Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon: Rethinking the Rise of the Right

10.1057/9780230102200 - Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon, Sarah Katherine Mergel

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CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUALS AND RICHARD NIXON

Also by the author

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A Biography of John M. Gillespie: A Teamster’s Life

10.1057/9780230102200 - Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon, Sarah Katherine Mergel

Sarah Katherine Mergel

10.1057/9780230102200 - Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon, Sarah Katherine Mergel

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CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUALS AND RICHARD NIXON

CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUALS AND RICHARD NIXON

Copyright © Sarah Katherine Mergel, 2010. First published in 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–61994–4 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mergel, Sarah Katherine. Conservative intellectuals and Richard Nixon : rethinking the rise of the Right / Sarah Katherine Mergel. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–61994–4 1. Nixon, Richard M. (Richard Milhous), 1913–1994—Political and social views. 2. Nixon, Richard M. (Richard Milhous), 1913–1994—Influence. 3. Conservatism—United States—History—20th century. 4. Intellectuals— United States—History—20th century. 5. United States—Politics and government—1969–1974. 6. United States—Intellectual life—20th century. I. Title. E856.M46 2010 973.924092—dc22

2009024204

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: January 2010 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

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All rights reserved.

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In Memory of John W. Mergel

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Acknowledgments

ix

Introduction

1

1

Richard Nixon: An Electable Conservative?

11

2

Peace with Honor: Ending the Vietnam War

33

3

Games Nations Play: Dealing with the Communist Menace

57

4

Umpire or Player: Nixon’s Economic Games

83

5

Perpetuating the Follies of the Past: Welfare Reform and Race Relations

107

6

Mixed Emotions: The Wisdom of Supporting Nixon

131

7

Loyalty and Doubts: The Watergate Morass

153

8

Richard Nixon: Friend or Foe of Conservatives?

175

Notes

189

Selected Bibliography

231

Index

239

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CONTENTS

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F

irst off, I would like to thank the faculty and graduate students of the History Department at The George Washington University who provided much needed guidance and inspiration during my years as a student there. Special thanks go to my adviser, Leo Ribuffo. Without his prodding in and out of the classroom, I would not have found my way to a topic that I truly wanted to spend so much time working on. Moreover, while I researched and wrote he provided constructive, and yet encouraging, criticism and made the entire process intellectually stimulating and thoroughly enjoyable. I would also like to thank my committee, Allida Black and Gregg Brazinsky, for their discerning observations and their probing inquiries as I completed my research and writing. I am indebted to Chris Hickman, Rick Moss, and Jason Roberts for reading and providing useful insight on my work. Thanks also go to Michael Landis for posing challenging questions about my research and for reminding me to enjoy myself once in a while. Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude to Andrew Hartman for putting me in touch with the wonderful people at Palgrave Macmillan. Thanks go to William F. Buckley, Jr. and William A. Rusher for allowing me access to their papers, to Annette Kirk for speaking to me about her late husband’s work, and to all the members of the conservative movement who graciously allowed me to draw from their unpublished materials. This project would not have been the same without these valuable sources. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the staffs at the Library of Congress, the National Archives and Records Administration, the Hoover Institution, the Yale University Library, the American University Library, and Gelman Library for making my research at their institutions as painless as possible. I would like to thank Chris Chappell and Samantha Hasey for helping me transition from dissertation to manuscript and to the entire production staff at Palgrave Macmillan for making the transition from manuscript to book go smoothly.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

AC K N OW L E D G M E N T S

My friends have been instrumental in my ability to finish this manuscript. I hope they know how grateful I am for their support. I want to thank Erin Dionne, Katie Ginder-Vogel, and Jenn Kocher for taking time out of their busy schedules to read my work. Without their carefully trained writers’ eyes, I would have been lost as I wrote and revised this project. I am particularly grateful to my knitting group in Virginia whose good-natured humor and willingness to listen proved indispensable while I researched and wrote this manuscript. My colleagues at Northern Virginia Community College and Dalton State College were extremely supportive as I moved from graduate student to professor as well as worked to transition dissertation to manuscript. Of course, my students at GWU, NVCC, and DSC constantly remind me why I became an historian in the first place; so thanks go to them as well. Finally, special recognition goes to my family who were wonderfully supportive during my years in graduate school and as I settled into my first academic job. My brothers and sisters, as well as their spouses and children, have taken my somewhat-perpetual state of stress in stride and for that, I cannot say thank you enough. Special gratitude goes to the Passero family—Carrie, Bill, Claire, Kristin, Lauren, and Meredith—for providing me with much-needed breaks from my work. I am indebted to my nephew, Dan Mares, for doing some legwork that helped fill a few gaps in my research. Perhaps most importantly, I would like to thank my parents, Carolyn and John (to whom this book is dedicated), for their continued love and encouragement. Their enduring faith in my ability to succeed even when I had doubts gave me the strength to see this project to completion.

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T

he postwar intellectual and political right has become an increasing source of fascination for scholars and the wider public. Those on the right have attempted to chronicle the rise of conservatism in order to justify their political success in the 1980s. Those on the left have sought an answer as to why conservatism grew to be such a dominant force in American life and why liberalism no longer stood at the center of American thought and action. Frustration over the Vietnam War played a central role in the political shifts of the late twentieth century, but it was not the only reason. Discontent about domestic policies and the moral direction of the country disheartened many people who then began to question the dominance of liberalism at a time when conservatives vociferously proclaimed its defects. At mid- century, few conservatives managed effectively to challenge liberal dominance, and yet in less than thirty years they actively promoted their beliefs to larger audiences. Postwar conservatism brought together some rather unlikely individuals, who initially could not even agree to refer to themselves as conservatives. Most felt liberalism and communism threatened an inherent moral order and individual liberty, but they could not decide which ideal should take precedence. Conservative intellectuals worked hard in the late 1950s and early 1960s to bridge the ideological gaps among their fellow members. Ultimately, conservatives relied on the doctrine of fusionism—the idea that tradition and freedom were not mutually exclusive—to hold them together. Fusionism allowed the right to focus on their commonalities not their differences so they could broaden their base of support.1 Conservative victories in the 1970s and 1980s would not have been possible had it not been for their earlier efforts. Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980 showed that conservatives had learned how to translate their ideology to the political scene. For conservatives, Barry Goldwater’s defeat in 1964 taught them several lessons; however, Richard Nixon’s election

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INTRODUCTION

C O N S E RVAT I V E I N T E L L E C T UA L S A N D N I XO N

in 1968 taught them more about combining ideology with politics. Goldwater lost largely because he seemed too conservative prompting right-minded intellectuals to recognize that an outright conservative could not win the general election in 1968. So they sought a “centrist” who they could control. Richard Nixon turned out to be their centrist. With his victory in 1968 the right thought their time had finally come. Almost overnight, conservatives went from attacking the establishment to defending it. This situation, however, proved short-lived. The right assumed that Nixon would owe them loyalty for their support and thus he would promote at least nominally conservative positions. Once in office, Nixon chose to introduce domestic and foreign policies that went against general conservative doctrine. As his administration progressed, the right responded by distancing themselves from the president. In so doing, they set the stage for a fresh start after his resignation in 1974. The conservative’s relationship with Richard Nixon was a defining moment for the right. Not only did Nixon help them define what they were not, he helped them define what they wanted to become. The tale of why conservative intellectuals supported Nixon in 1968 and how their support dwindled assists in explaining their movement’s later successes. The conservative movement became increasingly important in American life after World War II. Its philosophy appealed to certain segments of the population as they began to question the wisdom of liberalism. Conservative success did not occur just because liberalism declined. People did not turn to conservatism because it was there, but because they could see how conservative ideas seemed more applicable to the issues of the time. Historians such as George Nash and Jerome Himmelstein in their studies of the right have done an excellent job of demonstrating how hard the conservatives worked to define themselves and their beliefs. As important as this work had been, the story of conservative development seemed incomplete, especially in terms of how conservative intellectuals learned to translate ideology into politics in the Nixon era. Conservative intellectuals expected to have a different—in fact a better— relationship with Richard Nixon when he was president. The course of their relationship should not be undervalued as a source of later conservative success. Exploring the relationship between Nixon and conservative intellectuals raised several interesting questions about conservative hopes. What did conservatives think about and expect from Nixon before and during his presidential campaigns, after his elections, and beyond his resignation? Were they overly optimistic about what Nixon could or would do as a “conservative” in 1968? Were their expectations even

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realistic? A second set of questions stemmed from how conservative intellectuals thought they could inf luence the president once he was in office. Nixon employed more moderates and liberals on his staff than he did conservatives and so conservatives did not have an intellectual champion in the Nixon White House.2 Could their limited visits and writings sway the president to conservative policies? Were Nixon’s staffing decisions a ref lection of politics or a ref lection of his ideological leanings? How, if at all, did Nixon approach conservatives for support? Finally, was the president interested in conservative viewpoints or merely hoping to placate potential critics with his efforts? Discussing the relationship between Nixon and conservative intellectuals also broached that rather interesting question of whether Nixon was an intellectual. Nixon told a group of intellectuals shortly after his 1968 election, “I am an intellectual too” and yet he seemed to possess an intrinsic animosity toward them as a group. He could not grasp how such highly educated individuals could attack him, his policies, or the country.3 Given his feelings about intellectuals, was he willing to concede that they might provide useful policy advice or did he rely on what he considered his own intellectual ability to guide the country? Lastly, how did his view of himself as a thinker compare with the views of others about his abilities? Conservative publications such as the National Review and Human Events helped outline the broad trends of conservative thought during the Nixon years in this study. National Review, which published its inaugural issue in 1955, hoped to give substance to the conservative attack against liberalism. Human Events, first issued in 1944, chronicled the Washington political scene from a conservative perspective. The writings, correspondence, and personal ref lections of leading conservative intellectuals such as William F. Buckley, Jr., Frank Meyer, Russell Kirk, and James Kilpatrick helped complete the picture of the conservative opinion of Nixon and his handling of issues including the Vietnam War, communism, inf lation, unemployment, poverty, and civil rights. Lastly, the personal ref lections of Richard Nixon and his key advisers plus relevant documents from Nixon’s presidential materials helped explore how the conservatives and the Nixon administration related to one another. Vast changes in the 1960s created uncertainty about American institutions and beliefs. The civil rights movement made progress in extending equality to black Americans after Brown v. Board of Education (1954) ended de jure segregation. However, the Supreme Court’s decision also spawned powerful reactions in the South and the North. Southern whites violently resisted the attempts of blacks to push the government to enforce Brown.

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I N T RO D U C T IO N

C O N S E RVAT I V E I N T E L L E C T UA L S A N D N I XO N

Northern blacks fiercely reacted to the slow progress in dealing with de facto segregation where economic opportunity or lack thereof emerged as a greater concern than did political rights. Race riots became increasingly common in the mid-1960s including those in Harlem, Newark, Los Angeles, and Detroit. Taking their cues from the civil rights movement, college age students and younger faculty members began to express themselves both culturally and politically in the 1960s. The hippies of the counterculture relied on sex, drugs, and rock ‘n’ roll to create a new society. The more politically active youth joined the New Left, which called for broader political participation and more social activism to address society’s ills. After working with the civil rights movement, the New Left turned its attention to the Vietnam War. Questioning the American response to communism, members held teach-ins and rallies to protest Lyndon Johnson’s policies.4 The civil rights movement, the antiwar movement, and the counterculture raised questions about the nation’s values and direction. On both sides of the ideological spectrum, intellectuals felt compelled to reposition their movements to capitalize on the relevant issues. Liberals faced challenges from within—activists who joined the New Left and disgruntled intellectuals who eventually became neoconservatives—as they attempted to cope with questions about race and morality. Conservatives, on the other hand, used the fissures of the 1960s to strengthen their political base among what Richard Nixon would later call the “silent majority.” As vocal as civil rights protestors, antiwar activists, and hippies appeared in the 1960s, these movements remained anathema to many Americans. Conservatives appealed to an ever-increasing constituency with their calls for respect of tradition and order, for reducing the inf luence of the federal government, and for a strong national defense. They sounded appeals for an end to the riots and protests that plagued the country. Most right-minded intellectuals supported the principles underlying the civil rights movement such as equal treatment under the law, but they sought less intrusive remedies encouraging black self-reliance and voluntary action. Conservatives strongly supported the Vietnam War and desired a fervent policy against communism. They believed that the more aggressively the United States responded to the communist threat, the more likely the country would be able to avoid destruction.5 Conservatives increasingly believed they had the power to control the Republican Party (GOP) because no other political faction truly addressed the needs of the American people. Working from the bottom up, conservative politicos engineered the nomination of Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) for president in 1964. The Draft Goldwater

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Movement successfully reached out to voters dismayed by the visible changes in American society. While Johnson soundly defeated Goldwater in the general election, conservative inf luence on the Republican Party remained strong. Moreover, many Americans warmed up to Goldwater’s message as they began to cling to old values to meet the changes of the 1960s.6 His ideas, drawing on themes from his best- selling book The Conscience of a Conservative (1960), spoke to Americans about renewing their fight for the cause of freedom. Conservative Republicans, he pledged, would fight for freedom grounded in a constitutional government limited “by laws of nature and of nature’s God.” Moreover, Americans with renewed effort could be “freedom’s missionaries in a doubting world.” Goldwater also lambasted liberalism’s approach to the country’s problems especially its disdain for order, hard work, and morality. He insisted that it was time once again for the government to provide security—from violence at home and aggression abroad.7 Goldwater’s image as an extremist counteracted his attempts to bring the conservative message to Americans in 1964. However, the grassroots organization that helped secure his nomination lived on to spread conservative ideas before the next presidential election. Capitalizing on the appeal of Goldwater’s message and changes in American society, conservatives worked to increase their exposure in the 1960s. Barry Goldwater and William F. Buckley, Jr. were by far the most visible conservatives in America, but they were not the only voices trying to convince Americans of the dangers of liberalism. The men who appear most often in this study not only shared a desire to spread the conservative message, but they also met generally speaking the definition of what Tevi Troy called “public intellectuals” in his book Intellectuals and the American Presidency. Public intellectuals were “relatively well-known generalists” able to speak on a broad range of subjects through the lens of their own worldview. Many supported themselves through free lance writing and part-time teaching rather than through a full-time institutional affiliation.8 In some cases, but not always, a better term to describe public intellectuals might be pundits. Politicians often fit the definition of a public intellectual; however, most politicians inf luence people through their actions (support for specific legislation or programs) as opposed to the content of their writings. So this work focused more on active public intellectuals in the late 1960s and early 1970s. William F. Buckley made his first public splash with God and Man at Yale (1951), which attacked the philosophy of the modern university especially as it related to academic freedom. After co-authoring McCarthy and His Enemies (1954) with his brother-in-law L. Brent Bozell, Buckley

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C O N S E RVAT I V E I N T E L L E C T UA L S A N D N I XO N

turned his attention to starting a journal for conservative-minded individuals, National Review. Throughout the 1960s, Buckley increased his visibility as a conservative pundit and worked to bring respectability to the movement. He served as National Review’s editor, wrote a syndicated column as well as other freelance articles, published several works of nonfiction, made frequent public appearances on university campuses, ran for mayor of New York City as the Conservative Party’s candidate in 1965, and began hosting Firing Line in 1966.9 Although Buckley was the most visible member of the National Review’s staff, he was not alone in the fight against communism and liberalism. In the late 1950s, James Burnham, Frank Meyer, and William Rusher joined him. Burnham and Meyer migrated to the conservative movement because of their first hand experience with communism in the 1930s and 1940s. In his pre-National Review writings, Burnham increasingly expressed disillusionment with communism and its promise of a more equitable society. In his column, “The Third World War,” Burnham continually lamented liberalism’s failure to stop the communist menace.10 In 1956, Meyer joined National Review as editor of the book review section. Through his choice of books and his column, “Principles and Heresies,” he provided postwar conservatism the philosophical grounding it lacked. The architect of fusionism, Meyer brought conservatives together in their opposition to liberalism, the centralization of power in the federal government, and the appeasement of communism. He also worked with the American Conservative Union (ACU) to give the right a political voice.11 Rusher joined National Review as its publisher in 1957; he also served on the editorial board. More politically motivated than his fellow editors from the beginning, Rusher felt the position would allow him to help focus the energy of the movement and propel its growth. In the early 1970s, he began to write a syndicated column and appeared regularly on PBS’s The Advocates.12 National Review, as well as Human Events, attracted other conservatively inclined writers to their pages including James Kilpatrick, Russell Kirk, Ralph de Toledano, M. Stanton Evans, Milton Friedman, and Henry Hazlitt. Kilpatrick began his career as the editor of the Richmond News Leader. He later became a well-known syndicated columnist, a contributor to National Review, and a commentator for 60 Minutes. While his writings covered a broad range of subjects, in the 1960s and early 1970s, he wrote most often about segregation, the courts, and presidential politics.13 Kirk became perhaps the most articulate voice of intellectual conservatism with the publication of The Conservative Mind (1953), which traced American conservative thought to the works of Edmund Burke and

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highlighted the key principles of conservatism. He wrote a regular column for National Review focusing on the maintenance of traditional values and institutions, wrote a syndicated column, and was instrumental in the founding of Modern Age and the University Bookman.14 Early in his career, de Toledano worked for The New Leader and Newsweek. After moving from left to right, he frequently wrote for National Review in the late 1950s and 1960s. In 1960, he began writing a syndicated column for King Features. De Toledano also authored two books on Richard Nixon based on his longtime association with the California Republican.15 Evans served as an assistant editor of The Freeman in the 1950s and then as the editor of the Indianapolis News in the 1960s and 1970s. He authored several books on the errors of liberalism and the prospects for conservatism in the 1960s. He wrote actively for National Review and Human Events on a domestic policy issues and politics. Evans also served as the chairman of the ACU in the 1970s.16 Friedman, a champion of economic freedom and a leader of the Chicago school of economics, helped guide the conservative approach to economic policy in his books and his column for Newsweek. He argued that monetary policy was the best means to combat inf lation and that no amount of government tinkering could fine-tune the economy. Hazlitt served as the leading spokesman of the Austrian school of economics. He wrote for National Review, Human Events, and The Freeman as well as several other newspapers and magazines calling for balanced budgets and reduced government expenditures to keep inf lation down.17 In the late 1960s a newer generation of conservatives emerged on the scene including Jeffrey Hart, R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., and George F. Will. Hart, a professor of English at Dartmouth, joined the editorial board at National Review in 1969 after serving as a book reviewer for seven years. A scholar of eighteenth- century politics and literature, Hart wrote on various issues for the magazine and began writing a syndicated column in the 1970s.18 Tyrell founded The Alternative in 1967 while attending Indiana University to counter New Left inf luence at his school. By the mid-1970s the magazine reached a nationwide audience. Tyrell wrote on a variety of topics, which included a series of enlightening interviews with noted conservative leaders. He also appeared on a local television show in Indiana (sometimes with M. Stanton Evans), where he attacked liberalism and Nixonian idealism.19 Will began his career in the 1960s as a professor of political philosophy at Michigan State and then the University of Toronto. He went on to work for Sen. Gordon Allott (R- CO), while also contributing articles to National Review and writing a column for The Alternative titled “Letter from a Whig.” When Allott

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lost his bid for reelection in 1972, Will convinced the NR editorial board that the magazine needed a Washington editor—a position he held from 1973 to 1976.20 As the postwar conservative movement started to take shape in the late 1940s and 1950s, Richard M. Nixon began his long career of public service. After serving in the navy during World War II, Nixon returned to California to practice law. He successfully ran for Congress in 1946. During the campaign, Nixon presented himself as the ultimate “conservative populist” fighting for the underprivileged, industrious, forgotten man. He also provided an alternative New Deal liberalism during the crisis of postwar reconversion. In 1950, Nixon ran against Helen Gahagan Douglas for a seat in the Senate. Although Nixon again relied on his conservative populist image, he added a new element to his image during the campaign. In 1948, Nixon had taken a seat on the House Committee on Un-American Activities then investigating instances of domestic communism and treason. His pursuit of former State Department employee, Alger Hiss, increased his national reputation as an anticommunist. After the outbreak of the Korean War, communism played a large role in the final months of the 1950 campaign giving Nixon the edge he needed to defeat Douglas. In the wake of the election, Douglas frequently repeated a phrase to describe her opponent she picked up from an article in the Independent Review, “Tricky Dick.”21 The Republican Party chose Richard Nixon to run with Dwight Eisenhower in 1952. When allegations that Nixon received illegal campaign contributions surfaced during the campaign, Eisenhower’s advisers forced Nixon to defend himself. He used a spot on national television to make his case. In his “Checkers Speech,” which took its name from his reference to a cocker spaniel named Checkers he received from a campaign contributor, Nixon appealed to the American people for support. In his remarks, the vice presidential nominee detailed his personal finances making for example a comment about his wife’s “Republican cloth coat” to prove that his family was not living beyond its means. He then challenged the other candidates to do the same. Although the broadcast upset Nixon, the support he received helped him stay on the Republican ticket.22 Nixon served eight years as vice president, during which time he did an extensive amount of foreign travel and showed a sense of level headedness in administration when Eisenhower suffered a heart attack and later a mild stroke while in office. He also furthered his reputation as an anticommunist during his these years. Eisenhower preferred to remain above the political fray and made his vice president the face of the Republican

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Party’s attack against not only communism, but overzealous anticommunists such as Joseph McCarthy. The Republicans nominated Richard Nixon for president in 1960. He lost the election against John Kennedy, but by only a small margin. Nixon then made an ill-fated run at the governorship of California in 1962. He was soundly defeated after which he gave one of his most famous press conferences telling reporters, “You won’t have Richard Nixon to kick around anymore, because, gentleman, this is my last press conference.”23 Nixon may have been serious when he gave his “last press conference” but he was drawn into politics once again in the mid-1960s. Slowly he laid the groundwork for a run at the presidency in 1968. Conservative intellectuals looked with anticipation to the 1968 presidential election and the prospect that unlike in 1964, a conservativeminded candidate might win. The civil rights and antiwar movements contributed to a rise in conservative sentiment in some segments of the American population. While conservatism was far from dominant going into the 1968 election season, it had blossomed into a more viable political movement after Goldwater’s defeat. A victory in 1968 would finally allow conservatives a fighting chance to tackle both liberalism and communism from inside the government. They would not only be able to roll back New Deal and Great Society programs, but fight a more effective war against the communists in Vietnam and elsewhere. Hence, conservative intellectuals had to decide which Republican candidate would best represent their interests. Was Richard Nixon—the clear frontrunner— conservative enough to suit their needs? Many right-minded individuals remained unsure as the campaign heated up.

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I N T RO D U C T IO N

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RICHARD NIXON: AN ELECTABLE CONSERVATIVE?

C

onservatives had extended only lukewarm support to Richard Nixon in 1960 when he ran against John Kennedy for president. However, in 1968 many right-minded intellectuals lent their voices to Nixon’s campaign. Surveying the political landscape in 1968, leading conservatives such as William F. Buckley and Frank Meyer concluded that supporting Nixon afforded their movement the best opportunity to defeat liberal Republicanism. Choosing Nixon proved difficult for some conservatives, but his election convinced them of their relevance to the American political scene. Conservative intellectuals believed Nixon’s administration would follow right of center policies and such expectations continually shaped their view of his presidency. Nixon’s wilderness years coincided with widespread political, social, and cultural changes in the United States. The civil rights movement and the antiwar movement, combined with the rise of an expressive utopian youth culture, made average Americans worry about the direction the country was headed. The tensions of the 1960s culminated in 1968, beginning with North Vietnam’s Tet Offensive in January and ending with Richard Nixon’s election in November. With each passing day and month, increasingly the country seemed to be on a course toward selfdestruction. Where conservatives wondered at the start of the year was the leadership that would head off the wave of violence at home and steer the country to victory in Vietnam. After Martin Luther King’s assassination in April sparked widespread urban rioting Human Events noted that “selective civil disobedience for the purpose of narrow goals [was] not the answer to the problems of America.” When student radicals at Columbia University later that month

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CHAPTER 1

C O N S E RVAT I V E I N T E L L E C T UA L S A N D N I XO N

began a sit-in to protest the administration’s racist policies toward Columbia’s neighbors in Harlem, conservatives hoped that university officials would take a stand that would head off similar protests at other schools, but they failed to do so. After Robert Kennedy’s assassination in June conservatives saw lawlessness everywhere, yet most thought the liberal’s response left much to be desired. Why, they wondered, had the liberals allowed the perpetrators of violent, illegal action to hold them hostage?1 Conservatives surveying these events concluded, as Frank Meyer did, that the country faced a “massive crisis . . . generated by decades of liberalism.” The problems stemmed from “the corrosion of national morale” caused by the government’s failure to live up to the social compact it had with the people. Anarchy seemed to be just around the corner. William F. Buckley further argued the intellectual response to the events at Columbia showed that the Old Left had faded into “utter intellectual ineptitude,” since the liberals insisted that the action of the rioters was consistent with American democracy. As the summer came to a close, the question of whether the nation had become ungovernable had escaped the realm of idle talk to become a legitimate fear for conservatives.2 Coming to Terms with the Republican Nominee Conservatives, determined to capitalize on their gains in the Republican Party, deliberated over the best means to triumph in 1968. Intellectuals and political activists brought much to the discussion. Convinced that with the appropriate candidate they would win, conservatives looked both to the 1960 and 1964 elections for guidance during the primaries. Experience with Nixon in 1960 made conservatives wary that any rightleaning candidate might move to the left in order to court liberal Republicans. Experience with Goldwater in 1964 showed conservatives the need for party unity and for keeping their emotions in check. 3 In 1960, Richard Nixon appeared the logical Republican choice to succeed Dwight Eisenhower as president. His experience as vice president and his strong anticommunism made Nixon appealing to some conservatives. Russell Kirk saw him as being “cool, prudent, and a good mediator.” His proposed policies shied away from centralization; rather he favored state and local action. The vice president, more importantly, seemed to share the traditional Republican value of “ordered liberty.”4 However, others on the right believed Nixon would continue Eisenhower’s moderate course of action thereby failing to meet the twin challenges of communism and domestic statism. Beyond that, Nixon’s

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conservative detractors maintained the reasonable fear that Nixon would abandon his seemingly conservative campaign positions. Frank Meyer, along with William Rusher, encouraged their colleagues at National Review to deny Nixon an endorsement. Rusher recalled that Nixon left him “simply cold or, more precisely, cool.” Meyer had similar doubts about Nixon’s conservative credentials. While “less obnoxious than the alternatives,” he was no conservative ideologue. Meyer, Rusher, and other conservatives of a similar mindset believed Nixon’s politics drifted “with the tide.” Therefore, they could not count on him to enact a conservative agenda.5 In 1964, the Republicans nominated a decidedly more conservative candidate for president. The National Draft Goldwater Committee succeeded in placing their candidate on the ballot, a significant victory for conservatives. However, Barry Goldwater’s supporters failed to translate their accomplishment into a November success. Lyndon Johnson took 61 percent of the popular vote leaving many political observers to offer postelection evaluations filled only with conservative failure. Goldwater’s extremist image was only one reason for his defeat; the senator’s lack of support from moderate and liberal Republicans also contributed to his loss. Wary of the consequences of a conservative victory for their own political agenda, many liberal Republicans chose not to support the party’s nominee. Without party unity, the GOP simply could not mount an effective challenge to Johnson.6 Many conservatives believed that Goldwater’s message carried little responsibility for the outcome in 1964. Rather, the loss resulted from organizational problems. Frank Meyer argued that the 1964 campaign stood as a conservative success because it created conditions in which the Republican Party could serve as an “institutional vehicle for conservatism.” 7 Richard Nixon and William F. Buckley discussed two key factors for securing Republican victory in 1968—both of which related to the results of the 1964 election—during a September 1967 taping of Firing Line. Nixon argued that since President Johnson had not sold the liberal agenda in a way that appealed to most voters, they would look elsewhere for solutions. He believed that the Republicans had to present their proposals in an “exciting fashion” to draw in voters. Buckley reiterated Nixon’s point by noting that the GOP’s future depended on whether or not it could produce a “seductive spokesman” to “penetrate the shibboleths . . . cultivated by the other side.” Furthermore, both men agreed that the results of the 1964 election showed “the necessity to unite” all elements of the party. If what happened in 1964 happened in 1968, the prospects for the Republican Party would be dim.8

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Although conservatives recognized the importance of unity, they had distinct notions about their ideal candidate for 1968 as well. To win conservative support, according to Frank Meyer, a candidate should hold “broad views which are in general consonant with the conservative consensus in America today.” When choosing a candidate the right needed to remember the tenets of modern conservatism—namely, the preservation of individual liberty and the dangers of communism. Shortly before the Republican National Convention in Miami Beach, Meyer also maintained that above all else, the GOP nominee needed to be ready and willing to stand up against liberal-radical ideologues who subjected themselves to the blackmail of the dissatisfied.9 Moreover, though most conservatives saw the need of choosing a moderate, some worried about the potential problem of placing party needs before conservative ends. Conservatives headed into 1968 guarding against the possibility that they would allow their emotions for a conservative-minded candidate to sweep them away.10 Richard Nixon began campaigning for the 1968 election almost immediately after Barry Goldwater’s defeat, perhaps even before. Ever the realistic politician, Nixon knew that 1964 was not his year to make a comeback. However, he used the campaign to demonstrate his loyalty to the GOP. Nixon looked upon his selection to present the nominee to the convention as his “best chance to begin the ministry of party unity.” He dutifully played this role though the end of the campaign. In the five weeks before the election, Nixon made appearances in thirty- six states on behalf of Goldwater and local candidates.11 To meet the challenge of almost constant campaigning Nixon recruited Patrick Buchanan, an editorial writer for the St. Louis Globe-Democrat, to serve as his chief aid in 1966. Buchanan took the position because in his opinion Nixon “could unify our bitterly divided party; he knew foreign policy; he was the most qualified man in America to be president.”12 During the 1966 congressional elections, Nixon with Buchanan’s help carefully picked the races in which he campaigned for Republican candidates. He focused on those districts that had been lost to the Democrats in 1964, but the GOP could recapture. The plan paid high dividends; Republican victories made Richard Nixon the frontrunner as the 1968 election approached.13 Nixon also attempted to counter his image as a loser. His narrow loss to Kennedy in 1960 and his defeat in the 1962 California gubernatorial race remained major liabilities for the 1968 campaign. He needed to prove himself a winner in the primaries. Nixon’s growing campaign staff knew that simply relying on the party apparatus would be futile. He needed to build delegate strength at the state level in the primary races.

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The closer Nixon came to the nomination, the more former advertising men like H. R. (Bob) Haldeman, Dwight Chapin, Larry Higby, and Ron Ziegler controlled his image. Their strategy worked to Nixon’s advantage; he managed to speak to the voters without over exposing himself. He positioned himself to be the one person with the ability to guide the GOP to victory.14 In 1967, Nixon’s team worked to develop his political base and raise the necessary funds for his campaign. Nixon delivered the annual Lakeside Speech in July to the members of California’s Bohemian Club (something Herbert Hoover did until his death in 1964). His appearance helped to solidify support from powerful Republican donors in the business community. At similar engagements around the country, Nixon worked to ensure he had the financial backing to make his candidacy successful. He also travelled abroad in 1967 to revitalize international contacts and to sharpen his ideas about the state of the world. Nixon’s article “Asia after Vietnam” appeared in the October issue of Foreign Affairs. It outlined his post-Vietnam worldview and reinforced the view that he had a wealth of experience and insight on foreign policy.15 Richard Nixon built his campaign message around the two touchiest issues facing the country in 1967 and 1968—Vietnam and domestic disorder. He based his Vietnam position on a desire to end the war “in a manner that would save the South Vietnamese people from military defeat and subjugation to the domination of the North Vietnamese Communist regime.” Nixon reasoned that the only way to push the communists to a negotiated settlement would be “for the United States to employ its great economic power to demonstrate convincingly to the Communists that aggression would not pay.” He also indicated that he would look to the Soviet Union (USSR) to assist with negotiations telling the New York Times that the Soviets were “very possibly key” to concluding an agreement in Southeast Asia.16 Nixon’s position on domestic disorder caused by urban rioting centered not only on his belief that racism was wrong, but also on his belief that “systemic racism” was not solely responsible for the violence in the mid-1960s. Rather, the riots resulted when “extremists” encouraged people “to obey only the laws with which they agree.” Nixon thus stressed the law and order theme. He called upon his fellow citizens to “pay the necessary price to restore peace to society” and to “commit themselves to the proposition that any man who disobeys the law pays the penalty the law exacts.”17 Nixon’s basic campaign speech spoke directly to the country’s problems, but proposed only vague solutions. Its elusiveness allowed him room to attack opponents on the left and right.18 His mantra during the

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primaries centered on a call for new leadership to end the war and quell domestic troubles. He harkened back to Franklin Roosevelt in hopes of pulling in some Democratic voters with his call for new freedoms. However, Nixon made the emphasis on freedom more positive. Rather than proposing the freedom from want or from hunger, he offered the freedom to work and to choose. “Personal freedom” he said “will not ensure that everyman will get all he desires, it will ensure that everyman will get all he deserves.” Nixon also maintained that the federal government could not deal with domestic problems alone—state and local governments needed to take some responsibility.19 He was equally appealing when he spoke about an American obligation to maintain world peace. Nixon favored making it “clear to a potential aggressor that the price of aggression [was] too high, and the chances of success too slight.” Nixon proposed to restore American military superiority, noting the “ ‘parity’ concept means superiority for potential enemies . . . we cannot accept this concept and survive as a free people.”20 Nixon’s standard speech also gave the impression that the “new” Nixon was being entirely candid with his audience. To shed his “Tricky Dick” image, his staff implemented Operation Candor—a program designed to impress voters with his sincerity and conviction. Richard Whalen, a conservative journalist who worked for Nixon’s speech writing team, noted that the candidate surrounded himself with a young campaign staff to enhance his “new” image. By shedding advisers from his vice presidential days and choosing young men from different ideological backgrounds, Nixon gave his campaign a sense of drama.21 Nixon also relied on his skills as a master political speaker to appeal to a wide variety of voters. William Rusher, never a fan of Nixon, recalled being impressed with the former vice president’s capacity to enunciate both sides of an issue after a meeting in 1967. Regarding the same meeting, William F. Buckley wrote to Patrick Buchanan: “A note to tell you that I was glad . . . to talk with Mr. Nixon, who was wonderfully candid and ingratiating.”22 By early 1968, Richard Nixon appeared well on his way to proving himself a strong candidate to conservative intellectuals and the wider voting public. Of course, Nixon was only one of many potential Republican candidates in 1968. He faced challenges from Charles Percy, George Romney, and Nelson Rockefeller on his left and Ronald Reagan on his right. Percy, Romney, and Rockefeller—at various stages in the campaign—competed with each other and with Nixon for center and liberal-leaning Republican votes. Reagan, always more of a direct threat to Nixon, competed with the former vice president for the support of conservative Republicans,

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especially those voters in the South who might consider George Wallace if the GOP nominated someone too liberal for their taste. Charles Percy (a senator from Illinois) and George Romney (the governor of Michigan) appeared early on to have a great deal of promise, but by the convention in August both had lost their momentum. Nelson Rockefeller, more so than Percy or Romney, had the support in Republican circles to challenge Nixon. As the governor of New York, he had solid backing from the Eastern Establishment and thus from many party regulars. However, the governor declared his noncandidacy and only sporadically participated in the primary process. Although he had done little in the way of campaigning, by the time the Republican Convention Rockefeller remained the only hope of the Establishment. The other liberals failed to garner enough support to win the nomination.23 Conservatives dreaded Richard Nixon to some degree in 1968; but they feared Nelson Rockefeller even more. So they devoted a great deal of energy to prevent Rockefeller’s nomination. While his chances of defeating Nixon at the convention seemed slim, he could still thwart a conservative effort to control the platform deliberations. Conservatives were also mindful of the effect Rockefeller’s tactics would have on Nixon’s campaign strategy. When Rockefeller declined to fight for the nomination after New Hampshire, Nixon moved to court moderate to liberal Republicans. Conservatives worried that without a liberal in the race Nixon would never have to be specific on his approach to the issues.24 To ward off Rockefeller’s appeal, William F. Buckley, for example, said he was a competent politician, but offered nothing new to voters. He was too similar to “the typical and tedious Democrats.” Voters wanted something “fresh” and Rockefeller’s record hardly met such a qualification. 25 Nixon’s greatest test during the campaign, beyond demonstrating he could win in the polls, was to ward off a challenge from Ronald Reagan. As a former actor, Reagan was a national figure even before he attracted the attention of conservative intellectuals and politicians in 1964. With his speech, “A Time for Choosing,” in support of Barry Goldwater, Reagan cast himself as a responsible conservative. For many on the right, he appeared to be the next standard-bearer for their movement after Goldwater’s defeat. Reagan, a former Democrat, by the mid-1960s was a fiscal and social conservative; however, the main reason he moved to the GOP was its stronger stand against communism. Encouraged to run for governor of California in 1966, Reagan won the election by a large margin. His victory increased speculation that he would run for president in 1968. Reagan denied any interest in the nomination throughout much of the campaign.

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Until two days before the convention, he remained a favorite son, noncandidate. Of all conservative intellectuals, Frank Meyer emerged as perhaps Ronald Reagan’s strongest supporter, although others certainly praised his conservative qualities. Meyer argued that he had “the most consistent principled conservative stand, on both domestic and foreign policy.” Although Reagan had limited knowledge of governmental procedure, Meyer maintained that he was “the only conservative in a generation who has had the actual experience of carrying solid conservative principles into practice in a major state.” Reagan, more than any other Republican candidate, would attempt “to re-establish constitutional freedom and order.”26 Fear of a drift to the left made Reagan even more appealing to many right-minded individuals. Most suspected he would be less likely to cave into pressure from liberal Republicans. Both Frank Meyer and William Rusher encouraged the NR editors to support and even endorse Ronald Reagan. In one letter to Buckley, Rusher argued, “The simple fact is . . . that Reagan is the conservative spokesman, standardbearer and candidate in this race.”27 Many conservative intellectuals made it clear that they preferred Reagan, but few stated that Nixon was a poor choice. What they wanted from Nixon were assurances that as president he would uphold conservative principles. The right continually tested his loyalty so that Nixon would have to make a commitment to their cause. In a 1966 television appearance, William Rusher called on Nixon to clarify his efforts to distance himself from the movement particularly Nixon’s insinuation that the Buckleyites posed a greater danger to the GOP than the John Birch Society.28 Patrick Buchanan sent a letter to the editor of National Review responding on Nixon’s behalf to Rusher’s demand for an explanation. What Nixon meant to say, according to Buchanan, was that splinter actions—such as William F. Buckley’s run for mayor of New York on the Conservative Party ticket—were perilous to Republican Party unity.29 Although the Nixon camp diffused the problem in this instance, conservatives still doubted his intentions. In the weeks leading up to the Republican National Convention, conservatives warned of a potential Nixon leftward drift. Ralph de Toledano questioned the sincerity of his campaign promises to reduce the size of the federal government, since dealing with his staff was similar to dealing with an overgrown federal agency. Nixon intellectually understood the need for a smaller central government, but de Toledano worried that political pressure would drive him in the other direction.30 More than Nixon’s sincerity though troubled

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conservatives. M. Stanton Evans worried that 1968 would be a replay of 1960. Rockefeller remained on track to sabotage the conservatives. To prevent his dominance of the issues, Nixon should have been reaching out to conservatives, attacking George Wallace, and focusing on the South. Evans saw evidence of just the opposite; Nixon seemed to be moving toward the Rockefeller strategy of trying to win over the liberal Northeast.31 The composition of Nixon’s campaign staff emerged as another area of concern for conservative intellectuals. Perhaps Ralph de Toledano put it best in his article “Which Adviser Will Nixon Listen to This Year?” Political pundits had said to win Nixon would have to lash out against the Johnson administration. However, de Toledano thought his liberal staff seemed to be preventing such criticism.32 Gary Wills, while gathering information for an article on Nixon in 1968, asked speechwriter Raymond Price who Nixon’s advisers were. Price’s answer—elusive at best—indicated he could not provide the names of Nixon’s contacts in the government. Within the academy, the former vice president had few advisers, but he was his own expert in many areas so his team had no concerns. 33 In the end, Nixon’s immediate circle tended to hail from the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency or from his law firm, which did not sit well with conservatives who wanted their voice heard within the Nixon team. While conservatives weighed their options, Nixon actively sought to dispel their fears, especially of those in the intellectual crowd who remained dubious of his intentions. When asked by William F. Buckley in 1967 about his relationship with intellectuals in general, Richard Nixon noted he had received little support from the intellectual community in the past. However, if nominated by the GOP he would certainly make an effort to reach out to it.34 Nixon began his effort by setting up meetings with inf luential conservative thinkers. He impressed those who attended the meetings including Buckley and Rusher with his grasp of the issues and his interest in their opinions. Nixon’s aides also reached out to conservatives by supporting their writings and sending them key speeches and comments Nixon made that would appeal to their ideological leanings. The Nixon camp sent several letters to Buckley as early as 1966 highlighting his positions on Vietnam, the rule of law, and inf lation. They continued to do so in 1967 and 1968.35 William Rusher—with a hint of cynicism in his recollection—noted that Nixon used Patrick Buchanan and Thomas Huston as conduits to the conservative movement. These aides asked conservatives to write a policy memo on a topic of interest to them after which they would be told something to the effect that “the boss liked your memo.” The author then felt he had an open line of communication with

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the next president and would be a loyal supporter.36 Nixon’s staff paid a good deal of attention to the conservatives to create the impression that he was one of them throughout the campaign. The question for conservatives in the summer of 1968 was how to ensure the right candidate—even if he was a moderate—took the nomination at the convention. The intellectuals associated with National Review initially failed to agree on the endorsement issue in 1968. Their experience in many ways mirrored the experience of the conservative movement. As in 1960, the editors debated whether to support a specific candidate in the primaries or to remain neutral. During Nixon’s previous run for the White House, Frank Meyer and William Rusher wanted the journal to endorse Barry Goldwater or at a minimum not to endorse Nixon. Both men felt that endorsing Nixon would only strengthen the Republican Party establishment. In 1968, they thought the magazine should follow the same course—either endorse Reagan or remain neutral. On the other hand, James Burnham and Priscilla Buckley (the managing editor) reasoned that while Nixon was not an ideal conservative candidate, he was far better than the liberal alternative. 37 At heart, the debate rested on how best to stop the liberal Republicans while at the same time promoting a conservative agenda. For James Burnham a key factor in 1968 was to avoid emotional ties to a candidate. He argued that conservatives needed to find a person able to challenge liberalism, something that Goldwater had not been able to do. His support for Nixon was purely practical according to biographer Kevin Smant. Burnham indicated to Buckley on at least one occasion that the conservative’s main concern should be preventing Rockefeller’s nomination. Burnham feared that Reagan supporters were “so concerned with eliminating Nixon that their opposition to Rockefeller” disappeared. He saw their hope that Rockefeller could knock out Nixon and Reagan could knock out Rockefeller as too risky. Burnham’s suggestion in May that NR endorse a candidate—namely Nixon—for “journalistic reasons” angered Meyer and Rusher.38 However, such a suggestion was entirely in line with Burnham’s rather pragmatic approach to see a non-liberal win in November. Another factor for many conservatives in the primaries was to avoid close association with any one candidate. For instance, William F. Buckley rarely addressed the Nixon-Reagan issue during the 1968 campaign in his syndicated column. From a political perspective, some conservatives feared that endorsing the wrong person could lead to a lessening of their inf luence in the Republican Party. Although conservative intellectuals did not think Nixon was conservative enough, he impressed many Middle

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Americans with his rhetoric in 1967 and 1968. Since conservatives had greater control in the GOP after Goldwater’s defeat than they had before, it was important not to squander that advantage by risking estrangement from their support base for endorsing the losing candidate. Furthermore, for some conservatives having options seemed important in trying to deal with Rockefeller’s campaign. Political analysts and intellectuals seemed unsure who would benefit most—Nixon or Reagan—from Rockefeller’s stops and starts. Nixon based his campaign strategy on having a liberal Republican in the primaries so his anticipated wins would be all the more impressive. William Rusher noted that “the Nixon people have been using Rockefeller’s candidacy to scare conservatives into backing their man. . . . To the extent that Rockefeller is now visibly less menacing, the case for Nixon, from a rigorously conservative standpoint, is less overpowering.” The extent to which Nixon’s forces built upon Rockefeller’s starts and stops according to Rusher would be crucial for determining the best conservative candidate.39 William Rusher and Frank Meyer spoke for conservatives who believed that the longer they held onto Reagan as a candidate, the better chance they had to prevent Nixon from moving left. Meyer cautioned that with Rockefeller potentially out in March Nixon might move toward the “wide vacuum on his left.” Conservatives ought to “put pressure on him from the right, i.e., keep Reagan alive at least as a rhetorical pressure source.”40 The fear that Nixon might move left explained Meyer and Rusher’s heated responses to Burnham’s suggestion that NR endorse Nixon. Rusher responded with a fiery letter to William F. Buckley on May 23, 1968 protesting any change in the NR editorial policy; he believed that Reagan would make a strong showing at the convention. Rusher passionately continued: The simple fact is, moreover, that Reagan is the conservative spokesman, standard-bearer and candidate in this race. Nixon not only isn’t, he doesn’t even want to be. . . . Why should it be necessary for me to maneuver and counter-march in an effort to keep NR from doing an irreparable disservice to Reagan, who has spoken up for conservatism responsibly and persuasively? This man has more than a right to our silence while he battles and bargains for conservatism at the convention: he has the right to our support. And on his behalf, I request it.41

Meyer’s May 25, 1968 memo to the editors was strikingly similar in its appeal to support Reagan. He did not believe it was necessary to move away from non- endorsement. As a conservative journal, if NR chose to endorse any candidate it should be Reagan first and Nixon second.42

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In the end, many Republicans supported the nomination of Richard Nixon. So the most important consideration for conservative delegates was to prevent a liberal backslide during the convention’s platform deliberations. In June, William F. Buckley outlined conservative expectations for the Republican plan. Leading the list was that Republican policymakers should recognize American efforts in Vietnam remained worthwhile and that the party should not support an agreement allowing communist control of the South. With respect to fighting world communism, Republicans should not allow the recent division between the Soviets and the Chinese to change American policy. Moreover, the United States should continue to support Japan and Western Europe as part of the effort to contain the communist menace. With respect to monetary issues the party, Buckley said, should support f lexible exchange rates to address problems with the balance of payments and ease internal inf lation. Conservatives also wanted major tax reform proposals in the platform, perhaps along the lines of Milton Friedman’s uniform tax proposals. With respect to poverty and welfare, conservatives wanted to see the Republicans support local control of the issue. Furthermore, the GOP should call for an elimination of all minimum wage laws, the extension of antitrust laws to labor unions, and the end of compulsory unionism. With respect to the race question, the Republican platform should encourage the black community “to exert itself in ever field of endeavor” and to emphasize order over the “rhetoric of racial utopianism.”43 With the help of Raymond Price, Nixon drafted his positions on both domestic issues and foreign policy for the platform committee. In his position paper on crime, Nixon argued that the “chief deterrent to crime was respect for law and the rights of others.” He encouraged a strong government response to the violence and disorder that plagued American cities in the 1960s. More importantly, Nixon indicated that the country “must cease . . . the granting of special immunities and moral sanctions to those who deliberately violate the public laws—even when those violations are done in the name of peace or civil rights or antipoverty or academic reform.” He also maintained that his call for renewed respect for law and order was not “meant to be any code word for the repression of the black American.”44 Nixon’s discussion of Vietnam was more extensive, but equally as vague. He called for an honorable end to the war, while also deemphasizing the strategic importance of Vietnam to American interests. Nixon maintained that the war would not end on the military front, but through various tactics employing the “the economic, political, diplomatic and psychological fronts.” He encouraged a gradual phasing out of American

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troops as the United States increased its efforts training the South Vietnamese. Finally, Nixon also tried to direct American attention to a bigger picture—one in which ending the war in Vietnam was meaningless if the possibility of similar conf licts existed. He suggested that the United States could not deal with Vietnam in isolation. The Americans needed to open a constructive dialogue with the Soviets and Chinese in hopes that they would assist in ending the conf lict.45 During the public hearings on the platform, Republican leaders stressed party unity above all else. While there was some disagreement during the meetings, the party pledged more state and local control of programs relating the cities and to human development. The platform called for a major revision of federal welfare and poverty programs to “liberate the poor from the debilitating dependence which erodes selfrespect and discourages family unity and responsibility.” It also proposed to initiate programs that would be simpler and would protect the family. The Republicans vowed to institute a vigorous and yet evenhanded crusade against crime as well. The platform implied that domestic policy under a Republican administration would restore the individual’s autonomy and freedom of choice. The cornerstone of the party’s economic policy would be fiscal responsibility and a lessening of the government’s role in economic matters. The Republicans, moreover, promised not to support wage and price controls in an effort to curb inf lation or to reduce taxes. On Vietnam, the GOP proposed to end the war through “progressive de-Americanization” and through a negotiated settlement based on self- determination. The Republicans also opposed recognition of Communist China. Finally, the party vowed to restore American military “pre-eminence” by devoting more money to national security and more time to effective administration of defense related issues.46 Conservatives, for the most part, accepted the Republican Platform in 1968. While the platform did not live up to all their expectations, it still spoke to their more general desires for less government involvement and more effective national security. Human Events reported conservative satisfaction with the platform. More importantly, James Kilpatrick maintained that the deliberations seemed likely to allay conservative fears of a liberal sell-out. The platform emphasized “enlarging the opportunity of the individual and extending the range of human choice.” It was also dotted with references to private enterprise and repudiated the New Left’s “crippled sociology” on crime. While not the republicanism of Coolidge, said Kilpatrick, the party was definitely to the right of center.47 The platform was not just as Buckley proposed, but it did not cave to liberal demands by any means. Looking toward the candidate selection process

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in Miami Beach, conservatives had hope that no matter who the nominee their interests would be represented come November.

Richard Nixon worked hard before the convention to line up his delegates by appealing to southern politicians and taking a commanding lead in the primaries. Ronald Reagan and Nelson Rockefeller, however, still held hope that Nixon would not have enough votes to prevail on the first ballot and thus the delegates would turn to them as compromise candidates. As Nixon succinctly put it, Reagan and Rockefeller shared a joint strategy—the “erosion” of his support by highlighting Nixon’s f laws to the delegates. Before the convention, William Rusher speculated that Reagan had a better chance than Rockefeller of exploiting Nixon’s weak spots in Miami Beach.48 However, Nixon’s preconvention activity warded off both challengers’ threats. His strategists knew the South would be both crucial for his nomination and for a victory in November. In late May and early June, Nixon held meetings with Republican state chairmen throughout the South. Nixon said of one visit to Atlanta: “I was doing some serious courting and hard counting.” He also met with Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-SC) to secure his support. Thurmond wanted Nixon to take a strong position on national defense, to which Nixon happily agreed. The senator also desired protective tariffs for South Carolina’s textile industry. He was less happy with this request but went along “reluctantly” because of political realities. Nixon also convinced Thurmond and other southern leaders that he would make the federal government less active on civil rights issues.49 Gary Wills writing on the Republican National Convention noted that “the Beach’s convention was a dazzle of noise and light” with the candidates arriving “in order of their chances.” Nixon, as the frontrunner, came after the proceedings began with his entrance timed for maximum television coverage.50 Once there, he continued appeasing representatives from around the country, but especially those from the South. Rockefeller and Reagan could not chip away at his hold on the delegates. On August 7, Nixon easily outpaced his rivals taking the nomination on the first ballot. The South held for Nixon and Wisconsin, a primary state, put him over the top. With the nomination in hand, he turned to picking a running mate. After reviewing his options, Nixon chose Spiro Agnew, the governor of Maryland. Agnew, a vocal advocate for the rule of law from a border state, appealed to conservatives and

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southern voters. William F. Buckley, for example, praised Agnew for his spontaneity and his sincerity.51 For many conservatives—those leading the movement and those casting ballots at the convention—Nixon may not have been the ideal conservative candidate, but he was a respectable choice. Russell Kirk posited that Nixon won the Republican nomination for three reasons: (1) his speeches were more compelling than Romney’s or Rockefeller’s; (2) his domestic political experience and foreign policy expertise convinced most Republicans he could lead the country; and (3) his tireless efforts campaigning for the Republican Party in the 1960s paid off. Nixon, said William F. Buckley, was “the closest thing to a conservative running for president” who might actually succeed. According to National Review, “People [were] talking about his ideas; not his personality,” which for Nixon was key to his appeal in 1968. His positions would draw in traditional Republicans, some liberals, southerners, and perhaps even black militants focusing on pride not welfare. Ralph de Toledano also observed that Nixon had become the safe candidate because “in recent years Mr. Nixon has filed down the sharp edges of his political personality and his ideology.”52 The “new” Nixon of 1968 promised much to the American people—most of which seemed to be conservative. Moreover, conservatives believed he would owe his nomination to the right. Nixon would not have the opportunity to swing left if elected because conservative control of the Republican Party would keep him in line.53 Conservatives could legitimately endorse Nixon because he had cultivated the image among the voters that he stood for conservative values in the primaries and then in the general campaign. Frank Meyer believed that GOP had exuded an air of conservatism in Miami Beach. Nixon had clearly made a firm challenge to liberalism—one that even pro-Reagan delegates could accept. If Nixon lived up to what he said at the convention, conservatives could “support the Republican ticket with confidence.”54 William Rusher, in a letter to his colleagues written in September 1968, admitted that NR readers would likely glean that he favored Reagan, but noted his summary of the convention “is essentially a conservative blessing on the Nixon candidacy, and all the more effective (I hope) because it comes from a Reagan supporter.”55 Conservative columnists and politicians lined up to support Nixon throughout the rest of the campaign. It remained important as Republicans to counter the image that the left presented of Nixon. Rep. John Ashbrook (R- OH) encouraged his fellow conservatives to support Nixon. In National Review, he observed that Nixon supported the right’s positions on crime, Supreme Court nominations, and communism. Ashbrook concluded that

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“Nixon is a man of our own time, in touch with the real issues. He deserves the support of conservatives.”56 National Review indicated that Republicans should have confidence in Nixon’s ability to direct the country. He was a “superb machinist” when it came to politics, so he should have no trouble dealing with world leaders. NR also endorsed Richard Nixon for president, something it had refrained from doing in 1960. His election strategy, thought the editors, freed him from potential “middle-of-the-roadism.” More importantly, he shared the conservative’s “disillusions with liberalism.” Nixon might not have been as passionate of a believer in the free market or as anti-bureaucracy as conservatives would hope, but NR noted he had the potential to do many little things to set in motion larger, more important trends within the country.57 Conservatives also worked to diffuse the threat posed by George Wallace especially after the Republican convention. A Democratic candidate in 1964, Wallace ran as an independent in 1968. His anti-integration stand made him appealing to many southern voters. He hoped to force the election into the House of Representatives where he could compel concessions especially on desegregation. While conservatives noted that Wallace’s campaign raised some legitimate questions, it might ruin Nixon’s ability to enact real conservative solutions to those issues. James Kilpatrick and Russell Kirk further maintained that conservatives needed to take his candidacy seriously. The Wallace “factor” meant that Republicans could not expect that the implosion of the Democratic Party would lead to their victory in November. Kilpatrick noted that many Americans saw Wallace as a protest candidate, and they feared that unless they supported him their protest would go unheeded. To win Nixon had to make inroads with these conservative independents not abandon them. Kirk argued that Wallace was not a conservative and would only disappoint conservatives if elected. His “vague slogans” offered little guidance in terms of what programs he would pursue in office. William F. Buckley expressed concern about those voters who saw Wallace as the answer to conservative prayers. Although his rhetoric targeted legitimate concerns of many Americans, he had little inclination to fix the problems. During his “bizarre career,” Wallace supported federal welfare programs and increased Alabama’s debt. His support for states’ rights appealed to many conservatives, but promoting states rights to him was nothing more than an excuse to continue segregation. Voting for Wallace would not move the conservative agenda forward, so conservatives, in Buckley’s opinion, should support Nixon as the responsible choice.58 The Democrats nominated vice president Hubert Humphrey during their tumultuous Chicago convention in late August. His post-convention

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efforts started poorly because many voters associated him with the violence and disorder of the convention. The vice president had a difficult time conveying his message to voters because of constant heckling from antiwar protesters. Moreover, since Lyndon Johnson heavily inf luenced the Democratic platform for 1968, Humphrey found himself tied to some very unpopular positions. When he broke with the platform’s position on bombing in Vietnam in October, his campaign picked up momentum. Humphrey also benefited from Nixon’s lackluster attempts to improve his own standings in the polls. The Nixon team decided even before the Republican convention to wage a holding campaign that capitalized on divisions in the Democratic Party. Based on his experience in 1960, Nixon targeted key races in California, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Texas, and Michigan rather than try to campaign across the country. Victory in those states would give Nixon the Electoral College votes needed to win. More importantly, he wanted to avoid making any mistakes on the campaign trail that could jeopardize his status as the frontrunner. Nixon’s staff carefully controlled his appearances and limited opportunities for the press corps to question him.59 Although he dropped in the polls before the election much to conservative dismay, on November 5, 1968, Richard Nixon managed to pull ahead of Hubert Humphrey and George Wallace to win a close election. Nixon took 43.4 percent of the popular vote to Humphrey’s 42.7 percent and Wallace’s 13.5 percent. With 301 votes, Nixon easily won the Electoral College. Unfortunately, for Nixon and the conservatives, the Republicans failed to take the House or the Senate.60 Nevertheless, surface calm emerged around the country in the wake of his election as voters waited to see what the new president had in store for them. Nixon’s Won, Now What? In the months between Nixon’s election and his inauguration, conservatives and liberals wondered about the meaning of his victory. Did Nixon in fact have a mandate to effect conservative change? Nixon certainly thought so. Combining his totals with those of Wallace, the presidentelect maintained that 57 percent of the voters wanted to see the nation head in a new direction.61 During the transition period, most conservatives argued in favor of Nixon’s mandate for change, but also pleaded for diligence in pursuing the conservative agenda. James Kilpatrick’s encounters with voters during 1968 showed him that the American people wanted a “reassertion of certain deeply held convictions—that crime should be punished, that laws should be obeyed,

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that men and women have a right to walk safely on the streets, [and] that society depends for its security upon the preservation of standards and discipline.” Kilpatrick saw an increase in conservative sentiment that would support a more right-minded approach to the nation’s problems. However, the trend he observed was not what Russell Kirk called “principled conservatism.” The country simply desired some time to recover from the “shocking change” brought on in the Kennedy-Johnson years.62 Human Events commented that Nixon made a huge comeback thus scoring a personal victory, but his election was not necessarily a triumph for conservatives. Conservatives should still have hope because Nixon could “strengthen our foreign policy, rebuild our defenses and take a strong stand against Communist aggression.” The editors, however, concluded that it was “no time for conservatives to relax or become complacent.” They needed to keep pressure on the president- elect in order to see a conservative agenda pursued.63 M. Stanton Evans thought that Nixon’s victory was a turning point for the Republican Party and conservatism in America. Liberal presidential politics was “driven into an enclave along the Eastern seaboard, maintaining a few isolated posts in the hinterlands.” If Nixon kept his conservative campaign promises, he would move “America away from collectivism and domestic anarchy” and secure Wallace voters for the future.64 However, as Frank Meyer pointed out, Nixon faced a difficult task in directing the significant conservative consensus (those in the GOP and those who voted for Wallace). To preserve and expand the conservative consensus the president-elect needed to take into account the recent changes in American society. Nixon and conservatives must not play on people’s emotions, but must recognize the “legitimate sources of those emotions [and] guide them to reach a civilized solution.” Failure to act on this mandate, in Meyer’s estimation, “could plunge America into massive social chaos.”65 Conservatives seemed optimistic about the Nixon’s administration potential, but they remained cautious as well. Right-minded thinkers adamantly believed that Nixon could lead the country in a new and better direction, should he so choose. Ralph de Toledano, M. Stanton Evans, Frank Meyer, and Russell Kirk all wondered whether Nixon had the will to put conservative principles in action. Meyer pondered whether Nixon had “the imagination to see where the true center of gravity of American society now rests.” Kirk worried whether Nixon would be able to refrain from his tendency to be receptive “to new ideas of every description.”66 Conservative intellectuals thus carefully watched how Nixon planned to structure his administration and his Cabinet for signs

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that the new president planned to live up to his campaign promises. For example, William Rusher sent William F. Buckley an update on conservative opinions about the staffing of Nixon’s administration. He noted the importance of putting good people in the White House, at the State Department, and at the Justice Department who would help enact conservative inspired policies.67 As the announcements about the proposed appointments began, conservatives pondered who would champion their positions. On November 25, 1968, the ACU expressed some concern that the liberals, who did not support Nixon, were becoming “self-appointed king makers.”68 National Review reported the conservative dissatisfaction with Nixon’s appointments the following day. The editors reminded readers that leading a government was different from running a party; a president must make an effort to have the opposition represented in his government. Having acknowledged the possibility that Nixon would have to appoint some liberal-minded individuals to his administration, NR argued against appointing the opposition to key positions in the State Department. Instead, Nixon should place the liberals in administrative not policy oriented cabinet positions.69 Conservative foreign policy experts seeking a tougher stand against communism from the incoming Nixon administration met Henry Kissinger’s appointment as national security adviser with “cautious optimism,” according to Human Events. Some conservatives expressed misgivings because of Kissinger’s past association with Nelson Rockefeller and the Council on Foreign Relations. Then again, most conservatives conceded that Kissinger likely would “pursue a realistic approach in the face of communist strategy,” if his writings were any indication of his position on communism. The appointment of Charles Yost as Ambassador to the United Nations also dismayed some conservatives, since Yost had previously stated that he did not consider the communists the biggest threat to American security; rather, he viewed the arms race and turbulence in Africa and Asia to be greater problems. To conservatives this was a cardinal sin leaving them to worry about the future course of containment. Nixon’s other foreign policy appointments—Melvin Laird to Defense and William Rogers to State—showed conservatives that more than anything he wanted people who would be able to work well with Congress.70 The right also closely watched Nixon’s decisions on key domestic policy positions. His appointment of Paul W. McCracken as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers caused trepidation for conservatives. McCracken was “more middle- of-the-road” than many on the right

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would have liked. Human Events thought he could be an asset, however, because of his commitment to cutting federal spending and the budget deficits as well as to slowing the growth of the money supply. James Kilpatrick had good things to say about David Kennedy and Robert Mayo. Kennedy, Nixon’s designate to head the Treasury Department, was a strong fiscal conservative. Robert Mayo, selected to be the Budget Director, had a history of supporting small business enterprise.71 The appointment of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a former Kennedy adviser, to the domestic policy staff worried conservatives. As Human Events noted, most would have preferred someone like Martin Anderson (who had made a name in the conservative movement with his study on the pitfalls of urban renewal) to serve as Nixon’s urban affairs guru. However, for a liberal democrat Moynihan did have “some iconoclastic views” and he appeared willing to consider other ideas.72 Both Human Events and National Review maintained that most of Nixon’s appointments leaned rightward, although conservatives would like to have seen more concessions especially in light of the role they played in Nixon’s nomination and victory. Human Events ultimately concluded that “conservatives should find much that is pleasing in a Nixon administration.” National Review called the Nixon team a “happy band” of pragmatists, problem solvers, and moderates who might actually do well in guiding policy under Nixon. James Kilpatrick wrote regarding the Cabinet selections that “Nixon’s performance so far seems mighty promising.” The president- elect was “cutting a good Republican cloth coat—but it’s a pattern with style and class.” 73 *

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Richard Nixon’s election filled conservative intellectuals with hope. They recognized that he might not meet all of their expectations as president, but they reasoned that the conservative thrust of the electorate would push Nixon to pursue a more conservative agenda than Kennedy or Johnson had. Conservatives believed in the Nixon who at the Republican National Convention had said to his fellow Americans that “the long dark night for America is about to end. The time has come for us to leave the valley of despair and climb the mountain so that we may see the glory of the dawn—a new day for America, a new dawn for peace and freedom in the world.” 74 They believed in the Nixon who in his inaugural address called on Americans to “reach beyond government” for solutions to the nation’s problems in order to shape their destiny.75 Conservative intellectuals looked forward to his presidency because for

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the first time they thought their ideas would affect the shaping of policy at the federal level. Would Nixon reduce the size of the government and its role in the people’s lives? Would he expand the country’s defense capabilities? Would Nixon pursue free-market policies? Could he in fact bring the nation together or would his policies further exacerbate divisions? Naturally, conservatives hoped that with their inf luence the new president’s policies might forever lead to the abandonment of liberalism. Human Events noted shortly after the inauguration that Nixon would be able to solve the nation’s problems only if he lived up to his campaign promises. As president, he would need to “justify the faith of those who voted him into office last November.” 76

