CONTINUITY IN LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS
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CONTINUITY IN LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS
LINGVISTICÆ INVESTIGATIONES: SUPPLEMENTA Studies in French & General Linguistics / Etudes en Linguistique Française et Générale This series has been established as a companion series to the periodical "LINGVISTICÆ INVESTIGATIONES", which started publication in 1977. It is published by the Laboratoire d'Automatique Documentaire et Linguistique du C.N.R.S. (Paris 7).
Series-Editors: Jean-Claude Chevalier (Université Paris VIII) Maurice Gross (Université Paris 7) Christian Leclère (L.A.D.L.)
Volume 19 Catherine Fuchs and Bernard Victorri (eds) Continuity in Linguistic Semantics
CONTINUITY IN LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS Edited by
CATHERINE FUCHS BERNARD VICTORRI Université de Caen, France
JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY AMSTERDAM/PHILADELPHIA
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences — Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Continuity in linguistic semantics / edited by Catherine Fuchs. Bernard Victorri. p. cm. — (Linguisticae investigationes. Supplementa ISSN 0165-7569; v. 19) Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: The limits of continuity : discreteness in cognitive semantics / Ronald Langacker - Continuity and modality / Antoine Culioli - Continuum in cognition and continuum in language / Hans-Jakob Seiler — Is there continuity in syntax? / Pierre Le Goffic - The use of computer corpora in the textual demonstrability of gradience in linguistic categories / Geoffrey Leech, Brian Francis & Xunfeng Xu ~ A "continuous definition" of polysemous items / Jacqueline Picoche « The challenges of continuity for a linguistic approach to semantics / Catherine Fuchs — What kind of models do we need for the simulation of understanding? / Daniel Kayser - Continuity, cognition, and linguistics / Jean-Michel Salanskis ~ Reflections of Hansjakob Seller's continuum / René Thorn ~ Attractor syntax / Jean Petitot — A discrete approach based on logic simulating continuity in lexical semantics / Violaine Prince ~ Coarse coding and the lexicon / Catherine L. Harris — Continuity, polysemy, and representation: understanding the verb "cut" / David Touretzky ~ The use of continuity in modelling semantic phenomena / Bernard Victorri. 1. Semantics. 2. Continuity. 3. Linguistic models. I. Fuchs, Catherine. II. Victorri, Bernard. III. Series. P325.C57 1994 401'.43--dc20 94-38916 ISBN 90 272 3128 1 (Eur.) / 1-55619-259-2 (US) (alk. paper) CIP © Copyright 1994 - John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. • P.O.Box 75577 • 1070 AN Amsterdam • The Netherlands John Benjamins North America • P.O.Box 27519 • Philadelphia, PA 19118 • USA
CONTENTS
Preface
3
PART I : LINGUISTIC ISSUES Ronald Langacker : The limits of continuity : discreteness in cognitive semantics Antoine Culioli : Continuity and modality Hans-Jakob Seiler : Continuum in cognition and continuum in language Pierre Le Goffic : Is there continuity in syntax ? Geoffrey Leech, Brian Francis & Xunfeng Xu : The use of computer corpora in the textual demonstrability of gradience in linguistic categories Jacqueline Picoche : A "continuous definition" ofpolysemous items : its basis, resources and limits Catherine Fuchs : The challenges of continuity for a linguistic approach to semantics
9 21 33 45
57 77 93
PART II : MODELLING ISSUES Daniel Kayser : What kind of models do we need for the simulation of understanding ? 111 127 Jean-Michel Salanskis : Continuity, cognition and linguitics René Thorn : Reflections on Hansjakob Seiler's continuum 155 Jean Petitot : Attractor syntax : morphodynamics and cognitive grammar 167 Violaine Prince : A discrete approach based on logic simulating continuity in lexical semantics 189 Catherine L. Harris : Coarse coding and the lexicon 205 David Touretzky : Continuity, polysemy and representation : understanding the verb 'cut' 231 Bernard Victorri : The use of continuity in modelling semantic phenomena 241
PREFACE Until recently, most of linguistic theories avoided recourse to the notion of continuity. Structuralism, which developed within a problematic of purely discrete relations of commutation (paradigmatic relations) and distribution (syntagmatic relations) among forms, contributed to the marginalisation of all phenomena outside such discrete framework. This tendency was accentued by transformational-generative grammars, two essential characteristics of which tend towards the elimination of continuity : on the one hand, the priority accorded to syntax, with its emphasis on categorisation (which leads to compositionality as far as semantics is concerned) and on the other, the utilisation of an algebraic forma lism which sanctions the discrete character of these models. It should be noted that contemporary theories of cognition also resort massively to discrete formalisms, partly under the combined influence of linguistic theories and of symbolic artificial intelligence. Thus the Gestalt theory seems to be almost forgotten today, despite the fact that, particularly as regards the psycho logy of perception, it had completely transformed the paradigms of research, by opposing to the then prevailing associationist ideas a point of view closer to the theory of dynamic systems (inspired by the fields theory of physics), in which the relation between the whole and its parts is the result of more global interactions, irreducible to discrete combinations of elementary sensations. Nevertheless, the predominance of discrete approaches does not mean that continuity has been completely absent from the scene. In linguistics, in the hey day of structuralism, the psychomecanic theory of Gustave Guillaume already ran counter to the dominant point of view by defining a kinetics which could account for a continuum of significations obtained in discourse by earlier or later "interceptions" in the movement of "tension" inherent in each linguistic unit in tongue. More recently, various trends in linguistics have been trying to go beyond the constraints imposed by discrete approaches : Culioli, Picoche, Lakoff, Langacker, Leech, Seiler and others. Despite their diversity, these approaches evidently share a certain number of common semantico-cognitive preoccupa tions (whether it is a question of cognitive grammars, invariants in the typology of languages, or of enunciative categories). However, these attempts have remained generally isolated and seldom succeeded in building up problematics sufficiently operative to oppose to the all-powerful discrete models.
