Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies Regional Challenges
A
Journal of Democracy Book
BOOKS I N
THE SERIES
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Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies Regional Challenges
A
Journal of Democracy Book
BOOKS I N
THE SERIES
Edited by Larry Diamond and Marc
F.
The Global Resurgence of Democracy
Plattner
(1993)
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy Revisited Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy Economic Reform and Democracy
(1993)
(1994)
(1995)
The Global Resurgence of Democracy, 2d ed. Civil-Military Relations and Democracy
(1996)
(1996)
(1997) (with Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien)
Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies
Published under the auspices of the International Forum for Democratic Studies
A 395801 ConsOlidating the Thi rd Wave Dem
ocracies edited by Larry Diamon d, Marc F. Plattner, Yun -han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien
Available in separate pap erback editions: Consolidating the Thi rd Wave Democracies : Themes and Perspect ives edited by Larry
Diamond, Marc F. Plat tner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien
Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Reg ional Challenges edited by
�onsolidating the •
Third Wave DemocracIes
Regional Challenges
Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu , and Hung-mao Tien
Edited by Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien
The Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore and London
© 1997 The JohnsHopkins University
CONTENTS
Press um for Democratic Stud ies and The Institute for Nati onal Policy Research
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The International For
All rights reserved. Pub lished 1997 Printed in the U 't . III ed States a f Amenca on acid
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The JohnsHopkins Univ
ersity Press
2715 N orth Charles Street, Baltimore, Maryland 2121 8-4319 The Johns Hopkins Pres
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\" Introduction: In Search of Consolidation, Larry Diamond
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s Ltd., London
Library of Congress Cat alog Card Number 97-7 2775 A catalog record for this book is available from the British Libr ary. ISBN
Acknowledgments
0-8018-5795-3 (pbk)
I. Regional Perspectives
1 . Southern Europe: A Third Wave Success Story , P. Nikiforos Diamandouros 3 2. Latin America' s Multiple Challenges, Edgardo Boeninger 3 . Russia' s Rough Ride, Michael McFaul
26
64
4. East Asian Democracy : Progress and Limits, James Cotton II. Taiwan
5. Taiwan ' s Transformation, Hung-mao Tien
1 23
6. Taiwan : Still Defying the Odds , Thomas B. Gold
1 62
7. Chinese Culture and Political Renewal, Lee Teng-hui
1 92
8 . A Common Commitment to Democracy, Lien Chan
198
9 . Explaining Taiwan' s Transition, James c. Y. Soong
202
ill. China
1 0 . "Creeping Democratization" in China, Minxin Pei 1 1 . China' s Constitutionalist Option, Andrew J. Nathan
213 228
95
viii
Contents
1 2 . Can Chin a Cha nge? David S. G. Goodman
250
1 3 . Chin a' s New Wav e of Nati onalism, Ying -shih Yii
257
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
IV. Externallnflnences
X 1 4 . S outh Korea and Taiw an : The International Context Yun-han Chu, Fu Hu & Chung-i n Moon
X 1 5.
267
The Rise of "Political Aid," Mic hael Pinto-Duschinsky Index
' 295
325
7
This book is the offspring of the most memorable conference that any of us has ever attended�a four-day event held in Taipei on 27-30 August 1 9 9 5 . Cosponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy ' s International Forum for Democratic Studies and Taiwan's Institute for National Policy Research (lNPR), the conference brought to Taiwan some 60 leading scholars and practitioners of democracy from 25 countries to discuss the issue of consolidating the new "third wave" democracies that have emerged over the past two decades. Among the political leaders who participated were Edgardo B oenin ger, former minister of the presidency in Chile; Yegor Gaidar, a member of the Duma and former acting prime minister of Russia; Mart Laar, former prime m,inister of Estonia; and Jose Marfa Maravall, former min ister of education and science in Spain. The scholars included such lu minaries in political science as Robert A. Dahl, Francis Fukuyama, Samuel P. Huntington, Juan J. Linz, Abraham Lowenthal, Guillermo O' Donnell, Adam Przeworski, Robert Scalapino, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Alfred Stepan. Among the heads of major civil society organizations present were S adikou Alao (GERDDES-Afrique), Wilmot James (Insti tute for Democracy in South Africa), Ghia Nodia (Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development, Georgia); Aleksander Smolar (Stef an B atory Foundation, Poland) ; and Chai-Anan Samudavanija (Institute of Public Policy Studies, Thailand). In addition to those whose essays appear in these two volumes, other prominent democratic scholars and practitioners who participated in the conference included Vincent Maphai (South Africa) ; Yasmeen Murshed (Bangladesh); Anthony Bing-Ieung Cheung (Hong Kong) ; Hyug-baeg 1m and Sung Chul Yang (South Ko rea) ; Hulan Hashbat (Mongolia) ; Carolina Hernandez and Haydee Yorac (Philippines ) ; Ergun Ozbudun (Turkey); Rudolf Joo (Hungary) ; Nina Belyaeva, Vladimir Mau, and Lilia Shevtsova (Russia) ; Serhiy Holovaty (Ukraine) ; Patricia Valdez (Argentina) ; BoHvar Lamounier (Brazil) ; Denise Dresser (Mexico); Juan Arias (Panama) ; and Carl Gershman, Gordon Hein, Ramon Myers, and Marc F. Plattner (United States) .
x
Acknowledgments
The conferen ce was remarkable not only for bring ing together leading figures from so many third wave dem ocracies, but also for the role it played in the democratic evolution of Taiwan. Not long after the conferen ce's conclusio n, Taiw an held the parliamentary elections (in December 1 995) and the presiden tial elections (in March 1 996) that are regarded by most analy sts as havi ng completed its trans ition to democracy . In the impo rtanc e that they accorded our conference, and the strong statemen ts that they made there, the top political leaders of Tai wan mad e clea r in a very publ ic way their determination to follow through with their trans ition and to join the rank s of the world's democracies. The attendees were privileged to hear major addre sses from four of Tai wan ' s most important offic ials: Presi dent Lee Teng-hui; Premier Lien Chan (who was elected vice-presi dent in March 1 996) ; James c.Y. Soon g, the elected governor of Taiw an prov ince; and Chen Shui -bien , the elected mayo r of Taipei (and a mem ber of the oppo sition Demo cratic Progressi ve Party). We are very pleased to be able to publish here revised vers ions of the pres entations by the first three of these, and regret that circu msta nces did not allow May or Chen Shui -bien to prov ide us with a revised vers ion of his rema rks in time for pUblicati on. In this context, we also wish to take spec ial note of the key role played by Jaso n Hu, then the director of Taiw an' s Government Information Office, whose enco uragement and assis tance were vital to the succe ss of this project. Another important contr ibuti on was made by Hui- chen g Huang, then executive director of INPR. With the completio n of its democrati c trans ition , Taiwan can lay claim to being one of the most notab le of the third wave democraci es. It is remarkable not only for its extra ordinary econ omic success, but also for emb odyi ng the first freely elect ed governme nt in the history of the Chinese people-and thereby dispr oving the conte ntion of those who clai m that dem ocra cy is incompatib le with Chinese culture. Given the venue of our conferen ce, we gave special atten tion in this project to Taiwan ' s emerging democracy , and to the prospects for democratization in the neighborin g People' s Repu blic of China. We believe that the importanc e of Chin a for the futur e of democracy in the world more than justifies this emph asis. A project of this scop e requires the contr ibuti ons of man y people. We were bless ed to have the assis tance of a considerable number of dedicated staff mem bers at both the Inter natio nal Foru m and INPR. The conferen ce arrangements were hand led primarily by INPR, with invaluable administrativ e support prov ided by Chih-peng Lin, Chi a-ch ing Lu, Pei-Iing Lin, Mam ie Barrett, and Trevor Spon agle. A report on the conferenc e was prepared by You- ming Yang and Mamie Barrett and was prod uced and printed by the Cultural Development Divis ion, Evergreen Internatio nal Corporati on. Debra Lian g-Fenton of the Internatio nal Forum
xi
Acknowledgments
provided important assistance at the confere � ce, . and she and Art . Kau fman eff'ICle ntly took charge of commUnIcatIOns WI'th overseas participants. . Th work on thiS b k was performed primarily by the International . ForUl . The . enormous task of coordinating and supervisin t ed' r aI y and productIOn pro s on these two volumes was super b y ndl . Annette Theu�mg. e recel'ved help on various administrative matters from Debra LJang-Fenton and f m Jennifer Alstad and Bo Tedards of , Juan J. Linz and Alfred INPR . The essays by s amue I . Huntington . ' h -B oadi , Stepan, G UI'II ermo O'Donnell Aleksander Smolar, E. GYlma ' Ad am Przeworski et al Lee Teng-hUI,' Minxin Pei , and Andrew J. Nathan were fIrs t p ublis hed in the Journal of Democracy; these refl ect . the skillful manuscnpt ed'Itmg f Phil Costopoulos and Annette Theuring, 'bUtI' �� S b y Miriam Kramer Zerxes 0 along with other editorial contn e dited �ith care a Da Spencer, Piled by David I i by �my I z an Ratigan Henry Tom at the Johns Hopkins University Press was once g t� more a� unfailing source of useful adv e d nc s an, the t a Finally, we wish to exp . for emocracy, for his valuable m president of the NatlO�1 En . participation at the conlerence In Taipei and for his enthusiastic support for this project.
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INTRODUCTION: IN SEARCH OF CONSOLIDATION Larry Diamond
World politics have changed radically in the past two decades. At the beginning of 1 975, there were only some 40 democracies in the world, and they were predominantly the rich, industrialized nations of the West. l Few states in what was then termed the Third World had democratic systems of government. Communist dictatorships were firmly entrenched--or so it seemed-in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba, China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. In 1 975, communist forces took control of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos as well. That year, Marxist governments also came to power in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique and, soon thereafter, in Ethiopia. Military or one-party dictatorships held sway in most of Latin America, Africa, and Asia; only. three countries in Central and South America had democratically elected leaders. Indeed, the mid-to-late 1 970s seemed a low-water mark for democracy in the world, and the empirical trends were reified by intellectual fashions dismissing democracy as an artifice, a cultural construct of the \XI est, or a "luxury" that poor states could not afford. Yet even as authoritarian trends were expanding and deepening in most parts of the world, a countertrend was taking shape. In 1 974, the 48-year-old dictatorial regime in Portugal was deposed by a military coup, and three months later the Greek military dictatorship collapsed. Elected, civilian democratic government took hold in Greece first, but by late 1 975 democrats had bested radical forces at the polls in Portugal as well. That same month of November 1 975, the 36-year-old dictator ship of Francisco Franco in Spain ended with his death, and a transition to democracy ensued. Over the following three years, Spain crafted a new democratic regime while the process of military withdrawal began in Latin America and military regimes gave way to civilian, elected governments in Ghana and Nigeria. The latter two democracies did not last long, but in a grand process that Samuel P. Huntington has dubbed the "third wave" of global democratization, a democratic Zeitgeist swept the globe.2 As the return
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Introduction: In Search of Consolidation
to at least formally democratic, civilian rule was becoming the norm in �entral a?� S?uth :--merica, democracy was restored in Turkey in 1983, In the PhilIppInes In 1986, in South Korea in 1987, and in Pakistan in 1988. By then, Hungary was already in transition to a multiparty system. In 1989, communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, and a regional wave of .de�ocratic transitions ensued there, followed in 1990 by the begInnIng of a "second liberation" on the African continent. By the end of 1994, 38 of the (then) 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa had held . competitive multiparty elections for at least the national legislature/ and :he nu�ber of electoral democracies in Africa had increased to 18 from . J ust 3 In 1988. 4 CommunIsm collapsed in the Soviet Union as well, and . new democraCIes emerged in many of the former Soviet states ' including, most significantly, Russia. In two decades, the third wave of democratization has transformed the balance of political regimes in the world. This transformation has been especially dramatic since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism in the former East bloc. Between 1990 and 1996, the number of electoral democracies in the world increased from 76 to 118 Even with the increase in the total number of countries in the world during this period, this trend established democracy as the typical form of government. The percentage of countries with at least an electoral form of democracy-in which multiple political parties regularly compete for power through (relatively) free and fair elections-increased from 27.5 percent in 1974 to 46 percent in 1990 and to 61 percent in 1996. On clos�r exami�ation, however, the scope of democratic progress in the world IS partly Illusory, for regular, free, and fair elections do not ensure the presence of other important dimensions of democracy. A more comprehensive conception-what I have elsewhere termed "liberal democracY :'--en�ompasses extensive protections for individual and group f�e��oms, InclUSive pluralism in civil society as well as party politics, CIvIlIan control over the military, institutions to hold officeholders accou�table, an? t�us a � trong rule ?f law secu:ed through an indepen . . . dent, Impartr�l J udI�Iary. Although It IS not artIculated in these precise . terms, the dIstInctIOn between the minimal framework of electoral democracy and the deeper institutional structure of liberal democracy . . figures pro1ll1nently In many of the theoretical and empirical chapters in our two volumes, entitled Themes and Perspectives and Regional Chal�eng es. Indeed, as Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan insist in their . contnbutIOn to Themes and Perspectives, "If freely elected executives (no m �tter what the magnitude of their majority) infringe the constitu . tIO�,. vIOlate the rights of individuals and minorities, impinge upon the . legItrmate functIOns of the legislature, and thus fail to rule within the bounds of a state of law, their regimes are not democracies." The number of "liberal" democracies has also increased during the third wave, although not nearly as sharply as the number of electoral
xv
Introduction: In Search of Consolidation
as a rough in democracies. Taking the Freedom House rating of "free" jum states such of �ed from639 dicator of liberal democracy, the nu�ber In 1990. In 76 to then and 1980 In 52 to at the start of the third wave from 27:5 te, modera more even is increase the terms, al proportion . er, In Moreov 1990. In percent of all states in 1974 to 41.5 percent d (as stagnate less or more has states free recent years the number of states free of number the fact, In . general) in levels have freedom g dipped slightly in 1992 and 1993, edging back up to :6 in the foll�win Irberal terms, Onal proportI In 1996. in two years and increasing to 79 the democracies were no more common in 1996 (4 1 .4 percent of world's regimes) than in 1991.7 the The juxtaposition of these two trends-steady e.xpa�slOn In of levels In On stagnatI recent but acies, democr number of electoral betwe�n gap growing a signals worldthe in freedom civil and l politica democratrc the two standards. In 1990, 86 percent of all the formally 1993, only Since acies. democr liberal or "free," states in the world were levels freedom decade, past the over And been. have rds two-thi about , Turkey as such acies, democr have actually declined in many third wave older some in as well as , Zambia and r, Pakistan, Peru, Brazil, Ecuado ela. democracies, including India, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and Venezu nce prevale the in t Regional differences are also much more apparen 1996, of end the By acy. democr l electora of liberal democracy than of them well all 24 West European countries were "free" (with most of , only contrast By above the threshold dividing "free" from "partly free"). E�st in ose � t of third a as, Americ 57 percent of the countries in the m the AsIa percent 42 Union, Soviet former the Central Europe and . In the Pacific region, 17 percent in Africa, and one (Israel) of 14 states l electora are that states of ion Middle East were free.8 In the proport West the to closer much came regions other democracies, however, ricas, 69 European standard of 100 percent: 89 percent in t�e A�� . regIOn, CIfic ASia-Pa the in percent in the former East bloc, 63 percent and 34 percent in Africa. greater Clearly, the third wave of democratization has had . much ume two-vol thIS in breadth than depth. As a number of the essays of form n commo most the be may acy collection demonstrate, democr ialized dust j : �Wl .\ye the of outside but : ? world, the y government in �. If � nations it tends to--&e shallow, illiberal, and poorly Instlt���?_ [iJ��� those of most in e collaps atic democr f there are no imm�diate threats() become con countries, neither are there clear signs that democracy has and method system l politica viable only the truly statile, and d solidate . acies democr new 70 than more the for the foreseeable future. In fact, of only a small that have come into being since the start of the third wave, se�u�e. T?e and rooted deeply be to red conside ly general are r numbe w�le ratrc o � � � n remai to � remainder appear. for now "'condemned' .. . htaries 1 1ll WIth aCIes, democr ed solidat 'uncon they "muddle through as •
•
xvi
Introduction: In Search of Consolidation
unwilling to seize power even in the classic circumstances of political stalemate and crisis that were used to justify past COUpS.1O But there are clear signs of erosion of the quality and stability of democracy in many of these third wave regimes-abuses of power and even "self-coups" by domineering executives, constraints on the press and independent organizations, assassinations of crusading journalists, and mounting corruption, criminality, political violence, and civil strife. There are even growing doubts, reflected in some of our chapters, about how long the constitutional structures of democracy can survive amid prolonged economic suffering, severe inequality, rampant crime, venal and feeble judicial systems, growing vigilante movements, and chronically weak and ineffectual political institutions. From this perspective, the greatest challenge still lies ahead: to consolidate and make permanent the extraordinary democratic gains of the past two decades. There is more at stake here than the quality and stability of new (and, in countries like Sri Lanka and Colombia, old) democracies. The future status of democracy in the world could itself be in question. As Huntington emphasizes in his book The Third Wave, each of the previous two waves of global democratization ended in a "reverse wave" of democratic breakdown . And each of these reverse waves was a . traumatic time for human freedom, international peace, and liberal values, giving rise to fascist and communist regimes in the interwar period. and to numerous insurgencies and brutal military dictatorships in the 1960s and early 1970s. Today, human rights abuses, genocide, aggression, warfare, and insecurity are still generated by nondemocratic states; generally, the more repressive these states are, the more they threaten their neighbors as well as their own people. As Huntington observes in the opening chapter of Themes and Perspectives, the euphoria generated by the collapse of communism has long since worn off, and we must now recognize that "this great third wave of democratization . . . may be losing its outward dynamic" of expansion, and even that "a new reverse wave may be gathering which could lead to the erosion of some third wave gains." It is vitally important to preempt this third reverse wave. And this can be done only if the third wave democracies become consolidated. What Is Democratic Consolidation?
Our two companion volumes, and the 1995 conference that spawned them, were organized in the belief that consolidation is an important concept in the study of democracy, and a vital political goal for new democracies. This view is not without its critics, one of whom, Guillermo O'Donnell, offers a thoughtful challenge here. Yet the bulk of our contributors have converged on an understanding of democratic consolidation as a discernible process by which the rules, institutions,
Introduction: I n Search o f Consolidation
xvii
and constraints of democracy come to constitute "the only game in town," the one legitimate framework for seeking and exercising political power. In Themes and Perspectives, Linz and Stepan offer a conceptual framework for consolidation that has already become widely influential and that informs many of the other chapters in this collection�_:rhe)' posiL.'{eriapping behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions of consolidation, through which "democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional , and even psychological life, as well as in political calculations for achieving success." In consolidated democracies, they argue, there may be intense conflict, but no significant political or social actors attempt to achieve their objectives by illegal, unconstitutional, or antidemocratic means. Further, though there may be severe problems of governance and widespread disapproval of the government of the day, elites and the public at large overwhelmingly believe "that democratic procedures and i nstitutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life." At bottom, then, the consolidation of democracy represents a kind of mirror image of the process of democratic breakdown that Linz and Stepan studied a generation ago.lI While democratic breakdowns feature the erosion of democratic legitimacy and the rise of disloyal and semi-loyal political actors, consolidation is buttressed by a deep and widespread legitimation of democracy. And this legitimation-internalized, practiced, and transmitted across political generations-involves more than a commit ment to democracy in the abstract; it also entails adherence to the specific rules and constraints of the country's constitutional system.12 It is this broad, unquestioning embrac;(: of demo<:;raticp!,ocedures that produces a crucial element of consolidation-a reduction in the uncer tainty of democracy, regarding not so much the outcomes as the rules and methods of political competition. As P. Nikiforos Diamandouros observes in his case study of Southern Europe in Regional Challenges, this regularization of politics promotes democratic stability by safeguard ing the rights of political oppositions and minorities, containing conflict within institutional channels, and thus reducing the intensity of conflict. As consolidation advances, "there is a widening of the range of political actors who come to assume democratic conduct [and democratic loyalty] on the part of their adversaries," a transition from "instrumental" to "principled" commitments to the democratic framework, an increase in trust and cooperation among political competitors, and a socialization of the general population (through both deliberate efforts and the practice of democracy in politics and civil society).13 As Robert A. Dahl notes in Themes and Perspectives, the consolidation of democracy thus implies, a � d indeed requires, the emergence of a democratic political culture. Democratic cultures may vary across countries in many of their particulars, but unless democratic institutions are braced by such broadly
xviii
Introduction: In Search of Consolidation
shared norms as political trust, tolerance, willingness to compromise, and, most of all, belief in democratic legitimacy, those institutions will be vulnerable to breakdown in times of crisis.14 In the cases examined in this study, progress toward democratic consolidation is closely correlated with the growth of democratic culture. In this respect, our Southern European cases are the most advanced; Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have seen the rapid emergence of democratic values; and such value change has been significant but uneven in Latin America, East Asia, and especially Russia (where Michael McFaul notes some recent slippage in support for democracy). Democratic consolidation is fostered by a number of institutional, policy, and behavioral changes. Many of these improve governance directly by strengthening state capacity; liberalizing and rationalizing economic structures; securing social and political order while maintaining basic freedoms; improving horizontal accountability and the rule of law; and controlling corruption . Others improve the representative functions of democratic governance by strengthening political parties and their linkages to social groups, reducing fragmentation in the party system, enhancing the autonomous capacity and public accountability of legisla tures and local governments, and invigorating civil society. Most new democracies need these types of institutional reform and strengthening, especially those that O'Donnell has labeled "delegative democracies" precisely because of their particularism, lack of horizontal accountability, and hence tendency toward corruption.15 Some also require steady efforts to reduce military involvement in nonmilitary issues and subject the military and intelligence establishments to civilian control and oversight. And some require legal and institutional innovations to foster accommo dation and mutual security among different ethnic and nationality groups. Underlying all of these specific challenges, however, is an intimate connection between the deepening of democracy and its consolidation. Some new democracies have become consolidated during the third wave (and there are also some older consolidated democracies in the "Third World"), but none of the "nonliberal" electoral democracies that have emerged during the third wave has yet achieved consolidation. To do so, they must become more democratic, making more progress in protecting individual rights, ensuring a rule of law, representing citizen interests, incorporating marginalized groups, institutionalizing "horizontal account ability" of different branches of officeholders to one another, and eliminating the "reserved domains of power" enjoyed by the military and other social and political forces that are not accountable (directly or indirectly) to the electorate.16 Put in slightly different terms, as Abraham Lowenthal does in his contribution to Themes and Perspectives, before democratic institutions can become consolidated, they must first fully exist. From this perspective, "talk of consolidating democracy is premature and misleading" in much of Latin America and the Caribbean
Intr oduction: In Search of Consolidation
xix
because so many of the essential institutions of democratic governance re main to be "solidly constructed."I? In some cases, becoming more democratic may involve completing the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. Linz and Stepan argue in their essay here (and at greater length in their Problems of Der!l.Qs;mtic..1mnsition and Consolidation) that a democratic transition is completed only when the freely elected government has full authority to generate new policies, and thus when the executive, legislative, and judicial powers generated by the new democracy are not constrained or compelled by law to share power with other actors, such as the military. Chile' s interlocking system of prerogatives for the military and its civilian appointees, embedded in the 1980 Constitution that General Augusto Pinochet left to the new civilian regime, so constrains the authority of elected governments and so insulates the military from democratic control that until it "is removed or greatly diminished, the Chilean transition cannot be completed, and, by definition, Chilean democracy cannot be consolidated."18 An important issue in the .conceptual debate on consolidation is: How do we recognize it? Certainly no single indicator will do. And it is easier to recognize the phenomenon in its absence: the signs of fragility, i nstability, and nonconsolidation (or deconsolidation). These include all the manifestations of "disloyalty" that Linz has noted: explicit rejection of the legitimacy of the democratic system-{)r of the nation-state and its boundaries-by (significant) parties, movements, or organizations; willingness by political competitors to use force, fraud, or other illegal means to acquire power or influence policies; "knocking at the barracks door" for military support in a political struggle; refusal to honor the right to govern of duly elected leaders and parties; abuse of constitu tional liberties and opposition rights by ruling elites; and blatantly false depiction of democratically loyal opponents as disloyal ("instruments of outside secret and conspiratorial groups"). Fragility may be further indicated by "semi-loyalty": intermittent or attenuated disloyal behaviors; a willingness to form governments and alliances with disloyal groups; or a readiness to encourage, tolerate, or cover up such groups' antidemocratic actions. 19 At the elite level, consolidation may be discerned from the behavioral patterns (and mutual interactions), symbolic gestures , public rhetoric, official documents, and ideological declarations of leaders, parties, and organizations.zo At the mass level, public-opinion survey data are needed, not only to assess the degree of support for the legitimacy of democracy (in principle and in the regime's specific form), but also to determine its depth and its resilience over time. In Spain, support for democracy remained high and even increased during the late 1970s and early 1980s, even as unemployment rose dramatically . This durability of public support, fostered by effective "political crafting" on the part of political
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Introduction: In Search o f Consolidation
elites, was surely evidence of democratic consolidation, and most scholars consider that Spain became a consolidated democracy by 1 982, only seven years after the start of its transition.21 Yet in South America, democratic regimes have persisted for a decade and longer, through much more crushing economic depressions that have dramatically lowered living standards and increased rates of urban poverty, as Edgardo Boeninger notes in his chapter in Regional Challenges. These developments have (in most cases) generated no new antisystem parties or movements, yet regional and country specialists still regard most of these regimes (with the exception of Uruguay) as unconsolidated. Why? One could point to pervasively weak political institutions (parties, legislatures, judiciaries , and so on) ; a general lack of horizontal accountability; and the prevalence of delegative democracy. But this may be to confuse the phenomenon (nonconsolidation) with some of its causes (or facilitating factors). In fact, it is precisely because these third wave democracies-particularly Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecua dor-have persisted for some time now in the face of weak institutional ization of formal democratic structures that O' Donnell, in his contribu tion to Themes and Perspectives, vigorously questions the utility of the concept of "democratic consolidation": "All we can say at present is that, as long as [competitive] elections are institutionalized [as they are in the above countries], polyarchies are likely to endure." O' Donnell challenges the equation of consolidation with political insUtmionalliatlon in general. Iii-principle, countries can have weak, volatile party systems but highly stable and legitimate democraci es (though some degree of political institutionalization appears to be important for democratic consolidation) . Or established party systems can dissolve into considerable turbulence (as in Italy today) with no visible sign that democracy itself is losing legitimacy and becoming less viable. The strength of formal democratic institutions and rules-as opposed to the informal practices of clientelism, vote buying, rule-bending, and executive domination-no doubt facilitates the endurance (and consolida tion) of democracy, but as O' Donnell notes, the two are not the same, and other factors "have strong independent effects on the survival chances of polyarchies ." To respond to O'Donnell' s important challenge, it is necessary to step back and ask: If these South American (and other third wave) democra cies have persisted through serious adversity for a decade or more, why are they not considered consolidated? How can we tell when consolida tion occurs? And what does it matter, if the democracies continue to persist? Without satisfactory answers to these questions, the concept of consolidation does indeed lose its utility. The key factor may be the pattern of behavior (and beliefs, if we could find a reliable way to measure them) of major players in these systems. There may be no significant, explicit antisystem players, but
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there are military and police establishments that remain, or have again become, unaccountable to civilian authority and contemptuous of legal and constitutional norms. There are presidents-a rather extraordinary succession of them across the South American continent in recent years-who are not just "delegative" but have so openly abused the laws and constitution that they have been driven from office, or have done so with such political cunning and economic success that (as with Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Carlos Menem in Argentina) they have thrived politically. There are corrupt and oligarchical local bosses, and deeply corrupted legislatures and judiciaries. There is, in short, precisely what O'Donnell observes-"another," very different, institutionalization, of informal, indeed illegal and even unconstitutional, practices, especially between elections. Of course, the degree and distribution of these "informalities" vary across countries . Where such departures from the democratic framework are not just one featnre of the system (as they are to some degree in virtually every complex democracy) but a recurring and defining feature, they signal a lack of commitment to the basic procedural framework of democracy: democratic disloyalty, semi loyalty, frailty, in other words, nonconsolidation. The implications of these behavioral signs of uneven, ambivalent, or deteriorating democratic commitment are twofold. First, in those cases where powerful officials (elected and unelected) and powerful persons and groups outside the state behave in this way, civil liberties get abused, opposition forces get harassed, elections may get violent (and even fraudulent), and democracy gets hollowed out. The second implication is more speculative, but follows logically. If these abusive elites do not act against the constitutional form of democracy, their commitment to it nevertheless appears to remain contingent and instrumental rather than routinized, internalized, and principled. And a good deal of the instrumental value they derive from sustaining the democratic form (or facade), one may speculate, owes to the interna tional system, which imposes costs on countries that overturn democracy. If this international pressure (or the perception of it) ever recedes, the viability of frail democracies will also diminish. International, and especially European regional, constraints ultimately helped to consolidate democracy in Southern Europe, and are doing so today in some countries in East Central Europe, because they quickened and reinforced enduring changes in elite and mass political culture. Such cultural changes are not occurring among key elites in many third wave democracies, even though those democracies have persisted. Political Institutions and Institutional Design
As summarized above, the first part of Themes and Perspectives traces the evolution and character of the new democracies of the third
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wave and advances the theoretical debate about the meaning-and importance of democratic consolidation . The rest of our two-volume study pursues two additional goals: to identify and explore the factors that facilitate (or obstruct) democratic consolidation, and to assesS the progress made toward consolidation by some of the principal countries and regions in the third wave. Increasing scholarly attention has been paid in recent years to the strengtfi a�d�haracter of political institutions as a key factor affecting the viability and stability of democracy. If democracy is to be consoli dated, it must garner broad and deep legitimacy among all significant political actors and the citizenry at large. Such legitimacy may accrue in part in reaction to the failures and abuses of the authoritarian past, or it may derive from a historic cultural commitment to democratic values and norms that-as in the Czech Republic-has been revived after a long period of authoritarian rule. It may be stimulated or reinforced by incorporation into regional and international networks dominated by democratic states (such as the European Union) and liberal values. But legitimation is unlikely to be fully and lastingly achieved without some degree of effective governance on the part of the new democratic institutions. As several of our chapters demonstrate, economic performance remains an important part of the governance challenge. But it has tended to be overemphasized, to the neglect of other, more political, dimensions of governance. Citizens of new democracies form judgments about their political systems based not only on what they deliver economically, but also on the degree to which they deliver valued political goals: freedom, order, a rule of law, accountability, representative ness, and overall efficacy. In other words, citizens expect their democracies to govern democratically, in compliance with the constitution and the laws, and to govern efficaciously, in terms of choosing and implementing policies that address the most important problems the society confronts. Among the most frequent causes of democratic alienation, delegitimation, and breakdown have been the abuse of democratic procedures and norms by government officials and political leaders themselves, so that democracy comes to be seen as a sham; the turn toward political violence on the part of significant actors who are either marginalized from the demo cratic process or impatient with its procedures; and the incapacity of governments to decide and act as a result of political fragmentation, polarization, and stalemate.22 Sometimes democracy seems simply overwhelmed by the weight of insoluble problems, or is destroyed by the incompetence, venality, and stubbornness of failed political leaders. Yet, at some point in their lives, most democracies confront crises that appear (at least for a time) overwhelming and insoluble. And a key challenge for democratic constitutions is to anticipate the flaws and foibles of potential leaders.
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If democracies are to weather the storms of history and limit the self aggrandizIng impulses of human actors, they need strong and well de-si"giie4_political institutions. T� rTl?st��sic institut�on is the state itself. In their chapter in this _ Linz and Stepan collection, argue tb-at a state of Iaw-a Rechtsstaat-is vital to the consolidation of any democracy. Unless the behavior of public officials is effectively constrained by "a network of laws, courts, semiautonomous review and control agencies, and civil-society norms" of transparency and accountability, democracy will be diminished by political abuse and cynicism, and actors will fail to commit themselves to a consensus on the rules of the game. B.e-y.ond _this, however, a consolidated democracy also requires what they term "a usable bureaucracy," a state that has the administrative capacity to perform the essential functions of government: to maintain order, adjudicate disputes, construct infrastructure, facilitate economic exchange, defend the national borders, and collect the taxes necessary to fund these activities . Where state structures have been historically weak, or state decay has accompa nied· the decomposition of the authoritarian regime, state-building emerges as a central challenge for democratic consolidation. In particular, McFaul shows in Regional Challenges how Russia's dual transition-from communism and from empire-left a huge vacuum in state political authority, administrative capacity, and judicial efficacy. The-resuTt has been a sense of anarchy, which poses one of the most formidagle threats to democracy in Russia in the near term. Where the statecbuilding challenge is compounded by significant ethnic or nationality divisions (as in many postcommunist and African states), democratic consolidation is also fostered by the construction of an inclusive state that gives all citizens political equality, with "a common 'roof' of state-mandated and state-enforced individual rights," as Linz and Stepan explain. . On�f the �ost important institutional arenas for democracy is the party system. Eveii--wiTIi--iFie--growTng prominence of-civil society, political parties remain important if not essential instruments for representing political constituencies and interests, aggregating demands and preferences, recruiting and socializing new candidates for office, organizing the electoral competition for power, crafting policy alterna ti ves, setting the policy-making agenda, forming effective governments, and integrating groups and individuals into the democratic process. Institutionaliz ed party systems thus increase democratic governability and legitimacy by facilitating legislative support for government policies; by channeling demands and conflicts through established procedures; by reducing the scope for popUlist demagogues to win power; and by making the democratic process more inclusive, accessible, representative, and effective. 23 Many of our chapters demonstrate the obstacle to democratic
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consolidation presented by institutionally weak party systems, in which parties lack clear programmatic identities, autonomous organizations, strong linkages to social groups, and durable bases of electoral support, and in which parties may proliferate in number and flit across the national stage, never lasting long enough to build up strong structures, identities, and ties. These problems are particularly apparent in McFaul's analysis of Russia and the discussions of South Korea by Teh-fu Huang and James Cotton. As Boeninger observes, weak and fragmented party systems are also a problem for many of Latin America's third wave democracies. By contrast, as Diamandouros stresses, democratic consolidation was greatly facilitated in the Southern European cases, especially Greece, by the emergence of relatively strong and effective political parties.24 Diail1aE.clQur2S_acknowledges that "the consolidation of a party system is not a necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy," but shows that the importance of the former for the latter increases with the weakness of other political institutions and facilitating conditions. This generalization helps to explain the puzzle that Giibor T6ka presents in his study of the emerging party systems in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. In the first half of the 1990s, each of these party systems exhibited considerably greater electoral volatility than did the party systems of the West European democracies in their first decade, or even the new party systems of Latin America's third wave democracies. In their durability, in their levels of actual voter support, and in surveys of voter preferences, political parties in East Central Europe have appeared highly unstable. Yet, T6ka argues, by the criteria of Linz and Stepan, democratic consolidation has now clearly been achieved in each of these countries, except possibly Slovakia. Among politicians as well as overwhelming majorities of the public, there is no'vv deep comrrtitment to the nOITDS and institutions of the democratic order. This democratic consolidation, T6ka persuasively argues, "could hardly have been the result of strongly institutionalized party systems." Does this conclusion challenge the prevailing wisdom about the importance for democracy of effective parties and party systems? Not exactly. As T6ka argues, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were able to achieve rapid consolidation despite unfavorable party structures because of other factors that were overwhelmingly favorable, especially their close proximity to Western Europe (the most strongly democratic region of the world) and political cultures that in each country generated widespread initiri commitment to democracy and tempered the extreme uncertainty that �ypically surrounds institutionally shallow party systems. Thus political culture and the incipient or anticipated integration into a larger Europe produced the political predictability, trust, and willingness to compromise that typically derive in part from strong and settled party systems. Where, as in Russia and Belarus, these other variables have
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been far less favorable, the consequences of shallow, inchoate party systems have been much more damaging. Moreover, though East Central European party systems have exhibited high volatility, they have also featured levels of programmatic structuring typical of much more institutionalized party systems. And Jinally ,T6ka reminds us, stable and effective parties and party systems may improve the quality of democracy, even if they are not necessary for its consolidation.25 The challenge of institutional performance and design involves a number of dilemmas. One is the tension between the "durability" features of institutional strength (coherence around principles, programs, and policies; unified action in the legislature and political process; and elaborate, well-ordered vertical and horizontal structures) on the one hand, and the capacity to adapt to changing social and political circumstances on the other. From this perspective, stronger is not necessarily better; political parties and party systems can be "overinstitu tionalized" as well as "underinstitutionalized." In the former instance, structural coherence, discipline, and regularity may turn into rigidity and underrepresentation of important new (or newly salient) generational, regional, ethnic, or class groups ; and extremely low electoral volatility may signify a lack of competitiveness, meaningfulness, or civic engagement in the party system.26 Similar ..c!i!eIIlffia s .. confront the choice or design of democratic institutions. Representativeness and inclusiveness, secured through highly proportional systems of representation, foster broad commitments to democratic legitimacy by incorporating ethnic and political minorities into the democratic process. In addition, as McFaul shows in his chapter on Russia, party-list proportional representation (PR) provides a greater stimulus to the emergence of coherent parties than does the single member-district (SMD) plurality method of electing legislators. The more purely proportional the electoral system, however, the more parties it tends to produce; the resulting political fragmentation undermines govern ability. Majoritarian electoral systems for the parliament, in particular SMD plurality, may enhance governability, but at the cost of producing a disj unction between vote shares and seat shares that may leave many groups feeling poorly represented or even voiceless. The top-down party control over nominations that is often found in party-list PR systems produces more coherent, disciplined parties, but deprives voters of choice in the selection of individual representatives, and if carried too far, may produce a brittle system. "Democraticness" and governability may also be seen as competing in the choice of an executive structure. Advocates of presidentialism argue that a directly elected chief executive is closer to the people and offers more direct personal accountability for governance than the indirectly chosen prime minister in a parliamentary system. But several studies maintain that parliamentary democracy is more conducive to
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democratic stability, a view confirmed by the statistical analysis of Adam Przeworski and his colleagues in their contribution to Themes and Perspectives. They find (as have other empirical studies) that presidenti ar' democracy is particularly vulnerable to breakdown when it is joined to a fragmented party system, and most of all under conditions of "legislative deadlock" (in which the largest party has between one-third and one-half of the seats in parliament) .27 In Themes and Perspectives, John M. Carey assesses some of these issues and trade-offs in institutional design that affect the quality and stability of democracy, and hence the prospects for consolidation. But he does so by examining finer-grained issues than the choice between PR and SMD plurality or parliamentary versus presidential government. Carey focuses on two key factors affecting regime support and governability: the degree of fragmentation in the party system and the degree of cohesion within each major political party. In a presidential system, the degree of party fragmentation in parliament, he shows, can be heavily influenced by the formula used to elect the president and the timing of presidential and legislative elections. Where a candidate must win an absolute majority to be elected (rather than a simple plurality in a single-round election), many more parties compete for the presidency, since they expect to secure more bargaining strength by forming coalitions after the first round. Where such a presidential election is held concurrently with legislative elections, the greater party fragmentation in the presidential election carries over into the legislature. A plurality rule can produce a less fragmented legislature. Carey shows (and our case studies of Russia and Latin America confirm) that, independent of whether a majority is required, legislatures also tend to be more fragmented when their elections are not fully synchronized with presidential ones, but occur either at mid-term or on an entirely different timetable. The importance of holding elections concurrently is also emphasized by Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, but for a rather different reason. For them, democratic governance is most stable and effective within an integrated political system in which politicians of different branches and levels are dependent on one another and therefore inclined to cooperate and coordinate-rather than incessantly compete and bargain--on jurisdictional and other issues. Such interdependence is fostered, argue Niou and Ordeshook, by the presence of large numbers of elective offices, at various levels of governmental authority, all of which are contested simultaneously. In such systems, autonomous local party structures mobilize crucial support for the n ational party ticket but in turn depend on the national party label (and the coattails of the national party leader) to help elect their local candidates. Where elections for different levels of authority are not concurrent, as in Russia and Taiwan (and many other third wave democracies), and where
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relatively few offices are filled through elections, politicians in the various branches and levels of government have far fewer incentives to cooperate. Russian president Boris Yeltsin' s 1 99 1 decision to postpone elections for governors, mayors, and regional legislatures stifled party system development and democratic consolidation in Russia, McFaul concludes . In Taiwan, the centralization of internal party politics further complicates the quest for an integrated polity. Like Niou and Ordeshook, Carey considers party coherence a crucial dimension of governability, but his concern is with the extent to which legislators are encouraged to support their party' s program rather than cultivate an independent, personal constituency (with all of its implica tions for wasteful pork-barrel politics). A key factor is whether electoral rules require candidates of the same party to compete against one another; this can be the case under presidential or parliamentary, and SMD or PR, systems. In closed-list PR systems, the higher the district size, the greater the tendency toward party coherence; however, in open list systems like that of Brazil or in the single nonstranferable vote (SNTV) system in Taiwan, where voters choose a single candidate among many, the more candidates per district, the more intense the competition. Overall, the incentives for party cohesion in the legislature are shaped to a great degree by a complex mix of institutional factors: district size, the number and types of votes citizens cast, party leaders' control over nominations, and the degree to which the votes for one candidate may help other candidates of her party (vote-pooling).28 The fragmenting effect of the SNTV electoral system is emphasized both by Teh-fu Huang in his contribution to Themes and Perspectives and by Hung-mao Tien in his case study of Taiwan in Regional Challenges. The SNTV system has produced a fairly proportional distribution of seats among parties in Taiwan, but within the two principal parties, the Kuomintang (I<�T\;!T) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), it has fostered severe factionalism that has undermined the governing effectiveness of the KMT, hampered the competitiveness of the DPP, and facilitated the birth of new splinter parties. In South Korea, the problem-as Huang shows-has been excessive top-down organization of parties, but on the very shallow institutional basis of personal loyalty to an individual leader. This extreme personalization of both the ruling and opposition parties has combined with powerful regional ties, frequent changes in electoral rules and constitutional structure, and the long disruption of democratic politics by authoritarian rule to produce breathtaking instability and weakness in the Korean party system, with parties constantly changing names and identities . (These same problems have plagued democracy in Thailand and the Philip pines.) Huang thus concludes that democratic consolidation would be advanced by implementing electoral reforms : in Taiwan, terminating SNTV by increasing the currently small proportion of seats elected
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through PR and converting the remaining seats into single-member districts (a reform now under discussion) ; in South Korea, by increasing the number of PR seats while decreasing or eliminating the proportion of seats automatically awarded as a premium to the leading party. Our contributors do not entirely agree on the most desirable institutional designs. But their analyses do suggest that, because major institutional decisions (especially that of presidentialism versus parlia mentarism), once made, are very difficult to change, a democracy seeking consolidation is probably best off pursuing specific institutional reforms that address specific problems. Stronger, more effective party systems could be fostered by reforms that increase the number of elected officials, enhance the autonomy of local party branches (and of local and regional government more generally), and synchronize the timing of elections for most offices. In particular. if a country is to have an elected president with significant executive authority, it makes sense. as Carey argues. to synchronize presidential and legislative elections and to make it more likely for a president to be elected on a first ballot-if not by plurality . then by a "double complement rule" that requires the leading candidate to have a substantial margin over his or her closest competitor.
Civil-Military Relations B y definition. democracy cannot be consolidated until the military ia d to civilian control and solidly committed becomes fiI'mly-subordfrfe to the democratic constitutional order. More specifically. as Felipe Aguero puts it in Themes and Perspectives, "civilian supremacy" gives democratically elected governments unquestioned authority over all policy arenas. including defining the goals and overseeing the organization and implementation of national defense, In such a system, the military role is limited to matters of national defense and international security-with the military relieved of all responsibility for internal security-and governmental structures (such as a civilian ministry of defense) are put in place to enable civilians to exercise effective oversight and control of the military (as well as the intelligence services). A key . element in the rapid progress toward consolidation of the new democracies of Spain. Portugal. and Greece was the establishment (facilitated in part by integration into NATO) of such norms and structures. One reason why several new democracies of East Central Europe have been able to make such rapid progress toward consolidation is that they inherited and maintained traditions of firm civilian control over the military. This. ironically. has been one of the few positive legacies of their communist past. Many Latin American and Asian third wave democracies have not been so fortunate. As Aguero details for South America and Harold Crouch for Thailand and the Philippines. most of
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these new regimes have had to struggle to overcome deeply entrenched structures and traditions of military autonomy and even impunity. So has South Korea, where President Kim Young S am ' s initiatives to enhance civilian control and purge the dominant military faction may rank among his more important accomplishments. Like the new democracies of postcommunist Europe, those in Spain, Portugal, and Taiwan benefited from the military' s lack of direct involvement in authoritarian gover nance (although the extensive penetration of the military by Taiwan ' s long-dominant party, the KMT, does complicate democratic consolidation there) .29 As_ Diamandouros argues, the nature of prior military rule also matters : where, as ill Greece, the military as a hierarchical institution did not administer the regime and the military did not rule for long, the consequences for future civil-military relations are less serious. Wh<:re the military as an institution has a long tradition of political intervention and where it retains extensive political and economic preIQgC!1iY��L _democracies face a particularly difficult and dange,QUs challenge. In such circumstances, as AgUero and Crouch show, establishing civilian supremacy is a complex and typically protracted process, requiring many of the factors that promote democratic consolidation in general : skilled political leadership, unity among civilian political forces (across partisan and other divides), and civilian expertise (both within and outside of government) on national-security matters, as well as luck (in the form of divisions within the military and the failure of military rebellions). Successful reform al so requires a long-term policy vision . Typically this involves gradually reducing the size of the military (and hence its capacity to seize and exercise political power) while increasing the military ' s capacity to perform its defense mission, keeping salaries at a respectable level, and preserving the honor of the military as an institution.3D Good leadership involves knowing when and ho\X/ far to push reform, as well as how to forge proreform coalitions both in the legislature and among rising military officers. Presidents Fidel Ramos in the Philippines and Carlos Menem in Argentina were able to implement reforms in part because of their political skills (in sharp contrast to their predecessors, Corazon Aquino and Raul Alfonsfn). Yet Ramos benefited considerably from his prestige and connections as the former head of the military, and Menem purchased military acceptance of reforms at the cost of sweeping immunity for past human rights abuses. Unfortunately, civilian supremacy can rarely be achieved through systematic punishment of human rights abuses under military rule. Most cases in which those abuses were serious and recent are precisely the ones in which the military retains too much power for civilians to risk a polarizing confrontation over the issue. Still, as Agiiero stresses, immunity for past crimes need not and should not carry over into the current and future conduct of security forces.
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The strength and legitimacy of civilian political institutions-the president, the legislature, and political parties in general-can also greatly affect the ability to narrow military prerogatives and restructure military commands without inviting resistance or rebellion. As Crouch emphasizes, one reason the Thai military was able to seize power again in 1 99 1 was that the massive corruption of the civilian politicians had broadly discredited them in the eyes of the public. In Latin America, weakened and discredited presidents have been unable to achieve policy reforms of any kind, including those involving civil-military relations. 3 l Finally, civilian supremacy requires the wisdom and the will to remove the military fully from matters of domestic policy . As Aguero notes, the growing demand for participation in international peacekeeping activities opens up a new, appropriate mission for the armed forces . But the growing pressure on Latin American militaries to go to war against drug production and trafficking takes them in the wrong direction, toward a new involvement in internal security and in the corruption that invariably surrounds the drug trade.
Civil Society nt, Perhaps no single factor more readily evokes the romance , exciteme of image the than wave third s ' cy democra of ities possibil and heady and t, discredi resist, resurgent civil societies mobiliz ing peacefully to ns are ultimately overturn authoritarian rule. Although democratic transitio regime the both in elites political by ed negotiat and ted typically inaugura building and the oppositi on, civil society has played a crucial role in ion . complet to through it pressure for democratic transitio n and pushing work famous a of insight d neglecte es sometim and This is an important C. on democratic transitio ns by Guillermo O ' Donnell and Philippe and Themes o t tion contribu Schmitter, reiterated b y Schmitter in his rian 32 Perspec tives. The role of civil society in bringing down authorita Europe Central East in ns transitio tic democra the in seminal was rule -Boadi and sub-Saharan Africa, as Aleksander Smolar and E. Gyimah the among also were tions organiza and nts show here. Social moveme as Taiwan, and Korea outh S in tization democra behind forces leading these all as Yet . Hsin-Hu ang Michael Hsiao and Hagen Koo explain society contributors emphas ize, the democratic spirit and capacity of civil n. transitio the after usly precipito may decline that are Civil society-the realm of organiz ed intermediary groups and family, the and state the of dent voluntary, self-generating, indepen to te contribu may rulesshared of set or order bound by a legal expectations democratic consolidation in numero us ways: by stabilizi ng ment, and social bargain ing, generating a more civic normative environ of burdens the g reducin , process l politica the bringing actors closer to Schmitter as Yet power. of abuses l potentia g checkin and nce, governa
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notes, civil society can also impede consolidation by making political majorities more difficult to form, exacerbating ethnic di visions and pork barrel politics, and entrenching socioeconomic biases in the distribution of influence. Civil society can contribute to democratic consolidation only if other institutions are also favorable, and if actors in civil society behave in a "civil" way, respecting the law and other social and political actors while accepting and not seeking to usurp or conquer democratic political authority. Viewing democracy as a composite of "partial regimes," Schmitter is particularly concerned with the way in which the interests of various social groups are politically articulated and represented, and how their conflicts with one another and with the state are resolved. A key dimension is the degree to which interest associations have encompassing scope, strategic capacity, and broad authority to speak and bargain for an entire class or sector. Civil society will tend to advance democratic consolidation more under such corporatist arrangements, he believes, than under plural ist ones, "where a great multiplicity of narrowly specialized and overlapping organizations emerge with close dependencies upon their members or interlocutors. " A key post-transition dilemma, Schmitter notes, i s that the "primacy" of social movements and other democratizing civil society actors inevitably declines after the transition , as the authoritarian state disappears, political parties and more established interest groups take center stage, and people turn to more private concerns. Civil society must adapt after the transition, writes Smolar of postcommunist Europe, because "revolutionary civil society is by definition a transient phenome non, even though it remains deeply embedded in the minds of its participants as a myth and an ideal ." As McFaul ' s chapter on Russia also shows, democratic adaptation is especially difficult for postcommu nist civil societies, becau,se the all-encompassing nature of state control over (and penetration of) society und�r co�munism precludes the smoother passage from authoritarian state corporatism to democratic societal corporatism that has occurred in Southern Europe and is now in progress in Taiwan. What has followed the democratic revolutions in East Central Europe, Russia, and Africa has not been adaptation so much as retreat and dissipation of civic energy. The broad fronts of religious, professional, student, labor, and other associations broke up once their common goal of bringing down a despised regime had been achieved. Class and ethnic divisions once again fragmented society, and the leadership ranks (and thus operational capacities) of civil society organizations were rapidly depleted as activists were drawn into politics, government, or business. The social inheritances of communism in Europe and neopatrimonial statism in Africa also reasserted themselves in the forms of renewed dependence on the state, co-optation, mistrust, and societal atomization,
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revealing the paucity of social capital and, in Smolar's words , "the lack of a culture of free collective activity." In fact, "preliberal," illiberal, and uncivic cultural orientations constitute a major obstacle to democratic consolidation in much of Africa and the postcommunist world. In both regions as well, civil society has been further hampered after the transition by the harsh economic conditions of the 1 990s, which have driven people to preoccupation with the exigencies of daily survival, and have rendered African associations in particular much more vulnerable to the compromising blandishments of domineering states . A rich, dense, vibrant, institutionalized, and highly "civic" civil society is not strictly necessary for democratic consolidation, b� t democracy will be more likely to achieve consolidation, and wIll undoubtedly be of higher quality, to the extent that such a society emerges. Thus in a great many third wave democracies, and especially in Africa and the postcommunist world, a great task of social construc tion and civic empowelment lies ahead. Precisely because of the financial and political weakness of civil society in these countries, direct international assistance to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the cooperative linkages that Schmitter terms "transnational civil society" loom increasingly large in the quest for democratic consolidation. Such international support and linkages have been especially important in encouraging new types of NGOs (and critical media) that seek to reform and deepen democracy as they "foster group and individual autonomy from the state," in Gyimah-Boadi ' s words . This underscores the importance of the types of initiatives Michael Pinto-Duschinsky discusses in his contribution to Regional Challenges.
Socioeconomic Development The contributors to this collection are more or less unified in rejecting structurally deterministic explanations of democratic consolida tion and persistence. Democratic consolidation is largely a matter of political crafting, the design and maturation of political institutio ? s, and the spread of democratic norms and values . The opportumty for democratic development and consolidation is not ruled out for any country, however poor. Yet the comprehensive statistical analysis of Adam Przeworski and his colleagues does show the powerful impact of economic development and economic performance. Like O' Donnell, Przeworski and colleagues diverge from the consensus that consolidation is a discernible process and a useful concept. Because older democracies (when economic development is controlled for) do not enjoy any immunity against democratic break down, they conclude that consolidation is "an empty term" and that, , it . is more useful simply to examine "what makes democracIes end ure. 33 Their findings are striking. Confirming the classic thesis of Seymour
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Martin Lipset, they demonstrate a strongly positive relationship between the affluence of a nation and the likelihood of democratic persistence. During the period of their study ( 1 950-90) democracy (understood simply as electoral democracy) had a 1 2 percent chance of breakdown in any given year among the lowest-income countries. The expected life of democracy increases with per-capita income up to the highest income level of over $6,000 (in 1 98 5 purchasing-power-parity U. S . dollars). At that level of affluence-now exceeded not only by Spain, Portugal, and Greece, but by South Korea and Taiwan (and probably Argentina and Chile) as well-"democracies are impregnable and can be expected to live forever." In less affluent countries, and especially in the poorest ones, annual economic performance becomes critical . Democracies are significantly more likely to persist when they experience real economic growth (especially rapid growth, in excess of 5 percent annually). High inflation-above 30 percent annually-is also toxic to democracy (though moderate inflation is associated with somewhat improved prospects for democratic survival). And, despite the scantiness of data on inequality, Przeworski and colleagues find that democracy is much more likely to endure in countries where income inequality declines over time than where it increases. It appears that the ability to meet popular expecta tions for better income distribution improves the prospects for democ racy. One maj or way that socioeconomic development has been thought to increase the likelihood and stability of democracy is through changes in the class structure. From Aristotle to Lipset, a large middle class has been considered conducive to political moderation and democracy. Major historical analyses of class actors have pointed either to the bourgeoisie or to the organized working class as the driving force behind democrati zation.34 Hsiao and Koo show instead the need for a more disaggregated class analysis. In the cases of S outh Korea and, especially, Taiwan, the most important social force for democratization has been the "new middle class" of professional, technical, and white-collar workers and especially its intellectual elements (writers, professors, journalists, lawyers, religious leaders, and so on). Organized labor played an important role as well, but-especially in South Korea, where it was very strong-this role cut both ways, provoking a conservative reaction when labor mobilization became too intense. The "old middle class" of small entrepreneurs and the self-employed was less active on behalf of democracy, and has been more inclined (again, especially in Korea) to support the status quo. As the quest for democratic consolidation unfolds in each country , it is the middle class in general and its professional and intellectual elements in particular that are leading civil society move ments for democratic deepening and reform. Their economic, political, and demographic weight in the body politic-the product of three
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Introduction: In Search of Consoiidation
decades of rapid economic development-is one of the most important positive factors for democratic consolidation in these two very promising East Asian third wave democracies. In Diamandouros' s analysis of the three success stories of Southern Europe, we find an important additional reason why socioeconomic development facilitates democratic consolidation . Rapid economic development (particularly in Spain and Greece) in the two decades before 1 975 transformed not only social structures but values as well. As these societies became more secularized and educated, and as class, gender, and urban-rural inequalities attenuated, values and belief systems became more "open-ended and positive-sum," more flexible, moderate, conciliatory, and tolerant of different interests. This in turn facilitated an essential feature of consolidated and stable democracy, the predominance "of dialogue and compromise in the daily practices , tactics, and strategies of both individual and collective actors. " Here again we see the centrality of change in political culture to the consolidation of democracy .
International Factors One of the distingui shing features of the third wave of democratiza tion has been the salience of international influence s . As Huntington emphasizes in The Third Wave, international and especially regional demonstration effects played a crucial role in stimulating and providing models for subseque nt democratic transition s. No less influential were a variety of more tangible international pressures and inducements, including the growth of governmental and nongovernmental forms of assistance to democratic actors, and the increasing emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion in the foreign policies of established democracies, especially the United States. As Diamandouros shows, regional and international assistanc e efforts (especially through the West g German party foundati ons) were particularly crucial in bolsterin April the after months 8 1 democratic forces in Portugal during the first 1 974 revolutio n, when the authoritarian Left threatened to prevail. International factors also figure as never before in the quest to consolidate the third w ave democracies, as the two concludin g chapters of Regional Challenges make clear. Yun-han Chu, Fu Hu, and Chung-in Moon explore how regional and international factors fueled the transitions and now shape the prospects and challenge s for consolidation in two of the third wave' s more externally threatened new democracies, South Korea and Taiwan. With the reunification of Germany , these two democra cies are now u nique in their status as divided countries , facing threats to their very existence from commun ist regimes of the same nationali ty that claim sovereign ty over them. It is only on the Korean peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait that the Cold War continue s. The
introduction: In Search o f Consolidation
xxxv
resulting threats to the national security of the two democracies have slowed efforts to democratize civil-military relations and to dismantle the vestiges of authoritarian national-security laws and structures. At the same time, the quest for international legitimacy and Western (especially U.S.) support has driven forward the process of democratization in many other respects, including most recently Taiwan 's presidential elections in 1 996 . As Chu, Hu, and Moon stress, the dilemma is particularly acute for Taiwan , given mainland China' s economic dynamism and substan tially greater size and power. Yet precisely because Taiwan is so threat ened-and by one of the worid' s most authoritarian states-democracy has become a resource and a legitimating symbol in its quest for an accepted place in world affairs, and democratic procedures have forged a growing pragmatic consensus on the national-identity question that is beginning to bridge the old divides.35 Chu, Hu , and Moon also show how the export dependence of Korea and Taiwan has pushed political development in a democratic direction. Closer economic and political integration with the advanced industrial democracies-which has become an ever more valued goal as Korea and Taiwan have crossed the threshold of national affluence themselves, and have grown culturally closer to the democratic West-will become virtually impossible if these two countries cannot implement and maintain democratic systems . At the same time, however, middle classes aware of the need for socioeconomic stability to maintain international competitiveness have not been sympathetic to militant mobilization by labor and other organized groups. Thus the high degree of involvement in the world economy also generates a bias for stability and moderation that tends to limit the potential for polarizing conflict over socioeco nomic issues (to which South Korea, with its strong labor unions and "hyperactive" civil society, is particularly prone). At somewhat earlier stages of their development, Korea and Taiwan also benefited from various forms of private and semipUblic assistance to their nascent civil societies. As Pinto-Duschinsky shows in the final chapter of Regional Challenges, such democracy-promotion efforts have expanded dramatically in scope and scale during the third wave and now constitute an important factor in democratic consolidation, even though their impact is difficult to measure precisely and their effects can only complement and reinforce favorable domestic factors . Following the model of the West German party foundations-which since the early 1 960s have received public funding to support democratic parties, trade unions, and civic activities around the world-the United States and seven additional European countries have by now established party foundations to promote democracy abroad using public funds. In a few countries , these efforts are part of a larger program of nongovernmental but publicly funded assistance, as exemplified by the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy, created in 1 9 8 3 . The growing international-
xxxvi
Introduction : I n Search of Consolidation
ization of democrac y-building efforts has had numerous other institu tional manifestations discussed by Pinto-Dus chinsky : the redirection of many official development-assistance agencies toward goals and programs concerned with democracy, human rights , and "good gover nance" ; increasingly explicit conditionality of official aid on standards of human rights and democracy ; an expanding architecture of formal declarations and convention s entrenching internation al standards of democracy and human rights; and growing involveme nt of the United Nations and various regional bodies (such as the European Union, the Commonwealth, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Organization of American States) in election monitoring and other forms of democratic assistance, especially to transitional regimes. These external influences have probably contributed greatly to the scope and dynamism of the third wave. As Pinto-Du schinsky cautions, however, excessive zeal, inflated ambitions , and "unwise triumphal ism" can undermine the effectiven ess of democrati c-assistanc e programs. If such programs are to work, he argues, they must have circumscribed goals that are consistent ly pursued. At the same time, they cannot rest content with the role of midwife in the birth of a new electoral democracy , but must address with equal vigor problems of human rights and democratic governance after the transition. They need to share and disseminate information about their activities and coordinate their programs and strategies more effectively . And they need to appreciate the inherent uncertaint ies of trying to foster democratic institution s. As Pinto-Duschi nsky states, "Democracy promotion should be a process of sowing a considerab le number of seeds in the hope that a small proportion of them will take root." Democrati c Consoli dation: Progress and Prospects
The third wave democracies examined in this study display consider able variety in their progress toward consolidation, and in the factors that have inclined them toward or away from it. As Diamandou ros shows, Southern Europe represents the most unambigu ous (and rapid) instance of democratic consolidat ion in the third wave. Many of the factors that facilitated consolidation in the three Southern European cases have been noted above: the preceding decades of rapid developm ent, the consequen t transformation of class structure and values, the lack of _ highly politicized militaries, the favorable regional context, and timely internation al assistance . In addition, Diamandouros calls attention to the nature of the transition itself and the vital role of political leadership . Democratic consolidat ion in Spain and Greece was facilitated by. the absence of extensive mass mobilization and violence during the transition. In Spain it was also helped by the centrality of elite
Introd u ction: In Search of Consoiidation
xxxvii
negotiations in the transition, and, in Greece, by the weakness of the mili tary as it withdrew from power. The more violent and revolutionary natu re of the Portuguese transition "severely complicated democratization . . . and significantly retarded the advent of consolidation ."36 In contrast to most postcommunist regimes (especially in the former Soviet Union), the emergence of limited political and social pluralism in the later, softer phase o! th e �PJinish dictatorship helped (as in Taiwan) make for a less di sruptive and conflictual transition to democracy. Political learning from the mistakes of previous democratic attempts, and resurrect;on�o{ their positive legacies and memories, enabled political actors to adjust more quickly and effectively to the give-and-take of democratic politics. Finally, in all three Southern European cases, democratic consolidation was clearly advanced by the "vision and tactical acumen" of strong, democratically committed leaders like Mario Soares, Adolfo Suarez, and ConstE(ntil1e J(ilfamanlis. In many respects, the Russian case stands as a mirror image of the Southern European ones. As McFaul shows, Russia inherited at its rebirth as a state in 1 99 1 a sweeping array of "major impediments to democratic consolidation from the Soviet era, including an ambiguous set of constitutional rules, a weak state, a collapsing economy, a lack of pol�tical PilrtiesJ and virtually no rule of law." Almost every aspect of the political and economic system-including the territorial boundaries and federal structure of the Russian state-remained to be defined or transformed. In addition, Russia' s sharply confrontational and revolution ary mode oftransitiDn.�en�Elted acute polarization and uncertainty, with "many of the rules of the game ambiguous, uncodified, and subject to constant manipulation." In contrast to Portugal, political-leadership choices in Russia-particularly President Boris Yeltsin' s fateful decision to defer constitutional reform and founding elections-further confounded these inherited problems. Only with the adoption of a new constitution in 1993 and the subsequent holding of legislative, presidential, and then regional elections has the political framework of democracy begun to gel. As McFaul emphasizes, the new constitutional structure is flawed in important respects, but it at least clarifies institutional powers and provides a framework in which elections can become institutionalized and parties can begin to take shape. Thus while democracy remains endangered, Russia may now have a chance to make progress toward consolidation if it can meet the other challenges that McFaul identifies: building a state that can control crime and corruption while generating new social classes and civil society organizations that are independent of the state and capable of articulating and aggregating their interests. These tasks require further progress in market reforms to create the economic foundations for a modern system of interests and interest intermediation. But all of this hinges, finally, on the establishment of a "rule-of-law state."
xxxviii
introduction: in Search of Consolidation
The picture that B oeninger paints locates Latin America' s new democracies somewhere between the extremes of Southern Europe' s rapid consolidation and Russia' s torturous path. Progre.ss tow �rd democratic consolidation has been tentative and uneven in LatIn Amenca (with the exception of Uruguay and, to some extent, Chile, where the reserved powers of the military now seem the chief obstacle). As O' Donnell also emphasizes in his contribution to Themes and Perspec tiv eS. Latin America' s renewed democracies have persisted for well over a decade now, and they have at least institutionalized the principle of electoral competition for power. This is rather limited progress, Boeninger concedes, but for countries like El Salvador, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Paraguay, it is nevertheless a historic breakthr��gh. Throughout Latin America, polarization has eased greatly and pO ltJcal culture has been transformed as the Left has recognized the necessIty of democracy ' s political procedures and more or less resigned itself to capitalism. Economic culture has also changed profoundly in other ways, as free-spending populism has been discredited, privatization �rograms (and other liberalizing reforms) have gained momentum In . many countries, and all sectors have come to appreciate the necessIty of permanently controlling inflation. Militaries remain powerful . in many countries , but in most cases-even in Chile-their prerogatIves have been reduced. 3? And U . S . policy and the entire regional context have never been more favorable. As a result of these sweeping and probably enduring changes, Boeninger concludes, Latin America' s prospects for democracy and development "look indisputably better than ever b�fore." Yet democracy is far from complete-much less secure-In. the Americas . Three diffuse challenges lie ahead; they can be effectIvely addressed only through far more extensive reforms . At bottom lie the interrelated economic and social challenges . No region touched by the third wave h as more massive and embedded social and economic in equalities . And while economic growth has been rekindled in most Latin American countries , it is still typically far from producing the level of prosperity of, say, Southern Europe . Thus much remains to be done to improve social equity and the structural foundations "of economic growth. As the East Asian miracles have taught, the two are not unrelated : raising the level of human capital, especially through expanding � ass access to high-quality education, extending social insurance (especIally through social-security reform), and expanding the tax base are clear imperatives for growth and equity . These will in turn entrench the fragile and fraying social consensus around market-oriented policies : et economic and social progress in turn require major reforms of polItIcal institutions . Most Latin American party systems need to become less fragmented and more institutionaliz ed. Boeninger believes th�t g er electoral thresholds (of at least 5 percent) or even more maJontanan electoral systems would help, as would simultaneous election of
�
:r
?i �
Introduction: In Search of Consolidation
xxxix
presidents and parliaments and public financing of election campaigns. Further devolution of power to state and local government and the private (or nonprofit) sector is also called for, but Boeninger warns of the corruption and fiscal chaos that can result when power is devolved hastily and excessi vely , as with Brazi l ' s "regional feudalism." Moreover, the state needs to be reformed in many other ways, through comprehen sive modernization and professionalization of judicial systems , greater autonomy for legislatures, stronger central banks, greater technical competence in macroeconomic management, and institutionalized mechanisms of the kind that the administration of Patricio Aylwin implemented in Chile for consultation among government leaders, party and legislative leaders , ' and top-level economic technocrats . The key, stresses Boeninger, is to accelerate the pace of state-building and institutional reform. Positive trends may be discerned in East Asia as well, but, again, progress toward democratic consolidation has been tentative and mixed. Among the four third wave democracies that Cotton examines (the Phil ippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand), only the Philippine regime failed to inherit a dynamic economy and a strong state bureaucracy . Yet it has the benefit of a more substantial prior democratic history than the other three regimes have. While problems of inequality are significant in the Philippines and to a lesser extent in Thailand (and are growing in Taiwan), the key challenges are political and institutional . As Cotton stresses , a distinctive feature of East Asian democracies is the weakness of political opposition. All four regimes may be considered at least elec toral democracies, but democracy is "contained" by the dominance of ruling parties and by controls on civil society and the mass media. The Philippines and Thailand have more competitive party systems , but they are fragmented to a degree that renders political opposition a rather fluid and shallow phenomenon. fv'ioreOVef, personalism, clientelism, vote buying, and scant linkages of parties to issues and organized interests contribute to the weak, inchoate character of party systems , which are domi nated in all four regimes by "money politics." Only in Taiwan are parties substantially defined, and, as Hung-mao Tien shows (as does Huang in Themes and Perspectives), its party system is still evolving. Democracy i n East Asia requires political and institutional reforms to strengthen parties, streamline party systems, and reduce the role of money in politics. Prospects for consolidation appear brightest in Korea and Taiwan , given their economic dynamism and recent political reforms aimed at controlling corruption and increasing judicial independence. But political liberalization must go further to dismantle the legal architecture of the national-security state and provide more space for dissent and i ndependent organization. If the reform process continues and democracy survives without interruption, political parties seem likely to develop institution al strength, and electoral politics to become more competitive.
xl
Introductio n : In Search of Consolidation
For Cotton, the weakness of political opposition and constraints on democracy prevalent in East and Southeast Asia derive in large part from the collectivist, elitist, and uncompromising features of "Asian values" (whether of Confucian or other origin). But this interpreta tion-which has been more forcefully asserted by some Asian political leaders, and accepted by many intellectuals in both Asia and the West-is largely rejected by other contributors to this study, including the elected political leaders on Taiwan. In Regional Challenges, the president of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, notes the considerable political pluralism and freedom that have emerged in Taiwan during its gradual and peaceful political transformation . Independent observers agree: Taiwan i s now counted among the 40 percent of the world' s regimes that Freedom House rates as "free." Rather than viewing Taiwan ' s Confucian cultural heritage as an obstacle to democracy, President Lee identifies its significant continuities with basic democratic principles. These include benevolent (rather than corrupt and abusive) governance and responsiveness to the will of the peo ple-and thus popular sovereignty . He argues that classical Chinese civilization, untainted by the monarchical politics of later centuries, can actually be a resource and inspiration for the development of democracy. The compatibility of democracy and Confucian culture is echoed here by the vice-president of the ROC, Li en Chan . Stressing the widespread support for democracy among the Taiwanese people, Lien suggests that the "experience with democratic reform in Taiwan could be called a Confucian cultural renaissance, in that it involves remolding and refining an ancient Oriental civilization , while extending Western thought and institutions ." Ying-shih Yli takes a similar approach in rebutting the culturalist argument that Confucianism limits democracy in Asia: "Confucian education often inculcated in the minds of the young a sense of j ustice, social responsibility, human equality , and the well-being of people, which are some of the closest Confucian equivalents to Western civic virtues. It was this Confucian public-spiritedness that disposed many Chinese intellectuals [such as Sun Yat-sen] to Western democratic ideas at the turn of the century . " Neither o f our case studies of Taiwan , b y Hung-mao Tien and Thomas B. Gold, views traditional political culture as a significant obstacle to democratic consolidation . Gold does see in Confucian Chinese cultural traditions a largely unfavorable legacy, featuring a "zero-sum, moralistic view of political disagreements ," a heavy stress on "obedience to distant authority," and suspicion of autonomous organiza tions. But these cultural constraints on democracy have been heavily eroded by the breathtakin g pace of socioeconomic development, which has produced a host of more powerful favorable conditions : widespread affluence, relatively low inequality , growing opportunities for women, high educational levels, increasing political sophistication, a greater
In troduction : In Search of Consolidation
xli
disposition to compromise, a burgeoning civil society full of issue-based movements and think tanks, and a flourishing pluralism in the mass media. The latter trends have been further facilitated by the liberalizing reforms of political leaders such as presidents Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui , who have transcended cultural traditions to embrace accommodation and i nitiate reform at decisive moments in the country ' s political evolution. As Tien demonstrates, the obstacles to democratic consolidation in Taiwan are primarily institutional and geopolitical in nature : the extensive vestiges of the KMT ' s longtime hegemony over politics, s � c iety, the mi litary, and even the economy ; the profoundly contrasting . . . . VISIOns of natIonal IdentIty and the related ethnic divisions between "mainlanders" and "native Taiwanese" ; the continuing threat of force from the People' s Republic of China (PRC) ; the factionalism and the increasingly large role of money i n party and electoral politics; and the long shadow that the party and state have cast over civil society . Yet each of these factors contains or is balanced by positive elements . The KMT' s unquestioned dominance permitted a gradual and elite-centered mode of transition that fostered stability and the growth of democratic practices and norms . The impressive degree of negotiation and consen sus- uilding underlying this transition is detailed here by one of its key archItects , James c.Y. Soong. The threat of aggression-which surfaced anew with the PRC ' s offshore firing of missiles in the preludes to the 1 995 and 1 996 elections-has fostered moderation on the national identity question, undermining support for advocates of both overt independence and near-term reunification. The political disenfranchise ment of trade unionism has weakened civil society but checked an important source of political instability and economic vulnerability (as seen in Korea) . And, for all its problems, factionalism did generate a new splinter party from the KMT that has helped to produce a more competitive and less polarized party system, as well as a legislature that is more independent of the government. Taiwan ' s 1 99 6 presidential election-by all accounts a victory for the democratic process and for the political center on the national-identity question-marked an important step on the road to democratic consolida tion . Completin g that journey will require, as in so many other third wave democracies, further institutional reforms to modernize political structures, alter the electoral system, control organized crime and its infiltration of electoral politics, and complete the extrication of the ruling party from the state, society , and economy. Even with such reforms, consolidation may not be clearly achieved until control of government passes smoothly to the political opposition through the electoral process. Yet i n such key respects as its economic prosperity , sizeable middle class, favorable mode of transition , civilian supremacy over the military, pragmatic and competitive politics , and visionary national leadership,
�
xiii
introduction: in Search of Consoiidation
Taiwan now bears a striking resemblance to the Southern European cases of successful consolidation. Clearly, these parallels augur well for its prospects for consolidation. Yet, more than any other third wave democracy , Taiwan finds its political future still clouded by the escalating power and increasingly unpredictable behavior of the authoritarian colossus on the other side of the Taiwan Strait.
A Fourth Wave? Even if the third wave is drawing to a close, a democratic recession is not inevitable. The chapters in these two volumes paint a sober but largely hopeful picture of the prospects for consolidating the extraordi nary democratic gains of the past two decades . Some new democracies are clearly entrenched, and many more (especially in East Asia and Latin America) should achieve consolidation soon as long as the necessary institutional changes and growth-inducing economic reforms are implemented. If the democratic expansion of the third wave is deepened and secured in this way , the first decades of the next century could bring a political reality that seemed virtually unimaginable just a decade ago : a world composed mainly of stable democracies. But "mainly" would still refer to states rather than population. According to Freedom House at the start of 1 997 , 40 percent of the world' s people still live in the most authoritarian class of regimes: "not free." And half of these 2.2 billion people live in one country : mainland China. In the first decades of the twenty-first century, no other country ' s politics will more heavily determine the scope for democratic expansion in the world. If a "third reverse wave" does not ensue but is instead preempted by widespread democratic consolidation, the development of a fourth wave of global democratization will hinge primarily on events in one country : China. Is the democratization of China a wildly distant and implausible dream? In the years of political freeze that have followed the June 1 989 massacre at Tiananmen Square, the conventional assumption has been yes. But in Regional Challenges Minxin Pei and Andrew J. Nathan give us empirical grounds for questioning that assumption. Ying-shih Yli stresses the shallow and very tentative nature of the trends Pei and Nathan identify . Still , the latter two show that political liberalization has at least begun, and that thinking about political reform in China has advanced significantly. The kinds of incremental and endogenous institutional changes that initiated regime opening in other East Asian autocracies (notably Taiwan) are now taking place in China (and, to different degrees, in Indonesia and Vietnam as well) , Pei argues . A system of law is gradually taking shape to buttress economic reform, protect property rights, and constrain the arbitrary power of the state. The community of
Introduction : In Search of Consolidation
xliii
priv ate legal practitioners is growing in size and becoming more ass ertive. B oth the National People' s Congress (NPC) and the local people' s congresses are exhibiting more autonomy and initiative. Power is becoming more decentralized in "a nascent federalist structure," allowing economic and political reforms to advance more rapidly in some regions and then diffuse to others . A growing number of villages are experimenting with direct and sometimes vigorously competitive elections. A key part of the Chinese Communist Party ' s structure of domination-its grassroots organizations in the countryside-is crum bling, while peasant political awareness and activism mount. In addition to these political changes, China ' s rapid economic development and integration with its Asian neighbors are producing a more sophisticated, open, secular, and aware society, as David S .G. Goodman observes here.38 China' s political reforms have been modest to date and carry risks , not least of which is the danger, in Pei ' s words, of "an accelerat ing crisis of govern ability" if the old system collapses "before the new institutions take root." Thus, Pei warns, China' s leaders in the post-Deng Xiaoping era are in a race against time. A key imperative, writes Pei, is for China to adopt a new constitu tional framework to codify and clarify the evolving boundaries of political authority . This, argues Nathan, is not a far-fetched prospect. He notes numerous calls for constitutional revitalization and reform under Deng, and a growing need of Communist Party leaders to "limit government by law" for two reasons: to reinforce their sagging popular legitimacy and to "institutionalize power relations among agencies and level s of the vast party-state." Gradually, an agenda for "transition from lawlessness to constitutionalism" is taking shape, focusing on four broad goals: professionalizing and empowering the NPC while reducing Communist Party authority over it; instituting direct and meaningfully competitive (even possibly multiparty) elections for the national and provincial people' s congresses (the two highest levels); establishing a specialized body (perhaps even a constitutional court) to interpret the Constitution and supervise its implementation ; and increasing the independence of judges while improving their professional capacity. All of these changes (and others that are being discussed) entail a progres sive separation of party and state. Such a program of "constitutionaliza tion" would not make China a democracy, but it would greatly diminish the central obstacle to democratization, the pervasive, Leninist hegemony of the Communist Party . As communist politicians j ockey for power in the post-Deng era, some are likely to promote constitutional reforms in order to advance their own political influence. Elsewhere in the world, precisely such divisions, calculations, and functional needs for regime adaptation have spawned real political liberalization-and ultimately transitions to democracy. Nathan' s scenario of an incremental , smooth, regime-led
Introduction: In Search of Consolidation
xliv
tranSItIOn from a Leninist party-state "to a Chinese brand of consti tutional democracy" is striking in its parallels with the Taiwan experi ence. It would be ironic and fitting if what Gold calls "the great imponderable" for Taiwan ' s democratic consolidation-Beijing' s potential for belligerence-were neutralized by the "creeping democratization" of China itself. For the future of democracy and peace in the world, there is no higher long-term priority than to encourage this trend.
See Freedom House ' s annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, as
classified only 39 countries as "free" at the end of 1 974; that is a reasonable measure of the number of democracies at the time. Today, there are many political systems that "free, " or liberal (in the sense of enforcing a rule of law and protecting
indi v idual rights) but are nevertheless formally democratic in that they have reasonably open and competitive elections i nvolving multiple political parties. In 1 975, however, there were few if any countries that met the latter standard but not t he former. The distinction between electoral and liberal democracy is elaborated later in t he body of this introduction .
2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Centul)' (Norman : University of Oklahoma Press, 1 99 1 ) . 3 . Michael Bratton and Nicolas van d e Walle, Democratic Experiments i n Africa: Regime Transitions ill Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1 997). 4. Lan), Diamond, Prospects for Democratic Development ill Africa (Hoover Institution Essays in Public Appendix.
Policy
No.
Juan J. Linz and Al fred Step an , eds . , The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 97 8 ) .
1 2 . This theoretical perspective on consolidation is elaborated and applied in Juan J . L i n z a n d Alfred Step an , Problems of Democratic Transition a n d Consolidation: Southem
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 996); and Richard Gunther, Hans-Jurgen Puhle, and P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Introduction," in Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds . , The Politics of Democratic
Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: J � hns Hopkins
University Press, 1 995).
with Ill ustrations," i n Robelt Pastor, ed . , Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the
reported i n t he January-February 1 97 5 issue of Freedom in the World. Freedom House
are not
I I.
xlv
1 3 . Laurence Whitehead, "The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies: A Discussion
NOTES l.
Introdu ctio n : In Search of Consolidation
74) (Stanford, Calif. :
Hoover Institution Press,
1 997),
Pend� lum. (New York : Holmes and Meier, 1 989), 79; on the contributions of civil society
III
thIS
process,
see Larry
Diamond,
"Rethinking Civil
Societ y :
Toward Democratic
Consolidation," Joumal of Democracy 5 (July 1 994) : 4- 1 7 . In a seminal formulation, Dankwart Rustow gave the name "habituation" to this process, in which contingent and instrumental elite commitments to democracy become rooted in values and beliefs at both the elite and mass levels through the continuous, successful practice of democracy. See his "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics 2 (April
1 970): 3 5 7 .
.__
.
1 4. For further elaboration of the relationship between political culture and democratic stability, see, for example, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 963); Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, Conn . : Yale University Press, 1 97 1 ) , 1 24-6 2 ; 1. Roland Pennock, Democratic Political Theol), (Princeton :
Princeton University Press,
1 979), 236-59; and Larry Diamond, "Political
Culture and Democracy," i n Diamond, ed . , Political Culture and Democracy in Developing
Countries (Boulder, Colo . : Lynne Rienner, 1 993), 1 - 1 5 . 1 5 . Guillermo O ' Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy 5 (January 1 994): 55-69. See also O ' Donnell ' s essay i n Themes and Perspectives. 1 6. A semi nal discussion of reserved domains appears in J . Samuel Valenzuela,
5 . On the distinction between liberal and electoral democracy, see Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" .loumal of Democracy 7 (July 1 996): 20-37 . 6 . "Free" states are those w i t h a n average score of 2 . 5 o r less on t he t w i n Freedom I to 7, with I indicating the most free and 7 t he least free. The methodology of the survey is described in t he annual Freedorl1 House publication Freedom in the World: The Ann.ual Survey of House scales of political rights and civil liberties. Each scale ranges from
Political Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: Freedom House) and in the Janu
ary-February issue each year of the Freedom House periodical Freedom Review (formerly
Freedom ill the World). 7. See Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?"
27-28, Tables 2 and 3; and Freedom
Review, January-February 1 99 7 .
"Democratic Consolidation in Post-transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions," in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O ' Donnell, and J . Samuel Valenzuela, eds . ,
issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, Ind . : University of Notre Dame Press, 1 992), 64-66. See also Huntington, The Third Wave, 1 0; Philippe C. Sch mitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is and Is Not ," Journal of Democracy 2 (Summer 1 99 1 ) : 8 1 ; and O' Donnel l ' s essay in Themes and Perspectives. 1 7 . I ndeed, as Lowenthal observes, even the electoral process has been "marred by gross irregularities"
in
such formally democratic systems as those of the Domini can
Republic and Paraguay. For more comprehensive assessments of the status of democracy in
the
region
and
t he
challenges
confronting
consolidation,
see
Larry
Diamond,
"Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, lllusions, and Directions for Consolidation," in
8 . Freedom Review, January-February 1 99 7 .
Tom Farer, ed. , Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively D�fending Democracy ill the Americas . (BaltImore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 996), 52- 1 04 ; and t he various essays i n
9 . Philippe C. Schmitter, "Democracy ' s Future: More Liberal, Preliberal, or Postlib
Jorge
eral?" Journal (!f Democracy 6 (January 1 99 5 ) : 1 7 .
1 0. A classic example was t he political crisis i n Ecuador i n February 1 997, when the Congress declared the recentl y elected president, Abdala B u caram, "mentally unstable," and three different officials claimed the presidency. Instead of seizing power, the military persuaded Bucaram to step aside, with the vice-president assuming power briefly, followed by the president of Congress.
Similarly, during two other recent political crises-in
Guatemala in 1 99 3 following the attempted autogolpe ("self-coup") of President Jorge
1 996-97 following the ouster (for corruption) of the government of Benazir B h utto-the military remained on the sidelines and constitutional procedures, however controversial, were observed.
Serrano
and
in
Pakistan
in
l . Dominguez and Abraham F. Lowenthal, eds . , Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean ill the 1990s (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1 996).
1 8 . Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 2 1 0. For their conceptual treatment of the. problem, see 3-5 and 207- 1 1 . On Chile, see also Felipe Aguero ' s chapter in Themes and Perspectives.
1 9 . Juan J . Linz, The Breakdowll of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, alld Reequilibratioll (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 978), 2 8-3 8 . 20. G u nther, Puhle, an d Diamandouros, "Introduction," in Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds. , The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, 1 3 .
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In troduction: In Search of Consolidation
xlvii
2 1 . Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Political Crafting of Democratic Consolidation or Destruction: European and South American Conwarisons," in Pastor, ed., Democracy in the Americas, 4 1 -6 1 , and Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, ch. 6.
and the Southern Cone (Princ7ton : Princeton University Press, 1 9 88), chs. 6--8 ; Huntington, . T�e Tlllrd Wove, 2 3 1-53; D I amond, "Democracy in Latin America," 86--9 1 ; and Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattoer, eds . , Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore'. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 996).
22. See the essays in Linz and Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, and particularly Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration.
I . In part, this u nderscores the importance of the design of political institutions. As Aguero notes, where political i nstitutions incline democracy toward fragmentation and . . s tal �mate (as m B razil), structural improvements in civil-military relations are difficult to achIeve.
23. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R . Scully, " Introduction : Party Systems in Latin America," in Mainwaring and Scully, eds. , Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford , Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1 995), 1 -34; Political Parties and Democracy (report of a conference sponsored by the International Forum for Democratic Studies in Washington, D.C., on 1 8- 1 9 November 1 996) (Washington, D . C . : International Forum for Democratic Studies, 1 997). 24. See al so Leonardo Morlino, "Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe," in Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds. , The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, 3 1 5-88. 25. Although Taka finds no evidence among his four cases of a relationship between party-system strength and policy effectiveness, or between support for parties and support for democracy among the populace, other evidence does identify features of the party system (in particular, fragmentation and polarization) as having an important relationship to policy effectiveness. With respect to economic reform, see Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1 995). 26. Andreas Schedler, "Under- and Overinstitutionalization : Some Ideal Typical Propositions Concerning New and Old Party Systems" (Working Paper No. 2 1 3 , Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame, Ind . , March 1 995). 2 7 . On the debate over presidentialism versus parliamentarism, see (in addition to the sources cited by przeworski et al . ) Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 992); Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds . , The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 994) ; and Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds . , The Global Resurgence of Democracy, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 996), pt. 2. 2 8 . Niou and Ordeshook d o not differ as sharply from Carey on the structural inducements to party coherence as it may appear at first glance. Carey' s concern is for coherence (or integration) among a party' s national legislators, and among those legislators and their national leadership (or president) outside of parliament. For Niou and Ordeshook, the key issue is vertical autonomy of party branches at subnational levels of power-their freedom to choose their own candidates and craft their own campaigns. Both hypotheses may be right; party coherence may be maximized when different levels of party organization (e .g., state and local branches) have the freedom to choose their own nominees, but, within each level, party officials exercise some top-down control over who those nominees will be. Here again, democratic effectiveness implies a certain balance, in this case between u ndercentralization and overcentralization. 29. In both Taiwan and South Korea, the legacy of divided nationhood-which poses grave threats to n ational security-complicates the quest to develop more democratic and institutionalized control over the military. See the essay by Yun-han Chu, Fu Hu, and Chung-in Moon in Regional Challenges . 30. With the disastrous decline in the physical and economic conditions of the armed forces in Russia-as military readiness collapses and salaries plummet to below-poverty levels, if they are paid at all-it may seem a wonder that no military coup has been attempted. On the other han d , when military capacity collapses almost entirely, the abi lity to stage a successful coup may go down with it. On strategies and conditions for democratizing civil-military relations, see Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil
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o.
32. See uillermo O' Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: �enfal!Ve Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 9 86), 48-56. 3 � . They do acknowledge that consolidation is not "j ust a matter of time. " Indeed theonsts ?f co nsolida�ion, i � this study and elsewhere, do not argue that consolidated . last mdefinltely, but only that their breakdown (as Li nz and Stepan put ? emocra�les will It here) wo uld be r�lated not to weaknesses or problems specific to the historic process . . of democratic � onsohdatlOn, but to a new dynamic" of insoluble problems and shifts to dlslo � al or semI-loyal norms and behavior on the part of key political actors. Neither do theo� sts of cons �lidation ru le out. the possibi lity that unconsolidated democracies may persIst for some tIme, but usually m a state of lower-quality democracy. 34. See, respectively, Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: L� rd and Peasant in the Making of the Modem World (Boston: Beacon, 1 966); and . Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Dletnch Development and Democracy (Chicago : Un iversity of Chicago Press, 1 992). 35. In fact, as party politics and democratic elections gather momentum a new line of cleavage relatin g to the issue of socioeconomic j ustice is beginning to ross-cut and soften the I �ngstandi n g ? ational-policy divide of reunification versus independence an d the . . . dIVIde once- �olan zmg ethmc of main lander versus Taiwanese. On this important trend, see Tse-ml ? L �. n, Yun-han Chu, and Melvin J. Hinich, "Conflict Displacement and Regime TranSItion m Taiwan : A S patial Analysis," World Politics 48 (July 1 996): 453-8 1 .
;
3 6 . For seminal statements of the relationship between the mode of transition and the subsequent nature and stability of democracy, see Terry Lynn Karl , "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative Politics 23 (October 1 990) : 1 -2 1 ; and Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and E.astem Europe," International Social Science Journal 1 2 8 (May 1 99 1 ) : 269-84. B o� h Dl aman � our?s and Karl and Schmitter recognize that elite-pacted transitions that excessIvely margmahze mass actors run the risk of generating their own "birth defects" by narrowing the base of democracy. 3 ! . An important step in Chile, Boeninger notes, h as been the transfer of domestic . l � t�I lgence functions to civilian bodies accountable to the executive. The improvement in clVlhan control and the declining scope for military coups appear to be part of a broader global trend. See Samuel P. H untington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," in Diamond and Plattner, eds . , Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, 3 - 1 2 .
�
3 8 . Good ,:" an sees these various economic, social , a n d political changes in China as probably lead m g to a much more controlled and authoritarian form of Asian "democracy," . perhaps on the model of Smgapore . For a view that sees rising income and educational levels impelling China more strongly toward democracy in the next qu arter-century, see Henry S. Rowen, "The Short March : China's Road to Democracy," The National Interest 45 (Fall 1 996): 6 1 -70.
I Regional Perspectives
1 SOUTHERN EUROPE : A THIRD WAVE SUCCESS STORY P. Nikiforos Diamandouros
P. Nikiforos Diamandouros is professor of comparative politics at the University of Athens. He also serves as director and chairman of the Greek National Centre for Social Research and president of the Greek Political Science Association. He is the coeditor of The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: S outhern Europe in Comparative Perspective (1995).
Viewed
in terms of what S amuel P. Huntington has aptly named the "third wave" of democratization, Southern Europe stands out for being the only region in the world to date where democratic regimes inaugurated during the third wave have been consolidated. l In great part, this distinction can be attributed to the particular mix of facilitatir'g factors that allowed Southern European societies to overcome, for the first time, confining conditions hindering successful democratization and to ensure the consolidation of their democracies. The region' 5 history of previous failure at democratic consolidation is important in three respects . First, all Southern European countries, with the partial exception of Portugal , had had prior experience with democratic regimes . Second, these earlier democratic experiments invariably failed in the dual sense that they did not bring about consolidation and they were replaced by authoritarian alternatives . Third, as an outcome of the overall democratization process , democratic consolidation has historically tended to be the exception rather than the rule. More often than not, democratic regimes became mired in a state of nonconsolidation marked by political instability, intense conflict, and an inability to institutionalize the rules of the democratic game. The result was frequent breakdowns and an apparent inability to break out of a vicious cycle of alternation between unstable democratic regimes and variants of nondemocratic or pseudodemocratic ones .2 What accounts for S outhern Europe' s success relative to democratiza tion experiments in other regions in the world? And why did democracy
4
S outhern Europe : A Third Wave Success Story
succeed in the region this time around? Can one identify characteristics peculiar to Southern Europe before, during, and after the 1 970s that contributed to successful consolidation? What lessons , if any , does the experience of Southern Europe hold for countries or regions currently facing similar challenges ?
Defining Concepts The notion of democratic consolidation implies success on two different fronts : creati ng a fully democratic regime and consolidating it. By "fully democratic regime," I mean, following Juan Linz, an ideal type that "allows the free formulation of political preferences , through the use of basic freedoms of association, information, and communica tion, for the purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by nonviolent means their claim to rule . . . without excluding any effective political office from the competition or prohibiting any members of the political community from expressing their preference. "J Linz, in collaboration with Alfred Stepan, has refined this definition to include the proviso that the existence of "reserve powers" retained or yielded to electorally unaccountable elites or the placing of policy areas "off limits" to elected officials and beyond their effective control implies that a political system falls short of the democratic ideal type.4 On the other hand, a democracy can be considered to be consolidated when "all politically significant groups regard its key political institutions as the only legitimate framework for political contestation and adhere to democratic rules of the game."s This definition underscores the need for both attitudinal and behavioral criteria of consolidation and, by implication, stresses the qualitatively different character of unconsolidated democracies . The regular, institutionalized nature of politics in consoli dated democracies contributes to democratic stability and persistence liy 1 ) containing conflict within institutional channels, 2) reducing the intensity of that conflict, and 3) ensuring respect for procedures-and .. rules of the game that safeguard the rights of opposition and minority groups and promote positive-sum (as opposed to zero-sum) problem solving strategies. A number of observers insist on what I term "maximalist" definitions of consolidation, which assume that the label "consolidated democracy" presupposes a long socialization process entailing primarily the inculca tion of democratic values among the majority of citizens. In other words, the prevalence of "convinced democrats" among the citizenry-a situation that takes a generation or more to develop-is, according to this view, a precondition for consolidation. A distinctive trait of democracy, however, is its open-ended character and its s tructural predisposition toward the ever-increasing involvement of citizens in
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Niki foros Diamandouros
settings likely to result in posltIve, democratic socialization. In short, democracy breeds democracy. I prefer to adopt a "minimalist" definition of consolidation based on the absence of 1) challenges to the legitimacy of democratic institutions, and 2) systematic viol ations of behavioral rules of democracy by politically significant groups. This minimalist definition in no way seeks to devalue the significance of the added benefits to be derived from a citizenry socialized in democratic values over a long period of time. At the same time, it draws an implicit distinction between the requisite conditions for "sufficient consolidation" and those longer-term conditions that relate to the quality of a consolidated democratic regime-that is, to the phase of democratic persistence, which lies beyond consolidation. Not only does this definition refrain from conflating consolidation and persistence, it enl arges the universe of political regimes that, according to demanding criteria internal to it, can be regarded as both democratic and consolidated. " In addition, it contributes to theoretical clarity. If we use a minimalist definition , we arrive at the conclusion that the political regimes in S outhern Europe were both democratic and consolidated as of the 1 980s. In Greece, Portugal , and Spain democracy ,, was , to use Adam Przeworski ' s phrase, "the only game in town. 7 In none of these countries could the case be made that politically significant groups regularly violated the rules of the democratic game, either by acting as veto groups or by exercising effective control over reserve policy domains closed to democratically accountable officials.8 B y itself, this conclusion constitutes powerful and eloquent testimony to the fundamental transformation of politics, society , economy , and culture in Southern European societies in the generation following the Second World War. To explai n this change and its linkages to democratization and democratic consolidation , one must focus on a series of factors : the international environment in which the transition and consolidation are undertaken, socioeconomic modernization , prior democratic learning, the character of the predecessor nondemocratic regime, and the nature and dynamics of the transition to democracy.
International Influ.ence S tudents of democratization generally agree that domestic factors take precedence over international ones during the transition and, especially, consolidation phases . Still, it is important to note that transition and consolidation in Southern Europe occurred in an international-and regional-context that, both negatively and positively, strongly supported democracy . Following the collapse and complete delegitimation of fascism in the S econd World War, communism and some variants of authoritarian rule remained the sole alternatives to democracy . By the 1 970s, the appeal of nondemocratic models of political organization had
6
Southern Europe: A Third Wave Success Story
declined significantly . By the late 1 970s and the 1 980s , authoritarianism had become discredited, especially i n Latin America, where the bureaucratic version systematically studied by Guillermo O ' Donnell revealed glaring inadequacies. At the same time, the limitations of communism as a model for political organization were increasingly visible, as problems in the Soviet Union , the locus classicus of the model, proliferated. It was at the regional, European level , however, that democracy received its greatest support. Throughout the postwar period, nondemo cratic regimes in Greece, Portugal, and Spain were widely and increasingly condemned by West and Northern European states and were generally regarded as outcasts of the democratic European community. When these regimes began to crumble, beginning with the Portuguese Revolution of 25 April 1 974, democratic forces within each society received positive reinforcement in the form of moral, political, and material support from a variety of influential European and international actors. The case of Portugal is particularly instructive in this regard. The radical thrust of the revolution ' s initial wave and the actions and utterances of the early transitional governments and some of their major supporters, such as the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), indicated that the Portuguese transition from authoritarian rule was particularly open-ended and unpredictable. Procedural democracy as defined by Linz was , in these initial moments , only one possible scenario. Once General Antonio de Spinola had been effectively pushed from the scene, neither the leadership of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) nor the PCP and its powerful leader, Alvaro Cunhal, appeared willing to tolerate, let alone promote, the emergence, formation, and eventual consolidation of a pluralist democratic regime. In the critical period leading up to the failed coup of 25 November 1 975, the democratic alternative seemed to be in jeopardy in Portugal.9 It was during this period that international and regional support for democratic forces was most visible. A broad array of actors , including the United S tates but centered on the European Community , especially Germany, provided fin ancial, political, and moral support. Particularly notable was the assistance offered to the Socialist Party and its leader, Mario Soares , by the Socialist International , the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the Friedrich Ebert S tiftung, the research fou ndation affiliated with the SPD. The other two major German political parties and the research foundations affiliated with them actively aided other democratic parties and organizations. International support for prodemocracy forces was less o vert and decisive in the Greek and Spanish cases , if only because in these countries the real or perceived threats to a democratic outcome were less formidable. In each of these countries , however, international support for democratic forces created
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Nikiforos Diarnandouros
7
a broad political and cultural context that was distinctly favorable to 10 democracy. Two lessons about the importance of the international context as a factor facilitating democratic consolidation can be derived from the experience of Southern Europe. First, by mobilizing effectively in support of forces favoring a democratic outcome, nondomestic structures can enhance the democratization dynamic and thus contribute to eventual consolidation . Second, and perhaps more important, international influences play a role that can only be described as complementary and secondary to that of domestic forces. In the words of one student of this phenomenon, the role of the international players in democratic consolidation is best conceptualized as that of "underwriter" of democratic norms and practices, a supporter of what others have already achieved or are in the process of achieving, rather than as an outright exporter or securer of democracy. I I
Socioeconomic Modernization S ocioeconomic development seems to have served as another powerful factor that facilitated democratic consolidation in Southern Europe. In all three countries, the long period of postwar prosperity contributed to an unprecedented degree of social , economic, and cultural modernization, which profoundly transformed these societies and enabled them to take forward in their protracted and fragile transition to a giant step modernity . In the span of only one generation, these societies managed to overcome deep socioeconomic and cultural divisions that, for a century and a half following their initial encounter with modernity (the Enlightenment, the French Revolution , and the Napoleonic wars), had lain at the root of repeated failed attempts at political modernization. Spai n , arguably Europe' s most cleavage�ridden society well into the first half of the twentieth century, grew from the 1 950s to the 1 970s into a vibrant, modern country similar in many respects to the advanced industrial societies to its north. During the same period, Greece registered the highest rates of economic growth in the world except for Japan (and, at times, Israel), i n the process transforming itself from a backward society dominated by premodern rural structures to an industrializin g and rapidly modernizing country well on its way to adopting structures and practices typical of advanced, modern societies. Change arrived in the 1 960s in Portugal . The perceived cost of socioeconomic u nderdevelopment and the perceptible lag relative to other modernizing societies were root causes of Portugal' s 1 974 revolution, which overturned the austere and instinctively antimodern , authoritarian regime inaugurated by A ntonio S alazar in 1 92 8 . By the mid- 1 9 80s, Portuguese democracy was widely considered consolidated and the signs of profound socioeconomic change were widespread and abundant.
8
Southern Europe: A Third Wave S uccess Story
degrees throughout This profou nd change was observa ble in varying rban cleavag e, the the region. It resulte d in a. sharp reducti on in rural-u the primary one, over sectors ary domina nce of the tertiary and second educati on, and a and literacy in rise sharp a , pronounce d secularization in society . These profound transformation of the role of women l ascend ancy gradua the to uted structural and cumulative changes contrib the eventu al al, Portug and Spain of case d, the in these countries-an in practic es , and oral behavi , es attitud , values se of univer a dominan ce-of concep tions of "cogni tive maps" reflect ing open-e nded and positiv e-sum t and the interes of nce accepta in the world and of social change . Rooted the moder n of ts elemen utive constit ate and legitim market as central geared toward condition , these concepti ons, in turn, sustain a culture s t �t are problem l politica and arrangeme nts and solution s to social concIl Iatory and ate moder toward ; ionary exclus inclusi onary rather than dialogu � a � d compro politics ; and, more general ly, toward the logic of . both indivi dual and of ies strateg mise in the daily practi ces , tactics , and
�
collective actors . 1 2 teristics o f this great Reduc ed to their essent ials, the distinc tive charac ting condit ion for facilita a as socioeconomic transformation that served First, change two: were Europe rn Southe in democratic consol idation accelerated manner-a and essed compr ably remark a in ed occurr the region to speak of develo pment that has enable d studen ts of of the three countrie � ' teristic charac tive "leapfro gging" as a distinc effect oc � urred In gging leapfro this , Second . ries trajecto l developmenta r to third wave peculia teristic the contex t of, and benefited from , a charac of electronic ce influen and ancy ascend g democ ratizations : the growin . Democratic society and s politic n ion-i televis , all media-above cultural setting where consol idation unfold ed in a socioe conom ic and greatly facilitated, was masses and direct contact betwee n elites t�ly devalu i n � the ensura comm and ship leader of privilegin g the role . . parties and polItiCi zed relative weight of collecti ve actors such as mass atic politics . The full second ary organiz ations in the conduc t of democr felt du�ng the clearly more be would pments . impact of these develo consol Idation ; ed follow period of democratic persist ence that directly quality of democracy they would significantly and advers ely affect the er, lie within the howev , s change these of in these countries. The roots conom ic change in socioe to linked y directl are and phase consol idation the region .
Prio r Democratic Learning Prior democratic learning was u n doubtedly a major resource upon which S outhern Europe' s collective actors and elites were able to draw during the transition and consolidation phases. Such learning can be understood in both positive and negative terms, corresponding with the
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lessons derived from the successes or failures of prior democratic regimes . All S outhern European states had experimented with liberal parliamentary i nstitutions from the middle of the nineteenth century onward. Indeed , their exposure to liberal ideas and institutions dated back to the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars , and the first years of the Restoration, when the region became deeply embroiled in the confrontation between tradition and modernity , expressed politically in the deadly contest between absolutism and liberalism. During the second half of the century, especially in its last quarter, significant expansions in suffrage combined with effective control of the masses through inventive use of clientelistic mechanisms and structures to produce a system-prevalent throughout the region-of carefully managed electoral competition and peaceful alternation in power. This was particularly the case in Greece and Spain, where the system of trasjormismo, which originated in Italy, flourished . Developments in the twentieth century tended to reinforce this pattern in Greece and Spain, while initiating a somewhat divergent path for Portugal . A republic was established in Portugal in 1 9 1 0. The country ' s first democratic experiment, however, proved to be short-lived. By 1 9 1 7, Portuguese politics entered a period of pronounced instability that, in the midst of the general crisis of liberal political and economic institutions in postwar Europe 1 1 years later, gave way to S alazar' s Estado Novo, which would last until 1 974. Thus, at the time of the revolution unleashed by the events of 25 April 1 974, the accumulated democratic learning upon which elites and masses could draw was limited to weak collective memories dating back more than two generations. Portugal also lacked another key resource capable of aiding a smooth and peaceful transition and consolidation traj ectory : a temporally close but prior comparable experiment in democracy to serve as a model to be emUlated, amended, or avoided. In fact, the Portuguese experience was just such a valuable guide for the subsequent Spanish transition . In Greece and Spai n , on the other hand, the situation was quite different. In Spain, memories of the S econd Republic ( 1 93 1 -36) and its disastrous end in a bloody civil war served as a major negative point of reference and as a cautionary tale counseling moderation and restraint in the democratic consolidation of the late 1 970s and early 1 980s. In Greece, democratic memories were even more powerful. The colonels' authoritarian regime had lasted only seven years ( 1 967-74) ; between 1 950 and 1 967 a restricted democracy, replete with parliamentary institutions and circumscribed electoral competition, had operated in that country . The experiences of limited democracy and repression of the quest for democratization in 1 967 were powerful reminders of mistakes to be avoided when Greece' s new democratic regime was installed in 1 974, and contributed greatly to its eventual consolidation. In short, prior experience with democratic institutions and potent
10
Southern Europe: A Third Wave S uccess Story
memories of earlier democratic failures served as a valuable form of "democratic capital" that undoubtedly enhanced the capacity of Southern European societies successfully to negotiate democratic consolidation in the 1 9 80s. Democratic capital must be u nderstood in two distinct senses. First, it indicates diffuse learning that derives from the "negative legitimation" of democracy , seen as a political regime preferable to other alternatives . This type of learning can contribute decisively to making democracy appear to be "the only game i n town. " 1 3 At a more concrete level, democratic capital refers to specific memories tmd learning relating to the loyal, semiloyal, or disloyal attitudes and behavior of p articular institutions (e. g . , the monarchy, the armed forces, or political powers such as the Right or the Left) in prior democratic regimes . In both senses, the capital represented by prior democratic learning served as a guide for corrective measures designed to ensure the success of the new democratic experiment and greatly facilitated democratic consolidatio n in Southern Europe.
