Conquerors and Slaves (Sociological Studies in Roman History, Vol. 1)

C O N Q U E R O R S AND SOCIOLOGICAL SLAVES STUDIES IN ROMAN VOLUME 1 HISTORY CONQUERORS AND SLAVES SOCIOLOGICA...

Author: Keith Hopkins

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C O N Q U E R O R S AND

SOCIOLOGICAL

SLAVES

STUDIES IN ROMAN VOLUME

1

HISTORY

CONQUERORS AND

SLAVES SOCIOLOGICAL

STUDIES IN ROMAN VOLUME

KEITH Professor

1

HOPKINS

of Sociology,

CAMBRIDGE

Brunei

University

UNIVERSITY Cambridge

London

HISTORY

New York

Melbourne

PRESS

Published by the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press T h e Pitt Building, T r u m p i n g t o n Street, Cambridge CB2 IRP Bendey House, 200 Euston Road, L o n d o n N W I 2DB 32 East 57th Street, New Y o r k , N Y 10022, U S A 296 Beaconsfield Parade, Middle Park, Melbourne 3206, Australia © Keith Hopkins 1978 First published 1978 Printed i n Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge Library

of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data Hopkins, Keith. Conquerors and slaves. (Sociological studies in R o m a n history; v. 1) Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Slavery in Rome, 2. Social structure. 3. Rome - Social conditions. 4. Rome - History. I. T i d e . I I . Series. HT863.H66 3 -44'93'°9376 7*-9M°9 I S B N o 521 21945 o OI

CONTENTS

List of plates List of tables List of figures Preface Abbreviations Map

I

page v i i viii viii ix xiii xvi

CONQUERORS

AND SLAVES:

CONQUERING

AN E M P I R E ON T H E P O L I T I C A L

ECONOMY

T H E IMPACT

OF

OF ITALY

I

The argument T h e i n t r u s i o n o f slaves A sketch o f t h e e c o n o m y Continuous war T h e products of war T h e f o r m a t i o n o f l a r g e estates L a n d i n politics T h e s o l u t i o n - mass m i g r a t i o n Structural differentiation and the wider implications o f c h a n g e : t h e a r m y , e d u c a t i o n a n d t h e law A p p e n d i x : O n t h e p r o b a b l e size o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e city o f R o m e

II

T H E GROWTH ROMAN

i 8 15 25 37 48 56 64 74 96

AND PRACTICE

OF SLAVERY

TIMES

IN 99

T h e g r o w t h o f a slave society W h y d i d t h e R o m a n s f r e e so m a n y slaves? Conclusions

v

99 115 131

Contents 111

BETWEEN AT

SLAVERY

AND FREEDOM:

ON F R E E I N G

DELPHI

133

T h e background F u l l f r e e d o m a n d c o n d i t i o n a l release Prices F a m i l y ties a m o n g t h e f r e e d Conclusions

IV

T H EPOLITICAL

POWER

133 141 158 163 168

OF EUNUCHS

172

T h e p o w e r a n d privileges o f c o u r t eunuchs Changes i n the power structure T h e strategic p o s i t i o n o f e u n u c h s

V

D I V I N E EMPERORS OR T H E SYMBOLIC THE

ROMAN

UNITY

172 181 186

OF

EMPIRE

197

Introduction T h e b e g i n n i n g s o f e m p e r o r w o r s h i p i n R o m e , its establishment a n d diffusion S o m e f u n c t i o n s o f b e l i e f - t h e l i v i n g presence Omens and portents Conclusions

Bibliography Modern Modern Modern Modern Modern

works works works works works

Supplementary

SLAVES

cited cited cited cited cited

in in in in in

Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter

i 11 111 iv v

197 200 215 231 241

243 243 246 248 249 250

bibliography

R o m a n h i s t o r y f o r sociologists a n d sociology f o r R o m a n historians Index of subjects Index of proper names

252 255 261

vi

PLATES

i

Between pages 222 and 223 A p o t h e o s i s o f Sabina. R o m e , Palazzo d e i Conservatory, I n s t . N e g . 60.2542

2 a A p o t h e o s i s o f A n t o n i n u s Pius a n d Faustina. V a t i c a n , A r c h i v i o Fotografico Vaticano, M o n u m e n t ! Musei e Gallerie Pontificie, A r c h . V a t . x v m 27.22 2ft C a m e o o f a n e m p e r o r ' s apotheosis. Paris, C a b i n e t des médailles, B i b l . N a t . C4656 3 a M a x i m i n u s T h r a x . C o p e n h a g e n , N y C a r l s b e r g G l y p o t e k 744. F r o m A r c h ä o l o g i s c h e s I n s t i t u t des d e u t s c h e n Reiches, M . W e g n e r , e d . , Das römische Herrscherbild: Caracalla ( B e r l i n , 1971) p l . 6 9 a 36 D o m i t i a n . M u n i c h , G l y p o t h e k 394. F r o m W e g n e r , Flavier (1966) pl. 23a 3c M a r c u s A u r e l i u s . R o m e , M u s e o C a p i t o l i n o , I m p e r a t o r i 38. F r o m W e g n e r , Antonine (1939) p l . 26 3d L u c i u s V e r u s . T u r i n , M u s e o d i A n t i c h i t à . F r o m W e g n e r ,

Antonine

(«939) P - 41 4 a H a d r i a n . I s t a n b u l , A n t i k e n m u s e u m 585. F r o m W e g n e r ,

Hadrian

1

(1956) p l . 16c

46 Severus A l e x a n d e r . Naples, M u s e o N a z i o n a l e 5993. F r o m W e g n e r , Caracalla ( 1971 ) p l . 5 6 a 4c M a r c u s A u r e l i u s . R o m e , C a m p i d o g l i o - A n d e r s o n 347. F r o m W e g n e r , Antonine (1939) p l . 22 4
vii

TABLES

1.1

T h e m i l i t a r i s m of R o m e : the n u m b e r s o f citizens s e r v i n g as s o l d i e r s i n t h e R o m a n a r m y , by d e c a d e s , 2 2 5 - 2 3 BC

1.2

page

ulative figures 11.1 HI. 1

68

T h e p o p u l a t i o n o f five s l a v e societies P r e l i m i n a r y a n a l y s i s o f 1,237

101

manumissions recorded and sur

viving from Delphi

140

HI.2

C o n d i t i o n a l l y f r e e d slaves w e r e i n c r e a s i n g l y e x p l o i t e d

HI.3

The

111.4

T h e cost o f f u l l f r e e d o m i n c r e a s e d , b u t t h e cost o f c o n d i t i o n a l

average

prices

paid

by

slaves

for

freedom

at

151 Delphi

(201-1 BC)

159

r e l e a s e h e l d s t e a d y at D e l p h i (201-1 BC) HI.5

33

P o p u l a t i o n c h a n g e s a n d m i g r a t i o n i n I t a l y , 2 2 5 - 8 BC: s o m e s p e c

161

M a n u m i s s i o n s by m a l e s l a v e - o w n e r s d e c r e a s e d ; m a n u m i s s i o n s b y female slave-owners i n c r e a s e d . M a n u m i s s i o n s i n w h i c h relatives

in.6

formally collaborated increased

164

S l a v e f a m i l i e s w e r e split by m a n u m i s s i o n

166

Appendix in.1 111.4 615

C o n d i t i o n s of release i n m a n u m i s s i o n s f r o m C a l y m n a

170

R e c a s t to i n c l u d e p r i c e s p a i d by slaves m u l t i p l y f r e e d

171

FIGURES 1.1

The

growth

of slavery i n R o m a n

I t a l y - a scheme of inter

dependence

page

1.2

Peasants ate most of t h e i r o w n p r o d u c e : a hypothetical s c h e m e

1.3

Young

men's

length

of

service in the

coordinates

Roman

army:

12 17

some 34

viii

PREFACE

T h i s is a b o o k a b o u t t h e R o m a n e m p i r e . I t is n o t a n a r r a t i v e h i s t o r y , b u t a n a t t e m p t t o analyse a c h a n g i n g social s t r u c t u r e a n d t o evoke a lost w o r l d . I t is also a n a t t e m p t t o a p p l y some m o d e r n sociological concepts a n d t e c h n i q u e s t o R o m a n h i s t o r y . T h a t m a y seem strange, b u t i t w o u l d n o t have seemed strange t o t h e f o u n d i n g fathers o f sociology, M a r x a n d W e b e r , n o r t o Pareto. W e b e r w r o t e t w o l o n g w o r k s a b o u t t h e a n c i e n t w o r l d . Y e t m o s t students o f sociology l e a r n m o r e a b o u t t h e A r a p e s h , t h e N u e r a n d t h e T r o b r i a n d e r s t h a n they d o a b o u t t h e R o m a n s o r t h e Chinese, w h o created a n d p r e s e r v e d m i g h t y empires a n d highly influential cultures. Social h i s t o r i a n s o f t h e post-mediaeval w o r l d have l o n g t a k e n a d v a n t a g e o f d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e social sciences. E c o n o m i c h i s t o r y , d e m o g r a p h i c h i s t o r y , q u a n t i t a t i v e h i s t o r y have b e c o m e accepted, p r o d u c t i v e , e v e n fashionable branches o f h i s t o r y - w r i t i n g . B u t classical h i s t o r i a n s , w i t h some n o t a b l e exceptions, have t y p i c a l l y i n s u l a t e d t h e m selves f r o m these t r e n d s w i t h t h e n o t i o n t h a t t h e a n c i e n t e v i d e n c e is t o o f r a g m e n t a r y a n d t h e a n c i e n t w o r l d t o o a l i e n f o r these m o d e r n concepts t o be easily a p p l i e d . A l l h i s t o r y is c o n t e m p o r a r y h i s t o r y a n d reflects n o t o n l y t h e p r e j u d i c e s o f t h e sources b u t c u r r e n t c o n c e r n s a n d concepts. T h e achievements o f t h e R o m a n w o r l d n e e d t o be i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h e m p a t h e t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t t h e R o m a n s themselves t h o u g h t a n d w i t h concepts w h i c h we ourselves use. M o d e r n h i s t o r i a n s m i g h t w e l l take t h i s f o r g r a n t e d , b u t m a n y a n c i e n t h i s t o r i a n s have a l l o w e d themselves t o be isolated f r o m m a i n s t r e a m m o d e r n h i s t o r y . Several factors have c o n t r i b u t e d : t h e rigours o f l e a r n i n g classical languages, t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f universities, c o n v e n t i o n a n d t r a d i t i o n . W h a t e v e r t h e causes, t h e results are clear: a w i d e g u l f b e t w e e n t h e ways i n w h i c h m o d e r n a n d ancient historians write their history. T h i s b o o k l i k e its t w i n v o l u m e (Succession and Descent) a t t e m p t s t o b r i d g e t h e g a p b e t w e e n m o d e r n concepts a n d a n c i e n t sources; sometimes t h e y are w o v e n t o g e t h e r i n a single analysis; at o t h e r times ix

Preface m o r e can be g a i n e d f r o m m a i n t a i n i n g a c o u n t e r p o i n t b e t w e e n m o d e r n a n d R o m a n perspectives. O n e objective is t o e x p e r i m e n t w i t h m e t h o d s b o r r o w e d f r o m sociology i n o r d e r t o g a i n n e w insights i n t o changes i n R o m a n society - n o t n e w facts, b u t a d i f f e r e n t way o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n v a r i o u s changes. T h i s is n o t t h e place t o e m b a r k o n a l o n g discussion a b o u t m e t h o d s . T h a t r e q u i r e s a n abstract l a n g u a g e o f its o w n . B u t let m e m e n t i o n o n e d i f f i c u l t y . T h r o u g h o u t t h i s b o o k I t r y t o e x p l o r e some o f t h e l o n g - t e r m consequences o f r e p e a t e d actions, f o r e x a m p l e , t h e consequences o f i m p o r t i n g slaves i n t o I t a l y d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f Rome's i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n , o r o f a l l o c a t i n g c o l o n i a l plots t o e m i g r a n t I t a l i a n peasants. I w a n t t o e x p l o r e t h e consequences o f these actions i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l actors. A c t o r s o f t e n d i d n o t k n o w t h e l o n g - t e r m consequences o f t h e i r actions. T h e r e f o r e , I c a n n o t p r o p e r l y follow the conventional practice o f citing quotations f r o m an ancient source i n o r d e r t o a u t h e n t i c a t e each step i n t h e a r g u m e n t . T h e a n c i e n t source, i f we are l u c k y , tells us o n l y w h a t a n a n c i e n t a u t h o r t h o u g h t was h a p p e n i n g a n d h o w h e f e l t a b o u t i t , o r h o w h e t h o u g h t t h a t o t h e r s f e l t a b o u t i t . T h a t is o b v i o u s l y i m p o r t a n t , b u t p a r t i a l . I n t h e face o f t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , we have t o l o o k o u t f o r o t h e r m e t h o d s by w h i c h we can v a l i d a t e analyses. O f course n e i t h e r e f f o r t n o r awareness o f t h e difficulties guarantees success. H i s t o r y is a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h t h e d e a d . W e have several advantages o v e r o u r i n f o r m a n t s . W e t h i n k we k n o w w h a t h a p p e n e d subsequently; we c a n take a l o n g e r v i e w , clear o f e p h e m e r a l d e t a i l ; we c a n d o a l l t h e t a l k i n g ; a n d w i t h a l l o u r p r e j u d i c e s , we are alive. W e s h o u l d n o t t h r o w away these advantages by p r e t e n d i n g t o be j u s t collators o r i n t e r p r e t e r s o f o u r sources. W e can d o m o r e t h a n t h a t . A l m o s t i n e v i t a b l y , w h a t e v e r o u r a m b i t i o n s , we f i n i s h u p by f o i s t i n g s i m p l i f y i n g fictions o n t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s o f a past w h i c h is l a r g e l y lost. A t first sight, t h i s m a y seem u n f l a t t e r i n g ; b u t i t helps a c c o u n t f o r some o f t h e differences b e t w e e n successive g e n e r a t i o n s o f h i s t o r i a n s . H i s t o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s d o n o t necessarily get b e t t e r ; m a n y s i m p l y c h a n g e . E v e n so, o n e o f t h e persistent p r o b l e m s i n each g e n e r a t i o n is h o w t o choose b e t w e e n c o m p e t i n g fictions. T h a t is w h e r e sociological m e t h o d s c a n be h e l p f u l . A n d t h a t is w h y these t w o books m a k e use o f sociological concepts a n d a r g u m e n t s , set o u t e x p l i c i t hypotheses, a n d seek t o s u p p o r t those a r g u m e n t s w i t h m o d e l s , figures a n d c o o r d i n a t e s , as w e l l as w i t h q u o t a tions f r o m t h e sources. T h e y a r e a l l a t t e m p t s t o reveal h o w R o m a n s t h o u g h t a n d t o m e a s u r e l i n k s b e t w e e n factors; they are a t t e m p t s t o l i m i t t h e a r e n a w i t h i n w h i c h elusive a n d c o m p e t i n g t r u t h s m a y p r o b a b l y be f o u n d . x

Preface M o d e r n h i s t o r i a n s w i t h t h e i r w e a l t h o f d a t a sometimes seek t o discover w h y actors b e h a v e d as t h e y d i d ; t h e y seek t o recover i n t e n t i o n . A n c i e n t historians f o r the most part k n o w only about behaviour; they are t h e r e f o r e sometimes t e m p t e d t o r e a d back f r o m b e h a v i o u r t o i n t e n t i o n by i m p u t i n g r a t i o n a l i t y . T w o o b v i o u s p r o b l e m s arise: whose r a t i o n a l i t y ? a n d s h o u l d we assume t h a t actors ( e m p e r o r s , generals o r peasants) w e r e r a t i o n a l ? I n t h e c h a p t e r called ' D i v i n e e m p e r o r s ' , I t r y t o show h o w sociologists a r e c o n c e r n e d n o t o n l y w i t h statisticsand m o d e l s b u t also w i t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g actors' t h o u g h t s a n d feelings a n d w i t h symbolic a c t i o n ; i n this c h a p t e r I e x a m i n e w h a t we i n o u r c u l t u r e w o u l d p r o b a b l y call t h e i r r a t i o n a l a n d t h e u n t r u e . I suggest t h a t c e r t a i n u n t r u e stories a b o u t e m p e r o r s ( r u m o u r s , p r e d i c t i o n s , miracles) w e r e t h e c u r r e n c y o f t h e p o l i t i c a l system, j u s t as m o n e y was t h e c u r r e n c y o f t h e e c o n o m i c system. T h e s e u n t r u e stories have been l a r g e l y neglected, because p r o p e r h i s t o r i a n s , l i k e detectives, are t r a i n e d t o scent o u t t h e t r u t h . Y e t i f we w a n t t o e n t e r t h e t h o u g h t - w o r l d o f t h e R o m a n s , we m u s t r e s t r a i n o u r p r e j u d i c e s a n d t r e a t Mies' seriously. I have been e x t r e m e l y f o r t u n a t e i n m y advisers. Professors P. A . B r u n t a n d M . I . F i n l e y have r e a d c h a p t e r a f t e r c h a p t e r w i t h m e t i c u lous care a n d c r i t i c a l a c u m e n ; D r J . A . N o r t h has r e a d t h e final v e r s i o n o f each c h a p t e r a n d saved m e f r o m n u m e r o u s e r r o r s o f fact a n d t h o u g h t . Professor Sir H e n r y Phelps B r o w n has g i v e n m e r e p e a t e d t u t o r i a l s i n economics a n d I w o u l d l i k e t o t h a n k Professor R. P. D o r e f o r his f r i e n d l y e n c o u r a g e m e n t . I n a d d i t i o n several scholars have g i v e n m e t h e i r advice o n i n d i v i d u a l c h a p t e r s : C h r i s t i a n H a b i c h t a n d Chester S t a r r r e a d C h a p t e r i ; D a v i d A p t e r a n d E d w a r d Shils m a d e suggestions a b o u t C h a p t e r n ; E r n s t B a d i a n i m p r o v e d C h a p t e r i n c o n s i d e r a b l y ; R o b e r t Bocock gave m e t h o u g h t f u l advice a b o u t C h a p t e r i v as d i d G e o f f r e y L l o y d a b o u t C h a p t e r v . T h i s b o o k has been o v e r t e n years i n t h e w r i t i n g a n d o v e r t h a t t i m e I have i n c u r r e d debts o f g r a t i t u d e t o colleagues i n several universities a n d t o i n s t i t u t i o n s w h i c h have been g e n e r o u s i n t h e i r g r a n t s o f rese a r c h f u n d s . I a m p a r t i c u l a r l y g r a t e f u l t o K i n g ' s College, C a m b r i d g e f o r t h e g r a n t o f a f o u r - y e a r research f e l l o w s h i p , t o t h e I n s t i t u t e o f A d v a n c e d S t u d y , P r i n c e t o n w h i c h f o r t w o years, 1969-70 a n d 1974-5, a l l o w e d m e t o sit q u i e t l y r e a d i n g a n d t h i n k i n g i n i d e a l circumstances; I a m also v e r y g r a t e f u l t o Professors F r a n k G i l l i a m a n d C a r l Kaysen f o r n u m e r o u s conversations, as w e l l as t o m y o t h e r colleagues at t h e I n s t i t u t e . T h e N u f f i e l d F o u n d a t i o n , t h e Social Research D i v i s i o n o f t h e L o n d o n School o f E c o n o m i c s , t h e Social Sciences Research C o u n c i l a n d B r u n e i U n i v e r s i t y have each p r o v i d e d m e w i t h f u n d s w i t h w h i c h I c o u l d e m p l o y research assistants t o h e l p w i t h t h e e n o r m o u s task o f xi

Preface c o d i n g a n c i e n t d a t a . I w a n t t o t h a n k L y n d a Rees, G r a h a m B u r t o n , P. J . Roscoe a n d O l i v e r N i c h o l s o n f o r h a r d w o r k a n d a m u s e d t o l e r ance. F i n a l l y , I s h o u l d l i k e t o t h a n k m y colleagues at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Leicester w h o first t a u g h t m e sociology, a n d m y colleagues at t h e L S E a n d B r u n e i w h o t o l e r a t e d m y strange interests i n t h e R o m a n w o r l d . K.H. London November

1977

xii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AE

Année

Ancient

Roman

USED

Epigraphique. Statutes

A.C.

J o h n s o n et al., A Translation

with

Commentary,

A u s t i n , T e x a s , 1961 BMCRE

Coins

of the Roman

Empire

in the Brituh

Museum,

ed. H . Mattingley

et al., L o n d o n 1 9 2 3 - . CAH CCAG

The Cambridge Catalogus

Ancient

codicum

History,

e d . J . B . B u r y etal., C a m b r i d g e , 1923-39.

astrologorum

gracecorum,

v o l , 6,

ed.

W. Kroll,

B r u s s e l s , 1903; v o l . 8, e d . F . C u m o n t et ai., B r u s s e l s , 1911-29. CIG

Corpus

Inscriptionum

Graecarum,

CIL

Corpus

Inscriptionum

Latinarum,

CJ Corp.

Codex Justinianus, Pap.

Jud.

e d . A . B o e c k h et al., B e r l i n , 1828-77. e d . T . M o m m s e n et al., B e r l i n , 1 8 6 3 - .

e d . P. Krüger, B e r l i n ,

Corpus

Papyrorum

Judaicorum,

1877. e d . V . A . T c h e r i k o v e r et

al.,

C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . , 1957-64. CPR

Corpus

Papyrorum

Raineri,

CSHB

Corpus

Scriptorum

Historiae

e d . C . W e s s e l y , V i e n n a , 1895.

C. Th.

Codex

D.

T h e D i g e s t o f J u s t i n i a n , e d . T . M o m m s e n , B e r l i n , 1870.

ESAR

T . F r a n k et at., An

FD

»933-40· Fouilles de Delphes,

F I RA

Fontes

GCS

i940-3Die griechische

GDI

H . Collitz, J . B a u n a c k

IG

Inscriptiones

ILAlg

Inscriptions

ILS

Inscriptiones

JRS

Journal

MG H

Monumenta

NJ

J u s t i n i a n ' s Novellae,

OGIS

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e d . B . G . N i e b u h r et al., B o n n ,

1828-78. The

Theodosianus, Theodosian

Iuris

Inschriften,

e d . T . M o m m s e n , B e r l i n , 1905.

Code,

t r a n s . C . P h a r r , P r i n c e t o n , 1952.

Economic

Survey

of Ancient

Rome,

Baltimore, Md.,

e d . G . D a u x et al., P a r i s , 1 9 2 2 - .

Romani

Anteiustiniani,

christliche

e d . S . R i c c o b o n o et al.,

Schriftsteller, et

al.,

Florence*,

L e i p z i g , 1897- .

Sammlung

der

griechischen

Dialekt-

Göttingen, 1899. Graecae, Latines

B e r l i n , 1873- · de VAlgérie,

Latinae

of Roman

Selectae,

1922-57. 1892-1916.

Studies.

Germaniae Graeci

e d . S. Gsell, Paris,

ed. H . Dessau, Berlin,

Historica,

Auetores

antiquissimi,

Berlin, 1877-9 · 1

e d . R . Schöll a n d W . K r o l l , B e r l i n , 1895.

Inscriptiones

Selectae,

ed. W . Dittenberger, Leipzig,

i9°3-5ORF

Oratorum

PBSR

Papers

Romanorum

of the British

Fragmenta, School

at

ed. H . Malcovati, T u r i n ,

Rome.

xiii

3

1967.

List of abbreviations PG

Patrologioe

cursus

P.O.

Potrologia

Orientalis,

computus,

series Groeco,

vols.

18-19,

e<

e d . J .-P. M i g n e , Paris, 1857- .

*-

R- G r a f f i n a n d F . N a u , P a r i s ,

1924-6. P.Giss.

Griechische

Papyri

im Museum...

z u Glessen,

e d . O . E g e r et at., L e i p z i g ,

1910-12. P.Lond.

Greek

Papyri

in the British

Museum,

e d . F . G . K e n y o n et al.,

London,

1893-1917. P.Oxy.

The

PSI

Papiri

Oxyrhynchus

R.A.C.

Reallexikon

greci

Papyri,

e latini,

e d . B . P. G r e n f e l l et al., L o n d o n , 1 8 9 8 - .

e d . G . V i t e l l i et al.,

für

Antike

Real-Encyclopädie

der

und

Florence, 1912-.

Christentum,

ed. T . Klauser,

Stuttgart,

1950-. RE

classischen

Altertumswissenschaft,

ed. A . F . von

P a u l y et al., S t u t t g a r t , 1 8 9 4 - . RIB

The

Roman

Inscriptions

Wright, Oxford, SIG

Sylloge

of Britain,

ed. R. G . Collingwood

a n d R . P.

1965.

Inscriptionum

Graecarum,

ed.

W . Dittenberger,

Leipzig , 3

1915-24. TAM

Tituli

ZSS

Zeitschrift

To

Asiae

Minoris,

e d . E . K a i i n k a et al.,

der Savigny

V i e n n a , 1901- .

Stiftung.

f i n d s t a n d a r d e d i t i o n s o f c l a s s i c a l a u t h o r s , see The

tionary,

ed.

Tusculum

N. G. L. Hammond,

Lexikon

griechischer

Oxford , 2

und

1970,

lateinischer

or

Oxford

Classical

W. Buchwald

Autoren,

Munich,

Dicet

1963.

al., For

t r a n s l a t i o n s a n d texts, see t h e L o e b C l a s s i c a l L i b r a r y ; m a n y u s e f u l t r a n s l a t i o n s a r e also i n T h e P e n g u i n Classics. Selected sources a r e translated with a c o m m e n t a r y i n N . L e w i s a n d M . R e i n h o l d , Roman

Civilization,

Harper Torch-

b o o k s , N e w Y o r k , 1966, t w o v o l u m e s . Measures a n d coins T h e following r o u g h equivalences are used: 1 modius

— 8 . 6 2 - 8 . 6 7 l i t r e s = 6.5 k g w h e a t

1 medimnos 1 iugerum

= 52 l i t r e s = 39 k g w h e a t = 0.25 h e c t a r e = 0.625

4 H S (sesterces) 100 drachmae

= 1 denarius = 1 mna

a

c

r

e

(dn) = 1 drachma

(dr)

(usually)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS T h e following translations a r e reprinted by permission of P e n g u i n B o o k s L t d : P l u t a r c h , Makers

of Rome,

1965), p p . 145, 159-60, Copyright © T a c i t u s , The

160-2

I a n S c o t t - K i l v e r t , 1965 Annab

of Imperial

C l a s s i c s , 1971)» p p . 112, Copyright © T a c i t u s , The

t r a n s l a t e d by I a n S c o t t - K i l v e r t ( P e n g u i n C l a s s i c s ,

Rome,

translated by M i c h a e l G r a n t ( P e n g u i n

175-6

M i c h a e l G r a n t P u b l i c a t i o n s L t d , 1956, 1959, Histories,

1972), p p . 2 6 3 - 4 Copyright ©

1971

translated by K e n n e t h Wellesley ( P e n g u i n Classics,

K e n n e t h W e l l e s l e y , 1964,

xiv

1972

To

Juliet

Xi

Ο

G A I

T h e R o m a n E m p i r e in the 2nd 0

m i l .,>«.,

bOO

(;

krn

SOO

Mountain areas «*oovs» îOOOm ar»? i>h;»d<»j

<\H|

Alexandria

E

I CONQUERORS AND SLAVES: THE IMPACT OF CONQUERING AN EMPIRE ON T H E POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ITALY THE

ARGUMENT

A t its h e i g h t , t h e R o m a n e m p i r e s t r e t c h e d f r o m t h e n o r t h o f E n g l a n d t o t h e b a n k s o f t h e r i v e r E u p h r a t e s , f r o m t h e B l a c k Sea t o t h e A d a n t i c coast o f S p a i n (see m a p ) . I t s t e r r i t o r y c o v e r e d a n area e q u a l t o m o r e t h a n h a l f t h a t o f c o n t i n e n t a l U S A a n d i t is n o w split a m o n g m o r e t h a n t w e n t y n a t i o n states. T h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n was t h e e m p i r e ' s o w n i n t e r n a l sea. I t s p o p u l a t i o n is c o n v e n t i o n a l l y e s t i m a t e d at a b o u t fifty t o sixty m i l l i o n p e o p l e i n t h e first c e n t u r y A D , a b o u t o n e fifth o r o n e s i x t h o f t h e w o r l d p o p u l a t i o n at t h e t i m e . E v e n t o d a y t h i s w o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d a large national p o p u l a t i o n , difficult to govern w i t h the aid o f m o d e r n t e c h n o l o g y . Y e t t h e R o m a n e m p i r e persisted as a single p o l i t i c a l system f o r at least six c e n t u r i e s (200 B C - A D 400); its i n t e g r a t i o n a n d p r e s e r v a t i o n s u r e l y r a n k , w i t h t h e Chinese e m p i r e , as o n e o f t h e greatest p o l i t i c a l a c h i e v e m e n t s o f m a n k i n d . 1

T h e m a i n subject o f t h i s c h a p t e r is t h e i m p a c t o f a c q u i r i n g a n e m p i r e o n the traditional political a n d economic institutions o f the conquerors. M o s t o f t h i s s t o r y is w e l l k n o w n . I shall n o t t r y t o give yet a n o t h e r d e t a i l e d c h r o n o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t . I n s t e a d I have selected c e r t a i n r e p e a t e d l y i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t s i n t h e process o f conquest (such as t h e m i l i t a r i s t i c ethos o f t h e c o n q u e r o r s , t h e e c o n o m i c consequences o f i m p o r t i n g t w o m i l l i o n slaves i n t o I t a l y , t h e s h o r t a g e o f f a r m i n g l a n d a m o n g t h e f r e e p o o r ) a n d I have a t t e m p t e d t o analyse t h e i r r e l a t i o n ships t o each o t h e r . T h i s involves g o i n g o v e r f a m i l i a r t e r r i t o r y , i f s o m e t i m e s by u n f a m i l i a r paths. R o m a n h i s t o r y can be p r o f i t a b l y s t u d i e d f r o m several v i e w p o i n t s w h i c h c o m p l e m e n t each o t h e r . T h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f a h u g e e m p i r e i n t h e last t w o c e n t u r i e s b e f o r e C h r i s t t r a n s f o r m e d a l a r g e sector o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l I t a l i a n e c o n o m y . T h e i n f l u x o f i m p e r i a l p r o f i t s i n t h e f o r m o f b o o t y a n d taxes c h a n g e d 1

F o r estimates of world population, based o n backward extrapolation a n d o n estimates of Chinese a n d R o m a n populations of this period, see D. M . H e e r , Society and Population (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968) 2. I

Conquerors

and slaves

t h e city o f R o m e f r o m a l a r g e t o w n t o a r e s p l e n d e n t city, c a p i t a l o f a n e m p i r e . B y t h e e n d o f t h e last c e n t u r y B C , t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e city o f R o m e was i n t h e r e g i o n o f o n e m i l l i o n . R o m e was o n e o f t h e largest p r e - i n d u s t r i a l cities ever c r e a t e d by m a n . I t was h e r e t h a t aristocrats d i s p l a y e d t h e i r b o o t y i n t r i u m p h a l processions, s p e n t m o s t o f t h e i r i n c o m e a n d c o m p e t e d w i t h each o t h e r i n o s t e n t a t i o u s l u x u r y . T h e i r private expenditure, and public expenditure o n b u i l d i n g m o n u ments, temples, roads a n d drains, directly a n d indirecdy contributed t o t h e l i v e l i h o o d o f several h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d n e w i n h a b i t a n t s . I m m i g r a t i o n f r o m t h e c o u n t r y s i d e was also e n c o u r a g e d b y t h e g r a n t o f state subsidies o n w h e a t d i s t r i b u t e d t o citizens l i v i n g i n t h e city o f R o m e . 2

T h e g r o w t h i n t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e c a p i t a l city a n d i n d e e d i n t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f I t a l y as a w h o l e (see T a b l e 1.2), i m p l i e d a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e c o u n t r y s i d e . T h e p e o p l e l i v i n g i n t h e city o f R o m e c o n s t i t u t e d a h u g e m a r k e t for the purchase of f o o d p r o d u c e d o n Italian farms: w h e a t , w i n e , o l i v e o i l , c l o t h a n d m o r e specialised p r o d u c e . T o be s u r e , t h e city o f R o m e was f e d p a r t l y f r o m t h e p r o v i n c e s ; a t e n t h o f t h e Sicilian w h e a t c r o p , f o r e x a m p l e , was e x t r a c t e d as tax a n d was o f t e n sent t o R o m e . B u t a l a r g e p a r t o f t h e f o o d c o n s u m e d i n t h e city o f R o m e a n d i n o t h e r p r o s p e r o u s t o w n s such as C a p u a a n d P u t e o l i also c a m e f r o m estates n e w l y f o r m e d i n I t a l y , o w n e d by rich R o m a n s a n d c u l t i v a t e d b y slaves. 3

T h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f a subsistence e c o n o m y w h i c h h a d p r e v i o u s l y p r o d u c e d only a small surplus i n t o a m a r k e t economy w h i c h p r o d u c e d a n d c o n s u m e d a l a r g e s u r p l u s was a c h i e v e d by i n c r e a s i n g t h e p r o ductivity of agricultural labour o n larger farms. Fewer m e n p r o d u c e d m o r e food. U n d e r - e m p l o y e d small-holders were expelled f r o m their plots a n d r e p l a c e d by a s m a l l e r n u m b e r o f slaves. T h e r i c h b o u g h t 4

2

3

4

R o m e was the largest city in the world and was perhaps not equalled in size before the rise of the great cities of C h i n a in the S u n g dynasty. See G . R o z m a n , Urban Networks in Ch'ing China and Tokugawa Japan (Princeton, 1973) 35 a n d the com pendious, useful but not obviously reliable T . C h a n d l e r a n d G . Fox, 3000 Years of Urban Growth (New Y o r k , 1974). T h e population of L o n d o n reached about one million in 1800 a n d it was then by far the largest city in E u r o p e . I n 1600, only two E u r o p e a n cities h a d populations over 200,000 namely Paris and Naples. T h e r e is n o direct confirmation of this generalisation in the classical texts. B u t that does not matter. W e must suppose either that large Italian landowners sold the produce of their estates to Italian townsmen, or that they got no return o n the capital which they repeatedly invested both in land and in the slaves who worked it. T h e first generalisation seems more economical. It is not possible to prove this assertion by the traditional method of selective quotation from classical sources. F o r example, Livy (6.12) suggested that the frequent wars in a district of central Italy in an earlier period might be explained by its high population. H e noted that in his time the district produced few soldiers, and would have been deserted but for slaves. My assertion is compatible with such passages in the sources, but cannot be validated by them. Instead, I have tried to consider

2

The

argument

u p t h e i r l a n d , o r t o o k possession o f i t by violence. T h e y r e o r g a n i s e d small-holdings into larger and m o r e profitable farms i n o r d e r to c o m p e t e w i t h o t h e r n o b l e s , t o increase t h e r e t u r n o n t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t i n l a n d a n d i n slaves, a n d t o e x p l o i t t h e i r slaves m o r e effectively. M o r e o v e r , i n m a n y parts o f Italy, large land-owners changed the p a t t e r n o f l a n d - u s e . C o n s i d e r a b l e areas o f a r a b l e l a n d w e r e t u r n e d i n t o p a s t u r e , p e r h a p s so t h a t h i g h e r v a l u e p r o d u c e such as w o o l o r m e a t , instead o f w h e a t , c o u l d be sold i n t h e city o f R o m e , e v e n a f t e r t h e heavy t r a n s p o r t costs h a d b e n p a i d . O t h e r l a n d was c o n v e r t e d i n t o o l i v e p l a n t a t i o n s a n d v i n e y a r d s , a n d t h e v a l u e o f its p r o d u c e increased. T h e s e i m p r o v e m e n t s w e r e i m p o r t a n t ; t h e y figured l a r g e l y i n R o m a n h a n d b o o k s o n a g r i c u l t u r e . B u t t h e i r scope was l i m i t e d by t h e size o f t h e available m a r k e t . M a n y peasant f a r m s r e m a i n e d intact. A f t e r a l l , t h e u r b a n p o o r c o n s t i t u t e d t h e o n l y mass m a r k e t , a n d t h e y p r o b a b l y s p e n t a b o u t as m u c h o n b r e a d as o n w i n e a n d o l i v e o i l t o g e t h e r . T h i s 5

6

5

s

both the probability a n d the consequences of the assertion being wrong, a n d then to ask: What alternative assertion is more likely to be true? T h i s procedure, based on a compatibility theory of historical truth, is used often in this book. * I was the first to make shepherds give way to ploughmen on the public land*, Inscriptiones Lotinoe liberoe rei publico*, ed. A . Degrassi (Florence, 1957-63) n° 454. T h i s was one of the p r o u d boasts of a consul (? of 132 BC) who had a milestone, in the genre of a market cross, set u p in a southern Italian town and inscribed with his achievements. T h e inscription is commonly understood to refer to the distribution of public land to small-holders i n accordance with the G r a c c h a n land laws (133 BC). V a r r o (On Agriculture 2, preface 4) also wrote that latterly Romans had * turned arable into pasture out of greed a n d against the law*. F r o m such snippets, it is difficult to prove any general change in land use. B u t my general impression is that the rapid expansion of pasture and vineyards was based on the conversion of arable as well as o n the extension of private property over hitherto unclaimed o r c o m m o n lands. O n the growth in volume a n d prestige of Italian wines, dated to the second century BC, see Pliny, Natural History 14.87-8; on the growth of pasture, see A . J . Toynbee, Hannibal*s Legacy (Oxford, 1965) vol. 2, 286ff. T h e relative size of the markets for agricultural crops is obviously an important problem. T h e ancient data are clearly insufficient. A s a sighting shot, without any implication that the prices in R o m e were of the same order a n d for illustration only, I looked at the single case of M a d r i d i n the mid-eighteenth century. Goods entering the city (which had a population of about 135,000 in 1757) were checked for customs; in 1757, imports totalled as followed: 96,000 arrobas of olive oil, 500,000 arrobas of wine, 520,000 fanegas of wheat. I took average prices for 1753-62 for New Castille from L . J . Hamilton, War and Prices in Spain 1651-1800 (New Y o r k , 1957) 229 ff. and figures on consumption from D . R. Ringrose, * Transportation and economic stagnation in 18th-century Castille', Journal of Economic History 28 (1968) 51-79. O f the three products, wheat consistuted 46 % of the total costs; wine 45 %; olive oil 9 %. Wheat consumption works out at about 160 kg per person year, wine at 100 litres per adult year - which is rather low for wheat a n d high for wine. However, these figures can serve as only a very rough guide. F o r comparison, I posited the same consumption but with prices from Marseille, 1701-10; this produced somewhat different ratios of cost: wheat 6 4 % , wine 19%, oil 17%; data from R. B a e h r e l , Une Croissance (Paris, 1961) 530ft. I n R o m e wheat was probably also the single most important product, in volume and value, particularly for the poor.

3

Conquerors

and slaves

weakness i n t h e a g g r e g a t e p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r o f t h e u r b a n sector h e l p e d i n s u l a t e a sizeable sector o f t h e I t a l i a n p e a s a n t r y f r o m t h e a g r a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n w h i c h t r a n s f o r m e d w o r k i n g practices o n l a r g e r farms. T h e c o n q u e s t o f a n e m p i r e affected t h e I t a l i a n c o u n t r y s i d e i n several o t h e r i m p o r t a n t respects. M i l i t a r y c a m p a i g n s a l l a r o u n d t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n basin f o r c e d p r o l o n g e d m i l i t a r y service o n tens o f t h o u s a n d s o f peasants. T h r o u g h o u t t h e last t w o c e n t u r i e s B C , t h e r e w e r e c o m m o n l y o v e r 100,000 I t a l i a n s s e r v i n g i n t h e a r m y , t h a t is m o r e than ten per cent o f the estimated adult male p o p u l a t i o n . Global n u m b e r s disguise i n d i v i d u a l s u f f e r i n g ; we h a v e t o t h i n k w h a t p r o l o n g e d m i l i t a r y service m e a n t t o i n d i v i d u a l peasants, w h a t its i m p l i c a tions w e r e f o r t h e i r f a m i l i e s a n d f o r t h e f a r m s off w h i c h t h e y l i v e d . M a n y s i n g l e - f a m i l y f a r m s c o u l d b e a r t h e absence o f a g r o w n - u p son, e v e n f o r several years; m i l i t a r y service m a y e v e n have h e l p e d by g i v i n g t h e m s o m e a l t e r n a t i v e e m p l o y m e n t a n d pay. B u t i n s o m e f a m i l i e s , t h e c o n s c r i p t i o n o f t h e o n l y a d u l t m a l e o r t h e absence o f a n o n l y son i n t h e a r m y overseas w h e n his f a t h e r d i e d m e a n t i n c r e a s i n g p o v e r t y a n d debt. 7

8

O v e r t i m e , mass m i l i t a r y service m u s t have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e i m p o v e r i s h m e n t o f m a n y f r e e R o m a n s m a l l - h o l d e r s . A t least we k n o w t h a t t h o u s a n d s o f R o m a n peasants lost t h e i r l a n d . I n a d d i t i o n invasions by C a r t h a g i n i a n s a n d Celtic tribes, slave r e b e l l i o n s a n d c i v i l wars w h i c h w e r e r e p e a t e d l y f o u g h t o n I t a l i a n soil a l l c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t r a d i t i o n a l a g r i c u l t u r a l h o l d i n g s . E v e n so, m o r e I t a l i a n peasants m i g h t h a v e s u r v i v e d b o t h t h e d e m a n d s o f m i l i t a r y service a n d t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f w a r b u t f o r o n e o t h e r f a c t o r : t h e massive i n v e s t m e n t by t h e r i c h o f t h e p r o f i t s d e r i v e d f r o m e m p i r e i n I t a l i a n l a n d . T h e r i c h c o u l d establish l a r g e estates i n I t a l y o n l y by t h e wholesale e v i c t i o n o f I t a l i a n peasants f r o m t h e i r f a r m s . T y p i c a l l y these estates w e r e 7

6

See T a b l e 1.1 below, which deals with R o m a n citizen soldiers only. P. A . B r u n t , Italian Manpower 225 BC-AD 14 (Oxford, 1971) 425 lists the size of the Italian a r m e d forces for the twenty-one years between 200 and 168 BC for which we have full information. T h e average size of the army a n d smallish fleet was about 140,000, d r a w n from a n adult male population of about one million (ibid. 59). I n the traditional R o m a n histories, folk-heroes faced similar problems; it seems likely that their problems reflected anxieties which persisted. F o r example, Cincinnatus s u m m o n e d to be dictator while working at the plough is said to have e x c l a i m e d : ' My land will not be sown this year, a n d so we shall r u n the risk of not having enough to eat* (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 10.17). A n o t h e r famous gen eral, Atilius Regulus serving in Africa d u r i n g the first war against Carthage wrote to the senate to say that the bailiff of his small farm h a d died, that a farm h a n d had taken the stock, a n d requested that a replacement be sent to see to its cultivation, so that his wife a n d children should not starve (Valerius Maximus 4.4.6). Poor soldiers h a d no such privilege.

4

The

argument

c u l t i v a t e d by i m p o r t e d slaves. T h e d i s p l a c e m e n t o f l a r g e n u m b e r s o f f r e e peasants by slaves h e l p e d t r a n s f o r m t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l e c o n o m y o f I t a l y , a n d f o m e n t e d t h e p o l i t i c a l conflicts o f t h e late R e p u b l i c . T h e mass e v i c t i o n o f t h e p o o r by t h e rich u n d e r l a y t h e p o l i t i c a l conflicts a n d c i v i l wars o f t h e last c e n t u r y o f t h e R o m a n R e p u b l i c . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e possession o f p u b l i c l a n d (oger publicus) a n d its r e d i s t r i b u t i o n t o t h e p o o r became a m a j o r p o l i t i c a l issue, a n d e x a c e r b a t e d t h e tensions b e t w e e n t h e r i c h a n d t h e p o o r . T h i s p u b l i c l a n d i n I t a l y h a d b e e n k e p t a p a r t o u t o f l a n d sequestrated by t h e R o m a n s f r o m c o n q u e r e d tribes o r r e b e l l i o u s allies, ostensibly f o r t h e collective benefit. I t c o n s t i t u t e d a s i g n i f i c a n t b u t m i n o r p a r t o f a l l R o m a n l a n d , b e i n g by m o d e r n estimates w e l l less t h a n a fifth o f a l l R o m a n l a n d i n t h e m i d - t h i r d c e n t u r y B C , a n d h a r d l y m o r e t h a n t h a t i n t h e second c e n t u r y B C (such estimates are i n e v i t a b l y c r u d e ) ; b u t its m a l d i s t r i b u t i o n became a p o l i t i c a l cause célèbre. T h e p u b l i c l a n d was c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t h e h a n d s o f t h e r i c h ; t h e laws w h i c h p r o h i b i t e d l a r g e h o l d i n g s o f p u b l i c l a n d w e r e i g n o r e d (so C a t o , f r a g . 167 ORF); a n d t h e r e n t s w h i c h s h o u l d h a v e b e e n p a i d t o t h e state w e r e by s e n a t o r i a l i n e r t i a left uncollected (Livy 42.19). 9

10

A n a r r a t i v e h i s t o r y o f t h e last c e n t u r y o f t h e R e p u b l i c w o u l d be p u n c t u a t e d by conflicts o v e r this l a n d , by l a n d laws a n d by l a n d dist r i b u t i o n s , w h i c h w e r e m o r e o f t e n p r o p o s e d t h a n effected. I n 133 B C f o r e x a m p l e , a y o u n g aristocratic a n d r e v o l u t i o n a r y t r i b u n e o f t h e p e o p l e p r o p o s e d t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e p u b l i c l a n d illegally h e l d by t h e r i c h . H e was assassinated by his o p p o n e n t s i n t h e senate, b u t t h e l a n d c o m m i s s i o n w h i c h he h a d f o u n d e d succeeded i n d i s t r i b u t i n g •

10

Ancient commentators o n the political struggles of the late Republic usually saw the main axis of conflict as between nobles a n d the people; see L . R. Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley, 1944). T h e direct opposition r i c h - p o o r is only rarely mentioned in historical sources of the period (see, for example A p p i a n , Civil Wars 1.10). Nevertheless, it seems to have underlain m u c h social a n d political conflict; see the interesting discussion by M . I . Finley, The Ancient Economy ( L o n d o n , «973) 35ffSee T o y n b e e (1965): vol. 1, 166; vol. 2, 556-7). T h e traditional histories reflect this concern with the maldistribution of public land, sometimes anachronistically. Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Roman Antiquities 8.73-75; cf. 9.51 ) who lived in the reign of Augustus; he recorded a debate purportedly held in 486 BC, but it probably reflected typical attitudes of a m u c h later period. A leading senator, Appius, said (73.4): ' A s things now stand, the envy of the poor against the rich who have appropriated a n d continue to occupy the public lands is justified; it is not surprising that they d e m a n d that public property should be divided among all citizens instead of being held by the f e w . . . ' B u t he went o n to argue that splitting state-land into small lots would be troublesome to the poor, because they were poor; it would be better for the state to lease land in large lots: these would bring i n large revenues, from which soldiers could be paid a n d fed. With some refinements, the suggestion was generally approved. F o r a long discussion of the evidence, see G . TibUetti, ' II Possesso dell* A g e r Publicus*, Athenaeum 26 (1948) 173-236.

5

Conquerors

and slaves

some l a n d t o p o o r citizens. T h e t r o u b l e was t h a t i n spite o f legal safeguards, t h e n e w settlers w e r e as l i k e l y t o be evicted as t h e o l d ; t h e same forces w e r e still at w o r k . A g a i n i n t h e first c e n t u r y B C , c i t i z e n soldiers w h o h a d m i l i t a r y p o w e r a n d t h e p a t r o n a g e o f p o l i t i c a l generals such as Sulla, P o m p e y a n d J u l i u s Caesar, occasionally secured s m a l l h o l d i n g s f o r themselves at t h e e n d o f t h e i r service. B u t t h e y usually t o o k o v e r l a n d w h i c h was a l r e a d y b e i n g c u l t i v a t e d b y o t h e r s m a l l h o l d e r s , a n d i n a d d i t i o n , some o f t h e m f a i l e d t o settle d o w n o n t h e i r lands, w h i c h w e r e a g a i n b o u g h t u p by t h e r i c h . T h u s t h e successive r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f s m a l l - h o l d i n g s p r o b a b l y d i d n o t s i g n i f i c a n t l y increase t h e t o t a l n u m b e r o f s m a l l - h o l d e r s , e v e n i f i t slowed d o w n t h e i r d e m i s e . T h e o v e r a l l t e n d e n c y was f o r p o o r R o m a n s t o be squeezed o u t o f a n y s i g n i f i c a n t share i n t h e p r o f i t s o f conquest so l o n g as t h e y stayed i n t h e I t a l i a n c o u n t r y s i d e . 11

T h e c e n t r a l place o f l a n d i n R o m a n politics s p r a n g f r o m t h e overw h e l m i n g importance of land i n the Roman economy. L a n d a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o u r r e m a i n e d t h e t w o most i m p o r t a n t c o n s t i t u e n t s o f wealth i n ail periods of R o m a n history. M a n u f a c t u r i n g , trade a n d u r b a n rents were o f m i n o r i m p o r t a n c e i n comparison w i t h agriculture. T h a t does n o t m e a n t h e y s h o u l d be i g n o r e d ; t h e d e p l o y m e n t o f t e n t o t w e n t y p e r c e n t o f t h e l a b o u r f o r c e i n n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l tasks is o n e o f t h e factors w h i c h d i f f e r e n t i a t e s a f e w p r e - i n d u s t r i a l societies f r o m t h e rest. I n I t a l y at t h e e n d o f t h e p e r i o d o f i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n , t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n e n g a g e d i n u r b a n o c c u p a t i o n s m a y have risen t o w a r d s t h i r t y p e r c e n t (see T a b l e 1.2; t h e figures are speculative), because t h e p r o f i t s o f e m p i r e a n d t h e e c o n o m i c changes, r e f l e c t e d i n the change of occupation f r o m country to t o w n , f r o m agriculture to h a n d i c r a f t s o r t o service trades, w e r e c o n c e n t r a t e d i n I t a l y . T h e city o f R o m e was t h e c a p i t a l o f t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n basin. I n t h e rest o f t h e Roman empire, the p r o p o r t i o n of the labour force p r i m a r i l y engaged i n a g r i c u l t u r e was p r o b a b l y i n t h e o r d e r o f n i n e t y p e r cent, as i t h a d been i n Italy before the p e r i o d o f e x p a n s i o n . B u t even i n Italy 12

11

12

Soldiers were commonly given land which was already under cultivation; 'where the plough a n d reaping hook have been', as a law of Augustus on colonies stated (Hyginus, On the Fixing of Boundaries, ed. L a c h m a n n (Berlin, 1848) 203). T h i s led to repeated friction between colonists a n d the old inhabitants (see, for example, G r a n i u s Licinianus p. 34F). Some ex-soldiers settled by Sulla before 80 b c were involved in the rebellion of Catiline in 63 b c ; according to Sallust (Catiline 16): 'they had squandered their resources and remembered their former victory a n d booty'. T h i s seems an inadequate basis for thinking that all ex-soldiers were bad farmers. It was always assumed in the classical world that soldiers could turn into peasants and vice versa. O n all this, see B r u n t (1971: 204fF.). Some comparative evidence may help as a guide. Bulgaria (1910), Yugoslavia (1931) had 81 % a n d 79 % of their work-force engaged in agriculture. T h e figures for T u r k e y

6

The

argument

at t h e p e a k o f its p r o s p e r i t y , a n d at a l l levels o f society, a m o n g nobles, b o u r g e o i s a n d peasants, p o w e r a n d w e a l t h d e p e n d e d a l m o s t d i r e c t l y o n t h e area a n d f e r t i l i t y o f t h e l a n d w h i c h each i n d i v i d u a l possessed. L a n d - h o l d i n g s w e r e t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l e x p r e s s i o n o f social stratification. A m o n g t h e r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n , e v e n w h e n slavery i n I t a l y was at its h e i g h t , f r e e peasants p r o b a b l y c o n s t i t u t e d a m a j o r i t y o f t h e I t a l i a n p o p u l a t i o n o u t s i d e t h e city o f R o m e . B y peasants, I m e a n i d e a l l y f a m i l i e s e n g a g e d p r i m a r i l y i n t h e c u l t i v a t i o n o f l a n d , w h e t h e r as f r e e - h o l d e r s o r as t e n a n t s ( o f t e n as b o t h ) , t i e d t o t h e w i d e r society by t h e liens o f tax a n d / o r r e n t , l a b o u r dues a n d p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n . T h e persistence o f t h e peasantry is i m p o r t a n t ; b u t so w e r e t h e changes i n t h e o w n e r s h i p a n d o r g a n i s a t i o n o f estates, a n d t h e mass e m i g r a t i o n o f f r e e I t a l i a n peasants w h i c h m a d e those changes i n estate o r g a n i s a tion possible. 1 3

S o m e i n d i c a t i o n s o f scale m a y be h e l p f u l ; t h e y are r o u g h o r d e r s o f m a g n i t u d e only* t h o u g h based o n o r d e r i v e d f r o m t h e c a r e f u l analysis o f t h e e v i d e n c e by B r u n t (1971). R a t h e r speculatively I calculate t h a t i n t w o g e n e r a t i o n s ( 8 0 - 8 B C ) , r o u g h l y h a l f t h e peasant f a m i l i e s o f R o m a n I t a l y , o v e r o n e a n d a h a l f m i l l i o n p e o p l e , w e r e f o r c e d m o s t l y by state i n t e r v e n t i o n t o m o v e f r o m t h e i r ancestral f a r m s . T h e y w e n t e i t h e r t o n e w f a r m s i n I t a l y o r overseas, o r t h e y m i g r a t e d o f t h e i r o w n a c c o r d t o t h e city o f R o m e a n d o t h e r I t a l i a n t o w n s . T h e m a i n c h a n n e l o f t h e i r m o b i l i t y was t h e a r m y . I n a c o m p l e m e n t a r y flow, m a n y m o r e t h a n t w o m i l l i o n peasants f r o m t h e c o n q u e r e d p r o v i n c e s became w a r captives

1 3

(1927) and C h i n a in the 1940s were 8 2 % and over 8 0 % . See O . S. Morgan ed., Agricultural Systems of Middle Europe (New Y o r k , 1933) 48 and 359; Recensement general de la population ig2j ( A n k a r a , 1929) 29; C . K . Y a n g , A Chinese Village ( M I T , 1959) 23. T h e composition of these populations was already somewhat affected by their links with foreign, industrial markets. I think the comparable figures for the R o m a n empire would have been higher. It is impossible to calculate the ratio of free men to slaves outside the city of R o m e accurately, but we can see whether o u r guesses are compatible with each other and with what else we know. F o r present purposes, I assume a total population in Italy of 6.0 million, which is between the best guesses of Beloch (5.5 million (Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt 436) and B r u n t (7.5 million (1971: 124)). I follow Beloch in thinking that there were no more than two million slaves (see note 14 below). F o r crude estimates, which may be useful as illustrations of rural/urban distribution, see T a b l e 1.2 below (p. 68). I f all the r u r a l population worked on the land, and the agricultural land constituted 4 0 % of Italy's surface (as against 5 5 % in 1881), then at roughly 10 million hectares, it allowed over two hectares per person, which is feasible but not generous, given (a) low yields, (b) the high proportion of adults among slaves, and (c) their need to produce a surplus. F o r similar arguments, see Beloch (1886: 417) and B r u n t (1971: 126). I agree with Beloch that the estimated slave population was extremely high for R o m a n conditions.

7

Conquerors

and slaves

a n d t h e n slaves i n I t a l y . C h a n g e s such as these affected e v e n those peasants w h o stayed secure i n t h e i r ancestral f a r m s . I n d e e d , t h e g r o w t h o f m a r k e t s , t h e i m p o r t o f p r o v i n c i a l slaves a n d taxes, t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f r e n t s a n d a g e n e r a l increase i n m o n é t i s a t i o n c h a n g e d t h e w h o l e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e R o m a n e c o n o m y . B u t i n spite o f these changes a n d m i g r a t i o n s , t h e solid c o r e o f I t a l i a n peasants r e m a i n e d peasants. 1 4

I n this c h a p t e r , I shall c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e i m p a c t o f c o n q u e s t o n the two most i m p o r t a n t elements i n the R o m a n economy, l a n d a n d l a b o u r . W e can see t h e i r c h a n g i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p , f o r e x a m p l e , i n t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f l a r g e estates by t h e r i c h a n d t h e massive i m p o r t o f slaves t o w o r k t h e m ; b o t h h a d d e e p social a n d p o l i t i c a l repercussions. T h e i m p a c t o f v i c t o r y o n t h e c o n q u e r i n g society presents us w i t h a process o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y sociological i n t e r e s t . R o m e p r o v i d e s o n e o f t h e f e w w e l l - d o c u m e n t e d e x a m p l e s o f a p r e - i n d u s t r i a l society u n d e r g o i n g r a p i d social c h a n g e i n a p e r i o d o f t e c h n i c a l s t a g n a t i o n . M i l i t a r y c o n quest served t h e same f u n c t i o n as w i d e s p r e a d t e c h n i c a l i n n o v a t i o n . T h e resources o f t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n basin w e r e h e a p e d i n t o I t a l y a n d split the traditional institutions asunder. T h e R o m a n g o v e r n m e n t t r i e d t o a b s o r b t h e n e w w e a l t h , values a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i t h i n t h e e x i s t i n g f r a m e w o r k . I t f a i l e d , j u s t as m o s t m o d e r n d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s f a i l , t o establish i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f n e w resources w i t h o u t violent conflict. 15

THE

INTRUSION

OF

SLAVES

T w o aspects o f t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e I t a l i a n e c o n o m y i n t h e p e r i o d o f i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n s t a n d o u t : t h e increase i n t h e w e a l t h o f t h e 1 4

1 5

T h e r e is no clear evidence o n the number of slaves in Italy, a n d the best we can d o is guess. Beloch (1886: 418) thought that there were less than two million slaves in Italy at the e n d of the first century BC; B r u n t (1971: 124) thought that there were three million. T h e discrepancy serves as a n index of the plausible margin of error. O n e discrepancy should be mentioned here. Since male slaves predominated a n d mortality was high, the total of slaves ever imported was higher than the n u m b e r of slaves at any one time. T h e r e is therefore little point in adding u p the known figures of enslaved captives, even if they were accurate. F o r a thorough discussion of the sources of slavery, see E . M. Schtaerman, Die Blütezeit der Sklavenwirtschaft in der römischen Republik (Wiesbaden, 1969) 36-70. She is quite right to point out how exceptional it was for R o m a n s to enslave the conquered. B u t I still think that war was the most c o m m o n source of slaves in the period of imperial expansion. N o r were war a n d trade mutually exclusive; enslaved prisoners of war were imported into Italy a n d distributed by traders. I have dealt with some of the problems of this process in 'Structural differentiation in R o m e ' in I . M . Lewis ed., History and Social Anthropology ( L o n d o n , 1968) 63-78 a n d also at the e n d of this chapter; more generally, see S. N . Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (New Y o r k , 1963), a n d N . J . Smelser i n B . F . Hoselitz a n d W . E . Moore, Industrialization and Social Change (Paris, 1963).

8

The intrusion of slaves R o m a n elite a n d t h e massive g r o w t h o f slavery. L e t us d e a l w i t h slavery first (see also C h a p t e r n ) . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e best m o d e r n estimates, t h e r e w e r e a b o u t t w o ( o r e v e n t h r e e ) m i l l i o n slaves i n I t a l y by t h e e n d o f t h e first c e n t u r y B C . T h a t is a b o u t t h i r t y - f i v e t o f o r t y p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l e s t i m a t e d p o p u l a t i o n o f I t a l y . G i v e n o u r evidence, these figures are o n l y guesses; t h e y m a y w e l l be t o o l a r g e ; w h e n slavery was at its h e i g h t i n t h e s o u t h e r n states o f t h e U S A , t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f slaves was o n l y o n e t h i r d . H o w e v e r t h a t m a y be, n o o n e can reasonably d o u b t t h a t h u g e n u m b e r s o f slaves w e r e i m p o r t e d i n t o I t a l y d u r i n g t h e last t w o c e n t u r i e s B C . R o m a n I t a l y b e l o n g e d t o t h a t v e r y s m a l l g r o u p o f five societies i n w h i c h slaves c o n s t i t u t e d a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f the labour force. W h e n w e c o m p a r e R o m a n w i t h A m e r i c a n slavery, t h e g r o w t h o f slavery i n R o m a n I t a l y seems s u r p r i s i n g . I n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , slavery was used as a m e a n s o f r e c r u i t i n g l a b o u r t o c u l t i v a t e n e w l y d i s c o v e r e d l a n d s f o r w h i c h t h e r e was n o a d e q u a t e local l a b o u r f o r c e . Slaves b y a n d l a r g e g r e w c r o p s f o r sale i n m a r k e t s w h i c h w e r e b o l s t e r e d by the incipient industrial r e v o l u t i o n . I n R o m a n Italy (and t o a m u c h s m a l l e r e x t e n t i n classical A t h e n s ) , slaves w e r e r e c r u i t e d t o c u l t i v a t e l a n d w h i c h was a l r e a d y b e i n g c u l t i v a t e d by c i t i z e n peasants. W e h a v e t o e x p l a i n n o t o n l y t h e i m p o r t o f slaves b u t t h e e x t r u s i o n o f citizens. T h e massive i m p o r t o f a g r i c u l t u r a l slaves i n t o c e n t r a l I t a l y i m p l i e d a drastic reorganisation o f land-holdings. M a n y small farms were t a k e n o v e r b y t h e rich a n d a m a l g a m a t e d i n t o l a r g e r f a r m s so t h a t slave-gangs c o u l d be efficiendy s u p e r v i s e d a n d p r o f i t a b l y w o r k e d . E v e n so, slavery was b y n o m e a n s a n o b v i o u s s o l u t i o n t o t h e elite's needs f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o u r . M a n y peasants h a d s u r p l u s l a b o u r , a n d f r e e l a b o u r e r s w o r k e d p a r t - t i m e o n t h e estates o f t h e r i c h . T h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e o f r i c h m e n a n d o f f r e e peasants, m a n y o f w h o m o w n e d some l a n d a n d also w o r k e d as p a r t t e n a n t s o r as l a b o u r e r s o n t h e l a n d o f t h e r i c h , is w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g passage f r o m t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l treatise o f V a r r o (last c e n t u r y B C ) : 1 6

A l l agricultural work is carried out by slaves o r free men, o r by b o t h ; by free men, when they cultivate the g r o u n d themselves, as many poor people do with 1 6

I t is useful to distinguish between holdings a n d farms. R i c h m e n h a d huge holdings of land, commonly divided into farms; many of these were m u c h larger than peasant family farms, but they were not lotifundio. T h i s is deduced from the illustrations used by the agricultural writers Cato, V a r r o a n d Columella of farms varying from 25 h a (100 iugtra) for a vineyard to 50 h a (arable) a n d 60 h a (olives), worked by 16, 8-11 a n d 13 slaves respectively. T h e recommended size of herds was 50-100 goats, 100-120 cattle, 100-150 pigs - large by peasant standards, but hardly ranching. F o r testimony, see Cato, On Agriculture 10-11; Columella, On Agriculture 2.12; a n d o n livestock, see V a r r o , On Agriculture 2.3-5 a n d P. A . B r u n t , JRS 62 (1972) 154.

9

Conquerors their families, o r w h e n

and slaves

they w o r k as h i r e d l a b o u r e r s c o n t r a c t e d f o r t h e

h e a v i e r w o r k o f t h e f a r m , s u c h a s t h e h a r v e s t o r h a y i n g . . . I n m y o p i n i o n , it is m o r e p r o f i t a b l e to w o r k u n h e a l t h y l a n d w i t h f r e e w a g e l a b o u r e r s t h a n w i t h s l a v e s ; a n d e v e n i n h e a l t h y p l a c e s , t h e h e a v y t a s k s s u c h as t h e s t o r a g e o f t h e h a r v e s t c a n b e s t b e d o n e b y f r e e l a b o u r e r s . (On

Agriculture

1.17)

17

T h e e x t r u s i o n o f peasants f r o m t h e i r p l o t s increased t h e p o o l o f u n d e r - e m p l o y e d f r e e l a b o u r e r s . W h y d i d t h e r i c h n o t m a k e use o f f r e e w a g e - l a b o u r e r s , i n s t e a d o f b u y i n g slaves o u t o f capital? T h a t is always o n e o f t h e p r o b l e m s a b o u t mass c h a t t e l slavery. I a r g u e b e l o w ( p . 110) t h a t slaves w e r e n o r m a l l y q u i t e e x p e n s i v e ( t h o u g h t h e e v i d e n c e is sparse); t o m a k e a p r o f i t o n t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t i n slaves, slave-owners h a d t o k e e p t h e i r slaves at w o r k twice as l o n g as R o m a n peasants n o r m a l l y n e e d e d t o w o r k i n o r d e r t o live at t h e level o f m i n i m u m subsistence. T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t R o m a n a g r i c u l t u r a l slavery c o u l d w o r k e c o n o m i c a l l y o n l y i f peasant s m a l l - h o l d i n g s w e r e a m a l g a m a t e d i n t o l a r g e r u n i t s a n d i f c r o p s w e r e m i x e d so as t o p r o v i d e slaves w i t h f u l l e m p l o y m e n t , a n d masters w i t h a l a r g e r p r o d u c t f r o m slaves' l a b o u r t h a n was c o m m o n l y a c h i e v e d w i t h f r e e l a b o u r o n s m a l l peasant f a r m s . Masters also h a d t o t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t t h e risk t h a t t h e i r slaves m i g h t d i e , a n d t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t m i g h t be lost; a d d t o t h a t t h e cost o f s u p e r v i s i o n . T h e massive r e p l a c e m e n t o f f r e e c i t i z e n peasants w i t h c o n q u e r e d slaves was a c o m p l e x process, w h i c h is d i f f i c u l t t o understand. 18

A s w i t h m o s t sociological p r o b l e m s , each a t t e m p t at a n e x p l a n a t i o n involves f u r t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n s . A n e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e g r o w t h o f slavery involves us i n a w h o l e n e t w o r k o f changes w h i c h affected a l m o s t e v e r y aspect o f R o m a n society. W h y slaves? Was i t t h e chance o f g r e a t e r p r o f i t w h i c h i n d u c e d t h e r i c h t o b u y slaves, o r was i t r a t h e r t h e values o f f r e e m e n w h i c h i n h i b i t e d t h e m f r o m w o r k i n g as t h e p e r m a n e n t d e p e n d a n t s o f o t h e r R o m a n s ? H o w f a r was t h e g r o w t h o f slavery affected b y t h e f r e q u e n c y o f w a r s , t h e d e m a n d f o r citizens as soldiers, o r t h e ease w i t h w h i c h t h e c o n q u e r e d w e r e enslaved? W h a t was t h e fit b e t w e e n t h e increase i n t h e size o f f a r m s , i n t h e size o f t h e s u r p l u s a n d o f t h e u r b a n m a r k e t s w h i c h c o n s u m e d t h e increased surplus? I t is o f course, m u c h easier t o asks questions t h a n t o p r o v i d e answers. B u t f o r t h e m o m e n t I w a n t t o stress t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e p r o b l e m a n d t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h e c o n o m i c changes w e r e c o n n e c t e d w i t h a n d ! T

1 8

Sec also: Cato, On Agriculture 5 a n d 144; Suetonius, Julius Caesar 42. T h e best discussion of R o m a n agricultural labour, although awkwardly arranged, is still W . £. Heitland, Agricota (Cambridge, 1921) a n d see also K . D. White, Roman Farming ( L o n d o n , 1970). See C h a p t e r u , notes 15 a n d 23.

10

The intrusion of slaves affected b y p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n s a n d social values. R a t h e r a r b i t r a r i l y , I have d e c i d e d t o c o n c e n t r a t e o n seven processes, w h i c h i n m y v i e w m o s t affected t h e g r o w t h o f slavery: continuous war; the influx of booty; its i n v e s t m e n t i n l a n d ; t h e f o r m a t i o n o f l a r g e estates; t h e i m p o v e r i s h m e n t o f peasants; their e m i g r a t i o n to towns a n d the provinces; and the g r o w t h o f u r b a n markets. I shall d e a l first w i t h t h e i r i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s , a n d t h e n w i t h each o f t h e processes i n t u r n i n t h e l a t e r sections o f t h i s c h a p t e r ( p p . 25ff.); b u t t h e processes w e r e i n t e r w o v e n t o such a n e x t e n t t h a t neatly segregated analysis o f each f a c t o r has been i m p r a c t i c a b l e .

A first look at the scheme T h e d i a g r a m (Figure I . I ) provides an overview o f the connections b e t w e e n these seven processes. I a m n o t sure w h e t h e r t h e scheme is m o r e u s e f u l as a n i n t r o d u c t i o n o r as a s u m m a r y w h i c h s h o u l d be p u t at t h e e n d o f t h e c h a p t e r ; i t is m e a n t , r a t h e r l i k e a passport p h o t o o r a m e n u , o n l y as a g u i d e t o a c o m p l e x r e a l i t y , n o t as a r e p l a c e m e n t f o r i t . I t s shape was g r a d u a l l y d e t e r m i n e d b y a series o f a r g u m e n t s w h i c h I shall set o u t b r i e f l y at first, a n d t h e n e l a b o r a t e . T h e R o m a n s c o n q u e r e d t h e w h o l e o f t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n basin i n t w o c e n t u r i e s o f a l m o s t c o n t i n u o u s fighting. D u r i n g these t w o cent u r i e s o f c o n q u e s t , a h i g h e r p r o p o r t i o n o f R o m a n citizens was u n d e r a r m s f o r l o n g e r t h a n I have f o u n d i n a n y o t h e r p r e - i n d u s t r i a l s t a t e . R e p e a t e d successes i n w a r e n a b l e d t h e R o m a n s t o b r i n g back t o I t a l y h u g e q u a n t i t i e s o f b o o t y i n t h e f o r m o f t r e a s u r e , m o n e y a n d slaves. T h e a c c u m u l a t e d t r e a s u r e o f t h e eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n was t r a n s f e r r e d t o R o m e . B o o t y d e l i v e r e d t o t h e state t r e a s u r y was s o o n supp l e m e n t e d b y p r o v i n c i a l taxes w h i c h t h e n g r a d u a l l y became t h e c h i e f 19

'·

I n Prussia u n d e r Frederick William I and Frederick the Great for less than fifty years, and in France u n d e r Napoleon for less than twenty years, rates of recruitment perhaps equalled a n d may have surpassed average rates of recruitment in late Republican Rome. B u t these rates were not maintained for long compared with Rome. See The New Cambridge Modern History vol. 7, ed. J . O . Lindsay (Cambridge, 1957) 179 a n d 305; vol. 9, ed. C . W . Crawley (Cambridge, 1965) 32 a n d 64. I have not considered warlike tribes such as some R e d Indians o r the Zulu as comparable. O n the general problem of military participation ratios see S. A n d r e s k i , Military Organization and Society ( L o n d o n , 1954).

11

Conquerors Continuous w a n of imperial conquest

T h e plundering of conquered territories

c. 250 BCAD

and slaves

9

T h e repopulation of provinces by R o m a n cobnuts

T h e financing of further wars

Agricultural slaves T h e import into Italy of booty, taxes and slaves

Ostentatious expenditure in towns U r b a n slaves

T h e purchase of land in Italy; the formation of large estates worked primarily by slaves

T h e growth of towns and luxury in Italy

Food sold to growing towns — *

T h e displacement of free yeomen by slaves

T h e production of a food surplus provides land* owners with rent

Ejected peasants migrate to towns and help create a market for food

Peasants are recruited to the Roman army

Figure 1.1. T h e growth of slavery i n Roman Italy - a scheme of interdependence source o f state r e v e n u e . T h e R o m a n e l i t e e n h a n c e d its status b y s p e n d i n g this n e w w e a l t h o n o s t e n t a t i o u s d i s p l a y i n t h e c i t y o f R o m e a n d other Italian towns. Such e x p e n d i t u r e p r o v i d e d new f o r m s o f e m p l o y m e n t f o r b o t h f r e e citizens a n d f o r slaves, a n d c r e a t e d a n e w d e m a n d f o r f o o d i n t o w n s . T h i s i n c r e a s e d d e m a n d f o r f o o d was m e t p a r t l y by i m p o r t s o f f o o d r a i s e d as tax i n t h e p r o v i n c e s , a n d p a r d y o u t of a new surplus g r o w n o n Italian farms. T h e same forces c r e a t e d n e w m a r k e t s a n d a n e w s u r p l u s at r o u g h l y t h e same t i m e . A s m e m b e r s o f t h e R o m a n elite g r e w r i c h e r , t h e y 12

The intrusion of slaves invested a considerable p a r t o f their wealth i n agricultural l a n d i n Italy. L a n d was t h e o n l y safe a n d p r e s t i g i o u s large-scale i n v e s t m e n t available. T h e r i c h c o n c e n t r a t e d t h e i r l a n d - h o l d i n g s a n d b u i l t u p t h e i r estates n e a r h o m e o n l a n d p r e v i o u s l y o c c u p i e d by citizens. L a r g e n u m b e r s o f t h e d i s p l a c e d citizens m i g r a t e d t o t h e city o f R o m e t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f t h e increased e x p e n d i t u r e t h e r e , o r j o i n e d t h e a r m y , o r m i g r a t e d t o t h e n e w l y o p e n e d n o r t h e r n I t a l i a n p l a i n . I t does n o t seem at a l l clear w h y t h e R o m a n l a n d - o w n e r s so o f t e n p r e f e r r e d slaves t o f r e e w o r k e r s . Several a r g u m e n t s have b e e n a d v a n c e d : t h e g r e a t e r p r o f i t a b i l i t y o f slaves, t h e cheapness o f slaves ( w h i c h I d o u b t ) , t h e l i a b i l i t y o f f r e e s m a l l - h o l d e r s t o m i l i t a r y service a n d t h e i r c o n s e q u e n t u n a v a i l a b i l i t y as p a r t - t i m e l a b o u r e r s , a n d t h e r e l u c t a n c e o f f r e e citizens t o w o r k f u l l - t i m e as l a b o u r e r s o n t h e f a r m s o f t h e r i c h . W h a t e v e r t h e reasons, several results seem clear. T h e e c o n o m i c s i t u a t i o n o f m a n y f r e e peasants d e t e r i o r a t e d . M a n y o f t h e ' c o n q u e r o r s o f t h e w o r l d ' , as t h e R o m a n s o f t e n c a l l e d themselves, w e r e ejected f r o m t h e i r f a r m s a n d d i s p l a c e d b y peoples w h o m t h e y h a d v a n q u i s h e d a n d enslaved. Y e t t h e massive i m p o r t o f slaves d e f i n e d even p o o r citizens as b e l o n g i n g t o a s u p e r i o r s t r a t u m (estate). T h e d i s p l a c e m e n t o f peasants h a d p o l i t i c a l repercussions w h i c h r e s u l t e d i n t h e r e a l l o c a t i o n o f s m a l l h o l d i n g s t o t h e landless a n d t o ex-soldiers. T h e s e allocations t e m p o r a r i l y a l l e v i a t e d b u t d i d n o t effectively i m p r o v e t h e c o n d i t i o n o f p o o r citizens. State subsidies f o r f o o d d i s t r i b u t i o n t o t h e u r b a n p o o r increased t h e flow o f m i g r a n t s t o t h e city o f R o m e , a n d , as I shall a r g u e , f u r t h e r s t i m u l a t e d a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n o n l a r g e estates, by u n d e r w r i t i n g the purchasing power o f the u r b a n poor. T h e final s o l u t i o n t o t h e c o n f l i c t o f interests b e t w e e n c i t i z e n peasants a n d l a r g e l a n d - o w n e r s was i n i t i a t e d by J u l i u s Caesar a n d f o l l o w e d t h r o u g h u n d e r A u g u s t u s : t h e massive r e s e t d e m e n t o f R o m a n colonists i n t h e p r o v i n c e s r e d u c e d t h e p r e s s u r e f r o m landless citizens a n d t h e u r b a n p o o r o n l a n d i n I t a l y ; a n d i t also a l l o w e d t h e f u r t h e r e x p a n s i o n o f elite l a n d - h o l d i n g s i n I t a l y . T h e s e , i n s u m , a r e t h e a r g u m e n t s w h i c h I shall be p u t t i n g f o r w a r d i n t h e rest o f t h i s c h a p t e r a n d w h i c h a r e s u m m a r i s e d i n t h e flow-chart ( F i g u r e I . I ) . B u t I s h o u l d l i k e t o a d d a n o t h e r perspective o n t h e f u n c t i o n o f slavery i n t h e p o l i t i c a l system. T h e e x p l o i t a t i o n o f slaves p e r m i t t e d t h e R o m a n e l i t e t o e x p a n d its w e a l t h t o a level w h i c h was c o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h its p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l o v e r t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n basin, w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o e x p l o i t t h e mass o f f r e e citizens o v e r t l y , e x c e p t i n t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e as soldiers. T h i s s t a t e m e n t m a y seem s t r a n g e , i f w e c o n s i d e r t h e scale o n w h i c h peasants w e r e e x p e l l e d f r o m t h e i r l a n d s . B u t i t makes sense i f w e c o n s i d e r h o w m u c h m o r e o b v i o u s t h e *3

Conquerors

and slaves

e x p l o i t a t i o n w o u l d h a v e b e e n , i f , f o r e x a m p l e , e x p e l l e d peasant citizens h a d b e e n r e d u c e d t o w o r k i n g f o r rich R o m a n s as d o m e s t i c servants, as t h e y w e r e i n E n g l a n d b e f o r e a n d d u r i n g t h e I n d u s t r i a l Revolution. Slavery also m a d e i t possible t o m a i n t a i n a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n i n I t a l y , i n spite o f t h e h i g h levels o f r e c r u i t m e n t i n t o t h e a r m y a n d o f e m i g r a t i o n t o the city o f Rome. U n l i k e the M a n c h u conquerors o f C h i n a i n t h e seventeenth c e n t u r y , w h o latched o n t o the existing b u r e a u c r a c y a n d became p e n s i o n e r s o r sinecurists o f t h e tax-system, t h e R o m a n c o n q u e r i n g elite secured its w e a l t h b y t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f l a n d i n t h e h o m e c o u n t r y . A s M a x W e b e r saw, t h i s process r e q u i r e d changes i n t h e laws g o v e r n i n g t h e o w n e r s h i p o f l a n d so as t o a l l o w u n l i m i t e d a c c u m u l a t i o n a n d secure t e n u r e o f p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e land. O n c e l a r g e u r b a n m a r k e t s h a d b e e n established, l a n d - o w n e r s h i p p r o v i d e d t h e elite w i t h c o n t i n u o u s i n c o m e , whereas e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t h e p r o v i n c e s d i d n o t . F o r u n d e r t h e R o m a n p o l i t i c a l system, a r i s t o c r a t i c f a m i l i e s h a d t o seek e l e c t i o n t o p o l i t i c a l office f r o m t h e plebs. T h e g r e a t m a j o r i t y o f R o m a n a r i s t o c r a t i c f a m i l i e s r a n t h e risk o f n o t s e c u r i n g e l e c t i o n t o h i g h office i n each g e n e r a t i o n a n d t h e c h a n c e o f p r o v i n c i a l p r o f i t w h i c h w e n t w i t h i t ( o n t h i s see C h a p t e r i i n V o l u m e T w o o f t h i s w o r k ) . W h e n t h e y d i d r e a c h office, t h e p r e s s u r e t o m a k e a p r o f i t , a n d t o c o n v e r t t h e i r b o o t y i n t o l a n d e d i n c o m e was a l l t h e g r e a t e r . T h u s o n e o f t h e m a i n f u n c t i o n s o f slavery was t h a t i t a l l o w e d t h e e l i t e t o increase t h e d i s c r e p a n c y b e t w e e n rich a n d p o o r w i t h o u t a l i e n a t i n g t h e f r e e c i t i z e n p e a s a n t r y f r o m t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o fight i n w a r s f o r t h e f u r t h e r e x p a n s i o n o f t h e e m p i r e ; slavery also a l l o w e d t h e r i c h t o r e c r u i t l a b o u r t o w o r k t h e i r estates i n a society w h i c h h a d n o l a b o u r m a r k e t ; a n d i t p e r m i t t e d ostentatious display, again w i t h o u t the direct e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t h e f r e e p o o r . Slavery m a d e i t unnecessary f o r t h e r i c h t o e m p l o y t h e p o o r d i r e c d y , e x c e p t as soldiers. T h i s f a i l u r e o f t h e r i c h t o e m p l o y t h e u r b a n masses d i r e c d y l e f t t h e p o o r at t h e m e r c y o f m a r k e t forces. A g r i c u l t u r e was liable t o s h a r p v a r i a t i o n s o f p r o d u c t i o n , a n d supplies t o t h e c i t y o f R o m e d e p e n d e d u p o n unreliable transport. Luckily for the urban poor, their power as c i t i z e n v o t e r s secured t h e use o f state resources, t h r o u g h t h e agency 2 0

*°

M. Weber, Die rdmische Agrargeschichte (Stuttgart, 1891) 67ft. a n d 119ft. R o m a n law (in contrast, for example, to traditional Chinese law) was marked by the complete freedom of the head of the household to sell o r testate land to whomever he wanted. Moreover, c o m m u n a l land was slowly transformed into privately held land (through the right of seizure, ager occupatorius), a n d the traditional limits o n the amount which could be held were removed; by agrarian laws of c. 113-111 BC, private tenure of previously public land in Italy was confirmed. See £. G . H a r d y , Roman Laws and Charters ( O x f o r d , 191a) 35ff.

H

The intrusion of slaves o f p o l i t i c i a n s w h o w a n t e d t h e i r f a v o u r . T h e state i n t u r n s e c u r e d supplies o f w h e a t t h r o u g h t a x a t i o n , a n d s u p p l i e d a substantial sector o f t h e m a r k e t w i t h w h e a t (34 k g p e r m o n t h p e r c i t i z e n ) first at a f i x e d l o w p r i c e a n d l a t e r f r e e . I a r g u e b e l o w t h a t t h i s s u p p o r t by t h e state served t o u n d e r w r i t e t h e capacity o f t h e p o o r t o b u y m o r e w h e a t a n d o i l a n d w i n e p r o d u c e d o n t h e estates o f t h e rich. B u t t h e c o n v e r s i o n o f t h e capital's citizens i n t o state p e n s i o n e r s , w h i l e i t c u s h i o n e d t h e m against p o v e r t y , also h e r a l d e d t h e d e m i s e o f t h e i r p o l i t i c a l p o w e r .

A

S K E T C H

OF T H E

ECONOMY

T h e R o m a n economy i n Italy a n d the provinces, i n all periods, rested u p o n t h e backs o f peasants. L e t us t h e r e f o r e b e g i n by e x a m i n i n g some factors w h i c h r e p e a t e d l y c o n s t r a i n e d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n peasants a n d t h e e l i t e . A f t e r w a r d s we c a n t u r n o u r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s o u t o f w h i c h t h e R o m a n state b e g a n its t e r r i t o r i a l e x p a n s i o n overseas. T o s i m p l i f y o u r task, w e shall m a k e t w o assumptions* T h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s , l i k e several w h i c h f o l l o w , a r e o b v i o u s l y speculative, b u t t h e y d o h e l p us g a i n a clearer perspective o f t h e R o m a n e c o n o m y . O n e easy c h e c k o n t h e i r p l a u s i b i l i t y is t o t h i n k o f t h e consequences o f a l t e r n a t i v e a s u m p t i o n s . F i r s t , let us assume t h a t f o u r fifths o f the Italian a n d provincial l a b o u r force were p r i m a r i l y engaged irt p r o d u c i n g f o o d ( I t h i n k t h e r e a l figure was p r o b a b l y h i g h e r ) . A n d s e c o n d , l e t us assume t h a t t h e average c o n s u m p t i o n by t o w n s m e n , m o s t o f w h o m w e r e p o o r , was n e a r t h a t o f peasants. W e c a n t h e n d r a w t w o conclusions. F i r s t , a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i v i t y was l o w since i t t o o k f o u r f o o d - p r o d u c i n g f a m i l i e s t o f e e d a fifth. I t was o n l y a f t e r t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l r e v o l u t i o n i n E n g l a n d i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h a t these average p r o p o r t i o n s b e g a n r a d i c a l l y t o be c h a n g e d ; i n t h e U S A n o w (1973 figures) f o r e x a m p l e , o n e f a r m w o r k e r p r o d u c e s e n o u g h f o o d f o r o v e r fifty p e o p l e . S e c o n d l y , on average, R o m a n peasants c o n s u m e d f o u r fifths o f t h e i r o w n p r o d u c e a n d s u p p o r t e d non-peasants w i t h t h e r e m a i n i n g fifth. A$ i n a n y self-sufficient p r e - i n d u s t r i a l e c o n o m y , t h e b u l k o f t h e e m p i r e ' s l a b o u r f o r c e was p r i m a r i l y e n g a g e d i n p r o d u c i n g f o o d , m o s t o f w h i c h t h e p r o d u c e r s also c d n s u m e d . T h i s was t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t o f t h e R o m a n e c o n o m y . W e m a y a d d t o t h i s p i c t u r e by a s s u m i n g also t h a t peasants i n d i v i d u a l l y g r e w m o s t o f t h e i r o w n f o o d a n d d i d n o t e x c h a n g e m u c h p r o d u c e w i t h each o t h e r . I n a d d i t i o n , i t seems l i k e l y t h a t h a n d i c r a f t w o r k e r s , because o f t h e l o w level o f c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t , each p r o d u c e d l i t t i e m o r e t h a n t h e a v e r a g e peasant. W e c a n n o w see t h a t a n e x t r e m e l y l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f a l l t h a t was p r o d u c e d b o t h i n I t a l y a n d i n t h e p r o v i n c e s was n e v e r t r a d e d ; i t 15

Conquerors

and slaves

s t o o d o u t s i d e t h e m a r k e t , s o l i d a n d i n f l e x i b l e , a l m o s t u n t o u c h e d by t h e forces o f m o n e y . A n a l y s i s o f t h e R o m a n e c o n o m y has always t o take that solid u n m a r k e t e d core i n t o account. T h e m e t h o d s b y w h i c h t h e elite b o t h c r e a t e d a n d e x t r a c t e d t h e peasants' s u r p l u s p r o d u c e : taxes, r e n t a n d m a r k e t e x c h a n g e , c o n stituted a second i m p o r t a n t element i n the structure o f the R o m a n e c o n o m y . O f these t h r e e , i n t h e e m p i r e as a w h o l e , t a x a t i o n g r a d u a l l y c a m e t o be t h e largest i n v o l u m e , a n d t h e tax o n l a n d a n d c r o p s c o m p r i s e d a v e r y l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f a l l taxes; h o w e v e r , i t s h o u l d be stressed t h a t t h e R o m a n s m a d e t h e i r way r a t h e r j e r k i l y f r o m a t r a d i t i o n o f p l u n d e r t o a stable system o f t a x a t i o n . A n d l e v y i n g taxes d i d n o t p r e c l u d e officials f r o m p r i v a t e p r o f i t e e r i n g b o t h at t h e m o m e n t o f conquest a n d d u r i n g the subsequent administration of conquered p r o v i n c e s . T o be c o m p r e h e n s i v e , t h e r e f o r e , we s h o u l d a d d p l u n d e r , i n c l u d i n g slaves, a n d p r i v a t e p r o f i t e e r i n g t o taxes, r e n t s a n d m a r k e t e x c h a n g e as c o m m o n m e t h o d s o f e x t r a c t i n g a s u r p l u s f r o m p r i m a r y producers. 21

T h e r e w e r e w i d e r e g i o n a l differences i n t h e i n c i d e n c e o f t a x a t i o n . R o m a n citizens i n I t a l y p a i d n o tax at a l l o n l a n d a f t e r 167 B C . T h i s p r i v i l e g e was p r e s e r v e d u n t i l t h e e n d o f t h e t h i r d c e n t u r y A D . W h o p r o f i t e d f r o m it? I m m u n i t y f r o m tax e n a b l e d l a n d l o r d s t o c h a r g e h i g h e r r e n t s a n d so h e l p e d p u s h u p t h e p r i c e o f I t a l i a n l a n d . I n E g y p t , by c o n t r a s t , peasants l i v i n g off i r r i g a t e d C r o w n l a n d p a i d n o r e n t , b u t r e g u l a r l y gave u p h a l f t h e i r p r o d u c e i n tax. I n o t h e r p r o v i n c e s , t h e m o s t c o m m o n r a t e o f tax seems t o have b e e n a t i t h e o f t h e c r o p (decuma). I f w e t a k e this t e n t h o f t h e c r o p as a n average tax f o r t h e 22

1 1

R o m a n nobles thought themselves judged by their victories and by the value of their booty. F o r example, i n 182 BC, a governor returned from Spain where he h a d one o r two m i n o r victories, H e entered the city with a n ovation [i.e. a m i n o r triumph]. I n his procession he carried 9,320 [ R o m a n ] pounds of silver, eighty-two [Roman] pounds of gold a n d sixty-seven golden crowns* (Livy 40.16). T h i s passage implies both the public record of booty a n d competition. E v e n when R o m a n administrators took over previous systems of taxation, as i n Sicily, they were still u n d e r pressure to make a profit for themselves. L a w s to protect subjects were ineffective. O n e exceptionally rapacious governor (Cicero, Verrines 1.40) boasted that one third of the profits from the province would be used to pay off his patrons a n d protectors in case of trial for unjust extortion, one third for the jurors, a n d one third to secure a comfortable living. I n the civil wars of the last century BC, rivals for power extorted as m u c h as they could from the provinces, a n d it was only in the H i g h E m p i r e that extortion was firmly controlled; it was never suppressed. See P. A . B r u n t , ' C h a r g e s of provincial maladministratlion u n d e r the early Principate*, Historia 10 (1961) 189-227. A tithe was paid in Sicily a n d Sardinia. T a x was reckoned as a tithe in Asia, until the reform of Julius Caesar, but was probably often paid in money. A tax in kind was also collected in Africa (see for example ESAR 4.89ft). T h e evidence is collected by W . Schwann i n RE sv Tributum a n d A . H . M . Jones, The Roman Economy, ed. P. A . B r u n t (Oxford, 1974) 151ft. 4

n

16

peasants* subsistence

seed

peasants' subsistence

seed

rent

c

b

c

tax

a

O

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

IOO

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

a = rent and tax paid i n produce. b = produce sold i n the local market for cash to pay rent and tax i n money. c = produce sold i n the market to buy goods for peasants' consumption. * T h e scheme illustrates the large subsistence sector of the economy, the small non-agricultural sector, the equivalent functions of tax and rent, the low value of money exchange between peasant and town, the low average standard of living of peasants. I t is, of course, crudely hypothetical and i f roughly true, only true for the population as a whole. Figure 1.2. Peasants ate most of their own produce: a hypothetical scheme* w h o l e e m p i r e , w h i c h seems reasonable, t h e n o n o u r p r e v i o u s a s s u m p t i o n s , l a n d taxes b r o u g h t i n ( o r w e r e e q u a l i n v a l u e t o ) a b o u t o n e h a l f o f t h e f o o d c o n s u m e d b y non-peasants. A s t h e c o m m o n use o f t h e w o r d t i t h e (decuma) f o r tax i m p l i e s , a c o n s i d e r a b l e v o l u m e o f t a x i n t h e late R e p u b l i c was e x t r a c t e d d i r e c t l y as f o o d , n o t m o n e y . W h e a t f r o m Sicily a n d A f r i c a , f o r e x a m p l e , was used t o f e e d t h e a r m y a n d t h e c i t y o f R o m e . E v e n w h e n taxes w e r e r a i s e d i n m o n e y , t h e y w e r e o f t e n s p e n t by t h e state t o b u y f o o d f o r R o m a n soldiers. T h e c o n s i d e r a b l e r e l i a n c e o n taxes l e v i e d i n f o o d h e l p e d t h e R o m a n state s u p p o r t a l a r g e s u p e r s t r u c t u r e w i t h f a i r l y s i m p l e e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d o n l y a s m a l l m a r k e t sector. T h e c i t y o f R o m e , f o r e x a m p l e , d e p e n d e d f o r its p r o s p e r i t y o n R o m a n p o l i t i c a l p o w e r a n d o n t h e c o n s e q u e n t i n f l o w o f taxes a n d r e n t s ; u n l i k e p r e i n d u s t r i a l L o n d o n , i t d i d n o t d e p e n d f o r its size o n its capacity t o e x p o r t m a n u f a c t u r e s o r o n t r a d e . I t is w o r t h n o t i n g t h a t i n so f a r as taxes were levied i n m o n e y i n the provinces a n d spent i n Italy, they probably stimulated t h e i m p o r t o f a n equal v o l u m e o f goods by value i n t o Italy, w i t h w h i c h t h e p r o v i n c e s c o u l d , as i t w e r e , b u y t h e i r m o n e y back, a n d pay t h e i r taxes i n t h e n e x t year. N o d o u b t , i t t o o k q u i t e a t i m e t o establish such a balance o f t r a d e a n d t a x , so t h a t i n t h e e a r l y stages 17

Conquerors

and slaves

o f conquest the provinces were impoverished a n d fell i n t o debt, while some i n f l a t i o n o c c u r r e d i n I t a l y . O f c o u r s e , t h i s c r u d e m o d e l o f t h e i m p e r i a l e c o n o m y needs t o be r e f i n e d t o take m o r e factors (such as m i n i n g ) i n t o account, b u t even i n this p r i m i t i v e f o r m , i t draws a t t e n d o n t o i m p o r t a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n taxes a n d t r a d e . A f t e r taxes, r e n t s f r o m a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d w e r e t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t m e t h o d f o r g e t d n g t h e s u r p l u s p r o d u c e o u t o f t h e h a n d s o f peasants i n t o t h e h a n d s o f t h e e l i t e a n d i n t o t o w n s . F o r t h e u p p e r classes, a g r i c u l t u r a l r e n t s a n d t h e i n c o m e f r o m f a r m s w o r k e d b y slaves a n d a d m i n i s t e r e d by agents c o n s t i t u t e d t h e largest s o u r c e o f i n c o m e . G o v e r n m e n t service ( i n c l u d i n g t a x - c o l l e c t i o n ) c a m e a p o o r second. S o m e r e n t s t o o w e r e collected i n f o o d n o t m o n e y ; t h i s practice r e s t r i c t e d t h e m a r k e t sector still f u r t h e r . I n t h e e m p i r e as a w h o l e , t h e t o t a l v a l u e o f r e n t s ( i n c l u d i n g i n c o m e f r o m f a r m s m a n a g e d b y agents) p r o b a b l y a m o u n t e d t o less t h a n taxes. T h i s was because m a n y f e w e r p e o p l e p a i d r e n t t h a n p a i d t a x , n o t because r e n t levels w e r e l o w e r . T h e r e was always a substantial b o d y o f i n d e p e n d e n t , n o n - r e n t - p a y i n g peasants b o t h i n I t a l y a n d t h e p r o v i n c e s . T h e i r n u m b e r s fluctuated b u t t h e y n e v e r d i s a p p e a r e d . F i n a l l y , f r o m d e s c r i p t i o n s o f peasant l i f e i n m a n y o t h e r societies, i t seems reasonable t o s u p p o s e t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e v a r i a t i o n , nevertheless m o s t peasants i n t h e R o m a n e m p i r e w e r e p o o r ; r e n t a n d tax t o o k away m o s t o f t h e i r s u r p l u s ; i f t h e r e was a n y t h i n g l e f t t o spare, t h e y w e r e l i k e l y t o eat m o s t o f i t . O n l y a v e r y s m a l l p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e i r gross p r o d u c t w e n t o n t h e p u r c h a s e o f g o o d s m a n u f a c t u r e d ( m a d e by h a n d ) i n t o w n s . B u t I d o n o t w a n t t o e x a g g e r a t e . T h e a g g r e g a t e d e m a n d s o f fifty m i l l i o n peasants* e v e n i f m o s t o f t h e m w e r e p o o r , constitutes a s i g n i f i c a n t market for urban produce. T h e preponderance o f tax plus r e n t over m a r k e t exchange u n d e r lines t h e c o m m o n view t h a t i n t h e R o m a n w o r l d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t o w n a n d c o u n t r y was t o a l a r g e e x t e n t o n e o f e x p l o i t a t i o n * T h e towns were 'centres o f c o n s u m p t i o n ' , c o n s u m i n g the b u l k o f the t o w n s m e n ' s o w n p r o d u c e as w e l l as t h e b u l k o f t h e peasants' s u r p l u s . B u t i t s h o u l d n o t be f o r g o t t e n t h a t t o w n s m e n also p r o v i d e d services, f o r e x a m p l e o f g o v e r n m e n t a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , w h i c h gave peasants a stable e n v i r o n m e n t i n w h i c h t h e y c o u l d w o r k . T h e p r i c e w h i c h t h e 28

tt

T h i s was one of the basic perspectives in M. I . Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire (Oxford*, 1957). See also the evocative book by R. MacMullen, Roman Social Relations (New H a v e n , 1974), a n d the articles by M. I . Finley, ' T h e city from Fustel de Coulanges to Max Weber a n d beyond', Comparative Studies in Society and History 19 (1977) 305ff. a n d K . Hopkins, ' E c o n o m i c growth i n towns i n classical antiquity', i n P. Abrams a n d E . A . Wrigley eds., Towns in Societies (Cambridge, 1978) 35ff.

18

A sketch of the economy peasants p a i d f o r t h i s peace was v e r y h i g h . A s i n o t h e r p r e - i n d u s t r i a l e m p i r e s , i t seems r e m a r k a b l e t h a t t h e y t o l e r a t e d t h e i m p o s i t i o n s o f g o v e r n m e n t a n d l a n d l o r d s f o r so l o n g .

