CONTENTS LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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ABOUT THE EDITORS
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INTRODUCTION Michael M. Beyerlein, Doug...
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CONTENTS LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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ABOUT THE EDITORS
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INTRODUCTION Michael M. Beyerlein, Douglas A. Johnson and Susan T. Beyerlein DEVELOPING COMPLEX COLLABORATIONS: BASIC PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION Don Mankin, Susan Cohen and Stephen P. Fitzgerald
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CO-DEVELOPMENT: COLLABORATING ACROSS BOUNDARIES ON JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER Jude G. Olson
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NOT YOUR STEPPING STONE: COLLABORATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF FIRM EVOLUTION IN THE LIFE SCIENCES Kenneth W. Koput and Walter W. Powell
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THE IMPACT OF COLLABORATIVE MOTIVATION ON COMPLEX MULTI-AGENCY PARTNERSHIPS: A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM Janine Stiles and Paul Williams
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COMPLEX COLLABORATIONS: THE CASE OF A BUSINESS SCHOOL AND ITS COMPLEX NETWORK OF RELATIONSHIPS Peter Lorange
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INTEGRATING PERSPECTIVES: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONSTRUCT OF COLLABORATIVE CAPABILITY Melanie Schreiner and Daniel Corsten
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THE COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY FRAMEWORK: FROM LOCAL TEAMS TO GLOBAL ALLIANCES Stephen P. Fitzgerald
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LEADING COMPLEX COLLABORATION IN NETWORK ORGANIZATIONS: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH Karen L. Higgins and Joseph A. Maciariello
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“SKONK WORKS HERE”: ACTIVATING NETWORK SOCIAL CAPITAL IN COMPLEX COLLABORATIONS LuAnne R. Johnson and David Knoke
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MANAGING VALUE AND VULNERABILITY IN COMPLEX COLLABORATIONS: ALLYING WITH COMPETITORS Joseph P. McGill and Michael D. Santoro
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Susan Cohen
Center for Effective Organizations, University of Southern California, USA
Daniel Corsten
Kuhne Institute for Logistics, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Stephen P. Fitzgerald
California School of Organizational Studies, Alliant International University, Alhambra, CA, USA
Karen L. Higgins
Executive Director and Director for Research and Engineering, NAVAIR Weapons Division, China Lake, CA, USA
LuAnne R. Johnson
Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota, USA
David Knoke
Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota, USA
Kenneth W. Koput
Eller College of Business, University of Arizona, USA
Peter Lorange
IMD – International Institute for Management Development, Lausanne, Switzerland
Joseph A. Maciariello
Drucker Graduate School of Management, Claremont, CA, USA
Don Mankin
Co:e-laboration Design Associates, Venice, CA, USA
Joseph P. McGill
College of Business, Kean University, Union, NJ, USA
Jude G. Olson
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, Fort Worth, TX (AND) Fielding Graduate Institute, Santa Barbara, CA, USA vii
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Walter W. Powell
Education and Organizational Behavior and Sociology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
Michael D. Santoro
College of Business & Economics, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA, USA
Melanie Schreiner
Institute for Technology Management, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Janine Stiles
Henley Management College, Henley on Thames, UK
Paul Williams
National Centre for Public Policy, University of Wales, Swansea, UK
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work was partially supported by the Center for Collaborative Organizations, formerly The Center for the Study of Work Teams. The change in name reflects our recognition that collaboration occurs at many levels of organization besides the team level. The Center has always considered bridging the gap between the academic and practice worlds a mission to be pursued. The success of that bridging is critical for understanding practice and for basing practice on tested theory. The chapters in this book reflect this kind of bridging partnership. We want to acknowledge the help and support of Nancy Gorman. For four volumes in this series, Nancy has been responsible for communicating with authors, editors, and the publisher, arranging for flow of manuscripts back and forth among these people, educating all of us on manuscript format, arranging for proofing, catching the errors the editors miss and bringing the chapters, introduction, and preface together in a final assembly to complete a whole for the publisher. Nancy has done an outstanding job under significant time pressure to pull the pieces together into a carefully prepared manuscript. Much of the quality in appearance for this volume is due to her thoughtful work.
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ABOUT THE EDITORS Michael Beyerlein is Director of the Center for Collaborative Organizations (www.workteams.unt.edu) and Professor of Industrial/Organizational Psychology at the University of North Texas. His research interests include all aspects of collaborative work systems, organization transformation, work stress, creativity/innovation, knowledge management and the learning organization, and complex adaptive systems. He has published in a number of research journals and has been a member of the editorial boards for TEAM Magazine, Team Performance Management Journal, and Quality Management Journal. Currently, he is senior editor of the Elsevier annual series of books Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams and the Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer Collaborative Work Systems series. He has authored or edited 15 books. His most recent are Beyond Teams: Building the Collaborative Organization (2002), The Collaborative Work System Fieldbook (2003), and Team-based Organizing (2003). He has been involved in projects at the Center for Collaborative Organizations (formerly, The Center for the Study of Work Teams) with such companies as Boeing, Shell, NCH, AMD, Raytheon, First American Financial, Westinghouse, and Xerox and with government agencies such as Veterans Affairs, DCMAO, EPA, and the City of Denton. Douglas A. Johnson is director of the Industrial/Organizational psychology program, professor of psychology, and associate director of the Center for Collaborative Organizations at the University of North Texas. He has published research in a variety of areas ranging from teams, leadership and job satisfaction, to operant conditioning and interpersonal attraction. He co-founded and served as president of the Dallas-Fort Worth Organizational Psychology Group (now Dallas Area Industrial/Organizational Psychologists), and participated in the creation of the Dallas office of the consulting firm, Personnel Decisions International, from whom he recently retired. Susan Tull Beyerlein holds a Ph.D. in organization theory and policy with a minor in education research from the University of North Texas. Since 1995, she has been an instructor of business and psychology at Our Lady of the Lake University in Irving, Texas. Susan has served as a research scientist/project manager with the Center for Collaborative Organizations at the University of North Texas, and has been a recipient of research grant awards from the Association for Quality xi
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and Participation, the National Science Foundation, and corporate donors. Since 1995, she has co-edited the Elsevier/JAI Imprint annual book series entitled, Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams, and has served as an ad hoc reviewer for The Academy of Management Review. She has been a member of the Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer Collaborative Works Systems series since its inception. Susan has published book reviews on contemporary business offerings in Business and the Contemporary World, and her work has also appeared in Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal, Journal of Management Education, Empirical Studies of the Arts, and Multiple Linear Regression Viewpoints. She is a member of the Academy of Management, Beta Gamma Sigma – the honor society for collegiate schools of business, and Phi Kappa Phi National Honor Society.
INTRODUCTION Complex collaboration refers to situations where working together effectively across boundaries is critical for complex projects and problems. This work often involves projects of large scope and long duration. The knowledge of a variety of disciplines may be involved. Such projects may cross organizational, national, and/or cultural boundaries. The problem of managing such situations includes ambitious schedules, conflict of cultures and practices, massive amounts of information, multiple languages, and ambiguity of roles and responsibilities. Complex collaboration represents a capability that is essential to effective execution in such situations as new product development, mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, and supply chain management, as well as large government projects. A number of issues emerge in examining complex collaboration, including: unit of analysis, critical relationships, resource development, virtual teaming, key skills, and improvement processes. The chapters in this volume address these issues and share examples that illustrate the principles that may be operating in complex systems. The authors suggest new directions for research with some arguing that complex collaboration may be an emerging field. (1) Is the unit of analysis for research and change work the same across levels of such complex systems or different? This issue deals with convergence of research and change work. Part of the question involves the practicality of attempting planned change in a complex system. Most successful change work focuses on limited systems. For example, what may be referred to as “work at the corporate level” may actually be as simple as teambuilding with the top management group. Interventions such as organizational redesign usually occur at single sites. Little literature exists to test the question of whether or not change work can occur effectively across multiple boundaries. On the other hand, researchers must find ways to study the whole of a complex system, as much as the parts. Can a convergence of research and change work improve the way complex collaboration capability is developed? (2) Does success depend on a few critical links or on the overall set of relationships? A few critical members often determine how well an overall system functions. The network of relationships across the boundaries of component systems in a complex collaboration is often represented by how the few critical xiii
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members interact. However, total performance of such a system may depend more on raising the level of collaborative capability of all members. For example, if a front line worker in component system A can talk directly with a supply chain member in another component, an improvement in process may emerge. Is there an advantage in focusing on one or the other of these relationship sets? Does the preferred focus change with stage in the evolution of the project? (3) Should project leaders focus resources on infrastructure and skill development or on process improvement to achieve high performance? In every organization, simple or complex, resource limitations make tough choices necessary. In situations where complex collaborative capability is essential to successful attainment of organizational goals, the choice may be whether to spend resources such as money, time, and personnel on development of: (a) infrastructure surrounding the actual work, such as common computer platforms; (b) knowledge, skills, and abilities of the organizational members, so the quality of collaboration rises at all points of contact; or (c) processes that guide decisions and behaviors toward effective collaboration. Perhaps the answer, as usual, is “it depends.” It may depend on the nature of the project, the style and philosophy of the top management group, the level of complexity or uncertainty or risk, or the difference between currently adequate and inadequate levels of support. (4) Can the teams rely on virtual communication or is face-to-face interaction necessary? Complex situations depending on collaboration for knowledge sharing, innovation, and decision making, often involve geographic distances that require use of electronic forms of communication, ranging from phone & fax, to email, to video conferencing. With heightened travel restrictions in most companies now, a heavier reliance on virtual communication has emerged. What is the role of face-to-face contact in this situation? When is that essential enough to warrant increased expense and risk? Is there a way to find a balance point between the methods of meeting? (5) Are the key skills lateral or hierarchical in making complex collaborations work? Crossing boundaries for networking on a project involves lateral communications and the skills that go with that, such as the when, who, and how of connection. Much of the innovation work occurs in the conversations that occur in these lateral relationships. However, the more complex the project, the more important the big picture, and although it ought to be shared by everyone to some extent, its scope is likely to be such that only a few people higher in the hierarchy can achieve an adequate viewpoint. Control through top-down decisions is essential in coordinating the main components of a complex project. How can that control be managed so innovation at lower levels is not
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stifled? The answer depends on collaborative capability that is both vertical and lateral. (6) Is the role of change agent working on complex collaborations the same as or different than for traditional organizational change? Most organization change projects are complex but focus on a single site or group. As with most aspects of organization and change in a complex situation crossing multiple boundaries, the change agent may need to make changes in the change process. The term “complexify” in this context means that the change process must be as complex as the change target. However, there may be practical limitations to how complex it can become. (7) Is there a general set of steps to make any complex collaboration effective or are the sets tailored to particular complex collaborations? Building collaborative capability in a complex situation is likely to require a multi-pronged approach. Certainly some tailoring would be required across situations, but some questions remain unanswered, such as: (a) how much is generalizable; (b) how much needs to be tailored; and (c) how can the boundary between the two be established? Complex collaboration represents a capability that is essential to effective execution in such business situations as new product development, mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, and supply chain integration. It can also represent a requirement in government collaborations such as economic, environmental, political, and war projects. There seems to be a naivet´e about collaborative organization on complex projects. At one extreme in practice, is an attitude of “it will take care of itself.” At the other extreme, disciplined process, carefully established infrastructures, and intelligent leadership enable the members of the project team to excel. The result of a laissez faire approach is frequently mediocre performance – a performance level that is acceptable, because of a failure to understand what excellence means in this situation. Simple solutions to the collaboration problem only work if a fractal structure is imposed where the practices and processes at the lowest or simplest level of coordination are mirrored at higher levels. Whether this is both necessary and sufficient remains an unanswered research question. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that collaborative capability is not something that will take care of itself. A disciplined approach is required that establishes effective ways of working together and a supportive context as the surround. Complex collaboration refers to knowledge-intensive business processes that require highly interactive communication, coordination, negotiation, research and/or development. Some projects require all of these. Such processes typically involve a large number of people, internal or external to the enterprise, large
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volumes of structured and unstructured data, and numerous steps. These solutions have critical applications across various industries including technology, manufacturing, financial, and pharmaceutical companies. Complex collaboration represents dynamic, complex systems. As such the rules of complexity theory may apply, but research evidence remains scarce. Complex systems have special vulnerabilities that increase the likelihood of system failure. Somewhat like the problem of the weakest link in the chain, complex systems have myriad interdependencies among components where performance at any particular link is constrained by the limits of performance of the remaining links and they are in turn constrained by the one link. Hence, failure at one link can endanger the whole enterprise and, conversely, enhancement of one relationship may contribute to overall performance improvement. Consequently, as business systems become more complex, collaborative excellence becomes more critical. Complex projects often struggle with complex problems or issues that have been called “fuzzy,” “wicked,” “ill-defined,” etc. (e.g. Pacanowsky, 1995). Such problems are characterized by an ambiguity of the problem definition, a need to invent new processes to solve the problem or develop a solution, multiple and conflicting perspectives of the goal, the need for an iterative and trial-and-error approach, and the absence of any objective measure of success. As projects become increasingly global, virtual, and fuzzy, the process will seem to be more populated with wicked problems. Several facets of this field of study are becoming obvious. First, complex collaboration is becoming more common. The number of examples is increasing. The number of industries relying on complex collaboration is increasing. The complexity and variety of those collaborations is increasing. Second, a wide variety of researchers are studying complex collaboration. Multiple disciplines are focusing on various facets of complex collaboration. The resulting issue is whether or not we have a case of the six blind men and the elephant with each discipline acting as a knowledge silo – unaware or unconcerned about what is happening in the other silos. This volume includes work from authors representing many of those disciplines, including psychology, sociology, management of technology, strategic management, finance, organization development, etc. Integration of knowledge and frameworks across disciplines will contribute to more informed research and more effective practice. This volume begins with case examples, where the authors have done in-depth studies of the practices of collaboration in industrial and government settings. The findings from the case studies led the authors to insights about the framework and principles that underlie effective complex collaboration. In the first chapter, Don Mankin, Susan Cohen, and Stephen Fitzgerald focus on their interview studies at John Deere, Radica, and Solectron. Each case has unique
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features and reveals principles that contribute to a framework. The Solectron case is the most complex with its focus on the supply chain relationships that enable the company to be a world leader. The second chapter presents an interdisciplinary framework and applies it in examining one of the most complex new product development projects in the world today – the design of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Jude Olson, senior consultant of organization development for the project, provides a literature review to approach the interdisciplinary challenges of understanding co-development when collaboration across boundaries is required. She is in the process of researching JSF through qualitative interviews which will be provided in a later article. Chapter 3 examines new product development in biotechnology. Kenneth Koput and Walter Powell make the case that growth of biotech firms depends on collaboration as a way of accessing knowledge and resources – partnering for learning. A rich network of relationships between firms with diverse expertise increases the innovation resources of a firm over time. Janine Stiles and Paul Williams shift the focus from collaboration across industrial firms to the relationship between firms and government agencies in Chapter 4. They examine the collaboration between multiple stakeholders involved in healthcare in Wales. The relationships are complex and their management challenging. The framework that results from examining this case provides insights for use in future investigations. Peter Lorange, in Chapter 5, examines another non-industrial form of collaboration – partnerships with business, and between major business schools in Europe and the USA. His examples include IMD, where he is President, in Switzerland with partnering MIT and other schools. A key finding is that three different strategies for the collaboration are available and that their fit with the nature of the partnership is a key to success of the collaboration. Chapter 6, by Melanie Schreiner and Daniel Corsten, examines the software industry from the perspective of the resource-based theory of the firm. They argue that collaborative capability represents a key resource that must be developed. They show that this capability has multiple and complementary dimensions: structural, cognitive, and affective. These dimensions of collaborative capability must be balanced for effective management of collaborative opportunities. The final four chapters draw from multiple theories and multiple examples to present general models. In Chapter 7, Stephen Fitzgerald bases his model on literature from seven fields to create a multi-level picture of collaborative capacity based on 10 constructs. The environment around the core of collaboration is complex and must be attended to for successful partnership. Yet, he acknowledges that a true model would be even more complex, since each construct is multi-faceted.
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In Chapter 8, Karen Higgins and Joseph Maciariello note that executives use networks to combine competencies and talents of individual firms for given projects to create competitive advantage. They draw on multiple examples and findings from a major research project to identify a model for leading complex collaboration in network organizations. They argue that the success of a network organization depends directly on the trust between the executives of the participating companies and that depends on integrity. In these days with ethics at the top of the organization being under scrutiny, the conclusion that values drive business success provides some hope. LuAnne Johnson and David Knoke address a similar issue in Chapter 9 when they argue that social capital held by members of the network is accessed and acquired through activating a relationship. The model apparently applies to intraorganizational work teams and to cross-organizational networks. However, the latter are more complex because of differentiated authority and power structures. Recognizing that collaboration is particularly complex when competitors partner, Joseph McGill and Michael Santoro conclude the book by examining strategic alliances in high technology industries. The dilemma in these alliances is sharing selected resources while simultaneously protecting others from unintended transfer. They use resource-based, transaction cost, and industrial organization economic theories to model the risks and rewards of collaboration. The model is based on two dimensions: resource interdependence and competitive interdependence. When both of these are high, collaboration reaches its most complex level. Michael M. Beyerlein Douglas A. Johnson Susan T. Beyerlein The Editors
REFERENCE Pacanowsky, M. (1995). Team tools for wicked problems. W. L. Gore & Associates Inc. Organizational Dynamics, 23(3), 36–52.
DEVELOPING COMPLEX COLLABORATIONS: BASIC PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION夽 Don Mankin, Susan Cohen and Stephen P. Fitzgerald INTRODUCTION People have worked together since the beginnings of human time. Since then the forms of collaboration have barely changed. While a group of laborers building the pyramids of Egypt might seem to bear little resemblance to a team of machine operators working in a plant, they actually have much in common. Both groups are made up of people of similar backgrounds with clear loyalties and interests, interacting face-to-face to perform relatively well-defined tasks in pursuit of a shared goal. But things have changed in recent years – new technologies have made the world a smaller place and altered the nature of work, competition and markets have become global, and knowledge is now the most important resource for organizations trying to make their way through an increasingly complex world. As a result, traditional forms of collaboration are no longer sufficient for competing effectively in this new, more demanding, global business environment. 夽 This chapter is adapted from Don Mankin and Susan Cohen’s book “Business without boundaries: An action framework for collaborating across time, distance, organization and culture” (Jossey-Bass, 2004).
Complex Collaboration: Building the Capabilities for Working Across Boundaries Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams, Volume 10, 1–26 Copyright © 2004 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1572-0977/doi:10.1016/S1572-0977(04)10001-0
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To meet constantly changing conditions and demands, business has to transcend boundaries to get what it needs regardless of where it exists – geographically, organizationally and functionally. Remaining competitive in the new global economy means collaborating across time, distance, organization and culture. Organizations now have to go further to find the right pieces and rapidly pull them together to create the best fit for their purposes. They also have to be able to take these collaborations apart just as rapidly when circumstances change and start over again with different pieces. In short, they need more complex collaborations to address the challenges of a more complex world. These new collaborative forms are not like the teams of recent years past. They can be strategic partnerships among multiple organizations with similar stakes in the outcome of the project. Or they may involve virtual collaborations among people and teams working in different parts of the world. Value chains – relationships among different organizations to produce a product or service that is primarily identified with one primary organization – are yet another collaborative form. What makes these collaborations so complex are the number of people involved, the multiple organizational contexts within which they must function, and the potential psychological, cultural, and geographical distances that must be overcome. That is what this chapter is about – how to span these distances and transcend these boundaries to create collaborations that can address the business challenges of the new global economy. In this chapter we will address this issue by describing the basic principles for the design of complex collaborations that emerged from our analysis of three case studies. Before that, we need to get a better understanding of what we mean by the expression, “complex collaboration,” the characteristics of these collaborations, and the unique challenges they present.
THE NEW WORLD OF “COMPLEX COLLABORATION” This is one of those situations where it’s easier to define an expression by first describing its opposite, a “simple collaboration,” and then to compare a complex collaboration against this base line. A simple collaboration is an ideal case – a situation that involves no barriers to overcome and where the collaborative process can flow unobstructed. The characteristics of simple collaborations and of their more complex counterparts are summarized in Fig. 1. One characteristic of a simple collaboration is a simple task, where the inputs are predictable and manageable and where the procedures for processing these inputs are well defined. These are “routine” tasks and are characterized by low
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Fig. 1. Simple versus Complex Collaborations. Source: Business Without Boundaries. Copyright 2004 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Used by permission.
“uncertainty” (Pava, 1983). A non routine or highly uncertain task – one in which the nature and timing of the inputs are difficult to predict and the task procedures are not predetermined but require judgement – is more complex. What is typically referred to these days as knowledge work is characterized by high task uncertainty (Mohrman et al., 1995). New product development, new program development, process improvement, and the buying, selling and manufacturing decisions involved in global supply chains would be examples of non-routine, highly-uncertain, and therefore, more complex tasks. The simplest kind of collaboration also involves only two people. With less than that, you do not have a collaboration. With the addition of more people to the collaboration, the possibility of different goals, points of view, personalities, etc. increases geometrically, as does the potential level of complexity. In fact, differences of any kind make the collaborative task more complex. Two very similar people do not need to spend a great deal of time understanding each other’s point of view, language, and expectations. The more diversity involved
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in the collaboration, the more obstacles to be overcome before the collaborators can successfully complete their task. Although everyone is now familiar with the challenges of cultural diversity, the challenges of organizational diversity may be less obvious but are just as important. People from different organizations involved in an interorganizational collaboration bring different agendas, goals, points of view, and even different cultures to the collaboration, making these collaborations far more complex and challenging than if they were from the same organization (Park & Ungson, 1997; Saxton, 1997). Similarly, people from different functional units – engineering, manufacturing, marketing – within the same organization bring their different professional “thought worlds” (Dougherty, 1992) or culture into the collaborative mix, making this more complex than a collaboration among two like minded engineers, for example. Face-to-face collaboration is simpler than virtual collaboration. The immediacy, almost instantaneous reciprocity, richness, and social cues of a face-to-face interaction generally make it easier for two or more people to collaborate if they are “co-located” and can, therefore, interact face-to-face when they need to. If they have to interact “virtually” via media that are less rich, more impersonal, and feature time delays between the back and forth responses that characterize successful collaborations, their task becomes more complex and difficult (Nemiro, 2003a). All of these factors can contribute to the complexity of a collaboration. “Complexity” is a continuum, not an “either/or” situation. Therefore, the important issue is not whether a collaboration is complex or not, but how complex it is. The more complex the collaboration, the more effort required to make it work. The challenge is to overcome the difficulty and compensate for the complexity. How to do that is the focus of this chapter.
ABOUT OUR CASE STUDIES This chapter is based on three very different case studies reflecting widely diverging purposes, forms, and circumstances. The first case features interorganizational collaborations among the John Deere Construction and Forestry Equipment Company and various John Deere dealerships and two-year technical colleges located throughout the United States. The purpose of the collaborations was to develop training programs for John Deere construction equipment service technicians, which were in short supply at the time the program was initiated. The case includes the overall program run by Deere – which initiates, facilitates and supports these programs nationwide – as well as two projects that have been conducted under the auspices of the program in different regions of the United States. This was the first case we examined so we had the opportunity to follow
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this case over an extended period of time. As a result we were able to observe the ebb and flow of a long term project – from the initial uncertainties as participants from different organizations feel each other out, through the development of critical relationships and trust, to the eventual pulling back as changing economic conditions produce different priorities. The second case shifts the focus to cross cultural collaboration, particularly collaboration across international boundaries. Only one company is involved in this case, the Radica Games Group, Inc., one of the leading developers and manufacturers of handheld electronic games and video game controllers in the world. This case also includes two projects, the development of the Bass Fishin’ Game in the mid-1990s and the more recent project to develop controllers for the video game consoles produced by Nintendo, Sony, and Microsoft. The Bass Fishin’ Game project involved different teams in Dallas, Hong Kong and Radica’s factory in Southern China; the Controller projects involved the same sites plus a team from a company in the United Kingdom that was acquired in the late 1990s. How they partitioned, allocated and integrated tasks among these different sites is one of the more interesting features of this case. The international nature of the case also enables us to take a close look at the challenges of collaboration across dramatically different cultures. We see how the CEO, Bob Davids, and his right hand man, S. W. Lam, an engineer from Hong Kong with a long-term interest in Western management ideas, collaborated early on in the shaping of the unique culture of this multinational company. We also see Lam’s critical role in the Bass Fishin’ Game project as a cultural and functional liaison between the teams in Dallas and Hong Kong. With the acquisition of the company from the U.K. several years later, Radica quickly became larger and even more dispersed and culturally diverse. The tensions and stresses associated with integrating the new site added yet another challenge, a challenge that was exacerbated by the intense time and performance pressures inherent to product development in the toy and game business. The third case also features an interorganizational collaboration, but with a very important difference. While the first case involved multiple organizations in a project that was only indirectly related to the core business of most of the organizations involved in the case, the third case focuses on a supply chain collaboration where interorganizational collaboration is not just the means, but also the end. The case focuses on Solectron, one of the pioneers in the electronics manufacturing services industry (EMS), an industry that is the epitome of the increasingly global and interrorganizational nature of modern manufacturing. In their evolution over the years from contract manufacturer to “global supply chain facilitator,” Solectron’s role now involves the facilitation of the entire supply chain, not just acting as one of the links in this chain. One could argue that collaboration is now the very core of their business.
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Since close collaboration is intrinsic to supply chains, the interorganizational collaborations in the Solectron case are more tightly linked and critical to the success of all of the parties involved in the collaboration than they are in the John Deere case. In fact, close collaboration with customers and suppliers is a particularly important element in Solectron’s new strategic direction. In this case we see how Solectron executes this strategy and supports their new emphasis, especially via the extensive use of performance metrics and information technology. The case also examines one of their most far reaching efforts to date, their close collaboration with their customer Brocade, a producer of data network storage systems. This close collaboration is especially apparent in the innovative logistics initiative, which involved a Solectron employee serving on site, in effect, as Brocade’s logistics department. This initiative demonstrates the challenges, risks, and rewards that go along with the blurring of boundaries in global supply chain collaborations that seem to grow closer and more complex every day. For each case we interviewed about 20–25 people who were either directly involved in the collaborations or were close enough to the projects to provide additional details and supplementary perspectives. The actual names of the organizations and individuals are presented in this paper with the exception of the John Deere case. The John Deere names are real, but the names of the other organizations and individuals in that case are fictitious. Before we describe the factors and principles that emerged from our analysis of these cases, we need to say a few words about how we approached that analysis, our perspective on the kinds of factors and principles we expected to find, and the framework we used to organize and understand our findings.
ABOUT OUR PERSPECTIVE AND FRAMEWORK We analyzed the case studies by identifying the critical success factors in each case. We grouped the factors into four broad categories that fit the kind of collaborations we examined in our case studies. The categories are: organizational level factors – the characteristics of the organizations and teams involved in the collaboration (e.g. culture) and of the relationship among them (e.g. shared goals, complementary capabilities). structure of the collaboration – The role of structure is to make complex collaborations less complex and more manageable by reducing uncertainty and increasing predictability. Simple collaborations among just a few people working for the same organization can be structured “on the fly” – spontaneously, informally, and as the need arises. As we will see in the following, complex
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collaborations require proactive structuring in the form of formal agreements (e.g. contracts); well-defined roles, tasks, responsibilities, and decision-making processes; and the like. Structure makes it easier for the participants to get a handle on the many issues, problems and challenges they have to face to make these collaborations work. characteristics of key people and their relationships – personality and skills of people in critical roles and the relationships among these people. collaboration process – how the people involved in the collaboration work together (e.g. the nature and style of leadership, how they communicate, the norms that guided their interactions, etc.). What we present in the next several pages is the integration of the findings, the critical success factors, from all three cases (the full case descriptions and analyses for each case are presented in Mankin & Cohen, 2004). These critical success factors help define basic principles that apply to all of the cases. In effect, we move from the critical success factors for each case to the basic principles that underlie all of our cases.
PRINCIPLES IN COLLABORATION DESIGN What can we learn from collaborations as varied as those in our cases? That is the purpose of this section – to pull together all of the separate findings from the three cases to identify basic principles for the design of complex collaborations. Table 1 presents these basic principles. All three of our cases demonstrate these principles in action, though their specific manifestations often vary from case to case. These basic principles can be used as a foundation for the design and implementation of complex collaborations, regardless of the forms they take or the conditions under which they operate (see Mankin & Cohen, 2004 for an action framework based on these principles). The Table and our description of the principles follow the organizing framework we described in the preceding section. The logical place to begin is with the highest level factors, those that define the context (Fitzgerald, 2003) and entity within which the complex collaborations unfold.