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PEACE WITH HONOR: ENDING THE VIETNAM WAR

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he situation in Vietnam was a top priority for Richard Nixon upon taking office in 1969. Although a longtime supporter of efforts to contain communism in Southeast Asia, Nixon knew if elected he would need to end the American military commitment to South Vietnam because of rising domestic dissatisfaction with the war. Whether or not he had a secret plan to end the war, Nixon wanted to conclude American involvement honorably to preserve the nation’s credibility in dealing with its allies and enemies. Relying on his reputation as an anticommunist, he was able to def lect questions about specific policy initiatives on Vietnam during the campaign. Nixon’s self-imposed moratorium on the issue, intended to allow President Johnson room to maneuver at the peace talks, also meant he did not have to explain his ideas about a settlement. Liberal intellectuals in the 1960s grew to loathe the Vietnam War as their anticommunism became more selective. Increasingly, they doubted the containment policy and wondered whether or not protecting South Vietnam was worth the cost. They raised moral and tactical questions about Lyndon Johnson’s handling of the war that carried over into Richard Nixon’s presidency. Liberal opposition shaped Nixon’s response to the situation in Vietnam, especially how to achieve an honorable peace. Most conservative intellectuals, on the other hand, supported American involvement in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. While they debated the consequences of the war at home, they rarely argued that the United States should abandon its Vietnamese allies. The right believed that until someone proposed an effective alternative, continued support for South Vietnam remained necessary. Although Nixon remained ambiguous on Vietnam during the campaign, conservatives felt confident that he would

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CHAPTER 2

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pursue a policy to their liking if elected. They found much to praise in Nixon’s Vietnam policies once he took office.1 However, the way Vietnam related to Nixon’s overall foreign policy goals gave conservatives some pause. Moreover, they expressed concern that Nixon moved too quickly and gave too much away in peace negotiations. With the realization that not all was well in Southeast Asia, conservatives wondered whether Nixon’s priorities for international affairs were in order. Vietnam and the Election of 1968 In the years after World War II, the American view of the communist menace resulted in policies designed to combat the spread of communism wherever it threatened freedom and liberty. From the Truman Doctrine (1947) to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964), the U.S. government committed itself to assisting other countries in their fights against communism. Although questions emerged about how best to meet the communist threat, policymakers on both sides of the ideological spectrum supported some version of containment. The consequences of losing inf luence in Europe and Asia troubled American leaders more than the thought that the United States would fall victim to a communist revolution in the late 1940s and early 1950s. So Presidents Truman and Eisenhower provided resources to noncommunists around the world including those in South Vietnam to halt the communist’s drive for worldwide power. Over time American policymakers lost sight of the initial premise of the containment policy. George Kennan, the father of containment, stressed the importance of recognizing the difference between vital and peripheral interests. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson failed to assess the local nature of the conf lict between South Vietnam (RVN) and North Vietnam (DRV) as they increased the American commitment to the noncommunists. The credibility of the commitment became more important than a strategic assessment of the feasibility of defeating communism in Vietnam.2 From 1961 to 1963 John Kennedy increased the number of military advisers on the ground in Southeast Asia, but he resisted a full-scale military commitment. In 1965, to ensure the stability of the weak South Vietnamese government, Lyndon Johnson sent American forces to fight the war against the communists. After three years, the end of the conf lict was nowhere in sight. Given the domestic opposition to the war, Johnson withdrew from the presidential race to focus on ending American involvement. Since conservatives loathed communism and the prospect of its expansion, they thought the United States should do more than fight a limited

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war in Vietnam. By the mid-1960s, according to historian Kevin Smant, the conservative intellectual community tempered their views on what was ideal and what was practical in the fight against communism. Although not perfect, containment was realistically the only option for battling communists in the nuclear age. However, conservatives did not want to see containment used as an excuse to lessen the American commitment to its allies. They still wanted to win the Cold War. A limited war in Vietnam, they thought, ref lected political and ideological restrictions that made no sense militarily. James Burnham blamed liberalism for the American inability to defeat communism because the liberals refused to employ sufficient force to guarantee victory. Frank Meyer therefore encouraged conservatives to be more aggressive in their role as “loyal opposition” and to propose better ways to sustain the war effort.3 Liberal dissatisfaction with the war led in part to Richard Nixon’s election because the situation in Vietnam defined the key political questions in 1968. The New Left saw no difference between Humphrey and Nixon, so it sought out other alternatives. Nixon, however, did not win just because the liberals split between Humphrey and other left-leaning candidates. A significant number of voters appreciated Nixon’s indication that he could do better with respect to Vietnam. In 1966, Nixon began to criticize openly Johnson’s handling of the war. His bold and somewhat innovative statements appealed to conservatives looking for a stronger American response to communism in Southeast Asia.4 Before the New Hampshire primary, the press reported that Nixon had a secret plan to end the war. At campaign appearances, he emphasized his view that the war could be brought to a successful end, while simultaneously pledging to avoid similar wars in the future through preventive diplomacy.5 Nixon, however, never used the phrase “secret plan” to describe his proposal; rather he indicated that new leadership would be able “to end the war and win the peace.” He later suggested looking to the Soviet Union to help secure a settlement. Although Nixon planned to give a major statement on Vietnam in March, after Johnson withdrew from the presidential race he declined to provide specifics about his plan to end the war.6 Conservatives responded well to Nixon’s campaign statements on the war for three reasons. First, they believed that his strong anticommunist stand in the past would translate to his actions in Vietnam. Second, they feared the proposals of the Johnson administration and the other candidates more. Finally, they did not believe the DRV and their communist allies wanted to make actual progress toward peace through negotiation. Nixon’s anticommunism for conservatives was a key factor in their decision to lend

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P E AC E W I T H H O N O R : E N D I N G T H E V I E T N A M WA R

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support to his campaign. While they worried about his penchant for drifting with the political tide, they never doubted his conviction about the communist menace. Given the peace initiatives of the Johnson administration, Nixon’s proposals to end the war and win the peace seemed to conservatives a more appropriate strategy for Vietnam. During the campaign, Russell Kirk argued that the former vice president had the diplomatic experience to end the war in Vietnam. Nixon would take drastic military measures if needed. Moreover, his willingness to engage the USSR in the peace efforts showed that he recognized the real threat in Southeast Asia went beyond the conf lict between North and South Vietnam.7 James Burnham, who condemned the Vietnam doves for offering the same argument as classic isolationists since they only wanted “isolationism from this particular war,” thought Nixon would not fall under the spell of such leftists. He would use the force necessary to defeat the communists and ensure the survival of South Vietnam.8 James Kilpatrick argued that Johnson’s gradual, limited course of action in Vietnam did not provide a reason for reneging on the American commitment in Southeast Asia. He maintained that “it is not merely the present situation that supports a course of unremitting pressure. If communist aggression can be blocked in Vietnam . . . a hopeful vista opens on the future. . . . The other side of the coin spells failure.”9 Like Kirk and Burnham, Kilpatrick had no interest in seeing the South Vietnamese put at risk because the Americans acted too hastily in negotiating with the communist enemy. With Nixon’s victory, conservatives began to look to the future of Vietnam policy. National Review noted in December 1968 that the minimum conditions necessary to end the war hinged on the assurances that the communists could not take over the South in the near future. Nixon, furthermore, needed to escalate the American commitment if the North Vietnamese proved unwilling to accept an agreement similar to Eisenhower’s Korea solution.10 In May 1969, National Review presented a more detailed statement of the conservative position on the war. The editors argued that the objective in Vietnam should be to defeat the DRV and at a minimum to prevent a communist takeover in the South for roughly eight to ten years. North Vietnam was unlikely to abandon its ultimate goal of revolution in Southeast Asia, but it seemed that Hanoi “might . . . postpone the military phase of the struggle” to deal with its own internal problems. The right could tolerate such a solution only if the communists withdrew from South Vietnam, as well as from Cambodia and Laos. NR believed the acceptance of a coalition government would demonstrate that America’s minimum objectives had not been achieved. Finally, Nixon needed to deal with domestic dissent

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Nixon’s Exit Strategy Richard Nixon’s international experience and personal worldview shaped his stance on the Vietnam conf lict. While president, he hoped to take diplomatic relations in a new direction by controlling foreign policy decision making in the White House. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, were well suited for each other because they thought alike on most foreign policy issues. Moreover, both saw the State and Defense Departments as inept. Hence, Nixon and Kissinger directed Vietnam policy with little input from those asked to carry out the policies. Thinking in global terms, both men saw the Vietnamese conf lict as a part of the power struggle between capitalism and communism.12 Nixon devoted his first two years, in terms of foreign policy, almost entirely to ending American involvement in Vietnam. With survival of the Saigon government important to America’s global image, Nixon and Kissinger considered everything about the Vietnam settlement negotiable except the POW issue and the status of South Vietnamese president, Nguyen Van Thieu. Nixon realized he would have to prepare the public for the fact that total military victory was no longer possible; nevertheless he still wanted a settlement favorable to American interests.13 Nixon needed to convince the enemy he would to do anything to end the war so he employed the so- called madman theory and the threat of escalation in Southeast Asia. He believed that by showing that he would use nuclear weapons, the North Vietnamese would capitulate to American demands. The plan focused on Nixon’s unpredictability and willingness to use excessive force (beyond what a normal statesman might consider appropriate for the situation at hand).14 To make the madman theory a credible threat, Nixon had to escalate the conf lict in Southeast Asia. He did so with the secret bombing of Cambodia (1969), the Cambodian Incursion (1970), the Laotian Invasion (1971), the response to the Easter Offensive (1972), and the Christmas Bombings (1972). Nixon coupled escalation with changes to the American national security policy. In 1969, the president indicated that the time had come for the United States to encourage Asian nations to be responsible for their own internal security and military problems. The Nixon Doctrine, as his statement became known, ensured the United States would continue to live up to treaty

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against the war by explaining how immediate withdrawal would lead to the spread of communism.11 To what extent Richard Nixon followed through on his campaign pledge to end the war honorably and to enact the conservative position on Vietnam informed their appraisal of Nixon.

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commitments with all noncommunist allies in Asia and elsewhere. However, it also signaled Nixon’s intention to lessen long-term military involvement abroad.15 Nixon needed to do more than convince the enemy that he would do anything to end the war; he had to demonstrate to the American people that he wanted to diminish the country’s involvement in Southeast Asia as well. Nixon implemented three means for appeasing American opinion of the conf lict in Vietnam. First, he withdrew American troops through the Vietnamization program, which turned more responsibility over to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Second, he announced plans to end the draft in the fall of 1969 and to move to an all volunteer army by 1973, thus ending the hated system that sent so many American men to Vietnam.16 Finally, Nixon appealed to the patriotism of average Americans with his calls for support from the silent majority— average taxpaying citizens. On November 3, 1969, the president explained why the United States became involved in Vietnam and why it was important to win the peace. While recognizing that Americans had grown frustrated with the war, Nixon argued that defeat would cause “a collapse of confidence in American leadership.” He concluded by asking the American people to “be united for peace” and “be united against defeat.” The most important thing for the nation to remember was that “North Vietnam [could not] defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans [could] do that.” Nixon guided the silent majority to remember patriotic loyalty and national self-respect when thinking about the American commitment to South Vietnam.17 Nixon had little faith that the negotiations in Paris would lead to peace. He thought that the United States needed to deal directly with the North Vietnamese and its Chinese and Soviet allies through secret negotiations. Nixon and Kissinger decided to treat military and political issues separately meaning once both sides resolved the military issues the North and South Vietnamese could decide on the future political framework of their countries.18 Given the rate of American withdrawal, North Vietnam merely had to wait until the United States had pulled enough troops out that it could easily overrun the South. Nixon and Kissinger tried to compensate for this disadvantage by putting pressure on the USSR and China to limit the supplies they provided North Vietnam. Both men thought that through linkage—making U.S. willingness to negotiate on the issues of interest to the Chinese and the Soviets contingent on their aid in ending the war in Vietnam—they could speed along the peace process. Nixon and Kissinger, as well as most of the intellectual community, recognized that ending American involvement in Vietnam was not the same thing as

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ending the war there. The conf lict between the communists and noncommunists would continue to plague the region until one side achieved a decisive victory and the communists likely would win. Thus, the White House focused on developing an agreement that would ensure South Vietnam’s survival for a decent interval after the enactment of the agreement. As peace negotiations wore on, the American terms became more generous to address the North Vietnamese reluctance to implement a cease-fire before engaging in discussions on the political future of the South.19 Quelling Dissent: Vietnamization and the Silent Majority Conservatives agreed with the general direction of Richard Nixon’s Vietnam policy. They certainly understood the importance of the president’s announcement on Vietnamization, especially its relation to his ability to pursue an effective settlement in Southeast Asia. National Review remarked that Nixon sought to buy time to f lesh out an appropriate response to the Vietnam question. His announcement to placate critics fit into an overall “holding operation.” Recalling troops did not have to be a negative factor in the successful conduct of the war if ARVN capabilities grew at an equal or faster rate. Pleased with Vietnamization as a policy choice, the editors hoped that South Vietnam’s political and military capabilities could improve enough to allow the United States to complete its goals.20 While some conservatives, such as Russell Kirk, observed that Nixon had made progress in Vietnam, by the second half of 1969, others looked to the president to do more to address the war. James Kilpatrick said in July that the time had passed for Nixon to disengage from Vietnam without blame. After six months in office, he was responsible for the character of the end of American involvement. Without a settlement, said Kilpatrick, Nixon risked the future of the GOP. He needed to take action in Vietnam to ensure that his goal—either effective Vietnamization or victory— succeeded, since there was little hope for the war to be won at the peace talks in Paris.21 National Review also noted that Nixon would face serious consequences if the South fell because Vietnam was now his war. Failure to follow through on his campaign promise for an honorable peace would provide the left with fuel for their “anti-Nixonism.” But more importantly, the right would never forgive him and he would be “finished politically” without their support.22 In spite of their desire for more action, conservatives also supported Nixon by lashing out against antiwar activists who renewed their protests

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at the end of summer. Antiwar demonstrators called for a “Moratorium” against the war on October 15, 1969, and every month thereafter until American involvement in Vietnam ended. Organizers hoped to put pressure on congressional doves to increase their criticism of Nixon’s handling of the war by attracting media attention to their cause.23 James Kilpatrick called Nixon’s opponents “insatiable” and further noted that “short of absolute and precipitate withdrawal” the dissenters would continue to make trouble. Therefore, during the upcoming moratorium Kilpatrick planned to make “every gesture” he could think of to support the president. R. Emmett Tyrrell argued that the moratorium was an “exercise of the intellectually lost.” Moreover, the organizers seemed “embarrassingly ignorant as exhibited by their suggestions that our Vietnam syndrome will be relieved” by immediate withdrawal. Russell Kirk argued that the president might be able to achieve American geopolitical objectives and withdraw troops if “the radicals and isolationists [did] not ruin” his plans. Since the protesters tended to ignore the success of the pacification program in the South, Kirk believed their activities would only prolong the war in Asia.24 Conservatives applauded Nixon’s silent majority speech largely because they so disdained the antiwar protestors. National Review commented that the president managed to “rally the support of a substantial portion of the citizens.” His speech connected with many Americans willing to “trust what their President told them, and to go along with his policies as he outlined them.” Although Nixon found it harder to blunt the opposition, with the support of the silent majority he could “maintain his course and at the same isolate the opposition from the mass of the population.”25 Ernest van den Haag, a frequent contributor to National Review, concluded that merely pulling out of Vietnam would not stop discontented youth from protesting; questioning the broader values of society, they would protest about something else. To avoid the disintegration of authority that would follow a dishonorable withdrawal, van den Haag suggested that the silent majority should support Nixon’s resolve in Vietnam.26 As the second year of the Nixon administration began, conservative intellectuals once again called for decisive action from the president. Although pleased that through Vietnamization and rhetorical attacks Nixon held an advantage in the debate on Vietnam, conservatives still wanted greater progress against the communists. Vietnamization, according to Human Events, needed to be more than just a means to withdraw American troops. Nixon—to live up to commitments made in 1968— had to provide adequately for South Vietnamese security.27 William F. Buckley argued that sadly the South Vietnamese seemed to have inherited

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the American fear of escalation. American leaders remained unwilling to stop the inf lux of men and supplies from Cambodia and Laos because such steps might provoke retaliatory action by the Soviets or the Chinese. Buckley hoped that through Vietnamization ARVN would be released from the political issues that “hampered” the Americans for so long otherwise an enemy victory would likely ensue.28 M. Stanton Evans further argued that Nixon’s appeal to the silent majority was not enough to successfully end the war in Vietnam, or for that matter make the most of his conservative mandate. The silent majority appeal needed to reach beyond Nixon’s efforts to stall a third party challenge in 1972 and beyond rhetorical appeals to conservative minded voters. More concerning to Evans, Nixon extended the bombing halt and pulled out forces with little regard for the communist activities in the South and with no attempt to put diplomatic or economic pressure on the enemy.29 Frank Johnson, editor of the American Security Council’s “Washington Report” and a contributor to the ACU’s Battle Line, also criticized Nixon for his lack of action in Vietnam. His failure to follow through on his threat of massive escalation in 1969 raised serious doubts as to whether he had the resolve to follow through with his peace initiatives. As president, argued Johnson, Nixon had yet to prove that he could stand up to the communists or the doves.30 The Madman Theory in Play: Response to Escalations Richard Nixon’s first year in office left conservatives waiting for a clear picture of how his administration planned to end the war in Vietnam without forsaking American commitments to noncommunists in Southeast Asia. Not until the Cambodia Incursion in the spring of 1970 did conservatives believe that Nixon had the will to follow through with his campaign pledges. Through the military action in Cambodia and later Laos, as well as a decisive response to North Vietnamese aggression, Nixon demonstrated that he had the heart of a conservative when it came to fighting communism. He also showed that antiwar protesters and congressional doves could not pressure him into capitulating to the DRV. In the spring of 1970, noncommunists under the direction of Lon Nol overthrew the Cambodian government of Prince Sihanouk and sought assistance from the United States to keep communist forces out of their country. Cambodia, since it bordered South Vietnam, had become wrapped up in the struggle between the communists and the noncommunists in the region. As part of its infiltration campaign, the North constantly moved men and supplies through the country. The White

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House took little immediate action in response to the coup. Eventually Nixon and Kissinger decided military action in Cambodia was necessary to demonstrate American support for the noncommunist regime. American and South Vietnamese forces crossed into Cambodia as part of a two-phase operation, known as the Cambodia Incursion, in late April. They intended to destroy the communist headquarters well as weapons destined for transport across the border. On April 30, 1970, the president announced the decision and he attempted to explain how the operation would aid in the success of Vietnamization, protect American soldiers still stationed in Southeast Asia, and further peace discussions in Paris.31 Even before Nixon’s announcement of the Cambodian Incursion, conservatives recommended aiding Lon Nol. Russell Kirk called on the Nixon administration to apply the Nixon Doctrine to Cambodia after the coup. The situation there seemed the perfect opportunity to test the feasibility of supplying weapons of war while refraining from sending troops and if successful would ensure that the American withdrawal from Southeast Asia would proceed on schedule.32 Human Events expressed some concern that if the Nixon administration did not act tough in Cambodia, the communists would “continue to make gains at the expense of the free world.” Later, the editors pleaded with the Nixon administration to end its vacillation on whether or not to assist the anticommunists in Cambodia. Aid to Lon Nol would prove to be the logical choice because vital American interests were at stake.33 After Nixon’s announcement, conservatives lined up to support his action. James Kilpatrick called the president’s decision “courageous, necessary, and wise.” The Cambodian Incursion followed through on Nixon’s warnings in November and April demonstrating that the United States remained strong and willing to exert force against its aggressive enemy. Russell Kirk argued that the Cambodia decision showed Nixon’s leadership ability. The operation would help South Vietnam prepare “to conduct her own defense.” More importantly, its success would bring peace with honor one step closer. So long as the American people understood that the operation did not widen the war, Nixon should not have to “forfeit . . . domestic popularity as the price of his courage.”34 The Cambodian Incursion again pushed antiwar critics to attack Nixon and his advisers. The student response was immediate, massive, and far worse than what the president expected. Colleges across the country experienced disturbances. When the National Guard killed four protestors at Kent State in Ohio and local officials killed two more students at Jackson State in Mississippi, students stepped up their demonstrations. Many felt the government purposely lashed out against critics of Nixon’s

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policy. The Vietnam Moratorium Committee organized a protest in Washington that attracted over 100,000 marchers in May that significantly upset the president.35 Conservatives recognized Nixon’s despondence in the wake of the protests and did their best to encourage the president to stay the course in Vietnam. William F. Buckley argued that the critics of the Cambodia Incursion at heart challenged the idea that America needed to be a first rate power. The conf lict in Southeast Asia was a test of wills—the enemy wanted to prove that the Americans could no longer “dispatch responsibility” so they could claim free reign when the United States renounced its role as a global leader. In Buckley’s opinion, winning this test of wills remained important for the future of American prestige. How would the United States handle the Middle East if it could not handle Southeast Asia?36 National Review also observed that the Cambodian operation was entirely in line with the Vietnamization policy. According to the editors, the critics responded as though the president approved the use of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia, rather than approving this “secondary incident.”37 James Kilpatrick argued that the guardsmen were the least responsible for the tragedy at Kent State. The student revolutionaries inciting the violence, college administrations reacting wrongly to student complaints, faculty members failing to provide an example of maturity and restraint, and nonparticipating students not standing up for their rights emerged as the real culprits.38 To quell domestic unrest, in early May Nixon announced that the Cambodian Incursion would end by June 30, 1970. Although Nixon tried to slow criticism of his administration, the Senate repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and Congress just missed passing the CooperChurch Amendment to cut off funds for the invasion. Nixon proclaimed the operation a success at the end of June. South Vietnamese and American forces, he said, destroyed a substantial number of weapons, ammunition, and food; moreover, they inf licted significant manpower losses on the enemy.39 By and large, conservatives accepted Nixon’s interpretation of the joint American-Vietnamese effort in Cambodia. Less than a year after the conclusion of the Cambodian Incursion, the Nixon administration planned an attack against North Vietnamese supply lines along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. In theory the assault would demonstrate the ability of ARVN to conduct major operations on its own. To prevent domestic criticism of the escalation, the president insisted that American troops provide only logistical support in Vietnam and air cover for the South Vietnamese. After Nixon and Thieu approved the operation, it began in late January. On February 8, 1971, ARVN

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forces crossed into Laos but then stopped in the face of enemy resistance. ARVN then deviated from the battle plan and the operation slowly fell apart. The American press covered the disorderly retreat in depth, especially the fact that the North Vietnamese followed the South Vietnamese across the border and attacked American forces at the operation’s staging area. The Pentagon freely admitted that the enemy’s response forced an early end to the operation in April.40 The operation initially received favorable press coverage and support from Congress, but by mid-February opinion had turned against the South Vietnamese effort and Nixon’s policy. Conservatives, however, remained optimistic about the prospects for the latest escalation. William F. Buckley wrote several columns on the importance of the exercise and its relation to Vietnamization. First, Buckley maintained that the South Vietnamese should be free to engage in military operations in their best interest apart from the discussions about a political solution or great power collisions. Moreover, the negative reaction to the invasion came partly from the fact that “many political and journalistic reputations would be severely wounded” should ARVN prove to be capable of defeating the North. Finally, it stemmed from fear that China would enter the war on behalf of North Vietnam because of the operation. Buckley did not consider the possibility of Chinese entry a drawback because the Americans then would know the North needed Chinese assistance to fend off the South.41 Conservatives ultimately praised Nixon’s decision because the operation would help the South Vietnamese defend itself in the future. National Review maintained that the overall outcome of the operation was far better than the media led the American people to believe. It seemed “ridiculous to pronounce [the operation] a heavy defeat because the North Vietnamese army was not wiped out and the South Vietnamese did not settle down permanently.” Besides, the editors noted, those were not the goals of the operation to begin with. On the plus side, the operation disrupted of the movement of enemy supplies into South Vietnam. Furthermore, it delayed an upcoming offensive for months or even a year since it cut into the enemy’s troop strength. While ARVN could have fought better and needed to be less dependent on American aid, overall the Laotian operation proved beneficial. James Kilpatrick called Nixon’s post-operation speech impressive in terms of delivery and content. The president noted that the maneuver’s success gave him the confidence to speed up Vietnamization.42 In the end, conservative intellectuals believed that the results of the operation in Laos showed that once the negotiators reached a settlement, the South would be able to resist pressure from the North.

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Given the rate of troop withdrawals, the Laotian invasion was the last major offensive in Southeast Asia in which American troops participated. Nixon had to rely on other means to convince the communists that the American commitment to aid the noncommunists remained intact. Nixon used extensive bombing and mining in response to the North’s Easter Offensive in the spring of 1972. When ARVN quickly succumbed to the communist’s conventional attack, the United States came to the South’s rescue by bombing Hanoi and Haiphong as well as mining the waters around Haiphong to prevent the Soviets and Chinese from resupplying the North. The heavy toll of the air campaign contributed to the North Vietnamese decision to end the offensive in August.43 The conservatives’ initial reaction to the Easter Offensive was to support the Nixon administration’s aggressive action. Human Events noted that since evidence suggested that the Soviets helped plan and supply the offensive, the Americans should in fact “squeeze” them harder because they “[held] the key to peace.” National Review pointed out that the United States must respond to the Easter Offensive because it was part of the global fight against communism. More importantly, Nixon’s commitment to Vietnamization meant he had to respond. Should North Vietnam triumph, communist control would eventually follow and thus demonstrate that Nixon’s objective of developing a sustainable South Vietnam had failed.44 William F. Buckley also concluded that the Soviets spurred the North Vietnamese invasion because they wanted a major victory before the Soviet-American summit in May. Nixon correctly assessed the situation before him based on his understanding of the historical lessons that led to World War II, namely that “if you let a military power which is strong enough to disturb the peace of the whole world underwrite armed aggression against a little power, the fabric of peace and stability is disrupted.” Nixon thus had to demonstrate American power and resolution.45 Russell Kirk argued that the president’s successful diplomacy allowed him to approve the escalation. In fact, Kirk considered the decision long overdue. Nixon’s decisive action might “have undone Hanoi’s offensive and have confounded both his dove and his hawk opposition at home.”46 While the right supported Nixon’s response to the Easter Offensive, they worried about what ARVN’s failure said about the future status of South Vietnam. National Review suggested that the need for a large-scale bombing effort seemed to demonstrate that “Vietnamization [had] not worked.” ARVN did not perform in a manner that the administration led the American public to believe it could. More importantly, Nixon’s statement on the bombing implied that the war might eventually end with a communist takeover meaning he had no right to escalate the conf lict by

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bombing the North.47 William F. Buckley saw Nixon’s speech as troublesome. The North was “getting away with the kind of thing it would never have ventured during the period the United States Army was there.” Furthermore, the logical outcome of Nixon’s policies was that the American commitment would end when the people’s patience wore out and Congress voted to cut off funding. If that happened, the American objective of an independent South Vietnam would not be met.48 Nixon later used bombing to force the communists back to the negotiating table in late 1972. The president hoped to convey the seriousness of the U.S. commitment to the South and force the North back to the negotiating table. With peace so close, the so- called Christmas Bombings drew heavy domestic criticism from antiwar activists and congressional doves. National Review came out in support of Nixon’s decision to bomb both civilian and military targets. Since the nature of war had changed, the editors thought it had become more difficult to separate the civilian from the military, especially in Vietnam where all citizens participated in the war effort. Furthermore, a global level response was needed because Vietnam was part of a global conf lict.49 William F. Buckley also supported Nixon’s decision not to talk about why he chose to bomb the North; the president did not need to provide his critics with more ammunition. How could Nixon have responsibly answered any question by the press on whether he expected the bombings to work? His answer would have either strengthened the North Vietnamese resolve or would have made him appear as though he was “indulging a petulance” with the bombings. Buckley concluded that the bombing campaign did not dim, but “enhanced the prospects for peace in Indochina.”50 Finding Peace with a Vietnam Settlement The Nixon administration continually mixed escalation with peace initiatives. While the Cambodian Incursion and the Laotian Invasion demonstrated continued American support and the progress of Vietnamization, efforts persisted behind the scenes to resolve the issues that prohibited a negotiated settlement. As Nixon made public statements about the American terms for peace, Kissinger held secret meetings with North Vietnamese negotiators. The president thought these secret talks afforded the best possibility to work out areas of contention between the Americans and the North Vietnamese. Conservative observers constantly wavered between support for an end to the war and a concern about the prospects for South Vietnamese survival during Nixon’s first term as the president laid out his peace plans.

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Richard Nixon made several public statements on acceptable terms for settlement between 1969 and 1971. First the president proposed simultaneous withdrawal over twelve months, which improved upon Johnson’s proposal that the North Vietnam withdrawal six months before the United States. He also made gestures to communist demands including consenting to RVN neutrality, welcoming the participation of the National Liberation Front (the communist political organization in the South) in future discussions, renouncing any intention for the United States to maintain a permanent military presence in Southeast Asia after an agreement, and accepting possible reunification of Vietnam (but only after five years). Later, Nixon stated that a North Vietnamese withdrawal need not accompany the American withdrawal. Finally, Nixon called for the DRV to return all POWs immediately and to make earnest attempts to find a settlement. Despite the American concessions, Hanoi had no interest in a settlement that did not include unconditional American withdrawal and Thieu’s removal.51 As Nixon spoke publicly about American desires, Kissinger opened the secret channel with the North Vietnamese in August 1969. Little progress was made. After the Laotian Invasion, Nixon and Kissinger tried again to push negotiations forward. They hoped their latest terms would convince Hanoi that Washington was negotiating in good faith and would encourage the communists to abandon their insistence on Thieu’s removal. In May 1971, Kissinger presented a proposal in which the United States would accept a deadline for withdrawal if North Vietnam would agree to a cease-fire and to returning American POWs. He then stated in August that the Americans would accept unilateral withdrawal if the North would abandon its position on Thieu’s future. In October 1971, Kissinger indicated that all allied forces would withdraw from Vietnam six months after a cease-fire agreement after which new elections could be held in the South. Moreover, Thieu would resign one month before the election and all political factions—the noncommunists, the neutralists, and the communists—would be welcome to participate in the election.52 The North Vietnamese failed to respond favorably to the terms presented publicly or privately by the Americans through 1971. The Nixon administration concluded they were reluctant to negotiate because of plans for a major military effort against the South. To force their hand, Nixon announced the existence of the secret negotiations and the content of the secret proposals on January 25, 1972. Then during discussions about the upcoming Soviet-American summit, Kissinger revealed to Soviet leaders, that the Americans would abandon mutual calls for

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withdrawal meaning that almost 100,000 North Vietnamese troops could remain in the South after a cease-fire agreement. The North agreed to meet, but preparations for the Easter Offensive had in fact made them apprehensive. The two sides made no progress because of the early success of the spring offensive. To encourage forward movement, Kissinger said, during discussions on Vietnam at the Moscow Summit in May 1972, that the release of the POWs was not a prerequisite for the end of the bombing campaign. Moreover, he commented that the Americans would accept a tripartite electoral commission including representatives from Thieu’s government, the neutralists, and the National Liberation Front (NLF).53 Conservatives took Nixon’s disclosure of the secret negotiations with North Vietnam in stride. The secrecy of the negotiations mattered very little to most conservatives, but the content of the American proposals did cause their pulses to quicken. National Review called the actual revelation about the negotiations “a vintage Nixon political ploy, a masterpiece of many-sided ambiguity, accomplishing a dozen little things at little or no cost.” His key concessions seemed to disappear in the fine print. Thieu looked good in offering to resign before an election, but the likelihood of his reelection meant that his regime would lose little from offering to leave office. Furthermore, while Nixon set a timetable for American withdrawal he said nothing about ceasing air or logistic support for the South. Hanoi saw little in the agreement worth pursuing, but they “looked bad, at least to the Western public opinion” in refusing to discuss it. Their rejection allowed Nixon more leverage should there be another Tet-like offensive in the future.54 James Burnham dissented from National Review’s more optimistic view of Nixon’s peace terms. In February, he called the proposal “a petition by the defeated to the victor offering terms of surrender.” The initiative was no more than Nixon’s attempt to plead with the enemy to let the United States “save face.” Several weeks later Burnham also noted that Kissinger’s secret discussions with the North Vietnamese led to the American abandonment of President Thieu—“the political expression of South Vietnam’s resistance to being Communized.” Nixon’s primary concern was his reelection, not the importance of retaining a noncommunist ally in Southeast Asia.55 National Review’s editors might have found Nixon’s January peace initiative acceptable, but they critically assessed his statement in May on the situation in Vietnam. Nixon sadly “reduced to . . . the vanishing point all of the diminished political conditions that he had theretofore advanced as a basis for . . . settlement with North Vietnam.” He now promised complete

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American withdrawal if the North would release American POWs and would agree to a cease-fire in Southeast Asia. Nixon abandoned all demands regarding the future political situation in Vietnam. The American position, according to NR, would “guarantee Hanoi’s achievement . . . of the aims of its protracted conf lict.”56 Although Thieu remained reluctant to see a settlement, Nixon allowed Kissinger to go ahead with his planned talks with the North Vietnamese in September largely because the national security adviser had convinced the president that an impasse at this stage would have a detrimental effect on his reelection effort.57 On October 8, 1972, Le Duc Tho (a member of Hanoi’s Politburo) presented a working draft to American negotiators, rather than a list of demands. The North agreed to a cease-fire and the release of POWs after U.S. withdrawal. More importantly, they consented to the continuation of Thieu’s regime at least until the Vietnamese people could work out key political questions after an armistice. Thieu was understandably upset when Kissinger presented him with the unfinished draft proposal on October 19, 1972. He publicly announced his objections to the draft forcing Nixon to postpone the signing. North Vietnam then concluded that the United States planned to renege on the agreement and so they published the text of the proposed settlement the following day. On October 26, 1972, Kissinger while indicating that “peace [was] at hand” stated that the United States could not sign the agreement as it was. However, he assured the American people and the North Vietnamese leaders that with a few more meetings an understanding could be reached.58 Prior to the announcement on the October breakthrough, Human Events predicted that conservatives would “explode with fury” if the administration announced a coalition formula before the election. The editors also noted it would be unfortunate after the years of sacrifice by Asians and Americans for the president to “slide into a settlement that would pave the way for a communist takeover.” When North Vietnam disclosed the terms of the proposed agreement, Human Events stated that the draft conceded too much to the enemy. It provided the communists “the opportunity to gain an overwhelming military superiority over the pro-Western government in Saigon.” More importantly, the Americans had no way to assure that Hanoi would not break the terms, as communists were apt to do. In the end, the agreement would stand as one more example of the West surrendering to the communist powers.59 National Review saw Thieu’s rejection of the cease-fire as just another part of the process on the way to a negotiated settlement. Thieu needed to take a tough stand against the draft in hopes he could exert some pressure on the

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final agreement and to demonstrate to the South Vietnamese people his relevance after the settlement. Furthermore, having had no input into the content of the agreement, Thieu had every right to object to the proposal’s terms. South Vietnam’s president, concluded the editors, was the victim of the Nixon-Kissinger trend of “callousness towards friends.”60 James Burnham remained unconvinced that a negotiated settlement would solve the problems in Southeast Asia. The October draft eliminated from the peace accords any mention of the Thieu regime or the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government; the United States also agreed to pay reparations to North Vietnam. Burnham hoped that Thieu’s rejection of the provisions would prevent a deal because the longer the settlement was outstanding the more time the South had to remedy the dismal situation on the ground and become self- sufficient.61 M. Stanton Evans also criticized the contents of the proposal, noting that the Kissinger-Tho draft “[contained] little to suggest a change in Communist intransigence or American naïveté.” It also further harmed the political future of the South because the DRV, the USSR, and the NLF had the power to hold up progress because decisions of the proposed Council of National Reconciliation needed to be unanimous. While the three sides worked out potential differences, North Vietnam would be “free to do whatever it [pleased].” Evans also argued that if accepted the agreement would pave the way for “a dishonorable peace.”62 In spite of Kissinger’s attempt to reassure the North Vietnamese, Thieu’s opposition stalemated the peace efforts. After Nixon’s reelection, the president and national security adviser worked to convince Thieu this settlement was the best he could get while also working to overcome the DRV’s reservations about concluding an agreement. With the Christmas Bombings, the president hoped the action would send a message to Thieu about future American intentions in Southeast Asia. Moreover, he sought to make continued conf lict with the Americans an undesirable prospect for the North. Nixon feared that prowar factions in Hanoi might gain the upper hand and permanently stall an agreement. The North Vietnamese agreed to return to the negotiating table and the two sides reached an agreement on January 13, 1973. The settlement signed on January 27, 1973 appeared only marginally different from the October proposal.63 The Paris Peace Accords provided for the termination of all American offensive operations in Vietnam, the removal of the mines from Haiphong and Hanoi Harbors, the return of American POWs, and an allied withdrawal within sixty days of the agreement. Both sides agreed to not send anymore troops to South Vietnam and abide by international supervision of the cease-fire. The accords created a Council of National Reconciliation

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and Concord to determine the political status of the South. Nixon also promised the North Vietnamese reconstruction aid, but only if they met the terms of the agreement and if Congress voted to fund the program. Afterward, Nixon maintained that the pact met the conditions he sought for an honorable end to the war.64 James Kilpatrick concluded that the accords respectably ended the American involvement in Vietnam. Moreover, by preventing a communist takeover the Americans had accomplished a major objective. U.S. involvement was thus worth the effort because in time the fight for freedom in Vietnam might inspire another generation of Americans “to sustain such freedom again.”65 Human Events maintained that the January agreement was better than the October proposal. Jubilation over the pact, however, should not cloud the importance of ensuring that the communists lived up to their end of the bargain. Americans needed to prepare for the possibility that Nixon would have to take drastic action to convince Hanoi of the seriousness of the American commitment to upholding the accords. Finally, the editors noted that the settlement could have been more favorable to the Americans and the South Vietnamese, but it was far from a McGovernite sellout.66 Russell Kirk also praised the accords because he believed they lived up to Nixon’s pledge of peace with honor. Through careful maneuvering, Nixon—a realist in matters of foreign policy—pursued “an imaginative and f lexible foreign policy, conservative in the sense that similar diplomatic methods were employed by conservative statesmen in the 18th and 19th centuries.” Nixon grasped the most important facet of diplomacy that “all sensible politics is the art of the possible, not the art of the ideal.” Kirk concluded that if “Nixon has given four or five years of relative peace to Indochina, on decent terms, his accomplishment will have been mightier than his critics.”67 Conservatives also tried to abate criticism over the more controversial terms of the Paris Peace Accords, namely the American agreement to pay reparations to the North Vietnamese. National Review agreed with the belief that the proposal appeared to “coddle the enemy.” Nevertheless, such aid needed to be understood as a necessary part of the agreement to induce North Vietnamese participation. Americans had every right to disagree with the reparations; in fact, continued opposition would demonstrate to Hanoi “that the majority of Americans [were] pretty sore at the North Vietnamese.” At the same time, the situation in Vietnam meant that a debate on the issue of foreign aid to the North Vietnamese seemed premature. If all went well in Southeast Asia, support for rehabilitation might promote stability in the region and might even ease “North Vietnam away from the great Communist powers.”68

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Consistently unenthusiastic, James Burnham maintained the agreement did not encompass the objectives of securing peace with honor, nor was it “even an armistice” for Southeast Asia. At best, the agreement was a step toward ending the war. The settlement would not work because its provisions were impossible, preposterous, or ambiguous. Moreover, the pact did not change the fact that the Vietnamese communists wanted to unify Vietnam under their control nor did it compel them to abandon that goal. For the Vietnamese communists, the cease-fire meant only that the Americans would no longer be actively involved in the fighting. Ultimately, Burnham believed the United States failed in its mission in Southeast Asia.69 Conservatives Assess the Post-Vietnam World While conservatives took issue with some provisions of the Vietnam agreement, for the most part they supported the Paris Peace Accords. Nevertheless after the settlement, conservatives questioned how Nixon could maintain the initiative in Southeast Asia. The issues that James Burnham raised when criticizing the agreement spoke to conservative fears about how a pullout in Southeast Asia would inf luence America’s overall strategic position. The right also worried about the effect the prolonged fighting in Vietnam would have on Nixon’s ability to carry out the foreign policy objectives necessary to fight the communist menace elsewhere. From the beginning of the Nixon presidency, conservatives were convinced that Vietnam was part of the global fight against communism. Throughout the peace process, conservatives commented on Vietnam’s relation to the nation’s strategic posture. Their fears became worse after the settlement. James Burnham saw the United States as a reluctant empire because it wanted the benefits of empire without exercising the responsibility needed to maintain its hegemony. Imperial citizens required certain characteristics including “confidence in their right and their ability to perform imperial tasks; resoluteness; perseverance; a willingness to assure the strength . . . to fulfill the task; and finally . . . a willingness to kill people . . . without collapsing into a paroxysm of guilt” to uphold an empire. The collapse of American leadership in the face of the North Vietnamese was a symptom of a breakdown fostered by a desire to pull away from responsibility around the globe.70 Burnham also maintained that the failure of American leaders to situate the conf lict in Southeast Asia in its proper global setting led to policies that were inadequate to stop the spread of communism. He feared that the real causes of the

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American retreat would go unexplored allowing the situation to repeat itself in the future. After the settlement, Burnham expressed concern about the effect of the momentum of withdrawal on the future of U.S. policy. Would the United States be able to prevent the communists from violating the cease-fire agreement? Since the Americans desired to move on, the North would have free reign in dealing with those South Vietnamese reluctant to fall under communist rule. Nixon’s détente “destroyed the political as well as moral foundation for an American antiCommunist policy in Indochina.” 71 When Nixon decided to launch a bombing campaign against the communist forces in Cambodia in the spring of 1973, conservatives feared how the congressional response to the developments in Southeast Asia would affect the nation’s future ability to deal with the communist menace. Congress mandated that the bombing cease as of June 29, 1973. Nixon’s acceptance of the congressional decision, according to National Review, had important ramifications with respect to the scaling back of presidential powers and in turn the ability to conduct effective foreign policy. The Vietnam War, coupled with the revelations about the Watergate affair, contributed to congressional feelings that the executive branch had garnered too much power since World War II. Past measures to cut funding for the support of the noncommunists in Southeast Asia could not secure enough votes to pass both houses, but this time legislators set their reservations aside. How then would the likely fall of Cambodia to communism affect the United States? From the communist perspective, said National Review, an American embarrassment in Cambodia would soften “Washington up still further for their efforts to get the most for the least out of the détente harvest.” The actions of the Soviets and the Chinese with respect to Cambodia would show the ultimate effectiveness of Nixon’s détente policies.72 Human Events predicted that the mandate on ending assistance to the noncommunists in Cambodia spelled doom. Not only would Cambodia and the rest of Southeast Asia eventually crumble to the communist menace, but the congressional decision had important ramifications for future policymaking as well. Nixon would be unable to “curb the bullying behavior of the Soviet Union and Red China,” if the United States could not “deter . . . second-string Communist powers.” 73 Some conservatives in the months after the settlement tried to look at how the Nixon administration as well as its successors could deal with the post-Vietnam world. William Schneider, Jr. (a member of Sen. James L. Buckley’s staff ) noted that the settlement, because it eliminated “the chance for South Vietnamese political survival,” would require alliance

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partners in Asia to accept the “changing U.S. role in the region.” The Nixon Doctrine would provide an excellent basis for the change because it emphasized the American willingness to come to the aid of its allies when necessary. This modification, however, would not happen quickly for alliance members would require time to adjust to “the ‘catalytic’ rather than direct role of U.S. policy” in Southeast Asia. The Nixon administration needed to implement the change gradually and needed to place alliance relations before reparations to the enemy.74 Russell Kirk thought that since the world’s real peacekeepers—the Soviet Union, China, and the United States—had “the capacity for making grand- scale war,” Nixon’s turn to détente was appropriate. To bolster the peace in Vietnam and elsewhere, Nixon and his advisers needed to attack ideology. The president had to continue his focus on Russia and China, where the threat of ideology was the greatest. To thwart attempts to spread communist ideology, the United States had to ensure the maintenance of a “Pax America.” If peace were maintained, people subjected to ideology would ultimately react against that ideology.75 James Burnham argued ideological assessments of the war based on preconceived assumptions would be useless for determining future policy. The Vietnam conf lict, nonetheless, did provide American policymakers with several practical lessons. First, limited war proved to be an ambiguous strategy. Simply put, a nation should not pursue an objective if it did not intend to employ the necessary means to achieve its goal. Second, gradual escalation failed and would fail again in future conf licts. Therefore, the U.S. military needed a strategy for dealing with revolutionary warfare. Finally, although the least likely to be recognized, it remained important to remember that the communists remained intent on world domination.76 *

* *

As Nixon embarked on his second term, conservative intellectuals doubted the wisdom of his Vietnam policy. Most supported the agreement to end the war and saw it as the honorable settlement Nixon promised, in spite of the fact that it hardly lived up to their expectations. At the same time, they questioned how the end of the war would affect broader foreign policy. Vietnam policy was one of the few areas in which conservatives consistently supported Nixon. They appreciated his efforts to quell domestic dissent as well as his efforts to hit the communists hard. While at times they doubted the specifics of Vietnamization and the

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peace proposals, for the most part they believed that Nixon’s anticommunism would lead to a settlement that protected the future independence of South Vietnam. If his Vietnam policy resulted in a communist takeover of all of Southeast Asia in the near future, how could they legitimately support the president’s foreign policy? Could they reconcile their apprehensions about Nixon’s course of action with their desire to support him as the Watergate scandal became more pervasive during the second term? How would the future of anticommunism in America, in light of the failure in Vietnam, affect conservatives? The settlement in Southeast Asia left conservatives with many unanswered questions about their relationship with Nixon. It also provided important guidelines for conservatives as they looked to future efforts to fight communism in the Third World.

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onservative intellectuals loved Richard Nixon’s aggressive talk about Vietnam, but they loathed his apparent capitulation to communism. Détente with the Soviets and the Chinese proved an anathema to conservative beliefs about what James Burnham often called “the Third World War.” The right believed that Nixon would continue the global fight against communism upon his election in 1968. To say that his overtures to China and Russia shocked them would be putting it mildly. Conservatives thought that opposition to the Vietnam War was part of a greater malaise affecting the country—a malaise centered on the reluctance of American leaders to take a global role. When Nixon indicated he wanted to improve relations with the communist powers, many conservative intellectuals felt he too had succumbed to this sickness. Détente in and of itself was not the problem for conservatives; the measures taken to achieve it were. Given the American inability to arrest the development of communism in Southeast Asia, conservatives feared the abandonment of other loyal allies, namely Taiwan. Moreover, the Nixon administration’s actions with respect to arms limitation caused concern since conservatives assumed such maneuvers would leave the United States vulnerable to attack. The Conservative View of Communism The conservative quest for authority made the right hostile to communism. As a form of government, it prevented the creation of the social, political, and economic ties that a nation’s citizens agreed to as necessary

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CHAPTER 3

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for their society’s survival. Communism, to conservatives, destroyed all that was good in society, particularly the exercise of individual rights grounded in an objective moral order. The defection of former communists, such as James Burnham and Frank Meyer, to the conservative cause heavily inf luenced the right’s anticommunism. Their first-hand experience with communist ideology made them adamant that communism must be opposed wherever it existed. Former communists more than anything pushed right-minded thinkers to accept a permanent global role for the United States.1 James Burnham grew to believe that conservatives should work to protect, and if possible improve, “the inherited structure of civilization against the continuous threat of barbarism.” After splitting with Leon Trotsky in 1939, he became increasingly skeptical of communism’s promise of a more equitable society. The role of the USSR in World War II and in the immediate postwar years convinced Burnham that World War III had already begun between the two superpowers. Drawing on his experience with communism, he painted the movement as monolithic. The Soviets would continue their expansion until resisted and the Americans seemingly lacked the will to stop them. Responding to the challenge required the United States to adopt a network of alliances and maintain nuclear superiority. Burnham initially wanted the free world to rollback communism because containment would not cause a mellowing of Soviet power. Rollback called for a more proactive stance against the communists, for exploiting their weakness, and for outlawing the domestic communist movement. It essentially provided a rationale and a strategy to achieve victory in the Cold War.2 As Burnham’s disenchantment with liberal foreign policy and liberal intellectualism increased, conservatives became more attracted to his ideas. In his columns for National Review and his books, Burnham emphasized the liberal assumption that the communists and the Democrats were moving toward a shared political outlook had enabled the left to see “defeat as victory . . . withdrawal as advance.” He also criticized liberal foreign policy for seeing communism as another form of nationalism to be held in check. While tempering his belief on the monolithic nature of communism, Burnham maintained that the communist powers hated the West more than they hated each other. In the 1960s and 1970s, he gravitated away from liberation recognizing that American leaders could not go that far. However, Burnham continued to push for the strongest possible realistic action given the situation.3 Frank S. Meyer moved away from communism during World War II. His intellectual odyssey during the conf lict ultimately led to his efforts to

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unite the budding conservative movement. Meyer’s wartime reading pushed him to call for a more democratic and more peaceful American Communist Party. When the party failed to match his growing respect for the dignity of the individual, he abandoned communism and became a Democrat. The inability of liberalism to resist communism by advocating the moral case for freedom pushed Meyer further to the right.4 Meyer’s writings in the 1950s and 1960s focused on cementing the relationship between traditional conservatives and libertarians. He sought to expose the continued brutality of the Soviet regime and the need for moral action to defeat communism as well. Fusionism, what Meyer preferred to call a conservative consensus, demonstrated how the libertarian concern for individual freedom coincided with the traditionalist concern for virtue. The libertarian objections to statism combined with the traditionalist affirmation of moral order provided a formula to stop the spread of communism. Fusionism allowed conservative-minded individuals to focus their attention on shared enemies—communism and liberalism.5 Meyer believed that the United States found itself locked in a struggle against world communism directed by the Soviet Union. Meyer could not accept isolationism, even though he would have preferred it, because the communists wanted to destroy the free world. He considered one of the greatest challenges facing the United States at the start of the Nixon administration to be the “defense against the world-conquering impetus of Soviet communism.”6 In their desire to fight the evils of communism, conservatives pushed for an active foreign policy. Hopes placed in a relaxation of tensions between the communist and noncommunist world were in their minds misguided. The right wanted to win not survive the Cold War. Intellectuals saw the support of the military, the draft, sometimes disagreeable noncommunist governments, and nuclear superiority as keys to combating communism.7 Failure to do so would have dire consequences for the United States, especially in terms of its ability to defend itself. Conservatives worried about Soviet advances in nuclear weapons and delivery systems as well as the consequences of proliferation of nuclear technology to the Chinese. Conservatives noted with fear in the late 1960s that the USSR would soon possess first- strike capability. Even if the United States possessed the same capability, the right assumed that communists would not exercise caution in using their missile force. According to National Review, the Nixon administration needed to take the crisis seriously and reorder priorities to focus on national security.8 Chinese nuclear capability according to Robert M. Lawrence and William van Cleave would also “threaten international stability” and American

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interests. Such capability, if reports were true, required assertive disarmament achieved through “a precise, surgical disruption of China’s present capability to produce nuclear weapons.”9 Conservatives sought a demonstration that the United States was ready to be assertive in the fight against the communist menace. Moreover, they feared that Nixon might not provide adequately for the defense of the country since he failed to appoint hard-line foreign policy advisers. The right also reported alarm over Nixon’s cuts to the defense budget early in his administration. National Review argued that lack of pressure from the right had allowed Nixon to avoid providing a “sound defense system.” The Democrats succeeded in turning Nixon’s attention to social issues thus chipping away at the country’s defense perimeter.10 Conservative intellectuals wanted more action from the Nixon administration, but often the president simply left them disappointed. In spite of their connections within Nixon’s foreign policy team, the conservatives never seemed to be able to inf luence the course of policy. Nixon’s Shell Game Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger came to their positions in the White House with the hope of rejuvenating American foreign policy in the face of the Vietnam War and dwindling nuclear superiority. They wanted to more effectively guide America’s changing international role. Détente— long-term peaceful coexistence—became the cornerstone of their foreign policy. Nixon and Kissinger hoped that relaxing tensions with the USSR would allow them to control an antagonistic relationship and to continue to pursue the Cold War while also trying to overcome it. Détente, said Kissinger, “calibrated the benefits of restraint and the penalties of recklessness to keep Soviet leaders from mounting a challenge” at a time when the United States faced internal turmoil.11 Both men saw the Russians as weak in spite of their bravado inspired by advances in nuclear technology. Détente ultimately would force fundamental internal change on the already weak Soviet state. By changing the USSR’s conception of international relations, Nixon and Kissinger thought they could contain the power and inf luence of communism. While the development of détente was ad hoc, it had a distinct strategic outline. First, Nixon planned to engage the Soviets in negotiations on issues of interest to them (especially arms limitation), but which the Americans could control. Second, he intended to use the tactical policy of linkage. For arms talks to proceed, the USSR would have to restrain itself and its allies in trouble spots such as Vietnam and the

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Middle East. Third, Nixon planned to pursue diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to bring it into the international community and put pressure on the Soviet Union. Playing the China card—implementing triangular diplomacy—took advantage of the Sino- Soviet split. Fourth, the president used the Nixon Doctrine to phase down American commitments around the globe by asking allies to take more responsibility for their own defense. Finally, Nixon hoped to introduce an element of uncertainty into détente. Using his reputation as an ardent anticommunist, Nixon thought through the madman theory he could raise doubts about whether or not he would overreact to international developments. For Nixon and Kissinger, the key to accomplishing détente was to isolate the traditional foreign policy bureaucracy from policymaking through backchannel negotiations on the Vietnam settlement, the opening of China, and arms limitation among other things.12 Nixon spoke openly of détente during his 1969 visit to Rumania. The president indicated that Americans sought “the cause of a just peace . . . a peace among nations of different interests and vastly different social systems.” Moreover, Nixon indicated that to promote peace the United States would respect the sovereignty of other nations by setting aside reservations about its domestic system when considering normal diplomatic relations. The Americans sought “the substance of détente, not its mere atmosphere” as well as “a peace not of hegemonies . . . but a peace in which the legitimate interests of each are respected and all are safeguarded.”13 Such statements helped convince the Soviets and the Chinese of the seriousness of the Americans desire to improve relations. Therefore, the communists accepted their role in the American quest for détente, but they conceived the policy and improved international relations differently. For the Soviets, détente became an effective way to deal with both the changing world and their foreign commitments. Reducing tensions served as a means to overcome the Cold War and to provide for a transition to normal, equal relations among states. Détente also implied that the United States and the Soviet Union would consider the legitimate interests of their enemy and settle international differences at the conference table not through war. It did not mean the Soviets would cease support for civil wars and national liberation movements, nor did it imply the erosion of socialism. Peaceful coexistence was just part of the struggle between the two superpowers that would help aid the complete and final victory of communism. Lastly, Soviet leaders thought access to western technology and trade would strengthen socialism.14

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China responded reluctantly to American attempts during the Johnson administration to open a dialogue because of the Cultural Revolution. However, after the cementing of the Sino-Soviet split in the spring of 1969, the Chinese became more receptive to normalization. Like the Soviets, Chinese leaders believed that better relations with the Americans would translate into worldwide acceptance as well as the American acceptance of one China. In other words, détente might help the PRC to regain Taiwan—a long sought after goal. Much of the internal debate on whether to open discussions hinged on the U.S. position on Taiwan. The Chinese also feared the possible fallout of the Brezhnev Doctrine issued in 1968. Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the Communist Party, claimed the right for the Soviet Union to intervene in any Warsaw Pact country (and later non-Warsaw Pact countries) where a threat to socialism existed. As tensions mounted on the Sino-Soviet border, the Chinese worried the Soviets would use the doctrine as a pretext for an invasion and an alliance with the Americans might prevent such an event. Lastly, normalization would allow the Chinese access to western technology.15 Conservatives looked upon Nixon’s Rumanian speech as well as his declaration shortly thereafter reducing trade and travel restrictions for China with some trepidation. Still, in 1969 conservatives were not entirely convinced that Nixon’s decision was ill-conceived. National Review argued that from Moscow’s perspective it would appear that there had been “a definite shift of American power away from the Soviet and toward the Chinese sector of the world power equilibrium.” The American decision was in accord with “Henry Kissinger’s Metternichian conception of diplomacy,” since the Russians remained the central threat to the Americans. Nixon’s “double-play” was “a classic example of traditional diplomacy.” The only thing this decision proved in its larger context was that the president preferred to have options. Such a move, in the opinion of NR, put pressure on Moscow rather than signifying any real change in American policy.16 The right only soured on détente once it became clear that Nixon was indeed pursuing a policy that appeared to weaken U.S. defenses. Conservatives later articulated concern that the Soviets and the Chinese had a different conception of détente and therefore it would be dangerous for the Americans to proceed with the policy.17 Patrick Buchanan, ever mindful of conservative opinion, expressed unease regarding Nixon’s theme of a “full generation of peace” and “our last war” in 1971. Such statements sent the wrong message to a “war-weary people.” As far as Buchanan was concerned, Nixon’s “place in history” would be jeopardized if the communists made “a fool of him” with limited aggression.

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Moreover, the president promised something that the United States could not deliver alone. Finally, talk of peace generated complacency among the American people making it more difficult to justify future requests to increase strategic defense spending. While Nixon recognized that Buchanan made valid points, détente in many ways lived up to these conservative fears.18 Playing Ping-Pong: China, Taiwan, and the United States For Nixon and Kissinger to make détente a reality they needed to use improved relations with the PRC to put pressure on the USSR. Moreover, they felt that it was important to open discussions with China before it had made significant progress in developing nuclear technology. Nixon feared that leaving the Chinese isolated only would lead to more problems for western nations in the future. To play the China card, Nixon and Kissinger needed a way to convince the Chinese of the serious nature of American overtures, which translated into risking the status of Taiwan. The Chinese became more willing to reach an understanding with the Americans after the Nixon administration set aside its reservations about the PRC’s membership in the United Nations.19 From the time of the Sino- Soviet split in 1969 until after his trip to China in 1972, Nixon pursued a policy toward the PRC that was at heart contrary to conservative views on the issue. The revelation by Nixon in 1971 that he had been pursuing rapprochement with the Chinese since he took office was particularly galling to conservatives. Changes in Sino-American relations proceeded slowly at the beginning of Nixon’s first term. The president accompanied the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine with denunciations of Soviet proposals for a joint anti- Chinese policy. He then arranged meetings with Rumanian and Pakistani leaders in hopes that one or both would serve as a conduit to Chinese leaders, all the while keeping his intentions secret from the State Department. Nixon also approved Kissinger’s plan to end the permanent American destroyer patrol of the Taiwan Straits. Receptive to the American gestures, Chinese leaders agreed to informal meetings in late 1969. To speed things along, Nixon and Kissinger also indicated that they thought that the two Chinese regimes should resolve the question of Taiwan’s future. Although the Cambodian Incursion stalled talks, Nixon and Kissinger continued their efforts to woo the Chinese.20 Obtaining the China seat in the United Nations was one means by which the PRC sought to end its self-imposed isolation. Nationalist China (Taiwan) held the China seat since the founding of the UN. For

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the communists to hold the seat, Taiwan would have to forfeit it or the General Assembly would have to vote to recognize the communist government as the legitimate government of China. The General Assembly previously had denied the seat to the PRC but member nations (especially France and various Third World countries) increasingly supported seating the communists. The United States had held its Third World allies in check, but it was unclear for how long it could maintain such a policy given Nixon’s overtures to the PRC. In assessing Nixon’s policy vis-à-vis the China seat, William F. Buckley noted that conservatives did not want to see the United States engage in such idealistic diplomatic plans. Moreover, it was ludicrous to believe that Red China would “dissolve into peacefulness” immediately upon entering the UN.21 Ralph de Toledano opposed any American recognition of the PRC. Moreover, since China continually violated the standing principles of the United Nations, it could not be expected to uphold those principles if it became a member nation.22 James Burnham recognized that the United States could live with the PRC in the UN and it could even live with two Chinas in the UN. However, what it could not live with was the abandonment of Taiwan. The Americans created Nationalist China; thus from a strategic and economic perspective, the United States could not afford to see it crushed. Most Americans cared little about the China question, but they did care about their nation’s credibility. Therefore, Burnham concluded that unless Nixon wanted “to be known as the President who destroyed his country’s global credibility” he must draw a line on the China issue.23 Ultimately, right-minded thinkers wondered how America’s Asian allies were expected to trust the United States if its policy toward Communist China had a hand in humiliating Taiwan. Unlike Buckley, de Toledano, and Burnham, James Kilpatrick thought the United Nations should seat Communist China and should give Taiwan a separate seat in the General Assembly. His low opinion of the organization (one shared by many conservatives) led to his conclusion. Kilpatrick saw the UN as a victim of its own excesses, primarily “an excess of morality” and “an excess of illusion.” It should not have engaged in moral judgments about the internal affairs of member nations for one of the key founding principles of the body was an understanding on that issue. However, morality was the key factor in the body’s reaction to China. For the UN to survive as a viable international organization it needed to return to its roots and so Communist China should have the Security Council seat.24 Kilpatrick never thought the presence of the PRC in the UN would affect the American relationship with Taiwan.