Yeomen in early Rome M y m a i n c o n c e r n i n t h i s c h a p t e r is w i t h t h e effects o n t h e I t a l i a n e c o n o m y o f t h e i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n w h i c h t o o k place a f t e r Rome's l o n g s t r u g g l e against C a r t h a g e (264-202 BÇ). A S b a c k g r o u n d t o t h i s , I w a n t b r i e f l y t o describe s o m e aspects o f t h e e a r l y R o m a n e c o n o m y w h i c h m a y be h e l p f u l i n t h e discussion o f l a t e r d e v e l o p m e n t s . T h e r e is o n e m i n o r d i f f i c u l t y ; we h a v e n o c o n t e m p o r a r y sources. W e can t a l k o f e a r l y R o m a n social h i s t o r y ( t h a t is, b e f o r e t h e m i d d l e o f t h e t h i r d c e n t u r y B C ) o n l y b y w o r k i n g b a c k w a r d s f r o m i n s t i t u t i o n s w h i c h we k n o w b e t t e r i n later p e r i o d s , a n d by r e c o n s t r u c t i n g a d i s t a n t past f r o m t h e images l e f t us by later h i s t o r i a n s . N o t m u c h is c e r t a i n a n d a l m o s t e v e r y t h i n g is d i s p u t e d ; t h e a c c o u n t g i v e n b e l o w is c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y dubious. 24

F o r a l l its p o l i t i c a l p o w e r i n c e n t r a l I t a l y , R o m e i n t h e e a r l y t h i r d c e n t u r y h a d a s i m p l e near-subsistence e c o n o m y . T h e r e was l i t t l e s u p e r s t r u c t u r e , n o i n s t i t u t i o n s such as a p r o f e s s i o n a l a r m y o r p e r manent bureaucracy w h i c h depended u p o n the regular delivery o f a l a r g e s u r p l u s . T h e r e was l i t t l e o r n o u s e f u l c o i n a g e m a d e i n R o m e a n d p r o b a b l y l i t d e t r a d e . E v e n t h e R o m a n elite was n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y r i c h ; witness t h e s m a l l area w h i c h i t c o n t r o l l e d (equal i n 296 B C t o a b o u t o n e quarter o f Belgium) a n d the strong tradition of simple living which persisted i n t o h i s t o r i c a l times. T h e c h r o n i c p r o b l e m s o f t h e state c e n t r e d o n c o n q u e r i n g h i l l - t r i b e s , o n r i v a l r y b e t w e e n aristocrats, a n d a m o n g the p o o r o n l a n d shortage a n d i m p o v e r i s h m e n t t h r o u g h debt. M o s t o f t h e l a b o u r f o r c e consisted o f s m a l l f a r m e r s l i v i n g o n f a m i l y f a r m s , m a n y o f w h i c h , i t seems reasonable t o guess, w e r e o n l y j u s t l a r g e e n o u g h t o p r o v i d e a m i n i m u m subsistence. U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h e r e is h a r d l y a n y s o u n d e v i d e n c e w i t h w h i c h t h i s g e n e r a l i s a t i o n can be v a l i d a t e d ; yet i t seems m o r e a t t r a c t i v e t h a n a n y a l t e r n a t i v e I can t h i n k o f . T h e r e are several pieces o f e v i d e n c e , each i n s u f f i c i e n t o r *

4

T h e structure of the economy i n early R o m e is rarely discussed i n R o m a n history books which concentrate like the sources o n political a n d military history. T h e view expressed here is compatible with a n d seemingly implied in the m o d e r n tradition, although many scholars might think it applies better to R o m e say in the early fourth century BC. B u t see T o y n b e c (1965: vol. 1, 290ft.), a n d cf. K. J . Beloch, Romische Geschichte (Berlin, 1926) 333ft.; £. P a n s a n d J . Bayet, Histoire Romaine (Paris, 1926) 77ft.; a n d see R. Besnier, 'L'état économique de R o m e [500-264 BC]', Revue historique de droit français et étranger 33 (1955) 195ft.

l9

Conquerors

and slaves

u n t r u s t w o r t h y i n itself, w h i c h seem collectively t o c o n f i r m i t . I call t h i s t h e w i g w a m a r g u m e n t : each p o l e w o u l d f a l l d o w n by itself, b u t t o g e t h e r t h e poles s t a n d u p , b y l e a n i n g o n e a c h o t h e r ; t h e y p o i n t r o u g h l y i n t h e same d i r e c t i o n , a n d c i r c u m s c r i b e ' t r u t h * . I realise t h a t i t is d a n g e r o u s t o accept t h e g e n e r a l t e n o r o f t h e e v i d e n c e w h i l e d o u b t i n g t h e t r u t h o f i n d i v i d u a l pieces. B u t t h i s is w h a t w e are f o r c e d t o d o i n r e c o n s t r u c t i n g e v e n t h e c r u d e o u d i n e s o f R o m e ' s e a r l y social structure. F i r s t , t h e t r a d i t i o n a l histories w h i c h p r e s e n t t h e R o m a n elite's pict u r e o f its o w n past i m p l y a w i d e s p r e a d o w n e r s h i p o f l a n d i n e a r l y R o m e . A l t h o u g h these histories are a n a l m o s t i n e x t r i c a b l e m i x t u r e o f f a b l e a n d d o u b t f u l fact (e.g. heroes, batdes, v i c t o r i e s , t e m p o r a r y defeats, f i c t i t i o u s speeches o n t h e b a t d e f i e l d a n d i n t h e senate), t h e stories w h i c h t h e y t e l l are u n l i k e l y t o be c o m p l e t e l y false a n d o n t h e m u n d a n e l e v e l are l i k e l y t o reflect c o n d i t i o n s at s o m e e a r l y p e r i o d . F o r e x a m p l e , D i o n y s i u s o f H a l i c a r n a s s u s (Roman Antiquities 2.28) r e c o r d e d that the second k i n g of Rome, w h o r e i g n e d i n the e i g h t h century BC, a p p o i n t e d slaves a n d f o r e i g n e r s t o s e d e n t a r y a n d m e c h a n i c a l t r a d e s , a n d restricted Romans to agriculture a n d warfare. Secondly, the o b l i g a t i o n o f s e r v i n g i n t h e i n f a n t r y , o f p r o v i d i n g one's o w n a r m o u r a n d o f p a y i n g taxes d e p e n d e d u p o n t h e o w n e r s h i p o f s o m e , t h o u g h a p p a r e n d y n o t v e r y m u c h l a n d . I t seems t h a t t h e R o m a n a r m y , u n l i k e t h a t o f classical A t h e n s , d i d n o t r e q u i r e heavy a n d e x p e n s i v e a r m o u r , a n d i t was t h e r e f o r e r e c r u i t e d f r o m a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n . * T h i r d l y , t h e R o m a n census figures o f a d u l t m a l e citizens (e.g. 262,321 citizens i n 294/3 B C ) suggest h i g h p o p u l a t i o n d e n s i t i e s . 5

26

**

M

T h i s is the conclusion of Beloch (1886: 26); it is based mainly o n the m i d second-century account by Polybius (6. igff.) of R o m a n soldiers' a r m o u r , which varied according to age a n d wealth. According to Polybius (6.19) the lowest property qualification for legionaries was only 400 drachmae = 400 denarii. T h i s is difficult to interpret because of the lack of contemporary prices; at a cheap wheat price of 2 ^ H S per modius, it equals only 4 tons of wheat a n d so could not yield a n income sufficient to support a family. Dionysius Halicarnassus (Roman Antiquities 4.18) a n d Livy (1.43) in their accounts of the reforms of Servius T u l l i u s in the sixth century BC set the m i n i m u m property of soldiers at 1,250 a n d 1,100 denarii. T h e figures are probably anachronistic, a n d may instead refer to the third century BC. See the brilliant essay of E . Gabba, Republican Rome, the Army and the Allies (Berkeley, 1976) 1-69. Gabba takes the evidence to reflect a fall i n the m i n i m u m property requirement for legionaries. Dionysius also averred that half the R o m a n population had less than this m i n i m u m ; but he also tells us a lot which cannot be believed. I take the evidence to imply a low property requirement, a widespread ownership of land a n d a widespread obligation to fight. T h e transmitted figures for the early third century are unbelievable: they give an average density of 111 persons per k m i n R o m a n territory, which is several times the figure for the agricultural population i n Italy in 1936 ( B r u n t 1971:54; Beloch 1886: 320). At the end of the third century BC, according to Brunt's estimate (loc. cit.) R o m a n territory had 36 persons per km* compared with 22 for the rest of R o m a n Italy. T h e traditional histories transmitted myths of overpopulation: for example, 1

t

20

A sketch of the economy A l t h o u g h these e a r l y f i g u r e s a r e m u t u a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t a n d p r o b a b l y i n a c c u r a t e , t h e g e n e r a l i n f e r e n c e o f h i g h p o p u l a t i o n d e n s i t y seems c o r r o b o r a t e d by t h e h i g h r a t e o f e m i g r a t i o n t o colonies. B e t w e e n 338 a n d 218 B C , t h e R o m a n g o v e r n m e n t established f o r t y colonies o n c o n q u e r e d I t a l i a n l a n d a n d f i l l e d t h e m w i t h a m i x t u r e o f citizen a n d n o n - c i t i z e n setders f r o m a r o u n d R o m e . T h e sources g i v e us f i g u r e s o n t h e n u m b e r o f a d u l t males w h o w e n t t o several o f these colonies (i.e. 300, 2,500, 4,000, 6,000); 4,000 a d u l t m a l e colonists w o u l d i n v o l v e a t o t a l i n i t i a l p o p u l a t i o n o f a b o u t 13,000 m e n , w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n , w h i c h seems t o o h i g h . Y e t at a c o n s e r v a t i v e estimate, t h e flow o f e m i g r a n t s t o these f o r t y I t a l i a n colonies m u s t h a v e e x c e e d e d o n e h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d a n d m a y have r e a c h e d a q u a r t e r o f a m i l l i o n men, women and children. 1 7

F i n a l l y , stories f e a t u r i n g f o l k - h e r o e s l i k e C i n c i n n a t u s a n d M a n i u s C u r i u s D e n t a t u s , n o b l e b u t p o o r , i m p l i e d t h a t peasant l a n d - h o l d i n g s w e r e u s u a l l y small. T h e sources r e p e a t e d l y cite l a n d plots o f t w o a n d seven iugera (0.5 a n d 1.75 ha) as t r a d i t i o n a l o r sufficient. F o r e x a m p l e , ' T h e r e is a f a m o u s s a y i n g o f M a n i u s C u r i u s [ c o n s u l i n 290 B C ] . . . t h a t a citizen n o t satisfied w i t h seven iugera m u s t be c o n s i d e r e d subversive (perniciosum); f o r t h a t was t h e size o f p l o t s g i v e n t o t h e p e o p l e a f t e r t h e k i n g s w e r e d r i v e n o u t * ( P l i n y , Natural History 18.18). L i k e t h e e a r l y census f i g u r e s , these f i g u r e s o f p l o t size seem d i s t o r t e d . A t t h e m o s t p r o b a b l e levels o f p r o d u c t i v i t y , a p l o t o f seven iugera w o u l d b a r e l y p r o v i d e h a l f t h e m i n i m u m subsistence f o r a n average f a m i l y . N o r is i t easy t o see h o w m u c h s u c h a s m a l l i n c o m e c o u l d r e g u l a r l y be s u p p l e m e n t e d ; p o o r peasants w e r e least l i k e l y t o a f f o r d g r a z i n g a n i m a l s ; a n d i t seems u n l i k e l y t h a t mast peasants i n t h i s e a r l y p e r i o d w e r e dependent for half their income o n w o r k i n g the farms of the rich. T h e risk o f b e i n g t e n d e n t i o u s is o b v i o u s ; e v e n so, i t is h a r d t o a v o i d a g e n e r a l i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t peasant p l o t s i n e a r l y R o m e w e r e t y p i c a l l y small. 28

Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Roman Antiquities 1.16) wrote that in early times all the youths b o m i n a certain year were sent out of R o m a n territory to look for land to conquer a n d settle. I assume that some truth lay behind these tales. T h e ancient evidence is conveniendy but uncritically listed by E . T . Salmon, Roman Colonization under the Republic ( L o n d o n , 1969) 55-81. A colony of 6,000 adult males would involve a total population of about 20,000; if we assume a stationary popu lation with a n average expectation of life at birth of 25 years, then males aged 17+ constitute rather less than 3 0 % of the population (see U . N . Model Life T a b l e s in 'Methods for population projections by sex a n d age*, Population Studies (New Y o r k , 1956)). T h e establishment of such large settlements seems out of proportion to R o m a n resources a r o u n d 300 BC. ** It is obviously dangerous to take what the Romans believed about their past as evidence of their past, because of the difficulties later R o m a n s had in knowing m u c h about it. O n the farmer heroes, see Heitland (1921: 134*?.). F o r a slighdy different discussion of the implications of small colonial allotments in the second century BC see B r u n t (1071: 194). , 7

Conquerors

and slaves

I n s u m , t h e absence o f i n s t i t u t i o n s d e p e n d e n t u p o n a l a r g e s u r p l u s , t h e absence o f locally m i n t e d silver coins, t h e s m a l l scale o f t r a d e , t h e absence o f g r o u p s o f landless r e t a i n e r s l i v i n g o f f r e n t s , t h e w i d e s p r e a d o b l i g a t i o n s o f m i l i t a r y service t i e d t o t h e o w n e r s h i p o f l a n d , t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f c e n t r a l I t a l y was dense i n spite o f considerable e m i g r a t i o n , a n d finally the evidence o f smallish landplots, w h e n a l l a r e t a k e n t o g e t h e r , seem t o s u p p o r t t h e v i e w t h a t t h e R o m a n e c o n o m y i n t h e e a r l y t h i r d c e n t u r y B C was d o m i n a t e d by a w i d e c e n t r a l b a n d o f self-sufficient y e o m e n , t h a t is b y peasants w h o o w n e d and cultivated their o w n farms. Below the b r o a d b a n d o f yeomen, there may have been a significant m i n o r i t y o f d e p e n d e n t peasants w h o g o t some o f t h e i r l i v e l i h o o d by w o r k i n g f o r those w h o w e r e b e t t e r off. I n d e e d m a n y y e o m e n f a m i l i e s l i v i n g j u s t above t h e m a r g i n o f subsistence m a y h a v e b e e n r e c u r r e n d y dependent o n wealthier neighbours. T h e varying demands o f the f a m i l y at d i f f e r e n t stages o f its l i f e cycle, t h e h i g h a n n u a l v a r i a t i o n i n t h e size o f c r o p s w h i c h still bedevils M e d i t e r r a n e a n a g r i c u l t u r e , a n d t h e s u d d e n i m p o s i t i o n o f taxes i n o r d e r t o m e e t a n e m e r g e n c y , a l l r e i n f o r c e d a p a t t e r n o f b o r r o w i n g a n d d e p e n d e n c e , w h i c h is c o m m o n t o m o s t peasant societies. I n some, this d e p e n d e n c e was p a r t l y expressed t h r o u g h d e b t , h i g h i n t e r e s t rates, d e b t - b o n d a g e a n d sale a b r o a d i n t o slavery. D e b t b o n d a g e was m a d e i l l e g a l i n R o m e i n 326 B C , b u t i t persisted i n o t h e r parts o f t h e e m p i r e a n d p r o b a b l y i n Italy too u n t i l m u c h later, 29

D e p e n d e n c e was also e x p r e s s e d i n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f c l i e n t s h i p . I n its idealised f o r m , c l i e n t s h i p was seen as a h e r e d i t a r y b o n d o f i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e s i m i l a r t o a b l o o d r e l a t i o n s h i p a n d sanctified by ritual penalties f o r its v i o l a t i o n . C l i e n t s o w e d services, w e r e m e a n t t o g i v e t h e i r p a t r o n g i f t s w h e n e v e r h e h a d t o pay r a n s o m , d o w r y , fines o r t h e expenses o f p u b l i c office. I d e a l l y , t h e p a t r o n was e x p e c t e d t o e x p l a i n *·

I n early Rome, the laws provided for the savage treatment of debtors. A c c o r d i n g to the T w e l v e Tables (traditional date 451 BC), a debtor who could not pay his debt might be kept chained for sixty days by his creditor (fed at the creditor's expense), then be produced i n public a n d either sold abroad as a slave, or executed (see Ancient Roman Statutes 8, T a b l e 3). A s a midgation of this law, it was later possible for a free m a n to give his services as a slave, for money which he owed until he paid it' ( V a r r o , On the Latin Language 7.105). Such m e n were called nexi, bondsmen, a n indication i n itself of their powerlessness. Cf. H . F . Jolowicz, A Historical Introduction to Roman Law (Cambridge , 1972) 164ft. Eventually the maltreatment of debtors was seen to conflict with cidzen rights. I n 326 BC (the date is conventional) a law was passed which prohibited holding the body of a debtor as security (Livy 8.28; R. M. Ogilvie, A Commentary on Livy (Oxford, 1965) ad loc.). I t was, said Livy, a new beginning of liberty for the plebs. I t also reflected the power a n d will of citizens to defend their rights against the u p p e r classes. B u t the practice of working off debts i n slavelike conditions persisted. 4

3

22

A sketch of the

economy

laws t o clients a n d t o p r o t e c t t h e m against law suits. W h a t seems i m p o r t a n t a b o u t t h i s a n d seemed n o t e w o r t h y t o o u r sources was t h e i d e a o f m u t u a l service w h i c h d i s t i n g u i s h e d R o m a n c l i e n t s h i p f r o m f o r m s o f d e p e n d e n c e e l s e w h e r e , i n w h i c h masters t r e a t e d f r e e d e p e n d a n t s as t h o u g h t h e y w e r e slaves. O n e d i f f e r e n c e lay i n t h e a s s u m p tion t h a t R o m a n clients h a d s o m e t h i n g t o give t h e i r p a t r o n s a n d w e r e therefore not completely dependent u p o n them. This reciprocity i n t h e c l i e n t - p a t r o n r e l a t i o n s h i p fits v e r y w e l l w i t h m y view t h a t a l m o s t a l l citizens i n e a r l y R o m e o w n e d some l a n d . H o w e v e r , w e s h o u l d be c a u t i o u s a b o u t a c c e p t i n g a n idealised p o r t r a i t o f c l i e n t s h i p ; s i m i l a r ideals i n J a p a n , f o r e x a m p l e , have m a s k e d c o n s i d e r a b l e e x p l o i t a t i o n . I t seems l i k e l y t h a t c l i e n t s h i p s i g n i f i c a n d y r e s t r i c t e d t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f some y e o m e n . 3 0

T h e o r g a n i s a t i o n o f a g r i c u l t u r a l w a g e - l a b o u r i n R o m e seems t o h a v e a s s u m e d t h a t m o s t l a b o u r e r s o w n e d some l a n d . T h i s can be d e d u c e d f r o m t h e fact t h a t t h e R o m a n s a p p a r e n d y n e v e r d e v e l o p e d a system of e m p l o y i n g free labour f o r l o n g periods similar to the English i n d e n t u r e , a p p r e n t i c e s h i p o r a n n u a l h i r i n g s . N o r is t h e r e any e v i d e n c e that R o m a n landlords regularly i n the early p e r i o d exacted labour f r o m tenants as p a r t o f t h e i r r e n t ; i n s t e a d , t h e w e l l - t o - d o e m p l o y e d f r e e peasants u s u a l l y f o r a d a y o r f o r a specific j o b , such as h a r v e s t i n g o r t h r e s h i n g . S u c h i n t e r m i t t e n t w o r k h a d several i m p l i c a t i o n s . First, labourers must have had l a n d plots of their o w n to p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h t h e b u l k o f t h e i r l i v e l i h o o d . Secondly, i n t h e R o m a n w o r l d o f t h e t h i r d c e n t u r y B C , t h e r e was n o effective l a b o u r m a r k e t o f m o b i l e , landless labourers. As a result, w h e n the g r o w t h of e m p i r e induced a change i n t h e p a t t e r n s o f a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n i n I t a l y , new l a b o u r was 3 1

30

3 1

T h i s paragraph is in part a summary of the ideals set out by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 2.9-11; see also A . Gellius, Attic Nights 5.13. T h e R o m a n lawyer Proculus (D. 49.15.7.1) held that clients were free, although inferior in authority and rank. R. P. Dore discussed a Japanese tract of 1934 (Land Reform in Japan ( L o n d o n , 1969) 55): ' T h e s e master-servant reladonships, b a s e d . . . o n the landlord's paternal care for his tenants a n d the tenants' implicit obedience of the landlord's authority may, of course, from one point of view be considered a fine a n d noble expression of the ideals of harmony and co-operation, of mutual regard and help.' B u t they often worked out differendy in practice; cf. ibid. $gtt. See also on the recent exploitation of clients, S. F . Silverman, Exploitation in rural central Italy', Comp. Stud. Soc. Hist. 12 (1970) 327ft. T h i s is the impression I get from Cato, On Agriculture (5 and i44f.); it is the earliest surviving such treatise from Rome, written i n the second century BC. T h e small shares given to share-croppers, 1/6-1/8 of the crop depending on the quality of the land, would keep them alive only if they also had land of their own to work. I n a subsequent publication, I shall discuss probable values of yield, labour input a n d household consumption i n R o m a n agriculture. It is worth stressing that land-owners a n d tenants are in many peasant societies overlapping not separate categories. Y o u can own some land a n d lease more.

23

Conquerors

and slaves

r e c r u i t e d p r i m a r i l y b y c o m p u l s i o n , t h r o u g h t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f slavery. O f course, e v e n i n t h e t h i r d c e n t u r y B C , t h e r e w e r e some slaves i n R o m a n I t a l y , b u t n o t , I suspect, m a n y . M o s t o f t h e references t o slavery i n e a r l y R o m e i m p l y small-scale slavery; o t h e r s seem anachronistic. T h i r d l y , prosperous landowners w h o owned m o r e l a n d t h a n t h e y c o u l d c u l t i v a t e b y t h e i r o w n l a b o u r used c l i e n t s h i p c o m b i n e d w i t h t e n a n c y a n d s h a r e - c r o p p i n g as m e t h o d s o f e n s u r i n g t h a t t h e i r l a n d was w o r k e d first at c r i t i c a l seasons, b e f o r e peasants l o o k e d a f t e r t h e i r o w n plots. 32

I n s u m , as I see i t , t h e area g o v e r n e d d i r e c t l y by R o m e i n t h e e a r l y t h i r d c e n t u r y B C was n o t l a r g e a n d r i c h e n o u g h t o s u p p o r t sizeable c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o f w e a l t h . T h e p o l i t i c a l system r e f l e c t e d t h e w i d e s p r e a d o b l i g a d o n t o bear a r m s a n d t h e w i d e s p r e a d o w n e r s h i p o f l a n d ; a l t h o u g h f a r f r o m d e m o c r a t i c , i t effectively l i m i t e d t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h m o s t citizens w e r e e x p l o i t e d . T h e nobles collectively p r o b a b l y o w n e d m u c h o f t h e best l a n d , b u t t y p i c a l l y h a d o n l y m o d e s t estates. Few o f the farms were large e n o u g h to require the e m p l o y m e n t o f non-family l a b o u r t h r o u g h o u t t h e year. T h e b u l k o f a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d a n d o f c o m m o n l a n d was e x p l o i t e d b y s m a l l - h o l d e r s o r y e o m e n peasants, some o f w h o m w e r e p a r t l y d e p e n d e n t o n t h e p a t r o n a g e o f t h e prosperous. Most Romans were under-employed. Even independent yeomen l i v i n g j u s t above t h e level o f m i n i m u m subsistence h a d p l e n t y o f t i m e w i t h n o t h i n g t o d o . A n average peasant h o u s e h o l d p r o d u c i n g its m i n i m u m subsistence o n q u i t e g o o d a r a b l e l a n d used u p v e r y m u c h less t h a n h a l f o f its o w n l a b o u r p o w e r . T h i s c h r o n i c u n d e r - e m p l o y m e n t is still c o m m o n i n m a n y peasant economies u s i n g d r y f a r m i n g . I t was institutionalised i n Rome i n n u m e r o u s public holidays a n d i n p o p u l a r participation i n politics. Above all, u n d e r - e m p l o y m e n t allowed the state, w h e n i t c o u l d n o t e x t r a c t a sufficient s u r p l u s o f p r o d u c e i n t h e f o r m o f taxes, t o t a x l a b o u r i n s t e a d . S u r p l u s l a b o u r was t a x e d i n t h e f o r m o f m i l i t a r y service. O v e r a l l , t h e p o v e r t y a n d u n d e r e m p l o y m e n t o f m a n y R o m a n peasants p e r m i t t e d a h i g h rate o f m i l i t a r y mobilisation (regularly over t e n per cent o f a d u l t m a l e citizens) t h r o u g h o u t t h e last t w o c e n t u r i e s B C . I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e l a n d s o f absent soldiers w e r e c u l t i v a t e d b y o t h e r s . T h e d i s o r g a n i sation a n d social costs i n v o l v e d w e r e c o n s i d e r a b l e . Soldiers' wives 8 1

Such a method of argument is obviously dangerous: I have a picture of R o m e i n the early third century BC; it h a d a simple, relatively undifferentiated economy. I f any evidence fits in with my view, I claim it as corroboration. Anything in the traditional history which does not fit in with this picture, I call anachronistic. I see the danger, but can think of no better method. F o r similar views a n d a discussion of the evidence see Heitland (1921: 149-50); Tibiletti (1948: i73ff.).

24

A sketch of the economy a n d c h i l d r e n , widows a n d o r p h a n s were left u n p r o t e c t e d ; t h e i r farms w e r e m o r e t h a n u s u a l l y liable t o be e n c u m b e r e d w i t h d e b t . T h e y f e l l into the hands o f the rich. Complementarily, i n the traditional a g r i c u l t u r a l system, t h e r i c h d e p e n d e d f o r t h e c u l t i v a t i o n o f t h e i r f a r m s o n t h e s u r p l u s l a b o u r o f t h e f r e e p o o r , e m p l o y e d as tenants, s h a r e - c r o p p e r s o r as occasional l a b o u r e r s . B u t t h e conquest o f a n e m p i r e increased t h e i n c i d e n c e o f m i l i t a r y service, a n d e i t h e r t o o k f r e e l a b o u r away o r increased its u n r e l i a b i l i t y . Besides, as t h e estates o f t h e rich increased i n size, so d i d t h e i r n e e d f o r l a b o u r . Y e t peasants, as w e k n o w f r o m p r e - m o d e r n studies, are t y p i c a l l y r e l u c t a n t t o d o m o r e w o r k t h a n is sufficient t o p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h m i n i m u m subsistence. T h e R o m a n rich t h e r e f o r e l o o k e d elsewhere f o r f u l l - t i m e d e p e n d e n t l a b o u r e r s . T h e y c o u l d n o t be d r a w n f r o m t h e l a b o u r m a r k e t , because t o a l l i n t e n t s a n d p u r p o s e s i t d i d n o t exist. I n s t e a d , slaves w e r e c a p t u r e d i n w a r a n d i m p o r t e d by f o r c e . T h e e m i g r a t i o n o f f r e e l a b o u r i n t o t h e a r m y a n d t h e i m m i g r a t i o n o f a g r i c u l t u r a l slaves w e r e complementary.

CONTINUOUS

WAR

3 3

I w a n t n o w t o d e a l w i t h t h e first o f t h e seven factors w h i c h m o s t affected t h e g r o w t h o f slavery a n d t h e p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y o f I t a l y . D u r i n g t h e last t w o c e n t u r i e s o f t h e R e p u b l i c , t h e R o m a n state was a l m o s t c o n t i n u a l l y at w a r . T h e R o m a n e l i t e was p e r m e a t e d w i t h p r i d e i n its m i l i t a r y achievements; t h e histories o f its past w e r e filled w i t h accounts o f battles; its heroes a n d leaders w e r e generals such as Fabius t h e D e l a y e r , Scipio t h e C o n q u e r o r o f A f r i c a ( R o m a n generals f r e q u e n d y took soubriquets f r o m the lands w h i c h they h a d conquer e d ) , P o m p e y t h e G r e a t a n d J u l i u s Caesar. T h e c e n t r e o f t h e city o f R o m e was p a c k e d w i t h t h e t r o p h i e s o f w a r : altars a n d t e m p l e s v o w e d i n a m o m e n t o f crisis i n t h e b a t t l e f i e l d a n d t h e n b u i l t f r o m t h e spoils; v i c t o r y arches a n d t r i u m p h a l statues; t h e c o l u m n s o f t e m p l e s c o v e r e d w i t h shields a n d m i l i t a r y i n s i g n i a o f every k i n d ( L i v y 40.51); a n d i n s c r i b e d stones w h i c h b o t h r e c o r d e d a c h i e v e m e n t s a n d i n s p i r e d emulation i n the y o u n g (for example, an inscription i n the T e m p l e o f M a t e r M a t u t a , set u p i n 174 B C ) : Under the Command and Auspices of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus Consul, the Legion and A r m y of the Roman People conquered Sardinia. I n this 3 3

I n this section, I a m again especially indebted to B r u n t (1971), although we disagree occasionally o n interpretation. I have discovered that my arguments in this section and the next are similar to a n d complementary to those of W . V . H a r r i s , War and Imperialism in Republican Rome $27-70 BC (Oxford, 1978).

25

Conquerors

and slaves

province, more than 8 0 , 0 0 0 of the enemy were killed or captured. T h e State was well served; the allies freed; the revenues restored. He brought back the A r m y safe and sound, laden with booty. H e returned to the City of Rome i n T r i u m p h , for the second time. I n Commemoration of This Event, he gave this Tablet as a Gift to Jove. (Livy 4 1 . 2 8 ) 34

W h e n a R o m a n g e n e r a l h a d c o n d u c t e d a successful c a m p a i g n , he w r o t e t o t h e senate d e t a i l i n g his a c h i e v e m e n t s . I f his victories w e r e o v e r * w o r t h y e n e m i e s ' , a n d at least five t h o u s a n d o f t h e m h a d b e e n k i l l e d i n a single b a t d e , he m i g h t r e q u e s t a t r i u m p h a l procession o n his r e t u r n t o t h e city o f R o m e . T h e scale o f R o m a n s l a u g h t e r is r e f l e c t e d i n t h e a w a r d o f o v e r seventy t r i u m p h s i n t h e t w o h u n d r e d years 252-53 BC. 3 5

T h e g r a n t o f a t r i u m p h was a p r i z e r e s e r v e d f o r s e n i o r R o m a n magistrates: p r a e t o r s , consuls a n d d i c t a t o r s . E v e n f o r t h e m i t was a n exceptional h o n o u r , a p e r m a n e n t emblazonment o f the family line. I t was t h e o n e occasion o n w h i c h a g e n e r a l c o u l d l e g i t i m a t e l y p a r a d e his t r o o p s t h r o u g h t h e city o f R o m e . First c a m e t h e magistrates a n d senators a c c o m p a n i e d by t r u m p e t e r s , t h e n t h e spoils o f w a r ceremonially displayed (and competitively enumerated i n the public r e c o r d s ) : ' . . . g o l d e n c r o w n s w e i g h i n g 112 [ R o m a n ] p o u n d s ; 83,000 p o u n d s o f silver; 243 p o u n d s o f g o l d ; 118,000 A t h e n i a n tetrodrochmoe; 12,322 coins c a l l e d P h i l i p p i c s ; 785 b r o n z e statues; 230 m a r b l e statues; a g r e a t a m o u n t o f a r m o u r , w e a p o n s a n d o t h e r e n e m y spoils, besides catapaults, ballistae a n d e n g i n e s o f e v e r y k i n d . . . ' ( L i v y 39.5; o n 187 B C ) . Pictures a n d slogans, such as J u l i u s Caesar's * I c a m e , I saw, I c o n q u e r e d ' , i l l u s t r a t e d t h e general's a c h i e v e m e n t s . A f t e r these, t h e p r i s o n e r s o f w a r : k i n g s i n c h a r i o t s w i t h r o p e s a r o u n d t h e i r necks, 3 4

3 6

T h e centres of m o d e r n d u e s i n relatively non-militaristic countries also have their war memorials, statues of generals o n horseback a n d May Day parades. I find it difficult to portray the intensity of R o m a n militarism - I use the word evocatively, not pejoratively. B u t a reading of Livy, or for that matter of any R o m a n historian, shows it clearly. T h e i r concern with war was not merely a historiographical con vention. Rather, historians put war at the centre of the stage because it deserved to be there. O n R o m a n war statues see Pliny, Natural History 34.1 iff.; on personal emulation see ibid. 35-2ff. See especially Valerius Maximus 2.8. T h e r e was a law forbidding generals to exag gerate the n u m b e r of enemy killed; on entering the city triumphant generals had to swear the truth of their reports. Generals who had been refused public triumphs customarily (Livy 42.21) celebrated private triumphs just outside Rome. It was an indication of their competitive exhibitionism. See also A u l u s Gellius, Attic Nights 5.6.21 on the difference between a t r i u m p h a n d a lesser * ovation*. Specific triumphs are described by Plutarch (Aemilius Paullus 32) a n d by Livy (34.52; 37.46; 45-35ff.). F o r a n extremely detailed discussion, see H . S. Versnel, Triumphus (Leiden, 1970); otherwise usefully sv Triumphus in RE or D S . Lists of all triumphators in the history of R o m e were, at least by the reign of Augustus, inscribed on large tablets o n show on the Capitol; they survive incomplete (Inscriptumes Italiae, A . Degrassi (Rome, 1947) vol. 13.1, 534ff.).

26

Continuous war p r i n c e s i n chains, t h e c o m m a n d e r s o f d e f e a t e d a r m i e s - a l l f o d d e r f o r philosophers intent o n moralising about the wheel of fortune. T h e n c a m e t h e v i c t i m s t o be sacrificed, bulls w i t h g i l d e d h o r n s . A n d finally, t h e g e n e r a l h i m s e l f ; he was c a r r i e d o n a c h a r i o t , d e c o r a t e d w i t h l a u r e l a n d d r a w n b y f o u r w h i t e horses; b e n e a t h t h e c h a r i o t was s l u n g a p h a l l u s . T h e general's cheeks w e r e d a u b e d w i t h r e d ; h e was c l o t h e d , like J u p i t e r himself, i n a p u r p l e cloak over a toga sown w i t h golden stars. I n o n e h a n d , h e c a r r i e d a sceptre c r o w n e d w i t h a n eagle, i n t h e o t h e r a l a u r e l b r a n c h . A b o v e his h e a d , a slave h e l d a heavy g o l d c r o w n . E a c h t i m e t h e c r o w d c h e e r e d , t h e slave r i t u a l i s t i c a l l y m u r m u r e d : ' R e m e m b e r y o u a r e o n l y a m a n . ' T h e t r i u m p h a l procession d r a m a t i s e d t h e s p l e n d o u r o f R o m a n victories, r e i n f o r c e d p u b l i c p r i d e i n t h e value o f conquest, at o n c e elevated t h e successful l e a d e r a n d yet fitted h i m i n t o a w e l l - w o r n slot, so t h a t w i t h l u c k his p o p u l a r i t y w o u l d n o t subvert the power-sharing oligarchy. Such p u b l i c displays o f prowess c a n serve as o n l y o n e i n d e x o f m i l i t a r i s m i n the R o m a n elite. T h e r e are m a n y others: f o r example, t h e p r e o c c u p a t i o n o f t r a d i t i o n a l histories w i t h c a m p a i g n s a n d battles. T h e m o d e r n r e a d e r m a y be i n c l i n e d t o s k i p these s e e m i n g l y r e p e t i t i o u s accounts. I n so d o i n g , h e does less t h a n j u s t i c e t o t h e i r c o n s u m i n g i n t e r e s t f o r R o m a n readers, a n d t h e i r p r o m i n e n c e i n t h e p u b l i c r e c o r d s f r o m w h i c h t h e histories w e r e d e r i v e d . T h e histories reveal a c o m p e t i t i o n f o r g l o r y a m o n g t h e R o m a n nobles w h i c h was itself i n p a r t t h e cause o f w a r . F o r e x a m p l e , o n e c o n s u l ( i n 176 BC) was d e t a i n e d at R o m e f o r a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y e l e c t i o n ; ' h e h a d l o n g been a n x i o u s t o get t o his p r o v i n c e , w h e n l u c k i l y f o r his a m b i t i o n letters a r r i v e d i n f o r m i n g h i m t h a t t h e L i g u r i a n s h a d r e b e l l e d ' ( L i v y 41.17). I n yet a n o t h e r case, w h e n t h e e n e m y gave hostages a n d s u e d f o r peace, t h e c o n s u l (177 B C ) , w h o was still i n R o m e , was d e e p l y c o n c e r n e d t h a t he h a d lost his o p p o r t u n i t y f o r v i c t o r y ( L i v y 41.10). T h e s e s h o u l d n o t be seen as t h e a t t i t u d e s o r acts o f i r r e s p o n s i b l e m a d m e n ; r a t h e r , t h e y s h o u l d be seen as t h e r e c u r r e n t p r o d u c t s o f a c o m p e t i t i v e elite c u l t u r e w h i c h b o t h p r o v o k e d a n d effectively c o n d o n e d belligerence. A s o n e R o m a n g e n e r a l said: I d o n o t n e g o t i a t e f o r peace, e x c e p t w i t h p e o p l e w h o h a v e s u r r e n d e r e d ( L i v y 40.25). R o m a n p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s reflected a s i m i l a r c o n c e r n w i t h w a r . E v e r y s e n i o r R o m a n o f f i c e - h o l d e r was s i m p l y e x p e c t e d t o be a c o m p e t e n t g e n e r a l . T h e best i n d e x o f t h i s is t h e fact t h a t e v e n serious theatres o f w a r w e r e allocated t o t h e elected magistrates by lot. T h i s practice alone dictated the need f o r military experience early i n a senator's career. D u r i n g t h e second c e n t u r y B C , t e n years* m i l i t a r y service, u s u a l l y f r o m t h e age o f seventeen, was t h e n o r m a l p r e r e q u i s i t e 27

Conquerors

and slaves

f o r e l e c t i o n t o p u b l i c office. S y m p t o m a t i c a l l y , t h e first m i n o r p u b l i c office t o w h i c h y o u n g nobles w e r e elected was t h a t o f l e g i o n a r y officer (tribunus militum); t h i s was n o t a n essential step i n t h e c a r e e r o f a successful leader, b u t i t was b o t h c o m m o n a n d u s e f u l . I t gave o p p o r t u n i t y f o r p e r s o n a l g l o r y i n b a t t l e , as w e l l as f o r m i l i t a r y e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h m i g h t p r o v e v i t a l later. F o r o n c e a m a n was elected t o h i g h office, as praetor or consul, he m i g h t w e l l c o m m a n d a l a r g e a r m y allocated by l o t . D u r i n g t h e first c e n t u r y B C , l o n g m i l i t a r y service was n o l o n g e r r e q u i r e d o f y o u n g m e m b e r s o f t h e elite. I t became i n c r e a s i n g l y fashi o n a b l e t o c o n c e n t r a t e i n s t e a d o n g a i n i n g e x p e r i e n c e i n c i v i l i a n politics a n d i n advocacy i n t h e c o u r t s i n R o m e . B u t s o m e a m b i d o u s y o u n g m e n o f r a n k still e n l i s t e d w i t h t h e a r m y , a n d served as aides (contubernales) to a r m y c o m m a n d e r s . J u l i u s Caesar, f o r e x a m p l e , served i n this cap-, acity, a l t h o u g h o n l y f o r t w o o r t h r e e years. A n d t h r o u g h o u t t h e R e p u b l i c , h i g h office c o n t i n u e d t o i n v o l v e t h e c o m m a n d o f a r m i e s . N o b l e generals w e r e still e x p e c t e d t o d e f e a t R o m e ' s e n e m i e s , a n d t o fight t h e i r way o u t o f c r i t i c a l situations. Besides, m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d always p r o v i d e d t h e m a i n p a t h t o c o n q u e s t , e n h a n c e d r e p u t a t i o n , a t r i u m p h a n d booty. T h e i d e a l i s a t i o n o f m i l i t a r y g l o r y d i s g u i s e d t h e h u g e costs o f w a r w i t h r h e t o r i c . T h e n as n o w , w a r s w e r e f o u g h t i n d e f e n c e o f t e r r i t o r y , t o p r o t e c t allies, t o secure l i b e r t y ( L i v y 35.16) a n d * i n t h e h o p e o f peace' ( L i v y 40.52). ' T h e o n l y r e a s o n f o r g o i n g t o war*, w r o t e C i c e r o , 'is t h a t w e m a y l i v e i n peace u n h a r m e d * (On Duties 1.35). T h e r e is i n o u r sources n o m e n t i o n o f t h e m a i m e d o r w o u n d e d . W e h e a r o n l y r a r e l y o f t h e d e v a s t a t i o n o f c r o p s , o f livestock a n d o f h o m e s ; such losses m u s t have h i t t h e p o o r m u c h h a r d e r t h a n t h e rich. O u r sources d o r e c o r d t h e d e a t h i n b a t d e o f j u s t u n d e r 100,000 R o m a n a n d a l l i e d soldiers i n t h e first h a l f o f t h e second c e n t u r y B C ; s i g n i f i c a n t losses, i f t h e y a r e t o be b e l i e v e d , o u t o f a t o t a l a d u l t m a l e p o p u l a t i o n o f p r o b a b l y less t h a n o n e m i l l i o n at t h a t time. T h e s e figures t a k e n o account o f the deaths t h r o u g h epidemics t o w h i c h armies were p r o n e n o r o f t h e i m c o m p l e t e n e s s o f R o m a n r e c o r d s ; i n times o f crisis, s u c h as H a n n i b a l ' s i n v a s i o n o f I t a l y a n d t h e c i v i l wars o f t h e late R e p u b l i c , t h e i m p a c t o f d e a t h a n d d e s t r u c t i o n was e v e n g r e a t e r . N o d o u b t , t h e defeated 'barbarians' o f n o r t h e r n Italy a n d the provincials fared even w o r s e t h a n t h e R o m a n s . T h e d e a t h o f n u m e r o u s peasants i n w a r b o t h 36

** O n R o m a n losses i n war, see ESAR vol. 1,110; for the R o m a n a n d Italian adult male population, see B r u n t (1971: 54); on the impact of the second Punic war o n Italian peasants see Livy (28.11 o n 206 BC): ' I t was not easy for the people [to go back to their farms] because free farmers had been wiped out by the war, there was a shortage of slaves, cattle h a d been stolen, farms ravaged o r burnt.' See also T o y n b e e (1965: vol. a ioff.); cf. Brunt's cautious qualifications (1971: 269ff.). f

28

Continuous

war

at h o m e a n d a b r o a d was o n e o f t h e i m p o r t a n t factors m a k i n g f o r vacancies o n a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d i n I t a l y . C o n d n u o u s w a r a n d t h e c o n q u e s t o f t h e w h o l e M e d i t e r r a n e a n basin p r e c i p i t a t e d r a d i c a l changes i n t h e p a t t e r n o f m i l i t a r y service. T r a d i t i o n a l l y , a h i g h p r o p o r t i o n o f citizens w e r e liable t o serve i n t h e a r m y . T h e c o m m o n style o f f i g h t i n g against n e a r b y t r i b e s h a d i n v o l v e d m o s t l y s u m m e r c a m p a i g n s by peasant soldiers. E v e n those w h o o w n e d only small plots of l a n d a n d w h o c o u l d afford to p r o v i d e simple body a r m o u r a n d weapons were obliged to fight; they were o f t e n categorised persuasively as ' t h o s e w i t h a stake i n t h e c o m m u n i t y ' . T h e h i g h level o f m i l i t a r y p a r t i c i p a t i o n by citizens f o u n d its r e f l e c t i o n i n t h e shape o f e a r l y p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s (such as t h e comitia centuriata), i n the p o l i t i c a l p o w e r o f citizens, i n citizens' l e g a l r i g h t s , a n d i n a p e r c e i v e d c o m m o n i n t e r e s t {res publico), at least w i t h i n t h e s t r a t u m o f society which bore arms. B y t h e same t o k e n , slaves, r e s i d e n t aliens a n d women were excluded. 3 7

3 8

T h e repeated involvement o f R o m a n armies i n p r o l o n g e d wars overseas i n t h e last t w o c e n t u r i e s o f t h e R e p u b l i c b r o u g h t t h e t r a d i tional system o f r e c r u i t m e n t t o a n e n d . T h e n o r m a l l e n g t h o f m i l i t a r y service i n c r e a s e d , a n d t h e b u r d e n s o f m i l i t a r y service g r a d u a l l y s h i f t e d f r o m t h e b r o a d b a n d o f c i t i z e n peasants w h o o w n e d l a n d a n d s e r v e d occasionally as s o l d i e r s t o a p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y s m a l l e r g r o u p o f p r o fessional l o n g - s e r v i c e soldiers, m a n y o f w h o m w e r e p o o r a n d landless. I t is d i f f i c u l t t o a t t a c h d e f i n i t e f i g u r e s t o these t r e n d s , a n d p e r h a p s e v e n m i s l e a d i n g . F o r o n e o f t h e m a i n characteristics o f t h e R o m a n a r m y 3 9

3 7

3 3

3 9

A u l u s Gellius, Attic Nights 16.10: ' B u t since property a n d family money were regarded as a hostage a n d pledge of loyalty to the Republic, a n d since there was in them a guarantee a n d assurance of love for one's fatherland, neither the proletariat, nor the capite censi [i.e. those with no property at all, or nearly none] were enrolled as soldiers, except i n a state of e m e r g e n c y . . S o similarly, Valerius Maximus 2.3. T h e comitia centuriata was the dtizen assembly originally organised i n fighting units, centuries (whence centurions), a n d divided between those liable for military service (iuniores), a n d those past the age of forty-six (seniores). Because they used to meet a r m e d , they met outside the d t y walls in the Field of Mars. T h e cavalry (equites) a n d the first two classes (out of five classes categorised by the value of property owned) had a highly disproportionate weight in vodng a n d if they were unanimous cons tituted a majority. B u t in elections, which were usually disputed, we cannot assume such unanimity. T h a t said, the people (populus) as a whole, particularly in the tribal assembly, had considerable political power expressed, for example, in their election of nobles for office, a n d in their exdusive power to pass laws a n d to declare war. T h e protection of individual citizens against abuse of power by noble officials was vested i n the T r i b u n e s of the People. My discussion here needs some qualification; see Jolowicz (1972: 19IF.). T h e absolute size of the R o m a n army increased, but so by enfranchisement d i d the population of citizens from whom the soldiers were drawn. T h e proportion fell partly because of the increase in the length of service.

29

Conquerors

and slaves

t h r o u g h o u t t h e w h o l e p e r i o d o f i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n was t h e u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f its size. Soldiers w e r e e n l i s t e d n o t f o r a specific t e r m o f service, b u t f o r a c a m p a i g n , w h i c h m i g h t last o n e o r several years. T h e size o f t h e a r m y f l u c t u a t e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d a n g e r s f a c i n g t h e state. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e m a i n o u t l i n e s o f a t r e n d seem clear. I shall a r g u e b e l o w t h a t i n t h e e a r l y second c e n t u r y B C , m o r e t h a n o n e h a l f o f a l l citizens served i n t h e a r m y p r o b a b l y f o r a n a v e r a g e p e r i o d o f less t h a n seven years. R o u g h l y t w o c e n t u r i e s l a t e r , i n t h e r e i g n o f A u g u s t u s , less t h a n o n e s i x t h o f a l l I t a l i a n - b o r n citizens s e r v e d i n t h e a r m y f o r a s t a n d a r d t e r m o f t w e n t y years. A p r o f e s s i o n a l a r m y h a d r e p l a c e d a r m e d peasants. T h e s e changes i n t h e l e n g t h o f m i l i t a r y service, i n t h e social c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e a r m y a n d i n its p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m a l l r e i n f o r c e d t h e r e p e r cussions o f t h e h u g e m i l i t a r y e f f o r t o n t h e p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y o f I t a l y . T h e absence, o n average* o f 130,000 I t a l i a n peasants i n t h e a r m y was i n effect a f o r m o f peasant e m i g r a t i o n . L i k e d e a t h i n w a r , i t h e l p e d t o create vacancies o n I t a l i a n l a n d , w h i c h t h e r i c h w e r e o n l y t o o a n x i o u s t o o c c u p y . B u t u n l i k e d e a t h , i t was t e m p o r a r y a n d u n p r e d i c t a b l e i n d u r a t i o n . S o m e peasant soldiers r e t u r n e d a f t e r l o n g service a b r o a d o n l y t o f i n d t h a t d u r i n g t h e i r absence t h e i r f a m i l i e s h a d f a l l e n i n t o d e b t , o r t h a t t h e i r f a r m s h a d befen s e q u e s t r a t e d by c r e d i t o r s . M o r e o v e r , t h e m e r e l i a b i l i t y o f peasants t o be c a l l e d away o n service r e d u c e d t h e i r d e p e n d a b i l i t y as s h a r e - c r o p p e r s o r p a r t - t e n a n t s . M i l i t a r y service a g g r a v a t e d t h e e c o n o m i c h a r d s h i p s o f t h e p o o r , w h i l e i t m a d e possible a n increase i n l a n d - o w n e r s h i p a n d p r o s p e r i t y f o r t h e elite. R o m a n victories overseas w e r e c r e a t i n g a n a l t e r n a t i v e s o u r c e o f l a b o u r , i n slaves. R o m a n peasant soldiers w e r e f i g h t i n g f o r t h e i r o w n displacement. N o r was t h i s a l l . T h e changes i n t h e p a t t e r n o f r e c r u i t m e n t s t i m u l a t e d t h e d i r e c t i n v o l v e m e n t o f t h e R o m a n a r m y i n p o l i t i c a l conflicts i n R o m e . I n t h e o l d days, at t h e e n d o f a c a m p a i g n , o r b e t w e e n f i g h t i n g seasons, peasant soldiers r e t u r n e d t o t h e i r f a r m s . T h e a r m y was e m b e d d e d i n t h e peasantry. W e can trace t h e process o f its disengagement i n the shortage o f recruits w i t h the traditional p r o p e r t y q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r m i l i t a r y service, i n t h e r e d u c t i o n a n d e v e n t u a l f o r m a l a b o l i t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y r e q u i r e m e n t (107 B C ) , a n d i n t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f f a r m s t o landless ex-soldiers, a n d f i n a l l y , i n t h e P r i n c i p a t e i n t h e l o c a t i o n o f long-service p r o f e s s i o n a l t r o o p s a l o n g t h e f r o n t i e r s o f t h e e m p i r e far f r o m their b i r t h place. T h e new policy o f r e c r u i t i n g 40

4 0

T h e evidence o n recruitment is conveniendy gathered by W . L i e b e n a m in RE sv dileetus, by B r u n t (1971: 391-415, 625-44). I do not agree with B r u n t (1971: 66) in his interpretation of Livy (24.18.7) that in 216 BC only 2,000 R o m a n s h a d evaded

30

Continuous

war

soldiers p r e d o m i n a n t l y f r o m a m o n g t h e p o o r o r landless, e v e n t h o u g h c o n s c r i p t i o n was s o m e t i m e s u n p o p u l a r a n d m e n w e r e press-ganged i n t o service, h e l p e d alleviate social c o n f l i c t i n I t a l y by o f f e r i n g t h e m e m p l o y m e n t o f f t h e l a n d . I t h e l p e d solve t h e p r o b l e m s o f r e c r u i t m e n t , since t h e p o o r w e r e m o r e w i l l i n g t o serve f o r l o n g p e r i o d s t h a n those w h o h a d f a r m s t o l o o k after. T h e l o n g e r t h e y served i n t h e a r m y , t h e m o r e c u t o f f t h e y became f r o m t h e i r o r i g i n a l villages. B u t t h e p o l i c y created a new p r o b l e m of what to d o w i t h a professional corps of landless soldiers w h o faced d i s c h a r g e w i t h o u t a n y prospects o f a secure l i v e l i h o o d . T h e p r o f e s s i o n a l a r m y r e l i e v e d m a n y peasants w i t h l a n d o f t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o f i g h t , b u t o n l y at t h e cost o f f o r g i n g a new w e a p o n o f c i v i l war. L e t us t a k e a closer l o o k at t h e R o m a n w a r e f f o r t . O n e o b v i o u s m e a s u r e is t h e size o f t h e a r m y . T h r o u g h o u t t h e last t w o c e n t u r i e s o f t h e R e p u b l i c (see T a b l e 1.1), t h e R o m a n a r m y r e p e a t e d l y t o t a l l e d e i g h t p e r c e n t o r m o r e o f a d u l t m a l e citizens; t h e m e d i a n size o f t h e a r m y (225-23 B C ) a m o u n t e d t o t h i r t e e n p e r c e n t o f a d u l t m a l e citizens. B u t i n t h e years b e f o r e t h e mass e n f r a n c h i s e m e n t o f t h e I t a l i a n allies (90/89 B C ) , t h e c i t i z e n a r m y r e p r e s e n t e d o n l y a p o r t i o n o f t h e t o t a l R o m a n m i l i t a r y e f f o r t . T h e I t a l i a n allies c o n t r i b u t e d o n average a b o u t t h r e e f i f t h s o f t h e t o t a l R o m a n a r m e d forces d u r i n g t h i r t y years (200-168 B C ) a f t e r t h e w a r against C a r t h a g e , f o r w h i c h we have f u l l i n f o r m a t i o n . I n this p e r i o d , t h e average size o f t h e R o m a n / I t a l i a n a r m i e s was o v e r 130,000 m e n . I t was r o u g h l y t h e same f o r t h e p e r i o d 8 0 - 5 0 B C , f o r w h i c h we also h a v e g o o d i n f o r m a t i o n (see T a b l e 1.1); p a t c h y e v i d e n c e f o r t h e i n t e r v e n i n g p e r i o d suggests t h a t t h e allies military service, o r in his conclusion that the R o m a n soldiers, even in times of crisis were predominantly recruited from peasants owning land (ossidui). O n this see my review of B r u n t (1971) in JRS 62 (1972) 192-3. I think B r u n t overestimates the efficiency of R o m a n recruiting and the objective reliability of the sources. T h e testimony for the m i n i m u m property requirements of soldiers is provided by Livy 1.43 (11,000 asses); Polybius 6.19 (4,000 asses); Cicero, On the Republic 2.40 or A u l u s Gellius, Attic Nights 16.10.10 (1,500 asses). T h e changes seem difficult to date with any certainty, but see the interesting discussion by E . Gabba, T h e origins of the professional army at Rome* (Gabba, 1976: 1—19). T h e reduction in property qualifications supports the idea that there was a trend towards professionalisation a n d proletarianisation of the army d u r i n g the last two centuries BC - so well analysed by Gabba (1976: 1-69) and by B r u n t (1971: 405ff.). I n 107 BC according to Sallust, JugurthaQ6, Marius broke with tradition by enlisting volunteers mostly from the poorest classes. It was perhaps less of a revolution than the confirmation of a trend. It is important to stress that poor m e n had probably served before (how else could the Romans have kept such large armies in the held? - see below), that the landed peasantry were forcibly conscripted in the decades following, and that poor soldiers were probably recruited mainly from the coun tryside. See B r u n t (1971: 403ff.), Gabba (1976) a n d J . H a r m a n d , Varmee et le soldat a Rome (Paris, 1967) 1 iff. O n land allotments, see B r u n t (1971:294-344).

3

1

Conquerors

and slaves

r e p e a t e d l y c o n t r i b u t e d m o r e soldiers t h a n R o m e . I n b o t h p r o p o r tional a n d absolute t e r m s , R o m a n m i l i t a r y e f f o r t was i m m e n s e . T h e size o f t h e R o m a n a r m y c o m p a r e s , f o r e x a m p l e , w i t h t h a t o f t h e F r e n c h a r m y i n t h e m i d - s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y , t h e n t h e largest a r m y i n E u r o p e , b u t t h a t was d r a w n f r o m a p o p u l a t i o n o f o v e r t w e n t y m i l l i o n r o u g h l y t h r e e t i m e s as l a r g e as t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f R o m a n I t a l y . 4 1

4 2

R i g h t d o w n t o t h e e n d o f t h e R e p u b l i c , R o m e is best seen as a w a r r i o r state. T h e e m p i r e was w o n o n l y t h r o u g h t h e massive i n v o l v e m e n t o f t h e l o w e r classes i n w a r , a n i n v o l v e m e n t w h i c h m i r r o r e d t h e m i l i t a r i s m o f t h e elite. W e c a n see t h i s c l e a r l y e n o u g h i f w e c o n s i d e r t h e average l e n g t h o f m i l i t a r y service. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , as so o f t e n i n R o m a n h i s t o r y , accurate i n f o r m a t i o n is m i s s i n g . M o r e o v e r , i t is i m p o r t a n t t o stress t h a t i n t h e late R e p u b l i c t h e r e was n o f i x e d t e r m o f service. A n n u a l l y elected g e n e r a l s w e r e a u t h o r i s e d by t h e senate t o r e c r u i t legions, as t h e s i t u a t i o n d e m a n d e d , b e f o r e t h e y set o u t f o r t h e z o n e o f w a r . I n d i v i d u a l soldiers, w h e n t h e y e n l i s t e d , c o u l d have h a d v e r y l i t d e i d e a h o w l o n g t h e i r service w o u l d last. T h i s i n s t a b i l i t y was a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y , a n d s h o u l d n o t be f o r g o t t e n . Y e t o b v i o u s l y s u c h v a r i a t i o n does n o t p r e c l u d e a n average. W e k n o w t h a t citizens w e r e l i a b l e t o serve i n t h e a r m y f o r u p t o sixteen years ( t e n years f o r cavalry) b e t w e e n t h e ages o f seventeen a n d f o r t y - s i x . I n t h e e a r l y second c e n t u r y B C , citizens w h o h a d served o v e r six years c o n t i n u o u s l y w e r e t h o u g h t o v e r d u e f o r r e t u r n h o m e ( L i v y 40.36.10); t o w a r d s t h e e n d o f t h e R e p u b l i c , soldiers r e p e a t e d l y served l o n g e r ; t h e e m p e r o r A u g u s t u s i n s t i t u t e d a p r o f e s s i o n a l a r m y i n w h i c h soldiers served f o r s i x t e e n , t h e n l a t e r t w e n t y y e a r s . I t is t e m p t i n g t h e r e f o r e t o f i l l t h e gaps i n o u r i n f o r m a t i o n by s p e c u l a t i o n ; t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s a r e l i m i t e d ; t h e coefficients a r e clear; t h e s h o r t e r 43

4 1

4 1

4 3

T h e r e is m u c h scholarly argument about the trustworthiness of the figures trans mitted by the sources for the size of legions, of armies a n d of the cidzen population recorded i n the R o m a n census. I a m aiming here at rough orders of magnitude only; the figures would have to be widely awry to destroy the implications deduced here. T h e figures given here a r e based o n B r u n t (1971: 424-5 a n d 449). T h e average for 200-16% BC i n d u d e s c. 10,000 marines a n d oarsmen; for 80-50 BC it is arrived at by multiplying the number of legions given by B r u n t by their probable size (i.e. 5,500 men). B r u n t (1971: 447) gives the average for 80-50 BC as 90,000, but this seems discordant with his o w n figures. O n the ratio of allied a n d R o m a n soldiers, see B r u n t (1971: appendix 26). Based o n H . Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst (Berlin, 1920) vol. 4, 261; F . F . Helleiner in the Cambridge Economic History (Cambridge, 1967) vol. 4, 67. F o r six years service, see P. A . B r u n t , ' T h e army a n d the land i n the R o m a n revolution', JRS 52 (1962) 80; see also A p p i a n , Spanish Wars 78 (c. 140 BC); A . Afzelius, Die römische Kriegsmacht (Copenhagen, 1944) 34fr*.» 47,61; A . £. Astin, Scipio Aemilianus (Oxford, 1967) 167-72 (a very clear account). O n longer service later, see R. £. Smith, Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army (Manchester 1958) 22t?.; H a r m a n d (1967: 258-60).

3*

Continuous

war

T a b l e I . I . The Militarism of Rome: the numbers of citizens serving soldiers in the Roman army, by decades, 225-23 B C a Dates BC (mostly interval mid-points) 225 213 203 »93 183 '73 163 "53 «43 '33 123 "3 103

b

e

Estimated citizen population Cooo)

d Estimated size of citizen army Cooo)

300 260

52 75 60

»35 266 3'5 3«4 383 374 400 381 476 o r 366 476 o r 366

Soldiers as a proportion of all male citizens (%)

(db)

53

17 29 26 20

4* 44 33 30

15 «4 9 8

44 37 3 34

11 10 7 or 9 7 or 9

2

(400) (400) (1,030) 1,030

50 52 (143) 171

'3 «3 »4 17

63 53 43 33

1,030 (1,030) 1,600

120 121 240 250

12 12 16 16

23

1,800

156

9

93 83 73

as

Note to T a b l e 1.1 T h e estimates of citizen population (col. b) are adapted from B r u n t (1971: 13-14,54-83 a n d 117-18). T h e y are based o n the nearest R o m a n census figure, plus the estimated n u m b e r of citizen soldiers serving overseas; I have followed B r u n t i n adding a n extra 10% to this total to allow for under-reporting i n the census. T h e sudden changes in the figures deserve explanation. T h e changes in 213 a n d 183 BC were largely due to the dis- a n d re-enfranchisement of 38,000 Campanians; in 83 a n d 43 BC, they reflect the enfranchisement of the Italian allies a n d Cisalpines. T h e figures from 123 BC onwards are less certain because of the difficulty of interpreting the census data. U p to 53 BC I have not included Italians living overseas, because they did not serve i n the R o m a n army i n sufficient numbers. Thereafter, I have included them, a n d have followed B r u n t ' s figures for them; roughly 150,000 i n 43 BC a n d 375,000 in 23 BC. T h e figures i n brackets are even less certain than the others. T h e estimates of army size (col. c) are also based o n B r u n t (1971: 44, 404, 418, 424, 432-49, 501-10). Between 198 a n d 59 BC, the figures given are averages for the decade (198-189,188-179 BC etc), the others are for single years. I have gone further than B r u n t in multiplying the n u m b e r of legions i n service by their nominal strength, that is 5,500 from 168-108 BC, a n d by 6,200 from 107 BC after the reforms of Marius to 91 BC. I n the civil wars which followed, it seems that more legions were formed than could be fully m a n n e d , a n d to allow for this I have multiplied by 5,500 only, except where B r u n t gives explicit figures. T h e margin of e r r o r may be quite large, but probably not so large that it would materially alter the percentage figures i n column a\

33

Conquerors

20

o

40

and slaves

50

60

Proportion of y o u n g citizens aged 17+

80

IOO

%

in army

F i g u r e 1.3. Y o u n g m e n ' s l e n g t h o f s e r v i c e i n t h e R o m a n a r m y - s o m e c o o r d i n a t e s . N B : t h e m e d i a n size o f t h e a r m y 2 2 5 - 2 3 BC w a s 1 3 % o f a l l a d u l t male citizens.

t h e a v e r a g e l e n g t h o f service, t h e l a r g e r t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f cidzens involved. I n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , t h e b u r d e n o f m i l i t a r y service f e l l d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y o n y o u n g m e n . Citizens became liable t o m i l i t a r y service o n t h e i r seventeeth b i r t h d a y . I n p r e p a r i n g F i g u r e 1.3,1 have m a d e f o u r s i m p l i f y i n g a s s u m p t i o n s : (a) a l l m e n j o i n e d t h e a r m y at age seventeen, (b) t h e y a l l s e r v e d t h e same l e n g t h o f t i m e , (c) t h e r a t e o f d e a t h a m o n g soldiers was t h e same as f o r civilians, (d) t h e average e x p e c t a t i o n o f l i f e was r o u g h l y m i d - w a y b e t w e e n t h e h i g h a n d t h e l o w f o u n d i n p r e - i n d u s t r i a l p o p u l a t i o n s ($o = a s ) . N o n e o f t h e first t h r e e a s s u m p tions is l i k e l y t o be accurate; b u t i n so f a r as m o r t a l i t y a m o n g soldiers was h i g h e r t h a n a m o n g civilians o r i f r e c r u i t s j o i n e d t h e a r m y s i g n i f i c a n t l y l a t e r t h a n age seventeen, t h e n t h e b u r d e n o f service w o u l d 44

4 4

T h e average expectation (e) of life at birth (o) a m o n g soldiers is estimated at twentyfive years (e = 25). 0

34

Continuous war have been even heavier t h a n shown. O n the o t h e r h a n d , i f the citizen p o p u l a t i o n ( o r i f t h e sector o f i t w h i c h b o r e a r m s ) was u n d e r e n u m e r a t e d a n d i f t h e legions w e r e systematically u n d e r m a n n e d , t h e n t h e b u r d e n was l i g h t e r t h a n s h o w n . T a b l e 1.1 a n d F i g u r e 1.3 s h o u l d be used to illustrate limits o f probability and r o u g h orders of magnitude only. T h a t said, t h e conclusions seem s t a g g e r i n g . A n a r m y w h i c h a c c o u n t e d f o r t h i r t e e n p e r cent o f a l l citizens ( t h e m e d i a n o f t h e last t w o c e n t u r i e s ) c o u l d be raised by e n l i s t i n g e i g h t y - f o u r p e r c e n t o f seventeen-year-olds f o r five years, o r <;. sixty p e r cent f o r seven years, o r f o r t y - f o u r p e r c e n t f o r t e n years, o r t w e n t y - e i g h t p e r c e n t f o r sixteen years. ( T h e c o h o r t o f seventeen-year-olds (at e = 25) e q u a l l e d a b o u t t h r e e p e r cent o f t h e a d u l t m a l e p o p u l a t i o n ; i t d i m i n i s h e d slowly each year a f t e r . ) T h e q u a l i t a t i v e a n d i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c evidence o n e n l i s t m e n t i n t h e e a r l y second c e n t u r y B C suggests t h a t service was t y p i c a l l y o n t h e s h o r t side o f t h i s s p e c t r u m . B y t h e e n d o f t h e R e p u b l i c service h a d b e c o m e s i g n i f i c a n t i y l o n g e r . T h e i m p l i c a t i o n s are t h e n i n e v i t a b l e ; i f t h e evidence o n a r m y size a n d citizen p o p u l a t i o n is a n y w h e r e n e a r r i g h t , t h e n a v e r y l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n (say o v e r h a l f ) o f R o m a n cidzens r e g u l a r l y served i n t h e a r m y f o r seven years i n t h e e a r l y second c e n t u r y B C . B y t h e r e i g n o f A u g u s t u s , t h e a r m y was t h o r o u g h l y p r o f e s s i o n a l i s e d ; b u t a n average o f t w e n t y years* service still r e q u i r e d t h e e n l i s t m e n t o f a b o u t o n e fifth o f seventeen-year-old citizens. A m o n g p r e - i n d u s t r i a l states, as f a r as I k n o w , o n l y Prussia u n d e r F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m I a n d F r e d e r i c k t h e G r e a t a n d N a p o l e o n i c France, a n d those o n l y f o r s h o r t p e r i o d s , achieved such consistent m i l i t a r y e f f o r t . 0

4 5

I n s u m , c o n t i n u o u s wars w e r e l a r g e l y a consequence o f t h e c o m p e t i t i v e a m b i t i o n s o f a m i l i t a r i s t i c e l i t e , s u p p o r t e d by a h i g h r a t e o f r e c r u i t m e n t o f peasants i n t o t h e a r m y . W a r s affected I t a l i a n l a n d a n d l a b o u r d i r e c t l y by d e s t r u c t i o n a n d d e a t h . F o r e i g n i n v a d e r s , r e b e l l i o u s slaves a n d i n s u r g e n t I t a l i a n s p l u n d e r e d f a r m s , r a v a g e d c r o p s a n d s l a u g h t e r e d livestock. I n a d d i t i o n , n u m e r o u s R o m a n soldiers a n d Italians were killed o r m a i m e d i n batde. T h e i n d i r e c t economic a n d p o l i t i c a l consequences o f w a r f a r e w e r e even m o r e serious. T h e m i l i t a r y service o f o v e r 100,000 R o m a n s / I t a l i a n s at m o s t t i m e s t h r o u g h o u t t h e last t w o c e n t u r i e s o f t h e R e p u b l i c was e q u a l t o a s i g n i f i c a n t e m i g r a t i o n f r o m t h e c o u n t r y s i d e . A b s e n t peasants w e r e p a r t l y r e p l a c e d b y slaves; t h i s * e m i g r a t i o n ' o f soldiers was o n e o f t h e factors w h i c h p e r m i t t e d o r e v e n e n c o u r a g e d t h e f o r m a t i o n o f l a r g e estates. O r seen a n o t h e r 46

4 5

4 6

See note 19 above. O n the recruitment of soldiers predominantly from the countryside, rather than from the urban proletariat, see B r u n t (1962: 69*!.). Some urban recruitment also occurred.

35

Conquerors

and slaves

way, t h e p a u p e r i s a t i o n o f m a n y peasants o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d t h e increases i n l a b o u r p r o d u c t i v i t y o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h i c h w e r e associated w i t h a g r i c u l t u r a l i n n o v a t i o n a n d economies o f scale o n l a r g e estates, w e r e t h e t w o sides o f o n e c o i n , j u s t as t h e y w e r e i n t h e agricultural revolution i n England i n the eighteenth century. T h e t r a n s f e r o f t h e b u r d e n o f p r o l o n g e d m i l i t a r y service f r o m p r o p e r t i e d peasants t o t h e p o o r o r landless h a d c o n s i d e r a b l e p o l i t i c a l repercussions. I n t h e m e d i u m t e r m , i t h e l p e d alleviate t h e u n p o p u l a r i t y o f c o n s c r i p t i o n a m o n g peasant v o t e r s ; since such l a r g e a r m i e s c o u l d n o t be filled exclusively w i t h v o l u n t e e r s , t h e R o m a n s h a d o f t e n r e l i e d also o n p e r s u a s i o n a n d f o r c e . O u r sources r e v e a l t h e m i l i t a r y levies as a r e p e a t e d source o f t r o u b l e . I n o n e year (152 B C ) , f o r e x a m p l e , c o m p l a i n t s o f u n f a i r n e s s i n d u c e d t h e consuls t o select r e c r u i t s by l o t ; o n a n o t h e r occasion, s i m i l a r c o m p l a i n t s p r o v o k e d t h e t r i b u n e s o f t h e p e o p l e t o fine a n d i m p r i s o n t h e consuls. G i v e n t h a t t h e e x e c u t i v e a r m o f t h e R o m a n g o v e r n m e n t was t o o w e a k t o d i s t r i b u t e t h e l o a d e q u i t a b l y , i t was o b v i o u s l y a d v a n t a g e o u s t o s h i f t t h e b u r d e n o f m i l i t a r y service o n t o f e w e r p e o p l e d r a w n p r e d o m i n a n t l y f r o m those w h o w e r e p o l i t i c a l l y weakest, a n d w h o h a d least a t t a c h m e n t t o t h e l a n d . P o v e r t y p u s h e d t h e m o u t , w h i l e a r m y pay a n d t h e p r o s p e c t o f b o o t y pulled. 4 7

T h e s o l u t i o n o f t h e p r o b l e m o f r e c r u i t m e n t h a d its p r i c e . A t t h e e n d o f t h e i r m i l i t a r y service, landless soldiers n e e d e d m e a n s o f s u p p o r t . I n the undifferentiated R o m a n economy, that meant land. W h e n the p o w e r o f soldiers was w e d d e d t o t h e p o l i t i c a l a m b i t i o n o f a successful g e n e r a l , a n a r m y was i n a p o s i t i o n t o get t h e l a n d i t w a n t e d . Sulla, a f t e r his t r i u m p h a n t m a r c h o n R o m e i n 82 B C , is said t o h a v e r e s e t d e d t w e n t y - t h r e e legions, d e p l e t e d b y w a r losses t o p e r h a p s 80-100,000 m e n , o n I t a l i a n l a n d m a d e vacant b y c o n f i s c a t i o n f r o m t o w n s w h i c h h a d o p p o s e d h i m . S i m i l a r policies o f r e s e t t l e m e n t w e r e effected by o t h e r p o l i t i c a l generals; P o m p e y , J u l i u s Caesar a n d A u g u s t u s . T h e n u m b e r s o f soldiers r e s e t d e d i n I t a l y , p e r h a p s a q u a r t e r o f a m i l l i o n b e t w e e n 80 a n d 25 B C , w e r e still f a i r l y s m a l l as a p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e t o t a l l a b o u r f o r c e . B u t m o s t o f I t a l y was t o o densely p o p u l a t e d t o a l l o w t h e easy a s s i m i l a t i o n o f a s u d d e n i n f l u x o f l a r g e n u m b e r s o f n e w setders. T h e r e s e t d e m e n t o f ex-soldiers t h e r e f o r e u s u a l l y l e d t o t h e e v i c t i o n o f e x i s t i n g t e n a n t s o r peasants. L i k e t h e s m a l l l a n d g r a n t scheme o f t h e G r a c c h i , i t w e n t against t h e t r e n d t o w a r d s t h e f o r m a t i o n o f l a r g e estates. B u t t h e r e was n o t h i n g t o stop t h e n e w s m a l l - h o l d e r s f r o m 4 8

4 7

4 0

Astin (1967: 167-72); Livy 43.14 o n 169 BC; A p p i a n , Spanish Wars 49; Livy, Summary of Book 55. O n land allotments to Sulla's soldiers, see B r u n t (1971: 305).

36

Continuous war b e c o m i n g themselves t h e v i c t i m s o f s i m i l a r e c o n o m i c o r p o l i t i c a l pressures; t h e y t o o m i g h t s o o n be e v i c t e d . T h e r e s e t d e m e n t o f ex-soldiers i n I t a l y seems o n l y t o have r e p l a c e d o n e g r o u p o f s m a l l - h o l d e r s w i t h another; it d i d litde to change the overall pattern o f l a n d - h o l d i n g a n d it made a significant c o n t r i b u d o n to instability. Finally, the l o n g - t e r m p o l i t i c a l consequences o f c h a n g i n g f r o m a peasant t o a p r o f e s s i o n a l a r m y w e r e serious. T h e g r a d u a l d e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n o f t h e y e o m a n r y u n d e r m i n e d t h e t r a d i t i o n a l b r o a d base o f t h e R e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n . L a n d e d peasants w e r e r e l i e v e d o f t h e heavy b u r d e n o f m i l i t a r y service at t h e e v e n t u a l cost, t o p u t i t s o m e w h a t d r a m a t i c a l l y , o f t h e i r p o l i t i c a l liberty. Between Republic a n d Principate, the a r m y changed f r o m an e x p r e s s i o n o f c i t i z e n p o w e r t o a n i n s t r u m e n t o f c o n t r o l . Citizens became t h e e m p e r o r ' s subjects.

T H E

PRODUCTS

OF W A R

T h e m a i n p r o d u c t o f c o n t i n u o u s w a r was e m p i r e . I t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n v o l v e d a n increase i n t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l skills o f t h e R o m a n e l i t e ; f o r e x a m p l e , specialist lawyers became d i s t i n c t f r o m priests, soldiers f r o m peasants, school-teachers f r o m f a t h e r s , t a x - c o n t r a c t o r s f r o m p l u n d e r i n g generals. T h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s w e r e p a i d f o r , i n i t i a l l y o u t o f b o o t y a n d w a r i n d e m n i t i e s , a n d e v e n t u a l l y f r o m t h e taxes i m p o s e d o n t h e v a n q u i s h e d . Revenues f r o m e m p i r e m a d e possible t h e ' t a k e - o f f ' i n t o p o l i t i c a l e x p a n s i o n a n d t h e f i n a n c i n g o f f u r t h e r wars. A s t h e e m p i r e became m o r e f i r m l y established, t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f g o v e r n m e n t income derived f r o m booty d i m i n i s h e d ; indemnities were replaced by taxes; v i c t o r i o u s generals w e r e succeeded b y R o m a n a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . I n d e e d t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m b o o t y t o taxes was a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f t h e process o f e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e e m p i r e . T h e r e v e n u e s o f t h e state w e r e secured. A t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e second c e n t u r y B C , a c c o r d i n g t o F r a n k ' s t e n t a t i v e estimates, a b o u t t h r e e q u a r t e r s o f t h e r e v e n u e s o f t h e R o m a n state c a m e f r o m a b r o a d . B y t h e m i d d l e o f t h e first c e n t u r y B C , state r e v e n u e s h a d increased t o r o u g h l y six times t h e i r p r e v i o u s level; a n d almost all came f r o m a b r o a d . A s i n o t h e r successful 4 9

4 9

I follow here T . Frank's speculative estimate of gross revenues i n the early second century BC: about 50-60 million H S per year (ESAR vol. 1, 141). A s a result of Pompey's conquests 63-60 BC, state revenues rose from 200 to 340 million H S (Plutarch, Pompey^). Plutarch's comment is ambiguous; but I prefer this interpretation to a rise from 200 to 540 million H S , argued by £. B a d i a n , Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic (Oxford ,1968) 78 a n d accepted by P. A . B r u n t , Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic ( L o n d o n , 1971) 39. T h e importance of booty a n d indemnities is reflected in the detailed accounts of them preserved i n traditional histories (e.g. Livy 34.46). F o r what it is worth, F r a n k estimates that booty a n d indemnities accounted for about two fifths of R o m a n state revenues in the first part 1

37

Conquerors

and slaves

p r e - i n d u s t r i a l e m p i r e s , t h e p r o c e e d s o f victory were d i s t r i b u t e d , albeit somewhat unequally, a m o n g the conquerors. Soldiers w e r e a m o n g t h e first t o b e n e f i t . A t t h e e n d o f a w a r , t h e c o m m a n d i n g g e n e r a l r e g u l a r l y gave soldiers a share o f t h e b o o t y i n cash. I n t h e e a r l y s e c o n d c e n t u r y B C , these g r a n t s w e r e q u i t e m o d e s t ; o n average b a r e l y e n o u g h t o f e e d a f a m i l y f o r t h r e e m o n t h s . I n t h e m i d - f i r s t c e n t u r y B C , i n t h e t w o p a r t i c u l a r l y lavish cases we k n o w o f , t h e c o m m o n soldier's share o f t h e b o o t y was e n o u g h t o b u y several years' f o o d f o r a h o u s e h o l d o r a m o d e s t p l o t o f l a n d . W e d o n o t k n o w h o w m u c h b o o t y soldiers succeeded i n c a r r y i n g o f f f o r themselves; b u t R o m a n c o m m a n d e r s w e r e o f t e n i n d u c e d t o a l l o w t h e i r soldiers t o p l u n d e r ; s o m e t i m e s t h e soldiers p l u n d e r e d a c a p t u r e d city w i t h o u t orders. N o t o n l y soldiers b e n e f i t e d . I n 167 B C , as a r e s u l t o f o n e p a r t i c u l a r l y l a r g e h a u l o f b o o t y f r o m Greece, taxes l e v i e d o n I t a l i a n l a n d o w n e d by R o m a n citizens w e r e a b o l i s h e d ; t h e l a n d tax was n o t r e i m p o s e d i n I t a l y , e x c e p t d u r i n g crises at t h e e n d o f t h e R e p u b l i c . T h i s is o n e o f t h e factors w h i c h accounts f o r t h e h i g h p r i c e o f I t a l i a n l a n d , since, o t h e r t h i n g s b e i n g e q u a l , r e n t c o u l d e q u a l r e n t p l u s tax o n p r o v i n c i a l l a n d . As t h e p r o f i t s o f e m p i r e i n c r e a s e d , d i s t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e c i t i z e n b o d y became m o r e lavish. I n p a r t , t h e pay-off was v i c a r i o u s a n d s y m b o l i c : p u b l i c games w e r e g i v e n t o celebrate victories; o n e o f t h e i r f u n c t i o n s was t h a t t h e y r e i n f o r c e d p o p u l a r p r i d e i n t h e a r m y ' s a c h i e v e m e n t s . I n 123 B C , a p o p u l a r t r i b u n e o f t h e p e o p l e h a d a law passed by w h i c h citizens l i v i n g i n t h e city o f R o m e r e c e i v e d w h e a t at a subsidised p r i c e . F r o m 58 B C o n w a r d s , t h e w h e a t was d i s t r i b u t e d f r e e ; t h e n u m b e r o f r e c i p i e n t s fluctuated a p p a r e n t l y b e t w e e n 150,000 a n d 320,000. I n this way, a sizeable m i n o r i t y o f a l l R o m a n citizens, at t i m e s o v e r o n e 5 0

5 1

5 0

5 1

of the second century BC, when less than a third of revenues came from provincial taxes a n d mines. At the e n d of the Republic (see ESAR vol. 1,322ff.) provincial taxes constituted the bulk of state revenues. T h e great hauls of booty taken by Pompey and Caesar were exceptional. F r o m the early second century BC, we know of 17 gifts of money by generals to soldiers from booty (tabulated by B r u n t (1971: 394). T h e median was 100 H S , the average 122 H S . At the conventional price of wheat (3 H S per modius), the average would have provided c. 40 modii = 260 kg wheat = about one quarter of a family's m i n i m u m a n n u a l needs. B y contrast, Pompey gave his soldiers 6,000 H S (Plutarch, Pompey 45), Julius Caesar 20,000 H S (Appian, Civil Wars 3.44) a n d 24,000 H S (Suetonius, Julius Caesar 38). Augustus gave soldiers 12,000 H S after sixteen, later twenty years' service. See P. A . B r u n t , JRS 52 (1962) 786*. Ideally, R o m a n soldiers shared all the booty; according to Polybius 10.15ff. a specific body of soldiers, never more than half the army, was detailed to collect booty, while the rest stood guard. Ancient ideals of discipline sometimes broke down (e.g. Livy 37.32; Plutarch, Lucullus 14 a n d 19) H a r m a n d (1967: 410-16).

38

The products of war q u a r t e r , received a d i r e c t share o f t h e p r o f i t s o f e m p i r e . A t m o s t a f t e r 58 B C , t h e cost o f t h e w h e a t - d o l e e q u a l l e d a s i x t h o f state r e v e n u e s , w h i l e each r e c i p i e n t g o t a b o u t t w o fifths o f t h e m i n i m u m subsistence requirements o f a family; the wheat-dole helped the p o o r o u t , b u t i t d i d n o t m a k e w o r k u n n e c e s s a r y . T h e use o f state resources t o subsidise p o o r voters h a d several u n i n t e n d e d a n d p e r h a p s u n p e r ceived consequences. I t e n c o u r a g e d t h e f u r t h e r m i g r a t i o n o f peasants t o R o m e ; i t was o n e o f t h e factors w h i c h m a d e possible t h e c i t y o f Rome's h u g e g r o w t h ; a n d i t h e l d d o w n t h e cost t o t h e r i c h o f e m p l o y i n g f r e e l a b o u r i n t h e c i t y o f R o m e . I n a d d i t i o n , as I a r g u e b e l o w , i t h e l p e d support the market f o r the food g r o w n o n the farms of the rich. One final p o i n t . M o s t o f t h e official r e v e n u e s f r o m e m p i r e w e n t t o finance m o r e wars. I t a l i a n t r o o p s w e r e p a i d a n d s u p p o r t e d . I n effect, t h e R o m a n g o v e r n m e n t was p r o v i d i n g a l t e r n a t i v e e m p l o y m e n t f o r I t a l i a n peasants; t h e y w e r e p a i d t o k e e p o f f t h e l a n d , w h i c h t h e r i c h w a n t e d t o o c c u p y . O n e can u n d e r s t a n d t h e f u r y o f conservative leaders w h e n occasionally soldiers r e t u r n e d en masse, a n d t h r o u g h t h e p a t r o n a g e o f t h e i r generals d e m a n d e d l a n d i n I t a l y t o settle o n . A b o v e a l l , t h e i n c o m e f r o m e m p i r e flowed i n t o t h e purses o f t h e p r i v i l e g e d . T h a t was o n e o f t h e c h i e f advantages o f b e i n g p r i v i l e g e d , at o n c e a t o k e n o f h i g h status a n d a means o f r e i n f o r c i n g i t . T h r o u g h o u t t h e second c e n t u r y B C , t h e r i c h became steadily richer, a n d i n t h e first c e n t u r y B C , t h e process accelerated. R i c h m e n boasted p u b l i c l y o f t h e i r w e a l t h ; t h e size o f one's possessions o r debts became m a t t e r s o f c o m m o n k n o w l e d g e . T h e richest nobles a c q u i r e d p r i v a t e f o r t u n e s w h i c h e q u a l l e d t h e r e v e n u e s o f s m a l l states, a n d c o u l d by themselves sustain p r i v a t e a r m i e s a n d dispense massive c h a r i t y . O n e m a n , M . L i c i n i u s Crassus, r e p u t e d l y t h e richest o f his d a y , gave R o m a n cidzens l i v i n g i n t h e c i t y o f R o m e e n o u g h w h e a t t o live o n f o r t h r e e m o n t h s i n t h e h o p e o f s u s t a i n i n g his p o l i t i c a l p o p u l a r i t y w h i l e h e was away seeking m i l i t a r y g l o r y . H i s f o r t u n e a m o u n t e d t o a b o u t 192 m i l l i o n H S , r o u g h l y e n o u g h t o f e e d 400,000 f a m i l i e s f o r o n e year. A c o n t e m p o r a r y n o t a b l e r e c k o n e d t h a t o n e n e e d e d 100,000 H S t o l i v e c o m f o r t a b l y a n d 600,000 H S a year t o live w e l l , i n c o m e s r o u g h l y e q u a l t o t w o h u n d r e d 52

M

O n the wheat-dole i n Rome, see B r u n t (1971: 376-82). I calculate its cost very roughly as 5 (modii per m o n t h ) x i 2 (months per year)x320,000 ( m a x i m u m number of recipients) x 3 H S (conventional wheat price) = 58 million H S from a revenue in 60 BC of more than 340 million H S . Cicero's polemical implication (pro Sestio 55) that free wheat for citizens cost the state a fifth of its budget was probably an exaggeration. I reckon the m i n i m u m living requirements of a n average sized family at 1,000 kg wheat equivalent per year (c. 150 modii).

39

Conquerors and one thousand two level o f a f a m i l y .

hundred

and slaves times the m i n i m u m

subsistence

5 3

As a result o f this g r o w t h i n wealth, the differences between the r i c h a n d p o o r i n w e a l t h a n d style o f l i f e w i d e n e d . T h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e p o o r e s t , t h e u r b a n p r o l e t a r i a t a n d landless l a b o u r e r s , d e t e r i o r a t e d s h a r p l y b o t h a b s o l u t e l y a n d r e l a t i v e l y t o t h e r i c h . A t t h e same t i m e , sections o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n o u t s i d e t h e t r a d i t i o n a l elite w e r e also p r o f i t i n g f r o m e m p i r e . T h i s is m y u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t h a p p e n e d , b u t i t is d i f f i c u l t t o d o c u m e n t ; elitist l i t t e r a t e u r s d i d n o t discuss i n c r e a s i n g d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o u t s i d e t h e elite. O n e s y m p t o m o f t h i s d e v e l o p m e n t m a y be f o u n d i n t h e b o o t y d i s t r i b u t e d t o soldiers. W e have a l r e a d y seen t h a t e a r l y i n t h e p e r i o d o f i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n t h e a m o u n t s g i v e n t o soldiers by generals w e r e v e r y s m a l l ; at t h e e n d o f t h e p e r i o d , t h e y w e r e , o n t h e t w o k n o w n occasions, v e r y l a r g e . I n t h e e a r l i e r p e r i o d (c. 200 B C ) , c e n t u r i o n s r e g u l a r l y g o t o n l y t w i c e as m u c h b o u n t y as o r d i n a r y s o l d i e r s ; i n t h e last c e n t u r y B C , o n o n e occasion, c e n t u r i o n s r e c e i v e d t w e n t y times as m u c h as o r d i n a r y soldiers ( P l u t a r c h , Pompey 33), a n d b y t h e e n d o f t h e R e p u b l i c , t h e r e g u l a r pay o f c e n t u r i o n s was five t i m e s h i g h e r t h a n t h a t o f o r d i n a r y soldiers ( A p p i a n , Civil Wars 4.100); at t h e e n d o f A u g u s t u s ' r e i g n , i ; m a y have b e e n sixteen t o s i x t y times higher. S o m e soldiers still g o t d o u b l e pay (duplicarii), but their p o s i t i o n i n t h e r a n k o r d e r was f a r b e l o w t h a t o f a c e n t u r i o n . A t t h e o t h e r e n d o f t h e scale i t is w o r t h n o t i n g t h a t P o m p e y ' s s e n i o r officers (legates, quaestors) a p p a r e n d y g o t five h u n d r e d t i m e s as m u c h as o r d i n a r y soldiers (ESAR, v o l . 1, 325). T h e p i c t u r e we get f r o m a l l these e x a m p l e s is o n e o f i n c r e a s i n g d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n t h e a r m y . I t p a r t l y reflected the army's o w n increased professionalisation a n d b u r e a u 5 4

M

M

T h e fact that the size of his fortune was public knowledge reflects the competition a m o n g nobles for wealth. I n fact Pompey's fortune was significandy larger than that of Crassus. See B a d i a n (1968:8iff.); Plutarch, Crassus 2; Pliny, Natural History33.134; Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum 49. It is noteworthy that Pompey's assets roughly equalled the state's a n n u a l revenues - a n index of the weakness of the state machine relative to the nobility in the late Republic. O n this, see P. A . B r u n t , 'Pay a n d superannuation in the R o m a n army*, Papers of the British School at Rome 18 (1950) 71 a n d the slighdy different calculations i n A . von Domeszewski, Die Rangordnung des rbmischen Heeres (Cologne , 1967) i n extrapolating backwards from a n early third-century inscription (CIL 3.14416). I n 46 BC Caesar gave centurions the old traditional ratio, i.e. twice as m u c h bounty as ordinary soldiers ( A p p i a n , Civil Wars 2.102); this was a clear exception to the trend I describe. However, it is worth noting that in this distribution centurions got 40,000 H S , which was enough to set them u p as substantial peasants. T h e high ratio (20:1) of bounty given to centurions in 66 BC (see also A p p i a n , Mith. 104) may also have been d u e to exceptional political circumstances. T h a t said, the evidence of a trend, although scant a n d patchy, seems cumulatively convincing. See also B r u n t (1971:459) for a sensible discussion of the evidence. 1

40

The products of war c r a t i s a t i o n ; i t also r e f l e c t e d , I t h i n k , t h e increased s t r a t i f i c a t i o n o f c i v i l i a n society. T h e m a i n s o u r c e o f n e w w e a l t h f o r nobles was p r o v i n c i a l government. T h e o r i g i n s o f p r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n conquest affected its style. L i k e t h e R o m a n a r m y , p r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was c o n t r o l l e d b y h i g h - s t a t u s a m a t e u r s , w h o h e l d office f o r s h o r t p e r i o d s o n l y a n d saw i n i t a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o e n h a n c e t h e i r status a n d m a k e a profit. T h e importance o f war booty declined, t h o u g h the p l u n d e r collected b y t h e a r m i e s a n d officers o f Sulla, P o m p e y a n d J u l i u s Caesar p r o v i d e s n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n s . I n s t e a d R o m a n aristocrats m a d e m o n e y f r o m t h e supervision o f taxation a n d the dispensation o f justice. I n t h e first c e n t u r y B G , a c a u t i o u s a n d u n e x p l o i t a t i v e g o v e r n o r o f a p r o v i n c e c o u l d m a k e e n o u g h p r o f i t f r o m a single y e a r i n office t o set u p his f a m i l y i n style f o r g e n e r a t i o n s . M a n y g o v e r n o r s a n d t h e i r aides saw a t o u r i n t h e p r o v i n c e s as a n o p p o r t u n i t y f o r m a k i n g t h e i r fortunes, o r f o r restoring t h e m after they had been debilitated by the cost o f s e c u r i n g e l e c t i o n . T h e scale o f R o m a n e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t h e p r o v i n c e s is r e f l e c t e d i n t h e fact t h a t t h e f i r s t p e r m a n e n t j u d i c i a l t r i b u n a l established i n R o m e was set u p ( i n 149 B C ) t o d e a l w i t h c o m p l a i n t s b y p r o v i n c i a l s o f i l l e g a l e x t o r t i o n . A t best, t h e t r i b u n a l p r o v i d e d provincials w i t h a n o p p o r t u n i t y to recuperate some small p a r t o f t h e losses t h e y h a d i n c u r r e d a n d , f o r w h a t i t was w o r t h , t o p u n i s h g o v e r n o r s w h o h a d o p p r e s s e d t h e m . A t w o r s t , t h e t r i b u n a l was p l a g u e d b y d o m e s t i c R o m a n p o l i t i c a l i n t r i g u e s a n d collusions. B u t p e r h a p s its m o s t i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n , its u n i n t e n d e d consequence, was m e r e l y t o establish a c o n v e n t i o n as t o t h e level o f e x t o r t i o n w h i c h w o u l d be c o n d o n e d . 5 5

E v e n a w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d g o v e r n o r , l i k e C i c e r o , was r e s t r i c t e d b y his o b l i g a t i o n s t o o t h e r senators a n d t a x - f a r m e r s , a n d b y t h e i r e x p e c t a tions based o n w h a t p r e v i o u s g o v e r n o r s h a d a l l o w e d . C i c e r o , w h o g o v e r n e d C i l i c i a (at t h a t time t h e s o u t h e r n a n d eastern p a r t o f T u r k e y p l u s C y p r u s ) i n 51-50 B C , set h i m s e l f u p as a m o d e l o f p r o p r i e t y . H e r e s t r a i n e d his o w n aides; b u t h e n e e d e d t h e p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t o f his f r i e n d s at R o m e t o o m u c h t o be able t o w i t h s t a n d t h e i r d e m a n d s successfully. F o r e x a m p l e , h e f o u n d t h a t t h e t o w n s o f C y p r u s h a d p a i d t h e p r e v i o u s g o v e r n o r 4.8 m i l l i o n H S ( r o u g h l y e n o u g h t o f e e d 10,000 f a m i l i e s f o r o n e y e a r ) i n o r d e r t o a v o i d h a v i n g soldiers g a r r i s o n e d t h e r e . T h i s was o n l y o n e i t e m i n t h e g o v e r n o r ' s p r o f i t s . C i c e r o osten5 6

T h e scale o f R o m a n p l u n d e r is illustrated by B a d i a n (1968: 8»ff.), a n d discussed i n more detail by R. O . Jolliffe, Phases of Corruption in Roman Administration (Diss. Menasha, Wise., 1919), mostly excerpts from C i c e r o interestingly discussed.

41

Conquerors

and slaves

t a t i o u s l y a b s t a i n e d f r o m squeezes l i k e t h i s . I n d e e d , h e r e t u r n e d o n e m i l l i o n H S f r o m his a l l o w a n c e t o t h e t r e a s u r y t o t h e c h a g r i n o f his aides w h o e x p e c t e d i t t o be d i s t r i b u t e d t o t h e m . E v e n so, C i c e r o tells us t h a t h e m a d e 2.2 m i l l i o n H S f o r h i m s e l f , p r o b a b l y o u t o f t h e m o n e y a l l o c a t e d t o h i m f o r t h e u p k e e p o f t h e soldiers assigned t o his p r o v i n c e . T h r o u g h o u t his g o v e r n s h i p , C i c e r o was e n g a g e d i n r e g u l a t i n g t h e c o l l e c t i o n o f d e b t s a l r e a d y i n c u r r e d b y p r o v i n c i a l s ( a n d by the k i n g o f a n e i g h b o u r i n g principality) a n d already swollen by i n t e r e s t . Colleagues i n R o m e pressed h i m t o a p p o i n t t h e i r business agents as officials (prefects) o r t o s e n d i n t r o o p s t o e n f o r c e t h e i r requests f o r p a y m e n t . A p p a r e n d y o t h e r governors o f t e n d i d this. O n l y recendy, t h e a g e n t o f o n e n o b l e senator h a d s h u t u p s o m e t o w n c o u n c i l l o r s i n t h e i r c o u n c i l house i n a n a t t e m p t t o e n f o r c e p a y m e n t o f a d e b t s w o l l e n b y a h i g h r a t e o f i n t e r e s t , a n d h a d n o t released t h e m u n t i l five h a d d i e d o f s t a r v a t i o n . E x a c t i o n o f such debts e x t e n d e d t h e scope of p r o f i t e e r i n g f r o m provinces well beyond the short tenure built into t h e R o m a n system o f g o v e r n o r s h i p s . M o s t R o m a n a d m i n i s t r a t o r s w e r e p r o b a b l y less callous. Y e t t h e r e a r e sufficient stories f r o m t h e late R e p u b l i c t o i n d i c a t e t h e scale o n w h i c h t h e a c c u m u l a t e d treasures o f t h e c o n q u e r e d p r o v i n c e s w e r e t r a n s f e r r e d t o R o m e , a n d hints o f the methods used t o extract t h e m . I n effect, m o s t R o m a n g o v e r n o r s a n d t h e i r aides c o u l d exercise t h e i r p o w e r , i n p u r s u i t o f p r o f i t o r pleasure, a r b i t r a r i l y a n d w i t h o u t fear o f reprisal. L e t m e give a n example, taken, I a m a f r a i d , f r o m a s o m e w h a t biased source: a p r o s e c u t o r ' s speech ( C i c e r o , Against Verres 2.1.648.) against a g o v e r n o r o n t r i a l f o r e x t o r t i o n i n 70 B C . I t describes a n e p i s o d e e a r l i e r i n his career f o r w h i c h h e was n e v e r t r i e d ; t h e p r o s e c u t o r p r o b a b l y cast i t i n t h e w o r s t possible l i g h t . Nevertheless, i t seems r e v e a l i n g . A s t h e g o v e r n o r ' s a i d e (legatus), V e r r e s was q u a r t e r e d i n a s m a l l t o w n i n w h a t is n o w w e s t e r n T u r k e y ; h e l u s t e d a f t e r t h e d a u g h t e r o f a l e a d i n g c i t i z e n ; t h i s c i t i z e n gave a feast i n V e r r e s ' h o n o u r ; d u r i n g t h e feast V e r r e s o r d e r e d t h e d o o r s l o c k e d a n d d e m a n d e d t h a t t h e g i r l be b r o u g h t t o h i m . T h e r e e n s u e d a b a t d e b e t w e e n t h e h o u s e slaves a n d those o f Verres* i n w h i c h o n e o f Verres* official g u a r d s was k i l l e d . N e x t m o r n i n g * t h e t o w n s p e o p l e , w h o s i d e d w i t h 56

5 6

O n Cicero's governorship, see best his Letters to Atticus, ed. D . R. Shackleton Bailey (Cambridge, 1968) vol. 3. Specific references used here a r e (in the old enumeration) 5.21; 6.1; 7.1; a n d ad Fam. 5.20.9. I t is difficult to know what was normal; exploitation may have worsened considerably d u r i n g the last decades of the Republic. T h e ravages committed were public knowledge, regretted a n d c o n d o n e d : W o r d s cannot express, citizens, how hated we are among foreign nations because of the lust of those we have sent to govern them d u r i n g the past years a n d the damage they have d o n e ' (Cicero, O n the Manilian Law 65; cf. ad Fam. 15.1.5). 4

42

The products of war t h e i r o w n citizen, gathered t o batter d o w n the d o o r o f the house i n w h i c h V e r r e s was l o d g e d , b u t w e r e e v e n t u a l l y dissuaded f r o m h a r m i n g h i m b y a g r o u p o f R o m a n citizens l i v i n g i n t h e t o w n . V e r r e s escaped, but quickly brought the father of the girl to trial for the m u r d e r of his g u a r d . H e fixed t h i s b y g e t t i n g t h e j u r y p a c k e d w i t h R o m a n citizens t o w h o m p r o v i n c i a l s o w e d m o n e y a n d w h o w o u l d w e l c o m e his h e l p i n g e t t i n g t h e i r debts p a i d . T h e p r o s e c u t o r was a m o n e y - l e n d e r t o o ; t h e f a t h e r c o u l d find n o o n e w h o was w i l l i n g t o d e f e n d h i m a n d risk o f f e n d i n g t h e g o v e r n o r . H e was f o u n d g u i l t y a n d e x e c u t e d . So m u c h f o r R o m a n justice. I t seems w o r t h stressing t h a t t a k i n g p r i v a t e p r o f i t f r o m p u b l i c office was b u i l t i n t o t h e R o m a n system o f p r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T o s o m e e x t e n t , o f c o u r s e , c o r r u p t i o n , o v e r t l y r e c o g n i s e d as w r o n g b u t c o n d o n e d , has b e e n a n d still is t h e h a l l - m a r k o f b u r e a u c r a t i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h e exceptions are few a n d notable. B u t I a m not t h i n k i n g here o f the routine inability o f a central administration c o m p l e t e l y t o c o n t r o l t h e i n c o m e o f its officials. R a t h e r I a m t h i n k i n g o f t h e m e t h o d s first a d o p t e d by t h e R o m a n s t o secure r e v e n u e s f r o m the rapidly expanded empire. As i n many other pre-industrial e m p i r e s , t h e R o m a n g o v e r n m e n t c o m m o n l y sold t h e right t o collect taxes t o p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s ( t a x - f a r m e r s , publicani). T h i s h a d l o n g b e e n t h e practice i n I t a l y f o r t h e c o l l e c t i o n o f fees f r o m state lands a n d b u i l d i n g s , as w e l l as i n t h e l e t t i n g o f state c o n t r a c t s , a n d h a d b e e n c o m m o n i n t h e G r e e k k i n g d o m s o f t h e eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n w h i c h t h e R o m a n s a b s o r b e d . Since t h e r e was at R o m e n o t r a d i t i o n o f e m p l o y i n g m e n o f h i g h status o n a salary f o r a l o n g t e r m , e i t h e r i n t h e p u b l i c o r t h e p r i v a t e s p h e r e , t h e r e was n o effective a l t e r n a t i v e t o t a x - f a r m i n g easily available. H o w else c o u l d t h e R o m a n s have t a x e d t h e i r p r o v i n c e s r e g u l a r l y ? T o be s u r e , several v a r i a n t s o f t a x - f a r m i n g were k n o w n a n d used i n different parts o f the e m p i r e ( f o r example, i n Sicily a n d A s i a ) . Y e t t h e v a r i a t i o n s d i d n o t m a t t e r e i t h e r t o t h e R o m a n state o r t o t h e p r o v i n c i a l tax-payers as m u c h as t h e d e g r e e o f c o n t r o l e x e r c i s e d b y R o m a n magistrates o v e r t h e t a x - f a r m e r s . 5 7

F o r t h e R o m a n g o v e r n m e n t , t a x - f a r m i n g h a d several advantages. O n c e t h e t a x contracts h a d b e e n a u c t i o n e d , t h e g o v e r n m e n t received cash i n a d v a n c e , p r o b a b l y w i t h I t a l i a n l a n d p l e d g e d as security f o r 5 7

T h e article by C . K . Y a n g i n D . S. Nivison a n d A . F . Wright, Confucianism in Action (Stanford, 1959) is very suggestive. See now, £. B a d i a n , Publicans and Sinners (Oxford, 1972), the best even if a some times polemical discussion of R o m a n Republican tax-farming; o n the Principate also, see M . I . Rostovtzeff, Geschichte der Stattspacht (Leipzig, 1901) 39ff.; cf. G . Urdgdi, sv Publicani i n RE Supplement-Band x i , col. 1184-1208.

43

Conquerors

and slaves

further payment and orderly conduct. Since c o n t r a c t s r e g u l a r l y lasted f o r five years, t h e g o v e r n m e n t secured its r e v e n u e a n d c o u l d c o m m i t itself t o e x p e n d i t u r e , s u c h as a f o r e i g n w a r , w h i c h m i g h t last several years. B y s e l l i n g t h e right t o t a x , t h e g o v e r n m e n t t r a n s f e r r e d its r i s k t o t h e t a x - f a r m e r s a n d t h e i r g u a r a n t o r s . O n e o f t h e m a i n risks was a b a d harvest; a n d harvests o f t e n w e r e b a d ; p r o v i n c i a l s m i g h t n o t be able t o p a y t h e i r taxes i n f u l l , o r i f t h e t a x was a f i x e d p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e c r o p i t m i g h t n o t y i e l d as m u c h as t h e t a x f a r m e r s h a d p a i d f o r t h e c o n t r a c t a n d its a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . S u c h s h o r t f a l l s d i d h a p p e n , a n d o n t w o occasions w e k n o w t h a t t h e t a x - f a r m e r s asked t h e R o m a n senate t o r e m i t p a r t o f t h e p r i c e a g r e e d at t h e a u c t i o n . 5 8

5 9

T a x - f a r m i n g also h a d disadvantages f o r t h e state. C o l l u s i o n b e t w e e n b i d d e r s at a u c t i o n s p r e v e n t e d t h e state f r o m g e t t i n g t h e best p r i c e . E v e n w h e n t a x - f a r m e r s b i d h i g h , t h e y w e r e m o r e l i k e l y t o screw e x t r a taxes o u t o f p r o v i n c i a l s t h a n t o s u f f e r losses themselves. T h e m a i n p r o b l e m , as has a l r e a d y b e e n suggested, was t h a t t h e efficiency o f t a x - f a r m i n g as a n i n s t r u m e n t o f g o o d g o v e r n m e n t d e p e n d e d u p o n t h e effectiveness o f t h e s u p e r v i s i o n o f t h e t a x - f a r m e r s . I n a s m a l l society, tax-payers c o u l d s o o n h a v e m a d e t h e i r dissatisfaction w i t h abuses f e l t ; i n a m o n a r c h y , t h e k i n g o r e m p e r o r has a n i n t e r e s t i n p r e s e r v i n g t h e t a x - p a y i n g capacities o f his subjects a n d n o special interest i n the e n r i c h m e n t o f tax-farmers. However, i n the oligarchic e a r l y R o m a n e m p i r e (200-31 B C ) , t h e p r o v i n c i a l s h a d a l m o s t n o p o w e r a n d w e r e h u n d r e d s o f m i l e s , e v e n m o n t h s away, f r o m t h e c e n t r e o f p o w e r . T h e g o v e r n o r s , w h o s e task i t was t o supervise t h e t a x - f a r m e r s , r u l e d u s u a l l y f o r o n l y o n e year a n d h a d l i t t l e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e special p r o b l e m s o f t h e p r o v i n c e t o w h i c h t h e y h a d b e e n assigned a n d h a d n o p e r m a n e n t s k i l l e d staff o n w h o s e e x p e r i e n c e t h e y c o u l d d r a w . B o t h g o v e r n o r a n d t a x - f a r m e r were usually interested i n m a k i n g a private p r o f i t ; t h e r e w e r e o f t e n d i s p u t e s o v e r t h e d i v i s i o n o f t h e spoils; m y i m p r e s s i o n is t h a t c o l l u s i o n was t h e m o s t f r e q u e n t s o l u t i o n t o t h e conflict, t o the d e t r i m e n t o f the provincials. 60

A n inscription from Puteoli, set u p in 105 BC, records that a municipal building contractor h a d to pledge land against proper fulfilment of his contract (CIL 10.1781 * FIRA 153). T h i s is thought to have been typical a n d traditional; see similarly, Polybius 6.17 a n d Cicero, Verrines 2.1.142-3; Ps. Asconius 252 St; Schol. Bobb. 106 St. Plutarch, Coto the Elder 19; C i c e r o , ad Att. 1.17.9; ^ * Manilian Law 16; other references i n ESAR vol. 1, 345. Collusion was the complement of risk. *° Cicero, Letters to Atticus 6.1.16:' Y o u seem to want to know how I manage about the tax-farmers. I dote u p o n them, defer to them, butter them u p with compliments - a n d arrange that they h a r m n o b o d y . . . M y system is this: I fix a d a t e . . . a n d say that if (the provincials) pay before that date I shall apply a rate of 1 % (interest p e r month): if not, then the rate i n the agreement. S o the natives pay a tolerable interest M

w

44

The products of war D e p e n d e n c e o n t a x - f a r m i n g was a s y m p t o m o f t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t ' s weakness t h r o u g h o u t t h e R e p u b l i c . F i r s t l y , t h e R o m a n senate h a d n o c a d r e o f m i d d l e a n d l o w e r level p r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s u n d e r its c o n t r o l ; i t c o u l d t h e r e f o r e p r o v i d e o n l y a n e x t r e m e l y l i m i t e d service, i f a n y , t o its n e w l y c o n q u e r e d subjects. D u r i n g t h e P r i n c i p a t e a salaried o f f i c i a l d o m d i d evolve o u t o f t h e e m p e r o r ' s o w n h o u s e h o l d ; i t was staffed p r e d o m i n a n d y by slaves, a n d h e a d e d b y ex-slaves a n d a few k n i g h t s .

6 1

I t s e s t a b l i s h m e n t spelt a slow d e a t h f o r t a x - f a r m i n g ,

w h i l e its s m a l l size h i g h l i g h t s t h e meagreness o f p r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d u r i n g the Republic. Secondly, the Republican

government

h a d a small budget; reliance o n t a x - f a r m i n g i m p l i e d that groups o f w e a l t h y m e n c o u l d raise h u g e s u m s o f cash m o r e easily a n d c o u l d b e t t e r a f f o r d t o s p r e a d t h e i r risks o v e r a f e w years t h a n t h e g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s is a n i n d e x o f t h e g e n e r a l l y l o w p r o p o r t i o n o f gross p r o d u c t s i p h o n e d o f f f r o m t h e p r o v i n c e s i n t a x a t i o n i n t h e e a r l y stages o f i m p e r i a l c o n q u e s t overseas a n d suggests t h a t d u r i n g t h i s e a r l y p e r i o d of. e m p i r e t h e share o f p r o v i n c i a l p r o f i t s w h i c h f o u n d its w a y i n t o p r i v a t e h a n d s was g r e a t e r . O n e o f t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n s o f t a x - f a r m i n g was t o g i v e p r o s p e r o u s non-senators a n d especially k n i g h t s a share i n t h e p r o f i t s o f e m p i r e ; t h e r e was n o o t h e r established c h a n n e l by w h i c h t h i s c o u l d be d o n e . Polybius (6.17) w r i t i n g i n t h e m i d d l e o f t h e second c e n t u r y BC, w i t h some exaggeration,

stated t h a t ' a l m o s t e v e r y o n e ' i n I t a l y

s e e m e d t o be i n v o l v e d i n s o m e way w i t h p u b l i c c o n t r a c t s . M o r e o v e r , t a x - f a r m i n g p r o v i d e d t h e financial f r a m e w o r k w h i c h u n d e r p i n n e d t h e development o f the political ' t h i r d force' (Pliny,

Natural History 33.34),

t h e k n i g h t s , a b o u t w h o m m o r e i n a m o m e n t . F i n a l l y , t h e system o f t a x - f a r m i n g h e l p e d preserve the t r a d i t i o n a l amateurishness

of the

nobles. T h r o u g h o u t t h e c e n t u r y o f e x p a n s i o n w h i c h f o l l o w e d t h e defeat o f Carthage, the provinces were governed by a h a n d f u l o f aristocrats a n d t h e i r f o l l o w e r s sent o u t each y e a r by t h e senate. T h e i r v e r y s h o r t t e n u r e o f office, t h e s m a l l scale o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w h i c h they controlled, a n d their exclusion f r o m tax-collecting all helped p r e s e r v e t h e o l i g a r c h y , w h i c h d e p e n d e d u p o n l i m i t i n g each aristocrat's power. I d e a l l y , g o o d p r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d e p e n d e d u p o n a balance

t !

a n d the tax-farmers are delighted with the a r r a n g e m e n t . . . ' trans. D . R . Shackleton Bailey (Cambridge, 1968) vol. 3, 95. C i c e r o thought himself a model governor, as he was, compared with V e r r e s (Cicero, Verrines 2.2.170). B a d i a n (1972: 76) points out cases of the long-tenure of tax-contracts in particular towns a n d regions a n d the large size of companies. Oligopoly suggests collusion, then as now. O n patrimonial bureaucracy, see particularly Max Weber, Economy and Society (New Y o r k , 1968) vol. 3, ioo6ff.

