New Economic Windows Series Editor MASSIMO SALZANO
Series Editorial Board Series Editorial Board
Jaime Gil Aluja Departament d’Economia i Organització d’Empreses, Universitat de Barcelona, Spain Jaime Gil Aluja Departament d’Economia i Organització d’Empreses, Universitat de Barcelona, Spain Fortunato Arecchi Dipartimento di Fisica, Università di Firenze and INOA, Italy Fortunato Arecchi Dipartimento di Fisica, Università di Firenze and INOA, Italy David Colander Department of Economics, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT, USA David Colander Richard H. of Day Department Economics, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT, USA Department of Economics, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, USA Richard H. Day Mauro Gallegati Department of Economics, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, USA Dipartimento di Economia, Università di Ancona, Italy Mauro Gallegati Steve Keen di Economia, Università di Ancona, Italy Dipartimento School of Economics and Finance, University of Western Sydney, Australia Steve Keen Alan SchoolKirman of Economics and Finance, University of Western Sydney, Australia GREQAM/EHESS, Université d’Aix-Marseille III, France Giulia Iori Marji Linesof Mathematics, King’s College, London, UK Department Dipartimento di Science Statistiche, Università di Udine, Italy
Alan Kirman Thomas Lux GREQAM/EHESS, Université d’Aix-Marseille III, France Department of Economics, University of Kiel, Germany
Marji Lines Alfredo Medio Dipartimento di Science Statistiche, Università di Udine, Italy Dipartimento di Scienze Statistiche, Università di Udine, Italy
Alfredo Medio Paul Ormerod Dipartimento di Scienze Statistiche, Università di Udine, Italy
Directors of Environment Business-Volterra Consulting, London, UK
Paul Ormerod Peter Richmond Directors of Environment Business-Volterra Consulting, London, UK School of Physics, Trinity College, Dublin 2, Ireland
J. Barkley Rosser J.Department Barkley Rosser of Economics, James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA, USA Department of Economics, James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA, USA
Sorin Solomon Sorin Solomon Racah Institute of Physics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel Racah Institute of Physics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Kumaraswamy Pietro Terna (Vela) Velupillai Department of Economics, National University of Ireland, Ireland
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Finanziarie, Università di Torino, Italy
Nicolas Vriend (Vela) Velupillai Kumaraswamy
Department of Economics, Queen Mary University of London, UK Department of Economics, National University of Ireland, Ireland
Lotfi Zadeh Nicolas Vriend
Computer Science Division, University of California Berkeley, USA Department of Economics, Queen Mary University of London, UK
Lotfi Zadeh
EditorialScience Assistants Computer Division, University of California Berkeley, USA Maria Rosaria Marisa FagginiAlfano Marisa Faggini Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università di Salerno, Italy Editorial Assistants Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università di Salerno, Italy
Marisa Faggini
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università di Salerno, Italy
Massimo Salzano • David Colander
Complexity Hints for Economic Policy
IV
A. Achiron et al.
MASSIMO SALZANO Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche Università degli Studi di Salerno, Italy David Colander Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT, USA
The publication of this book has been made possible thanks to the financial support of the MIUR-FIRB RBAU01 B49F
Library of Congress Control Number: 2006930687 ISBN-978-88-470-0533-4 Springer Milan Berlin Heidelberg New York This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole of part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, re-use of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in other ways, and storage in databanks. Duplication of this pubblication or parts thereof is only permitted under the provisions of the Italian Copyright Law in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer-Verlag. Violations are liable for prosecution under the Italian Copyright Law. Springer is a part of Springer Science+Business Media springer.com © Springer-Verlag Italia 2007 Printed in Italy Cover design: Simona Colombo, Milano Typeset by the authors using a Springer Macro package Printing and binding: Grafiche Porpora, Segrate (MI) Printed on acid-free paper
Preface
To do science is to find patterns, and scientists are always looking for patterns that they can use to structure their thinking about the world around them. Patterns are found in data, which is why science is inevitably a quantitative study. But there is a difficulty in finding stable patterns in the data since many patterns are temporary phenomena that have occurred randomly, and highly sophisticated empirical methods are necessary to distinguish stable patterns from temporary or random patterns. When a scientist thinks he has found a stable pattern, he will generally try to capture that pattern in a model or theory. A theory is essentially a pattern, and thus theory is a central part of science. It would be nice to have a single pattern - a unified theory - that could serve as a map relating our understanding with the physical world around us. But the physical world has proven far too complicated for a single map, and instead we have had to develop smaller sub maps that relate to small areas of the physical world around us. This multiple theory approach presents the problem of deciding not only what the appropriate map for the particular issue is, but also of handling the map overlays where different maps relate to overlapping areas of reality. It is not only science that is focused on finding patterns; so too are most individuals. In fact, as pointed out by Andy Clark (1993), human brains are ‘associative engines’ that can be thought of as fast pattern completers - the human brain has evolved to see aspects of the physical world and to create a pattern that places that aspect in context and allows individuals to draw broader implications for very limited data1. Brian W. Arthur gives the following example ‘If I see a tail going around a corner, and it’s a black swishy tail, I say, “There’s a cat”! There are patterns in music,
—————— 1
This discussion is based on observations by Brian W. Arthur (2000).
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art, religion, business; indeed humans find patterns in just about everything that they do2. Determining when a pattern fits, when there are multiple patterns mapping to the same physical phenomena, and which pattern is the appropriate pattern, is a difficult task that is the subject of much debate. Science differentiates itself from other areas of inquiry by setting rules about when a pattern can be assumed to fit, and when not, and what the structure of the map can be. It essentially is a limit on the fast pattern completion nature of humans. For example, that swishy tail could be a small boy with who is playing a trick with a tail on one end of a stick. To prevent too-fast pattern completion, and hence mistakes, standard science requires the map to be a formal model that could be specified in a set of equations, determined independently of the data sequence for which it is a pattern, and that the patterns match the physical reality to a certain degree of precision. That approach places standard logic at the center of science. Arthur tells the story of Bertrand Russell’s to make this point. A schoolboy, a parson, and a mathematician are crossing from England into Scotland in a train. The schoolboy looks out and sees a black sheep and says, ‘Oh! Look! Sheep in Scotland are black!’ The parson, who is learned, but who represents a low level of science, says, ‘No. Strictly speaking, all we can say is that there is one sheep in Scotland that is black’. The mathematician, who might well represent a skilled theoretical scientist, says, ‘No, that is still not correct. All we can really say is that we know that in Scotland there exists at least one sheep, at least one side of which is black’. The point is that science, and the formal models that underlie it, works as a brake on our natural proclivity to complete patterns. In many areas the standard science approach has served us well, and has added enormous insight. By insisting on precision, scientists have built an understanding that fits not just the hastily observed phenomena, but the carefully observed phenomena, thereby developing much closer patterns. Once individuals learn those patterns, the patterns become obvious to them - yes, that table is actually nothing but a set of atoms - but without science, what is obvious to us now would never have become obvious. In other areas, though, we have been unable to find a precise set of equations or models that match the data representing the physical world, leaving large areas of physical reality outside the realm of science. For many scientists, —————— 2
Human’s ‘fast pattern completer’ brains have been shown today to be less rational than previously supposed by economists. The new “neuroeconomics”, in fact, has demonstrated that many choices are often made more from an emotional than a rational approach.
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a group of areas that have proven impervious to existing mappings includes most of the social sciences; these areas are simply too hard for traditional science. The difficulty of finding a precise map has not stopped social scientists from developing precise formal models and attempting to fit those precise models to the data, and much of the methodological debate in the social sciences concerns what implications we can draw from the vague imprecise mappings that one can get with existing analytic theories and data series. Critics of economics have called it almost useless - the celestial mechanics of a nonexistent universe. Until recently, the complaints of critics have been ignored, not because standard economists did not recognize the problems, but because the way we were doing economics was the best we could do. But science, like all fields, is subject to technological change, and recently there have been significant changes in analytic and computational technology that are allowing new theories to develop. Similar advances are occurring in empirical measurement, providing scientists with much more data, and hence many more areas to place finer patterns on, and in the analytics of empirical measurement, which allows the patterns developed by theories to be brought to the data better3. Such technological change has been occurring in the economics profession over the last decade, and that technological change is modifying the way economics is done. This book captures some of that change. The new work is sometimes described as complexity theory, and in many ways that is a helpful and descriptive term that we have both used (Colander 2000a, b; Salzano and Kirman 2004). But it is also a term that is often misused by the popular press and conveys to people that the complexity approach is a whole new way of doing economics, and that it is a replacement for existing economics. It is neither of those things. The complexity approach is simply the integration of some new analytic and computational techniques into economists’ bag of tools. We see the new work as providing some alternative pattern generators, which can supplement existing approaches by providing an alternative way of finding patterns than can be obtained by the traditional scientific approach. The problem with the use of the complexity moniker comes about because, as discussed above, individuals, by nature, are fast pattern completers. This has led some scientific reporters, and some scientists in their non—————— 3
As usual the reality is more complicated than can be presented in a brief introduction. The problem is that measurement does not stand alone, but is based on theory. Discontent about traditional theories can lead to a search for new ways of measurement, and improvements in the quality of data.
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scientific hats, to speculate about possible patterns that can follow from the new models and techniques. As this speculation develops, the terms get away from the scientists, and are no longer seen as simply descriptions of certain properties of specific mathematical models, but instead as grand new visions of how science is to be done, and of our understanding of reality. Such a grandiose vision makes it seem that complexity is an alternative to standard science, when it is actually simply a continuation of science as usual4. The popular press has picked up on a number of ideas associated with these models - ‘emergent structure’, ‘edge of order’, ‘chaos’, ‘hierarchy, ‘self organized criticality’, ‘butterfly effect’, ‘path dependency’, ‘histeresis’, etc. - and, using its fast-pattern completer skills, has conveyed many of these ideas to the general population with a sense that they offer a whole new way of understanding reality, and a replacement for standard science. Scientists have shied away from such characterizations and have emphasized that while each of these terms has meaning, that meaning is in the explicit content in the mathematical model from which they derive, not in some general idea that is everywhere appropriate. The terms reflect a pattern that economic scientists are beginning to develop into a theory that may prove useful in understanding the economy and in developing policies. But the work is still in the beginning stages, and it is far too early to declare it a science and a whole new way of looking at something. Scientists are slow, precise, pattern completers and they recognize that the new work has a long way be go before it will describe a meaningful pattern, and an even longer way to go before it can be determined whether those patterns are useful5. Thus, even if the complexity approach to economics is successful, it will be a complement to, not a substitute for, existing approaches in economics. That said, there are some hopeful signs and research in “complexity” is some of the most exciting research going on in economics. The most hopeful work is occurring in analysis of the financial sector, where —————— 4
This is not dissimilar from what has already happened for the “biological evolution” work, which was a more general, but not fundamentally different, approach from the mechanical physical biological model. 5 In agent-based modeling (ABM), the model consists of a set of agents that encapsulate the behaviors of the various individuals that make up the system, and execution consists of emulating these behaviors. In equation-based modeling (EBM), the model is a set of equations, and execution consists of evaluating them. Thus, “simulation” is the general term that applies to both methods, which are distinguished as (agent-based) emulation and (equation-based) evaluation. See Parunak & A. (1998).
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enormous amounts of quality data are available. But even where high quality data is not available, such as in questions of industrial organization, the approach is changing the way the questions are conceptualized, with markets being conceptualized as dynamic rather than static as in the more traditional approach.
How the Complexity Approach Relates to the Standard Approach The standard theoretical approach used in economics is one loosely based on a vision of rational agents optimizing, and is a consideration of how a system composed of such optimizing agents would operate. The complexity approach retains that same vision, and thus is simply an extension of the current analysis. Where complexity differs is in the assumptions it allows to close the model. The complexity approach stresses more local, rather than global, optimization by agents than is done in the traditional approach. Agent heterogeneity and interaction are key elements of the complexity approach. The standard approach, which developed over the last 100 years, was limited in the methods available to it by the existing evolving analytic and empirical technology. That meant that it had to focus on the solvable aspects of the model, and to structure assumptions of the model to fit the analytics, not the problem. The analysis evolved from simple static constrained optimization to nonstochastic control theory to dynamic stochastic control theory, but the general structure of the analysis - the analytic pattern generating mechanism - remained the same, only more jazzed up. In the search to focus on the solvable aspects of the model, the standard approach had to strongly simplify the assumptions of the model using the representative agent simplification, and the consequent gaussianeity in the heterogeneity of agents. Somehow, models the economy without any consideration of agent heterogeneity were relied upon to find the patterns that could exist. The complexity approach does not accept that, and proposes a different vision, which is a generalization of the traditional analysis. In fact, it considers the representative agent hypothesis that characterizes much of modern macro as a possible, but highly unlikely, case and thus does not find it a useful reference point. But these changes in assumptions are not without cost. The cost of making agent heterogeneity central is that the complexity model is not analytically solvable. To gain insight into it, researchers must make use of simulations, and generally, with simulations, results are neither univocally nor probabilistically determined.
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The standard approach offered enormous insights, and proved highly useful in generating patterns for understanding and applying policy. It led to understanding of rationing situations, shadow pricing, and underlay a whole variety of applied policy developments: cost benefit analysis, modern management techniques, linear programming, non-linear programming, operations research, options pricing models, index funds … the list could be extended enormously. It suggested that problems would develop if prices were constrained in certain ways, and outlined what those problems would be; it led to an understanding of second order effectsexternalities, and how those second order effects could be dealt with. It also led to actual policies - such as marketable permits as a way of reducing pollution - and underlies an entire approach to the law. Moreover, the standard approach is far from moribund; there are many more areas where the patterns generated by the standard approach will lead to insights and new policies over the coming decades. Standard economics remains strong. Despite its academic successes there are other areas in which standard economics has not been so helpful in generating useful patterns for understanding. These include, paradoxically, areas where it would seem that the standard theory directly applies - areas such as stock market pricing, foreign exchange pricing, and understanding the macro economy more generally. In matching the predictions of standard theory to observed phenomena, there seem to be too many movements uncorrelated with underlying fundamentals, and some patterns, such as the arch and garch movement in stock price data, that don’t fit the standard model. The problem is twofold the first is the simplicity of the model assumptions do not allow the complexity of the common sense interactions that one would expect; the second is the failure of the models to fit the data in an acceptable way. It is those two problems that are the starting points for the complexity approach. The reason why the complexity approach is taking hold now in economics is because the computing technology has advanced. This advance allows consideration of analytical systems that could not previously be considered by economists. Consideration of these systems suggested that the results of the ‘control-based’ models might not extend easily to more complicated systems, and that we now have a method - piggybacking computer assisted analysis onto analytic methods - to start generating patterns that might provide a supplement to the standard approach. It is that approach that we consider the complexity approach. It is generally felt that these unexplained observations have something to do with interdependent decisions of agents that the standard model assumes away. Moreover, when the dynamics are non-linear, local variations from the averages can lead to significant deviations in the overall system
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behavior. Individuals interact not only within the market; they also interact with other individuals outside the market. Nowadays, theorists are trying to incorporate dynamic interdependencies into the models. The problem is that doing so is enormously complex and difficult, and there are an almost infinite number of possibilities. It is that complexity that the papers in this volume deal with. In terms of policy the papers in this volume suggest that when economists take complexity seriously, they become less certain in their policy conclusions, and that they expand their bag of tools by supplementing their standard model with some additional models including (1) agent-based models, in which one does not use analytics to develop the pattern, but instead one uses computational power to deal with specification of models that are far beyond analytic solution; and (2) non-linear dynamic stochastic models many of which are beyond analytic solution, but whose nature can be discovered by a combination of analytics and computer simulations. It is elements of these models that are the source of the popular terms that develop. Developments in this new approach will occur on two dimensions. The first is in further development of these modeling techniques, understanding when systems exhibit certain tendencies. It is one thing to say that butterfly effects are possible. It is quite another to say here are the precise characteristics that predict that we are near a shift point. Until we arrive at such an understanding, the models will be little help in applied policy. Similarly with agent-based models. It is one thing to find an agent-based model that has certain elements. It is quite another to say that it, rather than one of the almost infinite number of agent based models that we could have chosen, is the appropriate model to use as our theory. The second development is in fitting the patterns developed to the data. Is there a subset of aspects of reality that better fit these models than the standard models? Are there characteristics of reality that tell us what aspects they are? Both these developments involve enormous amounts of slogging through the analytics and data. The papers in this volume are elements of that slogging through. They are divided into four sections: general issues, modeling issues, applications, and policy issues. Each struggles with complicated ideas related to our general theme, and a number of them try out new techniques. In doing so, they are part of science as usual. The choice of papers highlights the necessity to consider a multifaceted methodology and not a single methodology in isolation. Our goal is to give the reader a sense of the different approaches that researchers are following, so as to provide a sense of the different lines of work in the complexity approach.
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It is commonly said that science progresses one funeral at a time; the papers in this volume suggest that there is another method of progression one technique at a time, and as various of these techniques prove fruitful, eventually the sum of them will lead economics to be something different than it currently is, but it is a change that can only be seen looking back from the future.
Part I: General Issues The first two papers deal with broad definitional and ontological issues, the cornerstone of economic thinking. One of the ways economists have arrived at patterns from theory is to carefully delineate their conception of agents, restricting the analyst to what Herbert Simon called sub rationality, and which Vercelli, in the first paper, “Rationality, Learning, and Complexity: from the Homo Economicus to the Homo Sapiens”, calls ‘very restrictive notions of expectations formation and learning that deny any role for cognitive psychology’. He argues that the approach of standard economics succeeds in simplifying the complexity of the economic system only at the cost of restricting its theoretical and empirical scope. He states, ‘If we want to face the problems raised by the irreducible complexity of the real world we are compelled to introduce an adequate level of epistemic complexity in our concepts and models’, (p 15) concluding, ‘epistemic complexity is not a virtue, but a necessity’. In the second paper, “The Confused State of Complexity Economics: An Ontological Explanation”, Perona addresses three issues: the coexistence of multiple conceptions and definitions of complexity, the contradictions manifest in the writings of economists who alternate between treating complexity as a feature of the economy or as a feature of economic models, and finally the unclear status of complexity economics as an orthodox/heterodox response to the failures in traditional theory. He argues that economists supporting the complexity ideas tend to move alternatively between different conceptions of complexity, which makes it hard to follow what their argument is. Using Tony Lawson’s ontic/theoretietic distinction, he argues that the plurality of complexity definitions makes sense when we observe that most of the definitions are theoretic notions, but that the apparent agreement between heterodox and orthodox traditions over complexity ideas is fictitious since the ‘two sides represent in fact quite different and even opposite responses to the problems perceived in traditional theory’. (p 14).
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Part II: Modeling Issues I - Modeling Economic Complexity The next set of papers enters into the issues of modeling. The first of these, “The Complex Problem of Modeling Economic Complexity” by Day, develops the pattern sense of science that we emphasized in the introduction, and provides a general framework for thinking about the problem of modeling complexity. Day argues that rapid progress only began in science when repetitive patterns, which could be expressed in relatively simple mathematical formulas, were discovered, and that the patterns developed could provide simplification in our understanding of reality. However, this approach left out many aspects that could not be described by simple equations. Day argues that Walrasian general equilibrium is a theory of mind over matter, that has shown “how, in principle a system of prices could coordination the implied flow of goods and services among the arbitrarily many heterogeneous individual decision-makers”. The problem with the theory is that it is about perfect coordination, while the interesting questions are to be found in less than perfect coordination - how the process of coordination works out of equilibrium. He then goes through some of the key literature that approached the problem along these lines. He concludes with an admonition to complexity researchers not be become intrigued with the mathematics and models, but to concentrate on the task of explaining such things as how governments and central banks interact with private households and business sectors, with the hope of identifying “policies that improve the stability and distributional properties of the system as a whole”. Day’s paper is the perfect introduction to the modeling sections of the book because it provides the organizing belief of the contributors to this volume that the work in complexity on chaotic dynamics and statistical mechanics “provides potential templates for models of variables in any domain whose behavior is governed by nonlinear, interacting causal forces and characterized by nonperiodic, highly irregular, essentially unpredictable behavior beyond a few periods into the future”. Above we argued that the complexity revolution was not be a revolution in the sense of an abandonment of previous work, but will be a set of developments that occur one technique at a time, which when looked back upon from a long enough perspective, will look like a revolution. The second paper in this section, “Visual Recurrence Analysis: Application to Economic Time Series” by Faggini, suggests one of those new techniques. In the paper Faggini argues that the existing linear and non-linear techniques of time series analysis are inadequate when considering chaotic phenomena. As a supplement to standard time series techniques he argues
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that Recurrence Plots can be a useful starting point for analyzing nonstationary sequences. In the paper he compares recurrence plots with classical approaches for analyzing chaotic data and detecting bifurcation. Such detection is necessary for deciding whether the standard pattern or one of the new complexity patterns is the pattern appropriate for policy analysis. The third paper in this part, “Complexity of Out-of-equilibrium Play in a Tax Evasion Game” by Lipatov, uses the same evolutionary framework that characterizes work in complexity, but combines it with more traditional economic models, specifically evolutionary game theory with learning, to model interactions among taxpayers in a tax evasion game. The paper expands on previous models of tax evasion, but adds an explicitly characterization of taxpayer interaction, which is achieved by using an evolutionary approach allowing for learning of individuals from each other. He argues that the dynamic approach to tax compliance games reopens many policy issues, and that as a building block for more general models, the evolutionary approach he provides can be used to consider policy issues.
Part III: Modeling Issues II - Using Models from Physics to Understand Economic Phenomena Part III is also about modeling, but is focus is on adapting models from physics to explain economic phenomena. The papers in this section explore various issues of modeling, demonstrating various mathematical techniques that are available to develop patterns that can then be related to observation to see if they provide a useful guide. The first paper in this section, “A New Stochastic Framework for Macroeconomics: Some Illustrative Examples” by Aoki, extends the Day’s argument, starting with the proposition that that the standard approach to microfoundations of macroeconomics is misguided, and that therefore we need a new stochastic approach to study macroeconomics. He discusses the stochastic equilibria and ultra metrics approaches that might be used to get at the problems, and how those approaches can provide insight into real world problems. He gives an example of how these approaches can explain Okun’s Law and Beveridge curves, and can demonstrate how they shift in response to macroeconomic demand policies. He also shows how these new tools can reveal some unexpected consequences of certain macroeconomic demand policies. The second paper in this part, “Probability of Traffic Violations and Risk of Crime: A Model of Economic Agent Behavior” by Mimkes, shows the relationship between models in physics and economic models. Specifi-
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cally he relates the system of traffic agents under constraint of traffic laws to correspond to atomic systems under constraint of energy laws, and to economic models of criminal behavior. He finds that the statistical Lagrange LeChatalier principle agrees with the results, and concludes by suggesting that “similar behavior of agents may be expected in all corresponding economic and social systems (situations) such as stock markets, financial markets or social communities” (p. 11). Muchnik and Solomon’s paper, “Markov Nets and the Nat Lab Platform: Application to Continuous Double Auction”, considers Markov Nets, which preserve the exclusive dependence of an effect even on the event directly causing it but makes no assumption on the time lapse separating them. These authors present a simulation platform (NatLab) that uses the Markov Net formalisms to make simulations that preserve the causal timing of events and consider it in the context of a continuous double auction market. Specifically, they collect preferred trading strategies from various subjects and simulate their interactions, determining the success of each trading strategy within the simulation. Arecchi, Meucci, Allaria, and Boccaletti’s paper “Synchronization in Coupled and Free Chaotic Systems”, examines the features of a system affected by heteroclinic chaos when subjected to small perturbations. They explore the mathematics of what happens when there is an intersection point between a stable and unstable manifold, which can create homoclinic tangles, causing systemic erratic behavior and sensitivity to initial conditions. The possibilities of such behavior should serve as a cautionary tale to policy makers who make policy relying on the existence of systemic stability.
Part IV: Agent Based Models Part IV considers agent based models, which differ from the models in the previous section in that they begin with specification of agent strategies and do not have any analytic solution, even in principle. Instead one allows agents with various strategies to interact in computer simulations and from those interactions one gains knowledge about the aggregate system. This allows the exploration of models in which the agents are assumed to have far less information and information processing capabilities than is generally required for analytic models. The first paper in this section, “Explaining Social and Economic Phenomena by Models with Low or Zero Cognition Agents” by Omerod, Trabatti, Glass, and Colbaugh, examines two socio-economic phenomena, the distribution of the cumulative size of economic recessions in the US
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and the distribution of the number of crimes committed by individuals. They show that the key macro-phenomena of these two systems can be accounted for by models in which agents have low or zero cognitive ability. They conclude by arguing that the likely explanation for the success of such simple models of low cognition agents in describing actual phenomena is the existence of institutions, which have evolved to enable even low cognition agents to arrive at good outcomes. The second paper, by Delre and Parisi, entitled “Information and Unionization in a Simulated Labor Market: A Computation Model of the Evolution for the Evolution of Workers and Firms”, uses a genetic algorithm in an agent-based model to consider the bargaining behavior of workers and firms, and how the behavior is likely to evolve over time. They consider the social interaction among workers when they are looking for a new job. They find that the value of information about job offers is higher when both firms and workers evolve than when only workers evolve. They also find that when workers are connected in social networks the value of information about job offers increases.
