captain in the army of the Parliament, and in the course of the events that took place during this turbulent period in English history, his estate was greatly reduced so that only a minor portion of what was once of considerable size was left to be inherited by the sons. When John Locke was fourteen years of age, he was placed in Westminster school, where he remained for six years. In 1652, he was granted a scholarship in Christ Church in Oxford, and it was there that he made his home for a period of fourteen years. He was not altogether happy with the type of instruction that he received at Oxford. The school had for a long time been under the influence of the Aristotelian tradition, and Locke resented the idea of being told what he should think. He is said to have reported that while there, he discovered that what was called general freedom was general bondage. His attitude is illustrated in the fact that he refused to take notes on the lectures that were given, and he did not participate in the debates that were being held since he considered them to be for the most part idle disputations about topics of no practical use. He preferred sticking to facts rather than dealing with abstractions. The year of the Restoration in England was an important one for Locke. It was during this year that his father died, and the small estate which he left was sufficient to enable the son to pursue studies along the lines of his varied interests. It was a time when Calvinistic theology was ascendant in England, and Locke's interest in religion led him to give some consideration to the idea of preparing for the ministry. The idea was soon abandoned, primarily because of the dogmatic character of the instruction given to those who expected to follow that profession. Locke's sympathies with the idea of free inquiry persuaded him to pursue studies along other lines. However, his interest in the field of religion continued throughout the later years of his life, as evidenced by the publication of his book entitled The Reasonableness of Christianity. Experimental research was fashionable in England at the time, and the methods used in the pursuit of these investigations were more in line with Locke's temperament. He became familiar with what was going on in these areas, and he resolved to do something on his own to extend the domain of human knowledge. It was during these years that he became acquainted with the philosophy of René Descartes, whose writings had been published about twenty years earlier. Although the method used by Descartes was something of which Locke became critical in his later years, it seems highly probable that the purpose and content of these writings had much to do with the objective that Locke had in mind when he wrote his own book about human understanding. Descartes had said that the question concerning the limitations of human knowledge was one that "any man who loves truth must

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examine once at least in his life; since the adequate investigation of it comprehends all intellectual method and the organon of human knowledge." He had said further, in the same connection, that "nothing is more absurd than to argue about the mysteries of the universe without consideration of the relative competency of the human mind." Experiments in the field of chemistry occupied Locke's attention for some time, and he became especially interested in medicine. He never became a practitioner, but it was his close association with a physician that led to his first meeting with Lord Ashley, who later became the first Earl of Shaftesbury. This acquaintance developed into a friendship that became a significant factor in Locke's later career. Locke's studies included more than an investigation of the experimental sciences, for he became very much interested in the fields of education and in the problems that have to do with government. Both of these interests bore fruit in his later years and led to important publications, the merits of which have been recognized by succeeding generations of students. During the winter of 1665, Locke spent several months in the diplomatic service at the court of the Elector of Brandenburg in Germany. It was shortly after his return to England that he became acquainted with the Earl of Shaftesbury, and the friendship that developed between them made possible a series of conversations having to do with academic subjects and contributing much to the philosophical views that were expressed in Locke's later writings. Locke served as secretary to the earl and was on such intimate terms with the family that he is said to have become "the factotum of the most striking political personage in the reign of Charles the Second." It was during this period that he came in contact with several of the leading scientists of England and was held by them in such high esteem that one of their number wrote concerning Locke that he was "a man whom, in the acuteness of his intellect, in the steadiness of his judgment, and in the simplicity, that is, in the excellence of his manners, I confidently declare to have, amongst the men of our time, few equals and no superior." It was at the close of a series of discussions that took place among a small group of friends who were accustomed to meet regularly that Locke began the writing of what eventually became the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. It began in a small way, but he tells us that what he had intended to put down on a single sheet of paper kept on growing and developing in his own mind until it became a huge volume of writing. His reflections on the subject matter that was being treated did not take place all at once but continued with interruptions over a period of more than twenty years. The interruptions included two periods of residence on the continent. The first one took place between the years 1675 and 1679. The Earl of Shaftesbury had fallen into disfavor with the ruling powers, and Locke found it expedient to go to France, where he stayed for approximately four years. His return to England did not mean for him a peaceful existence, for the government of the country was in a state of turmoil and Locke had been too deeply involved in political affairs to be undisturbed by the events that were taking place. In 1683, he became a voluntary exile in Holland, which had long been known as a place where refugees could abide in safety. He stayed in Holland for five years and returned to England shortly after the revolution of 1688 and the accession to the throne of William and Mary. In fact, Locke is said to have returned to London on the same ship that carried the new queen. Because he stood in high favor with the new administration, he was offered a post of honor in the new government, which he declined to accept. In 1689, he began his residence in Oates in the household of Sir Francis Masham. His circle of friends included the great scientist Sir Isaac Newton, with whom he carried on long series of conversations. The results of these conversations can be seen in several of Locke's later publications. Public recognition of Locke's achievements is evidenced by the fact that he was made a member of the Royal Society. The last fourteen years of his life were occupied chiefly by his numerous writings.

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The Essay Concerning Human Understanding was published for the first time about 1690. It attracted the attention of scholars not only in England but on the continent as well. It became the subject of much scholarly discussion, and books were soon to appear in which Locke's views were subjected to analyses and criticisms. Some of these criticisms led to certain modifications and additions in the three later editions that appeared while the author was still living. Although the Essay Concerning Human Understanding is still recognized as Locke's greatest literary achievement, his interests were by no means confined to a discussion of the problem of knowing. He was deeply concerned with governmental issues and the role of education in human society. His publications included two Treatises on Government, three Letters on Toleration, Thoughts on Education, The Reasonableness of Christianity, and An Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul's Epistles. He died in 1704.

INTRODUCTION TO THE NOVEL An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke is one of the great books of the Western world. It has done much to shape the course of intellectual development, especially in Europe and America, ever since it was first published in 1690. Few books have ever been written that have so adequately represented the spirit of an age or left so great an imprint on so many different fields of inquiry. Although the main subject matter of the Essay is primarily a philosophical one, it has had a direct bearing on such areas of thought as education, government, ethics, theology, and religion. Indeed, there are few disciplines in the field of higher education that have not been influenced to some extent by the ideas set forth in this monumental work. The importance of the book is well indicated by the number of editions that have been published. Between the time of its first publication and the author's death, four editions had been printed, and since that time more than forty editions have been published. Scholars in each succeeding generation have become acquainted with its contents, and in many instances they have made replies in book form to the arguments presented in it. Because the Essay deals with a subject that is of vital concern to every field of knowledge and because the author was held in high esteem by authors and men of affairs who were contemporary with him, the book became at once the subject of criticism and the occasion for many vigorous controversies. This was in a sense what Locke had hoped his writing would accomplish. He was not a dogmatist, and he made no pretense of possessing a store of wisdom to be passed on to others. Rather, his purpose was to stimulate others to think for themselves, and what he had to say was intended as a means toward that end. In fact, it was one of Locke's major ambitions in all of his writings to dispel the sources of intolerance and encourage people to promote the cause of freedom in their thinking as well as in their actions. Many of the freedoms of which we boast in the Western world today are due in no small measure to the work of this man. Among the critics who have expressed their views about Locke's work in writing, one finds both praise and condemnation. This is due in part to the fact that not all of them have interpreted what he had to say in the same way. Each critic has viewed the work from the perspective of his own experience and understanding. Each one has come to it with his own presuppositions, and these have been bound to influence the judgments made concerning it. To some extent, this is an unavoidable procedure, and one must deal with it in the best way that he can.

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The Essay Concerning Human Understanding was the first work of its kind to appear in modern times. It was an attempt on the part of the author to make a serious and systematic inquiry in the problems of epistemology. It marked an important beginning, for once the inquiry had been brought to the attention of a reputable group of scholars, it became the central issue in the philosophical discussions that took place during the next one and one-half centuries. In fact, the movement that began with Locke was continued by Berkeley, Leibnitz, and other writers of distinction. It reached in one sense a culmination in the philosophies of Hume and Kant. After Kant, interest in epistemology was replaced to a considerable extent by other topics, which dominated the field until the early part of the twentieth century. After the close of the First World War, a new interest was developed in questions concerning the nature and limitations of human knowledge, and once more the problems that were discussed in Locke's book were given consideration by scholars who were working in many different areas of human experience. While it is true that many of Locke's conclusions are rejected by philosophers of the present time, the spirit of his inquiry may still be regarded as a dominant characteristic of the thinking of the present day. Any adequate appreciation of Locke's work must take into account the circumstances under which the book was written, as well as the major objective that the author had in mind. Many of the criticisms that have been written about it appear to have overlooked one or both of these points. For example, it has been fairly common among Locke's critics to call attention to the fact that incongruities can be found among the different sections of his work. That instances of this kind can be found when one reads the entire book must be admitted by anyone who has read it with care. But at least a partial explanation for this fact can be seen in the way in which it was composed. The Essay was not the product of a continuous period of writing. It was produced a little at a time over a period of more than twenty years. Obviously, some changes and modifications were bound to take place as Locke gave added consideration to the questions that were involved. Besides, he made it abundantly clear throughout the Essay that he had no intention of speaking the last or final word on the subject. All that he intended to do was to set down the best thoughts that had come to him at the time of his writing. This he did with the hope that it would stimulate others to carry on a similar inquiry in their own minds. In an epistle to the reader which forms a kind of preface to the book, Locke tells us how it was that he became interested in this type of inquiry. It all began in a series of discussions that took place in the company of a small group of friends who had been meeting at regular intervals to exchange with one another their views on important questions of the day. Evidently the topics for discussion included such subjects as science, morals, religion, and their relation to one another and to other disciplines. The fact that the members of the group seldom reached any agreement among themselves and often failed to reach any definite conclusions at all caused him to wonder just what benefits, if any, these discussions might have. The more he thought about it, the clearer it became to him that any progress which might be achieved along these lines could come about only by giving careful consideration to the possibilities and the limitations of the human mind. If one could find out what it is possible for human minds to know and what are those areas that cannot be known, then one need not waste time on those questions that cannot be answered. Again, it would be most helpful to find out those areas, if any, of which we can have certain or absolute knowledge, as well as those areas in which we can never obtain more than probable knowledge. It was the pursuit of these inquiries that led to the writing of the Essay. The task that he set out to accomplish was far more difficult than he was aware at first, and reflection on the issues involved over long periods of time led to many changes and modifications.

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The Essay as a whole is a lengthy piece of work, and it is not unusual for those who read it at the present time to become lost in the detailed accounts that are included in it. Many of the words that are used are ambiguous in their meaning, and the ways in which they are used are not always consistent with one another. Further difficulties arise from the fact that words do not necessarily have the same meaning today that they did at the time when Locke wrote. His purpose was the very practical one of helping people to think more clearly about the problems of everyday living, and as a means toward this end he used language in the sense in which it was generally understood at that time. Technicalities in connection with the use of language with which we are familiar at the present time were not recognized by the average reader in Locke's day, and this accounts for some of the misunderstandings that have occurred in connection with the interpretation of his writings on the part of more recent critics. But these difficulties are relatively minor and should in no way obscure the major objective that Locke had hoped to accomplish. The primary purpose that seems to have inspired all of Locke's major writings was his intense devotion to the cause of human liberty. He was unalterably opposed to tyranny in any of the forms in which it had been manifested. This included not only political tyranny but moral and religious tyranny as well. The age in which he lived had witnessed the results of tyranny on the part of both political and religious institutions. In the field of government, tyranny had been supported by the theory of the divine right of kings. In a somewhat similar manner, the authority and prestige of the church had been used to coerce individuals into acceptance of what they were told to believe and to do. To all of these devices for controlling the minds and activities of men, Locke was opposed. His views found eloquent expression in his Treatises on Government and his Letters on Toleration. The same objective, although expressed in a more indirect fashion, can be attributed to the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Because the freedom of the individual to think and to act for himself necessarily entails a sense of responsibility to exercise these freedoms in the best possible manner, anything that would help to prepare people for this task would be in order. As Locke saw it, nothing would help them more in this respect than a better understanding of the processes that enable human minds to arrive at truth. Furthermore, an appreciation of the limitations of the human mind would encourage an attitude of tolerance toward individuals holding different and conflicting opinions. Tolerance in human society would tend to be a safeguard against persecution and the evils that are necessarily associated with it.