45

Conquerors

and slaves

b e i n g k e p t b e t w e e n t h e c o m p e t i n g interests o f nobles, t a x - f a r m e r s , c i t i z e n s o l d i e r s , c i t i z e n v o t e r s , a n d p r o v i n c i a l s . T h e increase i n t h e p r o f i t s a t t a i n a b l e u p s e t t h e balance, s h a r p e n e d t h e c o n f l i c t a n d t u r n e d t h e exercise o f c o n t r o l o v e r p r o f i t - m a k i n g i n t o a p o l i t i c a l f o o t b a l l . A t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e second c e n t u r y B C , t h e collective p o w e r o f t h e o l i g a r c h y was s t r o n g e n o u g h t o r e s t r a i n b o t h i n d i v i d u a l g o v e r n o r s a n d t a x - f a r m e r s , at least w i t h i n v e r y b r o a d b o u n d s . E v e n t h e n , h o w e v e r , t h e r e was a r e l u c t a n c e o n t h e p a r t o f s e n a t o r i a l j u d g e s t o p u n i s h f e l l o w senators f o r f a u l t s c o m m i t t e d against m e r e p r o v i n c i a l s ; c o n v i c t e d g o v e r n o r s w e r e a l l o w e d s i m p l y t o g o i n t o e x i l e t o a l l i e d t o w n s less t h a n 40 k m (25 miles) f r o m R o m e . C o n d o n a t i o n at h o m e l e d t o licence a b r o a d ; t h e senate p e r c e i v e d t h e p r o b l e m b u t was e i t h e r u n w i l l i n g o r u n a b l e t o d o a n y t h i n g t o c o n t r o l i t effectively. O n o n e occasion i n 167 B C , i t o r d e r e d s o m e v e r y p r o f i t a b l e m i n e s i n G r e e c e t o be closed, o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t w o r k i n g t h e m gave R o m a n t a x - f a r m e r s t o o m u c h o p p o r t u n i t y f o r o p p r e s s i o n , w h i l e h a n d i n g t h e m o v e r t o local c o n t r a c t o r s w o u l d n o t h a v e p r o d u c e d a n y b e t t e r results. T a x - f a r m e r s , t h e h i s t o r i a n L i v y c o m m e n t e d (45.18), d e p r i v e d e i t h e r t h e state o f its right o r p r o v i n c i a l s o f t h e i r l i b e r t y . B u t t h e w h o l e e m p i r e c o u l d h a r d l y be r u n w i t h s u c h o s t r i c h - l i k e tactics. 6 2

I n 123 B C , service o n t h e j u r y i n t h e c o u r t w h i c h t r i e d p r o v i n c i a l g o v e r n o r s f o r e x t o r t i o n was r e s t r i c t e d t o k n i g h t s , t o w h o s e r a n k s t h e wealthiest t a x - f a r m e r s b e l o n g e d . T h i s r e s t r i c t i o n has b e e n t a k e n b y b o t h R o m a n a n d m o d e r n w r i t e r s as a n i m p o r t a n t s y m p t o m o f a c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t b e t w e e n senators a n d k n i g h t s , w h i c h is a m a j o r t h e m e i n p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h o u t t h e last c e n t u r y o f t h e R e p u b l i c . C e r t a i n l y t h e r e s t r i c t i o n o f j u r y service t o k n i g h t s was consciously i n t e n d e d as a flamboyant p o l i t i c a l act (Gaius G r a c c h u s said t h a t h e h a d t h r o w n d a g g e r s i n t o t h e f o r u m ; C i c e r o , On Laws 3.20), at o n c e a n attack o n t h e senate a n d a n i d e n t i f y i n g focus f o r t h e s t r a t u m o f k n i g h t s . G r a c c h u s h a d g i v e n t h e state t w o heads ( V a r r o , f r a g . 114R) 63

Y e t t o o m u c h cart easly be m a d e o f t h i s c o n f l i c t ; i n a l l t h e serious p o l i t i c a l conflicts w h i c h f o l l o w e d , b o t h senators a n d k n i g h t s w e r e o n each side; m o r e k n i g h t s w e r e s i m p l y I t a l i a n l a n d - o w n e r s t h a n t a x f a r m e r s ; i n n o reasonable sense o f t h e t e r m was t h e c o n f l i c t a class conflict. Perhaps the c o n t r o l o f juries by knights can m o r e profitably be seen as a m e t h o d o f r e c o g n i s i n g t h e e n l a r g e m e n t o f t h e e l i t e O n this see B a d i a n (1972: 11-47); Livy 43.2. ** See the incisive review of £. B a d i a n , ' F r o m the G r a c c h i to Sulla', Historic 11 (1962) 203-9; the detailed, evocative, though heavily prosopographical history of £. G r u e n , Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts 149-78 BC ( H a r v a r d , 1968); a n d the brief suggestive chapter o n knights by C . Meier, ResPublicaAmissa (Wiesbaden, 1966)64-95. See also note 70 below. tt

46

T h e products of war involved i n p r o f i t i n g f r o m the provinces, a n d the accommodation o f t h a t e n l a r g e d elite w i t h i n t h e p o l i t i c a l system w h i l e p r e s e r v i n g e x e c u t i v e m o n o p o l y b y a senate o f o n l y t h r e e h u n d r e d m e m b e r s . T h i s v i e w seems c o r r o b o r a t e d b y t h e p r o m o t i o n o f m o r e t h a n t h r e e h u n d r e d k n i g h t s t o t h e senate i n 81 B C ; t h i s was a n o t h e r a t t e m p t t o solve t h e same p r o b l e m , w h i c h a v o i d e d a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d clash b e t w e e n elite social g r o u p s . T h a t said, t h e r e was a n i d e n t i f i a b l e t a x - f a r m i n g i n t e r e s t , c e n t r e d a m o n g w e a l t h y , p o l i t i c a l l y active k n i g h t s i n R o m e . T h e i r access t o a n d t e m p o r a r y m o n o p o l y o f juries w h i c h t r i e d senatorial governors f o r c o r r u p t i o n w e a k e n e d t h e g o v e r n o r s ' capacity t o supervise t h e c o r r u p t acdvities o f t a x - f a r m e r s . T h e n o t o r i o u s c o n v i c t i o n i n 92 B C o f R u t i l i u s , a n i n n o c e n t , i n d e e d r e p u t e d l y i n c o r r u p t i b l e a c t i n g - g o v e r n o r was m e r e l y o n e e x t r e m e case; its i m p o r t a n c e was symbolic, a w a r n i n g t o o t h e r g o v e r n o r s t o t r i m t h e i r sails. I n Cicero's c o r r e s p o n d e n c e f r o m his p r o v i n c e a n d i n his [?] b r o t h e r ' s p a m p h l e t o n e l e c t i o n e e r i n g , we can see t h a t t a x - f a r m e r s w e r e a f o r c e t o be r e c k o n e d w i t h . ' Y o u seem t o w a n t t o k n o w h o w I m a n a g e a b o u t t h e tax f a r m e r s . I d o t e u p o n t h e m , defer to t h e m , butter t h e m u p w i t h c o m p l i m e n t s . . . ' (Cicero, Letters to Atticus 6.1.6 - see n o t e 60). 6 4

T h e knights' d o m i n a t i o n o f the j u r y courts f o r m o r e than a generation c o n f i r m e d the power a n d wealth o f the t a x - f a r m i n g companies. T h e increased c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n aristocrats f o r office (after 81 B C ) ensured the continuance o f what h a d become a t r a d i t i o n ; senatorial a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a n d t a x - f a r m e r s c o l l u d e d i n g e t t i n g rich at t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e weakest p a r t y , t h e c o n q u e r e d p r o v i n c i a l s . I n s u m , w h i l e s e n a t o r i a l generals a n d g o v e r n o r s w o n battles, capt u r e d t o w n s , i m p o s e d taxes, d r e w expenses a n d dispensed ' j u s t i c e ' , R o m a n k n i g h t s collected taxes a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e charges, a m e n a b l y l e n t p r o v i n c i a l s m o n e y w i t h w h i c h t o pay t h e i r taxes, at a suitable rate o f i n t e r e s t (cf. P l u t a r c h , LucuUus 7ff.), a n d i n case o f n o n - p a y m e n t f o r e c l o s e d o n t h e m o r t g a g e s . I n t h i s way, a m o n g o t h e r s , R o m a n citizens became t h e o w n e r s o f l a r g e estates i n t h e p r o v i n c e s , a n d t h e c o n q u e r i n g elite o f t h e R o m a n s g r a d u a l l y a c q u i r e d w e a l t h c o m m e n surate w i t h t h e i r c o n q u e s t o f t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n b a s i n . 65

6 4

w

[?Q.] Cicero, Guide to Electioneering (Comm. Pet.) 3; G r u e n (1968: A p p e n d i x E ) listed 22 known cases brought before the extortion court between 119 a n d 91 BC; eleven cases resulted in acquittal; two of the convicted committed suicide. T h e evidence is probably very incomplete; yet what we know reveals neither outright persecution of senators by equestrian jurors nor condonation. After 70 BC juries were d r a w n from senators, knights, a n d the stratum just below the knights. T h e r e is little evidence of senatorial land-holdings overseas before the Principate. Senators were restricted from travelling abroad privately, a n d may have been forbidden explicidy from owning land outside Italy (Cicero, 2 Verrines 5.45); i n any case, it would have been difficult to be sure of getting stable revenues from estates

47

Conquerors T H E

FORMATION

and slaves

OF L A R G E

ESTATES

T h e p r o f i t s o f e m p i r e , w e r e t h e single m o s t i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r i n gradually b u i l d i n g u p the wealth o f the R o m a n elite. A large p o r t i o n o f t h e p r o f i t s t a k e n o u t o f t h e p r o v i n c e s was i n v e s t e d i n l a n d , especially i n I t a l i a n l a n d . Since t h e R o m a n u p p e r classes g o t m o s t o f t h e i r r e g u l a r i n c o m e f r o m l a n d , a g e n e r a l increase i n t h e i r w e a l t h was necessarily a c c o m p a n i e d b y t h e f o r m a t i o n o f l a r g e r estates. T h i s s t r o n g l i n k b e t w e e n ( i ) i m p e r i a l p r o f i t s , (2) t h e increased w e a l t h o f t h e elite a n d (3) t h e f o r m a t i o n o f l a r g e l a n d h o l d i n g s o f t e n seems o v e r s h a d o w e d b y t h e m o r e d r a m a t i c processes, w h i c h we discussed i n t h e last section: the violent acquisidon o f fortunes i n the provinces, t h e i r ostentatious d i s p l a y i n t h e city o f R o m e , a n d t h e m a n i p u l a t i o n o f f r e e f l o a t i n g cash b y financiers, l i k e Crassus a n d r i c h t a x - f a r m e r s . O f course, t h e t r a n s f e r o f m o n e y f r o m t h e p r o v i n c e s a n d its i n v e s t m e n t i n I t a l i a n l a n d was a g r a d u a l process; its gradualness m a y h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d t o its neglect. I n a n y o n e y e a r o r e v e n g e n e r a t i o n , t h e v o l u m e o f p r o f i t s b r o u g h t back f r o m t h e p r o v i n c e s was s m a l l e r t h a n t h e i n h e r i t e d stock o f c a p i t a l ; a n d o n c e t h e year's p r o f i t s w e r e i n v e s t e d , t h e y t o o became p a r t o f t h e c o m m o n capital. Thereafter, they were redistributed t h r o u g h the n o r m a l c h a n n e l s : d o w r y a n d i n h e r i t a n c e , s u p p l e m e n t e d by b a n k r u p t c y a n d c o n f i s c a t i o n . T h u s at a n y o n e t i m e , these n o r m a l channels f o r t h e t r a n s f e r o f p r o p e r t y seemed o f m o r e i m p o r t a n c e t o c o n t e m poraries t h a n provincial profits. T o be s u r e , a s i g n i f i c a n t p r o p o r t i o n o f b o o t y was s p e n t r a t h e r t h a n i n v e s t e d . W h e t h e r i n v e s t e d o r s p e n t , t h e m o n e y was passed o n t o s o m e o n e else. T h e same m o n e y c o u l d be u s e d t o p a y c r e d i t o r s , w h o m i g h t b u y l u x u r i e s w i t h i t ; t h e y , i n t u r n , m i g h t b u y l a n d f r o m peasants, w h o t h e n used t h e same m o n e y t o b u y clothes a n d f o o d . . . T h e c o n c e p t *the m u l t i p l i e r effect o f m o n e y ' r e f e r s t o s u c h sequences. T h e h i g h cost o f m a i n t a i n i n g status b y o s t e n t a t i o u s e x p e n d i t u r e a n d o f s e c u r i n g e l e c t i o n t o p u b l i c office w e r e i m p o r t a n t factors u n d e r l y i n g p r o f i t e e r i n g i n t h e p r o v i n c e s . N o b l e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e first c e n t u r y B C , c o m m o n l y i n c u r r e d debts i n t h e h o p e o f p a y i n g t h e m o f f a f t e r w a r d s w i t h w h a t t h e y m a d e o u t o f p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c e . Retainers as w e l l as 66

m

abroad which could not be personally supervised. T h i s may partly explain the concentration of senatorial estates i n central Italy. Knights d i d own estates abroad d u r i n g the Republic a n d clearly spent some time in residence there. See E . Rawson, ' T h e Ciceronian aristocracy a n d its properties\ in M . I . Finley ed. Studies in Roman Property (Cambridge, 1976) &$tt. F o r a discussion of debt, see M . W . F r e d e r i k s e n , Caesar, Cicero a n d the problem of debt', JRS 56 (1966) especially 128-3,0; Cicero (Catiline 2.18; Offices 2.78!!.) m e n tioned a category of rich m e n , heavily in debt. F o r Pompey, see Pliny, Natural History 37.16 a n d ESAR vol. 1, 325. 4

48

The formation of large estates c r e d i t o r s h a d t o be p a i d . P o m p e y , i n 61 B C , f o r e x a m p l e , p r o b a b l y gave each o f his l i e u t e n a n t s o n e m i l l i o n H S (c. 2,000 t o n s w h e a t e q u i v a l e n t ) . H u g e sums w e r e lavished o n p r e s t i g i o u s displays, silver p l a t e , m a r b l e statues a n d o t h e r objets a"art. O n e i n d i c a t i o n o f i n c r e a s i n g w e a l t h is t h a t t h e f i n e s t t o w n h o u s e i n t h e c i t y o f R o m e i n 78 B C was said n o t t o have been even i n the t o p h u n d r e d a generation later (Pliny, Natural History 36.109). T h e senate t r i e d t o p r e s e r v e t r a d i t i o n a l s i m p l i c i t y ( a n d so t o r e s t r i c t c o m p e t i t i o n f r o m r i c h arrivistes) by a w h o l e succession o f laws r e s t r i c t i n g c o n s u m p t i o n , f o r e x a m p l e , at feasts a n d f u n e r a l s ; b u t i n v a i n . Senators a n d l e a d i n g k n i g h t s m a i n t a i n e d e l a b o r a t e h o u s e h o l d s staffed w i t h h u n d r e d s o f slaves, i n c l u d i n g cooks, scribes, l i b r a r i a n s , d o c t o r s , name-callers, at o n c e a m a r k o f t h e i r c u l t u r e , a n d o f a n e x t r a v a g a n c e w h i c h e n h a n c e d t h e i r status. 67

T h i s e x p e n d i t u r e o f p r o v i n c i a l p r o f i t s i n t h e city o f R o m e p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n c e r n s us h e r e because i t c o n s i d e r a b l y e x p a n d e d t h e m a r k e t f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c e . N o b l e s k e p t a n d f e d slaves, b u i l t palaces, c o m m a n d e d services a n d s p e n t m o n e y w h i c h b y its m u l t i p l i e r effects gave lots o f p e o p l e e n o u g h m o n e y t o b u y f o o d . W i t h o u t this e x p a n s i o n o f the city p o p u l a t i o n a n d m a r k e t , a n d a similar expansion i n other I t a l i a n t o w n s , i n v e s t m e n t b y nobles i n I t a l i a n a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d w o u l d h a v e b e e n useless. A s i n m o s t o t h e r p r e - i n d u s t r i a l societies, l a n d - o w n e r s h i p was t h e b e d r o c k o f w e a l t h . G e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , b o t h senators a n d k n i g h t s derived t h e b u l k o f t h e i r i n c o m e s f r o m l a n d . T h e r i c h e r t h e y became, therefore, the larger their land-holdings. B u t good agricultural land i n c e n t r a l a n d s o u t h e r n I t a l y was a l r e a d y c u l t i v a t e d , m u c h o f i t by f r e e peasants. T h e f o r m a t i o n o f l a r g e l a n d - h o l d i n g s i n e v i t a b l y i n v o l v e d t h e i r e x p r o p r i a t i o n a n d e x p u l s i o n . T h e process was g r a d u a l , a n d estates w e r e e n l a r g e d piecemeal, as a n d w h e n o p p o r t u n i t y o f f e r e d . T h i s p a r t l y e x p l a i n s w h y l a r g e l a n d - h o l d i n g s i n I t a l y d u r i n g t h e late R e p u b l i c t y p i c a l l y c o m p r i s e d several scattered estates. T h i s f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f l a n d - h o l d i n g s was p o l i t i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t i n t h a t i t by a n d l a r g e p r e c l u d e d R o m a n aristocrats, u n l i k e E u r o p e a n f e u d a l l o r d s , f r o m basing t h e i r power o n tlie c o n t r o l o f a particular t e r r i t o r y . 6 8

Levels of ostentatious expenditure rose considerably after Rome's conquest of the eastern Mediterranean (see Pliny, Natural History 33 passim, but especially 138ff.). O n sumptuary laws, see for example, A u l u s Gellius, Attic Nights 2.24 a n d I . Sauerwein, Die Leges Sumptuariae (Diss. H a m b u r g , 1970). ** O f course, R o m a n aristocrats had local political connections a n d clients. I n 83 BC, Pompey recruited troops i n Picenum 'because of his father's reputation there* (Appian, Civil Wars 1.80), but his support there melted away in the civil war against Julius Caesar in 49 BC. See also Caesar, Civil Wan 1.34 a n d 56, a n d M . Gclzer, The Roman Nobility (Oxford, 1969) 9 3 L O t h e r political connections were m u c h more important. 9 7

49

Conquerors

and slaves

L a n d was t h e m a i n source o f w e a l t h , a n d w e a l t h was a m a i n s p r i n g o f p o l i t i c a l p o w e r . T h e t r o u b l e was t h a t t h e r i c h a n d p o o r w e r e c o m p e t i n g a m o n g themselves a n d w i t h each o t h e r f o r a s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d resource. Conflict over the ownership o f l a n d i n Italy constituted a m a j o r axis o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y t h r o u g h o u t t h e last t w o c e n t u r i e s o f t h e R e p u b l i c . T h e c o n f l i c t was e x p r e s s e d , f o r e x a m p l e , i n laws l i m i t i n g t h e e x t e n t o f p u b l i c l a n d w h i c h a c i t i z e n c o u l d h o l d , i n mass confiscations o f p r o p e r t y a n d its r e d i s t r i b u t i o n t o soldiers a n d o t h e r citizens, a n d i n t h e i n d u c e d m i g r a t i o n o f citizens away f r o m t h e i r h o m e s t o d i s t a n t a n d less p o p u l a t e d p a r t s o f I t a l y . A s we h a v e seen, t h e c h a n g i n g p a t t e r n o f l a n d - o w n e r s h i p l e d t o t h e mass i m p o r t a t i o n o f slaves a n d to the emigration o f the free poor f r o m the land to the a r m y and to t h e city o f R o m e . T h e r e s u l t i n g e v o l u t i o n o f a p r o f e s s i o n a l a r m y ( o r p e r h a p s m o r e accurately, a c o r e o f long-service soldiers) a n d o f a n u r b a n p r o l e t a r i a t u p s e t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l balance o f p o w e r a n d c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e chaos o f t h e last decades o f t h e R e p u b l i c . T h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e c o n f l i c t o v e r l a n d is i n t e r e s t i n g : t h e e m i g r a t i o n o f several h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d citizens t o t h e p r o v i n c e s , o r g a n i s e d by J u l i u s Caesar a n d Augustus, relieved the pressure o f the p o o r o n Italian l a n d ; c o m p l e m e n t a r i l y , t h e a d v e n t o f peace a n d t h e i n t e g r a t i o n o f t h e e m p i r e u n d e r t h e stable a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e e m p e r o r s e n a b l e d t h e Italian r i c h increasingly to o w n l a n d i n , a n d transfer rents f r o m the p r o v i n c e s (see n o t e 65). A s u s u a l , t h e e v i d e n c e f o r m a n y o f these assertions is b o t h f r a g m e n t a r y a n d d i s p u t e d . B u t t h e m a i n o u d i n e s seem clear e n o u g h . F o r e x a m p l e , w e have n o d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n o n senators' o r k n i g h t s ' incomes, o n the relative i m p o r t a n c e o f a g r i c u l t u r a l a n d u r b a n rents, o f i n c o m e f r o m loans o r t a x - f a r m i n g , c o m m e r c e a n d m a n u f a c t u r e . B u t i t is r e v e a l i n g t h a t a n c i e n t a u t h o r s s i m p l y a s s u m e d t h a t r i c h m e n w e r e l a n d - o w n e r s , t h a t l a n d was t h e i r p r i m e s o u r c e o f w e a l t h . C i c e r o f o r e x a m p l e , i n a p h i l o s o p h i c a l discussion o f t h e v e r y r i c h a n d t h e c o m f o r t a b l y r i c h m a n n o t e d t h a t ' h e takes 600,000 H S f r o m his f a r m s , I t a k e 100,000 H S f r o m m i n e ' (Paradoxes of the Stoics 49). T h e m i n i m u m census q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r senators a n d k n i g h t s (1 m i l l i o n a n d 400,000 H S respectively) was e x p r e s s e d i n v a l u e o f p r o p e r t y , m o s t l y l a n d e d p r o p e r t y , a n d n o t i n t e r m s o f i n c o m e . J u l i u s Caesar's a n d t h e e m p e r o r T i b e r i u s ' laws o n d e b t p r e s u p p o s e d t h a t large-scale d e b t o r s h a d g i v e n l a n d as security, a n d seem t o h a v e r e q u i r e d c r e d i t o r s t o invest t w o t h i r d s o f r a p i d loans i n I t a l i a n l a n d . T w o c o m m o n w o r d s f o r w e a l t h y (locuples, possessor) both i m p l y the ownership of l a n d . Even the poli6 9

*

O n laws of debt, see T a d t u s , Annals 6.17; Suetonius, Tiberius 48; a n d Frederiksen (1966) 134!!. T h e word possessor originally, a n d apparently still in the time of Cicero, referred to someone who held public land without full tide (on this see C . Nicolet,

5°

The formation of large estates tically p o w e r f u l m i n o r i t y o f k n i g h t s w h o specialised i n t a x - f a r m i n g p r o b a b l y o p e r a t e d f r o m a basis o f l a n d - o w n i n g . T h i s is i m p l i e d by t h e fact t h a t t h e y w e r e r e q u i r e d t o give l a n d as security f o r t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e i r c o n t r a c t s (see n o t e 58). I t f o l l o w s a fortiori t h a t lesser k n i g h t s , locally p o w e r f u l i n t h e i r I t a l i a n h o m e t o w n s , w e r e p r i m a r i l y l a n d - o w n e r s ; i n d e e d C i c e r o r e f e r r e d t o t h e m several t i m e s collectively as f a r m e r s , c o u n t r y m e n (agricolae, rusticani). Besides, i t seems o b v i o u s t h a t i n a p r e d o m i n a n t l y a g r a r i a n society, w i t h o u t a sophisticated a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s u p e r s t r u c t u r e , l a n d w o u l d be t h e m a j o r source o f w e a l t h . E v e n i f a m a n m a d e a l o t o f m o n e y i n some o t h e r way, he w o u l d achieve b o t h h i g h status a n d s e c u r i t y by i n v e s t i n g i t i n l a n d ( C i c e r o , On Duties 1.151). 70

T h e prevalence of l a n d - o w n i n g a m o n g the R o m a n rich d i d not m e a n t h a t senators a n d k n i g h t s g o t t h e i r i n c o m e o n l y f r o m l a n d . L a n d - o w n e r s h i p was c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e p u r s u i t o f o t h e r f i n a n c i a l interests. I n t h e m o d e r n w o r l d , t h e specialisation o f o c c u p a t i o n s t e m p t s us t o t h i n k o f l a n d - o w n e r s , b a n k e r s , f i n a n c i e r s , tax-officials a n d b u s i n e s s m e n as d i f f e r e n t p e o p l e . I n R o m e , t h e y w e r e o f t e n t h e same p e o p l e . I t was c o m m o n f o r l a r g e l a n d - o w n e r s , f o r e x a m p l e , n o t t o r e n t o u t all t h e i r l a n d t o f r e e t e n a n t s , b u t t o e x p l o i t some o f i t d i r e c t l y . T y p i c a l l y , a slave m a n a g e r (vilicus) was p u t i n c h a r g e o f t h e day-to-day r u n n i n g o f a r i c h man's f a r m . B u t i t seems p r o b a b l e t h a t m a n y r i c h m e n , e v e n nobles, t o o k a d i r e c t a n d lively i n t e r e s t i n t h e sale o f s u r p l u s p r o d u c e f r o m t h e i r estates, t h o u g h e x p l i c i t e v i d e n c e o n this is scarce. S i m i l a r l y i t seems p r o b a b l e t h a t m a n y r i c h m e n , e v e n nobles, set u p t h e i r slaves a n d ex-slaves i n business, p r o v i d i n g t h e m w i t h 71

70

7 1

L'ordre équestre à l'époque républicaine (Paris, 1966) 301). O n locuples, see Cicero, de republica 2.16; A u l u s Gellius, Attic Nights 10.5. T h e prevalence of land in the estates of the rich persisted. T h e emperor T r a j a n ordered senators to have one third of their fortunes in Italian land; Olympiodorus (frag. 44) tells us that in the fourth century wealthy senators got one quarter of their incomes in the form of farm pro duce, the rest from rents. B y a swing in intellectual fashion this view of the knights has become widely accepted: the pioneering essays were: P. A . B r u n t , ' T h e Equités in the Late Republic*, Second International Conference of Economic History ig6a (Paris, 1965) vol. 1, especially i22ff. a n d Nicolet (1966: 28sff.); see also Meier (1966: 64ff.). T h e previous view that knights were primarily a class of businessmen was over-modernising. Nobility does not preclude concern with money; see the very interesting study of the fortunes of English aristocrats by L . Stone, Family and Fortune (Oxford, 1973). W e have no such information about R o m a n nobles; some like Cato, V a r r o a n d Pliny obviously cared about their estates. Epictetus (Discourses 1.10) says that the conversation of non-philosophers presumably in court circles turned on accounts, land prices and wheat prices. Senators' names survive on wine-jars a n d bricks, presumably made on their estates (ESAR vol. 1, 355 a n d 5, 2 0 8 - 9 ) ; such labels are indices of involvement but not of close care. I n brief, we don't know how m u c h the predominant culture induced aristocrats typically to care for or ignore their sources of income.

5*

Conquerors

and slaves

c a p i t a l a n d i n o n e w a y o r a n o t h e r t a k i n g a share o f t h e i r p r o f i t s . T h i s is o n e f a c t o r w h i c h w o u l d h e l p t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e d o m i n a n c e o f ex-slaves i n t h e c o m m e r c i a l l i f e o f R o m e a n d o t h e r I t a l i a n cities (see C h a p t e r I I ) . B u t i t is o n l y a c o n j e c t u r e ; we h a v e n o t e s t i m o n y o n h o w closely, o r w h e t h e r slave-owners s u p e r v i s e d such business activities. T h e i n v o l v e m e n t o f senators i n t r a d e o r c o m m e r c e o f a n y s o r t has o f t e n b e e n d e n i e d , a n d i n s u p p o r t o f t h i s v i e w m u c h is usually m a d e o f a law passed i n 218 B C f o r b i d d i n g senators t h e r i g h t t o o w n l a r g e ships. T h e y w e r e a l l o w e d t o o w n s m a l l ships, o f u n d e r seven t o n n e s b u r d e n ' e n o u g h t o c a r r y c r o p s f r o m t h e f a r m s . A l l p r o f i t m a k i n g was t h o u g h t d e m e a n i n g f o r s e n a t o r s ' ( L i v y 21.63). B u t we k n o w t h a t b y 70 B C t h i s law was a d e a d l e t t e r , a n d t h a t b y t h e n senators w e r e d e e p l y i n v o l v e d i n l o a n finance, e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r t h r o u g h agents. T h e y o u n g n o b l e B r u t u s , f o r e x a m p l e , l e n t m o n e y t o a t o w n i n C y p r u s at f o u r p e r c e n t m o n t h l y c o m p o u n d i n t e r e s t a n d g o t t h e senate t o pass a special d e c r e e e x e m p t i n g his l o a n f r o m n o r m a l r e g u l a t i o n s l i m i t i n g i n t e r e s t rates. M . Crassus h a d q u i t e o p e n l y b u i l t u p his f o r t u n e p a r t l y by speculation i n m e t r o p o l i t a n p r o p e r t y . 7 2

I d e a l l y , nobles w e r e n o t e x p e c t e d t o be i n t e r e s t e d i n p r o f i t - m a k i n g ; we find s i m i l a r ideals i n o t h e r p r e - i n d u s t r i a l ' h i g h c u l t u r e s ' . B u t t h e i d e a l was b o t h h o n o u r e d a n d v i o l a t e d ; i n d e e d m a n y ideals exist because t h e y are g e n e r a l l y n o t a c h i e v e d . I r o n i c a l l y , C i c e r o a p p r o v e d o f t r a d e , p r o v i d e d i t was o n a l a r g e scale; o n l y s m a l l scale t r a d e seemed d e m e a n i n g t o h i m ( O n Duties 1.151). Probably a t t i t u d e s h a d c h a n g e d i n t h e c o u r s e o f R o m e ' s e x p a n s i o n . Senators c o u l d be b a r r e d f r o m p r o f i t - m a k i n g by l a w i n 218 B C because i t was r e l a t i v e l y u n i m p o r t a n t . W h e n banking, loan-financing and commerce grew i n importance, I suspect t h a t senators p a r t i c i p a t e d , e v e n i n v i o l a t i o n o f t r a d i t i o n a l values. B u t c o m m e r c e a n d finance w e r e o n l y t h e c r e a m o n t h e cake, n o t t h e cake itself. W e h a v e n o R o m a n figures, b u t estimates f r o m E n g l a n d i n 1801 are suggestive. T h e average i n c o m e o f t h e t o p t w o t h o u s a n d m e r c h a n t s a n d b a n k e r s was o n l y 2,600 p o u n d s s t e r l i n g p e r year, c o m p a r e d w i t h 8,000 p o u n d s s t e r l i n g p e r y e a r f o r t h e t o p g r o u p o f l a n d o w n e r s , a n d 3,000 p o u n d s s t e r l i n g p e r y e a r f o r t h e u p p e r g e n t r y . B y t h a t time E n g l a n d was m u c h m o r e i n d u s t r i a l i s e d a n d c o m m e r c i a l l y 7 3

n

7 3

Plutarch, Crassus 2; on Brutus, sec n n . 55 a n d 56 above; Cicero (Verrines 5.45) said that the law on ship-owning by senators was ineffectual, but it survived in a law of Julius Caesar - see the L e i d e n fragment of Paul's Sentential (edd. G . G . A r c h i et al. L e i d e n , 1956). G . Mingay, English Landed Society in the Eighteenth Century ( L o n d o n , 1963) 21 (cf. 26). T h e number of land-owners discussed was smaller (400+750), but their aggregate wealth was greater than the merchants' a n d bankers'.

52

The formation of large estates sophisticated t h a n R o m e ever became. T h e r a d o o f a g r a r i a n t o n o n - a g r a r i a n incomes i n R o m e , e v e n i n t h e e x c e p t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e R e p u b l i c , was a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y h i g h e r . T h e h i g h status o f l a r g e l a n d - o w n e r s was e n h a n c e d b y t h e i r h u g e w e a l t h (nihil dukius agriculture).

E v e n i f R o m a n l a n d - o w n e r s h a d w a n t e d t o invest i n business, t h e y faced o n e d i f f i c u l t y w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e d a serious obstacle t o e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . T h e R o m a n s n e v e r e v o l v e d a legal f o r m f o r c o m m e r c i a l o r m a n u f a c t u r i n g e n t e r p r i s e s s i m i l a r t o o u r j o i n t stock c o m p a n y , w h i c h h a d t h e a d v a n t a g e o f l i m i t i n g investors' l i a b i l i t y , a n d o f p r e s e r v i n g t h e business as a u n i t b e y o n d t h e d e a t h o f its o w n e r . I t was o n l y i n t h e spheres o f t a x - f a r m i n g a n d m i n i n g t h a t t h e R o m a n s devised a c o r p o r a t i o n (societas). T h e right t o collect taxes i n each p r o v i n c e was a u c t i o n e d every five years; t h e sums a n d t h e r i s k i n v o l v e d w e n t b e y o n d t h e scope o f i n d i v i d u a l f o r t u n e s . T o solve t h i s , t a x - f a r m i n g c o r p o r a t i o n s w e r e set u p w h i c h t o o k i n i n v e s t m e n t s a n d guarantees f r o m n u m e r o u s i n d i v i d u a l s . E a c h c o r p o r a t i o n existed as a j u r i d i c a l e n t i t y , b u t was m u c h m o r e l i a b l e t o d i s s o j u t i i o n t h a n m o d e r n c o r porations. I n d e e d the death o r withdrawal of the president (manceps) was a p p a r e n d y sufficient i n s o m e circumstances t o necessitate d i s s o l u t i o n . I n v e s t m e n t i n t a x - f a r m i n g t h u s d e p e n d e d o n success i n p e r i o d i c a u c t i o n s , a n d m i g h t be i n t e r m i t t e n t as w e l l as s h o r t - t e r m . Perhaps t h e system w o r k e d , o n l y because R o m a n t a x - f a r m e r s , as we h a v e seen, w o r k e d f r o m t h e m o r e stable base o f l a n d - o w n i n g . T h e organisation a n d aggregated capital o f tax-farmers were never applied to trade a n d manufacture; they r e m a i n e d very fragmented, d o m i n a t e d by s m a l l , s i n g l e - f a m i l y businesses. T h e largest h a d slaveworkers, b u t typically e m p l o y e d far fewer m e n t h a n large agricultural estates (latifundia);™ besides, t h e r e was i n t r a d e a n d i n d u s t r y n o e q u i v a l e n t o v e r l o r d i n s t i t u t i o n such as tenancy, w h i c h a l l o w e d t h e large-scale, c o o r d i n a t e d e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t h e p o o r b y a single rich m a n . P e r h a p s a f e w f o r t u n e s m a y have b e e n m a d e i n t r a d e , b u t n o t m a n y a n d not large fortunes. Traders, u n l i k e tax-farmers, d i d not constitute a g r o u p w h i c h [?] Q . C i c e r o t h o u g h t w o r t h c o u r t i n g i n elections; w h i l e i n m u c h later times, the fortunes o f prosperous merchants i n the 74

7 4

7 8

C f . B a d i a n (1972: 67-81); G . Urdgdi, sv Publicani in RE, Suppl. x i , col. 1184!!. I think the largest factory we know of i n the ancient world was i n Athens in the fourth century BC - a shield-factory with nearly 120 m e n (Lysias 12.19). & contrast, Pliny's estate i n U m b r i a , would have employed several h u n d r e d m e n , i n different tenandes. T h e important texts are Pliny, Letters 10.8; 3.19; Columella, On Agriculture 2.12. F o r a detailed discussion, see R . P. Duncan-Jones, The Economy of the Roman Empire (Cambridge, 1974) 19-20,48-9; I agree broadly with his conclusions, but his calculations d e p e n d too m u c h o n fixed assumptions. v

53

Conquerors

and slaves

empire's chief t r a d i n g city, A l e x a n d r i a , were perhaps only a fraction o f those o f l a r g e l a n d - o w n e r s . I t was t h e s h o r t a g e o f a l t e r n a t i v e i n v e s t m e n t s a n d t h e h i g h status o f l a n d - o w n i n g w h i c h above a l l i n d u c e d m e n t o invest c a p i t a l i n l a n d . A m o n g senators t h e r e was a n a d d i t i o n a l pressure. T h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r o f i t h u g e l y f r o m e m p i r e o c c u r r e d i n f r e q u e n t i y . M a n y senators h a d o n l y o n e o r t w o chances i n a l i f e - t i m e t o h o l d g o v e r n m e n t posts i n t h e p r o v i n c e s , a n d t h a t i n a j u n i o r capacity (as quaestor o r as g o v e r n o r ' s a i d e - legatus). A more favoured group, which varied f r o m t w o t o t h r e e fifths o f those w h o e n t e r e d t h e senate, w e r e elected t o t h e office o f praetor a n d so became e l i g i b l e f o r a p p o i n t m e n t as p r o v i n c i a l g o v e r n o r . I n t h e o r y , each official h a d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o g o v e r n a p r o v i n c e f o r o n e year, since t h e R o m a n s f o r l o n g p e r i o d s k e p t a balance b e t w e e n t h e n u m b e r o f p r o v i n c e s a n d t h e n u m b e r o f s e n i o r elected officials ( p r a e t o r s a n d c o n s u l s ) . I n fact, t h e r e w e r e o f t e n lags a n d shortages, especially at t h e v e r y e n d o f t h e R e p u b l i c , so t h a t s o m e officials l i k e V e r r e s o r Cicero's b r o t h e r , f o r e x a m p l e , g o v e r n e d a p r o v i n c e f o r t h r e e years, w h i l e o t h e r s , a l t h o u g h e l i g i b l e , n e v e r g o v e r n e d a p r o v i n c e at a l l . W e show i n C h a p t e r i o f V o l u m e T w o o f this w o r k that only a n extremely small n u m b e r o f leading f a m i l i e s s e c u r e d access t o h i g h office f o r o n e o f t h e i r sons i n each g e n e r a t i o n ; f o r e x a m p l e , o n l y f o u r p e r c e n t o f consuls 249-50 B C ( N = 364) c a m e f r o m f a m i l i e s w i t h consuls i n six successive g e n e r a t i o n s ; c o m p l e m e n t a r i l y , o v e r a q u a r t e r o f t h e consuls c a m e f r o m f a m i l i e s w i t h o n l y o n e c o n s u l i n t w o c e n t u r i e s . T h e b u l k o f senators, t h e r e f o r e , c o u l d n o t be sure t h a t e i t h e r t h e y o r t h e i r sons w o u l d have a n o t h e r o p p o r t u n i t y t o m a k e m o n e y o u t o f h i g h office. T h e senators w h o w e r e successful t h e r e f o r e f e l t c o n s t r a i n e d t o m a k e t h e i r p i l e a n d invest i t i n l a n d . I t m i g h t have t o s u p p o r t t h e f a m i l y f o r g e n e r a t i o n s . W e h a v e n o exact e v i d e n c e o n t h e increased size o f r i c h m e n ' s l a n d - h o l d i n g s . Pliny's f a m o u s r e m a r k t h a t * l a r g e estates r u i n e d I t a l y ' (Natural History 18.35) is as m u c h m o r a l j u d g e m e n t as fact, dates f r o m the mid-first century A D , a n d may m a r k the c u l m i n a t i o n of a l o n g process. A c q u i s i t i o n a n d a g g r e g a t i o n o f estates h a d p r o b a b l y b e e n g o i n g o n f o r c e n t u r i e s , as t h e c e n t r a l R o m a n e l i t e s t r e n g t h e n e d its h o l d o v e r t h e t e r r i t o r i e s o f I t a l i a n t o w n s a n d t r i b e s , w h e n t h e y became p o l i t i c a l l y assimilated t o R o m e . W e h a v e o n l y v e r y g e n e r a l i n d i c a t i o n s 76

77

7 6

7 7

[?Q«] Cicero, Guide to Electioneering (Comm. Pet.). O n Alexandrian trade, see Jones (1964: 870-1); the evidence which Jones cites comes mosdy from the sixth century A D ; it is the only such evidence we have, a n d his conclusions are often referred to. Unfortunately, the testimony cited hardly authenticates Jones' conclusion. Never theless he may well be right. See also Jones (1974: 35ff.). F . B . Marsh, The Founding of the Roman Empire (Oxford, 1927), 2ff.

54

The formation of large estates f r o m t h e late R e p u b l i c ; b u t we c a n r i s k some estimates. F i r s t , i f t h e m o d e r n c o n v e n t i o n a l estimates o f t h e n u m b e r o f slaves i n I t a l y are a n y w h e r e n e a r r i g h t , t h e n by t h e m i d - f i r s t c e n t u r y B C t h e r e m u s t have b e n o v e r a m i l l i o n a g r i c u l t u r a l slaves i n I t a l y . T h e slave r e b e l l i o n s i n Sicily a n d I t a l y (135, 104 a n d 73 B C ) , each o f w h i c h a t t r a c t e d tens o f t h o u s a n d s o f r e b e l slaves, c o r r o b o r a t e t h i s view. Secondly, t h e w r i t e r s o n a g r i c u l t u r e whose w o r k s s u r v i v e : C a t o , V a r r o a n d C o l u m e l l a , a l l assumed t h a t slaves w o u l d f o r m t h e m a i n w o r k f o r c e o n t h e i r o w n a n d t h e i r r e a d e r s ' estates. C a t o d e s c r i b e d t w o f a r m s as e x a m p l e s , o n e w i t h t h i r t e e n , t h e o t h e r w i t h fifteen slaves ( V a r r o , On Agriculture 1.18). E i t h e r figure i m p l i e s slave-farms several t i m e s l a r g e r t h a n a singlef a m i l y peasant f a r m . T h i r d l y , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a specialist l i t e r a t u r e o n a g r i c u l t u r e is itself a n i n d i c a t i o n o f a n increase i n e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l , o r even * c a p i talistic' a g r i c u l t u r e . I t s b e g i n n i n g s a p p a r e n t l y d a t e back t o t h e official t r a n s l a t i o n o f a C a r t h a g i n i a n treatise, c o m m i s s i o n e d by t h e senate s h o r d y a f t e r Rome's v i c t o r y o v e r C a r t h a g e (202 B C ) . C a t o , V a r r o a n d C o l u m e l l a a r e o n l y t h e s u r v i v i n g t i p o f a v a n i s h e d i c e b e r g ; we k n o w o n l y isolated facts a b o u t o t h e r w r i t e r s o n a g r i c u l t u r e ; C i c e r o , f o r e x a m p l e , t r a n s l a t e d X e n o p h o n ' s treatise Economicus, A Discussion on Estate Management i n t o L a t i n . T h e r e is a m a r k e d d e v e l o p m e n t i n s o p h i s t i c a t i o n f r o m C a t o t h r o u g h V a r r o t o C o l u m e l l a , a n d i t is t e m p t i n g t o t h i n k t h a t t h i s was a r e f l e c t i o n o f a g e n e r a l advance i n k n o w l e d g e . T h a t said, a b r i e f r e a d i n g o f e a r l y n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y E n g l i s h a g r i c u l t u r e h a n d b o o k s shows h o w b a c k w a r d R o m a n a g r i c u l t u r a l w r i t e r s w e r e , especially i n t h e i r capacity t o d e t e r m i n e t h e relative profitability o f crops. 78

F i n a l l y , i f R o m a n nobles' a n d k n i g h t s ' i n c o m e s c a m e i n l a r g e measure f r o m r e n t s , o r f r o m t h e d i r e c t e x p l o i t a t i o n o f l a n d , t h e n t h e areas o f g o o d l a n d w h i c h a r i c h m a n c o n t r o l l e d m u s t have been l a r g e . F i g u r e s are d i f f i c u l t t o a r r i v e at, a n d d e p e n d o n several debatable a s s u m p t i o n s ; besides, t h e r e m u s t h a v e been v e r y c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f e r ences a c c o r d i n g t o t h e f e r t i l i t y a n d l o c a t i o n o f t h e f a r m , t h e t y p e o f c r o p , t o say n o t h i n g o f a n n u a l fluctuations i n t h e size o f t h e harvest a n d i n p r i c e . I n spite o f a l l these d i f f i c u l t i e s , a single e x a m p l e m a y be suggestive. I f , o n average, R o m a n senators g o t o n l y 60,000 H S a year f r o m a g r i c u l t u r a l r e n t s (this is l o w ; i t was o n l y t e n p e r c e n t o f Cicero's v e r y r i c h man's i n c o m e ) , a n d i f r e n t s e q u a l l e d t h i r t y p e r cent o f t h e n

F o r ancient agricultural writers, the most recent a n d very full discussion is by White (1970). It is in my view often apologistic a n d so should be read with some scepticism. Examples of eighteenth- a n d nineteenth-century English agricultural writings can be found i n A . Young's periodical, Annab of Agriculture 1784-1815.

55

Conquerors

and slaves

gross c r o p ( w h i c h is h i g h ) , t h e n at a c o n v e n t i o n a l p r i c e f o r w h e a t , i t w o r k s o u t t h a t 600 senators t o g e t h e r o w n e d l a n d sufficient t o m a i n t a i n 200,000 peasant f a m i l i e s (i.e. 800,000 m e n , w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n ) at t h e level o f m i n i m u m subsistence. T h i s was a f i f t h , at least, o f Italy's f r e e peasant p o p u l a t i o n . O n e can p l a y a r o u n d w i t h such f i g u r e s , b u t t h e y serve t o give r o u g h o r d e r s o f m a g n i t u d e . W h e t h e r d o u b l e d o r h a l v e d , t h e y show b e y o n d reasonable d o u b t t h a t t h e increased l a n d e d w e a l t h o f t h e senate ( t o say n o t h i n g t o t h e equites) was b o u g h t at t h e cost o f a h u g e d i s p l a c e m e n t o f peasants. 7 9

L A N D

IN

POLITICS

T h e c r e a t i o n o f l a r g e estates i n I t a l y c o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h t h e w e a l t h , p o w e r a n d ostentation o f the R o m a n elite, * conquerors o f the w o r l d ' , r e q u i r e d t h e mass e x t r u s i o n o f I t a l i a n peasants f r o m t h e i r l a n d . W e n e e d t o e x a m i n e t h e process o f t h e i r dispossession a n d its p o l i t i c a l consequences. F o r a l o n g t i m e t h e e v a c u a t i o n was k e p t w i t h i n o r d e r l y channels: t h e p o o r sold o u t a n d e m i g r a t e d t o colonies established b y t h e state i n I t a l y o r w e n t by themselves t o t h e c i t y o f R o m e . W a r s w e r e o n e o f t h e p r i m e agents o f c h a n g e ; as we h a v e seen, t h e y k e p t o n average 130,000 I t a l i a n soldiers o f f t h e l a n d . B u t t h a t was n o t a l l . H a n n i b a l ' s i n v a s i o n o f I t a l y h a d sent t h o u s a n d s o f peasants s c u r r y i n g f o r t h e p r o t e c t i v e walls o f R o m e . T h e i r f a r m s a n d catde w e r e d e s t r o y e d . W h e n H a n n i b a l h a d r e t r e a t e d , t h e consuls w e r e i n s t r u c t e d b y t h e senate t o h e l p r e l u c t a n t peasants back t o t h e i r d e s e r t e d f a r m s ( L i v y 28.11). T w o years a f t e r t h e w a r was o v e r , i n 200 B C , a l o t o f I t a l i a n l a n d was u p f o r sale ( L i v y 31.13, cf. 25.36); m e n o f h i g h social s t a n d i n g , w h o i n time o f crisis h a d l e n t m o n e y t o t h e state, d e m a n d e d t h a t t h e i r loans be r e p a i d so t h a t t h e y c o u l d t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f t h e m a r k e t . T h e g o v e r n m e n t was u n a b l e t o pay i n cash because i t was f i n a n c i n g o t h e r wars; i n s t e a d i t gave its c r e d i t o r s l a r g e tracts o f state l a n d at p e p p e r c o r n r e n t s . T h e c i v i l wars a n d j u d i c i a l confiscations o f t h e first c e n t u r y B C gave s i m i l a r o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r t h e s u r v i v i n g r i c h t o a c c u m u l a t e l a r g e estates. 1

80

7 9

8 0

T h e values used here are: prices of wheat 3 H S per modius of 6.5 kg; yield 5 dmes seed; a m i n i m u m subsistence for a n average family of four persons of 1,000 k g wheat equivalent per year. So [600 (senators)x60,000 H S (income)/3 ( H S price per modius wheat)] x [100/30 (gross product as a proportion of rent) x 6.5/1,250 (kg per modius/ gross family consumption in kg wheat equivalent = 1,000 kg net of seed)] = 208,000 families who could live off aristocrats' land as discussed. I f you do not agree with these values, please consider the implication of changing each of them u p o r down; for example, if the normal price of wheat was less than 3 H S per modius, then the area of land occupied by the rich was larger. See conveniendy B r u n t (1971: 300-4, 327-8) for discussion a n d references.

56

Land in politics T h e upsets o f w a r can also be t r a c e d t o t h e p r o g r a m m e o f c o l o n isation o r g a n i s e d by t h e R o m a n senate b e t w e e n 194 a n d 177 B C . I n this p e r i o d , t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f c e n t r a l I t a l y was d i m i n i s h e d by a b o u t 100,000 m e n , w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n . T h e y w e r e resettled i n o v e r t w e n t y colonies, p r e d o m i n a n t l y i n t h e e x t r e m e s o u t h a n d i n n o r t h e r n I t a l y . T h e large n u m b e r s a n d the very small plots o f l a n d w h i c h most o f t h e m a p p a r e n d y r e c e i v e d are e v i d e n c e i n themselves o f c o n s i d e r a b l e i m p o v e r i s h m e n t . Peasants w e r e u n l i k e l y t o w a l k t h r e e h u n d r e d o r m o r e k i l o m e t r e s f r o m t h e i r ancestral h o m e s i n c e n t r a l I t a l y , c a r r y i n g w i t h t h e m a l l t h a t t h e y possessed, i n t o n e w a n d o f t e n hostile t e r r i t o r y , unless t h e y w e r e p u s h e d h a r d - especially w h e n f o r m a n y o f t h e m t h e p r i z e was less t h a n f o u r hectares ( t e n acres) o f l a n d ; t o a d d i n s u l t t o i n j u r y t h e settlers s o m e t i m e s f o r f e i t e d t h e i r f u l l R o m a n c i t i z e n s h i p t h o u g h they received extra land i n compensation. 8 1

O t h e r peasants m i g r a t e d t o t h e t o w n s , above all t o t h e city o f R o m e . O n c e a g a i n we have o n l y f r a g m e n t s o f i n f o r m a t i o n t o be p i e c e d t o g e t h e r . I n 187 B C , a n d a g a i n i n 177 B C , t h e L a t i n allies t o g e t h e r ' c o m p l a i n e d t o t h e senate t h a t a l a r g e n u m b e r o f t h e i r citizens h a d m i g r a t e d t o R o m e a n d h a d b e e n assessed t h e r e * ( L i v y 39.3). I f this w e n t o n , t h e y said, t h e i r t o w n s a n d f a r m s w o u l d be d e s e r t e d . A l r e a d y t h e y f o u n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o m e e t t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s t o p r o v i d e soldiers ( L i v y 41.8). O n each occasion t h e senate d i r e c t e d a n official t o flush o u t r e c e n t i m m i g r a n t s o f L a t i n o r i g i n ; we are t o l d t h a t o n t h e first occasion t w e l v e t h o u s a n d L a t i n m e n w e r e i n s t r u c t e d t o g o back h o m e ; w i t h t h e i r 81

T h i s calculation is based on the assumption that colonies of known size were typical of those of unknown size. T o t a l adult males 13 maritime colonies (size of 5 known; 300 setders each) 4 citizen colonies (size of 3 known; 2,000 setders each) 8,000 5 Latin colonies (size of 5 known) 19,600 V>$oo

I assume that adult males contributed c. 3 0 % to the total population. T h e r e were probably no more colonies founded until 128 BC ( A u x i m u m ) , though there was a n allotment of public land to individuals in 173 BC. We do not know why this fifty-year gap occurred. T h e size of land allotments is known i n 11/22 colonies. I n the maritime colonies, citizens apparendy received 5-6 iugera (1.25-1.5 h a ; n = 3/13); more in other citizen colonies ( 5 , 8 , 10, 51 Vi iugera); a n d m u c h more i n L a t i n colonies (15,20,50,50 iugera; n = 4/5) as though in compensation for loss of citizenship. Citizens got 10 iugera in individual allotments in 173 BC. Cavalrymen a n d centurions received more, It seems likely that colonists supplemented their living on small allotments by working the land of rich setders who occupied public l a n d ; how else would they have got the working capital to move, why else would rich Romans have helped move them? Colonies thus recreated the social situation in central Italy - this idea is also put forward by B r u n t (1971: 194). F o r details of colonies, see ESAR vol. 1, 122-3.

57

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d e p e n d a n t s t h e y c o n s t i t u t e d a sizeable b o d y . N e w r e g u l a t i o n s restrict i n g i m m i g r a t i o n w e r e passed, b u t w e r e e v a d e d b y a legal fiddle, a n d i t is d o u b t f u l i f m i g r a t i o n t o t h e c i t y o f R o m e was e v e r s t o p p e d by s i m p l e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e decree. A n o t h e r i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e g r o w t h i n t h e city's p o p u l a t i o n c a n be f o u n d i n t h e a t t e m p t s m a d e t o increase t h e w a t e r - s u p p l y . M o n e y was allocated f o r a l a r g e n e w a q u e d u c t i n 179 B C , b u t t h e plans w e r e b l o c k e d by a n a r i s t o c r a t t h r o u g h whose l a n d s i t h a d t o pass ( L i v y 39.41); i t was c o m p l e t e d e v e n t u a l l y i n 143 B C ; yet a n o t h e r a q u e d u c t , Rome's f o u r t h , was b u i l t i n 125 B C . S o m e o f t h e city's e x t r a p o p u l a t i o n w e r e slaves a n d t h e i r o f f s p r i n g . M a n y o f t h e rest w e r e I t a l i a n peasants p u s h e d o u t by t h e l a r g e l a n d - o w n e r s a n d b y t h e d e m a n d s o f m i l i t a r y service a n d p u l l e d i n by t h e h u g e sums o f m o n e y b e i n g spent i n t h e city. A s a r e s u l t some areas o f t h e I t a l i a n c o u n t r y s i d e w e r e d e n u d e d o f f r e e peasants. I n 180 B C , f o r e x a m p l e , 40,000 d e f e a t e d n o r t h e r n t r i b e s m e n ( L i g u r i a n s ; t h e figure i n c l u d e s wives a n d c h i l d r e n ) w e r e r e s e t d e d i n t h e c e n t r a l I t a l i a n h i g h l a n d s ( L i v y 30.38). I t was a g o o d i d e a ; t h e s e t t l e m e n t s u r v i v e d f o r at least t h r e e c e n t u r i e s . B u t i t was a p a l l i a t i v e n o t a c u r e f o r peasant e m i g r a t i o n . 82

T o a c o n t e m p o r a r y R o m a n n o b l e , t h e changes m u s t have seemed so f r a g m e n t e d a n d v a r i e d i n t h e i r c o n t e x t s t h a t t h e y h a r d l y c o n s t i t u t e d a single process at a l l : h e h a d m o r e m o n e y a n d a c q u i r e d m o r e l a n d ; a f e w p o o r f a r m e r s w e r e b o u g h t o u t o r e v i c t e d ; m o r e shacks c o u l d be seen a l o n g t h e r o a d i n t o R o m e , p e r h a p s m o r e beggars w e r e at his d o o r ; some m o r e slaves e n t e r e d his h o u s e h o l d ; t o o m a n y G r e e k p h i l o s p h e r s a n d n e w m o r a l s i n R o m e - a b e w i l d e r i n g v a r i e t y o f events, t h e c o n c e r n o f n o one i n particular to cope w i t h o r to prevent. W h e n m i g r a t i o n caused d i f f i c u l t i e s by u p s e t t i n g e x i s t i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s (as i t d i d b y r e d u c i n g t h e allies' capacity t o p r o d u c e t r o o p s ) , t h e n t h e a u t h o r i t i e s d i d w h a t t h e y c o u l d . T h e y f o r b a d i m m i g r a t i o n . T h e r e was l i t t l e m o r e that they could do. W i t h t h e w i s d o m o f h i n d s i g h t , R o m a n h i s t o r i a n s l a t e r saw t h e cumulative impact o f evicting small-holders. Whenever the Romans annexed land f r o m their neighbours as a result of their wars, i t was their custom to p u t a part u p for sale by auction: the rest was made common land and was distributed among the poorest and most needy citizens, who were allowed to cultivate it on payment of a small rent to the public treasury. When the rich began to outbid and drive out the poor by offering higher rentals, a law was passed which forbade any one individual to hold more than 500 iugera [ 125 ha] of [state] land. For a while this law restrained the greed of the rich and helped the poor, who were enabled to 8 2

See the L i g u r e s Baebiani (CIL 9.1455 of A D 101), named after Baebius one of the consuls who settied them there. O n the aqueducts, see T . Ashby, The Aqueducts of Ancient Rome (repr. Washington, D C , 1973).

58

Land in politics r e m a i n o n the l a n d w h i c h they h a d r e n t e d , so that e a c h o f t h e m c o u l d o c c u p y the allotment w h i c h h e h a d originally b e e n g r a n t e d . B u t after a time the

rich

m e n i n e a c h n e i g h b o u r h o o d b y u s i n g t h e n a m e s o f fictitious t e n a n t s , c o n t r i v e d to t r a n s f e r m a n y o f t h e s e h o l d i n g s to t h e m s e l v e s , a n d finally t h e y o p e n l y t o o k possession of the greater part of the l a n d u n d e r their o w n names. T h e poor, w h e n t h e y f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s f o r c e d off t h e l a n d , b e c a m e m o r e a n d m o r e u n w i l l i n g to v o l u n t e e r f 6 r m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e o r e v e n to r a i s e a f a m i l y . T h e r e s u l t was a r a p i d d e c l i n e of the class o f free s m a l l - h o l d e r s all o v e r Italy, their place b e i n g t a k e n b y g a n g s o f f o r e i g n s l a v e s , w h o m t h e r i c h e m p l o y e d to c u l t i v a t e t h e estates f r o m w h i c h t h e y h a d d r i v e n off t h e f r e e c i t i z e n s . ( P l u t a r c h , of Tiberius

Gracchus

Life

8; t r a n s l a t e d b y I . S c o t t - K i l v e r t , P e n g u i n B o o k s ) .

I n 133 B C , t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f l a n d i n t h e h a n d s o f t h e r i c h e r u p t e d as a m a j o r p o l i t i c a l issue. A l m o s t i n e v i t a b l y i t has b e n p r e s e n t e d as a conflict b e t w e e n r i c h a n d p o o r , b e t w e e n g r e a t l a n d - o w n e r s a n d t h e landless. L i k e i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l issues i n o t h e r societies, i t was i n t e r shot w i t h private ambitions, ideologies a n d o t h e r political problems; nevertheless, i t seems reasonable t o t h i n k t h a t t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f l a n d was t h e c r u c i a l issue. T h e events o f t h a t year are especially i m p o r t a n t because t h e y e p i t o m i s e a n d h e r a l d t h e n e x t c e n t u r y o f i n t e r n a l s t r i f e . I n p a r t i c u l a r , G r a c c h u s ' l a n d law was o n e o f t w e n t y a t t e m p t s m a d e i n t h e course o f t h e n e x t h u n d r e d years t o solve t h e a g r a r i a n p r o b l e m by law a n d by t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f l a n d t o t h e p o o r . B u t b e f o r e we discuss t h e a t t e m p t e d r e f o r m s o f T i b e r i u s G r a c c h u s , I w a n t t o o u t l i n e t h r e e s t r u c t u r a l features w h i c h d e t e r m i n e d t h e shape o f t h e conflict. 8 3

First, e v e n t h o u g h t h e aristocrats i n t h e senate d o m i n a t e d R o m a n p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , l a r g e sections o f t h e plebs r e t a i n e d c o n siderable p o w e r : t h e p o p u l a r assemblies w e r e c o u r t e d by a n d chose b e t w e e n aristocrats i n t h e e l e c t i o n o f t h e h i g h e s t officials, a n d t h e y h a d t h e f o r m a l p o w e r t o pass laws. T h e i d e a t h a t t h e senate a n d t h e R o m a n p e o p l e ( S P Q R is still s t a m p e d o n d r a i n s i n R o m e ) w e r e p a r t n e r s i n g o v e r n m e n t was t o a l a r g e e x t e n t m y t h , b u t a m y t h w i t h l i f e still i n it. Secondly, t h e t r i b u n e s o f t h e p e o p l e , as t h e n a m e o f t h e i r office i m p l i e s , w e r e ostensibly o b l i g e d t o p r o t e c t t h e specific interests o f t h e p e o p l e . T o be s u r e , t h e y d i d n o t always f u l f i l this o b l i g a t i o n ; m o s t m u s t have b e e n c o n t e n t t o a b i d e by t h e status quo. I n d e e d , t h e t r i b u n e s w e r e usually aristocrats i n t e n t o n m a k i n g t h e i r way i n a s e n a t o r i a l career. Y e t i n spite o f t h e d e m a n d s o f t h e i r careers, t r i b u n e s o f t h e p e o p l e r e p e a t e d l y cast themselves as t h o r n s i n t h e flesh o f s e n a t o r i a l c o n 8 8

19 agrarian laws are listed in RE sv Leges agrariae, dated 133-44 BC; the list is not necessarily complete. T h e r e were three such laws in the previous century. T h e discussion of these laws by B r u n t (1971) is excellent.

59

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servatism. T h e events o f 133 B C m e r e l y c o n f i r m e d a l o n g t r a d i t i o n . I n history, it had been tribunes o f the people w h o h a d proposed agrarian r e f o r m o r t h e r e s t r i c t i o n o f s e n a t o r i a l p r i v i l e g e . A n d i n t h e r e c e n t past, i n 151 a n d 138 B C , t r i b u n e s h a d e v e n i m p r i s o n e d t h e consuls i n p r o t e s t against t h e injustices o f t h e m i l i t a r y l e v y . 84

T h e p o p u l a r assemblies a n d t h e t r i b u n a t e p r o v i d e d l e g i t i m a t e a n d established c h a n n e l s f o r t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f c o n f l i c t . S o m e R o m a n leaders t h o u g h t t h a t t h e i r s u p p r e s s i o n w o u l d e r a d i c a t e t h e c o n f l i c t ; t h e t r i b u n a t e was c u r b e d t e m p o r a r i l y by Sulla, a n d p o p u l a r assemblies w e r e i n effect c o n t r o l l e d subsequently b y t h e t r i u m v i r s . A s a r e s u l t , t h e lines o f c o n f l i c t became m o r e e x p l i c i t l y d r a w n elsewhere; p o l i t i c a l issues w e r e d e c i d e d i n s t e a d b y generals a n d t h e i r a r m i e s . T h i r d l y , w e m u s t c o n s i d e r p u b l i c o r state l a n d (ager publicus populi Romani). T h i s legal c a t e g o r y o f l a n d h a d b e e n v e r y i m p o r t a n t as a c o v e r u n d e r w h i c h l a r g e p r i v a t e estates w e r e f o r m e d . State l a n d consisted o f l a n d w h i c h t h e R o m a n state h a d t a k e n o v e r f r o m I t a l i a n c o m m u n i t i e s (usually o n e t h i r d o f t h e i r t e r r i t o r y ) w h e n t h e y w e r e first c o n q u e r e d , p l u s o t h e r lands confiscated b y t h e R o m a n state; f o r e x a m p l e , R o m a n allies w h o s i d e d w i t h H a n n i b a l d u r i n g his i n v a s i o n o f I t a l y w e r e p u n i s h e d b y h a v i n g t h e i r l a n d confiscated. S o m e o f t h e l a n d was g i v e n t o colonists, o r s o l d , o r leased; b u t t h e g r e a t e r p a r t , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s e c o n d - c e n t u r y h i s t o r i a n A p p i a n , was n o t allocated. A n y o n e c o u l d o c c u p y i t ( i t was called ager occupatorius) o n payment o f a r e n t t o t h e state, a l t h o u g h t h i s o c c u p a t i o n gave n o legal security of tenure. I t was the rich who took most of this unallocated land. I n time, they became confident that they would not be dispossessed. They acquired the lands nearby, including the plots of the poor, sometimes by purchase with persuasion, sometimes by force so that i n the end they cultivated large estates not farms . . . ( A p p i a n , Civil Wars 1.7) T h e r e is e v i d e n c e t h a t o b l i g i n g l y t h e r e n t s , n o r m a l l y a t e n t h o f t h e c r o p o n arable l a n d , w e r e o f t e n n o t c o l l e c t e d , a n d t h e laws w h i c h r e s t r i c t e d h o w m u c h state l a n d a m a n c o u l d h o l d w e r e e v a d e d w i t h i m p u n i t y . L a n d w h i c h h a d been c o n q u e r e d b y t h e R o m a n p e o p l e a n d w h i c h was n o m i n a l l y e x p l o i t e d f o r its collective b e n e f i t cast a t h i n v e n e e r , as o f t e n b e f o r e a n d since, o v e r t h e d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e p r o f i t o f t h e rich. 8 5

8 4

Livy, Summaries of Books 48 a n d 55, a n d see J . Bleicken, Das Volkstribunat der Klassischen Republik ( M u n i c h , 1968). See the commentary o n A p p i a n , Civil Wars 1.7 by E . Gabba (Florence, 1958); Livy 42.1 a n d 19; Cato's speech in 167 BC (ORF* 167), which implies that m e n held more than 500 iugera of state land with impunity. 1

8 5

60

Land in politics T h e political power a n d privilegesof land-owners weresodeep-rooted t h a t n o o n e at t h i s stage suggested a g e n e r a l r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f l a n d w h i c h b e l o n g e d i n f u l l t i t l e by ' r i g h t o f p e r p e t u a l possession* ( C i c e r o , On Behalf of Milo 78) t o p r i v a t e R o m a n citizens. S u c h a suggestion w o u l d h a v e u n i t e d t h e o p p o s i t i o n . B u t t h e status o f state l a n d , w i t h its c o n n o t a t i o n o f b e i n g a collective g o o d (ager publicus populi Romani), i n t e c h n i c a l t e r m s h e l d ' p r e c a r i o u s l y ' , o c c u p i e d n o t o w n e d , was a m b i g u o u s , a n d p r o v i d e d sufficient leverage t o m a k e its r e d i s t r i b u t i o n legitimate. W i t h these factors i n m i n d let us t u r n t o t h e events o f 133 BC. T i b e r i u s G r a c c h u s was b o r n i n t o a n o b l e f a m i l y , t h e son o f a i n a n w h o h a d twice b e e n c o n s u l a n d censor. A s a y o u n g official, he served w i t h t h e a r m y i n S p a i n a n d h e l p e d n e g o t i a t e peace t e r m s a f t e r a R o m a n a r m y h a d b e e n d e f e a t e d t h e r e , t e r m s w h i c h t h e senate subsequendy r e p u d i a t e d . I n his travels t h r o u g h I t a l y , G r a c c h u s h a d been s t r u c k by t h e e x t e n t o f estates c u l t i v a t e d b y slaves a n d by t h e d e c l i n e o f t h e f r e e peasantry. T h e slave r e b e l l i o n w h i c h b r o k e o u t i n Sicily i n 135 B C m u s t have r e i n f o r c e d his views. O n his r e t u r n t o R o m e , h e was elected t r i b u n e o f t h e p e o p l e a n d p r o p o s e d t h a t state l a n d be r e d i s t r i b u t e d t o t h e p o o r . O n e effect o f t h i s w o u l d have b e e n t o increase t h e n u m b e r o f p r o p e r t y - h o l d e r s liable t o serve i n t h e a r m y . A s i m i l a r p r o p o s a l h a d b e e n p u t f o r w a r d a f e w years e a r i e r b y L a e l i u s , b u t h a d b e e n d r o p p e d because o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n w h i c h i t a r o u s e d . Needless t o say, t h e r i c h w e r e o p p o s e d t o G r a c c h u s ' proposals also. T o describe Gracchus* c a m p a i g n f o r his law, I c a n n o t d o b e t t e r t h a n q u o t e t h e a c c o u n t by P l u t a r c h , w r i t t e n i n t h e second c e n t u r y A D , b u t d r a w n f r o m m u c h earlier sources. 86

Tiberius [Gracchus].. .went straight to the root of the matter as soon as he had been elected tribune. H e was encouraged i n his plans, as most writers report, by Diophanes the orator and Blossius the p h i l o s o p h e r . . . Some writers consider that Cornelia was at least partly to blame for Tiberius' death, since she often reproached her sons with the fact that the Romans still referred to her as the mother-in-law of Scipio, but not yet as the mother of the Gracchi. Others maintain that Tiberius was also influenced by his jealousy of a certain Spurius Postumius. This man was of the same age as Tiberius and a close rival as a public speaker. So when Tiberius returned f r o m the campaign against Numantia and f o u n d that his adversary had far outdistanced h i m i n fame and influence and had attracted general admiration, it seems likely that he resolved 8 6

T h e literature o n the G r a c c h i is mammoth. I have followed Astin (1967: 161 ff.); a n d see D. C . E a r l , Tiberius Gracchus(Brussels, 1963),]. Carcopmo AutourdesGracques ( P a n s , 1967), a n d especially E . Badian, ' T i b e r i u s Gracchus and the beginning of the R o m a n Revolution \ in H . T e m p o r i n i ed., Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt (Berlin, 1972) vol. 1.1, 668-731. t

2

61

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and slaves

to o u t d o h i m by i n t r o d u c i n g a c h a l l e n g i n g p o l i t i c a l p r o g r a m m e , w h i c h w o u l d a r o u s e great expectations a m o n g the people. H o w e v e r , his b r o t h e r G a i u s has w r i t t e n i n a p o l i t i c a l p a m p h l e t that w h i l e T i b e r i u s w a s t r a v e l l i n g

through

E t r u r i a o n h i s w a y to N u m a n t i a , h e s a w f o r h i m s e l f h o w t h e c o u n t r y h a d b e e n d e s e r t e d by its n a t i v e i n h a b i t a n t s , a n d h o w t h o s e w h o t i l l e d t h e soil o r t e n d e d t h e flocks w e r e b a r b a r i a n slaves i n t r o d u c e d f r o m a b r o a d ; a n d t h a t it w a s t h i s e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h i n s p i r e d t h e p o l i c y t h a t l a t e r b r o u g h t so m a n y m i s f o r t u n e s u p o n t h e t w o b r o t h e r s . B u t it w a s a b o v e a l l t h e p e o p l e t h e m s e l v e s w h o d i d m o s t to a r o u s e T i b e r i u s ' e n e r g y

a n d a m b i t i o n s by i n s c r i b i n g s l o g a n s a n d

appeals o n porticoes, m o n u m e n t s a n d the walls of houses, calling u p o n h i m to r e c o v e r t h e p u b l i c l a n d f o r t h e p o o r . H e d i d not, h o w e v e r , draft his law by himself, but c o n s u l t e d a n u m b e r of the most e m i n e n t a n d r e s p e c t e d c i t i z e n s . . . A n d certainly m a n y will a g r e e that n o law directed against injustice a n d avarice was ever f r a m e d i n m i l d e r o r m o r e c o n c i l i a t o r y t e r m s . F o r t h e m e n w h o d e s e r v e d to b e p u n i s h e d f o r b r e a k i n g t h e l a w , a n d w h o s h o u l d h a v e b e e n f i n e d as w e l l as o b l i g e d to s u r r e n d e r t h e l a n d w h i c h t h e y h a d b e e n i l l e g a l l y e n j o y i n g , w e r e m e r e l y r e q u i r e d to g i v e u p t h e i r u n j u s t a c q u i s i t i o n s - f o r w h i c h t h e y w e r e c o m p e n s a t e d - a n d to a l l o w t h e o w n e r s h i p to p a s s to t h o s e c i t i z e n s w h o m o s t n e e d e d t h e l a n d . B u t e v e n t h o u g h this act o f r e s d t u t i o n s h o w e d s u c h t e n d e r n e s s for the w r o n g d o e r s , the p e o p l e w e r e c o n t e n t to f o r g e t t h e p a s t so l o n g a s t h e y c o u l d b e a s s u r e d o f protection against injustice i n the future. T h e wealthy classes a n d l a n d o w n e r s o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w e r e b i t t e r l y o p p o s e d to t h e s e p r o c e e d i n g s : t h e y h a t e d t h e l a w o u t o f s h e e r g r e e d , a n d its o r i g i n a t o r o u t o f p e r s o n a l r e s e n t m e n t a n d p a r t y p r e j u d i c e , a n d t h e y d i d t h e i r u t m o s t to t u r n t h e p e o p l e a g a i n s t t h e r e f o r m by a l l e g i n g t h a t T i b e r i u s ' o b j e c t i n i n t r o d u c i n g a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f l a n d w a s r e a l l y to u n d e r m i n e t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f t h e state a n d stir u p a g e n e r a l revolution. H o w e v e r , t h e s e tactics a c h i e v e d n o t h i n g . T i b e r i u s w a s f i g h t i n g f o r a m e a s u r e w h i c h w a s h o n o u r a b l e a n d j u s t i n itself, a n d h e w a s a b l e to s u m m o n u p a n e l o q u e n c e w h i c h w o u l d h a v e d o n e c r e d i t to a f a r less w o r t h y c a u s e . T h e r e s u l t " w a s t h a t w h e n e v e r h e m o u n t e d t h e r o s t r a to p l e a d t h e c a s e o f t h e p o o r w i t h the

people

crowding

a r o u n d h i m to l i s t e n , t h e effect o f

his words

was

o v e r w h e l m i n g a n d n o other orator c o u l d stand against h i m . ' T h e w i l d beasts t h a t r o a m o v e r I t a l y ' , h e w o u l d tell h i s l i s t e n e r s , ' h a v e t h e i r d e n s a n d h o l e s to l u r k i n , b u t t h e m e n w h o fight a n d d i e f o r o u r c o u n t r y e n j o y t h e c o m m o n a i r a n d l i g h t a n d n o t h i n g e l s e . I t is t h e i r lot to w a n d e r w i t h t h e i r w i v e s a n d c h i l d r e n , h o u s e l e s s a n d h o m e l e s s , o v e r t h e face o f t h e e a r t h . A n d w h e n o u r g e n e r a l s a p p e a l to t h e i r s o l d i e r s b e f o r e a b a t d e to d e f e n d ancestors' tombs a n d their temples against the e n e m y ,

their

their words are a

m o c k e r y a n d a lie, for not a m a n i n the a u d i e n c e possesses a family altar; not o n e o u t o f a l l t h o s e R o m a n s o w n s a n a n c e s t r a l t o m b . T h e t r u t h is t h a t t h e y fight a n d d i e to p r o t e c t t h e w e a l t h a n d l u x u r y o f o t h e r s . T h e y a r e c a l l e d t h e m a s t e r s o f t h e w o r l d , b u t t h e y d o n o t p o s s e s s a s i n g l e c l o d o f e a r t h w h i c h is truly their own.' T o s u c h o r a t o r y as t h i s , t h e u t t e r a n c e o f a n o b l e s p i r i t , d e l i v e r e d w i t h a genuine

p a s s i o n to a p e o p l e

profoundly

moved

a n d f u l l y a r o u s e d to t h e

s p e a k e r ' s s u p p o r t , n o n e o f T i b e r i u s * a d v e r s a r i e s c o u l d m a k e a n effective r e p l y . ( P l u t a r c h , Life

of Tiberius

Gracchus,

ft-io;

62

trans. I . Scott-Kilvert, Penguin)

Land in politics T h e c o n f l i c t g r a d u a l l y escalated. I n defiance o f c o n v e n t i o n , w i t h o u t c o n s u l t i n g t h e senate, G r a c c h u s p u t his proposals d i r e c t l y t o a vote o f t h e p e o p l e ; a f e l l o w t r i b u n e used his veto t o b l o c k t h e p r o c e e d i n g s . T h e n G r a c c h u s , a g a i n by p o p u l a r v o t e , h a d h i m set aside - a n a c t i o n w h i c h was u n p r e c e d e n t e d a n d possibly u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . B u t t h e n e w u r b a n p r o l e t a r i a t a n d t h e peasants l i v i n g near R o m e a n d a m i n o r i t y o f nobles s u p p o r t e d h i m . T h e l a n d law was passed; t h e a n c i e n t law l i m i t i n g h o l d i n g s o f state l a n d t o 500 iugera (125 ha) was r e a f f i r m e d . A l a n d c o m m i s s i o n was set u p t o survey t h e state l a n d a n d allocate t h e s u r p l u s t o t h e p o o r . A few o f t h e i r l a n d - m a r k e r s (cippi) still s u r v i v e . T h e n e w s m a l l - h o l d e r s t h e n n e e d e d m o n e y t o stock t h e i r f a r m s , b u t t r a d i t i o n a l l y o n l y t h e senate a u t h o r i s e d e x p e n d i t u r e ; G r a c c h u s i n v a d e d t h e senate's p r e s e r v e by p r o p o s i n g a law t o t h e p e o p l e by w h i c h e x t r a r e v e n u e s f r o m A s i a M i n o r w o u l d be d i v e r t e d f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n to the new farmers a n d m o r e generally to the p o o r r e m a i n i n g i n the city ( L i v y , Summary of Book 5 8 ) . O n e can i m a g i n e t h e o u t r a g e o f conservative senators; t h e use o f p u b l i c m o n e y f o r a h a n d - o u t t o t h e plebs was r e v o l u t i o n a r y : a l l t h e m o r e so because t h e p o l i t i c a l prestige o f b e i n g t h e b e n e f a c t o r o f t h e p e o p l e w o u l d accrue t o T i b e r i u s G r a c c h u s . B u t t h e final straw was G r a c c h u s ' a t t e m p t t o stay i n office by s e e k i n g r e - e l e c t i o n , o n c e a g a i n i n v i o l a t i o n o f t r a d i t i o n . O n t h e d a y o f t h e elections, a posse o f v i g i l a n t e senators l e d by t h e c h i e f p r i e s t (pontifex maximus), h i m s e l f t h e o c c u p a n t o f l a r g e tracts o f state l a n d , o p e n l y assassinated T i b e r i u s G r a c c h u s a n d f o u r h u n d r e d o f his immediate followers. 87

T h e w h i r l w i n d p o l i t i c a l c a r e e r o f T i b e r i u s G r a c c h u s lasted less t h a n a year. Y e t i t is i m p o r t a n t , p a r t l y because i t was t h e p r e c u r s o r o f f u r t h e r c i v i l conflicts a n d p a r t l y because i t illustrates t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t w i t h n e a r l y a l l t h e factors o f social a n d e c o n o m i c c h a n g e w h i c h we have b e e n discussing: t h e i n c r e a s i n g w e a l t h o f l a n d - o w n e r s , t h e e m i g r a t i o n o f p o o r peasants, t h e g r o w t h o f slavery, t h e s h o r t a g e o f r e c r u i t s f o r t h e a r m y , t h e p o w e r o f t h e senate, t h e rise o f t h e u r b a n plebs, t h e c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n nobles a n d t h e use o f i m p e r i a l r e v e n u e s as a w e a p o n o f p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t . I n t h e s h o r t r u n , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , b o t h G r a c c h u s a n d his assassins w e r e successful. T h e assassins r e s t o r e d t h e s u p r e m a c y o f t h e senate a n d s e c u r e d peace b y f u r t h e r j u d i c i a l e x e c u t i o n s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n spite o f G r a c c h u s ' d e a t h , t h e l a n d c o m m i s s i o n persisted i n its w o r k a n d a p p a r e n t l y succeeded i n d i s t r i b u t i n g l a n d t o several t h o u s a n d citizens. G r a c c h u s was m o r e effective d e a d t h a n alive. H o w e v e r , i n 129 B C , representatives o f t h e I t a l i a n allies o b j e c t e d s t r o n g l y t o t h e d i s t r i b u d o n 8 7

Some of what is recorded i n ancient histories may not have happened; but in politics, r u m o u r s a n d beliefs about what is happening are often very important.

63

Conquerors

and slaves

o f state l a n d located w i t h i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r y , a n d t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n was e n o u g h w h e n c o m b i n e d w i t h p o w e r f u l p a t r o n a g e at R o m e t o h a m s t r i n g t h e c o m m i s s i o n ' s a c t i v i t i e s . I n 128 B C , as t h o u g h b y c o m p e n s a t i o n , a n e w c o l o n y was established i n I t a l y , t h e first f o r fifty years; t h r e e o r f o u r m o r e f o l l o w e d soon a f t e r w a r d s , t w o o f t h e m at t h e i n s t i g a t i o n o f T i b e r i u s G r a c c h u s ' b r o t h e r Gaius, w h o was t r i b u n e o f t h e p e o p l e i n 123 B C . A f t e r a l l , colonies i n d i s t a n t t e r r i t o r i e s served t h e same f u n c t i o n f o r t h e p o o r as l a n d - a l l o t m e n t s , o n l y t h e l a n d was n o t t a k e n f r o m t h e r i c h . G a i u s G r a c c h u s also h a d t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s p r e v i o u s l y p l a c e d o n t h e l a n d c o m m i s s i o n r e m o v e d , b u t e v e n so i t seems n o t h a v e a c h i e v e d m u c h ; i t was a b o l i s h e d p r o b a b l y i n 119 B C , as p a r t o f t h e backlash w h i c h f o l l o w e d Gaius' assassination. 88

8 9

T h r o u g h o u t , o n e basic p r o b l e m r e m a i n e d u n t o u c h e d . T h e n e w s m a l l - h o l d e r s w h o h a d r e c e i v e d l a n d f r o m t h e state e i t h e r i n d i v i d u a l l y o r as colonists, w e r e liable t o suffer f r o m t h e v e r y same pressures w h i c h h a d previously d r i v e n t h e m o r t h e i r fathers off the l a n d . T i b e r i u s G r a c c h u s h a d f o r e s e e n t h i s p r o b l e m a n d t r i e d t o legislate against i t ; u n d e r his l a w , t h e n e w l a n d - h o l d e r s w e r e f o r b i d d e n t o sell t h e i r l a n d ; I d o u b t t h a t t h e l a w was effectively e n f o r c e d ; i n a n y case its p r o v i s i o n s w e r e f o r m a l l y a b a n d o n e d , p r o b a b l y i n 121 B C . A f t e r a l l t h e fuss, w h a t h a d t h e G r a c c h i achieved? I n t h e l o n g r u n , seen, t h a t is, i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e events o f t h e n e x t c e n t u r y , b o t h l a n d laws a n d v i o l e n t r e p r e s s i o n f a i l e d t o d e a l a d e q u a t e l y w i t h t h e social consequences o f e m p i r e . T h e y c a n best be u n d e r s t o o d as v a i n a t t e m p t s t o b a t t i e against t h e g e n e r a l t r e n d . I t is o n l y l o n g a f t e r w a r d s w h e n w e h a v e seen t h e same o r s i m i l a r v i o l e n t conflicts r e c u r r i n g t h a t we feel e n c o u r a g e d t o t h i n k o f b r o a d socio-economic changes. S u c h overviews a r e t h e p r i v i l e g e o f h i s t o r i a n s . C o n t e m p o r a r y actors h a v e m o r e o n t h e i r m i n d s , b o t h t o e n r i c h a n d t o c l o u d t h e i r views. O u r sources r e c o r d some, b u t o n l y s o m e o f t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s a n d actions.

T H E

SOLUTION

-

MASS

MIGRATION

C o n v e n t i o n a l l y , m o d e r n h i s t o r i a n s o f t h e a n c i e n t w o r l d have t r i e d t o r e c o n s t r u c t f r o m t h e i r p a r t i a l r e c o r d each successive crisis, l o o k e d at M

*

T h e census r e t u r n for 125/4 BC perhaps recorded 76,000 more cidzens than that of 131/oBc. Interpretations vary, but it seems likely that the distributions of land by the G r a c c h a n commissioners was partly responsible for the rise; see B r u n t (1971: 77*·)· I follow Salmon (1970: 110) i n dating A u x i m u m to 128; there might have been more colonies founded but for the fact that they became a central political issue. A rival tribune to Gaius Gracchus upstaged h i m by proposing the foundation of twelve colonies for the poorest citizens, apparentiy without having the slightest intention of executing his proposals once they were confirmed.

64

The solution - mass migration i n its o w n c o n t e x t . T h e heroes a n d v i l l a i n s o f t h i s r e c o n s t r u c t e d w o r l d are t h e society's leaders, ' m e n w h o s h a p e d h i s t o r y ' : t h e G r a c c h i , M a r i u s , Sulla, P o m p e y , J u l i u s Caesar, A u g u s t u s ; t h e m a i n subject m a t t e r o f such h i s t o r y is t h e f a c t i o n a l r i v a l r i e s o f aristocratic cliques; i n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e w o r l d as R o m a n notables a n d h i s t o r i a n s saw i t . M o d e r n h i s t o r i a n s h a v e m a d e i t t h e i r j o b l a r g e l y t o u n d e r s t a n d these leaders' m o t i v e s a n d i n t e n t i o n s , t h e i r b e h a v i o u r a n d its consequences a n d t o describe each o f t h e m , o n e a f t e r t h e o t h e r . I d o n o t m e a n by this t h a t a n c i e n t h i s t o r y has consisted m o s t l y o f b i o g r a p h y o r annalistic history, b u t r a t h e r that elite individuals l o o m large i n ancient a n d m o d e r n h i s t o r y books o f R o m e , a n d t h a t these h i s t o r y books are organised p r i m a r i l y by time, not by topic o r p r o b l e m . Conventional a n c i e n t h i s t o r y is t h u s v e r y d i f f e r e n t i n flavour f r o m c o n t e m p o r a r y p o s t - m e d i a e v a l h i s t o r y . A t best, i t r e c a p t u r e s t h e a u t h e n t i c f e e l i n g o f w h a t i t was l i k e t o h a v e l i v e d i n t h e a n c i e n t w o r l d . A t w o r s t , i t is o n l y d e s c r i p t i v e a n d scholastic; m i n o r persons are g i v e n a s p u r i o u s i m p o r t a n c e , e i t h e r b y t h e elitist p r e j u d i c e o f t h e sources o r by t h e m e r e a c c i d e n t t h a t a m e n t i o n o f t h e m has s u r v i v e d . T h e evidence is o f t e n so t h i n t h a t m o t i v e s , t h e stuff o f b i o g r a p h y , c a n be d e d u c e d o n l y f r o m b e h a v i o u r - a speculative process t o say t h e least. A b o v e a l l , m o d e r n h i s t o r i a n s o f t h e a n c i e n t w o r l d t i e d t o t e s t i m o n y , systematically neglect those factors o r processes o f w h i c h t h e a n c i e n t actors a n d t h e sources were unaware. I n s t e a d o f e m b a r k i n g o n yet a n o t h e r d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t o f t h e r e c u r r e n t disputes o v e r l a n d d u r i n g t h e late R e p u b l i c , I w a n t t o c o n c e n t r a t e o n o n e aspect w h i c h seems especially i m p o r t a n t . I w a n t t o generalise a b o u t w h a t I shall r a t h e r c l u m s i l y call t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e s i t u a t i o n . T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t w e c a n p l a u s i b l y s u b s u m e a w h o l e series o f events, such as t h e t w e n t y l a n d laws s p r e a d o v e r a c e n t u r y , as s y m p t o m s o f a single p r o b l e m . T h i s act o f g e n e r a l i s a t i o n has f u r t h e r serious i m p l i c a t i o n s . I t i m p l i e s t h a t t h e actions o f i n d i v i d u a l legislators w e r e m o u l d e d n o t o n l y by i m m e d i a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s b u t also by l o n g - r u n factors o f w h i c h t h e y w e r e n o t necessarily a w a r e ; i t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e validity o f the generalisation cannot d e p e n d o n whether contempor a r i e s p e r c e i v e d i t ; i t c a n n o t be v a l i d a t e d , t h o u g h i t m a y be c o r r o b o r a t e d b y c i t i n g a passage f r o m C i c e r o . I t s acceptability m u s t d e p e n d i n s t e a d o n its i n t e r n a l c o h e r e n c e , its e c o n o m y , its f i t w i t h t h e k n o w n facts a n d w i t h some i m p l i c i t , c o v e r i n g laws. B u t e n o u g h o f t h e o r y . I n t h e R o m a n e c o n o m y , because i t was r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l e , l a n d was t h e c h i e f source o f l i v e l i h o o d a n d t h e p r e d o m i n a n t f o r m o f d i s t r i b u t a b l e w e a l t h . Peasants, soldiers, t a x - f a r m e r s a n d aristocrats w a n t e d land a n d m o r e l a n d . Preferably they wanted l a n d i n Italy. T h e conquest o f a n e m p i r e gave i m p o r t a n t g r o u p s w i t h i n t h e society c o n t r o l 65

Conquerors

and slaves

o v e r u n p r e c e d e n t e d l y l a r g e resources. C o m p e t i t i o n f o r a f i n i t e q u a n tity o f l a n d i n c r e a s e d , a n d decisions a b o u t t h e c o n t r o l o v e r l a n d r e p e a t e d l y became a n i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l issue; t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f Sulla's veterans, f o r e x a m p l e , t h e a b o r t i v e l a n d b i l l o f R u l l u s i n 63 B C , a n d t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f s e c u r i n g l a n d f o r Pompey's veterans c o m e r e a d i l y t o m i n d . T h e t w e n t y l a n d laws, p r o p o s e d o r passed; t h e confiscations o f l a n d f r o m r i c h a n d p o o r ; its r e d i s t r i b u t i o n t o t h e landless, t o ex-soldiers a n d t o t h e n o b l e f o l l o w e r s o f successful w a r chiefs o r t o w e a l t h y o p p o r t u n i s t s , as w e l l as t h e p r i v a t e a c q u i s i t i o n o f l a n d by t h e r i c h can a l l be seen as v a r i a t i o n s o n t h e t h e m e : w h o was t o get w h a t out of the profits of empire? T h e bitter competition f o r a limited good f u e l l e d t h e p o l i t i c a l conflicts o f t h e late R e p u b l i c ; I d o n o t m e a n by this t h a t c o m p e t i t i o n f o r l a n d was t h e sole cause o f c o n f l i c t . T h e solvent was c i v i l w a r , w h i c h i n v o l v e d t h e r e c r u i t m e n t o f h u g e a r m i e s , separated h a l f a m i l l i o n I t a l i a n peasants b e t w e e n 49 a n d 28 B C f r o m t h e soil a n d m a d e t h e m , as i t w e r e , available f o r e m i g r a t i o n . T h e s o l u t i o n was t h e acceptance by substantial n u m b e r s o f r i c h a n d p o o r o f a l t e r n a t i v e g o o d s ; a mass o f peasants, i n m y view, m i g r a t e d t o t h e city o f R o m e w h e r e t h e y w e r e subsidised by t h e state w i t h gifts of free wheat; m u c h larger groups were resited either o n new farms i n I t a l y o r i n t h e p r o v i n c e s . T h e r i c h t o o , first k n i g h t s t h e n senators, a c q u i r e d estates o u t s i d e I t a l y . T h u s b o t h social strata g r a d u a l l y accommodated their traditional ambitions to the opportunities offered i n an enlarged empire. 9 0

T h e scale o f m i g r a t i o n by t h e I t a l i a n p o o r is a m a z i n g . B e t w e e n 80 a n d 8 B C , i n t w o g e n e r a t i o n s , i t seems t h a t r o u g h l y h a l f t h e f r e e a d u l t males i n I t a l y left t h e i r f a r m s a n d w e n t t o I t a l i a n t o w n s o r w e r e setded by t h e state o n n e w f a r m s i n I t a l y o r t h e p r o v i n c e s (see T a b l e 1.2). T h i s s t a t e m e n t is d e r i v e d f r o m t h e s u r v i v i n g official f i g u r e s : t h e census u n d e r A u g u s t u s o f 28 a n d 8 B C , t h e n u m b e r o f soldiers u n d e r a r m s o r d i s c h a r g e d , a n d t h e n u m b e r o f n e w colonies f o u n d e d o r r e f o u n d e d . B e f o r e I g o f u r t h e r , I s h o u l d stress f o u r e l e m e n t s i n m y discussion: first, the n u m b e r s given p r o v i d e r o u g h orders o f m a g n i t u d e o n l y ; secondly, t h e y are l a r g e l y based o n o r d e r i v e d f r o m t h e c a r e f u l analysis o f t h e evidence b y B r u n t (1971); t h i r d l y , t h e y describe n e t m i g r a t i o n o n l y , t h a t is t h e y take n o a c c o u n t o f t h e several moves i n d i v i d u a l s m a y have m a d e f r o m b e f o r e t h e i r f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t ( f o r e x a m p l e , f r o m f a r m e r t o landless l a b o u r e r , p e r h a p s t o t o w n , t h e n s o l d i e r a n d e v e n t u a l l y c o l o n i s t ) ; f o u r t h , t h e y c o n c e n t r a t e o n stateo r g a n i s e d m i g r a t i o n , f o r w h i c h evidence survives i n official r e c o r d s ; t h e y take a l m o s t n o a c c o u n t o f p r i v a t e m o v e m e n t s , e i t h e r o f t h e m e n , 9 0

B r u n t , (1971: 511).

66

The solution - mass migration w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n u p r o o t e d t o m a k e r o o m f o r official settlements o r o f i n d i v i d u a l m i g r a n t s , w h o m a y have become progressively m o r e n u m e r o u s , as n u c l e i o f I t a l i a n s p r o v i d e d a base f o r f u r t h e r m i g r a t i o n i n n o r t h e r n I t a l y a n d t h r o u g h o u t t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n b a s i n . 1 realise t h a t t h e figures are speculative, b u t i f B r u n t ' s basic f r a m e w o r k is accepted, I d o n o t see h o w t h e y can be w i l d l y w r o n g . T h e y show t h e sheer size o f t h e c u m u l a t i v e changes i n t h e late R e p u b l i c , o f w h i c h o u r sources give us o n l y successive glimpses. 91

I n T a b l e 1.2, I have s u m m a r i s e d m y d e r i v a t i o n s f r o m t h e evidence a n d i n t h e notes t o t h e table I have g i v e n some reasons f o r t h e figures. T h e m o s t s t r i k i n g c h a n g e is t h e d e c l i n e i n t h e f r e e r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n by 1.2 m i l l i o n ( f r o m 4.1 t o 2.9 m i l l i o n ; a d r o p o f 2 9 % ) . I t is a n e n o r m o u s figure; i t m u s t h i d e colossal h u m a n m i s e r y ; i t m a y n o t be accurate, b u t i t gives a sense o f scale w h i c h is m i s s i n g f r o m o u r sources. M o r e o v e r , i t seems l i k e l y t h a t m o s t o f t h e change was c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t h e last c e n t u r y BC. W h e r e d i d t h e r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n go? W e k n o w t h a t w h e a t was d i s t r i b u t e d ' f r e e o f c h a r g e t o 320,000 citizens i n 46 B C a n d t o 250,000 citizens i n 29 B C . T h i s evidence indicates t h a t t h e city o f R o m e a t t r a c t e d Targe n u m b e r s o f i m m i g r a n t s ( b o t h f r e e a n d slave, since we can call slaves f o r c e d i m m i g r a n t s ) ; i t seems p l a u s i b l e t h a t a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t o f t h e o v e r a l l u r b a n g r o w t h ( a r b i t r a r i l y I guess a b o u t h a l f ) was d u e t o peasant i m m i g r a t i o n . T h e city also served as a c h a n n e l f o r f u r t h e r m i g r a t i o n ; i n a n e f f o r t t o r e d u c e t h e b u r d e n o f f e e d i n g t h e city, J u l i u s Caesar resettled 70,000 a d u l t m a l e p r o l e t a r i a n s i n colonies overseas ( B r u n t 1971: 257); i t was o n l y p a r t o f his p r o g r a m m e o f c o l o n i s a t i o n . B e t w e e n 45 a n d 8 B C , i t seems t h a t a b o u t o n e h u n d r e d colonies w e r e established overseas, w i t h a n e s t i m a t e d average o f 2-3,000 a d u l t m a l e settlers each, m o s t o f t h e m ex-soldiers. T o be sure, n o t a l l t h e colonies received settlers f r o m I t a l y , a n d i n o t h e r s , g r o u p s o f I t a l i a n s a l r e a d y settled t h e r e p r o v i d e d t h e c o r e o f t h e n e w c o l o n y . B u t i n spite o f these q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , o v e r 250,000 a d u l t males f r o m I t a l y , a b o u t o n e fifth o f all t h a t l i v e d t h e r e ( N = c. 1.2 m i l l i o n ) , w e r e d e c a n t e d f r o m I t a l y by t h e R o m a n g o v e r n m e n t i n a single g e n e r a t i o n . 92

T h e m a i n c h a n n e l f o r t h i s t y p e o f m o b i l i t y as w e have seen, was t h e a r m y . B e t w e e n 49 a n d 28 BC, 500,000 I t a l i a n males served i n t h e a r m i e s 9 1

9 1

T h e cautionary remarks of B r u n t (1971: 159-65) are worth noting; private migration by poor peasants was difficult a n d hazardous a n d has often been thoughtlessly exaggerated. B u t large-scale private migration in agrarian states has sometimes occurred. B r u n t (1971: Appendix 15) ascribes less than 100 provincial colonies to Caesar, the triumvirs a n d Augustus. F . Vittinghoff, Römische Kolonisation und Bürgerrechtspolitik (Wiesbaden, 1951) 148-50 gives 104 colonies.

67

Conquerors Table

1.2. Population

changes

and

speculative

and slaves

migration figures

in

28 BC 4,000

Free Slave Total

500

2,OOO

5.000

6,ooo

D

rf

225-8

0

BC:

some

Ç000)

A - Population changes Men, women a n d children 225 BC

Italy

A d u l t males (aged 17+ years)*

225 BC

28 BC

gain (loss)

".350 150

1,220 600

(13°) 450

I,5O0

1,820

320

B - R u r a l / U r b a n * split Rural free Rural slaves Urban slaves Italian towns free City of R o m e free Total

4,100

2,900*

870

i ,200* ?5°° 250

/

150

360 240

. 450

500*

75

150

75

6oo>

45

200*

6,000

C - Migration from Italy overseas* A d u l t males (aged 17+ years) Before 69 BC 69-49 BC 49-28 BC

(360)

• ?i5°

800

5,000

Sub-tota) 28-8 BC

1,230

125 25 165

1,500

D - Decline of free r u r a l population A d u l t males (aged 17+ years) Emigrants overseas, 225-28 BC T o Italian towns

(net) 265' 315 (gross) ioo

320

I,820

T o t a l loss

265 100" 365

m

E - G r o w t h of Italian towns a n d City of R o m e - A d u l t males (aged 17+ years) 225-28 BC R u r a l free to urban Ex-slaves to urban free T o t a l gain

100" 130' 230

F - R u r a l migration within Italy* - A d u l t males (aged 17+ years) G r a c c h a n reforms 133-120 BC Sullan veterans c. 80 BC Pompey's veterans 59 BC Civil wars 41-36 BC Augustan setdement (1) 30-28 BC Augustan settlement (2) 28-8 BC Total

10 80 50 60 57 3 260

T h e solution - mass migration T h i s includes northern Italy (Cisalpine Gaul). Adult males aged 17+ years are reckoned here as 30% of the total population. I n a stationary, i.e. self-reproducing, population this implies a n average life expectancy at birth of 27 years. T h i s is probably too high. It could also be justified, but only in the short term, by a fall in the birth rate ( B r u n t 1971: 117); the exclusion of infants aged less than one year from the R o m a n census-returns would raise the proportion of adult males i n the remaining population by less than one per cent. I f the average expectation of life at birth was 25 years i n a stationary population, adult males aged 17+ years would be roughly 26% of the total population. T h e s e calculations are based on U . N . Model Life Tables (see note 27). T h e number of adult males available in Rome was therefore probably less than the 35% proposed by B r u n t (1971: 117). I accept Brunt's (1971: 59*121) estimate of the Italian free population of Italy at 3.1 million in 225 BC, plus 1.4 million for Cisalpine G a u l . See notes 13 a n d 14 above; the slave population here includes a full quota of men, women a n d children, a situation probably not achieved until later. I n the first century BC, at the height of imperial expansion, the ratio of adult males among war captives a n d in the slave population as a whole must have been abnormally high. I suspect therefore that the figure given here is too high. T h e figure for adult male slaves is better. « Urban/rural here indicate the type of job-non-agricultural/agricultural, rather than the place of residence. T h u s a peasant living in a town but working i n his fields counts as rural. T h e r e were 434 towns in Italy (Beloch 1886: 442). / T h e free urban population is reckoned at 9% of the total free population. I n the modern era, the city of Rome achieved a population of 150,000 again only in the seventeenth century, a n d was then fed primarily from local Italian sources. O n size, see K . J . Beloch, Bevdlkerungsgtschichte Italiens (Berlin, 1937) 13; on feeding Rome, see J , Delumeau, L a vie economique et social* de Rome (Paris, 1959) vol. 2, 52iff. * T h e rural population in 28 BC is put at 4,100,000 free a n d slave as against 4,100,000 plus slaves in 225 BC. B u t note that the cultivated area was appreciably larger in 28 BC thanks to the drainage and clearance of parts of northern Italy. * T h e total urban population in 28 BC is here arbitrarily estimated at 1.9 million including slaves, that is 32 % of the population of Italy; that is very high for a pre-industrial state, though of course Rome was the capital of the empire, not just of Italy. I assume that the high consumption in Rome produced ancillary urbanisation i n Italy; even so the figures here at 0.5 million free urban and 0.5 million slaves (nearly 20% of the population outside Rome) are high. ' T h e number of citizens receiving free wheat under Augustus i n 29 BC was 250,000 (Suetonius, Augustus 41) though that may include some boys aged 10+ years, and some m e n rurally occupied, living near Rome. T h a t said, 200,000 is a low estimate for adult male recipients, which at 30% would imply a total free population of 670,000. T o be o n the safe side, I have taken a total free population for the city of Rome as 600,000, which presumably limits the probable number of slaves in Rome to about 300,000-350,000. * Derived from B r u n t (1971: 262-4); t n c figure for Italian emigrants overseas before 49 BC indudes Italians setded in more than a dozen colonies a n d other less formal settlements (such as that of the colonists at Carthage sent out in 122 BC, and of veterans in Spain); cf. B r u n t (1971: 204&.). B r u n t almost completely discounts the 'mythical' record that Mithridates in 88BC h a d 80,000 Italians massacred in Asia Minor; I a m convinced that this number is an exaggeration; but B r u n t may also have overstated his case, in his attempt to fit scattered data to the surviving census figures. At least his figures for overseas migration are cautiously low. ' Some of the Italians abroad in 49 BC were caught u p in the ensuing civil wars, a n d were killed or re-entered the setdements made after 49 BC. B r u n t constructed the figure of 265,000 to take this into account; it refers to the number of adult male citizens of Italian origin living overseas in 28 BC. However, the total loss of Italian adult males through emigration by 28 BC is estimated 0

b

c

d

m

at 315,000. B r u n t (1971: 264) reckons that the number of legionaries discharged between 28 and 8 BC was 127,000 o r more, but thinks that only about 100,000 of these were setded in 42 colonies overseas.

T h i s reduction is perhaps large enough to make unnecessary a further reduction to take account of legionaries of non-Italian origin. " T h e figure for r u r a l - u r b a n migration appears arbitrary at first sight, a n d of course it is. I t is derived from Brunt's figures, though he may not agree with my conclusion. I n my view, the reduction i n rural population was made possible primarily by the transfer of people elsewhere; thus, i n this scheme, r u r a l - u r b a n migration (sub-tables D and E: 100,000) plus net rural overseas migration (sub-table c: 265,000) roughly equalled the loss in rural free population (sub-table o: 365,000). O f course, this is much too neat. T h e free rural poor may not have reproduced themselves, though I think that B r u n t exaggerates this risk; after all, poverty does not by itself prevent reproduction. It seems plausible that substantial numbers of peasants migrated to Rome and other Italian towns. T h e number given here (100,000) is a crude guess. P T h i s is also a crude guess. T h e evidence of tombstones suggests that the number of freed slaves was high both i n Rome a n d other Italian towns. 4 T h e s e figures for r u r a l migration within Italy relate to state allotments only. I have no idea how many people received Gracchan allotments, but five colonies were established in Italy 128-122 BC, so that the figure given here is minimal. T h e figures for 80-28 BC are taken from B r u n t (1971: 342); the figure for 28-8 BC refers to the year 25 BC only; but there were other setdements of soldiers sent to colonies and towns (cf. Augustus, My Achievements 3).

69

Conquerors

and slaves

o f c o m p e t i n g generals i n a series o f c i v i l w a r s ( B r u n t 1971: 511). V i c t o r i o u s generals, Sulla, J u l i u s Caesar a n d his p o l i t i c a l h e i r s , A n t o n y a n d A u g u s t u s , a l l r a i s e d l a r g e a r m i e s t o s u p p o r t t h e i r cause. W h e n v i c t o r y came, t h e y s o u g h t peace b y d i s a r m a m e n t a n d gifts o f l a n d . T h e y h o p e d t h a t i f a n e m e r g e n c y arose, colonies o f t h e i r ex-soldiers w o u l d be a source o f s u p p o r t ( A p p i a n , Civil Wars 1.96; 2.140). F o r t h i s p u r p o s e , o n l y colonies i n I t a l y w o u l d be u s e f u l . B e t w e e n 80 a n d 28 B C , o v e r a q u a r t e r o f a m i l l i o n soldiers ( a n d t h a t is a conservative estimate) w e r e g i v e n n e w f a r m s i n I t a l y ( B r u n t 1971: 34). A t first s i g h t , i t m a y seem clear t h a t t h e r e s e t t l e m e n t o f so m a n y m e n o n t h e l a n d e i t h e r increased t h e n u m b e r o f peasants o r at least h e l p e d s t e m t h e i r d e c l i n e ; t o some e x t e n t , o f course, i t d i d , j u s t as i t h e l p e d p o p u l a t e w h a t w e r e t h e n t h e less f a v o u r e d p a r t s o f I t a l y . B u t i n m a n y p a r t s o f I t a l y , arable l a n d c o u l d be g i v e n t o p o o r citizens o n l y i f i t was t a k e n f r o m o t h e r s . O u r evidence also suggests t h a t m a n y o f t h e n e w settlements w e r e c r e a t e d o n l y at t h e cost o f e v i c t i n g o t h e r s m a l l h o l d e r s . * T h e n u m b e r s i n v o l v e d w e r e s i m p l y t o o l a r g e t o be a c c o m m o d a t e d o n vacant l a n d . E v e n t h e estates o f t h e r i c h w e r e t o o s m a l l o r scattered f o r a r e g u l a r c o l o n y . So l a r g e tracts o f l a n d w e r e t a k e n away f r o m t o w n s w h i c h h a d s u p p o r t e d o r e v e n s y m p a t h i s e d w i t h t h e l o s i n g side. E v i d e n c e f r o m o v e r a c e n t u r y l a t e r shows t h a t , i n s o m e places, successive waves o f colonists r e t a i n e d t h e i r separate i d e n t i t y e v e n w i t h i n a single c o m m u n i t y ; f o r e x a m p l e , i n A r e z z o t h e r e w e r e t h r e e g r o u p s , t h e o l d i n h a b i t a n t s , t h e * f a i t h f u l ' t h a t is Sulla's veterans, a n d t h e Caesarians ( P l i n y , Natural History 3.52). I t was also said t h a t s o m e ex-soldiers m a d e b a d f a r m e r s , o r s i m p l y g o t b a d l a n d (Sallust, Speech of Lepidus 23), o r w e r e d r a f t e d back i n t o t h e a r m y ; i n o t h e r cases, a n e w wave o f v i c t o r i o u s soldiers i n t h e i r t u r n e v i c t e d t h e o l d soldiers, o r t h e i r w i d o w s a n d sons (D1048.9). Each f r e s h e x p u l s i o n severed m o r e peasants f r o m t h e l a n d , c r e a t e d f r e s h reserves f o r t h e a r m i e s o f conquest a n d n e w m i g r a n t s t o I t a l i a n t o w n s . T h e p a i n f u l cycle o f expulsion, military r e c r u i t m e n t , civil war a n d the reallocation o f l a n d achieved l i t t l e e x c e p t t o m a k e a d i f f e r e n t set o f p o o r peasants landless. 3

A m o n g t h e e l i t e , a n e q u a l l y vicious c i r c l e o p e r a t e d . A s we have seen, t h e R o m a n r i c h w a n t e d t o invest a l a r g e p a r t o f t h e i r p r o v i n c i a l p r o f i t s i n I t a l i a n l a n d ; t h e estates o f o t h e r r i c h m e n w e r e o b v i o u s targets f o r their greed, previously, the Romans h a d achieved a political c u l t u r e i n w h i c h m e n i n t h e c i t y w e n t u n a r m e d ; t h e t o g a was a s y m b o l o f t h a t w

My discussion here is the briefest synopsis of B r u n t (1971: 30off.). Some of those resettled i n Italy might have been evicted later, then re-enlisted in the army a n d then setded in colonies overseas. I think the element of double-counting is small a n d covered by Brunt's scaling down of ancient estimates.