Part V: Applications Part V deals with applications of the broad complexity ideas to empirical evidence issues. The first paper entitled “Income Inequality, Corruption, and the Non-Observed Economy: A Global Perspective” by Ahmed, Rosser, and Rosser,extents their previous work that found a strong and robust positive relationship between income inequality and the size of the non-observed economy in a global data set. In this paper they find that the relationship between income inequality and the size of the non-observed economy carries over, and that the corruption index is also significantly related. However, the relationship between inflation and growth of the nonobserved economy does not carry over, nor does the relationship between higher taxes and the size of the nonobserved economy. The second paper, by McNelis and McAdam, entitled “Forecasting Inflation with Forecast Combinations: Using Neural Networks in Policy”, discusses the use of non linear models, which Granger and Jeon have called “thick models”. These non-linear models use split sample and bootstrap methods in inflation forecasting. They find that in many cases the thick models perform better than linear models for out-of-sample forecasting. They recognize that the approach is ad hoc, and advocate the thick model “as a sensible way to utilize alternative neural network specifications and ‘training methods”‘ in a ‘learning context.’” (p. 2)
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Part VI: Policy Issues The final three papers in the book deal with complexity and policy. In the first, “The Impossibility of an Effective Theory of Policy in a Complex Economy”, Velupillai discusses the problem of drawing policy from the complexity work. His starting point is papers by Duncan Foley (2000) and Brock and Colander (2000), who argue that complexity changes the way in which economists should think about applied policy. Velupillai agrees with much of their argument, but argues that it can be extended into a formal impossibility theorem - that ultimately there is an undecidablity of policy in a complex economy. In the second paper of this section, “Implications of Scaling Laws for Policy Makers”, Gallegati, Kirman, and Palestrini integrate some of the insights from Alan Kirman’s representative agent approach for economic policies with recent work discovering that some phenomena in economics can be described by scaling laws, and draw policy implications from that work. They hold that in order to stabilize in power law related processes in which a main source of aggregate fluctuations is idiosyncratic volatility, policies that control individual volatility can reduce aggregate fluctuations. They also argue that since firm size is descriptive of a power law relationship (Axtell), economic policies that reduce legal protection of intellectual property can help increase growth, that economic policies to reduce the concentration in the market can reduce aggregate fluctuations and that economic policies can be useful to control financial crises. The final paper, “Robust Control and Monetary Policy Delegation” by Diana and Sidiropoulos, considers “the robust control method of Hansen and Sargent” as a way of getting around model misspecification. They begin with Rogoff’s article on classic game theoretical model of monetary policy delegation, and put the argument into a robust control framework, which takes into account the uncertainty of policy, and hence the need to make sure the model is robust to different specifications. Doing so, they suggest that governments should be very hesitant to delegate monetary policy to a “conservative” central banker who would be concerned only with inflation.
June, 2006
David Colander Massimo Salzano
Contents
Part I General Issues Rationality, learning and complexity: from the Homo economicus to the Homo sapiens A. Vercelli ..………………………………………………………………..…… The Confused State of Complexity Economics: An Ontological Explanation E. Perona ...………………………………………………………………..…..
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Part II Modeling Issues I Modeling Economic Complexity The Complex Problem of Modeling Economic Complexity R. H. Day ...………………………………………………………………..…..
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Visual Recurrence Analysis: Application to Economic Time series M. Faggini ..……………………………………………………………………
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Complexity of Out-of-Equilibrium Play in Tax Evasion Game V. Lipatov .…………………………………………………………………….
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Part III Modeling Issues II Using Models from Physics to Understand Economic Phenomena A New Stochastic Framework for Macroeconomics: Some Illustrative Examples M. Aoki ..………………………………………………………...……………
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Probability of Traffic Violations and Risk of Crime - A Model of Economic Agent Behavior J. Mimkes ..………………………………………………………………….. 145
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Markov Nets and the NetLab Platform: Application to Continuous Double Auction L. Muchnik and S. Solomon ..……………………………………………... 157 Synchronization in Coupled and Free Chaotic Systems F.T. Arecchi, R. Meucci, E. Allaria, and S. Boccaletti ..…………………
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Part IV Agent Based Models Explaining Social and Economic Phenomena by Models with Low or Zero Cognition Agents P. Ormerod, M. Trabatti, K. Glass, and R. Colbaugh ..………………… 201 Information and Cooperation in a Simulated Labor Market: A Computational Model for the Evolution of Workers and Firms S. A. Delre and D. Parisi ..…………………………………………………
211
Part V Applications Income Inequality, Corruption, and the Non-Observed Economy: A Global Perspective E. Ahmed, J. B. Rosser, Jr., and M. V. Rosser ..……………………….. 233 Forecasting Inflation with Forecast Combinations: Using Neural Networks in Policy P. McNelis and P. McAdam ..…………………………………………….. 253
Part VI Policy Issues The Impossibility of an Effective Theory of Policy in a Complex Economy K. Vela Velupillai …………………………………………………………… 273 Implications of Scaling Laws for Policy-Makers M. Gallegati, A. Kirman, and A. Palestrini ..………………………………
291
Robust Control and Monetary Policy Delegation G. Diana and M. Sidiropoulos ..……………………………………………
303
List of Contributors
E. Ahmed
R. Colbaugh
James Madison University, Harrisonburg, USA
[email protected]
Department of Defense, Washington, USA
[email protected]
E. Allaria
R. H. Day
Dept. of Physics, Univ. of Firenze INOA Italy
[email protected]
University of Southern California, USA
[email protected]
M. Aoki
S. A. Delre
Department of Economics, University of California USA
[email protected]
Faculty of Management and Organization, University of Groningen, The Netherlands.
[email protected]
F.T. Arecchi
G. Diana
Dept. of Physics, Univ. of Firenze INOA Italy
[email protected]
BETA-Theme, University Louis Pasteur of Strasbourg France
[email protected]
S. Boccaletti
V. Lipatov
Dept. of Physics, Univ. of Firenze INOA Italy
[email protected]
Economics Department, European University Institute Italy
[email protected]
XXII
List of Contributors
M. Faggini
L. Muchnik
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche Università degli Studi di Salerno, Italy
[email protected]
Department of Physics, Bar Ilan University, Israel
[email protected]
M. Gallegati
P. Ormerod
Università Politecnica delle Marche Dipartimento di Economia, Italy
[email protected]
Volterra Consulting Ltd., London UK
[email protected]
K. Glass
A. Palestrini
National Center for Genome Resources, USA
[email protected]
University of Teramo Italy
[email protected]
A. Kirman
D. Parisi
Université Paul Cézanne (AixMarseille III), EHESS, Greqam-Idep, France
[email protected]
Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Italy
[email protected]
P. McAdam
E. Perona
DG-Research, European Central Bank Frankfurt am Main
[email protected]
Departamento de Economía, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba Espain
[email protected]
P. McNelis
J. B. Rosser, Jr.
Fordham University, USA
[email protected]
MSC 0204, James Madison University, USA
[email protected]
J. Mimkes
M. V. Rosser
Physics Department, University of Paderborn - Germany
[email protected]
MSC 0204, James Madison University, USA
[email protected]
R. Meucci
M. Sidiropoulos
Dept. of Physics, Univ. of Firenze – INOA, Italy riccardo.meucci&inoa.it
BETA-Theme, University Louis Pasteur of Strasbourg France
[email protected]
List of Contributors
XXIII
S. Solomon
K. Vela Velupillai
Racah Institute of Physics., The Hebrew University, Israel and Lagrange Interdisciplinary. Lab. for Excellence in Complexity, ISI, Italy
[email protected]
National University of Ireland, and Department of Economics, University of Trento,
[email protected]
M. Trabatti
A. Vercelli
National Center for Genome Resources, USA
[email protected]
Dipartimento di Politica Economica, Finanza e Sviluppo Italy
[email protected]
1
Part I
General Issues
3
____________________________________________________________
Rationality, learning and complexity: from the Homo economicus to the Homo sapiens1 A. Vercelli
1. Introduction Standard economics is based on methodological individualism but this does not imply that the individuals play a crucial role in its models. On the contrary, in such a theory the individual is deprived of authentic subjective characteristics and plays no sizeable role as genuine subject. The so called Homo economicus is just a signpost for given preferences that, however, are generally conceived as exogenous and invariant through time. Therefore, the genuine psychological features of the economic agent do not matter. In this chapter we intend to concentrate on the impact of cognitive psychology upon the economic behavior. Casual observation and experimental research suggest that cognitive psychology significantly affects expectations and learning that play a crucial role in many economic decisions. In standard economics, however, expectations and learning are conceived in such a way to make cognitive psychology altogether irrelevant. This essay —————— 1
A preliminary version of the ideas discussed in this chapter was presented at the Conference “Keynes, Knowledge and Uncertainty” held at the University of Leeds in 1996, and eventually published in its Proceedings (Vercelli, 2002). Successive versions have been presented on many occasions, including the annual Conference of Anpac (San Salvador de Bahia, December 2001), the annual conference of EAEPE (Siena, November 2001), the first meeting of the Italian Society of “Cognitive sciences” held in Rovereto in September 2002, the International World Congress of IEA held in Lisbon in September 2002, the conference on “Complex behavior in economics” held in Aix-en-Provence in May 2003. I thank very warmly the audiences of my presentations for the constructive comments.
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intends to clarify the reasons of this neglect and aims to suggest a way to reduce the chasm between economics and cognitive psychology. The crucial obstacle to be removed in order to close this gap is the very narrow notion of rationality entertained by standard economics, generally called “substantive rationality” following Simon (1982), that implies very restrictive notions of expectations formation and learning that deny any role for cognitive psychology. The straitjacket of substantive rationality is felt as suffocating by an increasing number of economists. Many of them are actively exploring new research avenues. There are basically two strategies: the progressive relaxation of some of the most constrictive assumptions of the standard approach in order to generalize it, or the search for a more satisfactory alternative approach2. As a consequence of this effort, recent advances in economic theory brought about many important insights in different specialized subfields of economics that go beyond the limits of substantive rationality. What is still missing is the coordination of these new insights in a fully-fledged economic paradigm able to replace the traditional paradigm based on substantive rationality. Having in mind this goal, this essay aims to individuate the main assumptions underlying the traditional paradigm and to classify the deviations from it in coherent alternative paradigms. Therefore, the conceptual backbone of the argument is a taxonomy of different notions of a few basic concepts that play a crucial role in economics: rationality, learning, expectations, uncertainty, time, and a few crucial ontological assumptions on the real economic world. This essay intends to show that between these notions there are relations of semantic congruence or incongruence having interpretive and normative implications. In particular, whenever it is necessary to take account of the complexity of economic behavior, and in particular of the impact of cognitive psychology on it, we cannot rely on the standard paradigm but we have to refer to alternative paradigms whose characteristics are specified in some detail in the following sections. The definitions of complexity vary according to the epistemic and ontological context of the analysis. Since the scope of the analysis that follows is rather broad, the argument is not based upon a unifying definition —————— 2
The dividing line between the two strategies is not always clear and is often more a matter of language than of substance. An apparently small change in an axiom of a theory may be enough to evoke a completely different conceptual world as in some recent contributions to decision theory under uncertainty, while what appears to be a radical change may turn out to be of secondary importance for the empirical application as in the case of the distinction between objectiveprobability and subjective-probability decision theory (see section 6).
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of complexity. The following discussion is developed at an intermediate level of abstraction relying on a taxonomy of different basic notions of a few crucial concepts that characterize economic analysis according to their degree of complexity. There is a clear relationship, however, between the concept of complexity here utilized and the analytic literature on complexity. The usual measures of complexity are syntactic, or computational, measures concerning the minimal number of logical steps, or amount of information, necessary to describe a certain system or to obtain a particular class of its transformations. We recall that the most popular measures of complexity refer to properties of linguistic systems, or dynamical systems, or computing machines and that there are quite strict correspondences between them (for a critical survey with special reference to economics, see Foley, 2001 and Albin, 2001). In each of these cases four basic levels of complexity are distinguished. In terms of dynamical systems the degree 1 of minimal complexity corresponds to stable linear systems having a unique equilibrium; the degree 2 to stable systems having a regular periodic attractor (such as a limit cycle); the level 3 to nonlinear systems characterized by chaotic behavior and monotonic propagation of a disturbance, and the level 4 by chaotic behavior and irregular propagation of a disturbance (ibidem). In this chapter, however, complexity is discussed from the semantic point of view, i.e. from the point of view of the correspondence and the interaction between the degree of complexity of the objective system that we intend to describe or forecast and their subjective representation through models or expectations. This semantic approach clarifies that standard economics applies, under further limiting conditions, only if the degree of complexity does not exceed the level 2 of complexity. In order to take account of higher levels of complexity more advanced approaches based on more sophisticated concepts of rationality and learning are required. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic framework of the analysis centered on the interaction between subject and object in economics that is characterized by different concepts of rationality, learning and expectations. In this section the usual specification of standard economics based on substantive rationality is clarified in its inner logic. In section 3 more general concepts of rationality are introduced (procedural and designing rationality) in order to overcome the strictures of substantive rationality. In section 4 the relationship between expectations, learning and rationality is further spelled out. In section 5 more general concepts of learning are introduced to cope with the more general concepts of rationality introduced before, and their economic value is assessed and compared in qualitative terms. In section 6 the implications of different ontological assumptions concerning the nature of uncertainty, the
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irreversibility of time, and the nature of the “world” are clarified. In section 7 the correspondences between the different versions of the keyconcepts examined in the preceding sections are discussed and their normative implications are made explicit. Concluding remarks follow.
2. The interaction between subject and object and the strictures of substantive rationality The subject may be defined only in relation to the object. Therefore the analysis of the subjective features of economic behavior must start from a representation of the interaction between subject and object in economics, i.e. the interaction between the economic agent and the economic system (that for the sake of brevity is called in this essay just the Interaction). According to the usual conceptualization of the Interaction, that is shared by most economists, the economic agent is characterized by a set of preferences, an initial endowment of resources and a set of options each of which leads to well-specified outcomes for each possible state of the economic system (i.e. the “world” under investigation). Whenever the economic agent has to face an inter-temporal decision problem she chooses the best possible option according to her preferences and an objective function on the basis of her preferences and her expectations on the future values of the key variables that affect the value of the objective function. These expectations are based on a “model”, i.e. on a representation as accurate as possible, of the part of the “world” that is relevant for the decision problem. In this chapter the epistemic and ontological properties of the Interaction are sharply distinguished in order to study their mutual impact. The ontological properties of the “world” are defined as properties of the economic system that are considered “true” regardless of their epistemic representation, while the epistemic properties of the “model” are provisionally entertained by a subject as representation of the corresponding ontological properties but are liable to be revised and corrected to represent them better. The divergence between an ontological property and its epistemic representation is here defined as stochastic error when it depends exclusively on exogenous shocks, and systematic error when it depends on some intrinsic bias of the representation (e.g. a different value of one parameter of the probability distribution). Within this conceptual framework, learning is defined as the epistemic process directed to reduce, and possibly to eliminate, the systematic errors, while rationality may be defined essentially as ability to learn. The feed-back between rationality and learning is crucial in determining the economic behavior of decision makers and is therefore
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at the center of what follows. The Interaction as here represented is deceivingly simple since it involves a crucial self-referential loop of the economic agent whose behavior is part of the world that has to described and predicted and affects it through its representations and expectations (see Fig.1). This awkward circle partially overlaps with what the philosophers call the “hermeneutic circle” (see, e.g., Gadamer, 1960) whose solution is very controversial and divides the analytic school from the continental school. Also in economics the way in which the Interaction is conceived and modeled is crucial in classifying the economic theories and assessing their capability to represent, predict and control complex economic behavior. The dynamic decision problem, as defined above, may give determinate results only by imposing some more structure to it. This role is played by the assumption that the agent is rational from both the epistemic (or cognitive) and pragmatic (or practical) point of view in a specific sense that must be accurately defined and modeled. According to the standard point of view, the epistemic rationality is specified as ability to avoid systematic errors. In a deterministic decision problem, this implies that the agent has perfect foresight. In a stochastic decision problem the above condition implies that the agent has rational expectations which by definition avoid any sort of systematic errors. In a deterministic model the value expected is the correct one, while in a stochastic model the subjective probability distribution of the forecast coincides with the “objective” or “true” probability distribution. As for pragmatic rationality, it is assumed that no systematic errors are made in the execution of the decision so that, under these assumptions that involve the stationarity of the real world, the maximization of the objective function translates in its effective maximization so that the absence of systematic errors ex ante translates in the absence of systematic mistakes ex post. In this view the subjective characteristics of the economic agent are irrelevant, since the model (and therefore the expectations based on it) is by definition “true” in the sense that the subjective representation of the world “coincides” with its objective features. It is true that the preferences of the decision maker play a crucial role in the choice of the option that maximizes the objective function, but this does not involve any role for the psychological characteristics of the agent. Preferences should express, by definition, subjective features of the individual, i.e. her tastes, but in the standard approach they are exogenous and given, exactly as the initial endowment of resources. Moreover, self-interest is the only motivation taken into account, completely neglecting different motivations such as altruism, or equity or solidarity, whose role in the real world is confirmed by massive empirical evidence and extensive experimental work. Finally, even
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cognitive psychology has no role to play within the assumptions of substantive rationality, since the economic agent is assumed to base her choices on the “true” model of the real world and is endowed of perfect foresight or its equivalent in an uncertain world: rational expectations. Learning does not completely disappear but in this context it keeps only a very trivial role: the updating of the information set as soon as new observed values of the relevant variables occur. This role does not involve, however, an influence of the subjective cognitive features of the agent as it could be performed by a computer that collects in real time all the relevant news to update the information set that is relevant for the decision problem, exactly as a seismograph does with earthquakes. We may conclude that within the framework of standard economics the psychological features of the agent are altogether neglected and this is in particular true with its cognitive aspects. SUBJECT EXPECTATIONS: predictive systematic errors
MODEL:
DECISIONS:
cognitive systematic errors
ex ante pragmatic systematic errors
CONSEQUENCES: ex post pragmatic systematic errors
OBJECT Fig. 1: The Interaction between rationality and learning
Under the assumptions of substantive rationality, thus, the Interaction is described by a dynamic process that is assumed to be always in equilibrium. In the absence of systematic errors ex post there is no reason to revise the model of the world and the expectations based on it. Since the axiom of intertemporal coherence that is crucial in the definition of substantive rationality assures that the preferences of the agent do not change through time, the agent makes the same choices in the same circumstances and the Interaction settles in a stationary equilibrium.
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9
3. More general concepts of rationality The advantage of substantive rationality is that within its assumptions we may, indeed we have to, assume equilibrium and this greatly simplifies the analysis of the economic behavior permitting the systematic application of sophisticated formalization that leads to determinate results (Vercelli, 1991). The trouble is that the same axioms restrict the scope of legitimate application to a closed, simple and familiar world, i.e. to problems that are well known and are characterized by stationarity, trivial uncertainty, and irrelevance of the psychological and cognitive features of the agent. This has been recognized long ago by economists dissatisfied with the standard approach. Schumpeter (1921) clarified that the standard approach applies to the circular flow characterized by routine economic behavior but is unable to analyze development characterized by non-stationarity, innovation and radical uncertainty. Keynes (1936) clarified that the axioms of the standard approach are like the axioms of Euclidean geometry that cannot be legitimately applied to a non-Euclidean world, i.e. whenever hard uncertainty and structural instability play a crucial role as is typical in a monetary economy. Simon (1982) further clarified the crucial role played by the concept of rationality of standard economics, called by him “substantive rationality”, in narrowing its empirical scope and suggested a more general concept, called “procedural rationality”, borrowed from cognitive psychology. This concept became immediately so successful that we do not need to expand on it. What is important to emphasize is that the concept of procedural rationality allows the analysis of the dynamic process that describes the Interaction also from the point of view of disequilibrium. Whenever a systematic error ex post is detected by the agent, the model of the world is revised in order to correct the expectations and to eliminate, or at least to reduce, the size of the error. From this more general point of view the equilibrium of the process does not need to imply a complete absence of systematic errors. According to the criterion suggested by Simon, the dynamic process of learning may stop as soon as the size of errors becomes small enough to be satisficing. A further attempt to eliminate the residual errors in a situation characterized by limited information and bounded rationality could in the average imply more economic and psychological costs than benefits. The dynamic process of learning so conceived does not need to be linear and may be complex. In particular the equilibrium may depend on the initial conditions and on the path actually followed. In this view substantive rationality may be seen as a special case of procedural rationality as it focuses exclusively on a particular equilibrium characterized by the absence of systematic errors to which the process of learning could
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converge under a series of restrictive assumptions: linearity of the process of learning, no cost of transaction and of learning itself, weak or “soft” uncertainty (see section 6), and unbounded rationality. This generalization, however, is still limited if it expresses the process of passive adaptation of the agent to a given environment. In this view the agent is option-taker in the sense that cannot alter the set of options of which she is endowed to begin with. Biologists tell us that the adaptation of the Homo sapiens to the environment is obtained also by adapting the environment to her needs. This is almost altogether absent in the other living species and, in any case, was progressively developed in the course of evolution of this particular species to degrees unimaginable by other living beings, including the other primates. While animal rationality is purely adaptive, the Homo sapiens developed a peculiar kind of rationality that became progressively more and more proactive. The reciprocal adaptation of man to the environment is seeked on the basis of a project or design that may be updated or revised according to its success. For this reason we may call “designing” this more general concept of rationality (Vercelli, 1991). The agent is in this case also option-maker in the sense that she is endowed of creativity that allows her to introduce new options made possible by advances in scientific research and technology. Human rationality therefore re-acquires the specific features that distinguish our species from the others, features that are completely neglected by substantive rationality and, to some extent, also by adaptive procedural rationality3. The latter may be considered as a limiting case of designing rationality when the set of options is given and invariant.
Expectations, learning and rationality Coming back to the Interaction, after the implementation of the option chosen the economic agent observes its consequences. Whenever she ascertains the absence of systematic errors ex post, as by definition in the case of substantive rationality, there is no reason to revise the model and the expectations based on it apart from their updating. Therefore, in this case, the Interaction repeats itself unchanged apart from the exogenous drift induced by updating. In other words, substantive rationality focuses exclusively on the equilibrium path of the Interaction. This point of view is —————— 3
Some advocates of procedural rationality give a broader definition that encompasses what we have called here designing rationality. In this case, to avoid confusion, we may distinguish between adaptive and designing procedural rationality.
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reasonable and productive to the extent that we are able to provide dynamic foundations to it by showing that such an equilibrium is stable and that the convergence to it is sufficiently rapid, otherwise the scope of the theory and of its applications would be very limited. For this reason an extensive literature started long ago at least from the study of the tâtonnement by Walras (1774), in order to study the stability of the general equilibrium. The results have been on the whole quite discomforting. As is well known, the stability of a Walrasian general equilibrium requires quite demanding conditions4. In particular the convergence to the substantiverationality equilibrium crucially depends on the process of learning of selfinterested rational agents pursuing the maximization of the objective function that is assumed to obtain in the position of equilibrium. In order to clarify the relation between rationality, learning and expectations let us express their analytical relation. We start from the deterministic case that prevailed in economic theory until the 1960s. In this case, the prevailing paradigm may be expressed through the following difference equation: xt – xt-1 = a [ T(xt-1) – xt-1 ] + kt
(1)
where xt is the expectations of a certain variable that describes the behavior of the “world”, T(xt) designates the effective behavior of such a variable that is affected by its expectations, while kt is an exogenous variable that affects the dynamics of the endogenous variable and its expectations5. The dynamics of the expectations depends on two terms. The first one, a [T(xt-1) – x t-1 ], describes the endogenous dynamics of the interaction between the subject who formulates the expectations and the economic system. The endogenous dynamics depends on what we have called the systematic error observed ex post: T(xt-1) – xt-1. Whenever the endogenous dynamics is stable, i.e. the systematic error tends to zero, we have genuine learning and convergence towards the equilibrium path of the interaction. The exogenous dynamics determined by the second term kt specifies the —————— 4
This difficulty was already fairly clear in Samuelson (1947). Later on Scarf (1960) provided precise examples of plausible trading processes failing to exhibit global stability. Sonnenschein (1973) proved that under the usual assumptions about consumer preferences and behaviour even quasi-global stability cannot be assured. This result was confirmed and extended by subsequent papers. A recent brief survey on this literature may be found in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995). 5 This equation may be easily generalized by assuming that the variables represented are vectors of variables.
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nature of the equilibrium path that is stationary when the exogenous term is stationary and mobile whenever it is a function of time. When the first term describing the endogenous dynamics of the interaction is systematically zero we have the case of perfect foresight that in a deterministic environment, by definition, is the only case fully consistent with substantive rationality. However, since perfect foresight is a very demanding assumption for applied economics, in the 1960s an alternative hypothesis of expectations formations, called adaptive expectations, became hegemonic (Cagan, 1956). The reason of its success rested on its capacity to deal, to some extent, with the existence of systematic errors and genuine learning. Notwithstanding the high sophistication reached by this literature, the idea was very simple and was constrained in such a way to avoid to challenge the paradigm of substantive rationality but only to add realism to it. It was assumed that a rational agent is able to learn so that the parameter a is always in the range of values that assure dynamic stability. The endogenous part, moreover, is assumed to be relevant for the short period (business cycle) while the exogenous part, fully consistent with the axioms of substantive rationality, was considered to be the center of attraction of the system always prevailing in the long period (growth). In addition, the linear specification of equation (1) that excludes complex dynamics is crucial as it assures that the equilibrium path is not affected by the disequilibrium dynamics. Therefore a sort of hierarchy was established between equilibrium dynamics that describes, so to say, the “essence” of the economic dynamics and the study of the deviations from it that are assumed to be fairly small and rapidly vanishing in consequence of the capacity of genuine learning attributed to rational agents. Therefore the substantive-rationality paradigm was somehow saved as gravity center of the economy, while the introduction of disequilibrium dynamics was just meant to confer to it some more realism. The paradigm of adaptive expectations broke down at the end of the 1960s, for a series of reasons that have to do both with the history of facts (stagflation) and the history of ideas. On this occasion we only mention, very briefly, a few crucial reasons related to the latter6. The adaptive expectations paradigm was consistent with the idea, prevailing until the late 1960s, that economic equilibrium needed sound dynamic foundations. This was fully recognized by Walras (1774) who tried himself to solve the problem by studying the process of tâtonnement. An important breakthrough came with the Ph.d thesis of Samuelson who for the first time was able to suggest quite comprehensive dynamic foundations to general equi—————— 6
For some hints to the role of the history of facts see Vercelli (2003).