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At the same time, mathematical and computer science tools have been set forth, which seem interesting for the modelling of continuous phenomena in lin guistic semantics. Thus, in mathematics, Thorn has shown that the framework of differential geometry and of dynamic systems could constitute an alternative to discrete formalisations for linguistics. Several researchers (Petitot, Bruter, Wildgen) have explored the possibilities offered by Thorn's "catastrophe theory" for the treatment of linguistic problems. More recently, the revival of interest in connectionist techniques in artificial intelligence has been accompanied by some attempts to apply these techniques to the description of language : the modelling of language learning processes (McClelland and Rumelhart, Touretzky, etc.), the treatment of semantic ambiguities (Cottrell, Waltz and Pollack, etc.) and lately even syntactic representations (Smolensky). Time has come now to take stock of these advances. This book provides a confrontation between linguists, philosophers, mathematicians and computer scientists, dealing with two major questions : which language phenomena call for continuous models, and what can the tools of formalisation contribute in this respect ? In order to focus the reflexion even further, the authors deliberately restricted themselves to the problems of linguistic semantics, linked to the lexi con, to grammatical categories (aspect, modality, determination, etc.) or to syn tactic structures. The book is thus divided into two main parts : Part one is devoted to linguistic issues : one of our main concerns has been to give priority to linguistic problematics, because the utilisation of ma thematical or computer science formalisms too often leads to an emphasis on the tool at the expense of the phenomena to be accounted for. The following questions are at stake : In linguistics, which semantic phenomena appear difficult or impos sible to describe in discrete terms ? How can recourse to the notion of continuity allow resolution of the difficulties encountered ? How can a description of these phenomena in terms of a continuum be articulated with the discrete character of linguistic units and their composition ? Should continuity be conceived as a con venient representation of very gradual, but nevertheless basically discrete, pheno mena, or must one postulate that continuity is an intrinsic characteristic of seman tic phenomena ? Part two is devoted to modelling issues, considered from a threefold point of view : namely a philosophical, a mathematical and a computer science viewpoint. The various contributions try to answer the following questions : - From an epistemological point of view, must the introduction of the notion of continuity be seen as a radical break with the tradition of formalisation in linguistics ? In particular, how can the introduction of this notion be reconcilied with a methodology based on the falsifiability of theories ? Is there necessarily a
PREFACE
5
link between this type of modelling and the cognitive approaches which are also based on the notion of continuity ? What new interactions might such an approach open up, particularly with a general cognitive theory like the Gestalt theory ? - On the mathematical plane, what is the relation betweeen the notions of "continuity" versus "discreteness" in linguistics and the various mathematical properties to which they can be compared (oppositions between continuous and discontinuous for a function, between continuous and countable in set theory, between continuous and discrete for a variety) ? Can linguistic "continuity" really be accounted for by a mathematical model ? Can one expect really operative pre dictions (quantitatively and qualitatively) from such a model ? What links are there between a continuous mathematical model and the quantitative mathematics already widely employed in linguistics, namely statistics ? - Finally, on the plane of computer science, how can continuity be implemented on a digital, and therefore discrete, machine ? Must a continuous mathematical model necessarily correspond to a continuous implementation in computer science ? Does connectionism provide a novel and completely satisfactory solution to this problem ? Catherine FUCHS Bernard VICTORRI
PART I LINGUISTIC
ISSUES
THE LIMITS OF CONTINUITY : DISCRETENESS IN COGNITIVE SEMANTICS RONALD W. LANGACKER University of California, San Diego, USA
I take it as being evident that many aspects of language structure are matters of degree. This is a common theme in both functional and cognitive linguistics, including my own work in cognitive grammar (Langacker 1987a, 1990, 1991). It would however be simplistic to assume that a commitment to cognitive (as opposed to formal) semantics necessarily correlates with the view that semantic structure is predominantly continuous (rather than discrete). I suspect, in fact, that the role of true continuity in linguistic semantics is rather limited. My goals here are to clarify some of the issues involved, to briefly discuss a certain amount of data, and to propose a basic generalization concerning the distribution of discrete vs. continuous phenomena. In approaching these matters, I will ignore the fact that linguistic structure reduces, ultimately, to the activity of discrete neurons that fire in discrete pulses. Our concern is rather with phenomena that emerge from such activity at higher le vels of organization, phenomena that could in principle be either discrete or conti nuous. I will also leave aside two aspects of discreteness that are too obvious and general to merit extended discussion : the fact that we code our experience primarily by means of discrete lexical items, each of which evokes individually only a limited portion of the overall notion we wish to express ; and the discrete nature of the choice (i.e. at a given position we have to choose either one lexical item or another, not some blend or in-between option). In using terms like discrete and continuous, what exactly do I mean ? A continuous parameter has the property that, between any two values (however close), an intermediate value can always be found. There are no "gaps" along the parameter, nor any specific values linked in relationships of immediate succession. By contrast, discreteness implies a direct "jump" between two distinct values, one of which is nonetheless the immediate successor of the other. To take an obvious example, the real numbers form a continuous series, whereas the integers are dis crete (there is no integer between 4 and 5). Many continuous parameters are of course discernible in conceptualization and linguistic semantics : length, pitch,
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brightness, the angle at which two lines intersect, etc. Yet the role of true conti nuity appears to be circumscribed in various ways. We must first distinguish actual continuity from other phenomena that tend to be confused with it. One thing that does not qualify as continuity is hesitancy or indeterminacy in the choice between two discrete options (which is not to deny that one's inclination to choose a particular option may be a matter of degree). For instance, although I may not know whether to call a certain object a cup or a mug, I nevertheless employ distinct and discretely different prototypical conceptions in making the judgment (cf. Wierzbicka 1984). Continuity is also not the same as va gueness or "fuzziness". It would be arbitrary, for example, to draw a specific line as the definitive boundary of a shoulder. This body part is only fuzzily bounded — there is no definite point at which it is necessarily thought of as ending. Yet we do conceive of it as a bounded region (this makes shoulder a count noun), and a boundary implies discontinuity (a "jump" between shoulder and non-shoulder). We impose the boundary despite being unsure or flexible in regard to its place ment. I believe, moreover, that certain linguistic phenomena often thought of as forming a continuum are better analyzed in terms of multiple discrete factors that intersect to yield a finely articulated range of possibilities. For instance, basic grammatical categories are sometimes seen as varying continuously ("squishily") between the two extremities anchored by nouns and verbs (Ross 1972). I have ar gued, however, that grammatical classes are definable on the basis of discrete se mantic properties (Langacker 1987a, part II ; 1987b). A noun designates a thing (defined abstractly as a "region"), while an adjective, preposition, participle, infi nitive, or verb designates a relation. Verbs are temporal (in the sense of desi gnating relationships that evolve through time and are scanned sequentially), whe reas the other categories are atemporal (being viewed holistically). Some rela tions are simple (i.e. they comprise just a single configuration), but others — verbs, infinitives, as well as certain participles and prepositions — are complex (comprising multiple configurations). When additional semantic traits are taken into account, together with polysemy and the prototype organization of individual categories, behavior can be anticipated that is "squishy" for all intents and pur poses. Still, merely indicating the position of elements along a continuous scale can at best only summarize their behavior. Specific semantic characterizations offer the prospect of explaining it. Let us turn now to conceptual parameters that can indeed be regarded as continuous. Even here there are serious qualifications. The most obvious point is that a continuous scale is usually not coded linguistically in a continuous manner. For temperature we have terms like hot, cold, warm, cool, scalding, and freezing, not to mention ways of expressing specific values (e.g. 13 ° C). We devise musi-
THE LIMITS OF CONTINUITY
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cal scales to structure the domain of pitch, and for time we have many discrete units of segmentation and measurement. The most celebrated example, of course, is the idiosyncratic "tiling" of color space imposed by the basic color terms of each language. Color is also celebrated as a domain which harbors a certain kind of dis creteness despite the apparent continuity of its basic dimensions. I refer to the phe nomenon of "focal colors", which provide the prototypical values of basic color terms and have special cognitive salience even when such a term is lacking (Berlin and Kay 1969 ; Kay and McDaniel 1978). Focal colors mitigate the continuity of color space by making it "lumpy" rather than strictly homogeneous. As natural co gnitive reference points, the lumps are easily adopted as the basis for categori zing judgments, so that color categories tend to coalesce around them. Focal colors are just one manifestation of a reference-point ability that I have claimed to be both ubiquitous and fundamental in cognition and linguistic seman tics (Langacker 1993a). It is, I think, self-evident that we are able to evoke the conception of one entity for purposes of establishing "mental contact" with another. This reference-point ability is manifested in the physical/perceptual do main whenever we search for one object in order to find another, as reflected in sentences like the following : (1)
a. The drugstore is next to the post office b. There's a deer on that hill just above the large boulder
More abstractly, a reference-point relationship is central to the meaning of "possessives" : the man s wallet ; my cousin ; the girl's shoulder ; our train ; her attitude ; your situation ; Kennedy's assassination ; etc. I suggest, in fact, that it constitutes the one constant aspect of their meaning. This schematic semantic value accounts for both the extraordinary variety of the relationships coded by possessive elements and also their asymmetry. If the "possessor" is properly analyzed as a natural cognitive reference point vis-à-vis the "possessed", it stands to reason that these roles would not in general be freely reversible (*the wallet's man ; *the shoulder's girl ; *the assassination's Kennedy). With respect to basically continuous parameters, the reference-point ability has what might be termed a "quantizing" effect. We are not in general able to di rectly ascertain a precise value falling at an arbitrary location along a continuous scale, nor do languages provide separate terms for each possible value. Instead, the usual strategy is either to assimilate the value to a salient reference point (ignoring its deviation therefrom), or else to estimate and discretely characterize its position in relation to one or more such reference points. The result is a kind of quantization, wherein linguistically coded values either "jump" directly from one reference point to another, or alternatively, are calculated from reference points in some discrete fashion.