70

The solution - mass migration a c h i e v e m e n t . I n t h e last decades o f t h e R e p u b l i c , social c o n t r o l o f p r i v a t e v i o l e n c e b r o k e d o w n , so t h a t i n b o t h t o w n a n d c o u n t r y , rich m e n k e p t b a n d s o f a r m e d slaves t o p r o t e c t t h e i r p r o p e r t y ; some, i f occasion o f f e r e d , used t h e m t o seize t h e p r o p e r t y o f o t h e r s . T h r e e cases o f v i o l e n t seizure o f estates s u r v i v e i n t h e speeches o f C i c e r o ; t h e f r e q u e n c y o f v i o l e n c e is also reflected i n t h e f o r m u l a s o f legal i n j u n c t i o n (interdictd) which ordered the restitution of property; two o f the f o u r commonly-used formulas envisaged violence o r a r m e d v i o l e n c e as t h e m e t h o d w h i c h h a d b e e n used t o g a i n possession o f l a n d unjustly. 94

9 5

T h i s p r i v a t e v i o l e n c e pales i n t o insignificance w h e n c o m p a r e d t o t h e v i o l e n c e w h i c h p e r v a d e d t h e t w o m a i n p e r i o d s o f c i v i l w a r (90-80 B C ; 49-31 B C ) . M u r d e r b y d e c r e e ( p r o s c r i p t i o n s ) a n d confiscation o f p r o p e r t y h i t t h e r i c h i n p a r t i c u l a r , p a r t l y because t h e y h a d b e e n p o l i t i c a l l y p r o m i n e n t , a n d p a r t l y because t h e y w e r e rich. T h e victors n e e d e d t o raise m o n e y f r o m t h e sale o f t h e i r estates o r w a n t e d t o r e w a r d t h e i r f o l l o w e r s b y l e t t i n g t h e m b u y estates at k n o c k d o w n prices. O n e o f Sulla* ex-slaves, f o r e x a m p l e , is said t o have b o u g h t estates v a l u e d at six m i l l i o n H S f o r o n l y t w o t h o u s a n d H S (Cicero, I n Defence of Roscius of Anuria 6); Crassus b u i l t his f o r t u n e o n t h e m i s f o r t u n e s o f t h e p r o s c r i b e d . Sulla i n t h e e n d is said t o have k i l l e d o r b a n i s h e d 105 senators a n d 2,600 k n i g h t s ( A p p i a n , Civil Wars 1.103). T h e i r p r o p e r t y was u p f o r grabs. A l t o g e t h e r i t m u s t have a m o u n t e d t o a sizeable p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e t o t a l w e a l t h o w n e d by t h e elite. V e r y l i t d e o f i t was u s e d t o p r o v i d e lands f o r t h e p o o r . P a r t o f i t m e r e l y q u a l i f i e d a n e w set o f m e n f o r m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e elite - a c h a n g e o f p e r s o n n e l b u t n o t o f s t r u c t u r e . B u t p a r t o f i t m a d e possible a significant change i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f wealth: the surviving r i c h became i m m e n s e l y richer. T h e y i n t h e i r t u r n raised t h e level o f c o m p e t i t i v e e x p e n d i t u r e at R o m e a n d o f e x p l o i t a t i o n i n t h e p r o v i n c e s , a n d so k e p t t h e vicious circle t u r n i n g . T h e j u n t a f o r m e d i n 43 B C a f t e r t h e assassination o f Caesar h a d 300 senators, a b o u t a t h i r d o f t h e senate at t h a t t i m e , a n d 2,000 k n i g h t s p r o s c r i b e d a n d p r o b a b l y e x e c u t e d ; t h e i r p r o p e r t y was confiscated. I n t h e c i v i l w a r s w h i c h f o l l o w e d yet m o r e 9 4

*

T h e R o m a n general going out to war ceremoniously put on military clothes (paludamentum) a n d could re-enter the city as a soldier accompanied by his a r m e d troops only if he was awarded a triumph by the senate. Romanists who take this level of political culture for granted will see from B . Cellini's Autobiography, for example, how difficult it was to re-establish after the Middle Ages. At least, in Rome, Cicero tried to get redress for his clients in court. Cicero, Pro Quinctio, Tullio and Caecina, a n d cf. also Pro Cluentio 161; Pro Vareno frag. 5; on restitutory injunctions (e.g. si quis.. .ex possessione vi eiectus sit) see A . H . J . Greenidge, The Legal Procedure of Cicero*s Time (Oxford, 1901) 21 off.; a n d Jolowicz (1972: 259ff.).

7*

Conquerors

and slaves

senators a n d k n i g h t s w e r e k i l l e d ; t h e i r deaths m a d e a n o v e l p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n easier. T h e i m p o s i t i o n o f a m o n a r c h y by the victorious general Octavian ( A u g u s t u s ) r a d i c a l l y c h a n g e d t h e t e r m s o f c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n aristocrats. P r i v a t e violence, e x p l o i t a t i o n i n t h e p r o v i n c e s a n d r e c o u r s e t o t h e a r m y as t h e decisive w e a p o n i n p o l i t i c a l struggles w e r e severely r e s t r i c t e d . T h e r e w e r e n o m o r e c i v i l wars f o r a c e n t u r y . F o r t h e m o m e n t I w a n t t o c o n c e n t r a t e o n w h a t can be seen as t h e economic u n d e r p i n n i n g of the A u g u s t a n settlement, a factor w h i c h is u s u a l l y i g n o r e d . Augustus* p o l i t i c a l s o l u t i o n was r e n d e r e d viable, as I see i t , b y t h e c u m u l a t i v e effects o f r e d u c i n g t h e pressure o n I t a l i a n l a n d . O f course, this was a necessary n o t a sufficient c o n d i t i o n . I t was a c h i e v e d p a r t l y by large-scale, state-assisted m i g r a t i o n overseas ( T a b l e 1.2c); p a r t l y b y r u r a l - u r b a n m i g r a t i o n ( T a b l e 1 . 2 E ) ; a n d p a r t l y t h r o u g h the integration of an empire-wide economy which encoura g e d t h e richest R o m a n s t o o w n estates o u t s i d e I t a l y . T h e mass m o v e m e n t o f m e n overseas was s t a r t e d b y J u l i u s Caesar, b u t as i n so m a n y o t h e r t h i n g s i t was A u g u s t u s w h o f o l l o w e d his plans t h r o u g h effectively. B o t h policies seem t o h a v e b e e n d e t e r m i n e d b y i m m e d i a t e factors: f o r e x a m p l e , by t h e p r e s s i n g n e e d t o ease t e n s i o n a f t e r a c i v i l w a r by d i s b a n d i n g t r o o p s , a n d t o p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h a l t e r n a t i v e m e a n s o f s u p p o r t . T r a d i t i o n a l l y s u p p o r t f o r veterans i n v o l v e d t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f I t a l i a n l a n d , b u t t h a t was e x p e n s i v e , p o l i t i c a l l y a n d financially. Seizing t h e l a n d , as t h e t r i u m v i r s ( i n c l u d i n g O c t a v i a n ) d i d i n 41 B C , c r e a t e d u n r e s t ; b u y i n g i t , as A u g u s t u s d i d a f t e r 31 B C (My Achievements 16), cost 600 m i l l i o n H S , r o u g h l y e q u a l t o twice t h e a n n u a l cost o f m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i m p e r i a l a r m y . P r o v i n c i a l l a n d was c h e a p e r ; m o r e o v e r , i t b e l o n g e d t o subjects; a n d t h e r e was t h e a d d e d a d v a n t a g e t o t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t o f h a v i n g R o m a n veterans setded a m o n g t h e c o n q u e r e d . B u t t h e r e was n o t r a d i t i o n o f overseas c o l o n i s a t i o n . I t m u s t h a v e s e e m e d a r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n n o v a t i o n . T h e first p r o p o s a l h a d b e e n m a d e b y G a i u s G r a c c h u s i n 123 B C ; u n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r his e x p e r i m e n t , h e chose t h e o l d site o f C a r t h a g e f o r his n e w c o l o n y , w h i c h a d d e d s u p e r s t i t i o u s fears a b o u t t h e r e b i r t h o f a n e n e m y t o t h e e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n ; wolves w e r e said t o h a v e t o r n u p t h e n e w b o u n d a r y stones o v e r n i g h t , a n d t h e p l a n s w e r e l e f t u n c o m p l e t e d ( P l u t a r c h , Gains Gracchus*)). I n t h e n e x t seventy years, o n l y five colonies w e r e f o u n d e d overseas; we k n o w l i t d e a b o u t t h e m . W h e n h e was d i c t a t o r i n 45 B C , J u l i u s Caesar was t h e first t o o r g a n i s e colonies overseas o n a g r a n d scale; his d e c l a r e d p o l i c y at h o m e o f n o - v i c t i m i s a t i o n against his e n e m i e s (dementia) a n d his slogans: * S e c u r i t y ' a n d 'Peace' (quies, pax, solus) were incompatible w i t h largescale r e s e t d e m e n t w i t h i n I t a l y - a l t h o u g h his o t h e r slogans 'Peace i n 72

The solution - mass migration t h e P r o v i n c e s ' a n d 'Safety i n t h e E m p i r e ' (Caesar, Civil Wars 3.57) m i g h t have l i m i t e d his acdons i n t h e p r o v i n c e s as w e l l . Besides, t h e m a i n objects o f h i s m i g r a t i o n p o l i c y w e r e citizens l i v i n g i n R o m e ; t h e y w e r e e x p e n s i v e t o f e e d , a noticeable b u r d e n o n t h e state b u d g e t , a n d t h e y h a d less p o w e r t h a n veterans t o resist t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . Whatever the intentions o r determinants o f the policy, one o f the f u n c t i o n s o f overseas settlements was t h a t i t s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e d u c e d t h e n u m b e r o f f r e e I t a l i a n s (by 165,000 = 13% i n 17 years, 4 5 - 2 8 B C ) , w h o m i g h t legitimately claim a.right to earn their living f r o m Italian land. T h e f u r t h e r r e c r u i t m e n t o f I t a l i a n soldiers f o r i m p e r i a l a r m i e s a n d t h e s e t d e m e n t o f 100,000 o f t h e m i n t h e p r o v i n c e s d u r i n g t h e n e x t t w e n t y years ( 2 8 - 8 B C ; c. 9 % o f I t a l i a n a d u l t males) served t h e same f u n c t i o n . I n d e e d , m i l i t a r y service b y I t a l i a n s was m a i n t a i n e d at such a h i g h level t h a t i t inevitably l e d t o a s h o r t a g e o f y o u n g I t a l i a n males, a n d i n d u c e d the R o m a n g o v e r n m e n t t o r e c r u i t provincials instead. T h e e m i g r a t i o n o f p o o r peasants f r o m I t a l y n o t o n l y r e d u c e d t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f u n w e l c o m e p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e f r o m b e l o w , b u t also m a d e m o r e I t a l i a n l a n d available f o r o c c u p a t i o n by t h e rich. T h e m i g r a t i o n o f peasants t o t h e city o f R o m e served a s i m i l a r f u n c t i o n , a n d b r o u g h t e v e n m o r e b e n e f i t t o t h e R o m a n rich. I a m n o t r e f e r r i n g h e r e t o t h e fact t h a t t h e R o m a n rich d e p e n d e d f o r t h e i r increased w e a l t h u p o n t h e increased p u r c h a s i n g capacity o f I t a l i a n townsmen i n o r d e r to derive profits f r o m their farms. M y a r g u m e n t h e r e is d i f f e r e n t a n d deserves s o m e e l a b o r a t i o n . I n a n e f f o r t t o secure t h e e l e c t o r a l a n d legislative s u p p o r t o f t h e plebs, Gaius G r a c c h u s i n 123 B C h a d passed a law p r o v i d i n g citizens l i v i n g i n t h e c i t y o f R o m e w i t h a m o n t h l y a l l o w a n c e o f w h e a t a t a stable, state-subsidised p r i c e . T h e a l l o w a n c e r e m a i n e d fixed at m o r e t h a n e n o u g h f o r a m a n , n o t e n o u g h f o r a f a m i l y (five modii = 33 k g ) . T h e g r o w t h i n t h e city's p o p u l a t i o n m u s t have increased t h e average p r i c e o f w h e a t , t o say n o t h i n g o f t h e f l u c t u a t i o n s caused by t h e p o l i t i c a l crises w h i c h affected supplies. So Gracchus* scheme was p r o b a b l y v e r y h e l p f u l as w e l l as p o p u l a r , t h o u g h i t m u s t have e n c o u r a g e d m o r e peasants t o m i g r a t e t o t h e c i t y . B u t its p a r t i s a n o r i g i n s gave i t a b u m p y ride i n t h e p o s t - G r a c c h a n p e r i o d ; i t became a p o l i t i c a l s h u t t l e c o c k , r e j e c t e d by conservatives, p r o m o t e d b y d e m a g o g u e s ; t h e scale a n d cost o f t h e scheme v a r i e d . B u t f r o m 58 B C o n w a r d s , w h e a t was a p p a r e n d y g i v e n f r e e o f c h a r g e t o a l l citizens l i v i n g i n t h e city o f R o m e . T h e n u m b e r o f r e c i p i e n t s rose t o 320,000 b y 46 B C ; J u l i u s Caesar c u t t h e figure d r a s t i c a l l y t o 150,000, b u t i t rose a g a i n t o 250,000 b y 29 BC. O n e o f t h e f u n c t i o n s o f w h e a t d i s t r i b u t i o n s was t o u n d e r w r i t e t h e p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r o f I t a l y ' s largest m a r k e t f o r f o o d . T h e rich w e r e rich l a r g e l y by v i r t u e o f s e l l i n g t h e s u r p l u s p r o d u c e o f t h e i r f a r m s . 73

Conquerors

and slaves

T h e p u r c h a s i n g p o w e r o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a t m u s t o f t e n have been i n d o u b t W h a t b e t t e r way o f g u a r a n t e e i n g sales t h a n t o a r r a n g e p u r c h a s e by t h e state i n s t e a d o f by t h e consumers? C o n t e m p o r a r y leaders m a y n o t h a v e seen t h e e c o n o m i c advantages o f w h e a t doles f o r t h e i r o w n s t r a t u m ; t h e y m a y n o t h a v e seen t h e l o n g - t e r m e c o n o m i c advantages o f e m i g r a t i o n overseas. W e d o n o t k n o w . E v e n i f t h e y d i d , o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , f o r e x a m p l e t h e heavy cost t o t h e t r e a s u r y o f gifts o f w h e a t , o r t h e p o w e r o f t h e soldiers o n occasion o u t w e i g h e d t h e m . B u t i t is m o r e l i k e l y t h a t t h e y saw t h e w h e a t - d o l e as a p o l i t i c a l o r m o r a l issue; a way o f k e e p i n g t h e plebs q u i e t , w h i c h h a d its o r i g i n i n a p a r t i s a n a t t e m p t t o b r i b e t h e plebs w i t h state resources, b u t w h i c h h a d u n f o r t u n a t e l y become a traditional r i g h t . T h e senatorial historian Tacitus later d u b b e d i t a s y m p t o m o f the m o r a l d e g r a d a t i o n o f the R o m a n plebs, m a r k i n g t h e i r d e c l i n e f r o m i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d v i g o u r ; a l l t h e y w a n t e d was ' b r e a d a n d circuses'. T h i s t o o has been t h e k e y n o t e o f its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n b y m o d e r n h i s t o r i a n s . B u t t h e m o r a l d e c a d e n c e o f t h e p o o r was c o m p a t i b l e w i t h p r o f i t b y t h e r i c h ; t h e m o r a l a n d the functional interpretation are complementary, not competing. I t c o u l d be a r g u e d t h a t m o s t w h e a t g i v e n t o t h e p o o r c a m e f r o m a b r o a d i n t h e f o r m o f taxes; even so, t h e s u p p l y o f f r e e w h e a t e n a b l e d p o o r citizens t o s p e n d t h e m o n e y w h i c h t h e y w o u l d h a v e s p e n t o n wheat o n extra f o o d instead. W e k n o w that the u r b a n p o o r i n u n d e r d e v e l o p e d e c o n o m i e s t o d a y have a h i g h p r o p e n s i t y t o s p e n d e x t r a m o n e y o n f o o d . I suggest t h a t t h e R o m a n p o o r s p e n t t h e m o n e y released by g i f t s o f w h e a t o n w i n e a n d o l i v e o i l p r o d u c e d o n t h e estates o f t h e r i c h . T h e f u n c t i o n , t h e u n i n t e n d e d consequence, o f g i v i n g w h e a t f r e e t o t h e plebs was a n increase i n p r o s p e r i t y f o r r i c h landowners.

S T R U C T U R A L IMPLICATIONS

D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N O F CHANGE: AND

A N D T H E

T H E ARMY,

W I D E R

E D U C A T I O N

T H E L A W

U p t o n o w we h a v e d e a l t w i t h changes i n t h e R o m a n p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y i n t e r m s o f t h e i n t e r a c d o n o f seven factors, set o u t i n t h e schema o f i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . T h i s p r o v i d e d us w i t h o n e p e r s p e c t i v e o n a n e x u s o f events. I t m a y be u s e f u l t o f i n i s h t h i s c h a p t e r b y l o o k i n g o n c e m o r e at t h e same events a n d t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s b u t f r o m a d i f f e r e n t perspective, b y u s i n g t h e c o n c e p t s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . T h i s 9 6

··

I n using the concept * structural differentiation' I do not imply a necessary evolution in one direction. T h e concept is used retrospectively a n d analytically: this is how I perceive what happened, rather than as a total explanation: this is how it h a d to happen. F o r sophisticated elaboration, see T . Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966) 2iff. a n d Eisenstadt (1971). Cf. note 15 above.

Structural

differentiation

c o n c e p t i m p l i e s t h a t as societies b e c o m e m o r e c o m p l e x , some i n s t i t u t i o n s separate o u t a n d b e c o m e m o r e f u n c t i o n a l l y specific; these newly emergent institutions ( f o r example, a professional a r m y ) t h e n establish t h e i r i d e n t i t y by d e v e l o p i n g n o r m s a n d values specific t o t h e i n s t i t u t i o n (such as r u l e s o f c o n d u c t specific t o soldiers, even a * m i l i t a r y ' l a w ) ; t h e i r m e m b e r s c o m p e t e w i t h o t h e r social g r o u p s f o r resources ( f o r e x a m p l e , by c l a i m i n g r e s e t t l e m e n t f a r m s f o r veterans), a n d t h e y e v e n c h a l l e n g e t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t f o r h i g h e r r e w a r d s (as i n c i v i l war). A t t h i s p o i n t we c o m e u p against a p r o b l e m . I d e a l l y , t h e a r g u m e n t s h o u l d advance o n t w o f r o n t s at t h e same t i m e , t h e c o n c e p t u a l a n d t h e e m p i r i c a l ; b u t t h a t is d i f f i c u l t . T h e r e f o r e , I shall b e g i n by e x a m i n i n g three i m p o r t a n t R o m a n institutions, the army, education a n d the law, i n o r d e r t o i l l u s t r a t e s i m i l a r i t i e s i n t h e i r d e v e l o p m e n t . T h i s involves m a k i n g forays i n t o n e w t e r r i t o r y at t h e e n d o f a l o n g c h a p t e r , b u t we can d e a l w i t h t h e a r m y b r i e f l y since several changes i n m i l i t a r y o r g a n i s a t i o n have a l r e a d y b e e n discussed, a n d we can m a k e some economies i n o u r discussion o f e d u c a t i o n a n d law by c o m p a r i n g t h e i r state at t h e b e g i n n i n g a n d e n d o f t h e p e r i o d o f i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n . T h i s c r u d e j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f e x t r e m e s h a r d l y does j u s t i c e t o t h e i r h i s t o r y , b u t i t serves t o h i g h l i g h t s o m e o f t h e changes w h i c h o c c u r r e d . T h e n finally, we can r e t u r n t o t h e c o n c e p t s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , l o o k i n g back t o t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s f o r e m p i r i c a l i l l u s t r a t i o n s . T h e R o m a n a r m y was o r i g i n a l l y e m b e d d e d i n t h e p e a s a n t r y ; l a n d o w n i n g c i t i z e n peasants w h o p r o v i d e d t h e i r o w n a r m o u r served as soldiers a n d at t h e e n d o f a season's fighting r e t u r n e d t o t h e i r f a r m s ; d a i l y pay p r o v i d e d sustenance a n d c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r absence f r o m t h e i r l a n d . B y t h e e n d o f t h e last c e n t u r y B C , c i t i z e n s h i p b u t n o t l a n d - o w n e r s h i p was p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r service i n t h e legions; soldiers served f o r a s t a n d a r d p e r i o d o f t w e n t y years, u s u a l l y o u t s i d e I t a l y . A s a r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e soldiers' l o n g service, t h e y w e r e p a i d o n l y t h r e e t i m e s a year, a n d at a r a t e w h i c h r o u g h l y e q u a l l e d twice t h e level o f m i n i m u m substistence f o r a peasant f a m i l y . A n d o n r e t i r e m e n t , legionaries received a resettlement b o u n t y w h i c h equalled m o r e t h a n t h i r t e e n years' pay. S o l d i e r i n g h a d t h u s b e c o m e a p r i v i l e g e d o c c u p a t i o n , p a i d f o r i n taxes b y c o n q u e r e d p r o v i n c i a l s . T h e a r m y h a d b e c o m e f u l l y p r o f e s s i o n a l . I t h a d been t r a n s f o r m e d f r o m a s e l f - a r m e d c i t i z e n m i l i t i a i n t o a n i n s t r u m e n t o f i m p e r i a l c o n t r o l a n d d e f e n c e , isolated b y distance f r o m t h e c e n t r a l p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t h e c i t y o f R o m e a n d d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e r e g u l a r d e l i v e r y o f m o n e y taxes. I t s existence t h u s d e p e n d e d u p o n o t h e r changes i n t h e p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y o f t h e e m p i r e . 9 7

*

7

See Gabba (1976) a n d Smith (1958).

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and slaves

Secondly, education. T h e importance o f education f o r o u r present a r g u m e n t lies n o t o n l y i n t h e s i m i l a r i t i e s b e t w e e n its d e v e l o p m e n t a n d t h e changes i n t h e a r m y , b u t also i n t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n w h i c h e d u c a t i o n m a d e t o t h e c o h e r e n c e o f t h e e l i t e i n a r a p i d l y g r o w i n g social system. O r i g i n a l l y a n d i d e a l l y , R o m a n boys l e a r n t w h a t t h e y n e e d e d t o k n o w at h o m e a n d i n m i l i t a r y service. T h e e l d e r C a t o ( c o n s u l 195 B C ) , f o r e x a m p l e , w h o was a d e v o t e d t r a d i t i o n a l i s t t a u g h t his son h i m s e l f ; h e t a u g h t h i m t o r e a d a n d t o w r i t e ; h e t a u g h t h i m law a n d physical prowess: t h r o w i n g t h e spear, f i g h t i n g , riding, b o x i n g a n d s w i m m i n g . H e said t h a t h e d i d n o t w a n t a slave p u l l i n g his son b y t h e ear f o r e r r o r s , n o r w o u l d h e h a v e his c h i l d o w e g r a t i t u d e t o a slave f o r a g i f t so v a l u a b l e as l e a r n i n g ( P l u t a r c h , Coto the Elder 20). B u t even i n that p e r i o d , h e was a p p a r e n d y a n e x c e p t i o n ; l e a d i n g R o m a n s u s u a l l y h a d t h e i r y o u n g c h i l d r e n , b o t h boys a n d g i r l s , t u t o r e d at h o m e by G r e e k slaves o r sent t o school. A c c o r d i n g t o P l u t a r c h (Roman Questions 278E), t h e first f e e - p a y i n g p r i m a r y school was set u p i n t h e city o f R o m e i n t h e s e c o n d h a l f o f t h e t h i r d c e n t u r y &c b y a G r e e k ex-slave; b u t m o d e r n scholars h a v e m o s t l y d o u b t e d t h a t f o r m a l g r o u p t e a c h i n g i n basic w r i t i n g c o u l d h a v e s t a r t e d i n R o m e so late. 98

T h e b e g i n n i n g o f s e c o n d a r y e d u c a t i o n at R o m e , t h a t is e d u c a t i o n i n G r e e k a n d L a t i n l a n g u a g e a n d l i t e r a t u r e (grammatike), dated f r o m t h e m i d d l e o f t h e second c e n t u r y B C , w h e n a G r e e k o n a n embassy t o t h e R o m a n senate f e l l d o w n a n d b r o k e his l e g , a n d d u r i n g his convalescence gave n u m e r o u s a n d s t a r d i n g l y p o p u l a r lectures (Suet o n i u s , On Grammarians 2). B e f o r e t h e n , a g a i n a c c o r d i n g t o S u e t o n i u s (ibid. 1), t h e R o m a n s w e r e t o o u n c i v i l i s e d a n d b e l l i g e r e n t t o spare t i m e f o r s c h o l a r s h i p . B u t i t is also possible t o d a t e these b e g i n n i n g s e a r l i e r t o t h e w o r k o f L i v i u s A n d r o n i c u s , w h o was b r o u g h t t o t h e c i t y o f R o m e as a p r i s o n e r o f w a r f r o m a G r e e k t o w n i n s o u t h e r n I t a l y t o w a r d s t h e m i d d l e o f t h e t h i r d c e n t u r y B C . H e t a u g h t G r e e k l i t e r a t u r e a n d also w r o t e L a t i n plays a n d p o e m s ; his t r a n s l a t i o n o f H o m e r ' s Odyssey m a r k e d t h e b e g i n n i n g o f L a t i n l i t e r a t u r e as we k n o w i t , a n d i t was f o r c e n t u r i e s u s e d as a school t e x t - b o o k . E x a c t dates f o r t h e start o f c o m p l e x changes h a v e a n e l e m e n t o f fiction i n t h e m . W h a t m a t t e r s f o r o u r p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s is t h a t i n t h e p e r i o d o f i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n , L a t i n h i g h c u l t u r e was c r e a t e d i n t h e image o f Greek models. As Horace w r o t e : 'Captive Greece overcame her barbarous c o n q u e r o r a n d b r o u g h t civilisation to w i l d Latins* n

I follow here the excellent book by H . I . M a r r o u , A History of Education in Antiquity ( L o n d o n , 1956) (there is a sixth F r e n c h edition published in Paris, 1964); see also, A . G w y n n , Roman Education from Cicero to Quintilian (Oxford, 1926); M . L . C l a r k e , Rhetoric at Rome ( L o n d o n , 1953) a n d Higher Education in the Ancient World ( L o n d o n , 1971).

76

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differentiation

2.1.156). A s p a r t o f t h i s process o f c u l t u r a l c h a n g e , t h e R o m a n elite l e a r n t t h e G r e e k l a n g u a g e a n d G r e e k l i t e r a t u r e , as w e l l as w h a t t h e r e was o f L a t i n l i t e r a t u r e . T h e i r c h i l d r e n a t t e n d e d secondary school f r o m t h e age o f a b o u t twelve t o f i f t e e n . E d u c a t e d R o m a n s w e r e e x p e c t e d t o be p r o f i c i e n t i n G r e e k as w e l l as L a t i n . S o m e R o m a n magistrates d e l i v e r e d elegant speeches i n G r e e k t o c o n q u e r e d p r o vincials; some e v e n w r o t e R o m a n histories i n G r e e k . T h e c u l t o f H e l l e n i s m h a d its f a t u i t i e s , b u t i t also i n d u e course f o s t e r e d t h e g r o w t h o f L a t i n d r a m a , p o e t r y , h i s t o r y , p h i l o s o p h y a n d r h e t o r i c . " A n idea o f scale m a y be h e l p f u l ; a c c o r d i n g t o S u e t o n i u s , t h e r e w e r e m o r e t h a n t w e n t y flourishing g r a m m a r schools i n t h e c i t y o f R o m e t o w a r d s t h e e n d o f t h e R e p u b l i c (On Grammarians 3). W e c a n speculate: i f each o f t h e t w e n t y schools g r a d u a t e d o n l y t e n s t u d e n t s a g e d fifteen each year, a n d t h a t is a m o d e s t a s s u m p t i o n f o r a flourishing school, t h e n at a n y o n e t i m e t h e r e w e r e a b o u t seven t h o u s a n d a d u l t R o m a n s , w h o h a d b e e n e d u c a t e d i n t h e city o f R o m e . D o u b l e o r q u a d r u p l e t h e n u m b e r (it c a n o n l y be a v e r y r o u g h figure, since t h e base n u m b e r g i v e n b y S u e t o n i u s m a y n o t be t r u s t w o r t h y ) , a n d t h e n u m b e r o f educated adults remains a small p r o p o r t i o n o f the total living i n the city o f R o m e . (Epistles

R o m a n e d u c a t i o n also h a d a t h i r d stage, w h i c h these few R o m a n boys e n t e r e d w h e n t h e y w e r e a b o u t sixteen years o f age a n d h a d assumed a d u l t dress ( t h e toga virilis). T h e m a i n subject was r h e t o r i c , w h i c h was also G r e e k i n o r i g i n . T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f f o r m a l t e a c h i n g i n r h e t o r i c , first i n G r e e k a n d t h e n i n L a t i n , a r o u s e d c o n s i d e r a b l e opposition. Conventional Romans apparendy thought that f o r m a l r h e t o r i c a l s k i l l was a waste o f t i m e , a t r i c k y way o f m a k i n g shallow a r g u m e n t s s o u n d p l a u s i b l e . ' K e e p t o t h e subject', said C a t o , a n d t h e w o r d s w i l l f o l l o w ' (Cato, e d . H . J o r d a n ( L e i p z i g , i860) 80). T h a t was t h e t r a d i t i o n o f r e a l R o m a n s ; a n d C a t o was n o t a l o n e i n his o p i n i o n . I n 161 B C , t h e R o m a n senate passed a d e c r e e o r d e r i n g t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d teachers o f r h e t o r i c s h o u l d be e x p e l l e d f r o m t h e c i t y o f Rome. 4

F a s h i o n p r e v a i l e d o v e r law. Six years l a t e r , t h e d i s t i n g u i s h e d p h i l o s o p h e r C a r n e a d e s , f o u n d e r o f t h e n e w A c a d e m y at A t h e n s , c a m e w i t h ··

Polybius (39.1) recounts with scorn the activities of A . Postumius Albinus, consul of 151 BC, who was a fervent admirer of G r e e k culture, a n d by his extravagances brought admiradon for G r e e k culture into disrepute * a m o n g the older a n d most distinguished of the Romans*. H e even wrote a poem a n d a history i n G r e e k , a n d i n the preface asked his readers to excuse his mistakes, since he d i d not have a complete mastery of the language. Cato ridiculed h i m for this a n d said it was like a m a n who put his name down for a boxing contest, a n d then when the time came for the fight, excused himself to the spectators because he could not bear being hit.

77

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o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s o n a n embassy t o R o m e . P l u t a r c h has l e f t a lively p i c t u r e o f t h e i m p a c t w h i c h t h e l e a r n e d G r e e k delegates m a d e : . . . a l l t h e y o u n g R o m a n s w h o h a d a n y taste f o r l i t e r a t u r e h u r r i e d to f r e q u e n t t h e i r c o m p a n y a n d l i s t e n e d to t h e m w i t h d e l i g h t a n d w o n d e r . A b o v e a l l t h e y w e r e s p e l l b o u n d by the grace a n d c h a r m with w h i c h C a r n e a d e s e x p r e s s e d h i m s e l f . . . H i s discourses attracted

large

and

admiring audiences... T h e

r e p o r t s p r e a d that a G r e e k of e x t r a o r d i n a r y talents h a d a r r i v e d , w h o c o u l d s u b d u e a l l o p p o s i t i o n b e n e a t h t h e s p e l l o f h i s e l o q u e n c e , a n d w h o h a d so b e w i t c h e d a l l t h e y o u t h o f t h e city t h a t t h e y s e e m e d to h a v e a b a n d o n e d a l l t h e i r o t h e r p l e a s u r e s a n d p u r s u i t s a n d to h a v e r u n m a d a f t e r

philosophy.

M o s t o f t h e R o m a n s w e r e g r a t i f i e d b y t h i s , a n d w e r e w e l l c o n t e n t to s e e t h e i r sons embrace G r e e k c u l t u r e . . . B u t C a t o . . .was deeply

disturbed. H e was

a f r a i d that t h e y o u n g e r g e n e r a t i o n m i g h t allow t h e i r a m b i t i o n s to be d i v e r t e d i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n , a n d m i g h t c o m e to v a l u e m o s t h i g h l y a r e p u t a t i o n t h a t w a s b a s e d o n feats o f o r a t o r y r a t h e r t h a n u p o n feats o f a r m s . ( P l u t a r c h , Cato Elder

the

22 t r a n s l a t e d b y I . S c o t t - K i l v e r t , P e n g u i n B o o k s )

R h e t o r i c was b a n n e d a g a i n i n 92 B C , t h a t is j u s t a f t e r i t was first t a u g h t p u b l i c l y i n L a t i n i n t h e city o f R o m e ( S u e t o n i u s , On Rhetoricians 2). T h e censors' e d i c t was a d a m a n t l y conservative: I t h a s b e e n r e p o r t e d to u s t h a t t h e r e a r e m e n w h o h a v e i n t r o d u c e d a n e w f o r m o f t e a c h i n g , a n d t h a t o u r y o u t h is f r e q u e n t i n g t h e i r s c h o o l s ; t h a t t h e s e m e n h a v e a s s u m e d the tide of L a t i n rhetoricians, a n d that o u r y o u n g m e n idle whole days there. O u r f o r e f a t h e r s i n s t i t u t e d w h a t t h e y w i s h e d t h e i r c h i l d r e n to l e a r n a n d t h e s c h o o l s t o w h i c h t h e y s h o u l d go. T h e s e i n n o v a t i o n s , w h i c h r u n c o u n t e r to the customs a n d traditions of o u r ancestors, neither please us, n o r d o they seem proper. T h e r e f o r e it s e e m s to b e o u r d u t y t o m a k e o u r o p i n i o n k n o w n b o t h t o t h o s e w h o h a v e t h e s c h o o l s a n d t h o s e w h o h a v e b e c o m e a c c u s t o m e d to a t t e n d i n g t h e m . W e d o n o t a p p r o v e . ( S u e t o n i u s , On

Rhetoricians

1)

R e p r e s s i o n f a i l e d ; r h e t o r i c flourished. R h e t o r i c i a n s d e v e l o p e d c o m p l i c a t e d r u l e s o n r h y t h m , o n style, o n t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n o f a r g u m e n t s ; t h e y t a u g h t advocates h o w t o p l e a d i n c o u r t , a n d w o u l d - b e p o l i t i c i a n s h o w t o sway t h e e l e c t o r a t e ; a l l w e r e t a u g h t h o w t o e x p a t i a t e o n m o r a l p r o b l e m s , a n d h o w t o eulogise t h e d e a d . E a c h b r a n c h o f o r a t o r y h a d its p r o p e r n a m e : ' j u d i c i a l , d e l i b e r a t i v e , d e m o n s t r a t i v e ' ; f u r t h e r c o m p l e x i t i e s f o l l o w e d : ' A legal issue is d i v i d e d i n t o six sub-types: Letter and Spirit, Conflicting Laws, A m b i g u i t y , Definition, T r a n s f e r e n c e a n d Syllogism* (?Cicero, Ad Herennium 19, cf. 2). A l l these categories w e r e b o r r o w e d f r o m t h e G r e e k a n d s o l e m n l y t r a n s l a t e d i n t o L a t i n . T h u s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n e d u c a t i o n b r e d a special l a n g u a g e ( t h e p h e n o m e n o n is n o t p e c u l i a r t o s o c i o l o g y ) , b y w h i c h cognoscenti d i s t i n g u i s h e d themselves f r o m , a n d i n t h e i r o w n o p i n i o n elevated themselves above o u t s i d e r s . 78

Structural

differentiation

T h e assimilation o f a new profession b r o u g h t w i t h i t problems o f relativities i n status a n d pay. I n t h e late E m p i r e , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e E d i c t o n M a x i m u m Prices ( A D 301), r h e t o r i c i a n s w e r e p a i d five t i m e s , g r a m m a r i a n s f o u r t i m e s as m u c h as p r i m a r y school teachers. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e evidence f r o m e a r l i e r p e r i o d s is p a t c h y . B u t c l e a r l y some g r a m m a r i a n s f e t c h e d fancy prices; o n e was b o u g h t as a slave f o r 700,000 H S ; a n o t h e r was said t o have m a d e 400,000 H S p e r year f r o m his school; a n d a n o t h e r was chosen by t h e e m p e r o r A u g u s t u s t o be t h e t u t o r o f his g r a n d s o n ; h e was m o v e d w i t h his w h o l e school t o t h e i m p e r i a l palace a n d was p a i d a n a n n u a l salary o f 100,000 H S , w h i c h was r o u g h l y e q u a l t o 200 t i m e s t h e level o f m i n i m u m subsistence o f a peasant f a m i l y ( S u e t o n i u s , On Grammarians 3, 17 a n d 23). T h a t t o o was t h e r e g u l a r salary p a i d t o professors o f r h e t o r i c w h o h e l d state chairs i n t h e c i t y o f R o m e - t h e y w e r e f o u n d e d i n t h e m i d d l e o f t h e first c e n t u r y A D , b u t t h e r e w e r e n o n e f o r l a n g u a g e a n d l i t e r a t u r e . I n a n y case, a l l such m e n w e r e e x c e p t i o n a l ; t h a t is w h y we k n o w a b o u t t h e m . E v e n so, t h e y reflect t h e h i g h v a l u e p u t u p o n l e a r n i n g b y i n f l u e n t i a l m e m b e r s o f t h e elite. M a n y teachers o f r h e t o r i c a n d l i t e r a t u r e w e r e G r e e k s , e v e n slaves b y o r i g i n . T h e i r social acceptability is t h e r e f o r e s u r p r i s i n g . A c c o r d i n g t o S u e t o n i u s , s o m e r h e t o r i a n s w e r e so w e l l r e c e i v e d i n R o m e t h a t some a d v a n c e d t o s e n a t o r i a l d i g n i t y a n d t o t h e h i g h e s t magistracies ( O n Rhetoricians 1), b u t h e c i t e d n o e x a m p l e s . H o w e v e r , i t seems p r o b a b l e t h a t t e a c h i n g was a c h a n n e l o f social m o b i l i t y ; i t was also a n i n s t r u m e n t f o r t h e socialisation o f aristocrats. R o m a n aristocrats w a n t e d t o be l i t t e r a t e u r s ; t h e r e f o r e e x p e r t l i t t e r a t e u r s h a d a c r e d i t w i t h aristocrats b y w h i c h t h e y c o u l d a d v a n c e t h e i r o w n status. T h i s m o v e m e n t affected b o t h teachers a n d p u p i l s . A m o n g t h e u p p e r classes i n R o m e , as i n t r a d i t i o n a l C h i n a a n d J a p a n , i n f o r m a l c o m p e t i t i o n f o r status o f t e n took the f o r m of p e p p e r i n g conversation o r correspondence w i t h l i t e r a r y allusions, p h i l o l o g i c a l niceties a n d r h e t o r i c a l flourishes. E d u c a t i o n was t o t h e c u l t u r a l e c o n o m y w h a t m o n e y was t o t h e m o n e t a r y e c o n o m y , a lingua franca by w h i c h elites o f v a r i o u s s u b - c u l t u r e s c o u l d be assimilated a n d f u s e d . 100

T h i s f u n c t i o n a l ' e x p l a n a t i o n ' o f c u l t u r a l c h a n g e is n o t sufficient by itself; b u t i t s u p p l e m e n t s t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l d i f f u s i o n i s t v i e w t h a t t h e R o m a n elite s i m p l y i m i t a t e d a n d assimilated G r e e k c u l t u r e . I n s h o r t , n e i t h e r v i e w is c o m p l e t e l y satisfactory; yet w h a t e v e r its cause, t h e r e s u l t 1 0 0

T h i s is as evident in the G r e e k allusions i n Cicero as in the scholastic discussions of A u l u s Gellius (Attic Nights) a n d of Fronto, the tutor of the e m p e r o r Marcus Aurelius. F o r similar conventions, see The Tales of Genji by the L a d y Murasaki ( L o n d o n , 1965) a n d The Pillow Book o/Sei Shonagon ( L o n d o n , 1967) together with the brilliant evocation by I . Morris, The World of the Shining Prince ( L o n d o n , 1964).

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o f i m i t a t i o n was t h a t m o s t upper-class I t a l i a n s , R o m a n s , G r e e k s , conquerors a n d conquered alike, shared an identical h i g h culture w h i c h was by o r i g i n a l i e n t o a l l e x c e p t t h e G r e e k s . E d u c a t e d G r e e k s t h e r e f o r e acted as t h e h i g h priests o f t h i s c u l t u r e . B u t R o m a n s also w o n m e m b e r s h i p by a c q u i r i n g a b o r r o w e d e d u c a t i o n . W e have c o m e a l o n g way f r o m t h e o l d R o m a n system o f e d u c a t i o n i n t h e h o m e . A s i n m o d e r n i n d u s t r i a l i s i n g states, e d u c a t i o n was t a k e n o u t o f t h e f a m i l y a n d was l o c a t e d i n s t e a d i n f u n c t i o n a l l y specific i n s t i t u t i o n s , n a m e l y schools. T h e o l d - f a s h i o n e d r o l e - m o d e l o f t h e f a t h e r was t o o s i m p l e f o r t r a i n i n g t h e leaders o f a c o m p l e x society. A s we h a v e seen, y o u n g R o m a n s d i d l e a r n G r e e k a n d L a t i n l i t e r a t u r e , r h e t o r i c a n d l a w , i n a d d i t i o n t o a n d o f t e n , as C a t o f e a r e d , i n s t e a d o f m i l i t a r y service. C h i l d r e n w e r e n o w t a u g h t by specialised q u a l i f i e d p e r s o n n e l w i t h n e w n a m e s f o r n e w roles (grammcUistes, litterator, calculator, paidagogus, hypodidaskalus, grammaticus, rhetor); the new personn e l s p o k e a n e w - f a n g l e d p r o f e s s i o n a l l a n g u a g e , a n d acted o u t t h e i r roles i n n e w l y f o u n d e d i n s t i t u t i o n s (ludi, scholae) w h i c h were disting u i s h e d b y specific n o r m s a n d values, r a n g i n g f r o m s o p h i s t r y t h r o u g h p h i l o l o g i c a l correctness t o scholasticism. Similar developments occurred i n the administration o f justice. N e w i n s t i t u t i o n s w e r e c r e a t e d , a n d t h e y w e r e staffed b y n e w p e r s o n n e l , specialised lawyers (iuris consulti) a n d advocates (advocati, causidici, patroni), w h o n o t o n l y f i l l e d n e w roles b u t also t a l k e d a n d w r o t e i n a specialised l a n g u a g e , t h e l a n g u a g e o f R o m a n l a w . T h e t r a d i t i o n a l source o f R o m a n law was t h e T w e l v e T a b l e s o f 451 B C , a p r i m i t i v e c o d i f i c a t i o n , closer i n style t o Moses t h a n t o H a m m u r a b i . T h e T w e l v e T a b l e s set o u t s o m e g r o u n d r u l e s f o r legal p r o c e d u r e a n d p u n i s h m e n t i n archaic a n d o f t e n arcane l a n g u a g e . I t is n o t e w o r t h y t h a t several provisions left the exaction o f vengeance f o r w r o n g s t o the i n j u r e d p a r t y , e v e n i f t h e state m a g i s t r a t e h a d i n t e r v e n e d e a r l i e r t o j u d g e t h e w r o n g d o e r guilty. T h e Twelve Tables survive only i n fragmentary q u o t a t i o n s , b u t t h e f o l l o w i n g clauses g i v e t h e i r c l i p p e d f l a v o u r : 101

I f one summons h i m to justice, he shall go. I f he does not go, summon a witness. T h e n shall one seize h i m . (1.1) I f one has broken his limb, there shall be strict retaliation, unless one has made a pact with h i m . (8.2) I f theft has been done by night, i f one has killed h i m , he shall have been killed lawfully. (8.12) 1 0 1

R o m a n law is a jungle into which visitors stray at the risk of getting lost o r in fear of being mauled by the resident scholarly tigers. I have been guided by W . K u n k e l , An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History (Oxford, 1973); Jolowicz (1972); F . Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science ( O x f o r d , 1946); G r e c n i d g e (1901). I a m very grateful to M r J . A . C r o o k for advising m e how to correct several errors in this section. 80

Structural

differentiation

A t t h e e n d o f o u r p e r i o d by c o n t r a s t , t h a t is at t h e e n d o f t h e last c e n t u r y B C , t h e R o m a n s h a d several d i f f e r e n t specialised c r i m i n a l j u r y c o u r t s , a l a r g e b o d y o f statute l a w , c r i m i n a l , p r i v a t e , p u b l i c a n d p r o c e d u r a l (such as t h e C o r n e l i a n l a w o n m u r d e r , o r t h e F a l c i d i a n law w h i c h r e s t r i c t e d t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f a n estate w h i c h c o u l d be l e f t i n legacies, o r t h e Caecilian law w h i c h f o r b a d c o m p o s i t e laws a n d presc r i b e d a d e l a y b e t w e e n t h e p u b l i c a t i o n a n d t h e passage o f a b i l l ) ; t h e r e w e r e p u b l i s h e d c o m m e n t a r i e s o n t r a d i t i o n a l law a n d p r o c e d u r e s , books o f legal o p i n i o n s a n d t h e edicts o f t h e p r a e t o r s , w h o w e r e t h e c h i e f j u d i c i a l magistrates o f R o m e ; these edicts w e r e i n effect s u p p l e m e n t a r y p r o c e d u r a l r u l e - b o o k s . A l l these t o g e t h e r f o r m e d t h e basis o f a sophisticated legal system, q u i t e d i f f e r e n t i n its t e n o r f r o m t h e archaic law, a n d s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r (mutatis mutandis) i n its c a r e f u l p h r a s i n g t o m o d e r n legal l a n g u a g e . T h e f o l l o w i n g q u o t a t i o n is t a k e n f r o m a set o f m u n i c i p a l r e g u l a t i o n s ( t h e so-called Lex Iulia Municipalis): (10) I f a n y o n e , w h o i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h i s l a w s h o u l d p r o p e r l y m a i n t a i n t h e p u b l i c s t r e e t i n f r o n t o f h i s p r o p e r t y , d o e s n o t m a i n t a i n it a s h e p r o p e r l y s h o u l d , i n t h e j u d g e m e n t o f t h e a e d i l e c o n c e r n e d , t h e l a t t e r at h i s d i s c r e t i o n s h a l l l e a s e a c o n t r a c t f o r its m a i n t e n a n c e . F o r at least t e n d a y s b e f o r e h e a w a r d s the contract, h e shall post i n front o f his tribunal i n the F o r u m the n a m e of the street to be m a i n t a i n e d , t h e d a y o n w h i c h t h e contract shall be given a n d the n a m e s o f t h e p r o p e r t y o w n e r s o n that p a r t o f t h e street. T o t h e a f o r e s a i d o w n e r s o r t h e i r a g e n t s at t h e i r h o u s e s h e s h a l l g i v e n o t i c e o f h i s i n t e n t i o n to lease t h e contract f o r t h e aforesaid street a n d o f the d a y o n w h i c h the contract s h a l l b e g i v e n . . . (Ancient

Roman

Statutes

113)

T h e l a w was o b v i o u s l y d r a f t e d by professionals (cf. C i c e r o , O n H i s Own House 48), a n d i n its s o p h i s t i c a t i o n reflected t h e conflicts o f interests w h i c h h a d t o be c a t e r e d f o r a n d t h e l o o p h o l e s i n p r e v i o u s d r a f t s w h i c h w e r e n o w closed. S u c h f o r m a l laws seek t o a v o i d o p e n c o n f l i c t b y o u t l i n i n g p r e d i c t a b l e consequences f o r m i s b e h a v i o u r . T h e significance o f t h i s s o p h i s t i c a t i o n s h o u l d n o t be e x a g g e r a t e d . Just as t h e j u s t i c e o f t h e T w e l v e T a b l e s u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y p r e s u p p o s e d a l l c l a i m a n t s ' capacity t o h a u l t h e d e f e n d a n t t o c o u r t t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e d i s p u t e d o b j e c t , so t h r o u g h o u t R o m a n h i s t o r y t h e e x e c u t i o n o f j u d g e m e n t was t h e weakest l i n k i n t h e R o m a n legal s y s t e m . There w e r e few c o u r t s ; t h e y w e r e available p r e p o n d e r a n d y t o t h e rich a n d p o w e r f u l ; b r i b e r y was r a m p a n t . W e k n o w v e r y l i t d e a b o u t p o o r c r i m i nals; w e suspect t h a t sophisticated j u s t i c e was r a r e l y available t o t h e m . T h a t is a n o b v i o u s l i m i t a t i o n o f j u s t i c e i n a l l p r e - i n d u s t r i a l states, a n d i n i n d u s t r i a l states as w e l l . T h a t said, appeals f r o m m o d e s t l i t i g a n t s 101

1 0 8

J . M . Kelly, Roman Litigation (Oxford, 1966) somewhat idealises modern judicial systems, but points u p the inadequacies a n d distortions i n R o m a n legal practice, as apparendy few scholars h a d done before h i m .

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d o s u r v i v e i n t h e l a t e r R o m a n law codes; a n d i t seems p r o b a b l e t h a t s o m e p o o r p e o p l e g o t access t o t h e c o u r t s i n a l l p e r i o d s . Y e t i n e v i t a b l y m o s t cases a b o u t w h i c h we k n o w c o n c e r n e d t h e p r i v i l e g e d . W i t h these q u a l i f i c a t i o n s i n m i n d , let us v e r y b r i e f l y r e v i e w some d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e R o m a n legal system. O n c e a g a i n I s h o u l d e n t e r t h e caveat t h a t m u c h is u n c e r t a i n a n d n e a r l y e v e r y t h i n g is d i s p u t e d , a n d i n a b r i e f a c c o u n t I shall i n e v i t a b l y s i m p l i f y c o m p l e x issues. H o w e v e r , at t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e p e r i o d o f i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n o v e r seas, p r o c e d u r e s i n R o m a n l a w w e r e still h i g h l y r i t u a l i s t i c . L i t i g a n t s h a d to appear i n c o u r t before the magistrate together w i t h the object whose possession was d i s p u t e d . I f t h e d i s p u t e d o b j e c t was i m m o v a b l e , t h e n o r i g i n a l l y t h e m a g i s t r a t e h a d v i s i t e d t h e site, ' b u t w h e n t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f t h e R o m a n state w e r e e x t e n d e d a n d t h e magistrates w e r e f a i r l y busy w i t h legal business, t h e y f o u n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o g o t o d i s t a n t sites t o settle c l a i m s ' ( A u l u s G e l l i u s , Attic Nights 20. t o ) . A n d so by a n a g r e e d fiction, a c l o d o f e a r t h o r a r o o f tile was used as t h e visible s y m b o l o f a d i s p u t e d f a r m o r house: t h e c h a n g e was b o t h a n i n d e x o f t h e p e d e s t r i a n concreteness o f o l d R o m a n legal practices a n d o f its t r a n s c e n d a n c e by legal fictions. T h e case was o p e n e d b e f o r e t h e m a g i s t r a t e by t h e c l a i m a n t , w h o w i t h a r o d i n his h a n d p r o n o u n c e d a series o f f o r m u l a e ; for example: 1 0 3

* I affirm that this m a n [ a s l a v e ] is mine by Quiritary r i g h t according to his proper tide. As I have spoken, so you behold: I h a v e l a i d my r o d on him.* A n d at that moment he l a i d h i s r o d o n t h e m a n . H i s opponent s a i d t h e s a m e w o r d s and performed t h e s a m e act.. .and t h e n the magistrate s a i d : * U n h a n d the man, both of y o u / ( G a i u s , Institutes 4.16) Recitation o f f u r t h e r f o r m u l a e f o l l o w e d , a n d t o quote Gaius again:'the excessive t e c h n i c a l i t y o f t h e o l d l a w - m a k e r s was c a r r i e d so f a r t h a t i f e i t h e r p a r t y m a d e t h e slightest e r r o r , h e lost t h e s u i t ' (Institutes 4.30). So t o o i n R o m a n r e l i g i o u s rites, a n y e r r o r i n p r o c e d u r e m a d e t h e r i t e v o i d . T h e rest o f t h i s p r e l i m i n a r y a c t i o n b e f o r e t h e m a g i s t r a t e t o o k t h e f o r m o f a sacred w a g e r (sacramentum) f o r a fixed s u m ; a c c o r d i n g t o t h e v a l u e o f t h e d i s p u t e d object, t h e w a g e r was f o r 50 o r 500 asses, a p p a r e n t l y e q u i v a l e n t t o five o r fifty sheep ( A u l u s G e l i u s , Attic Nights 11.1), a substantial s u m , w h i c h was f o r f e i t e d by t h e loser t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e d i s p u t e d object. T h i s a n t i q u e p r o c e d u r e , w h i c h was o n l y o n e o f several w h i c h e v o l v e d , shows u p some i m p o r t a n t aspects o f e a r l y R o m a n law. F i r s t , i t was r i t u a l i s t i c , b u t t h e n so is m u c h m o d e r n legal p r o c e d u r e . Secondly 1 0 3

T h e r o d signified a spear, which i n turn symbolised rightful possession, see Gaius, Institutes 4.16.

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Structural

differentiation

i t was f o r m a l i s t i c , i n t h a t r e c i t e d w o r d s w e r e i n v e s t e d w i t h s y m b o l i c o r r i t u a l m e a n i n g . T h i r d l y , i t was r i g i d , i n t h a t t h e f o r m o f a c t i o n was fixed a n d p r e c l u d e d t h e possibility o f a c o m p r o m i s e j u d g e m e n t b e t w e e n c o m p e t i n g claims, b o t h o f w h i c h m i g h t have h a d some r i g h t o n t h e i r side. T h e c o u r t t o o k t h e f o r m o f a t o u r n a m e n t w i t h o u t weapons, i n w h i c h t h e r e h a d t o be a v i c t o r a n d v a n q u i s h e d . F i n a l l y , i t was r e s t r i c t i v e , i n t h a t t h e w a g e r was f o r a s i g n i f i c a n t s u m , so t h a t p o o r l i t i g a n t s w e r e effectively e x c l u d e d . B u t o n c e t h e f o r m a l process b e f o r e t h e m a g i s t r a t e was o v e r , t h e case was t h e n a r g u e d i n a second a c d o n b e f o r e a lay j u d g e a p p o i n t e d b y t h e m a g i s t r a t e , a n d t h i s second a c t i o n m a y w e l l have been c o n d u c t e d i n f o r m a l l y a n d i n a m a n n e r which changed with changing conditions. A s t h e s p h e r e o f R o m a n i n f l u e n c e w i d e n e d , R o m a n s h a d extensive legal dealings w i t h f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s ; t h e y also faced t h e n e w p r o b l e m s o f g o v e r n i n g a c o m p l e x state. T h e s e changes m u s t have e n c o u r a g e d c o r r e s p o n d i n g d e v e l o p m e n t s i n R o m a n l a w ; b u t o b v i o u s l y , t h e r e was n o neat fit b e t w e e n i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n a n d i n c r e a s i n g legal sophist i c a t i o n , o n l y a n observable t r e n d i n substantive l a w a n d i n legal p r o c e d u r e s . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e scope o f l a w w i d e n e d t o cover consensual contracts a n d t h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e e l a b o r a t i o n o f t h e l a w r e l a t i n g t o u n j u s t i f i a b l e d a m a g e t o p r o p e r t y ; such changes i n substant i v e l a w m a y have been a n i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r i n i n d u c i n g increased flexibility i n p r o c e d u r e . M o r e o v e r , as i n e d u c a t i o n , l a w was c o n s i d e r ably affected b y G r e e k scholars, w h o i n t r o d u c e d G r e e k dialectical d i s t i n c t i o n s i n t o R o m a n j u r i s p r u d e n c e . C i c e r o , f o r e x a m p l e , i n a lost w o r k , p r o p o s e d a n d m a y even h a v e e x e c u t e d a systématisation o f R o m a n l a w (De iure civili in artem redigendo). T h e o l d f o r m s o f litigation by strict f o r m u l a were gradually c i r c u m v e n t e d a n d t h e n s u p p l a n t e d , p r o b a b l y f r o m t h e second c e n t u r y B C o n w a r d s , b y a n e w legal p r o c e d u r e . T h e p r e s i d i n g m a g i s t r a t e , n o r m a l l y t h e p r a e t o r , a f t e r h e a r i n g b o t h parties settled o n a r u b r i c o r t e r m s o f r e f e r e n c e ( c o n f u s i n g l y t h e L a t i n f o r t h i s is formula), suited t o t h e facts o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r case a n d t o t h e claims a n d c o u n t e r c l a i m s o f t h e l i t i g a n t s ; these w e r e t h e t e r m s o f r e f e r e n c e b y w h i c h t h e j u d g e (index) d e c i d e d t h e case i n a subsequent h e a r i n g . T h i s system a l l o w e d successive magistrates (especially t h e p r a e t o r s ) c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s c r e t i o n b o t h i n a d a p t i n g e x i s t i n g statute l a w t o c h a n g i n g c o n d i t i o n s , a n d i n effectively c r e a t i n g n e w substantive l a w b y s u p p l e m e n t i n g statute l a w , o f t e n t h r o u g h t h e i m a g i n a t i v e use o f legal fictions. F o r e x a m p l e , some p r i v a t e legal actions w e r e f o r m a l l y available o n l y b e t w e e n R o m a n citizens; t h e m a g i s t r a t e i n his r u b r i c c o u l d a u t h o r i s e t h e j u d g e t o assume t h a t t h e a l i e n , i f liable, s h o u l d p a y damages as t h o u g h h e w e r e 83

Conquerors

and slaves

a R o m a n c i t i z e n . O r t o cite a n o t h e r e x a m p l e , i n t r a d i t i o n a l law, cases h a d b e e n d e c i d e d by legal rights o f possession; u n d e r t h e new-style r u b r i c s , t h e m a g i s t r a t e m i g h t i n s t r u c t t h e j u d g e t o d e c i d e t h e case o n t h e basis o f w h a t s h o u l d be d o n e as a m a t t e r o f g o o d f a i t h (bona fides). T h u s e q u i t y a n d s o m e t i m e s e v e n i n t e n t i o n s u p p l e m e n t e d strict l a w . 1 0 4

T h e r e w e r e also changes i n t h e p r a c t i c e o f c r i m i n a l law; i n t h e o l d days, i m p o r t m t c r i m i n a l cases h a d r e g u l a r l y b e e n h e a r d o n a p p e a l b e f o r e t h e so-called c o u r t s o f t h e p e o p l e (indicia populi), with a potential cast o f h u n d r e d s , e v e n t h o u s a n d s ; these c o u r t s h a d t h e same c o m p o s i t i o n as t h e p o p u l a r assemblies, t h e comitia centuriata and tributa, w h i c h also v o t e d o n l e g i s l a t i o n a n d elected officers o f state. B u t f r o m t h e m i d d l e o f t h e s e c o n d c e n t u r y B C o n w a r d s several separate a n d m u c h s m a l l e r j u r y c o u r t s (quaestiones) each specialising i n a specific t y p e o f c r i m e , such as e x t o r t i o n , b r i b e r y , t r e a s o n a n d m u r d e r , w e r e established. T h e c h a n g e was n o t a n u n q u a l i f i e d success. T h e r e d u c t i o n i n t h e size o f t h e j u r i e s m a d e t h e m m o r e accessible t o c o r r u p t i o n . T h e r a n g e o f cases t r i e d i n these c r i m i n a l c o u r t s was b o t h n a r r o w e r a n d w i d e r t h a n i n m o d e r n c r i m i n a l c o u r t s . I t was n a r r o w e r because m o s t p e t t y c r i m e s w e r e d e a l t w i t h s u m m a r i l y o n t h e street o r b y m i n o r magistrates f r o m w h o m t h e r e was l i t d e effective chance o f a p p e a l . Besides, some c r i m e s against p r o p e r t y , such as t h e f t , w e r e r e g a r d e d as m a t t e r s o f p r i v a t e l a w . T h e s p h e r e o f R o m a n c r i m i n a l c o u r t s was also w i d e r t h a n i t is n o w , because i n t h e late R e p u b l i c p o l i t i c a l conflicts 1 0 5

KM * T praetorian law is what the praetors have introduced to help, supplement o r correct the rivil law, in the public interest* (D. i . i .7.1: Papinian). T h e following rubric is typical; please note its emphasis on reparation and good faith. ' X shall be judge (index). Whereas A u l u s Agerius [the plaintiff] deposited with N u m e r i u s Negidius [the defendant] the silver table which is the subject of this action, for whatever o n that account N u m e r i u s Negidius ought to give or do to A u l u s Agerius i n good faith, you, judge, shall make N u m e r i u s Negidius liable to A u l u s Agerius* (Gaius, Institutes4.47). A n d on the importance of intention, of the spirit as against the letter of the law, see for example Cicero, On Behalf of Caecina 53 a n d 67. B u t I should not exaggerate the flexibility of R o m a n lawyers in the late Republic. F o r example, in the edict, it was held that when a man.left as a legacy * all his female slaves together with all their children \ a n d one of the female slaves died, the child of the dead female slave should not be part of the legacy, because the testator had legated the child only as an appurtenance of the mother. L a t e r imperial jurists objected to this literal interpretation, because it defeated the wishes of the dead m a n (D. 30.63: Celsus). Cf. Schulz (1946: 79) for other examples. n c

"* Cf. A u l u s Gellius, Attic Nights 20.1 and Gaius, Institutes 3, 189: ' B y the law of the T w e l v e Tables, the punishment for thieves caught in the act was capital. A free m a n was whipped a n d then solemnly 'assigned' by the magistrate to the m a n from w h o m he had been stolen. Lawyers of old debated whether this 'assignment' (addictio) made the thief a slave o r a debt bondsman. A slave caught in theft was similarly whipped a n d executed. B u t in later times, the cruelty of the punishment was frowned on, a n d the praetor's edict established, for both slave a n d free person, a suit for four times the value.' S u c h rivil suits must have had limited applicability except against rich thieves.

84

Structural

differentiation

w i t h i n t h e elite t o o k t h e f o r m o f charges i n t h e c r i m i n a l c o u r t s . F a c t i o n leaders, o r t h e i r close s u p p o r t e r s w e r e accused o f t r e a s o n , o f c o r r u p t i o n , o f v i o l e n c e , s o m e t i m e s w i t h g o o d cause, s o m e t i m e s w i t h o u t , by m e m b e r s o f r i v a l p o l i t i c a l factions a n d by o r a t o r s w h o h o p e d t h a t success i n t h e c o u r t s w o u l d serve as a s p r i n g - b o a r d f o r t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a m b i t i o n s . T h e j u d i c i a l process was a w e a p o n i n f a c t i o n a l p o l i t i c s ; f o r e x a m p l e , we k n o w o f o v e r o n e h u n d r e d c r i m i n a l cases i n v o l v i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l elite i n t h e t w e n t y years 70 t o 50 B C . 1 0 6

R o m a n law was n o t m e r e l y a m e a n s o f e x p r e s s i n g a n d t h e r e f o r e o f c o n t r o l l i n g p o l i t i c a l conflict w i t h i n t h e r u l i n g class, i t was also a m e c h a n i s m f o r p r o t e c t i n g u p p e r class p r o p e r t y . C i c e r o m a d e this p o i n t powerfully: I f t h e c i v i l l a w i s . . . n e g l e c t e d o r n o t c a r e f u l l y d e f e n d e d , t h e r e is n o t h i n g w h i c h a n y o n e w i l l b e s u r e a b o u t p o s s e s s i n g , e i t h e r to b e i n h e r i t e d f r o m h i s f a t h e r , o r to b e left to h i s c h i l d r e n . W h a t is t h e a d v a n t a g e o f h a v i n g a h o u s e o r a f a r m left y o u b y y o u r f a t h e r . . . i f y o u c a n n o t b e c e r t a i n o f k e e p i n g w h a t is yours by the law of o w n e r s h i p ? . . . Believe m e , w h a t e a c h of us has i n h e r i t e d is m o r e a l e g a c y o f o u r l a w s a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h a n o f t h o s e w h o left it to u s . A father c a n bequeath a f a r m ; but the enjoyment of the f a r m , without anxiety o r d a n g e r o f l i t i g a t i o n is b e q u e a t h e d n o t b y t h e f a t h e r , b u t b y t h e l a w . Behalf

of Caecina

(On

73-4)

O f c o u r s e , this is r h e t o r i c , B u t t h e r e was some t r u t h i n i t . R o m a n law h e l p e d p r o t e c t p r o p e r t y , n o t j u s t i n R o m e , b u t also i n t h e I t a l i a n t o w n s w h i c h came u n d e r R o m a n d o m i n a t i o n , a n d i n the p r o v i n c e s . 107

A l l these changes i n c i v i l p r o c e d u r e a n d i n t h e f o r m o f t h e c r i m i n a l c o u r t s i n d u c e d c o r r e s p o n d i n g changes i n legal p e r s o n n e l . I n t h e o l d days, p a t r i c i a n priests h a d m o n o p o l i s e d t h e k n o w l e d g e o f l e g a l f o r m u l a e . L e g a l k n o w l e d g e was a b r a n c h o f r e l i g l i o u s k n o w l e d g e a n d was t h e r e f o r e zealously g u a r d e d ( C i c e r o , O n Behalf of Murena 25). A c c o r d i n g t o t r a d i t i o n , t h e m o n o p o l y was f i r s t b r e a c h e d i n a b o u t 300 B C , w h e n t h e secretary o f a n o b l e c e n s o r was said t o h a v e stolen f r o m his m a s t e r t h e p r o c e d u r a l f o r m u l a e , t h e r i t u a l r e c i t a t i o n o f w h i c h 1 0 8

1 0 7

See E . S. G r u e n , The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley, Calif., 1974) 260S. for a long a n d lively account of the charges a n d counter-charges brought, especially in the period preceding Caesar's rise to supreme power. T h e need to apply R o m a n law in Italian towns a n d in the provinces was probably a major factor i n i n d u d n g flexibility. R o m a n law increasingly h a d to cover cases between parties with different legal systems. W e hear a lot of R o m a n corruption a n d mismanagement i n the provinces, a n d rightiy so. B u t there is also impressive evidence of sophisticated thought about how best to manage relations between city-states, which when they were independent h a d often settled their conflicts by war not law. T h e following clause cited by C i c e r o seems typical of several: ' I f a private ritizen sues a municipality, or if a municipality sues a private citizen, then the senate of another city shall be appointed judge, a n d each party shall have the right to challenge one of the cities proposed' (Against Verres 2.2.32).

85

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o p e n e d c i v i l actions. H e p u b l i s h e d t h e m i n t h e first R o m a n law b o o k ( L i v y 9.46). A c e n t u r y l a t e r , a c o n s u l , Sextus A e l i u s Paetus, b r o u g h t c r e d i t o n h i m s e l f by p u b l i s h i n g n e w a n d m o d i f i e d f o r m u l a e , w h i c h h a d c o m e i n t o use w i t h t h e g r o w t h o f t h e state, t o g e t h e r w i t h a c o m m e n t a r y o n t h e T w e l v e T a b l e s ( D 1.2.2.7: P o m p o n i u s ) . B u t i n spite o f t h i s p u b l i c a t i o n , nobles a n d priests o f t h e state cults, o r at least successful senators still h a d a v i r t u a l m o n o p o l y o f legal k n o w l e d g e a n d s k i l l ( C i c e r o , O n Duties, 2.65). T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n i n t h e second c e n t u r y B C o f flexible r u b r i c s , o r t e r m s o f r e f e r e n c e a d a p t e d t o t h e facts o f each case, c h a n g e d legal p r o c e d u r e s f r o m r i t u a l i s t i c r i g m a r o l e t o a n exercise o f legal s k i l l . T h e presiding magistrate h a d to adjudge a n d a m e n d complicated terms o f r e f e r e n c e p u t u p by t h e l i t i g a n t s a n d pass t h e m o n t o t h e j u d g e (index) w h o actually t r i e d t h e case. T h e s e t e r m s o f r e f e r e n c e o r r u b r i c s (formulae) were pardy a matter of precedent; they were codified i n the p r a e t o r ' s Edict, t h e set o f r u l e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s w h i c h w e r e h a n d e d d o w n f r o m o n e p r a e t o r t o t h e n e x t ; b u t t h e t e r m s o f r e f e r e n c e also h a d t o fit t h e m a t t e r i n d i s p u t e ; t h e y m i g h t v a r y a c c o r d i n g t o facts o f t h e case o r t h e p o i n t o f law i n v o l v e d . Y e t p r a e t o r s w e r e elected f o r o n l y o n e year i n office, a n d t h e y w e r e assigned t o m i l i t a r y o r legal d u t i e s by l o t . I n s h o r t , t h e y w e r e n o t necessarily e x p e r t s . T h e y d e p e n d e d u p o n advice. Magistrates, j u d g e s , a n d l i t i g a n t s a l l s o u g h t advice f r o m t h e same q u a r t e r s , f r o m legal c o n s u l t a n t s (iuris prudentes). These m e n f o r m e d a new a n d g r o w i n g profession divorced f r o m the o l d religious law, w h i c h f r o m t h e e n d o f t h e R e p u b l i c n o o n e s t u d i e d a n y m o r e ( C i c e r o , On Oratory 3.136). T h e b r e a k b e t w e e n priests a n d lawyers o p e n e d t h e p r o f e s s i o n t o o u t s i d e r s ; a n d i n t h e last c e n t u r y B C several d i s t i n g u i s h e d legal c o n s u l t a n t s are k n o w n t o have been o f e q u e s t r i a n , not senatorial status. K n o w l e d g e o f t h e law served as a p l a t f o r m f o r a p o l i t i c a l career, p r o b a b l y as a less p r e s t i g i o u s a l t e r n a t i v e t o m i l i t a r y service. C i c e r o gives us a p i c t u r e o f t h e b u d d i n g l a w y e r : 108

Servius [later consul i n 51 BC] d i d his service i n the city here with me, giving legal opinions, engrossing documents, and giving advice, a life full of worry and anxiety. He learned the civil law, worked long hours, helped many clients, put u p with their stupidity, suffered their a r r o g a n c e . . . H e was at the beck and call of others, not his own master. A man wins widespread praise and credit with others when he works hard at a discipline which will benefit so many. 1 0 8

T h i s is documented by W . K u n k e l , Herkunft ( G r a z , 1967) 48ff. 2

86

und soziale Stellung der römischen

Juristen

Structural

differentiation

B u t f o r a l l t h a t , C i c e r o p r e f e r r e d t h e claims o f his o w n c l i e n t , w h o h a d b e e n i n effective c o m m a n d o f a n a r m y . ' W h o c a n d o u b t t h a t m i l i t a r y glory confers m o r e distinction i n p u r s u i t o f a consulship t h a n achievements i n c i v i l l a w ? ' ( O n Behalf of Murena 19 a n d 22). O r a t o r s also, i n Cicero's o p i n i o n , r a n k e d above lawyers, B u t r e l a t i v e r a n k i n g c o n c e r n s us less f o r t h e m o m e n t t h a n t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f t h e professions. Pleaders (advocati, causidici, patroni) were distinct f r o m legal c o n s u l t a n t s (iuris prudentes); a n d m e m b e r s o f each g r o u p b o l stered t h e differences w i t h hostile s t e r e o t y p e s . 109

F i n a l l y , I s h o u l d stress t h a t t h e changes i n t h e law w h i c h I have d e s c r i b e d w e r e g r a d u a l n o t t h o r o u g h g o i n g . C i v i l actions by r i t u a l f o r m u l a (legis actio) a n d c r i m i n a l charges b e f o r e l a r g e p o p u l a r j u r i e s (indicia populi) persisted t o t h e e n d o f t h e R e p u b l i c . O l d a n d n e w co-existed, n o t always c o m f o r t a b l y , as t h e r u l i n g g r o u p s a t t e m p t e d t o keep the new w i t h i n the m o u l d o f tradition. For example, by the C i n c i a n law o f 204 B C , t h e p a y m e n t o f fees o r gifts t o lawyers was strictly l i m i t e d . I d e a l l y , t h e advocate was e x p e c t e d t o d e f e n d his c l i e n t as a f a v o u r , t o increase his p r e s t i g e b u t n o t his w e a l t h ( C i c e r o , On Duties 2. 6 5 - 6 ) . T h e o b l i g a t i o n w h i c h t h e c l i e n t t h e n o w e d his p a t r o n was u n s p e c i f i e d a n d u n a c t i o n a b l e . I n t h i s way, advocacy w o u l d have r e m a i n e d a n a v o c a t i o n f o r p r o p e r t i e d g e n d e m e n . B u t t h e C i n c i a n law, l i k e m a n y R o m a n laws, was a lex imperfecta, t h a t is a law w h i c h f o r b a d e a n act, b u t w h i c h n e i t h e r p e n a l i s e d n o r a n n u l l e d a c o n t r a v e n t i o n . N o t s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e r e f o r e , t h e law was e v a d e d , i n spite o f its r e i n f o r c e m e n t u n d e r A u g u s t u s ( D i o 54.18; cf. T a c i t u s , Annals 11.5-7). B u t t o a s u r p r i s i n g e x t e n t , t h e system o f n o t p a y i n g lawyers d i d w o r k . C i c e r o , f o r e x a m p l e , received substantial sums f r o m his clients, b u t o n l y i n t h e i r last t e s t a m e n t o r w i l l ; h e c l a i m e d t o have received t h e h u g e s u m o f t w e n t y m i l l i o n sesterces by bequests ( C i c e r o , Philippics 2.40). E v e n i n t h e c h a n g i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e late R e p u b l i c , m e m b e r s o f t h e elite s h a r e d values a n d h o n o u r e d o b l i g a t i o n s a f t e r a lapse o f t i m e , sometimes o f a g e n e r a t i o n , a n d i n m a t t e r s f o r w h i c h we s h o u l d w a n t a n i m m e d i a t e a n d specified r e c o m p e n s e . T o be s u r e , a system o f u n s p e c i f i e d m u t u a l o b l i g a t i o n does exist i n o u r society, i n c o n t e m p o r a r y u p p e r m i d d l e class c u l t u r e i n B r i t a i n a n d t h e U S A . B u t i t is reserved f o r r e l a t i v e l y u n i m p o r t a n t sectors o f b e h a v i o u r . F o r e x a m p l e , I i n v i t e y o u t o d i n n e r w i t h o u t e x a c t i n g f r o m y o u t h e specific o b l i g a t i o n t o i n v i t e m e back. B u t f o r m o s t exchanges, we translate i m p o r t a n t o b l i g a t i o n s i n t o m o n e y t e r m s a n d o f t e n r e i n f o r c e o u r expec1 0 9

F o r lawyers derogatory of orators, see the views cited by Cicero, O n Oratory 1.165; Topica 51; a n d vice versa: O n Behalf of Murena 25.

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rations o f r e p a y m e n t b y contracts. I n d e e d , m o n e y so d o m i n a t e s o u r system o f social e x c h a n g e t h a t w e c o m m o n l y express o t h e r social m a t t e r s , s u c h as j o b satisfaction o r e v e n social r e j e c t i o n i n m o n e y t e r m s : ' i t pays weir; ' s o r r y , I can't a f f o r d t o g o t o t h e p u b , o r t o t h e movies, o r o n holiday w i t h y o u \ I n R o m a n society, t h e s p h e r e o f diffuse u n s p e c i f i e d o b l i g a t i o n was traditionally very wide. Originally, i t centred i n the nexus of kinship a n d t h e n r a d i a t e d o u t a l o n g lines o f p a t r o n a g e . O n e s y m p t o m was t h e p r a c t i c e o f m a r r y i n g a d a u g h t e r o f f i n o r d e r t o c e m e n t a n alliance b e t w e e n p o l i t i c a l f a c t i o n s . A n o t h e r was t h e a p p e a l t o t h e ties o f k i n s h i p o r o f f r i e n d s h i p t o w i n p r i v a t e a d v a n t a g e , even i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f t h e law. A n y governor, any magistrate, any j u d g e o r j u r y m a n was p r e s s u r e d t o s h o w f a v o u r , t o give benefits t o relatives, t o f r i e n d s , t o t h e f r i e n d s o f relatives a n d t o t h e relatives o f f r i e n d s . K i n s m e n w e r e e x p e c t e d t o stick t o g e t h e r , b u t t h e e x t e n s i o n o f k i n ties t h r o u g h m a r r i a g e necessarily b r o u g h t conflicts o f i n t e r e s t . C i c e r o c o m p l a i n e d : Y o u c o m p a s s i o n a t e . I w a s y o u r c o n n e x i o n b y m a r r i a g e ; at y o u r e l e c t i o n [to c o n s u l ] y o u h a d a p p o i n t e d m e t o b e t h e first o v e r s e e r o f t h e t r i b e w h i c h o p e n e d the v o t i n g . . . y o u called u p o n m e to s p e a k t h i r d i n t h e senate; a n d yet y o u h a n d e d m e o v e r b o u n d to the e n e m i e s of t h e r e p u b l i c ; with a r r o g a n t a n d h e a r t l e s s w o r d s y o u d r o v e f r o m y o u r feet m y s o n - i n - l a w , y o u r o w n flesh a n d b l o o d (propinquum)

a n d m y daughter w h o was b o u n d

m a r r i a g e (odfinem).

(Cicero,

To

the Senate

after

his Return

t o y o u b y ties o f 17, t r a n s .

Loeb

Classical Library)

E l i t e p o l i t i c s w e r e t o o c o m p l i c a t e d t o r u n e x a c d y a l o n g k i n lines, b u t n o t c o m p l e x e n o u g h t o d e v e l o p rival i d e o l o g i c a l g r o u p i n g s . A t t e m p t s t o e x t e n d factions t h r o u g h m a r r i a g e s w e r e s o m e t i m e s t h w a r t e d because w o m e n , f r o m b e i n g p a w n s i n t h e p o w e r g a m e o f m e n , a r r o g a t e d s o m e p o w e r t o themselves; t h e y b e n e f i t e d c o n s i d e r a b l y f r o m t h e r u l e o f l a w w h i c h p r o t e c t e d t h e i r p r o p e r t y , as d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e i r h u s b a n d s ' ; a n d t h e y w e r e able t o i n i t i a t e d i v o r c e a n d subsequent r e m a r r i a g e s f o r themselves. T h e conservative i n s t i t u t i o n o f m a r r i a g e i n t h i s way served as a v e c t o r o f social c h a n g e a n d i n d u c e d a l e v e l o f f e m a l e e m a n c i p a t i o n i n t h e R o m a n e l i t e w h i c h has r a r e l y b e e n m a t c h e d i n h u m a n h i s t o r y . Personal o b l i g a t i o n s t o a n d claims f r o m wives a n d k i n , f r i e n d s a n d p a t r o n s w e r e i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e f o r m a l r u l e o f law, i n c o m p a t i b l e too with the impersonal 'rationality and diligence' which administ r a t i o n o f t h e p r o v i n c e s i d e a l l y r e q u i r e d . S o m e R o m a n s w e r e conscious o f t h e c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n i m p e r s o n a l ideals a n d p e r s o n a l p r o f i t . B u t t o be a f u l l m e m b e r o f t h e e l i t e c l u b , o n e h a d t o w i n f a v o u r s f o r one's o w n f r i e n d s a n d t o bestow f a v o u r s o n t h e f r i e n d s o f o t h e r s . L e t t e r s o f r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , o f w h i c h t h e r e a r e so m a n y i n t h e p u b l i s h e d correspondence o f Cicero, Pliny a n d Symmachus, were the personal 88

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cheques o f t h e system: t h e m e m b e r ' s c r e d i t d e p e n d e d u p o n his p o w e r t o place f r i e n d s i n positions o f p r o f i t . Patronage and c o r r u p t i o n ( w h i c h is t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f a p u b l i c office as p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y ) w e r e j u s t t w o sides o f t h e same c o i n . T h e i r persistence a n d p r e v a l e n c e u n d e r c u t any t h o r o u g h g o i n g changes t o w a r d s t h e f o r m a l legal o r bureaucratic administration of the empire. 1 1 0

W e have g o n e f a r e n o u g h . I t is t i m e t o r e c o n s i d e r t h e c o n c e p t s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . T h i s can n o w be d o n e i n r a t h e r abstract t e r m s , w i t h o n l y b r i e f references back t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e a r m y , e d u c a t i o n a n d t h e law, w h i c h we have j u s t discussed. I s h o u l d stress t h a t these t h r e e areas w e r e selected o n l y as i l l u s t r a t i o n s o f t h e r a m i f i e d changes w h i c h o c c u r r e d i n t h e w a k e o f e m p i r e . A f u l l social h i s t o r y w o u l d d e a l as w e l l w i t h s i m i l a r changes i n o t h e r areas o f social o r g a n i sation, such as a g r i c u l t u r e , t r a d e , a r c h i t e c t u r e , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I d o n o t l i k e f o r m a l d e f i n i t i o n s , b u t i n this case p e r h a p s o n e may h e l p . S t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n r e f e r s t o t h e process by w h i c h a n undifferentiated institution (for example, a family g r o u p charged with m u l t i p l e f u n c t i o n s ) becomes d i v i d e d i n t o separate i n s t i t u t i o n s (such as schools f o r e d u c a t i o n , factories f o r p r o d u c t i o n ) , each c h a r g e d w i t h a single m a i n f u n c t i o n . I shall t r e a t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n u n d e r five h e a d i n g s : s e p a r a t i o n , c o m p e t i t i o n , o l d against new, p e r i p h e r y against c e n t r e a n d t h e g r o w t h o f state p o w e r . F i r s t , t h e n e w l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n s t i t u t i o n s , such as, f o r e x a m p l e , t h e R o m a n a r m y , schools a n d t h e l a w - c o u r t s , d e v e l o p e d n o r m s a n d values w h i c h l e g i t i m a t e d t h e i r i d e n t i t y as separate a n d a u t o n o m o u s p a r t s o f t h e society. M i l i t a r y tactics a n d m i l i t a r y law, o r c o m p l i c a t e d r u l e s o f g r a m m a r a n d r h e t o r i c , o f legal l a n g u a g e a n d p r o c e d u r e s a l l serve as c o n v e n i e n t e x a m p l e s o f n e w n o r m s , w h i c h d i f f e r e n t i a t e d each i n s t i t u t i o n f r o m t h e o t h e r s . B u t above a l l , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f specific p r o f e s s i o n a l a n d o f t e n f u l l - t i m e social roles ( s o l d i e r as d i s t i n c t f r o m peasant, o r a t o r a n d advocate as d i s t i n c t f r o m n o b l e o r p r i e s t ) , i n d i c a t e d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f p e r s o n n e l , specific t o t h e n e w a u t o n o m o u s institutions. 111

1 1 0

1 1 1

F o r example, Cicero congratulated his brother o n his three-year governorship of a province in which he had not been moved from the* highest integrity and self-control' by the gift of a picture, a slave, a woman, o r by money (Cicero, Letters to his Brother Quintus 1.1.8). Cicero also told his brother (ibid, i.a) that lots of people had asked h i m (Cicero) to recommend them to his brother's secretary, who was an ex-slave. What worried Cicero was the low status of the intermediary, not the request for favours. T h e concept autonomy is problematic, easier to think about than to operationalise, but then that is true of several useful concepts, such as cowardice o r envy. Perhaps two points are worth making: the autonomy of insdtudons was relative not absolute; secondly, I should stress that my concentration here on autonomy is a tactic not a commitment; integration (how the differentiated institutions operated with each other) and conflict should also be considered.

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S e c o n d l y , t h e n e w d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n s t i t u t i o n s necessarily c o m p e t e d w i t h each o t h e r f o r society's resources, w h e t h e r these resources w e r e expressed i n t e r m s o f pay, p r e s t i g e o r p e r s o n n e l . T h e circumstances o f t h i s c o m p e t i t i o n w e r e q u i t e e x c e p t i o n a l f o r a p r e - i n d u s t r i a l society. A p r e - i n d u s t r i a l society can be d e f i n e d , n o t m e r e l y as a society whose m a j o r source o f e n e r g y is t h e m u s c l e p o w e r o f m e n a n d a n i m a l s , b u t also as a society whose v e r y s m a l l s u r p l u s p r o d u c t i o n is b e s p o k e n , e m b e d d e d , r o u t i n e l y u s e d f o r t h e same p u r p o s e , year a f t e r year. B u t R o m a n society, because t h e f r u i t s o f c o n q u e s t w e r e b e i n g h e a p e d i n t o I t a l y , t e m p o r a r i l y escaped f r o m some o f these l i m i t a t i o n s . I t h a d massive resources available, f o r w h i c h t h e r e was n o t r a d i t i o n a l alloc a t i o n i n t h e society. T h e resources w e r e ' f r e e - f l o a t i n g ' . R o m a n s t h e r e f o r e faced t h e n e w a n d b e w i l d e r i n g p r o b l e m o f h o w these r e sources w e r e t o be u s e d , a n d f o r whose b e n e f i t . W e k n o w o n e g e n e r a l a n s w e r : t h e rich g r e w r i c h e r . B u t t h a t is t o o s i m p l e a r u b r i c t o c o v e r t h e c o m p l i c a t e d e x p a n s i o n o f R o m a n society, as i t m o v e d f r o m l a r g e city-state t o i m p e r i a l p o w e r . T h e r e was c o m p e tition a m o n g t h e r i c h , f o r e x a m p l e , b e t w e e n e q u e s t r i a n t a x - f a r m e r s a n d s e n a t o r i a l g o v e r n o r s o v e r t h e d i v i s i o n o f p r o v i n c i a l spoils. T h e r e was c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h i n t h e e l i t e f o r p r e s t i g e ; witness t h e s t r e n u o u s a t t e m p t s by some m e m b e r s o f t h e e l i t e t o m a s t e r G r e e k , t h e l a n g u a g e o f a c o n q u e r e d c u l t u r e . T h e r e w e r e also e x p e r i m e n t s i n c o m p e t i t i o n , r e f l e c t i n g t h e elite's u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t t h e c r i t e r i a f o r a c h i e v i n g h i g h status; h e n c e e x a g g e r a t e d p a y m e n t s a n d h i g h fees t o r h e t o r i c i a n s , d o c t o r s , actors, artists a n d architects. S u c h p a y m e n t s elevated these n e w professions t o t h e status o f sub-elites, s h a r i n g i n Rome's n e w - f o u n d w e a l t h . A n d t h e r e w e r e also a t t e m p t s b y m e m b e r s o f t h e n o n - e l i t e t o w i n a g r e a t e r share o f t h e society's w e a l t h : claims f o r h i g h e r pay, m o r e p l u n d e r a n d l a r g e r f a r m s f r o m soldiers, f o r f r e e w h e a t a n d m o r e e n t e r t a i n m e n t f r o m p o o r m e t r o p o l i t a n voters. A l l these claims w e r e m a d e feasible b y t h e h u g e i n f l u x o f f r e e - f l o a t i n g resources, a n d w e r e e n c o u r a g e d b y t h e i n s t a b i l i t y o f social r e l a t i o n s f o s t e r e d by unaccustomed wealth. T h i r d l y , as society c h a n g e d , t h e r e w e r e conflicts b e t w e e n t h e o l d elite whose p o w e r was based o n t h e c o n t r o l o f t r a d i t i o n a l resources (such as l a n d , p r e s t i g e , o r t h e m e m o r y o f ancestors' status) a n d a n e w elite w h i c h p a r t l y d r e w its p o w e r f r o m n e w i n s t i t u t i o n s ( c o n t r o l o f t h e a r m y , o r a t o r i c a l s k i l l , legal k n o w l e d g e ) . I n p a r t , this d i s t i n c t i o n is c o n c e p t u a l r a t h e r t h a n r e a l , i n so f a r as n e w m e m b e r s o f t h e R o m a n elite, o f t e n f r o m a l l i e d I t a l i a n city-states, a l r e a d y h a d l a n d a n d t h a n k s t o g r a n t s o f R o m a n c i t i z e n s h i p c o u l d a c q u i r e p o l i t i c a l office i n R o m e . L a n d a n d p o l i t i c a l office w e r e t h e t w o h a l l - m a r k s o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l elite. 90

Structural

differentiation

C o m p l e m e n t a r i t y , m e m b e r s o f t h e o l d elite c o u l d a n d d i d a c q u i r e n e w skills. O l d a n d n e w elites d o n o t t h e r e f o r e r e f e r t o fixed g r o u p s . B u t i n a n y society, social c h a n g e i n v o l v i n g n e w ideas, n e w values, spreads at a n u n e v e n pace; d i f f e r e n t sectors o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n , y o u n g a n d o l d , peasants a n d m e t r o p o l i t a n s , assimilate c h a n g e at d i f f e r e n t rates a n d o f t e n j u s t i f y t h e i r b e h a v i o u r w i t h hostile stereotypes o f those w h o are d i f f e r e n t . C h a n g e was subjective as w e l l as objective. F o r e x a m p l e , w h e n C i c e r o became c o n s u l , t h e first o f his f a m i l y t o be so successful i n p o l i t i c s , he still f e l t at a d i s a d v a n t a g e c o m p a r e d w i t h those w h o m he t h o u g h t had i n h e r i t e d 'nobility'. I n o u r p r e v i o u s discussion o f t h e a r m y , e d u c a t i o n a n d t h e law, we have c o n s i d e r e d several instances o f c o n f l i c t between t h e o l d - f a s h i o n e d a n d t h e n e w - f a n g l e d . A n d w e have seen t h e p r o b l e m s w h i c h arose f r o m i n n o v a t i o n s , such as t h e r e c r u i t m e n t o f t h e landless t o t h e a r m y , the introduction of Latin rhetoric and the creation of jury-courts. A n o t h e r b r i e f e x a m p l e m a y be h e l p f u l . I n t h e last c e n t u r y o f t h e R e p u b l i c , t h e e q u e s t r i a n o r d e r e m e r g e d as a separate l e g a l l y - d e f i n e d social s t r a t u m , whose richest m e m b e r s w e r e b o t h t a x - f a r m e r s i n t h e p r o v i n c e s a n d I t a l i a n l a n d - o w n e r s . M o d e r n research has s h o w n t h a t i n m a n y e c o n o m i c a n d social respects, these k n i g h t s w e r e s i m i l a r t o senators, a n d t h a t i n a l l social conflicts, b o t h senators a n d k n i g h t s f o u g h t o n each side. O b j e c t i v e l y , t h e r e f o r e , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between senators a n d k n i g h t s is n o t i m p o r t a n t ; b u t c o n t e m p o r a r y R o m a n s a p p a r e n d y p e r c e i v e d k n i g h t s as a social g r o u p w h i c h was t o a sign i f i c a n t e x t e n t e n g a g e d i n a s t r u g g l e w i t h t h e senate. C i c e r o , f o r exa m p l e , t h o u g h t t h a t c o n c o r d b e t w e e n senators a n d k n i g h t s (concordia ordinum) w o u l d f o r m a satisfactory basis f o r stable g o v e r n m e n t a n d w o u l d e n d c i v i l s t r i f e . T h e d i c h o t o m y s e n a t e - k n i g h t s was i m p o r t a n t , e v e n i f i t was m i s c o n c e i v e d . I t illustrates h o w d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n s t i t u t i o n s became p o i n t s o f r e f e r e n c e by w h i c h m e m b e r s o f a society o r g a n i s e d t h e i r social m a p s ; d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d p a r t s o f t h e society became i t e m s i n t h e p o l i t i c a l v o c a b u l a r y a n d w e r e t u r n e d , sometimes u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y , i n t o axes o f p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t . F o u r t h , t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f resources b e t w e e n c o n f l i c t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s is o f t e n o r u l t i m a t e l y t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t . T h e n e w l y e m e r g e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s w e r e t h e r e f o r e l i k e l y (a) t o test t h e l i m i t s o f t h e c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y ' s p o w e r a n d (b) t o c h a l l e n g e t h e p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t at t h e c e n t r e ; t h e p u r p o s e m i g h t be t o w i n e x t r a resources ( f o r e x a m p l e , c o n t r o l o f t h e j u r y - c o u r t s b y k n i g h t s , o r r e s e t d e m e n t - f a r m s f o r veterans) o r s i m p l y t o c o n f i r m t h e place o f a g r o u p w i t h i n t h e social o r d e r . L e t us i l l u s t r a t e these processes. B y t r a d i t i o n , state priests h a d t h e r i g h t t o declare c e r t a i n p o l i t i c a l o r 9

1

Conquerors

and slaves

legislative activities i l l i c i t , i f t h e y ascertained t h a t s o m e t h i n g h a d g o n e a w r y i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e r i t e s . B u t i n several c r i t i c a l instances, p r i e s t l y s t r i c t u r e s w e r e d i s r e g a r d e d ; p o l i t i c a l leaders p r o c e e d e d w i t h lawm a k i n g i n spite o f r e l i g i o u s bans, j u s t as generals f o u g h t battles a f t e r b l i n d l y i g n o r i n g u n p r o p i d o u s signs. T h e p o l i t i c a l t r i u m p h e d o v e r t h e r e l i g i o u s ; t h e status a n d p o w e r o f priests w e r e c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y lowered. A t t a c k s o n t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t by p o l i t i c a l generals w i t h a r m i e s at t h e i r backs w e r e m o r e d i f f i c u l t t o s u r v i v e a n d deserve m o r e d e t a i l e d a t t e n t i o n . I n d e e d , t h e escalation o f c i v i l wars b e t w e e n r i v a l generals ( M a r i u s a n d Sulla, P o m p e y a n d Caesar, A n t o n y a n d O c t a v i a n ) e v e n tually led to the dissolution of the Republic a n d to the concentration o f p o l i t i c a l p o w e r i n t h e h a n d s o f a single successful p o l i t i c a l g e n e r a l , O c t a v i a n (later c a l l e d A u g u s t u s ) . B u t t h i s successful c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f p o w e r n e e d n o t have h a p p e n e d ; t h e h u g e e m p i r e , l i k e t h e Persian e m p i r e o r t h e e m p i r e o f A l e x a n d e r t h e G r e a t , c o u l d have s p l i t i n t o separate t e r r i t o r i a l satrapies, a n d a l m o s t d i d w h e n A n t o n y a l l i e d w i t h C l e o p a t r a i n E g y p t . T h e r e is n o u n i v e r s a l l a w t h a t m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t leads t o a c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l p o w e r , a l t h o u g h i t is a p h e n o m e n o n w h i c h has b e e n f r e q u e n d y o b s e r v e d . I n s h o r t , we c a n n o t e x p l a i n A u g u s t u s ' success b y i n v o k i n g o r i m p l y i n g some n o n - e x i s t e n t l a w o f the centripetal tendency o f military power. O n e m a j o r p r o b l e m w h i c h t h e R o m a n state faced was t h e s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f t h e m i l i t a r y t o t h e p o l i t i c a l . I t is still a r e c u r r e n t p r o b l e m i n m a n y e c o n o m i c a l l y u n d e r - d e v e l o p e d states t o d a y . I n the Roman P r i n c i p a t e (31 B C - A D 235), t h e p r o b l e m was solved f o r l o n g p e r i o d s ; t h e f a m o u s R o m a n peace, t h e pox Romana, a f f o r d e d R o m a n subjects p r o t e c t i o n f r o m c i v i l wars as w e l l as f r o m e x t e r n a l attack. B u t i n t h e late R e p u b l i c , t h e delicate balance b e t w e e n t h e p o l i t i c a l a n d t h e m i l i t a r y was upset b y t w o factors: t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f p o w e r i n t h e h a n d s o f super-generals a n d t h e e x a c e r b a t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t . L e t us d e a l w i t h each b r i e f l y . 1 1 2

T h e conquest o f a h u g e e m p i r e r e p e a t e d l y c o n f r o n t e d t h e R o m a n state w i t h m i l i t a r y p r o b l e m s w h i c h r e q u i r e d m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e a n d l o n g e r l a s t i n g m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d s t h a n c o u l d be c o m f o r t a b l y t o l e r a t e d b y a p o w e r - s h a r i n g a n d e g a l i t a r i a n ( a m o n g peers) o l i g a r c h y . F o r e x a m p l e , i n 67 B C , i n o r d e r t o clear pirates f r o m t h e eastern M e d i 1 1 1

Mass poverty, rapidly rising expectations, expanding central government expendi ture which threatens traditional elites, a n d the insecurity of army officers are some of the important factors i n the coups d'etat in underdeveloped states. See S. E . Finer, The Man on Horseback ( L o n d o n , 1962), K. Hopkins, 'Civil-military relations i n developing countries*, British Journal of Sociology 17 (1966) 165*1.; I . Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development (New Y o r k , 1966) 254^.

92

Structural

differentiation

t e r r a n e a n , P o m p e y t h e G r e a t was, i n t h e interests o f m i l i t a r y efficiency, g i v e n a c o m m a n d w h i c h c o v e r e d several o r d i n a r y p r o v i n c e s ; t h i s i n e v i t a b l y raised P o m p e y above o t h e r s e n a t o r i a l generals. S i m i l a r l y , J u l i u s Caesar secured t h e c o m m a n d o f a l a r g e a r m y , i n effect f o r t e n years; a n d i t was t h i s e x t r a l o n g c o m m a n d w h i c h a l l o w e d h i m t o c o n q u e r G a u l . T h u s R o m a n s r e p e a t e d l y c r e a t e d super-generals i n t h e interests o f i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n , a n d t h e n w a i t e d i n fear a n d a n x i e t y , w o n d e r i n g w h e t h e r t h e super-generals, l i k e t h e generals o f o l d , w o u l d s u b o r d i n a t e themselves, w h e n t h e i r victories w e r e w o n , t o t h e state. S o m e t i m e s t h e y d i d ; at o t h e r t i m e s , t h e y u n l e a s h e d t h e i r forces against t h e c i t y o f R o m e , o r against t h e senate's hastily a p p o i n t e d d e f e n d e r s . T h e m e r e fact t h a t R o m a n generals a n d soldiers w e r e w i l l i n g t o attack t h e c i t y o f R o m e was i n d e x e n o u g h o f deep-seated p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y . W h a t h a d c h a n g e d ? Part o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e c h a n g e d b e h a v i o u r o f t h e elite lay i n t h e e x a c e r b a d o n o f p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t , a n d i n t h e b r e a k d o w n o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l system o f t h e serial e x c h a n g e o f p o l i t i c a l offices w i t h i n t h e e l i t e , based o n r e c i p r o c i t y a n d o n t r u s t as t o t h e l i m i t e d consequences o f b e i n g w i t h o u t p o l i t i c a l p o w e r . I n t h e o l d days, loss o f a n e l e c t i o n ( t o p r a e t o r s h i p o r c o n s u l s h i p , f o r e x a m p l e ) m e a n t loss o f face, b u t n o l o n g t e r m loss o f status f o r one's f a m i l y (we r e t u r n t o t h i s t o p i c i n C h a p t e r i o f V o l u m e T w o ) . T o w a r d s t h e e n d o f t h e R e p u b l i c , loss o f a n e l e c t i o n c o u l d m e a n b a n k r u p t c y ; loss o f p o l i t i c a l p o w e r c o u l d m e a n , as i t d i d i n Cicero's case, e x i l e a n d l a t e r e x e c u t i o n . P o l i t i c a l c o m p e t i t i o n h a d b e c o m e fiercer because t h e r e w a r d s o f g a i n i n g office, at h o m e o r i n t h e p r o v i n c e s , a n d t h e disadvantages o f m i s s i n g office h a d b e c o m e g r e a t e r . T h e use o f violence by a r m i e s a n d b y a r m e d gangs h a d e r o d e d , e v e n t h o u g h t h e y d i d n o t d e s t r o y t h e r u l e o f law. R o m a n s i n t h e last decades o f t h e R e p u b l i c b e g a n a g a i n t o w a l k i n c i t y streets c a r r y i n g a r m s , o r a c c o m p a n i e d by a r m e d r e t a i n e r s . I n t h e i r fight f o r v i c t o r y o r s u r v i v a l , p o l i t i c a l factions felt themselves f o r c e d t o use a n y w e a p o n w h i c h c a m e t o h a n d ; t h e y used especially those i n s t i t u t i o n s w h i c h h a d b e e n f o r g e d i n t h e process o f s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , a n d w h i c h w e r e n o t yet firmly e m b e d d e d i n t h e social o r d e r . H e n c e c r i m i n a l charges against p o l i t i c a l e n e m i e s i n the jury-courts, judicial m u r d e r s by ' p r o s c r i p t i o n ' (the publication o f lists o f e n e m i e s o f t h e state w h o c o u l d be l a w f u l l y m u r d e r e d f o r a r e w a r d ) , attacks by t h e a r m y o n t h e c a p i t a l a n d c i v i l wars. A s t h e p o w e r o f t h e state ( m e a s u r e d i n taxes g a t h e r e d , coins m i n t e d , m e n e m p l o y e d o r r a n g e o f laws passed) increased, so i t became c r u c i a l f o r f a c t i o n leaders t o m a k e s u r e t h a t t h e y a n d n o t o t h e r s c o n t r o l l e d t h e state. F i f t h a n d finally, i f t h e R o m a n state was t o persist as a single e n t i t y , t h e n i t n e e d e d n e w i n s t i t u t i o n s , n e w n o r m s a n d values w h i c h w o u l d 93

Conquerors

and slaves

h e l p integrate the newly differentiated parts. T h e m a i n new integrative i n s t i t u t i o n was t h e P r i n c i p a t e , t h e n a m e we give t o t h e p a t r i m o n i a l m o n a r c h y w h i c h was f o r g e d by A u g u s t u s a n d w h i c h i n its essentials persisted f o r close o n t h r e e h u n d r e d years. T h i s n e w p o l i t i c a l o r d e r r e p r e s e n t e d t h e increased p o w e r o f t h e state. I t deserves a n d has received w h o l e v o l u m e s o f d e s c r i p t i o n a n d discussion. F o r o u r p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , i t is e n o u g h v e r y b r i e f l y t o describe several c o n s t i t u e n t s which distinguished the Principate f r o m the Republic. T h e emperors* p o w e r clearly rested o n c o n t r o l o f t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l , long-service a r m y . T h e legions w e r e r e l o c a t e d o u t s i d e I t a l y o n t h e f r o n t i e r s o f t h e e m p i r e at a c o m f o r t i n g distance f r o m t h e scene o f active p o l i t i c s at R o m e . L e g i o n a r i e s ' pay h a d b e e n s i g n i f i c a n d y i n creased by J u l i u s Caesar; A u g u s t u s a d d e d a b o u n t y t o be p a i d o n satisfactory c o m p l e t i o n o f s i x t e e n , l a t e r t w e n t y years* m i l i t a r y service. Such regular payments, w h i c h accounted f o r almost half o f the total imperial budget, depended u p o n the regular a n d predictable payment a n d c o l l e c t i o n o f taxes. T h e y also d e p e n d e d u p o n t h e increased monetarisation of the imperial economy. U n d e r the Republic there h a d a l r e a d y b e e n substantial increases i n t h e v o l u m e o f coins m i n t e d at R o m e ; b u t u n d e r t h e P r i n c i p a t e , t h e w h o l e e m p i r e was f o r t h e first t i m e g i v e n a n e a r l y u n i f i e d system o f c o i n a g e , w h i c h i n t u r n r e f l e c t e d a partial unification of the whole monetary economy. T h i s partial u n i f i c a t i o n o f t h e m o n e t a r y e c o n o m y was a c h i e v e d l a r g e l y b y t h e i n t e r a c t i o n o f t a x a n d t r a d e . M o n e y taxes w e r e e x a c t e d i n t h e c o r e p r o v i n c e s (such as G a u l , S p a i n a n d Asia) a n d w e r e m o s t l y s p e n t i n I t a l y o r o n a r m y pay i n the f r o n t i e r provinces; core provinces t h e n h a d t o e x p o r t g o o d s i n o r d e r t o b u y back t h e m o n e y w i t h w h i c h t o pay t a x e s . T h i s s i m p l i f i e d m o d e l goes some way t o w a r d s e x p l a i n i n g w h y I t a l y u n d e r t h e P r i n c i p a t e was such a heavy n e t i m p o r t e r o f p r o v i n c i a l goods. 113

A n o t h e r c o n s t i t u e n t o f t h e n e w i m p e r i a l o r d e r was its l e g i t i m a c y . T h i s l e g i t i m a c y h a d several facets: t h e conscious r e s t o r a t i o n o f t r a d i tion, the extension of political support beyond the metropolis to the elites o f I t a l i a n a n d o f p r o v i n c i a l t o w n s , a n d t h e e n f o r c e m e n t o f t h e r u l e o f law. A u g u s t u s , t h e first e m p e r o r , o s t a n t a t i o u s l y set a b o u t r e s t o r i n g t h e o l d R e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n . I t was a s u r p r i s i n g act f o r a m o n a r c h . B u t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l o l i g a r c h i c c o n s t i t u t i o n was d e s i g n e d t o e n s u r e ( f o r e x a m p l e , t h r o u g h collegiate t e n u r e a n d s h o r t p e r i o d s o f h o l d i n g office) t h a t n o a r i s t o c r a t g o t t o o m u c h p o w e r . W i t h a m o n a r c h 1 1 3

O n the growth i n money supply at R o m e u n d e r the Republic, see M . H . C r a w f o r d , Roman Republican Coinage (Cambridge, 1974) 696^.; o n the reciprocity of tax a n d trade, see briefly K . Hopkins (1978: 39ff.).