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librium theory (see Samuelson, 1947). This approach inspired many economists in the two following decades and is clearly at the background of the success of adaptive expectations. In the meantime, in consequence of the axiomatization suggested by Debreu (1959), a new point of view emerged in economic theory according to which (general) equilibrium theory did not need dynamic foundations but only axiomatic foundations (Ingrao-Israel, 1990). In this view, the latter assure in the best possible way the logical consistency of the theory while its empirical validity is best assessed by statistic and econometric tests so that dynamic foundations seem unnecessary. From the point of view of the axiomatic foundations of general equilibrium theory the adaptive expectations hypothesis is clearly unacceptable because the existence of systematic mistakes involved by such hypothesis are logically inconsistent with the axioms of the theory (in particular that of intertemporal independence or “sure thing principle”). From the logical point of view, their alleged small size and vanishing nature are hardly an acceptable excuse. In the meantime, in the same circle of economists and mathematicians, a fully-fledged theory of general equilibrium under uncertainty was elaborated (Arrow, 1953; Arrow-Hahn, 1971). This permitted a stochastic interpretation of equation (1) that seemed to provide a different and better solution. The equilibrium was then described in terms of probability distributions of the relevant variables so that it does not exclude the possibility of ex post errors provided that they are not systematic (see, e.g., Begg, 1982). This adds to the realism of the substantiverationality interpretation of the Interaction. In the meantime a new hypothesis of expectations formations was suggested in the literature that turned out to be fully consistent with this view: the rational expectations hypothesis (Muth, 1961). According to this hypothesis, the rational agent is assumed to be always able to avoid systematic errors by predicting their expected value, in the mathematical sense, given the probability distribution of the variable under the assumption that the subjective distribution of this variable always coincides with its objective distribution (Begg, 1982). Clearly in this view there is no room for genuine learning. The only kind of learning consistent with, indeed necessary to, this view is the “real-time updating” of the information set that assures the persistent and continuous absence of systematic mistakes. The issue of equilibrium stability, however, did not disappear because if the logical possibility of disequilibrium is not excluded, one needs to know if there are sound reasons for focusing on it. In particular, a literature developed on the stability of rational expectations equilibrium. We may distinguish two basic streams based on the study of expectational stability or on the study of learning rules. The first stream based on contributions by Lucas (1978, section 6), DeCanio (1979), and Evans (1983), ultimately
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(see Evans and Honkapohja, 1990) refer to the following difference equation xt – xt-1 = a [ T(xt-1) – xt-1 ]
(2)
that is nothing but the equation (1) without considering the exogenous factor that by definition does not affect the stability of the system. This equation is meant to describe a stylized process of learning which occurs in ‘notional’ time t, that determines a progressive reduction in the gap between the dynamics of expectations xt and the effective dynamics T (xt), which is a function of perceived dynamics. The dynamics of expectations is a function of the systematic ex post errors defined by T (xt) - xt. Actual learning implies a process of convergence towards the rational expectations equilibrium. Notice that, as soon as this equilibrium is effectively reached, the systematic errors vanish and the process of genuine learning stops. The second stream focuses on the study of the learning rules in real time and is based on contributions by Bray (1982), Bray and Savin (1986), Fourgeaud, Gourieroux, and Pradel (1986), Marcet and Sargent (1989 a and b), and Woodford (1990). Learning rules are expressed in terms of approximation algorithms (in particular recursive least squares, and recursive ARMA estimations). Also in this case, the learning process may be expressed through a dynamic equation which is a function of the systematic ex post mistakes. For example, the seminal model by Bray (1982) may be expressed by the following stochastic approximation algorithm: ßt = ßt-1 + (1/t)[pt-1 - ßt-1]
(3)
where pt is the effective price at time t and ßt is the expectation of pt+1 which is equal by hypothesis to the average of realized prices. Also in this case, the dynamics of expectations depends exclusively on the ex post systematic errors, which are expressed in equation (3) by the term inside square brackets (i.e. by the deviation of the last observation from the average of past values)7. Also in this case, the dynamic process of learning stops only if the ex post systematic errors are fully corrected, that is as soon as the rational expectations equilibrium is reached. The rational expectations hypothesis implies that the economic agent is not allowed to make systematic errors ex post: therefore genuine learning, i.e. correction —————— 7
Marcet and Sargent (1989a) proved that the limiting behavior of ß can be analyzed by the following differential equation: (d/dt)ß = a + (b - 1)ß which is stable for b < 1. The right-hand side of the differential equation can be redefined by the difference T(ß)-ß, where T(ß)=a+b(ß), which expresses the ex post systematic error in expectations (see Sargent, 1993, n.2, p. 88).
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of systematic errors is inconceivable in any theory or model based upon this hypothesis. On the contrary, the process of convergence towards the rational expectations equilibrium, which can be considered as a process of genuine learning, would imply that, while the agent is learning, she is not allowed to form her expectations on the basis of the rational expectations hypothesis. Therefore, whether the learning process converges or not towards a rational expectations equilibrium, this literature proves the inconsistency between rational expectations and genuine learning. The only kind of learning really consistent with rational expectations is the trivial process of real-time updating of the realizations of the relevant stochastic variables, which by hypothesis does not affect the parameters of the stochastic processes involved. The way out from the above dilemma should be seeked by elaborating alternative hypothesis of expectations formation that do not rule out the ubiquity of systematic errors and the crucial role of genuine learning in correcting them. To proceed in this direction, the tradition of adaptive expectations could be rescued and consistently developed within the assumptions of broader concepts of rationality. This may be done by eliminating the constraints introduced to comply with the axioms of substantive rationality. In this different framework, the criticisms leveled against adaptive expectations from the point of view of substantive rationality loose their logical strength. In particular, the resting points of the dynamical system do not need to be unique, may be path-dependent and could be reached in a finite, possibly short, time as soon as the perceived marginal costs of learning (plus transition costs) exceeds its perceived marginal advantages in the light of the awareness of bounded rationality. In this case the possible persistence of systematic errors becomes fully consistent with economic logic. In addition, the process of revision of expectations does not need to be backward looking as in the traditional specification of the adaptive expectations hypotheses. The announcement of a change in the policy environment leads the bounded-rational agent to re-define instantaneously the resting points of the system complying with the criterion of satisficing. This may determine a shift of behavior similar to that occurring in the hypothesis of rational expectations that, however, is in general unlikely to eliminate the systematic errors and to stop the process of genuine learning. In addition, from the point of view of designing rationality, expectations may be pro-active in the sense that their influence on future events may be taken into account in order to realize a pro-active adaptation to the environment modified according to a rational design.
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4. Concepts of learning and their economic value In the light of the preceding analysis we may explore which is the economic value of the different concepts of learning within the different concepts of rationality. To this end a preliminary clarification of the concept of learning is needed. There are different concepts of learning in the economic literature. Their common denominator may be expressed in the following way. Let’s define Ωt as the information set at time t, t-nΩ t as the ‘information flow’ in the time spell going from t-n to t, so that: Ωt-n ∪
t-nΩt
= Ωt
(4)
For the sake of simplicity we assume, as is usual, that no loss of information is possible (for a memory failure or a breakdown in the systems of information storage, and so on). Therefore: Ωt-n ⊆ Ωt,
(5)
that is the stock of information, or information set, cannot shrink throughout time. On the basis of these premises, it is possible to say that there has been effective learning in the relevant period, whenever Ωt-n ⊂ Ωt,
(6)
that is the information set at the beginning of the period turns out to be a proper subset of the information set at the end of the period. The simplest concept of learning that complies with the general definition (6) is the updating of the information set that is obtained simply by adding the most recent values of the relevant deterministic variables, or realizations of the relevant stochastic variables, to the information set: Ωt-1 ∪
t-1Ωt
= Ωt,
t-1Ωt
≠ Ø.
(7)
We define “real-time updating” the instantaneous updating that occurs without involving any sort of time lag between the occurrence of the new events and their registration in the information set. This simplistic and demanding concept of learning is the only concept of learning consistent with substantive rationality. In fact the other concepts of learning, including noninstantaneous updating, would involve the existence of systematic errors that are excluded by definition under the assumptions of substantive rationality. A lag in updating would induce the rational agent to formulate mistaken expectations and therefore to make sub-optimal choices. This is excluded by the assumption of unbounded rationality intrinsic in substantive rationality that implies a complete set of relevant information always updated in real time. Therefore real-time updating is not only consistent with substantive rationality but also a necessary condition of it. Real-time
Rationality, learning and complexity
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updating, however, is just assumed not explained. In order to provide behavioral foundations to it, we have to consider the full dynamics of the Interaction without restricting its analysis to its equilibrium values. The new events shift, generally speaking, the equilibrium of the process. Therefore a lag in the updating of the information set would induce a pragmatic error that would lead to lower than expected wealth. There is an economic incentive, thus, to update immediately the information set by eliminating the cognitive error and the ensuing pragmatic error. The value v of updating from t-1 to t, t-1Ωt , is given by: v ( t-1Ωt ) = max u (xi|Ωt) – max u (xi|Ωt-1)
(8)
where xi ε X is an option belonging to the set of options X. This value is in general positive, unless the new information is redundant, as in the case of the average values of stationary variables. This implies the paradox that real-time updating is a necessary condition of substantive rationality but has no value since it applies legitimately only to stationary processes. Therefore substantive rationality remains without any economic foundations within its own assumptions. As we have recalled before, a possible way out has been explored since long and became hegemonic in the 1960s and early 1970s, under the name of “adaptive expectations”, just before the rational expectations revolution (Cagan, 1956). In this case, the existence of systematic errors is admitted and their correction mechanism is formalized in such a way to assume convergence, although only asymptotic, towards the substantive-rationality equilibrium. The hypothesis of adaptive expectations is patently inconsistent with substantive rationality as it describes a mechanism of correction of systematic errors the very existence of which is denied by the assumptions underlying substantive rationality. This hypothesis, however, was utilized in such a way to conceal this contradiction by assuming that the dynamics in disequilibrium (adaptive expectations learning) could not affect the equilibrium dynamics, being relevant only in the short term (business cycles) but not in the long term (growth). This compromise gave a role, though limited to the short period, to genuine learning, i.e. correction of systematic errors, without challenging the ultimate validity of substantive rationality (at least in the long period), but only at the expense of logical consistency. The systematic errors converge only asymptotically to substantive rationality equilibrium and therefore do not disappear in the long period as required by the above compromise. Eventually in the 1970s the requirement of logical consistency and analytic simplicity prevailed sweeping away the hypothesis of adaptive expectations in favor of the rational expectations hypothesis that is fully consistent with the hypothesis of substantive rationality (Muth, 1961). In the case of rational expectations, by definition, the economic agent does
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not make systematic errors, neither ex ante nor ex post. Systematic ex ante errors are excluded by the assumption that the agent makes an optimal forecast conditional to the information set. Ex post errors are by definition non-systematic, since they are neither correlated nor auto-correlated, nor do they show any bias, as is implied by the assumption that the subjective probability distribution coincides with the ‘objective’ probability distribution (see e.g. Begg, 1982). However logical consistency is obtained at the cost of giving up the analysis of genuine learning and leaving the hypothesis of rational expectations and the assumptions of substantive rationality without any economic foundations, since this sort of issues can be discussed only within the assumptions of a more general concept of rationality. The assumption of adaptive expectations itself may be rescued and properly developed within the assumptions of procedural rationality. In this case there is no reason to assume that the process of learning converges towards the substantive-rationality equilibrium. It may stop before, whenever the psychological and economic costs of learning exceed the benefits of the expected improvement. In this context, there is no logical reason of neglecting the psychological factors. The assumptions of procedural rationality allow a serious analysis of genuine learning, i.e. of the effective mechanism of correction of systematic errors, taking account of cognitive psychology and other aspects of human subjectivity. A lot of experimental work was pursued from this perspective confirming that economic agents often do not comply with the tenets of substantive rationality, but so far no general theory of learning emerged from this research. In this essay we limit ourselves to show that, only by assuming a concept of rationality more general than that of substantive rationality we may analyze the economic role of genuine learning. As we have seen learning, conceived as updating, has an economic value as it assures optimization through time. However, this very weak concept of learning, the only one consistent with substantive rationality, cannot justify any change in the intertemporal strategy of the decision maker, that may be justified only by the discovery and elimination of systematic errors. We may conclude that updating does not have any strategic value. As was hinted at before, learning may have a strategic economic value because it permits the exploitation of new information in order to substitute a more profitable strategy for the existing strategy8. In slightly more formal terms, it is possible that, in the light of the new, larger, information set induced by strategic learning, at time t+n a new strategy is discovered —————— 8
This definition of strategic learning intends to ‘capture’ its economic motivations and not to exclude further, and perhaps more important, motivations.
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19
whose expected value v(t+nst+h | Ωt+n) exceeds that of the old strategy, chosen at time t, recalculated in the light of the new information set: v(tst+h | Ω t+n) . Therefore the value of strategic learning from t to t+n, tVt+n, as assessed at time t+n, may be defined as the difference between the value of the optimal strategy at time t+n, in the light of the new enlarged information set, and the value of the optimal strategy chosen at time t and reassessed at time t+n: tVt+n = v(t+nst+h | Ωt+n) - v(tst+h | Ωt+n)
≥ 0.
(9)
Generally speaking, this value is not negative because the updated information set may offer new opportunities which were non-existent or unclear before. However, in order to calculate the net value of strategic learning, it is necessary to take into account the costs cl associated with learning (such as the cost for the acquisition of new information). Therefore, the net value of strategic learning V’, neglecting the subscripts for simplicity, may be defined in the following way: V’ = V-cl
(10)
A positive net value of strategic learning in an uncertain and open world, is a sufficient economic motivation for implementing it. However, in order to justify a change in strategy, we have to take into account also the transition costs ci (such as the transaction costs) associated with it. Generally speaking, the new optimal strategy will be implemented only when V’ > ci.
(11)
The reason for distinguishing (10) from (11) depends on the fact that, by assumption, the outcome of strategic learning has been defined as a permanent acquisition while the transition costs are contingent; therefore, when the (11) is not currently satisfied, it cannot be excluded that a fall in the transition costs will justify a change in strategy in the future. It is important to emphasize that strategic learning implies the possibility of systematic errors ex post (not necessarily ex ante, whenever the existing information is efficiently utilized). In the absence of systematic errors ex post, learning would be deprived of any strategic value and would become meaningless, at least from the economic point of view. This is the case of perfect foresight and rational expectations. So far we have considered strategic learning from the point of view of procedural rationality as adaptation to a world that is open since it is characterized by the emergence of new states which, however, does not depend by a conscious design of the agents. In this case learning is a genuine addition of knowledge on the world and its evolution, but the set of options is
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not modified by the conscious will of the decision maker who is assumed to be, so to say, option-taker. From the point of view of designing rationality the creativity of the Homo sapiens, missing in the Homo economicus of the standard approach, becomes crucial. The biologists maintain that the Homo sapiens is the only living species that adapts to the environment not only passively but also pro-actively, i.e. by modifying it. Therefore in this view the economic agent has to be considered as option-maker in the sense that she is able to add new elements to the option set based on a design of modification of the world. In this case the value of strategic learning is potentially higher since it permits the discovery of a better strategy in the light not only of a better knowledge of the world and its evolution but also of the growing extension of the option set Xt: tV’t+n =
v(t+nst+h | Xt+n U Ωt+n) - v(tst+h | XtU Ωt+n) – ci.
(12)
This relation clarifies that from the point of view of designing rationality the strategic value of learning is higher than from the point of view of procedural rationality since the Homo sapiens learns not only to adapt better to a changing world but also, for a given world, to extend the set of options in order to find a better one. This reflects, and motivates, the increasing capacity of the economic agent to innovate the technological, organizational and institutional processes in which she is involved.
5. Ontological assumptions and decision theory under uncetainty The subject, in our case the economic agent, defines herself and her objectives in relation to the perceived features of the environment, or “world”, in which she lives and happens to operate. Therefore the assumptions formulated on the relevant characteristics of the world are crucial in determining the behavior o the economic agents and should be accurately analyzed by the economists who observe, interpret and forecast it. We intend to examine these neglected aspects of economic methodology from the point of view of decision theory. We may say that the ultimate foundations of standard economic theory, that adheres to methodological individualism, rely on decision theory. This is self-evident in microeconomics that is often nothing but decision theory applied to specific economic problems of individuals, or – by extension – families or firms. When the strategic interaction between single decisionmakers is studied, the foundations are based on game theory that, however, is nothing but an extension of decision theory to this field. As for macroeconomic theory, a branch refers to a representative agent whose behavior
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21
is explained and predicted on the basis of standard microeconomic theory and thus ultimately on standard decision theory. Another branch that emphasizes the importance of disaggregation, stresses the crucial role of foundations in terms of general equilibrium theory. However general equilibrium models need in their turn microeconomic foundations. These have been suggested in terms of game theory and therefore, ultimately, of decision theory. Even the branches of macroeconomics that do not accept methodological individualism often tried to provide foundations in terms of a different variety of decision theory whose different assumptions falsify the assertions of standard theory and justify alternative theoretical assertions (a case in point is Shackle who elaborated a non-standard decision theory as foundations of a non-standard interpretation of Keynesian economics: see Shackle, 1952). Mainstream economic theory may claim solid foundations in standard decision theory. The analysis of these foundations is illuminating since the axioms of standard decision theory clarify under which conditions mainstream macroeconomic theory may be considered as well founded. We may thus assess its empirical scope and limitations. As is well known, there are basically two varieties of standard decision theory, the objectivist theory suggested by Morgenstern and Von Neumann (1944), and the subjectivist theory, often called Bayesian, suggested by Savage (1954) who built upon previous work by De Finetti9. Since these theories are axiomatized, it is possible to study in a rigorous way their theoretical and empirical scope. They are apparently very different, since the first one is based on a frequentist concept of probability while the second one on a personalist (or subjectivist) concept. As for their scope, textbooks typically claim that the objectivist theory applies when the probabilities are “known” as in the case of roulette, while the Bayesian theory when they are “unknown” as in the case of a horse race. However their axioms and ontological implications are almost identical (Vercelli, 1999). Both theories refer to a world that is familiar to the decision maker in the sense that the optimal adaptation to it has already happened (Lucas, 1981). In addition, such a world is closed in the sense that the decision maker knows the complete list of its possible states, and of her possible options, and she knows which are exactly the consequences of each of her choices for each possible state of the world. These assumptions make sense only if the world is stationary and time is unimportant so that genuine innovations and unexpected structural change are excluded. In both cases the crucial —————— 9
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) suggested a sort of synthesis of the two basic varieties. The discussion of the latter applies also to this stream of literature.
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axiom, called “axiom of independence” in the Morgenstern-von Neumann case or “sure-thing principle” in Bayesian theory, ensures intertemporal coherence and absence of systematic errors, guarantying the substantive rationality of the decision maker through time. Moreover, both theories may consider only a very weak kind of uncertainty, which may be called “soft uncertainty”, such that the beliefs of the decision maker may be expressed by a unique fully-reliable additive probability distribution. Under these assumptions it is natural to adopt a decision criterion based on the maximization, respectively, of expected utility or subjective expected utility. On the contrary, the more general concepts of rationality and learning sketched above are inconsistent with the tenets of standard decision theory. However, alternative decision theories have been suggested in recent times in order to explain non-standard behavior in an open and non-stationary world. These theories assume more general measures of uncertainty such as non-additive probabilities (Schmeidler, 1982, Gilboa, 1987), multiple probabilities (Ellsberg, 1961, Gärdenfors and Sahlin, 1982, Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), fuzzy measures (Zadeh, 1965; Ponsard, 1986), and so on (see Vercelli, 1999a, for a more detailed survey). They may be called theories of decision under “hard uncertainty” to stress that the beliefs of decision makers may be represented only by a non-additive probability distribution or by a plurality of additive distributions none of which may be considered as fully reliable. The non-additivity of the probability distribution reflects uncertainty aversion, i.e. the awareness that in an open and non-stationary world relevant unforeseen, and unforeseeable, contingencies may occur. Although both standard decision theories have a well developed intertemporal version, even in these versions time is substantially unimportant. The decision maker chooses in the first period an optimal intertemporal strategy contingent to future states of the world (Kreps, 1988, p.190). In order to comply with the axioms of the theory that assume intertemporal coherence, this strategy cannot be revised in the subsequent periods (Epstein and Le Breton, 1993). Therefore these theories can be applied only to a closed and stationary world. In fact the standard approach is unable, by definition, to take into account the influence that a certain choice may have on the future ‘states of nature’ (which is forbidden by the Savage definition of states of nature)10, on future uncertainty (which would imply the analysis of ‘endogenous uncertainty’, while only exogenous uncertainty is —————— 10
According to Savage, the states of nature describe the evolution of the environment and are independent of the actions of the agents.
Rationality, learning and complexity
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considered)11 and future choice sets (to analyze intertemporal flexibility preference which cannot even be defined in the standard approach)12. For the reasons mentioned above, the Von Neumann-Morgenstern and Savage theories of decision-making under uncertainty cannot be applied to a genuine process of learning, since in this case many of their crucial assumptions and conclusions become implausible. In particular the existence of systematic errors is inconsistent with the axiom of independence (or “sure-thing” in Bayesian theory). In addition, in order to violate the ‘surething principle’ and the ‘compound lottery axiom’, each of which is necessary for a rigorous use of the expected utility approach (see Machina and Schmeidler, 1992, pp.748, 756; Segal, 1987, p.177), it is sufficient to assume non-instantaneous learning in the sense that some delay may occur between the time a choice is made and the time the uncertainty is actually resolved. The intertemporal analysis of decisions under uncertainty introduces a new dimension of the utmost importance for economic analysis: the degree of irreversibility which characterizes the consequences of sequential decisions. It is irreversibility which makes uncertainty such an important issue in many fields of economics. Any kind of uncertainty, even soft uncertainty, implies unavoidable ex post errors even for the most rational decision maker. If these errors were easily remedied (promptly and at a low cost) the value of a normative theory of decision under uncertainty would be quite limited. Irreversibility implies that the consequences of an error have a much higher value. Unfortunately, while irreversibility greatly increases the practical importance of normative decision theory under uncertainty, it also prevents the use of standard theories: neither objectivist theories nor subjectivist theories may be satisfactorily applied to irreversible events. In fact it is generally agreed that the objectivist decision theories apply only to stationary processes with stable frequencies. In the case of Bayesian theory it is possible to show that the requisite of exchangeability implies stationarity. This is not the case in many fields of economics which are often characterized by irreversible structural changes. In addition, it may be proved that, whenever decision-makers believe that the economic system might be non-stationary, their behavior would become nonstationary even assuming that the exogenous environment is in fact stationary (Kurz, 1991b, p.10). For the same reason in the standard theories of decision under uncertainty the value of strategic learning, involving genuine or ‘creative’ learning, is nil. In fact, as was established before, the —————— 11 12
See Kurz, 1974. See Kreps, 1988.
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value of strategic learning is necessarily zero whenever complete irreversibility is postulated; the postulate of independence which implies dynamic coherence (Epstein and Le Breton, 1993) also implies strict irreversibility of the strategy chosen conditional upon future information. This ‘axiomatic’ irreversibility implies that strategic learning is without economic value.