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Quantization is most apparent when a continuous parameter is structured by means of a discrete grid or numerical scale. The musical scale is a case in point. Not only do the basic terms (C, D, E, etc.) jump from one precise value to the next, but they also provide the basis — both conceptual and linguistic — for deter mining the only permissible intermediate values. Conceptually, F-sharp or B-flat lies mid way between two primary values (or else one quantum above or below such a value, given some conception of the magnitude of allowable incre ments/decrements). Linguistically, the expression that codes an intermediate value comprises the basic term and either of two discrete qualifiers (sharp/flat). A tempe rature scale is comparable except that there is more flexibility in specifying inter mediate values. In describing the temperature as being 13.2 ° C, we take 13° C. as a reference point and indicate that the actual value lies beyond it at a distance repre senting a certain fraction of the interval between 13° and 14°. And while it is true in principle that any real number can be used to specify a temperature, in everyday practice we confine ourselves to the integers or at most to fractional intermediate values that we can estimate in terms of quanta. Intuitively, for instance, I unders tand 13.2° as a step beyond 13° such that five steps of the same magnitude would take me to 14°. Fractions themselves neatly illustrate the type of phenomenon I have in mind. Expressions like 21/2 and 53/4 clearly take the integers as both linguistic and conceptual reference points. Moreover, they use other integers as the basis for computing a specific intermediate position : the denominator indicates how many steps there are between two successive integers, while the numerator specifies how many steps should be taken. Or consider the angle at which two lines inter sect. Although there is obviously a continuous range of possible values, it seems evident that certain discretely computed values have special cognitive status. Particularly salient is an angle of 90°, as reflected by terms like right angle and perpendicular. The reason, I suggest, is that perpendicularity represents the privi leged situation in which the two angles formed by one line joining another have precisely the same magnitude — if one angle is mentally superimposed on the other (which is thus invoked as a kind of reference point), they are found to coincide. We are also more likely to characterize an angle as being 45°, 30°, or 60° than, say, as 7°, 52 °, or 119°. These values are privileged psychologically because they bear easily computed relationships to a right angle. An angle of 45° is one whose complement within a right angle is identical to it in magnitude. As for 30° and 60°, we can easily imagine sweeping through a right angle in three discrete and equal steps, defining three component angles whose superimposition likewise results in judgments of identity. Quantization of this sort is by no means confined to quasi-mathematical do mains. For instance, compound color expressions like brick red, celery green, and
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sky blue can be thought of as evoking dual cognitive reference points. By itself, a term like red, green, or blue evokes a focal color, which in turn evokes the more inclusive region in color space that it anchors. A noun such as brick, celery, or sky names an entity that not only has a characteristic color but is sufficiently familiar to serve as a reference point. From these two reference points, we compute the proper notion : red tells us that brick is to be construed with respect to its color, and brick directs our attention to a particular location within the red region. Also varying continuously are parameters such as size, length, and distance. We can of course measure these numerically, as for temperature. The more usual strategy, however, is to assess magnitudes only with respect to broad categories standing in binary opposition : big vs. small ; long vs. short ; near vs. far. The categorization is therefore basically discrete despite the vagueness of the boundaries. (Continuous analogical coding — as in The train was looooong — is clearly a rather marginal phenomenon.) Furthermore, placing an object in such a category involves a single step, in either a positive or a negative direction, from a privileged value that serves as reference point for this purpose. For a given object type, that reference point comprises the range of values that everyday experience has led us to regard as being "normal" for that type. Thus a big flea is smaller in absolute terms than a small moth, and a short train is longer than a long centipede. The phenomenon is quite general. It seems to me that in every domain we operate primarily in terms of salient reference points, from which we arrive at other notions in ways that are largely discrete. When the effect of reference points and quantization is worked out systematically and fully appreciated, the role of true continuity in linguistic meaning will, I believe, appear rather limited. This is not to say that it has no role whatever. There are in fact important aspects of linguistic semantics for which continuity should probably be considered the default assumption. Let me offer the following broad generalization as a working hypothesis that may have some heuristic value : with respect to the "internal structure" of a linguistically coded conception, discreteness predominates ; on the other hand, semantic effects due to "external" factors — i.e. relationships with other conceptual structures — are basically continuous. Since conceptions are containers only by dint of metaphor (and are not really very container-like), the terms "internal" and "external" should neither be taken as implying a strict dichotomy nor pushed beyond the limits of their utility. Factors reasonably considered internal are an expression's conceptual "content" and many facets of its "construal". I have thus far focused on content, arguing that true con tinuity is circumscribed and circumvented in various ways. Construal is the phe nomenon whereby essentially the same content is susceptible to alternate "viewings", which represent distinct linguistic meanings. One aspect of construal,
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namely background, is by nature an external factor. Other, more internal aspects include specificity, scope, perspective, and prominence. Here, as with content, the role of true continuity is more limited than one might think. Specificity (or conversely, schematicity) refers to our manifest ability to conceive and portray a situation at any level of precision and detail, as exemplified in (2) : (2)
Something happened > A person saw an animal > A woman examined a snake > A tall young woman carefully scrutinized a small cobra
Observe, however, that we can generally only adjust the level of specificity in quantized fashion, either by adding a discrete element {woman > young woman) or else by shifting from one discrete level to another in a taxonomic hierarchy {examine > scrutinize). Furthermore, beyond their obvious discreteness such hierarchies are usually "lumpy", in that certain levels have greater cognitive salience than others. In particular, the "basic level" (e.g. snake in the hierarchy thing > animal > reptile > snake > cobra) is known to have special psychological status (Rosch 1978). I define an expression's scope as the array of conceptual content it invokes and relies upon for its characterization. By nature, it tends to be flexible and va riable — it is generally no easier to precisely delimit an expression's scope than it is to determine exactly how far a shoulder extends. Nevertheless, there is good linguistic evidence for believing not only that this construct has some kind of cognitive reality, but also that scopes are conceived as being bounded, however fuzzily (see Langacker 1993b). Grammatical constructions can refer to them specifically and equate them with other bounded regions. Consider the "nested locative" construction, as in (3) : (3) The camera is upstairs in the bedroom in the closet on the top shelf Intuitively, this construction involves a "zooming in" effect, wherein each successive locative in the sequence focuses on a smaller area contained within the previous one. More technically, we can say that the scope for interpreting each lo cative in the sequence is limited to the search domain of the preceding locative. (The search domain of a locative is defined as the area to which it confines the en tity being located, i.e. the set of locations that will satisfy its specifications.) A partonomy like arm > hand > finger > knuckle further illustrates both nesting and quantization with respect to scope : the conception of an arm overall provides the spatial scope for the characterization of hand ; the conception of a hand in turn constitutes the immediate spatial scope for finger ; and that of a finger, for knuckle.