94

Structural

differentiation

s u p e r i m p o s e d t o see t h a t a l l t h e r u l e s w e r e o b e y e d , t h e t r a d i t i o n a l Republican constitution w o r k e d i n the monarch's favour. One i m p o r t a n t c h a n g e was necessary: aristocrats' access t o t h e m e t r o p o l i t a n p o p u l a c e i n elections was b l o c k e d . T h e m e t r o p o l i t a n p o o r w e r e effectively d i s f r a n c h i s e d ; b u t t h e c i t i z e n a r m y was n o l o n g e r sufficiently identified w i t h t h e m t o protect t h e i r ancient privileges. T h e y were left w i t h b r e a d a n d circuses. M e a n w h i l e t h e basis o f t h e e m p e r o r ' s o w n p o l i t i c a l s u p p o r t h a d been w i d e n e d (this h a d been p a r t i c u l a r l y necessary i n t h e b i t t e r c i v i l w a r against A n t o n y ) t o i n c l u d e t h e elites o f I t a l i a n t o w n s , a n d t h e n l a t e r o f p r o v i n c i a l t o w n s also. I n C h a p t e r v , w e e x a m i n e some o f t h e beliefs a n d r i t u a l s w h i c h h e i g h t e n e d t h e e m p e r o r ' s l e g i t i m a c y a n d w h i c h h e l p e d m a n y subjects t h r o u g h o u t t h e e m p i r e t o i d e n t i f y w i t h t h e n e w r e g i m e . L e g i t i m a c y also rested u p o n t h e r u l e o f law. I n d e e d , i n m a n y h i s t o r y books, A u g u s t u s ' p o w e r is d e s c r i b e d as r e s t i n g o n t h e legal r e g u l a t i o n o f his c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o w e r s (his c o n s u l a r imperium, his t r i b u n i c i a n p o w e r ) ; n o d o u b t , these w e r e i m p o r t a n t p r o p s f o r R o m a n s , as w e l l as f o r m o d e r n scholars. B u t t h e r u l e o f law also s i g n i f i e d a w i d e s p r e a d r e t r e a t f r o m violence i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , a n d even m o r e i m p o r t a n t a p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f o u t c o m e i n m a n y p o l i t i c a l , social a n d business a r r a n g e m e n t s . T h e A u g u s t a n s e t t l e m e n t b r o k e t w o vicious circles. T h e first vicious circle we set o u t i n F i g u r e I . I ; i t was a sequence o f conquest a n d p l u n d e r , t h e i m p o r t o f b o o t y a n d slaves i n t o I t a l y , t h e i m p o v e r i s h m e n t o f I t a l i a n peasants a n d t h e i r e x t r u s i o n f r o m t h e i r f a r m s , t h e i r r e c r u i t m e n t to the a r m y (or t h e i r m i g r a t i o n to the city o f Rome) a n d their subsequent d e m a n d s f o r I t a l i a n f a r m s o f t h e i r o w n . T h e b r e a k i n this c h a i n r e a c t i o n , as w e have seen, was t h e mass e m i g r a t i o n o f I t a l i a n peasants, m o s t l y ex-soldiers, t o settle i n colonies o n n o r t h e r n I t a l i a n o r p r o v i n c i a l l a n d . B y t h e e n d o f A u g u s t u s ' l o n g r e i g n (31 B C - A D 14), the territorial expansion o f the e m p i r e had virtually stopped, and the v o l u m e o f slave i m p o r t s h a d , i n m y v i e w , c o n s i d e r a b l y d i m i n i s h e d . A second vicious circle a f f e c t i n g aristocrats a n d o t h e r w e a l t h y I t a l i a n l a n d - o w n e r s was also b r o k e n . T h e massive e m i g r a t i o n o f s o l d i e r c o l o n ists h a d eased t h e c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n r i c h a n d p o o r f o r I t a l i a n l a n d ; the peaceful conditions o f the Principate a n d the g r a d u a l unification o f t h e m o n e t a r y e c o n o m y o f t h e e m p i r e as a w h o l e m a d e i t easier f o r r i c h R o m a n s , i n c l u d i n g senators, t o o w n estates overseas i n t h e p r o v i n c e s , a n d t o h a v e t h e i r cash r e n t s safely t r a n s m i t t e d o v e r l o n g distances t o be spent i n t h e city o f R o m e . T h i s r a p i d c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f s o m e o f t h e differences b e t w e e n R e p u b l i c a n d P r i n c i p a t e a n d o f t h e process o f c h a n g e i n t h e late R e p u b l i c has c a p t u r e d some b u t o n l y some aspects o f a c o m p l e x 95

Conquerors

and slaves

r e a l i t y . S t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n has t w o p a r t i c u l a r disadvantages: first, i t does n o t f o r m p a r t o f a n effective, large-scale t h e o r y o f social c h a n g e ; i n t h i s respect, i t is n o t l i k e t h e c o n c e p t ' m o d e o f p r o d u c t i o n ' w i t h i n a M a r x i s t t h e o r y ; secondly, s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n is a m o d e r n , n o n - R o m a n c o n c e p t ( l i k e social m o b i l i t y o r e c o n o m i c growth), superimposed o n Roman history, and independent o f the p e r c e p t i o n s o f R o m a n actors. N e i t h e r d i s a d v a n t a g e is o v e r w h e l m i n g . A n d o f course, u s i n g a m o d e r n c o n c e p t does n o t p r e c l u d e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f actors' p e r c e p t i o n s a n d i n t e n t i o n s . I n d e e d i n l a t e r c h a p t e r s , I shall t r y e x p l i c i d y t o e n t e r i n t o t h e p e r c e p t u a l w o r l d o f R o m a n s a n d h o l d a c o u n t e r p o i n t between m y a n d their perceptions o f various p r o b l e m s , f r o m w i n n i n g f r e e d o m f o r a slave t o w o r s h i p p i n g t h e e m p e r o r as a g o d . T h e p o i n t I w a n t t o m a k e is t h a t a l l a p p r o a c h e s , b o u r g e o i s , M a r x i s t , a n n a l i s t i c , p r o s o p o g r a p h i c a l , are necessarily selective a n d p a r t i a l . A c h a n g e i n perspective o r t h e use o f a d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t leads us t o select d i f f e r e n t facts o r t o p r e s e n t t h e same facts i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t . I n t h i s sense, concepts a r e i n t e l l e c t u a l l y p r i o r t o t h e e v i d e n c e a n d d e m a n d as m u c h s k i l l a n d a t t e n t i o n as does t h e e v i d e n c e itself. 1 1 4

A P P E N D I X On

the

probable

size

of

the

population

of

the

city

of

Rome

T h e size of the population of the city of Rome has often been disputed. T h e r e is not enough evidence f r o m which to deduce secure conclusions. However, it seems worth outlining such evidence as does exist and some of the problems surrounding i t , since an estimate of the city's size plays a significant part i n any estimate of the population of Italy as a whole and its distribution. T h e main basis for estimating the size of the city of Rome's population is the recorded number of recipients of the free wheat dole and/or the money gifts (congiaria) occasionally handed out i n the city of Rome. These were recorded as n u m b e r i n g 320,000 i n 46 BC; but they were then immediately reduced to 150,000 by Julius Caesar who organised emigration to the provinces and a careful block by block registration of those qualified (Suetonius, Julius Caesar 41 -2). This reduction gives g r o u n d for t h i n k i n g that the official number of recipients was swollen at other times also by malpractice o r inefficiency. Augustus himself i n his record of his achievements claimed that the recipients of his money gifts and/or wheat doles i n the city of Rome numbered 250,000 or more on five occasions (in 44, 29, 24, 23, and 12 BC); i n 5 BC, the number of recipients rose again to 320,000 but then sank i n 2 BC to * just over 200,000' (Res Gestae 15). A l t h o u g h the distribution was formally limited to those living in the city of Rome, i t would have been worthwhile f o r peasants living nearby to walk to the city and claim a sizeable free ration of wheat (33 k g per month). 1 1 4

I d o not mean by this to imply that since all approaches are partial, no choice can be made between them. F a r from it. S u c h choices are repeatedly made.

96

Appendix P e r h a p s w e s h o u l d m a k e s o m e a l l o w a n c e f o r this. E v e n so all t h e r e c o r d e d n u m b e r s i n d i c a t e a v e r y l a r g e city b y p r e - i n d u s t r i a l E u r o p e a n s t a n d a r d s . A l l t h e recipients w e r e m a l e a n d o f c i d z e n status; w e m u s t therefore a d d w o m e n , c h i l d r e n , r e s i d e n t aliens without citizenship, slaves a n d soldiers. W e d o n o t k n o w h o w m a n y . W e a l s o d o n o t k n o w h o w o l d m a l e s o f c i d z e n status h a d to b e to qualify f o r t h e wheat dole. S u e t o n i u s

(Augustus

41) s t a t e d t h a t

A u g u s t u s i n his distribution o f m o n e y i n c l u d e d y o u n g boys, e v e n t h o u g h they customarily received largesse only w h e n they r e a c h e d the age o f ten. B e l o c h (1886:392ff.), w h o s e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e a n c i e n t e v i d e n c e still s e e m s best, d e d u c e d f r o m this that boys also n o r m a l l y r e c e i v e d the wheat dole f r o m the age o f ten o n w a r d s . T h i s a s s u m p t i o n m a y n o t b e right, s i n c e S u e t o n i u s w a s w r i t i n g a b o u t m o n e y gifts, b u t it s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s e n s t h e m u l d p l i e r w h i c h w e h a v e t o u s e i n o r d e r to a c c o u n t f o r w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e n u m b e r o f

250,000 m a l e r e c i p i e n t s a g e d t e n y e a r s a n d o l d e r i m p l i e s a total p o p u l a t i o n (if s e x r a d o s w e r e b a l a n c e d a n d t h e p o p u l a t i o n w a s s e l f - r e p r o d u c i n g - t h e s e a r e s i m p l i f y i n g a s s u m p t i o n s o n l y , n o t s t a t e m e n t s o f fact) o f a b o u t «0 = 25). A l t e r n a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n s o f h i g h e r m o r t a l i t y

670,000 (at

= 20) o r a h i g h e r a g e

o f q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e w h e a t d o l e (say a g e fifteen a n d 4, = 25) p r o d u c e total populations o f about

690,000 a n d 770,000 r e s p e c t i v e l y . I n fact, t h e p r o p o r t i o n

o f w o m e n a n d y o u n g c h i l d r e n i n t h e city m a y h a v e b e e n less t h a n i n t h e population at large. T o t h e s e figures w e s h o u l d t h e n a d d r e s i d e n t a l i e n s , s o l d i e r s a n d s l a v e s , a n d s u b t r a c t t h e o u d y i n g c i t i z e n s w h o w a l k e d t o t h e city to c o l l e c t t h e i r d o l e . T h i s is p u r e g u e s s w o r k . B e l o c h r e c k o n e d t h a t to t a k e a c c o u n t o f t h e m a l l , w e s h o u l d

300,000 t o m a k e a total p o p u l a t i o n f o r t h e city o f 800,000 a n d j u s t u n d e r o n e m i l l i o n .

add roughly a further between

O t h e r e v i d e n c e c a n a l s o b e u s e d t o h e l p u s : t h e b u i l t - u p a r e a o f t h e city, the

quantity

o f wheat

i m p o r t e d a n d t h e n u m b e r o f houses listed. T h i s

i n f o r m a t i o n serves as a c h e c k o n t h e estimates w e have just m a d e . T h e a r e a i n s i d e t h e city w a l l s w h i c h w e r e b u i l t i n t h e t h i r d c e n t u r y A D w a s 1,373 hectares (Meier

1953/4: 329): t h i s a r e a c o r r e s p o n d e d r o u g h l y w i t h t h e e s t i 1921 , v o l . 4,117).

m a t e d a r e a o f t h e city i n t h e t i m e o f A u g u s t u s ( F r i e n d l a n d e r

10

I f t h e population o f this a r e a h a d b e e n o n e m i l l i o n , t h e n the average density w o u l d h a v e b e e n a b o u t 730 p e r s o n s p e r h e c t a r e . T h i s w a s c e r t a i n l y p o s s i b l e ; t h e d e n s i t y i n t h e p o o r e s t d i s t r i c t s o f R o m e a n d N a p l e s i n 1881 w e r e o v e r 800 a n d a l m o s t 1,500 p e r s o n s p e r h e c t a r e r e s p e c t i v e l y ( B e l o c h 1886: 409). A n d I myself have seen squatter settlements i n H o n g K o n g , c o m p r i s i n g o n e - o r two-storey r a m s h a c k l e huts, built o f b a m b o o a n d tin-sheeting, with densities c o n s i d e r a b l y h i g h e r ( u p t o 2,500 p e r h e c t a r e ) . B u t s u c h a h i g h a v e r a g e d e n s i t y f o r
(1921: 11 ff.) i n d i s m i s s i n g t h e e v i d e n c e o f J o s e p h u s (Jewish a n d t h e E p i t o m e (On the Caesars

War

2.383 a n d 386)

1.6), w h i c h t a k e n t o g e t h e r s u g g e s t t h a t R o m e ' s

97

Conquerors

and slaves

a n n u a l c o n s u m p t i o n o f w h e a t t o t a l l e d 6 0 m i l l i o n modii

= 390,000 t o n s p e r y e a r .

T h i s w o u l d h a v e b e e n e n o u g h to f e e d a l m o s t t w o m i l l i o n p e o p l e at 200 k g w h e a t p e r p e r s o n y e a r . T h i s is a h i g h b u t n o t i m p o s s i b l e r a t e o f c o n s u m p t i o n , if w e a l l o w f o r s p o i l a g e a n d loss. B u t t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o n p o p u l a t i o n size a r e incredible. A n o t h e r g e n e r a l l y u n r e l i a b l e s o u r c e (SHA,

Septimius

Severus

23) i n f o r m s u s

t h a t i n a b o u t t h e y e a r A D 200, d a i l y c o n s u m p t i o n i n t h e city o f R o m e w a s 75,000 modii

( = 180,000 t o n s p e r y e a r ) , less t h a n h a l f t h e figure c i t e d a b o v e . A s i m i l a r

figure,

8 0 , 0 0 0 modii

p e r d a y , is g i v e n by a n a n c i e n t c o m m e n t a t o r , a s c h o l i a s t ,

o n L u c a n ( a d Pharsolia two

figures

1.319; e d . C . F . W e b e r ( L e i p z i g , 1831) v o l . 3, 53). T h e s e

c o u l d i m p l y p o p u l a t i o n s o f a b o u t 9 0 0 , 0 0 0 at t h e r a t h e r h i g h r a t e s

of c o n s u m p t i o n cited above. F i n a l l y , t h e n u m b e r o f h o u s e s , as l i s t e d i n a f o u r t h - c e n t u r y t o p o g r a p h y f o r e a c h r e g i o n o f t h e city o f R o m e (see R . V a l e n t i n o , Codice di Roma

topografico

delta

( R o m e , 1940) 89ff., a n d 1 6 1 - 2 ; a n d Z a c h a r i a s o f M y t i l e n e , ibid.

citta 331).

D e p e n d i n g o n w h i c h t e x t o n e u s e s , t h e r e w e r e a b o u t 44,000, 4 6 , 0 0 0 o r 4 7 , 0 0 0 insulae

a n d a b o u t 1,800 domus.

W h a t insulae

T h e domus

were clearly grand houses,

palaizi.

w e r e is d i s p u t e d .

A u t h o r i t y c a n be f o u n d for two m e a n i n g s : single residential units like the m e d i a e v a l h e a r t h s , o r h o u s e s , s o m e o f w h i c h w e r e s u b d i v i d e d a n d let to d i f f e r e n t f a m i l i e s a n d i n d i v i d u a l s . T h e m e a n i n g house s e e m s m o r e c o m m o n , a n d e v e n a very m o d e s t m u l t i p l i e r , s u c h as only ten p e r s o n s p e r h o u s e

(insula)

g i v e s a total p o p u l a t i o n o f c l o s e o n h a l f a m i l l i o n . B u t c l e a r l y w e d o n o t k n o w a n y t h i n g certain about o c c u p a n c y rates i n R o m a n I n s u m , p r e c i s i o n is i m p o s s i b l e . B u t a l l t h e

insulae.

figures

cited suggest that the

city o f R o m e h a d a v e r y l a r g e p o p u l a t i o n , a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y a b o v e 500,000 i n t h e r e i g n o f A u g u s t u s , a n d p r o b a b l y less t h a n o n e m i l l i o n . I a g r e e w i t h B e l o c h , t h a t t h e m o s t p r o b a b l e g u e s s is i n t h e r e g i o n 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 - 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . B u t it is o n l y a guess. F i n a l l y , I s h o u l d a d d that s u c h a large m e t r o p o l i t a n p o p u l a t i o n was possible only because of the sophisticated system of water supply (eventually w a t e r w a s b r o u g h t by n i n e t e e n a q u e d u c t s f r o m as f a r as 9 0 k m (56 m i l e s ) a w a y ) , a n d a l s o b e c a u s e o f t h e less v i s i b l e b u t e q u a l l y i m p r e s s i v e s y s t e m o f m a i n drainage. T h e l i t e r a t u r e o n t h i s s u b j e c t is e x t e n s i v e . K . J . B e l o c h , Die griechisch-römischen

Welt

Bevölkerung

der

( L e i p z i g , 1886) 392 ff. s e e m s b e s t ; t h e d i s c u s s i o n b y

U . K a h r s t e d t i n L . Friedländer, Sittengeschichte

Roms

( L e i p z i g , 1921) v o l . 4, 1 0

1 iff. a d d s s o m e t h i n g t o t h i s . F . G . M a i e r , ' R ö m i s c h e Bevölkerungsgeschichte u n d I n s c h r i f t e n s t a t i s t i k * , Historia

2 (1953/4) 3i8ff. is o v e r s c e p t i c a l .

T h e best d i s c u s s i o n i n E n g l i s h is p e r h a p s b y W . J . O a t e s , ' T h e p o p u l a t i o n o f R o m e ' , Classical

Philology

29 (1934) 101 ff.; t h a t b y P . A . B r u n t (1971:376ff.) is

too m u c h i n f l u e n c e d by h i s v i e w s o n t h e p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f e x - s l a v e s i n t h e city's p o p u l a t i o n .

98

II THE GROWTH AND PRACTICE OF SLAVERY IN ROMAN TIMES

T H E

G R O W T H

OF A

S L A V E

SOCIETY

It's n o f u n b e i n g a slave. A n d it's n o t j u s t t h e w o r k B u t k n o w i n g t h a t y o u ' r e a s l a v e , a n d t h a t n o t h i n g c a n c h a n g e it. S l a v e c h a r a c t e r i n P l a u t u s , Amphitryo

(c. 200 BC)

O n l y a h a n d f u l o f h u m a n societies can p r o p e r l y be called * slave societies', i f by slave society we m e a n a society i n w h i c h slaves play a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t i n p r o d u c t i o n a n d f o r m a h i g h p r o p o r t i o n (say o v e r 20 %) o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n . T h e r e are o n l y t w o w e l l established cases f r o m a n t i q u i t y : classical A t h e n s a n d R o m a n I t a l y ; b u t p e r h a p s o t h e r G r e e k districts (such as c e n t r a l Greece a r o u n d D e l p h i ) o r t h e G r e e k cides o n t h e A s i a M i n o r seaboard (such as Ephesus a n d P e r g a m u m ) w e r e also slave societies i n this sense. T o be safe, we s h o u l d call t h e t w o a n d q u e cases: Greece u n d e r s t o o d l i b e r a l l y t o i n c l u d e G r e e k settlements o v e r seas a n d R o m a n I t a l y . Y e t e v e n this loose f o r m u l a t i o n is i m p o r t a n t since i t i m p l i e s t h a t i n m o s t parts o f t h e R o m a n e m p i r e slavery was o f m i n o r importance i n p r o d u c t i o n . F r o m the early m o d e r n p e r i o d , 1

2

1

1

Twenty per cent is obviously an arbitrary cut-off point, but it marks a discontinuity between slave societies as defined here a n d other slave-owning societies. I n other words, I a m claiming that the number of slave societies would not be increased if the dividing line were fifteen per cent or even ten per cent. Marxists in particular have been keen to think that slavery predominated throughout the R o m a n empire, primarily because that was the received opinion when Marx wrote. Recendy, however, the discovery a n d acceptance of the Asiatic mode of production as an alternative link in the social evolutionary chain has diverted attention from slaves to other forms of dependency. T h e literature is enormous, but see F . Vitinghoff, ' D i e T h e o r i e des historischen Materialismus über den antiken Sklavenhalterstaat', Saeculum 11 ( i 9 6 0 ) 89-131, E . Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory ( L o n d o n , 1968) 86ff., a n d E . V a r g a , * U b e r die asiatische Produktionsweise', Jahrbuch f. Wirtschaftsgeschichte (1967, 4) 181 ff., a j o u r n a l which regularly carries good articles by East G e r m a n marxists about ancient history. See also P. A n d e r s o n , Lineages of the Absolutist State ( L o n d o n , 1974) 462fr. T h e ancient evidence on slavery in the R o m a n empire outside Italy is so thin that it seems compatible with many theories. Incidentally the single passing statement by G a l e n (ed. Kühn, vol. 5, 4 9 ) that there were roughly equal numbers of (a) citizens, (b) women, (c) slaves in Pergamum is surely best understood not as a census statistic, but as meaning Mots of slaves'. W e know so litde of rural: urban populations that this single statement by itself is difficult to interpret.

99

The growth and practice of slavery o n l y t h r e e m o r e cases are k n o w n , t h e W e s t I n d i a n I s l a n d s , B r a z i l a n d t h e s o u t h e r n states o f t h e U S A . T h e s e five societies i n w h i c h slaves played a considerable role i n p r o d u c t i o n (and i n ostentatious c o n s u m p tion) f o r m a d i s t i n c t c a t e g o r y o f 'slave society'. 3

T h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f slave society is a d m i t t e d l y a r b i t r a r y , b u t i t m a y be u s e f u l , because i t u n d e r l i n e s h o w r a r e such * slave societies' have been, and the m a r k e d discontinuity between t h e m a n d the n u m e r o u s t r i b a l a n d p r e - i n d u s t r i a l s l a v e - o w n i n g societies, i n w h i c h a s m a l l p r o p o r t i o n o f m e n a n d w o m e n w e r e k e p t as slaves. T h e Human Relations Area Files r e c o r d t h e presence o f s o m e slaves i n n e a r l y h a l f o u t o f 800 societies s t u d i e d . B u t sacrificial slavery a m o n g t h e K w a k i u d , f o r e x a m p l e , o r d o m e s t i c ' s l a v e r y ' i n t r a d i t i o n a l C h i n a , o r t h e presence o f several t h o u s a n d black slaves i n E n g l a n d i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y was o n a c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t scale f r o m slavery i n slave societies as d e f i n e d above. A m o n g t h e K w a k i u d , i n t r a d i t i o n a l C h i n a a n d i n E n g l a n d , slaves w e r e a n e g l i g i b l e f a c t o r i n p r o d u c t i o n . I n R o m a n I t a l y , t h e s o u t h e r n states o f t h e U S A a n d B r a z i l , slavery was a v e r y l a r g e f a c t o r i n p r o d u c t i o n (see T a b l e n . i ) . 4

T h e s i m i l a r i m p o r t a n c e o f slavery i n t h e five slave societies makes c o m p a r i s o n s b e t w e e n t h e m seem a t t r a c t i v e . O b v i o u s l y , c o m p a r i s o n o f slavery w i t h i n t h e A m e r i c a s is easier. W h a t e v e r t h e differences i n c u l t u r e , a l l A m e r i c a n slave societies w e r e t h e p r o d u c t o f s i m i l a r c o n d i t i o n s : E u r o p e a n e x p a n s i o n i n t o spacious a n d u n c u l t i v a t e d t e r r i t o r i e s , t h e absence o f a n easily available a n d effective l a b o u r f o r c e , t h e mass i m p o r t o f black A f r i c a n s t o p r o v i d e l a b o u r , a n d finally t h e close l i n k s b e t w e e n p r o d u c t i o n by slaves a n d t h e e c o n o m i c a l l y d e v e l o p e d non-slave societies, w h i c h p r o v i d e d b o t h tools o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d m a r k e t s i n w h i c h t h e slaves' s u r p l u s p r o d u c e was s o l d . I n this c h a p t e r , f e w e x p l i c i t c o m p a r i s o n s are t o be m a d e b e t w e e n 3

4

F o r present purposes it seems reasonable to treat the West Indies as a single case. T h e West African kingdoms at the other e n d of the slave trade present a difficult case; there seems to be evidence of significant levels of slavery; in some kingdoms slaves probably accounted for fifty per cent of the total population according to nineteenth-century travellers' reports; but the functions of slavery a n d the treatment of slaves seem remarkably different from those we find in other slave societies. I have therefore, tentatively, not included them as slave societies. T h i s may be wrong. See further the essays i n C . Meillassoux, L 'esclavage en Afriqueprecoloniale (Paris, 1975) a n d A . G . B. Fisher and H . J . Fisher, Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa ( L o n d o n , 1970). Evidence of the presence o r absence of slavery was available from 808 societies. O f 387 societies with some slavery, hereditary slavery was certainly attested in only 165 societies. B u t the quality of such data is inevitably uneven. See G . P. Murdock, ' E t h n o g r a p h i c atlas: a summary*, Ethnology 6 (1967) i09ff. T h e distinction between a slave-owning society a n d what I call here a 'slave society* is adapted from M . I . Finley, sv Slavery in The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New Y o r k , 1968).

too

The growth of a slave society Table II.I.

The

population

of

five

slave

societies

Estimated

Estimated

S l a v e s as a

total

number

proportion of

population

o f slaves

the population

('000,000)

('000,000)

(about)

Athens* c.

400

BC

(0.2)*

(0.06)

30%

(4) (5-6)

(0.6) (2)

15% 35%

R o m a n Italy

225 31

BC* BC

C

Brazil"

1800 1850

1

3 8

2.5

33% 30%

45 12

1.5 4

33% 33%

0.5

0.18 0.4

28% 30%

U S A , s o u t h e r n states

1820* 1860^ Cuba

1804 1861

i*4

* F i g u r e s i n parentheses indicates a considerable degree of doubt. S o u r c e s to T a b l e (a) R . L . S a r g e n t , The 63,

127;

Size of the Slave

11.1

Population

(b) d e r i v e d f r o m P. A . B r u n t , Italian

at Athens Manpower

( U r b a n a , 111., ( O x f o r d , 1971)

( e x c l u d i n g n o r t h e r n I t a l y ) - a r o u g h g u e s s ; (c) K . J . B e l o c h , Die do Brasil

Bevölkerung

Welt ( L e i p z i g , 6

the American

K. M. Stampp, Slavery

60

1886) 418, 435-6; (d) C . P r a d o , Historia Economica (Säo P a o l o , 1963), a p p e n d i x ; (e) S . E . M o r r i s o n e t a l . The Growth

der gr.-röm. of

1924)

in

v

Republic The

the Americas

(New Y o r k , sixth edition

Peculiar

Institution

( L o n d o n , 1967)

1969)

( L o n d o n , 1964) 202.

262, 39;

(g)

499,

861;

(/)

H . S. Klein,

T h e slave population of other

islands i n the West Indies was smaller.

R o m a n slavery a n d slavery i n t h e o t h e r * slave societies'. B u t c o m p a r i s o n s is i m p l i c i t , i n t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t c o n c e n t r a t e s o n f o u r i m p o r t a n t aspects o f R o m a n slavery, w h i c h seem e x c e p t i o n a l by c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e s o u t h e r n states o f t h e U S A . T h r e e o f these factors h a n g t o g e t h e r : t h e h i g h status o f a n i m p o r t a n t b o d y o f p r o fessional a n d s k i l l e d slaves i n R o m e , t h e h i g h r a t e o f slave m a n u 5

5

Explicit comparisons have been rare, but see particularly J . Vogt, Sklaverei und Humanität, Historia Einzelschrift 8 (Wiesbaden , 1972), esp. gjtt. (now translated as Ancient Slavery and the Ideal of Man ( O x f o r d , 1974) 170ft.); D . B . Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (Ithaca, N . Y . , 1966); Finlcy (1968); C . A . Y e o , ' T h e economics of R o m a n a n d A m e r i c a n slavery', Finanzarchiv 13 (1952) 445-83 is now somewhat dated. 1

IOI

The growth and practice of slavery m i s s i o n , a n d t h e a s s i m i l a t i o n o f f o r m e r slaves i n t o c i t i z e n society o n t e r m s o f n e a r e q u a l i t y w i t h n a t i v e - b o r n R o m a n citizens. T h e f o u r t h f a c t o r is m o r e c o m p l e x , a n d a g a i n i n s t a r k c o n t r a s t w i t h s o u t h e r n slavery: t h e R o m a n s i m p o r t e d a massive n u m b e r o f a g r i c u l t u r a l slaves i n t o I t a l y i n o r d e r t o c u l t i v a t e l a n d w h i c h was already being cultivated by citizens. W e have t o e x p l a i n n o t o n l y t h e i m p o r t a t i o n o f slaves, b u t t h e e x t r u s i o n o f citizens. A n d we have t o fit t h e g r o w t h o f slavery i n t o its h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t , c o n c e n t r a t i n g o n s t r u c t u r e a n d process i n t h e p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y o f R o m e d u r i n g its i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n . L e t us tackle this last p r o b l e m first; we c a n d o i t q u i t e r a p i d l y , b u t some r e p e t i t i o n o f a r g u m e n t s f r o m t h e last c h a p t e r is u n a v o i d a b l e .

Slavery

and

the

expansion

of

empire

Mass slavery i n R o m a n I t a l y ( i n c l u d i n g Sicily) was a p r o d u c t o f c o n quest. I n j u s t o v e r t w o h u n d r e d years, t h e R o m a n s c o n q u e r e d t h e w h o l e o f t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n basin. I n 260 B C , R o m e was a p o o r b u t p o l i t i c a l l y p o w e r f u l city-state w i t h c o n t r o l o v e r c e n t r a l a n d s o u t h e r n I t a l y . B y t h e e n d o f t h e first c e n t u r y B C , R o m e c o n t r o l l e d a n e m p i r e w h i c h s t r e t c h e d f r o m t h e E n g l i s h C h a n n e l t o t h e R e d Sea a n d f r o m A l g e r i a t o t h e B l a c k Sea. I t c o v e r e d a l a n d area e q u a l t o m o r e t h a n h a l f t h e U S A , a n d c o n t a i n e d a p o p u l a t i o n w h i c h is c o n v e n t i o n a l l y e s t i m a t e d at fifty o r s i x t y m i l l i o n , w h i c h was (again by c o n v e n t i o n a l estimates) a b o u t o n e fifth o f t h e w o r l d p o p u l a t i o n at t h a t t i m e . 6

Slaves w e r e c o n c e n t r a t e d i n R o m a n I t a l y , t h e h e a r t l a n d o f t h e e m p i r e . M o s t o f t h e m w e r e p r o b a b l y c a p t u r e d i n b a t d e , a f t e r sieges o r i n t h e i m m e d i a t e a f t e r m a t h o f c o n q u e s t ; a m o n g a g r i c u l t u r a l slaves, males p r e d o m i n a t e d ; w h i l e t h e e m p i r e was b e i n g e x p a n d e d , t h e y w e r e r e p l a c e d by f r e s h captives, s u p p l e m e n t e d b y t r a d e a n d b r e e d i n g . T h e e v i d e n c e o n slave n u m b e r s is s l i g h t a n d d i s p u t e d ; b u t i t is c o m m o n l y a g r e e d t h a t t h e r e was a h u g e increase i n t h e slave p o p u l a t i o n i n t h e p e r i o d o f e x p a n s i o n , a n d i t seems l i k e l y t h a t b y t h e e n d o f t h e first c e n t u r y B C t h e r e w e r e a b o u t t w o m i l l i o n slaves i n I t a l y o u t o f a t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n o f six m i l l i o n . 7

8

6

7

8

K. J . Beloch, Die Bevölkerung der gr.-röm. Welt (Leipzig, 1886) 507; United Nadons, Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends (New Y o r k , 1953) 8; D. M . H e e r , Society and Population (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968) 2. T h i s is disputed, but wrongly, I think, by E . M . Schtaerman, Die Blütezeit der SMavenwirtsckaft in der römischen Republik (Wiesbaden, 1969) 36-70; she thinks that even in the period of imperial expansion most slaves i n Italy were bought or bred. O f course, war captives too were traded. I follow Beloch (1886:418,435-6) rather than P. A . B r u n t , Italian Manpower ( O x f o r d , 1971) 124, who thinks in terms of about three million slaves out of a total Italian population of seven a n d a half million. T h e s e differences give some idea of the inadequate evidence.

102

The growth of a slave society T h e conquest, p l u n d e r a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f a h u g e e m p i r e t r a n s f o r m e d the o l d political order. T h e traditional oligarchy had l o n g b e e n e n t r e n c h e d b u t its p o w e r ( m e a s u r e d i n taxes o r i n t h e n u m b e r o f officials) was l i m i t e d b y t h e lack o f g o v e r n m e n t a l resources a n d b y a n electorate o f a r m e d c i t i z e n peasants. T h e n e w p r o s p e r i t y d e s t r o y e d its stability. A series o f b i t t e r a n d d e s t r u c t i v e c i v i l wars b e t w e e n r i v a l generals l e d t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a p o w e r f u l m o n a r c h y s t r o n g l y based o n exclusive c o n t r o l o f a p r o f e s s i o n a l a r m y . I n a p a r a l l e l process, t h e i n t r u s i o n o f a l a r g e n u m b e r o f slaves t r a n s f o r m e d t h e t r a d i t i o n a l system o f p r o d u c t i o n . Peasants w h o o f t e n g r e w b a r e l y e n o u g h t o f e e d themselves w e r e e v i c t e d t o m a k e r o o m f o r slaves w h o p r o d u c e d a s u r p l u s f o r sale i n t h e m a r k e t . T h e d i s p l a c e m e n t o f c i t i z e n peasants by slaves, o f c o n q u e r o r s b y t h e i r captives e m b i t t e r e d t h e p o o r , a n d f r o m t h e e n d o f t h e second c e n t u r y B C e x a c e r b a t e d a series o f p o l i t i c a l d i s r u p t i o n s . A s soldiers a n d city p r o l e t a r i a t , t h e landless peasants w e r e an i m p o r t a n t factor b o t h i n f o m e n t i n g a n d i n p r o v i d i n g fodder f o r t h e c i v i l wars w h i c h m a r k e d t h e d e m i s e o f t h e R e p u b l i c (133 B C - 3 1 9

BC).

T h e p r o v i s i o n o f f o o d a n d w o r k f o r t w o m i l l i o n slaves i m p o r t e d t o live side b y side w i t h f o u r m i l l i o n citizens i m p l i e d r a d i c a l changes i n e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n . I t is i m p o r t a n t t o see t h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e o f these changes, a n d so t o be able t o set t h e m i n a f r a m e w o r k w h i c h i n some way transcends t h e specific circumstances o f a n y o n e event. T h i s v i e w c o m p l e m e n t s t h e h i s t o r i a n s ' n o r m a l focus o n p a r t i c u l a r m e n a n d t h e i r actions o r d e r e d p r i m a r i l y by t i m e . F i g u r e 1.1 ( p . 12) illustrates t h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e o f some o f t h e factors w h i c h affected t h e g r o w t h o f slavery i n R o m a n I t a l y . A s b e f o r e , I m u s t stress t h a t t h e d i a g r a m is selective a n d schematic, b u t i t m a y be h e l p f u l i n p r o v i d i n g a g u i d e t o t h e discussion. I shall b e g i n f r o m t h e t o p l e f t - h a n d corner. T h e R o m a n s c o n q u e r e d t h e w h o l e o f t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n basin o n l y by a f a n a t i c a l d e d i c a t i o n t o f i g h t i n g wars. T h i s c a n be seen as a p r o d u c t of the w a r r i o r ideology, embedded i n the nobility a n d shared by c i t i z e n soldiers. I t is d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d a d e q u a t e c r i t e r i a o f m i l i t a r i s m . W e c a n see i t r e f l e c t e d i n R o m a n f o l k - h e r o e s such as Fabius t h e D e l a y e r w h o r e f u s e d t o fight H a n n i b a l i n o p e n b a t t l e , o r i n t h e i r l a t e r i m i t a t o r s s u c h as P o m p e y t h e G r e a t o r J u l i u s Caesar, a n d i n t h e names a d o p t e d b y R o m a n nobles t o c o m m e m o r a t e t h e r e g i o n s w h i c h t h e y h a d c o n q u e r e d (e.g. A f r i c a n u s , A s i a t i c u s ) , a n d i n t h e b e l l i g e r e n t beh a v i o u r o f R o m a n generals. T h e R o m a n senate was o n c e d i s m a y e d t o find t h a t a g e n e r a l assigned t o a r e g i o n i n w h i c h ' h e h a d n o t 9

F o r the most perceptive ancient comments o n these developments, see A p p i a n , Wars i.7ff.

103

Civil

The growth and practice of slavery a c c o m p l i s h e d a n y t h i n g m e m o r a b l e ' h a d m a r c h e d several h u n d r e d k i l o m e t r e s t o fight a n u n p r o v o k e d w a r , p r e s u m a b l y i n t h e h o p e o f w i n n i n g g l o r y ( L i v y 4 3 . 1 ; 171 B C ) . F r o m t h e m i d d l e o f t h e second c e n t u r y B C o n w a r d s , t h e goddess V i c t o r y r i d i n g i n a c h a r i o t a n d b r a n d i s h i n g a w h i p became a c o m m o n s y m b o l s t a m p e d o n R o m a n silver coins. B u t t h e m o s t p o w e r f u l i n d e x o f t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f w a r i n R o m e is t h e n u m b e r s o f soldiers e n l i s t e d . F o r t w o c e n t u r i e s , t h e R o m a n s t y p i c a l l y m o b i l i e d a b o u t o n e e i g h t h o f a l l a d u l t m a l e citizens, a n d a m u c h h i g h e r p r o p o r t i o n o f y o u n g m a l e s . T h i s was g r e a t e r a n d m o r e sustained m i l i t a r y e f f o r t t h a n I h a v e f o u n d r e c o r d e d i n a n y o t h e r p r e - i n d u s t r i a l state. 10

E c o n o m i c a l l y , f o r e i g n wars w e r e disastrous f o r m a n y o f t h e R o m a n p o o r a n d p r o f i t a b l e f o r t h e rich. T h e r e is a n e l e m e n t o f c r u d e s i m p l i f i c a t i o n a n d t a u t o l o g y i n t h i s s t a t e m e n t : e v e n so, i t seems w o r t h saying. T h r o u g h d e a t h i n b a t t l e , i n j u r i e s a n d p r o l o n g e d absence, wars c r e a t e d vacancies o n I t a l i a n a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d , w h i c h t h e r i c h w e r e o n l y t o o anxious to occupy. W a r d e p r i v e d p o o r families o f male labour (and i n R o m a n law, l a n d n e g l e c t e d b y its o w n e r c o u l d be legally c l a i m e d by a n y o n e ) , while victory p r o v i d e d r i c h Romans w i t h the alternative l a b o u r o f slaves. P o o r soldiers w e r e e n g a g e d i n c a p t u r i n g t h e i r o w n replacements. 11

F r e q u e n t victories e n a b l e d t h e R o m a n s t o b r i n g back t o I t a l y h u g e q u a n d t i e s o f b o o t y i n t h e f o r m o f t r e a s u r e , m o n e y a n d slaves. T h e a c c u m u l a t e d w e a l t h o f t h e k i n g d o m s o f t h e eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n was b r o u g h t back t o R o m e . Provinces w e r e first p l u n d e r e d t h e n t a x e d ; t h e r a p a c i t y o f m a n y p r o v i n c i a l g o v e r n o r s was n o t o r i o u s , a n d l a r g e l y u n c h e c k e d . S o m e o f t h e b o o t y was s p e n t i n t u r n i n g t h e c i t y o f R o m e i n t o a resplendent capital city. Aristocrats displayed t h e i r booty i n t r i u m p h a l processions, s p e n t t h e i r i n c o m e s i n t h e c i t y a n d c o m p e t e d w i t h each o t h e r i n o s t e n t a t i o u s l u x u r y . T h i s lavish p r i v a t e e x p e n d i t u r e , t o g e t h e r w i t h g o v e r n m e n t e x p e n d i t u r e o n p u b l i c w o r k s a n d o n gifts o f w h e a t d i s t r i b u t e d t o R o m a n citizens l i v i n g i n t h e c i t y o f R o m e , a l l h e l p e d e n c o u r a g e t h e m i g r a t i o n o f peasants t o t h e c i t y (just as heavy e x p e n d i t u r e i n c a p i t a l cities i n d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s nowadays p u l l s i n peasants f r o m t h e c o u n t r y s i d e ) . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n was s w o l l e n b y slaves i m p o r t e d t o w o r k i n w o r k s h o p s a n d t o serve t h e rich i n t h e i r palaces. B y t h e m i d d l e o f t h e first c e n t u r y B C , t h e 1 0

1 1

B r u n t (1971: 391 ff.) reveals a n d tabulates the extent of this military effort. \ . . a m a n may without violence take possession of another's land, which is lying vacant either because of the owner's neglect, o r because the owner h a d died without a successor o r has been absent for a long time' Gaius, Institutes 2.51 - a text-book of the second century A D , but I assume that the laws derived from earlier times.

104

The growth of a slave society p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e city o f R o m e was p r o b a b l y w e l l o v e r t h r e e q u a r t e r s o f a m i l l i o n . R o m e was t h u s o n e o f t h e largest p r e - i n d u s t r i a l cities ever c r e a t e d . T h e rich invested a c o n s i d e r a b l e p a r t o f t h e i r n e w w e a l t h i n a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d i n I t a l y . L a n d was t h e o n l y safe a n d p r e s t i g i o u s large-scale i n v e s t m e n t available. B u t f e r t i l e l a n d a r o u n d R o m e was a l r e a d y densely o c c u p i e d by c i t i z e n peasants. T h e r i c h b o u g h t u p peasants' l a n d , o r t o o k possession o f i t by violence. T h e y r e o r g a n i s e d s m a l l - h o l d i n g s into larger and more profitable farms. T h e existing pattern of landh o l d i n g s p r e v e n t e d nobles f r o m c r e a t i n g h u g e single estates i n I t a l y ; their total land-holdings were large, but were typically made u p of several p r o p e r t i e s . T h e r e is a l m o s t n o e v i d e n c e o f estates o w n e d by R o m a n nobles i n t h e p r o v i n c e s u n t i l t h e e n d o f t h e R e p u b l i c a n p e r i o d of conquest. 1 2

13

L a r g e n u m b e r s o f t h e peasants w h o h a d b e e n d i s p l a c e d by slaves m i g r a t e d t o t h e city o f R o m e t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f t h e increased e x p e n d i t u r e there and to other Italian towns, o r they joined the army, o r t h e y m i g r a t e d t o t h e n e w l y p a c i f i e d n o r t h I t a l i a n plains. T h e r e a c t i o n t o d i s p l a c e m e n t was o f t e n b i t t e r a n d p r o v i d e d a p l a n k f o r p o l i t i c a l activists, o f w h o m T i b e r i u s G r a c c h u s is t h e best k n o w n exa m p l e . A s we have seen, he t r i e d t o l i m i t t h e a m o u n t o f p u b l i c l a n d (ager publicus) w h i c h c o u l d be c u l t i v a t e d by t h e r i c h a n d p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e r e m a i n d e r be d i s t r i b u t e d t o t h e p o o r . H e was assassinated by conservative nobles, t h o u g h his plans w e r e , i n t h e s h o r t r u n , m o d e s t l y successful. I n t h e course o f t h e n e x t c e n t u r y , soldiers r e p e a t e d l y a p p e a l e d t o t h e i r generals f o r l a n d t o settle o n a n d t h e y w e r e w i l l i n g t o fight f o r w h a t t h e y w a n t e d . A s a r e s u l t , s m a l l - h o l d e r s w e r e o f t e n d i s p l a c e d b y veterans, since l a r g e estates g e n e r a l l y escaped seizure a n d 1 1

T h i s figure is based primarily on the figures of male recipients of free wheat in the late Republic: 320,000, 150,000,250,000; a d d females, children, free non-citizens and slaves. T h e best discussion of the evidence still seems to be by U . Kahrstedt, in L . Friendlander, Sittengeschichte Rams ( L e i p z i g , 1921) vol. 4, 11-21 (in detail, see A p p e n d i x I . I , pp. 96-8). See E . Rawson in M. I . Finley ed., Studies in Raman Property (Cambridge, 1976) 85fF. R. P. Duncan-Jones, The Economy of the Roman Empire (Cambridge, 1974)324-33, has collected m u c h of the relevant ancient evidence on estate size and farm size and on labour input from the R o m a n agricultural writers, a n d has tackled the problem again in Finley ed., op. ext. 8ff. H i s methods sometimes give a spurious precision to data of varying reliability, without providing criteria by which the plausibility of o u r records can be tested. T h e r e are other problems; estate and farm sizes varied; we need to know how m u c h they varied, a n d how the variation changed over time. T h e R o m a n agricultural writers tried to overcome the variation i n the real world by using formal modules of 25-60 hectares (according to crop), and these have sometimes been incautiously used as evidence of actual farm size. T h e classification of farm size by H . D o h r , Die Italischen Gutshofe (Cologne, 1965) uff. is arbitrary and misleading. 10

1 3

105

The growth and practice of slavery w e r e g i v e n t o r i c h f a v o u r i t e s . T h e c o m b i n e d p r e s s u r e o f peasants, ex-soldiers a n d slaves o n I t a l i a n l a n d was f i n a l l y r e l i e v e d by t h e e m i g r a t i o n o f several h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d soldiers a n d civilians t o p r o v i n c i a l colonies, set u p by J u l i u s Caesar a n d A u g u s t u s (c. 50-10 B C ) , a n d by t h e f u r t h e r s e t d e m e n t o f n o r t h I t a l y . 1 4

The

Economic

Structure

of

Slave-Holdings

E c o n o m i c a l l y , m a n y o f these changes i n l a n d use a n d m o v e m e n t s o f p o p u l a t i o n m a y be seen s i m p l y as t h e s i m u l t a n e o u s c r e a t i o n o f a new s u r p l u s a n d a n e w m a r k e t f o r its c o n s u m p t i o n . T h e new slave f a r m s of Italy produced a surplus of marketable crops o n land which had p r e v i o u s l y s u p p o r t e d o n l y peasants n e a r t h e level o f subsistence. Land-owners must have achieved this surplus p r i m a r i l y by raising the productivity of labour. Fewer m e n p r o d u c e d m o r e food. U n d e r e m p l o y e d peasants (typically p r o v i d i n g e n o u g h f o o d f o r themselves a n d t h e i r f a m i l i e s w i t h less t h a n o n e h u n d r e d m a n - d a y s l a b o u r a y e a r ) w e r e e x p e l l e d f r o m t h e i r f a m i l y p l o t s a n d r e p l a c e d by a s m a l l e r n u m b e r o f slaves. T h e R o m a n w r i t e r s o f treatises o n a g r i c u l t u r e i m p l y t h a t i n t h e p e r i o d o f e x p a n s i o n a g r i c u l t u r a l slaves w e r e u s u a l l y m a l e a n d c e l i b a t e . P r o v i d i n g a single m a l e w i t h f o o d cost substantially less t h a n a f a m i l y ; t h e d i f f e r e n c e was o n e s o u r c e o f t h e slave-owner's p r o f i t . F o r e x a m p l e , C o l u m e l l a ( O n Agriculture 2.12) r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t a n a r a b l e f a r m o f 200 iugera (50 ha) c o u l d be c u l t i v a t e d by e i g h t a d u l t m a l e slaves. T h i s contrasts w i t h t h e m e d i a n size o f f a r m s a l l o t t e d 15

16

14

1 5

1 6

B r u n t (1971: 262-4); 1 think that he underestimated peasant migration to the city of R o m e ; see also A . J . N . Wilson, Emigration from Italy in the Republican Age of Rome (Manchester, 1966). Estimates of underemployment in dry-farming for R o m a n peasants may be based (a) o n the known size of colonial allotments to R o m a n s (see conveniendy E . T . Salmon, Roman Colonization under the Republic ( L o n d o n , 1969) or ESAR vol. 1, 123); (b) o n the labour input indicated in ancient sources (see best Columella, On Agriculture 2.12 but see also Book 11 for the two-year cycle of cultivation; (c) o n comparative evidence, see, for example, O . S. Morgan ed., Agricultural Systems of Modern Europe (New Y o r k , 1933). K. D. White, T h e productivity of labour in R o m a n agriculture', Antiquity 39 (1965) i02ff., contains several significant errors. I shall deal with this problem of labour input a n d farm size at length in a subsequent publication. A s so often, the evidence is ambiguous. I n some passages, the R o m a n agricultural writers Cato, V a r r o a n d Columella seem to take it for granted that only overseers had female partners; but in other passages (for example, V a r r o 2.10.6 a n d Columella 1.8.19), it seems clear that slave offspring were encouraged. It is clear from the West Indies that it is possible to r u n an economy with a predominantly male labour-force, high mortality a n d a high rate of imports. M u c h depends o n the relative cost of adult slaves a n d of breeding plus maintenance. Cf. O . Patterson, The Sociology of Slavery ( L o n d o n , 1967) 107. F o r a slightly apologistic account of some ancient evidence, see K . D. White, Roman Farming ( L o n d o n , 1970) 370.

106

The growth of a slave society to ordinary Roman settlers in twelve colonies in the early second century BC - the only period from which we have such evidence; they were only 10 iugera (2.5 ha). This suggests that the same area of land could support either twenty free colonists' families, comprising some eighty men, women and children or just eight adult male slaves. Unfortunately, this evidence poses several problems of credibility which we cannot go into here. But there can be no doubt that the man-power saving made by changing from peasant to slave farming was substantial. An increase in productivity would have been useless without its reciprocal: the creation of a market. Land-owners needed to sell the newly created surplus so that they could make a return on their investment in land and slaves. The peasants who migrated to Rome (and other Italian towns) and the new urban slaves together provided this market; they consumed the surplus food which was transported from the Italian slave estates. Too much is sometimes made of the heavy cost of overland transport in Roman Italy. In so far as the rich owned surplus-producing farms distant from Rome, they must have sold the surplus, whatever the transport cost. In the sixteenth century, when the population of the city of Rome was under 200,000, wheat was regularly brought from the east coast of Italy around Ancona to Rome - partly by way of the Tiber. In so far as the increased wealth of the Roman elite was based on the ownership of land, then a surplus produced on that land must have been sold. Most of it was probably sold to the largest market, the city of Rome. T o the elite whose writings survive, the Roman proletariat seemed impoverished. But they must have earned enough money to buy food. This analysis cannot be authenticated in the conventional way by citations from ancient authors; ancient authors did not conceive contemporary changes in economic terms. But modern history-writing should not be limited to what the ancients themselves perceived. After all, it is commonly agreed that there was a great increase in the production of wine and olive oil in Italy during the last two centuries BC. This increase in production must have been based on an increase in the purchasing power of Roman consumers; and by far the single biggest market was the city of Rome. 17

18

19

17

Cf. Brunt

18 19

See J. Delumeau, La vie économique et sociale de Rome (Paris, 1959) vol. 2, 52iff. What did the urban proletariat do? We do not know. In contemporary underdeveloped economies, there is often in the capitals what is called a bazaar economy, a fantastic fragmentation of services and retail sales. Expenditure by rich Romans must have had a considerable multiplier effect, as those who received money spent it - a process which was then repeated.

(1971:

194!?.)

for some doubts and explanations and

107

ESAR

vol.

1,

The growth and practice of slavery The provision of subsidised and then free wheat to citizens living in the city of Rome must have provided important support to the market. It underwrote the capacity of the free poor to buy food produced on estates owned by nobles and worked by slaves, although there is no evidence that contemporary Romans perceived this func tion of the wheat dole. T o be sure, some of the wheat was imported from the provinces as tax, especially from Sicily and North Africa. But the urban poor could still spend the money, which they would have spent on bread, on wine and oil instead. After all, the rich did not consume all the wine and oil produced on their own estates. Why slaves and not citizens? There is one problem about the growth of slavery in Roman Italy which seems particularly puzzling. Why did Roman landowners get rid of citizen peasants and put slaves in their place? At first sight, this may seem like making a mountain out of a molehill. The expansion of slavery may seem to need no explanation. It might be said that the conquering Romans simply took advantage of their victories, enslaved the defeated and carted them off to Italy to work their farms; after all, enslaving captives was an old trandition in the Mediterranean world. But then so was killing captives, putting them to ransom, sparing them, exacting a single indemnity from them, forcibly evicting them and taxing them. Of all these solutions to the problems of victory, slavery was one of the least common, and usually reserved for particularly obstinate or treacherous enemies. After all, the Romans conquered lands occupied by about fifty million people and had only about two million slaves. In a subsistence economy, not everyone wants a slave. Poor Italian peasants might well look the gift of a slave in the mouth, as someone extra to feed. Poor peasants with only small plots of land could not benefit from another pair of hands. They could not afford to maintain a slave. The rich used slaves instead of free men as dependent workers, because slaves had advantages which outweighed their obvious dis advantages. Slaves cost money and were often, even usually expensive (see below, pp. no, 161); unlike wage labourers or tenants, they were probably unwilling to work hard or efficiendy, and were cosdy to supervise. On the other hand, slaves, unlike citizens, were not liable to be called away for several years on military service, they were at their master's beck and call and could be forced to work long hours throughout the whole year. Slavery allowed masters to sell land with an adequate supply of labour attached. Above all, unlike peasant 108

The growth of a slave society families, slaves could be formed into permanent work-gangs several times the size of a family. Columella, for example, recommended gangs of ten male slaves spread over a large farm (On Agriculture i .9.7). Slaves could thus be made to cooperate in working the large farms of nobles who had grown rich on the profits of empire. Slaves were the fuel of an agrarian revolution, a means of organising labour in an economy without a labour market. In modern societies, we take the relationship of employer to employees for granted and sugar the pill of wage-slavery with political democracy. The Romans had no tradition which legitimated the regular employment of free men; in Roman law (the evidence comes from the High Empire), employees in the household were considered as slaves (loco servorum) for the duration of their service. Free citizens therefore tried to avoid such work. In the period of imperial expansion, continuous war made slavery seem an easy and attractive way for rich men to organise labour on farms which were much too large to be cultivated by a free family. Slavery was by no means an obvious solution to the elite's need for agricultural labour. The extrusion of free peasants created a large pool of landless or underemployed citizens. The rich could have employed them to work their estates either as tenants or as day-wage labourers. Some did; Cato, who wrote on farming in the second century BC, advised that the manager of an estate should not employ the same labourers for more than one day, and so assumed a large pool of free labourers (On Agriculture 5); Julius Caesar passed a law (which like most Roman laws could not be enforced) that at least one third of men employed as herdsmen should be free citizens (Suetonius, Julis Caesar 42). Similarly, our sources generally assumed that most work on the 20

21

22

* * The ancient slave estate devours human beings as the modern blast-furnace devours coal.' So Max Weber, 'The social causes of the decay of ancient civilization' trans, in J. E. T. Eldridge, Max Weber (London, 1971) 263 or M. Weber, The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations, trans. R. I. Frank (London, 1976) 398. 11 The long distance between production and consumption in industrial societies allows the growth of institutions and values which disguise the degree to which manual workers are exploited by the prosperous. In pre-industrial societies, exploitation was more likely to be face-to-face. I use the word exploitation, insofar as possible, neutrally to describe the process by which the product of one man's manual labour is consumed by someone else. ** A typical legal text is D. 43.16.1.16-20: '.. .the term household (familia) includes slaves.. .and those whom we keep like slaves {loco servorum) \ on which see the commentary of F. M. de Robertis, Lavoro e lavoratori net mondo romano (Ban, 1963) 101-42. The arguments of D. N 6 r r , 'Zur Bewertung der Arbeit in Rom', ZSS (rom. Abt.) 82 (1965) 9off. are a useful corrective to those of de Robertis. The sophisticated discussion about whether a debtor was really a slave (Quintilian, Institutes 7.3.26; Ps. Quintilian, Declamations 311) is evidence of their assimilation. See the arguments of E. M. Schtaerman and M. K. Trophimova, Slave ownership in the Early Roman Empire (Italy) (Moscow, 1971) 21 (in Russian). 9

109

The growth and practice of slavery estates of the wealthy was done by slaves, helped out (for example, at harvest time) by free men. Why did land-owners not make more use of free men? Free workers have obvious advantages. They can be paid wages out of current income, as and when they are needed; free tenants have an interest in productivity and cost much less than slaves to supervise. Through out world history, tenancy has been a much more common method of exploitation than slavery. Tenancy was already well established in Roman Italy, and it was always much more important than slavery in the provinces. Its availability intensifies the difficulty of understanding why rich Romans preferred to buy slaves. The chief disadvantage of slaves was their high capital cost, all the more so if we include the cost of buying the slaves who normally supervised other slaves. This assertion contradicts the common assumption by modern historians that Roman slaves were cheap. They probably were after a battle or in moments of glut in a con quered province. But such fragmentary evidence as we do have sug gests that, at the end of the period of expansion, adult male unskilled slaves cost as much as would support an average peasant family for four years ( 2 , 0 0 0 HS = four tons of wheat equivalent at a conventional price for wheat of 3 HS per modius). At that price, slave-owners would have had to keep their slaves at work for at least two hundred days per year in order to make a profit. That is, more than twice as long as most subsistence farmers in Mediterranean (i.e. dry) farming normally work. Moreover, in conditions of high mortality, such as were prevalent in the ancient world, a slave owner risked the sudden death of the slaves he had bought and the immediate liquidation of his asset. I do not mean by all this to question the profitability of Roman slavery in the period of expansion. Slavery lasted too long for that to 23

13

The demand price for slaves should reflect their marginal profitability; it is therefore misleading to concentrate on knockdown slave prices ruling at moments of oversupply. The common price ( 5 0 0 dn = 2,000 HS) used here is the one given by A. H. M.Jones, 'Slavery in the ancient World', in M. I. Finley ed., Slavery in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge, i 9 6 0 ) , 9 - 1 0 , admittedly on exiguous evidence, mostly chance remarks in poems; it is corroborated by a second-century inscription from Africa (CIL 8 . 2 3 9 5 6 ) : 'the price of a slave according to the census scale is 5 0 0 dn*. So also D. 4.4.31: Papinian; D. 5.2.8.17: Ulpian', D. 5.2.9: Paul. And see the prices for release cited in Chapter 111. The calculation of days' work is based on the amortisation of capital cost over twenty years, plus the cost of feeding, plus interest at 6% on capital invested against the cost of day wage labourers, derived from Diocletian's Edict on Maximum Prices at 2.5 kg wheat equivalent per person per day plus food (ESAR vol. 5, 3 3 6 ) ; I follow R. P. Duncan-Jones' persuasive argument that the castrensis modius used in the Edict equalled 1 Vi regular modii (each of 6.5 kg wheat), ZPE (1976). These data are crude, but the best we have, and give rough orders of magnitude. They would have to be absurdly wrong to upset the general conclusion advanced here. 1IO

The growth of a slave scxiety be a realistic problem. Rather I want to stress the economic logic of slavery. The importation of a large number of agricultural slaves into central Italy necessarily implied a drastic reorganisation of land hold ings. In a system of small family farms, slaves could not be adequately exploited. If slaves were to be properly supervised in gangs, then small family farms had to be amalgamated into larger holdings. The high capital cost of slaves led to the creadon of units large enough to provide them with work throughout the year. Moreover, large farms, especially those which concentrated on herding, olives or viticulture, could have yielded some economies of scale. Put another way, owners could afford to pay high prices for slaves, precisely because of the high productivity which could be forced out of them on larger farms. For the owners of large farms, slaves offered several advantages over free labour. Slave-ownership conferred status. Slaves could be completely controlled by the master. They could be forced to work long hours throughout the year: Cato allowed oxen holidays on feast days unless there was grain to be stored, or firewood was needed; but mules and donkeys (and presumably the slaves working with them) got no holidays, except for family festivals (On Agriculture 138; cf. Columella 2.21). And slaves could be organised in gangs, in a way which cut across the traditional family organisation of free labour, and allowed some agricultural specialisation (such as ox-drivers, and vine dressers). In a society without a market in free labour, recruitment by force (i.e. slavery) was probably the only method of securing large numbers of full-time dependants with particular skills. Finally, in the exceptional circumstances of imperial conquest, Roman nobles could afford the high capital cost of slaves. They had massive spoils from the provinces at their disposal, and a shortage of opportunies for their profitable investment. At the same time they faced a shortage of amenable free labour. Slavery was one solution to this predicament. 24

25

Slavery and politics Mass slavery in Rome should also be seen as a product of Roman politics. In the Roman political system, aristocrats depended for their status and power on election to political office, which they solicited from the plebs. T o be sure, aristocrats manipulated the electorate. 44 M

Gangs of itinerant free labourers were available for specific agricultural tasks, such as the olive harvest, but not all the year round. These spoils were archetypal' free floating resources', rare in pre-industrial societies in which the surplus is usually committed to a narrow range of conventional expenditures. For this idea, see S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political System of Empires (Ncvt York, 1963), 6ff. 7

III

The growth and practice of slavery Nevertheless, the political power of the citizen body significantly limited the extent to which rich Romans could systematically exploit free Roman citizens as overt dependants. Roman histories preserved the proud tradition of how, in the past, the armed plebs had marched out of the city of Rome in protest against aristocratic misrule and had won important concessions. An aristocrat who was shaking the hands of the people before an election once commented laughingly on the horny hand of a peasant; the rumour went round the rural tribes that he despised peasants for their poverty, and he lost the election. This story is only one illustration of the fact that throughout the period of conquest, portions of the Roman plebs had sufficient political and military power to limit the power of nobles and to secure a share in the imperial booty for themselves. Roman citizens living in Italy were exempted from direct taxes (after 167 BC); citizens living in the city of Rome received subsidised (from 122 BC) and eventually free wheat (from 58 BC); citizens and ex-soldiers received land-grants in colonies established outside central Italy and in the provinces. One function of all these developments was to allow the rich to occupy more land in central Italy because the state was providing alternative supple mentary benefits for the free poor. Slaves were forcibly imported aliens who were exploited to a degree and in a way which citizens would not allow. Moreover, slavery fed on itself. The presence of a substantial number of slaves in Roman society defined free citizens, even if they were poor, as superior. At the same time, free citizens' sense of superiority probably limited their willingness to compete with slaves, to work full time as the overt dependants of other citizens. Yet rich men, by definition, need dependants. Slavery permitted the ostentatious display of wealth in the palaces of the rich without involving the direct degradation of the free poor. Indeed slavery persisted as a method of displaying wealth in the Roman empire long after it had ceased to be a major method of producing wealth. Slavery allowed an increase in the discrepancy between the living-styles of rich and poor, while the traditional inde pendence of the citizens was apparently preserved. It was important for the state that citizens should not be alienated from their willingness to fight as soldiers, for the further extension of the empire and the capture of more slaves. Even so, it is worth noting that, although slaves were often a significant element in war booty for both soldiers and 26

27

86 97

Valerius Maximus 7.5.2. This is a core argument of M. I. Finley, The Ancient Economy (London, 1972) 76IF. I am not sure that the resistance to working for someone else persisted among the proletariat or peasantry after the fall of the Republic; cf. n. 22 above and D. Norr (1965: esp.

75ff.).

112

The growth of a slave society generals, there is no evidence that the capture of slaves was a primary objective of warfare. Slaves were an important but incidental product of empire. The sudden influx of huge wealth disrupted long-established pat terns of production, consumption and exploitation. The elite conver ted their new-found wealth into the only asset which conventionally gave high status, Italian land. Compared with public office, landownership gave a steady income. Roman nobles did not become feudal lords or satraps, each ruling one sector of the conquered domain; oligarchic control of nobles by each other and by citizen soldiers was too strong. The central government, after a severe struggle through out the last century of the Republic, survived as a strong force which controlled the power of individual nobles. Even so, Roman nobles increased their wealth towards a level commensurate with their control over a huge empire. But they kept their main source of wealth, the private ownership of land in the home country. The preservation of these political and economic boundaries deter mined the developments already outlined. The nobles dispossessed large numbers of peasants of their land and replaced them by slaves. This led to the mass emigration of peasants. They went to the army and to the towns (and much later went to settle in the provinces). As soldiers, they provided the means of new conquests; as plebs, they formed a market for the consumption of the produce grown by slaves on the farms of the rich. The forcible intrusion of so many slaves into the peasant economy precipitated the repeated civil disturbances of the last century of the Republic. Even so, slavery was probably less disruptive than some of its alternatives, such as feudal fragmentation or the sudden transformation of Roman citizens into serfs. This analysis suggests some of the aspects of slavery which have been common to the five 'slave societies'. In Rome and the Americas, and perhaps in Athens too, mass slavery was a direct consequence of imperial expansion. The purchase price of slaves was largely funded from outside the slave societies. In the southern states and in the West Indies, the growth of slavery can be seen as only one point in a triangle of extensive economic development. North-western Europe and the northern states of the USA provided both capital and a market; Africa provided labour; the slave states produced staples for export. The Roman economy was less differentiated; slavery was more direcdy a product of war: booty capitalism, as Weber called it, instead of industrial capitalism. In both Athens and Rome, the mass participation of citizens in prolonged fighting was to some extent dependent on the labour of "3

The growth and practice of slavery slaves. Large numbers of citizens could fight, simply because slaves were producing food or goods (wheat, wine, armour, ships). In both societies, the rights of citizenship were secured by the military power of citizens; these same rights prevented the full exploitation of citizens by each other. The rich were driven to exploit imported aliens as well or instead. Democracy in Athens and plebeian privileges in Rome were made possible by the combination of imperial conquest and slavery. It is interesting that slavery was also an important part of the economic network of democratic England and the northern states of the USA; but the connection between them is obscured by the fact that slavery was geographically located outside the boundaries of democratic society. It is tempting to use these selected common characteristics of mass slavery as part of an explanation of its rarity. Conquest seems to have been a prerequisite, since most pre-industrial societies do not by themselves generate a sufficient surplus to pay for the capital purchase of a large alien labour force. The predominance of the subsistence sector precludes the sudden expansion of production, if only because there is no market for the consumption of a surplus. A similar vicious circle still binds economically underdeveloped societies today. But when conquest had occurred, slavery was only one of several possible forms of exploitation: feudal fragmentation, the colonisation of populated territories (which requires the conquerors to live in the conquered lands) or dependence on tax revenues (which presupposes a stable fiscal system and bureaucracy), each lessens the need to purchase and transport a slave labour force to the home country. Mass chattel slavery has arisen only where there was either a shortage of a local labour force in the conquered territory, or some effective limitation on the number and degree to which conquerors could themselves be exploited; or both. In Athens and Rome, the rich remained in the home-country; their exploitation of fellow-citizens was constrained by the norms of citizenship and by their continued dependence on citizens as soldiers, In a simple economy, where ownership of land was the chief basis of wealth, the distance between production and consumption was so short that effective disguise of exploitation was difficult. Exploitation was mostly face-to-face. You knew who was profiting from your labour. Slavery allowed the rich 28

29

n

The part played by slavery in the economic development of the first industrial nadons is provocatively stressed by £. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (London, 1964).

* This analysis is derived in part from H.J. Nieboer, Slavery as an Industrial System (The Hague 1 , 191 o); cf. for an interesting comparative discussion A. Sio, * Interpretations of slavery', Comp. Stud. Soe. Hist. 7 (1964-5) 289-308. 114

The growth of a slave society to enjoy the fruits of conquest by exploiting outsiders instead of insiders, without provoking a sharp break in the political culture. How else could the elite take advantage of a rapid increase in the chances of being rich? W H Y D I D T H E R O M A N S F R E E SO M A N Y S L A V E S ?

I took care that he would not die a slave, when a fatal fever held him burning in its grip. I resigned all my rights as a master to the sick man - he deserved my gift and to get better. Dying, he was conscious of his reward, and called me 'patron' [not master], as he began his journey to the underworld waters, a free man. (Martial 1.101.5-10) Freedom conferred at the end of l i f e . . . is of no importance. (Julian - a Roman lawyer second century AD (D 40.4.17)) On the number of ex-slaves and the high status of some One of the most striking aspects of Roman slavery was the frequency with which slaves were freed by their masters. The impression one gets from the sources is of a large number (i.e. tens of thousands) of ex-slaves mingled with the free-born population in the city of Rome. It is important to note that we have clues rather than precise numbers of ex-slaves in the total population. For example, one successful political general in the late Republic (Sulla) is said to have freed ten thousand slaves (Appian, Civil Wars 1.100 and 104); the fire-brigade of seven thousand men, formed in AD 6, was initially recruited only from ex-slaves (Dio 55.26); under Augustus, a law was passed prohibiting a master from freeing more than a hundred slaves in his will (Gaius, Institutes 1.42-3), although no effective limit was placed on the number of slaves whom he could free during his life-time. About seven thousand tombstone inscriptions from the city of Rome clearly indicate the dead person's status; of these, three times as many commemorate ex-slaves as free-born. We should not conclude from this that most 30

31

30

31

See S. Treggiari, Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic (Oxford, 1969) 31-6; and A. N. Sherwin White, The Raman Citizenship (Oxford*, 1973), 322-34; and on the ineffectiveness of laws restricting manumission see G. Alfoldy, 'Die Freilassung von Sklaven', Rivista storica dell* antichita 2 (1972) 97-129; he shows that a high proportion of ex-slaves, whose ages at death were recorded and who were freed, died before the age of thirty. But such slaves are probably not a random sample of all slaves or ex-slaves, to that his conclusion that most slaves were freed before the age of thirty is obviously illegitimate (see note 63 below). On Republican tombstones from the city of Rome recording the death of slaves (N « 650), see Treggiari (1969) 32; for later evidence see L. R. Taylor, 'Freedmen and freeborn in the epitaphs of imperial Rome', Amer. /. Phil. 82 (1961) 113-32. It is very important to note that only about one third of 22,000 tombstone-inscriptions from the city of Rome provide clear indication of the dead person's status, whether slave, "5

The growth and practice of slavery citizens living in the city of Rome had once been slaves or were the offspring of slaves. But it seems reasonable to think that the numbers of ex-slaves were substantial. Almost all ex-slaves freed by Roman masters received Roman citizenship (but see Gaius, Institutes i . i 2 f f . ) . Some ex-slaves gained considerable wealth and social prominence. In a debate in the Roman senate, it was reportedly said that many knights and some senators were descended from ex-slaves (Tacitus, Annob 13.27). Throughout the first century AD, ex-slaves of the emperor's household filled impor tant posts as secretaries of state (of the treasury, appeals etc.) in the central administration. They were the confidants of emperors, resentfully flattered and courted for favours by free-born nobles. Pallas, the ex-slave of the emperor Claudius, for example, was given the rank of praetor; and in a fulsome decree the senate offered him fifteen times the minimum fortune of a senator. * Pallas, to whom all to the utmost of their ability acknowledge their obligation, should reap the just reward of his outstanding loyalty and devotion to duty' (Pliny, Letters 8.6). T o add insult to injury, he refused the offer. In the provinces, ex-slaves of the emperor supervised the collection of taxes and kept an eye for the emperor on the activities of senatorial governors. Sometimes, ex-slaves governed a province; for example, Felix, the procurator of Judaea who judged St Paul, was an ex-slave. Ex-slaves were sometimes admirals in charge of the Roman navy. Slaves of the emperor frequendy married women of free birth and 32

83

34

M

33

34

ex-slave, free citizen or alien. Their status was clearly not as important to them as to us. On the basis of names typically given to slaves (for example, Eutyches), and from the marriage of men and women with the same name taken from their common master, Taylor deduced that among those whose death was recorded and whose status is uncertain the proportion of slaves and ex-slaves was as high as among the minority whose status was certain. But what about the descendants of ex-slaves, who were free born? T. Frank ('Race mixture in the Roman empire', Amer. Hist Rev. 21 (1916) 689-708) concluded that most people living in Rome, including the descendants of ex-slaves, were of slave extraction. Brunt (1971: 377, 386) concluded on even worse evidence that in the late Republic most people living in the city of Rome were either slaves, ex-slaves or their descendants. Prima facie, this is improbable; it presupposes a cordon sanitaire around Rome preventing the immigration of landless citizen-peasants. It seems clear to me that the surviving tombstones are unrepresentative of the total city population; that said, the explanation for the preponderance of tombstone inscriptions set up to or by ex-slaves escapes me. Other notable flatteries by free men of ex-slaves are in Statius, Silvae 5.1 and 3.3 (the latter addressed to the son of an ex-slave married to a woman of noble birth); Seneca, To Polybius, On Consolation - addressed by a senator to an ex-slave high official of the emperor. For a very good general discussion see A. M. Duff, Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire (repr. Cambridge, 1958) 143-86; for detailed footnotes, see G. Boulvert, Esclaves et affranchis imperiaux (Naples, 1970), esp. io7ff. on ex-slave provincial procurators. 116

Why did the Romans free so many slaveys? themselves owned slaves. Private owners used slaves as business agents, confidential secretaries and farm bailiffs. Such slaves were put in charge of other slaves, as overseers, and unlike practice in the American south, they were, at least ideally, specially trained for the task (Columella, On Agriculture i I . I ) . Education and literacy were in no sense thought of as subverting slavery. Many skilled slaves gained their freedom. A few amassed huge fortunes and set up magnificent monuments; the wealth of ex-slaves became notorious, a subject of satire on the decadence of old free Roman virtues. One ex-slave at his death owned over 4,000 slaves, 7,200 oxen and 60 million HS in cash (sixty times the minimum fortune of a senator) (Pliny, Natural History 33.135). Our sources give the impression that at humbler levels of society ex-slaves dominated commercial life in the city of Rome. Nor was it only commercial life which they dominated. Ex-slaves commonly became leaders of religious cult-groups, apparently on equal terms with free citizens. The large number of ex-slaves and the high status of some pose a problem. Why did Roman masters free so many slaves? At first sight, it seems amazing. Slaves cost money. Skilled or talented slaves appa rently stood the best chance of securing their freedom, and they cost a lot of money. By buying a slave in the first place, a master had acquired the right to all the slave's labour and produce for the rest of his life, without further payment. Why did he surrender these rights? Roman society was not marked by altruism. Historians of ancient slavery have usually described the emanci pation of slaves from a humanitarian point of view; they have seen it as a softening element in a harsh system. It is true that for the individual slave, manumission was an act of generosity by the master 35

36

37

38

35 38

37

38

P. R. C. Weaver, Familia Caesaris (Cambridge, 1972) 114. Of 462 known wives of imperial slaves, only a quarter were themselves slaves. The archetypal rich ex-slave is Trimakhio, Petronius' satirical fiction in the Satyricon. He made his money through inheritance from his master and by risky trade. For other ex-slaves' wealth, see Martial 5.13; Pliny, Natural History 33.134-5; Seneca, Letters 27.5 and

86.7.

One inscription (ILS 6073) from the second century A D shows that 229 ( 8 6 % ) out of 275 district officials (magistri vicorum) connected with the imperial cult in the city of Rome were ex-slaves; see Duff (1958: 132). In many religious cults there was no stria dividing line between slaves, ex-slaves and free. Indeed slaves were sometimes cult-masters (magistri) with free men as cult 'servants' (ministri). See F. Bdmer, Untersuchungen uber der Religion der Sklaven in Griechenland und Rom, part 1 (Wiesbaden, 1958) passim. Columella (On Agriculture 3.3.8) advised the purchase of a skilled vine-dresser at 6-8,000 HS, that is three-four times the 'normal* (see n. 23) price for an unskilled adult male slave. At the conventional wheat price of 3 HS per modius of 6.5 kg, 6,000 HS - 13 tons of wheat equivalent, roughly enough to support a peasant family at minimum subsistence for thirteen years. "7

The growth and practice of slavery which allowed him to escape from servitude. Ex-slaves presumably felt, and in the surviving records frequendy expressed their gratitude to their masters - a feeling for which we have the flattering mirror-image in Martial's poem on the liberation of his own dying slave, quoted at the beginning of this section. Such descriptions of individual feelings have biased the discussion of slave emancipation. If we consider slavery as a system, then the liberation of slaves, whatever blessings it brought to individuals, acted not as a solvent of the slave system, but as a major reinforcement. Emancipation reinforced slavery as a system because Roman slaves, frequently, even customarily in my view, paid substantial sums for their freedom. The prospect of becoming free kept a slave under control and hard at work, while the exaction of a market price as the cost of liberty enabled the master to buy a younger replacement. Humanity was complemented by self-interest. Misery, cruelty, rebellion and philosophy Both views of slave manumission, the humanitarian and the economic, require some qualification and elaboration. Most Roman slaves were freed only by death. Roman writers on agriculture took it for granted that their readers' land would normally be worked by gangs of chained slaves. Such slaves presumably had no realistic prospect of liberty, Cato recommended that slaves worn out with work should be sold (On Agriculture 2.7). And we know that some masters in the first century AD left their sick slaves to fend for themselves in public places dedicated to the god of healing, only to reclaim them if they recovered (Suetonius, Claudius 25; D. 40.8.2); the emperor denied the master's right to recover slaves neglected in this way. Roman literature abounds with examples of incidental cruelty to individual domestic slaves. The emperor Augustus, for example, ordered that the legs of a trusted slave be broken because he had taken a bribe and revealed the contents of a letter (Suetonius, Augustus 67). Th<e physician Galen reported that the emperor Hadrian once in anger stabbed a slave in the eye with a stylus. He later regretted it and asked the slave to choose a gift in recompense. The slave was silent. The emperor pressed him for a reply. The slave said that all he wanted was his eye back (ed. Kuhn, vol. 5, 17-18). Seneca portrayed a master at dinner, surrounded by slaves: 'The unfortunate slaves are not 39

40

* This assumes an egalitarian heaven. 40 Pliny (Letters 3.19) made a special point of the fact that he and neighbouring land-owners did not use chained gangs. This makes sense only if it was common in some other places - for which see Columella, On Agriculture 1.6.3; 1.8.15ff.; 1.9.4. Il8

Why did the Romans free so many slaves? allowed to move their lips, let alone talk; the birch keeps murmuring down. A cough, a sneeze, a hiccup is rewarded by aflogging,with no exceptions. Any break in the silence is severely punished. They stand at the ready all night, tense and mute* (Moral Letters 47) Gladiatorial shows in which slaves were publicly killed for the pleasure of the free, and the legal fiction in criminal cases that the evidence of slaves could be trusted only if it was exacted under torture are two symptoms of the customary cruelty of Roman masters to their slaves. Ancient descriptions of working conditions for slaves in quicksilver mines in central Asia Minor, or gold mines in Egypt make it clear that slave miners there did not survive long. In the Spanish silver mines, forty thousand slaves were said to have worked: 41

42

T h e slaves... produce incredible profit for their masters, but they themselves wear out their bodies, digging underground by day and by night, and many of them die under the strain of such terrible conditions. They are not allowed any pause or rest from their work, but are forced by the blows of their overseers to endure sheer misery. (Diodorus 5.38) 'All slaves are enemies' (quot servi, tot hastes) went a Roman proverb. Tens of thousands of slaves were systematically exploited on farms and in mines; even talented and responsible slaves in the households of senators and knights were liable to suffer from the cruel caprice or normal disciplinary practices of a master. Slaves were at 43

44

41

41

43

44

Augustus was also said to have punished an ex-slave procurator in Egypt, who ate a prize-fighting quail, by having him nailed to a ship's mast (Plutarch, Sayings of the Romans 207B). Beating slaves was routine; philosophers merely advised that it should not be done in anger (Galen, ed. Kühn, vol. 5, 17-18; Seneca, On Anger 3.32!^). For the realgar (Pquicksilver) mines, see Strabo 1 2 . 3 . 4 0 . .in addition to the harshness of the work, it is said that the air in the mines is deadly... so that workmen very soon die*. Cf. Cyprian, Letter 76 (Bud£) for a rhetorical account of conditions in mines for condemned Christians. For numbers in the Spanish silver mines in the second century BC, see Strabo 3.2.10 citing Polybius. For Egyptian gold-mines in the second century BC, see C. Müller, Geographi Graeci Minores vol. 1,123 ff., and Diodorus 3.12-14. For an overview, cf. O. Davies, Roman Mines in Europe (Oxford, 1935). Festus 314L; Seneca, Moral Letters 47.5; Macrobius, Saturnalia 1.11.13; all call it a proverb. Seneca (loc. cit.) preached that masters alienated slaves by their cruelty and abuses; Macrobius similarly: 'At home we become tyrants and want to exercise power over slaves, constrained not by decency but capacity'. It is of course difficult to tell what was normal. Ancient sources provide no systematic account of slavery; there are no slave autobiographies, no abolitionist tracts because no one questioned the institution of slavery. The occasional glimpses provided by ancient authors, however, fit in well enough with the full and very interesting accounts provided by, for example, Frederick Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom (New York, 1855), and G. Osofsky, Puttin* on Ole Massa (New York, 1969) respectively the best and a collection of slave autobiographies from the American south. See also the detailed eye-witness accounts in The Minutes of the Evidence taken before a Committee of the Whole House (the British House of Commons on slavery in the West Indies) 1789-91, and the discussion by G. Freyre, Masters and Slaves (New York, 1946) on Brazilian slavery. "9

The growth and practice of slavery the mercy of their masters. They could be overworked, neglected, thrown out when old, beaten, or even killed, and mostly had no realistic chance of protecting themselves (but see below, p. 222). T o be sure slaves had no monopoly of misery. The free poor did most of the jobs which slaves did; they worked in mines and on farms, though less often as domestics. Indeed, the economic value of slaves to their masters sometimes protected them. In Roman Italy, as in the southern states, masters on occasion gave dangerous jobs to free men explicitly in order to safeguard their slaves (see Varro, On Agriculture 1.17). Even so, slaves must often have feared maltreatment, and that fear must have affected even more than those who actually suffered. The mutual hostility of master and slave, which slavery inevitably evokes, showed through both collectively and individually. Between 135 and 70 BC, there were three major slave rebellions in Sicily and Italy, which were apparendy fostered by the concentration and neglect of thousands of newly enslaved. The slaves' initial success against Roman legions was not maintained; eventually the slave armies were defeated and ruthlessly crushed. It is worth noting that rebel slaves never aimed at the abolition of slavery, only at the exchange of roles with their masters or at escape to their home country; after 70 BC, we hear of no serious, large-scale slave revolts, though minor outbreaks occasionally threatened (Tacitus, Annals 4.27; Histories 3.47; ILS 961). The hostility of masters to their slaves ran just below the surface of Roman civilisation. It erupted in the law and the practice that all the slaves living in the house of a master killed by one of his own slaves should be tortured and executed. In one notorious case (AD 61), four hundred household slaves were executed, though only after a debate in the senate and in the teeth of popular outcry. According to Tacitus, the clinching argument in the senate was: 45

46

. . . d o you believe that a slave made u p his mind to kill his master without an ominous phrase escaping him, without o n e word uttered rashly? Assume however that he kept quiet, that he procured his weapon in an unsuspecting household. Could he pass the watch, carry in his light, and perpetrate his murder without an accomplice? A crime has many antecedent symptoms. So long as our slaves act as informers, we may live a minority amid their mass, secure while they fear, and finally, if we die, certain of vengeance against the guilty. Our ancestors always suspected slaves... 45 The road from Capua to Rome was lined with 6,000 crucified slaves captured from the remnants of Spartacus' rebellion. In general, see J. Vogt, Struktur der antiken Sklavenkriege (Wiesbaden, 1957) now translated in J. Vogt, Ancient Slavery and the Ideal of Man (Oxford, 1974) $gff. 46 By a senatorial decree of A D 10 (SC Silanianum) if a master was killed, and the murderer could not be found, all the household slaves were tortured and executed. t

120

Why did the Romans free so many slaves? Now that our households comprise tribes with customs the opposite of our own, with strange cults or with none, you will never coerce such a mixture of humanity, except by terror. (Annals 14.44, ** 3-3 )i trans adapted from the Loeb Classical Library) c

,

2

Most slave resistance involved neither open rebellion nor murder. It probably took the form of guile, deceit, lying and indolence. This can be documented only from incidental remarks in Roman and Greek literature, which of course reflect the masters' stereotype of their slaves. Yet it is interesting that the character of slaves in Roman comedy has a lot in common with the American stereotypical slave Sambo: impudent, gossiping, lazy, deceitful, light-fingered, unscrupulous. It seems reasonable to suppose that the stereotype was based in reality; many slaves' characters were moulded by their overt powerlessness. Roman slaves had one decisive advantage over American black slaves; they had no obvious distinguishing marks. Proposals to make them wear special dress were rejected out of fear that they would then realise the strength of their numbers (Seneca, On Mercy 1.24). Both as slaves and as freed men they could merge with the rest of the population. In a society without photographs, it was relatively easy for slaves to run away. The emperor Augustus recorded in his list of achievements that during the civil wars he had returned 30,000 run away slaves to their masters for punishment. Conditions during the civil wars were exceptional; but the problem was recurrent, witness the iron slave-collars excavated by archaeologists. Several are inscri bed; for example. *I have escaped; arrest me; take me back to my master Zoninus and you will be rewarded with a gold piece' (CIL 47

48

i5-7 4)IQ

The viciousness of Roman slavery, the exploitation, cruelty and mutual hostility are worth stressing because modern accounts often focus instead on those elements in Roman philosophy, literature and law which point to the humanitarian treatment of slaves, and to the willing loyalty of some slaves to their masters. Stoic philosophers stressed the common humanity of slaves and free men: the master buys and sells only the slave's body; 'only their body is at the mercy and disposition of the master; the mind is its own master, and is free...' (Seneca, On Benefits 3.20); the slave can be free in spirit, just as the 49

47

G. E. Duckworth, The Nature of Roman Comedy (Princeton, 1952) 249fr.; S. M. Elkins, (New York, 1963) 81-139. My Achievements 25; those for whom no master could be found were impaled, so Dio 49.12.5. See now also H. Bellen, Studien zur Sklavenfiucht im römischen Kaiserreich (Wiesbaden, 1971). On loyal slaves, see J. Vogt on Sklaventreue (1972) 83-96; (1974) 129. Slavery

4 9

49

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The growth and practice of slavery free men can be a slave to ambition, fear, grief or gluttony. Man is by nature free, not a slave. But for all their enlightened views on slavery, Stoic philosophers were not social reformers. They objected to cruelty, but they never aimed at abolishing slavery. The elevation of moral freedom above the slavery of the body relieved them of any pressure to change the social order. Christians similarly, by their emphasis on rewards in heaven partly in compensation for sufferings on earth, accepted slavery. 50

51

Slaves, give entire obedience to your earthly masters, not merely with an outward show of service, to curry favour with men, but with single-mindedness out of reverence for the L o r d . . . knowing that there is a Master who will give you your heritage as a reward for your service. Christ is the Master whose slaves you must be. (Paul, Colossians 3 . 2 2 - 4 ; T h e New English Bible, 1961) Within these rigid lines of accepting slavery, philosophy and later Christianity both helped to soften the rigours of Roman law concern ing slaves. It was forbidden to sell slaves as gladiators or prostitutes without stating specific cause (SHA, Hadrian 18); masters were not allowed to punish slaves excessively or to kill them (unless they died as a result of reasonable punishment!); the separation of slave wives and children was discouraged; slaves who thought that they were unjustly treated could seek asylum at the emperor's statue, in a temple, or later in a Christian church; a magistrate could order maltreated slaves to be sold to another master. In some borderline cases, the law gave the benefit of doubt to the slave and upheld his right to be freed. Slavery was even defined by an academic jurist as 'a practice of the law of nations, by which one person is subjected to the dominion of another, contrary to nature* (D. 1.5.4.1 Florentinus). Yet for all this, it is doubtful that the Roman government ensured that its laws were executed systematically, let alone in favour of slaves. Rather, we should understand the laws as reflecting a desire of the ruling class to see that the worst excesses of masters were checked. 'Masters, be just and fair to your slaves, knowing that you too have a Master in Heaven' 52

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Seneca, On Benefits 3. i8ff. ; Epictetus, Discourses 1.29; 3.24; Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 14-15 which (in fifteen pages) form the longest treatment of slavery in classical literature. Still the best discussion of Christian and philosophical attitudes is H. Wallon, Histoire de Vesclavage dans Vantiquité (Paris, 1879) v°l* 3» ~4ß* niore recently, H. Gülzow, Christentum und Sklaverei (Bonn, 1969). Gaius, Institutes 1, 53; D. 1.6.2: Ulpian; Paul, Sententiae 5.23.6; D. 33.7.12.7: Ulpian; Wallon (1879) v°l- 3» *>2fF.; W. L. Westermann, The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity (Philadelphia, 1955) 114fr. l

M

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Why did the Romans free so many slaves? (Colossians 4 . 1 ) . Ideals no doubt affected practice; but moral pres cription is usually weak evidence of actual behaviour. Evidence from elsewhere suggests that laws and social values deprecating cruelty failed to prevent excesses. The midgation of slavery by philosophical belief and imperial decree probably made litde impression on the routine corruption implicit in an elite culture which took the massed subservience of slaves for granted. 53

54

The legal and social status of slaves and ex-slaves In Roman law, slaves were treated more as things than as persons. According to the Roman senator Varro, agricultural slaves were 'articulate tools* (instrumentum vocale) as distinct from 'semi-articulate tools* such as oxen, or 'dumb tools' such as carts. These definitions are yet further symptoms of the powerlessness and suffering of many slaves in Roman Italy. Yet the starkness of the legal definition is too persuasive; it tempts us to think of slaves as forming unequivocally the lowest stratum in the Roman social pyramid. But an important minority of slaves had considerable prestige, social power and influence. Their social status conflicted with their legal status as slaves. I am not thinking here of masters' pet slaves, con cubines or nannies. As in Brazil and the southern states, their privileges implied a dent in the stratification system, but their deferential depen dence on their masters kept them in their place. However, there were other slaves whose value to their masters lay in the fact that they were able to take responsibility as thinking persons, not things. These were slave doctors, teachers, writers, accountants, agents, bailiffs, overseers, secretaries, and sea-captains. Why did the Romans give such jobs to slaves? Part of the answer lay in the cultural and administrative implications of conquering an empire. The Romans admired and wanted to imitate the culture of the conquered East. But imitation required refined education and the exercise of skills, in which Romans had no experi ence. T o fill the gap, Greek-speaking philosophers, teachers and 55

53

54 55

Cf. Seneca, On Mercy 1.18:' It is praiseworthy to be moderate in what you tell slaves to do. Even with slaves, one ought to consider not how much you can make them suffer without fearing revenge, but how much jusdce and goodness allow; both enjoin mercy on captives and bought slaves.* See Douglass (1855) and Minutes (1789-91) cited in note 4 4 ; poor masters did maltreat their only valuable slave. Occasionally Roman slaves succeeded in invoking the law in their favour; I suspect they had powerful patronage. On Agriculture 1.17; but see D, 1.6.2: Ulpian; Gaius, Institutes 1.53. 123

The growth and practice of slavery doctors were brought to Rome. Slavery was one of the chief methods of recruiting the highly cultured to work in Roman Italy. The sophis tication of Rome as the cultural capital of the empire depended considerably on educated, foreign-born slaves. Similarly, the adminis tration of a huge empire under a single stable government required the development of a bureaucracy. As we have seen, free-born Roman citizens traditionally disliked the idea of working as long-term em ployees at the beck and call of other free men (except in the army). The second-century satirist Lucian has left an amusing account of the servitude implicit for a free man working as a * professor' or litterateur in the house of a noble Roman (On Salaried Posts in Great Houses, esp. 23-4). In a later essay, he justified his own actions in taking a salaried post in the provincial administration, on the grounds that working for the emperor did not involve the same servitude (Apology 11). It seems amazing that this had to be argued, even for amusement, in the second century. Free men apparendy felt that a permanent job restricted their freedom of choice, constrained them like slaves. Faced by this prejudice, provincial governors in the Republic and then emperors staffed their administration predominandy with slaves and ex-slaves, and not with free born citizens. The slaves and ex-slaves of the emperor formed an especially privileged and powerful group. The status and power of their master inevitably rubbed off on them. Unlike nobles, slaves' tenure of office was not restricted to short periods. They had time to accumulate power. Several top slaves and ex-slaves had privileged access to the emperor; they provided him with, or cut him off from information; they were his trusted confidants. But their inferior legal status was still important; they were at the emperors' mercy, even more than senators; because they were slaves, or ex-slaves, they could easily be punished and they were not rivals for imperial power. In many other monar chies, lower-class servants have been similarly used in positions of power (see below, Chapter iv). In the imperial household, and in private households too, the discrepancy between the legal status of cultured slaves and their actual power and responsibility was repeatedly solved by giving them 56

57

58

46

87

88

On slave litterateurs, see for example those listed by Suetonius, On Grammarians. Both Terence and Aesop, for example, were slaves. A notable ex-slave doctor was Antonius Musa, physician to the emperor Augustus. Many such skilled men were freed. Freeborn citizens served as lieutenants or aides-de-camp of the governor; as such they were subordinates, but only temporarily and they saw themselves ideally as men of independence. For a Republican example of the power of a slave assistant to the governor, see Cicero, Letters to his brother Quintus 1.1.17. On the influence of the emperors* slaves and ex-slaves, see Boulvert (1970: 335ff.). 124

Why did the Romans free so many slaves? freedom. But it was only a partial soludon. First, even the insignia of high rank, commensurate with actual power (for example, a few imperial ex-slaves were given senatorial insignia, several the status of knights) could not erase the stigma of previous slavery. Secondly, the émancipation of imperial administrative slaves did not generally raise the status of administrative jobs in the eyes of many free men sufficiendy to make them attractive; the attitudes of Lucian cited above show this clearly. Throughout the High Empire, many important posts remained the preserve of slaves and ex-slaves, although in the course of the first century AD the highest positions in the central and pro vincial administration (such as head of the central government secretariat or of indirect taxes in the provinces), were increasingly filled by free-born knights. The regular use by Romans of skilled and highly cultured slaves in responsible positions (which contrasts so markedly with common practice in the American southern states) induced a series of flexible compromises with the weaknesses and rigidity of chattel slavery. For example, by a legal fiction, an agreement made by a slave acting as his master's accredited agent was binding on the master; the slave was assumed to be an extension of the master's body, working with his master's mind.* The master thus revoked total control of the slave and gave him discretion in bargaining. In other cases, the master explicidy limited his liability to the extent of the slave's own 'private purse* (peculium). The concept 'peculium' applied originally to the money which a father allowed a son, who was still under his authority; in our sources, however, it is most commonly used to describe a slave's possessions. The institution of peculium allowed the slave a working capital, 'borrowed' from his master. The use by slaves and ex-slaves of their master's capital gave them a decisive advantage over the free poor, and must have been an important factor underlying the prominence of slave and ex-slave enterprises in Roman commerce and manu facture. The manumission of slaves engaged in commerce or manufacture, with finance derived from their masters, symptomised the fragmentation of production and trade in the Roman world and the predominance of the family as the unit of labour. In the Roman world, slavery was almost the only mechanism which allowed the aggregation of labour into units larger than the family. But manu mission split large units owned by a capitalist master back into smaller, 59

0

M 60

On the rise of knights, see H. G. Pflaum, Les procurateurs équestres sous le romain (Paris, 1950). W. W. Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery (Cambridge, 1908) 131IF. 125

haut-empire

The growth and practice of slavery family units, based on the ex-slave. In the process, the master sacrificed any economies of scale for lower costs of supervision and smaller risk. In return, he presumably got from his ex-slaves, either interest on loans or a share in the ex-slaves' profits, or both. The devolution of risk and control in commerce to individual ex-slaves was similar to the growing preference of Italian landlords in the High Empire for tenancies rather than large direcdy-controlled farms. The very idea that slaves could de facto control their own property, including their own slaves, implied independence of action. The peculium was the institutional expression of that freedom of action. Although even privileged slaves were not always able to sell their labour on the market as they chose, many of them worked in positions in which they were able to make a profit for themselves. Indeed, there is evidence that masters paid some of their slaves a regular monthly wage. Slaves could save out of their earnings. And eventually they could use their savings to buy their freedom. The slave's desire to buy his freedom was the master's protection against laziness and shoddy work - although the slave might also cheat his master to speed his chances of buying freedom. The slave had freedom to work for. The master held out the carrot as well as the stick; the stick by itself, as the American experience showed, was ineffectual. The cost of providing an incentive for good work was liberty. But the regular emancipation of slaves subverted the original unconditional purchase of a slave's total life-long labour. For skilled slaves, chattel slavery was effectively transformed into a medium-term labour 'con tract'. Of course, it was not a legal contract; it could not be enforced by individual slaves; slaves had no such legal rights; but in general, the 'contract* was honoured. The slave who killed his master and so brought about the execution of four hundred fellow slaves may have been provoked, according to Tacitus (Annals 14.42) by his master's refusal to grant him liberty, after a price had been fixed. Cicero once implied (Philippics 8.32) that 'diligent and honest' slaves could reckon on liberty within seven years. Among the ex-slaves of private owners 61

62

61

Seneca, Moral Letters 80.7 indicated that urban slaves got 5 modii (33 kg) of wheat and HS cash per month. Lucian (On Salaried Posts in Great Houses 23) made it clear that slaves there got monthly pay. Roman manumissions were not unique. Some slaves were freed in the American south, and a great number of slaves were freed in Cuba, through the bridging institution of caartacion (H. S. Klein, Slavery in the Americas (London, 1967) 197). However, the scale of manumission in Rome, the high status of some ex-slaves and their assimilation into the free population, all seem exceptional. In other passing remarks, Cicero implied that freedom was regularly granted to slaves (Pro Balbo 24), and that without the prospect of freedom slavery would be intolerable (Rob. Perd. 15 and 16). It is likely that he was thinking of a narrow range of slaves such as those with whom he himself came into contact. Even then his perceptions may not have been realistic for all masters. 20

68

126

Why did the Romans free so many slaves? whose age at death was recorded on tombstones in the western half of the empire, over three fifths had been freed before the age of thirty (N = i,20i). Among ex-slaves belonging to the emperor, the proportion was lower, but clearly freedom was granted to most of those commemorated before the age of forty. Such evidence is difficult to interpret because slaves and ex-slaves with inscribed stone memorials were unlikely to have been typical of all slaves, or perhaps even of all ex-slaves. Yet this evidence does corroborate the general impression we get from the sources. A substantial body of skilled slaves secured their freedom at an age when they were still valuable to their masters. Why? Analytically, we can separate the various reasons for freeing slaves, but in reality the reasons were probably mixed. Some masters freed their slaves predominandy out of affection. Three fifths of the ex-slaves, commemorated as dying before the age of thirty, were female (N == 768), and we find a similarly high proportion of females among the slaves freed at Delphi (Chapter 111). A fair number of tombstones record marriages between a master and his ex-slave. Admittedly, tombstone inscriptions invite pious over-statement; still, full legal marriages between master and ex-slave, publicly acknowledged, be speak a paternalism quite different in quality from what is known from the southern states of the USA. Slaves were not considered slaves by nature; they had no distinguishing racial characteristics and so could easily become free parents of free citizens. Other surviving tombstones record affection between a master and the slave he had found, reared (alumnus) and then freed. The law codes preserve dozens of legacies by which a master provided for the benefit or maintenance of ex-slaves 63

64

65

This is based on G. Alfdldy's (1972) analysis of 1,201 ages at death of ex-slaves from the city of Rome, Italy, Spain and the Danubian provinces, excluding the emperors' ex-slaves. He drew attention to the fact that only 14% (N = 644) of slaves, as against 38% of ex-slaves are recorded as dying over the age of thirty. He concluded that therefore most slaves, except those living in the countryside, were released before the age of thirty. But those who had their age at death recorded by patrons, masters or fellow slaves may have been a biased sample of all slaves and ex-slaves dying; for example, young highly valued slaves, of a quality such that they might later be freed, were presumably more likely to be commemorated if they died young, than dull slaves who would never be freed. For a discussion and analysis of uncorrectable bias in ages of death recorded on Roman tombstones see Volume Two. But even though Alfoldy overstated his case, it does seem that manumission before the age of thirty was common for those * privileged' ex-slaves commemorated on tombstones. Moreover, ex-slaves who died at ages greater than thirty may have been freed before they reached thirty. 64 Among imperial ex-slaves, only 24 % (N = 173) are recorded as freed and dead before the age of thirty, while 47 % (N = 440) of imperial slaves died over the age of thirty while still slaves. Overall, Weaver (1972: 100-4) plausibly concluded that imperial slaves were often manumitted at ages 30-40. • G. Alfdldy (1972) i n . 63

127

The growth and practice of slavery after his death (for example D. 33.1; 34.1 and 40.4). Moreover, it became common to allow ex-slaves to be buried together with the ex-master's wife and children in the family tomb. For example, a tombstone inscription from the city of Rome reads: *To the Gods of the Underworld. Q. Alfidius Apolaustrus to his revered wife Turrania Satulla with whom he lived for 45 years and to his son Q. Alfidius Apolaustrus who lived 27 years...and to their ex-slaves and their descendants' (CIL 6.11439). Masters also freed slaves as an ostentatious token of their wealth and power. Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote of conditions in the late Republic, before Augustus limited the number of slaves who could be freed by will: ' I know of some who have allowed all their slaves to be freed at their death in the hope of being called good men when they are dead, and of having a large funeral procession of ex-slaves wearing the cap of freedom on their heads' (Roman Antiquities 4.24). Perhaps some prominent citizens freed their slaves to swell the numbers of their clients (though I don't know whom they would have impressed); and it is said that others freed their slaves to take advantage of the free wheat distributed to citizens. Emancipation of this kind caused something of a scandal in the time of Julius Caesar and Augustus, but it seems doubtful that the numbers involved were really as great as the objectors implied. In the final analysis, the liberation of so many slaves was acceptable to masters only because it was profitable. As we have seen, masters derived some of their profit from the extra work which favoured slaves did under the spur of freedom enticingly visible on the horizon. This prospect of freedom was underpinned by yet another subversion of pure chattel slavery: such slaves were paid a wage. If the slave died before he bought his freedom, which must have happened often in the conditions of high mortality prevalent in Rome, then in law his savings automatically went to the master. Generous masters might waive their rights in favour of the slave's wife or children (Pliny, Letters 8.16), but that was mentioned presumably because it was excep tional. The sum which the slave paid, or contracted to pay out of his future earnings, was the master's chief source of profit from manu mission. With this money he could replace an old slave with a young one. These arguments are plausible, but they do not constitute proof. Unfortunately, the Roman evidence for frequent self-purchase of manumission is only circumstantial. The frequency with which the practice was mentioned in the Roman law codes (I have found over 128

Why did the Romans free so many slaves? seventy references) suggests that the practice was common. Opinions in the law codes confirm also that the slave's purchase of freedom was compatible with other forms of release. For example, a master in his will commonly gave a slave permission to buy his freedom in the formula: *If he gives n denarii to my heir, let him be free.' Lawyers sometimes just took it for granted that a slave had to pay his market value to the ex-master's estate. Many slaves would have been grateful for such an opportunity; yet literary sources have understandably concentrated on the axis of generosity and gratitude, rather than on the cash paid. All in all, it seems reasonable to argue that slaves' purchase of their own freedom was very common. In the manu missions from Delphi in Greece which we examine in Chapter HI, purchase of freedom was almost universal. Passing references in literature took it for granted that slaves were saving up to buy their liberty. 'The money which slaves have saved up by robbing their stomachs, they hand over as the price of liberty' (Seneca, Moral Letters 66

67

80.4).

Sale was not the only source of profit. By custom, the ex-slave owed his former master, his patron, a whole set of unspecified obligations (obsequium, revereniia, officium); the ex-slave was expected to be at his patron's service until his death, and when he died at his children's; he was generally precluded from doing anything to put his former master in disrepute (for example, by suing him at law); and he was expected to help maintain his former master if he fell on hard times. 68

Frequency of mention is a risky criterion. Buckland (1908: 496), considered that payment of money by the slave was the most common condition exacted in testamentary manumission. There seems to be no handy compendium of wills. The references are mosdy to be found in the Digest, Bks 3off., and see M. Amelotti, // Ustamento romano (Florence, 1966). 97 See D. 40.7.3 (Ulpian) and ff. for several variations on the formula and Buckland (1908: 496ff.) for comments. When a will was technically void, but by the ruling in favour of freedom (favor libertatis), liberty was still granted to those named in the will, they were required to pay 20 aurei — 500 dn (so D. 5.2.8.17: Ulpian). These 500 dn equalled the 'normal' value of a slave fixed in the census (see note 23). It is worth adding that in the Principate the 5 % tax on manumissions was well-conceived only if it was common for the slave to buy his freedom in a publicly declared act which specified the price. Otherwise, the master and slave could collude to defraud the tax collector by fixing a low value on the slave. The tax would certainly make more sense if slaves normally bought rather than were given their freedom. ·* See M. Kaser, Das romische Privatrecht (Munich1, 1971) 298-9, and in greater detail his 'Die Geschichte dcr Patronatsgewalt ttber Freigelassene', ZSS 58 (1938) 88-135. Three legal opinions on ex-slaves' duties are worth citing: 'ex-slaves shall give support in accordance with the resources they possess to their former masters, when they are in need (egentibusY (D. 25.3.5.19: Ulpian). 'Former masters and their children have absolutely no rights over the possessions of their ex-slaves unless they have proved before the governors that they are sick or poverty-stricken as to merit M

129

The growth and practice of slavery It became a commonplace in ruling circles to complain of the 'in solence and ingratitude, of some ex-slaves nowadays'; the senate in AD 56 debated the proposal that masters should have the right to re-enslave. According to Tacitus some senators argued that 'it would be no great burden for a freed slave to keep his freedom by the same obedience which had earned it' (Annals 13.26). The emperor Nero rejected the proposal because it threatened too large a class of exslaves. However, magistrates still had the power to punish 'ungrateful ex-slaves' by fine or whipping, and in exceptional cases by re-enslave ment. In addition, as a condition of freedom, slave-owners often stipulated specific duties (operae) which the ex-slave had to undertake for the benefit of his former master and if specified, for his heirs. The Roman evidence on these duties is unfortunately sketchy. According to one distinguished lawyer in the late Republic, masters 'customarily made very stringent demands on their ex-slaves' (Servius cited in D. 38.2.1). Surprisingly, the praetor eventually limited this form of exploitation by law, 'because it had grown excessively, so that ex-slaves were burdened and oppressed* (D. 38.1.2). It usually takes considerable excesses to persuade an unselfconscious ruling class to limit its ex ploitation of the powerless. From the Principate, legal opinions are preserved which insisted, for example, that the specific duties (operae) required of an ex-slave should suit his health and status; that no such jobs be required of women over the age of fifty; and significantly, that the ex-slave either be given enough time to earn his own food, or be fed while working for his former owner. Of course, such legal regulations were for the most part unenforceable; but they reflect both the sympathetic concern of lawyers and the actual burdens imposed on ex-slaves by exploitative masters. We know very little of the variety of terms imposed by Roman masters on their ex-slaves; it is tempting therefore to supplement our knowledge with the rich details about manumission available from central Greece (see Chapter in). But to what extent can we infer Roman practices from Greek, even though for most of this period Greece was 69

70

99 70

aid from their ex-slaves in the form of monthly maintenance* (D. 25.3.9: Paul). Ulpian also ruled that a slave's purchase of his own liberty reduced the master's claim on an ex-slave's general obligations (D. 25.3.5.22). It is worth noting that a patron also owed his ex-slave a general obligation to help. Buckland (1908: 422!!.); see also Suetonius, Claudius 25. See particularly, D. 38.1 and 2. In general, manual dudes (operae fabriUs) could be willed to heirs, service dudes (operae officiales) could be willed only if that had been stipulated on manumission (Ulpian, D. 38.1.5-6). 130

Why did the Romans free so many slaves? part of the Roman empire? There are similarities: for example, in Roman law (D. 48.19.11.1: Marcian) as in central Greek practice, an ex-slave who continued to live in his master's household was subject to his master's discipline like a slave. One difference was that Roman masters often seem to have stipulated specific, rather than open-ended obligations for their ex-slaves. Moreover, Augustus in his social legis lation on the family, legally undercut the Roman system by offering ex-slaves release from their specific obligations to their former masters if they bore two children by a free spouse (D. 38.1.37 pr. Paul). This suggests that such services were a marginal not a major factor in a slave-owner's recompense for granting freedom. CONCLUSIONS

Our clear distinction between slave and free, indeed the clear legal distinction between slave and free in Roman law cannot do justice to much Roman practice. The Roman system of slavery, like the Greek, worked by adulterating slavery with some of the privileges which we normally associate with freedom (such as giving slaves the right to make contracts, and to receive wages and to save); on the other hand, the Romans often extended a slave's servitude into the period when he had become legally free. The prospects of emancipation served as an incentive for many slaves, including perhaps many slaves who never succeeded in getting their freedom. For the masters, manumission was economically rational, partly because it tempted slaves to increase their productivity and lowered the cost to the master of supervising his slaves at work, and partly because the slave's purchase of freedom recapitalised his value and enabled the master to replace an older slave with a younger one. In some cases the contract of manumission also provided an additional source of income even after the slave had been freed. Manumission, for all the benefit which it gave to individual ex-slaves, thus served to strengthen slavery as a system. Roman slavery was a cruel system of extreme exploitation. Its cruelty was attacked, and for some slaves perhaps even mitigated, by philosophers and philanthropists. Manumission offered a channel of escape. The evidence suggests that the number of freed slaves was absolutely large; we have litde idea and can only guess that slaves who secured freedom constituted a minority, though perhaps a substantial minority of all slaves. We have concentrated on the economic under71

71

Sec particularly, M. I. Finley, * Between slavery and freedom*, Comp.