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As conservatives discussed the public question of China’s UN representation, the White House moved forward with its attempts to seek normalization. While their published accounts suggested a concern for the status of Taiwan, Nixon and Kissinger came to the conclusion that normalization with the mainland was more important than insisting on the two- China policy. Mao Zedong (the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party) and Zhou Enlai (the premier of the PRC) wanted to open better lines of communication with the Americans, but not at the expense of their desire to defeat the nationalists. Hence the president accepted the phasing down and likely elimination of an American presence in Taiwan. Both sides sent subtle signals that they wanted to continue in discussions in 1971. Nixon further relaxed trade and travel restrictions in March. Then in April after the World Table Tennis Championships in Japan, the Chinese team asked the American team to come to China for a series of exhibition games. During their trip, Zhou Enlai announced to the players that their visit signified a “new chapter” in Sino-American relations.25 Conservatives questioned the logic of better relations with Communist China in the wake of the ping-pong initiative. William F. Buckley worried about the American willingness to forgo years of experience with the Chinese communists for a chance to play a risky game. Liberals, he said, should not have dismissed past Chinese transgressions—such as aggression in Korea, the development of nuclear weapons, and attempts to exert inf luence on Japanese politics—so quickly to justify normalization. Buckley later argued that discussions with Chinese leaders challenged the basis of American foreign policy. Nixon abandoned the domino theory and along with it international commitments to defend freedom.26 James Burnham recognized that in light of the balance of power strategy, rapprochement with China made sense. However, he remained troubled that the Americans had no idea what effect better relations with the PRC would have “on the security of our advanced line of strategic defenses.” The Chinese knew how to make the fine distinctions during negotiations that the Americans did not, which put U.S. negotiators at a disadvantage for it allowed the Chinese to “brainwash” them.27 Human Events also raised concern about the strategic impact of normalization with Communist China. Driving a wedge between Moscow and Beijing could be useful, but not if Washington became alienated from its Asian allies in the process. Maintaining the Southeast Asian alliance, according to the editors, was far more important than the possibility that China and the Soviet Union would continue their hostility toward each other.28

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After the ping-pong episode, the Chinese conveyed their desire for a meeting with a high-level emissary to discuss a broad range of issues including Taiwan. The president chose Henry Kissinger for the mission, keeping the State Department in the dark about the trip. While on a factfinding mission to Vietnam in July 1971, he faked the stomach f lu to cover his sojourn to Beijing. Zhou Enlai emphasized the importance of the Taiwan question on the future course of discussions, during their exchanges. Kissinger implied the American government would cease its support of the nationalist’s independence movement. Zhou remained unsatisfied. Kissinger then indicated that the United States would not aid any nationalist assault against the mainland and would not oppose PRC membership in the UN. However, he also said the Americans would attempt to maintain a separate seat for Taiwan. Zhou and Kissinger also discussed Vietnam, Japan, and the Soviet Union.29 On July 15, 1971, the president announced that Kissinger had met with Zhou in Beijing where the two men began preparations for a presidential visit to China in 1972. The goal of the Sino-American conference was “to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides.” Nixon highlighted the peaceful gains that could result from the dialogue between the United States and the PRC, while also emphasizing that the “new relationship” would not “be at the expense of our old friends.”30 Nixon’s statement surprised everyone, especially loyal allies such as Japan and Taiwan who had little or no advance notice of the policy shift. American reaction to the announcement was overwhelmingly positive, except from the China lobby and the conservatives. William F. Buckley thought that Nixon’s trip would accomplish little of consequence. Summit diplomacy in the 1950s did nothing to change Soviet conduct in the 1960s; thus, the likelihood of an improvement in Chinese behavior seemed slim. However, talk of “world cooperation” in Beijing would consummate a “subtle revolution,” especially in countries bordering China (like Japan) and Taiwan would become a forgotten “abstraction.” More importantly, the meeting would cause a change in the “American psyche” lessening the country’s resistance to what he called “the single most hideous large-scale social enterprise in the history of the world.”31 Human Events saw Nixon’s position as “extraordinary” because he seemed to be giving into the PRC without receiving anything in return. Nixon’s personal diplomacy would not “produce any tangible benefits for the West” but Nixon seemed “determined to push ahead with his astonishing diplomatic gambit.”32 James Kilpatrick thought that the president’s announcement of a trip to China would appeal to some

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Americans because it belied the image of Nixon as dull and indecisive. However, there was an inherent risk in the decision to pursue a summit with Chinese leaders—American negotiators since Yalta tended to fare poorly in “the exotic casinos of summit diplomacy.” Nixon’s action would likely push already alienated conservatives farther away, especially if the United States extended diplomatic recognition to the PRC. To Kilpatrick, it appeared that China stood to gain much more from the meeting than the United States.33 Ernest Cuneo, a syndicated columnist and military analyst for the North American Newspaper Alliance, likened the president’s demarche to Chamberlain’s “peace in our time.” While from a realpolitik perspective, the decision made sense, the new policy threatened American alliances in Asia. It amounted to the Americans accepting defeat in the global Cold War because of their failure in Vietnam.34 Frank Meyer also linked Richard Nixon’s action to appeasement. The China move amounted to “de facto recognition” and was a symbol of “the liquidation of the antiCommunist stance of the American Government.” He concluded that Nixon’s balance of power initiatives would not stop the communists, but only open the door to further expansion.35 In the fall of 1971, the question of China’s United Nations seat once again surfaced, when the General Assembly scheduled a vote on the issue. Henry Kissinger, Patrick Buchanan, and others tried to convince conservatives that the administration intended to keep its treaty commitments with Taiwan. The administration also attempted to demonstrate the conservative foundations of the China policy.36 Given Nixon’s July announcement, conservatives remained reluctant to accept the assurances of the president and his advisers. National Review speculated that for Taiwan to retain the China seat in the UN the Americans would have to take the stand that Taiwan stays or the United States goes. However, Nixon’s statements on Taiwan, China, and the UN seemingly demonstrated the administration’s hope that both sides would agree to a two- China solution. In seeking rapprochement with China, Nixon “maneuvered himself into a dilemma” because he could not have détente and still maintain American strategic commitments. The editors noted that “most American conservatives have . . . reconciled themselves to the inevitability of Peking’s being invited to become a UN member. They have not reconciled themselves to the expulsion, nor are they likely to.” William F. Buckley later concluded the best situation for the United States would be for Taiwan to leave voluntarily rather than be forced out.37 While some conservatives looked to Nixon to take stronger action on the representation question, others were more concerned at how Nixon’s

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policies would affect American credibility with conservatives. Jeffrey Hart reasoned that the question of Taiwan’s membership was not significant for whether or not Taiwan would remain a UN member. The vote was noteworthy in the sense that it would demonstrate “how much political muscle” the United States was willing to f lex on behalf of an ally. If the General Assembly expelled Taiwan, Washington tacitly would have agreed to that course of action. From a domestic political perspective, the potential UN action could “crystallize conservative alienation from the Nixon administration.”38 Like Hart, James Kilpatrick believed the consequences of Nixon’s policy shift primarily affected domestic politics. It changed “nothing in the real world” for the PRC had been the real government of China for many years.39 In late October 1971, the General Assembly awarded the Security Council and General Assembly seats to the PRC. The American Conservative Union called the General Assembly’s decision “shameful.” Nixon’s silence on the issue of the defense of Taiwan, while speaking openly about friendlier relations with the PRC, had a dramatic effect on undecided delegates. What Nixon’s silence did not convey, Kissinger’s second trip to Beijing on the eve of the vote did. The outcome showed that “the systematic sabotage of loyal allies” had become “a marked feature of the Administration’s Asian policy.”40 Human Events remarked that “with tireless and consummate skill” Nixon brought about the seating of Communist China in the UN as well as “the complete and public humiliation of our long-time ally, Taiwan.” Nixon’s maneuver not only scared America’s Asian allies, but also other friends around the globe. The president, said the editors, “suffered a diplomatic Bay of Pigs in his obsession to court Peking.”41 In a speech at New York’s Commodore Hotel days after Taiwan’s expulsion, William F. Buckley expressed dismay over the jubilation of the smaller nations in the General Assembly after the vote. For these countries, it was not about Taiwan’s representation in the UN, but about defeating the United States. More importantly, the UN suffered an additional loss in its prestige, making membership in the body “less desirable” than ever before. As the General Assembly grew in light of decolonialism, Third World nations came together to vote in blocs, which often served the interest of a major power. Buckley believed that in the future the United States should stop participating in General Assembly votes so it would not have to be party to decisions that the country could not ethically agree. Lastly, he thought that “we must cherish Taiwan, which is the West Berlin of China.” Since the nationalists f led to Taiwan with the help of American aid, the standard of living rose significantly while the

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Taiwanese respected the culture and tradition of their forefathers. It had become a country “abloom with promise.” While Taiwan remained far from being the capital of all China, it stood as a “repository of the hopes and dreams of those Chinese” still struggling with the Maoist drive against human nature.42 Conservatives also wondered what the United States received from Communist China in exchange for its willingness to abandon a loyal ally. Jeffrey Hart remarked that when Nixon first made his announcement about the China trip he indicated the trip would have no effect on the American relationship with Taiwan. However, Nixon’s pledge did not accurately represent the administration’s intentions. The UN fiasco marked one hint. The abandonment of Nixon’s scheduled stop in Taipei on the way to Peking was another warning. Finally, Kissinger’s admission that the Nixon administration “no longer consider[ed] the Taipei regime to be the government of a sovereign entity” exhibited a final sign. Hart saw nothing good coming of Nixon’s China policy especially with respect to U.S. relations with its noncommunist allies.43 In the opinion of Human Events, Nixon’s attempts to change the relationship with the PRC gave the United States nothing in return. The Chinese remained “as intransigent as ever, indeed, even more so since we began our policy of conciliation.”44 Richard Nixon embarked on his trip to China in February 1972. Zhou Enlai accompanied by a small delegation of officials met the president’s plane. Although the Nixon team expected a large crowd, the president made the most of the situation for the over 300 American reporters also at Beijing’s airport. Shortly after arriving, Mao Zedong sent word to Nixon that he wished to see him. To maintain the utmost secrecy, Kissinger and Nixon agreed to use Chinese interpreters at this gathering and most other important meetings throughout the visit. During the remaining days of Nixon’s stay in China, he and Kissinger met with Zhou for over fifteen hours to discuss the contents of the proposed communiqué. American and Chinese leaders also conferred about Taiwan, Japan, and the USSR. The American entourage also attended several formal banquets and visited the Great Wall.45 At the end of the visit, the Americans and the Chinese presented the Shanghai Communiqué. Noting differences in their economic and social systems, the two sides agreed “to conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, nonaggression against other states, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.” More specifically, the two countries identified normalization and the

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reduction of international military conf lict as major goals. While not specifically mentioning the Soviet Union, they agreed “it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.” On the Taiwan question, the PRC noted that Taiwan was rightfully part of China. The Americans did not dispute this contention and pledged to “progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan” as tension in the region lessened. Lastly, the Chinese and the Americans supported broadening communication in the areas of science, technology, culture, sports, and journalism.46 President Nixon stated after his trip that he had achieved the primary goal of the trip—reestablishing “communication with the People’s Republic of China after a generation of hostility.” The communiqué also outlined “some rules of international conduct,” which stood to “reduce the risk of confrontation and war in Asia and in the Pacific.” The joint statement, however, did not “guarantee peace in our time.” The president called upon his fellow Americans to continue to be strong so as to preserve freedom.47 Most Americans saw Nixon’s visit to China in a positive light—both the liberal George McGovern and the conservative Barry Goldwater praised the trip. However, not all conservatives were pleased with the communiqué. Patrick Buchanan threatened to resign because he thought Nixon had sold out Taiwan with the communiqué. Moreover, conservative intellectuals came out strongly against the implications of the joint statement.48 William F. Buckley was one of the many reporters who accompanied Nixon’s entourage to China. His inclusion among the American reporters traveling with the president was an attempt by Nixon to win back some conservative support before the 1972 election. Buckley’s coverage of the events set the tone for the conservative reaction to the trip. He maintained the initial reception the president received in Beijing was not a good omen for the trip. The Chinese were not hostile, but indifferent to Nixon’s presence. To Buckley and other onlookers it appeared that Zhou Enlai could not bring himself to recognize Richard Nixon as an amiable participant during the trips many events in spite of Nixon’s personal diplomacy.49 After reviewing the communiqué, Buckley concluded that the Chinese gave up virtually nothing over the course of the meetings. On the other hand, the Americans gave up too much. The United States agreed to a communiqué in which China “reasserted their absolute right to conquer Taiwan” while the Americans failed to mention their defense treaty with that country. Nixon’s summit performance caused

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the United States to lose “any remaining sense of moral mission in the world.” Moreover, before the communiqué only a minority of Democrats had taken “the position that we need to dump Taiwan” to improve relations with the mainland. Given that Nixon agreed with the communists during his trip that normalization was more important than the independence of Taiwan, Buckley believed nothing remained to stop all Democrats from concluding that abandoning the nationalists was a necessary must.50 William Rusher observed that Nixon’s trip to China was nothing more than an attempt to raise his public approval ratings. Nixon’s team scheduled his arrival at a time when it could be covered live in prime time by the networks at home. But beyond the predicted public relations coup, the trip’s consequences remained hard to discern. Benefits from trade agreements were not immediately apparent, especially considering that many Chinese could not afford to buy American goods and the Chinese had little in the way of goods worthy for export. The trip only evidenced Nixon’s willingness to abandon American allies, including Taiwan, Japan, and Korea. These nations had the right to be concerned about the future direction of U.S. policy and had the right to suspect White House and State Department professions of friendship.51 The Alternative, R. Emmett Tyrell’s publication, devoted two articles to Nixon’s trip to China in May 1972. Allan C. Brownfeld pointed out that U.S. allies in the region were “nervous” because Nixon decided to make his historic China trip without consulting them and from a position of weakness. They believed that Nixon’s visit signified the end of the containment policy. Moreover, they saw the Americans as undependable and duplicitous. Despite public assertions, the United States appeared on the cusp of abandoning its treaty commitments to Taiwan. Ultimately, Nixon’s move toward isolationism surprised conservatives because it was not the course they expected him to follow.52 Eric Brodin commented that it was too early to tell what the consequences of Nixon’s China trip would be. However, the press (aside from William F. Buckley and James Michener) appeared to believe that the trip would have positive implications for peace. Sen. Barry Goldwater felt comfortable expressing his confidence that Nixon gave nothing away to the communists, but Brodin wondered whether the act of going to China in some way legitimized the communists. This new found recognition, coupled with membership in the UN, allowed the Chinese communists to develop new “methods of subversion.” Red China, Brodin observed, continued “to be what it was before: a brutal, dehumanizing, totalitarian dictatorship.”53

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Conservatives were just as wary of Richard Nixon’s approach to the Soviet Union as they were of his approach to China. Nixon and Kissinger used secret discussions and open negotiations on trade and arms limitations to engage the USSR and convince its leaders that it was in their interest to be contained. The Soviets were primarily interested in continuing the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which began during the Johnson administration. Meanwhile, the Americans desired assistance in ending the conf lict in Vietnam. Improvements in Soviet-American relations proceeded slowly in the first two years because linkage failed to produce a Vietnam settlement and because the Soviets were unwilling to hold a summit in 1970 to fuel Nixon’s domestic political interests. Conservatives tentatively accepted the theory of containment, but did not want to witness the policy turn to active negotiation on issues of trade and defense. While they could accept that liberation was not a practical goal, conservatives ultimately wanted to see communism vanquished. Containment, if properly implemented to prevent the Soviets from expanding their power base, could bring about the end of communism. After Nixon’s announcement on détente, conservatives wondered about his commitment to defeating the communist menace. Their concern grew as Nixon made plans for a summit meeting with Leonid Brezhnev. In part conservative concern stemmed from the fact that to move talks forward, Nixon and Kissinger had to accept Soviet nuclear parity. While the China initiative was planned in secret, détente with the USSR was not kept a secret in the sense that Nixon was not hiding his desire for better relations. However, Nixon and Kissinger used a backchannel—Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States—to make proposals that were secret from official American negotiators at the State Department and the Arms Control Disarmament Agency. Nixon proposed the backchannel during his first month in office. Thereafter, Kissinger held almost weekly and sometimes daily meetings with Dobrynin. The Soviets and the Americans made most of the progress on détente during these meetings.54 In the end, the secret channel meant that the content of many of the agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union came as an unhappy surprise to most conservatives. Conservatives expressed hope that the Soviets would not take advantage of the Americans when SALT negotiations began in late 1969. James Burnham observed that limitation talks were part of the arms

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competition game. Limitations, like expansions, made changes to the “equilibrium” and therefore could be acceptable if the United States did not give away too much.55 Anthony Harrigan, associate editor for the Charleston News and Courier, hoped that the SALT negotiations would not become another Yalta. Specific dangers included the possibility that the Nixon administration would “agree to a moratorium on vital weapons testing and development during the talks” and that the United States would accept “a ‘freeze’ on key weapons systems” such as multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), an enhanced missile defense system (Safeguard), and land- based missiles. The “real danger” with these talks was that American negotiators might “lose sight of the fact that parity with the USSR, not U.S. nuclear superiority” was “the real destabilizing force in the world.” Harrigan also believed that the liberal press would obscure the Soviet determination to use the negotiating table as a battlefront.56 Conservatives took Harrigan’s concern to heart and began to argue that the Nixon administration needed to spend more to defend the country. Writing for National Review, Mark Schneider maintained that intercontinental ballistic missiles, an anti-ballistic missile system (ABM), and MIRVs were essential for national security. Soviet advancement in weaponry put the United States at a greater risk; failure to keep pace would leave the nation open to surprise attack. Deploying an ABM would buy “a critically important option for the preservation of our [nuclear] deterrent.” Charles Benson also in NR suggested that the United States had to improve its defense against Soviet nuclear weapons or face dire consequences. One means of resistance was not sufficient; the country needed as many defense strategies as possible to deter and defend against attack. The NR editorial board supported Benson’s contention that the strategy of mutual deterrence had been outmoded by new technology. Given the situation, the president and his advisers needed to take the “approaching crisis” seriously. A “reordering of priorities” was necessary and not of the kind that liberals tended to favor.57 Conservatives wanted a larger defense budget not because they wanted war with the communists but because they did not want to find the country at war with a better prepared enemy. Conservatives simply did not trust the communists to maintain peaceful coexistence. As SALT negotiations continued, William F. Buckley speculated that Nixon had said little about strategic defense during his first two years in office because he had a new weapon or concept that could be used before the USSR became too high-handed, or he knew the Russians eventually would have to make proposals that were amenable to U.S. interests. Since

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Nixon’s silence caused anxiety for many conservatives, Buckley thought the president needed to show his ace before suspicions of détente and a Russian first- strike capability made the plan useless.58 The ACU was less convinced that Nixon had a plan to deal with communism. Nixon’s record remained stronger than that of his liberal opponents; but at the same time, he had failed to present a “coherent strategic purpose.” His lack of commitment to fighting the communist menace would result in not just a retreat from the world, but a “national collapse.”59 During 1971, the Americans and the Soviets strengthened the prospects of peaceful coexistence when arms negotiators decided to draft SALT as two agreements—one covering offensive weapons and one covering defensive weapons. The Americans consented to discuss the control of ABM deployment. In exchange, the Soviets consented to some limits on offensive weapons. Effective détente moved even closer when the two countries announced the likelihood of a summit in 1972. In an attempt to arrange for a meeting in Moscow before the election, Nixon sent a private letter through Dobrynin (not through the State Department) to Brezhnev in 1971. The Soviet leader responded with unusual speed at the beginning of August indicating that he would welcome a visit from Nixon in May or June of the following year. The Soviets made the invitation official during Nixon’s September 1971 meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.60 When Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev met in May 1972, the key focus was signing the SALT agreements. The first document limited the defense capabilities of each side since both countries agreed to restrict ABM to two sites—one protecting the country’s capital and the other a cluster of land based missiles. The ABM treaty took into consideration the Soviet desire to protect Moscow as well as the American aim to safeguard remote offensive missile sites. The second document was an interim agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms set to expire in October 1977. It froze launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched cruise missiles at their 1972 levels. Since, the Americans were unsure how many warheads the Soviets had, the interim agreement counted launchers and submarines rather than the actual missiles.61 SALT was not the only issue on the table in Moscow. The Americans wanted to discuss the Soviet role in securing a settlement in Vietnam and the Soviets wanted American acceptance of a conference on European security. During the meetings, Brezhnev offered to serve as an intermediary between Hanoi and Washington. Nixon agreed to the security conference, which the Soviets hoped would lead to more contact between

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Eastern and Western Europe. The two leaders also signed agreements on the exchange of science and technology and decided that representatives from both countries would meet in the fall to discuss economic cooperation. Finally, the Americans and the Soviets agreed to the “Basic Principles of Mutual Relations,” which dictated that future relations would be based on peaceful coexistence not ideological confrontation.62 Nixon asserted that the agreements made in Moscow did not contain “the promise of instant peace.” However, they did “bring the beginning of a process that [could] lead to a lasting peace.” The agreements laid “the foundation . . . for a new relationship between the two most powerful nations in the world.” Nixon also called on Congress and the people (echoing his silent majority speech of 1969) to keep the country strong and to be vigilant in supporting the American way of life.63 Conservatives were not convinced that the Moscow agreements would live up to Nixon’s promises. They feared not only that Nixon had given too much away, but also that the United States was on the verge of abdicating its role as a great power. The cover of National Review’s first post-summit edition summed up conservative feeling about Nixon’s trip. It noted, “While you’re over there, you might want to read some off-beat stuff on Russia, E.g., Notes from Soviet Asylums, by Communist artists who have resisted; and A Month in the Life of Yevtushenko about an artist who didn’t. And say hello to Solzhenitsyn. Best—The Staff.”64 The editors went on to question why Nixon and Brezhnev agreed to meet. Common interests seemed to be a rather slim explanation; presumably, both leaders thought they personally would get something out of the meeting and possibly something for their country as well. Evidently, Brezhnev sought acceptance of communist rule in Eastern Europe and quite possibly the acceptance of the Finlandization of Western Europe. On the other hand, Nixon had not presented a “comparable counterstrategy” and the editors could not discern (even after the fact) what Nixon wanted to gain from the summit. Furthermore, SALT seemed to be an agreement accepting nuclear inferiority and thus degraded American credibility in Western Europe— especially on the issue of strategic defense.65 James Kilpatrick saw the nature of the summit as somewhat surreal, but noted that Nixon would reap the political rewards for taking the initiative to bring peace. But since Soviet behavior changed little after the summit, the talk of peaceful coexistence was just talk.66 James Burnham also assessed the meeting in light of the nature of the enemy—feeling that the Nixon administration resolutely ignored this factor in negotiations. Freed from worrying about Western Europe because of the summit

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agreements, the USSR would be able to expand especially in the Middle East. While the American people were led to believe that the summit was about furthering peace, according to Burnham, Soviet leaders considered the gains from this meeting to be part of a larger “strategic maneuver” consistent with their revolutionary goals to expand communism.67 Brian Crozier, the director of the Institute for the Study of Conf lict in London, argued that the statement on peaceful coexistence between Nixon and Brezhnev changed nothing about the world situation, but rather cemented the status quo. For the communists, détente was another means to pursue the struggle for the triumph of socialism. The liberal acceptance of the Soviet definition of the Cold War proved “one of the greater triumphs of the Soviet propaganda machine.” Crozier believed, knowingly or not, the western world accepted the Soviet right to continue its attack on freedom and liberty.68 Beyond concern about détente and the summit agreements, conservatives specifically feared the implications of SALT. They alleged that the United States would be unable to defend itself in the future and that the Soviet Union was the real winner. Human Events called the limitation agreements a disaster. The treaties were one-sided because they hindered the Americans power to deploy weapons but they did not stop the Russians from taking the lead in the arms race, National Review also remarked on the administration’s reluctance to provide details on the content of the agreements. Further review demonstrated that the freeze was not a freeze at all. It was a ceiling. In terms of offensive missiles, the ceiling favored Russian superiority—both in number and in mega tonnage.69 Donald Brennan, director of national security studies for the Hudson Institute, saw the two SALT agreements as “profoundly unwise.” The accords disappointed those, including Brennan, who hoped and worked “for a strategic arms-control agreement that would make a genuine contribution to American security.” The interim agreement seemed particularly irresponsible because it committed the United States to acceptance of nuclear inferiority. While the ABM treaty did not favor the Soviets to the extent that the interim agreement did, Brennan thought it forced the United States to give up the right to defend itself against attack by the USSR or other enemies.70 As the president sank deeper into the Watergate morass, conservatives were left wondering how he could adequately address the complications détente seemed to bring. Prior to the second Nixon-Brezhnev summit held in Washington in June 1973, Human Events called on the president to hold the line despite his weakened state at home. The editors hoped Nixon would not give in to the Soviets to boost his image. The United

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States still had one advantage—economic power. Nixon could use that power to his benefit. He needed to avoid any trade concessions without getting support for the Vietnam settlement, compromises on SALT II, and an agreement to diminish Soviet conventional forces in Europe. Finally, neither Nixon nor Congress should let Brezhnev’s image as a peacemaker deceive them; both should consider his real record before granting further concessions.71 According to National Review, the second summit renewed a “gnawing question” about détente, namely its objectives and Nixon’s strategies for meeting those objectives. How, for example, could the White House work out an acceptable deal with the Kremlin while maintaining commitments to Western Europe and reassuring China? Such goals appeared incompatible. Nixon’s maneuvers looked to be “elaborate temporizing” rather than a “sustained and consistent policy.” NR also thought that the meeting “stimulated the spirit of unrealistic euphoria vis-à-vis the continuing Soviet threat—and the still expanding Soviet military power.” 72 James Burnham noted that nothing in recent Soviet behavior suggested a change in their attitude. In fact, they had elevated their campaign against dissidents and nationalism without a word of protest from the Americans. Nixon and Kissinger became “the accomplices of those who man the Berlin Wall, who shut those who differ with them in madhouses run by the secret police, who lock their citizens inside their borders, who black out communication with their fellow man.” 73 As Middle East tensions increased in the fall of 1973, conservatives once again were left to speculate how détente affected the global situation. Dating to 1948, hostilities in the region derived from the contested national borders of Israel. The Arab-Israeli war of attrition manifested itself in the Suez Crisis (1956), the Six Day War (1967), and the Jordanian Crisis (1970). In an attempt to recapture lands lost in the 1967 conf lict, specifically the Sinai Peninsula and portions of the Golan Heights, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack across the 1967 cease-fire lines on Yom Kippur in 1973. Once open conf lict broke out, the combatants and their allies began to look for some kind of settlement. Unfortunately, the Arabs and the Israelis had different conceptions of peace and both sides had the resources to make the conf lict quite destructive thanks to their superpower allies. The Americans and the Soviets in turn had to balance the tensions in the Middle East with the tenor of détente. Both countries supported a UN Security Council resolution for a cease-fire in place; however, given Egypt’s intransigence such a solution was initially impossible. Nixon approved a request for emergency aid to the Israelis to help them push back Egypt and Syria prompting the Arab countries to begin

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an oil embargo against the West. East-West tensions mounted as the Soviets and the Americans worked to ensure the Arabs and the Israelis reached an agreement. Once the Soviets and their allies accepted the American negotiating position on the cease-fire conditions, the combatants worked out the details of a settlement.74 James Burnham thought no matter what the outcome of the Yom Kippur War, the Soviets would benefit. Any forward movement of the Arab cause was a good thing for the communist’s Middle East policy. The region was important for its strategic location and for its petroleum-based wealth. The USSR wanted progress, but not total victory so that the Arabs would continue to depend on them and allow them greater freedom of movement in the area. In the end Burnham wondered how “Soviet détente conduct” during the conf lict differed “from Soviet Cold War conduct.” 75 William F. Buckley maintained that initial Arab performance gave the Soviets reason to be happy, but he questioned what would happen once the United States provided aid to Israel. Would the Soviet Union merely increase its own aid efforts, or would something else ensue? The weakness of the Nixon-Kissinger policy was that “when certain kinds of people play chess, they end by overturning the table and hitting the opponent in the face.” Buckley further doubted the legitimacy of the president’s claim that détente prevented a confrontation between the Russians and the Americans amid the tensions in the Middle East. No one stopped to ask why the two countries came so close to an altercation in the first place. The recent events showed that the USSR continued “its old imperialistic policies” and that détente did not prevent such aggression. Given the projected decline in American defenses, how did the president plan to stop the Soviets the next time?76 The president attended a third summit in Moscow in July 1974. Conservatives expressed suspicion of the meeting because of Nixon’s weakened condition at home. However, they concluded that his political situation actually prevented him from making any truly egregious errors during his talks with Soviet leaders. Human Events observed that while Nixon did not enter into a new arms agreement, sadly he was unable to chip away at the concessions the Americans made to the Soviets in previous meetings. Thus, the USSR still possessed the capacity to deploy more missiles than the United States did. Soviet unwillingness to make any concessions to the Americans at this meeting did not bode well for the future of détente. The editors concluded that the Soviets would dominate the Americans unless the president and Congress responded “vigorously” to the military buildup in the USSR. Nevertheless, George Will observed that the country should be thankful that “This year’s

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summit did not produce anything as dramatic as the 1972 offensive weapons agreement.” 77

Conservatives continually said that détente was a misguided policy. Before and after Nixon’s resignation, they assessed how it affected American credibility and purportedly weakened American defenses. Détente seemed the antithesis of a key conservative tenet—the defeat of communism. Even though some conservatives accepted that détente could be a way to deal with the changing world situation, they still feared the way the Nixon administration implemented the policy. Conservative intellectuals believed that it was important for the United States to not only demonstrate the benefits of a free society, but also support other countries seeking a similar goal. Détente seemingly allowed the United States to walk away from its commitments abroad. Taiwan and SALT were symbolic for conservatives and represented all that was wrong with Nixon’s foreign policy. In retrospect, conservatives argued that détente failed to live up to Nixon’s promises. Shortly before Nixon’s resignation, James Burnham remarked that if U.S. leaders were afraid to raise the question of human rights abuses in the USSR and its satellites, then détente could not be worth much. By not addressing the issue, Nixon (as well as the media) censored the reality of Soviet life. The USSR’s abuse of its citizens spoke to the nature of this totalitarian regime and therefore should have made normal relations impossible. It appeared to Burnham that Moscow controlled the relationship and that Washington was “underwriting the Soviet regime.” 78 Conservatives further condemned the Nixon policy after his resignation. They blamed Nixon for deceiving the country about the meaning of détente and its objectives. William F. Buckley recalled the Cold War fondly because international tension was easily recognized. Détente was “diplomatic hypocrisy” for it did not relax tensions in Eastern Europe or South Vietnam. It merely provided “a backdrop for the exchange of toasts between American Presidents and Communist tyrants.” Moreover, Nixon and Kissinger never discussed how détente and human rights intertwined. If there was no connection, was détente under Nixon any different from how Eisenhower dealt with communism? Buckley asserted that at least under Eisenhower, Americans were not deluded by or ignorant of communist intentions. George Will argued that the nature of the policy was confusing—it was never clear whether negotiations would

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The Evils of Détente

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bring détente or whether détente would bring agreements. It became useless for American policymakers because neither Nixon nor Kissinger explained this aspect of the strategy.79 Détente also forced the United States to ignore the victims of communism. James Burnham lambasted the policy for attempting to improve relations with the Soviet government at the expense of the Soviet people and the nations under Soviet rule. The United States needed to fight for freedom and individual rights; however, under Nixon’s policy the country courted tyrants. Burnham noted that the communists employed détente as “a cover for their fundamental strategy of aggression.” Meanwhile, western politicians used the policy “to obscure their renunciation of genuine leadership, their failure of nerve, and their reduction of governing to the study of opinion polls.” Former army intelligence officer Daniel O. Graham also thought that American strategy should focus on what was best for the Soviet people, not the Soviet government. The United States needed to direct its attention to “the forces for change inside the Soviet Union” and to recognize that a struggle still existed between communism and liberal capitalism. It was time for the country to embrace once again the fight for “free economics and free political institutions.”80 *

* *

Nixon’s foreign policy, especially the fight against global communism, never lived up to the expectations of conservative intellectuals. When it came down to it, conservatives could never resolve the inherent contradiction they saw in détente. As James Burnham pointed out, détente pushed the government to call for relaxed tensions but at the same time, the government still considered communism dangerous.81 Détente and normalization convinced many Americans that the Cold War was ending and that the Soviet Union and China were not the threat they once were. Those on the right never believed that peaceful coexistence had brought the end of hostilities; they thought it had changed the means of fighting the Cold War. Conservatives, as George Will observed, wanted the United States to live up to its obligations as a world leader. Détente clouded this commitment because it allowed Americans “to derive standards of political right from whatever happens to be winning the inchoate ‘approval’ of foreign populations.”82 Nixon’s presidency made it more difficult for conservatives internally and externally to deal with foreign policy related issues.

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Was fusionism still a viable means to hold the movement together and could they convince Americans the fight was still worth pursuing? Toward the end of Nixon’s tenure, conservatives wondered how much harder he could make the nation’s commitment abroad as well as how the United States would defend itself in the coming years. Richard Nixon’s foreign policy contributed to a conservative reevaluation later in the 1970s especially as the neoconservatives increasingly contributed to discussions of conservative foreign policy.

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UMPIRE OR PLAYER: NIXON’S ECONOMIC GAMES

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he wave of good economic fortune experienced by the United States following World War II began to taper off by the late 1960s. As Germany and Japan recovered, both challenged American dominance in manufactured goods. Spending less on defense, these rivals devoted more resources to improving their industrial core; American businesses found themselves ill-prepared to deal with the effects of a serious challenge to the nation’s economic lead. At the same time, the American government expended large sums of money to fund the Vietnam War and the Great Society. Richard Nixon thus confronted rising inf lation, a mounting deficit, and growing unemployment. The rate of inf lation for 1968 hovered around 4 percent, almost double what it had been the previous year, while the rate of unemployment averaged 3.6 percent. While Americans cared about the war and domestic disorder, they focused more on what the money in their pockets could buy. In 1969, their money did not go nearly as far as it had in previous years. When Nixon first ran for president in 1960, the price of a gallon of milk averaged $0.49. Eight years later the price climbed to approximately $1.04. Moreover, the problem seemed to grow only worse. In 1970, the inflation rate was close to 6 percent and the unemployment rate averaged to 5.6 percent.1 Nixon’s campaign rhetoric convinced conservative supporters that he would cut federal spending to ease the deficit and curb the money supply to slow inf lation.2 As he unveiled his economic policies, the right’s biggest concerns were the way in which the government spent tax payers’ money and how it addressed the f luctuating economy. Over time, the administration’s policies seemed to move farther and farther from the conservative inspired economic principles that Nixon espoused during

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CHAPTER 4

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Conservatives and the Economy Conservative convictions about human nature and individual rights guided them to support free-market capitalism. To most conservatives, it was of paramount importance to restrict the government’s role in the economy to control government power. Milton Friedman argued that in trying to offset economic forces, the government had become “the major source of instability.” Conservatives opposed government attempts at economic leveling because such actions restricted personal liberty. A capitalist economy protected and promoted freedom by allowing citizens choice with respect to financial decisions. A state directed economy led to totalitarianism since it took away individual choice in matters of money and property.3 Private ownership, said Michael Clurman in The Alternative, gave “people a stake in society” and thus preserved freedom. The free market was better equipped than central planning for dealing with the production and distribution of goods and services. David Lindsay, also in The Alternative, argued that regulating the market would never provide for the stabilization its proponents promised because government programs tended to be counterproductive.4 At the heart of conservative economics was the belief—espoused by Milton Friedman in Capitalism and Freedom (1962) and before that by Friedrich Hayek and Henry Simons— that the government should serve as the umpire not as a player in the financial game.5 How best to achieve this distance pushed conservatives to evaluate questions of inf lation and the deficit. Economists saw two methods for dealing with inf lation—fiscal policy or monetary policy. Milton Friedman described fiscal policy as “the relationship between government spending on the one hand, and government tax receipts on the other.” Fiscal policy dealt with a depressed economy “by increasing government spending relative to government tax receipts—either raising spending or reducing taxes” to stimulate growth. Monetary policy focused on the quantity of the money supply— both the amount of money a person had to spend and the amount of money available for credit at the nation’s banks.6 Conservative economists of the Chicago school, like Friedman, tended to favor monetarism for addressing inf lationary tendencies. Friedman argued that money

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1968. Conservatives doubted they could continue to support Nixon when he abandoned a sound economic policy for showy maneuvers that would likely prove costly in the end. However, as with national security related issues, those on the right could not convince Richard Nixon to sustain a more conservative approach to economic issues.

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managers had the power to maintain a stable economy by avoiding swings in policy, which tended to promote instability. Adopting a program designed to achieve a steady growth rate would help avert inf lation and def lation as well as advance the enterprise, ingenuity, hard work, and thrift necessary for economic growth.7 Friedman also believed the key to success with any economic policy was to follow a steady course and only fine-tune in the most “delicate and sensitive way.” When using a monetary policy, the government—namely the Federal Reserve (the Fed)— needed to avoid tightening or easing the money supply to address political pressure. Monetarism might produce some recessionary tendencies in the short term, but in time it would steady inf lation and provide for a healthy economy.8 Henry Hazlitt, although not trained as an economist, was the leading spokesman for the Austrian school of economics during the Nixon administration. The Austrians tended to be less pragmatic than the Chicagoans; however, they were equally concerned with the inf lation and the deficit. The Federal Reserve’s tightening and easing of the money supply was to Hazlitt merely another form of government intervention.9 Solving the problem of inf lation meant dealing with government spending and the growing deficit. Balancing the budget through spending cuts as opposed to higher taxes was central to a healthy economy as was a return to laissez-faire principles. Inf lation would remain a problem if Americans “continue[d] to operate on the assumptions of the welfare state.” Governments started inf lation, said Hazlitt, because they believed the pursuit of inf lation to would help avoid economic downturns. Unfortunately, as soon as prices rose labor demanded increased wages eating up the potential extra profits. Any effort made to curb inf lation would then result in a stabilization crisis where demand and prices dropped.10 Conservatives had varying opinions on the most effective way to curb inflation, but agreed that an incomes policy—wage and price controls— was not the solution. Although some business leaders at the beginning of the 1970s saw controls as the only way in which curb union power, William F. Buckley argued that government management of wages and prices would solve nothing. Controls often provided short- term reversal, but such reversal could not be sustained. He later commented that what the proponents of controls failed to suggest in their logic was that true regulation resulted from competition. The only way to regulate the economy was to bring back “the Invisible Hand.” Meanwhile James Kilpatrick, using the example of World War II, maintained that the government should resist controls to deal with inf lation. It would be

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“better to bear the bloat of inf lation . . . than to see the concept of a free marketplace abandoned forever.” To William Rusher, controls were simply a means to lull consumers into complacency; economists and politicians knew that they had no effect on slowing inf lation. Conservatives initially felt confident that Nixon would not pursue an incomes policy. As syndicated columnist Victor Riesel said, “There is no more chance that President Nixon will ever seek a wage-price freeze than there is of Hades icing over. That’s certain, absolute and positive.”11 Nixon’s Game Plans Nixon’s economic philosophy changed frequently during his administration. Based on the advice of his ever rotating key advisers, Nixon employed several methods to cope with the budget and inf lation to ensure that economic policy produced a rise in political fortunes. In retrospect, his economic policies failed to control the deficit or inf lation and contributed to rising prices throughout the 1970s. However, as historian Allen Matusow observed, part of Nixon’s problem stemmed from the inability of his economists to forecast how the end of American financial dominance would affect the American economy.12 Conservatives had little patience during the Nixon administration for the shifts in economic policy. Convinced they knew the answers to curbing the deficit and inf lation they frequently spoke out against Nixon’s decision to employ policies contradictory to their economic philosophy. Nixon, however, rarely heeded their suggestions. As president, Nixon managed economic decisions in three ways. First he drew advice from the Cabinet Council of Economic Policy comprised of Paul McCracken, the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) and Arthur Burns, counselor to the president among others. The council lost inf luence in late 1970 because the president grew tired of its collegial bureaucratic approach. Then Nixon developed policy with the help of John Connally (his “economic czar”) who joined the administration as the Secretary of Treasury in 1971. Connally was not an economist, but that was precisely why Nixon wanted him as the front man for economic policy. Concerned about the 1972 election and the role the economy might play, Nixon wanted someone with an eye for politics and an ability to put a positive spin on the economic situation. After Connally left the administration, Nixon relied on the advice of George Schultz, the first director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) who then

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replaced Connally, Herbert Stein, McCracken’s replacement, and Caspar Weinberger, Schultz’s replacement at OMB. Nixon also relied on the advice of Peter G. Peterson on matters relating to international economic policy. Peterson served as a special assistant to the president and later as the Secretary of Commerce.13 Nixon’s approach to the economy broke down into four “game plans” with goals for the budget changing yearly. The first game plan, the one most supported by conservatives, was closest to a traditional laissez-faire approach. During this phase, known as gradualism within the administration, Nixon’s advisers pushed for an economic slowdown through tightening the money supply and slowing the growth of federal expenditures. Paul McCracken maintained this “Friedmanesque” policy would curb inf lation within politically tolerable limits. Nixon’s team also looked to maintain a balanced budget during this phase. Nixon, although skeptical of the political pitfalls of the policy, liked the idea that a monetary policy would not require government intervention to stabilize wages or prices.14 The second game plan, the so-called Keynesian phase, followed Nixon’s January 1971 declaration that he was a disciple of John Maynard Keynes when it came to economic policy. While the administration still followed a somewhat gradualist approach, it also launched a campaign against recession. Nixon’s advisers were concerned that inf lation and unemployment had risen during the previous two years to just over 5.5 percent. With a full-employment budget for FY72—designed to balance only when the nation was at full- employment—the administration could run a deficit that would in theory stimulate the economy. Nixon’s advisers, especially George Schultz, thought the full- employment budget would help deal with the emergence of stagf lation—rising inf lation and unemployment at the same time.15 With the 1972 election drawing closer, Nixon embarked on the third game plan, the “big play” phase. The New Economic Policy (NEP) announced in August 1971 was a multifaceted approach for dealing with the domestic and global economy. The NEP abandoned gradualism and embraced controls on wages and prices. It also closed the gold window ending the dominance of the Bretton Woods system and pursued a policy of f loating exchange rates. Since the United States no longer had enough gold on hand to exchange for the large sums of dollars held by foreign countries, Nixon suspended other countries’ ability to convert dollars to gold. The White House also needed to address a balance of payments problem—the nation spent more on imported goods and foreign aid than

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it received from exported goods and earnings on foreign investments—so the NEP promoted an exports push.16 After his reelection, Nixon’s economic team returned to more conservative-minded methods for dealing with inflation and unemployment. With the last game plan, Nixon planned to be more fiscally conservative. He wanted to balance the budget and cut federal spending; in essence, he sought to bleed the welfare state dry. Nixon’s FY74 budget message to Congress offered no new programs and proposed to eliminate programs for the unemployed, farmers, students, veterans, small businessmen, and the mentally ill. Through such devices as impoundment—the refusal to spend appropriated funds—Nixon hoped to send a message to Congress that his administration was serious in its adherence to conservative economic principles.17 Revenue sharing was an additional piece of Nixon’s approach to the economy and federal spending. He announced the program as a part of his New Federalism plan in August 1969. Revenue sharing transferred federal revenue back to the states giving the local and state governments more control over Great Society programs. The program also allowed Nixon to promote an activist government while at the same time removing the federal government from the operation of social programs. The administration pushed revenue sharing heavily in 1970 to prevent Congress from spending the projected budget surplus for FY71. In 1972, Nixon and his advisers returned to revenue sharing to head off calls for tax reform by voters and to win support among Republican governors in an election year.18 Economic policy during the Nixon administration had to confront the growing unease of Americans about rising prices and unemployment. Richard Nixon, often remembered for careless statements about the economy during the Watergate crisis, did in fact care about economic policy. His concern stemmed from the potential consequences of an unhappy electorate. While Nixon might have been detached from the minutia of policymaking, he recognized the importance of economic growth to his administration’s political fortunes. His advisers attempted to balance between liberal and conservative economic positions to achieve the maximum political benefit.19 William Safire, a member of the Nixon speechwriting team, told the president in 1969 that the administration needed to present the public with an “identifiable economic philosophy” rather than just single out inf lation as the enemy. In other words, the president had to explain to voters what he stood for. Nixon took Safire’s advice to heart and paid particular attention to how the public perceived his economic message and policy throughout his administration.20

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With gradualism, Richard Nixon supported conservative economic principles convincing many on the right that he was heading in the proper direction and living up to his campaign promises. Conservatives thought his appointment of Paul McCracken and David Kennedy (as the Secretary of Treasury) boded well for the prospects of cutting spending and the budget deficit as well as slowing the growth of the money supply. They were also optimistic because Milton Friedman had been a Nixon adviser during the 1968 campaign and thus had ties to the new president. Perhaps more importantly, Nixon also sought Friedman’s advice on economic policy once in office.21 At the same time, conservatives had some reservations. Alan B. Somers noted that it was important to continue to show that the economy could run smoothly and inf lation could be checked using conservative philosophy. Moreover, Henry Hazlitt speculated that the Nixon administration or the Fed would lose its nerve prematurely and would not allow conservative economic solutions to run their course.22 Although Nixon committed himself to Friedmanesque policies, he worried about the effect gradualism would have on unemployment. Therefore, the White House felt the need to sell his economic program. In 1969, William Safire noted that gradualism was not an effective tag line for the administration’s economic philosophy. He suggested using the term “growth economics” to convey the administration’s earnestness in tackling inf lation. Moreover, Safire thought an effective public relations campaign would demonstrate that Nixon’s policy was a “cool, responsible, and rational” approach. The effort also sought to emphasize that Nixon relied on a variety of economists in formulating his philosophy. His economic advisers, including Arthur Burns, Herbert Stein, and David Kennedy concurred with Safire’s findings. The president then asked John Ehrlichman to keep this “excellent idea” from being “submerged in study.”23 Nixon’s attempts had only partial success, at least among conservatives, because unemployment was not their major concern. Henry Hazlitt maintained that in a healthy, functioning economy there would always be normal unemployment. In times of higher unemployment, the government should simply “encourage the free market to function.”24 Deficit spending and inf lation took precedent for conservatives. Already concerned that Nixon might abandon gradualism too hastily, the administration’s actions in 1969 and 1970 raised the right’s fears. To them it seemed as though Nixon was not doing enough to sheperd his economic proposals through

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The Conservatives and Gradualism

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Congress nor was he making any attempt to keep spending down. In April they lamented his decision to extend a 10 percent surtax instituted by the Johnson administration. Since once Congress had more revenue it would increase spending, conservatives worried he would be unable to keep spending at the levels proposed in his revisions to Johnson’s FY69 budget. Nixon’s decision to double the budget of the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities also dismayed conservatives. They considered the foundation to be a “cultural boondoggle.” Many had hoped the president would use his veto power as an economic weapon, but in this instance he refused.25 Henry Hazlitt found Nixon’s economic record during his first year in office to be mixed. He praised the president’s concern for the budget and attempts to achieve a surplus as well as his turn to money and credit restraint. The CEA’s preference for a tight money policy seemed to underscore the actions of the Fed. Moreover, the appointment of Arthur Burns as the next chairman of the Federal Reserve boded well for a continuation of such a monetary policy. However, Hazlitt thought Nixon’s actions fell short because the negatives outweighed the positives especially when it came to government expenditures. While Nixon’s policies were “at least more conservative than the policies of his Democratic opponents in Congress,” the president had not done enough to reduce spending, nor did he seem likely to do so in the future.26 Milton Friedman put a more positive spin on the administration’s policies during its first year in office. He focused his attention on how the Nixon team supported a monetary policy while also noting that such a policy would take time to stabilize prices. He commended the Fed for its tight money policy, but warned against going any further in that direction. Friedman maintained that although the cost of living had increased since the Fed reduced monetary growth that did not mean the policy had failed. In three to six months, the country would feel the first effects of the Fed’s decision to curb the money supply. At the end of the year, Friedman sought to support Nixon’s policy by inserting some perspective with respect to the cries for instant relief to inf lationary trends. Restraint was working. However, inf lation had “a momentum of its own,” so the time required for reducing it depended on how much restraint the Fed used.27 In the spring of 1970, National Review criticized Nixon for his decision to back away from gradualism. Taking into consideration the midterm elections, the president released quarantined construction funds and encouraged an easing of the money supply; moreover, he pressed for welfare reform, antipollution measures, benefits for veterans, and an increase

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in social security benefits. The budget was no longer balanced and any positive effects coming from a monetary policy (likely to be seen in the months leading to the election) would be marred by these more recent measures appealing to peoples’ pocketbooks.28 Milton Friedman also cautioned the administration not to bow to pressure for more drastic action to deal with the recession caused by the Fed’s overly tight monetary policy in late 1969.29 After the disappointing Republican showing in the 1970 elections, conservatives thought the results illustrated that the administration should change tactics with respect to domestic policies. The White House needed to provide “a solid record of achievement for the Republican Party to present to the basically conservative voters” around the country. The ACU thought that meant support for a balanced budget and attempts to lower inf lation. National Review noted that while Nixon would likely receive little credit for his efforts to deal with the “overheated” economy, he had to resist pressure to fiddle with the economy through shortcuts. The president needed to continue pursuing gradualism in spite of any short-term political consequences.30 Milton Friedman tried after the midterm elections to reinforce the Nixon administration’s commitment to gradualism. According to George Schultz, during a visit to the White House he advised “against paying too much attention to short-term developments and short-term moods in Wall Street.” In his opinion, gradualism had contributed to the slow decline in inf lation and a slight expansion of the economy. He recommended “against any move toward a heavily expansive fiscal and monetary policy” because it would lead to more inf lation.31 Friedman also considered loyalty to gradualism a “major achievement” for which Nixon had not “received the credit he deserve[d].” The relative steadiness of the policy had been working. Moreover, he thought Nixon’s decision to remain faithful to restraint showed courage and vision.32 The Full-Employment Budget Woes Richard Nixon’s announcement that John Connally would join the administration as the Secretary of Treasury dashed conservative hopes for a steady course. More worrisome for conservatives was the president’s indication that the administration would pursue a full- employment budget for FY72 because the government slowly was moving away from its role of umpire. When Nixon proclaimed himself a Keynesian in January 1971, conservatives worried less about the term than the implications it would have on future budget proposals. As William F. Buckley argued,

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Nixon used the term Keynesian in its most popular sense in which the government supported programs designed to increase employment. In the current ideological debate—whether to emphasize fiscal policies or to deal with the money supply—both sides could by definition call themselves Keynesian. The term simply implied government intervention, via fiscal or monetary policy, was important for a healthy economy.33 The pursuit of full- employment budget turned Nixon’s previous economic policy of a balanced budget on its head. Nixon’s FY72 budget projected $229.2 billion in expenses and $217.6 billion in receipts. Although the president maintained that his budget would help control federal spending and achieve economic stability, conservatives could not accept that spending would exceed revenue by about $11.6 billion. Such an expansionary budget would result in a deficit and inf lation.34 Henry Hazlitt considered the FY72 budget problematic because supporting a deficit through government borrowing did not add anything to monetary purchasing power. A full- employment budget worked only when price increases were ahead of wage increases, but experience since World War II showed that wages tended to outpace prices. In Hazlitt’s opinion, Nixon’s attempt was “at best a gamble” and would likely lead to an “economic crack-up.”35 The president’s reasoning for turning to deficit spending rested, said Human Events, on the dubious assumption “that unemployment [was] an unusually serious problem in the United States.” Unemployment had risen to an average of 4.9 percent for 1970, but conservative economists saw “no reason for Nixon to push the Keynesian panic button.”36 Frank Meyer, reacting to statements Nixon made in January 1971, observed a growing “disquiet” about Nixon’s policies among responsible conservatives because he over spent on welfare issues at the expense of defense issues. No conservative liked running a deficit, but they would rather rely on deficit financing than be in a disadvantageous military position. Unfortunately, Nixon presented “deficit financing . . . not as a last alternative for defense, but as a good in itself.”37 The 1971 State of the Union address and the annual budget message confirmed Nixon’s intention to pursue a full-employment budget. He stated that such a budget was “a tool to promote orderly economic expansion” and also maintained that “by operating as if we were at full employment, we will help to bring about that full employment.”38 While Human Events thought the State of the Union address had some merit, the editors disliked the budget proposal. Nixon could only combat the inf lationary spiral if he cut back on his own expansionary budget; his efforts promoting moderate monetary restraint were not enough. The ACU also saw some positive aspects of Nixon’s message, but said the budget proposal

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was “a blow to all who hoped the administration would stick to sound Republican budgetary principles.”39 Henry Hazlitt called Nixon’s budget “completely irresponsible” in its plans for a deficit in FY72. While the president argued the budget was expansionary not inf lationary, there seemed no reason to suspect he was correct. The proposed method of financing would cause inf lation, but inf lation would not lead to expansion in production or employment. James Kilpatrick saw Nixon adrift without a compass precisely at a time when he needed to be reassuring conservative voters that he was moving in the right direction. They wanted some action showing that Nixon still believed in sound conservative values. With the increased use of deficit spending however, the president seemed to have “jettisoned his charts and compass of 1968.” Maybe Nixon’s course would lead to a stable economy, but Kilpatrick had doubts. William Rusher also noted in early 1972 that Nixon’s approach to budget deficits made it harder for conservatives to rally against federal spending.40 Perhaps the only conservative to support a full-employment budget in theory was Milton Friedman. He believed that the case for a balanced full-employment budget was good, but Nixon had not lived up to it. Essentially, the country should budget as though it were always at full employment. According to Friedman, “We ought to set our tax rates and keep them stable, and we ought to set our expenditures programs and keep them stable, so that they average out over a period of time.” Deficits should only be used in years when tax income was low. The main problem was the size of government not deficits per se. Spending increased because government programs continued to expand; hence, stopping the growth of unnecessary programs remained more important. Since Nixon had abandoned the balance rule allowing for a deficit at full employment, economic recovery would fall short of predictions.41 The New Economic Policy Blues In late June 1971, John Connally stated that the president was not considering wage and price controls nor was he seeking tax relief; moreover, the president had faith in the administration’s current policy. However, members of the administration had seriously been debating controls well before Connally’s press conference. Administration economists had predicted a faster pace for economic recovery than was actually occurring. Paul McCracken forecasted in 1969 that if the Fed pursued moderate monetary restraint and the government operated without a deficit, by mid-1970 the rate of inf lation would hover around 3 percent and unemployment would

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be in the 4 percent range. However, by January 1971, inf lation was over 5 percent and unemployment had risen to 6.6 percent. Arthur Burns, in hopes of pushing a faster recovery, led the charge for an incomes policy. Nixon, while not convinced of their effectiveness, thought controls might be the only way to politically make the economy work for his reelection. And so he adopted a policy that moved the administration decidedly from the position of umpire to the position of player in the financial game. Richard Nixon stayed with gradualism for as long as he did because George Schultz, a Friedman disciple, was his central inf luence on matters of the economy during this phase. Schultz never wavered in his faith that gradualism would eventually net a positive gain for the economy and the administration. However, the CEA thought that gradualism produced too much unemployment. Paul McCracken and Herbert Stein advocated an adjustment to deal with inf lation and unemployment. Although the OMB director and his mentor were probably right, the public’s patience with gradualism had worn out by mid-1971 and consequently so had Nixon’s. Near the end of July, Nixon and Connally began to prepare for a change in the administration’s policy toward the domestic and international economy. Domestic changes centered on adopting an incomes policy, while international changes centered on the gold standard, exchange rates, and the balance of trade.42 Nixon announced the New Economic Policy in August 1971 after a weekend of secret meetings with his advisers at Camp David. There they discussed the international monetary situation as well as domestic problems. Although Schultz recommended staying with gradualism because it was slowly working, Nixon had already made up his mind to pursue a new policy before the meetings. Connally pushed the president to action to prevent other countries or the American people from boxing the government into a situation it could not control. Like the China announcement that had come only shortly before, the changes to economic policy surprised everyone fitting perfectly into Nixon’s big play approach to economic planning. The NEP speech was intended to convey Nixon’s leadership both at home and abroad. By making the economic situation a crisis, the president hoped to show the courage and conviction that went into the decision. After outlining the program, Nixon ended with an appeal once again to the silent majority to remain confident in their country for that was fundamental to the success of the nation.43 The NEP consisted of five key points dealing with the domestic and international economic situation: (1) a ninety- day wage and price freeze; (2) tax cuts totaling $6.3 billion; (3) a 10 percent import tax; (4) government spending cuts totaling $4.7 billion by deferring revenue sharing and welfare

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reforms currently on the table; and, (5) adopting the dollar standard in place of the gold standard at least temporarily.44 The decision to employ wage and price controls and to close the gold window created the most waves in the wake of NEP’s announcement. Controls proved initially popular with much of the electorate, but support faded overtime. Meanwhile the decision to abandon the Bretton Woods system caused chaos for American allies who had placed their faith in the dollar. The administration gave little thought to what would happen after the announcement of NEP, both in terms of controls and in terms of setting new international exchange rates. The ninety- day freeze led to four phases of controls. In Phase I, the newly created Cost of Living Council instituted a freeze on all goods except raw materials and imports. Phase II broke controls into a wage component and a price component to appease organized labor as the 1972 election year approached. Beginning in January 1973, Phase III continued wage and price regulation but abandoned the bureaucracy—price raises could be justified to the Cost of Living Council after the fact. Six months later, Phase IV began with another ninety- day freeze; price controls for the oil industry followed. After abandoning the gold standard where the United States would willingly exchange gold for dollars at $35 per ounce, Nixon hoped to set a new fixed exchange rate forcing other countries to revalue their currencies rather than raising the price of gold. The United States devalued the dollar again in March of 1973 and by then there was little hope for the reinstatement of the Bretton Woods system. In the end, the United States agreed to raise the price of gold and continue f loating exchange rates.45 Initial conservative reaction to the institution of the NEP appeared somewhat subdued. However, when the reality of controls set in, conservatives became more biting in their criticism toward the policy. James Kilpatrick took a pragmatic view with respect to the establishment of controls. While lamenting the loss of the free-enterprise system, Kilpatrick did not blame Nixon. Given the levels of unemployment, inf lation, balance of payments, and competition from abroad, the president “had to act decisively” and “to his credit, he did.” Human Events reported that the NEP received praise from some conservatives heartened by the promise of tax cuts and foreign aid cuts. However, controls dismayed most conservatives and should they become permanent, Nixon’s action would “not be looked upon as a genuine move toward reform, but [as] a dramatic move toward a state-controlled economy.” According to Henry Hazlitt, controls would only “divert attention” from the only acceptable solution—returning to a balanced budget and reducing the paper money supply.46

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Milton Friedman panned controls at the end of August. The administration tried to head off Friedman’s criticism, but they could not stop his negative reaction. He found the proposed reduction in taxes and spending commendable, but regretted the freeze for it would only end in disappointment. Price changes—both up and down—ref lected “changes in conditions of supply and demand affecting particular goods and services.” The economy would become “rudderless” if the government prevented such changes. The freeze would merely distort relative prices. Once the freeze ended, a spurt in prices would occur. Friedman also argued that given the delay in effect of fiscal and monetary policy, any positive gains in the coming months would result from Nixon’s old gradualist game plan. However, most novice observers would attribute positive gains to the president’s new policy since the news media had been emphasizing its likely immediate and dramatic results. Friedman concluded that by suggesting the American economy was in trouble, the president created an international monetary crisis and nothing more. Finally, he thought that the most likely result of Nixon’s new game plan was that the NEP would bring large deficits. Congress had taken the position that controls would handle inf lation and thus they could spend with abandon.47 Conservatives also recognized that in large part the turn to controls was politically motivated. The ACU believed that the president abandoned gradualism because of public pressure. Given the partisan calls for something to be done, the announcement was a “typical Nixon stroke” providing a little something for everyone by combining the proposals of his critics into one proposal. While Nixon said he would never institute controls, he had little choice once he pronounced himself a Keynesian—a codeword for pursuing inf lationary policies. The ACU wanted to see the administration cut spending and move to a less controlled economy. While these steps would cause temporary problems, both policies were more desirable than the president’s most recent move.48 William F. Buckley commented that Nixon’s patience gave way with respect to gradualism because he needed to “appear to be acting decisively.” In addition, National Review noted the administration shelved the policy for an image making initiative. Nixon took a big political risk. According to the editors, “The president will learn that . . . bold moves made from a position of weakness tend to disintegrate under the skepticism of would-be allies . . . he will probably find that his ‘freeze’ will result . . . in a severe case of frostbite.”49 National Review later rechristened the NEP as the “New Election Policy.” The only thing, said the editors, that had changed since Nixon announced his confidence in the country’s economic course in June was

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a psychological downturn. Perhaps worse, the rhetoric of NEP would mislead the American people. Nixon used diversionary tactics to justify the need for sacrifice. The government obscured the fact that it caused the problems through its overexpansion and general wastefulness. Finally, the editors noted the similarities between Nixon’s NEP with that of the first NEP proposed by V. I. Lenin in 1921. The origins of Nixon’s NEP, like Lenin’s, stemmed from “the foibles of government.”50 Phase II proved equally galling to conservatives because, as National Review noted, it “resulted in general confusion.” The Nixon administration made the voluntary sanctions purposely baff ling to fit with its belief that “as long as you don’t know exactly what is happening to you, you won’t object.” Right-minded thinkers also worried about the problem of politicizing the economy. Nixon’s attempts to cater to George Meany, president of the AFL- CIO, by allowing labor to control the structure of the new Pay Board would only prove problematic. Labor had a tendency to demand wage increases out of step with the broader needs of the economy, which meant the problem of inf lation would never be solved.51 Frank Meyer took particular issue with the way in which Nixon presented Phase II because he gave the impression that “the motivations and principled reasons for the program were to buttress the foundations of the free-enterprise system.” In reality, such a program only led to excessive governmental control at home and an obstacle to overseas trade.52 A month into the second round of controls National Review called the program “a colossal f lop.” Nixon’s “monster” would only become uglier with time. The inf lation, resulting from the NEP, would cause a hefty federal deficit. The Nixon administration might have painted a rosy picture about controls, but the fact remained that they did not help. The president’s attack on free enterprise likely would push away many 1968 supporters, proving potentially “fatal” to his reelection chances.53 Milton Friedman and Percy L. Greaves (a former economics professor at the University of Plano) responded to Phase II by noting that controls went against the country’s founding principles.54 Friedman maintained that “by substituting the rule of men for the rule of law and voluntary cooperation in the marketplace, the controls threaten the very foundations of a free society.” He was concerned not only that the controls would fail, but also with how quickly the nation embraced a policy fundamentally at odds with its founding principles. Greaves, looking back at the use of controls during the American Revolution, commented that price controls allowed the government power over allocating the necessities of life. “Consumers are entirely at their mercy,” said Greaves. Controls, therefore, amounted to “economic slavery.”55

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Phase III, announced in January 1973, represented Nixon’s attempt to ease away from controls. The rate of inf lation had fallen to 3.27 percent in 1972 and so the White House felt safe in moving away from a regulated economy. This phase removed controls from most sectors of the economy and thus conservatives took some consolation in the move. However the threat of reinstatement remained creating “a paralyzing uncertainty,” according to National Review. Nevertheless the editors concluded that “Phase III is a pleasant surprise and a welcome step back . . . toward a free economy.” Milton Friedman also praised Nixon’s decision to end most mandatory wage and price controls because evidence thus far demonstrated that controls had no real effect on inf lation.56 Yet, the fear of reintroduction of controls continued to plague conservatives as 1973 wore on. NR commented that in spite of Nixon’s confidence in voluntary restraints, the Consumer Price Index rose after the initiation of Phase III because unprecedented deficits increased the money supply. Conservatives believed the Fed needed to take action to slow the growth of money. More importantly, Nixon had to resist more controls as a means of providing “an instant and painless cure-all.” He needed to maintain the government’s present course of “less, not more, government control.”57 Conservatives, although disappointed, were not surprised when the Nixon administration announced a second freeze in June 1973. James Kilpatrick once again noted, given that voluntary controls proved such a dismal failure, Nixon needed to institute a temporary price freeze. Nixon had little choice in light of the mounting price increases triple that of their growth during Phase II—inf lation rose to over 6 percent by midyear and continued to rise. If it was the right decision, however, it was a “right wrongness” for it took another step away from a free economy.58 Henry Hazlitt on the other hand had no kind words for Nixon upon the announcement of Freeze II—calling it “his greatest economic blunder to date, and perhaps the greatest by any president in the last 40 years.” Nixon’s universal price freeze would lead to shortages and a black market for needed goods. To Hazlitt, however, the worse part about the freeze was “the utter contempt” it showed for the principle of economic freedom.59 Following the second price freeze, Nixon announced Phase IV of controls. National Review noted before the administration outlined this phase that the president appeared addicted to controls because he kept returning to them as a “means of escaping reality.” According to Henry Hazlitt, Phase IV was a “mitigated” disaster—mitigated in that there was some incentive to increase production/supply. Nixon also hoped to keep “fiscal and monetary policies under restraint,” which would come from cutting

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expenditures rather than increasing taxes. But beyond these bright spots, Phase IV offered little consolation. The controls were full of “mindboggling complications” mandated not “by economic necessity, but by political expediency.” This phase of controls, said Hazlitt, “will fail, as did all its predecessors. It will fail because all price fixing is bad. It has never stopped inf lation.” Although Hazlitt seemed to think that Nixon’s recent statement suggested that he understood that controls did not work, he still chose to bring them back.60 The main target of Phase IV was the price of petroleum and conservatives lambasted the idea that regulating it could prevent a rise in prices for heating oil or gasoline. Rather than allowing prices to rise on the free market until demand for oil lessened and the market cleared, Nixon and his advisers chose to resist higher prices as part of their fight against inf lation. Phase IV put controls and regulations on all parts of the oil industry— producers, refiners, and filling stations. The Arab oil embargo resulting from tensions in the Middle East in October 1973 only made the situation worse as higher oil prices pushed inf lation up to unprecedented peace time levels of over 6 percent. Henry Hazlitt maintained that Nixon’s recent measures to deal with the oil crisis would create “maximum disruption” with “minimum relief ” for American consumers. Controls on petroleum products “encouraged wasteful consumption and discouraged both immediate production and the expansion of capacity.” The only means to end the crisis was to end the controls, which would ensure the conservation of fuel oil and gasoline.61 In addition to questioning the institution of the freeze and controls in August 1971, conservatives evaluated Nixon’s turn away from dollar convertibility. Conservatives were not upset that Nixon abandoned the fixed exchange rates of the Bretton Woods system, but rather they expressed concern with how he did it and what should be done to replace it. William F. Buckley maintained in 1968 that conservatives should support f loating the dollar and Henry Hazlitt argued before the president announced the NEP that Bretton Woods was not a system of natural growth, but “an arbitrary scheme devised by a handful of monetary bureaucrats who did not even agree with each other.” It only “appeared to ‘stabilize’ all currencies by tying them up at fixed rates to each other.” However, Nixon’s economic program (especially deficit spending) rocked the dollar’s stability. To fix the situation, according to conservatives, nations needed to adopt their own currency policy in the context of the free market.62 The right believed that the way in which Nixon abruptly changed the nation’s adherence to the Bretton Woods system damaged American global credibility. After Nixon publicized the NEP, National Review