Organization The basic principles at the organizational level fall into three loosely defined categories. The first category includes those principles that bring teams and organizations together – we describe them as “magnetic forces.” They comprise the raison
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Table 1. Basic Principles in the Design of Complex Collaborations. Basic Principles Organization Shared goals Complementary capabilities Compatible cultures Bias for performance Mutual respect and trust High level management support Access to resources Prior experience Structure Formal roles, tasks, expectations and understandings Charter Formerly-defined liaison roles Special governance structures All entities represented Clarity and simplicity Clear decision authority Information, performance metrics, and information systems People and relationships Liaison roles and collaborating pairs Lateral skills Collaborative process Facilitative but adaptable leadership Frequent communications among participants and with external stakeholders via multiple means Face-to-face interactions and relationship building Attitudes, expectations, and norms Mutual respect and trust Communication norms (cultural sensitivity, 24 hour design) Formal and informal learning processes Adaptable goals and plans Utility of early wins Fun and playfulness
d’etre for the projects. The second category is the “glue” that helps keep them together, and the third includes the factors that propel the collaboration forward. The Magnetic Forces That Pull Them Together Of the organizational level factors, shared goals (Gomes-Casseres, 1993) and complementary capabilities (Doz, 1996) are a good starting point. In effect, they are what pull together the different organizations and teams involved in a
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complex collaboration; they provide the reason for them to collaborate. This is particularly easy to see in interorganizational collaborations such as those in the John Deere case. All of the organizations in that case had a stake in the success of the projects, albeit for different reasons. For John Deere, an on-going supply of well-trained service technicians helps them sell equipment; for the dealers, the revenues generated from servicing this equipment is one of their fastest growing sources of profit; for the colleges, the new programs and the students they attract is the coin of their realm. All of the organizations bring different capabilities to the mix – equipment for the students to learn on from the dealers; cachet, resources and wide spread experience from Deere; and expertise in curriculum development and instruction from the colleges. Without these shared goals and complementary capabilities, the collaborations would never have been able to get off the ground. These factors were also critical in the Solectron and Radica cases. Shared goals and complementary capabilities are essentially a “given” in the contract manufacturing business and are fundamental to the very nature of supply chains. They are also critical to new product development efforts, such as those conducted at Radica, involving as they do intra-organizational collaborations between marketing, design, engineering and manufacturing to develop new products. The Glue That Keeps Them Together The glue that keeps collaborating organizations and teams together is their compatible cultures (Doz, 1996; Dyer & Singh, 1998). We can see this factor in play in both Brocade’s and Solectron’s willingness to take risks and try new things – for example, by placing a Solectron employee in a sensitive position on-site at Brocade. Similarly, all of the organizations involved in the John Deere programs shared a commitment to hands-on technical careers in the construction industry, and their cultures tended to reflect the traditional values of this industry. The Radica case also illustrates this factor as well as the two dimensions that are most important to a supportive, collaborative culture. Despite the profound cultural differences between the product development team in Dallas and the engineering design team in Hong Kong, they both shared a commitment to “getting the product out the door.” In the toy and game industry if new products are not on the market in time for the Christmas season, the company risks losing out on the bulk of their sales for the year. Companies that do not have strong bias for performance do not last long in the toy and game business. The Radica case also illustrates the other side of this cultural coin. Mutual respect and trust (Inkpen & Currall, 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994) played a critical role in the success of the Bass Fishin’ Game project. The CEO, Bob Davids, with the help of his cultural liaison, S. W. Lam, spent several years
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before the project intentionally and explicitly developing a culture of mutual trust and respect throughout the company. This culture laid the foundation for the project by guiding the kind of behavior needed to collaborate effectively across their considerable geographic, temporal and cultural differences. Without this culture, and the norms and behavior through which this culture was expressed, the company would not have been able to pull off this crucial project, especially given the time pressures they faced and the stakes involved. This cultural dimension was also a significant factor in the other cases, but nowhere was its role more dramatically illustrated than in the Radica case. The Factors That Propel Them Forward We now turn our attention to a number of factors that enable collaborating organizations and teams to continue collaborating and carry out these projects over time. One of the most important is high level management support and the access to resources that typically accompanies that support (Nemiro, 2003b). This was one of the most frequently mentioned success factors in all three of our cases. In the John Deere case, for example, high level support from the various partners fluctuated throughout the projects as personnel, priorities and other circumstances changed. When there was high-level support from all of the partners, the projects moved along, when there wasn’t, the projects stalled. The actions of the EVP for one of the dealerships provides an object lesson in what the expression “high level support” means in operation, transforming this obvious clich´e into a blueprint for executive action. First, prior to his involvement in this project he already had a reputation for “walking his talk.” He talked a great deal about how important the project was and backed up his “talk” by pressuring individual dealer stores to provide internships, tuition support, and jobs to students after they graduated from the program. One of his most important actions was to assign one of his employees almost full time to the project to serve as liaison and representative and provided her with a budget to support her role in this project. Our last principle in this category, prior experience with complex collaboration (Fitzgerald, 2003, Inkpen & Currall, 1998; Khanna, 1998), was only explicitly mentioned in the John Deere interviews, but it was at least implicit in the other two cases. Almost all of Solectron’s customers have used contract manufacturers like Solectron for years. In addition, Solectron only collaborates closely with their 100 or so best suppliers. And, the way a company becomes a “best supplier” is to have enough previous experience with Solectron to build up the kind of track record needed to qualify for that status. This factor was also an issue at Radica on the Controller projects after their acquisition of the company in the UK. Because of their history of collaboration on the Bass Fishin’ Game project, the Dallas and Hong Kong teams had little
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difficulty working together on the Controller projects. On the other hand, the UK designers from the newly acquired company did have some initial difficulty communicating with the Hong Kong engineers, and vice-versa. The employees at the two sites had never worked together before, so they were unfamiliar with each other’s language habits and cultural norms and sensitivities. Over time, as they became more familiar with each other’s culture and language constraints, they learned how to avoid many of their earlier communication problems and worked together more effectively from there-on-in. It seems clear from the Radica case, and is at least suggested by the other two cases, that previous experience may develop collaboration skills and possibly even help build a culture of relationships that can lay the groundwork for future collaborations across multiple boundaries.
Structure The structural principles also fall into three categories, though the categories do not seem to reflect as clear a logic as the categories in the previous section. The first category deals with formal roles for the entities involved in the collaborations – individuals, teams and organizations – the responsibilities that go along with these roles, and the relationships among the roles. The second category focuses on governance and authority structures – i.e. how projects are managed and decisions made. The third category has to do with how these roles and structures are supported, primarily via information and information technology. Formal Roles, Tasks, Expectations, and Understandings This principle manifests itself in very different ways in each of our cases. In the Solectron case it was in the form of formal contracts with the company’s suppliers and customers. At first glance this might appear too obvious to even mention. In a business where pennies per part can add up very quickly and delays in delivery schedules can shut down production, a formal contract specifying costs, delivery date and penalties for failure to perform would almost seem to be a given. According to one of our interviewees, however, a VP in the materials organization, the wide spread use of formal contracts is a relatively recent development in the electronic manufacturing services industry. Personal relationships and “handshake” deals used to be the norm in this industry. In recent years, though, relationships between Solectron and its suppliers have become “more than just a couple of beers and hot dogs,” but now have to be “based on good business principles.” Not surprisingly, these good business principles include formal contracts.
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Formal contracts were not as relevant in the John Deere and Radica cases, since nothing was being bought or sold among the participants. However, the basic principle still applies though the forms it takes vary from case to case. In the John Deere case, for example, there was some initial uncertainty about participants’ roles, responsibilities, and boundaries which slowed down both projects in their early stages. More formal documentation of these roles and other, related issues such as decision-making processes – in the form of a charter, for example (Dowling, 2003; Justice & Jamieson, 1999) – would have helped. In the Radica case, each team was given a well-defined goal, tasks were identified and allocated based on these goals, and then the tasks were integrated via shared understandings about what to communicate, when, and by which means. These task designs served the same purpose as formal contracts specifying roles, responsibilities and expectations. While the issues that need to be formalized depend on the nature of the collaboration – e.g. products, prices, and delivery dates for supply chain collaborations vs. roles and responsibilities for joint interorganizational projects – all complex collaborations require formally-defined liaison roles. In all three of our cases, people in these roles were responsible for integrating the teams, organizations and cultures involved in the collaborations. Without them, the projects would have failed. Too often, in an attempt to save money and resources, roles such as these are left to chance and good intentions, to be filled by whoever has the inclination and the time. But there is rarely time left over from other responsibilities, especially when these other responsibilities are important enough to be formal job requirements. Informal roles like this are rarely fulfilled, or at least fulfilled well. Therefore, liaison roles need to be created proactively and intentionally. Designating a formal liaison role with distinct responsibilities increases the likelihood that these responsibilities will actually be carried out. Creating this role is a design issue, a structural intervention that formalizes the role to make sure that it is not overlooked and that it receives the support, recognition and attention it deserves. Since liaison roles are so inextricably linked with the qualities of the people who fill those roles and the relationships among them, we will address this issue again in the section on “people and their interrelationships.” Special Governance and Authority Structures This principle is most clearly seen in the John Deere case. For each project, there was an advisory team to oversee the project and a separate implementation team (with some overlapping members) to carry it out. Special governance structures were not needed in the Solectron case, however, since the nature of their business is interorganizational collaboration and they have ongoing structures
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and processes in place, both formal and informal, to deal with their supply chain relationships. At Radica, the CEO acted, in effect, as the “special governance structure” for the Bass Fishin’ Game project by participating closely in the project from beginning to end. This informal approach worked well at the time because the organization was small, but a more formal structure was created when Radica grew larger and more complex, after their acquisition of the UK unit. Our findings suggest a number of criteria that can be used to design these governance structures. First, the structures need to ensure that all of the entities (organizations and teams) involved in the project are represented in the governance structure. Second, since interorganizational collaborations frequently involve organizations and/or people that have not previously worked together, simplicity and clarity is critical, especially if there are more than two organizations involved in the collaboration. In other words, the structure should be as simple as possible to minimize confusion, especially in the early stages of the project when the different parties are trying to figure out who everyone is, the roles they play, and the organizations they represent. The rule of thumb is to create the simplest structure that will enable the work to get done while providing adequate representation for all of the critical parties involved in the collaboration. The overlapping advisory groups and implementation teams used in the two John Deere projects are good examples of this tradeoff among simplicity, representation, and an efficient way to get work done. The advisory group provided for broad representation and access to a wide range of perspectives, experience and expertise to guide the projects. The implementation team made it possible for a smaller group of individuals, representing the organizations with the greatest stakes in the project, to dedicate time necessary for carrying out the day-to-day tasks. A third rule of thumb suggested by our cases is to create a clear decision authority, especially if the work is “high intensity” – i.e. critical to the success of the organizations, requires close collaboration, and is performed under significant time pressures. At Radica, the CEO was the clear decision authority in the Bass Fishin’ Game project. After the company acquired the UK unit, the new CEO could no longer be as closely involved, so the lines of authority became murky, at least for a while. This is one of the reasons it took so long to resolve the differences which slowed down the Controller projects in the early stages. As this last example illustrates, it is important to create this authority early on, before conflicts emerge. During the heat of battle is not the best time to make decisions about how best to make decisions. A clear decision authority was not as necessary for the John Deere projects, since they were under less time pressure and the projects were not as critical. Therefore, these collaborations functioned more informally and democratically. This suggests a general conclusion; the more
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critical the project and the greater the time pressures, the closer the collaborators need to work together and the greater the need for explicit and unambiguous decision-making processes, structures and authority. Information, Performance Metrics, and Information Technology and Systems In his ground-breaking book on organization design, Jay Galbraith argued that “the greater the task uncertainty, the greater the amount of information that must be processed among decision makers during task execution in order to achieve a given level of performance” (1973, p. 4). As we argued in the introduction to this paper, increased task uncertainty makes collaborations more complex. Therefore, more complex collaborations require more information – and more information technology – to manage the uncertainty and make these projects more manageable. We can see the importance of this factor by comparing the John Deere case with Solectron. The latter is more complex – more organizations (suppliers and customers), different kinds of relationships (with suppliers vs customers), more dispersed sites, greater time pressures, and outcomes that are more critical to the companies involved. Therefore, the use of performance metrics and other information is much greater. The conclusion that we can draw from this is that the more complex the collaboration, the more information and information technology are needed to support the collaborative relationships and processes. We see a similar relationship when we compare the two projects at Radica. The earlier, simpler Bass Fishin’ Game project was able to make do with fax machines and telephones, while the Controller projects needed technology that was far more complex, so they added email and 3-D design systems to the mix. We may be able to extrapolate from this conclusion about information to an even broader conclusion about structure in general. The totality of findings for this category supports one of the basic assumptions and premises upon which this chapter is based, that complex collaborations require significant amounts of structure to make the complexity more manageable; the more complex the collaboration, the more structure may be required. We saw this clearly as we moved from the John Deere case to Radica and then to Solectron. New layers of complexity were added with each case as tasks, roles, and relationships became more formal, less ad hoc, and more highly articulated and developed.
People and Their Interrelationships The principles in this category are few, straightforward and very basic. They are so closely related and universal that they comprise a foundation which may very well underlie all collaboration, complex or otherwise. This may be where all
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successful collaborations begin, with good relationships among competent people in the right roles. Liaison Roles and Collaborating Pairs This is one of the most compelling and consistent findings that emerged from our analyses of all three cases. As we mentioned earlier, liaison roles are actually structural issues since they are concerned with how tasks and roles are structured and designed, but the connection between the roles and the people who fill these roles is so close that it is easier to discuss these two issues together. Liaison roles are actually a kind of “integrating role,” which Jay Galbraith describes as an effective means to achieve “lateral coordination” across “functional specialization, business diversification, and global dispersion” (1994, p. 87). According to Galbraith, . . . these differences make it more difficult to integrate all subtasks into the completion of the whole task. The different specialities, countries, and businesses all have their own interests, constituencies, and ways of thinking. It is the task of the integrator to span these differences and achieve coordinated outcomes. Thus, the integrating role is to obtain better coordination, as well as more coordination (p. 87).
Liaison roles played a critical part in the success of the collaborations in all of our cases. Lam single handedly played that role for the Bass Fishin’ Game project at Radica, linking the Hong Kong and Dallas teams, as well as crossing the cultural and functional boundaries separating both locations. In most of the other instances throughout the three cases, the lateral integration was accomplished by “collaborative pairs” – i.e. designated individuals at each site responsible for working closely on common tasks with their counterpart(s) in similar roles at the other sites. For example, the relationship between the heads of the North America and UK divisions at Radica helped to resolve some of the initial tensions between these two units following the acquisition of the latter. These collaborative pairings are also critical at the operational level. In the John Deere case, it was the strong task-based relationship between two mid-level people serving in liaison roles that enabled one of the projects to get off the ground and helped sustain the project through its difficult initial months. Similar relationships among key liaisons at both the managerial and operational level were critical to the success of the Solectron-Brocade collaborations. Although collaborating pairs were the norm in most cases and instances, Lam’s example suggests another possible means for fulfilling this function – i.e. the single liaison person who effectively integrates separate organizations or teams by him or herself. We suspect that Lam was able to fulfill the liaison role by himself because the units he spanned already had close ties, and he had significant experience and
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relationships in both. We found another example of a single liaison person spanning two sites in the Solectron case. The person was also Asian, linked sites in Asia and North America, had spent time at both sites, and was fluent in both English and the language of the Asian site (Malay, in the latter case). In addition, like the Radica case the organizational separation was relatively small since both sites were part of Solectron. Aside from these two examples, the linking function happened via collaborating pairs, probably because the “organizational separation” was too great and no one had similar experience at all of the sites where tasks had to be integrated. All of this suggests a corollary to the basic principle of liaison people and collaborating pairs. Collaborations across different organizations almost always require separate liaison people to represent each of the organizations involved in the collaboration – collaborating pairs or even integrating teams of liaison people when more than two organizations are involved. On the other hand, complex collaborations within a single organization can get by with one person serving as the link between the separate plants, teams or units if the sites have close ties and if the liaison person is able to effectively represent each site via his or her experience, cultural background, and language skills. In conclusion, we are struck by how often these collaborating pairs appeared in our cases and how important a role they seemed to play in their success. These pairings are the axes around which the complex collaborations revolve. The question then is how to ensure that these collaborative pairings work effectively. Part of the answer, as we have already noted, is to create these roles, explicitly and proactively. Another part of the answer is to put the right people in these roles. By “right” we mean people who can transcend differences to work on shared tasks with their counterparts on other teams and in other organizations. The special challenges of lateral integration require people with special qualities to fill these critical liaison roles. What are these special qualities? What is it about the liaison people we found that enabled them to fill these critically important liaison roles so effectively? Lateral Skills We explored these questions by identifying key people who functioned effectively in these roles, and asking them and others who worked closely with them to speculate on the traits and behaviors underlying their success. From this we have been able to put together the beginnings of a profile which describes the “lateral skills” we consider to be indispensable for anyone serving in these critically important and challenging roles. First and foremost, the necessary but not sufficient foundation for this quality is good interpersonal skills. But it is much more than that. It doesn’t take very
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much in the way of interpersonal skill to get along with and work effectively with someone who is very similar and who has the same basic values, interests and background. But working effectively with someone who is very different requires skills that go well beyond the ordinary. It requires the kind of skill that enables, for example, a businessman from Los Angeles and a Hong Kong engineer several years his junior to collaborate on the transformation of an entire organization and its culture, as happened at Radica during the years preceding the projects in our case. Perhaps one way to understand the difference between what are merely good interpersonal skills and what we mean by the more important lateral skills is to imagine a person who might be best described as a “congenial racist.” This is a person who is personable and gets along well with people who are similar in background and outlook and whose roots are in the same culture. On the other hand, this person has difficulty relating to anyone who has different experiences or points of view, or comes from a different cultural background. It takes a person with good lateral skills to work with someone who is very different. This a far more valuable set of skills – particularly in today’s multicultural, crossfunctional, and interorganizational workplace – and one that is much more difficult to find. To get a better handle on what we mean by “lateral skills” we go back to a definition we offered in our earlier book, “Teams and Technology” (Mankin et al., 1996). In that book, we describe lateral skills as the ability “to work effectively with people of different functional backgrounds, work experiences, knowledge bases and skills” (p. 97). What this means in terms of the preceding discussion is that people in collaborative pairs who possess strong lateral skills can transcend their differences to find a common ground. This common ground enables them to work together on mutual tasks to fulfill their shared goals. Our interviews, observations and previous work on this issue suggest that empathy plays an especially central role in lateral skills. By “empathy” we mean the ability to put oneself in another’s place, to be open to the opinions, concerns, perspectives and interests of others who are quite different. It also means the ability to transcend cultural boundaries, to respect and appreciate differences, especially differences associated with national, ethnic and functional cultures. One of our examples from the Solectron case enables us to add some additional wrinkles to our emerging profile of good lateral skills. Everyone we interviewed about the Brocade-Solectron collaborations pointed to one person in particular as one of the most important reasons for the success of the logistics initiative. This person, Glenn, was the Solectron employee chosen to be the logistics liaison person on site at Brocade and was one half of the collaborating pair that was the critical operational axis for this initiative.
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Our interviewees were also very consistent in their descriptions of those qualities they thought made Glenn so effective in this role. They described him as being open to working with others, especially customers, and sensitive to their needs and concerns. “He wants to help,” one interviewee noted, “he wants to understand others’ issues and concerns so that he can serve them better.” According to his boss at Solectron, “Glenn does a really good job of listening. He really hears what you have to say.” Glenn is clearly empathic in the way we describe above, but he is also more than that. He views the people he works with as his customers and does his best to serve them well. He is able to put himself in the customer’s place. Because he can internalize their needs and make them his own, he understands their needs and can serve them better. This is empathy in the “service” of customer service. Glenn’s example also suggests another dimension. In his role as Solectron’s logistics liaison to Brocade he had access to confidential information about other EMSs – Solectron competitors – that Brocade also used. Therefore, he had to be very careful about how he handled the boundaries of his role. His care and sensitivity did not go unnoticed by his Brocade collaborators. Many of them used descriptors such as “integrity” and “inspires trust” to describe this dimension of his personality and behavior in this all important role. It is easy to see how this character trait could affect an individual’s performance in a liaison role, especially in an interorganizational collaboration where confidentiality and other boundary issues can be so important.
The Collaborative Process Consideration of the collaborative process logically follows a discussion of the people who are the participants in this process. How they interact, the means they use to collaborate, and their attitudes and state-of-mind as they execute their tasks – these are the remaining principles to be addressed in the design and implementation of complex collaborations. Leadership This is one of the first basic principles underlying the collaborative process. How could it be otherwise? Leadership is necessary for focused and sustained action for almost all work-related activity, complex collaborations included, and is necessary for getting the collaborative process started. Beyond the obvious statement that leadership of some sort is important, what is most significant is the particular style, form and approach that seems most appropriate for the conditions and nature of the collaboration.
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In all of our cases, leadership was generally facilitative and shared, but also adaptable to different circumstances and stages. That said, there were also some very important differences between the leadership of the John Deere projects, on the one hand, and the Radica and Solectron cases, on the other. As we noted earlier in this paper, the John Deere projects were “lower intensity” than the others – i.e. the projects did not have the same sense of urgency as the projects in the other cases, and they were not as critical to the success of the organizations involved in the projects. Therefore, leadership was generally facilitative and shared throughout the projects. On the other hand, the need to get “the product out of the door” in the Radica and Solectron projects required an approach that could quickly get more directive when necessary. This was especially apparent in the Bass Fishin’ Game project in the Radica case where the CEO would step in and make decisions about the design of the game when the members of the project team couldn’t agree or were reluctant to make the decision themselves. Communication Communication among participants as well as between participants and others not directly involved in the collaboration was also critical to the success of all of the cases. The participants in our cases communicated frequently with each other by whatever means they had at their disposal. They also communicated frequently with external stakeholders, particularly in the interorganizational collaborations – i.e. the John Deere and Solectron cases – where the project participants communicated regularly with their managers in their “home” organizations, as well as with others who provided critical support and were most impacted by the projects. Our cases demonstrate that face-to-face interaction is still one of the most important means of communication, not just for sharing information and working together on shared tasks but also for building and maintaining relationships. Over the last decade the idea of virtual collaboration has spread throughout the business world, promoted as the cure for skyrocketing travel costs, as the means for linking distant sites and collaborators, and so on. Every day, more and more business leaders, consultants, and writers are buying into the seductive vision of individuals interacting with each other via the internet or videoconferencing technology rather than face-to-face (FTF). Unfortunately, this fevered interest has tended to distort our perception of how work is actually changing in this era of global enterprise. Recent research and the experiences of many people on virtual teams offer a very different picture of the relative roles of virtual and FTF interaction in complex collaboration. Maznevski and Athanassiou (2004), writing in the recent book, Virtual Teams That Work (Gibson & Cohen, 2003), succinctly capture the new conventional wisdom “[F]or a virtual team, the single greatest challenge is building relationships . . . [and]
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it is easier,” they continue, “to build strong ties in face-to-face relationships” (p. 210). The reality of virtual collaboration is that there is no substitute for FTF interaction. Our findings are consistent with this emerging consensus. Face-to-face interaction was an important factor in all of our cases. This was even true in the Radica projects where the different teams involved in the projects were so widely dispersed – in Dallas, Hong Kong, southern China, and in the Controller projects, the UK. The design of the tasks in both the Bass Fishin’ Game project and the Controller projects allowed for intensive FTF interaction where it was most needed – e.g. among the product designers in Dallas and among the engineers in Hong Kong. However, even in this case, Lam, the CEO and others traveled when they had to, and several other people felt that they could have worked more effectively with their collaborators at other sites if they were able to travel more often. Face-to-face interaction is particularly important in building relationships, especially the collaborating pairs described in the previous section. The importance of this issue is succinctly described by the head of Radica’s North America division, who played a major role in resolving the conflict that slowed down the Controller projects following the acquisition of the company from the UK. “Solutions work out much better if you have a personal relationship with the person you are dealing with,” she notes in reference to her relationship with her UK counterpart. “If you have the opportunity to spend some time with that person, then it’s easier to work out issues via email or phone.” With respect to some of the initial difficulties between the two divisions, she concludes that “we would have solved it much faster if we could have gotten all of the key people together in the same room and had these meetings beforehand.” She sums this up well in her final words on the subject, “before I had an issue, I had a relationship,” a relationship, we would add, that was built on a foundation of face-to-face interaction. Of course, the problem is that FTF interaction is often not possible or far too expensive, especially in situations where collaborators are separated by great distances. In those situations the only choice is to make virtual collaboration work. What that means is learning when and how to use the media that are available – fax, phone, email and the world-wide web – and when and how to supplement these media with FTF interaction via meetings, co-location, and the like. In addition, many of the factors we have already described (e.g. structuring tasks) and will soon describe (e.g. communication norms) can help make virtual collaboration work. Attitudes, Expectations and Norms Complex collaborative processes require well-defined and explicit attitudes, norms, and expectations to guide these processes, especially those underpinning
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the prerequisite culture of mutual respect and trust (Fitzgerald, 2003, p. 86; Hood et al., 1993). This was especially important at Radica where the cultural and geographic differences were so great. That is why the CEO and Lam worked so diligently for so many years to create this culture and the norms that go along with it. Without this foundation, they never would have been able to transcend the formidable boundaries of time, distance, and culture so that this very complex collaboration could succeed. Norms that guide communications with other collaborators are also important. These norms include how often to communicate, by what means, and the need to acknowledge receipt of phone and email communications and provide a timely response. Also important are norms that call for sensitivity and judgment in all communications, particularly in email communications where the possibility of misinterpretations and unintended slights is so great (Nemiro, 2003a). When these communications span geographic and cultural distances, the challenges and potential consequences are even greater. International collaborations, for example, require that special attention be paid to cultural sensitivity, especially when email is the medium for communication. In addition, expectations about daily communications and responses might need to be established if the international collaborations cross significant distances and time zones, the work days of widely separated sites do not overlap, and significant time pressures are involved. The Radica Bass Fishin’ Game project is very instructive here. At the end of every work day, the product design team in Dallas would fax drawings to the engineering team in Hong Kong. Because of the 13-hour time difference, the drawings would be waiting when the engineers in Hong Kong arrived for work each morning. They would then work on the engineering designs and fax their responses back to the Dallas team by the end of the work day in Hong Kong – pointing out, for example, that the game features the Dallas team was asking for would raise the manufacturing costs above the targeted price point for the game. This process would go back and forth until the issues were resolved, much like passing a baton back and forth in a never-ending two-person relay race. These communication norms, coupled with the culture of mutual respect and trust that the CEO and Lam had worked so hard to develop, enabled this 24 hour design process to proceed unaccompanied by the rancor and tension that one might expect in situations marked by such intense time pressures and profound cultural differences. Learning Processes Once the collaboration is well underway, formal or informal learning processes can be used to monitor progress and explore how to improve the effectiveness of the collaborative process. All of the organizations involved in our cases either used
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some form of learning process or intended to do so in the near future. One of the best examples is the annual meetings jointly sponsored by Solectron and Brocade to address high level strategic issues in the increasingly close collaboration between the two companies. These meetings were usually attended by five to seven VPs and other senior level managers from the two companies, as well as by some of the key operational level people involved in the collaboration. The agenda typically included such items as an overview of the activities and developments of the past year, what the two companies had learned from the initiatives, the areas that needed improvement, and what they would focus on for the next year. The John Deere case demonstrates that these learning processes can lead to significant mid-course corrections. The slow economy during the early years of the decade led many of the organizations involved in the various programs to rethink their priorities. The programs continue but with more modest goals. This example illustrates that complex collaborations functioning in equally complex and dynamic times need to have goals and plans that are adaptable to changing conditions. This means reasonable goals, flexible plans, and a willingness on the part of the participants and their managers to change goals and plans when necessary. The Solectron-Brocade collaborations illustrate a corollary to this principle, the utility of “early wins” – modest but meaningful goals that can be achieved quickly. The logistics initiative was intentionally designed to produce “early wins” that would quickly build support for the initiative at Brocade and confidence and trust in Glenn. Fun and Playfulness Our last basic principle is perhaps the most difficult to get a handle on, at least in terms of how to make it happen. This was only occasionally mentioned in our interviews, but it was clear from the tone of the interviews that many people derived a great deal of intrinsic satisfaction from their participation in the projects, especially when things were going well. If this is an important principle, the logical question, then, is how to make this an actionable principle. In other words, how to make the collaborative experience pleasurable and fun? Our cases suggest an answer to this question, not because of what was done but what was apparently not done, or at least was not perceived to be important enough to be mentioned by our interviewees – i.e. specific team building activities, experiences, or even social events designed for the explicit purpose of having fun, rather than doing work. We have no doubts that there were some experiences of this sort in all of the projects, but they did not seem to play an important enough role for any one to cite them as a major factor in the success of their efforts. Since extrinsic sources of fun – parties, games, clowns, humor consultants – did not play a significant role in the projects, we can only conclude that the fun came from
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the intrinsic pleasures of doing a difficult job well. The other factors described here are what made it possible for the participants to have fun – to be challenged by the demands of a complex project, to meet these challenges by performing their tasks effectively, and to derive great satisfaction from the success of their efforts. In other words, fun is not the cause of their success, it is a byproduct of their successful efforts. Therefore, by focusing on the other factors, the fun will likely follow.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD AN ACTION FRAMEWORK FOR THE DESIGN OF COMPLEX COLLABORATIONS In this paper we have identified a number of basic principles for the design of complex collaborations. These principles apply in all three of our cases, and possibly to all forms and under all conditions. However, some circumstances can accentuate the importance of particular principles or make different aspects more salient. For example, A performance-oriented culture, clear decision authority, and a more directive leadership approach are especially important in “high intensity” projects. International collaborations require that more attention be paid to developing communication norms that emphasize cultural sensitivity. Shared goals, complementary capabilities, and information sharing are more likely to be critical issues in collaborations among multiple organizations. The more complex the collaboration, the greater the need for information, information technology, and performance metrics – in fact the greater the need for structure in general. All of these principles, plus the limited caveats and qualifications listed above, may be too complex for many managers and others who face the challenges of real world collaboration. Therefore, in these last few paragraphs we offer a “meta-principle” which underlies and integrates the basic principles we have described in the last several pages. For the most part, the basic principles are essentially specific manifestations of this overarching meta-principle. The meta-principle is much easier to keep in mind, and it may be all that is needed in many situations and projects. It is our hope that once the meta-principle is internalized and deeply grasped, the specific action steps to be taken will easily follow. They will flow naturally from the convergence between the logic of the principle and the particular conditions of each project.