6(1964) 233-49.

•3

1

Stud. Soc.

Hut.

The growth and practice of slavery pinning of manumissions. Masters could afford to be generous with liberty, because they benefited from giving it. But we should also remember the non-economic factors which may have determined their acdons. Some Roman masters freed their slaves by will and did not exact compensation. Their wishes took effect only when they them selves had died. What did they hope to gain from this public dissi pation of the family wealth, which worked only to the detriment of their heirs? Was it merely a desire for social ostentation, or an attempt to secure an easier path to quick salvation in purgatory? We do not know. Many other slaves were freed without charge by living masters, somedmes out of love or gratitude or kindliness. Slaves often felt and expressed their gratitude to their masters. Masters who manumitted their slaves liberally, and who acted as considerate patrons to their ex-slaves received their social reward from heightened prestige, and no doubt got personal rewards from a favourable self-image. These human factors have often been exaggerated, but they should not be ignored.

132

Ill BETWEEN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM: ON FREEING SLAVES AT DELPHI Written in collaboration with P. J . Roscoe

THE BACKGROUND

The purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyse changes in the practice of freeing slaves at Delphi in central Greece in the last two centuries before Christ. It is based on roughly one thousand recorded acts of slave manumission, involving over twelve hundred slaves. Most of these records were carved on the smoothed polygonal blocks which make up the retaining wall for the terrace on which the temple of Apollo at Delphi was built; others were carved in the base of prominent public monuments by the side of the Sacred Way which led to the temple. These inscriptions provide some of the fullest information which we have from the ancient world on the price which slaves paid to their masters for full freedom. The inscriptions also cast light on a curious institution called paramone, which we translate rather loosely as con ditional release; perhaps suspended release would be better. By this institution, slaves bought formal freedom but contractually bound themselves to stay with and to continue serving their former owners even after they were freed, just as though they were still slaves, usually until the former owner's death. Conditional release was a twilight state of juridical freedom combined with slave-like service, a state which overlapped both slavery and freedom. It is found else where in Greece, besides Delphi, as well as in other parts of the Roman world; parallels have also been found in the ancient Near East. But the Delphic inscriptions, with their amazing variety of specified con ditions, reveal more than all the evidence from elsewhere the ties which bound ex-slaves to their former owners. Our study shows that the prices which slaves paid for their freedom rose in the last two centuries before Christ. And as the prices of full freedom rose, a higher proportion of slaves bought conditional release. The price of conditional release remained fairly stable, but the conditions of release contractually agreed were increasingly to the '33

Between slavery and freedom slaves' disadvantage; some ex-slaves were even required to hand over their babies as replacement slaves. We argue that one of the functions of manumission, particularly if a slave bought full freedom, was that it enabled masters to recapitalise the value of older slaves and to replace them with younger ones. Finally, we argue that the prices which slaves paid for release approximated the market price for slaves and that market forces both systematically overrode affective ties between masters and slaves and disrupted the slaves' ties with their families. Excavations at Delphi yield information about over twelve hundred slaves freed in the period 201 BC-AD too. Over two thirds (71 % ) of these were freed in the second century BC; less than one tenth ( 9 % ) were freed in the first century AD (see Table I I I . I ) . Rostovtzeff once argued that this decline in the number of recorded and surviving manumissions from Delphi reflected a general decline in the Greek economy under Roman rule. This deduction seems wrong, partly because we know nothing about manumissions at Delphi before 201 BC, and partly because the manumissions in neighbouring Thessaly show clearly that the rate of recorded and surviving manumissions rose in Thessaly during the last century BC, that is when recorded manumissions at Delphi declined; and they were still at a high level in Thessaly in the early second century AD, when no manumissions were apparendy recorded at Delphi. It seems likely therefore that the number of manumission tablets at Delphi reflects local developments in the social history of Apollo's shrine rather than rates of manumission in Greece as a whole. This conclusion poses difficulties. The surviv ing manumissions fit somewhat awkwardly with what else we know about the Delphic oracle, although our knowledge of that too is patchy. The peak of Delphi's glory and prosperity was much earlier and its fame endured much later than the manumissions. A brief overview of Delphi's history will give some background to the manumissions. According to ancient myth, Delphi was situated at the centre of the earth (Strabo 9.3.6). In its golden age, that is in the sixth and fifth centuries BC, the Delphic oracle had given its enigmatic prophecies to ambitious generals and kings from all over Greece and even from Asia Minor. Its blessing was regularly sought to ensure the appropriate 1

2

M.I. Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World (Oxford, 1941) vol. 2, 625-6. And on manumissions in Thessaly, see K. Hopkins and P. J. Roscoe, Manumissions in Thessaly (forthcoming). * The brief account of Delphi depends on H. W. Parke and D. E. W. Wormell, The Delphic Oracle (Oxford 1 , 1956), G. Daux, Delphes au He et let Steele (Paris, 1936) and R. Flaceliere, Greek Oracles (London, 1965) 33ff. 1

'34

The

background

religious rites and propitious timings for the foundation of new colonies sent out from Greece to southern Italy and Asia Minor. City states appealed to the priestess at Delphi for decisions on disputes, both military and religious, which could not be resolved at home. The temple of Apollo at Delphi was in some sense a ritual centre for Greeks from all the different city states. The gratitude which the oracle inspired in its devotees was reflected in the wealth, grandeur and beauty of the buildings, monuments and dedications at Delphi, and presumably in the prosperity of its citizens (priests, guides, hoteliers). The political role of Delphi changed as the larger kingdoms created in the wake of Alexander's conquests robbed small city states of their political independence. In the third century BC, Delphi fell under the political control of the local Aetolian League. In general, the oracle became less concerned with affairs of state, although great kings still occasionally made flattering dedications. The Roman senate, after a crushing defeat in the war against Carthage (216 BC), sent an official delegate to consult the Delphic oracle (Livy 22.57; 23.11); and even tually, when the Romans defeated Carthage, the shrine was richly rewarded (Livy 28.45). A few years later, when the Romans were fighting the Macedonians in Greece, both sides used Delphi as a place to publicise their claims or to proclaim their victories (Plutarch, Flamininus 12; Aemilius PauUus 28 and 36; Polybius 25.3.2; Livy 41.22). But Roman domination of Greece ended both the Aetolian League's control over Delphi (191 /190 BC) and the oracle's own role as a mediator in interstate politics. Even so, Delphi continued to engage occasionally and profitably in relationships with the kings of Pergamum, Syria and Egypt; and the Amphictionic Council, which represented Greek states from a wide area around, continued to meet regularly at Delphi. The oracle retained some of its old prestige. Important persons consulted it. Sulla, for example, asked for the interpretation of a dream; but that did not prevent him from robbing the shrine when he needed money for a military campaign (Plutarch, Sulla 12 and 19); Appius Claudius consulted the oracle on the outcome of the Roman civil wars (Valerius Maximus 1.8.10); Cicero called Delphi the oracle of the whole world (Pro Fonteio 30). The recorded visits by famous men serve as one index of the continued high reputation of Delphi, which presumably at once reflected and increased the flow of lesser visitors. Important men paid more for their consultations, but it was ordinary folk and dignitaries from surrounding towns, with their anxieties about marriage, voyages and loans (Plutarch 408c) who presumably provided priests and temple guardians with their regular basic income.

!

35

Between slavery and freedom According to Plutarch, cides still consulted the oracle officially not on matters of state but about the size of crops and public health (408c).

It is difficult to know how much these changes, the growth of Roman power and the domestication of the oracle, affected Delphi's pros perity. The evidence is ambiguous. The geographer Strabo, wridng at the end of the last century BC stated that the temple was then very poor compared with older times (0.3.8). But there is considerable evidence that Delphi continued to be a tourist attraction with im pressive buildings, thousands of statues (Nero removed 500, but 3,000 statues remained), professional guides and occasional royal patronage (Pausanias, Description of Greece 10.7; Pliny, Natural History 34.36). Nero's patronage was a mixed blessing; Hadrian visited the shrine and asked the oracle the old chestnut about where Homer came from and he got a stunning reply: Homer was the grandson of Odysseus (Contest of Homer and Hesiod 314). Plutarch, writing at the end of the first century AD, in an essay On the Obsolescence of Oracles (Moralia 4ogff.), stated that Delphi employed only one priestess; formerly, there had been two with a third in reserve. He attributed the decline of oracles to a general decline in the population of Greece (414A). But he also noted that many shrines at Delphi were new or restored, and that its affluence had spread even to its suburb (409A). Pausanias, who wrote in the second century AD, devoted the best part of a book in his Description of Greece to the artistic wonders of Delphi. In sum, although our knowledge of Delphi is scanty, we should not expect from what we know that manumissions would begin to be recorded about 201 BC (ten years before the Roman domination) nor that they would peak in the second century BC, nor that they would stop before the end of the first century AD. T O be sure, such expectations do not help; but it seems worth saying that the limitation of recorded manumissions to this period (201 BC-AD 100) is puzzling. 3

4

3

4

Delphi had been attacked by barbarians in the beginning of the last century BC (Appian, IUyrian Wars 5) before its despoliation by Sulla, who made some reparations (Plutarch, Sulla 19). According to some interpretations of a sentence in Plutarch, (Antony 23), the temple at Delphi was not rebuilt for forty years; this may serve as a symptom of Delphi's decline, but this interpretation is speculative (sec Daux, 1936: 410). The previous wealth of Delphi was mythical, so a decline may have been imagined (cf. Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 37.36). It seems customary but dangerous for scholars to equate dated mentions of Delphi with temporary efflorescence and decline. A visit by the emperor Hadrian or Julian in the mid-fourth century is not good evidence of prosperity; nor is silence in the sources good evidence of decline. The local council of Delphi was apparendy in difficulties about providing games as late as A D 424 (C.Th. 15.5.4). 136

The

background

These Delphic manumissions have often been studied. Since Calderini's basic work of 1908, most scholars have concentrated on religious and legal aspects of manumission. They have been fascinated by the role played in manumission by the priests of Apollo, and by the so-called holy or temple slavery which existed elsewhere in the ancient world. They have attempted to sort out the exact legal status and implications of the conditional or suspended release (paramoni), for which there is comparable evidence from the pre-classical Near East and from several areas of the classical world outside Greece. Westermann and Finley have used this intermediate stage of conditional release to create the concept of a spectrum of statuses between slave and free. This idea seems now to have won general acceptance among ancient his torians and has undermined the old, strict dichotomy, slave-free. Recently, some Russian research, notably by Zel'in and Marinovich, has combined Marxist theoretical sophistication with careful deduc tions from fragmentary evidence and an empathy with the oppressed; this constitutes a real advance over the stricdy juridical approach which has guided many Western studies. 5

6

7

8

8

6

7

8

The basic work is A. Calderini, La manomissione e la condizione dei liberti in Grecia (Milan, 1908); W. L. Westermann, The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity (Philadelphia, 1955: i8ff.) gave not only a sympathetic account of the Delphic manumission inscriptions, but also briefly described comparable Semitic-Oriental practices; he also reanalysed Calderini's data on freed slaves' origins. P. Foucart, Memoire sur Vaffranchissement des esclaves (Paris, 1867) gave the most colourful account of the detailed variations in Delphic manumissions, and we have benefited a lot from his ideas. The review by H. Rädle, Untersuchungen zum griechischen Freilassungswesen (Diss. Munich, 1969) is somewhat legal but careful and useful, except on prices. M. Bloch, Die Freilassungsbedingungen der Delphischen Freilassungsurkunden (Diss. Strasburg, 1914) presented the best statistical analysis. On temple slavery, see F. Börner, * Die sogenannte sakrale Freilassung', Abhandlungen der Akad. Mainz, geistes- undsozialwiss. KL (i960,1), A. Cameron, 'Sacral manumission and confession', Harvard Theological Review 32 (1939) 148fr. and P. Koschaker, 4 Uber einige griechische Rechtsurkunden aus der östlichen Randgebieten des Hellenismus', Abhandlungen Sachs, Akad. Wiss. phiL-hist. KL 42 (1931) iff. On paramoni, see W. L. Westermann, 'The Paramone as a general service contract', Journal of Juristic Papyrology 2 (1948) 9-50, and A. £. Samuel, 4 The role of paramone clauses in ancient documents', ibid. 15 (1965) 221-311, especially 221-9 and 256fr. - this is the fullest account of paramoni clauses in English, but some of his main conclusions concentrate on legal clarification without taking account of social practices or pressures: in short, one has to ask not merely what the law was, but also whether people obeyed it. W. L. Westermann, 'Between slavery and freedom', American Historical Review 50 (1945) 213fr; M. I. Finley, 'Between slavery and freedom*, Comparative Studies in Society and History 6 (1964) 233-49, 4 The servile statuses of ancient Greece', Revue internationale des droits de Vantiquiü 7 (i960) 165fr, and The Ancient Economy (London, 1973) 6afF.

See particularly K. K. Zel'in in K. K. Zel'in and M. K. Trophimova, Forms of Dependency in the Eastern Mediterranean in the Hellenistic Period (in Russian; Moscow, 1969) 119-87 and L. P. Marinovich, 'Paramone in Delphic manumissions of the Roman '37

Between slavery and freedom We thought that it would be worthwhile to analyse the manumission inscriptions from Delphi once again to see if we could squeeze anything further out of them. We used the chronological list of priesthoods and inscriptions published by Daux (1943) and followed the example of Westermann (1955: 32) in splitting the data into fifty-year periods to coincide with priesthoods. But first a note of caution. The surviving inscriptions were merely the last part, the by-product of a religious ritual, in which the master set the slave free solemnly and publicly before the god Apollo, his priests and civil witnesses and guarantors. Only those masters, and slaves, who set store by a solemn act of manumission validated by a religious ceremony and by a public record of the act took the trouble to manumit and to be manumitted at a prestigious shrine. The ceremony must have cost money; the priests must have expected something in return for their involvement; in scribing a detailed record of the act on stone and on papyrus cost money. All these factors probably made these Delphic manumissions a biased sample of all manumissions. We cannot correct the bias, since we know litde or nothing of other manumissions. We do know that in the beginning of the second century BC the majority of manumittors recorded at Delphi came from the towns surrounding Delphi, con vincing evidence of the shrine's extra-local prestige. We assume that they were typically visitors to the shrine rather than resident aliens. But from the middle of the second century BC onwards, slave-owners from other towns apparendy freed their slaves in their home-towns, and the majority of manumittors at Delphi came from Delphi itself. 9

10

period', Vestnik Drevnei Istorii 118 (1971) 27-46. Marinovich's concentration on manumissions after 20 BC is slighdy odd; the numbers of manumissions surviving from this period are too small to justify some of his tabulations. But his findings reinforce our view, which perhaps we should have put more forcefully, that the manumissions of the first century AD are, for reasons unknown, signihcandy different from the earlier manumissions. • G. Daux, Chronologic Delphique (Paris, 1943); the date ordering of the inscriptions is fairly secure, especially in the second century BC; but we do not know the exact dates of later priesthoods, so that the dates used in the text are only rough. Period A (201-153 BC ) covers priesthoods I-V; period B (153-c. 100 BC) covers priesthoods VI-XII 1 ; period c t (c. 100-53 BC) covers priesthoods XIP-XVI; period c* (c. 53-1 BC) covers priesthoods XVII-XXV; period D (c. AD 1-47) covers priesthoods XXVIXXVIII; period D , ( C . A D 4 B - 1 0 0 ) covers priesthoods XXIX-XXXIV. The dates of the later periods are approximate only. 10 On the origins of manumittors from towns near Delphi see G. Daux (1936: 490-6). We supplemented these conclusions with three systematic samples of fifty inscriptions, complete with the relevant data, taken from the periods 201-174 BC, 152125 BC, 100-53 the proportions of known non-Delphic manumittors fell from 55% to 22% to 16% respectively. In the later inscriptions, the custom of stating expliritiy that a manumittor came from Delphi, which was prevalent in the earliest period, fell into disuse; we assume that this was because the vast majority of manumittors in the later periods did come from Delphi. T

138

The

background

And the great majority of Delphic manumissions recorded in these inscriptions came from a narrow interrelated circle of priests, towncouncillors and guarantors. This suggests that the Delphic material is surprisingly complete, and not just a dny surviving sample of a vast mass of lost inscriptions. However that may be, in the rest of this chapter when we write of manumissions at Delphi we mean only those which were recorded and have survived. Finally, we should stress that freed slaves were probably only a small minority of all slaves. Most slaves, we think, were never freed. Therefore, we cannot properly make deductions about all slaves from those slaves who were fortunate enough to buy liberty. A preliminary analysis is set out in Table I I I . I . We apologise for the mass of numbers in it. Let us glance quickly at three factors: age, sex and origins. In a significant minority of cases ( 1 7 % ) , the inscriptions record that the freed slave was a young boy (paxdarion) or a young girl (korasion). These categories are never explicidy defined and may not have meant anything precise. We necessarily assume that all the remaining freed slaves were adults. Of these, a majority (63 % ) were female; that implies a sex ratio of only 59 male freed slaves for every 100 female slaves freed. This high proportion of females among freed slaves is found elsewhere in the Roman world, but that does not make it easier to understand. Since slaves paid considerable sums for their freedom, we have to ask what opportunities these female slaves had for acquiring money. Finally, origins; in one half of the inscriptions, no mention was made of a slave's origins. The other half can be divided into home-born 11

1 2

13

14

15

11

11

13

14 15

According to Zel'in (1969:185), 75 % of the manumittors who came from Delphi itself (N = 452) between 180 and 120 BC were archons, councillors, priests, guarantors, or close relatives of such; the circle of known manumittors from Delphi was thus quite small. The inscriptions come from two prime collections: H. Collitz, J. Baunack et al., SamnUung der griechiscken Dialckt-Inschriften (Gdttingen, 1899) vol. 2, i683ff; and G. Daux, ed., FouilUs de Delphes vol. 3 (Paris, 1922-70) in six parts. Hereafter they are called GDI and FD respectively. Many of the works cited in the last few notes are cited hereafter only by author and date. In the newly discovered fragments of Diocletian's Edict on Maximum Prices from Aphrodisias, kindly shown to us by Michael Crawford and Joyce Reynolds, slave prices of youths were split into age groups 0-7, 7-15 years (by English reckoning); adults began at age 15; we do not know if these practices have any relevance to what happened at Delphi. See Hopkins and Roscoe (forthcoming), and G. Alfoldy, 'Die Freilassung von Sklaven', Rivista storica dell* antichita 2 (1972) 109-14, and Chapter II above, notes 30 and 63. Westermann's influential reanalysis of slaves' origins (1955: 32-3) depended effectively on ignoring those ex-slaves whose origins were unknown and concentrated on the ratios of home-bom ex-slaves to known aliens. Thus in his and our first three periods (ABCJ in Table I I I . I ) home-born ex-slaves constituted successively 2 8 % , 6 1 % *39

a

c

1 »237

-

63 50

495 37B 123 128

37 371

«3

4* 25

39 37 36

63 627

59 75 77

63

61

Adults*

b e

105

9 4

23 38 15 16

-

no

3

»9 23 16

«7 32

Children

d

/ Origins

g

h

k

m

50 621 357

29

36 41 18

259

21

3 0

29 8 2

44 46

27 46 62 56 82

27

11

62

32 400

25 37 52 61 40

30

974

45 26

93 96

4ii 3<>3

»59

16

24 35

>9 21

«4 «4

n

33 404

39 39 46 66

29 27

Slaves multiply manu mitted (%)

Preliminary analysis of 1,237 manumissions recorded and surviving from Delphi

Slaves Acts of Acts of Not Home- Known condi multiple Slaves 1Male Female Male Female known born aliensf tionally manu manufreed released* mission missionj (Number) (Number) (Number) % (%) (%) (%)

I I I . I .

* 24 ex-slaves of unknown sex are excluded. t Known aliens were from a wide variety of places, especially the Balkans, Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine and other regions in Greece. t The conditions of release were not known for 45 slaves (3.6% of the total) and are excluded. 5 Acts of multiple manumission were acts in which more than one slave was released by an owner at one time.

Total % Total numbers

1-47 D| AD 48-IOO

r>, AD

Ci IOO-53 BC

A 201-153 BC B 153-100 BC

Approximate dates

Table

The

background

slaves (oikogeneis, endogeneis) and' known aliens', that is those for whom a specific ethnic origin was given; they came from Asia Minor, Syria and the Balkans as well as from other parts of Greece. Overall, 2 9 % of freed slaves are known to have been home-born, but in some periods the proportion was much higher (153-100 BC: 4 4 % ) . This, as Westermann argued (1955: 32-3), is an important finding. These figures constitute the only hard evidence which we have from the classical world on rates of slave reproduction. But they are under estimates. We must also take into account the actual origins of those slaves whose origins are unknown; evidence on prices (which we present later) suggests that many of them were in fact home-born. Indeed it seems safe to conclude that from 153 BC to AD 47, over half of the slaves freed were home-born. This conclusion poses a problem of succession. If home-born slaves were freed, who then were the home-born slaves freed in the next generation? Two complementary answers are obviously possible: first those freed were only a small proportion of all slaves; and secondly, slaves were typically freed only when they had left children behind them in slavery to take their place. We shall explore this problem later in greater detail. 18

17

18

FULL FREEDOM AND CONDITIONAL RELEASE

Most (72 % ) of the slaves freed at Delphi in the second century BC were freed unconditionally; they were given full freedom. As soon as they had paid, their masters declared them free in a formal act which took

14 17

18

and 84% of those whose origins are known (these proportions are based on Westermann's figures which are very slighdy different from ours). But those of unknown origins should not be so cavalierly ignored. It seems safer to argue for a real fall in the proportion of known aliens in period c than for a real increase in the proportion of home-born slaves in period B (see note 17). The argument that slaves' children were a major source of slaves is put strongly for Roman Italy in the late Republic, perhaps too strongly by E. M. Schtaerman, Die Bluteteit der Sklavenwirtsckaft in der romischen RepuMik (Wiesbaden, 1969) 36-70. Changes in the recorded proportion of home-born slaves may have resulted from a change in what was conventionally recorded rather than from a revolution in slave imports or slave reproduction. We can date the transition to a twenty-year period 157-139 BC (Delphic priesthoods v - v i n ) . The proportions of slaves who were recorded as home-born by priesthoods was as follows: I - I V 10% (N * 449); v 17% (N = 4 6 ) ; v i 3 6 % (N - 144); v i i - v i i i 5 0 % (N = 56). In priesthood ix (c. 139-122 BC) the proportion of recorded home-born ex-slaves was 49 % (N * 120). For the evidence on prices see below, note 55. G. Alfdldy (1972) has argued from Roman data that most slaves were freed; but in our view his arguments are unconvincing. He ignores the probability that only a small proportion of all slaves and ex-slaves were commemorated on inscribed stone memorials; cf. p. 127, note 63. 141

Between slavery and freedom the form of a fictional sale to the god Apollo. We quote from a second-century BC inscription, which is typical: A date

In the Magistracy of Damosthenes, in the month of Poitropios, when Philaitolos the son of Phainis and Timokles the son of Thraslas were councillors for thefirsthalf of the year, and when Anaxandridas the son of Aiakidas was scribe, B sale to Polemarchos, the son of Polemon, with the agreement the god of his son Polemon, sold to Phythian Apollo, the female body [slave] whose name is Pistis, home-born, on the following conditions for a c full price of four and a half mnoe [ 4 5 0 drachmae]. Accordingly, freedom Pistis has entrusted the sale price to the god, on condition that she is free and cannot be claimed as a slave by anyone for all her life; she can do whatever she wants, and she can run off to whom she chooses. D guarantee Guarantor in accord with the law of the city... of free ( G D I 2187) status The slave became juridically free; she was her own mistress, free from arbitrary seizure, doing what she wanted, and going where she chose. These were the four aspects of freedom repeatedly emphasised in these inscriptions. But in the second century BC, a substantial minority, and before the end of thefirstcentury BC a majority (52 % ) of slaves were freed conditionally. There was some considerable variety in the conditions specified, but for us the definitive condition was that the ex-slave, although juridically free, should stay and serve (paramenein) her former owner, usually until the owner's death. An illustrative example dating from the first century BC is on the page opposite. 19

The formula discussed Several points in this formulaic record deserve our attention. The temptation to dismiss formulas, simply because they are repetitive, should be resisted. The inscription begins with the date (A) and then records the sale of the slave to the god, Pythian Apollo. The sale was fictitious in that its function was not to transfer the ownership of the slave to the god, but to give a religious sanction to the slave's freedom.

* We are making a statement about social relations here, not about law. In law perhaps, as Samuel (1965: 282-4) argued, all ex-slaves were fully free; some then entered into contractual obligadons similar to those into which originally free-born persons had entered; these obligations did not affect their juridical status as free men. In fact, the obligations taken on by ex-slaves in paramoni clauses severely restricted their actions and status; socially, therefore, we think that it is proper to see them as conditionally freed, in the sense that they were freed and then bound by conditions. We leave legal debate to others. 142

A

typical

manumission

giving

conditional

release

In the magistracy of Antipholos son of Gorgilos, in the month of Enduspoitropios [April/May], when Aristokles son of Philoneikos, and Damon son of Polemarchos were councillors, on the following conditions Eurydika daughter of Archidamos sold to Pythian Apollo, so that he would free them, two female bodies [slaves] whose names are Onasiphoron and Sotero, home-born for a price of eight mnae [800 drachmae], and I have received the whole price. T h e guarantor in accord with the laws of the city is Stratagos son of Philon. T h e two aforementioned bodies are to stay and serve Euridika the whole time so long as Euridika lives and are to d o everything she orders without giving cause for complaint. If either or both of the aforementioned bodies disobeys or does not d o what she is ordered by Euridika, Euridika may punish them in whatever way she wishes. When Euridika dies, let the aforementioned slaves be free, never to be claimed by anyone for all time, belonging to n o one in any way. But if o n e of the aforementioned bodies wishes to be freed from staying and serving (paramone) at an earlier time, let her give o n the spot whatever price for release she may persuade [her mistress to accept] and let her be released from staying and serving (paramone) just as she would also be freed after the death of the woman w h o gave her conditional release (paramone). And if anyone lays a hand on the aforementioned bodies after their [release] from staying and serving (paramone), let the seller and the guarantor make the sale to the god secure. Similarly, let anyone have the right to rescue and set the aforementioned bodies free, without incurring punishment or trial, free from all legal action and penalties. Witnesses: the priests of Pythian Apollo, Philon, son of Stratagos, Polemarchos, son of Damon, and private citizens K l e o n . . . , Pason, son of Polemarchos, Diolkes son of Philistion, Agon son of Poplios, Theokles son of Kaloklidas, Antigonos son of Babylos. (G. Daux ed., Fouilles de Delphes 3-3*3 3; end of first century BC) 1

'43

Between slavery and freedom The role of the god in maintaining the slave's freedom against all comers is reaffirmed in the last section of the record. Even at the moment of their freedom, the slaves were called bodies (somata). In law slaves were regarded in some ways as things not persons; but it still comes as a shock to see how depersonalised, how degraded slaves were, not men or women, but bodies male or female. And just as in the American south, masters called slaves by their given names. This was another social stigma of slavery. A free person had a socially recognised father (Euridika daughter of Archidamus); the father of the slave was not socially recognised; the slave was simply Zoila. Just because stigma is commonplace, that is no reason for us to take it for granted. We shall be discussing conditional release in some detail below, so for the moment let us merely stress two aspects of the paramone clause (c) in the formula; first the tension between what we might call the ex-slave's juridical freedom given in the previous paragraph (B) and the contractual restraints of conditional release. In numerous Delphic inscriptions, this contrast was even starker than in the example quoted; the slave was first explicitly given full freedom, then contractually constrained: 20

Accordingly Athenais has entrusted the sale price to the god on condition that she is free, never to be claimed by anyone for all time, doing what she wants and running off to whomever she wants... But let Athenais stay and serve [her mistress] Klyta as long as Klyta lives... (GDI

1925)

Secondly, let us stress that the master, anxious to secure good performance of the contract from the freed slave, found his chief answer in punishment. If the freed slave did not do what she was told, the mistress had power to punish her in whatever way she wished. Westermann (1955: 22 and 41) has written of the general leniency shown towards slaves in classical Athens and, individual abuses apart, of the non-oppressive nature of Hellenistic slavery; perhaps Greek slavery was lenient, if it is compared with Roman slavery in mines or on large estates. But we should beware of masters' idealisation (Ps. Xenophon, The Constitution of the Athenians 1.10), and we doubt if any chattel slavery can in general be humane, in any normal meaning of that word. The Delphic inscriptions make it quite clear that punish-

*° AH discussions of classical slavery take place in the shadow of American slavery. Indeed one of the purposes of the present chapter is to stress some areas of difference between Greek and American slavery. For slave institutions, see still K„ M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution (London, 1964); for colour and much else, see £. D. Genovese, Roll Jordan Roll (London, 1975). 144

Full freedom and conditional

release

ment, at the complete discretion of the master, was central to the owners' perception of the slave system, and that the threat of punish ment persisted in conditional releases, even after the slave was freed.* In the final sections of the formula (EF), the seller, the guarantor, the priests of Apollo and other witnesses joined forces in assuring the ex-slave that his newly won freedom would be protected. This clause reflected the history of the institution of manumission: in most Greek city-states, manumission was originally a private act, of no formal interest to the state authority, and in theory susceptible to easy upset. If a rich citizen laid hands on a poor non-citizen claiming him as a slave, the poor man needed both protection and evidence that he was indeed free. Hence the public record of manumission - in the theatre, in a temple, on papyrus, on stone; the slave needed reassurance that all the effort expended on winning his release would not arbitrarily be lost. The guarantor and witnesses were meant to ensure that. But at the same time the formula recognised the violability and uncertain status of the unprivileged outsider in Greek city-states. Changes of Fortune and Death were prominent in ancient life, not just in ancient literature and philosophy. We should stress two conclusions: first, conditional release as an institution depended upon the probability that the master would die soon, even if soon meant a decade; secondly, both masters and slaves sought through religious sanctions to give the ex-slave a security of status which civil authorities were too weak to ensure. Our present-day scepticism should not lead us to underestimate the god Apollo's power. Manumission was a religious ceremony held 'in the middle of the temple by the altar' (GDI 2010). The following inscription from the shrine of Apollo the Sun God at Dionysopolis (in modern Turkey) reveals the public abasement which transgression against the god could induce. It was put up by an ex-slave: 1

22

I confess that I have perjured myself.. .and that I have transgressed and forcibly entered the (holy) precinct.. .and although the god commanded me not to give up the document of manumission to my master, when I was pressed from all sides, I gave it up. And I was punished by the god gready, and he appeared unto me in dreams and stood over me and said 1 shall take my slave by the feet, even if he were sitdng at the gates (of Hell) and shall bring him back up from there/ 4

21

n

On the centrality of punishment in the American south see perhaps best the collection of autobiographical accounts by ex-slaves, collected in the 1930s edited with an interpretative summary by G. P. Rawick, The American Slave, From Sundown to Sunup (Westport, Conn., 1972) especially 55-7, and Genovese (1975) passim. This point is well made by A. Gouldner, Enter Plato (New York, 1965) 24R.

Between slavery and freedom And I command that no one shall scorn the god of the Sun Apollo, when he shall have this monument as a reminder. 23

In sum, four elements of the formula are striking: first, the role of the god Apollo as guardian of liberty for the ex-slave; secondly, the danger that the ex-slave might lose his status through arbitrary seizure; thirdly, the centrality of punishment; and finally the severity of the contractual obligations which some slaves entered as soon as they were formally free. The problem Conditional release posed three obvious problems. First, why did slaves scrimp and save sizeable sums of money merely to change their legal status? T o all appearances, conditional release obliged the slave to remain in a slave-like condition, liable to work and punishment just like a slave, with only the indeterminate prospect of full freedom when her former owner died. There were some advantages: in most cases we think that children born to the freed slave during this protracted service were free; that was one of the obvious advantages to the slave of securing conditional release; but several scholars (cf. Zel'in 1969; 148) have assumed the opposite; no one knows for sure. Above all, the ex-slave would have the feeling that she was free. But the price paid for this illusion was considerable. At conventional wheat prices, the sum of 400 drachmae which was commonly paid for conditional release (cf. Table 111.4) equalled some three and a half tons of wheat equivalent, enough to feed a poor peasant family for over three years. Such a calculation is inevitably crude and gives only a rough order of magnitude. Yet halve or double the price of wheat, and the sum still 24

** The text is edited by Cameron (1939: 155ff.) with an interpretation of possible meanings and this is the text which we translate as best we can here. 84 We know only seven Greek wheat prices from the second century BC. Four of these come from the small island of Delos between 190 and 169 BC; the most common price was \o drachmae presumably for one medimnos conventionally estimated at 52 litres = 39 kg wheat. This seems high for three reasons: first, the price of barley meal from Delos in the same period, which should be higher than for barley grain, was only 3-5 drachmae per medimnos (N = 5) - see J. A. O. Larsen, * Roman Greece* in ESAR vol. 4, 385-6; secondly, in Egypt and elsewhere, barley prices were normally about three fifths of wheat prices; thirdly, Delos wheat prices also look high if we compare them with the conventional Roman price for wheat (3 HS per modius of 6.5 kg = 4.5 drachmae per medimnos). The three other prices for wheat (SIG 976 Samos; IG 5.2.437 Megalopolis; Inschriften von Priene 108.46) were not market prices but administered prices: for example, the price fixed by a public benefactor in a famine. They were 5 ^ , 5 ! ^ and 4 drachmae per medimnos respectively, all much closer to the conventional price of wheat at Rome than to the price of wheat at Delos. Whether we take the wheat prices from Delos or Rome, the 400 drachmae paid by a slave equalled 1W to 3J4 tons of wheat equivalent. We think the latter price more plausible. A poor peasant family needed one ton of wheat equivalent for minimum subsistence, which includes a bare allowance for heat, housing and clothing. 146

Full freedom and conditional

release

remains sizeable, difficult enough for a peasant, let alone a slave to accumulate. This leads to our second problem, which we have already raised: how did slaves, perhaps especially female slaves, acquire such sums of money? In the cities of Rome and classical Athens, both trading centres and capitals of empire, it is easy enough to understand that there were spaces in the economy in which outsiders, aliens, even slaves, could acquire small fortunes. Indeed perhaps because they were outsiders, like the Chinese in south-east Asia or Indians in East Africa, they had more social space in which to make a profit, exacdy because they were outsiders, free from the constraints which compelled citizens to give their kin-folk and fellow citizens a bargain. But all that does not explain why large-scale manumission, based on cash accumula tions, was possible in the relatively rural and economically under developed area around Delphi (and in Thessaly). T o be sure, business derived from the oracle and Apollo's temple accounted for some economic activity, but they do not fully explain the high level of release prices paid by slaves, and of course they do not explain the high rate of manumission in Thessaly. Our third problem is why did slave-owners free their slaves con ditionally. Perhaps an answer to this problem presupposes an answer to the broader problem: why did masters allow slaves to buy their freedom at all? Let us discuss that briefly; two arguments seem important. First, it was sensible for masters to opt for the carrot rather than or in addition to the stick. The prospect of buying freedom encouraged a slave to show both initiative and parsimony. Ideally, the slave both sought to make a profit and to save. If the slave died before achieving liberty, the master pocketed his savings; in strict law, they belonged to the master anyhow. If the slave later bought full freedom, the master had recapitalised the slave's value and with the purchase money he could buy a younger slave to replace him. The second argument is complementary: as the adult slave grew older, the chances of death and sickness increased; insofar as release prices were related to market prices, it was better for the master at some stage to capitalise the slave's current value than to go on risking total loss or to keep on a declining asset. It was the paradox of classical slavery that a master maximised his profit from a valuable slave by selling him freedom. We do not assume that all or even most masters and slaves perceived manumission in this light, or that all masters maximised their profit. 25

tt

It might be particularly in the master's interest to sell a slave freedom, if the slave borrowed some part of the capital costs of liberty from someone else, for example from her father or husband-to-be. Borrowing transferred the risk of death or of non-repayment from the master to outsiders.

Between slavery and freedom But doubtless some did; and it seems probable that some such rationale underlay the institution of manumission as a whole. Very few slaves were given freedom without payment; a small minority bought release at well below average prices (for reasons unknown), and as we shall see, home-born slaves paid on average about 6 % less for their freedom than foreign-born slaves. Some exploitation was coated over with a veneer of paternalism and of its reciprocal, loyalty, and even with affection. From the individual's point of view, whether master or slave, the master's agreement to release a slave counted as generosity. The master had given away his right to the slave's life-long labour. But from the point of view of the system, if that makes sense, manumission reinforced slavery as an institution. It allowed ambitious slaves a focus for their ambitions; it gave them the possibility of being released, and it gave them the crowning prize of eventual success, with all its implications of virtue rewarded. Finally, manumission provided slave owners with the working capital to buy new slaves; manumission gave strength to the slave market. But manumission also transformed slavery, at least for some, from the inescapable hereditary caste which it might have become, into a temporary servitude. In the light of this discussion, let us take another look at conditional release. Clearly it was a compromise between slavery and freedom, between what the master wanted and what the slave wanted. The master capitalised some part of the slave's value, and yet retained a lien on the slave's services. He did not have to buy a new slave or to break him in; he simply kept the old slave on. The slave too gained something. He paid only part of his market value; indeed, as we shall see, the average prices paid for conditional release remained fairly steady throughout the last two centuries BC, while the cost of full freedom rose sharply, so that the difference in the price paid for each became substantial (see Table 111.4). The ex-slave on conditional release also remained secure in the socio-economic role which he had occupied as a slave; he did not have to leave the house and find a new niche. Juridical freedom probably made very littie difference to his way of life; nor was that necessarily to the slave's disadvantage. We imagine that he continued to receive food and clothing from the ex-owner, whom he continued to live with and serve. Conditional release was an insu rance against the harsh risks of independence. Epictetus presents a 26

27

M

17

Not that slavery in the American south, still less in Brazil or Cuba, was an inescapable caste (for manumissions in Cuba see H. S. Klein, Slavery in the Americas (Chicago, 1967) 62!!.). But the existence of colour difference reinforced hereditary status; the. low visibility of status distinctions in the classical world must have helped manumissions. The shock of independence recurs in the autobiographical accounts collected by G. P. Rawick, The American Slave, A Composite Autobiography (Westport, Conn., 1 9 7 2 - ) 19 vols. 148

Full freedom and conditional

release

colourful picture of the slave putting all his hopes and fantasies in freedom: 'If I am set free', he says, 'immediately everything will be fine...I shall talk as an equal on equal terms with everyone; I shall go where I please*.. .Then he is freed, and immediately he has nowhere to eat; he looks for someone to flatter at whose table he can eat...he falls into harsher slavery than before.. .and yearns for his old slavery. 'What was wrong with it? Someone else clothed me, shod me, fed me, looked after me when I was ill: and I didn't do much for him'.. .(Discourses 4.1.33) Yet there were difficulties on conditional release; three seem parti cularly worth stressing. First, the master committed himself to wasting a valuable asset; as soon as the master died, the ex-slave became completely free and the loss of the slave fell on the master's heirs. Secondly, giving the slave the status of a free person made it difficult to exact from the ex-slave, now formally free, punctilious performance of slave-like duties; from the master's point of view, the slave became less reliable. Thirdly, conditional release gave the slave an active interest in his master's early death, which occasionally must have made the master feel uncomfortable. Given these disadvantages, it is in teresting that conditional release survived and was not displaced by manumission by sealed will, which was so common in Rome, and perhaps had fewer drawbacks. Manumission by will was known in post-classical Athens (Diogenes Laertius 5.55 and 72-3), and in neigh bouring Thessaly (e.g. IG 9.3.1118); but it is only once recorded in Delphi and then by an outsider (GDI 2101). Finally, from the slave's point of view, the main disadvantage of conditional release was that he remained at his master's beck and call while his master went on living, sometimes for years on end. Greek masters and slaves were clearly aware of all these problems. The variations of conditions which we shall now discuss under the three headings 'Length of service', 'Performance', 'Loss of an asset' reflect their attempts to tackle them. 28

Length of service after manumission - fixed term and doubled obligations The majority of conditionally freed slaves were obliged to stay and serve either their former master or their former mistress, until the old owner died. We do not know how long on average this service lasted, because we do not know how old manumittors typically were. But if we assume that most manumittors were mature adults, we can use life

** Manumission by will did not necessarily preclude the slave from paying the master's heirs for his release. W. W. Buckland (The Roman Law of Slavery (Cambridge, 1908) 496) considered that the payment of money by slaves was the most common of the conditions exacted in Roman testamentary manumissions. H9

Between slavery and frtdedom tables to get a general idea of the average length of a slave's postmanumission service. At levels of mortality most probably prevalent among slave owners in the classical world (an average expectation of life at birth of 25-30 years), half the men aged forty survived a further 17-20 years, and half the men aged sixty survived a further 8-10 years. Female owners would have survived marginally longer. If these projections based on historical data from comparable societies are a good guide, then in general and on average, slaves released condi tionally to serve oldish owners could still expect to continue in service for a substantial term. Of course, each slave was interested not in the average, but in his own length of service. The sheer fact that he did not know how long it would last was probably a continual source of irritation. Some slaves must have developed a ghoulish interest in their master's every illness. A substantial minority of conditionally released slaves were obliged to serve both master and mistress until both had died. The chances of protracted service were doubled. The obligation to serve both master and mistress as a condition of release became increasingly common during the last two centuries BC (see Table 111.2: col. c); from 201 to 153 BC, only a tenth of conditionally released slaves were exploited in this way; but in the last century BC, the proportion rose to one third. This double obligation was merely one aspect of a general deterio ration in the conditions of release which slaves got from their owners. Over time, as we have already seen (Table I I I . I , col. k) progressively fewer slaves were given full freedom, and those who were given it paid steeply higher prices (see Table 111.4). In the second century BC, a small minority of slaves ( 1 3 % of those conditionally released 201-153 BC) negotiated a fixed term with their masters, similar to the old English indenture; on average, it lasted six years (N = 25). But by the first century BC, according to these inscriptions, the practice had died out completely (Table in.2: col. d). The fixed term was replaced, again for the few, by manumission in stages. As the price of full freedom rose, more slaves bought con ditional release; if they were lucky, this was only the first step. Instead of waiting for their old owner(s) to die, they bought full freedom with a second and often sizeable payment (av. = 388 drachmae; N = 12). We can trace this two-stage purchase of freedom for forty-four slaves, who 29

9

30

*· United Nations, 'Methods for Population Projection by Sex and Age*, Population Studies (New York, 1956) 7off. 30 In a few cases the year limit was used to protect the owner's interest. For example, in one case (GDI 2084 cf. 1742) a female ex-slave was required to serve her master until his death, and to serve his wife if he died before eight years had passed. 150

Full freedom and conditional

release

Table 111.2. Conditionally

freed slaves were increasingly exploited Conditionally freed slaves were required to stay and serve until a

b

c

d

e

One master died

One mistress died

Both died*

Fixed termf

Total number of cases

'3 8 0

142 88 107

(%) A 2 O I - 1 5 3 BC B 1 5 3 - I O I BC C IOI-I

BC

49 38 24

27 V

41

11 24 35

* T h e great majority of these paired owners were apparendy husband and wife - but in some cases they were brother and sister, mother and daughter, etc. t T h e average length of fixed term service was 6 years. constituted a small but steadily increasing proportion (it eventually affected one quarter) of those conditionally freed. We can also tell, though only somewhat roughly, how long their service after manu mission lasted. Most of them ( 5 9 % N = 4 i ) secured full freedom during the same Delphic priesthood in which they had been condi tionally freed; the duration of priesthoods varied, on average they lasted ten years; the average length of conditional service within one priesthood was probably significantly shorter. But a few ( 2 0 % ) had to wait several priesthoods, in some cases for twenty years or more, before they secured the second stage of full freedom (cf. FD 3.3.43; 340-1 ) . The increasing frequency of two-stage manumissions is corro31

3 2

" The successive proportions of conditionally freed slaves who were released from service in periods A B c t d and D (see Table I I I . I ) were4%, 2 % , 10%, 2 6 % , and 2 7 % ; NB the base numbers in the later periods are small - c. fifty per period. In one case, in the second century BC, a master who gave a slave release from service without charging her a fee, explicidy declared himself to be sound in mind and body (GDI 1751). This suggests that charging a fee was normal; but in the formula for release which became established about the time of Christ, the price paid was rarely mentioned; occasionally (e.g. -ED 3.3.333) it was stated that the money had been paid as arranged; indeed in this example, it was paid in spite of the fact that the ex-slave was clearly the mother of the slave-owner's son. We doubt if silence about price meant that the second release was usually free. Samuel (1965: 265) came to a similar conclusion after an excellent discussion of the evidence. a We can trace these two stages of release for forty-one ex-slaves. Twenty-four were fully freed in the same priesthood, nine in the next priesthood and eight several priesthoods after their first manumission.

Between slavery and freedom borated by the standardisation of the formula giving release from conditional service. In the second century BC, release from service had been recorded in a form similar to the first ficdve sale to the god; but by the first century BC it was recorded in a distinctive, standard and brief formula (contrast GDI 2015/1868 with FD 3.3.398 and 419). This standardisation strongly suggests that formal release from service before the owner's death had become common. And in the first century BC it also apparendy became common to make specific pro vision in the first manumission contract for a slave to buy himself, or more often herself, out of service, sometimes at the death of one of two joint manumittors, sometimes whenever the ex-slave wished (eg. FD 3.3.351). There had been occasional provision for this early release (eg FD 3.2.243; GDI 1717) in the second century BC, but in the first century BC the two-stage releases (which we know to have been success ful) and the provisions for slaves to buy early release (about whose outcome we are ignorant) cover a third (33 %; N = 109) of all the slaves conditionally freed. Thus although the Greeks adopted an institution of conditional release (seemingly from the Near East) which catered for slave-owners until their death, they adapted it and allowed a significant proportion of ex-slaves to escape from service before the owners had died. 33

34

35

Performance Up to now we have taken for granted that masters and slaves had conflicting interests, as did the former owners and the ex-slaves still serving them. We have assumed that the ex-slaves wanted speedy release into full freedom, while the masters wanted sterling perfor mance of all duties both from slaves and from the ex-slaves serving them. Punishment was as central to this intermediate institution of conditional service as it was to slavery itself. The tension between the ex-slave's formal status as a free man and the contractual obligations 33 34

35

This point is made by Daux (1936: 615) but his list of releases from conditional service stops in the middle of the last century BC and is therefore shorter than ours. The 36 cases of potential or actual two-stage release from service may be subdivided as follows: (a) 11 slaves were freed in two stages, (b) six more slaves were offered the option of early release and we know that they took it, (c) six slaves were obliged to stay with their owner(s) until death and then could buy freedom with a second payment (this may be considered to belong to another category, since it was in the owner's interest to exact a second fee), but the slave may have seen it as early release, (d) thirteen slaves were given an option to get early release, usually when they wished, but subject to the agreement of their master and the payment of a fixed fee. Please note that in the second century BC, similar provisions, excluding those who received fixed term contracts, covered less than 5 % of the conditionally freed. See I. Mendelsohn, Slavery in the Ancient Near East (New York, 1949) especially pp. 1 off. and 74!!. Samuel (1965: 255) attributed the creation of the legal concept of paramoni to the third century BC. 152

Full freedom and conditional

release

into which he entered when he was first freed, was solved in the master's favour. In some manumission contracts, ex-slaves were explicitly required to go on working after manumission, 'like slaves' (douleuonta - FD 3.3.337 cf. 6.51). Such requirements, which have paral lels in Roman practice, make nonsense of the conventional dichotomy, dominant in the sociological literature, between slave and free; in the classical world, the two categories had a significant overlap. Masters usually took the right in conditional manumissions to punish ex-slaves as they chose, if the ex-slave did not do what he was told or did not stay and serve. * If Eisias does not stay and serve or does not do as she is ordered let Kleomantis have power to punish her in any way he wishes; he may beat her, chain her or sell her* (FD 3.3.329). Of course, formal contracts do not tell us how people, ex-masters and ex-slaves behaved. Legal documents often merely set limits, which are not necessarily tested. Yet they do betray each party's fears and give clues about actual behaviour. After all, the centrality of punishment in the manumission records reflected not only the owners' power, but also their fear that ex-slaves might not do what they were told, neither stay nor serve. At one extreme, then, the master could legally punish the ex-slave's disobedience by selling him, presumably as a slave, to someone else; in other words, the master could, unilaterally, void the sale to the god and revoke the freedom which the slave had paid for: 'but if he does not stay and serve, the sale is void and without effect' (GDI 1721 there are a dozen similar instances; cf. FD 3.3.6). In this respect, the institution of paramoni gave Greek slave-holders more power than Roman manumission did. This may have been partly because the act of manumission at Delphi, although it was carried out in public, was a private act, in the sense that state authorities were not involved. 36

37

*· In formal law, Roman ex-slaves could not be slaves: *the praetor does not allow tne manumitted slave to serve as a slave, unless he is bound under another law' (Dositheus, frag. 12, FIRA vol. 2, 620). But Roman freedmen owed their masters the general duties of clients to patrons and could be contractually bound at manumission to perform specific services. Moreover, ex-slaves who stayed in their master's household after manumission were subject to his disciplinary power, to some extent like slaves (D. 48.19.11.1: Marcian) while free men who worked for a period in a household were also like slaves (D. 43.16.1.16-20: Ulpian). See F. M. Roberds, Lavoro e lavoratori net mondo romano (Bari, 1963) 101-42; D. Nörr, 'Zur Bewertung der freien Arbeit in Rom', ZSS (ram. Abt.) 82 (1965) 90ft. and M. Käser, 'Die Geschichte des Patronatsgewalt über Freigelassene', ZSS 58 (1938) 88-135 and S. Treggiari, Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic (Oxford, 1969) y$ß. 37 Rädle (1969) analysed very well the progression of manumission from private acts done in private to private acts proclaimed and recorded in public to acts in which the state took an active interest. However, his proffered explanations, namely that literacy was increasing and that ex-slaves wanted to preserve their free status, are plausible, but surely insufficient. l53

Between slavery and freedom At Rome by contrast, slaves who were properly manumitted before a magistrate became Roman citizens; they lost citizenship only rarely and by official acdon. In sum, Greek masters sought to secure high performance from their freed slaves who stayed with them by threats of punishment, sale and the loss of freedom. This was not true of all conditional manumissions. In several cases the master's power was restricted. The single most common limita tion (N = 26) was that the master could not sell the ex-slave. He could punish as he wished but not sell. Slaves wanted to avoid sale, not merely because sale would sever the slave from his or her family but also because it would presumably destroy the rights which the slave had acquired at manumission. In a few cases at Delphi, the restriction on a master's power was considerably greater; masters and freed slaves agreed to resolve any differences about the quality of the ex-slaves' work through arbitrators (GDI 1832, cf. 1694, 1696, 1874). This pro vision implicidy recognised a measure of equality between master and freed slave. But most contracts of conditional release were unequal; the legal force of contract was being used to get ex-slaves to agree to their own exploitation. Masters and slaves were not always at loggerheads. In some cases, a slave was acknowledged as the owner's foundling (idion threpton: FD 3.6.37 and eleven similar instances), reared by him, presumably with some affection. We should stress again that neither this tie nor the obvious parentage by the owner of a slave (such parentage was never made explicit but it can be deduced from names; for example, Kleomantis changed the name of his slave's son to Kleomantis - FD 3.3.333) led to any obvious reduction in the fees which child or foundling paid for freedom. But it is clear that in some cases the ex-slave was the master's only or main helper, obliged to care for him 'day and night' (FD 3.6.57), provide all bodily services (FD 3.2.169), and look after him in old age (GDI 1723, 1731). When the master died, the ex-slave, in a dozen surviving instances, was charged with the care of the funeral, so important in Greek life, and even inherited the owner's property (FD 3.2.172 and five other cases). As in other slave societies, the tie between master and slave could be warm; this warmth did not necessarily lessen exploitation, though it may have softened the slave's feelings about it. 38

38

The following sketch of various conditions is necessarily selective. Please note that the universe is 289 conditional manumissions involving 400 slaves. From a statistical point of view, therefore, none of the conditions discussed is important, though several seem intrinsically interesting. These two dimensions of analysis, incidence and interest, have sometimes been confused. 154

Full freedom and conditional

release

How to lessen the loss of an asset From the slave-owner's point of view, there were two main arguments against conditional release. First, freeing a slave, even when he was kept on in service, weakened the master's control over him, and made it more difficult to get good work out of him. We have already dealt with these problems at some length. Secondly, freeing a slave conditionally might cost the slave-owner money. Conditionally freed slaves paid considerably less for the change of juridical status than those who bought immediate and full freedom. But when the owner died, the conditionally freed slave became completely free. The mas ter's heirs had lost an asset. We have seen how a minority of owners struggled against this loss, whether by doubling a slave's obligations so that he served both his former owner and his mistress, until both had died, or by exacting an additional payment from the ex-slave when one of his owners died. Two further sets of conditions revealed in the inscriptions deserve our attention, since they highlight interesting aspects of exploitation. The first is familiar because it has a direct parallel in Roman law. In these cases, the slave-owners freed a slave but kept a lien on the ex-slave's property even after he had gained full freedom, by stipulating that when the ex-slave died, especially if he had no issue, all his property reverted to his erstwhile owner, or to his owner's heirs. He was not allowed to give anything away or to adopt an heir (see for example, GDI 1891, 2097, 2202). The savings of these freed slaves, just like the savings of a slave, were claimed by the master. But in other cases, owners explicidy allowed their conditionally freed slaves to take their savings away with them when they left service (FD 3.3.37 and 205). The second set is more dramatic. It concerns the children born to conditionally freed slave-women during their service. Were their children to be slave or free? We assume that in most cases, children born during service were free, but we really cannot know for certain, since up to 50 BC explicit provision was rarely made (but see GDI 2136, 2171 and perhaps 1719). But towards the end of the last century BC and in the first century AD, it became increasingly common for masters to make explicit provision in the manumission contract about the status of children born during service. The number of inscriptions surviving from the first century AD is small, so that any conclusions must be very tentative; moreover the provisions are polarised, and split evenly between slave-women whose children born during service were free (N = 9/27), and those who were required to hand over a child or children as slaves usually to the heir, son or daughter, of their former *55

Between slavery and freedom owner (N = 10/27). In extreme cases, the master specified that al though the children of his ex-slave were formally free, he reserved the right to sell them if the need arose (FD 3.6.39), or that children born during service belonged to the master, and once again, if the need arose, they could be sold by the master (FD 3.3.306). But the most common stipulation was that the female slave who had already bought her freedom at a price should serve her owner until he died and in addition should surrender a baby or babies, one or two years old, to the master's heir. It was not enough for the master to get money from his former slave with which to buy a new slave; he wanted the slave's own flesh and blood, and was knowledgeable enough to wait undl the child was weaned and the risks of mortality had diminished. The development of this new institutional form of hereditary slavery and its ironical creation within the framework of manumission are extremely interesting. And although the number of instances known from Delphi is limited, many similar cases have been found from the same period, the first century AD, in Calymna, a tiny Greek island near Cos. Perhaps this development can be partly explained by the increasingly peaceful conditions of the early first century AD, which drastically reduced the numbers of prisoners of war enslaved. The fall in slave supplies may have forced masters to seek replacement slaves outside the market, from among the children of their own slaves. Rather than prevent manumission, they compromised and got the best of both worlds by giving the appearance of freedom and by demanding child replacements for the adults freed. The following is an illustrative example from Delphi: 39

40

... Euphoria sold to Pythian Apollo two bodies called Epiphanea and Epaphro for the price of six mnoe [600 drachmae], and I have received the whole sum...on the following conditions: they [the ex-slaves] shall remain with Euphoria as long as she lives and are to do everything she orders without giving cause for complaint. If they do not do what they are told, let Euphoria have the power to punish them in whatever way she wishes. And after my death, let Epaphro give to my grandson Glaukias, son of Lyson, three babies (brephi), each two years old. If she does not have any children, let her give 200 denarii (= 200 drachmae). And let Epiphanea give to my son Sostratos one three-year-old child

* The requirement to produce children for the former master gained momentum only in the first century AO. In the second half of the last century BC, only one out of twenty-seven conditionally freed adult women was required to surrender a child or pay a fee of 300 drachmae to her previous owner's heir (FD 3.3.291), although two out of twelve conditionally freed young girls were so required (FD 3.3.273 and 332). 40 See M. Segrl ed: 'Tituli Calymnii', Annuario delta Scuola archeologica di Atene 22/3 (1944-5) ifyff.; his introduction to these inscriptions is very useful. 156

Full freedom and conditional

release

(paidion) after five years, and another three-year-old child to my grandson Glaukias after three years. And then let Epaphro and Epiphanea be free.. ,(FD 3.6.38 - c. AD 20)

The Calymna inscriptions show that the institution of service after manumission was not limited to central Greece; they also suggest that the development of demands for young replacement slave children was widespread, a response to developments within slave society at large. The following is a typical example from Calymna: 41

In Asklepios' third monarchy [of Cos] in the month of Hyacinth... Asphales

and Menodotos freed their own foundling slave Monarchia on condition that she stays and serves Asphales for the rest of her life. And if she does not stay and serve him, she shall pay for each day's absence 4 asses [ > 2 kg wheat equivalent]. And she shall bear and rear for the sons of Menodotos a male child [and hand him over] when he is two years old, or pay 5 0 denarii. After the death of Asphales, she shall be freedwoman to no one. (Tituli Calymnii 176a; ed. M. Segre (1944/5)) As at Delphi in this period, most of the slaves (for whom a record survives at Calymna) were freed conditionally (56/68) and of these, half were apparendy released only for service during the lifetime of one owner, less often of two owners. The other half of the conditionally freed slaves (28/56) were required to stay and serve their masters and to produce one, and less often two children for their owner or his heirs; in a few cases (6/28), children only were required, apparently without service. One difference between Calymna and Delphi is striking: at Calymna, 42

41

41

W. L. Westermann (1948) reported about sixty instances of paramoni from documents found in Roman Egypt; but these do not seem to be connected with release from chattel slavery. They were general service contracts, usually associated with a loan to the servitor or to his family. There are several isolated examples of conditional service, as discussed in this paper from elsewhere, but not in sets of data comparable with those from Delphi and Calymna. See, for example, in other parts of central Greece, IC 9.1.36-42 and 189-94, especially 193 (second century AD) in which an ex-slave was required to hand over a two-year-old child at the end of service or 200 dn; the prices charged in these inscriptions were very high (6/7: 1,000 drachmae or more); cf. IG 9.1.318 (Amphissa), 350-1 (Physkus) and 3796*. (Naupaktus), and SEG 2 5 097 1 ) 640 and 23 (1968) 352-3, where the prices read by the editor £. Mastrokostas are difficult to believe. See also PSI1263 (Egypt, second century A D ) and Gregory Nazianzen's will (PG 37.392b: Asia Minor, fourth, century A D ) . Several of these inscriptions are fragmentary; the analysis of conditions which is set out in Appendix ill. 1 may overestimate numbers in the short categories, such as 'no conditions' (rows A B E F ) . We distrust Segr6's condusion (1756*.) that all ex-slaves were legally bound to provide (a) service after manumission and (b) one replacement slave child. He deduced this from the fact that the phrase 'in accord with the manumission laws' only once occurred when these two conditions were explicit, and argued therefore that these were the conditions which the manumission laws prescribed. G. Klaffenbach (Gnomon 25 (1953) 459) also disagreed with Segre\ 157

Between slavery and freedom male as well as female slaves were conditionally freed with an obligation to produce issue for their previous owners. If they did not meet these requirements, they were often liable to pay money instead. But we are not told whether or how much they paid for their first formal liberation. It was usually specified that the child should be male and two years old when it was handed over to the former owners to start a new generation of foundlings (threptoi). This category of foundlings of which there are 23 examples from Calymna (out of less than 75 possible cases) seems to have replaced the older category - home-born. Overall the purposes of these chilling practices seem clear. The old stock of slaves was given formal freedom with residual dudes of service until the owner died, and at the same time the slave stock was updated; adults were replaced by children within the framework of a quasi-familial relationship. For the owners, foundlings were better than slaves bought in the market. 43

PRICES

The prices which slaves paid for their freedom at Delphi form the single largest series of prices over time which we have from the classical world. For that reason alone, they deserve more attention than they have received. T o be sure, many of the prices seem conventional: prices of 300, 400 and 500 drachmae were very common. But when we analysed the prices in terms of the other variables known: sex, agegroup, conditions of release, origins and date, significant patterns emerged. Table 111.3 shows what we think no one has previously argued from this evidence, namely that there was a steady rise in slave prices in the last two centuries before Christ. Average prices of all slaves rose by 44

43

44

It seems likely that the ownership of the baby by the ex-slave's master was confirmed formally, rather than that the baby was actually handed over to be cared for in the master's household. The whole institution of service after freedom and of foundlings' slavery presupposes a close settled community in which the slaves, the ex-slaves and the enslaved children of the ex-slaves lived in various shades of dependence on the master. The classic but opaque article on foundlings is by A. Cameron, 'Threptos and related terms in the inscriptions of Asia Minor', Studies presented to W. H. Buckler, ed. W. M. Calder and J. Keil (Manchester 1939) 27-62; see also A. N. Sherwin-Whitc, The Letters of Pliny (Oxford, 1966) 650. The prices in Tables 111,3 and 111.4 are for slaves freed singly. We excluded the multiply manumitted slaves because most of their prices are given in combinations (for example, an adult male and an adult female freed together for 1,000 drachmae - GDI 2158) which we do not know how to split. Occasionally, prices for slaves freed together were given separately, or for pairs of slaves of the same sex. However, we decided not to include these prices as and when they occurred lest there was a systematic difference between the prices paid by slaves freed singly and multiply, 158

Prices Table 111.3. The average prices (drachmae) paid by slaves for freedom at Delphi (201-1 BC)

Approximate dates A 2 0 1 - 1 5 3 BC B 1 5 3 - 1 0 0 BC Ci IOO-53 BC

C, 5 3 - I BC

Rough ratios

a

h

c

d

e

Adult males

Adult females

Boys

Girls

Rough ratios*

4<>3 510

376 428

235 276

160

100

244

566 641

470

3*9

287

125 140

437

33o

333

150

100

80

55

50 9 18

Number of cases A B Ci Ot

130

190

11

83

128

9

27

«9 8

15

*9

l9

10

15

* The vertical ratios indicate the relative cost over time of one man, one woman, one boy and one girl. The horizontal ratios indicate the relative cost over time of four men to four women, etc. roughly 5 0 % (Table 111.3 col. e.). One explanation which immediately comes to mind is that the demand for slaves in Roman Italy outran supply, in spite of the thousands of prisoners captured in war and enslaved. Central Greece was hooked by Roman conquest into a pan-Mediterranean economy, and so slave prices rose. Table 111.3 also shows fairly steady rises in release price over two centuries for adult males, adult females, boys and girls. It is impressive to find steady price rises (only two figures are awry) for each category. The rough ratio of release-price paid by adult male and adult female slaves (100:80) and the lower prices paid by children (55:50) seem to rule out prostitution associated with Apollo's temple (for which there is no evidence) as a major source of slaves' income. The steep rise in release-price for adult males (from an average of 403 drachmae to 641 drachmae) may reflect demand for adult male slave labour in Italy.

or lest the master was more interested in the total price than in its allocation between those freed together - for example between a mother and her child. In fact, there was no significant difference in prices paid by those multiply freed, and their exclusion or inclusion makes only slight differences to the profile. This is illustrated in Appendix in. 1, where Table 111.4 is recast to include the multiply freed. The only exception we made was to include in Table 111.3, cols, cd 18 boys and girls released in pairs or trios of one sex without an adult; their inclusion increased the base numbers signihcandy, although the profile was not much changed. *59

Between slavery and freedom In most cases, presumably the grant of full freedom to a slave involved the owner in buying a new slave to replace the slave who had been freed. Insofar as this was true, it is therefore probable that the prices which slaves paid for manumission bore a close relationship to what it would cost to buy replacement-slaves in the market. Indeed in one manumission inscription, replacement was specified: a condi tionally freed slave was to be allowed full freedom if she provided a slave of similar age instead of herself (GDI 1717). Of course, it is possible that many slaves paid more for their freedom than the market price. Masters had power to impose their own terms; and they were often harsh. But it was also in the masters' interests to keep within reason. In general, they wanted slaves to accumulate savings; freedom had to appear reasonably achievable. In sum, we conclude that release prices approximated market prices. Table 111.3 prompts two questions. First, did the rise in release prices reflect a general rise in prices throughout the Greek world, or a specific rise in slave prices? Unfortunately we do not know enough about prices in the rest of the Greek world to make any firm statement about price trends in the last two centuries BC. But Table 111.4 solves part of the problem. Secondly, can we properly combine prices for full freedom with prices for conditional release? That depends on the problem being considered. Prices for full freedom and conditional release can be amalgamated, if what we want to know is how much slaves paid for release of any type. And it is worth stressing that on average they paid a high price, and that the price during the last two centuries BC rose. But the price of full freedom was significantly higher 45

46

45 48

Alternatively manumission led to a reduction in the number of slaves, or slaves left replacement slave children behind them in slavery; but the latter alternative would work easily only if slave holdings were very large. Westermann (1955: 36) doubted that manumission prices were closely tied to market prices. We have no firm information on Greek slave market prices for this period; contemporary data from Greek Egypt are exiguous and difficult to compare with Greek prices; but they seem to confirm that prices paid by slaves at Delphi were high. Radle (1969: 165-7) argued and Bloch (1914: 21) noted in passing that the mna at Delphi was divided into 35 staters = 70 drachmae, and so was worth only 70/100 of the Attic mna (100 drachmae). By no means all the evidence fits this assertion (see GDI 1951, 2001, 2082) and what does (for example, three manumission prices including the figure 17^ staters) can easily be explained as survival from the fourth century BC (when there is apparently evidence of a mna of 70 drachmae) rather than as current practice in the second century BC. We have willingly followed the dominant convention: one Delphic mna equals one Attic mna. The only problem is what to do with the 38 prices which include staters and/or drachmae. We have counted them in the Attic style, as equally 1/50 and 1/100 of a mna. If we had treated them as 1/35 and 1/70 of a mna, it would have altered the average prices paid by slaves for freedom by 0.01 drachma or less in each period. We thank Mr M. Crawford for advice on these points. 160

Prices Table 111.4. The cost of full freedom increased, but the cost of conditional release held steady at Delphi (201-1 BC) Average prices (in Adult males

drachmae)

Adult females

Full freedom

Conditional release

Full freedom

Conditional release

A 201-153 BC B 153-100 BC Ci 100-53 c* 53"

405 532 641 827

3^ 422

390 440 500

337 372 37 383

A B Ci

107

Approximate dates

8 0

1

(3°°) 433

485

6

Numbers

c,

23 16 2

67 7 10

9

140 106 21 10

50 22 6 9

than for conditional release, so that we are mixing two different entities. Table 111.4 provides some answers. Table in.4 is extremely interesting. It shows that the price of condi tional release remained fairly constant, while the price of full freedom soared. Indeed for adult males, the average price of full freedom doubled (from 405 to 827 drachmae) while the price of conditional release increased by only 10 % (from 396 to 433 drachmae). The changes in the average price paid for freedom by adult females were significant but less striking; their average price for full freedom rose by a maxi mum of 2 8 % from 390 to 500 drachmae while the price of conditional release rose by only 14%. These differences in the increase of prices make it unlikely that general inflation is the correct explanation. If there had been inflation, the price of both full and conditional freedom for adult males and females should have increased similarly. As the price of full freedom rose, the proportion of slaves who could afford it fell (from about three quarters of those freed in the second century BC to under half at the end of the last century BC - see Table 47

47

At first we were tempted to see the markets for full and conditional freedom as somehow belonging to different circuits of the economy, to different markets, Mediterranean and local. Perhaps they did, but please note that although the price of conditional release remained roughly constant, the terms of conditional release became tougher, so that slaves received less for their money. The cost of conditional release rose even though the price did not. 161

Between slavery and freedom in. i, col. k). Complementarity, since the average price of conditional release remained fairly steady for two centuries (at 396-433 drachmae for adult males and 337-383 drachmae for adult females), more slaves compromised and bought conditional release. Again from Table m.i (col. k) we know that between the second century BC and the second half of the last century BC the proportion of slaves having to be satisfied with conditional release almost doubled (from 2 7 % to 5 2 % ) . It was all that they could afford. At the beginning of the second century BC, there was only a very small difference between the cost of full freedom and conditional release; indeed for adult male slaves, the average difference (9 drachmae) was negligible. Why? Surely it makes sense only if there was little practical difference between the actual consequences of the two types of freedom. We suggest that in the early period most ex-slaves continued to live in the same socio-economic roles which they had fulfilled as slaves. In a stable, local economy, the juridical status of workers made only a slight objective difference to their other social and economic ties; most ex-slaves, once freed, continued to depend on their former owners for patronage, for the preservation of their new status, for the sale of produce, for loans in times of famine or family crisis. The integration of central Greece into the Roman world, the pro longed upsets which followed the Roman conquest, the imposition of taxes, the migration of slaves and of ex-slaves to Roman Italy stirred up local economies throughout the entire Mediterranean basin. By the last century BC, owners who gave slaves their full freedom not only changed the slaves' status, but also ran the real risk of losing the ex-slaves' services. Moreover, replacement slaves had to be bought in a slave market, whose tentacles now stretched from the rich market of Italy as far as Greece. We think that is why the price of full freedom rose, and that is why it increased more steeply for men than for women slaves - because men could more easily take advantage of the ex panding economy by personal mobility. But why did the price of conditional release remain relatively stable? Once again we can only speculate, but the principal reason must surely 48

49

48

49

Radle (1969: 134ff.) argued, as others have done, that Plato's Laws (11.915) reflected current Athenian practice and that ex-slaves there owed their former master serious obligations. It does seem likely that paramone as an institution grew up out of practice. What we see in these Delphic inscriptions is the codification and development of those practices, and the bifurcation of paramone as an institution from full freedom. It is of course possible, though we know nothing of it, that the two forms, of freedom were reserved for distinct categories of slaves. This process in Greece is described in Rostovtzeff (1941: vol. 2, 6ioff.). 162

Prices be that the slaves who bought conditional release secured only a change in status; they had no chance of changing their socio-economic roles. As ex-slaves they continued to stay with and serve their former owner, until his death. Therefore the price of conditional release was relatively unaffected by increases in the price of full freedom and of new slaves. In short, the price of conditional release was fixed in a different, completely local market. But the two markets did influence each other. As the price of full freedom rose, and so became more difficult to acquire, so some masters, as we have seen, felt able to squeeze conditionally-freed slaves harder: they doubled their obligations by requiring them to serve during the lives of both master and mistress, or they exacted an extra payment for full freedom. Similarly, as the cost of replacement slaves increased, so masters exacted new slaves - infants - from a significant minority of the conditionally freed. The increasing harshness of conditional freedom was a consequence of the higher cost of full freedom. 50

F A M I L Y T I E S AMONG T H E F R E E D

One stark contrast between slave and free was in family relations. In the American south, free persons were married in church * until death do us part'; slaves were married by ceremonially jumping over a broomstick in the master's house, and the marriage was scheduled to last, the cynics said, until buckra [master] sold one of them. Surviving classical evidence cannot match the American south for richness of detail; we have to be satisfied with glimpses. But even the lapidary inscriptions from Delphi reveal many of the family ties between free manumittors, and also between the freed slaves. As we have seen, husbands and wives often joindy required conditionally-freed slaves to serve them until they both died (see Table in.2). A free manumittor also often secured the formal consent of a relative to the manumission; this collaboration was not required by law, but since relatives were potential heirs they had an interest in the family property and so bore witness to the renunciation of a shared good. 51

52

50

A somewhat similar conclusion, reached in a different way by Rädle (1969:152), relied too much on the ratio of home-born slaves to the known aliens; but see Bloch (1914:

51 51

Genovese (1975: 481). Collaboration may not have been related only to property but may also have helped guarantee the ex-slave's freedom. In this respect, collaboration especially by sons who might oudive the prime manumittor was particularly helpful (soCalderini 1908: igoff.). We should stress that although women had collaborators more often than men, they also acted singly; and many men had women as collaborators.

25 and

37-8).

163

Between slavery and freedom Table 111.5. Manumissions by male slave-owners decreased; manumissions by female slave-owners increased. Manumissions in which relatives formally collaborated increased* Proportions (%) of cases in which a slave was released by a

b

Male Female manumittor manumittor A 201-153 B B 153-101 BC G IOI-I

BC

68

17

52 35

3° 3*

c

d

Joint manumittorst

Collabora tive manu missions:):

15 18 32

58 56

*9

* These data are based on systematic samples of 100 inscriptions from each period. t Joint manumittors are manumittors who released a slave together, equally (x and y freed the slave z). Please note that the figures in columns a+6+c horizontally add up to 100%. The figures in column d are separate. X By collaborative manumissions, we mean manumissions in which the manu mittor explicidy indicated that the manumission was undertaken with the agreement of relative(s) (x with the agreement of y freed z). Husbands agreed to manumissions by wives (GDI 1697) and more surprisingly wives formally consented to the acts of husbands (FD 3.3.295 and 394); sons and daughters agreed to the acts of fathers and mothers (GDI 2062, 2212, 2245); less often mothers (FD 3.3.375), brothers (FD 3.3.433) and grandchildren (GDI 2188) signified their agreement. What is more, the custom of collaborative release became increasingly common, for reasons which may be connected with, but which are not fully explained by the increase in the number of manumissions performed by women (cf. Tables in.2 and 111.5)· But for our present purposes, all we need to stress is that these brief inscriptions recorded a wide variety of family relationships among free slave-owners. Among slaves, matters stood differendy, at least as far as their owners were concerned. We can see this particularly in the large number of multiple manumussions which occurred in the last two centuries BC (133 acts analysed, involving 323 slaves). By multiple manumissions we mean those manumissions in which more than one slave was freed. A priori, we might expect such multiple manumissions explicidy to include slave husbands and wives freed together, or slave fathers and sons, brothers and sisters. But they do not. The only 164

Family ties relationship among slaves repeatedly recognised in these Delphic inscriptions was that between slave mother and child (in 29 out of 133 multiple manumissions). The law, of course, did not recognise the capacity of slaves as persons to have husbands or wives; this was true in Roman law as well, but in Roman pracdce slave mates were frequendy commemorated. We suspect that slave mothers were explicidy recognised as mothers, both because slave status derived from the mother, and because it was in the slave-owners' interest that slave children should be nurtured. Even among slaves, motherhood was a valued role. The recognition of lateral kin among slaves, whether husbands, wives or brothers (or even fathers) would have limited masters' free dom to split families by sale. This judgement may sound harsh. But how else can we explain the virtual absence of any other acknowledged relationship in the large number of slaves freed in multiple or single manumissions. Only once in a thousand (N = 978) manumissions, single or multiple, was the tie between slave husband and slave wife explicitly recognised (GDI 2183); and only once was a slave's father acknowledged (GDI 1708). Chattel slavery depends upon the market. The market operates best by denying family ties, partly because buyers do not necessarily want to purchase a whole family unit, partly because slaves themselves might not be able to pay for the release of all family members at one time. The tie between slave mother and slave child was the only tie which partly withstood these forces of separation. Most ( 8 0 % ; N = 2 i 5 ) of the slaves freed as children were freed separately from their mothers (a few of these ( 1 0 % ) were freed with apparendy unrelated adults). Apparendy the pressure of increased prices for full freedom paid by adult slaves induced an increasing proportion of slave parents to buy their own liberty first and to leave their children behind them in slavery, perhaps with the hope of buying them out later. And then the increased cost of manumission induced more and more parents to rest satisfied with the cheaper intermediate stage of conditional freedom. This pressure was probably highest when an ex-slave tried to free a mother and child, or children, altogether at the same time. Table 111.6 shows the trends: the pro portion of child slaves released alone, without an adult, rose during the last two centuries BC from 5 0 % to 8 5 % (Table 111.6, col. a); the proportion of children conditionally freed, which was initially the same 53

53

In six cases, we can deduce reladonships from the similarity of names of slaves freed together; they are probably sibs: for example, Kleo, Kleonika (GDI 1977): Boiska, Boiskos (GDI 1837; cf. 1836). Fatherhood is probably implied by the joint release of an adult male and a one-year-old child (FD 3.6.12), but it is the only such case. 165

Between slavery and freedom Table m.6. Slave families were split by manumission a

b

e

d

Slave children Slave children Number of slave freed without freed Adults freed children an adult conditionally conditionally recorded (%) A 2 O I - I 5 3 BC B 1 5 3 - I O I BC C IOI-I

BC

50 63 85

30 46 56

29 19 38

40 70 73

as for adults (cf. col. b with col. c), became significantly higher and eventually accounted for half of the slave children whose manumission is recorded at Delphi in the last century BC (Table 111.6, col. b and col. c: 5 6 % for children as against 3 8 % for adults). Thus many ex-slave parents succeeded in securing their children's full or partial freedom only by the successive manumission of family members (father, then mother, then child). It must have taken years of struggle. But our figures, especially the overall ratios of adults to children (c. 4:1) and the high proportion of home-born slaves who bought freedom only as adults, suggest that most parents failed to free their children. Parents left children behind in slavery to win freedom for themselves as adults. Slave-owners also developed family ties with slaves. Masters had children by their female slaves; and they probably established affec tionate ties with some of the slaves who had been members of the household since birth. As in several other slave societies, the category * home-born' (oikogenes) grew out of this recognition that home-bred slaves were different from the aliens bought in the market place. We can see the impact of these affections both statistically and by illustrative example. First, statistically: there are over five hundred prices for singly freed adult slaves from the second century BC, enough to run a series of paired comparisons between the prices paid by home-born and by known alien slaves (for example, from 201 to 153 BC the average prices paid by adult males for full freedom were: 54

54

The overall proportion of children among the freed slaves at Delphi (17%) is the product of some uneven sub-totals. In 201-153 BC, the proportion was only 8 % ; from 153-100 BC, it was 19%; and in the last century BC, it was 2 9 % . These figures perhaps support the idea that the proportion of home-born slaves was increasing; just as the high proportion of home-born slaves among those freed suggests that freed slaves left slave children behind them. 166

Family ties home-born: 350; known aliens: 410 drachmae). The average price paid by home-born slaves was lower in six out of eight such paired comparisons, and the (unweighted) average price-advantage to homeborn slaves was 6 % . Put another way, being home-born counted for litde when the master fixed the price of a slave's release. Some masters may have been more generous than we know about. After all, there were many factors affecting price; we do not know which slaves were ugly, handsome, attractive, hard-working, lazy, clever or dull. Less than a dozen inscriptions record that a slave had a particular skill, such as embroiderer (FD 3.3.230) or bronze worker (FD 3.1.565), skills which elevated the cost of their freedom well above the norm. This may mean that such skills were not usual; we cannot tell. Nor can we tell from the prices alone which slaves their masters loved, or which they were pleased to see go. The overwhelming majority of slaves paid sizeable sums for their freedom. We noted only two slaves who were explicidy given their freedom free of charge (FD 3.3.45 and 364), and each had to stay on with her previous mistress and serve her as long as the mistress lived. Some gift. In addition over thirty slaves, less than 3 % of the total, paid what we may call a concessionary price of 100 drachmae or less; most of these were child ren; and in any case the top limit, 100 drachmae, was equal at conventional wheat prices to 850 kg wheat equivalent, somewhat less than a year's maintenance for a poor family; this was surely not a token sum to most slaves. A few masters, as we have seen, relied on an ex-slave to look after them in old age, to arrange the funeral; some masters made their ex-slaves heirs, a measure of loneliness but also of affection. In 172 BC, for example, one girl was freed by her master and was to be' considered the daughter' of his daughter Dorema' doing all that children properly do for their parents' (GDI 1803; cf. 1806, 1945). For this privilege the girl called Hedula paid 350 drachmae; her real parents probably paid it on her behalf. The matter apparendy ended well: fifteen years later, 55

56

Other paired comparisons, for example, are (201-153 BC): males with home-born 333 drachmae; known-aliens 357 paramone

drachmae

females without home-born

363 drachmae;

known-aliens 404

drachmae

females with

300 drachmae;

known-aliens 346

drachmae

paramone'

paramone

home-born

Those whose origins were not given tended to pay a price between the home-born and the aliens, but the pattern was not as even as in the home-born/known aliens comparisons. Nonetheless, it suggests that many of those whose origins were not given, were in fact home-born. Such analyses were not practicable for the slaves freed in the last century BC, because the numbers involved were too small. .67

Between slavery and

freedom

another inscription records the manumission of a slave by Dorema 'with the approval of her daughter Hedula' (FD 3.3.8). In another case ( G D I 1715), a master Agamestor, son of Telestas, released a woman and two house-born males called Agamestor and Telestas; the names certainly suggest that they were the owner's own sons. Yet the trio paid 700 drachmae for conditional freedom (for similar cases see GDI 2144; FD 3.3.372). In the southern states of the USA, similar instances are recorded in which masters acknowledged the paternity of slaves; but that paternity only mitigated slavery, it did not eliminate slave status. CONCLUSIONS

Finally, we should return to a basic problem which we raised earlier and never solved. How did slaves, perhaps especially female slaves, acquire the very considerable sums necessary for buying their free dom? The straightforward answer is that we do not know, and in the absence of knowledge, we shall be reduced to speculation. Several points are worth making. First, the average prices paid by slaves for their freedom at Delphi were high - roughly equal (at 400 drachmae) to a family's sustenance for three years. Many paid substantially more. This suggests that those slaves who were freed lived at well above the level of minimum subsistence. During their time as slaves, they accumulated sizeable capital sums. They were not an underclass; they must have been richer than many free peasants. We do not know what they did. It seems unlikely that they were typically tenant farmers, because the region around Delphi is not agriculturally rich. Very few of the slaves freed (less than a dozen) are explicidy stated to have been craftsmen. We have excluded temple prostitution as a typical characteristic of the slaves freed, because men paid more for their freedom than women and boys or girls. It seems likely that many of the slaves freed were in some way connected with the prosperity derived from the Delphic shrine. And we should stress once again that these slaves, freed by special ritual, are likely to have been an unrepresentative sample of all slaves freed, and a minority of all slaves most of whom, we suspect, were never freed. Secondly, we may have been wrong to assume that all slaves paid for their own freedom. We cannot help wondering whether money for the purchase of freedom was sometimes put up by someone else. Perhaps the best way to broach this speculation is by posing another problem. By and large most masters in Delphi released a single slave; admittedly this was partly a function of the style of record: one 168

Conclusions inscription per act of manumission. We know that some masters freed more than one slave in the same year (GDI 2169, 2187) or freed several slaves in several years (GDI 1783, 1888; FD 3.3.37); but such cases are rare. And when masters did release more than one slave in a single act of manumission, then by and large the number of slaves released in each multiple manumission was small (the average was 2.54 slaves in 159 acts). Typically most masters released only one slave at a time. We deduce that most slave-holdings were small. Small slave-holdings face a special problem of reproduction. Each slave household is unlikely to contain a marriageable male and a nubile female. Among free persons in free societies, the circulation of fe males, if we can look at it in this crude way, so that each adult female goes to one adult male, takes up a lot of social time, emodon, ritual and expense. Perhaps then, some of the release money for female slaves may have been paid by males, whether free or slave, who wished to marry them. Freedom, full or conditional, may have been the only path by which slaves mates could be provided. Why did masters not sell their slaves outright to the owners of male slaves? Perhaps they did, and if they did, we should know nothing of it from manumission documents. But we can easily envisage a situation in which the owners of a young single female slave, acknowledging her wish to marry, sold her partial freedom, which both allowed her to marry an outsider and yet retained a lien on her services. Eventually in a number of cases, owners even demanded a share in their former slaves' offspring. Of course, this reconstruction is only speculation. But even so, understanding intermarriage between small slave households and their reproduction remains a real problem. And there are eleven cases in the Delphi manumission in which the ex-slave was condition ally released and required to serve someone other than her former owner. Probably not all those who paid for a slave's liberation had marriage in mind. But it is worth stressing that in this tiny minority of cases the purchaser of liberty was not the slave herself but some one else. Thirdly, slavery in central Greece, like slavery in Roman Italy, seems to have been only a temporary servitude, at least for some slaves. Greek slavery, even the slave-like service of conditional release, was usually indeterminate; its period was decided either by the master's 'genero56

86

Over the whole period, covered by the manumission at Delphi (201 B C - A D 100), both the proportion of all manumissions which were multiple, and the proportions of slaves freed in multiple manumissions doubled (see Table 111.1, cols mm 14 % to 35 %, and 2 9 % to66%). It seems reasonable todeduce from this that thesizeof slave-holdings among those who freed slaves at Delphi was increasing. We reached a similar conclusion in our study of Thessalian inscriptions (see note 1 above). 169

Between slavery and

freedom

sity' in allowing the slave to buy his freedom at a price, or by the ex-master's death. But in spite of this uncertainty, numerous slaves became free. This system worked for masters because it made slaves work harder and because the money which slaves saved and gave to their masters paid for new slaves. Manumission and the slave market grew hand in hand. Finally, our data have allowed us to trace changes both in the price which slaves paid for freedom and in the degree of exploitation implicit in the institution of conditional release (paramone). While the price of full freedom rose, the price of condidonal release remained nearly constant; but for a significant minority of conditionally freed slaves the terms of their release deteriorated; they received less for what they paid; they either had to serve two owners for their life-times instead of one, or to pay a second fee to win full freedom, or to surrender one or two of their children as replacements for themselves. Thus their own escape was tempered by a child's enslavement. We have discussed these developments in detail; the point we wish to make here is that the institutions of slavery, manumission and conditional release are too often treated as monolithic, unchanging. It will come as no surprise to historians, that they changed.

APPENDIX I I U Conditions

of release

in manumissions

Conditions of release A No conditions B Paramonë only c Paramone only, one child D Paramone only, two children £ One child only F Two children only G Conditions not known Totals

from

Male slaves

Female slaves

5 *3

7

"S

Calymna

(see note

Sex not known 2

28 16

75

1

1

I

1

3

3

33

37

5

2

4

170

Total 12

-2 -1

8

8

42)

6

4 2

7

Conclusions Table 111.4. -

bis.

Recast

to include

prices

paid

Adult males

by slaves

multiply

freed*

Adult females

Full freedom

Conditional release

Full freedom

Conditional release

A 2 O I - 1 5 3 BC B 153-IOO BC

409 5»8

d 100-53 BC C, 5 3 - I BC

387 43 478

794

375 413 (3°°) 409

330 369 367 356

Approximate dates

A B Ci

112

c,

H

Numbers

467

34

l9

72 9

1

4 11

116 23 »3

65 25 6 17

* By 'multiply freed* we mean those slaves who were freed together by one owner.

171

THE POLITICAL POWER OF EUNUCHS

1

T H E POWER AND T H E P R I V I L E G E S OF T H E COURT EUNUCHS

Why Eunuchs? Primarily because they were important. No one who has waded through the church histories of the fourth and fifth cen turies or the numerous later Byzandne chronicles, or those lives of the saints which touch upon court life, can have failed to be struck by the frequent imputation that, in the Eastern Empire especially, the real power lay in the hands not of the emperor nor of his aristocrats, but of his chief eunuch; or alternatively that the corps of eunuchs as a group wielded considerable if not predominant power at court. Yet the eunuchs were barbarians by birth and slaves into the bargain. The purpose of this chapter is to explain why slave eunuchs and particularly ex-slave eunuchs held so much power in the imperial and aristocratic society of Eastern Rome, to put this power in the context of the socio-political developments of the later empire, and to analyse some of the social functions of this power. 2

3

4

1

1

3

This chapter owes a huge amount to the kindness and encouragement of my then supervisor Professor A. H. M. Jones, and to his great work The Later Roman Empire (Oxford, 1964). An earlier version of this chapter was published in the Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 189 (1963) 6 2 - 8 0 . 1 am grateful to the society for permission to publish this version. For the power of chief eunuchs under various emperors see, for example, Libanius, Speeches 18.152; Malalas 340; Olympiodorus, frag. 13; Priscus, frag. 7; Cedrenus 1.587 and 626 (Byzandne annalists are cited from the texts published in the Corpus Scriptorum

Historiae

Byzantinae

-

CSHB).

Again for eunuchs' collective power under different emperors, see Sozomen, History 3.1; Zosimus 4.22-3 and 28; Suidas, sv thladias; John of Antioch, frag. 191,194. The fragments of John of Antioch, Olympiodorus and Priscus may be found in C. Mtiller, ed. Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum vol. 4 (Paris, 1885). Castration was forbidden on Roman soil (C/4.42.1-2) and the penalties were severe; Justinian made the penalty fit the crime (NJ 142). Most eunuchs apparendy came from outside the empire (Cedrenus 1.601; Theophanes 1.154), especially from the Abasgi (Procopius, Gothic Wars 8.3.15-17 and 19), at least until the sixth century. But in times of famine some parents are said to have castrated their children and sold them (Cedrenus 1.590); moreover general laws like this could not be rigorously enforced, so that some eunuchs may have been from inside the empire. of the Church

4

172

Power and privileges of court

eunuchs

Here, right at the beginning, the objection might be raised that we are faced with nothing but a problem of historiography. Eunuchs might have been to Byzandne historians nothing more than women and gods were to Herodotus, convenient personal pegs to hang his torical causes on. In itself this would not be without its interest. Eunuchs served as scapegoats. They were like Court Jews in German states in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They were sub jected to similar obloquy and similar characteristics were attributed to them by contemporaries. This comparison suggests, what we should have suspected, that these characteristics (ambidon, emotional insta bility, arrogance and avarice) were the product of a position within the structure of power, common to both court eunuchs and Court Jews, rather than a direct consequence of castration. Being a scapegoat was one of the eunuch's functions at court. But above and beyond this, I hope to show that ex-slave eunuchs did in fact exercise real power; that people who wanted important tasks immediately executed with the support of imperial authority regularly approached the court eunuchs rather than any other imperial officer or indeed the emperor himself. People believed that eunuchs exercised power and acted upon that assumption. But were court eunuchs actually responsible for the acts attributed to them by historians in antiquity, or were these acts instituted by the emperor himself with the ex-slave eunuch as a front? What were the motives of each in effecting a particular policy? Such questions can never, with our sources as they are, be finally answered. It was difficult enough at the time. For example, the emperor Julian did not really know whether it was the Grand Chamberlain Eusebius alone who had prevented him from having audiences with the then emperor Constantius I I , or whether Constantius himself also did not want to see him. Eunuchs were unpopular. Even an intelligent and wellinformed contemporary like the historian Ammianus Marcellinus took a somewhat prejudiced view. He believed that his hero and com mander Ursicinus had been insufficiendy recognised and rewarded. He put the blame on the palace intrigues of malicious eunuchs, 5

6

(Philadelphia, 1950) 4 - 4 9 , 245**., and H. Schnee, Die (Berlin, 1955-5) vol. 3, ijztt. In many interesting ways the Court Jews paralleled court eunuchs. They were dependent on the favour of the prince, but their rise to power was independent of the characteristics of any particular prince and often took place in the context of the struggle between the ruler and the Estates. The rulers needed servants who were free from attachments to religious and corporate associations. And Court Jews like eunuchs had relatively free private access to rulers. * Julian, To the Athenians 274AB. 8

See S. Stern, Hofinom

The

Court

Jew

und die moderne

Stoat

173

The political power of eunuchs and on one eunuch Grand Chamberlain in particular. But a modern scholar has argued convincingly that there may have been a serious and well-considered purpose behind this policy; the Grand Cham berlain may simply have been responsible for executing this policy and not acting out of self-interest. The problem is more difficult with the annalistic compilers of the later Byzantine period. Many of their stories have an apocryphal ring about them. Anything strange or wrong was attributed to the court eunuchs; above all, anything unpopular. This may be valuable in showing the common attitude to eunuchs or for the analysis of their usefulness in soaking up criticisms which might otherwise have fallen upon the emperor. But it makes an accurate estimate of their powers difficult. Once again the function of court eunuchs seems similar to that of Court Jews, who received some of the unpopularity caused by political acts which had been initiated by the ruler; the Court Jews were rewarded with great wealth, but at the cost of increased social isolation; and like ex-slave eunuchs, Court Jews ran the risk of sudden denunciation. Many of the acts which the Grand Chamberlain exe cuted on the emperor's behalf and in response to his instructions must have been debited to the Grand Chamberlain's account. We cannot say, of course, which particular actions come under this category; we cannot say with certainty that any did; but it is unlikely that most writers had any accurate inside information. In this quandary we shall have to turn not only to historical anecdotes, but to the development of certain institutions which reflect the real and increasing power of eunuchs. 7

8

Whatever may have been the prestige of eunuchs in society at large, the rank which they held at court was almost the highest in the land; and if anything the court eunuchs improved their rank during the fourth and fifth centuries, as the depreciation and inflation of tides produced yet more formal differentiation within the central elite. In the first part of the fourth century, the Grand Chamberlain (proepositus sacri cuhiculi) seems to have been of senatorial rank ( C I L 6.31946). In the second half of the fourth century, the tide of clarissimus attached to senators had so depreciated as to make necessary the institutionalisation of two new and superior tides for court nobles, those of Respectable (spectabilis) and Illustrious (iUustris). The highest title, that of Illustrious, was restricted at first to a very small group of prefects 7 8

Ammianus 18.4.3 a n < l E - A • Thompson, The (Cambridge, 1947) 42-5. See note 5 above. *74

Historical

Works of A mmianus

Marcellinus

Power and privileges of court

eunuchs

and generals, and members of the * Privy Council* (consistorian counts). By AD 384 the Grand Chamberlain was also reckoned 'among those of the first rank'. In the established order of precedence of the Eastern Empire, the Grand Chamberlain, eunuch and ex-slave, held the fourth rank in the realm, coming after the Praetorian Prefects, the Prefect of the City and the Masters of the Soldiers. A similar ranking was given in a Western law of AD 412 (C.Th. 11.18.1). This is interesting because it shows that the rank achieved by Grand Cham berlains in general was independent of the great individual power of the Eastern Grand Chamberlain, Eutropius. In AD 422 the grade illustris was already depreciated and was split into two. The Grand Chamberlain was classed with the upper group which consisted of the prefects and the masters of the soldiers (C.Th. 6.8.1). And at the end of the fifth century the Grand Chamberlain was still an official of the highest rank (CJ 3.24.3 (AD 485/6) and 12.5.5 (Anastasius). The Grand Chamberlain was not the only court eunuch to hold high rank, although he was in a special position because his tenure continued at the emperor's pleasure and often lasted longer than the three years thought to be normal for praetorian prefects. Beneath the Grand Chamberlain, two other eunuch ex-slaves, the Superin tendent of the Sacred Bedchamber (primicerius socri cubiculi) and the Chief Steward of the Sacred Palace (costrensis socri polatii) were prob ably recruited from the corps of eunuchs and held their offices for a statutory two years. The very names of their titles and their close association with the emperor's private person recall the high status of similar functions in the courts of European monarchs (for example, the English Lord High Chaniberlain and the pages, grooms and Ladies of the Bedchamber); but in European courts these duties were 9

10

11

12

•

10

11 18

C.Th. 7.8.3 ( A D 384); but cf. C.Th. 11.16.15 ( 3&*) which Ensslin (ic£Suppl. 8,558) interprets wrongly; see rather J. E. Dunlap, The Office of the Grand Chamberlain in the Later Roman and Byzantine Empires (University of Michigan, Humanistic Series, 14; New York, 1924) 184. Notitia Dignitatum, ed. O. Seeck, Or. 1, index; cf. Occ. 1, index. Cf. for example, Socrates, History of the Church 2.2; Sozomen, History of the Church 3.1; Ammianus 21.15.4 for the long tenure of Eusebius; and Theophanes, 1.125 and 127 for Andochus. It could be inferred from CJ 12.5.2 ( A D 428) that promotions to three of the four top jobs held by eunuchs: primicerius, costrensis and comes domorum went by seniority. This is partially confirmed by John of Ephesus (Lives of the Eastern Saints, trans, from the Syriac by E. W. Brooks, P.O. 19.202) who wrote that Theodore retired before his time, as costrensis; and that castrenses normally retired after two years (C. Th. 6.32.1. ( A D 416)). But there are difficulties about ranks; E. A. Costa (The Castrensis Sacri Palatii', Byzantion 42 (1972) 358-87) argues convincingly that in the early fourth century, the castrensis was superior to the Grand Chamberlain and may not have been a eunuch; by the end of the fourth century, the Grand Chamberlain was certainly superior. See also for other difficulties, Hopkins (1963) 65 n.6. A D

175

The political power of eunuchs performed by nobles or gendefolk of high status, not by castrated ex-slaves. The closest parallel to these late Roman practices can be found in the Chinese and Ottoman courts; the latter probably inheri ted or copied Byzantine habits. According to the Roman book of precedence (the Notitia Dignitum), the Superintendent of the Sacred Bedchamber and the Chief Steward of the Sacred Palace both ranked as Respectables (spectabiles) and thus were equal in rank, in spite of their origins, to high nobles. I n the late fourth and during the fifth century, four further posts of high rank were created and filled exclusively by eunuchs. The number of high positions open to them was still further increased when it became customary for the empress to have a separate Bedchamber with its own complement of high officers. Nothing reflects more clearly the tremendous and sustained influence which court eunuchs were able to bring to bear upon a whole succession of emperors than their occupation of a regularly increasing number of offices, and the high rank which went with them. In the early days of the Roman monarchy, in the first century AD, some ex-slaves of the emperor exercised considerable power as heads of administrative bureaux; and they were given the insignia of high rank (inter praetores). But the chief eunuchs in the later Empire con tinuously achieved rank superior to the vast majority of nobles, and quite out of proportion to the formal duties of palace organisation. 13

14

15

13

14

19

Notitia

Dignitatum

Or.

17; Occ.

14-15; C.Th.

6.32.1 ( A D 4 1 6 ) .

In sum, the chief positions held by eunuchs in the palace and the earliest known date of their tenure were: (i) Grand Chamberlain (praepositus sacri cubiculi) A D 326; Codinus, On the Origins of Constantinople 18. (ii) Superintendent of the Sacred Bedchamber (primicerius sacri cubiculi) perhaps by A D 312, more certainly by A D 326; ib. 18 and 21. (iii) Chief Steward of the Sacred Palace (castrensis sacri palatit) c. A D 343; Athanasius, History of the Arians 15; Apologia against the Arians 36. (iv) Count of the Imperial Estates in Cappadocia (comes domorum per Cappadociam) between A D 379 and A D 414; CTh. 6.30.2 ( A D 379); 11.28.9 subscript (AD 414); Not. Dign. Or. 10; Dunlap (1924) 187. (v) Count of the Imperial Wardrobe (comes sacrae vestis) A D 412; C.Th. 11.18.1. (vi) Captain of the Bodyguard (spatharius) A D 447; Theodoret, Letters no. (vii) Keeper of the Purse (saceUarius) A D 474-91; John of Antioch, frag. 214.4. NB: offices may well have existed before these dates and may also have been occupied by non-eunuchs. Already by the reign of Constantine, the empress was attended by eunuchs (Philostorgius, History of the Church 2.4, and Codinus, On the Origins of Constantinople 18 and 21) mentions two Grand Chamberlains in Constanune*s court, though Ensslin doubts that any firm condusion about their rank may be drawn from so late a source (RE Suppl. 8,557). Certainly in A D 400, Amantius was Chief Steward to the empress Eudoxia (Marcus Diaconus, Life of Porphyry 3 6 - 7 , 4 0 ) , and by the reign of Theodosius II, and again at the coronation of Leo I and in the reign of Anastasius, there is evidence of separate Bedchambers (Theophanes 1.151-2; Constantine Porphyrogenitus, On Ceremonies 1.91 (416 CSHB); CJ 3.24.3 ( A D 485/6) and 12.5.5). In A D 536. the empress had her own Keeper of the Purse (John of Ephesus, P.O. 18.630, n.i). In fact the two Caesars, Gallus and Julian, both had their own Grand Chamberlains in the middle of the fourth century (Ammianus 15.2.10; 16.7.2). .76

Power and privileges of court

eunuchs

In the highly centralised system of the later Empire, with its detailed and established order of precedence, the exercise of informal power without formal recognition would have been very difficult. Besides, however important the rights of aristocratic birth and of wealth, and no one can deny that they were important, what gave most power at court in the later Empire was the degree of association with the emperor. And the exercise of office near to the sacred person of the emperor entided even eunuchs to honour and acknowledgement. This proximity to the emperor and the assurance of his favour was the sole firm basis of court eunuchs' power. Their duty to protect the emperor from intruders was of great importance in this respect. It served to emphasise the eunuchs' own freedom of access and their opportunities for informal persuasion. And it gave them the formalised right of controlling audiences (Constantine Porphyrogenitus, On Ceremonies 1.87). It was Gallicanus, the Grand Chamberlain of the usurper Maximus, who apparendy decided that St Ambrose should be received in formal council and so wrecked his diplomatic mission (Ambrose, Letters 2 4 ) . On a humbler level it was through the services of Amantius, the Chief Steward of the empress Eudoxia, that Porphyry bishop of Gaza gained an imperial order against pagans still practising in his home town (Mark the Deacon, Life of Porphyry 366*.). A further product of the eunuchs' closeness to the emperor was that those who wanted favours, either positions or policies, found it advisable to grease the palm of the court eunuchs and to get them to espouse their cause. Several stories ilustrate this point. When one governor of a province was accused of corruption, he only just man aged to escape by putting his whole future at the disposal of the court eunuchs (Zosimus 4 . 4 0 . 8 ) . When the Arian sect wanted support from the new emperor Constantius, they found it easiest to get at him by winning over the Grand Chamberlain Eusebius first. The lesser eunuchs and the empress followed suit, and the emperor was sur rounded (Socrates, History of the Church 2.2). T o be sure we must be careful in the evaluation of these stories. Many of them may have been based upon hearsay. However that may be, there is enough reliable evidence that men of importance were willing to stake very consid16

17

18

" On occasions the emperor seems to have been surrounded by eunuchs alone (Cedrenus 1.622); certainly even the Grand Chamberlain was within calling distance while the emperor was asleep (Theophanes 1.253). 17 The Grand Chamberlain could enter the presence freely (Constantine Porphyrogenitus, On Ceremonies 1.97 (442 CSHB); the other chamberlains could gossip with the emperor while performing intimate tasks (Ammianus 14.11.3; 18.4.2; Suidas, sv. thtodios; Zosimus 5.1.4). 18 Libanius, Speeches 18.149; Ammianus 18.4.3. c f * al* 0 Sozomen, History of the Church 4.12.16; Mark the Deacon, Life of Porphyry 26-7. 177

The political power of eunuchs erable sums on the assumption that the persuasive powers of eunuchs were paramount. When Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, wanted to win the emperor over to his cause, he distributed considerable bribes both to the wife of the Praetorian Prefect and to the Master of Offices: each got ioo Roman pounds of gold and sumptuous furnishings. A similar amount went to the chief legal officer, the quaestor of the palace. But one of the two chief eunuchs received twice as much gold, and a further seven chamberlains shared between them similar furnishings and 380 Roman pounds of gold in cash (Acts of the Ecumenical Councib, ed. E . Schwartz (Berlin, 1922-) vol. 1.4, 224 and 293). In addidon to favours for others, eunuchs were not slow to gain privileges for themselves. They exacted fees for audiences; and by the fifth century they exacted a sizeable commission from everyone appointed to public office. It was a token of their influence in the process of selection. The eunuch Chrysaphius demanded a payment even from a newly appointed patriarch of Constantinople; nor was he put off by the archbishop's plea that in order to pay up, church plate would have to be sold. (Evagrius, History of the Church 2.2; Theophanes 1.150-1). Justinian, even when he abolished payment for office, allowed the fees of eunuchs to survive. And there is further evidence for the privileged position of eunuchs to be found in a law of AD 430; if the emperor made a grant of confiscated land, eunuch chamberlains alone were allowed to keep the whole grant; everyone else had to surrender half to the treasury. Some of them, Ammianus claimed (18.4.3), «re not above plotting against those whose possessions they coveted. The consistent exploitation of these opportunities led eunuchs to consolidate usage into privilege; such privileges brought wealth, and wealth can be considered as both an index of their power and a reinforcement of it. The fortunes accumulated by eunuchs, even by ones not noted for their avarice, were enormous (John of Ephesus, Lives, P.O. 19.202; Zosimus 4.5.3-4). The wealth of the eunuch Narses was legendary; the bequests of the eunuch chamberlains Calapodius and Antiochus to the Church survived as entities for near on two centuries, and were so large that they required the services of twelve full-time accountants (chartularii) to manage them (CJ 1.2.24.11; AD 530). The fortune of Theodore, a pious eunuch who retired before his time, as Steward of the Sacred Palace, is illustrative. His fortune amounted to 1,500-2,000 Roman pounds of gold, plus silver, slaves and rich clothing (John of Ephesus, Lives, P.O. 19.200-5). One hesitates to 19

20

w

21

1 9

Life

*°

C.Th.

of Melania 10.10.34;

(Analecta

Liber

Pontificalis

of the Franks

8 (1889) 29), 1.11.

eunuchs had various other privileges: CJ

( A D 435). 11

Bollandiana

63

(ed. L. Duchesne (Paris,

5.13 (19).