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declared that rejecting the gold standard threw “the international money markets into turmoil.” Addressing the ensuing chaos, especially the crash of the European stock markets and the closing of the currency markets, became difficult in light of the fact that no one had given much thought to what would happen once the administration closed the gold window.63 Frank Meyer maintained that the NEP undermined the stability of American allies because it had a negative effect on the economies of Western Europe, Great Britain, and Japan. Meyer foresaw a trade war in the nation’s future. The Nixon administration abandoned world leadership by exporting the country’s economic problems rather than taking the necessary steps at home to curb inf lation/unemployment. Moreover, although the Bretton Woods system was not perfect, it created a climate of expanding international trade, which Nixon shattered rather than attempting to reform.64 Henry Hazlitt argued that the United States should support f loating exchange rates to keep inf lation in check. Nixon’s suspension of gold convertibility merely recognized the existing absence of convertibility. Hazlitt also preferred to see a return to the gold standard, in the nineteenth-century sense where gold was the only acceptable international currency and it was traded freely. This approach would be more stable than “pegged rates supported by secret government buying and selling operations.” Given the state of U.S. gold reserves, Hazlitt thought Nixon should indicate that the government would not buy or sell gold. The government should also let private citizens own gold to create a free gold market in the country. Gold would not necessarily need to be monetized by any government for it to have a monetary value (i.e., to become an international currency).65 Milton Friedman also supported f loating exchange rates, but he had a different take on the gold standard than had Henry Hazlitt. Friedman did not want the government to set a new official price of gold as part of an international agreement to establish new fixed exchange rates. He wanted to “keep the dollar free—from gold and from other currencies.” As a speculative commodity, it should not have a monetary role. According to Friedman, some economists were of the opinion that so long as the United States refused to buy or sell gold the official price did not matter so there was no harm in raising the price of gold to appease American allies. However, setting a new fixed exchange rate would only create renewed “monetary instability, balance of payments crises, and exchange controls.” The United States needed to avoid committing itself to converting dollars into gold at a fixed price. Other countries then had the option to let the free market set exchange rates or peg their currency to the f loating

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dollar. Flexible rates allowed for gradual change providing for a more stable environment.66

Nixon’s post-reelection return to more conservative fiscal principles pleased those on the right, but his continued reliance on controls called into question his real intentions. Conservative intellectuals long recognized that Nixon tied his preference for specific economic measures to his political aspirations. For example in January of 1970, the ACU said Nixon’s policies might have been good politics, but they were “no way to run the economy of the United States.”67 The question was to what extent was Nixon really a Keynesian. Was he truly a devotee of deficit spending or had his statement been a political ploy? Conservatives speculated it was the latter and thought after winning his last election Nixon would return to his past preference for fiscal and monetary restraint. However, Watergate interceded and conservatives once again began to question Nixon’s motives. In his second inaugural address, Nixon indicated his desire to cut Great Society programs that had outlived their usefulness and pledged to keep government spending down. Moreover, the president signaled with his budget proposal that if Congress wanted to expand programs then it would have to propose a tax increase. While unsure Nixon’s program would work, National Review commented that it looked “like a wellconceived and tough minded strategy for clearing away the detritus accumulated during a generation of domestic illusion.”68 Wayne Valis, a staff member at the American Enterprise Institute, observed in an editorial for The Alternative that the proposed FY74 budget still contained a deficit, but it was less than those in previous years. Furthermore, the attempts to reduce or eliminate major social welfare programs heartened supporters of fiscal restraint. Nixon promised to begin the process of ending the government’s control over the taxpayer’s pocketbooks. His budget responded to the impending taxpayer revolt against higher taxes and demonstrated the president’s “attempt to keep faith with his constituency.”69 Nixon’s FY74 budget received some praise from Milton Friedman for its commitment to cutting wasteful “sacred cow” programs. However, the budget did not go far enough. It was a long way from ‘tight’ or ‘austere’ as the president suggested. Moreover, once Congress and the administration entered discussions on the budget, spending would increase.70 With Watergate taking center stage in the spring of 1973, National Review questioned how it would affect Nixon’s economic policy. Nixon

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had a history of moving in a more liberal direction during crises to appease his critics. Would he now forsake his renewed commitment to conservative economic policies? The editors argued that Nixon needed to regain the initiative he had before the crisis against his liberal opponents in Congress. The American people still wanted the elimination or redesign of ineffective programs, the budget under control, and a disciplined bureaucracy. Therefore Nixon should pursue such issues to prevent the Democrats from using Watergate as a means stop the White House from achieving its goals.71 Nixon’s 1974 State of the Union address and FY75 budget further disappointed the right. Human Events wondered why so many Republicans cheered the State of the Union. In the address the president indicated that the country would “embark upon sweeping new and untried spending programs, thus escalating the budget ever upwards.” Conservatives could not live with such wanton disregard for fiscal restraint; Nixon’s proposals would send the deficit soaring and lead to increased taxes. Moreover, the FY75 proposed budget reversed the previous years’ attempts to cut federal spending. In FY74, spending cuts helped keep the deficit under $4 billion; for FY75, the Nixon administration predicted a deficit of $9 billion.72 Nixon had abandoned all caution and projected spending that would lead to a dire economic future. Henry Hazlitt called the budget completely irresponsible. James Kilpatrick, after reviewing the FY75 budget, argued that the nation’s priorities were out of order. While the budget proposal made a “persuasive argument in support of defense spending,” the expenditures for national security were the smallest percentage since 1950. The budget favored agriculture, housing, community development, environmental policy, and welfare programs. For example, the food stamp program—long a conservative target—would receive more money in 1975 than it did in 1972. Kilpatrick called upon the country to set aside their obsession with Watergate long enough to challenge such a deficit inducing budget.73 The Pitfalls of Revenue Sharing Conservatives expressed mixed emotions about Nixon’s revenue sharing program. On the one hand, it transferred power to the states removing federal government inf luence on a host of programs. On the other hand, it offered no actual cuts in spending on the social programs they disliked. Nixon used revenue sharing as a part of his effort to portray himself as an innovator and as a reformer. He sold the program as a means to redress the expansion of the federal government, especially after the institution

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of the Great Society. The president indicated revenue sharing would serve as a cure for growing poverty levels through a “determination to test new engines of social progress” and by enlisting “the full potential of the levels of government closer to the people.” Moreover, the program would remedy the inequitable distribution of federal tax revenues to the states.74 Revenue sharing had broad appeal, and yet conservative intellectuals frequently pointed out its f lawed logic and warned it would never meet its objectives. James Kilpatrick initially looked favorably upon the plan. It seemed to him a major step in revising the welfare system in America and a means to revise the tax system to use revenue more effectively. Revenue sharing and federal reorganization were “based in wise tradition and old fashioned frugality.” However, Human Events sounded early concern that revenue sharing might not actually reduce the f low of power to Washington, even though it might represent a tax reduction for the states.75 Other conservatives thought Nixon was on the right track by first tackling the administration of federal government programs rather than the content. They also realized that Nixon could then appeal to both left and right, which was not objectionable so long as the program actually reduced the size and role of the federal government. National Review said revenue sharing was simply a means for the Nixon administration to defy the liberal-conservative dichotomy and expand support among moderate voters for 1972. Both sides could find something to like in the proposal. Conservatives (especially those in Congress) ultimately needed to avoid pressure from their liberal counterparts to keep existing programs while enacting the new program.76 As the contours of the revenue sharing proposal became clearer, the right became increasingly despondent over its content because it could not see how the program reduced government spending. When Nixon presented the plan’s details in the 1971 State of the Union, William F. Buckley questioned how any power could be returned to the states when coupled with a full- employment budget. Under the program, the government would tax individuals at a higher rate to support the same programs. Nixon’s expressed desire to return power to the people was “balm for the conservative soul” because they had long spoken about it. However, conservatives used the word individual. Nixon’s choice of people made his call ambiguous because Nixon could be trying “to co- opt the rhetoric of the hard left.” 77 National Review thought the program seemed likely to “become just one more huge welfarist expenditure.” William Rusher expressed concern that revenue sharing was not as it appeared and thus called on the

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National Review editors “to move with caution” in their assessment. He believed the program “if adopted, would make immense and only partially discernable changes in the funding of the government expenditures in this country.” However, Nixon’s claims about the positive effects of revenue sharing made conservatives and liberals unsure of where to stand on the issue. While “conservatives ought to approve of anything that turns control (and the expenditure of money certainly equals control) back to the states and the localities,” revenue sharing had two disturbing aspects in Rusher’s view. First, state and local governments were “more corrupt and corruptible than the federal government.” Second, legislators would be more likely to spend money when they did not have to defend their decisions to the taxpayers.78 Human Events felt that revenue sharing, as outlined in Nixon’s 1971 State of the Union address, allowed Congress to expand the federal bureaucracy in the program’s name. There was “no guarantee that the . . . legislation to implement the program [would] coincide with what conservatives favor.” Nixon seemed to be moving toward “the complete federalization of welfare and a multi- stringed revenue sharing package.” Such a shift would invert the intention of the revenue sharing plan, because it would not result in the streamlining of government. Conservatives needed to decide what they wanted the program to mean and present some demands to the White House, one of which should be that revenue sharing reduce federal personnel.79 Frank Meyer noted that revenue sharing seemed at first glance to be an attractive program, but it raised serious issues. The program would add an additional burden on taxpayers because a third of the funds were not a substitution “for existing programs but would be new money.” The White House no longer intended to freeze funds for objectionable programs and thus revenue sharing would not cut the budget. Russell Kirk worried that revenue sharing would not “reinvigorate the truly federal character of the American political system.” He feared the states could not learn how to use the federal government money prudently, which would lead to the “heavy centralization of political authority.” M. Stanton Evans commented that revenue sharing did not live up to conservative principles as some believed. It institutionalized “the idea that one set of officials should spend the dollars raised by another,” which provided endless opportunities for abuse.80 Conservatives assessment had some merit. Revenue sharing once it was passed by Congress in October 1972 did not reduce the size of the federal government’s spending and tax payers never received a refund. As

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historian Melvin Small noted, “By the time the program ended in 1986, the federal government had distributed $83 billion directly to the states and to local governments. The money went primarily for urban and rural social services programs, education, worker training, and transportation.” Nixon, at the start of his second term, realized that budget cutting was an important part of improving the American economy. But Watergate diverted his attention away from Roy Ash’s calls to revise the revenue sharing program. Ash, who served as Nixon’s last director of the OMB, wanted to see the program move in a more conservative direction.81 *

* *

Conservatives in the end could not reconcile themselves to Nixon’s economic policies no matter how hard they tried. While they approved of gradualism, once the administration abandoned it there was little positive to say about how Nixon dealt with economic problems. Although Milton Friedman had the attention of the president, when Nixon turned to an incomes policy Friedman became less inf luential within government circles. Thus with respect to the economic matters, conservatives had no voice in the administration to effect change. After Nixon’s resignation, conservatives found themselves at a loss to explain his repeated tendency to lambaste expansionary fiscal policies one day and then implement them the next especially when those policies helped push the rate of inf lation to over 11 percent in July 1974. M. Stanton Evans argued that Nixon never used the weapons at his disposal to fight for economic conservatism; he relied on liberal advisers who in turn promoted liberal economic programs.82 Human Events maintained that Nixon “trampled” on conservative principles while in office. The editors complained, “This Republican President, claiming his conversion to Keynesian economics and exploiting such fiscal gimmicks as the full employment budget, racked up the biggest peace time deficits in history.” Nixon continually dreamt up new ways to spend money, when the government needed to control spending.83 William F. Buckley argued that Nixon confounded the usual categories of political discourse when it came to economic matters. Conservatives traditionally supported a balanced budget and the free market; however, Nixon went against both of those positions with his major policies. His actions, especially the NEP, made it more difficult for conservatives to tackle big government, budget deficits, or federal regulation of the economy. Conservatives were further blindsided in trying to defend Nixon

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during the Watergate crisis. According to Buckley, they needed to recognize the damage he had done to their movement in order to prosper in the future. In short, economic policy was another area in which Richard Nixon failed to live up to conservative expectations. Conservatives wondered at the end of his presidency how they could convince the new president of “the relevance of the conservative vision.”84

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uring the 1968 election, Richard Nixon implied to voters that his domestic policies would be different from that of his liberal predecessors. Although his campaign focused most directly on law and order, he also promised voters the personal freedom to live and work as they chose. Nixon’s remarks implied he planned to punish criminals, restore order, and protect security. For the conservative movement, however, Nixon’s campaign statements offered something more. In the conservative mind there existed a link between the issues of crime, race, and welfare; all three stemmed from the inability of liberalism to meet the needs of society. Conservatives believed it was of the utmost importance to remove the threat of revolution before addressing the social issues. They wanted a tough stand on the law and order question as well as some attempt to address the cause of the country’s problems. Those on the right thought that, under Nixon, liberalism would finally be exposed for what it was—a step toward collectivism. Nixon’s right-leaning supporters expected his biggest conservative move to come in the realm of domestic social policy. They anticipated changes in the welfare state that would require recipients to take some control over their own lives. They sought an approach to desegregation in the schools that would lessen the role of the federal government as well as end busing to achieve racial balance. Nixon’s inauguration filled conservatives with hope because they believed he shared their passion to fight liberalism. They had high, yet realistic, expectations. Conservatives assumed the fight against liberalism would be difficult. At the same time,

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they saw Nixon as enough of a conservative to lead the nation away from the liberal follies of the postwar years.1 Richard Nixon, however, confounded the conservatives with his approach to welfare reform and to civil rights. With the exception of his nominations to the Supreme Court, conservatives pined for responses to domestic issues that matched their philosophy. In the end, very little they said or did in response to Nixon’s policies carried much weight in the White House. The Dangers of Liberalism Liberalism had long been a target of conservative intellectual criticism because of its negative effect on the “organic order” of American society. Conservatives lamented the secular nature of American culture caused by those on the left. They did not share with liberals the belief that it was the central government’s responsibility to solve all of society’s problems. Russell Kirk noted centralization did not always bring something better. Frank Meyer concluded liberalism (over time) led to materialism that in turn gave way to totalitarianism. In their opinion, the government usually created new crises when it tried to deal with social issues rather than fixing existing problems.2 Initially postwar conservatives had a difficult time convincing people of the dangers of liberalism. However, by the late 1960s, their critique of the nation’s liberal domestic agenda began to seem less abstract. Increasingly, right-leaning intellectuals such as Milton Friedman, Martin Anderson (a finance professor at Columbia University), and Ernest van den Haag (a social scientist at New York University) showed quantitatively how ineffective the welfare state had become. Favorite targets included urban renewal, public housing, rent control, and social security. Such muckraking had convinced many voters by 1968 that social problems resulted from liberal solutions.3 George Will argued that conservatives preferred that the government not interfere in ways that inhibited man’s ability to make choices. The conservative program—where the government ordered and disciplined competition in a neutral manner—could be pursued only if elected individuals insisted “that the government mind its own business” and recognized “that the government’s proper business is preserving for the citizens the freedom to mind their own business.”4 While conservatives attacked specific New Deal and Great Society programs, ultimately they wanted a president who would support minimum government intervention and maximum personal responsibility. Conservatives, however, did not always agree on the level at which the government should abandon the welfare state. James Burnham could

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accept some aspects of the welfare state, such as Medicare, because they were the result of heavily populated, industrialized societies. At the same time, he also advocated privatization of such programs. Frank Meyer and William Rickenbacker thought Burnham’s practical approach was misguided. It would only open the door for greater government infringement of the people’s rights and freedom. Will Herberg (a professor of philosophy and culture at Drew University) and L. Brent Bozell (the founder of the conservative Catholic magazine Triumph) went further arguing that many welfare programs at heart were unconstitutional. Perhaps worse, in Bozell’s opinion, no one seemed particularly concerned about the direction of public policy under the liberals.5 Conservative intellectuals tied welfare reform to the issue of race relations and the increasing violence associated with the civil rights movement during the 1960s. As historian Nancy MacLean pointed out, the civil rights and conservative movements engaged in a parallel development in the 1950s. As blacks increased their calls for political and economic equality, conservatives strove to make their mark on American society. In the 1950s, National Review relied on southerners like James Kilpatrick, then the editor of the Richmond News-Leader, to bring southern conservatives into their movement. NR’s coverage of debates on integration in the late 1950s and early 1960s tried to balance the conservative position on states’ rights with the conservative position on civil order. Buckley, Meyer, and the other editors remained skeptical of black activists and southern segregationists. Conservatives ultimately attacked the goals (mandated integration) and the tactics (civil disobedience) of the civil rights movement. Many intellectuals recognized the injustices blacks had suffered, but could not accept the proposed remedies.6 Conservatives supported integration, but as Frank Meyer noted in 1963, “black grievances could not be remedied ‘by destroying the foundations of a free constitutional society.’ ” Government coercion to desegregate was no better than government mandated segregation. A National Review editorial from 1964 (likely written by James Burnham) argued that as the civil rights movement became more militant it transformed into a social revolution. Its methods tended to the extra-legal tactics that disturbed civil order. Worse, the revolution “had no realizable goal” for the mass demonstrations would not bring “knowledge, skills, culture, [or] happiness.” Conservatives, as William F. Buckley quipped, thought Brown v. Board of Education (1954) was “bad law and bad sociology.” Integration was noble in principle, but the courts failed to provide a practical guideline for integration.7 The right also thought rapid desegregation including the moving away from neighborhood schools would have dire

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consequences for society. National Review noted the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) found that few integrated schools were free from violence; therefore, they were not an “atmosphere conducive to learning.” School integration failed because as the black students moved in, the white families left. The white middle class tax base went to the suburbs leaving no money for improvements in urban centers.8 James Kilpatrick became a leading proponent of the conservative segregationist cause in the 1950s and 1960s. The racism so common among southern defenders of Jim Crow tinged his early writings on integration and equality. For example, in 1963, Kilpatrick argued against the adoption of a civil rights bill. He condemned prejudice per se, but held that the Constitution protected an individual’s right to discriminate. Later as his national exposure increased, Kilpatrick tempered his treatment of segregation. He tended to focus on the legalities of Supreme Court intervention and the failure of integration. According to Kilpatrick, Brown made the nation a better place, but the law itself left open the possibility that race would still be the determining factor in matters of integration. Brown was about removing race from the determination of where a child could attend school. To prevent segregated schools, however, districts relied on various schemes to impose racial balance, which subverted the original intention of the Warren Court.9 Conservatives also drew upon their belief in individual self-reliance to call on blacks to take responsibility for their own improvement. Some conservatives in the 1950s and 1960s maintained that blacks either lacked the ability or chose not to compete in the free market to improve their economic position. Nevertheless, no one—black or white—should rely on the government to provide a remedy regardless of their ability or inclination to work.10 Jeffrey Hart called on blacks not to shy away from self-consciousness, but to put their awareness to good use by relying on themselves and their communities for further development. Will Herberg argued that self-help was the only means to promote self-esteem and thus self-advancement. Blacks, according to Frank Meyer, stood to benefit from civil order because it would ensure “good will” to people striving to improve themselves by opening up new opportunities for respect and employment.11 Conservatives at the start of the Nixon administration hoped for three things in terms of social policy. First, they saw a need for a return to the voluntary community. They wanted Nixon to end liberalism’s turn toward involuntary collectivism. Second, since conservatives believed the central government had a limited role—preserving freedom, administering justice, maintaining order, and sustaining a minimum moral

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consensus—they wanted to see the return of some power to state and local governments. Third, conservatives thought it was time to stop “the rhetoric of endless promises.” People needed to take responsibility for their own lives. Conservative intellectuals did not see themselves as indifferent to the poor; they thought voluntary action was part of the solution. Specifically conservatives wanted to see working become more advantageous than not working through a revision in the federal welfare program and a redirection of the conception of poverty and work.12 The Guiding Principles of Nixon’s Domestic Policy Although Richard Nixon indicated that a “competent cabinet” could run the country at home, he did in fact focus on domestic issues that piqued his interest including welfare and busing. During his first two years in office Nixon relied most heavily on the advice of Daniel Patrick (Pat) Moynihan, who joined the administration as Nixon’s counselor on urban affairs. Moynihan, a liberal Democrat who served in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, helped define Nixon’s reformist image by proposing that he become a modern- day Benjamin Disraeli. Moynihan convinced the president that he could be like Disraeli who as Britain’s prime minister in the nineteenth century became conservative reformer. Nixon could enact liberal reforms that would appeal to working class voters through conservative means. Moynihan also called upon Nixon to give serious thought as to how to implement a public relations campaign for his programs. Particularly, the president needed to educate the press and thereby the American people of the intellectual reasoning behind his programs. If he could do so, the president would successfully sell his reform measures to the intellectual community and the wider voting public.13 Pat Moynihan also became Richard Nixon’s primary conduit to American intellectuals. The president never expected Moynihan to help him maintain a positive relationship with the liberal intellectual community, but he hoped his domestic affairs adviser would be able to report on their opinions and possibly cultivate “Nixon liberals.” Moynihan’s own disillusionment with the liberal establishment, which criticized his work on the black family in the 1960s, made him the perfect candidate for seeking out other disaffected liberals.14 Moynihan believed that few, if any, Republicans could understand the complex problems Nixon and his advisers faced with respect to the fear of many Americans that traditional values were collapsing. The administration could only demonstrate moral authority by seeking out liberals willing to help the administration establish

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legitimacy.15 While Nixon outwardly disdained intellectuals, he also desired their respect. With Moynihan’s help, the president set out to put forward programs that appealed to even his enemies. During Moynihan’s tenure, Nixon’s domestic agenda was set in a haphazard way. Innovative ideas f lowed freely, but the policies lacked theoretical direction because there was no master plan. No one gave much thought as to how to develop Nixon’s calls for a less intrusive government in an effective or meaningful way. Policy suggestions derived not from Nixon’s conviction about an issue, but on the need to appeal to political constituencies or on which adviser was better at manipulating the president. Through out his presidency, Nixon’s domestic policy moved across a broad ideological spectrum. His adherence to the Disraeli image of conservative reformer made actual policy appear as though it was coming from many different directions. In effect Nixon’s domestic approach had a split personality—sometimes liberal, sometimes conservative, but never consistent. For example, liberal advisers shaped Nixon’s environmental and Native American policies, whereas conservative advisers had more inf luence on his Supreme Court nominations.16 During the 1968 campaign, Nixon alluded to welfare reform as a means to relieve the middle classes tax burden. Although he did not have a plan on how to improve the welfare system, he was inclined to move forward on reform once in office. With Moynihan’s help, Nixon turned to what would become the Family Assistance Plan (FAP). The program— a form of a guaranteed annual income that set national standards for welfare recipients—allowed Nixon to move from a service based approach to welfare to a direct cash payment system. In theory, FAP provided his administration the opportunity to lessen the stigma of welfare and attack the welfare bureaucracy. In a 1970 memo to speechwriter Raymond Price, Nixon demonstrated empathy to recipients when he reasoned that the administration should pursue welfare reform to ensure that all families could take pride in their hard work rather than feel the stigma of poverty that the present system encouraged. Moreover, as Moynihan carefully noted to the president, direct payments would alleviate the role bureaucrats played in the lives of welfare recipients.17 Nixon proved more ambiguous on the issue of race relations. He supported affirmative action for federally funded construction projects and yet he took a strong stand against busing to achieve effective integration of public schools. Nixon thought his record showed him as a civil rights advocate, but to the black community he came across as against integration. To ensure election in 1968 Nixon made promises to southern leaders that his administration would slow integration especially in the

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schools. Nixon came out against forced integration, but not the principle of Brown. Essentially he took the position that more legislation was unnecessary; more acceptance of the current legislation would address racial discrimination and end segregation. As president, he hoped to find programs that would aid blacks without alienating whites and if at all possible to avoid the issue altogether.18 Nixon’s strategy later translated into “benign neglect” coupled with attempts to convince whites and blacks that the administration supported equal opportunity for all. At the beginning of Nixon’s second year in office, Moynihan submitted a report on the position of blacks in America. Quantitatively, Moynihan found blacks to be making “extraordinary progress.” Overall, black income and occupations improved since the beginning of the 1960s and more blacks stayed in school. However, the situation of female headed households and alienation among young black males had gotten only worse. Moynihan wanted the administration to do more to present a coherent approach to improving the fortune of the black population. At the same time, he also believed that the rhetoric of race had gone too far. He suggested that “the time may have come when the issue of race could benefit from a period of ‘benign neglect.’ ” While he wanted progress to continue, he also wanted to see the charged rhetoric fade. Nixon liked Moynihan’s suggestion because it met his desire of keeping a low profile on civil rights issues.19 Race and welfare reform had opposite goals in terms of how they appealed to the public. Stephen Ambrose indicated that Nixon wanted to be “safely bland” on race. Progress was fine as long as it happened at the state or local level. However, on welfare Nixon wanted to make a big splash.20 Nixon embraced the image of Disraeli because he thought it was a way in which he could justify doing the unexpected and a way in which he could silence critics of his social policies. He ultimately took a pragmatic approach, making the most of the opportunities presented to improve his political position. Nixon was not necessarily eager for reform but he was open to persuasion. He conceived domestic policy, especially social issues, as a means to reach out to current supporters as well as attract new allies. FAP: Boob-Bait for Conservatives? Richard Nixon often spoke about reforming the nation’s welfare system in order to shrink welfare rolls and lessen the tax burden on the middle class. He expressed a desire for a more equitable welfare program based on national standards that preserved the family structure. Shortly after his

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election, Nixon moved forward on the welfare reform issue in response to an early Moynihan memo highlighting the welfare dilemma. Based on his research of New York State’s program, Moynihan saw the national system as “bankrupt and destructive.” He indicated that poverty had not increased, but welfare dependency had risen especially among minority groups.21 In making his bid for change, Moynihan capitalized on Nixon’s empathy for the poor and his love of jaw-dropping actions. Moynihan initially championed family benefits and national standards but proposals for a negative income tax (NIT) to replace the present system caught his interest in the spring of 1969. HEW welfare specialists devised a plan that evolved into FAP. It recommended moving from the services approach to welfare—consisting of such programs as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, food stamps, and school lunches—to a direct payment system.22 Moynihan saw great political wisdom in moving away from the services strategy. An incomes strategy assumed that the poor and the near poor needed money more than anything else. It also sought “to provide adequate incomes for all, so that as much as possible everyone purchase[d] services in a single market.” Finally, direct payments to the working poor removed the image that the government played favorites.23 While FAP was a version of a negative income tax, it would be used only for the poor, including the working poor. A true NIT would have been applied to all taxpayers. FAP was a guaranteed annual income in that it proposed to provide a fixed dollar amount to all families under a certain annual income. Some historians have called into question the true nature of the welfare crisis during the late 1960s and early 1970s, but Nixon truly believed the system created a crisis and so he decided to act.24 It was a crisis to him for humanitarian reasons, but also political reasons. The so- called working poor as well as conservatives saw welfare as a problem. It was a common belief, even if it was not true, that welfare benefits went primarily to single black mothers and their children. Many working poor thus felt the government asked them to pay taxes so others would not have to work. Conservatives maintained that the AFDC system made it seem as though the government thumbed its nose at the integrity of the family and rewarded indolence. Nixon thought his proposal would appeal to both groups because it would help the working poor by pushing people from welfare dependency to self-sufficiency. Before the public announcement on welfare reform, Moynihan sought conservative support for the proposal. He appeared before a group of conservatives to explain the program in June 1969. Though Nixon’s adviser spoke fervently about the benefits of the program, according to

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William F. Buckley, those present were not convinced of its merits. Moynihan provided more information about the plan after the meeting to demonstrate the program’s advantages. Buckley commented that “a formal approval would depend on whether [the changes] are plausibly advanced as substitutes for the farrago of measures they are designed to replace.”25 Some conservatives did support a negative income tax before the announcement, but they were very specific about its implementation. Milton Friedman thought the NIT would end the bureaucratic mess of the present system and allow the recipients more freedom over the course of their lives. However, NIT would be successful only if the Internal Revenue Service administered the program. Ernest van den Haag maintained that NIT would not be beneficial unless it incorporated work requirements and it abolished the minimum wage laws.26 In 1969, Nixon announced FAP as part of his New Federalism reforms. He noted that welfare reform and revenue sharing would change the way in which the government approached those in need. Since Americans could not legislate their “way out of poverty,” Nixon indicated that the country could end poverty through workfare programs.27 Under FAP, the federal government would provide an annual income of $1,600 to families of four when parents could not support their dependents. The new program would support the family because two-parent families would qualify for benefits whereas AFDC payments only went to single parents. Moreover, work disincentives would end; in fact, recipients had to accept suitable work or enter a job training program. Finally, the system would be equal across all states. Nixon noted that under the present system that the costs of welfare benefits had risen “from $1 billion in 1960 to an estimated $3.3 billion in 1969” with the costs spread about evenly between the federal and state governments. His advisers predicted that federal costs during the first year would increase by almost $4 billion, but eventually FAP would cost the tax payer less as more people moved off welfare.28 Conservative intellectuals appeared cautious, but optimistic about the Family Assistance Plan’s potential after Nixon’s August announcement. Details of FAP were fuzzy at first; it was unclear what features would receive the most emphasis as the plan worked its way through Congress. However, FAP seemed on track to end objectionable New Deal and Great Society programs encouraging dependency. Human Events reported that some conservatives cheered Nixon’s announcement because the proposals revealed “a remarkably ingenious effort to remove people from the welfare rolls” and contradicted liberal programs for dealing with poverty. James Kilpatrick equated the program to a “new humanism” in government to deal with the working poor and people on welfare. It appeared

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that “most of the evils of the present system would be routed out.” Like Kilpatrick, Ernest van den Haag supported Nixon’s welfare reform proposal because it would provide beneficiaries with an incentive to work, ultimately lowering the number of people on welfare.29 At the same time, conservatives worried the proposal would not work once drafted in to legislation. If workfare—the most appealing element— failed, then a more expansive federal bureaucracy as well as an increase in the welfare rolls would result. Likewise, no one seemed to know how the plan with its loose policing of recipients could prevent fraud or force people to work. Nixon’s claims aside, it remained unclear what current programs would end. National Review expressed concern about how the term “suitable employment” would be interpreted. Conservatives thought it should mean any job one was capable of doing for this program to reach its objective of getting people to work and off welfare. However, welfare rights activists would likely resist such a broad definition leading to the program’s ultimate failure. Finally, M. Stanton Evans thought it possible Nixon’s suggestions would make the problem of social welfare worse. He feared the number of recipients would actually increase and so too would the benefits.30 Conservatives became more wary and more critical of FAP the more they learned about it. The ACU endorsed the principle of welfare reform; however, at the same time it began an extensive study of the proposal to ensure FAP was the appropriate solution. The ACU issued the results of that study in January 1970. The report noted that if Congress enacted FAP the cost and number of welfare recipients would double. More importantly, for “those who support the principal of limited constitutional government” the plan was quite disturbing because federal standards would expand the power of the national government. Furthermore, the ACU saw a guaranteed income as immoral in that “it allows one person who will not work to live off the earnings of another who can and does.” Hence, Nixon’s proposal would make “welfare more comfortable when it should be made less comfortable.”31 James Kilpatrick, after reading the ACU report, stated that Nixon presented his welfare proposals “wrapped in a package of pretty rhetoric and tied with a bow of conservative blue . . . some of us who should have known better were fairly swept off our feet. I hereby repent.” Kilpatrick agreed with the ACU’s findings that workfare—a major reason conservatives supported Nixon’s reforms—would not work in practice. Among the some 9.6 million people receiving welfare, only about 500,000 would actually be required to work under the proposal. The system would not even be effective for these individuals because the “publicly

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operated job training programs [were] notoriously inefficient.” Kilpatrick ultimately concluded Nixon’s reforms “would sink us down a little deeper in the mud.”32 In a memo to his fellow editors at National Review, William Rusher noted Kilpatrick’s conversion on FAP as a reason for the magazine to once again address the issue of welfare reform. The editors commented in March 1970 that the Nixon administration initially deceived conservatives about FAP’s intentions. His recommendations would not dismantle the present system; in fact, FAP developed “as an extension of the present non-system.” William F. Buckley saw the proposal working through Congress as “another federal prop . . . added to a house already jerrybuilt.” The talk of workfare and job training was simply “boob-bait for conservatives” for even proponents of the plan thought workfare would not put people to work.33 The Nixon administration was unable to shepherd FAP successfully through Congress in 1970. In spite of Moynihan’s efforts to sell the bill, including an appearance on Firing Line and requests to the president to step up support for the program, the right and left in Congress could not agree on the bill’s proposed terms. Moynihan told the president that Republicans failed to resist the efforts of the Democratic opponents to kill the bill because it did not appear as though the administration really supported the bill.34 The administration pursued FAP again in 1971 and 1973–1974. Conservatives continued to attack what James Kilpatrick called the “lunacy” of Nixon’s welfare reform proposals in hopes that FAP could be avoided.35 For conservatives the debate over FAP, beyond the actual merits of the proposal, was important for two reasons. First, conservatives worried about the proposal’s implications on the fight against liberalism. Second, conservatives worried about whether they could continue to support Nixon if he persisted in his effort to pass FAP and they wondered if they could not back Nixon what options did they have. Conservatives were cognizant of the political realities surrounding the welfare reform proposal, which made them perhaps even more uncomfortable with the Nixon’s plan. According to National Review, the president’s favorite political strategy—co- opting both left and right—made it difficult to interpret his welfare reform proposal. On the surface, the plan was “relevant and persuasive.” Nixon had once again found a way to play left against right by disarming “opponents on both f lanks.” NR noted that conservatives appreciated the program’s sentiments; however, they were unhappy with the amount of federalization used to deal with a local problem. Meanwhile, the liberals could not bash the program because Pat Moynihan and Robert Finch—the administration’s liberals—proposed

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and designed the changes. Moreover, while the liberals had tried to use Nixon’s performance “to banish conservatism from the American political landscape” conservatism remained viable. Nixon’s appeal to both sides of the political spectrum was not an acceptance of liberalism. Rather it recognized the growing conservative sentiment of the American electorate. Nixon’s domestic policy, said the editors, supported their belief that “we have entered the post-liberal era when much of the former controversy over liberalism may have become obsolescent.”36 While conservatives tried to disconnect the Nixon’s acceptance of welfare reform along the lines of FAP from the larger political debate, they still questioned whether or not they could rely on the president in the future to support conservative proposals. After the 1970 midterm elections, National Review reported on the cooling of conservative opinion toward Nixon’s administration. Furthermore, Nixon’s State of the Union for 1971 offered no real answers to conservative criticisms. How would conservatives reconcile supporting Nixon in 1972 while he was urging a program that would expand the federal government?37 Patrick Buchanan, one of the few ideological conservatives in the administration, thought the right would not continue to support Nixon because of his social policies. Nixon’s statements and positions especially on FAP, demonstrated how he was “no longer a credible custodian of the conservative political tradition of the GOP.” Buchanan advised the president to be aware that his recent moves left “the Republican True Believers without a vocal champion” and the resulting “political vacuum [would] not go unfilled.”38 Buchanan proved correct in his assumption that conservatives would indeed look for other options, however Nixon seemed little concerned about the potential they might choose to support another candidate. At the start of his second term, Nixon appeared to be backing away from liberal social policy. National Review came out in favor of Nixon’s calls to cut federal welfare expenditures although the editors would have liked greater cuts.39 However, by late 1973, conservatives had pretty much given up on his ability to promote a conservative domestic policy agenda. Nixon turned to liberal programs, especially FAP, to salvage his presidency as Watergate unfolded. While not surprised by Nixon’s course, conservatives still expressed disappointment. They did not think the ploy would work and wondered how severe the consequences of Nixon’s latest liberal turn would be. Human Events thought to save his presidency Nixon should move right—polls suggested that people wanted lower taxes, less government, and stronger national defense. If he lived up to his 1972 campaign promises he would improve his popularity, but he seemed unable or unwilling to do so. There was a growing sentiment, among the right,

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The Hands- off Approach to Civil Rights The real impetus for Richard Nixon’s civil rights policy was politics. The consequences of his decision to focus on the South in 1968 affected his policy on race while in office even after the strategy had outlived its usefulness. Benign neglect was as much a manifestation of the southern strategy as it was a plan for toning down race as an issue. Nixon’s goal was to have a low profile with respect to desegregation while also managing the issue differently. By the time he took office, the Supreme Court had expanded on the Brown decision leaving the president unable to stop integration even if he had wanted to do so. In response, Nixon as well as many conservatives supported freedom of choice plans where black students could choose the school they attended as the best option for dealing with desegregation. The Supreme Court ruled against such an approach in Green v. New Kent County School Board (1968).41 With few other options left, Nixon looked for a policy to achieve desegregation while shifting the blame to the courts or his political opponents. Nominations to the Supreme Court also played into Nixon’s strategy toward desegregation. The president could demonstrate his commitment to southern interests by selecting southern nominees who were “strict constructionists.” Moreover, the right hoped that Nixon while not turning back time could ensure through judicial appointments and responsible policy the continuation of a free society.42 While Lyndon Johnson favored HEW compliance agreements coupled with threats to cut off federal funding to achieve desegregation, Richard Nixon planned to change approaches to put some distance between the White House and civil rights. Using Justice Department litigation meant the final action would rest with the courts; Nixon could demonstrate concern without having to take responsibility for the consequences. The president could not change the laws regarding desegregation as southerners expected, but he could make the process more palatable. In July 1969, HEW Secretary Robert Finch and Attorney General John Mitchell in the so- called guidelines statement described how the federal government would approach the desegregation question through litigation. While the administration appeared to be retreating from the battle for integration, the real purpose of the speech seemed to

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“that both the country and the Republican party would be better off without RMN at the helm.”40 While not all conservatives thought that Nixon had to go, they articulated concern about the impact his liberal swing would have on the Republicans in the 1974 midterm elections.

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be confusion. Nixon could accept desegregation and placate the South, but only if his course was unclear. Although this approach was risky because it could backfire, to Nixon it appeared the only way to maintain southern support.43 Conservatives said little about the “change” in Nixon’s policy; however, some noted it looked as though the right had made some headway within the administration. Human Events maintained Nixon’s announcement on desegregation, among other things, demonstrated that conservatives in the administration were “riding higher than they ever [had] before.” National Review concluded liberals did not like the small steps on desegregation because they perceived them as part of an overall tendency of moving right. However, the country—black and white—had moved beyond the desire to see racial balance imposed by “executive or judicial fiat” and Nixon needed to be more cognizant of that fact.44 After the administration released its guidelines, Nixon faced a situation that put his balancing act to the test. John Stennis, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, indicated that unless the administration did something to halt desegregation in his state’s public schools he would have to return to Mississippi to deal with the situation. Nixon could not afford to see Stennis in his home state with a crucial vote on ABM coming up. Stennis supported the proposal, but the ranking member who would replace him in his absence did not. Contradicting his own policy, Nixon ordered Finch to petition the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for an extension. The president’s decision marked the first time since Brown that the federal government had taken a stand against desegregation. Finch requested the court set a new deadline in December because adequate plans for integration could not be prepared by August. When the court granted the extension, the NAACP filed an appeal. In October, the Supreme Court mandated immediate integration for the affected Mississippi school districts in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education (1969). While Mississippi lost its bid to halt integration, Nixon gained politically because he stood up for the South and could lay the blame on the courts.45 The Alexander decision did not come as a surprise to conservatives. Nor did it come as a surprise to those in the South according to William F. Buckley. Southerners were not likely to abandon Nixon because of the court’s decision, since his administration asked for more time and the court unanimously said no.46 James Kilpatrick noted Alexander seemingly marked the end of the courts’ patience with the stalling tactics used by districts where de jure segregation still existed. The court ruled that the Mississippi schools, and by inference other districts still resisting unitary

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school systems, must immediately operate single school systems where race played no factor in admission. However, it seemed to Kilpatrick that through Green and Alexander the Supreme Court managed to change the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1954, it meant equal protection under the law; since 1968, the court supported forced integration dependent on race.47 The day the Nixon administration went to court to fight Mississippi’s battle against integration it also announced its nomination to replace retiring Justice Abe Fortas. Nixon had previously nominated Warren Burger to replace retiring Chief Justice Earl Warren. Conservatives praised Nixon’s choice of Burger because he was a strict constructionist and his legal record was marked by integrity, competence, and experience. Human Events remarked if Nixon managed to place strict constructionists like Burger on the court, he would likely “rekindle enthusiasm for his administration among many regular Republicans and Southern Democrats who [had] been distressed by the administration’s all-tooheavy reliance on certified liberals.”48 The Senate easily confirmed Burger in June. Richard Nixon’s nomination to replace Fortas was far more controversial and more political in nature. The president first chose Clement Haynsworth whom Dwight Eisenhower nominated to serve on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to fill the seat. Haynsworth, a native of Greenville, South Carolina, had a reputation as a conservative strict constructionist. While many observers expected Haynsworth’s confirmation, the Senate rejected him in November. While looking into Haynsworth’s past, investigators uncovered that he had invested in the same real estate company as Bobby Baker a former Senate aide to Lyndon Johnson known for his corruption. Therefore, he was not above suspicion of misconduct. Furthermore, Justice Fortas had filled the “Jewish” seat on the court. Nixon believed it should be a “southern” seat, but the Senate was not ready to acquiesce on that point. Finally, Senate liberals opposed Haynsworth’s past decisions on civil rights and labor issues.49 Conservatives defended Clement Haynsworth against his critics’ charges. James Kilpatrick argued that just because Haynsworth hailed from the South did not mean his decisions on school integration should prohibit his nomination to the court. Haynsworth likely reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited segregation, but did not “require state- encouraged integration.”50 William F. Buckley observed that the “fight to stop Haynsworth is what in other days, against other targets, would have been denounced as McCarthyism.” The judge’s so-called impropriety consisted of participating in a business deal along with several

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others including Baker (a man he had never met). Buckley also lamented that none of the critics had considered whether Haynsworth had the legal skills to serve as a member of the Supreme Court, which in the opinion of conservatives he had.51 When the Senate failed to confirm Haynsworth, the president nominated G. Harrold Carswell of Florida, a relatively new member of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Nixon’s determination to nominate a southern conservative to the court was evident when he told aides that he wanted a man further to the right of Haynsworth. Carswell had the support of southern conservatives, but in their haste to select another nominee no one on Nixon’s staff fully vetted his record. Senate critics found evidence of outright racism in Carswell’s past and raised questions about his judicial skills. By the time the Senate voted on the nomination, Nixon knew Carswell was a poor choice. Nevertheless, the president would not withdraw his name from consideration because of the southern strategy. In the end, the administration’s attempts to support Carswell were unenthusiastic. Congressional liaison Bryce Harlow noted privately it was hard to counter his reputation as a “dummy.” Sen. Roman Hruska (R-NB) in an attempt to defend the nomination stated that even mediocre people were entitled to representation by other mediocre people.52 Conservatives supported Carswell, but it was harder to defend him on the merits of his nomination. James Kilpatrick was less enthusiastic about his nomination. Although liberal critics objected to Carswell’s strict constructionism, that was not evidence of his unfitness. Kilpatrick’s doubts centered on Carswell’s active role in transferring a public golf course to a private country club to prevent its integration before he served on the bench. In spite of such misgivings, he still thought the Senate should confirm Carswell.53 William F. Buckley assumed that Nixon nominated a qualified individual to the high court and thus the campaign against the president’s latest nominee was misplaced. Carswell’s past positions on segregation were not necessarily a guide for what he would do as a Supreme Court Justice. Like Justice Hugo Black, who had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan in his youth but consistently voted with civil libertarians, Carswell renounced his 1948 “Dixiecrat” sentiments.54 In the end, the Senate rejected Carswell in April 1970. Nixon was furious with the thirteen members of the GOP that voted against him. The day after the vote, the president spoke brief ly with reporters and stated that it was “not possible to get confirmation for a judge on the Supreme Court of any man who believes in the strict construction of the Constitution” especially if he lived in the South.55 Nixon’s third nominee for the Fortas seat was Harry Blackmun who hailed from Minnesota and

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served on the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals since his nomination by President Eisenhower. Chief Justice Burger recommended Blackmun and the Senate confirmed him unanimously. Although Nixon failed to see a southerner successfully seated on the court, conservatives noted that his gesture would yield political benefits. Southern voters would conclude Nixon was an “understanding president” and would be less likely to back George Wallace in the next election.56 Nixon was looking for just such a response in implementing the southern strategy. If he could head off defections to Wallace because he alleviated southern concerns about integration, he could turn his attention to other voting blocs. After Carswell’s defeat, the Nixon administration still had to deal with the fact that in the upcoming school year questions about integrating the remaining dual school systems were sure to arise. In March 1970, the White House had released a formal statement and report on school desegregation, which Nixon hoped would help to clarify his position on the question of desegregation in elementary and secondary schools. The statement pledged that the administration would do what the law required, namely what the Supreme Court already had dictated. In addition, the administration would not use decisions of lower courts as a guide for directing their policy. In his statement, Nixon indicated that de jure segregation had to be eliminated, although it should be up to local school districts to decide the best means to accomplish this goal. The administration supported the principle of neighborhood schools and opposed busing beyond normal geographic zones to ensure racial balance. Finally, Nixon also asked Congress to reallocate money from other domestic programs to help improve education “in racially impacted areas.”57 Although Nixon pledged to follow the law, conservatives took consolation in the fact that he seemingly remained committed to preserving a free, open, and orderly society. James Kilpatrick praised the president’s decision to fix limits on coercive integration with his insistence that the government would ensure the immediate end to segregation but would take no further steps. Such action by previous administrations, in Kilpatrick’s opinion, could have prevented the bleak situation facing the nation in 1970. Unfortunately, the theory of integration lulled those administrations into ignoring the potential consequences. The government’s schemes for forced integration also left no room for human nature resulting in the resegregation of inner cities.58 Nixon’s statement outlining the administration’s policy was not enough to quiet questions about how to handle de facto desegregation, especially since the president purposely nationalized the issue to placate

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southern leaders. White southerners long pointed to the hypocrisy of making desegregation a regional issue when in fact schools in the North were just as segregated. In the later 1960s and early 1970s, school districts, especially in urban areas, found themselves wondering how to achieve racial balance. The question became how might authorities determine which schools had desegregated when laws could not account for human nature. Busing of students within and across district lines was one solution. However, most Americans wanted to avoid busing. Somewhere around 74 percent of Americans accepted integration, but only 2 percent believed busing was an appropriate means to combat racism.59 Conservative intellectuals had a long history of opposing busing to achieve racial balance. While it would be easy to accuse these individuals of pandering to reactionary voters, their writings on the issue were more refined. They thought about the consequences of how to end de facto segregation in a practical manner. The right believed that the government should not attempt to force people to make the morally upright decision; people needed to retain their free choice. Conservative intellectuals (as well as southern politicians) liked to note that the same liberals making desegregation policy in Washington had moved out of the city to send their children to essentially all-white schools. James Kilpatrick reported that before the Brown decision the ratio between black and white students in Washington was about equal. By 1968, there were around 139,000 black students and 9,000 white students in the District’s public school system. More importantly, these results were typical for communities with small and large black populations.60 In any place where whites could move they did; right or wrong it happened often. Conservatives also remarked on several occasions that integration failed to provide better education. Likewise, HEW studies showed that few integrated schools were free from violence. As such, black and white parents began to question the logic of forced integration. How was busing children to a racially balanced school better for a child than busing a child to a segregated school, especially across long distances? Russell Kirk noted that parents of both races in Grand Rapids, Michigan, opposed a busing scheme; however, the loudest complaints came from black parents calling for neighborhood schools. William F. Buckley maintained that aside from the philosophical arguments against compulsory integration, the government had to address procedural arguments. Parents tended to make decisions about their children’s education based on the circumstances at hand. Since most parents—black and white—preferred neighborhood schools, the government should respect that decision and focus on providing better education for all children.61

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As president, Richard Nixon vocally opposed busing as a solution to end de facto segregation. Political expedience not moral principle contributed to his position making his policy ambiguous and confusing. In his March 1970 statement on desegregation, the president indicated that his administration would not support schemes that forced students beyond normal geographic zones. Only weeks before the president announced that his administration would not support busing, responding to the Alexander decision, he implied busing was an appropriate means to ensure desegregation so long as it did not disrupt “the education routines of children.”62 Nixon essentially contributed to the busing controversy that would come to the forefront in 1971–1972 because he painted an inconsistent picture on what his administration would or could do to address the issue. Conservatives initially looked to the Supreme Court to take action on the question of racial balance, with the hope that it would strike down lower court decisions in favor of busing. James Kilpatrick called upon the court to recognize the difference between desegregation and integration. The court needed to define guidelines for “just schools” because the schools and lower courts had only racial criteria to determine what children went to what schools. Compulsory busing to Kilpatrick was “a manifestation of racism” because the main criteria considered was the color of a child’s skin. Russell Kirk maintained that the courts could only address the question of racial balance through moderate, pragmatic decisions. Moreover, the courts should not expect schools to address the cultural factors that contribute to a child’s success. The Supreme Court could demand equal opportunity for students, but not equal performance.63 Sadly in the minds of conservatives, the Supreme Court moved in the wrong direction when it upheld a busing plan involving white suburban and black urban school districts to remedy de jure segregation in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg School District (1971) even though the average one-way trip exceeded an hour. James Kilpatrick worried that no clear guidelines for the schools emerged on the acceptable measures for achieving desegregation. The opinions were “turgid pronouncements, combining bad law with wretched style.” The Burger court allowed race to become once again the sole factor in determining where a child should go to school. Kilpatrick concluded that the decision was “not equity” but “nonsense.”64 Since they could not control the courts, conservatives hoped for more leadership from Nixon on the busing issue. After the Swann decision, two additional seats on the Supreme Court opened in the fall of 1971 because of retirements. Conservatives thought Nixon had an excellent opportunity to replace Justices Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan with strict

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constructionists who would push the court away from its position on busing even though the previous decision had been unanimous. Nixon nominated Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist to fill the vacant seats. Conservatives according to Human Events thought if approved by the Senate these nominees would “do much to shift the balance of the court toward the conservative side.” James Kilpatrick approved of Nixon’s choices not only because of their qualifications, but also because Nixon, unlike his predecessors, was using his appointive power “in the acknowledged hope of achieving particular ends at law” namely to redirect the court in a more conservative direction.65 Although his latest Supreme Court nominations pleased them, conservatives still wanted the president to take more immediate steps to address the busing issue. Nixon continued his opposition to busing in principle, but pledged to uphold the law. He also indicated in an August 1971 statement that he planned to ask Congress to prevent the use of federal aid for education to support busing.66 Conservatives thought his actions were not enough. The White House failed to indicate how it would end the mess created by the courts with respect to busing. It seemed Nixon had only bent to the court’s and HEW’s pressures.67 Kevin Phillips, who had been instrumental to the conception of the southern strategy, noted in his syndicated column that while the Burger court was retreating from the Warren court’s position on busing, the president might need to take on the court to convince potential supporters of his opposition to busing.68 In January 1972, a lower federal court ruled in favor of a busing program to counter residential segregation patterns in Richmond, Virginia. In June, another lower court made a similar ruling with respect to schools in Detroit, Michigan. After the Richmond decision, Human Events argued Nixon should “support effective measures to end . . . [the] sociological nonsense” emanating from the ruling on integration. The decision, if upheld by the Supreme Court, would end neighborhood schooling. “Presidential leadership in this area has been sorely lacking,” said the editors. Conservatives wanted Nixon to come out in favor of a constitutional amendment against busing as a means to remedy problems of racial balance. However, the president had no comment on the Richmond decision, nor was there any indication that he opposed the decision.69 When Nixon finally took action, conservatives were still disappointed. The president announced his intention in February 1972 to appoint a committee to look into the busing issue. Human Events thought the decision ref lected Nixon’s “surprise-a-month” reelection strategy. Appointing a panel, composed primarily of liberal members, did not seem to be a step in the appropriate direction. Moreover, Nixon’s committee favored a

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scheme that would actually expand busing and eliminate local control of schools.70 National Review maintained that with Nixon’s latest move on busing perhaps “the national wave of revulsion” finally had been felt in the White House. However, the president also was in some ways unwilling to “make up his mind what to do about it.” With effective leadership, a constitutional amendment would pass through Congress and receive approval from several states before the November election. But such leadership did not seem to be coming from the Nixon White House.71 The president asked Congress to call for a moratorium on busing in March 1972. Nixon thought the cessation would allow time for the development of national standards on desegregation. He also proposed the Equal Educational Opportunities Act allocating $2.5 billion in aid for education especially in urban areas. The president hoped the request would relay his opposition to busing and his commitment to education.72 Nixon’s attempt to drop the issue on Congress received mixed reviews from conservatives. Russell Kirk approved of the president’s move because he reasoned that the real necessity was to “improve all schools,” especially those in the inner city. Nixon also correctly deduced that an amendment against busing would take too long to enact. James Kilpatrick thought the president’s proposals made sense because they promoted “a return to reason in the schools.” Moreover, the proposals could “cure a form of judicial lunacy” while simultaneously reducing community tensions and providing better education.73 Human Events, however, thought that the proposed Equal Educational Opportunities Act left too many questions unanswered. The act would open the way for increased federal control of education and introduced regulations that in theory would make it more difficult for the courts or a government agency to order busing. Moreover, a great deal of confusion existed even within the administration as to what the act would accomplish. Busing might be reduced, but there was no indication that it would be outlawed by congressional action.74 National Review noted that Nixon’s proposals allowed him to maintain his desired centrist position on the busing question. His actual statement would “do little to untangle the endemic legal uncertainties over desegregation—how to define it, how to achieve it, and what the limits of federal intervention ought to be.” But from the perspective of the upcoming election, the public would remember his call for ‘No More Busing’ allowing the president “to capture the high ground” on the issue.75 Busing continued to be a concern while Congress debated the merits of Nixon’s proposals, but the president had once again successfully maneuvered his administration away from the spotlight. Conservatives only occasionally raised the issue after 1972,

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usually to note that Nixon could ill-afford to alienate supporters over the busing question.76 Adding to confusion about the administration’s position on civil rights was its support for affirmative action. The administration seemed to move away from the president’s instruction of doing what the law required and nothing more by endorsing a policy that supported preferential hiring practices. Kennedy and Johnson had spoken of affirmative action, but under Nixon, the idea came to fruition with the aggressive implementation of the Philadelphia Plan requiring federal construction contractors in Philadelphia to hire minority workers. While bureaucrats in the Johnson administration put forward the original proposal, Nixon’s team revised the plan to give the White House more control over the program. The Philadelphia Plan required contractors to meet specific goals for minority hires in a certain timeframe, not attain specific quotas for minority hires. The administration subsequently extended the program to nine other cities and other areas of federal employment. Nixon came to support the proposal at the recommendation of George Schultz. The president appreciated the plan’s focus on providing jobs to minorities which was in keeping with his belief that economic opportunity was more important than civil rights to many blacks. The Philadelphia Plan allowed Nixon to focus on discrimination issues in the North while also demonstrating his administration’s commitment to action.77 Conservatives doubted the program’s legality more than its intentions, but they had their reservations about more government intervention in the area of civil rights. The right opposed affirmative action in principle because, as Ernest van den Haag noted, such a policy did not promote equality of opportunity. More specifically, Human Events argued that the Philadelphia Plan practiced reverse discrimination. While prejudice was “ugly, demeaning and destructive,” coercion did not provide the best means with which to overcome it. The true way to achieve liberty was not “though executive fiat but through example, persuasion and goodwill.” James Kilpatrick thought the proposed hiring guidelines of the plan would require contractors to be agents of social uplift. While the goal of the plan was “meritorious,” it contradicted the ban on preferential treatment in the Civil Rights Act.78 William Rusher called on his fellow editors at National Review to pay more attention to the implications of the Philadelphia Plan. Given the proposal’s nature, there would be nothing to stop liberals from imposing “racial quotas on any business involved in interstate commerce, includ[ing] the Board of Editors of National Review.” Rusher did not

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think Nixon would take the plan that far, because he called on the courts to test the plan. If the courts threw it out, then the president would successfully embarrass the Democrats trying to balance between labor and blacks. But of course, Nixon’s plan could fail leaving no constitutional reason against applying quotas to all areas of American life. The editors never actually took a position for or against the Philadelphia Plan, but they expressed fear that the Supreme Court would not declare the plan unconstitutional.79 After the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Philadelphia Plan in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), Allan Ornstein said in National Review that the plan turned the meaning of nondiscrimination in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “into affirmative action compliance and reverse discrimination.” Objective standards of hiring went by the wayside. Employers could no longer base their hiring decision on individual merit they had to use the proportional representation of groups to make hiring decisions. The Griggs decision promoted reverse discrimination because a significant proportion of educationally disadvantaged whites would be discriminated against by affirmative action plans because of their inability and their race.80 *

* *

The proposed guaranteed annual income, the status of busing, and the consequences of affirmative action disappointed conservative intellectuals well into Nixon’s second term. The fact that the Family Assistance Plan never came to fruition was of small consolation to conservatives. Certainly, they were glad that Nixon did not expand the welfare state through the policy, but the whole tenor of his approach to social issues caused greater concern. In domestic policy, Nixon never lived up to their expectations. They believed that he shared their disdain for liberalism as manifested in the New Deal and Great Society. At the start of his administration, the president implied that the government had reached the limit of what it could do to ensure better lives for all Americans. Hence, it was time to look beyond the government for solutions.81 Conservative thinkers reveled in such talk, but Nixon quickly dashed their hopes. The reality was that under his leadership, the federal government spent more on domestic social policy than had ever been spent before.82 Worse still, Nixon’s stand against busing and for affirmative action confused the question as to whether the federal government should play a role in enforcing civil rights. The right was left to conclude, as M. Stanton Evans

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did, that the “presentation of liberal policies in the verbal trappings of conservatism has become the distinguishing ploy of the Nixon government.” The president had “used conservative energies to sustain a further national movement to the left.” Nixon was no friend to the conservative position on welfare or race relations because he was “thoroughly pragmatic and non-ideological.”83

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MIXED EMOTIONS: THE WISDOM OF SUPPORTING NIXON

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very action Richard Nixon took on becoming president looked toward his future—his reelection in 1972 and his historical legacy. Nixon’s compulsion to demonstrate his vision and his success played out in the choices he made about domestic and foreign policy. Nixon’s domestic policy sought to allay voters’ fears about the economy, crime, and social order; his foreign policy found inspiration in his desire to make a lasting impression as a man of peace and grand vision. If Richard Nixon had made inroads with the silent majority during his first term with his initiatives, he also pushed conservatives away. Nixon was less concerned about conservative support for 1972 because he felt confident he could win the support of Middle America, especially as the Democrats leaned toward increasingly liberal policy alternatives. Conservative intellectuals constantly worried that as president, Richard Nixon did not have the will to move the country in a rightleaning direction. Ralph de Toledano early in the first term recorded conservative distress that the president ignored them and yet basked “in the approving smiles of the ‘liberal’ establishment.”1 Nixon’s failures to conduct a foreign policy rooted in American nuclear superiority, to cut domestic spending, and to attack the size of the federal government increasingly troubled those on the right. They stuck with Nixon early on because of common enemies, but conservatives still hoped the president would take note of the alternatives they proposed. Increasingly conservative intellectuals found it difficult to remain true to their principles while trying to give Nixon the benefit of the doubt.