6. Semantic congruence We are now in a position to summarize the results obtained so far. We have to distinguish different notions of a few key concepts (rationality, learning, expectations, uncertainty, time reversibility and a few crucial ontological assumptions on the real world) that may be semantically congruent or incongruent. In fact we have argued that there are strict semantic correspondences between different notions of the above concepts, according to a gradient of ontological and epistemic complexity. These correspondences may be summarized in a Synoptic Table. Each column lists different notions of the concept written at its top according to an order of growing complexity going down. The notions of the different concepts which stay on the same line are characterized by semantic congruence while different notions on different lines are incongruent. We wish to emphasize that semantic congruence is a neglected, but important, requisite of a sound theory or model. Its normative strength does not refer to logic: incongruence, differently from logical inconsistence, does not imply logical contradictions but semantic incompatibilities. There are two kinds of semantic incongruence. The first kind is between a crucial characteristic of a theoretical construct (concept, model or theory), and a different connotation of a certain empirical field that forbids a sound application to it of the incongruent construct. For example, the rational expectations hypothesis implies stationarity of the relevant stochastic processes and cannot be safely applied to empirical evidence that does not exhibit this property. The second kind of semantic incongruence is between concepts having different semantic scope so that they cannot be integrated in the same theory or in the same model because they cannot be applied to the same set of data. For example rational expectations and genuine learning cannot be part of the same theory or model because the first concept implies stationarity while the second implies non-stationarity. Semantic incongruence is a crucial source of misguided application of theory to the empirical evidence. Its consideration is crucial in order to define the empirical scope of concepts, theories or models. In what follows we utilize the information on semantic congruence summarized by the synoptic table
Rationality, learning and complexity
25
in order to discuss the empirical scope of different approaches that characterize economics. RATIONALITY
LEARNING
EXPECTATIONS
UNCERTAINTY
TIME
WORLD
substantive
updating
perfect
certainty
reversible
deterministic
substantive
updating
rational
soft
reversible
closed
procedural
adaptive
unconstrained
hard
irreversible
open
designing
creative
proactive
hard
irreversible
open
SYNOPTIC TABLE
Reading down the table the degree of generality increases with the degree of complexity taken into account. According to the point of view here advocated, designing rationality is the most comprehensive conception of rationality that may better take into account the complexity of the real world. Designing rationality is applicable in cases of hard uncertainty as well as in the limiting case of soft uncertainty, whatever is the degree of irreversibility. Therefore it encompasses as special case procedural rationality, when the environment is considered as given and substantive rationality under the further restrictive assumption of equilibrium. Of course, whenever the decision problem is characterized by full reversibility or irreversibility and uncertainty is soft, it is possible to use substantive rationality (the Morgenstern-von Neumann theory for roulette-wheel problems, or Bayesian theory, also for horse race problems) but their use is intelligible and justified only within the broader framework of designing rationality, structural learning, hard uncertainty and time irreversibility. It is important to emphasize that the correspondences summarized in the Synoptic Table are compelling from the conceptual and methodological point of view. For example, genuine structural learning implies a certain degree of irreversibility and non-stationarity, so that it cannot be analyzed within the traditional decision theories under (soft) uncertainty. This must be kept well in mind because, reading down in the table, the awareness of the complexity of the object analyzed increases, making more and more difficult the application of rigorous methods and sophisticated formal languages. We have to resist the temptation to which economists too often succumb of applying to complex phenomena powerful formal approaches that, however, are fit only for simple phenomena. In order to study consistently the complex phenomena that characterize the behavior of modern
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A. Vercelli
economies we have to develop, diligently but patiently, specific methods. A case in point in the analytical field are the recent advances in decision theory under hard uncertainty mentioned in this paper that offer new opportunities for a rigorous analysis of structural learning and creative rationality in an open and evolutionary environment. Another promising example is the development of simulation methods that allow a precise, formal, analysis of complex economic behavior without requiring excessive simplifications. Finally, another growing stream of literature is based on experimental methods that try to reconstruct the effective economic behavior without irrealistic normative constraints.
7. Concluding remarks In this essay we have introduced a sharp distinction between ontological complexity that refers to the properties of the economic system and epistemic complexity that refers to the formal properties of the model that represents it. On the basis of this distinction we have emphasized the limitations of the approach of standard economics that succeeds in simplifying the complexity of the economic system only at the cost of restricting its theoretical and empirical scope. If we want to face the problems raised by the irreducible complexity of the real world we are compelled to introduce an adequate level of epistemic complexity in our concepts and models. Examples of epistemic complexity are the degree of non-linearity of a dynamic system, and the degree of non-additivity of a probability distribution. Conversely, there are ontological sources of complexity that prevent simplification. To keep in touch with the examples of epistemic complexity just mentioned, it may be cited structural change as a source of nonlinearity in dynamic systems, while we can cite non-stationarity and openness of the world that we have to analyze as a source of both. In particular evolutionary phenomena, that are by definition non-stationary and open processes and are often characterized by essential non-linearities, imply irreducible complexity. Complexity has been discussed in this essay from the semantic point of view, i.e. from the point of view of the correspondence and the interaction between the degree of complexity of the objective system that we intend to describe or forecast and their subjective representation through models or expectations. The semantic approach to complexity here outlined has clear implications also from the point of view of the usual formal definitions of complexity recalled in the Introduction. In particular, focusing on the dynamic definition of complexity, it may be inferred from the preceding analysis that standard economics applies, under further limiting conditions,
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only if the degree of complexity does not exceed the level 2. In other words it may be applied only to stable linear systems having a unique equilibrium (level 1) or to dynamic systems having a regular periodic attractor, such as a limit cycle (level 2). In order to take account of higher levels of complexity, more advanced approaches based on more sophisticated concepts of rationality and learning are required. Epistemic complexity is not a virtue, but a necessity. We have to introduce in our theoretical constructs and models the minimal level of complexity sufficient to take account of ontological complexity to the extent that it is essential for understanding and controlling empirical phenomena. All the definitions of complexity have in common the emergence of properties that cannot be defined within a simpler context. If these properties are considered essential for the purposes of the analysis we cannot ignore them. If we insist to do so, as too often happens in economic analysis, we are liable to incur in systematic errors that may lead us astray. Therefore we have to introduce in economic models not less, and possibly no more, than the minimal degree of complexity required by the object. This establishes compelling correspondences between the degree of ontological complexity ascertained in the object and the degree of epistemic complexity to be attributed to the concepts utilized in its analysis. We may conclude by endorsing the advice of a famous scientist: “make things as simple as possible - but no simpler”13.
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—————— 13
The original advice is by Einstein according to Phillips, Freeman, and Wicks (2003, p.486).
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Ponsard, C., (1986): Foundations of soft decision theory, in J. Kacprzyk, and R.R. Yeger, eds., Management Decision Support Systems Using Fuzzy Sets and Possibility Theory, Verlag TUV, Rheinland, Köln. Runde, J., (1990): Keynesian uncertainty and the weight of arguments, Economics and Philosophy, 6, pp. 275-292. Runde, J., (1994): Keynesian Uncertainty and liquidity preference, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 18, pp.129-144. Samuelson, P.A., (1947): Foundations of Economic Analysis, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press Sargent, T.J., (1993): Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics, MIT Press, Boston. Savage, L.J., (1954): The Foundations of Statistics, John Wiley and Sons, New York. Revised and enlarged edition, Dover, New York, 1972. Scarf, H., (1960): Some examples of Global Instability of Competitive Equilibrium, International Economic Review, vol.1, 3, pp.157-72 Schmeidler, D., (1982): Subjective probability without additivity, Working Paper, Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Tel Aviv University. Schmeidler, D., (1986): Integral representation without additivity, Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, 97, 2, pp.255-261. Schmeidler, D., (1989): Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity, Econometrica, 57, pp.571-87. Schumpeter, J.A., (1934): The theory of Economic Development, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Segal, U., (1987): The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility Approach, International Economic Review, 28(1), 175-202. Shackle, G.L.S., 1952, Expectations in Economics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Simon, H.A., (1982): Models of Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.). Simonsen, M.H., Werlang S.R.C., 1991, Subadditive probabilities and portfolio inertia, Revista de Econometria, 11, pp.1-19. Sonnenschein, H., (1973): Do Walras’ Identity and Continuity Characterize the Class of Community Excess Demand Functions?, Journal of Economic Theory, vol.6, pp.345-354. Tobin, J., (1958): Liquidity Preference as Behaviour Toward Risk, Review of Economic Studies, 25, 65-86. Vercelli, A., (1991): Methodological foundations of macroeconomics. Keynes and Lucas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Vercelli, A., (1992): Probabilistic causality and economic analysis: a survey, in A.Vercelli, and N.Dimitri, eds. 1992, Macroeconomics: A Survey of research Strategies, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Vercelli, A., (1995): From soft uncertainty to hard environmental uncertainty, Economie Appliquée, 48, pp.251-269. Vercelli, A., (1999): The recent advances in decision theory under uncertainty: a non-technical introduction, in L.Luini, ed., Uncertain Decisions: Bridging Theory and Experiments, Kluwer, Dordrecht.
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Vercelli, A., (2000): Financial Fragility and Cyclical Fluctuations, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 1, 139-156. Vercelli, A., (2002): Uncertainty, rationality and learning: a Keynesian perspective, in S.Dow and J.Hillard, eds., 2002, Keynes, Uncertainty and the Global Economy, vol.II, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Glos. (U.K.), pp.88-105. Vercelli, A., (2003): Updated Liberalism vs. Neo-liberalism: Policy Paradigms and the Structural Evolution of Western Industrial Economies after W.W. II, in Arena-Salvadori, eds., Money, Credit and the State: Essays in Honour of Augusto Graziani, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003 Walras, L., (1874): Elément d’économie politique pure ou théorie de la richesse sociale Wakker, P., (1989): Continuous Subjective Expected Utility With Non-Additive Probabilities, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18, pp.1-27 Willinger, M., (1990): Irréversibilité et cohérence dynamique des choix, Revue d’Economie Politique, 100, 6, pp. 808-832. Woodford, M., (1990): Learning to Believe in Sunspots, Econometrica, 58, pp.277-307. Zadeh, L.A., (1965): Fuzzy sets, Information and Control, 8, pp.338-353.
Acknowledgements The Editors are very grateful to Palgrave MacMillan Publisher for the permission to publish the paper by A. Vercelli.
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The Confused State of Complexity Economics: An Ontological Explanation E. Perona
1. Introduction1 ‘Complexity’ ideas are becoming a hot issue in economics. Originally developed within the natural sciences, complexity theory is now believed by many to be a novel and powerful framework of thought, capable of challenging the fundamental principles sustained by mainstream economics for more than a century. One of its main advocates, David Colander (2000a:31), has written that “Complexity changes everything; well, maybe not everything, but it does change quite a bit in economics”. Also, in a recent issue of a popular scientific magazine, it is suggested that complexity ideas “are beginning to map out a radical and long-overdue revision of economic theory’ (Buchanan, New Scientist, 2004:35). Indeed, the proliferation of publications, journals, summer schools, and conferences on complexity economics during the past few years can hardly pass unnoticed. Amidst such a generalized optimism, a more careful reflection on the economic literature on complexity theorizing reveals various prima facie problematic features: confusions or at least curiosities. Some of them are widely acknowledged and have been matters of discussion within the complexity community. Others are more subtle and need clarification. In this paper I will discuss, as well as seek to remedy and/or explain, some of —————— 1
I am grateful to my former supervisor, Dr Tony Lawson, for his suggestions on the original structure of this paper. Thanks also to Gustavo Marqués and several colleagues from the Department of Economics for their useful comments and to Universidad de Córdoba for providing financial support. Any errors remain mine.
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the most significant problems and confusions subjacent to complexity economics. This exercise is helpful to carry out a more accurate assessment of the potential benefits attributed to the complexity paradigm in relation to traditional economic theories.
2. Three puzzling features of complexity economics The problems with complexity economics I will focus upon here comprise three broad issues: (a) the coexistence of multiple conceptions and definitions of complexity, (b) the contradictions manifest in the writings of economists who alternate between treating complexity as a feature of the economy or as a feature of economic models, and (c) the unclear status of complexity economics as an orthodox/heterodox response to the failures in traditional theory. The first source of confusion is that there are various competing conceptions of complexity, with the range of notions apparently resistant to successful systematization. In other words, the range and types of notions of complexity appear not to have been successfully clarified or explained. This fact is admitted quite openly by researchers, not just in economics but in the sciences at large. For example, according to the statement on the website of the ‘Complexity Group’ at the Faculty of Engineering in Cambridge2. Complexity is difficult to define. Many people have tried to define it based on the characteristics of complexity in the context of their own research fields. But not a single definition seems comprehensive enough to suit all the situations where complexity exists. It seems that a general definition of complexity can only be approximated by adding different definitions. Other comments pointing out the non-existence of a unique complexity conception and the difficulty of systematizing the various existing definitions include Cowan (1997:56), Dent (1999:5), Edmonds (1999:210), Fontana and Ballati (1999:16), Heylighen (1999:17,19), Kilpatrick (2001:17) and Lissack (1999:12). Specifically within economics, Brian Arthur et al. have echoed the general trend. These authors affirm in their introduction to the proceedings of the conference held at the Santa Fe Institute, The economy as an evolving complex system II: —————— 2
http://www-mmd.eng.cam.ac.uk/complexity/complexity.htm
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But just what is the complexity perspective in economics? That is not an easy question to answer... Indeed, the authors of the essays in this volume by no means share a single, coherent vision of the meaning and significance of complexity in economics. What we will find instead is a family resemblance, based upon a set of interrelated themes that together constitute the current meaning of the complexity perspective in economics (1997:2). Is it possible to explain the coexistence of a variety of complexity definitions? Can a commonly accepted conception of complexity (in general or at least in economics) be found at all? These questions, which transcend disciplinary boundaries, are central to the vision of complexity I will be defending. A second notable feature of complexity theorizing in economics is that many authors provide what seems to be an inconsistent account of the nature of their project. In particular most economists suppose that complexity exists as a feature of economic reality; for example Wible comments, “Economic phenomena are complex social phenomena. In today’s intellectual milieu, this is hardly a novel statement” (2000:15). At the same time, however, many among them affirm and/or believe that such a feature is, or act as if it were, irrelevant for the sort of complexity analysis they support: “[The complexity and simplicity visions]... have little to do with how complex one believes the economy is; all agree that the economy is very complex” (Colander 2000b:2). In other words, many researchers take for granted that the economy, or some aspects of it, are complex (a contentious matter in itself), whilst in their opinion the complexity project is independent of how complex one believes the economy really is. At first sight, this looks like a paradox indeed. For if their ideas of complexity are not connected to the (admittedly) complex nature of the social realm, i.e. if complexity economics is not about the complex economy, what is it about? An analysis of this matter, focusing in particular on the connection between models and reality, is useful to expose the extent to which complexologists are prone to methodological inconsistencies. A third rather remarkable feature of modern complexity theorizing in economics is that, unlike other methodological conceptions, this one seems to be embraced by mainstream and heterodox economists alike. For instance, from an evolutionary perspective, Potts writes: My sincere hope is that the approach developed herein, and the strength of the platform it expresses, might then further encourage students and researchers to make stronger connections between a unified heterodox economics - an evolution-
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ary microeconomics - and the burgeoning research fields of complex systems theory (2000:xii). Austrian economists also seem to be pleased by the prospects of complexity theorizing: Economists should recognize that complexity theory is not an ‘import’ from the natural sciences. Its two fundamental principles of self-organization and evolution can be traced to seventeenth and eighteenth-century philosophers of society. The view of the economy as a complex adaptive system is entirely congruent with the methodological approach of Menger and the Austrian school (Simpson 2000:211). This is surprising in that currently the distinct nature of mainstream and heterodox traditions is highlighted by emphasizing their irreconcilable methodological differences (Lawson 2003b). Does the rise of complexity theory thus mean that we need to theorize the mainstream/heterodox projects all over again? Or is it the case that the different traditions mean something different by the idea of complexity? In the following sections I will outline one way of rendering intelligible the phenomena expressed in these observations. That is, I will endeavor to advance and defend an interpretation of what is going on that can account for the: • various competing conceptions of complexity; • recurrent incoherences that arise in complexity theorizing; • apparent agreement between otherwise opposed mainstream and heterodox traditions that complexity is an acceptable and indeed seemingly potentially fruitful category of analysis.
3. Explanatory background: Lawson’s ontic/theoretic distinction My explanation for the phenomena noticed above follows from a broad thesis about the nature of modern economics advanced by Lawson (2003a, 1997). Lawson starts from a premise about the object of study (i.e. the economy), asserting that economic systems are typically open and structured systems. Then he adheres to the observation - also subscribed to by
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many others - that economics, as a discipline, is not in a healthy state3. He concludes that the main reason for such a failure is that the methods largely employed by the dominant tradition in economics - essentially mathematical-deductive modeling - entail ontological presuppositions that are at odds with the actual nature of the object of study. In short, mathematical models are appropriate for dealing with a reality consisting of closed and atomistic systems rather than open and structured ones. To put it differently, the problem can be phrased in terms of a conflict between the nature of economic reality and the methods employed to apprehend it. This idea is advanced by Lawson in the form of an ontic/theoretic distinction: If I can use the term theoretic to denote the quality of being a feature of a model and the term ontic to denote the quality of being features of the world the economists presumes to illuminate, a more succinct way of describing the problem that arises through the prioritization of the modeling orientation is a conflation of the theoretic and ontic, with the latter reduced to the former (2003c:4). As Lawson argues, the limited power of formalistic methods to illuminate social reality, i.e. the lack of fit of the former to the latter, necessarily results in mainstream economists inventing ‘a reality’ of a form that their modeling methods can address - for example, a world of isolated atomistic individuals possessing perfect foresight, rational expectations, pure greed, and so on, rather than real-world categories whose meaning is driven by their more usual historical or intuitive understandings. That is, the ontic dimension is determined by, and hence reduced to, the theoretic dimension, and this happens in ways that are often unappreciated, if ultimately explicable. Any viable alternative should then be one that takes into account the open and structured nature of the real economy. In Lawson’s opinion, this is the case of heterodox approaches in economics. He contends, however, that such a commitment to ontology goes to a large extent unnoticed by heterodox practitioners (2003b), who have tended to take the mainstream constructs at face value, and thereby to counterpoise alternative conceptions at the same level, mostly failing to appreciate that in the two sides to the discussion, the respective proponents are talking about entirely different worlds. —————— 3
According to Lawson (2003a, 2003c), economics: (a) achieves few explanatory or predictive successes, (b) is plagued by theory-practice inconsistencies, (c) relies on constructs recognized as quite fictitious, and (d) generally lacks direction.
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Therefore, in addition to the mainstream not fully realizing their method-driven orientation together with the (restrictive) ontological presuppositions entailed by deductivist mathematical modeling, heterodoxy has failed to fully acknowledge their ontological foundations. In Lawson’s view, it is only through the recognition of the ontic/theoretic divide that the fundamentally distinct nature of the orthodox and heterodox projects can be appreciated. In the following sections I will make use of the ontic/theoretic distinction in a rather different fashion. Essentially I will be arguing that such a dichotomy is also fundamental to help to explain the conflict that appears when some categories or system properties are, inadvertently, dealt with at both levels. And I will show that complexity is indeed a category that suffers such a fate4. In particular, my claim is that complexity admits two different, not necessarily related, meanings: first, an ontic meaning with complexity being a property of real-systems, and second, a theoretic meaning with complexity being a property of model-systems. When these two distinct aspects or dimensions of complexity fail to be recognized by its practitioners, as is often the case in economics, the problematic features noted at the beginning of this essay easily follow. In other words, I will be suggesting that it is only through sustaining the ontic/theoretic distinction that we can ultimately comprehensively explain the conundrums surrounding complexity ideas, that is: (a) the variety of complexity notions on offer, (b) the number of methodological inconsistencies that arise, and (c) the apparent agreement between the two implacably opposed traditions of mainstream and heterodox economics. Let me now defend this claim in detail.
4. The ontic/theoretic distinction in the context of complexity analysis 4.1 Various competing conceptions of complexity The first puzzling feature noticed above is the existence of a variety of notions of complexity, with most supporters of the complexity project explic—————— 4
Further examples of interest, but not considered here, are those of equilibrium (Lawson 2003c) or the econometric idea of a data generation process or DGP (Pratten 2005).
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itly acknowledging the lack of agreement about what complexity actually means. I would like to suggest that a plausible way of making sense of the confusion is to observe that some conceptions of complexity found in the literature (the majority in fact) are theoretic notions, whilst others are ontic. Moreover, this difference in the nature of the competing conceptions goes largely unnoticed. This I argue is indeed a fundamental distinction to draw in any attempt to systematize in a meaningful way the various conceptions of complexity. Most if not all complexity definitions (see below) agree with viewing complexity as a property of systems, i.e. a set of elements/aspects/parts that interact giving rise to wholes with their own system-level properties. There is often no indication, however, as to whether the system to which the property of complexity is attributed is the object of study itself (a realsystem), or whether it is a representation of the object of study (a modelsystem)5. Complexity would be an ontic feature in the former case, and a theoretic feature in the latter. Let me now review some of the most common conceptions to establish their ontic/theoretic character. A first group of complexity notions is given by those basic (dictionarylike) definitions, which emphasize the systemic nature of complex objects but are otherwise ambiguous in relation to their ontic/theoretic status. For example6: Dict. 1) Complexity is the state of being marked by an involvement of many parts, aspects, details,and notions, and necessitating earnest study or examination to understand or cope with. Dict. 2) Complexity has many varied interrelated parts, patterns, or elements and consequently is hard to understand fully. Other notions are more precise than the previous general ones. Some of them take as central the idea that complexity is fundamentally related to certain mathematical methods, especially nonlinear dynamic analysis —————— 5
A detailed defense of complexity as a property of both real-systems and modelsystems (with a different meaning in each case) has been made elsewhere (Perona 2004). There it is claimed that together with the systemic form, another key characteristic of complex systems is the existence of unknowable aspects within the system. In the case of ontic complexity, these unknowable aspects or ‘difficulties of understanding’ refer to actual human cognitive limitations, whereas in the case of theoretic complexity such difficulties are merely a consequence of model design (e.g. a model involving nonlinearities). 6 Reproduced in the website of the Complexity Group at the Faculty of Engineering (Cambridge University): http://www-mmd.eng.cam.ac.uk/complexity/complexity.htm
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(among other features, such as self-organization, adaptability, and chaos). The following definitions provide good examples: Nld. 1)... the study of complexity concerns those systems that allegedly cannot be understood when using a linear reductionist approach (McIntyre 1998:27). Nld. 2) Complexity is a broad term for describing and understanding a wide range of chaotic, dissipative, adaptive, non-linear and complex systems and phenomena7. Nld. 3) [Complexity]... includes such ideas as phase changes, fitness landscapes, self-organization, emergence, attractors, symmetry and symmetry breaking, chaos, quanta, the edge of chaos, self-organized criticality, generative relationships, and increasing returns to scale (Lissack 1999:112). It is apparent that these (mathematically-oriented) definitions convey theoretic conceptions of complexity, for nonlinearity and its potential consequences are features of (systems of) equations, a particular type of reality representation or model. The notion of complexity as a property associated with nonlinear models is widely accepted among complexologists; proof of this is that the leading institutions for the advancement of complexity adhere to this type of notion8. A third group of complexity definitions or conceptions is given by the numerous ‘measures of complexity’ that abound in the literature (see e.g. Simon 1976; Edmonds 1999: Appendix 1; Lloyd 1999). These measures are also theoretic in nature, regarding complexity as quantifiable aspects of systems - for example the system’s size, its degree of variability, or the effort involved in solving a problem or performing a certain task. Although the definitions/measures above clearly regard complexity as a property of representations of reality (hence being theoretic), most commentators do not spend time arguing that this is the case. An exception is Edmonds, whose efforts to systematize complexity ideas led him to reflect upon the ontic/theoretic dichotomy. In his opinion, although complexity may be seen as a property of real systems, it is not a useful notion as such. The problem, Edmonds argues, is that the complexity of real systems is
—————— 7
This notion can be found under the title ‘What is Complexity?’, defining the position of the interdisciplinary Center for Complexity Research at the University of Liverpool: http://www.liv.ac.uk/ccr/ 8 For example, the Santa Fe Institute (www.santafe.edu) or (http://necsi.org/) Necsi.
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unmanageably large9; in consequence, he strives to develop what he sees as a general notion of model (theoretic) complexity: Complexity is that property of a model which makes it difficult to formulate its overall behavior in a given language, even when given reasonably complete information about its atomic components and their inter-relations (1999:72; emphasis added). Now with most complexity notions being (deliberately or not) theoretic in nature, the confusion arising from the plethora of competing conceptions currently available can be easily explained. For where complexity is merely a model concept, or more precisely, a property of a system of equations, there can clearly be as many definitions of complexity as there are possibilities for model-system construction. And scope for the latter seems limitless. Such a generalized emphasis on theoretic complexity can also be observed within economics. In effect, the dominant strand in complexity economics corresponds to the vision advanced by the Santa Fe Institute. According to this general vision, the economy is seen as an adaptive system, consisting of many agents who interact continuously among themselves, whilst being immersed in an overall ‘evolutionary’ environment (Arthur et al. 1997). ‘Agents’ interactions are usually described by means of (predetermined nonlinear) rules, which are repeated through several steps, thus accounting for the system’s dynamic nature. This is clearly a theoretic perspective, where complexity is a property attributed to models, i.e. simulation models. Within this broad theoretic framework, several approaches to complexity economics can and do coexist. To repeat, when theoretic notions of complexity predominate, that is, when complexity is understood as a property of reality representations, the existence of multiple complexity conceptions poses no problems or contradictions. Since modeling possibilities are unlimited, so are the potential complexity definitions and measures. This seemingly problematic feature has, after all, a simple explanation. What about ontic complexity, i.e. complexity as a property of real systems or phenomena? Does a unique or universal notion make any sense in this case? In comparison to theoretic complexity, there are not many examples of ontological elaboration regarding complexity analysis. Within —————— 9
I do not claim that this position is correct; In fact I disagree with Edmonds’s defense of a theoretic approach to complexity. It is, however, a position worth remarking because, as I will discuss later, many economists believe that model complexity is to a large extent independent of the complexity of the real economy.