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There are two threads that weave through the principles and help tie together what might otherwise look like a disconnected series of items in a long laundry list. One thread conveys the “soft side” of complex collaboration, i.e. the people, their relationships and how they work together. This is the foundation of all collaborations, complex or otherwise. This is where collaboration begins and the petri dish within which it breeds and grows. The second thread involves the structuring elements that support the collaboration – i.e. the infrastructure that helps focus action, informs decisions, buffers distraction, and improves efficiency. In and of itself, this structure is not the essence of collaboration. However, as we mentioned earlier, it does reduce uncertainty and confusion, increase predictability, and can make complex collaborations less complex and more manageable. Structure provides a safe harbor of predictability and stability within which creative collaborations can develop and thrive. These two threads weave throughout our principles. They are of course related and inseparable. Structure supports collaborative relationships, and these relationships produce structure. Both threads are needed to stitch the fabric of complex collaborations together; without both, the “garments” will fall apart. These are the fundamental truths that underlie our principles and our perspective on how to make complex collaborations work. The two threads represent the yin and yang of our meta-principle – the interdependence of structure and relationships. The synergy between the two can be summarized in four broad steps: (1) Collaborations start with relationships between the right people in critical liaison roles. Therefore, the first step is to explicitly and intentionally create these liaison roles and formalize these roles by defining specific responsibilities and requirements. (2) The next step is to put the right people in these roles – i.e. those with well-developed lateral skills. (3) After that, it is important to enable collaborative relationships to form among the people in these roles, by intention to initiate specific projects or by “enabled serendipity” – creating conditions that enable these relationships to form spontaneously around common interests which may evolve in time into joint projects. (4) Then the next steps are to use these relationships as the axes for launching a formal, more extensive effort by having the people in these relationships collaboratively design the structure (e.g. charters, governance and authority structures, performance metrics, etc.) that will help them focus on their collaborations and tasks. To state it as simply as possible, our meta-principle is to start with relationships among key people, then use the relationships to create the structure they need
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to do their work. By internalizing this meta-principle and using it as a mind set, plus referring to the specific principles for details as needed, managers and others should be able to design any complex collaboration, regardless of form, type or circumstances. Our working metaphor for the application of the basic principles is jazz. Neither the tightly orchestrated compositions of Stan Kenton – intricate, predictable, and smooth flowing – nor the free improvisations of Ornette Coleman – unpredictable, chaotic, and for many, very unsettling. Instead, the “jazz” of our framework is the music of Charley Parker and John Coltrane (before his cosmic period) which were characterized by improvisations on clearly stated themes. Like their music, the principles are meant to suggest approaches and inspire ideas, not to constrict action into narrowly defined boxes. In keeping with this metaphor, we encourage the “musicians” who read this chapter to follow their own muses and improvise their own melodies, coming back to the themes from time to time and keeping the score and the principles which underlie it squarely in mind. Like any good jazz musician, readers can improvise on the principles to create harmonious collaborations that transcend boundaries to produce deeply fulfilling performances.
REFERENCES Dougherty, D. (1992). Interpretative barriers to successful product innovation in large firms. Organizational Science, 3(2), 179–202. Doz, Y. L. (1996). The evolution of cooperation in strategic alliances: Initial conditions or learning processes. Strategic Management Journal, 17, 55–83. Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. (1998). The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23, 660–679. Dowling, K. (2003). Chartering your team for peak performance. In: M. M. Beyerlein, C. McGee, G. Klein, J. Nemiro & L. Broedling (Eds), The Collaborative Work Systems Fieldbook: Strategies for Building Successful Teams. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer. Fitzgerald, S. P. (2003). Exploring collaborative capacity in a global chaordic alliance: The United Religions Initiative. Dissertation Abstracts International #AAT 3077445. Galbraith, J. R. (1973). Designing complex organizations. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Galbraith, J. R. (1994). Competing with flexible lateral organizations (2nd ed.). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Gibson, C. B., & Cohen, S. G. (Eds). (2003). Virtual teams that work: Creating conditions for virtual team effectiveness. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Gomes-Casseres, B. (1993, May 14). Managing international alliances: Conceptual framework. Harvard Business School Case #9–793–133, 1–20. Hood, J. N., Logsdon, J. M., & Thompson, J. K. (1993). Collaboration for social problem-solving: A process model. Business and Society, 32(1), 1–17.
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Inkpen, A. C., & Currall, S. C. (1998). The nature, antecedents, and consequences of joint venture trust. Journal of International Management, 4(1), 1–20. Justice, T., & Jamieson, D. W. (1999). The facilitator’s fieldbook (pp. 50–62). New York: AMACOM. Khanna, T. (1998). The scope of alliances. Organization Science, 9, 340–355. Mankin, D., Cohen, S. G., & Bikson, T. K. (1996). Teams and technology: Fulfilling the promise of the new organization. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Mankin, D. A., & Cohen, S. G. (2004). Business without boundaries: An action framework for collaborating across time, distance, organization and culture. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Maznevski, M. L., & Athanassiou, N. A. (2004). Designing the knowledge-management infrastructure for virtual teams: Building and using social networks and social capital. In: C. B. Gibson & S. G. Cohen (Eds), Virtual Teams that Work: Creating Conditions for Virtual Team Effectiveness (pp 196–213). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Mohrman, S. A., Cohen, S. C., & Mohrman, A. M., Jr. (1995). Designing team-based organizations: New forms for knowledge work. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Nemiro, J. E. (2003a). How to effectively communicate virtually: Lessons from case studies of virtual teams. In: M. M. Beyerlein, C. McGee, G. Klein, J. Nemiro & L. Broedling (Eds), The Collaborative Work Systems Fieldbook: Strategies for Building Successful Teams. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer. Nemiro, J. E. (2003b). Developing and assessing a climate for creativity in virtual teams. In: M. M. Beyerlein, C. McGee, G. Klein, J. Nemiro & L. Broedling (Eds), The Collaborative Work Systems Fieldbook: Strategies for Building Successful Teams. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass/ Pfeiffer. Park, S. H., & Ungson, G. R. (1997). The effect of national culture, organizational complementarity, and economic motivation on joint venture dissolution. Academy of Management Journal, 40, 279–307. Pava, C. (1983). Managing new office technology: An organizational strategy. New York: Free Press. Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1994). Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational relationships. The Academy of Management Review, 19, 90–113. Saxton, T. (1997). The effects of partner and relationship characteristics on alliance outcomes. Academy of Management Journal, 40, 443–461.
CO-DEVELOPMENT: COLLABORATING ACROSS BOUNDARIES ON JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER Jude G. Olson ABSTRACT Product development becomes more complex when co-development involves multiple parties crossing boundaries of functions, companies, countries and even competitors. An interdisciplinary framework is needed to understand the challenges of structuring collaborative work within global product teams – especially in the research arenas of strategic partnerships, product development teams, collaboration, distributed work, organizational learning and new metaphors. The multi-party partnership of the Joint Strike Fighter Program at Lockheed Martin, the largest aerospace program in history, provides an illustration of the complex information-sharing and problem-solving challenges in aligning a large, distributed, global integrated product team in an environment where even connectivity is a challenge. It sets the stage for the innovative management approaches needed to build collaborative climates as well as research directions for the future.
At any point, it would have been easier to say, ‘This is too difficult. Let’s go back to the old way and split the plane up.’ But the management team made it clear that that was an unacceptable answer. And they were right. Neither of the three companies, individually, had the resources
Complex Collaboration: Building the Capabilities for Working Across Boundaries Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams, Volume 10, 27–58 Copyright © 2004 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1572-0977/doi:10.1016/S1572-0977(04)10002-2
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JUDE G. OLSON or the technology to make this happen. It took a collective team effort – pushing each other beyond our wildest dreams – to build this airplane. Martin Taylor, BAE Systems’ Program Manager for Joint Strike Fighter Lockheed and Northrop have battled each other for 60 years . . . in my career alone, we lost three out of four programs to Fort Worth. Those were knock-down-drag-out battles. At the time, I couldn’t believe it: We’re supposed to partner with these guys? Martin McLaughlin, Northrop’s Joint Strike Fighter Airframe Manager Running a three-partner team is not easy, but the deal bought us the power of three companies to combat Boeing . . . we realized that if we didn’t change the entire way we did business, we’d never beat Boeing. Mickey Blackwell, Lockheed Martin EVP (Breen, 2000, pp. 73–74)
THE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM The challenge on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is to create collaboration between a disparate group of engineers, many of whom had previously been competitors. The special technical challenges also require an innovative management approach – including creating a collaborative climate and focusing and aligning a large, distributed, global, integrated product team. The JSF program is a tri-service, multi-national transformational weapon system with unique requirements recently won by Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth, Texas. Not only is it expected to be the most advanced fighter of its kind, it is expected to be “affordable,” driving transformation in military procurement and an industry known for its technical expertise, but not historically for its program management. As conceived by Lockheed Martin, JSF would represent a new kind of program as well as a complex organization built on collaborative teams and relationships. Recent acquisition reform in the Department of Defense contributed to making this largest aerospace program in history a “joint” model customized for three of our military services – the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps as well as foreign customers – U.K., Netherlands, Italy, Turkey, Denmark, Norway, Canada. More than 3,000 aircraft will be designed, built, flown and supported with export sales. Tom Burbage, JSF Program Director, likens the organizational chart of JSF to a “jigsaw” puzzle – with many interdependent, sometimes conflicting or competing partnerships. The vision of collaboration among competitors was born on a rationale of selecting “Best Athletes” (people will lead Integrated Product Teams – regardless of whether they are employed by the prime contractor or by a partner) and using “Best Practices” (derived from Lessons Learned across partner companies) to give a competitive edge in winning the bid for the largest aerospace defense contract in history. Combining three fourths of the world’s tactical fighter
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expertise and industrial base in the United States and U.K., the Pentagon calculated that if the Air Force, Navy and Marines coordinated their planning and purchased the same plane together, they could slash the price tag to a more affordable one. The primary partners include: Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and British Aerospace Systems (BAE). Other business partnerships include Lockheed Missiles & Information Systems, Fokker, Pratt & Whitney, Rolls Royce Allison and General Electric – as well as multiple key suppliers emphasizing supply chain management including TRW, Smiths Industries, Harris, Hamilton, Sundstrand, Honeywell and Moog-Parker, and others. JSF was conceived as a “world airplane.” This project, as it was designed, presented many paradoxical challenges that would strain conventional notions of organizing, including reframing the way companies construe traditionally competitive relationships. To cite but one example, the demand for “interoperability” would mean that other countries would be invited to share the costs of development. Companies from these host countries would then become eligible to compete as suppliers. To cite another unique challenge that strains traditional logics of organizing: In the U.S., the same airplane is expected to fill the needs of three military branches, even building a lift fan for the Marine STOVL version to lift vertically like a helicopter. The development process also faces unprecedented demands: engineers, vendors, suppliers, all of whom are expected to cooperate, would be using a novel digital design and logistics process. On the surface, a joint partnership to build the JSF is not so unusual. BAE and Northrop had teamed with McDonnell Douglas on the first round of the JSF competition. Lockheed had partnered with Boeing on the F/A-22 program. Typically, these projects consist of a prime contractor that doles out parts of the jet’s development to dozens of subcontractors and hundreds of smaller suppliers. These arrangements usually encourage predictable maladaptive behavior where the prime contractor browbeats the subcontractors and they, in turn, overcharge which results in delays and cost overruns (Fallows, 2002). Lockheed’s proposal offered BAE and Northrop a full-fledged strategic partnership in which the two companies would command a combined 30% stake in the program. Lockheed, Northrop and BAE people would work shoulder to shoulder to develop the entire aircraft. Lockheed brought in Burbage, a 21-year Lockheed veteran and Navy test pilot and graduate of the naval academy, to manage the complex collaboration that would be required to complete design and production goals. From the beginning, Burbage framed it as a challenge in managing collaboration rather than a challenge in managing complex technology. Burbage reflects on the challenge, “If one looks at JSF through the legacy management filters we have used in the past, it appears unmanageable. One
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of our ultimate challenges is to develop a JSF leadership and collaborative culture that will allow us to achieve success” (J. Olson, personal communication, October, 2002). This type of organization gives us a “living laboratory” for research on understanding collaborative start-ups and alliances. In taking an exploratory look at JSF, one can look at the literature of complex collaboration as if looking through an interdisciplinary lens or kaleidoscope. Different frames can give one a glimpse of different dimensions and when you turn it, you can see overlaps and interdependencies. The author is in the process of researching JSF through qualitative interviews which will be provided in a later article. This article provides a literature review to approach the interdisciplinary challenges of understanding co-development when collaboration across boundaries is required. The literature search intends to explore these questions and dimensions regarding complex collaborations: (1) What motivates partners to seek each other out and then stay together – innovation, new market needs, new capabilities, globalization? (2) Do they have the same vulnerabilities as in other alliances – disparate goals, lack of trust or lack of experience in partnering? (3) What are risk factors that lead to failures – different cultures, lack of integration, inability to learn? (4) What are key success factors that have been found in other partnerships – overcoming Not Invented Here (NIH) syndrome, structured processes, flexibility? (5) What can we apply from other collaborative settings – i.e. negotiations, International Government Organizations (IGO), union-management relations – to add to our understanding of the collaborative corporate world? (6) How do you balance cooperation with competition when your competitors are your partners? How do you overcome traditional win-lose strategies with multiple perspectives, thought-world’s and stakeholder creativity? (7) How does the composition and group processes of new product teams affect their ability to plan work, communicate and problem-solve? (8) What are the unique challenges faced by large companies when they organize to innovate? (9) What is the collective nature of multi-disciplinary work – creating new routines, systematic processes or chaos? (10) What are the communication and connectivity issues that geographically distributed work presents? (11) What does collective learning have to do with knowledge transfer and building community?
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(12) What new metaphors and models would enable us to look at collaborative work in new ways to better the understand the dynamics of complexity?
Strategic Partnerships and Start-ups Purpose In large companies, the primary reason for co-development is innovation. Faster time-to-market and more development output are the top reasons for small companies (Performance Management Group, 2003). Progress in co-development seems to be needed on multiple fronts: strategy, processes and tools. “Companies can no longer rely solely on in-house resources” is echoed in The Futurist where is it estimated that 50% of all technology developed will be transferred between countries by corporations or universities (Segil, 2002). Fifty-two percent of pharmaceutical products to be launched in 2002 were associated with alliances vs. 38% in 2001 and 25% in 2000. The accelerated growth through alliances is predicted to build the biopharmaceutical industry of the future (Dionne, 2002). This mirrors strategic reasons for forming acquisitions and alliances cited by others (Dionne, 2002; Henricks, 1991; Lev, 2001; Palcheck & Stewart, 2002) which include: strengthening competitive position in an existing market and gaining access to knowledge – obtaining competence or establishing a leadership position in technology or a market. Other companies may try to create a growth engine using products as a springboard for next generation or facilitate value creation through research, learning, development of products and services to gain speed to market. Alliances usually require a mixture of risk-sharing, overall integrated technology platform, globalization and shorter windows of opportunity – to create shorter product design cycles. A co-evolutionary theory of strategic alliances may be seen in the context of the adaptation choices of a firm over time. These alliances are embedded in a firm’s strategic portfolio and co-evolve with the firm’s strategy, the institutional, organizational and competitive environments and with management intent for the alliance (Koza & Lewin, 1998). This theory of co-evolution has over recent years, seen an increase in studies of organization adaptation at different levels of analysis – i.e. evolution of organizations cannot be understood independently from the simultaneous evolution of the environment (McKelvey, 1997). Lewin has advanced a theory of the evolution of new organization forms as an “outcome of the co-evolution of the competitive environment, firm intentionality and the institutional environment of the firm under conditions of stochastic or chaotic environmental uncertainty” (Lewin et al., 1998).
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One strategic model of alliances uses “exploration” and “exploitation” in organizations learning to provide a framework for linking adaptations at the firm level to changes occurring at the level of the organizational population. In terms of complexity theory, exploration is associated with prospecting for “new landscapes; discovering new opportunities for wealth creation and above average returns and involves basic research, invention, risk-taking, building new capabilities and entering new lines of business and investments in the firm’s absorptive capacity” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). Exploitation is associated with increasing productivity of employed capital and assets – “improving and refining existing capabilities and technologies, standardization, routinization, and systematic cost reduction” (Levinthal & March, 1993). Here the firm’s choice to enter into an alliance can be distinguished in terms of its motivation to exploit an existing capability or to explore for new opportunities. Levinthal and March (1993, p. 105) argue that the “survival of the firm is dependent upon the firm’s ability to engage in enough exploitation to insure the organization’s current viability and engage in enough exploration to insure its future viability.” They also see the environment as a dependent variable, suggesting that in stable markets, the firm’s focus on exploiting (refining, improving, cost reduction of) existing capabilities can lead to a stronger competitive position in that market. In changing competitive markets, the same self-reinforcing exploitation strategies may negatively affect the firm’s survival by creating a competency trap. This ability to achieve new forms of competitive advantage can also be described as a “dynamic capabilities” approach (Teece et al., 1997). “Dynamic” refers to the capacity to renew competencies so as to achieve congruence with the changing business environment and “capabilities” emphasizes the key role of strategic management in appropriately adapting, integrating and reconfiguring internal and external organizational skills, resources and functional competencies to match the requirements of a changing environment. Competencies and capabilities of a firm rest fundamentally on processes, skills and complementary assets that are difficult to imitate. The ability to calibrate the requirements for change and make the necessary adjustments would appear to depend on the ability to scan the environment, evaluate markets and competitors and to quickly accomplish reconfiguration and transformation ahead of the competition to be a “high-flex” organization. It is in this dimension of encompassing skill acquisition, learning and accumulation of organizational and intangible or “invisible” assets that some believe (Itami & Roehl, 1987) lies the greatest potential for contributions to strategy. In summary, we see that companies form alliances to respond to changing external environments and can be stimulated by market needs, new products,
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new competencies and managerial preferences. These alliances also require a complex response internally – development of new capabilities, skill acquisition and reconfiguration of resources and processes. Organizations need to get better at continually partnering over time. Failures Multi-party collaborations are unique challenges and often unsuccessful. Reasons for failures include lack of previous experience with partnering, integration of different management styles and learning capabilities, lack of cultural sensitivity and lack of trust. According to Sherman (1992), the rate of joint venture formation between U.S. companies and international partners has been growing annually by 27% since 1985. Roughly one-third reportedly fail to live up to parents’ expectations, however; and two-thirds of companies are not satisfied with their co-development efforts (Performance Management Group, 2003). Few companies are satisfied with current collaborative development tools. In a McKinsey study of 150 top partnerships ranked by market value (50 each from U.S., Europe and Japan), only 51% were successful for both partners. Cross-border alliances and cross-border acquisitions both have roughly a 50% rate of success (Bleeke & Ernst, 1991). Bleeke and Ernst also report that alliances between two strong partners are a safer bet than alliances involving two weaker players, and that 67% of alliances run into trouble during the first two years. The Alliance Analyst cites 30% of in the pharmaceutical industry fail outright and an additional 23% achieve only limited success (McCamey, 2002). AT Kearney research (Henricks, 1991) cites the most common pitfalls: a partner having little strategic alliance experience, integrating different management styles, not building consensus from the beginning and moving too fast on too many fronts. Management issues also continue to top the list of concerns (Performance Management Group, 2003), especially inadequate executive leadership. Mergers, in particular, seem to fail due to poor strategic fit, choice of poor acquisition candidate, poor financing, poor integration and lack of cultural and organizational sensitivity (Palcheck & Stewart, 2002). One key failing is the inability to sustain a spirit of cooperation and attention to the ongoing advantage of all partners. Newcomers to corporate alliances are often surprised by the demands placed upon them. One of the biggest variables is the concept of “trust.” It has been concluded that successful alliances exhibit trust between the partners. While many factors have been attributed to explain alliance success, failure and stability, trust seems to have emerged as the magic ingredient necessary for alliances to succeed. Kumar (1996) defines trust as “dependability” by the partners in which a “leap of faith” is made that each partner is interested in
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the welfare of the other. One can extend the theme of mutual welfare where trust is the “perceived likelihood of the other not behaving in a self-interested manner” (Madhok, 1995). Some define trust as “a type of expectation that alleviates the fear that one’s exchange partner will act opportunistically” (Gulati, 1995). Axelrod suggests that it is more likely that in successful alliances, organizational structures and processes have been developed which align interests so that “cooperation evolves naturally” (Axelrod, 1984). Segil (2002) has studied partner difficulties three to four years after the formation of the partnership and found that these primarily are due to differing culture and objectives of the partners. Economic changes also lead to shifts in market demands which then requires a constant refocusing of each company on individual strengths and core businesses. Failure can also be measured in the lack of collaborative learning that was not properly followed through or effort that was reduced over time. If success is defined in terms of learning where parties collaborate to acquire new skills and competitive advantage, then failure can be defined as one partner having advanced skills and the other having diminished skills with loss of competitive position and increased dependency. Firms often lack the organizational capacity to develop new competencies quickly and so need to make choices about how much to spend (invest) on different possible areas central to the firm’s strategy (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Unless firms have replicated their systems of productive knowledge on many prior occasions, the act of replication is likely to be difficult. The ability to replicate indicates that the firm has foundations in place for learning and improvement (Teece, 1996). Dynamic capabilities thus reflect an organization’s ability to achieve new and innovative forms of competitive advantage given path dependencies and market positions. A firm’s previous investments and its repertoire of routines (its history) constrains its future behavior. Post success, an organization’s core capabilities can just as easily create “core rigidities” because learning tends to be local and a process of trial, feedback and evaluation (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Even measuring performance can be a challenge. McKinsey reports (Sherman, 1992) that although most large companies now have at least 30 alliances, very few systematically track their performance and doing so is “not a straightforward task.” Fewer than one in four have adequate performance metrics and it is estimated that few senior management teams know whether the alliance portfolio as a whole really supports corporate strategy. Success Factors Key success factors of alliances focus on integration – of task through work structures and processes; culture that strengthens shared perceptions, values and behaviors; and interdependence.
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Integration Many successful scenarios rely on strong implementation plans to chart integration and management plans by establishing clear goals and performance milestones. These focus on human resources, communication, a team approach, crossfunctionality and managing the NIH – “not invented here” syndrome. Procter & Gamble, for instance, uses an Alliance Toolkit for pre-alliance activities aimed at alignment: partner selection, preparing for due diligence, work and staffing planning, startup and alliance operations, conflict management and alliance key element assessment and renewal. The alliance framework emphasizes management structure, mid-course corrections and intellectual property (McCamey, 2002). How efficiently and effectively internal coordination or integration is achieved is very important, as is external coordination. Increasingly, strategic advantage requires the integration of external activities and technologies as seen in strategic alliances, the virtual corporation and buyer-supplier relations and technology collaboration (Aoki, 1990). A resource-based strategy model can aid managers to differentiate between resources which might support a competitive advantage from other less valuable resources (Barney, 1991). These describe productive factors having intrinsically different levels of “efficiency.” This helps a firm in deciding whether to license a new technology or whether to develop it internally (Peteraf, 1993). A survey conducted by Performance Management Group (2003) revealed the deployment of seven specific practices as key success factors: structured process, project teams, relationship management, partner management, partner selection, metrics and product strategy. Although all were deemed important, the respondents reported only 20% or less of these practices were deployed systematically. One of the key ingredients for success seems to be flexibility to allow joint ventures to overcome problems and adapt to changes over time. This may include objectives, resources, strategies and skills. These inherent tensions require more flexibility on the part of joint venture parents than many other business strategies. Meeting the requirements of change may also include rebalancing or even exiting the alliance.
Culture A common theme of risk is culture and relationship development where there is continued development of trust, acceptance of compromise and specific attitudes that contribute to managing change – like not assuming projective cognitive similarity (Segil, 2002). Millenium Pharmaceuticals uses core values
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and relationship values to synergize their alliances. These values include: “hiring the best people, creating an environment where people can succeed, listening and learning from everyone, encourage innovation in the search for breakthrough products, build a socially and ethically responsible corporation and believe that nothing is impossible.” They even use the term “over the top” alliances to describe those that truly transform the business of the two partners. Here they say the ingredients for success are “a breakthrough platform combined with a breakthrough business structure.” They shoot for transformation where they want to change the entire base of competition to dramatically increase productivity for new products. An extremely high degree of collaboration is critical in these scenarios (Dionne, 2002, p. 52). One critical phase in multi party issues is to arrive at a shared perception of a desired future and an overlapping task (Vansina et al., 1998). This challenge is quite complex, involving multiple perspectives and multiple resources. How is it possible to achieve collaboration between a diversity of interests, when parties represent different organizations, when there has been no or little common history of collaboration?
Interdependence According to Gray (1989) two factors that are necessary to motivate multi-party organizations to collaborate are “high stakes and high interdependence.” The literature on multi-party collaboration suggests that collaborative task systems are different from integrating teams in that they must start at an earlier stage, independent interest parties have to find common ground through sharing their views and definitions of a particular domain. Integrating teams already have shared interests; but collaborative start-ups need to discover or create shared principles that derive from common ground or shared interests. Cohen and Mankin (2003) suggest this process needs to be intentional – it won’t just emerge from the turmoil of collaborative start-ups. Stakeholders come from different institutions and need to negotiate agreements to achieve collaboration because their interests up to this point may not have overlapped. Fleck (1979) suggests that this collaboration problem of divergent understandings “runs deeper than conflicts over personality types or goals.” Nor is it the proverbial set of blind men touching a different part of an elephant. It is more like the tales of eyewitnesses at an accident, or of individuals in a troubled relationship – each tells a “complete” story, but tells a different one. Strategies to overcome these barriers might include: having innovators using and building on the unique aspects of each thought world, developing collaborative mechanisms
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that deal directly with the interpretive as well as structural barriers to collective action (interdisciplinary responsibility for focus groups, market research plans, technology audits and visits with customers) and finally, an organizational context for collective action that enables both. In building an organization’s capacity for commitment to the innovation process, Dougherty (1996) recommends we consider both organizational and individual levels – just as individual creativity triggers organizational innovation. The culture needed is that of risk-taking, values change and learning to reinforce the need to take innovative action. There needs to be an emphasis on the contributive nature of special knowledge and expertise with these tasks understood realistically as part of the business as a whole, not just abstracted out. This suggests a collective accountability where the innovator becomes legitimate and all participants take on some responsibility for innovation. Culture’s power comes from its integrative perspective that includes an organization’s fundamental goals, values, ways of thinking, managerial styles, the paradigms and approaches to problem solving. It can clarify expectations of the organization and of individuals in “codes of conduct” and expressions of a shared system of belief. Efficiently translating R&D into new products, which can be speedily gotten to market, requires creativity and innovation in business processes and systems as well. This calls for corporate cultures at ease with new ideas, changes, uncertainties and possible failure. Quinn (1985, p. 79) compares the process of introducing a new product to the world to raising a child. He suggests it needs a mother (champion) who loves and supports it, a father (authority figure with resources) to strengthen it, and pediatricians (specialists) to get it through difficult times. It may survive solely in the hands of specialist, but its chances of success are remote. Creativity, like children, can be difficult to contain, impossible to dictate and filled with indifference toward the status quo. Like children, ideas are the future and so the effort to cultivate them is indeed worthwhile.
COLLABORATION AND COMPETITION Literature has investigated the structure and processes associated with both cooperation and competition between and among organizations. Typically, these studies emphasized such phenomena as the struggle for power in interfirmnetworks (Cook, 1977). According to Gray (1989), this struggle can include asymmetrical power distribution among stakeholders differentiating those who are more influential and those who are weaker, disparate political cultures with differing values, attitudes and beliefs about the way the world works, and technical complexity which can hinder collaborative efforts because science is
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not easily translated into policy terms and may make it easier for stakeholders to use information to serve their own purposes. They also describe learning alliances where “partners hope to learn and acquire from each other technologies, products, skills and knowledge” (Lei & Slocum, 1992). Some are business alliances which maximize the utilization of complementary assets – each partner brings and contributes a distinctive capability in a particular value adding activity (Lei & Slocum, 1991).