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CHAPTER 6

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The right was unprepared for his dedication to his reelection and his future image. Although they knew he was a politician at heart, few conservatives truly expected the level of political opportunism Nixon exercised to achieve his goals. Moreover, few expected his disdain for their support after they worked hard for him in 1968. Conservative anxiety continued to grow as the right examined Nixon’s political expediency. FAP, benign neglect, tough talk on economics, and a tough stand on crime were only a few places conservatives saw Nixon pandering to the electoral center. Conservatives accepted some of these ideas, but still viewed Nixon’s actions as unprincipled tactics to gain votes. Many conservatives openly challenged Nixon in 1971 and 1972 first by suspending their support for the president and then by backing John Ashbrook’s primary challenge. Although Nixon eventually won general conservative support for his reelection, several of the intellectuals backing him thought he was the lesser of two evils rather than an effective choice. Most conservatives who avidly supported Nixon in 1968 could not muster the same kind of enthusiasm for him in 1972. Rather than cast their ballot for a candidate they did not believe in, other conservatives decided not to vote in the presidential race. After Nixon’s reelection with a slight sense of foreboding, conservative intellectuals held out hope that he would return to conservative principles. The president did swing to the right in an attempt to reverse some of his more liberal measures. However, conservative complaints in the second term were the same as during the first term especially with respect to welfare, defense, and the economy. Conservatives Lose Faith: The Suspension of Support Right-minded intellectuals and pundits realized in 1971 that their criticism of Nixon’s policies and politics was having little effect in pushing the president toward conservative alternatives. Part of the reason stemmed from the lack of conservative voices in the Nixon administration. National Review lamented that liberal advisers prevented conservatives, including long standing members of Congress, from reaching the president.2 The right felt increasingly divorced from the administration’s policymaking center and never was that more true than when Nixon announced that he planned to visit China in early 1972. While domestic policy troubled them as well, the China trip and the possible fate of Taiwan proved the tipping point for most conservative intellectuals in their turn away from the president. Nixon’s staunch anticommunism seemed to be disappearing before their eyes at the same time he was supporting measures that would increase the welfare state and further burden taxpaying Americans.3

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Nixon’s appeal to the middle had left conservatives few alternatives as the 1972 election approached. According to National Review, one Nixon adviser quipped that the president was “spreading himself so broadly across the middle of the road that ‘you’ve got to go in the ditches to get around him.’ ” Given the situation, Frank Meyer thought it would be difficult for the right to challenge the president. There appeared no other option but to support Nixon’s reelection because the Democratic candidate for 1972 would be much worse than Nixon. Nevertheless, said Meyer, a difference existed between support as a lesser evil and enthusiastic support. The challenge for conservatives was to demonstrate their dissatisfaction, to fight for more conservative programs, and to ensure that Nixon understood the importance of their support. Reluctant conservative backing could make the difference between victory and defeat as it had done in 1960 when many the conservatives withheld their support for Nixon and he lost to Kennedy.4 William F. Buckley, at James Burnham’s suggestion, called on conservative leaders to discuss their dissatisfaction with Richard Nixon’s policies in the summer of 1971. Burnham thought collective action was necessary to convince Nixon and his advisers that they should heed conservative warnings. He wanted conservatives to abandon their ambivalence toward Nixon’s programs, which paved the way for collectivism. Burnham hoped that if the conservatives took action, they could effectively distance themselves from the administration without severing all ties.5 In July, conservative intellectual and political leaders gathered at Buckley’s Manhattan home to air their grievances and determine a course of action. What they wondered would grab Nixon’s attention? If they broke with Nixon, what would their next steps be? Could they back a Democrat for president? In the end, they decided to issue a statement critical of Nixon and then debated how severe their split with the administration should be. Some wanted a complete break with Nixon, but Buckley and Burnham convinced them to “suspend” their support for the president rather than completely repudiate the administration. Suspension implied that the White House could regain the favor of the conservatives if it made some policy changes in the near future. Buckley and Burnham feared that completely burning all bridges would only push Nixon farther to the left which was not the desired outcome of their challenge.6 The Manhattan Twelve, as they began to call themselves, released their statement on July 28, 1971. The signers included William F. Buckley, James Burnham, Frank Meyer, and William Rusher from National Review, Allan Ryskind and Thomas Winter from Human Events, Jeffrey Bell and John Jones from the American Conservative Union, Anthony Harrigan

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from the Southern States Industrial Council, J. Daniel Mahoney from the New York Conservative Party, Neal McCaffrey from the Conservative Book Club, and Randall Teague from the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF). Although their declaration mentioned domestic issues such as inf lation and welfarism, foreign policy and defense issues took center stage.7 Beyond his failure to stop Soviet advancement in the Middle East and his overtures to Red China, the group had problems with Nixon’s unwillingness “to call attention to the deteriorated American military position.” They thought his failure would lead to a loss of deterrent capability and the loss of friendly governments to communism; both of those developments threatened the safety of the country. The signers did not intend to challenge Nixon in the primaries; they planned to await political developments before making any decision on next steps. Personal admiration for Nixon aside, the Manhattan Twelve believed their “defection [was] an act of loyalty to the Nixon [they] supported in 1968.”8 They felt justified in saying that the president had abandoned their principles because in their opinion the results of the 1968 election suggested that the majority of the American people wanted right-leaning solutions to the country’s problems and Nixon was not providing those solutions. After the suspension, William F. Buckley indicated on Firing Line that the assumption that the president was looking out for conservative interests proved wrong. The purpose of the group was therefore “to maximize pressure against Mr. Nixon from the right.” Buckley also wrote a lengthy article for the New York Times Magazine explaining the reasons behind the conservative action. The president’s behavior with respect to Communist China, previous endorsement of unbalanced budgets, and plans for compulsory welfare in some measure convinced Buckley that his brother-inlaw L. Brent Bozell correctly predicted that Nixon’s election would change the American right “permanently” because the president had undermined the conservative’s “structural positions.” Since Nixon no longer seemed to need the support of a right wing that only a few years prior he saw as vital, conservatives needed to reassess their position on the issues important to them and how they wanted to accomplish their goals.9 The suspension seemed one way in which to do that. Buckley also said Nixon ostensibly planned to rely on his diplomacy to appeal to the right in 1972, but he wondered whether or not the president would have enough time to demonstrate his resolve against the communists and prove worthy of conservative support. In Buckley’s opinion, the president would be hurt by the revelations about his administration’s lack of commitment to the country’s military predominance and the fact that little had changed with respect to the dire situation of

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national security since he took office. In the end, Nixon would have to counter the suspicion that he had been taken in by the “other side’s reveries” to prevent the American right from looking for other options.10 Frank Meyer’s explanation of his break with Nixon came across as slightly harsher than Buckley’s justification. The administration’s policies with respect to China and a government directed economy stood out as part of the “American withdrawal from world leadership.” Nixon’s programs abandoned the necessary elements of an anticommunist hegemonic power—realizing that the communist quest for world domination threatened free people everywhere and fostering strong anticommunist relationships around the globe to resist the communist advance. Conservatives had forsaken their own principles by not attacking the problems sooner, which consisted of “an ostrichlike refusal to face the hard reality of a world containing the Communist threat to our survival, compounded by the insistence upon an ever increasing scale of welfare and material comfort.” Meyer also said that Nixon’s actions could “only be interpreted as a failure of nerve . . . before the incessant pressure of the liberal Establishment.”11 Allan Ryskind and Thomas Winter understood that although some Human Events’ readers would be upset with the decision to join in the suspension, they thought a majority would back their course of action. The editors said they took great care in making the decision to join the dissent against the president. Over time, it became apparent to them that Nixon’s policies, which had diverged too far from conservative principles, threatened “the survival of the American republic.” Until Nixon took steps to remedy the problem, suspension seemed the only recourse.12 After the declaration, Jeffrey Bell, John Jones, and Randall Teague encouraged members of the ACU and the YAF to join the suspension. The ACU’s Board of Directors at their meeting in September voted in favor of the suspension, though not unanimously. Members of the YAF, at their annual meeting, voted to suspend their support of Richard Nixon and indicated that they would support Spiro Agnew for president in 1972.13 National Review found response to the declaration mixed both among their readers and among conservative columnists. On August 24, 1971, Linda Bridges reported to the editors that she had received little mail on the suspension. But of what she had seen, approximately 50 percent supported the action, 25 percent agreed with the action but wanted the conservatives to do more, and 25 percent rejected it. Most of the opposition had concluded that the right could do much worse than Nixon. Other readers noted that NR should stop “whining and sulking” because

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Nixon had not been doing so badly. Finally, the respondents noted that without a conservative alternative, Nixon knew that “the Conservative community [was] stuck with him” (which for conservative leaders was the crux of the problem). A second report on reader response showed that the reaction had grown more favorable toward the suspension as the magazine received more letters.14 The editors also observed that reactions to the Manhattan Twelve decision by conservative columnists ranged from Kevin Phillip’s warning that if these intellectuals effectively used “the power of their pens” they would be able to do serious damage to Nixon’s efforts for reelection to Roscoe Drummond’s doubts that right-leaning voters would “follow these conservative intellectuals in their anti-Nixon tizzy.”15 For Richard Nixon and his advisers the suspension of support caused only a minor blip on their political radar. On July 28, 1971, Bob Haldeman noted that the administration had a “stir” because of the statement of nonsupport. William F. Buckley warned Henry Kissinger that several conservative leaders planned to publish a statement coming out against the president. Kissinger, who in the past had asked Buckley to push conservatives to attack the liberals on Vietnam, was disheartened that the conservatives planned to attack Nixon. Buckley responded that “the White House need[ed] certain battering rams coming in from the right.” In discussions on how to react, the president indicated that they should not “worry too much about the right-wing nuts.” To ensure that Buckley did not “get off the reservation” Nixon asked Kissinger to meet with him. The president also dispatched John Mitchell to speak with Daniel Mahoney about the New York Conservative Party.16 Nixon met personally with Sen. James L. Buckley in an attempt to mend fences with conservatives and to ward off further defection on August 5, 1971. Buckley had been elected in 1970 as a ConservativeRepublican from New York with the backing of the president. He shared the concern of the dissenters, but did not join their effort. In his statement on the suspension, the senator predicted that the decision would have “serious implications” on the presidential election in 1972 because the signers were inf luential conservatives whose final verdict could “kindle or extinguish the kind of enthusiasm and willingness to work on which elections depend.” If their positions matriculated to solid opposition, it would be “virtually impossible for the President to regain their credible support.” After the meeting, the senator implied in an interview with the Washington Post that Nixon was on the “right wavelength.” He also indicated that the Manhattan Twelve did not want to be taken for granted and that the problem would only become worse if the president ignored it.17

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The only member of Nixon’s staff to be truly concerned about the impact of the conservative defection was Patrick Buchanan, who had been warning the president about the right’s concerns since the beginning of 1971. In January, he predicted trouble if Nixon did not deal with conservative complaints that he took them for granted, especially the notion the right got the rhetoric, while the left got the policy. The president needed to show that conservative policy alternatives would receive a fair hearing by his administration. He could do so by appointing an identifiable conservative in a visible position to whom the right could air complaints and the president would listen. More importantly, Nixon had to meet with ideological conservatives in the writing community and in Congress to hear their grievances. If given the opportunity to become an integral part of the administration, such conservatives would make “the best defenses of the White House in the conservative community.” Should the president ignore the conservative complaints long enough, the upcoming election year would find him in “deep kimshee.”18 Essentially Buchanan wanted the Nixon administration to revert to policies it used during the 1968 election to shore up support from the right. As long as the administration could keep conservatives satisfied with a little ego stroking, Buchanan thought Nixon would have nothing to fear from the right. The day the conservatives announced their decision, Patrick Buchanan speculated to Bob Haldeman that the Manhattan Twelve hoped to energize conservatives outside of Congress. Buchanan seemed most worried about William F. Buckley’s position and concerned that the press would actually play up the suspension more so than they would an endorsement of the president by the conservatives. A few days later, Buchanan provided a fuller assessment of the situation calling on the administration “to take these conservative defections more seriously.” He cited five reasons: (1) the dissenters had supported Nixon’s nomination in 1968; (2) their meeting united and publicized their antagonism; (3) Ronald Reagan had advanced knowledge of the move and he did not oppose it; (4) younger conservatives planned to go after Nixon in the primaries; and (5) the attack could help the Democrats since the administration opened itself to conservative assault on about a half a dozen issues. The conservative threat was still a potential danger because they had neither drawn active politicians to their cause nor made the decision to “dump” Nixon. However, if the trend continued “some voice just might emerge to articulate their bitterness” resulting in a serious problem. Buchanan recommended that the White House not attack the defectors if it wanted these conservatives to “return to the fold.” The president also needed to realize that their complaints were not “cosmetic” differences, but “substantive”

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issues, especially those related to defense. Many of the defectors wanted a reason to support the president and so Nixon’s forces should not “write off people we had and need in 1972.”19 Patrick Buchanan further concluded that the administration could not rely on surface changes or rhetoric to convince the conservatives to support Nixon. That window had passed and now the president would need substantive changes with respect to foreign and domestic policy. In spite of Buchanan’s impassioned plea to treat the conservatives with respect Nixon probably did not even read his memo on how to placate the right. Charles Colson—Nixon’s communications liaison with special interest groups—had a copy of the memo in his files, but it was not in the president’s office files. Colson did listen to some of Buchanan’s suggestions. Specifically, he prevented Lawrence Higby, Bob Haldeman’s assistant, from setting up an organization made up of loyal conservatives such as Hobart Lewis, Jeffrey Hart, Clare Boothe Luce, and Billy Graham to counter the defectors. Colson felt the organization would “simply isolate Buckley & Co.” making it “more difficult for them to rejoin the fold.” Colson continued that the Twelve “consider themselves to be the sole repository of all conservative intellectual thought.” Organized opposition would only antagonize them further. There seemed no reason to provoke genuine conservatives or set up “a situation where it’s ‘our conservatives’ against ‘The conservatives.’ ” Colson effectively deferred to Buchanan’s efforts to encourage individual conservatives to come out in support of the president.20 Per the president’s instructions, Henry Kissinger met with William F. Buckley in mid-August to address some of the concerns raised in the declaration. According to John Judis, Buckley’s most important contact in the White House was the national security adviser. The two men met in 1954; they based their relationship on friendship and mutual respect. However after joining the Nixon team, Kissinger manipulated Buckley on behalf of the president. He summoned Buckley to the White House on occasion to get support from the right for the administration’s foreign policy initiatives not for policy advice. The meeting after the declaration was no different; the administration hoped to use the Buckley-Kissinger relationship to cut off the rebellion.21 According to Kissinger’s staff, he needed to tell Buckley that the president was not heading to China “from a position of weakness.” The Chinese asked for the visit as a means to obscure their concern about their power in Asia. Furthermore, the United States would not make any gains at the expense of their allies in Asia. Finally, the president believed that his policy would actually help Taiwan keep its UN seat.22

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Kissinger had some success in convincing Buckley that the State Department was at fault for the soft turn toward the communists. Buckley noted in a letter to the national security adviser after the meeting that while he could understand some of the administration’s positions, others remained inexplicable. He mentioned specifically the lack of conservatives in the administration and the nation’s declining military posture. Kissinger was less successful in convincing other members of the Manhattan Twelve because among other things his defense of the SALT policy did not mesh with information they had from reputable sources about the American willingness to negotiate on matters of national security. When Kissinger reported his conversation with Buckley to the president, Nixon remained unconcerned noting that “they just need an issue” to galvanize the conservative movement.23 Moving Beyond the Suspension of Support The administration’s nonchalance about their threat pushed the Manhattan Twelve to be more specific about what it would take to endear conservatives to the president. As a first step, the right tried to emphasize the potential consequences of their defection. Conservatives, according to National Review, understood that the Nixon administration scoffed at their defection because they had nowhere else to go. Nevertheless, the declaration was more than a “ripple” for it could “swell into a troublesome wave.” Ultimately, the inf luential conservative signers might prevent supporters from working for Nixon’s reelection.24 NR also noted that Nixon could be hurt in the South where in fact there were alternatives if the right remained “lukewarm” to the president’s policies. Southern conservatives would be happy to vote for George Wallace or switch back to the Democrats if the nomination went to the relatively conservative Sen. Henry Jackson.25 M. Stanton Evans called the response of the Nixon administration “predictable but nonetheless distressing.” However, the conservatives had some options. They could change their rhetorical approach to the administration—moving into the opposition camp. They could also withhold money from Nixon by giving it to a conservative challenger or the Democratic candidate.26 In mid-September, Patrick Buchanan again expressed concern about the Nixon administration’s reaction to the conservative revolt. The interadministration communications coming to him about the conservatives showed “a lack of understanding of what they [were] about, and what [motivated] them.” According to Buchanan, the defectors were “concerned with substance and policy, more likely to be alienated than

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appeased by gestures . . . in the absence of action.” While Buchanan did not come right out and say it, his interpretation of the situation suggested that Nixon’s pragmatic approach to politics prevented him from taking true believers on either side of the political spectrum seriously. Moreover, he stated that the right had divided into two camps—the hawks and the doves. The hawks wanted to see Nixon defeated in the general election, feeling that only a liberal in the White House would strengthen the conservative movement. The hawks were pushing doves like William F. Buckley further away from the administration with accusations that conservatives who supported the president had abandoned their principles. Still the president would remain in good shape so long as no political leaders defected. Thus, the administration had to take steps to prevent a solidification of conservative opinion before it was too late to prevent more desertions.27 The Manhattan Twelve ultimately concluded they needed to take further action to put pressure on Nixon. On September 17, 1971, Jeffrey Bell proposed that the group formulate a list of demands that would placate conservatives after which they batted around ideas about what should be included. Members of the group debated which issues should be included and whether they should focus more on foreign or domestic policy issues.28 For example, Neil McCaffrey highlighted several domestic areas that needed attention. He felt the conservatives should support a constitutional amendment to prevent busing and wanted to see more efforts made in the area of crime, especially in enforcement and prosecution. McCaffrey also called for budget cuts in health, education, and welfare.29 Frank Meyer further noted in a letter to the Manhattan Twelve in response to suggestions made by Daniel Mahoney that while the conservatives probably lacked the funds for a primary challenge, he supported the idea of reaching out to other Republicans. Such action would allow for a f lexible response and would hit “at an area most likely to inf luence Nixon, the political cadre of the Republican Party.”30 The group met in mid- October and chose William F. Buckley, M. Stanton Evans, and Allan Ryskind to draft their recommendations for the White House.31 Patrick Buchanan, in his report to Haldeman and Colson on the situation, observed that in absence of a favorable response the conservatives proposed to challenge Nixon either in the primaries, at the convention, or in the general election. Buchanan believed that conservative bitterness about the UN vote on Taiwan, which happened as the dissenters penned their suggestions, would make it harder to draw the conservatives back into the fold, but it was still possible.32 On November 1, 1971, Allan Ryskind presented Charles Colson with the list of demands and asked for

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the administration’s response. The conservatives broke down their complaints into three areas—strategic policy, foreign policy, and domestic policy—and provided a detailed list of expectations incorporating the many suggestions of the group’s members. They also wanted to ensure that Spiro Agnew remained on the ticket in 1972 as vice president. Colson forwarded the conservative plank to Kenneth Cole (for the domestic policy issues) and Alexander Haig (for the foreign and strategic policy issues) so they could prepare a reply. He noted that “we would like to respond agreeably on all points possible, and try to indicate common ground on most remaining items.”33 The White House response to their demands did not improve the conservative view of Nixon’s policies. The president planned to continue supporting welfare reform in the form of FAP since the present system was “a mess” and he had clearly “taken the lead in offering a proposal which would clean up that mess.” With respect to supporting a constitutional amendment against busing, the president “believed that there [were] other better means of achieving” racial balance in the schools.34 On SALT, the administration reaffirmed its desire to pursue arms limitation agreements in order to “enhance national security.” Moreover, Nixon’s staff defended détente by noting that the United States planned to proceed with agreements “grounded in specific accomplishments.” Finally, the administration indicated its unwillingness to support any detailed plans to develop new defense systems.35 The Manhattan Twelve initially expected to make a bigger splash with their declaration of nonsupport. However, they had won few converts among conservative politicians. Ronald Reagan, James L. Buckley, Strom Thurmond, and Barry Goldwater stayed with the president. Although the conservative dissenters did not have a clear picture of what they should do about the Nixon problem (mostly because they could not agree on a course of action), they continued their efforts in large part because of the New Economic Policy and the UN vote on Taiwan. William Rusher, one of the most anti-Nixon of the group, noted after the Taiwan vote that the movement would be better off having a Democrat in the White House, because how could conservatives possibly have less inf luence than they had with the present Republican administration. Rusher believed it was time to take serious action to prevent reelection.36 Most conservatives were not prepared to go quite as far as Rusher suggested, but they still wanted to find a means to push Nixon back into line rather than push him out of office. As 1971 came to a close, responsible conservatives seriously pondered their options for the upcoming presidential election.

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Conservatives did not take lightly their debate on whether to support a candidate besides Richard Nixon and whom to support if they went in that direction. The Manhattan Twelve embarked on their campaign against the president because they believed he had forsaken conservative principles, but they also had to weigh the practical consequences of challenging Nixon. Political costs aside, most of the members of the group were also businessmen. Neil McCaffrey and Anthony Harrigan resigned from the group in December. McCaffrey felt signing political manifestos would be harmful to the interests of the Conservative Book Club and Harrigan thought that as the executive vice president for a nonpolitical organization he could not partake in such political action.37 William F. Buckley of all the group’s members was perhaps the most torn about what to do with respect to next steps. As the most public figure of the group, he was likely to pay the highest price for his decision. Whether he stayed with the president or supported an alternative candidate, magazine subscriptions, book sales, requests for appearances, and Firing Line viewership might drop. In spite of these concerns, conservatives pressed forward. The Manhattan Twelve met in late November to examine whether or not they should support a primary challenge by Congressman John Ashbrook. It was not an easy discussion. They chose Ashbrook because no other conservative politician seemed willing to take on the president. Few potential supporters knew Ashbrook outside Ohio’s Seventeenth District, except perhaps the members of the ACU and the readers of Human Events and National Review; therefore challenging Nixon would be no simple feat. If Ashbrook failed to make a respectable showing in New Hampshire, it might appear as though the conservatives had lost their strength. If the conservatives decided not to run their own candidate, however, Republican voters would have to choose between Richard Nixon and liberal Republican challenger Pete McCloskey. With that as an incentive, the Manhattan Twelve decided to encourage and support Ashbrook’s campaign. As M. Stanton Evans later noted, Ashbrook’s candidacy showed that the Manhattan Twelve was “intensely serious” and Nixon was “in considerable trouble with the American people.”38 John Ashbrook publicly said he was considering running on December 7, 1971. Several days later, Ashbrook delivered a speech in Congress later reprinted in the New York Times explaining why he considered it the duty of all conservatives to challenge Richard Nixon in 1972. Nixon told voters in 1968 that he would change the direction of the country; he promised to

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end wasteful domestic spending and to protect the nation’s security. Instead, Nixon gave the country “FAP and the Red China fiasco.”39 On December 29, 1971, Ashbrook made his intention to run in the New Hampshire and Florida primaries official. In a statement drafted largely by William Rusher, he noted that the actions of Richard Nixon motivated him. Ashbrook claimed that the president’s policies did not reflect what the American people wanted.40 Most political observers knew that Ashbrook was not trying to win; he was trying to make a respectable showing to pressure Nixon into changing his policies. While appearing on a special television program “American Conservatives Confront 1972” hosted by William F. Buckley, John Ashbrook argued that conservatives needed to challenge Richard Nixon more effectively on the domestic and foreign policy matters important to them. If faced with a Democratic administration making similar policies, the conservatives would attack those policies. However, Nixon’s status as a Republican meant that party unity seemed to come before principle. In another television appearance Ashbrook said, “I think my basic problem with Mr. Nixon is that he keeps moving to the left and then he wants to call that the middle of the road. If you keep moving the middle of the road to the left as he’s doing, then you’re clear beyond the Democratic territory pretty soon.”41 The administration reacted to John Ashbrook’s challenge in much the same way they did to the suspension of support. They tried to head off conservative dissension while also discounting the threat Ashbrook posed. On December 8, 1971, Charles Colson wrote to Bob Haldeman that he knew that “both you and the President do not feel that I should worry about Ashbrook or any other candidate challenging us in the primaries. I still feel a major effort should be made to avoid it.” Colson asked him to postpone a meeting the president scheduled with conservative leaders. He wanted more time to try some things that Buchanan had been discussing with Sen. Buckley. Haldeman agreed to delay the meeting.42 The White House press office also worked to ensure the public that Nixon was not worried about a challenge from the right (or the left). In an attempt to minimize Ashbrook’s threat, the administration also worked to discount his candidacy. One aide called Ashbrook “a nuisance and a bother.” Others suggested Ashbrook’s supporters were “intellectual ideologues” with little inf luence or ability to raise money for their candidate.43 At the same time, Richard Nixon dispatched Spiro Agnew to speak with William F. Buckley and William Rusher. The president hoped that the vice president, a darling of the conservative movement, could persuade the dissenters to abandon their push for an alternative candidate.

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If a bright young Ph.D. had been selected on July 26th and put in a small office in the Executive Office Building and told to devise the most offensive possible series of gestures towards conservatives, in the period following conservatives’ announcement of their “suspension of support” for Mr. Nixon, he could not possibly have done a better job than had been done by the President himself in the ensuing months.

Agnew failed, for the most part, to convince Buckley and Rusher that the administration heard their calls for change. They remained dubious of Agnew’s assertion that Nixon planned to seek a larger defense budget in 1972. Conservatives already had heard from reporters at the Pentagon that Nixon had no plans to spend a substantial portion of the proposed increase. Agnew also protested Ashbrook’s candidacy for personal reasons; he feared Nixon would drop him from the ticket if Ashbrook pursued in his efforts to unseat Nixon. Buckley and Rusher tried to convince Agnew that his position would actually improve if Ashbrook forced Nixon to the right because Nixon could not drop a conservative from the ticket. They indicated that more concessions from the administration would be necessary to avoid further trouble as well.45 The White House attempted to play up the differences between those dissenters who wanted to see Nixon reelected and those that did not. Agnew wrote to Buckley after their meeting that he took comfort in the fact that although conservative intellectuals had identified an important problem, it was clear that they did not “agree on the proper solution.” Separating conservatives from the Republican Party would accomplish nothing. Conservatism would not be “a pragmatic, effective political reality unless it developed within the two-party system.”46 Peter M. Flanigan, a New York banker who became an aide to Nixon on international economic affairs, later tried to persuade William F. Buckley that he owed the president more loyalty for supporting his brother’s campaign for the Senate. In an effort to divide and conquer the dissenters, Flanigan then told Buckley that National Review had become an “instrument” of William Rusher for sponsoring Ashbrook’s candidacy. Buckley denied that Nixon had any claim on his political loyalty and noted that he personally opposed Ashbrook’s entering the race. In any event, the magazine had not sponsored Ashbrook, but urged its readers to vote for Ashbrook

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Buckley and Rusher met with Agnew and his aide David Keene (a former member of the YAF) on December 15, 1971.44 Buckley expressed his dissatisfaction with the Nixon administration’s reaction to conservative complaints. Rusher further noted:

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in what was becoming a popularity contest between Nixon’s challengers. Flanigan responded that from a practical standpoint there seemed no difference between sponsoring and endorsing Ashbrook’s candidacy.47 Flanigan’s position likely made Buckley more hostile to the administration. Even if Nixon did not know about Flanigan’s effort, the exchange fit into the administration’s decision to pressure Buckley to withdraw his support for Ashbrook. Patrick Buchanan later suggested to Charles Colson that the administration capitalize on William F. Buckley’s obvious uncertainty about what to do. In early January, Buchanan proposed approaching Buckley whose columns seemed to indicate that the Ashbrook challenge was all “fun and games” to see whether he could persuade Ashbrook to withdraw from the race. No evidence suggested Colson followed through on the idea but he did call on Buchanan to put pressure on the Ashbrook forces in February “before the situation in California [got] out of hand.” To that effect, during the China trip, Buchanan informed Buckley of the administration’s intention to do everything possible to force Ashbrook to pull out of the California primary.48 Nixon’s advisers recognized the damage conservatives did to president’s gubernatorial campaign in 1962. If California conservatives came out in force against Nixon in 1972, the president and the GOP had something to fear.49 Thus the administration worked hard to endear itself to Ronald Reagan in hopes of drawing conservative supporters to Nixon’s primary campaign. Human Events supported Ashbrook in his challenge and urged other conservative Republicans to support his campaign taken “on behalf of the principles they [held] dear.” Ashbrook was no spoiler; rather he ran to give voice to conservative opposition and remind Nixon that conservative support mattered. Later disclosures about the Nixon administration’s budget deficit and the results of the China trip prompted the magazine to remind readers of the importance of the Ashbrook venture to conservative initiatives.50 M. Stanton Evans speaking on behalf of the ACU Board of Directors called Ashbrook’s candidacy a “watershed” moment for American conservatism. For one thing, Ashbrook’s campaign allowed for broader criticism of Nixon’s policies from big name conservatives. The challenge might swing Nixon to the right, but failing that, it would at least break the main body of conservative opinion from its “complicity in liberalism.” Evans concluded whatever the outcome of the 1972 election the emergence of new conservative leaders was a positive development for the GOP.51 National Review took a more muted stand on the Ashbrook challenge. Publicly the magazine gave support to Ashbrook, while privately the editors

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debated how much assistance to extend to the campaign. In an issue that went to press before Ashbrook made an official announcement of his candidacy, the editors commented that the magazine would not sponsor the candidacy, but would likely endorse Ashbrook if he ran. Later in an editorial most likely written by James Burnham, NR called on conservatives to support Ashbrook because (1) the huge deficit represented the administration’s acceptance of the welfare state; (2) the NEP repudiated Nixon’s campaign statements on wage and price controls; (3) the NEP would not cure inf lation because it did not fix the “fiscal and monetary irresponsibility” of the administration; (4) Nixon had failed to warn the people that the Russians reached strategic equality and would soon reach strategic superiority; and (5) Nixon’s foreign policy risked critical strategic interests making Americans more unsafe. In the end, even if Ashbrook failed the qualitative and philosophical aspects of his challenge were important for galvanizing the conservative movement.52 In his syndicated column, William F. Buckley also defended Ashbrook’s right to challenge Nixon for the nomination. Buckley took issue with Barry Goldwater’s contention that “the idea of opposing Mr. Nixon from the right . . . [was] a threat ‘to the entire party, the entire country, the entire free world, and freedom itself.’ ” The senator’s statement proved heartening to the Republican establishment for it supported Nixon’s hold on the party. However, Buckley was more concerned about the implication that if voters did not reelect Nixon, the United States might cease to exist. As far as Buckley could see, Nixon helped create the problem and therefore it was imperative to fight against his policies. Ashbrook’s venture might prove “counter-productive” but that was a tactical question on “which men of identical political opinions might disagree.” Ashbrook’s entrance in the race provided the conservative movement a renewed spirit. Goldwater, said Buckley, taught the conservatives well and now they could not “accept with continuing docility the policies responsible for leading us to the brink” of destruction.53 Privately William F. Buckley, James Burnham, and William Rusher went back and forth on the merits of continued support given that Ashbrook’s campaign lacked funding and more than likely votes. Frank Meyer, who had reluctantly supported Ashbrook’s challenge, played only a small role in the debate due to his failing health. Meyer preferred to see conservatives boycott the 1972 election altogether. He thought they should focus on principles and vow not to compromise on the important issues.54 Rusher, adamantly opposed to Nixon’s reelection, thought that Ashbrook’s candidacy helped to keep the conservative position “alive and capable of being fought for.” In late January, he observed that Ashbrook

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would probably not defeat McCloskey in New Hampshire but would make a good showing in Florida. Rusher’s analysis deeply concerned Buckley because a poor Ashbrook showing would “sorely affect the general confidence in the right-wing’s wit.” In his response, Rusher indicated that NR needed to maintain its “cautious” but “commendable” coverage of the Ashbrook effort. More importantly, a public change in Buckley’s position would “be treated by the national press as an out- andout bolt from the Ashbrook candidacy, a master- stroke for the Administration, a gratuitous stab in the back . . . and generally, a major contribution to the growing fissures in the conservative movement.” Beyond the 1972 election, the editors needed to consider the future of the right. Ashbrook, no matter the outcome in New Hampshire, would continue to be a spokesman for responsible conservatives unwilling to be duped by Nixon’s Republicanism.55 Rusher’s appeals did not console Buckley who feared that conservative strength would wane if Ashbrook persisted in challenging Nixon. He knew that the administration planned to put a great deal of pressure on the congressman to withdraw from the race in California. More importantly, the strategic importance of the Ashbrook campaign was to ensure the reelection of a more conservative Nixon, not a Democrat. Buckley likely stayed with Ashbrook not because of Rusher’s prodding but because of James Burnham’s inf luence. The ever practical and yet principled Burnham sent Buckley a letter that summed up his position on the race on February 7, 1972. He believed that Ashbrook’s invisibility and the fact that his campaign had not caught fire mattered little; the campaign was about defending the conservative position for the “historical-moral record.” Burnham admitted that he would likely vote for Nixon in the fall, but not because Nixon represented his interests. He concluded, “I would be (or would like to think of myself ) in an autonomous section of a pragmatic united front; and I think the Ashbrook candidacy is the way, and the only way, no matter how badly it does in quantitative terms, to symbolize the relationship publicly.”56 Ashbrook garnered a little less than 10 percent of the vote in New Hampshire and in Florida, but he continued to press on with his efforts in California. Many conservatives maintained their support for his efforts because the Ashbrook candidacy was good for the movement. Holmes Alexander observed that the campaign highlighted “the President’s dishonest abandonment” of solvency and security. The clear message of the campaign was that if a real conservative had been leading the country FAP, NEP, and SALT would not have been issues. 57 William F. Buckley, clearly inf luenced by James Burnham, argued that John

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Ashbrook’s challenge to Nixon might be deemed a mistake, but he did not think so. Ashbrook had all the necessary qualities of a presidential candidate including “exhibiting an extraordinary immunity to ideological defilement.” His challenge failed because he did not have enough money; however, that did not mean he did not represent the sentiments of many conservatives. Finally, the editors at National Review thought that although Ashbrook’s campaign ended after the California primary where he again took less than 10 percent of the vote, the congressman’s inf luence would be felt for the remainder of the campaign.58 The Lesser of Two Evils Given the trouble the Manhattan Twelve had in deciding to support Ashbrook’s primary challenge, it was not surprising that some conservatives refused to join in the effort. Russell Kirk stayed with Nixon during the 1972 election because he felt that Nixon was the most prudent choice. Kirk praised the president for his commitment to national security, his desire to provide quality education to all students, and his efforts to end the Vietnam War. After traveling to Washington in April 1972 for a meeting at the White House, Kirk remarked that Nixon’s concern with such perennial questions as the country’s decadence impressed him. He also maintained that Nixon deserved praise because he understood “the principle that politics is the art of the possible.” As president, he was willing to make the tough decisions even when he knew he would find little support for his actions.59 James Kilpatrick continued to treat Nixon much as had before the conservative revolt. He praised some decisions and lambasted others. Kilpatrick never took a position on the suspension. However, even before the Manhattan Twelve went public, he maintained that conservatives had expected too much from Nixon in terms of a discernable conservative agenda. Later he noted that the conservatives failed in their rebellion because Nixon was not a cooperative enemy. For example, his nominations to the Supreme Court were decidedly right of center. Although a principled conservative, Ashbrook could not attract enough voters to hurt the president. At the same time, Kilpatrick could not bring himself to condemn the rebellion. Because Nixon would need conservative votes, he was likely to make meaningful gestures toward the conservative movement. Kilpatrick stayed with the president because, the possibility that a liberal president would dismantle the national security state seemed too great a risk for conservatives to take.60 The likelihood that Sen. George McGovern would be the nominee for the Democrats was indeed a major factor in the decision of many 10.1057/9780230102200 - Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon, Sarah Katherine Mergel

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conservatives who supported Ashbrook to return to the Nixon camp. National Review eventually endorsed the Nixon-Agnew ticket, although the magazine was hardly enthusiastic about it. “The proffered alternative to Mr. Nixon,” said the editors, was “not something with which a grownup superpower can play.” Considering what McGovern might do as president emerged as the main reason to cast a ballot for Nixon. While William F. Buckley would have preferred a more conservative candidate, he could cast his vote for Nixon knowing that choosing the lesser of two evils was the best approach to the election.61 Conservatives did not expect a second administration to be better than the first, but they felt it would be better than a McGovern administration. For many conservatives being responsible also meant being practical when it came to casting a ballot in November. Russell Kirk promoted Nixon’s reelection throughout the summer. According to Kirk, the Democrats, by nominating McGovern, gave Nixon an opportunity for great political success. Nixon’s reelection would demonstrate that Americans desired “security, stability, retrenchment, the reign of law and renewal: a thoroughly conservative undertaking.” Like Kirk, James Kilpatrick thought Nixon’s reelection would bring the much expected conservative turn. Nixon’s challenges for governing the nation had only grown more severe since 1968, but that did not mean he would be unable to provide effective solutions. So long as the administration made a conscious effort to lead by “ardent choice” not “dispirited default,” it would be able to address the nation’s problems. Nixon might not have been “a philosopher” but he was “a first class man- of-allwork”—something the country desperately needed.62 Conservatives also had enough inf luence on the platform deliberations to reconcile most objections to Nixon’s reelection. While the Republican platform endorsed Nixon’s plans for détente, it also pledged the country would negotiate only from a position of strength. The platform also suggested that Nixon would consider a constitutional amendment against school busing. The Republicans maintained that although the welfare problem in the country needed to be addressed, they opposed “programs or policies which embrace the principle of a governmentguaranteed income.” Finally, the platform implied an end to economic controls in the near future, supported responsible federal budgets, and championed tax reform.63 Human Events maintained after the convention that while Nixon did not count himself in the conservative ranks, the convention showed that a majority of Republicans were in fact conservative. Centrist Nixon managed to unite the party, noted National Review, but the future prospects for conservatism looked good. Conservatives could accept four more years of Nixon because they believed that Nixon’s 10.1057/9780230102200 - Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon, Sarah Katherine Mergel

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rhetoric and policies would contribute to greater conservative control of the GOP in 1976.64 Other conservatives refused to support any candidate in 1972. M. Stanton Evans maintained after the convention that conservatives had “permitted themselves to be taken for granted by Nixon” because of the trauma of the 1964 defeat. Nixon assumed he had the conservatives “in the bag” and he was right. Conservative leaders ended up supporting him even though they disagreed with his policies.65 William Rusher publicly dissented from the position of National Review when it came to Nixon’s reelection. He called the election of 1972 the “winter of our discontent.” NR, said Rusher, supported Nixon in 1972 because he would be easier to elect. Thus, it shifted “from a strategy of ‘ideological superiority’ to one of ‘sufficiency.’ ” Worse still, Nixon’s liberal policies had “won recruits.” Nixon apologists relied on the argument that McGovern would be worse; therefore, Nixon deserved the conservative vote. Rusher refused to support Nixon because he estimated that the conservatives who were “rolling over and playing dead for Richard Nixon, would rise up in wrath to stop McGovern from McGovernizing America.” The conservative movement was far more active in opposing liberal policies when they came from liberal presidents. They seemed reluctant to criticize or oppose Nixon’s leftward turn, because he appeared “sufficiently conservative.” For Rusher sufficiency was no longer enough and he planned not to vote in November.66 McGovern had little chance to defeat Nixon in the general election. Most voters were attracted to the center and Nixon placed himself directly in the middle. Nixon’s victory was never really in doubt. The Committee to Reelect the President worked hard throughout the campaign to sell Nixon’s image as a responsible leader while ensuring that the Democrats could not mount an effective challenge in 1972. Beyond the campaign shenanigans of Nixon’s reelection team, the economic upturn that brief ly followed the NEP and the winding down of the war in Vietnam (especially the troop withdrawals) helped Nixon secure broad voter loyalty. Nixon used the same tactics in 1972 to campaign against McGovern that Johnson had used in 1964 to attack Barry Goldwater. While Goldwater had seemed conservative to the extreme; McGovern had garnered a reputation of being overly liberal. Nixon’s campaign slogan—“Nixon: Now More than Ever”—spoke to the concerns of many Americans that McGovern might be too far to the left. His policy positions seemed too extreme for so many voters that many members of his own party refused to work for his election. After being nominated at the Republican National Convention, the president did not need to campaign because McGovern’s own effort was

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essentially self-imploding. Nixon also relied on his status as the incumbent to secure victory—in acting presidential he could demonstrate why he was the better choice come November. On Election Day, Nixon attracted voters from the moderately conservative as well as socially conservative Democrats from the Northeast. He carried the South, a majority of Catholics, and half the youth vote. Moreover, he took 35 percent of registered Democrats. When the votes had been tallied, Nixon won almost 61 percent of the popular vote and lost only Massachusetts and the District of Columbia in the Electoral College.67 Although Nixon won by a landslide and seemed to have a mandate to carry out whatever policies he wanted, conservatives appeared skeptical about the meaning of his victory. Surprisingly, Russell Kirk denied Nixon had received any mandate. Kirk—using the literal definition of mandate—insisted that the American people merely suggested the direction in which they would like the country to head. The president “won a vote of confidence, not a portfolio of programs.”68 James Kilpatrick thought that during his second term Nixon would move in a more conservative direction because he had run his last political campaign and his victory would allow him to be less compromising on important matters. To some extent, Kilpatrick’s reasoning made sense, but it discounted or ignored that Nixon was equally obsessed with his historical reputation so he might continue his bold and somewhat liberal policy moves to ensure his future posterity.69 William F. Buckley noted that Nixon’s landslide was not a result of Americans supporting Nixon. It was because the Democrats chose George McGovern and George Wallace pulled out of the race for after an attempt on his life during a campaign appearance in Maryland. According to Buckley, there was no indication that Congress would work with the president in the future, which could spell problems for Nixon’s policies.70 National Review speculated that Nixon’s second term would be similar to his first. Nothing would change with respect to his foreign and domestic policies. Therefore, conservatives needed, almost immediately, to “decide how, if at all, they [would] figure in the American situation” during the second term.71 *

* *

Perhaps R. Emmett Tyrell said it best when he noted that while Richard Nixon was both wise and cunning, it was too early to tell if history would judge him as an “unprincipled statesman.” However, Tyrell also noted that history might be written sooner than the president thought if he “did not soon pause to consult the conservatives within his own party.” 72 In

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many ways the Manhattan Twelve’s suspension of support and John Ashbrook’s primary challenge showed the limits of conservative power in the United States in the early 1970s since neither event made much of a splash among average American voters. At the same time, conservative leaders did not expect major changes because of their efforts. They hoped to push Richard Nixon from the center to the right. As James Burnham cogently suggested in a letter to William F. Buckley on the Ashbrook effort, the conservatives needed the challenged for the historical-moral record. Their opposition to Nixon in 1971 and 1972 was never about winning, but about looking toward the future. Burnham had the foresight (as he often did) to see that conservatives would need to distance themselves from Nixon in the future. He, however, could not have predicted what would come after Nixon started his second term. Burnham assumed that Nixon would carry on much as he had in his first term and the conservative movement would need distance in 1972 to challenge the president on the issues after his reelection.73 Had it not been for Watergate, conservative intellectuals and pundits might have begun to reassess their position vis-à-vis the American political scene in early 1973 just as National Review suggested and Burnham suspected. However, Richard Nixon’s political troubles forestalled these efforts at least until 1974 when he resigned. Conservatives, in the face of liberal opposition to the president, felt compelled to defend Nixon even as they viewed his policies with dismay.

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ooking toward Richard Nixon’s second term in office, conservative intellectuals and pundits had lower expectations than when he became president in 1969. William F. Buckley thought that Nixon’s reelection did not bring much satisfaction to the American people. Democrats disliked the president “for ideological and personal reasons” and the Republicans “mistrusted” him because he turned the election “into a prolonged and expensive venture in narcissism, without regard to the political party on whose cooperation he now depends.”1 James Kilpatrick recognized Nixon’s “conservative instincts” but seemed unsure at the end of 1972 in which direction the president would move.2 Conservatives worried about the future of their movement, the Republican Party, and the fate of the American people given that, as Tom Taggert suggested, Nixon was not a leader who could to articulate values and strategic objectives with nobility.3 Conservatives suspected the second term would be as rocky as the first. They thought for much of the time they would end up challenging Nixon on foreign relations and domestic policy (especially in relation to the question of taxes and the size of the government) in order to further their own policy objectives.4 Conservatives never expected that the events surrounding the Watergate burglary in 1972 would change their relationship with the president. Ultimately, in every policy area, conservatives remained disappointed because Watergate interfered with Nixon’s ability to present any real solutions to the nation’s problems. Richard Nixon’s crimes and misdemeanors posed vexing questions for conservatives. Should they support Nixon in the face of attacks from the left side of the political spectrum? Should they cut their losses and look ahead? Should they abandon him because he was no longer an effective

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leader? The conservative response to Watergate essentially went through three phases. Many conservatives supported Nixon initially because they thought that the scandal resulted from liberal bias and hatred of the president. Some turned away as more evidence of malfeasance worked its way to the surface. In time, conservatives began to debate the merits of resignation and impeachment as it became increasingly clear that Nixon was no longer able to govern. Not all conservatives went through these phases at the same time and some conservatives never left the first phase. In the end, guilt or innocence did not provide the basis of their reasoning— effectiveness of leadership did. With Nixon out of the picture, the conservatives had the opportunity to redefine their movement vis-à-vis the Republican Party. C. Bascom Slemp had suggested after the 1972 election that voters chose Nixon because their felt comfortable with him in light of his long political career leaving conservatives little room to maneuver.5 However, his resignation provided the right the chance to prepare for the struggle for the GOP in 1976. Revelations about the Watergate Break-In Richard Nixon’s desire to ensure his reelection took a wrong turn when his campaign advisers set up the Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP) in March 1971 under the direction of John Mitchell, the former attorney general. In large part, the president authorized the committee because of the poor Republican showing in the 1970 midterm elections. Nixon felt he could not afford for the Democrats to capitalize on their gains. CREEP sought to improve the president’s public image, to reach out to favorable voters, and to damage the reputation of potential Democratic candidates including Edward Kennedy, George Wallace, Edmund Muskie, and George McGovern. The organization also allowed the Nixon team to keep the campaign out of the hands of the Republican National Committee.6 The break-in at the Watergate Hotel was part of a “dirty tricks” campaign launched to hassle the Democrats. Nixon did not know about each trick, but he approved the program that paid CREEP operatives from private White House funds. On June 17, 1972, the police apprehended G. Gordon Liddy (CREEP’s attorney), E. Howard Hunt (a former CIA agent and CREEP security consultant), James McCord (another former CIA agent and head of CREEP security), and four Cubans with ties to the CIA for burglarizing the Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters at the Watergate office building. John Mitchell approved the break-in as part of Liddy’s plan to gather political

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intelligence for the campaign, but none of the participants in the ensuing saga ever explained on record exactly what the Nixon team hoped to gain by spying on the DNC. The burglars went to the Watergate that June evening either to remove or improve listening devices placed in DNC office on May 28, 1972.7 The cover-up of the White House’s connection to what press secretary Ron Ziegler called a “third rate burglary” began once the president knew of the links between the burglars, CREEP, and the White House. On June 20, 1972, the president spoke with Bob Haldeman about their options. Initially Richard Nixon, Bob Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and White House counsel John Dean hoped to keep any connection to the administration from surfacing, to contain the investigation, and to pay participants for their silence. When Nixon approved the cover story that indicated the Cubans were involved in CIA activities and any disclosure of those activities would threaten national security, he became involved in the cover-up. On June 23, 1972, Bob Haldeman proposed having Vernon Walters, the deputy director of the CIA, ask L. Patrick Gray, the acting director of the FBI, to drop the investigation for reasons of national security. Walters approached Gray who agreed to call off the investigation, but his agents did not heed the order. Meanwhile, Dean reached out to the Watergate burglars offering hush money and used contacts in the Justice Department to keep the administration apprised of course of the investigation.8 Initially, the White House managed to keep a lid on the Watergate burglary in part because the national news media simply did not pursue it. However, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein doggedly covered the story as part of their reports on the local crime beat for the Washington Post. They unearthed important evidence that suggested CREEP did more than financially support the president’s reelection campaign, but their efforts made almost no dent in Nixon’s chances in November.9 In January 1973, five of the Watergate defendants pleaded guilty while juries convicted the remaining two. If Nixon and his advisers hoped the scandal would die down with the convictions, then they were sorely mistaken. In February, the Senate voted to create a select committee to investigate Watergate. The White House in an attempt to ward off the examination of its activities pushed the Senate to look into political abuses of other administrations as well. Nevertheless, the Senate restricted the review, led by Sen. Sam Ervin (D-NC), to Watergate and other recent Republican campaign abuses. L. Patrick Gray’s confirmation hearings to serve as J. Edgar Hoover’s permanent replacement and the sentencing of the Watergate defendants caused more trouble for the White House. Gray

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admitted in late February that he gave John Dean the FBI’s reports on Watergate and that he had met on numerous occasions with the White House counsel about the investigation.10 Then in March, James McCord wrote a letter to Judge John Sirica (who presided over the burglary trials), which opened the f loodgates. McCord stated that the administration had pressured the defendants to plead guilty and remain silent, that witnesses had perjured themselves during the trial, and that the burglary’s connection to national security was dubious.11 Sirica handed down severe sentences to the other defendants in hopes they would cooperate with the Senate’s investigation. Gray’s admission and McCord’s letter made it more difficult for the president and his staff to control the investigation. Nixon therefore relied on executive privilege to protect his administration from further scrutiny. He maintained that a president need not turn over information about confidential discussions with his advisers to congressional or judiciary investigators.12 After the letter and Gray’s statement, Watergate began to gain national attention opening nightly newscasts on a regular basis. Watergate did not make a big splash among conservatives. Most took press secretary Ron Ziegler and Richard Nixon at their word—the breakin was at best a “third rate burglary” and the administration was not involved. However, others noted early on the possible effect that the scandal would have on the Republican Party and the conservative agenda. James Kilpatrick called on Nixon in August 1972 to support candid disclosure about the relationship between his reelection campaign and the suspects. When the Washington Post reported that the administration had ties to Watergate, the caper lost its “funny aspects.” The president should have called for complete disclosure about the event. Failure to clear the air would result in a loss of respect for the president, something Nixon had long sought to earn from the American people.13 In the beginning, the editors at National Review were of mixed opinion about Watergate. William Rusher and Jeffrey Hart thought the incident to be nothing more than campaign antics. William F. Buckley and James Burnham believed there was more to the story. The editors (sans Buckley who chose not to take a position on the break-in because of a personal relationship with E. Howard Hunt) eventually called for complete disclosure about Watergate since all political campaigns engaged in some underhanded tactics. They believed that the actual break-in was like any other campaign effort to infiltrate the opponent’s camp—although in this case perpetrators bungled their attempt. Disclosures about the burglars, however, suggested that somewhere along the line someone wanted to cover up something. Therefore, NR thought Republicans who knew the

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truth should actively participate in the Senate hearings and “the administration should purge itself of any person of whatever level whose relation to the Watergate affair was legally or morally culpable.”14 By 1973, James Kilpatrick and National Review’s editors began to worry about the use of executive privilege to protect the White House from scrutiny. Kilpatrick, who believed Nixon could no longer dismiss Watergate or hope that it would go away, suggested that the president “abandon any notions of ‘executive privilege’ and order his aides to report on the double when Senator Ervin sends a summons.” NR expressed criticism of Nixon for relying on executive privilege to minimize scrutiny of the White House. There was in fact a constitutional issue at stake—the right to rely on the doctrine. Presidents had long used executive privilege, but Nixon seemed to be extending it too far thereby threatening the whole premise of doctrine. Still, Kilpatrick and NR managed to point the finger at the Democrats for allowing the scandal to fester. Clearly, the party wanted to redeem itself after the McGovern debacle.15 While the Democrats could not interest anyone in the caper before the election, with the coming of televised hearings the public became engrossed in the matter. Growing Suspicions of the President’s Malfeasance Executive privilege did not help Richard Nixon or his advisers when James McCord revealed the extent of the administration’s participation in the burglary in his statement to the Ervin Committee. Members of Nixon’s reelection campaign ( John Mitchell, Jeb Magruder, and Charles Colson) and staff (Bob Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and John Dean) subsequently came under suspicion. After McCord’s disclosure, White House aides began to divulge information to federal prosecutors about their involvement in the events or their perjury on behalf of the administration in hopes that cooperation would ensure favorable plea bargains. John Dean, fearing Nixon would make him the scapegoat, agreed to make a statement to the Justice Department and to the Ervin Committee about the administration’s involvement in the cover-up. He informed the president in April 1973 about his intention prompting Nixon to announce that he would permit his aides to testify before the Ervin Committee.16 McCord’s testimony also sparked a more intensive reaction by conservatives. While accepting that the scandal tarnished the administration, they continued to believe that Nixon was not personally involved. Ralph de Toledano found it hard to believe that the president had participated in the planning or the cover-up. The president was “much too astute,

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much too aware of the pitfalls of politics, to have allowed that feckless adventure.” Nixon’s reliance on executive privilege seemed misguided because it did not involve confidential presidential communication because the perpetrators had acted without presidential consent. According to de Toledano, Nixon should force Haldeman to resign and stop wasting his time on the foibles of others.17 Human Events concluded in light of recent revelations it erred in claiming that there were other more important issues to discuss and the Democrats were exaggerating the importance of Watergate. The affair called into question the “integrity of the President.” Nixon had to engage in damage control to preserve his ability to govern by routing out any remaining members of the administration with established ties to Watergate. The president, said the editors, had done “his party and his country a grave disservice by failing to act swiftly on the Watergate issue and to clean out his top White House assistants.”18 William F. Buckley responding to statements by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. about the president and Watergate argued that while Nixon was no fool, loyalty and fidelity to his aides had led to foolish acts. Because of personal feelings, Nixon delayed his response to the Watergate revelations. He should have appointed an independent prosecutor immediately to look into the allegations. Nixon suffered “not only from excessive desire of his friends to please, but from the ravenous appetite of his enemies to harm.” Buckley also believed the debate on Watergate had gotten out of hand and that some form of retreat seemed necessary for the health of the country.19 Nixon announced the resignations of Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman as it became clear that testimony of other aides would tie them to the cover-up on April 30, 1973. He also stated that John Dean and Attorney General Richard Kleindienst had given up their positions. Elliot Richardson was slated to replace Kleindienst, but the Senate would only confirm him if he appointed a special prosecutor to look into Watergate. Hence, Richardson appointed Archibald Cox on May 18, 1973. To limit the damage of the testimony of his former aides to the Ervin Committee or to the new special prosecutor, Nixon issued a statement disavowing any knowledge of the break-in before it happened and any involvement in the cover-up on May 22, 1973. At the same time, he disclosed that the administration had been involved in prior dubious activities to protect national security. Finally, the president acknowledged that he should have paid more attention to the “warning signals” about a cover-up than to the assurances he received from his advisers that the administration was not involved.20

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Before Nixon’s statement on May 22, 1973, conservatives expressed faith that the administration would survive the scandal. Even so, some conservatives conveyed concern about how Watergate would affect Nixon’s ability to lead the nation. James Kilpatrick reaffirmed his belief that the president did not know about all of the shady tactics used during the campaign, but noted that his aides probably did not report the events to him because they thought they did what he wanted. If Nixon took responsibility for the scandal, then he might emerge strengthened by the experience. George Will saw Watergate as ending the Nixon administration’s theme of restoring “faith in the competence and dignity of our political system.” Nixon’s former advisers, as they turned on one another, further damaged the institution of the presidency. His new advisers needed to work on “preserving the President’s ability to govern” before the president had no authority left. Human Events was more concerned that Nixon would fill White House vacancies with left-leaning individuals, abandoning “his post- election determination to steer this country in a conservative direction.” The editors were particularly troubled by the appointment of Leonard Garment as White House counsel. In this position, the liberal Garment would have greater access to the president and a larger impact on proposed legislation. Given the situation, responsible conservatives in Congress needed now more than ever to emphasize to Nixon that they were still interested in seeing the country move in a conservative direction.21 National Review was slightly more optimistic about how Watergate would inf luence future public policy. While the media remained in an uproar about Watergate, the average American cared more about day-today issues like the price of meat. Common sense dictated the response of Middle America; the man on the street knew that the Republic would survive. Nixon needed to regain the initiative he had against his liberal opponents before the crisis. The American people wanted the same things as before—eliminating or redesigning ineffective programs, getting the budget under control, and disciplining the bureaucracy. Democrats kept Watergate f loating to prevent a conservative turn by the White House. The editors expressed some concern that Watergate weakened Nixon’s foreign affairs position. Foreign leaders knew that Nixon needed a diplomatic coup and so they could afford to hold out for more favorable terms.22 Nixon’s statement in May on his involvement in Watergate renewed the faith of some conservatives, but not all believed the president was entirely candid or that the statement would have the desired effect. William F. Buckley thought that wide disbelief would meet Nixon’s reasoning for

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discouraging the Watergate investigation, but perhaps state secrets really were at stake. It would be tempting, according to Buckley, to dismiss Nixon’s latest justification because he had “not acted more credibly” before, but countries—even republics—sometimes did almost anything to protect against an outside threat. Thus, it would be “unfair, unworldly, and altogether reckless automatically to assume at this moment [Nixon was] telling other than the truth.” National Review cautioned conservatives to resist calls for Nixon’s removal from office. If conservatives supported his resignation, it would only impair the president’s ability to recover from the damage caused by his aides and to continue to rule.23 As pressure mounted on Nixon, conservative defenders of the president more frequently raised questions about similar behavior by Democratic leaders. M. Stanton Evans, no fan of Nixon in the past, noted on several occasions that Watergate inf lamed the liberal call for the public’s right to know. The right to know was fine, but only when fairly applied. While not condoning the activities of those involved in Watergate, he wanted to know why the left failed to call for disclosure on campaign espionage during other presidential elections.24 While Russell Kirk could accept that the Nixon administration had botched the handling of the Watergate affair, he thought the attacks on the president remained unjustified. In his view, the liberal press provided a perfect example of the bias and prejudice that members of the Nixon administration had identified as a problem several years before.25 On the other hand, James Kilpatrick thought putting Watergate into perspective by comparing Nixon’s follies with those less reported abuses of his predecessors or political competitors was a mistake. Exposing scandals by Franklin Roosevelt or John Kennedy would not end Watergate as an issue. Conservatives would “gain nothing by peripheral diversions and recollections,” according to Kilpatrick. Nixon’s failings left conservatives with an unhappy prospect; nothing about past behavior could change that. The president was either “crooked” or “inept” depending on whether or not he knew about the break-in. Kilpatrick was not against supporting Nixon, but conservatives needed to be realistic that only the president’s candor could check the problem.26 The White House Tapes The more Richard Nixon tried to distance himself from the Watergate saga the worse the problem became. With each passing day in the summer of 1973, the president looked more and more involved. John Dean’s testimony to the Ervin Committee in June proved especially damaging

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to Nixon and his administration. His prepared comments along with the documents he took from the White House convinced the committee of the administration’s malfeasance. Moreover, his statement shined a light on the president’s involvement and when exactly he knew about a coverup of the White House connection to the burglary. Bob Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and John Mitchell all tried to refute Dean’s testimony in their own statements to the committee. There seemed no way to determine who was telling the truth, until Alexander Butterfield confirmed to Ervin’s staff in July the implications in Dean’s statements that Nixon recorded his conversations.27 Richard Nixon was not the first president to tape his conversations, but he was the first to use a voice-activated system. Before Nixon took office, Lyndon Johnson explained the taping system he implemented that required someone turn on the recorder. Nixon initially removed the system but later changed his mind about taping because he thought the recordings would help maintain his credibility in the face of liberal opposition and assist in writing his memoirs. Technicians installed the new system that went live in February 1971 and remained in place until July 1973. Only Richard Nixon, Bob Haldeman, Lawrence Higby, Alexander Butterfield, and his successor Stephen Bull knew of the tapes existence prior to March 1973. The president certainly never intended for the tapes to be made public.28 Once the public knew about the tapes, it was only a matter of time before the extent of Nixon’s involvement would come to light. After the system became public knowledge, the president failed to follow the advice of his new advisers and destroy the tapes to protect the administration from more scrutiny. Nixon made a valiant effort to refuse the requests of Ervin and Cox for the tapes based on his reading of executive privilege. The president maintained that the senator and the special prosecutor had no right to subpoena the tapes; furthermore, the tapes would simply indicate that he had told the truth. When Nixon refused to volunteer the tapes, Ervin subpoenaed the tapes leaving the courts to resolve the dilemma.29 Conservatives appeared less concerned about the content of the tapes than how the entire scandal would change public policy. Human Events maintained that Nixon was likely to attempt “to ward off possible impeachment” by “co-opting Democratic policies.” Since Nixon had no chance to buy liberal silence on Watergate, he needed to focus on the promises made to conservatives to shore up their support. Moving left would only exacerbate the right’s frustration with the president; evidence suggested that if Nixon turned left in response to the crisis the Republicans

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would call for his resignation to prevent a poor showing in the 1974 midterm elections. Jenkin Lloyd Jones, the editor of the Tulsa Tribune, further argued that the voters’ rejection of McGovern suggested that a majority of Americans did not really support the direction in which Nixon seemed to be headed. Although the GOP was distancing itself from the president because of the scandal that did not mean Middle America had accepted left-liberal theories on social or economic policy.30 National Review and Jeffrey Hart also lamented the possibility that Nixon would lurch leftward because of Watergate. NR observed that while there was no coherent domestic policy emanating from the White House, conservatives needed to be aware of several developments during the summer of 1973. FAP had resurfaced and the president had caved in on federal spending issues The Justice Department adopted “socialworker rhetoric” with respect to the problems of criminal justice instead of taking a tougher stand against offenders. Finally, Washington was abuzz with rumors that former Secretary of State William Rogers, a representative of the Eastern Establishment, would be Nixon’s next appointee to the Supreme Court. These trends, according to Hart in his syndicated column, would anger the president’s supporters who remained opposed to “higher taxes, expanding welfare, busing, and dangerous strategic concessions.” Nixon’s constituency had not changed its mind on these issues just because Watergate caused problems for administration officials.31 As the controversy about executive privilege and the tapes wore on, conservatives began to weigh in on how Nixon should respond. Privately James Burnham concluded during the summer of 1973 that the only measure that would protect conservatism was Nixon’s departure. In a letter to the other National Review editors, he argued that from a national security policy perspective that Watergate could become “a staggering and potentially divisive defeat” for hard-line anticommunists. Signs included postponing the development of new advanced weapons systems, early troop withdrawals from Europe, and the collapse of the dollar internationally. Seeing as Nixon was “politically crippled,” these trends would continue until he left office. Moreover, “if the conservatives allow[ed] themselves to be saddled with Nixon and therefore the Watergate millstone, they [would] be left decimated and isolated.” Conservatives at this point could still repudiate Nixon without repudiating conservative policy. Burnham concluded: “We are not merely pragmatic but philosophic conservatives . . . I find it difficult to see how we can avoid the moral and intellectual duty to repudiate the quality of mind, feeling, and conduct that have been revealed by Watergate.”32 The other editors at NR seemed

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at this point reluctant to follow Burnham’s advice, but it was only a matter of time before they came to a similar conclusion. Publicly, conservatives once again indicated that Richard Nixon misapplied executive privilege to protect the tapes. Although William F. Buckley expressed sympathy for the president’s dilemma, he also recognized that refusal to hand over the tapes would only make Nixon appear more devious. In private conversations, Nixon likely said things (especially about other people) that he did not intend those people or anyone else for that matter to hear. So to avoid unnecessary embarrassment, said Buckley, Nixon should turn the tapes over to two or three impartial men, perhaps retired judges, who would then listen to the tapes to determine what Nixon knew and when he knew it. James Kilpatrick maintained that whatever the outcome of the legal proceedings, Nixon for political purposes would need to release the tapes as a voluntary act. To lead in the future, Kilpatrick believed that Nixon had to surrender the tapes now.33 More importantly conservatives thought the president could no longer rely on time to serve as a great healer. National Review noted Nixon’s “campaign of attrition” would not work because Watergate was so traumatic that it needed resolution before it could end. Nixon had to do more to allay public concerns about Watergate so that the country could avoid three more years of “paralyzed government and a straw-man President.” Sadly, Nixon seemed unwilling to move forward. He ceased dealing with issues facing the country including busing, quotas, an expansive federal bureaucracy, and national defense. Nixon, the editors thought, must tackle these problems, not rely on foreign travel to improve his image.34 Conservatives faced more bad news in late summer when the vice president became embroiled in an entirely different scandal relating to kickbacks he received while serving as governor of Maryland. National Review had previously stated that Spiro Agnew would make a good president if Watergate forced Nixon from office. Nixon’s departure in 1973 or 1974, they thought, could ensure a brighter future for the Republicans because they would have a greater possibility of success in 1976.35 The vice president initially fought the charges by accusing the media of launching a false attack and most conservatives rallied to his defense. However, the Justice Department had a solid case against him and he resigned on October 10, 1973.36 Agnew’s decision dismayed most conservatives. He had personally assured William F. Buckley and others of his innocence. Buckley went so far as to defend him in his syndicated column on more than one occasion. In a speech shortly after Agnew’s departure, Buckley reminded conservatives that their movement was not tied solely to the fate of Agnew or Nixon. As a movement, the conservatives

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were not obligated to salvage the former vice president in order “to salvage [its] own pride.” Conservatives had a duty to apply the principles to Agnew that he so strongly professed when he entered the national political scene. However “dazed and saddened” Agnew’s indiscretions made conservatives, it was important to “rededicate [themselves], without hesitation, with faith, with hope, and with charity” to the fight against liberalism.37 Buckley’s speech was not just directed at Agnew’s failings, but Nixon’s failings as well. Conservatives began to realize that they needed to look beyond the current administration if they wanted their movement to prosper. Whatever loyalties conservative pundits still held for the president began to fade noticeably after Agnew’s resignation. In mid- October 1973 Judge Sirica decided that Nixon had to turn over tapes so he could determine privately which ones pertained to the investigation. The president countered by offering to provide Judge Sirica summaries of the requested tapes, authenticated by Sen. John Stennis, if the special prosecutor would not ask for more tapes. Cox would not agree to Nixon’s terms and he announced on national television why he chose not to accept the offer on October 20, 1973. The special prosecutor maintained that among other things he did not have to take direct orders from anyone except perhaps the attorney general. Furious, Nixon ordered Elliot Richardson, the attorney general, to fire Cox. When he refused and resigned his deputy William Ruckelshaus also refused to follow the president’s order. Ruckelshaus’s departure left Solicitor General Robert Bork to carry out the president’s missive. The president then disbanded the special prosecutor’s office. The so- called Saturday Night Massacre enraged the public; the president’s approval rating dropped significantly because for the first time it truly appeared as though he had something to hide. Within days at least twenty impeachment resolutions emerged on Capitol Hill from different members of Congress. On October 30, 1973, the House voted to conduct an impeachment investigation on a strictly partisan basis—Democrats for and Republicans against.38 Should the President Resign or Fight? Conservatives began to address the impact of impeachment and resignation in late 1973 and early 1974. Most of them thought that Nixon erred in not being more forthcoming about his advisers’ complicity in the Watergate scandal, but few believed that Nixon participated directly in attempts to prevent the government from investigating the burglary. The more important question for conservatives was if and when he

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should resign his office. National Review observed after the Saturday Night Massacre that Nixon might have been the “legal head of the government” but that did not make him “a legitimate ruler.” The president’s thwarting of justice meant few people had confidence in him; nothing he had done abated the situation and even turning over the tapes would probably not help. Nixon’s departure—through resignation not impeachment—might be the only way to end the crisis. 39 Conservatives clearly began to recognize that the longer Nixon stayed in office, the longer they would have to defend him. If he resigned, then at least they could start looking toward future elections. In October 1973, James Kilpatrick called the idea of impeaching the president “pure nonsense.” Impeachment and subsequent trial in the Senate would only paralyze the nation. Kilpatrick did not “condone” Nixon’s mistakes but maintained that history, not the Senate, should be the judge of Nixon’s failings.40 Russell Kirk thought that prominent members of Congress would not and should not support impeachment. They had to recognize that in the end the Senate would not convict Nixon even if the House impeached him. Historically, in past cases of impeachment members of Congress were harmed politically more than the individuals they attacked. More importantly, Congress would not risk setting a precedent where a Democratic Congress took down a Republican president. The repeat of the situation with the parties reversed was one possible outcome, not to mention that such action might render the country powerless on the world stage.41 At the beginning of November 1973, James Kilpatrick changed his position on impeachment primarily due to the events surrounding the disclosure of the 18.5 minute gap in Nixon and Haldeman’s conversation on June 20, 1972. Only an impeachment trial, he said, would “clear the poisonous air and restore a sense of domestic tranquility.” Resignation would not solve the problem or effectively move the country off its “rudderless course.”42 Like Kilpatrick, George Will disagreed with calls for Nixon’s resignation. The president had to be dealt with “through the constitutionally provided channel, impeachment.” Guilt or innocence was not the issue for Will, although he had concluded that Nixon was likely guilty. Resigning at the first sign of discontent would set a precedent “even more injurious to the nation than his dreadful presidency.” If he left under those circumstances, an “informal ‘no confidence’ vote procedure” would have been added to “our tripartite governmental system.” Nixon had to hold his decision on resignation until the House actually impeached him. Then if he resigned, his departure would represent essentially a nolo contendere plea.43

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As conservative intellectuals weighed in on the impeachment and resignation questions, the Republicans in Congress had to determine how and whether they would continue to support the president. Sen. James L. Buckley, while not the first office holder to favor resignation, made a splash in March 1974 with his speech in the Senate Caucus Room calling for Richard Nixon to resign. Buckley’s announcement surprised many mainstream Republicans because they still believed Nixon’s presidency might be saved.44 More importantly, Sen. Buckley’s appeal was unique on the right because he thought the president had already “been stripped of the ability to fulfill his mandate.” Other conservatives thought that Nixon had yet to reach that point. Although he noted his loyal support of the president in the past, Buckley could no longer lend his voice to the Nixon cause because Watergate had created a “crisis of the regime.” Guilt or innocence was not as important as was the country’s ability to move beyond Watergate to more important legislative business. The president’s resignation at this stage would be “an extraordinary act of statesmanship and courage” for it would serve the nation’s best interests. It would allow Nixon’s campaign vision to be fulfilled rather than squandered.45 On March 20, 1974, Jeffrey Hart wrote to William F. Buckley that his brother’s statement seemed to come at just the right time. Hart’s own support for resignation had been unpopular with the readers of his syndicated column. But he suspected that the senator’s statement would legitimize the idea.46 For the most part, however, Sen. Buckley’s proposal received a negative reaction especially in political circles. Howard Phillips, chairman of The Conservative Caucus (a public policy advocacy group) and former Nixon administration official, said that Buckley pulled “a plug out on the President’s most important political reservoir” because remaining conservatives would reexamine whether Nixon could help the movement meet its objectives. Sen. William Brock (R-TN), Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-SC), and Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) all noted that they could not agree with their colleague’s conclusion that the president should resign before the House investigation had run its course. Sen. Barry Goldwater maintained that if more evidence of Nixon’s malfeasance surfaced then he would alter his position. But until that time, Goldwater felt he must continue to support the president. Nor were these members of the Senate the only people to conclude that it was too soon to call for resignation. William Rusher, George Will, and Ronald Reagan made similar comments about the senator’s statement.47 Russell Kirk accepted the sincerity of the calls for Nixon’s resignation especially from his fellow conservatives like Sen. Buckley, but he could not agree with the recommendation. While Nixon’s decision to stay