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The term perspective subsumes more specific aspects of construal such as vantage point, orientation, direction of mental scanning, and subjecti vity/objectivity. Although some of these factors can in principle vary conti nuously, in practice they tend toward discreteness. Presumably, for instance, our conception of a cat includes numerous visual images, representing cats with diffe rent markings, in various postures, engaged in certain activities, etc. There is doubtless considerable variation and flexibility. Still, it seems apparent that these images tend to reflect certain canonical vantage points, and certain orientations of the cat within the visual field. These vantage points and orientations are of course those which predominate in our everyday visual experience. For example, images in which the cat is viewed from underneath, or is upside down within the visual field, are possible but hardly typical. The notion of mental scanning can be illustrated by the contrast between pairs of expressions like the following : (4)
a. The roof slopes steeply {upward/'downward} b. The road {widens/narrows} just outside of town c. The hill gently {rises from/falls to} the bank of the river
In each case a difference in meaning is quite evident, even though the two expressions describe precisely the same objective situation. Intuitively, moreover, the semantic contrast involves directionality, even though the situations described are static — objectively, nothing moves, hence there is no apparent basis for direc tionality. I do ascribe motion to these sentences, but not on the part of the subject : rather, it is the conceptualizer who "moves" in these expressions, scanning men tally through the scene in one direction or the other (Langacker 1990, ch. 5). For our purposes, the pertinent observation is that the contrast in directionality (e.g. between the conceptualizer scanning upward along the roof or downward) is clearly discrete. Subjectivity/objectivity is defined as the extent to which an entity is construed, asymmetrically, as the "subject" vs. the "object" of conception (Langacker 1985 ; 1990, ch. 12). In (4), for example, both the conceptualizer and his motion are construed subjectively, since the conceptualizer does not actually conceive of himself as scanning mentally through the scene, but merely does so implicitly as he focuses on the objective configuration thus assessed. Although subjectivity/objectivity is a matter of degree, here too there are grounds for belie ving that the scale is lumpy and partially quantized owing to the privileged status of certain canonical arrangements. Consider the role of the speaker, for instance. At one extreme, represented by the pronoun I, the speaker goes "onstage" to be the expression's referent ; as the explicit focus of attention, the speaker is construed quite objectively. Another standard arrangement finds the speaker
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"offstage" but still within an expression's scope, hence intermediate in terms of subjectivity/objectivity. Examples include deictics (e.g. this ; here ; now) and sentences like those in (5), where the speaker functions as the default-case reference point. (5)
a. The mailbox is right across the street b. Please come as soon as you can
The last basic option is for the speaker to remain outside an expression's scope altogether, having no role in the conception conveyed apart from the conceptualizer role itself (which he has in every expression). In this event the speaker's construal is maximally subjective. There are many sorts of prominence, and while some kind of quantization may in each case be discernible, I suspect that in general it may be less obvious and less important in this area. Nonetheless, the two kinds of prominence that are most essential for grammatical purposes show definite quantum effects. One type is profiling, which might be characterized as "reference within a conceptualiza tion". Within its scope (i.e. the conceptual content it invokes), every expression profiles (designates) some substructure. Thus knuckle profiles a certain substruc ture within the conception of a finger, and finger within the conception of a hand. Many expressions (verbs, adjectives, prepositions, adverbs, etc.) profile rela tionships. For example, conquer designates a two-participant relationship that evolves through time, whereas the stative-adjectival conquered profiles the final resultant state of that process. {Conqueror profiles a thing, namely the agentive participant of conquer). Even though an expression's profile is not invariably sus ceptible to precise delimitation, the contrast between profile and non-profile is ba sically discrete and grammatically significant. In particular, the nature of its profile determines an expression's grammatical class. For expressions that profile relationships we need to recognize a second type of prominence, pertaining to the relational participants, whose grammatical import is hardly less substantial. It is usual for one participant — which I call the trajector — to stand out as the primary figure within the profiled relation. Additionally, there is often a second "focal" participant — termed the landmark — with the status of secondary figure. Observe that two expressions, e.g. before and after, may invoke the same conceptual content and even profile the same relationship within it (in this case one of temporal precedence), yet differ semantically because they impose opposite trajector/landmark alignments. While participant prominence may in general be a matter of degree, I believe that trajector and landmark status represent distinct quantum levels, and that they furnish the ultimate basis for the notions subject and object.
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Now that we have examined the "internal structure" of conceptions, inclu ding both content and construal, it is time to recall the working hypothesis advan ced earlier : internally, discreteness predominates (a more cautious phrasing is that continuity is circumscribed and mitigated in various ways) ; by contrast, semantic effects due to "external" factors — i.e. relationships with other conceptual struc tures — are basically continuous. These external factors will now be briefly discussed. While they tend to be neglected, I do not regard them as incidental or even subsidiary, but as integral components of linguistic meaning. Moreover, they would seem to be essentially continuous (although the discovery of significant quantization would not at all surprise me). An important aspect of linguistic semantics is our ability to construe one structure against the background provided by another. There are many kinds of background, including previous discourse, pertinent assumptions and expecta tions, and — in metaphor — the role of the source domain in conceiving and structuring the target domain (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980 ; Lakoff and Turner 1989 ; Turner 1987). While it is not hard to think of possible quantization in this realm, I wish to emphasize an important parameter that may well be continuous : the salience of the background structure, i.e. its level of activation in the construal of the target. For example, once a discourse referent is introduced its salience tends to diminish through the subsequent discourse unless and until it is mentioned again. There are of course discretely different ways of doing so (e.g. with a pronoun, or with a definite article plus noun), reflecting quantized estimates of the referent's current status (cf. Givón 1983 ; van Hoek 1992). But its salience per se (and hence the effect of its background presence when it remains implicit) presumably varies continuously. The relation between the source and target domains of a metaphor poses a number of thorny questions. To what extent do we understand the target domain prior to (or independently from) its structuring by the source domain? To what extent does target-domain reasoning depend on metaphorical structuring? To what extent do the source and target domains merge to form a "hybrid" conception (Fong 1988)? Possibly we are dealing here with basically continuous parameters. Be that as it may, there are clearly many expressions that originate through meta phorical extension even though the target domain can easily be grasped indepen dently. At least in such cases, we can speak of the gradual, presumably continuous "fading" of a metaphor, reflecting the declining likelihood and/or level of the source domain's activation on a given occasion of the expression's use. Intuitively, for example, the literal sense of fade ('decrease in color intensity') is still reasonably salient in expressions like fading metaphor, fade from memory, etc. By comparison, reflect reflects more weakly the source domain of light and mirrors.
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A related phenomenon is analyzability, the extent to which the component elements of a complex expression are recognized within it and perceived as contri buting to its meaning. Thus complainer is more analyzable than computer, which in turn is more analyzable than ruler (i.e. 'instrument for measuring and drawing — "ruling"—straight lines'). We invariably interpret complainer as 'someone who complains', whereas we do not necessarily think of a computer specifically as 'something that computes', and a ruler is hardly ever thought of as 'something that rules [lines]'. I consider analyzability to be an important dimension of linguistic semantics. Indeed, I characterize an expression's meaning as comprising not just its composite semantic value, but also the entire compositional path which leads to it. In processing terms, analyzability is interpretable as the likelihood or degree to which component semantic values are activated along with the composite conception. Presently I have no linguistic evidence to suggest that this parameter is other than continuous. Finally, I assume an "encyclopedic" view of linguistic semantics which de nies the existence of any precise or rigid line of demarcation between knowledge that is "linguistic" and knowledge that is "extra-linguistic" (see Haiman 1980 and Langacker 1987, ch. 4). Our conception of a given type of entity — e.g. a cat, an apple, or a table — is almost always multifaceted, comprising a potentially openended set of specifications pertaining to any domain of knowledge in which it fi gures. Of course, these specifications vary greatly in their status. Some (like shape and primary function) are so "central" to an expression's meaning that they are virtually always activated when it is used. Other specifications (contingent know ledge, cultural associations) may be quite peripheral, being activated only in very special circumstances. A priori, it is reasonable to suppose that their likelihood and strength of activation vary continuously, being determined by such basically conti nuous factors as entrenchment, cognitive salience, and contextual priming. It is time now for a brief summary and conclusion. By way of summary, I will merely reiterate a basic working hypothesis : that discrete constructs are essential if not predominant for the characterization of linguistically coded conceptualizations, so far as their internal structure is concerned ; whereas those aspects of meaning which involve the relationship of such conceptions to one another would appear to vary continuously. By way of conclusion, let me emphasize that discreteness vs. continuity may itself be a matter of degree, the various shades and types of discreteness being distributed along a (quantized) continuum. Depending on what we examine and what we wish to emphasize, both discreteness and continuity can be discerned in virtually any aspect of language and cognition. Our task is not to choose between them, but rather to explicate the specific ways in which this fundamental opposition plays itself out across the full range of linguistically relevant phenomena.