Collaboration Gray (1989) suggests there are critical prior conditions essential to making collaborations work where reciprocity is key to advancing a shared vision. These include considering the organizational interests or stakes of the organization in the outcome of the joint effort – as well as the perceived interdependence with the other partners. Her framework for cross sectorial collaboration for social problem-solving lends itself to the needs of all partnerships – building of common definitions from problems stemming from interdependence, commitment to collaboration and identification of resources to enable the collaboration. Gray (1989, pp. 255–256) even suggests that there are several conditions under which collaboration should not be attempted: (1) the conflict is rooted in basic ideological differences; (2) a legitimate convener cannot be found; (3) one or more groups of stakeholders cannot establish representation; (4) the issues are too threatening because of historical antagonisms; and (5) maintenance of interorganizational relationships represents substantial costs to the partners. She recommends that all stakeholders must be included & perceive that their interests are fairly represented, because partnerships are not founded solely on philanthropic motives. The challenge is to discover shared interests, arrange the most advantageous trade-offs possible among differing interests and provide sufficient incentives for collaboration. Process factors require that stakeholders agree on the scope of the collaboration, that they negotiate in good faith and that the timing is right – meaning that stakeholders and their constituents are aware of the issue and have developed ideas about ways to resolve related problems. Resolution, Gray observes, often depends on stakeholder creativity: the ability to connect self-interest & community interest represents a new way of approaching international relations, which historically have been characterized by more competitive behaviors. Another arena of collaborative process models comes from the labor union and management negotiations where reliable partnerships are key to establishing strong communications systems and providing in equitable sharing of gains
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from workplace improvements over time (Kaminski et al., 1996). New benefits are being realized from “joint transformation initiatives” between unions and their companies to produce greater responsiveness to customer needs and a more highly skilled workforce. In particular, these benefits include a focus on developing new products and markets with joint design of work processes, work organization, technology and skills. Lessons learned concerning joint design include establishing good ground rules with solid, clear contract language for processes. It is suggested that neither management nor unions should enter into partnerships “lightly,” due to the serious time and financial resources required and the risk of long term failure of transformation efforts which lack planning and are poorly implemented. Lessons learned are also being identified in negotiating multi-party problems at the international level where stakeholders with complex interdependencies must construct governance structures to manage a variety of new global challenges. Collaborative efforts to institutionalize rules and decision-making procedures in several issue areas continue despite difficulties inherent in international negotiations. These lessons include that rules must be realistic – attainable, flexible and compatible with perceived needs – or they will not be followed. Many International Government Organizations (IGOs) have achieved success in attaining technical goals by facilitating rather than demanding absolute compliance (Golich, 1991). They also rely on discussion forums to ensure that member and process factors are incorporated into collaborative efforts. Stakeholder creativity is a key to resolving contentious issues where the ability to connect self-interest and community interest represents a new way of approaching international relations, which historically have been characterized by more competitive behaviors.
Competition Earley and Gibson (2002) also provide a framework for assessing multinational team functioning which clearly identifies those elements that could inhibit collaborative performance. These include: (1) nature of competition and cooperation within a team – e.g. for resources; (2) sense of fractionism or disunity within a team – especially when composed of members of multiple cultures; (3) development of a hybrid, team or culture; (4) shared understanding and meaning that exists for team functioning; and (5) shared goals and priorities viewed as a central feature of cooperation. “Principled negotiation” (Fisher et al., 1991) is a way for differing parties to see themselves as “partners” sitting on the same side of the table while facing
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a mutual problem or challenge together and advancing shared interests. They advise focusing on the problem, not the people; interests rather than positions; generating a variety of possibilities before decision-making and using an objective standard for evaluating results. They liken the negotiation process to shipwrecked sailors who must overcome seeing each other as adversaries, if they are to be able to focus on getting water and getting to shore. The goal, they say, is to “accept the task as a shared problem and face it jointly.” This also must be a continued effort, not just promoted as the beginning of a relationship. Their approach definitely requires a different mindset – where the game has changed from the traditional win-lose posturing often seen in union-management negotiations. Their premise is that, in most instances, to ask a negotiator “who’s winning” is as inappropriate as to ask who’s winning a marriage. “If you ask that question about your marriage, you have already lost the more important negotiation – the one about what kind of game to play, about the way you deal with each other and your shared and differing interests (Fisher et al., 1991, p. 148). In handling groups that may have differing values, cultures, experience or perceptions Fisher, Ury and Patton (1991) go on to suggest that agreement on the “best standard” may not even be necessary. They advise being sensitive to those differences of partners while avoiding stereotyping individuals and then adapting behavior accordingly. Questioning one’s own assumptions about the others’ intentions or interests is a vital part to listening very actively. Less is written about how to make a collaborative alliance work, once partnered – especially when it comes to collaboration among competitors. Very few of the research studies actually emphasize the competitive risks of partnerships other than to mention the issues of intellectual property rights and competing with customers or suppliers. When both partners have a presence in the same geographic market, alliances often lead to competitive conflicts (Bleeke & Ernst, 1991). The challenge of balancing collaboration with competition is considered by some to be a “wicked problem” where multiple perspectives must be integrated in a dance of change as incremental and revolutionary changes are introduced into the situation (Pacanowsky, 1995). Wicked problems are complex with interdependent facets and solutions need to be context-specific. Organizational transformation may be required for solving the problems of competition and collaboration.
NEW PRODUCT TEAMS In the overarching research on innovation, two broad areas of inquiry can be found (Adler, 1989). The first is an economics-oriented tradition, which typically examines differences in the patterns of innovation across countries,
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industrial sectors, and the evolution of technologies over time. The second is an organizations-oriented tradition, looking at a microlevel regarding how specific new products are developed (e.g. Ancona & Caldwell, 1992b; Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Zirger & Maidique, 1990). This arena is where product development literature is found which especially focuses on the structures and processes by which individuals create products. Historically, the literature on product development can be seen as three separate streams: rational planning (which focuses on a broad range of determinants of financial performance of the product), communications web work (which is concerned with effects of communication on project performance) and disciplined problem solving (which centers on the effects of product – a development team, its suppliers and leaders on the actual product-development process) (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995). Brown and Eisenhardt’s emphasis on execution spotlights that “internal organization is critical to product success” (1995, p. 351), especially cross-functional skills and their synergies with existing firm competencies. A new integrative model proposed by Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) attempts to improve the understanding of product development by synthesizing the common findings of the research streams and blend in complementary ones to form a model of factors affecting the success of product development projects. This research typically emphasizes factors primarily related to team composition, organization of work and group processes. The new model distinguishes between process performance, product concept effectiveness and financial success while broadening the importance of agents including team members, project leaders, senior management, customers and suppliers – all of whose behavior affects these outcomes. These streams complement each other as well as overlap. For example, in the communications web work stream, foundational work was provided by Allen at MIT (1977). The underlying premise is that communication among project team members and with outsiders stimulates the performance of development teams. The better that members are connected with each other and with key outsiders, the more successful the development process will be. A new perspective looks at how both internal and external communications come together with development processes into a theoretical overall “information-processing view” under process performance. This is first seen through a typology of external communication or “boundary-spanning” behaviors identified by Ancona and Caldwell (1992b). They surveyed 45 product-development teams in their sample to better understand communication strategy that was very comprehensive in combining external lobbying activities with task-coordination behaviors that helped these teams to secure resources, gain task-related information, and so enhance success. They also found that teams with a more thorough internal communication (e.g. they defined goals better, developed workable plans, and prioritized work)
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had superior performance (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992a). This also contributes to a “resource dependence view” which emphasizes that frequent political communication (typically external) leads to higher performing development processes by increasing the resources (e.g. budget, personnel, equipment) available to the team. Another example of complementary streams is portraying product development as a balancing act between product vision developed at the executive level and problem solving found at the project level. A study by Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995) examined the computer industry in Japan, Europe and the United States. This deductive study considered 72 products in 36 firms where the focus was on speed of development as the performance measure. They found that product teams who were engaged in more experiential or improvisational product design through frequent iterations, more testing, frequent milestones and powerful leadership developed products more quickly as well as did cross-functional teams. This adds to the research of two relevant problem-solving models for organizing product development for more stable products in mature settings (Clark et al., 1987; Clark & Fujimoto, 1991) where several Harvard researchers studied the management of product-development projects in the auto industry. Building on data consisting of in-depth case studies of 29 major car-development projects across 20 companies – three American, eight Japanese and nine European, these authors replicated earlier findings. They reported that supplier networks coupled with overlapping product-development phases, communication and cross-functional groups improved the performance of the development teams by introducing two central concepts: heavyweight team leaders and product integrity. The heavyweight team leads are actually “linking pins” with senior management who create an overarching product concept so that senior management can exercise subtle control by managing within a product context. Product integrity here is defined as being consistent with the corporate image. Overall, Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) try to organize their model to emphasize the relationships between the theoretical underpinnings identified from the combined research streams. For instance, process performance is driven by the amount, variety and problem-solving organization of information and by the resources available to the team. Product effectiveness is driven by the input of leaders, senior management and customers into the formation of a clear product vision. Both product effectiveness and product performance influence the financial success of the product. The key players in the model are the heart of the product development process – the project team. The composition, group process and work organization of the project team affect the information, resources and problem-solving style of the team. These factors ultimately influence process performance (i.e. speed and performance). According to Brown and Eisenhardt,
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consistent with the empirical support in all three research streams, cross-functional teams are associated with high-performing processes. Moreover, this link in their model is suggested to be among the most important and empirically robust (e.g. Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Dougherty, 1992; Zirger & Maidique, 1990).
Innovation Dougherty (1996) further explores critical cross-functional issues of team communication by stating that organizations need to embrace “the principle that work is inherently collaborative.” She presents a useful metaphor of “tensions” to describe the number of challenges and conflicts of seemingly opposing forces that can be found in the innovation process – with an emphasis on innovative product development in large, established firms. She references the dialectical nature of innovation whereby the organization and new products are mutually constitutive. Four sets of activities are critical, she says, to effective product innovation. They include: first, conceptualizing the product which requires integrating market needs and technological potential called market-technology linking; second, organizing processes for creative problem-solving; third, monitoring the innovation process; and finally, she recommends that developing the commitment/culture to the innovation effort is critical. Dougherty (1996) goes on to suggest that these four activities all interrelate in practice and that product innovation is inherently interfunctional – second only to corporate strategy. It also is inherently ambiguous and involves varied perception and social constructionism. Each activity has their own set of organizational wide tensions, which can help illuminate the challenges of innovation. The arena of market-technology linking is particularly relevant to understanding the complex collaboration on new product teams where innovators try to create designs that reflect customer needs, market structure, technological capability, manufacturability, selling and distribution. Here, the tensions surface between internal and external activities – i.e. operations and technology. If the innovation can be handled in a single project, then the team members can collaborate among themselves, users and suppliers. Integrated Product Teams, for instance, were created to support this front-end market-linking and knowledge creation as innovators work with customers, experiment with new designs and test different approaches. Development of new products requires that technological and market possibilities are linked effectively in the product’s design. Dougherty (1990) demonstrated that two interpretive schemes are found to inhibit development of technology-market knowledge: departmental thought worlds and organizational product routines. Three implications from her findings
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relate to collaboration: (1) collaboration is necessary to technology-market linking, enhancing the product’s design along with improving the execution of the development process; (2) the styles in which people organize their thinking and action about innovation – their interpretive schemes are major barriers to linking and collaboration. These could be departmental & organizational routines which separate rather than coordinate the thought worlds; (3) correcting these innovation problems caused by interpretive barriers requires cultural solutions, not structural ones. Dougherty (1990) demonstrated that various functional departments were tantamount to “thought worlds,” each with its own fund of knowledge – what members know – and “system of meaning” – how members know (Dougherty, 1992).
Multi-disciplinary “Thought-Worlds” These “thought worlds” can create silos. Fleck (1979, p. 99) emphasizes the social basis of cognition and adds that “innovations often are epistemologically unsolvable by any one person.” Due to specialization, a certain thought world is likely to best understand certain issues, but also to ignore information that may be equally essential to the total task. Their intrinsic harmony would also reduce the possibility for joint learning, since members of a department may think they already know everything – the “Not Invented Here (NIH) syndrome.” He found four themes in thought worlds in new product development: (1) people’s descriptions of other departments and customers; (2) what people see when they look into the future and uncertainty; (3) what people consider to be the critical aspects of the product development process; and (4) how people understand the development task itself. Contrasting perspectives can seriously impede a dialogue over what the product is and how it should be developed. This will require new organizational routines in what Fleck (1979, p. 100) calls “collective work proper.” He suggests this is different than additive work, as when people come together to lift a large rock. Collective work refers to “the coming into existence of a special form, like a soccer match, conversation or orchestra.” This new social form alters the thought worlds’ existing readiness for directed perception to allow new possibilities for discovery and new facts. He further explains that each thought world rechannels its readiness from an inward focus to an outward focus so that their knowledge could join to produce new insights and facts. In his research, he saw how interdepartmental relationships encouraged ideas to be heard and built on and enhanced appreciation of one another’s contributions. Research on project development in the automobile industry (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991) also illustrates the role played by coordinative routines. Their study reveals
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significant degrees of variation in how different firms coordinate the various activities required to bring a new model from concept to market. Routines related to coordination are firm-specific in nature and these differences in coordinative routines and capabilities seem to have a significant impact on such performance variables as development cost, development lead times and quality. When organizing for innovation, innovators must solve complex problems to overcome surprises, work around barriers, merge processes from different functions and weave together resources from different locations. One of the prime tensions in jointly focusing on problems that affect more than one function is by taking into account the constraints of the other function. This is multidisciplinary work that must be coordinated (Dougherty, 1996). She proposes that to support creative problem solving in organizations, it is essential to see the organization itself as a process, focusing on organizing for innovation. It is suggested that if people could see work as a process, then they could see sets of work and emphasize the relationships between them. This would challenge managers with a complexity to solve cross-boundary problems, as well as provide a focus on product lines where managers can see how new ideas flow into generations or product revolutions. In summary, Dougherty (1996) presents a case that there is little insight into organizational problems of innovation because research has not been anchored into basic activities which underlie product innovation – they have either been project-focused or have been done at too high at a top-level of the organization. The question “How can we organize organizations to be more effectively innovative?” is put on the table to challenge our next frontier of research and analysis.
Organizing for Innovation Quinn (1985) found that big companies could stay innovative by behaving like small entrepreneurial ventures within an environment of “controlled chaos.” His research showed that a large company could emulate smaller ones by using groups that function in a skunkworks style. Small teams of engineers, technicians, designers, and model makers were placed together with no intervening organizational or physical barriers to developing a new product from idea to commercial prototype stages. The skunkworks approach eliminates bureaucracies, allows fast, unfettered communication, permits rapid turnaround times for experiments and instills a high level of group identity and loyalty. Overall, his suggested approach is not one of highly structured planning systems, but an “incrementalist” approach where “major innovations are best managed as incremental, goal-oriented, interactive learning processes” (Quinn, 1985, p. 82). He describes the innovative
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process itself as inherently incremental where technological systems evolve through relatively small steps marked by an occasional stubborn obstacle and by constant random breakthroughs interacting across laboratories and boundaries. The challenge for managers is how to manage this chaos. They may be able to learn lessons from venture capitalists who administer primarily by setting goals, selecting key people and establishing a few critical limits and decision points for intervention rather than by implementing elaborate planning or control systems. Quinn suggests that executives need to understand and accept the tumultuous realities of innovation. Beyerlein, Freedman, McGee and Moran (2003) suggest that collaborating is a process that forms the skeleton of a dynamic system. They describe work teams as the most common structural change to improve effective use of collaboration: a useful mix of expertise, an opportunity to increase commitment through involving employees in decision-making, leveraging of resources through identification of interdependencies, pooled energy through commitment to the team or common purpose. A team-based organization capitalizes on the competitive advantage of collaboration that grew out of socio-technical systems work, where the need to jointly optimize the social and technical facets of the organization was recognized as the key to performance (Beyerlein et al., 2003). Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1987) found that “although many managers profess to have a systematic process plan in place for product development, an audit of what actually happens “in the trenches” reveals many gaps and deficiencies.” Often, a number of activities, often critical, are either eliminated or key activities are superficially undertaken. This can result in poor design, product malfunctioning, product liability suits, expensive product recalls and potential higher production costs (Hise et al., 1989). The challenge is to speed up the product life cycle even in an industry like aerospace where slow, development cycles have been acceptable – without cutting corners or avoiding taking important steps which might sacrifice quality. Gupta and Wilemon (1990) researched the new product development (NPD) process of 12 large technology-based firms. They were chosen because they were known to have active NPD programs for a number of years and they had experienced both important successes and failure in their innovation programs. Although 88% of the respondents had experienced a need to reduce the development time for their new products since 1980, 87% of the study participants reported that most of the reasons that delayed product development in the past continue to exist in their companies. The four main categories of areas having significant impact on the NPD process performance in terms were senior management support, early integration of functional expertise in NPD, availability of NPD resources and their management, and an organizational environment that supports teamwork.
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Content analysis of the responses of the interviewees revealed that major concerns included management and organizational style, lack of attention to details, limited support for innovation, lack of strategic thinking, and inadequate manufacturing facilities. Roberts (1988), in his review article on managing innovation, emphasizes that the “management of technological innovation is complex, involving the effective integration of people, organizational process and plans.” If there is a breakdown in any one of these elements or if they are not well integrated, the NPD process becomes less effective. Cohen and Mankin (2003) suggest, “the structural challenge (as in any new product development project) is to partition the tasks effectively so that specialized work can proceed, while simultaneously integrating the different parts across the boundaries of time, distance and culture.” They also stress the importance for collaborators to be proactive in developing mutual understandings about respecting their each other’s boundaries. People with strong interpersonal skills, particularly “lateral skills” – the ability to work with others different than themselves – are critical to put in key linking roles to enable work integration across organizations. Cohen and Mankin suggest that an organization develops the capability to conduct complex collaborations when it can consistently and successfully execute them. This capability is developed when all parts of the organization are aligned to support complex collaboration – structure, task, technology, processes, rewards and people practices. Although the heart of new product development seems to rest on teams, their performance, in turn, relies on the larger organization of innovation that surrounds them. This complexity increases when these teams are geographically dispersed.
Distributed Work Virtual teams are an evolution of collaborative work. They have developed on two particular correlations: (1) the emergence of environments that require interorganizational cooperation as well as competition; and (2) the increasing globalization of trade and corporate activity (Townsend, 1998). Organizations have also recognized that team-based structures have the potential to create a more productive, creative and individually fulfilling working environment. Townsend (1998) suggests that new competencies are required of these virtual team members including superior team participation skills to assimilate with a team, proficiency with computerbased technologies and the ability to cross national boundaries and communicate with a variety of cultural backgrounds which will be represented on the team. Cohen and Mankin (2003) describe that “virtual organizations are more complex than traditional organizations, in that they connect multiple organizations
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in a dynamic network.” Each organization has its own policies, systems, and structures that may not easily mesh with its partners. The dynamic nature of the network as well as the number of boundaries that are crossed increase uncertainty and complexity. Collaboration is essential, although Cohen and Mankin (in press) go on to describe a paradox within virtual teams. They present a fragmentation which challenges workers to cut across multiple boundaries, country, department and discipline, and at the same time, creates a need to create those systems and enablers that would normally be taken for granted and yet, not in place. Complexities of multinational enterprises are also emphasized by Boudreau, Loch, Robey and Straud (1998) due to the management of interdependencies between nations, as well as companies. They found three characteristics of virtual organizations which seem to enhance global competitiveness: (1) seamless integration among a variety of federated organizations; (2) ability to overcome vast spatial and temporal barriers linking together geographically remote sites; and (3) flexibility to form, disband and reform to respond rapidly to changing business needs – especially customer needs. The new Lotus Sedan and Lotus Wagon are the result of a co-development dilemma – trying to preserve its carefully crafted image as a “different kind of car company” independent from GM decision-making (Pryweller, 1999). On the other hand, they wanted to save money by adapting a European car for the North American market. The challenge was manage the politics of world-platformsharing. The work was headquartered in Norwich, England at Lotus Group, Ltd., the outside British engineering and vehicle development company previously owned by GM. There, designers and engineers from around the world met to produce a vehicle that “cherry-picked” components from across GM. At any given meeting, Lotus coordinators might be hosting a group of 40 to 50 people that included Lotus engineers, Saturn’s manufacturing engineers from Spring Hill, Saturn vehicle engineers from Michigan, powertrain experts from New York and England, engineers from Saab, which supplies a transmission, and Opel engineers from Russelsheim. The engineers claimed that having England as a “neutral site” helped, and leveraging resources from around the world was their competitive edge (Chappel, 1999). Gibson (2002) continues to build the argument for multicultural virtual teams being able to enhance performance when well managed. Her research reveals that these teams seem more creative, can generate more and better alternatives including criteria and perform better on complex, multi-faceted tasks. The challenges they face include being geographically dispersed over multiple time zones, rarely meeting face-to-face, having members who do not share the same access to electronic communication and whose native language may be different than most team members. Diversity barriers could also include members who
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are from two or more functions or disciplines. She presents a design model for virtual teams that emphasizes people, process, group structure, organization context and technology building toward shared understanding, integration and trust. Hoped-for outcomes are described in both organizational and human terms. Mohrman (1998) speaks to the new need for “distributed work” with two requirements for success in today’s global competitive environment: (1) locating locations throughout the world in order to be close to needed resources and be responsive to customers; and (2) organizations having to leverage knowledge, products and activities around the world, requiring new activities to integrate across their operations. Using geographical dispersed teams also improves the capabilities of organizations to introduce new technologies, redefine core organizational processes and leverage knowledge capabilities. This enables companies to pull expertise from wherever in the company it happens to exist, which makes them heavily dependent on interactions with the systems and people that provide the resources, task, goal and performance-related information to them. Clark and Wheelright (1992) suggest a product development framework including the organizational issues of cross-functional cooperation, learning and building capabilities.
Organizational Learning Researchers (Doz & Shuen, 1990; Mody, 1993) have pointed out that collaboration and partnerships can be a vehicle for new organizational learning, helping firms to recognize dysfunctional routines and preventing strategic blindspots. The concept of dynamic capabilities as a coordinative management process opens the door to the potential for interorganizational learning. Learning requires common codes of communication and coordinated search procedures which may be expressed in new patterns of activity in “routines” or a new logic of organization. The capacity to reconfigure and transform is itself a learned organizational skill. (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Levitt & March, 1988). The recently popularized vision of a “learning organization” provides us with a new picture of companies as dynamic learning communities. Senge (1997) suggests that new capabilities are required for this vision, including creating a “set of practices for generative conversation and coordinated action; and a capacity to see and work with the flow of life as a system.” He then suggests that language functions as a device for connection, invention and coordination. “If people can talk from their hearts and connect in a spirit of dialogue then a common fabric connects them at a deep level of being,” Senge (1997, p. 18) writes. This, in turn, produces a tremendous power to invent new realities in conversation, and to bring about these new realities in action.
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Wenger and Synder (2000) suggests this is especially true in the workplace. They say we need to “view learning as work and work as learning.” Only when we recognize learning in all its forms can we find ways to nurture it and connect it across the organization. It is this view of the organization as a constellation of interconnected practices that can provide a new spirit for collective learning in corporations. They truly could be the springboards for creating organizations, which can thrive in a world of increasing interdependency, change and innovation. Most learning in organizations does not happen at the organizational level, it seems. It happens at the group and individual level in what Bristow, an international consultant who specializes in collective genius, calls “learning communities” (Bristow, 1997). He uses this term to describe both formal and informal associations where individuals take responsibility for their own learning, as well as the learning of those with whom they work and associate. Another way to design agile organizations is to develop the capability of collectively linking together working, learning and the capacity for change across inter-and intraorganizational boundaries in Communities of Practice (CoPs). Focused at the microlevel of how individuals and small groups make sense of and respond to their environment, CoPs embrace the social and dynamics of getting the work done, organizational processes and the challenge of agility (McDermott, 1990). Since CoPs embody and bind the knowledge of the organization’s processes, they can potentially hold that knowledge of practice from the rest of the organization. Agile organizations thus distinguish themselves by becoming proficient at communicating applying the knowledge of practice contained within multiple CoPs to solve complex organizational problems. It is in this spirit that CoPs can also learn from one another to lead continual innovation within an organization. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) describe an organizational knowledge creation and transfer cycle that loops from the individual to the group and then to the organizational level, a process that kneads both tacit and explicit knowledge through processes that they label “internalization” and “externalization.” From this perspective, innovation is best understood as the process by which an “organization creates and defines process problems and then actively develops new knowledge to solve them.”
Metaphors of Collaboration and Creativity Rugby In product development, the new emphasis on speed and flexibility calls for a different approach for managing new product development (Takeuchi & Nonaka, 1986), and so requires new images to describe collaboration and creativity (Brown
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& Eisenhardt, 1995). The traditional sequential or “relay race” approach to product development – typically called a phased program planning system – often conflicts with the goals of maximum speed and flexibility. Takeuchi and Nonaka (1986) suggest a holistic or “rugby” approach – where a team tries to go the distance as a unit, passing the ball back and forth – may be more relevant in today’s competitive requirements. Rugby is a team effort where its members continually interact until the game is over. On the other hand, a relay race is more like a typical sign-off procedure followed in many companies in which the job moves from one functional department to another. Such linear, relay race-type processes are often slow, inflexible and inefficient. Their approach to new product development would be characterized by small, self-managing, multi-functional project teams; overlapping development phases, multi-learning, subtle control, organizational transfer of learning, built-in instability, and tracking cycle time throughout the organization. Carrier Decks The environment of the carrier deck has often been used to describe a collaborative team – and collective mind – even within a bureaucratic system (Pool, 2000; Rochlin et al., 1987). What these research scientists were looking for were the reasons why so few accidents happened, even in treacherous conditions. The challenges of an aircraft carrier flight operations include many planes taking off and landing at the same time – often without using radar to avoid detection – with short take-offs and landings on decks covered with seawater and oil. Pool (2000, p. 88) says, “What they found was that on the surface, a nuclear carrier is run in exactly the rigid, hierarchical way that one would expect. But in times of high demand – such as the launching and recovery of planes – this traditional hierarchy dissolves and in its place appears a loosely organized structure in which officers and sailors collaborate as colleagues.” They discuss and negotiate about the best procedures and generally follow the lead of whoever has the most experience and expertise in a particular situation. In this mode, there is no sense of “not my job” or “not my responsibility.” A crewmember who notices an unusual reading on a gauge or who spots a potential problem with a plane is expected to respond quickly or else tell someone who will. If the circumstances warrant it, each member of the crew has the power – and the obligation – to shut down flight operations immediately. La Porte (Rochlin et al., 1987) describes “constant communications” as one of the key features of this alternative structure. The 60 seconds between the landing of one plane and the next offers no time to send messages up the chain of command and wait for orders to come back down. Instead, crew members are continually talking to one another, announcing what they have done and what
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they will be doing next. This ability to morph from one structure to another was not predicted by any of the standard organizational theories. La Porte (Rochlin, et al.) found that in these organizations, the managers are not conscious of having created any innovative organizational structure. Instead, the structures seem to have evolved naturally under the pressure of slipups and unforeseen events. The top-down command structure of a large organization enforces the discipline necessary to keep the rules respected and bad luck at bay. When it is impossible to control everything, and the pace and complexity of operations increases, it is not simply enough to follow rules and obey orders. Another analysis of flight deck processes (Weick & Roberts, 1993) describes these communications among colleagues as a “collective mind” found in organizations. They suggest that performance, itself, is mediated by collective mental processes that are inherent in all organizations. Some organizations just choose to develop these processes to more advanced levels. The word “collective” here refers to individuals who act as if they are a group and refers to the pattern of interrelated activities among many people. These create social forces that can provide integrated information about a situation, when in reality, the several sources are relatively independent of one another and located in different parts of the ship. The result is joint action that begins with individual contribution. Jazz McDermott (2000) and Barrett (1998) use a jazz metaphor to illustrate that collective “thinking” is the key to making information useful. When jamming, jazz musicians get a feel for where the music is going, adjust to their partner’s moves, change direction and readjust. They take in information, make sense of it, generate new musical ideas, and apply their insights to the ongoing musical conversation. Responding to each other, they draw on tunes, chords, progressions and musical “feels” they have known before, even though at any moment they could not predict “what next.” Barrett (1998) highlights the collaborative value of playing jazz by describing a “transformation occurring in a player’s development” when he or she begins to export materials from different contexts and vantage points – combining, extending, and varying the material to create different harmonies and grace notes (p. 607). Machine Shop Culture Despite his image as the “Wizard of Menlo Park” – a lone, heroic inventor whose brilliant mind created magical inventions – Thomas Edison rarely worked alone. Innovation in his laboratories was a “cooperative affair” (Millard, 2001). In fact, Edison organized for socialization. He modeled Menlo Park after the craft culture in Europe and the machine shops of Newark, New Jersey,
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which incorporated a measure of freedom and socialization quite different from other work environments of his day. He organized teams like today’s project teams, each composed of a chief experimenter and several assistants. These could be augmented by other machinists and craftspeople determined by the team, which also was free to draw on any resource in the laboratories (supplies, library information, Edison himself, the experience of tradespeople, etc.) Most importantly, the teams were encouraged to maintain communication among the teams because Edison knew that this was a vital part of the process of innovation. “The key to one problem might be found in the experimental results generated in another project. The openness of the machine shops permitted the ready spread of information, not necessarily the written knowledge of science but the nonverbal information of ways of doing things, of techniques and prior experience. The ease of communication in the shops had helped bring forth a great number of important inventions,” Millard (2001) describes. The other tradition of the shop culture was collaborative learning by doing across disciplines – or in the Menlo Park lab, it was “inventing by doing.” Millard (2001) describes that true to the democracy of the machine shop culture, Edison was always open to the suggestions and ideas of his men when it came to new experiments or inventions. Anyone was free to try a new idea. The machinists did more than act as Edison’s hands – they filled in the details that were omitted in Edison’s fast-moving thoughts, and they applied their own expertise in the struggle to get the thing to work. They also took the initiative to modify devices and to experiment freely. Machinist and experimenter were partners in invention. A nickname for these experimenters was “muckers” from the expression “to muck in” or “to muck about” – to fool about with little purpose other than amusement. Edison used laboratory notebooks to quickly record “half-baked” ideas or rough sketches. These were left on the experimental tables for others to pick up and use or pass on to one of the machinists to begin the invention process. Forests New metaphors are also being offered for distributed, collaborative work as by a key executive at Weyerhaeuser Corporation (Fisher & Duncan, 1997): “When we think a company is like an engine, we manage it that way. We assume that there are discrete activities like changing the oil or replacing the carburetor that will create predictable improvements. But companies don’t act like machines; they act more like gardens or forests. They aren’t mechanical; they are organic. It is time to change our metaphor. Instead of acting like mechanics, we need to act like farmers or foresters. We need to plant and nurture and analyze and protect, not tighten, fix or lubricate. We need to ensure that the soil of our organizations isn’t
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poisoned by distrust. Like farmers, we need to remember that success requires hard work, discipline, and patience.”