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might hurt the Republican Party, it was worth the price. If a “hostile majority” in the media and Congress forced the president to resign, then the country would “lose our famous separation of powers in our federal government.” Nixon should not resign and allow such “a permanent enfeeblement of the Presidency.” Kirk also maintained that Nixon had committed no impeachable offense so he was right to wait until Congress had taken further action before making a decision on his future.48 In a column on his brother’s proposal, William F. Buckley defended the idea that resignation was an acceptable constitutional solution to the problem, although he left room for the possibility that the recommendation was misguided. Many politicians cited the potential danger to the Republic if popular opinion not convincing evidence forced Nixon from office. What they failed to realize was that his brother thought there was greater danger to the Republic if Nixon stayed in office. Calling on Nixon “to perform an act of noblesse oblige” was not a misunderstanding of republican government, but an expression of faith in it. National Review also argued in April 1974 that resignation was a legitimate means to resolve the Watergate crisis. While the constitution provided impeachment as a means to remove a president from office, it did not exclude resignation as an option. Nor would resignation somehow weaken the integrity of the presidency. Resignation from political office, like any other resignation, could be taken to preserve the honor of that office.49 While conservatives did not unite on the question of resignation in the spring of 1974, they did agree on the need to make a renewed effort to challenge liberalism. Most conservatives now saw Nixon as an unacceptable leader for their movement and so they began to further distance themselves ideologically from the president. National Review maintained that “what Nixon and his people [had] accomplished [was] to stand athwart history and side track the formation of a new, dynamic, nonliberal majority.” Watergate had brought back a “political establishment that [was] substantially to the left of the nation at large.” James Kilpatrick looked at the budget for FY75 with dismay because it supported the expansion of wasteful domestic programs, while slighting the needs of national security. Continued obsession with Watergate meant that the country’s priorities were out of order.50 As conservatives debated how Watergate would hurt the presidency, the Republican Party, and their movement, the House moved forward with an expanded investigation of the scandal. Nixon finally handed over the tapes covered by the original subpoena. However, those tapes did not put the matter to rest. Leon Jaworski (the new special prosecutor) and the House Judiciary Committee requested additional tapes to supplement

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their investigations. Nixon agreed to provide edited transcripts of those tapes in April. After reviewing the transcripts, Judge Sirica called for the actual tapes reasoning that the transcripts were incomplete. Nixon’s lawyers petitioned the Court of Appeals. Jaworski asked the Supreme Court to review the case immediately, rather than wait for it to go through the standard appeals process. The Justices agreed to hear the case in early July though several members were not inclined to expedite the case. On July 24, 1974, the Supreme Court upheld the doctrine of executive privilege in an 8–0 decision, but also said it did not apply to the case in question.51 Before the Court’s decision, it seemed likely that the House would to vote to impeach Nixon. The evidence against the president appeared overwhelming. Conservative intellectuals could see that the future prospects of the Nixon administration did not look good. At the same time, they remained unconvinced that the tapes would force Nixon from office. According to National Review, the spring release of some tapes pertaining to the Watergate burglary showed that “Nixon [was] much less culpable than [had] been widely assumed.” However, Nixon created the impression that he was guilty and that impression would be hard to shake. James Kilpatrick argued much the same thing when he noted that the tapes were “painfully embarrassing to the president.” They also provided Nixon’s enemies with ample fuel because he said and did “things that [were] less than admirable.” Each gap in the recording only provoked new reservations, but Nixon seemed to emerge from the transcripts’ disclosures in “pretty good shape.” Russell Kirk, after reading the edited transcripts in May, maintained that Nixon did not deliberately obstruct justice and therefore the tapes did not support impeachment. The president participated in the cover-up to the extent “that he did not wish to have the public scandal grow even bigger.” However, most people in his position would have done the same.52 Human Events nonetheless observed that since the release of the tapes in April calls for the president’s resignation increased. The tapes severely damaged Nixon’s credibility even if they did not confirm his guilt or innocence. The president had finally reached the point where he could no longer govern effectively because the image of Nixon on the tapes shook even the most loyal supporters. This Nixon was “seen as one who desperately sought stratagems to cover up the wrongdoing of his key aides.” Moreover, while his instincts were somewhat natural, Nixon and his advisers portrayed a very different situation to the public.53 William F. Buckley observed that Watergate so poisoned the atmosphere that no matter what direction the president took his critics pounced. Sadly, there was “no apparent escape from this rut” because of Nixon’s “political and

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psychological mistakes.” Buckley remained convinced that the only way for Nixon to “dissipate the miasma” would be his “disappearance from the public scene.” The president by not quitting threatened to defeat the mandate for which he proclaimed to be fighting. The partisan nature of the impeachment debate meant that McGovern’s vision for America might be realized through a veto-proof Congress.54 On July 24, 1974—the same day the Supreme Court handed down its decision on executive privilege—the House Judiciary Committee began televised hearings at the end of which 66 percent of Americans polled supported impeachment. The committee adopted three articles of impeachment on obstruction of justice, the abuse of power, and contempt of Congress. It rejected articles on the secret bombing of Cambodia in 1969 and Nixon’s supposed tax evasion. Unlike the original vote in the House to consider impeachment, some Republican members of the committee voted to impeach. On August 5, 1974, Richard Nixon turned over unedited transcripts of the “smoking gun” conversation with Bob Haldeman from June 23, 1972, which clearly demonstrated his complicity in the illegal attempts to hide the burglars’ connection to the White House. After that, the Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee who initially voted against impeachment changed their vote on the first article of impeachment, which charged Nixon with obstruction of justice.55 The release of the unedited version of the “smoking gun” tape left no doubt in the minds of most conservatives that Nixon had obstructed justice. According to James Kilpatrick, the disclosures about his behavior in the summer of 1974 made “Nixon’s duplicity . . . almost beyond bearing” especially for those Americans like himself who believed that the president had told the truth about not knowing about the cover-up. Nixon’s lies were reason enough to see the vice president, Gerald Ford, become president. George Will thought that the Nixon of the tapes was “not quite as thoroughly bad as he came to appear.” However, it was time to stop Watergate from being the country’s “dominating preoccupation.” The people must get to doing what it was they do—“human and civilizing pursuits that have been neglected because the task of getting the government back on the leash demanded a hideously large slice of the Republic’s energies.”56 Nixon’s Resignation and Renewal Facing certain impeachment and likely conviction, Nixon announced his resignation on August 8, 1974, to take effect the following day. The

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previous day, he had met with Sen. Hugh Scott and Sen. Barry Goldwater and Rep. John Rhodes (the minority leader) who confirmed what Nixon already knew—he would not be able to stave off impeachment because he had so little backing left among Republicans in Congress. In his resignation speech on August 9, 1974, Nixon noted his disappointment in leaving a job unfinished, but accepted that he did not have the support to go on as president. He judged that his departure would allow the nation to move forward. He also hoped people would understand that he made his decisions about Watergate with the nation’s best interests at heart.57 Conservatives, no matter where they fell on the question of resignation and impeachment, breathed a sigh of relief on August 9, 1974. Some expressed continued dismay with the bias of the liberal media, while others merely shook their heads at the extent to which the president had continually deceived the American people about his involvement in the Watergate cover-up. However, most agreed with frequent National Review contributor Ernest van den Haag who thought Nixon made the right choice to resign when he did. Although not a fan of resignation, van den Haag admitted that “the cumulative burden of his self-defeating conduct made it imperative that he leave.” Moreover, many conservatives shared William F. Buckley’s conviction that the president brought his fate upon himself. Nixon, said Buckley, gave importance to Watergate through his entirely human though not commendable attempts to cover the White House connection to the break-in.58 Right-minded intellectuals and politicians concurred with the editors of National Review that it was too soon to address effectively Nixon’s contributions in foreign and domestic policy as president. There were in both areas elements that earned praise and elements that deserved criticism, but it would take some time to measure Nixon’s legacy. A new majority still could emerge from the Nixon years, but “its evolution [had] been delayed and perhaps altered by the Watergate experience.”59 Only time would tell what policies proved valuable to American interests as well as what lessons conservatives learned during the Nixon years. Watergate and resignation did not bring the end of Richard Nixon’s public life. As he had done several times before in his career, Nixon staged a comeback. His interviews with David Frost (the British television presenter and satirist) in 1977 and the release of his memoirs in 1978 marked the beginning of Nixon’s return to respectability. William Safire, a speech writer for Nixon during his presidency, noted after the first installment of the Frost interviews that it appeared that Nixon learned something from his Watergate experience. While he took shots at his

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tormentors, he also recognized that had he been in their position he would have acted in the same manner. The former president’s personal growth in turn opened up the possibility that he could put his vast experience to use if only people would listen. Safire concluded that since Nixon posed no threat because his political career was over, his foreign policy advice could be useful to present and future American leaders.60 As Nixon began to rebuild his reputation in the late 1970s, conservatives began to ease their own criticism. While they did not like his policies as president, they appreciated his experience and his forward thinking as the nation faced new foreign policy challenges (some but not all created by his détente policies). They also continually expressed amazement at the success with which Nixon had rebuilt his image. National Review noted at the end of 1978 that his recent public statements showed that the former president intended once again to be an active participant in public policy debates, especially those related to foreign policy. Nixon was decidedly more “hard-line on relations with the Soviets than he was as President.” Clearly, he believed that the leadership class in the United States needed reinvigoration to continue the fight against communism.61 Jeffrey Hart went so far as to confess, in his review of Nixon’s memoirs, that he had come to like Nixon since his resignation in spite of his bad judgment as president. The memoirs proved to be a “tremendous book, rich in concrete detail, a major political event, and as close as we [were] ever likely to get to that sui generis political creature, Richard Nixon.”62 Nixon’s later books on foreign affairs won for the most part favorable reviews from conservatives. William Rusher was critical of Nixon’s The Real War, but noted it was “gratifying to note how totally, in Mr. Nixon’s present opinion at least, American conservatives [had] won the argument.”63 Jeffrey Hart and Brian Crozier agreed that No More Vietnams provided a “penetrating analysis of what went wrong and why.” In fact, Crozier even noted that “more and more, the ex-president whose career was ruined by the Watergate imbroglio [was] emerging as possibly the most important writer in the world on international affairs.”64 John O’ Sullivan (National Review’s editor in the late 1980s and early 1990s) remarked that Seize the Moment was “the right book on the right issue at the right time.” Writing after the fall of the Soviet Union, Nixon came across as a cautious interventionist. In the face of such international change, the former president called for practical idealism while simultaneously advancing the nation’s interests by riding not resisting the waves of change. Nixon—unsuccessful as president—was certainly “the most successful ex-President” in recent years.65

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Richard Nixon’s death on April 22, 1994, did little to change the conservative postscript of his presidency, although his own efforts at rehabilitation clearly tempered conservative opinion. Jonathan Aitkin, who came to know Nixon well in his later years while writing a biography of the former president, wrote in Human Events that “Nixon the man was even more intriguing than Nixon the statesman.” Although Nixon had a dark side, his growth in the post-presidential years would go a long way in determining how history remembered him. His successful rehabilitation came from a new credo that “included several quintessential Nixonian ingredients, among them tenacity, ref lective reading and the desire to perform useful public service by inf luencing great events.”66 George Will was far more critical in his ref lection of the former president. He noted that in Nixon’s “long slog through various valleys of humiliation, to political triumph and disgrace, to partial rehabilitation, there were many episodes of glory, but a constant griminess.” No amount of rehabilitation could take away from the fact that Nixon’s administration expanded the government’s role as “society’s supervisor” more than any other modern president aside from Lyndon Johnson. In addition, Nixon’s foreign policy “probably prolonged the life of the Soviet Union.” Will’s retrospect focused on how Richard Nixon’s nature was unsuitable for politics, which made his pursuit of such a life more difficult and bitter. His personal sense of loss when he resigned was a “terrifying testimony to the toll ambition can take on character.”67 Generally speaking, conservative reaction fell somewhere in between Aitkin and Will. Most commentators cited both the good and bad aspects of Nixon’s life. Syndicated columnist Cal Thomas noted that “Richard Nixon saw his own life as a series of misunderstandings . . . [he] was so often misunderstood because he never gave us a clear vision of himself, possibly because he couldn’t figure out who he was or what people wanted him to be.” Nixon was “difficult to understand” but his self- directed political resurrection provided a lesson in persistence.68 Thomas Sowell, a fellow at the Hoover Institution, looked at Nixon’s life through the eyes of his critics noting, “What Nixon represented was an assault on the whole moral aura with which the New Deal era and its liberal successors surrounded themselves . . . Watergate gave the media their long-awaited chance to destroy him.” Sowell, however, also faulted Nixon for turning to the dirty tricks that opened the door to attack because he was intelligent enough to know that such tactics would bring more harm than good.69 R. Emmett Tyrell, who admitted disdain for Nixon’s presidency, said the former president “inveigled” him into friendship. Nixon, at their first private meeting in San Clemente after his resignation, “was bookish, ref lective, [and] f leetingly religious.” While aspects of his personality 10.1057/9780230102200 - Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon, Sarah Katherine Mergel

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came and went without warning, Tyrell “came to like the Nixon he knew.” In the end, Nixon “was not all that different from the best Democrats of his generation . . . though more interesting.”70 Washington Times columnist Samuel Francis considered it ironic that in death Nixon found praise from some of his political enemies on the left, while the right remained cool to his presidential record. The right’s disdain for Nixon was not surprising, for his resignation left their political movement in shambles. However, the right never revered Nixon for his conservatism but for his antiliberalism. The former president showed conservatives how to build a coalition of voters that “could destroy liberalism.” Nixon’s coalition of Middle Americans proved more historically significant than the measures for which he won praise from his traditional enemies.71 William F. Buckley commended Nixon for his return to public life in the face of such hostility. The former president had no great personal talent; “he had only the force of his own personality, his unswerving determination to succeed, and his mastery of the political craft.” In retirement, Nixon was able to do the things he loved—write, muse, and travel. Moreover, world leaders came to accept that Nixon’s reputation was not solely tied to his presidency. They began to appreciate his understanding of American politics. Buckley concluded “one more remarkable achievement of Richard Nixon [was] how he earned the special affection and admiration of U.S. conservatives without ever significantly advancing their cause.” 72 *

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The retrospectives of Richard Nixon’s life showed that conservatives still had mixed emotions about the effect Nixon’s presidency and resignation had on their movement. Samuel Francis might have been right that resignation left the conservative cause in shambles, but it was a short-term setback. In the late 1970s as Nixon made his comeback, traditional conservatives were building a new coalition to challenge the problems caused by liberalism. Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980 showed the effect of their renewal and expansion on newly conservative voters. Only a few months after Nixon’s death, conservative Republicans headed by Newt Gingrich successfully challenged the liberal tendencies of the early Clinton administration through the “Contract with America.” Richard Nixon’s presidency for all its failures in conservative eyes did indeed have some benefits for the right. Watergate did much harm to the country, but it also provided conservative intellectuals with a new starting point to build support for their views about national security as well as the relationship between the government and the people. 10.1057/9780230102200 - Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon, Sarah Katherine Mergel

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RICHARD NIXON: FRIEND OR FOE OF CONSERVATIVES?

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he process of assessing and reassessing Richard Nixon’s presidency and contribution to the conservative movement began before his resignation on August 9, 1974. Conservatives rallied to support Nixon in 1968 and in 1972—the first time because they thought he would enact conservative policies and the second time because they did not want to see George McGovern elected. However, conservative intellectuals were never entirely comfortable with Richard Nixon as president. Throughout his tenure, conservatives used his administration to help define their movement by seeking ways to distance themselves from Nixon. Conservatives tried to strengthen their cause by showing how his policies were not in line with his campaign statements about personal freedom and individualism. Nixon’s departure from office made their task easier for two reasons. First, as James Kilpatrick noted when Gerald Ford took the oath of office the nation breathed a sigh of relief. Ford’s presidency provided the country with an opportunity for a fresh start and a renewal of civilized society that had been lacking since the Watergate saga began.1 Second, the right no longer felt any need to defend Nixon from attack. Conservatives, according to James Buckley, stayed true to their own principles by not jumping to any conclusions about Nixon’s guilt—only changing their position once the evidence proved them wrong. They felt it more important during Watergate to defend the institution of the presidency than to attack Nixon. However, with Nixon gone they were free once again to renew their challenge against liberalism.2 Although Nixon failed to live up to their expectations in policy and personal conduct, conservative intellectuals found Nixon’s presidency useful in their attempts to broaden their appeal to American voters. Vociferous opposition

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to Nixon while experiencing some insider status proved an integral component in the development of modern conservatism.

Like many of Richard Nixon’s later psycho-biographers, conservatives tried to measure the personal reasons behind Nixon’s policies and actions. Conservative distrust of Nixon dated to the Eisenhower years, but during the 1968 campaign many overcame their objections. Nixon, some thought, had grown wiser in his years away from Washington. Ralph de Toledano suggested that Nixon appealed to voters in 1968 because he had softened the “edges of his personality and his ideology.” Moreover, the right praised Nixon’s political abilities, his prudence, and his organizational skills. 3 As Nixon continually disappointed conservative intellectuals with his policies, they again raised questions about his character and his ability to lead. Positives turned to negatives as conservatives tried to make sense of the policy trends and political happenings under his guidance. Richard Nixon had a mildly conservative populist temperament, according to National Review, but he was committed to neither left nor right. Nixon tended toward realistic not ideological choices.4 Too much realism of course meant a lack of principles, which many conservatives could not accept. The idea that Nixon was not ideologically committed to anything—a feeling many conservatives had in 1960—returned as the president steered left on domestic policy issues and proposed détente with the dreaded communists. Human Events remarked that the Nixon administration appeared “confused and at cross-purposes with itself ” because its leader had no guiding principles. Nixon wanted “to tranquilize the electorate rather than lead in a certain direction.” John R. Coyne suggested in 1972 that centrism in and of itself was not always a bad policy, but such a position left the ideologically committed (on both sides of the political spectrum) without a sense of grounding.5 For conservatives who felt underrepresented in government to begin with, centrism did little to help them pursue their policy objectives. Complaints about Nixon’s ability as a president went beyond his political centrism and pandering to the left. Personal limitations as they related to political ability also troubled conservatives. Frank Meyer concluded in 1971 that Nixon’s surrender to the liberal establishment resulted from a “failure of nerve.” Nixon simply did not have the passion to fight liberalism.6 After the 1972 election, Tom Taggert suggested that Nixon was not a philosopher and he lacked ideological principle. Rather Nixon was “a

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fixer” who enjoyed “tinkering with the machinery of government.” He wanted to make government work, a noble aspiration to be sure. However, he did not have the leadership skills to pursue his goals. To do so Nixon would have needed to articulate values and strategic objectives with nobility, something he could just not accomplish.7 Concern about Nixon’s f laws only grew louder as Watergate took center stage in 1973. George Will argued that Nixon, due to his involvement in partisan politics, had always had a credibility problem. But Nixon’s problems went beyond integrity. His administration had been “awash with self-consciously tough guys.” But only “timid, insecure, scared men [spent] so much time assuring the public and each other that they [were] ‘tough.’ ” Nixon’s advisers were tacky elites who “poisoned the atmosphere of the White House and, eventually, in most of Washington.” As such, few Americans had faith in what the president said about Watergate. Moreover after firing his key aides, Nixon had few friends to help him navigate the storm.8 Conservatives also thought Nixon’s need for greatness hindered his ability to be a truly effective leader. R. Emmett Tyrell likened Nixon to F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Jay Gatsby because the president paid such a high price for pursuing his dream. While the pieces fell around him, Nixon’s dream remained just beyond his reach. Had Nixon been content to be a strong administrator and a “bourgeois gentilhomme,” he would have made a successful president. Unfortunately he had grander illusions— illusions of usurping John Kennedy’s greatness. Recalling Gatsby, Nixon’s single-minded pursuit of his goal pushed him over the line of acceptable behavior. While his predecessors engaged in questionable actions, they never graduated to dirty tricks. He planted the seeds of his own destruction in pursuing his dream.9 James Kilpatrick saw “a certain incongruity” in Nixon’s character as a source of his troubles. “One part of him—the best part—[was] the world statesman, seeking peace. . . . Another part of him—a most regrettable part—[was] the thin- skinned politician, fretting at the gnat- swarm irritations of the press.” Nixon’s personality f laws made him appear paranoid, rather than simply human. Revelations about the Nixon White House showed how absorbed the president became with negative press coverage. What emerged from such disclosures was “a picture of a president suffering from a terrible insecurity.” This insecurity permeated the Watergate saga and caused Nixon to lose sight of the big picture.10 After Nixon’s interviews with David Frost in 1977, William F. Buckley provided perhaps the most biting assessment of Nixon’s character f laws. He said the program revealed so much because it showed how different

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Nixon was from his predecessors and not in the areas of abusing executive power, tramping on other’s rights, or loyalty. Nixon proved to be above all else, stupid. According to Buckley, “He was incapable of reasoning simply from a position taken, over to the consequences of taking it. He could not see that by f logging the hounds of justice and urging them hotly to sniff out wrongdoing, he was setting these hounds upon himself.” Policy aside, Nixon simply could not even after months of self examination find a way to make the American people see his side of the story. Personal limitations, as much as any other factor, led to Watergate and destroyed Nixon’s ability to lead the country in a new direction. Buckley previously observed that in spite of the many efforts to “institutionalize the problems of Richard Nixon,” in the end “the key to the mystery lies in Mr. Nixon’s character.” His bad taste led to the “derivative institutional consequences.” Ideology did not bring down Richard Nixon; his “lack of ethical discrimination” did.11 Nixon a Liberal? Personal limitations might have led to Nixon’s downfall, but his policies were equally if not more galling to conservative intellectuals. He gained a reputation for being a liberal on domestic and economic policy after his resignation. For a man who pledged to reduce the size of government such a designation seems odd. Historians, however, noted his affinity for liberal minded policies such as the instatement of peacetime economic controls, the proposal for a guaranteed annual income, the expansion of food stamp program, the defense of affirmative action, the introduction of the Supplemental Security Insurance program, the support for automatic cost of living increases for social security, and the pitch for national health insurance. Several gave him credit for defying expectations and attempting to improve the lives of Americans through government intervention. But was Nixon really a liberal? More importantly, why did it matter if he was a closet liberal? Nixon, through wage and price controls, abandoned traditional Republican adages of price stability and sound money to keep unemployment low. Regardless of the outcome of controls, historians tended to give Nixon credit for trying. James Kilpatrick had done the same previously, but other conservatives remained less forgiving of full employment budgets and the New Economic Policy. Milton Friedman, Henry Hazlitt, and others assailed controls. For conservatives the free market was the key to a healthy economic system. Nixon’s economic policies demonstrated to conservative intellectuals that the president was at best a centrist.

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M. Stanton Evans lamented the loss of gradualism as Nixon “embraced the full-bodied economic liberalism he was supposedly elected to combat.” Even revenue sharing, which some thought would reduce the size and scope of the federal government, institutionalized “the idea that one set of officials should spend the dollars raised by another.”12 Conservatives who thought that in his second term Nixon would pursue conservative economic policies were sadly mistaken. Nixon tried to reverse some aspects of the NEP, but declining economic conditions pushed him back to controls in late 1973. Moreover, Nixon could not press his calls for reduced spending through such measures as impoundment while fending off criticisms about Watergate. Nixon’s welfare policies, especially the Family Assistance Plan, were a bitter pill for conservatives to swallow. Welfare dependency was an anathema to conservatives for it went against their belief in self-reliance. Government assistance, they thought, should provide only temporary relief. FAP initially looked as though it would restore welfare to its proper place in society. However, the closer conservatives looked the more they felt deceived by the president’s claims about the proposal; Nixon had plied conservatives with rhetoric designed to drum up support. Rightminded intellectuals recognized the politics behind Nixon’s welfare reform proposal, but they still disliked it. As Frank Meyer noted in 1971, conservatives found it difficult to challenge Nixon from the right because he dealt so well with the frustrations of Middle America. Their only hope was to convince the average voter that FAP would harm them more than help them. To a certain extent, conservatives were successful in this endeavor. Their repeated warnings convinced many former supporters to abandon the proposal. FAP continued to be a threat until Nixon’s resignation because the president resurrected it when he felt he needed to placate liberals, which seemed even more insulting to conservatives. Human Events wondered how much the right was expected to take when Nixon had clearly “lost the will to heed” conservative sentiments.13 Conservative intellectuals ultimately took comfort in the fact that through their efforts, Congress never enacted the guaranteed annual income. Nevertheless, it was a challenge to reconcile Nixon’s policy with their theories on the welfare state. Conservative intellectuals also found it difficult to cope with Nixon’s civil rights policies. Nixon said one thing, did another, and then if possible distanced himself from the decision. Conservatives could understand the politics of confusion, but it did not make it any easier for them. Nixon’s pro-Brown, anti-busing stance fit nicely with the conservative conception of civil rights. However, the president’s support for affirmative action

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moved him toward promoting artificial schemes for racial balance. Could Nixon be against government mandated busing and for government intervention in hiring practices? Conservatives could not decide. So rather than attack Nixon’s position on civil rights, they attacked his leadership skills. William F. Buckley argued that he had capitulated to the forces of eastern seaboard liberalism with his approach to race relations. As Frank Meyer noted, Nixon’s “strange maneuverings on forced integration” was but one example of how Nixon left much to be desired as a leader.14 The right wanted to defend Nixon on the merits of his policy, but at the same time because he purposely confused the issue his administration seemed rudderless. Conservative intellectuals believed that Nixon had the ability to lead the country in a more conservative direction on civil rights. When he failed in that respect, they found it difficult to continue supporting his policies. Although the Burger court confounded conservatives with the Roe v. Wade (1973) decision on abortion rights, Nixon’s judicial appointments came across as decidedly more conservative than liberal. On most issues, said National Review, conservatives felt “the requirements of order and stability received a far more favorable hearing from the Nixon Court than from its predecessor.” Nixon’s appointees seemed to live up to his desire to restore judicial restraint. In surveying decisions of the court in mid1973, James Kilpatrick remarked that “The court is acting, in general, just as the conservatives had hoped and the liberals had feared. It is a delightful state of affairs.” Aside from the abortion decision, the court painted “a generally consistent picture of moderation and restraint.” The inf luence of Nixon’s appointees “operate[d] as a palatable restraint upon the judicial activism of the Warren years.” When conservatives had little good to say about the Nixon administration toward the end, they could at least take comfort in the fact that his appointments to the court would outlast him.15 Nixon’s closet liberalism, especially when it came to domestic policy, did matter to conservatives because it was an area in which they expected the president to make a significant rightward shift. Right-minded intellectuals tried, without much satisfaction, to understand why Nixon continually moved left. Most believed that Nixon’s motivation was political; he was trying to co-opt left and right to cast a wide net over the electorate. While they saw the merits of such a policy, they felt that such a policy benefited the left more than the right. Frank Meyer thought Nixon made a mistake when he emulated Benjamin Disraeli. Following the Disraeli model in domestic policy would only lead to “the institutionalization of parasitism going far beyond anything put forward in a liberal

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administration.” The government had no excuse for supporting policies that would continually take from the producing population and give to the nonproducing population.16 Tom Taggert described Nixon’s domestic policies—including FAP and economic controls—as Tory Socialism. Nixon pursued Disraeli’s course because he thought it would help allow him to spend more time on foreign policy issues. Tory Socialism assumed that “the Have-A-Lots and the Have-Nothings [could] both profit at the expense of the Have-A-Littles.” However, the middle class seemed less inclined to play into Nixon’s vision. While willing to support some government programs that might require more taxes, they would only back such programs if they upheld traditional American values. Voters in 1972, Taggert concluded, never wanted Nixon to move left.17 To a great extent, the practical political nature of Nixon’s social policies made it almost impossible to call him a liberal or a conservative. Early in the first administration, National Review observed that Nixon’s desire to appeal to both sides of the political spectrum made “it difficult at times to figure out just what’s what on the Potomac front.”18 Human Events commented it was hard “to think of any Nixonian policies that did not in some way violently wrench long-held Republican beliefs.” Furthermore, under Nixon “many of the conservative principles undergirding the GOP were trampled upon” especially those relating to the budget, controls, welfare, busing, and racial quotas. The editors thought Nixon emerged as more a pragmatist than a liberal.19 And yet, Nixon’s failure to pursue a truly conservative social agenda helped to solidify conservative positions on the issues that mattered the most to those on the right. M. Stanton Evans was correct when he concluded in 1970 that the only positive effect of Nixon’s “conservatism” was that “rhetoric . . . has consequences.” Nixon’s apparent liberalism consolidated liberal policies in the short term. But eventually his “conservatism” would force the electorate “to think in the categories of conservative discourse,” which would prove more lasting than Nixon’s policy initiatives.20 Conservatives tended to ignore the Nixon years when recounting their own growth mostly because they found it hard to accept that even though Nixon chose policies not to their liking, his focus on social issues helped their movement in the end. Perhaps conservatives expected too much from Richard Nixon in the area of social policy. Perhaps they were not realistic enough in their assessment of how hard it would be to challenge liberalism (how likely was it that Nixon could arrest liberalism in its tracks when it was so entrenched in the fabric of government). Perhaps the conservatives’ time had not yet come (maybe the movement needed more time to develop support). Perhaps they misread Nixon’s statements

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because they wanted to believe that their movement was relevant to American life. Whatever the case, conservatives benefited from Nixon’s social policies. At the same time, they benefited from his designation as a liberal. By casting him as a centrist or a liberal, they could put distance between Nixon’s actions and conservative positions during his administration. They could argue that Nixon deceived them about his intentions and thus did not have to admit that they expected too much of him. In the late 1970s, such distance was exactly what the conservatives needed to build a successful political coalition to support Ronald Reagan. Coming to Terms with Nixon’s Foreign Policy Nixon never shook his Watergate legacy, but successfully resurrected himself into an elder statesman starting in the late 1970s. Through several books, articles, meetings, and interviews Nixon capitalized on his foreign policy experience to place him once again in the public eye. By the time of his death in 1994, he had become a wise sage when it came to diplomatic initiatives. The right initially had mixed emotions about the former president’s efforts. Many defended him not from criticism of his actions during Watergate, but from the seeming “transcendent hatred” he inspired.21 Conservative intellectuals remained somewhat critical in the post-presidential years, but eventually they came to accept that Nixon might have something valid to say about international affairs. Like Richard Nixon’s domestic policy, conservatives lamented his foreign policy and could find even fewer reasons to explain it. Détente did not bring the stability Nixon promised. In the 1970s, it appeared to conservatives that the Soviets were outpacing American military development. More importantly, peace in Vietnam was short lived. Only a year after Nixon left office, South Vietnam fell and the United States did nothing to prevent the communist takeover. Détente in Europe brought the Helsinki Agreements legitimizing postwar European borders— exactly what the USSR had wanted. Finally, the communists continued their assault in the Third World. The Middle East remained unstable and Africa had become the latest war zone. In Angola, a former Portuguese colony, the American, Soviets, and Chinese fought to attain dominance. The Soviets and the Chinese outpaced the Americans in the effort because Congress refused to support Ford’s attempts to prevent the forming of a government friendly to the USSR or the PRC. Everywhere conservatives looked Nixon’s foreign policy had wrought only disastrous consequences. William F. Buckley maintained that to consider Nixon’s policy

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triumphant given the world situation might be considered even tasteless. Furthermore, Norman Hannah (a retired diplomat) blamed Nixon for the fall of South Vietnam because the credibility gap he exacerbated while in office led to the reluctance of Americans to continue to support noncommunists in Southeast Asia.22 When Richard Nixon announced that he would return to China in February 1976 to commemorate his historic 1972 visit, conservatives could hardly contain their disdain. National Review said his visit played into the hands of the Chinese who did not like the Ford-Kissinger version of détente. The decision to visit before the 1976 election sent a message that Nixon too was concerned about how Ford practiced the policy. William F. Buckley further observed that Gerald Ford’s precarious hold on foreign policy resulted from the “decomposition of the Presidency” under Nixon. In defending himself during Watergate, Nixon vowed never to do anything that would undermine the presidency, and yet his trip to China damaged Ford’s attempts to deal with the problems he bequeathed him. The Chinese did not consider Nixon a private citizen, but a “leader-in-opposition” and therefore thought they could inf luence American politics by extending an invitation. Nixon’s explanation that good relations were now more important than when he went to China in 1972 was only true because Nixon’s détente allowed the Soviet military to surpass the American military. It was bad enough that Nixon went in 1972, for nominally realpolitik reasons, but now, said Buckley, he had nothing to offer the Chinese, except perhaps his toasts to Mao.23 Although conservatives reconciled themselves to Nixon’s presence as an elder statesman in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they still held his foreign policy in disregard. William Rusher noted during the Reagan years that while it was permissible for Nixon to change his mind about détente, that should not in turn make him a spokesman for conservative opinion. Nixon’s policies “paved the way for the enormous strides Soviet power made” in the 1970s leaving his successors to pick up the pieces. Nixon’s past experience with détente in no way made him right about how Ronald Reagan should deal with the Soviet Union, especially in terms of arms agreements.24 Moreover, as much as conservatives praised Nixon’s hardheaded détente in the 1980s, they still felt his realism left something to be desired. For conservatives, there was always a sense of regret that the man they believed such an ardent anticommunist would in turn leave the country in their minds so vulnerable to communist expansion. The right benefited more politically from their position that détente was a failure than they did from accepting Nixon as an elder statesman. Nixon’s own

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inconsistency in foreign affairs went a long way to explain why conservatives continued to be skeptical of Nixon after his resignation.

Shortly after Richard Nixon resigned, William F. Buckley noted that he confounded the usual ideological and political categories. Conservatives believed above all else in a balanced budget, the free market, and strong national defense. Nixon went against each of those positions with his major policies making it more difficult for conservatives to make their case against liberalism. Nixon’s departure provided conservatives with the opportunity to “regroup” and to press upon the nation “the relevance of the conservative vision.” His deceptions cost the conservatives to be sure, but that did not mean they should stop fighting for the issues that the American people deemed important. William Rusher stated that conservative disaffection with Nixon fostered political activity on the right. Conservatives paid “a price for their long and inexcusable indulgence toward this complex, devious, and singularly unsatisfactory leader,” but he did not end their movement. Although Watergate slowed conservative political development, it could not stop it.25 Conservatives gained from Nixon’s designation as a liberal and in some respect from the failure of détente to bring an era of peace because they could distance themselves from his reputation and recover from the effects of Watergate. Nixon’s downfall ended the ascension of what political journalist E. J. Dionne referred to as “modern” Republicanism— not liberal or conservative, but moderate. Nixon gave liberal choices a right-wing feel, but centrism lost ground in the post-Nixon era paving the way for conservative growth. The failure of the liberals in the 1960s and the moderates in the early 1970s left voters, by the time of Nixon’s resignation, only one direction in which to go. Furthermore, as conservative intellectuals noted during the height of Watergate, Nixon and his centrist advisers were responsible for most of the malfeasance. Conservative and liberal Republicans in some ways were spared from the public’s discontent.26 Mary Brennan and Bruce Schulman, like William Rusher, argued that Watergate was good for conservatives, but in reality conservatives benefited from more than just Watergate in the early 1970s.27 Although conservative intellectuals found much in his policies to complain about, Richard Nixon was good for the conservative movement. His centrism attracted voters disappointed with the direction of the country; he opened the Republican Party to many long-time Democrats. However, his

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administration’s solutions failed to capitalize on the growing challenges the country faced. Conservative intellectuals ultimately used Nixon’s electoral success to make inroads to the silent majority. At the same time, Nixon’s election did not end their outsider status—something they would need to overcome in the future. Conservative intellectuals remained unable to effect policies during Nixon’s tenure that would put an end to liberalism’s inf luence over national policy. The legacy of the right’s experience with Richard Nixon allowed a younger generation of conservatives to come to the forefront of the political fight to secure right-leaning solutions to the nation’s problems. Younger conservatives, with the support of those who had been fighting for the cause since the 1950s, wanted to give the movement an independent political voice. One that would keep them in the Republican Party, but also allow them room to walk away if faced with another Republican like Richard Nixon. Drawing on the ideas of the postwar conservative movement with respect to communism and liberalism, the New Right made an effort to educate Americans (especially those in the center of the electorate) about the conservative cause. Even more politically active than the previous generation of conservatives who still held sway in the movement, the New Right sought to add legitimacy to the cause through the foundation of think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute. According to William Rusher, they also created rightwing publications, mounted a successful campaign against the Equal Rights Amendment, and formed new political organizations for promote their agenda.28 The Old and New Right also recognized that in broadening their appeal they would have to align with other political and social groups in the mid-1970s that were redefining themselves in response to the turbulence of the previous decade. Neoconservatism emerged in the late 1960s in response to what its proponents saw as the misapplication of the social policies to end poverty and discrimination that they helped create. Neoconservatives and traditional conservatives disagreed on the merits of liberal social policy, but they shared belief in the failure of the left to deal effectively with the problems posed by the Cold War. Neoconservatives also shared with conservatives a belief that American democracy should be defended because of its moral superiority and that détente served only to make the problems with the USSR and the PRC worse.29 While the neoconservatives moved more to the right because of foreign policy issues, the Religious Right moved into politics in the 1970s because of their disappointment with changes in American life in recent years that had pulled the country away from the more traditional values

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N I XO N: F R I E N D O R F O E O F C O N S E RVAT I V E S ?

C O N S E RVAT I V E I N T E L L E C T UA L S A N D N I XO N

they revered. Hailing from middle- class, suburban, evangelical Christian backgrounds, religious-minded conservatives looked for a restoration of morality in American culture. Concerned about the growing permissiveness of society, they advocated a respect for life by opposing abortion and promoting respect for traditional family institutions. Moreover, the Religious Right criticized the government for taking over responsibility for tasks once reserved for the family (something that traditional conservatives had long been concerned about).30 In both of these groups, traditional conservatives found allies. While they certainly did not always agree, the experience with Richard Nixon showed many on the right that a unified front with a strong ideological and political voice was a must for future success. In 1976 conservative elements in American society were not quite ready to support one presidential nominee. The New Right supported Ronald Reagan’s challenge to Ford in the Republican primaries. Neoconservatives initially hoped to remain within their old party and looked to Sen. Henry Jackson (D-WA), a liberal on social policy but an opponent of détente. However, Jimmy Carter built a successful campaign centering on his populist appeal and his outsider status, which gave neoconservatives pause when election day rolled around. The Religious Right, on the other hand, found Carter appealing because of his missionary message and his own Christian faith. Carter’s election proved that the country wanted something different in a leader, but he failed to make the most of his outsider status. His moralism might have worked in his favor if Americans saw him as an effective and strong leader. However, Carter’s inability to deal with communism and the economy left many Americans cool to the prospect of his reelection. The conservative coalition in 1980 managed to bridge their remaining differences in hopes of effectively challenging Carter’s brand of liberalism masked in some ways by his evangelical spirit and his initial fiscal restraint. The right realized in Ronald Reagan they had an outsider who exuded strength, optimism, and faith—a seemingly perfect combination to defeat Carter in 1980 and breathe new life into their movement. Traditional conservatives, many of whom had been supporters of Reagan in 1968 and 1976, rallied around him in 1980 because their experience with Richard Nixon taught them not to settle for a candidate who met only some of their requirements for a good president. Conservatives praised Reagan for his fiscal policies as governor of California. More importantly, Reagan provided a contrast to Nixon and Carter in terms of foreign policy. Nixon’s détente as well as Carter’s attack on human rights violations of anticommunist regimes made conservatives wary of a candidate that did

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not promise an aggressive policy toward the communist menace. Ronald Reagan’s victory, like Nixon’s a dozen years earlier filled conservatives with hope; however, this time around reality met with expectations. * *

In the end, William F. Buckley was correct that Richard Nixon did not advance the conservative cause, but so too was Samuel Francis when he wrote that Nixon bequeathed the conservatives a political coalition ready to take on liberalism.31 Conservatives saw places where their message appealed to the electorate, and Nixon’s response to those issues helped the conservatives define their movement in the future. No longer would conservatives accept, as they did in 1968, the closest thing to a conservative that could win a presidential election. Conservative intellectuals and pundits pushed harder than ever for their brethren to put ideology first in choosing a candidate. The movement did not so much change its position on freedom, tradition, or authority, but rather finetuned its approach in light of Nixon’s foreign and domestic policies. Had Richard Nixon not proved such a failure in their eyes, conservative intellectuals might not have distilled their message successfully for the average voter in the late 1970s.

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Endnote Abbreviations ACU: American Conservative Union HE: Human Events Hoover Institution: Hoover Institution Archives NPM: Nixon Presidential Materials NSC: National Security Council POF: President’s Office Files SMOF: Staff Member Office Files WHSF: White House Special File NR: National Review NRB: National Review Bulletin NYT: New York Times Post: Washington Post Star: Washington Star Sun: Baltimore Sun WAR Papers: William A. Rusher Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC WFB Online: William F. Buckley Jr. Online Archive, Hillsdale College, MI WFB Papers: William F. Buckley, Jr. Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, CT

Introduction 1. George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945, paperback edition (Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1998), xv–xvii (hereafter Conservative Intellectual Movement); Jerome L. Himmelstein, To the Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 57. 2. Tevi Troy, Intellectuals and the American Presidency: Philosophers, Jesters or Technicians? (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 12. 3. Steven Hayward, The Age of Reagan: The Fall of the Old Liberal Order, 1964–1980 (Roseville, CA: Prima Publishing, 2001), 231–233.

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NOTES

NOTES

4. For more on the social and political chances of the 1960s, see Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (New York: Bantam, 1993) or Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 5. Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 243, 264–266; Robert R. Tomes, Apocalypse Then: American Intellectuals and the Vietnam War, 1954–1975 (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 81–83, 115. 6. Mary C. Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 60–61. 7. Barry M. Goldwater, “Acceptance Speech, Republican National Convention,” Washington Post (hereafter Post), 7/16/1964. 8. Troy, Intellectuals and the American Presidency, 12–13. 9. John B. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr.: Patron Saint of the Conservatives (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988). 10. Kevin J. Smant, How Great the Triumph: James Burnham, Anticommunism, and the Conservative Movement (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992); Daniel Kelly, James Burnham and the Struggle for the World: A Life (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002). 11. Frank S. Meyer, “Summing Up: Consensus and Divergence,” What Is Conservatism? (New York: Holt Rinehart Winston, 1964), 229–232; Kevin J. Smant, Principles and Heresies: Frank S. Meyer and the Shaping of the American Conservative Movement (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002). 12. William A. Rusher, The Rise of the Right (New York: William Morrow, 1984). 13. Gregory Wolfe, Right Minds: A Sourcebook of American Conservative Thought (Washington, DC: Regnery Books, 1987), 164–165. 14. Russell Kirk, The Sword of Imagination: Memoirs of a Half-Century of Literary Conflict (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1995); Russell Kirk, The Politics of Prudence (Washington, DC: ISI Books, 2004). 15. Lisa Palladino, “Ralph de Toledano ’38: Author, Journalist, Conservative,” Columbia College Today, (May/June 2007); Douglas Martin, “Ralph de Toledano, 90, Writer Known as Nixon Friend, Dies,” New York Times (hereafter NYT ), 2/6/2007. 16. Wolfe, Right Minds, 155. 17. Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 267–272; “Milton Friedman, RIP,” National Review (hereafter NR) 58 (12/18/2006), 16–17; Peter Witonski, “Rough and Tumble among Conservative Economists,” NR 24 (2/4/1972): 91–95, 114. 18. Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 96; Peter Robison, “Lessons from Jeffrey Hart,” Dartmouth Review (6/12/2005). 19. “R(obert) Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.,” Contemporary Authors Online, Gale Literary Resources Database, http://galenet.galegroup.com (hereafter Contemporary Authors Online). The Alternative changed its name to The American Spectator in 1977.

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20. Larry W. Chappell, George F. Will (New York: Twayne, 1997), xiii; Letter, William F. Buckley, Jr. to George F. Will, 3/29/1972, folder 2421, box 277, William F. Buckley, Jr. Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven, CT (hereafter WFB Papers). 21. Tom Wicker, One of Us: The Crisis of the Self-Made Man (New York: Random House, 1991), 76–79. 22. Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, reprint edition (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 92–110 (hereafter Memoirs). 23. Nixon, Memoirs, 245.

1

Richard Nixon: An Electable Conservative?

1. “Martin Luther King,” Human Events (hereafter HE) 28 (4/13/1968): 3; “Columbia Turmoil,” HE 28 (5/4/1968): 4; “When Will the Violence End?” HE 28 (6/15/1968): 1, 4. 2. Frank S. Meyer, “Ten Days in April,” NR 20 (5/7/1968): 453; Frank S. Meyer, “When Governors Cease to Govern. . . . ” NR 20 (6/4/1968): 554; William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Disintegration of the Old Guard,” 7/2/1968, William F. Buckley Jr. Online Archive, Hillsdale College, http://cumulus.hillsdale.edu/buckley (hereafter WFB Online); William F. Buckley, Jr., “Have We Become Ungovernable?” 7/27/1968, The Governor Listeth: A Book of Inspired Political Revelations (New York: Putnam, 1970), 269–271. 3. Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties, 107–108, 125. 4. Russell Kirk, “The Case for Nixon,” New York Times Magazine, 11/6/1960, 19, 113. 5. Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 236–237, 405; Rusher, The Rise of the Right, 87; Frank S. Meyer, “The Politics of the Impossible II: 1960 Election,” NR 7 (12/19/1959): 555. The editors of NR were not unanimous on the need to remain neutral in the 1960 election. For a detailed discussion of the battle between moderate and conservative Republicans over the 1960 platform, see John Andrews, “The Struggle for the Republican Party in 1960,” Historian 59 (Spring 1997). 6. Rusher, The Rise of the Right, 161, 170–171; Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties, 71, 96. 7. Frank S. Meyer, “Thinking Aloud about 1968,” NR 19 (6/13/1967): 640. 8. “The Future of the GOP,” Richard M. Nixon, 9/14/1967, Firing Line Episode 069, Firing Line Television Program Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, CA (hereafter Hoover Institution). 9. Meyer, “Thinking Aloud about 1968,” 640; Frank S. Meyer, “Conservatism and Republican Candidates,” NR 19 (12/12/1967): 1385; Frank S. Meyer, “What Is at Issue in 1968,” NR 20 (7/30/1968): 751. 10. Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties, 121, 125; Meyer, “Conservatism and Republican Candidates,” 1385.

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NOTES

11. Nixon, Memoirs, 259, 263. 12. Patrick J. Buchanan, Right from the Beginning (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988), 320–322. 13. Stephen Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 1962–1972 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 81, 100 (hereafter Nixon, Volume 2). 14. Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999), 27; Ambrose, Nixon, Volume 2, 80; Nixon, Memoirs, 264. 15. Nixon, Memoirs, 279–280; William Safire, Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate Whitehouse (New York: Doubleday, 1975), 42–43; Ambrose, Nixon, Volume 2, 114–116. 16. Nixon, Memoirs, 298, 269; Robert B. Semple, Jr., “Nixon Withholds His Peace Ideas,” NYT, 3/11/1986, 1, 33. 17. Nixon, Memoirs, 268; Richard M. Nixon, “Toward Freedom from Fear,” Nixon Speaks Out (New York: Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee, 1968), 135–152. 18. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume 2, 133. 19. Nixon, “The American Spirit,” Nixon Speaks Out, 48–55; Nixon, “Learning to Share Responsibility,” Nixon Speaks Out, 39–47. 20. Nixon, “A Commitment to Order,” Nixon Speaks Out, 28–28; Nixon, “The Security Gap,” Nixon Speaks Out, 238–244. 21. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume 2, 104, 121, 134–136; Richard J. Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag (Boston: Houghton Miff lin, 1972), 52–65, 210. Whalen left the Nixon team shortly after the election because he felt the campaign organization wasted his talents. Whalen did not want to be part of what he considered a mediocre merchandizing effort. 22. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume 2, 122; Rusher, The Rise of the Right, 201–202; Letter, William F. Buckley to Patrick Buchanan, 1/19/1967, folder: Nitsche, Charles G.-Nixon, Richard M., box 44, WFB Papers. 23. Garry Wills, Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self-Made Man (Boston: Mariner Books, 2002), 192. 24. Robert B. Semple, Jr., “Nixon to Start Quiet Courtship,” NYT, 3/24/1968, 50. 25. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Rocky?” 6/22/1967, WFB Online. 26. Meyer, “Thinking Aloud about 1968,” 640; Meyer, “When Governors Cease to Govern,” 554. 27. Letter, William A. Rusher to William F. Buckley, Jr., 5/23/1968, folder: Interoffice Memos, Apr–Jun 1968, box 50, WFB Papers. William A. Rusher’s writings copyright William A. Rusher, Distinguished Fellow, The Claremont Institute. Emphasis in original. 28. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Inside Report: Nixon and Buckleyism” (undated), folder, Nixon, Richard M., box 40, WFB Papers. 29. Patrick J. Buchanan, “Letter to the Editor: Nixon and the Buckleyites,” NR 18 (4/5/1966): 294.

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30. Ralph de Toledano, “Analyst Nixon and Politician Nixon,” 7/6/1968, King Features Column. 31. M. Stanton Evans, “Warning to GOP,” HE 28 (8/3/1968): 1, 10. 32. Ralph de Toledano, “Which adviser will Nixon listen to this year?” HE 28 (2/3/1968): 7. 33. Wills, Nixon Agonistes, 15–16; Troy, Intellectuals and the American Presidency, 76. 34. “The Future of the GOP,” Firing Line Episode 069, Hoover Institution. 35. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 279–280. For sample communication between the Nixon campaign and William F. Buckley see folder: Nixon, Richard M., box 40, WFB Papers. 36. Rusher, The Rise of the Right, 200–201. 37. Lee Edwards, The Conservative Revolution: The Movement That Remade America (New York: Free Press, 1999), 95–96. 38. Smant, How Great the Triumph, 138; Memo, James Burnham to William F. Buckley, Jr., 3/9/1968, folder: Interoffice Memos, Jan–March 1968, and Memo, Frank S. Meyer to WFB, JR, JB, WFR, AC, WAR, PLB, 5/25/1968, folder: Interoffice Memos, Apr–Jun 1968, box 50, WFB Papers. James Burnham’s writings copyright Stanford University. 39. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume 2, 102–105; Letter, William A. Rusher to William F. Buckley, Jr., 3/21/1968, folder: Interoffice Memos, Jan–March 1968, box 50, WFB Papers. William A. Rusher’s writings copyright William A. Rusher, Distinguished Fellow, The Claremont Institute. 40. Memo, Frank S. Meyer to William F. Buckley, Jr., 3/21/1968, folder: Interoffice Memos, Jan–March 1968, box 50, WFB Papers. 41. Letter, William A. Rusher to William F. Buckley, Jr., 5/23/1968, folder: Interoffice Memos, Apr–Jun 1968, box 50, WFB Papers. William A. Rusher’s writings copyright William A. Rusher, Distinguished Fellow, The Claremont Institute. Emphasis in original. 42. Memo, Frank S. Meyer to WFB, JR, JB, WFR, AC, WAR, PLB, 5/25/1968, folder: Interoffice Memos, Apr–Jun 1968, box 50, WFB Papers. 43. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Notes for the Platform Committee,” The Governor Listeth, 97–102. 44. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume 2, 167–168; Nixon, “The Crusade Against Crime,” Nixon Speaks Out, 131–134. 45. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume 2, 167–168; Nixon, “Vietnam,” Nixon Speaks Out, 234–237; John W. Finney, “Nixon Asks Easing of U.S. War Role,” NYT, 8/2/1968, 1, 16. 46. “Highlights of the Proposed Republican Platform,” NYT, 8/5/1968, 25 and “Excerpts from the Republican Platform Proposed by Committee on Resolutions,” NYT, 8/5/1968, 25–26. 47. “Nixon-Agnew: A Winning Ticket?” HE 28 (8/17/1968): 1, 4; James Kilpatrick, “GOP Emerging Clearly to Right of Center,” Washington Star (hereafter Star), 8/8/1968, A11.

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NOTES

48. Nixon, Memoirs, 309–310; Memo, William A. Rusher to the Editors, 5/3/1968, folder: Interoffice Memos, Apr–Jun 1968, box 50, WFB Papers. William A. Rusher’s writings copyright William A. Rusher, Distinguished Fellow, The Claremont Institute. 49. Nixon, Memoirs, 306–309, 304–305; Wills, Nixon Agonistes, 260–262. Strom Thurmond, a former Democrat, moved to the Republican Party in the mid-1960s as a response to President Johnson’s civil rights policies. Given his long tenure in southern and national politics, he had the ability to control the South’s convention delegates. 50. Wills, Nixon Agonistes, 189–190, 258–259. 51. William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Doubts about Agnew,” 10/22/1968, The Governor Listeth, 55–57. 52. Russell Kirk, “Holds Nixon Task to Out-Appeal Wallace,” New Orleans Times-Picayune (hereafter Times-Picayune), 8/10/1968, (1) 11; William F. Buckley, Jr., “A Look at George Wallace,” 10/29/1968, The Governor Listeth, 57–61; “Nixon,” NR 20 (6/4/1968): 533; Ralph de Toledano, “How the Politicians Will Decide,” 6/7/1968, King Features Column. 53. An early prediction of this sentiment appeared Meyer, “Thinking Aloud about 1968,” 640. For more examples, see Jeffrey Hart, “The New Aesthetics of Politics,” NR 20 (10/8/1968): 1008–1009, 1027; William A. Rusher, “What Happened at Miami Beach?” NR 20 (12/3/1968): 1206, 1208–1209, 1231. 54. Frank S. Meyer, “A Conservative Convention,” NR 20 (8/27/1968): 859. 55. Letter, William A. Rusher to William F. Buckley, Jr. and Priscilla Buckley, 8/3/1968, folder: Interoffice Memos Jul–Sep 1968, box 50, WFB Papers. William A. Rusher’s writings copyright William A. Rusher, Distinguished Fellow, The Claremont Institute. 56. John Ashbrook, “And Anyway Is Wallace a Conservative?” NR 20 (10/22/1968): 1048–1049. John Ashbrook (R-OH) was elected to Congress in 1960. He also helped to found the ACU and served as its chairman from 1966 to 1971. Linda Bridges and John R. Coyne, Jr., Strictly Right: William F. Buckley, Jr. and the American Conservative Movement (New York: Wiley, 2007), 138–139. 57. “Now for the Main Bout,” NR 20 (8/27/1968): 838; “Nixon for Prez,” NR 20 (11/5/1968): 1097–1098. 58. James Kilpatrick, “Wallace ‘Snake-Oil’ Campaign Aid to Johnson,” Star, 3/21/1968, A17; Russell Kirk, “Holds Nixon Task to Out-Appeal Wallace,” Times-Picayune, 8/10/1968, (1) 11; James Kilpatrick, “GOP Heads for Blunder by Ignoring Wallace,” Star, 9/17/1968, A9; Russell Kirk, “Analysis of Wallace as Potential Proxy,” Times-Picayune, 10/25/1968, (1) 13; Buckley, “A Look at George Wallace,” The Governor Listeth, 57–61; William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Role of Wallace,” 10/31/1968, WFB Online; William F. Buckley, Jr., “An Hour with George Wallace (I),” 2/24–25/1968, WFB Online. 59. Wicker, One of Us, 348–350, 354, 357–365.

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60. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume 2, 218–221. 61. Ibid., 221. 62. James Kilpatrick, “Random Notes from the Campaign Trail,” NR 20 (12/3/1698): 1210–1212, 1235. 63. “Conservative Battle Is Hardly Over, But Nixon Victory Provides Great Opportunity,” HE 28 (11/16/1968): 1, 4. 64. M. Stanton Evans, “Why the GOP Must Move Right,” HE 28 (11/23/1968): 1, 6. 65. Frank S. Meyer, “The Mandate of 1968,” NR 20 (11/19/1968): 1170. 66. Ibid.; Russell Kirk, “Nixon Unfettered by Campaign Obligation,” Times-Picayune, 11/9/1968, (1) 11. 67. Letter, William A. Rusher to William F. Buckley, Jr., 11/11/1968, folder, White House—Suggestions and Recommendations for Positions in the Nixon Administration (Oct 1968–April 1969), box 59, WFB Papers. William A. Rusher’s writings copyright William A. Rusher, Distinguished Fellow, The Claremont Institute. 68. ACU/News Press Release, 11/25/1968, folder 23, American Conservative Union, box 2, Henry Regnery Papers, Hoover Institution. 69. “Nixon Tap Days,” National Review Bulletin (hereafter NRB) 20 (11/26/1968): B185. 70. “The Kissinger Appointment,” HE 28 (12/14/1968): 3; “Yost’s Unnerving Views,” HE 29 (1/18/1969): 3; “Capital Bulletin: Nixon’s Appointments,” NRB 21 (1/21/1969): B4–B5. 71. “Nixon’s New Economic Adviser,” HE 28 (12/14/1968): 3; James Kilpatrick, “Nixon Cabinet a Good Republican Cut of Cloth,” Star, 12/17/1968, A17. 72. “Moynihan: Maverick Liberal,” HE 28 (12/21/1968): 4. 73. “Nixon Heading Starboard,” HE 28 (12/21/1968): 3; “Capital Bulletin: Nixon’s Appointments,” NRB 21 (1/21/1969): B4–B5; James Kilpatrick, “Nixon Cabinet a Good Republican Cut of Cloth,” Star, 12/17/1968, A17. 74. Nixon, “I See a Day,” Nixon Speaks Out, 277–291. 75. Richard M. Nixon, “First Inaugural Address,” 1/20/1969, Public Papers of the President, Richard Nixon, 1969 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971). 76. “The Problems on Nixon’s Desk” HE 29 (1/25/1969): 3.

2

Peace with Honor: Ending the Vietnam War

1. From 1969 to 1971, conservatives praised Nixon’s Vietnam policies, while they lambasted his domestic and economic policies. See James Kilpatrick, “Report Card for Richard Nixon,” NR 21 (6/30/1969): 532–537; Frank S. Meyer, “The Future of the Republican Party,” NR 22 12/1/1970): 1271–1273; Frank S. Meyer, “Uneasy Doubts about Nixon,” NR 23 (6/29/1971): 706.

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NOTES

2. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 238–243. 3. Tomes, Apocalypse Then, 83, 115; Smant, Principles and Heresies, 222–227; Smant, How Great the Triumph, 102–110, 127–129. 4. Melvin Small, “The Election of 1968,” Diplomatic History 28 (September 2004): 513; David Greenberg, Nixon’s Shadow (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), 77–79. 5. Robert B. Semple, Jr. “Nixon Developing a Vietnam Stand,” NYT, 4/14/1968, 29. 6. Nixon, Memoirs, 298–301; Robert B. Semple, Jr., “Nixon Withholds His Peace Ideas,” NYT, 3/11/1968, 1, 33. 7. Russell Kirk, “Foreign Affairs as Nixon Strong Point,” Times-Picayune, 11/18/1967, (1) 13; Russell Kirk, “No Room Is Seen for Catchword Aspirant,” Times-Picayune, 12/9/1967, (1) 15. 8. James Burnham, “Which Isolationism Is Your Isolationism,” NR 20 (1/16/1968): 22; Smant, How Great the Triumph, 104–107. 9. James Kilpatrick, “Why We Can’t Quit the Vietnam Struggle Now,” Star, 3/31/1968, G4. 10. “Heavy, Heavy, Over His Head,” NR 20 (12/31/1968): 1306–1307. 11. “What Now in Vietnam?” NR 21 (5/6/1969): 418–421. NR later published comments from Republican politicians such as John Tower, Strom Thurmond, John Ashbrook, and Ronald Reagan in support of the conservative position on Vietnam. 12. Jeffrey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998), 50, 66–67, 72; Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 151–152. 13. Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 85–91; Herring, America’s Longest War, 173–178; Nixon, Memoirs, 348–349. 14. H.R. Haldeman, The Ends of Power (New York: Times Books, 1978), 82–83. 15. Richard M. Nixon, “Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsman,” 7/25/1969, Public Papers of the President, 1969. 16. William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 57–67, 334, 532. 17. Richard M. Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam,” 11/3/1969, Public Papers of the President, 1969; Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 173–175. 18. Henry A. Kissinger, “Beyond the Old Left and the New Right,” Foreign Affairs 78 (May/June 1999): 100–101. 19. Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 107–109; Bundy, A Tangled Web, 296–301, 314–319, 353. 20. “Slow Boat from Vietnam,” NRB 21 (6/25/1969): B92. 21. Russell Kirk, “Nixon Has Achieved What Johnson only Talked About,” The New York Times Magazine, 7/20/1969, 5; James Kilpatrick, “It’s Getting to Be Richard Nixon’s War,” Star, 7/20/1969, G2. 10.1057/9780230102200 - Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon, Sarah Katherine Mergel

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197

22. “The Sands are Running,” NR 21 (7/29/1969): 735–737. 23. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume 2, 299–302. 24. James Kilpatrick, “Voices Raised in Support of Nixon as Drums Roll,” Star, 10/14/1969, A11; R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., “The Moratorium: Some Observations,” The Alternative 3 (November–December 1969): 2, 12; Russell Kirk, “Says South Vietnam Able to Defend Self,” TimesPicayune, 11/9/1969, (3) 4. 25. “The Commander in Chief Reports to the Nation,” NR 21 (11/18/1969): 1153–1154. Shortly after the speech, Henry Kissinger spoke with William F. Buckley and then reported on his conversation with the president. Buckley would have liked a stronger statement, but according to Kissinger he was “very complimentary” and “pleased” with the speech. See Conversation between Henry A. Kissinger and the President, 11/3/1969, box 3, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, Richard M. Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives at College Park, MD (hereafter NPM). 26. Ernest van den Haag, “The Honorable Alternative,” NR 21 (11/18/1969): 1167–1168. Van den Haag emigrated from the Netherlands to the United States in the early 1940s. Gradually van den Haag moved from left to right. He received a Ph.D. in economics, but he frequently taught courses on sociology, psychology, and social philosophy at several New York area universities. His articles for NR as well as for other publications focused on a variety of topics including foreign policy, the minimum wage, feminism, and capital punishment. George H. Nash, “In Memoriam: Ernest van Den Haag (1914–2002),” The University Bookman 43 (Winter 2004). 27. “Nixon on Vietnam,” NR 21 (12/30/1969): 1302; “Conservatives Worried,” HE 30 (1/24/1970): 1, 5. 28. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Summing Up-II,” 12/20/1969, The Governor Listeth, 238–240. 29. M. Stanton Evans, “Administration Politics: Conservatives Get the Words; the Liberals Get All the Action,” Battle Line 4 ( January 1970): 7–9. 30. Frank Johnson, “Foreign Policy: The President’s Weakness in that He Is Not Sure of Himself,” Battle Line 4 ( January 1970): 9–13. 31. HRHD, 4/28/1970; Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 197–198, 210–212; Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 492; Richard M. Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia,” 4/30/1970, Public Papers of the President, Richard Nixon, 1970 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971). 32. Russell Kirk, “Supplying Cambodia Called Way to Peace,” TimesPicayune, 4/27/1970, (1) 11. 33. “U.S. Foreign Policy in Trouble,” HE 30 (4/11/1970): 4; “Cambodia Needs U.S. Military Aid,” HE 30 (5/2/1970): 1, 6. Although the May article was published after Nixon’s speech on Cambodia, it clearly represents the editors pre-announcement position. 10.1057/9780230102200 - Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon, Sarah Katherine Mergel

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34. James Kilpatrick, “Nixon’s Move in Cambodia Has Support of History,” Baltimore Sun (hereafter Sun), 5/5/1970, A21; Russell Kirk, “Political Courage and Cambodia,” Sun, 5/9/1970, A17; Russell Kirk, “U.S. Wins More Than Military Victory in Cambodia,” Sun, 5/25/1970, A11. 35. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 79–80. 36. William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Cambodian Incursion,” 5/5/1970, Inveighing We Will Go (New York: Putnam, 1974), 137–139. 37. “Now Is the Time for All Good Men to Come to the Aid of Their President,” NR 22 (5/19/1970): 500–501. 38. James Kilpatrick, “Guardsmen Aren’t to Blame,” Sun, 5/10/1970, K6. 39. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 80–81; Richard M. Nixon, “Report on the Cambodian Operation,” 6/30/1970, Public Papers of the President, 1970. 40. Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 241–248; Tad Szulc, “Push Cut Short, Pentagon Admits,” NYT, 3/24/1971, 1; Iver Peterson, “On Route 9, An Ambush Every day,” NYT, 3/24/1971, 1; Peter A. Jay, “Saigon Ends Laos Drive; Last Units Withdrawn,” Post, 3/25/1971, A1. 41. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Lam Son 719,” 2/13/1971, Inveighing We Will Go, 143–145; William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Fear of China,” 3/2/1971, Inveighing We Will Go, 145–147. 42. “Laos: Plus and Minus,” NR 23 (4/6/1971): 351; James Kilpatrick, “Nixon’s Speech Was Superb; Will Middle America Listen,” Sun, 4/13/1971, A13. 43. Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 302–308, 316, 323–324; Bundy, A Tangled Web, 307–309, 314–319. 44. “Nixon Should Get Tough with Soviets,” HE 32 (4/15/1972): 1, 5; “The Stakes in Vietnam,” NRB 24 (5/5/1972): B65. 45. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Hour of Decision,” 4/13/1972, WFB Online. Days before Buckley wrote this column Kissinger reported to Nixon that during a recent conversation Buckley indicated he would go “all out to get us support.” The president said that “he was probably pleased to be asked” and Kissinger responded “delighted.” See Conversation between Henry A. Kissinger and the President, 4/9/1972, box 13, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, NPM. 46. Russell Kirk, “Nixon May Bring War to End by Winning It,” Sun, 4/26/1972, A13; Russell Kirk, “Closing Hanoi Ports Long Overdue,” Sun, 5/22/1972, A13. 47. “Richard Nixon’s War,” NR 24 (5/12/1972): 498; “Beginning of the End?” NRB 24 (5/19/1972): B76–B77. 48. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Mr. Nixon’s Speech,” NR 24 (5/26/1972): 606. 49. “The Bombing and Morality,” NR 25 (1/19/1973): 74, 76. 50. William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Remote Mr. Nixon,” 1/6/1973, WFB Online; William F. Buckley, Jr., “Say Wasn’t Nixon Right,” 2/8/1973, WFB Online.