178

12.5.2 ( A D 428); C.Th.

7.8.16

Gregory of Tours,

History

1886) 1.306);

Power and privileges of court

eunuchs

think what an impious eunuch could have acquired. For this fortune alone was equal to that of a very wealthy eastern senator. It can do nothing but reflect the socio-polidcal power of eunuchs that they managed to expropriate so large a slice of the economic surplus and accumulated wealth. Proximity to the emperor had yet another consequence. It led to the selection of eunuchs for special tasks. Invested with imperial authority and high rank, eunuchs were sent on special missions. The Grand Chamberlain, Eusebius, was sent to quell an incipient revolt in the Gallic army by bribing the rebel leaders (Ammianus 14.10.5). And later in his career he was given the delicate duty of persuading the pope, Liberius, to condone Arianism (Athanasius, History of the Avians 3 5 - 8 ) . The future Grand Chamberlain, Eutropius, was sent by Theodosius the Great to consult a holy hermit in Egypt about the outcome of his batde against the usurper Eugenius (Sozomen, History of the Church 7.22). Another eunuch chamberlain, Chrysaphius, was instru mental in organising a plot to assassinate the king of the Huns Attila, and the eunuchs' power is reflected in the fact that when Atdla uncovered the conspiracy and demanded the surrender of Chrysa phius on the threat of invasion, there was sufficient support at court for Chrysaphius for the emperor to run the risk of calling Atdla's bluff (Priscus, frag. 7-8, 12-13). Certainly Eusebius, Eutropius and Chrysaphius were exceptional. In their dme they wielded nearly absolute power. But there are many other humbler examples. And it was this consistent exploitation of the emperor's need for servants he could trust, and the loose demarcation of jurisdiction typical of a patrimonial bureaucracy, which together paved the way for the extensive informal powers of eunuchs, many of which crystallised into exclusive privileges. This is not to say that eunuchs considered as a body, let along as individuals, were the major political force in the state. Their power rested upon their personal contact with the emperor, and was usually confined to palace politics. In the provinces the hereditary and traditionally 21

23

24

25

The same Theodore was given a pension of 1,000 solidi p.a. when he had dispersed his capital in charity (John of Ephesus, Lives P.O. 19.205). This was more than the entire annual salary of a governor of a small province (NJ 24-7). 83 There are many examples; e.g. Vitae vivorum apud monophysitas celeberrimorum, ed. E. W. Brooks in CSCO, scr. syr., ser. 3, vol. 25, 9; Cedrenus 1.581; Jordanes, Getica 42.224; Ammianus 20.8.4. These tell of rather less famous eunuchs than those mentioned in the text. u Cf. Marcellinus Comes, Chronicon (MGH. AA XI) 83, a.449; 101, a.519. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, On Ceremonies 1.92 (421-2), and 1.93 (428 CSHB); two attempts at king-making. ** E.g. Ammianus (21.16.8) speaks of Constantius' fear of conspiracy and his tireless investigation of the slightest suspicion. M

'79

The political power of eunuchs legitimate powers of the aristocracy, church, and army were para mount; and at court too their representatives competed for the em peror's favour. Yet the power of eunuchs was both great and significant enough to pose a problem. It was so firmly entrenched that the two upstart emperors (Julian and Maximus) who attempted to do away with eunuchs, both failed to establish an effective alternative. Julian executed the Grand Chamberlain Eusebius and his followers for their part in the prosecution of the Caesar Gallus, and dismissed eunuchs and other palace attendants from service. His pretext for the dismissal of the eunuchs was that, since he was celibate, he had no need of eunuchs. More likely the real motive was to show that he was not subject to the same influences as his predecessor Constantius (Socrates, History of the Church 3.1). Julian's policy was surprisingly unpopular; if we can believe a Christian historian, people thought that he was stripping the monarchy of its necessary pomp (Socrates, History of the Church 3.1). But the reversal of Julian's policy was easy, because eunuchs fulfilled a vital function. They acted as a lubricant preventing too much friction between the emperor and the other forces of the state which threatened his superiority. Constantius, with the eunuch Eusebius as his chief executive, managed both to keep the army from getting above itself, as Ammianus says (21.16.1-2), and to avoid giving too many honours to the nobility. The several accounts of plots against over-powerful generals, often attributed to emperors but engi neered by eunuchs, are symptomatic of the same conflict and the eunuchs' role in it. 26

A

sociological

dimension

The problem of the ancient power of eunuchs was never been ade quately tackled, either because historians until recendy thought that it offended propriety or because the position of eunuchs could be superficially explained in psychological terms. Eunuchs exercised their power, the traditional view maintained, under 'weak' emperors, by means of 'subde flattery', oily insinuation and unsavoury ambition reinforced by their sexual frustration. Over the long road from Ammianus Marcellinus in the fourth century through Gibbon in the eighteenth to Hug, Dunlap and Herter in the twentieth century this has been thought sufficient. 27

M t7

Theophanes 1.197; Marcellinus, op. cit. 90, a.471; John of Antioch, frag. 201.2; 201.4; Zosimus 4.23.5. Ammianus 18.5.4; Gibbon, Decline and Fall, ed. Bury, vol. 2, 245; Hug, RE Suppl. 3, col. 454; Dunlap (1924: 180); Herter, R.A.C. sv Effeminatus. But for more sensible views cf. S. Runciman, Byzantine Civilisation (London, 1933) 203-4, and best of all K. A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism (Yale, 1957) 354-8. 180

Power and privileges of court

eunuchs

What can be said against this explanadon is not so much that it is untrue, but that it is inadequate. The most significant aspect of the power held by eunuchs is its consistency, its repetidveness from the middle of the fourth century onwards. No sooner had one eunuch been burnt because of his arrogance, or executed after a batde because his power threatened all other forces in the state, or compulsorily retired to a monastery as the result of political intrigue, than another took his place at the apex of formal power. Within a few years either he, his successor, or the eunuchs as a body had accumulated con siderable informal influence as well. We should be wary of evalu ations of emperors as 'weak', which are based exclusively or mainly on whether eunuchs held power in their reign. For eunuchs flourished under powerful soldier emperors like Valentinian I, even under Theodosius the Great, just as under an idle fop like Theodosius I I * We are confronted here with something more than the weakness and virtues of individual emperors. T o be sure, it is not only fruitful but indispensable to view history in this dimension, as a mosaic of the individual actions of separate individuals; without a doubt we can profitably discuss the personalities and achievements of individual actors. But there is another dimension. Emperors as individuals dele gated power to different barbarian, ex-slave eunuchs, but the whole series of eunuchs cannot be explained satisfactorily exclusively in terms of their individual actions. It was not merely coincidental that all emperors appointed eunuchs to positions of power, nor was the power of eunuchs determined exclusively by the psychological make-up of each emperor. The continuing power position of eunuchs must be considered rather as a socio-political institution in itself, a patterned regularity, a phenomenon to be explained not only by its individual manifestations but with reference to other broad social factors. It is this generality which we shall now discuss. 28

2

30

CHANGES IN T H E P O W E R S T R U C T U R E

Political eunuchism as an institution arose in response to and gained a new weight in society because of changes in the power structure of society as a whole. Political development in the Roman Empire can M

Cf. the fates of Rhodanus: Malalas 339-40; Eutropius: Philostorgius, History of the Church 11.6; Antiochus: Cedrenus 1.600. A similar recurrence in the wealth and power of imperial ex-slaves in spite of individuals' demise is noted by Tacitus, Histories

1.37 and

2.95.

* Malalas 340; Zosimus 4.28; Cedrenus 1.587. * Cf. N. Elias, Uber den Prozess der Zivilisotion (Basel, 1939), vol. 2, 2 - in my view a neglected sociological masterpiece; but now see his Die hdfische GeseUschoft (Berlin, 1969) especially the chapters on sociology and history, and on court etiquette as a restriction on the king's freedom of action. 181

The political power of eunuchs be seen as the gradual concentration of power in the hands of the emperor, and of his direct nominees holding office in the patrimonial bureaucracy. In the early days of the principate, wide areas of self-government were left to the cities through the unpaid services of avocational (non-professional) notables. Taxadon was light. The senate ruled the internal provinces of the empire by means of its appointees. The emperor was only first among equals, and often had friendly and personal relations with his aristocratic peers. Trajan's surviving corres pondence with his provincial governor Pliny and Hadrian's dinner parties for senators can not be paralleled in the later Empire, the so-called dominate, because by then the emperor was removed from fellows mortals not only by elaborate court ceremonial, but also by the general idea that he was sacred. A weak point of the monarchy in the first three centuries after Christ lay in its failure to legitimate among aristocrats the supremacy of any particular man or family. The first emperor Augustus had originally made monarchy tolerable to repub lican aristocrats by proclaiming that emperor and aristocrats were social equals; this inevitably led to the idea that any one noble might replace or succeed the ruling emperor. T o confirm his position, therefore, the emperor had to restrict the power of aristocrats and to secure the loyalty of the standing army, paid from taxes raised by his bureaucracy. The bureaucracy was at first the extension of the administration of the emperor's private household and estates: a classic case of what Max Weber called patrimonial bureaucracy. It was staffed by slaves and headed by ex-slaves. The hierarchic organisation of the bureaucracy, and the long working career which alone enabled expertise in it, implied a submissiveness which in the beginning excluded aristocrats. However, because of the increasing prestige associated with wielding the delegated power of the ruler, the bureaucracy came by the end of the first century AD to be headed by equestrians or knights, drawn from the second estate of the empire, though the emperor's slaves and ex-slaves were still powerful. 31

In sum, we can enumerate the constituent elements in the power constellation of the High Empire as follows: (1) the emperor; (2) his patrimonial bureaucracy headed by personal appointees with the social status of knights but largely manned by imperial slaves and ex-slaves; 31

For an apology by a litterateur for working in the imperial bureaucracy see Lucian, 10. On patrimonial bureaucracy, see M. Weber, Economy and Society (New York, 1968) vol. 3. Apology

182

Changes in the power

structure

(3) the army, recruited from the peasantry and officered by regulars with the social status of knights and access on retirement to the bureaucracy; (4) the peasants who paid taxes and rents and so supported the whole empire on their backs; (5) the small urban population, both slave and free, which manu factured goods and provided services for landlords, army and peasants; (6) the cities administered locally by notables with access in recognition of services to the status of knights or senators; (7) the senators themselves, the political elite of the hereditary landowners. First a few words about senators. Some of them renewed their social position in each generation by holding offices for a short term only (rarely more than two years) in an area where they had no possessions, or as supreme military generals with an under-staff of professionals. Most members of the senatorial stratum inherited status by virtue of their inherited wealth; only a minority of them entered active politics. But senators, individually and collectively, were the greatest threat to the emperor's position; and senatorial status was the prime objective of many men's ambitions; promotion to the senate was in the emperor's and his servants' estimation the highest reward. The organisation of the political system which gave senators the positions of greatest honour, but restricted their tenure of office and exposed them to persecution, confiscation of goods and execution, is sufficient evidence of the tension in the power structure (see further in Volume Two, Chapter 11 of this work). The emperor maintained his position only by maintaining a balance of power between constituent elements. The appointment of the praetorian prefect as chief executive of the government from the equestrian estate, and his combination of military and fiscal authority were significant indications of which way the balance was turning: away from the senatorial aristocracy towards the consolidation of the emperor's supremacy over his social rivals. In the crises of the third century brought about by the barbarian invasions, it was the technical efficiency of the bureaucratically organised army and administration which saved the empire. T o minimise risks of amateurish defeat in batde, the emperor increasingly excluded senators from responsible gubernatorial or military positions and arranged for the collection of taxes from cities by way of professional tax collectors under the general supervision of the traditional local gentry. In spite of num183

The political power of eunuchs erous barbarian attacks and civil wars, the empire was saved both from barbarians and from regional fragmentation. The winner of the last scrimmage of the third century, a soldier of obscure origins from the north Balkans (Eutropius, Breviarium 9.19), Diocletian, was faced with a different balance of power from that of the Principate. The senatorial aristocracy had high social esteem, but had only localised power. Its individual members were by lack of training excluded from the efficient exercise of military or bureau cratic command. The bureaucracy had grown beyond the palace, and was headed by equestrians and divided into separate ministries with an organised jurisdiction and an established order of promotion. The army officered exclusively by equestrians offered the greatest chance of social mobility, and the biggest threat to established authority. Diocletian and his successor Constantine together by their reforms established a system by which the equestrian order was assimilated to the old senatorial order; military power was divided between palace and local troops, and military power was separated from fiscal power, while the size of individual commands was greatly decreased. Similar developments took place in the bureaucracy. Staff was increased to gain greater control over the populace and greater revenues, but the area of individual authority was diminished. The legitimation of the emperor was heightened by symbols and rituals which asserted his close association with god. The elements in the new power situation of the later empire thus were (1) the emperor deified or in Christian times, the vice-gerent of God on earth; (2) a large and by former standards very efficient professional bureau cracy, separate from the army and divided into ministeries; the lower ranks were hereditary occupations; the upper ranks, upon retirement only, gave access to the new nobility (which was a significant separation of administrative power and social prestige); (3) the army, recruited from the peasantry and from barbarians living on the borders of the empire, divided into border troops, heavy reserve and imperial guard, organised in small units and officered by professionals, who on retirement received ennoblement; (4) the peasantry as before were so diffused that they lacked any organisation by which they could express effective objections to the 32

n

Cf. e.g. 'The emperor is one, image of the one all-ruling God', Eusebius, In Praise of Constantine 7 (GCS 7.215), and K. M. Setton, Christian Attitudes towards the Emperor. in the Fourth Century (New York, 1941), for the interrelation of the Christian idea of the emperor and of God. 184

Changes in the power

structure

increased taxation which supported the larger army and bureau cracy or to the deterioration of their status vis-a-vis land-owners; (5) the urban population in the later Empire was probably smaller than in the High Empire and probably contained significandy fewer slaves; some manufacturing for the army was carried on by here ditary workers in state factories; (6) the cities, much fallen in prestige, with vestigial autonomy and a hereditary local gentry who were dragooned into being collectively responsible for the payment of taxes which were high; (7) a new nobility made up of: (a) great landlords and their immediate descendants, who might be invited by the emperor to fill office for a very short period, (b) upwardly mobile lesser landlords, origina ting in the local gentry, who served semi-professionally as provin cial governors or bureaucratic executives, (c) high army officers both serving and retired, often of barbarian origin, ( d ) retired professional bureaucrats. The tensions at work in this constellation may be seen from the developments which actually took place over the next two centuries, Whereas previously the emperor had been able to control the aristocracy by the persecution of individuals, and by means of the professional equestrians in the army and in the bureaucracy, the complete victory of the equestrians and the eclipse of the cities had left only one unified upper order. To be sure entry into this order was controlled by the emperor and given only upon office, that is, upon the performance of certain services. But there was a constant and powerful tendency in both East and West for the aristocracy to expect to hold office as a matter of birthright and as a profitable sinecure. The second tendency, one reinforced by the high level of taxation, was centrifugal in direction: a tendency for the local land-owners to resist the taxcollecting claims of the bureaucrats. On the other side of the balance sheet, the division of the army into different corps of differing prestige and smaller units, plus the theocratic (or morecorrecdy caesaropapist) legitimation of the new order, reduced considerably but by no means eradicated rebellions and usurpations. The unified honour system, which gave everyone of importance an exact position in the hierarchy, emphasised the overall superiority of the emperor. But it also accen tuated the major problem which the emperor had to face. In so far as efficiency in executing the major tasks of government, that is, the collection of taxes, the administration of justice, the supply of the army, and its command, depended upon the skill and experience of his chief officers, any step the emperor might take towards the lengthening 185

The political power of eunuchs of their service to increase their experience, or any reward he might give them in terms of wealth or prestige in the only way available to him, and in the only way they wanted, was likely to increase the threat they represented to his survival as sole emperor. 33

T H E STRATEGIC POSITION OFEUNUCHS

In other societies a similar general problem has occured; namely the problem of conflict between an autocratic government aided by a patrimonial bureaucracy on the one hand, and on the other the military power of a professional army and a centrifugally inclined hereditary aristocracy. Yet in by no means all such societies have eunuchs risen to power. A structural analysis of developments in the power structure of the Roman Empire is indispensable. Without it we cannot delineate the functions of political eunuchism; we cannot analyse its contribution to the maintenance of the socio-political order of the Roman Empire; nor can we show why eunuchs came to power in the fourth and fifth centuries rather than before or after. Never theless, such an analysis cannot by itself explain the rise and survival of political eunuchism rather than of any other institution with the same function. It does not explain the question: Why eunuchs in particular rather than any other analogous group? For this we shall have to turn to a more detailed examination of the specific traits of eunuchs and of Roman culture. Eunuchs, in the later Han and T'ang dynasties, were able to rise to positions of power when the emperor was deified and the executive ministers were excluded from intimacy. It was in the same conditions that eunuchs became powerful in the later Roman Empire. The ritual of an audience became elaborate and compared with republican times servile. It was a mark of humility on the part of Valentinian I I that he forgot his imperial dignity sufficiendy to kiss the head and hands 34

35

38

34 35

This rather abstract analysis should be supplemented by the basic chapters on Government, Administration and Senators in A. H. M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire (Oxford, 1964) 32iff. or the splendidly written evocation of J. F. Matthews, Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court (Oxford, 1975). Ch'ien, T-S., The Government and Politics of China (Harvard, 1950) 31. Cf. A. Alföldi, 4Die Ausgestaltung des monarchischen Zeremoniells', Mitt, des deutschen arch. Instituts 49 (1934) 1-117, reprinted in Die monarchische Repräsentation im römischen Kaiserreiche (Darmstadt, 1970). Alföldi argues forcibly for the gradual development of elaborate ritual and exposes the general attribution of its introduction to Diocletian as little more than a literary topos. But then how does one explain the fact that the literary topos centres so frequendy around Diocletian? The two views are not irreconcilable: a general development of ritual with additions by Diocletian. 186

The strategic position of eunuchs of his sisters. T o kiss the bottom of the emperor's robes was the peak of some men's careers (adorotio) The emperor's consilium changed its name and its tenor. It became at first the consistorium and finally the silentium. * St Ambrose on a diplomatic mission for Valentinian II objected strongly to being received in such a formal atmosphere (Letters 24). Negotiation was impossible, persuasion out of the ques tion. By keeping to himself the emperor gained in prestige but lost in contact with his subjects. Synesius of Gyrene complained bitterly about this to the emperor Arcadius. Nothing, he said, is so bad as shutting the emperor away from public sight. The emperor should lead his troops in*person as he used to do; he should travel around the provinces in person and see for himself how his people are faring 36

37

3

(On

Kingship

PG

66: 1076, 1080, 1100).

In many cases the exercise of power leads to isolation. This is to the leader's advantage when, like the captain of a ship, he is secure in the legitimacy of his authority. But the Roman emperors had to reaffirm their legitimacy by their divinity, reinforce it with a ritual which served to emphasise their superiority over humans, and each rebellion or palace plot served only to emphasise their insecurity. Absolute power is correlated with absolute isolation. There is no need to exaggerate, but the atmosphere in which nobles could mix with the emperor was completely different in the fourth century from the first. Gallus Caesar like Harun al Raschid wandered in disguise through the streets and inns of Antioch, asking people what they thought of him (Ammianus 14.1.9). The comparison of the Byzandne empire with the Abbasid Caliphate and the very fact that a Caesar had to go to such lengths are not without their significance. Most emperors did not have Gallus' sense of adventure. And to rule effectively the man at the top needs information. The rise of eunuchs is not to be attributed to their ' skilful flattery and shrewd insinuation \ There is more to it than that. Eunuchs met a distinct need, the need of a divine emperor for human information and contact. 39

40

41

36 37 38 39 40 41

Ambrose, de obitu Valentiniani 36. Cf. the story of a doctor who sat down to treat a bedridden emperor without permission by Marcellinus Comes, Chronicon (MGH AA XI), 88, a.462.

It was also customary to kiss the emperors slippers, see Constantine Porphyrogenitus,

On

Ceremonies

1.84 and

86 (CSHB

387, 392).

Cf. iV/ 62.1-2, where both terms are used; cf. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Ceremonies

1.86 (CSHB

393).

On

So too did Nero, but on drunken sprees (Suetonius, Nero 26). Dunlap (1924: 180). Insofar as the Scriptores Historiae Augustae reflected fourth-century conditions and allowed their opinions to enter their historical judgements, the following passage might be of interest: 'under Elagabalus, when everything was sold by the eunuchs 187

The political power of eunuchs The power position of eunuchs stemmed in the first place then from their intermediary position between a sacred and isolated emperor and those about whom the emperor wanted information or who wanted favours from the emperor. Governors and bishops, nobles and vicars who wanted strings pulled had access to the emperor only through the Grand Chamberlain, the chief eunuch, and his services had to be paid for. From being a mere channel of information, through the exploitation of informal influences such as the patrimonial bureau cracy permitted, the Grand Chamberlain in particular and the corps of eunuchs in general expanded their power well beyond the formal confines of palace administration. But the continuity of their power as individuals depended upon the direct patronage of the emperor, and the sphere of their power was limited as it radiated from the court. Secondly, eunuchs' power depended upon the tension between the autocratic emperor and the other power elements in the state whose exercise of power threatened the emperor's supremacy. Yet the emperor had to entrust the execution of his commands to some of his subjects and the exercise of imperial authority inevitably invested its bearers with high status. The traditional bearers of this delegated authority, backed by the system of imperial justice (i.e. the systematic protection of traditional property rights), were precisely the people who most threatened the emperor's legitimacy and his universal power. Aristocrats had to be given power. But in the fourth century there were no equestrians to counterbalance them. Aristocratic power was limited by collegiality and short tenure, but the danger implicit in the situation can be seen in the growth of proto-feudal large land owners (potentiores) in the western empire and in their resistance to taxation and to the levy of recruits for the army. Since power, and especially that power whose major source is derived from the centre, is fixed, any exercise of power by nonaristocrats limited the power of aristocrats. Indeed the authority exercised by eunuchs not only by-passed the aristocracy but also served to supervise them. The search for executives of lowly or foreign 42

43

- a class of men who desire that all the palace-affairs should be kept secret, solely in order that they alone may seem to have knowledge of them and thus possess the means of obtaining influence or money* (SHA Severus Alexander 45.4-5, Loeb Classical Library translation). The power of eunuchs is put in the same context in other studies of comparable societies, namely the emperor's desire to liquidate rival political cliques. Cf. H. S. Levy, Harem Favorites of an Illustrious Celestial (Taichung, 1958) 17-18. P. A. Tschepe, S.J., Histoire du royaume de Ts'in (777-207 avJ.-C.) (Shanghai, 1909) 360; and cf. Zosimus 2.55. 4 Since his castration deprived him of hopes of the purple, he persuaded the emperor to make him patrician and consul.' So Philostorgius (History of the Church 11.4) of Eutropius. t

41

43

188

The strategic position of eunuchs origin free from aristocratic ties and dependent upon royal favour has been common to many kings and most notable in those who have struggled against the traditional or hereditary interests of the aristo cracy. But whether we take the service nobility of Peter the Great, the incipient bureaucracy of Prussia, or the commoners of Henry I I , none wielded delegated imperial authority so much in the emperor's interest as the eunuchs of the Chinese and early Byzantine empires. There is no specific ancient evidence that early Byzantine emperors used eunuchs with a clear vision of their superiority over functionally comparable groups. Yet the very fact that eunuchs, in spite of their unpopularity with the aristocracy, in spite of their despised status, were constandy invested by emperors with high rank and great power, does in some measure confirm the hypothesis that this was done to coun teract the power of the nobles. Nonetheless, the following analysis is not presented on the assumption that it was directly perceived by contemporaries, but that, whether it was perceived or not, the qualities of eunuchs could not but have influenced the role they played in politics. This may appear in its sharpest light when eunuchs are compared with other groups. Let us take for example the Imperial Secretaries (notarii), a body of short-hand writers who took notes at meetings of the imperial council. They were recruited in the first half of the fourth century from outside the elite, probably because the long training needed to acquire manual skill was traditionally despised. Yet their knowledge of state secrets acquired in the course of their job and their personal contact with the emperor made them suitable for executive and supervisory jobs. They gained power and prestige. And by the end of the fourth century they had already become litde more than a fashionable body ignorant of short-hand and holding sinecures, with the status of ordinary senators ( C I L 6.1710). They had to be rewarded in conventional terms of high status and rank, and were thus assimi lated to the aristocracy; they both penetrated into and were penet rated by the aristocracy. By contrast the corps of eunuch chamberlains could never be assi milated into the aristocracy. Their origin as slaves and barbarians, their physical deformity and the emotions it aroused, their easy recognisability, were all against it. They were completely dependent upon the emperor and had no natural allies in society, no other retreat than his protection. Nor could they, unlike others, gain acceptance by the 44

45

44 45

Wittfogel (1957) sees the rise of eunuchs in the Tang and Ming dynasdes as coindding significandy with the attacks upon the hereditary power of nobles through the establishment of the examination system and the restriction of yin prerogadves. Their barbarian origins robbed them of support outside the court. Cf. Claudian, In Eutropium

1.187.

189

The political power of eunuchs social mobility of their sons. In this respect they were like the clergy of the Middle Ages; but unlike them they had no corporate existence by which they could transmit inherited wealth. The existence of a strong clergy might preclude the extensive use of eunuchs, but the non-corporative character of eunuchism was much more favourable to the maintenance of the emperor's power. The complete dependence of eunuchs as individuals upon the emp eror made their exercise of power more tolerable to all parties. Like Court Jews in German states they took the blame for many unpopular actions, and like Court Jews they could be sacrificed when the outcry was too great. Their accumulated wealth, often enormous, could then be redistributed by the emperor to his favourite supporters; the aristocracy would breathe more easily now that a threat to their power and honour had been dramatically removed. The official decree dismissing the Grand Chamberlain Eusebius went as follows: 46

47

48

H e shall be stripped of his splendour and the consulship is to be freed from the foul stain, the memory and the sordid dirt of his name; all his acts are to be annulled, so that all ages will pass him over in silence, and a blot will not appear in the history of our t i m e s . . . We command that all his statues, all his images, in bronze and m a r b l e . . . shall be destroyed in all cides, towns, private and public places, so that the blemish, as it were, of our age may not pollute the sight of onlookers... (C. Th. 9.40.17 (AD 399))*· The exclusion which eunuchs faced, the hatred they met all around them, cut them off from the rest of the Court and must have strengthened their cohesion as brothers in misfortune: \ ..those whom nature or bcJdily disaster has separated from the common lot of humanity and exiled from either sex' (Claudius Mamertinus, Panegyric n . 1 9 . 4 ) . And compared with ambitious aristocrats who were ama50

46

Eunuchs seem to have a desire for wives and children. Their acquisition by purchase of both in China was a sign of their power, an attempt both at evading the appearance of being a eunuch and at transmitting wealth. Acolius, Grand Chamberlain under Valentinian III, had an adopted son (Constandus, Vita Germani 39

47

Eunuchs by a decree of Constandus were allowed to make wills (CJ 6.22.5 (35 ))» but even so they could hardly be compared to the institution of the Church. Cf. Procopius, Anecdote 29.13. Schnee, 1953-5: vol. 3, i9off. See also the brilliant homily on vanity of vanities, preached by John Chrysostom over the quaking prostrate Eutropius who had sought asylum in his church (PG 52.392^). The trauma of castration itself might also have strengthened their ties. Justinian cited one instance in which 87 out of 90 boys died from the operation (NJ 142). If this was the normal rate of loss we should expect to find it reflected in the price; slave prices given in a law (CJ 7.7.1 (AD 530)) reveal a sizeable premium for eunuchs but nothing of the above order; newly discovered fragments of the Diocletianic Edict on Maximum Prices kindly shown me by Mr M. Crawford and Miss J. M. Reynolds do not give eunuch slaves any special price.

48 49 50

(MGH

SRM.

7.279)).

2

190

The strategic position of eunuchs teurs fighting their way competitively to the top as individuals, at best with patronage, and who held office only for short periods, eunuchs were lifetime professionals, habitues of court ceremonial, and further more with unrivalled opportunities of free access to the emperor (Constantine Porphyrogenitus, On Ceremonies 1.97). Insofar as eunuchs stuck together, they did not cater to the emperor's best interests. In combination, they can be seen less as intermediaries and more as an independent force with its own interests, and not always on the emperor's side. We can see them, for example, in action as a group, hammering away at the emperor to secure the execution of the Caesar Gallus, in support of the policy of the Grand Chamberlain Eusebius (Ammianus 14.11.3-5), just as we can see them collectively protecting Gorgonius, Gallus' Grand Chamberlain, from the fate of his master (Ammianus 15.2.10). T o recapitulate: the tension between an absolutist monarch and the other powers of the state; the seclusion of a sacred emperor behind a highly formalised court ritual; the need of both parties for inter mediaries; the exploitation by eunuchs of this channel for the appro priation to themselves of some of the power of controlling the distribution of favours; the non-assimilability of eunuchs into the aristocracy; the cohesive but non-corporate nature of their corps; and the expertise which resulted from the permanence of their positions as compared with the amateurish, rivalrous and individualistic strivings of aristocrats; all these factors in combination and in interaction can account for the increasing power with which eunuchs were invested, and the continuity with which they, as a body, held it.

Eunuchs

and

chamberlains:

the

convergence

of

two

traditions

Such general considerations as these, however, though they help to account for the continuity of eunuchs' power and the gradual increase in their rank and influence, can hardly explain their introduction into the palace and their rise to power. For this we have to look at the convergence of two traditions and an external catalyst. The position of chamberlain, cubicularius involving general duties of personal atten dance upon a Roman nobleman and the surveillance of visitors, is first recorded in our sources in the first century BC (Cicero, Against Verres 2.3.8). Its appearance was in line with the progressive specia lisation of duties within wealthy households. Like aristocrats, the early emperors had chamberlains, and some like Helicon under Caligula and Parthenius under Domitian achieved considerable influence, but their power was never institutionalised as it was in the later Empire. 9

'9i

The political power of eunuchs Apparently very few of the chamberlains known to us from the Principate were eunuchs. In sum, the position of chamberlain was well established, and the chamberlains of the later Empire fulfilled similar dudes to those of their predecessors; but it was new to use castrated servants in the bedchamber. Eunuchs had been known to the Mediterranean world from the earliest times. They were associated in classical times with certain priesthoods, such as that of Cybele, or with harems such as that of the Persian king (Herodotus 3.48; 8 . i 0 4 f f . ) . In the early Roman Empire their use does not seem to have been widespread, though there are an increasing number of references to them in the literature. Occasion ally, for example under the emperor Claudius, a eunuch is said to have been influential (Suetonius, Claudius 28). By the early third century, there is evidence that they were increasingly being employed in private households, probably as attendants upon women. Dio noted with shock (75.14) that a contemporary praetorian prefect under Septimius Severus had a hundred free Romans castrated so that only eunuchs should wait upon his daughter; and according to a rather doubtful source, the emperor Aurelian limited the number of eunuchs a noble might own. The position of eunuchs at court in the third century thus seems to have been insecure; except under the mad Elagabalus, there is no evidence to suggest that eunuchs wielded power or consistendy filled the post of chamberlain before the reign of Diocletian. It is my suggestion, therefore, that the consistent use of eunuchs as court chamberlains and their repeated exercise of power were probably connected with the elaboration of court ritual, which can be roughly dated to the end of the third century. There is evidence from a variety of sources that there were eunuchs at work in the palace of Diocletian, and also a suggestion that they were powerful. I cannot help won dering whether the capture of the Persian king's harem by Galerius 51

52

53

54

55

56

Dunlap, 1924: 166-9; ana" F - Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World (London, 1977) 74-83 goes through the evidence on the early powerful chamberlains. Parthenius, the chamberlain of Domitian, had a son (Martial, Epigrams 4.45), and so did Cleander, the powerful chamberlain of Commodus (Dio 72.13), so they were not eunuchs. Such chamberlains had huge influence and wealth and were occasionally assimilated to the formal status hierarchy (AE 1952, 6), but not as a matter of course. And see Dio 76.14 and 7717. 88 Wittfogel (1957: 354-5) * o r references. ** Hug, RE Suppl. 3, col. 451. M SHA, Aurelian 49.8. Cf. Alex. Sev. 23.5^, but see also Clement of Alexandria, M

Paidagogus

99

M

SHA,

3.26.

Gordiani

I I I 23.7^; but

Cams

8.7.

B. de Gaiffier, 'Palatins et eunuques dans quelques documents hagiographiques', Analecta Bollandiana 75 (1957) 17-46; Lactantius, de mortibus persecutorum 15. 192

The strategic position of eunuchs in AD 298 led to a proliferation of eunuchs in the Roman court. Their presence may have acted as the catalyst for the separate tradi tions of chamberlains and eunuchs. The new emperors may well have felt the need for a ritual which elevated them above their courtiers, and for these purposes what servitors could be better than eunuchs acquainted with the elaborate ritual of the Persian court? Lactantius certainly accused Galerius of imitating the Persian king. In any case eunuchs, wherever they came from, became the proper appurtenance of an emperor, and once established, their power increased for the reasons which we have already analysed. 57

58

The

eunuch

image

The full paradox of the political power of eunuchs cannot be complete without a description of their public image. T o some extent, of course, their stereotype was built up as part of the aristocratic objection to the power which eunuchs wielded. But it also reflected the residual characteristics of eunuchs, and the roles they played in social life. It appears from modern comparative studies that eunuchs have a normal range of intelligence, but that as with domestic animals castration leads in many cases to docility, though a small proportion of hypogonads have compensating aggressiveness. Eunuchs have high-pitched voices, and faces with smooth glossy skins covered with a network of 59

57 5 8

M

Theophanes 1.11 -13 (CSHB). On the Persian campaigns see T. D. Barnes, * Imperial campaigns 285-311 ', Phoenix 30 (1976) i82ff. de mortibus persecutorum 21 ; Theophanes (1.11-12) connected Diocletian's elation at the success of Galerius* Persian campaign with the introduction of prostration (proskynesis). Cf. Aurelis Victor, de Caes. 39.2-4; Claudian, In Entropium 1.415; but contra Alfôldi, 1970 and see note 35 above. ^ R. I. Dorfman and R. A. Shipley, The Androgens (New York, 1936) 319; J. Kasanin and G. R. Biskind, 'Personality changes following substitution therapy in préadolescent eunuchoidism*,/. Amer. Med. Assoc. (1943) 1317-21; S. L. Simpson,'Hormones and behavior patterns', BMJ (1957) 839. Hypogonads may not be stricdy comparable to eunuchs in their social situation, but the sense of deprivation may be a significant common factor. J. J. Matignon, a doctor at the French legation in Peking, who had opportunities to study court eunuchs at first hand, wrote 'C'est à tort qu'on a représenté l'eunuque comme sanguinaire et violent. Il est plutôt doux, conciliant, conscient de son infériorité', 'Les eunuques du palais impérial à Pékin', Bull, de la soc. d*anthropologie de Paris, 4 sér. 7 (1896) 334. J. J. Bremer, in a comprehensive recent study of the castration of adult sex criminals, etc., wrote of a 'peculiar emotional lability' among castrates and of an endocrine psychosyndrome (usually of an asthenic and dysphoric-depressive nature) which affected 25 % of his sample. He did not find a general pacifying effect in many cases in social behaviour; one cannot tell how far this was affected by the psychopathology of his subjects (Asexualisation (Oslo, 1958) 25,159/., 309). The same lability is remarked by A. Mez, Die Renaissance des Islams (Heidelberg, 1922) 336. •93

The political power of eunuchs fine wrinkles; they tend to run to fat. Their physical distinctiveness must have reinforced their group solidarity and separateness. What makes eunuchs' exercise of political power at court even more remarkable is the type of occupations with which eunuchs were nor mally associated. Hordes of them, wrote Ammianus (14.6.17), looking sallow and misshapen (obluridi, deformes) cleared the way for the sedan chairs of noble Roman women. They were increasingly used as private attendants upon women, and were clearly intended to be their ineluctably safe guardians. But humans are resourceful, and we are told that even eunuchs were occasionally exploited to satisfy their mistresses' appetites; sexual intercourse could have occurred to any serious extent only with post-adolescent castrates. And there is evi dence to suggest that most boys were castrated young. These young castroti seem to have been often used as catamites by men, who took advantage of the fact that eunuchs preserved their freshness longer than boys passing through puberty. T o these indignides were added the performances by eunuchs of lewd dances in theatres (Prudentius, Hamartigenia 309-10); and in private service too, part of their attrac tion, as with the hunch-backed jesters of medieval courts, lay in the freakish piquancy of their deformity. In the descriptions of court eunuchs which survive, these general associations were rarely forgotten. Eutropius was alleged to have progressed from catamite to pander in private service before his elevation to Grand Chamberlain under the emperor Arcadius (AD 395-408 BC, cf. Claudian, Against Eutropius 1.62-150). True, the poet Claudian had a particular axe to grind, and perhaps the eunuchs Eusebius and Chrysaphius would not have suffered so much if they had been on the side of victorious orthodoxy. But perhaps most revealing is the way in which Ammianus hedged his praise of the chamberlain Eutherius: 60

61

62

63

64

65

If a Numa Pompilius or a Socrates should give any good report of a eunuch and should back their statement by a solemn oath, they would be charged 60 Bremer, 1958: 100-11. 61 Cf. Jerome, Letters 22.16 and 32; 54.13; 66.13. Life of Melania 1.5 {Anal. Boll. 8 (1889) 23); Cyril of Alexandria, Sermon against Eunuchs, PC 77.1108; Palladius, Historia Lausiaca 35 (ed. Butler, 106); ibid. 61.157; Malchus, frag. 8. 63 Cyril of Alexandria, Sermon against Eunuchs, PG 77.1108-9, * o r a catalogue of their activities; Jerome, In Jovinianum 1.47 and cf. Juvenal 6.366!. 64 Claudian, In Eutropium 1.45-6; Basil, Letters 115; CJy.y. 1 ( A D 530); Petronius, Satyricon 119. Cf. the Chinese custom of early castration: S. W. Williams, The Middle Kingdom (New York, 1904) vol. 1, 408; and the Spanish: R. P. A. Dozy, Spanish Islam (trans. London, 1913) 430. The eunuchs had to be trained and educated for the palace service. 65 Theophanes 1.79; Cyril of Alexandria, op. cit. PG 77.1108. 8 2

*94

The strategic position of eunuchs with having departed from the truth. But among the brambles roses spring up, and among the savage beasts some are tamed...In unrolling many records of the past, to see which of the eunuchs of old I ought to compare him to, I could find none. True there were in times gone by those that were loyal and virtuous (although very few), but they were stained by some vice or other. (16.7.4 d 8 - Loeb Classical Library translation)* a n

6

Praise was the exception; more typical of fourth- and fifth-century attitudes, if more than usually vituperative, was the view attributed to St Basil: ... lizards and toads... the dishonest race of detestable eunuchs, neither men nor women, but made with lust for women, jealous, corruptible, quick tempered, effeminate, slaves of the belly, avaricious, cruel, fastidious, tem peramental, niggardly, grasping, insatiable, savage and envious. What else can I say? Born to the knife, how can their judgement be straight when their legs are crooked? They do not pay for their chastity; the knife has done it. Without a hope of fulfilment they are made with desires which spring from a natural dirtiness. (Letters 115) One can only imagine the horror with which a blue-blooded aristocrat must have approached such tainted upstarts to beg for favours (cf. Sozomen, History of the Church 4.16). It was easier to curse court eunuchs behind their backs than to their faces. A considerable part of the objection made to their power arose from the lowness of their origins (Ammianus 22.3.12). Roman eunuchs deserved the soubriquet of eunuchs in China, 'the lucky risers'. But social mobility in so stable a society offended the interests and the oudook of hereditary aristocrats; and the literature which survives stems mostly from the aristocracy, or reflects their prejudices. Nothing shows the dislike of eunuchs more clearly than their behaviour on retirement. Sundered from the protection of the emperor's favour, they lurked, wrote Ammianus, like bats in secret hiding places (16.7.7). At court it was a different story. Their non-assimilability to the aris tocracy left them isolated, not as individuals but as a group. And it was as a group that they exercised power. The Grand Chamberlain and the high officers stole the limelight, but beneath them there must have been a substantial number of chamberlains of all ages gradually progressing upwards through the ranks. Their survival depended 67

68

66

67 68

There is a fulsome dedication to the chamberlain Lausus in Palladius' history, but Buder considers it a later bombastic redaction (E. C. Buder, Historia Lausiaca (Cambridge, 1904) 4). Priscus (frag. 13) says that all men held Chrysaphius in high regard, but this was not a view shared by all (John of Antioch, frag. 198). Yang, L.-S., 'Great families of eastern Han', trans, in Chinese Social History (Washington, 1956) 122. There is no accurate indication of number. Libanius says they were' more numerous than flies on sheep in the spring' (Speeches 18.130). As an impression only, I should *95

The political power of eunuchs upon the emperor's favour; the price was that they served his interests; the rewards were great wealth and high rank; though the greater the power, the higher the risks of sudden demotion and execution. The violent criticism directed against eunuchs diverted dissatisfac tion which might otherwise have been aimed at the emperor. But this was not their only or their most important function. By acting as intermediaries they made the emperor's isolation viable. T o be sure other groups as well were used as lubricants for the system, but as in the case of the Imperial Secretaries and the Companions (comités), they were rapidly assimilated to the aristocracy. As can be seen from the rise in eunuchs' rank and from the increase in the number of offices which they filled, eunuchs also progressed by this process of consoli dation of privileges, which seems endemic to a patrimonial bureau cracy. Thus their powers can be understood only in the context of their non-assimilability and their consequent continuity. This applies to the Grand Chamberlains with exceptional powers as well as to the run-of-the-mill Superintendents and Stewards of the Sacred Bed chambers. The one was inconceivable without the other. Finally, the exercise of power by eunuchs limited the power of centrifugal forces in the state. Eunuchs' influence in the Eastern Empire was one of the major interacting factors (partly cause, partly result) in the preser vation of central monarchic authority. In the Western Empire, there was a polarisation of power between the army which dominated the emperor and the aristocracy which avoided tax payments, whether of men or money. In the East, the eunuchs were at the very balance of power between these constituents. Paradoxically, the political power of eunuchs in general, far from being a sign of the emperor's weakness, was, in the Byzantine empire of the fourth and fifth centuries, a token of, and a factor in, the survival of the emperor as an effective ruler. 69

say there were hundreds rather than thousands. If they were taken in young, and given education, and there is evidence that they were (Ammianus 17.7.5, and no accusation of illiteracy), given the high rates of mortality prevalent in the Roman empire, a fairly large base number would be needed to fill seven top posts with reasonably efficient eunuchs. * Certainly eunuchs feathered their own nests, but they were not exclusively selfinterested. Cf. Ammianus 21.15.4; Malchus, frag. 2a; Ambrose, Letters 20.28: Calïigonus, the Grand Chamberlain of Valentinian II, said to the great bishop Ambrose: * While I am alive, do you criticise Valentinian? 1*11 have your head off/

196

V DIVINE EMPERORS OR T H E SYMBOLIC UNITY OF T H E ROMAN EMPIRE

INTRODUCTION

Absolutist kings of large pre-industrial states have almost always ruled with divine aid. The nature and degree of their divinity have varied: for example, the Pharaohs of Egypt were god-kings, Chinese emperors ruled by the mandate of heaven, Abbasid Caliphs called themselves Shadows of God on Earth, Byzandne emperors ruled as the vice-gerents of god on earth, English and French kings claimed divine right. The list could be extended; but the basic point is clear. The king of a large empire, never seen by most of his subjects, legitimates his power by associating himself and his regime with the mystic powers of the universe. Reciprocally, subjects who rarely see an emperor come to terms with his grandeur and power by associating him with the divine. The first part of this chapter is concerned with emperor worship, but emperor worship is only one way of approaching a wider problem. The problem is: How did the Romans know that they were living in the Roman empire? In what sense was the Roman empire a single political system? One obvious answer is that the inhabitants of the empire shared an emperor. In many rituals and public celebrations the emperor was declared to be divine, a god or the son of god, or he was closely associated with a god. The diffusion of emperor cults, their acceptance in once Republican Rome, and philosophical resis tance to the idea of human divinity have fascinated many scholars. I too have succumbed. But I have also tried in the second half of the chapter to look beyond the direct evidence, which consists mosdy of 1

1

'The state of monarchy is the supremest thing on earth, because kings are not only God's lieutenants here below and sit upon God's thrones, but even by God himself are called gods' (from a speech by James I of England in 1609; see C. W. Mcllwain, The Political Works of James I (New York, 1965) 3o6ff.). The literature on the religious legitimation of rulers is enormous, but sec M. Weber, Economy and Society (New York, 1968) vol. 3; P. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1974); and the different perspective of S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (New York, 1963) 5off.

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honorary inscriptions, to the rituals which created the evidence. And 1 began wondering about the significance of stories or myths which, although they were untrue, had considerable currency in Roman circles. Sober historians are interested primarily, sometimes exclusi vely, in the truth; they therefore usually ignore untrue stories. Indeed as one reads an ancient source, there is a temptation, rooted perhaps in modern scientific rationalism, to pass over these fabrications, roughly as most readers turn over a page which contains statistical tables, with barely a glance. But political power and legidmacy rest not only in taxes and armies, but also in the perceptions and beliefs of men. The stories told about emperors were part of the mystification which elevated emperors and the political sphere above everyday life. Stories circulated. They were the currency of the political system, just as coins were the currency of the fiscal system. Their truth or untruth is only a secondary problem. Power is a two-way process; the motive force for the attachment between the king and the gods does not come from the ruler alone. His aides and his lowest subjects, since they cannot usually change the social order, wish to justify, indeed they often wish to glorify, the status quo and their own place within it. The attachment of the people is not necessarily to a particular king, but to an ideal king, who symbolises the fixed order of the world. When the king dies or is deposed, the people's loyalty is automatically transferred to the new king. The close association of the king with god or gods, the sacred rites performed in his honour, the laudatory rhetoric, the similarity of attributes of god and king (such as Omniscience, Justice, Omnipresence), all stem from the belief that the emperor like god represents the moral order, and that the emperor, as the best of men, stands between ordinary men and the gods. This view is most clearly expressed, if clearly is the right word, in semi-philosophical writings:

Of all that is most honoured in nature, god is greatest; so too, in earthly and human matters the king is greatest. As god rules the universe, so the king rules the state. As the state is to the universe, so the king is to god. T h e state is a harmony of many different elements and so imitates the order and harmony of the universe; since the king has absolute power and is living law, he is transformed into a god among men. (From Diotogenes, On Kingship cited in Stobaeus, Anthologium 7.61 = Wachsmuth and Hense eds., vol. 4, 2 6 5 ) . * 2 Diotogenes is unknown except from the citations in Stobaeus dating from the fifth century A D . According to L. Delatte (Les traités de la Royauté (Liège, 1942) 2d4ff.), Diotogenes' vocabulary, style and ideas date him to the first or second century AD; this is hotly disputed by H. Thesleff, An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period (Abo, 1961 ) 65ff. ; see also F. Taeger, Charisma (Stuttgart, 1957-60) vol. 2, 6i6ff. and E. R. Goodenough, 'The political philosophy of Hellenistic kingship', Yale Classical Studies 1 (1928) 55ff. for commentaries on these philosophical excerpts. 198

Introduction This formulation is regrettably abstract, but the underlying problem is clear enough. How and why did Roman emperors reinforce the political system by associating themselves with gods? Why did local leaders of towns in Italy and in the provinces honour emperors in the elevated language of prayer and call emperors, like gods: Saviour, Benefactor of the Whole World, Defender from Evil, Lord of all mankind? It is not enough to say that the practice originated in the east and spread to the west, because that begs the question: Why did it spread? Nor is it enough to say that professional orators elaborated the language of panegyric, so that it took on an academic life of its own, divorced from reality. That is true as far as it goes; but why did subjects and kings spend long hours listening to this inflated rhetoric of praise? What meaning did they attach to the extravagant metaphors and similes scattered through honorary decrees and speeches? These rococo figures of speech recurred too often to be simply meaningless or hypocritical. The following extravaganza is taken from a formal speech of welcome delivered in the presence of the emperors Diocletian and Maximian (alias Jupiter and Hercules) in Milan in AD 2 9 1 . 3

4

.. .while other m e n and places were frozen and overcome by the bitter cold, you were followed by gentle breezes and spring winds, and the rays of the s u n . . . shone on your path. With the greatest of ease, you overcame obstacles which others would find unsurmountable. O n e of you crossed the Julian, the other the Cottian Alps, as though they were beaches o n the open shore when the tide is o u t . . .You, invincible emperors, almost single-handed with your divine steps like Hercules.. .opened u p the path across the Alps blocked by winter s n o w s . . . Then, as your divinity shone from the ridge of each of the Alps, a brighter light shone over the whole of Italy and all who looked u p were struck with wonder and doubt as to whether the gods had risen to the mountains or whether they had descended to earth from the sky. 3 The parallelism between the cults of emperor and Christ is striking: the following terms were used frequendy of both: god (theos), Son of god, god made manifest, lord (Kurios), lord of the whole world, lord's day (Sebaste - pagan, KuriakeChristian), saviour of the world, epiphany, imperator, sacred writings. See the superb discussion by A. Deissman, Light from the Ancient East (tr. London, 1910), 346-84, and more recendy K. M. Setton, Christian Attitudes Towards the Emperor in the Fourth Century (New York, 1941). 4 It may seem dangerous to use evidence from the late third century to cast light on attitudes in the Principate. Yet there seems to be a similarity in thought and expression between the extract cited and Greek honorary decrees and, for example, the speeches of Aelius Arisddes (second century). The only surviving Latin panegyric from a significandy earlier period is by Pliny (AD 100). It is less floridly fanciful, but dates from a dme when the emperor Trajan was consciously trying to play down imperial power. Imagine the panegyrics delivered by Roman senators to Caligula, Nero and Domitian; and besides, the idea of Jupiter and Hercules as especially associated with Roman rulers dates back at least to Trajan, see J. Beaujeu, La religion romaine a Vapogee de Vempire (Paris, 1955) 7iff. 199

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But as you came nearer, people began to recognise you. All the fields were filled not only with men rushing to see you, but also by the herds of catde which abandoned their distant pastures and glades. In all the villages, farmers rushed to spread the n e w s . . . altars were lit, incense put in place, libations of wine were poured, victims sacrificed. Everywhere ardent joy was felt, everywhere applause resounded. Praises and thanksgiving were sung to the immortal gods. Jupiter was i n v o k e d . . . a s visible and present; Hercules was worshipped.. .as an emperor. (Panégyriques latines 3.9-10 ed. Galletier) In modern societies, similarly inflated language is heard at alumni reunions, retirement banquets and at political rallies, though the metaphors are different: * Brethren, let us keep alive the white hot fires of Socialism' - U K 1975; 'May Chairman Mao Live for Ever.' These are ritual occasions during which the evocation of sentiment induces feelings of camaraderie, necessary for the success of a large and mixed social occasion. The language reflects a search for symbols, redolent with shared associations, which will suspend criticism and unite diver gent groups. The mystical elements in Roman decrees to the emperor may have served a similar function. The fusion of god and emperor reflected the coalescence of the moral and political order. T H E BEGINNINGS O F E M P E R O R W O R S H I P IN ROME, ITS ESTABLISHMENT AND DIFFUSION

Originally, the divinity of the living emperor was alien both to tradi tional Roman religion and to Roman oligarchic politics. Its eventual acceptance even by the elite in the city of Rome was a symptom of the growth of emperors' power and of the changes which took place in Roman political culture; these changes made it possible to express individual emperors' political power in religious terms. But the em peror's divinity was only one aspect, albeit the most impressive aspect of the emperors' association with the gods. The intricate relationship of emperors and gods and its political significance can be understood only against the backcloth of Roman religious beliefs and rituals. Religion and politics were intertwined. In metaphors, myths and sacred rites, Romans frequendy bridged the great divide which in puritan Christianity separates man from God. The every-day world of the Romans (not simply their mystic world) was populated by a host of divine intermediaries who stood between men and the great gods of Heaven and Hades. They ranged from demi-gods and divine heroes such as Castor and Hercules to divine forces such as Victory, Fortune and Hope and even to portents and omens of good and evil. Each household had its private cults in which 200

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men placated the spirits of the living (Genius) and the dead (Lares) with sacrifice and ritual, and invested them with such divinity as they chose. Cicero, for example, wanted to build a shrine, not a tomb to his dead daughter in order 'to achieve deification as far as possible* (Letters to Atticus 12.36). This was a private act, and therefore consistent with his violent public objection to the official deification of Julius Caesar. Earlier in the Republic, Romans had associated several of their leaders with gods, but not in the state cult. For example, after the political murder of the Gracchi brothers, statues of them were set up in a prominent place in the city of Rome; 'many people sacrificed at and worshipped their statues every day, as though they were visiting the shrines of the gods' (Plutarch, Gaius Gracchus 18). Other leaders were similarly honoured, while they were still alive. For example in 102-101 BC, the general Marius achieved a crushing victory over the Celtic tribes which had for several years defeated Roman armies in northern Italy. He was honoured in the city of Rome with libations 'just like the immortal gods' (Valerius Maximus 8.15.7). Exceptional ability or success or the spark of genius was commonly recognised as having something divine about it. The dictator Sulla took the soubri quet Felix, Fortunate, to reflect his protection by divine forces. Republican poets such as Ennius, Lucretius and the early Virgil each referred to great men (Scipio, Epicurus and Octavian) as though they were gods or god-like. Emperor worship involved the transfer of what had previously been private and unofficialritesto the public domain; it involved the inclusion of the emperor in private household rites; and it involves paying honours to the living which had customarily, though not exclusively, been given to the dead. For example, a wall painting has been dis covered in a private house in Pompeii, which shows the spirit (Genius) of the head of the household, surrounded by his family, pouring a libation; a second figure was added to this picture, and was carefully 5

6

The background to Julius Caesar's deification is discussed by L. R. Taylor, The Divinity of the Roman Emperor (Middletown, Connecticut 1931) 42ft. and at length by S. Weinstock, Divus Julius (Oxford, 1971) - on which sec J. A. North, JRS65 (1975) i7iff. Cicero violendy objected to Caesar's public and official deification: 'Do you think, conscript fathers, that I would have voted for the decree which you have reluctandy passed and which associates a cult of the dead with prayers, introduces sacrilegious practices into state religion and decrees prayers to the dead? I deny that honour to anyone, even to Brutus, who liberated the state from monarchy... I cannot accept that I should associate any dead man with the worship of the immortal gods... May the immortal gods pardon the Roman people who did not approve the decree and voted it unwillingly...' (Philippics 1.13). • Scipio: Seneca, Moral Letters 108, 33-4; Epicurus: Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe 5.8; deus ille fuit, deus; Octavian: Virgil, Eclogues 1.6-7. Cf. Weinstock 5

(1971: 294-6).

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preserved in ancient dmes. Mau interpreted this figure as the Genius of the emperor Augustus, since beneath the picture were the letters E X SC 'by decree of the senate', which Mau took to be the decree of the senate which ordained that a libadon should be poured to the emperor at all public and private meals (Dio 51.19) - like a Christian grace or an English royal toast. And we know from literary sources that this toast: ' T o Augustus, Father of the Fatherland, hail' (felieiter) became common practice (Petronius, Satyricon 60). Julius Caesar was the first Roman to be recognised as a god in a public state cult. He had also been more powerful than any Roman before him. His divinity followed from his political power. Julius Caesar had also been the first living Roman noble to claim descent from a god, through Aeneas from Venus. Even during his life-time, when he was dictator, he was given honours similar to those given to a god. For example, a statue of Caesar was set up in the temple of Quirinus with the inscription ' T o the Unconquered God* (Dio 43.45). At the circus games, an ivory statue of Caesar was carried in solemn pro cession along with those of the gods (ibid.). The senate ordered that a temple be built ' T o Julius Caesar and his Clemency', and that a special priesthood be instituted in his honour similar to Jupiter's (Dio 44.6). But his elevation provoked opposition. He was assassinated by a band of nobles who could not endure his supreme power and quasi-divinity. Julius Caesar's deification after his death was partly a legitimating manoeuvre by his political successors, particularly by his adopted son and heir Octavian, who thus became 'Son of God' (divi ftlius)* Deification after death was also a continuation of Caesar's life-time ambitions and of popular belief. An angry crowd reacted to his assassination by burning down the senate-house in which he had been murdered and then attempted 'to bury his body in the temple [of 7

8

This interpretation seems bold but justifiable. Mau cites two other instances in which the Genius of the emperor may have been portrayed in private shrines. Cf. A. Mau, Pompeii in Leben und Kunst (Leipzig, 1908) 278; G. K. Boyce, 'Corpus of the Lararia of Pompeii', Memoirs of the American Academy at Rome 14 (1937) no. 466. 'A genius is a god, the same as a lar as many ancient authorities such as Granius Flaccus [? first century BC] have said... A genius constandy observes us and is not away from us even for a second, but stays with us from the moment of birth until our dying day1 (Censorinus, On The Birthday 3). 8 Horace described how the peasant on his return from the fields had dinner and invoked Augustus as a god: 'he prays to you, honours you with unmixed wine and joins your divine spirit (numen) to his household gods' (Odes 4.5.29!?.). • In Latin there was a distinction between deus and divus (Weinstock (1971) 391—2). Stricdy, deus was used for the immortal gods and divus for gods who had been men (Servius on Aeneid 5.45); in Greek, both were called Theos and the Greek equivalent 7

f

of

divi filius was

theou huios, son

of

god.

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Jupiter on the Capitol] along with the gods' (Appian, Civil Wars 2.148). The priests turned the crowd back and so they burnt the body on a hastily built pyre in the Forum. Caesar's power, his popularity, the manner of his death and the political sagacity of his heir, all combined to make his funeral and his memory more a public than a private family matter. Julius Caesar was numbered among the state gods, wrote Suetonius,

not only by public decree but also by popular belief. At the first games, which his heir Augustus gave in honour of his consecration, a comet shone for seven successive d a y s . . . it was believed to be the soul of Julius Caesar, which had been taken to heaven. And this is why a star is set at the top of his statue. (Julius

Caesar

88)

10

Augustus and the emperors who succeeded him were the first Romans to be widely acknowledged as gods during their life-time. Several emperors found this personally embarrassing, and in the city of Rome it was politically awkward; it cut across the constitutional mask which disguised the emperors* supremacy. They did not want to be assassinated. Members of the elite, who suffered most from the emperor's human weaknesses, were most sceptical of his divinity. Hence, for example, Seneca's savage skit on dead Claudius' arrival in heaven and his open scorn for the senators who had seen the soul of the imperial dead rising in the sky and had been richly rewarded for the speed of their vision (The Pumpkinification of Claudius 1; Dio 56.46; 59.11).

Emperors were caught in a cleft stick. In the eastern provinces rulers were traditionally honoured as gods. Emperors could not refuse the honours and prayers of the eastern provincials without giving gratuitous offence which might undermine the provincials' loyalty. Equally, they could not afford to be seen, especially by the Roman elite, to welcome divinity. Augustus and his immediate successors tried to cope with this clash of cultures by a compromise which they enforced in the provincial state cults; in these, they allowed temples and priests 10

The separation of the divine spirit from an obviously dead body is always an awkward moment in the apotheosis of a human; cf. the Christian account of Jesus' death/ascension. On this problem for the Romans, see £. Bickerman in Le cutte des souverains dans Vempire romain, Fondation Hardt, Entretiens 19 (Geneva, 1972) 3-37 (the essays in this collection are excellent) and the dramatic account of the ritual of apotheois at Rome by Herodian (see below, p. 214). Julius Caesar's deification became a noted motif in Roman state art. See, for example, the picture of four horses pulling a chariot carrying Caesar's soul, steeply rising into the sky, depicted on an Augustan altar from the city of Rome (I. Scott Ryberg, 'Rites of the state religion in Roman art', Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome 22 (1955) fig. 28a); also the Augustan silver coin from Spain (19—15 BC) which showed a comet with eight rays and a tail and bore the legend Divus Julius (BMCRE 1.63). 203

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to be established in their honour, but only in association with an established deity, usually Roma. Or they diverted the direct imputation of personal divinity by allowing sacrifices only to the living or divine spirit of the emperor (Genius, Numen Augusti). In this way, religious rites and feelings were harnessed to the political order as well as to the individual emperor. Several sources reveal the awkwardness of this solution, as emperors rejected unwanted honours proffered by deferential provincials or defended themselves to Romans for the honours which they had accepted. The extract which follows is from a papyrus, first published in 1924, which contained a letter from the emperor Claudius to the Alexandrians sent in AD 4 1 :

. . . First, I allow you to keep my birthday as a sacred day as you have requested, and I permit you to erect.. .a statue of me and my family.. .But I decline the establishment of a high-priest and temples to myself, not wishing to be offensive to my contemporaries and in the belief that temples and the like have been set apart in all ages for the gods alone. (P. Land. 1912 = Corp. Pap. Jud. 153 = Loeb Classical Library, Select Papyri 212) 1 1

But in the proclamation publicising this very letter, the Roman prefect of Egypt referred to 'the Greatness of our God Caesar*, apparendy in direct defiance of the emperor's explicit wishes. The conventional explanation of this inconsistency is persuasively simple; it was considered all right publicly to entide Caesar 'God', provided it happened in the provinces. But decisions about emperor worship in the provincial state cults were often made in the city of Rome. The contradictory expectations of Roman aristocrats and of provincials therefore could not be segregated. And when a decision was made in public in the city of Rome, the emperor often took the Roman elite's view into account. Besides the emperor was a member of that elite. Tacitus records the following debate which took place in the senate in A D 25: 12

Farther Spain sent a delegation... (which applied) to follow Asia's example and built a shrine to Tiberius and his mother. Disdainful of compliment, II Claudius* refusal was made at Rome, which partly explains its tone. In Egypt itself, temples had been set up to Augustus during his life-time, and we know from one (at Philae) that he was depicted as Pharaoh God (cf. Taylor (1931) 143-4» fig. 22). A Greek epigram to Octavian from the same place, inscribed on stone, identified him with Zeus: *To Caesar, Lord of the Sea and Ruler of the Universe, Zeus the Liberator, bom of Zeus the Father, Lord of Europe and Asia...' (CIG 4923 * G. Kaibel, Epigrammata graeca 978). 11 I follow here the conventional distinction between the provincial state cults and individual or town cults, but without much conviction. Perhaps the place where the derision was made about the cult's form was more important than whether the cult was provincial or municipal. 204

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Tiberius saw an opportunity to refute rumours of his increasing selfimportance. ' I am aware, senators*, he said, * that my present opposition has been widely regarded as inconsistent with my agreement to a similar proposal by the cides of Asia. So I will justify my silence then and my intentions from now on. 'The divine Augustus did not refuse a temple at Pergamum to himself and the city of Rome. So I, who regard his every action and word as law, followed the precedent thus established, the more since the senate was to be worshipped together with myself. One such acceptance may be pardoned. But to have my statue worshipped among the gods in every province would be presumptuous and arrogant.. .senators, I emphasise to you that I am human, performing human tasks. I am content to occupy the first place among men.' Later too, even in private conversation, (Tiberius) persisted in rejecting such veneration. Some attributed this to modesty, but most people thought it was uneasiness. (Annab 4.37-8 tr. slighdy adapted from M. Grant, Penguin books) Such public protestations had litde effect, in Italy or the provinces. We can see this, for example, in the public proclamation made by Germanicus Caesar, the nephew and adopted son of Tiberius, in Alexandria in AD 19. He refused divine honours for himself, although the offer was very restrained by Egyptian standards.

I welcome the good-will which you always display when you see me, but I totally reject your acclamations which are invidious and appropriate to the gods. They belong exclusively to the real Saviour and Benefactor of the Human Race, my father [the emperor Tiberius], and to his mother, my grandmother [Livia].. .(Loeb Classical Library, Select Papyri 211) He was perhaps afraid that exaggerated reports of the honours accepted by him would reach the jealous emperor's ears. Emperor worship in a broad sense, that is the public association of emperors with gods, divine forces, sacred rites, altars and temples, flourished almost everywhere. Even the elite in the city of Rome repeatedly elevated living emperors to the level of a god. The list of honours voted to Octavian is extraordinary: in 29 BC, the senate decreed that his name be included in its hymns equally with the gods (Dio 51.19-20). They decreed 'that a tribe should be called the Julian tribe after him, that he should wear the triumphal crown at all festi vals ... that the day on which he entered the city of Rome should be honoured with sacrifices by the whole population and be held sacred for evermore' (Dio 51.20). In 27 »c, he took the name Augustus, which like divi filius - theou huios (Son of God) - symbolised his superiority over the mass of humanity. An altar was set up in Rome to his Victory, temples were built to Fortune which vouchsafed his Safe Return (Fortuna Redux), and to the Augustan Peace. His statue was placed in the entrance to the Pantheon while another statue of him, dressed in 205

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all the insignia of Apollo was set up in the library attached to the new temple of Apollo (Ps. Aero on Horace, Epistles 1.3.17). Stories about the connections between Augustus and Apollo cir culated even in sophisticated circles and have survived in the histories of Suetonius and Dio. In the book About the Gods by Asklepias of Mendes, the story was told that Augustus* mother once spent the night in the temple of Apollo with other matrons. While she slept, a snake came to her (by Roman convention, a snake was apparendy used on household altars to represent the Genius - but Freudians will also make speculations about the imagery in the story); when she awoke, she washed herself as though after intercourse with her husband, but she could not wash away the mark of the snake which she found on her body. In the tenth month afterwards, Augustus was born and was therefore considered to be the son of Apollo (Suetonius, Augustus 94; Dio 45.1).

T o continue the saga, Augustus eventually in 12 BC became High Priest. He did not move into the traditional High Priest's house, but gave it to the Vestal Virgins. In compensation he made part of his own house into a public shrine with an ever burning fire. In this way the household gods of the state and Augustus's own household gods were under the same roof. Augustus was Father of the Fatherland {pater patriae) as well as head of his own family (paterfamilias). The headship of state was fused with the office of High Priest; the regime had the ostensible support of the gods. Outside Rome, in Italy and in the provinces, eastern and western towns and town-councillors competed in their search for the appro priate honours to pay their monarch. They looked for honours which would cast most glory upon themselves, in their own eyes, in the eyes of the distant monarch, and in the eyes of the common folk who watched the sacrifices and participated in the festivals held in the emperor's honour. The emperor's birthday and other anniversaries were celebrated by public games and in other ways. In 9 BC, for 13

18

The vote of honours by a municipal coundl was often marked by the dispatch of a legation to inform the emperor. This provided towns with an opportunity for self-advertisement and gave ambassadors a legitimate excuse for a trip to court with the prospect of an audience, with enhanced kudos on their return home. On the accession of Caligula, in AD 37, the small town of Assos (in western Asia Minor) swore an oath of loyalty to Caligula 'by Zeus the Saviour, the God Caesar Augustus and the ancestral Holy Virgin [Athene]... It was decreed by the town council and by the Roman businessmen among us and by the people of Asserts to appoint an embassy chosen from the foremost and best Romans and Greeks to seek an audience and congratulate him and to beg him to remember the city with solicitude, as he himself promised when he first visited our city's province with his father Germanicus..(when Caligula was aged six!) (SIG 797). 206

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example, 'the cities of Asia [Minor] decreed.. .that a crown be awar ded to the person suggesting the highest honours for the god [Augus tus]. ..' (OGIS 458). Discreetly enough, they then awarded the prize to the Roman governor of the province for suggesting 'an honour for Augustus hitherto unknown among the Greeks, namely to start the year on his birthday' (ibid.). The idea was taken up with public enthusiasm. 'The birthday of the most divine emperor is the fount of every public and private good. Jusdy would one take this day to be the beginning of the Whole Universe.. .Jusdy would one take this day to be the beginning of Life and Living for everyone...' (CIG 3957b - Apamea Cibotus). In other cities also, the emperor's birthday and other anniversaries were publicly celebrated by sacrifice, rituals, ceremonies and games. Three more examples will be enough to give the flavour, and to illustrate the variety. The following is a brief extract from a calendar inscribed on stone from Cumae in the bay of Naples; it listed public festivals and is one of a number found in Rome and nearby towns: 14

January 7 On that day Caesar first held high office. Public prayers to Eternal Jupiter. January 16 On that day Caesar was called Augustus. Public prayers to Augustus. January 30 On that day the Altar of the Augustan Peace was dedicated. Public prayers to the rule of Caesar Augustus, guardian of Roman citizens and the whole world. (CIL 10.8375: heavily restored = A. Degrassi, Inscriptiones Italiae 13.2 (Rome, 1963) 279)

14

15

15

Fragments of nearly forty calendars inscribed on stone have survived, nearly all from the city of Rome and the surrounding towns. They date from after Julius Caesar's calendar reforms to the end of the first century AD. They listed public and sacred festivals. Unfortunately, the fragments allow us to assess uniformity and diversity only in about ten towns and not in all of them for the same months. For some festivals (such as Augustus' victory in Spain or his deification) there was considerable uniformity; but in other cases there were discrepancies; for example, the anniversary of the assumption of the tide Augustus was recorded as a festival in only three out of five towns; the consecration of the Altar of the Augustan Peace was celebrated in only four out of six towns, and of the Altar of Victory in only one out of three towns for which the calendar is complete. This diversity is interesting and shows how unrealistic it is to create single calendars, as though all festivals were celebrated everywhere. The evidence is collected by A. Degrassi, Inscriptiones Italiae 13.2 (Rome, 1963) and collated by J. Marquardt, Römische Staatsverwaltung (repr. Darmstadt, 1957) vol. 3, 5676*. The cumulative impact of celebrating imperial achievements can be seen in the calendar of festivals of the 20th Palmyrene cohort stationed at Dura (Syria) dating probably from A D 225-7. By dien 21 deified emperors and empresses were still recognised; and of 41 festival days recorded for this military unit, 27 were connected with the imperial cult. By then also most of these imperial festivals were celebrated expensively by the sacrifice of animals (usually an ox), rather than by the simpler 207

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Secondly, in AD I I , the town council of Narbonne in southern France had a marble altar erected to Augustus and dedicated it in perpetuity to Augustus' divine spirit (numen). They put it there so that 'each year on this altar on 23 September, the day when he [Augustus] was brought forth to be ruler of the world for the happiness of the age, three Roman knights chosen by the people and three ex-slaves will each sacrifice a (sheep) a n d . . . will provide the colonists and the other inhabitants with incense and wine for the cult worship of his spirit' ( C I L 12.4333). Similar celebrations were to take place at the expense of the chosen six on four other days of the year, while another inscription on a bronze plaque probably from the same period records the establishment of a provincial priesthood of Augustus - the priest to have the right to set up a statue of himself with the name of his father and his year of office and the obligation to set up statues of the emperor with surplus temple money ( C I L 12.6038). The third example comes^from Naples: in 2 BC, the cidzens there voted to establish games sacred to Augustus, ' ostensibly because Augus tus had restored the town after it had been laid flat by earthquake and fire, but in reality because its inhabitants.. .emulated Greek customs ' (Dio 55.1 o). The games were grandiosely called Italien Romaia Sebasta Isolympica and to drive the point home the Neapolitans built a temple to Augustus, the first temple to a living emperor on Italian soil. Augustus must have approved, since he attended the fourth games in AD 14 (Dio 56.29).

These examples illustrate three general points. First, the style of public celebrations held in honour of the emperor varied considerably from town to town, as it did between provinces. This variety demon strates that the festivals were not instituted by Augustus himself or by the dictate of the central government. The varied arrangements reflected local initiatives or competitive innovations rather than im perial decree. The strength of local feelings and beliefs, the sense of 16

16

offering of wine and incense which dominated (15:1) the Cumaean calendar cited above. But then one would expect the imperial cult to be more effusively celebrated in the army than elsewhere - it was in the emperors* interest to invest heavily in the army's loyalty to their image. Sec R. O. Fink, A. S. Hoey and W. F. Snyder, *The Feriale DuranunT, Yale Classical Studies 7 (1940) esp. 236., 1739. We can compare the festivals at Dura with those at Theveste (Algeria) from an inscription (ILAlg$041) dated AD 214. Of 15 imperial festivals listed at Theveste, 12 were also celebrated at Dura, but N.B. 16 out of 36 festivals certainly dated from Theveste are of no known public significance (Snyder op. cit. 1940: 20X)ff.). Thus in the early third century, there was a central core of uniformity in imperial festivals between a military unit in Syria and an African colony, and considerable local variation as well. An additional example: the imperial cult was joined with that of Roma in only one (Tarraconensis) of the three Spanish provinces - see R. Etienne, Le culte impérial dans la péninsule ibérique (Paris, 1958) 293, cf. 231. 208

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obligation to the emperor, the belief in the benefits to be derived from his propidadon far outweighed the effect of any imperial regulation. The evidence simply does not match the model which consciously or unconsciously still seems to underlie some modern discussions of the imperial cult, especially in the western provinces: namely that it was inidated, licensed, controlled and maintained primarily by the em perors themselves in the interest of some overall policy of political control, and that western provincials were far too sensible to believe in such eastern superstititions. Sometimes local leaders spontaneously initiated their own rites in honour of the emperor; at other times, especially in the western provinces, emperors themselves or their delegates did play an impor tant role in initiating and organising the cult of the emperor. For example, Drusus, Augustus' stepson, is said to have forced a meeting of the chiefs of sixty Gallic tribes, at a time when they were reportedly dissatisfied with Roman administration. Apparendy, he won them over and instituted the cult of Rome and Augustus, with a great altar and a provincial high priest chosen annually from amongst them (Livy, Summary of Book 139; Strabo 4.3.2). This official promotion of the state cult is often considered as overt political manipulation. And so it was. But the cult would have been of no use to the emperor, nor would the provincial leaders have kept it alive unless they had quasi-religious feelings or beliefs which could be harnessed. At other times, emperors responded to provincials* requests that they approve certain honours. Emperors' replies to these requests, together with competitive imitation between towns and the common cultural traditions which existed within provinces, combined to create distinct patterns of emperor worship: statues, processions, games, altars, arches, temples, sacrifices in commemoration of birthdays, victories and of each new emperor's accession. But within and around this common core there was always variation which reflected the uncontrollability or spontaneity of local demonstrations of loyalty to the emperors. For example, it is impossible to imagine that the 17

17

Sometimes provincials and provincial governors behaved contrary to the emperor's declared wishes, often because they did not know better. For example, the senate pressed Tiberius to have his birth-month November named after him as Julius Caesar had done before him. He refused the honour scathingly: 'What will you do when you get to the thirteenth Caesar?' (Dio 57.18). But in Smyrna and Calymna, for example, November was called Tiberion (A. £. Samuel, Greek and Roman Chronology (Munich, 1972) 175) and in Egypt this month was called Neos Sebastos - New Augustus-and the name stuck through the second century (K. Scott, 'Honorific months', Yale Classical Studies 2 (1931) 243-4). So much for control by the emperor. The Cypriot calendar of 15 BC was exclusively honorific, with months named after the following: Augustus, Agrippa, Livia, Octavia, Julia, Nero, Drusus, Aphrodite, Anchises, Rome, Aeneas, Capitol (ibid. 183). 209

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following script for a public presentation celebrating the accession of the new emperor Hadrian in AD 117, which was found on a papyrus fragment from a district capital in upper Egypt, was anything but local. The two characters in the dialogue represent the sun god Phoebus Apollo and the People:

Phoebus: With Trajan in my chariot of white horses I have just climbed aloft to heaven; and now I come to you, oh people, I Phoebus, by no means an unknown god to proclaim the new ruler Hadrian. All things serve him on account of his virtue and the Genius of his Divine Father. People: Let us make merry, let us kindle our hearths in sacrifice, let us surrender our souls to laughter, to the wines of the fountain and the unguents of the gymnasia. For all these we are indebted to the reverence of our governor [strategos] towards our Lord [Hadrian] and to his zeal on our behalf. (P. Giss. 3 adapted from the translation by P. J. Alexander, Harvard Studies in

Classical

Philology

4 9 (1938)

143-4.)

One of the main functions of these celebrations was that they confirmed the prominence of local leaders. Emperors and the feelings which they evoked served as the pretext for ceremonial display, for the expense and the fun. But it was also more serious than that. The processions, dedications and sacrifices were the symbolic forms by which the local elite and the local populace of free men and slaves, townsmen and peasants, reaffirmed their relative positions and their subordination, however they perceived it, to their distant emperor. How else would anyone have known that he ruled? Secondly, participation by the poor must have been encouraged by the gift of free wine and incense, and by the prospect of a share in the meat from the sacrifice. The gods got only the entrails. In a poor society, hunger was endemic; food was a recurrent subject for art in rich men's houses; eating meat was a treat. The sense of occasion was heightened by the dramatic slaughter of the choice victim and by the anticipation of eating. In surviving carved altar panels, the sacrificial victims figure prominendy (for example, a bull for the Genius of Augustus, a hog for his Lares). At the celebration of games or at the dedication of a statue to the emperor, rich men often gave banquets to their social equals. Scores of inscriptions, mosdy from Italy, also 18

18

It is clear that sacrifices were sometimes made .the excuse for eating meat. For example, Titus in thanksgiving for his victory in Judaea 'sacrificed a vast number of oxen.. .and distributed them all to the army to feast on* (Josephus, Jewish War 7.16). For a similar equation, sacrifice equalled a meat feast, see Ammtanus Marcellinus 22.1a. However examples illustrate but do not prove my point that sacrifice was an important source of meat for the urban poor. 210

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record that occasionally they also gave money or a feast, or meat (visceratio), sometimes just rusks and mead (crustum et mtUsum) to all the citizens.

Sacred to Apollo Augustus, for the safety of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Commodus Antoninus Augustus, Conqueror of the Sarmatians and of the Germans, Son of the divine Marcus Antoninus Pius, Conqueror of the Germans and of the Sarmatians, Grandson of the divine Pius, Great-grandson of the divine Hadrian, Great-great grandson of the divine Trajan, Great-great-great grandson of the divine Nerva, High Priest, in the seventh year of his Tribunician Power, Victor for the fourth time, in his third Consulship, Father of the Fatherland, Quintus Abonius Secundus son of [?] in honour of his (priesthood) which the order (of decurions) decreed to him of its own accord, has set up this statue with a donation of 4,000 HS of his own money over and above the legal sum required, and on the occasion of the dedication [has donated] gifts of money to the decurions and a feast [to the people]. (Inscribed o n a statue base from a small town in north Africa - C I L 8 . 1 4 7 9 1 ) The

role

of ex-slaves

in

the

imperial

cult

The cult rules from Narbonne also show that ex-slaves played a pro minent part in the celebration of the imperial cult. Why did ex-slaves take a leading part in the worship of the emperor? T o be sure, some of them were rich; but all of them bore the stigma of their foreign origin, captivity and enslavement. Yet in spite of their low origins, ex-slaves held office as organisers and celebrants, Augustales, of the rites associated with the family spirits of Augustus, held at the cross-roads (compitalia) in the city of Rome and throughout Italy and the western provinces. An explanation is difficult to find. The rites were partly an Augustan innovation built on a traditional base. In Republican Rome, the two guardian spirits of the cross-roads (Lares compitales) had been pro pitiated in local festivals and sacrifices provided by district leaders (vicomagistri) (Asconius, p. 7 ed. Clark). Slaves and ex-slaves had always 19

19

For a detailed analysis of hundreds of inscriptions recording the existence and functions of Augustales, see A. von Premerstein, DE sv. Augustales. In central and southern Italy, nearly all the Augustales whose status is known were ex-slaves, but in northern Italy several free-born Augustales are known (ibid. cf. CIL 5.1765). Leading Augustales (usually seviri) gave money for the celebration of games as well as animals for sacrifices. See also now R. Duthey,' La fonction sociale de l'Augustaiitl', Epigraphica 36 (1974) 134-54» D u t his deductions about those whose status is unrecorded should be treated with caution. 211

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played a prominent part in this ritual and for the duradon of the festival they Were traditionally freed from all slavish stigmata and got extra wine rations (Dionysius Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 4.14; Cato, On Agriculture 57). Interestingly enough, the cult leaders were also allowed for the duration to wear senatorial dress of purplebordered toga, and like magistrates, were accompanied by two lictors (Dio 55.8). Our sources tell us that Augustus revived this cult along with other parts of the traditional religion which were dying (Sue tonius, Augustus 31) and transformed it by adding his Genius to the two Lares of the cross-roads; the three were thereafter called the Lares August!. 20

I looked for images of the twin gods, But they had decayed with the force of time. T h e City now has a thousand Lares and the Genius of our Leader; H e gave them to us; and the districts worship three divinities. (Ovid; Fasti 5 . 1 4 3 - 6 ) Several finely sculpted altars to the Augustan Lares, nearly all of them set up by district leaders, survive from the city of Rome and confirm the transformation of the cult. Like other monuments of the period, they depict scenes which glorify the virtues of Augustus and his family: for example, a chariot carrying the soul of Julius Caesar to the sky, winged victories, and Augustus in priesdy garb handing over to other men, presumably district priests, a statuette of a Lar. Augustus cannot have created this cult from nothing. It seems more likely that in the course of his long reign, ex-slaves had begun to celebrate the emperor's power in the traditional local festivities and rites; when Augustus reorganised the districts in the city of Rome and was High Priest, he legitimated and institutionalised these local celebrations, which had been till then only informal, and they became the rites of his cult. The cult of the emperor's Genius and his guardian spirits persisted over the next two centuries, as the evidence of more than a thousand surviving inscriptions shows. The cult provided rich 21

M

II

Excavations at Pompeii show that it was common for Roman households to have niches or shrines (like saints' wayside shrines in rural Italy or Greece recently) which contained a statuette or portrait of a Lar (or portrait of the Genius - for their fused identity see note 7 above) and two Penates - household gods. Shrines at the cross-roads traditionally held only two Lares, one for each road - Augustus made it a trio - and at least in some minds Penates equalled Lares.4 Augustus had ordered household-gods (Penates) to be set up in the cross-roads.. .The priests were ex-slaves called Augustales' (Ps.-Acro on Horace, Satires 2.3.281); cf. the oath *by Jupiter and divine Augustus.. .the genius of the [living] emperor and the household gods (Penates)* (CIL

2.1963).

Ryberg (1955) has the best pictures; but the discussion by Taylor interesting as ever; cf. CAH plates vol. iv, i28ff. r

212

(1931) 186 is

as

Emperor

worship

ex-slaves, as organisers of the cult, with a prestigious and public outiet for social display. And it allowed emperor worship to flourish at street level. The emperor's divinity won some acceptance even in the elite. It may seem surprising that leading Romans gave even grudging acceptance to the idea that their human emperor and his father were divine. It seems surprising partly because it contrasts with earlier Republican sentiments, and partly because it contradicts our own modern notions of humanity, divinity and rationality. As a conse quence, several modern historians of Rome have dismissed the evi dence of our sources as glib flattery or as insincere exaggeration. Perhaps much was, but that does not explain it away. The idea of the emperor's divinity and close association with the divine persisted and was fostered by Roman notables. Sometimes emperors demanded, and sometimes the Roman senate volunteered, an extra token of its belief that the emperor was a favourite of the gods. For example, at the beginning of the New Year in AD 40, the senate in a body went to the Capitol and offered the regular sacrifices; and then because the emperor was away from Rome, they abased themselves (prosekuneson) before his empty throne in the temple of Jupiter. Roman senators, grandchildren of the generation in which the heroes of the Republic, Brutus and Cassius had assas sinated Caesar, returned to the senate house and * spent the whole day in praising the emperor and saying prayers on his behalf (Dio 59.24)** In AD 65, the consul-designate proposed that a temple should im mediately be built to the divine Nero, because Nero had earned the worship of mortals. Nero refused the honour as an unwelcome presage of his death (since in the city of Rome emperors had been openly deified in a state cult only when dead) and was content to rename the month of April Neroneus (Tacitus, Annals 15.74 and 16.12) and planned to rename Rome Neropolis (Suetonius, Nero 55). Perhaps fear prompted the senators to humble themselves with flattery, but fear does not explain the form which their flattery took. Nor was it fear which induced the 'richest citizens to use all their influence to compete with each other to obtain the priesthoods' of the temple to Caligula (Suetonius, Caligula 22). The emperor's divinity was created by the deference of subjects to a visibly powerful ruler more than by the emperors' own policy.

" Caligula was particularly extravagant in his demands; in the temple, which he had set up to his own divine spirit (numen), * there was a life-size statue of the emperor made of gold, which was dressed every day in clothes similar to those he was wearing' (Suetonius, Caligula 22). But the ceremonies recorded here by Dio seem to have been initiated by the senators themselves. 213

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These developments can be illustrated from Roman art. Plate 2a shows the magnificent panel which celebrated the ascent to heaven and deification of the emperor Antoninus Pius and his wife Fausdna. It formed one side of the pedestal which supported a high funerary column, set up in the city of Rome to commemorate the emperor's death. The panel portrays the emperor's ascent to heaven on the back of a winged Genius, watched by two seated figures. The beautiful young man on the left, holding the whole column in his lap, represents Mars, the god of war, in whose field (the Campus Martius) the monu ment was built and Roman emperors were solemnly cremated in effigy. The female on the right is the goddess Roma. The imperial couple is seated; each is carrying a sceptre and is flanked by an imperial eagle; traditionally the eagle was believed to carry the imperial soul to heaven and of course signified Roman power. Plates 1 and 2b show other scenes of deification, one of the empress Sabina, who died in AD 136/7, the other a beautiful cameo, said to be of either Germanicus (Tiberius' adopted son) or of the emperor Claudius. For our present purposes it does not matter which; what matters is that in Roman art, seen by people who never read a literary text, the Roman emperor was portrayed as a favoured inhabitant of heaven. Deification was not merely a subject for sculpture, however brilli antly executed. It was also the end process of lively and impressive rituals with a cast of thousands. The historian Herodian, who wrote in the early third century, has left a good account of the elaborate ceremonies which in the city of Rome surrounded the emperor's death and elevation to Heaven. 23

It is normal Roman practice to deify emperors who d i e . . .All over the city, expressions of grief are displayed, but they are combined with a festival and a religious ceremony. T h e body of the dead emperor is buried in a normal way with a very expensive funeral. But then they make a wax model exacdy like the dead man and lay it on an enormous ivory couch raised u p on high legs at the entry to the palace, and spread golden drapes under the effigy. T h e model lies there pale, like a sick man, and on either side of the couch people sit for most of the day. O n the left is the entire senate dressed in black cloaks and on the right all the women who hold a position of high honour because of the distinction of their husbands or fathers. None of these women appear wearing gold ornaments or necklaces; they wear only a plain white dress to show they are in mourning. For seven days these ceremonies continue. Each day the doctors come and go u p to the couch, and each day they pretend to examine the patient and make an announcement that his condition is deteriorating. Then, when it appears that he is dead, the noblest members of the equestrian order and 23 I rely here on L. Vogel, The Column of Antoninus Pius (Cambridge, Mass.; 1973) 32ff. 214

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picked young men from the senatorial order lift the couch up and take i t . . . out of the city to the Campus Martius, w h e r e . . .a square building made of vast wooden beams has been constructed in the shape of a house (with several storeys). Inside, the building is completely filled with brushwood, and outside it is decorated with gold-embroidered drapery, ivory carvings and a variety of paintings.... T h e bier is taken up and placed on the second storey. Every perfume and incense on earth and all the aromatic fruits and herbs and juices are collected in great heaps. There is no tribe or city or prominent person who does not compete in sending these last gifts in honour of the emperor. When an enormous heap of these aromatic spices has filled the entire space, a cavalry procession around the pyre begins; the whole equestrian order rides in a circle round and round in a fixed formation, following the movement and rhythm of the Pyrrhic dance. Chariots circle round in the same formation... carrying figures which wear masks of all the famous Roman generals and emperors. When this part of the ceremony is over, the heir to the throne takes a torch and puts it to the built-up pyre. T h e whole structure easily catches fire because of the large amount of dry wood and aromatic spices which have been piled high inside. T h e n from the highest and topmost storey an eagle is released... and soars up into the sky with the flames, taking the soul of the emperor from earth to Heaven, as the Roman believe. After that he is worshipped with the rest of the gods. (Herodian 4.2 adapted and abbreviated from the translation by C. R. Whittaker, Loeb Classical Library) SOME F U N C T I O N S O F B E L I E F — T H E L I V I N G

PRESENCE

Did sensible educated men really believe that a man was a god, or did they merely mouth these empty metaphors and put on a polite face through the formal ritual of singing the emperor's praises? Did they do it only because it brought them political advantage or social prestige, while it left their hearts and minds untouched? In short, was emperor worship political rather than religious? No single answer to this question can be found; the surviving literary evidence relates only or predominandy to educated men; surviving memorials were put up mainly by the prosperous. And it is difficult to deduce feelings from artefacts. We know little of the actions and feelings of the lower classes. In a society as large and as culturally varied as the Roman empire, the range of cult practices was immense. Add the dimension of time stretching over three centuries, and it becomes painfully obvious that historians are forced to impose plausible and simplifying fictions on a complex and largely irrecover able past. Besides, the question is itself misconceived, since it treats the two categories of politics and religion as separate. Even in modern, 215

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emperors

relatively irreligious societies, the two are often intertwined (for example, at ceremonies commemorating those killed in war, or at the installation of new heads of state). But in classical Rome, religion and politics often overlapped and were fused. There was a wide spectrum of values, beliefs and attitudes. At a rational level, several of them were probably incompatible, yet in fact held by the same people simultaneously. Indeed, people often pick values, beliefs and attitudes from a common social stock and give them different emphasis and expression according to the demands of social circumstances. For example, different values and beliefs are expressed at cocktail parties or stag parties and in church, in public and in private, at the emperor's court, in the royal presence, and in a philo sophical discussion. It is both impracticable and undesirable to com press this huge variety into a single historical account, whether our subject is beliefs in contemporary England, America or in ancient Rome. Nor can we discover what the Romans really believed, any more than we can give a single account of what really happened. What we can do is to illustrate the variety of Roman religious values, beliefs and practices, and consider particular social contexts (such as public processions in provincial towns, appeals to the emperor by maltreated slaves, or the prosecution of Christians) which moulded the expres sion of beliefs in the emperor's divinity. Our task ideally is to show the relationship between beliefs, social processes and the political structure. That is a tall order, and I shall tackle it selectively, choosing evidence from a variety of places and periods, so that we can draw on the full inventory of Roman beliefs and practices. In the sophisticated circles of philosophers, courtiers and historians, cynical scepticism about the divinity of a human emperor was readily available. Roman emperors themselves manifesdy distrusted or re jected as absurd some of the honours wished on them by flattering admirers. The emperor Vespasian, for example, on his death-bed was reported to have said: Alas, I think I am becoming a god', a story told then, as now, in mockery of his impending deification (Suetonius, Vespasian 23J. A panegyrist, Aelius Aristides, in a letter to the 24

4

25

This concentration on structure and process has its costs. In this case, by drawing on a wide variety of evidence from different places and periods, I somewhat ignore the canons of time and place, which are the prime ordinandsof most history-writing. In other words, for these purposes, I treat the Roman empire statically as a single entity, when dearly there was both change over time and variation between regions. Obviously, I regret this; as I show elsewhere in this book, this is not a strategy imposed by my methods, only a tactic in this chapter. ** When the citizens of Tarraco reported to Augustus that a palm tree had magically grown on his altar, he is said to have quipped: * That shows how often you light fires on it* (Quintilian, Institutes 6.3.77). But the most notable satire on deification is by Seneca, The Pumpkinification of Claudius - an eye-witness account of the new god's arrival in heaven. 14

216

The living

presence

emperors (AD 178), when Smyrna was in ruins after an earthquake, made a clear distincdon between the gods to whom men pray, and * the most divine rulers' from whom men beg favours (Speech 19.5, ed. Keil). He clearly did not intend any disrespect; we can assume that his distinction was acceptable and did not cause offence. Whatever men said, at least some knew that the emperor was not a real god. Indeed after the excesses of the emperor Domitian, there was a period of reaction in which emperors emphasised their humanity not their divinity, at least at court in Rome (Pliny, Panegyric 2). Speculative philosophers often made fine distinctions: 26

T h e emperor is the last of the g o d s . . .but the first of men. As long as he remains on earth he is separate from his true divinity, but in relation to men he has something exceptional, which is akin to the divine. His soul within him comes from a higher place than the souls of men. (Corpus Hermeticum, ed. Festugiere (Paris, 1954) vol. 4, 53; frag. 24.3) We simply do not know how widespread such sophisticated distinc tions were either among intellectuals or common folk. Nor does it matter much. After all, in the contemporary world, it is quite possible to find cynical unbelievers who participate in religious rituals of marriage and death, and who listen to the rhetoric of Christian prayer and gain a certain satisfaction or pleasure from their participation, without feeling that it challenges their disbelief. We do not have to choose between politics and religion, between hypocrites and true believers. The rituals themselves, the symbolic acts of priests and congregation, the words of prayer are all redolent with associations, whether from childhood or a historical past. They bring a message which transcends the actual meaning of the words.

Immortal Nature, after Overwhelming Benefactions, has Bestowed o n Men the Greatest Good of all. She has given us the Emperor Augustus, who is not only the Father of his Country, Rome, Giver of Happiness to our Lives, but also the Fatherly God and Saviour of all Mankind. It is H e whose Providence has not only Fulfilled but even Surpassed the Prayers of all. For Land and Sea lie at Peace and the Cities bloom with the Flowers of Order, Concord and Prosperity.. .(Greek Inscriptions in the British Museum 8 9 4 ) " * I owe this point to G. W. Bowersock, 'Greek intellectuals and the imperial cult* in he cuUe des souverains (see note 10) 179!!., who amply illustrates the scepticism of philosophers. I think however that he underestimates the probability that philosophers' acts differed from their thoughts. J. R. Fears (Princeps a Diis Electus (Rome, 1977) 10) makes a distinction between the 'official ideology of the prinripate' and the metaphorical language of men of letters. But he puts too much weight upon it; it is only one of several plausible distinctions. Otherwise this seems a very good guide to the evidence. 97 It is a pity that classical epigraphers have concentrated exclusively on the transcription of discovered texts and have done so litde to present a synoptic picture which 217

Divine

emperors

This was a decree of the local senate of Halicarnassus in Caria inscribed on stone for the occasion of a visit by the emperor's grandson in i BC. T o the rationalistic prejudice of moderns, the language may seem hopelessly inflated, reminiscent of English tombstone encomia in the eighteenth century. But statements which do not mean exactly what they say, should not be summarily dismissed as meaningless. Honorary decrees recur much too often for that; the hundred which survive must reflect many thousands ever drafted, intoned or carved. It is clear from these surviving decrees that in the East the emperor was widely acknowledged in public as a god. The following is a fragmentary extract from a decree set up early in the first century in a small town (Tlo) in Asia Minor, to mark the establishment of a cult in honour of Livia, the wife of Augustus, the mother of the emperor Tiberius:

. . . since She had established the family of the Augusti through the most Holy Succession of the Gods Manifest, the Incorruptible and Immortal House for Time Everlasting, the Lycians in their Piety to the Goddess [Livia] have decided to institute Processions, Sacrifices and Banquets to Her in Perpetuity.. . ( T A M 2.549) To catch the true flavour, such passages should not be read softly to oneself; they should be intoned aloud, at half an octave above or below one's normal speaking pitch. Each of these two extracts has some uncanny echoes of later Christian prayer; they belong to the same genus. We should not be too impressed by the evidence which happens to survive. Words cut in stone stand a good chance of survival; the memory of 'Processions, Sacrifices and Banquests' fades. Yet to the provincial notable who played a prominent part in the processions, and paid for them, and certainly to the men in the street who watched and cheered, the actions of the day mattered more than their record for posterity. Cult acts, sacrifices, ritual, public games, feasts all underwrote the conception of the emperor's supremacy and the benefits derived from the existing order. The following description, 28

highlights the importance of their hard work, unifies the texts with the monuments on which they were inscribed, and which explicates the culture which shaped the ceremonies which prompted the inscriptions. Credit in the profession apparendy goes to those who transcribe new texts, however similar to those already found. ** Of course, both mattered. That is why men spent money on inscriptions for posterity. I wonder how long the interval was between the erection of a monument and its displacement. Tombs often declared fines against violators in perpetuity. * Statue bases did not, and we know that new heads were sometimes fitted onto old torsos. 218

The living

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although it is of an emperor's proud entry into the city of Rome, and comes from the fourth century, gives a good idea of how impressive such processions were, and were intended to be. 29

. . . [the emperor] sat alone in a gold chariot in the resplendent blaze of various precious stones, whose mingled glittering seemed to form a second daylight... H e was surrounded by dragons which were woven from purple thread and attached to golden and jewelled spearheads, their gaping mouths exposed to the breeze so that they hissed as though in anger, while their tails whirled behind them in the wind. . . . when he was hailed as Augustus with shouts of approval... he never moved, but showed that imperturbability which had been apparent in the provinces... he gazed straight ahead as if his neck was in a vice, and turned his face neither to right nor l e f t . . . nor did he nod when the wheel jolted, and not once was he seen to wipe his face or nose, or to spit.. .and although this was affectation on his part, nevertheless... [it was also] an indication of considerable endurance granted, it was thought, to him alone. (Ammianus Marcellinus 16.10) The emperor's progress, like the king's progress in post-feudal Europe, was only one aspect of royal grandeur. Since most emperors in the High Empire visited few cides outside central Italy, the towns which were visited by the emperor often tried to immortalise their transient glory by erecting commemorative arches, temples and columns or even by starting the calendar year or an era from the date of the emperor's visit (*in the 6 9 t h year from the first visit of the god Hadrian in Greece'= AD 101/2; one of several such decrees from 30

Tegea, IG 5.2.52)*

31

In daily life, there were repeated reminders of the emperor, and of his close association with the gods. All coins carried a picture of the emperor's head and name, the reverse showed portraits of symbols illustrating the emperor's success or power such as, for example, the personification of Victory, Rome or Justice together with varied

*· On such processions see S. MacCormack, * Change and continuity in late antiquity: the ceremony of adventus\ Historian (1972) 721-52; T. E, V. Pearce, Classical Quar30

31

terly 20 (1970) 313-16.

I am very grateful to C. Geertz who first persuaded me of the significance of such processions and the symbols of power, and gave me his then unpublished article to read, 'Centers, Kings and Charisma* in J. Ben-David and T. Clark, eds., Culture and Its Creations (Chicago, 1977). 'Some Italian towns made the day on which (Augustus) visited them the beginning of their year* (Suetonius, Augustus 59). In Thessaly, Greece, the era of Claudius was apparendy dated from a visit to Greece in AD 10/11 as well as by the years of his reign: 'in the seventh year of Caesar Germanicus Augustus and the 37th year' = A D 47/8 (IG 9.2.13). See H. Kramolisch, Chiron 5 (1975) 543ft*. 219

Divine

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slogans reminding people of the benefits of imperial rule (such as LIBERTY RESTORED, CONCORD, JOY, LOYALTY OF T H E ARMIES).

32

In city streets, squares and temples, prosperous cidzens erected statues of the emperor, usually to commemorate their own tenure of local office. The dedication inscribed on the statue base recorded the formal tides of the emperor and often the exact sums spent. For example:

Anicia Pudentilla in her will ordered two statues to be erected at a cost of 30,000 HS Manlia Marcina her mother and heir had that done, adding 8,000 HS of her own G. Manilius Manilianus her son-in-law executor. (The Inscriptions of Roman Tripolitania 2 2 , from Sabratha) In some provincial towns, statues of the emperors were highly stan dardised. At Bulla Regia in north Africa, for example, statues of the joint emperors Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus were almost identical except for a higher brow on one (Marcus Aurelius), a detail which may have been copied from a coin. In other towns, statues of emperors portrayed as gods have been found (for example the face of Hadrian with the body of Mars at Carthage). In the city of Rome in the fourth or fifth century there were said to be close on 4,000 bronze statues of emperors in public places and an unknown number of stone or marble; excavations at Lyttos, an undistinguished town in Crete, have yielded thirty-two bases of emperor's statues from a single century (Inscriptiones Creticae 1.18.15-46); in a medium-sized north African town (Leptis Magna), archaeologists have found over eighty statue-bases with inscriptions 33

31

u

Too much is often made of these slogans as a means of communication. After all most coins circulated for decades so that most messages were passe\ That said, the symbols are sometimes very striking, much more raised than in modern coins, and the messages were probably more prominent in popular consciousness then than they would be nowadays, when we suffer from mass communications pollution. The Roman coin slogans reflect most on their composers whoever they were. In several reigns, there were too many issues for the emperor to have supervised them personally. Two late Syriac epitomes perhaps from the chronide of Zachariah Rhetor, who wrote in the late fifth century, preserve the number of bronze statues in Rome, and much other such information; they probably derive from Greek versions of the earlier (fourth-century Curiosum urbis Romae. See R. Valentini and G. Zucchetti, Codice topografico delta cittd di Roma (Rome, 1940) vol. 1, 320-34 with an Italian translation. For Leptis, see J. M. Reynolds and J. B. Ward Perkins, The Inscriptions of Roman Tripolitania 3i6ff. My thanks to Joyce Reynolds for information about excavations in Leptis. But apparendy almost no statues of emperors have been found in private houses, so E. Bickerman in Le culte des souverains (see note 10 above) 5-6; emperors were public gods who protected the public good; for private benefits, men prayed to other gods. 220

The living

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to emperors. To be sure this number represents the accretions of four centuries - by no means all would have been on display at the same time. On the other hand, the whole of the public area has not yet been excavated and many statues and bases must have been lost. However, the exact number does not matter too much. The point I want to stress is that public places were filled with or dominated by representations of royalty, most of them put there by private cidzens. In a letter to Marcus Aurelius, then heir to the throne, his former tutor Fronto wrote: 'You know how in all the money changers' shops, in booths and bookstalls, eaves, porches, anywhere and everywhere, people have put up busts of you, badly enough painted to be sure, indeed for the most part modelled or sculpted in a crass, cheap style...' Even so, Fronto went on, however bad the likeness, the sight made him remember his royal pupil with a private smile (Fronto, Loeb Classical Library vol. i, 207 translation adapted).

The

emperor's

statue

(see

Plates

3 and

4)

The emperor's statue was not just a lifeless monument, an aesthedc adornment to a public square. Slaves, litigants and even magistrates in times of trouble fled to the emperor's statue, as though it stood for the emperor himself, as though it could provide the protection and justice which ideally the emperor would himself dispense - if only he were present and knew the facts. Once in Aspendos (in southern Turkey) in the reign of Tiberius, during a food shortage ' . . . a n excited crowd was infuriated with the chief magistrate and was lighting a fire to burn him alive, even though he was clinging to the statue of the emperor, which at that time was more feared and venerated than the statue of Zeus at Olympia' (Philostratus, Life of ApoUonius 1.15). In the Greek East, the right of asylum in certain temples, such as the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, had long been recognised. But the idea of asylum was alien to traditional Roman law, since it seemed to offer an extra-judicial escape from deserved punishment. And it was open to abuse. In AD 22, the Roman senate received a report (which may well have been exaggerated) that: 'Throughout the Greek cities, there was a growing laxity in granting rights of asylum, so that criminals escaped punishment. Temples were filled with the dregs of slaves, the same asylum was granted to debtors escaping their creditors, and to men suspected of capital offences' (Tacitus, Annak 3.60). The senate determined to restrict the number of sanctuaries, and with that in mind, investigated the rights of various cities. Some sanctuaries were said to stretch back centuries to a mythical past, while the Cretans 221

Divine

emperors

claimed rights of sanctuary for a statue of Augustus (Tacitus,

ibid.