Predecessor Nondemocratic Regimes Comparative analysis of democratic consolidation suggests that the character of the predecessor nondemocratic regime has a major i nfluence on the democratization traj ectory of a given society. Juan Linz and Alfred S tepan have argued that, of all nondemocratic regimes sultanistic, totalitarian, post-totalitarian, and authoritarian-authori tarianism, because of its significant degree of social, economic, and limited, nonresponsible political pluralism, is least likely to obstruct a smooth democratization and most likely to enhance consolidation. 1 4 The Southern European societies clearly benefited from such a situation . Despite significant differences in transition trajectories, all three countries attained consolidation within a fairly s hort time. The manner of consolidation suggested that the i nstitutionalization and legitimation of the new democratic regime did not entail a radical break with the past in social, economic, political, and cultural aspects of life and organiza tion . Indeed, a careful study of the variance exhibited among the democratization and consolidation traj ectories of the Southern European societies in the 1 970s and 1 980s strongly suggests that, wherever practices and structures of the authoritarian regime were adapted to the qualitatively different logic and imperatives of the new democratic regime, the route to a successful consolidation proved smoother and decidedly less problematic. Spain stands out as the country that realized its democracy through gradual but complete self-transformation of its authoritarian regime in a manner that did not necessitate a violent or major break with the past. What distinctive characteristics of the Spanish authoritarian regime served as facilitating conditions for the consolidation of democracy in
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tha� cou � try ? To begin with, the remarkable pluralism of Spanish SOCIetY-Itself the result of the rapid socioeconomic development fostered by the regime of General Francisco Franco beginning in the late 1 95 0s:-meant that, by the time of that regime' s expiration, Spain was . a dIStInCtly modern society. It had already resolved some of the more intr�c �able problems that often bedevil democratization processes of other SOCIetIes and delay, if not derail, consolidation. These problems include the extreme income i nequalities that, as Terry Karl has repeatedly argued, are so prominent in the Latin American democratization picture and constitute an i mportant confining condition hindering successful democratization in the region ; 1 5 and the need for new democratic regimes in the former S oviet Union and in East Central and Southeast ern Europe to overcome the drawbacks of their totalitarian and post totalitarian legacies and foster the emergence of markets and general economic and social pluralism. The preexistence of such pluralism in Spanish society meant that the problems the new democratic leadership ad to handle were significantly less in both number and intensity, . mcreasIng the chances of resolution and commensurately enhancing the likelihood of consolidation . 1 6 The civilianized n ature o f the late Franco regime also facilitated eventual consolidation. The military ' S lack of direct involvement in the running of the regime meant that the transfer of power from the auth �ritarian to the democratic leadership would not entail the explosive and Intractable problems of extricating the military from the structures of power. The contrast here between the Spanish case on the one hand and the Greek and Lati n American authoritarian regimes on the other is ins �ructive. The Greek case stands in the middle of the conceptual range defmed by the civilianized nature of the Spanish regime and the profound military penetration of the B razilian regime. Deep penetration of the regime by the military as an i nstitution, without disruption of the mili tary' s hierarchical structures, has made extrication of the military extraordinarily difficult; consolidation has proved commensurately protracted and elusive. Greece was spared Brazil ' s problems by a series of interrelated factors that, taken together, constitute the legacy of its authoritarian regime. First, the brevity of the regime translated into low military penetration of Greek social and economic institutions. Second, the organization of the military elite that was in control of the regime was nonhierarchical . 1 7 Third , a profound delegitimation and almost universal rej ection of the military as an actor in politics was brought about by the military ' s direct involvement in the April 1 967 coup and the destruction of Greece ' s limited democracy ; its central role in the disastrous 1 974 Cyprus crisis, which brought Greece to the brink of war �ith Turkey and ended in a national humiliation ; and the patent . of the colonel s ' regime. All of this culminated in the meptltude "negative legitimation" of democracy. 1 8
?
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Southern Europe: A Third \Vave S uccess Story
The Portuguese case does not at first seem to conform to the preceding analysis. The revolutionary dynamic unleashed by the events of April 1 974 and the military ' s role in bringing these events about raise significant questions about the links between the authoritarian legacy and democratic consolidation in Portugal. Yet once the revolutionary wave-itself at least partly the result of the country ' s relative underde velopment and entanglement in a losing colonial war-subsided, the forces favoring political democracy were able to draw upon and benefit from aspects of the authoritarian regime that could serve as facilitating factors in consolidation. These included the significant social and economic pluralism characteristic of Portuguese society by the 1 970s and the civilianized ethos of the authoritarian regime of Antonio S al azar and Marcello Caetano .
Nature of the Transition The manner in which the Spanish and Greek regimes expired points to an additional authoritarian legacy that influenced the chances for consolidation in the region. In both cases, elites within the regime were willing to negotiate with the opposition . Thus the transfer of power was smooth and free of disruptions. Over time, this strategy contributed to the consolidation of democracy in both countries by involving all political forces in the democratic game, thereby enlisting all players i n its smooth operation a n d institutionalization. This assessment holds especially true for Spain, where the extrication of the authoritarian regime occurred through a series of carefully organ ized and controlled negotiations and agreements between regime and opposition. The transfer of power in the Greek case was much faster and involved very little negotiation. The military urgently wished to extricate itself as quickly as possible from a precarious situation-the threat of war and its own inability to deal with it-which, if not rapidly contained and defused, could have resulted in political and social explo sion s . Its u neventful withdrawal from power substantively contributed to a smooth democratization and undoubtedly facilitated consolidation . The violent overthrow of the Portuguese regime and the ensuing revolutionary upheaval severely complicated democratization in that coun try and significantly retarded the advent of consolidation . Between 1 974 and 1 982, two competing authority structures struggled for power. On the one hand was a parliament based on elections and the principle of popular sovereignty ; on the other, a Council of Revolution, whose legitimacy derived from the self-assigned role of the MFA as the vanguard of the revolution . In eliminating the Council as a competing source of legitimacy in the Portuguese political system, the 1 982 constitutional revision cleared the way for the normalization and consolidatio n of democratic politics i n that country .
P. Nikiforos Diamandouros
13
The ultimate significance of the manner i n which a nondemocratic reg ime expires is its i mpact on the critical transition period with which it is directly and sequentially linked. Leaving aside cases of complete regime collapse and overthrow (e. g . , Portugal), the moment and manner of the transfer of power can have a long-lasting effect on the way subsequent phases of democratization unfold. This is the time when the elites representing the authoritarian regime in the transfer-of-power neg otiations make their final attempt to secure their future influ ence-and that of their collaborators-in the emerging democratic regime. Negotiations that result in reserve domain(s) that lie beyond the de j ure control of democratically elected officials may well constitute a "birthmark" that will haunt the nascent democracy ' s evolution, life, and chances of consolidation . I n Latin American democratizations, agreements extracted from incoming ci vilian democratic elites by the outgoing military secured a range of privileges for protagonists of the outgoing regime-ranging from exemption from prosecution for offenses committed while in power to formal cession of specific policy areas , such as defense, to the armed forces . This pattern has attracted the attention of many students of democratization in Latin America and has led Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl to speak of democracies that remain hostage to their birth processes , "frozen" and unable to move toward consolidation . 19 The Southern European democratization process was , for the most part, mercifully spared these problems . B y skillfully handling sensitive issues, such as the recognition of the Communist Party, Spai n ' s transition leadership assuaged the military ' s fears and secured its acqui escence in the unfolding democratization. In Greece, a meek demand for control of "sensitive" ministries in the new civilian government put forth by generals who negotiated the transfer of power was rejected unequivo cally by the opposition: the request was never repeated. At different times in its evolution , however, the Portuguese democratization produced dysfunctions in this area. For example, the MFA attempted to secure a reserve domain that would ensure a permanent role for the military in the Portuguese political system. The Portuguese experience teaches another important lesson : Attempts to secure reserve domains need not occur only at the moment of the transfer of power from the nondemo cratic predecessor to the new democratic regime. They can also take place at l ater points in the transition process. Whatever the circum stances, however, their success can only impede consolidation.20 The observable differences in the various transitions of Southern Europe confirm the findings of many students of democratization, who stress the critical i mportance of the n ature of the transition to the overall traj ectory of democratization and consolidation of a given society and for the subsequent stage of democratic persistence. Portugal ' s consolida tion was protracted because of a tumultuous and troubled transition
14
Southern Europe: A Third \Vave Success Story
launched through the collapse and violent overthrow of the predecessor authoritarian regime. The transition was characterized by intense elite conflict, very significant mass mobilization, and pronounced u ncertainty about the ultimate outcome of the democratization process. Conversely, the highly contained nature of the Spanish and Greek transitions prevented the radicalization observed in the Portuguese case. B oth countries exhibited a surprising degree of moderation and cooperation, which went a long way toward ensuring the success of democratic consolidation. The Greek and Spanish transitions demonstrate the advantages of transitions as elite affairs . In each case, elites benefited enormously from the remarkable self-restraint exercised by collective actors at critical moments of the process . This situation also provided freedom of movement, autonomy, and increased space for initiative, negotiation, and consensual resolution of potentially divisive issues. This pattern was particularly striking in Spain, where the transition unfolded in a notable climate of trust, consensus, and moderation that is widely credited with the success of Spanish consolidation. In fact, it was the capacity of the Spanish elites to negotiate binding agreements, or pacts of lasting importance, that became the distinguishing feature of the Spanish consolidation process. The Greek transition, o n the other hand, provides important evidence that, though they contribute greatly to the consolidation dynamic, pacts are not necessary for successful consolidation . Greece' s swift transition was remarkably free of both mass mobilization and interelite conflict. The threat of war with Turkey over Turkey ' s invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1 974 acted as a powerful constraint in this regard and paved the way for a consolidation process, the most salient features of which were the absence of explicit elite agreements and the l ack of rancor and divisiveness among elites, which i n the years from 1 96 1 to 1 967 had helped destabilize Greece' s democradura and bring about its demise. This assessment stands despite the vociferous opposition tactics of Greece' s major opposition party , the Panhellenic S ocialist Movement (PASOK), during the early years of consolidation ( 1 975-77). Powerful memories made both P ASOK and the communist parties (legalized for the first time since 1 947) acutely aware of the potential adverse consequences of excessive elite conflict and ensured the parties' commitment to the first genuinely democratic regime in modern Greek history .
Other Actors That having been said, it is also important to stress that the S outhern European consolidations did not occur in the absence of mass actors . Quiescence is one thing, absence another. On a number of occasions, the
p, Nikiforos Diamandouros
15
masses did figure prominently in the strategic calculations o f the elites handling the Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese transitions ; the masses set clear parameters within which elite action could take place and beyond which it could not proceed without peril. This was clearly the case with President Constantine Karamanlis ' s decision to withdraw Greece from the military win g of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); he preempted potentially destabilizing mass demonstrations against the alliance' s and the United S tates' perceived failure to restrain Turkey in the events leading up to the i nvasion of Cyprus. Once unleashed, such protests would be difficult to contain, could easily spill over into other areas, and could imperil the transition and, eventually, consolidation. On the Spanish side, Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez attempted to force hard-liners in the opposition to acquiesce in proposed government reforms by citing the possibility of mass unrest. Whatever the reality of that threat, its use points to the significant role that mass actors play in settin g parameters for the action of elites during the sensitive transition period. Finally, mass mobilization among the conservative smallholders in northern Portugal during the radical phase of the revolution is widely regarded as an i nstance when the masses effectively circumscribed elite action s . In the process, they helped deradicalize Portuguese politics and foster a more moderate climate conducive to the resurgence of prodemocratic forces , 2 1 Two conclusions emerge from this analysis of the role of elites in the Southern European transitions . First, elite-driven transitions tend to be smoother and more peaceful than those that are not driven by elites . Thus they facilitate the chances of eventual consolidation. Second, the democrati zation traj ectory followed by a given society can be signifi cantly influenced by the particular mix of elite-mass interaction that characterizes it. Central and direct involvement of mass actors in the transition can, as the Portuguese experience indicates, derail democratiza tion and reduce the chances of consolidation. On the other hand, excessive reliance on elites and the marginalization of mass actors that this implies may , as the Greek case demonstrates, lead to a democratic regime built on too n arrow a social base. In this case, the regime may be unable to generate the complex social and political interactions and solidarities upon which the quality of a democratic regime depends . The result may well be a consolidated democratic regime lacking in quality. Once agai n , the S panish case lies somewhere in the middle. Even there, however, the case can be made that various problems that have recently plagued Spanish democracy (e, g . , corruption of the heads of the B ank of Spain and the Guardia Civil; the affair involving the clandestine organization GAL [Antiterrorist Liberation Groups] , which engaged in terrorist activities against the nationalist B asque organization ETA [Basque Homeland and Liberty] ) and adversely affected its quality can
1
16
Southern Europe: A Third Wave S uccess Story
in part be traced back to the particular elite-mass balance characteristic of the Spanish democratization trajectory . The marked moderation of the Spanish and Greek transitions also meant that the military and the economic elites, the two actors most capable of disturbing-even derailing-the process , either acquiesced in unfolding events or chose to support the democratization dynamic. The very need to ensure that these two actors were not antagonized by transition initiatives to the point that they might consider shifting their stance from support or acquiescence to opposition, either covert or overt, undoubtedly had a fu rther moderating influence on the democratization process and facilitated eventual consolidation . Conversely , the hostility with which the Portuguese economic and financial elites met the revolution ' s direct challenge to their interests contributed to the highly contentious , divisive, and disruptive character of that country ' s transition and commensurately complicated and delayed the consolidation of democracy there.22
Economic Stresses The manner in which the leaders of S outhern European countries undergoing transition handled economic problems provides additional evidence of the impact of the transition dynamic on consolidation . The oil crises that rocked the world economy in the middle and late 1 970s and proved profoundly disruptive even for advanced industrial economies coincided with the transition and consolidation phases i n these countries and adversely affected their economies . Governing elites of the new democratic regimes adopted strikingly similar responses to the crises. They deliberately chose to decouple politics from economics, and postponed dealing with the problems of their economies until after the new democratic political arrangements were in place and democracy had been consolidated.23 The ability to decouple politics from economics highlights three additional features of the Spanish , Greek, and, to a lesser extent, Portuguese consolidation trajectories. First, this ability hinged on the willingness of a powerful collective actor, labor, to refrain from demanding that problems relatin g to both realms be handled simulta neously. As Giuseppe DiPalma has pointed out, l abor' s self-restraint demonstrated an important quid pro quo central to the S outhern European tran sitions. Labor consciously decided to postpone i mmediate gratification of economic demands in exchange for the newfound, highly prized freedom to organize as an autonomous force-an option clearly forbidden under the predecessor authoritarian regimes .24 Second, decoupling politics and economics simplified the work of the elites managing the transitio n , avoided the dangers of overloading a sensitive and fragile process, and thus increased the chances of eventual
f
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Nikiforos Diamandouros
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consolidation. Third, the abili ty t o decouple was a distingui shi ng feature of the region, directly linked to the socioeconomic transformation of the preceding quarter-century . By the 1 970s , the fledgli ng third wave democracies of Southern Europe had developed economies strong enough to allow leaders to postpone dealing with major dislocations such as the oil crises without endangering the unfolding democratization dynamic.25
Leadership The prospects for successful democratization in Southern Europe were also enhanced by the presence in all three countries of strong leaders who were endowed with both vision and tactical acumen, and who exerted a strong, positive influence on the transition . These leaders did not act alone, nor were they dei ex machina, somehow "external" to the sociopolitical context in which they operated. Rather, their importance to democratization in Southern Europe lies in their capacity to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the structural parameters of the transition and consolidation game in each country.26 S tudents of the Spanish democratization have long insisted on the pivotal roles played by Prime Minister Adolfo S uarez, King Juan Carlos, and, to a lesser extent, Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez in the critical years of transition and consolidation. Juan Carlos' s dramatic support for Spanish democracy during the failed military coup of 1 9 8 1 has repeatedly been singled out as an act of leadership that enormously contributed to democratic consolidation in Spai n . So did his choice of Adolfo Suarez as the man to whom he entrusted responsibility for the Spanish transition. Suarez' s leadership in implementing his democratiza tion strategy is widely regarded as having been pivotal to the consolida tion of Spanish democracy. Leadership was also a major factor in Greece; however, Karamanli s ' s dominant role i n shaping the course o f events has no parallel i n the other two countries. B ecause Karamanlis had remained in self-imposed exile for 1 1 years, his reputation had not been tarnished by the events leading to the demise of the Greek democradura and implicating the rest of the Greek political class. Above all, however, Karamanlis is a man of forceful personality whose vision and acumen are deeply imprinted on postwar Greek politics and have conferred on him the title of the architect of the first consolidated democracy in modern Greek history . A salient example of his talent is his conception and implementation of a democratization strategy that astutely combined gradualism, continuity, and decisive breaks with the past with an eye to building a democratic regime qualitatively different from the ones Greece had experienced in the past-one capable of surviving. Another example is his sagacious strategy for prosecuting and trying principal figures i n the Greek authoritarian regime. This strategy ingeniously circumscribed the universe
Southern Europe: A Third Wave S uccess Story
18
of those tried and combined severity with clemency in a way that benefited the Greek transition and strongly enhanced its chances of consolidation. 27 In Portugal, President Mario Soares , Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva, and, despite his untimely death, Prime Minister Francisco Sa Carneiro all contributed substantively to democratization. This was especially true of Soares, who, during the radical phase of the revolu tion, waged an often lonely battle in support of the democratic rules of the game. By keeping the Socialist Party alive, Soares contributed to the survival of democratic forces and to democracy' s eventual ascendance over less democratic alternatives.
Other Facilitating Conditions The Southern European democratization experience points to two additional facilitating conditions for democratic consolidation in the region. First, the short duration (seven years) of the Greek authoritarian regime meant that democratization in 1 974 was as much an instauration as a restoration of democracy. In other words, the significant degree of continuity with the previous democratic regime, especially in political personnel with experience in parliamentary practices and institutions , provided a dimension of stability that counterbalanced the discontinuity infused into the system by the entrance of new players from the clandestine and radicalized politics of the resistance to the colonels , within Greece and abroad. Conversely, the long duration of the Franco and Salazar-Caetano regimes meant that this kind of knowledge was absent in the Spanish and Portuguese cases ; collective memories of the Spanish Civil War effectively restrained the elites handling that country ' s democratization process. I n Portugal , the absence o f such restraints coupled with lack of the practical knowledge of parliamentary institu tions and their moderating impact on politics exacerbated the highly divisive and conflictual style of the Portuguese transition ; the adverse consequences were felt well into the country ' s consolidation . Second, the Spanish democratization successfully addressed a problem rarely encountered-hence little noted in previous democratizations--:but of major and direct concern to ethnically heterogeneous societies , such as those in the former Soviet Union and in East Central and Southeast ern Europe: the intimate link between democracy and the territorial integrity of the state within which it operates. Of all the third wave democracies in S outhern Europe, Spain has by far the most ethnically and culturally heterogeneous society . Andalusia and Galicia and, especially, Catalonia and the B asque country are all areas with distinct ethnic and cultural identities. Given the highly centralist heritage of the Spanish state and the Franco regime ' s elevation of �this heritage to an article of faith (in an attempt to combat the
P.
Nikiforos Diaman douros
19
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centrifugal for� es unleas�ed y the Spanish Civil War), one o f the major challenges fac10g the elItes 10 charge of democratization in the 1 970s was how t.<> accommodate the demands for regional autonomy (or, in the Basq � e case, independence) without jeopardizing the integrity of the Spamsh state and antagonizing a military totally committed to the state ' s integrity. The successful formula chosen by the Spanish transition leadership comprehensively decentralized the government and erected what came to be known as the state of autonomous regions Stopping short of a federal arrangement, this strategy mgemously balanced the principle of a unitary state with demands for regional autonomy . As a result partly of the opportunities afforded by the � ew arran gemen ts and partly of deliberate strategies pursued by . . dorrunant regIOnal elItes, an additional, critical outcome of this process was the emergence in Spain of a system of multiple identities, national . and regIOnal . This solution equipped the nascent political system with the flexibility and positive-sum logic that were decisive in the consolida tion of Spanish democracy. The "Spanish solution" to what Linz and tepa � have te r:n:e the "stateness" problem contrasts sharply with mflexIble and dIVISIve strategies, based on exclusionary constructs of nati �nal dentity and zero-sum logic, currently being tested in many multIethmc and multinational third wave democracies in East Central and Southeastern Europe as well as in the former Soviet Union.28
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Lessons to Be Learned What are the broader insights to be drawn from the Southern European consolid ation story ? Five stand out in my mind. The first is the strong link between socioeco nomic moderni zation and demo �i:ic �onsolidation . Socioec onomic modern ization is not a necessarj precond i tIOn for consolid ation, but is certainly an importa nt facilitating factor. Clos ely related to this is the notion that modernity privileges flexible , open -ended approaches to problem solving based on . Positive- sum rather than zero-sum concept ualizatio ns of change. In turn, an open-en ded view of c �n � e emphasi zes politics as a process geared primarily toward conCIlIa tIon and compro mise and as the principal means by which modern societies establish prioritie s concern ing the allocatio n of finite goods and formula te policies designed to impleme nt these prioritie s. The contr�sting styles of the Southern Europea n democratizations , particul arly the dIfferen ces between the relativel y moderate and smooth Spanish and Greek cases and their more radical and turbulen t Portugu ese counterpart, seem to confirm these observa tions. ��.<:.o,l!.
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20
Southern Europe : A Third Wave Success Story
discrete sequences . These can best be understood if cast in terms of "soft" path-depend ency analysis, which combines the flexibility of human action with adherence to the logic of sequential ordering while eschewing the deterministic rigidities implicit in a teleological construc tion. This type of path-depend ent conceptualiz ation is rendered here by the heuristic concept of "trajectories ." Trajectories thus become useful analytical tools whose explicitly development al logic and capacity to combine macro-level with micro-level perspectives substantively enrich the systematic, comparative study of democratiza tion and consolidatio n. S alient examples of factors that can serve as constitutive elements for the construction of traj ectories are socieconom ic modernizati on; prior democratic learning; the character of the predecessor , nondemocratic regime; the nature and dynamics of the democratic transition; the specific mix of elite-mass interaction ; leadership ; and the international
en vironment. 29 _�.�Third, the compressed and accelerated pace of democratization and -the profounCl impact of the electronic media, especially television , on the structure of politics in each country constitute two distinctive features of the Southern European consolidatio n experience that are of direct relevance to students of democratiza tion in late-develop ing societies. The ability of leaders and of ruling elites to reach voters or particular constituencie s directly through the media implies, among other things, a decisive diminution of the role of parties as mechanisms of organiza tion, a significant loosening of traditional solidaristic arrangements in the region, and the arrival in these societies of what has been called "new politics" typical of more "mature" democracies . The adverse impact of these developmen ts on the quality of democracy in those countries has been considerable . Whether this leapfrogging phenomenon is peculiar to this cluster of third wave democracies or is a more general attribute of late-democrati zing societies is a matter for students of democratic
consolidation to explore. Four1.h.-..th€- democratiz ation trajectories of the S outhern European s �cieties seem to bear out the view that, because of their toleration and fostering of pluralist structures and because of their institutionali zed nature, authoritarian predecessor regimes produce legacies more conducive to successful democratiza tion and consolidatio n than do other
nondemocratic variants. tinally, the different trajectories that third wave Southern European dem�;;'aC1es have followed to consolidati on highlight the intimate link between the manner i n which consolidation was achieved and the quality of democracy during the ensuing stage of democratic persistence. Here, Philippe Schmitter' s conceptualiz ation of consolidatio n as an overall, institutionalized set of democraticall y structured and democraticall y functioning social relations made up of a number of distinct "partial regimes" is q uite usefu l . It explicitly points to the existence of different
f
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21
combinations of such regimes in the formation o f a consolidated democracy and forcefully links different types of consolidation with different types of democracy and of democratic persistence.3D It follows logically that the greater the number of partial regimes that become consolidated, the greater the overall depth of the consolidation and the better the quality of democracy attained. Illustrative examples of partial regimes that play a role in the consol1aatioli- Qf -de"rri ocracy include the party system, central representa tivt: iristi_tutions, interest groups, and the management of the territorial order in a given state. The experience of third wave Southern European democracies strongly suggests that the first two of these play a central role in consolidation. Still, as the Spanish case shows and as Leonardo Morlino has pointed out, the consolidation of a party system is not a necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy.3l It is, however, as the Greek case demonstrates, a powerful facilitating condition whose importance i ncreases with the weakness or absence of other partial regimes that contribute to system legitimacy and to consolidation. The utility and importance of Southern European democratic consolidations as obj ects of systematic study and analysis for both scholars and policy makers concerned with democratization stem from two salient properties of these processes . First, they serve as a rich empirical laboratory of both confining and facilitating conditions of democratic consolidation .32 Second, they focus attention on democratic persistence and the quality of democracy as the next frontier for social science inquiry . NOTES In preparing this essay, [ have drawn extensively on the introduction, general findings, and conclusion of the first volume issuing from the ongoing, collective project on democratic consolidation in Southern Europe of the Subcommittee on the Nature and Consequences of Democracy in the New Southern Europe of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social S cience Research Council. The five volumes that will result from this project will be published by the Johns Hopkins University Press as a series on the New Southern Europe. The first volume in the series is Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jurgan Puhle, eds., The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective ( 1 995). 1 . Italy, whose democrati,c regime was established in the aftermath of the Second World War, did not. according to most observers, achieve consolidation until the latter part of the 1 970s, when the Italian Communist Party became integrated into the Italian demo cratic regime. As Italy ' s democratic transition began in the I 940s, however, it cannot properly be considered a third wave democracy and will not be considered here. Not counting Costa Rica, whose democratic consolidation precedes the onset of Huntington 's third wave, the only other third wave democracy t o have become consolidated t o date is Uruguay. This makes the Southern European case all the more compelling. On the notion of the "third wave" of democratization. see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991 ). 2 . For recent discussions o f variants o f democracy, see Larry Diamond. "Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1 996): 20-3 7 ; and David Collier and Steven
22
Southern Europe: A Third Vo/ave S u ccess Storj
Levitsky, "Democracy 'with Adjectives ' : Conceptual Innovations in Comparative Research" (Working Paper No. 230, Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame, Ind., August 1 996) . 3 . Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, " in Fred 1. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass . : Addison-Wesley, 1 975), 3 : 1 82-83. 4 . For the formulation concerning "reserve domains," see Juan 1. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South Ame rica, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 996), 67-69; and Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, and Richard Gunther, "Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, with Reflections on Latin America and Eastern Europe," in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jorgen Puhle, eds . , The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 995), 85-86. For similar theoretical concerns regarding the definition of consolidation, see Guillermo O' Donnell, "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes," and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions," in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O' Donnell, and 1. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, Ind . : University of Notre Dame Press, 1 992), 1 7-56 and 57- 1 04, respectively. 5. Richard Gunther, Hans-Jorgen Puhle, and P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Introduction," in Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds . , The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, 7. 6 . For recent general discussions of democratic consolidation and its properties, see Linz and Stepan , Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 1 - 8 3 ; Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros, " Introduction," in Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds . , The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, 1-32; Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" ; t h e chapters o f Samuel P. Huntington, Guillermo O ' Donnell, a n d Juan J. Lin z and Alfred Stepan in this collection; and the exchange between Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle ("O ' Donnell ' s ' Illusions ' : A Rejoinder") and O ' Donnell ("Illusions and Conceptual Raws"),
Journal of Democracy 7 (October 1 996): 1 5 1 -6 8 . 7 . Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 99 1 ), 26. 8. At first glance the B asque problem in Spain and the antisystem stance and activities of Spain ' s ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty) would appear to question this assessment. Yet the fact remains that, despite the ETA ' s continuing regional importance, its influence on national politics has consistently declined in the 1 9 80s and 1 990s. Most important, the Basque problem has not resulted in any arrangements limiting the power of the national government to control particular areas of policy. Thus it is possible to speak of a continuing Basque problem within the context of a consolidated democracy in Spain. 9 . For analyses of the Portuguese transition and its turbulent phase, see Kenneth Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 995); Lawrence S. Graham, "Redefining the Portuguese Transition to Democracy," in John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds ., Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1 992), 2 82-99; Nancy Gina Bermeo, The Revolution Within the Revolution: Workers ' Control in Rural Portugal (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1 9 86); and Paul Christopher Manuel, Uncertain Outcome: The Politics of the Portuguese Transition to Democracy (Lanham, Md. : University Press of America, 1 995). For general studies of regime transitions in Southern Europe, see Guillermo O' Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 986), 3- 1 64; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation; Geoffrey Pridham, ed., The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transition in Spain, Greece and Portugal (London: Frank Cass, 1 984); Giuseppe DiPalma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on
P. Nikiforos Diamandouros
23
D�mocratic Transitions (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1 990); and Geoffrey Pn dham and Paul G. LeWIS, eds., Stabilising Fragile Democracies: Comparin g New Party Systems In Southern and Eastern Europe (London : R outledge, 1 996).
t
I �;u or information on the support extended to the Portugues e democratic forces ' especI y th e Soclahst Party, see Maxwell, The Making of Portugue se Democracy 1 32 . 1 53, a� d, espeCIall y, 2 1 2- 1 3 ; Thomas C. B ru neau, Politics and Nationhood: ' Post: RevolutlO nary Portugal (New York: Praeger, 1 9 84), 53-54, and "As dimensoe s no . �nto da de �ocracia," Analise social 18 ( l 982): 8 85-96 ; and Maria �stabeleclm Jose Stock A base SOCIal de apolO e 0 recrutamento dos Ifderes do PSD " . ta de ClenclO R eVls " . poilflca ,. ' . I ( l 985) .' 1 03-2 1 , and " 0 ce� tn � mo ?olftico em Portugal ' : genese do Bloco Central e , . anahse dos partldos da coh gaqao, , Analise social 21 ( l 985): 45-8 1 . I I . On the concept o f "underwri ting," see Basilios Evangelos Tsingos, "Underwr itin g Democracy, Not Exporting It: The European Communi ty and Greece" (D Ph ' l ' d ' Magdalen College, University of Oxford, 1 994) . See also Geoffrey Pri d h Encouragmg Democracy: The lnternatio al Context of Regime Transition in � EUlOpe (Lelcester , Englan d : LeIcester Unt versity Press, 1 99 1 ) . The East European democratiz ation experience might, at first glance, ap ear to . contradIct the assessmen t of the role of internation al factors in the transition o and . c nsohdatlOn of, democrati c regimes . On closer scrutiny, however' it becomes cle ";' that t e role of s � ch factors in this case stemmed from the fact that the withdrawal of the . regIOnal, SovIet hegemon unquestionably helped trigger democratiz ation. Once that had . occurred, the pn macy of domestIc processes over internation al factors in these transitions . as unmIstakable. It appears unlikely that the East European consolidat ion experience will evtate so drastIcally from that observed in other regi ons .
IS�., � S;�tll:r� �
�
;
analysis of the socioecon omic transformation of Southern ��rop� , see Edward Ehistorical . Malefakis, "Southern Europe in the 1 9th and 20th Centuries' An 1 2 . For a broad
�
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Istoncal Ov rvlew" (Working Paper No. 35, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Cie cias Soclales I stltuto Juan March, Madrid, 1 992); and the somewhat briefer treatment in : MalefaklS, , The Polttlcal and S ocioecono mic Contours of Southern European History " . n . Gunther, Dtamando uros, and Puhle, eds . , The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, 3 3 7
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1 3 . O the notion of "negative legitimatio n," see Leonardo Morlino and Jose Ramon M ontero, legItimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe," in Gunther, Diarnandou ros, and Puhle, eds . , The PoiltlCS of Democratic Consolidation, 23 1 -60.
' 1 4. Li nz and Stepan , Problems of Democrat ic Transition and Consolidat ion 55-65' LInZ, Stepan, and Gunther, "Democrat ic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe ,: ' n- I n . I 5 . For Karl ' s views concerning the distinctive challenges facing democratization in LatIn A encan SocI tles, s�e Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin . Amenca , ComparatIve Poiltics 23 (October 1 990) : 1 -2 1 .
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1 6 . Literature on the Spanish transition and consolidation is rich. Notable country-specific co tnbutlOn s to he SUbject, i n addition to the more comparative works listed in note 9 InC ude Jos , Man a Maravall, The Transition to Democracy in Spain (London : Croom Helm , Mara; 1 982), Jose Mana all an Julian Santamaria, "Political Change in Spain and the Prospe ts for Democracy, , In 0 Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead , eds . , Transitions from Authorl tanan Rule, 70- 1 0 8 ; Donald Share, The Making of Spanish Democracy (New York ' eger, 1 986); Rlchard Gunther, Giacomo S ani, and Goldie Shabad, Spain After Franco: Th ' klllg of a COl fetlflve Party System (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 9 86); R Ichard Gunther, Spam : The Very Model of the Modern Elite Settlement, " in Higley and . ther, eds., Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southem Europe, . 8 80, Lmz and Step , Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 87- 1 1 5 ; and t he pertment sectIOns I n Gunther, Diamandou ros, and Puhle, eds . , The Politics oif Democratic consolldatlOn . " On the Portuguese transition, see Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy and R gl e Overthrow and the Prospects for Democratic Transition in Portugal," in O' Donnell, sc ITIltter, and WhItehead , eds . , TranSlflO1lS from A uthoritarian Rule, 1 09-37; Philippe C.
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24
Southern Europe: A Third Wave Success Story
Schmitter, "Liberation by Golpe: Retrospective Thoughts on the Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal," Armed Forces and Society 2 (November 1 975): 5-3 3 ; Thomas C . Bruneau and Alex Macleod, Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy (Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner, 1 9 80); Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 1 1 6-29; and the pertinent analyses in Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds ., The Politics of Democratic Consolidation . Finally, for Greece, see Harry J. Psomiades, "Greece: From the Colonels ' Rule to Democracy," in John H. Herz, ed., From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism (Westport, Conn. : Greenwood, 1 982), 250-7 3 ; P. Nikiforos Diarnandouros, "Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1 974-1 983," in O' Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 1 3 8-64, and "Transition to, and Consolidation of, Democratic Politics in Greece, 1 974- 1 983," in Pridham, ed., The New Mediterranean Democracies, 50-7 1 ; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 1 30-38 ; and the analyses on Greece in Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds ., The Politics of Democratic Consolidation . 1 7 . On the impact that the hierarchical or nonhierarchical organization of the military within predecessor nondemocratic regimes can have on democratic consolidation, see Felipe AgUero, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military in Southern Europe and South America," in Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds . , The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, 1 24-65; as well as Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 66-68 and, for the Greek case, 1 3 0-3 8 . 1 8. On t h e Greek authoritarian regime, see Felipe AgUero, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military in Southern Europe and South America," 1 3 0-65 ; and P. Nikiforos Diamandou ros, "Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1 974- 1 9 83," 1 3 8-{i4. 1 9 . Concerning the notion of "frozen democracies," see Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Transition and Types of Democracy in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," International Social Science Journal 1 28 ( 1 9 9 1 ) : 269-84; and Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," 1 3 . 2 0 . O n the importance o f the manner i n which the transfer o f power i s effected for the prospects for democratic consol idation, as well as for a typology of different transfers of power, see Philippe C . Schmitter, "Speculations About the Prospective Demise of Authoritarian Regimes and Its Possible Consequences" (Working Paper No. 85/ 1 65 , European Uni versity Institute, Florence, 1 985). On t he impact of t he m od e of expiration of predecessor authoritarian regimes on their democratic SUCCllssors , see Robert Fishman, "Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe ' s Transition to Democracy," Comparative Politics 42 (April 1 990) : 422-40; and Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 55-65. 2 1 . For a good analysis of t he reaction of t he smallholders in northern Portugal and their deradicalizing impact on the revolution , see Maxwell, The Making of the Portuguese Revolution, 1 3 1 -46, especially 1 3 2 and 1 37-42. 22. On the importance of economic elites and the military for the smooth evolution of democratic transitions and their impact on the chances of consolidation, see Giuseppe DiPalma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1 990), 90-97. On the Portuguese industrial elites during an d after the revolution, see Harry S. Makler, "The Consequences of the Survival and Revival of the Industrial B ourgeoisie," in Lawrence S . Graham and Douglas L. Wheeler, eds . , In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and Its Consequences (Madison : University of Wisconsin Press, 1 983), 2 5 1 -83 ; on the landed elites, see B ermeo, The Revolution Within the Revolution, 200-202. The assess ment of the positive role of the military in the Spanish transition in no way minimizes the threat to the democratic process posed by the failed coup attempt of February 1 98 1 . Rather, it underscores the fact that the bulk of the military as an institution remained loyal to the monarch and the government at this critical moment and, in so doing, decisively tipped the balance of contending forces in favor of democracy. 2 3 . On the advantages for democratic consolidation of decoupling political from
Nikiforos Diamandouros
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econ omic issues, see P . International Organization Seq uen ce, and Strength in Politics 56 (August 1 994) :
Nikiforos Diamandouros, "The Southern European NICs," 20 (Spring 1 9 86): 547-56 ; and Nancy Bermeo, "Sacrifice, Successful Dual Transitions : Lessons from Spain," Journal of 6 1 0-27 .
P.
24. For a discussion of the interests of labor as an actor affecting democratization, see DiPalma, To Craft Democracies, 97-1 0 1 . 25. I n sharp contrast t o S outhern Europe stand Central and Latin America, where the enormity of economic inequalities severely complicates transition and impedes consolida tion. The same is true in Eastern Europe, where exigencies of the simultaneous transition to democratic politics and some variant of the market economy have rendered decoupling impossible. On this general point, see Claus Offe, "Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Faci ng the Triple Transition in East Central Europe," Social Research 5 8 (Winter 1 99 1 ) : 865-92; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 435-5 3 ; and, for Sou theastern Europe, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Prospects for Democracy in the B alkan s : Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives," in F. Stephen Larrabee, ed., The Volatile Powder Keg: Balkan Security After the Cold War (Washington, D . C . : American University Press, 1 994) , 3-26. 26. On the importance of leadership for democratic transitions and consolidations, see Gianfranco Pasquino, "Political Leadership i n S outhern Europe: Research Problems," West European Politics \ 3 (October 1 990): 1 1 8-30; and Juan Linz, "Innovative Leadership in the Transition to Democracy and a New Democracy: The Case of Spain," i n Gabriel Sheffer, ed . , Innovative Leadership in International Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1 993), 1 4 1 -86. 27. On Karamanlis' s strategy for trying principal figures in the Greek authoritarian regime, see Nicos C . Alivizatos and P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Politics and the Judiciary in the Greek Transition to Democracy," in A. James MacAdams, ed . . Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies (Notre Dame, Ind . : University of Notre Dame Press, forthcoming). 28. For an extended discussion of the stateness problem, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 26-3 3 ; for a shorter treatment, see Linz, Stepan, and Gun ther, "Democratic Transition and Consoli dation in Southern Europe," 1 2 1 -22. 29 . For the view that the notion of trajectories, as used here, is inherently teleological, see Guillermo O ' Donnell, "Illusions and Conceptu al Fl aws"; and Gu nther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, "O' Donnell ' s ' Illusions ' : A Rejoinder." For an analysis that uses the notion of "paths" in a way similar to the way in which "trajectories" is used here, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 55-{i5; and, for the Latin American setting, R uth B erins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1 99 1 ), 27-3 9 . For an early conceptualization of the importance of sequences for political change, see Leonard B in der et al . , Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1 97 1 ) . 3 0 . On the concept of "partial regimes" and democratic consolidation, see Philippe Schmitter, "Organized Interests and Democratic Consolidation i n Southern Europe," in Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle, eds . , The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, 284-3 1 4 . 3 1 . Leonardo Morlino, " Political Parties a n d Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe," in Gunther, D iamandouros, and Puhle, eds . , The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, 3 1 5- 8 8 . 32. For a discussion of "facilitating conditions," see J . Samuel Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings," 57- 1 04. For the notion of "confining conditions," see the classic article by Otto Kirchheimer, "Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs," American Political Science Review 59 (December 1 965) : 964-74.
Edgard o B oeninger
2 LATIN AMERICA'S MULTIPLE CHALLENGES Edgardo Boeninger
Edgardo Boeninger is chairman of the board of directors of Corpora ci6n Tiempo 2000 as well as chairman of the board of the Fundaci6n Chilena del Pacifico in Santiago, Chile. A former cabinet member in the Chilean government and former vice-president of Chile 's Christian Democratic Party, he has written extensively on issues of governance and development.
This essay attempts to place the discussion of democracy and develop ment in Latin America within the broader framework of basic national goals that are shared by the majority of countries in the world today . Briefly stated, these objectives are political stability, economic progress, and social peace. Political stability, so often elusive, can be and has been achieved for significant periods of time by both authoritarian and democratic regimes. Economic progress , for the purposes of this discussion, is equivalent to sustained growth. The conceDt of social neace. on the other hand. is difficult to define with any degree of precision. Certainly it is not the total elimination of conflict, a condition no society can expect to achieve. Social peace does, however, imply a society in which coopera tion prevails over confrontation in social relations, and conflicts are dealt with in accordance with established rules at the bargaining table instead of in the streets or military barracks. Social peace precludes the recurrent use of riots, violence, or armed force to challenge existing institutions. Thus defined, social peace has also been achieved in both democratic and authoritarian environments . In some cases, however, polarized social conflict has led to the demise of democracies and authoritarian regimes alike. These three national goals are closely interrelated and heavily dependent o n one another. If any one of them is absent for a significant period, the others cannot be sustained. Prolonged political polariza tion-as in Chile from 1 96 8 to 1 973-produces economic paralysis and ....
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spills into social conflict, which in turn exacerbates political confronta tions. Social upheavals and intense ethnic or class conflicts as seen in Chiapas, Mexico, in 1 994, or in Argentina prior to Juan Domingo Per6 n ' s rise to power, breed economic uncertainty , discourage invest ment, and increase levels of rhetorical and ideological polarization . Finally, a lengthy period of economic stagnation-as experienced across most of Latin America during the 1 970s-i nevitably leads to social unrest; negative assessments of the political system ' s performance undermine the regime ' s legitimacy. In practice, countries face the challenge of simultaneously addressing political, economic, and social problems and their complex-often unpredictable-interrelationships . The specific ways in which these variables intersect depend on the behavior of people, who act both as individuals and as members of social organizations . B ehavior is heavily influenced by culture, a crucial factor that should never be disregarded when analyzing a country ' s history or debating its prospects. Thus far, sustained economic growth has taken place only in capitalist market economies that are based on private property . That they also happen to be democracies provides sufficient evidence of the full compatibility of democracy and capitalism.l On the other hand, a significant number of authoritarian regimes have achieved substantial levels of market-based growth , and today a majority of these regimes, regardless of their particular stages of development, follow the capitalist model . Business communities in developing countries have repeatedly demonstrated-directly or indirectly-a preference for "safe" dictators, who support private property, over unstable democracies , in which leftist parties and unions may challenge pIO-capitalist policies. Thus capitalism can also prevail in nondemocratic political settings. The close relationship between economic and political variables is evident . Economic policy making is not only a matter of making the "right" choices from the economist ' s point of view.2 Economists tend to blame misguided policies or a lack of political will when misunderstand ings with politicians develop or when economic objectives are not attained. But economists frequently lack understanding and awareness of political factors . It is not only m arket-friendly economists who err when jUdging political processes . At the other end of the ideological spectrum, dependency theory has long argued that structural economic relations and the distribution of power determine political outcomes . This approach neglects the behavior of individuals and institutions as well as other political variables . Perhaps the most striking example of the linkages among the three sets of variables discussed here can be found in the broad compromises achieved in the 1 930s by Western democracies, when workers accepted capitalism and its market-driven rules (although the state often played
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Latin America' s Multiple Challenges
a significant economic role), while capitalists in turn endorsed the social legislation and protective guarantees that · have come to be known as the welfare state, This social peace created an environment conducive to the spectacular growth that led to developed countries ' current standards of living. Japan has sustained social peace in an entirely different way . Japanese culture maintains a hierarchy of social relationships that features the undisputed acceptance of the authority of one ' s superior and imbues elites with a sense of responsibility and commitment to collective well-being. This model was later followed by the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of East Asia. Latin America was unable to follow either of these models, or indeed any other path to social compromise and stability . Unsurprisingly, the more developed nations of the region, culturally attached to Western Europe, have searched long, if fruitlessly, for an equivalent of the welfare state.
The Legacy of the Past Diversity and instability stand out as the main features of Latin American politics throughout the region ' s history . Still, Latin Americans are likely to describe themselves as democratic. Since Western tradition and culture are firmly entrenched in the region, no other kind of political system can expect to enjoy true legitimacy. In fact, all twentieth-century dictators in Latin America have declared the establish ment of or return to democracy to be their ultimate goal-once law and order have been restored. Most felt forced to hold election s , which, although brazenly manipulated and tainted by fraud, were supposed to attest to the dictators ' commitment to democracy. The region includes a number of countries that have been democratic most of the time (Costa Rica, Uruguay , Chile, Colombia, and, in recent decades, Venezuela) as well as others characterized by instability and frequent shifts between democracy and authoritarianism (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador). Mexico is a unique case of institutionalized authoritarianism by a domin ant party . Finally, among the Central American republics (other than Costa Rica), Paraguay, B olivia, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, military or paternalistic dictatorships predominated until a decade ago. Even countries where the democratic tradition is most clearly part of the national ethos, such as Chile and Uruguay, have experienced lengthy periods of authoritarianism . It is therefore fair to say that Latin America' s political culture has been democratic but fragile; it is extremely vulnerable to crises , poor governmental performance, and ambitious soldiers or civilian caudillos ("strongmen") . In the economic sphere, the region has mainly exported primary goods. Some countries richly endowed by nature, such as Argentina and
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Uruguay, prospered from high-productivity agriculture. Central American countries became plantation economies (except Costa Rica, where family farming prevailed), while large and increasingly absentee landowners controlled most of S outh American agriculture in a framework of near feudal and paternalistir social relations. Mexico ' s peasant revolution ended in a one-party authoritarian state that has survived to this day . The Latin American economies were shattered by the great depression of the 1 930s, giving rise to a development strategy that came to be known as import-substitution industrialization (lSI) and involved the use of high tariffs and administrative barriers to protect domestic production. After a promising start, growth stalled, and by the 1 960s economic stagnation had set i n . Also from the 1 930s t o the 1 960s, the urban middle classes and workers in the relatively developed countries increased their participation in public life through electoral reforms and social organizations, and stepped up their political and economic demands. Most governments tried to accommodate these demands through policies such as mandatory wage increases, price controls , public deficit spending, and other popUlist measures. These policies led to the inflationary spiral that has for so long been associated with Latin American economies . Latin America' s "reverse wave," to use S amuel Huntington ' s words, to authoritarianism in the 1 970s is a prime example of the close interrelationship among political stability, economic progress, and social peace.3 At this point it should be added that Latin American culture lacks the values predominant in Southeast Asia, such as social discipline and respect for hierarchy, authority, and leadership. In fact, the region ' s countries have been noted for their lack o f social cohesion-in the Andean countries and Central America, ethnic factors are paramount in this regard-and lack of a collective sense of nationhood. These cultural constraints must be kept in mind; however, the dominant economic factor in the political crises of the 1 970s was that lSI ceased to be a growth-enhancing strategy. The most important political factor in this period of crisis was the impact of the Cuban revolution on intellectual elites and political parties. Left-wing party platforms and rhetoric became more radical and there was a shift toward the preaching of revolution and guerrilla warfare, especially in the Southern Cone, Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru . In Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, leftist calls to arms pushed political parties further to the left. Governments adopted increasingly irresponsible popUlist policies in a futile attempt to stem the tide. The ensuing inflation, followed by short-lived adjustment efforts , escalated social unrest and political confrontation. S eeds of the Cuban revolution fell on fertile grou nd. Revolution promised a shortcut to progress and justice and blamed "American imperialism" and "false bourgeois democracy" for society ' s ills, thu s transferring responsibillty for failure to external agents
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Latin America' s Muitipie Chaiienges
and class domination. At a later stage, this same process spread to Central America (again , with the exception of Costa Rica). Dominant oligarchical elites were challenged and guerrilla warfare ensued. As a result, the entire Latin American political system moved to the left. Impatience with gradual solutions and rejection of orthodox economics became the "politically correct" and socially legitimate platform; governments leaned even further toward populism and protectionism. The scope and timing of this process varied greatly from one country to another, as did specific outcomes : Extreme ideological and political polarization progressively weakened the social legitimacy of Chile' s strong democratic institutions and drastically reduced the ability o f the country ' s well-established party system to reach even minimal compro mise. The 1 973 military coup (an "institutional intervention" by the highly professional and cohesive armed forces) was followed by 1 7 years o f authoritarianism. Argentina' s political process was dominated for more than a decade by the efforts of conservative civilians and the deeply politicized armed forces to keep the populist Peronists out of power. This strategy eventually failed, but the ensuing Peronist administrations were short-lived. Their leadership split into conservative and radical factions ; the latter supported guerrilla movements while the former allied themselves with the armed forces . Democracy broke down, a bloody "dirty war" ensued, and Argentina fell into another lengthy period of dictatorship. Unable to cope with the tensions and violence generated by the Tupamaro guerrillas, Uruguay ' s party structure and longstanding democratic framework also broke down. Brazil, on the other hand, never experienced a period of extreme polarization. In fact, the leftist government of Joao Goulart does not appear to have posed any real threat of socialist revolution, despite its radical rhetoric and extremely populist policies . Nevertheless, the country suffered from the complete lack of a party system, an institutional weakness that facilitated the military ' s seizure of power in 1 964. Brazil thus became one of the first cases of the authoritari? , wave. In Peru, a reform-minded military, doctrinaire champions of guided social participation, overthrew an i neffective civilian government closely identified with the country ' s European-heritage upper class. S ignificantly, the three countries in which democracy survived the authoritarian wave are distinguished by their strong party systems . Two party Costa Rica was never at risk. In Colombia, consensus among the elites in both the conservative and liberal parties succeeded in curbing the endemic political violence that had plagued the country since the nineteenth century. In Venezuela, oil wealth was certainly a positive factor, but centrist, competitive politics by the country' s two strong parties-Acci6n Democnitica and COPEI-also contributed decisively to democratic stability. The inferences to be drawn from the above are clear: Economic
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stagnation fueled social unrest, which fed political polarization and undermined the legitimacy of weak political systems that were simulta neousl: suffering ideological erosion . Democracy survived only in countrIes endowed with relatively strong party systems and without a strong degree of ideologically based political polarization.
Transi tions to Democ racy in Latin Americ a In Latin America ' s political culture, only democra cy can be con sid ere a legitimate �liticaI option. That statemen t must be qualified � by saymg that the mIlItary leaders who seized power in the 1 960s and 1 9 Os enjo� ed what has been called "negative legitimac y" for lengthy penods .4 DIctators j ustified intervent ion as necessary to restore law and order, deal with "commu nist subversi on," and curb inflation . In broader terms , they presente d themselv es as the standard -bearers of patriotism who worked selflessly toward national goals, in contrast to the self serving pO litical parties driven by clientelis m and interest groups. . Through thIS approach , dictators were able to weaken the urban working class (although this was not so clearly the case in Argentin a). Platforms of this kind held great appeal in the polarized environm ent then prevalen t in Latin America . Certainly in Chile-where polarizat ion had become extreme , the economy was in chaos (inflation had reached 500 percent), and people feared that the Marxist- led government would grab total power- the 1 973 coup enj oyed the support of a maj ority of the popUlatio n. Military takeover s were also welcome d in Argentin a and Uruguay , where Montonero and Tupamaro guerrilla s spread fear and uncertain ty. As stated earlier, military legitimac y in Peru was based on an attractive program of national integration and social reform. Latin America n military rulers thus enjoyed a honeymo on period. Sustained social support for authoritarianism. however. is an p.ntirp.1v -different matter. Authoritarian continuity depends on erfor r circumst ances that allow a regime to extend initial "negative support" beyond the honeymo on period. Democra tic legitimac y rests on an accepted set of rules and procedur es such as free and fair elections , the accounta bility of public officials, and the rule of law. Democra cy in Latin America has survived severe crises without widespre ad rej ection of democra tic regimes, although failures i n performance have frequentl y eroded regime s ' legitim acy. S ome military rulers attempted to maintain lSI policies, while others so � ght more outward- looking strategies . Brazil under military rule e�Jo d a lengthy period of rapid economic growth, :� including a . slgm flcant expansIO n of exports, while following the lSI pattern. The most flexible of the region' s authoritar ian regimes, the B razilian military allowe d some controlled political activity, including elections, and established a system of rotating president s, who were always chosen
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Latin Americ a ' s f\1ultiple Challenges
from military ranks . The "Brazilian miracle" became a showcase for several years . When the winds of the Brazilian economy changed, the Brazilian military, with some hesitation and occasional backlash, gradually returned the country to democracy after 13 years in power. When the military left power, the economy was in shambles, the debt crisis had taken a toll , and inflation was soaring. In Huntington ' s typology, this was a case o f transition b y transformation.s The Argentine military performed poorly. It did not significantly modernize or adjust the economy but pursued nationalistic and protec tionist policies. The regime collapsed when it lost the ill-advised MalvinaslFalkland war to Britai n . 6 In Huntington ' s typology, this case partly follows the replacement model because the regime fell , but no struggle took place either before or after its collapse.7 A good deal of bargaining took place in Uruguay, both between the military government and the parties and among the parties themselves . The signal that the end was near came in 1 9 80 when the government was defeated in a referendum on the new constitution it had drafted and through which it had expected to consolidate its power. When the final agreement leading up to elections was reached, the regime had no significant economic accomplishments to show ; instead, it left the � ew democratic government to deal with most of the problems . In Huntmg ton ' s terms, this is a mixture of all three transition models.8 Chile offers the most complex and i nteresting case of transition. Chile under General Augusto Pinochet pioneered the shift from lSI to an open, export-oriented market economy. Property rights were fully guaranteed, trade unilaterally liberalized, and foreign i nvestment welcomed in most areas. Flexible labor legislation was enacted, � hi1e a pension-fund scheme managed by the private sector replaced the traditional state-run "pay as you go" system. In fact, Chile was the only case in which an authoritarian regime turned its back on lSI and state intervention in the economy. Significant growth rates and reductions in inflation were achieved between 1 976 and 1 980. Yet technical policy errors by the economic team (such as pegging the exchange rate to the U.S . dollar and relying excessively on external loans), compounded by the oil and debt crisis , produced a catastrophic financial breakdown in 1 9 8 1 and 1 982, foll owed by a severe adj ustment. Gross domestic product fell by more than 1 0 percent for two consecutive years . Massive protests erupted, forcing some social liberalization on the part of the regime, a change that enabled the political parties to edge their way back into the system . Democratic forces were eventually able to challenge the regime at the polls and to win the 1 98 8 plebiscite. Free presidential a � d parliamentary elections followed, usheri'1g in the return to democracy m . 1 9 89. The Pinochet government, meanwhile, had not changed jts economic course. The policies finally bore fruit, and from 1 9 8 6 onward dynamic growth ensued. The democratic coalition that was voted into
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office in December 1 989 thus inherited a healthy economy, a situation that contrasts with the stories of other authoritarian legacies of this perio d.9 Chile fits none of Huntington ' s models . In the early 1 9 80s, an attempt at replacement failed to bring down the regime, but led to the minimal degree of liberalization needed for further political action by the opposition parties . Provisions in the 1 980 Constitution had an unintended transformation effect; the regime' s plan had bee ; to establish what its ideologues called "protected democracy." Finally, after the 1 988 plebiscite and before the 1 989 elections, the military government and the victorious democratic coalition reached consensus on constitutional refor� , which contributed decisively to the orderly and peaceful transItIOn that so surprised the world.
Recent Political Transformations Today, all Latin American countries but Cuba have freely elected presidents . What made such a turnaround possible? To what extent are these regimes effectively democratic? What are their prospects for democratic consolidation , sustained growth, and social peace? Undoubt edly, the profound political and economic changes of the 1 980s and early 1 990s-some global, others more specifically Latin American-are crucial to understanding the processes and outcomes of the region ' s transitions a s well a s t o forecasting future challenges, opportunities, and risks . S ome recent, well-documented scholarship is highly critical of the Latin American democratization process. In fact, only a few cases Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay-are credited with having achieved liberal , that is to say full, democratic status as enjoyed by the mature democraci es of the devel oped nations. The so-called fallacy of electoral ism is said to have led benevolent analysts to overlook the lack of features required of liberal democracy : the absence of reserved domains of power of the military or other social and political forces not accou ntable to the electorate, horizontal accountability of officeholders, ?olitical inclusion, constitutional constraints on executive power, mdependent j udiciary and media, effective rule of law, and respect for human rights . l o Larry Diamond label s most Latin American countries today either semidemocracies, pseudodemocracies, or elective democracies. His final assessment is that liberal democracy has stopped expanding; positive steps in some countries are outweighed by increasingly shallow, illiberal electoral processes and a general erosion of the rule of law in other cases . I I In Guillermo O ' Donnell ' s judgment, many Latin American regimes are not on a path to representative democracy. 1 2 He defines them (again , excepting Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay) as "delegative
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Latin America' s Multiple Challenges
democracies" that show neither institutional progress nor governmental effectiveness in resolving socioeconomic problems. While I fully share these reservations with regard to the most recent newcomers to electoral democracy , I feel that comparing the region ' s present status with that o f the world' s most highly rated democracies underestimates the progress achieved. The mere fact that the transfer of the presidency now takes place through the baIlot box and that this most basic procedural feature of democracy is growing roots in Central America, Haiti, and Paraguay is in itself a fundamental breakthrou.gh. Moreover, as Diamond himself recognizes, the persistence of constItu tional procedures provides grounds for optimism about the future of
democracy in Latin America. 13 Whatever their failings, the countries of Latin America are no longer dictatorships; even the most fragile cases of political pluralism or incipient polyarchy do not fit the authoritarian model . Perhaps the situation is better described as meeting the threefold challenge of 1 ) improving regime quality, 2) consolidating democracy.' a�d 3 ) ensuring govern ability . As Diamond has stressed, "Rather than vlewmg democracy as merely present or absent (a sterile perspective now that mo.st countries of the region h ave trans ited from authoritarian rule, at least m their formal constitutiona l frameworks) , it is more fruitful to view democracy as a spectrum , with a range of variation in degree and ,, form. 14
Ideological Convergence The most significant political change of the more advanced democra cies of the region can best be defined as a process of ideological convergence, produced in part by the downfaIl of socialism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This convergence put an end to the intellectual and political challenge to democracy from the far left, who criticized it as a bourgeois facade erected to mask social domina tion. This process of convergence was reinforced by the ideological a? d emotional transformations experienced by left-wing exiles from ChIle and, to a lesser extent, from Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay . Those who had the opportunity to live in Western countries learned to appreciate democratic freedoms, in contrast to those who took refuge in the Eastern bloc and came to abhor the repression, social control, and privileges of the nomenklatura fou n d i n those countries . Furthermore, human rights violations by military dictators at home gave exiles a new awar� ness that respect for the basic rights of the individual is closely assOCIated with democratic accountability and the rule of l aw . The personal experiences o f exiles resulted i n a dramatic le:rrn ing process . In those Latin American countries that had been most dIrectly affected by ideological polarization , the left eventuaIly came around to
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a full and sincere commitment to democracy . This conversion has strengthened Latin America ' s fragile democratic culture, even extending it gradually (albeit superficially) to countries where it had not existed before, including several Central American nations, Bolivia (in a remarkable turnaround of that country ' s history) , Paraguay, and Haiti. The appeal of paternalistic caudillos and self-proclaimed saviors , so deeply ingrained in Latin American tradition, has thus been severely, perhaps definitively , undermined . At the same time, the tide of economic thinking turned sharply away from socialism and belief in the virtues of a dominant, interventionist state. By the mid- 1 980s, the failure of socialism in the East and Latin American popUlism was painfully evident to all , while market economics gradually became the new conventional wisdom. Throughout the region, a new generation of economists and social scientists, mostly trained at U.S . universities, took over, advocating a market-led economy based on private property. This trend extended even to economists with cultural and emotional ties to socialist-leaning parties. The combined effect of political changes , the flow of ideas, and lessons from experience effectively put an end to the "capitalism versus socialism" dilemma that had been at the heart of polarized politics, notably in Chile, Peru, and, to a lesser extent, Brazil. This process is currently taking place in Nicaragua and El S al vador. The lSI model faced a definitive crisis that led to its eventual demise. Awareness that sustained growth was no longer feasible within the protected walls of the smaIl domestic markets of Latin America (except perhaps in B razil) spread among economists and-at a slower pace-political leaders . Export-oriented policies and gradual integration into the world economy represented the only option that provided the impetus needed for growth. It is now recognized that lSI actually increased the vulnerability of the region' s econoIrJes, acted as a disincentive to greater productivity and competitiveness, and produced overvalued currencies. The significant change in prevalent economic thinki ng, particularly its gradual acceptance by political elites, stands out as the key factor in Latin America ' s current development process . Although the region has never harbored centrally planned economies (except, of course, in Cuba), and private entrepreneurs have always had their place, the prevailing model for most of the region' s history has been an interventionist state that was expected to control what is often referred to as the "command ing heights of the economy"-that is, strategic economic sectors and centers of economic power. Latin American elites-intellectuals, politicians , and union leaders alike-shared a strong anticapitalist prej udice underpinned by a rejection of the profit motive that stemmed from both the Catholic and Marxist traditions . Market economics has been-and for many still is-viewed as i nherently unfair because the
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36
Latin America' s Muitipie Chalienges
prevailing profit motive leads to gross i njustices in the distribution of wealth and income . 1 5 Today , the market economy is accepted by most Latin Americans as an i nevitable fact, whether they like it or not. While it is no longer condemned in party programs or academic writing, it would be fair to say that in m any countries the market economy still does not enjoy the active support of a majority of the population . Most significantly, the region' s elites ,
broadly
defined,
have
come to share the view that
inflation-the chronic Latin American disease-harms workers and the u nderclass
more
than
other
social
group s .
In
a
region
mired
in
distributional conflicts that fully occupied the political agenda, the crucial role that growth plays in job creation h ad never been seriously taken into account. The discrediting of populism has gone hand in hand with a stronger appreciation of a stable macroeconomic environment as a precondition for growth and protecting real income levels. Anti-inflation ary policies now enjoy widespread support, even when they involve difficult adjustments . Budget surpluses have become a policy goal , albeit one rarely achieved (again , with the notable exception of Chile) , and many countries continue to reduce the size of the state significantly. The end of the Cold War brought about a substantive change in U . S . n ational-security priorities and perspectives . The United S tates ceased to support right-wing rulers simply because they were anticommunist, a policy
that had contributed decisively to the seizure of power and
lengthy tenure of many Latin American dictators. On the contrary , the United States has since pressured surviving authoritarian regimes toward democratization.
This
has
happened
in
El
S alvador,
Guatemala,
Nicaragua, and, most conspicuously , Haiti . In practical terms , entities with
the
blessing
of
the
U.S .
government
(such
as
the
National
Endowment for Democracy) effectively helped organize and monitor free and fair elections through vote-counting control systems, media access, international electoral observers, and other measures . The "demonstration effect" has also significantly i nfluenced processes of political
and
economic
change.
The
spectacular
success
of the
export-oriented Southeast Asian NICs (not only the four "tigers ," but also Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia) , compared with the lSI-bound economies , provided increasingly strong evidence that Latin America desperately needed to reorient its development strategy . 1 6 In the political sphere, elections in a number of countries provided previously excluded groups access to effective political participati n a d � � power-sharing coalitions (e. g . , socialists in Chile and Peromsts m Argentina) . Political compromise and electoral politics are now more attractive than civil war, since guerrillas perceive the democratic game as
holding
greater promise of access
to power . Nicaragua
and El
S alvador are cases in point, although Colombia is not. 1 7 It is fair t o s ay that Latin America h a s been a n d still is immersed i n
Edgardo B oeninger
37
a profound learning process that i n vol ves deep cultural changes . Latin Am ericans are acquiring a certain distrust of government intervention and are ceasin g to blame the rest of the world for their economic ills. This new positive attitude makes foreign i nvestment and multin ational corporations possible. 1 8 At this point a bal anced analysis requires some
�
s ron� words of cauti o n . The political , economic, and cultural changes hIghhghted above remain unfinished processes. The legitimacy of the free-market economy has been achieved only in part . Actual performance over the next decade wi!! influence future ideological currents, political platforms , and economic polic y . Distributional concerns still rank very high on the political agenda.
�
tr g criticism of the Latin American transition s , as expressed by �� a slgmficant number of political leaders and social scientists , reflects the incompleteness (in the critics ' view) of the transition processes . At the heart of such critical thinking lies a recurrent theme in Latin American political debate. The structural school of Latin American social science has long insisted that pluralist representative democracy has only limited significance because it is basically procedural and ignores the elimination of
inequality
and
social
inj u stice
as
prerequisites
for
substantive
democracy . 1 9 From this perspective, Latin American tran sitions that result from reforms led by the authori tari an regime itself, or from bargains and compromises, severely restrict the chances for the ki nd of structural reforms required to remedy soci al injustice.20 Therefore, the democratic maj ority should eventually impose a new, strongly egali tarian social order by popu l ar vote. Recent history does n ot support these assertions . The government of Carlos Menem i n Argenti n a h as i m p l emented neoliberal policies and severely reduced union power without l o s i n g popular support. On the co trary , its success in fi ghti n g inflation has increased its approval � ratmgs in pUblic-opinion polis (at least those conducted before 1 995) . As B razil' s min ister of fin ance, Fernando Henrique Cardoso lagged poi
�s �
20
behind i n the presidential race. Then he masterminded a tough
antI-mfiatlOnary adjustment policy and won the election. The escalation of social demands feared by analysts , business, and conservatives has yet to take p l ace. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated above, the concerns expressed by the critics of Latin American rupturas pactadas, or "pacted breakdowns" of authoritarianism (which feature an agreed-upon
and
therefore bounded framework for democratization),
cannot be ignored . They should be viewed i n the context of democratic consolidation and the simultaneous n eeds for political stability, sustained growth, and social peace. It i s no coincidence that numerous presidents who have implemented market-oriented policies i n recent years were elected
by
left-of-center parties or coalitions . Many ran on populist
pl atforms and then reversed directi o n , i n several cases adopti ng the very programs of the candidates they had defeated . Peru ' s Alberto Fuj imori ,
38
Latin America' s Multiple Challenges
who has applied the program of Mario Vargas Llosa, is the most outstanding example of such a switch" but the same behavior can be seen in Argentina' s Menem, Venezuela' s Carlos Andres Perez, and Bolivia's Paz Zamora, These examples of seemingly contradictory politics support the assertion that no other policy framework is feasible today. They also suggest that these leaders might not have been elected had they based their campaigns on the platforms of their defeated rivals. The prospects for democracy and development in Latin America look indisputably better than ever before. Adam Przeworski has said that in Europe there is no room for nondemocratic politics.21 Only those East European countries where democracy has been consolidated will be allowed to join the European Economic Community. Though no such compelling reason exists in Latin America, the trend away from nondemocratic politics is obvious. Authoritarian regressions in the region may still occur, but they are unlikely to be more than short-lived interruptions of predominantly democratic trends. Yet it would be premature to say that a higher quality of democracy or governability is the most likely outcome.22 Economic Reforms in Comparative Perspective
The comparative effectiveness of democracies and authoritarian regimes in implementing market-oriented economic reform or comprehen sive adjustment processes has aroused a great deal of interest. It is a matter of heated debate in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the West. In S outheast Asia, developments in the People's Republic of China and Vietnam are compared with changes in Taiwan and Korea. The transformation of the Chilean economy undertaken by the Pinochet regime is often put forth as the prime argument in favor of an authoritarian environment for implementing neoliberal economic reforms. I feel that for Latin America, such a debate is largely irrelevant, however, because democracy prevails in the region and is fast becoming a fact of life. I should add that those who prefer the implementation of reforms under authoritarianism actually presume a "benevolent despot" theory. Despots, however, are not chosen; they simply seize power. Thus it is far from certain that a despot will be benevolent and wise. What admirers of the Pinochet model really have in mind is a competent and cohesive team of technocrats who use the power bestowed upon them by the authoritarian ruler to dictate policy from behind the scenes. This is, in fact, what Pinochet actually did: he placed the Chilean economy in the hands of the "Chicago boys" and consis tently supported their policies for more than a decade. Such a scenario follows the "technopol" concept: technocrats are appointed to public office and allowed to do "the right thing" without interference from ordinary politics.23 In a democratic framework, however, things simply
Edgardo Boeninger
39
do not happen this way. Policy decisio ns are by definition politic al in nature and are therefore made by politic ians, who may or may not heed the recomm endatio ns of technocrats. The available eviden ce does not warrant the verdict that author itarian regimes are more effective in implem enting economic reform s than . . d emocracles. 24 It IS often assum ed that authoritarian governments will be more l��ely to li beraliz e becaus e their survival does not depend on . competItIve electio ns and they can repress other manife stations of discon:en � . Comparative analys is shows , however, that althoug h some authontanan govern ments have carried out succes sful transit ions there is little eviden ce that authoritariani sm per se increases the likelih � od of such transit ion.25 Latin Ameri can cases certain ly do not suppor t the theory. As Stepha n �aggard and Robert Kaufman note, authoritarian regimes do not necess anly grant the state the autonomy to impose unpopu lar . adjustm ent programs. In fact, it has rightly been pointed out that "one may look for opportunistic policies and loose fiscal management when weak dictators are in danger of being overthrown."2 6 Further more auth �rit �rian rulers d pend on the loyalty of particular elite groups t� � remam m power. DIctators are thus prone to cliente listic links and widespread use of patron age, which fertilizes the ground for further corruption. When a domes tic, protected industry that benefit s from the lSI model has a close relatio nship with an authoritarian govern ment, the economy can hardly be expected to move toward free trade. This model reflects Latin American reality, with the exception of Chile. The freedom of the popula ce to use their voice as an instrum ent of social pressu re and politic al protest undoubtedly constrains democratic pol� cy makers . Well-organized middle -class groups can effectiv ely block polIcy, as can public- sector unions . It is also true that the technical complexities of econom ic policy are hard to explain and rarely unders �ood by the general public, "who can hardly be expecte d to know or belIeve that free markets will stimulate econom ic growth .'027 The market concep t has scant meanin g for people mired in extrem e poverty. In a number of cases, however, the urban workin g class has not been able to defend its interests when severe adjustment produc ed high unemployment-even in fully democratic countries govern ed by parties elect�d with workin g-class upport : Spain, Argent ina, Greece, and � Br�I!. 2 B One reason for thIS outcome is that an anti-infl ationary, . antipopu!Ist cultur e has come to prevai l. The Promise of Democratic Governments
Many of the most effective and promising reforms in Latin America were implemented by postauthoritarian, democratic governments. The Argentine military left the economy in a shambles ; the first democratic
40
Latin America' s Multiple Challenges
government (that of Raul Alfons(n) was unable to cope with the situation. The second democratic administration (that of Carlos Menem) moved rapidly to control inflation and has drastically liberalized the economy. Brazilian military rulers were effective in their early years, but by the time of the transition to a democratic government, the economy was in crisis. Matters did not improve during the first two democratic adminis trations until Cardoso, as finance minister, implemented a radical reform to curb inflation. The Peruvian military ended its period in office with a crisis; later, the democratic government of Alan Garda was one of Latin America's most extreme cases of populism. Finally, democratically elected Alberto Fujimori, lacking political parties able to support any set of poli� ies, gained authority by means of a self-imposed coup. He has smce implemented one of the region' s most radical liberalization progra�ns, . has again won the presidency by a landslide in a free and fair el ectI � n, . and has reestablished the formal trappings of democracy, albeit With strong authoritarian undertones. . ., In Venezuela, former populist Carlos Andres Perez also InitIated a radical reform program, which by 1 992 was deemed one of the most successful in Latin America. But the Perez government lost the support of its own party, Acci6n Democnitica, and Venezuela bec�e the . o.nly recent case of regression to more interventionist and populist poliCies. The Perez administration also suffered from endemic corruption and from the unwillingness of the people-long accustomed to the easy life provided by oil wealth-to accept the inevitable belt-tightening measures required for adjustment. Populist president Rafael Caldera has now been · · 29 forced to resort to precisely such orth0 d ox po I ICles. Mexico is a highly revealing case. The Institutional Revolutionary Pa.rty (PR!) presidential administrations of Miguel de la Madrid and Carlos Salinas were widely praised for their reforms, while the technocrats in charge of economic policy were lauded for their competence, cohesion, and effective decision making.3D One of the region' s worst crises then suddenly erupted, leading to a profound reassessment of the Mexican system. In the first place, the "technoc racy," shielded by authoritarian politics, had persisted in technic �lly . misguided policies but hidden the consequences from public scrutmy until it was too late. S econd, the PR!, stable and solid for more than 60 years, was no longer dominant. The people had begun to demand accountability in public affairs, free and fair elections, and an end to corruption.31 . Of all the cases of authoritarianism in Latin America, only Chile can be considered to have been economically successful. Its business community thought the Pinochet regime rescued them from the left wing ' s threats of expropriation and union control; business was in no
Edgardo B oeninger
41
mo �d to contradict the new regime on any matter. This gave Pinochet . suffiCient leeway for drastic liberalization measures which forced domestic firms t� face international competition at th e high cost of . bankruptCies and mdustrial restructuring. It should be noted that the Pinochet regime was voted out of office by a substantial popular maj ority, giving the incoming administration of Pa�icio Aylwin a clear popular mandate. The new government could easily have steered economic policy back in the direction of interven tionist and popUlist policies. It never attempted to do so; on the contr� , t�e new administration liberalized the economy even further, foll o:,,"mg Its o ,,; n firm convictions. Democratic government provided . politIcal and SOCial legitimacy for a policy that could not otherwise have been sustained over time. Authoritarianism did not provide Latin America with an effective political fo:m � la for economic reform. The wide diversity of outcomes, however, mdlcates that labeling democracy the shortest road to development is not a decisive or even a wholly sustainable argument in favor o� democratic systems. East Asian cases reinforce this viewpoint. . If It IS true that democracy in Latin America will continue to prevail, "�ver the long run, the consolidation of economic reform will hinge . CrItically on the govern ability of new democracies, and vice versa."32 !hough. "the current wave of democratization is frequently considered lITeverslble, . . . new democratic experiments may prove quite fragile in the face of continued poor economic performance"33 and if levels of social unrest increase. These comments return the discussion to the issue of social peace. S ocial Equity
Socia! peace is a concept lacking in precision. I understand it to imply that in a democratic fraInework, social conflict is bounded by accepted rules and procedures for settling disputes and by a Willingness to do so at the bargaining table. In general, conflicts break out over dem �nds for better living conditions, higher wages, improVed social s ervlces, and a host of similar issues. Conflict is prone to erupt at any . tlm � , even ?� er lesser matters, if certain classes or groups perceive that s oclal con�ltlons and relationships are excessively unfair. Such percep . tIOns are likely to lead to polarization and confrontation when disadvan taged classes do not expect conditions to improve. Latin America is particularly sensitive to these issues. Social justice has always been a key component of political platforms and of promises made by leaders, especially those of the center and left. For decades pOli tical confrontation has centered on the redistribution of income (and, . at times w�alth). The struggle among various groups for a larger share : of the pie lies at the heart of the region ' s popUlist tradition and chronic
42
Latin America' s Muiiipie Chalienges
inflation , Price stability in the 1950s and 1960s was achieved most effectively in those countries (those in Central America, except Costa Rica, and Paraguay) in which oligarchic social domination and authori tarian rulers left no room for social demands, and in which a largely rural, poorly educated populace was in no position to organize in protest. Latin America has high, often severe, rates of poverty, even in those nations that enjoy comparatively high levels of development. The region's poor track record in most matters of social equity aggravates the impact of poverty, As research undertaken by the World B ank and other organizations has shown, conditions in Latin America do not compare favorably with those in other regions of the world, particularly Southeast Asia?4 Latin American countries accepted that the region needed completely new social strategies, policies, and programs, Meanwhile, economic changes of the 1980s not only produced a different environment; they also changed the nature of the debate. The shift from import substitution and state interventionism to market-based, export-oriented policies drastically reduced the domain of political decisions directly affecting the economy or having significant economic repercussions. Governments have discontinued price controls, salaries fixed by law, exchange-rate policies, and fiscal deficit spending to subsidize basic consumer goods because they are no longer feasible. Even the political elite now recognizes the lesser role politics play in economic matters. A more fundamental debate continues, however. Neoliberal econo mists, conservative politicians, and the business community tend to equate social equity with a high rate of economic growth and efficient implementation of programs directed at reducing poverty. They acknowledge that growth plays a key role in the pursuit of equity by creating jobs , increasing real salaries, and providing the treasury with resources for social programs. Political elites and leaders of social organizations suspect that the trickle-down effect of market-led growth is uncertain, however, and that in the best of cases it is a slow process that might take several generations to be fully effective. The true source of disagreements therefore lies in sharply differing definitions of social equity. A majority of citizens--contrary to neoliberal tenets-feel that social equity is a broader concept that covers distributional issues and stretches beyond the poor far into the middle classes. Thus social equity becomes a multidimensional issue involving the following objectives: 1) Elimination of poverty; 2) Reduction of the often vast differences in the quality of life, including access to basic services, the urban environment, and recreational and cultural facilities; 3) Equality of opportunity, which exists when an individual has a
Edgardo B oeninger
43
reasonable chance of upward mobility in terms of income, status, and quality of life regardless of his or her class, ethnic, or religious background; 4) Reasonable protection against the uncertainties of a market economy--:that is, some !d � d o � a safety net for individuals and groups who are laId off and vanatIOn In the groups that enjoy the comparative advantages 0: trade inherent in open, liberalized market economies; and 5) ReductIOn of extreme disparities in income and wealth. Necessary Conditions
These ? ondition s are critical to the region' s social peace and long . . . term politIcal stabIlIty . The market does not equalize rewards' indeed it cannot do so if incentives to increase savings and investme� t are t� ? Iay thei� indispe.nsable role. On the contrary, economic growth tends to Increase Income Ine�uality, at least in the early stages of development, because of the relatIve scarcity of such factors as capital, education, ta� ent, managerial capability, and creativity . Joan Nelson reminds us that stIli more problematic for democratic consolidation are trends toward the im? o �eris �ment of middle strata--civil servants, the public-service sector, UnIOnIzed Industrial workers, and pensioners. In addition, the increasing wealth of the upper classes exacerbates the discontent of the middle cJasses.35 Research shows that even in the best of cases, income distribution varies only marginally over time. No effective policies compatible with democracy and the functioning of open, liberalized market economies have been found to achieve significant changes in income distribution. Tax struet ures and enforcement can and should be improved, but the . effect on Income distribution will be slight. The need for effective policies in alI the other dimensions of social equity is obvious . Equal access to high-quality primary and secondary . educatIOn for all societal groups is a top priority. Well-focused social programs are and will continue to be a crucial responsibility of the state. The reduction of uncertainty requires the creation of safety nets.36 Unemployment insurance is being discussed in Chile, although the government must avoid Spain's mistake of inducing fiscal deficits . Rece� t literature suggests strategies for making market-oriented economIC reforms compatible with social needs and demands . Nelson str�sse� that economic reforms are more sustainable if accompanied by rapId Improvement in basic services and utilities.37 Governments that purs � e open trade policies tend to maintain large-scale programs of job . retraining, unemployment benefits, and social insurance.38 Based on equity-related concerns, these proposals are intended to bolster political support for the market economy. Considerations of social equity spill over into institutions that govern
44
Latin America's I\1ultiple Challenges
relations among social actors. Progressive elites widely share the view that what can be broadly defined as the "empowerment of the underdog" constitutes an essential component of equity. Perhaps the most relevant objective of such a definition is to place business and labor on equal footing by facilitating fair bargaining processes. Labor legislation and the role of unions thus come to the forefront. An open economy requires flexible labor markets. Workers, on the other hand, consider protective networks and · job security to be fundamental requirements of an equitable business-labor relationship; they rely heavily on union strength to achieve these goals. The Latin American business community generally opposes unions and views them as a hindrance to growth. Business faces the dilemma of trying to cooperate with unions or attempting to destroy them. The fact that changes in the global economic system have caused union membership to decline worldwide does not mean that unions have lost their political and social legitimacy as representatives of the working class. This is certainly the case in Chile, where the National Confederation of Workers, whose membership fluctuates between 1 0 and 15 percent of the work force, enjoys strong recognition and support from centrist and leftist political parties. If social peace is to be preserved over the long term in Latin America, rapid, significant, and sustained progress must be achieved in all these areas. As Przeworski has noted with regard to Poland, tolerance for inequality has increased but is certainly not boundless?9 Given the ideological patterns prevalent in Latin America, the egalitarian leanings of politicians and intellectuals, the scope of unsatisfied demands and aspirations, the strength of "voice" in a democratic environment, and the dynamics of electoral competition, I predict that tolerance will remain limited until the living standards of the majority reach the level of, say, present-day Spain. The Pope has said that the poor cannot wait: this is the moral imperative for fighting poverty. In addition, large sectors of the middle classes, of organized civil society, do not want to wait. This is a political dimension that policy makers cannot afford to ignore. Latin Americans today are searching for an equivalent of the welfare state. The short-term adjustment costs of economic restructuring fall most heavily on the shoulders of workers in the form of unemployment, reduced wages, job insecurity, and the need for retraining. An affordable safety net will be defined by available resources. At the same time, specific policies and institutions such as legal entitlements and obliga tions, regulations, and administrative measures must remain growth friendly, as an environment dominated by the private sector requires. Even in the brightest scenarios, widespread social progress that satisfies standards of equity and rising expectations of the lower and middle classes will take decades to achieve in most Latin American countries. As Haggard and Kaufman argue, "long-term support for orthodox economic reforms can only be sustained if the population has
Edgardo B oeninger
45
reason to believe they provid e a welfare-impro ving alternative. ,, 4o In Nelson's words , "peop le need a credib le image of a reasonably attract ive ,, society . 41 Developi � g such a nation al vision requires leaders hip, . persuaSIOn, and consIs tent and sustain ed politic al-party support, as well as timely compe nsation for eventu al "losers" in the economic proces s and signific ant short-term results . �opular trust in political leadership thus becomes crucial; the way in whIch workers relate to govern ment is a critical factor in succes sful economic reform. In Latin Ameri ca, liberalizing economic reform s have been implemented most effecti vely and with the least social disrupt ion by govern ments led by preside nts and parties (or coalitio ns) with left-of center records and platforms. The succes s of these efforts is closely related to trust, to the belief among the people that such govern ments have the long-term interests of the underdog at heart. Menem , Fujimo ri, Carlos An �res Perez, and the Aylwin admini stration in Chile exempl ify thIS assertIO n. The govern ment of Nelson Mandela in South Africa is moving in the same directio n . It should also be noted that former commu nists turned social democrats have been winnin g a large number of election s in Eastern Europe. The people ' s trust in the Spanish Sociali st Workers' Party (PSOE ) has repeatedly been pointed out in the literature.42 This observation is not intended to have predictive validity ; rather, I mean to empha size the complexities of simulta neously maintai ning social peace in a democratic framework and sustain ing economic growth . The Challenges of Consolidation
Although social-equity issues pose an enormous challenge for Latin America, they are on the whole unlikely to disrupt democracy, at least in the more institutionalized regimes of the region. Consensus on democracy itself and on a market-led economy based on private property has become strong enough to survive social unrest in the foreseeable f� ture . The same cannot be said for economic growth. Instability, . dIsruptIOn, and eventual backsliding into popUlism and high inflation are the real threats to all Latin American countries, bar none. The failure of less consolidated democracies to build the institutions inherent in a mature democratic polity leaves them poorly equipped to face political conflict or social unrest. I base this forecast on the view that respect for democratic procedure is now widespread in the region. In countries with a tradition of democracy (Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica), ideological convergence stands out as the main reason for democracy' s newfound strength. Defeat in an election no longer causes the losers to fear that their fundamental values and interests will be threatened by the policies of the victors. A word of caution is required with regard to countries without
46
Latin America' s Multiple Challenges
democratic traditions. I identify them as unconsolidated regimes delegative or elective democracies in the literature--:-th�t �e � nderg�ing political transformations. The vulnerability of authont�namsn: In MexIco, . coinciding unfortunately with the recent economIC �nsis and the socioethnic uprising in Chiapas, could have a democratIC outco�e . To . do so, the necessary democratic institutions must be cons�cted m tIn:e . and unforeseen complications stemming from the compleXIty of the cnSIS must not arise. The year 1990 was a watershed in Nicaragua' s move toward democracy. The election was followed by a peaceful t�ansfer of power-the first in that country ' s history. Former guernllas w ere . . successfully integrated into the national army; then a San�mI sta . . commander in chief reduced the armed forces by two-thuds. A sIgmfi cant faction of the Sandinist National Liberation Front is moving toward the political center, as are groups previously aligned with the extre�e right. Nicaragua still faces enormous challenges in its effort to bUlld democracy, but the process is now on track. . El Salvador finally ended its civil war and brought t�e guernlla movement back into the political system. At the same tIme, It has launched an ambitious program of economic liberalization within the framework of a relatively healthy economy. Guatemala, Paraguay, and Haiti remain the region ' s most dubious cases. . It must be noted that in the countries referred to here, electIOns n si remain tainted by suspicions of fraud, and losers fea� exclu. � or reprisals from winners (certainly, many PRJ cadres are stIli unwIllmg t.o accept a transfer of power in Mexico). Nevertheless, reasonably �aIr elections do take place, and democracy-oriented reforms now rank hIgh among popular demands in most of these countries. . As democracy is consolidated, the military cellses to play . an actIve political role. Indeed, this is happening in t?�se countnes . where elections are already recognized as the only legItImate mec? an� sm for the transfer of power. In these countries, political depolarIza�IOn. has dramatically reduced the stakes for both winners and losers. InstItutIOnal attempts at coups d' etat (as opposed to the adve� t� r� sm of individual officers) can succeed only if significant groups of CIVIlIans clamor at the gates of the barracks. In some cases, such a� �hil � , the armed forces will continue to enjoy significant levels of mstItutIOnal a.ut� no�y for some time, although even here, the trend is toward dimmutIOn of power.43 . . Again , caution applies in the case of countries that are o � ly begmmng to institutionalize democracy. In Central America (Costa Rica excepted� , Ecuador, Peru, and Paraguay, military takeover is far less likely than It was a decade ago, but it still cannot be ruled out. We can exp�ct the military in these countries to play a significant political role behmd the scenes, to wield considerable veto power, and perhaps to become the
Edgardo B oeninger
47
final arbiter of politi cal confli cts . The only effective vaccin e "to keep the military at bay" is to make democracy work.44 If a fundamental conse nsus in support of democracy and the market ec onom y is emerging in Latin America, the challe nge of simul taneo usly pursuing politi cal stabil ity, sustai ned econo mic growth, and social peace becomes a question of basic governabili ty.45 Governabil ity calls for enhancing freedo m, ensuring stabil ity, produ cing prosperity, and solvin g social problem s. Democratic Institutions and Leadership
Future govern ability in Latin America depends on more effective definition and attainment of national goals, a major surge of creativity and innovative spirit, more efficient use of scarce resources, and greater responsiveness to social needs and demands. Simultaneous progress on all of these fronts will require enhanced symbiotic relationships among political, economic, and social processes and a leadership with the foresight to anticipate the inevitable contradictions and incompatibilities among the three. These democratic prerequisites relate to institution-building, the modernization of the state, or both. Latin America still has a long way to go to achieve satisfactory standards in most of these areas . Before turning to institutions, I will address the issue of majoritarian versus consociational democracy as a desirable model for the region. I have thus far singled out the emerging consensus on fundamentals as the crucial change taking place in Latin America. I have also emphasized the need for further consensus-building. These observations suggest a preference for Arend Lijphart's model of consociational democracy.46 On the other hand, the social equity issues-indeed, Latin American history itself-remind us that Latin ,a.merica remains a region of deeply divided societies. At the same time, conventional wisdom would say that effective policy making depends on effective decisions, which only a political majority can provide. Most Latin American leaders would agree that only a majoritarian democracy (in Lijphart' s terms) can overcome the entrenched interests of privileged groups, avoid stalemate, and simply get things done. Yet Lijphart disagrees with the conventional wisdom on this last point. With South Africa in mind, he has stated that a consociational or power-sharing system offers an excellent democratic solution for divided societies. He adds that consociational democracy is better suited to divided societies than majority rule-indeed, that it is the only feasible type of democracy in deeply divided countries. On the issue of decision making, the consociational model recognizes that fast, decisive action is more likely to occur in a majoritarian democracy, but allows that quick decisions are not necessarily wise ones . Perhaps this last argument is
48
Latin America ' s Multiple Challenges
intended to suggest that decisions made by a narrow majority agai.nst the wishes of significant sectors of society may not only lead to socIal and political conflict but turn out to be unsustainable � ver time : In divided societies such as those of Latin AmerIca, the sImultaneous consolidation of economic reform and promotion of social equity requires that fundamental decisions and policies stand for the long term. I do not believe that Latin America fits either of Lijphart' s models. The level of consensus achieved thus far is incomplete and fragile; it has made little headway against specific "growth versus equity" di.lemmas. There remains ample scope and need for further extensIOn and deepening of socioeconomic consensus. . Consensus, however, tends to favor the status quo. ConservatIve forces can be expected to defend privileges and entrenched interests. This is certainly the case among the upper class, but it is . also tr�e. of members of public-sector unions, employees of state enterprIses, p�lItI� al appointees, and firms that have prospered from the protectlOnIs t, . nationalistic policies of the lSI model. Consociational demo � racy .IS prejudiced against change and therefore unlikely to prosper m Latm America. An elaborate system of checks and balances, one that exceeds those necessary for the accountability of public authoriti �s, . is inhe.rent to a consociational system. At some point, such restrIctIve de :l l� es �ay become unacceptable to the political majority; thus consoClatlOnalIsm would actually increase polarization. Finally, policy making by conse.nsus inevitably decreases policy consistency ; the diverse and sometImes contradictory interests that feed sequentially into different agree��nts may lead to stalemate. This is particularly true in fragmented polItIes, where the system simply reaches no consensus whatsoever. What, then, can we expect or suggest? I would venture to say th?t consensus should be expanded to cover basic political and econom� c institutions, the rules of the game, and the policies required to sustam a dynamic process of domestic savings, priva�e . in :v estment, and innovation. It is my belief, however, that beyond thIS Illruted c � n� ensus, sustained legitimacy of the democratic system requires a deCISIveness and capacity to deliver that only a strong political majority can ens�re. The protection of minority rights by constitutional provision provIdes an alternative to consociationalism that has reduced fears of sudden, drastic changes in the rules of the game. One might call it �rocedural consociationalism. S uch is the case in Chile, where parlIamentary majorities of up to two-thirds are required to approve constitu�ional amendments on sensitive matters such as civil liberties, property rIghts, and constitutional-reform procedures themselves. Leadership has been a decisive factor in Latin A�erica's re�e �t progress . Aylwin kept to the moral high ground so crucIal for ChIle s first democratic government after an interregnum of 1 7 years. Cardoso
Edgardo Boeninger
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enj oys overall credibility. Menem has shown political aggressi veness and an unusual willingn ess to take risks; the same can be said of Fujimori. Long-term political support, however, requires a more permanent fou ndation that can be provided only by political parties. The presiden tial tradition and the authority of the executive branch of government alone have not been able to deliver sufficien t political support for parti cular policies . Nor can individu al leaders be expected to deal effectively with the complexi ties of democratic governability. Only well-dev eloped parties can be expected to ensure social support for or acquiesc ence to policies over time; this acquiescence, in turn, facilitates parties' role in providin g incumbe nt administrations with the consistent political majority required for effective governance. Politica l Parties and Eledora l Syst ems
An institutio nalized party system is understood to include the following features : continuity (measured in decades) in the system's compone nt parties, strong roots in society, nationwid e constitue ncies, reasonab le consisten cy in the parties' ideologic al positions , a party organization not dependen t on a single patron or leader, and party disciplin e that ensures that, on relevant issues, a party line can be defined and supported by members , especiall y those holding congres sional seats. Latin America ' s most politically stable and developed countries -Chile, Uruguay , Costa Rica, Argentin a, and Colombia-meet these criteria and effectively possess institutio nalized party systems, as opposed to inchoate party systems .47 Political fragility in Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Central America (with the exceptio n of Costa Rica) is closely related to the failure, so far, to institutio nalize political parties. Mexico and Paraguay face the specific challeng e of moving from one-party hegemony in an authoritarian framework to a free and fair competi tive system. What can be done to install an institutio nalized party system in the least politicall y develope d countries of the region ? To be sure, making elections more attractive for politicia ns as well as for ordinary citizens is an important compone nt of this effort. It is essential to level the playin g field and build expectati ons of free and fair elections , respected outcom es, and peaceful transfers of power. Legitimacy of elec tions-acceptan ce by the people that elections are the only mechanism for choosing political leaders and transferri ng government authority-is the bedrock on which all other domestic institutio ns are built. Creati ng power-sh aring opportun ities in provincial and local govern ments can also contribut e significa ntly to party developm ent. Finally, the proce ss of institutio nalizing a party system requires constitutional reco gnition of parties, a legal framework that regulates party organiza tion, and procedures to ensure accountability and transparency in the
50
Latin America' s Multiple Chaiienges
management of party affairs, A system of public financing for election campaigns should also be considered to reduce corrupt practices and avoid party dependency on powerful contributors, Beyond this first stage of party building, the literature next focuses on reducing the polarization and fragmentation of the party system, an observation certainly applicable to the inchoate party systems of Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador. In these countries, fragmentation has been extreme, Uruguay ' s long-institutionalized two-party (now three-party) system is also in fact highly fragmented, Party factions are numerous, largely independent of central party authority, and quite unpredictable in their political behavior. The country ' s peculiar electoral system is to a large extent responsible for this fragmentation, which inhibits governability. Thus it is not surprising that former president Luis Lacalle' s proposed legislation to privatize state enterprises was blocked in Congress and finally defeated in a national plebiscite. Incompetent government combined with party weakness in Peru reduced major parties to insignificance. Acci6n Popular (AP) and the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) fell prey to the poor performance of the Fernando Belaunde (AP) and Alan Garcia (APRA) presidencies. In turn, the United Left (IU) , which had consistently shown significant electoral strength, was unable to sever its links to extremist movements and was swept away when voters rejected the Shining Path guerrillas . With his highly personal style and popularity, Fujimori used the stable economy and the defeat of Shining Path and Revolutionary Tupac Amaru Movement terrorism to complete the job. The question now is whether Fujimori and the Peruvian political elite possess the will and clarity of vision to take institution-building seriously with regard to the party system, the role of Congress, an independent judiciary, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. Such a process is unlikely to occur under Fujimori' s leadership. By 1 990 the failure of the Cruzado Plan and an inflation rate that had soared to 1 , 500 percent deal t a fatal blow to Brazil' s Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), which had been widely expected to become a modern mass party. Prospects for the development of a party system now appear brighter, however. First, President Cardoso-unlike his predecessors-is a firm supporter of political institutions. He can be expected to use his power and prestige to facilitate a new party-building process. Second, the Workers' Party and Cardoso's Brazilian Social Democratic Party already are reasonably well structured parties on the left and center of the political spectrum. They should stimulate others to organize in opposition, Yet regional bosses still wield enormous power in Brazil' s feudal political system, though they are increasingly discredited. At this point, it is unclear whether democratic breakthrough can last. Political competition and winning elections have gained meaning in
II
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Latin America. Electoral campaigning requires organization, money, a political platform, and collective action to persuade voters and gain the trust of citizens. Only palties can accomplish this. Thus a window of opportunity has been opened despite widespread skepticism and a negative public impression of parties and politicians. Latin American All Latin American countries urgently need substantial progress in the areas of legislatures have party discipline and cohesion, enhanced traditionally been weak, and presidents technical expertise for handling substantive policy matters, and programmatic clarity. have too often Elected officials also need the willingness attempted to weaken to reach internal compromises, thereby them further. enabling factions to survi ve without the party splits that have been endemic throughout Latin American history. Effective measures governing campaign financing and organization, expanded access to mass media, the timely provision of position papers on key issues , and statute-based requirements for public commitment by candidates to the party line are some of the mechanisms party leaders can use to enforce party discipline and loyalty. The legislature is the basic institution of representative democracy, even in presidential regimes. The legislative process is, of course, crucial for policy . Furthermore, the legislature is the usual locus for party activity and political debate, because members enjoy-as does the president-the legitimacy of election by popular vote. Latin American legislatures have traditionally been weak, and presidents have too often attempted to weaken them further by withholding crucial information, by ramming bills through, or by attempting to bypass parliament altogether. This situation, however, is changing. First, concern for increasing the power of legislatures vis-a-vis the executive branch is spreading throughout the region, as is awareness that legislative majorities are crucial for the implementation of policy. To facilitate the building of consensus and coalitions and to avoid vetoes by fringe-party legislators, institutional safeguards against excessively fragmented party representa tion should be built into the electoral system. Institutional engineering is required for this purpose. On the one hand, if grassroots legitimacy is a top priority, propor tional representation would seem to be the best option. On the other hand, if the formation of a political majority in parliament is to be facilitated, a majoritarian first-past-the-post system might be preferred. The simultaneous election of the president and parliament makes divided government less likely; conversely, separate elections are more likely to produce a divided government. Fragmentation will be reduced by requiring a minimum 5 to 1 0
52
Latin America's 1vlultipie Challenges
percent of the national vote to gain legislative seats. In a multiparty system, moderate proportionality-three to five seats per district-may achieve fair representation in parliament of all parties enjoying signifi cant popular support, while avoiding fragmentation and veto power by fringe parties. The first-past-the-post majoritarian system is another option, although it leaves minorities at the mercy of the majority hardly advisable in unconsolidated democracies. Finally, the electoral system can be used to produce overrepresenta tion of minorities, thereby forcing the majority to bargain and compro mise. The present Chilean system of two members per district was designed for this purpose, as well as to push the parties into a two-bloc pattern (bipartism by forced coalitions). In Latin America, full proportionality based on democratic principles of fair representation has unfortunately prevailed in most countries. This has been the case precisely in those nations where party systems are weak and fragmented, such as Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador. In Brazil' s Sao Paulo State, a deputy to the National Congress can be elected with 1 .7 percent of the regional vote because districts are large and no national threshold has been established. Electoral reform is a necessity; experience, however, shows that it is extremely difficult to achieve. Whatever the drawbacks of a system, a majority of incumbents usually feel threatened by reform and predictably oppose any change, establishing across-the-aisle coalitions if need be. I believe a combination of some kind of majoritarian system and constitutional protection for the rights of minorities to be well suited to Latin American conditions. At the operational level, a large number of programs sponsored by the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the U.S . Agency for International Development are being implemented to strengthen legislatures across the region. These programs promote the flow of information; j udgments on the merits of bills provided by politically trustworthy and technically competent advisers; consultation with experts and interest groups; and well-established routines, rules, and procedures for the operation of parliamentary committees and plenary sessions, the approval of bills, and the settlement of disputes. The Regime Debate
The debate between advocates of presidential systems and advocates of parliamentary systems is closely related to the issues discussed above. With few exceptions, Latin American countries are and have always been presidential. The parliamentary option has recently appeared on the public agenda in several countries of the region. The theoretical arguments favoring a parliamentary system are convincingly strong ; its capacity to solve crises by dissolving parliament and calling for new
Edgardo Boeninger
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elections and its ability to facilitate coalitions are especially attractive qualities.48 Given the region ' s presidential tradition, the historical weakness of parties and legislatures, and the military factor,49 a shift toward parliamentary systems is unlikely. Indeed, the public perception that presidents are statesmen with their country ' s interests at heart and the fact that parliaments are held in low esteem (albeit often unfairly) would make any attempt to move toward a parliamentary system in Latin America controversial. Only in Costa Rica and Chile do parties come close to meeting the standards required under a parliamentary system. The counterargument is that it is precisely a parliamentary framework that can exert on parties the kind of pressure needed to modernize rapidly. This is one possibility, but party c;liscipline and loyalty do not develop overnight. It would also be fair to say that ideological and political depolariza tion has already bee'n crucial in creating opportunities for stable democratic government within a presidential framework, as borne out by the Chilean Coalition of Parties for Democracy (La Concertaci6n), the Menem administration in Argentina, and the governments of Costa Rica and Colombia. I believe, however, that the issue of regime type will eventually resurface on the agenda, at least in the politically more sophisticated countries of the region . There is in presidential regimes an inherent tension among the executive, the parties, and the legislature that can lead to political stalemate and confrontation. A parliamentary system provides an automatic solution to these issues: parliament is the locus of political authority, a certain number of legislators become the executive, and leadership of parties is necessarily transferred to the legislature. Furthermore, the career prospects of legislative backbenchers are improved, as they can expect to rise through the ranks to become senior members of the cabinet. It has become fashionable among Latin American neoiiberaI economists, business leaders, and "independent" candidates for office (usually running on antipolitical and antiparty platforms) to blame policy failures or shortfalls on the self-interested and shortsighted behavior of politicians. This perception that economic reform and sound policy are simply a matter of giving competent technocrats a free hand to do "what has to be done" has led to the recent recommendation that political power be granted to technopols.5o The technopol concept seeks to isolate decision makers from social demands and interest-group pressures that are incompatible with available resources and sound policy judgments. But the appointment of technopols simply does not fit into the democratic political process. A more realistic and politically feasible alternative is found in what I call "protective institutions." For example, Latin American countries have increasingly granted autonomy to central banks, either through the constitution or by law. In Chile, the constitution provides that only the
54
Latin America' s Muitipie ChaHenges
president can initiate bills involving tax reform, increases in public salary levels and pensions, or new jobs in the administration. The legislature has the right to reduce expenditures or delete items from the annual budget, but it has no power to increase disbursements. I recommend another consensus-building device to help cushion social demands and contain populist pressures: tripartite forums of business associations, unions, and relevant government officials would create a setting for representatives of each group to discuss such matters of mutual concern as minimum wage, inflation-related salary and pension adjustments, and labor legislation. The Judiciary
The rule of law and an autonomous, effective, and honest judiciary are universally recognized as essential to democratic stability, economic development, and social equity. Latin America' s shortcomings in this area are widespread and often severe. The people have a strong feeling that the law does not apply equally to all; some people are above the law.51 In the first place, democratic consolidation is incompatible with the levels of human rights abuses prevalent in many of the fragile regimes of this region. An effectively independent judiciary is a basic require ment if human rights are to be protected. International pressure and the external intervention in domestic affairs that is now deemed legitimate when human rights are concerned will continue to accelerate progress in this area. But worldwide experience shows that authoritarian regimes are seldom fully accountable for past violations, even after the regimes have passed from power. I believe that full-scale attempts at punishment are not advisable; wounds of the past must be allowed to heal, and military institutions retain residual de facto power. Second, an independent judiciary and other enforcement agencies are indispensable to preventing and eradicating corruption. It is worth noting that Chile' s well-founded reputation as the Latin American country with the lowest levels of corruption in connection with public employees, the police, business affairs, and tax compliance owes a great deal to the country' s legalistic tradition-a respect for the law that can be traced well back into the nineteenth century. As Edgardo Buscaglia and Marfa Dakolias have said, "there is ample evidence that the lower the social status of the potential claimant, the less the likelihood that formal channels of dispute solution will be resorted to."52 Geographical and "cultural" distance of significant sectors of the population from legal structures, courts, and judges may bar people' s access to the judiciary;53 other barriers include high litigation costs, delays and backlogs produced by outdated procedures, and, in some cases, outright corruption.54 Judiciary reform should include equity-
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enhancing components such as public defenders, state-subsidized legal aid, tribunals at the neighborhood level , tribunals for family affairs, and similar institutional arrangements based on simple and flexible proce dures. The legal framework that supports the prevailing market-led economic systems of the region is nominally based on individual property rights. But markets do not emerge when rules concerning the ownership and exchange of tangible and intangible assets are not adequately defined and enforced because of either substantive or procedural failures.55 A market-compatible judicial system must be put into place for this purpose. Successful reform also requires the establishment or strengthen ing of a career judiciary, an increase in salary levels, merit-based promotion standards, and, most important, a nomination process for judges that protects autonomy. Broad consensus on these matters appears to be emerging in many Latin American countries. The issues currently being debated are not likely to be politically divisive. Perhaps the most formidable barriers to reform are the corporate interests and the conservative bias of incumbent supreme-court judges. I believe, however, that the discontent of the population with the growing threat of institutional decay from corruption, the crime wave in the cities, and the spread of drug addiction and trafficking is having a salutary effect on political elites. Decentralization and Modernization of the State
Decentralization and devolution-the transfer of responsibility, authority, and resources from the government to the private sector, including nongovernmental organizations, and from national government to local and provincial levels of administration-is an inevitable part of the process of increased participation in derrlocracy. Without caution, however, this could backfire through increases in inefficiency, patronage, and corruption. Many countries of the region bear witness to the risks involved in hastily implemented decentralization : In Argentina, provincial governments' misuse of financial authority contributed decisively to fiscal deficits, heavy losses by state enterprises, and runaway inflation. In Brazil, regional feudalism has been a source of chronic fiscal deficits . Socialist and other progressive thinkers and politicians have now turned to the empowerment of civil society as a substitute for former reliance on the state. Indeed, progressives conceive of decentralization and social participation as a countervailing power to the big-business interests they so deeply mistrust. Thus decentralization measures play a significant role in consensus-building because they elicit support from diverse groups for different reasons ; they also soften otherwise adversarial attitudes toward private enterprise and central political authority.