Future Directions for Research Results of these studies show that the picture and description of how complex collaboration actually functions needs more research. Metaphors may help us get a glimpse into the nature and rhythm of this phenomenon, but more study is required on the multiple variables that influence the success and failure of multi-party co-development. How these variables interrelate and synergize to produce true innovation requires new processes, capacities, routines and models of organizing. Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) indicate potential paths for future research that center on the links between process performance, effective product, market factors and financial performance – as well as the patterns of organizing product-development work. New metaphors are required for the image of product development, rather than just a focus as disciplined problem solving. Absent from the literature (Lewin et al., 1998) are studies of evolution of alliances over time – as they co-evolve with changing strategies of the firm, evolving industry strategic practices and the changing regulatory and institutional environment. The study of process variables also remains an unexplored area of research, as well as a clearer articulation of those routines that inhibit or foster innovation (Fleck, 1979). The biggest barriers in large organizations according to Dougherty (1996, p. 436) include the power of existing organizational routines and organizational structure, resource limitations, and an organizational cultural value that tradition is preferable to change. It is here, she concludes, that behavior and culture need to be “crystallized into skill sets or systematic patterns of thinking and acting,” or “capacities,” to enable the activities of innovation. New capacities would enable people throughout the organization to work with customers, form teams, solve problems creatively, apply technical potential to market needs and appreciate the relationships among functions and businesses well enough to shift them as necessary. Here large organizations can become as adept with ongoing product innovation as a new form and social system. They must find new ways to solve problems of normal functioning and still embody the tensions which power innovation. The author will be examining more closely the translation of collaboration into effective team behaviors across competitive boundaries on JSF. She will look into work task examples and identify how coordination challenges are solved by engineers using formal and informal mechanisms.
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Mohrman (1998) and Galbraith and Lawler (1994) both suggest future research is needed to develop new models of organization contexts within which distributed work can occur more naturally – especially forms with a boundaryless nature. Mohrman (1998, p. 20) says there is a need for an integrative framework for a myriad of dispersed, multi-dimensional activities. Following her direction, we see that dispersed teams and networks are a way of organizing work that challenges many of the assumptions and approaches of the traditional hierarchical business model. “We are on the edge of a theoretical frontier for new theories of organizing for innovation,” Dougherty (1996, p. 436) reflects. This applies as well to building the capabilities of complex collaboration.
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NOT YOUR STEPPING STONE: COLLABORATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF FIRM EVOLUTION IN THE LIFE SCIENCES Kenneth W. Koput and Walter W. Powell ABSTRACT In this chapter, we make the argument that science-based firms in the life sciences are expected to actively expand the volume and scope of collaborations, and broaden the kinds of partners with whom they collaborate, as they grow larger, older, and become successful. We base our arguments on a general process of organizational learning in which organizations with diverse ties are exposed to a broader stock of knowledge, heterogeneity in the portfolio of collaborators facilitates innovation, and repeat contracting enables organizations to deepen their protocols for the exchange of information and resources. We draw from these ideas the conclusion that interfirm collaboration is not a transitional stage, or stepping stone, to success or maturity, but a significant organizational practice in technologically advanced fields. Extending this argument, we suggest this strategy of interfirm collaboration represents neither dependency nor specialization but an alternative way of accessing knowledge and resources.
Complex Collaboration: Building the Capabilities for Working Across Boundaries Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams, Volume 10, 59–81 Copyright © 2004 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1572-0977/doi:10.1016/S1572-0977(04)10003-4
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INTRODUCTION Collaboration among competitors was once regarded as a provisional or transitional step taken to enter new markets, spread risks, or to share the early stage costs of R&D (Mowery, 1988; Porter, 1986). In contrast, recent studies suggest that various forms of partnership are now core components of corporate strategy. Indeed, contemporary research on organizations and industrial performance is replete with reports of a marked upsurge in various types of interorganizational collaboration. While these collaborations can take a number of forms (including research consortia, joint ventures, strategic alliances, and subcontracting) and span a wide range of key functions, a recent National Research Council analysis of trends in industrial research and development (R&D) suggests that the innovation process has undergone the most significant transformation over the past decade (Merrill & Cooper, 1999). A National Research Council survey of eleven industries, purposefully diverse in character and technology but all resurgent in the 1990s, observes in every industry an increased reliance on external sources of R&D, particularly universities, consortia and government labs, and greater collaboration with domestic and foreign competitors, as well as customers in the development of new products and processes (Mowery, 1999, p. 7). Other surveys also point to the enhanced centrality of interorganizational collaboration, especially in R&D (Rosenbloom & Spencer, 1996). For example, National Science Foundation data show a marked increase in the number of international alliances between the United States and Western European countries between 1980 and 1994; but by the mid-1990s, the formation rates for intranational alliances linking U.S. firms with their domestic competitors outpace international linkages (National Science Board, 1998). The former collaborations were motivated largely by concerns with market access, while the latter focus more on the development of new technologies by teams of organizations. Similarly, there is now ample research illustrating the growing links between U.S. firms and universities (Cohen et al., 1994), and greater involvement by firms and government labs in research joint ventures (Link, 1996, 1999). In the realm of science, Hicks and Katz (1996) find that research papers are much more likely to be co-authored and involve authors with multiple institutional affiliations that span universities, government, and industry. In short, as Mowery (1999, p. 9) observes, “the diversity of institutional actors and relationships in the industrial innovation process has increased considerably.” Complex networks of firms, universities, and government labs are critical features of many industries, especially so in fields with rapid technological progress, such as computers, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.
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These developments in industry and science suggest a significant refashioning of the division of labor in which smaller science-based firms, and the linkages between them and centers of innovative activity, assume prominence in researchintensive fields. New science-based startup firms, whether spun out of an existing company or university or created as an entrepreneurial venture, have played a greater role in both the U.S. and the global economy over the past two decades. Moreover, these firms appear to operate according to a different organizing logic, with smaller workforces and extensive linkages to other organizations and partnerships with outside parties for key business functions. Despite the increasing salience of science-based firms, we know relatively little about their developmental trajectories. Thus, we want to add theoretical flesh to these discussions of the structure of the science-based firm (hereafter, SBF), and to debates over the importance of alliances and various types of collaborations. We take up the theoretical task in the next section, suggesting that, despite the hazards of collaborating, SBFs will expand the volume and scope and broaden the reach of their alliances as they grow, age, and succeed. We conclude with a discussion of the important properties of networks for innovation and industry evolution in research-intensive domains.
COLLABORATION AS A CORNERSTONE At the point of founding and in their initial years, startup companies face a number of challenges. Young firms lack an established reputation, are often resource-constrained, and face uncertainty with respect to the quality of their work (Stinchcombe, 1965). In knowledge-intensive fields, these concerns are mitigated somewhat by establishing alliances with organizations that provide resources and/or scientific expertise. These initial connections may well involve a variety of motives. A large corporate partner may turn to a smaller firm to do contract research. A university may license a new technology to a startup firm to speed the development of a new therapy. A professor from a university may found a company and forge a research partnership with a university, a research institute, or a government lab to help support the research. Financial institutions may seek to get in on the ground floor of the enterprise, and bankroll the new technology. Biotechnology provides a good illustration. The science underlying the field of biotechnology had its origins in university laboratories. The scientific discoveries that sparked the field occurred in the early 1970s. These promising discoveries were initially exploited by a handful of science-based start-up firms founded in the mid to late 1970s. The year 1980 marked a sea change, with the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the Diamond v. Chakrabaty case that genetically engineered life
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forms were patentable. Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act in the same year, which allowed universities, nonprofit research institutes, and small businesses to retain the intellectual property rights to discoveries funded by federal research grants. And Genentech, which along with Cetus was then the most visible biotech company, had its initial public offering, drawing great interest on Wall Street, with a single day stock price run up exceeding any previous one-day jump. Over the next two decades, hundreds of small, science-based human biotech firms have been founded, mostly in the United States but more recently in Canada, Australia, Britain, and Europe. The initial breakthroughs – most notably Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen’s discovery of recombinant DNA methods and George K¨ohler and Cesar Milstein’s cell fusion technology to create monoclonal antibodies – drew primarily on molecular biology and immunology. The early discoveries were so path-breaking that they had a kind of natural excludability, that is, without interaction with the university scientists who were involved in the research, the knowledge was difficult to transfer (Zucker et al., 1994). But what was considered a radical innovation three decades ago has changed considerably as the science diffused rapidly. Genetic engineering, monoclonal antibodies, polymerase chain reaction amplification, and gene sequencing are now a standard part of the toolkit of microbiology graduate students. To stay on top of the field, participants have to be at the forefront of knowledge-seeking and technology development. The commercial potential of biotechnology appealed to many scientists and entrepreneurs even in its embryonic stage. In the early years, the principal efforts were directed at making existing proteins in new ways, then novel methods were developed to make new proteins, and today the race is on to design entirely new medicines. The firms that translated the science into feasible technologies and new medical products faced a host of challenges, needing huge amounts of capital to fund costly research, assistance in managing themselves and in conducting clinical trials, and experience with the regulatory approval process, as well as manufacturing, marketing, distribution, and sales. In time, established pharmaceutical firms were also attracted to the field, initially allying with SBFs in research partnerships and in providing a set of organizational capabilities that SBFs were lacking. Eventually, the considerable promise of biotechnology led nearly every established pharmaceutical corporation to develop, to varying degrees of success, both in-house capacity in the new science and a wide portfolio of external collaborations (Arora & Gambardella, 1990; Gambardella, 1995). Thus, the field is not only multi-disciplinary, it is multi-institutional as well. In addition to research universities and both start-up and established firms, government agencies, nonprofit research institutes, and leading hospitals have performed key roles in conducting and funding research, while venture capitalists
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and law firms have played essential parts as talent scouts, advisors, consultants, and financiers (Gilson & Black, 1998; Lerner & Merges, 1998; Powell & Owen-Smith, 1998). Biotechnology emerged at a time, in the 1970s and 1980s, when a dense transactional infrastructure for relational contracting was being developed, especially in Silicon Valley (Powell, 1996; Suchman, 1994). This institutional infrastructure of venture capital firms, law firms, and technology talent scouts greatly facilitates interorganizational collaboration. Taking all these elements into account, two factors are highly salient. One, all the necessary skills and organizational capabilities needed to compete in biotechnology are not easily housed in a single organization (Powell & Brantley, 1992). Thus, organizations must work as teams. Two, in fields such as biotech, where knowledge is advancing rapidly and the sources of knowledge are widely dispersed, organizations enter into an array of alliances to gain different competencies and knowledge. In so doing, firms develop portfolios of relationships that permit access both to developments in science and skill in bringing new products to markets. Such collaborative arrangements involve an indissoluble mix of science, status, and strategy. Alliances with prestigious partners enhance a young firm’s reputation (Stuart, 1998; Stuart et al., 1999), while also signaling legitimacy (Baum & Oliver, 1991). External partners also provide much needed resources and complementary skills (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Powell & Brantley, 1992). And to the extent that new firms are formed by entrepreneurial faculty, collaboration often involves carrying the scholarly model of an invisible college into the commercial realm (Powell & Owen-Smith, 1998). Founders of firms who come from the academy wear dual hats, using one social form for a completely different purpose. Whether viewed through the lens of multiple networks or of refunctionality, the transposability of scholarly research linkages into business connections mixes science and strategy in a novel way (Padgett, 2000). Yet, alliances are also hazardous and commonly seen as unstable, both individually and as a strategy for organizing. Economists have stressed the threats of information leakage, adverse selection and moral hazard, opportunism, and hold-up problems (Holmstom & Roberts, 1998), whereas management perspectives view alliances as strenuous balancing acts involving sometimes incompatible interests (Das & Teng, 2000; Doz & Hamel, 1998). Alliances are the mode of organizing of last resort: used to overcome unaffordable costs, counter uncertainty, or acknowledge a weak or dependent market position. Hence, from an economic or management perspective, as firms grow, age, and succeed they should either outgrow or tire of alliances, allowing existing alliances to lapse and not pursuing new ones. We particularly identify three challenges to the viability of alliances as firms grow, age, and succeed. First, competition is frequently size-localized
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(Baum & Mezias, 1992; Wholey et al., 1992). As a result, partnerships typically involve firms with dissimilar market positions. Organizational growth brings a smaller firm into more direct competition with a larger ally, upsetting the balance between competition and cooperation that enables alliances between them. Second, firms should prefer to protect proprietary work in order to appropriate the gains from their innovations (Porter, 1980). Success would bring the necessary financial resources and “complementary assets” that allow firms to “go solo,” thus firms would no longer require linkages to organizations for the purpose of establishing credibility. Third, uncertainty stems from inexperience and lack of power (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). As a smaller firm grows, it develops internal capabilities and power that reduce uncertainty, obviating the need for outside assistance. The question we address here is whether science-based firms shift their strategies of collaboration as they grow older, larger, and more successful. We argue that in fields where knowledge is advancing rapidly, the three challenges to alliance stability may not hold; firms may come to view collaborations as more than a means to compensate for a lack of resources, internal skills, or market power. Collaboration may represent an admission ticket to an information network (Powell et al., 1996). In our view, collaborative networks constitute organizational teams and therein provide timely access to knowledge and resources, where learning is protracted and resources divided, while also testing internal expertise and learning capabilities. This access is exceedingly important in fields where scientific discoveries are occurring simultaneously in many different locations, and the time to discovery is protracted. Following ideas initially developed by Penrose (1959, pp. 222–225), smaller firms may thrive at the interstices of fast-developing fields, where they can play a bridging role linking participants in different organizations and different kinds of organizations. The crux of our argument is that SBFs utilize interorganizational networks as an important cornerstone of their strategy. The ability to reach across multiple partners in diverse fields is important in lessening dependence. Alliances across fields may place smaller organizations in an enviable arbitrage role, increasing access and prominence, and creating an opportunity to learn from a variety of partners. But we do not wish to overemphasize the logic of intention, as a logic of appropriateness may be equally salient. To the extent that key participants are drawn from the research community, the norms of collaborative science may cross over to the commercial realm. Or if collaboration with prestigious partners at an early stage produces success (or at least the illusion), then a bandwagon may be created. We do not, in this chapter, attempt to disentangle the twin pulls of strategic and appropriate behaviors. We first present an admittedly preliminary typology of dynamic alliance strategies and then develop hypotheses concerning the consequences of organizational
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growth, aging, and success for the collaborative arrangements that firms employ. Viewed differently, growth, aging and success are mileposts for organizations, and we can look at these road markers and see whether the mix of arrangements that were used to reach a particular milepost are continued, disbanded, or expanded, diversified, and broadened as movement toward the next marker occurs. Each process – growth in size, the gaining of experience, and the successful launching of a new product – presents a challenge to a firm in terms of how it chooses to organize. Growth brings problems of communication and coordination as the number of employees grows. As an organization ages, its stock of knowledge increases and its routines for organizing core tasks become more well developed. With a successful product, an organization faces the challenge of reproducing its initial success but now has new resources to deploy. Each of these stages could be the occasion to either retreat from alliances or become more deeply embedded in clusters of relationships with diverse parties.
STRATEGIES AND ALLIANCE LOGICS In actual practice, individual companies in a number of fields, including biotechnology, have pursued varied strategies of expanding, retreating, holding course, deepening, diversifying, and broadening collaborations over time. Commentators have portrayed alliances as strenuous balancing acts involving sometimes incompatible interests (Das & Teng, 2000; Doz & Hamel, 1998). Strategies for allying over time are attempts to manage this balance according to different logics.
Expanding To begin, some new entrants blast onto the scene and rapidly ramp up their portfolio of collaborators, seeming unconstrained by either hazards or capacity. The logic here is simply to get more alliance capacity, through investing internal resources. Often, such firms are carriers of critical new technologies. In the genomics area, Millenium made a splash by generating more than $2 billion through R&D partnerships with six different pharmaceutical giants. Arqule, another genomics entrant, rocketed from “0 to 60” by establishing dozens of affiliations with venture capital firms, DBFs and pharmaceuticals in its first few years of existence. This strategy derives from a network-theoretic perspective that emphasizes the competitive advantage of working in teams of allied organizations. Firms invest in routinizing structures and practices for collaborating that allow them to expand their alliance capacity. As a pure type, expansion occurs where
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the number of alliances increases without any change in the structure of individual relationships or the overall composition of the portfolio. Some of this may simply represent firms getting up to speed, although the latter is perhaps better reflected when increases in volume are accompanied by an extension of scope of activity. But, some if it also represents increases in alliance capacity.
Retreating Some companies begin, out of necessity, with external linkages but upon obtaining success with their initial products, they decrease their involvement with outside parties. Amgen, by some standards the most successful biotech firm, is a good example of this approach. It met with early success with its initial lead drug, Epogen, and opted to forego further collaborations in favor of internal expansion and a strategy of acquiring smaller, struggling young biotech companies. This strategy derives from the perspective that alliances clearly have many benefits for new firms, but collaboration also entails risks. Indeed, cooperation with potential competitors was once regarded only as a provisional or transitional step taken to enter new markets, spread risks, or to share early stage costs of R&D (Mowery, 1988; Porter, 1986). Cautious observers have stressed the threats of information leakage, adverse selection and moral hazard, and hold-up problems that attend various types of interfirm relationships (see the review in Holmstom & Roberts, 1988.) Others see alliances as learning races in which partners try to outlearn each other in order to appropriate common benefits into private ones (Hamel, 1991). Retreating occurs where a firm decreases the volume of alliances without increasing some other dimension of collaboration. The logic is to use alliances to get started, learn functional competencies from your teammates, and then go solo to minimize hazards.
Holding Course Rather than retreating from external affiliations or ramping up alliances, some firms stay the course and use the resources garnered from the successful launch of new products to reinvest in a cycle of collaboration. Genentech, another biotech industry bellwether, has developed novel medicines in a variety of therapeutic areas and uses collaboration with small companies and research centers to move into fast-developing areas, thus renewing its mix of ties as it builds its pipeline of new medicines. Chiron, also one of the larger biotechs, continually renews its mix of collaborations as it diversifies its coverage of different therapeutic areas.
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This approach acknowledges what appear to be diminishing returns to experience with and numbers of alliances (Powell et al., 1999), reinforcing notions from information processing theories that, conditional on their age, size, and so forth, firms may face some finite capacity for alliances. The logic here is to recognize and work at or near alliance capacity.
Deepening Building on the knowledge-based view of the firm, SBFs might respond to the challenge of managing the hazards and diminishing returns to alliances by deepening relationships with individual partners. The logic is to get more out of alliance capacity by getting more out of each alliance. Genzyme, the largest biotech in the Boston region, has moved from R&D linkages with smaller firms and research centers to clinical trials and co-development activities. The number of its partners stays relatively constant, but the depth of its ties change as the relationships evolve to cover multiple stages of the production process and entail extensive joint contact. By developing more multiplex ties with individual partners, either through pursuing multiple collaborations or expanding an existing R&D partnership into clinical development or manufacturing, SBFs increase the points of contact between the two organizations. Organizations with both multiple and/or multifaceted ties to others are likely to have developed better protocols for the exchange of information and the resolution of disputes (Powell, 1998). Recurrent contacts facilitate a strategy of long-term relational contracting in high-risk contexts (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992) such as the “winner-take-all” world of scientific research. Parties that develop a broader bandwidth for communication through relational structures are likely to be more capable of transferring tacit knowledge and more likely to uncover idiosyncratic ways to combine their resources to advantage (Doz & Hamel, 1998; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Zander & Kogut, 1995).
Diversifying Other firms may try to extract more from alliances by reshuffling their overall portfolio. The logic is to get more out of alliance capacity by getting more out of the structure of a portfolio. One approach is for firms to pursue economies of scope by diversifying types of activities. The advantages of economies of scope are well-known. Competences learned from managing one type of alliance activity can be appropriated to managing alliances of other types (Parisi & Henderson, 2001;
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Powell et al., 1996). As applied to collaboration in a knowledge-intensive field, diversity of alliance activities also reflects scientist-entrepreneurs commitment to re-investing in new upstream projects as other projects advance downstream. Rather than internalizing the new projects to protect against the hazards of alliances, this strategy emphasizes that experience lessens those hazards. At the same time, alliance experience combined with diverse points of contact into the information network enhances the firm’s ability to identify and absorb knowledge and exploit resource synergies (Powell et al., 1999).
Broadening Other firms may try to extract more from alliances by reshuffling their overall portfolio in a different way. The logic is again to get more out of alliance capacity by getting more out of the structure of a portfolio, but here firms pursue “creative abrasion” by broadening forms of partners. Following ideas initially developed by Penrose (1959, pp. 222–225), one strategy for SBFs is to locate at the interstices of fast-developing research areas and new technologies where they can play a bridging role linking participants in different kinds of organizations and acquiring competitive capabilities from organizations in different arenas (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999). In the area of commercializing scientific advances, heterogeneity in the portfolio of partners allows SBFs to learn from a wider stock of knowledge.1 Organizations with a broader network range are exposed to more experiences, different competencies, and added opportunities for discussion and debate. Such a setting creates an environment in which “creative abrasion,” the synthesis that is developed from multiple points of view, is more likely to occur. In this view, “innovation occurs at the boundaries between mind sets, not within the provincial territory of one knowledge and skill base” (Leonard-Barton, 1995, p. 62). A strong tradition of theory and research, running from Simmel (1954) to Merton (1957) to Granovetter (1973) to Burt (1992), makes abundantly clear that there are informational, status, and resource advantages to having a broad and diverse social circle. Networks rich in non-redundant contacts provide fast access to valuable information (Burt, 1992). How frequently broadening occurs is somewhat dependent on how we define it. When firms broaden their reach, this can occur with or without an attendant increase in scope, and firms broaden can their reach with or without also expanding their volume of alliances. Whether by diversifying activities or broadening partner forms, or both, restructuring is a theoretically tempting strategy. By having access to a more diverse set of activities, experiences, and collaborators, SBFs not only broaden the resource and knowledge base that they draw on, but position themselves to combine external
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knowledge and resources in novel and inimitable ways (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati et al., 2000), increasing “combinatorial capabilities” (Kogut & Zander, 1992).
KNOWLEDGE, NETWORKS, AND ADVANTAGE The advantages of a heterogeneous team are well established in both social theory and network analysis. In the area of commercializing scientific advances, we note additional gains from network diversity. One, heterogeneity in the portfolio of partners allows SBFs to learn from a wider stock of knowledge. By having access to a more diverse set of activities, experiences, and collaborators, SBFs are broadening the resource and knowledge base that they draw on. By developing more multiplex ties with individual partners, either through pursuing multiple collaborations or expanding an existing R&D partnership into clinical development or manufacturing, SBFs increase the points of contact between the two organizations. When relationships are deepened, greater commitment and more thorough knowledge sharing should follow. Organizations with both multiple and/or multifaceted ties to others are likely to have developed better protocols for the exchange of information and the resolution of disputes (Powell, 1998). Parties that develop a broader bandwidth for communication are likely to be more capable of transferring tacit knowledge. SBFs may, therefore, have motive to develop deeper and/or diverse collaborations with a wider array of partners as they grow and age. SBFs have a different kind of competence, possessing a specialized expertise often needed by their larger industrial counterparts. Hence, they are vital teammates. Yet their scientific know-how is most valuable, we contend, when marshaled through networks with diverse contacts. The critical question becomes whether SBFs have the capacity to establish and manage broad, expansive networks. We expect growth and aging, along with success, will enhance an SBF’s ability to mobilize, manage, and strengthen these networks. Implicit in our analyses is the recognition that SBFs, even the largest ones, are typically small in comparison to the industrial giants that have dominated the U.S. economy during most of the 20th century. We begin our arguments by considering how the processes of growing and aging influence organizations’ capabilities for collaboration. As firms add employees and expand their operations internally, they face a series of choices. Organizations could opt to pursue more activities internally and fewer externally as they increase internal capacity. In contrast, a persistent finding from a diverse set of empirical studies is that internal R&D intensity and the level of technological sophistication are positively correlated with the number and intensity of strategic alliances (Freeman, 1991; Hagedoorn, 1995). Recent network studies have emphasized that
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growth is an outcome of network position (Baum et al., 1999). Powell et al. (1996) show that centrality in an industry network generates access to resources. Firms centrally positioned attract new employees and participate in more new ventures. Thus, “a firm grew by becoming a player; it did not become a player by growing” (Powell et al., 1996, p. 122). Seen in terms of contemporary work on learning and innovation, increased size can bring greater “absorptive capacity,” enabling firms to better exploit external sources of knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990). Absorptive capacity represents more than access to information, it also entails the ability to value, assimilate, and utilize information. Adding more staff may increase the odds that learning from collaboration occurs, and that knowledge spills over across projects and partners. Moreover, positive feedback from a practice can prompt firms to apply the practice to new activities (Child & Kieser, 1981). Consequently, Hypothesis 1. As SBFs become larger, they expand the volume and scope of collaboration; increasing the number of external ties and the diversity of types of collaborative activities. A well-established finding in the sociology of organizations is that growth is associated with increased complexity of activity and greater differentiation of structure and expertise (Blau, 1970; Haveman, 1993; Kimberly, 1976; Scott, 1992, pp. 258–267). The key question is whether growth and differentiation produce bureaucratization, as is often observed, or increase the diversity and expertise needed to collaborate on more complex projects and to reach and collaborate with heterogeneous types of partners. Externally, growth has two effects. One, larger size enhances a firm’s bargaining power, lessening its dependence and allowing it to garner less restrictive and exclusive agreements. Two, growth provides a signal of a firm’s quality and value as a collaborator to a broad range of potential partners, including those that may not be expert in assessing a firm’s science. Dependence on a single large partner is likely to inhibit the ability of small firms to obtain other partners, as large rivals are likely to prefer not to work with competitors. As small firms grow, they thus become less dependent, and, with a more developed internal structure, face less uncertainty. Uncertainty has been found to be associated with exclusivity and homophily in exchange relations (Podolny, 1994), thus increasing size should enable firms to develop promising ideas and leverage them with more partners from a wider range of sectors. Hence, we predict that increases in size allow SBFs to collaborate more broadly and/or intensively with partners. Hypothesis 2. As SBFs become larger, they broaden their collaborative reach; collaborating with more partners and more kinds of partner organizations; and engage in more multi-party and multiplex arrangements (multi-tie partners) and more complex agreements (multi-activity ties).