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198

199

51. Bundy, A Tangled Web, 205–206; Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 146–147, 230–236; Tad Szulc, “How Kissinger Did It: Behind the Vietnam Cease-Fire Agreement,” Foreign Affairs 15 (Summer 1974): 24–25. 52. Szulc, “How Kissinger Did It,” 26–31. 53. Ibid., 34–43. 54. “Nixon Peace Move,” NR 24 (2/18/1972): 138–139; “Settlement or Surrender,” NRB 24 (2/11/1972): B17. 55. James Burnham, “I’ll Tell You a Secret,” NR 24 (2/18/1972): 144; James Burnham, “Omelette à la Richard Nixon,” NR 24 (3/17/1972): 279; James Burnham, “Is It All Over in Vietnam?” NR 24 (4/28/1972): 449. 56. “What Nixon Wants,” NR 24 (5/26/1972): 566–568. 57. Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 301, 332; Szulc, “How Kissinger Did It,” 48–51. 58. Bundy, A Tangled Web, 355–358; Szulc, “How Kissinger Did It,” 53–58. 59. “Will Kissinger’s Secret Diplomacy Undermine Saigon?” HE 32 (10/21/1972): 1, 6; “Multiple Dangers in Vietnam Pact,” HE 32 (11/4/1972): 1, 5. 60. “Into the Stretch,” NR 24 (11/10/1972): 1224; “Peace Troubles,” NRB 24 (11/17/1972): B177. On October 25, 1972, Nixon had asked Kissinger to see whether he could convince William F. Buckley to drum up support for the proposed agreement among conservatives. Judging by NR’s negative reaction, Kissinger had little success on this front. See Conversation between Henry A. Kissinger and the President, 10/25/1972, box 16, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, NPM. 61. James Burnham, “Victory, Stalemate, Failure, Defeat?” NR 24 (12/22/1972): 1394. 62. M. Stanton Evans, “At Home,” NRB 24 (11/17/1972): B182. 63. Bundy, A Tangled Web, 360–361; Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 352–368. 64. Szulc, “How Kissinger Did It,” 59–63; Richard M. Nixon, “Address to the Nation Announcing Conclusion of an Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam,” 1/23/1973, Public Papers of the President, Richard Nixon, 1973 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975). 65. James Kilpatrick, “Freedom Furthered by Viet War,” Sun, 1/30/1973, A15. 66. “Only Nixon Resolve Can Make Pact Work,” HE 33 (2/3/1973): 1, 5–6. 67. Russell Kirk, “A Pragmatic President Sets Sights High,” Detroit News, 4/1/1973, 2E; Russell Kirk, “Realism results in a Flexible Policy,” Detroit News, 4/3/1973, 7B. 68. “A Kissinger Plan for North Vietnam,” NR 25 (3/16/1973): 298–299. 69. James Burnham, “Peace, Peace, but Is It Peace?” NR 25 (2/16/1973): 199; James Burnham, “Under Northern Eyes,” NR 25 (3/16/1973): 303; James Burnham, “Cambodia: Prelude or Epilogue?” NR 25 (5/11/1973): 515.

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70. James Burnham, “Joys and Sorrows of Empire,” NR 23 (7/13/1971): 748. For other expressions of concern about America’s withdrawal from world leadership, see James Burnham, “The Great Retreat,” NR 22 (12/15/1970): 1339; Ernest Cuneo, “U.S. Is Retiring as Champion of Free World,” HE 31 (7/31/1971): 1; Frank S. Meyer, “Down the Primrose Path,” NR 23 (9/10/1971). 71. James Burnham, “I’ll Tell You a Secret,” NR 24 (2/18/1972): 144; James Burnham, “Under Northern Eyes,” NR 25 (3/16/1973): 303. 72. “[Cambodia],” NRB 25 (7/27/1973): B105; “End of the Cambodia Chapter,” NR 25 (8/3/1973): 823. 73. “Nixon’s Bombing Authority Must Be Restored,” HE 33 (8/11/1973): 1, 6. 74. William Schneider, Jr., “A National Security Agenda for the Second Administration,” The Alternative 6 (December 1972): 11–12. William Schneider received his Ph.D. from New York University in 1968 in economics. Prior to joining Sen. Buckley’s staff, he worked for the Hudson Institute on issues relating to arms control and economic warfare. James W. Canan, “Conversations with William J. Schneider, Jr.,” Aerospace America ( January 2007), 12–15. 75. Russell Kirk, “US Strategy Bypasses a Weak UN,” Detroit News, 4/4/1973, 7B; Russell Kirk, “ ‘Armed Doctrine’ Is the Foe,” Detroit News, 4/5/1973, 15B. 76. James Burnham, “Everyman His Own Teacher,” NR 25 (4/27/1973): 459.

3

Games Nations Play: Dealing with the Communist Menace

1. Melvin J. Thorne, American Conservative Social Thought since World War II: The Core Ideas (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 57–61, 64–65, 67–68; Himmelstein, To the Right, 24. 2. James Burnham, “The New Left and Right,” NR 20 (7/16/1968): 690; John Patrick Diggins, Up from Communism: Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual History (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 319–321, 332–333; John B. Judis, “Apocalypse Now and Then: James Burnham’s Ambiguous Legacy to American Conservatism,” The New Republic 197 (8/31/1987); Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 77–87. 3. Diggins, Up from Communism, 414–415; Smant, How Great the Triumph, 127–129, 131. 4. Ramesh Ponnuru, “The Fusionist,” NR 54 (6/17/2002): 54–57. 5. Himmelstein, To The Right, 46–50, 57–59; Smant, Principles and Heresies, 43–48, 99–104. 6. R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., “An Interview with Frank S. Meyer,” The Alternative 3 (8/1/1969): 3–4, 13–15.

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7. Thorne, American Conservative Social Thought, 130–131. 8. James Burnham, “Strike Three and Out,” NR 21 (6/3/1969): 531, 557; Charles Benson, “Deterrence through Defense,” NR 23 (3/9/1971): 251–259; “Mr. President, Sir . . . ,” NR 23 (3/9/1971): 240. 9. Robert M. Lawrence and William R. van Cleave, “Assertive Disarmament,” NR 20 (9/10/1968): 898–905. After completing his graduate work in political science, Robert Lawrence held various teaching and research positions. In 1968, he finished a year of research at the Stanford Research Institute before taking a position at the University of Arizona. He frequently partnered with William van Cleave who headed the Defense and Strategic Studies Program at the University of Southern California. “Robert M. Lawrence,” Colorado State University, http:// www.colostate.edu/dept/PoliSci/fac/rl/rl.html (accessed 11/12/2008); “William van Cleave,” Right Web, http://rightweb.irc-online.org/ profile/1376.html (accessed 11/12/2008). 10. “Nixon Worries Asian Experts,” HE 28 (12/28/1968): 3; “Laird’s Alarming Budget Cuts,” HE 30 (1/17/1970): 3; Cato, “Needed: Thunder from the Right,” NR 22 (4/21/1970): 399. 11. Kissinger, “Beyond the Old Left and the New Right,” 104–106; Henry A. Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), Document #4. 12. Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), 29, 33; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 289–305. 13. Richard M. Nixon, “Toasts of the President and President Ceausescu at an Official Dinner at the Council of State in Bucharest,” 8/2/1969, Public Papers of the President, 1969. 14. Adam B. Ulam, Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970–1982 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 39–40; Leonid Brezhnev, Peace, Détente, and Soviet-American Relations: A Collection of Public Statements (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), 150; Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 36–49. 15. Bundy, A Tangled Web, 100–110; Evelyn Goh, “Nixon, Kissinger, and the ‘Soviet Card’ in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971–1974,” Diplomatic History 29 ( June 2005): 476–477. 16. “Nixon’s Chinese Puzzle,” NRB 21 (8/5/1969): B116–B117. 17. Frank S. Meyer, “Mr. Nixon’s Course?” NR 23 (1/26/1971): 86; “The Strategy of Collapse,” Battle Line 5 ( July 1971): 1–4; James Burnham, “The Détente Trap,” NR 25 (9/28/1973): 1046. 18. Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger and H.R. Haldeman from Patrick J. Buchanan, March 12, 1971, folder 3, box 809, National Security Council (hereafter NSC) Name Files, NPM.

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NOTES

19. Nixon, Memoirs, 373–374, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China,” Journal of American History 92 ( June 2005): 110, 114. 20. Bundy, A Tangled Web, 105–109, 165–167; Tucker, “Taiwan Expendable,” 112–113. 21. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Teddy’s Realpolitik,” 3/29/1969, The Governor Listeth, 213–215. 22. Ralph de Toledano, “Is the Nixon Administration Going to Recognize Red China?” HE 31 (1/16/1971): 19. 23. James Burnham, “How to Solve the China Problem,” NR 23 (6/29/1971): 693. 24. James Kilpatrick, “UN Suffers from Too Much Moralism and Illusion,” Sun, 11/19/1970, A21. 25. Tucker, “Taiwan Expendable,” 120–121; Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 315–316. 26. William F. Buckley, Jr., “The New China,” 4/17/1971, WFB Online; William F. Buckley, Jr., “Mr. Nixon’s Long March to China: Preliminaries,” 4/13/1971, Inveighing We Will Go, 77–78. The ACU expressed similar sentiments in May. See “The Face of Evil,” Battle Line 5 (May 1971): 3. 27. James Burnham, “Whose Serve?” NR 23 (5/4/1971): 469. 28. “Nixon’s Peking Diplomacy Imperils Southeast Asia,” HE 31 (5/8/1971): 1, 5. 29. Tucker, “Taiwan Expendable,” 122–123; Bundy, A Tangled Web, 235–238. 30. Richard M. Nixon, “Remarks to the Nation Announcing Acceptance of an Invitation to Visit the People’s Republic of China,” 7/1/5/1971, Public Papers of the President, Richard Nixon, 1971 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972); Reeves, President Nixon, 345–346. 31. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Notes on the China Visit,” 7/20/1971, WFB Online. 32. “The Betrayal of Taiwan: What It Would Mean,” HE 31 (7/31/1971): 3–4; “Will Mao Tse-tung Throw Nixon a Bomb?” HE 31 (8/14/1971): 1, 6. 33. James Kilpatrick, “Nixon’s Chinese Cookie Could Crumble,” Sun, 7/22/1971, A15; James Kilpatrick, “But What’s in It for Us?” Sun, 9/5/1971, K6. 34. Ernest Cuneo, “U.S. Is Retiring as Champion of Free World,” HE 31 (7/31/1971): 1. Ernest Cuneo’s columns occasionally appeared in HE but Cuneo was less a conservative than an ardent Cold Warrior who like the right worried about the U.S. position vis-à-vis the USSR. During World War II he worked for the Office of Strategic Services in Italy and after the war he returned to the practice of law. In the mid-1950s he began his association with the North American Newspaper Alliance. “Ernest L. Cuneo, 82; Owned News Service,” NYT, 3/5/1988.

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203

35. Frank S. Meyer, “Peace in Our Time,” NR 23 (8/10/1971): 873; Frank S. Meyer, “Down the Primrose Path,” NR 23 (9/10/1971). 36. See Memorandum to the President from Henry Kissinger, 8/15/1971, folder 3, box 809, NSC Name Files, NPM; Memorandum to Henry Kissinger from Jeanne W. Davis, 8/12/1971, folder 3, box 809, NSC Name Files, NPM; Memorandum to the President from Ray Price, 8/17/1971 (with attachment), folder 2, box 13, White House Special Files (hereafter WHSF): President’s Office Files (hereafter POF), NPM. 37. “The President’s Dilemma,” NRB 23 (8/17/1971): B121; “Peking In. Taiwan Out?” NR 23 (8/24/1971): 912; William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Secretary of State Marches On,” NR 23 (8/24/1971): 948. 38. Jeffrey Hart, “Taiwan Expulsion Could Be Conservative Last Straw,” HE 31 (10/16/1971): 1. 39. James Kilpatrick, “UN Doesn’t Matter Anyway,” Sun, 8/8/1971, K6. 40. “Vietnam Next? Nixon’s Asian Disaster,” Battle Line 5 (November 1971): 1–3. The ACU believed that since many of the nations that voted for Taiwan’s ouster received foreign aid from the United States. Nixon had a useful tool at his disposal to prevent such defections. 41. “Nixon Responsible for Taiwan Ouster,” HE 31 (11/6/1971): 1, 5–6. For a similar argument, see James Burnham, “Omelette à la Richard Nixon,” NR 24 (3/17/1972): 279. 42. William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Expulsion of Taiwan,” Inveighing We Will Go, 162–167. 43. Jeffrey Hart, “Is Taiwan’s Abandonment Price for Peking Visit?” HE 32 (1/1/1972): 1. 44. “Nixon Peking Diplomacy Causes Ugly Fallout,” HE 31 (11/27/1971): 5. 45. Bundy, A Tangled Web, 304–305; Reeves, President Nixon, 434–438. Mao’s health was not good and although Kissinger had promised the U.S. delegation would not disclose this information it was unclear whether he would meet with Nixon. 46. “Joint Statement Following Discussions with Leaders of the People’s Republic of China,” 2/27/1972, Public Papers of the President, Richard Nixon, 1972 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974). 47. Richard M. Nixon, “Remarks at Andrews Air Force Base on Returning from the People’s Republic of China,” 2/28/1972, Public Papers of the President, 1972. 48. Reeves, President Nixon, 458–459. 49. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Richard Nixon’s Long March,” NR 23 (3/17/1972): 264–266, 268–269. 50. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Veni, Vidi, Victus,” NR 23 (3/17/1972): 258–262. Before the trip, William F. Buckley indicated on Firing Line that that Nixon “is trying to play a very large game with very dangerous and very big stakes. If he brings it off, more power to him. I sincerely hope that he does.” Buckley was not opposed at the time to some form of

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51. 52.

53.

54. 55. 56.

57.

58. 59. 60.

direct communications with the PRC, but the outcome of the visit made him wary of Nixon’s intentions. See “The American Conservatives and Mr. Nixon,” 10/29/1971, Firing Line Episode S0028, Firing Line Television Program Collection, Hoover Institution. William A. Rusher, “Day of Reckoning for Conservatives,” NYT, 3/2/1972, 39. Allan C. Brownfeld, “Taiwan: America’s Moral Dilemma,” The Alternative 5 (May 1972), 7–8. Brownfeld graduated from law school at the College of William and Mary and went on to receive an M.A. in government and politics from the University of Maryland. He had a successful career writing for such publications as HE, The Yale Review, Commonweal, and Modern Age, and writing several books. “Allan C. Brownfeld: The Conservative Curmudgeon,” Fitzgerald Griffin Foundation, http://www.fgf books.com/AllanBrownfeld/aBrownfeldbio.html (accessed 10/27/2008). Eric Brodin, “Report from Hong Kong: Nixon and Mao,” The Alternative 5 (May 1972): 8–10. Brodin emigrated from Sweden to the United States. He did graduate work at the University of California and at the University of Geneva in the fields of political science and international relations. In the early 1970s he was a fellow at the Hoover Institution and a charter member of the Philadelphia Society. According to The Alternative, he was the “alien contributor” for the magazine. “Contributors,” The Alternative 6 (December 1972): 8. Nixon, Memoirs, 369–370; Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 101–103. James Burnham, “Games Nations Play,” NR 21 (12/2/1969): 1219. Anthony H. Harrigan, “Three Concessions We Shouldn’t Make,” NR 21 (12/30/1969): 1311–1314; Anthony H. Harrigan, “The SALT Talks: Round Two,” NR 22 (4/7/1970): 360. Mr. Harrigan is the author, coauthor, and editor of 22 books. Harrigan began writing on foreign policy related issues for the Charleston News and Courier in 1955. In the early 1960s he also worked with the Foreign Policy Research Institute and served as the served as the secretary of the American Security Council’s national strategy committee. In 1970 he became the executive vice president of the Southern States Industrial Council. “Anthony (Hart) Harrigan,” Contemporary Authors Online. Mark Bernard Schneider, “Why Our Defenses Are Down,” NR 22 (5/19/1970): 512–513; Charles Benson, “Deterrence through Defense,” NR 23 (3/9/1971): 251–259; “Mr. President, Sir . . . ,” NR 23 (3/9/1971): 240. William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Extraordinary Patience of Richard Nixon,” 5/29/1971, Inveighing We Will Go, 158–160. “The Strategy of Collapse,” Battle Line 5 ( July 1971): 1–4. Bundy, A Tangled Web, 252–255; Reeves, President Nixon, 353–354, 374, 469.

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61. Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1979), 21–23. 62. Bundy, A Tangled Web, 322–323; “Joint Communiqué Following Discussions with Soviet Leaders,” 5/29/1972, Public Papers of the President, 1972. 63. Richard M. Nixon, “Address to a Joint Session of the Congress on Return from Austria, the Soviet Union, Iran, and Poland,” 6/1/1972, Public Papers of the President, 1972. 64. “Memo to the President,” NR 24 (6/9/1972): cover. 65. “Waiting for a Miracle?” NR 24 (6/9/1972): 623–624, 626. Perhaps the only conservative to consider the SALT agreements in a positive light was Russell Kirk. He noted that the SALT talks were one good example of Nixon’s return to “realistic methods of peace keeping.” See Russell Kirk, “U.S. Strategy Bypasses a Weak UN,” Detroit News, 4/4/1973, 7B. 66. James Kilpatrick, “Distantly, Blood and Caviar,” Sun, 6/4/1972, K6. 67. James Burnham, “The Heart of the Matter,” NR 24 (6/23/1972): 684; James Burnham, “SALT on Whose Tail?” NR 24 (7/21/1972): 788. Based on what Soviet leaders said after the fact, Burnham’s assessment in 1972 proved correct. 68. Brian Crozier, “The End of the Cold War?” NR 25 (3/16/1973): 304–307, 327–328. Like many of his fellow conservatives, Crozier moved from left to right in the 1950s in large part because of the works of James Burnham. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s he served as an adviser for the British intelligence community. He also wrote numerous books on communism and fascism. In 1970, he founded the Institute for the Study of Conf lict. In the 1980s, Crozier became more actively involved with NR when he took over James Burnham’s column “The Protracted Conf lict.” Joseph A. D’Agostino, “Conservative Spotlight: Brian Crozier,” HE (11/26/1999). 69. “What Has SALT Wrought?” NR 24 (6/23/1972): 679. 70. Donald G. Brennan, “When the SALT Hit the Fan,” NR 24 (6/23/1972): 685–692. Brennan, a mathematician and communications theorist, had a long history of writing on arms control related issues. He authored Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (1961), edited Arms Control and Civil Defense (1963) and contributed pro-ABM essays to anthologies in the late 1960s. “Donald (George) Brennan,” Contemporary Authors Online. 71. “Nixon Should Hang Tough at Summit,” HE 33 (6/23/1973): 1, 6; “Behind the Détente Façade,” HE 33 (6/30/1973): 3–4. 72. “Richard at the Summit,” NR 25 (7/6/1973): 719–720; “The New Spirit of Camp David,” NRB 25 (7/13/1973): B100. 73. James Burnham, “What Ever Happened to Horse Trading,” NR 25 (8/31/1973): 953. 74. Bundy, A Tangled Web, 428–429, 434–441.

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75. James Burnham, “Moscow Wins Heads or Tails,” NR 25 (11/9/1973): 1229; James Burnham, “War, Arms, Détente, NATO, Oil,” NR 25 (11/23/1973): 1291. 76. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Mideast Crisis,” 10/18/1973, WFB Online; William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Vindication of Détente?” NR 25 (11/23/1973): 1316. 77. “Will Nixon’s Moscow Trip Undercut Strategic Posture?” HE 34 (6/15/1974): 1; “Summit Leaves U.S.S.R. with Big Nuclear Lead,” HE 34 (7/13/1974): 1, 6; George F. Will, “Chevrolet Summit,” NR 26 (7/19/1974): 800. 78. James Burnham, “Détente (Deletions),” NR 26 (8/2/1974): 857; Smant, How Great the Triumph, 143–144. 79. William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Coils of Détente,” NR 27 (2/28/1975): 240; William F. Buckley, Jr., “Notes on Nixon II,” 5/17/1977, WFB Online; George F. Will, “Kissinger’s Dubious Monument: Détente,” 12/13/1976, The Pursuit of Happiness and Other Sobering Thoughts (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 300–302. 80. James Burnham, “The Logic of Détente,” NR 27 (8/15/1975): 873; James Burnham, “The Dialectics of Détente,” NR 27 (8/29/1975): 928; Daniel O. Graham, “Détente Adieu,” NR 28 (9/3/1976): 946–950. Graham joined the U.S. Army in 1946 and worked in various positions related to military intelligence mostly in Southeast Asia. From 1970 to 1973 he was the deputy director for estimates at the Defense Intelligence Agency; he then went on to serve in the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. In the late 1970s he also began writing studies on national security policy. “Daniel O(rrin) Graham,” Contemporary Authors Online. 81. Smant, How Great the Triumph, 144. 82. George F. Will, “The World Role of the United States,” The Alternative 5 (November 1971): 8–14.

4

Umpire or Player: Nixon’s Economic Games

1. All inf lation and unemployment figures courtesy of Inf lation Statistics for Advancing Countries, World Economic Outlook Database (September 2000), International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/ external/pubs/ft/weo/2000/2/data/index.htm#7 (accessed 2/13/2009) and Historical Unemployment Rates, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http:// www.bls.gov/data/sa.htm (accessed 2/13/2009). 2. Nixon, “A New Direction for America’s Economy,” Nixon Speaks Out, 89–102; Nixon, “The Threat to the American Economy,” Nixon Speaks Out, 103–105. 3. “The Economic Crisis,” Milton Friedman, January 9, 1968, Firing Line Episode 083, Firing Line Television Program Collection, Hoover

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4.

5. 6. 7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12. 13.

207

Institution; Thorne, American Conservative Social Thought since World War II, 113–117. Michael Clurman, “A Soft-Hearted Defense of Capitalism,” The Alternative 5 (March 1972): 5–8; David E. Lindsay, “In Defense of the Free Market,” The Alternative 5 (March 1972): 8–9. Michael Clurman received his M.A. in economics from Harvard and went to work for a firm in Boston to do research on the computer industry. David Lindsay studied with Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago and after receiving his Ph.D. he went on to teach economics at Macalaster College in Minnesota. “Contributors,” The Alternative 5 (March 1972). Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 267–268. “The Economic Crisis,” Firing Line Episode 083, Hoover Institution. Milton Friedman, “The Role of Monetary Policy,” American Economic Review 58 (March 1968): 1–17; Milton Friedman, “Memo to Richard Nixon: The Role of Monetary Policy,” NR 20 (12/17/1968): 1268–1269. “The Economic Crisis,” Firing Line Episode 083, Hoover Institution; Milton Friedman, “The Case for Monetary Rule,” Newsweek 79 (2/7/1972): 67. Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 270–271; Peter Witonski, “Rough and Tumble among Conservative Economists,” NR 24 (2/4/1972): 91–95, 114. Henry Hazlitt, “President Nixon Should Let Income Surtax Expire,” HE 29 (4/19/1969): 7; Henry Hazlitt, “Is ‘Age of Inf lation’ Coming to an End,” HE 29 (6/7/1969): 11; Henry Hazlitt, “Republican Economics? Spending Up, No Tax Cut, But a ‘Balanced’ Budget . . . ,” Battle Line 4 ( January 1970): 13–16; Henry Hazlitt, “Nixon’s Economic Dilemma,” NR 22 (12/15/1970): 1351. William F. Buckley, Jr., “[untitled],” 1/22/1970, Inveighing We Will Go, 299–300; William F. Buckley, Jr., “Mr. Nixon on Inf lation,” 6/20/1970, Inveighing We Will Go, 300–302; James Kilpatrick, “A Cure Worse Than the Disease,” Sun, 11/29/1970, K6; William A. Rusher, “WagePrice Curbs a Socialist Fraud,” Sun, 9/8/1973, A17; Victor Riesel, “Nixon’s Economic Strategy,” HE 29 (6/28/1969): 11. Like many conservatives, Riesel moved from left to right in the wake of World War II and started writing for the Hearst Syndicate in 1945. Many of his columns dealt with the problems of communism and racketeering within American labor unions. “Victor Riesel,” The Scribner Encyclopedia of American Lives, Volume 4: 1994–1996 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2001). Allen J. Matusow, Nixon’s Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars, and Votes (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998), 303–305. Michael Genovese, The Nixon Presidency: Power and Politics in Turbulent Times (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 64; Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 14–16, 84–87, 201–202.

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NOTES

NOTES

14. Genovese, The Nixon Presidency, 67; Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 16–18; Leonard Silk, Nixonomics: How the Dismal Science of Free Enterprise became the Black Art of Controls (New York: Praeger, 1972), 4–7. 15. “Nixon Reportedly Says He Is Now a Keynesian,” NYT, 1/17/1971, 19; Genovese, The Nixon Presidency, 68; Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 90–92; Wicker, One of Us, 550–551. 16. Genovese, The Nixon Presidency, 69; Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 138–140; Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 117, 125–126. 17. Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 214–219; Reeves, President Nixon, 566–568. 18. Wicker, One of Us, 412, 524–529. 19. Genovese, The Nixon Presidency, 62–63; Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 3–4. 20. Memorandum to the President from John R. Brown, 6/3/1969 (with attachments), folder 3, box 2, WHSF: POF, NPM. 21. “Nixon’s New Economic Advisor,” HE 28 (12/14/1968): 3; James Kilpatrick, “Nixon Cabinet a Good Republican Cut of Cloth,” Star, 12/17/1968, A17. 22. Alan B. Somers, “Nixon as a Liberal and What We Can Do,” The Alternative 2 (February–March 1969): 5; Henry Hazlitt, “Is ‘Age of Inf lation’ Coming to an End,” HE 29 (6/7/1969): 11. Alan Somers attended Indiana University with R. Emmett Tyrrell. Prior to going to Indiana’s medical school and later becoming a neurologist, Somers was a member of the 1960 Olympic Swimming Team. He held both American and World records. “Contributors: R. Emmett Tyrrell with Alan B. Somers,” The American Spectator, http://www.spectator.org/ (accessed 11/15/2008). 23. Memorandum to the President from John R. Brown, 6/3/1969 (with attachments), folder 3, box 2, WHSF: POF, NPM. 24. Henry Hazlitt, “Should the Government Provide Jobs?” HE 31 (1/16/1971): 13, 17. 25. Henry Hazlitt, “President Nixon Should Let Income Surtax Expire,” HE 29 (4/19/1969): 7; “Disappointing Budget Cuts,” HE 29 (4/26/1969): 3; “Nixon’s Cultural Boondoggle,” HE 29 (12/20/1969): 3. 26. Henry Hazlitt, “Republican Economics?” Battle Line 4 ( January 1970): 13–16. 27. Milton Friedman, “The Inf lationary Fed,” Newsweek 73 (1/20/1969): 78; Milton Friedman, “Money and Inf lation,” Newsweek 73 (5/26/1969): 105; Milton Friedman, “Economic Perspective,” Newsweek 74 (12/22/1969): 75. Within the administration, there was also concern that the Fed might overreact. George Schultz called on the president to encourage the Fed to return to a gradualist policy in October. Nixon forwarded the suggestion to Arthur Burns. See Memorandum to the President from John D. Ehrlichman, 10/7/1969 (with attachments), folder 2, box 3, WHSF: POF, NPM.

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208

209

28. “The Old Champ Wins Again,” NR 22 (4/21/1970): 391–392. 29. Milton Friedman, “Burns and Guidelines,” Newsweek 75 (6/15/1970): 86; Milton Friedman, “Monetary Overheating?” Newsweek 76 (7/6/1970): 75. 30. “GOP ‘72 Strategy . . . Leftward or Rightward?” Battle Line 4 (November 1970): 1–3; “Economics and Elections,” NR 22 (12/1/1970): 1250. 31. Memorandum for the President’s File from George P. Schultz, 11/19/1970, folder, Beginning December 6, 1970, box 83, WHSF: POF, NPM. Haldeman recorded that Nixon “had a good talk with Milton Friedman. And said after it was nice to have someone say we’re doing things right.” See HRHD, 11/19/1970. 32. Milton Friedman, “Steady As You Go,” Newsweek 78 (7/26/1971): 62. 33. “Richard Nixon and the Young Conservatives,” 6/16/1972, Firing Line Episode S0052, Hoover Institution. 34. Richard M. Nixon, “Annual Budget Message to Congress, Fiscal Year 1972,” 1/29/1971, Public Papers of the President, 1971. 35. Henry Hazlitt, “New Gamble With Inf lation,” HE 31 (1/23/1971): 8. 36. “Unemployment: No Real Crisis,” HE 31 (1/23/1971): 3. 37. Frank S. Meyer, “Mr. Nixon’s Course?” NR 23 (1/26/1971): 86. 38. Richard M. Nixon, “Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1972,” 1/29/1971, Public Papers of the President, 1971. 39. “Nixon’s Address Strikes Encouraging Note,” HE 31 (1/30/1971): 1; “Davis-Bacon Should Be Repealed Altogether,” HE 31 (3/6/1971): 6; “Who’s Doing the Driving?” Battle Line 5 (February 1971): 1–2, 6. 40. Henry Hazlitt, “Budget Deficits Will Not Bring Prosperity,” HE 31 (2/13/1971): 1, 4; James Kilpatrick, “Has Our Skipper Lost Compass and Chart?” Sun, 2/23/1971, A14; James Kilpatrick, “Nixon Is in Trouble, But What Can He Do?” Sun, 3/23/1971, A11; William A. Rusher to William F. Buckley, Jr., 2/9/1972, folder 1093, box 16, WFB Papers. William A. Rusher’s writings copyright William A. Rusher, Distinguished Fellow, The Claremont Institute. 41. “American Conservatives Confront 1972,” Southern Educational Communications Association Program, 1/5/1972, Firing Line Television Program Collection, Hoover Institution. 42. Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 17–18, 88–89, 101–116. 43. Reeves, President Nixon, 355–360. 44. Roger Leroy Miller and Raburn M. Williams, The New Economics of Richard Nixon: Freezes, Floats, and Fiscal Policy (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 1–2. 45. Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 124–125, 154–160, 166–174, 220–221, 253–254. Gold standard here refers to the Bretton Woods arrangements not the nineteenth-century gold standard in which gold was the only official currency for international trade. 46. James Kilpatrick, “The Free Economy Is Gone,” Sun, 8/22/1971, K6; “Will Wage-Price Controls Be Permanent?” HE 31 (8/28/1971): 1, 5;

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47.

48. 49.

50. 51. 52. 53.

54.

55.

56.

57. 58. 59.

Henry Hazlitt, “Can U.S. Escape Regimented Economy?” HE 31 (9/4/1971): 21–22. Milton Friedman, “Why the Freeze Is a Mistake,” Newsweek 78 (8/30/1971): 22; Milton Friedman, “Last Readings on the Old Game Plan,” Newsweek 78 (9/27/1971): 95; Milton Friedman, “First Readings on the New Game Plan,” Newsweek 78 (11/8/1971): 100; Milton Friedman, “Will the Kettle Explode?” Newsweek 78 (10/18/1971): 30. “What I Will Not Do,” Battle Line 5 (September 1971): 1–2, 7. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Goodbye Milton Friedman,” NR 23 (9/10/1971): 1010; “Richard Nixon’s NEP,” NR 23 (9/10/1971): 969; “There’s also the Risk of Frostbite, Mr. President,” NR 23 (9/10/1971): 969–970. “Mr. Nixon’s New Election Policy,” NRB 23 (9/17/1971): B137; “An NEP of a Different Color,” NR 23 (9/24/1971): 1043–1044. “Phase Two,” NRB 23 (10/29/1971): B164-B165; “Stop It Now,” NR 23 (11/5/1971): 1218–1219. Frank S. Meyer, “The Rhetoric of Phase II,” NR 23 (11/5/1971): 1240. “II, III, Many Phases,” NR 23 (12/10/1971); “Phase II: Whose Pill?” NR 23 (12/17/1971): 1391–1392; “Phase III Coming Up,” NR 24 (1/21/1972): 25; “Poor Old New Economic Policy,” NR 24 (4/14/1972); “Monetarism Reconsidered,” NR 24 (5/12/1972): 500–501. Milton Friedman, “Morality and Controls,” The Freeman 22 ( January 1972): 29–32; Milton Friedman, “Controls: An Exercise in Futility,” Newsweek 79 (5/22/1972): 86. Percy L. Greaves, Jr., “From Price Control to Valley Forge, 1777–1778,” The Freeman 22 (February 1972): 81–84. After a long career as an economic consultant and writer (including positions with U.S. News in the 1930s, with the Foundation for Freedom in the 1940s, and the Christian Freedom Foundation in the 1950s, and the Foundation for Economic Education in the early 1960s), Percy Greaves took a position as the Armstrong Professor of Economics at the University of Plano that he held until 1971. Many of his publications especially those written after he left the academic world focused on the work of Ludwig von Mises. “Percy L(aurie) Greaves, Jr.,” Contemporary Authors Online. “The Failure of Controls,” Battle Line 7 ( January 1973): 1–2; “Phasing Out,” NR 25 (2/2/1973): 132–133; Milton Friedman. “Perspective on Controls,” Newsweek 81 (1/29/1973): 58. “More Controls Coming?” NR 25 (4/13/1973): 408. James Kilpatrick, “Freeze Prompts Flood of Oxymorons,” Sun, 6/19/1973, A14; Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 239. Henry Hazlitt, “The Mania for Price Controls,” HE 33 (6/30/1973): 1, 6. Paul McCracken had previously noted that controls would likely “distort our pricing system and produce many other undesirable side effects, such as black and gray markets and inf luence peddling.” See Memorandum to the President from Paul W. McCracken, 12/19/1969; folder 2, box 4, WHSF: POF, NPM.

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60. “Hooked on Controls?” NR 25 (7/6/1973): 722; Henry Hazlitt, “Phase IV: ‘A Mitigated Disaster’,” HE 33 (7/28/1973): 1, 6. 61. Henry Hazlitt, “The Oil Shortage Is the Government’s Fault,” HE 33 (12/22/1973): 9. 62. Buckley, “Notes for the Platform Committee,” The Governor Listeth, 97–102; Henry Hazlitt, “Dollars at a Discount,” NR 23 (6/1/1971): 591–592; Henry Hazlitt, “IMF: World Inf lation Factory,” The Freeman 21 (August 1972): 463–471. 63. “The President ‘Does Something,’ ” NRB 23 (8/31/1971): B129. 64. Frank S. Meyer, “Down the Primrose Path,” NR 23 (9/10/1971); Frank S. Meyer, “The Rhetoric of Phase II,” NR 23 (11/5/1971): 1240. 65. Henry Hazlitt, “Dollars at a Discount,” NR 23 (6/1/1971): 591–592; Henry Hazlitt, “Can U.S. Escape Regimented Economy?” HE 31 (9/4/1971): 21–22; Henry Hazlitt, “IMF: World Inf lation Factory,” The Freeman 21 (August 1972): 463–471. 66. Milton Friedman, “Keep the Dollar Free,” Newsweek 78 (12/20/1971): 83; Milton Friedman, “A Dramatic Experiment,” Newsweek 84 (4/1/1974): 65; Milton Friedman, “The Price of Gold,” Newsweek 84 (4/22/1974): 97. 67. “The Administration: The New Nixonomics,” Battle Line 4 ( January 1970): 3–5. 68. “Counterrevolution,” NR 25 (2/16/1973): 192–193. 69. Wayne H. Valis, “The Nixon Budget,” The Alternative 6 (May 1973): 3–4. Valis served as the editor of the Intercollegiate Review, a conservative publication, from 1969 to 1972; he worked brief ly for the American Enterprise Institute with the Director of Legislative Analysis. He joined the Nixon White House in 1973 and stayed on during the Ford administration where he served as the Director of Research and Planning, Office of Public Liaison. “Wayne H. Valis, Biographical Information,” Gerald R. Ford Library, http://www.ford.utexas.edu/LIBRARY/ (accessed 10/27/2008). 70. Milton Friedman, “The Nixon Budget,” Newsweek 81 (4/2/1973): 82. 71. “Watergate: Shifting Perspectives,” NR 25 (5/25/1973): 565–566. 72. “Why Were All Those Republicans Cheering,” HE 34 (2/9/1974): 1, 6; “Budget: Retreat from Fiscal Responsibility,” HE 34 (2/16/1974): 1, 5; Richard M. Nixon, “Annual Budget Message to Congress, Fiscal Year 1975,” 2/4/1974, Public Papers of the President, Richard Nixon, 1974 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975). 73. James Kilpatrick, “We Feed on Watergate Ignoring Important Issues,” Sun, 3/17/1974, K5. 74. Richard M. Nixon, “Special Message to the Congress on Sharing Federal Revenues With the States,” 8/13/1969, Public Papers of the President, 1969. 75. James Kilpatrick, “Nixon Proposes a New Humanism,” Star, 8/11/1969, A7; James Kilpatrick, “Nixon’s Plan Invites a Power Free-For-All,”

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76.

77. 78.

79. 80.

81. 82. 83. 84.

Sun, 1/28/1971, A15; “Can Nixon’s Welfare Plan Work?” HE 29 (8/23/1969): 1, 4–5. “Nixon Gets to the Nitty Gritty,” NRB 21 (9/2/1969): B132–B133; “Nixonology,” NR 23 (2/23/1971): 180, 182; “Newest Nixon,” NRB 23 (2/16/1971): B17; Memorandum to H.R. Haldeman from Patrick J. Buchanan, January 15, 1971 (with comments), folder 1, box 9, WHSF: POF, NPM. William F. Buckley, Jr., “State of the Union,” 2/2/1971, Inveighing We Will Go, 256–258. “The President and His Allies,” NRB 23 (2/2/1971): B9; Letter, William A. Rusher to WFB, PB, JB, JH and FSM, 2/3/1971, folder 4, box 121, William A. Rusher Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC (hereafter WAR Papers). William A. Rusher’s writings copyright William A. Rusher, Distinguished Fellow, The Claremont Institute. “Will Congress Block Revenue Sharing?” HE 31 (2/6/1971): 1; “Disturbing Trends in Domestic Policy,” HE 31 (3/6/1971): 1. Frank S. Meyer, “Nixon’s Domestic Program,” NR 23 (3/9/1971): 262; Russell Kirk, “Revenue Sharing Kills Federalism,” Sun, 1/15/1973, A11; M. Stanton Evans, “Submerging the Republican Majority: The First 1,000 Days of Richard Nixon;” folder 2, box 30, WAR Papers. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 195. M. Stanton Evans, “Submerging the Republican Majority: The First 1,000 Days of Richard Nixon,” folder 2, box 30, WAR Papers. “An Assessment of the Nixon Administration,” HE 34 (8/17/1974): 5. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Ford and Conservatism,” 9/3/1974, WFB Online.

5

Perpetuating the Follies of the Past: Welfare Reform and Race Relations

1. “Nixon-Agnew: A Winning Ticket?” HE 28 (7/17/1968): 1, 4; James Kilpatrick, “Richard Nixon: He’s Still the One,” Star, 10/27/1968, C4; Frank S. Meyer, “The Mandate of 1968,” NR 20 (11/19/1968): 1170; “Nixon for Prez,” NR 20 (11/5/1968): 1097–1098. 2. Himmelstein, To the Right, 13–14, 24, 30, 49–50; Kirk, The Politics of Prudence, 221, Thorne, American Conservative Thought since World War II, 103. 3. Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 256–258. 4. George F. Will, “The Conservative Critique of the Welfare State,” The Alternative 5 (October 1971): 5–8, 23. 5. Smant, How Great the Triumph, 118–119; Will Herberg, “We Are All Guilty: The Great Society and the American Constitution,” Modern Age 11 (Summer 1967): 231–235; L. Brent Bozell, “The Unwritten Constitution,” Did You Ever See a Dream Walking: American Conservative

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6.

7.

8. 9.

10. 11.

12.

13.

14. 15.

16. 17. 18.

213

Thought in the Twentieth Century (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), 52–74. Herberg was a professor of philosophy and culture at Drew University. He contributed articles to both NR and New Republic. Bozell began his career as a speechwriter for Sen. Joseph McCarthy. He co-authored McCarthy and His Enemies with William F. Buckley. From 1955 to 1964, he worked at NR as an editor and columnist. In 1965, he founded Triumph. Wolfe, Right Minds, 145–146, 162. Nancy MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Workplace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 36, 44–51; Smant, Principles and Heresies, 203–211; Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 260–262. Frank S. Meyer, “The Negro Revolution,” NR 14 (6/17/1963): 496; “Doomed Revolution,” NRB (2/18/1964) as cited in Smant, Principles and Heresies, 209, 368; William F. Buckley, Jr., “A Playboy Interview,” 5/1/1970, Inveighing We Will Go, 15–64. Smant said in his footnotes that William F. Buckley informed him that Burnham wrote most Bulletin lead editorials. “The Fruits of Integration,” NR 22 (2/10/1970): 122. MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough, 63; Smant, Principles and Heresies, 208; James Kilpatrick, “Brown Righted Wrongs, But It Is Still Bad Law.” Sun, 5/12/1974, K5. MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough, 62–63. Jeffrey Hart, “The Negro in the City,” NR 20 (6/18/1968): 603–606, 623 as cited in Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 264; Will Herberg, “America’s ‘Negro Problem’ in Historical Perspective,” The Intercollegiate Review 7 (Summer 1971): 207–214; Frank S. Meyer, “Showdown with Insurrection,” NR 20 (1/16/1968): 36. Himmelstein, To The Right, 30; Kirk, The Politics of Prudence, 22–23; Nash, Conservative Intellectual Movement, 264–267; Thorne, American Conservative Thought since World War II, 102, 107. Memorandum to John D. Ehrlichman and H.R. Haldeman from Daniel P. Moynihan, 7/24/1970, box 1, WHSF: Staff Member Office File (hereafter SMOF): John D. Ehrlichman, NPM. Troy, Intellectuals and the American Presidency, 12–14, 77–79, 83, 86–90. Memorandum to John D. Ehrlichman and H.R. Haldeman from Daniel P. Moynihan, 7/24/1970, box 1, WHSF: SMOF: John D. Ehrlichman, NPM; Memorandum to the President from Daniel P. Moynihan, 11/13/1970, box 163, WHSF: SMOF: H.R. Haldeman, NPM. Genovese, The Nixon Presidency, 72, 76–77; Wicker, One of Us, 418; Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 185. Wicker, One of Us, 530–531, 535; Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 115–120; Reeves, President Nixon, 99–100. Rowland Evans, Jr. and Robert D. Novak, Nixon in the White House: The Frustration of Power (New York: Random House, 1971), 135–141;

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19. 20.

21. 22.

23. 24. 25.

26.

27. 28. 29.

30.

31. 32. 33.

Genovese, The Nixon Presidency, 82–83, 87; Kenneth O’Reilly, Nixon’s Piano: Presidents and Racial Politics from Washington to Clinton (New York: Free Press, 1995), 277–278, 299–302. Memorandum to the President from Daniel P. Moynihan, 1/17/1970 (Benign Neglect Memo), folder 1, box 5, WHSF: POF, NPM. Stephen Ambrose as quoted in Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960–1972 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 302–303; Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New York: Free Press, 2001), 35–36. Daniel P. Moynihan as quoted in Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 116–117, 119. Ibid., 115, 122–123. For more information on FAP, see Daniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan (New York: Random House, 1973). Memorandum to the President from Daniel P. Moynihan, 5/17/1969, folder 1, box 2, WHSF: POF, NPM. Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 132; Schulman, The Seventies, 33–34. William F. Buckley, Jr., Cruising Speed: A Documentary (New York: Putnam, 1971), 58–59; Telegram, William F. Buckley, Jr. to Daniel P. Moynihan, 6/20/1969, folder, White House (1969)-Moynihan, Daniel P., box 59, WFB Papers. Milton Friedman, “The Market v. the Bureaucrat,” NR 22 (5/19/1970): 507–510, 525–526; Milton Friedman, “Welfare Reform Again,” Newsweek 76 (9/7/1970): 70; Ernest van den Haag, “Ending the Welfare Mess,” NR 20 (12/17/1968): 1260–1264. Richard M. Nixon, “Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs,” 8/8/1969, Public Papers of the President, 1969. Richard M. Nixon, “Special Message to the Congress on Reform of the Nation’s Welfare System,” 8/11/1969, Public Papers of the President, 1969. “Nixon Moves Cheer Conservatives,” HE 29 (7/16/1969): 3; James Kilpatrick, “Nixon Proposes a ‘New Humanism’,” Star, 7/11/1969, A7; James Kilpatrick, “Revised Welfare Approach Gets Quick Cheer,” Star, 7/14/1969, A13; Ernest van den Haag, “What’s Missing in Nixon’s Welfare Program,” NR 22 (1/27/1970): 85–87, 99. “Can Nixon’s Welfare Plan Work?” HE 29 (8/23/1969): 1, 4–5; “Welfare and the ‘Suitable Job,’ ” NR 21 (9/9/1969); M. Stanton Evans, “At Home,” NRB 21 (9/2/1969): B134. “The Nixon Welfare Plan . . . Solution or Socialism,” ACU, January 1970, folder 2, box 137, WAR Papers. James Kilpatrick, “Second Thoughts on Nixon’s Welfare Plan,” Star, 1/15/1970, A13. Letter, William A. Rusher to the Editors, 1/15/1970, folder 1, box 123, WAR Papers; “Deeper and Deeper Still,” NR 22 (3/24/1970): 292–293; William F. Buckley, Jr., “Family Assistance Plan: Nay,”

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34.

35. 36.

37. 38. 39.

40. 41.

42.

43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

48.

49. 50.

215

4/14/1970, Inveighing We Will Go, 284–286. William A. Rusher’s writings copyright William A. Rusher, Distinguished Fellow, The Claremont Institute. Memorandum to the President from Daniel P. Moynihan, 7/1/1970 and Memorandum to the President from Daniel P. Moynihan, 7/2/1970, folder 5, box 6, WHSF: POF, NPM. James Kilpatrick, “The Thicker Fog of Welfare,” Sun, 8/1/1971, K6. “Let Not Your Right Hand,” NR 21 (7/26/1969): 838–839; “Nixon Gets to the Nitty Gritty,” NRB 21 (9/2/1969): B132–B133; “Times Manifesto,” NR 24 (2/18/1971): 135–136, 138; “Nixonology,” NR 23 (2/23/1971): 180, 182. “State of the Union,” NR 23 (2/9/1971): 124. Memorandum to H.R. Haldeman from Patrick J. Buchanan, 1/15/1971, folder 1, box 9, WHSF: POF, NPM. Letter, William A. Rusher to File, 3/5/1973, folder 4, box 123, WAR Papers. William A. Rusher’s writings copyright William A. Rusher, Distinguished Fellow, The Claremont Institute. “Is Nixon Dumping His ‘72 Promises?” HE 33 (7/7/1973): 1, 6; “How Much Can Conservatives Take?” HE 33 (12/29/1973): 1, 6. Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 78–80; Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 163; Lawrence J. McAndrews, “The Politics of Principle: Richard Nixon and School Desegregation,” Journal of Negro History 83 (Summer 1998): 188. James Kilpatrick, “Back to Segregation, By Order of the Courts,” NR 22 (6/16/1970): 611–626; James Kilpatrick, “Strict Constructionist Defined,” Sun, 4/24/1970, K6. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 163; Reeves, President Nixon, 116–117; McAndrews, “The Politics of Principle,” 194. “Conservatives to the Fore,” HE 29 (7/19/1969): 3; “Nixon at the SixMonth Mark,” NR 21 (7/29/1969): 734–735. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 164; Wicker, One of Us, 492–494. William F. Buckley, Jr., “They are Going to Do It,” 11/6/1969, The Governor Listeth, 110–112. James Kilpatrick, “Back to Segregation, By Order of the Courts,” NR 22 (6/16/1970): 611–626; James Kilpatrick, “The Court Plays Its Own Shell Game,” Star, 11/16/1969, C4; James Kilpatrick, “Let’s Face It: Integration Hasn’t Worked,” Star, 1/11/1970. James Kilpatrick, “Choice of Burger Reveals Nixon’s Thinking,” Star, 5/27/1969, A13; “Burger Appointment Hailed,” HE 29 (5/31/1969): 3; “Nixon’s Golden Chance,” HE 29 (5/24/1969): 3. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 167–168; Wicker, One of Us, 496–497. James Kilpatrick, “Clement Haynsworth: The Judge’s Judge,” Star, 7/24/1969, D4.

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NOTES

51. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Get Nixon,” 10/11/1969, WFB Online; William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Haynsworth Flap,” NR (10/21/1969): 1051, 1053. 52. Wicker, One of Us, 497–498; Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 169. 53. James Kilpatrick, “Carswell Proved to Be an Able District Judge,” Star, 3/24/1970, A13. 54. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Carswell’s Indiscretion,” 1/29/1970, WFB Online; William F. Buckley, Jr., “Judge Carswell’s Mediocrity,” NR 22 (4/21/1970): 429. 55. Reeves, President Nixon, 185–186; Richard M. Nixon, “Remarks to Reporters about Nominations to the Supreme Court,” 4/9/1970, Public Papers of the President, 1970. 56. “In Re: Carswell,” NRB 22 (4/28/1970): B57. 57. Richard M. Nixon, “Statement about Desegregation of Elementary and Secondary Schools,” 3/24/1970, Public Papers of the President, 1970. 58. James Kilpatrick, “Nixon Tells It Like It Is on Integration,” Star, 3/29/1970, D4; James Kilpatrick, “Back to Segregation, By Order of the Courts,” NR 22 (6/16/1970): 611–626. 59. McAndrews, “The Politics of Principle,” 196. 60. James Kilpatrick, “Back to Segregation, By Order of the Courts,” NR 22 (6/16/1970): 611–626. 61. “The Fruits of Integration,” NR 22 (2/10/1970): 122; Russell Kirk, “School Mix by Bus Stirs Wide Protest,” Times-Picayune, 9/12/1969, (1) 9; William F. Buckley, Jr., Four Reforms: A Guide for the Seventies (New York: Putnam, 1973), 87–88. 62. Richard M. Nixon, “Statement about Assistance to Local Communities for School Desegregation Plans,” 2/16/1970, Public Papers of the President, 1970. 63. James Kilpatrick, “Desegregation, Not Integration,” Sun, 6/7/1970, K6; James Kilpatrick, “Supreme Court Must Delineate School-Bias Guidelines,” Sun, 7/30/1970, A13; Russell Kirk, “School Mix by Bus Stirs Wide Protest,” Times-Picayune, 9/12/1969, (1) 9; Russell Kirk, “Salvation by Bus,” NR 24 (9/29/1972): 1065. 64. McAndrews. “The Politics of Principle,” 190; James Kilpatrick, “High Court’s Decision on Busing Is Bad Law and Racist,” Sun, 5/11/1971, A17. 65. Russell Kirk, “Racial Based Busing Held Widely Opposed,” TimesPicayune, 10/7/1971, (1) 13; “Nixon Nominees Should Tip Court Balance,” HE 31 (10/30/1971): 1, 5; James Kilpatrick, “Nixon Chose Wisely for Court,” Sun, 10/27/1971, A19; James Kilpatrick, “The High Court—Where Now?” NR 23 (11/19/1971): 1287–1291. 66. Richard M. Nixon, “Statement about the Busing of Schoolchildren,” 8/3/1971, Public Papers of the President, 1971. 67. “Nixon Questions,” NR 23 (9/24/1971): 1042–1043. 68. Kevin Phillips, “Nixon, Busing, and the Supreme Court,” HE 31 (9/25/1971): 7. Phillips began writing a syndicated column in the early

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69. 70.

71. 72. 73.

74. 75. 76.

77. 78.

79.

80.

81.

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1970s after his successful The Emerging Republican Majority gained national attention for its analysis of his work on Nixon’s campaign team analyzing voting trends. “Kevin P. Phillips,” Contemporary Authors Online. McAndrews, “The Politics of Principle,” 190; “Nixon Should Fight for Busing Amendment,” HE 32 (1/22/1972): 1. “Nixon’s Uncertain Move on Busing Issue,” HE 32 (1/28/1972): 1, 5; “Will Nixon Come Up with Liberal Busing Solution,” HE 32 (3/18/1972): 1. “Battle of the Buses,” NR 24 (3/3/1972): 204; “Let Us Off Please,” NRB 24 (3/10/1972): B36. Reeves, President Nixon, 460–461. Russell Kirk, “Nixon’s Political Advantage Coincides with His Convictions on Busing,” Sun, 3/25/1972, A17; James Kilpatrick, “What the Busing Bill Means,” Sun, 3/26/1972, K6. “Nixon Busing Policy Leaves Many Questions,” HE 32 (3/25/1972): 1, 6. “Nixon, Front and Center on Busing,” NRB 24 (4/7/1972): B49. Jeffrey Hart, “Nixon’s Leftward ‘Game Plan’ Is Poor Strategy,” HE 33 (7/28/1973): 14; M. Stanton Evans, “Busing Is Liberal Racism,” HE 33 (7/25/1973): 15; “Nixon: Beyond Watergate,” NR 25 (9/14/1973): 982–983; M. Stanton Evans, “The ABC’s of Busing,” HE 33 (10/13/1973): 8; James Kilpatrick, “Brown Righted Wrongs, But It Is Still Bad Law,” Sun, 5/12/1974, K5. Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 90–93; MacLean, Freedom Is Not Enough, 99. Ernest van den Haag, “Reverse Discrimination: A Brief Against It,” NR 29 (4/29/1977): 492–495; “The Philadelphia Plan,” HE 29 (7/26/1969): 5; “Comply or Else: Coercion Is No Way to Foster Equal Opportunity,” HE 29 (7/26/1969): 13; James Kilpatrick, “Racial Guidelines for Building Trades Decried,” Star, 7/10/1969, A13. Letter, William A. Rusher to Pricilla Buckley, 1/12/1970, folder 1, box 123, WAR Papers; “Goals or Quotas,” NR 22 (1/27/1970): 73. William A. Rusher’s writings copyright William A. Rusher, Distinguished Fellow, The Claremont Institute. Allan C. Ornstein, “Are Quotas Here to Stay?” NR 26 (4/26/1974): 480–481, 495. Ornstein, who received his doctorate from New York University, was a Professor of Education at Loyola University Chicago. Much of his early research and writing focused on effective teaching strategies in the urban setting including How to Teach Disadvantaged Youth (1969), Urban Education (1972), and Race and Politics in School/ Community Organizations (1974). Prior to working at Loyola, he taught social studies in the New York City public school system while also teaching at Fordham. “Allan C(harles) Ornstein,” Contemporary Authors Online. Richard M. Nixon, “First Inaugural Address,” 1/20/1969, Public Papers of the President, 1969.

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NOTES

82. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 154. 83. M. Stanton Evans, “Submerging the Republican Majority: The First 1,000 Days of Richard Nixon,” folder 2, box 30, WAR Papers.

Mixed Emotions: The Wisdom of Supporting Nixon

1. Ralph de Toledano, “Nixon Ignores the Right-Wingers,” 2/21/1969, King Features Column. 2. Cato, “What About Ehrlichman?” NR 22 (8/11/1970): 830. 3. Smant, Principles and Heresies, 312. 4. “1972 Campaign,” NR 23 (6/15/1971): 626; Frank S. Meyer, “Uneasy Doubts about Nixon,” NR (6/29/1971): 706. 5. Kelly, James Burnham and the Struggle for the World, 333–334; Smant, How Great the Triumph, 139–143; Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 329–330. 6. Smant, Principles and Heresies, 314–315; Kelly, James Burnham and the Struggle for the World, 334, 428; Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 329–330. Judis maintained that Buckley came up with the term suspension, but Kelly indicated that it was Burnham. 7. Edwards, The Conservative Revolution, 170; Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 329. M. Stanton Evans wrote the initial draft of the declaration, but did not sign the final document because Buckley’s revised version took out specific mention of domestic programs like FAP. Neal B. Freeman also attended the first meeting of the group, but did not sign the declaration for professional reasons. 8. “A Declaration,” NR 23 (8/10/1971): 842. 9. “The American Conservatives and Mr. Nixon,” Firing Line Episode S0028, Firing Line Television Program Collection, Hoover Institution. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Is Nixon One of Us?” 8/1/1971, Inveighing We Will Go, 65–76. Buckley was referring to comments Bozell made after the 1968 election in his “Letter to Yourselves.” 10. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Is Nixon One of Us?” 8/1/1971; Inveighing We Will Go, 65–76. 11. Frank S. Meyer, “Down the Primrose Path,” NR 23 (9/10/1971); Frank S. Meyer, “The Voter or the Politician?” NR 23 (10/8/1971): 1120. 12. “Leading Conservatives ‘Suspend Support’ of Nixon,” HE 31 (8/7/1971): 1. 13. Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of the ACU, 9/19/1971, folder 3, box 134, WAR Papers; William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Young Conservatives,” 9/11/1971, Inveighing We Will Go, 242–244. 14. Memo, Linda Bridges to WFB, WAR, JB, JH, FSM, PLB, CHS-PCS, KL, AS, JPM, BD, DO, DP, NK, 8/24/1971 and Memo, Linda Bridges to WFB, WAR, JB, JH, FSM, PLB, CHS-PCS, KL, JPM, BD, DO, DP, 9/2/1971, folder 1085, box 165, WFB Papers. 15. “Echoes and Re-Echoes,” NR 23 (8/24/1971): 908–909. Drummond worked in various positions for the Christian Science Monitor from 1924

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16.

17.

18. 19.

20.

21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30.

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to 1953. In 1953 he began writing a syndicated column that looked at the political scene from a Republican perspective. “( James) Roscoe Drummond,” Contemporary Authors Online. HRHD, 7/28/1971; Conversation between Henry A. Kissinger and William F. Buckley, 7/28/1971, box 10, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, NPM. Statement of Sen. James L. Buckley on Suspension of Support of the Nixon Administration by Leaders of the Conservative Movement, 8/1/1971, folder 5, box 13, WAR Papers; Don Oberdorfer, “Nixon, Buckley Meet to Soothe Conservatives,” Post, 8/6/1971, A2; Don Oberdorfer, “Sen. Buckley Says Nixon Risks Loss of Right-Wing Support,” Post, 8/7/1971, A2. Memorandum to the President from Patrick J. Buchanan, 1/6/1971, folder 1, box 9, WHSF: POF, NPM. Memorandum to H.R. Haldeman from Patrick J. Buchanan, 7/28/1971 and Memorandum to the President from Patrick J. Buchanan, August 4, 1971, folder, Conservatives, box 52, WHSF: SMOF: Charles W. Colson, NPM. Memorandum to Chuck Colson from Lawrence Higby, 8/4/1971, and Memorandum to Larry Higby from Charles Colson, 8/11/1971, folder, Conservatives, box 52, WHSF: SMOF: Charles W. Colson, NPM. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 300–302. Memorandum to Henry Kissinger from Jeanne W. Davis, 8/12/1971, folder 4, box 809, NSC Name Files, NPM. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 331–332; Letter, William F. Buckley, Jr. to Henry A. Kissinger, 8/16/1971, folder 2401, box 274, WFB Papers; Conversation between Henry A. Kissinger and the President, 8/14/1971, box 11, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Chronological File, NPM. “Smoke to the Right of Him,” NRB 23 (8/17/1971): B124. Winston, “Capital Bulletin,” NRB 23 (8/17/1971): B124–B125. M. Stanton Evans, “Have Conservatives a Place to Go?” HE 31 (10/23/1971): 7. Memorandum to H.R. Haldeman and Charles Colson, 9/13/1971, folder, box 52, WHSF: SMOF: Charles W. Colson, NPM. Edwards, The Conservative Revolution, 171; Smant, Principles and Heresies, 316–317. Letter, Neil McCaffrey to Manhattan Twelve, 9/20/1971 and Letter, Neil McCaffrey to Bill Buckley, Stan Evans, and Allan Ryskind (cc: Manhattan Twelve), 10/22/1971, folder 12, box 167, WAR Papers. In 1964, McCaffrey founded the Conservative Book Club and Arlington House Publishers as a means of promoting the conservative cause. He was a long-time supporter and promoter of NR as well. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Neil McCaffrey, RIP,” NR (12/31/1994): 18. Letter, Frank S. Meyer to Manhattan Twelve, 10/16/1971, folder 12, box 167, WAR Papers.

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NOTES

NOTES

31. Edwards, The Conservative Revolution, 171; Smant, Principles and Heresies, 316–317. 32. Memorandum to H.R. Haldeman and Charles Colson from Pat Buchanan, 10/26/1971, folder, Conservatives, box 52, WHSF: SMOF: Charles W. Colson, NPM. 33. Memorandum to Ken Cole and Alexander Haig from Charles Colson, 11/2/1971, folder, box 52, WHSF: SMOF: Charles W. Colson, NPM. 34. Undated response to Colson on the domestic aspects of the conservative demands, folder, Conservatives, box 52, WHSF: SMOF: Charles W. Colson, NPM. 35. Memorandum to Charles Colson from Alexander Haig, 11/16/1971, folder, Conservatives, box 52, WHSF: SMOF: Charles W. Colson, NPM. 36. Memo, William A. Rusher to Those Concerned, 11/23/1971 as quoted in Smant, Principles and Heresies, 321. 37. Letter, Neil McCaffrey to Manhattan Twelve, 12/1/1971, folder 12, box 109, WAR Papers; Letter, Anthony Harrigan to William A. Rusher, 12/9/1971, folder 6, box 168, WAR Papers. Mr. Harrigan is the author, co-author, and editor of 22 books. 38. Smant, Principles and Heresies, 321–322; M. Stanton Evans, “Ashbrook’s Challenge to Nixon,” Indianapolis News (12/24/1971). 39. John M. Ashbrook, “Those Rumblings on Mr. Nixon’s Right,” NYT, 12/16/1971, 35. 40. Draft of Ashbrook’s Announcement of his Candidacy, folder 6, box 168, WAR Papers; Marjorie Hunter, “Ashbrook Enters Presidency Race,” NYT, 12/30/1971, 1. 41. “American Conservatives Confront 1972,” Southern Educational Communications Association Program, 1/5/1972 and “The New Hampshire Primary,” 2/29/1972, Firing Line Episode S0038, Hoover Institution. 42. Memorandum to H.R. Haldeman from Charles Colson, 12/8/1971, folder, Conservatives, box 52, WHSF: SMOF: Charles W. Colson, NPM. 43. “Nixon Said to be ‘Gratified’ at Support of Conservatives,” NYT, 12/19/1971, 53; James M. Naughton, “White House Discounts Bid by Ashbrook,” NYT, 1/2/1972, 24. 44. “Agnew Confers with Nixon Foes,” NYT, 12/17/1971, 15. 45. Memo, William A. Rusher to File, 12/21/1971, folder 2401, box 274, WFB Papers. William A. Rusher’s writings copyright William A. Rusher, Distinguished Fellow, The Claremont Institute. 46. Letter, Spiro Agnew to William F. Buckley, Jr., 12/20/1971, folder 2401, box 274, WFB Papers. 47. Letter, William F. Buckley, Jr. to Peter Flanigan, 1/3/1972 and Letter, Peter Flanigan to William F. Buckley, Jr., 1/6/1972, folder 2401, box 274, WFB Papers; Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 335–336; Rowland Evans

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48.