56
Latin America's M uitipie Chaiienges
Substantial agreement has developed that the region needs a smaller but stronger state,56 Although neoliberals rhetorically advocate a minimal state, mainstream political thinking shares a more balanced view of the contemporary state' s role and requirements, The most critical factor for strengthening the public sector is the state's ability to attract and retain a nucleus of expert, Latin American countries have yet to competent professionals to cope with the increasing complexities of economic, social, replace traditional and political issues. No Latin American patronage systems has adequately dealt with this country with an effective problem. In the first place, the popular career-oriented civil desire for a single salary scale for all service. public employees and the strict limitations of budget constraints make it difficult to pay technocrats competitive salaries. Sec ond, Latin American countries have yet to replace traditional patronage systems, in which promotion is based on length of service, with an effective career-oriented civil service, in which promotion is based on performance. Efforts to modernize the state cannot make much headway until a strong public sector has been firmly established. In some cases, matters may even be becoming worse: when faced with unavoidable fiscal adjustments, many governments choose to reduce salaries rather than staff. A coherent decision-making process is a key component of modern ization. I will not dwell on the flow of information and related managerial aspects, but I would like to emphasize the importance of an element mostly ignored in the literature: effective interplay and integration of political and techno-economic factors in policy making. Chile offers a case of a deliberate attempt to institutionalize consultative mechanisms among government officials-including political appointees, top-level technocrats, and relevant party and legislative leaders-on issues of significance. This process increases politicians' understanding of economic and technical considerations and enhances political sensitivity and awareness among technocrats. The Aylwin administration placed particular emphasis on the establishment of a solid alliance-with full support from the president-between the minister responsible for economic policy and senior members of the cabinet in charge of political affairs.57 Effective state modernization requires the establishment of mecha nisms and institutions that prevent and resolve conflict by integrating various political and techno-economic actors into a single policy-making or bargaining process. In Chile, programmatic and political coordination have been entrusted to a single ministry, which has thus become the main locus for systematic integration of the technical and political
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dimensions of policy issues.58 I believe this arrangement was responsible for creating an environment attractive to the private sector, a key factor in explaining the high rates of investment achieved by that country. The technical capacity for sound economic policy making has already improved impressively in Latin America. Policy makers are significantly freer fr�m p � litical pressure, at least in some key areas. Unfortunately, the regIOn stIli suffers from chronic fiscal deficits. Taxation is bound to be a contentious issue. Neoliberal economists conservative politicians, and the business community advocate reducin� taxes drastically, especially income taxes, while cutting costs across the board and producing revenue through privatization. Parties of the center-left, as well as unions, strongly oppose such policies. Indeed, progressives feel that, even with present tax levels, the wealthy do not bear their fair share of the cost of equity-oriented social programs. Latin American countries have failed to enforce tax compliance and eliminate loopholes. Income taxes are unlikely to be repealed or cut sharply. In my view, tax reductions are undesirable in Latin America because of their political significance as the most direct and visible contribution to social equity by the well-to-do. On the other hand, a tax system friendly to savings and investment is hardly compatible with high income-tax rates. An effective pattern of redistributive expenditures should be expected to take care of the budget's contribution to equity ; income will be generated mainly from broad-based indirect taxes such as the value-added tax. This tax has consistently enabled Chile to achieve a fiscal surplus; it is the only country in the region to have done so. Perhaps more important, the debate over the role of the state in the growth process is still very much alive. Inputs derive from the laissez faire arguments of neoliberals, the protectionist bias of farmers and other interest groups, and the preference of many economists and political leaders for East Asian models, which selectively support some industries as prospective economic "winners" through a wide range of subsidies and incentives. With regard to this last option, I would stress that for intervention to be successful it must remain selective. Unfortunately, in Latin America's cultural and political environment such policies have led to generalized, lasting subsidies. Privatization of state enterprises is taking place on a large scale in many Latin American countries, although the extent and pace of this process vary greatly, as does political resistance to it. Argentina, Peru, and Mexico have undertaken massive privatization schemes with scant opposition, and Brazil appears to be following suit. An ambitious privatization plan in Uruguay, on the other hand, was derailed in 1 990 through a national plebiscite. The Bolivian government also faces political and public-sector union opposition to privatization. In Chile, where substantial privatizations are already complete, further efforts to
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Latin America' s tv1ultiple Challenges
privatize such sensitive industries as the national copper company and water utilities either have been rejected outright or remain a subject of heated debate. I believe that in countries where the number and size of state-owned companies is significant and budget deficits are high, extensive privatization is inevitable. Nevertheless, political factors-ranging from ideological rejection of profit motives in areas of basic social services to the vested interests of powerful public-sector unions-may lead to different outcomes and compromise solutions such as associations between the state and private enterprises. In any case, privatization should never become a substitute for an effective tax system. Such a policy would lead to renewed fiscal deficits once revenues from privatization were exhausted. As the entrepreneurial state yields ground, the demand for an effective public regulatory framework grows. Public regulation is particularly relevant to privatized monopolies and activities that are strongly concentrated in a few large companies. It is not only necessary to safeguard and promote competition and protect the consumer; public regulation is a prerequisite for political consensus. Ideological prejudices, nostalgia for state interventionism, and self-interested union demands fuel widespread fears of economic domination and arbitrary conduct by powerful private conglomerates . A balanced regulatory framework is one that safeguards both competition and equity while avoiding neointerventionist measures that impede the effective functioning of markets. To implement such a framework, supervisory power must be delegated to autonomous public agencies ; safeguards against arbitrary administrative decisions must be built in. Accountability and transparency are essential to institutional arrangements in this field.
Labor L egislation and S ocial Security Labor legislation and social security are perhaps the most sensitive areas of social policy and state regulation. Latin America can expect to face tough conflicts between growth and equity in these fields . Current conditions range from unregulated labor markets with almost no protective network to sophisticated, deficit-producing social legislation and rigid labor laws that safeguard job security, particularly in the public sector. In an open economy, employment fundamentally depends on competitiveness. The business sector rightly stresses the need for flexible labor markets. Workers, on the other hand, correctly point out that they bear the main costs of unemployment and retraining that result from companies ' adjustments to new market opportunities and shifting comparative advantages. Workers feel that the rights to strike, bargain
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collectively, and organize unions are essential components of equity based legislation. Union leaders and politicians must be educated further on the hard facts of economics before more progress in this area can be made. At the same time, businesses would be misguided to push their demands for a free hand in labor relations to extremes. In the long run, this would only escalate workers ' politically supported demands for power sharin g and for state i ntervention and control measures. Difficult choices and trade-offs now confront the more developed countries of the region. Governments throughout the region face the resolute opposition of public-sector unions to any reforms that threaten job security and related privileges. Only imaginative solutions will enhance growth and equity simultaneously . For instance, some kind of unemployment-insurance scheme may be a creative option that preserves market flexibility and improves workers' income security. I would in this regard stress the potential of private pension funds to go beyond their primary purpose of replacing deficit-ridden conventional social-security plans previously managed by the state. In Chile, these funds have already become the largest and fastest-growing source of domestic savings . This process leads to an increasingly diversified investment portfolio, eventually extending to shares of large, profitable private corporations, including foreign firms. I believe that such a process supports both equity and consensus because it gradually gives millions of citizens access to the ownership of corporations, thereby democratizing the distribution of assets. At the same time, diversification gives ordinary people a stake in the profits of private enterprise and therefore a shared interest in the success of the market economy. For the delivery of social services, as well as poverty-reduction programs, policy-making power should remain in the hands of the state. Increasing the efficiency of these services is likely to require an increase in participation by the private sector. To a l arge extent, the failure of social policies in Latin America is attributable to faulty resource allocation and general governmental inefficiency . The problem of how to reach the poor effectively remains unsolved, despite some encouraging results achieved by focused indicator-linked programs such as Solidari dad in Mexico and FOSIS in Chile, and various social investment funds. 59
Education Primary and secondary education warrant mention . First, increased productivity and sustained growth depend on better education . Second, education is the most effective tool in the pursuit of equality of opportunity. Policies equalizing educational quality between schools in rich and poor neighborhoods, in urban and rural settings, and across ethnic communities must be formulated. Finally, civic education is the
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most effective means of spreading and strengthening democratic values . International comparisons show that access to and quality of education in Latin America lag far behind conditions in Southeast Asia. This applies even to countries such as Argentina and Chile, which reputedly enjoy the highest educational standards in the region. The emergence of the global information-based society will catch Latin America at a costly disadvantage if educational practices do not improve in the coming decade. Increases in know-how that lead to higher productivity and wages that remain lower but do not decline relative to those in developed nations represent an unbeatable equity-friendly combination that supports international competitiveness and economic growth.60 A sobering indicator should be noted, however: South Korean wages were only a fraction of those in Latin America in 1 960. Today they are significantly higher. Declining or stagnant wages are not politically or socially feasible options for development in democratic Latin America. If the region succeeds in educational, training, and retraining reform, it will have taken a giant stride forward. This essay ' s cautious optimism implicitly assumes a reasonably stable, investment-friendly, and trade-enhancing global environment. A major international political crisis, recession, turbulence in financial markets and capital flows, or widespread trade war would have a devastating impact on a still-fragile region whose sustained growth-and hence long term prospects for democratization-increasingly depends on integration into the world economy. NOTES I . For a comprehensive analysis, see Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman. eds . . The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1 992). 2. See Stephall Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca. N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1 990). 3. S amuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave : Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman : University of Oklahoma Press , 1 99 1 ), 1 3-26 and 290-94. 4. See Guillermo O' Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1 97 3 ) . O' Donnell presents the view that military coups in the 1 960s and 1 970s, at least those in Argentina and Brazil, should be seen as expressing the political strategy of a military-business coalition that relied on authoritarianism to deepen lSI by keeping labor costs down . 5. See Huntington, The Third Wave, 1 24-40. Huntington divides transition processes into "transformations," "replacements," and "transplacements ." In transformation , democratization is initiated by the leaders of the old authoritarian regime; in replacement, the authoritarian regime coll apses or is overthrown by the opposition; fin ally, in transplacement, the transition results from the combined actions of government and opposition . 6. It is widely believed that the MalvinaslFalkland war was initially conceived as a diversion from domestic ills that would mobilize the people in patriotic support of the regime.
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61
7 . Huntington, The Third Wave. 1 42-52.
8 . Ibid. . 1 09-64. 9 . If the economy was strong, why did the Chilean military accept the transition to de � ocracy? The answer, p �culiar to the Chilean process. is related to the global changes takIng plac� In LatIn Amenca during the 1 9 80s and early 1 990s . Chile's political culture and InstItutIOns also played a decisive role in the transition. The democratic and legalistic tradmon of the country pushed the military to enact a constitution in 1 980 that provided for a plebISCIte eIght years later on whether the military (presumably Pinochet himself) would retam power for another eight years or free elections for the president and Congress would take place one year l ater. This formula wa' conceived as a rubber stamp to sidestep the apparent lack ?f legitimacy of a 1 6-year term. Things did not, however, work out that way. The liberalizatIOn forced upon the regime by the 1 9 8 2 crisis enabled social organizations, and later political parties, to lead the electoral challenge. Success was attnbutable to party organization and the mobilization of voters, with the crucial assistance of the National Endowment for Democracy and other groups in establishing effective ' independent vote-counting controls. 1 0 . Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave OverT ' Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1 996) ' .. 20-37. 1 1 . Ibid . , 29-3 1 . 1 2 . Guillermo O' Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Joumal of . Democracy 5 (January 1 994): 55-69. 1 3 . Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" 29. 14 . Larry Diamond, "Democracy in Latin A merica," in Tom Farer, ed . . Beyond . Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 996). 53. 15. For an extensive discussion, see Edgardo Boeni nger, "Reform a y modernizaci6n del estado en A merica latina" (unpubl. ms . , Inter-American Development Bank, Mexico City, 1 994). See also Edgardo Boeninger, "The 1 994 Hemispheric Policy Forum" (paper prese � ted at the conference "Prospects for Democracy in Latin America, " Institute of the Amencas, La Jolla, Calif. , March 1 994), 3 . 1 6 . According t o Enrique Iglesias , president o f the Inter-American Development Bank, . ChIle' s success m ade that country a significant role model . See Iglesias, "Economic . Reform: A VIew from Latin A merica," in John Williamson , ed . , The Political Economy of Policy Reform (\Vashjngton, D . C . : Institute for International Economics 1 994) , ' 49 1-50 1 . 1 7 . See Dieter Noh len and Bernard Thlbaut, "Investigaci6n Sobre America Latina" (Arbeltspapier I I UniverSIty of Heidelberg, Instltut ftir Pohtische Wissenschaft 1 994) , ' 1 7-1 8 . 1 8 . Iglesias, "Economic Reform," 495. 1 9. See Nohlen and Thibaut, "Investigaci6n Sobre America Latina," 14. 20. Philippe Schmitter and Guillermo O' Donnell, as quoted by Nohlen and Thibaut, suggest two stages to the transition process : first, political transition to a democratic regIme, and second, development of a strong egalitarian social order. See ibid . , 2 3 . 2 1 . S e e Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Markel (Cambridge: Cambridge UOIvers � ty Press, 1 9 9 1 ) , for an extensive and insightful comparison of political and economIc reforms In Eastern Europe and Latin America. 22. In Diamond ' s words, three things are different today : Military establishments are extremely reluctant to seize power overtly (I would say they are in no position to do so), democ racy IS a vahd goal, and no antidemocratic ideology with global appeal has emerged. . . See DIamond, "Is the Thlfd Wave OverT' 3 1 -32.
Latin America ' s iviultiple Challenges
62
23.
See
John
Williamson,
"In
Search of a Manual
for Technopols,"
and
John
Williamson and Stephan Haggard, "The Political Conditions for Economic Reform," in Williamson, ed . , The Political Economy of Policy Reform, 1 1 -28 and 527-30, respectively, as well as comments by several contributors.
24. Stephan Haggard and Robert R . Kaufman, "Institutions and Economic Adjustment," i n Haggard and Kaufman, eds . , The Politics of Economic Adjustment, 32. 2 5 . Barbara Geddes, "Challenging the Conventional Wisdom," i n Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Economic R�form and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1 995), 63-64.
of Macroeconomic Policy and Fiscal Reforms," in Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb, eds. , Voting for Reform (Oxford :
26.
See Alberto Alsina,
"Political
Models
Oxford University Press, 1 994), 46 .
2 7 . See Jeffrey Sachs, "Life in the Economic Emergency Room," in Williamson , ed.,
The Political Economy of Policy Reform, 5 0 1 -2 5 . 2 8 . Geddes, "Challenging t h e Conventional Wisdom," 63-6 8 .
30. See Haggard and Kaufman, eds. , The Politics of Economic Adjustment, for an
extensive analysis of reforms in Venezuela, Mexico, and other Latin American countries. See also Haggard and Webb, eds . , Voting for Reform.
3 1 . The politically motivated murder of Luis Donaldo Colosio, the PRI presidential Chiapas candidate who was an outspoken proponent of democratic reform, along with the ged the uprising, which signaled the end of the PRI era of social peace, drastically chan . polItIcal, expectations of foreign and domestic investors . These events compounded a deep democratic economic, and social crisis that can at this point be solved only within a more framework . Democracy, however, does not in itsel f guarantee success in Mexico . 3 2 . Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, "Economic Adjustment and the Prospects
for Democracy," in Haggard and Kaufman, eds . , The Politics of Economic Adjustment, 32 1 .
3 3 . Ibid .
Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 993), 27-70.
3 5 . Joan Nelson, "Linkages Between Politics and Economics," in Diamond and Plattner,
eds . , Economic Reform. and Democracy, 54-5 5 .
3 6 . For a n extensive discussion o f safety nets, see Carol Graham, "The Politics of
Safety Nets," in Diamond and Plattner, eds . , Economic Reform and Democracy, 2 1 1 -25.
3 7 . See Joan Nelson ' s contribution to the "Panel Discussion," in Williamson, ed . , The
Political Economy of Policy Reform, 472-7 7 . 3 8 . Robert H . B ates, "Comment o n 'In Search of a Manual for Technopols, ' "
in
Williamson, e d . • The Political Economy of Policy Reform, 3 3 .
3 9 . See Przeworski, Democracy and the Market. 1 7 4-9 1 . for a n insightful analysis of
the significance of equity and distributive considerations for democratic prospects in Eastern Europe. See
43 . In Chile, the institutional safety valves left in place by the Pinochet regime were 1. 0tend ed to protect mI lI tary leaders from prosecution for human rights violations. Milit leaders are n o lon ger political actors i n any other sense. Certainly domestic-int ellige functIOns have been transferred to civilian bodies accountable to the executive. In Col ombl �, the military is indispensab le in the war on drug traffickers. The military has also r� galned Its backstage role I n Venezuela since the popular rejection of corruption and the cnSls of the party system have weakened democratic institutions .
:::;;;
44. Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America," 9 1 . 45. Governability i s the term most widely used i n Latin America. I believe i t adds to
th e concept of governance a more explicit consideration of sociopolitical variables .
Haggard
and
Kaufman.
"Economic
Adjustment
� ee
�6 .
Arend
P.
Lijphart, "Democracies :
Forms,
Performance and Constitutional
Englneenng, " European Journal f
4 7 . This ection draws upon t h e extensive. well-documented discussion of Latin � Amencan partIes p esented in Scott M ainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds . , Building � . DemocratIc InsfltutlOns: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University
48. See Juan J . Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds . , The Failure "f Presidential Democracy, vo!. I , Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1 994). See also Arturo Valenzuela, "The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes," in Valen zuela, ed., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America (Baltimore: Johns . HopkinS UmvefSlty Press, 1 97 8 ) ; and Arend Lijphart, ed.. Parliamentary versus . Presldelltlal Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 992). 49. The military is more likely to respect a head of state, the president of all citizens, . than a partIsan head of government, as a prime minister would be considered. 50. See Williamson, "In Search of a Manual for Technopols," 20. 5 1 . Pilar Domingo, "The Judiciary and Rule of Law in Latin America" (unpubl . ms . , CIDE, Mexico City, February 1 995), 2. Edgardo
52.
3 4 . World B ank, The East Asian
63
Press , 1 995). See also Arend P. Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Reforms: A Study "f Twenty-seven DemocraCies, 1945-1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 994).
29. Developments in Venezuela remai n unpredictable.
40.
Edgardo Boeninger
and
the
Prospects
for
Democracy," 3 1 9-50, for a discussion of tensions between capitalism and democracy 10 the Third World as well as the sequence of political and economic reforms.
4 1 . See Nelson ' s contribution to the " Panel Discussion," in Williamson , e d . , The
Political Economy of Policy Reform, 477 . 42. Strong competition finally ended the PSOE era in Spain with the 1 996 elections.
B u scaglia a n d Maria Dakolias,
"Judicial
Reform in Latin America'
�
Economic Efficiency vs. Institutional Inertia" (unpub! . ms .. Latin American an d Caribbea
Law and Economic Association, 1 99 5 ) .
5 3 . Domingo, " T h e Judiciary and R u l e of Law in Latin America," 2 7 . 54. Ibid" 8-10.
2 1 . S e e a l s o B uscaglia Wid Dakolias. "judiciai Refonn in Latin America,"
5 5 . B uscaglia and Dakolias. "Judicial Reform i n Latin America," 5.
:
56. or an extensive and coherent analysis of the smaller but stronger state, see Moises , , Latin A menca: The Second Stage of Reform," i n Diamond and Plattner, eds . . Nalm,
EconomIc Reform and Democracy, 28-44. 57. Boeninger, "Reforma y modernizaci6n del estado en America latina," 25-26 . 5 8 . Ibid . , 1 0. 5 9 . FOS IS ("Fondo de S o l aridad") is an autonomous public agency created in 1 990 that
supports the development of microenterprises.
60 .
.
Joseph
Grunwald ,
"Reflections
on
Promoting
Prosperity
Through
Economic
IntegratIOn and Free Trade i n the Western Hemisphere" (unpu b ! ' m s . , University of Miami ' North-South Center, March 1 995), 5 .
Michael McFaul
3 RUSSIA'S ROUGH RIDE Michael McFaul
Michael McFaul is assistant professor of political science at Stanford University. He is also a research fellow at the Center for International Security and A rms Control and at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, as well as a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Among his books is Post-Communist Politics : Democratic Prospects in Russia and Eastern Europe (1 993).
At first
glance, the process of democratic transition and consolidation in Russia-and the postcommunist world in general-seems similar to that in other countries that are part of the "third wave" of democratiza tion. The descriptive discourse of "transitplogy" efficiently identifies the actors, actions, and accidents of postcommunist regime transformations. Scholars already have successfully used concepts from Latin America and Southern Europe such as liberalization, "hard-liners vs. soft-liners," "reforma vs. ruptura," pacts, and founding elections to describe communist regime change. I These developments have brought the study of the former communist world into the mainstream, if not the cutting edge, of comparative politics . A survey of the postcommunist world, however, reveals several deviations from the standard models of transition and consolidation, as well as a wide variatio n of outcomes regarding regime type.2 The farther east one goes, the less fitting the democratic transition and consolidation models become. On the western frontier of the former communist world, regimes in East Central Europe-particularly Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic-closely resemble emergent democracies elsewhere. Countries on the eastern frontier appear to be on an entirely different trajectory. Rigged elections in Kazakhstan, repression of political parties in Uzbekistan, and civil war in Tajikistan suggest that the collapse of communism by no means leads automatically to a democratic transition. In fact, the divergence i n regime type between east and west i n the former communist world today suggests that other variables, such as
65
socioeconomic development, culture, geography, and religion, may have more influence on the type of regime than the strategic and institutional variables traditionally associated with "transitology" and "consolidology ." So where does Russia stand? Is Russia more like Hungary or Uzbekistan ? Is it leaning toward consolidation of nascent democratic institutions , or creeping toward its "traditional" authoritarian roots ? An assessment of the prospects for democratic consolidation in Russia should downplay the exceptional cultural, historical, and geographic variables involved and highlight Russia' s structural and strategic differences from the standard pattern. Two of these differences are particularly significant. First, Russia began its transition from a different starting point. Specific features of communism-most notably the lack of private property and the consequent absence of independent political, economic, and civil societies, coupled with the multinational configura tion of the S oviet regime-made transition a qualitatively larger project in Russia than in noncommunist states . Whereas most countries in transition seek to change only the system of governance, Russia had to create a new state, a new political system , and a new economic system simultaneously . Second, Russia' s mode of transition differed from the standard. Instead of a negotiated settlement between the old and new elites for governing a single territory, Russia' s revolutionary transition featured a polarized standoff involving competing notions of sovereignty for the same territory . This period of transition ended only after one side defeated the other, and in doing so divided the ancien regime into 1 5 new states . The socioeconomic legacy of communism and the revolutionary nature of the transition have created a set of problems for democratic consolidation in Russia different from that encountered by noncommunist countries. Russia ' s communist legacy and type of transition do not preordain a particular path of regime emergence or consolidation. Rather, this historical legacy outlines the parameters within which strategic decisions about institutional configuration must be made.3 In other words, path dependency is the first but not the only variable shaping postcommunist regime consolidation.4 Russia' s democratic consolidation is best understood by tracing the process by which the large, structural variable of Russia ' s communist legacy and the imprint of Russia's revolutionary transitions interact with the more proximate, strategic variables regarding decisions about institutional design .
The Ancien Regime Two features distinguish the ancien regime from which Russia' s new polity emerged. First, the new state was created from the remains of a deposed regime.s While transitions in Latin America and Southern
66
Russia ' s Rough Ride
Europe began and ended within the same territories, Russia' s transition involved a second component-national liberation from the Soviet Union. The absence or extreme weakness of a Russian state administration, a Russian polity, or a Russian national identity created additional questions to be resolved before transition or consolidation could occur. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union, a necessary condition for Russia' s democratic transition, confused the border lines between and within the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union . As has been tragically demonstrated in Chechnya, these ambiguities of territorial integrity have impeded democratic consolidation in Russia.6 Second, the Soviet regime was totalitarian in design. Authoritarian states in Latin America, Southern Europe, Asia, and most of Africa did not attempt to control all social , political , and economic activity within their borders. Communist states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union did. In the Soviet Union ' s most successful manifestation-under Stalin-totalitarianism was achieved . Other regimes in Eastern Europe, and post-Stalinist regimes in the Soviet Union , were less effective in achieving total control over all activity, provoking many analysts of the region to abandon the totalitarian model entirely. Despite an abatement of totalitarian methods and a bureaucratization of party-state power, communist regimes never evolved into polities and economies like those of the West or the South. In striking contrast to noncommunist regimes, communist countries retained no separation between government and regime, little distinction between polity and economy, and only slight separation of state and society. Even the most ruthless authoritarian regimes in the noncommu nist world did not appropriate all the means of production. Likewise, none of these authoritarian regimes fully suppressed or controlled all units of civil society .7 Like communist regimes, nOQcommunist authori tarian regimes did sometimes blur the distinction between regime and government. Such confusions, however, were often only temporary. When the authoritarian regime collapsed or withdrew, the skeleton of state institutions and the basic organizations of civil society were often suitable for supporting a democratic regime. This was not the case for postcommunist states. S tate institutions in noncommunist authoritarian regimes also supported a market economy based on private-property rights. Thus noncommunist societies were organized like capitalist market systems. In some cases, economic reform has accompanied as well as precipitated transitions to democracy in capitalist economies, but never was economic transformation on the agenda.8 This point of departure for democratic transition provided Russia and other communist regimes with different paths to a new regime type.9 Evolutionary reform was not an option . lO While it is possible to conceive of a non authoritarian regime in which the economy and society are
67
Michaei McFaui
controlled and administered by the state, neither liberal democratic theory nor empirical reality has posited such a regime. Political change in a totalitarian state meant total change of all aspects of social and economic organization.
Revolutionary Transition Research on democratic transition in noncommunist regimes posits that regime failure produces a crisis of confidence within the ruling body , which in turn leads to a split between "hard-liners ," who seek to maintain the status quo, and "soft-liners," who seek to reform the authoritarian regime. I I Once this cleavage crystallizes, the soft-liners then seek allies within the moderate wing of the opposition . I 2 With these moderates, and to the exclusion of radical forces in society, the liberal wing of the ruling regime then negotiates an evolutionary and controlled transition from authoritarian rule. Not all transitions from authoritarian rule have been "pacted," but the majority of successful transitions to democratic rule have included some transitional agreement between competing political forces. The Soviet case initially followed this sequence. By the end of the 1 970s, the flaws of the Soviet regime seemed apparent. After the death of Konstantin Chernenko in 1 98 5 , regime failure seemed to produce a split between soft-liners, led by Mikhail Gorbachev, and hard-liners, represented first by Giorgy Romanov and later by Yegor Ligachev. Gorbachev ' s liberalization of society, which followed the formation of these two opposing camps, appeared to have many of the characteristics exhibited by liberalization periods in noncommunist regimes. I 3 The next expected stage o f transition , however, did not occur. Rather than producing cleavages between soft-liners and hard-liners within the ancien reJ;!ime on the one hand, and between moderates an d radicals within so �iety on the other, liberalization in Russia led to polarization between the S oviet state and Russian society. Societal organizations that formed during this period initially allied with Gorbachev against the hard-liners within the Soviet party-state. By 1 990, however, these same organizations, led by Boris Yeltsin and Democratic Russia, turned against Gorbachev when the Soviet leader refused to back their "revolutionary" calls for national sovereignty, market capitalism, and liberal democracy. Gorbachev ' s reaction against Russia's "democrats" produced a political stalemate in which both sides refused to negotiate new political rules . The standoff culminated in August 1 99 1 . when Boris Yeltsin and Russi a ' s democratic movement won. This mode of transition-confrontational rather than negotiated, revolutionary rather than evolutionary-differed in several important ways from the "standard model" of democratic transition. 14 First, Russia' s transition generated a greater level of uncertainty and ambiguity
68
Russia' s Rough Ride
concerning the transition process. In all transitions, the rules of the game that define the parameters of political competition become uncertain. I5 Nonrevolutionary transitions, however, are more predictable than revolutionary transformations in several important respects. For instance, basic functions and boundaries of state institutions are often negotiated between the old rulers and the new democratic challengers, spelled out, and codified before the polity is expanded to accommodate wider contests . If the incumbent authoritarian regime is still relatively cohesive and powerful, it can dictate many of the rules to the other political actors. In countries where the outgoing regime is not so strong, pacts often result. Typically , soft-liners seek out cooperative, moderate actors within the opposition to develop a "first-order understanding-the ,, foundation for eventual pacts. 16 In the SovietlRussian transition, however, no rules were negotiated to delineate the path from old to new. Rather, multiple actors claimed sovereignty over the same territory. This ended when one side, led by Boris Yeltsin, finally took power from the other-Gorbachev ' s Soviet regime-in a moment of high uncertainty soon after the August 1 99 1 putsch. This mode o f transition left many of the rules of the game ambiguous, uncodified, and subject to constant manipulation . I7 Was the Soviet president the head of state, or was the Russian president the true holder of executive power? Should the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) be considered one among many political parties, or is it better understood as a criminal organization that had imprisoned the nations located within Soviet territory? Most important, where were the borders of the new state? Russia' s revolutionary mode of transition challenged not only the existing political regime, but the economic system as well. Of course, during transitions in noncommunist regimes, many democratic move ments have introduced economic issues into the negotiation process . During noncommunist democratic transitions, however, the entire economic system was never challenged. On the contrary, it is an implicit rule in nonrevolutionary transitions that the organization of property rights is not challenged. As Adam Przeworski has observed, "We cannot avoid the possibility that a transition to democracy can be made only at the cost of leaving economic relations intact, not only the structure of production but even the distribution of income." 1 8 I n Russia' s transition , though, economic transformation became a central item on the agenda. By 1 990, the abject failure of the Soviet command system (and the attempts to reform this system under Gorbachev) catalyzed popul ar demand for radical economic transforma tion. By the end of 1 990, lack of agreement on a new economic model crystallized into another issue of polarization between moderate reformers within the regime and radical challengers from without. I9 When the ancien regime collapsed in August 1 99 1 , the challengers were
Michael IvtcFaul
69
given the opportunity to pursue economic transformation and political change simultaneously.
A Com p licated Process In democratization in Latin America and Southern Europe, the rules of the game negotiated during the transition have often guided the consolidation process. The timing of elections, the organization and especially the division of power within the state, and even the menu of issues open for discussion have been decided beforehand. Often, existing exclusionary democratic institutions have been opened, or dormant democratic institutions--even whole constitutions-have been reactivated. Many governmental institutions, in fact, have undergone little change at all ; it has been merely the process of controlling them that has changed. Ministries of education have rarely changed in form, local government bodies have stayed in place, and even the basic organization of armed forces has often remained intact. Most significantly, the basic principles of economic organization have not been revised during consolidation. All states in Southern Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia had market based, capitalist economies before and after transiting to democracy. In Russia, the agenda after transition included almost every aspect of political and economic activity , making democratic consolidation a more complicated and comprehensive process . In August 1 99 1 , Russia was not a sovereign state; Russia had no sovereign borders, no sovereign currency, no sovereign army, and weak, ill-defined state institutions. Even after the December 1 99 1 agreement to create the Commonwealth of Independent States , Russia' s political , territorial, and psychological location was still uncertain. Throughout the former Soviet Union , 30 million ethnic Russians became expatriates overnight at the same time that ethnic minorities within the Russian Federation pushed for their own independence. If the parameters of the Russian state were both territorially and intellectually ambiguous, the rules for governing this amorphous political entity were even more uncertai n . When Yeltsin assumed de facto control of the Russian part of the S oviet Union in August 1 99 1 , he was neither constrained nor guided by a negotiated institutional design . Before and immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, neither the division of power between the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches nor the demarcation of authority between different levels of government had been established within the Russian Federation. Nor, however, was Yeltsin given a tabula rasa upon which to create new institutions. Constituent elements of the old Soviet system remained in place . While Russia' s abrupt, revolutionary mode of transition removed guideposts for navigating the transition, the peaceful nature of the transition also allowed many individuals, institutions, and social
70
Russia' s Rough Ride
forces endowed with certain rights and powers in the ancien regime to continue to play important political and economic roles in the postcom munist era, Unlike in pacted transitions in nonrevolutionary situations, the roles of these old actors and institutions were not delineated before August 1 99 1 , but unlike in violent revolutions, these forces were neither suppressed nor destroyed, Additionally, Yeltsin was constrained by the institutional legacies of the transition period, which he and his revolutionary challengers had helped to create,20 Perhaps most significantly, the system of sovi ets-first reinvigorated by Gorbachev and then further legitimated by Yeltsin-remained in place as the central governing mechanism in Russia, Elections to the Russian Congress of People' s Deputies and its upper chamber, the Supreme Soviet, gave these i nstitutions a valid claim to governance, Yeltsin ' s own political comeback was made possible solely by these elected bodies, While disputed at the time within the democratic camp, this strategic decision by Yeltsin and the "democrats" to participate in these elections reinforced the legitimacy of the soviets as organs of Russia' s nascent governmental apparatus , Paradoxically, Yeltsin and the "democrats" would l ater view this vertically integrated institutional system, especially its highest organ , the Congress of People' s Deputies, as the greatest impediment to political and economic reform. In addition to the soviets, the issues of sovereignty that were first introduced to promote Russia' s democratic transition lingered to impede democratic consolidation. Yeltsin ' s democratic movement had actively promoted sovereignty, within both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, as a strategy for advancing its opposition project. In 1 989, Russian democrats united with B altic nationalists in the Soviet Congress of People' s Deputies in calling for greater powers of self-government for all republics. By 1 990, Yeltsin openly championed Russian independence while at the same time encouraging autonomous republics within the ,, Russian Federation to "seize as much sovereignty as you can handle. 21 In championing Russian sovereignty , Yeltsin won favor among Russian deputies, democrats and communists alike, who sought greater powers for their own i nstitutions. In embracing local self-autonomy, Yeltsin also garnered support from regional leaders , including some local Communist Party officials. Like the legacy of the soviets, however, Yeltsin ' s successful play o f the sovereignty card during the transition period came back to haunt him during the consolidation period, when several republics within the Russian Federation pushed for complete indepen dence. Presidentialism is another institutional innovation from the transition period that initially facilitated the democratic transition but later impeded democratic consolidation. The idea of a Russian presidency first percolated within the democratic opposition in 1 990, when Yeltsin' s
Michael McFau l
71
precarious control of the Congress of People' s Deputies became increasingly evident. The people were firmly behind Yeltsin , but the majority of the deputies were not. To translate this popular support into effective governing power, Yeltsin ' s team advocated the creation of a popularly elected presidency . They correctly calculated that both this idea (approved in a referendum in March 1 9 9 1 ) and Yeltsin' s candidacy would be supported by the Russian electorate. In their haste to create the office, get Yeltsin elected, and thus save him from being removed from power by the Congress, the architects of Russia's presidential system neglected to articulate clearly the constitutional powers of the president and the division of power between the president and the Congress of People' s Deputies.
D ecisions About Institutions Yeltsin and his supporters faced extraordinary impediments to consolidating democracy in the wake of the Soviet collapse. The process of consolidation after August 1 99 1 , however, was not preordained by the institutional and socioeconomic endowments from the Soviet ancien regime or the historical mode of transition. Working within the constrai nts of these legacies, Yeltsin and his compatriots made or declined to make several critical decisions concerning Russia' s new political instituti ons. In particular, the euphoric moment immediately after the triumph over the putschists in August 1 99 1 provided an opportu nity to design new democratic institutions and thereby consolidate Russia' s new democracy. The opportunity was wasted. Yel tsin took some important first steps toward transforming the Soviet political system when he banned the CPSU, subordinated Soviet ministries to the Russian state, and, most dramatically, in December 1991 dissolved the S oviet Union. P:t.t the same time, however, Yeltsin failed to take several other key steps. He did not push to adopt a new constitution, although a first draft of a new fundamental law produced by the Supreme S oviet Constitutional Commission (chaired by Yeltsin) had been circulated as early as October 1 990.22 Yeltsin' s new regime also did little to institutionalize its popular support in society. Despite pleas from the Democratic Russia movement, Yeltsin refrained from holding new parliamentary elections, even though elections in the fall of 1 99 1 would surely have produced a more reformist legislative branch and stimulated the development of a multiparty system.23 Nor did Yeltsin establish his own political party, a decision that went against the wishes of his closest political advisor, Gennady Burbulis .24 Yeltsin also delayed elections for regional heads of administration, which had been scheduled for December 1 99 1 , and instead appointed regional executives . Finally, Yeltsin did not dismantle many Soviet-era governmental institutions, including, most significantly, the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of
72
Russia ' s Rough Ride
People's Deputies . Each of these decisions impeded democratic consolidation in Russia. Rather than focus on political reform, Yeltsin and his new govern ment used their political mandate to initiate economic transformation. Eager to avoid what they perceived as Gorbachev ' s mistake-putting politics before economics-Yeltsin ' s team concentrated its energies on dismantling the Soviet command economy and creating a new Russian market system. In fact, many in Yeltsin ' s new government believed that economic transformation was a precondition for democratic consolida tion.25 Without private property, Russian voters did not know their own political interests . In their view, the emergence of markets and private property would transform Russian society, creating social strata out of which new parties could grow. Until these new classes emerged, only political organizations representing old interests could acquire electoral majorities . Accordingly, these theorists held, democracy during the transition to a market economy was antithetical to the goals of market reform. The most vocal proponents of this logic advocated a Pinochet type dictatorship as an interim stage between command communism and capitalist democracy. Yeltsin ultimately pursued neither democratic consolidation nor dictatorship. He postponed the creation of new democratic institutions, and instead grafted new names and functions to old Soviet authoritarian institutions . The Congress of People' s Deputies assumed the role of a parliament, a function it was never designed to play. Regional commu nist party bosses formerly appointed by the CPSU Politburo became local heads of administration appointed by the president. Communist Party Central Committee secretaries became deputy ministers ; CPSU apparatchiki became executive-branch apparatchiki. Of course, revolu tionary figures, including Yegor Gaidar, initially occupied top govern ment pOSItIOns. Over the course of just one yeat, however, Yeltsin replaced almost all of these radical reformers with Soviet-era bureau crats . Perhaps this was the only way to avoid civil war or communist restoration, but Yeltsin ' s half-measures regarding either democratic or authoritarian consolidation left unresolved key questions of Russia' s constitutional design, retarded the growth of central components of democratic consolidation, and consequently undermined support for the very idea of democratic governance. Two fundamental constitutional issues obstructed and then polarized political and later economic reform in Russia: legislptive-executive relations and federal relations. Ambiguities r�garding Moscow' s relations with its constituent units first threatened Russia' s democratic transition. By 1 992, the centrifugal forces unleashed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and fueled by Yeltsin ' s own pronouncements challenged the territorial integrity of the new Russian state. Immediately after the August coup attempt, Chechnya
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declared its independence. In March of the following year, Tatarstan held a successful referendum for full independence. Negotiations over a federal treaty dragged on without resolution into the summer of 1 993, prompting several other republics and oblasts to make their own declarations of independence, complete with their own flags, customs agents, and threats to mint new currencies .26 This constitutional crisis between center and periphery might have erupted into armed conflict had not the stalemate between different branches of the central government proved to be even more consequen tial . As mentioned above, institutional ambiguity between the executive and legislative branches also was a historical legacy of the polarized transition between Russia and the Soviet Union . Immediately after the putsch attempt, this institutional ambiguity did not have a direct impact on politics, as most deputies in the Congress of People' s Deputies at that time (and in the Supreme Soviet) supported Yeltsin. Ruslan Khasbulatov, Yeltsin ' s successor as chairman of the Congress, was considered a close Yeltsin ally . The Congress ' s November 1 99 1 decision to grant Yeltsin extraordinary powers of decree reflected this mutual support. After price liberalization and the beginning of radical economic reform in January 1 992, however, the Russian Supreme Soviet and Congress of People' s Deputies began a campaign to reassert their superiority over the president.27 With no institutions to structure relations between the president and the Congress, polarization crystallized yet again. Even after Yeltsin' s referendum victory in April 1 993, the Congress continued to block executive initiatives , constrain ministerial power, and pass laws contradicting Yeltsin' s decrees. During the summer of 1 99 3 , in anticipation of the Tenth Congress of People' s Deputies scheduled for the fall , Congress deputies prepared a series of constitu tional amendments that would have liquidated Russia' s presidential office altogether?8 To prevent pis o\.vn dov/nfal1, Yeltsin dissolved the Congress in September 1 99 3 , a move that in turn precipitated a tragic military standoff between the parliament and the president in October. Once again, as in August 1 99 1 , the failure of all strategic actors to negotiate the new rules of the game for political competition in Russia had produced stalemate, polarization, and armed confrontation.
The Decay of Political Society Yeltsin' s series of nondecisions regarding political reform after the union collapse, and the resulting constitutional crises in 1 992 and 1 993, impeded the emergence and development of other components of a consolidated democracy. First, Russia's political society grossly decayed in this two-year period. Before August 1 99 1 , political parties in Russia had already begun to proliferate.29 The socioeconomic organization of the Soviet system inhibited the development of interest-based, ideological
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parties ; only after the emergence of markets and private property could parties develop distinct social bases and represent articulated material interests.3o Additionally, Russia's mode of transition hampered party development. The period leading up to the coup in August 199 1 accorded political space to only two groups-the status quo (Gorbachev, the Soviet regime, and the "communists") and opponents of the status quo (Yeltsin, Democratic Russia, and the "democrats"). B efore August 1 99 1 , most new political parties realized the constraints of this polarization and joined one camp or the other, but all democratically oriented parties anticipated and prepared for the end of this polarized transition period and the beginning of multiparty consolidation. The stage entrance for Russia' s political parties, however, did not occur immediately after the collapse of the ancien regime. 3 1 Had Yeltsin called a founding election in the wake of communist disarray and Soviet collapse, the trajectory of Russia's multiparty development might have been very different. Reform-oriented parties of the era such as the Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Republican Party, and some party manifestation of Democratic Russia would have dominated the ballot; the Communist Party was banned and unpopular at the time, while the grounds well for extreme nationalist groups such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky ' s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had not yet begun .32 Consequently, elections held immediately after the Soviet collapse might have produced a new legislative body organized along multiparty lines, but dominated by reformist political organizations . Yeltsin ' s decision not to hold a founding election in 1 99 1 meant that Russia's political parties had almost no role for the following two years. Factions formed in the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People' s Deputies , but these deputy groups lacked internal discipline and maintained only sporadic contact with party organizations outside of the Congress.33 External initiatives that aimed to reorganize deputies along party lines, such as Civic Union, ultimately failed, especially after Russian politics polarized again between the executive branch and the Congress during the spring of 1 99 3 . Nor did parties play a role in the formation of the government. On the contrary, a Yeltsin decree from 1 99 1 that was initially designed to purge government bureaucracies and enterprises from Communist Party control also discouraged noncommu nist government officials from actively participating in parties. Yeltsi n himself, like many executives in n e w democracies, was consciously nonpartisan and resolutely against the formation of a presidential party .34 Perhaps most significantly, Yeltsin ' s decision to postpone elections for governors, mayors, and regional soviets stifled party development outside of Moscow. Thus the dozens of parties that sprouted during the twilight of the S oviet era had withered away by the time of Russia' s first genuine multiparty election i n December 1 99 3 . With weak representation in
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parliament, no ministers in government, poor access to the president, and no opportunity to participate in local politics, these parties could not mediate interests between state and society. In the vacuum, corporatist arrangements between sectoral interest groups and the state defined the system of interest intermediation during this period, a legacy that continues to influence state-society relations in Russia today .35 The lack of activity by parties during this period also helped to discredit more broadly the very idea of a multiparty system. Significantly, only one reformist party and two opposition parties from the Soviet era-the Democratic Party of Russia (led by Nikolai Travkin), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) (run by Gennady Zyuganov), and Zhirinovsky ' s LDP--exceeded the 5 percent threshold on the party list vote during the December 1 993 elections . By the time the 1 995 elections were held, none of the reformist parties from 1 9 9 1 surpassed the threshold.
Economic and Civil Society In transitions that renegotiate the principles of government without addressing issues of economic transformation, civil society is resurrected during liberalization as a precursor to democratization .36 Because the type of economic system is not questioned in nonrevolutionary transi tions, civil society embedded within and constructed by a market economy can quickly emerge during liberalization to aggregate interests, organize social groups, and ultimately support the democratization process. In Russia, there was little or no civil society to resurrect. Independent organizations, associations, and even proto-parties formed during Gorbachev' s reign. This proto-civi! society was just emerging when communism collapsed. Civic organizations had neither the time nor the opportunity to develop into effective self-governing organs able to influence the state. Moreover, the type of civil society that emerged within the commu nist regime has little relation to the new civil society forming under conditions of capitalism and democracy . Some of the same historical and cultural factors that influenced the construction of the Soviet Union' s nascent civil society have continued to condition the formation of Russian society; however, a new civil society has to be reordered in accordance with the new set of property rights and social relations being constructed under capitalism.37 Whole new social classes (bankers, entrepreneurs , small-business owners , white-collar employees of the service sector) have had to emerge, while old social groups (factory workers , enterprise directors, government bureaucrats) had to adjust to new economic conditions. Until basic markets and market institutions took root and a significant portion of property was privatized, truly independent "economic" and "civil" societies did not exist. Instead,
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pockets of new socioeconomic interest groups coexisted in a decaying system of social stratification created by the Soviet system. In the short run , these old social units had better-defined interests and larger resources with which to defend those interests than the emerging, market-based classes and social groups . Decision s about institutional design made after the collapse o f the Soviet regime, however, also influenced the emergence of civic and economic society . Most important, the absence of a pluralist system of interest intermediation limited the growth of civic organizations and their influence over political outcomes . Interests of mass-based groups (e.g., consumer organizations, associations for voucher holders , women ' s groups) and individuals are best represented i n electoral, parliamentary systems.38 As already noted, however, pluralist institutions for articulating interests and organizing representation were not consolidated during the first two years of Russia' s postcommunist polity . Without elections, the voices of individuals and mass-based groups could not compete with associations representing sectoral interests of powerful economic actors. The corporatist system of interest intermediation also blocked new economic interest groups from pursuing their agenda within the state. Deputies to the Congress were elected in 1 990, before political parties existed and before the Soviet Union collapsed, and well before economic reform had begun. These deputies, therefore, represented neither the electorate (as demonstrated most conclusively in the April 1993 referendum) nor the new social and economic groups that had emerged in postcommunist Russia (e. g . , entrepreneurial associations, new independent trade unions, coalitions of directors of privatized enter prises).39 The directors ' lobby had many allies in this Congress , while entrepreneurs had none. Gradually, Russia' s entrepreneurs and bankers courted new allies within the executive branch, such as the State Property Committee u nder Anato!y Chubais. The vast maze of Soviet-era ministries, committees, and commissions governing economic policy, however, remained penetrated by old economic interest groups through out the first two years of economic reform. Finally, the harsh consequences of radical economic reform fell hardest on the very social strata that had earlier spearheaded the anticommunist movement-urban-based academics, engineers, doctors, teachers, and educated workers. Despite attempts by Democratic Russia to transform its supporters from opponents of communism to advocates of capitalism, the personal gains from economic reform were initially so marginal that this segment of society soon became depoliticized at the same time that communist diehards, patriotic groups, and the disenfran chised (including many former radical supporters of the democratic movement) became increasingly mobilized. Like the 1 9 90--9 1 period for the "democrats," however, the mode of activity for these groups was antisystem protest, not participation. As demonstrated most vividly during
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the spring and fall of 1 993, these groups aimed to overthrow the Yeltsin regime, not influence it, and thereby played no constructive role in developing civil society.
A Second Chance The failure to design new democratic institutions after August 1 99 1 ultimately resulted i n tragedy i n October 1 993 , when , for the first time since 1 9 1 7 , Russians battled other Russians on the streets of Moscow. October' s events did, however, open a second window of opportunity to pursue democratic consolidation. In his decree dissolving the Congress of People ' s Deputies, Yeltsin also called for immediate elections for a new parliament and a referendum to adopt a new constitution. This new law was ratified in the December 1 993 vote. After years of ambiguity, Russia had a new set of formal rules for organizing politics accepted both by the majority of the population and by all strategic political actors. While the CPRF urged its supporters to vote against the new constitution, even they recognized this change after the vote.40 The constitution attempted to resolve the two institutional ambiguities that had plagued the Russian state during its first two years of existence. Regarding Russia' s federal structure, it specified that all constituent elements were to enjoy equal rights vis-a-vis the center. Ideas circulated earlier about an asymmetric federal system were conspicuously absent in the new document. Many "states' rights" (rights of the oblasts, krais, and rep'J blics) were still not assigned in the new law, but general principles regarding equality among subjects were spelled out clearly for the first time since Russia' s independence. Significantly absent from the document was any mention of a mechanism for secession. This new constitutional clarity regarding federal relations helped to resolve the territorial status of Russia ' s newly "independent" republics and "sovereign" oblasts. By declaring all republics, oblasts, and krais equal subjects of the Russian Federation with no option to secede, the new constitution spelled out a de jure resolution to the internal conflicts that plagued Russia throughout 1 992 and 1 99 3 . While bilateral negotia tions between Moscow and other republics continued throughout 1 994, only one republic-Chechnya-did not recognize the new constitutional basis of Russia's federal framework. In 1 994, therefore, Chechnya' s independence became the exception rather than rule, providing the "party of power" within Yeltsin ' s government with reason for military invasion in December 1 994. Paradoxically, the brutal war in Chechnya illustrates both the success and failure of federal consolidation within Russia. The war is the tragic consequence of Yeltsin ' s 1 990 appeal for republics and oblasts to seize as much sovereignty as they could. Yeltsin and his advisors tacitly supported Chechen independence before the Soviet collapse. Only after
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the near collapse of the Russian state in October 1 993 did an empow ered Yeltsin feel compelled to roll back Chechnya' s claim of indepen dence. Had Yeltsin adopted a different strategy regarding issues of sovereignty at the beginning of Russia' s transition, the Chechen tragedy may have been avoided. The Chechen crisis, ironically, is also the manifestation of successful federal consolidation throughout the rest of Russia. In 1 992 and 1993, many predicted the collapse of the Russian state, but Chechnya remains the last outstanding territorial issue within Russia. Since December 1 993, the trend throughout the rest of Russia has been toward greater federal consolidation, not less .41 Regarding executive-legislative relations, the new Russian constitution provided the legal basis for a very strong presidential system, while also replacing the system of soviets with a two-tiered parliament called the Federal Assembly . The upper chamber, the Federation Council, consists of two representatives from each federal subject; the lower house, the . State Duma, comprises 450 deputies popularly elected through a mIxed system. Compared with Western constitutions, Russia's new basic law grants inordinate power to the executive branch of government. The president appoints the prime minister and the Duma confirms his or her selection. If the Duma rejects the president' s candidate three times, the president then has the right to dissolve the Duma and call for new elections. A similar procedure holds for parliamentary votes of no confidence. Two consecutive votes of no confidence by the Duma compel the president either to name a new prime minister or to dissolve the Duma. Additionally, the constitution grants the Russian president the power to legi slate by decree. Despite this imbalance, the adoption of a new constitution has advanced the process of democratic consolidation . By spelling out the political rules of the game, the constitution has facilitated, regulated, and normalized relations between the president, the government, and the legislature. S ignificantly, extraconstitutional crises have not occurred in the realm of executive-legislative relations . The relationship between the Duma and the president has survived votes of no confidence during the summer of 1 995, new elections for parliament in December 1 995 and for president in the summer of 1 996, and the approval of a prime minister by the legislature for the first time ever in August 1 996, when Yeltsin nominated and the Duma approved Viktor Chernomyrdin to head the Russian government. If the Russian state has achieved greater institutional specificity regarding executive and legislative powers after 1 993, judiciary power remains ambiguous and weak. Russia' s first Constitutional Court relinquished its authority as arbitrator between the president a� d parliament in 1 99 3 when the head of the Court, Valery Zorkin, unequivocally sided with White House defenders during the Octob �r 1 993 crisis . The Court ceased to function for a year and convened agam
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only after Yeltsin had expanded the number of justices to dilute the voi ce of his opponents . Since reconveni ng, the Court has made few important decisions. Additionally, progress toward creating a rule-of-law state has been limited at best. The court system has not been revamped to deal with the new challenge s of a market economy . Institution alization of a legal system to protect property rights, govern bankruptcy procedures, enforce contracts, and ensure competiti on has j ust begun. In the corporate legal con text, laws on disclosure are weak and unenforced, general accounting procedures have not been codified, procedures for shareholder and proxy voting are ambiguous , and institution s governing the payment of dividends do not exist. Consequen tly, stockholders have little access to information about enterprises in which they have invested. "Rule of law" also has become weaker regarding criminal and civil matters. The combination of a weak state and an incompetent judicial system has produced a sense of anarchy in Russia, a situation alien and frightening to a population accustomed to a powerful authoritarian state. Popular cries for law and order, in turn , threaten to undermine individual liberties and human rights .
Elections as Normal Events In addition to calling for a vote on a new constitution, Yeltsin ' s September 1 993 decree also called for new parliamentary elections, the first national elections in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. While many claimed that Yeltsin artificially boosted turnout figures to validate the constitutional referendum, few contested the general fairness of the 1 993 parliamentary vote (see Table 1 ) . The strong showing of anti-Yeltsin parties helped to counter claims of presidential falsification. Two years later, this interim parliament (as outlined in Yeitsin ' s 1 993 decree) was replaced by a new group of legislators, elected according to schedule, under law, and in a free and fair process. In this election, participation increased to 65 percent, 15 points higher than in 1 99 3 . Most dramatically, Russia held elections for the presidency in June and July of 1 996, the first direct election for the head of state in the thousand-year history of the country. Despite calls for postponement by Russian businessmen and some of Yeltsin ' s own aides, this election also occurred on schedule and under law, and was considered partially free and fair.42 Turnout in these elections was extraordinary, reaching almost 70 percent in the first round and 68 percent in the second. Elections do not a democracy make. Nonetheless, this sequence of three major national elections in four years signaled an important turning point in Russia' s troubled transition to democracy . First, strategic actors committed themselves to a set of rules about political competition before they knew the results that these rules would produce.43 Yeltsin' s actions
81
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were especially unexpected, a s most observers believed h e had the option to maintain power by other means than subjecting his political career to the unknown whims of the people. Second, all strategic actors participated. While some candidates and parties openly espoused antidemocratic principles, their participation in this series of elections produced a moderating influence on Russian politics . Extreme nationalists and extreme communists failed to win representation in the 1 995 parliamentary elections. The recurrence of elections also has begun to damage the career of nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky ; he lost half of his electoral support between 1 993 and 1 9 95, and then lost half of this support in the June 1 996 elections. The CPRF, after its defeat in the presidential election, also began to creep toward the center and marginalize extremists . Third and finally, all of the main players accepted the results of these elections. While many predicted riots and street demonstrations after the communists' electoral defeat in 1 996, Gennady Zyuganov and his communist comrades accepted defeat, attended Yeltsin ' s inauguration, and then approved Yeltsin ' s candidate for prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, by an overwhelming majority . Zyuganov then began planning for the next election, creating the impression that democracy ,, had become "the only game in town. 44 In turn, Yeltsin spoke after his electoral victory of the need for reconciliation of all political forces in Russia, and hinted that communists might be offered positions in his government.
Political Parties While elections in Russia have produced positive signs of consolida tion since 1 99 3 , the legacies of Russia' s first failed transition still linger in terms of party-system development in Russia. The presidential decree governing the 1 99 3 parliamentary elections (reconfirmed as a law with only minor modifications before the 1 995 elections) resulted from a compromise between political forces interested in stimulating party development and the president ' s desire to limit the role of parties.45 In the Duma, 50 percent of all seats, or 225, were allocated according to proportional representation (PR) , divided among parties that won more than 5 percent of the pppular vote. The other half of the parliamentary seats were filled by representatives from 225 single-member districts chosen in first-past-the-post, single-vote elections. In the Federation Council, two "senators" were elected in 1 993 from each of Russia' s 88 repUblics, krais , and oblasts (with the exception of Chechnya) on a single ballot in which the top two finishers won election. The law governing the formation of the Council changed radically, however, between the 1 993 and 1 995 elections. Under the new law, the upper house now comprises the head of the local executive and legislative
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Russia' s Rough Ride
branches of government, who must be elected to their regional posts but are not directly elected to the Council. As planned, the PR side of Russia' s mixed electoral system helped to stimulate the formation of new parties in the parliamentary elections in 1 993 and again in 1 995 .46 For the first time ever during Russia' s transition, voters selected parties and not just individuals in the 1 993 and 1 995 elections. Moreover, the increased importance of party identifica tion for winning single-mandate seats in the 1 995 parliamentary elections suggests that the role of parties in providing information about candidates and structuring electoral choices is growing, not decreasing.47 Within the first and second postcommunist Dumas , parties and their corresponding factions also played critical organizing roles, making the Duma considerably more efficient than the Congress of People' s Deputies .48 Russia's party system nonetheless remains fragmented and deeply rooted neither in society nor in the state. The main reason is that Russia has too many parties.49 In 1 993, 13 parties competed for seats on the PR list; in 1 995, 43 parties made the ballot. The 1 995 parliamentary vote may have induced consolidation, as only 4 of these 43 parties crossed the 5 percent threshold.50 Yet all of these parliamentary parties have uncertain futures. The CPRF looks like a valid national party that will outlive its current leaders . Yet Gennady Zyuganov ' s electoral defeat in the 1 996 presidential election has caused splits between pragmatic nationalists and militant communists that may shatter this disciplined, centralized party structure. Moreover, because the average age of CPRF members was 59 in 1 995 while the median voter for the CPRF in 1 996 also was above retirement age, the CPRF or its successor organizations must develop strategies to attract new party cadres and a more differentiated electoral base to survive. Other parties are even weaker. Zhirinovsky ' s LDP has created an extensive network of regional offices and loc�l organizers. It remains unclear, however, whether this organization is a political party or a personality cult, as it would collapse almost instantaneously without Zhirinovsky . Our Home Is Russia, the political group founded by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, is endowed with significant financial resources, government support, and modest regional organization, but could easily follow in the footsteps of earlier "parties of power" in Russia and disintegrate. Grigory Yavlinsky ' s Yabloko, the one reformist party not connected to the government that won seats through the proportional system in both 1 993 and 1 995, most closely resembles a proto-party, complete with a parliamentary faction, grassroots regional organizations, and internal democratic procedures. Yet Yabloko ' s small faction in the parliament and near lack of penetration of government bodies outside of Moscow will ensure a marginal role for the nascent party in the near future.
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The weakness of Russia ' s party system is especially apparent outside Moscow. While most parties have some local branches, only the CPRF and the LDP have regional party affiliates throughout the country and in regional parliaments, and only the CPRF has representatives natio nwide. Most of these regional legislatures are dominated by local "parties of power" with no ideological affiliation and strong ties to local executives .5 1 S imilarly, few governors in oblasts and krais and presidents in autonomous republics have any party affiliation. During the cascade of elections of regional executives in the fall of 1 996, in which 52 leaders were chosen, political parties played only marginal roles in selecting and endorsing candidates.52 Russia' s incomplete socioeconomic transformation still retards the formation of interest-based political parties . If new socioeconomic cleavages are still emerging in the context of Russia' s new market system, then parties seeking to represent societal interests al so will be emergent, and not stable. Additionally, Russia' s turbulent mode of transition has served to divide society into those who support the Yeltsin course of reform and those who oppose it, leaving little ideological space for parties based on more narrow interests.53 As demonstrated first in the 1 995 parliamentary elections and then more dramatically in Russia's 1 996 presidential election, there is little room for third-party candidates in Russia' s polarized electoral politics. These structural impediments to party development have been fortified by institutional factors and strategic decisions about the timing and sequence of elections. As already stated, the PR component of Russia' s parliamentary-election law has helped to stimulate the development of political parties , but these positive effects of the law are offset in part by the single-mandate seats in the Duma and the termination of direct elections to the upper house. Russia' s mixed system has produced neither a two-party nor a multiparty system, but instead a fragmented and weakly institutionalized system. Even more damaging to party development is Russia' s superpresidential system. In both the 1 993 and 1 995 parliamentary elections, Yeltsin actually had institutional and political incentives to encourage fragmentation among his party supporters, as these divisions weakened the Duma' s effectiveness; impeded the development of strong liberal political parties that could counter or constrain Yeltsin' s personal power; discredited potential presidential candidates , including Viktor Chernomyrdin and Grigory Yavlinsky ; and helped garner support for Yeltsin as the only person capable of uniting reformist forces and defeating the communists .54 More generally, Russia ' s presidential system, like all presidential systems, has served to delimit the role of parties in policy outcomes. Given the Duma' s limited powers, interest groups must deal directly with the executive to achieve policy results . Given the nonpartisan formation of both the presidential administration and the government,
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Russian political parties have been sidestepped in the process of interest intermediation. As the new procedures for amending the constitution are extremely difficult, Russia' s superpresidential system will continue to create disincentives for party development no matter who the next presidential contenders are,55 A similar pattern occurs on the regional level, where strong executives have little incentive to develop or allow for the development of political parties . After the dissolution of the soviet system throughout Russia in the fall of 1 993, regional governments created new legislative organs, called oblast dumas and city dumas. Poor voter turnout for elections of representatives to these new bodies, coupled with the absence of oblast-Ievel constitutions or city-level charters, has under mined the power and legitimacy of these new legislative organs. Instead, heads of administration at the oblast and city levels virtually rule by decree. Having acquired a new source of legitimacy through elections in the fall of 1 996, these executive heads have even fewer incentives to interact with party organizations than before. More generally, the limited number of elected offices and the low frequency of elections to these offices at the subnational level of government have provided few opportunities for parties to play organizing functions during elections .56 In sum, a nascent party system has emerged in Russia, stimulated primarily by the PR component of the parliamentary-election system, but this system is still fragmented, Moscow-centric, and thereby peripheral to the organization and articulation of interests in Russia' s political system.
Economic Reform In addition to creating a new political beginning and a different institutional context for democratic consolidation, Russia' s "second transition" also created a new political and institutional framework for furthering economic reform, Regarding the formation and execution of economic policy, the new constitution gives the president power to form the government, n ame the head of the central bank, write the budget, and legislate by decree when necessary. Under the Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin government, these enhanced powers have been used to advance Russia' s economic transformation. Privatization expanded furiously throughout 1 994 and 1 995, with over 1 00,000 enterprises privatized by the summer of 1 994 and more than half of the work force employed in the private sector by the summer of 1 995. S tabilization, a goal that eluded Russia during the first two years of economic reform, has also become an attainable objective since December 1 993, Clearly delineated political rules of the game emboldened Chernomyrdin to tighten both monetary and fiscal policy, resulting in single-digit monthly inflation rates and a budget deficit of under 1 0 percent of GNP throughout most of 1 994 and
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1 995. Regarding liberalization, the government resisted initial parliamen tary pressures to implement new price controls, and instead maintained the tenets of Gaidar's liberal regime regarding prices, currency exchange, and export and import controls. Greater liberalization is still needed, particularly with respect to oil and gas, while a labyrinth of government rules , licenses, and regulations continues to stifle small business and sustain government corruption. As a whole, though, Russia has made significant progress in creating a new capitalist order. The question is no longer whether to develop a market economy but rather what kind of market economy to create. The consolidation of a market economy based on private-property rights, in turn, has allowed for the emergence of an independent economic society with real consequences for democratic consolidation .57 Three features of Russia' s emerging capitalism are particularly significant for the development of Russia ' s democracy. First, capital is concentrated sectorally. Dynamic economic activity is located in trade and services, banking, and the export of raw materials, particularly oil and gas. Production of manufactured goods of any sort decreased dramatically in 1 990 and 1 9 9 1 and has fallen steadily since then. Small-enterprise development, after a boom in the late Gorbachev era, has steadily decreased as a percentage of GNP. Second, capital is concentrated geographically, with an estimated 80 percent of Russia's capital assets located in Moscow. Third , capital is closely tied to the state. Through privatization and the financing of state transfers, Russian banks are still dependent on information and money from the state for profits . The intimate relationship between the state and the private sector is even more apparent in sectors exporting raw materials, as the state retains large equity stakes in all of these enterprises and a majority share in many. It is not mere coincidence that the current Russian prime minister is the former head of and alleged major stockholder in Russia' s largest gas exporter. , A concentrated, centralized capitalist class that is intimately if not parasitically tied to the state has already influenced the role of Russia' s economic society in democratic consolidation. Interest articulation and intermediation are corporatist, not pluralistic, and are dominated by big .business , which crowds out other interest groups in lobbying the state.58 The profiles of some of the economic actors have changed (i .e., bankers have replaced military-enterprise directors), but the rules of the game governing relations between the state and economic society have remained rather similar to those institutionalized during the late Soviet era. 59 Significantly, Russia' s leading capitalists have no use for the democratic process, as disruptions in the status quo only threaten their business interests . Once their attempts to postpone parliamentary elections in 1 995 and presidential elections in 1 996 failed, almost all large financial groups supported first Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's
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bloc, Our Home Is Russia, then B oris Yeltsin.60 By some estimates, these financiers spent as much as $500 million to ensure that their men in the Kremlin stayed in power. This relationship between big business and the Russian state has fueled tremendous corruption. These bankers, oil and gas exporters, and their allies dwarf other economic actors in terms of both wealth and political organization. Directors of formerly state-owned enterprises, once a relatively unified lobby, have now fractured into several sectoral and regional industrial organizations. Civic Union, the electoral bloc most firmly identified with this economic class, garnered only 1 .9 percent of the popular vote in 1 993 , prompting many factory managers to gravitate back to the "party of power" as the only political organization worth investment. Paradoxi cally, then, enterprise directors in a wide variety of industrial sectors have had a convergence of political interests in the short run with both old money from raw-material exporters and new money from Russia' s financiers and bankers. Some enterprises of the military-industrial complex have formed alliances with opposition parties and lobbies such as the CPRF and the Congress of Russian Communities, headed by Yury Skokov, but the influence of this segment of Russia' s economic society has steadily declined since 1 992. Small businesses and start-up companies have been damaged by the kind of capitalism emerging in Russia. Exorbitant taxes, inflation, the mafia, and the consolidation of large financial groups exerting monopoly control over many markets have created a very unfriendly environment for the small-business owner. Consequently, this economic interest group-the backbone of many consolidated democracies-is weak, disorganized, and depoliticized in Russia. Labor is also disoriented and disorganized in the midst of Russia' s economic transformation. Old Soviet trade unions, once a tool of control for the CPSU. have been slow to reorganize to meet the new challenges ' c pit lis �. The Federation of Indep;ndent Free Trade Unions (FNPR), a consortium of sectorally based unions claiming more than 50 million members, in most cases still identifies with and represents the interests of directors rather than workers. As the interests of management and labor diverge, the FNPR has gradually lost its credibility with both groups, and consequently its political clout as well. In the 1 996 presidential election, the FNPR did not endorse a candidate. Truly independent trade unions, however, have not yet developed.61 Wildcat strikes persist, particularly in coal regions and the Far East, raising speculation that Russian labor has finally started to remobilize, but the lack of national organization suggests that these strikes will remain isolated instances . The organization of the Soviet enterprise made workers dependent on their employers for food, health, preschool education, housing, and summer holidays. Uncertainties of Russia' s economic transition have
�f- � ;
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87
only strengthened this dependency, leaving little opportunity for postcommunist trade-union development. Consequently, labor has no unified, organized voice in Russian politics. This gap, combined with the presence of a strong Communist Party organization, has impeded the development of a real social democratic party in Russia. All other kinds of mass-based economic interest groups remain equally weak.
A Declining Commitment Participation i n overt political activity by civic groups may have peaked as early as 1 990, while the organization of political acts by civic groups swelled in 1 99 1 as part of the nationwide anticommunist movement.62 Since then, independent civic groups have played less of a role in the organization and conduct of state policy, for several reasons. First, the ability of civic groups to articulate and lobby for their interests vis-a-vis the state in Russia' s postcommunist era has been impeded by the same factors retarding party development more generally-structural changes in the economy and society, delayed development of democratic institutions, especially representative institutions , and the commensurate ascendancy of executive power. Second, Russia's economic revolution had its strongest negative effects on the Soviet-era emergent civil society . As with the labor movement, Russi a' s new market-embedded society has not become sufficiently consolidated to produce social organizations. Additionally, postcommunist grassroots organi zations have no financial resources , as the "middle class"-the financier of most civic groups in the West-has not yet emerged in Russia. Third, famous anticommunist civic groups, such as Memorial (a nationwide grassroots organization dedicated to commemo rating the victims of Stalinism), lost their raison d' etre in the postcom munist era. The Chechen w ar b riefl y mobilized human ri ghts leaders and organizations, but the low level of mass participation underscored the fact that postcommunis't Russian society in 1 995 had developed a set of concerns and interests different from those of Russian society in 1 99 1 . The development o f a vibrant postcommunist civil society is further hampered by the sequence and type of consolidation of Russia' s political institutions . The suspension of party development from 1 99 1 to 1993 served to keep civic groups out of politics within the state. If the party system is underdeveloped, then the ability of civic organizations to influence the state is also impaired. After 1 993, by the time parties began to play a more substantial role in politics, the disconnect between political society and civic society was nearly total. Civic organizations saw no benefit from participating in the electoral process, while political parties discerned no electoral benefit from catering to small and ineffective civic groupS.63 Growing executive power at all levels of the Russian state constitutes
88
Russia's Rough Ride
a final negative influence on Russian state-society relations. Mass-based civic groups are much more successful at working with parliaments than with the executive b�anch of government. Yeltsin and several governors and mayors have created "social chambers ," allegedly as a way to compensate for weak representative bodies and to bridge the gap between Russian civic groups and executive power. With few exceptions, however, these advisory councils camouflage, rather than attend to, the growing state-society divide, while at the same time undermining the legitimacy of legislative bodies. This alarming disengagement of society from the state does not mean that a Russian postcommunist civil society has withered away entirely. Civic groups of all stripes still exist, and the number of organizations continues to grow in postcommunist Russia-a situation that is itself a revolutionary improvement over the Soviet era. The danger is that civic groups and organizations, however active in their own spheres of work, will come to involve a smaller and smaller percentage of the population, and that ci vic groups themselves will become increasingly disinterested in and disconnected from the state as a whole, seeking instead to pursue narrow agendas in the private sphere alone.64 More generally, public demand for democratic institutions in Russia is widespread but weak. The tremendous voter turnouts in the 1 995 and 1 996 elections and the electoral victory of Boris Yeltsin-the candidate most clearly identified with democratic reform-suggest that Russian citizens care about democracy. Similarly, opinion polls demonstrate that Russians value individual human rights, the right to own private property, and an i ndependent press .65 Yet polls also suggest that commitment to democracy as presently practiced in Russia has declined over the last several years at the same time that increasing numbers of Russians are willing to give up their democratic rights for greater order and security. For instance, in 1993, 42 percent of Russians believed that democracy was the best type of government for Russia, while 27 percent thought socialism was best, and another 26 percent advocated "some thing else." In 1 996, only 28 percent of those polled believed that democracy was the best system of government, a steady 27 percent still longed for socialism, and 45 percent of respondents wanted "something else."66 These attitudes toward the idea of democracy, combined with the dearth of i nstitutions in Russia connecting society to the state, suggest that few Russian citizens would be willing to resist the state should it begin to drift toward more authoritarian practicesY
Democratic Renewal Russia' s revolutionary departure from communist rule has not led to a smooth transition to democracy. The requirement of accompanying socioeconomic transformation-a condition of all transitions from
Michael McFaul
89
communist rule-ensured that Russia' s transition would be more complex and prolonged than transitions to democracy in capitalist countries . A further precondition for Russia' s transition to democracy -the destruction of the Soviet empire-further complicated the process of consolidation of the Russian state. Third, Russia's confrontational mode of transition increased ambiguity about Russia' s postcommunist political institutions, which in tum impeded the emergence of critical institutions of a democratic polity, including first and foremost an effective multiparty system . Russia' s failure to institutionalize democracy in the first two years after S oviet collapse also undermined its legiti macy within Russia ' s population . Only time will tell if this damage to the ideal s of democracy in Russia is irreparable. While Russia's transition from Soviet communist rule has not followed the typical roadmap, its bumpy path may still end in a consolidated democracy . In 1 99 1 , Russia inherited several major impediments to democratic consolidation from the Soviet era, including an ambiguous set of constitutional rules, a weak state, a collapsing economy, a lack of political parties, and virtually no rule of law. By postponing elections and failing to ratify a new constitution , Yeltsin further delayed the development of new political institutions in Russia. The immediate consequence of delay was armed conflict between the president and the Congress of People' s Deputies . More indirect but long term consequences included a constitution that provided for extensive presidential control and was virtually immune to amendment; a weak and fragmented party system; the depoliticization of civic groups ; little progress on establishing the rule of law; and a general decline in popular support for the idea of democracy. Despite these defects in Russia' s democratic transition, Russia has made substantial progress toward democracy since December 1 993 . Wh ile fl awed, Russia' s ratified constitution is better than no constitution at all . Parties are weak, but still have played a more central role in Russian politics since December 1 993 than they did before. Perhaps most important, all maj or political actors have accepted elections as the only method of coming to power in Russia. This acceptance of elections and the constitution as the rules of the game suggests that Russia is not forever destined to be a quasi-authoritarian, quasi-democratic regime. If Russia can emerge from economic depression and political polarization with a more varied socioeconomic structure and interest-based political parties, the fundamental democratic institutions first established at the end of 1 99 3 may provide the conditions for democratic renewal in Russia in the future. NOTES I.
See especially R ussell Bova. "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition:
A Comparative Perspective," in Nancy Bermeo, ed., Liberalization and Democratization:
90
Russia's Rough Ride
Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 992), 1 1 3-3 8 .
Michael McFaul
91
Valenzuela, "Labor Movements i n Transitions t o Democracy: A Framework for Analysis,"
Comparative Politics 21 (July 1 9 89) : 446 .
2 . For comparisons, see Charles Gati, " I f Not Democracy, What? Leaders, Laggards,
1 3 . Philippe Schmitter, "Reflections on Revolutionary and Evolutionary Transitions: The
and Losers in the Postcommunist World," in Michael Mandelbaum, Post-Communism: Four
R ussian Case in Comparative Perspective," in Alexander Dallin, ed . , Political Parties in Russia (Berkeley: International and Area Studies, University of California, 1 993), 29-3 3 .
Perspectives (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1 996), 1 68-9 8 ; Joel Hellman, "Political Power and Economic Reform in the Post-Communist Transitions" (unpubl. ms ., Harvard University, March 1 995); and Philip Roeder, "Varieties of Post-Soviet Authoritar ian Regimes," Post-Soviet Affairs 10 (January-March 1 994) : 6 1 - 1 0 1 .
negotiated transition are greater than those of transitions that do not involve negotiations,
3. Otto Kirchmeier, "Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs," American
Political Science Review 59 (December 1 965): 1 1 42-46. 4,
Douglass North,
(Cambridge:
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Cambridge University Press,
1 990); William Riker,
"The Experience of
Creating Institutions: The Framing of the United States Constitution," in Jack Knight and !tai Sened, eds ., Explaining Social Institutions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1 995), 1 2 1 -44 ; Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, Structuring Politics:
Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 992), Introduction; David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 997), especially ch. 3 .
Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South
America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 996), ch. 2. 6 . See Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,"
Comparative Politics 2 (April 1 970) : 3 5 1 . Rustow even argued that national unity is a "background condition" that "must precede all other phases of democratization."
suppressed. Other units of civil society, however, such as churches, business associations, of other voluntary organizations that
constitute civil society were allowed to exist.
9 . On path dependency, see Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative aIld
Historical
Dynarnics." Comparative Politics 16 (Ja..nuary 1 9 84); Robert
Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); an d Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, Structuring Politics. 10. Hungary' s transition most closely resembled-but did not achieve-an evolutionary transition to democracy. See Andrew Arato, "Revolution and Restoration : On the Origins of Right-Wing
Radical
Ideology
in
Hungary,"
in
Christopher Bryant
and
Edmund
Mokrzycki, e d s ., The New Great Tran�formation: Change and Continuity in East-Central Europe (London: Routledge, 1 9 94), 99- 1 1 9 . 1 1 . Guillermo O' Donnell and Philippe C . Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
�
University Press, 1 986), 1 9 . Adam Prz worski has gone even further, arguing that "the process of liberalization can be launched only if some groups in the authoritarian regime prefer broad dictatorship to the status quo." Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 9 9 1 ) , 6 1 . 12.
Adam Przeworski,
transition
theorists
implicitly
undermine
the
importance
of the
"mode
of
1 5 , James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis
of Politics
(New York: Free Press, 1 9 89), 5 3 .
16. See
0' Donnell
and Schmitter, Transitions from A uthoritarian Rule, 2 5 , 39; and
Terry Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative Politics 23 (October 1 990): 9.
Affairs 9 (July-September 1 99 3 ) : 1 9 6-222. 1 8 , Przeworski, "Problems in the Study of Transitions to Democracy," 63. See also O' Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 69. 1 9 . During the summer and fall of 1 990, representatives from the two sides worked together to draft the so-called 500-Day Plan, a sweeping blueprint for introducing market reforms . Upon considering the plan, however, Gorbachev backed away in favor of a more plan
that
had
not
been
negotiated.
Once
Gorbachev
reneged
on
his
commitment to a negotiated economic plan, the battle lines between "reformers" and "revolutionaries" were drawn once again. 20. Institutions, then" not only reflect the interests of their makers, but can have an autonomous, intervening effect on outcomes . On this "sociological" or "historical" approach
8. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 995).
Conceptions
outcome,
transition" variable in explaining democratic outcomes .
conservative
7 . Overtly political organizations that challenged the authoritarian state were usually youth groups, and the thousands
pacts, or interim agreements, or transitions in which the scale of change is not limited to political arrangements. Moreover, by asserting that many modes can produce the same
1 7 . See Michael McFaul, "Russian Centrism and Revolutionary Transitions," Post-Soviet
5 . This problem of "stateness" for transitions is addressed in Juan Linz and Alfred
trade unions,
1 4. Theorists of democratic transitions argue that there is n o "standard model" of democratic transition. Most agree, however, that the chances of success of a pacted or
"Problems i n the Study o f Transition to Democracy," in
Guillermo O ' Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds . , Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 9 86), 56, S ee also Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 56-5 7 ; and J. Samuel
to institutions, see the introductory chapters in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, eds . ,
The New Institution.alism. i n Organizational Analysis (Chicago : University o f Chicago Press, 1 99 1 ) ; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, Structuring Politics; and March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. 2 1 . See john Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fail of the Soviet Empire Princeton University Press, 1 993), 54-58 , 62-64.
(Princeton:
22. The author received a copy of this draft from Oleg Rumyantsev, secretary of the Constitutional Commission, in October 1 990. 2 3 . Democratic Russia polling indicated that it, with Yeltsin ' s backing, would win a majority in the Congress of Peopl e ' s Deputies. At the time, Democratic Russia was the only legal party or social movement of national status . Having organized Yeltsin ' s electoral victory in June 1 9 9 1 and then spearheaded the popular resistance to the coup in August, the leaders of Democratic Russia were quite certain of their next victory. Democratic Russia leaders Vladimir B o xer, Victor Dmitriev, Yuri Afanasiev, Ilya Zaslavsky, Mikhail Schneider, and Lev Ponomarev, interviews with author, Moscow, October 1 99 1 . 24. Gennady B u rbulis, then state secretary and first deputy prime minister i n Yeltsin ' s government, interview with author, Moscow, July 1 995. 2 5 . This reasoning followed in the tradition of structural theorists on democratization and modernization theory in the West. See especially Seymour Martin Upset, Political
Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N . Y . : Doubleday, 1 960) ; and a review of these debates in Larry Diamond, "Economic Development Reconsidered," American Behavioral Scientist 35 (March-June 1 992): 450-99.
Russia' s Rough Ride
92
Michael McFaul
93
26. Lyudmila Pertsevaya, "Rodina prezidenta khochet stat' respublikoi" (The fatherland
a result of the assets they i nherit. Compare, for instance, the platform of the Association
of the president wants to become a republic), Moskovskie novosti (Moscow news), 4 July
of Privatized and Private Enterprises, a lobby organization chaired by Yegor Gaidar ("Materialy Uchreditel' nogo S ' ezda" [Materials of the Founding Congress], Moscow, 2-3
1 993,
9A.
For overviews,
see Jessica Eve S tern,
"Moscow
Meltdown :
Can Russia
Survive?" International Security 18 (Spring 1 994): 40-65; and Gail Lapidus and Edward Walker, "Nationalism, Regionalism, and Federalism: Center-Periphery Relations in Post Communist Russia," in Lapidus, ed ., The New Russia: Troubled Transformation (Boulder, Colo . : Westview, 1 995), 79- 1 1 4. 27. Ruslan Khasbulatov, interview with author, Moscow, April 1 99 5 . The sources of
April 1 993, mimeo), with Civic Union ' s program ("Dokumenti Foruma Obshchestvennikh Sil" [Documents of the Forum of Social Forces], Moscow, 21 June 1 992, mimeo). 40. Officially, the CPRF continued to assert that the constitution was not legitimate, as the method o f drafting the document was not democratic and the results of the referendum were falsified . In practice, however, CPRF leaders have abided by the new
polarization between the Congress and the president were not only disputes over economic
constitution and have participated in all major elections since its adoption, according the
issues. The real issue was political power. Which political institution was supreme: the
new political system de facto legitimacy.
Congress or the presidency? See Yeltsin-Khazbulatov: Edinstvo, kopromiss, bor 'ba (Unity, compromise, struggle) (Moscow : Terra, 1 994). 28. On the last major war of laws on privatization between the parliament and president before the disbanding of the Congress, see Igor' Karpenko, "Chek ili schet" (Voucher or account), Izvestiya (News), 17 July 1 993, 4; and Pyotr Mostovoi, "Privatizatsi ya v strane pod vliyaniem reshenii parlamenta priobretaet zavedomo nomenklatumyi kharakter" (Privatization in a country under the influence of decisions of parliament obviously attains a nomenklatura character), Rossiskie vesti (Russian news), I I August
1 993, 2. Oleg Rumyantsev (secretary of the constitutional committee that prepared these amendments), interview with author, Moscow, May 1 995. 29. Michael McFaul and Sergei Markov, The Troubled Birth �f Russian Democracy: Political Parties, Programs, and Profiles (Stanford, Calif. : Hoover Institution Press, 1 993) ; M. Steven Fish, Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution (Pri nceto n : Princeton University Press, 1 995), ch. L 30. This problem, of course, is common to all postcommunist transitions . See Valerie B u nce and Maria Csanadi, "Uncertainty and Transition : Post-Communism in Hungary,"
East European Politics and Society 7 (S pring 1 99 3 ) : 240-7 5 .
4 1 . Of course, economic decentralization still continues and must continue for greater marketization of economic relations between Russia's constituent parts. Likewise, the slew of gubernatorial elections throughout Russia in the fall of 1 996 has fueled greater political decentralizatio n . Efforts to promote economic and
political
autonomy
do not mean,
however, that Russia's territorial integrity is under threat. 42. Boris Yeltsin contro l l ed all national television networks and enjoyed an unlimited campaign budget. There was also evidence of falsification in some of Russia's autonomous republics in favor of B oris Yeltsin . For a fuller discussion, see Michael McFaul, "Russia' s 1 996 Presidential Elections," Post-Soviet Affa irs 1 2 (October-December 1 996): 3 1 8-50. 43. Przeworski has labeled this disti nguishing characteristic of democracy "conditional uncertainty." See Adam Przeworski, "Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts," in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds . , Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 993), 59-80. 44. This is Przeworski ' s definition of consolidation . See Przeworski, Democracy and
the Market, 26. 45. Viktor Sheinis (one of the original authors of a draft electoral law in the Congress
3 1 . O' Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 5 7 . 3 2 . Zhirinovsky d i d w i n 7 percent o f the presidential vote in June 1 99 1 . The failure
of Peopl e ' s Deputies that i ncluded proportional representation), and Presidential Advisor Giorgy Satarov (a proponent of the single-mandate system who helped draft the 1 993 presidential decree), interviews with author, Moscow, April 1 995. The English text of the
of the putsch in August 1 99 1 created true-albeit short-lived--euphoria for Yeltsin and the
decree can be found in "NDI Pre-Election Report: The December 1 993 Elections in the
democrats, making a strong showing for Zhirinovsky right after the coup unlikely. Only
Russian Federation" (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Washington,
after the collapse of the Soviet Union and prolonged economic hardship were conditions ripe for a strong nationalist protest vote.
D.C., 23 November 1 993), 37-52.
33. Jerry Hough, "The Structure of the Russian Legislature and Its Impact on Party Deveiopment," in jeffrey Hahn, ed., Denwcratization in Russia: The Development of
Carey,
Legislative Institutions (Armonk, N . Y . : M.E. S h arpe, 1 996), 8 3- 1 0 5 .
34. Guillermo O ' Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy 5 (January 1 994) : 55-69 ; Juan Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy:
Does It Make a
46. On the relationship between PR and multipartism, see Matthew Shugart and John
Presidents
Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics 1 992); and Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes (New
(Cambridge:
and Assemblies:
Ca.T-bridge
University
Press,
York: New York University Press, 1 994). 47.
Unlike
the
1 993. presidential
decree, the electoral
law governing the
1 995
Difference?" and Arend Liphart, "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical
parliamentary elections allowed for party identification of candidates to be printed on
Observations," in Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds . , The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 994), 3-87 and 9 1 - 1 05 .
influencing their extraordinary success in single-member districts in the 1 995 elections.
3 5 . I n sharp contrast to European corporatist arrangements, Russia' s emerging system does n ot include trade unions or other mass-based organizations, but is dominated by big business groups. 3 6 . Philippe Schmitter, "Society," in The Transition to Democracy: Proceedings of a
Workshop (Washington, D . C . : National Academy Press, 1 9 9 1 ), 1 7 . 3 7 . Bronislaw Geremek makes the same point i n "Problems o f Postcommunism: Civil Society Then and Now," Journal qf Democracy 3 (April 1 992): 9. 3 8 . Alan Cawson, "Is There a Corporatist Theory of the State?" in Graeme Duncan, ed .,
Democracy and the Capitalist State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 9 89), 233-52. 3 9 . As privatization proceeds, the directors will have increasingly different interests as
single-mandate ballots . CPRF officials consider this rule change one of the principal factors
4 8 . Thomas Remi n gton and Steven S mith, "The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia," Legislative Studies Quarterly 20 (1 995): 457-89 . 49.
Sartori
argues
that more than five parties constitutes "extreme pluralism" and
fragmentation. See Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, 5 8-6 1 . 50. Other parties, including the communist Agrarian Party of Russia and the liberal Democratic Choice of R ussia, won several seats in single-mandate races (see Table
I ).
5 1 . Darrell S l ider, "Elections to Russia ' s Regional Assemblies," Post-Soviet Affairs 12 (July-September 1 996): 1 -2 1 . 52. The CPRF an d its bloc ally, the National Patriotic Union of Russia, publicly endorsed only 1 1 of 52 candidates. Our Home Is Russia also supported several candidates,
Russia' s Rough Ride
94
4
but only a few were "party" members. No other party ran serious candidates ; instead, all endorsed already competing independents. 53. Some parties, including the CPRF and Democratic Choice of Russia, headed by former prime minister Yegor Gaidar, have programmatic identities based on cleavage issues traditionally found
in Western democracies.
Almost all other parties,
however,
EAST ASIAN DEMOCRACY: PROGRESS AND LIMITS
are
constructed principally around charismatic leaders; ideas and interests are secondary. 54. Lijphart, "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy," 9 8 . Yeltsin ' s team deemed fragmentation within Russia ' s reformist forces in the December 1 99 5 elections especially important to Yeltsi n ' s electoral prospects the following year. If Chemomyrdin, Yavlinsky,
James Cotton
or Lebed had emerged from the December 1 995 elections as a viable competitor with a chance to defeat Zyuganov, reformist forces and voters quickly would have gravitated to one of them i nstead. I n 1 995, it must be remembered,
Yeltsin
polled even with or
sometimes behind these potential challengers from the reformist or anticommunist side of Russia's political ledger. 55. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy . " 5 6 . Peter C . Ordeshook and O l g a S hvetsova, "Federalism a n d Constitutional Design," Journal of Democracy 8 (January 1 997): 27-42. 57.
On the importance of an
independent economic society for guaranteeing an
independent civil and political society, see Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 1 2- 1 3 . 5 8 . Lilia Shevtsova, Postkommunisticheskaya Rossiya: logika raz:vUiya i perskeptivy (Postcommunist Russia: Moscow Center, 1 995).
Logic
of development and perspectives) (Moscow:
Carnegie
5 9 . Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social Groups," 436-37. 60. "Bolshoi vos' merke' vybory ne nuzhny" (The big eight does not need elections),
Kommersant ' Daily, 14 March 1 99 5 , 3 . 6 1 . Walter Conner, Tattered Banners: Labor, Conflict, and Corporatism i n Postcommu nist Russia (Boulder, Colo . : Westview, 1 996); Leonid Gordon, Dblas! ' Vozmozhnogo (Realm of the possible) (Moscow : Mirt, 1 995). 62. See Mark Beissinger, "Protest Mobilization i n the Former Soviet Union : Issues and Event Analysis" (unpub ! . m s . , University of Wisconsin at Madison, June 1 995). 6 3 . This obServation is based on my work as an advisor to the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NOI) from 1 990 to 1 996. During this period, one of NDI' s central objectives in Russia was to foster cooperation between civic groups and political parties. 64. On decreasing levels of participation in political and civic activities as a whole, see
Politicheskii protsess v Ross;; v 1994 g: Sotsial'nyi kontekst i problemy politichekogo uchastiya (Political process in Russia in 1 994: Social context and problems of political participation) (Moscow : Russian Independent Institute for Social and National Problems, 1 995). 6 5 . See Igor Klyarnkin and Boris Kapustin , "Liberal ' nye tsennosti v soznanii Rossiyan" (Liberal values and mentalities of Russians) (Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie, Moscow, 1 995, mimeD). 66. Exit poll conducted by Mitofsky International/CESSI during the first round of the 1 996 presidential election . The sample size was 7,400 people. 67. James Gibson, " A Mile Wide but an Inch Deep : The Structure of Democratic Commitments in the Former USSR," American Journal of Political Science 40 (May 1 996): 396-420. On the importance of this social demand for democracy for consolidation more generally, see Barry Weingast, "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law" (unpub!. ms., Hoover Institution, January 1 996).
James Cotton is head of the Department of Political Science at the Uni versity of Tasmania in Hobart, A ustralia. He has also taught at the Australian National University, the University of Singapore, and the University of Newcastle- upon - Tyne in England. His most recent works have focused on South Korean democratization and on Northeast Asian regional relations.
T
his essay considers the prospects for the consolidation of democracy in East Asia, focusing on the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, with some attention paid as well to Malaysia and Singapore. In all of these cases, democratic forms are embedded, with more or less regular electoral mechanisms for managing political change. Not discussed here are Brunei, China, Indonesia, Laos , Myanmar, North Korea, and Vietnam ; in each of these countries, political contestation either is formally illegitimate or is not articulated through regular institutions. This approach is taken in an attempt to establish a sufficiently broad basis of comparison for Asian transitions to democracy. Using S amuel Huntington' s framework for understanding the recent global trend toward democratization, a trend for which he coined the term "third wave," democratization i n Taiwan is considered an example of "transformation" (with the government in charge of the democratization process), while in South Korea it is an example of "transplacement" (with government and opposition both affecting the outcome), and in the Philippines an example of "replacement" (with the opposition supplanting the govern ment) . 1 Thailand was a "semidemocracy" when Huntington' s book The Third Wave was written in 1 99 1 ; just one year later, however, in 1 992, the military brought extraconstitutional pressures to bear on the political system. Mass demonstrations ensued, ultimately forcing a constitutional amendment and new elections that returned a democratic coalition to power. At first, this seemed to indicate that a process of leadership
96
East Asian Democrac y : Progress and Limits
"replacement" had been launched. Subsequent developments, however, notably the elections of 1 995, throw a different light on the Thai case, which now either may be seen as an example of "transplacement" or may be interpreted as not having changed fundamentally from its "semi democratic" condition. Malaysia and Singapore, not having been part of the third wave, are excluded from this kind of comparison. Without rejecting the utility of Huntington' s approach, or positing the existence of an "Asian style" of democracy, I · propose that a wider regional approach to understanding the character and limits of democrati zation is of value, for several reasons. First, despite differences in the original democratization experiences of the various cases discussed here, these differences have become less important than certain key similarities during the course of democratic consolidation . To take the Taiwanese and South Korean cases as examples , the initial democratization processes were clearly distinct, though both occurred during the third wave. In Taiwan the established elite remained in charge of the transition , while in Korea popular pressures helped define the pace and character of change. By 1 996, however, one key similarity had emerged. In both cases, opposition candidates had emerged triumphant in the most important local elections in Taiwan and South Korea, specifically in the mayoral contest in Taipei in 1 994 and in a similar contest in Seoul in 1 995. Another similarity was that generalized political factionalism largely accounted for the character of the opposition in both cases . In both political systems, two major groups with little in common besides hostility to the government now dominate the opposition. A second striking characteristic of the Asian experience with democracy is that it is hard to find clear-cut cases in which an opposition group has assumed control of the national government, though this may be due in part to definitional problems with the term "opposi tion ." Liberal democratic theory assumes that a genuine opposition is an alternative government, while in countries that are less than fully democratic the term is often used in a looser sense. As Huntington observes, "In none of these countries . . . in East Asia, except for the . . . Philippines, has a turnover of power occurred from an elected ,, government of one party to an elected government of another party . 2 This suggests that there may be some important comparisons to be made across the region. It also alerts us to the possibility that while democ racy may be further extended and consolidated in some cases, in other cases constitutional systems may evolve to a point of equilibrium where the degree of political contestation and i nclusiveness consistently falls short of that required for full democracy. In such cases, democracy may be contained rather than consolidated, with neither elites nor major social interests committed to its full realization . I propose, therefore, to add Malaysia and Singapore to the category of "East Asian constitutional systems," all of which will be shown to have significant similarities .
James Cotton
97
This essay will first identify some of the major characteristics of the co nstitutional systems in the cases analyzed here. It will then consider how far and in what respects the democratic features of these systems might be consolidated, and to what extent democratization might be contained, especially in view of the likely international environment of th e 1 990s .
The Rules of the Game In Taiwan from 1986 to 1 99 1 , in S outh Korea from 1985 to 1 993, in the Philippines since the 1 986 ouster of Ferdinand Marcos, and progressively in Thailand since 1 975, competitive political systems have replaced authoritarian rule. In recent years, each of these political systems has adopted a constitution embodying many if not all of the major formal requirements of democracy. South Korea adopted its new constitution in 1 98 7 . Likewise, Taiwan amended its constitution in May 1 992, as did the Philippines in 1 987, while Thailand adopted its constitution in 1 9 9 1 and then amended it a year later with a provision requiring that the prime minister be an elected member of parliament. Significantly, the Philippines functioned at least in a formal sense as a democracy prior to the declaration of martial law in 1 972, as did South Korea from 1 960 to 1 96 1 , and Thailand from 1 973 to 1 976. Only Taiwan never functioned as a democracy-setting aside, that is, the elections held under civil-war conditions in November 1 947. Neverthe less, the brevity and interrupted nature of constitutional order in all of these systems suggests that it is premature to regard consolidation as having been achieved. The cases of Malaysia and Singapore are both more settled and more suggestive of the limits that may be placed on democratic contestation. In Malaysia and Singapore, the rules permitting democratic political competition were established during British decoionization in the 1950s. Although these rules have been suspended on some occasions, they have nevertheless endured. While the constitutions of Malaysia and Singapore have remained in force, however, it has become progressively easier to amend them. In Malaysia, apart from a limited number of entrenched provisions relating primarily to the rights of ethnic Malays, the constitution may be amended by two-thirds of the members of parlia ment, a majority the ruling coalition has commanded nearly continuously since 1 969. The constitution was amended at the formation of Malaysia in 1 963 and has been amended frequently since then, with this frequency increasing over time, often at short notice and with little if any public debate.3 The malleability of the Singaporean constitution, as amended in 1 965, is also generally acknowledged, and has been facilitated by the virtual monopoly of parliament by the People ' s Action Party (PAP). Another British legacy in Malaysia and Singapore is the
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continuing existence of an internal-security act, originally introduced by the British colO'lial authorities in an attempt to control the activities in both of the Malayan Communist Party, under the "Emergency" declared in 1 948. Since decolonization, the Internal Security Acts in Malaysia and Singapore have been used to detain opposition figures without trial and have generally been employed against both dissidents and opposition members, most notably in a series of arrests and detentions involving political activists in 1 986 and 1 987. Political actors in each of the cases examined here have not always adhered to the formal rules . Although laws have been established to restrain corrupt electoral practices, these laws have not always been enforced. In both South Korea and Taiwan, influence-peddling and vote buying have been particularly problematic. In Taiwan, for example, the long association of party and state gave the Kuomintang access to resources unavailable to its rivals . Likewise, in South Korea, the munificent funding of the regime and its political machine by the chaebol, or i ndustrial conglomerates, was fully exposed in the trial of former president Roh Tae Woo, who was found guilty of accepting campaign funds of more than $600 million in exchange for special favors. To help redress the political imbalance in Taiwan and South Korea, party reforms (including the holding of primaries to choose parliamentary candidates) have been established in the former while stringent laws against improper campaign funding have been introduced in the latter. Nevertheless, in South Korea organizations such as trade unions are still forbidden by law to contribute funds to political parties, obstructing the development of linkages between parties and civil society. Moreover, political contestation for office may be deflected or contained through veto powers accorded to institutions that are formally subordinate to those offices . For example, the power of the Thai bureaucracy, although it has diminished somewhat since the heyday in the 1 960s of the "bureaucratic polity," is still a feature of government in B angkok. S imilarly, in South Korea until the mid- 1 980s, the military and security establishments wielded a measure of independent power. Constitutional rules also coexist with laws that can be used by ruling parties to undermine the formation of opposition parties and political competition in general. In Singapore, for example, several opposition figures have fallen afoul of libel laws . The award of punitive damages to members of the ruling PAP has crippled such oppositionists as J.B . Jeyaretnam and Chee Soon Juan. Overall, the judgments in these and other cases have allowed the ruling party to use the courts as yet another tool for restricting the opposition.4 In Singapore and Malaysia, very short campaign periods constrain the opposition, while recent constitutional changes have put opposition parties at a decided disadvantage. For example, Singapore has switched
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from a parliamentary to a presidential system, with the rules for candidacy so hedged with qualifications that very few individuals other than former cabinet members are eligible to run. Likewise, national security laws in South Korea, still in force pending a final reconciliation with North Korea, constrain internal political organization and expres sion.
Media Controls Another essential element of a genuinely competitive political system is access to nonpartisan, independent information and commentary. Here, the terrain of constitutional East Asia is quite distinctive, with no system possessing a completely independent and nonmonopolistic media. Progress toward a free press has been greatest in South Korea. In the Chun Doo Hwan era, dissident journalists were driven out of the media by the government but later played a role in popularizing the critique of authoritarianism.s Although the press now publicizes the deeds and misdeeds of the government, and South Koreans may, under particular circumstances, gain access to North Korean media, national-security laws still impose some constraints . For example, in 1 994, a writ was issued against a group of university professors who allegedly produced a textbook showing North Korea in a favorable light. Similarly, insinua tions of treason resulted from the mere suggestion in the National Assembly that Seoul send a delegation to Pyongyang for former president Kim II Sung ' s funeral. Such actions serve as stark reminders that neither information nor commentary can be disseminated freely in South Korea. It is also noteworthy that Seoul has yet to legalize and regulate the possession of satellite dishes, though the government has justified its inaction ;o n "cultural" grounds. The government of Korea is still wary of allowing free access to international, and especially Japanese, media. While South Korea has taken some strides toward greater press freedom, controls on the media in Singapore are without parallel.6 Agencies answerable to the government control the press and television, which devote considerable, generally uncritical coverage to government initiatives . Legislation introduced in 1 9 8 7 also gives the government the power to ban or limit the circulation of foreign media. Controls on the media in Malaysia are less stringent than they are in Singapore, although the Malaysian authorities at times block the opposition' s access to the media. For instance, in the April 1 995 national parliamentary election campaign, the opposition was hamstrung by its inability to gain significant television or press coverage, due to the fact that most important media organs are government-controlled, and all are govern ment-licensed. In Taiwan, magazines once provided a focus for opposition activity,
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East Asian Democracy: Progress and Li.rnits
since most newspapers and all television stations were controlled by the Kuomintang or influential members of the ruling party. This kept the opposition at a disadvantage, limiting its ability to convey its message to the electorate. Until recently, the predominance of Mandarin in the media was also a contentious issue, as the language of the bulk of the population, Taiwanese, was downgraded to the status of a "dialect." Moreover, laws have been enforced to close unlicensed radio stations. Although this has a Taiwanese cultural dimension, it has been a political issue as well. For example, in 1 994 local elections for the governorship of Taiwan and for the positions of mayor of Taipei and Kaohsiung, critics maintained that opposition candidates did not receive entirely independent or impartial coverage in the official media. Further, without the unlicensed radio stations as a popular source of unofficial, often irreverent political commentary, access to such coverage became a political issue. The 1 995 elections for the Legislative Yuan were the first in which the opposition enjoyed relatively equal access to and coverage in the media, owing to the acceptance by the ruling party of the need for a better-informed public. Meanwhile, in Thailand, the military still owns most major radio stations, as it has since the popularization of the medium in the 1 960s, and pressures to change this situation are weak) In the Philippines, by contrast, the media are not monopolistically controlled, though j ournalists have been known to avoid open criticism of major political figures.