A BRIEF SYNOPSIS The Essay Concerning Human Understanding begins with a short epistle to the reader and a general introduction to the work as a whole. Following this introductory material, the Essay is divided into four parts, which are designated as books. Book I has to do with the subject of innate ideas. This topic was especially important for Locke since the belief in innate ideas was fairly common among the scholars of his day. The belief was as old as the dialogues of Plato, in which the doctrine of a world of ideas or universals had been expressed. Plato had taught that ideas are latent in the human mind and need only the stimulation of sense perception to bring them to the level of consciousness. Many of the philosophers of the so-called rationalistic school followed Plato in this respect. In the era that preceded Locke, Descartes had insisted that the criterion of truth was to see so clearly and distinctly that it could not be doubted. For him the source of all knowledge was to be found in these ideas, which because they were innate, were also true. From them all other truths could be derived by making logical inferences. Locke saw many of the difficulties that follow from this position, and it occurred to him that these could be avoided if it could be shown conclusively that innate ideas do not exist. Any

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attempt to further the cause of human knowledge must begin by showing the falsity of this position. This is what he attempted to do in Book I. A more affirmative aspect of this theory of knowledge was set forth in Book II. Having stated his reasons for rejecting the belief in innate ideas, he now goes on to show how it is possible to construct the whole pattern of human knowledge from what has been experienced. Beginning with an account of simple ideas which are derived from the senses, he proceeds to an explanation of the ideas of reflection, perception, space, time, substance, power, and others that are related to these. Book III has to do with the meanings of words. It includes analysis of general terms, the names of simple ideas, the names of substances, an account of abstract and concrete terms, and a discussion concerning the abuse of words. Book IV treats the subjects of knowledge and probability. Some information is given about knowledge in general, and this leads to a discussion with reference to the degrees of knowledge and the extent of human knowledge. In addition, it includes a detailed account of such subjects as the reality of knowledge, the nature of truth, the character of judgments, and the respective roles of reason and faith. Locke's theory of knowledge as a whole may be said to have four dominant characteristics. These are empiricism, dualism, subjectivism, and skepticism. A brief word concerning each of these should be helpful in preparing one to read the entire book. Locke's empiricism was to a large extent the result of the contrast he had observed between the natural scientists of his day and the work of the moralists and theologians. The conclusions advanced by the scientists were tentative and always subject to revision in the light of new facts. Moralists and theologians were usually of the opinion that their doctrines expressed the final and absolute truth, and no amount of experimentation or observation would cause them to change. The scientists were making remarkable progress and, with all of their differences, were discovering more and more areas of agreement. No similar progress could be observed in the areas of morals and religion. Indeed, there seemed to be more confusion and disagreements here than in other fields of inquiry. What was the reason for all of this? The answer, as Locke saw it, was to be found in the different methods that had been used. The scientists did not begin with some innate idea or presupposition from which their knowledge could be derived. Instead, they looked to experience as the sole source of information, and they accepted as true only those conclusions that could be verified by experiment and observation. The moralists and theologians had used a different method. They began with some authoritative statement. It might be an innate idea, as it was in the philosophy of Descartes, or it could be a divine revelation or something that was so regarded by an ecclesiastical body. Whatever was accepted in this fashion necessarily became the source from which knowledge must be derived. Since this knowledge could be obtained by deductive inference from the initial starting point, it was believed to have a certainty and finality about it that would not be possible on any other basis. People who believe they have certain or absolute knowledge are likely to be intolerant of those who hold opposite opinions. Intolerance leads to persecution and the suppression of human freedom. In view of these considerations, it seemed clear to Locke that the method employed by the scientists was the only safe one to follow and that this method should be extended to cover all fields of inquiry. In his acceptance of the empirical method used by the scientists, Locke took over some of their basic presuppositions as well. One of these was the belief in an external world the existence of which is quite

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independent of what human minds may know about it. Although he remained somewhat skeptical about the nature of that which is external to the mind, he followed the customary procedure among the scientists of referring to it as a material world. On the other hand, knowledge and all that is included in human consciousness were regarded as the world of mind, something that was separate and distinct from the world of matter. This dualism of mind and matter was comparable to that of a knowing subject and an object which is known. Just how these two worlds, which are so different in their respective characteristics, can interact on one another is something that Locke did not explain, but that an interaction of some kind did take place he never doubted. It had been recognized for some time that the sense qualities of color, sound, taste, and so forth, do not belong to the objects that are sensed but to the mind which perceives the objects. At the same time, it was generally assumed that spatial characteristics and such items as size, weight, and density are present in the objects which constitute the material world. Locke followed the customary practice of designating the qualities that belong only to the mind as secondary and those that belong to the objects as primary. Recognizing the difficulty that is involved in knowing anything at all about the real nature of that which is external to the mind, he assumed that, whatever its nature might be, it was capable of acting on human minds and causing the sensations that are experienced. Having accepted the empirical method as the only reliable one for an adequate understanding of the phenomenon of human knowledge, Locke was led by the logic of his position into a kind of subjectivism. This means that one may have genuine knowledge about only the workings of the human mind, and consequently no positive claims can be made about the nature of that which lies outside the sphere of consciousness. This may seem to be a strange position for him to take since the scientists whose methods he was attempting to follow always considered that they were studying the material world and not merely the appearances which it produced in human minds. Locke's major contribution in this respect consisted in shifting the emphasis from a study of nature to a study of the mind and the processes by means of which knowledge of any kind is obtained. In doing this, he achieved a measure of success, for he was able to give some account of the way in which ideas are formed even though he was unable to present any empirical evidence for assertions concerning the nature of that which is external to the mind. It is obvious that the logical outcome of Locke's empirical method could be nothing other than skepticism insofar as the real nature of the external world is concerned. While it is true that Locke continued to believe in many of the basic assumptions of the scientists of the seventeenth century, he could provide no evidence from human experience to support their validity. He believed as ardently as any of the scientists that there is a rational order in nature and a cause and effect relationship which holds good for all observed phenomena. But since these beliefs imply more than the facts of experience, we may have faith in their validity but we can have no certain knowledge concerning them. Because the term knowledge had been used in a way that implied certainty, Locke was forced to the conclusion that we can have no genuine knowledge about nature. All that we can have is probable knowledge. This conclusion he did not think should cause any alarm, nor should it be disturbing to any thoughtful person. Probable knowledge is, in many areas at least, reliable knowledge, and as such it is sufficient for our needs. Since this is true, we ought not to bemoan the fact that our minds are limited. Rather, we should learn to make use of what capabilities we do possess. The only certain knowledge that we have is the kind which is illustrated in the field of mathematics, where the test of truth is the consistency of our ideas with one another. But this type of knowledge does not tell us anything about the world of nature, nor does it give us truths in the areas of morals and religion.

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CRITICAL COMMENTARIES BOOK I INNATE IDEAS Summary Any complete analysis of the knowing process must include an account of the sources of error as well as of the procedures that enable one to arrive at truth. Some distinction must be made between knowledge and that which is a false pretension of knowledge. Locke's observations had led him to believe that one of the most common sources of error and false pretension in his day was the generally accepted belief in innate ideas. "Self-evident truths," as they were frequently called, had constituted the basis or foundation for many of the popular doctrines proclaimed by scholars and were generally accepted as true by the masses of people who possessed neither the ability nor the inclination to think for themselves. To be sure, these doctrines were not necessarily false but neither were they necessarily true. Being based upon principles that were regarded as innate, there was no way of determining which ones were true. Besides, this method of supporting beliefs was bound to lead to unfortunate consequences, and this was true whether the doctrines in question were true or false. The fact that these so-called innate ideas could not be questioned gave to the persons who proclaimed them an unwarranted authority over the minds of others and frequently led to intolerance and persecution. This source of error and false pretension, Locke believed, could be eliminated if it could be shown convincingly that innate ideas do not exist and that the proper use of one's natural faculties was sufficient to account for all the knowledge that anyone possesses. This is precisely what he set out to do in Book I of the Essay. There are three chapters in this book, and they deal, respectively, with speculative principles, practical principles, and ideas about such topics as God, substance, and others for which the claim of being innate had been made. It had been held that certain principles and ideas were innate because they are present in all human minds. Locke challenged this notion on two accounts. In the first place, he was convinced that there are no ideas which are present in all minds, and in the second place, even if there were ideas which are universally present, this would not prove that they are innate. In order to make his position clear, Locke uses as an illustration one of the most general and widely accepted principles that can be imagined. That a thing cannot be what it is and what it is not at the same time is generally recognized as one of the laws of thought, or basic assumptions that are necessarily implied in all thinking. Locke reasons that if there is any principle that could properly be called innate, this one should qualify. However, the fact of the matter is that there are comparatively few minds that have ever been aware of this principle at all. Certainly the idea is not present in the minds of young children. To be sure, even an infant may know that one object is not identical with another object, and this bit of knowledge does imply the law of non-contradiction, but the child is not aware of it, nor will he have any consciousness of it for years to come, if indeed he ever does become aware of it. The fact that he will give his assent to it at a later time, after the idea and its meaning have been explained to him, does not indicate that the idea was innate, even though the defenders of the doctrine have insisted that it does. If an idea of which we become aware at some later period is for that reason innate, then by the same logic we must conclude that all of the ideas which one acquires through the whole course of his life are innate. But to call all ideas innate robs that term of any special meaning which might distinguish innate ideas from any others.

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Now the principle of non-contradiction along with the other laws of thought are the presuppositions on which all thinking is based. If these are not innate, it would seem most reasonable to conclude that none of the ideas that are based upon them can be regarded as innate. To say that an idea is present in one's mind when he is not conscious of it is to speak nonsense, for, as Locke understands it, the mind and consciousness are synonymous terms. In this respect, he followed the teaching of Descartes, who had said that the essence of matter was extension and the essence of mind was consciousness. Again it is pointed out that if any principle or idea is innate, it must be present in the mind prior to any instruction or reflection upon it. If it does not appear until after the instruction, there is not only a possibility, but a very strong probability, that it has been derived from the instruction. Furthermore, ideas that are present prior to instruction should be more clear and distinct than those that appear later because they have had no opportunity to become corrupted by custom and false opinion. Since the principles under discussion fail to meet both of these tests, this is further evidence that they are not innate. Having shown that speculative principles are not innate, Locke next gives his attention to practical or moral principles. It should be somewhat easier to show that these are not innate because there are no moral rules to which people give their assent so readily or so universally as they do the principles included in the laws of thought. There were, however, in Locke's day many scholars of repute who defended the idea that the principles of right and wrong are implanted in the human mind by God, and hence they are innate rather than being derived from human experience. Locke attempts to show there is no evidence that lends support to this theory. This does not mean that he rejects the belief that there are valid principles or rules for distinguishing right from wrong, but he does deny that there is any sound basis for regarding them as innate. The usual argument given in support of the belief that moral principles are innate is that there is universal agreement concerning them. Everyone knows, it is argued, that it is wrong to lie, to steal, and to do various other things. The awareness that these actions are wrong is said to precede any reflection or thinking about them and hence they must be innate. To this argument, Locke replies that there is no universal agreement about the rightness or wrongness of any particular action. It may appear that such agreement exists if practically everyone believes that it is wrong for a person intentionally to violate his agreements or to act unjustly in his dealings with his fellow humans. But what is the extent of the agreement that we find? Actually we discover that the area of agreement is directly proportionate to the generality of the principles that are in question. When it comes to a specific action or what should be done in the concrete instances that arise, the agreement no longer exists. What does it mean for all men to subscribe to the principle of justice so long as they have different notions about what is the just or right thing to do in particular instances? Obviously, it can mean nothing. Justice or any other virtue can mean nothing more than the particular instances that are included in it. So far as these concrete particulars are concerned, there is no universal agreement and hence no reason for believing they are innate. Further evidence that moral principles are not innate can be seen from the fact that it is customary to give reasons to support or justify one's belief in any given moral principle. In this respect, the belief in moral principles is different from belief in speculative principles. No one would think of giving reasons to justify the belief in the law of non-contradiction, which tells us that a thing cannot be what it is and what it is not at the same time. That would be like trying to prove the principles of proof itself, which would be nonsense. This is not the case with respect to moral beliefs. One can always give reasons for believing that people should keep their promises, pay their debts, or treat their fellow humans the way they would want to be treated themselves. Since the reasons are logically prior to the beliefs, we can only conclude that the beliefs themselves are not innate.

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The affirmative side of Locke's argument can be seen in the explanation he gives for the origin of moral beliefs. Rejecting the idea that they are innate or even latent within the human mind, he argues that experience is adequate fully to account for the presence of any moral idea or principle present in anyone's mind. The basis for this belief lies in the fact that human nature is so constituted that everyone has a desire for happiness and an aversion to pain and misery. One learns through his experience that certain kinds of action are normally productive of painful consequences, and it is for this reason that he comes to regard them as wrong. On the other hand, actions that normally tend to produce happiness are approved. It is this approval that, according to Locke, constitutes the real meaning of the term "good" when it is used with a moral connotation. To be sure, the meanings of such terms as "good" and "bad" and "right" and "wrong" are not determined solely by the immediate consequences that follow particular actions. It is necessary to take into consideration their long-range consequences in relation to life as a whole. It is also equally important that one should anticipate so far as possible the consequences that are likely to follow with respect to the lives of other people. In this connection, it is interesting to note that while Locke advocates such principles as kindness, benevolence, and justice in one's dealings with his fellow men, he does so purely for the reason that actions of these kinds will in the long run bring more happiness to the individual who performs them. Virtues, according to Locke, are approved not because they are innate but because they are profitable. One's belief in moral rules or principles is an expression of his feelings of approval or disapproval. For this reason, it is not proper to speak of them as true or false since this would imply agreement or disagreement with some external standard that exists prior to, and independent of, experience. There is, Locke believes, no sound basis for believing that any such standard exists. If a standard of this kind did exist, it is most unlikely that the behavior of people would take place in the ways in which it has been observed. It is reasonable enough to assume that moral principles, even if they were innate, would at times be violated by some persons. Gangsters and criminals of various kinds have always been a part of human society. But even so, we would not expect the criminals to be entirely free of any feelings of remorse, and certainly their actions would not be approved by a whole nation or by any civilized society. What is the situation with reference to moral beliefs? Here we find that at least a great many of what have been recognized as important moral beliefs have been violated in a wholesale manner and without any feelings of remorse or disapproval on the part of the society in which the actions occurred. This could scarcely be expected if the rules in question had been innate. Ideas that are innate remain constant in spite of changing circumstances, but this is not true of the rules pertaining to human conduct. What has been recognized as right at one time and under a given set of circumstances will be regarded as wrong at other times and under different conditions. Even among the same people and under similar conditions, ideas about right and wrong will change from time to time. In the third chapter of Book I, Locke concludes the discussion about innate ideas with an attempt to show that the idea of God is not innate. This is in many respects the most important part of his argument, for it was on the basis of a belief in innate ideas that so many of Locke's contemporaries had sought to prove the existence of God. There was a sense, too, in which the belief in God was regarded as the foundation for the principles of morality. Since the rules governing human conduct were regarded as laws, it was inconceivable that they could have come into existence without a lawgiver, and the lawgiver must be more than human, for the law was the standard by which human conduct was judged. Of all the ideas that had been believed to be innate, the idea of God was considered to be the most important.