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the natural sciences, researchers usually admit that the complexity of models reflects (to a greater or lesser extent) the complexity found in reality itself, due to the fact that models are typically constructed taking into account the underlying reality in the first instance. The situation is more complicated in the case of the social sciences. Not only are social systems the result of an unaccountable number of facts that converge to produce a state of the system10, but also they often involve elements that are beyond the researcher’s understanding capabilities (one such element is the subjective nature of human beings). In the social realm there is no easy association between reality and its representations, and consequently the ontic/theoretic divide becomes a fundamental issue in this case. Among the few attempts acknowledging an ontic dimension of complexity within economics and the social sciences, we can mention the work by Schenk (2003) and Amin and Hausner (1997), from an institutional perspective: Ont. 1) Complexity of economic interactions will be taken head-on in a concept for composite economic systems - their structure, and, in turn, the impact of structural patterns on behavior and economic performance. It will be the variety of coordinating interactions which is understood here as a definition for complexity... (Schenk 2003:2-3; his emphasis). Ont. 2) The complex economy, consequently, is a microcosm of criss-crossing organizational and institutional forms, logics and rationalities, norms and governance structures. It is difficult to grasp in anything like its entirety by individuals and it escapes the reach of a central organization... (Amin and Hausner 1997:6). Also Potts (2000) engages in ontological elaboration, this time from an evolutionary point of view. His position emphasizes the systemic nature of economic phenomena, i.e. economic systems consisting of elements which are interrelated by means of multiple connections giving rise to networks. Essentially Potts sustains what he calls an ‘ontology of connections’, followed by certain epistemological considerations that lead him to conclude that systems theory (or graph theory) might be appropriate to deal with complexity at the representational level. —————— 10
As early as 1967 this problem was pointed out by Hayek in his Theory of complex phenomena: “The chief difficulty in [those disciplines concerned with complex phenomena]... becomes one of in fact ascertaining all the data determining a particular manifestation of the phenomenon in question, a difficulty which is often insurmountable in practice and sometimes even an absolute one” (1967:27).
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Finally, Delorme (2001, 1997) focuses on the problem of understanding, characteristic of complex events, which necessarily arises between the (complex) object and the subject of knowledge. For Delorme, “complexity is a property of both the world and the process of inquiry into the world” (2001:81), where the former “originates in the properties of the subject matter that the analytical capacities of the scientist cannot reach” (1997:36). A discussion and criticism of these visions, together with an attempt to derive a generalized conception of ontic complexity which takes into account both the systemic form and the limitations in knowledge typical of complex systems, has been carried out elsewhere (Perona 2004). My point here is to illustrate the distinct nature of ontic vs. theoretic conceptions of complexity: whilst the former focus on the difficulty in understanding real systems, the latter center on the representational level, understanding complexity as the complexity of models and, more precisely, mathematical models. In this case models are seen as complex because of, for example, the nonlinearities involved in their construction, which make prediction difficult. To summarize, I have been arguing that when the theoretic vision predominates among complexity supporters - which is clearly the case in economics and the sciences at large - the existence of many different (and sometimes incompatible) complexity notions, definitions and/or measures, should not be an unexpected result. The reason why complexologists regard it as a problem - in contrast to, for instance, philosophers of science (for whom this problematic feature is not problematic at all) - is their general lack of concern with methodological issues. In particular, were complexity researchers aware of the ontic/theoretic distinction, they would not be preoccupied with the multiplicity of definitions on offer. The mere existence of such a preoccupation reveals that at least some of them tend to confuse and/or to conflate complexity as a property of models with complexity as a property of the real world. 4.2 Some recurrent incoherences of complexity theorizing in economics Whilst the problem of several coexisting definitions belongs to complexity analysis in general, the second problematic feature, namely the recurrent incoherences that arise in complexity theorizing, is specific to economics. These incoherences start with the fact that most economists take for granted that complexity is a feature of economic reality; i.e. they accept, as
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a matter of common sense, that economic phenomena are complex phenomena11. However, it has been pointed out earlier that most complexity conceptions in economics are, in effect, theoretic accounts of complexity. In particular, the so-called ‘complexity theory’ project may be regarded as an attempt to extend traditional economics by means of incorporating more flexible modeling features such as agents’ interactions, increasing returns to scale, non-equilibrium outcomes, emergence of behavioral patterns, and so forth. Now what is the connection between these theoretic complexity conceptions and the allegedly complex nature of economic phenomena explicitly accepted? Actually the majority of contributions seem to imply that there is none; in other words, it does not matter “how complex one believes the economy is”. Papers that portray nonlinear models constructed using ad-hoc rules lacking empirical foundations or any other type of ‘real’ connection to the object or phenomena being represented do indeed support this sort of position12. Complexity is, from the point of view of most contributors, a property of models totally independent of the complex nature of the actual economy. This is clearly an instrumentalist methodology whose main drawbacks (especially in the case of economics and the social sciences) have been pointed out by Lawson (2001). Can economists assert the complexity of the real economy on the one hand, and complexity as a modeling feature on the other, as two distinct and unrelated concepts? Can such a separation between models and reality (which presupposes an instrumentalist stance) be sustainable at all? In spite of the criticisms cast upon instrumentalism, there are no a priori reasons to rule it out as a valid methodology so long as its advocates stick to it consistently. What I want to suggest is that, when it comes to complexity, some economists maintain instrumentalist positions both unwarily and inconsistently. In effect, instrumentalist methodologies presuppose the possibility of prediction. Quantitative prediction is, however, ruled out in the case of complexity modeling, whose outcome are usually ‘likely scenarios’ or ‘patterns’ associated with specific rules and particular —————— 11
See the quotations by Wibble and Colander in Section 2. Edmonds (2001) suggests that this situation is generalized in the case of complexity modeling: “What I am criticizing is the use of such algorithms without either any justification of their appropriateness or modification to make them appropriate. Thus many agent-based models fail to escape the problems of more traditional models. They attempt to use some ensemble of interacting agents to reproduce some global outcome without knowing if the behavior of the individual agents is at all realistic. The wish for the ‘magic’ short-cut is still there”.
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values of initial conditions. Faced with this dilemma, some authors (e.g. Day 1999:354-355) have stressed the importance of qualitative prediction, namely the possibility of forecasting ‘general tendencies’ rather than specific values. In any case it is hard to see how theory assessment could be seriously carried out in those circumstances. The only plausible justification for the employment of such methods is, then, for complexologists to posit that the problem setting, including the rules and parameter values chosen, has been selected bearing in mind, even if in an imperfect fashion, realistic properties in the first instance. To put it differently, rules have been chosen to be reasonable and to ‘make sense’. But this clearly contradicts the assumed independence of models from reality. In sum, this type of methodological incoherence, which I shall call an ‘instrumental inconsistency’, is displayed by researchers who: (a) believe that the economy is complex in a fundamental way and (b) affirm that and/or act as if models are independent from reality, whilst they (c) defend complexity theory methods on the grounds that they are better representations of reality than traditional theory provides. There are other views on the relationship between reality and representations (i.e. the economy and economic models) that coexist with the previous one, contributing to aggravate the general state of ontic/theoretic incoherence. On occasion, contributions to complexity economics seem to imply that it might be possible to describe reality in its full complexity (this is the case, for example, with some econometric works attempting to retrieve nonlinear data generation processes from seemingly chaotic series). To suppose that reality is ultimately explainable is, however, inconsistent with the purported belief that economic phenomena are inherently complex. In addition, a number of works on complexity economics reveal that their authors do often tend to use the same terminology to speak indiscriminately of the complexity of models, and the complexity of the real economy, thus showing an erroneous choice to conflate theoretic and ontic features in the analysis. This is noticeable in the frequent use of expressions such as the ‘inherent nonlinearity of social systems’ (e.g. Elliot and Kiel 1998) or the ‘occurrence of chaos within the [human] realm’ (e.g. Day 1999:Chap.26). My explanatory thesis for the second problematic feature affecting complexity economics is, then, that the virtual absence of methodological elaboration in modern economics - in particular regarding the ontic/theoretic divide, or the connection between reality and models - leads economists to adopt positions that are ultimately inconsistent, both within themselves and also relative to each other. Sometimes researchers act as if
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methods could be improved to the point of uncovering the ‘true model’, although this is inconsistent with asserting the existence of complexity as a feature of reality, something that, in general, they do. Alternatively, they maintain (explicitly or implicitly) an instrumentalist position which is not sustainable due to the typical (nonlinear) nature of complexity methods. In addition, they frequently confuse, at a semantic level, the complexity of models with the complexity of the real economy13. In short, complexity theory - as advocated by most leading institutions and practised by most economists - is a theoretic project, an attempt to extend traditional economics to incorporate more flexible modeling features. But it is one thing to suppose that models and reality are the same thing, quite another to hold that reality is something different from models but ultimately attainable, and still another that they are different and independent from each other. Economists supporting complexity ideas often tend to alternate, without realizing it, between these positions. 4.3 Apparent agreement between mainstream and heterodox traditions The third problem noted at the outset is the apparent agreement between mainstream and heterodox economists about the relevance of a complexity notion. In addition to the ‘complexity revolution’ taking place in science, the growing interest in complexity within economics seems to be caused by an increasing discontent with the performance of traditional (neoclassical) theories, whose problems are well known and extensively highlighted in the literature14. In effect, many economists - ranging from the more conservative to the more heterodox - claim to have found ideas in complexity —————— 13
A thesis by Glenn Fox asserting the coexistence of several methodologies within economics supports my argument: “Philosophically, economics is a house divided. [Economists]... have combined elements from various methodological doctrines in an eclectic manner. But these hybrid methodologies are not coherent. Methodological discussion among economists is made more difficult by the variations in meaning attached to certain fundamental terms” (1997:122). 14 Depending on the author’s methodological position, the most common criticisms of traditional economic theory include the construction of unrealistic assumptions, the neglect of institutions, the lack of behavioral foundations, the systematic failure to obtain accurate predictions, the difficulties in carrying out empirical tests, and the inadequate treatment of aspects such as time, evolution, uncertainty, and the formation of expectations.
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that provide a way out of the trap in which much of today’s economics seems to have been caught. Researchers coming from a more mainstream orientation have centered primarily on the advancement of nonlinear dynamic modeling, in an attempt to provide a formal description of the non-equilibrium and evolutionary nature of the economy as well as the unpredictability of aggregate outcomes. This is the theoretic vision outlined in previous sections. Concepts such as self-organization and emergence, technological lock-in and path dependence, increasing returns to scale, and interaction among learning agents are frequently emphasized in this literature (see, for example, the classic papers in Arthur et al. 1997, or the more recent volumes on Complexity in Economics by Rosser 2004). From a non-mainstream point of view, representatives of several heterodox schools including the (new) Austrian, institutionalist, and evolutionary approaches, are also, to different degrees, supporting the complexity paradigm15. Even some critical realists have become strong advocates of complexity theory, viewing it as a ‘scientific ontology’ compatible with the critical realist ‘philosophical ontology’ (Reed and Harvey 1992; Harvey and Reed 1998). Heterodox contributions on complexity do, in general, see it as promising that the new approach has been able to incorporate a number of notions hitherto neglected by traditional theory, such as evolution, self-organization, uncertainty, historical contexts, and so on. Does this mean that the two types of reaction to the neoclassical shortcomings have something in common? Is it the case that a sort of convergence is taking place between mainstream and non-mainstream schools, with complexity ideas providing the missing link between them? To be blunt, the answer is ‘no’, and I can once again use the ontic/theoretic distinction to provide a plausible explanation. Essentially, my claim is that the two groups - i.e. mainstream and heterodox supporters of complexity - are employing the category in systematically different ways, without this difference being recognized. For the mainstream, complexity is mainly a feature of their models. For the heterodox, on the other hand, complexity is a feature of the reality being studied. To put it differently, the orthodox response to the failures in traditional theory is a theoretic response: the goal of the researcher is to develop more powerful modeling frameworks, including fictional agents capable of displaying non-equilibrium, adaptive, evolutionary-like behavior. The heterodox response is in turn an ontic response: in this case, the purpose of the —————— 15
See e.g. the quotations in Section 2.
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researcher is to investigate the nature of social reality, to provide (partial and fallible) explanations of inherently unknowable (and hence complex) economic phenomena. To some extent orthodox complexologists acknowledge their theoretic orientation when they remark on the importance of formal modeling, drawing a line between their project and the one sustained by their nonmainstream colleagues16: Complexity economics differs from heterodox economics in that it is highly formal; it is a science that involves simplification and the search for efficient means of data compression. Thus, complexity economics will be more acceptable to standard economists because it shares the same focus on maintaining a formal scientific framework, and less acceptable to many heterodox economists who otherwise accept its general vision (Colander 2000b:5). In the case of heterodox advocates of complexity, it not so clear that they perceive their ideas to be fundamentally different from the ones postulated by the mainstream side. Many heterodox complexologists are not only non-skeptical about theoretic developments in complexity economics but they actually seem to welcome them17. The fact that certain economists within the heterodox traditions, largely opposed to any sort of formal modeling, appear to be interested in complexity theory at all, is indeed surprising. A crucial factor explaining such a bizarre situation has been cogently pointed out by Lawson (2003b). In his view, although currently the distinct nature of mainstream and heterodox visions is highlighted by emphasizing their methodological differences, and in particular the ontological commitment of the latter, the ontic/theoretic distinction is never explicitly formulated and/or systematized. It therefore goes largely unrecognized by both orthodox and heterodox traditions, whilst sloppy use of language serves to camouflage the fact that the two traditions are indeed concerned with significantly different endeavors: ... I do not claim that the ontological orientation of the heterodox opposition has always been, or is always, recognized. To the contrary I believe that one reason that the heterodox tradi—————— 16
Mainstream complexologists do not acknowledge the ontic orientation of heterodox approaches, though. In other words, they are not aware of the ontic/theoretic divide. 17 For instance, Lavoie believes that “Computational modeling, the use of computer programs to create artificial, complex evolutionary systems, is an approach to modeling that a Hayekian would find interesting” (1994:550).
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tions have been less effective than their case appears to warrant is precisely that the ontological nature of their opposition has not been made sufficiently clear (2003b:19). The rise of complexity within economics is not thus merely a case of two projects coming to the same response from different angles. On the one hand, the theoretic response advanced by complexity theory advocates, centered on the ‘complexification’ of models, serves to confirm the mainstream reliance on mathematical methods. On the other hand, the heterodox traditions are concerned about understanding a world of real or inherent complexity; an open, structured, and intrinsically dynamic world, comprising totalities of internally related parts. The two projects could not be more different. The failure to recognize this comes down to a failure to see that one term, ‘complexity’, is being used in quite different ways ways that are distinct from one another. In addition to the confusion arising from the lack of proper recognition of the ontic/theoretic dichotomy, it is possible to conjecture another reason explaining the recent interest of a number of heterodox researchers in complexity analysis. This reason is of a more pragmatic order and relates to the necessary bi-directionality characterizing the relationship of models to reality. If the mainstream has been often criticized by heterodoxy for lacking ontological elaboration and, more specifically, for endorsing modeling frameworks underpinned by ontological foundations at odds with the actual nature of the socio-economic realm, it is also true that the heterodox paramount concern with ontology has seldom given room to epistemological elaboration, namely to the discussion about research guidelines and/or methods consistent with the posited nature of economic phenomena18. In this context it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that the rare attempts by heterodox economists to clarify the means by which (complex) economic phenomena can be studied in practice might have induced some of them to regard complexity modeling as a representational strategy compatible with their claims at an ontological level, i.e. a complex world characterized by uncertainty, evolution, structures, institutions, and so on. This is actually what Reed and Harvey (1992, 1998) mean when they argue that complexity theory provides a ‘scientific ontology’ consistent with a critical realist ‘philosophical ontology.’ In other words, the relative lack of concern of heterodox studies with practical matters might have led some supporters of heterodoxy to see in —————— 18
This is changing, though. In recent years, heterodox economists have become increasingly concerned with epistemological issues. A good example is Downward (2003).
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complexity theory a plausible way to make heterodox claims operational. This feature, together with the lack of awareness about the ontic/theoretic divide separating the mainstream from the non-mainstream, and the resulting confusion arising from common terminology, explains the apparent interest of heterodoxy in complexity economics19. Our last problematic feature is thus rendered intelligible.
5. Concluding remarks: ontology and methods matter In this paper I have discussed and elucidated three puzzling and/or problematic features of complexity analysis in economics, aided by Lawson’s insightful ontic/theoretic distinction. First, the existence of a plurality of complexity definitions makes sense when we observe that most of them are theoretic notions. Second, the methodological inconsistencies pervading complexity economics are brought to light when the tacit connections between models and reality are investigated. Finally, the apparent agreement between heterodox and orthodox traditions about complexity ideas is shown to be fictitious when considered from the ontic/theoretic perspective: the two sides represent in fact quite different and even opposite responses to the problems perceived in traditional theory. Complexity is thus a category that illustrates quite forcefully the necessity of ontological elaboration in economic theory. The real question, the question of social import, and the one that is ultimately relevant for economic policy, is how can we understand a world of complex, evolving socio-economic structures. And this question can only start with a debate of what is to be identified as complex (i.e. what complexity actually means), followed by a discussion on how to deal with such complex objects (i.e. a discussion about methods). This is precisely the ontic/theoretic dichotomy I have been defending. The ontological implications of the various complexity projects in economics, and in particular the strand characterized by a quantitative orientation, are rarely explored, though. Mainstream complexity theory, including the development of more flexible and comprehensive mathematical models and the reliance on simulation methods, may bring about important insights for both theoretical and applied economics. It is often the case, how—————— 19
There are also heterodox economists who reject complexity ideas at once, arguing that complexity is merely a theoretic project revolving around simulation modeling. These researchers do not acknowledge the possibility of an ontic dimension of complexity.
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ever, that these more flexible modeling strategies are not the result of inferential processes trying to uncover the mechanisms in operation in actual economic systems, but simply more elaborate deductive constructions. A turn to ontology may be of help here because, as Leijonhufvud has warned us, “If all one is doing is playing with the equations that specify the interactions among pixels, the result, obviously, is just another Nintendo game” (1995:1500). In short, ontological elaboration, the question of methods, and the link between the two, are inevitable issues in the complexity debate, if the new complexity economics vision intends to be fruitful.
References Amin A., Hausner J. (1997): Beyond market and hierarchy. Interactive governance and social complexity. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Arthur B., Durlauf S.,Lane D. (1997): The economy as an evolving complex system II. Perseus Books, Reading Buchanan M. (2004): It’s the economy, stupid. New Scientist 182:34-37 Colander D. (2000a): Complexity and the history of economic thought. Routledge, London Colander D. (2000b): The complexity vision and the teaching of economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Northampton Cowan G. (1997): Complexity? Who ordered that? Complexity 2:56-57 Delorme R. (1997): The foundational bearing of complexity. In: Amin A., Hausner J. (eds):, Beyond market and hierarchy: Interactive governance and social complexity. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 32-56 Delorme R. (2001): Theorizing complexity. In: Foster J., Metcalfe J. S. (eds) Frontiers of evolutionary economics. Competition, self-organization and innovation policy. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Northampton, pp 80-108 Dent E. B .1999): Complexity science: a worldview shift. Emergence 1:5-19 Downward P. (2003): Applied economics and the critical realist critique. Routledge, London New York Edmonds B. (1999): Syntactic measures of complexity. Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester (http://bruce.edmonds.name) Edmonds B. (2001): Against: a priori theory. For: descriptively adequate computational modeling. Post-Autistic Economics Review 10:article 2 (http://www.paecon.net) Elliott E., Kiel L. D. (1998): Introduction. In: Kiel L. D., Elliott E. (eds) Chaos theory in the social sciences. Foundations and applications. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp 1-15 Fontana W., Ballati S. (1999): Complexity. Why the sudden fuss? Complexity 4:14-16 Fox G. (1997): Reason and reality in the methodologies of economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Lyme
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Harvey D. L., Reed M. (1998): Social science as the study of complex systems. In: Kiel L. D., Elliott E. (eds): Chaos theory in the social sciences. Foundations and applications. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp 295-323 Hayek F. A. (1967): The theory of complex phenomena. In: Hayek FA, Studies in philosophy, politics and economics. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London Heylighen F. (1999): The growth of structural and functional complexity during evolution. In: Heylighen F., Bollen J., Riegler A. (eds) The evolution of complexity. The violet book of “Einstein meets Magrite”, VUB University Press and Kluwer Academic Publishers, Brussels Dordrecht, pp 17-44 Kilpatrick H. E. (2001): Complexity, spontaneous order, and Friedrich Hayek: are spontaneous order and complexity essentially the same thing? Complexity 6:16-20 Lavoie D. (1994): Austrian models? Possibilities of evolutionary computation. In: Boettke P. J. (ed) The Elgar companion to Austrian Economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 549-555 Lawson T. (2001): Two responses to the failings of modern economics: the instrumentalist and the realist. Review of Population and Social Policy 10:155181 Lawson T. (2003a): Reorienting economics. Routledge, London Lawson T. (2003b): Heterodox economics: what is it? (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Heterodox Economics, Nottingham Trent University-UK) Lawson T. (2003c): The (confused) state of equilibrium analysis in modern economics: an (ontological) explanation. (Paper presented at the London History and Philosophy of Science Meetings, LSE-CPNSS, London-UK) Leijonhufvud A. (1995): Adaptive behavior, market processes and the computable approach. Revue Economique 46:1497-1510 Lissack M. (1999): Complexity: the science, its vocabulary, and its relation to organizations. Emergence 1:110-126 Lloyd S. (1999): Complexity: plain and simple. Complexity 4:72 McIntyre L. (1998): Complexity: a philosopher’s reflections. Complexity 3:26-32 Perona E. (2004): Conceptualising complexity in economic analysis: a philosophical, including ontological, study. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge Potts J. (2000): The new evolutionary microeconomics. Complexity, competence and adaptive behavior. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Northampton Pratten S. (2005): Economics as progress: the LSE approach to econometric modeling and Critical Realism as programmes for research. Cambridge Journal of Economics 29:179-205) Reed M., Harvey D. L. (1992): The new science and the old: complexity and realism in the social sciences. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 22:353380 Rosser J. B. (2004): Complexity in economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Northampton Schenk K. E. (2003): Economic institutions and complexity. Structures, interactions and emergent properties. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Northampton
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Simon H. (1976): How complex are complex systems? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennal Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol 1976, Issue Two: Symposia and Invited Papers, The University of Chicago Press, pp 507522 Simpson D. (2000): Rethinking economic behavior. How the economy really works. Macmillan, Basingstoke Wible J. (2000): What is complexity? In: Colander D. (ed) Complexity and the history of economic thought. Routledge, London, pp 15-30
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Part II
Modeling Issues I: Modeling Economic Complexity
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The Complex Problem of Modeling Economic Complexity R. H. Day
Complexity: a group of interrelated or entangled relationships. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993)
... history... where everything is in a state of flux, of perpetual transition and combinations... 1 Jacob Burckhardt, Reflections on History (1979)
1. Some Scientific Background Theoretical science generates testable, logical (mathematical) systems of thought that explain or comprehend observations and empirical data that themselves only reflect some properties of some realm of experience. Progress began to occur rapidly when stable, repetitive patterns were discovered, such as the motion of stellar bodies that could be carefully observed and their distances, masses, and velocities measured, and such as the ratios in which various pure substances interacted to form different compound substances. At the basis of all such efforts is an elemental faculty of the brain, one that enables the mind to discriminate, to discern the differences and similarities of things and happenings; in the former case, between complex and simple motions isolated by telescopic observations, in the latter, between simple and complex interactions isolated in test tubes. In general, this fundamental faculty permits classification of the manifold complexity of indi—————— 1
Published in German posthumously in 1905. Burckhardt died in 1897. Translated by M.D. HoHinger in 1943. See Burckhardt (1979).
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vidual things and events into categories relatively small in number with measurable, quantifiable, or qualitatively discernible attributes. It was the brilliant insight of Newton to show how a quantifiable index of matter in motion, the mass of objects, could play a central role in explaining and predicting the behavior of macro physical objects - as long as one wanted only to explain their positions relative to one another and not all the things going on inside or immediately around them. So the earth, moon, sun, and other planets become mass points. There never has been a more radical simplification of experience than that! But the single number, used to characterize an infinitely complex object like the earth, is not a contradiction of experience. It is not the earth, it is of the earth, an abstract representation of a quantifiable, emergent macro property - and useful: among other things, men landed on the moon. For a long time the principal of cause and effect that is central to the kind of theories just exemplified seemed to be wholly inappropriate for understanding complex patterns and irregular trajectories of physical, biological, and cultural events. The Nineteenth Century, however, began to contribute analytical advances that greatly extended the applicability of the kind of mathematics already in use to explain regular relationships and predictable events. Among the advances, one attributed to Poincaré is the discovery that the nonlinear equations of mechanics could generate nonperiodic, random-like trajectories. It was a crucial step in the development of chaotic dynamics that isolated the conditions that imply irregular, essentially unpredictable behavior and showed how to characterize it with the tools of probability theory. These developments provided the foundation for modeling complex dynamics that arise in many fields where the nonlinear causal relationships involved are already known and derivable from standard theoretical constructs. A rather different development that had a somewhat earlier origin was the finding that the average location of independently and dynamically interacting but constrained objects could be characterized by stable probability distributions, even though their individual trajectories could not be followed. Together, chaotic dynamics and statistical mechanics provide potential templates for models of variables in any domain whose behavior is governed by nonlinear, interacting causal forces and characterized by nonperiodic, highly irregular, essentially unpredictable behavior beyond a few periods into the future. Although widely applied now, including extensively in economics, the theories mentioned so far originated in physical science. A second, more general, analytically less tractable category of dynamical concepts had long been recognized. Eighteenth Century explorers and scientists had already provided the classificatory foundations for geological and biological
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theories of transformation. Then in the next century a comprehensive theory of evolution in the biological world was set forth by Darwin and Wallace based on variation and selection2. Even broader ideas of structural transformation and evolution were emerging from speculation about ecological and archaeological observations and the study of written records and histories produced in the ancient world. Differing production technologies and forms of socio-political organization and their development from one into another could be discerned. Adam Smith, later exponents of the German Historical School, and subsequent researches in archaeology, as for example described in V. Gordon Childe’s (1951) Man Makes Himself, explained how economic life passed through stages of successively advancing development3. Ancient historians were well aware of the development of peoples and their periods of growth and decay. The widespread revival of Greek and Roman literature led inescapably to the idea of Civilization’s Rise and Fall already enshrined in masterful prose by Edward Gibbon in just the same year that Adam Smith’s own masterpiece appeared. These broad descriptive works describe and explain technological, economic, political, and cultural evolution, but for the most part lack the mathematical precision of the physical sciences. The possibility, however, that a first rate scientific mind could construct a rigorous conceptual system that clarifies and helps understand human history was produced in Carol Quigley’s (1979) Evolution of Civilizations. In any case, human experience as the object of inquiry poses a unique problem for the development of scientific theory, one that convinces many that a science of human cultural evolution is an oxymoron. In common parlance that problem is “mind over matter”.