Party Systems There are numrous examples of weak party institutionalization in Asian democracies, especially where formal or informal political rules have impeded the formation or the activities of political parties . Opposition movements have sometimes found ways to circumvent such rules, however. The Taiwanese case is particularly instructive. Although elections for local-government positions were instituted in 1 950 and elections for a limited number of positions in the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan were introduced in 1 969, the formation of new political parties was proscribed in Taiwan until 1 986. Non-Kuomintang candidates did run for office and over time cooperated through the tangwai ("outside the party") movement to circumvent the exisiting prohibitions. There are some parallels in the case of South Korea. From the installation of President Park Chung Hee' s Yushin ("Revitalizing") constitution in 1 972 until 1 9 8 5 , when party formation and competition were liberalized under Chun Doo Hwan, party activity was sidelined. Although it had taken Park almost two decades to build his political machine from his original seizure of power in 1 96 1 , it did not survive
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him. Chun w a s more successful, though only a fragment o f the party he created, the Democratic Justice Party, survived to 1 995 as part of the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) . The opposition also suffered fragmenta tion, as personality conflicts among leaders led to a series of party splits and realignments, underlining the weakness of party structures and their shallow popular roots. While the opposition ' s New Korea Democratic Party did well in 1 9 8 5 elections to the Assembly, the party was subsequently shown to be a marriage of convenience, with its two leading personalities founding their own parties, thereby dividing the forces opposed to authoritarianism. The history of political parties in S outh Korea reflects, in part, the deleterious effects of authoritarianism. From the time of the First Republic ( 1 948-60), there have been more than a hundred different South Korean political parties, and a relatively small number of leading political figures have been associated with several different parties during their careers. Even in the Kim You ng Sam era (beginning in 1 993), political parties have functioned more as the creations of powerful leaders than as vehicles for policy or the advocacy of interests. The party realignments of 1 995-96 attest to this. The Korean political landscape has been remade, yet while all the major parties now have new names and are constituted on the basis of new power alliances, a few leading personalities remain in charge.s In Thailand, party proliferation has been a constant of the political environment. Party factionalism has also been common, with few parties espousing distinctive policies . Under the current constitution, attempts have been made to enhance party institutionalization by permitting only those parties with the minimum required number of members to register officially. Similarly, only those parties that agree to mount candidates in all constituencies for the national legislature are now eligible to run in the general elections. Following the political crisis of 1 992, there "vas an attempt to characterize some political parties as "devilish" (or promilitary) and others as "angelic" (or antimilitary), but this lasted only until the subsequent parliamentary elections in 1 995. Indeed, the reason for the fall of the government of Chuan Leekpai and the subsequent scheduling of the elections was the defection of Palang Dharma from the "angelic" coalition led by the Democrat Party. Following the election, Palang Dharma (though under new leadership) went into the Chart Thai government of B anharn Silpa-Archa, thus joining forces with its formerly "devilish" opponents .9 This coalition did not prove any more stable, dissolving to force elections in 1 996. In the Philippines, competition between the Nacionalista and Liberal parties after independence in 1 946 until the declaration of martial law in 1 972 appeared to herald the emergence of regular political contesta tion . lO Despite the appearance of a competitive two-party system, however, factionalism was common, as was movement between the two
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East Asian Democracy: Progress and Limits
parties by leaders and other key individuals. Since the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos in 1 986, political contestation has revived, but there has been little progress toward party institutionalization . Following the 1 992 presidential election, major realignments occurred in the House of Representatives, with 71 members defecting from their parties in order to join the Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (NUCD) party of newly elected president Fidel Ramos . In subsequent midterm elections, Ramos managed to negotiate an electoral pact with the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) , which had been his toughest competitor in the earlier presidential contest. The Lakas-Laban coalition then won an overwhelming majority in the House and consolidated its majority in the Senate, only to have the coalition dissolve a year later under acrimonious circumstances. In Singapore, there are many officially registered parties, most of which are small and unconsolidated. The present Workers' Party, despite its use of a name that has been in currency since 1 957, is in fact a creation of the 1 970s. Its membership is small and its finances uncertain, though its performance at the polls suggests that it would be a more credible entity in a benign environment. The Singapore Democratic Party is of comparable vintage. It was created in 1980 largely as a vehicle for Chiam See Tong, the sole opposition member of the legislature from 1 9 8 8 to 1 99 1 . In 1 995, Chiam disagreed with other leading members of the party , rendering the party ' s future uncertain. Despite such weaknesses in party structure, some Asian political parties have enjoyed remarkable continuity . In particular, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in Malaysia and the PAP in Singapore both date from the era of anticolonial struggle in the 1 950s. Likewise, the Kuomintang grew out of the movement that fought to displace the Manchu rulers of imperial China. Each of these three parties, however, has sought to exercise a hegemonic role in its political system, and it is possible that none would be readily recognized by its founders. Although S ingapore' s Lee Kuan Yew remains the intellectual leader of the PAP, its program, structure, and rationale are profoundly different from what they were in 1 954. Indeed, many party elders, including former party chairman Toh Chin Chye and former Singaporean president Devan Nair, have expressed uneasiness with the party ' s evolution. Similarly, Malaysia' S UMNO endured a major split in 1987, and until 1 996 competed (officially as UMNO B aharu, or "new UMNO") with a rival movement. Party factionalism within the Kuornintang, as well as defections to the New Party (which is essentially a mainlander group unhappy with concessions made to the Taiwanese and Taiwanese issues), has transformed the ruling party on Taiwan. In fact, the New Party, by competing with the Kuomintang for the votes of those with mainlander
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affiliations, was a major factor in the opposition ' s success in 1 994 with the election of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate as mayor of Taipei . The present leadership of the Kuomintang has also been criticized by such figures as Chiang Wei-kuo and Sun An-ti, who have implied that the original guiding ideology of Sun Yat-sen is now being ignored through a focus on Taiwan rather than all of China. I I The formation of the New Party, which attracted 1 3 percent of the popular vote in the 1 995 elections for the Legislative Yuan, was in part a response to such criticisms.
Electoral Support for Parties The pattern of electoral support for the parties in these systems is difficult to characterize. It can be asserted, however, that the cross cutting and overlapping affiliations that in Western liberal democracies facilitate democratic contestation are often absent in these cases. 1 2 Pluralist structures are weak, and multiple allegiances to groups that have contending political identities are unusual. At the same time, attitudes and social structure alike are in rapid change, with continued economic growth and associated social transformation, making it uncertain how this picture will look a decade from now. For Malaysia, it i s impossible to account for the dynamics of electoral politics without reference to communalism. Indeed, the ethnic character of political competition is openly affirmed, with the dominant party in the ruling coalition being UMNO, the party of the majority (53 percent) Malay communityP The most important of Malaysia's opposition parties is the Democratic Action Party, most of whose supporters are ethnic Chinese (who constitute 33 percent of the population) and whose most significant opponent is the Malaysian Chinese Association, an UMNO ally. Commun al identification can also be discerned in Taiwan, the most modernized and affluent of Asian states after Singapore and Japan. There is some evidence that an individual voter's perception of his or her ethnic identity as ''Taiwanese'' (as opposed to Chinese mainlander) is the best indicator of a propensity to vote for the opposition DPP.'4 Recent elections in Taiwan, however, indicate that this is changing as voters focus on new issues such as corruption and environmental pollution that transcend longstanding debates about whether the political ,, system on Taiwan should or should not be considered part of "China. ' 5 There are no reliable data on opposition support i n Singapore, but i t is often alleged that the Chinese-educated are less likely to vote for the ruling party than are the English-educated. The ruling PAP may therefore be an uncertain coalition of an English-educated elite and a Chinese-educated following. In South Korea, despite rapid modernization and the military' s retire-
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East Asia.'1 Democracy: Progress and LiJTIjts
ment from government, factors other than those anticipated by conven tional analysis have greatly affected support for political opposition . In short, Koreans still tend to view politics from the perspective of their regional affiliation, rather than being influenced by education or income level . In both 1987 and 1 992, Kim Dae Jung was a candidate in presi dential elections. He may yet run under the banner of the National Con gress for New Politics in the upcoming 1 997 elections . Since 1 990, his party has also been the chief opposition party in the National Assembly. The Kim Dae Jung vote has been remarkably consistent. Over 80 percent of the voters who supported him in 1987 voted for him again in 1 992. This support has not, however, brought him to office. In the latter contest, Kim stood against Kim Young Sam, a longstand ing opposition figure and also an unsuccessful candidate in the 1987 elections. In the meantime, Kim Young S am had shifted his position in the party realignment of 1 990 in which he brought his erstwhile opposition grouping into the government. Industrial magnate Chung Ju Yung of the Unification Nation al Party was the third candidate. As Kim ' Young Sam was perceived by many to have changed sides, it was expected that he would lose at least some votes to the other candidates . With Chung not likely to amass enough of a following to win office, Kim Dae Jung had to pick up most of these defectors to win . In the event, the defectors favored Chung, however, thereby denying Kim Dae Jung victory . Kim Dae Jung kept his loyal followers, but was unable to broaden his support base. The most likely explanation for Kim Dae Jung ' s failure to gain office is the regional nature of political support in South Korea. In the Honam/Kwangju region, Kim Dae Jung has consistently captured between 80 and 90 percent of the vote; in Seoul, which accounts for about 25 percent of the electorate, he has managed to capture only about 30 percent of the vote. Interestingly, many in Seoul regard themselves as affiliated with the Honam region despite different voting patterns. In other regions, he has performed poorl y . 1 6 Moreover, those deserting Kim Young S am in 1 992 were primarily from areas beyond his regional base in Yongnam . South Korean electoral behavior is funher complicated by education , but regional affiliation appeared to be the strongest factor in the 1987 and 1 992 results. Likewise, the outcome of 1 995 local elections followed the regional pattern established in 1 9 8 7 and 1 992 . In 1 995, Kim D ae Jung had officially retired but campaigned vigorously, securing a plurality in Seoul. Otherwise, howevp!', his party won only in HonarnlKwaneju. The ruling DLP won everywhere else, except in the home region of Kim Jong Pi!, whose supporters followed him to his new party after he defected from the DLP . I 7 Recent elections in Thailand and the Philippines demonstrate that similar dynamics are at work in these Asian democracies . In Thailand, 1 995 election s brought to power a new coalition led by Chart Thai. This
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led, in turn , to a major realignment of the parties. The pattern of representation was striking testimony to the bases of party support in the country . For example, although Chart Thai had the largest representation nationwide, in the capital it did not win a single seat. Instead, Palang Dharma and Prachakorn Thai, parties much more attuned to policy is sues and thus of greater appeal to the more educated voters in Bangkok, captured the great majority of the seats . The bulk of Chart Thai ' s support came from the rural areas outside the capital, though not from the South, and much of the party' s success may be attributed to the mobilization of voters or rural leaders . This mobilization was achieved either through vote-buying or by simply addressing the particular needs of voters from these areas. In the capital, the buying of votes was much less extensive, and issues and policies were correspondingly more important. One explanation for this difference is that, in the capital , the middle class constituted about 30 percent of the population . IS In addition, the relative decline of Palang Dharma may well be related to the change in leadership from Cham long Srimuang, who had been a strong advocate of the special needs of the city and a fierce critic of corruption, to Thaksin Shinawatra. Although the latter espouses many of the same causes , he is one of the nation ' s richest men , with a fortune that has been linked to government patronage, and so is a much less credible figure. In the Philippine presidential contest of 1 992, neither candidate of the large party machines won, although these parties' power persists. Specif ically, both Ramon Mitra of the LDP and Eduardo Cojuangco, the chief inheritor of the patronage network of Ferdinand Marcos, lost to Fidel Ramos. The factor that was probably crucial to his victory was outgoing president Corazon Aquino' s endorsement. Still , with only 23 .4 percent of the popular vote, his victory was a narrow one and so does not provide overwhelming evidence of a new style of politics . Following the election, Ramos assembled a coalition with the main competing party, as described above, to command a majority in the House and Senate. Although 1 995 legislative elections increased the coalition' s majority in both the House and the S enate, the Ramos administration continued to depend on the cooperation of the LDP to command a floor majority. The next presidential election will probably involve a contest between the major political machines, most likely including the LDP and Lakas NUCD. 19 Even in Taiwan , the relative success of the Kuomintang in local politics can be explained by the party' s ability to mobilize voters using patronage and factional ties, as a number of studies have shown .20
Civil S ociety and Political Culture It should not be presumed that such patterns of political support are static. Although civil society is relatively weak in East Asia, there are
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East Asian Democracy: Progress and Limits
indications that the new politics of citizen mobilization has won some converts. This has influenced parliamentary opposition in Taiwan, and was one reason the DPP took an interest in problems of pollution and environmental degradation, since alliances with groups formed to address these problems brought the party support at the pOllS.21 The more general pattern for organizations of this type, such as the Citizens ' Coalition for Economic Justice in South Korea and the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union, has been to advance their specific issues through selective contact with a variety of political and govern mental figures as well as with the media.22 This pattern of selective contact was not followed in Malaysia, where the Malaysian Trade Union Congress in the early 1 990s openly backed the opposition party Semangat ' 46. In that and other such cases where special-interest groups have not followed a pattern of selective contact, civil society has suffered divisions.23 As Philippe Schmitter has pointed out, state policy has a specific impact (via regulation, encouragement, prohibition, and the like) on the capacity and scope of the elements of civil society to influence policy outcomes.24 Evidence from at least one East Asian case suggests that in principle the state may permit these elements to proliferate while in practice still containing their influence on politics. For example, under the provisions of the Singapore Societies Act, any association of ten or more individuals must be registered and must restrict its activities to those for which the group has been formed. The Registrar of Societies may refuse to register or may expel any association on a variety of grounds, including affiliation with an overseas group deemed contrary to the national interest. Most significantly, any association seeking to influence public policy must register as a political party or movement, effectively rendering illegal any activities defined as "political" by other associations such as lobbying or the dissemination of political information.2s Although some social organizations such as the Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE) have managed to remain active, considerable obstacles to the emergence of an autonomous civil society persist. At the same time, the government has created official channels for managing public demands. One such channel is the Feedback Unit in the Ministry of Community Development, the operations of which encourage especially the better educated to voice in off-the-record hearings their views on government policies. A similar, although in practice somewhat less restrictive, S ocieties Act exists in Malaysia. Selective political action by special-interest groups is a marginal trend at present, but it is likely that this form of politics will have a greater impact on electoral outcomes in the future. Given that East Asian democracies exhibit considerable variation in their treatment of organized social interests, from Singapore' s restrictive approach, as discussed
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above, to the increasingly demanding, even unruly civil society that has emerged in Taiwan in the 1 990s, there is clear potential for change in this aspect of Asian constitutional systems. 26 Although social dynamics are changing constitutional Asia' s patterns of political orientation, the distinctiveness and durability of the received political Central to culture should nevertheless be acknowl edged. Lucian Pye as well as other com Confucianism is an mentators have maintained that Confucian ethical view of ism has had a powerful impact on East government tha t Asian approaches to authority, which in renders compromise turn have conditioned notions of political morally repugnant. opposition and contestation.27 If the term "political culture" includes not merely popular beliefs about authority but also the essentials of the high culture, then this will serve as another important obstacle to the development of a democratic opposition in those cases in which Confucianism continues to have some influence, for several reasons. First, central to Confucian ism is an ethical view of government that renders compromise morally repugnant. S econd, a belief in the superiority and duty to lead of the educated man undercuts the legitimacy of contending interests . Finally, a generally collectivist and organic conception of the state creates conditions unfavorable to adversarial rules of political competition. Although some East Asian statesmen have argued that there is not necessarily an inconsistency between Confucianism and democracy, such arguments are difficult to support.28 According to Confucian theory, the superior men , or chun tzu, have a duty to rule irrespective of the wishes of the masses, while the masses are seen as concerned primarily with their own interests and personal profit and therefore without the moral perception to comprehend the basis of the chun tzu ' s duty . Giving the masses the vote and thus the power to dismiss the chun tzu contravenes the central element of Confucian political thought. This is not a matter of interest solely to historians of ideas. Confucianism continues to influence school curricula in Taiwan, while South Korea' s Confucian lobby is vocal in its criticism of some measures of social reform. Singapore has even tried, with the help of Harvard University professors, to reinvent Confucianism for consumption by a popUlation never especially familiar with it (given the historical lack of a Confucian ruling elite in what was originally an emigrant community). Although Thailand and the Philippines have not been directly influenced by the texts and history of Confucianism, in both cases patron-client relations are pervasive and important enough to be considered crucial elements of the political culture. Thailand also has a deeply entrenched monarchical tradition, which further strengthens a
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Limits
deferential attitude on the part of the masses vis-a-vis the elites.29 In both systems, party solidity and strategy are as likely to result from networks of personal ties to political leaders as from competition for office. This is not to say, however, that conditions in either political system are static.
Prospe cts for Consol idation Other features could be added to those considered above, but none would alter the basic character of the political syndrome that has here been identified . Two central j udgments emerge from this analysis. The first concerns the extent to which the cases examined have certain important political features in common . Although a broadly inductive approach to operating constituti ons-an approach exemplifi ed by B ooks IV through VI of Aristotle ' s Politics-is beyond the scope of the present the essay, the systems analyzed here as a class resemble neither other the nor America North and Europe democracies of Western we political systems of the East Asian region. The second conclusi on be can here analyzed cases can draw relates to the extent to which the more the to conform them of none Although described as "democratic." stringent definition s of democrac y, all satisfy to a degree the view of a democracy held by Joseph Schumpeter. That is, each allows for s people' the for elites g governin potential competitive struggle between political as well as social of process the n i are all r, vote. Moreove
change. To summar ize the features of the cases that have been considered, the rules of the game in the East Asian constitutional systems described here the facilitate political competition, the outcome of which determines rs. paramete d establishe within composit ion of the governme nt, though naliza institutio party Further, . nts incumbe favor , The rules do, however tion is generally weak (even in the case of hegemon ic political movements such as Singapor e' s PAP). Finally, the political sociology and culture of electoral support are not generally conduciv e to a two
party system. a Further consider ation of this group of political systems requires be to appear Taiwan and Korea South review of their dynamic s . While moving toward institutio nalizing and extendin g democratic forms, d in institutio nalizing a Malaysia and Singapore seem to have succeede ,, ,, or "democracy by 31 lism, form of "semi-de mocracy , 30 "electora es , it is too soon for Philippin the and Thailand to default."32 With regard here a definitive judgmen t, though if the whole group of cases analyzed tic, democra least to most were to be placed along a continuu m from how clear not is It middle. the in re somewhe fall these two cases would their long these semidem ocracies will persist in their present forms, but after even that, stability at this level of democratization is a reminder
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important democratic forms have democratization is not inevitable.
become
entrenched,
continued
�ecessary Steps If democracy is to be consolidated rather than contained, several immediate steps must be taken. First, constitutionalism itself must be fu�her embedded . This requires, at the very least, a settled period during whIch the existing constitutional order is recognized and respected. Following this period, changes must be made only after extensive consultation and debate, and with the clear understanding that such changes are being made for the sole purpose of enhancing the operations of the constitutional order. In performing this task, it is important to avoid the predicament Thailand found itself in during the 1 980s: "What Thailand experienced was neither constitutionalism nor constitutional government, but rather different types of regimes that adjusted and readjusted institutional relationships between the executive and the legislative branches in order to strengthen their own positions vis-a-vis their opponents.'033 Here, there is no easy remedy for the present lack of solidity in constitutional arrangements . In fact, the oldest constitutions have been among those most easily altered, while some of the newest constitutions have proved most conducive to political contestation. Here the comparison between Singapore and S outh Korea is instructive. A subordinate area, but one of vital importance, concerns laws relating to electoral procedures and the conduct of political parties. In South Korea, the reforms of 1 994 introduced stringent penalties for improper campaigning and corrupt practices . Under the new rules, candidates must channel all campaign funds through registered bank accounts, with total funds committed not exceeding a specified limit. Further, government fu nding of parties was made proportional to the level of national support the parties receive. This approach followed the German model, and was instituted in South Korea in an attempt to reduce the reliance of parties on funding from business groupS .34 By contrast, Thailand' s Chart Thai administration under the leadership of Chatichai Choonhavan was described as a "buffet" government, with party members taking turns at the "cabinet table" in order to benefit from the distribution of patronage. Similar criticisms led to the resignation of the coalition government of Banharn Silpa-Archa in 1 996. To a great degree, the ability of a political system to entrench constitutionalism rests on its ability to guarantee the rule of law.35 In the past few years, considerable efforts have been made in Taiwan and South Korea to strengthen the rule of law and provide for the indepen dence of the j udiciary . In S outh Korea in particular, many legal officers tainted by their experience with the authoritarian era have resigned or
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East Asian Democracy: Progress and Limits
retired, and the legal profession has reorganized itself in order to uphold proper professional standards. In Malaysia and Singapore, however, legal developments have followed a different course. In Malaysia, Lord President Tun S alleh Abas (the most senior of the judges in Malaysia's highest court) was removed in 1 988 as a result of a direct confrontation with the prime minister. Likewise, in Singapore, the Democratic Law Society (the official association of the consolidation will legal profession) was dissolved after the not proceed without government criticized its leadership. Both an increase in the cases indicate the ease with which this power and status of aspect of democratization may be con the opposition. tained.36 Across the region, party hegemony is either a structural feature of the political system or an aspiration of the parties. A means must be found to ensure that if parties do claim to speak for an all-inclusive national consensus or shared fundamental values, or to embody some deep cultural inheritance, they also recognize that these claims require substantiation and fair electoral tests . Similarly, claims of "performance legitimacy" are much easier to state than to prove. Another difficult problem to consider is the role of regional or communal sentiment in determining political affiliation . As long as politics is conceived in these terms, parties will be able to appeal to such sentiments in order to assemble a majoritarian base of support while excluding minority regions or commu�ities . Some evidence suggests that this strategy is more likely to be employed by the older generation, but in some East Asian constitutional systems the older generation has been slow in passing. Taken together, the communal or regional approach to party affiliation and the generational approach to leadership support the argument that democracy in the region may not follow the pattern prescribed in Western theory . In order for this to change, a more inclusive type of political leadership as well as popular demand for such leadership is required. Democratic consolidation will not proceed without an increase in the power and status of the opposition. The tasks to be performed by opposition groups in these systems are challenging, yet without any real prospects for a change of government, such systems lack public contestation and i nclusiveness, the two essential components of democracy as defined by Robert Dah!.37 In parliamentary systems, where opposition groups are allowed an official presence even if they do not hold office, the opposition must walk a particularly fine line, subjecting members of the governing party to a sustained critique while respecting as legitimate the existing political structures .38 In constitutional East Asia, the exact position of this line is often unclear.
james CotlOn
111
Politics in constitutional East Asia has been as much about the persistence, moderation, or eradication of authoritarianism as about more conventional issues such as wealth redistribution, welfare, employment, and education . While the mobilization of opinion against authoritarian systems has been an important factor in the demise or modification of authoritarian regimes, antiregime movements have not necessarily been able to manage the transition to the role of opposition parties . Indeed, as Alfred Stepan has noted, the (on occasion conspiratorial and always single-minded) strategies and predilections appropriate to the struggle against authoritarianism may obstruct the capacity to aggregate opinions or pursue policy consensus?9 In some of the cases analyzed here, it is not yet clear whether the term "opposition" is entirely appropriate for many of the parties engaged in political contestation. In order for an opposition to be credible, it must be viable as an alternative to the ruling party in government. In Taiwan and South Korea, opposition groups may have reached the point, at least in electoral terms, where they can claim that status. In Thailand, it is difficult to speak of a genuine opposition given that the ruling coalition moves parties in and out of government with regUlarity. Similarly, in the Philippines, electoral contestation is as much about securing a leader' s local power base (often held as a traditional family fief) as it is about changing the shape of national politics. In Malaysia and Singapore, opposition parties are even less viable. Cooperation between Semangat '46, Parti Islam SeMalaysia, and the Democratic Action Party of the type attempted during the 1 995 general election conformed to the tactic of opposing Mahathir bin Mohamad by all available means, but did not make for a coherent program for an alternative government. While Semangat ' 46 was part of the political mainstream, the other parties had a reputation for (Malay and Chinese, respectively) communalism and exclusivity . Meanwhile, in Singapore, the major opposition parties have even cooperated in fielding at election time such a distribution of candidates that it would be possible for them to win in only a minority of seats, precisely to prevent the ruling party from losing office. Finally, in order for democratic consolidation to progress, the various elements of civil society will need to have more freedom as well as more responsibility. For example, in some of the cases described here, civil society has been unable to expand much beyond the restrictive parameters established by the state. Elsewhere, especially in states where civil society is a relatively new phenomenon given the recent transition from authoritarianism, its manifestations are still not sufficiently linked to the political process, which is often regarded as a limited space dominated by democratizers and authoritarians. All of the five conditions regarded by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan as prerequisites for the consolidation of democracy are to be found in
1 12
james Cotton
East Asian Democracy: Progress and Limits
this region ; yet none is sufficiently entrenched so as to be completely unproblematic .40 While the necessary economic prerequisites of demo cratic consolidation are less of a problem in this region than in other regions, such critical political requirements for democracy as the rule of law, the presence of an autonomous political sphere, and a free and Ii vely civil society cannot yet be taken for granted in the cases examined here. In addition, strenuous efforts have been made to build national identities in multiethnic states. Although these efforts have been successful, they must be continued if democratic consolidation is to continue. Democratic consolidation in these cases is a process, not a result.
The Question of Timing The timing of democratization in the cases reviewed here has had and will continue to have a powerful bearing on prospects for consolidation. Malaysia and Singapore have been seen as examples of democracy ' s "second wave" ; South Korea, Taiwan, and perhaps Thailand as examples of the third wave; and the Philippines as at least a partial example of both. For all of these systems, the timing of democratization was crucial. The second wave was part of the process of decolonization; the third wave arose during the era of U.S. hegemony. In Malaysia and Singapore, British decolonization proceeded on the assumption that the political institutions to be left as a legacy should be modeled on the B ritish system. The only concessions made were those deemed expedient and necessary for a constitution to be adopted. For example, in Malaysia, a role for the Malay sultans was preserved while many Chinese were denied the rights of citizenship. In fact, UMNO was dominated for decades by aristocrats with a specifically Malay mission, although they also were strongly influenced by British education and ideas . Similarly, in Singapore, political rights were abridged, with citizenship not initially extended to all inhabitants , and detention without trial permitted for reasons of n ational security . The general perception was that the only alternative to a decolonized political order of this kind was communism, although communism was rejected after i ntense domestic conflict. During the process of decolonization, British-educated elites inspired largely by Fabian socialism captured the political high ground. While the second wave of democratization in Asia was dominated by British political ideas, the third wave was given impetus by the general perception that American political ideas and institutions were superior to those of Britain. The sources of this perception were various, but they included the fact that the U. S . constitution was already an important inspiration for the Republic of China on Taiwan and (from 1 948) successive Korean constitutions, and was also largely replicated in the
1 13
Philippine constitution of 1 935, and democratic movements and critics were assisted by and were often based in the United States. Moreover, by the time the third wave was under way , the alternative economic and social systems of America ' s Cold War antagonists were in visible decline. American approaches to political science dominated the academic discourse in all of the countries studied here, generally overlooking any arguments to the contrary aside from an increasingly discredited Marxism.
A New Context
I
j i
1
Democratization in the 1 980s, insofar as it was affected by external influences and trends, thus proceeded according to an American formula. Democratic consolidation in the 1 990s, however, is occurring and will occur in a radically different context. In particular, the disappearance of the Cold War as a reference point has stimulated a search for new foundations. The perception is widespread that the apogee of American power is over, and that serious fissures in the American social order are a warning to any who would emulate the American system too closely. On the one hand, there has been a rise in the number of indigenous or cultural theories of the polity, including Islamic and Buddhist approaches in Malaysia and Thailand, and Confucianism in Singapore. Similarly, suitable local models are being actively sought in Taiwan and South Korea.41 The Japanese model has also been influential , owing in part to the resurgence in Japan of cultural nationalism and also to the develop ment of the "contempt for America" school of thought. Even in South Korea, though there is a great deal of residual hostility toward and cultural fear of Japan due to historical legacies, notably Japanese colonialism, Japan ' s political dynamics were much studied following the democratic transition of 1 987. The extent to which there exist alternatives to the Western model of democracy continues to be disputed. Even so sanguine a critic as Francis Fukuyama presents a "new Asian authoritarianism" as his alternative vision for the end of history, if liberal democracy is not universally triumphant. In this case, such a "systematic, illiberal and non-democratic alternative will combine technocratic economic rationalism with ,, paternalistic authoritarianism. 42 Without adopting this extreme view, the kind of democracy that is being consolidated in the 1 990s may nevertheless be less like American democracy than might have been the case in the 1 980s. This may affect, in turn, a whole range of political characteristics, possibly including mobilization strategies employed by parties, the prerogatives of government, and conceptions of legitimate rights. A further point related to timing may have even greater consequences for democracy in East Asia than the ones described above. Although any
1 14
East Asi3J1 Democracy: Progress and Limits
prognosis in this area remains uncertain, the democratic consolidation of the 1 990s will proceed in an era of increasing regionalization and globalization.43 This trend was, in fact, one factor contributing to the third wave itself ("people' s power" in the Philippines and American support for Corazon Aquino were powerful i nfluences on Korean popular opinion in 1 9 86), but its influence has now increased Globalization can to the point where the individual national have both beneficial polity is both too large and too small a and deleterious unit of analysis in much political science. imp lications for democratization and The polity is too small because its borders are porous and flexible; it is too large democratic because its constituent elements are influ consolidation. enced as much by what goes on outside those borders as by what transpires within, and so must be analyzed in their own terms . As Kenichi Ohmae has remarked, "the nation state has become an unnatural, even dysfunctional unit for organizing human activity and managing economic endeavor." 44 Individuals may draw their tastes and wants from cosmopolitan models, while organized interests may either focus locally or look beyond their own polities for support, alliances, or resources. Likewise, transnational economic and political actors, including business conglomerates, regional economic groupings, and world organizations, will continue to erode the state both as a source of sovereign prerogatives and as a unit of analysis. All of these trends will therefore influence the scope and character of democratic consolidation, though some will likely operate in ways as yet unforeseen. While the limited reach and increasing permeability of the state has been an enduring theme of political science in its approach to "developing nations" since the 1 960s, this approach will have to be more broadly applied in the 1 990s. International and regional linkages will have an impact on the progress of democracy in the cases analyzed here. For example, the emerging international human rights regime-embodied in UN instru ments and obligations and now a major issue in diplomacy-has already elicited a comprehensive response from Asia in the form of the B angkok Declaration of 1 993, which contained the region ' s contribution to the UN-convened World Conference on Human Rights. Although this response has sought to limit the scope of the international instruments protecting such rights,45 democratic consolidation may yet incorporate some structures for protecting and promoting human rights. On the other hand, regional linkages in East Asia, spanning economic, cultural, and security concerns, will be of great importance. Japan and China will loom large as markets, as sources of capital and technology, and as powerful cultural influences. Already security dialogue in the Regional
James Cotton
1 15
Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has become preoccupied with conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea. Perhaps the biggest uncertainty is the future shape of China and its role in the international system.46 Globalization can have both beneficial and deleterious implications for democratization and democratic consolidation. On the beneficial side, new and less easily censored global telecommunications networks, including the Internet, can expose authoritarian governments to external criticisms while informing the subjects of such regimes of alternative forms of organizing political life. Globalization may, however, have less than benign effects as well. For example, the development of the world market to incorporate major transnational actors and methods of production has i ncreased worldwide demand for the products of the advanced economies , generating also a popular belief in the right to a comparable standard of subsistence and consumption. Many may also find, however, that globalization undermines their freedom to consume by weakening the capacities of their communities to deliver the requisite political and social goods . Evidence of this is abundant. One has only to consider the almost complete destruction in many areas of China in the post- 1 979 era of market-oriented reforms of the system of social welfare, which provided (albeit at a low level in some localities) housing, health care, and education. If this can occur in what is considered one of the region ' s "strongest" states, weaker states in pursuit of globalization may pay an even higher price. Extending this point directly to the political systems in the cases analyzed here, both Malaysia and Thailand have modernized rapidly in the past three decades and exemplify a form of development that employs very little indigenous technology .47 The people in these societies who have prospered have been the elites, especially those with foreign connections, and the benefits of development have been spread very unevenly.48 Moreover, if international conditions change radically as the result of major economic disputes that disrupt the world trading regime, this technology may be withdrawn or redirected, with possibly drastic consequences for employment and welfare in the region . For example, Singapore has now reached income levels comparable to those of Western Europe, but is heavily dependent on transnational capital , with about three-quarters of the city-state' s manufactured exports deriving from the operations of foreign investors . Even South Korea and Taiwan, the most successful at fostering local technology of the cases considered here, are still located in hierarchies of production. They are host to the basic processing entailed in the production of transnational commodities, while design and other value-added activities are often based in Japan.49 In such an environment, the consolidation of democracy may become devalued. Democracy may be seen as a political system that is incapable
1 16
East Asiilll Democracy: Progress and LiInits
of delivering important social and political goods, thereby weakening state capacity at a time when globalizing forces have already eroded the resources and reach of the state. Further, the state ' s ability to engage successfully with the transnational economy or the world market may be regarded as a much more important task than the extension and entrenchment of democracy. This argument is frequently made in Singapore and Malaysia, where the leaders of the PAP and UMNO assert that full-fledged liberal democracy is undesirable because it would shift the focus of state policy to redistributive and welfare issues or ethnic differences and away from the maintenance of those linkages and conditions that make those polities attractive and profitable for transna tional business. Considered as a group, the political systems of the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, and to some extent Malaysia and Singapore as well, are ranged across a continuum in terms of democratic practice and prospects. While progress is being made toward the consolidation of democracy in some respects, various democratic institutions and practices have also been contained in each of the cases, indicatin g that democratization may stop short of full political contesta tion. Moreover, some of the democratic forms that have been success fully adopted suggest that even consolidated East Asian democracies may be distinct from their counterparts elsewhere.50 In particular, hegemonic parties have been slow to relinquish their control, and party support has not followed the typical prescription of pluralist theory. In short, where democratic consolidation has been proceeding, it has not always established the conditions that are fundamental for the reproduction of a Western-style democracy. Finally, the present era may not be as favorable to democratization as the latter part of the 1 980s was . In particular, the imperatives of globalization may reduce the attractiveness of democracy , either because the state may lose its capacity to deliver traditional public goods or because the state's linkages to regional and global economic orders may take on more importance for policy makers . NOTES 1 . S amuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1 9 9 1 ) . 2 . S amuel P . Huntington, "American Democracy i n Relation to Asia," in Robert Bartley
et aI., Democracy and Capitalism: Asian and American Perspectives (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1 99 3 ) , 39-40.
3. Michael Ong, "Government and Opposition in Parliament: The Rules of the Game," in Zakaria Haji Ahmad, ed., Government and Politics of Malaysia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1 987), 40-55 . 4. Christopher Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control i n Singapore (London : Routledge, 1 994), 1 87-227; Francis T. Seow, To Catch a Tartar: A Dissident
1 17
J ames Cotton
in Lee Kuan Yew 's Prison (New Haven, Conn . : Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1 994). 5 . Chin Sok Chong, "The S outh Korean Press," in Donald N . Clark, ed., Korea
Briefing, 1 992 (Boulder, Colo . : Westview/Asia Society, 1 992), 1 1 7-39. 6 . Tan Teng Lang, The Singapore Press: Freedom, Responsibility and Credibility (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1 990). 7 . Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "Thailand: A Stable Semi-Democracy," in Larry Diamond, Juan J . Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries, vol . 3, Asia (Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner, 1 9 89), 324. 8 . Ahn Chung-Si, "Democratization and Political Reform in Korea: Developmeut, Culture, Leadership and Institutional Change," in Doh Chull S hin, Myeong-han Zoh, and Myung Chey, eds . , Korea in the Global Wave of Democratization (Seou l : Seoul National University Press, 1 994), 1 6 1 -7 8 . 9 . Daniel E. King, "The Thai Parliamentary Elections of 1 99 2 : Return t o Democracy in an Atypical Year," Asian Survey 32 (December 1 992): 1 1 09-23. 1 0. David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (Ithaca, N. Y . : Cornell University Press, 1 9 88 ) , 93- \ 03 . 1 1 . Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 7 Apri l 1 99 5 , 29. 12. Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu, "Neo-Authoritarianism, Polarized Conflict and Populism in a Newly Democratizing Regime: Taiwan ' s Emerging Ma,s Politics" (Working Paper No. 9, Conference Group on Taiwan Studies of the American Political Science Association, Duke University, 1 995). 13. Gordon P . Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1 9 9 1 ) , ch. 5; A . B . Shamsul, "Religion and Ethnic Politics in Malaysia," in Charles F. Keyes, Laurel Kendall, and Helen Hardacre, eds . , Asian Visions of Authority: Religion and the Modern States of East and Southeast Asia (Honolul u : University of Hawaii Press, 1 994), 99-1 1 6 . 1 4. F u H u and Yun-han Chu, "Electoral Competition and Political Democratization," in Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, eds . , Political Change in Taiwan (Boulder, Colo . : Lynne Rienner, 1 992), 1 86-97. 1 5 . Yun-han Chu and Tse-min Lin, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan: Social Cleavage, Electoral Competition, and the Emerging Party System." i n Hung-mao Tien, ed., Taiwan 's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave (Armonk, N . Y . : M.E. Sharpe, 1 996), 79- \ 04 . 1 6.
B ae
S un-kwang,
"Continuity
or Change:
The
Voter' s
Choice
in
the
1 992
Presidential Election," in James Cotton, ed., Politics and Policy in the New Korean State:
From Roh Tae -woo to Kim Young-sam (New York: SI. Marti n ' s , 1 995), 66-82; Bae Sun kwang and James Cotton, "Regionalism in Electoral Politics," in James Cotton, ed., Korea
Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratisation,
Northern Policy and Inter-Korean Relations
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1 993), 1 70-84. 1 7 . Korea Newsreview,
I
July 1 995, 4-7 ; Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 July 1 995, 28.
1 8 . Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 June 1 99 5 , 1 4-20; Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "State and S ociety in Thailan d : How Fragile the Democracy?" Asian Survey 33 (September 1 99 3 ) : 879-9 3 . 1 9 . Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 8 May 1 995, 1 6 : and 1 8 June 1 995, 1 6-22. 20.
Joseph B osco,
"Taiwan Factions:
Guanxi, Patronage and the State in Local
Politics," Ethnology 31 (April 1 992): 1 57-8 3 . 2 1 . David W . Chen, "The Emergence o f Environmental Consciousness i n Taiwan," i n
East Asian Democracy: Progress and Limits
118
James Cotton
40. See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan ' s chapter in this collection.
Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., The Other Taiwan: 1 945 to the Present (Armonk, N . Y . : M.E. Sharpe, 1 994), 257-86. 22. Lee S u-Hoon, "Transitional Politics of Korea, 1 987-1 992: Activation of Civil Society," Pacific Affairs 66 (Fall 1 99 3 ) : 3 5 1 -67. 23. James V . Jesudason, "Statist Democracy and the Limits to Civil Society in Malaysia,"
Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 33 (November 1 995): 335-56. 24. See Philippe C . Schmitter ' s chapter in this collection. 25. Beng-huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (London: Routledge,
1 995),
204-5;
Tremewan,
The Political Economy of Social Control in
4 1 . Clark D . Neher, "Asian Style Democracy," Asian Survey 34 (November 1 994) : 949-6 1 ; Kishore Mahbubani, "The Dangers of Decadence," Foreign Affairs 72 (September 1 993) : 1 0- 1 4 . 4 2 . Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Londo n : Penguin, 1992), 243. See also his "Democracy ' s Future: The Primacy of Culture," Journal of Democracy 6 (January 1 9 9 5 ) : 7- 1 4. 4 3 . David Held and Anthony McGrew, "Globalization and the Liberal Democratic State," Gove rnment and Opposition 28 (Spring 1 99 3 ) : 261-88. 44. Kenichi Ohmae, "The Rise of the Region State," Foreign Affairs 72 (Spring 1 99 3 ) :
Singapore, 1 95-96. 26. Thomas B. Gold, "Civil Society and Taiwan ' s Quest for Identity," in Stevan Harrell and Huang Chun-chieh, eds . ,
Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan (Boulder, Col o . :
Westview, 1 994), 47-68 . 2 7 . Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 987) ; Peter R. Moody, Political Opposition in Post-Confucian Societies (New York: Praeger, 1 9 8 8) . 2 8 . For a n energetic exposition of this position, see Lee Teng-hui' s chapter i n this collection. 29. Alfred W.
McCoy,
ed., An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in
the Philippines (Quezon City, the Philippines : Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1 994); Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 April 1 995, 2 1 . 30. William Case, "Semi-Democracy i n Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures for Regime Change," Pacific Affairs 66 ( S ummer 1 99 3 ) : 1 83-205 ; Harold Crouch, "Malaysia: Neither Authoritarian nor Democratic," in Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison, and Garry Rodan, eds., Southeast Asia in the 1 990s: A u thoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism (S ydney : Allen and Unwin, 1 993), 1 33-58 ; Garry Rodan, e d . , Singapore Changes Guard:
Social, Political and Economic Directions in the 1990s (New York: St. Marti n ' s , 1 993); Huntington, The Third Wave, 295 . 3 1 . Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative
Politics 23 (October 1 990-9 1 ) : 1 4 . 3 2 . Laurence Whitehead, "The Alternatives to 'Liberal Democracy' : A Latin American
3 3 . Samudavanija, "Thailan d : A Stable Semi-Democracy," 320. 34. Huh Young, "Laws Alone Cannot B ring Political Reform," Korea Focus 2 (May-June 1 994) : 22-3 1 .
Law and Political Authority in South Korea
78. 45. James T . H . Tang, ed., Human Rights a n d International Relations i n the Asia Pacific Region (London : Pinter, 1 995); Bilahari Kausikan, "Asia' s Different Standard," Foreign Policy 92 (Fall 1 99 3 ) : 24-4 1 . 46.
David
S.G.
Goodman
and Gerald
Segal, eds . ,
(Seoul : Kyungnam
University Press, 1 990), 2 1 4- 1 5 .
3 6 . T u n S alleh Abas, The Role of the Independent Judiciary (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Promarketing, 1 9 89); H . P . Lee, Constitutional Conflicts in Contemporary Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Oxford University Press, 1 995); Seow, To Catch a Tartar. 3 7 . Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, Con n . : Yale University Press, 1 9 7 1 ) , 6-7. 3 8 . Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 9 9 1 ), 89. 3 9 . Alfred Stepan, "On the Tasks of a Democratic Opposition," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds. , The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 993), 67.
China Deconstructs (London :
Routledge, 1 994); Jack A. Goldstone, "The Coming Chinese Collapse," Foreign Policy 99 (Summer 1 99 5 ) : 35-5 3 . 47 . Yoshihara Kunio, The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism i n South-East Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1 9 8 8 ) ; Kit G . Machado, "Proton and Malaysia's Motor Vehicle Industry: National Industrial Policies and Japanese Regional Production," in Jomo K . S . , ed . ,
Japan and Malaysian Development i n the Shadow of the Rising Sun (London: Routledge, 1 994), 29 1 -325. 4 8 . Edmund T . Gomez, Political Business: Corporate Involvement of Malaysian Political Parties (Townsville, A ustralia: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1 994). 49. Mitchell Bernard and John Raven hiII, "Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese: Regionalization, Hierarchy, and the Industrialization of East Asia," World Politics 47 (Janu ary 1 99 5 ) : 1 7 1 -209. 50. James Cotton, "The Limits to Liberalization in Industrializing Asia: Three Views of the State," Pacific Affairs 64 (Fall 1 99 1 ) : 3 1 1-27.
Perspective," in David Held, ed., Prospects for Democracy: North. South. East. West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1 993), 325.
35. Dae-Kyu Yoon,
1 19
II Taiwan
5 TAIWAN'S TRANSFORMATION Hung-mao Tien
Hung-mao Tien is p resident of the Institute for National Policy Research in Taiwan and a member of the National Unification Research Council. He is also a policy advisor to President Lee Teng-hui and a director of the Foundation for International Cooperation and Develop ment. His books include The Great Transition : Social and Political Change in the Republic of China (1989) and Taiwan ' s Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition : Riding the Third Wave (/996).
O
n 28 September 1 986, about 1 30 opposition activists gathered in Taipei ' s landmark Grand Hotel to discuss the formal organization of a new opposition party and the nomination of candidates for the year-end legislative election s . ! For years , Taiwan ' s opposition movements had participated in elections under the ad hoc group label tangwai Oiterally, "non-Kuomintang"), as the authoritarian Kuomintang (KMT) regime had outlawed new parties, permitting non-KMT candidates to compete in elections only as individuals.2 Although tangwai activists had taken gradual steps to coordinate their efforts since the late 1 970s, it was not until the afternoon session of the Grand Hotel convention that the spontaneous birth of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) occurred when the convention unanimously endorsed a last-minute motion for immediate action to organize the party .3 The birth of the DPP took the authorities by surprise. Only two days earlier, the minister of justice had reiterated the government' s objection to the "illegal" formation of any new parties. Even so, Chiang Ching-kuo, then KMT party chairman, took no immediate action against the organizers. The D PP ' s birth and the KMT authorities' tolerance marked the beginning of democratic transition in the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC). In subsequent years, the ruling elite adopted a series of liberali zation measures as well as democratic reforms . Although elements of the authoritarian regime lingered, many repressive institutions, legal impedi ments, and practices were dismantled . Thus, less than a decade after the
Taiwan ' s Transfonnation
1 24
transition began, Taiwan is entering the consolidation phase of democra tization, even though the transition involved complex political maneuver ing and tense interactions among various political actors and forces. By and large, Taiwan' s democratic transition has incurred relatively low social costs . Taiwan ' s rapid democratic development has not led to significant economic decline, social unrest, or serious political turbulence. Nonetheless , continuing ethnic divisions and the accompanying dispute over national identity pose serious impediments to Taiwan' s democratic consolidation. This essay analyzes Taiwan' s democratic transition and assesses the prospects for democratic consolidation beyond the fIrst popular presidential election in Taiwan in March 1 996. Taiwan ' s democratic transition has been variously characterized as "transformation," "reform," and "transition through transaction."4 Terminological differences aside, these theories share a common theme: the dynamics of democratic transition involve strategic interaction or negotiation between the incumbent elite and its opposition.s The incum bent regime is not overthrown or replaced, nor does it collapse. Instead, it remains in power throughout the transition, or at least through the most critical phase, and controls the direction, pace, and political agenda of the transition.6 Taiwan ' s transition has exhibited this incumbent-oppo sition dynamic ; the incumbent KMT has changed in response to opposition demands and, in turn, has influenced opposition behavior. Democratic transition from its threshold to its consolidation consists of two developmental phases. The first involves the termination of authoritarian rule; the second, the adoption of fundamental democratic institutions and rules .7 Though Taiwan has experienced only one decade of formal democratic development since the birth of the DPP, elements of democracy such as electoral participation did exist at local-govern ment levels prior to the 1 986 breakthrough . Indeed, Taiwan ' s democratic transition was hastened by a series of pretransition democratic elements .
Pretransition Politics Though the breakthrough of the DPP in 1 986 is generally considered the beginning of Taiwan ' s democratic transition, it in fact represents the culmination of years of democratic evolution . Despite official suppres sion, political movements against the hegemonic KMT were never com pletely absent from Taiwan ' s political landscape.8 In virtually every local election, from township to provincial assembly, anti-KMT candidates who ran as unaffiliated individuals won seats and captured mayoral and magistrate posts, even though KMT authorities violated the rules of fair electoral competition. The KMT outlawed opposition parties, strictly monitored and sanitized the mass media, and subjected anti-KMT candidates to harassment and, occasionally, arrest. Entire state institutions and their resources were mobilized to support KMT candidates. Though
1 25
Hung-mao Tien
campaign periods served as "democracy holidays" during which authorities temporarily suspended harsh restrictions on freedom of expression and political activity, such freedom was short-lived if not illUSOry. Once elections ended, individuals could be subjected to retroactive legal recourse for their acts and opinions of this period. As a result, some antigovernment activists in North America, Japan, and Europe advocated the violent overthrow of the KMT. By the mid1 9 80s, the KMT faced the difficult choice between continuing repression at the risk of violent conflict and exchanging democratic concessions for peace. At the same time, Taiwan' s i ndigenous population demanded re distribution of political power along ethnic lines, which resulted in the breakup of mainlanders' monopoly of legislative control. Thus the KMT elite faced the threat of isolation and criticism from abroad and ethnic uprising at home, and feared that liberalizing measures might trigger retribution from mainland China. In the later years of President Chiang Ching-kuo' s life, the KMT un dertook liberalization measures in response to popular demands and external pressure, especially from the United States .9 Opposition move ments intensified their political activities throughout the late 1 970s and 1 980s. The number of dissident social movements and protests for civil reforms i ncreased from 1 75 incidents in 1 9 8 3 to 1 . 1 72 incidents in 1 986, reflecting a heightened public consciousness. !O Opposition activists manipulated social and political arenas to their advantage, confronting authorities in the street, in the legislature, and in foreign countries, and mediating dialogues through respected academics and social notables. 1 1 Across the Taiwan S trait, Beijing was preoccupied with economic modernization and reducing military spending under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang. By 1 986, KMT leaders were convinced that democratization would enhance U.S . support without risking military pressure from China. 1 2 Chiang Ching-kuo initiated major political reforms in 1 986. Initially, he appointed a blue-ribbon task force consisting of 1 2 KMT leaders to study and offer advice on a wide range of issues, including institutional overhauls, lifting martial law, and KMT party reform. 1 3 In perhaps his most significant democratic move, Chiang chose to take no action against the DPP on its formation in late 1986. In short, Taiwan ' s initial transition from authoritarianism was propelled by both broad-based opposition and protest movements and the KMT ' s responsive political engineering. Consistent with transition theory, its "traj ectory of transition" reflects the dynamic of strategic interaction between the authoritarian incumbents and emerging anti-KMT forces . 1 4
Indigenous Politics In January 1 9 8 8 , Chiang Ching-kuo passed away . Within hours of his death, the powerful KMT Central Standing Committee-the party' s
1 26
Taiwan's Transformation
highest decision-making body-endorsed Vice-President Lee Teng-hui as Chiang' s successor. Military leaders quickly seconded this decision, ' eliminating fears of a succession crisis. The business community also urged a smooth leadership transition in order to avert negative effects on Taiwan ' s robust economy . Lee' s endorsement was no great surprise, as KMT leaders who faced continuing challenges from domestic opposition activists and from Chinese communists across the Taiwan Strait strongly favored maintaining political stability . In addition, KMT ruling elites apparently expected the formation of a collective leadership S that would include the key figures among the party ' s old guard. I Despite having been Taipei' s mayor as well as the governor of Taiwan, Lee was perceived to be politically weak and without a strong power base. The KMT elites' expectation of an oligarchical collective proved to be misguided. Lee ' s Taiwanese background and Chiang Ching-kuo' s blessin g gave Lee the broad-based support necessary at critical times during the power transition. His Taiwanese background emerged as both an asset and a liability, however. Although native Taiwanese had given Lee strong popular support in part because of ethnic affinity, many mainlanders questioned his stand on the eventual unification of Taiwan and China. Lee' s efforts to accommodate these opposing views, as well as his commitment to political reform, fueled substantial controversy within the party. With time, the incumbent elite divided into Lee's supporters and opponents. His popularity and skillful politickingI 6 could not halt the ever-deepening intraparty division, and many mainlander members who had been standard-bearers for the ruling party became increasingly alienated from it. I7 In retrospect, Lee' s succession to the KMT leadership may have saved the party from faltering in its democratic transition . Native Taiwanese sentiment that the KMT was a relentlessly oppressive alien regime had increased over time. In the postauthoritarian "founding elections" of 1 989, 1 99 1 , and 1 992, the KMT, possessing a more indigenous character under Lee, prevailed over the predominantly Taiwanese DPP to gain control of the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly . In the end, dissenting mainlander party members either joined a critical minority power bloc within the party or left the KMT to organize the New Party (NP) in 1 99 3 . In this manner, the KMT managed to postpone, if not avoid entirely, the consequences of a "stunning election . " 1 8
The Role of "Confining Conditions" Much of the political-culture literature argues that the evolution and persistence of a democracy requires certain supportive habits and attitudes among the general public . 1 9 Taiwan possesses social and
Hun g-mao Tien
1 27
ec onomic characteristics that shape its continuing transition, as well as what Terry Lynn Karl has described as "confining conditions"-that is, structural and institutional constraints that shape the available options for transition strategy.20 These confining conditions in Taiwan have both encouraged and inhibited the transition process. 1 ) Strength of the KMT. Taiwan has a strong ruling party, the KMT, which exercises corporatist control over the state as well as society.21 Over the years, the party has institutionalized its control over major occupational groups : the state bureaucracy, the military, the judiciary, and even a large segment of the mass media. Moreover, the party has extended its corporatist control into many areas of society . Thus, in the absence of regime rupture, democratic transition must evince the party ' s retreat from not only the state ' s ruling apparatus, but also the civil society. 2) Ethnic divisions in democratic transition. Democratic transition has developed synchronously with two other political processes : the indigenization of political power and nation-building. Democratization confers a greater share of power on indigenous Taiwanese and correspondingly weakens the domination of the mainlander political elite. From a nation-building standpoint, democratization politicizes the previously hidden wishes of many native Taiwanese to seek a new national identity without sovereign ties to mainland China. Accordingly, the issues of national identity and the interethnic redistribution of power have compounded the difficulties inherent in transition strategy.22 3) Th reat of force from the mainland. The specter of forced reunification with the People' s Republic of China (PRC) has always hung over Taiwan . Political extremism could cause the sort of chaos that would provide the PRC with a convenient excuse to conquer Taiwan by military force. This "China factor" has fostered moderation throughout the political struggles between the ruling elite and opposition activists, with neither party wishing to trigger a violent confrontation with the mainland. Because of its close links to ethnic and national-identity issues, the China factor has profoundly shaped the political divisions within both the elite and the general public. The debate over the nature and path of democratic reform will continue to center on maximizing or minimizing the impact of the China factor on domestic political strategy. 4) Large middle class. Taiwan lacks politically salient class antago nism, as big capitalists are few and do not play a significant political role.23 Trade unionism is politically disenfranchised; a large number of poorly organized small and medium-sized enterprises populate the business world. These entrepreneurs, along with professionals, managers, and intellectuals, form a large new business class that has been at the forefront of democratic and social movement. This middle class seeks both reformism and stability, but it evidently opposes political extrem ism. While democracy may be the product of political crafting, the
128
Taiwan I S TraI1Sformation
presence of a large middle class in Taiwan has paved the way for a broad-based democratic movement similar to those of many third wave nations .24 5) History of electoral politics. Elections and political parties have played major roles from the beginning of Taiwan ' s democratic transition and, indeed, have existed in Taiwan since the 1 950s . As an external regime, the KMT implemented local elections in 1 949 to confer legitimacy on the party and elicit feedback to gauge party performance.25 Local elections eventually led to the emergence of opposition activists who competed regularly and used the relative permissiveness of the campaign seasons to air their discontent and to press for political reform. As a byproduct of local elections during authoritarian rules, unorganized opposition activists and local factions gradually contributed to the erosion of the KMT ' s authoritarian foundation. Furthermore, elections contributed to the habitualization of electoral practices, hastening democratization in the 1 980s.26 Although the KMT originally manipulated the local factions that competed in these elections to preserve its political hegemony , the party eventually came to depend on these links to win elections. The KMT' s incumbent elite gradually became responsive to the demands of local political forces . Thus local and provincial elections played an important role in socializing democratic values by institutionalizing a fundamental democratic procedure and directing opposition movements to organize political parties.27 6) Evolution of factionalism. According to conventional theory, both incumbents and opposition challengers may be differentiated into two further subdivisions: incumbents into conservatives and reformers, and challengers into radicals and moderates. Political bargaining during democratic transition entails interaction between incumbent reformers and conservatives on one hand, and opposition radicals and moderates on the other. This perspective, which originated with studies of Latin America and Southern Europe, shortchanges other players in the transition process when applied to Taiwan, however. Taiwan' s ruling elite is not divided merely at the center when it comes to major reform measures ; political factions at county and city levels also play important roles in intraparty power struggles and alliances .28 Reformers at the party center have relied heavily on local factions to gain strategic advantages on ethnic and constitutional issues. Furthermore, academics and activists have played major roles in promoting constitutional revision, civil liberties, civil autonomy, elections, and legislative restructuring. Many have no ties to political parties, but are instead intellectuals who command respect and deference in Taiwanese society .29 Neither the ruling party nor the opposition can ignore the effects of these actors ' participation; in fact, both compete for their affiliation.
Hung-mao Tien
1 29
7) Confucian ethic. Supposedly Taiwan, like other East Asian countries, should be culturally constrained from developing democrati cally because of the persistence of a Confucian ethic. 3D Indeed, some commentators have suggested that Taiwan' s democratization appears promising precisely because Taiwan lacks strong Confucian values and traditions.3l Historically, Confucianism did lend support to Chinese imperial autocracy, and as a philosophical system, it contained no articulation of human rights .32 Confucianism' s personal values revolve around personal ethics, humanism, and familism: teachings that engender an acceptance of authoritarianism. Likewise, the emphasis on group behavior fosters hierarchical social order and factional networking rather than the individualism and autonomy typically associated with democratic societies.33 Yet some scholars argue that the Confucian educational system, based on examination, provides egalitarian social mobility that is consistent with democratic ideals .34 Such pedagogical questions as the influence of Confucianism in Taiwan and whether Confucianism is truly antithetical to democracy cannot be verified empirically with any degree of precision .
Democratic Consolidation As Donald Share has observed, "The artificial boundaries to delimit the beginning and end of the transition to democracy are necessarily ,, imperfect. 35 His statement accurately reflects Taiwan' s democratic transition, in which consolidation, institutionalization, and the early maintenance of a new democratic regime overlap. Because of the KMT ' s continued dominance, Taiwan ' s transition has been largely incremental, demonstrating Lee Teng-hui' s determination to maximize intraparty consensus whenever possible. Thus efforts to initiate change can proceed only within the framework of maintaining continuity with the past-namely, with the authoritarian regime. The national flag, anthem, constitutional structure-even the name Republic of China-are all symbols of the authoritarian regime, preserved despite significant controversy . KMT reform initiatives and strategies reveal political choices aimed at compromise among such diverse groups as conser vatives, activists , opposition parties, and the increasingly assertive leaders of local political factions. This consensual approach requires founding leaders to control the political climate while incorporating support from the most powerful members of the authoritarian coalition, allowing for a rapid yet orderly transition . While Taiwan ' s transition to and consolidation of democracy have been relatively smooth so far, two fundamental issues complicate uninterrupted progress toward democracy. First, while consolidation theorists maintain that the loyalty of the citizenry to a state possessing
1 30
Taiwan ' s Transfonnation
a definite national boundary is a precondition for a modern democratic state, there is no public or political consensus on Taiwan ' s national identity .36 Few mainlanders in Taiwan-who constitute nearly 15 percent of Taiwan' s population-would accept Taiwan' s status as an independent state permanently severed from the mainland. At the same time, the great majority of DPP members and supporters take the opposite position. The two sides of this debate are unlikely to reach consensus in the foreseeable future; even such democratic devices as the plebiscite proposed by the DPP provide no adequate solutions . Consequently, nationality-based issues such as the national constitution, name, flag, and boundaries remain sources of serious political contention. In the absence of regime-level consensus on the central issue of identity, the future of democracy in Taiwan remains unclear. The successful presidential election in 1 996 implicitly addresses the question of national identity by signaling the fundamental shift in orientation of the Taiwanese regime from the mainland to a separate Taiwanese identity . Thus the 1 996 presidential election serves a dual purpose: it is a symbol of the conclusive phase of democratic consolida tion and is an important step in nation-building.37 Mainland Chinese leaders regard the nation-building aspect of the election as a serious irritant given China' s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. On the other hand, the DPP uses the election as a basis for asserting Taiwan' s separate identity. Popular election o f the president has served a s an important catalyst for debate over whether Taiwan has established itself as a de jure independent state that has already cut the reins of mainland control . The second challenge to Taiwan ' s democratic progress is the historical entrenchment of the KMT. Whether Taiwan' s political institutions are capable of adapting to the uncertainties inherent in a two-party or mUltiparty system will not be apparent until opposition parties take over the leadership. Given the present dual-executive system, a hybrid regime consisting of a KMT president and an opposition premier could test the loyalty of the military and security forces, who have been socialized not only to rej ect the idea of Taiwan ' s indepen dence but also to associate it with the DPP. With divisive issues as deeply rooted as national identity and with the institutional response to a democratic political system uncertain, the true test of the viability of Taiwan' s democratic consolidation lies beyond the 1 996 presidential election . During Taiwan ' s democratic transition from 1 986 t o 1 995, the KMT sponsored numerous reform measures. A mixture of presidential decrees (before the emergency regime was dismantled in 1 993), KMT intraparty resolutions, legislative acts, and constitutional revisions aimed to weaken the regime' s authoritarian practices and liberalize Taiwan ' s political climate; others specifically sought to i nstall democratic institutions and
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procedures (see Table 1 ) . Such reform measures address six major aspects of democratic consolidation: regime transformation, or the adoption of a democratic constitution; civilian control over the military and security forces ; development of a fair and competitive electoral system; formation of a two-party or multiparty system; institutionaliza tion of a representative legislature; and autonomy of civil society.38 Because most democratic theorists agree that neither a universal definition of democracy nor a single process of consolidation exists, each evolving polity must follow a unique path to its own con solidation .39 Accordingly, transitologists follow Robert Dahl' s lead in using the "procedural minimum" approach to defining democracy.40 This theory posits that public contest for executive and representative offices and popular participation in the political process are the two cardinal dimensions of democratic consolidation while underscoring the impor tance of all six major aspects of democratic consolidation listed above. The collective literature on democratic development provides the schematic framework for this analysis of Taiwan ' s experience.
Regime Transformation and the Constitution The Republic of China ' s constitution, adopted in 1 947, was intended to encompass all of the mainland provinces as well as Taiwan. B ut before it had the opportunity to practice fully a constitutional govern ment on the mainland, the KMT regime was embroiled in civil war. Once the ruling KMT forces were defeated and exiled to Taiwan, ROC jurisdiction was greatly curtailed. Faced with a hostile communist regime across the Strait and a Taiwanese population of uncertain loyalty, the KMT installed an authoritarian ruling structure. Throughout the 1 950s, the hegemonic KMT regime transformed itself into an emergency regime by imposing martial law and establishing repressive institutions such as the Taiwan Garrison Command, as well as suspending many articles of the constitution under the so-called Temporary Provisions of martial law. Because of this background, Taiwan ' s democratic transition initially involved a revived commitment to constitutionalism, accompanied by steps to dismantle the authoritarian apparatus and end the state of emergency. Once these reforms were under way , open debate about transformation to a constitutional regime became possible. From 1 987 to 1 992, the KMT adopted liberalization measures that restored suspended civil rights and lent substance to the democratic transition . Among other things, the KMT abolished martial law in 1 987 and replaced it with the more democratically acceptable National Security Law and Civil Organization Law. The party also lifted the ban on travel to the mainland and passed a set of new laws guaranteeing freedom of speech , association, and other forms of public assembly. In 1 99 1 , President Lee declared the end of the state of emergency. Shortly
Table 1
-
Important Milestones in Taiwan's Democratic Transition, 1987-95
Refonn Article
Date
Content of Original Law
Content of Law After Refonn
Proponents
Opponents
Remarks
Martial law lifted.
711 5/87
Constitutional law regarding the protection of freedom and citizen rights is sus-
Constitutional protection of freedom and citizen rights is restored.
KMT chairman Chiang Ching-kuo
KMT conservative faction
Opposition parties play an important role in prompting the lifting of martial law.
Press restrictions lifted.
111188
Registration of new newspapers may be restricted and number of pages per issue may be limited.
Registration of new newspapers is opened and restrictions on the number of pages a1lowed per issue are relaxed.
KMT
Opposition parties play pivotal supporting role in refonn.
Assembly and Parade Law passed.
1120/88
Popular assembly and demonstration is forbidden during period of martial law.
Nonns established for acceptable popular assembly and demonstration.
KMT
Opposition parties lend strong support but have · serious arguments with KMT over content of legislation.
Public Officials Eledion and Recall Law, Articles 8, 26, and 50, revised.
1126/89
No quotas on membership by party affiliation in election committees.
Members of Central Elections Commission representing one political party may not exceed one-half of total membership. Restrictions on political candidates and campaign activities also relaxed.
KMT
KMT support of opposition parties' calls for revision of the law is crucial to the success of the refonns.
Law on Civic Organization revised, permitting fonnation of opposition parties.
1126/89
Fonnation of political parties is prohibited during period of martial law.
Only an official registration is required for the fonnation of new political parties.
KMT
KMT party affiliates accept the reality of a changed political environment.
Statute of Involuntary Retirement of Parliamentarians passed.
6/21190
Council of Grand Justices Interpretation No. 31 states: "Until free elections can be held all over China for the second tenn of the Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan, the flfst tenn representatives of these two government brmlches will continue to exercise constitutiona authority."
Council of Grand Justices Interpretation No. 26 1 overrules Interpretation No. 3 1 , requiring all flfst-tenn representatives to retire by 3 1 December 1 99 1 .
KMT refonn faction
KMT conservative faction
Opposition parties and student activism are crucial in prompting the involuntary retirement resolution.
First stage of constitutional refonn.
4/22/9 1
Council of Grand Justices Interpretation No. 3 1 rules that first-tenn Legislati ve and Control Yuan representatives will continue to hold authority until the election assembly for the second tenn can be convened.
Second-tenn representatives will be elected by eligible voters in territories under effective jurisdiction of the ROC.
KMT refonn faction
KMT conservative faction
Opposition parties and student activism provide strong support for COo1prehensive election refonn in the legislature.
Period of National Mobilization for the Snppression of Communist Rebellion terminated; Temporary Provisions abolished.
51119 1
Portions o f constitution are suspended by "Temporary Provisions" effective during the Period of National Mobilization.
Constitutional rule is restored.
KMT refonn faction
KMT conservative faction
Lifting of the National Mobilization law is closely connected to the long-tenn democratic movement pushed forward by the opposition parties.
Statutes for the Punishment of Insurrection abolished.
5/22/9 1
Contents in viollation of the constitution.
Criminal Code regulations are restored.
KMT
pended.
KMT replaces old statutes with the National Security Law.
Table 1 Reform Article
Date
Statutes for Purging of Communist
6/3/9 1
-
Continued
Content of Original Law
Content of Law After Reform
Proponents
Contents in violation of the
Criminal Code regulations are restored.
KMT
KMT advocates replacement of old statutes with new espionage laws.
Restoration of constitutional protections of the individuaL
KMT
Former law is replaced by Law for Preservation of Social Order.
Special elections by functional groups are abolished and election system is expanded so that a small portion of parliamen-
KMT
Regarding the party-list proportional system, the KMT strongly supported a one-ballot system, while the opposition parties advocated a two-ballot system.
constitution.
Opponents
Agents abolished.
Law on Police
612919 1
Public Officials Election and Recall
Coutents in violation of the constitution.
Authority to Punish Misdemeanors abolished.
8/2/9 1
Law, Articles 3 and 3 1 , amended.
Criminal Code, Article 1 00, revised.
Law of Public
tary seats, representing nationwide and overseas constituencies, are elected by proportional representation.
5/1 6/92
A person who prepares or conspires to commit an act of treason against the state shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six months, and not more than five years.
611 5/93
Military
8/93
Coalition of opposition parties
Mandates compulsory financial disclosure by public officials.
Opposition parties
Military personnel on active
Military personnel on active
duty may openly participate
KMT
duty must withdraw from all political-party activities and are forbidden to attend KMT
Officials Financial Disclosure
depoliticized.
Language pertaining to "prepares or conspires" is deleted, making action, rather than intention, punishable.
in KMT internal party meetings.
KMT
KMT
Remarks
Dissent expressed by KMT-affiliated committee members.
KMT committee members voice opposition to reforms . Opposition parties press actively for separation of the military from political parties
internal party meetings.
and end to covert political activity by proKMT generals.
University Law,
Political parties may not
No regulations restricting orga-
organize on school campuses.
nization of political parties on campuses.
6/3/94
Strict eligibility requirements greatly restrict political candidates.
Restrictions on eligibility for political candidacy are relaxed.
Opposition party
Third stage of constitutional reform.
7/28/94
President and vice-president will be elected by eligible voters in the territories under effective juriisdiction of the ROC.
President and vice-president will be directly elected by the public in territories under effecti ve jurisdiction of the ROC.
KMT reform faction
Bill passed restoring citizen rights in suspension under martial law.
1 1 1 7/95
Constitutional protection of citizen rights is restored.
Opposition party
1217193
Article 30, Clause I, amended. Public Officials Election and Recall Law, Article 32, revised.
Opposition party
KMT
KMT committee mem-
bers voice opposition to reforms.
KMT conservative faction
Opposition parties play strong role in calling for direct popular presidential elections.
Taiwan ' s Transformation
thereafter, the Temporary Provisions were repealed and the Taiwan Garrison Command abolished. Finally, following a series of public and legislative confrontations, the controversial Article 1 00 of the Criminal Code was revised, removin g the last legal barrier to freedom of speech in Taiwan and freeing advocates of Tai wanese independence from j ail. During this transformation, KMT reformers used their Two crucial issues mass-mobilization skills to garner wide persisted throughout spread support for Lee' s liberalizing mea Taiwan's regime sures. Even KMT conservatives lent support transformation: national identity and to reform, albeit reluctantly, in response to the rising costs of repression. form of government. Two crucial issues persisted throughout Taiwan' s regime transformatio n: national identity and form of government. National-identity issues engendered a host of questions regarding ROC state boundaries and the application of the constitution to the whole of China, including the mainland. Because the KMT continued to insist on its sovereignty over the mainland, it categorically rejected the idea of a new constitution espoused by the DPP and other indigenous forces. Accordingly, constitutional debate focused from the start on amendments to the existing constitution rather than the adoption of a new constitution . In addition, there was consider able debate over whether the president should be popularly elected or indirectly elected via an electoral college. National-identity issues were paramount to regime transformation and were linked directly to the rise of the opposition movement. Before the formation of the DPP, opposition movements were not distinct from the Taiwanese independence movements, which were active overseas during the state of emergency in Taiwan . The DPP differed from these early opposition movements by incorporating both democratic activists and independence advocates, which led to the coexistence of two groups in the party : radicals who were militant proponents of a new independent Taiwan and moderates who stressed the democratic process of self determination in shaping Taiwan ' s future. The DPP used election campaigns from 1 986 to 1 99 1 to propagate its views and solicit popular support.41 For example, in the 1986 legislative elections, 17 DPP candidates adopted a common platform urging "self-determination of Taiwan ' s future" at a time when the DPP was condoned by the KMT but not formally accepted by law . The DPP also adopted a platform endorsing Taiwan independence if mainland China attempted to take over Taiwan by force or if the KMT negotiated with Chinese communists. Three years later in the 1 989 legislative elections, the DPP took an additional step, promoting a "new state with a new constitution ." On the eve of the National Assembly elections in late 1 99 1 , the DPP convention amended this platform, stating that "the
H ung-mao Tien
1 37
formation of an independent sovereign Republic of Taiwan with the establishment of a new constitution must be decided upon by all Taiwan ,, inhabitants through a plebiscite. 42 A year later, the DPP proposed a new draft con stitution for the Republic of Taiwan. In response, PRC president Yang Shangkun warned that "those who play with fire will be burned to ashes ."43 Perhaps in response to these DPP activities, popular sentiment regarding democratic transition has changed significantly. According to one study, only 1 0.5 percent of Taiwan residents believed in 1986 that democratization would inevitably affect national identity and crystallize the inherent potential for mainlander-Taiwanese ethnic conflict; by 1 989, this figure had risen to 3 1 .9 percent.44 The KMT, in contrast, has consistently maintained its commitment to the ultimate unification of mainland China and Taiwan. Despite intraparty divisions over the form of government and the electoral method, the KMT remains united on revising the current constitution rather than designing a new regime. As divisions on n ational identity came to the forefront of the constitutional debate, seeking a consensus of the elite became increas ingly important for Taiwan ' s democratic transition.45 The decline of electoral support for the KMT and the corresponding decline in the party' s ability to dictate the transition ' s process and goals have further amplified this need.46 In an attempt to resolve some important constitu tional disagreements, President Lee assembled the elite-based National Affairs Conference (NAC) in 1 990 to develop a common agenda for future political reform, addressing constitutional issues and Taiwan-main land rel ations in particular.47 To obtain the broadest input, the NAC held more than one hundred meetings throughout Taiwan in addition to its regular sessions in Taipei. Although the large size, political diversity, and ad hoc nature of the NAC made it exceedingly difficult to reach any agreement, NAC meetings did lead to decisions on four major points : 1 ) to repeal the Temporary Provisions that had circumscribed constitutional rights , suspended civil liberties , and vested the president with emergency powers ; 2) to change the Legislative Yuan by forcing the retirement of the "old crooks"-Iegislators who had been "elected" on the mainland in 1 947; 3 ) to apportion some seats in the Legislative Yuan along party lines ; and 4) to hold a popular election of the president, but without endorsing either a direct or an indirect electoral format. President Lee used the results of the NAC meetings to appoint a KMT constitutional-revision group to recommend a cohesive party position on reform.48 He also directed the party to call a meeting of nearly nine hundred party participants to seek elite consensus . Intraparty
138
Taiwan ' s Transformation
deliberations were extremely divisive; the revision group was compelled to adopt the following positions to satisfy conservative mainlanders : I ) The original text of the 1 947 Constitution was not to be deleted in any way ; changes would take the form of amendments. 2) Although constitutional amendments would be effective on Taiwan, the original articles of the 1 947 Constitution would supersede them upon reunification with the mainland. 3) The current government structure, which divides power among the Executive, Legislative, Judiciary , Control, and Examination Yuans, must remain intact. Although DPP and reform-minded KMT members opposed this status quo stance, the power of conservative mainlanders prevailed. Eventually, the groups agreed on two major democratic reforms: early retirement of . the life-tenured "old crooks" that would pave the way for comprehensive National Assembly and Legislative Yuan elections in 1 99 1 , and direct popular election of the president in 1 996. The National Assembly debated constitutional amendment in two stages. The first stage, which took place in April 199 1 and still featured the "old crooks" quite prominently, returned the country to constitutional government by amending ten constitutional articles and repealing the emergency powers of the president contained in the Temporary Provisions. The second stage, carried out by a newly elected National Assembly from 1 992 to 1 994, had quite a different purpose: to revise the constitution and make it applicable specifically to Taiwan. The Assembly added eight new articles to the constitution , focusing primarily on presidential election . Taiwan ' s transition from authoritarian regime to constitutional democracy was essentially complete by 1 994. The legal and institutional apparatus pressed into service during the period of emergency was stripped away through careful revision of the constitution. KMT ref��ers dis layed c� nsiderable skill in reconciling party conservatives and opposition radicals and prevented the regime from rupturing om . violence. The resulting reforms preserved the basic tenets of the ongmal constitution while transforming the regime into a democracy specifically tailored to Taiwan ' s unique needs. The transition was not perfect, however, as neither the DPP nor the KMT conservatives were wholly satisfied with the outcome; deep divisions between the two groups persisted. Important constitutional issues , including the choice between presidentialism and parliamentalism and the reduction of the number of governing bodies from five to three, received insufficient attention.49 Furthermore, the KMT avoided altogether the thorny question of the overlap of the n ational government and the Taiwan provincial govern ment, which is central to the debate over national identity. These matters require further debate. While committed in theory to a wholesale . replacement of the existing constitution, the DPP will not be tested unnl
p
�
Hung-mao Tien
1 39
it commands a majority or musters a majority coalition that transcends party lines.
Civilian Control over the Military Civilian control over the military is a central concern in democratic transition from military leadershi p, particularly in countries where party organizat ion is relatively weak and the military commands major resources and institution al bases of power. In the quasi-Len inist structure of the KMT party-state, however, the ruling party has established control over the military and security forces . As originally conceived on the mainland, the military was meant to be the KMT ' s vehicle for achieving domestic power. When the KMT moved to Taiwan, it incorporated the military within its purview; the party and military have been interrelated ever since. The KMT established a communis t-like political commissariat (or political-w elfare) system in the armed forces to enforce party primacy over military profession als. At the same time, the KMT co-opted the military by rotating military leaders in key posts, such as in the Central Committee and the Central Standing Committee, on the basis of strict party discipline and loyalty to KMT leaders. Thus throughout the period 1 95 0-88, the KMT limited the military ' S political role. Furthermore, the authoritarian structure reinforced military subordinat ion to the KMT by subsuming it within the overall institu tional structure of the party-state .50 Despite KMT supremacy over the military, the armed forces have not been excluded from politics. To the contrary, military personnel have played an integral role in the party-state-both by occupying prominent positions within the party and by providing the "iron votes" necessary to keep the party in power. Chiang Kai-shek was a military strongman who appointed other leading figures to key governmen t posts, including premier, provincial governor, and various ministers.5 1 Under Chiang Ching-kuo , retired military officers were allowed to transfer to govern ment civil service and public enterprise through specially designed examinati ons . Between 1 968 and 1 992, 1 ,660 colonels and generals passed these exams; many held important posts in ministries and committee s .52 The military always maintained a power bloc in the Central Committee and had considerable influence in the Central Standing Committee . As Figure I indicates, almost 12 percent of Central Committee members and almost 14 percent of Central Standing Committee members in 1 976 were military elites. In addition, the military provided a loyal voter base for the party. KMT organizatio ns in the armed forces actively participated in election ca mpaigns and supported KMT candidates. 53 Under Chiang Ching-kuo, the military established an elaborate Veterans Affairs Commissio n that mobilized veterans ' votes for KMT candidates in local elections. Military
Taiwan ' s Transformation
1 40
Figure 1 Military Elites in the KMT Power Structure, 1976-93
1 5 0/0
II 1 976
;; 1 9 8 1
[J 1 986
[J 1 98 8
II 1 993
.----=
10
5
o
Central Standing Committee
Central Committee
Sources: Data from KMT Secretariat, "Chung kuo kuo-min-tang pa chih shih san chih chung chuan hui shih lu" (A record of the eighth through thirteenth KMT party congresses) (Taipei, 1 9 88), 602-869; and Hsin Hsin-wen (The journalist), 22 August 1 993, 26-36, and 29 August 1993, 34-40.
Note: Central Committee figure for 1 986 is not available.
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Hau ' s proteges were replaced with defectors and Hau's previous rivals. By mid- 1 995, the civilian president had established his control over the armed forces . In recent years , KMT-military ties have weakened steadily. Figure 1 shows the significant decline in military representation in the Central Committee and the Central Standing Committee by 1 993. KMT organizations no longer operate formally in the military apparatus . President Lee has appointed and retired ranking officers without resistance. The Legislative Yuan has established an Intelligence Committee to supervise the conduct of the military-dominated National Security Bureau as well as to oversee the armed forces. Military budgets and weapons acquisitions are now subject to legislative scrutiny. Thus even though the KMT remains in power, civilian control over the military seems well institutionalized. Though Lee is a native Taiwanese and a nonmilitary figure, he is still a KMT member and thus commands a certain degree of party loyalty from the military . The question lingers whether the military would show the same cooperation with a civilian president from the DPP, both because the military lacks any ties to the DPP and because it regards the DPP as the party of national independence. Democratic consolidation cannot be complete until a nonpartisan military is fully installed.
Electoral Systems officers influenced voters in localities where military units were situated and mobilized reliable votes in the residential villages of military personnel. Civilians drafted for military service were frequently dispatched to their home districts to vote for designated candidates. Chiang Ching-kuo' s death in 1 9 8 8 created some uncertainty over presidential succession, in part because Chiang' s hand-picked successor, Lee Teng-hui, faced the test of mi1ita..�j loyalty_ In the ensuing five years, however, Lee dissolved most of the entrenched power blocs and successfully consolidated his civilian leadership. Lee' s initial endorsement by the military, led by General Hau Pei-tsun, then general chief of staff, smoothed Lee' s succession to the presidency. 54 The cooperation proved short-lived, however. Conflicts between Lee and several conservative leaders i ntensified, culminating in a 1 990 power struggle over Lee ' s nomination for a second term and his choice o f vice-president.55 Lee ' s decision t o establish civilian control over the military antagonized Hau, who had continued to dominate military affairs. In 1 989, Hau reluctantly agreed to retire from active military service to become the minister of defense. The following year, he was appointed premier, a post he held until 1993, when he was compelled to retire. Hau' s departure enabled Lee to exert civilian control over the military. As commander in chief, Lee held the constitutional authority to appoint and remove major military and security figures.56 Many of
Local elections have taken place in Taiwan since the advent of authoritarian rule in the 1 950s.57 In 1 969, authorities began partial elections for seats in the Legislative Yuan, and occasionally non-KMT candidates seriously challenged KMT candidates. Until the mid- 1 9 80s, however, these elections were not truly democratic but actually helped consolidate the KMT ' s rule by conferring a degree of legitimacy upon it.58 Furthermore, the KMT ' s hegemonic control over the electoral process meant that most elections prior to the mid- 1 980s were "elections without choice."59 Nonetheless, the practice of elections helped institu tionalize the electoral mechanism. The environment undermined authoritarian rule by nurturing opposition parties and activating civil society, laying the foundation for democratic transition.60 Local elections in Taiwan generated factions based on highly individuali zed patron-client relationships. As elections progressed, county and subcounty-Ievel factions became integral to the KMT' s authoritarian rule. The KMT recruited local elites to share in the spoils of elected office and the patronage that accompanied political leadership.61 In return, at election time, local factions, through the local elites, were mobilized to deliver votes for KMT candidates.62 The KMT frequently used such dubious campaign devices as vote buying to maximize party victories and manipulating rivalries of local factions to segregate
i 42
Taiwan ' s Transformation
indigenous politicians. For several decades, this unholy bond between the KMT and indigenous political forces persisted, permitting the regime to acquire legitimacy while it rewarded local politicians with semi monopolistic resources and positions of importance.63 Since 1 986, both the nature of factionalism and the relationship between local factions and the KMT power center have changed. Factional politicians now network beyond the confines of county and city borders to the national level.64 In the Legislative Yuan, local-faction leaders b egan organizing power blocs in 1 9 8 8 to challenge mainlanders' power monopoly. Once the intraparty struggles within the central KMT elite began in 1 990, local factions began allying with competing central factions, substantially enhancing local factions ' political leverage. Increased public demand for political accountability has strengthened local officials and weakened nonelected cabinet officials in the legis lature. As a result, the KMT regime has had to rely increasingly on elected officials with ties to local factions to remain in power. The nature of political campaigning has also changed since 1 986. In Taiwan ' s more liberal atmosphere, candidates of different parties now use their increased access to the media to turn attention to public-policy issues.65 No longer do opposition candidates confine their appeals to such primordial issues as ethnicity and national identity, for which there are no near-term solutions. Instead, recent campaign debates have covered a broad range of policy matters affecting daily life such as health care, taxation, the environment, land use, minority rights, social welfare, and elder care. Under these changing circumstances, campaign debates have become practical and meaningful. With the advent of cable television and pluralistic j ournalism, the media infrastructure necessary to support democratic elections appears to be in place. Finally, the internal electoral process that formerly kept the KMT in power has been departisanized. Election rules, which formerly favored the KMT, have bee; revised. 66 The KMT used to dominate th� national and subnational election commissions; now, no party may hold more than two-fifths of the membership of any election commission. To compensate for the financial deficiencies many opposition candidates experience, the government now budgets public funds to subsidize campaign expenses in proportion to the aggregate votes that candidates for executive posts receive.67 The KMT, DPP, and NP have all adopted democratic procedures to nominate candidates for most public offices . But the single nontrans ferable vote (SNTV) system for legislative competition at national and subnational levels remains controversial . When the KMT dominated the election, the SNTV system was instrumental in helping the party to keep its local factions in balance. The system no longer favors the KMT because intraparty competition within a district may result in greater opposition success . . With the advent of multiparty competition, SNTV
Hung-mao Tien
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facilitates the mobilization of support for smaller parties and undermines KMT party unity by allowing a candidate who defects to a third party in a multimember district with a single vote to be elected.68 Thi s strategy generates intraparty factionalism because the KMT typically nominates more than one candidate per district for at least one of the seats ; thus KMT candidates run against one another. Furthermore, SNTV encourages , if not protects, political extremism by allowing radical candidates to cater to a small constituency and still win with as little as 5 to 10 percent of the vote in a multimember district. On the whole, Taiwan' s more liberal electoral system functions reasonably well. As the electorate has been socialized to accept the electoral process and participate in the political culture, elections have become the single most important source of the regime' s legitimacy and have laid a solid foundation for Taiwan' s democratic consolidation.
A Competitive Party System The birth of the DPP led to the breakdown of the hegemonic one party authoritarian system, but its emergence on the political scene had been in the works for over a decade. Opposition activists initially became involved in the political process through elections, and from the beginning, their democratic movement was bound up with the goal of nation-building. Many opposition activists desired Taiwan' s independence, demanding a termination of political ties with the mainland and estab lishment of a new national identity. This enabled the DPP to mobilize indigenous Taiwanese across societal sectors and transform itself into a nation-building organization .69 It also started ethnic cleavage between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders, who opposed the attempts to forge a distinct national identity . Not surprisingly, the mainlander-controlled KMT regime regarded the DPP (and the tangwai before it) with profound distrust. Even so, Chiang Ching-kuo led KMT reformers to accept the inevitable formation of opposition parties, though nearly three years elapsed between the DPP ' s formation and its formal legalization when the Law on Civic Organization was revised in January 1 989. B etween 1986 and 1 99 1 , the DPP campaigned vocally on issues of democratic reform and national identity. The party was divided into the moderate Formosan faction, which was keen on democratic reform, and the New Tide faction, which espoused a radical position on national identity and placed primary importance on social reform. The DPP concentrated its efforts on recruiting voters from the self-employed business sector and the working class; its supporters were almost exclusively ethnic Taiwanese who agreed with the DPP's call for a separate national identity .7o During the democratic transition, the Formosan faction entered into a dialogue with KMT reformers to build a broad coalition of activists to lead democratic reform. Although the
1 44
Taiwan ' s Transformation
New Tide activists favored agitation against and confrontation of KMT authorities, the reform-minded arm of the KMT pursued a policy of co-opting the DPP into the democratic process. Having allied with opposition moderates to steer the regime transformation, the KMT' s reformers used the DPP ' s more militant activities to press KMT conservatives for democratic concessions. B y 1 992, when the first comprehensive election of the Legislative Yuan took place, the DPP had turned its attention toward public-policy issues. This political reorientation was necessary for the DPP's continued viability ; democratic reform and national identity lost their appeal as basic constitutional reforms and fairer electoral competition took place. Furthermore, the KMT leadership had "Taiwanized" significantly under President Lee, weakening the DPP' s claim to ethnic affiliation with the indigenous electorate.71 Thus, partly because of its alliance with KMT reformers and partly because of the change in the social and political climate, the DPP metamorphosed into a democratic party concerned primarily with electoral and legal reform. Another viable party, the NP, appeared in 1 993. Unlike the DPP, the NP was organized by KMT splinter groups. The KMT' s gradual indigenization under President Lee combined with a new pragmatic foreign policy and tolerance of radicals to breed substantial intraparty dissent among mainlanders. In 1 990, shortly after disgruntled mainlander conservatives sought unsuccessfully to topple Lee ' s leadership, a nonmainstream group known as the New KMT Alliance challenged the reformist central leadership within the Legislative Yuan . In the summer of 1 993, it formally split from the KMT to form the NP .72 Ethnic cleavage and national identity played central roles in the formation of both the DPP and the NP, although the two differ almost diametrically. Unlike the DPP, the NP is essentially the party of disenchanted younger mainlanders who harbor a strong sense of Chinese identity and are in favor of u nification with the mainland.73 Its primary electoral base derives from a cross section of mainlanders who no longer identify with the indigenized KMT and from young Taiwanese voters discontented with both the KMT ' s history of money politics and the DPP ' s radical image. In the 1 994 elections, the NP captured 1 1 of the 5 1 seats, and 2 1 .7 percent of the popular vote, in the Taipei City Council races ; it also won a meager two seats in both the Taiwan provincial assembly and Kaohsiung City Council elections.74 The NP' s electoral strength is confined t o the Taipei metropolitan area, where most
mainlanders reside. In response to the same pressures that formed and shaped the DPP and the NP, the KMT also has entered a period of internal transfor mation. Its most important task has been to turn a highly institution alized authoritarian party with a revolutionary heritage into a democratic party . Because the party is increasingly young and indigenized, conflict
Hung-mao Tien
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over democratic reform and national identity is fertile ground for power struggles that pit conservatives against reformers and mainlanders against Taiwanese. The KMT is no longer run by a dictator, but much of the KMT' s old authoritarian legacy remains in place. As its revolutionary ideology of Chinese unification has been undermined, if not completely foreclosed, by the persistent communist regime on the mainland, the KMT needs to redirect its energies toward maintaining power at home. Not only must the party prepare to compete with the opposition in fair and open electoral contests, but it must reconsider the relationship between state and society, and its internal rules and procedures. Taiwan' s fast pace of democratic transition and the accompanying range of urgent issues have stressed the KMT and led to significant intraparty conflict. In fact, it is incredible that the KMT has remained in power given the extent of its factional antagonism. Nonetheless , the KMT' s internal operations have liberalized significantly. The process of selecting members of the party congresses, the Central Committee, and the Central Standing Committee have become more open and demo cratic. In party conventions and Central Committee plenums, genu ine--even heated-debates are now standard. Although decisions at the weekly meeting of the Central Standing Committee are not yet made by formal vote, Chairman Lee Teng-hui ' s style of "decision by interpreta tion" is more in tune with consociational consensus-building than was Chiang Ching-ku o ' s previous practice of "decision by repression," to quote Arend Lijphart.75 The KMT ' s ability to remain in power is attributable to four major factors : 1) Taiwanization. The indigenization of the KMT under President Lee has changed the party ' s image from an externally imposed mainlander institution to a Taiwanese-controlled party, preempting the DPP ' s ability to exploit ethnic cleavage. As Figure 2 shows, the Taiwanese component ' of the Central Committee rose �teadily from 15 percent in 1 976 to 35 percent in 1 98 8 and to 54 percent in 1 993. At the same time, the Central Standing Committee' s Taiwanese membership rose from 1 9 percent i n 1 976 to over 6 0 percent i n 1 993. While this change i n ethnic makeup results partly from the attrition of first-generation mainlanders, it also reflects the impact of democratization on the ability of Taiwanese to advance through the KMT hierarchy . Had the party remained in the hands of old-guard mainlanders after Chiang Ching-kuo' s death, the party would have lost ground quickly to the indigenous DPP in an election where the majority of voters are Taiwanese. Indigenization of the KMT also has led to significant changes in ethnic partisanship. As is shown in Figure 3, between 1 984 and 1 992 the number of mainlander voters who identified themselves as KMT members decreased from 65 . 1 percent to 35.6 percent, reflecting their increasing alienation from the party . Change in the number of Taiwanese
Hung- mao Tien
Figure 2
Taiwanese in the KMT Power Structure, 1976-93
80%
§l 1 976
0 1 993
• 1988
,------,
60 40 20 o
Central Standing Committee
; Central Committee
Sources: Data from Chung-kuo shih-pao (China times), 23 August 1 993, 4; and Teh-fu Huang, "Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang," in Hung-mao Tien, ed., Taiwan's
Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1 996), 7.
Figure 3 Indigenization of the KMT: Ethnicity and Party AffIliation
m 1 984
80% 70
• 1 992
60 50 40 30 20 10 o
Sources: Data from Yun-han Chu, "Hsien chieh tuan Kuo-min-tang chih tzu-chih ti chu yu ch' uan Ii sheng
I' ai"
(KMT' s current organization and power) (paper presented at the
conference "The New Era of the Republic of China" sponsored by Chung-kuo shih-pao [China times ] , Taipei, 7-9 July 1 992), 1 3 .
1 47
voters who are KMT members was less than 1 percent for the same period.76 At the same time, the proportion of KMT members who are Taiwanese rose from 6 3 . 5 percent to 75.2 percent, reflecting their increasing identification with the party, while the mainlander membership registered a declin e from 36.5 percent to 24. 8 percent. The percentage of Taiwanese voters favoring the KMT, according to this survey, grew from 30.7 percent to 42.3 percent, whereas mainlanders favoring the KMT declined from 69. 1 percent to 6 1 .6 percent during that period. Shifts in voting patterns along ethnic lines reflect a change from the perception of the KMT regime as a party of outsiders. 2) Economic health. The KMT has benefited from Taiwan ' s continuing economic prosperity. Figure 4 depicts the economy' s continued high economic growth, which averaged 7.7 percent annually during 1 987-94. This figure is somewhat lower than those for previous periods-a slowdown that reflects the maturation of the Taiwanese economy. Yet, unlike the economies of many third wave democracies, in which economic difficulties or even breakdown have accompanied democratic transition, Taiwan' s economy overcame challenges to growth: labor and social activism, increasing income inequality, a shortage of production workers, rising wages, the decline of government regUlation, and cumbersome legislative processes. Consequently, the KMT has side stepped the defeat that might have been linked to a stagnant economy. A prolonged economic downturn or stagnation would be a critical test of the KMT' s viability as a dominant party .77 3) Clientelism. The KMT' s corporatist networks and extensive links to local political factions form a pervasive electoral base for the party. Taiwan' s electorate has been susceptible to electoral mobilization by local clientelism, state agencies, and social and economic groups; most of these groups still maintain ties with the KMT. The foundation of clientelist factions has cracked somewhat and is being supplanted slowly by factional politics at the national level and autonomous interest groups . Bifurcation of the KMT elite also has eroded the solidarity that characterized the corporatist Chiang regimes . Although the decline of factional clientelism helps explain the decline in KMT support, the triple alliance among the party, corporatist units (farmers' aSSOCIatIOns and business-industrial councils), and local factions has delayed, if not prevented, regime turnover in Taiwan. 4) Money. Enormous financial resources enable the KMT to maintain a large party bureaucracy and to contribute to party candidates' campaign coffers. The party ' s net assets totaled NT$ l OO billion, or slightly less than US$4 billion, as of March 1 995 .78 Its seven holding companies invest in 1 2 1 enterprises with an aggregate value of NT$400 billion, or almost US$ 1 6 billion.79 These figures do not include dues collected from nearly 2.5 million party members. The KMT ' s operating costs are high, however, and the government
Taiwan ' s Transformation
1 48
Figure 4 Taiwan 's Economic Growth, 1952-94
-- Annual Average
1 5 % ,-------, 8.6%
IO �
10.8% -+-
8.4%
1 952-64
figures could lead the KMT down the same path as that followed by the LDP. Whether opposition parties will be able to broaden their electoral bases depends on numerous factors beyond the scope of this essay, but this much is clear: The DPP has a good chance of accumulating enough strength in the next few elections to tip the balance in its favor. The critical battlegrounds will be the Legislative Yuan elections in 1 998, and, more importantly , the presidential election in 2000.
7.7%
Representation and the Legislature
5 o
1 49
Hung-mao Tien
1 964-72
1 973-86
1 987-94
Sources: Data from Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan of the Republic of China, National Income: Taiwan Area (Taipei, December 1 994); and Directorate-General of B udget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan of the Republic of China, Quarterly National Economic Trends: Taiwan A rea (Taipei, February 1 995). Note: Economic growth rates are calculated on the basis of the 1 99 1 price index.
budget has been subjected to more scrutiny in recent years. The party must prepare an annual operating budget of nearly NT$ 8 billion.so In addition, the party can no longer use the state fund for party activities . Therefore, party investments must generate sufficient income to cover the campaign fund, estimated at NT$650 million for 1 995, excluding money raised by the individual candidates.sl Monetary support from the party is essential to worthy but financially starved candidates for the Legislative and Executive Yuans and city and county posts, at a cost of millions of dollars per candidate. Democratic consolidation perpetuates the primacy of elections, but the spiraling costs of campaigning and serving constituents, as Philippe Schmitter has observed, exacerbate the problems of generating revenue for electoral politics.s2 If the KMT suffers from budget pressures, however, opposition candidates, financially outmatched by KMT rivals, face inherent campaign disadvantages. And although the KMT's reliance on money politics has exposed it to growing criticism, the adverse effects of these tactics do not yet outweigh the advantages. In sum, Taiwan has successfully acquired a competitive party system. At present, it retains some important features of a dominant-party system, similar to the Japanese party system before the breakup of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1 99 3 . The KMT remains in power, but its electoral foundation has eroded as the DPP and the NP have emerged as viable contenders . Above all, the KMT ' s ability to maintain its dominant position in a competitive party system will require party cohesion . Further intraparty conflict or disenchantment of significant
Philippe Schmitter has said that democratic consolidation begins with the first comprehensive popular election of the national legislature and is basically complete after consecutive parliamentary elections spanning a period of approximately 12 years.S3 This approach poses difficulties when applied to Taiwan. Although the Legislative Yuan had never been a vital institution in the KMT party-state, its dramatic development did begin prior to Taiwan ' s official democratic transition. Originally composed almost entirely of the "old crooks" elected on the mainland, its existence in Taiwan perpetuated the myth that the ROC exercised both sovereignty and jurisdiction over mainland China. The Legislative Yuan began adding members in the 1 970s and 1980s, increasing the representation of native Taiwanese each time. The first comprehensive election of the entire Legislative Yuan did not take place until 1 992, however-six years after the democratic transition technically began. During authoritarian rule, Taiwan ' s legislature operated somewhat autonomously at local levels and in the provincial assembly, although it exercised virtually no influence over national law or policy. Under the state-corporatist scheme, the Legislative Yuan functioned as a rubber stamp for the party, providing a basis for the ROC ' s claim to represent China on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Because the legislature was basically a satellite institution of the party-state, the ruling KMT exerted complete control over the legislative process. Thus the Legislative Yuan earned the satirical reputation of being the cabinet' s legislative agency. Not surprisingly, the Legislative Yuan faced fundamental transformation as soon as democratic transition was under way because, as transition theorists have posited, the task of building truly representative institu tions is essential to a consolidated democracy. 84 Transforming the legisla ture into a truly representative body called for far-reaching changes in the legislature' s composition, internal rules, and governing structure. Compositional changes have come about gradually, but did precede the official beginnings of the democratic transition . Between 1 969 and 1 989, a growing number of legislators were elected in "supplemental elections" to compensate for attrition from the 1 947 cohort elected on the mainland. The 1 989 Legislative Yuan election marked the first election in which opposition parties were allowed to use party labels.
1 50
Taiwan ' s Transformation
Following the involuntary retirement of the "old crooks." however. the first comprehensive election of the Legislative Yuan took place in 1 992. Because the legislative transformation began before the advent of democratic transition. its development is an inaccurate gauge of democratic progress. The office of the president still maintains primacy in the governing structure. From 1 949 to 1 9 8 8 the president appointed the premier. cabinet members. and ranking military officers.8s As Samuel Huntington has argued. a political system is not democratic until the most powerful decision makers are elected.86 Taiwan ' s popular election of the president is a strong indication that the transition process is essentially complete. In fact. the presidential election of March 1 996 has produced a strong anchor for Taiwan ' s fluid politics .87 As Figure 5 indicates . the KMT candidate. President Lee Teng-hui . won a landslide victory in 1 996. capturing 54 percent of the total vote in a four-way race. The election took place without violence or campaign irregularities. and under military threats from the Beijing authorities. By 1 996. three postauthoritarian elections of the Legislative Yuan had also taken place: in 1 989. 1 992. and 1 995. The 1989 and 1 992 elections resembled postauthoritarian "founding elections" in terms of their political significance. but did not result in any stunning defeats for the ruling party . Yet the opposition ' s electoral gains in terms of both num bers and percentages have been significant. and the rise of the DPP in Legislative Yuan elections has been steady. In 1 989. 2 1 DPP legislators were elected. Just three years later. the DPP captured 5 1 of 1 64 seats. As Figure 6 demonstrates. the DPP' s share of the popular vote increased from just over 1 3 percent in 1 980 to more than 33 percent in 1 995. Even in 1986. when democratic transition began. the DPP ' s share of the popular vote was almost 6 percentage points more than it had received (under the tangwai label) in 1 9 8 3 . In contrast. the KMT' s share of the vote dropped by more than 25 percentage points between 1 980 and 1 99 5 . from 7 1 . 7 percent to just over 46 percent. These changes in composition were compounded by high turnover rates i n the legislature. In the 1 989 supplementary election. 88 of the 1 30 supplementary legislators were freshmen; in 1 992. 9 1 of the 1 6 1 total members were first-timers .88 The legislative chamber has had to adjust to the growing presence of representatives who are new to the legislative process. The recent changes to the Legislative Yuan have engendered a variety of corresponding internal alterations.89 First. the popularly elected legislators have brought a new activism to the chamber. revitalizing its image. They have initiated closer examinations of budgets. lengthy interpellation of the premier and other cabinet officials. public hearings. and introduction of numerous private bills. B ecause cabinet officials are appointed by the president. not elected. their lack of popular mandate restricts their ability to impose the government' s will on the legislators. ending the days of executive dictatorship. Moreover. in the more liberal
Figure 5
Results of the 1996 Presidential Election : Vote Shares
60%
r-------�
40
20
o
KMT: Lee Teng-
DPP: Peng Ming-
NP : Lin Yang
Independents:
hui and Lien
min and Hsieh
kang and Hau
Chen Li-an and
Chan
Chang-ting
Pei -tsuna
Wang Ching-feng
Source: Chung-kuo shih-pao (China times), 24 March 1 996. aCandidates official l y endorsed by the New Party.
Figure 6
Trends in Legislative Yuan Elections, 1980-95: Vote Shares --+---
80%
KMT
--II--
7 1 .7% 69.4% r-------�____
tangwailDPP
------- NP
-*-- Others
�6� 6.7%
__
60
59.2% 52.5% 46. 1 %
40 29.9%
20
1 8 .9%
30.8%
1 6. 7 %
1 5.3%
1 3 .0%
8.7% 1 3 .0%
o
1 98 0
1 1 .7%
1 983
33.2%
7.8%
1 986
1 989
1 992
1 995
Sources: Teh-fu Huang, Min-chu chin-pu tang y u T'ai-wan ti-ch 'u cheng-chih min-chi hua (The Democratic Progressive Party and political democratization in Taiwan) (Taipei : Shih ying, 1 992), 1 57, 1 66; Chung-kuo shih-pao (China times), 20 December 1 992 and 3 December 1 995.
1 52
Taiwan ' s Transfonnation
attnosphere that now characterizes the Legislative Yuan, individual legislators, rather than the party, sponsor bills. From 1 982 to 1 992, for instance, individual legislators sponsored a total of 250 bills; in 1 993 alone they sponsored 268 bills, accounting for nearly 80 percent of the newly introduced bills in the legislature.9o Unfortunately, legislative efficiency lags behind activism. Obsolete rules and procedures, break downs of floor management, obstructionism, occasional violence on the legislative floor, and declining KMT party discipline all contribute to legislative inefficiency and require both fundamental structural changes and civility in legislative competition. Second, faction-like groupings have become rampant in the Legis lative Yuan since 1 9 8 8 . The KMT has ten opinion groups, some with overlapping membership, and the DPP has five. These groups-which are based as much on social ties (such as professional interests and prior careers) as on policy and ideological beliefs-sometimes override the importance of party unity and undermine party discipline, particularly within the KMT. Furthermore, these groups compound the already difficult floor management within the legislature. Third, the KMT' s control over the legislative process has declined. Party leaders outside the legislature lack a popular mandate and often fail to impose hierarchical power over other legislators, many of whom were elected without KMT patronage. Further, because the party-state' s resources are now subject to public scrutiny, the party can no longer use them to patronize KMT legislators at will . The KMT has attempted to restructure its operations to give more autonomy to individual legislators in such matters as the selection of floor leadership, a move that has strengthened the position of legislative party members when dealing with the party center. The DPP has always had a much weaker party center, so its legislative members operate with virtual autonomy from the national DPP headquarters . Consequently, interparty and interfactional dialogue have become important aspects of the political process. Renegade KMT legislators have joined the DPP on several occasions to pass such important bills as the controversial Sunshine Law, which requires complete financial disclosure of politicians and higher-echelon government employees, and to defeat important government-sponsored legislation such as a bill to build a nuclear-power station.91 Finally, the Legislative Yuan has fundamentally changed its internal organization and operating procedures. The committee system has been overhauled. Public hearings on important policy matters take place frequently, and many obsolete rules and procedures that were legacies of the old regime have been revised. These changes have paved the way for the Legislative Yuan to become a true modem legislature. Yet its transformation into a true democratic institution depends on continued evolution. The relationship between the parties and their factions is still unclear. Floor management,
1 53
Hu ng-mao Tien
which depends in part on the parties' ability to control their members, must be improved. And the occasional exhibition of physically obstruc tionist behavior shows that democratic consolidation in the Legislative Yuan is not complete. But in the aggregate the legislature has emerged as a publicly mandated component integral to the democratic regime.