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In support of this claim, it had been argued that some notion of a supreme being had been found in every society of which man had any knowledge. Even in the most primitive societies, evidence could be found that indicated a belief in some type of superhuman power which constituted for them an object of worship. The universality of a belief of this kind was often interpreted to mean that the idea had been implanted in human minds by the Creator himself and for the reason that it was absolutely essential for human welfare. It should be noted in this connection that Locke believed in the existence of God and did not question the importance of this belief as the foundation for the principles of morality. He accepted, too, the idea of God as the Creator of the universe. What he did not accept was the belief that the idea of God was innate. He believed that he could show conclusively that it is not innate, and if there were no good reasons for believing the idea of God was innate, there would be less reason for thinking that any other idea was innate. The argument presented in this section of the Essay has to do primarily with the meanings of words. Locke wanted to show that these meanings are acquired through experience rather than being impressed on the mind by some other force. He illustrates this point at the beginning of the chapter by referring to the ideas of impossibility and identity. A small child will know that it is impossible for one object to be identical with another object, but the child will not know the meaning of the words "impossible" or "identical" until his experience has taught him what they mean. Words derive their meaning from their use. They are not given to one at the time of his birth, nor do they have any meaning that is prior in point of time to one's experience. Those who have asserted that the idea of God is innate have insisted that some notion of a supreme being has been present in the minds of all people. Even those who may now claim that they are atheists did at some time in their lives believe in God, but finding no adequate reasons to support their belief have abandoned it. Believing, then, that the idea of God has been held universally, they have advanced this reason for holding that the idea is innate. The importance of a belief in God and its significance for human welfare was another reason for insisting that the idea was implanted in human minds in order that the lives of people could be directed by it. Locke's first argument is directed against the assertion that the idea of a supreme being is universal. He points out that anthropologists who have made a special study of primitive tribes have reported on various occasions that they have found tribes who have no idea of a god of any kind. At least there is no evidence of a belief of this kind and many indications of a complete absence of it. Christian missionaries working among primitive peoples have given similar testimony. Furthermore, the fact that there are many educated persons who are professed atheists is sufficient to prove that the idea is not universal. If the idea had been innate, it would have remained with them in spite of any evidence either for or against the belief. Obviously, the idea of God is not universal; even if it were, this would not prove that the idea is innate. There are plenty of false ideas that have been held universally, and there are plenty of true ones that have not been accepted by all people. Further evidence that the idea of God is not innate can be seen in the fact that the word itself has such a wide variety of meanings when used by different people. Even if you did find that men everywhere believe in God, this would not mean that they have the same idea in their minds unless their conceptions of God were alike, which is not what one finds to be the case. If God had implanted the idea of himself in human minds, it is reasonable to suppose that he would have given the same idea to all people. Actually we find that the notions of deity held by different people vary so much that there is nothing in common among them except the name. These differences can be explained only on the basis of the varied

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experiences that accompany the different concepts. The ideas reflect not only the culture of the people who possess them but the extent to which they have reflected on the meaning of their experiences. Having shown that the idea of God is not innate, it seems reasonable to conclude that no other idea is innate, for, according to the popular conception, everything in the universe is dependent on God. Locke concludes his discussion of this topic by showing that the idea of substance is not innate. It might be supposed that this idea is innate because it is not one that is derived from our normal faculties of sensation and reflection, and yet it is one that is present in our minds. Ever since the days of Aristotle, people have been taught to believe that there is a substance or substratum in which the qualities that are perceived through the senses really exist. Descartes had set forth the idea that there are two kinds of substance in the universe, a material substance which is extended in space and a spiritual substance which is consciousness. Locke does not deny the existence of either of these kinds of substance, but he wants to show that the idea of substance is not innate. His argument on this point follows from the fact that the nature of substance is not given through either sensation or reflection, and consequently we can have no knowledge of it at all. The sensations that we do have may very well be the sensations of something, but to use Locke's words, it is "a something we know not what." Commentary Locke's refutation of the doctrine of innate ideas had important consequences for the history of modern thought. It marked the beginning of a new trend in humanity's attempt to understand itself and the world to which it belongs. It constituted a direct challenge to those rationalistic thinkers whose doctrines had been based primarily on principles which had been taken for granted and from which their conclusions had been reached by a process of deductive reasoning. Now it is quite evident that any system of doctrines can be supported if one only accepts as true the premises on which they are based. The real issue consists in determining whether the premises are true. By insisting that their premises were innate ideas, the proponents of these doctrines assumed that they must be true. In fact, they held that they should not even be questioned. By showing that the whole concept of innate ideas is an erroneous one, Locke had hoped to make it clear that any idea might be brought into question. Any good reason for believing that any particular idea or principle is a true one must be obtained from some other quarter. The only source for establishing the validity of any belief must be found in the facts that have been obtained through human experience. From this point of view, one could see the necessity for a change in the method of inquiry. Instead of employing the deductive method for arriving at truth, one should use an inductive type of procedure. Locke's argument concerning the erroneous character of the belief in innate ideas was one of the important factors that led to the remarkable development of empirical philosophy which took place during the century that followed the publication of the Essay. While it is true that the new emphasis which was given to the empirical method did not mean the complete disappearance of rationalistic philosophy, it did mean that the proponents of rationalism were forced to proceed with more caution than before. On the other hand, the influence of empiricism became more and more prominent with succeeding generations, and it is still one of the main characteristics of contemporary thinking. While the magnitude of Locke's influence in shaping the course of Western philosophy can scarcely be questioned, it is not at all clear that he succeeded in proving as much as he had set out to do. He was quite successful in his attempt to show that speculative principles, along with practical principles and such ideas as God, substance, and the like, are meaningful only in the light of human experience.

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But that there is nothing in the mind except that which comes in through the senses may not be granted so readily. The law of non-contradiction is not an innate idea if one means by innate that the idea must be present in one's immediate consciousness and fully understood without any reference to experience. But this was not the meaning of innate as this term had been used by the rationalistic thinkers whom Locke had set out to refute. Plato, for example, had taught that ideas such as justice, truth, humanity, and, in fact, everything that we are accustomed to denote by common nouns are present in the soul prior to its entrance into a human body. He did not think the soul was conscious of these ideas until the mind had been stimulated by sense perceptions. He believed there were good reasons for holding the view that there is more in the mind than what comes in through the senses. Plato's chief reason was the fact that we can think of objects which have not been experienced. We can think of a perfect circle even though we have never seen one. This would not be possible on the basis of experience alone. It is true that we would never think of a perfect circle if we had not experienced an imperfect one, but this only illustrates his point that sense experience is needed to bring into consciousness that which was latent within it before. Descartes' conception of innate ideas had to do with his criterion of truth. He held that any idea which one sees so clearly and distinctly that it cannot be doubted must be true. The one idea that for him was the starting point for his whole system of philosophy was that of his own existence. This was an idea that no one could doubt, for even the doubting would necessarily imply its existence. He also argued in a similar manner that one must admit the existence of God. But Descartes did not insist that every individual is conscious of either the idea of the self or the idea of God. In other words, it was not the universality, but rather the logical necessity, that formed the basis for both of these ideas. Like Plato, he held that the ideas are present in the mind without being perceived by the senses, but this did not imply that the full meaning of either of them was necessarily present in one's consciousness. Another point in Locke's argument that was open to challenge was his conception of what constitutes a human mind. Apparently he had accepted the definition of mind that Descartes had used. Descartes had distinguished mind from matter by stating that matter is extension and mind is consciousness. This would mean that unless an idea was present in one's consciousness, it was not in his mind at all. Leibnitz was able to show quite conclusively that this conception of mind is not adequate to account for all the facts. Actually the mind includes a great deal more than that of which one is conscious at any particular moment. Certainly the phenomenon of memory provides ample reason for believing that at least part of the mind is at times below the level of consciousness. If this were not true, one could not distinguish between remembering something and obtaining information for the first time. In fact, the idea of a subconscious mind is so generally accepted by psychologists that no one is inclined to doubt it. Once the idea of a subconscious mind is admitted, Locke's argument about the universality of an idea loses its force, for the idea may be located in this part of the mind and not brought into the level of consciousness until after experiences have taken place. It should, however, be remembered that one of Locke's major objectives was to refute those who maintained that their understanding of the meaning of certain ideas was necessarily true and that no one had a right to question them. So far as this objective was concerned, his argument was indeed adequate.

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BOOK II OF IDEAS CHAPTERS 1-11 Summary Having developed in Book I his argument concerning the nonexistence of innate ideas, Locke undertakes in Book II to describe in detail the process by means of which ideas come to be present in human minds. His fundamental thesis is that experience alone is adequate to account for all the ideas included in anyone's store of knowledge. In beginning this discussion, he calls attention to the fact that neither the belief in an immortal soul nor the phenomenon of sleep can furnish any evidence for the existence of ideas prior to one's experience. Although the claim has been made by some thinkers that ideas were present in the soul before it was united with the body, he shows that this cannot be the case. His reason is that thinking is an activity which takes place only in bodies, and without thinking there can be no ideas. The same may be said with reference to the phenomenon of sleep. Thinking takes place only when one is awake. If we assume that ideas are present when one is not awake, there would be no way of distinguishing between having ideas and not having them. All ideas, according to Locke, enter the mind by way of the senses or one's reflection on the materials that have been received that way. The first of these he designates by the term sensation, which refers to the conscious states that are produced by the action of external bodies on the mind. It is in this way that we derive our notions of color, heat, cold, softness, hardness, bitter, sweet, and all the sensible qualities of which one ever becomes aware. Since it refers to the action of external bodies on the mind, it might be called the external sense. The second source of our ideas is the perception of the operations which take place within one's mind as it assimilates and interprets the materials that have been received through the senses. This includes such processes as thinking, doubting, believing, knowing, willing, and all the various activities of the mind of which we are conscious in understanding ourselves and the world about us. Because this source is within the mind, it might be designated as the internal sense. Locke, however, prefers to use the term reflection instead because he believes this will help to avoid confusion with the external sense or sensation. Ideas are classified as simple and complex. The simple ones are the particular ones that may be considered singly. Complex ideas are made up of simple ones that must be viewed or taken together. Simple ideas are derived in a number of different ways, but they always refer to a separate and distinct quality that is present in one's mind. It is true that in the objects which are external to the mind, several of these qualities are often combined. For example, we may say of an orange that it is soft, yellow, sweet, and round. Nevertheless, in our minds each of these qualities is separate and distinct. All simple ideas enter the mind through one of the five senses, and it is impossible to experience sensations of any other kind than those for which the sense organs are adapted. It is conceivable that other qualities may exist in the world around us, but if they do it is impossible for us to know anything about them. In receiving sensations, the mind is passive, which is one of the characteristics of simple ideas. The situation is different in the case of complex ideas, for these are due in part to the activity of the mind. According to Locke, these are formed in three different ways: combining simple ideas into compound ones, comparing ideas with one another, and abstracting from a number of ideas elements that are common to the members of the group.

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There are four ways in which simple ideas may enter the mind. First, they may enter through one sense only. Second, they may enter through more than one sense. Third, they may come from reflection only. Fourth, they may make their appearance through a combination of all the ways of sensation and reflection. Each of these ways may be illustrated in the following manner. The first group includes ideas of any of the colors, tastes, sounds, or smells that may be experienced. It includes also the sensations belonging to touch such as heat, cold, and solidity. In all of these sensations, there is a wide degree of variations, and we have names for only a comparatively small number of them. Solidity, for example, may be described as that which hinders the approach of two bodies when they move toward one another. It is closely related to the ideas of space and hardness, and yet it is distinct from each of them. In the second group, we have ideas of objects in which several distinct sense qualities are combined. An example of this can be seen in the idea of a metal, such as gold, which at the same time is bright, yellow, and hard. In fact, most of the objects that we experience have more than one sense quality. In addition to these qualities, we have also the ideas of space, figure, rest, and motion. In the third group, we have the ideas of perception or thinking, and volition or willing. Some of the different modes in which these ideas are present include remembering, reasoning, judging, knowledge, and faith. In the fourth group, we have such ideas as pleasure, pain, power, existence, unity, and succession. We normally think of the ideas in our minds as having been caused by the objects that exist in the outside world. It is true that some of these ideas, such as cold or dark, may refer to the absence instead of the presence of certain qualities, but this does not mean that they have no external cause. Even a negative cause can produce a positive idea. In discussing the problems that are involved in the development of human knowledge, it is important to bear in mind that what exists in one's consciousness is not identical in every respect with that which exists in the external world. If our ideas did not tell us something about the objects that are outside of our minds, we would have no knowledge of anything pertaining to the world around us, which is something that Locke's theory of knowledge would not permit him to admit. At the same time, he was convinced that the ideas we do have are caused by external objects, and at least some of the qualities revealed to us through sensation are not only in our minds but are also in the objects to which these qualities refer. It is necessary then to make a clear distinction between those qualities that exist only in our minds and the ones that also belong to the external objects. This is what Locke attempted to do in what he had to say about primary and secondary qualities. We are told that primary qualities are inseparable from the bodies to which they belong. They include solidity, extension, figure, number, and mobility. Any physical body will possess these qualities no matter how many changes may take place within it or how many times it may be divided into smaller parts. For example, a grain of wheat may be divided into two parts, which in turn may be divided again and so on without limit, but no matter how small the particles into which it is divided may become, they will still possess these same qualities. It is quite true that the particles may be too small to be perceived by the senses, but they still possess size, weight, figure, number, and motion. Secondary qualities include such items as colors, sounds, tastes, and smells. These exist only in the minds of those who perceive them, although they have been caused by the powers that are present in the primary