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REFERENCES Berlin, Brent, and Paul Kay. 1969. Basic Color Terms : Their Universality and Evolution. Berkeley : University of California Press. Fong, Heatherbell. 1988. The Stony Idiom of the Brain : A Study in the Syntax and Semantics of Metaphors, San Diego : University of California doctoral dissertation. Givón, Talmy (ed.) 1983. Topic Continuity in Discourse : A Quantitative CrossLanguage Study, Amsterdam : John Benjamins. Haiman, John. 1980. Dictionaries and Encyclopedias, Lingua 50.329-357. Kay, Paul, and Chad K. McDaniel. 1978. The Linguistic Significance of the Meanings of Basic Color Terms, Language 54.610-646. Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors We Live By, Chicago : University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, George, and Mark Turner. 1989. More than Cool Reason : A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor, Chicago : University of Chicago Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1985. Observations and Speculations on Subjectivity. In John Haiman (ed.), Iconicity in Syntax, 109-150, Amsterdam : John Benjamins. Langacker, Ronald W. 1987a. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, vol. 1, Theoretical Prerequisites, Stanford : Stanford University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1987b. Nouns and Verbs, Language 63.53-94. Langacker, Ronald W. 1990. Concept, Image, and Symbol : The Cognitive Basis of Grammar, Berlin : Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 1991. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, vol. 2, Descriptive Application, Stanford : Stanford University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1993a. Reference-Point Constructions. Cognitive Linguistics 4 : 1.1-38. Langacker, Ronald W. 1993b. Grammatical Traces of some "Invisible" Semantic Constructs, Language Sciences 15 : 4.323-335. Rosch, Eleanor. 1978. Principles of Categorization. In Eleanor Rosch and Barbara B. Lloyd (eds.), Cognition and Categorization, 27-47, Hillsdale, N. J. : Erlbaum. Ross, John R. 1972. The Category Squish : Endstation Hauptwort. Papers from the Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society 8.312-328. Turner, Mark. 1987. Death is the Mother of Beauty. Chicago : University of Chicago Press.
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van Hoek, Karen. 1992. Paths Through Conceptual Structure : Constraints on Pronominal Anaphora, San Diego : University of California doctoral dissertation. Wierzbicka, Anna. 1984. Cups and Mugs : Lexicography and Conceptual Analysis. Australian Journal of Linguistics 4.205-255.
CONTINUITY AND MODALITY ANTOINE CULIOLI University of Paris VII (URA 1028, CNRS), France
Introduction In this paper I shall attempt to identify and describe two possible fields in which the implications of continuity are particularly manifest. Firstly I shall deal with the approach which is concerned with problems such as continuity and lin guistics, and more specifically semantics. Secondly I shall consider that no basic discrimination between syntax, semantics and pragmatics is called for and I purpose, here, to put forward an attempt to model the operations which allow us to establish a verifiable relation between representations on the one hand, and on the other, the traces of these operations which implement the transition from re presentations to textual phenomena. 1.
The choice of a theoretical framework and an attempt at a definition of continuity
The question of continuity can obviously be approached in two different perspectives. It can either be considered from a methodological point of view, which involves the problem of continuity in mathematics, and concerns in a more general way the construction of a system of metalinguistic representations, or it can be considered from a point of view based on observation, i.e., a "theory of observables", in such a way that we may see which points are affected by this problem of continuity. For reasons of competence — or perhaps incompetence in the areas of mathematics and computer science — my position will be that of the linguist. I shall thus present a certain number of examples, which are wellknown, and do not allow any discussion concerning facts, to bring into view the areas in which continuity occurs. Before discussing my examples, however, I should first like to add one or two considerations concerning the notion of continuity such as it appears to the linguist. To simplify the question, I would say that continuity occurs, in the strict sense of the word, at a basic level, in the relation between several different types of continuity on the one hand, and on the other, the phenomena which one en-
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counters in the linguistic domain, i.e. in the assimilation which can be made between empirical observations and the various types of continuity known in mathematics. Let us now consider the areas in which continuity occurs. This phenome non is particularly manifest in domains such as that of exclamatives, which I have had the opportunity of studying in some detail in various languages around the world (cf. Culioli 1974). Examples like Quel beau livre ! ("What a beautiful book ! ") show that there is constancy in a certain number of representations, which is of great interest, because here it is possible, in certain respects, to carry out a kind of assimilation based on the fact that the process is carried out as though one had an ordered series of occurrences of representations of, say, livre or beau livre in such a way that, in exactly the same way as for real numbers one would have an order by means of which one would eventually reach the ideal, inaccessible, detached representation, which would then provide the "really" something. The problem of continuity also occurs in another domain, which is that of time and space, and more particularly in the domain of time. Once again it is possible to demonstrate, just as I have done above, that we have, basically, in a pre-mathematical fashion, discovered the notion of the limit. In the domain of time, when one works on representations of events by means of intervals provi ded with topological properties — even the elementary, rudimentary topology which one is brought to introduce as a linguist — one becomes aware of the problem of the limit. See Figure 1 :
Figure 1 If one is located in A, in relation to B, one is obliged to take two points ; in A, one can never say that one has reached the boundary unless, being at a point xj in B, one says "that is it ; it's over" and in this case one reconstructs a last, imaginary point xi. But one cannot have a final point in A. This phenomenon occurs with striking regularity, whatever language one considers. I have never come across a counter-example to this type of thing, and the empirical facts related to modeling are extremely clear. This leads to a whole series of consequences. Furthermore, if one looks at the other side of the figure,
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the same problem arises concerning B in relation to A, etc., Thus, in a certain number of domains, which I shall not study here, one encounters this problem which is the problem of continuity in what might be called the "serious" sense of the term or at least the "real" sense compared to constructions which have been put forward for instance in mathematics. Another point in connection with which one encounters the problem of continuity is that which naturally occurs when one is brought to introduce the notion of cuts — could there be such a thing as continuity without cuts ? — Here, space permitting, it would be interesting to look more closely at the pro blem and demonstrate that one cannot provide adequate models in the domain of linguistic observation if one fails to associate the notion of cuts with that of con tinuity. By a cut I mean something akin, in a way which mathematicians may find horribly metaphorical, to Dedekind's cuts, such as expounded in the foundation texts. Another area in which continuity becomes an active factor can be observed when one introduces the property of deformability. This occurs in connection with abstract schematic forms : when they are made to undergo certain pressures, either by bringing something to bear upon them, or by immersing them in a space element provided with certain properties, these abstract forms produce, through what must be called deformations ("warps" or "shear" effects), local forms, which will become associated with the basic form, which is an abstract schematic form. This property of deformability leads us to another acceptation of the con cept of continuity which is the extent to which there is a relation between conti nuity and contiguity, a question which has become highly controversial, as we all know. This question of contiguity arises each time a deformation is brought about, since it can be supposed that between the resulting local forms there is a relation in which there is indeed discontinuity on the one hand but also an ele ment which will have a connectional property, in the form of "jumps" from one form to another. This notion of contiguity is fundamental to a whole series of considerations, particularly in connection with relations of causality. The whole notion of causality revolves around the relation between contiguity and conti nuity. On the basis of these preliminary remarks I shall now proceed to analyse my examples. These are of widely different types, because the notion of conti nuity is difficult to discuss from a linguistic point of view if one's examples be long to a single type, owing to the wide variety of representations of continuity one obtains, depending on the type of example chosen.