Civil Society The emergence of a civil society in Taiwan follows the path of transition from state corporatism to societal corporatism. Under state corporatism, the state held decision-making power over most aspects of society.92 KMT authorities operated a hierarchical system of control over social groups , noncompetitive business, and industrial organizations to prevent citizens from organizing to challenge the party-state.93 Taiwan' s recent social movements thus have sought the triple goals o f democra tizing, redefining state-society relations, and staking an indigenous claim against a regime that is perceived to be alien.94 As the party-state' s control mechanism began to weaken, a liberal societal corporatism emerged wherein leaders of the most important associations were no longer beholden to the state and rejected the notion that the government is the guardian of the common goOd.95 The upsurge of protest movements in the decade prior to Taiwan ' s democratic transition further propelled this transition from state to societal cor poratism. Given the party-state ' s corporatist structure, the arrival of a liberal societal corporatism does not necessarily parallel the birth of an American-style pluralistic society because the KMT and the state still control many roles in strategic organizations . Put simply, although Taiwan ' s emerging civil society displays many characteristics of any civil society-autonomy, collective action, nonusurpation of state roles, and civility of modern private society96-it retains elements of demo cratic corporatism similar to those of Northern Europe and Japan.97 S ocial-protest movements, one gauge of civil autonomy , emerged in Taiwan in the 1 9 80s. From 1 98 3 to 1 9 8 8 , the number of reported protest incidents climbed from 1 75 to 1 , 1 72.98 By 1 989, at least 1 8 social movements pursued claims o n a wide variety of issues .99 Among other things , these i ssues included the liberalization of state-corporatist control, protection of minorities and other disadvantaged groups, human rights, labor-employer conflict, consumer and environmental protection, and the retreat of the KMT from university campuses and the armed forces . B y compressing decades' worth of issues into a single decade, Taiwan ' s protest movements reinforced the newly emerging opposition parties. The symbiotic relationship between the protest movements and opposition parties loosened the social fabric so tightly woven by the party-state. This loosening, in turn, leveraged protest movements. Civil society in Taiwan contributed significantly to democratic
Taiwan's Transfonnation
1 54
transItIon as well as to subsequent democratic consolidation.l°O Autono mous social and economic groups strive for policy change and demo cratic reforms in a variety of ways . They recruit and train democratic activists. They contribute to the experience of participation and competition, providing a training ground for the nascent democracy. They articulate diverse claims of interest and link various civil constituencies to political society . Increasingly, they supply and endorse election candidates and oversee the legislature. wl Taiwan' s experience suggests that civil culture evolves synchronously with democratic transition and matures during democratic consolidation . In other words, democratization generates the positive attitudes, behaviors, and norms that characterize a civil culture. W2 An empirical study of Taiwan' s voters showed that citizens ' apolitical attitudes decreased throughout the 1 970s and 1 980s. 103 By the late 1 980s, voters had become significantly more politically inclined . 104 Yet Taiwan' s rapidly forming civil society creates certain problems for democratic consolidation . As Larry Diamond notes, "The demands of various highly mobilized social groups may overwhelm the ability of a relatively weak democratic state to satisfy them without throwing the economy into severe stress."105 The decline of government authority that accompanied the democratic transition has fueled concern over disruption of normal economic activities. The effects of rising economic stress have been mitigated in part by the massive exit of labor-intensive industries to such offshore destinations as mainland China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. This movement helped prevent the serious economic dislocation that had been widely feared since the start of the democratic transition, but it and other forms of foreign economic ventures have raised questions about the democratic government ' s ability to foster a business environment at home. Following the peaceful presidential election in 1 996, the government may be in a stronger position to deal with the many demands unleashed by the rising social forces . Already, the 1 994 popular elections of Taiwan ' s provincial governor and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung have resulted in a strengthened government response to demands of citizens and social groups. With the popular mandate the governor and mayors acquired legitimacy, hence credibility , in their implementation of public policies. Ultimately , democratic consolidation requires Taiwan to maintain an equilibrium between state and society . Democracy requires a civil society . Moreover, democracy is not the antithesis of a strong state. 106 A good civil society can benefit from effective state institutions.
Democratic Persistence
Hung-mao Tien
1 55
legacy lingers even as consolidation proceeds. In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, Taiwan ' s democratic transition was accompanied by only minimal disruptions common to most countries undergoing democratic transition: an increase in crime and political violence, and more frequent disruption of some basic services . 107 Taiwan has not experienced serious economic disruption or breakdown. On the contrary, it has proved that a quasi-Leninist authoritarian regime with a highly educated population can transform itself quite peacefully while con tinuing its economic growth. Philippe Schmitter once noted, "No single path to consolidation is necessarily a guarantee for the future stability or viability of all types ,, of democracy . 108 Given its continuing ethnic and national-identity issues, Taiwan ' s new democracy still faces serious "dangers and dilemmas."I09 Regression to outright autocracy is unlikely, as Taiwan' s civil society, flourishing mass media, institutionalized elections, and highly organized and competitive party system are already in place. Even so, Taiwan ' s social and political systems leave some room for authoritarian variants; a resurgence of authoritarian rule in the face of threats from the PRC or deeply divisive political issues at home hinges largely on the issue of democratic persistence. Without democratic persistence, a regular, stable, and predictable democratic pattern will not crystallize. The variables described in this essay-successful regime transfor mation, civilian control over the military , a fair electoral system, a representative legislature, a competitive party system, and civil soci ety--do not alone guarantee a secure path to democratic consolidation in Taiwan . The most important factor-and the most difficult one to resolve-is the issue of national identity . Proponents of a separate national identity for Taiwan clash with those favoring a greater China, who show a propensity for siding with the mainland should Taiwan pursue independent statehood. 1 10 The wissile tests and milita.ry exercises in July 1 995 and March 1 996 show that authorities in Beijing may resort to force should Taiwan seek independence. Armed conflict from across the Strait poses a serious ongoing threat to Taiwan' s democratic consolidation. Thus, despite Taiwan ' s successful democratic transforma tion and readiness for consolidation, the democratic transition cannot be completed without a successful resolution of the national-identity issue. NOTES 1 . Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1 989), 99. See also Li Hsiao-feng, T'ai-wan min-chu yun-tung szu shih nien (Four decades of democratic movement in Taiwan) (Taipei: Chih-li wan-pao [Independence Evening Post] , 1 987), 23 8-40. 2. Two tiny satellite parties-the Young China Party and the Democratic Socialist
Taiwan' s democratic transformation has progressed without an abrupt breakdown of the former authoritarian regime. Rather, the authoritarian
Party-had formed in mainland China before the KMT regime' s arrival on Taiwan in
1 949 . They were financially patronized by KMT authorities and operated as friends of the
KMT.
In Taiwan, they had little if any electoral support.
1 56
Taiwan ' s Transfonnation
3. Li, T'ai-wan min-chu yun-tung szu shih nien, 239-40.
well
4. Many third wave transition theorists' have conceptualized democratization in terms of development processes. See Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Guillermo O ' Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds . , Transitions from A u thoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 9 86); Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O' Donnell, and J . Samuel Valenzuela, eds . , Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American
Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, Ind . : University of Notre Dame Press,
1 992);
Philippe
C.
Schmitter,
"The
Consolidation
Hung-mao Tien
of Political
Democracies :
Processes, Rhythms, Sequences and Types" (unpub\. ms" Stanford University, October
as
opposition
1 57
activists,
particularly
those
with radical tendencies.
The "torture
problem"--the threat of revenge against the many KMT officials with records of brutality or blatant human rights violations-has been resolved with civility and complacency. See Huntington, The Third Wave, 209 ; and Edwin A. Winckler, "Taiwan Transition," in Cheng and Haggard, eds . , Political Change in Taiwan, 223 . 1 9 . Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," American Political Science
Review 8 2 (December 1 98 8 ) : 1 204. 20. Huntington, The Third Wave, 209; Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization
in Latin America," Comparative Politics 23 (October 1 990): 6-7.
1 9 9 1 ) ; Donald Share, "Transition to Democracy and Transition Through Transaction,"
2 1 . Tien , The Great Transition,
44-45;
Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, "China,
Comparative Political Studies 19 (January 1 987): 525-4 8 ; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of
Corporatism, and the East Asian Model, " Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 33 (January
Oklahoma Press, 1 99 1 ) . In their "Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies" in Transitions .from A u thoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, Guillermo O ' Donnell and
Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?" China Quarterly 99 (September 1 984) : 48 1 -99.
1 995): 3 6 ; Edwin A. Winckler, "Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From
Philippe Schmitter divide this process into four steps, maintaining that democratic transition occurs in analytically distinct, if empirically overlapping, phases: transition, consolidation, persistence, and eventual deconsolidation. 5 . O'Donnell and Schmitter, "Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies," 37-47 .
22. Tien and Chu, "Taiwan ' s Domestic Political Reforms," 2-3 ; Yun-han Chu, "The
Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan: Social Cleavage, Electoral Competition and the Emerging Party System," in Tien, ed., Taiwan 's Electoral Politics and Democratic
Transition, 3; Tun-jen Cheng, "Issue Structure, DPP ' s Factionalism and Party Realign ment," in Tien, ed., Taiwan 's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition, 1 43--50.
6. Bruce J. Dickson, "Kuomintang Before Democratization: Organizational Change and the Role of Elections," in Hung-mao Tien, ed" Taiwan 's Electoral Politics and Democratic
Transition: Riding the Third Wave (Armonk, N . Y . : M.E. Sharpe, 1 996), 1 .
23. Chang Mao-kuei, "Jen-min, tzu-pen yu kuo-chia: Ii-fa yu- kung-kung cheng-ts ' e"
(People, capital, and nation-state: Legislative Yuan and public policy), Chung-shan she-hui
k 'e-hsueh chi-k 'an (Chung-shan social science quarterly) 7 ( 1 992): 2 1 ; and Cheng, "Taiwan
7 . Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," 56. See
in Democratic Transition," 203 .
also Mainwaring, O' Donnell, and Valenzuela, eds . , Issues in Democratic Consolidation, 3 .
24. Huntington, The Third Wave, 65-66 .
8 . Tien, The Great Transition; Tun-jen Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist
2 5 . Dickson, "Kuomintang Before Democratization," 42-43.
Regime in Taiwan," World Politics 4 1 (July 1 989): 47 1 -99; Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, "Regime Transformation i n Taiwan: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives,"
in Cheng and Haggard, eds . , Political Change in Taiwan (Boulder, Colo . : Lynne Rienner, 1 989), 1 2- 1 9 ; Dickson, "Kuomintang Before Democratization"; Li, T'ai-wan min-chu yun
tung szu shih nien; Huang Teh-fu, Min-chu-chin-pu tang yu T'ai-wan ti-ch 'u cheng-chih min-chi hua (The Democratic Progressive Party and political democratization in Taiwan)
26. Tien , The Great Transition, 1 62-94; Dickson, "Kuomintang Before Democratiza
tion," 5 8-62 ; Cheng, "Taiwan in Democratic Transition," 204-5.
27. S amuel P. Huntington, "Foreword," in Cheng and Haggard, eds . , Political Change
in Taiwan, xii.
(Taipei: Shih ying, 1 992). 9.
Dickson,
"Kuomintang
2 8 . Lin Chia-Iung, "Wai lai cheng-chu ' an fan tui yun-tung yu ti-fang p ' ai-hsi te hsuan Before
Democratization,"
1 8- 1 9 ;
Cheng,
"Taiwan
in
Democratic Transition," 2 1 0- 1 2 ; Hung-mao Tien and Yun-han Chu, "Taiwan ' s Domestic Political Reforms: Institutional Change and Power Realignment," in Gary Klintworth, ed . ,
Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the i 990s (Sydney : Allen & Unwin, 1 994), 1 -20.
10. Yun-han Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1 992), 1 02-3 . 1 1 . Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 485-86. 12. Dickson, "Kuomintang Before Democratization," 1 8- 1 9 .
13 .
Tien, The Great Transition, 8 1 , 2 7 8 ; Cheng and Haggard, "Regime Transformation
in Taiwan," 1 5 ; Dickson, "Kuomintang Before Democratization," 1 0 . 1 4. Cheng, "Taiwan in Democratic Transition," 209. 1 5 . Chou Yu-kou, Li Teng-hui te yi ch 'ien t 'ien (Lee Teng-hui ' s one thousand days) (Taipei : Mai-tien, 1 993), 2 1 . 1 6. For example, Lee manipulated intraparty divisions to his advantage in 1 990 when he selected Li Yuan-ts ' u , a mainlander outside the ru ling circles, to be vice-president. 1 7. Tien and Chu, "Taiwan ' s Domestic Political Reforms," 1 3- 1 5 . 1 8 . I n addition, Lee ' s succession helped avert revenge b y former political victims as
chu hu tung: lun kuo-min-tang t ' i-ming cheng-ts ' e te yen pien yu T' ai-wan cheng-chih te min chu hua" (Alien regime, opposition movements, and local factions : Evolution of the KMT ' s nomination policy and Taiwan ' s political democratization) (paper presented at the
First Annual Meeting of the Taiwan Political Science Association, Taipei, 1 7- 1 8 December 1 994); Chen Ming-tong, P 'ai-hsi cheng-chih yu T'ai-wan cheng-chih pien-ch 'ien (Politics
of factions and Taiwan ' s political change) (Taipei : Yue-dan Publishers, 1 995), 1 66-230. 29. Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao, "The Rise of Social Movements and Civil Protests,"
in Cheng and Haggard, eds . , Political Change in Taiwan, 58-62 ; Chu, Crafting Democracy
in Taiwan, 99- 1 00.
30. Huntington, "Foreword," in Cheng and Haggard, eds . , Political Change in Taiwan, xiii. 31.
Ying-shih Yti, a noted scholar of Confucianism,
maintains that the political
significance of Confucianism has become marginal in China since the anti-Confucian May
Fourth period in the late 1 9 1 Os . For more information, see Ying-shih YO, "The Idea of Democracy and the Twilight of the Elite Culture in Modem China" (unpub\. ms . , Princeton University,
1 994).
Other
scholars
insist
that
this
"political
Confucianism"
must be
distinguished from the "Confucian personal ethic," which has more enduring impact on society.
For examples, see Wei-ming Tu, Confucian Ethics Today: The Singapore Challenge (Singapore: Cuniculum Development Institute of Singapore, 1 984), 90; and
Francis Fukuyama, "Modernization and the Future of Democracy in Asia" (paper presented at the conference "The Predicament of Modernization in East Asia" sponsored by the Institute for National Policy Research, Taipei, 27-28 June 1 994), 1 1 .
1 58
Taiwan' s Transfonnation
32. Lin Yu-sheng, "Ts ' uang-chao hsing chuan-fa ti tsai su yu tsai jen" (Rethinking and reaffinnation of the concept of creative transformation), Chih-shih fen-tsu (The Chinese . intellectual) 41 (Fall 1 994): 26. 3 3 . Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 983), 62, 80; Andrew
1.
Nathan, "Is Chinese
Hung-mao Tien
1 59
and city and county chief executives, the KMT' s share of the vote dwindled from 66.7 percent, 70.5 percent, and 60.9 percent in the previous elections to 59.2 percent, 65.2 percent, and 56. 1 percent, respectively. 47. Tien and Chu, "Taiwan ' s Domestic Political Reforms," 1 1 . 48. Chu, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation i n Taiwan," 4-5; Leng and Lin,
Culture Distinctive? A Review Article," Journal of Asian Studies 52 (November 1993): 926-27.
"Political Change on Taiwan," 8 1 3 ; Stainton, "Taiwanese Lambada," 40-4 1 .
34. Francis Fukuyama, "Democracy's Future: The Primacy of Culture," Journal of Democracy 6 (April 1 99 5 ) : 2 5 ; Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," 1 228.
eliminating the Judicial Yuan and the Control Yuan . 50. In reality, this co-optation of the military mocked the constitution ' s requirement that
3 5 . Share, "Transition to Democracy and Transition Through Transaction," 528.
"no political party . . . shall make use of the armed forces as an instrument in a struggle
3 6 . Juan J . Linz, "Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration," in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds ., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 978), 6 1 ; Edward Friedman, ed. , The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences (Boulder, Colo . : Westview, 1 994), 37; Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1 992), 2 1 6. 3 7 . Michael Stainton, "Taiwanese Lambada: Revising the Constitution of the Republic of China" (Working Paper No. 60, University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asian Pacific Studies, Toronto, 1 993), 3 8 . 3 8 . Adam Przeworski, "The Games of Transition," in Mainwaring, O ' Donnell, and Valenzuela, eds . , Issues in Democratic Consolidation, 127; Schmitter, "Consolidation of Political Democracies," 65-6 6 ; Huntington, The Third Wave, 209 . 39.
Philippe
C.
Schmitter,
"Transitology
and
Consolidology:
Proto-Sciences
of
Democratization?" (paper prepared for the Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D . C . , 1 994);
1.
Samuel Valenzuela,
"Democratic Consolidation in Post-transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions," in
Mainwaring,
O ' Donnell, and
Valenzuela,
eds., Issues in Democratic
Consolidation, 60; Marcin Krol, "Democracy' s Future: Where East Meets West," Journal of Democracy 6 (January 1 995): 4 1 . John Plamenatz argues that democracy as most theorists describe it is beyond complete realization in Democracy of Illusion: An Examination of Certain Aspects of Modern Democratic Theory (London: Longman, 1 993), 27. 40. Robelt A . Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 9 7 1 ) , 5-20; O ' Donnell and Schmitter, "Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies," 8; Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-transitional Settings," 60-6 1 . 4 1 . Shao-chuan Leng and Cheng-yi Lin , "Political Change on Taiwan: Transition to Democracy?" China Quarterly 1 36 (December 1 993): 825-26; Fu Hu, "Hsuan-chu
yu
cheng-chih chuan hsing" (Election and political transition) (paper presented at the "Seminar for Voting Behavior, Constitutional Order and Political Transition," sponsored by National Taiwan University and the National Science Council, Taipei, 17 December 1 993), 1 4 .
for power" (Article 1 39). 5 1 . General Chen Cheng, another leading military figure, provides an excellent example of early political-military leadership under Chiang Kai-shek: He served as premier from 1 950 to 1 954 and again from 1 9 5 8 to 1 963, and held other key administrative posts . 52. C h ' ai Liang-wen, "Wen-kuan k ' ao hsuen kung neng chih t'iao-cheng yu chu-hsing fang hsiang" (Recruitments of civil servants through examination: Functional adjustment and implementation), in Chyuan-jenq Shiau, ed . , Chung chien wen-kuan t'i-chih (Refonn of the civil service system) (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1 994), 96. 53. Su Chin-ch' iang, T'ai-hai an-ch 'uan yu kuo-fang kai-ke (Security in the Taiwan Straits and modification
of defense
policy) (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1 995), 75 .
54. Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan, 1 22. 55. Chou, Lee Teng-hui te yi ch 'ien ( 'ien, 1 63-84. At issue were Lee's democratic refonns, tolerance of radical activists, pragmatic foreign policy, and increasingly assertive leadership style. 56. Tien and Chu, "Taiwan ' s Domestic Political Reforms," 14. 5 7 . Tien, ed., Taiwan 's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition, 3- 1 0 . 5 8 . Dickson, "Kuomintang Before Democratization," 3 . 5 9 . H u , "Hsuan chu y u cheng-chih chuan hsing," 4 . 6 0 . Hu, "Hsuan-chu y u cheng chih-chuan hsing," 5-9; Huang, "Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang," in Tien, ed., Taiwan 's Electoral Politics and Democratic
Transition, 1 0 5 ; Dickson, "Kuomintang Before Democratization," 2. 6 1 . Dickson, "Kuomintang Before Democratization," 5 . 62. Shelley Rigger, "Electoral Strategies and Political Institutions in the Republic o f China on Taiwan" (Fairbank Center Working Paper No.
I,
Taiwan Studies Workshop,
Harvard University, 1 993), 1 3 ; Stainton, "Taiwanese Lambada," 20. 6 3 . Chen, P 'ai-hsi cheng-chih yu T'ai-wan cheng-chih pien ch 'ien, 208-14.
42. Leng a n d L i n , "Political Change on Taiwan," 826.
64. Ibid. , 200-206.
43. Ibid. 44. Hu, "Hsuan-chu
yu
65. Chu, Crofting Democracy in Taiwan, 7 1 -73 ; Chen, P 'ai-hsi cheng·chih yu T'ai-wan cheng-chih pien ch 'ien, 8- 1 0 .
cheng-chih chuan hsing," 8.
45. In an opinion poll of 583 elites consisting primarily of academics, legislators, businesspeople, media personalities, and civil activists, 86.4 percent of the respondents believed in the
49. The DPP advocated altering the essential structure o f the central government by
existence
of a constitutional
crisis in Taiwan.
See Hungdah Chin,
"Constitutional Development in the Republic of China in Taiwan," in Steve Tsang, ed.,
In the Shadow of China: Political Development in Taiwan Since 1 949 (London : Hurst, 1 993), 34. 46. In the December 1 9 8 9 elections for the Legislative Yuan, the provincial assembly,
66. Stainton, "Taiwanese Lambada," 1 8 . 67 . Most opposition candidates have difficulty eliciting financial contributions t o their campaigns.
Businesspeople
and
the
wealthy
are more
inclined
to
donate
to
KMT
campaigus. The KMT also receives substantial income from party enterprises that enables it to allocate funds to its candidates' campaigns. 6 8 . John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, "The SNTV System and Its Political Implications," in Tien,
1 60
Taiwan ' s Transformation
H ung-mao Tien
161
ed., Taiwan 's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition, 1 2- 1 3 ; G. Bingham Powell,
Arrigo, "The Environmental Nightmare o f the Economic Miracle: Land Abuse and Land
Jr. . Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 9 82), 222-23.
Struggles in Taiwan," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 26 (January-June 1 994) : 23; Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan, 1 34.
69. Cheng, "Issue Structure, DPP ' s Factionalism and Party Realignment," 23-24. 70. Cheng, "Taiwan in Democratic Transition," 2 1 5 . 7 1 . Chu, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation i n Taiwan," 6 . 7 2 . The decision t o split finally came when the nonmainstream faction realized that it would not be able to alter the agenda set for the forthcoming KMT party congress. 73. Lin, "Wai lai cheng-chu ' an, fan tui yun-tung yu ti-fang p ' ai-hsi te hsuan-chu hu tung," I I . 74. Chung-kuo shih-pao (China times), 4 December 1 994, 2. 7 5 . Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Theory: Problems and Prospects," Comparative Politics 1 3 (April 1 9 8 1 ) : 3 5 8-59 . 76. Yun-han Chu, "Hsien chieh tuan Kuo-min-tang chih tzu-chih t i chu-yu ch' uan-li sheng-t ' ai" (KMT ' s current organization and power) ,(paper presented at the conference "The New Era of the Republic of China" sponsored by Chung-kuo shih-pao [China times], Taipei, 7-9 July 1 992), 1 3 . 7 7 . Samuel P . Huntington, "Religion and the Third Wave," National Interest 24 (Summer 1 99 1 ) : 40.
95. Unger a n d Chan, "China, Corporatism, and t h e E as t Asian Model," 30--3 1 . 96. Philippe C . Schmitter, "Some Propositions About Civil Society and the Con solidation of Democracy" (paper presented at the conference "Reconfiguring State and Society," University of California, Berkeley, 22-23 April 1 993), 1 -2 ; Lin, "Ts ' u ang-chao hsing chuan-fu ti tsai su yu tsai jen," 27-29. 97. Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,"
Journal of Democracy 5 (July 1 994) : 1 3 ; Unger and Chan, "China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model," 3 1 . 9 8 . Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan, 1 02. 99. Hsiao, "The Rise of Social Movements and Civil Protests," 59; Hsin-huang Hsiao, Shih-ming Huang, and Shih-chieh Weng, "Pai nien lai T' ai-wan she-hui-Ii te fu ch'en yu chuan-hsing" (The currents and transition of Taiwan ' s social forces in the twentieth century) (T' ai-wan yen-chiu chi-chin-hui [Society for Taiwan Studies ] , Taipei, January 1 995), 1 7- 1 8 ; Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan, 1 0 1 -2. 1 00. Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Civil Society and the Struggle for Democracy," in Diamond, ed . , The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the
78. Chung-kuo shih-pao (China times), 2 March 1 995, 2.
Developing World (New York: Freedom House, 1 992), 7-1 5 ; Diamond, "Rethinking Civil
7 9 . Min-chung jih-pao (Commons daily), 1 9 March 1 995, 2.
Could Succeed," Foreign Affairs 74 (March-April 1 995): 1 35 .
Society," 7-1 1 ; Michael Ignatieff, "On Civil Society: Why Eastern Europe' s Revolutions
80. Chung-kuo shih-pao (China times), 1 0 March 1 995, 4.
1 0 1 . Chang, "Jen-min, tzu-pen y u kuo-chia," 1 8-20.
8 1 . Hsin Hsin-wen (The journalist), 2 April 1 995, 39.
1 02. Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," 5; Friedman, ed . , The
82.
Philippe
C.
Schmitter,
"Dangers
and
Dilemmas
of Democracy," Journal of
Democracy 5 (April 1 994) : 69. 8 3 . Schmitter, "Consolidation of Political Democracies," 1 6-- 1 7 .
2.
94. Chang, "Jen min, tzu pen yu kuo chia," 2 1 ; Hsiao, "The Rise of Social Movements and Civil Protests," 5 8 .
8 4 . Mainwaring, O' Donnell, a n d Valenzuela, eds . , Issues i n Democratic Consolidation,
8 5 . The only exception was 1 97 5-7 8 . Following the death of Chiang Kai-shek, Yen Chiakan, a respected but powerless technocrat, served as the interim president. 86. Huntington, The Third Wave, 9 . 8 7 . Stainton, "Taiwanese Lambada," 3 8 . 8 8 . This figure includes 1 30 legislators popularly elected from districts plus 25 at-large members and 6 overseas members. These 3 1 at-large and overseas seats are allocated to parties according to their aggregate partisan vote, but this proportional representation applies only to parties winning at least 5 percent of the votes cast. See Chung-kuo shih-pao (China times), 20 December 1 992, 6; and United Daily News, 3 December 1 995, 9 . 8 9 . Shu-hui Liu, "Ming-chu-hua kuo-ch' eng chung t e Li-fa-yuan" (The Legislative Yuan in democratic transition) (unpub!. ms . , 1 9 9 5 . ) 9 0 . Chung-nien jih-pao (Youth daily news), 2 4 January 1 994, 2. 9 1 . Chu, "The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan," 1 4. 92. Unger and Chan, "China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model," 3 1 . 9 3 . Tien, The Great Transition, 43-46 ; Winckler, "Taiwan Transition," 24 1 ; Linda Gail
Politics of Democratization, 3 1 . 1 03 . Yaw-chi Chin, "T' ai-wan te ke an yen-chiu, hou ju -hsueh wen-hua chung te min chu t' an-so" (Confucian culture and democracy: A case study of Taiwan), Erh shih yi shih
chi shuang yueh-k 'an (Twenty-first century bimonthly) (Taipei) 6 (November 1 99 3 ) : 1 5 1 . 1 04. Hu, "Hsuan chu yu cheng chih chuan hsing," 7-8. 1 05 . Larry Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, a.'1d Directions for Consolidation,"
in Tom Farer, ed . , Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 996), 92. 1 06 . Friedman, ed., The Politics of Democratization, 48. 1 07 . Schmitter, "Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy," 70. 1 08 . Schmitter, "Transitology and Consolidology," 3. 1 09 . Schmitter, "Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy," 59--6 1 .
I10.
Thomas B . Gold, "Taiwan ' s Quest for Identity i n the Shadow of China," in
Tsang, ed . , In the Shadow of China, 1 74 .
1 63
Thomas B. Gold
6 TAIWAN: STILL DEFYING THE ODDS Thomas B. Gold
compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote."l Huntington sees democracy as a dichotomous rather than a continuous variable. That is, either democracy exists or it does not: it cannot exist in degrees. On this view, Taiwan would not be considered to have become formally democratic until the first direct election of the top official, in this case the president. This occurred on 23 March 1 996. the other top decision maker, the premier, is president of the Executive Yuan, and continues to be appointed by the president with the approval of the Legislative Yuan, making Taiwan ' s political system a hybrid presidential-parliamentary one.
Taiwan and the Third Wave Thomas B. Gold is associate professor of sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, where he was previously chair of the Center for Chinese Studies. He also serves as interpreter-escort for the National Committee on U. S. - China Relations and the Department of State. He is the author of State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (1986) and has contributed to various other publications.
T
aiwan continues to confound the oddsmakers. Just as it defied the odds when it avoided an invasion by Communist forces after they drove the Nationalist Party (KMT) off the mainland, defied the odds again when it raised the economy out of basket-case status, and defied the odds yet again when it survived in the face of near-total diplomatic isolation, Taiwan has now caught the "third wave" of democratization. In the process, it has rapidly transited from longstanding hard-line authoritarianism to the difficult stage of consolidating new democratic institutions. This essay explores key factors in this current, ongoing process of democratic consolidation. I look first at factors favoring consolidation, such as the social requisites of democracy that were proposed by Seymour Martin Lipset nearly four decades ago, as well as factors that are potentially unfavorable to democracy, namely, China' s traditional political culture and history. I then examine Taiwan in relation to a set of "arenas'� whose interconnectedness and mutual reinforcement, Juan Linz and Alfred S tepan argue, are necessary for democratic consolida tion. Next, I examine the issue of national identity. Finally, I discuss the role that mainland China plays in setting limits on Taiwan ' s democrati zation. I adopt S amuel Huntington' s procedural definition of democratization, wherein "a twentieth-century political system [is] democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely
Taiwan' s transition to democracy fits solidly into Huntington ' s discussion o f the third wave, the period from 1 974 to 1 990 during which some 30 countries made transitions to democracy .2 Actually, Taiwan was still not very far along this road in 1 99 1 when Huntington ' s book o n the third wave appeared. A t the end o f that year, however, there was an election for a new National Assembly , followed a year later by an election for a new Legislative Yuan . Neither the National Assembly nor the Legislative Yuan had been entirely reconstituted since the mid- 1 940s, when the Chinese civil war disrupted the implementation of the 1 947 Constitution as well as the institutionalization of new elected bodies . At the end of 1 994, elections were held for governor of Taiwan province and for mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, Taiwan ' s two largest cities. Until that time, these posts had been appointed by the president. The election for the third Legislati ve Yuan, in December 1 995, signaled significant progress in the institutionalization of the electoral process, clearly qualifying Taiwan for membership in the third wave. The March 1 996 elections for president, vice-president, and the third National Assembly were further steps toward democratic consolida tion. Huntington writes of three types of democratic transition : transforma tion, replacement, and transplacement. From this perspective, Taiwan' s experience most closely exemplifies "transformation," with the elites taking the lead to liberalize and then democratize the system. Although one could also argue that this would not have occurred without concerted pressure from opposition groups, making Taiwan ' s democrati zation more a case of "transplacement," Taiwan ' s elites have been able to guide the interactive dialectical process to such a degree that the former category provides a better fit.3 Many of the countries in Huntington' s survey have endured cycles of democratization followed by authoritarianism. Taiwan, however, appears to have succeeded on the first try in going directly from stable authoritarianism with absolutely no pre-authoritarian democratic
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experience to stable democracy.4 Although formally a constitutional democratic republic, the government of the Republic of China (ROC), both on the mainland and in Taiwan, never actually implemented democracy.s When the transition process began in Taiwan , liberalization preceded democratization as the regime began actually to protect the rights of individuals and groups, which had been granted in but suspended along with the constitution , before going on to reform the political system itself.6 The struggle for democracy was spearheaded by intellectuals and was quite protracted. While not approaching the levels of violence and bloodshed seen in many other countries , it was by no means peaceful or bloodless, a fact sometimes conveniently neglected in the current phase of mythologizing. Since the early 1 990s, the transition to and consolidation of democracy have achieved the status of a totally self-conscious project. Political leaders who have had much experience working with the hard-line authoritarian regime now compete with one another, and with their former victims, to profess their love of democracy and their total commitment to its consolidation.7 With the lifting of martial law in 1 9 8 7 and the termination of the Temporary Provisions that undergirded it in May 1 99 1 , the key institutions supporting authoritarianism were dismantled. Beginning in the mid- 1 970s, a new corps of opposition politicians elected to the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly began challenging the KMT-dominated regime to practice the democracy that the KMT had long preached. As a result, new institutions and laws to consolidate and protect democracy have been introduced and implemented. Consolidation is an analytically separate stage from transition. It is, to borrow Philippe Schmitter ' s definition, "the process of transforming the accidental arrangements , prudential norms, and contingent solutions that emerge during transition into relations of cooperation and competi tion that are reliably known, regularly practiced, and voluntarily accepted by those persons or collectivities (Le . , politicians and citizens) that , participate in democratic governance.' 8 That is to say, the unpredictabil ity, uncertainties, and exhilaration of the transition give way to the more mundane and often disillusioning tasks of resolving political disagree ments in a routine, rule-abiding way. The core dilemma "lies in coming up with a set of institutions that politicians agree upon and citizens are ,, willing to support. 9 These institutions, in the sense of rules to regulate political activity, include the following: open elections for key officials and representatives, competition among political parties, robust represen tative institutions, free media and access to it, and organizations of state, military, education, and so on that enjoy freedom from a single party ' s domination. It is also crucial that political actors b e willing t o support and protect these institutions and engage in the difficult work of ensuring their survival over ·time. Political actors must also accept the fact that these institutions themselves will continue to evolve as the
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domestic and external environments change. On this matter, it is important to note that, as of late 1 996, politicians from across the political spectrum appeared committed to adhering to and improving these institutions. I O While fistfights continued in the Legislative Yuan, there were also calls for a grand coalition of the three major parties as well as actual efforts by contending politicians to cooperate on particular issues. Certainly, numerous contingencies are at work here that influence the chances of continued consolidation of Taiwan' s democracy.
Lipset's Social Requisites In a classic 1 959 article in the modernization vein, Seymour Martin Lipset analyzed several social conditions that supported, but could not be shown to bring about, democratic political systems . I I These social conditions included aspects of economic development such as wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education, as well as political legitimacy-in particular, how socially divisive issues are resolved. Although this approach has lost favor since Lipset' s article was published, these economic, social, and political variables do appear to correlate with democratization. The causal link between Lipset's social requisites and actual democratic transitions has yet to be demonstrated, but as Przeworski and colleagues have shown, democratization and the survival of democracy are strongly correlated with a society ' s level of development. 1 2 Leaving aside the question of its current acceptance among scholars, modernization theory, with its predictions that a market economy will require social pluralism, which in turn will facilitate political pluralism, does seem to help explain Taiwan' s democratic transition over the long term. By the late 1 970s, if not earlier, after three decades of rapid economic development, Taiwan met the social requisites for democracy that Lipset reviews. In most categories, Taiwan ranks with the upper income or high-development countries according to United Nations and World B ank data: Industrialization. The proportion of GDP contributed by industry surpassed that contributed by agriculture as early as 1 965, with manufacturing accounting for the lion ' s share of industrial value. In keeping with postindustrial trends in the developed world, Taiwan' s service sector h as expanded rapidly relative to the primary and secondary sectors in recent years, particularly in the finance, insurance, and business-services category, which accounted for more than 2 1 percent o f GDP i n 1 995 . 1 3 Wealth. Officially, Taiwan' s per-capita national income in 1 995, in current prices, reached US$ 1 1 ,3 1 5, a figure widely believed to underesti mate actual income.14 Such household amenities as color television sets,
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refrigerators, and telephones are virtually universal, with automobiles, air conditioners, and washing machines also widely owned. IS While figures on income, disposable income, possession of a range of consumer goods, and so on are impressive and rank Taiwan with upper-middle-income and high-income countries according to the World Bank' s classification, even more significant has been Taiwan' s extraordinary record of equitable income distribution. 16 Urbanization. Taiwan is highly urbanized, although urbanization figures are hard to verify because so many people commute between the countryside and the cities, with most farmers acting as only part-time agriculturalists. The urban areas themselves, however, have expanded to such an extent that much of the west coast of the island appears to be one continuous urban sprawl. In fact, that area has a population density of 592 per square kilometer-a figure second only to that of Bangla desh.17 Education. In terms of school enrollment and retention, literacy, and so forth, Taiwan has a remarkable record of achievement. As of December 1 995, over 85 percent of the population aged 6 to 2 1 was enrolled in school, and the figure was nearly 1 00 percent for the 6-to- 1 1 cohort. I S There are nine years of compulsory education. Through 1 994, 10 percent of the population had higher education and more than 52 percent had secondary education, while the literacy rate was over 94 percent. 19 As Taiwan ' s economy grew, the island' s social structure changed dramatically. Farmers became full- or part-time wage workers, women entered the labor force, children became educated, and new careers opened up . There has been an extraordinary expansion of opportunities for women as well as for men . In spite of the major role played by the state in the economy, the private sector expanded rapidly and a bourgeois class emerged from small and medium-sized enterprises. Unlike in Japan or Korea, few large conglomerates emerged. This pattern of industrial organization helped to generate high employment and economic competitiveness, which helped to prevent extreme income polarization . Taiwan' s large middle class, which had supported the authoritarian regime for years, developed a social consciousness and adopted prodemocratic political attitudes .20 Many members of this class are professionals trained abroad and, in many cases, had successful careers outside of Taiwan before they returned to the island in the 1 9 80s.21 Some returned because the political environment had changed, and they, in turn, quite consciously participated in political activity to promote the democratic transition. Others have brought with them expectations and practices learned abroad. Perhaps less intentionally, they have also influenced the democratic practices and ideas within their organizations and in society as a whole.
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In sum, Taiwan had many favorable developments that facilitated democratic transition and consolidation.
Cultural and Historical Factors Whether China' s traditional political culture, which the original Han immigrants brought with them from the mainland to Taiwan, is more conducive to democracy or to authoritarianism is open to debate. President Lee Teng-hui, in his contribution to the present collection, takes "a look at the influence that ancient political philosophy has had on our natio n ' s political development in terms of what Chinese culture says about the relations between the government and the people.'m He locates passages from ancient texts that stress that the ruler should listen to and respond to the will of the people, and that "the government and people are a symbiotic unity." President Lee laments that after the imperial system coalesced, Chinese culture became "tainted by the monarchical politics of later centuries," and that "feudalistic thinking unfortunately cut short the development of this kind of thought." Nevertheless , he insists that no Chinese emperor "dared openly to repudiate the people' s will," and that "the influence of these political philosophies persisted. " While the .-passages that President Lee quotes can b e cited as evidence of a democratically oriented political culture, one can also find quotations as well as historical evidence, the existence of which Lee does not deny, to support the view that Chinese philosophy is more conducive to authoritarianism. In the view of Lucian Pye and others, Chinese political culture, derived from the teachings of Confucius as well as the much harsher Legalist school , emphasizes order, with a concomitant fear of chaos, or luan. 23 Order can be achieved when everyone knows his or her social role and performs it properly. Social roles are organized hierarchically , such that the individual must submit to the group, conform, adhere to an orthodox ideology, and obey an elitist, though meritocratic, official class of generalists who rule by moral example. There is no conception of God-given rights of individu als . Rather, the state determines rights, such as they are, and also determines the obligations of the populace. The legal system does not protect the rights of individuals or legitimate something we would recognize as civil society. From my reading of Chinese history, I would side with the latter emphasis, certainly as regards Taiwan ' s historical experience?4 In spite of a reputation for preferring to harmonize conflicts and save the face of all concerned, Chinese political culture, as revealed in centuries of practice, takes a zero-sum, moralistic view of political disagreements, in which the ultimate obj ective is the elimination of rivals as well as their followers, families, and even names . China' s historical record of
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unspeakable violence does not offer much proof of a tendency toward harmony and compromise, in spite of the written heritage. Pacts and coalitions have functioned as temporary tactics allowing room to maneuver, and have i nevitably degenerated into violent confrontation with clear winners and losers . The common people have not expected, nor have they Taiwan's experience received, much sympathy from their rulers. The concept of the Mandate of Heaven, has demonstrated which still holds power in the popular that nondemocratic mind, asserts that when rulers are rotten, political traditions there will be natural disasters signaling do not pose an Heaven ' s disapproval as well as popular insurmountable uprisings to overthrow the dynasty. The obstacle to new dynasty that replaces it, however, is Western-sty Ie not expected to be any more democratic or democratization. solicitous than its predecessors were. Rather, the maj ority of the people expect to suffer. Many elites, however, did share an optimism that moral leaders could be found to lead the country in a positive direction. Those stalwart and upstanding officials who dared to remonstrate with the emperor, as was their moral prerogative or obligation, were likelier to be beheaded than heeded. There is no immanent tendency to democracy in Chinese tradition. These values of obedience to distant authority for one' s own good have been taught to the Chinese within the family as well as in school and in society at large. The family, school, and society mutually reinforce this culture, stressing moral , sacred authority, with the state seen as the family writ large, headed by an unassailable paternalistic authority. Overcoming this deeply ingrained legacy has heretofore proved impossible. China' s two twentieth-century modernizing regimes, the ROC and the People' s Republic of China (PRC) , talk extensively of democ racy and of formally democratic institutions but in fact erected highly authoritarian structures that utilized the traditional political culture of authoritarian rule. Because of the strong and persistent authoritarian aspects of the political culture, it is difficult to argue convinciflgly for a causal or even a supportive link between China' s traditional political culture and history and the very real process of democratization that is now under way in Taiwan.25 If anything, Taiwan ' s experience has demonstrated that nondemocratic p0litical traditions do not pose an insurmountable obstacle to Western-style democratization, and arguments by former Singaporean prime minister Lee Kuan Yew, Malaysian prime minister Mahatir bin Mohamad, and other people about uniquely Asian values, while true at one level, should not be made into mountains that can never be climbed.26
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Individual leaders have played a critical role in Taiwan' s democratiza tion . Chiang Ching-kuo, as president and KMT chairman, recognized the handwriting on the wall and promoted Taiwanization of the party and state. He also began dismantling the hard-line authoritarian institutions that he himself had erected and then maintained for three decades. While we can credit Chiang with starting the transition, Lee Teng-hui took up the task of consolidating the new institutions. President Lee has acted against traditional Chinese political culture time and again by eschewing extremist zero-sum politics and building consensus on a "win win" platform. Nothing better exemplifies this than the National Affairs Conference he convened in June and July 1 990. Facing student demonstrations and popular disaffection not unlike the giant Tiananmen demonstrations in Beijing the previous spring, he went against what had become standard practice and, in contrast to the Communists, brought together citizens from across the political spectrum, including some with life prison sentences, in order to discuss Taiwan ' s destiny and set out a blueprint of future action. This conference discredited the archconser vatives who remained in the leadership and paved the way for the reinvention of Taiwan ' s political system, a reinvention that is still under way .27 For comparative purposes, it is important to recognize that Taiwan ' s people had no pre-authoritarian experience with democracy, either on the mainland-where both Taiwan ' s original emigres and the post- 1 945 regime originated-or on the island. Sun Yat-sen established Asia' s first republic in 1 9 1 2, but it quickly deteriorated into a congeries of battling warlords. When Chiang Kai-shek took over the leadership of party and state and united much of mainland China' s territory, he ruled both through the Leninist KMT and the military . In line with Sun's "Three Principles of the People"-nationalism, democracy, and people' s livelihood-Chiang preached that China would build democracy in three stages. First came military rule, then tutelage by the KMT, and finally constitutional democracy. Decades later, oppositionists successfully used this public pledge to democratize as a wedge against authoritarianism. Before that, however, endless civil war and invasion by Japan prevented Chiang from establishing constitutional democracy and then allowed him to suspend the 1 947 Constitution in 1 949. Some would argue that the civil war and the Japanese invasion actually gave Chiang the pretext he needed for delaying a transition out of the tutelary phase. The regime that Chiang brought to Taiwan in 1 949 was decidedly nondemocratic in practice, although it was officially committed to establishing democracy, albeit without any fixed timetable. For its part, the island of Taiwan had never enjoyed democracy. In 1 895, it was ceded to Japan after the Japanese defeated China in war. Japan proceeded to suppress any opposition and ruled the i sland in an authoritarian manner until the end of the S econd World War, when, on
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22 October 1 945, Taiwan was retroceded back to China. The Japanese combined military rule with a developmentalist state to bring rapid economic change to Taiwan while treating the Chinese people as second class citizens. They provided education, mainly to boys, in order to make them better workers rather than informed citizens ; only a few received advanced training. Chinese imperial rule of the island had been rather lax, while the Japanese introduced an unprecedented level of control and social penetration by the state.28 The Japanese co-opted local elites. There were several social movements pressing for more represen tation, equal treatment by the Japanese, local autonomy , and elections, but not full-blown democracy?9
Confining Conditions Taiwan ' s retrocession to China (by then the ROC) in 1 945 had further negative repercussions for democracy. In his earlier classic study Political Order in Changing Societies, Huntington focused not on the form of government that countries have, but on their "degree of ,, government. 30 By any measure, Taiwan had an extraordinary degree of Japanese and Chinese governance, almost none of it directly conducive to democracy.3 1 One thing that set Taiwan apart from other authoritarian regimes was that Taiwan did not have to create authoritarian institutions de novo in a democratic setting.32 Although the ROC never established effective control over the entire Chinese mainland, it did have an elaborate bureaucratic structure, a large military force, and a five-house governing system, much of which crossed over to Taiwan with more than sufficient staff.33 The ROC also reestablished itself in what some would call a colonial fashion vis-a-vis the indigenous population in order to build a new society . In a hostile environment, the mainlanders from all over the continent who ran this show at first submerged their normal regional rivalries to band together for mutual support, thereby reinforcing their control over local society . In the process, they carried out reforms that gradually facilitated social integration and a limited form of democracy . Under the Chinese the Leninist KMT penetrated the government and military as well as all societal sectors such as education and the media. The party had cells throughout society as well as an extensive network of secret police and informers. Alliances with local factions cemented control at the base of society.34 The regime established a corporatist structure, with single state-created or state-dominated bodies representing state-designated societal sectors such as workers , farmers , students, professionals, business, women, and so on.35 Under martial law, competing organizations, including political parties, were forbidden. All political mobilization was thus closely monitored and controlled by the KMT, and challengers were ruthlessly suppressed.
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I n sum, the history and political culture of China and o f Taiwan, including the half-century of Japanese control and later the militarized Leninist KMT regime, presented confining conditions for democratic transition and consolidation. The Leninist KMT had an edge over the military regimes common in authoritarian systems elsewhere; its clear lines of control through the party eliminated civilian-military conflict, centralizing civilian control over the military as well as society . This made it much harder to dislodge the KMT, as there were no barracks to which the regime could return . It was also much more penetrating and powerful than single dominant parties such as Japan' s Liberal Democratic Party or Mexico' s Institutional Revolutionary Party, and it had a more elaborate ideology . At first, the populace had few outlets for democratic participation beyond the local (subprovincial) level. Mean while, the cohesive elite controlling the centralized structure showed little inclination to change the system, as the system not only kept them in power but also sparked phenomenal economic growth. Economic growth and attendant social change gradually created a solid foundation for democracy. President Lee took steps toward reducing the extremism that marked the late 1 980s and early 1 990s, after martial law was lifted on 1 5 July 1 987. Lively but peaceful 1 995 and 1 996 elections showed that even disaffected politicians appeared to be willing to abide by the current democratic rules and participate in formulating new ones. Yet the KMT had a weak showing in the 1 995 Legislative Yuan vote, and the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and New Party (NP) now aim to establish a tripartisan grand-coalition government even at the risk of political paralysis. Should such changes occur, the KMT ' s ability to continue to guide the transition process will be sorely tested. Moreover, Lee seems to be building a political base outside the party, appealing to various urban and rural constituencies, relying on local factions, and tolerating the underworld. These developments pose new, potentially severe challenges to the consolidation of democratic institutions.36
Arenas of Consolidated Democracy In an important new formulation, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan propose five interconnected and mutually reinforcing arenas, in addition to a functioning state, that are necessary for democratic consolidation?7 What follows will be an admittedly sketchy effort to relate the Taiwan case to their approach and to encourage further research. The five arenas are civil society, political society, the rule of law, the state apparatus , and economic society, each o f which has a primary organizing principle. Each arena receives support from and mediates the others. Most of the discussion here is devoted to the first of these arenas.
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Civil society. Civil society is "that arena of the polity where self organizing and relatively autonomous groups, movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and solidarities, and to advance their interests ."38 Its primary organizing principle is freedom of association and communication, which, bolstered by law, the state, and a pluralist economy, generates political society and Chinese tradition helps to monitor the state and the econ and practice have omy. not been supportive Chinese tradition and practice have not of what those in the West would call civil been supportive of what those in the West would call civil society.39 There has been society. suspicion of autonomous organizations or movements, and problems have arisen in establishing trust beyond kin and close associates . Popular organizations that did exist, such as guilds, saw themselves not as standing apart from the state but as serving it, supplementing the state in areas such as welfare, disaster relief, education, and health care. The state did not offer guarantees to protect or encourage a marketplace of ideas and organizations. On the contrary , it stamped them out. The KMT inherited this culture and practice, and used martial law on Taiwan to bolster both the suppression and the emergence of civil society, while establishing a corporatist system. At first, the party also closely restricted the public sphere through ownership of media, censorship, and prohibitions against the rights of assembly and strike. There has been much skepticism about the use of the term "civil society" to analyze Chinese societies. Although its applicability for the mainland may be limited, something closely resembling Linz and Stepan' s definition of civil society has clearly emerged in Taiwan over the course of its development experience. This process has been supported by the rise of a pluralist market economy and a strong private sector, and now government protection.4o Following the democratic changes in Eastern Europe, when the concept of "civil society" became a political obj ective,41 KMT and opposition activists and theorists have made the establishment and consolidation of civil society a conscious project in Taiwan. The first tentative autonomous associations and movements that were not automatically suppressed by the regime were the consumer, environmental, and women' s movements that first emerged around 1 9 80.42 By calling attention to issues affecting the health and well-being of citizens while not directly challenging the state ' s authority, these movements were able to grow in size and voice. As early as the late 1 970s, political dissidents had attempted to establish a new political party, but met with repression. Their activities gradually coalesced into a movement referred to as the tangwai, or
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"outside the party," meaning, of course, political activity outside the KMT. The tangwai became, in effect, a nonparty organization resem bling a party, thus serving as a magnet for a range of social movements, especially after the lifting of martial law in 1 987 .43 After that watershed event, unlike the more cautious movements cited above, these move ments and organizations often quite directly challenged the state ' s policies a n d authority, especially its handling o f certain issues like the environment. Among the 20 or so identifiable movements have been social forces-including farmers, women, students, original residents, and so on-and cause-based groups, including consumer-protection, environ mental-protection, antinuclear, and other movements . Some have coalesced into or have spun off a range of formal organizations, which are the foundation of civil society . Some have established links with international movements, while others originated abroad and then moved to Taiwan to participate in and advance the new democracy . With the termination of martial law in 1 9 87 and the subsequent lifting of bans on new newspapers, magazines, associations, political parties , and radio stations, Taiwan ' s public sphere has flourished, although the Chinese viewed such changes as chaotic. The liberation of the media, in particular, has been extraordinary. In 1 989 and 1 992 elections for the Legislative Yuan, candidates complained about their lack of access to the three government-dominated television stations. By 1 995, the situation had improved dramatically , with many privately owned cable stations, collectively known as "Channel 4," offering multiple alternatives to the government' s three channels and providing opportunities for candidates and pundits to air their political views .44 The Taiwanese enjoy religious freedom, although organized religion never played the galvanizing political role that it played in Poland, South Korea, and elsewhere. Organized Buddhism is a repository of great wealth, especially land and buildings, and engages in charitable and social work.45 In 1 995, Chen Li-an, former president of the Control Yuan and a devout Buddhist, announced his candidacy for president on a religious platform. That same year, he offered his support to a nonparty B uddhist candidate for the Legislative Yuan in Kaohsiung; the candidate won handily, surprising many observers . Chen ' s presidential bid fared poorly, but he and his female running mate garnered just under 10 percent of the popular vote. Foreign Christian missionaries have been numerous, and their religious groups operate a number of schools , hospitals, and charitable organi zations. Many missionaries withdrew from the mainland with Chiang Kai-shek, who was a Methodist, and then staunchly supported his regime. There are at least 57 Protestant sects .46 The Presbyterians are the largest and were one of the few sects to oppose the regime, which responded with surveillance and intimidation. The Presbyterians' secretary general, Kao Ch' un-ming, sheltered the fugitive dissident Shih
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Ming-teh after the Kaohsiung Incident of 1 979-when an observation of International Human Rights Day turned violent, allegedly because of government agents provocateurs-for which Shih served time in jail. Reverend Ts' ai Yu-ch' uan received a j ail sentence in 1988 for his advocacy of Taiwanese independence. Yet President Lee is a devout Presbyterian as well. Another Christian group, the fundamentalist New Testament Church, has been involved in a long-running confrontation with the government due to a land dispute. Its supporters frequently parade banners and distribute literature at DPP rallies. The eclectic millenarian Buddhist society Yiguan Dao (YVay of B asic Unity) had been allied with the KMT on the mainland but was banned on Taiwan from 1 950 until 1 9 87. Many businessmen and professors are believed to be members of the now legal groUp.47 The legal system now guarantees and protects civil society in theory and practice, and the state has enforced the law, often to its own dismay . Citizens down to the neighborhood level feel confident and comfortable about organizing to pursue a range of interests.48 Clearly, civil society wields much clout in Taiwan, as politicians attempt to co opt and latch on to movements originating within society. Much of the political agenda is now being set within civil, not political, society. Political figures inside and outside government seriously consider the ideas of the media, think tanks, social movements, and autonomous organizations in formulating policy . The June-July 1 990 National Affairs Conference signaled a new relationship between state and society, evidence that the once-hegemonic political center had become quite "inhibited."49 The consolidation of civil society, like the consolidation of democracy, is now a conscious project in Taiwan, and the concept has received much academic and popular attention. Activists also closely monitor the activities of foreign nonstate organizations and movements. After the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill hearings in the United States, for example, Taiwan wome n ' s groups launched protests against sexual harassment. 50 Political society. Political society is an arena whose primary organizing principle is free and inclusive electoral contestation, legitimated by civil society , guaranteed by law, and maintained by an impartial state apparatus with political parties, elections, electoral rules, legislators, and so on.51 Although these entities had not functioned effectively for decades, if ever, the ROC leadership had long been committed to building democracy, albeit not according to any particular time frame. This commitment opened the door for opposition politicians to challenge the KMT regime to deliver on its promises of democracy by permitting an opposition party to form. The struggle to establish new political parties outside the KMT and
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its two puppet parties constituted the focus of dissident action as early as 1 960, when the government imprisoned mainlander intellectual Lei Chen for wanting to set up a democratic party . The climax, however, came in September 1 986, when tangwai activists publicly established the DPP at Taipei' s Grand Hotel and waited to be hauled off to j ail. To their surprise, this did not happen . Instead, Chiang Ching-kuo personally intervened to protect them. A law permitting new parties was passed in 1 9 8 8 and implemented in 1 9 8 9 . Very quickly, nearly 80 parties registered, although many of these are like Taiwan ' s tens of thousands of trading companies, with little more than a business card and a telephone number.52 Until 1 99 3 , the DPP was the only viable opposition party. Within the KMT, varioll.s elites voiced their opposition to many of the policies that the Lee Teng-hui team began implementing after he was elected as ROC president in March 1 990. In the 1 989 local electoral campaign, however, a faction called the New KMT Alliance, also referred to as the "nonmainstream" KMT, publicly began opposing the "mainstream' ; KMT leadership because of the KMT ' s tendency to ally with big business, KMT corruption, and Lee ' s alleged support for Taiwan independence. Ultimately, many-mostly mainlander-KMT members quit the party to establish the NP in August 1 993 .53 The 1 990 National Affairs Conference set the agenda for reform and for new political institutions, essentially reinventing Taiwan ' s political system. The National Assembly was completely reelected for the first time in Taiwan on 2 1 December 1 99 1 , as was the Legislative Yuan on 5 December 1 992. The mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung and the governor of Taiwan were all popularly elected on 4 December 1 994. The first direct election of the president on 23 March 1 996 completed the first round of the democratic process. The successful holding of a second election for the Legislative Yuan on 5 December 1 995 and for the National Assembly on 23 March 1 996 also helped consolidate the democratic institutions. Long a hegemonic, hidebound party intolerant of organized public challenge, the KMT has changed its face dramatically in the past ten years. The KMT' s proportion of the popular vote has declined precipitously from more than 70 percent in the 1980s to just below 50 percent in the 1 995 polls, yet it clings to power and continues to focus on winning elections, with no indication of plans to invalidate polls not in its favor. A future test will be the KMT ' s handling of the unprecedented challenge to its control of the Legislative Yuan, including the Yuan ' s ability to stymie the KMT' s nominee for premier and other cabinet members. There is much discussion of how to revise the Constitution to resolve jurisdictional overlap between the National Assembly and the ROC and provincial governments, because the Nation al Assembly has lost its main function of electing the president and vice-president.
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With the successful 1 995 and 1 996 elections, political figures seem more committed to party politics and democratic rules, notwithstanding the persistence of vote buying. The once-radical DPP has become an accepted fixture on the political landscape, and is now joined by the NP. In 1 995, disaffected Taiwanese and mainlanders joined the NP in droves, expressing their dissatisfaction with the current environment but determined to act within the system. From long years of service, NP leaders understood the KMT machine, and they demonstrated extraordi nary sophistication in instructing voters how to allocate votes to ensure thai a high percentage of their candidates were elected in Taiwan' s single-vote multiseat-district system. All three major parties tried to present themselves as sophisticated, mature, and capable of navigating the ship of state. Civil society thus appears to have legitimated the new political society, which actively drafts new legislation and monitors the state and economy . Rule of law. Rule of law has constitutionalism as its primary organizing principle. Like other Asian societies, Taiwan was traditionally ruled by powerful men, not by laws, but it has learned a new legal culture that respects law and human rights. Because of the KMT ' s manipulation of the legal system for so many decades, separating the KMT from the judiciary has been another formidable challenge. There has been progress , especially under the aggressive and well-publicized leadership of Harvard-trained Minister of Justice Ma Ying-jeou .54 Among other issues, Ma focused on cleaning up local legislatures, where underworld figures have acted with impunity in recent years, murdering colleagues in cold blood and daring the authorities to move against them.55 Ma worked assiduously during the 1 995 election campaign to prosecute cases of vote buying and other improprieties, even though most of the offenders were affiliated with his party , the KMT.56 Despite such efforts, the alleged ongoing alliance of the criminal underworld with the KMT and the risk of authoritarian populism pose major obstacles to the establishment of an independent and reliable rule of law on Taiwan. The rise of crimin al activity, or at least its increased publicity , also requires attention. State apparatus. The state apparatus, an effective bureaucracy whose primary organizing principle is adherence to rational-legal norms in the Weberian mode, has an established track record in Taiwan . In Linz and Stepan' s terms, it receives normative support from civil society and monetary support from political society ; in turn, it has made major strides i n enforcing democratically sanctioned laws and procedures in the arenas of civil, political, and economic society. In spite of party hegemony, Taiwan' s b ureaucracy, especially in the economic realm, has been dominated by technocrats operating with a great deal of autonomy
Tho mas B. Gold
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from politics. At all levels of the bureaucracy, a new generation of highly educated officials, many trained abroad, has taken charge. The bureaucracy is hardly free of controversy, however. The newly energized legislatures , especially at the national and provincial levels, have attacked the bureaucracy for its waste and corruption as well as for avoiding accountability . The economic bureaucrats have become embroiled in controversy surrounding the wildly ambitious Six-Year Plan for National Development. Scheduled to run from 1 99 1 to 1 996 at a cost of over US$300 billion, the plan became mired in charges of corruption and incompetence; its infrasiruture projects, such as a subway and an elevated light railway for Taipei, aggravated that city ' s already atrocious traffic problem s . Some critici zed the plan as a monster created by then Premier Hau Po-ts ' un ( 1 990-93) to prove his bona fides as a statesman after a long military career. Also contested by many in political society is the plan to turn Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center, with local and foreign companies coordinating regional manufac turing, financial, transportation, and media activities from a base in Taiwan-a plan that has been championed by Vice-President Lien Chan . Many bureaucrats also oppose it, seeing the liberalization it requires as a threat to their power.57 Economic society. Economic society has the institutionalized market as its primary organizing principle. Political society, in league with civil society and the state, produces, respects , and enforces these norms. Meanwhile, a successful economy produces the surplus necessary for the state to operate and for there to be pluralism and autonomy in civil and political societies. Although the fact is rarely noted, the KMT ' s ideology has a socialist, anticapitalist bias. Sun Yat-sen' s writings urge the restriction of private capital and a commanding role for the state in sectors such as defense and heavy industry . While certainly permitting private business, the state tries to control large conglomerates, some of which it previously promoted. Moreover, the government at all levels owns and operates numerous enterprises in key sectors of finance, infrastructure, and upstream raw materials, especially petrochemical products. The KMT itself may be the largest wealth-holder and business conglomerate on the island .58 Nonetheless, private industrial production has increased rapidly compared with the state sector. Industrial production accounts for more than 80 percent of added value.59 In recent years, the state has privatized some of its enterprises and has liberalized others, such as the financial field, allowing private domestic and foreign investors. 60 The government has run a current-account surplus almost every year since 1 965, with net expenditures running approximately 30 percent of GNP in the 1 990s. In sum, i n all of the above arenas, Taiwan has made gains strong enough to signify that the chances for successful democratic consolida-
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Taiwan : Still Defying the Odds
tion are high. Again, much of this goes against expectations given Taiwan ' s history, which features a traditionally weak civil society, prohibitions barring free and open political contestation, a rule of men rather than laws , and a bureaucratic antipathy to private business. Yet all indications are that the economic, social, and political changes over the past four decades created a solid foundation for civil society, which, as it matures, generates changes in other spheres supportive of democ racy . Without trying to gloss over the potential for chaos and extremism, or the recent rise in criminal activities, some with links to politics, the overall evidence indicates that actors in all five arenas are building fonus of interaction conducive to democratic consolidation. In tenus of behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional factors , the citizens and the state are generally acting to facilitate the practice of democracy.
The Identity Issue While the preceding discussion clearly indicates that Taiwan has been able to overcome numerous obstacles to the consolidation of democracy, two major challenges remain. One is the subethnic cleavage. The other is the role of the mainland. The two are interrelated. In his essay discussed above, Lipset identifies three types of historical cleavages in society that affect political stability. These are religious differences ; admission of the lower strata, especially workers, to citizenship status ; and the struggle over distribution of national income.61 None of these posed or poses a threat to Taiwan' s stability or democ racy. The maj or domestic threat comes from a source unique to the Taiwan situation, namely , the subethnic rivalry between Taiwanese and mainlanders. We need to consider this rivalry in discussing the consolidation of democracy because it affects the way power is shared. Moreover, it affects whether those in power conceive of the entity they govern as being part of a larger nation (Le., China) or as a sovereign unit in its own right. 6 2 The situation in Taiwan poses problems for comparative research, as it differs fundamentally from the ethnic rivalries that have violently tom so much of the post-Cold War world apart. Most of the people on Taiwan are of the Han nationality, the same ethnic group that comprises an estimated 92 percent of the mainland ' s popUlation today . Except for a small number of "original residents," who are of Malay-Polynesian origin, Taiwan ' s inhabitants are of mainland-Chinese ethnic stock, and are differentiated from one another mainly by when they or their forebears crossed to the island. "Taiwanese" refers mainly to those who came to the island prior to or during the 1 895-1 945 Japanese occupation and speak the Hokkien dialect; they are overwhelmingly from the southern part of Fujian province, directly across from Taiwan. Southern Fujian has historically been a major source of Chinese emigrants,
Thomas B. Gold
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especially to Southeast Asia. Another maj or group of people who speak a different dialect are also considered ''Taiwanese'': the Hakka, literally, "guest people," who live all over the mainland, with major concentra tions in Fujian and Guangdong. "Mainlanders" refers to those people-again, mostly Han-who came after 1 945, especially the group that retreated along with the KMT regime in 1 949 . The mainlanders came from all over China, but especially from the Yangzi Delta region around Shanghai and Nanjing (the ROC ' s capital). On the mainland, they engage in a range of regional rivalries, but on Taiwan they became a residual category of people-in Chinese, waishengren (outside provincials), in English, "mainlanders"-who banded together to preserve their power and status in the face of the much more numerous Taiwanese. Although the mainlanders and the Taiwanese share many cultural traditions, one fundamental difference between them stems from the fact that the Taiwanese underwent a half-century of Japanese rule, including a concerted effort to turn them into cultural Japanese. The mainlanders fought a bitter war against Japanese imperialist aggression in China. Certainly there were adjustments to be made when the Chinese regained control, but the mainland regime handled the situation with extraordinary insensitivity and incompetence. The war-weary mainlanders came to Taiwan as an occupying army, with greedy officials and merchants treating the local Chinese as second-class citizens. Tensions escalated, culminating in an uprising in February 1 947 that was brutally suppressed by the KMT regime.63 When the regime itself moved to the island in December 1 949, ostensibly for a short time until it could launch a counterattack against the mainland, it continued to repress the Taiwanese and many mainland refugees as well . Moreover, the regime set up a system that was, in effect, neocolonial. Mainlanders occupied the commanding heights of the political, military, and social systems. In addition to facing blatant discrimination and cronyism among mainland ers, all but a handful of Taiwanese lacked the "cultural capital" --especially mastery of Mandarin-as well as the "social capital," or connections with the elite, needed to take advantage of opportunities for upward mobility . The overwhelming force of the mainland regime made overt resistance virtually impossible, although resentment persisted. Over time, the Taiwanese overcame their initial handicaps and accumulated the cultural, social , and economic capital needed to advance eventually to the heights of the political system . The mainlanders justified their long-tenu refusal to cede control on the grounds that theirs was the legitimate government of all of China. Further, because they believed that their regime was only temporarily on the island, they argued that it could not be turned over to only one regional group-that is, local Taiwanese. To do so would have implied not only that the mainlanders acknowledged that their chances of reconquering the mainland were nil,
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Taiwan: Still Defying the Odds
but also that they therefore had no legitimate claim to monopolize power. In short, it would have been tantamount to political suicide. Over time, despite much assimilation culturally and socially, frictions between the two subethnic groups persisted. In the midst of the hard-line authoritarianism and the emerging civil society of the 1 970s, Taiwanese intellectuals and political activists began to openly discuss subethnic differences, particularly as these translated into unequal access to political power.64 Expressing their ideas through cultural works as well as political action, Taiwanese began to challenge mainlander hegemony, especially the national myth, also upheld by Beijing, that there was only one legitimate government of all of China, that Taiwan was just a province, and that the ultimate mission of all Chinese was national reunification. The tangwai and DPP were primarily Taiwanese movements, and through code words such as "self-determina tion" they began to raise the issue of Taiwan ' s status, especially as the ROC government faced near-total international diplomatic isolation after expulsion from the United Nations in October 1 97 1 . Chiang Ching-kuo promoted many Taiwanese in the party and state apparatus by default, since many second-generation mainlanders went and stayed abroad. This also constituted recognition of the fact that a return to the mainland was unlikely, and that, because of their large numbers, the Taiwanese had to be included in the regime. Although the Taiwanese are neither more nor less democratic than other Chinese, bringing them into the top echelons of the formerly closed system led to further democratic openings. This drew many overseas Taiwanese back to the island, which, again, fueled liberalization. The termination of martial law and other restrictions on free speech moved the question of national identity to the political forefront. Whether or not Taiwan should be independent and abandon claims to the mainland became a dominant theme in election campaigns beginning in 1 989, with mixed results. It is certainly significant for democratization that this political taboo is now so publicly debated, and is even a central plank of the DPP platform, with opposition to it at the core of the NP' s ideology . I t i s significant not just for free expression, but also for how politicians in the Legislative Yuan or in the presidency respond to their constituents' demands for either a formal declaration of independence or aggressive negotiations for reunification with Beijing. Many voters cast their ballots on the basis of a c andidate' s stance on the issue of independence versus reunification.
Competing Viewpoints There are thus two nationalist identities competing in Taiwan, one favoring independence, the other favoring steps toward reunification with mainland China. In the December 1 995 Legislative Yuan campaign and
181
Thomas B. Gold
i n the 1 996 presidential and National Assembly campaigns, the DPP supported the former position, the NP the latter, although Communist threats during the summer of 1 995 and during the 1 996 campaign actually pushed both extremes toward the more centrist KMT position. During that time, DPP activists argued that they did not need to declare independence because Taiwan was already independent and was sovereign in practice. The NP, meanwhile, favored dialogue but not reunification under current conditions . The KMT, in the middle of the DPP and the NP, has become a predominantly Taiwanese party, officially advocating eventual reunification and engaging in discussions with mainland representatives, while simultaneously leading the effort to restructure Taiwan ' s political institutions in order to maintain and extend de facto independence indefinitely . In any event, after some initial debate over the mainland question, which is of greater interest in Taipei than elsewhere on the island, domestic issues took center stage during the 1995 campaign . In an interesting contretemps on the competing-identities issue, both sides battled in early 1 996 over the planned exhibition of irreplaceable works from Taiwan ' s Palace Museum at New York ' s Metropolitan Museum of Art. Some NP activists claimed it was a betrayal of Chinese cultural patrimony, while pro-independence advocates used it as a wedge to argue for a separate grand museum celebrating Taiwan's indigenous culture.65 In contrast to what would be predicted by theory, Taiwan has become democratic without resolving the national-identity issue.66 The ability even to raise the issue is both a cause and an effect of democratization ; pressing too far, however, runs the risk of exacerbating social divisions and heightening the level of concern in Beijing.
The Mainland Factor Taiwan ' s democratic transition and consolidation fit quite comfortably into the global third wave, which has also affected many of its neighbors. Events in the Philippines and South Korea in the mid- 1 980s surely influenced the democratization process in Taiwan as well. On the one hand, then, the external environment has been quite conducive to Taiwan ' s democratization. On the other hand, Taiwan ' s domestic political changes have provoked a great deal of concern in the PRC, the major factor in Taiwan ' s external environment.67 This is because, as discussed above, Taiwan ' s democratization has been inseparable from questions about whether it is part of China or is an independent sovereign state. From Beijing' s point of view, dismantling the authoritar ian system and establishing new democratic institutions on Taiwan constitute an increasingly obvious attempt to prepare the groundwork for a formal declaration of independence.
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Taiwan: Still Defying the Odds
For some time, the Communists insisted that the people on Taiwan yearned for reunification but were prevented from achieving this by their reactionary rulers.68 The Communists promised to liberate them. Since 1 979, they have toned down their rhetoric, calling instead for peaceful reunification, although they continue to proclaim their right to use force against Taiwan should it issue a formal declaration of independence. When the mainlander-dominated KMT regime stayed firmly in control, like the CCP that controlled the mainland, it rejected the notion of "two Chinas" and claimed sovereignty over the mainland, as did the PRC over Taiwan. Yet with the termination of martial law, the rise of the pro-independence DPP, and the emergence of a "Taiwanized" KMT whose actions baffle Beijing' s Taipei-watchers, things have changed. Under Lee Teng-hui, the ROC has redefined the one-China principle to signify that two political entities make up China, and that Taiwan has the right to expand its "international living space." President Lee has stated the obvious: Chin a has long been a divided nation . Each side should acknowledge this fact and deal with the other as a political entity having control over part of Chinese territory . Lee's position is in part a response to domestic pressures arising from Taiwan ' s diplomatic nonexistence and the problems its passport holders face in doing business or traveling abroad.69 As Chinese from both sides of the Taiwan Strait engage in a wide variety of interactions, the mainland' s Taiwan experts have gradually become aware of the gap between their official analyses of the situation in Taiwan and the realities . Although public-opinion polls and election results on Taiwan indicate reluctance to support outright independence, there is little support for reunification under communist rule. Beijing reacted belligerently to President Lee ' s trip to the United States in June 1 995, and then conducted missile tests across Taiwan ' s bow that July and November and again around the March 1 996 election in a brazen attempt to intimidate voters. Beijing ' s tactics, however, had mixed results . Pro-independence activists generally toned down their rhetoric, and President Lee retreated somewhat from his aggressive pursuit of heightened international recognition. Yet pro-reunification activists also found that Communist bullying did little to support their assertions that Beijing could be dealt with in a reasonable manner.70 Beijing has made opposition to Taiwan ' s search for "international living space," which it sees as a code phrase for independence, a key pillar of its foreign policy. With a succession struggle under way in Beijing, no aspirant dares risk losing Taiwan. Taiwan' s new generation of leaders, led by Lee Teng-hui and a coterie of mostly American trained social scientists, has a very different agenda from that of either its predecessors or Beijing ' s rulers. In addition, the new elites have a different political culture; they attempt to resolve disputes democratically rather than by force. For years, the KMT referred to national division
i S3
Thomas B. Gold
and the communist menace to deny full democracy to the people of Taiwan, but new politicians argue that successfully meeting the communist challenge requires domestic unity based not on the suppres sion of dissent, but on a solid consensus achieved through open debate and elections.
A Promising Future This overview of the factors central to Taiwan ' s democratic consoli dation demonstrates that on almost every indicator, the citizens of the island and its leaders have surmounted obstacles to the institutionaliza tion of a new political system. They have overcome nondemocratic historical and cultural legacies as well as a lack of experience with the uncertainties and suboptimal compromises inherent in democracy, and they are democratically addressing the consequences of the historically grounded subethnic divisions . Politicians and intellectuals have publicly committed themselves to using peaceful compromise to continue the process of institutionalizing the new system in ways that facilitate democratic consolidation. The extremely smooth implementation of the 1 995 and 1 996 elections and the prosecution of violators of election laws made what had looked like a society on the brink of chaos a few years earlier seem increasingly like a mature and stable democracy. Although street demonstrations and parliamentary incivility remain potent tools of expression, the transition to democracy is increasingly driven by elections. That democratic consolidation has occurred does not mean that this is a system set in stone, resistant to change. Rather, it is generally accepted that change must and will come, and that citizens at the top and throughout society must be prepared to participate in managing it within stable democratic institutions. Full consolidation will occur when democracy becomes "the only game in town," when no elite group will try to seize power through undemocratic means, and no group within society would support such an attempt.71 For scholars, Taiwan continues to pose interesting theoretical questions: How can societies with no pre-authoritarian democratic legacy overcome cultural and institutional barriers to democratization? Can societies that take groups and networks, rather than individuals, as the basis of social interaction construct something that functions like Western civil society? Is authoritarianism necessary at a certain stage to foster economic growth? Do market economies eventually bring about pluralist political systems ? Can a democratizing society build trust among groups with fundamental differences as to the identity of the nation ?7 2 Can democratization continue without an agreement on the collecti ve representations that constitute the nation ?73 In a more down-to-earth and less theoretical realm, social changes
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Taiwan: Still Defying the Odds
growing out of democratization such as strikes, demonstrations, and a rise in crime have at times frightened the business community .74 The threat of government paralysis due to the KMT' s weak showing in 1995 and its bureaucratic stalling in economic and political reform has also worried many observers. Nonetheless, the economy continues to grow at a rate of around 6 percent annually, and major plans for restructuring, as well as foreign reserves ranging between U�$80 billion and more than US$ 1 00 billion, continue to attract foreign interest. The great imponderable remains Beijing. While advocates of democracy can only applaud Taiwan ' s political achievements, the freeing of the public sphere has given rise to vociferous debate about once taboo fundamental questions of national identity . The majority (60 percent) support the status quo of a separate and independent Taiwan, with the possibility of unification should critical conditions be met, notably the existence on both sides of the Taiwan Strait of democracy, prosperity, and equal wealth distribution . Yet Lee Teng-hui and his foreign supporters are using Taiwan ' s democratization as an act of defiance. This trend frightens Beijing.75 The risk remains that out of a desire to save face, an elite power struggle, antidemocratic traditions, and a zero-sum understanding of international relations, Beij ing might choose the military option, which would reverse democracy on Taiwan while precluding its evolution on the mainland .
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5. The KMT ' s ideology and the ROC ' s constitution both reflect Western democratic values, although martial law rendered these moot from 1 949 until 1 987, when martial law was lifted . In 1 9 9 1 the Temporary Provisions that suspended the constitution during the period of mobilization against the Communist rebellion were terminated. For details, see Tien, The Great Transition, 1 06- 1 2 . On
6.
the
O' Donnell and
difference Philippe
between
C.
liberalization
and
democratization,
see Guillermo
Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 9 86), 7ff. 7. A n excellent example is Taiwan governor James
c.y.
Soong's chapter in this
collection. Soong held a number of posts in the KMT prior to and during its prodemoc racy tilt, before winning a decisive victory as Taiwan ' s first elected governor in December 1 994. 8. See Philippe C . Schmitter's chapter in this collection, 240. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan propose a somewhat different definition, which breaks consolidation down into three
components: behavioral (no significant national actor spends significant resources to achieve
objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or by seceding from the state); attitudinal (the strong majority of the people believes that only democratic means are appropriate to govern collective life in spite of a range of serious problems awaiting solution, and the
support
for
antisystem
alternatives
is
small) ;
and
constitutional
(governmental
and
nongovernmental forces tum to laws, procedures, and institutions to resolve conflict). See Juan
1.
Linz and Alfred Stepan ' s chapter in this collection.
9. See Schmitter' s chapter in this collection, 24 1 . 1 0 . For elaboration, see Tse-min Lin, Yun-han Chu, Tong-yi Huang, and Baohui Zhang, "Elections and Elite Convergence: The Consolidation of Democracy in Taiwan" (Working Paper No. 1 5 , American Political Science Association, Conference Group on
NOTES
Taiwan Studies, 1 99 5 ) . One possible area of serious contention is the fate of the National Assembly. Its primary functions had been to elect the president and vice-president and to
I want to thank Ezra Vogel, Peter Berger, Rob Weller, Lin Cho-shui, Carol Leff, and
practical usefulness of the Assembly has been called into question, as its constitution
especially Ramon Myers for comments on earlier versions of this chapter. I . Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1 9 9 1 ), 7 . 2 . The "first wave" o f the nineteenth century had its roots in the American and French revolutions and was primarily a European phenomenon. The "second wave" began during the Second World War and included a number of developing countries and newly liberated colonies. A reverse wave followed each of these democratic trends (see Huntington, The
Third Wave, 1 3-26). For a summary of the argument, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," Journal of Democracy 2 (Spring 1 99 1 ) : 1 2-34. In this essay, I will not retell the story of the protracted struggle for democracy in Taiwan. For details, see Yun-han Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute for National Policy
Research, 1 992); Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in
the Republic of China (Stanford, Calif. : Hoover Institution Press, 1 9 89) ; and Jaushieh Joseph Wu, Taiwan 's Democratization: Forces Behind the New Momentum (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1 9 9 5 ) .
3 . In "transplacement," democratization results from joint action by the government and opposition groups, which certainly occurred. Yet since Huntington argues that the categories
distinguish the relative importance of either the government or the opposition in the process, with a third category, "replacement," reflecting a government collapse and opposition
takeover, the government' s role in dismantling the old system and creating new institutions seems to have been more important in Taiwan (Huntington, The Third Wave, 1 1 4).
4. That is, there has not been a cycle of democracy and authoritarianism, nor were
there any previous periods of either failed or interrupted democratization.
amend the constitution. °With the president and vice-president subject to direct election, the amending responsibility could go to the Legislative Yuan. The main opposition party, the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), campaigned in 1 996 for the National Assembly on
a platform of abolishing the Assembly and writing a new constitution. As it won slightly
less than one-third of the 334 seats (99, to be exact), and as constitutional amendments require a three-fourths vote of a quorum of two-thirds of the members, at this point the
DPP would have to build a coalition of non-DPP members to achieve a minimum goal of
preventing any action. This is not likely, as the other parties oppose abolishing the 1 947 Constitution . II.
Seymour
Martin
Lipset,
"Some
Social
Requisites o f Democracy:
Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review 53 (March 1 959) : 69- 1 05 . 1 2 . See the chapter o f Adam Przeworski e t al . i n this collection. 1 3 . Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of China, Taiwan
Statistical Data Book 1996, 3 8 . 1 4 . Ibid . , 3 4 . Per-capita GNP, which i s similar t o per-capita income, officially reached US$ I 2,439 in 1 99 5 . 1 5 . Free China Journal, 29 December 1 99 5 , 8 . S e e also Social Indicators i n Taiwan Area of the Republic of China 1 993 (Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Executive Yuan, 1 993). 16. Shirley E . Y . Kuo, Gustav Ranis, and John c.H. Fei, The Taiwan Success Story: Rapid Growth with Improved Income Distribution in the Republic of China, 1 952-1979 (Boulder, Colo . : Westview, 1 9 8 1 ) . The Gini coefficient, which measures inequality, has
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Taiwan: Still Defying the Odds
risen (i.e., inequality has increased) from a low of 0.277 in 1 980 to 0.3 1 6 in 1 993; in comparative terms, however, thls is still extraordinary (Social Indicators in Taiwan Area, 60-6 1 ) . Comparative data, which do not include Taiwan because it is not a member of the United Nations, can be found in United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1 995 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 995); and World Bank, World Development Report 1 994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 994). Taiwan had one of the hlghest savings rates in the world for many years. Gross national savings as a percentage of GNP was over 30 percent for nearly every year from 1 972 through 1 9 89 and is still over 25 percent (Taiwan Statistica l Data Book 1 996, 56). The average household savings rate has fallen from a hlgh of 29 percent in the mid-1 980s to slightly below 20 percent a decade later (Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1996, 59). 17. Free China Journal, 8 September 1 995, 4. The figure for Bangladesh is 828 per square kilometer. In Taiwan, the popUlation per square kilometer of cultivated land in 1 995 was 2,440 (Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1 996, 9). 18. Free China Journal, 29 December 1 995, 8. 19. Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1 996, 1 1 . 20. See Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, ed., The Discovery of the Middle Classes in East Asia (Taipei: Academia Sinica, Institute of Ethnology, 1 993). 2 1 . Previously suffering from a dismal retum swamped by returnees. This change is due in part efforts begun in the early 1 980s aimed at upgrading students returned from abroad. This figure j umped Data Book 1996, 272).
rate, Taiwan in the 1 990s has been to aggressive government recruitment the industrial structure. In 1 982, 1 , 1 06 to 6,272 in 1 995 (Taiwan Statistical
Thomas B . Gold
1 87
Conference and the Future of Democracy in Taiwan," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 25 (January-March 1 993): 1 7-32; and Ts ' ai Ling and Ramon H. Myers, "Manichaean Suspicions and the Spirit of Reconciliation: Currents of Public Opinion in Taiwan on the Eve of the 1 990 Conference on the Republic of Chlna's Destiny," American Asian Review 9 (Summer 1 9 9 1 ) : 1 -4 1 , and "Achieving Consensus Amidst Diversity: The Conference to Decide the Republic of Chlna' s Destiny (28 June-4 July 1 990)," American Asian Review 9 (Fall 1 9 9 1 ) : 1 -40. Teresa Ann Wright, in "Protest and Peril: Students, Democracy, and the State in Chlna an d Taiwan" (Ph .D . diss ., University of California, Berkeley, 1 996), compares the evolution and handling of Tiananmen in 1989 and the Taipei student demonstrations a year later. 28. Chen Ching-chlh, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1 895-1 945" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1973); Edward i-te Chen, "Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of the Systems of Political Control," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 30 ( 1 970): 1 26-5 8 ; E. Patricia Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan. 1 895-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 977). 29. Lin Hengdao, Taiwanshi (History of Taiwan) (Taipei : Zhongwen Tushu, 1 977); Edward I-te Chen, "Formosan Political Movements Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1 9 1 4- 1 937," Journal of Asian Studies 31 (May 1 972): 477-97 ; Hsu Shikai, Nihon tochika 110 Taiwan (Taiwan under Japanese rule) (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1 972) . 30. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 968). 3 1 . An important exception, in the Taiwan case, was the introduction of local elections with some degree of actual competition and participation by non-KMT politicians . This provided an opportunity for the accumulation of what Nikiforos Diamandouros, in his chapter in this collection, calls "democratic capital." One could also argue that the long period of tutelage provided the stability that is conducive to democratization. See also Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, "The First Chinese Democracy: Political Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1 986-1 994," Asian Survey 34 (March 1 994) : 2 1 3-30; and Hung-mao Tiell, "Elections and Taiwan ' s Democratic Development," in Hung-mao Tien, ed., Taiwan 's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave (Armonk, N . Y . : M.E. Sharpe, 1 996), 3-26 .
22. See Lee 's chapter in this collection. To some degree, President Lee was using this address to prove hls bona fides as a Chinese person in order to overcome the criticism that resulted from an interview he had given to a Japanese reporter in which he claimed to be Japanese, having been raised in Japan-occupied Taiwan and given a Japanese education. The issue of whether or not Taiwan should be seen as having a Chinese culture is hotly debated on the islan d . President Lee has stressed hls knowledge of Chlnese culture, which can be seen as a signal to the mainland that he considers himself Chinese, not a Taiwanese separatist, and that he is trying to allay some of the Communists' fears of hls motives. For more on thls, see Li Xiaozhuang and Zhang Jueming, Jie Li Denghui dipai (Revealing Li Denghui' s cards) (Taipei: Shuhua, 1 995).
32. The "ideal type" of authoritarian regime is discussed in Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds . , Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass . : Addison-Wesley, 1 975), 1 75-4 1 1 .
2 3 . See, e.g., Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 9 85). See also Huntington, The Third Wave, 300-307, and Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China (New York: Norton, 1 995), ch.
3 3 . O n the ROC' s governmental structure, see Ch' ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Poiitics of China (Cambridge: Harvard Univeisity Press, 1 9 6 1 ) , and Tien, The Great Transition.
24. Alastair lain Johnston, i n examining classical Chinese strategic beliefs and practices, shows that while the langu.age of Confucian-Mencian values was frequently used, practice was subsumed to the demands of realpolitik. See Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 995).
34. Joseph Bosco, "Faction versus Ideology: Mobilization Strategies in Taiwan ' s Elections," China Quarterly 1 37 (March 1 994): 28-62; J . Bruce Jacobs, Local Politics in a Rural Chinese Cultural Setting: A Field Study of Maw Township, Taiwan (Canberra: Australian National University, 1 980); Fang Wang, "The Political Economy of Authoritar ian Clientelism in Taiwan," in Luis Roniger and Ayse Gunes-Ayata, eds. , Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society (Boulder, Colo . : Lynne Rienner, 1 994), 1 8 1 -206.
I.
25. This differs from the economic realm, where many of these same values can facilitate or obstruct economic development, depending on the context. 26. These issues were raised before the first Asia-European Meeting held in Bangkok in early March 1 996. See Seth Mydans, "Do Rights Come First? Asia and Europe Clash," New York Times, I March 1 996. In the event, the topic of human rights was bypassed. See Michael Vatikiotis and Shada Islam, " A Whole New Game," Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 March 1 996, 1 7 ; and "Three Years After the B an gkok Declaration: Reflections on the State of the Asia-West Dialogue on Human Rights," Human Rights Dialogue, March 1 996, 1 -6. 27. For more on thls conference, see c.L. Chlou, "The 1 990 National Affairs
35. For a discussion of corporatism and its relevance to East Asia, see Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, "Chlna, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 3 3 (January 1 995): 29-5 3 . 3 6 . There has been much discussion in Taiwan of the purported alliance between Lee and local powerholders, many of whom are gangsters. See the cover articles in Tianxia (Commonwealth), 1 September 1 995, 24-67, on the general state of chaos and corruption. In September 1 995, I questioned several of Lee ' s loyalists about the issue; they did not deny the phenomenon, but argued that it was a tactic of realpolitik, not a long-term strategy, and was necessary in order to push reforms forward against opposition from KMT hard-liners, especially mainlander military elites and the internal-security apparatus. The strategy was to "use the localities to surround the center." They argued that Lee would
1 88
Taiwan: Sliii Defying the Odds
later move against the gangsters through law and public opinion. The gangsters, in tum, recognized that Lee was using them but knew that they needed his help against DPP suPP rters. During the 1 995 election campaign for the Third Legislative Yuan, opposition
?
candidates from the DPP and the NP hammered at this alliance; this may have been a factor in their strong showing and the KMT' s weakening. Some critics see Lee as employing "authoritarian populism," going around the party and military organizations, whose loyalty to him is suspect, in order to reach the people directly, with potentially dangerous consequences for democratic consolidation. Others respond that, as there are no
?
P htlcal pnsoners or censorship, with Lee tolerating severe public criticism, he is not a dlCta or. For some discussion of concepts, see Michael Ignatieff, "On Civil Society," FOreign Affmrs 74 (March-April 1 995) : 1 28-36. For specific applications to Taiwan, see
�
Huang Guangguo, Mincui wangtai lun (On populism and the death of Taiwan) (Taipei: Shang hou enh ua, 995); and Jenn-hwan Wang and Sechin Y . S . Chien, "Maixiang . xmguoJla? MmcUl welquanzhuyi di xingcheng yu minzhu wenti" (March toward a new natIOn-state? The rise of populist authoritarianism in Taiwan and its implications for
�
�
!
democracy), Taiwan shehui yanjiu jikan (Taiwan : A radical q uarterly in social studies) 20 (August 1 995): 1 7-55 . 37. This discussion is based on Linz and Stepan ' s chapter in this collection. 38. Ibid . , 1 7 . The meaning of "civil society" is highly contested, and I am using Linz and Stepan ' s defi nition for the sake of a good fit with their other arenas. For more on the SUbject, see Adam Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: Free Press, 1 992). 39. For an overview of the debate regarding the relevance of the term for the study of China, see the symposium " ' Public Sphere ' I ' Civil Society' in China? Paradigmatic Issues in Chinese Studies," Modern China therein.
? ��
19 (April 1 993), as well as the references
� �
4 For ove i e s of the emergence of civil society in Taiwan, see Zhang Maogui, . : " MI J an shehUl, zlyuan dongyuan yu xinshehui yundong" (Civil society, resource . mobilIzatIOn, and new social movements), Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences 4
(Autumn 1 994) : 33-66; Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, "Emerging Social Movements and the Rise of a Demanding Civil Society in Taiwan," Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 24 (July 1 990) : 1 63-7 9 ; and Ngo Tak-wing, "Civil Society and Political Liberalization in Taiwan," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 25 (January-March 1 993): 3-1 5 . 4 1 . For elaboration o f these ideas, see the introduction t o John Keane, ed., Civil Society
and the State (London: Verso, 1 988), 1 -3 \ .
?
42. On the consumer movement, see Chai Songlin, "Xiaofeizhe yundong di shige
xi fangxiang" (Ten nevI directions of the consumers ' movement). in Zha.rt g Xiaochun. Xiao Xmh�ang, and Xu Zhengguang, eds" Shehui zhuanxing (Social transformation) (Kaohsiung: Dunh, 1 9 86), 9 1 - 1 05 ; Huang Rongcun, "Baohu xiaofeizhe hai you changlu yao zou"
(There is still a long way to go to protect consumers), also in Zhang Xiaochun et aI., eds" Shehui zhuanxing, 1 06- 1 2 ; and Gwo-Shong S hieh, "Public Interest Groups, Corporatism, and the State: The Consumerism Movement in Taiwan" (master's thesis, University of Hawall, 1 9 86). On the antipollution/environmental-protection movement, see David W. Che , e Emergence of an Environmental Consciousness in Taiwan," in Murray A . RubInsteIn, ed . , The Other Taiwan: 1 945 to the Present (Armonk, N . Y . : M.E. Sharpe, 1 994), 257-86; Hsu Jinn-yuh, "The Struggle over Local Space: A Case Study of the
? "'�'h
EnVIronmental Movement in Taiwan," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 6 (March 1 995): 1 1 3-24; Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, Lester W . Milbrath, and Robert P. Weller, "Antecedents of an Environmental Movement in Taiwan," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 6 (Septemb r 1 99 5 ) : 9 1 - 1 04; James Reardon-Anderson , Pollution, Politics, and Foreign
�
Investment In TaIWan: The Lukang Rebellion (Armonk, N . Y . : M.E. Sharpe, 1 992); and Robert P. Weller, "Environmental Protest in Taiwan: A Preliminary Sketch," in Harvard Studies on Taiwan (Cambridge, Mass . : Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, 1 995), 1 :35-6 3 . On the women ' s movement, see Ku Yen-lin, "The Feminist Movement i n Taiwan, 1 9 2- 1 .987," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 21 (January-March 1 989): 1 2-22; and
:
HSiU-Lien Annette Lu, "Women ' s Liberation: The Taiwanese Experience," in Rubinstein, ed., The Other Taiwan, 289-304.
1 89
Thomas B. Gold
43 . Zhang Maogui, Shehui yundong yu zhengzhi zhuanhua (Social movements and political change) (Taipei: Guojia Zhengci Yanjiu Ziliao Zhongxin, 1 989). 44. For an overview of the cable-television revolution, see the series of articles in the February 1 996 issue of Free China Review; and Raphael Jacquet, "Cable TV: A New
Campaign Weapon," China Perspectives 3 (January-February 1 996) : 50-52. On media
more generally, see Jason C. Hu, "Freedom of Expression and Development of the Media," in Jason C. Hu, ed., Quiet Revolutions on Taiwan, Republic of China (Taipei: Kwang Hua, 1 994), 478-500. 45. See the series of articles on B u ddhis m ' s renaissance in the December 1 994 issue of Free China Review. 46. Republic of China Yearbook 1 994 (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1 993), 485-98 on religion and 495-97 on Christianity. See also Murray A . Rubinstein, The
Protestant Community on Modem Taiwan: Mission, Seminary, and Church (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1 99 \ ) . 47 . For its activities o n the mainland, see Kenneth G . Lieberthal, Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin, 1949-1952 (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1 980), 1 4- 1 5 , 1 08- 1 8 . S e e also Joseph B osco, "Yiguan Dao : 'Heterodoxy' and Popular Religion in Taiwan," in Rubinstein, ed" The Other Taiwan. 423-44; and Dong Fangyuan, Taiwan
minjian zongjiao xinyang (Essays on Taiwanese folk beliefs) (Taipei: Evergreen Cultural Enterprise C o . , 1 975), 1 2 1 -2 7 . 48. S e e t h e s e t of articles on community organizations and the umbrella groups that coordinate their activities and help them share information in the May 1 995 issue of Free
China Review. 49. For a discussion of the "inhibited political center," see Thomas A . Metzger and Ramon H . Myers, "Introduction," in Ramon H . Myers, ed . , Two Societies in Opposition:
The Republic of China and the People 's Republic of China After Forty Years (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1 99 1 ), xiii-xiv, In the same book, see Lu Ya-li, "Political Modernization in the ROC: The Kuomintang and the Inhibited Political Center," 1 1 1-26. 50. Winnie Chang, "Invisible Injuries," Free China Review 42 (March 1 992): 62-67. 5 1 . For an overview of political society, see Tien, ed . , Taiwan 's Electoral Politics. For in-depth studies of two seminal elections, see John F. Copper, Taiwan 's 1991 and 1992 Non-supplemental Elections: Reaching a Higher Stage of Democracy (Lanham, Md . : University Press o f America, 1 994) ; Chung Y . Hsu and Parris Chang, eds . , The 1 991 National Assembly Election in Taiwan: Reports by Observers from the United States of America (Chicago and University Park, Pa. : North America Taiwanese Professors' Association and Center for East Asian Studies, Pennsylvania State University, n . d . ) ; and James
A.
Robinson,
"Local
Elections
in
Taiwan,
1 993-94:
Appraising
Steps
in
Democratization," Political Chronicle 6 (Winter-Spring 1 994-95): 1 -9 . 52. T h e Green Party, j ust established in 1 99 5 , actually w o n a seat in the third National Assembly, elected in March 1 996. For a critical insider ' s view of the DPP, see Linda Gail Arrigo, "From Democratic Movement to Bourgeois Democracy: The Internal Politics of the Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party in 1 99 1 ," in Rubinstein, ed" The Other Taiwan, 1 45-80. See also Tun-jen Cheng and Yung-ming Hsu, "Issue Structure, DPP ' s Factionalism and Party Realignment" (Working Paper No. 5, American Political Science Association, Conference Group on Taiwan Studies, 1 995). 5 3 . I am using the language of Albert O . Hirschman from Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 970). For details on the KMT ' s internal dispute, see Steven J. Hood, "Political Change in Taiwan: The Rise of Kuomintang Factions,"
Asian Survey 3 6 (May 1 996): 468-82; and Wu, Taiwan 's Democratization, 97- 1 02 . 54. F o r a very favorable profile of M a , s e e H e Q i y u , " M a Y i n gj i u Shenxing Jimo Zhengzhilu" (Ma Ying-jeou ' s cautious and lonely political road), Tianxia, 1 September 1 995, 1 04- 1 0 and 1 1 3- 1 5 . In the cabinet reshuffling that followed President Lee ' s 1 996
190
Taiwan: Still Defying the Odds
inauguration, Ma lost his justice post and was made a "minister without portfolio," a move seen by some as an effort by powerful interests in the party and state to curb the anticorruption campaign (and seen by others as giving Ma time to prepare to stand for election for mayor of Taipei). 55.
See,
bianyuan?"
e.g., (Wu
Chen
Shenqing,
Zeyuan-Is
controversy?) Tianxia,
I
the
"Wu
Ph . D .
Zeyuan-boshi
xianzhang
cai
zai
zhengyi
county magistrate stepping on the edge of
September 1 9 9 5 , 44-52; and James A. Robinson, "Taizhong zhifa
renyuan zhankai xiaotan zhi zhan" (Law enforcers in Taichung start corruption-elimination war), Zhongguo shibao (China times), 26 December 1 995,
II.
56. The media were full o f articles on Ma' s efforts throughout the 1 995 campaign. See
also his I December 1 995 speech "War on Election Bribery." He also publicly criticized the KMT-dominated High Court for suspending bribery sentences against two vote buying deputies (China News. 20 November 1 9 9 5 ,
I).
For the transcript of a press conference held
on the eve of the election, see Free China Review 46 (February 1 996): 47-50. In a show of original entrepreneurship, a man named Tsai Pai-hsu made a great deal of money collecting rewards for turning in vote buyers.
He and other citizens organized the
Anti-Vote-Buying Association of Taichung County. See Douglas Habecker, "Ghost Buster,"
Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 March 1 996, 70. 57. Free China Review, which is published by the Government Information Office, published informative articles on these plans. See the November 1 992 issue on the Six Year Plan and the November 1 995 issue on the Regional Operations Center. The March 1 995 issue included articles on bureaucratic reform. On corruption plaguing public-works projects, see Julian Baum, "Price of Progress," Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 May 1 996, 1 6 . 5 8 . Julian B aum, "The Money Machine," Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 1 August 1 994, 62-66; Jeremy Mark and Julia Leung, "KMT' s Blend of Business and Politics Draws Fire," Asian Wall Street Journal, 2 December 1 992, 1; Xu Dianqing, "Zhengdang ji qi jingfei laiyuan-jiantian Taiwan di dangying shiye" (On the financial resources of parties and party-owned enterprises in Taiwan), Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiu (Modem China studies) 3 (May 1 9 9 5 ) : 67-80. 59. Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1 996, 82. The state' s role is still large; if we take 1 99 1 as a base year equaling 1 00, the index of private industrial production reached 1 20.95 in 1 995, while that of the state reached 1 1 7.93 (Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1 996, 8 1 ). 60. Thomas J. B ellows, "Privatization in the Republic of China on Taiwan," American
Asian Review 12 (Fal! 1 994) : 1-1 3 ; .Agnes Syu, From Economic :A;/iracle to Privatization Success: 1nitial Stages of the Privatization Process in Two SOEs on Taiwan (Lanham, Md. : University Press of America, 1 995). 61. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 92. 62. The most comprehensive discussion in English of the identity issue is Alan M. Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 1 994). This once-taboo subject has also attracted a great deal of scholarly attention in Taiwan. See,
e.g.,
Chen Chung-min, Chuang Ying-chang, and Huang Shu-min, eds . ,
Ethnicity in Taiwan: Social, Historical, and Cultural Perspectives (Taipei : Academia Sinica, Institute of Ethnology, 1 994); Wang Fu-chang, "Zuqun tonghua yu dongyuan Taiwan minzhong zhengdang zhichi zhi fenxi (Ethnic assimilation and mobilization: an analysis of party support i n Taiwan), Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology (Academia Sinica) 77 (Spring 1 994) : 1 -34; and Wu Nai-teh, "Zuqun yishi yu ziyou zhuyi : souxun Taiwan minzu zhuyi di jichu" (Ethnic consciousness and liberalization : Searching for the foundation of Taiwan nationalism) (paper presented at the first annual meeting of the Taiwan Political Science Association, 1 7-1 8 December 1 994, Taipei). 63. A recent detailed study of the uprising is Lai Tse-han, Ramon H . Myers, and Wou Wei, A Tragic Beginning: The February 28, 1 947 Uprising in Taiwan (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1 9 9 1 ) .
Thomas B . Gold
191
64. I discuss this at greater length i n "Civil Society and Taiwan ' s Quest for Identity," i n Stevan Harrell and Huang Chun-chieh, eds . , Cultural Change in Postwar Taiwan (Boulder, Colo . : Westview, 1 994), 47-68 . See also articles in the Spring-Fall 1 992 issue of Modern Chinese Literature (Special Issue on Contemporary Chinese Fiction from Taiwan). 65. Andrew Solomon, "Don ' t Mess with Our Cultural Patrimony ! " New York Times
Magazine, 1 7 March 1996, 28-64. 66. As discussed in Wachman, Taiwan. 67. For more details, see my "Taiwan ' s Quest for Identity in the Shadow of China," in Steve Tsang, e d . , In th.e Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan Since 1 949 (London : Hurst and Co., 1 993), 1 69-92. See also Weiqun Gu, Conflicts of Divided
Nations: The Cases of China and Taiwan (Westport, Con n . : Praeger, 1 995). 6 8 . For an overview, see Hsin-Hsing Wu, Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for Reunification (Hong Kong : Oxford University Press, 1 994). 69. I discuss this at greater length in "Domestic Roots of Taiwan ' s Influence in World Affairs," in Robert G. Sutter and William R . Johnson, eds . , Taiwan in World Affairs (Boulder, Colo . : Westview, 1 994), 1 9 1 -2 1 3 . 7 0 . Julian B aum, "Politics I s Local," Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 4 December 1 995, 1 4- 1 5 ; Patrick E. Tyler, "How Politics Torpedoed Asian Calm," New York Times, 1 1 February 1 99 6 . See also articles in the 21 March 1 996 and 28 March 1 996 issues of
Far Eastern Economic Review. In observing the 1 995 campaign, I felt that the NP' s impressive electoral gains resulted less from its opposition to independence, which is primarily a Taipei . issue, than from its well-founded criticisms of corruption, money politics, and the KMT ' s links with the underworld. 7 1 . l owe this formulation to Larry Diamond. 72. Francis Fukuyama has raised the issue of the problem of trust in Chinese societies beyond the family and particularistic network, especially in terms of building large-scale enterprises. B uilding political parties would seem to involve similar problems. While the recent split within the KMT and severe intraparty wrangling in the DPP certainly support this view, it is problematic to argue that such problems differ significantly from those of party-bui lding in other societies. See Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the
Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1995). 7 3 . For an interesting discussion of this Durkheimian concept, see Ann Swidler. "Cultural Power and Social �v1ovements," in Hank Johnston and Bert ¥�arldennans, eds"
Social Movements and Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1 995), 25-40. 74. Tun-jen Cheng, "Economic Consequences of Democratization in Taiwan and South Korea" (Working Paper No. 1 2, American Political Science Association, Conference Group on Taiwan Studies, 1 995). 7 5 . Andrew Tanzer, "How Taiwan Is Invading China," Forbes, 8 April 1996, 86-9 1 .
Lee Teng-hui
7 CHINESE CULTURE AND POLITICAL RENEWAL Lee Teng-hui
Lee Teng-hui i s president of the Republic of China. The chairman of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), he was first sworn in as president of the republic in January 1 988 upon the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, and was reelected by the National Assembly in March 1 990. On 23 March 1996, he won the island 's first direct presidential election. He holds a doctorate from Cornell University.