3- 3)* 6

The very existence of a supreme emperor tempted appeals to the highest authority. In both civil and criminal cases, Roman citizens even in the provinces could appeal to Caesar. If they were lucky, like St Paul, they were sent to Rome for trial. But citizenship did not always afford protection. The town magistrates at Philippi (northern Greece) had St Paul flogged and imprisoned; next day, when they discovered that he was a Roman citizen, they apologised (Acts 16). In Jerusalem, St Paul saved himself from another flogging by declaring his citizenship immediately to thetenturion in charge (Acts 22.25). He spent two years in captivity, while his case was being considered; it was said that the governor hoped for a bribe (Acts 24.26). Eventually when a new governor came, St Paul extricated himself from prosecution by Jewish leaders by appealing to Caesar. 'Then Festus [the governor], after conferring with his advisers, replied: "You have appealed to Caesar; to Caesar you shall go" (Acts 25.12). But when a murderer pleaded his Roman citizenship to another provincial governor, all he got for his trouble was an extra high white-washed cross to be crucified on (Suetonius, Galba 9). Several such cases show how erratically legal privileges were honoured. What concerns us here is not only the access to higher authority which some citizens gained through their right of appeal to Caesar, but also the feeling that Caesar was there to protect the rights of the underprivileged against injustice. It was this feeling which underwrote the extraordinary development by which slaves, the least privileged stratum in Roman society, could appeal against malreatment by their masters to the statue of Caesar (Seneca, On Mercy 1.18). By the middle of the first century AD, slaves in Rome had an established right to flee to the statue of the emperor to complain against outrageous cruelty; starvation or enforced prostitution (Ulpian, D. 1.12.1.8; Labeo and Sabinus (consul in AD 69) cited in Ulpian, D. 21.1.17.12). If their case was upheld, they were sold to another master. Emperors had to steer a delicate course. They did not wish to undermine the slave-owners' traditional rights: 'the powers of masters over their slaves should not be diminished' (decree of Antoninus Pius, D. 1.6.2); after all, emperors' own power rested upon respect for tradition. At the same time, with the plea of public interest, emperors sought to earn their reputation for all-seeing justice by checking outrageous abuses. T f you exercise authority with revolting cruelty, the provincial governor may be forced. 34

34

I follow here Jones

Sklavenflucht

(i960: 53-65).

im römischen

Kaiserreich

On slaves' appeals, see H. Bellen, (Wiesbaden, 1971) 64-78. 222

Studien

zur

The living presence to prevent a possible breach of the peace by taking away your slaves with my authority' (decree of Antoninus Pius, Comparüon of the Laws of Moses and the Romans 3.3.6). We do not know how many slaves managed to exercise their rights by fleeing to the statue of Caesar; success must have been even more difficult for them than for Roman citizens. The difficulty of bringing off an appeal to Caesar successfully is caught beautifully by Apuleius in his satirical story, The Golden Ass. The author had just been turned into an ass by a magical error, when robbers broke into the magician's house in a small town in Greece and used the author-ass to carry away their booty:

I was almost dead

with the w e i g h t . . .

I d e c i d e d to a p p e a l to t h e civil a u t h o r i t i e s ,

by i n v o k i n g t h e v e n e r a b l e n a m e o f t h e e m p e r o r , a n d s o d e l i v e r m y s e l f f r o m

so m a n y m i s e r i e s . . .1 t r i e d to call o n t h e A u g u s t n a m e o f C a e s a r i n G r e e k , I called out * 0 \

c l e v e r l y a n d l o u d l y , b u t as f o r t h e rest o f C a e s a r ' s n a m e I

j u s t c o u l d n o t get it o u t . A n d t h e t h i e v e s w e r e f u r i o u s w i t h m e f o r b r a y i n g a n d s l a s h e d m y p o o r s k i n u n t i l it w a s n ' t fit f o r a n y t h i n g . (3.29)

In real life, the appeals of many slaves must have been similarly frustrated by their owners' violent punishment. But the mere possibility of making an appeal, even dreaming about it or telling stories about how others had successfully done it, must have been important, just as the myth of the poor man becoming the President of the USA has been more important in fantasy than in reality. Yet, in fact, it was significant that the sellers of slaves in Rome reassured buyers by claiming that the slave was 'neither a gambler, nor a thief, nor had he ever fled to [Caesar's] statue' (Ulpian, D. 2 1 . 1 . 1 9 . 1 ) . The statues were a silent court of appeal against injustice, and not merely for slaves. An unsuccessful claimant in Egypt, dis appointed in his appeals to the local bureaucrat, finally deposited his petition 'in the temple of Augustus at the feet of our Lord and most divinely favoured emperor Gaius.. .Trajan Decius' ( C P R 20, AD 250). The statue of the emperor was the only court of appeal available to him. The statues and portraits of the emperors helped maintain a living presence of the emperors in public places and in the consciousness of subjects. These statues were not necessarily objects of worship, especially as worship is commonly understood in our culture; rather the emperor's statues and portraits were objects of homage or respect, symbols of the emperors' legitimate authority. This point is well made by a bishop called Severian, who preached at the end of the fourth century. 35

35

See H. Kruse, Studien zur offiziellen Geltung der Kaiserbildes im römischen Reiche (Paderborn, 1934). 223

Divine

emperors

Consider how many governors there are in all the world. Since the emperor is not with them all, the emperor's picture has to be put u p in courts of justice, in market places, in meeting-houses, in theatres. T h e emperor's picture must be put in every place in which the governor exercises power, in order to give his acts authority. (Sermons on the Creation of the World 6.5 = PG 56.489) I do not know how far back this practice went or how widespread it was in the early Roman Empire, but there is one instance recorded from north Africa in the second century in which the defendant appealed to the emperor's statue in the court room as the final arbiter of propriety (Apuleius, Apology 85). And the custom persists even today: portraits of the President of the USA, of British monarchs and of Chairman Mao Tse-tung adorn different court-rooms and public offices throughout the world. The cult of the emperor, alone or associated with other gods, was particularly important to the authorities in the Roman army. Emperors continued the Republican tradition of taking tides (such as Germanicus, Parthicus) to celebrate the victories of their armies, and were ever conscious of the need to foster a special relationship with the army - as Commander in Chief (Imperator), as leader in battle (a role played by Caligula and Claudius as well as by Vespasian, Trajan and Marcus Aurelius among others), and as benefactor, donor and paymaster. Soldiers' loyalty and their will tofightbravely were enhanced by having their minds fixed on the greatness and glory of the ruler of the known world, the divine emperor in Rome. From the first century onwards, the emperor's portrait was carried (like a flag or in medallions) along with the other military standards (Tacitus, Histories 1.41 and 4.62). Indeed a special soldier (the imaginifer - C I L 13.1895) was entrusted with the task of carrying this royal standard for each unit. Reverence was given to the emperor, or to his Genius, alongside the military standards, and emperors were worshipped or closely associated with divinity on altars set up by officers in military camps throughout the empire. For example, in a British fort near Hadrian's wall, two altars have been found inscribed: T o the Genius of our Lord and of the standards of the first cohort of the Vardulli and the Unit of Scouts...' ( R I B 1262) and *To the God Matunus for the welfare of Marcus Aurelius who reigns for the good of the human race' (RIB 1265). In other contexts too, the presence or power of the emperors was recognised in the custom of swearing oaths by the emperor, or by the emperor's Genius (or Tyche), just as, in other circumstances, men swore, as they still do, by a god (Jupiter, God, Christ). Of course, there 4

36

M

On the importance of the imperial cultin the army, see Fink, Hoey and Snyder (1940). 224

The living

presence

was an element of formulaic repetitiveness in oaths; but nonetheless, the style of such formalities has to be taken seriously. For example, on the accession of the emperor Caligula in AD 37, the inhabitants of Aritium in Portugal swore the following oath of loyalty: \ .. If con sciously I swear falsely or am proved false, may Jupiter the Best and Greatest and the deified Augustus and all the other immortal Gods punish me and my children with loss of my homeland, with loss of security and of all my fortune' ( C I L 2.172: adapted from the trans lation in Ancient Roman Statutes). It is noteworthy that the deified ancestor of the new emperor kept the highest company. In less formal acts, it also became common practice to swear what came to be known as 'the divine oath' ( P . Oxy. 85). For example, in a will made in the second century AD in Italy, the testator appealed to the local town-councillors: *I ask and beg you by the welfare of the most holy (sacratissimi) emperor' ( I L S 6468) to keep the terms of the will. In Egypt, many papyri show that statements made in court, routine statements of tax obligations, and even of record-keeping were sworn to be true 'By the Fortune of the Emperor* (e.g. P . Oxy. JJ), or by the emperor himself: ' I swear by the Emperor Caesar Marcus Aurelius Commodus Antoninus Augustus that the above statements are correct' (AD 180-92 - P. Oxy. 79 cf. 246). And a master manumitting a slave in central Greece did it 'in the presence of the priest of Sarapis and of Isis, and before the aforesaid Gods and the Augustus Trajan Caesar Germanicus' ( I G 9.1.86 Hyampolis). Since the emperor Trajan himself was certainly not there in person, the manumittor was either relating to a statue or to a metaphorical presence, which gave his act supreme validity. In consequence, the violation of the oath involved the law-breaker, or tax defrauder not merely in crime, but also in sacrilege. The oaths of subjects, voluntarily undertaken, legitimated aspects of the political order by appeals to the religious and moral order. Romans did not always think well of their emperors. The ubiquitous imperial statues were also targets for attack. They were exposed to popular hostility as well as to admiration. Indeed, at times ofriotor rebellion, the emperors' statues were often the prime target, much easier to overthrow than the emperor himself. For example, a crowd of rioters in Antioch objected violendy to an increase in taxation in AD 387:

. . . seeing the many images (of the emperor) on painted panels, they committed blasphemy by throwing stones at them, and jeered at them as they were smashed. / T h e statues of the emperor and of the empress were thrown down 225

Divine

emperors

and dragged through the city, and as is usual o n such occasions, the enraged multitude uttered every insult which passion could suggest. (Libanius, Speech 22.7 / Sozomen, History of the Church 7,23) On other occasions the rioters indulged in ostentatious hostility, mal treating the statue of the emperor like a common criminal. Libanius against tells how once the citizens of Edessa pulled down a bronze statue of the emperor Constandne and dragged it through the streets face downwards, hitting it like a school-boy as it went with straps 'on the back and the parts below as befitted someone furthest removed from royalty* (Libanius, Speech 19.48). In this way, the populace exor cised their anger and then spent anxious days in trepidation, awaidng condign punishment, while officials diplomatically pleaded their basic innocence, since only the statues and not the emperor himself had been harmed (John Chrysostom, Homilies on the Statues, PG 49, 73 and 216). The destruction of the image sometimes symbolised, not merely discontent, but rebellion. For example, the end of Galba's regime was dramatically signalled, when the colour-bearer of the imperial escort, at the approach of rebel troops, tore the portrait of Galba from its standard and dashed it to the ground (Tacitus, Histories 1.41; cf. Plutarch, Galba 26). Once an unpopular emperor had been dethroned and killed, the desecration of his statues, the erasure of his name from the historical record, in short, the damnation of his memory, invited widespread and uninhibited participation. The staid senator Pliny re called the delight with which Domitian's golden statues had been deposed after his assassination.

It was our delight to dash those proud faces to the ground, to smite them with the sword and savage them with the axe, as if blood and agony could follow from every blow. Our transports of joy, so long deferred, were unrestrained; all sought a form of vengeance in beholding those mudlated bodies, limbs hacked in pieces, and finally that baleful, fearsome visage cast into the fire, to be melted d o w n . . .(Pliny, Panegyric 5 2 , trans by B. Radice, Loeb Classical Library) The violence of the hatred, almost primitive in its intensity, is sur prising. It indicates, perhaps better than eulogy, the high hopes which men had of their ideal emperors. Deification was merely one ritual expression of such hopes. 'For as the old proverb correcdy states: T o rule is to have the power of a god' (Artemidorus, The Interpretation of Dreams 2.36). The hatred expressed by Pliny reflected the dis illusionment which men experienced when their expectations were betrayed by a bad ruler. The importance of the emperor in the minds of men and the close 226

The living

presence

association of the emperor with the gods can be seen in the Roman response to attacks upon their religious-political culture. The most systematic attacks were launched by Christians and by Jews. These attacks induced Romans in positions of power to identify the central elements in their own culture, which distinguished them from their attackers. Roman accusations against the Christians, according to the Christian apologist Tertullian, for example, were:' You do not worship the gods; you do not offer sacrifice for the emperors' (Apology 10). Thus, emperor worship, in association with the worship of the other pagan gods, had become a defining characteristic of the Roman political system, a test by which one Roman recognised another as a full member of the society. Indeed loyalty to the emperor, seen as divine or favoured by the gods, was probably the only universal symbol of belonging available to the Romans and valid for all social groups in all provinces of the empire. Let me illustrate this point by quoting from the dramatic dialogues between Roman judges and Christian martyrs. The hagiographical literature is suspect in many ways, but I shall quote here from those Acts of the Martyrs, or those passages in the Acts which are considered genuine records of court cases. The first excerpt is from the Acts of the twelve Scillitan Martyrs, executed in Africa in AD 180; their leader was Speratus. 37

Saturninus the proconsul said: You can earn the pardon of our Lord the Emperor if you return to your senses. Spearatus said: We have done n o wrong, we have never turned our hands to wickedness, we have cursed no one, but return thanks when we are abused, and therefore we are loyal to our Emperor. Saturninus the proconsul said: We too are religious, and our religion is simple, and we swear by the Genius of our Lord the Emperor, and we make offerings for his safety, which you ought to d o too. Speratus said: If you will listen, I shall tell you a mystery of simplicity. 37 F. Millar,1 The Imperial Cult and the persecutions * in Le culte des souverains (see note 10) i45ff. has argued powerfully, and I think wrongly, for the unimportance of the imperial cult in the Christian persecutions before the mid third century. In his view, moderns have underestimated the pagan religious elements in the persecutions; in many or most of the persecutions of Christians, he claims, the critical test was sacrifice to the gods; the worship of the emperor, and sacrifice to the gods for the emperor's welfare, were in his view of modest importance, partly because emperor worship was integrated into the wider spectrum of pagan cults. I agree that the imperial cult was less important in most circumstances than other major pagan cults, and that the motive for persecuting Christians was probably fear that neglect of pagan gods would damage humans, Romans, everybody. But I think that the evidence also shows that the emperor, and his close association with the gods, repeatedly appeared as a critical element in most accounts pf the prosecution of Christians. 227

Divine

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Saturninus said: I shall not listen if you speak evil of what we hold sacred; please swear by the Genius of our Lord the Emperor. Speratus said: I d o not recognise the empire of this world; I serve instead the God whom no man has ever seen or can see with mortal eyes. I have not committed theft; but if I buy anything, I pay the tax o n it; for I recognise my Lord, T h e King of Kings and Emperor of all Mankind. Saturninus the proconsul said to the rest: Stop being of this belief.. . D o not be involved in this man's madness. (Acts of the Scillitan Martyrs). 38

They refused, the proconsul offered them a period of thirty days in which to think it over; they refused. So he ordered them to be beheaded. They all said: * Thanks be to God; and so they were all crowned with martyrdom together and reign with the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit for ever and ever. Amen.' The sequence is similar in other acts of the martyrs. If these reports are accurate, they reflect surprisingly well on the Roman magistrates who clearly preferred to reform rather than punish Christians. But once the Christians had adamandy refused to recant, and had boldly professed their faith, they often earned martyrdom only after the most terrible tortures. Two further examples of official conversations illustrate the centrality of the emperor's divinity: \ . . they tried to persuade him, saying "Now what harm is there in saying Caesar is L o r d . . . Swear by the Genius of Caesar"' (The Martyrdom of St Polycarp 8-9). * Change your mind, said the proconsul Perennis; take my advice, Apollonius, and swear by the Genius of our Lord the Emperor Cornmodus', and then again \ . .sacrifice to the gods and to the image of the Emperor Commodus' (The Martyrdom of St Apollonius 3 and 7). Of course; (a) sacrifice to the image of the emperor or (b) swearing by the emperor's genius or (c) sacrificing to the gods for the welfare of the emperor are distincdy different acts, but they can all be understood as blending into each other, as a fusion of religious and political processes. In yet other prosecutions of Christians, the emperor appeared first as the political authority who had ordered the observation of pagan rites. * You surely know the emperors' decrees that you must honour the gods' (The Martyrdom of Saints Carpus, Papylus and Agathonice 4 (cf. 11 Greek version). But even this presentation of the emperor as 39

38

39

I follow here the translation of T. D. Barnes, TertuUian (Oxford, 1971) 61; his chapter on the persecutions is excellent, as is his article * Legislation against the Christians', Journal of Roman Studies 58 (1968) 32ft. See also W. H. C. Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church (Oxford, 1965) and G. E. M. de Ste Croix, 'Why were the early Christians persecuted?* in M. I. Finley ed.; Studies in Ancient Society (London, 1974) 21 off. For the other martyr acts, I broadly follow the translations given by H. Musurillo, The Acts of the Christian Martyrs (Oxford, 1972). For similar passages, see also the martyrdoms of St Justin (B) 2 and St Pionius 3, cf. 5.2 and 8.4. 228

The living presence protector of the faith seems important, and his divine associations were only just in the background: 'By allowing you to babble on so much, said the proconsul, I have allowed you to blaspheme the gods and the August Emperors* (ibid. 21). From the pagan side, we get a similar story; the following excerpt comes from the famous letter written by the provincial governor Pliny to the emperor Trajan:

For the moment this is the line I have taken with all persons brought before me on the charge of being Christians. I have asked them in person if they are Christians, and if they admit it I repeat the question a second and third time, with a warning of the punishment awaiting them. If they persist, I order them to be led away for execution... Now that I have begun to deal with this problem, as so often happens, the charges are becoming more widespread and increasing in variety. An anonymous pamphlet has been circulated which contains the names of a number of accused persons. A m o n g these I considered that I should dismiss any who denied that they were or ever had been Christians, when they had repeated after me a formula of invocation to the gods and had made offerings of wine and incense to your statue (which I had brought near for this purpose along with the images of the g o d s ) . . . (Pliny, Letters 10.96 from the translation by B. Radice, Loeb Classical Library) It seems quite clear from this considerable evidence that acknow ledgement of the emperor's divinity or of his close association with the pagan gods played a critical part in the formal judgement that self-confessed Christians were not full members of Roman society. Of course, it is difficult to know what most provincials felt about the emperor. I do not want to exaggerate or to romanticise their attachment. It seems obvious that some prayers to the emperor were recited without feeling, that some games were celebrated only nominally in the emperor's honour, and that some altars or statues were erected by magistrates to emperors primarily out of duty or to advertise the donor's generosity. Yet the several thousand surviving inscriptions honouring the emperor represent considerable solemn ceremony. Public bodies, local magistrates and private citizens voted honours, dedicated altars and public buildings to the emperor. They have been found all over the empire, from the east and from the west and from Italy, and from all periods including the reign of Augustus: triumphal arches, huge altars, porticoes, temples, colossal statues of stone, or small ones of silver or bronze; some, as we have seen, declaimed the full tide of the emperor and asserted his legitimate succession stretching back over generations. Others associated the emperor more or less direcdy with a god or gods. Two examples from Roman Africa and Syria, and from the first and second century respectively will suffice: 229

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Sacred to Ceres Augusta C. Rebellius Blandus consul, state priest, Governor [of the Province] Dedicated Suphunibal Benefactress of her home town Annobal Ruso Provided With her own Money for the Erection (The Inscriptions of Roman Tripolitania 269; from Leptis Magna, an altar of ten limestone blocks altogether 12 m long; AD 35-6) T o Jupiter Best and Greatest, to Venus, Mercury and the Gods of Heliopolis For the Safety and Victories of our Lord Antoninus Pius Felix Augustus And of Julia Augusta, Mother of Our Lord, and for the Army, Senate and Fatherland Aurelius Antoninus Longinus, military policeman (speculator) of the 3rd Legion - the Gallic Antonine Has given the Capitals of T w o Columns in Gilded Bronze at his own Expense Willingly in Accomplishment of his Vow (Inscriptions grecques et latines de la Syrie vol. 6, 2 7 1 1 - 1 2 ; Baalbek, early third century). The synthesis of gods with Augustus in a single dedication (for example, to Apollo Augustus, Mars Augustus) is extremely interesting. Hundreds of similar inscriptions have been found from all over the empire and all periods. The emperor was associated with almost every god, for example with Aesculapius, Ceres, Hercules, Isis, Mercury, Neptune and Venus, and on monuments great and small: ranging from the huge temple of Jupiter Augustus in Cyrene set up in the reign of Augustus (PBSR 26 (1958) 38) to a humble undated stone slab set up in southern Spain to Apollo and Aesculapius Augustus ( C I L 2.2004).

It is possible that men had in their minds only the god, to whom they gave the added tide Augustus. But even that is revealing. The local gods of conquered peoples were slowly assimilated to the GraecoRoman Pantheon of the conquerors. Sometimes, the Roman and native gods merged into one, as for example in Britain and Gaul, where several dedications to Mars Lenus have been found ( R I B 309; C I L 13.3654). Sometimes a Roman god received the attributes of a native god and vice versa. For example, Jupiter was sometimes represented in Britain with a wheel (the attribute of the native god Taranis), or Celtic gods were depicted in traditional animal form, accompanied by the thunderbolt of Jupiter. In yet other cases, two gods, one Roman, one native were joined in a single cult, for example of Mercury and Rosmerta. Yet almost all of these numerous cults were only local. The Greek and Roman Pantheon served to integrate local gods into the religious frame of the conquerors. And beyond this, Augustus served 230

The living presence as the integrating title of them all. Most people may have been hazy about what this meant; only sophisticated litterateurs would have thought about it, and even then perhaps not clearly. It is enough that many people thought in a vague way that kings like gods had mystical powers, worth invoking in a public crisis and worth being grateful to for public well-being. Both the religious and the political world were under a single government-identified in one second-century inscrip tion from near Cordoba in Spain as Jupiter Pantheus Augustus (CJL 40

2.2008). OMENS A N D P O R T E N T S

Mystical power and close association with the gods implied magical power. This attribute of kings is well attested in other cultures. In England, for example, in the mid-seventeenth century, Charles I I touched about eight thousand people in one year to cure them of the King's Evil. His legitimacy was confirmed, both to himself and his people, by the ritual touch. For our present purposes, it was not the cure that mattered, but the widespread reporting of such cures as took place and the widespread belief in the King's curative powers. What of Roman emperors? Almost the only known miracles were performed by Vespasian just after his accession to the throne in AD 69 while he was at Alexandria waiting to sail to Rome. Tacitus wrote that at this time 'many miracles occurred'. 41

There seemed to be indications that Vespasian enjoyed heaven's blessing and that the gods showed a certain leaning towards him. A m o n g the lower classes at Alexandria was a blind man whom everybody knew as such. One day this fellow threw himself at Vespasian's feet, imploring him with groans to heal his blindness. H e had been told to make this request by Serapis, the favourite god of a nation much addicted to strange beliefs. H e asked that it might please the emperor to anoint his cheeks and eyeballs with the water of his mouth. A second petitioner, who suffered from a withered hand, pleaded his case too, also on the advice of Serapis: would Caesar tread upon him with his imperial foot? At first Vespasian laughed at them and refused. When the two insisted, he 40 The sophistication of philosophers and litterateurs was beyond most people. On this see the interesting book on the religious beliefs of a single village and the different levels of knowledge about the Buddhist and Taoist pantheon by D. K. Jordan, Gods, Ghosts and Ancestors (Berkeley, Calif.; 1972). For Roman religlion, J. Toutain, Les cultes patens dans Vempire romain (Pans, 1907-20) 3 vols, still seems best; cf. J. Ferguson, The Religions of the Roman Empire (London, 1970) for a brief account. 41 In general, M. Bloch, Les rots thaumaturges (Strasbourg, 1924) and the brilliandy evocative book by K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (London, 1973). On Vespasian's miracles, see A. D. Nock, Essays on Religion and the Ancient World, ed. Z. Stewart (Oxford, 1972) vol. 2,838. Hadrian was also said to have cured a man and a woman of their blindness (SHA, Hadrian 25); but on the whole recorded magical cures by Roman emperors were rare. 231

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hesitated. At o n e moment he was alarmed by the thought that he would be accused of vanity if he failed. At the next, the urgent appeals of the two victims and the flatteries of his entourage made him sanguine of success. Finally he asked the doctors for an opinion whether blindness and atrophy of this sort were curable by human means. T h e doctors were eloquent on the various possibilities... Perhaps this was the will of the gods, they added perhaps the emperor had been chosen to perform a miracle. Anyhow, if a cure were effected, the credit would g o to the ruler, if it failed, the poor wretches would have to bear the ridicule. So Vespasian felt that his destiny gave him the key to every door and that nothing now defied belief. With a smiling expression and surrounded by an expectant crowd of bystanders, he did what was asked. Instantiy the cripple recovered the use of his hand and the light of day dawned against upon his blind companion. Both these incidents are still vouched for by eye-witnesses, though there is nothing now to be gained by lying. (Tacitus, Histories 4.81 translated by K. Wellesley, Penguin Books) Several aspects of this dramatic account are interesting: the em peror's hesitation, his request for scientific information, the tempor ising doctors, the pressing flattery of the courtiers, the magical cure, the lasting belief. As with Christ, miraculous cures were part of the process of legitimation. Vespasian needed it, because 'he lacked authority and majesty, since he was unexpectedly and recendy called to the throne' (Suetonius, Vespasian 7). Portents provided an answer. In Suetonius' biographies of the first nine emperors, by far the highest number of portents presaging an emperor's rule relate to Augustus and Vespasian, both founders of a dynasty. T o quote but one example of many: an ox on Vespasian's country estate shook off its yoke when it was ploughing, burst into the dining-room where Vespasian was at table, scattered his servants and then, as if weary, knelt down and bowing its neck placed its head beneath Vespasian's feet (Suetonius, Vespasian 5). In Krauss' interpretation, the ox was the state; the overthrown symbolised Nero's tyranny. The truth of such stories and of their interpretation matters less than the fact that they were told and believed, not only by common folk but also by elite historians and litterateurs. Miracles, omens and portents, like ritual incantations, curses, astrological predictions, divinations, the interpretation of dreams, and belief in omnipresent maleficent and benevolent forces all contributed to the atmosphere in which Romans regarded their emperors as in 42

41

K. Scott,

(Stuttgart, 1936) 4; F. B. Krauss, An On the number of portents, see R. Lattimore, Classical Journal Augustus had 17, Vespasian 12;. the next highest was Galba 6, Tiberius 5 and Vitellius 3. The discrepancies are too marked to be meaningless. The

Interpretation

Imperial

of Omens..

Cult

under

the Flavians

.(Diss. Philadelphia,

1930) 173. 29 (1934) 443;

232

Omens and portents some sense like gods. Because of our modern rationalistic prejudices, we tend to underestimate the pervasiveness of the unpredictable, the inexplicable and the magical in the daily life of Romans, rich and poor, educated and uneducated. Yet even a cursory inspection of Artemidorus' Dream-book (especially Book 5) or Firmicus Maternus' text book on astrology or Julius Obsequens' book of prodigies should convince us how persecuted Romans were by the unknown; they sought to control it by propitiating sacrifice, prayer and magical incantation, and to understand it by the interpretation of signs. T o be sure, the books I have mentioned are store-houses of what we and some disbelieving Romans might have called superstitition, although it is worth recalling how seriously they were taken by most of their readers. Several emperors were devotees of astrology; magic men like Apollonius of Tyana were held in high social regard, and were consulted by both emperors and senators. Tricksters like Alexander from Abonoteichus held whole provinces to ransom, and induced even the emperor Marcus Aurelius in the hope of victory against border tribes to have two lions thrown into the Danube with a load of perfumes - the lions swam to the other bank, and the Romans suffered a tremendous defeat (Lucian, Alexander 48). Serious and scholarly historians and litterateurs, doctors and philosophers mingled careful observation and cynical detachment with credulous superstition. In our attempts to find out what 'really happened', we should be careful not to suppress what Romans thought was happening. It seems impossible to find a satisfactory index of the pervasiveness of what we might today call the irrational elements in Roman public life. We shall have to be content with illustrations. For this purpose, I shall concentrate on astrology. Of course, people look up their fate 43

43

It is difficult to integrate what we know of Roman magic with Roman elite politics; usually the two have been considered separately. A. Bouchl-Leclercq, L'astrologie grecque (Paris, 1899) 543-627 still serves as a useful introduction. R. Macmullen, Enemies of the Roman Order (Harvard, 1966) 95-162 has brought much recondite material together; his account is both tantalising and evocative, but the overall impression is confusing. W. and H. G. Gundel, Astrotogoumena (Wiesbaden, 1966) give an excellent account of the astrological tradition, including Firmicus Maternus. A. Barb, T h e Survival of Magic Arts' in A. D. Momigliano ed.; The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity (Oxford, 1963) illustrates excellendy what we know of magic and politics in the fourth century and P. Brown (Religion and Society in the Age of St Augustine (London, 1972) 119-46) subtiy interprets accusations of sorcery as weapons between established and unestablished factions in the elite. But above all, I must stress the pervasiveness of what we would call superstitious practices. For example, Augustus is said to have carried an amulet of seal-skin as a protection against thunder and lightning which frightened him (Suetonius, Augustus 90) and Julius Caesar is said to have repeated a prayer three times whenever he entered a carriage, to ensure a safe journey, * just as most people do nowadays* (Pliny, Natural History

28.21).

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in the stars nowadays, but among the Roman elite astrology was a major intellectual pursuit, a preoccupation which, like economics nowadays, coloured serious political behaviour. Men were killed for it. Domitian, for example, had a senator executed because it was generally known that he had an imperial horoscope (Suetonius, Domitian 10), and it was said that he would have killed his successor Nerva but for a friendly astrologer who assured the emperor that Nerva would die soon anyhow (Dio 67.15; cf. a similar story about Tiberius - Dio 58.27). Astrologers also predicted the manner, day and hour of Domitian's own death - and this may well have encouraged his assassins. 44

45

On the day before he was murdered, some apples were brought to him. 'Serve them tomorrow*, he said and added 'if it comes to pass.' T h e n turning to his companions, he remarked 'There will be blood o n the moon as she enters Aquarius and a deed will be done, which men will talk about all over the world.' In the middle of the night Domitian was so terrified that he jumped out of bed; first thing in the morning, he tried a sooth sayer, who had been brought from Germany on a charge of predicting a change of government.. .and condemned him to death. While he was scratching vigorously at the festering wart o n his forehead, he drew some blood; *I hope this is all the blood required', he said. (Suetonius, Domitian 16) He then asked the time; his attendants lied to him that it was the sixth hour, because they knew that he feared the fifth. 'Convinced that the 44

45

For example, the story is told that Nero was worried by the appearance of a comet on successive nights, since it was commonly believed to be a portent of the death of kings. The court astrologer (Balbillus, the son of Thrasyllus who was astrologer to Tiberius, see below ad note 46) advised Nero that kings usually averted the danger by killing some nobles. Nero set about this, all the more willingly when he discovered two conspiracies against him (Suetonius, Nero 36). Other emperors killed men who had imperial horoscopes: Tiberius (Dio 57.19), Domitian (Dio 67.15), Hadrian (SHA, Hadrian 23; CCAG 8.2.85: the horoscope of an ill-advised young man). In general, see the readable and informative book by F. H. Cramer, Astrology in Roman Law and Politics (Philadelphia, 1954). For the prediction, see Suetonius, Domitian 14 and Cramer (1954) 144; it is unreasonable to suppose that all such predictions took place after the event, although some obviously did. For example, Apollonius of Tyana, according to Philostratus (8.26), was credited with supernatural vision; when he was at Ephesus, he saw what was happening at Rome, stopped in the middle of a philosophical discussion and shouted: 'Strike the tyrant; strike him', as though he saw the murder taking place; incidentally the time of day and other details are different from those recorded by Suetonius. Accuracy mattered less than the moral of the story: the confrontation of philosopher and tyrant (7·iff.). The philosopher always won; for example, when he was brought to court before Domitian himself, he was accused of contempt; he is told to keep his eyes 'on the God of all Mankind'; 'at which he turned his eyes to the ceiling, to show that he had his eyes on Zeus' (8.4). This anti-establishment literature was careful to attack an emperor whose memory had been officially damned; even so, it still upheld the possibility of criticism. 234

Omens and portents danger had passed' Domitian happily went off to have a bath and was murdered. In such accounts, and there are several similar, it is difficult to distinguish truth from fiction. Do we have to? Once told and repeated such stories became part of the myth of kingship; the actors were not only assassins but agents of Fate. What happened had to be. In fact Suetonius lived through the reign of Domitian and was well connected at court; the story probably has some truth in it. However that may be, we know from him and from other historians and litterateurs that successive emperors Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Vespasian, Titus, Domitian and Hadrian (the list is not exhaustive) all took astrology seriously. And so, in antiquity, did their historians. Tacitus, for example, related how Thrasyllus, scholar and astrologer, became the confidant of Tiberius. When he was in exile in Rhodes, and his succession to the throne was very much in doubt, Tiberius took Thrasyllus, as he had taken other astrologers, to a high cliff and questioned him about his chances of becoming emperor. Tiberius was impressed by Thra syllus* answers. Finally, he asked Thrasyllus about his own horoscope for that day. Thrasyllus pondered, shuddered with fear and said he was threatened with a crisis. 'Then Tiberius embraced him and congratulated him on his fine prescience of danger and of his escape [from being thrown over the cliff], treated everything which Thrasyllus had told him as an oracle, and kept him among his closest friends' (Tacitus, AnnoU 6.21). The same story is told with minor variations by Suetonius and Dio and appears in an anonymous Byzantine astro logical fragment (CCAG 8.4.99). * a l s o ^ mutatis mutandis in the Greek, Armenian, Syriac and Ethiopic versions of the romantic and semi-fictional life of Alexander the Great. The recurrence of this myth in a different context casts some doubt on its credibility. That matters, but not as much as one might at first think. Political power and legitimacy rest not only in taxes and armies, but in the minds of men. The myths made up and told about emperors were part of the mystification which elevated the political sphere above everyday life. The stories circulated and were told whether they were true or not. Obviously emperors neither created nor controlled their currency (although they tried to), since emperors were often depicted B

u

t

s

t o

46

46

The Greek story is conventionally attributed to Ps. Callisthenes, Historic AUxandri Magni ed. Kroll (Berlin, 1926) 1.14. In the oldest (fifth-century) Armenian version, The Romance of Alexander the Great tr. A. M. Wolohojian (New York, 1969) the story is slighdy different, but the Syriac version is substantially the same with virtuoso variations (tr. E. A. W. Budge (Cambridge, 1889) 15-16) and so is the simpler Ethiopic version (tr. E. A. W. Budge (London, 1896) vol. 2, 32). 235

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in a light which they would not have chosen for themselves. The stories were created by subjects and so served as the batdeground and the catharsis of the conflicting emotions which power aroused. A comparison may help clarify the point. In a modern university, myths and stereotypes of the pedantic and absent-minded professor in one sense elevate him above other more worldly professors and students and yet at the same time depreciate him as merely 'academic*. The stories of the absent-minded professor's antics help preserve respect for the institution's core values, while allowing students a pigeon-hole into which they can dismiss those values as being inapplic able to themselves. Similarly, the story about the emperor and the astrologer implicidy deprecated the emperor's cruelty, while admitting his power (to kill astrologers) and acknowledging his final mercy; it • also contrasted the foolishness of most astrologers with the conquering wisdom of the astrologer royal (and perhaps by implication, of the story-teller). The royal astrologer survived to show that if properly done, astrology works. Roman astrologists felt most comfortable with the prediction of events which had already occurred. We can see this in the hundred or so surviving retrospective horoscopes recorded by Vettius Valens in the second century and the horoscope of the emperor Hadrian, cast after his death by Antigonus of Nicaea: 47

[At his birth, Hadrian had] the Sun in Aquarius 8 degrees, the Moon and Jupiter and the Horoscopos, the three together at the first degree of the same sign, namely Aquarius; Saturn in Capricorn 5 degrees and Mercury with it at 12 d e g r e e s . . . H e was adopted by a certain emperor [Trajan] related to him They lived together for two years and then he became emperor. H e was wise and educated so that he was honoured in shrines and temples. H e married only once; she was a virgin; they had n o children. H e had o n e sister; he quarrelled violently with his relatives. At the age of 63, he died of dropsy and difficulty of breathing (Pasthma). (Catalogus codicum astrologorum graecorum = CCAG vol. 6 , ed. W. Kroll (Brussels, 1903) 6 7 - 8 ; partly translated by O. Neugebauer and H. B. von Hosen, Greek Horoscopes (Philadelphia, 1959) 90.)

The astrologer then took each of these scanty pieces of information and explained which conjunction of the stars was responsible, and sometimes added how slight changes in the stars would have effected a different outcome. For example: 47

Vettius Valens, Anmobgiae ed. W. Kroll (Berlin, 1908). O. Neugebauer and H. B. Van Hosen, Greek Horoscopes (Philadelphia, 1959; see especially 8iff. and ijSff.) translate many of Valens* horoscopes and also date them by the conjunction of stars. Such retrospective horoscopes were used to instruct would-be astrologers. Valens expected his readers to swear to keep what they read 'mysterious and guarded' (7. pr.)236

Omens and portents He was wise and educated and stern because Mercury with Saturn was in the morning phase in the twelfth locus with the Sun attendant... He was honoured and worshipped by all, because with the Sun attendant, the star of Jupiter occupied a cardinal point.. .and he gave benefits to many and was wor shipped by many, as I have said, because of the cardinal position of the Sun and the Moon.. .{CCAG 6.69-70) These interpretations were more contentious than is at first appar ent. Was the emperor controlled by the stars? Was it proper for his subjects to know his fate? And, most important, who were the others fated to become kings? According to the lawyer Ulpian, nearly every emperor prohibited astrology; on ten occasions in the first century astrologers were expelled from Rome; meanwhile emperors retained their services, and senators continued surreptitiously to consult them even in exile (for one example, see Tacitus, AnnoU 16.14). The proscriptions probably had the opposite effect from the one intended: they increased astrologers' prestige (Juvenal, Satires 6.55JR.). Besides, the sheer repetition of the laws illustrates their ineffectiveness, the demand for magic was too strong to be suppressed by law. In recognising astrology, emperors acknowledged the existence of an authority higher than themselves. Of course, unlike Christianity, astrology was not based on a single sacred text, interpreted into an orthodox dogma by a hierarchy of priests with exclusive congregations of parishioners. Unlike Christianity, therefore, astrology and other pagan beliefs posed no substantial threat or limitation to imperial power. Nevertheless, emperors even if they could not gain a monopoly by exiling astrologers, wanted to control access to them. Ideally, they succeeded. The following extract is taken from the book of astrological learning (Mathesis) written by the senator Firmicus Maternus in the fourth century; some of his formulations were con temporary, but much of his work was copied from earlier treatises which have been lost. 48

Never reply to anyone who asks about the condition of the State or the life of the Roman emperor. It is both morally wrong and illegal.. .An astrologer who replies when he is asked about the fate of the emperor is a disgrace and deserves all the punishment he gets, because he really can neither say nor discover anything...

* The recorded expulsions of astrologers are listed by Cramer (1954: 234). * Prophets who pretend to be inspired by a god are by decree expelled from the state, lest public morals be seduced by human credulity into hoping for change, or lest they excite the minds of the people.. .Who ever consults astrologers, soothsayers, omeninterpreters or prophets about the health of the emperor or about high matters, shall be executed together with the person who gave an answer.. .And if slaves consult about the health of their masters, they are to be punished with crucifixion' (Paul, Opinions 5.21); cf. Ulpian, Comparison of the Laws of Moses and the Romans 15.2. 237

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In fact no astrologer could find out anything true about the desdny of the emperor. The emperor alone is not subject to the course of the stars and in his fate alone the stars have no powers of determination. Since he is the master of the whole world, his destiny is governed by the judgement of the god most high; since the whole of the earth's surface is subject to the power of the emperor, he himself is also considered among those gods whom the supreme power has set up to create and conserve all things... For all free-born men, all orders, all the rich, all the nobles, all the officials, all powers serve him; he is endowed with the power of divine authority and immortal freedom and is numbered among the first rank of the gods. (Mathesis 2.30; translation adapted from J. R. Bram, Ancient Astrology (Park Ridge, N.J.; 1 9 7 5 »

In practice, these prohibitions were ignored. Ptolemy, the great astronomer and geographer of the second century, also wrote an astrological treatise, in which inter alia he recorded the conjunction of the stars which would bring a new-born child to imperial power (Tetrabiblos 4.3). In spite of the risk, senators repeatedly sought out imperial horoscopes and emperors repeatedly executed those whom they considered potential even if improbable rivals. One rare excep tion was noted by Suetonius: the emperor Titus was so confident in the security of his own Fate that he spared two patricians who had been convicted of aspiring to the throne. .. .his only reaction was to advise them to desist, since.. .the Principate was a gift of Fate.. .the next day, he deliberately seated them near him at a gladiatorial show and offered them the combatants' swords brought to him for inspection. It is also said that he consulted the horoscopes of both men and warned both of them that they would be in danger, but at some other time and from someone else - quite correcdy as events proved. (Suetonius, Titus

9)

Fact or fiction, astrology the real reason or an embroidered pretext for well-considered ostentatious clemency? We do hot now, nor do we have to choose. As we have seen, such stories circulated in court circles and among the population at large. They were the currency of the political system. They have been largely ignored or under estimated by rationalistic historians, partly because historians are look ing for something more recognisably 'fact', and partly because such accounts fuse moral and metaphysical myth with what we might rashly and in an old-fashioned way call objective truth. However much we may regret this fusion, we can at least be glad that Suetonius, Tacitus and Pliny did not write modern scholarly histories. I took astrology as an example because it provided the Roman upper-class with a theatre for the fusion of their moral, mystical and political views. Of course, it provided much else as well: predictions 238

Omens and portents about length of life, character, wealth, happiness, the choice of a wife, the sex of children, the outcome of an illness and style of death (cf. Ptolemy, TetrobMos 4.1-9). Instead of astrology, it would have been possible to use dreams, or omens or magic (each was prevalent at all levels of Roman society, from emperors to beggars), to illustrate not merely the nature of Roman 'superstititions', but also the force of the supernatural which rulers and subjects had to take into account. For example, Tacitus reported how Germanicus Caesar, the emperor Tiberius' adopted son died; he had a relapse aggravated by his belief that Piso, the governor of Asia, in whose house he was staying had poisoned him; he had his sick-room investigated. 'Examination of the floor and walls of his bedroom revealed the remains of human bodies, spells, curses, lead tablets inscribed with the patient's name, charred and bloody ashes and other malignant objects which were supposed to consign souls to the powers of the tomb* (AnruUs 2.69 transl. by M. Grant, Penguin books). Of course, we know that Germanicus did not die from magic; but Germanicus as reported by Tacitus, clearly thought otherwise (ibid. 2.71). And the emperor Hadrian on a visit to Egypt was reportedly impressed by the magical skill of the priest of Isis:

Pachrates, the prophet of Heliopolis, demonstrated the spell to the emperor Hadrian, to reveal the power of his magic. For by his spell, he caused a man to come to him within o n e hour, caused him to take to his bed within two hours and caused his death within seven hours. H e also caused a dream to be sent to the emperor himself which [acquainted] him with the complete truth about his magical powers. T h e emperor was amazed by the prophet and ordered that he be given a double salary. (Papyri graecae magicae ed. K. Preisendanz, vol. 1, 148) In most cases, presumably, magic was used in the service of highly personal interests, as in lovers' spells, remedies for sickness, or in curses on the unfaithful. For example, figurines have been found, with heads cut off, arms and legs tied tight behind the back with leaden cords; bronze nails transfix the heart and stomach. With these figures went curses inscribed on lead tablets invoking outlandish gods; the following example was found in north Africa; it was written in Latin transcribed into Greek letters, perhaps to make it more mysterious and effective; 49

* On figurines, see A. Audoilent, Defixionum TabeUae (repr. Frankfurt, 1967) esp. and Sophronius, Miracles of St. Cyrus and St. John (PG 87.3541-8); on magical spells, see K. Preisendanz, Papyri graecae magicae (Stuttgart8, 1973-4) with a German translation; S. Eitrem, Magical Papyri - Papyri Osloenses 1 (Oslo, 1925); and recendy a long example translated and explained by D. Wortmann, 'Neue magische Texte', L X X I X

Bonner

Jahrbucher

168 (1968) S$ft.

*39

Divine

emperors

I call to witness and entreat.. .by the great god and by Anterotas and by him who has a hawk above his head and by the seven stars, that from the moment I have written this, Sexdlius son of Dionysia may not sleep, but will burn with fever; let him not sleep, sit nor speak, but let him have m e Sepdma, daughter of Amoena on his mind; let him burn furiously with love and desire for me, let the mind and heart of Sexdlius son of Dionysia burn with love and desire for m e Sepdma, daughter of Amoena. A n d you Abar Barbarie Eloe Sabaoth Pachnouphy Pythipemi, ensure that sleep does not touch Sexdlius son of Dionysia, but let him burn with love and desire for me, let the spirit, heart and all the limbs of the whole body of Sextilius son of Dionysia be on fire. If you d o not achieve this, I shall g o down to the shrine of Osyris and dismande the tomb and send it to be torn away by the river, for I am the great deacon of the great god Achrammachalala.. .(A. Audollent, Defixionum Tabellae (repr. Frankfurt, 1967) 270) Yet sometimes as in astrology, personal magic and the political sphere overlapped. The following curse, one of several against adver saries in court-cases, was uttered against Theodorus tentatively identified as a governor of Cyprus: 'Spirits below the earth, spirits everywhere... take away the danger of Theodorus against m e . . . take away his power and strength, make him lifeless and speechless...' (T. B. Mitford, The Inscriptions of Kourion (Philadelphia, 1971) 130-1). And there followed a curse, which might have sounded impressive, but which seems unintelligible. Yet other spells were thought to be immensely powerful; 'brings victory, works even with kings'.. .'also brings men to women and women to men, and makes virgins run out from their homes' (Papyri Osloenses 1). These infernal forces could either help emperors or hinder them. Therefore they had to be dealt with, placated and sometimes their agents on earth had also to be indulged. Since kings and gods had many similar powers, it was important to make sure that they were all fighting on the same side.

I am I s i s . . . I gave a n d ordained laws unto men, which no one is able to c h a n g e . . . I divided the earth from the h e a v e n . . .1 ordered the course of the sun and the m o o n . . . I made strong the right. I brought together woman and m a n . . . I ordained that parents should be loved by their children... I taught men to honour images of the g o d s . . . I broke down the government of tyrants. (IG 12.5.14; an inscription from Ios, second or third century AD; transl. A. Deissmann (1910: 136-7)) Religion, as the Christians showed, was the one power-base within Roman society from which opposition against the regime could be effectively launched.

240

Conclusions CONCLUSIONS

The prevalence of magical practices and of astrological beliefs among rich and poor, powerful and weak does not explain emperor-worship. Nor does the pervasiveness in daily life of unknown mystic powers. But they provided the necessary conditions in which emperor worship flourished. We started with the question: Why did the Romans, con trary to their dominant political and religious traditions, grow to accept the idea that their visibly human ruler was a god? T o answer this, we invoked in the traditional way a whole array of factors concerning the origin, transmission, acceptance and institutionalisation of emperor cults, without being able to attach specific weight to any of them. They included: the reluctant acceptance of eastern *flattery',popular belief in Julius Caesar's and Augustus' divine connections, the close asso ciation of Augustus and the succeeding emperors with a divine father and with other gods, the appeal to emperors in public and private oaths, and the widespread initiative of provincials in celebrating the emperor's divinity with sacrifices, statues and festivals. Our initial question (why did Romans worship emperors?) had its origins not only in the earlier Roman sceptical dismissal of emperorworship as alien, but also probably in our modern rationalistic anti pathy to 'superstition' as unworthy of a 'fact-based' history. This antipathy has allowed modern scholars systematically to under-value repetitive and inflated honorary decrees and the myths whether true or fabricated, reported by serious Roman historians. Modern scholarly concentration on * facts' and on the surviving epigraphic * evidence' has diverted attention from the beliefs and feelings which prompted the creation of the evidence. Investigation along these lines gradually changed the focus of our discussion. We already know that in Graeco-Roman culture the dis tinction between man and god was blurred, not only by the existence of semi-divine figures, such as Hercules, and by spirits (manes, daimones), but also by ambiguities in feelings and expression. Belief can be, and often is, at odds with action; indeed there would be litde point in having ideals if they were always or even often realised. Nor is there any profit in accusing the inconsistent of hypocrisy or deceit; spoken scepticism and conformist superstition may simply belong to different pigeon-holes or different social contexts. It is dangerous therefore to deduce behaviour from statements about beliefs. As Pliny wrote: '... Do magic words and incantations have any power?... individually, one by one, our wisest minds have no faith in such things; but in mass, throughout their everyday lives, they act as though they believe, 241

Divine

emperors

without being aware of it' (Natural History 28.3). Sophisticated Romans may not have believed that the emperor was a god, nor did the courtiers who saw him, but they sacrificed to him, as though he was a god, and perhaps they covered the conflict of evidence with a metaphysical metaphor - god made manifest, son of god, the least of gods but highest of mortals, son of Apollo, Hercules on earth. Most people probably did not bother with the demarcation; the emperor was clearly both man and god. In the last part of this chapter, we returned to our main theme. The unity of a political system rests not only in shared institutions, taxes and military defences, but in shared symbols, in the minds of men. Emperor cults, and all that they involved: oaths, sacrifices, sharing meat and wine, processions, games, statues, images, the reading and recording of pompous decrees which under the pretext of honouring the emperor recorded the reluctant generosity of some local burgher, the hopeful embassies to the distant capital, the distant memory of an emperor's visit, the stories of sudden success at court, of the emperor's cruelty - all these provided the context in which inhabitants of towns spread for hundreds of miles throughout the empire could celebrate their membership of a single political order and their own place within it. Small wonder, then, if for such important purposes the distant emperor was in the collective mind 'transformed into a god among men' (Stobaeus, Anthologium 7.61 - see p. 198 above). 50

50

See V. Pareto, Mind and Society (London, 1935) vol. 1, io6ff. for surely the best sociological discussion of these aspects of Roman religion.

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Westermann W. L. (1955) The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity, Philadelphia. White A. N. (1966) Sherwin- The Letters of Pliny, Oxford. United Nations (1956) 'Methods for population projections by sex and age', Population Studies, New York. Zel'in K. K. (1969) Forms of Dependency in the Eastern Mediterranean in the Hellenistic Period by K. K. Zel'in and M. K. Trophimova, Moscow. MODERN WORKS C I T E D IN C H A P T E R I V

Alföldi A.

'Die Ausgestaltung des monarchischen Zeremoniells', archäologischen Instituts 49, iff., reprinted in Die monarchische Repräsentation im römischen Kaiserreiche, Darmstadt, 1970. Barnes T. D. (1976) 'Imperial campaigns 285-311 *, Phoenix 3 0 , 182fr. Bremer J. J. (1958) Asexualisation, Oslo Ch'ien T. S. (1950) The Government and Politics of China, Harvard. Costa E. A. (1972) ' T h e Castrensis Sacri Palatii', Byzantüm 42, 358fr. Dorf man R. I. and Shipley R. A. (1936) The Androgens, New York. Dozy R. P. A. (1913). Spanish Islam, London. Dunlap J. E. (1924) The Office of the Grand Chamberlain in the Later Roman and Byzantine Empires, University of Michigan, Humanistic Series, 14, New York. Elias N. (1939). Uber den Prozess der Zivilisation, Basel. Elias N. (1969). Die höfische Gesellschaft, Berlin. Ensslin W. sv Praepositus Sacri Cubiculi in RE, Supplementband 8. Gaiffier B. d e (1957) 'Palatins et eunuques dans quelques documents hagiographiques', Analecta Bollandiana 75, 17fr. Gibbon E. (1896) The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. J. B. Bury, London, in seven volumes. Guilland R. (1943) 'Les eunuques dans l'empire byzantin', Etudes Byzantines (1934)

Mitteilungen

des deutschen

1, 197fr.

Herter H. sv Effeminatus in Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum Hopkins K. ( 1 9 6 3 ) ' Eunuchs in politics in the Later Roman Empire', of the Cambridge

Hug

sv Eunuchen

Philological

Society

189, 62fr.

in RE, Supplementband 249

3.

Proceedings

Modem

works cited in Chapter iv

Jones A. H. M. (1964) The Later Roman Empire, Oxford. Kasanin J. and Biskind G. R. (1943) ' Personality changes following substitution therapy in pre-adolescent eunuchoidism*, Journal of the American Medical Association,

1317fr.

Levy H. S. (1958). Harem Favourites of an Illustrious Celestial, Taiwan. Matignon J. J. (1896) Les eunuques d u palais impérial à Pékin, Bulletin de la société d'anthropologie de Paris, 4 série 7, 334fr. Matthews J. F. (1975) Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court, Oxford. Mez A. (1922) Die Renaissance des Islams, Heidelberg. Miliar F. (1977) The Emperor in the Roman World, London. Runciman S. (1933) Byzantine Civilisation, London. Schnee H. (1953-5) Die Hoffinanz und die moderne Staat. Geschichte und System der Hoffaktoren an deutschen Fürstenhofen im Zeitalter des Absolutismus, Berlin. Setton K. M. (1941 ) Christian Attitudes towards the Emperor in the Fourth Century, New York. Simpson S. L. (1957) 'Hormones and behaviour patterns', British Medical e

Journal,

Stern S. Central

839.

(1950)

The Court

Europe,

Jew, A Contribution

Philadelphia.

to the History

of Absolutism

in

Tschepe P. A. (1909) Histoire du royaume de Ts'in (777-207 av. J . - G ) , Shanghai. Thompson E. A. (1947) The Historical Works of Ammianus Marcellinus, Cambridge. Weber M. (1968) Economy and Society, New York. Williams S. W. (1904) The Middle Kingdom, New York. Wittfogel K. A. (1957) Oriental Despotism, New Haven. Yang L.-S. (1958) 'Great families of Eastern Han* translated in Chinese Social History, Washington. MODERN WORKS C I T E D IN C H A P T E R V

Anderson P. (1974) Lineages of the Absolutist State, London. Barb A. (1963) ' T h e survival of magic arts' in A. D. Momigliano, ed., The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity, Oxford. Barnes T . D. (1971) Tertullian, Oxford. Barnes T. D. (1968) 'Legislation against the Christians', Journal of Roman Studies

58, 32fr.

Beau jeu J. (1955) La religion romaine à l'apogée de l'empire, Paris. Bellen H . (1971) Studien zur Sklavenflucht im römischen Wiesbaden. Bickerman E. (1972) in Le culte des souverains dans l'empire romain, Hardt, Entretiens 19, Geneva. Bloch M. (1924) Les roü thaumaturges, Strasbourg. Bouché-Leclercq A. (1899) L'astrologie grecque, Paris. Bowersock G. (1972) in Le culte des souverains dans l'empire romain, Hardt, Entretiens 19, Geneva. Boyce G. K. (1937) 'Corpus of the Lararia of Pompeii'; Memoirs of the Academy

at Rome

14.

250

Kaiserreich, Fondation

Fondation American

Modem

works cited in Chapter v

Brown P. (1972) Religion and Society in the Age of St Augustus, London. Cramer F. H. (1954) Astrology in Roman Law and Politics, Philadelphia. Croix G. M. de Ste (1974) 'Why were the early Christian Persecuted?' in M. I. Finley, ed., Studies in Ancient Society, London. Deissman A. (1910) Light from the Ancient East, London. Delatte L. (1942) Les traités de la royauté, Liège. Duthey R. (1972) 'La fonction sociale d e l'Augustalité', Epigraphica 36, 134fr. Eisenstadt S. N. (1963) The Political Systems of Empires, New York. Etienne R. (1958) Le culte impérial dans la péninsule ibérique, Paris. Fears J. R. (1977) Princeps a Dits Electus, Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome 26, Rome. Ferguson J. (1970) The Religions of the Roman Empire, London. Fink R. O., Hoey A. S. and Snyder W. F. (1940) ' T h e Feriale Duranum', Yale Classical

Studies

7,

iff.

Frend W. H. C. (1965) Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church, Oxford. Geertz C. (1977) 'Centers, Kings and Charisma' in Ben-David J. and Clark T., eds., Culture and Its Creations, New York. Goodenough E. R. (1928) ' T h e political philosophy of Hellenistic kingship', Yale

Classical

Studies

1, 55fr.

Gundel W. and H. G. (1966) Astrologoumena, Wiesbaden. Jones A. H. M. (i960) Studies in Roman Government and Law, Oxford. Jordan D. K. (1972) Gods, Ghosts and Ancestors, Berkeley. Kramolisch H. (1975) 'Zur Ara des Kaisers Claudius in Thessalien*, Chiron 5, 337**. Krauss F. B. (1930) An Interpretation of Omens..., Diss. Philadelphia. Kruse H. ( 1934) Studien zur offiziellen Geltung des Kaiserbildes im römischen Reiche, Paderborn. MacCormack S. (1972) 'Change and continuity in late antiquity: the ceremony of adventus', Historia 21, 72iff. Mcllwain C. W. (1965) The Political Works of James I , New York. Macmullen R. (1966) Enemies of the Roman Order, Harvard. Marquardt J. (1957) Römische Staatsverwaltung, repr. Darmstadt, vol. 3. Mau A. (1908) Pompeii in Leben und Kunst, Leipzig. Millar F. (1972) ' T h e imperial cult and the persecutions* in Le Culte des souverains dans l'empire romain, Fondation Hardt, Entretiens 19, Geneva. Musurillo H. (1972) The Acts of the Christian Martyrs, Oxford. Neugebauer O. and Van Hosen H. B. (1959) Greek Horoscopes, Philadelphia. Nock A. D. Essays on Religion and the Ancient World, ed. Z. Stewart, Oxford. Pareto V. (1935) Mind and Society, London. Pearce T. E. V. (1970) 'Notes on Cicero, In Pisonem', Classical Quarterly 2 0 , 3'3 f f Premerstein A. von sv Augustales in DE. Ryberg I. S. (1955) 'Rites of the state religion in Roman art', Memoirs of the American

Academy

in Rome

22.

Samuel A. E. (1972) Greek and Roman Chronology, Munich. Scott K. (1924) The Imperial Cult under the Flavians, Strasbourg. Scott K. (1931) 'Honorific months', 251 Yale Classical Studies 2, 243fr.

Modern

works cited in Chapter v

Setton K. M. (1941) Christian Attitudes Towards the Emperor in the Fourth Century, New York. Taeger F. (1957-60) Charisma, Stuttgart, 2 vols. Taylor L. R. (1931) The Divinity of the Roman Emperor, Middletown, Conn. Thomas K. (1973) Religion and the Decline of Magic, London. Toutain J. (1907-20) Les cultes paiens dans I'empire romain, Paris, 3 vols. Vogel L. (i973> The Column of Antoninus Pius, Cambridge, Mass., 32ff. Weber M. (1968) Economy and Society, New York. Weinstock S. (1971) Divus Julius, Oxford. Wortmann D. (1968) 'Neue magische T e x t e \ Bonner Jahrbucher 168, 85ff. SUPPLEMENTARY B I B L I O G R A P H Y ROMAN HISTORY FOR SOCIOLOGISTS AND SOCIOLOGY FOR ROMAN HISTORIANS

Several sociologists have written about the ancient world. At first sight, their works may seem an obvious starting point for students of sociology and ancient history who wish to explore the overlap between the two disciplines. But none is designed as introductory reading. For example, it is I think preferable to begin with M. Weber, Economy and Society (New York, 1968) especially volume 3, rather than with the same author's more obviously relevant The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations (London, 1976). K. Marx, Pre-capitalist Economic Formations (London, 1964) is shorter and more readable than his Grundrisse (London, 1973); like V. Pareto, The Mind and Society (London, 1935), it contains illuminating comments o n Roman society, but n o extended discussion of Roman society alone. Perhaps the best recent sociological book o n the ancient world is A. W. Gouldner's, Enter Plato (London, 1967), especially the first part, but that is about Greece not Rome. B. Hindess and P. Q. Hirst, Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production (London, 1975) is * a work of Marxist theory' with chapters on the ancient mode of production and o n slavery; I admire their intellectual gymnastics while being oppressed by their ignorance. I should like to mention two more works, an essay in a collection which might interest historians, and a book: R. A. Nisbet, 'Kinship and political power in first-century Rome' in W. J. Cahnman and A. Boskoff, Sociology and History (New York, 1964) and G. £. Lenski, Power and Privilege (New York, 1966) which is in effect a sociological history of the social evolution of inequality, with a long section on agrarian societies. Some sociologists may like their history straight. T h e following are all, in my opinion, excellent and unlike many Roman history books are written so as to be intelligible to those who know little Roman history: £. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic (Oxford 1 , 1968); P. A. Brunt, Social conflicts in the Roman Republic (London, 1971); M. I. Finley, The A ncient Economy (London, 1973); W. Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History (Oxford, 1973); M. I. Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire (Oxford 2 , 1957); C. G. Starr, Civilization and the Caesars (New York, 1965); and a source book: N. Lewis and M. Reinhold, Roman Civilization (New York, 1966). 252

Bibliography:

sociology

For Roman historians who want to read sociology without being crushed by jargon or by text-books, I tentatively suggest the following, some of which are comparadve history or good social history rather than straight sociology: P. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1974) - it is, I think, much better than his Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London, 1974); C. M. Arensberg and S. T. Kimball, Family and Community in Ireland (Cambridge, Mass., 1948); F. Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life 1400-1800 (London, 1967); M. Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past (London, 1973); M. Freedman, Lineage Organization in Southeastern China (London, 1958); B. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (London, 1967); R. A. Nisbet, Social Change and History (New York, 1969); J. D. Spence, Emperor of China (London, 1974); K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic (London, 1971); I. Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York, 1974).

253

INDEX

OF SUBJECTS

administrators, lack of, 45 advocacy, career in, 28 ager

publicus,

5,

inefficiency,

185-6; patrimonial, 116, 124, 179, 182, 184, 188

58-61

agricultural handbooks, 3, 23, 55, calendars, 207, 209, 213, 219 105-6, 118 Caliphate, 187, 197 agriculture: numbers engaged in, 6, census, 20, 66 15; productivity, 14-15, 44» 106-7 centurion's pay, 40 allies, military obligations, 31, 57 chamberlain (cubicularius), 191 ff.; anecdotes, 174, 177, 206, 223, 232, Grand, 174-5; see also eunuchs 234-8, 241; currency of, 198 change: cultural, 58,70-1,76-7,79-80, annalists, Byzantine, 172, 174 90,93-4; social, 58, 76, 78,80,87,91 aqueduct, 58 Chinese court, 176, 224; emperor, arbitration, 154 197; eunuchs, 186, 189 aristocrats: power of, 59, 65,172,180, Christian: prosecutions, 227-9; religion, 218, 232, 237; views o n slav182-5, 'SB* '9°' 96; pride, 26, 112, ery, 122 190, 195; relations with emperor, 94-5, 182, 185-6 citizens, 39, 114; status, 109, 112, 124 army: loyalty to emperor, 182, 208, citizenship: gained by ex-slaves, 116, 224-6; power, 30-1, 92, 94, 183-6; 154; lost by colonists, 57 professionalisation, 30, 35, 37, 50, civil war, 60,63,66,70-1,92-3,95,113, 75,89,103; re-organisation in Later 184 Empire, 185; size, 4, 11, 30-5, 66-7, clients of lawyers, 87 72-3; stationed outside Italy, 73,94, clientship, 22; see also ideals; 183-4; see also military service; patronage peasants coinage, absence of, 19 art, 210, 214 colonies: foundation, 56-7, 64, 66-7, assassination, see political murder 70, 72-3,112; land allotments in, 57, astrology, 233-41 107, 114; size, 21, 57, 67 asylum, at emperor's statue, 221-3 commerce, 52, 53 augustales, see emperor worship; competition for resources, 75, 90 slaves, ex-slaves concepts (selected): autonomy of institutions, 89; chain reaction, 95; cobarbarians, 184 efficients, 32; class conflict denied, bishops, 177, 188 46; compatibility theory of truth, 3; booty: from booty to taxes, 16,37,41, core values, 236; diffusion, 79, 199, 104; booty-capitalism, 113; distribu210; free-floating resources, 90; tion, 38, 48, 111; volume, 11, 104 functions, 13-14, 41» 45» 7 ~4» 79» bureaucracy: complexity, 184; 108, 112, 134, 173, 186, 189, 200; !

2

255

Index of Subjects

concepts (cont.) marginal propensity to consume, 74; norms and values, 80, 89, 94; patterned regularity, 181, cf. 65; role model, 80; selective use of evidence, 21; social exchange, 88, 93; social map, 91; social mobility, 79; stereotype, 91, 121, 172-3,181,193; structure and process, 180, 216; underclass, 168; unspecified obligations, 87; vicious circle, 70-1,95,114 confiscation, 48, 56, 66, 71, 178 consuls, 54, 60 continuous war, 11,25ff.; see also military service; war conscription, see military service corruption, 41,43,47,60,81,89,177-8 council (conciliumr^omistoriurn-silenHum),

187

belief in astrology, 233ff.; birthday begins year, 206-7, 219; Byzantine, 197; death of, 198, 214-15; epithets, 199, 202, 204-7,

2 1

'»

21

7 » 3°J * " 2

a v

ourites of, 190; first, 94, 182, 205; flattery of, 180, 213, 241; ideal, 182, 222; image on coins, 219; isolation, 187; legitimacy, 182, 184-5, *87-8, 197-8, 202, 225, 229, 232, 237, 242;

magic power, 231-2, 239-40; need for information, 187; need for trusted servants, 179, 188-9; proximity to person of, 124, 175, 177, 179; reliance on ex-slaves, 124; relation to aristocracy, 94-5, 185, 189; ritual surrounding, 186-7, 9 " 3 » ° ° > 205, 214-15, 219; symbol of moral order, 198, 225, 228-9, 3 * symbol of political order, 197,222,226,228, 231; weak emperors, 180 emperor's statue, 122, 205-6,208,210, ,

2

I

2

!

court: European post-feudal, 175-6; 220-6 precedence at Roman, 176-7 emperor worship: alleged unimpordebt: of peasants, 22, 25; of political tance, 227; and army, 224; ascent candidates, 49; of provincials, 42,52 to heaven, 203, 214-15; association demand, aggregate, 18 of emperor with gods, 198-200, destruction, in war, 4, 28, 35 204-5, 4 » 7 » 9 - 3 ° » 4 J bedeus/divus, 202 lieved in, 202-3, o8~9> 213,215,241; divorce, 88 between man and god, 198, 217; doctors: in emperor's entourage, 232; deified on death, 202-3, 213; disin ritual of emperor's death, 214; believed, 203-4,213; divinity, i97ff., slave, 124 200, 202, 235; formal belief, 199, dowry, as channel of wealth, 48 225, 229, 241; genius of emperor, drachma, 160 204, 212, 224, 228; political, 209, dreams, interpretation of, 135, 233, 215; sacrifices, 205,207-8; senators, 204-5, 3»ex-slaves active, 211 - 1 3 ; 239 son of God, 201, 202; test of loyalty, economies of scale, 36 227-9 economy: subsistence, 15; unification empire: area, 1, 102; population, 1, of, 94, 159, 162; without labour 102 market, 109, 111 empress, 176, 214 edict, praetor's, 81, 86 enemy killed or captured, 26 education, 76ff., 117 elite: based on slavery, 123; belief in epigraphers, failings of, 217-18 astrology, 234!?.; differentiation eunuchs: access to emperor, 173, 177, 188; agents of emperor, 174, 179; within, 90-1, 174; relation to embarbarian origins, 192; bribed, peror's divinity, 200-5, 3 » shared 177-8, 188; castration, 173, 190, norms and values, 27, 87-8, 93, cf. 193-4; corporate identity, 179, 65; wealth, 12, 14, 47-8 189-91, 195-6; functions, 173-4, emperor; acts attributed to, 173; ap196; number at court, 176,195; perpeals) to,| 222-3;! audience with, 177; 22

22

22

2

21

21

256

2

F

Index of Subjects

eunuchs: (cont.) Jews, Court, 173-4, 190 sonal characteristics, 173, 180,juries, 84 3 - 5 J power at court, 173, 177, justice, 43, 8 iff., 222 179-81, 190-1, 196; ranks, 174-6; sudden demise, 174, 180-1, 190; king, English, French, 197, 231 wealth, 174, 178, 190 kinship, 88 ex-slaves, see slaves knights (equites): against senators, expectation of life, 21, 34, 50 46-7, 90-1; army officers, 184; exploitation: forms, 114, 125-6; limiimperial administrators, 125, 182, ted by political structure, 24, 112, 184; killed, 71; land-owners, 49-51, 114; of citizens, 14; of provinces, 41; 66; lawyers, 86; tax-farmers, 45-7,51 of slaves, 114 labour: cost subsidised, 39; input of family, life cycle, 22 peasants, 110; productivity increasfamily, as unit of labour, 109, 111, ed, 36; of slaves, 10, n o ; see also 125-6 wage-labour farms: single family, 4; increase in land: arable to pasture^; the basis of size, 105 wealth, a safe investment, 6, 11,13, folk-heroes, 21, 25 48-51, 65, 104-5, 7 » " 3 1 outside food: distribution to poor, 13; see also Italy, 95, 105; in politics, 6, 50, 59, 63, 66; as security for contracts, 51; wheat small-holdings, 21; to soldiers, 30, fortunes, size of, 39 foundlings ((threptot), 158 3 » 39» 50, 70» 105 free labourers, 9-10 land-commission, 5, 63-4 free peasants, 5, 7 land-laws, 5, 50, 58-64, 66 freedman, see slaves, ex-slaves lar, see genius large landholdings: formation of, 4, games, public, 38, 95, 119, 206-8 11, 35, 48-9, 54, 56, 60, 105, 111; genius, 201-2, 214; of emperor, 204, slaves on, 55, 109; see also slaves 212, 224, 228 Latin culture, 76-8 grammarians, see Greek and Latin law: codification, 86; see also Twelve culture Tables; criminal, 84-5, 93; ineffecGreece, conquered by Romans, 135 tiveness, 115, 122-3, 237> praetorGreek: culture, 76-9, 83; economy, ian, 84; protecting property, 85; 134; manumission, 130, 133, 153; rule of, 93-5; substantive, 83, 85 slaves, 124; slave society, 99 laws (specific): on astrology, 237; debt, 50; employment of free men, 109; ship-owning by senators, 52; slaves, hereditary status, 184-5 115, 120, 122, 128-9, 222; sumptuary, 49 ideals: of aristocracy, 45, 52; Christian, 122; of clientship, 23; legal, law courts: criminal, 81,84; emperor's 88; of philosophers, 121-2; of Prinportrait in, 223-4; extortion, 41-2, cipate, 182, 199-200, -203, 226; 46-7; magic in, 240; specialised, 81, rhetorical, 28, 198-200; of slave89 owners, 15, 121-3, 129-30 lawyers, 37, 80, 83-7 inflation of titles, 174 legal: consultants, 86; fictions, 82,125; inheritance, as channel of wealth, 48 formulae, 82,86; judgements, exeinnovation, resisted, 78, 91 cution of, 81; language, 80-1; ruinscriptions: honorary, 198, 211; rebrics - terms of reference, 83, 86; cording manumissions, 133 system, 81-3 i o

io

6

257

Index of Subjects

mining: conditions, 119; corporations legal procedure, 80-4, 86, 227-9 of investors, 53 legionaries, see soldiers miracles, see emperor: magic power legion, size, 33, 35 legitimacy of monarchy, 91, 94-5; see mnoy 160 monarchy: imposed by Augustus, 72, also ideals of Principate 92, 94; modus operandi, 95, 124 letters of recommendation, 88-9 monétisation, 8, 94 litterateurs, 79 money, multiplier effect of expenditure, 48 magic, 231, 233, 239-41 mortality, high, n o , 128, 145 magistrates, 83, 86 manumission: age at, 126-7, l39~4 > mystic powers of universe, 197,23iff., 241 bought by slaves, 126; chances of getting, 126-7, " 3 ; » 3 3 - 4 . myth, 223, 234-7; see also anecdotes 138-9, 142, 146, 160; frequency, nobles: modest standard in early 101-2, ii5ff.; profitable to slaveRome, 24; see also aristocrats; owners, 128, 131-2, 170; reasons senators for, 117, 127-8, 147; sex-ratio, 139-40; by statue of emperor, 225; oaths: by emperor, 224-5; °f loyalty, see also slaves, ex-slaves 225 manumission at Delphi, i33ff. market: lack of labour market, 23; oligarchy, power-sharing, 46, 93-5 olive oil, 3, 107 new, 12, 106-7; * » 3™4» 15-16 omens, see portents marriage of slaves, 163 ostentatious display, 26, 39, 48-9, 71, meat, 3, 207-8, 210-11 104, 112, 128 Mediterranean, 1,4, 162 methods: extremes juxtaposed, 75; see slaves, ex-slaves at formal definition, 89; frequency of paramoni, Delphi, conditional freedom mention, 129; incompatible rejected as anachronistic, 24; model patronage, 22, 87-9 (scheme), 12, 17-18, 34, 94-5, 103; patrons' power over ex-slaves, 115, 153-5 plausibility not proof, 128; rough peasants, i6ff.; eviction of, 10, 30, 36, order of magnitude, 58,66,97,146; 49, 56ff., 63, 103, 113; impoverishtied to testimony, 65; traditional ment, 11,18,36,62; lack of political method inadequate, 2, 107; wigpower, 183-5; participation in emwam argument, 20 peror worship, 210; see also military migration: to army, 50; colonies, 57; service of landed from Italy, 50,64,66-7,95,103,106; within Italy, 66, 68-9, 113; process, peculium, see slaves: private purse 57-8; scale, 7,66-9,72; of slaves into Persian king's harem, 192-3 Italy, 50; to towns and the city of philosophers, 58, 61, 77-8; and emperor, 197-8, 217, 234; o n slavery, Rome,i 1,1 3,5<>»57- » -9'7 -3»« 04-5 i 2 i , 123 military service: of allies, 57-8; political conflict, 46-7, 50, 60, 63, 85, changes in pattern, 2off., 63, 74; of 90, 92-3, 180 landed, 20,28-30,37,75; of landless, political murder, 63-4, 71, 93, 105, 31, 36, 91, 105; length, 27, 30-2, 35, 202, 235 75; number liable, 4, 61, 67, 108, political office, 14,28,48,54,63,111,178, 112—13; proportion of males re183 cruited, 34, 104; in provinces, 73; political slogans, 72-3, 220 rewards at end, 70; unpopular, political system, 92, 185, 196-8 3 0 - 1, 36; see also army pomp, see rituals militaristic ethos, 1, 25ff., 103-4 0

1

s

c o s t

!

zc

8

6d

2

Index of Subjects

poor, 5, 14, 62, 74, 81, 109 popular assemblies, 59-60,84, 111-12 population: of city of Rome, 2, 96-8, 105, 107; of empire, 1; rural, 63, 67-70, 73; urban, 68-9 portents, 232, 239 power: arbitrary exercise in provinces, 41-4; emperor's, 94, 172,187-8, 197-8, 200, 202; eunuchs', 173, 177, 179-80,188; government's, 91-2; of imperial ex-slaves, 116, 124; landbased, 7, 50, 61; military, 92-3, 184; plebs', 14, 37, 59, 112; political and religion, 92; senate's, 59, 182; structure, 46, 181-6, 196, 198-200 prefects, 174-5, 183 pre-industrial society, 90, 114 prices, see slaves, conditional freedom, full freedom; wheat priests, 37,85-6,91-2,135, 204,208-9, 213

Principate, 94-5 processions, 25-6,206,209-10,215-16, 218-19

profit, 10, 41-3, 48, 66; from provinces, 41, 45-6, 48 provincials, emperor worship, 203-5, 207-10

rebellion, 55, 120, 187 recruitment, see military service religion: at Delphi, 134rT., 142-3, 147; divine forces, 200-1, 219; and emperor-worship, 201-2, 205, 225, 227-30; and law, 85-6; and politics, 204-6, 212, 215-17, 231, 237, 240;

sacrifice, 202, 210; and ex-slaves, 117, 142-3, 145-6

rents, 5, 16, 18, 38, 50, 55 resettlement of soldiers, 36, 66 return on investment, 2, 107 rhetoric, 77-9, 85, 89-90, 198-9, 217 rich: incomes, 39, 51-2, 55; landowners, 3-4, 50, 66, 70, 105, 113; and poor, 3, 14, 50, 59, 61-3, 112; become richer, 38, 39ff., 71, 90; slaves, 59, 114 rituals, 82, 180, 182, 186, 192-3, 212, 214-15

schools,

76-7, 79-80, 89-90

school-teachers, 37, 79, 123 secretaries, imperial, 189 seed, 17 senatorial career, 28, 46-7, 86, 191 senators: and emperor, 213, 226; killed, 71; and knights, 46-7, 90-1, '184; land-owners, 49-50,55,66,179; lawyers, 85-6; power, 182-3, 238 sexual desire, 240 slave-owners: affective ties to slaves, 127, 134, 148, 154; cruelty, 118-21, 122-3; female, 164; generosity, 117, 127, 129, 132; hostility to slaves, 119-21, 152; humanity, 121-3; and manumission, 128-9, 130-2, 147, 155, 160; size of holdings, 168-9 slavery: compared with American, 9, 100, 113-14, 121, 125, 163; decline, 156; functions, 13-14, 99-100, 102, 112-13, 5 » labour in, 9, 24, 100, i n , 124; medium term, 126, 148, 169; punishment central to, 144-6; stigma, 144; system of, 114, 118, l2

147-8

slaves: affective ties to owners, 127, 132, 134, 148, 154, 166-7; agricultural, 55, 106, asylum, 221-3; freedom, 128-30, i33ff., 142-3,146, 148, i58ff., 168, see also manumission; ex-slaves (below); children 165-6; compared with free labour, 108, i n , 125, 131; decline, 95, 185; gangs, 109,111; high status of some, 101; hostility to owners, 119-21, 152; import of, 1, 103; legal status, 123»., 131, 153; marriage, 163; misery of, n8ff., 144; motivation, 126, 128, 147,149; never freed, 118, 7 > i 3 9 - f i ; number, 7-9, 55, 102, 108; origins (aliens), 112-13, 141, (captives), 8, 108, (home-born), 139-41; paid wages, 128; price, 108, n o , 113, 117, 134, 158».; private purse (peculium), 125-6, 129, 147, 168; productivity, 10, i i o - n , 131; profitability, 107; rebellions, 55, 120; reproduction, 155-8, 166-7, 169; rich landowners, 59,61-3,106; risk of loss, n o , 126; runaway, 121; status spectrum, 131, 137, 153; stereotype character, 121; D U V

I2

259

f Subjects

Index

taxes, 11, 16-17, 38, 94, 182, 185, 198 slaves: (conL)\ supervision, 110,126; teachers, 76, tax-farmers, 43-4; corporations, 53; knights, 45-7, 51 79; trusted, 51,123-5, urban, 49, 67, temples, 25, 133, 137, 145; asylum, 97, 104. 221; to emperor, 204-5, ° 8 ex-slaves: as agents, 117; in commerce, 52; given citizenship, 102, tenancy, 53, n o , 126 116; disappointed with freedom, town-councillors (decuriones): competition among, 206, 208-9, 229; gifts 149; active in emperor worship, from, 210-11; power, 183, 185; sta211-13; gratitude to former tues, 208, 220 owners, 118, 128, 130, 154; legal status, 153; number in the city of town-country relations, 18 Rome, 115-17; obligations to trade and tax interacting, 94 traditional Roman histories, 4 , 2 0 , 2 7 , former owners, 129-31, 144, 155 64-5, 103, 112 ex-slaves at Delphi, 1331T.; contransport costs, 3, 107 ditional freedom (contract), i42ff., (defined), 133, 142, (deteriorated), tribune of the people, 5 , 3 6 , 3 8 , 5 9 - 6 1 , 2

«34» i49-5 » 149-5«» 0

!

55» 1°*» Oength), 148, 156, i58ff.,

triumphal procession, 26; see also pro(price), cessions; rituals 161 -2, 171, (punishment during), Twelve Tables, 22, 80 145-6, (surrender of child), 155-8, (compared with conditional freedom at Calymna), 156-8, 170; full underemployment, 2, 4, 10, 24 freedom, 133, 141-2, (declining urban markets, n , 74, 107 proportion), 150, 161, (increasing urban poor, 3, 15, 74, 95,97,183,185, 210 cost), 150, 159, 161-2, 165-7, 7 « imperial ex-slaves, 116, 176; staviolence, 3, 70-1, 93, 95,105 tus, 124-5 slave societies, 9, 99-100 wage-labour, 23, 43, 109-11, 120 small-holdings, 3, 6, 106 soldiers, 38, 40, 42, 70, 75, 90, 94; see war, 251T., 28, 56, 104, 108; war trophies, 25 also army; land; military service water supply, 58 soubriquet, 25, 103, 195, 224 specialisation: in law, 80-1; in schools, wealth, 8, 13, 39, 41, 48-9, 107, 113 80 wheat, 3 , 9 7 - 8 , 1 0 7 - 8 ; price, 20,38,56, state: attacks on, 91-2; power, 93-4, 73» 146 113; resources, 91; revenues, 37-8, wheat dole, 15, 38-9, 66-7, 72-3, 90, 44» 63, 73» 94» weakness, 36, 4 3 , 4 5 , 95, 108, 112; cost and functions, 39, 196 72-4; number of recipients, 67, 73, statue, 201—2; see also emperor's statue 96, 105 stratification pyramid, 40, 46-7 wheat equivalent, n o , 157 structural differentiation, 37, 74-5, wills, 87, 127, 129, 149 89ff.,96 wine, 3, 107, 210, 212 subsistence, level of minimum, 40,58, women: emancipation, 88; and eunn o , 146, 168 uchs, 192, 194; sex-ratio, 97, 106; surplus, 16,90,106-7; surplus labour, slaves, 147, 159^., 162, 168; exslaves, 127, 139-40, 152 9» * 4 !

yeomen, 2iff., 37 260

INDEX OF PROPER

Abasgi, tribe in Caucasus, 172 Abbasid Caliphate, 187, 197 Acolius, Grand Chamberlain under Valentinian III, 190 Acts of the Aposdes, 222 Aeneas, mythical founder of Rome, 202

NAMES

Antioch, 187, 225-6 Antiochus, Grand Chamberlain under Theodosius II (?), 175, 178, 181

Antoninus Pius, emperor (AD 138-61), 214, 222-3; Plate 2a Antony, M. Antonius, consul 44 BC,

Aesop, 124 70» 9*> 95 Aetolian League, connection with Apamea Cibotus, city in Phrygia, 207 Delphi, 135 Apolaustrus, family tomb of, 128 Africa, Roman provinces in, 108, n o , Apollo: associate of emperors, 206, 21 o; oracle of, at Delphi, 133-6,137, 239-40 Africa, and slave trade, 100 142-3, 145, 151, 156, 159; power of, Albinus, A. Postumius, consul, 151 145-6; see aJso Delphi BC, 77 Apollonius of Tyana, wonder-worker, Alexander the Great, 135, 235 ist century AD, 221, 233, 234 Alexandria, 54, 205, 231-2 Apollonius, Christian martyr, 2nd Amantius, Chief Steward to empress century AD, 228 Eudoxia, 176, 177 Appian, historian, 2nd century AD 5, Ambrose, Saint, Bishop of Milan (AD 32, 36, 38, 40, 60, 70, 103, 115, 136, 374-97)» «77»

**7> 196

American, southern states of USA, slavery in, 9, 99-101, 113-14, 117,

119,121, 123,125-7, *44-5» 148» 163, 168

Ammianus Marcellinus, historian, 4th century AD, I 73-4,175,176,178, 179, 180, 187, 191, 194-5» 96» 219 !

2 I O

»

Amphictionic Council, met at Delphi, «35 Anastasius, emperor (AD 491-518), 175» 176

Ancient Near East, slavery in, 133,152 Andronicus, Livius, man of letters, 3rd century BC, 76 Antigonus of Nicaea, astrologer, 2nd century AD, 236-7

202-3

Apuleius, man of letters, 2nd century AD, 223, 224

Arcadius, emperor (AD 395-408), 194

187,

Arezzo, Italy, 70 Aristides, Aelius, man of letters, 2nd century AD, 199, 216 Artemidorus, interpreter of dreams, 2nd century AD, 226, 233 Artemis, temple of at Ephesus, 221 Asia Minor, 63,94,119,141,204,206-7 Asklepias of Mendes, writer, 206 Aspendos, city in Pamphylia (southern Turkey), 221 Assos, city in western Asia Minor, 206 Athanasius, Saint, Bishop of Alexandria (AD 328-73), 176, 179

Index of Proper

Names

Athens: Academy of, 77; factory at, Carneades, philosopher, 2nd century 53; slavery at, 99, 113-14» «44» «47 BC, 77-8 A tula, H u n leader, 5th century AD, Carpus, Papylus and Agathonice, Christian martyrs, 2nd or 3rd cen'79 tury AD, 228 Augustoles, 21 i f f . Carthage (Tunisia), 19, 31, 45, 54, 72, Augustus, tide of gods, 211, 230-1 135, 220 Augustus, C. Julius Caesar Octavianus, Plate +d; establishes Princi- Catiline, L. Sergius Catilina, 6 pate, 72, 94-6,182; honoured like a Cato, M. Porcius Cato 'Censorim', consul 195 BC, 76-8; on farming, 5, god, 201-10, 21 i f f . , 218, 222-3, 225, 9-10, 23, 51, 55, 106, 109, i n , 118, 229,241; land settlement and army, » 3» 3°* 3 » 3 » 3 » 4<>» 5°» °9-7<>» 72» 92,94-7,106; and slaves, 115,118-19, 6

1

2

6

8

121, 124, 128; other mendons, 65,

212

Cedrenus, Byzantine chronicler, 172, 181

Censorinus, grammarian, 3rd cen79, 87, 232, 233 tury AD, 202 Aurelian, emperor (AD 270-5), 192 Aurelius, Marcus Aurelius Antoni- Charles II of England, and King's nus, emperor (AD 161-80), 79, 211, Evil, 231 Chief Steward of the Palace (costrensu 220-1, 224, 233; Plate 3c, Plate 4c socri polatii), 175ff.; see also under Aurelius Victor, see Victor Auximum, colony in Italy, 64 individual names China, 1, 14, 79, 100; Imperial court, Baalbek, Syria, 230 176, 186, 188-90, 193-5, 197 Balbillus, court astrologer under Christianity, 122-3, °°» » 7 " 9 » Nero, 234 237, 240 Basil, Saint, Bishop of Caesarea in Chrysaphius, Grand Chamberlain Cappadocia (AD 370-9), 194, 195 under Theodosius II, 178-9, 194-5 Brazil, slavery in, 100, 119, 123 Cicero, M. Tullius, orator, consul 63 Brutus, Marcus Junius, 'tyranicide', BC; on government and tax-farm1 st century BC, 52, 213 ing, 16,41-2,44-5,47,54,89,91; o n Bulla Regia, city in Africa (Tunisia), land-ownership, 31,47-8,50,51,55, 220 61, 71, 85; law, 78, 83, 84, 85, 86-7; senatorial politics and elections, Caecilian Law (98 BC), 81 88-9, 91, 93; slaves, 71,89,124,126; Caesar, C. Julius: army remuneradon other mentions, 28, 39, 46, 52, 65, and land setdement, 6,13,36,40-1, «35 67, 70, 72-3, 94, 96, 106; honoured Cicero, Quintus Tullius, brother of like a god, 201-3,209,212,241; miliM. Tullius Cicero, 53-4, 89, 124 tary career and successes, 25-6, 28, Cilicia, 41 38, 40-1, 65, 92, 103; other men- Cincian law (204 BC), 87 tions, 16, 50, 52, 71, 109, 128, 233 Cincinnatus, general and farmer, 5th Calapodius, Grand Chamberlain century BC, 4, 21 under Leo, 178 Claudian, poet, late 4th century AD, Caligula, emperor (AD 37-41), 191, 189» «94 199, 206, 213, 224-5 Claudius, emperor (AD 41-54), 116, Calligonus, Grand Chamberlain 192, 203-4, 214, 224 under Valentinian II, 196 Claudius, Appius, senator, 135 Calymna, small island near Cos, 156-8, Cleander, chamberlain under Corn209 modus, 192 Cleopatra, 92 Capua, Italy, 2, 210 2

262

2 2 2

22

Index of Proper

Names

Codinus, writer on Constantinople, 127» '55-8» 164-6, 169; temple and ?i5th century AD, 176 oracle at, 134-6, see also Apollo Columella, writer on farming, 1 st cen- Dentatus, Manius Curius, consul 290 tury AD, 9, 53, 55, 106, 109, I I I , BC, 21 Dio, Cassius, consul AD 229 and hist"7 orian, 70,87,115,192,202,205,208, Commodus, emperor (AD 180-92), 212-13, 235

192, 225, 228

Constantine I, emperor

(AD 306-37),

176, 184, 226

Dio Chrysostom, orator, ist century AD, 122

Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, Diocletian, emperor (AD 284-305), 184, 186, 192, 199-200; edict on emperor (AD 912-59) and author, Prices (AD 301), 79, 110, 190 176-7, 179, 191 Diodorus Siculus, historian, ist cenConstantius II, emperor (AD 337-61), tury BC, 119 173. 179» 190. 219 Diogenes Laertius, historian of philoCordoba, Spain, 231 sophy, 148 Corinth, Greece, 99 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, historian, Cornelian Law, 81 1 st century BC, 4,5,20-1,23,128,212 Corpus Hermeticum, 217 Court Jews, in 17th/ 18th-century Ger- Dionysopolis, Asia Minor, temple of Apollo, 145-6 many. «73-4» »9° Domitian, emperor (AD 81-96), 191-2, Crassus, M. Lirinius Crassus Dives, 199, 217, 226, 234; Plate 36 Dositheus, lawyer, 153 millionaire, 1st century BC, 39-40, Drusus, stepson of Augustus, consul 4^» 52, 7

9 BC, 209

1

Crete, 221-2 Dura Europos, town on the EuphraCuba, slavery in, 148 tes, Syria, 207-8 Cumae, near Naples, 207 Cybele, 192 Edessa, northern Mesopotamia, 226 Cyprian, Saint, Bishop of Carthage Egypt, 16, 119, 135, 146,157, 204, 210, (AD 248/9-58), 119 223, 225 Cyprus, 41, 52, 209, 240 Elagabalus, emperor (AD 218-22), Cyrene (Libya), 230 187-8, 192 Cyril, Saint, Bishop of Alexandria England, 18th century, 52, 100 (AD 412-44), 178, 194 Ennius, poet, 3rd/2nd century BC, 201 Danube and Danubian provinces, Ephesus, west coast of Asia Minor, 99, 127» 233

Decius, emperor (AD 249-51), 223 Delos, 146 Delphi, 99, 127, 129, Chapter III passim; Apollo and priests involved in manumission, 137-9, 140-2, 145-6, 156; full freedom and conditional release, 133-4» 137» 4 ~4» i46ff., 148-52, 169-70; inscriptions recording manumission of slaves, *33> l35> «37» »42-4» *53» l5^T> origins, 99, 139-^1, 166; prices, 133-4, 146-8, 158-63,166-8; relations with owner and his family, 144-5,153-4, 163,167; slave women and children, I

I

221, 234

Epictetus, philosopher, ist/2nd century AD, 51, 122, 148 Epicurus, philosopher, 4th/3rd century BC, 201 Eudoxia, empress, wife of Arcadius, 176

Eugenius, usurper (AD 392-4), 179 Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea in Palestine (c. AD 315-c. AD 340) and church historian, 184 Eusebius, Grand Chamberlain of Constantius II, 173, 179-80, 190-1,

263

194

Index of Proper

Names

Eutherius, Grand Chamberlain of Gracchus, brother of Gaius GracJulian, 194-5 chus, 58-9, 61^4, 105 Eutropius, consul AD 387 and histor- Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius, ian, 183 consul 177 BC and 163 BC, 25 Eutropius, Grand Chamberlain Grand Chamberlain (proepositus socri under Arcadius, 175, 179, 181, cubicxdi), i74ff., i88fL, 195-6 188-90, 194 Greece, 130-1, 162-3, 9» 5 Evagrius, church historian, 178 Greek language, 76-7, 90 Gregory Nazianzcn, Saint, Bishop of Fabius, Quintus Fabius Maximus Constantinople (AD 381), 157 Cunctator, consul for the fifth time Gregory of Tours, Saint, Bishop of 209 BC and general, 25, 103 Tours (AD 573-94) and historian, Falcidian Law, 81 178 Fausdna, empress, wife of Antoninus Hadrian, emperor (AD 117-38), 118, Pius, 214; Plate 2a 122, 136, 182, 210, 219, 231, 234, Felix, procurator of Judaea, 1st century AD, 116 236-7, 239; Plate 4a Festus, procurator of Judaea, 1st cen- Hadrian's Wall, 224 tury AD, 222 Halicarnassus, Caria (south-west Festus, scholar, late 2nd century AD, Turkey), 218 Hammurabi, 180 "9 Hannibal, Carthaginian general, Firmicus Maternus, astrological 3rd/2nd century BC, 28, 56, 60, 103 thinker, 4th century AD, 233, 237-8 Harun al Raschid, Abbasid Caliph Florentinus, lawyer, 122 (AD 786-809), 187 Fronto, orator and tutor to Marcus Helicon, chamberlain under CaliAurelius, 79, 221 gula, 191 Gaius, lawyer, 2nd century AD, 82,84, Heliopolis, Egypt, 239 Heliopolis, Syria, see Baalbek 104, 115-16, 122-3 Galba, emperor (AD 68-9), 226, 232 Hercules, 199, 230, 241 Galen, doctor, 2nd century AD, 99, Herodian, historian, early 3rd century AD, 203, 214-15 118, 119 Herodotus, historian, early 5th cenGalerius, emperor (AD 293-311), tury BC, 192 «93 Homer, 76, 136 Gallicanus, Grand Chamberlain of H o n g Kong, population of, 97 usurper Maximus, 177 Gallus, brother-in-law of Constantius Horace, Q. Horatius Flaccus, poet, 1st century BC, 76, 202, 206, 212 II and Caesar (AD 351-4), 176, 180, Hyampolis, central Greece, 225 187, 191 Hyginus, writer on land-tenure, 6 Gellius, Aulus, man of letters, 2nd century AD, 23,26,29,49,51, 79,82, Ios, inscription from, 240 Germanicus, adopted son of Tiber- Isis, Hellenised Egyptian goddess, ius, 205, 214, 219, 239 225, 230, 239, 240 Gorgonius, Grand Chamberlain of Italy: food and farming, 2,4,6,9-10, Gallus, 191 12, 14-15, 38-9, 55, 67, 106-8; landGracchi, land reformers and sons of ownership and land law, 3, 5, 7-8, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, 13, 16, 18-24, 36-7» 39» 4 8 - 5 . 54~6» 13» 36, 61-5, 72-3, 201; Gaius Grac59-65,105; land taxation, 16-18,24, chus, 46, 64; Tiberius Sempronius 38; migration, colonies and the 21

2 2

1

264

Index of Proper

Italy: (cont.) effects of war, 4,11,13-14,21,24-5,

28-32, 35-8, 56, 64, 66-74; 103»., 105-6; slavery, 2-3,5,8-10,14,24-5, 5 * 55. 99* - » 7> < & > 59 -» 169, 211-12 1

I 0 2 f f

lo

1

S

I

ff

James I of England, 197 Japan, 23, 79 Jerome, Saint, 194 Jerusalem, 222 Jesus Christ, 199, 203, 232 John of Antioch,historian, 172,176,180 John Chrysostom, Saint, Bishop of Constantinople, (AD 398-403), 190, 226

John of Ephesus, church historian, 6th century AD, 175-6, 178-9 Josephus, Jewish historian, 1st century AD, 97, 210 Julian, emperor (AD 361-3), 136, 173, 180

Julius Caesar, see Caesar Julius Obscquens, writer on prodigies (?4th century AD), 233 Jupiter, 27, 199, 202-3, b* 230-1; see also Zeus Justinian, emperor (AD 527-65), 178; Code of, 172, 175, 176, 178; Digest 22

of,

129,

and

see under

names

of

law-

yers; novels, of, 172, 179, 187, 190 Juvenal, satirical poet, ist/and century AD, 237

Kleomantis, slave-owner at Delphi, 153-4

Names

Leo, emperor (AD 457-74), 176 Leptis Magna (Libya), 220-1, 230 Lex Julia Municipalis, 81 Libanius, orator, 4th century AD, I 72, 177, 195, 225-6

Liber

Pontifical^

178

Liberius, Bishop of Rome, (AD 352-66), 179

Ligurians, 58 Livia, wife of Augustus, 218 Uvy, Titus Livius, historian, 1st Century Bc/ist century AD, 2, 5, 16, 22, 25-8,30,36,46,52,56-8,60,104,135

Lucian, man of letters, 2nd century AD, 182, 124, 233

Lucretius, poet, 1st century BC, 201 Lucullus, general and gourmet, 1st century BC, 47 Lysias, orator, 5th/4th century BC, 53 Lyttos, Crete, 220 Macedonians, 135 Macrobius, writer, early 5th century AD, 119

Madrid, 3 Malalas, John, Byzantine chronicler, 6th century AD, 172* 181 Malchus, historian, 196 Mamertinus, Claudius, political orator, consul AD 362, 190 Mao Tse-tung, Chairman, 200, 204 Marcellinus Comes, Byzantine chronicler, 6th century AD, 179-80, 187 Marcian, lawyer, early 3rd century AD, 131, 153

Marcus Aurelius, see Aurelius Marius, consul for the seventh time 86 BC, general, 31, 65, 92, 201 Mars, 214, 220,230; Field of Mars, 29,

Kourion, Cyprus, 240 Kwakiud, 100 Lactantius, Christian political satirist, 214-15 3rd/4th century AD, 192-3 Martial, poet, 1st century AD, 115,118 Laelius, C. Lealius Minor Sapiens, Maximian, emperor (AD 286-305), 199-200 consul, 140 BC, 61 Maximus Thrax, emperor (AD 235-8), Lares Compitales, 211-12 Plate 3a Latins, 57 Maximus, usurper (AD 383-8), 177, 180 Lausus, Grand Chamberlain under Melania, the Younger, Saint, 178,194 Theodosius II, 195 Mercury, 230 laws, see under names of individual laws Milan, 199 and lawyers and under Justinian and Twelve Tables (Index of Subjects) 265

Index of Proper

Moses, 80 Musa, Antoninus Musa, doctor of Augustus, 124

AD, 3, 21, 26, 45, 51, 53, 54, 70, 117, 136, 241-2

Naples, 97, 208 Narbonne (southern France), 208,211 Narses, eunuch general under Justinian, 178 Nero, emperor (AD 54-68), 131, 136, 187, 199, 213, 252, 234

Notitia

Dignitatum,

7 *=» 239

Plutarch, philosopher and biographer, ist/2nd century AD, 26, 38, 44, 52, 58-9, 76, 78, 119, 135-6, 226

Polybius, historian, 2nd century BC,

«5» 3 » 37» 40- » 49» °5-6\ 92-3, 103 6

1

Porphyry, Bishop of Gaza (AD

Paetus, Sextus Aelius, consul 198 BC and lawyer, 86 Palestine, 140 Palladius, hagiographer, 4th/5th century AD, 194-5 Pallas, ex-slave of the emperor Claudius, 116 Papinian, lawyer, early 3rd century AD, 84, n o Parthenius, chamberlain under Domitian, 191 -2 Paul, Saint, 116, 122-3, 222 Paul, lawyer, early third century AD, n o , 122, 131, 237 Pausanias, antiquarian and traveller, 2nd century AD, 136 Pergamon (Asia Minor), 99, 135, 205 Persian court, eunuchs at, 192-3 Petronius, novelist, 1st century AD,

Plato, 162 Plautus, playwright, 3rd/2nd century BC, 99 Pliny the Elder, naturalist, 1st century

116,118,128,158,182,199,217,226, 229, 238

Polycarp of Smyrna, Christian martyr, 2nd century AD, 228 Pompeii, near Naples, 201-2, 212 Pompey, consul 52 BC and general, 6,

Octavian, see Augustus Olympiodorus, of Thebes, historian, early fifth century AD, 51, 172 Ottoman court, 176 Ovid, P. Ovidius Naso, poet, 1st century Bc/ist century AD, 212

Philae, holy island in the Nile, 204 Philippi, Macedonia (northern Greece), 222 Philostorgius, church historian, 5th/6th century AD, 181, 188 Piso, Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, consul

Pliny the Younger, nephew of Pliny the Elder and friend of Trajan, 88,

20, 31» 45» 77» «35

175-6

117, 202

Names

395-420), 176-7

Priscus, historian, 172, 179, 195 Procopius, historian, 6th century AD, 172, 190

Prudentius, Christian poet, late 4th century AD, 194 Ptolemy, astronomer, 2nd century AD, 238-9

Puteoli, near Naples, 44 Quintilian, orator, 1st century AD, 109, 216

Regulus, M. Atilius, consul for the second time 256 BC, general and farmer, 4 Rhodanus, Grand Chamberlain under Valentinian I, 181 Rhodes, 235 Roma, cult, of 208-9 Rome: citizenship and law, 41, 80-7, 116,123,153-4; culture and display, 48-9,76-80,104,123-5; early Rome, 19-25; emperors honoured at, 200, 202-6,211-15,217; food supply, 2-3, 14-15,38-39,66,73-4,107-8; immigration to, 14, 50, 56-8, 66-7, 73, 105; monuments and triumphs, 2, 16,25-7,104,219-20; population of, 68-9, 96-8, 107, 127; power of and politics at, 2, 11,19,42,46,88-9,94, 102-4, 237; slaves and ex-slaves,

266

Index of Proper

Rome:

Names

Stobaeus, compiler, ?5th century AD, 113-14, i i 5 f f . , n 8 f f . , i26ff., 147, 198 (Diotogenes), 242 (Diotogenes) 153-4, 211-13 Strabo, geographer, 1 st century BC/ I st Roscius of Ameria, 1st century BC, 71 century AD, 119, 134, 209 Rullus, land reformer, 1st century BC, Suetonius, biographer, ist/2nd cen66 tury AD: lives of literary men, 76-9, 124; lives of emperors, 10, 50, 69, Sabina, empress, wife of Hadrian, 96-7, 109, 118, 130, 187, 192, 203, 214; Plate 1 206, 212-13, 222, 232-4, 238 Sabratha, Libya, 220 Suidas, Byzantine encyclopaedist, late Sallust, historian, 1st century BC, 6, 10th century AD, 172 Sulla, consul 88 BC and general, 6,36, 3 > 70 Sarapis, 225, 231 41, 60, 65-6, 70-1, 92, 115, 135 Sardinia, 16, 25 Superintendent of the Sacred BedScillitan martyrs, Christian martyrs in chamber (primicerius socri cubiculi), Africa, late 2nd century AD, 227-8 175* Scipio Africanus, consul for the Symmachus, consul AD 391, 88 second time 194 BC, and general, 25, Synesius of Cyrene, Bishop of Ptole201 mais (c. AD 410-c. AD 414) and man Scriptores Historioe Augustoe (SHA), of letters, 187 late 4th-century AD imperial bio- Syria, 135, 141 graphies, 98, 122, 187-8, 192, 231, Tacitus, historian, ist/2nd century 234 AD, 50, 74, 87, 116, 120-1, 126, 130, Seneca, philosopher, 1st century AD, (cont.)

!

116, 118-19,

I2I

181, 204-5, 3 » 221-2, 224, 226, 231-2, 237, 239

~ 3 » 9> 201, 222

2I

I2

Septimius Severus, see Severn s Taranis, British god, 230 Servius, lawyer, 86, 130 Servius, literary critic, 4th century AD, Tarraco, Spain, 216 Tegea, Peioponnese, 219 202 Severian, Bishop of Gabala (c. AD Terence, playwright, 2nd century BC, 124

400), 223-4

Severus, Septimius, emperor (AD Tertullian, Christian sophist, 227-8 Theodore, Steward of the Sacred 193-211), 192 Palace under Justinian, 178-9 Severus Alexander, emperor (AD Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrrhus (AD 222-35), Plate 46 423-c. AD 466) and church hisSicily, 16-17, 61, 102, 108, 120 torian, 176 Smyrna, west coast of Asia Minor, Theodorus, ? governor of Cyprus, 240 209, 216 Socrates, church historian, 4th/5th Theodosius I, emperor (AD 379-95)» 179, 180 century AD, 175, 177, 180 Sophronius, Bishop of Jerusalem, Theodosius II, emperor (AD 408-50), 176, 180; Theodosian Code (AD (AD 634-8) and hagiographer, 239 Sozomen, church historian, early 5th 43 >» *75» 178» «9° Theophanes, Byzantine chronicler, century AD, 175, 179, 195, 225-6 Spain, 16, 94, 119, 127, 204, 230 8th/oth century AD, 172,175-6,180, Spartacus, leader of slave revolt 73 BC, «93» 194 120 Thessaly, 219, slavery in, 134,147,149 Speratus, Christian martyr, late 2nd Theveste (Algeria), 208 century AD, 227-8 Thrasyllus, court astrologer under Statius, poet, 1st century AD, 116 Tiberius, 234-5 8

267

Index of Proper

Names

Tiberius, emperor

Verres, governor of Sicily (73-70 BC),

Tlo, Lycia (south-west Turkey), 218 Trajan, emperor (AD 98-117), 51,182,

Verus, Lucius Verus, emperor (AD 161-9), 220; Plate 3
(AD 14-37), 50, 204-5,209,218,221, 232, 234-5,239 Titus, emperor (AD 79-81), 210, 238 199, 210, 224-5,

2 2

9

Trimalchio, see Petronius Tullius, Servius Tullius, king of Rome (trad. 578-535 BC), 20 Ulpian, lawyer, early 3rd century AD, 110,122,123,129-30,153,222-3,237

16, 42-3, 45, 54, 85

224, 231-2

Vestal Virgins, 206 Victor, Aurelius Victor, historian, 4th century AD, 193 Victory, goddess, 102, 200, 205 Virgil, poet, 1st century BC, 201 Vitellius, emperor (AD 69), 232

Ursicinus, general under Constandus West Indies, slavery in, 100, 106 H. «73 Valens, Vettius Valens, astrologer, Xenophon, historian, 5th/4th century BC, 55; Pseudo-Xenophon (The 2nd century AD, 236 Constitution of the Athenians), 144 Valentinian I, emperor (AD 364-75), 181

Zachariah Rhetor, Zacharias of Mytilene, church historian, 5th/6th cen186-7, $ß tury AD, 98, 220 Valentinian II I, emperor (AD 425-55), Zeus, statue of at Olympia, 221, 234 190 Valerius Maximus, historian and Zosimus, historian c. AD 500, 172, 177-8, 180-1 moralist, ist century AD, 4, 26, 29, Valentinian II, emperor

(AD 375-92),

l

112, 135, 201

Varro, polymath, ist century BC, 3, 9-10, 22, 51, 55, 106, 120, 123

268