2. Mind Over Matter: On Rationality and Equilibrium Philosophers, scientists, and mystics have argued over the issue: Can the human mind change matter or energy? Most people do not ask the question. They just live their lives, move themselves about, fabricate things with their hands, or control the use of a machine or instrument that transforms a part of the material world. Obviously, therefore, the question —————— 2
For a beautifully insightful survey into the development of physical and biological sciences, see Toulmin and Goodfield (1961, 1962). 3 For a brief survey of the German Historical School, see Schumpeter, pp. 808882.
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makes sense only if it is about the world in its ultimately elemental aspects of material and energy. If it is about human action, the mind is elemental. Thus, is it not true that all the dynamics of agriculture and industry are initiated by the force of human thought? Is it not true that humans even cause atoms to be split and can guide electrons along pre-designed and constricted pathways? Somehow, out of the matter and energy that make up a brain, emerge thoughts that live in a realm of mind that cannot be seen, that can be communicated only imperfectly, but that move men and mountains. It is the discerning, analyzing, and problem solving rational mind we are now talking about. It is this aspect of mind that brings us to economics. Formalizing their predecessors’ verbally expressed theories of economic systems and behavior, Cournot and later Walras constructed the mathematical theories of production, consumption, exchange, and competition based on an idealized disentanglement of two of the basic components of a market economy, the Consumer or Household and the Producer or Business Firm. The general mathematical conditions required to demonstrate the existence and properties of equilibrium were provided many decades later by Wald, von Neumann, Arrow, Debreu, Dorfman, Samuelson, and Solow. The first empirical implementation (still more radically simplified compared to the pure theory) was the inter-industry economics of Leontief. Iconoclasts of the present era, in our eagerness to gain attention for an explicitly dynamic, adaptive, evolutionary point of view, tirelessly point out the deficiencies of that new classical school: its dependence primarily on statics; its exclusion of common attributes of economizing behavior such as imitation, trial and error search, learning by doing, and so on. What we often forget is that this general equilibrium theory is a theory of complexity based on mind over matter, not on the random encounters of thoughtless objects, but on the choices of thinking consumers and producers. These theoretical, thinking, heterogeneous agents, an arbitrary number of them (none necessarily alike) exercise the rational capacity of the mind to set the flow of commodities in motion. The general equilibrium theorists showed how - in principle - a system of prices could coordinate the implied flow of goods and services among the arbitrarily many heterogeneous individual decision-makers. Of course, that is not good enough. We must have a theory that goes beyond the equilibrium property, that directly confronts the more fundamental problem of existence: how to model the mechanisms that mimic the dynamic process of coordination out of equilibrium. Before touching on a few contributions to the struggle to reach this objective, let me make an important point about the logical content of the
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neoclassical concept of equilibrium among heterogeneous, rational agents. The rationality is based on the same faculty of discrimination that permits scientific thought. We discriminate among things and actions and compare their desirability according to some kind of attribute or set of attributes, and order those alternatives, picking one among those highest (best or optimal) in the order. The mathematical theorist gives the set of alternatives being considered and the ordering of elements of that set symbolic representations amenable to a logical characterization and further analytical investigation. The exact conditions that permit feasible exchanges among all the individuals so that the agents are able to execute what they consider to be their best choices is the theoretical problem Walras formulated and his followers solved. Agents in this theory need not be assumed to have perfect knowledge of all possible alternatives. It need only be assumed that they recognize distinct well ordered opportunities. For this reason, in a competitive equilibrium so defined, Pareto superior choices could exist if only the agents knew more. Contrastingly, for a social welfare equilibrium total knowledge of all possible alternatives would be required. But aside from that requirement, in pure logic the theory is not about perfect knowledge or unbounded rationality! If neoclassical economics - interpreted correctly - is not about perfect rationality, what is it about? It is about perfect coordination. It identifies those conditions on the alternatives and orderings for which a price system exists - in principle - that could - if it prevailed - permit perfect decentralized coordination: agents only know their own minds - to the extent that they do know them - and among perceived feasible alternatives choose one they prefer. If they base their choice on equilibrium prices, they all get to carry out their chosen actions. Thoughtful economists understand the questions begged by this theory of perfect coordination among boundedly rational minds: Where do the perfectly coordinating prices come from? Supposing they are found, what do agents do until they appear? And, once the dust settles, wouldn’t the agents, those with any mammal’s curiosity, observe something not noticed before, and learn something from the choices made? The simplest way to deal with these questions is to call them ‘some other kind of economics’ and ignore them all together, or instead - in contradiction of the boundedly rational foundations of the theory - endow agents with equilibrium knowledge and call it ‘rational expectations’. Now there is an oxymoron! The more complicated way to deal with the problems not yet solved is to acknowledge their existence and do something about them. That brings us to consider some steps in the right direction.
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3. Steps in the Right Direction First, we should remember that the seminal founders of neoclassical economics themselves initiated steps in this direction: Cournot with his adaptive or recursive best response strategies as a model of competition in oligopolistic markets; Walras with his consumers’ and producers’ tâtonnement mechanism with prices adjusting to demand/supply disequilibrium and quantities adjusting to profit disequilibrium; Marshall, more or less analogously, with his quasi-rent theory of investment and marginal adjustment of consumer choices at their present operating point. Some readers may be surprised that these steps had already been taken well over a century ago and may wonder why no one has told you about them. All of us should wonder why these early disequilibrium theories of market dynamics are not being exposed to graduate students today. Quite distinct from the neoclassical microeconomics and interindustry messoeconomics of Leontief was the construction of a macroeconomics theory on an abstract basis as daring as Newton’s, namely Keynes’ equations of aggregate consumption, investment, government spending, demand, output and income, all represented by statistical indexes constructed from various observational data, but, like Newton’s mass, not observable themselves. At about the same time, Tinbergen constructed the first macroeconometric model of a national economy, encompassing more detail than did Keynes but still basing the statistical estimates on more or less highly aggregated variables. A decade later the Klein-Goldberger model initiated a worldwide explosion of research in macroeconometric models. This general approach came to form a separate sub-discipline just as optimal growth theory has done in more recent decades. But out-ofequilibrium macro - still being extended in substantial works - has been defamed on grounds it is ad hoc. Rather, it is a tractable approach for modeling out-of-equilibrium behavior. Modern investigators are continuing to improve on the approach. (I think here, for example, of recent studies by Flaschel, Franke, and Semmler (1997) and Chiarella, Groh, Flaschel, and Franke (2000). The frequent criticism that Keynesian macro theory does not have a micro foundation is also mistaken. Indeed, Morishima (1994) provided a quite explicit micro foundation of macro based on an elaborate extension of general equilibrium theory. At the other extreme, Simon and his then-young colleagues, March and Cyert, began a serious reconstruction of microeconomics from an adaptive out-of-equilibrium point of view. Simon’s original work and his later collaboration with March was concerned with the internal structure of decision-making and administration in large business and government organizations. Cyert and March elaborated these ideas in an explicit attempt to
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model and simulate the adaptive microeconomic processes on computers. A more formal effort to develop an adaptive theory of business behavior was that of Modigliani and Cohen who focused on the formulation of expectations and partial adjustment mechanisms. Hard on the heels of these works came two studies, each attempting to build a coherent dynamic out-of-equilibrium theory. Forgive me if I mention my own work at this point, the first applied, empirical version of which was published in 1963. It is perhaps à propos on this occasion because I gave my first lectures in Italy about it in the Spring of 1968. This recursive programming (RP) or adaptive economizing approach is a more general and explicitly behavioral restatement of Cournot and Walras’ models of recursively optimizing agents who adapt to disequilibrium signals. Agents form alternative possibilities subject to technical constraints and choose a best alternative on the basis of adaptively adjusted price expectations and updated resource constraints - and here a specific behavioral element is introduced - they choose in the neighborhood of their current operating point. This neighborhood is their zone of flexible response or ZFR. In the specific form implemented in empirical work, the ZFR expands in the direction of a successful past choice and contracts in the direction of less successful past choices. Behavior then follows a local economizing, learning-by-doing sequence of adjustments to experience as it unfolds. In all of this early work, I represented choice alternatives as processes which allow one to represent families of distinct technological activities, to follow their paths of adoption and abandonment, and to derive the implied demands for labor and other resources. These applied studies and the basic ideas on which they are based, together with some broad inferences about economic development in general, are described in a recent Cambridge University Press volume, The Divergent Dynamics of Economic Growth (Day, 2004). Sidney Winter’s (1964) dissertation, “Economic ‘Natural’ Selection and the Theory of the Firm”, in the Yale Economic Essays, advanced the Simon-March-Cyert behavioral viewpoint in an evolutionary framework built up on the real primitives of decision-making in complex organizations: rules, strategies, or routines. The fundamental selection process driving businesses in his system is the innovation, adoption, and abandonment of alternative rules and procedures or routines, the work was subsequently elaborated and developed in collaboration with Nelson, culminating in their influential book in 1984, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, which marks a true milestone in the development of the discipline.
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Clearly, any selection among alternatives involving an explicit comparison according to an ordering criterion is an example of the economic principle of rationality, the simplest being a choice between two objects such as two apples, between two or more alternative production activities in my RP models, or between two routines that could be carried out to accomplish some task within a complex production or administrative process, as in Nelson and Winter. Moreover, all operational optimizing models of any complexity require algorithms for their solution, which consist of sequences of simple computational routines that involve at each step a locally improving direction of search according to an explicit criterion. In my terms they constitute recursive programming systems based on local search within prescribed zones of flexible response. In this way, we find our way back to a foundation in neoclassical theory based on rational choice. We are not developing ‘some other kind of theory’ but extending the theory of our intellectual fathers in the same direction as their own faltering steps guided them, but, hopefully, well beyond. And it is possible to derive analytical results: the condition under which trajectories exist and their dynamic properties such as their multiple phase switching (evolutionary) character and possible non-convergence, periodic, chaotic, or convergent properties. To derive such properties, one must construct models that simplify the approach with one (or at least a very small number) of variables, or one must formulate the model abstractly as the Day-Kennedy paper did (1970), or as Nelson and Winter did more concretely in their “Economic Growth as a Pure Selection Process” (Chapter 10 in their 1984 book). I also want to remind you of a very early collection of papers, Adaptive Economic Models, based on a 1974 conference at the University of Wisconsin’s Mathematics Research Center, which made significant advances in outlining the methodological underpinnings of the adaptive evolutionary approach and in exemplifying various aspects of the theory in specific theoretical and empirical models. Coincidentally, two other participants in the present volume in addition to myself contributed to that collection: Massanao Aoki, who wrote about dual (adaptive) control theory, and Alan Kirman, whose paper, “Learning by Firms About Demand Conditions”, illustrated an especially important insight: (i) what can potentially be learned depends on how you learn; and (ii) a learning procedure may converge when there is still more to be learned if only the way one is learning could be suitably reconstituted. As Alan put it, “the firm... may develop an inaccurate picture of the world which nevertheless generates exactly the information it does in fact observe. The firm may well be satisfied with
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this situation and there is little evidence to suggest that such unjustified complacency is uncommon”. (Kirman, 1975, p. 138)
4. Disequilibrium Existence Most of what has been reviewed in the previous section is concerned with how agents behave out-of-equilibrium given that they have and find feasible opportunities. Yet to be dealt with is the disequilibrium existence problem. How does an agent get along in a world it does not fully understand, when it is influenced by other agents whose actions it does not control, when one may find it difficult to ‘fit in’, and when one’s existence can be threatened by unpredictable physical or financial disasters? Indeed, how does any living thing survive the vicissitudes of its life? The answer is immediately available on every hand, just by observing the living systems around us, especially our own. The physician, Cannon, in an exceptionally readable book, The Wisdom of the Body, articulated the solution precisely in physiological terms: the stock/flow mechanisms in living beings that stores the various fats, proteins, and carbohydrates in various forms throughout the organism, retaining their quantities sufficient for all but the most extreme and prolonged demands, replenishing them at more or less regular intervals as they are drawn down. Cannon coined the term ‘homeostasis’ for these mechanisms. He also suggested explicitly that such homeostatic mechanisms operate within economic systems, and where they do not, troubles can arise that might be overcome by introducing such systems. The stocks maintained in economic homeostasis are inventories of goods in process, goods in transit, goods in warehouses and stores, and goods maintained in household cupboards, pantries, and refrigerators. Building on papers by D.H. Robertson and Eric Lundberg, Lloyd Metzler showed how, at the macroeconomic level, the stock/flow inventory mechanisms led to fluctuations, which, given certain stability properties on the marginal propensity to consume and invest, are bound within limits, just as physiological balances adjust within limits consistent with survival. The study of such stock/flow mechanisms at the micro level took place in the literature on inventory control, but as far as I know has never been incorporated into general economic interdependence theory. Metzler himself emphasized the mathematical difficulties of further complications. But progress might be made by adapting the Bourboki-Arrow-Debreu-like level of abstraction, an obvious task, it seems to me, that should be undertaken.
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But that will not be enough to solve the disequilibrium existence problem. Monetary economies run on financial assets and debts, which define intended future flows of monetary payments. The creation of such assets and debts by means of bank credit has played a crucial role in the development of market economies and in the nonperiodic incidence of prosperity and depression. The flow of income payments that the stock of debts is supposed to generate is based on expectations that may not be realized. When such failures become widespread and sufficiently grave to produce widespread bankruptcy, homeostasis is threatened. Economywide breakdowns can occur. The non-periodic incidence of alternating prosperity and recession has led to further innovation in the use of debt instruments. Hence, we have the refinancing of consumer and business debt, with central banks relaxing or restricting the requirements for credit expansion, and with ad hoc government loans and grants as saviors of last resort. My old friend, John Burr Williams, said that, “To leave money out of a book on the private enterprise market economy was like leaving blood out of a book on physiology”. It was Keynes’ most important contribution to have devised a way to introduce that financial blood into economics at the macroeconomic level. In spite of some brave efforts to overcome this lacuna at the microeconomic level and despite the flourishing development of finance, the task remains, for there is no area of economic theory so badly in need of development as the disequilibrium dynamics of financial stocks and flows. I have not mentioned in these remarks the creative faculty of mind responsible for generating the design for things that did not exist before and scenarios of action one has never previously experienced. Nor have I touched on the social aspect of mind that leads people to cohere in groups, to believe in similar thoughts, to follow a leader, and to adhere to the dictates of some kind of group mentality. But perhaps the basic problem of disequilibrium existence has to be solved first. My impression is that many of us go out of our way to avoid that task, becoming intrigued with all manner of mathematics, models, and mechanisms only peripherally related to the task of explaining how governments and central banks interact with the private household and business sectors. Of course, there is the view that market systems must inevitably selfdestruct. Believers in this point of view argue that the best course of action is to help them do so and get it over with. It is evident that experiments carried out in the last century with that intent proved unpleasant. They produced long, miserable interludes in the general process of economic evolution. I would rather continue our basic mission, that of focusing on how democratic market systems work, how market institutions and banks
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use out-of-equilibrium stock/flow intermediation and adjustment processes to maintain viability for the system of interacting households, firms, government institutions. In the process of this research we might then identify policies that improve the stability and distributional properties of the system as a whole.
References Burckhardt J., (1979): Reflections on History, Liberty Classics, Indianapolis. Cannon W., (1963): The Wisdom of the Body, W.W. Norton and Co., New York. Chiarella C., Flaschel P., Groh G., Semmler W., (2000): Disequilibrium Growth and Labor Market Dynamics, Springer-Verlag, Berlin. Childe V.G., (1951): Man Makes Himself, The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., New York. Originally published in 1931. Cyert R., March, J., (1992): A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, 2nd edition, Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, MA. Day R., (1963): Recursive Programming and Production Response, NorthHolland Publishing Co., Amsterdam. Day R., (1994): Complex Economic Dynamics, Volume I, An Introduction to Dynamical Systems and Market Mechanisms, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Day R., 2000, Complex Economic Dynamics, Volume II, An Introduction to Macroeconomic Dynamics, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Day R., (2000): The Divergent Dynamics of Economic Growth, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England. Day R., Kennedy P., (1970): Recursive decision systems: an existence analysis, Econometrica 38, 666-681. Flaschel, P., Franke, R. and Semmler, W., (1997): Dynamic Macroeconomics: Instability, Fluctuations and Growth in Monetary Economics, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Kirman A., (1975): Learning by firms about demand conditions, Day, R and Groves, T. (eds), Adaptive Economic Models, Academic Press, New York. March J., Simon H., (1958): Organizations, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York. Mezler L., (1941): The nature and stability of inventory cycles, Review of Economic Statistics 23, 100-129. Modigliani, F. and Cohen, K. J.: 1963, The Role of Anticipations and Plans in Economic Behavior, University of Illinois, Urbana. Morishima M., (1994): Dynamic Economic Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Nelson, R. and Winter, S.: 1982, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Quigley C., (1979): The Evolution of Civilization, Liberty Press, Indianapolis. Schumpeter J., (1954): History of Economic Analysis, Oxford University Press, New York.
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Simon H., (1983): Reason in Human Affairs, Stanford University Press, Stanford. Toulmin S., Goodfield J., (1961): The Fabric of the Heavens, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Toulmin S., Goodfield J., (1962): The Architecture of Matter University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Winter S., (1964): Economic ‘natural’ selection and the theory of the firm, Yale Economic Essays, Yale University Press, New Haven.
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Visual Recurrence Analysis: Application to Economic Time series M. Faggini
1. Introduction The existing linear and non-linear techniques of time series analysis (Casdagli, 1997), long dominant within applied mathematics, the natural sciences, and economics, are inadequate when considering chaotic phenomena. In fact, on their basis, the irregular behaviour of some non-linear deterministic systems is not appreciated and when such behaviour is manifested in observations, often it is considered to be stochastic. This has driven the search for more powerful tools to detect, analyse and cope with non-stationarity and chaotic behaviour (Kantz and Schreiber 2000). Nevertheless the typical tools used to analyse chaotic data fail when there are short time series. Therefore the typical tools are unable to detect chaotic behaviour, in particular in economic time series. For this goal different tools are identified. Some of them, such as Recurrence Plots (RPs), rely on the presence of deterministic structure underlying the data. The RPs can be a useful starting point for analysing the non-stationarity sequences. It seems especially useful for cases in which there is modest data availability. RPs can be compared to classical approaches for analysing chaotic data, especially in the ability to detect bifurcation (Zbilut, Giuliani, and Webber 2000). Starting from this point of view we will apply a topological tool (Visual Recurrence Analysis) to macroeconomic data that has already been analysed with metric tools (correlation dimension, Lyapunov exponent) by Frank., Gencay, and Stengos (1988) and we will compare the different results obtained when using one method or the other.
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In the last few decades, there has been an increasing interest in nonlinear dynamic models, in all scientific fields (mathematics, chemistry, physics, and so on)1. The discovery that simple models can show complex and chaotic dynamics has also propelled some economists to be interested in those fields2. In fact, in the literature there are many examples of nonlinear economic models that exhibit chaotic dynamics. Linear models are inadequate when we deal-with such phenomena and particularly, when we want to analyse economic and financial time series3. Irregular behaviour of some non-linear deterministic systems is not appreciated and when such behaviour is manifest in observations, it is typically explained as stochastic. Almost all existing linear and non-linear techniques for analysis of time series assume some kind of stationarity, that is, in the time series there is no systematic change in mean (no trend) in variance, and strictly periodic variations have been removed. In fact, the probability approach to stationary time series requires that a non-stationary time series be turned into a stationary time series4. However, these techniques, long dominant within applied mathematics, the natural sciences, and economics, are inadequate when considering chaotic phenomena. Moreover, in order to perform a more reliable analysis it is important to consider the time series in a non-linear framework because nonlinearities provide information about the structure of time series and insights about the nature of the process governing that structure. The last point is crucial because in the absence of information about the structure of time series it is difficult to distinguish the stochastic from the chaotic process5.
—————— 1
Paragraphs 4 and 5 are parts of an article by Marisa Faggini Un approccio di teoria del Caos all’analisi delle serie storiche in Rivista di Politica Economica, n. 7-8 (luglio-agosto) 2005, Editore SIPI SpA, Roma. 2 Interest in non-linear dynamics models in economics is not new, however, and dates back to the time before economists had learned about chaos. Kaldor (1940), Hicks (1950), and Goodwin (1951) have already tried to model economic fluctuations by nonlinear deterministic business cycle models. At that time, attention was focused on regular periodic dynamic behaviour rather than on irregularity and chaos” Hommes (1995). 3 Ramsey (1989). 4 Strozzi et al. (2002). 5 Panas and Ninni (2000).
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This awareness has led to powerful new concepts and tools to detect, analyze, and control apparently random phenomena that at a deeper level could present complex dynamics6. The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 the traditional tests for chaos are described, highlighting their positive and negative features. In section 3 an alternative tool to overcome the problems of metric tools is presented. In section 4 we describe the application of visual recurrence analysis (VRA) to macroeconomic time series, highlighting the different results obtained by applying a topological tool versus a metric tool. In section 5 we report the conclusion of our work: the implications of chaos control theory as a new perspective for modeling economic phenomena showing what implications for policy implementation can be derived by using a chaotic approach to model economic systems and chaos control techniques to control them. The presence of chaos offers attractive possibilities for control strategies7 and this point seems particularly interesting for insights into economic policies. Detecting chaos in economic data is the first condition to apply a chaotic control to phenomena that generate them. In this case the goal is to select economic policies that allow a regular and efficient dynamic by choosing among different aperiodic behaviours: the attractor’s orbits, thus maintaining the natural structure of the system.
2. Tools for detecting non-linearity and chaos in economic time series The discovery of chaotic behaviour in economic models led to the search for such behaviour in data. The first work that took this tack is that of Brock (1986), Sayers (1986), Barnett e Chen (1988), Ramsey (1989), Chen (1993), LeBaron (1994). After these pioneering works, it was realized that chaos in economics had a broad range of potential applications. From forecasting movements in foreign exchange and stock markets to understanding international business cycles there was an explosion of empirical work searching for possible chaos in all types of economic and financial time series. —————— 6
“[...] term ‘complex economics dynamics’ to designate deterministic economic models whose trajectories exhibit irregular (non periodic) fluctuations or endogenous phase switching. The first properties includes chaotic trajectories [...] the second [...] change in the systems states [...] according to intrinsic rules”, Day (1992). 7 Boccaletti et al. (2000).
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The most likely candidates for non-linear dynamic structures in economics were macroeconomic time series. These series, which exhibit a large amount of structure through business cycle fluctuations, seemed like a natural place to look for unseen determinism. Chaotic dynamics are also an appealing model for financial time series. Sometimes apparently random fluctuations that can be characterized like chaotic behaviours are seen in the stock market. While the stochastic models can explain many of these fluctuations as due to external random shocks, in a chaotic system these fluctuations are internally generated as part of the deterministic process. The analysis of macroeconomic time series has not yet led to particularly encouraging results: these first studies have found little or no evidence for chaos in any economic time series. That is due to the small samples and high noise levels for most macroeconomic series, since they are usually aggregated time series coming from a system whose dynamics and measurement probes may be changing over time. The analysis of financial time series has led to results that are as a whole more interesting and reliable even if an important obstacle in applying chaos theory has been the lack of tests, such as autocorrelation functions, that can distinguish between chaotic and random behaviour8. Therefore, to examine the chaotic behaviour of time series a variety of methods have been invented. These are widely used in physics to detect chaos. However, not all of the approaches developed by physicists are applicable in economics because most of those methods require a large amount of data to ensure sufficient precision. There are, therefore, advantages and disadvantages to each of these criteria. Their importance in examining the chaotic structure lies not only in their usefulness in analysing the non-linear structure but also in their relevance and potential utility to distinguish between stochastic behaviour and deterministic chaos9. The main and more frequently used tests for chaos in economic time series are correlation dimension, Lyapunov exponent, and the BDS statistic test. The correlation dimension measures the degree of instability of a dynamic system while being interested in the long term evolution of the system. The Lyapunov exponents allow researchers to estimate the rate of separation between two initially close trajectories. Chaotic dynamics show two fundamental characteristics: a local instability and a global stability. All the trajectories diverge on the attractor (lo—————— 8 9
Sakai and Tokumaru (1980). Pasanu and Ninni (2000).
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cal instability); thus two points as close as possible will have two different trajectories. While the sensitive dependence of initial conditions is measured by means of the Lyapunov exponent, the convergence of all the trajectories towards the attractor (global stability) is measured using the dimension of attractor; that is the correlation dimension. The correlation dimension test (CD) was developed in physics by Grassberger and Procaccia, (1983). This test is based on measuring the dimension of a strange attractor. A pure stochastic process will spread all space as evolving, but the movements of a chaotic system will be restricted by an attractor. If the integer dimension for an attractor is provided, it is not clear whether the system is chaos; on the other hand, a fractal dimension means the system is chaotic because a chaotic attractor has a fractal dimension. The correlation dimension is generally used to estimate the dimension of attractor in an economy because it has the major advantage of being very easy to calculate compared to other dimensions whose estimate algorithms are very difficult. Correlation dimension can be calculated using the distances between each pair of points in the set of N number of points s (i, j ) = X i − X j .