I
n 1 994, former S oviet president Mikhail Gorbachev accepted an invitation to visit the Republic of China. During my meeting with him, we exchanged views on reforms in the former Soviet Union . I stated then that political and economic reforms are simultaneous equations with two unknowns . What I meant was that political and economic reforms are mutually indispensable; it is difficult to get anywhere by focusing on either one alone. Which equation should be solved first depends on the conditions and problems of each country . For the Republic of China on Taiwan, economic reforms clearly led the way, while political reforms just fell i nto place when the time and conditions were right. Indeed, political reform or development cannot depend solely on economic improvements for support, but must be determined by each individual situation. What we call political development is an enormously complex social proj ect that involves all sorts of social organizations and forces and is intimately bound up with cultural heritage. In every society, culture influences political development to one degree or another. Culture can be compared to the x in the mathematical expression fix)-that is, each distinct cultural heritage will result in a different political outcome. Scholars examining China' s political development from a historical or cultural standpoint have generally been enamored of constructing theories based on historical data to explain current political issues and predict future directions . For instance, some scholars contend that China could not possibly break away from authoritarianism in its political develop-
1 93
ment, because Chinese society has traditionally valued authority, is strongly group-oriented, lacks individualism, and does not respect human rights. While this kind of opinion can of course be analyzed in depth as an academic issue, it must also provide a reasonable interpretation of the actual situation if it is to be acceptable. Clearly, most theories based on Chinese history and traditional culture cannot adequately explain Taiwan ' s political development over the last five years. Thus we must first sort out the actual facts of a nation' s political development and then study its cultural heritage before we can determine the links between the two with any obj ectivity. Of course, the determinants of successful political reform or develop ment are highly complex. We cannot take cultural heritage as the only important factor. Probably most political scientists would admit that the political order is not j ust an abstract concept. For example, although democracies have certain core principles in common, there are differ ences-and not so minor ones at that-in actual substance and manner of implementation, even among the countries of Western Europe and the United States, which are culturally rather similar. These institutional differences follow directly from the differences in historical conditions and cultural traditions between one country or society and another. Therefore, I would like to offer our political reform and development here in the Republic of China on Taiwan as an example, and present a historical and cultural explanation instead of an economic interpretation. The Republic of China on Taiwan is a part of the greater Chinese cultural system. For two millennia, the Chinese political order involved a government of centralized power headed by an emperor. It lacked the features of Western-style democracy and a parliamentary system. These are all facts of history . Following the War of Resistance Against Japan from 1 937 to 1 945, the Chinese Communist Party rebelled, and in 1 948 the ROC government promulgated the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion. The following year, the ROC government relocated to Taiwan. Because of communist threats, the Temporary Provisions remained in effect for 43 years before being abolished in 1 99 1 . These provisions restricted the rights given to the people by the ROC Constitution, leaving the Republic of China in a state of war under martial law. In less than five years, however, since the lifting of the Temporary Provisions, the ROC has carried out a series of political reforms. These include amendments to the Constitu tion ; termination of the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion; retirement of all members of the first National Assembly , Control Yuan, and Legislative Yuan ; elections for all seats in the three parliamentary organs; and passage of laws governing the popular election of the governor of Taiwan province and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung special municipalities, as well as the direct election of the president and vice-president. The Republic of
1 94
Chinese Culture and Political Renewal
1 95
Lee Teng-hui
China has thereupon become a democratic country in which "power rests with the people." The Republic of China' s progre � s toward democracy has been steady, without the emergence of absolute political authority or an unreasonable political monopoly . Many different political views coexist in our society; the result has been the formation of political parties that have been able to compete fairly and reasonably for the support of the people. ROC citizens have also been able to exercise their freedom within the scope of the law. The ROC has produced not only an "economic miracle" but also a "political miracle" that some have termed a "quiet revolution." Despite the cumbersome two-thousand-year legacy of an imperial system and the tribulations of more than 40 years of communist rebellion, the Republic of China has managed to complete this historic task of political reengineering peacefully. This fact deserves the attention of scholars in the humanities and social sciences . I believe that there are many levels of reasons for this success, and that the factors at each level have played a crucial role. I would now like to take a look at the influence that ancient political philosophy has had on our nation' s political development i n terms o f what Chinese culture says about the relations between the government and the people.
in this respect. For the more democratically mature countries, the developmental process has been mild ; for others, it has been fairly dramatic. But the basic concept of democracy has invariably developed out of an antagonistic relationship between the people and their government. S ince Western democracies have generally developed from monarchies, it is natural that antagonism would have arisen when the people struggled to gain power from the monarch. Therefore, a discussion of the nature of democracy must be grounded in the historical background of each country . Looking back at the historical experiences of Western Europe, the governed att�.mpted to gain more power from the government through various me ans. In the course of their struggle, some kings were sent to the guillotine, some went into exile, and some were reduced to rulers in name only. The ultimate result was invariably that the people were elevated to the status of masters of the country. Contemporary democratic development in Europe shows that the milder the people' s fight for power, the slower but stabler was the transformation of the national political institutions and system. Conversely, the more intense the struggle, the more rapid and turbulent the transformation. This latter course produces a far greater social impact than the former.
The Government and the People
A Profound Cultural Heritage
Democracy is a political system in which the public is the principal political entity. Its ultimate goal is to produce the greatest possible well being for the people. Although this precept has been realized in a variety of forms through the ages, none has deviated from the principle of "power rests with the people," the sine qua non of democracy. There is a certain disparity, however, between the precept of democracy and its political manifestations. Once mankind began to form large and complex social · groups , public matters were increasingly shouldered by a few people, as they could not be handled by all group members. Put another way, a minority became the rulers while the majority became the ruled. The rulers acquired power and dominated more and more resources, while the opposite was true for the ruled. Theoretically, this was a virtually unavoidable direction for various forms of political orders to take. Since it is impossible for the people to manage national affairs directly, republican nations that have emerged from monarchical rule have been able to implement only what is called indirect democracy. Reasonably defining the relationship between a government that has public authority and carries out public business and the people, to whom sovereignty belongs, is a topic of concern to us all. Like other political systems, the world ' s democracies of today are the result of historical development, and no two countries are exactly alike
The Republic of China on Taiwan ' s political development in the past five years could be termed quite dramatic and rapid, in the context of either the two thousand years of Chinese history or the SO-some yea rs of ROC history . Moreover, the price we have paid for it has been minuscule. Our economy has continued to expand, our society has developed, education and culture have flourished, and the people have become more prosperous . What is the reason for this? I have often wondered whether the rule that democracy grows out of antagonism between the people and their government can provide a satisfactory explanation of Taiwan ' s recent political development. I believe that a reasonable answer lies in our cultural heritage, a factor that exists at a comparatively deep level in a given society . If one does not look carefully, it is often obscured by heated power struggles. "Following the hearts of the people," an idea expressed in the ancient Chinese Book of History, could also serve as a succinct statement of the essence of modem democracy. This kind of precept for the head of a nation was widely prevalent in ancient Chinese culture. This amply proves that the political thought of the time basically affirmed that the ultimate obj ective of politics was to fulfill the wishes of the people, just as democratic thought today stresses a similar function of government. Of the many documents that contain such political philosophy, the foremost one pertains to the era of King Yu of the twenty-first century
1 96
Cmnese Culiure and Poiitical Renewal
B . C . Kao Yao, who was in charge of legal affairs, admonished King Yu, saying, "Heaven can see and hear, and does so through the eyes and ears of the people; Heaven rewards the virtuous and punishes the wicked, and does it through the people." A similar statement was used in the eleventh century B . C . , when King Wu of the Chou dynasty sent troops to suppress the tyrannical King Chou of the Shang dynasty. In my speech in June 1 995 at Cornell University, I specifically noted the ancient teaching, "Whatever the people desire, Heaven must follow." This utterance was said to be the oath taken by King Wu' s troops before going to war in the eleventh century B . C . It is similar in meaning to what Kao Yao had said to King Yu, yet has more positive significance. As Heaven conforms to the popular will and the popular will finds a respondent, the people become more assertive; this results in more than just a passive reflection of popular will. In the third century B .C . , Mencius also said: "Give the people what they desire; never force upon them that which they abhor." By doing so, one can win the hearts of the people and their support, and thus an opportunity to rule. Therefore, ancient Chinese wisdom reminds rulers always to p ay close attention to the will of the people and comply with the popular will, which leads to the realization of the concept of popular sovereignty . The government and people are a symbiotic unity-this i s also a longstanding political precept of our nation . Ancient Chinese political philosophers believed that the government and the people are a harmoni ous unity , rather than an antagonistic duality . In the seventh century B .C . , an official historian of the Chou dynasty quoted the Book of Hsia: "If the people do not support their monarch , whom should they support? If a monarch does not have the support of the people, he cannot secure his realm. " A similar declaration can be found in the Book of Shang. Centuries later, when Confucius journeyed through a number of states to disseminate his ideas, he advised the rulers to practice "benevolent governance. " Mencius also promoted "kingly governance." Both preached that rulers should bring government and people closer together through the way they administered. In the Warring S tates Period between the fifth and third centuries B . C . , the Confucianists used the metaphor: "The ruler is the mind of the people, while the people are the body of the ruler." The relationship between body and mind is a symbiotic one, j ust like that between the monarch of a nation and the people. Superficially, it would appear that the body follows the mind much like the people obey their ruler; upon further reflection, however, we realize that the mind depends upon the body to protect it from harm, and is vulnerable to injury when the body is injured. Following what the people desire and thinking of the government and the people as a single entity are both basic precepts of democracy today . Although they both appeared early in the political activities of our
Lee Teng-hui
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Chinese forebears, the subsequent formation of feudalistic thinking unfortunately cut short the development of this kind of thought. Nevertheless, over many thousands of years of Chinese history these ideals have never disappeared; they have always been goals constantly pursued by the Chinese people. Virtually no Chinese emperor throughout the ages, however dictatorial or selfish, dared openly to repudiate the people' s will, or explicitly to claim that the people' s welfare need not be the ultimate goal of govern mental administration . Clearly, the influence of these political philoso phies persisted. I am confident that, by injecting into our modern democratic order the political precepts long inherent in Chinese culture-of exalting the people' s will and claiming that the government and the people form a unity-we can infuse democracy with new vitality. It is my firm belief that our culture is the most important factor that has allowed the Republic of China to achieve successful political reforms in the past five years . Recently I had guidelines drawn up entitled "Manage the Great Taiwan, Nurture a New Chinese Culture," believing that our profound cultural heritage is indeed deeply embedded in Taiwan ' s experience of producing an economic miracle as well as a political miracle. This heritage can be traced as far back as the end of the third century B .C . , a time when the imperial system had not yet coalesced. Chinese culture then was fresh and pure, and had not yet been tainted by the monarchical politics of later centuries. More than two thousand years separate us from that classical Chinese culture, so it cannot be transplanted to our age exactly as it was, but must be creatively transformed. The "new" in the term "New Chinese Culture" means creative transformation, and this is the direction in which our cultural development is heading. I believe that a fresh and unsullied Chinese classical civilization will be an inexhaustible source of inspiration for us.
Lien Chan
8 A COMMON COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY Lien Chan
Lien Chan was elected vice-president of the Republic of China on 23 March 1 996 as the running mate of President Lee Teng-hui. From 1 993 to 1996 he served as premier, a position to which he was appointed by President Lee. Before beginning his career in public service in 1975, he was chairman of the political science department at National Taiwan University. He earned his doctorate from the University of Chicago.
When we think about problems related to the third wave of democrati zation, the value and significance of democratic reform in the Republic of China are apparent. The ROC ' s democratic achievement has been unique and important globally in three respects . First, it has not only dispelled the mistaken impression that traditional Confucian philosophy is incompatible with modern democratic ideas ; it has also created a paradigm for the convergence and fusion of Eastern and Western civilizations. The modernization of our nation has demonstrated unique vitality and adaptability in combining traditional Confucian culture with such modern democratic concepts and institutions as free elections, popular sovereignty, representative politics, the rule of law, and even free enterprise, a market economy, and an open society . Our experience with democratic reform in Taiwan could be called a Confucian cultural renaissance, in that it involves remolding and refining an ancient Oriental civilization, while extending Western thought and institutions. This indicates how pervasive democratic precepts have become and how far they have gone beyond national boundaries and traditions. Second, the high degree of support for democracy among the people of the Taiwan area is well worth noting. Strictly speaking, the impetus for Taiwan ' s democratic reforms came mainly, as S amuel Huntington has noted, from the ruling establishment. Our transition to democracy has followed a "transformation," rather than a "replacement" or "transplacement," model. Of the democratic transformations experienced in other countries, however, we have rarely witnessed a case where,
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during the process of reform, ruling and opposition parties were equally attracted to democratic change, as they have been here in Taiwan. We have also rarely seen a democratic transformation that attempts, to everyone' s satisfaction, a mix of centripetal forces impelling progress and centrifugal forces seeking stability. Perhaps it is because of this that the ROC' s democratic reforms were able to be carried out so peacefully and smoothly without incurring excessive social costs. The third unique aspect of the ROC ' s democratic transition is its potential impact: our experience with reform in Taiwan may influence the political development of one-fourth of the world' s population. While Taiwan ' s democratic transformation from one-party domination to multiparty competition is, of course, a successful example of the worldwide trend toward democracy, it also provides a considerable impetus for the Chinese mainland to work at pursuing human rights and freedom. Who doubts that the 1 .2 billion people on the Chinese mainland would easily identify with and embrace the democratic achievements of the 2 1 million people of Taiwan? In fact, the more mature Taiwan ' s democratic system becomes, the more this will lead the Chinese mainland' s political and democratic development in the right direction, instilling greater confidence in the people on the Chinese mainland. Consequently, ensuring the autonomous development of the ROC ' s democratic system so that it can continue to serve as a beacon for the Chinese mainland not only is a hope shared by all Chinese people, but also deserves the support of democratic people everywhere in the world. The 2 1 million people in Taiwan not only are closely watching democratic changes on the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong, and Macau, but also are intensely aware of democratic development everywhere in the world, especially in the Asia-Pacific region . This regional trend springs from a demand for human dignity and an insistence on freedom and equality, as well as from a hope for world peace and development. We cannot deny that the third wave of democratization was an important catalyst for the breakup of the opposing East and West Cold War blocs, nor can we deny that the consolidation of third wave democracies has been directly related to the growth of a new and more civil world order during the post--Cold War period. The extension and improvement of democracy throughout the Asia-Pacific region is especially important for regional peace and development. The Asia-Pacific region has had no specific experience, however, with multilateral economic cooperation, and lacks multilateral channels for discussing regional security . Accordingly , as the economic might of each country in the region increases and as regional arms races gradually develop, it is increasingly important for defense policies and arms expenditures to be disclosed and for effective multilateral channels of dialogue to be set up. Whether this sort of multilateral security
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mechanism can operate in a stable and effective manner depends on the degree of democracy and openness in every Asian-Pacific country. The more democratic a society is, the more likely it will be to allow issues concerning national security and strategy to be discussed pUblicly . The more open a society is, the more likely i t will b e t o allow professional nongovernmental organizations to carry ·· out exchanges and cooperation on many levels with their counterparts in other countries . Democratization is the indispensable basis for building mutual trust throughout the region and is a necessary means for building consensus on regional peace and development among national leaders. Democratic development in the Asia-Pacific region is the best bulwark against the threat of military adventures . It is also the best assurance of a bright common future for all countries of the region . Thus we cannot compromise on democracy, for to do so would leave no guarantee of our future peace and stability .
A Powerful Force Looking ahead to the twenty-first century, I am very confident about the prospects for democratic development. We are living in an exciting new era when the whole world is embracing market economics; the information revolution is having an extensive impact; and there are unprecedented opportunities for democratic development. We must not underestimate the enormous power of market economics to transform social structures and political institutions . One planned economy after another has failed, inevitably giving individuals who used to live under socialism more freedom of choice and economic autonomy, while at the s ame time obligating them to shoulder greater responsibility for deciding policies . This structural change eventually impels individuals to demand a richer quality of life and freer sources of information, as well as greater opportunities for participating in politics in order to guarantee all that they have already won. This is the greatest impetus for democratic development. Some believe that the information revolution will result in "semidirect democracy," while others think it will arrest democratic development and cause "demosclerosis." I still believe that we cannot underestimate the corrosive influence the information revolution has on modern authori tarian systems. A monopoly of information has always been an effective tool of authoritarian rule. Yet one heartening development of recent years has been the sudden explosion of communication and information technologies, giving people who were previously living in a "hermeti cally sealed" environment greater opportunities and the wherewithal to break through the "information iron curtain." The collapse of information monopolies shakes totalitarian rule to its very foundation. With the aid of emerging communication and information tech-
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nologies, individuals now have greater access than they had before to open and unbiased information through such interference-free channels as the telephone, fax, satellite television, and computer networks . At the same time, they can also utilize the speed, convenience, and accessibility of these different media to convey their own ideas and opinions, directly talking with other members of the "global village" in order to win their understanding and support. I am confident that the revolutionary advances in information technology will ultimately hasten the collapse of all authoritarian regimes and help set the entire human race on the path to democracy. Naturally, the development of democracy still faces many challenges in the international community . I am convinced, however, that democ racy will ultimately triumph. Although the outcome of this competition may no longer be in doubt, political scientists still have the responsibil ity to help more people, including both the rulers and the ruled, understand the basic requirements of democracy and constitutional governance, and evaluate the shortcomings of our current democratic institutions. Those who have successfully implemented, or are now implementing, political reforms have the obligation to provide moral support and to pass on their experience to people everywhere in the world who are pursuing democracy . With this political learning, those who are just beginning to move their nations toward democracy may be better able to distinguish between the correct path and the obstacles to reform, allowing them to make the right choices at crucial moments. I have great respect for the efforts and accomplishments of those who are at the forefront of the struggle for democracy. However, I also sincerely hope that we will not merely be satisfied with what we have j ointly accomplished to date, but will also have gained the optimism and confidence we need in order to deal with the challenges we jointly face. Democracy is our common commitment for the world of tomorrow.
james
9 EXPLAINING TAIWAN'S TRANSITION James c. Y. Soong
James C. Y. Soong was elected governor of Taiwan province, Republic of China, in 1 993. A native of Hunan province, China, he has served as secretary-general of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and director of Taiwan 's Government Information Office. He was educated in Taiwan and the United States and received a doctorate from Georgetown University.
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s governor of Taiwan province, I feel a great deal of exhilaration just contemplating the process of democratization that has taken place in my country . The role of the administrator has not become easier. In many ways, it has become more difficult. At the same time, democrati zation has certainly made our work much more interesting and fascinating. Knowing you are working for the will of the people gives you an authority and satisfaction you never had as an appointed administrator. Before, we labored in forced isolation , usually in an office sheltered from the communities we administered. Now our actions have the full support of our people. In fact, we must be guided by their desires. Technology has also revolutionized our governing styles. I have adopted a style of governing that I call the "three R ' s"-Responsive, Responsi ble, and Reasonable. I apply it both ways-my administration must perform in this manner and the people must approach government in this manner. I am constantly on the road. In fact, my office is the vehicle in which I am traveling. That is what modern technology has done for us. It puts me in daily contact with my constituents . We in the Republic of China trace our democracy to our founding father, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who, through his Three Principles of the People-nationalism, . democracy, and social well-being-and his Three Stages of Political Development-the period of military government, the period of political tutelage, and the period of constitutional govern ment-laid a clear blueprint for us to follow in achieving full democ-
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racy. A war with Japan, a communist rebellion, and nearly half a century of confrontation over straits fewer than one hundred miles in width did not allow us to develop as quickly as we would have liked, but we have greatly accelerated the process in the last decade and have now realized Dr. S un ' s dream. The absence of disorder in our transfor mation has made us exceedingly proud. I had the good fortune in this effort to be in the right place at the right time, and so was able to play a role in the final transition of my country to a full democracy . Following is my evaluation of the major events leading up to what people have called the "quiet revolution" to democracy in the ROC and the reasons for its success . Immediately after the surrender o f the Japanese i n World War II, the Republic of China returned to Dr. Sun ' s blueprint. The ROC passed a national constitution in 1 946 and elected its First National Legislative Yuan in 1 947. Shortly thereafter, communist rebellion on the mainland forced our government to move to Taiwan in 1 949. Although we remained in a declared state of civil war, we took steps to prepare the country for democratic government. In the early 1 950s, the Kuomintang (KMT) government instituted local elections , and by 1 960 elections were extended to the provincial legislature. I am convinced that two parallel developments greatly prepared the nation for its recent peaceful, bloodless transition to full democratization. Our government' s emphases on mass education and economic develop ment created a well-educated, relatively affluent society that not only was sufficiently sophisticated to make a smooth and stable transition but also was actually demanding it as the next step in its modernization efforts .
An Increased Momentum Democratization gained real momentum in the late 1 980s, when the ruling KMT decided that the time had come to release its hold on the political process. "Democratization" and "liberalization" were the watchwords of that era. The de.cision to accelerate the democratization process was made by President Chiang Ching-kuo. I had the honor of serving President Chiang in various capacities . I was his personal secretary for 1 5 years, from 1 974 to 1 989. I was also deputy secretary-general of the KMT from 1 987 to 19 89 , and during the year following President Chiang' s death, I was made secretary-general, i n which capacity I served until 1 993 . President Chiang Ching-kuo was totally devoted to the people. Despite impaired health, he spent as much time as possible among the people. Unlike other prominent Asian heads of state, for whom police emptied the streets in front of their cavalcades when they traveled, no
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one ever knew when President Chiang Ching-kuo traveled to and from his office because this was timed and orchestrated so as not to inconvenience the people, President Chiang' s model has greatly reinforced my own approach to effective governance. I refuse to govern by sitting in an office in the provincial capital. As I pointed out above, I am constantly on the go, visiting my constituents throughout the island. My van is my flagship. I sometimes call it mobile management. I feel it is the only way that I can personally know the people and remedy their problems, Modern telecommunications have made it possible for me to effectively govern on the road. President Chiang actually spent the early years of his tenure preparing for accelerated democratization . He launched such reforms as electing additional parliamentary representatives from Taiwan , invigorating the parliamentary function to accord more with the people' s expectations, and recruiting more Taiwanese to major posts in the government and party. The structural changes began in his later years . An obstacle to democratization and full constitutional government was rooted in the state of war that had existed between the Republic of China on Taiwan and the Chinese Communist regime on the mainland since 1 949. The state of war necessitated restrictions on movement and contacts between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Martial law had been declared in 1 949 and remained in force until 198 7. Although martial law is said to have affected only 3 percent of the Taiwan area, its existence drew criticism and was an obstacle to normal constitutional government. President Chiang' s first effort was to lift martial law. Compassionately, he also allowed mainlanders living on Taiwan to visit their mainland relatives . The government did not strictly enforce the restriction limiting such visits to relatives, however, and tourists from Taiwan flocked to the mainland in large numbers. B usiness arrangements also proliferated as Taiwanese businessmen took advantage of lower production costs on the mainland. Equally important to the democratization movement was the liberation of the print media. Under martial law, the number of newspapers was frozen, as was the number of pages each newspaper was allowed to publish. Removing these restrictions had an immediate impact, with the number of newspapers j umping from 3 1 in 1 986 to 246 by mid- 1 992. Government and, in effect, the whole country was thereafter subjected to the scrutiny and criticism of a free press . President Chiang also opened the political arena to multiparty competition. Although the Law on Civic Organizations under martial law restricted the number of political organizations that could be established, President Chiang had allowed those individuals opposed to the KMT to organize the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) prior to the amendment
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of the law. Since its amendment, the number of political parties has soared to more than 70. In addition to amending the Law on Civic Organizations , the government also established a Law on Assemblies and Parades in 1 9 8 8 that allowed political parties to assemble and present petitions. Indoor assemblies were completely open, and outdoor assemblies had only to be registered. President Chiang Ching-kuo thus laid the groundwork for subsequent reforms to be carried out by his hand-picked successor, President Lee Teng-hui.
Completing the Process President Chiang Ching-kuo initiated the democratization movement. President Lee Teng-hui put it on the fast track and carried it through to completion. Lee Teng-hui was the first native of Taiwan to serve as president of the ROC. Given the influence of the ruling party on government policy at that time, I felt that it was imperative that he also be elected to head the KMT. A majority of the party members fortun ately agreed with my reasoning, and President Lee was elected to head the KMT party apparatus. President Lee completed President Chiang ' S unfulfiIled term and was then elected by the National Assembly to be president in his own right. Prior to his inauguration in May 1 990, President Lee met with his top advisors to map out Taiwan' s continued growth for the six years o f his presidency. His strategy dealt with three closely interwoven priorities : democratization, modernization, and unification . President Lee' s first task was t o guide the structural transition to reflect Taiwan ' s political realities . The people would be satisfied with nothing less than complete openness and greater political participation. The first priority was to arrange for the fair and just retirement of the mainland-elected members of what we considered to be parliamentary type organizations, i ncluding the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan. The senior parliamentarians had performed valuable services to the nation since their election in 1 947, but times and circumstances had changed, and considerable effort was made to persuade them to voluntarily retire from active service while preserving for them a role as advisors on the subject of national unification. As secretary-general of the KMT at that time, I called on every key senior parliamentarian and secured agreements from all of them to resign voluntarily . Constitutional reform i s the duty o f the National Assembly, s o the election for the Second National Assembly was held in December 1 99 1 . I n order to amend the constitution, three-quarters of the assembly members must agree. Fortunately, the KMT gained 79 percent of the seats. The election results indicated that the people entrusted the ruling
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party to guide the transitIOn to full democracy. The groundwork for updating the constitution was thus laid. The Second Legislative Yuan was elected in December 1 992, and the Control Yuan has now been transformed into a quasi-judicial or ganization. Full constitutional government has now been attained, and democratization was completed in March of 1 996 with the direct election of the president and vice-president by the people. The KMT thus presided over its demotion from a ruling party to a majority party in the ROC government. President Lee also completed the reform of the KMT and moved to reconcile differences between citizens who had immigrated to Taiwan before and after 1 945. He did this by giving a greater voice to the Taiwanese or pre- 1 945 immigrants, who formed the majority of the KMT' s membership, and also by airing and removing tensions between the two groups that had developed as a result of various incidents in the early years following the transfer of the ROC government to Taiwan. Reducing these differences has made it possible for all to cooperate for the betterment of the country . I, for instance, have a mainland Chinese background but was elected governor of Taiwan. At the same time, a Taiwanese member of the KMT was elected mayor of Kaohsiung, and a Taiwanese member of the DPP was elected mayor of Taipei. There is no doubt that multiparty politics is firmly ensconced in Taiwan and that the differences between the local and mainland-born citizens are disappearing. Normalization of relations between the ROC and the People' s Republic o f China (PRC) was also a goal o f President Lee. H e therefore announced an end to the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion. This situation had initially led to martial law and had placed constraints on normal constitutional government. With this announcement, President Lee in effect declared an end to the civil war that had gone on across the Taiwan Strait since 1 949. President Lee reasoned that almost half a century had confirmed the existence of two separate political entities. He therefore declared an end to the war as far as the ROC was concerned. Although the communist Chinese still refuse to renounce their state of war, President Lee looked toward eventual reunification with the mainland through a set of Guidelines for National Unification once both sides enjoyed democracy, freedom, and a comparable living standard. To protect Taiwan until unification becomes possible, President Lee inaugurated two policies to handle external relations: "unofficial talks" between the two sides of the Strait and enhancement of Taiwan ' s standing in the international community through what has become known as "pragmatic diplomacy." Modernization of the local society in the broadest sense was another of the president' s goals. He laid plans to move the country into the twenty-first century technologically, scientifically, materially, and
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culturally. A multifaceted Twelve-Year Development Plan for infrastruc tural and other modernizations and an agenda for establishing the country as an Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center are key ingredi ents of the modernization drive. The president himself decided to chair the National Cultural Association in order to add more meaning to the daily lives of his people.
Reasons for Success Despite the constant threat to our security posed by the communist regime across the Taiwan S trait, the ROC has now moved into the democratic camp. Our success is due, I am convinced, to the rational way in which we approached the objective. I would attribute our victory to four specific strategies : consensus-building, staged reforms, trans parency, and stability. 1) Consensus-building. In his pioneering and masterful study of the third wave of democratization, Samuel P. Huntington identified four types of authoritarian regimes : one-party, personal, military, and racial oligarchic . These have democratized or liberalized through four processes : transformation, transplacement, replacement, and intervention. He correctly identified the ROC as a one-party system that democratized through transformation. In analyzing the various political groups in and out of government that affect the democratization process, he made it clear that reform is much more difficult than revolution . On the extreme conservative side are those who want to maintain the status quo and the establishment while rej ecting reform. On the extreme liberal side are the opposition radicals who demand change overnight. In the ROC, the KMT, or ruling party, controlled the government. If democratization was to be achieved, a consensus had to be built within the party for that reform . To succeed, democratization had to have the support of both the entrenched leadership, composed mostly of mainlanders elected in the late 1 940s, and the Taiwanese or pre- 1945 immigrants, who made up the majority of the party membership. To build this consensus, it was necessary to find a coordinator. As deputy secretary-general before the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo, and as secretary-general under President Lee Teng-hui, I was given this responsibility . My immediate job as coordinating secretary-general of the KMT was to arrange for the retirement of the senior legislators. This was a tough assignment. These elderly gentlemen had been elected on the mainland and had served the country, government, and party with distinction through a very dangerous period of our history. Times had changed, however, and for the country to move forward it was necessary that younger legislators more representative of the local population assume responsibility . I therefore adopted a moderate approach. Within a period
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of three months, I visited the home of every key senior legislator. I tried to convince them that retiring with honor would be preferable to resisting the tide of popular opinion. To retire voluntarily would mean that their long service to the party and government would be honored and protected, while being forced to retire would destroy their well earned reputation for service. I found that the senior legislators were, in large measure, sympathetic to the problems facing the party and were willing to make this last sacrifice for the party and the nation. President Chiang had started the process of bringing more Taiwanese into positions of authority in the party and government, and President Lee continued and accelerated this process . It was important at the same time to minimize the distinction between local and mainland-born members of the party. Government opponents had seized upon this issue as a technique for attracting new members and for preaching Taiwan ' s independence. Within the party, those who opposed reform were using it to sow discord. It was important that the issue be neutralized. President Lee has been largely successful in this effort. In a 1 995 speech, he pointed out that citizens of the ROC are both Taiwanese and Chinese, and he called for an end to efforts to create discord among the citizens, who all sincerely care about the welfare of the nation. 2) Reform by stages. One of the most important decisions of the party was that if democratization was to succeed, the process had to be carried out in stages , slowly but surely. The alternative could well have led to revolution rather than reform. A well-managed, disciplined approach with toleration of the opposition positions was deemed essential. Precipitous, overnight changes or obstinate refusal to consider opposition views would have led to a crisis 'mentality and given those opposing reform on both the left and right legitimate excuses for attacking and discrediting the process . Sincere efforts were therefore made to work with the opposition in order to turn differences into opportunities for cooperation. The KMT has tried from the start to draw opponents of orderly reform into the process and, on the whole, has been very successful. The party ' s main concern has therefore been manageable reform, and it has stood firm against calls for actions that would have thrown the movement into a free fall of disorder. The complexity of the task ahead of us also mandated reform by stages. We were determined that the transition be made within the constitutional framework of the country. Political reform was pro grammed from the start. President Chiang allowed the formation of new parties and liberated the press, while the senior parliamentarians were persuaded to vote themselves out of office in order to pave the way for the election of a multiparty National Assembly that could amend the constitution. In addition, the Second Legislative Yuan, composed of representatives of several parties, was elected, and elections for the provincial governor and the mayors of Kaohsiung and Taipei were
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carried out. The process was completed in March 1 996 when the president and vice-president were elected directly by the people. As a result of this gradual approach, this reform by stages, we have a population that fully supports the process. The alternative would have been chaos . 3) Transparency. If there has been a revolutionary aspect to our democratization process, it has been in the field of decision making. Before our transition to democracy began, important government decisions were made in the councils of the party while information was released on a need-to-know basis . That practice is no longer possible. Every important action taken by the government and party is now subjected to intense scrutiny . The partner in this transformation was the press. With its liberation in the late 1 9 80s , the press very quickly assumed a watchdog role. Much as in the United States, the press has been very critical. At the same time, it has been very supportive of reform . Its dual role has forced the decision-making process to be more responsible and open and to support democratic reform. It has been both a critic and a partner in the process. 4) Stability. The final reason for the success of our democratization approach that I would like to mention is the conscious effort we made to maintain stability, to steer clear of precipitous moves that would encourage chaos. By the mid- 1 9 80s, Taiwan ' s economic achievements had led to the emergence of a middle class that constituted 57 percent of the total population . Middle classes are the bedrock of stability. They will allow political reform only if it preserves stability. At the same time, our emerging middle class voiced dissatisfaction with our essential isolation in the international community . Continued isolation could threaten stability and the security of the economy by affecting trade. This middle class reasoned that the way to break out of the isolation imposed by the PRC was to seek democracy and upgrade our inter national i� age. They were willing to sacrifice in order to achieve democratic reforms that would protect stability . The support of this group reduced the influence of the more conservative and liberal elements in the country . Stability thus became a partner of reform.
Democracy Is Universal There is an ongoing debate on just what "democracy" means. Some believe that the American style of democracy, for instance, is basically different from what one world leader has called "Asian democracies ." I agree with S amuel Huntington ' s analysis that democracy has an "institutional core" whereby "the principal officers of government are chosen through competitive elections in which the bulk of the population can participate." Aside from that, democracies are, by their very nature, affected by the values and culture of their people. What is essential is
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that each nation' s democracy reflect the wishes of its people. If democracy fails in that respect, it faces the danger of either dying or being cast aside. We m ust therefore each seek our own path to democracy. The 30 or more democracies represented in this third wave followed 30 or more routes to democracy. That is not to say that we cannot learn from each other ' s experiences, especially now that we are seeking to consolidate our democratic achievements. Now that technol ogy has placed the world in constant contact and destroyed a nation ' s ability to shut out the outside, w e should work to find as many areas as possible in which we can cooperate and advance the cause of democracy. We in the Republic of China are extremely confident in the future of our democracy. We have advanced to the stage where the process cannot be reversed. We are also confident that we made the right choice. Our people agree.
III China
10 "CREEPING DEMOCRATIZATION" IN CHINA Minxin Pei
Minxin Pei is assistant professor of politics at Princeton University. The author of From Reform to Revolution : The Demise of Communism in China and the S oviet Union (1 994), he spent the 1994-95 academic year as a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He currently serves as associate editor of World Politics .
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"third wave" o f global democratization has left untouched several East Asian autocracies that are experiencing rapid economic growth: China, Vietnam, and Indonesia. These three countries have made enormous progress in liberalizing markets and integrating themselves into the world economy . Most private citizens there have gained considerable economic freedom and civil liberties as a result · of market-oriented reforms . Yet these encouraging developments have not been accompanied by any meaningful degree of liberalization of the political system. Political rights and participation remain severely restricted, and the ruling elite maintains a monopoly of power. These East Asian autocracies ' lack of significant progress toward democratization challenges two widely held views about the relationship between economic development and politics : 1 ) The historical experience of the West and the rise of new democracies since the end of the Second World War indicate that economic development has a powerful impact on a country ' s political system and forces major institutional changes, primarily (but not exclusively) to ensure greater security of property rights . New property owning social groups eager to defend their rights will struggle to liberalize the political system. 2) The rule of law is the foundation for sustained economic growth. A cursory examination of the progress of political liberalization in China, Vietnam, and Indonesia would both confound and alarm advocates of democracy and the rule of law. How did ruling elites in these authoritarian states manage to hold on to power in the face of
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rapid social change unleashed by high rates of growth? How do we explain these countries ' spectacular records of economic growth given their weak or absent rule of law ? If the rule of law fails to take hold in the East Asian autocracies, will they be able to sustain their high growth rates? At first glance, the East Asian anomalies would seem to suggest that the above-mentioned theories are wrong-that is, that economic liberalization can occur without accompanying changes in the political system, and that long-term growth can be achieved in the absence of the rule of law. A more careful examination of the evidence, however, reveals that in the East Asian autocracies, economic development is in fact being accompanied by changes in political institutions, albeit relatively slow and subtle ones. The rule of law is gradually emerging and acquiring constraining power, although not without great difficulty. In the case of China, although there have been virtually no signs of direct or overt democratization, endogenous and incremental changes in the political institutions of the authoritarian regime are gradually forming subtle but important checks and balances against the ruling party ' s monopoly of power, strengthening the rule of law, and cultivating self-government at the grassroots level . Although China ' s progress in these three different areas has been extremely limited to date, a fragile institutional frame work appears to have been put into place. If the liberalizing trends of the 1 980s and early 1 990s are allowed to continue, this currently flimsy institutional framework will provide a solid foundation for the eventual democratization of China.
Endogenous Institutional Changes Thus far, the literature on democratization has focused on two main sources of change. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter have emphasized the political calculation of autocrats as the most critical factor in transitions from authoritarianism. l Others have stressed factors exogenous to the regime, such as foreign influences, mobilization of opposition forces, and socioeconomic conditions. 2 Relatively few authors have examined endogenous changes in existing political institutions as a source of "creeping democratization." In most cases of transition, autocratic regimes pressed by rising costs of maintaining political control implement programs to economize their dwindling resources (mass political support and fiscal revenues) . Most such programs lead to a greater dependence on institutions as sources of political stability , efficiency, and credibility. This explains why in many authoritarian states a significant increase in the level of political institutionalization long precedes democratization. Typical components of political institutionalization under authoritarian rule include a modest strengthening of the rule of law, the establishment of nominally
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representative institutions under the direction o f the regime, the expansion of local autonomy , and even the holding of semi-free local elections. S uch endogenous-and usually incremental-institutional changes may unexpectedly pave the way for genuine democracy. This is so primarily owing to the effects of "path dependency" in the evolution of institu tions: the high costs of reversal of such progress enable these changes to become virtually self-sustaining.3 New political actors are able to exploit the institutional changes as they pursue their own goals and devise more effective political strategies. Such dynamic interactions between political actors and institutions lead to subtle internal transfor mation of the institutions and enhancement of the role of institutional arrangements in determining political outcomes. In the relatively successful cases of East Asian democratization (especially Taiwan), endogenous and incremental institutional changes introduced under the old regime (in Taiwan, local self-government and semi-free local elections) laid solid foundations for the transition to democracy. As a rule, autocratic regimes enjoying high levels of political institutionalization experience lower levels of transitional instability during the democratization process. Although the advantages of introducing gradual changes in political institutions prior to democratic transition are clear, how the new institutional rules are enforced remains a difficult puzzle. In other words, how are autocratic rulers made to comply with the new arrangements in the absence of third-party enforcement? In addressing this puzzle, political economists often point to "self enforcing" mechanisms that are built into these institutional arrange ments. Generally, enforcement of the new institutional rules is achieved through: 1 ) the bundling together of diverse interests of various political groups into an institutional framework so that any infringement by the �ove�eign upon such an arrangement will constitute an attack on all these groups, triggering a collective response against the sovereign; and 2) reliance on the organizational self-interest of different branches of government to provide "checks and balances." Over time, initially experimental arrangements may gain acceptance and sanctity as binding institutional norms. As they become ever more embedded in the public political consciousness, their powers of self-enforcement steadily increase. Have such incremental institutional changes occurred in China in the last 1 5 years? If so, are the changes beginning to have an impact on the functioning of the country ' s political system? Are the changes durable? These are not merely theoretical questions about the validity of the above-mentioned assumptions regarding the role of endogenous institutional changes. Their answers bear directly on our understanding of the overall direction of China' s political evolution and are essential
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to the formulation of appropriate policies for promoting democratization in China.
The Consequences of Reform S ocietal prodemocracy movements during the Deng era have received extensive attention and scholarly treatment. Three mini-waves of spontaneous prodemocracy activity (the Democracy Wall movement of 1 978-79 , the student demonstrations of 1 986-87, and the Tiananmen S quare movement of 1 989) have constituted the main societal efforts at democratization in China. Scholars of China have also noted important administrative, legislative, and legal reforms that have been introduced by the regime since the late 1 970s.4 With few exceptions, most studies have concluded that these steps were taken primarily as part of Deng Xiaoping ' s program to construct a new political order more conducive to his goal of economic modernization, rather than to democratize the country . Yet as events in China over the past 1 5 years have shown, these measures have had unintended consequences that bode well for democratization. The most notable institutional changes have taken place in three areas : 1) legal institutions, 2) representative organizations, and 3) experiments in grassroots self-government.
1) The rule of law. The rule of law-the institutional foundation of a market economy and constitutional government-is fundamentally at odds with a one-party regime, for the simple reason that the ruling party, with its monopoly of power, is above the law. This essential truth is borne out by the experience of authoritarian states around the world, with China being no exception. S ince the initiation of reforms in 1978, the government has given top priority to the establishment of a system of law (as opposed to the rule of law). Between 1 979 and 1 992, the National People ' s Congress (NPC), China' s legislature, passed more than 600 laws (an additional 2,300 laws were enacted by local people' s congresses [PCs]). Yet the enforcement record-the true measure of the effectiveness of the rule of law-is abysmal owing to the monopoly of power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the absence of an independent judiciary, and the lack of any tradition of the rule of law in China. According to one official study, only about half of China' s laws are enforced . Public knowledge and understanding of the legal system remain poor. The same study alleged that only 5 percent of all the laws recently issued were understood by the pUblic.5 Law-enforcement officials report meeting with open defiance in their attempts to enforce court decisions. In Shanxi province, court officials were said to have met with hostility in 60 percent of such cases.6 This enforcement record is certainly disappointing. Yet it should not
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obscure the subtle impact of China's emerging legal system, both in terms of changes in institutional norms and in terms of public awareness of legal resources that are available for the defense of individual rights. Institutionalist literature rightly notes that formal institutional rules have little force unless they become "embedded" in the public consciousness as norms for evaluating political behavior. This embedding process occurs through a combination of the gradual evolution of the political system and a series of deliberate probing efforts by individual "entrepre neurs ," who shoulder the initial risks inherent in pressing for change in an attempt to capture the gains to be derived from hidden public resources. The existence of a body of laws constitutes a source of public goods available to knowledgeable economic and political entrepreneurs . A reformist authoritarian government is unusually vulnerable to appeals to the rule of law and j ustice made by these entrepreneurs, because its violation of the new rules (which the government typically promulgates with much fanfare as a means of distinguishing itself from its more repressive and "unreasonable" predecessor) casts the government in an extremely unfavorable light and damages its credibility . An illustrative example here is a law that allows Chinese citizens to sue the government for administrative action deemed illegal . Before the enactment of the Administrative Litigation Act in October 1 990, Chinese citizens victimized by the miscarriage of justice and the abuse of state power had no legal recourse. Although a considerable number of private citizens challenged administrative acts by filing suit in China' s courts, their claims had no legal basis, and their chances of winning were extremely small. Official records show that about 44,000 such suits-most brought by citizens who believed that the government had violated their civil liberties and property rights-were filed between 1 983 and 1 990 (with an average of about 1 0,000 a year filed at the end of the 1 980s). The passage of the law in 1 990 immediately unleashed a flood of new l awsuits against the government, and the number of cases filed in 1 99 1 reached 25,600. Data for 1 992 and 1 993 show that the number of suits filed had stabilized at approximately 27 ,000 a year. Official data for 1 992 show that the courts upheld the government' s administrative decisions in 28 percent of the cases filed, dismissed the government' s decisions in 1 9 percent, forced changes in the original government decisions in 1 . 8 percent, and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaints in 7 . 8 percent; plaintiffs withdrew their lawsuits in 37.8 percent of the cases .7 A significant portion of the suits that were filed against the govern ment had to do with private property rights and economic freedom. Sample cases detailed in the Chinese press included suits filed by peasants whose property was seized or damaged by government agents . Private entrepreneurs whose businesses were closed down or who were
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"Creeping Democratization" i n China
harassed by local officials also made up a large number of plaintiffs. This development signals a trend of ordinary citizens ' becoming politically active primarily to defend their newly acquired property rights. Additional evidence points to the emerging role of the rule of law in the enforcement of contracts .8 Prior to the initiation of reform, China' s legal system was used almost exclusively to enforce criminal laws and resolve (noncommercial) civil litigation. With the growth of a market economy , Chinese courts have become heavily involved in securing property rights and resolving contract disputes . In 1 992, 890,000 cases of "economic disputes" were accepted by Chinese courts (representing about 27 percent of all cases accepted). In the long run, this involve ment will enhance the institutional power of China' s courts, transforming them into a counterweight against the CCP ' s monopoly of political power. For China's small dissident community, the emerging legal framework provides a valuable political resource with which to challenge the government. Many dissidents have filed suit against the government for violation of their constitutional rights . China' s legal system will increasingly become another arena in which democratic activists will test the limits of the regime' s political tolerance and probe for new openings. China' s tentative legal reforms have produced a small but fast growing community of legal professionals who have an immediate stake in the continuation of this trend. In the mid- 1 990s, about 1 5 ,000 lawyers have been admitted into the bar each year. China is expected to have more than 1 50,000 practicing attorneys at the end of this decade.9 There are several encouraging signs indicating that Chinese lawyers, in spite of the adverse political and institutional conditions under which they are forced to work, are beginning to assert themselves in their professional role. Within this emerging community, a small number of lawyers have already gained a national reputation for vigorous defense of their clients. Some of them have paid a very high personal price for their professional independence. The Chinese legal press frequently reports that lawyers are harassed, persecuted, and even j ailed by the police for their strong defense of their clients . Inside the regime, soft-liners have become increasingly aware of the critical importance of the rule of law as a foundation for sustained economic reform; they recently accelerated efforts to institutionalize it. Since March 1 993, the NPC under the leadership of Qiao Shi has given a new urgency to legal reforms. Qiao himself identified as the top priority the enactment of laws protecting property rights, maintaining openness and competition in the marketplace, strengthening the state ' s capacity for macroeconomic control, and providing a social safety net. China' s justice minister also declared that the legal system must be
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developed simultaneously with the market economy i n order to safeguard the autonomy of the market, enforce contracts, and maintain market credibility, competition, integrity, and compliance with international standards.
2) The National People 's Congress. Throughout the 1980s, the NPC consistently subordinated itself to the wishes of the CCP. Most of its legislation was drafted by the State Council (the executive branch). The !'.u'C merely supplied a formal stamp of legislative approval that provided these decisions with representative legitimacy. In the early 1 990s, generational changes, a rise in the educational levels of NPC deputies, and, more importantly, the maturing of the institution itself have begun to push the NPC toward a more independent role that promises to check and balance the power of the ruling party . !O The NPC as well as local PCs used to rubber-stamp key personnel decisions made by the CCP. Recently they have begun to exercise, albeit cautiously, their powers of confirmation and formal approval. In some cases, beginning in the late 1 9 80s, local PCs elected to government positions a small number of candidates they themselves nominated, rather than those designated by the CCP. In 1 988, provincial and municipal PCs succeeded in electing their own candidates to deputy mayorships and deputy provincial governorships. In the spring of 1993, the CCP ' s hold on local PCs encountered unprecedented direct chal lenges . Several CCP-nominated candidates for key government positions failed to win approval from local PCs, while six candidates put forward by local deputies were elected to deputy provincial governorships. Most significant, for the first time in post- 1 949 China, two CCP-nominated candidates for provi ncial governorships (in Guizhou and Zhejiang) were unexpectedly defeated by two candidates nominated by deputies of provincial pes . Since the late 1 9 808, provincial and municipal PCs have also nominated their own candidates as deputies to the NPC, instead of merely approving the candidates handpicked by the CCP. I I In 1988, such nominees made up about 15 percent of the candidates for deputies of the NPC. In its annual session in March 1 995, the NPC deputies delivered a heavy blow to the CCP when an unprecedented 36.5 percent voted against the nomination of a CCP Politburo member to a deputy premiership (he was considered too old, poorly educated, and tainted by corruption scandals) . Over the years, the NPC has become a court of appeal for ordinary Chinese citizens . Each year it receives more than 1 00,000 letters from private citizens seeking assistance in various matters. The NPC frequently served as a protector for local PC deputies who were persecuted by local-government officials because of their political outspokenness. The NPC occasionally intervened in individual cases of abuse of power by government officials. In many ways, Chinese NPC
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deputies took on the role of "remonstrators" by criticizing the poor performance of the government , on various public policy issues such as the environment, law and order, education, health, and municipal services. 1 2 The NP C has provided a limited forum for debating issues that the government tries to keep off the national agenda. For example, in order to maintain its strategic relations with Japan, the Chinese government has attempted to muffle popular demands for Japanese war reparations. But a group of political activists managed to line up 32 NPC deputies in March 1 992 to sponsor two resolutions calling on Japan to make war reparations to Chinese citizens victimized by the Japanese invasion of China. This incident greatly embarrassed the government on the eve of the first visit by the emperor of Japan . Activist NPC deputies also tried to pass laws protecting the rights of Chinese lawyers after the press reported numerous instances of government officials' persecution of lawyers who energetically defended their clients . In recent years , the NPC has subtly asserted its legislative autonomy and its role as a representative of major social interests. In some localities, PC deputies led the efforts to push through environmental legislation. At the national level , the NPC played an important role in writing China' s bankruptcy and state-owned enterprise laws. The drafts of both laws were repeatedly revised in light of obj ections from NPC deputies voicing concerns of workers in state-owned enterprises . In October 1 9 89 , for the first time in the NPC ' s history, its Standing Committee formally rej ected a law (regarding urban neighborhood committees) after less than half of its members voted for its passage. The events at the Third Session of the Eighth NPC in March 1995 suggest that the body was becoming more aggressive in establishing itself as an institutional force. The session witnessed the largest number of deputies ever who either voted against or abstained on key govern ment-sponsored legislation. A third of the deputies voted against or abstained during the passage of the Central Bank Law (draft), feeling that the law would give the State Council too much power over the Central Bank and the country ' s monetary policy . A quarter of the deputies refused to endorse the Education Law (draft) . About 20 percent of the deputies did not approve the reports of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Procurator' s Office. These chang'es constitute only minor steps toward the democratization of China. They should not be taken as signs of the NPC' s legislative independence or its role as institutional counterweight against the dominance of the CCP. At the same time, they should not be dismissed as insignificant and irrelevant. They represent a welcome and promising trend toward functioning institutional pluralism in China. In assessing the significance of this trend for the prospects for democracy in China, it is worth recalling the crucial role played by the counterparts of the NPC
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in the former Soviet Union (the Supreme Soviet, the Congress of People' s Deputies , and similar institutions in the 15 republics). It was precisely in these institutions, long dismissed as the rubber stamp of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, that the initial challenges were mounted against the ruling party ' s monopoly of power. Provided that a political opening akin to perestroika occurs in China, similar develop ments there are likely .
3) Experimental grassroots self-government in rural areas. It is well known that rural reforms have led to a deep erosion of the institutions and authority of both the CCP and the Chinese state in the countryside. Although the main causes of this institutional decay have received considerable attention , the speed, full extent, and consequences of the collapse of the party-state (along with affiliated organizations such as the Youth League and the Women ' s Organization) in rural China remain to be explored. On paper, the CCP had about 3 million grassroots organiza tions at the end of the 1 9 80s, with 1 .3 million in the countryside. In reality , as many as half of the CCP rural cells have ceased to function with any degree of effectiveness. Case studies conducted by CCP survey teams show that in many villages the party failed to recruit a single member after the initiation of agricultural reform in 1 979 . Rural CCP members were not paying dues or conducting any organizational activities. In late 1 984, a nationwide study of 272 villages in China' s 30 provinces showed that only about 60 percent of the rural CCP cells could be said to be ,, functioning "normally . 13 Internal CCP documents leaked to the Hong Kong press provide corroborating evidence of even more widespread decay of the CCP's rural , grassroots organizations. A State Council report in early 1992 warned that 30 percent of the CCP cells in the countryside had "collapsed" and another 60 percent were extremely "weak" and , "disorganized., 1 4 Another classified report by the CCP Central Commit tee in 1 994 alleged that up to 75 percent of CCP rural organizations were in "a state of collapse" and could not "perform their normal duties." About 30 percent of township and village administrative agencies were said to be unable to function. 1 5 The rapid decline of the CCP ' s rural organizations has led to several important developments : 1) The resurgence of traditional forms of authority, principally lineage-based groups. These traditional authority structures have made the most rapid gains in large agrarian inland provinces, such as Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Anhui, as well as in the coastal province of Zhejiang. S emi-official reports suggest that in townships and villages, lineage-based groups and large clans dominate local governments and the local economy. One such report warns that a very large portion of the
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16 million private enterprises and 22 million township and village enter prises in rural areas is controlled. by these groupS. 1 6 2 ) A drastic reduction i n the state 's provision of public goods and social services. The government has slashed its investment in rural infrastructure and public health. Law and order has deteriorated at an alarming pace. Official statistics reveal a surge of violent crime, with a doubling of the homicide rate between 1 980 and 1 9 8 8 in rural areas (compared with a rise of 30 percent in urban areas). 1 7 Published survey results show that in the early 1 990s the top concern of rural residents was the deterioration of law and order (30.6 percent), with inflation ranking a distant second (2 1 . 1 percent). 18 A senior official of the government' s Special Commission on Law and Order admitted that the principal cause of the deterioration of rural law and order was the disintegration of grassroots political institutions. 1 9 3) A growing crisis of governability d u e t o deteriorating relations between the peasantry and the state. There have been numerous reports in the official press of various forms of peasant resistance and violence against rural cadres. As i nstitutionalized channels for addressing grievances became more and more dysfunctional, peasants increasingly resorted to spontaneous collective protest.20 The number of peasant riots in 1993 allegedly reached 6,230 (about 800 of which involved more than 500 participants) .21 A survey of 1 00 villages in northern China in 1 99 1 found that the relationship between the CCP cadres and peasants was "tense" in 55 of them. 22 Two main factors contributing to this crisis were the massive corruption of local-government officials and the arbitrary imposition of taxes and fees for which peasants received no government-provided services and over which they exercised no control. Village finances were mismanaged and lacked transparency. About 70 percent of villages and townships failed to disclose local public revenues and expenditures on a regular basis.23 Government auditors who examined the financial records of 2 , 1 96 villages found that embez zlement of public funds occurred in 1 ,493 of them (68 percent).24 In some cases , the responsibility for providing public goods and local governance has been taken over by revived lineage-based power structures. In most villages, however, a pOlitical vacuum has emerged, a situation that has greatly alarmed top government leaders. Thus, ironically, one of the driving forces behind village self-government was Peng Zhen, the former conservative chairman of the NPC. Under Peng' s stewardship, the NPC passed the Organic Law o f the Villagers' Committees of the PRC in November 1 9 87. Prior to the passage of this law, peasants in many villages sponta neously formed village residents ' associations (VRAs) and elected villagers' committees (yCs) to cope with the virtual anarchy created by the demise of the communes . In December 1 9 82, the revised Chinese Constitution recognized the legal status of VRAs as grassroots civic
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organizations (rather than as a form of political administration). In 1 983, the CCP formally endorsed the formation of VRAs. By the begin ning of 1 98 5 , the government claimed that nearly one million VRAs had been formed. Following the passage of the Organic Law in 1 987 (which was implemented on an experimental basis in June 1988), two-thirds of the provinces also passed local legislation on VRAS .25 Although the political repression following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1 989 temporarily slowed the pace of the expansion and institutionalization of village self-government, the momentum resumed in 1 992 after the revival of economic reforms. By the end of 1 992, all 30 provinces had begun to experiment with village-level self-government, with 59 counties ,, and municipalities chosen as "demonstration jurisdictions. 26 The results of the experiments in village-level direct elections varied widely; and the effectiveness of VCs was uneven across different areas. In many villages, VCs barely functioned. In villages that established effective VCs, their success was attributed to the crucial role played by local governments (specifically, the Bureau for Civil Affairs) in organizing and supervising village elections. In villages chosen for experimentation, there were some encouraging signs of grassroots democratization. Voter turnout was high: samples from seven provinces show a rate of about 90 percent. Many villagers appeared to take these elections seriously. The level of competition varied across regions . In some areas, competition was fierce, with many candidates running against one another. In other areas, elections were uncontested. An indication of the openness of the elections was that non-CCP candidates won about 30 percent of the chairmanships of VCs in demonstration jurisdictions in three provinces . In some cases, CCP incumbents were defeated when running for reelection. Data from eight counties and municipalities in five provinces show that non-CCP individuals account for an average of 40 percent of the VC members.27 Peasants' political awareness has been routinely discounted owing to their low social status, income level, and educational attainment. Yet significant alterations in institutional arrangements can motivate them to increase their level of participation. The introduction of VRAs as self governing bodies and of semi-open elections represents a critical institutional change with real potential to mobilize at least part of the Chinese peasantry. These factors explain the rising level of political awareness and activism in rural China. A survey of two hundred peasants conducted in two villages in Fuj ian in 1 992 found that nearly 90 percent of villagers believed that the head of the VC ought to be elected by a direct and open vote. Fifteen percent wanted to participate in the decision-making process bearing on village matters that directly affected their lives .28 Surveys conducted in villages in demonstration jurisdictions revealed that an overwhelming majority of peasants (80 percent) agreed that VC
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members "should be elected." About two-thirds of them believed that elections "made a maj or difference. ,,29 Despite the lack of national data on how the institution of self government in those selected villages had improved local governance, anecdotal evidence suggests that such an embryonic form of grassroots democracy may offer a limited solution to the crisis of govern ability in rural China. A central-government official in charge of this experiment told me a revealing story about peasant riots in Sichuan province in 1 992 . In one county, peasants rioted violently against imposition of a highway tax. In the neighboring county, the same tax was collected without incident. The difference was that the latter was chosen as a site for experimentation with rural self-government, and village-level free elections had been held. The highway tax was approved by elected VCs . The Chinese press has reported extensively on how freely elected VCs were able to restore law and order, implement government policies, bring integrity to village finances, and provide social services to rural residents . Western observers of such experiments also noted that governance improved in villages where these efforts were relatively successfu1.30 The most important improvements were the establishment by elected village officials of a transparent system of fiscal accounting and the holding of public discussions and village referendums on proposals for maj or public expenditures. Still, the gains in grassroots democratization in Chinese villages have been meager. Genuinely free elections have been held in only a tiny fraction of them. Even in the small number of villages where such elections were held, the results have been mixed. In some villages, elected VCs were quite democratic and effective. In others, they were dominated by one or two large clans. In many others, elections were pro jorma, held mainly as a result of pressure from county officials. For all of its flaws , however, this development represents the first step toward genuine self-government in rural China. In villages that have held these elections, the procedure itself will gradually acquire legiti macy and impose constraints on village officials' conduct. It will also generate and raise expectations about the acceptable level of local governance. There are some signs that this process is already under way in some villages . Many VC members told interviewers that they remem bered exactly how many votes they received in the last election . They knew when they were coming up for reelection. The concept of political accountability seems to be taking root.
A Race Against Time The process of the institutionalization of authoritarian rule in China over the last 1 5 years has generated limited momentum toward a more open political system. Though little has been achieved thus far in the
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way of actual democratization, the institutional foundations for genuine democracy are slowly taking shape. The maturation of the rule of law, the NPC, and village self-government are important components of this evolutionary process. In the near term, two immense challenges confront the Chinese political system. First, the intense power struggle among the ruling elites for political supremacy in the post-Deng era has added great uncertainty to the prospects of the continuation of the evolutionary changes discussed here. The hardening of the political line in the mid1 990s (evidenced by an increase in human rights abuses and repression of dissidents), which was probably the result of this struggle, may cause severe and permanent damage to these fragile institutions. An external shock, such as an armed conflict with Taiwan over the issue of reunification or independence, will definitely set back this evolutionary process of political change. Second, the uneven pace of the two broad political trends analyzed above has put the political system under enormous stress. On the one hand, the prereform communist-authoritarian political institutions are decaying at a dizzying rate. On the other hand, the new political institutions capable of improving governance, or ganizing political participation, and mediating conflicts are emerging slowly and with great difficulty. This situation warns of an accelerating crisis of governability : the old system may give way before the new institutions take root. In this sense, the post-Deng leadership is in a race against time. Whether the new leadership will win this race depends on two powerful forces , as well as on the political skills with which the new leadership manages them in strengthening the rule of law and representa tive institutions to relieve some of the political pressures on the CCP.
1 ) With the passing of the first-generation revolutionaries, the ruling elite will consist of a new generation of politicians with similar experiences of professional and political socialization . The disappearance · of strongmen � ill motivate key players to seek greater mutual security through increasing reliance on institutional rules and norms. This process will accelerate political institutionalization, with increasing emphasis on binding institutional constraints. 2) A nascent federalist structure is emerging in China as a result of rapid economic and political decentralization. Although federalism is distinct from democracy, the history of federalism in the West and in the developing world suggests that this institutional arrangement has built-in enforcement mechanisms capable of checking the autocrats in the center. While centralized bureaucratic empires are extremely vulnerable to centrifugal forces and tend to collapse when the political authority of the center drastically declines, a federalized system with a well-defined division of political authority can create numerous political safety valves to reduce the stress on the center and limit its political liability . In China, genuine political decentralization founded upon an emerging
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economic federalist structure augurs well for future regional democratic breakthroughs. Indeed, the emerging political federalism in China will inject a new momentum into the three positive developments analyzed in this essay. At the national level, progress in instituting the rule of law, establishing genuine representative institutions, and holding competitive elections may be very slow. Yet these institutional changes may proceed at a faster pace in regions where local socioeconomic conditions and the political orientations of elites are more hospitable to democratization. Of course, such a development would pose a new challenge to the central government: controlling the pace of democratiza tion . This challenge may be more easily met if the post-Deng leadership succeeds in working out a new constitutional framework that clearly establishes the boundaries of political authority and responsibility between the center and provincial governments . Such constitutional re form is in the post-Deng regIme' s own interests, for without it the new regime may find it impossible to maintain the political system in anything resembling its present form.
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Tension in the World of Chinese Legal Workers," China Quarterly 141 (March 1 995): 22-2 3 . 1 0 . Murray Scot Tanner h a s provided a fascinating account of China's legislative system, showing that it has acquired a great deal of institutional sophistication and maturity.
See his "How a Bill Becomes
a Law in China: Stages and Processes in
Lawmaking," China Quarterly 141 (March 1 99 5 ) : 39-
II.
Deputies to the NPC are indirectly elected. Typically, they are handpicked by the
CCP and formally nominated by the presidiums of municipal and provincial PCs . 12.
Kevin
O ' B rien,
"Agents
and Remonstrators:
Role
Accumulation by Chinese
People' s Congres � Deputies," China Quarterly 1 3 8 (June 1 994) : 359-80. 1 3 . Office for Rural Policy Research of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee,
Nongchun zai biange zhong qianjin (The countryside is progressing amid reform) (Beijing: Nongye, 1 987), 36-3 8 . 1 4 . Cheng milig ( H o n g Kong), March 1 992, 44. 1 5 . Cheng ming, September 1 994, 1 8 . 1 6 . China Press (USA), 6 April 1 99 5 , 2 . 1 7 . Zhongguo shehui tongji ziliao 1 990 (Chinese social statistical yearbook 1 990) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji, 1 990), 298.
NOTES
1 8 . Lu Jianhua, "The B asic Outlook of Various Social Sectors on the Current Situation in 1 992," Sociological Studies 3 ( 1 99 3 ) : 9 .
The
author
gratefully
acknowledges
the
financial
support
provided
by
the
Hoover
1 9 . Liao wang (Outlook) 23 ( 1 994) : 1 0 .
Institution during 1 994--9 5, and by a grant from the United States Institute of Peace. The opinions,
findings, conclusions, and recommendations expressed here are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Hoover Institution or the United States Institute of Peace. 1 . Guillermo O ' Donnell and Philippe S chmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
2 0 . Accordin g to one study, spontaneous collective protests b y peasants often take the form of collective complaints lodged with government authorities at higher levels. Kevin O' Brien and Lianjiang Li, "The Politics of Lodging Complaints in Rural China," China
Quarterly 1 43 (September 1 99 5 ) : 756-8 3 .
Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
2 1 . Cheng ming, August 1 994, 2 8 .
Press, 1 9 86). 2 . The most authoritative work summarizing such factors is Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of
22. Wang Xijia, "Why Is the Relationship Between Cadres and the Masses S o Tense?"
Shehui (Society), November 1 99 1 , 1 8 .
Oklahoma Press, 1 99 1 ) .
2 3 . G u Haibing, " A Comprehensive Strategy i n Addressing China' s Rural Problems,"
3 . I t must b e noted that path dependency alone does not make all institutional innovation self-sustainable. Many institutional arrangements collapse after a long time
Journal of the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 5 (May 1 993) : 53.
because of the huge efficiency losses created by these arrangements. A typical example
2 4 . Wang, "Why I s the Relationship Between Cadres a n d the Masses So Tense?" 1 8 .
is state-owned enterprises in many developing and socialist countries.
2 5 . The Organic Law lays out the basic legal principles for VCs, defining their legal
4. See Anthony Dicks, "The Chinese Legal System : Reforms in the Balance," China Quarterly 1 1 9 (September 1 9 89) : 540-76; John Burns, "China ' s Governance: Political Reform in a Turbulent Environment," China Quarterly 1 1 9 (September 1 989): 480-5 1 8 ; and China Quarterly 1 4 1 (March 1 995), special issue o n Chinese laws. 5 . Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, "A Comprehen sive Analysis of S ocial Development During China's Transition," Sociological Studies, April 1 99 1 , 84. 6 . Falu yu shenghuo (Law and life) (Beijing), November 1 99 1 , 2 3 . 7 . Note that t h e numbers here do not a d d up to 1 00 percent. Democracy and (Shanghai) I ( 1 995): 6 .
Law
8 . Donald Clarke provides a survey of the enforcement of property rights in China in "The Execution of Civil Judgment in China," China Quarterly 1 4 1 (March 1 995) : 65-8 1 . 9 . William Alford, "Tasselled Loafers for Barefoot Lawyers: Transformation and
status and political roles . According to this law, a typical VC has three to seven members,
all
with a term of five years.
26. China Rural ,Villagers' Self-Government Research Group and the Chinese Research Society of Basic-Level Government, Study on the Election of Villagers ' Committees in
Rural China: Main Report (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Publishing, 1 993); hereafter, Main Report. 27. Ibid . , 76-77. 28. Zhang Xiaojin, "Changes in Peasants' Values During Reform," Shehui, August 1 992, 32. 29. Main Report, 9- 1 1 . 30. Kevin O ' Brien, "Implementing Political Reform i n China' s Villages," and Susan Lawrence, "Democracy, Chinese Style," A ustralian Journal of Chinese Affairs 32 (July 1 994): 33-67 and 69-76, respectively.
Andrew J. Nathan
11 CHINA'S CONSTITUTIONALIST OPTION Andrew J. Nathan
Andrew J. Nathan is professor of political science at Columbia University and chairman of the advisory committee of Human Rights Watch/Asia. Formerly director of the East Asian Institute at Columbia University, he is the author of Chinese Democracy (1985), China' s Crisis (1990), and China' s Transition ( 1997) and the coauthor of The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China' s Search for Security (1997).
Of the plausible scenarios for China' s future, a transition to constitu tionalism has been the least discussed. Commentators have debated the likelihood of social unrest, local separatism, a military coup, the emergence of a new Communist strongman, and a factional stalemate. Only a few Western specialists have taken seriously the possibility of a new Chinese constitutionalism. In previous writings I suggested the possibility of peaceful transition to democracy through empowerment of the National People' s Congress (NPC) and direct competitive elections to it. I Arthur Waldron recently argued that "the search for a constitu tional order to replace the dynasties has been the most important theme in twentieth-century China' s history . . . . When Deng dies, the search for constitutional order is certain to resume."2 The constitutionalist scenario may seem unlikely, but it gains credibility from the improbability of the alternatives. Civil disorder is the worst fear of most Chinese, and few stand to gain from it. Local separatism would do more economic harm than good to the southeastern coastal provinces that are viewed as the most likely to secede and would be opposed by the Chinese army . Some in Tibet and Xinjiang would like independence, but they lack the military power to seize it. Coup plotters would need broad support that would be difficult to marshal in a vast civil-military command apparatus in any but the direst of circumstances. No one in the new generation of leaders seems to have strongman potential. And a factional stalemate would be only an interim stage in the search for a solution to the problem of political authority.
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So the worst one can say against the constitutionalist scenario is that it seems too sensible to be a genuine option. To paraphrase Churchill on democracy, it may be less probable than anything but the alter natives . Recent writings by Chinese scholars both within China and abroad suggest what the constitutionalist option might look like if it came to pass.3 Constitutionalist reform in China is neither an ivory-tower idea nor predominantly a foreign suggestion . On the contrary, China' s twentieth century history is littered with constitutions and attempts to make them work.4 China adopted seven different constitutions between 1 9 1 1 and 1 949.5 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) berated the Kuomintang throughout the 1 940s for failing to implement constitutionalism. The democratic transition in Taiwan has been structured around the return to and later the revision of the 1 947 Republic of China Constitution. The People ' s Republic of China (PRC) has adopted four separate constitu tions : in 1 954, 1 97 5 , 1 9 7 8 , and 1 982. The four PRC texts are significantly different in some respects,6 but three common features are crucial . First, the Chinese constitutions establish a sovereign legislature, the NPC, that is supposed to embody popular sovereignty . There is no division of powers. The judicial and administrative branches report to the NPC. Either directly or through its Standing Committee, the NPC legislates; elects and recalls the top leaders of the other organs of state; supervises those officials' work, including the state budget and development plans; interprets the Constitution and laws; makes war, peace, and treaties ; and so on. The system is modeled on Stalin' s 1 93 6 Soviet Constitution, which in turn had its theoretical source in Marx ' s analysis of the 1 87 1 Paris Com mune. Marx saw the Commune as the correct political form for the period of the socialist transition from revolution to communism because it was a "proletarian dictatorship" that efficiently combined the legislature and the administration in one organ . S econd, under all four Chinese constitutions the sovereign legislature as well as the government agencies supposedly subordinate to it have been controlled by the Communist Party-again, in emulation of the Soviet model. The constitutions refer briefly to this fact, but do not describe the mechanisms of party control . As in the Soviet model, Communist Party leadership is exercised by cells in each government agency, and the party has sole authority over ideology, personnel decisions, and the instruments of coercion . Other techniques of party control are specific to particular institutions (e.g . , academia, the press, and the military). Those relating to the legislature and the courts are described in the relevant sections below. Third, all of the Chinese constitutions recognize fundamental political and civil rights. Yet they regard these rights as citizens ' rights rather than human rights : the state is permitted to define the rights of its
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citizens as it deems appropriate. Party control over the legislature and the courts allows the CCP to determine how these rights are defined, both on paper and in practice. Central party authorities do show concern for individual rights in some cases-particularly when local officials violate such rights in the process of disobeying central policies. Today, therefore, citizens can sometimes get satisfaction under the Admin istrative Litigation Law of 1 98 9 and the Compensation Law of 1 994. But there is no appeal when central policy itself limits, to the · point of disappearance, rights such as freedom of speech, association, assembly, and publication. Under Mao Zedong, dissident movements, from the Hundred Flowers of 1 957 to the group of young intellectuals who used the pseudonym Li Yizhe to mount a wall poster in Guangzhou in 1 974, called for implementing constitutional guarantees of political rights, parliamentary supremacy, and independence of the judiciary. Under Deng Xiaoping, constitutionalism was a major demand of Democracy Wall activists in 1 978 and 1 979 and student protesters in 1 986 and 1 989. And in 1 995, constitutionalism was a central theme of two petitioning movements targeting the NPC, one led by B ao Zunxin and other intellectuals, and the other by Xu Liangying and other scientists . But the call for constitutional revitalization and reform under Deng was not limited to dissidents. The resolution of the party' s epochal Third Plenum in December 1 9 7 8 stated, "In order to safeguard people' s democracy, i t i s imperative to strengthen the socialist legal system so that democracy is systematized and written into law in such . a way as to ensure the stability , continuity and full authority of this democratic system and these laws ."7 Deng Xiaoping stated in 1 9 80: We must make our constitution more perfect, more complete, and more accurate, so we can really guarantee that the people truly enjoy the power to manage the state organs at every level and the state enterprises and insti tutions , and that they enjoy their full citizens' rights . We must let the minority-inhabited areas carry out genuine minority regional autonomy, i mprove the people ' s congress system, and so on. And the principle that power is not allowed to b e too concentrated will be also expressed in the 8 Constitution.
The Preamble of the 1 982 Constitution calls for "high civilization and high democracy," in context a reference to full implementation of constitutional principles.9 The S tate Council ' s Human Rights White Paper of 1 99 1 says, "The Party does not take the place of the government in the state' s leadership system. The Party conducts its activities within the framework of the Constitution and the l aw and has no right to transcend the Constitution and the law." 1 0 Discussion of constitutional issues thus enjoys a strong official mandate. In the Chinese discourse, terms like "human rights," "political-
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structure reform," and "rule of law" are used more often than " constitu tionalism." But the issue is the same as that implied by the term "constitutionalism" in the West: whether and how China can move from a virtually lawless system to one in which governmental authority is legitimated by reference to popular will, and the powers of government organs and officials are effectively limited by law. I I Despite its modem history of constitutional attempts, China since the fall of the Qing i n 1 9 1 1 has never been governed under constitutionalism in this sense, with the exception of Taiwan in recent years . Yet the fact remains that for a variety of domestic and international reasons, the regime has promulgated not only a new constitution but thousands of national and local laws and regulations covering many aspects of the functioning of government, society, and the economy . 1 2 Limiting government by law appeals to CCP leaders as an answer to two problems : how to reestablish the party' s legitimacy in the eyes of society, and how to institutionalize power relations among agencies and levels of the vast party-state so as to provide for the smooth exercise of authority and avoid instances of arbitrary exercise of power that do not serve the interests of the regime. Since Deng Xiaoping' s reforms began, the authorities have licensed three waves of discussion of constitutional issues. The first · occurred during the drafting of the new Constitution that was promulgated in 1982. The second took place during preparation for Zhao Ziyang' s Political Report to the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987. The third has consisted of a series of studies and conferences in academia and the legislative branch of government since 1 990. 1 3 Research tasks were delegated to study groups in the central CCP organization and the NPC staff. Discussions also took place within study projects and at confer ences sponsored by university law departments, the Institute of Law of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and the national-level Association of Constitutional Studies and its hundred-odd local branches. Such internal debates have drawn less publicity than have instances of public dissidence, but they may have more impact in the long run. They have included some of the best-placed legal scholars in China, the people to whom the future leaders of the country will have to tum when they seek advice on the redesign of political institutions. Some members of the Chinese democracy movement now in exile participated in the pre- 1 989 phases of this debate and continue to develop their ideas abroad in parallel to the internal discussions. 1 4 The discussions as a whole have been labeled a "new constitutionalist movement." The discussions are interesting as much for their diagnoses of what is wrong with the current system as for their proposals for reform. The diagnoses often carry implications too bold to be stated explicitly under today ' s political constraints. This essay details four sets of diagnoses and proposals on which the debate has focused, and which seem likely to
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be high on the agenda of post-Deng reformers whether the CCP remains in power or not. Also described briefly are other constitutional-reform proposals that have been put forward. Although the status quo has not gone undefended in the debates, most legal specialists have swung to the view that government, including the ruling party, should be founded in the consent of the governed, and its powers should be limited by law . 1 5 Politicians have spoken less clearly. They are likely to shape their future positions according to the exigencies of the power struggle. As the government establishes an increasing number of legal rules around more and more of its activities, Chinese legal scholars believe that a peaceful path may open from dictatorship to constitutionalism. But even if the near-universal Chinese desire for a smooth transition were to be thwarted by the political dynamics of the transition, any new postrupture Chinese elite would still face the problem of redesigning political institutions . They would draw on the same models and probably on many of the same specialists who have shaped the debate during the past decade and a half. The debates thus provide a script for reform efforts that are likely to be made in the coming years no matter who comes to power. For those interested in comparative constitutional design, the debates suggest how people living under a Soviet-style constitution see its possibilities for evolutionary reform.
Empowering the National People's Congress Most Chinese constitutionalist thinkers agree that the key to a gradual transition from lawlessness to constitutionalism lies in empowering the NPC . 1 6 Chinese Communist Party control over the NPC i s exerted i n a variety of indirect and direct ways. Party members make up from one-half to over three-fourths of the membership of the NPC, including the top layer of NPC officials and the majority of its Standing Committee, Secretariat, committee heads, and Presidium (the temporary organ that sets the agenda and conducts the proceedings of NPC meetings), as well as the bulk of its staff. Party cells guide the work of all these organs and staff. Aside from the CCP ' s indirect influence through the dominating presence of its members, the central party organs directly "lead" the NPC through a series of unwritten yet formalized procedures. The central party organs instruct the NPC whom to elect to such posts as head of state, chair of the Military Affairs Commission, president of the Supreme People' s Court, and chief procurator. The party center controls the NPC ' s budget, sets its long-term work plan, determines the agenda of its meetings, drafts much of the legislation that the NPC considers (although some drafting work is assigned by the party center to
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government agencies or NPC staff), and helps guide bills through committees to the final stage of passage by the NPC plenum. The NPC ' s structure limits its ability to develop an autonomous ethos . It normally meets only once a year, usually in March, for 1 2 to 2 0 days; the S tanding Committee (consisting o f seven members) meets every two months for about a week. During sessions, the huge member ship of about 3 ,000 convenes in full only to vote. Debate and discussion are limited to caucuses of provincial delegations, who learn about one another ' s opinions from a newsletter circulated among the delegations. Nonetheless, the legislature has shown a growing measure of assertiveness. In 1 986, the Standing Committee refused to clear a draft of the B ankruptcy Law for presentation to the NPC plenum. It was returned to the relevant government agency for redrafting, then adopted in the next NPC session for limited trial implementation . In 1 989, a substantial number of delegates opposed a State Council-drafted bill relating to the delegation of certain legislative powers to the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, so the bill was postponed and later replaced by one that answered the members ' objections . In 1 992, only two-thirds of the deputies voted in favor of a proposal to build a huge dam on the Yangtze River at the Three Gorges ; approval was postponed. In 1994, 337 votes were cast against the Budget Law, with another 274 abstentions and invalid ballots. In 1 995, the Third Session of the Eighth NPC reached a new level of assertiveness by casting a total of 1 ,006 abstentions, spoiled ballots, and votes against the nomination of Jiang Chunyun as vice-premier, and by withholding a significant amount of support from the draft Central B ank and Education laws and from the work reports (reports of work performed over the past year and plans for future work) of the Supreme Procuratorate and the Supreme People' s Court. I n 1 996, hundreds o f delegates voted against or abstained from voting on the work reports of the procurator-general and the chief judge of the Supreme People' s Court. These events indicate that NPC members are taking their roles more seriously. They may also reflect the behind-the-scenes encouragement of the head of the NPC, Qiao Shi, who may be strengthening it to enlarge his role in the political succession to Deng. Finally, the NPC gains power as the duties given to it expand. The Congress passed 1 75 laws from 1 9 8 2 to 1 994 and is in the middle of a CCP-assigned five-year legislative plan to promulgate by the end of the century 1 52 additional laws deemed essential to China' s economic and administrative modern ization . 1 7 The accelerated production of laws places a growing burden on the expertise of the NPC staff and the energies of the delegates and brings them a larger role in drafting and revising legislation. None of the proposals publicly put forward for empowering the NPC touches explicitly on the problem of CCP control. Rather, each is aimed at strengthening the NPC so that it can play a larger role within the
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CCP-dominated structure of government. Between the lines, however, one often glimpses the idea that when the time is ripe the NPC will be ready to take on the full powers that the Constitution grants it. The specific proposals include the following : Reducing the size of the NPC. Scholars argue that the large size of the NPC makes it unable to discuss proposals in plenary meetings, while discussion in small groups provides no efficient means of communication among members . Since the delegates' groups are divided mostly by territorial administrative unit, the discussion is dominated by high-rank ing officials from the localities . Enormous NPC meetings place an extraordinary burden on staff. To increase the ability to communicate and the efficiency of proceedings, scholars have proposed reducing the membership to between 700 and 2,000. Lengthening sessions. Longer sessions would allow delegates to discuss proposed legislation more adequately. Strengthening the committee and staff systems. The 1982 Constitution established a system of six committees for the NPC ; two more were set up in 1 9 8 8 . The committees are supposed to help the Standing Committee with the study , review, and drafting of legislation and the supervision of other agencies of government. Scholars have proposed that the system be strengthened, though without suggesting specific methods of doing so. A related proposal is to establish (or strengthen, in the few cases where they exist) professional staff offices to help legislators at the national and provincial levels discharge their duties. Since few legislators are trained in the law, the staff would consist of legal specialists working as full-time professionals. I S Improving the qualifications of NPC members.l9 Scholars have proposed that fewer officials and model workers be chosen for the NPC and that more professional politicians, legal specialists, and social activists be selected. Another proposal has been to establish a training school for NPC members.20 Clarifying or imp roving the legislative process. Proposals include allowing NPC delegates to introduce legislation (they can do so in principle but never do in practice), ending CCP prereview of legislation, allowing more time for NPC debate over legislative proposals, opening NPC sessions to the public and the press , and making a practice of voting on each part of a bill separately rather than on the bill as a whole. The idea behind these proposals is to center legislative action within rather than outside the NPC. Increasing the NPC 's role in rule-making. Scholars argue that the boundary between the legislative process and the process of framing administrative regulation s is currently misplaced. B ecause the NPC meets so seldom, fewer rules are put through the legislative process than in most countries . Wide latitude is left for administrative agencies (the State Council, ministries and commissions, and others) to enact regula-
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tions that have the character of laws. This is referred to as "administra tive legislation" (xingzheng lifa). For example, the NPC has made almost no laws pertaining to military affairs, leaving the rule-making process almost entirely to the Military Affairs Commission (nominally a state agency, but in actuality a party organ). Scholars have proposed a clarification of the division of rule-making powers between NPC and administrative organs so as to give a larger role to the legislature. Introducing two chambers. S ome scholars argue that the NPC already has certain features of a two-chamber system and that these should be strengthened. The NPC and its Standing Committee share legislative power. Members of the Standing Committee are usually leaders of lower-level people ' s congresses or retired senior party, government, or military officials. In the current structure the jurisdictional line between the NPC and the Standing Committee is hard to draw, with the Standing Committee exercising more power than the NPC itself because it meets more often and has more influential members. One proposal is to elect an upper chamber from the provinces and provincial-level municipalities, autonomous regions , and Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions, with each of these units producing three members. A lower chamber of 300 to 400 members elected in proportion to population would represent the interests of the people as a whole. The division of powers between the two houses is not generally specified. Introducing the no-confidence vote. Scholars have proposed that if the work report of the government, Supreme People' s Court, or Supreme Procuratorate is not approved by the NPC either initially or after one round of revision the relevant official (premier, Supreme People' s Court president, or procurator-general) should resign . The common theme of these proposals is to increase the autonomy of the NPC and reduce the CCP ' s authority over it.
Invigorating Elections S cholars have also put forward proposals to invigorate the process by which the NPC is elected. If implemented, they would also help make the legislature more autonomous?l Of the four levels of people ' s congresses-national, provincial, county , and local-the two higher levels are indirectly elected, with NPC deputies elected by provincial congresses and provincial-congress deputies elected by county congresses. Local (village) people' s con gresses have been directly elected since the first elections in 1 954. The Electoral Law of 1 979 provided for direct election at the county level , as well as for multicandidate elections. With scattered exceptions in 1 979-80, the county-level elections have not turned into competitive campaigns owing to tight party control of nomination and election processes through the local election committees.
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The term "election" is an officially encouraged misnomer for the delegate-selection process, which is sometimes referred to more forthrightly as "production" (chansheng). At each level of people' s congresses, the standing committee organizes the selection process for the level directly below. The standing committee supplies lists of persons who must be chosen22 as well as lists of other candidates from whom the remaining delegates must be selected. Few of the candidates are well known to the electors . The process, when it is carried out at all , is almost always a formality . Reformers propose direct, competitive elections to the provincial- and national-level people' s congresses, believing that competitive elections would produce higher-quality delegates with closer ties to the people. Against the concern that this would create an out-of-control NPC, they argue that a more strenuous election process would be good for the CCP. Because the party faces no real competition and has most of the best potential candidates in its ranks, electoral reform would facilitate the advancement of the best CCP members as candidates. If the campaigns are competitive, the CCP members closest to the people will win. Specific proposals include the following: Improving the nomination process. Many argue that the greatest need for electoral reform lies in the nomination process . Although ten citizens can j oin to nominate a candidate, this seldom happens . Even when it does, the final list of nominees results from a CCP-controlled consulta tive process . Rarely are there candidates not approved by the party. (These details pertain to county-level people' s-congress elections, but the same types of procedures are used in elections at all levels, including the indirect elections to the NPC Standing Committee.) Reformers propose changes not in the rules but in their implementation, to allow genuine nominations from below with less CCP control over the process. Reducing malapportionment. The Chinese system intentionally gives urban districts four times as many delegates per voter as rural districts in the county-level congresses ; the imbalance is even worse at higher levels. This practice is j ustified by the Marxist theory that the urban proletariat is more progressive than rural peasants . Many reformers are nervous about granting too much power to rural people, whom they view as backward and pro-authoritarian. Political leaders fear that a farmer-dominated legislature would not support longstanding CCP policies unfavorable to rural residents. At least one scholar, however, has proposed reducing the rural-urban disparity to two-to-one.23 I am not aware of any proposal to move to a "one person, one vote" system. Shifting to single-seat districts. China' s legislative system has multi seat districts. At the county level, each district elects from one to three representatives to the people ' s congress. (Taiwan also has a multiseat-district system for its Legislative Yuan, but I have been unable to discover whether these two Chinese systems have a common
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historical origin.)24 S ome writers have suggested moving to a "small-dis trict" (that is, single-seat) system as a way of tightening representatives' links with their constituencies .25 This shift would undermine the "capping" system by which the CCP ensures representation of its own cadres and certain protected categories like women and national minorities. In order to achieve the same representational quotas, the party would have to work harder to nominate candidates attractive to the voters in particular districts . Beyond this, I do not know whether Chinese scholars have begun to look seriously at other institutional choices in the design of an electoral system, such as balloting rules, which could affect the party system and the stability of governments .26 Direct elections. Scholars have refuted the idea that China is too backward or too large for direct elections to the NPc . They argue that the idea of direct elections is found in the Marxist classics, and that Chinese citizens who have been educated in advanced socialist ideas for more than 40 years must have as strong a democratic consciousness as did the citizens of capitalist systems when the direct election of parliaments was implemented long ago. As for constituency size as an obstacle to direct elections, they point out that each of the current NPC delegates represents a population of 360,000-fewer than the 5 1 0,000 represented by each U . S . congressman . Competitive campaigns. Direct election would not be meaningful without reform of campaign procedures. The direct elections for local people's congresses feature an often perfunctory process of official "introductions" of candidates to voters, either on paper or at meetings. Reformers have suggested that the job be done better, that those who nominate candidates be allowed to speak for them, and that more time be spent on ' the process. The new procedures could build on the experience of competitive village-committee elections that have been going on since 1 987, an experiment that some senior leaders see as a first step in training rural residents for a more democratic system. Multipartism. Scholars have also proposed new legislation on parties that would allow multiparty competition, arguing that a party claiming to represent the people' s interests should submit to the test of com petitive elections. The CCP has advantages over other parties and could benefit from such elections, they contend. They argue that competition is a natural law and a dynamic of social development, not a monopoly of the bourgeoisie. Multiparty elections would keep the CCP on the right track and prevent the emergence of another Cultural Revolution.
Constitutional Supervision The Constitution gives the NPC the power to "supervise the enforcement of the Constitution" (Article 62) and empowers the NPC Standing Committee "to interpret the Constitution and supervise its
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enforcement" and "to interpret statutes" (Article 67).27 These powers of supervision and interpretation are . not equivalent to constitutional review in a system of divided powers . The NPC would hardly declare unconstitutional a law it had made itself. Nor would it make sense for the NPC to declare acts of the CCP unconstitutional, since the party controls the NPC, or to rule out of order the acts of other state organs that are themselves implementing the orders of the CCP. Rather, "supervising enforcement" (jiandu shishi) means supervising the implementation or carrying out of the Constitution. Nominally, the NPC does this by hearing reports from the other organs of government. It has seldom exercised its supervisory power in a more concrete way. A supervision law (jiandu fa), which would detail the means by which the NPC can exercise its supervisory power, exists in draft form, but its contents are not public. Nor does the NPC Standing Committee often exercise its power of constitutional interpretation. It has responded occasionally to requests for interpretation from lower-level people' s congresses. It has also issued a small number of "internal interpretations" (neibu jieshi) in response to requests from other government agencies. Such clarifications have the character of ad hoc problem solving, rather than formal constitutional interpretations. Other agencies often substitute for the NPC Standing Committee in interpreting statutes, chiefly because the job has become too vast for one committee to perform. For example, the 1 980 Marriage Law stipulates that the breakdown of spousal feelings is a reason for approval of divorce, but the lower courts have raised questions about how to measure such breakdown. The Legal Committee of the NPC was unable to answer owing to lack of expertise. The Supreme People' s Court filled the gap , issuing a brochure answering more than a hundred questions on marital breakdown. The Court has done similar work for the Civil Procedure Law of 1 99 1 , the Inheritance Law of 1 9 8 5 , and other laws.28 These activities seem to go beyond the constitutional authority of the Supreme People' s Court to "supervise the administration of justice by the local people ' s courts" (Article 1 27); rather, the Court got involved because the NPC Standing Committee abdicated authority. The under staffed courts themselves often yield authority to administrative agencies, which have yet more personnel and expertise.29 In making these diagnoses, scholars imply that the NPC ' s constitu tional-supervision function should be strengthened. To this end, some have recommended the establishment of a specialized organ to exercise the powers of constitutional interpretation and supervision. They argue that the NPC S tanding Committee lacks the time and expertise to perform these functions, and point out that most foreign countries relegate them to speciiil organs of one kind or another. Three proposals have been floated. The first is to establish a subsidiary committee under
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the Standing Committee to advise it in interpreting the Constitution .30 The second is to establish a separate constitutional-supervision committee within the NPC, equal in rank to the Standing Committee and able to supervise all organs of state including the Standing Committee itself. The third is to establish a constitutional court with authority to reverse the actions even of the NPC, in effect creating a separation of powers and broadening the constitutional-supervision function to include constitutional review. Only the first of these proposals could be put into place without a constitutional amendment. The discussion draws attention to the absence of a locus within the state apparatus where problems of jurisdiction and other intrastate issues can be solved. It also implicitly identifies the problem of CCP dominance as an obstacle to the lawlike functioning of the state. In addressing this issue, scholars have debated whether the CCP could be subjected to constitutional supervision . On the one hand, the party might be considered not subj ect to the Constitution, since CCP leadership is listed as a prin c iple of state power in the Constitution' s Preamble. On the other, the academic consensus is that the party is in principle subject to the Constitution, both because the Constitution lists political parties among the entities that it governs, and by virtue of the party ' s charter, which calls for it to obey the Constitution. But scholars recognize that it is impractical to exercise constitutional supervision over the party now. They envision a transitional stage during which the NPC might review seleCted CCP documents and notify the party of any contradic tions with the Constitution so that the party can rectify them itself.
Judicial Independence The Chinese Constitution states that people' s courts "shall . . . exercise j udicial power independently and are not subject to interference by administrative organs, public organizations or individuals" (Article 1 26).31 This is not a provision for what those in the West understand by the term "judicial independence"-that is, the protection of each individual j udge from interference in the lawful exercise of judicial authority. Literally, it holds that the courts should "independently carry out the j udging power" (duli xingshi shenpanquan). Chinese scholars interpret this to mean that the court as an organization should do its job exclusively, rather than having other organs share in the function, as occurred, for example, during the Cultural Revolution . There is debate about the scope of the term "public organizations" (shehui tuanti, literally, "social groups") that appears in Article 1 26. The question is whether the CCP is included among these entities that constitutionally cannot interfere with the work of the courts. The dominant interpretation is that the category does not include the party. Scholars note that the 1 98 2 phrasing is different from that of 1 954,
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which stated, "People ' s courts independently carry out judgment, following only the law" (Artic;le 76). In listing the entities that are prohibited from interfering in judicial processes, the 1 982 Constitution seems to make room for groups that are not listed-namely, the CCP and the NPC-to get involved. In light of this reasoning and the fact that the Consti Involvement of the tution mentions the principle of "Party leadership" in its Preamble, involvement of CCP in the work of the CCP in the work of the courts is not the courts is not deemed interference, but rather constitu deemed interference, tionally sanctioned leadership. but rather Party "leadership" takes three forms. 32 constitutionally One is collective decision making by each sanctioned court under the guidance of its party com leadership. mittee. Under the "report and approval system," authority for court judgments is vested in a j udicial committee of each court (shenpan weiyuanhui) that is led by the court president and vice-president, who are invariably also officials of that court's party group or cell.33 Thus judicial independence in China is not the indepen dence of individual judges, but the independence of any given court as an organ. As one sitting judge stated, "If the [court] leaders want to change my decision, I have no power to interfere [ganshe] .,,34 In the Chinese judicial system, then, it is a judge's stiCking to his own decision, rather than court authorities' changing it, that constitutes "interference. " The second form of CCP "leadership" is the "asking for instruction" system, by which lower courts are expected to bring important or complicated cases to higher courts to obtain instructions before handing down a j udgment. Ostensibly aimed at avoiding the reversal of judgments , the process provides the opportunity for the party organs located in higher-level courts to decide the outcome of important cases in lower courts . Third, local CCP authorities (who are also administrative authorities) often issue directives to local courts on how to decide individual cases. The practice is of questionable constitutionality but is built into the system of party leadership. At each level of the administrative hierarchy (say, in a city), the local party committee has a subsidiary organ known as a political-legal committee (zhengfa weiyuanhui), which brings together the heads of the police, procuratorate, court, department of justice, state-security department, and civil-affairs department so that they can coordinate their work. As part of such coordination, the courts are required to seek the committee' s guidance in deciding important or difficult cases (zhongda fuza anjian) . If opinions are divided or the case is especially crucial, the political-legal committee may refer the issue to
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the full party committee at that level of the hierarchy . Since nearly all the key personnel in the court system are CCP members, it has never been deemed inappropriate for them to accept party direction of their work. The courts not only are led by the CCP but are constitutionally subordinate to the legislative branch. The Constitution says the courts are "responsible to" their respective people' s congresses (Article 1 28). A people' s congress cannot constitutionally interfere in a specific case, but it can take a number of steps to force a court to reverse itself, from requiring a report on a case, through organizing its own investigation into the suspected mishandling of a case, to cashiering and ordering the indictment of judicial officials who criminally mishandle a case. The frequency with which this happens is uncertain, but improper inter ference in court cases by people' s congresses was sufficiently problem atic that the NPC Standing Committee in 1 989 issued a decision stressing the limits on such interference, presumably as a reminder to lower-level people' s congresses .35 S ince local people's congresses are controlled by local CCP authorities, this seems to be a second channel for party control of the courts. Scholars and practicing judges have called for greater independence for the courts because of flaws they perceive in the functioning of the court system. Much has been made in the West of the failure of Chinese courts to give satisfaction to foreign plaintiffs in business cases. Chinese legal professionals point to similar problems for domestic plaintiffs . The local courts often fail to protect the interests of out-of-town Chinese plaintiffs in business cases . Judgments, if obtained, are frequently unenforceable.36 The Administrative Litigation Law and Compensation Law created a volume of suits from individual citizens that placed increasing pressure on the judicial system. But Chinese judges report that the reluctance of local courts to rule against local ad ministrators has led to widespread disappointment at the ineffectiveness of these laws. The courts are used more to enforce the decisions of administrative organs against citizens than to defend the rights of citizens against administrative organs.37 Proposals for improving the functioning of the courts are modest. The largest class of proposals involves improving the professional quality of judges and establishing better remuneration and more secure tenure. Judges in China, as in other civil-law jurisdictions, are civil servants. Their ranks are equivalent to those of various other bureaucrats across the system. Their incomes tend to be less than those of factory workers, educators, doctors, and government officials in many fields because of the lack of outside opportunities, bonuses, and supplements. In 1 995, the NPC adopted new legislation concerning judges.38 Along with a companion law on the procuratorate, the Judges Law was designed to fill a gap in the personnel system created when employees
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of courts and procuratorates were left out of the new civil-service system. The law mandates minimum qualifications for judges and specifies circumstances under which they can be removed from office. In these small ways it increases their independence. It states further that anyone who interferes with j udges ' exercise of their duties will be prosecuted according to law. But there is no law under which to prosecute such people, nor does the Judges Law define interference. The law does not solve the problem of inadequate remuneration ; does not create a standard of j udicial conduct; and supplies too many and too broadly stated causes for which judges can be dismissed. Some judicial reformers nonetheless see the Judges Law as the start of a trend toward independent individual judges who have job security, professional prestige, and adequate remuneration. Other proposals relating to the judiciary include shifting more of the burden of evidence collection from judges to litigants, thus putting judges in a more neutral position, improving their efficiency, and assigning a more proactive role to litigants ' attorneys ; ending the system whereby judges get approval for their rulings from their administrative superiors ; and reducing the practice of lower courts ' seeking directives on specific cases from higher courts .39 A proposal has also been made to do away with the police power to sentence people under the "administrative punishment" system of labor reeducation. By moving many acts now deemed noncriminal into the criminal category, this would increase the number of cases that would have to be taken to court for judgment. The central point of these reforms would be to strengthen the autonomy of individual judges in trying. cases. More boldly, some Chinese legal workers who view the arrangement by which people' s congresses can intrude into judicial affairs as invasive have argued that the NPC ' s power over courts should be limited to reviewing their annual reports. This proposal approaches advocacy of separation of powers.
Other Proposals Aside from the proposals described so far, the constitutionalist debate has raised a number of other significant issues.4o The legal force of the Preamble to the Constitution. The debate over the legal force of the Preamble is in effect a debate over whether Deng Xiaoping' s "four basic principles" (socialism, people' s democratic dictatorship, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, and Communist Party leadership), which are contained therein, are legally binding. Some scholars hold that the Preamble has legal force. A second view is that while the Preamble as a whole does not have legal power since parts of it are simply assertions of historical facts or goals, some stipulations in it have legal authority, including the four principles . A third view
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holds that the Preamble does not have legal authority because it is not written as a formal article. Rather, it is a statement of purposes and values, compliance with which is optional for law-abiding citizens who are not CCP members. Peking University professor Gong Xiangrui has gone so far as to argue, "The Constitution is, after all, not the Party' s constitution . The spirit o f the Preamble i s i n conflict with the principles ,, of constitutionalism. 41 The implication of this position is that both state institutions and citizens ' rights should be freed from party control . Citizens ' rights versus human rights.42 Many scholars argue that the constitutional notion of citizens' rights should be changed to a notion of human rights as a w ay of symbolizing the importance of individual rights . Legal specialists have argued for years that certain laws-includ ing the Public Demonstrations Law and the State Secrets Law, both passed in 1 989-should be revised to protect such rights. The difficulty of finding the right balance between protecting and limiting rights has delayed the adoption of a press law that has been undergoing drafting on and off for more than a decade. A revision of the Criminal Procedure Law in March 1 996 increased the impartiality of judges, improved defense lawyers ' access to clients and evidence, limited detention without charge to one month, and improved other procedural safeguards for defendants , at least on paper. Proposals have also been made to expunge crimes of counterrevolution from the criminal code and to eliminate the power of the police to imprison people for up to three years without trial ("administrative detention"). Separation of powers. Since the top leadership has ruled this subject out of bounds, it is seldom discussed explicitly. But some scholars privately favor greater separation of powers . They view the Paris Commune model of single-branch government (the historic root of the current system) as an immature one that was adopted under conditions of civil war in a single city and lasted only a few weeks. When implemented in a large country over an extended period of time, it confuses the division of labor between the legislative and executive branches, allows an unhealthy growth of executive powers, and undermines the ability of the legislature to supervise the executive. Some scholars see a germ of separation of powers in the provision in the current NPC Organic Law that states that members of the NPC Standing Committee cannot hold full-time offices in state administrative organs. A similar provision governs members of standing committees of local people' s congresses. Subjecting the Military Affairs Commission to the authority of the NPC. The Chinese military is led by a Military Affairs Commission. The Commission is a party organ, although it has a second, nominal, identity in the C onstitution as a state organ. It promulgates its own laws and regulations without the involvement of the NPC. Some scholars argue that this exercise of legislative power violates the Constitution;
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some have suggested amending the Constitution to state more strongly that the Military Affairs Commission is subordinate to the NPc.43 This would be a move toward shifting the military from party to state control, a process referred to in Chinese as "statization" (guojiahua) of the military. However, civilian control of the military through the Military Affairs Commission is already weak, and some scholars worry that it would be even weaker under the NPC unless the NPC were much more vigorous than it is now. Federalism. China is a unitary state but has some quasi-federalist traditions. There was a federalist movement in the early twentieth century. The Constitution and the Regional Autonomy Law for Minority Nationalities ( 1 984) provide for the nominal autonomy of minority inhabited areas. Deng Xiaoping' s idea of "one country, two systems" for Hong Kong and Taiwan also has federalist elements, and is reflected in the inclusion in the 1 982 Constitution of Article 3 1 , which provides for the establishment of Special Administrative Regions. Under the reforms, provinces have developed substantial economic, fiscal, and policy-making powers. Although originally delegated by the center, these powers have become vested rights that the center seems unable to reclaim. All these relationships have led to tension between substantive quasi-federalism and the formal unitary system. Some Chinese scholars think that making the system more explicitly federal would help clarify Han-minority relations and center-province relations. Abroad, Yan Jiaqi has argued this position most strongly.44 Within China, scholars tend to avoid the term "federalism. " Nevertheless, several have argued for new, clearer definitions of central and local powers , or for a "financial apportionment committee" under the State Council or the NPC Standing Committee to resolve issues of central-local revenue sharing and interprovincial financial transfers. Since the NPC is made up of local CCP elites, strengthening the role of the NPC would likely lead to increased articulation of provincial interests . In contrast to a national breakup , which would be inimical to constitutionalism, the lawful institutionalization of power sharing between the center and the regions would be a move in the direction of a more constitutionalist regime.
Leninism and the Rule of Law Although individually modest, the proposals reviewed here array themselves around the issue of the role of the CCP. The diagnoses of problems and proposals for change are cautious and technical, but they make clear that the authors see China as far from constitutionalism, and that they see the Leninist one-party system as the main obstacle to the rule of law. In 1 5 years of legal reform, the Leninist core has developed mechanisms to bargain with, consult, and persuade other actors in an increasingly complex society. But power is neither grounded in popular
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consent nor limited by laws. As Carol Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao argue, China under Deng has been a form of "bureaucratic authoritarianism."45 But the constitutional debates also give us a glimpse of the pressures for change that are building. The legal scholars themselves are not a powerful constituency , although they have influence as possessors of expertise that the leaders need in order to fix problems in the system. But the party authorities are beginning to discover that reliable and predictable processes of rule-making, adjudication, and enforcement will constrain them as well as other actors. As marketization erodes the old techniques of control, the leaders have turned to law to direct lower-lev el officials and constrain independent economic actors. Lawyers, judges, law professors, and NPC staff are pointing out that legal institutions cannot perform the tasks they are charged with unless they are given more autonomy . As one Chinese scholar put it, "When conditions are ripe, we should move from conceiving of [our government] as a 'people' s democratic dictatorship' and start calling it a 'people' s democratic constitutionalism' o r a ' socialist constitutionalism."'46 There are also more directly political reasons why some CCP leaders have not just tolerated, but promoted, the discussion of constitutionalism. Politicians associated with the NPC (formerly Peng Zhen and Wan Li, now Qiao S hi) want to enlarge the NPC' s power in order to increase their own influence. The regime is also influenced by foreign pressure and example with respect to investment law, tax law, contract law, court procedures , intellectual property rights, human rights law, and so on.47 Constitutionalism also has opponents. If one faction would benefit from an increase in the NPC ' s strength, others would benefit from a continuation of the status quo . While law in some ways improves the functioning of the economy, many entrepreneurs and local communities have learned to profit through law evasion and personal connections. The experience of postcommunist Russia is often cited as evidence that China cannot afford to democratize. To be sure, the process of transition to constitutionalism has been turbulent almost everywhere, and China' s earlier history of failed experiments is not encouraging . But constitutionalism-which is not necessarily democracy American-style or Russian-style-is one of the most conservative options for change in a situation where stasis seems impossible. In its transition from utopia to development, the regime has not found a way to replace revolutionary legitimacy with legal-democratic legitimacy .48 Constitutionalization would serve the CCP' s interests in legitimation and stability . If the reform proposals reviewed in this essay were implemented, China would still be a dominant one-party system with weak separation of powers and weak federalism. Transitions occur when there is a convergence of interest by crucial actors, a situation that can come out of a stalemate as well as a collapse of power or a civil w ar. The example of Taiwan shows how an
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authoritarian regime that faces no imminent domestic threat may nonetheless initiate far-reaching changes from above when legitimacy and succession crises intersect to weaken the regime' s internal cohesion and its societal power, Now that Deng Xiaoping is not available to make final decisions, the NPC or its Standing Committee may be tempted to try to make them. An attempt by some members of the NPC Standing Committee to call a meeting in order to countermand the martial-law decree of 20 May 1 989 failed. In the future, however, with more of the elders dead and their successors less able than before to maintain a common front, it will be more difficult to prevent the NPC from exercising powers that the Constitution says it has. Post-Deng leaders ' search for legitimation could even lead them to take the initiative to call NPC direct elections and implement some of the other proposals that have been put forward. Such measures might be taken by the immediate post-Deng transitional generation of Jiang Zemin and his rivals, or by their successors. They would have reason to do so if none of them is able to establish the authority to rule alone. As the NPC' s power grew, the CCP would remain on the scene and probably would retain power. But it would gradually become more accountable to the electorate and share more power with increasingly assertive legislative and j udicial institutions. If the efforts of China' s constitutionali st thinkers and the officials to whom they report are successful, they may contribute to the first and perhaps only negotiated transition with constitutional continuity in a Soviet-style system. Just as China under Deng established a model for an economic "soft landing" in the reform of a socialist economy, so may post-Deng leaders discover a smooth route for the transition from socialist dictatorship to a Chinese brand of constitutional democracy. NOTES I am grateful to Lu Feng for research assistance, and to Cai Dingjian, R . Randle Edwards, Gong Renren, Louis Henkin, Kevin O ' B rien, Sun Zhe, Arthur Waldron, and Zhou Qiang for comments and information.