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The effects of age have been well studied in the organizations literature. Building on Stinchcombe’s (1965) key insights, there has been a great deal of attention paid to the liability of newness (Hannan & Freeman, 1989, pp. 245–270). Younger firms need to build credibility with consumers, suppliers, creditors and the like and overcome initial reservations toward a new entity. Given these obstacles, it is not surprising that SBFs turn to venture capital firms, law firms, and established companies for assistance, as well as rely on universities and government laboratories for key technologies. Consequently, survival often hinges on location in a supportive network in order to overcome initial questions about credibility and reliability. As a small firm ages, it faces a choice. Having overcome various liabilities, the company can become less reliant on external parties. Or, as the firm matures and expands its activities downstream from its initial research focus into product development, production, and sales, it may opt to become involved with more outside partners as it takes on new tasks. Researchers have stressed the importance of research prowess as an admission ticket to information networks in science-based fields (Arora & Gambardella, 1994; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1989; Powell et al., 1996). A firm can utilize its R&D ties to gain support for downstream activities. Other researchers have emphasized that initial ties admit the firm’s members into social circles, where the norms of collaboration become stronger over time (Gulati, 1995a, b; Uzzi, 1996). As a firm’s social circle broadens over time, the firm may combine its experience and recognition to reach a wider span of partners for key activities, selecting and being selected by a heterogeneous group of collaborators for critical functions such as R&D, commercial development, or sales. For firms that collaborate when young, age also brings experience at managing collaborations. Once developed, such experience becomes a skill to be employed in new domains, and imposes a cost to retreating from collaboration in prior domains. Further, the more experienced a firm becomes at collaboration, the more they will establish a reputation for being a reliable partner so that others will perceive them as unlikely to act opportunistically (Podolny, 1993). From a firm’s perspective, experience reduces uncertainty, thus allowing the firm to build on their reputation to work with kinds of partners with whom they have not interacted in the past. Consequently, Hypothesis 3. As SBFs become older, they engage in more downstream as well as more complex external activities, and they increase the reach of their ties (become involved with a more heterogeneous group of partners) for each activity. In many emerging industries with a strong science base, companies spend much of their early years burning up investors’ money on costly initial research. External
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support is the lifeblood during this phase and, as noted above, R&D alliances serve as the portal to benefit-rich networks. As the research program develops and moves into application and testing, the prospect of a new product looms larger. As the product cycle unfolds, companies have differential needs, and the nature of the reliance on others shifts depending on the stage of product development. For the successful firm, products are eventually released and sales generated. The firm again faces a choice. From a strategic standpoint, earnings can be used to integrate R&D and other activities to protect a firm’s technology and know-how. A number of scholars have argued, in contrast, that companies in knowledge-intensive businesses are involved in a cycle of learning in which initial success generates the resources that allow advancement to the next level. The “cycles of learning” argument suggests that organizations respond to the positive feedback provided by initial success of sales and/or profits by re-investing in external research affiliations (Powell et al., 1999). Hypothesis 4. As SBFs generate greater earnings, they subsequently engage in more external R&D collaborations. The above arguments suggest that SBFs play a critical role in binding innovation networks together, deepening, extending, and reshaping networks of collaboration. To evaluate this conjecture, we need to understand the range of possible roles performed by science-based companies. For example, SBFs may provide the ideas that jumpstart the innovation process. Because these firms are both closer to the underlying basic science and have a deeper understanding of the technology, they continue to exert influence as the ideas are translated into commercial products. In this scenario, the independent firm is able to use its knowledge to orchestrate production through an innovation network. In contrast, independent firms could serve as the sources of new ideas or novel products, but, due to their small scale, they are unable to develop, produce, or market the final product. Harrison (1994) has argued that small firms are largely captives of large firms’ networks, and thus limited to discrete stages in the production process. Or the smaller firms may follow a specialist strategy (Carroll, 1985), remaining a research boutique that generates ideas, while larger and more established firms pursue their smaller partners’ most promising leads and typically reap the lion’s share of the benefits from innovation. Alliances between small and large firms are forged for symbiotic reasons under this scenario, with smaller firms serving as incubators for new products and large firms controlling production and distribution channels. Alternatively, the process of innovation may favor a few winners at the expense of other parties. An inner circle of key participants may dominate the innovation network, and these centrally positioned actors can reap greater rewards from their strategic location in the chain of production. This inner circle might well comprises
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an elite mix of established corporations and SBFs, research institutes, financiers, and providers of other key resources that play a disproportionately large role. Finally, industrial structure might be highly fluid, with different organizations taking on more central roles at different times and in different places, as well as for different stages of the product life cycle. Under this latter scenario, there is neither an inner circle of participants, nor a boutique or orchestrating role for small firms, but a changing division of labor in which industrial leadership varies according to capability and resource availability. We assess the veracity of these divergent accounts of the division of labor by positing the following arguments: Hypothesis 5A. SBFs play an active role in every stage of product development rather than solely in research and development. Hypothesis 5B. There is a heterogeneous group of participants for each stage of product development, rather than an elite cadre that dominates every stage. Hypothesis 5C. SBFs play a lynch-pin role, hence they are active in all stages of product development, while other participants play more specialized roles.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS We have argued that as SBFs grow, age, and succeed, they will (1) increase the number of alliances they engage in, (2) deepen existing alliances, renew R&D collaborations, and diversify their alliances into new business functions, and/or (3) become involved with a more heterogeneous set of partners. We have referred to these developments as expansion in volume, diversifying scope, and broadening the reach of their collaborative teams. In short, we predict a strong pattern in which “successful” SBFs are pursuing multiple collaborations with a more diverse group of partners, rather than establishing integrated, centralized structures or forming exclusive networks as fortresses against competition.2 In our view, there are clear gains from this strategy, despite some difficulties associated with it. Having an expansive, far-reaching network exposes a firm to many challenges, but in a fastmoving field there are also costs to not forging ahead and expanding the network portfolio. In the rapidly developing field of the life sciences, the core value of a SBF is its scientific expertise and technological leadership in a specific disease category. Maintaining that expertise enables the SBF to be an attractive partner. Linking with diverse participants for different activities permits a company to leverage its skills across a range of relationships with parties that have few interdependencies among themselves, but are connected through the biotech firm. Such a strategy
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has obvious benefits for a small science-based firm. If successfully pursued, the SBF contributes to the agendas of a diverse set of organizations without rendering itself redundant by allowing too much of its knowledge to migrate to others. By interacting with diverse participants, the SBF plays an orchestrator role rather than a specialist or dependent one. Network diversity thus allows little encroachment on the small firm’s scientific competence. Yet this is not a situation of a third party broker playing off others to maximize its own gain. The process of drug development is lengthy, costly, and protracted. The orchestrator role requires building across relationships for the advantage of all the participants. The better the transfer of knowledge and skills among the participants, and the better connected that partners are to one another, the richer the flow of information to all involved. Rather than exploiting one’s position, participants in these learning races must find a way to improve both their and their partners’ capabilities. On first observation in the biotech industry, we see SBFs actively linked to a great variety of different types of organizations – commercial, governmental, nonprofit, domestic and foreign. We suspect, but cannot demonstrate at this point, that these heterogeneous links represent alliance webs in different research and therapeutic areas. Put differently, competition in this field is not firm vs. firm or one firm’s network portfolio vs. another’s, but multilateral competition of different partners and different alliances on divergent projects. A collaborator on a cancer drug is likely to be a competitor in Alzheimer’s research. But such complex webs of multiple relationships present organizational challenges and tax the ability of an organization to sustain numerous external ties.3 Many organizations have ample trouble managing their internal operations, thus these diverse linkages post additional problems of control and coordination (for further discussion, see Doz & Hamel, 1998, pp. 195–220; Gomes-Casseres, 1996, pp. 157–166). Maintaining productive linkages with multiple parties is difficult; learning how to learn across relationships is even more so. Add to these operational challenges the strategic challenge of simultaneously learning from a partner while protecting core skills and knowledge base and the task is daunting. There is an inherent tension in this new form of interorganizational collaboration. An organization has a set of skills that makes it attractive to others and provides it with bargaining power. To be a valuable partner, it must share some of those skills and the knowledge or resources it acquires to create something it cannot create on its own. But it has to protect itself from letting its skills leak into the public domain, from learning less rapidly than its partners, and from being only a provider of a resource that others exploit to greater use. Given these challenges, heterogeneity is one solution. By having diverse collaborators, each participant provides a resource that the other party values and cannot readily find through alternative means.
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Finally, we should consider that in fields where knowledge is developing rapidly and the sources of scientific expertise are broadly distributed, there is a huge cost to inaction or inertia. In previous research, we have seen that repeat trading with similar partners lead to restricted access and cognitive lock-in. Powell (1985, pp. 202–207) found that repeated exchanges among a small circle of book editors and authors lead to parochialism and ossification. Glasmeier (1991) attributes the failure of Swiss watchmakers to adapt to digital technology to the restricted and insular nature of their contacts. Similarly, Grabher (1993) suggests overembeddedness led to organizational inbreeding in the Ruhr steelmaking district, leading to the decline of the German steel industry. Thus, even though the challenges of coordinating heterogeneous networks may be considerable, the alternative of parochialism is not viable.
CONCLUSION We seek to confirm the argument that commercial organizations in the life sciences are actively expanding their range of collaborations, and diversifying the array of business functions they collaborate on, as they grow larger, older, and become successful. If empirically demonstrated, we will attribute these results to a general process of organizational learning in which SBFs with diverse ties are exposed to a broader stock of knowledge. We could then draw from these results the conclusion that interfirm collaboration is not a transitional stage, or stepping stone, to success or maturity, but a significant organizational practice in this technologically advanced field. Extending this argument, we suggest this strategy of interfirm collaboration represents neither dependency nor specialization but an alternative way of accessing knowledge and resources. Our claim that this form of organizing is viable needs to be tempered in several ways. First, we have consistently linked these biotech firms to the adjectives emerging or small. Some of them, however, are not so small; the largest has 7500 employees and a number have sales in excess of one billion dollars. These are hardly weak or tiny firms. But all of them are relatively young, and even the largest biotechs pale in size compared to the large pharmaceutical corporations, all with employee counts numbering in the tens of thousands, or government research institutes, or elite research universities with whom they collaborate. To be sure, small is used as a relative term throughout, but the biotech firms are typically the smaller and younger party in any exchange relation. Second, we argue that the science-based firms in the life sciences are not specialists because they are diversifying their activities, both internally and externally, to all stages in the production process. Thus, they are not focused
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on only one aspect of production. But resource-partitioning arguments have primarily, though not exclusively, focused on product-market segmentation. Were we to analyze our companies in terms of the disease categories they concentrate on, we suspect we would find a persistent relationship: the smaller the company, the more focused they are on a single medicine or disease; as they grow, they branch into related therapeutic areas. With success and subsequent reinvestment in R&D, the SBFs branch into new therapeutic areas. This observation, however, represents conjecture at this stage in our research and awaits empirical testing. We have also not separately modeled the dynamics of expansion and contraction. The general picture we present is one where firms that are growing are broadening the network reach while other firms are both less attractive and less able partners and consequentially their networks are not expanding. But, are the networks of these firms actually collapsing, and if so, is there a difference between firms that are standing still, so to speak, and those that are shrinking in size?4 Finally, our ideas need to be considered in the context of the life sciences field, which both has some idiosyncratic features as well as characteristics shared with a number of high technology industries. Advances in basic science have continued to play a critical role in this field, and universities have a key hand in this process (Liebeskind et al., 1996; Powell & Owen-Smith, 1998; Zucker et al., 1994). In few other high tech industries have universities continued to exert such considerable influence for such a sustained period of time. Consequently, the industrial structure has evolved, in part, out of the invisible college structure of the academy. Moreover, scientific leadership is divided rather than concentrated, with diverse sources of expertise located in many advanced industrial nations. Again, the fact that scientific excellence is broadly distributed promotes interorganizational collaboration. Finally, interorganizational relations are largely focused on mutual learning, that is, developing new medicines or treatment regimes, and creating new medical markets. This orientation toward mutual gain extends the shadow of the future and lends itself to the expectation of future interaction. Effective sharing of knowledge is enhanced by awareness of a shared destiny. This open-ended time frame and focus on joint learning is not unique to the life sciences, however. Many new technologies, much more nascent than biotech, involve the delivery of new products or services and/or tap markets that did not previously exist. And fields such as e-commerce or wireless communications do not face the long arduous period of new product development, which presents many occasions for disappointment and defection, that characterizes biotech. The life sciences have also benefited from a decade of increases in research funding, both in the public sector at the National Institutes of Health and in the private sector, where increases in research spending have even outpaced government spending. But, again, a wide range of new research fields have benefited from
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this decade-long economic expansion. Indeed, the availability of venture capital funding has spurred the growth of a number of new industries. The coincidence of industry growth and a favorable economic environment raise the question as to whether these organizational arrangements are the product of a munificent environment. Many commentators have suggested that an eventual shakeout, or consolidation, will occur in these new fields. Others have contended that biotech and other new industries will eventually be absorbed by more mature, established firms. Still other pundits anticipate that with maturity will come a reversion to more traditional organizational arrangements. Obviously, access to capital in research-intensive fields is critical and the terms of contractual agreements vary with respect to the availability of capital (Lerner & Merges, 1998). But despite stiff competition for financing from other emergent industries, and the opening and closing of windows of opportunity for going public, the strategy of accessing external sources of expertise and support has not only continued, it has been deepened and refined. In sum, a single industry over a little more than a decade does not provide a definitive answer as to whether small science-based firms and collaborative practices are supplanting more traditional organizational arrangements based on hierarchy and economies of scale. Nevertheless, we follow March (1991) in arguing that all organizations face the challenge of balancing the demands of exploration, or experimentation with novel alternatives, and exploitation, the refinement and extension of existing competencies and technologies. We are persuaded that a good deal more attention needs to be paid to the processes of exploration and to those industries in which success is based on winning learning races. In such fields, more horizontally-based interorganizational collaborations appear to be a cornerstone of organizational practice, and these new routines are being actively developed.
NOTES 1. We thank Steve Klepper for first emphasizing this point to us. 2. Obviously, success is a relative term. None of these firms are hugely successful in comparison to pharmaceutical giants such as Merck, Novartis, or Pfizer. But success is used multi-dimensionally here; these firms are growing in size, surviving, and, in some cases, generating sufficient revenues for reinvestment. 3. An important question is just how much diversity can an organization sustain (Uzzi, 1997). In a recent paper, we found declining returns to network diversity and experience after an organization crossed a fairly high threshold of connectedness. Once centrally positioned, with a broad portfolio of partners, there were scant returns to performance from adding even more collaborators (Powell et al., 1999). 4. We thank Brian Uzzi for provoking this question.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS An earlier draft was presented to the Organization Science Winter Conference, Feb. 2000, the SCANCOR workshop, the GSB strategy workshop at Stanford, and the OB/IR workshop at the Haas School at UC Berkeley. We thank various participants, especially Trond Petersen and Toby Stuart, for useful feedback. We are particularly grateful to Joel Baum, Frank Dobbin, and Brian Uzzi for detailed and very helpful comments. Thanks also to the Co-evolution of States and Markets group (John Padgett, director, Sanjay Jain, David Stark, Sander van der Leeuw, Doug White, and Xueguang Zhou, participants) at the Santa Fe Institute for extensive commentary. Research support provided by National Science Foundation grant #9710729, W. W. Powell and K. W. Koput, co-principal investigators, and the Sante Fe Institute, where the final draft was completed.
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THE IMPACT OF COLLABORATIVE MOTIVATION ON COMPLEX MULTI-AGENCY PARTNERSHIPS: A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM Janine Stiles and Paul Williams No single actor, public or private, has the knowledge and information required to solve complex, dynamic, and diversified problems; no actor has an overview sufficient to make the needed instruments effective; no single actor has sufficient action potential to dominate unilaterally. (Kooiman, 2000).
INTRODUCTION This chapter compares the literature on public and private sector collaboration and considers the implications for success in collaborative relationships between the sectors. It highlights key comparative drivers of intent for both types of organization, explores the relationship between them, and proposes a framework for primary investigation based on the relationship between the key areas of competitive positioning and level of risk. A case study analysis of two complex strategic partnership initiatives in Wales,1 both involving collaboration between local health boards, local authorities, health trusts and other statutory, voluntary Complex Collaboration: Building the Capabilities for Working Across Boundaries Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams, Volume 10, 83–108 Copyright © 2004 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1572-0977/doi:10.1016/S1572-0977(04)10004-6
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and private sector stakeholders is then used to illustrate the complexity of successfully managing relationships in this context.
BACKGROUND The use of collaboration as a form of business operation has grown rapidly over recent years as organizations find themselves increasingly challenged by more complex customer demands, competitive challenges and new market opportunities (Barrett, 1999; Butler & Gill, 2001; Kale et al., 2000; Schruijer, 1999). The notion of partnership can be seductive within this new and turbulent arena, as it offers a relatively rapid, low-cost and flexible opportunity for an organization to leap-frog regulatory boundaries, enter new markets, acquire new skill sets, develop complex new product/service offerings, and facilitates the easy exploration of multiple options. This is in contrast to the high cost and restrictive requirements of strategy based on acquisition or merger (Doz, 1992; Doz & Hamel, 1998; Stiles, 2001). However, an increasing amount of evidence shows that collaborative partnerships suffer from a dramatically high failure rate, and are usually inherently far less stable than more traditional forms of operation (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Doz & Hamel, 1998). The history of collaboration continues to be haunted by the skeletons in its cupboard, with failure rates of anything between 50 and 80% regularly reported from research projects studying this phenomenon. A wide range of interrelated factors often mitigate against the success of this form of organization. These include perceived differences in each partner’s external environmental influences, varying customer demands, competing aims and objectives, different organizational and professional cultures, contrasting planning and financial decision making processes, different accountability systems and forms of transparency, problems of language, imbalances in power configuration, as well as profound issues of complexity and lengthy timescales involved in managing the collaborative process (Huxham & Vangen, 2001). The way in which organizations respond to these factors influences the extent to which they enter and operate within the collaborative relationship, determines the choice of whether they pursue a competitive or collaborative approach to the relationship, and ultimately plays a significant role in shaping the success of that relationship (Stiles, 2001).
MULTI-AGENCY PARTNERSHIPS Recently, multi-agency partnerships in the United Kingdom have burgeoned across all main policy areas including health and social care (Bartlett et al., 1994;
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Labonte, 1993; Loxley, 1997; Scott & Thurston, 1999), social exclusion (Geddes, 1998), urban regeneration (Harrison, 2000), crime and community safety, and education. This approach to policy making is largely imposed and driven by British central government. Although there is by no means universal consensus, both the center right and center left of the political spectrum now envisage a role for the private sector in the planning and delivery of public services. However, the means of achieving these ends are still highly contested. Under the stewardship of successive Conservative administrations during the 1980s and 1990s, New Public Management, with its focus on private sector management methods, in combination with New Institutional Economics, with its aim of introducing competition into the public sector, were used to justify the dismantling of public sector monopolies, and creating new service sector markets for private companies. This resulted in the genesis of markets and private sector disciplines as a method of governing in the public sector. Purchaser/provider splits, quasi-markets, outsourcing, externalisation, public-private partnerships, and the formation of various types of arms length and special purpose companies, and non-departmental public bodies now proliferate across many areas of local and national government (Williams, 2003, p. 15).
Although political control at a national level in the United Kingdom has changed since 1997, and the language and rhetoric now centers on the term “partnership,” the involvement of the private sector still remains an important plank of government policy, and the analysis of Bryson and Crosby (1992, p. 92) remains true: In today’s shared-power, no-one-in-charge, interdependent world, public problems and issues spill over organizational and institutional boundaries. Many people are affected by problems like global warming, AIDS, homelessness, drug abuse, crime, growing poverty among children, and teen pregnancy, but no one person, group or organization has the necessary power or authority to solve these problems. Instead, organizations and institutions must share objectives, resources, activities, power, or some of their authority in order to achieve collective gains or minimize losses.
Thus an approach to public policy in the United Kingdom is predicated on forms of collaboration and partnership between different types of organizations – government, statutory, voluntary, private and independent. The notion of “governance” underpins this approach, and relates to a set of participants that are drawn from, but also beyond, government. This reflects a continuing blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues, particularly between public and private interests, and the voluntary sector in the United Kingdom. Critically, as Stoker (1998, p. 18) comments, it acknowledges that “The capacity to get things done does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority. It sees government as able to use new tools and techniques to steer and guide.”
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Yet it may be argued that an even greater potential exists for differences, and consequent lack of compatibility, to occur between multi-agency organizations than between firms operating solely within the private sector. Many government agencies have supported the development of partnership agreements in attempts to reduce the problems that can arise in this context, but with little success to date (European Commission, 1991; McDonald, 2001). Therefore, this chapter considers the impact of collaborative motivation on the likely effectiveness of forms of multi-agency partnership, and highlights the flavour it imparts to the collaborative process in terms of leadership, power, trust and other elements. Initially, the authors review existing research to identify the key drivers of motivation in both sectors. This is followed by the design of an investigative framework that sets out to determine how these might influence the success or failure of a collaborative relationship involving the two sectors. Finally, this framework is linked to two case examples and conclusions drawn.
THEORY AND FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT Private Sector Motivational Drivers Existing literature in this field identifies a number of factors driving interorganizational cooperation within the private sector. These stem from the need for private sector firms to respond to the dynamics occurring in the increasingly competitive environment they find themselves now operating in to achieve or maintain their market position as industry sector boundaries continue to merge, and customer expectations are driven higher by new technological developments. Traditionally, alliances tended to be viewed as a means of combining resources in order to benefit from the synergies produced by such ventures (Berg et al., 1982; Bleeke & Ernst, 1991; Mohr & Spekman, 1994). This is still a key factor for many ventures driving entry into the relationship as shareholders push for increasing returns on their investment. Where successful, combining resources can help to generate economies of scale and increased efficiency of operation, thus reducing each partner’s overall relative costs and consequently improving the bottom line returns and boosting profitability (Grant, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). Also, a reduction in transaction costs can develop and be used to benefit the partners, thus enabling competitive advantage through an increase in economic efficiency (Kogut, 1988; Williamson, 1975). However, the extent to which each partner may benefit is not pre-defined. Much will depend upon the equity of distribution of the benefits between the partners; a factor that may be influenced in turn by the symmetry of the relationship and how this develops (Bleeke & Ernst, 1991). Also,
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profit growth through economies of scale or reduced transaction costs takes time to achieve and is often disappointing in the first two years of a partnership (Doz & Hamel, 1988). Initially, diseconomies can even occur as the partnership suffers from duplication of functions, or time-lags on agreements between the parties involved. Thus the profit motivation, though widely recognized as being a key driver and an expectation for shareholder returns, is not always easily achieved in a collaborative arrangement. The need to grow market share as a defensive mechanism against growing competition in the market place is behind many organizations’ drive to collaborate. One type of response to this is to enter partnerships that can enable access into new or uncertain markets with high potential. Joint ventures with local firms in different economies are commonly used as a way for multinational organizations to enter and operate within uncertain yet high-potential transitioning markets (Steensma & Lyles, 2000). This allows the firm to establish a presence within a new region through a partner while benefiting from the specific local knowledge of national policy, laws and customs the partner can supply (Sharp & Barz, 1997). This approach can be highly successful. Indeed, previous research has found that international joint ventures of this type are frequently more profitable than the state-owned local enterprises, and can provide a stabilizing influence in transitioning economies (Hamar, 1993). However, cultural dissimilarities can occur in any collaborative venture, and if not addressed early on, may result in collaborative failure (Anand & Khanna, 2000). The risk of loss of assets or returns to the partner can also increase in economies where stability is fragile or the economy in transition and the local situation moves into economic crisis or a closure of borders. The need for more rapid product development, or resource acquisition and skills transfer have also been recognized as key drivers in the growth of partnerships as firms try to respond to increasingly aggressive competition in their traditional markets, or try to maintain a lead in a consolidating industry. Smaller firms in particular are often constrained in terms of resources, and take time to develop ideas into innovative solutions. Collaboration with a larger firm enables these types of organizations with innovative idea generation capability to realise their full potential within the market place much more rapidly (Cooper, 2001; Rothwell & Dodgson, 1991). As shortening product life cycles and complex product requirements put increasing pressure particularly on high technology sectors, even larger firms are also finding that the challenge of maintaining the lead in a field is becoming more problematic (Duysters et al., 1999). Consequently, the attraction of partnership to share costs, research intellect or to bring together different technologies has significant benefits. However, this need for resource sharing and skill building can present a risk to participating firms. Where particular skills
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or technology capabilities are found to be transferable, one partner may suffer from a loss of its core competence or capabilities and, ultimately, a loss of market position as the acquiring partner ends the collaboration and continues to compete independently. Indeed, Ahuja (2000) argues that this is a key objective for some players as “Firms (will) seek to obtain control over those factors of production that can provide them with a competitive edge over their closest rivals” (p. 353). Hence, the need for each partner to protect its strategic resources needs to be recognized (Lei & Slocum, 1992; Lorange & Roos, 1992). In summary, collaboration by private sector organizations appears to be driven by the need to compete and satisfy shareholder profit expectations within an increasingly international, competitive and uncertain environment where customer expectations of products and services are becoming ever more complex and sophisticated. Therefore, the collaborative option is pursued in an effort to respond to this challenge through anticipated gains in cost, efficiency, market size and/or access to competitive resources or capabilities. However, the recognized benefits are also accompanied by potential risks which organizations need to manage or control to be successful.
Public Sector Motivational Drivers Until fairly recently, the planning and delivery of public services in the United Kingdom has been largely organized around a model of public sector monopolies – large, highly functionally differentiated and task orientated bureaucracies, often statutorily prescribed, and designed to deliver public and welfare services autonomously. Such organizations were driven by the virtues and values of a public service ethos, and legitimized by, and accountable to, a democratically elected body of representatives at national and local government levels. The defining challenge to the supremacy of this model was delivered by successive Conservative administrations in the 1980s and 1990s as a response to the growing problems of quality and efficiency in many public services. Major concerns were expressed about the way in which they were planned, organized and delivered particularly in relation to their producer as opposed to customer focus, inadequate or absent performance management regimes and general poor value for money. An alternative model was informed by two predominant philosophies. The first was New Public Management (Pollitt, 1990; Walsh, 1995) with its strong belief in the merits of private sector values, methods and working practices as an antidote to public service inefficiencies. The second was New Institutional Economics (Clarke & Newman, 1997) with its intention to introduce competition into the public sector by the creation of markets and opportunities for the private sector
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to compete for business. These philosophies were subsequently translated into public policy through a variety of policy instruments and interventions including compulsory competitive tendering in local government, the creation of quasi markets and purchaser/provider splits in the National Health Service, and the establishment of forms of non-departmental public bodies and next steps agencies designed to offer more freedoms and flexibility than was possible within traditional government organizations. Although there has been a change in the political persuasion of national government since 1997, it has not heralded a radical reversal in the approach to involving the private sector in the provision of public services. The language has changed – the talk is now of public/private partnerships and private finance initiatives rather than privatization – but the intent remains the same. It is an example of the “third way” approach (Institute of Public Policy Research, 2001; Office of Public Services Reform, 2002) and a key plank of the British Government’s “modernization agenda.” The rationale for such partnerships is highly contested territory. The British Government argues that the private sector is intrinsically more innovative and efficient than the public sector; its managers are more skilled and deliver better value for money; and public/private partnerships inject greater resources into the public sector and can absorb different types of risk. U.K. government policy has recently been set out in a document entitled “Reforming Our Public Services” (Office of Public Services Reform, 2002, p. 17) and this states that: alternative providers can also drive up performance across the service as a whole, even where the individual citizen does not gain a wider choice a result. Widening the market to create more suppliers of public services can improve the quality and management and value for money . . . public/private partnerships increase investment, with the private sector investment additional to that provided by the public sector . . . public/private partnerships are innovative schemes to increase investment and deliver swifter improvements in our public services (p. 17).
Opponents of this model challenge the so-called merits of this approach on a number of fronts, and point to the weakening of democratic accountability through lack in transparency and “commercial confidentiality;” the dangers of the profit motive gaining ascendancy over the public interest, and the argument that private sector investment is not additional to normal public expenditure because it is only a means of financing, with the costs of the investment having to be met by the public sector. In addition, the evidence that competition per se results in greater innovation and efficiency is contestable, as is the claim that the private sector possesses greater managerial skills than its counterparts in the public sector. A more fundamental objection concerns the increasing fragmentation of service delivery that results from public/private partnerships, and the problems of co-ordination that this presents for local and national governance. The pursuit of a holistic and joined-up approach to government is made more problematic in these circumstances.
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A second major stream to influence intent in the public sector is informed through concepts of holistic government (Perri 6, 1997; Perri 6 et al., 1999; Wilkinson & Appelbee, 1999) and network governance (Ebers, 2001; Jessop, 1997; Rhodes, 1996). Both take their starting point from the notion of “wicked issues” (Rittel & Webber, 1973) that are conceived as a special class of complex and interdependent policy problems afflicting contemporary societies – social exclusion, crime, health inequalities, poverty, unemployment and many more. These problems are cross boundary in nature, intractable, socially constructed by virtue of being framed through the lens of multiple stakeholders, not amenable to optimal solutions, non-linear in construction, and most importantly, not resolvable by single agencies or governmental sectors acting autonomously. The consequences of these influences are evidenced in the way policy is organized. This includes the placing of statutory duties on particular bodies such as local councils and health authorities to work in partnership, and the proliferation of various forms of interorganizational working – networks, strategic alliances, joint ventures – stimulated in particular by government initiatives, programs and pilots. Forms of partnership working are made a condition of access to funding opportunities. Consequently, it may be seen that motivation in the public sector in the United Kingdom to partnership is heavily mandated and influenced by national government. It is not voluntary but enforced and prescribed by a superordinate authority (Mackintosh, 1995; Oliver, 1990). There are a number of additional motivations and forces, more internal to public organizations, that impinge on the nature of public/private partnership formation (Clarke & Stewart, 1997; DETR, 2001). In a period of scarce resources and ever-increasing expectations on the quality and range of their services, public authorities are driven to forms of co-operation in order to achieve their own individual goals and objectives. This can take the form of a voluntary exchange of resources (e.g. finance, information, and status) and a working consensus around goals, functions, cultures and outcomes. This can be explained through a simple exchange perspective (Levine & White, 1961). However, the reality is that there is also competition for scarce resources made more complex by an underlying push for power and territory. Thus, one or more organizations are inducing others to interact within a particular domain, and bargaining and conflict are more commonplace – an aspect identified by Aldrich (1972) in his assessment of the power/resource dependency perspectives. The result is often an enlightened self-interest, but motivations are often multiple and conflicting in nature, and “true” motivations difficult to detect. Higher level or value-based intentions and drivers are also apt to confuse inter-organizational relationships. Notions of “the public interest” and “public sector ethos” can exert a significant influence, and certain client-oriented professional cultures such as those typically found in social
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care and health, are driven towards methods of working that value integration and co-ordination between different organizations. In summary, the key public sector drivers of multi-agency partnerships are very much a function of mandated co-operation orchestrated by national government; a rational/altruistic perspective grounded in concepts of holism and “wicked” issues; and a practical need to unlock resources through forms of co-operation that are rooted in exchange and resource dependency perspectives.
TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARISON The task of linking the motivation or intent of an organization to engage in forms of inter-organizational working with that of the ultimate outcome or effectiveness of that relationship is considerable. Evaluation is a difficult task to manage within intra-organizational settings, and it assumes added complexity in partnership arenas (Hallett, 1995). Huxham (1996) also notes that the expectations and motivations of organizational actors may change over the course of the relationship as a result of on-going performance, additional information on partner abilities, intentions or reliability, and changing environmental conditions. Ebers (1997) further argues that an understanding of the conditions/context that lead to organizations with particular motivations to choose the partnership route, and the processes that lead up to a particular arrangement, is also necessary. A number of discursive models have been developed to try to deal with these issues. Of these, the authors consider that Oliver’s (1990) critical contingencies for inter-organizational relationship forming offers the most useful typology of causes and motivations, and therefore provides a relevant basis for the purposes of this study. These contingencies are listed as necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability and legitimacy. The typology allows for necessity to be either mandated or voluntary, with the remainder being all voluntary interactions. Additionally, although each determinant is separate, the contingencies are likely to interact and/or be multiple in particular circumstances. An application of this framework to existing theoretical and empirical research on collaboration suggests that a number of factors are influential in driving motivation within both private and public sector organizations. Similarities and differences between the sector drivers are also apparent and exert an influence on the overall compatibility of motivations within inter-sectoral partnerships. The following discussion considers these in relation to each of Eber’s contingencies. Necessity for collaboration in both sectors is driven by the need to respond to stakeholder demands. In the private sector this takes the form of shareholder expectations, which drive the company to seek increasing returns, fight for market
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share and defend market position in an increasingly competitive environment. In comparison, public sector organizations are also driven by necessity, which is instigated by the government as a key stakeholder, and operationalised through mandate in an effort to improve efficiency of operation and meet need. Organizations in both sectors are also striving to up-skill, and are seeking increasingly complex solutions in rapid timescales. Although both motivated towards collaboration by necessity therefore, it may be considered that the drivers operating in the private domain stimulate a higher level of risk-taking as organizations strive for higher profits. Necessity as a voluntary motivation is very apparent in the public sector. Starved of resources in the context of rising customer expectations and increasing social needs, public authorities are increasingly looking to lever-in additional resources through partnership ventures to achieve organizational objectives. Oliver (1990) defines asymmetry in terms of its potential to exercise power or control over another organization or its resources. In this context, private sector organizations operating within highly competitive or consolidating environments may be more likely under the right circumstances to adopt this approach, as they pursue profit motivation to retain access over specific resources, or to gain or defend market share. Additionally, many private sector organizations have the resources and/or financial capability to dominate a partner organization. In contrast, public sector organizations may be in a more vulnerable position. The primary objectives in this sector are not generally competitive and the motivation to dominate is much less of an issue. The reciprocity contingency can be interpreted as the need for up-skilling and development of more complex offerings – factors that are reflected in both the private and public sector literature. For both types of organization these aspects can be highly beneficial to the organizations involved. However, it can also represent a risk of de-skilling or loss of core competence/market to a stronger partner. Political and legal restrictions can provide some protection in this respect for some public sector areas. In contrast, private sector firms may be highly vulnerable to an aggressive partner and can suffer from a competitive acquisition. Reciprocity between the two sector partners may also prove problematic as the basis for this may lie in profit returns for the private sector organization, but driven by social values in the public sector. This differential could impact compatibility of goals or objectives of the partnership, or compromise the initial aims of one or other partner organization. Efficiency issues have some similarities for driving partnership between the sectors. Efficiency in private sector terms drives bottom-line returns through transaction cost reductions, economies of scale and rapid product/service development. In contrast public sector efficiencies, although also aimed at cost reduction and rationalization, may compromise its overall objectives if undertaken on a purely profit-driven perspective. Thus, there is a need to consider social value and
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contribution in addition to a more effective process/cost objective. However, in both sectors, anticipated efficiencies are not always guaranteed and can also take some considerable time to achieve. Additionally, in the initial stages inefficiencies can occur as the two parties operate with duplicate resources or processes, or invest time in clarifying and gaining key agreements. Stability in organizations is driven by a need to reduce environmental uncertainty, which, in itself “is generated by resource scarcity and by a lack of perfect knowledge about environmental fluctuations, availability of exchange partners, and available rates of exchange in an interorganizational field” (Oliver, 1990, p. 246). This occurs as organizations attempt to forestall or absorb uncertainty in resource flows and exchanges, and can be seen in the collaborative initiatives of both private and public sector organizations. Within private sector firms, stability helps to ensure the development of increasingly complex customer offerings, thus assisting in both new product development and related competitive advantage in the market place. Equally, public sector organizations will pursue stability through partnership with a private sector organization in order to reduce public service inefficiencies and ensure reliable access to additional resources. However, in doing so, public sector organizations may have to comply with a profit driven partner, and be faced with the dichotomy of pursuing profit over public interest. Finally, it may be argued that public sector organizations may have additional complexity to deal with, as they have to respond to political dictates in addition to economic uncertainties. The legitimacy contingency which Oliver (1990, p. 246) identifies may be viewed in terms of an organization’s needs to either improve or demonstrate its reputation, image, prestige or congruence with prevailing norms in its institutional environment (p. 246).
This form of response can be identified in different contexts in private/public sector operations. In the case of private sector firms, legitimacy may be sought in order to enhance a company’s image while pursuing a profit-driven motive, and may be a key factor in these types of firms seeking out a public sector partner. However, for public sector bodies, the social legitimacy factor is more central to the organization’s operation as it seeks to add social value as its main purpose. However, legitimacy in terms of having the skill and prestige to provide increasingly complex service offerings or funding to do so, are key drivers in this sector. Thus legitimacy may be applied to both sectors but must be interpreted differently according the different characteristics of the sectors. Overall, it is evident that multi-agency collaboration is subject to a highly complex number of drivers, which can influence either success, or ultimate failure of the relationship if the interface is not managed effectively. Although both driven towards collaboration, the benefits of allaying risk via up-skilling and improved
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Fig. 1. Competitive Positioning/risk Drivers.
access to resources for public sector firms must be seen in the context of a potential compromise, in terms of control and of the social objectives these organizations pursue. Further, the objectives they seek are often directed rather than calculated. Thus any competitive direction would appear more secondary and tactical than strategic in these cases. In contrast, the private partner will generally continue to pursue competitive objectives for collaboration, either for increased potential profit, access to resources or control over the marketplace, as a primary course of action. Lastly, they are more likely to seek out risk in collaboration in order to compete in this environment. This variance in key motivations is illustrated in Fig. 1 below.
THE THEORY APPLIED The following section moves the discussion to an illustration of critical contingencies theory through an analysis of two case studies. These are based on strategic interventions devised by national government, and delivered by local government in collaboration with a range of public, statutory, private, voluntary and independent agencies. Both are based in Wales, a country within the United Kingdom and are referred to as community strategies, and health, social care and well-being strategies. They are contemporary examples of complex forms of collaboration and are considered by the authors to be ideal vehicles to explore differences in collaborative motivation between multi-agency partners, and to examine the influence this has on the design, course and outcome of these relationships.
The Context In order to better understand the case studies, some contextual information is helpful. In the first case, a statutory requirement has been placed by central government
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on all local authorities throughout the U.K., including Wales, to prepare community strategies for their areas which promote the social, economic and environmental well being of their inhabitants, and contribute to sustainable development in the U.K. (National Assembly for Wales, 2001). The duty to do so is part of a battery of changes introduced under the U.K. government’s modernization program, which includes alterations to local political managements arrangements, and the introduction of a new performance management regime. Although the community strategies are intended to be a demonstration of local government’s community leadership role, the plans are envisaged to be an expression of a whole range of public, voluntary and private organizations’ proposed interventions in a particular geographical area. Most importantly, the strategies are seen as opportunities to meaningfully involve and empower service users and citizens in their design and implementation. Community strategies are expected to set out a vision and future for their areas over the forthcoming 10–15 years, but also to contain an action plan detailing how this is to be achieved. The strategies themselves are not directly related to resource or funding mechanisms, but by implication should inform a wide range of financial frameworks of the participating agencies, and bend priorities accordingly. Although the production of the strategies is a statutory requirement, and in sharp contrast to other initiatives, the advice on the form and process or realizing them is not prescriptive, considerable flexibility lies with local stakeholders to devise a strategy-making process that is tune with local circumstances. The second case – health social care and well-being strategies – has many similarities to the first, but also demonstrates material differences. It again stems from a statutory requirement placed by central government to produce and deliver health, social care and well-being strategies (Welsh Assembly Government, 2003). In this case the duty is jointly placed on all local authorities in Wales and on coterminous Local Health Boards. Local Health Boards are the planning and commissioning agents of the National Health Service in Wales, and distribute financial resources to social care and health providers to meet the various needs of the local population. This program is envisaged to be the result of effective partnerships between various stakeholders, and in contrast to the first, directly informs the distribution of financial resources. Interestingly, however, both cases exhibit a high degree of interdependence as the notion of well being is common to both, and health and social care are important elements of a community strategy. However, the extent to which they are integrated or managed as two separate collaborative processes is illuminating, and reflects the different motivations of the key actors and organizations within local inter-organizational domains. An overwhelming characteristic of both cases is their complexity. Each is struggling with multiple and sometimes conflicting objectives. They involve social, economic and environmental policy areas; they involve a wide range of both local
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and national actors and organizations; they relate to different time frames; and they aspire to cover each of the stages of the policy process from planning and formulation, through implementation and delivery, to monitoring and evaluation. On closer examination, perhaps unsurprisingly, the management of motivation plays a particularly central role in shaping the course and outcome of these inter-organizational ventures. Different contributing parties and organizations can be observed to have different motivations governing their aspirations, engagement, commitment and behavior in these fields of activity. To complicate matters further, motivation is sometimes multiple in form and not simply single in intention, and can also change over time as a function of the ongoing collaborative experience, and in the light of emerging circumstances. Many expressions of Oliver’s (1990) critical contingencies can be detected in these two case studies, and the individual types of motivation leave their indelible marks on the nature of the collaborative process.
Necessity: Mandated Co-operation Fundamentally, as Oliver (1990) and Mackintosh (1995) note, there is a material difference between mandated and voluntary interactions. Even if participants have a prior disposition to collaborative working, an atmosphere of coercion is different to one based on voluntary interactions. Both the examples cited above are framed within heavily prescribed statutory frameworks with central government attempting to set and control the rules of engagement. In both cases, this is manifested in a statutory duty of partnership – in the case of community strategies, on one lead organization, and in the case of the other, a joint duty of partnership on two leading organizations to formulate and implement a strategy. In addition, in the latter case there is also a “duty of co-operation” on the local authority and local health board to co-operate with other named members of a partnership including health service delivery agencies, private, business and voluntary interests. Understandably perhaps, neither the notion of “partnership” nor “co-operation” is defined, or whether, indeed, there is an actual difference between them! In the final analysis, the effect of statutory duties is to make certain organizations – in these case studies, local authorities and health boards – ultimately accountable for their performance within conventional democratic processes. Of course, the problem for these organizations is how to engage with other prospective partners upon whom the duty does not rest. The danger is that other organizations do not attribute the same importance to the delivery of these strategies, as do the two statutory bodies. Their motivations may well be rooted in other considerations. Indeed, it is apparent that community strategies have not altogether captured the imaginations of many prospective
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partners because of the protracted nature of the process, and the lack of connection between the strategies and any direct resource allocation mechanism or framework. Consequently, there is a reluctance to offer assistance to local authorities to fund the not inconsiderable costs of servicing strategic partnerships. This often takes the form of dedicated staff appointments, which help with general administration and support, but can have the effect of perpetuating the idea that it is the local authorities’ sole responsibility. Jointly funded and accountable appointments can help overcome this. Overall, the situation places a particular onus on local authorities to devise an inclusive collaborative process that can be seen to deliver benefits to other public and private agencies. It is reported that the private sector is universally boycotting local community strategy partnerships because of their perception that there is nothing in it for them, and many national agencies with local remits are reluctant to get involved because of their lack of capacity to service so many local partnerships, and their reluctance to allow local priorities to influence national frameworks. The preparation of health, social care and well-being strategies do not face quite the same problems as community strategies, fundamentally because of their link with resource allocation mechanisms. Hence, social care and health providers in both the public and private sectors have no option but to seek engagement. It is questionable, however, whether this is based on the spirit of partnership, or whether it is founded on self-interest with the objective of extracting the maximum benefit for their individual organization. The aim of the overall strategy is to ensure that services are planned and commissioned to meet the disparate needs of the population in a way that is efficient, effective, economic and fair. However, these are not neutral notions and considerable negotiation is called for to resolve inevitable tensions and conflicting priorities. The ways in which these are handled and managed within the strategy making process has an impact on partner satisfaction, and sets out an expectation and behavior that influence similar engagements in the future. A final point concerns the effect of the creation of an inner group of organizations on which a statutory duty lies, and a more peripheral group of organizations that, of necessity, have to engage in a partnership. The dangers relate to perceived equality of treatment, access to information, decision-making, and issues of trust. A two-tier partnership has to be handled with great sensitivity.
Asymmetry: Collaboration or Control? Although outwardly projecting a vision of mutually beneficial collaboration, many local authorities secretly cherish a desire to exert more direct influence and control
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over health services and policy, which are the responsibility of other organizations. However, health, social care and well-being strategies offer them a vehicle to pursue this agenda. Although a joint approach to the planning and delivery of health and social care offers the prospect of an efficient and effective use of resources, there are suspicions harbored by social care agencies and professionals that this would result in an unequal redistribution of resources in favor of health services due to the insatiable demands made for additional resources to secure improved health. The role of the voluntary sector has always been uneasy and somewhat ambivalent in relation to public sector agencies. Its claim to be a voice for countless numbers of voluntary groups in a local area is often challenged by those representatives of democratically elected institutions who question the fundamental legitimacy of such groups. Conversely, membership of strategic local partnerships alongside more powerful partners is a huge opportunity to promote the reputation and role of the voluntary sector. Although local authorities are exhorted to secure effective ways of engaging and empowering local citizens and voluntary organizations in the preparation of community strategies, many understand that the effect of this is a loss of power. There is inevitably a reluctance to proceed down this route, and a certain amount of tokenism is apparent with the decisions of strategic partnerships not necessarily being reflected and ratified in the decisions of the key sponsoring bodies. In the case of the health, social care and well-being program, there is some confusion as to whether the statutory prescription relates only to the formulation of the strategy or to the implementation as well. It is apparent that some partners would be more comfortable with the former view because it gives them more scope to interpret what is often highly ambiguous and very general strategic statements. Working in partnership on the implementation of policies and programs implies a far greater degree of collaboration and potential loss of control. The modernization of the public services agenda promoted by the U.K. government aims to reposition public authorities more within a mixed economy of planning and delivery of services. It seeks to create more permeable boundaries between the public and private spheres of society, and promotes a partnership approach to governance, but with public authorities taking a clear leadership role primarily by virtue of their democratic legitimacy. It is within the spirit of this role that local authorities, through mechanisms such as community programs, endeavour to influence and infuse partners with a common set of principles and values. Hence, discussions around social inclusion, equality of opportunity and sustainable development – often referred to as cross-cutting themes – increasingly form the foundations and building blocks of strategic partnerships. However, achieving any consensus on the meanings of these notions is difficult enough, without the additional problem of converting the rhetoric into
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practical applications that inculcate the policy process from inception through to implementation.
Reciprocity: Mutual Interest and Benefit Although both case studies are framed within mandated frameworks of cooperation, Oliver’s critical contingency of reciprocity is nevertheless alive in the motivations of organizations and people in the strategic partnerships. The public sector stakeholders are rooted in an ethos of public service values, and driven by a desire to meet the needs of citizens and communities. They recognize that many of these needs are multiple in form – for example health, social care and housing – and cannot be delivered by organizations acting autonomously. It requires joint and co-ordinated action with the starting point being the needs of the customer, not the administrative configuration, roles and responsibilities of public and private agencies. Hence, in both case studies, although difficult to frame, the sense of devising a strategic direction underpinned by a set of basic values to deliver improvements to the quality of life of individuals and communities, is a strong driving force. The hegemony of partnership working appears to be taking root, although the practicalities of making it work in practice is an entirely different matter, and there are many barriers to be overcome. For instance, at a micro level, individual actors involved in the collaborative process are often driven by professionalism and professional cultures. This involves deep-seated values, particularly those between the public and private sectors – about the respective merits of the private sector’s drive to profit maximization and enhancing shareholder value vs. public interest based on concepts of fairness and equality. The recipients of services are conceptualized in different ways – typically customers in the private sector and citizens in the public. However, these stereotypes have been increasingly interpreted in different ways in new models of public service planning and delivery, and concepts and notions of public and private sector value and motivation remain highly contested political and academic areas of debate. These issues surface particularly in the health and social care sectors, where elements of service delivery are provided by private sector agencies, e.g. care of the elderly and hospital services.
Efficiency: Efficient and Effective Use of Resources There can be no doubt that considerations of efficiency underpin many actors’ and organizations’ views on the need to work co-operatively. In the case of community
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strategies, there is a macro level imperative to use them as an opportunity to rationalize the strategic partnership initiatives that currently proliferate at a local level. The problem has been that the effect of the U.K. government’s drive to predicate all forms of policy intervention on partnership working, is a large number of different partnerships for different purposes, e.g. crime and disorder, youth offending, health alliances, drug and alcohol abuse and countless more. This congested local governance causes problems of lack of co-ordination, duplication and overlaps. In addition, servicing multiple partnerships causes capacity problems for partnering organizations and “partnership fatigue.” The preparation of community strategies offers the potential for the rationalization of current arrangements, and the deployment of a more effective use of resources. The quest for efficiency permeates the motivations of actors concerned with the planning and delivery of particular services. Using the example of health and social care (the responsibility of two separate agencies), problems of limited resources constantly bedevil practitioners and managers. Demand outstrips supply in most service areas, and additional pressures are placed on managers to demonstrate the efficient use of resources through ever-restrictive performance management frameworks imposed by central government. Therefore, opportunities for designing and delivering services in the most efficient manner are high on the partnership agenda. In particular, ways of securing the joint delivery of services through integrated forms of provision are seen as very important. This often requires innovative approaches to service planning and delivery that is made possible by the synergy of multiple perspectives and imaginations being applied to a particular problem. Central government has encouraged this process through a recent Health Act that allows local authorities and local health boards certain “flexibilities” to work together on common areas of interest and responsibility such as joint commissioning and integrated care provision.
Stability: Managing Turbulence and Change Oliver (1990) suggests that one reason for entering forms of collaboration is to alleviate or manage uncertainty and instability in the external environment. It is seen as a method of coping with the future, and what that might mean for particular organizations. Partnership working offers an opportunity of sharing information about the future and of mapping out future scenarios. It often results in the creation or reinforcement of networks of people who can be a source of support and of information about other organizations, new legislation and potential changes in the external environment. Certainly, formal arrangements for joint information sharing are a prerequisite of effective partnerships, and the necessary precursor of
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any integrated delivery framework. This is not always straightforward because of issues of client confidentially and for reasons to do with the basis on which data is collected in terms of compatibility, units of analysis, type of data and so on. The development of a strong culture of partnership working between a number of agencies has the potential of presenting a united front in the face of external threats. For instance, the relationship between national and local government is a source of tension, and strong inter-agency partnerships are used to influence the decision making of national government. However, in the final analysis, the reality is that stability and predictability are but forlorn hopes. The public policy context is characterized by turbulence and change. Increasing complexity is a feature that has to be addressed – problems and solutions are highly interconnected, and there is a high degree of interdependence between different policy areas. Changes in one part of the system have ripple effects in others – both intended and unintended. The agenda is fast moving; policy interventions are many and varied, and the most effective public and private organizations are those that have the flexibility to respond to emerging challenges, and not remain fixed within the constraints of a rapidly outdated strategic courses of action.
Legitimacy: Increasing Profile and Legitimacy Collaboration presents an opportunity for particular players to raise their individual profile and legitimacy. Among other motivations, this is certainly the case with local authorities and the health, social care and well-being partnerships as is discussed above. It offers this sector the chance of making a point to confirm its belief that health issues are also a legitimate concern of local government as well as the National Health Service. It does this in the confidence that local authority policy areas such as housing, education, transport and employment are critical determinants of the health of a population, and in the context of a move away from the limited medical model of health to the social model, its influence on the health status of an area is fundamental, and proportionately more that the direct health care services themselves. In terms of legitimacy, and again as was discussed above, the voluntary sector has much to gain from being around a decision making table with partners of hugely more power as measured in terms of resources – financial, land, staffing. The management of the collaborative process in the context of an unequal distribution of partner power is a significant challenge. Of course, an issue that often is faced by partnerships, and the two case studies are no exception, is the question of convenorship and who to invite to the table. Should the dominant partner assume the convenorship or leadership role or the one
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on whom the statutory duty lays, or in the spirit of impartiality and independence, should a more impartial or less biased representative be chosen? This sometimes smacks of tokenism but often raises the profile of junior partners, and enhances their legitimacy. On the question of who to involve, this is problematic at the margins of the partnership and relates to the different perceptions of the legitimacy of different organizations or people. Partnerships face problems of inclusively, and need to address issues of membership on a regular basis. In the case of the two case studies, the route taken has been to involve a different set of stakeholders at different stages of the policy process – strategic planners and managers at the front end, and service managers, practitioners and street level implementers at the other. As Mintzberg (1994) so cogently argues, the separation of the planning from the implementation stage of the strategic planning process is one huge fallacy that can result in considerable ineffectiveness.
DISCUSSION The preliminary findings of the case studies considered in this chapter resonate with Oliver’s (1990) proposition that “although each of the foregoing determinants may be a separate and sufficient cause of relationship forming, the decision to initiate relations with another organization is commonly based on multiple contingencies” (p. 246). The interaction between them is interesting question, which is not easily resolved given the range of individual and organizations operating in these multi-agency initiatives. In addition, motivation occurs at a micro level with individual actors, but is also expressed through individual organizations. As has been suggested, motivation can change over time, and facades of motivation can be detected where people’s real motivation is hidden behind another for purposes of convenience, and usually self interest. A useful extension of Oliver’s critical contingency theory involves an exploration of the manner in which different sources, or combinations of sources of motivation can shape the determining factors of the collaborative process, and ultimately affect the outcome. A few examples help to illustrate this proposition. First, in relation to the framing of problems and concerns, the importance of understanding the motivations of the multiple interests represented in community strategy and health, social care and well-being partnerships is critical particularly at the outset. “Wicked” issues are socially constructed in the sense that the conceptualization and analysis of problem structure, cause and resolution are a function of the “gaze” of individual stakeholders. Many problems have no universally understood meaning but only a “family” of meanings which “attaches
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to the particular social, communicative, experiential and perceptual world” (Harvey, 1993, p. 97) of the knowledge holder. In the dense policy spaces occupied by health, poverty or social disadvantage, the number and range of stakeholders is extensive including different professionals and practitioners, citizens and customers, politicians, local and central government officers, and people employed in the private and independent sectors. Schon (1987) refers to the act of framing because “depending on our disciplinary backgrounds, organizational roles, past histories, interests, and political/economic perspectives, we frame problematic situations in different ways” (p. 4). Stone (1989) argues that problem definition is influenced by competition over causal theories and “the active manipulation of images of conditions by competing political actors” (p. 299). The ascendancy of particular causal stories colors both the type of reform required, and empowers particular people who have the resources or skills to resolve them. Secondly, in relation to leadership, the initial stage of partnership formation and convenorship is a delicate and complex operation that requires a particular style of leadership to reflect a collaborative theatre comprising multiple stakeholders representing diverse interests and aspirations, and inspired by mixed motivations. Although the configuration of power relationships is unequal because of differential access to resources, legitimacy and status, leadership styles typical of hierarchical forms of organizing tend to be less effective in partnerships. Directive and controlling styles of leadership fail to appreciate that all partners need to be valued for their contribution, and any attempt to exert power unilaterally is likely to be counterproductive and unsustainable in the long run. Consensus seeking is more the order of the day, and catalytic and collaborative forms of leadership (Feyerherm, 1994; Kanter, 1997; Luke, 1998) based on facilitation, engagement and negotiation is more relevant to the challenges of securing collaborative outcomes. Ideally, the task of leadership needs to be shared among participating actors, and leaders themselves can perform a valuable role in managing meaning and sense making, by helping to deconstruct and communicating with others the different languages of individual actors, by helping to secure a safe environment in which to share value differences, and providing a mechanism to align aspirations and aims, and, lastly, by building an architecture and a process to deliver significant outcomes (Citation). Finally, in relation to goal congruence and consensus building, the effect of multiple motivations on achieving goal congruence and building consensus is significant. The difficulty is being able to broker aims and objectives of sufficient clarity and coherence to facilitate strategic action. An interrogation of typical strategies produced by community strategy and health, social care and well-being partnerships is likely to reveal that the goals developed are slippery and vague,
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and in effect can mean everything or nothing! The argument in favor of this approach is that it is only at this high level of abstraction that disparate partners are able to offer their public commitment. Tightly framed aims and objectives are difficult to negotiate, and they potentially reduce future flexibility and room for manoeuvre. Arguably, a more appropriate time for this detailed discussion is the delivery stage of the partnership, where projects and contracts are prepared, inter-agency agreements written, and financing arrangements settled. Here, individual organizations are able to judge the extent to which their particular aspirations are likely to be achieved, and negotiate accordingly. The importance of constructing consensus-building frameworks in collaborative arenas is premised on its potential to engage a wide stakeholder group in a process of dialogue and mutual action. Although tangible outcomes may be delivered by this approach, the process itself can be considered a legitimate outcome in its own right through the development of social capital in the system. Raised levels of trust, improved communication and networking, and shared learning might be expected to deliver, as yet unspecified, types of co-operation in the future. However, balancing the long-term potential of multi-agency partnerships against the imperatives (particularly political) of short-term interventions and successes is not easy, especially with the onset of partnership fatigue. This tests the robustness of partnerships, and the commitment of individual organizations to collaborative approaches. So, different motivations have a profound influence on the determinants of effective partnership working such as problem framing, leadership and goal congruence and consensus building. Further research is required in this area to further explore the nature of the interactions between type of motivation and key factors in the collaborative process.
CONCLUSION This chapter has looked at the different motivational drivers impacting multiagency partnerships within the United Kingdom. As these partnerships are often made up of combinations of both public and private sector players, it was considered important to evaluate influences impacting both sector players, and their implications on motivation. The investigation found that multi-agency partnerships are subject to a highly complex – and sometimes contradictory – number of drivers, each of which can influence the success or failure of the relationship if the interface between these is not managed effectively. The need for compromise in relation to control and value-added (however this is defined by each partner), and congruency in terms
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of agreed-upon objectives appears fundamental to the success of these forms of relationships. However, motivational drivers frequently push these in different directions for the individual players. Additionally, the level of importance of such aspects as access to resources, and transfer of risk (rather than risk taking) was weighted most strongly on the side of public sector rather than private sector partners. The case studies of two complex, multi-agency partnerships highlighted the impact the above factors can have in terms of design, course and outcomes of this form of relationship. Motivation, consensus, process and goal congruency were all critical issues that demanded clarity, cohesion and delicate handling between the many stakeholders involved. The achievement of these was made more difficult to rationalize, however, as differing objectives, values, languages and environments all acted to obscure the view of the players involved. All these are factors that require continued consideration when commencing and developing a successful multi-agency partnership. The need for improvement in the performance of these forms of partnerships as they continue to grow in the U.K. is evident. Where successful, their potential to drive the economy forward to provide for increasingly complex social needs efficiently and effectively is undisputed. The key question to-date has been how to address this issue in a structured way given the high level of complexity this type of relationship reflects. The aim of this chapter has been to provide an insight into the motivational drivers that need to be considered, and the potential areas which might offer some opportunity for improvement in this context.
NOTE 1. Wales is a country in the United Kingdom
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COMPLEX COLLABORATIONS: THE CASE OF A BUSINESS SCHOOL AND ITS COMPLEX NETWORK OF RELATIONSHIPS Peter Lorange INTRODUCTION How can studying the case of the modern business school potentially give us a better understanding of the phenomenon of complex collaborations? (Gregoire & Prigogine, 1989; Peak & Frame, 1994; Stacey, 1995). Why does a business school need to enter into complex collaborations? (Lorange, 2000, 2002c, 2003). As a starting position, we should recognize that the activities of the classic business school are generally rather mature. There is fierce competition among business schools, the supply is abundant, and there are only a few established, elite business schools that can be seen as being truly different from the large agglomeration of schools. As such, we can see the business school arena as relatively mature, even atomistic. Are there steps that a business school can take to distance itself from the rest, i.e. to create unique settings, which might mean that it operates in a less mature context? We shall see that complex networks are one such route. We do of course realize that this question is not relevant for a few elite business schools with exceptional brand names, such as Harvard, Wharton or Stanford. These schools
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are virtually a priori distanced from the rest. Beyond this, however, there are many opportunities for repositioning for those schools that are willing – and able – to make use of complex collaborations: There seem to be opportunities for breaking new ground when it comes to business school teaching: away from classic teaching – to undergraduates, MBAs and PhDs – toward the executive education segment, say, with more action-oriented learning. And this will call for complex relations with firms. Similarly one can observe a shift when it comes to research, although perhaps not as distinct. There is a move away from an almost exclusive emphasis on classic discipline-based axiomatic research toward more action-oriented research, focusing on how to better understand particular contextual realities. Again this requires a closer relationship with corporations – complex collaboration! In short, although the classic activities of business schools – primarily focusing on younger students – are becoming increasingly competitive, the corporate niche – focusing more, through network relations, on executives and corporations and their knowledge needs – seems to be growing. Many business schools have caught on to this trend. Indeed, some have even impressively built their reputation further by excelling in the executive segment. A key to their success has been their ability to work via complex collaborations. The shift toward relatively more focus on the executive learning segment can make sense for several reasons: Competition might be less fierce, thus making it commercially relatively much more rewarding to operate in this segment. An underlying reason for this may be that there would be fewer schools active in this emerging value-creating segment. Schools such as INSEAD, IMD and several leading United States schools have indeed successfully developed new skill bases for this – and thus also enjoy competitive advantage relative to other schools, at least on a temporary basis. As we could have predicted, the commercial rewards also seem to be there, with these schools becoming financially strong without substantial cross subsidization from their universities and/or public funds. So, pursuing complex relations with business can pay off. Learning-wise it can perhaps be argued that one can – in the longer run – get relatively much more out of working with experienced executives than with young undergraduates and perhaps immature MBA students. After all, the field of business administration is generally an experience-based field – hence, there is a lot of potential benefit to be gained from working with leading executives, who can bring “real life, real learning” into the equation of knowledge accumulation. Similarly, more action-oriented research can give faculty a sense of being able to
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contribute, of being part of the success of a given company, seeing the relevance of what they are researching more directly – as opposed to focusing on a rather narrow axiomatic research segment where only a handful of academic colleagues might perhaps understand the relevance of the research. One probable implication of all of this is that business schools, with their community of professors and professional staff, may have to – not only want to – become more closely involved in executive education, executive development and lifelong learning. And, as already noted, this implies working with business – typically in a complex way (Lorange, 2002a). It can also mean working with other academic institutions, again typically in complex collaborative ways. Why this need for complex collaboration? With companies that are starting to demand executive education services, it will be important for the academic institution to understand, at least to some degree, the particular strategy of the corporation. The professors must have a feel for the unique strategic challenges. There might be different potential needs in the corporation’s various entities, calling for a situational view on what is needed in terms of lifelong learning for various stakeholders in each part of the company. This deep understanding cannot be gained without complex collaboration. Typically this would involve a large number of executives on one side, and a large number of professors and professional staff from the business school on the other side. As an example let us consider IMD’s executive education activities with Nestl´e – the world’s largest food company (Lorange, 2000a). Nestl´e operates in countries all over the world. Typically, many of these operations may face unique challenges, when it comes both to reaching the relevant consumers and to meeting the competition. Nestl´e’s business activities can be seen as falling into 10 strategic business units, ranging from coffee to water, from confectionery to pet food, all with different critical success factors. To provide truly relevant executive education in this context, IMD had to learn the essence of a broad variety of business situations, through a number of close cooperations with specific teams from Nestl´e. Without such complex collaboration, it is hard to see how cutting-edge executive development can realistically take place. Similarly, the need for relevant competences offered by a particular business school may now become a limiting factor. These competences are easily broader than those necessary to meet the classic needs defined by the normal set of academic disciplines. Thus, a business school can perhaps no longer offer everything by itself, hence the requirement for strategic alliances with other entities – consultants, research institutes, other schools, i.e. complex collaborations again. Being able to mobilize the relevant knowledge set, either through internal efforts at the school or via collaboration with others, will also
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depend on a realistic perception of quality and relevance. Here what will be key will be the way individual executives perceive a given business school’s network with its partners in a complex alliance. Thus, when it comes to choosing which business school to work with, the complex collaboration must offer better intangible benefits than the classic, proven alternatives. Perhaps the most complete example of a complex collaborative setting aligned with a global geographical scope would be INSEAD. The school has a strategic alliance with the Wharton School, which might work particularly well to strengthen its delivery in the U.S. It also has a campus in Singapore, facilitating the strengthening of its presence in Southeast Asia. And to crown it all, the school has several smaller international alliances, for example with Fundac¸a˜ o Dom Cabral in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. The result is a complex network, well positioned to deliver superior, relevant value.