Having defined this distance we can calculate the correlation function, C(r) that will be C ( r ) =
1 x (number of pairs (i, j) with s (i, j ) < r ) or better N2
C (r ) = lim N →∞
1 N2
N
∑θ (r − X
i
−Xj .
(1)
i, j i≠ j
Therefore, we can find Dcorr with the formula: Dcorr = lim r →0
log(C ( r ) . log(r )
Therefore, CD analysis provides necessary but not sufficient conditions for testing the presence of chaos. This test, designed for very large, clean data sets, was found to be problematical when applied to financial and economic series. Data sets with only a few hundred or even a few thousand observations may be inadequate for this procedure10. As indicated above sensitivity to the initial conditions is measured by the value of the first Lyapunov exponent. The Lyapunov exponent is based on the evolution of the variation in the course of time between two —————— 10
Ruelle (1991).
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very close points initially; it measures the rate of separation between trajectories starting from those points. This variation in the course of time diverges in an exponential way: δ xT = δx0 exp(λT ) 11. Here λ is the largest Lyapunov exponent12 and δ xT the difference between the two trajectories after T iterations and is equal to
λ = lim T →∞
1 T
T
∆x ( X 0 , t )
t =1
∆x 0
∑ ln
.
(2)
So if λ < 0 the orbit attracts to a stable fixed point or stable periodic orbit; λ = 0 the orbit is a neutral fixed point; and λ > 0 the orbit is unstable and chaotic. The positive Lyapunov exponent is generally regarded as necessary but not sufficient to the presence of chaos. Therefore, as for correlation dimension, the estimate of Lyapunov exponents requires a large number of observations. Since few economic series of a sufficiently large size are available, Lyapunov exponent estimates of economic data may not be so reliable. One of the most commonly applied tests for nonlinearity is the BDS13 test of Brock, Dechert, and Scheinkman (1996) which, using the correlation dimensions, constructed a variable that had a limiting standard normal distribution, thus enabling a test of the hypothesis of randomness of a time series. This tests the much more restrictive null hypothesis that the series is independent and identically distributed. It is not a test for chaos14. It is useful because it is well defined and easy to apply test and has power against any type of structure in a series. It is sensitive to both linear and nonlinear departures from IID and has been used most widely to examine the adequacy of fit of a variety of time series models with economic and financial data15. —————— 11
Filoll (2001). For a formal explanation of Lyapunov exponent see Wolf A., Swift J., Swinney W., and Vastano J., (1985). 13 ”Details of which may be found in Dechert (1996). Subsequent to its introduction, the BBS test has been generalised by Savit and Green (1991) and Wu, Savit, and Brock (1993) and more recently, DeLima (1998) introduced an iterative version of the BBS test” McKenzie (2001). 14 LeBaron (1994). 15 Brock and Sayers (1986); Frank and Stengos (1989); Scheinkman and Le Baron, (1989); Hsieh, (1989), Brock et al. (1991). 12
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The BDS test was developed for testing time series in the physical sciences where long, clean data sets are the norm. In economic time series, however, small noisy data sets are more common and the application of the BBS test to such data presents a number of problems. The first problem is that noise may render any dimension calculation useless16; to obtain a reliable analysis, large data sets are required. A rapid excursus among the techniques used to test the presence of chaos in time series shows that data quantity and data quality are crucial in applying them. The main obstacle in economic empirical analysis is limited data sources. In order to facilitate the testing of deterministic chaos and to improve our understanding of modern economies, it is worthwhile to develop numerical algorithms that work with moderate data sets and are robust against noise.
3. Recurrence Analysis: VRA An alternative to the technique problems discussed above could be applications of topological methods to detect chaos in economic time series. Generally, methods to analyse time series for detecting chaos could be classified in metric, dynamical, and topological tools17. For example, the correlation dimension is a metric method because it is based on the computation of distances on the system’s attractor; the Lyapunov exponent, on the other hand, is a dynamical method because it is based on computing the way near to where orbits diverge. Topological methods are characterized by the study of the organisation of the strange attractor, and they include close returns plots and recurrence plots. Topological methods exploit an essential property of a chaotic system, i.e. the tendency of the time series nearly, although never exactly, to repeat itself over time. This property is known as the recurrence property. In non-linear dynamical systems, the relation between closeness in time and in phase space is the most relevant manifestation of non-stationarity. The topological approach provides the basis for a new way to test time series data for chaotic behaviour18. In fact it has been successfully applied in the sciences to detect chaos in experimental data19, and it is particularly applicable to economic and financial data since it works well on relatively —————— 16
Brock and Sayers (1986). Belaire-Franch et al. (2001). 18 Mindlin et al. (1990). 19 Mindlin et al. (1991) and Mindlin and Gilmore (1992). 17
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small data sets, is robust against noise, and preserves time-ordering information20. Topological tests may not only detect the presence of chaos (the only information provided by the metric class of tests), but can also provide information about the underlying system responsible for chaotic behaviour. As the topological method preserves time ordering of the data, where evidence of chaos is found, the researcher may proceed to characterise the underlying process in a quantitative way. Thus, one is able to reconstruct the stretching and compressing mechanisms responsible for generating the strange attractor. For this, Recurrence Analysis can represent a useful methodology to detect non-stationarity21 and chaotic behaviours in time series22. At first, this approach was used to show recurring patterns and nonstationarity in time series; then Recurrence Analysis was applied to study chaotic systems because recurring patterns are among the most important features of chaotic systems23. This methodology makes it possible to reveal correlation in the data that is not possible to detect in the original time series. It does not require either assumptions on the stationarity of time series or the underlying equations of motions. It seems especially useful for cases in which there is modest data availability and it can efficiently compare to classical approaches for analysing chaotic data, especially in its ability to detect bifurcation24. Recurrence Analysis is particularly suitable to investigate the economic time series that are characterized by noise and lack of data and are an output of high dimensional systems25. In the literature the tools based on the topological approach are Close Return Test26 and Recurrence Plot27.
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Gilmore (1993). According Holyst and Zebrowska (2000), “system properties that cannot be observed using other linear and non-linear approaches and is specially useful for analysis of non stationarity systems with high dimensional and /or noisy dynamics”. 22 Zbilut et al. (2000). 23 Cao and Cai (2000). 24 Kononov (http://home.netcom.com/~eugenek/download.html), Ekmann et al. (1987); Zbilut et al. (2000). 25 Trulla et al. (1996) pp. 255. 26 Gilmore (1993) 27 Ekmann et al. (1987) 21
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3.1 Recurrence Plot The graphical tool that evaluates the temporal and phase space distance is the Recurrence Plot based on the Space State Reconstruction28. How the information can be recovered from time series was first suggested by Packard et al. (1980) and Takens (1981). They found that a phase space analogous to that of the underlying dynamical system could be reconstructed from time derivatives formed from the data29. The goal of such a reconstruction is to capture the original system states each time we have an observation of that system output. The idea is to expand a one-dimensional signal into an M-dimensional phase space; one substitutes each observation in the original signal X (t ) with vector 30 Yi = {xi , xi − d , xi − 2 d ,..., xi − ( m −1) d }. As a result, we have a series of vectors: Y = {y (1), y (2), y (3), ..., y ( N − (m − 1)d }. The key issue of state space reconstruction is the choice of the embedding parameters31 (delay and dimension) because in practical analysis it —————— 28
This approach is founded on flow of information from unobserved variables to observed variables and is widely used to reduce multivariate data to a few significant variables. The basic idea is that the effect of all the other (unobserved) variables is already reflected in the series of the observed output and the rules that govern the behaviour of the original system can be recovered from its output. Kantz and Schreiber (2000). 29 [...] From this picture we can then obtain the asymptotic properties of the systems, such the positive Lyapunov characteristics like the attractor’s topological dimension”, see Packard et al. (1980). 30 i is the time index, m is the embedding dimension, d is the time delay, N is the length of the original series. 31 The determination of embeddings parameters is a crucial point to obtain a significant state space reconstruction. In the literature there is still controversy regarding this point. For example, some researchers (Giuliani et al. 2000) have established for discrete data analysis a value delay time equal to 1, while for continuous data this value can be over 1. This rule of thumb is very limiting because in economics it is obvious that a value of variable today depends on the value of variable yesterday. The same rule is used for determining a dimension, in fact the typical dimension value for the economic time series state space reconstruction is 10. Other researchers (Stengos 1989, Scheinkman and LeBaron 1989, Hiemstra 1992, Mizrach 1992, Hsieh 1989, Guillaume 1994) of determination of dimension have found a value varying between 3 and 7. The consideration of Eugene Kononov (VRA author) after my request about this argument is the following: “I think the estimates of correlation dimensions in economic data are too optimistic. The presence of serial correlations, noise, and the relatively short length of data make it almost impossible to estimate a dimension reliably. And if there is such a thing as a low-dimensional structure in economic data, I’d like to
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has been demonstrated that different embedding parameters affect the predictions result and the quality of reconstruction. Nevertheless, there is not agreement about the procedures that calculate them. The techniques used for determining the embedding parameters (embedology32) are Mutual Information Function (MIF) and False Nearest Neighbours (FNN)33. The mutual information function provides important information about reasonable delay times while the false nearest neighbours can give guidance about the proper embedding dimension. Recurrence Plot is a graphical method designed to locate hidden recurring patterns, non-stationarity, and structural changes, introduced in Eckmann et al. (1987). The RP is a two-dimensional representation of a single trajectory. It is formed by a 2-dimensional M x M (matrix) where M is the number of embedding vectors Y(i) obtained from the delay co-ordinates of the input signal. In the matrix the point value of coordinates (i, j) is the Euclidean distance between vectors Y(i) and Y(j). In this matrix, the horizontal axis represents the time index Y(i) while the vertical axis represents the time shift Y(j). A point is placed in the array (i, j) if Y(i) is sufficiently close to Y(j). There are two types of RP: thresholded (also known as recurrence matrix) and unthresholded34. The thresholded RPs are symmetric35 around the main diagonal (45° axis).
————— ask the authors why they can’t predict their economic series any better than a random guess. I would suggest that you do your own research and don’t take the published results for granted. From my perspective of applied analysis, the best dimension is the one that gives you the best prediction results when used in your prediction model”. 32 The delay co-ordinates method has negative and positive properties. A positive one is that the “signal to noise ratio on each component is the same; a negative one is that their use implies the choice of delay parameters. If the parameter is too small, redundance, the co-ordinates are about the same and the trajectories of reconstructed space are compressed along main diagonal. If the parameter is too large, irrelevance, and the time series is characterised by chaos and noise, the dynamics may become unrelated and the reconstruction is no longer representative of true dynamics”. See Casdagli, et al. 1991. 33 Kennel and Abarbanel (1999); Cao (1997); Fraser and Swinney (1986). 34 “[...] In an unthresholded PR the pixel lying at (i,j) is color-coded according to the distance, while in a thresholded RP the pixel lying at (i,j) is black if the distance falls within a specified threshold corridor and white otherwise”. Iwanski and Bradley (1988). 35 The recurrence matrix is symmetric across its diagonal if ||Y(i)-Y(j)||=||Y(j)Y(i)||, McGuire et al. (1997).
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3.2 How to interpret RP In the Recurrence Plot it is quite usual to establish a critical radius and to plot a point as a darkened pixel only if the corresponding distance is below or equal to this radius. The points in this array are coloured according to the i − j vectors distance. Usually a dark colour shows the short distances and a light colour the long distance. We start by considering a random time series (default from VRA: White noise). The plot (Fig. 1c) has been built using delay 1 and dimension 12 as selected respectively from mutual information function and false nearest neighbours. As we can see in Fig. 1c, the plot of random time series shows a recurrent point distributed in homogenous random patterns. That means random variable lack of deterministic structures. These visual features are confirmed by the ratio calculated with RQA. We can see that the REC and DET assume values equal to zero, so in time series there are no recurrent points and no deterministic structure. These features are more evident if we compare REC and DET of time series with one of sine function (Fig. 1a). The plots of sine function are more regular and REC shows not only the recurrent point in each epoch but also that this value is the same. DET values are high, meaning a strong structure in the time series confirmed by the Maxline values which are also high, so deterministic rules are present in the dynamics. Comparing the Fig. 1a and Fig. 1b it is possible to see that if the analyzed series is generated from a determinist process in the RP there are long segments parallel to the main diagonal. If the data are chaotic these segments are short (Fig. 1b time series generated from a Lorenz equation). In Fig.1 it is possible to characterise stationary and non-stationary processes. If the coloration of the diagram is homogenous (Fig. 1c) the processes are stationary. The non-stationary, instead, causes changes in the distribution of the recurrent points for which the coloration of the matrix is not homogenous. If the texture of the pattern within such a block is homogeneous, stationarity can be assumed for the given signal within the corresponding period of time; non-stationary systems cause changes in the distribution of recurrence points in the plot, which is visible by brightened areas. Diagonal structures show the range in which a piece of the trajectory is rather close to another piece of the trajectory at different times. The diagonal length is the length of time they will be close to each other and can be interpreted as the mean prediction time. From the occurrence of lines parallel to the diagonal in the recurrence plot, it can be seen how fast neighboured trajectories diverge in phase space. The line segments parallel to the main diagonal are points close to each other successively forward in time and would not occur in a random,
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as opposed to deterministic, process. So if the analysed time series is deterministic, then the recurrence plot shows short line segments parallel to the main diagonal; on the other hand, if the series is white noise, then the recurrence plot does not show any structure. Chaotic behavior causes very short diagonals, whereas deterministic behaviour causes longer diagonals. Therefore, the average length of these lines is a measure of the reciprocal of the largest positive Lyapunov exponent. 3.3 Recurrence Quantification Analysis The RP approach has not gained much popularity because its graphical output is not easy to interpret. The set of lines parallel to the main diagonal is the signature of determinism. That set, however, might not be so clear. In fact, the recurrence plot could contain subtle patterns not easily ascertained by visual inspection. As a consequence Zbilut and Webber (1998) proposed statistical quantification of RPs, well-known as Recurrence Quantification analysis (RQA). RQA methodology is independent of limiting constraints such as data set size, data stationarity, and assumptions regarding statistical distributions of data, so that it seems ideally suited for dynamical systems characterized by state changes, non-linearity, non-stationarity, and chaos (Zbilut et al. 2000). RQA defines measures for diagonal segments in a recurrence plot. These measures are recurrence rate, determinism, averaged length of diagonal structures, entropy, and trend. Recurrence rate (REC) is the ratio of all recurrent states (recurrence points percentage) to all possible states and is the probability of recurrence of a special state. REC is simply what is used to compute the correlation dimension of data. Determinism (DET) is the ratio of recurrence points forming diagonal structures to all recurrence points. DET36 measures the percentage of recurrent points forming line segments that are parallel to the main diagonal. A line segment is a points sequence equal to or longer than a predetermined threshold (Giuliani et al. 1998). —————— 36
“This is a crucial point: a recurrence can, in principle, be observed by chance whenever the system explores two nearby points of its state space. On the contrary, the observation of recurrent points consecutive in time (and then forming lines parallel to the main diagonal) is an important signature of deterministic structuring” Manetti et al. (1999)
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These line segments show the existence of deterministic structures, their absence indicate randomness. Maxline (MAXLINE) represents the averaged length of diagonal structures and indicates the longest line segments that are parallel to the main diagonal. They are claimed to be proportional to the inverse of the largest positive Lyapunov exponent. A periodic signal produces long line segments, while the noise doesn’t produce any segments. Short segments indicate chaos.
(a)
(b)
(c) (d) Fig. 1. Examples by VRA. (a) Periodic time series; (b) Henon equation; (c) White Noise; (d) Lorenz equation.
Entropy (ENT) (Shannon entropy) measures the distribution of those line segments that are parallel to the main diagonal and reflects the complexity of the deterministic structure in the system. This ratio indicates the time series structureness, so high values of ENT are typical of periodic behaviours, while low values of ENT are typical of chaotic behaviours. The high value of ENT means a large diversity in diagonal line lengths; low
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values, on the other hand, mean a small diversity in diagonal line lengths37; “[S]hort line max values therefore are indicative of chaotic behaviours”38. The value trend (TREND), used for detecting drift and non-stationarity in a time series, measures the slope of the least squares regression of %local recurrence as a function of the orthogonal displacement from the main diagonal.
4. Macroeconomic data analysis using VRA: comparison of results In their paper “International Chaos?” (1988) Frank, Gencay, and Stengos analyzed the quarterly macroeconomic data from 1960 to 1988 for West Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The goal was to check for the presence of deterministic chaos. To ensure that the data analysed was stationary they used a first difference and then tried a linear fit. Using a reasonable AR specification for each time series, their conclusion was that time series showed different structures. In particular, the non-linear structure was present in Japan’s time series. Nevertheless, the application of typical tools for detecting chaos (correlation dimension and Lyapunov exponent) didn’t show the presence of chaos in any time series. Therefore none of the countries’ income appeared to be well interpreted as being chaotic. Starting from this conclusion, we applied VRA to these time series to verify these researchers’ results. The purpose was to see if the analysis performed by a topological tool could give results different from those obtained using a metric tool (Lyapunov exponent and correlation dimension). The time series39 chosen are GNP of Japan and GDP of the United Kingdom. The choice is based on the fact that Japan is considered the most dissimilar one of the four countries studied. In fact, in order to filter this series, the authors used an Ar-4, while for the others an Ar-2 was used. For this series they reject the hypothesis IID, and the correlation dimension value calculated for various values of M, (the embedding dimension) is less compared to the growth of the value of the embedding dimension. There is a saturation point. —————— 37
Trulla et al. 1996. Iwanski and Bradley (1998), Atay and Altintas (1999). 39 T analysis performed by Frank et al. (1998) the data are for the Japan Real GNP seasonally adjusted, quarterly from 1960 to 1988 and for United Kingdom from 1960 to 1988. Source Datastream. 38
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In fact, for calculated values of M, 5, 10, 15, the dimension of correlation is respectively, 1.3, 1.6, 2.1, against values of 1.2, 3.8, 6.8 of the series shuffled.The rejection of the IID hypothesis, the value of correlation dimension, the comparison with the value of shuffled series, and the presence of non-linearity inclined the authors to suspect that the time series could be chaotic. However, tested with the Lyapunov exponent, the conclusion was that the data didn’t manifest chaotic behaviour. In fact the value of the Lyapunov exponent test was negative40. Moreover, it was shown that Japan’s economy is the most stable of the economies in the analysed countries. Therefore, although the presence of nonlinearity and correlation dimension values seemed to admit chaotic behaviour in the time series, the Lyapunov exponent test has not supported this hypothesis. Probably, as admitted by these same authors, this conclusion could be the result of the shortness of the series. With longer time series, matters could change41. The GDP time series of the United Kingdom was chosen because, as emphasized by the authors, for the UK as for Germany, time series is not rejected by the hypothesis IID. The behaviour of correlation dimension is the same for all three European countries in the study: Italy, West Germany, and the UK42. The increase of the embedding dimension corresponds to sustained increase of the dimension of correlation. Such increase is also characterised in shuffled time series obtained from the time series fits with Ar-2. From this conclusion and considering that the values of Lyapunov exponent test were negative, the authors conclude that European time series didn’t show non-linearity and in particular didn’t exhibit chaotic behaviour. 4.1 Macroeconomic time series of Japan’s GNP: data from 1960 to 1988 Fig. 2a shows the Recurrence Plot (RP) of Japan’s GNP. This was built using a delay-time and embedding dimension respectively equal to 2 and 7. Comparison between RP of the original time series (Fig. 2a) and RP of the shuffled series (Fig. 2b) allows us to see that the first is non-stationary. The different and diversified coloration allows us to conclude that the more homogenous coloration we can see from the shuffled series (Fig. 2b) is typical of stationary data. —————— 40
See “Table 4” p. 1580, in Frank et al. (1988). Frank et al. (1988), p. 1581. 42 Table 2, p. 1579 in Frank et al. (1988). 41
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. (a) RP of Japan GNP; (b) shuffled time series
Japan
GDP Delay Dimension REC DET ENT MAXL TREND
1960-1988 2 7 2.314 48.485 1.00 28 -87.39
Shuffled 2 8 0.0 -1 0.0 -1 0.0
Table 1. RQA Statistics of original and shuffled time series
In Table 1, RQA results are indicated for both time series. REC is positive, meaning that the data are correlated. DET is also positive, indicating that roughly 43% of the recurrent points are consecutive in the time; that is, form segments are parallel to the main diagonal. This indicates that in the data there is some type of structure. As we can see in Fig. 1a, long segments indicate that the series is periodic; in Fig. 1b we can see that short segments indicate that the series is chaotic. The value of MAXL is 28. This value indicates length of the longer segment in terms of recurrent points of the longer segment and allows us to say that the data are nonlinear and it is not possible to exclude the presence of chaotic behaviour. The analysis of VRA using the shuffled series of Japan is described in Fig. 2b where we find the RP and in Table 1 where the statistics of RQA are indicated. The RP of Fig. 2b shows a homogenous coloration that al-
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lows us to say that the series is stationary. The statistics of the RQA (Table 1) indicate that the shuffled series has lost all information: there are no recurrent points (REC, or segments parallel to the main diagonal (DET). Therefore, no type of determinist structure is present. This consideration is confirmed by the fact that the value of the MAXL is negative. From the comparison between original time series and its shuffling we can conclude that the data of Japan’s GDP are characterised by nonlinearity, confirming the result obtained by Frank et al. (1988), and they are non-stationary. Our conclusion regarding the presence of chaotic behaviour is different43 from that of Frank et al. (1988), who refuse the hypothesis that the data can be chaotic. The authors ascribe the result of their analysis to the shortness of the time series. With longer time series it could be possible to reach a contrary result; that is, not to reject the hypothesis of chaotic data44. 4.2 Macroeconomic time series of United Kingdom GDP: data from 1960 to 1988 In Fig. 3 we can see the RP of the United Kingdom GDP. This was built with delay-time and embedding dimension respectively equal to 1 and 8. By comparing the RP of the original time series (Fig. 3a) and its shuffling (Fig. 3b), we deduce that the time series is non-stationary: the economy of the United Kingdom is characterized by a period of structural change. Table 2 summarises the statistics of RQA for the original time series and its shuffling. The statistics of original time series indicate that in the data there are recurrent points (REC positive), that is, more than 8% of the points that compose the area of the RP’s triangle are correlated. Of this 8%, 32% (DET) shapes segments are parallel to the main diagonal, indicating the presence of determinist structures. This conclusion is confirmed by the presence of a positive value of the MAXL. The same ratios of shuffled series are characterised by zero or negative values.
—————— 43
“[…] None of these countries’ national income would appear to be well interpreted as being chaotic”. Frank et al. (1988), p. 1581. 44 “[…] When interpreting the findings one must be cautions given the shortness of the series. With longer time series matters could change”, Frank et al. (1988), p. 1581.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 3. (a) RP of UK GDP; (b) shuffled time series
United Kingdom
GDP Delay Dimension REC DET ENT MAXL TREND
1960-1988 1 8 8.458 32.009 1.972 26 77.803
Shuffled 1 9 0.0 -1 0.0 -1 0.0
Table 2. RQA Statistics of original and shuffled time series
Comparing our analysis with that performed by Frank et al. (1988), it is possible to identify some points of difference. While they do not reject hypothesis IID, the analysis led with VRA does cause us to us to reject this hypothesis and to emphasize the presence of structure. The United Kingdom data are non-linear and this non-linearity can be interpreted as chaos. The MAXL and DET value, in fact, allow us not to reject the hypothesis of chaos in these data. For the United Kingdom as for Japan, Frank et al. (1988) emphasized that the analysis carried out on longer series could have obtained different results. In our case the analysis, which was also on short time series, has led to different conclusions. The different conclusions concern the fact that, while for Frank et al. the Japan’s economy seems more stable than that of the European countries (Italy, West Germany, and the UK), our analysis is performed from a different point of view; and this is also true if our analysis is limited to the UK. While in
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Frank et al. the comparison was made between stable economies, our analysis is based on unstable economies. Japan’s economy in these years (1960-1988) was less unstable than that of the UK. The different value of MAXL (Table 1 and Table 2) and the different non-stationary values allow us to conclude that the differences are very small. For Japan (Fig. 2a) these changes are more evident in the data from a later period (years 1970-1980). The same conclusions can be drawn from the relative data of the UK for the 1970-1980 period. From our analysis compared with the more conventional one by Frank et al. (1988), it is possible to conclude that the topological approach can be more useful for economic analysis performed on short time series typical of an economy.