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The example of pouvoir
My first example is : (1) 77 peut atteindre le sommet (He can / may reach the top) I shall not enter into problems raised by translation into English or any other language. This example does not present any particular problem, and one may wonder why it is open to a certain number of interpretations. I shall not dis cuss them all, but there is one which is absolutely fundamental : that of being "in a position" to reach the top. This does not imply that he actually reaches the top, simply that he is "in a position" to. The problem is now to find a way to repre sent pouvoir in such a case, allowing for this interpretation. If we use the imperfect tense — in French this alternative past tense exists : (2) Il pouvait atteindre le sommet (2) is open to two interpretations. Firstly in Il a dit qu' il pouvait atteindre le sommet, we have, in indirect speech, the simple 'translation' of (1) Il peut atteindre le sommet. Secondly, il pouvait atteindre le sommet means "77 aurait pu..." ("He could have..."). This "unreal" interpretation means that "he did not reach the top". What, from a semantic point of view, makes these two interpreta tions possible ? In relation to the different states of affairs, we shall attempt to discover that property of the forms as marks of operations which provides ope nings for such interpretations. If we now turn to the preterit tense (simple past) — I shall not enter into the question of the passé composé at this stage — : (3) Il put atteindre le sommet (3) means "He was able to..." and not "He could..." i.e., "il a effectivement atteint le sommet" ("He actually reached the top"). Several facts come to light when one attempts to provide a representation of this phenomenon (see Figure 2):
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We shall begin by constructing a point in T0 which will give rise to two branches, in such a way that, in relation to this point, we have, in fact, an antici patory construction of another point in TX, which will represent : (""), and which is the representation of a validatable state of affairs, such that it will perhaps be possible to say in Tx "such is the case". So here we have a "gap" between T0 and TX, in such a way that we know that there is a path to be covered, which may, if necessary, be covered by a subject S if the latter wishes at any time to be at T x , which is subsequent to T0, depending on variable circumstances. But we always have at this point of junc tion (which branches out as the representation is elaborated) the possibility of taking a second path, whereby something else may take place, and in this case the "something else" is empty. This means that here we will have, taking < r > for relation, "< r > is the case", which is "envisaged", and here we do not envi sage anything else but "< r > is the case". This representation of pouvoir in the case of (1) Il peut atteindre le sommet, shows how the item undergoes a filtering process, due both to the aspec tual properties of atteindre le sommet and to modal or in a general way seman tic properties. The aspectual property of atteindre is well-known : we have a transition, such that we may initially be at a point where we have not yet started, where we are "seeking" to reach, then, should the case arise, we succeed, i.e. we "have reached" the top. The modal property is what I personally call téléonomique or "goal-directed", which means that one has fixed for oneself a purpose which one has evaluated as "good" and one therefore considers the space T0 —> TX as "to be completed". If on the other hand our position is strictly epistemic, in the sense that we would not have a subject engaged in the covering of a gap evaluated as "good", in this case we would have at TX something which would not be constructed as empty. So in the case of (1) Il peut atteindre le sommet, we observe that with pouvoir we always have the representation of one term plus another term. Here the other term is constructed as 0 . This incidentally recalls, in a different style, something I read recently in a book as old as The English Verb by M. Joos (1964), in which there is a whole series of considerations on modals which are extremely interesting from an intuitive point of view. When we have (1) Il peut atteindre, we see that the path T0 —> TX repre sents a path to be completed, whereas the other one (To —> Ø) represents a simple relation. This is why Il peut atteindre... means "Il n'a pas encore atteint' ("He has not yet reached..."). Let us now come back to the imperfect, which, as we shall see, functions as a "translated" value of the point of origin. We shall now go on to state that in the construction of any system of reference we deal with the construction of a certain number of points of origin, one of which is an absolute point of origin,
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in relation to which we shall have (apart from the the origin of speech, which H. Reichenbach (1947) calls the "point of speech") two origins : one of them is a translated origin which will retain the properties of the absolute point of origin, and the other, a "disconnected" origin, will have specific properties. This allows us to account for empirical facts. These findings are founded on observations not on a single language but on a very wide variety of languages which are not rela ted in any way, either geographically or genetically. When we deal with a trans lation — let us call the absolute origin T0 and the translated origin T'0 — the translation may take place in the past or, under certain conditions, in the future. But in almost every case, it takes place in the past, and we maintain the proper ties. To illustrate this process let us take the following examples : (4) s'il pleut (if it rains) (5) s'il pleuvait (if it rained) (6) s'il vient à pleuvoir (if it happens to rain) (7) s'il venait à pleuvoir (should it happen to rain) (4), (5), (6) and (7) are quite acceptable. But let us now consider (8) to (11) : (8) *s' il doit pleuvoir (if it must rain) (9) s' il devait pleuvoir (should it rain) (10) *s' il va pleuvoir (if it's going to rain) (11) s'il allait pleuvoir (if it were to rain) (8) is unacceptable, because il doit pleuvoir would be deontic ; (9) is acceptable ; (10) is unacceptable (I mean with the strictly hypothetical value : otherwise cases such as s'il va faire ça ("if he's going to do that") are perfectly acceptable, especially when si ("if') has the value of puisque ("since")) ; and (11) is accep table. These examples show that when we bring about a translation of this type, we obtain, almost mechanically, a filtering effect implemented by the aspectual and modal properties of aller, devoir and venir à. All these findings should be taken into account but in the present case I shall simply take the fact that when we have (2) Il pouvait atteindre le sommet, it is either a strict translation of il peut, (and in this case we have maintained exactly the same property), or a sepa ration (see Figure 3) :
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Figure 3 This raisěs the problem of the relation between contiguity and continuity in terms of space (I use the term "space" in a metaphorical sense). We now have a value of separability. Let us return to T0 in relation to T0. I have used T for "Time-space", and in fact there is also a parameter S for "Subject" (which I shall not introduce here, to facilitate things). When we construct this we have two possibilities : - either there is continuity from one to the other : one takes as a starting point a former, previous state of things, and one proceeds up to the present (this in fact corresponds to the definition of the imperfect which can be found in Greek grammars) ; - or there is a separation : in this instance, there will be reference to the construction of an "analogous reality", such that what prevailed at a certain time no longer prevails ; this is typically the case in the classic French example Il y avait, à tel endroit, quelque chose (il y avait means that now, this is no longer the case). For amusement's sake, I could take similar examples from many other languages. Now coming back to (2) il pouvait, let us consider Figure 4 :
Figure 4 We may observe that we have constructed a disconnected point (which I shall represent as T0 1 ), which stands for a fictitious, disconnected reference point. Then, in relation to this fictitious point, which in fact represents our abso-
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lute origin translated and disconnected, we may recommence the trajectory of il pouvait. In the same way, when we say (1) il peut in relation to the present, we are in fact saying that, should the case arise, we will say "il a pu " at TX. If we say (2) il pouvait this means that we may subsequently be able to say "il a pu ". Interestingly, il pouvait means "il aurait pu " — an unreal value — and there fore means "il n' a pas pu". At this point, one must explain why one has this re versal of the situation. I shall not be able to do this here, space not permitting, but I feel these reversals are a part of the problem of continuity. Although I have a suggestion for a solution, my aim here is to raise the problem, not to put for ward a demonstration. Let us now take (3) il put. In French, il put has one property which is ex tremely clear. Here again I shall not go into all the preambles which have allo wed me to reach this conclusion. We construct this tense as a closed bounded in terval in such a way that the complements are empty. We have, in fact, a pure transition (see Figure 5) :
Figure 5 Exactly the same conclusions — although differently formulated — have been reached by H. Seiler (1952), in his study of the aorist in a remarkable book on aspect in modern Greek, which I consulted recently in connection with this type of phenomena. This is what has also been called the taking into account of the process as a whole. One can observe phenomena of this kind in studies on aspect. There are also other properties which I shall not expound. What, now, are the implications of this in terms of our representation? It means that we have constructed a disconnected reference point, which raises the question as to why, when one constructs, within a reference space, a transition related to a disconnected space, it is inevitably constructed as a whole. If we take a transition, we can, point by point, obtain this type of thing i.e., we may say that point is dominant over this point. If we observe a distortion, this means that we have a cut. If we have no distortion, this means that we have a stable state. If we are astride, so to speak, we have introduced a cut. If we take position on the left, it means that there is a prospect of moving to the right. If we take position on the
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right, this means that we reconstruct a last point, etc. And here in this particular case, in fact, we take into account both the left and the right boundaries at the same time. And it can be demonstrated that one of the properties of this discon nected reference point is that it allows the existence of this property. We then observe that the branch T0—>TX which, in Figure II above represented a gap, a vacuum, is going to be occupied by a closed bounded interval (see Figure 6) :
Figure 6 Somewhere we will have a transition from "here nothing happened" (the gap remains) and here a change occurs in the course of the transition, so that we obtain "you have reached the top", and (3) Il put atteindre le sommet means in French "ƒ/ atteignit effectivement le sommet " ("He actually reached the top"). We could now go on to study il a pu in the passé composé, and show why it has such and such a value. In fact we may, in this manner, construct all of the semantic interpretations. I feel that I use the word "interpretation" too freely and it could be thought that this is solely a question of interpretative semantics. This is not the case at all, and I use the term because it is convenient and applicable both for production and for recognition in cases such as this, and because the linguist attempts to analyse problems from the outside. 3.