49.

50.

51. 52.

53. 54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

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and Robert Novak, “A Phone Call to Bill Buckley,” Post, 1/16/1972, B7. Memorandum to Pat Buchanan from Chuck Colson, 1/10/1972 and Memorandum to Pat Buchanan from Chuck Colson, 2/10/1972, folder, Pat Buchanan [2 of 2], box 5, WHSF: SMOF: Charles W. Colson, NPM. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Nixon and the Conservatives,” 3/25/1972, WFB Online; “Nixon Forces Ref lect Concern Over Ashbrook Race,” HE 32 (5/20/1972): 3. “Why Ashbrook Primary Race Is Necessary,” HE 32 (1/8/1972): 3; “The Importance of Ashbrook’s Candidacy,” HE 32 (2/5/1972): 1, 6; “Taiwan Sellout Fuels Ashbrook Candidacy,” HE 32 (3/11/1972): 3. M. Stanton Evans, “The Chairmen’s Comment: The New Leadership,” Battle Line 6 ( January 1972): 8. “The Ashbrook Candidacy,” NR 24 (1/21/1972): 18–19; “The Meaning of the Ashbrook Candidacy,” NR 24 (3/3/1972): 198; Kelly, James Burnham and the Struggle for the World, 428. William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Conservatives and New Hampshire,” 12/28/1971, WFB Online. Smant, Principles and Heresies, 337–338. Meyer, who had begun to feel extremely ill in the fall of 1971, was diagnosed with cancer in early March 1972. He died only a few weeks later. Letter, William A. Rusher to William F. Buckley, Jr., 2/9/1972, folder 1093, box 166, WFB Papers; Letter, William A. Rusher to William F. Buckley, Jr., 1/31/1972, Letter, William F. Buckley, Jr. to William A. Rusher, 2/17/1972, and Letter, William A. Rusher to William F. Buckley, Jr., 2/25/1972, folder 5, box 121, WAR Papers. William A. Rusher’s writings copyright William A. Rusher, Distinguished Fellow, The Claremont Institute. Letter, William F. Buckley, Jr. to William A. Rusher, 3/7/1972 and Letter, James Burnham to William F. Buckley, Jr., 2/7/1972, folder 1093, box 166, WFB Papers. James Burnham’s writings copyright Stanford University. Holmes Alexander, “Why Not Ashbrook?” HE 32 (6/10/1972): 8. Holmes Alexander began writing a syndicated political column, with a conservative outlook, for the McNaught Syndicate in 1947. When not writing his column he wrote both fiction and nonfiction. Alexander also served as a ghost writer for what NR called “politicians [who] suddenly become eloquent.” “Holmes Alexander, RIP,” NR (12/31/1985): 19. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Why John Ashbrook,” 6/20/1972, WFB Online; “The Week,” NR 24 (8/4/1972); Edwards, The Conservative Revolution, 174. Russell Kirk, The Sword of Imagination, 330–332; Russell Kirk, “So Nixon Counts Upon Main Street,” Sun, 5/3/1972, A15; Russell Kirk, “Conversations with the President,” Center House Bulletin 2 ( June 1972): 5.

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60. James Kilpatrick, “The Disappointed Conservatives,” Sun, 7/18/1971, K6; James Kilpatrick, “Why the Conservative Rebellion Against Nixon Failed,” Sun, 12/30/1971, A11; James Kilpatrick, “Conservatives and Nixon” Sun, 1/30/1972, K6. 61. “Nixon-Agnew in 1972,” NR 24 (9/1/1972): 934; Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 338, 340–341. 62. Russell Kirk, “America’s Liberal Era Is Closing,” Sun, 10/15/1972, A19; James Kilpatrick, “Come On, Cleaning Crews,” Sun, 11/5/1972, K6. 63. “The Republican Party Platform of 1972,” 9/21/1972, The American Presidency Project, Political Party Platforms, University of California, Berkeley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu (accessed 10/5/2008); Spencer Rich, “GOP Image Polished in ‘72 Platform,” Post, 8/19/1972, A1; Spencer Rich, “GOP Plank Backs Nixon Busing Stand,” Post, 8/20/1972, A1. 64. “Conservatives Still Control GOP,” HE 32 (September 2, 1972): 1, 6; “Convention Notes,” NR 24 (September 15, 1972): 990–992. 65. M. Stanton Evans, “How One Conservative Views ‘72 Scene,” HE 32 (10/7/1972): 9; M. Stanton Evans, “The Political Odyssey of Spiro T. Agnew,” NR 24 (8/18/1972): 894–900, 914. 66. William A. Rusher, “The Nixon-McGovern Choice Is No Choice for Conservatives,” Los Angeles Times, 4/28/1972, Part II-7; “NR Publisher Won’t Back Nixon,” HE 32 (9/16/1972): 8; Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 341. Rusher wanted to publish his dissent in NR as an “Open Question” column, however Buckley refused. According to John Judis, Buckley thought on this issue the magazine would seem “f laky” if their publisher came out for such an “eccentric” position (or one that so opposed the main editorial position). 67. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 245–247, 250–251, 259, 266. 68. Russell Kirk, “Despite the Nixon Vote, There Is No Mandate,” Sun, 11/8/1972, A23. 69. James Kilpatrick, “Where Are We Now?” Sun, 11/12/1972, K6. 70. William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Morning After,” 11/9/1972, Execution Eve and Other Contemporary Ballads (New York: Putnam, 1975), 98–100. 71. “The Nixon Landslide: What’s Next?” NR 24 (11/24/1972): 1287. 72. R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., “The Nation’s Pulse: The Conservatives’ Revolt,” The Alternative 5 (February 1972): 4. 73. Letter, James Burnham to William F. Buckley, Jr., 2/7/1972, folder 1093, box 166, WFB Papers. James Burnham’s writings copyright Stanford University.

7

Loyalty and Doubts: The Watergate Morass

1. William F. Buckley, “The Morning After,” 11/9/1972, Execution Eve, 98–100. 2. James Kilpatrick, “Where Are We Now?” Sun, 11/12/1972, K6.

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3. Tom Taggert, “Tory Socialists and the Second American Revolution,” The Alternative 6 (December 1972): 12–14. According to the editors of The Alternative, Taggert was “a seasoned Washington hand and owner of one of the most famous hotels in southern Indiana.” “Contributors,” The Alternative 6 (December 1972): 8. 4. Jeffrey Bell, “Nixon and Realignment,” The Alternative 6 (December 1972): 7–9. Bell worked for the ACU as the Capitol Hill Director in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In addition to his writings for The Alternative, he wrote for NR, HE, and The Nation. “Contributors,” The Alternative 6 (December 1972): 8. 5. C. Bascom Slemp, “November and Beyond,” The Alternative 6 (December 1972): 9–10. Slemp began writing The Alternative’s column “Letter, a Whig” and serving as the chief Washington correspondent in September 1972. “Contributors,” The Alternative 6 (December 1972): 8. 6. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 249–253. 7. Ibid., 254–258. For a more in depth analysis of Watergate, see Stanley Kutler, Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon (New York: Knopf, 1990) and Stanley Kutler, ed., Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes (New York: Free Press, 1997). 8. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 276–278; HRHD, 6/20/1972 and 6/23/1972. The 18.5 minute gap that caused such controversy later was during the conversation on June 20, 1972. The smoking gun tape was of the conversation on June 23, 1972. 9. Edward D. Berkowitz, Something Happened: A Political and Cultural Overview of the Seventies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 21. 10. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 279–280. The Ervin committee held hearings from May 17, 1973 to August 17, 1973; over the course of the hearings, the television networks carried over 300 hours of testimony. 11. Berkowitz, Something Happened, 24–25. 12. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 280–282. 13. James Kilpatrick, “ ‘Watergate Caper’ Not So Funny Any More,” Sun, 8/8/1972, A11; James Kilpatrick, “Charges of Corruption Eroding Loyalty to GOP,” Sun, 3/29/1973, A23. 14. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 90–92, 344–347; “Meditations on Watergate,” NR 25 (2/2/1973): 131–132. 15. James Kilpatrick, “At Long Last, the GOP Is Waking Up to Watergate,” Sun, 4/5/1973, A19; “A President and His Privilege,” NRB 25 (4/6/1973): B41. Kilpatrick indicated if Nixon failed to deal with Watergate before it got out of hand, the event would “become his party’s Chappaquiddick.” 16. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 282–283; HRHD, 4/15/1973. McCord’s statement came before the Ervin Committee began its public hearings. 17. Ralph de Toledano, “Watergate Affair Raises Many Questions,” HE 33 (4/7/1973): 12.

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NOTES

NOTES

18. “White House Shakeup Could Restore Nixon Credibility,” HE 33 (4/28/1973): 1, 6; “Mr. President Why the Delay?” HE 33 (5/5/1973): 1, 6. 19. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Is Nixon a Fool?” 4/28/1973, Execution Eve, 109–111. 20. HRHD, 4/29/1973 and 4/30/1973; Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 283–284; Richard M. Nixon, “Statement about the Watergate Investigations,” 3/22/1973, Public Papers of the President, 1973. 21. James Kilpatrick, “President May Yet Emerge Strengthened by Watergate,” Sun, 5/6/1973, K5; George F. Will, “Unraveling,” NR 25 (5/11/1973): 514; “Will Watergate Push Nixon Left?” HE 33 (5/12/1973): 1, 6. 22. “Watergate: Shifting Perspectives,” NR 25 (5/25/1973): 565–566. 23. James Kilpatrick, “Watergate Probe Magnification Boosted,” Sun, 5/29/1973, A13; William F. Buckley, Jr., “Nixon’s Secret Secrets,” 5/27/1973, WFB Online; “Can the President Continue to Rule?” NRB 25 (6/1/1973): B73. 24. M. Stanton Evans, “At Home,” NRB 25 (4/20/1973): B54; M. Stanton Evans, “The Chairman’s Comment: The Double Standard,” Battle Line 7 (May 1973): 8. 25. Russell Kirk, “Watergate Rehash,” The Pioneer [Big Rapids, MI], 5/17/1973; Russell Kirk, “Popular Counter-Reaction,” The Pioneer [Big Rapids, MI], 6/19/1973. 26. James Kilpatrick, “Immaterial Data Cannot Erase Watergate Ugliness,” Sun, 6/26/1973, A15; James Kilpatrick, “Some Pro-Nixon Reaction; But Corruption Remains,” Sun, 7/15/1973, K5. 27. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 285; Berkowitz, Something Happened, 25–26. Since the Ervin Committee hearings appeared on television, witnesses rehearsed with staff beforehand so the members would not be surprised about the testimony during live coverage. Butterfield revealed the existence of the tapes during one of these preparation sessions. 28. H.R. Haldeman, “The Nixon White House Tapes: The Decision to Record Presidential Conversations,” Prologue, Quarterly of the National Archives (1988): 79–87. 29. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 286. 30. “Is Nixon Dumping His ‘72 Promises?” HE 33 (7/7/1973): 1, 6; Jenkin Lloyd Jones, “Liberals Using Watergate to Reverse ‘72 Election Mandate,” HE 33 (7/21/1973): 1. Jones began his career as a reporter for the Tulsa Tribune, his father’s paper, during the Depression. In 1941, he took over as editor and he added the responsibility of publisher in 1963. In addition to his duties at the paper, he wrote a syndicated column for the General Features Corp. “Jenkin Lloyd Jones,” Contemporary Authors Online. 31. Jeffrey Hart, “Nixon’s Leftward ‘Game Plan’ Is Poor Strategy,” HE 33 (7/28/1973): 14; “Apertura a Sinistra?” NR 25 (8/3/1973): 823–825.

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32. Letter, James Burnham to PLB, WFB, JH, and WAR, 7/16/1973, folder 4, box 123, WAR Papers. James Burnham’s writings copyright Stanford University. 33. William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Presidential Tapes (II),” 7/26/1973, WFB Online; James Kilpatrick, “Nixon Right about Confidentiality but Wrong about Withholding Tapes,” Sun, 9/6/1973, A15; “The Nixon Tapes,” NR 25 (10/12/1973): 1096. 34. “The President Marks Time,” NR 25 (8/31/1973): 926–927; “Nixon: Beyond Watergate,” NR 25 (9/14/1973): 982–983. 35. “President Agnew,” NR 25 (6/8/1973): 615–616, 618; George F. Will, “The Snicker Factor,” NR 25 (6/8/1973): 624. 36. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 287–288; Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 353. 37. William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Terrible Sadness of Spiro Agnew,” 10/15/1973, Let Us Talk of Many Things (Roseville, CA: Prima Publishing, 2000), 208–211. 38. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 289–291; Berkowitz, Something Happened, 27; Nixon, Memoirs, 933–935. 39. “Where Do We Go From Here?” NR 25 (11/9/1973): 1220–1222. 40. James Kilpatrick, “Let History, Not Congress Be the Judge of Nixon,” Sun, 10/14/1973, K5; James Kilpatrick, “Impeach the President? That Is Pure Nonsense,” Sun, 10/28/1973, K5. 41. Russell Kirk, “No Impeachment,” The Pioneer [Big Rapids, MI], 11/2/1973. 42. James Kilpatrick, “Only a Trial by the Senate Can Clear Nixon,” Sun, 11/8/1973, A17; James Kilpatrick, “Good of the Party Demands that Impeachment Proceed,” Sun, 11/11/1973, K5. 43. George F. Will, “Government by Western Union,” 11/13/1973, The Pursuit of Happiness and Other Sobering Thoughts, 221–222; William F. Buckley, Jr., “Ref lections on the Resignation,” NR 26 (8/30/1974): 954. 44. “President and Watergate,” Battle Line 8 (February 1974): supplement. 45. James L. Buckley, “Why Richard Nixon Should Resign the Presidency: A Statement Made in the Senate Caucus Room on March 19,” NR 26 (4/12/1974): 413–415. 46. Letter, Jeffrey Hart to William F. Buckley, Jr., 3/20/1974, folder 952, box 153, WFB Papers. The reactions to his comments were so bad that Hart jokingly said since his column he had “been soaking every package that comes in the mail in a bucket of water for 24 hours.” 47. “Commentaries,” NR 26 (4/12/1974): 416–419. 48. Russell Kirk, “Should Nixon Resign?” The Pioneer [Big Rapids, MI], 5/22/1974. 49. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Senator Buckley’s Proposal,” 4/4/1974, WFB Online; “Resignation and the Constitution,” NR 26 (4/12/1974): 407–408.

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NOTES

NOTES

50. “New Majority Squandered,” NR 26 (3/15/1974): 298, 300, 302; James Kilpatrick, “We Feed on Watergate Ignoring Important Issues,” Sun, 3/17/1974, K5. 51. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 292–293. Justice Rehnquist recused himself from the case before the Court agreed to hear the matter on an expedited basis. 52. James Kilpatrick, “Nixon Emerges from It All in Good Shape,” Sun, 5/7/1974, A23; Russell Kirk, “Talk of the Town,” The New Yorker 50 (5/20/1974): 29–30; Russell Kirk, “Nixon’s Defense,” The Pioneer [Big Rapids, MI], 6/14/1974. 53. “Will Tapes Force Nixon Out?” HE 34 (5/18/1974): 3. 54. William F. Buckley, Jr., “The Paralysis of Mr. Nixon,” NR 26 (5/10/1974): 554; William F. Buckley, Jr., “Kissinger and the Miasma,” NR 26 (7/5/1974): 777; William F. Buckley, Jr., “What Mr. Nixon Can Do for His Congressmen,” NR 26 (7/5/1974): 776. 55. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 293–294. 56. James Kilpatrick, “The President Is a Liar; He Must Go,” Sun, 8/8/1974, A19; George F. Will, “Richard Nixon: Too Many Evenings,” 8/8/1974, The Pursuit of Happiness and Other Sobering Thoughts, 223–224. 57. Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon, 294–295; Nixon, Memoirs, 1073, 1084–1085. 58. Ernest van den Haag, “Finally He Was Right to Resign,” NR 26 (8/30/1974): 956; William F. Buckley, Jr., “Ref lections on the Resignation,” NR 26 (8/30/1974): 954; William F. Buckley, Jr., “Let Him Go,” 8/10/1974, WFB Online. 59. “The Dimensions of Watergate,” NR 26 (8/30/1974): 966–967. 60. William Safire, “A Little Advice from Time to Time,” NYT, 5/5/1977, A27. 61. “Nixon’s Fourth Comeback,” NR 30 (12/22/1978): 1579–1580. 62. Jeffrey Hart, “Sui Generis,” NR 30 (8/18/1978): 1031–1032. 63. William A. Rusher, “Philip Sober,” NR 32 (7/25/1980): 909–910. 64. Brian Crozier, “The Last Vietnam,” NR 37 (5/17/1985): 22; Jeffrey Hart, “Years of the Fish,” NR 37 (5/3/1985): 52–53. 65. John O’ Sullivan, “The Vision Thing,” NR 44 (4/13/1992): 46–48; John O’Sullivan, “Now-More Than Then,” NR 44 (4/13/1992): 6. O’Sullivan became the editor of NR in 1988. Prior to that he served as an adviser to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and had been the associate editor of the London Times, assistant editor of the London Daily Telegraph, and editor of Policy Review. “John O’Sullivan, Editor-AtLarge,” NR Online, http://author.nationalreview.com/ (accessed 10/30/2008). 66. Jonathan Aitkin, “A Tribute to Richard Nixon,” HE 50 (5/6/1994): 12–13. 67. George F. Will, “Some Bravery, Even More Melancholy,” Post, 4/24/1994, C7.

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68. Cal Thomas, “Mysteries for History to Ponder,” Washington Times, 2/28/1994, A19. Thomas worked for the Armed Forces Radio and then for NBC News. In the mid-1980s he began writing a column for the Los Angeles Times, which eventually went into syndication. “Cal Thomas,” Contemporary Authors Online. 69. Thomas Sowell, “Political Hatred,” Forbes 153 (5/23/1994): 64. Sowell joined the Hoover Institution as a fellow in 1977 focusing on questions of economics, history, social policy, ethnicity, and the history of ideas; he also wrote a column for Forbes in the 1990s and for syndication. “Thomas Sowell,” The Hoover Institution, http://www.hoover.org/ bios/sowell.html (accessed 10/30/2008). 70. R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., “Richard Nixon, RIP,” American Spectator 27 ( June 1994): 12. 71. Samuel Francis, “The Smartest Man in the Stupid Party,” Washington Times, 4/26/1994, A19. Francis joined the Washington Times as an editorial writer in 1986 after stints with the Heritage Foundation and as a Senate staffer. He held the position of the deputy editorial page editor from 1987 to 1991 after which he was a staff writer for the paper. “Samuel Francis,” Contemporary Authors Online. 72. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Richard Nixon, RIP,” NR 46 (5/16/1994): 20–22.

8

Richard Nixon: Friend or Foe of Conservatives?

1. James Kilpatrick, “Breeze Sweeping the Capital Is a National Sigh of Relief,” Sun, 8/18/1974, K5; James Kilpatrick, “Watergate Tragedy: Highly Placed Men Acting without Moral Restraint,” Sun, 8/21/1973, A13. 2. “The Nixon Experience and American Conservatism,” Sen. James Buckley (R-NY), 9/4/1974, Firing Line Episode S0152, Firing Line Television Program Collection, Hoover Institution. 3. Ralph de Toledano, “How the Politicians Will Decide,” 6/7/1968, King Features Column. 4. “What is Nixon’s Policy?” NR 21 (2/25/1969): 159–160. 5. “Conservatives Worried: Nixon after One Year,” HE 30 (1/24/1970): 1, 5. John R. Coyne, Jr., “They Called Him ‘Tricky,’ ” The Alternative 5 (May 1972): 12. Coyne was an associate editor of NR and a frequent contributor to The Alternative. He went to work as a speech writer for Vice President Spiro Agnew in 1972. “John Richard Coyne, Jr.,” Contemporary Authors Online. 6. Frank S. Meyer, “The Voter or the Politician?” NR 23 (10/8/1971): 1120. 7. Tom Taggert, “Tory Socialists and the Second American Revolution,” The Alternative 6 (December 1972): 12–14. 8. George F. Will, “Capitol Issues: Tough Guys,” NR 25 (5/25/1973): 572.

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NOTES

NOTES

9. R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., “The Great Nixon as the Great Gatsby,” The Alternative 7 (October 1973): 3–4. 10. James Kilpatrick, “The Littleness in Mr. Nixon Keeps the Bigness in Check,” Sun, 4/21/1974, K5. 11. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Nixon-Frost,” 5/10/1977, WFB Online; William F. Buckley, Jr., “Approaching the Anniversary,” NR 27 (8/1/1975): 848. 12. M. Stanton Evans, “Submerging the Republican Majority: The First 1,000 Days of Richard Nixon,” folder 2, box 30, WAR Papers. 13. Frank S. Meyer, “Uneasy Doubts about Nixon,” NR 23 (6/29/1971): 706; “How Much Can Conservatives Take?” HE 33 (12/29/1973): 1, 6. 14. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Back to School,” 9/3/1970, WFB Online; Frank S. Meyer, “The Future of the Republican Party,” NR 22 (12/1/1970): 1271–1273. 15. “First Nixon Court,” NR 24 (7/21/1972): 785; James Kilpatrick, “Nixon Appointees Show Judicial Restraint,” Sun, 4/3/1973, A17; James Kilpatrick, “This Much, at Least: The Court,” NR 25 (9/28/1973): 1047–1052. 16. Frank S. Meyer, “Tory Men and Whig Measures,” NR 21 (10/7/1969): 1013. 17. Tom Taggert, “Tory Socialists and the Second American Revolution,” The Alternative 6 (December 1972): 12–14. 18. “Let Not Your Right Hand,” NR 21 (8/26/1969): 838–839. 19. “An Assessment of the Nixon Administration,” HE 34 (8/17/1974): 5. 20. M. Stanton Evans, “Administration Politics: Conservatives Get the Words; the Liberals Get All the Action,” Battle Line 4 (January 1970): 7–9. 21. “The Watergate Aesthetic,” NR 28 (4/20/1976): 436. 22. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Approaching the Anniversary,” NR 27 (8/1/1975): 848; Norman B. Hannah, “Nixon + Watergate = Communist Indochina,” NR 30 (6/23/1978): 772–775. Hannah had a long career with the State Department serving in China, Thailand, Iran, Afghanistan, and Australia. “Norman B(ritton) Hannah,” Contemporary Authors Online. 23. “Nixon Goes to China,” NR 28 (3/6/1976): 203; “Not Nixon!” NR 28 (3/19/1976): 257; William F. Buckley, Jr., “Nixon to China,” NR 28 (3/19/1976): 290–291. 24. William A. Rusher, “Reagan’s No Suicide,” NR 39 (6/5/1987): 36. 25. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Ford and Conservatism,” 9/3/1974, WFB Online; William F. Buckley, Jr., “The High Cost of Mr. Nixon’s Deceptions,” 10/18/1974, WFB Online; Rusher, The Rise of the Right, 259–261. 26. E.J. Dionne, Jr., Why Americans Hate Politics (New York: Touchstone Books, 1991), 200–208; “Watergate: Shifting Perspectives,” NR 25 (5/25/1973): 565–566; “The Conservatives’ Paradox,” NRB 26 (4/19/1974): B49.

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27. Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties, 134–137; Schulman, The Seventies, 43, 51. 28. Himmelstein, To the Right, 81–84; Rusher, The Rise of the Right, 252–255. 29. John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1994 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Murray Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 30. Himmelstein, To the Right, 83; Dionne, Why Americans Hate Politics, 219–223. 31. William F. Buckley, Jr., “Richard Nixon, RIP,” NR 46 (5/16/1994): 20–22; Samuel Francis, “The Smartest Man in the Stupid Party,” Times, 4/26/1994, A19.

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Books Ambrose, Stephen E. Nixon: The Education of a Politician, 1913–1962. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. ———. Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 1962–1972. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989. ———. Nixon: Ruin and Recovery, 1973–1990. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. Bell, Daniel. The End of Ideology. Reprint edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. ———, ed. The Radical Right. Garden City: Doubleday, 1964. Berkowitz, Edward D. Something Happened: A Political and Cultural Overview of the Seventies. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. Berman, Larry. No Peace, No Honor: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 2001. Berman, William C. America’s Right Turn: From Nixon to Clinton. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. Blumenthal, Sidney. The Rise of the Counter-establishment: From Conservative Ideology to Political Power. New York: Times Books, 1986. Brennan, Mary C. Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995. Brezhnev, Leonid. Peace, Détente, and Soviet-American Relations: A Collection of Public Statements. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979. Bridges, Linda and John R. Coyne, Jr. Strictly Right: William F. Buckley, Jr. and the American Conservative Movement. New York: Wiley, 2007. Buchanan, Patrick J. The New Majority: President Nixon at Mid-passage. Philadelphia: Girard Company, 1973. ———. Right from the Beginning. Boston: Little, Brown, 1988. Buckley, William F., Jr. Cruising Speed: A Documentary. New York: Putnam, 1971. ———, ed. Did You Ever See a Dream Walking: American Conservative Thought in the Twentieth Century. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970. ———. Execution Eve and Other Contemporary Ballads. New York: Putnam, 1975. ———. Four Reforms: A Guide for the Seventies. New York: Putnam, 1973. ———. The Governor Listeth: A Book of Inspired Political Revelations. New York: Putnam, 1970.

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Buckley, William F., Jr. Inveighing We Will Go. New York: Putnam, 1972. ———. The Jeweler’s Eye: A Book of Irresistible Political Reflections. New York: Putnam, 1968. ———. Let Us Talk of Many Things: The Collected Speeches. Roseville, CA: Prima Publishing, 2000. ———. Rumbles Left and Right: A Book about Troublesome People and Ideas. New York: Putnam, 1963. ———. Up from Liberalism. New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1959. Bundy, William. A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years. New York: Hill and Wang, 1998. Burnham, James. Containment or Liberation. New York: John Day Company, 1953. ———. The Struggle for the World. New York: John Day Company, 1947. ———. Suicide of the West: An Essay on the Meaning and Destiny of Liberalism. New York: John Day Company, 1964. ———. The War We Are In: The Last Decade and the Next. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1967. Burr, William, ed. The Kissinger Transcripts: Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow. New York: New Press, 1998. Carroll, Peter N. It Seemed Like Nothing Happened: The Tragedy and Promise of America in the 1970s. New York: Holt Rinehart Winston, 1982. Chappell, Larry W. George F. Will. New York: Twayne, 1997. Crawford, Alan. Thunder on the Right: The “New Right” and the Politics of Resentment. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980. Diggins, John Patrick. Up from Communism: Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual History. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. Dionne, E.J. Why Americans Hate Politics. New York: Touchstone, 1991. Dobrynin, Anatoly. In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986). New York: Times Books, 1995. East, John P. The American Conservative Movement: The Philosophical Founders. Chicago: Regnery Books, 1986. Edwards, Lee. The Conservative Revolution: The Movement That Remade America. New York: Free Press, 1999. Ehrman, John. The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945– 1994. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. Evans, M. Stanton. Clear and Present Dangers: A Conservative View of America’s Government. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975. ———. The Future of Conservatism. New York: Holt Rinehart Winston, 1968. Evans, Roland, Jr. and Robert D. Novak. Nixon in the White House: The Frustration of Power. New York: Random House, 1971. Francis, Samuel. Power and History: The Political Thought of James Burnham. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984. Friedman, Murray. The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Fryer, Russell G. Recent Conservative Political Thought: American Perspectives. Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1979.

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Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Garthoff, Raymond L. Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985. Genovese, Michael. The Nixon Presidency: Power and Politics in Turbulent Times. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990. Gerson, Mark. The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars. Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1996. Gitlin, Todd. The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage. Revised edition. New York: Bantam, 1993. Gottfried, Paul and Thomas Fleming. The Conservative Movement. Boston: Twayne, 1988. Graham, Hugh Davis. The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960–1972. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Greenberg, David. Nixon’s Shadow: The History of an Image. New York: W.W. Norton, 2003. Guttman, Allan. The Conservative Tradition in America. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Haldeman, H.R. The Ends of Power. New York: Times Books, 1978. ———. The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House. New York: Putnam, 1994. Hamby, Alanzo. Liberalism and Its Challengers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Harbour, William R. Foundations of Conservative Thought. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982. Hart, Jeffrey. The American Dissent: A Decade of Modern Conservatism. Garden City: Doubleday, 1966. ———. The Making of the American Conservative Mind: National Review and Its Times. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2005. Hayward, Steven F. The Age of Reagan: The Fall of the Old Liberal Order, 1964–1980. Roseville, CA: Prima Publishing, 2001. Herring, George. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. Third edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996. Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New York: Summit Books, 1983. Himmelstein, Jerome. To the Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. Hoff, Joan. Nixon Reconsidered. New York: Basic Books, 1994. Hofstadter, Richard. The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays. New York: Knopf, 1965. Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992. Isserman, Maurice and Michael Kazin. America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Judis, John B. William F. Buckley, Jr.: Patron Saint of the Conservatives. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988.

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Kelly, Daniel. James Burnham and the Struggle for the World: A Life. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002. Kimball, Jeffrey P. Nixon’s Vietnam War. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998. Kirk, Russell. The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953. ———. The Politics of Prudence. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2004. ———. The Sword of Imagination: Memoirs of a Half-Century of Literary Conflict. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1995. Kissinger, Henry A. White House Years. Boston: Little Brown, 1979. Kutler, Stanley, ed. Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes. New York: Free Press, 1997. ———. The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon. New York: Knopf, 1990. Lora, Ronald. Conservative Minds in America. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971. MacLean, Nancy. Freedom Is Not Enough: The Opening of the American Workplace. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. Markmann, Charles Lam. The Buckleys: A Family Examined. New York: Morrow, 1973. Mason, Robert. Richard Nixon and the Quest for a New Majority. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. Matusow, Allen J. Nixon’s Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars, and Votes. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998. McDonald, W. Wesley. Russell Kirk and the Age of Ideology. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004. McEvoy, James. Radicals or Conservatives: The Contemporary American Right. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971. McGirr, Lisa. Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. Meyer, Frank. The Conservative Mainstream. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1969. ———. In Defense of Freedom: A Conservative Credo. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962. ———, ed. What Is Conservatism? New York: Holt Rinehart Winston, 1964. Middendorf, John W. A Glorious Disaster: Barry Goldwater’s Presidential Campaign and the Origins of the Conservative Movement. New York: Basic Books, 2006. Miller, Roger Leroy and Raburn M. Williams. The New Economics of Richard Nixon: Freezes, Floats, and Fiscal Policy. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. Morris, Roger. Richard Milhous Nixon. New York: Holt, 1990. Moynihan, Daniel P. The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan. New York: Random House, 1973. Nash, George H. The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945. Paperback edition. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 1998. ———. Is the American Experience Conservative? Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 1997.

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Nixon, Richard M. 1999: Victory without War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988. ———. Beyond Peace. New York: Random House, 1994. ———. In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat, and Renewal. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990. ———. Nixon Speaks Out: Major Speeches and Statements by Richard M. Nixon. New York: Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee, 1969. ———. No More Vietnams. New York: Arbor House, 1985. ———. Real Peace. New York: Warner Books, 1984. ———. The Real War. New York: Warner Books, 1980. ———. RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. Reprint edition. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990. ———. Seize the Moment. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992. ———. Six Crises. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962. O’Reilly, Kenneth. Nixon’s Piano: Presidents and Racial Politics from Washington to Clinton. New York: Free Press, 1995. Parmet, Herbert. Richard Nixon and His America. Boston: Little, Brown, 1990. Person, James E. Russell Kirk: A Critical Biography of a Conservative Mind. Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1999. Price, Raymond. With Nixon. New York: Viking, 1977. Quimet, Matthew J. The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Charlotte: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. Reeves, Richard. President Nixon: Alone in the White House. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001. Reichley, A. James. Conservatives in an Age of Change: The Nixon and Ford Administrations. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981. Reinhard, David W. The Republican Right since 1945. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1983. Rusher, William A. The Making of a New Majority Party. Ottawa, IL: Green Hill, 1975. ———. The Rise of the Right. New York: William Morrow, 1984. Safire, William. Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate Whitehouse. New York: Doubleday, 1975. Schneider, George L. Conservatism in America since 1930: A Reader. New York: New York University Press, 2003. Schoenwald, Jonathan M. A Time for Choosing: The Rise of Modem American Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Schudson, Michael. Watergate in American Memory: How We Remember, Forget, and Reconstruct the Past. New York: Basic Books, 1992. Schulman, Bruce J. The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics. New York: Free Press, 2001. Silk, Leonard. Nixonomics: How the Dismal Science of Free Enterprise became the Black Art of Controls. New York: Praeger, 1972. Small, Melvin. The Presidency of Richard Nixon. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999.

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S E L E C T E D B I B L IO G R A PH Y

S E L E C T E D B I B L IO G R A PH Y

Smant, Kevin J. How Great the Triumph: James Burnham, Anticommunism, and the Conservative Movement. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992. ———. Principles and Heresies: Frank S. Meyer and the Shaping of the American Conservative Movement. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002. Steinfels, Peter. The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing American Politics. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979. Summers, Anthony. The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon. New York: Viking Press, 2000. Szulc, Tad. The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years. New York: Viking Press, 1978. Talbott, Strobe. Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II. New York: Harper & Row, 1979. Thorne, Melvin J. American Conservative Thought since World War II: The Core Ideas. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990. Tomes, Robert R. Apocalypse Then: American Intellectuals and the Vietnam War, 1954–1975. New York: New York University Press, 1998. Troy, Tevi. Intellectuals and the American Presidency: Philosophers, Jesters or Technicians? Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. Tyrrell, R. Emmett. Orthodoxy: The American Spectator’s 20th Anniversary Anthology. New York: Harper & Row, 1987. ———. Public Nuisances. New York: Basic Books, 1979. Ulam, Adam B. Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970–1982. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Whalen, Richard J. Catch the Falling Flag: A Republican’s Challenge to His Party. Boston: Houghton Miff lin, 1972. White, Theodore H. The Making of the President, 1968. New York: Atheneum, 1969. ———. The Making of the President, 1972. New York: Atheneum, 1973. Wicker, Tom. One of Us: The Crisis of the Self-Made Man. New York: Random House, 1991. Will, George F. The Pursuit of Happiness and Other Sobering Thoughts. New York: Harper & Row, 1978. Wills, Garry. Nixon Agonistes: The Crisis of the Self-Made Man. Reprint edition. Boston: Mariner Books, 2002. Wolfe, Gregory. Right Minds: A Sourcebook of American Conservative Thought. Washington, DC: Regnery Books, 1987.

Articles Andrews, John. “The Struggle for the Republican Party in 1960.” Historian 59 (Spring 1997): 613–631. Bell, Daniel. “America’s Cultural Wars: American Intellectual Life, 1965–1992.” Wilson Quarterly 16 (Summer 1992): 74–107. Berman, Larry. “Coming to Grips with Lyndon Johnson’s War.” Diplomatic History 17 (Fall 1993): 519–537.

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Crozier, Brian. “Political Thought of James Burnham.” National Review (April 15, 1983): 434–438. Doenecke, Justus D. “Conservatism: The Impassioned Sentiment.” American Quarterly 28 (Winter 1976): 359–376. Donnelly, Dorothy C. “A Settlement of Sorts: Henry Kissinger’s Negotiations and American Extrication from Vietnam.” Peace & Change 9 (Summer 1983), 55–79. Epstein, Joseph. “The Politics of William Buckley: Conservative Ideologue as Liberal Celebrity.” Dissent 19 (1972): 602–616. “A Generation of the Intellectual Right.” Modern Age 26 (1982): 226–460. Goh, Evelyn. “Nixon, Kissinger, and the ‘Soviet Card’ in the United States Opening to China, 1971–1974.” Diplomatic History 29 ( June 2005), 475–502. Judis, John B. “Apocalypse Then and Now: James Burnham’s Ambiguous Legacy to American Conservatism (obituary).” New Republic 197 (August 31, 1987): 29. Kissinger, Henry A. “Beyond the Old Left and the New Right.” Foreign Affairs 78 (May/June 1999), 99–116. Kristol, Irving. “American Conservatism, 1945–1995.” Public Interest 121 (Fall 1995): 80–91. Lovegall, Fredrik. “Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34 (March 2004), 100–112. McAndrews, Lawrence J. “The Politics of Principle: Richard Nixon and School Desegregation.” Journal of Negro History 83 (Summer 1998): 187–200. Moen, Matthew C. “From Revolution to Evolution: The Changing Nature of the Christian Right.” Sociology of Religion 55 (Autumn 1994): 345–357. Powers, Thomas. “The Appeal to Reason.” The War at Home. New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973. Small, Melvin. “The Election of 1968.” Diplomatic History 28 (September 2004). Szulc, Tad. “How Kissinger Did It: Behind the Vietnam Cease-Fire Agreement.” Foreign Affairs 15 (Summer 1974): 21–69. Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. “Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China.” Journal of American History 92 ( June 2005): 109–135.

Archival Materials and Government Documents Bureau of Labor Statistics, Historical Unemployment Rates [online]. Washington, DC. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database [online]. Washington, DC. Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives and Records Administration. College Park, MD. Public Papers of the President Series, Richard Nixon. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

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Buckley (William F.) Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven, CT. Burnham ( James) Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, CA. Firing Line Television Program Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, CA. Kirk (Russell) Papers, The Russell Kirk Center for Cultural Renewal, Mecosta, MI. Meyer (Frank S.) Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, CA. Rusher (William A.) Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Toledano (Ralph de) Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.

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Manuscript Collections

AFL-CIO, 97 Africa, 29, 182 African Americans, 3–4, 109–10, 113, 128–9 Agnew, Spiro, 24–5, 135, 141, 143–4, 149, 163–4 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 114–15 Aitkin, Jonathan, 172 Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education (1969), 120–1, 125 Alternative, The, 7, 71, 84, 101 Ambrose, Stephen, 113 American Conservative Union (ACU), 6–7, 29, 74, 91, 92, 96, 101, 116, 133, 135, 142, 145 Anderson, Martin, 30, 108 anticommunism, 8–9, 12, 33, 35, 42, 55, 58, 61, 132, 135, 183, 186 antiwar activists, 4, 9, 11, 27, 39, 40, 41–2, 46 Arms Control Disarmament Agency, 72 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), 38–45 Ash, Roy, 105 Ashbrook, John, 25, 132, 142–8, 149, 152, 194 Asia, 15, 29, 37–8, 40, 49, 54, 64–5, 67, 68, 70, 138 balance of payments, 22, 87, 95 Basic Principles of Mutual Relations (1972), 75

Battle Line, 41 Bell, Jeffrey, 133, 140, 223 benign neglect, 113, 119, 132 Benson, Charles, 73 Bernstein, Carl, 155 Black, Hugo, 122, 125 Blackmun, Harry, 122 Bork, Robert, 164 Bozell, L. Brent, 5, 109, 134, 212–13, 218 Brennan, Donald, 76, 205 Brennan, Mary, 184 Bretton Woods, 87, 95, 99–100, 209 Brezhnev Doctrine, 62 Brezhnev, Leonid, 62, 72, 74–7 Bridges, Linda, 135 Brock, William, 166 Brodin, Eric, 71, 204 Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 3–4, 109–10, 113, 119, 120, 124, 179 Brownfeld, Allan, 71, 204 Buchanan, Patrick, 14, 16, 18, 19, 62–3, 67–70, 118, 137–8, 139–40, 143, 145 Buckley, James L., 53, 136, 141, 166 Buckley, Priscilla, 20 Buckley, William F. 1968 election, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26 1972 election, 143–5, 146–9, 151, 153 background, 3, 5–6, 11 China policy, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70

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INDEX

IN DE X

Buckley, William F.—Continued civil rights, 109, 120, 124 détente with USSR, 73–4, 78, 79 economic policy, 85, 91–2, 96, 99, 103, 105–6 Nixon’s character/intentions, 177–8, 180, 182–3, 184, 187 Supreme Court nominations, 121–2 suspension of support, 133, 134–5, 136, 137, 138–9, 140, 142 Vietnam War, 40–1, 43, 44, 45, 46 Watergate, 156, 158, 159–60, 163–4, 167, 168–9, 170, 173 welfare reform, 114–15, 117 Bull, Stephen, 161 Burger, Warren, 121, 123, 125–6, 180 Burnham, James 1968 election, 20 1972 election, 146, 147, 152 background, 6 China policy, 64, 65 communism, 53 détente with USSR, 72–3, 75–6, 77, 78, 79, 80 suspension of support, 133 Vietnam War, 35, 36, 48, 50, 52–3, 54 Watergate, 156, 162–3 welfare reform, 108–9 Burns, Arthur, 86, 89, 90, 94, 208 Butterfield, Alexander, 161, 224 Cabinet Council of Economic Policy, 86 Cambodia, 36, 37, 41–53, 169 Cambodia Incursion, 41–3 Camp David, 94 capitalism (free market economy), 84–6 Carswell, G. Harrold, 122–3 Carter, Jimmy, 186 Chapin, Dwight, 15 China, 23, 38, 44, 53, 54, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63–71, 77, 80, 132, 134, 135, 138, 143, 145, 183

Christmas Bombings, 37, 46, 50 CIA, 154–5 civil rights, 3, 4, 9, 11, 22, 24, 108, 109–10, 112–13, 119–29, 179–80, 193 affirmative action, 112, 128–9, 178, 179–80 busing, 107, 111, 112, 123–8, 129, 140, 148, 162, 163, 179–80, 181 conservative view, 109–11, 120, 121, 124, 125–6, 127–8 Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 127 Nixon’s view, 112–13, 119–20, 121, 123–9, 125, 127, 128 Philadelphia Plan, 128–9 race relations, 109, 112, 130, 180 southern strategy, 112–13, 119, 122, 123, 126 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 128, 129 Clurman, Michael, 84, 207 Cold War, 35, 58, 60, 61, 67, 76, 78, 79, 80, 185 Cole, Kenneth, 141 Colson, Charles, 138, 140–1, 143, 145 Columbia University, 11–12 Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP), 150, 154–5 communism, 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 14, 17, 22, 25, 29, 33, 34–5, 37, 41, 45, 52–3, 55, 57–63, 65, 72, 74, 76, 79, 80, 134, 171, 185–6 Congress, 8, 14, 29, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 51, 53, 75, 77, 78, 88, 90, 96, 101–2, 104–5, 115, 116, 117, 123, 126–8, 132, 137, 151, 156, 159, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 170, 182 Connally, John, 86–7, 91, 93, 94 conservatism, 1, 2, 6–7, 9, 14, 28, 105, 118, 130, 144, 145, 149, 162, 173, 176, 184–8 conservative intellectuals 1968 election, 16–21, 28–31 1972 election, 144 communism, 57, 60

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domestic policy, 111, 115, 124, 129, 179–80 economic policy, 101, 103, 178–9 foreign policy, 70, 79, 80, 182–4 Nixon’s character/intentions, 131–2, 175, 176–8, 180–2 suspension of support, 132 Vietnam War, 33, 40, 44, 54–5 Watergate, 153, 168, 173, 184–5 conservative movement, 2, 6, 8, 20, 58–9, 107, 109, 139–40, 146–7, 148, 150, 152, 175, 184–5 Conservative Party, 6, 18, 134, 136 containment, 29, 33, 34–5, 58, 71, 72 Cooper-Church Amendment, 43 Cost of Living Council, 95 Council of Economic Advisers, 29, 86, 94 counterculture, 4 Cox, Archibald, 158, 161, 134 Coyne, John R., 176, 227 crime, 22, 23, 25, 27, 107, 131, 132, 140 Crozier, Brian, 76, 171, 205 Cuneo, Ernest, 67, 202 Dean, John, 155–8, 160–1 Defense, Department of, 37 Democratic National Committee, 154–5 Democratic Party, 14, 16, 26–7, 58, 60, 71, 90, 102, 117, 121, 129, 131, 133, 137, 139, 148–51, 153, 154–5, 157–8, 159, 164, 165, 184 desegregation, 26, 107, 109, 119–20, 123–5, 127 détente, 53, 54, 57, 60–3, 141, 149, 171, 176 American view, 60–1 Chinese view, 62 conservative view, 62–3, 67, 72, 73–4, 76, 77–8, 79–80, 182–4, 185–6

241

implementation, 61, 63–4, 66, 69–70, 72, 74, 76 Soviet view, 61 Dionne, E.J., 184 Disraeli, Benjamin, 111–12, 113, 180–1 Dobrynin, Anatoly, 72, 74 domestic disorder, 3–4, 11–12, 15, 83, 107–8, 110 domestic policy, 23, 29–30, 107–30, 162, 176, 180–1 conservative view, 23, 29–30, 108–11, 129, 162, 176, 180–1 Nixon’s view, 111–13, 131, 141 Douglas, Helen Gahagan, 8 Draft Goldwater Movement, 4–5, 13 Drummond, Roscoe, 136, 218 Easter Offensive, 37, 45, 48 economic policy, 7, 23, 83–4, 92, 94, 101, 106, 162, 178 conservative view, 7, 84–6 Nixon view, 86–8 economy, 7, 83, 84–6, 87–8, 89, 91–9, 101, 105, 131, 132, 135, 186 Egypt, 77–8 Ehrlichman, John, 89, 157–8, 161 Eisenhower, Dwight, 8, 12, 34, 36, 79, 121, 123 election of 1952, 8 election of 1960, 9, 11, 12–13, 14, 19–20, 26, 27, 83, 133, 176, 191 election of 1964, 4–5, 9, 12–13, 14, 17, 26, 150 election of 1968, 1–2, 3, 9, 11, 27, 107, 134, 137, 218 candidates, 12–24, 26 conservative view, 11, 12–14, 18–22, 25–6, 27–31 Democratic convention, 26–7 New Hampshire primary, 17 Nixon’s strategy, 14–16 Republican convention, 24–5 Republican Platform, 22–4 southern strategy, 112–13, 119, 122, 123, 126

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IN DE X

IN DE X

election of 1972, 70, 86, 87, 95, 131, 133, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 154, 176 Ashbrook primary challenge, 142–8 California primary, 145–8 candidates, 131, 142, 148–9 Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP), 150, 154–5 conservative view, 131–2, 142, 148–50 New Hampshire primary, 142–3, 146–7 Nixon’s strategy, 143–5, 150–1 Republican Platform, 149–50 Electoral College, 27, 151 Ervin, Sam, 155, 157, 158, 160, 223, 224 Evans, M. Stanton, 6–7, 19, 28, 41, 50, 104, 105, 116, 129–30, 139, 140, 142, 145, 150, 160, 179, 181, 218 exchange rates, 22, 87, 94, 95, 99–101 Family Assistance Plan (FAP), see welfare reform FBI, 155 Federal Reserve, 85, 90 Finch, Robert, 117, 119, 120 Firing Line, 6, 13, 117, 134, 142 fiscal policy, 84–5 Flanigan, Peter M, 144–5 Ford, Gerald, 169, 175, 183, 186 foreign policy, 14, 15, 22–3, 28, 29, 34, 54, 79, 80–1, 131, 134, 138, 141, 143 conservative view, 52–5, 60–7, 146, 172, 182–4, 185–6 Nixon’s view, 37, 51, 60–1, 171, 181 Fortas, Abe, 121–3 Francis, Samuel, 173, 187, 227 Friedman, Milton, 6–7, 22, 84–5, 87, 89, 90–1, 93, 96, 98, 100, 101, 105, 108, 115, 178, 207, 209 Frost, David, 170–1, 177–8

full-employment budget, 87, 91–3 fusionism, 1, 6, 59, 81 Garment, Leonard, 159 Germany, 83 gold standard, 94–5, 100–1, 209 Goldwater, Barry, 1–2, 4–5, 9, 12–14, 17, 20–1, 70, 71, 141, 146, 150, 166, 170 gradualism, 87, 89–93, 94, 96, 105, 179 Graham, Billy, 138 Graham, Daniel O., 80, 206 Gray, L. Patrick, 155–6 Great Britain, 100 Great Society, 9, 83, 88, 101, 103, 108, 115, 129 Greaves, Percy L., 97, 210 Green v. New Kent County School Board (1968), 119, 121 Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), 129 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 34, 43 Haig, Alexander, 141 Haldeman, H.R. (Bob), 15, 136, 137, 138, 140, 143, 155, 157, 158, 161, 165, 169, 209 Harlan, John Marshall, 125–6 Harlow, Bryce, 122 Harrigan, Anthony, 73, 133–4, 142, 204 Hart, Jeffrey, 7, 68, 69, 110, 138, 156, 162, 166, 171, 225 Hayek, Friedrich, 84 Haynsworth, Clement, 122–2 Hazlitt, Henry, 6–7, 85, 89–90, 92, 93, 95, 98–9, 100, 102, 178 Health, Education, and Welfare, Department of (HEW), 110, 114, 119, 124, 126 Helms, Jesse, 166 Herberg, Will, 109, 110, 212–13 Higby, Larry, 15, 138, 161 Himmelstein, Jerome, 2 Hiss, Alger, 8

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Hoover, Herbert, 15 House Committee on Un-American Activities, 8 House of Representatives (United States), 8, 26, 27, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169 Hruska, Roman, 122 Human Events, 3, 6, 11, 23, 28, 29, 30, 31, 40, 42, 45, 49, 51, 53, 65, 66, 68, 69, 76–7, 78, 92, 95, 102, 103, 104, 105, 115, 118, 120, 121, 126, 127, 128, 135, 142, 145, 149, 158, 159, 161, 168, 172, 176, 179, 181 Humphrey, Hubert, 26–7, 35 Hunt, E. Howard, 154, 156 Huston, Thomas, 19 impoundment, 88, 179 incomes policy, 85, 86, 94 inf lation, 83, 86, 87, 88 integration, 26, 109–10, 112–13, 119–23, 124–5, 126, 180 Israel, 77–8 Jackson, Henry, 139, 186 Jackson State (Mississippi), 42–3 Japan , 22, 65, 66, 69, 71, 83, 100 Jaworski, Leon, 167–8 Johnson, Frank, 41 Johnson, Lyndon, 5, 13, 19, 27, 28, 30, 33, 34, 35–6, 62, 72, 90, 111, 119, 121, 128, 150, 161, 172 Jones, Jenkin Lloyd, 162, 224 Jones, John, 133, 135 Judis, John, 138 Justice, Department of, 29, 119, 155, 157, 163 Kennan, George, 34 Kennedy, David, 30, 89 Kennedy, Edward, 154 Kennedy, John, 9, 11, 14, 28, 30, 34, 111, 128, 133, 160 Kennedy, Robert, 12

243

Kent State (Ohio), 42–3 Keynes, John Maynard, 87 Kilpatrick, James 1968 election, 23, 26, 30 1972 election, 148, 149, 151 background, 3, 6 economic policy, 85–6, 93, 95, 98, 102, 103, 178 foreign policy, 64, 66–7, 68, 75 integration/busing, 109–10, 120–1, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128 Nixon’s character/intentions, 177 Nixon’s impeachment/resignation, 165, 168, 169, 175 Supreme Court nominations, 121, 122, 125–6, 180 Vietnam War, 36, 39–40, 42, 43, 44, 51 Watergate, 156, 157, 159, 160, 163 welfare reform, 115–17 King, Martin Luther ( Jr.), 11 Kirk, Russell 1960 election, 12 1968 election, 25, 26, 28 1972 election, 148, 149, 151 background, 3, 6–7 détente, 54, 205 integration/busing, 124, 125, 127 liberalism, 108 Nixon’s impeachment/resignation, 165, 166–7, 168 revenue sharing, 104 Vietnam War, 36, 39, 40, 42, 45, 51, 54 Watergate, 160 Kissinger, Henry, 29, 37, 38, 42, 46, 47–8, 49, 50, 60–1, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72, 77, 78, 79–80, 136, 138–9, 183, 197, 198, 199 Kleindienst, Richard, 158 Korea, 65, 71 Korean War, 8, 36 labor unions, 22, 85, 95, 97, 121, 129 Laird, Melvin, 29

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IN DE X

IN DE X

Laos, 36, 37, 41, 43–4, 46, 47 law and order, 15, 22, 107 Lenin, V.I., 97 Lewis, Hobart, 138 liberalism, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 20, 25, 26, 31, 35, 59, 107, 109, 110, 117–18, 129, 145, 164, 167, 173, 175, 176, 179, 180–1, 185, 186, 187 liberals, 3, 4, 12, 17, 25, 27, 29, 35, 65, 73, 104, 108, 108, 111–12, 117–18, 120, 121, 124, 128, 136, 179, 180, 184 Liddy, G. Gordon, 154–5 Lindsay, David, 84, 207 linkage, 38, 60, 72 Lon Nol, 41, 42 Luce, Clare Boothe, 138 madman theory, 37, 61 Mahoney, J. Daniel, 134, 136, 140 Manhattan Twelve, 133–4, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 148, 152 Mao Zedong, 69, 183, 203 Matusow, Allen, 86 Mayo, Robert, 30 McCaffrey, Neil, 134, 140, 142, 219 McCarthy, Joseph, 5, 9, 213 McClean, Nancy, 109 McCloskey, Pete, 142, 147 McCord, James, 154, 156, 157, 223 McCracken, Paul W., 29–30, 86–7, 89, 93–4, 210 McGovern, George, 51, 70, 148–51, 154, 157, 162, 169, 175 Meany, George, 97 Medicaid, 114 Medicare, 109 Meyer, Frank 1960 election, 12–13, 20 1968 election, 11, 14, 18, 20–2, 25, 28 1972 election, 146 background, 3, 6, 221 communism, 58–9 détente, 67

domestic policy, 179–80 economic policy, 92, 97, 100, 104 liberalism, 12, 108–9, 110 Nixon’s character/intentions, 176, 180–1 suspension of support, 133, 135, 140 Vietnam War, 35 minimum wage, 22, 115, 197 Mitchell, John, 119, 136, 154, 157, 161 monetary policy, 7, 84–5, 87, 90–1, 92, 96 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 30, 111–13, 114–15, 117–18 Muskie, Edmund, 154 NAACP, 120 Nash, George, 2 National Liberation Front (NLF), 47, 48, 50 National Review, 3, 6–7, 13, 18, 20, 25–6, 29, 30, 36, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49–50, 51, 53, 58, 59, 60, 62, 67, 73, 75, 76, 77, 90, 91, 96–7, 98, 99–100, 101–2, 103–4, 109–10, 116, 117, 118, 120, 127, 128–9, 132, 135–6, 139, 142, 144, 145–6, 148–50, 151, 152, 156, 157, 159, 160, 162, 163, 165, 167, 168, 170, 171, 176, 180, 181, 183 national security, 23, 29, 37, 49, 50, 73, 76, 84, 102, 135, 138, 139, 148, 155–6, 158, 162, 167, 173 neoconservatism, 4, 81, 185–6 New Deal, 8, 9, 108, 115, 129, 172 New Economic Policy (NEP), 87–8, 94–101, 141, 178, 179 conservative view, 95–101, 146, 147, 150 gold standard, 99–101 Phase I, 96–7 Phase II, 97 Phase III, 98 Phase IV, 98–9 wage and price controls, 95–9

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IN DE X

ICBMs, 73–4 MIRVs, 73 safeguard, 73–4 O’Sullivan, John, 171, 226 Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 86–7, 94, 105 Old Left, 12 Operation Candor, 16 Ornstein, Allan, 129, 217 Paris Peace Accords (1973), 50–2 peaceful coexistence, 60, 61, 73–4, 75–6, 80 Percy, Charles, 16–17 Peterson, Peter G., 87 Phillips, Howard, 166 Phillips, Kevin, 120, 216 poverty, 3, 22, 23, 103, 111, 112, 114, 115, 185 Powell, Lewis, 126 Price, Raymond, 19, 22, 112 public intellectuals, 5 Reagan, Ronald, 1, 16, 17–18, 20–1, 24–5, 137, 141, 145, 166, 173, 182, 183, 186–7, 196 Rehnquist, William, 126, 225 Republican Party (GOP), 4, 5, 8–9, 12–13, 14, 16–17, 18, 20–1, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 88, 91, 93, 102, 111, 117, 118, 119, 121, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 149, 150–1, 153, 154, 155, 156–7, 161–2, 163, 164, 166, 167, 169, 170, 173, 178, 184–5, 186, 194, 196 revenue sharing, 88, 94–5, 102–5, 115, 179 Rhodes, John, 170 Richardson, Elliot, 158, 167 Rickenbacker, William, 109 Riesel, Victor, 86, 207 riots, rioting, 4, 11–12, 15 Rockefeller, Nelson, 16–17, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 29

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New Federalism, 88, 115 New Left, 4, 7, 35 New Right, 185–6 New York Times, 15, 134, 142 Nixon Doctrine, 37, 42, 54, 61, 63 Nixon liberals, 111 Nixon, Richard 1960 election, 9, 11, 12–13 1964 election, 14 1968 election, 1–2, 14–16, 17, 18–20, 21–3, 24–6, 27, 35–6 1972 election, 142–51 administration, 29–30 background, 8–9 and China, 63–71 civil rights, 22, 119–21, 123–9 death of, 172 domestic policy, 22, 111–13 economic policy, 83–4, 86–8, 89–92 Foreign Affairs, “Asia after Vietnam,” 15 foreign policy, 23, 60–3 intellectuals, 3, 11–12 New Economic Policy, 93–101 publications, 15, 170–1 relationship with conservatives, 2–3, 9, 131–41, 151–2, 153–4, 172–3, 175–87 renewal, 170–1 resignation, 164–70 revenue sharing, 102–5 and Soviet Union, 72–9 Supreme Court nominations, 121–3, 125–6 Tricky Dick, 8, 16 Vietnam War, 22–3, 33–4, 35–6, 37–9, 41–2, 43–4, 46–8, 49, 50–1, 53 Watergate, 154–64 welfare reform, 113–19 North Vietnam (DRV), 15, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47–9, 50–2 nuclear weapons, 37, 43, 59–60, 65, 73 ABM, 73–4, 76, 120

245

IN DE X

Roe v. Wade (1973), 180 Rogers, William, 29, 162 rollback, 58 Romney, George, 16–17, 25 Roosevelt, Franklin, 16, 160 Ruckelshaus, William, 164 Rumania, 61 Rusher, William 1960 election, 13 1968 election, 16, 18–21, 24, 25, 29 1972 election, 143–4, 146–7, 150, 222 affirmative action, 128–9 background, 6 China, 71 conservatism, 184, 185 economic policy, 86, 93, 103–4 Nixon’s character/intentions, 171, 183 Nixon’s resignation, 166 suspension of support, 133, 141 Watergate, 156, 184 welfare reform, 117 Ryskind, Allan, 133, 135, 140–1 Safire, William, 88–9, 170–1 Schlesinger, Arthur ( Jr.), 158 Schneider, Mark, 73 Schneider, William, 53, 200 Schulman, Bruce, 184 Schultz, George, 86–7, 91, 94, 128, 208 segregation, 3–4, 6, 26, 109–10, 113, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126 Senate (United States), 8, 27, 43, 120, 121, 122, 123, 126, 144, 155, 157, 158, 165, 166 Shanghai Communiqué (1972), 69 silent majority, 4, 38, 39–40, 75, 94, 131, 185 Simons, Henry, 84 Sino-American Summit (1972), 66, 69–71 Sino-Soviet Split (1969), 61, 62, 63 Sirica, John, 156, 164, 168 Slemp, C. Bascom, 154, 222

Small, Melvin, 105 Smant, Kevin, 20, 35 social security, 91, 108, 178 Somers, Alan B., 89, 207 South Vietnam (RVN), 15, 23, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53, 55, 79, 183 Southeast Asia, 15, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 57, 65, 183 Soviet Union, 15, 22, 23, 35, 36, 38, 41, 45, 50, 53, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74–5, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 171, 172, 182, 183, 185 Soviet-American Summit (1972), 74–5 Soviet-American Summit (1973), 76–7 Soviet-American Summit (1974), 78–9 Sowell, Thomas, 172, 226 State, Department of, 8, 29, 63, 66, 71, 72, 74, 139 Stein, Herbert, 87, 89, 94 Stennis, John, 120, 164 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 72–4, 75, 76–7, 79, 139, 141, 147, 205 Supreme Court, 3, 25, 108, 110, 112, 119–23, 125–6, 129, 148, 162, 168–9 decisions, 3, 109, 119, 120, 125, 129, 180 nominations, 25, 108, 112, 119, 121–3, 126, 148 suspension of support, 132–9, 143–4, 217 Buchanan, Patrick reaction, 137–8 conservative justification, 134–5 declaration, 133–4 Nixon’s response, 136, 138–9 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg School District (1971), 125

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IN DE X

unemployment, 3, 83, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 95, 100, 178, 206 unionism, 22 United Nations, 29, 63–4, 65–6, 67–8, 69, 71, 77, 138, 140–1 United States, 4, 11, 15, 22–3, 33, 34, 37–8, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70–1, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 87, 92, 95, 100, 101, 138, 141, 146, 152, 171, 182, 203 Valis, Wayne, 101, 211 van den Haag, Ernest, 40, 108, 115–16, 128, 170, 197 Vietnam War, 1, 3–4, 33–56 1968 election, 34–7 conservative proposals, 36–7 moratorium, 40, 43 Nixon’s exit strategy, 37–9

Paris negotiations, 46–50 Paris Peace Accords, 50–2 POWs, 37 Vietnamization, 38, 39–41, 42–3, 44, 45, 46, 54 volunteer army, 38 wage and price controls, 23, 85–6, 87, 93–9, 101, 146, 149, 178, 179, 181 Wallace, George, 17, 19, 26, 27, 28, 123, 139, 151, 154 Warren, Earl, 110, 121, 126, 180 Washington Post, 136, 155, 156 Watergate, 53, 55, 76, 88, 101–2, 105–6, 118, 152, 153–4, 155–69 break-in, 154, 156, 158, 160, 170 conservative view, 156–7, 158, 159–60, 161–3, 164–7, 168 cover-up, 155 Ervin Committee, 157, 158, 160, 223, 224 executive privilege, 156, 157, 158, 161, 162, 163, 168, 169 impeachment discussions, 154, 161, 164–6, 167, 168, 169, 170 Nixon’s resignation, 169–70 Saturday Night Massacre, 165 smoking gun tape, 169, 223 special prosecutor, 158, 164, 167 White House tapes, 160–1, 167–8 Weinberger, Caspar, 87 welfare, 22, 25, 26, 85, 88, 90, 92, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108–9, 111, 112, 113–19, 129–30, 132, 134, 135, 140, 146, 149, 162, 179, 181 welfare reform, 108–9, 112–13, 141, 179 conservative view, 108–9, 114–19 Family Assistance Plan (FAP), 112, 114–16, 117, 129, 132, 141, 143, 147, 162, 179, 181, 214, 218 guaranteed annual income, 112, 114, 129, 178–9 incomes strategy, 114 negative income tax, 114, 115 Nixon’s view, 112, 113–14

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Taggert, Tom, 153, 176, 181, 223 Taiwan (Nationalist China), 62, 63–6, 67–9, 70–1, 79, 132, 138, 140, 141, 203 tax reform, 22, 23, 88, 103, 104, 149 Teague, Randall, 134, 135 Tet Offensive, 11, 48 Thieu, Nguyen Van, 37, 43, 47–8, 49–50 Tho, Le Duc, 49–50 Thomas, Cal, 172, 226 Thurmond, Strom, 24, 141, 166, 194, 196 Toledano, Ralph de, 6–7, 18, 19, 25, 28, 64, 131, 157–8, 176 totalitarianism, 108 Treasury, Department of, 30 triangular diplomacy, 61 Trotsky, Leon, 58 Troy, Tevi, 5 Truman Doctrine, 34 Truman, Harry, 34 Tyrrell, R. Emmett ( Jr.), 7, 40, 208

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IN DE X

Western Europe, 22, 75–6, 77, 100 Whalen, Richard, 16, 192 White House, 3, 20, 29, 37, 39, 60, 65, 71, 77, 87, 89, 91, 98, 102, 104, 108, 119, 123, 126, 127, 128, 133, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 143, 144, 148, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 169, 170, 177 Will, George F., 7–9, 80, 108, 159, 165, 166, 169, 172, 177 Wills, Gary, 19, 24

Winter, Thomas, 133, 135 Woodward, Bob, 155 World War II, 2, 8, 45, 53, 58–9, 83, 92 Yom Kippur War (1973), 77–8 Yost, Charles, 29 Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), 134–5, 144 Zhou Enlai, 65, 66, 69, 70 Ziegler, Ron, 15, 155, 156

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