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qualities which do belong to the objects themselves. While it is customary to think of the qualities as existing in the objects rather than in the minds of people, a careful analysis makes it clear that such is not the case. Neither colors nor sounds would ever exist apart from some mind which perceives them. The natural tendency to assign these qualities to external objects is due to the fact that the powers which cause them are too small to be revealed to the senses, and thus it appears that the qualities which are sensed are really in the objects. Simple ideas include not only the ones that are derived from the senses but also the ones that are derived from the activities of the mind itself. One of these is the idea of perception, which Locke tells us is the first faculty of the mind exercised about our ideas. What perception is can be known only by those who have experienced it and have reflected on the nature of that experience. Impressions can be made on the sense organs, but unless these motions are communicated to the mind, there will be no ideas which enable the one who receives them to understand what they mean. Fire, for example, may burn one's body, but until the sensations are communicated to the mind, there will be no idea of either heat or pain. The awareness of these ideas is what is meant by perception. Perceptions are present in various degrees, and to some extent they may occur in children even before they are born. They may occur in the so-called lower animals. These facts should not be interpreted as giving support to the belief in innate ideas since in every case the perception is made possible only by means of some external object. The degree of perception that is experienced by normal human beings is one of the characteristics that distinguish the human mind from that of the lower animals. A further faculty of the mind that makes knowledge possible is memory, or the retention in the mind of ideas that have been experienced in times past. It is this power of the mind that makes contemplation and reasoning possible. The fact of memory does not imply for Locke any notion of a subconscious mind in which ideas are stored and from which they can again be brought into the level of consciousness. Rather it means that the mind has the power to revive perceptions that have occurred before and to do so with the additional perception that it has had them before. Besides perception and retention, there are other simple ideas that are derived from the activities of the mind. These include discerning and distinguishing between several different ideas. Also included are such ideas as comparing, compounding, naming, and abstracting. It is the extent to which these activities are present that distinguishes normal people from madmen. Locke concludes his discussion of simple ideas with these words: I pretend not to teach, but to inquire; and therefore cannot but here confess again that external and internal sensations are the only passages I can find of knowledge to the understanding These alone so far as I can discover are the windows by which light is let into this dark room. Commentary In these chapters, Locke has attempted a description of the process by which ideas are formed in human minds. While the source of ideas lies in an external world, any knowledge that one possesses about this source must enter the mind by way of sensation or reflection. Simple ideas are first in the order of appearance in the mind, and it is from these simple ideas that all of the other ones are constructed. In making this analysis, it seems quite probable that Locke was influenced by the way in which the physical scientists of his day had described the nature and structure of material bodies. They had put forth the view that all physical bodies are composed of atomic particles which are constantly in motion. The differences between various physical bodies could thus be accounted for by the various combinations of these units of matter. Locke's explanation of mental phenomena is a striking parallel to the one given for

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physical bodies. He tells us that simple ideas derived from either sensation or reflection are the units out of which human knowledge is composed. This explanation, it should be noted, is not without its difficulties, for it is by no means certain that ideas make their appearance in that order of sequence. Take, for example, the idea of an apple or an orange. It seems quite unlikely that one perceives the particular color, shape, and odor of the object first of all and then proceeds from them to the idea of the object as a whole. When through a process of introspection we examine our own minds, we normally find that the perception of the object as a whole occurs first, and this is followed by an awareness of the color, shape, and odor which belongs with it. In other words, the sequence appears to be the reverse of what Locke maintained. This, however, is a relatively minor point, to which it might be replied that Locke has not asserted that ideas are always received "in their simplicity," nor has he denied that a simple idea may be in some instances an abstraction from actual experience. What he was most concerned to point out was that simple ideas are incapable of further analysis. A more serious difficulty arises from the attempt to account for sensations by saying that they are caused by the powers that are present in the qualities which belong to external objects. One may ask on the basis of Locke's theory how it would be possible for one to know that Ideas are caused by anything. From which one of the five senses do we derive the idea of a cause? Obviously, a cause is not something that has color, sound, taste, odor, or feeling. Neither can we say that it is derived from reflection on the sensations that have occurred, for while these sensations appear in a certain order, there is nothing to indicate that they had to occur in that order. Eventually, empiricists who followed Locke came to the conclusion that causality is a characteristic of minds rather than external objects. Locke did not interpret causality that way. He assumed that it belonged to the world of external objects, for this was something that the scientists of his day had not questioned, and he accepted their view concerning it even though no basis for doing so could be found in the method he was using. The distinction that Locke made between primary and secondary qualities was another point that gave rise to a series of controversies. He had insisted that such items as size, weight, shape, motion, and number were present in the external objects, whereas color, sound, taste, odor, and feeling exist only in the minds which perceive the objects. He had argued that this distinction was necessary because the so-called primary qualities do not change but remain constant regardless of whether they are being perceived by any minds. On the other hand, secondary qualities do vary according to the changing conditions that are present in the perceiving minds. For example, the color of an object will vary according to the amount of light in which one sees it, and the sound will vary according to the distance that separates him from the object. But is this distinction a sound one? Some of Locke's critics insisted that it is not. They called attention to the fact that if variability of the qualities in question is the criterion to be followed, the primary qualities vary as much as the secondary ones even though they do not vary in the same way. The size of an object as it appears in the mind will vary in proportion to the distance from which it is seen as well as the density of the medium through which it is seen. The weight of an object is also variable, for it appears to be heavier if one lifts it when he is tired. Perhaps the most serious difficulty in this part of Locke's analysis arises from his attempt to explain the way in which the qualities that are present in the external object can produce sensations in a human mind. On this point he appears to waver between two different explanations. One of these is expressed in the

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view that only like can produce like. On this basis, he must assume that the sensations which are in the mind must be like the qualities in the object. This, he tells us, is what happens in the case of the primary qualities. But this principle does not hold for secondary qualities since these exist only in the perceiving minds. Obviously, another type of explanation must be found for them. It is in this connection that Locke tells us we can only say that the primary qualities which are in the external objects have the power to produce the sensations which occur in the mind. This is not a very satisfactory explanation, for it ignores entirely the question of how an object which is extended in space can act on a mind or consciousness which is not in space. Other difficulties arise in connection with this problem, and these will become even more apparent in the light of what he has to say about complex ideas. CHAPTERS 12-33 Summary In the first eleven chapters of Book II, Locke has presented an account of simple ideas. In the remaining chapters of this book, he makes an analysis of complex ideas. One of the main differences between simple ideas and complex ideas is the fact that in the former the mind is relatively passive, whereas in the latter it is active. While it is true that in the simple ideas which are derived from reflection the mind is active, in one respect it is an activity which has to do with the materials that have entered the mind involuntarily. In other words, what has been received is quite independent of the will of the conscious subject. This is not what happens in the case of complex ideas, for here the mind exerts its power over simple ideas and produces whatever content it takes in order to complete all that is contained in one's store of knowledge. This activity of the mind takes place in three different ways. The first of these consists in bringing together a number of simple ideas so as to form a single compound one. This type of activity is illustrated in such ideas as beauty, gratitude, mankind, army, or the universe. The second way in which the mind produces complex ideas is that of comparing simple ideas with one another. Here the ideas remain separate and distinct rather than being merged together to form a single one. It is from this activity that we derive the ideas of relationship, such as greater than, less than, to the right of, more costly than. The third way consists in separating ideas from all the others with which they have been associated in real experience. This is the opposite of the method of compounding. It is a process of abstracting from a number of particulars the elements which they have in common. These processes or activities of the mind are sufficient to produce what may be designated as an infinite number of combinations, although they are all derived from the materials that were received into the mind either by sensation or by reflection. This wide variety of ideas can be classified under three heads which are known, respectively, as modes, substances, and relations. By modes, the author means those complex ideas which refer to objects that do not exist by themselves but are always dependent on, or are affections of, some substance. This includes such ideas as triangle, gratitude, murder, and so on. Modes may be classified still further as simple and mixed, depending on whether they are combinations of the same kind of simple ideas, as in the case of such terms as a score or a dozen, or compounded of different kinds of simple ideas, such as we have in the case of beauty or theft. By substances is meant that type of combination of simple ideas which are usually interpreted to mean particular things subsisting by themselves. This is illustrated in the ideas such as wood, lead, man, sheep, and the like.

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By relations are meant the complex ideas that are obtained when simple ideas are compared with one another. These are the elements out of which all human knowledge is composed. The four kinds of simple ideas and the three classes of complex ideas may be combined in an almost limitless number of different ways. It is comparable to what may be done with the twenty-six letters of the English alphabet when they are arranged in all of the different combinations that make up the words and sentences found in all of the books produced in that language. To illustrate the way in which these kinds of complex ideas are formed in the human mind, Locke explains what happens in the case of such ideas as space, immensity, number, infinity, power, substance, cause and effect, personal identity, moral evaluations, and the sense in which ideas may be said to be true or false. A few of his examples will be sufficient to make clear the essential elements that are involved in his theory of knowledge. The idea of space is derived from both the sense of sight and the sense of touch. When it is considered with reference to the length that exists between any two objects, it is called distance, and when considered with reference to length, breadth, and thickness, it is called extension. Each different distance is a modification of space, or in other words, a simple mode of this idea. It is in this manner that we speak of an inch, foot, yard, mile, or any number of such units combined into a single idea. The power of repeating or doubling any of these ideas beyond any defined limit is what is meant by immensity. Another kind of distance has to do with the succession of ideas as they occur and disappear in our minds. This is what is called duration and forms the basis for our ideas of time and of eternity. It is by reflecting on the appearing of various ideas one after another that we get the idea of succession. Motion would not be perceived at all without a train of successive ideas. When the motion is too slow or too swift to be perceived by the senses, it produces the idea of a stationary object. Any portions of duration which are not distinguished and which therefore cannot be measured do not belong to the idea of time. It is in this sense that we use the phrase "before all time" and "when time shall be no more." The succession of ideas that occur with the revolutions of the heavenly bodies constitutes the most proper unit for the measurement of time. Infinity of duration, or that which goes beyond any definite limits, is what is meant by eternity. With reference to the idea of substance, Locke tells us that the occurrence in our minds of a great number of simple ideas which are always found together, and which therefore give rise to the impression that they belong together, are combined by the mind into a single complex idea. This is due to the fact that we are incapable of imagining how these ideas can subsist by themselves, and we therefore accustom ourselves to suppose that there is some substratum wherein they do subsist, which is what we call substance. If, however, we stop to examine the idea of substance, we will find that it contains nothing except that of an unknown something in which it is supposed that those qualities which have been sensed really exist. This is the general or obscure idea of substance. A more definite and specific idea of substance is derived when the mind brings together the combinations of simple ideas that have been associated in particular experiences. It is in this way that we come to think of such substances as gold, water, man, horse, and so forth. If we should be asked concerning the nature of these substances, we could only reply in terms of the simple ideas that have been associated with them. The idea of substance is associated with our mental experiences just as much as it is with those experiences that have to do with the external, or what we usually call the outside, world. It is just as impossible to imagine thinking, reasoning, comparing, or abstracting as processes that subsist by themselves as it is to imagine weight, size, or motion subsisting without some substance in which the

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activity takes place. Thus we come to think of spiritual substances in the same manner that we think of material substances. The idea of power is one of the elements associated with the idea of substance. The mind is informed through the senses of the alteration of simple ideas that are observed in connection with external objects. Reflecting on these changes that take place and that which makes the changes possible, it comes by the idea of power. One thinks that fire has the power to burn things, the sun has the power to melt wax, gold has the power to be melted, and so on. Powers are of two kinds depending on whether they are able to make or to receive changes. The former are known as active powers and the latter as passive powers. Power may be included as one of the simple ideas that belong to the class of relations. It is complex only insofar as it is combined with the idea of substance. Our clearest idea of active power is derived from spirit, or we may say from the activity that takes place in our own minds. Whenever a change is observed, the mind must possess the power to make that change. The power that is thus involved can be experienced directly, but we cannot in the same way observe the power that may be present in external objects. We can form some notion of their powers only through analogy with that which takes place in our own minds. The idea of causality, or that of a casual relationship existing between things, is closely allied with this idea of power. In observing the changes or alterations that take place as one sensation follows another, we think not only of a substance in which the qualities we have sensed exist, but that this substance is also the cause of that which we have experienced. We do not, however, derive the idea of a cause and effect relation from what we have experienced alone. It is impossible to see or hear a causal relation or to experience one through any sensation. Where then do we get the idea of a cause? Locke tells us that we get it from reflection on the processes which take place in our own minds. He says, "The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves; where we find by experience that, barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies, which before were at rest." Since the idea of a causal relationship means that the same sequence of events will occur in the future that have been observed in the past, we can only say that the mind interprets the external objects to have the power to bring about this orderly sequence of events. There is no sensory confirmation that the future will be like the past, and for this reason we do not have certainty in our knowledge concerning it. All that we do have is a high degree of probability which is based entirely on what has taken place in the past. Of all the problems which arise in connection with complex ideas, there is no one that is more puzzling than that of personal identity. The problem is a crucial one, for unless we can establish the fact that it is the same person who experiences a series of events, all attempts to derive a satisfactory theory of knowledge will be in vain. How can an individual whose body, mind, and actions are never exactly the same during any two successive periods of time be said to be the same person? This problem was not discussed in any thoroughgoing fashion in the first edition of Locke's Essay, but in response to a suggestion from one of his critics, a chapter was added in the second edition for the purpose of dealing with it in a more detailed manner. To say that a person, or for that matter any particular object, can change and still remain the same as it was before appears to be a direct violation of the law of non-contradiction. Those who believe in an immortal soul that remains always the same while inhabiting changing bodies would seem to have a solution for this problem, but Locke sees plenty of difficulties involved in this conception. Then, too, he has gone to great lengths to disprove the existence of innate ideas, which may be regarded as a corollary of the belief in immortal souls. He therefore attempts to find a solution on the basis of his empirical theory of knowledge.