Manifestations of continuity in other types of examples
In my last part I wish to draw the reader's attention to other types of pro blems. I shall briefly discuss three other points. The first concerns the fact that the English (12) it may well (as in it may well be due to...) cannot, by any means, be translated by il peut bien {cela peut bien être dû... is impossible, and does not have the meaning of it may well be due to...). If we wish to translate it into French we must say cela
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peut très bien, cela peut fort bien, cela peut parfaitement être dû or cela pourrait bien être dû. If we now analyse by means of a metalinguistic system of representations the English may as compared to can, if we analyse well, if we analyse the conditional, we can demonstrate in algorithmic fashion why the English may well cannot be translated by peut bien but must be translated by peut fort bien or pourrait bien. This is where things start to become interesting, since we have here empirical data which supports and confirms the analysis which is otherwise purely formal. The second point concerns specifically semantic problems. I should have liked to discuss why the German mögen, and the Dutch equivalent mogen as well, in a majority of cases, no longer mean what they originally did (i.e. "to have the power or the strength to"), and have eventually come to mean "to want" or "to wish" : (13) ich möchte means "I would like" and (14) ich mag in certain cases, "I like" (either "apples" or "someone" if I understand correctly). The same applies to Dutch except that it is used essentially for human animates, another verb being used for "apples" or "chocolate". The third point concerns semantic drifting and contiguity. I have made an extensive study of history in the Germanic field ; I do not intend to go into this, but I wish to draw attention to a very interesting case of semantic drifting. We have the choice, here, between two positions : either we say that languages have an element of "divine madness", as Whitehead said about mathematics, and that anything can happen in the linguistic field, or we consider that it is possible to provide an explanation, which is my position. If therefore an explanation can be provided, it stems from what I have referred to as contiguity, i.e. the construc tion of a semantic space such that when we pass from one value to the next we will have a series of successive transitions, which implies that there is contiguity from one value to another, which is a form of continuity. Another very interesting case is that of the use of the verb lassen in German or låta in Swedish which mean both "to let" and the causative "to have someone do something". Here again if we study in detail how we can pass from "I let him do something" to "I have him do something", we come across a very interesting problem since we have the impression that a total or almost total re versal of the meaning has been brought about. Here, once again, we could de monstrate how the transition from one stage to the next is brought about, I mean, from an abstract point of view, as we do not always have all the historical ele-
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merits at our disposal. This presupposes once again the construction of a space within which these distortions or warps can be brought about. All these examples — maagan, mögen, lassen, — revolve around inter-subject relations. Conclusion Whether one considers the problem of modality from the point of view of the notion of the limit, from the point of view of semantic and aspectual proper ties, or from the point of view of inter-subject relations, one becomes aware that the linguist cannot provide adequate processing for semantic problems without introducing the concept of continuity in a serious sense of the term.
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REFERENCES
Culioli, A. 1974. A propos des énoncés exclamatifs. Langue Française, Paris : Larousse, pp. 6-15. Culioli, A. 1990. Pour une linguistique de rénonciation, t. 1 : Opérations et re présentations, Paris : Ophrys. Joos, M. 1964. The English verb ; form and meaning, University of Wisconsin Press. Reichenbach, H. 1947. Elements of symbolic logic, New-York : Macmillan. Seiler, HJ. 1952. L'aspect et le temps dans le verbe néo-grec, Paris : Belles Lettres.
CONTINUUM IN COGNITION AND CONTINUUM IN LANGUAGE HANS JAKOB SEILER University of Köln, Germany
1.
Introduction
Continuum is one of the central notions in the work of the UNITYP research group at the University of Cologne1. In the following presentation we shall first expose a number of theses about the continuum reflecting our actual views about this notion. Our demonstration will then proceed by way of commenting on a recent major publication where this notion has been extensively put to use. The publication is entitled Partizipation : Das sprachliche Erfassen von Sachverhalten. [Participation : The representation of states of affairs by the means of language] (Seiler/Premper 1991). While some of the contributions to this round table are dealing with continuity in lexical semantics, it is the purport of my paper to show the usefulness of this notion in the domain of semantax, i.e. the semantics of syntactic relations — specifically the relation between the verb and its complements and adjuncts. 2.
Theses about the continuum
1) The continuum is a construct serving the purpose of putting some order into a variety of facts. As such it may be compared with such other constructs as the paradigm and the Porphyrian stemma as it appears, e.g., in the phrase struc ture trees of the generativists2. 2) The continuum and the discrete stand to each other not in a contradic tory, but in a contrary or complementary relation : the notion of continuum pre supposes discreteness ; it depicts an increase vs. decrease of properties between discrete steps in a linear ordering. The notion of discreteness in turn presupposes that of continuity. 1) The label UNITYP is an abbreviation of the descriptive title of our project : "Language universals research and typology with special reference to functional aspects". The project is funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft which is herewith gratefully acknowledged. 2) On a detailed discussion of this comparison see Seiler 1985 : 21 ff.
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3) The UNITYP framework insists on the distinction between a scale and a continuum (Seiler,1.c.16 f.). Scale means 'measuring staff' ; it is a static, unidi rectional means for measuring regular intervals of a 'minus' or a 'plus' of certain properties. The continuum, on the other hand, while corresponding to the 'measuring staff', has properties that come up to the phenomena themselves : directionality, dynamics, binarity, complementarity, parallelism, and reversi bility. 4) The continua which we can detect within one particular language or in cross-linguistic comparison are prefigured by corresponding continua on the co gnitive-conceptual level. If we imagine a cognitive-conceptual content, such as, e.g., POSSESSION (Seiler 1983), we will find that it can either be progressively specified and elaborated upon, or, on the contrary, simply posited as such, wi thout further specification. A cognitive-conceptual continuum with intermediate steps spans between these two extreme options. 5) The continua that we posit on the cognitive-conceptual level are ideali zations. They cannot be arrived at by empirical observations alone. Instead, they derive from a constant shifting back and forth between observations and rational reasoning. They are regular. Linguistic continua, on the other hand, can be irre gular, showing overlaps, or gaps, as e.g. when we say that language X has no case marking. But it is precisely such statements that are only possible on the background of a framework where overlaps and gaps do not occur. 6) There must be a common functional denominator to a continuum. The items on the scale of a linguistic continuum are semantically distinct. E.g. tran sitivity differs semantically from case marking. Yet they have a denominator in common which we situate on the cognitive-conceptual level. 7) Adjacency is a further defining trait of a continuum : adjacent positions are more similar to one another, share more properties, than non-adjacent ones. 3.