I. "Is China Ready for Democracy?" Journal of Democracy 1 (Spring 1 990) : 50-6 1 , reprinted in Larry Diamond and Marc F . Plattner, eds ., The Global Resurgence of Democracy (B altimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 993); "China's Path from Communism," Journal of Democracy 4 ( April 1 993): 3 0-42. 2 . Arthur Waldron, "China' s Coming Constitutional Challenges," Orbis 39 (Winter 1 995): 26. 3. Much of the information presented here was gleaned from seminar meetings and papers associated with a three-year study project on "China and Constitutionalism" conducted at Columbia University from 1 9 9 2 to 1 995, as well as from informal discussions with participants in the project. The project was supported by the Henry Luce Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the United Daily News Foundation. A series of papers from the project is being published over the course of several years in the Journal of Asian Law (formerly Journal of Chinese Law), starting with the Spring 1 995 issue.
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4. See, e.g., Andrew J. Nathan, Peking Politics. 1918-1923: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 976) ; and "Chinese Democracy: The Lessons of Failure," Journal of Contemporary China 4 (Fall 1 993): 3-1 3 . 5 . Y u Haocheng enumerates 1 2 altogether, starting with the Nineteen Articles o f 1 9 1 1 . He includes constitutions i n force in certain regions under the Communists before 1 949 and the People' s Republic of China' s Common Program, which preceded its four constitutions proper. Yu Haocheng, "Ershi shiji de Zhongguo xianfa" (Constitutions in twentieth-century China), working paper, China and Constitutionalism ProJect, Columbia University, Spring 1 995. 6 . R . Randle Edwards, Louis Henki n, a n d Andrew J . Nathan, Human Rights in Contemporary China (New York : Columbia University Press, 1 9 86), ch. 3. 7 . "Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 1 1 th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," Beijing Review, 29 December 1 978, 1 4 . 8 . "Dang he guojia lingdao zhidu de gaige" (Reforms in the leadership systems o f the party and state), in Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected works of Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1 994), 2 : 33 9 . 9 . Quotations from t h e 1 9 8 2 Constitution are from the official English translation published in Beijing Review, 27 December 1 982, 1 0-29 . 1 0 . "Human Rights in China," Beijing Review, 4- 1 0 November 1 9 9 1 , 1 4 . 1 1 . Louis Henkin, "Elements of Constitutionalism," working paper, Occasional Paper Series, Center for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University, August 1 994. 1 2 . Ronald C . Keith, China 's Struggle for the Rule of Law (New York: SI. Martin 's, 1 994); Albert Hung-yee Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People 's Republic of China (Singapore: Butterworth Asia, 1 992); Stanley Lubman, "Introduction: The Future of Chinese Law," China Quarterly 1 4 1 (March 1 995): 1 -2 1 . 1 3 . Overviews o f the discussion are contained i n Zhe Sun, "The Debate over Constitutionalis m in China: 1 97 9-94" (unpubl. ms., Columbia University, May 1 994) ; and Li Lin, "Zhongguo xianfa yanjiu de xianzhuang yu zhanwang" (The situation and prospects of constitutional research in China), working paper, China and Constitutionalism Project, Columbia University, April 1 994. On the 1 987 intraparty discussions, see Chen Yizi, "The Decision Process Behind the 1 986- 1 989 Political Reforms," in Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao, eds . , Decision-Making in Deng 's China: Perspectives from Insiders (Armonk, N . Y . : M.E. Sharpe, 1 995), 1 3 3-52. 1 4. Constitutionalism-related issues have been discussed in aii the main exiie publications : such as China Spring, Beijing Spring, and Democratic China. In addition, a San Francisco-based newsletter called Zhongguo xianzheng (China's constitutionalism newsletter) began publication in April 1 994. 15. See, e.g., X.L. Ding, The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 994) ; and Yan Sun, The Chinese Reassessment ()f Socialism, 1 9 76-1992 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 995). 1 6. This section draws chiefly on Cai Dingjian, Zhongguo renda zhidu (The Chinese people ' s congress system) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1 992); Cang Lin, "Zhongguo lifa gaige de jige wenti" (Several issues in the reform of China' s legislation), working paper, China and Constitutionalism Project, Columbia University, Spring 1 995; Cao Siyuan, Siyuan wenxuan (Selected works of [Cao) Siyuan) (Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe, 1 995); and Kevin J. O ' B rien, R�form Without Liberalization: China 's National People 's Congress and the Politics ()f Institutional Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1 990), ch. 7. On legislative assertiveness, see also O'Brien, "Chinese People ' s Congresses and Legislative Embeddedness: Understanding Early Organizational Development," Comparative Political Studies 27 (April 1 994): 80- 1 09, and "Agents and Remonstrators: Role Accumulation by Chinese People' s Congress Deputies," China Quarterly 1 3 8 (June 1 994) : 3 59-80; an d Murray Scot Tanner, "The Erosion of Communist
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Party Control over Lawmaking in China," China Quarterly 1 3 8 (June 1 994) : 3 8 1 -403 , and "How a Bill Becomes a Law in China: Stages and Processes in Lawmaking," China Quarterly 1 4 1 (March 1 995): 39-64. Also see Minxin Pei ' s chapter in this collection. 1 7 "Speech by Qiao Shi at a Meeting of All Circles in the Capital Marking the 40th : Foundmg Anniversary of the People' s Congress (on September 1 5 , 1 994)," in Foreign Broadcast InformatIOn ServIce (FBIS), Daily Report: China, 19 September 1 994, 27; legIslatIve plan from Jiang Ping, "Chinese Legal Reform: Achievements, Problems and Prospects," Journal of Chinese Law 9 (Spring 1 995): 67-75. 18 . Zhang Zhenge, "Renda lifa banzi ying zhuanzhihua he zhuanjiahua" (The NPC's . leglslaltve staff should be professionalized and specialized), Faxue (Legal studies) 6 ( 1 99 1 ) .'
�m
1 9 . Kevin J. O ' B rien and Lianjiang Li, "Chinese Political Reform and the Question of 'Deputy QUality,'" China Information 8 (Winter 1 993-94) : 20-3 1 . 20. �he Sun, "Rule by the Party vs. Rule of the Law: The Communist Party and the PerspectIve of Constitutionalism in the People' s Republic of China" (unpub!. ms., Columbia University, May 1 994), 9, citing Renda tongxun (NPC bulletin) 2 ( 1 993): 24; and Guo Linmao, "On Current Implementation of the Constitution and the Counter measures," Faxue zazhi (Jurisprudence magazine) 4 ( 1 993): 1 9-20. 2 1 . This section is based on Li Lin, "Zhongguo xianfa yanjiu," 1 2- 1 6 ; Cang Lin, " Zhongguo lifa gaige," 2 l ff.; and Wang Liqun, "Zhongguo xuanju zhidu de juxian jiqi wanshan" (The limitations of China's electoral system and its improvement), Renda yanjiu (NPC studies) 1 1 ( 1 992): 8- 1 2 . 2 2 . This is called the "capping" (daimao) system, a s certain candidates are "capped" to be elected. It allows the party to assure that its own top officials are chosen and that desired quotas are achieved of females, national minorities, "democratic personages," and other categories. Cai Dingjian, Zhongguo renda zhidu, 1 42-44. 2 3 . Wang Liqun, "Zhongguo xuanju zhidu." 24, See Andrew J . Nathan, "The Legislative Yuan Elections in Taiwan: Consequences of the Electoral System," Asian Survey 33 (April 1 993): 424--3 8 . 25. Renda yanjiu I I ( 1 992): 7 . I a m unable t o identify the author and title of this artIcle because I have a partial copy, not the original source. 26, See, e.g" Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determmants of Electoral Systems (New Haven, Con n . : Yale University Press, 1 989), 27. This section draws chiefly on Tao Ren, "Zhongguo de xianfa jiandu he xianfa . jleshi' : (Constitutional supervision and interpretation in China), working paper, China and ConstltutlOnaitsm Project, Columbia University, Spring 1 994. 28. Susan Finder, "The Supreme People' s Court of the People ' s Republic of China," Journal of Chinese Law 7 (Fall 1 993): 164--90. 29. Anthony R. Dicks, "Compartmentalized Law and Judicial Restraint: An Inductive View of Some Jurisdictional Barriers to Reform," China Quarterly 1 4 1 (March 1 995): 82- 1 09 . 30. In 1 9 8 9 , some N P C deputies submitted a proposal t o establish such a committee to help the Standing Committee review constitutional issues ; it was never listed on the agenda of the session. Renmin ribao (People ' s daily), overseas edition, 30 October 1 9 89, I . 3 ! . This section i s based chiefly on Qiang Zhou, "Judicial Independence in China," working paper, China and Constitutionalism Project, Columbia University, Spring 1 995. 32. Besides Zhou, see Shao-chuan Leng and Hungdah Chiu, Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China: Analysis and Documents (Albany, N , Y . : State University of New York Press, 1 9 85); and Finder, "Supreme People' s Court," 1 45-224.
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3 3 . The judicial committee is a professional committee. Issues considered political are dealt with by the court ' s party cell. Thus, for example, the head of the personnel section of the court sits on the party-cell committee but not on the judicial committee. All or nearly all the members of the j udicial committee are normally party members. The head of the judicial committee is the court president (yuanzhang), who is also normally the court ' s party secretary (dangshuji). 34. Interview with the author, New York, 7 March 1 99 5 . 3 5 , Peng Chong, report on behalf of t h e N P C Standing Committee t o the full NPC, 28 March 1 989, in Zhonghua renmin gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui gongbao (Gazette of the Standing Committee of the PRC National People' s Congress), 5 May 1 989, 1 0 8 . 36, Donald C . Clarke, "The Execution of Civil Judgments in China," China Quarterly 1 4 1 (March 1 995): 65-8 1 . 37. Yang Haikun, "Baituo xingzheng susong zhidu kunjing de chulu" (The way out of the dilemmas of the administrative litigation system), Zhongguo faxue (Chinese jurisprudence) 3 (March 1 994): 55-56; Yang Haikun, "Wei ' sifa duli' gu yu hu" (Calling out for judicial independence), Fazhi ribao (Legal daily), 23 May 1 994, I ; Susan Finder, "Like Throwing an Egg Against a Stone? Administrative Litigation in the People ' s Republic of China," Journal of Chinese Law 3 (Summer 1 9 89): 1-28. 38. "The PRC Law on Judges," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report: China, 21 March 1 995, 32-37 . 3 9 . See, e.g., Chen Guiming, "Minshi susungzhong fayuan zhiquan de ruohua ji qi xiaoying" (The weakening power of the courts in civil suits and the response), Faxue yanjiu (Jurisprudence Research) 6 ( 1 992): 6 1 -66; Guo Chunyu and Wu Jinhe, "Meihekou fayuan shixing zhushen faguan fuzezhi" (The chief judge responsibility system implemented in Meihekou court), Minzhu yu fazhi (Democracy and legal system) 12 ( 1 994) : 30-3 1 . 40. Except as otherwise noted, this section draws on interviews with participants i n the China and Constitutionalism Project and on Li Lin, "Zhongguo xianfa yanjiu." 4 1 . Gong Xiangrui, "Zhongguo xuyao shenme yang de xianfa lilun" (What kind of constitutional theory does China need?), Faxue (Law science monthly), to April 1 989, 6. On the Preamble, see Xu Xiuyi and Xiao Jinquan, "A Summary of Recent Theoretical Discussions of M'\ior Constitutional Issues in China," Social Sciences in China 2 (Summer 1 986): 1 2- 1 3 . 4 2 . Albert H.Y. Chen, "Developing Theories of Rights and Human Rights in China," in Raymond Wacks. ed., Hong Kong, China and 1 997: Essays in Legal Theory (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1 993), 1 23-49. 43. See Jeremy T. Paltiel, "Civil-Military Relations in China: An Obstacle to Constitutionalism?" Journal of Chinese Law 9 (Spring 1 995): 35-.D5 . 44. Yan Jiaqi, Lianbang Zhongguo gouxiang (A conception for a federal China) (Hong Kong: Mingbao chuban she, 1 992). 45. Hamrin and Zhao, eds., Decision-Making in Deng 's China, xxi-xlviii. 46. Du Gangjian, "Cong zhuanzheng dao xianzheng" (From dictatorship to constitution alism), Zhejiang xuekan (Zhejiang journal) 3 ( 1 992): 39. 47. Andrew J. Nathan, "Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy," China Quarterly 1 39 (September 1 994): 622-43 ; Pitman B . Potter, "Foreign Investment Law in the People's Republic of China: Dilemmas of State Control," China Quarterly 141 (March 1 995): 1 55-85; James V . Feinerman, "Chinese Participation in the International Legal Order: Rogue Elephant or Team Player?" China Quarterly 1 4 1 (March 1995): 1 86-2 1 0 . 48. I refer t o t h e classic statement on the legitimacy crisis o f communism b y Richard Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., Change in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 970), 33-1 1 6 .
David S . G . Goodman
12 CAN CHINA CHANGE? David S.c. Goodman
David S. G. Goodman is director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of Technology, Sydney, A ustralia. His most recent publications include China' s Provinces in Reform: Class, Community and Political Culture (1 997) and, with Gerald Segal, China Rising: National ism and Interdependence (1997).
Lee Kuan Yew, the late Deng Xiaoping, and others have propounded the view that economic modernization based on political authoritarianism is a superior, Asian alternative to liberal democracy for the development of any society. l This view is based on the premise that there are cultural differences between China (and Asia in general) and the West. Moreover, it holds that there are institutional, organizational, and ideological constraints that not only preclude democratization but also make democracy an inappropriate political form for Asian states. This perceived clash of values has been part of a sometimes fierce "contest for Asia" over "Asian values" as "veIl as the verj definition of Pl.sia, both among Asian nations within the region and between Asia and the rest of the world.2 Andrew Nathan and Minxin Pei, in their contributions to this collection, demonstrate lucidly and convincingly that arguments citing the impossibility and inappropriateness of democratic forms in China leave much to be desired. The People's Republic of China (PRC) may not become a liberal democracy, or it may not liberalize any further, but any limits to democratization will be due to factors other than those suggested by the Deng Xiaopings of the world. Economic reform and growth since 1 97 8 have not occurred without fundamental political change. Although there are clearly limits in terms of both the extent and the intensity of China' s political transformation during the reform era, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been prepared to trade shares in power for economic growth. In the process, politics has become increasingly secularized,3 and there is now a recognizably democratic
discourse in China.4 In addition, China ' s phenomenal growth rates have already yielded an organizationally complex society that stands in contrast to the organizationally simple society of the Mao years when the CCP was the sole social, political, economic, and cultural hierarchy.s Although economic growth has not yet led to demands from new entrepreneurs and managers for increased or different shares of political power, society could now afford to support democratic institutions.6 At the same time, neither the precise form nor the process of democratization is preordained. Three aspects of China' s political system may prove crucial in negotiating its transformation. By far the most important is the sheer size and scale of China. China is a continental system rather' than a simple, homogeneous nation-state, so political change is unlikely to be constant throughout the country. In addition, though it might be comforting to believe that a more homogeneous and united ruling group will emerge as a result of political change, there remains considerable potential for division within the ruling classes . Third, although democracy, like capitalism, may be a beacon for development i n contemporary China, the best model of democratization for China to emulate may be that of East Asia rather than that of Western Europe or North America.
Continental China The political importance of China' s size and scale is frequently underestimated. There are in fact certain tendencies that support the notion that political change will occur uniformly across China, not least of which is the position of the CCP. Post- I978 reforms, however notably decentralization and the introduction of market forces-have increased the importance of politics at the provincial level as well as the regional variations within China. China is a continental system with considerable diversity , both social and economic, and there appear to be variations in the propensity for political change among the country ' s provinces . Although it i s u nlikely that China will disintegrate, there is every reason to believe that with modernization individual provinces will develop different politics, with different degrees of openness and democratization. China is massive in terms of both land area and population. It is also still poorly integrated, with considerable internal communications problems . This is one reason that provinces trade less with one another than they do with the international economy ; arguably, China lacks a unified market.? The PRC ' s weak economic integration is matched by a lack of social homogeneity . Though the 94 percent of the population who are Han Chinese all share the dominant state idea of "China," the majority population' s languages, belief systems, traditions, and political culture still vary greatly.s Indeed, the unity of China under such
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conditions of heterogeneity is perhaps more remarkable than the often incorrectly imagined homogeneity of the Chinese. Despite rhetoric that basically identifies every sovereign state as a nation-state, it is difficult to equate China with the European "ideal-type" of a nation-state based on a single, homogeneous ethnic groUp.9 China has 30 provincial-level units-provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regionslO-and each is a considerable social, economic, and political system in its own right. Most are of at least the size and scale of a West European country in terms of population, land area, and social complexity , although not all are as big in land area as Tibet, or as large in population as Sichuan , which is home to 1 20 million people. To regard them as simply component parts of a unitary nation-state, or even as units of "local government," is misleading. Because of the variety of conditions in China' s provinces and the structure of the Chinese state, it is unlikely that reform could or would lead to democratization or revolution "from below" along the lines of the East European experience of the late 1 980s. First, the variability in cultural, economic, and political conditions across China ' s provinces leads to variability in the impact of reform on both social attitudes and political institutions. Moreover, the response to change by provincial leaders also varies . Structural changes in the ownership and management of industrial production offer a particularly useful example of provincial variability, not least because of the central importance to provincial leaders of industrial production and economic growth. At the national level , there has been a significant decrease in the state ' s share of production, and associated increases in those of the collective, private, and foreign-funded sectors. Yet these trends are far from universal . In 1 994, Heilongjiang ' s economy was still dominated by its state sector, as it had been since the establishment of the PRC despite 1 8 years of reform. Meanwhile, Jiangsu had a large collective sector but almost no private sector and only a small foreign-funded sector, while Guangdon g ' s economy was dominated by its foreign-funded and collective sectors . Guangxi had the largest private sector of any provincial-level unit as a proportion of provincial industrial production. 1 1 Second, democratization from below i n Beijing might succeed in nominally seizing national state power there, but this would not guarantee similar changes outside the capital, nor would it guarantee that the writ of the new government would be accepted elsewhere. Some provinces would be likely to stand firmly behind the CCP, while others might prefer still other alternatives to the CCP. The potential for compartmentalization in China' s politics has always been high, and it would be difficult to spread revolution from below in one province to other provinces. It is one thing to predict the collapse of central authority and the absence of reprisal. It is quite another, however, to assume that the collapse of central authority would also necessarily
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result in the sudden emergence of another national organization with a significant measure of popular legitimacy and support. On one level, by recognizing provincial differences, we attempt to avoid overgeneralizing about the impact of reform on social and political change throughout China. Yet there is also a provincial dimension to reform and political change. Just as reform has entailed the increasing withdrawal of government from economic management as well as the withdrawal of the CCP from social direction, so it has also led to considerable decentralization to the provincial level. Although the unity of the Chinese state may not have been called into question, the reform process has undoubtedly increased the relative importance of provincial politics and administration . 1 2 An essential part of that process has been the assumption that each province will build on its comparative advantage, both internationally and within China. Thus while the PRC is clearly a nation-state in terms of sovereignty and general adherence to the notion of a single "state idea," this may not be the most appropriate comparative device for understanding China' s development. More appropriate might be the notion of a continental system of great extent and diversity in which each province is regarded as a single though not completely autarchic-social, political, and economic system.
Elite Conflict It is tempting to believe that a more homogeneous ruling group will emerge in the PRC in the wake of the death of Deng and the passing of the "revolutionary generation," consisting of those who joined the communist movement before 1 949 and then fought to bring the CCP to power. The generally homogenizing effect of modernization is fairly well established. Yet China' s economic development since 1 978 has been a second-stage modernization that restructures an already modernizing society and relaunches the processes of industrialization. The economic trauma of these changes makes China ' s recent experience not exactly the same as the simultaneous processes going on elsewhere in Asia. The foundations of a modernizing state were already established in the PRC by the first half of the 1 950s, when new political structures were created, along with a new group of administrators and politicians. Although the PRC ' s economic growth has been spectacular since 1 978, with GNP rising an average of 1 0 percent annually, it had not been negligible before then. From 1 952 to 1 97 8 per-capita income grew an average of 6 percent annually, despite some years of serious economic problems, most notably in the wake of the Great Leap Forward during the early 1 9 60sP Modernization produced a new education system and new forms of administration, as well as a new urban middle class of white-collar workers associated with the new structures. 1 4 China' s economic reforms since 1 978 are more accurately described
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as a postindustrial restructuring than as an initial period of moderniza tion . The economic reforms have clearly created new social categories, including both the "new poor" and the "new rich." The latter includes a spectacular, almost bewildering variety of entrepreneurs and managers, who are often more visible for their opulent lifestyles than for their economic or managerial activities. The former include contract workers among the working classes and the unrestructured peasantry. The "new poor" also include, however, those from the urban middle classes who emerged from the social transformations of the early PRC years but who have been either unable or unwilling to adapt to the reforms and so have seen their standard of living take a nose dive. Teachers of alI kinds are among these new middle-class poor, and must often take addition al jobs in order to make ends meet.15 To date, the new social categories created during the reform era have generalIy not sought new political voices or channels of articulation, presumably because of the continued central role of the state in economic development. In particular, China' s new rich, for alI their entrepreneurship, generally are not independent of the state. On the contrary, a key feature of the reform era has been the replacement of central government (through the state sector) as the dominant force in the economy with local government (the mainstay of the collective sector) . 16 All the same, there is still potential for social and political conflict between two competing modernizing groups of middle managers, as welI as at the elite level-that is, between those who were the beneficiaries of the modernizing state of the 1 950s and those who have become rich and powerful more recently .
Asian Orientations The events of April through June of 1 9 89 in Beijing' s Tiananmen Square marked a significant turning point in the development of China' s politics, beyond the immediate concerns with freedom of expression and the use of force against demonstrators. One result of the Beijing massacre was that, for the second half of 1 989 and into 1 990, the PRC was shunned by Western governments. The CCP and the PRC govern ment responded to these pressures by trying to improve and open up their relation s with East and Southeast Asia. These changes might eventualIy have taken place in any case, as the restructuring ' of the developed East and Southeast Asian economies of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore had already increased economic activity in the PRC. There can be little doubt, however, that these trends were accelerated by the PRC' s policy change. Within a very short period, the PRC became dramaticalIy more Asia oriented in its international relations. The PRC took immediate measures to establish fulI diplomatic relations with all of its neighbors, including
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those with which relations had been almost nonexistent before 1 989, notably Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Singapore. Even relations with Taiwan improved significantly. Trade and investment between the PRC and these states greatly increased, as did the movement of people. The result has been increased regional economic integration, with many of the overseas Chinese and people of Chinese descent who are now based in other countries in East and Southeast Asia serving as vehicles of communication. 1 7 In the process, China has increased its openness to ideas and influences from those countries . It would be hard to understate the impact on China of these sudden cultural imports . Paradoxically, at the same time that these openings were occurring, the CCP was emphasizing the subversive influence on Chinese youth and society of foreign ideas, which it viewed as responsible for the events of 1 9 8 9 . 1 8 Still, cultural interaction with its neighbors has definitely increased China' s openness and secularization. While none of this has directly challenged the CCP ' s authority, it has assisted in dispersing authority more broadly within Chinese society. Most obviously affected has been the culture of the younger genera tion-its popular music, fashion, increased interest in sports and film stars, and lack of interest in politics and affairs of state.19 It thus seems likely that, with regard to political change, China will look more readily to East and Southeast Asia for its exemplars than to Western Europe and North America, owing to physical as well as political accessibility . The social and political values in the countries of East and Southeast Asia reflect the Asian experience; there, politics, government, and democracy are often, though not always, more authoritarian and less confrontational than their Western counterparts. They are also sometimes more consensual and are frequently more elaborate in their formal and informal rituals. In more concrete terms, the structures of social justice and the welfare state are much less in evidence in Asia than they are in the European experience, and the mass media are more frequently conveyors of government information than of independent criticism and commentary . NOTES 1 . For Deng Xiaoping ' s view. see "Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, S henzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai," 18 lanuary-2 1 February 1 992, sec. 4, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1 982-1992) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1 994), 3 : 366. 2 . Perhaps most spectacular has been the rhetorical conflict between Malaysia and Australia on both these counts. For a recent example, see "Fresh Air from Down Under" (editorial), New Sunday Times (Malaysia), 3 1 March 1 996, 8. More generally, see Richard Robison , ed. , The Contest for Asia (London: Routledge, 1 997). 3 . There is a large and growing literature on this topic, including Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove, China in the 1 990s (London: Macmillan, 1 995); Lowell Dittmer, China Under Reform (B oulder, Colo . : Wesrview, 1 994) ; Harry Harding, China 's Second Revolution (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1 9 89); and D.l. Solinger, China 's Transition from
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Socialism: Statist Legacies and Market Reforms, 1 980-1990 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1 99 3 ) .
13
4. H e Baogang, Three Models of Democracy (London : Routledge, 1 996). 5 . Gordon White, Riding the Tiger: The Politics of Economic R�form in Post-Mao China (London: Macmillan, 1 993); and David S . G . Goodman and Beverley Hooper, eds . , China 's Quiet Revolution (Melbourne: Longman, 1 994).
CHINA'S NEW WAVE OF NATIONALISM
6 . David S.G. Goodman, "China: The State and Capitalist Revolution," Pacific Review 5 (December 1 992): 3 50.
Ying-shih Yii
7 . Anjali Kumar, "Economic Reform and the Internal Division of Labour in China: Production, Trade and Marketing," in David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, eds . , China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism (London : Routledge, 1 994), 99. 8 . See, for example, Leo J . Moser, The Chinese Mosaic: The Peoples and Provinces of China (Boulder, Colo . : Westview, 1 985). 9 . For an interesting discussion of this and related points in other contexts, see P.W. Riggs, "Ethnonationalism, Industrialism, and the Modern State," Third World Quarterly 1 5 (December 1 994) : 583. 1 0 . The number is 31 if Taiwan is included. There are three municipalities (Shanghai, . Tlanjin, and Beijing), five autonomous regions (Guangxi Zhuang, Tibet, Xinjiang Uighur, Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia Hui), and 22 or 23 provinces (if Taiwan is included). 1 1 . Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1995 (Statistical yearbook of China 1 995) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji, 1 995), 379, Table 1 2-6. 1 2 . Opinions differ on this impact of the reform era. Those who fear for the cohere.nce of the Chinese state include W.J .F. Jenner (see The Tyranny of History [London: Allen Lane, 1 992]) and Maria Hsia Chang (see "China's Future: Regionalism, Federalism, or Disintegration," Studies in Comparative Communism 25 [September 1 993] : 2 1 1 ) . Countervailing views may b e found in Goodman aqd Segal, China Deconstructs. 1 3 . Quanguo ge sheng, zizhiqu, zhixiashi lishi tongji ziliao huibian (Collection of statistical historical materials on each province, autonomous region, and municipality in China) (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji, 1 990), 6. 1 4. On the political sociology of these developments, see Gordon White, "The Politics of Class and Class Origin" (Contemporary China Paper No. 9, Australian National University, Canberra, 1 976). 1 5 . David S.G. Goodman, "The People' s Republic of China: The PartY-State, Capitalist Revolution and New Entrepreneurs," in R. Robison and David S.G. Goodman, eds . , The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonalds and Middle-Class Revolution (London : Routledge, 1 996), 225-42. 1 6 . Kevin Lee, Chinese Firms and the State in Transition: Property Rights and Agency Problems in the Reform Era (New York : M.E. Sharpe, 1 99 1 ) ; Victor Nee, "Organizational Dynamics of Market Transition: Hybrid Forms, Property Rights, and Mixed Economy in China," in Administrative Science Quarterly 3 7 (March 1 992) : 1 -27. 1 7. East Asia Analytical Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Common wealth Government of Australia, Overseas Chinese Business Networks in Asia (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Services, 1 995); Sterling Seagrave, Lords of the Rim: The Invisible Empire of the Overseas Chinese (London: Bantam, 1 995). 1 8 . Chen Xitong, "Report o n Putting Down Anti-Government Riot," China Daily, 7 July 1 9 89. 19. Geremie Barme and Linda Jaivin, New Ghosts, Old Demons (New York: Random House, 1 992); Jianying Zha, China Pop: How Soap Operas, Tabloids and Best-Sellers Are Transforming a Culture (New York: New Press, 1 995).
Ying-shih Yii is Gordon Wu '58 Professor of Chinese Studies and professor of history at Princeton University. His most recent publications include Religious Ethics and the Merchant Class in Early Modern China (in Japanese, 1991) and Modern Confucianism in Historical Perspective (in Chinese, 1996). He is also the coeditor of The Power of Culture: Studies in Chinese Cultural History (1 994).
Samuel P. Huntington ' s idea of the "third wave" of democratization has been remarkably influential and continues to figure importantly in democracy studies today . Ironically, by 1993 Huntington had already : shifted his attention from the third wave to the clash of civilizations. In his 1 99 1 article "Religion and the Third Wave," Huntington suggests a causal relationship between Christianity and democracy that anticipates his much-debated thesis of 1 993 . I In his new book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, the third wave is summed - up as follows : During the 1 970s and 1 9 80s over thirty countries shifted from authoritar i an to
democratic poli tical systems.
.
.
.
Democratization was
most
successful in countries where Christian and Western influences were s trong. New democratic regi mes appeared most likely to stabilize in the S outhern and Central European countries that were predominantly Catholic or Protestant and, less certainly, i n Latin American countries. In East Asia, the Catholic and heavily American influenced Philippines returned to democracy in the 1 9 80s, whi le Christian leaders promoted movement toward democracy in South Korea and Taiwan . . . . [I]n the former Soviet Union, the B altic republics appear to be successfully stabilizing democ racy; the degree and stability of democracy in the Orthodox republics vary considerably and are uncertain; democratic prospects in the Muslim republics are bleak. B y the 1 990s, except for Cuba, democratic transitions h ad occurred in most of the countries, outside Africa, whose peoples espoused 2 exi sted .
Western
Christi anity
or
where
major
Christian
influences
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Clearly, in Huntington' s view, the third wave of democratization was largely a Christian phenomenon. This helps explain why he attributes democracy movements in South Korea and Taiwan in the 1 9 80s to the promotion of "Christian leaders . " As far as Taiwan is concerned, his statement is extremely misleading. Taiwan' s successful political transformation has many causes, but Christianity has not yet proved to be one of them. Huntington ' s emphasis on Christianity in the third wave is quite natural given his Western point of view and, as a historical explanation, well grounded. But it is also closely related to his negative view of Confucianism and Islam with respect to democratic development: Huntington consistently maintains that both Islamic and Confucian cultures are inhospitable to democracy. If so, then the third wave is practically over. Moreover, since Huntington identifies Chinese commu nists as "Confucians" (as is evident from his talk of a "Confucian Islamic connection"), from his point of view, the prospect of democracy in mainland China must be as bleak as it is in the Muslim republics of the former S oviet Union. This point has some bearing on the chapters in this collection by Andrew Nathan and Minxin Pei. Neither Nathan nor Pei takes very seriously Huntington' s notion that "Confucian culture" is an obstacle to democracy; both seem to assume that the third wave will eventually sweep through China. Both essays may be read as variations on a theme: China' s peaceful transition to democracy under the Communist regime. While Nathan explores the possibility of a constitutional option through empowerment of the National People' s Congress (NPC) , Pei suggests "creeping democratiza tion" through "endogenous institutional changes" in the following three areas: 1 ) the rule of law, 2) the NPC, and 3) experimental grassroots self-government in the countryside. In Chlnese cosmological terms, J'.Jathan ' s point of view embodies the yang principle and Pei ' s the yin principle. Constitutionalism initiated by the NPC can only be promoted openly and formally ; it must of necessity take the form of some political movement with the approval of the party leadership in power. In contrast, Pei ' s "creeping democrati zation" refers to a process of change that takes place under the very noses of the totalitarian rulers without attracting notice. By the time the leaders realize what is happening, the process of democratization will have already advanced to such a stage that it is irreversible. In other words, for Nathan democracy will come to mainland China through the front door, while for Pei it will creep through the back door and windows. From a historical perspective, Nathan is certainly right when he says that "China' s twentieth-century history is littered with constitutions and attempts to make them work." He lists seven constitutions between 1 9 1 1 and 1 949 and four under the Communist regime. In fact, political reform
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in modern China began with constitutionalism. The earliest attempt was Kang Youwei ' s advocacy of constitutional monarchy in 1 898; the first draft constitution, based on the Japanese model, was promulgated by the Qing imperial court in 1 908.
Why Did Constitutionalism Fail? How are we to understand China' s century-long obsession with constitutionalism as a historical phenomenon? I agree with Arthur Waldron' s observation, as quoted by Nathan, that "the search for a constitutional order to replace the dynasties has been the most important theme in twentieth-century China' s history," as well as with his prediction that "when Deng dies, the search for constitutional order is certain to resume." But this is only one side of the question. We must also ask why constitutio nalist reform in China failed time and again over an entire century ? First, from the 1 890s to the 1 990s, enthusiastic advocates of constitutionalism in China consisted mainly of intellectuals and reform minded bureaucrats who were, as a rule, not at the center of power. Second, those who held despotic or dictatorial power invariably disregarded the constitution. Authoritarian rulers appealed to the constitution only when they perceived their absolute power or the legitimacy of their regime to be threatened. This was true for Empress Dowager Cixi, Yuan S hikai. Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Zedong. For example, Chiang Kai-shek allowed the constitution of 1 947 to he adopted only because his regime desperately needed a coating of legitimacy in postwar China. When he was driven to Taiwan in the early 1 950s, Chiang seriously explored dismantling the constitutional apparatus altogether.4 Mao never respected the constitution, not even when Zhou Enlai was negotiating a draft constitution with the National ist Party in Chongqing in early 1 946.5 The only time Mao showed any interest in it was in January 1 965, when, having been interrupted by Liu Shaoqi on a previous occasion, Mao brought a copy of the constitution to a meeting saying that as a citizen he had the constitutional right to speak his mind.6 Third, since 1 9 1 1 , power struggles between political parties or factions of the ruling party were often engaged in the name of the constitution. Once the struggle was over, however, the winner would immediately shelve the constitution as if it never existed. This happened not only between Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Han-min in early 1930 (nominally over the controversy of a "provisional constitution") but also between the Nation alists and the Communists in 1 946 and 1 947 . In 1 9 80, when Deng Xiaoping talked of making the "constitution more perfect,"7 he was engaged in a power struggle with the ultra-leftist faction of the party with Hua Guofeng as a rallying force.8
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In light of this history, I am skeptical that China is experiencing a "new constitutionalist movement" simply because discussions of constitutionalism have bloomed in recent years. Other than the air in the conference room and the printing machine, little has really moved. In the past two or three years I have met a number of visiting intellectuals from mainland China who pin their hopes on the NPC as an engine capable of generating new political reforms and on Qiao Shi as a leader likely to be converted to constitutionalism. If history is any guide, however, the recent revival of constitutionalist discourse most likely signifies the current power struggle within the party . After all, Qiao Shi is one of the few qualified contenders for top leadership in the post Deng era. Two of Nathan' s arguments are particularly noteworthy. On the negative side, constitutionalism "may be less probable than anything but the alternatives ." On the positive side, constitutionalism "would serve the [Chinese Communist Party' s] interests in legitimation and stability." Both arguments are reasonable and powerful; I would be the last person on earth to delight in seeing them refuted by history. The trouble with history , however, is that it often plays tricks on us. It not only reveals its reasons after the fact, but also offers more alternatives than the human mind can possibly calculate beforehand. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to Pei ' s "creeping democratiza tion," although more should be said about his "rule of law" and "grassroots self-government." First, it seems more appropriate to speak of "rule by law" than "rule of law." Second, by Pei ' s own admission, China' s enforcement record is still "abysmal," even though more than 600 laws were passed by the NPC between 1 979 and 1 992. Third, as a recent legal study shows, Chinese judges generally lack adequate legal training. Until 1 994, about half of Chinese j udges had failed to reach a college-graduate level of legal education. Moreover, the judicial system as a whole is no more than a tool for the implementation of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule. It is neither an end in itself nor a servant of justice.9 It is difficult to imagine how the present legal system can help China' s democratization, especially democratization of a "creeping" variety. "Grassroots self-government" does not fare any better. Here I need only quote Pei himself: "Still, the gains in grassroots democratization in Chinese villages have been meager. Genuinely free elections have been held in only a tiny fraction of them. Even in the small number of villages where such elections were held, the results have been mixed." The proof of the pudding is, after all , in the eating. "Creeping democratization" as yet lacks proof. As a reader, I would like to see the term "creeping" further clarified. Can democracy "creep" all the way to consolidation without discovery ? What will happen when "creeping" democratization inevitably confronts
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,, head on the "four insistences 10 in the constitution? To put it in Marxist terms, will this "creeping" always remain a "quantitative change," or will it reach the point where a "qualitative jump" is required? In a theoretical construction, questions of this kind must be faced squarely.
Confucianism and Democracy I conclude by returning to Huntington' s thesis about the third wave and the clash of civilizations. By linking democracy specifically to Christianity, Huntington implies that the difficulties of China' s democra tization lie deep in its Confucian background. Both Nathan and Pei leave this cultural aspect virtually untouched. They seem to assume that the third wave is universal and thereby cuts across cultural boundaries . Is there then a conflict of assumptions between Huntington on the one hand and Nathan and Pei on the other? The answer must be no. In all fairness, Huntington does not believe that Confucian culture is a permanent barri er to democratization. On the contrary, he says the following about cultural traditions and democracy in the non-Christian world : " [G]reat historic cultural traditions, such as Islam and Confucian ism, are highly complex bodies of ideas, beliefs, doctrines, assumptions, writings, and behavior patterns . Any major culture, including even Confucianism, has some elements that are compatible with democracy, just as both Protestantism and Catholicism have elements that are clearly undemocratic. Confucian democracy may be a contradiction in terms, but democracy in a Confucian society need not be."l l Yet I find his discussion of Confucian societies' being "inhospitable to democracy" rather oversimplified, both theoretically and historically . 1 2 The problem of identifying the source of this "inhospitableness" is far more compli cated than he has indicated. As I have pointed out elsewhere, the earliest Chinese discoverers of the Western idea of democracy in the late nineteenth century were none other than the reform-minded Confucians. 1 3 From the end of the Qing Dynasty to the May Fourth Movement of 1 9 19 , leading advocates of democracy-including reformists, revolution aries, and anti-traditionalists-came almost exclusively from the intellectual elite, which had a strong background in Confucian culture. Many were also leading interpreters of Confucianism of their own day: Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Zhang B inglin, and Liu Shipei . In later years, even Chen Duxin and Hu Shi, who were largely responsible for the rise of anti-Confucianism in the May Fourth era, modified their views . These thinkers have helped us understand elements in Confucianism that are compatible with democracy. Hu Shi in particular took great pains to explain to U . S . audiences of his lectures and writings in the 1 940s and 1 950s how some Confucian ideas and institutions may prove capable of furnishing China with a solid foundation on which to
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establish constitutional democracy . Confucianism had formed a central part of what John Rawls calls the "background cultures" of traditional Chinese society which, with readj ustment, could become a "reasonable comprehensive doctrine" in the formation of a modern concept of political j ustice . 1 4 Confucian education often inculcated in the minds o f the young a sense of justice, social responsibility, human equality, and the well-being of people, which are some of the closest Confucian equivalents to Western civic virtues. It was this Confucian public-spiritedness that disposed many Chinese intellectuals to Western democratic ideas at the turn of the century . Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Republic of China, is famous for his espousal of Confucian values on the one hand and advocacy of democracy on the other. He showed no sign of psychologi cal tension resulting from his embrace of both cultures . 15 Much as I sympathize with Huntington ' s thesis, I cannot follow him so far as to see the conflict between the West and mainland China as the clash between Western and Confucian civilizations. Given Confucian ism ' s early reception of the idea of constitutional democracy, one cannot help but wonder if the notion of "clash of civilizations" applies to China at all . Moreover, Confucianism has been denounced as "poisonous remains of Chinese feudalism" for decades by the Communist regime; Confucian values in both elite and popular cultures are ruined or distorted beyond recognition. 1 6 As far as the CCP is concerned, a return to Confucianism may prove to be more difficult than a transition to constitutional democracy.
Nationalism, Not Democracy What is really happening in China today is not a revival of Confu cian culture but a new wave of nationalism, which seems to be a universal phenomenon in postcommunist countries. In a recent report from Belgrade, we read that students, professors, and many Serbs have shifted from a Marxist paradigm to a fierce form of Serbian nationalism. Chris Hedges of the New York Times tells us, "For two or three years following Tito' s death in 1 9 80, academics, freed from party dogma, reached out to Western intellectual traditions . But this was swiftly terminated with the rise of Serbian nationalism."17 This is revealing, for Chinese intellectuals , especially the younger generation, have traveled the same spiritual road in the short span of a decade. They began with a "culture fever," showing an unbounded admiration for the West in the mid- 1 9 80s that ended tragically in Tiananmen in 1989. In the early 1 990s nationalistic sentiments suddenly resurged. Today Chinese nation alism has attained monstrous proportions, as evidenced in such virulent xenophobic tracts as China Can Say No. 18 The wave of democracy has given w ay to a wave of n ationalism.
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There are signs that the CCP is trying to manipulate this new wave of nationalism to its own advantage. With the bankruptcy of Marxist ideology , the CCP faces its most serious legitimacy crisis ever. Theoretically, the CCP ' s interests in legitimation and stability are better served by nationalism than constitutionalization, which carries the inevitable risk of being voted out of power someday. By contrast, it is only a small step from socialism to national socialism, which is practically synonymous with "socialism with Chinese characteristics." It is unclear how far the CCP can manipulate the rising Chinese national ism; the more dangerous impulses of nationalism can easily run out of control. These are not predictions but observations. What will eventually become of nationalism in China is anybody' s guess. The evidence seems clear, however, that the CCP is moving toward nationalism, not constitutionalism or democracy. Should the third wave continue to find mainland China impenetrable in the years to come, it may be advisable to focus our analytical attention on the combined forces of a totalitarian system of Western origin with a new wave of nationalism, which seems to be the order of the day in the non-Western world. In any case, it is high time that Confucian culture be absolved of all blame. NOTES I . Samuel P. Huntington, "Religion and the Third Wave," The National [nterest 24 (Summer 1 9 9 1 ) : 29-42, and "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1 99 3 ) : 22-49. In the latter article Huntington argues that in the post-Cold War world global politics would take the form of conflict between groups from differing civilizations . 2 . Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1 996), 1 92-93. 3 . The Republic of China on Taiwan ' s recent success in constitutionalist transition belongs to a different category, which will not be considered here. 4. Hu Shi, Hu Shi de riji (Hu Shi ' s diary) (Taipei: Yuandong, 1 990), vol . 1 7, entry of 1 6 January 1 953 (unpagjnated). 5. See a first-hand account by Liang Shumin, Yiwang tanjiu lu (Records of memories of the past and talks about old days) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshu, 1 987), 1 8 1 . 6 . L i Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao (New York: Random House, 1 994), 4 1 6- 1 7 . This account is corroborated by other sources. See, for example, Ye Yunglie, Chen Poda (Biography of Chen B oda) (Hong Kong: Wenhua jiaoyu, 1 990), 237. 7 . See Andrew Nathan' s chapter in this collection, 230. 8 . See Ruan Ming, Deng Xiaoping diguo (Deng Xiaoping' s empire) (Taipei: Shibao wenhua, 1 992), ch. 6. 9. See He Weifang, "Duikong zhi yu Zhongguo faguan" (Adversary system and the Chinese judge) Faxue yanjiu (Legal studies) 4 ( 1 995): 85-92. 1 0. The four "insistences," also known as the Four Cardinal Principles, are 1) the socialist path, 2) the dictatorship of the proletariat, 3 ) the leadership of the CCP, and 4) Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought. As John Fairbank said, "This promised that the self-selected CCP dictatorship, like any dynasty, would continue its monopoly of power."
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See John King Fairbank, China: A New History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 992), 407 .
I I . Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1 9 9 1 ) , 3 1 0. 1 2. Ibid. , 300-307. 13. See my "Sun Yat-sen' s Doctrine and Traditional Chinese Culture," in Chu-yuan Cheng, ed., Sun Yat-sen 's Doctrine in the Modem World (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1 9 89), 79- 1 02 . 1 4. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1 993), xvi, 1 2- 1 4. 1 5 . See Ying-shih Yii, "The Idea of Democracy and the Twilight of the Elite Culture in Modem China" ( p ap er presented at the Seventh East-West Philosop hers' Conference, East-West Center, Honolulu, 8-20 January 1 995). 1 6 . See a rep ort based on field studies in the vicinities of Shanghai by Godwin C. Chu and Yanan Ju, The Great Wall in Ruins: Communication and Cultural Change in China (Albany : State University of New York Press, 1 993). 1 7 . Chris Hedges, "Student Foes of Belgrade Leader Embrace Fierce Serb Nationalism," New York Times, 10 December 1 996, Al and A8. For a discussion of the resurgence of nationalism after the collap se of communism as a universal p henomenon, see Mitchell Cohen, "Rooted Cosmo p olitanism," in Michael Walzer, ed ., Toward a Global Civil Society (Providence and Oxford: Berghamm Books, 1 995), 223-3 3 . 1 8 . See S o n g Qiang, Zhang Cangcang, a n d Qiao Bian, Zhongguo keyi shuo bu: lengzhanhou shidai di zhengzhi yu qinggan jueze (China can say no: Politics and emotional choice i n the p ost-Cold War era) (Beijing: Zhonghua gongshang Iianho, 1 996).
IV External Influences
14 SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN: THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT Yun-han Chu, Fu Hu & Chung-in Moon
Yun-han Chu is professor of political science at National Taiwan University, director of programs at the Institute for National Policy Research in Taipei, and coordinator of the Political Science Section of Taiwan 's National Science Council. Fu Hu is professor of political science at National Taiwan University and leader of the university 's National Election Research Project. Chung-in Moon is professor of political science at Yonsei University in Seoul.
A
consensus is emerging among theorists that analysis of external influences is an indispensable part of democratization studies ; bald relegation of external factors to a secondary or subordinate category is too simplistic. 1 As Geoffrey Pridham contends, however, most typologies of democratic transition in terms of modes and outcomes2 highlight internal forces and calculations in their explanations.3 While a few recent scholarly efforts go some way toward filling this intellectual void,4 virtually all of them confine their scope to South America, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe. East Asia is generally neglected.s In this essay, we initiate a modest effort to remedy this neglect by concentrat ing our empirical analysis on two recently democratized newly industrial ized countries (NICs) in East Asia: South Korea and Taiwan. Most of the recent transitions to democracy in Southern Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union benefited, in one way or another, from a highly supportive global political, economic, and ideological environment that was essentially lacking in the first and second waves of democratization. The reasons external and transnational influences have played a more consistent and expansive role in the creation of the "third wave" democracies are many.6 First, liberal democracy has triumphed as the predominant mode of legitimization in the international ideological community . As Juan Linz and Alfred S tepan argue, the democratic ideal has become the "spirit of the times" (Zeitgeist) . With the exception of revitalized fundamentalism
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in some parts of the Islamic world, there were no major ideological competitors to democracy as a political system around the world by the late 1 970s.7 This historically unprecedented promotion of democratization exerts pressure on existing authoritarian regimes and loads the dice in favor of successful transitions to democracy. Second, a series of policy changes by some of the most influential actors in international politics has created pressure and incentives amenable to democracy. B efore the mid- 1 960s, the Catholic Church accommodated itself to authoritarian regimes and frequently legitimized them. After Vatican IT ( 1 9 62-65), the Church' took an institutional stand against dictatorial regimes .8 Historically , industrialized democracies have been ambivalent about fostering democracy abroad, and have often seen it as in their strategic interest to support authoritarian regimes as well as to subvert popularly elected ones.9 This began to change in the late 1 970s. Democratic pressure and assistance from the United States have steadily increased since Jimmy Carter made human rights the major theme of U . S . foreign policy . The European Community (EC) shifted its membership policy in the late 1 970s and emerged in the 1 980s and 1 990s as the most consistent and influential sponsor of democratic development in Southern and Eastern Europe. lO Finally, Mikhail Gorbachev' s reform strategy and the subsequent abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine in the Soviet Union opened a previously closed gate to democratization efforts in the satellite states. Third, breakthroughs i n global communication have had momentous implications for the third wave democracies . Technology compresses space and time and blurs domestic-foreign boundaries. The blanketing of the world by shortwave radio, satellite television, facsimile, and computer networks undermines authoritarian rulers' control of the flow of ideas and information within and across their borders. More importantly, it amplifies the "demonstration effect" and accelerates the "snowballing" of international support. One country ' s successful transition immediately becomes an event in another country ' s own transition, especially among countries that are "culturally similar and , geographically approximate. ' 1 1 As a result, the image of global democratic revolution becomes a reality in the minds of politicians, intellectuals, and concerned citizens everywhere. Live coverage of the dramatic events of authoritarian repression and democratic struggle forces human rights issues in far-off localities into the foreign policies of industrialized democracies and into the world' s conscience. None of this would have been possible in earlier decades . While it is easy to identify these prevailing conditions in the international environment, analyzing their real impact on the process of democratic transition raises both theoretical and empirical challenges. So far, there have appeared very few well-known works on democratization that provide coherent and systematic accounts of why and how there are
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different kinds of external actors and different forms of influence at different phases of transition. The intrinsic complexity of the interna tional context complicates such an analysis. External factors' causal impact is often indirect and mediated by domestic structure, "working ,, in mysterious and unintended ways through ostensibly national agents . 12 Contextual factors, while important in their o wn right, never determine the transition process . Many structural potentials can be realized only under certain enabling conditions. Transition progresses only through human action and the strategic interaction of various political forces . To understand the linkages among structures, institutions, and contingent choices, we need to specify the triggering factors and the agents of change.
Triggering Factors and Agents of Change First, as Pridham suggests, we should unbundle the international context, which is clearly an umbrella term for a variety of different external actors, institutions, or conditions . It is useful to distinguish 1 ) background o r situational variables ; 2 ) external actors; and 3) forms and directions of external influence. 1 3 Background variables include evolving geostrategic conditions, the dynamics of and changes in the international economy, i nternational shifts in power alignment, and the resultant pressures for changes in a given country ' s external policy. External actors may be international organizations , foreign governments, trans national nongovernmental actors, or ethnic groups with cross-national allegiance. Forms of influence include a range of possibilities from deliberate to unintended (such as market forces), from coercion (such as invasion and occupation) to persuasion, and from covert to ostensible. Not all external influences are conducive to democratic change; some have a negative or deterrent effect on democratization. Second, we need to unscramble the dynamic linkages between external factors and domestic processes . These lirikages take many forms : standing international treaties and commitments; involvement in international organizations ; security dependence; lender-debtor or donor-recipient relation s ; trade and financial relations ; cultural ties through migration, education, and religion; foreign-media exposure; cleavages over international and cross-boundary issues; and ethnic groups with cross-border allegiance. These linkages condition the causal liability-that is, susceptibility and vulnerability-of domestic structure and actors to external influences. More specifically, these linkages condition domestic actors ' predisposition toward external actors and influences , and the extent to which domestic actors incorporate an "international dimension" into their political strategies. Third, we should conduct a process-oriented empirical analysis of countries using a research framework of both interregional and
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intraregional comparison to discover the influence of external factors on the course of regime transition . . We develop our case studies in two steps. First, we analyze the international dimension of democratic transition by proposing some nuanced hypotheses based on an interregional comparison of two East Asian NICs . Next, we examine the dynamics of regime transition of each country in greater detail. For the interregional comparison, we consider the two East Asian NICs in a group with other regional cases and emphasize their similarities . For each case study, we are more attentive to intraregional differences and to the specific history of each nation . W e consider the following five categories of external influence: 1 ) demonstration effects ; 2) external economic incentives, constraints, and conditions that express themselves in the policies of major trading partners and market forces; 3) global trends toward economic liberalism that infiltrate a country through idea transmission, multilateral organiza tions, and U . S . trade policies ; 4) transnational actors; and 5) legacies of divided nationhood.
Demonstration Effects , The phenomenon of "democracy by contagion ,14 was much less compelling in East Asia than in Eastern Europe. Because of NICs' geographic location and the timing of the breakdowns of their authoritar ian regimes, the demonstration or "snowballing" effects of the NICs' initial phase of transition were quite limited as compared with those of Eastern Europe.ls Events in Southern Europe and Latin America were too remote to exert any tangible impact on either the Kuomintang (KMT) regime in Taiwan or the Chun Doo Hwan regime in South Korea. When Chiang Ching-kuo decided in late 1 98 6 to tolerate the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and subsequently announced his intention to lift martial law and other long-term political restrictions-the two watershed events that ended authoritarian rule in Taiwanl6-there had been few signs that the downfall of the regime of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines would start a trend toward democratization in the region. The fall of Marcos in February 1 986 did raise the cry of "people power" in Seoul and set the stage for opposi tion parties to organize a popular movement for radical reform. 1 7 But the ripple effect did not travel very far. There is no evidence that the mid- 1 9 8 7 crisis in Seoul seriously affected the dynamics of regime transition in Taipei or elsewhere in the region. In late 1987 and early 1 9 8 8 , the tempo of Taiwan 's KMT-orches trated political reform was set primarily by the country ' s internal succession crisis, despite a noticeable surge of DPP-organized street
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demonstrations in the second half of 1 9 8 7 . 1 8 One could argue that the waves of democratic breakthrough crashing through the former socialist bloc, S outhern Europe, and part of South America between 1 989 and 1 990 helped South Korea and Taiwan complete a democratic transition. But the climate surrounding these two NICs remained quite hospitable to authoritarian rule; East Asia as a region was scarcely touched by the global trend toward democratic consolidation.19
International Economic Forces External economic incentives and constraints also worked very differently in the East Asian NICs' transition to democracy. In both Southern and Eastern Europe, the potent influence of the EC linked democratic conditionality and the attractive prospect of membership . In East Asia, however, not a single regional multilateral or unilateral actor played a role even vaguely resembling that of the EC . With their geostrategic and commercial interests in mind, the United States and Japan, the two most important trade partners of Taiwan and South Korea in the 1 980s, refrained from exercising their economic power to promote democratic change in the two NICs. Neither Taiwan' s nor South Korea' s most-favored-nation (MFN ) trading status was ever at stake, even in the aftermath of the Kaohsiung Incident ( 1 979) in Taiwan and the Kwangju Incident ( 1 980) in South Korea. Human rights, except matters of labor practices and labor-union regulations, never surfaced on the agenda of the NICs' bilateral trade negotiation with the United States . By the early 1 990s, the NICs' trade with the United States had been reduced substantially while bilateral trade with nondemocratic or semiauthoritarian neighbors in East and Southeast Asia had risen dramatically ?O Thus at the most critical j unctures during their respective regime transitions, South Korea and Taiwan rarely found that their valued regional and international economic ties depended on their being or becoming democratic.2 1 A more fundamental difference is that, unlike that of most Latin American and East European cases, the political opening in both South Korea and Taiwan was not triggered by a major socioeconomic crisis or external market shocks . Nor was it accompanied by a popular demand for major socioeconomic reforms.22 Rather, societal support for the regime-sponsored development programs in both South Korea and Taiwan has been much more broadly based than that of many Latin American countries at a comparable level of industrialization. In other words, the export-oriented industrialization strategy pursued under the old regimes was highly institutionalized and effective.23 There is no doubt that in both Taiwan and South Korea the democratic transition of the late 1 9 80s and early 1 990s was facilitated
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by the accumulated effect of social and political mobilization brought about by rapid industrialization and strong growth?4 But the same economic legacy constrained the transition process in many ways.25 It precluded international actors from applying economic influence such as aid conditionality and economic-transition assistance from abroad. In addition, international market forces exerted a subtle yet chilling effect on the strategic choice of the opposition in South Korea and Taiwan. Under an export-oriented industrialization strategy, much of the NICs' aggregate effective demand comes from abroad. Foreign demand is, however, highly volatile i n response to short-term political predictability. A few signs of social and political unrest could mean a country ' s loss of billion-dollar foreign contracts to other NICs. Therefore, participants in most export-oriented sectors-challengers as well as incumbents-have an economic stake in regime stability and political predictability . Fierce competition and concern for a high degree of regime stability and policy continuity of established and emerging NICs have constrained the political strategy of the antisystem opposition. Democratic struggle that entails mass mobilization and protracted political unrest cannot draw widespread support unless it is probable that such struggle will quickly lead to a conclusive end. The global trend toward economic liberalism, which coincided with the third wave of democratization and contributed directly to the collapse of socialist regimes worldwide, did feed the transition to democracy in the two NICs, although this effect was mostly unintentional . On the whole, the prevailing trend of neoliberalism has through a variety of ,, linkages gradually dismantled the "developmental state 26 and the "developmentalist" coalition supporting the old regime, and contributed to the emergence of a more autonomous private sector.27 In South Korea, macroeconomic stabilization and industrial-restructur ing programs implemented during the first few years of the Chun Doo Hwan regime were deliberately neoliberal. This policy choice resulted in part from monetarist ideas of economic management transmitted through native economists trained in the United States and from the strong endorsement of World B ank and International Monetary Fund advisors .28 The various reform measures, whose aim was to restore economic stability, enhance international competitiveness, and win political support from the "silent majority," provoked opposition from farmers, workers, and the business sector. The previously symbiotic state-business relationship became uneasy and even contentious.29 In the end, these unpopular reforms contributed to the setback of the govern ment ' s Democratic Justice Party in the 1 985 National Assembly election, the beginning of the end game of the Fifth Republic ( 1 980-86) ?O In the second half of the 1 9 80s, the U.S. Trade Representative Office, motivated by rising domestic political demand for trade adjustment and armed with the 1 98 6 Trade Act, pressured South Korea and Taiwan for
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sweeping trade liberalization and financial deregulation .3l In both cases, these external demands for economic reform stripped the dirigiste state bureaucracy of much of its power to circumscribe private business decisions and allocate "economic rents ." Consequently, these changes weakened the political base of the old regime and loosened the grip of the incumbent elite on the political allegiance of the business sector. A variety of transnational actors have played a noticeable role in facilitating democratic opening in South Korea and Taiwan . With the exception of students, democratic forces in South Korea formed diverse transnational networks with international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs ) . Of these, church-related groups were most active. In Taiwan, the Presbyterian Church has persistently provided moral and material support to political dissidents . Transnational human rights groups such as Asia Watch and Amnesty International vigilantly monitored political repression and human rights abuses during the authoritarian years and drew worldwide attention to the cause of democratization in both countries. Other international NGOs, notably the Asia Foundation, contributed to the growth of an autonomous civil society at its embryonic stage. Democratic forces in both South Korea and Taiwan received their most critical support from the overseas Korean and Taiwanese communities, especially those in the United States. On one front, overseas communities cultivated close networks with opposition political and movement leaders and provided them with both moral and material support. On another front, the communities aggressively lobbied the U . S . Congress and Executive Branch for a more assertive U.S. human rights policy toward the two countries.
A Legacy of Divided Nationhood The dominant characteristic of the two cases is not that they are East Asian or that they are newly industrialized, but that they both inherited legacies of divided nationhood. To appreciate the profound implications of this condition for democratic transition , we recall that "the condition that must precede all the other phases of democratization is national unity and agreed boundaries."32 A number of linkage mechanisms emanate from the divided nationhood of South Korea and Taiwan that make their regimes highly susceptible to external influences . First, the partition of the Korean peninsula and the division of the Taiwan Strait were a part of the Cold War arrangements in Northeast Asia.33 Faced with military threats from their respective communist rivals during the Cold War, the political systems of Taiwan and South Korea depended on security commitments from the United States for their very survival . The United States ' forward base in South Korea stabilized inter-Korean relations as the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty (and, to a lesser degree, the
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Taiwan Relations Act that succeeded it) braced cross-Strait relations. These two NICs' regime stability depends on keeping the hostile reunification ambitions of Pyongyang or Beij ing at bay ; thus the incumbent regimes remain vulnerable to strategic realignments among major powers in the region and structural changes on the global scene. Consequently, the United States has enjoyed formidable diplomatic leverage over any sitting regime, authoritarian or democratic, in the two NICs . Second, under the conditions of divided nationhood, a regime's democratic transition always risks the possibility of intervention from the rival regime. Uncertainty about the meaning and outcomes of the transition-in particular the repercussions for the prospect of reunifica tion and the potential to destabilize the rival regime' s own internal political order-may provoke a rival regime to take proactive or reactive steps. Third, in both cases, divided nationhood amplifies the international component of regime legitimacy. B ecause of the professed temporariness of their territorial structure, the sovereign status of South Korea and Taiwan was never fully institutionalized in international society . For much of the post-World War II period, both South Korea and Taiwan have competed fiercely with their rival regimes for diplomatic recogni tion and, in many cases, exclusive representation in international organizations. The result is a much more direct and powerful linkage between effective foreign policy and system reinforcement: Diplomatic isolation undermines the legitimacy of a sitting regime; international recognition and acceptance enhance its prospects for consolidation. This also means that, in the course of regime transition, domestic actors always incorporate an international dimension into their domestic political strategies . Divided nationhood also creates a number of potential challenges to the consolidation of democracy in South Korea and Taiwan. The first is the indeterminacy of the state structure. No polity can be democrati cally consolidated if there is intense internal conflict over national identity and the nature of the state in the territory ?4 No case illustrates this point better than the turmoil and carnage in the former Yugoslavia. The "stateness" issue also complicates consensus on constitutional design. One way to navigate this obstacle is to institutionalize the existing national division through multilateral · recognition and mutual accord with the rival regime. The extent to which this is possible has profound implications for the prospects for democratic consolidation. In addition, countries of divided nationhood inherit a military and security apparatus that is dominant in civilian affairs. Constant threat of force from the communist riv al and perceptions of communist support for internal insurgencies provided the historical rationale for a vast military-security apparatus and its institutionalized intervention in civilian
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affairs . The authoritarian regime' s militarization of society in Taiwan and South Korea strongly reinforced authoritarian rule. In both countries, the ,, acquired "new professionalism 35 accorded the military a pivotal license to intervene in domestic issues in the name of national security. The new democracies cannot be consolidated without eliminating the extraconstitutional prerogatives of the military-security apparatus and realigning civil-military relations. Thus depoliticizing the military-security apparatus , which has been an overriding imperative for Latin American democratic consolidation , is also a major challenge for successful consolidation in S outh Korea and Taiwan . To establish empirically how the legacy of divided nationhood and the concomitant geostrategic considerations have influenced regime change requires a process-oriented study of the two cases. Below we examine more 'closely the complex interaction between external and domestic actors in the course of regime transition in South Korea and Taiwan. We will show that, although the two are similarly situated in the international system, the condition of divided nationhood affects each country differently. Cross-Strait relations have inhibited Taiwan ' s transition to democracy more than inter-Korean relations have inhibited South Korea ' s ; likewise, the strategic confusion brought about by the end of the Cold War has had contrasting impacts on their respective regime transitions.
S outh Korea's Transition to Democracy South Korea' s domestic political dynamics have been intertwined with international changes. After national independence in 1945, South Korea underwent a traumatic transformation quite hostile to democratic development. Lingering Japanese colonial legacies, national division, and the devastating Korean War all undermined the foundations of political development in post-World War II South Korea. Furthermore, perpetual insecurity from military tension with North Korea and pervasive poverty and underdevelopment offered fertile soil for the growth of an authori tarian mode of governance. At the same time, recognition and legitimacy from abroad, transmission of ideas and images, and transnational networks of social forces have all influenced the nature and direction of political development in S outh Korea. The democratic transition of 1987 cannot be seen as an anomaly. S ome theorists attribute the democratic transition in South Korea to the structural realignment of Korean society. Development strengthened the power of civil society and expanded its room to maneuver politi cally. Moreover, Chu n ' s neoconservative reforms turned him into a political leader without supportive groupS.36 Others find the determinants of the democratic opening in the cultural domain . Three decades of modernization and social change had shifted South Korea' s political
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atic values.37 culture away from authoritarian values and toward democr the incum by made choices to An eclectic view draws our attention pressure of result a as 987 1 in opening atic bent.38 Chun chose democr played by role the Yet . shifts l cultura and groups ion opposit from . external factors should not be underestimated or ignored l-security nationa ent subsequ and North The threat of force from the s civil Korea' South in tion interven military justify to concerns used 1980s the of half politics and authoritarian rule. Howev er, in the second Since . machina ex deus a as serve national security could no longer en fundam been had ters parame security l regiona and 1986, international led the tally realigne d. Gorbachev' s perestroika and glasnos t' dismant States. With hegemonic rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United , China reforms al structur and policy ic econom or its expedited open-do importantly, also posed less of a danger to the Korean peninsu la. More South Korea' s military threats from North Korea became more diluted . ment from commit security ing continu its strategic parity with the North, economic and n isolatio growing s Korea' North and States, the United Korea' s South to le stagnation shaped a security environment favorab longer no could military the and regime democratic transition . The ruling of grounds the on reform atic democr for demand override popular national security . 39 States had Pressur e from the United States also mattered. The United Despite Korea. South in politics c domesti about lent ambiva always been States often its rhetorical commitment to democracy, the United coup in supported authoritarian regimes in South Korea. The military to attest 1980 in power l politica of r takeove s ' Chun 1 9 6 1 as well as Korea' s this . Washin gton ' s limits on diplomatic interference with South over domestic politics , coupled with its intrinsic preference for stability ng preventi in leverage U.S. ned constrai uncertainty, fundamentally changes. ic democrat g steerin and rule ian authoritar toward In 1987, however, the United States took a different posture States United the for prudent was it n: transitio South Korea' s democratic 1987, y Februar 6 as early As change. atic to democr ed to be committ affairs, Gaston Sigur, then assistan t secretary of state for Asia-Pacific sent a cautionary warning to Seoul that better bilateral relations and depended on the Chun governm ent' s creating "a more open ce of legitimate political system." He even emphasized the importan to "civilian izing" the governm ent and urged the Korean military May, In 40 defense. national of " mission y "primar concentrate on its a clear then-Secretary of State George Schultz visited Seoul with that and changes tic message that Washing ton supported democra of issue the over e stalemat political the President Chun should resolve the political s, warning these Despite ly. peaceful ent amendm ional constitut the June situation in S eoul worsene d. On 1 8 June 1 987, at the height of urging Chun to letter a sent Reagan Uprisin g, then-President Ronald
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Chun not to use force against his opponents but to resume negotiations with opposition parties and take steps toward establishing full democ racy.4 1 Reagan also dispatched Sigur to Seoul on June 23 to assess the situation and to find a solution to the deepening crisis .42 U.S. congres sional pressures were much stronger. B oth the House and the Senate passed resolutions (H .R. 1 4 1 1S .R. 24 1 ) calling for South Korea' s resumption of negotiations on constitutional amendment to facilitate democratization. Bifrontal pressures from the Reagan administration and Congress did not dictate the democratic outcome per se, but they contributed significantly to facilitating Chun ' s compromise option . The United States was insistent on democratic reforms for two primary reasons. First, its support of democratic reforms was the most effective way to offset widespread anti-American sentiments resulting from the confluence of the Kwangju Incident, American endorsement of the Chun regime, and bilateral trade friction . Second, U.S. foreign policy was undergoing a profound change. The fall of the Marcos regime in the Philippines taught a valuable lesson that supporting corrupt, authoritarian regimes in the name of maintaining the status quo did not serve U . S . national interests . South Korea was different from the Philippines, but a similar logic was applied. While American pressures deterred Chun ' s reversal of democratic opening, Seoul ' s hosting of the 1 9 8 8 Olympic Games further constrained the hard-liners ' position. The Chun regime regarded hosting the Olympics as one of its greatest diplomatic achievements, but extensive civil unrest in 1 9 8 7 created a difficult situation. Neutralizing democratic movements by coercive measures would have severely damaged the regime' s internal and external image, which could have in tum threatened the Olympics by provoking international boycott. Pacifying the domestic political scene through compromise must have been the logical choice. Risking the Olympics for short-term gains would have been risking the regime ' s survival in the intermediate term. While external factors such as the security environment, U.S. pressures, and the politics of the Seoul Olympics effectively deterred coercive repression of democratic movements, transmission of images and ideas from the outside world shaped and boosted pressure from below by altering the patterns of political socialization. Indeed, South Korea was also riding the third wave of democratic change. The most salient trend was the growing cognitive dissonance between the country ' s economic success and political deformity. By the mid- 1 980s, South Korea emerged as an indisputable leader of the middle-income countries . Yet elective affinity between economic growth and democratic develop ment was not evident. S outh Korea was an economically advanced but politically backward nation. It was more because of their desire to differentiate themselves from the North by excelling not only in the economic arena but also in the political domain that the Korean
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populace, especially the middle class, turned in support of democratiza tion. Such cognitive dissonance was underlined by events in other parts of the world. Political albetu ra ("opening") in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile compelled South Koreans , especially intellectuals, to contrast their plight with that of their Latin American counterparts. A more direct demonstra tion effect came from Manila. Television broadcasts of "people' s power" and the fall of Marcos made a sudden and lasting impact on the minds of Koreans. The message was clear: The trade-off between bread and ballots was no longer justifiable, and democratic changes were not a remote ideal. People' s power was activated in South Korea as well. Perceptions and images can shake people' s minds but cannot feed the fire of democratic movements . In order to be mobilized for democratic causes, people must be guided by pertinent ideas and organizations. By the mid- 1 9 80s, democratic-movement groups in South Korea were well armed with new ideologies and intellectual discourses ranging from orthodox Marxism and neo-Marxism to dependencia (dependency theory). Armed with these exogenous ideas, groups strengthened their organiza tion by forming loose but extensive horizontal coalitions of workers, farmers, students, dissident intellectuals, and church groups. They were .no longer romantic preachers of liberal democracy as in the past. Their ideology was clear, strategic goals well defined, and plans of action well thought out. Transmitted ideas began to give new momentum to populist democratic changes . Finally, transnational networks of NGOs and overseas Koreans also played a noticeable role in facilitating democratic opening in South Korea.43 Viewed in this context, the democratic transition in South Korea was not an isolated incident driven solely by domestic dynamics. It was also profoundly influenced by external changes. While a favorable security environment, U . S . pressure, and the S eoul Olympics narrowed the space for authoritarian maneuvers , globalization of Korean society and subsequent cognitive dissonance, transmission of ideas, and formation of transnational democratic networks provided the catalyst critical to fostering democratic transition .
D emocratic Consolidation, International Systems S outh Korea' s democratic opening of 1 987 produced sweeping changes in institutions, state-society relations, and coalition structure; institutional restructuring has been extensive ever since. A constitutional amendment passed in October 1987 replaced the indirect presidential election with a direct one; the first was held in December of that year. In the four-way race, Roh Tae Woo won 3 6 percent of the vote. In the general election held in March 1 9 8 8 , the ruling Democratic Justice Party failed to secure a majority in the National Assembly.
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Free and fair electoral competition has since become fully institution alized on the national and local levels. Local governments were given autonomy as promised in the 29 June 1 987 declaration. Town and city councils and provincial assemblies were set up, and nationwide elections were held. Freedom of association and expression were institutionally ensured with the abolition of the B asic Press Law, which had been the legal instrument for controlling the mass media. Political prisoners were released, and other undemocratic statutes were either amended or removed.44 These reforms were accompanied by an unprecedented expansion of civil society .45 Interest groups and local labor unions proliferated. In a calculated reaction to existing social organizations allied with the ruling regime, the popular sector actively reconsolidated its previously underground organizations. Teachers , farmers, intellectuals, workers , and journalists all formed new interest groups that balanced government-con trolled representational organizations . Even urban peddlers and artists organized. S everal issue-specific public-interest groups concerned with economic justice and the environment also became more vocal.46 During the democratic transition, civil society not only expanded but became polarized into conservative and progressive camps. Furthermore, civil society under democratic opening became more vigilant-even hyperac tive. The number of civil protests and workers ' strikes rose exponen tially . Remi niscent of pol itical openings in 1 960 and 1 980, Korean society had become unruly .47 Expanded civil society , increased political activism, and institutional ized democratic constraints inhibited governability .48 The state could no longer use corporatist methods of co-optation and intimidation to tame civil society . The new political pluralism began to debunk the myth of the developmental state. State autonomy, executive dominance, bureau cratic unity, and insulation of decision-making machinery all began to be questioned by the politically activated civil society . A collective egoism emerged as the pronounced norm of political behavior and discourse. Following the lead of the labor sector, farmers , herb doctors, pharmacists, students-virtually all sectors of society-engaged in collective actions to advance their own particularistic interests. Decentral ization of political power through local autonomy also began to cripple center-local coordination. 49 As it was in other countries , democratic transition in South Korea was an uncertain and precarious process. In the short run, it evolved into u nruly chaos portending a major social crisis. The ruling regime responded by forming a grand conservative coalition. Roh co-opted old foes Kim Young Sam and Kim Jong Pil into the ruling circle and merged three parties-Roh' s ruling Democratic Justice Party and two opposition parties, the Reunification Democratic Party and the New Democratic Republican Party-into one, the Democratic Liberal Party.
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This move, which was intended to secure a majority in the National Assembly, transformed a four-party system into a two-party system, leaving Kim D ae Jung ' s Party for Peace and Democracy as the sole opposition party .50 In the 1 992 presidential race, however, a third p arty was added with the entry of the U nified National Party, which was organized by Chung Ju Young, chairman of the Hyundai Group. Kim Young Sam won the election, and the ruling party maintained a majority in the National Assembly . Despite the party' s two consecutive victories, however, democratic transition has entailed precarious party cleavages as well as unstable coalitions. The overaIl process of democratic transition has invited some pessimistic projections.51 Yet the inauguration of Kim Young Sam' s government and his aggressive pursuit of reform politics have defied the predictions of the skeptics. Kim has been effective in consolidating democratic institutions. His extensive anticorruption campaign and the implementation of the long-delayed "real name" deposit system as well as a "real name" real-estate registration system restored accountab ility and public confidence in the government. He also completed institutional reforms such as amending laws governing elections and political campaign financing, and introducing the election of heads of provincial governments . By purging the Hanaboi, the dominant military faction, Kim has drastically reduced the chances of military intervention in civilian politics . 52 Kim' s reforms are not, however, sufficient to assure democratic consolidation. Several domestic barriers have surfaced. Conservative counteroffensives have slowed his reform politics . Shaky party cleavages and the politics of personalism and regionalism have returned. Intraparty power struggles led Kim Jong Pil to defect from the ruling Democratic Liberal Party to form his own party, producing a tripartite party system. Old patterns of regionalism have recurred in recent local elections with the return of personalistic politics framed around three Kirns (Kim Young S am, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Jong Pill and cast the future of democratic consolidation into doubt. Yet democratic consolidation is ' inevitably an uneven process; thus periodic setbacks do not necessarily herald its demise. The most critical chaIlenge to South Korea' s democratic path is not internal but external. The foremost threat is inter-Korean relations and modes of national unification.53 The "Vietnamization" of the Korean peninsula could mean the end of the democratic process, although this scenario is highly unlikely . Even the German model, which is predicated on South Korea' s absorption of the North through the latter's collapse, could destabilize the process of democratic consolidation by producing a matrix of political, economic, and social uncertainties. The status quo is not completely safe, either: prolonged military tension with the North keeps the S outh Korean military a potential agent of destabilization.
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Thus managing inter-Korean relations i s directly related to democratic prospects in South Korea. Despite the internal and external chaIlenges, democratic consolidation seems to be an irreversible part of South Korea' s historical development. The question is not whether, but rather how the country will realize a stable democracy. This task requires new institutional designs and learning. Problems will emerge, but they will be transitional rather than perpetual .
Taiwan's Trans ition to Democracy Regime transition in Taiwan involves more than just a cnSlS of legitimac y. It also caIls into question the legitimacy of the state-its claim to sovereignty, the boundaries of its jurisdiction, and the compass of its citizenship . The foremost characteristic of the state in postwar Taiwan was the dubious nature of its constitution in both the interna tional system and domestic society . From the time that the Republic of China (ROC) was transplanted from mainland China to the island of Taiwan, the ROC ' s sovereign status has been chaIlenged repeatedly by the People' s Republic of China' s conflicting claim, aborted military actions, and unceasing threats of forced retrocession. Both Beijing and Taipei seek exclusive representation of all of China in the international community . For an extended period following the outbreak of the Korean War, Taiwan ' s precarious sovereignty was sustained essentially by U.S. hegemony and p ostwar security arrangements . On the domestic front, the legitimacy of the KMT regime and the justification of the longtime political dominance of the mainland elite were founded on a parallel principle: There is only one China, Taiwan is part of China, and the ROC government is the sole legitimate government of China. The "one-China principle" is the cornerstone that legitimizes the ROC ' s state structure and defines the history and national identity of the people on Taiwan-including the ethnic demarcations of Taiwanese (including both Min-nan and Hakka) and mainlander. 54 The very structure of the ROC state turned out to be the major source of its regime crisis . First, the state-sponsored formation of Chinese nationality has always met with strong resistance from certain quarters of the native society , especially the families of victims of the February 28th Incident of 1 947 (the first popular uprising of the native Taiwanese against KMT rule), overseas Taiwanese, and members of the Presbyterian Church (the last of these groups represents the Westernized native elite).5S Second, both the legitimacy of the state structure and the political security of the KMT regime were vulnerable to a reorientation in U. S . policy on China. Third, during regime transition, the struggle over democratic reform and the ensuing redistribution of power between native Taiwanese and mainlanders became inevitably entangled with an
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internal contestation over Taiwan ' s international status and the island' s future political relations with mainland China. The Chung-li Incident of 1 977 signaled the beginning of the old regime' s protracted debilitation.56 The incident set in motion a new drive for an island-wide alliance of opposition candidates borne of an updated perception of the incumbent regime ' s vulnerability. Of The death of Chiang course, one can attribute the surge in oppo in January 1988 sition movements in the late 1 970s and hastened the early 1 9 80s to a complex set of long-term breakdown of and short-term forces,57 but the major Taiwan's one-p arty impetus came from abroad. A loss of rule. diplomatic recognition triggered the weakening of the entrenched regime.58 The PRC-U. S . rapprochement in the early 1 970s set off a series of diplo matic setbacks for Taiwan. Loss of its UN seat to the PRC, expulsion from all major international organizations, and loss of recognition by major allies undermined the ROC ' s claims to sovereignty over China. This shock wave from abroad did not undermine the one-China principle in the international community,59 but called into question the KMT government' s capacity to preserve the status quo of Taiwan and the legitimacy of institutional arrangements at the national level . Taiwan ' s loss of diplomatic recognition was coupled with a series of peace overtures from Beijing starting in the late 1 970s. Thus the KMT was squeezed on two fronts . On one side, the PRC-initiated detente across the Taiwan Strait began to melt the besieged mentality of the Taiwan public and weakened the rationale for martial law. On the other side, abrupt changes in the external environment awakened the political awareness of some segments of the emerging middle class . This fertilized the soil for growth of a new political opposition. Despite the setback of the Kaohsiung Incident in 1 979 (the first major crackdown on political dissidents by the KMT, which followed a large-scale antigovernment demonstration in Kaohsiung), leaders of the tangwai moved decisively to form a quasi party in the early 1 9 80s.6O Then-President Chiang Ching-kuo responded to the emerging crisis with a series of political reforms designed to prevent a deeper crisis. In the last years of his life, Chiang single-handedly quelled dissenting voices within the old guard, removed some of the hard-liners from strategic positions, accelerated the process of political liberalization, and appointed a reform-minded Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, as his successor. Chiang' s decision to liberalize was accompanied b y a KMT-initiated redirection of policy toward the mainland, which activated a new mechanism of external constraints on the future evolution of regime transition.61 The death of Chiang i n January 1988 hastened the breakdown of Taiwan' s one-party rule. Lee Teng-hui stayed the course of reform and
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even exceeded Chian g ' s vision by trying to reconsolidate the KMT regime on a new political foundation_ During the transition, many tangwailDPP leaders linked the goal of democratization directly to the issue of Taiwanese identity and the principle of self-determination.62 As the political environment became even more permissive toward the end of the 1 9 80s, the radical wing of the DPP steadily pushed the party to harden its position on Taiwan independence. Popular support for Taiwan independence also rose with the unfolding of the new world order. The previously frozen one-China principle began to thaw in the warmth of the Soviet Union's breakup and the deterioration in U.S.-PRC relations after the Tiananmen bloodshed. A resurgence of ethnic and national strife accompanied the dissolution of the East bloc ; the political and territorial integrity of many existing states was seriously challenged. In many instances, the international community seemed receptive to some collective entities' claims to the rights of self-determination, autonomy, and secession . This development raised the hopes of the proponents of Taiwan independence.63 On the eve of the 199 1 National Assembly election, some crusaders pushed a resolution through the party convention to write Taiwan independence into the DPP ' s party charter. In 1 992, the party discarded an earlier version of its proposal for constitutional reform, which was intentionally vague on the question of sovereignty , and put forward a new draft constitution for the "Republic of Taiwan ." The conflict over democratic reform and national identity not only divided the opposition and the KMT but created a schism within the KMT elite itself. Lee startled many senior members of the Central Standing Committee by taking new foreign-policy initiatives . First, Lee sent a high-level delegation to Beijing to attend the 1 989 annual meeting of the Asian Development B ank. Second, Lee directed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to seek dual recognition from Taiwan ' s maj or allies in the Caribbean . The first move, in the eyes of some KMT leaders, amounted to a de facto recognition of the PRC regime ; the second marked a clear departure from the longstanding one-China principle. After the 1 990 presidential election, the coalition centered around President Lee was called the "mainstream faction." The coalition of Lee ' s opponents, which centered around Premier Hau Pei-tsun, became known as the "nonmainstream faction ."64 The nonmainstream faction always questioned Lee ' s commitment to Chinese nationalism and objected to his efforts to accommodate the DPP ideologically . The mainstream faction, on the other hand, characterized the nonmainstream faction as a conservative group interested only in preserving its past prerogatives and allied more closely with mainland China than with the 2 1 million people on the island.65 The conflict evolved i nto a clash between two irreconcilable ideolog ical claims about Taiwan' s statehood and national identity. In the end,
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the state became the arena in which competing forces strove to gain control of the state apparatus ' and impose a cultural hegemony and vision of nation-building in the direction of either Taiwanization or sinicization. On one hand, this clash is very different from the contin u ing interethnic strife and secessionist struggles that crippled and finally shattered the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, for what is involved is only a de j ure (theoretical), not a de facto (real) , revision of the territorial structure of state authority . On the other hand, the dangers of both political polarization and external intervention inherent in any process of revision of the territorial structure of the state are also present. The polarization over national identity and the threat of external intervention vastly complicated the negotiation of a fundamental political pact between the incumbent and the opposition-and among the KMT leaders as well. First, the polarization structured the debate around constitutional reform. The ROC constitution was adopted when the Nationalist government still exercised effective governance over most of China and thus is the quintessential legal embodiment of the one-China principle. The mainstream faction, fearing the domestic and external political risks associated with abolishing the existing constitution, favored a substantial revision within the current framework. The nonmainstream faction favored a minimum amendment. The DPP vowed to abolish the existing constitution and replace it with a new one that manifests the general will of the Taiwanese people. In 1 992 the KMT won control of the National Assembly and pushed through constitutional amendments with a strong element of unilateral imposition. Second, the polarization over national identity structured the debate over the choice of institutional design. The DPP, after years of internal debate, shifted its preference from parliamentarism to semipresidentialism and finally to presidentialism. The idealistic New Tide faction eventually gave up its longtime commitment to parliamentarism, for it was convinced by other factions of the DPP that a strong presidency is imperative for the cause of independence. Many DPP leaders believed that a popular election of the president would help accentuate Taiwan' s sovereign status i n the international community and foster growth o f a Taiwan-centered national identity .66 It was also argued that a strong presidency free of parliamentary oversight is less vulnerable to the political infiltration of the PRC and its collaborators. The mainstream faction supported direct election of the president. The nonmainstream faction , on the other hand, preferred indirect election, akin to an electoral-college system, and opposed popular election. Popular election was viewed by the nonmainstream faction as a pretext for further expansion of presidential power and a potential vehicle for self-determination. The clash between the two KMT factions over the issue of presidential election almost split the party during its 1 992 plenary meeting. The obstacle of direct presidential election was
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removed only with the departure of Hau Pei-tsun from the premiership and the resultant marginalization of the nonmainstream faction in January 1 99 3. Taiwan ' s transition to democracy has made giant strides in four areas: reinstitution of the 1 947 Constitution and the holding of "founding" elections ; emergence of a competitive party system; elite turnover; and social mobilization . Most remarkably, this progress has been accom plished without a serious breakdown of state authority or irreparable political disorder. 1) The reinstitution of the 1 947 Constitution and the holding of "founding " elections. After the abolition of the Temporary Provisions in May 1 99 1 and three phases of KMT-directed constitutional revision, most of the legal obstacles to functional representative democracy were removed. The December 1 992 Legislative Yuan election was the first in a series of founding elections . The emerging political system is both open and inclusive. Even the leaders of overseas Taiwan independence movements have legally returned to the island after decades of exile and entered the electoral process. 2) The emergence of a competitive party system. The KMT now has two bona fide competitors, the DPP and the New Party (NP).67 Opposition parties are now formally accepted by the incumbent regime and protected by relevant state statutes . 3) The Taiwanization of the power structure. This process, while not synonymous with democratization , has nevertheless significantly inspired popular aspirations for democratic reform. The transfer of executive power from the hands of mainlander old-timers to the native elite was largely completed with the appointment of Lien Chan as the first native Taiwanese premier immediately after the December 1 992 election. 4) The freeing of civil society. The mobilization of various social movements in the 1 9 80s loosened the authoritarian state' s grip on civil society at the grassroots level . Professional associations and student, intellectual , religious , and public-interest groups now occupy public space in a relatively unhindered manner.
Unfinished Tasks Despite these profound changes , Taiwan ' s new democracy still faces a series of difficult challenges that it must overcome if it is to be considered "consolidated." First, the very smoothness and swiftness of the transition meant that the reinstatement of the constitution was accomplished without real bargaining and compromise among the contending elites . The three parties disagree strongly on both the nature and logic of the emerging constitutional order, and it remains unclear whether the existing constitutional order can survive a change of governing party .
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Second, residual authoritarian elements have been preserved under the largely KMT-initiated reforms. Some key elements of the abolished Temporary Provisions, including the emergency power of the president and the presence of the National Security Agency within the office of the president, were revived under the new amendments. At the same time, the KMT leadership has been slow to restructure the party' s overcentralized apparatus and its privileged relation to state and society-reforms that are essential for the normal functioning of a popularly elected legislature. The issue of instituting civilian supremacy over the military persists. The military and the national-security apparatus, citing presidential prerogative, continue to evade attempts at direct supervision by members of the Legislative Yuan. There is little sign that the KMT plans to relax its partisan grip on the military and the national-security apparatus. Nor will it relinquish its control of the island' s three television networks, much less its coveted ownership of privileged business operations and monopolistic enterprises. Prospects for democratic consolidation in Taiwan are clouded not only by these holdover issues of regime transition but also by so-called money politics and mafia politics and their troubling implications for the legitimacy of the new democracy .68 None of the above, however, is more unsettling than the question of national identity . This issue, much like that of ethnic conflict, revolves around the "exclusive conceptions of legitimacy and symbols of worth." Such issues "yield competing demands that tend to be indivisible and therefore zero-sum."69 Furthermore, the PRC is attempting to impose its "one country, two systems" vision of nation-building from across the Taiwan Strait. Thus Taiwan ' s new democracy runs the risk of becoming overloaded. First, democratic procedure will be called upon to resolve the zero-sum conflict over national identity . Second; the perceived need to contain political infiltration by the PRC and the emergence of "the PRC ' s collaborators in Taiwan" may clash with respect for political pluralism, minority rights , and due process . In response to these challenges , President Lee has tried to consolidate Taiwan ' s fragile new democracy on a new foundation of state legit imacy. His approach has been three-pronged. On the international front, President Lee has tried to shore up Taiwan ' s precarious sovereign status by taking a series of new diplomatic initiatives : seeking dual recognition, applying for membership in the World Trade Organization, conducting unofficial state visits , and launching a bid for a seat in the UN General Assembly . With respect to cross-Strait relations, his government has attempted to persuade the PRC to accept a divided-nation model (like Germany before 1 990).70 On the domestic front, he has attempted to harness the DPP ' s pro-independence zeal by calling for "a sense of , shared-destiny among the 2 1 million people [of Taiwan ] . ,71 He even
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proposed bipartisan agreement on Taiwan ' s mainland and foreign policies . The three preconditions for lifting the ban on direct trade and direct air and sea links with mainland China stipulated in Taipei' s February 1 9 9 1 National Unification Guideline won tacit endorsement from many DPP leaders.72 They worried that an overconcentration of investment capital in and deepening of trade dependence on the PRC would increase Taiwan ' s vulnerability to B eijing ' s economic statecraft, thereby restricting Taiwan ' s independence option. Lee ' s decision to launch Taiwan ' s bid for UN membership in early 1 993 enabled the KMT leadership to develop a new type of political partnership with the DPP as the two parties converged for the first time on a common foreign-policy objective. The DPP had been keen to push for UN membership not only because membership would yield a multilateral guarantee of Taiwan ' s political autonomy and territorial security , but also because the bid itself would create a common ground on which members of Taiwan ' s different factions could gather to share emotions of loyalty and assurance. At the same time, the bid would inform the international community of Taiwan ' s aspirations to indepen dence. Mainland China' s internal politics, however, moved in a quite different direction. Beijing ' s looming succession crisis, coupled with a deep-seated suspicion that the West conspired to fragment China, pushed the leadership to harden its position on the Taiwan issue. Thus just as the KMT leadership was making headway in narrowing its ideological distance from the DPP, Beijing ' s suspicion of Taipei ' s agenda of "creeping independence" rose sharply . Especially alarming was Taipei' s bid for U N membership ; Beijing viewed this bold move a s a prelude to seeking formal independence. The PRC responded with its own three part strategy : "to blockade Taiwan diplomatically, to check Taiwan ,, militarily , and to drag along Taiwan economically. 73 In the diplomatic arena, Taipei ' s advancement in some small African and Central American countries was immediately met with vigorous countermoves from the PRC . Beijing has also had some success in fostering hostility to independence among Taiwan ' s busi ness elite by strengthening cross-S trait commercial ties. The PRC has devoted an increasing proportion of its defense budget to the buildup of its surgical-strike capability , amphibious landing forces, and blue-water navy . After its futile attempt to block Lee ' s unofficial visit to the United States in June 1 995, Beijing threatened Taipei with a week of missile tests off the northern coast of Taiwan. On the eve of the KMT' s presidential-nominating congress in late August 1 995, the People' s Liberation Army (PLA) launched a second round of missile tests near a Taiwan-controlled offshore island. The missile tests and the shock waves they set off sent Taiwan' s stock market into a 30 percent
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nosedive and devalued the New Taiwan dollar by 9 percent, starting a wave of capital flight. Lee ' s opponents were given fresh ammunition for their attacks on his foreign and mainland policy as well as on his leadership in general. The PRC hard-liners had evidently hoped that their threats would disrupt Lee ' s reelection bid and bring Taipei to its knees. The saber rattling in the Strait continued right up to election day on 23 March 1 996. To the disappointment of the hard-liners, the exercise did little to stop Lee ' s campaign momentum. In fact, the crisis in the Strait might have actually helped Lee Teng-hui ' s reelection by spurring many traditional DPP supporters to shift their support to Lee out of fear that Taiwan would lose ground to the PRC if the majority could not speak with one voice.74 The effect of the PLA ' s military threats were also mitigated by the decision of the United States to send two aircraft carrier battle groups to international waters near the Taiwan Strait. Nevertheless, Beijing ' s intervention shaped Taiwan ' s domestic debate on mainland and foreign policy in the campaign process and built up internal pressure for a change of course following the presidential election . These developments suggest that, as long as the PRC stands ready to infiltrate Taiwan ' s domestic political process and threatens to subvert, perhaps by force, any democratically elected government that allegedly promotes Taiwan independence, Taiwan ' s new democracy will have a difficult time on its way to consolidation.75 In this case, nonmembers of Taiwan society are participating directly and authoritatively-in disregard of democratic procedures and possibly in tacit alliance with the society' s members-in the allocation o f their values or the mobilization of support on behalf of their goals. The extent to which the PRC will have its way-that is, a "Hong Kongization" of Taiwan--depends on the strategic choices Taiwan ' s domestic actors make, the dynaIrics of the PRC ' s political succession, and the willingness of the international community to safeguard the right of minorities to self-rule in the furtherance of democracy. So far, shifting patterns of international intervention (especially from the West) in ethnic and territorial conflicts in the post-Cold War era provide little assurance to the people on Taiwan.
Prospects for Consolidation The international system and external actors have exerted profound but inconsistent influences on democratic transition and consolidation in South Korea and Taiwan. B ecause of the geographic location and the timing of these authoritarian breakdowns, demonstration effects were less salient in the case of these two NICs than in Eastern Europe. External linkages derived from Taiwan ' s and S outh Korea' s positions in the
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international economy allowed these NICs to be influenced both positively and negatively from abroad. Although these NICs depended on the United States for military deterrence and market access, Washington ' s intrinsic preference for stability over uncertainty con strained its willingness to leverage the transition of authoritarian rule and steer democratic change in the two countries. While a legacy of divided nationhood does not necessarily impede democratic consolidation, it complicates the process of democratic transition in these two NICs. This historic condition suggests a special role for the communist rival regime, whose desire for unification-by hostile means, if necessary-may become a new democracy ' s most menacing destabilizing factor. Also, this structural condition accentuates the international component of regime legitimization by exposing a sitting regime to loss of international recognition. Finally, a legacy of divided nationhood may activate a legitimacy crisis within the state structure in the course of regime transition. Without effective multilateral security arrangements and bilateral accord with the rival regime, the indeterminacy of the state structure will severely constrain prospects for democratic consolidation. In Taiwan, a deep-seated national-identity crisis obstructs the lasting compromise on constitutional design necessary to democracy ' s consolidation. The legacy of divided nationhood affected Taiwan differently than it did South Korea. Democratization in Taiwan brought about a much greater break in the continuity of the ROC ' s external orientations and policies . The emerging political forces in Taiwan seek a break from the status quo, while the new leadership in South Korea seeks to institution alize the existing national division. South Korea' s economic and ideological "superiority" has put North Korea on the defensive over the issue of national reunification. Taiwan ' s smaller size, however, puts the ROC in a decidedly weaker position vis-a-vis the mainland. The deliberate and unintended influences of the PRC in Taiwan ' s regime transition have been preponderant at all three phases of transi tion-authoritarian breakdown, transition to democracy, and democratic consolidation. Mainland China contributed to the breakdown of the KMT regime by altering the international system, hence the context of the regime' s evolution. Once democratization got under way, however, Taiwan ' s emerging aspirations to independence had the reverse effect of discomfiting mainland China. Concerted efforts on the part of industrialized democracies to stabilize the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait are crucial for safeguarding democracy in the two NICs. The case of inter-Korean relations does not present much of a challenge for the United S tates, Japan, and the European Union ; their security and economic interests and ideological inclination all reinforce one another. Cross-Strait relations, however, present a tougher moral dilemma for the maj or industrialized democra-
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cies ; their security and economic interests and ideological inclinations do not necessarily converge in this region. NOTES We thank Gordon Hein and Sung Chul Yang for their helpful comments and suggestions.
I . Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1 9 9 1 ) ; Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems �f Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 996), 72-76; Philippe Schmitter, "The International Context for Contemporary Democratization : Constraints and Opportunities upon Choice of National Institutions and Policies" (unpub!. ms., Stanford University, September 1 99 1 ) ; Geoffrey Pridham, "The International Dimensions of Democratization : Theory, Practice and Inter-regional Comparisons," in Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, and George Sanford, eds. , Building Democracies? The International Dimension of Democratization in Eastern Europe (London : Leicester University Press, 1 994); Larry Diamond, Juan J . Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Introduction: What Makes for Democracy?" in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds . , Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo . : Lynne Rienner, 1 995), 1-66. 2. See Donald Share, "Transition to Democracy and Transition Through Transaction," Comparative Political Studies 1 9 (January 1 987): 525-48; Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," International Social Science Jou rnal 1 3 8 (May 1 9 9 1 ) : 1 - 1 4 ; and John Higley and Richard Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 992). 3 . Pridham, Herring, and Sanford, eds . , Building Democracies ? 1 5 . 4 . For example, Schmitter, "The International Context for Contemporary Democratiza' tion" ; Geoffrey Pridham, ed . , Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (London: Leicester University Press, 1 9 9 1 ) ; Pridham, Herring, and Sanford, eds . , Building Democracies ?; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. 5. There are some notable exceptions. See Huntington, The Third Wave; and Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds . , Politics in Developing Countries. 6. This is not to suggest that external factors were less important in the first and second waves. As a matter of fact, in those earlier waves, foreign imposition actually determined the outcome of regime change in some cases. What is unique in the third wave is the consistency and expansiveness of the external influences. As Huntington indicates, in those earlier waves, either domestic or international factors played the key role in the overthrow of authoritarian regimes-not some mix of the two. See Huntington, The Third Wave, 3 5 . 7 . Lin z a n d Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 74-76. 8 . Huntington, The Third Wave, 77-7 8 . 9 . Diamond, Linz, a n d Lipset, eds . , Politics i n Developing Countries, 1 2 1 . 1 0 . Pridham, "The International Dimensions o f Democratization," 23-25.
I I . H untington, The Third Wave, 1 02 . 1 2 . Schmitter, "The International Context for Contemporary Democratization," 4. 1 3 . Pridham, "The International Dimensions of Democratization," I I . 1 4. Schmitter, "The International Context for Contemporary Democratization," 1 8- 1 9 .
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1 5 . Laurence Whitehead, "East-Central Europe in Comparative Perspective," in Pridham, ed., Encouraging Democracy, 32-59. 16. Yun-han Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1 992), 3 8-44. 1 7 . Robert E. Bedeski, "State Reform and Democracy in South Korea," in James Cotton, ed., Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean Relations (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1 993), 62-65. 1 8 . Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan, 1 02-9. 1 9 . Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds . , Politics in Developing Countries. 20. The U . S . market, which had absorbed close to 40 percent of the NICs ' total exports in the early 1 9 80s, has accounted for only about a quarter since 1993, while intra-East Asia trade has risen to more than half. See Yun-han Chu, "The Political Economy of Taiwan ' s Mainland Policy" (paper presented at the conference "Cross-Straits Relations and Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region," sponsored by the Mainland Affairs Council and the Institute for National Policy Research, Taipei, 27-29 March 1 995). 2 1 . The U.S. Congress has played a much more assertive role in pressuring the two NICs for democratic changes . Taiwan ' s human rights record was repeatedly scrutinized by the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee under the chairmanship of Stephen Solarz. In June 1 9 87, the House passed a nonbinding resolution asking the KMT to accelerate political reform and hold reelection for the national representative bodies. During the mid- 1 987 crisis, several U . S . senators introduced a bill (S.R. 1 392) that would impose economic sanctions on South Korea until there was progress toward democracy. The proposed sanctions included the termination of Generalized Systems of Preference (GSP) benefits for goods manufactured in South Korea and suspension of U . S . government insurance for U . S . firms investing in South Korea. See H.N. Kim, "Political Changes in South Korea and Their Implications for U.S.-Korean Security Relations," Korea and World Affairs I I (Winter 1 987): 662. 22. Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan, 30--3 2. 23. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1 995), 232-39, 276-82. 24. Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China (Stanford, Calif. : Hoover Institution Press, 1 9 89); Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu, "Electoral Competition and Political Democratization," in Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, eds. , Political Chan.ge in Taiwan (Boulder, Colo . : Lynne Rienner, 1 992). 25. For an extensive analysis of the constraining effect of an export-oriented industrialization strategy on the strategic choice of the incumbent and the opposition in democratic reform, see Chu, Crafting Democracy in Taiwan, 30--32. 26. Chalmers Johnson , "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," in Robert Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, and Iusuf Wanadi, eds . , Asian Economic Development: Present and Future (Berkeley: Institute of Asian S tudies, University of California, 1 985). 27. c.1. Moon, "Changing Patterns of B usiness-Government Relations in South Korea," in Andrew MacIntyre, ed., Business and Government in Industrializing Asia (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1 994), 1 42-66; Yun-han Chu, "The Realignment of B usiness-Government Relations and Regime Transition in Taiwan," in MacIntyre, ed., Business and Government in Industrializing Asia, 1 1 3-41 . 28. Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions; Moon, "Chan ging Patterns of Business-Government Relations in South Korea." 29. Moon, "Changing Patterns of Business-Government Relations in South Korea," 1 45-52.
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30. Bedeski, "State Reform and Democracy in South Korea," 62--{i 3 .
48. Moon and Kim, "Circle of Paradox."
3 1 . Chu, "The Political Economy o f Taiwan ' s Mainland Policy."
49. Hysop Lim , "Group Interests Get in the Way," Korea Focus I ( I 993) : [ G- 1 6 .
32. Dankwart Rustow, "Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics 2 (April 1 970): 362. Robert Dahl similarly posited that agreement on the legitimate territorial structure of the state is a prerequisite for the establishment of viable democratic institutions. See Robert Dahl, Democracy and lts Critics (New Haven, Con n . : Yale University Press, 1 989), 207 . 33. Bruce Cumings, "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy : Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences," lntemational Organization 38 (Winter 1 984): 1 --40. 34. Linz and Stepan, Problems qf Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 1 7- 1 8 . 35. Alfred Stepan, "The N e w Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil (New Haven, Conn . : Yale University Press, 1 973), 47--{i9 . 3 6 . Kyungryung Seong, e d . , Hankuk jungchi minjuwhaui Sahoejok Kiwon: Sahoe undongjok jupkeun (Social OIigins of political democratization in South Korea: A social movement approach) (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1 993), 85- 1 32; C.I. Moon, "The Demise of a Developmentalist State? The Politics of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment," Journal of Developing Societies 4 (April 1 9 89): 64-84. 37. A . Lee, "Cultural Shift and Popular Protests i n South Korea," Comparative Political Studies 26 (April 1 993): 63-80. 38. J.J. Choi, Hankuk hyupdaijungchiui kuzo wa byunwha (Structure and changes of contemporary Korean politics) (Seoul: Kkachi, 1 993); Hyug Baeg 1m, Hankukaesoui Minjuwha gwajung Bunsuk: Junryakjok suntaed ironeul jungsimuro (An analysis of the democratization process in South Korea, with reference to theory of strategic choice) (paper presented at a summer convention of the Korean Political Science Association, Seoul, December 1 990); Gil-hyun Yang, "Hankukui 1 987 yon minjuwha ihaenggws wirubutoui chaekryak" ( 1 987 democratic transition in South Korea and maneuvering from above), Hankuk gwa kukje jungchi (Korea and international politics) I I (Spring-Summer 1 995): 47--{i2; e . J . Moon and Y.C. Kim, "Circle of Paradox : Development, Democracy, and Politics in South Korea," in Adrian Leftwich, ed . . Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1 995), 1 38-67 . 39. e.J. Moon and S . S . Lee , "The Post-Cold War Security Agenda of South Korea," Pacific Review 8 (March 1 995): 99- 1 1 5 . 40. Gaston J. S igur, Jr., "Korean Politics i n Transition" (U.S. Department o f State Bulletin, Washington, D .e., April 1 9 87), 23-25. 4 1 . Larry A. Niksch, "Korea' s Political Crisis: Policy Alert" (Congressional Research Service Report 8-523F, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 1 987), 8; Kim, "Political Changes in South Korea," 228. 42. Kim, "Political Changes i n S outh Korea," 228-3 1 ; Sung-joo Han, "South Korea in 1 987: The Politics of Democratization," Asian Survey 28 (January 1 9 88): 52-6 1 . 43. National Christian Council of Korea (NCCK), 1970 yondaiui minjuwha undong (Democratic movements in the 1 970s) (Seoul: Human Rights Commission NCCK, 1 987), vo!. 5. 44. Cotton, ed., Korea Under Roh Tae-woo. 45. Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Hankuk jungchi sahoiui sea hurum (New trends in Korean politics and society) (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1 993). 46. Moon and Kim, "Circle of Paradox." 47. Seong, ed., Hankuk jungchi minjuwhaui Sahoejok Kiwon.