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He begins by making a clear distinction between what is meant by identity and what is meant by diversity. Most of the confusion, he tells us, has been due to the fact that people have not been clear in their own minds about what it is that remains identical with itself and what it is that changes from time to time. Obviously, the identity is not to be found in the physical elements of which one's material body is composed, and the same is true of the specific contents included in one's mind. What does persist throughout the changing states of one's physical and mental existence is the type of organization that binds all of these states into a single unit, which we designate as the person. The crucial factor that determines the identity of a person existing at one moment with the person who exists at another moment is the phenomenon of memory. Consciousness at one moment of what has happened over a long series of experiences constitutes not only a unity of these experiences but an awareness of the continuing process that makes this unity possible. The identity is not in the process alone nor in the particular states of body and mind taken by themselves. Rather, it is the combination of these factors viewed as a single unifying process in which the differences are relatively unimportant, and for the purpose of establishing an identity they can be ignored. It is in this sense that we may speak of the justice that is involved when punishments or rewards are administered to an individual for deeds which were performed at some time in the past. Ideas of relations are of several different kinds. Some of them are known as proportional. Others are called natural. One of the most important of the various classes of relations is the one that is generally designated as moral. Ideas of good and bad are, in Locke's judgment, derived solely from pleasure and pain. He says, "moral good and evil is the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law where by good or evil is drawn on us, from the will and power of the lawmaker." It is the power of the lawgiver to administer either rewards or punishments, and this is what makes it a matter of pleasure and pain. In his discussion of the truth and falsity of ideas, Locke calls attention to the fact that in the strict sense of these words, ideas are neither true nor false. In this respect, they are like the names that we assign to given objects. They are an effective means of communication, but we cannot say that the name is necessarily like any of the qualities found in the object. The same is true of our ideas. Nevertheless, it is customary to speak of one's ideas as being true or false, and there is a sense in which it is legitimate to do so. It is important, however, to indicate the sense in which ideas may be true and the sense in which it is not true. Ideas may be true in the sense that they refer to real objects in the external world. Locke calls these objects archetypes. We cannot say that the sensations in our minds are like the qualities in the objects in any respect except that of having the power to cause these sensations. Simple ideas are the ones that are most likely to be true in this respect. Complex ideas which are formed by the processes of combining, comparing, and abstracting may be said to be true in the sense that they are adequate for communicating to another person's mind ideas which are like the ones in our own mind. They cannot be said to be true in the sense that they are like some object that is external to the mind. It is on this point that Locke differs from the rationalists, who have always insisted that universals refer to realities which exist independent of our human minds. For Locke, they are merely creations of the mind which serve a useful purpose in enabling human beings to communicate with one another. Commentary Locke's account of complex ideas is an attempt to explain the processes by which the mind arrives at all of its various conceptions concerning both itself and the world to which it belongs. It was a tremendous task, the pursuit of which involved not only an enormous amount of detailed analyses but also uncovered

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a multitude of problems that were more difficult than he had imagined when the work was started. Having proved, at least to his own satisfaction, that innate ideas do not exist, he found it necessary to account for such ideas as selfhood, cause and effect relationships, personal identity, class names, abstract principles, and all those objects that are designated by class names or universals on the basis of sense perceptions and the reflections of the mind on these sensations. The basic conviction on which he constructed his entire theory of knowledge was that all of the kinds of complex ideas are derived from simple ones which precede in point of time the combinations, comparisons, and abstractions that are formed. This type of analysis necessarily had implications for the field of psychology, and it can be said that the psychological approach to philosophical problems which became dominant during the two centuries that followed Locke was due in no small measure to his influence. The apparent success of Locke's work during the period which immediately followed its publication was due in part to the fact that he was able to use the new empirical method and still retain his belief in the validity of many of those ideas which his rationalistic predecessors had supposed it impossible to defend on any other than non-empirical grounds. The fact that he was not able to do this with complete consistency was not discovered all at once. It required the work of several of his more critical successors to bring these inconsistencies to light. However, in fairness to Locke, it should be remembered that he was a pioneer in this field, and the sciences of his day had not at that time achieved the progress that they acquired in later years. Throughout the entire Essay, it is evident that Locke never questioned the existence of an external world which is independent of the mind that perceives it. His problem was that of determining the extent to which one's ideas about that world could be regarded as true. In the case of simple ideas, he believed it was possible to maintain a real correspondence between the sensations that occur in one's mind and the qualities that exist in the outside world. This is what may roughly be regarded as an example of the correspondence theory of truth, and it is in this respect that he may be considered as one of the forerunners of what is now known as critical realism. One of the major difficulties involved in this conception arises from the fact that not all of the qualities present in sensation can be said to exist in the external object. The primary qualities, such as size, weight, and motion, may be regarded as present in the object, but the secondary qualities of color, sound, taste, and touch are only in the mind of the receiving subject. Locke apparently recognized this difficulty, for in some parts of his discussion he insists that we can know nothing about the independent character of that which is external to the mind. In other parts of his discussion, he departs from this position and says that we can know something about it. We not only know that external objects exist but that they have the power to cause the sensations which occur in the mind. In the case of the primary qualities, what exists in the mind is said to be like that which exists in the objects, but with the secondary qualities this is not true. All that can be said with reference to them is that the objects possess whatever power it takes to produce the sensations. Even this much is not warranted on the basis of Locke's method, for as we have indicated before, the logical consequence of his method is complete skepticism about what is external to the mind even though he does not pursue the method to this extent. The significance of Locke's method is even more apparent in the light of his treatment concerning complex ideas. It is in this area that he abandons any attempt to show a correspondence between ideas and the objects for which they stand. In fact, so far as the most of his examples are concerned, he denies that there are any concrete objects to which they refer. They are only creations of the mind, which are useful

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for the purposes of communication, but they have no existence that is separate from, or independent of, the mind which conceives them. This is a point of view that had important consequences for the future development of epistemological theories. It meant a change of direction in the course of inquiry. Instead of trying to discover the nature of the object to which the ideas might refer, the purpose of the investigation is to understood to be that of discovering the way in which these ideas are formed in the human mind. This can be seen in the analysis that Locke makes of the ideas of space and time. According to the Newtonian conception, which was generally accepted in Locke's day, both space and time have an existence in the outside, or external, world. In contrast with this view, Locke shows how they are derived from the mind's reflection on the particular sensations that have occurred and the order and manner of their appearance and disappearance. In this way he anticipated the subjective theories of space and time which were developed at a later time by Immanuel Kant. Locke's account of class names, or what had long been known as universals, brings to light one of the most important implications of his theory. Rationalistic thinkers had always insisted that because ideas of this kind are eternal and unchanging, they are the only ones that can rightfully be called real. In contrast with them, it was believed that the ideas derived from sense perceptions can be called real only insofar as the universal ideas are present in them. In other words, that which changes was regarded as unreal, and only the permanent and unchanging was real. Locke's theory reverses this conception entirely. For him, only that which is revealed through the senses is real. Since only particular objects are revealed in this way, it follows that universals must be regarded as mere abstractions which have no independent existence. This was a revival of the medieval doctrine known as nominalism, according to which universals are merely names that stand for nothing other than the particular ideas that have been present in the mind. Had Locke remained true to this position throughout his entire discussion, he could not have maintained his belief in substances, either material or spiritual. Some recognition of this fact seems to be implied in the ambiguity that is involved in his conception of substance. Actually he uses this term with three different meanings. Sometimes he speaks of substances, both spiritual and material, as though they existed independent of any mind. At other times, he writes as though substances were nothing more than the ideas that have been created by human minds. Finally, he speaks of substance as an unknown substratum, "a something we know not what." The problem concerning personal identity is another one in which the implications of Locke's method lead to a conclusion that he does not accept. Apparently he wants to retain the belief that it is the same person who passes through the successive stages of infancy, childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. Certainly there is no sense impression that indicates an object of this kind. To be sure, Locke has a kind of explanation to account for continuity of experiences that are included in one's life as a whole. Each moment of one's life, he tells us, acts in a causal way to determine what the next moment will be like. Hence, there is a sense in which the person at one moment in life may be said to be responsible for deeds that were done earlier. But the question still remains concerning what it is that constitutes the unity that binds together the successive moments of existence. On the basis of Locke's empirical method, we can only say that the person is a complex idea made up by the mind out of a series of simple ideas. It does not refer to a reality that is other than the particular sensations of which it is composed. This is scarcely sufficient to account for a personality who is morally responsible for the deeds he performs, and yet this is the sense in which the term person is generally used and understood. Once more it is the question of whether universals can be regarded as real. Since universals and particulars are correlatives in the sense that neither one is

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meaningful apart from the other, there seems to be no good reason why one of them should be considered as real in preference to the other. The same thing may be said with reference to the idea of causality. On this point Locke seems to be reluctant to admit the logical consequence of his empirical method. Since the notion of necessity that is involved in the idea of a causal relation is something that cannot be experience by the senses or discovered by the reflection of the mind on sensations, there is no basis for claiming that it has any real existence. The scientists of Locke's day had assumed without question that causation in the sense of a necessary connection between events was a characteristic of the external world. Locke accepts their position and continues to hold it even though no support can be found for it in the actual experiences of either sensation or reflection.

BOOK III OF WORDS Summary The subject matter of Book III is the use and the abuse of words. It is the shortest of the four books included in the Essay, and its primary purpose is to deal in a more direct manner with some of the problems that emerged from the accounts given in Book II concerning the formation and significance of complex ideas. One of these problems, as we have noted before, is the one that has to do with the question of personal identity. How can one be said to be the same person when all of the particular facts connected with both his physical and his mental existence have changed a number of times? This is but one instance of the larger problem that involves the meaning of all general or universal ideas. Philosophers of the rationalist tradition had always insisted that universal ideas stand for actual realities. This position had been maintained in two different ways. According to one of them, universals have an existence that is completely independent of particular things. According to the other view, they are realities which are always present in things but do not exist apart from the particulars in which they are expressed. Locke's theory of knowledge rejects both of these views and advocates instead that only particular things are real. For this reason, it seemed to him to be most appropriate that he should clarify his own position with reference to universals and set forth as clearly as he could the reasons upon which it was based. To accomplish this purpose, he found it necessary to discuss at some length the ways in which words are used and to point out the confusion that results when their proper use is not clearly understood. In making this kind of a report, he became one of the pioneers in the development of what is known as the philosophy of language. In the opening chapters of this book, Locke describes in brief the origin and function of language, pointing out the way in which particular sounds and signs acquire their first meanings. They are used to refer to that present in the minds of other people and also to refer to external objects, or what is usually called the reality of things. Once a word has been learned, it tends to excite in the mind the object to which it refers. This naturally suggests to anyone that there is some necessary connection between the word and the object for which it stands. This, according to Locke, is a mistaken notion. He insists that the connection is one that is chosen arbitrarily, and from this we may conclude that the meaning of a word is nothing other than what the individual who is using it wants it to mean. In other words, we may say that signs and sounds derive their meanings solely from their use.

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Chapter 3 is devoted entirely to a discussion of the meaning of general terms. Because they constitute by far the kind of words that occur most frequently in the development of any language, it is especially important to indicate just what it is to which they refer and what it is to which they do not refer. The formation and use of general terms, we are told, comes about because of the impossibility of finding a name for every particular object about which we wish to make some communication. Even if this were possible, it would only add confusion to any attempt on the part of one person to convey his ideas to the mind of another. For language to become a meaningful instrument of communication, it is necessary for some words to be used to refer to whole classes, or groups of objects, which have certain qualities in common. By giving a name to those qualities that are always associated in sense perception, we can designate a whole group of objects without stopping to take into account the various respects in which each member of the group differs from other ones. It is in this manner that we arrive at such class names as metal, chair, man, animals, tree, house, and so forth. The important thing to remember in this connection is that the name which is given to designate a class of objects is purely a creation of the mind. Although it serves a useful purpose in enabling persons to communicate with one another, it does not refer to any object in itself that may be thought of as having an existence independent of the mind. By giving this account of the formation of general or universal ideas, Locke expresses his opposition to the time-honored doctrine of essences, which had prevailed among most scholars since the days of Aristotle. According to this doctrine, the species of humans and animals as well as that of all created things is something that remains constant, and all of the particular examples included in each class of objects are only partial embodiments or imitations of the ideal reality for which each class name stands. One of Aristotle's illustrations of this doctrine can be seen in what he had to say about the species of plants and animals. He commented on the fact that nature appears to have a high regard for the species inasmuch as they remain constant in spite of all the changes that occur in the individuals through which the species is made manifest in the world of our experience. This doctrine, which has frequently been referred to as that of "the immutability of the species," was accepted by the majority of scientists in Locke's day. It was not challenged in any serious way on scientific grounds until the publication of Charles Darwin's Origin of Species. Locke's analysis of universal ideas constituted a challenge on philosophical grounds. His position is well indicated by the words with which he concludes this part of the discussion. He says, "all the great business of genera and species, and their essences amount to no more but this: --That men making abstract ideas do thereby enable themselves to consider things in bundles." This enables them to communicate with one another more readily than would be possible if their words and thoughts were confined to particulars. The use of general terms is necessarily involved in the making of definitions. On this point Locke tells us that simple ideas cannot be defined. The reason for this is that each one is unique, and any attempt to make a definition of it would consist in stating what it is in terms of what it is not. The situation is quite different in the case of complex ideas, which are derived through the processes of combining, comparing, and abstracting. Here the mind has the power of creating new ideas that did not have any prior existence. In the case of simple ideas, we naturally tend to think of an external object that has caused the sensation, but there is no object of this kind that produces complex ideas. When a name is given to any complex idea, it may suggest that there is an essence or entity of some sort that corresponds to it. However, we have no evidence to indicate that anything of this nature has any real existence outside of the mind which has created it. The name given to the complex idea does have a definite signification, and for this reason it can be used for the purposes of an inter-personal exchange of ideas.