A SCHOOL’S DYNAMIC GROWTH MODEL We shall now draw specifically on a number of in-depth illustrations of how complex collaborations have led to dynamic growth and new academic value creation at one business school, namely IMD – International Institute for Management Development, based in Lausanne, Switzerland. A brief history of IMD is therefore appropriate. The school is the result of a merger that took place in 1990 between two smaller executive development institutions: IMEDE, founded in Lausanne in 1957 with support from Nestl´e, and IMI, founded in Geneva in 1947 with support from Alcan. The school is a self-owning, not-for-profit institution, with no university affiliation. The main focus has always been on cutting-edge research and teaching that targets the executive segment; there is also a relatively small MBA program. There are no undergraduate teaching activities, and no doctoral program either. At IMD the complex collaborations with a number of corporations – the Learning Network – involve 160 companies, mostly multinationals, from all over the world, including 10 corporations from Japan and a similar number from the U.S. IMD offers 10 Discovery Events to these companies per year. Here particular research findings are presented and discussed. The companies give valuable feedback – it is two-way learning, give-and-take. In this “real life, real learning” context, a “global meeting place,” the executives also learn a lot from each other. There are also a Business Advisory Council and a CEO Roundtable. These help IMD to reach a better understanding of how it might handle various emerging needs in the Learning Network companies, to do a better job in serving the companies and to allow for learning through exchanges between the companies themselves.
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A Weekly Webcast, lasting for approximately 20–30 minutes and followed by a 10-minute live Q&A period, is also offered. So far, more than 8,000 executives from all over the world log in, and most of the 160 companies actively participate in this webcast. The themes every week have to do with practical applications of ongoing research, presented by a professor in a managerial meaningful sense. There are also ad hoc special webcast series on issues such as successful women in leadership, the CEO’s issues and a book review series. All of this is “free” for the members of the Network organizations, covered by the annual fee. One can see these activities as an example of the way IMD is trying to strengthen its links with its key client companies. These tend to be those that use IMD the most. The complex network is thus a manifestation of a deeper elaboration of the relationship between established clients and IMD – on both open-enrollment and in-company programs. The Learning Network is indeed a way for IMD to present its existing knowledge through a more user-oriented framework. IMD protects and extends its base of existing clients through complex collaborations. How can a business school take its existing knowledge base and leverage or build on it to reach new students, new market category segments of learners? Fig. 1 illustrates this – a dynamic growth model for the school.
Fig. 1. A Dynamic Growth Model for the School.
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We see from Fig. 1 that a school might position itself through segmentation. The question is how a school can build on its proven strengths – protect and extend. Perhaps the easiest would be to make its existing knowledge available to new product segments, say in the executive education area, or to other groups of students, say at satellite campuses – a leverage strategy. Alternatively, the school could think about adding new competences to its offerings, say increasing the number of disciplines on offer, introducing more pedagogically advanced capabilities, action learning, technology-based distance learning – a build strategy. The model also shows the possibility of a transform strategy, which would consist of pursuing both new market segments and new knowledge. However, our research in other areas (Chakravarthy & Lorange, 2002) indicates that this will typically not be successful. Rather a school would be better to go via leverage before adding build capabilities, such as, for instance, entering new student segments through leveraging and then adding a distance learning capability via building, thus arriving at a transform strategy in two steps. Alternatively, a school could build a new capability, say for more action-oriented, diagnostic learning for particular companies, and then take this into a new segment. Again, it would indirectly arrive at a transform strategy via first build, then leverage. Underlying all of this is the assumption that a school will want to build on the strengths it has, actively working with them in order to avoid commoditization and to create dynamic growth. As we have seen, this would typically call for complex relationships, in order to actively be able to pursue various types of leverage strategies, as well as various types of build strategies. We shall now discuss this again in the context of IMD’s experience (Lorange, 2002b).
IMD’S COMPLEX NETWORK OF RELATIONSHIPS FOR GROWTH Figure 2 portrays how this growth model might look in terms of a number of complex collaborations at IMD. We have already discussed IMD’s Learning Network of more than 160 companies as an example of protect and extend, so we shall not elaborate further on this.
Leverage IMD has developed a close relationship with a number of companies when it comes to delivering tailored programs. This has frequently evolved further into a relationship with the corporate universities of these companies. Here IMD delivers specific
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Fig. 2. IMD’s Complex Network of Growth Initiatives.
program modules as part of the offering of a given corporate university. It can also support the corporate university with virtual learning inputs, say by facilitating the use of the materials that have already been generated via the Weekly Webcasts. The benefits for the corporate university are that IMD provides “fresh” inputs to avoid deterioration and stagnation. Also, IMD perhaps has a better understanding of the pedagogical learning dimension than the typical firm and is thus able to contribute particularly effective program designs. Otherwise there is a danger that a corporate university activity can end up becoming too much of a set of fragmented “dog-and-pony-show” sessions. Based on the experience of IMD’s interaction with corporate universities, the school has decided to attempt to develop even more in-depth key client relationships with 10 of its major customers. This will involve a more intensive effort on IMD’s part to be on top of these customers’ key issues:
Key challenges in the business today. Challenges in developing the firm’s people. Challenges in learning across organizational entities within the firm. Challenges in managing knowledge in the firm and its subunits.
On IMD’s side, a key account team is established with a particular faculty member co-leading the relationship with a member of IMD’s marketing field force. Other faculty members and staff are involved on an ad hoc basis. The key account team typically has global responsibility.
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IMD also encourages the formation of a corresponding team in the company itself. A multitude of relationships will thus be established – not having only one relationship, say with the head of human resources or executive learning, but also working with senior line executives. Key account plans focus on interactive and iterative discussions with each specific key client on subjects including: The role of various faculty members and field force marketing representatives. How to capitalize on low-hanging fruits to obtain more immediate results from the complex collaboration. How to start working on – and developing – milestones for more involved, far-out learning initiatives, typically requiring more development work for both IMD and the company. This is a leverage strategy in the sense that the various capabilities and competences that exist within IMD’s community are being coordinated – “leveraged” – vis-`a-vis particular companies. Often a business school can be seen as analogous to a group of solo musicians, taking it in turn to perform their piece. This leverage strategy, however, is meant to draw on the entire body of knowledge of the school together, i.e. to create a performance analogous to that of a symphony orchestra. A fundamental question underlying this drive for leveraging would be how IMD’s professors and leadership identified possibilities and then created and maintained the possible partnerships. The key here is an open, iterative dialogue between specific corporations and the school. Typically this might start out as a rather simple working relationship. Over time, and helped by a sense of the benefits of the relationship activities, more and more actors might become involved on both sides, driving a broader and broader agenda for value creation. Always at the heart of this would be a strong commitment to serve the firm’s needs, and not impose IMD’s own solutions on the firm. Thus, a demand-side focus – not a supply-side focus – leads to the finding of relevant opportunities.
Build Let us now look at the other alternative for growth, namely developing new knowledge, which can then be added to the present knowledge base and thus become a build strategy. At IMD, new knowledge is constantly being developed, through the research undertaken by a faculty of 56 full-time professors, supported by 25 research associates. And there is continuous generation of knowledge via the accumulation
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of insights that come out of the various program initiatives with given companies. Although some of this knowledge is proprietary to the specific companies, most of it can be utilized as generic insights in other contexts. A considerable amount of pedagogically oriented knowledge is also accumulated. All of this can perhaps be seen as routine knowledge development, as part of the protect and extend strategic archetype. But what about adding more fundamentally new knowledge? Complex collaborations with other academic institutions are a realistic way to achieve this. First, IMD entered a strategic alliance with the Technical University of Switzerland, which has two campuses, one in Zurich (ETH) and one in Lausanne (EPFL). It has an outstanding reputation and is often referred to as “the MIT of Europe.” The strategic alliance was focused on developing a teaching and research program for executives from technology-based firms, i.e. the managerial side of technology development. Now in its seventh year, the alliance has been largely successful. Several professors are involved, the programs are offered jointly by all three faculty groups, and the physical location of the program modules rotates from campus to campus. The marketing of the program is done jointly by the three participating academic entities. This can indeed be seen as another example of complex collaboration. Then IMD went looking for another strategic alliance, to tap into the knowledge base of a leading U.S.-based business school. This led to an exclusive strategic alliance with the MIT Sloan School of Management aimed at developing a one-week teaching program with affiliated research: Driving Strategic Innovation. Faculty members from both institutions are deeply involved in developing and delivering the program. The program is offered every six months, alternating between MIT Sloan and IMD. For IMD, on the one hand, there was a clear strategy of gaining access to relevant know-how that it would be too small to realistically develop on its own: General management know-how. Information technology know-how, drawing on MIT Sloan’s extensive base here. Innovation know-how, again drawing on the U.S. school’s position as part of perhaps the most preeminent technical university in the world. Financial management know-how. MIT Sloan, on the other hand, was interested in IMD’s know-how in executivedevelopment program design, marketing, promotion, etc.
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So far, the alliance is faring well, a complex and dynamic network created and managed by faculty from both schools. Transform One of the major barriers to growth for IMD is its relative lack of credibility in the major executive development market in the world – the U.S. Partly this can be attributed to IMD’s small size, which means it is unable to afford to develop a strong base among U.S. consumers in the broadest sense. Partly this can also be attributed to the fact that many of the world’s leading business schools are located in the U.S., which perhaps induces a sense of skepticism about the need to work with international business schools such as IMD. Interestingly, the relationship between MIT Sloan and IMD led to a further focus on U.S. corporations, in terms of how they could benefit from the jointly developed program. This was coupled with a focus on the 10 key client companies with which IMD is forging a particularly strong relationship, and the result was specific efforts vis-`a-vis a handful of these companies in the U.S. Two of these companies are headquartered in the U.S., and another four have a very strong presence there. This led to the development of learning strategies for the U.S. parts of these companies, building both on the leverage positions already established (key client relationships) and on the build relationship through the MIT Sloan alliance – a true transform strategy. The undisputed reputation of the MIT Sloan School of Management, coupled with IMD’s strong capabilities when it comes to tailored executive development, seems to work.
MAJOR CHALLENGES TO MAKING COMPLEX COLLABORATIONS WORK Experience so far has indicated that there are several major challenges to making these complex networks function as intended. Let us review several broad areas: one deals with the existing organizational context; another deals with the links to rewards, which need to be established realistically, and still others deal with some specific barriers that are often present. Organizational Context One issue is whether there is a single link or multiple links between the various entities in the network. We see a clear trend toward the need for multiple links.
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For instance, when it comes to links between specific corporations and IMD, the relationship tends to work better when there are several links, specifically when several line executives are involved. The least productive situation tends to be where there is one link, with the corporate staff human resource function only. Similarly, in IMD’s relationship with other academic institutions, there are a number of links from both sides. Although initially this was not well understood, this was a guiding principle for the development of the relationship with MIT Sloan. This is indeed analogous to the discussion of structural holes in social networks (Burt, 1997). The question of organizational stability is closely related. There will inevitably be changes in the relationships on both sides. A given executive will be reassigned to another job internally, and/or he/she might leave the organization. This can create dysfunctional effects. Similarly, within the academic institution a particular faculty member may move on to other tasks, again, potentially leading to instability. To safeguard stability in the complex collaboration, relationships must be backed up – from both sides of the relationship (Dooley & Van de Ven, 1999).
Complementary Capabilities It is important that the various entities in the complex collaboration have complementary capabilities. When it comes to the relationships between IMD and various key clients, for instance, IMD can design and deliver executive programs. The client company has the capability to select and assign the appropriate set of executives to the program. When it comes to a corporate university, it is also important for the capabilities on both sides to complement each other, so that there is no unnecessary duplication of effort, or perhaps even rivalry, between organizational subunits on both sides. When it comes to relationships with other academic institutions, it is important for both entities to have the ability to generate commercial results, i.e. effective marketing in order to attract executives to the programs. Similarly, it is important for both sides to have the capabilities to design and deliver executive programs from a content and pedagogical point of view. Still, the two must address different customer segments, bring complementary capabilities to the program design, etc. There must be mutual respect on both sides, not a “we are the best” attitude.
Shared Vision and Strategy Here it is important that the strategy, vision, and agenda to be followed are broadly shared. We have experienced that some entities can become out of sync with
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the shared vision, and can therefore act dysfunctionally relative to the common vision and strategy. Clarity in the common vision must be developed at several levels. For instance, it could be that the relationship is clear at the top, whereas particular entities further down the hierarchy may have a different agenda, say a division wanting to work with another business school. A top-down/bottom-up pattern of interaction must be delineated when it comes to developing a common vision for the complex collaboration (Collins & Porras, 1996; Neubauer & Parikh, 1993).
Core Values A key issue here has to do with learning as a core value that drives all entities in the complex collaboration. Many companies engage in executive development activities, for instance. At times this can perhaps be more or less a “detached investment,” rather than based on a true commitment to lifelong learning. It goes without saying that the broader vision must be articulated from the top. The energy has to come from here to counteract any tendencies to abandon a complex relationship, just because it is simpler to do so, and the transaction costs are high. Top-down energy is needed to keep the more ambitious visions alive! This can create relational stress, in that some entities evolve, while others are left behind in the complex alliance.
Change Similarly, what is the view of change? Is it a normal part of the evolution of the complex alliance, or do the various parties to the complex alliance see it as something different? Clearly “good must always be done better,” and hence change is a central part of any complex collaboration. But the shared core values remain. If there is no core value then it might be difficult to see how a complex collaboration can sustain the changes. In the case of ETH/EPFL, the core values of these organizations seem to be considerably different to those of IMD. Similarly, at MIT Sloan, the more axiomatic and traditional academic values there lead to potential dysfunctionalities compared with the more general core values at IMD. When the core values differ, then even more energy must be mobilized – typically from the top of the organizations – to keep the complex collaboration going. The extra energy required seems to argue for increased care and skill in complex collaboration (Flood & Jackson, 1995).
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Links to Rewards Complex collaborations cannot work unless the various key stakeholders see the benefits of the collaboration for themselves. Thus, a particular professor will only be involved in a key client relationship with a company provided that he/she obtains significant benefits from it, say, in the form of added learning, more work, additional research funds, even private consulting. It is important that this does not create dysfunctionality regarding stakeholder rewards. For instance, if collaboration takes the professor’s energy away from his/her key tasks, then it may be that the professor should decline. Realism here is key. Interestingly, in the relationship between MIT Sloan and IMD, joint research efforts have already been established between professors on both sides, leading to, for example, collaborative works, with inputs from professors at both schools.
Barriers “Not invented here” can be a real issue in complex collaborations. For instance, organizational pride and organizational profile can easily lead to problems if the parties feel that “we know best.” It is therefore important for each party to lay out its strengths and weaknesses, and to enter the collaboration based on this recognition. It is assumed that all institutions involved are of world-class caliber, but with different – complementary – strengths. Thus a “not invented here,” “we know better” attitude would be dysfunctional. It is important to dispel any sense of immaturity or insecurity in this respect. Complex networks can only thrive when there is a clear recognized complementarity, and a willingness of all parties to take advantage of it (Holland, 1995).
Meeting Place This is an issue of getting together to thrash out ideas, perhaps without even having a clear agenda, but to share with others from all sides when it comes to stating “challenges” that need to be handled, and perhaps coming up with “potential solutions.” This kind of brainstorming, creating deliberate meeting places without very tight agendas, and being willing to spend time on a predetermined, regular basis – say once every two months – seems to be very important for a complex alliance to succeed. What emerges from this sequence of interactions might be new
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shared insights on how to tackle particular value-creating challenges in the learning process. And additional insights create new challenges – “good must always be done better.” This openness from both sides is thus key – to add relevant energy to the complex relationship on an ongoing basis.
Critical Brain Talents It has been argued (Black & Gregersen, 1997) that it is now the key brains or talents in a company who will shape the organization they work in – based on their own professional goals, ambitions, career aspirations, etc. Thus the old dictum “strategy and structure” (Chandler, 1962) may no longer hold true. It follows for complex collaborations, too, that they will only prosper if the key executives involved want such arrangements to succeed. They must find that complex collaboration offers exceptional career opportunities, new ways for them to grow personally, more excitement and speed. Career benefits from being involved in complex collaboration can thus result from new thought leadership, which can make it attractive for faculty. However, faculty can of course be quite self-centered. Thus, they must put value on a broadened self-imposed professional mission of expanding into “uncharted territory,” such as further influencing the field of international business. As we know, the very high transaction cost dimension typically associated with complex collaborations might therefore represent a counter-force against their very existence. The key talents may prefer simpler structures. It goes without saying that it will be particularly important for senior decision makers to make the complex collaboration simple – “simple complex collaborations” – should not be a contradiction in terms. This implies that maintaining a complex collaboration requires the investment of time, energy and ideas, in simple but key ways, to keep it going. This is parallel to the discussion in the literature of complex adaptive systems, which says that complexity is built up from repetition of simple patterns (Holland, 1995; Mitleton-Kelly, 1997).
The CEO in Complex Structures With simplicity in mind, it is interesting, therefore, that some CEOs have decided to head the human resource management function themselves. In this way, they might be able to keep transaction costs under control and make the complex structures work. A CEO who is head of human resources has a legitimate reason to move around in the organization, to assess the situation, i.e. to manage the complex structure by “getting his/her feet wet.” He/she can use the HRM dimension as
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a way to legitimize keeping a finger on the pulse of the company, making the right organizational choices, etc., i.e. keeping the complex collaboration moving. He/she can thereby be sure that his/her overall vision is being met.
CONCLUSIONS We have discussed the phenomenon of complex collaborations and complex networks in the context of the modern business school. We have argued that for the modern business school to grow, and to distance itself from commoditization, it will increasingly be necessary to have such complex collaborations. Partly, these will be with leading corporations, and will involve leveraging the business school’s capabilities by coordinating them in a key client relationship mode, involving people from both sides – executives and professors – most often in a rather complex network pattern. Partly also, complex collaborations can be established between several academic institutions to generate the necessary know-how required today, which one institution might find it hard to create on its own. Again, complex network relationships will typically be a solution, involving several professors on each side. The conceptual model behind all this consists of building on one’s organizational strengths, a so-called protect and extend strategic position, and then entering into complex collaborations/complex network initiatives by expanding into new markets based on one’s proven strengths, i.e. a leverage strategy, and/or by building new competences that can be added to one’s established strengths, i.e. a build strategy. A transform strategy, with both new competences and new market positioning simultaneously, is not recommended as a strategic alternative for complex collaboration in its own right. Rather, such strategic positions should be achieved via a two-stage mode of complex collaborations – i.e. from protect and extend via build to transform, or the other way round, i.e. from protect and extend via leverage to transform. Needless to say, complex collaborations will have to be managed particularly carefully in order to achieve such a two-pronged focus. Complex collaborations do indeed have to do with the organizational context itself, with strengthening various value links, and with dismantling specific barriers.
REFERENCES Black, J. S., & Gregersen, H. B. (1997). Participative decision making: An integration of multiple dimensions. Human Relations, 50(7), 859–879. Burt, R. S. (1997). Contingent value of social capital. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(2), 339–366.
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Chakravarthy, B., & Lorange, P. (2002). The growth imperative for Asian firms. Nanyang Business Review, 1(1), 69–76. Chandler, A. D., Jr. (1962). Strategy and structure. Cambridge: MIT Press. Collins, J. C., & Porras, J. I. (1996). Building your company’s vision. Harvard Business Review, 65–77. Dooley, K. J., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1999). Explaining complex organizational dynamics. Organization Science, 10(3). Flood, R., & Jackson, M. (1995). Creative problem solving: Total systems intervention. New York: Wiley. Gregoire, N., & Prigogine, I. (1989). Exploring complexity. New York: WH Freeman. Holland, J. (1995). Hidden order: How adaptation builds complexity. Reading, MA: Addision-Wesley. Lorange, P. (2000). Developing an internally driven growth strategy in network organizations: The Nestl´e friskies example. In: B. von Ostinger (Ed.), Unternehmen im Dialog (ed., pp. 38–47). Munich: Walter Biering. Lorange, P. (2002a). Setting strategic direction in academic institutions: The case of the business school. Higher Education Policy, 13(4), 399–413. Lorange, P. (2002b). Developing an internally driven growth strategy in network organizations: An organizational learning approach. In: V. Havila, M. Forsgren & H. Haakanson (Eds), Critical Perspectives on Internationalization. London: Pergamon. Lorange, P. (2002c). New vision for management education: Leadership, challenges. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Lorange, P. (2003). Global responsibility – business education and business schools – roles in promoting a global perspective. The International Journal of Business in Society, 3(3), 126–135. Mitleton-Kelly, E. (1997). Organisations as co-evolving complex adaptive systems. British Academy of Management Conference. Neubauer, F., & Parikh, J. (1993). Corporate visioning. International Review of Strategic Management, 4, 105–116. Chichester: Wiley. Peak, D., & Frame, M. (1994). Chaos under control: The art and science of complexity. New York: WH Freeman. Stacey, R. (1995). The science of complexity: An alternative perspective for strategic change processes. Strategic Management Journal, 16(6), 477–495.
INTEGRATING PERSPECTIVES: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONSTRUCT OF COLLABORATIVE CAPABILITY Melanie Schreiner and Daniel Corsten ABSTRACT With the advent of the resource-based and dynamic capabilities views of the firm, researchers of collaborative relationships have raised the question as to whether superior management of such relationships does indeed explain observed differences in collaborative performance of individual firms. While most research to-date has concentrated on antecedents and development of such management capabilities, in this chapter we propose a comprehensive construct aimed at capturing what constitutes collaborative capability. Results of an exploratory field study of vertical relationships in the software service sector suggest that collaborative capability consists of structural, cognitive, and affective dimensions. Based on our findings, we believe that the three dimensions of collaborative capability act as complements rather than substitutes, and that superior collaborative performance depends on a proper balance of the three dimensions.
Complex Collaboration: Building the Capabilities for Working Across Boundaries Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams, Volume 10, 125–159 Copyright © 2004 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1572-0977/doi:10.1016/S1572-0977(04)10006-X
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INTRODUCTION Recently, researchers have investigated the phenomenon of collaborative interfirm relationships drawing upon the theoretical contributions of the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) and the dynamic capabilities approach. They have found empirical evidence that a firm’s capabilities in managing collaborative relationships with external partners influences relationship performance: they may contribute to overall relationship success (Kale & Singh, 1999; Lambe et al., 2002) and firm profitability (Simonin, 1997), facilitate knowledge and competence development (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999; Simonin, 1997), foster technical and commercial innovation success (Ritter & Gem¨unden, 1999), and have an impact on the company’s value creation (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Kale et al., 2002). Collaborative relationships can be defined as cooperative agreements between legally separable organizations that do not involve establishing separate organizations (Masten, 1988; Williamson, 1991). While positive effects of capabilities in managing such relationships find increasing support, their identification and operationalization are still in their infancy. To date, while drawing upon organizational learning and evolutionary theories, many researchers have concentrated on the cognitive and structural aspects of capabilities in managing relationships. Some have investigated how experience with managing relations with external partners translates via organizational learning mechanisms into future collaboration success (e.g. Kale & Singh, 1999; Simonin, 1997). Other researchers have focused on structural aspects such as an organizational function for collaboration management or the building of idiosyncratic resources for alliance creation (Kale et al., 2002; Lambe et al., 2002; Ritter & Gem¨unden, 1999). Surprisingly, although studies on the relationship level consistently point to the importance of affect-based factors such as trust or relational quality, scholars have almost completely neglected the relevance of the social and affective dimensions in collaborative relationships. However, increasing scholarly attention is being paid to the impact of affective and emotional elements of performance in business settings (e.g. Lawler & Thye, 1999; Luthans, 2002). However, overall it remains unclear as to what constitutes a management capability for collaborative relationships, in other words, which organizational processes, routines, actions and behaviors translate intended relationship goals into practice. In this chapter, we present the results of an empirical field study of capabilities for managing vertical relationships in the software service sector conducted according to grounded theory principles. Based on our findings, we have developed a multidimensional construct of firm collaborative capability which integrates structural, cognitive, and affective dimensions. In the subsequent sections, we first outline the conceptual foundations of the dynamic capabilities approach and
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prior research findings. After a detailed description of the research setting and methodology, we then report and discuss our findings pertaining to structural, cognitive, and affective capabilities, followed by concluding remarks.
CAPABILITIES FOR COLLABORATION A tremendous body of research on collaborative relationships has accumulated in various disciplines in recent decades, especially in the strategic management and marketing domains. However, research that focuses on management capabilities for collaboration from a single firm perspective has emerged only relatively recently with the advent of the resource-based view (RBV) and the dynamic capabilities view of the firm. These approaches promote firm-specific resources and capabilities as a source of inimitable and thus sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfeld, 1984). As opposed to the view of the firm as being subject to deterministic environmental forces (Porter, 1980), resource-based theory suggests that firms’ unique assets and internal resources determine firm performance. The dynamic capabilities view extends this perspective. This approach posits that private wealth creation in periods of rapid technological change depends on honing technological, organizational, and managerial processes inside the firm. These internal processes serve to identify new opportunities and to organize effectively and efficiently to embrace them (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997). Yet, the question remains as to the nature of capabilities. For the purpose of our research we are essentially relying on Dosi, Nelson and Winter (2000, p. 2) who state: To be capable of something is to have a generally reliable capacity to bring that thing about as a result of intended action. Capabilities fill the gap between intention and outcome, and they fill it in such a way that the outcome bears a definite resemblance to what was intended.
In other words, we embrace the now emerging consensus about: (1) the functional nature of capabilities; (2) the impact of managerial action upon their development and maintenance assuming that they are not completely tacit and intangible; and (3) their value in altering the resource endowment of the firm and handling change by transformation and a combining of old capabilities into new capabilities to achieve competitive advantage (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997). Although prior research on capabilities for the management of collaborative relationships is relatively limited to-date, existing literature shows a considerable variety of labels, definitions, conceptualizations and operationalizations (see Appendix A). In the field of strategic management, several researchers have
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emphasized the relevance of organizational capabilities for managing relationships with external partners without specifying accounts of the phenomenon (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Khanna, 1998). Most research concentrates primarily on the influence of experience and organizational learning mechanisms to develop capabilities for managing collaborative relationships (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Gulati, 1999; Kale et al., 2002; Kale & Singh, 1999; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999). Just a few studies are concerned with the facets of a capability construct for the management of collaborative relationships (Lambe et al., 2002; Ritter & Gem¨unden, 1999; Simonin, 1997). However, they almost exclusively consider management tasks of the life cycle of a collaborative relationship, that is, identifying partners, negotiating, managing, restructuring, and eventually terminating the relationship. While marketing research has generated an enormous amount of knowledge on buyersupplier and various other forms of channel and market relations (e.g. Anderson & Narus, 1990; Dwyer et al., 1987; Heide, 1994; Heide & John, 1990; Hibbard et al., 2001; Hunt et al., 1985; Sivadas & Dwyer, 2000), Day’s (1994) seminal article on the capabilities of market-driven companies remained the only one to add to the relationship capability discussion. He accentuates customer-linking, respectively channel bonding capabilities. Almost all researchers in this area have modeled management capabilities for collaborative relationships as a predictor of relationship success. Yet, despite some initial forays, they remain surprisingly silent on the different dimensions of the capability constru