5 0 . H . J . Kim, Hankuk jungchi chegeron (Thesis on the Korean political system) (Seoul: Bakyoungsa, 1 992). 5 1 . Cumings, "Origins and Deve[opment of the Northeast Asian Political Economy"; Choi, Hankuk hyupdaijungchiui kuzo wa byunwha. 52. e.J. Moon and M.G. Kang, "Democratization and Military Intervention in South Korea: A Comparative Assessment," in James Cotton, ed . , From Roh Tae Woo to Kim Young Sam: Politics and Policy in the New Korean State (Sydney and New York: Longman and St. Marti n ' s , 1 995), 1 7G-9 1 . 53 . David I . Steinberg, "The Republic of Korea: Pluralizing Politics," i n Larry Diamond, Juan 1. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds . , Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner, 1 995), 369-4 1 5 ; Moon and Kim, "Circle of Paradox . " 5 4 . Thomas B . Go[d, "Civil Society and Taiwan ' s Quest for Identity" (unpub!. ms . , University of California, Berkeley, 1 99 1 ) . 55. The resistance has historical roots. The desire for a distinct Taiwanese identity and Taiwan' s ensuing quest for statehood were fostered by two related historical antecedents. The first is the extended Japanese colonial rule ( 1 895-1 945), during which the native elite was subordinated first to a state-orchestrated desinicization campaign and later a Japanization movement that proceeded in earnest during the Pacific war. At the same time, colonial rule facilitated Taiwan ' s early acquisition of a semiperipheral position relative to China within the Jap'anese Imperial Order through a state-directed modernization program. The second is the "birth defect" incurred during deco[onization and the reestablishment of Chinese ru[e over the island after the war. This birth defect, epitomized by the February 28th Incident, along with the imposed political subordination, precipitated the formation of the Taiwan independence movement among Taiwanese in exile. See George Kerr, Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1 974); Edward Chen, "Formosan Political Movements Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1 9 [ 4- 1 937," Journal of Asian Studies 31 (May [ 972): 477-97. The birth defect also attenuated the state' s effort to establish the supremacy of Chinese identity over local identity through resinicization and Mandarinization programs despite many shared ethnic heritages between the native and the newly arrived emigre group. See Edwin Winckler, "Taiwan Transition?" in Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, eds . , Democratization in Taiwan (Boulder, Co[o . : Lynne Rienner, 1 992), 22 1 -59; Gold, "Civil Society and Taiwan ' s Quest for Identity, " 1 -3 . 56. The Chung-Ii Incident happened during the 1 977 [ocal election, which marked a major electoral advancement of anti-KMT independent candidates. On election night, a mob of thousands provoked by alleged vote fraud stormed a police station. For a descriptive account of the incident, see Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (Armonk, N . Y . : M.E. Sharpe, 1 986), 1 1 4- 1 7 . 5 7 . Tien, The Great Transition, c h . 2; Tun-jen Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Lenin ist Regime in Taiwan," World Politics 42 (July 1 9 89): 47 1 -99; Chu, Crqfting Democracy in Taiwan, ch. 2. 5 8 . Cheng. "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," 475-77; Chu, Crqfting Democracy in Taiwan, 3 3-34. 59. During this external s hock wave, the one-China principle was actually institutional ized in the international arena with the signing of the Shanghai Communique ( I 972) and the August 1 7th Communique ( 1 982) between the United States and the PRe. These two documents precluded Taiwan' s unilaterally deciding its future political relationship with the PRC, including the independence option. See Cheng-yi Lin, Taiwan anquan de sanjia.o xietie (The equation of the triangle of Taiwan security) (Taipei : Laureate, 1 9 89), 20.
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60. Tangwai, which literally means "outside the party," was the umbrella label for the anti-KMT opposition before the forming . of the DPP in 1 986.
15
61. The new era began with the legalization of mainland visits in November 1 987. 62. Hu and Chu , "Electoral Competition and Political Democratization," 1 86-9 1 .
THE RISE OF "POLITICAL AID"
6 3 . Popular opinion o n the question of national identity has shifted markedly from favoring reunification in the late 1 980s to a more polarized distribution in the mid- 1 990s . Most pUblic-opinion polls conducted in 1 995, for example, showed that in a three-way choice the proportion of adults favoring an independence outcome fluctuates between 1 7 percent and 25 percent. A poll conducted by the DPP showed, however, that 26 percent of the respondents favored independence, 29. 1 percent favored future reunification, and 1 8 .4 percent favored the preservation of the status quo. Chung-kuo shih-pao (China times), 4 August 1 995, 4. 64. The two competing power blocs crystallized when Lee ignored possible objections of many senior KMT leaders by nominating Lee Yuan-tsu as his running mate. His rivals fought back by threatening to place a challenger in the presidential-election race. See Hung-mao Tien and Yun-han Chu, "Taiwan' s Domestic Political Reforms, Institutional Change and Power Realignment," in Gary Klintworth, ed. , Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1 994), 1 4. 65. Ibid . , 1 5 . 66. See Lin Tso-shui, "Zong-tong zhixuan y u xianzhong gaizhao" (Popular presidential election and constitutional reconstruction) (paper presented at the conference "Constitutional Reconstruction," sponsored by Chinese Association for Comparative Laws, Taipei, 9 December 1 993). 67. The New Party broke away from the KMT in August 1 993. 68. Yun-han Chu, "Taiwan ' s Unique Challenges," Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1 996): 69-82. 69. Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, "Introduction," in Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries, 42. 70. Chu, "The Political Economy of Taiwan ' s Mainland Policy," 22-23 . 7 1 . See, e.g., "The Inauguration Speech of Presip ent Lee Teng-hui (Government . Information Office, Taipei, 1 996). 72. The Guideline, promulgated in February 1 99 1 , essentially cast Taipei ' s bargaining position vis-a-vis mainland China in stone. The three preconditions are Beijing's renunciation of the use of force against Taiwan, recognition of Taiwan as a political entity on equal footing with the PRC, and provision to Taiwan of reasonable space for international recognition and participation. 73. This is a direct quote from a speech by PRC vice-premier Qian Qichen at the 1 994 annual working meeting on Taiwan affairs. See Minpao (Hong Kong), 14 May 1 994. 74. Most opinion polls show that the traditional DPP votes accounted for at least a fifth to a quarter of the 54 percent of the popular vote that went to Lee Teng-hui. Aggregate election statistics testify to this as well. For instance, a difference of almost 9 percentage points separates the share of the total popular vote that went to the DPP ' s 1 996 presidential candidate and the share that went to the same party' s candidates for the National Assembly. 75. Beijing is quite open about its political objectives . In its official documents, it calls for the PRC "to peddle the [domesticl politics through business; to influence the [Taiwanesel government through the people." See Mainland Affairs Council, "White Paper on Cross-Strmts Relations" (Taipei, 1 994), 37.
Michael Pinto-Duschinsky
Michael Pinto-Duschinsky is a senior research fellow at Brunei Univer sity, London, and a member of the Board of Governors of Britain 's Westminster Foundation for Democracy. Since 1989 he has been a consultant on democratization policy to the Policy Planning Staff of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He is the author of British Political Finance, 1 83 0-- 1 980, and is a regular contributor to the Times of London.
I
n an 1 862 review of international relations since the Napoleonic Wars, Lord S alisbury, a future B ritish foreign secretary and prime minister, issued the following warning: "All the failures that have taken place have arisen from one cause: the practice of foreign intervention in domestic quarrels. There is no experience which the experience of nations more uniformly condemns, and none which governments more consistently pursue. . . . [H]istory . . . is strewn with the wrecks of national prosperity which these well-meant interventions have caused. Often they ruin at once the party on whose behalf they are made; and even if they bring it to a seeming victory at first, they ruin it not less effectively in the end."! Lord S alisbury would have been even more concerned had he lived to witness current trends. 1n recent years, governments , international organizations, and nongo V;nmental bodies have become increasingly ready to intervene in the political life of other nations. They have justified these activities in the name of "democracy building, " "political aid," or the promotion of "civil society" and "good government. S o manifold have become such projects of "political aid" (to use the language of their proponents) or of "meddling" and "interference" (in the terms of the critics) that a thorough survey is not possible here. B ut a realistic assessment of contemporary developments in international relations-particularly in democratization-must include a review of their role. " _
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This essay first summarizes briefly the existing political-aid schemes, and then examines the uncertainties and challenges of democracy-. building . Only publicly funded organizations are examined here.2 Private bodies are excluded, even though some (notably the network of foundations established and funded by George Soros) are highly significant. 3 This analysis is limited to the foreign activities of states and international organizations about which it is easy to gather information, although some of the most determined foreign interventions may be carried out by non-Western nations-including Middle Eastern states-whose schemes are still shrouded in mystery and rumor.
I. Actors and Schemes States attempt to sway the internal politics of foreign countries in a number of ways. It is helpful to distinguish between actions taken by individual states and those of regional and international bodies . It also is useful to distinguish between measures that involve policy and those that consist of projects and expenditures. For example, in the 1980s, efforts aimed at eliminating apartheid in South Africa were of both types. At the level of policy, countries typically imposed economic sanctions. At the level of proj ects , some countries (and international bodies, such as the European Union) provided financial and other forms of assistance to anti-apartheid organizations within South Africa. One of the most important trends in political aid has been donor states' use of specialized organizations-frequently linked with political parties-as channels for action . Although these bodies receive most, if not all, of their funds from the public purse, a number of characteristics distance them from their parent governments and thereby make them better able to participate directly in political activities within recipient countrieS . First, unlike secret services, which have traditionally meddled in foreign nations ' political affairs, these new bodies are completely or largely open about their projects. In practice, openly acknowledged activities not only are more acceptable, they avoid the negative publicity associated with "secret" activities that become public knowledge or the subject of speculation. Second, the new political-aid bodies have a distinct identity and name. Decisions about projects are normally the responsibility of an independent board of governors in the donor country. Organizational activities are therefore kept at arm ' s length from the sponsor govern ment. Third, several political parties in the donor country are frequently involved in giving assistance to counterpart parties abroad. Aid that is transmitted through a number of parties in the donor nation to a variety of ideologically compatible organizations in a recipient country is less
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subject to criticism than is aid that comes directly from a foreign government and benefits a single party.
The Stiftung Model The method of delivering political aid described above was pioneered by a set of foundations (Stiftungen) in the Federal Republic of Germany, each of which was closely linked with (though technically independent from) a major German political party.4 By 1 957, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which had grown out of the Social Democratic Party, was using money provided by the West German foreign ministry for its work with ORIT, the organization of anticommunist trade unions in Latin America. Starting in 1 962, following the creation of the Bundesminister ium fiir wirtschaftliche Zusarnmunarbeit, a development-aid ministry, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation began to receive regular and increasingly large grants for its operations in developing countries. The aid ministry made similar payments to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Christian Democratic Union) and, on a lesser scale, to the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (Free Democratic Party) . Subsidies later went to the Hanns Seidel Foundation (Christian Social Union) and have recently been extended to the Regenbogen Foundation (the Greens). In addition to the money from the aid ministry, the political foundations have since 1978 received smaller sums from the foreign office for work within industrial ized countries. The foreign projects of the German party foundations are striking for their variety and scale. By 1 989, the Stiftungen were receiving $ 1 72 million from the aid ministry plus $ 1 8 million from the foreign ministry-a total of $ 1 90 million.5 Between 1962 and 1 995 the German aid ministry gave over $3 billion for the political foundations' overseas activities. In 1 993 alone, payments to the St�"tungen from the aid ministry totaled over $2 1 8 million . Public funding on this scale has enabled the foundations to build a formidable network of overseas offices, each staffed by at least one resident German director and by permanent local staff.6 Though troubled by occasional problems and scandals, the Stiftungen have proved to be powerful instruments not only for promoting democrac)" but also for furthering German interests and contacts. Several found;tio�s �e frequentryactivei�th;-s��� foreign country, where each backs a different political party , trade union, or business or civic organization. The fact that opposing parties in the recipient country receive assistance and the fact that the money comes directly from a German foundation (and only indirectly from the German government) help avoid accusations of interference. The Stiftung system serves Germany' s national interests as well. One Stiftung official described the use of German party foundations as channels for electoral assistance by
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saying, "We back several horses in the race; whichever is the victor, Germany wins." Another consequence of the generous flow of public funds to German political foundations is that foundations have come to play vital roles within the party internationals-the Socialist International, the Liberal International, the International Democrat Union (conservative), and the Christian Democrat International.
North America In 1 9 8 2 U . S . president Ronald Reagan delivered a speech to the British Parliament in which he praised the work of German political foundations and set out the case for promoting democracy. In 1 984 a new body became operational in Washington: the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), funded by the U.S. Congress. The NED uses its annual grant from Congress in large part to approve and control the projects of four "core grantees": 1 ) the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, a specially created body legally distinct from but connected with the Democratic Party ; 2) the International Republican Institute, connected with the Republican Party; 3) the Center for International Private Enterprise, a body linked with the American business community through the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; and 4) the Free Trade Union Institute, linked with the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL CIO). Apart from these "core" allocations , the NED ' s board also annually approves scores of grants to indigenous grassroots organizations promoting democratic values and initiatives in nondemocratic or transitional countries. Despite strong bipartisan support in both Congress and the White House, the NED faces an annual battle over its appropriation . That appropriation has remained far smaller than those of German political foundations. From $ 1 8 million in 1 984, the NED' s congressional grant fell to $ 1 5 . 8 million in 1 989, rising to $35 million in fiscal year 1 994-95 before falling to its current level of $30 million. (The four core grantees combined receive a little over half of this amount in equal shares .) In addition, the two party foundations-the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute-have received increasing sums in special grants earmarked for particular purposes by Congress or by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).7 The Montreal-based International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development was created in 1988 by the Canadian Parliament. The center became operational in 1 990; by fiscal year 1 993-94, it had an annual government grant equivalent to US$3.7 million. It has a greater focus on human rights than do its German and
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U.S . counterparts, and it does not channel money through Canadian parties.
Europe In 1 990, the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocated an annual budget equivalent to $ 1 . 1 million to Dutch parliamentary parties to promote their sister parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Some of the parties created foundations to administer the projects . The founda tions of the main parties are: Eduardo Frei Foundation for International S olidarity (Christian Democratic Appeal and Christian Democrat parties), Alfred Mozer S tichting (Labor Party ; responsible for Eastern Europe), Instituut Voor S amenwerking Oost- en Midden-Europa (Central and Eastern European Foundation D66; Demokrats 66 and Green Left parties). The People' s Party for Freedom and Democracy (right-wing liberal) receives its subsidy at its international secretariat.8 Since 1 994, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has given a further $2.7 million to Stichting voor het Nieuwe Zuid Afrika, a foundation created by eight Dutch parties to support the democratization process in South Africa. Since 1 992, Britain' s Foreign and Commonwealth Office has funded the specially created Westminster Foundation for Democracy. Its structure resembles that of the NED, albeit on a much smaller scale. The Westminster Foundation is controlled by a board consisting partly of governors nominated by the parliamentary parties and partly of governors drawn from "a broad spectrum of public life," including trade union and business leaders and academics. Half of its grants are allocated to the political parties that are represented in the House of Commons. With this money, party organizations administer projects for the benefit of sister parties abroad, especially in Eastern Europe, the former S oviet Union, and English-speaking East Africa. The other half of the Westminster Foundation' s grants go to nonparty projects such as aid to independent media, unions, and human rights groups. In fiscal year 1 995-96, the foundation ' s overall government grant was $4 million. France created in 1 992 a modest system of publicly funded political foundations on the German model .9 Core funding was provided by the prime minister ' s office. With the departure of a Socialist premier, the incoming administration of Edouard B alladur cut off these grants, but the existing foundations continued to receive limited public funding on a project-by-proj ect basis . In 1 996, President Jacques Chirac responded positively to an initiative from the S ocialist former premier Pierre Mauroy, who wished to put the public funding of French party foundations on a firmer footing. Prime Minister Alain Juppe commissioned Jacques Oudin, a senior Gaullist senator, to investigate; a maj or international conference on the topic was held in June 1 99 6 at the Senate. In July 1 996 Oudin issued a two-
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volume report together with proposed legislation that included public financing for the international activities of French party foundations; Philippe Seguin, president of the National Assembly, rejected the proposal . It was commonly feared that public funds for overseas activities would find their way into the domestic coffers of the French parties and thus exacerbate the party-finance scandals that had already rocked the French political establishment. The Gaullists (Rally for the Republic) and their allies, the Independents (Union for French Democ racy) nevertheless proceeded in autumn 1 996 to establish new party foundations without core public fu nding. The organization founded in November 1 996 by Valery Giscard d' Estaing is called the Fondation Montesquieu pour la Democratie en Europe. Other existing foundations are Fondation Robert Schuman (Union for French Democracy; active in Eastern Europe) and Fondation Jean Jaures (Socialist Party ; active in Eastern Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America). Following a study by the S wedish parliament, Sweden became in July 1 995 the latest country to use organizations attached to its political parties to assist political development abroad. The S wedish Foreign Ministry has assigned an amount equivalent to $3.7 million to Swedish parties for transmission to counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe. The main parties' organizations for carrying out such projects are Centerns Internationelle Fond (Center Party), Jarl Hjalmarsson-stiftelsen (Moderate Coalition Party) , Olof Palme Internationella Centrum (Social Democratic Labor Party) , and the S wedish International Liberal Center. lO The widespread use of party foundations as channels for conveying public funds in donor countries to political organizations in new democracies is illustrated by the following list. Each foundation is linked with a left-of-center party in its own country and each uses public funds to assist counterpart parties abroad: Karl Renner Institute (Austria); l l Westminster Foundation for Democracy (Great Britain); Fondation Jean Jaures (France) ; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Germany); Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (Greece) ; Alfred Mozer Stichting (Holland); Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (Italy); Olof Palme International Center (Sweden ) . 1 2 The availability of public funding for overseas purposes has enabled a number of European member parties of the Socialist International to establish the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, an organization in B russels that coordinates aid to sister parties in emerging democracies . This body, too, is financed in part by public funding, in this case from Austria. 13
Government Ministries and Agencies Official aid agencies have not altogether welcomed the creation of bodies that specialize in promoting democracy. A number of aid
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agencies feel that the development of democratic government is the consequence of economic development, not a precondition. At best, they see democracy-building as a diversion from the central tasks of providing economic aid; alleviating poverty and famine; and developing agriculture, education, and health care. At worst, aid agencies see democracy-building as a threat to their central mission. One response by the aid bureaucracies to the democracy "vogue" has been to give existing projects new titles . For instance, USAID decided at one point that half its grants to scholarship programs should be included under the category of "Democratic Initiatives," thus satisfying the policy demand for greater commitment to political refonD. 14 The United States is by no means the only country where this has happened. Alongside the cosmetic changes have come substantive changes . Since the late 1 980s, aid agencies have increasingly funded projects in human ,, rights, "good government," and "participatory development. 15 Some aid agencies , such as those of the Netherlands and S weden, have longstand ing programs of aid to foreign human rights organizations, trade unions, and even such liberation movements as the African National Congress . Grants for training public officials in developing countries are not new. The shift is seen in a series of policy declarations as well as in the creation of new grants . Following a parliamentary resolution, Denmark' s development agency stated in 1 9 8 8 that respect for human rights was to be a central objective of Danish development cooperation . Democratiza tion and "good government" were subsequently added to its explicit objectives . In 1 990, the Norwegian parliament allocated an amount equivalent to $9.3 million to the Norwegian Fund for Democracy in its aid budget. In the same year, Nordic ministers of development cooperatio n issued the "Molde Communique," which stressed the important role democracy plays in development and pledged active Nordic support for human rights and for democratization. USAID ' s Democracy Initiative, which was launched in 1 990 during the administration of George Bush, has been followed under President Bill Clinton by the Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act of 1 994. Larry Diamond calcul ated that USAID ' s proposed budget for 1 996 included some $500 million earmarked for political assistance for democrac y . 1 6 Britai n' s foreign secretary and minister for overseas development have both made major statements emphasizing the government' s commitment to fostering the new democracies of Eastern Europe and stressing "good ,, government. 1 7 In 1 989 a joint unit, administered by the diplomatic wing of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and by the Overseas Development Administration, was created to provide technical assistance to the emerging democracies of the crumbling Soviet bloc. Named the "Know How Fund," it has devoted most of its resources to projects concerning economic reform, privatization, and the creation of financial
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institutions. A small portion of its budget has gone to political and "good government" projects, including assistance for public administra� tion, the training of j ournalists, and a series of special broadcasts in Russia prepared by the BBC World Service under a project called the "Marshall Plan of the Mind ."IB In 1 993 the Know How Fund allocated $0.8 million to a special democracy fund for Russia. A Canadian International Development Agency policy paper of July 1 99 1 described the agency' s objectives as promoting "A) Respect for ,, human rights . B) Democratic pluralism. C) Good governance. 19 These became major themes of the Canadian Foreign Policy Framework approved by the cabinet in December 1 99 1 . In the Federal Republic of Germany, the minister for economic cooperation announced in 1 990 that aid allocations would be partly determined by recipient countries ' adherence to five different criteria, among which were political participation, human rights, and a satisfac tory legal environment (including the independence of the judiciary). Switzerland' s 1 99 1 "Image directrice" of the Directorate for Develop ment Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid included "human rights" and "a more political approach to poverty alleviation" among its criteria for the selection of proj ects . France, which is considered to be relatively inactive in the field of democracy promotion, was nevertheless a party to the La B aule Declaration of 1 989, following which French foreign assistance policy began paying greater attention to the promotion of democracy . A country that has rejected the inclusion o f democracy-building in its development program is Belgium. In the early 1 990s, Belgium stated in a confidential document submitted to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that "an overtly radical support to democracy can provoke a rupture which results in loss of contact with, and loss of influence on, the leaders of the country. This may, paradoxically, play into the hands of anti-democratic forces , as demonstrated by events in Central Africa."
Conditionality A related trend is that development agencies, ministries of foreign affairs, and international organizations have become considerably bolder in recent years in making their aid conditional on recipient countries' practices in the fields of human rights and governance. With the exception of a few donor countries (particularly Australia), most of the member states of the OECD' s Development Assistance Committee support conditionality in some form or other. Donor nations commonly make a distinction between using the stick and the carrot ("negative" and "positive" conditionality). Donors prefer to offer the carrot of expanded aid as a reward to nations that improve
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their human rights records . In exceptional circumstances, donors also threaten the stick of cuts in aid or, in extreme circumstances, of economic and other sanctions.20 An OECD survey of 1 993 captured examples of conditionality imposed by the Development Assistance Committee' s member states. For example, Canada' s policy stated that "aid allocations will favor countries which demonstrate respect for human rights ." As a result, Canada suspended, reduced, or retargeted aid to China, Haiti, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Zaire. Denmark ' s policy states that the "prospect of achieving effective progress in furthering democracy" is a criterion for choosing the 20 to 25 countries where Danish development assistance is concentrated . In 1 993, Germany increased aid to nine countries and decreased aid to six countries in response to the recipients' human rights and democratization records . Japan' s policy states that military expendi tures in developing countries "are of great concern ." Japan links its aid to developing countries with limits on military spending through "quiet dialogue. " The Netherlands imposed negative conditionality in Indonesia, Malawi, and Suriname, though "humanitarian and emergency aid are continued." S witzerland suspended aid in B olivia, Haiti, and Burma, while the United Kingdom suspended or terminated aid to Burma, Sri Lanka, Kenya, and Sudan . The number of international declarations and conventions regarding human rights, minority rights, and democratic government is growing. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 25, 1 966) provides that every citizen has "the right to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections ." These must be held by secret ballot "in circumstances which guarantee the free expression of the will ,, of the electors. 2 1 The European Convention on Human Rights (Protocol I, Article 3, 1 952), the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 23, 1 969), and, to a lesser extent, the African Charter on Human and Peoples ' Rights (Article 25, 1 9 8 1 ) include similar commitments. The list is extended by other documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ( 1 948), the document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (June 1 990),22 the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (November 1 990), the Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 1 99 1 ,23 and the Maastricht Treaty on European Union ( 1 992) . A group of the Council of Europe is currently working to draw up a declaration setting out a full definition of , "pluralist democracy.' 24 International law is subtle, complex, and controversial. Differences in interpretation abound, and there is considerable disagreement about whether these documents supersede traditional int ational law on nonintervention in the internal affairs of states.25 j Nevertheless, the proliferation of prodemocracy and pro-human rightS'conventions and declarations, combined with the establishment of human rights commis-
�
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sions and international courts, clearly tends to undermine noninterference doctrineiQ
Re g ional and International Organizations Democracy promotion is a field to which international bodies are well suited. Given the struggle for funds, competing organizations have been quick to exploit the bureaucratic opportunities that the growing legitimacy of political aid affords. The more closely organizations' activities are examined, the more varied and extensive the democracy building contributions of international bodies turn out to be. Since its participation in organizing the Nicaraguan election of 1 990, the United Nations has become heavily involved in electoral assistance.26 In 1 992 an Electoral Assistance Unit was created within the department of peacekeeping operations. The unit' s survey of electoral-assistance activities during 1 992 and 1 993 included reports of UN involvement in no fewer than 49 countries .27 Among the largest operations have been those in Cambodia, where the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia spent $ 1 .9 billion before the 1 993 elections, including an estimated $300 million or more on electoral assistance; in South Africa, where the LTN bill for observing the 1 994 election was $33 million ; and in Angola, where for the September 1 992 elections the electoral component of the UN' s operations consisted of a massive operation that included 98 international staff, 400 observers, and helicopters to transport electoral materials.28 The size and decentralized nature of the bureaucracy of the European Union (EU) makes it hard to gather details of expenditures under different budget lines. The 1 994 budget attempted to gather information on different EU projects in a single chapter. The following items, collectively titled the "European Democracy Initiative," are themselves incomplete. B7 5 200
Phare democracy program
$ 1 1 . 9 million
(Central and Eastern Europe) B7 5 20 1
Democracy and pacification
B7 5 2 1 0
in ex-Yugoslavi a Tacis democracy program
$4. 8 million $ 1 1 .9 million .
(former Soviet Union) B7 5 220
H uman rights and democracy
$ 1 6. 6 million
in developing countries $ 1 5 . 5 million
B7 5230
Latin America democracy program
B 7 5 240 B7 5 24 1
NGO human rights program Human rights i n Turkey
$0.6 milli on
Centers for the rehabilitation
$2.4 million
B 7 5 270
$5.9 million
of victims of torture TOTAL
$69.6 mi llion
29
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To this list must be added the EU' s spending on the 1 994 election in South Africa-grants administered via churches, trade unions, and the ,, Kagiso Trust to give "assistance to the victims of Apartheid 30-as well as democratization efforts for Palestinians. 3 1 Since the list has a narrow definition of democracy i nitiatives, it omits spending on "good govern ment" projects involving civil-service reform, local government, and other public-administration measures in emerging democracies. The Phare and Tacis programs have spent heavily on such projects outside the confines of their democracy programs?2 The Strasbourg-based Council of Europe aims to be an active player in the democratization field. It is concerned especially with human rights and legal frameworks, minority rights, media, and the role of parliamen tary institutions. The council ' s main expenditures are for numerous conferences, semin ars, and studies . It also provides occasional grants. In 1 990 the Council of Europe established the Demosthenes Program to provide Central and East European countries with expert assistance from the Council of Europe and its member states on the organization and functioning of participatory democracy. In 1 99 3 , an amount equal to $9 . 8 million was allocated to Demosthenes alone. Since "Demosthenes Program" is an umbrella term, it is unclear how many other programs are included in this budget. The Europe-wide Interparliamentary Co-operation Program conducts information seminars for East European parliamentarians and staff, assists with drafting parliamentary rules, and provides legislative advice by groups of experts. The Intergovernmental Program includes working groups on human rights and "genuine" democracy, sexual equality, minority rights, local democracy, public administration, and the rule of law. The European Commission for Democracy Through Law (the Venice Commission) was created in 1 990 and is based in Venice at the Scuola Grande di S an Giovanni Evangelista. Besides the normal round of conferences and studies , the Venice Commission runs the University for Democracy (Unidem), a program with universities in Central and Eastern Europe. The International Institute for Democracy is a small body-its 1 994 budget was $ l l O,OOO-that acts mainly as an informa tion clearinghouse.33 Following the Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 1 99 1 , the London-based Commonwealth Secretariat, whose members are countries of the former British Empire, has given strategic priority to democracy building and human rights . Commonwealth activities include observing elections, assisting in drawing up lists of eligible voters, helping to draft constitutional documents , providing legal assistance, and supporting anti apartheid activities and human rights projects .34 Other Commonwealth institutions are active. The Commonwealth Trade Union Congress, whose 1 993 income totaled $ 1 .5 million, plays a particularly valuable role in supporting trade unions in Africa. The
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Commonwealth Parliamentary Association ( 1 992 budget of $2. 1 million) not only acts as a forum for legislators but has also organized election observations .35 Since its creation in 1 99 1 , the Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has played a significant role in the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union.36 Other organizations that have become active in election observation and aspects of democratization are the Geneva-based Inter-Parliamentary Union as well as the Organization of American States and the Organiza tion of African Unity. Several international bodies concerned primarily with economic matters have become increasingly interested in questions of "good government" and "participatory development." In 1 989 the World Bank issued a maj or report on the economic crisis in sub-Saharan Africa in which it stressed that the basic problem underlying Africa's development problems was a "crisis of governance" : corrupt, coercive, overcentralized, and arbitrary rule could not sustain a dynamic economy.37 The World Bank has funded projects designed to reform the public sector and spur participation in political life. In 1 992, it established a $25 million Institutional Development Fund. Of 57 projects approved in 1 993 , four were concerned with human-resource development and women in development (in Gabon, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Chile) and 20 with public-sector reform. Public-sector projects included management reform in Zambia, civil-service reform in Albania and Poland, local-government reform in Bulgaria, and assistance in improving the legal system in Lebanon?8 The OECD has a program to promote civil-service reform in Eastern Europe and a Development Assistance Committee that has helped among development agencies coordinate information and -policy concerning good government and participatory development. The European B ank for Reconstruction and Development has made its aid to former Soviet bloc countries conditional on progress toward democracy. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance is a Swedish-inspired organization headquartered on the small island of Stroemsberg, in the center of Stockholm. The moving force behind its foundation, and its first secretary-general, is Bengt S aeve-Soederbergh, a former head of Sweden' s development agency. Launched in February 1 995, the institute has 1 4 contributing member countries : Australia, B arbados, B elgium, Costa Rica, Chile, Denmark, Finland, India, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, S outh Africa, and Sweden. Parliamentarians for Global Action and the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights have an organizational attachment to the institute. With a budget scheduled to reach $ 8 . 5 million by 1 99 8 , the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance is not a grant-givi ng
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body but concentrates on research, creating a data bank and supplying information services, setting guidelines (e.g., for international electoral observations), and providing advisory services.
II. Challenges of Democracy-Building Governments of developed nations were already starting to focus on democracy-building by the late 1 980s. The sudden collapse of the Soviet empire contributed to a rapid expansion of those efforts . By 1 99 1 , works such as Joshua Muravchik' s Exporting Democracy: FUlfilling America 's Destiny outlined desires for the future in ambitious and optimistic terms, ,, raising hopes for the emergence of "a new order of the ages. 39 It was inevitable that the first flush of celebration at the end of the Cold War would be succeeded by more sober reflections . Economic crises, mafia-style banditry, and territorial conflict in much of the former Soviet Union; violence in the former Yugoslavia; the challenge of Muslim fundamentalism in Algeria and elsewhere; and continuing abuses of human rights in Central America, B urma, and much of Africa have all brought policy makers and scholars down to earth. The experiences of Cambodia, Angola, and Haiti have shown that the act of holding an election--even with extensive foreign supervision and aid-does not solve the problems of deeply divided societies . Moreover, experiences in Somalia and Bosnia have reinforced the expensive lessons of the limits of outside intervention--even by the superpowers-that the United S tates learned in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan . These events have been accompanied by a range of popular and academic works that have attacked the "millenarian" zeal of the democratizers .4o Critics include not only radicals, such as Noam Chomsky ,41 but also prominent political scientists , especially specialists in Latin American affairs such as Thomas Carothers, Andrew Hurrell , Abraham Lowenthal , and Laurence Whitehead.42 It is significant that, apart from those of the radical fringe, these cautionary writings do not attack the notion of democracy promotion per se. Rather, they reserve their fire for overambitious, ill-considered ventures and for un wise triumphalism. I agree. Countries may be justified in mounting efforts to promote democracy abroad, but such proj ects need to be carried out with care. This approach is not, in fact, at odds with Lord S alisbury' s noninterventionism. Even in the nineteenth century, absolute isolationism was impractical. Salisbury ' s central argument was not that Britain should avoid entanglements altogether, but that the country should avoid commitments that it could not or would not honor. S alisbury condemned bluster and mixing "fierce notes and pacific measures." The ideal foreign policy should have limited aims and stick to them in practice. There is no shortage of challenges to democratic consolidation . For
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The Rise of "Pol itical Aid "
convenien c��_wiU- - be_ considere_d. jILthr.e!L grQ..up.LJ!.QliticaLchaL lenges ; challenges of choosing priorities and measuring suc.c�S.S;_< I!:!d practical challenges of enhancing the effectiveness of democracy-bltil din projects . I put forward a principal rule concerning the politic al chal lenges : Have limited goals but follow them consistently . In sett ing priorities for expenditures on democratization projects, the focu s sh oul d be on practicalities of the projects. This is likely to be more product ive than searching for scientific and theoretical judgments . The planning for political-aid proj ects needs to be more opportunistic than that for conventional development projects.
g
Political Challenges 1) Unrealistic expectations. Given the shallow nature of television reporting of international affairs, it is hardly surprising that world politics should appear as a succession of democratic triumphs and tragedies . Hundreds of millions of viewers witnessed the fall of President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines ; the release of Nelson Mandela and the first multiracial elections in South Africa; the breach of the B erlin Wall ; and the succession of demonstrations heralding the end of communist rule in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Albania. Then viewers saw the Russian parliament being shelled, emaciated prisoners of war in Bosnia, refugee camps in Rwanda, refugee boats flowing from Haiti, and fighting in Chechnya. The sudden breakup of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact encouraged an unduly optimistic response from the electorates of the West. As expected, the quest is on for a substantial "peace dividend" yielded by a radical reduction in military commitments and expenditures on development. This has been seen particularly in the United States, where congressional influence over foreign policy makes politicians more responsive to shifts in public moods than is the case in other countries. We must guard against wild swings between euphoria and cynicism. Supporters of the work of the National Endowment for Democracy and its counterparts abroad need to express their claims in modest terms, making clear that democracy , like Rome, cannot be built in a day. As Lowenthal has pointed out in his study of Latin America, "the inconstancy of U.S . policy has tended not only to erode the efficacy of U . S . policy but actually to undermine the conditions for democratic ,, politics . 43 2) Realpolitik. Underlying many political debates about development aid, particurarty support for democratization, is the question of donor nations' motives. Do developed nations provide help for idealistic, charitable reasons? Or is assistance based on self-interest? It is tempting to claim that idealism and self-interest go hand in hand. The argument that history shows that democracies do not make
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war on each other is convenient for this purpose, since it suggests that "soft" and altruistic assistance will produce tangible benefits in the field of national defense. Yet donor nations will inevitably find that the promotion of democratic government and the protection of human rights sometimes conflict with strategic or economic interests. During the Second World War, Winston Churchill, a fierce critic of Soviet totalitarianism, did not hesitate to ally Britain with the USSR because Britai n ' s central aim, the defeat of Hitler, required it. The spread of democracy-albeit fragile-throughout much of the world does not mean that considerations of power politics have become irrelevant in international relations. It would be unwise to forget the "balance of power" of the "realistic" school of foreign affairs associated with Walter Lippmann, George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger. The strategic imbalance between a few large European states and small, weak, and ethnically riven ones in the center of the continent is all too reminiscent of the pattern that emerged with such disastrous results after the First World War. Once again, moderation and consistency are keys to policy. Democ racy-building can be a useful supplement to sensible military and economic instruments of foreign policy, but it cannot replace them.44 3) Human rights. There is no guarantee that a government chosen through competitive elections will respect human rights. Where deep ethnic or religious conflicts persist or where the military retains de facto power, abuses of human rights may survive the advent of democracy. Concerning "recent developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union," Jon Elster has stressed that "to exaggerate somewhat, there has been a shift from the despotism of the Party to the despotism ,, of the maj ority, both inimical to minority rightS. 45 Hurrell has expressed concern that the international community has . been lulled i nto complacency . He states that a paradoxical result of the spread of elective government may be a deterioration of human rights or, at least, lack of action from some of the major international human rights organs .46 Although this thesis is, in my view, unproved, his con cerns (mainly regarding conditions in Latin America) must be taken seri ously. For example, the i nternational community may be more reluctant to publicize abuses of South African governments elected by majorities than they were to protest the excesses of white-minority regimes .
Strategic Choices Political scientists and economists have had a great impact on foreign policy and doctrines concerning development aid, especially in the T United States. ! h e study of democracy and of the processes of � democratization has produced some of the most influential and brilliant academic work since the Second World War7Such classic writers as .......t
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Ro�rt Dahl, S!lIIlu el p. Huntington, and Seymour-Martin Lipset- cent-iflue to produce influential writings alongside a generation of worthy successors who are stimulated by the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War. They have asked several basic question� WiLIIL.constitutes a democracy ? Apart from -eleCtioni:what arei ts essential _<::.l1aracteristics ? �.-� Can democracy be measured? What are the conditions that allow _ . democratic government to emerge? What is the relationship between economic and politicaC development? Does econom�_ ��",-�lopment necessarily lead to democratization, and do democratic goverI1me�t and "good government" lead to economic improvements? Is it true that democracies do not make war on one another? Which countries are likely to become democratic or to cease being democracies ? Such scientifically ambitious approaches, though invaluable academi cally, do not always serve the needs of policy makers and practitioners of democracy-building. Academic theories and analyses are of their greatest practical value when they provide a firm basis for predictions and for strategic choices . In the field of defense, priorities must serve for years or decades. Decisions regarding whether to manufacture a nuclear arsenal, to build or purchase a particular model of aircraft, to maintain a particular foreign military base, or to create a system of military conscription require massive commitments. Development aid also requires choices among costly engineering projects--dams, bridges, electrification schemes, and communications networks . It is therefore essential that priorities be chosen to serve for the long term. When it comes to human rights and democratization policy, prediction is at least as difficult as it is for defense and economic-aid issues . Which countries are likely to become more democratic? Where will elected governments be overthrown? It is not necessary to predict these outcomes, however, because schemes to promote democracy are in no way comparable to aircraft systems and dams in terms of expense. For instance, 80 percent of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy' s proj ects i n 1 994-95 cost less than $ 1 6,000;47 its 244 projects cost a total of $2.7 million . By contrast, a single scheme by the Overseas Develop ment Administration to finance the Pergau Dam in Malaysia involved a commitment of $400 million-3 5,OOO times as much as the average Westminster Foundation project. It becomes clear, therefore, that practical, tactical details are more important in democracy-building schemes . For example, the National Endowment for Democracy had to decide in the mid- 1980s whether to aid prodemocracy forces in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Because such proj ects would be limited in scope and cost-partly because the Soviet authorities could not be expected to tolerate large-scale interven tions-the decision to proceed did not depend on the predicted . ..
-- _._ . _.,
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likelihood of a democratic opening within the communist bloc. Even if the chances of progress were remote, an effort to assist internal democratic forces could be justified. A similar point emerges from considering academic research on the relationship between economic growth and democratization. The policy implications of the debate are, once again, overshadowed by the relatively low cost of political aid . This means that development-aid agencies need not choose between funding economic assistance and funding "good government" proj ects. It is possible to introduce political aid as a new dimension of development without compromising traditional economic approaches . The best way to reconcile prediction with setting priorities for political aid is thus to avoid it wherever possible. /fj�mocracy promotion should be a process of sowing a considerable n'i.i'iiJber of seeds in the hope that a small proportion of them will take root! As Dr. Horacio B oneo, the former head of the Electoral Assistance Division of the United Nations, put it, such assistance is largely a matter of taking advantage of "targets of opportunity ."
D emocratic Consolidation Should countries undergoing democratic consolidation be given special priority in decisions about political aid? Once again, policy and practice must be flexible. The "consolidation phase" certainly has characteristic needs, but it is a mistake to divide the phases of democratization and the forms of assistance appropriate to each too clearly. E2'peri�l1ces of the . late 1 980s suggest that a general process of democratization IS common to' all counfrIes. -b-urlii"g . .the . "i:>r_��4t:InP9i:atic" phase, opposition to tfiee- stablished government usually fails to take the form of an organizecl-pooHeaJ-. party. Nevertheless, indirect forms of opposition may develop, even under one-party regimes. In General Augusto Pinochet' s Chile, for instance, academic research institutes played the role of parties-in-waiting. In Poland, the trade union S olidarity provided the means for organized expressions of dissatisfaction with communist rule. Elsewhere, religious or civic bodies, human rights organizations, or independent publications (often based outside the country) constitute the most effective means of opposition . Consequently, foreign political aid during this initial phase generally concentrates on assisting such organizations. The "transition" phase consists . _ ()Lthe--peFied-immeQi�.!�ly before, try..:l'!onn al forms durin g;-aIKt1rlteF-tJ:w-flrst-t'ree elections h<;:htin B_GQYlL of foteiglLpoJ.iti.c.al a.§g�tallc:e ate ofg�nIi(l(t ()bsce.ryations of the election to ensure fair play, advice and aid to newly formed political parties (sometimes including the provision of basic equipment and even supplies of paper), and advice on formulating a new constitution.
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Once multip arty electi()l1s have been held, much _!y.QIlLr.emains.� be done�:.h@)ie a-democratic system is riiTIiIy-established. The parties that put forward candidates in the first election after a long period of nondemocratic government tend to be no more than ad hoc groupings of prominent individuals. Initially, a large number of embryonic parties appear with varied, misleading labels. A settled party system emerges only after a period of splits and unions. The growth of party organiza tions, especially at the local level, is also likely to take years. Thus assistance from sister parties abroad is a significant aspect of political aid during the consolidation phase. In fact, party-to-party assistance is a main feature of proj ects funded in Eastern Europe through the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. Projects vary from providing equipment (especially word processors and printers), to conducting training sessions for party activists in Eastern Europe, to discussing policy . Assistance to emerging party organizations is only one of a number of fOFms-- of--aid-appropnateto thephaseo-fdemocrafic cCrrrsoHdation . · Usually an-inae-]3enclent--press · needs to--be··-devetope(r iind--ih� efficiency of the electoral process needs to be safeguarded. For instance, it is not enough to provide the funds and equipment to register voters for a founding election if a country lacks the finances or technical capacity to maintain voter lists afterward. Once elections lead to a multiparty parliament with a real political role, the legislature may require support in the form of research and library facilities. Support for local-govern ment authorities is another common area of assistance. With the obvious drama and intense publicity of regime change-especially when it involves the fall of communism in country after country of the former Soviet bloc or the first multiparty elections in South Africa-it is not surprising that political-aid organizations feel pressure to concentrate their resources around such events . And clearly such assistance has a role to play for years after the founding election . Nevertheless , it is neither possible nor desirable t o specify rules about the precise forms that assistance for democratic consolidation should take or about the amount of time they should last. These factors will vary according to the circumstances of each recipient country and the resources and structure of donor organizations.
Measuring Success Mc:a.§uremellts _QLdem QCI<1.c y are tempting because they lend an air of objectivity to judgments . But if p��dictions -a.nd strategfC-CEOlces are ie-ss appropriate ta political aid than they · are tb other instruments of foreign and defense policy, so too is the need for measurement. When restricted to a theoretical, academic arena, measurements of democracy may be stimulating. Likewise, measurements intended to produce broad categori-
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zations-such a s the regular Freedom House surveys o f the number of democratic nations in the world-are a convenient way to summarize in formation about the state of the world. Consider, however, the limita tions of some of the other common-or PLo.pos.ed u_s.� of meas�r�_I!!�L 1) ,Advocacy. S ome development agencies are passionate to derive e success of their projects to persuade skeptical statistic sass�� s politicians to m aintain agency budgets. An international conference convened by one aid ministry discussed how to design a democracy barometer sensitive enough to gauge changes before and after specific political-aid projects ; the changes in readings could then "prove" the worth of the ministry ' s programs. The impossibility of this task aside, the idea is based on the fallacy that it would impress politicians . 2) Collective internationaLI1(;tio..ll. Ji. it were possible to establish an international scale of adh-erence to the standards of human rights and democratic government, it would be easier to persuade the international community to take concerted action against the worst offenders. The German development ministry decides to increase or decrease aid by scoring recipient countries on five dimensions. Whereas the German development ministry may agree internally on the resulting scores , the prospect of acceptance across nations is slim to none.48 The choice of dimensions and their relative weightings, as well as what score to assign to each recipient country under each dimension, are subjective. 3) Bureaucratic control. With incr_eased pressures within governmental organizations for audit and quality control has come the demand that each proj ect' s success be measured according to what the USAID terms "objectively verifiable indicators ." Unfortunately, methods that assess the productivity of industrial conveyor belts are not easily applied to democracy-building efforts . The measurement approach to assessment is likely to lead to the massaging of figures. One former senior Central Intelligence Agency officer has ciaimed that in Africa the vast majority of operations were generally agreed to be "fabrications" but were promoted by case officers anyway because of the requirements of the "numbers game." The pitfalls of this game are illustrated by two political-aid examples . First, one "obj ectively verifiable" indicator of performance for training projects for trade-union organizers in Third World nations is increased union membership. Given the informal conditions in some of these countries , membership is hard to define, let alone to list and count. Thus statistics are almost meaningless and open to manipulation--especially when proj ect leaders are motivated to over�ate results and numbers are impossible to verify without huge cost. 6t the headquarters of one European political foundation , three officials provided three different membership figures for the same Third World trade union the foundation had supported: the highest official praised the success of the venture and quoted as evidence the "fact" that the union ' s membership had reached
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1 80,000; his immediate subordinate gave a lower but "firm" figure of 1 20,000; and an official in another department that had no responsibility . for the project produced a document showing a membership of just 6,000-with the warning that this was an exaggerati Second, the reductio ad absurdum of statistical performance indicators was reached in a management report commissioned by the USAID. So that before-and-after comparisons could serve as gauges of the effective ness of outside aid, consultants suggested the following as indicators of the strength of political parties in recipient countries : the number of press releases produced by a party' s press office, the number of position papers produced by its research office, the total funds raised for a presidential campaign, and the percentages of "activists" who have a "strong identification" with the party.49 Neither "activist" nor "strong identification" was defined; the method, cost, and feasibility of collecting the information were not addressed. 4) Propaganda. The apparent objectivity of numbers and of statistical tables makes a statistical (or pseudo-statistical) approach ideal for propaganda purposes . For example, in 1 994, a British weekly, the New Statesman, in collaboration with a national television network published a worldwide table of democracy scores for each cou ntry. The results were curiously different from those of many academic studies . Britai n ' s score o f 75 percent put the country on a par with Poland and Uruguay but lower than Benin (77 percent) and far behind Hungary and the Czech Republic (82 percent) . These scores were compiled by a panel of "experts-academics, journalists and human rights campaigners." The United Kingdom was the only West European country to earn the inferior green coloring on the survey ' s world democracy map, which was also achieved by Russia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, and Madagascar. The table was part of a larger exercise that also featured studies by a university-based research group called Democratic Audit. A political objective of these bodies is to highlight "shortcom ings" in the workings of the British political system and to campaign for reform. The studies therefore chose criteria that serve this end.50
0B'
Evaluation The doubt cast on the value of statistical performance indicators is not meant to imply that evaluation is unnecessary or impossible. The challenge of evaluation is to choose a method appropriate to the purpose. Evaluation may serve four different functions, which have different objectives . Each requires a different form of evaluation : for honesty, efficiency, "tradecraft," and effectiveness. In other words, an evaluation program needs to include, and exceed, the narrow demands of bureaucratic accountability . 1) Honesty. Apart from determining that money for grants is not
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stolen o r lost, i t i s important to ensure that funds have been properly used for two reasons-to avoid scandal and bad publicity in the donor country , and to avoid the corrosive and divisive effects of corruption i n recipient countries. I f local political leaders are seen t o b e profiteering from their associations with a foreign funding body , their credibility may be gravely damaged. 2) Efficiency. Evaluations of efficiency include calculating the cost per person to attend a conference or training session, comparing different ways of providing equipment, or comparing the costs of maintaining fa cilities built for training schools to the cost of renting hotel and meeting rooms when needed for specific meetings . A further measure of efficiency-though subject to manipulation and redefinition-is overhead cost. It is worth noting that the objectives of assuring honesty and maximizing efficiency may conflict. For example, the head office of a donor body can ensure honesty by purchasing travel tickets itself, but this may prove much more expensive than the alternative if cut-rate tickets are available within the country receiving aid. 3) Tradecraft. When political-aid organizations are established, they are unlikely to have the necessary technical skills and experience to carry out or to fu nd democratization projects in foreign countries. They will need to learn what constitutes a useful party-building project, how to set up election observations, the pros and cons of employing a permanent field representative in a recipient country, the do' s and don ' ts of providing equipment, the ideal length and structure of a training course for trade unionists, and the timing of assistance. Gossip among political-aid officials soon brings to light some of the hard lessons of the past, but this information is rarely presented systematically-a computer and printer intended for use in an electoral campaign arrived months after the poll ; a grant was unknowingly sent to an organization with extreme political views; or the training course failed because a high percentage of attendees were murdered after returning home. The skills involved in administering these projects are specialized, and they need to be shared.51 4) Effectiveness. Conclusions about the effects of a project or set of projects require more than a mechanical tallying of immediate results . They need an investigation into the development of the political and social system of the country receiving aid that includes information about the inputs of foreign political-aid proj ects. In practice, this requires detailed case studies and conclusions based on informed judgment rather than "objective" indicators. This is because outside aid is only one of a set of factors in a nation ' s political development; it is difficult to disentangle its effects from those of other forces . Because of the heavy commitment involved in a detailed case study, this method of evaluation needs to be used selectively . It is occasionally
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useful in evaluating a particular project, but it is more valuable for examining a series-for example, a group of activities to aid opposition media, trade unions, or parties. An alternative approach would be to examine the overall impact of overseas proj ects in a particular country . So far, there have been too few such studies .52
Enhancing Effectiveness 1) Information dissemination. In light of the limitations of theoretical and scientific approaches, how is it possible to make assessments and decisions in the field of political aid? In an early classic, Edward Luttwak, writing on coups d' etat, disclaimed pretensions to theory. His Coup d 'Etat was written as a practical primer, a format that organiza tions that offer political aid and scholars who study the subject would be well advised to adopt. Despite the considerable efforts and expendi tures on research on democracy-building, some of the most simple yet most important building blocks of practical knowledge are still missing. Even when information is "public," in the sense that it is unclassified, it may be so obscure that it is in practice difficult to access . For instance, development-aid ministries are usually decentralized and keep no register of political-aid projects administered by field representatives. In Britain, the Overseas Development Agency ' s computerized "PIMS" system, geared mainly to conventional economic and technical aid ventures, does not record projects of less than $ 1 60,000. In the United States, some of the largest electoral-aid projects in Central America failed to show up in many reports in Washington because they had corne out of USAID funds at the country level or out of what were classified as "counterpart funds ." At the international level, even the most elementary, publicly available information has often remained unreported. New, specialized democracy-promotion bodies like the National Endowment for Democ racy and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy have until recently been ignorant of counterpart organizations abroad. Some international organizations have made useful attempts to collect information. The UN' s Electoral Assistance Unit regularly collects reports of electoral observations and other forms of electoral assistance given by national authorities and some international bodies . It is probably justified in claiming that its lists include about half of all such assistance. It is relatively easy to gather information on a distinct activity such as electoral assistance. It has proved harder to gather information about other "good government" and "participatory develop� ment" projects . The OECD' s Development Assistance Committee has surveyed the proj ects of development agencies of member countries; as usual, some replies have been incomplete. Even the German re sponse--one of the most systematic-excluded the work of the political
Michael Pinto-Duschinsky
317
foundations, which constitutes o n e the largest and most significant elements of its political-aid activities. 2) Coordinating efforts. The secrecy and rivalry among different departments of a single ministry or among different ministries of the same government are frequently greater than rivalries between opposing nations. In most donor countries, responsibilities for aspects of political aid are divided among agencies that do not even share information with one another, much less cooperate. This raises the practical question of how much internal cooperation is desirable. The same applies to cooperation betweeri different countries or between international agencies. 53 Although it is overly optimistic to expect any resolution of these bureaucratic rivalries, it seems reasonable to aim for a system of "cooperative decentralization. " Decentralization is needed because different government-funded organizations have special skills and experience best suited to particular tasks . For instance, democracy building bodies that channel government money through party founda tions can fund proj ects without political repercussions, while aid ministries cannot. At the same time, coordination is beneficial if it takes the form of a willing exchange of information and experience. 3) Follow- up. One of the most serious shortcomings of political aid today is that so much effort is concentrated on observing elections . One leading international official claims that it is easier to raise tens of millions of dollars for electoral observations than $50,000 for follow-up proj ects . An opposition politician from Eastern Europe complained that busloads of foreign observers left the country when the results were only beginning to emerge; they remained for the first batch of results from the capital, but by the time crucial and dubious returns carne from the rural areas , observers were already gone. At the other extreme, some political organizations-especially some Third World trade unions-have received support from abroad for decades, yet are still "emerging." They are always about to become self sufficient but never manage to do so. The time period over which aid should be given and how to provide incentives to organizations receiving aid to avoid permanent dependence on outside help are two central problems of tradecraft. 4) Knowledge of political institutions. Aid does not consist only of donated money and equipment or of making contacts and imparting skills. New democracies face the task of devising regulations and administrative systems to run fair elections, regulate political donations, limit corruption and conflicts of interest, and so forth. Organizations such as the Washington-based International Foundation for Election Systems have started to collect information about electoral administration worldwide, although a great deal of work remains to be done in this area. Comprehensive information has yet to be collected and analyzed
318
The Rise of "Political Aid"
about such building blocks of democratic government as regulations of political funding and the consequences of different control systems. As this review has indicated, "political aid" is a varied and some times controversial feature of present-day international relations , What is beyond doubt is that studies of international relations cannot realistically ignore the recent developments and new instruments summarized here. NOTES I am grateful for information received from a considerable number of people in the preparation of this essay, in particular Thierry Besan90n, Andrew Hurrell, Tineke Mulder, Shelley Pinto-Duschinsky, Nick Rogers, and Leslie Seidle. I benefited greatly from Larry Diamond ' s
Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives (report prepared for the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict,
December 1 995). I have not repeated here the comprehensive references given in his essay, but concentrated on providing additional ones. Finally, I wish to thank the Policy Planning Staff of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, whose commission to investigate democratization policy in Britain enabled me to collect some of the materials used in the
preparation of this chapter. The results are given in my Policy on Political Aid: A Review
of Existing Policies Funded by the British Government Together with Recommendations
(report to the Policy Planning Staff, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 30 December 1 995). This chapter is based on a variety of sources, including personal interviews with
officials and participants in several countries; internal documents; and published (but often obscure)
reports
of
political-aid
bodies,
governmental
agencies,
and
international
organizations. Where internal documents are cited, they are generally identified by the particular classification systems used by the organizations concerned.
1 . Lord Robert Cecil (later Lord Salisbury), "Lord Castlereagh," Quarterly Review 1 I I (January 1 862): 2 1 3 . 2 . I avoid using the misleading term "nongovernmental organization" (NGO), which appears all too often in the technical literature on development assistance. Nongovernmental organizations vary greatly in their degree of independence. The term is applied to bodies that obtain their funding from governmental sources and whose "nongovernmental" status is far from clear. In Britain, t\vo other terms are used for some of these orgarlization s : nondepartmental public bodies (NDPBs) a n d quasi-autonomous N G O s (QUANGOs).
3. Larry Diamond has included a description of privately funded organizations in his
Promoting Democracy in the I 990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives (report
319
Michael Pinto-Duschinsky
1 994). This study gives a valuable factual overview o f the statutes, expenditures, and
projects of political-aid foundations in Germany, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Sweden.
For another official French document, see Jacques Oudin, Senateur de la Vendee,
Parlementaire en Mission, Rapport sur les fondations democratiques a vocation politique en France (Paris, 2 9 July 1 996). For a summary of the overseas work of party
foundations,
especially
in
Germany,
the
United
States,
France,
and
Austria,
see
Utrikesdepartentet (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), "Betankande fran Utredningen om utvigade insatser for demokrakisk uppbyggnad" (Report by the Committee on Extended
Contributions Towards Democratic Construction), in Demokratier Krava Dessa Partier! Svenska partiers medverkan i bistandet till demokratisk uppbyggnad i u-lander och ostra Europa (Stockholm : Utrikesdepartentet, Ds 1 994), 6 3 .
5 . For t h e sake of simplicity, a l l currency amounts in this essay are given in U . S . dollars. Conversions are based on exchange rates a s o f February 1 997.
6 . For example, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation maintains two regional offices in Asia as well as permanent representation in China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, S ri Lanka, and Thailand. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation has
58 foreign field offices, including 1 3 in Asia. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, lahresbericht '94
(Sankt Augustin), 27 .
7. See Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1 990s, 72. The escalation in grants from
the USAID has made the two party institutes far less dependent on core grants from the NED.
8. The subsidy for Central and Eastern Europe is allocated to Dutch parliamentary parties on the following bas i s : $27, 1 9 3 plus $5, 1 85 per seat. For information on individual party foundations, see the following sources.
Christian Democratic Appeal: Eduardo Frei Foundation for International Solidarity,
Information on the CDA Foundation for International Solidarity Eduardo Frei (pamphlet,
The Hague, n . d . ) . The foundation's main activities involve party and campaign training projects for Christian Democrats in Chile, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Romania.
Labour Party: Alfred Mozer Stichting, iaarverslag 1 994 A lfred Mozer Stichting; and
Moret Ernst and Young Accountants, Rapport aan het bestuur van de Stichting Alfred
Mozer Am,terdam (Hilversum, 1 995). The object of the Alfred Mozer Stichting is to "make and keep contacts in Central and Eastern Europe." In 1 994 it had projects in Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, the former Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Russia, and Slovakia. Its core government subsidy amounted
to $330,000.
Demokraten 66: Instituut Voor Samenwerking Oost- en Midden-Europa (Central and
Eastern European Foundation D66), D66 International Quarterly. The
Instituut Voor
Samenwerking Oost- en Midden-Europa carried out nine projects in 1 994 and is currently
prepared for the Camegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, December 1 995) .
active in Serbia, the Baltics, Romania, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic.
Victory and Crisis: Nobel Symposium 1 994 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Hague). In 1 993, the People ' s Party for Freedom and Democracy decided to undertake
A slightly different version of this piece appears in Alex Hadenius, ed . , Democracy 's
1 997). 4. For more detailed accounts of the work of German political foundations, see the following works of mine: "Foreign Political Aid : The German Political Foundations and Their US Counterparts," International Affairs 67 (January 1 9 9 1 ) : 3 3-64; "The Party Foundations and Political Fi nance in Germany," in F. Leslie Seidle, ed., Comparative Issues in Party and Election Finance (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1 99 1 ), 1 79-250; "The Konrad
Adenauer
Foundation
and
Latin
America,"
in
Laurence
Whitehead,
ed . ,
International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 996), 227-5 5 . The u s e of t h e German Stiftungen a s a model for other nations is also a theme o f a study published by the French Senate. See French Senate, Service des Affaires Europeennes, Division des Etudes de Legislation Comparee, L 'action internationale des
fondations politiques allemandes et de leurs homologues itrangers, no. 63 (Paris, June
People ' s Party for Freedom and Democracy: International laarverslag WD, 1993 (The projects in the Baltic States, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia.
Dutch subsidies to party foundations for overseas projects that come from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs are actually administered by the Ministry of Domestic Affairs, which is responsible for party subsidies for political education within the Netherlands. For a review of the Dutch system of political-party funding, see Ruud A. Koole, "Dutch Political Parties: Money and the Message," in Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori, eds . ,
Comparative Political Finance Among the Democracies (Boulder, Colo . : Westview, 1 994).
9 . French Senate, L 'action internationale des fondations politiques allemandes et de leurs homologues "trangers, 2 . 10.
Utrikesdepartentet
Utredningen
om
utvigade
(Swedish insatser
Ministry for
for Foreign
demokrakisk
Affairs),
uppbyggnad";
"Betankande
fran
Utrikesdepartentet
(Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), pressmeddelande (press release), Stockholm, 2 1 June 1 99 5 . The new system o f grants t o Swedish parties for overseas work i s distinct from
o o Y) o \J o r:l . n
320
The Rise of "Political Aid"
an initiative to establish a Swedish-based international institute to study and coordinate infonnation on electoral assistance given by donor governments and international
Karl Renner Institute, Zwei-Jahres-Bericht, 1 991-1992 (Vienna). The institute is
responsible for the domestic political-education program of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. It also undertakes international "political education" activities, especially in Austria's neighboring
1 7 . R t . Hon. Douglas Hurd, speech to the Overseas Development Institute, London, 6 June 1 990; and Rt. Hon. Lynda Chalker (later Baroness Chalker), "Good Government and the Aid Program" (speech to the Overseas Development Institute and the Royal Institute
organizations.
I I.
321
Michael Pinto-Duschinsky
countries-the
Czech
Republic,
Slovakia,
Hungary,
Slovenia,
and
Po
land-which until recently were under communist rule. The institute also runs political education seminars in the Third World and Latin America. According to Demokratier
Krava Dessa Partier! annual expenditures on these projects have amounted to $300,000.
The conservative Austrian People' s Party ( Osterreichische Volkspartei) conducts similar work in Eastern Europe through its Politische Akademie. 1 2. The OIof Palme International Center was established in 1 992 following a merger of the Swedish Labor Movement' s International Center and its Peace Forum. The Swedish
International Development Agency has long channeled grants to foreign trade unions through the Swedish trade-union federation. The Palme Center has taken over and extended this work and assumed the added responsibility of administering part of the new public fu nding of Swedish political parties for foreign projects. 13. European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, Annual Report 1994 (Brussels). 14. "An overly broad . . . view o f 'democracy activities' could lead to a relabeling of on-going or currently planned activities, thus confonning to a new agency priority." U . S . Agency for International Development, communication to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1 99 3 . 1 5 . In development-assistance jargon, "good government" refers t o measures designed "Participatory development" refers to projects designed to
encourage the activities of individuals organizations, cooperatives, and so on.
and
groups
such
as
trade
unions,
women ' s
improve public administration, accounting standards,
and the rule of law. Electoral
assistance, media projects, and aid to human rights groups fonn only a small part of the aid
program. .Program and
Government
is
policy
Institutions
set
out
Department,
in
Overseas
"Taking
Development
Account
Administration,
of Good
Government"
(Technical Note No. 1 0, London, October 1 993). 1 8 . Political and "good govern m ent" projects accounted for $4.2 million, or 5.4 percent, of the Know How Fund ' s 1 992-93 budget. All projects took place in Central and Eastern Europe. 19.
Canadian
International
Development
Agency,
Policy
Branch,
"Sustainable
Development" (discussion paper, Hull, Ontario, 15 July 1 9 9 1 ) . 2 0 . Some of the growing academic literature o n conditionality is reviewed with examples in Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1 990s. See also Philippe Schmitter, "The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies," in Whitehead, ed., International Dimensions of Democratiza
tion, 25-54; and Robin Luckham and Gordon White, eds . , Democratising the South (Manchester, Englan d : Manchester University Press, 1 996). 2 1 . International Covenant o n Civil and Political Rights, Article 25, cited in James
International Development, Directorate of Policy, Democracy and Governance (Washington, D.C., November 1 99 1 ) . USAID ' s democracy projects have a variety of objectives and are administered through a range of intennediary bodies. In Asia, long-established organizations, such as the AFL CIO's Asian-American Free Labor Institute, receive funds to assist labor unions, especially in Indonesia, the Philippines, Turkey, and Bangladesh. The Asia Foundation, whose core grant comes directly from the U . S . Congress, receives additional funds from USAID ($20.5 million in 1 993) for educational, cultural, and environmental purposes as well as for "good govemment" and "participatory development" projects . The foundation has received a contracts to aid parliamentary
1 993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 994), 1 1 4. See also Thomas M. Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," American Journal of International
Law
86
(January 1 992): 46-9 1 ; and Gregory H . Fox and George Nolte, "Intolerant Democracies,"
Harvard International Law Review 36 (Winter 1 995): 1 -70. 22. The document states: "Democracy is an inherent element of the rule of law." The
1 6 . Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s. 70, n . 1 2 . See also U.S. Agency for
number of USAID
tio n ' s "good government" proj ects in the Third World strive to reduce corruption and to
Crawford, "Democracy and International Law," in British Yearbook of International Law,
to improve accounting procedures, administration of j ustice, public administration, and the quality of public services.
for International Affairs, Londo n , 25 June 1 9 9 1 ) . The Overseas Development Administra
libraries,
promote the expertise of
legislative staffs, support legal training and training of journalists, develop opinion polling, and aid women ' s organizations, as well as to support democratic transition in Mongolia. Grants have also been won by such new democracy-building organizations as the International Foundation for Election Systems, which supplies technical aid and materials for electoral administration, and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, which provides civic education and election assistance and observation and trains legislators and parliamentary staffs . This kind of aid aims to promote political participation and give technical aid to the democratic process while avoiding partisan involvements. See U . S . Agency for International Development, Bureau for Asia and Near East, Asia
Democracy Program Strategy (Washington , D.C., January 1 99 3 ) ; U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau for Asia and Near East, Asia Democracy Program: Activity Report for FY 1 990-1994 (Washington, D . C . . February 1 994); Asian-American Free Labor Institute, Annual Report to AJD (1 991-1 993) (Washington, D . C . ) ; Asia Foundation, 1 990 Annual Report and Project Lists (San Francisco, 1 99 1 ) ; Asia Foundation, 1 991 Annual Report and Projects ( S an Francisco, 1 992); Asia Foundation, 1992 Annual Report and Project Lists ( S an Francisco, 1 993); and Asia Foundation. 1 993 Annual Report and Project Lists (San Francisco, 1 994) .
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was later renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 23. The Charter of Pari s included the commitment of participating nations "to co operate and support each other with the aim of making democratic gains irreversible." In the Harare Declaration, heads of government of Commonwealth countries spoke of their commitment to promoting the "fundamental political values of democracy, human rights, . . . the rule of law, and just and honest government. " Commonwealth Secretariat, Report
of the Commonwealth Secretary-General 1 993 (London), 2 3 . 24.
Project
See
Group
"Human
Rights
and
Genuine
Democracy"
(CAHDD),
"Declaration on Pluralist Democracy" (preliminary outline prepared by Mr. Allan Rosas), CAHDD (94) 6 (Stnisbourg: Council of Europe, 1 994). 25. Crawford, "Democracy and International Law," 1 2 1 . See also W. Michael Reisman, "International
Human Rights Law Bearing o n
Individual
and Group Rights" (paper
prepared for the Fiji Constitution Review Commission, 1 995). 26. See S ally Morphet, "UN Peacekeeping and Election Monitoring," in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds. ,
United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 993), 1 83-239. 27. United Nations, Electoral Assistance Unit, Electoral Assistance Information Network: Second Special Edition: Electoral Assistance Activities from 1 January 1992 to 31 December 1 993 (New York, July 1 9 94), xii. See also Larry Garber and Clark Gibson, Review of United Nations Electoral Assistance 1 992-93 (report prepared for the United Nations Development Programme, 18 August 1 993). 2 8 . Information from Dr. Horacio BoneD, given while he was head of the Electoral Assistance
Division
of
the
United
Nations.
The
electoral
component
of the
UN
322
The Rise of "Political Aid"
Transitional Authority in Cambodia consisted of 1 98 international staff members at the headquarters and regional offices, 400 volunteers, 4,000 Cambodian personnel during the three- to four-month registration process, an d 1 ,000 international supervisors and 56,000 Cambodian personnel during the p olling process. The human rights component involved a staff of 308. See United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia S1236/3 ( 1 9 February 1 992). A comprehensive review of UN activities would have to include the work of a number of agencies, such as the UN Centre for Human Rights, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (which finances a program called Management of Social Transformations), the UN Development Programme, and the UN Institute for Training and Research.
Michael Pinto-Duschinsky
323
36. See Neil J . Kritz, "The CSCE in the New Era," Journal of Democracy 4 (July 1 993): 1 7-28 . 37. World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth-A Long Term Perspective Study (Was hington, D.C., November 1 989). 3 8 . International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Institutional Development Fund, SecM93-782 (Washington, D.C., 27 July 1 993). See also World Bank, Governance: The World Bank 's Experience (Washington, D.C., May 1 994). 39. Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America 's Destiny (Washington, D . C . : AEI Press, 1 99 1 ), 227 .
29. European Union, "European Initiatives in Support of Democracy and the Protection of Human Rights," 1994 Budget, ch. B7-52.
40. Robin Luckham and Gordon White, "Introduction," in Luckham and White, eds ., Democratising the South.
30. This program was introduced in 1985. It amounted to $ 1 07 million in 1 993 and $ 1 30.8 million in 1 994. Possibly a quarter of this total constituted political aid. The special program for South Africa (B7 5070) earmarked $5.6 million for voter education in 1 993 and $ 1 1 .9 million for electoral assistance in 1 994.
4 1 . See Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (London: Verso, 1 9 9 1 ) ; and, in a similar vein, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, National Endowment for Democracy (NED): A Foreign Policy Branch Gone Awry (Albuquerque, N . M . : The Resource Center, 1 990).
3 1 . See European Commission, Technical Assistance to the Occupied Territories, "Electoral Assistance to the East and the South Provided by the European Union and European Community" (Working Paper No. 2, Brussels, 28 March 1 994). In Chile, the EU provided $20.2 million from 1 985 to 1 990 "towards the strengthening of democratic groups" (budget line 992). European Parliament, 14 May 92, PE 1 6 1 .069, 1 74.
42. See, for example, Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America (Baltimore : Johns Hop kins University Press, 1 99 1 ); Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 99 1 ) ; Andrew Hurrell, "International Relations and the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights" (paper presented at the conference "The Third World After the Cold War: Ideology, Economic Development and Politics," Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, 5-8 July 1 995); Laurence Whitehead, "Notes on the Future of the San Jose Process" (memorandum presented at the Instituto de Relaciones Europeo-Latinoamericanas/European Union conference on the future of European Union aid to Central America, San Jose, Costa Rica, 29 May 1995); and Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democratic Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington, D . C . : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1 996). . 43 . Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The United States and Latin American Democracy: Learning from History ," in Lowenthal , ed . , Exporting Democracy, 400.
32. For example, in 1 993, Phare p rograms outside the democracy fund included $ 1 3 million for p ublic-administration reform and training i n six countries o f Eastern Europe. See European Commission, Phare 1993 Indicative Programmes; European Commission, Phare: Compendium of Operational Programmes ( 1 993); European Commission, Phare: Operational Programs 1 994 Update No. 6 (February 1 995); European Commission, Tacis: Compendium of Action Programmes 1 993 (March 1 994); and Euro pean Commission, Interregional Phare and Tacis Democracy Programme 1 993, Recommended Proposal List by Budget Category, 29 June 1 994. See also David Blackman, "Aid to the Democratically Elected Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe: The European Parliament's Programme" (paper presented at the Workshop of Parliamentary Scholars and Parliamentarians, Berlin, 1 9-20 August 1 994). 33" Council of Europe, Council of Europe Programmes of Co-operation and Assistance with Central and Eastern European Countries: Programme 1994, SGIINF (94) 2 (Strasbourg, 1 994); Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Bureau of the Assembly, Europe-wide Interparliamentary Co-operation Programme, ASIBur (44) 241 (Strasbourg, 21 December 1 993), and, financial year 1 994, ASIBur ( 1 994) 49 (9 May 1 994); Council of Europe, The Council of Europe 's Co-operation and Assistance Programs with Central and Eastern Europe in the Human Rights Field: 1 990 to Date, H (93) 1 rev. ; Council of Europ e, Intergovernmental Programme of Activities for 1 994, AP94 cov . , MEP (94) 2 (Council of Europe Press); Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy Through Law, Annual Report of Activities for 1 993, CDL-INF (94) 1 (Strasbourg, 7 March 1 994); and The International Institute for Democracy, Activities Report, October 1992-0ctober 1 993, lID/GB (93) I (Strasbourg). For a summary of the democratization commitments of the Organization of American States and of the Organization of African Unity, see Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s. 34. Commonwealth Secretariat, Report of the Commonwealth Secretary-General 1 993, ch. 2. 35. Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Aims, Organization, Activities (March 1 994); Commonwealth Parliarnentary Association, Annual Report of the Executive Committee, 1 992; Commonwealth Trade Union Council, Practical Solidarity: Report on Activities, 1993 and 1 994; Commonwealth Trade Union Council, Charitable Trust, Accounts for the Year Ended 31 December 1 993.
44. For further discussion, see my "Democracy and Foreign Policy," review of Exporting Democracy: FUlfilling America 's Destiny, by Joshua Muravchik, and Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America, edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal, Journal of Democracy 2 (Fall 1 9 9 1 ) : 1 27-3 1 . 45. Jon Elster, "Majority Rule and Individual Rights," i n Step hen Shute and Susan Hurley, eds . , On Human Rights: The OJiford Amnesty Lectures, 1 993 (New York: Basic B ooks, 1 993), 176. 46. Hurrell, "International Relations and the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights . " 47 . Westminster Foundation for Democracy, Annual Report 1 994-95 (London, 1 995), 8. 48. High officials of at least two major donor nations have been attracted by the idea of using an "objective" scoring system of human rights, democracy, and "good government" records to direct concerted international action against countries whose standards fall below a given score. Proponents envision a system whereby a score below an agreed percentage of the theoretical maximum would trigger a fall in the total development aid offered. Further drops in score would justify increasingly severe sanctions: a total cutoff of aid, economic sanctions, the withdrawal of diplomatic relations, and, fi nally, an automatic UN Security Council resolution for military action. 49. U . S . Agency for International Development, Democratic Initiatives Peiformance Monitoring Study for the Latin American and Caribbean Bureau (Washington, D.C., January 1 9 9 1 ) .
324
The Rise of "Political Aid"
50. See Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, "Why Britain Is Better Than Benin," The Times (London), 6 May 1 994.
5 1 . Among useful reports about successful and unsuccessful projects and methods are Ralph Goldman, "The Donor-Recipient Relationship in Political Aid Programs," in Ralph Goldman and William A . Douglas, eds . , Promoting Democracy: Opportunities and Issues (New York: Praeger, 1 988); and Carothers, Assessing Democratic Assistance. The collation
INDEX
of information on democracy-building efforts by different bodies and other aspects of the democratic process is now being organized by at least three bodies: the International Forum for Democratic Studies, the International Foundation for Election Systems (both based in Washington, D.C.), and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (based in Stockholm).
52. See, for instance, Alan Angell, "International Support for Political Democracy in Contemporary Latin America," in Whitehead, ed . , International Dimensions of Democratiza tion, 1 7 5-200.
53. See Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, 6 1 -65 . The U . S . Department of State and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office are examining the question of the internal coordination of democratization efforts.
Afgh ani stan , 307
1 92, 245 , 2 5 0 ; a s alternative to
Africa, 45, 47, 66, 69, 257, 296,
democracy, 1 1 3 , 250, 267-68;
299, 300, 302, 304, 305, 3 06 ,
compared with democracy, 38-3 9 ;
307, 308, 3 1 3
in Latin America, 3 0-3 1 , 37-4 1 ;
African Charter o n Human and Peo pIes ' Rights ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 3 03 African National Congress (ANC) (S outh Africa) , 3 0 1 Albani a, 306, 308 Alfonsln, Raul, 40
legitimacy of, 5-6; i n Taiwan, 1 24-26, 1 54-5 5 , 1 63-64; transi tions from, 1 24-26, 1 54-5 5 , 1 63-M, 2 1 4- 1 6 ; and transition t o democracy, 1 0- 1 4, 2 0 Aylwin, Patri cio, 4 1
Algeria, 3 07 American Conventior on Human Rights ( 1 969), 303 Amnesty Internati onal, 273
Bangkok Declaration ( 1 993), 1 1 4 B angladesh, 1 66 B anharn Silpa-Archa, 1 0 1 , 1 09
Angola, 3 04, 307
B ao Zunxin, 230
Aquino, Corazon , 1 1 4
Belaunde, Fernando, 50
Argentina, 27, 28, 29, 30, 3 1 , 34, 3 6 , 37, 3 9 , 49, 53, 5 5 , 5 7 , 60, 278 Ari stotle, 1 08 ASEAN. See Associ ation of South east Asian Nations Asia: civil soci ety in, 1 05-8 , 1 1 1 ; political parties in, 1 00- 1 0 5 , 1 1 0, I l l , 1 1 6 ; press freedom in, 99- 1 00 ; values in, 1 68 Association of S outheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) , 1 1 5 , 1 54 Australia, 250, 302, 306
Belgium, 302, 306 B enin , 3 1 4 B erlin Wall, 308 B o livia, 28, 29, 3 5 , 303 Bosnia, 307, 308 B razi l, 28, 29, 30, 3 1 , 34, 3 5 , 39, 49, 50, 52, 5 5 , 57, 278 ; transition to democracy in, 3 1 -32, 40 B ri tain. See Great Britain B ritish Empire, 305 B runei , 95 Buddhi sm, 1 73 B ulgari a, 306
Austri a, 3 00
Burhulis , Gennady, 7 1
Authoritarianism, 46, 9 9 , 1 0 1 , I l l ,
B urma, 303, 3 07
1 1 3 , 1 25 , 1 29 , 1 67 , 1 69 , 1 80 ,
Bush, George, 3 0 1
:0 , :0 ; I'"'"
:") X) :\J :0 :") :n
326
Index
Caldera, Rafael, 40
relations with Taiwan, 2 8 1 -8 3 ,
Cambodia, 304, 307
287-8 8 , 289-90; rise of lineage
Canada, 303
racy, 1 07-8, 1 29 , 26 1 -6 2 ; and
based groups in, 22 1 -22; rule of
Taiwan, 1 29
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 37, 40, 48 Carlos, Juan, 1 7 Carter, Jimmy, 268
Confucianism, 1 1 3 , 2 5 8 ; and democ
law in, 2 1 6- 1 9 , 230-32 ; and rural
Confucius , 1 67 , 1 9 6
self-government, 221-24; size of.
Congress o f People' s Deputies (Rus
25 1 -5 2 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) :
3 27
Index
sia), 70, 7 1 , 72, 7 3 , 74, 77, 82, 89, 22 1
287, 2 8 8 ; and Taiwan indepen dence, 1 3 6-3 7 , 143-44 Deng Xi aoping, 1 25 , 2 1 6, 225 , 226, 228 , 230, 23 1 , 232, 233, 242, 244, 245 , 246, 250, 2 5 3 . 259, 260 Denmark, 30 1 , 303, 306 Dictatorship, 72, 268
Catholic Church, 268
1 82, 2 1 6. 2 1 9 . 220, 225 . 230,
Cavaco Silva, Anfbal, 1 8
23 1 , 232, 23 3 , 234. 236. 237,
Central America, 29, 30, 34, 42, 46,
238, 239. 254. 255. 260. 262,
regime type, 1 2- 1 4 ; and political
263 ; constitutional powers of,
aid, 3 1 1 - 1 2 ; prerequisites of,
Central Intelligence Agency, 3 1 3
240-46; and reform, 250-5 3 ; and
1 65-6 7 ; in S outheast Asi a,
1 05-8 , 1 1 1 ; and external influ
Chamlong Srimu ang, 1 05
rural self-government, 2 2 1 -24;
1 08- 1 2; in S outhern Europe,
ences. 1 1 2- 1 6 ; political culture i n .
3-2 1 ; in South Korea, 278-8 1 ,
1 07-8 ; political parties in.
49, 307, 3 1 6
Charter of Paris for a New Europe
( 1 990) , 303
supremacy of, 229 Chirac, Jacques, 299
Consolidation, 1 9-20, 1 1 1 - 1 2 ; defini
Domi nican Republic, 28
tion of, 4-5 , 1 64 ; and former
289; i n Tai w an, 1 29-3 1
Eas t Asia, 28. 95. 96, 99, 25 1 , 257. 267 . 270. 27 1 ; civil society in.
1 00- 1 05 ; press freedom in.
Chart Thai , 1 0 1 , 1 04, 1 05, 1 09
Chomsky , Noam, 307
Chatichai Choonhavan, 1 09
Christianity, 257, 258, 26 1
1 09-1 6 ; in China, 228-3 2 ,
Chechen war, 87
Chuan Leekpai, 1 0 1
1 72. 267, 268. 270. 27 1 , 288.
Chechnya, 66, 72, 77, 7 8 , 8 1 , 308
Chun 000 Hwan, 9 9 , 1 00, 270, 272
237-3 9 , 242-46, 25 8-6 1 ; i n Latin America. 228-46; in Russia,
299 . 300. 3 0 1 , 304. 3 05 . 306.
Constituti ons : in Asia, 97-99 ,
Chee Soon Juan, 9 8
Chung Ju Yung, 1 04
Chen Duxin, 26 1
7 1 -73 , 7 7-7 8 ; in Tai wan, 1 3 1 ,
Churchi ll, Winston, 309
1 3 5-3 8 , 1 76, 284-86
Chernenko, Konstantin, 67
Civil-military relations: in China,
Chernomyrdin, Viktor, 7 8 , 8 1 , 82, 8 3 , 84 Chiam See Tong, 1 02 Chiang Ching-kuo, 1 23 , 1 25 , 1 4 3 , 1 69, 1 75 , 1 80, 2 0 3 , 204, 205 , 207
Corruption, 1 5 , 85, 86, 1 03 . 1 05 ,
99- 1 00 Eastern Europe, 34. 3 8 , 45, 64, 66,
309, 3 1 0, 3 1 2, 3 1 7 Economic development: and authori tari ani sm vs. democracy, 38-3 9 .
243-44; in Latin America,
1 75 , 1 77 , 2 1 9 , 222, 3 1 5 , 3 1 7 ; and
46-47 ; in South Korea, 9 8 ,
dictatorship, 3 9 ; in Latin America,
274-7 5 , 2 8 0 ; in Taiwan, 1 39-4 1 ,
54-5 5 ; i n S outh Korea, 280; in
Ecuador. 2 8 , 46, 49, 5 0 . 5 2
Venezuela, 40
Elections: i n Angola, 304; i n Brazil ,
274-75, 286 Civil society, 44, 55, 66, 9 8 , 1 27,
Costa Rica, 28, 29 , 30, 3 3 , 42, 45,
2 1 3- 1 4 ; and democracy. 27-28. 2 1 3- 1 4 ; and rule of law, 2 1 3- 1 4
3 7 ; in Cambodia, 3 0 4 ; in Chi le,
Chiang Kai-shek, 1 39 , 1 69 , 1 7 3 . 259
1 4 1 , 1 67 , 1 80, 275 , 285 ; in East
Chile, 26, 28. 29. 34, 3 5 . 3 6 . 43-46.
Asia, 1 05-8, 1 1 1 ; in Russia,
Council of Europe, 3 0 3 , 305
228 . 235-3 7 . 246, 260; and de
48, 5 3 . 56, 57. 59, 60. 27 8 . 306.
75-77, 87-8 8 ; in Taiwan, 1 5 3-54,
Coups, 6 . I I , 3 1 , 40, 46, 228, 27 6 ;
mocracy, 46. 49 . 1 62-63 , 1 64,
3 1 1 ; and benevolent authoritarian
1 72-74
ism, 3 8-3 9 ; . 1 973 coup in. 30;
Cli enteli sm, 3 1 . 1 47
transition to democracy in. 3 2-3 3 .
Cojuangco, Eduardo, 1 05
40-4 1
Cold War, 36, 1 1 3 , 1 99, 27 3 , 275 ,
China, 3 8 , 1 3 6-37 . 1 54. 1 5 5 .
307, 3 1 0 ; and the third wave, 1 1 3
1 92-95 . 1 97 . 1 98 , 202-4, 206.
Colombia, 28, 30, 36, 5 3
2 1 0, 2 1 3-6 3 , 289, 3 03 ; vis-a-vis
Commonwealth of Independent
Asia. 254-5 5 ; civil-military rela tions in. 243-44; civil rights in, 229-3 1 . 243 ; constitutionalis m in,
S tates , 69 1 1 4- 1 5 , 200-20 1 , 268 Communism, 5, 1 1 2, 2 1 3 , 229 , 3 1 2;
of, 253-54; federalism in, 225-26,
fai iure of, 6 ; in Russia, 64-65,
244; judicial independence in,
72, 75-76
239-42; modernization of,
in Chile. 3 0 ; in Russia, 6 8 , 72, 74; in S pain, 17 Cuba, 3 3 , 3 5 , 2 5 7 ; revo lution in. 29-30 Cultural Revolution (Chi na) . 237. 239 Czechoslovaki a. 308 Czech Republic, 3 1 4
Communications technology, 20,
228-46, 258-6 1 ; economic growth
253-54; and nationalism, 262; and
46, 49 , 53, 3 06
Communist Party of the Soviet Un ion (CPSU), 68, 7 1 , 72, 8 6
32, 3 3 ; in China, 223 , 224. 226.
209 . 309, 3 1 l - 1 2 ; and human ri ghts . 309 ; in Kazakhstan, 64; in Latin Ameri ca. 36. 45 . 46, 50-5 1 ; in M alaysia. 99. I l l ; i n Nicara gua. 46. 3 04 ; in Peru. 40; in the Phi lippines, 1 02, 1 04-5 ; and political aid , 305 . 306, 3 1 1 - 1 2 , 3 1 5 ; in Russia. 70, 7 1 , 7 4 , 7 5 , 77, 78, 79-8 1 , 82-86 , 8 8 , 89; in
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (Tai w an) , 1 03 . 1 06, 1 23 . 1 24,
Singapore, 1 1 1 ; in S outh Africa, 304, 305, 308; in South Korea,
1 25 , 1 26 , 1 30, 1 3 8 , 1 4 1 , 1 42,
96. 1 0 1 , 1 04, 272, 27 8 , 279, 280;
1 45 , 1 48 , 1 49 , 1 5 0, 1 5 2 , 1 7 1 ,
i n Taiwan, 1 30, 1 3 6. 1 3 8,
1 74, 1 75 , 1 7 6, 1 80, 1 8 1 , 1 82,
1 4 1 -50, 1 54, 1 5 5 , 1 7 5-76. 1 80,
204. 206, 270, 2 8 3 . 284, 285,
203 ; in Thailand, 95-96, 1 0 1 , 1 04-5
328
Index
329
Index
EI Salvador, 3 5 , 3 6 , 46
Hong Kong, 1 99 , 22 1 , 23 5 , 244, 254
Karamanli s, Constantine, 1 7
1 69 , 1 7 1 , 1 74, 1 75 , 1 82, 1 84,
European Communi ty, 268, 27 1
Hua Guofeng, 259
Kazakhstan, 64, 306
1 92, 1 9 8 , 205 , 206, 207 , 208,
European Convention on Human Rights ( 1 952 ) , 303
Hu Han-min, 259
Kennan, George, 309
Human rights, 268 ; in Asia, 1 1 4,
Kenya, 303
282, 283, 286-87, 288 Lei Chen, 1 75
European Economic Community, 3 8
1 29 ; in China, 1 9 3 , 1 99 , 225 ,
Khasbulatov, Ruslan , 73
Liang Qichao, 26 1
European Union, 289, 296, 3 0 3 , 3 04
229 , 230-3 1 , 243 ; and democracy,
Kim Dae Jung, 1 04, 280
Lien Chan, 1 77 , 1 9 8, 285
External influences: and democracy, 267-90, 309, 3 1 1 - 1 2; and irrele
309; in Latin America, 34, 54; in
Kim II Sung, 99
Ligachev, Yegor, 67
Peru, 50; and political aid, 298,
Kim Jong Pil, 1 04, 279, 280
Liu Shipei, 26 1
Kim Young Sam, 1 0 1 , 1 04, 279 ; and
Li Yizhe, 230
vance of nation-state, 1 1 4- 1 5 ; in
3 03-4 ; i n Russia, 79, 87; i n
Southern Europe, 6-7 ; and the
S outh Korea, 268, 273 ; in Tai
third wave, 27 1 -73
wan, 1 76 , 273 ; and the United
Kissinger, Henry, 309
States, 268, 27 1 , 273
Kuomintang (KMT) (Taiwan), 9 8 ,
Fabian socialism, 1 1 2 Federation of Independent Free Trade Unions (FNPR) (Russia), 8 6
Hundred Flowers of 1 95 7 (China), 230 Hungary, 64, 65, 3 1 4
reforms , 280
1 00, 1 02-3 , 1 05 , 1 23-5 2 , 1 53 ,
Madagascar, 3 1 4
1 79 , 1 8 1 , 1 82 , 1 92, 202, 203 ,
Madrid, Miguel d e la, 40 Mahathir bin Mohamad, Datuk Seri ,
Finland, 3 0 6
Hu Shi, 26 1
204, 205-6 , 207, 208, 229 , 270,
Hu Yaobang, 1 25
28 1 -8 5 , 286, 287, 289; and clien
Franco, Franci sco, 1 1 , 1 8 Freedom House, 3 1 3 Free Trade Union Institute (U. S . ) , 298 French Revolution, 7 , 9 Fuj imori , Alberto, 3 7 , 40, 45 , 49, 50
Import substitution, 29, 3 1 -3 3 , 3 5 , 36, 39, 42 Indi a, 3 0 6
Gaidar, Yegor, 72 Garda, Alan, 40, 50 Germany, 6, 286, 297, 29 8 , 300, 302, 303
111
telism, 1 47 ; decline of, 1 49-52;
M alawi, 303
and economic health, 1 4 7 ; and
M alaysia, 3 6 , 95, 96, 1 06 , 1 08, 1 1 3 ,
i nternal reform, 1 44-45 ; as mili
1 1 6, 255, 3 1 0; civi l society in,
tary party, 1 3 9-4 1 , 1 70-7 1 ; po
1 06 ; and globalization, 1 1 5 ; and
Indonesia, 3 6 , 9 5 , 2 1 3 , 255 , 303
litical history of, 1 70 ; Taiwan
legacy of B ritish colonialism,
Institutional Revolutionary Party
i zation of, 1 45-47 ; and transition
97-9 8 , 1 1 2; political parties in,
(PRI) (Mexico), 40, 1 7 1 Inter-American Development B ank,
Gabon, 3 06
( 1 992) , 303 M acau, 1 99 , 235
1 62 , 1 64 , 1 69 , 1 72 , 1 73 , 1 77 ,
First World War. See World W a r I France, 299, 300, 302
Maastricht Treaty on European Union
52
to democracy, 1 23-26, 1 3 0,
1 02 , 1 03 , 1 1 0, 1 1 1 ; press freedom
1 74-76
in, 99
Kwangju massacre, 27 1 , 277
Political Rights ( 1 966), 303 International Republican Institute (U. S . ) , 298
Mandela, Nel son, 45 , 308 M ao Zedong, 230, 25 1 , 259
International Covenant o n C i v i l and Laos, 9 5 Latin America, 6 , 1 3 , 23-60, 6 4 , 6 5 , 66, 6 9 , 1 28 . 2 6 7 , 270, 2 9 7 , 300,
M arcos, Ferdinand, 97, 1 02 , 1 05 , 2 7 0 , 2 7 7 , 27 8 , 3 0 8 M ar.<, Karl, 229
Globali zation, 1 1 4- 1 6 , 278
Islam, 258, 26 1
3 04, 3 0 8 , 309; civi l-mi litary rela
Marxi sm, 1 1 3 , 242, 278
Gonzalez, Felipe, 1 7
Israel, 7
tions in, 46-47 ; democratic lead
M a Ying-jeou, 1 76
Gorbachev, Mikhail , 67, 6 8 , 70, 74,
Italy, 9, 300
ership in, 47-49; economic reform
Menem, Carlos, 3 7 , 3 8 , 40, 45, 49 ,
85, 1 9 2 Goulart, Joao, 3 0 Great Britai n , 3 2 , 1 1 2 , 300, 307, 309, 3 1 4 , 3 1 6 Greece, 5-7 , 9 , I I , 3 9 , 300; transi tion to democracy in, 1 2- 1 8 Guatemala, 3 6 , 46
and redistribution in, 42-45 ; eco Japan, 7 , 1 03 , 1 1 3 , 1 1 4, 1 1 5 , 1 25 , 1 53 , 1 66, 1 93 , 203 , 220, 27 1 ,
ideological convergence in, 3 4-3 6 ;
289, 303; culture and democracy
political instability in, 26-3 1 ;
in, 2 8 ; and Tai wan, 1 69-70
poli tical parties in, 30, 49-5 2 ;
Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 1 99 1 , 3 0 3 , 305
53 Mexico, 27, 28, 49, 57, 5 9 ; transition to democracy in, 40-46 Middle class, 1 05 , 1 27 , 1 28, 1 66, 209, 253, 278, 282 Mitra, Ramon, 1 05
Jeyaretnam, J.B . , 9 8
presi dentialis m a n d parliamen
Ji ang Chunyun, 2 3 3
tarism in, 5 2-5 3 ; transition to
Mongolia, 3 1 4
Jiang Zemin, 246
democracy in, 3 1 -34, 3 7-4 1
Morgenthau, Hans, 309
Haiti , 28 , 34, 35, 36, 46, 3 0 3 , 307, 308
nomics of, 28-3 1 , 3 5-3 9 , 56-5 8 ;
Lebanon, 306 Kang Youwei , 26 1
Lee Ku an Yew, 1 02, 1 6 8 , 250
Kao Ch' un-ming, 1 7 3
Lee Teng-hui , 1 26 , 1 29 , 1 3 1 , 1 3 6 ,
Kaohsiung Incident, 1 74, 27 1 , 282
1 3 7 , 1 4 1 , 1 44, 1 4 5 , 1 50 , 1 67 ,
Myanmar, 95 Nair, Devan, 1 02 Napoleonic wars, 7, 9, 295
330
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NOl) (U. S . ) .
298 National Endowment for Democracy
Index Peru. 28. 29, 30, 3 1 , 35, 46. 49 . 52.
dentiali sm. 70-7 1 . 78. 8 3-84.
1 1 6. 1 7 3 , 1 8 1 . 254, 255. 257,
57; party weakness in. 50; transi
87-88 ; transition from totalitarian
258, 267; civil-military relations
tion to democracy in. 40
ism in. 65-67 ; transition to de
in, 98, 274-75. 280; ci vil society
mocracy in. 64-89. See also
in, 98. 279; consolidation of
Philippines. 95. 96. 97. 1 00. 1 04.
(NED) (U . S . ) . 36. 298. 308. 3 1 0.
I l l . 1 1 2, 1 1 4. 1 1 6. 1 8 1 , 257.
316
277 . 308; cultural legacy in.
Nationali sm: i n China. 262-63 ; in Japan. 1 1 3 ; in Taiwan. 1 69 . 202 National People' s Congress (NPC) (China). 2 1 9-2 1 ; Communist
331
Index
1 07-8 ; fall of Ferdinand Marcos in. 270; political parties in. 1 0 1 -2
Soviet Union Russian Federation. 69. 70. 75. 77.
See also Russia; Soviet Union Rwanda. 308
Pinochet. Augusto, 32. 38. 40, 4 1 .
72
democracy in. 278-8 1 , 289; and di vided nationhood, 275, 289 ; economic liberalization in, 272; and external influences, 270-8 1 ,
288-90; and globalization, 1 1 5 ; S a Carneiro. Francisco. 1 8
human rights in, 27 1 ; and politi
Party control over. 232-34;
Poland, 44. 64, 1 73 , 306. 3 1 1 . 3 1 4
S alazar. Antonio. 7 . 1 2. 1 8
cal parties, 98, 1 00- 1 0 1 , 1 03-4,
constitutional role of. 237-3 9 ;
Political aid. 295-3 1 8 ; and consolida
S alinas. Carlos, 40
1 09-1 0; press freedom in, 99;
S alisbury . Lord. 295 . 307
transition to democracy in.
elections t o . 23 5-37; increasing independence of. 220. 233-3 5 ; jurisdiction of. 237-39; and legal
tion of democracy. 3 1 1 - 1 2 Political parties. 1 09-10; i n Asia,
1 00-1 04. 1 09-1 1 . 1 1 6; i n Latin
reform. 2 1 8- 1 9 ; reform of.
America. 30. 49-52; i n Russia.
234-37
73-75. 8 1 -87; in South Korea,
Netherlands. 301 . 303. 306
1 00- 1 0 1 . 1 03-4; in Taiwan.
New Korea Democratic Party. 1 0 1
1 02-3 , 143. 148-49. 1 7 4-76
New Party (NP) (Taiwan). 1 02. 1 03 .
1 26. 1 7 1 . 285 New Testament Church. 1 74
New York Times. The, 262
S chultz, George, 276 S econd World War. See World War II Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) (Peru), 50 Shining Path. See Sendero Luminoso
Politics (Aristotle). 108
Sigur. Gaston, 276, 277
Polyarchy. 34
S ingapore, 95, 96, 99, 1 08 . 1 09 . 1 1 2.
Portugal. 3 . 8 . 306; constitutional revi sion of 1 982 in. 1 2; interna
275-78 S oviet Union, 6, 1 1 , 1 8, 1 9 , 34, 3 8 ,
66, 68, 69, 7 0 , 7 1 , 72, 73, 7 6 , 79, 1 92, 2 1 3 , 22 1 , 2 5 7 , 2 5 8 , 267, 268, 276. 284, 299 , 304, 306, 307. 308, 309, 3 1 0 Spain, S , 6. 7, 8, 3 9 . 44, 306; coup of 1 9 8 1 in. 1 7 ; federalism in.
1 1 3 , 1 1 6, 254-55 ; civil society i n .
1 8- 1 9 ; political learning in. 9, 1 8 ;
1 06-7 ; and globali zati on. 1 1 5 ;
transition to democracy in. 1 0-2 1
Nicaragua. 3 5 , 36. 46
tional support for democracy in.
and legacy o f B ritish coloni ali sm,
Nongovernmental organi zations
5-7 ; political learning in. 9. 1 8 ;
97-9 8 ; libel law in, 98; political
Sri Lanka, 303
transition t o democracy i n . 1 2- 1 8
parties in, 1 02 . 1 03 , 1 1 0. 1 1 1 ;
S talinism, 87
press freedom i n . 99
S tate. irrelevance of. 1 1 4- 1 5
(NGOs). 273 . 278 North Atlanti c Treaty Organization (NATO). 1 5
Qiao S h i . 2 1 8. 23 3 . 245 . 260
S i ngle nontransferable vote (SNTV)
S pani sh Civil War, 1 8 , 1 9
Sudan , 303
North Korea. 9 5 , 99, 275, 276, 289
Qing Dynasty. 26 1
Skokov, Yury. 8 6
Sun Yat-sen, 103, 1 69, 202, 262
Olympic Games ( 1 98 8 ) , 277. 278
Ramos, Fidel, 1 02, 1 05
Soares , M ario 6, 1 8
Supreme Soviet (USSR), 70, 7 1 , 7 3 ,
Organization for Economic Coopera
Reagan, Ronald, 276, 298
S ocialist International, 6 , 298, 300
Roh Tae Woo, 98, 278. 279
Somalia, 3 07
tion and Development (OECD).
302. 303 . 306 Organization of American S tates. 306 Oudin. Jacques, 299
74, 221 Suriname, 303
Romania, 308
S oros, George, 296
S weden, 300. 30 1 , 306
S outh Africa, 45, 47, 296, 299. 304,
Swi tzerland, 303
Rule of law, 1 2 1 , 2 1 3-19
Papua New Guinea, 3 1 4
3 1 4 ; civil society in, 75-77,
Paraguay, 28, 34. 3 5 . 42. 46, 49 ,
87-88 ; constitution of, 7 1 -73,
Paris Commune, 229, 243
Sun An-ti . 1 03
Romanov , Giorgy, 67 Russia, 64-89, 245 , 299, 302, 306,
3 14
electoral system, 1 42, 1 43
306, 308 S outheast A s i a . 29, 3 8 , 42, 60, 1 79 ,
254, 255, 27 1 , 300 Southern Europe, 3-2 1 , 64, 66, 69,
Taiwan, 38, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99-1 00,
1 02-3 , 1 07, 108, 1 09 , 1 1 1 , 1 1 2, 1 1 3 , 1 1 5 , 1 1 6, 1 23-9 1 , 197,
77-7 8 ; coup of 1 9 9 1 in, 68;
1 28 , 267, 270. 27 1 ; and external
1 98-2 1 0 , 2 1 5 . 225, 229 . 23 1 ,
economic transformation in,
influences, 5-7 ; and moderniza
236, 244, 245-46, 254, 255, 257,
Peng Zhen. 222, 245
68-69 , 84-87; elections in, 79-8 1 ;
tion, 7-8 ; transition to democracy
258, 259. 267, 270, 27 1 -72;
Perestroika, 22 1 , 276
federalism in, 70, 72-7 3 . 77-78;
in, 1 0- 1 8
civil-military relations in, 1 39-4 1 ,
Perez. Carlos Andres. 38, 40, 45
judiciary in, 78-79; political par
Pergau Dam. 3 1 0
ties in, 73-75, 8 1-87 ; and presi-
South Korea, 9 5 , 9 6 , 9 7 , 9 9 , 1 06,
1 08 , 1 09 , 1 1 1 , 1 1 2. 1 1 3 . l I S ,
274-75, 286; civi l society in. 1 05-6, 1 5 3-54, 1 7 2-74; and
332
Index
Taiwan (cont'd) Confucianism, 1 29, 1 67-70; con stitution of, 1 3 1 , 1 3 5-3 8 , 1 76 ,
284-86; elections in, 9 1 , 9 2 , 1 26, 1 28, 1 42-43, 1 49-50, 1 6 3 , 1 75-76; and external influences, 267-72, 278-87; and globaliza tion, 1 1 5 ; middle class and demo cratic transition in, 1 27-39, 1 66 ; and political identity, 1 29-30,
with Taiwan, 27 1 , 272-74; and the third wave, 1 1 2- 1 3 Universal Declaration o f Human Rights ( 1 948), 303 Uruguay, 28, 29, 3 1 , 3 3-34, 45, 49 ,
57, 3 1 4; transition to democracy in, 3 2 U . S . Agency for International Devel opment, 52, 298, 3 0 1 , 3 1 3 , 3 1 4,
316
1 36, 1 37, 143, 155, 1 78-83 ,
USSR. See Soviet Union
273-75, 283-86, 289; press free
Uzbekistan, 64, 65
dom in, 99- 1 00; and relations with China, 1 27, 1 55 , 1 79-8 3 ,
Vargas Llosa, Mario, 38
281-83, 287-88, 289-90; rule of
Vatican II, 268
law in, 1 76; transition to democ
Venezuela, 28, 30, 40; transition to
racy in, 1 49-50, 270-7 1 , 28 1 Taj iki stan, 64
democracy in, 40 Vietnam , 38, 9 5 , 2 1 3 , 307
Tangwai movement (Taiwan), 1 00, 1 23 , 143, 1 50, 1 72-73 , 1 75 , 1 80,
Warsaw Pact, 308
282, 283
Western Europe, 28, 1 08, 1 1 5 , 1 9 3 ,
Tartarstan, 73 Thailand, 36, 97, 1 04, 1 1 1 , 1 1 2, 1 1 3 ,
1 1 6; and Confuciani sm, 1 07-8; constitution of, 1 09, 1 1 9 ; and
1 95 , 25 1 , 255 Westminster Foundation for Democ racy (U. K . ) , 295, 299, 300, 3 1 2,
316
globalization, 1 1 5 ; political parties
World B ank, 42, 52, 1 65, 272, 306
in, 1 0 1 , 1 04-5, 1 1 0; power of
World Trade Organization, 286 '
bureaucracy in, 98; press freedom
World War I, 309
in, 99; and the third wave, 95-96
World War II, 5, 1 69, 2 1 3 , 309
Tiananmen Square, 2 1 6, 223 , 254 Tibet, 228, 252
Yang Shangkun, 1 37
Toh Chin Chye, 102
Yan Jiaqi , 244
Totalitariani s m , 66-67, 263, 3 09
Yeltsin, Boris, 67, 68, 69-74, 77,
Travkin, Nikolai , 75 Ts ' ai Yu-ch ' u an, 1 74 Turkey, 1 1 , 1 4, 1 5 , 304
78-8 1 , 83, 86, 8 8 , 89 Yiguan Dao, 1 74 Yuan S hikai , 259 Yugoslavia, 274, 284, 304, 307
United Nations, 1 65 , 1 80, 304, 3 1 1 United S tates, 6. 1 25 , 1 74, 1 82, 1 93 ,
202, 209 , 268, 277 , 287, 288,
Zaire, 303 Zambia, 306
289, 3 0 1 , 307, 308, 3 09 , 3 1 6 ;
Zamora, Paz, 38
declining influence of, 1 1 3 ; and
Zhang B i nglin, 26 1
policy toward Latin America, 3 6 ;
Zhao Ziyang, 1 25
and relations w i t h South Korea,
Zhirinovsky, Vladimir, 8 1 , 8 2
27 1 , 272-74, 276 ; and relations
Zyuganov, Gennady, 75, 8 1