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Locke's position regarding the meaning of general terms is made especially clear in a chapter entitled "Names of Our Ideas of Substances." He rejects the view that ideas of substances refer to essences which belong to the natural order of things. On the contrary, he maintains they are complex ideas that have been formed by the activity of the mind and given specific names, which makes it possible for one person to communicate with another about the particular ideas that he has in mind. While the naming of these ideas may carry the suggestion that they refer to entities which have been placed by nature in the external objects, a careful consideration of the facts will indicate that this is not the case. The limitless number of variations which distinguish the individual members of any given species makes it evident that nature does not have a fixed pattern or form which is imposed on the individual members of a class of objects. Rather, it is the mind of the person who is trying to understand the objects of his experience that determines what constitutes the essences of things. This is done by selecting the similarities that one observes in a number of these ideas and attaching a particular name to them. The fact that different people do not always select the same number of similarities is the reason why one person's understanding of what is included in a given essence does not always coincide with that of another person. The selections are more or less arbitrary, and they are conditioned in each case by the purpose for which they are made. The more general the nature of the substance that is named, the greater will be the amount of variations that this name will suggest to different minds. In the case of artificial substances in which the specific elements that are included can be named, there will be a greater degree of similarity in the minds of different people than will be true when one is speaking of natural substances. In his discussion of the abuse of words, Locke makes a number of important observations. There is nothing that hinders the acquisition of genuine knowledge any more than the failure of people to use words in the proper sense of their meaning. Before Locke's time, Francis Bacon had attempted to deal with this problem by insisting that the idols of the cave, market place, tribe, and theater should all be swept from the human mind. Locke appears to have been influenced a great deal by the general trend of Bacon's philosophy, which is especially evident in what he has to say about the abuse of words and the remedies that may be used to correct it. Among the abuses of words against which Locke warns his readers is the use of words that have no definite or specific meaning. Apparently he has in mind the way philosophers of medieval times would attempt to solve difficult problems by the use of some term the meaning of which was so obscure that instead of providing an adequate solution for the problem it did nothing more than give it a new name. Another abuse consists in the use of words to which some definite meaning has been attached in the past but which is now used in a very different connection and conveys a meaning that is other than the one for which it was originally intended. In some instances, this second usage will have no definite meaning at all. This is often the case when people use such words as wisdom, glory, grace, or liberty. Sometimes words are used when certain names have been learned before one understands the ideas to which they belong. As a result, there is a lack of constancy in the meanings attached to them. Several other misuses of words are described and illustrated, but the one which Locke is especially concerned to warn against is that of taking words to stand for things when in reality they signify nothing but ideas. This is what occurs when the names of essences are interpreted to refer to actual entities which have an existence that is independent of the mind. The remedy for these abuses of words is fairly obvious from the description of the ways in which they occur. However, Locke's statements concerning the remedies to be used are interesting even if they are not always consistent with the nominalistic position he has tried to maintain. He tells us, in the first place,

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that no word should be used without having some distinct idea annexed to it. When words are used to signify complex ideas, they must be determinate in the sense that they refer to a specific combination of simple ideas. This is especially important in the case of moral terms to avoid ambiguity in the use of words such as justice or righteousness. In the names of substances, we need something more than barely determined ideas: "In these the names must also be conformable to things as they exist." It is also important to apply words to such ideas as one finds in common usage, and in those instances where one wishes to depart from common usage, he must make clear the precise meaning that he attaches to the words used. This may be done by the use of definitions and also by giving examples to illustrate the meaning one has in mind. Commentary Book III is an attempt to account for the origin and meaning of universal terms without departing from the principles set forth in the earlier parts of the Essay. Having rejected the doctrine of innate ideas and having advocated the view that all knowledge comes from experience, the author found it necessary to explain the true meaning of those ideas that refer to something other than the changing and transitory elements of sensation and reflection. These elements are of momentary duration, but general terms and universal ideas refer to something that is at least relatively permanent. At any rate, they signify something that does not change as quickly or in the same manner as sensations. How then can one account for the meaning of universals without resorting to the view that they have been implanted in the mind from some source that is other than experience? Locke's answer to this question lies in his analysis of the way in which words are used. By giving attention to the psychological aspects of the problem rather than attempting to deal with the metaphysical issues that are involved, he initiated the movement which in later years came to be known as the philosophy of language. The importance of this trend in Locke's way of thinking can be understood only in the light of its influence on the course of philosophy during the centuries that followed. Although Locke was not the first one to call attention to the uses and the abuses of words, his analysis went further than that of Francis Bacon or any other one of his predecessors. This was due primarily to the fact that his account of words and their uses was directly associated with his empirical theory of knowledge. It is true, as many of his critics have pointed out, that Locke did not always accept the logical consequences of the method which he had adopted. Because of this, he has been severely criticized for the inconsistencies that are implicit in his epistemology. Those who are most sympathetic with the quality of Locke's work do not deny the inconsistencies, but they hold that he was too wise a man to allow theoretical inconsistencies to stand in the way of good common sense. They believe he was right in the views that he maintained even though they could not be made to harmonize with the premises on which his whole theory was based. This is the type of thing which has led some people to the conviction that in practical matters, ordinary common sense is more reliable than theoretical speculations no matter how consistent or complete they may be. Locke's inconsistences in this respect would be regarded by those of a practical turn of mind as evidence of sound judgment on his part. Nevertheless, any fair appraisal of Locke's work must take stock not only of what he believed to be true but also the adequacy of the arguments that he used in support of those beliefs. It is precisely in this area that the weaknesses of his philosophical position can be brought to light. He wanted to refute the scholastic doctrine of essences and along with it the belief that genera, species, and, in fact, all universals are demarcations of nature to which the ideas in out minds must correspond.

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To do this he tried to show how it is that all of these complex ideas are the products of the mind brought about through the processes of combining, comparing, and abstracting. Having created these complex ideas, the mind goes one step further and attaches names to them. The naming of these ideas serves a useful purpose in that it furnishes a means of identification and enables one person to communicate with another in a manner that makes it possible for each of them to know what is in the mind of the other person. The error which Locke warns against is that of supposing the name stands for an entity in nature; in reality, it is only an idea in someone's mind. Hence, there are no species, genera, or universals in nature. They are only devices that the mind has created to enable a person to understand and to adjust himself to his environment. It is easy to see that the logical outcome of this line of reasoning can be none other than complete skepticism about the nature of anything that is external to the human mind. Whether there are any permanent patterns or forms of objects in the outside world is something that it is impossible to know. The same thing must also be true with reference to personal identity or selfhood which persists over a period of years. What is generally understood to be a person or self cannot be identified with any single sensation or moment of existence. There are some passages in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding which indicate that Locke accepted this type of skepticism. He was always anxious to avoid the appearance of dogmatism, and this may have been one of the reasons why in some instances he was careful not to make any definite statement about the nature of the outside world. While he could not deny the existence of universals in nature, he could assert that there is no evidence to support one's belief in them. There are, however, other passages in the book which indicate quite clearly that Locke was not satisfied with so skeptical an attitude about knowledge of the world. He never abandoned the idea that it is objects in the outside world that cause sensations to appear in human minds. Even in his discussion of the names that are applied to substances, he warns his readers that they must be cautious in the way in which these names are selected and used. With reference to this matter, he says, "In these the names must also be conformable to things as they exist." One might ask in this connection by what means will it be possible for anyone to know whether the names given to complex ideas are conformable to things as they really exist? Apparently Locke never doubts his own personal identity, the reality of a material world, or the principle of causality as a force or power which produces changes both in the outside world and within human minds. Of course, the logical implications of his basic premises makes it quite impossible to establish the validity of any of these beliefs. Nevertheless, the beliefs may be true in spite of this fact, and there are few persons who would doubt that they are. The general character of Locke's theory of knowledge indicates that he is contemptuous of metaphysics. Since all knowledge is derived from experience, and human experience is so limited that one can have only partial and fragmentary knowledge about the world in which he lives, any attempt to go beyond the boundaries of human experience and find out something about the nature of the universe as a whole is necessarily doomed to failure. It was with reference to metaphysical speculations that Locke is said to have written to a friend, "You and I have had enough of this kind of fiddling." In spite of this general attitude, Locke found it impossible to avoid making some commitments with reference to the nature of the universe. He did affirm his belief in God, in the reality of material and spiritual substances, the existence of causal relationships, the moral character of the universe, and other matters all of which are metaphysical in character.

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BOOK IV KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY Summary In the fourth and final book of the Essay, Locke sets forth the major elements included in the theory of knowledge that he has sought to establish by the arguments presented in the first three books. Many of his conclusions can be anticipated by anyone who has followed his line of reasoning up to this point. There are, however, a number of questions which arise when one stops to consider the implications that are involved in many of the statements which he has made. Several of these questions are discussed at some length in this part of the Essay. In fact, the contents of this book may be summarized as the answers that Locke has given to the following list of questions. What, in general, is the meaning of the term knowledge, or in other words, how is knowledge to be defined? Are there different degrees of knowledge, and if so, how can they be distinguished? What is the scope of human knowledge, and what limitations with reference to it must be recognized? To what extent are the various degrees of knowledge reliable? What is the meaning of the term truth, and how can truth and falsity be distinguished? Can universal propositions, such as we have in the different fields of science, be said to be true or false? Do we have any certain knowledge of our own existence? Is it possible to know anything about the external world? Do we have any knowledge concerning the existence or the nonexistence of God? What, if anything, do we know about the principles of morality? Can ideas about what is right or wrong in the area of human conduct be regarded as true or false? What is the role of faith in the achievement of human knowledge? Is there such a thing as "revealed" knowledge? How can one distinguish between what is regarded as revealed truth and blind superstition? What is the relationship between faith and reason? In what areas of experience is it impossible to have anything more than probable knowledge? What are the major sources of error in the judgments that people make concerning the world of their experiences? All of these questions and many more of a like nature are pertinent to any type of epistemological inquiry. We shall here attempt to state briefly the substance of the answers that Locke has provided in the final portion of his Essay. Knowledge, according to Locke, is the agreement or disagreement of ideas with one another. To use his own words, it is "the perception of the connection of an agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas." This sounds like a purely subjective theory of knowledge, and if one were to follow it with complete consistency, it would lead to solipsism and a denial of any genuine knowledge about anything other than one's own mind. But Locke does not follow the implications of his definition of knowledge this far. Apparently his main purpose in this connection was to emphasize the fact that all knowledge has its origin in the sensations and reflections which occur within the human mind. Whether the ideas which are formed by these mental processes are adequate to tell us anything about that which is external to one's own mind is something that cannot be inferred from the ideas themselves. In spite of this fact, Locke never doubts that these ideas do signify something other than themselves, but he suggests very wisely that one should exercise considerable caution in determining just what it is that they do signify. While he admits that they do signify something, he is equally sure that they do not tell us as much as people in general suppose that they do.

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The agreement or disagreement of ideas with one another makes possible four different kinds of knowledge. The first one is that of identity or diversity. It consists in that activity of the mind which distinguishes one idea from another. It is what enables one to know that black is not white or that what is round is not square. The second kind is that of the immediate discernment of the relations between ideas. This type of knowledge is illustrated in the field of mathematics when, for example, we perceive that two plus two equals four. The third kind consists in the observation of the coexistence or non-coexistence of certain qualities in the same object. It is in this manner that we come to associate certain sense qualities with a particular substance, as we do in the case of gold, lead, wood, or any other substance. The fourth kind is one's knowledge of real existence or the correspondence between the ideas in one's mind and the objects to which they refer in the outside world. All that can be called knowledge belongs to one or more of these four kinds, but it must be recognized that no one of these types of knowledge is necessarily present in one's consciousness at any given moment. Knowledge may be either actual or habitual. It is actual when one is conscious of it, and it is habitual when it is preserved in one's memory. Locke maintains that there are different degrees of knowledge, and these can be distinguished by the extent to which they provide certainty in the realm of one's beliefs. They are also distinguished by the way in which the beliefs are obtained. Some ideas are known intuitively. Some are known through a process of demonstration. Still others are known through sense perception. Of these three ways of knowing, it is intuitive knowledge that provides the highest degree of certainty. Demonstrative knowledge comes next, and sensitive knowledge has the lowest degree of certainty, which amounts to no more than probability. There are, however, different degrees of probability which may be determined on the basis of past experiences, which include that of other persons as well as one's own. When the probability is high enough to meet certain tests which have been established, we may say that the beliefs which are supported by it may rightfully be classified as knowledge. Among the things which are known intuitively, nothing can be more certain than the perception of agreement or disagreement of ideas with one another. It is in this way that we know with certainty that one object is not identical with another object. In the same way, we know that the whole of anything is greater than any one of its parts. By the same token, we can be certain of our own existence. What is known intuitively is that of which we are immediately aware without the intervention of any proof or the invoking of any outside authority. Demonstrative knowledge differs from intuitive knowledge inasmuch as it requires a medium by means of which one idea can be compared with another. It is in this connection that we speak of the proof which supports a given conclusion. For example, it is possible to prove that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. In this case, the connection between premises and conclusion is not something that is evident at first sight or prior to any reasoning process. In the case of sensitive knowledge, which forms the basis for all of our scientific investigations, we must rely on past experiences for any knowledge about what will happen in the future So far as the logic of the position is concerned, we must admit that what has happened in the past does not tell us anything about what will occur in the future. Nevertheless, Locke maintains that the fact that events have occurred in a certain way so many times in the past makes it highly probable that they will continue with the same sequence in the future. It is this high degree of probability that constitutes the basis for what may be called sensitive knowledge. The extent to which human knowledge is reliable is determined by the nature and the number of the experiences on which it is based. Only that which has been experienced either directly or else demonstrated by means of inferences drawn from these experiences can be regarded as genuine knowledge. Concerning that which lies beyond experiences, we can know nothing at all. Metaphysicians