5. Conclusions Among some economists there has been an interest in detecting chaos in economic data. The applications of empirical chaos testing have been either in the context of macroeconomics or of finance. Several chaos tests have been developed to try to distinguish between data generated by a deterministic system and data generated by a random system. In general, it has been stressed that an accurate empirical testing of chaos requires the availability of high quality, high frequency data, which makes financial time-series a good candidate for analyzing chaotic behaviour. In fact, the analysis of financial time series has led to results that are, as a whole, more reliable than those of macroeconomic series. The reason is the much larger sample sizes available with financial data and the superior quality of that financial data. Traditionally the tests used for chaos include correlation dimension, Lyapunov exponent, and BDS. These algorithms were developed for use with experimental data. Since physicists often can generate very large samples of high quality data, their application to these data has been successful. Unfortunately the application to economic data has been very difficult because high noise exists in most aggregated economic data. None of the tests has, however, delivered solid evidence of chaos in economics data. Investigators have found substantial evidence for nonlinearity but relatively weak evidence for chaos per se. A recent development in the literature has been the introduction of tools based on topological invariant testing procedure (close return test and recurrence plot). Compared to the existing metric class of testing proce-
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dures including the BBS test and Lyapunov exponent, these tools could be better suited to testing for chaos in financial and economic time series. Therefore, after a description and comparison between metric and topological tools, we tested some macroeconomic time series that had already been analysed (Fran et al.) with traditional tests for chaos. The application of typical tools for detecting chaos (correlation dimension and Lyapunov exponent) didn’t show the presence of chaos in any time series. The conclusion of the authors is that none of the countries’ income appeared to be well interpreted as being chaotic. Testing these time series with Visual Recurrence Analysis based on the topological approach has provided different conclusions. Our analysis, although performed using a short time series (112 data, indicates the presence of chaotic behaviour. From our analysis compared with the more conventional one by Frank et al. (1988), it is possible to conclude that the topological approach can be more useful for economic analysis performed on short time series, typical of an economy. The presence of chaos offers attractive possibilities for control strategies45 and this point seems particularly relevant for the insights of economic policies. Detecting chaos in economic data is the first condition to apply a chaotic control to phenomena that generate them. In this case, the goal is to select economic policies that allow us to perform a regular and efficient dynamic choosing among different aperiodic behaviours: that is the attractor’s orbits, thus maintaining the natural structure of the system. The economic application of chaos control considering both stabilization46 and targeting47 procedures or the combined48 use of them has highlighted the possibility of modifying the behaviour of a system to achieve the best performance of that system49, choosing among many different behaviours (orbits) that characterize the system because it is chaotic. The main criticism when the analysis is moved to the linear models arises from the fact that the models mislead a real understanding of the economic phenomenon and can induce inadequate and erroneous economic policies50. An alternative that could lead to the formulation of ade—————— 45
Boccaletti et al. (2000). Holyst (1996). 47 Kopel (1997). 48 Kopel (1997). 49 Ott et al. (1990). 50 Bullard and Butler (1993). 46
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quate policies could be the use of non-linear models and, in particular, chaotic models. Two attributes of chaos are relevant for its control: (a) An ergodic chaotic region has embedded within it an infinite dense set of unstable periodic orbits and may have embedded fixed points. (b) Orbits in a chaotic system are exponentially sensitive in that small perturbations to the orbit typically grow exponentially with time. To control a chaotic system means that we have to move from one orbit to another; that is, from a behaviour of systems to another behaviour, exploiting the typical properties of chaotic systems such as aperiodic orbits, sensitivity, and ergodicity. The methods developed for chaos control consider a non-linear system set at particular parameters that result in chaotic motion. Then, using only tiny control adjustments, a chaotic trajectory is stabilised in an unstable periodic solution embedded within the chaotic motion. When the system has been pushed into the appropriate linearized regime by nonlinear aspects of the problem, we stabilize it in a periodic orbit from aperiodic orbits that characterise the chaotic attractor. Small parameter changes and the presence of many aperiodic orbits are characteristics that are attractive for economic policy insights. Using sensitivity to initial conditions to move from given orbits to other orbits of attractors means to choose different behaviour of the systems, that is, different trade-off of economic policy. Moreover the employment of an instrument of control in terms of resources in order to achieve a specific goal of economic policy will be smaller if compared to the use of traditional techniques of control. Therefore the salient feature of applying of chaotic control is the strong “energy saving”, that is resources, to perform economic policy goals. If the system is non-chaotic the effect of an input on the output is proportional to the latter. Vice versa when the system is chaotic, the relation between input and output are made exponential by the sensitivity to initial conditions. We can obtain a relatively large improvement in system performance by using of small controls. Therefore if the system is chaotic limited resources don’t reduce the possibility by policy-makers to catch up prefixed goals of economic policies. Resource saving and choosing among different trade-offs of economic policies (many orbits) could be significant motivations to use chaotic models in the economic analysis. To use them we need to discover chaos in the data and we have demonstrated hat VRA is a useful tool for this end.
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References Atay, F. M., Y. Altintas (1999): Recovering smooth dynamics from time series with the aid of recurrence plots, Physical Review E, 59 pp. 6593-6598. Barnett W. A., Chen P., (1988): The aggregation-theoretic monetary aggregates are chaotic and have strange attractors: an econometric application of mathematical of chaos, in Barnett W. A., Berndt E. R., White A., (eds.) Dynamic Econometric Modeling, Cambridge University Press. Barnett W. A., Chen P., (1988): The aggregation-theoretic monetary aggregates are chaotic and have strange attractors: an econometric application of mathematical of chaos, in Barnett W. A., Berndt E. R., White A., (eds.) Dynamic Econometric Modeling, Cambridge University Press. Belaire-Franch J., Contreras-Bayarri D., and Tordera-Lledó L., (2001): Assessing Non-linear Structures In Real Exchange Rates Using Recurrence Plot Strategies, WP DT 01-03, Departamento de Análisis Económico. Boccaletti S., Grebogi C., Lai Y. C., Mancini H., Maza D., (2000): The Control of Chaos: Theory and Applications, Physics Reports, vol. 329, pp. 103-197. Brock W. A., Sayers C. L., (1986): Is the business cycle characterised by deterministic chaos? Journal of Monetary Economics, 22, pp. 71-90. Brock W.A., Dechert W.D., Scheinkman J., (1996): Econometric Review, 15, pp 197-235. Brock W. A., D. A. Hsieh D. A., LeBaron B., (1991): Non-linear dynamics, chaos, and instability: statistical theory and economic evidence, (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Brock W.A., (1986): Distinguishing random and deterministic systems. Abridged version, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 40, pp. 168-195. Bullard J., Butler A., (1993): Nonlinearity and chaos in economic models: implications for policy decisions, Economic Journal, vol. 103, pp. 849-867. Cao L., Cai H., (2000): On the structure and quantification of recurrence plots, Physics Letters A 270, pp. 75-87. Cao L., (1997): Practical methods for determining the minimum embedding dimension of scalar time series, Physics Letters D 110, pp. 43-50. Casdagli M., Eubank S., Farmer J. D., Gibson J., (1991): State space reconstruction in the presence of noise, Physica D 51, pp. 52-98. Casdagli M.C., (1997): Recurrence plots revisited, Physica D 108 pp. 12-44. Chen P., (1993): Searching for Economic Chaos: A Challenge to Econometric Practice and Nonlinear Tests, Day R. H., Chen P., (eds), Nonlinear Dynamics and Evolutionary Economics, pp. 217-253, Oxford University Press. Day R. H. (1992): Complex Economic Dynamics: Obvious in History, Generic in Theory, Elusive in Data, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 7, pp. 10-23 Ekmann J. P., Kamphorst S. O., Ruelle D., (1987): Recurrence Plots of Dynamical Systems, Europhysics Letters, 4 (9) pp. 973-977. Faggini M., (2005): Un approccio di teoria del caos all’analisi delle serie storiche economiche, Rivista di Politica Economica, 7-8, luglio-agosto.
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Complexity of Out-of-Equilibrium Play in Tax Evasion Game V. Lipatov
1. Introduction In this paper, interaction among taxpayers in the tax evasion game is considered by means of game theory with learning. This interaction has been largely neglected in the modeling of tax evasion so far, although it brings about results significantly different from those of a conventional model. In case of tax authority commitment to a certain auditing probability, nonzero cheating equilibrium becomes possible. In case of tax authority with no commitment to a certain auditing probability, cycling may occur instead of long-run equilibrium, allowing for explanation of the fluctuations in “honesty” of taxpayers within the model rather than by exogenous parameter shifts. The paper reflects complexity of the issue in the sense of generating nontrivial dynamics. In presence of agents not maximizing expected payoff, the equilibrium play does not actually occur. Therefore, the evolutionary dynamics must be taken into account in order to draw accurate inference about the welfare effects of various policies. Without considering the complexity of dynamics explicitly, the policymakers are in danger of making wrong evaluation of tax reforms. The magnitude and importance of the shadow sector is hard to overestimate1. For a long time it has been realized that many classical results of —————— 1
A summary of recent attempts to estimate the size of tax evasion, avoidance and other informal activities is given in Schneider and Enste (2000). The results vary a
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public economics (optimal taxation, optimal provision of public goods, etc.) should be modified if the informal sector is an issue. Therefore, policy recommendations worked out without explicit accounting for the shadow economy are not likely to bring about desired outcomes in reality. A fundamental aspect of informal activities is tax evasion, which is usually defined as an effort to lower one’s tax liability in a way prohibited by law. This paper considers only this phenomenon, leaving tax avoidance and criminal activities aside. Specifically, it is devoted to income tax evasion, which has received the most attention in the theoretical modeling of evasion. This can be partially attributed to the existence of relatively reliable data on this matter (Tax Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) in the US). Another reason might be tradition founded in 1972 by Allingham and Sandomo’s seminal model. A detailed survey of the models of income tax evasion has been carried out by Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998). They show that there are two directions in modeling of strategic interaction between taxpayers and tax authorities: principal-agent (commitment) approach (for example, Vasin and Vasina 2002) and game theoretic (no commitment) approach (for example, Reinganum and Wilde, 1986, Erard and Feinstein, 1994, Peter Bardsley, 1997, Waly Wane, 2000). Both approaches are valid under the assumption that the parties first think about the strategies of each other, and then proceed to play equilibrium outcome. This, however, does not seem to be realistic when there are many taxpayers, although all the literature to date uses this (implicit) assumption. My paper is an attempt to relax this assumption, hence its main feature is explicit characterization of taxpayers’ interaction. This is achieved by using the evolutionary approach allowing for the learning of individuals from each other. Apart from this, there are a number of properties that distinguish my approach and allow one to match stylized facts about evasion. First, in reality taxpayers possess poor knowledge of audit function, usually overestimating the probability of being audited (Andreoni et al. 1998). In the model they do not know it, but rather make an implicit inference about this probability by observing other individuals’ actions. This is a case of “rational ignorance”, when the perceived benefits of acquiring additional information are lower than its costs. Second, because the agents have poor knowledge of the audit function they do not know the expected payoff of cheating. Their heterogenous beliefs are reflected in the initial distribution of strategies between cheating ————— lot with method and country considered; one general finding is that the shadow sector is growing over time.
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and not cheating. So the second feature of reality - different informational endowments of taxpayers - is implicitly accounted for. Third, instead of keeping in mind and updating perceived probability distributions of audit probability, agents just choose their actions according to a simple rule that compares their behavior with the behavior of the others. In this way another feature of reality is taken into consideration - substantial asymmetry in the reaction of tax authority and taxpayers. Indeed, the tax authority is supposed to explicitly conjecture the distribution of agents and make its decision based on this conjecture. In jargon, the authority is more “rational” than the taxpayers2. The fourth feature is the intertemporal nature of tax evasion decision, which is supported by Engel and Hines’ study (1999). In our framework the individuals have one period memory that allows them to choose a strategy tomorrow on the base of today’s observation of the behavior of the others and their own. As income reporting is a rare (annual) event, short memory can be a not plausible assumption. The game considered is a simple version of tax evasion relation with two levels of income and homogenous population of taxpayers. The learning rule in this population is a simple imitation of a better-performing strategy. Elsewhere I show that the qualitative features of the dynamics are robust to modification of the rule. The dynamics of the game are derived from the microfoundations in Lipatov 2004. The result here is quite intuitive: in the steady state the share of cheaters is the same as in the Nash equilibrium, whereas the auditing probability is not related to its Nash equilibrium value. The dynamics generated in the presence of agents not maximizing expected payoff show that the equilibrium play does not actually occur. But it is necessary to take these into account in order to draw accurate inference about the welfare effects of various policies. The estimation of such effects, however, requires calibration of the parameters of the model, which is a separate issue. The model produces results that are in line with stylized facts. Firstly, non-zero cheating of audited taxpayers is obtained for the commitment case, which is certainly more plausible than absolute honesty found in most of the conventional principle-agent models (for example, Sanchez and Sobel, 1993; Andreoni et al., 1998). Secondly, in the non-commitment case the following features of dynamics are explained: decreasing compli—————— 2
In my opinion the fact that the decision making agents consider more factors than researchers assign to them is not a sign of lack of rationality.
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ance (Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde, 1986) and auditing probability (Dubin, Graetz and Wilde, 1990; Adreoni at al., 1998, p. 820) observed in the US in the second half of the twentieth century, as well as the recent increase in auditing probability with continuing decrease of compliance. Additionally, an alternative explanation for the puzzle of why too much compliance is offered: it might not be the presence of intrinsically honest taxpayers, but the fact that the system is far from equilibrium. This is best illustrated in the commitment case: if the share of cheating taxpayers is below its equilibrium value, it stays so forever, and it looks as if taxpayers are cheating too little. The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 outlines the simple static model, which is then played repeatedly. Dynamics of such play is analyzed in section 3, where different learning rules are considered. Underlying the average payoff rule is the norm of high tolerance of evasion and the assumption that taxpayers share among themselves a lot of information about evasion. The conclusion stresses limitations of the model and pictures its possible extensions and applications.
2. Classical game theory: a simple model As a starting point for modeling dynamics I take a simple one-shot game of tax evasion, based on Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1986). Honest taxpayers are eliminated from that model, as their presence does not change the results in the given setup. The timing is as follows: 1. nature chooses income for each individual from two levels, high H with probability γ and low L with probability 1-γ; 2. taxpayers report their income, choosing whether to evade or not; 3. tax agency decides whether to audit or not. It is obvious that low income people never choose to evade, because they are audited for sure if they report anything lower than L. At the same time, the high income people can evade, since with a report L the tax agency does not know whether it faces a truthful report by the lower income people or cheating from the higher income people. Then the game simplifies to one between higher income people and the tax agency:
cheat
not cheat
audit (1 − t ) H − st ( H − L), tH + st ( H − L) − c
not audit
(1 − t ) H , tH − c
(1 − t ) H , tH
H − tL, tL
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where t is an income tax rate; s is a surcharge rate, determining the fine for the given amount of tax evaded; c is audit cost. All of them are assumed to be constant and exogenously given for the tax-raising body3. Then the tax authority maximizes its expected revenue choosing the probability to audit p given probability of cheating q: ⎛ qγ p⎜⎜ (tH + st (H − L )) + 1 − γ tL − c ⎞⎟⎟ + (1 − p )tL → max, qγ + 1 − γ ⎝ (qγ + 1 − γ ) ⎠
which is linear in probability due to linearity of audit cost function. The multipliers for the payoffs are probabilities to come across high income cheaters (qγ) or low income honest taxpayers (1-γ) given that only low income reports are audited. First order condition holds with equality for the value of q=
1− γ
γ
c t (1 + s )(H − L ) − c
This is the Nash equilibrium value of cheating probability. A high income individual maximizes its expected the payoff given probability of audit: pq ((1 − t )H − st (H − L )) + (1 − p )q (H − tL ) + (1 − q )(1 − t )H → max ,
which is also linear in probability because of the nature of expected utility. The equilibrium value of p is 1/ (1 + s ) . Simple comparative statics shows that auditing probability is decreasing with the amount of a fine; and the extent of evasion is increasing with costs of auditing and decreasing with amount of fine, tax rate, income differential and share of high income people. Among others, we implicitly assumed here linear tax and penalty schemes, risk neutral individuals, and linear cost function for the tax authority. Even with these strong assumptions, considering the dynamics generated by the game allows us to get some non-trivial insights of what could be going on in reality.
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Endogenous determination of tax and penalty rate is an interesting task, but it constitutes the problem of a government rather than a tax authority. Moreover, it has been largely discussed in the literature, see, for example, Cowell (1990).
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3. Dynamics Now consider the game presented in the previous section played every period from 0 to infinity. As before, the populations of high income and low income taxpayers are infinite with measures of γ and 1-γ respectively, and this is common knowledge. The proportion q(τ) of the high income population is cheating by reporting low income at time τ; the agency is auditing the low income reports with probability p(τ). With only two levels of income, it is possible to assume that the people know the income of those with whom they interact. Although the precise amount is not known, the aggregate level is easily guessed from observable characteristics. But the authority does not observe them, so the type of income is private knowledge of the agents who meet. On the other hand, the probability of auditing p is a private knowledge of the authority. Between the rounds the tax agency updates its belief about the distribution of taxpayers between cheating and not cheating, while the high income agents are learning whose strategy performs better. Irrespective of the rule, at a given time there are the following types of high income taxpayers: - honest, comprising proportion 1-q(τ) of population and receiving payoff (1-t)H; - caught cheating, q (τ ) p (τ ) of population with payoff (1-t)H-st(H-L); - not caught cheating, q (τ )(1 − p (τ )) of population with payoff H-tL. Note that the payoff when not cheating is bigger than when cheating and caught, but smaller than when cheating and not caught. In every period the tax agency is maximizing its expected revenue given its belief of distribution of taxpayers (assume fictitious play Eq(τ+1)=q(τ)). γ (1− q)tH + p(qγ (tH + st(H − L)) + (1− γ )tL) − c( p(qγ +1− γ )) + (1− p)(qγ +1− γ )tL → max,
which has an interior solution c′(.)=qt(1+s)(H-L) only if c(.) is a convex function4. This expression yields intuitive results: the tax agency chooses higher probability of audit for higher given values of fine, share of cheating population, and share of high income population (all these factors make auditing more profitable). The problem with this specification is that actual cost function may be concave. Then the optimal auditing probability is either 0 —————— 4
Convex cost function is assumed, for example, in Reinganum and Wilde (1986). In my view, a function best describing reality would be concave for p close to 0, and convex for p close to 1.
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or 1, since there is no budget constraint for auditors. I consider a linear case for the sake of tractability. As has already been mentioned, we cannot take a ready aggregate dynamics for the population of taxpayers because of the asymmetric nature of the players: the tax authority is making fictitious play, whereas taxpayers imitate each other. Without such asymmetry, our game resembles emulation dynamics as it is defined by Fudenberg and Levine (1998), which is known to converge to replicator dynamics under some assumptions. However, these assumptions are not satisfied in our setup: most strikingly, each individual communicates with more than one other. Due to this feature, even payoff monotonicity of the aggregate dynamics cannot be established. The aggregate dynamics corresponding to the rules considered is, however, derived in Lipatov (2004). In order to proceed we have to specify these learning rules.
3.1 Meeting two others: Average payoff principle An agent A meets agents B and C. Each of them has played strategies s _{A}, s _{B}, s _{C}. If s _{A} ≠ s _{B} = s _{C}, and average payoff of B and C is greater than the payoff of A, he/she switches to their strategy. If s _ {C} = s _{A} ≠ s _{B}, A switches in case the payoff of B is greater. The average of caught and not caught payoffs is bigger than the payoff of honesty (1 − t )H − st (H − L ) + H − tL > 2(1 − t )H for plausible value of fine s < 1. As a result, an honest taxpayer remains honest, if facing either of: - two other honest taxpayers
- two caught taxpayers - a caught and an honest taxpayer A caught taxpayer switches to honest, if he/she observes either of - two honest taxpayers - an honest and another caught taxpayer. A not caught taxpayer never switches. Thus:
[
]
1 − q(τ +1) = (1 − q)(1 − q + qp) + pq(1 − q + 2 pq) 2
where q=q(τ ), p=p(τ ). This equation actually defines the aggregate dynamics of the population we were interested in. As can be seen, the proportion of honest taxpayers tomorrow is completely determined by the proportion of honest taxpayers today and the probability of auditing today. We want to see what features this dynamics possesses, namely, we want to know whether the proportion of honest taxpayers is shrinking or expanding as time passes.
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This turns out to be crucially dependent on the level of auditing probability: for p < 1/ 3 the share of honest taxpayers is decreasing; for p > (2 / 3) it is increasing. Unexpectedly, in the small middle interval, change in the proportion of honest taxpayers is negatively related to the number of honest taxpayers. This “anti-scale” effect is explained by the high-enough detection probability, for which the caught cheaters contribute more to the increase of proportion of the honest, than the honest themselves. Further, we consider two cases for the behavior of the tax authority. If it is unable to announce its auditing probability and keep it forever, we are in the “game theoretic” framework, and the dynamics has two dimensions: one already derived for q and another one for p. We start, however, with a more simple case, when the auditors can credibly commit to a certain constant in time strategy (probability), and hence the dynamics is collapsing to one dimension.
3.2 Commitment The authority commits to a certain auditing probability once and forever (this corresponds to the principle-agent framework defined by Andreoni et al. 1998). From the population dynamics it can be seen that the long run predictors in this game are q=1 when p <1/ 3 , q=0 when p > ( 2 / 3) , and q=
2 − 3p 1 − 3 p + 3 p2
when p is in between. Keeping this in mind, the authority chooses p to maximize equilibrium payoff. γ (1 − q( p ))tH + p(q( p )γ (tH + st (H − L)) + (1 − γ )tL ) − cp(q( p )γ + 1 − γ )tL → max
The optimal p can either be zero or fall in the small middle interval. This is true for any learning rule, since the argument does not use the particular form of q( p ). For high values of c and low values of s,t,H “no auditing - all cheating” equilibrium is chosen. Notice that the interior solution does not arise, if γ is small relative to µ = c/(t(H-L)). This is easy to interpret: with small share of high income people (γ ) and low benefit from auditing (stH ) it is better not to audit anybody, given that auditing is costly (c). The comparative statics exercise for the interior solution gives the following relations (they hold for any other learning rule as well):
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dp q + pq ' ; = '' ds q − (1 + s − µ )(2q ' + pq '' )
dp q + pq ' + (1 γ ) − 1 ; = − '' dµ q − (1 + s − µ )(2q ' + pq '' ) dp µ γ2 . = '' dγ q − (1 + s − µ )(2q ' + pq '' ) The sign of any of these derivatives is ambiguous, and to say something definite we have to take advantage of the knowledge of the function q(p). For the average payoff principle, the relation between share of cheaters and auditing probability in the interior steady state is a decreasing and strictly convex function. Under the best average principle (dp/dγ > 0) for our baseline parameter values s = 0.8, t = 0.3, (c /(H-L)) = 0.06 ( µ = 0.2), γ = 0.5. The fine is usually up to the amount of tax evaded, and I take 20% less than the whole. The income tax rate ranges from 0.1 to 0.5 across developed countries; the measures for both (c /(H-L)) and γ are bound to be arbitrary, since in reality the auditing function depends on many more variables than just income, and there is a continuum of income levels rather than two. A convenient way to think of the first measure is to consider what share of audited income has to be foregone for the auditing itself. Andreoni et al. (1998, p. 834) take 0.05 as an example; I think of 0.01 to 0.1 as a possible range. Finally, γ to a certain extent reflects the income distribution, and 0.5 gives an extreme case where there is an equal number of rich and poor. The resulting optimal p = 0.62 brings about (dp/dγ ) = 0.02 > 0 states that with increase of the share of high income taxpayers (the only ones who can cheat!) the auditing probability in steady state rises, since marginal revenue from auditing goes up, whereas marginal costs stay the same. For baseline parameter values auditing is also increasing in the cost tax bill ratio (dp/dµ = 0.15 > 0) and decreasing in the amount of fine (dp/ds = -0.18 < 0), which is contrary to what was expected. Faced with higher fine or lower auditing costs, the taxpayers will cheat less in steady state, hence there is no need for the tax authority to commit to a higher auditing probability. In fact, this stems from the strong asymmetry in the behavior of tax authority and individuals: the authority is very “smart” in the sense that it can predict the level to which the cheating converges for given auditing probability; the individuals are, on the contrary, very naive, since they just imitate a strategy with higher payoff.
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Fig. 1. Optimal auditing probability depending on s, baseline parameter values (µ = 0.2).
To get a quantitative feeling about the influence of parameters, I plot the auditing probability as a function s for the baseline parameter values t = 0.3, c /H=0.06, γ = 0.5.
3.3 Comparison with classical game theory The solution obtained can be compared with the Stackelberg-like equilibrium of the classical evasion game, when the tax authority moves first (much weaker asymmetry). Recall that in this setup q = 1 if p < (1/1+s ), q = 0 if p > (1/1+s ), and undetermined for the equality. Since auditing is costly, the authority will choose either p = 0, q = 1, or p = (1/1+s ), q = 0. The latter is preferred whenever the auditing is not too costly. Comparative statics is trivial in this setup: zero cheating result is independent of parameter changes as long as they do not violate rather mild condition of relatively not too expensive auditing. Auditing probability is decreasing in the surcharge rate, just as in the previous model. The solution of the static model is discrete, and the probability of audit jumps to zero for high enough µ or low s. The prediction of the dynamic model appears to be more plausible, since non-zero cheating is not observed in reality. As is known from the literature, the result of zero cheating in the commitment case generalizes for more complicated models with continuum of taxpayers and presence of intrinsically honest taxpayers. Moreover, the commitment models are usually criticized on the basis of this unrealistic prediction. The model presented eliminates this fault, and allows us to reconsider the view of commitment as something implausible. Then it just boils down to the classical
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case of dynamic inconsistency, and the willingness to commit is equivalent to the planning horizon of the authorities. The comparison of the payoffs of the tax authority in evolutionary and classical settings is ambiguous. For the parameter values chosen (γ = 0.5, µ = 1/3), it is better off imitating taxpayers for the magnitude of fine smaller than 0.5 and worse off for the magnitude large