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who write about the nature of the universe as a whole, or who think they can tell us something about the world of spirits, or the character of the substances out of which the universe is composed are only fooling themselves as well as the persons who accept their judgments as being true. Their views can be nothing more than idle speculations so long as there is no sensory experience by means of which their conclusions may be either confirmed or denied. Because the human mind is limited by the number and kinds of experiences that are possible, the scope of one's knowledge is relatively small. No individual can ever hope to know more than a small fraction of all that exists. Recognition of this fact should have a wholesome effect on one's attitude both with reference to himself and his judgment of those who may happen to disagree with him. It should encourage humility in regard to himself and a spirit of tolerance and charity toward the opinions of others. Although the scope of one's knowledge is necessarily limited, this is no reason for complaint since the possibilities for knowledge that are open to him are sufficient for his needs. One of the most important items in any epistemological theory is the conceptions of truth and of error that are implied in it. In a strictly deterministic system which allows for no freedom of choice, neither truth nor error is a logical possibility. In a system that does allow for alternative choices, truth and error are possibilities provided there is some fixed standard in comparison with which one's ideas and beliefs may be judged. On the basis of Locke's empiricism, this standard cannot be things in themselves, for there is no way of knowing the nature of things apart from the way in which they affect human minds. Since Locke does believe that human judgments may be either true or false, he finds it necessary to develop a different standard for determining the validity of one's beliefs. The standard which he proposes is that of the agreement or disagreement of ideas with one another. Truth, as he understands it, is not something that exists eternally, nor is it something that is independent of one's thinking. The truth or the error of which we speak is something that comes into being when we begin to make propositions about things. The truth of a proposition consists in "the joining or separating of signs, as the things signified by them do agree or disagree with one another." The reverse of this statement is what is meant by error or falsehood. The use of universal propositions in which affirmations are made that go beyond the boundaries of past experience presents something of a problem for an empirical epistemology. When, for example, we say that "all men are mortal," we are asserting not only that people have died in the past but that the same will be true of people for all time to come. Since this statement includes the future as well as the past, we may ask how it is possible for anyone to know that it is a true statement? Locke's answer to this question is significant because of the way in which it illustrates his main position. He says, in substance, that whether this proposition is true depends on what one means when he speaks about humanity and mortality. If he has in mind some fixed and unchanging essence of humanity that exists independently of our thinking about it, then there is no basis for accepting the proposition as true. Whether an essence of this type really exists or not is something that cannot be known. Even if it does exist, we cannot know what it is like or how it will behave in the future. All that we do know in this connection is what takes place in our own minds. It is true that we may regard our sensations as being the result or effect of some external force, but how or why it acts that way is beyond the limitations of our minds. This does not imply, as one might think, that universal propositions are meaningless or that we have no way of determining whether they are true. What we need to recognize is that when we use a proposition such as "all men are mortal" in its proper sense, we are referring not to an external essence but to a definition which has been formed in our own mind. The proposition will be true because we have defined

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man as a mortal being and if he were not mortal he would not be a man. In other words, what this means is that universal propositions are true only when they are tautologies. This accounts for the fact that in the field of mathematics, the propositions which are used are not only universal but are also true. The multiplication table, for example, is true for all people and for all time. The reason, of course, is the fact that in mathematics we are dealing with ideas and not with things. Propositions of this kind illustrate what Locke meant when he said that truth is the agreement of ideas with one another. This explanation is sufficient to enable us to understand the validity of universal propositions that occur in the formal sciences such as logic and mathematics or any other area in which the propositions used are of an analytic nature. The situation is somewhat different in the inductive sciences where universal statements are used in reference to the laws of nature which enable us to make predictions about what will happen under a given set of circumstances. How, for example, can we know that the law of gravity will hold true for the movements of falling bodies in the future? Locke's answer is that we really do not know. All that we can say with certainty is that on the basis of past experiences, there is a strong probability that the same sequence of events will occur in the future. The so-called laws of nature are not fixed and unchanging entities that belong to the external world. They are only generalizations which have been formed by human minds by a process of abstracting from a series of events certain elements that they have had in common. Once this abstraction has been made, it becomes the basis on which predictions are made with reference to future occurrences of the same kind. This is the reason why Locke maintains that in the areas of the physical and the natural sciences, universal statements do not yield certainty but only varying degrees of probability. Because the knowledge that we obtain by intuition yields the highest degree of certainty, there is nothing of which we can be more sure than the fact of our own existence. Locke tells us that we perceive it so plainly and so certainly that there is no need for proof. With reference to the existence of an external world and of the existence of God, we have a very high degree of certainty, although it is somewhat less than the certainty we have of our own existence. In both of these instances, we have an example of demonstrative rather than intuitive knowledge. This means that the basis for our belief is an inference that has been drawn from ideas that have been established with certainty. We infer that an external world exists since there must be something which causes the sensations we experience. Likewise, Locke proposes, we infer the existence of God as the cause of the universe and as the author of the moral principles by which human conduct ought to be regulated. The existence of God, he holds, is logically necessary since it is impossible for something to come from nothing. All finite beings exist, and in order to avoid the idea that they came from nothing, we must believe in a being that is eternal rather than temporal and subject to all the characteristics of finitude. Whether God is a material being or only a thinking being is a matter that Locke does not discuss, but he does insist that he is a thinking being since thought cannot be a product of matter. Inasmuch as our sensory experiences can tell us nothing about the nature of deity or the moral principles which are derived from that source, Locke finds it necessary to rely on revelation for our knowledge about God and the basis for determining what is right or wrong conduct. He recognizes, however, that in so doing there are several precautions which need to be observed. Revealed truth may very easily be confused with blind superstition or wishful thinking. To avoid these errors, some criteria must be established for determining what is a genuine revelation of truth. If revelation is to be relied upon at all as a source of truth, it must be capable of imparting to human beings at least some things that go beyond the limitations of their finite minds.

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But while revelation may go beyond human reason, it cannot be contrary to reason. It is quite possible for us to accept by faith truths which are non-rational in the sense that they are not derived by reason, but we cannot accept as true anything that is irrational in the sense that it is either self-contradictory or contradicted by any known facts. The ideas that are obtained by means of faith and revelation do not have the same degree of certainty as intuitive or demonstrative knowledge, but they do go beyond the type of probability that we find in the inductive sciences. Revelation must always be tested by the criterion of reasonableness in relation to the knowledge that has been obtained in other ways. In no case can we accept revelation if it is contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge. Does this mean that all belief in miracles must be rejected? It would mean this if we held that the laws of nature are fixed and unchanging patterns which are embedded in the structure of the universe. But if the laws of nature are nothing more than generalizations or abstractions formed in human minds, this conclusion would not follow. We must, according to Locke's view, admit that miracles are possible and that they are supported by the testimony of those who produced the writings that are regarded as revelation. Our only basis for rejecting any of the miracle stories reported in the Bible would be some concrete evidence that the actual events which took place are not described accurately. Since we cannot reproduce the events in order to check the accuracy of the reports, we have no right to deny that they happened. On the other hand, we cannot affirm with certainty that they happened in exactly the way they have been described. In matters of faith which include the acceptance of revelation, we must recognize that reason is, and must be, the final judge with reference to any of our beliefs. Although Locke is not a rationalist in his philosophical position, he believes that reason has a very important place in the acquisition of human knowledge. Its function is primarily that of testing the validity of ideas which may be derived from different sources. Nothing can be regarded as true unless it meets the demands of reasonableness. Reason is not, however, to be interpreted in the narrow sense that identifies its use with purely deductive processes. It may include the use of the syllogism, but it also involves a great deal more. In this respect, Locke writes, "But God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational." It is not only possible but a very common occurrence for people to be reasonable without having had any instruction in the use of the syllogism. The proper use of one's rational faculties will provide a safeguard against the errors that stand in the way of achieving genuine knowledge. Among these errors we may observe such items as the following: assenting to propositions without stopping to examine the evidence on which they are based; making a wrong use of the evidence that we do have by refusing to give careful consideration to what is really implied by it; being swayed by non-rational considerations or, in other words, being guided by our feelings and emotions rather than logical inferences; and refusing to be convinced by unwelcome views which are contrary to our wishes and desires. To be aware of these tendencies toward error is the first step toward overcoming them. We may be confident that in the long run truth will win over error. Commentary The conclusions that Locke reached as the result of his long and painstaking investigations of the knowing process are set forth in this portion of the Essay. Book IV contains twenty-one chapters, and these are devoted to the task of making clear what he believes to be true about the nature and extent of human knowledge. Mainly, he has tried to follow the implications of the method and the presuppositions that were stated in the earlier portions of his work, but when these led to beliefs that he could not accept, he abandoned the ideal of consistency and included in his theory of knowledge a number of ideas that he held to be true. For doing this he has often been taken to task by his critics, who have insisted that any adequate system of thought must at least be consistent with itself.

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Without doubt the critics have been right in pointing out these particular defects in Locke's arguments, for it must be admitted that ideas and beliefs can never be entirely correct so long as they are inconsistent either with themselves or with any known facts. On the other hand, it must be recognized that ideas, and indeed whole systems of thought, may be entirely consistent and still be false. It is seldom if ever that human beings are completely consistent in their views about themselves or the world around them, and who is there to say that it is more important to be consistent than it is to be right? Most people who read Locke's Essay will agree that many of his conclusions were right even though they are not consistent with some of the positions on which they were supposed to be based. It would be a mistake to overlook the greatness of Locke's work because of some of the defects contained in it. The whole truth about human knowledge or any other subject of equal importance is more than can be grasped by any human mind, but this does not mean that it is impossible to gain valuable insights with reference to the topic under consideration. For bringing to light so many of these insights into the nature of the knowing process and the methods by means of which it may be achieved, the modern world has been greatly indebted to the work of this pioneer in the field of epistemology. By defining knowledge as the agreement or disagreement of ideas with one another, Locke has called attention to at least one important aspect of the knowing process. Sensation and reflection are the sources from which many of our ideas are obtained, and comparison of these ideas with one another is one method of determining whether they are true even though it may not be the only way in which this may be done. It is the method that is used successfully in the field of mathematics or any other science of a purely formal nature. But if this were the only way of determining what is true in any area of investigation, we could never know anything about an outside world. Our knowledge would, under these conditions, be limited to whatever takes place in our own minds. Because this type of conclusion was wholly unacceptable to Locke, he did not follow the implications of his definition of knowledge, but instead he insisted that true ideas are in agreement with the qualities which are present in things. Thus Locke maintained that two of the four kinds of knowledge which are possible on the basis of one's perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas imply something more than that which is immediately present in the ideas themselves. Memory is said to be the storehouse for knowledge that is not always present in one's consciousness. It can be seen quite readily that his statement implies a continuing self which does the remembering and which recognizes that it is a memory rather than an experience that is entirely new. There is no sensory evidence for the existence of selfhood which memory seems to imply, although the logic of the situation apparently compels us to believe in it. Again, Locke's belief in the existence of a self was probably correct, but certainly it could not be derived from the sensations themselves nor from any reflections that are based solely upon them. What is said in the Essay concerning the degrees of knowledge has considerable merit, for nothing is more obvious than the fact that some of our beliefs are more certain than others. Locke maintains, for example, that there are different degrees of certainty in what we believe about our own existence, the existence of God, and the phenomena of nature. These degrees of certainty correspond to the ways in which the knowledge is obtained. He tells us that we have intuitive knowledge of our own existence, demonstrative knowledge of the existence of God, and only probable knowledge of that which the senses reveal to us concerning the phenomena of nature. Although there appears to be some truth in each of these assertions, it requires only a very simple analysis to point out some of the inadequacies connected with each of them. Intuition does yield the highest degree of certainty that is possible with reference to some things. It is the supreme authority about what is present in our own states of consciousness. It tells us whether we are experiencing pain, or seeing yellow, or red, at any given moment. We can be equally sure about the content of any momentary state of consciousness. But to say, as Locke does say, that we know intuitively of the existence of a self that is

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continuous over a relatively long period of time is to assert something more than is warranted in the bare facts of the case. Demonstrative knowledge does yield a high degree of certainty, provided it is based on true premises and one makes no errors in his reasoning. Locke's argument for the existence of God, as well as his argument for the existence of an outside world, is based on the premise that whatever exists must have been caused by something other than itself. Now this is undoubtedly true so far as the world of our experience is concerned, but this does not warrant the belief that the final cause of events is something that lies outside of the realm of human experience. If causality is to mean anything more than a succession of ideas in one's mind--and apparently it does mean something more than that for Locke--there is no sensory experience which provides any basis for believing that things are caused at all. To be sure, demonstrative knowledge can yield certainty in the field of mathematics, in which all the propositions used are analytic in nature, but it does not yield the same results when applied to the phenomena of nature or to the existence of God. Locke believed in the existence of God, but he was evidently mistaken in his belief that it could be demonstrated or proved by logical deduction from the facts of human experience. Sense knowledge is what we must rely on for any information we have concerning the phenomena of nature, or what is usually referred to as the area of the physical and natural sciences. It is in this area that Locke is especially concerned to point out the limitations of the human mind. Since all of our beliefs about the external world must be formed on the basis of that which takes place in our own minds, it is obvious that we cannot know the real nature of things-in-themselves. Anyone who recognizes this fact will be more apt to avoid making dogmatic assertions about the character of the universe when viewed as a whole. It is for this reason that Locke is skeptical concerning the validity of any metaphysical speculations. Those who claim to know that reality is composed solely of matter, or that ideas are the stuff out of which all things are made, are in his judgment merely indulging in idle speculations since there is no concrete evidence that will either confirm or deny the truth of what they are saying. Even though Locke's epistemology appears to exclude all metaphysical assertions, he did not wish to eliminate the belief that we do have some genuine knowledge in the fields of the physical and natural sciences. This was possible on the basis of his theory, provided that we do not claim too much for the knowing processes in these fields of investigation. Scientific knowledge, he maintained, does not reveal the independent nature of external objects. It only reveals the way in which things appear to human minds. It is true that the scientist believes she can make accurate predictions with reference to the way events will take place in the future under specified conditions. However, the only basis for these predictions is the fact that events have taken place a certain way in the past. This, in itself, provides no guarantee at all concerning the future. Locke admits that this is true, and, accordingly, he insists that, while we do not have any certain knowledge about future events, we can have probable knowledge of when and how they will take place. The degree of probable knowledge will in each case depend on the number and character of the events that have occurred in the past. It seems appropriate in this connection to inquire just what Locke means by probable knowledge when applied to the predictions that scientists make on the basis of the so-called laws of nature. If probability means something more than an ordinary guess in which the chances of it being correct are equal to those of its being incorrect, then there must be something in the order of nature that governs the way in which events will take place. If we cannot know anything about the order of nature, as Locke has insisted in his former arguments, then there is no basis for asserting that we have even probable knowledge about future

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events. This is another instance in which Locke's beliefs may be correct even though from a logical point of view they are inconsistent with the views on which they are supposed to be based. The same type of criticism can be urged with reference to his attitude toward metaphysics. Having excluded all metaphysical speculations as idle and a waste of time, he goes on to affirm his belief in the existence of God, the moral order of the universe, the reality of both mind and matter, the reality of causal relations, and the possibility of probable knowledge in the field of the natural sciences. All of these beliefs are at least to some extent of a metaphysical nature. If what Locke had to say about metaphysical speculations is interpreted to mean that no one can have complete and exact knowledge about the entire universe, it would be impossible to take issue with him, nor would there by any reason to do so. But this is not what Locke meant in his criticism of metaphysics. What he did mean is that it is impossible for anyone to have any knowledge about that which goes beyond the limits of human experience. Furthermore, he held that no one has the right to accept as true any beliefs concerning ultimate reality or the character of the universe as a whole. Apparently Locke was not aware of the fact that any theory of knowledge, including his own, necessarily presupposes something about the ultimate nature of things. One may be critical of any particular metaphysical theory but cannot avoid having one of his own. The fact that no one's beliefs about the nature of the universe will be complete or exact in every respect does not imply that we can know nothing about it at all. We do have some principles that may serve as guides toward a correct view of things. We know that our beliefs in order to be true must be consistent with themselves, in harmony with all known facts, and they must provide us with a reasonable interpretation of our experiences. When these conditions have been met, it can be said that we have what may rightfully be called some degree of probable knowledge.

GLOSSARY agreement When Locke speaks of the agreement of ideas with one another, he means they fit together in a consistent pattern. archetypes This term was used by Locke to indicate the types or class of things. They are the universals, or what is sometimes known as the essences of things. Aristotle Greek philosopher (384-322 B.C.) who possessed one of the most brilliant minds of all time. His wide interests extended into many fields of knowledge. His ideas became central to Western thought for centuries and many of them retain their vitality to the present day. In the Organon he produced the first formal treatment of thought and logic. Among his other well known works are Physics, Metaphysics, Politics, Ethics, Rhetoric, and Poetics. Bacon, Francis A distinguished philosopher (1561-1626) who made important contributions to the field of inductive logic and who was instrumental in the development of modern scientific methods. His best known works are The Advancement of Learning (1605); Novum Organum (1620); and New Atlantis (1627). Berkeley, George An Irish churchman and philosopher (1685-1753) who, in his doctrines of philosophical idealism, vigorously opposed the tendencies of the freethinkers. He is best known for his Treatise Concerning the

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Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (1713), and Alciphron: or, The Minute Philosopher (1732). causality The notion that whatever exists has been caused by something. A cause is an invariable antecedent. The law of universal causation asserts that there is a reason for whatever happens. coexistence Two or more things are so related that they are always found together. No one of them can exist by itself alone. correspondence theory of truth This is the doctrine that ideas are true only when they are similar to, or correspond to, objects that are external to the human mind. critical realism This is a type of philosophy that asserts that material objects can be known by human minds even though there is no direct interaction between mind and matter. Darwin, Charles An eminent naturalist and scientist (1809-82) who was the author of On the Origin of Species (1859), a book which had much to do with the development of the theory of evolution. His other well-known works include the Diary of the Voyage of H.M.S. "Beagle" (1839) and The Descent of Man (1871). Descartes, René A prominent French philosopher (1596-1650) who is often referred to as the father of modern philosophy. He was an ardent rationalist who attempted to develop a system of philosophy by using the methods employed in mathematics. His Discourse on Method (1639) is a cornerstone of modern thought. dualism Composed of two elements that are qualitatively distinct: mind and matter for metaphysical dualism, and subject and object for an epistemological dualism. duration That which lasts over a period of time. For some thinkers, duration is a characteristic of minds, whereas for others it pertains to objects which are external to mind. empirical method The method which derives knowledge from sense experience. empiricism One of the methods of knowing. In contrast to rationalism, which derives knowledge from reason, it uses sense experience as the source and test for all valid knowledge. epistemology One of the major areas included in the study of philosophy. It examines and criticizes the different methods of knowing. extension This term was used by Descrates in his definition of matter. He held that matter is extension, or that which exists in space.

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falsity The opposite of truth; that which is contrary to fact. Hume, David A prominent Scottish philosopher (1711-76) who made a critical analysis of the knowing process. He is often characterized as a skeptic in his theory of knowledge. He is best known for An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748); An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751); and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779). ideas, complex Ideas that are compounded from simple ones. According to Locke, they are formed by combining, comparing, and abstracting. ideas, simple Ideas that are derived from either sensation or reflection, or a combination of them. identity, personal The belief that it is the same person who passes through a relatively long series of experiences. innate ideas Ideas that are present in the mind but have not been derived from experience. internal sense Sensations which reveal only that which is within the mind itself. immensity The idea of vastness, or that which goes beyond the limits of our imagination, such as infinite space. Kant, Immanuel One of the most influential German philosophers of modern times (1724-1804). His analysis of the knowing process has had an important bearing on nearly all of the subsequent treatments of the subject. He was the author of Critique of Pure Reason (1781); Critique of Practical Reason (1788); and Critique of Judgment (1790). Leibnitz, Gottfried W. An outstanding German mathematician and philosopher (1646-1716) who wrote extensively in the fields of epistemology, metaphysics, and religion. He published his treatment of the differential and integral calculus in 1684, nine years before Newton's work appeared. Among his other important writings are Monadology (1714) and Principles of Nature and Grace (1714). memory The retention in one's mind of past experiences; ideas or mental images that may be recalled from a subconscious state. metaphysics One of the important divisions included in the field of philosophy. It examines and criticizes theories concerning the nature of the universe.

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modes Locke uses this term to designate ideas that are not substances but that are dependent on substances, such as triangle, gratitude, murder, and the like. Newton, Sir Isaac A philosopher and physicist (1642-1727) best known for his formulation of the laws of gravity and laws of motion. His studies of light were also highly significant. His famous works are the Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (1687) and Opticks (1704). nominalism The theory which holds that only particular things are real. Universals or class names have no reality that is independent of the mind. non-contradiction, law of One of the laws of thought. It asserts that a thing cannot be what it is and what it is not at the same time. A presupposition of all thinking. perception The mental act that derives meaning from sensations. Plato A Greek philosopher (427-347 B.C.) who is generally regarded as one of the greatest thinkers of the ancient world. His ideas are contained in the famous Dialogues. power, active That which is capable of producing changes in things other than itself. power, passive That which receives impressions from without. qualities, primary The qualities which belong to external objects, such as size, weight, or motion. qualities, secondary Those qualities which are only in the mind of the perceiving, subject such as color, sound, taste, or smell. rationalism One of the ways of knowing. It is illustrated in such fields as logic and mathematics, where knowledge is derived from reason. Royal Society The Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge is an English scientific body organized around 1660. It has been concerned with the advancement of learning in all fields but particularly in the natural sciences. sensation That which occurs in the mind through the operation of the sense organs such as sight and sound.

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Shaftesbury, First Earl of Anthony Ashley Cooper (1621-83), an English statesman who was a close friend of John Locke. His grandson, the Third Earl (1671-1713), whose education was supervised by Locke, was the author of the moral treatises Characteristics (1711), which aroused much interest during the eighteenth century. skepticism A type of philosophy that emphasizes the element of doubt concerning the validity of all knowledge. subjectivism The term means within the mind of the knowing subject. It asserts nothing concerning that which is external to the mind. substance The idea of a something that is capable of having a continuous existence by itself. For example, both mind and matter were regarded as substances by both Descrates and John Locke. succession State of following one another in point of time. time A measure of duration. truth That which agrees with the facts.

ESSAY TOPICS AND REVIEW QUESTIONS 1.

Give a brief account of the life of John Locke, mentioning in particular those events that were most influential in shaping the development of his philosophy.

2.

Describe briefly Locke's participation in the discussion group that led eventually to the writing of his famous Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

3.

Make a list of Locke's published writings and show how the ideas set forth in the Essay are related to the other writings.

4.

Make a short outline of the topics discussed in the Essay and show how these are related to the main purpose for which it was written.

5.

Explain in some detail the doctrine concerning innate ideas which had been accepted by many of Locke's contemporaries and predecessors.

6.

Why did Locke think it was important to prove that innate ideas do not exist? What proof did he offer in support of his position?

7.

Criticize, from the point of view of logical adequacy, the arguments which Locke used to prove that innate ideas do not exist.

8.

What, according to Locke, are the two sources from which all ideas are derived? Explain briefly the kinds of ideas that are derived from each of these sources.

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9.

How does Locke distinguish between simple ideas and complex ideas? Give some examples to illustrate each of these two kinds of ideas.

10.

Name and illustrate each of the four kinds of simple ideas.

11.

How does Locke distinguish between primary and secondary qualities? Give some examples to illustrate each.

12.

What reasons are given to support the belief that primary qualities are present in the external objects while secondary qualities are present only in the mind?

13.

Explain with illustrations what Locke means by simple modes and mixed modes.

14.

How does Locke explain the origin of such ideas as duration, expansion, power, and relations?

15.

What explanation is given concerning the origin and meaning of the idea of substance?

16.

How does Locke's view concerning the meaning of the term substance differ from the traditional one which had been held by his predecessors?

17.

How does Locke account for the origin and meaning of the idea of causality? Do you think his conception of causality is consistent with his general theory of ideas? Explain.

18.

How does Locke distinguish between true and false ideas?

19.

What is the purpose of the discussion about words that forms the subject matter of Book III? In what respect does this part of the Essay constitute a contribution to the philosophy of language?

20.

What, according to Locke, are some of the common errors that result from a wrong use of words? How, in his judgment, can these errors be avoided?

21.

What does Locke mean by "degrees of our knowledge"? What different degrees does he recognize, and how does he account for the differences?

22.

What, according to Locke, are the limitations of human knowledge? In what areas can we have certain knowledge? In what areas can we have only probable knowledge?

23.

What is Locke's position concerning the validity of universal propositions in the formal sciences and in the inductive sciences?

24.

What, according to Locke, constitutes the basis for one's belief in his own existence? What reason do we have for believing in the existence of God?

25.

What, if anything, do we have a right to believe about the existence and the nature of the external world?

26.

What, for Locke, constitutes the basis for one's belief in the principles of morality?

27.

What does Locke mean by faith and by revelation? How can one distinguish between genuine revelation and blind superstition?

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28.

What do you regard as Locke's most important contributions toward an adequate theory of knowledge?

29.

What inconsistencies do you find in the doctrines that are set fourth in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding?

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY AARON, RAYMOND I. John Locke. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. This book is regarded by critics and reviewers as one of the most competent expositions of Locke's theory of knowledge. The book deals with Locke's life, his theory of knowledge, and his moral and political philosophy. BURTT, E. A., ed. English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill. New York: Modern Library, 1939. Contains lengthy extracts from the writings of nine prominent English philosophers. The extracts from Locke's Essay include the major aspects of his work, and they have the particular advantage of being presented from the perspective of English philosophy over a long period of time. CALKINS, MARY W., ed. Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Chicago: Open Court, 1962. A one-volume edition containing the complete text of Books II and IV. In addition to the text materials, the book contains a critical examination of the major ideas presented in the Essay. The author was a distinguished teacher of the history of philosophy. FOWLER, THOMAS. Locke. New York: Macmillan, 1909. This volume was written by an ardent admirer as well as critic of Locke. The approach to his philosophy is primarily historical. The events that were taking place in England and on the Continent are shown to have a direct bearing on the development of Locke's philosophy. HOFSTADER, ALBERT. Locke and Scepticism. New York: Albee Press, 1935. This study deals primarily with the philosophical aspects of Locke's theory of knowledge. It is both expository and critical. JAMES, D. G. The Life of Reason. New York: Longmans, Green, 1949. The period between 1650 and 1780 is frequently referred to as the Age of Reason. In this volume, the author deals extensively with the work of three men, Hobbes, Locke, and Bolingbroke. He shows how their respective contributions are related to each other and to subsequent periods of philosophy. LOCKE, JOHN. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2 vols. Ed. Alexander C. Fraser. In addition to the complete unabridged text, the edition includes an extensive introduction, along with biographical, historical, and critical notes. O'CONNOR D. J. John Locke. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1952. A highly recommended account of Locke's epistemology, with particular emphasis on its implications with reference to the philosophy of language. THOMPSON, SAMUEL M. A Study of Locke's Theory of Ideas. Monmouth, Ill.: Commercial Arts Press, 1934. A critical examination of Locke's empirical philosophy, with particular reference to the problems that are involved in any attempt to organize his ideas into a consistent system. YOLTON, JOHN W. John Locke and the Way of Ideas. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. A full account of Locke's philosophical position and its bearing on the field of epistemology, education,

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government, and religion. Recommended as one of the best secondary sources on the philosophy of Locke.

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