The cognitive-conceptual dimension of Participation
The notion of Participation pertains to the cognitive-conceptual level. It is a relation between a participatum and its participants. The participatum, "that which is participated in", can be, e.g., a situation or a process. The participants can be, e.g., actants or circumstants, or more complex entities. The mental repre sentation of this relation is brought about by a number of different options which we call techniques. The techniques can be arranged in a continuous order pro gressing from minimal to maximal elaboration on the relation of participation — or, in the reverse sense, from minimal to maximal condensation of the relation. In the overview (p. 35) you find an ordered array of 10 techniques — options for the mental representation of the relation of participation. In paren theses you find such familiar morpho-syntactic notions as nominal clauses, noun/verb distinction, verb classes, valence, etc. These are preceded by such terms as posited participation, distinction participants/participatum, generally
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implied participants, etc. They pertain to the cognitive-conceptual level and are coined to keep the two levels distinct. They are not meant to replace morphosyntactic terminology, but to encompass it. At a first glance the elaboration proceeds as follows (see the overview) : in the first two techniques the mental representation is holistic, instantaneous, or global. Techniques 2 to 5 lead to an increasing differentiation on the participation. Technique 6 marks a turning point where differentiation gradually shifts from the participatum to the participants. Techniques 7 and 8 produce further differentiations among the participants. Now that both participatum and participants are fully specified, techniques 9 and 10 proceed to further specifying the relation between them. This is brought about by a special relator that acts as operator. The path just described simulates the stepwise build-up of the relation of participation in our minds. It can also be followed in the reverse, leading to an increasingly condensated representation. We call such an order of techniques a dimension, in our case the dimension of participation. Overview 1. Posited Participation (holophrastic expressions, nominal clauses) 2. Distinction participants/participatum (noun/verb distinction) 3. Generally implied participants (verb classes) 4. Specifically implied participants (valence) 5. Orientation (voice) 6. Transition (transitivity and intransitivity) 7. Role assignment (case marking) 8. Introduction of new participants (serial verbs) 9. Cause and effect (causatives) 10. Complex propositions (complex sentences) Now you may say that this is all right. But how does the gradual exfolia tion or condensation of the relation of participation work ? What are the opera tional steps ? How are the techniques delimited from one another ? How do we define the dimension? Here we must have recourse to one further notion, the notion of parameters in a specifically defined sense. They are principia comparationis with a plus pole and a minus pole and possible intermediate steps, thus in principle again continua. They represent possible universals of cognition, and, at the same time, possible universals of language. As such, they would have to be defined — a task that must be left to further work. But like the notions of techniques and di mension, the parameter is an operational notion in the first place. This means that the definitions would have to be operational rather than categorial. The pa rameters are listed separately on p. 37 and figure again in the vertical of the fol lowing chart.
HANSJAKOB SEILER 36
PARAMETERS 1. meta language / object language 2. context-sensitive/ context-indep. 3. categorial / thetic 4. relational / absolute 5. referential / general 6. time-stable / temporary 7. dynamic / stative 8. active / inactive 9. plurivalent / monovalent 10. centralized / decentralized 11. profile outgoing / ingoing situation 12. basic / derived 13. individualized / non-individualized 14. affected / nonaffected 15. total in vol v./ non-total involv. 16. overt relator / covert relator 17. volitional / nonvolitional 18. control / noncontrol 19. emotive / nonemotive 20. epistemic / nonepistemic
2. Distinction p'atum/p'ants
3. Generally implied p'ants
4. Specifically implied p'ants 5. Orientation
6. Transition
0
7. Role assignment
0
8. Introducing new p'ants
0
9 Cause + effect
0
10. Complex propositions
0
1. Positing p'ation
0
0
0 0
0 0
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
I
0
0
I
0
I I 0
I
0
I
I I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
I
I
0
0
I
I
0
0
0
I
I
I
0
0
I
I
I
I
0
0
I
I
I
I
I
I I
I
I
I
I
I
I
0
I
I
0
I
I
I
I
I
CONTINUUM
37
List of parameters 1. metalanguage / object language 2. context-sensitive / context-independent 3. categorial / thetic 4. relational / absolute 5. referential / general 6. time-stable / temporary 7. dynamic / Stative 8. active / inactive 9. plurivalent / monovalent 10. centralized / decentralized 11. profile outgoing situation / profile ingoing situation 12. basic / derived 13. individualized / non-individualized 14. affected / non-affected 15. total involvement / non-total involvement 16. overt relator / covert relator 17. volitional / non-volitional 18. control / non-control 19. emotive / non-emotive 20. epistemic / non-epistemic This chart exhibits a cognitive-conceptual space featuring in the horizontal the techniques in the order from 1 to 10, and in the vertical 20 parameters in an order that follows the gradual build-up of the relation of participation as des cribed above. How did I arrive at these parameters, and how did I arrive at their ordering ? The procedure is not entirely governed by predetermined criteria. Rather, there is an initial understanding of such a Gestalt as the mental represen tation of the relation of participation. Parameters are chosen so as to guarantee maximum recurrence in other dimensions. Their ordering follows from rational considerations in the following vein. When perusing the sequence of parameters one can see that the first three are chosen with reference to a global characterization of Participation ; that 4 to 9 give rise to a progressive differentiation on the participation side ; that 10 to 12 mark a shift from the participatum to the participants ; that 13 to 15 produce further differentiation on the participants' side ; and that 16 to 20 have reference to the relation itself by introducing a RELATOR indicating whether the relation is one of cause, finality, consequence, etc. For lack of time and space it is not possible here to comment on every single parameter. Most of the names may be more or less self-explanatory.
38
HANSJAKOB SEILER
Nr. 11 "profile outgoing vs. ingoing situation" refers to a directed and bounded process (participatum) extending from its origin to its final stage and comprising an initiator that sets the process into going, and an undergoer affected by the process. In the technique "Orientation" that introduces this parameter the operation either profiles the outgoing situation and highlights the initiator, or the ingoing situation highlighting the undergoer. The total operation within this dimension proceeds in the following steps : 1) One to three new parameters are introduced in each technique as compared with the technique immediately preceding. The newly introduced parameters are those which distinguish it from the preceding technique. 2) The parameters inherited from a preceding technique are "active" for the following technique inasmuch as they produce new oppositions ; i.e. oppositions not encountered for that particular parameter in preceding techniques. On the chart this is symbolized by a vertical stroke. Otherwise they are "inactive", but they still form part of the total pool of parameters constituting the dimension. This is marked by a circle. To give an example : Parameter 4 (relational/absolute) applies to the opposition between noun and verb in technique nr. 2 : Nouns are typically absolute, non-relational ; verbs are typically relational, non-absolute. In technique nr. 3 the same parameter refers to the opposition between different verb classes, thus a new opposition. It is therefore "active" in this technique. In technique nr. 4 it refers again to the opposition between verb classes, and is therefore "inactive". 3) The active plus the newly introduced parameters define the technique, which thus appears as a bundle of parameters. 4) The dimension is defined by the thus ordered sequence of techniques. The schema visualizes the Gestalt of a continuum. The idea of decomposing such phenomena as transitivity or roles into a number of parameters is not new. Compare the work of Hopper and Thompson (1980) on transitivity, of Givón (1981) on passive, or Ch. Lehmann (1991a) on verb classes. Note that the bundles of parameters define the technique, but not necessa rily the linguistic means representing that technique. Thus, verb serialization is a means of representing technique nr. 8 ("introducing new participants"). But verb serialization serves other functions as well, such as TAM and directionality (Bisang 1991 : 510). The four parameters define the technique as represented by serial verbs only insofar as they represent participation, that is in their manifesta tion as coverbs. The chart says that techniques to the left and the right margin need fewer constitutive parameters as compared with the more central techniques. Transition shows the greatest number of active definitory parameters with regard
CONTINUUM
39
to the total pool. This amounts to saying that Transition is the prototypical tech nique of the entire dimension. 4.
Linguistic coding and typology
The question here is as follows : how are the various positions in the co gnitive-conceptual space as outlined above coded in one individual language and across languages ? At first sight it seems that at least in some languages the lin guistic coding reflects the cognitive-conceptual orderings in techniques and pa rameters fairly closely. As we follow the order from left to right we normally find a steady increase in morpho-syntactic "machinery" put to use in the repre sentation of Participation. In our UNITYP work we have described this by two universal operational principles, called indicativity vs. predicativity. Indicativity means that the cognitive concept is represented as inherently given, as being taken for granted. A simple renvoi suffices. Compare holophrastic utterances such as fire !, night !, or nominal clauses such as nomen omen. If the morpho-syntactic means are sparse, this is compensated by a high degree of pragmatic relevance : context-sensitivity, discourse pragmatics, etc. Predicativity means that the cognitive concept is represented by progres sive explication and differentiation, first on the participatum, then on the parti cipants, and finally on the signs for the relation itself. More and more "machinery" is being introduced, the number of oppositions increases. Complex sentences to the right-hand pole of the continuum represent the end-point. A third semiotic principle, iconicity, appears to have its preferential peak somewhere in the middle where the two other principles are about equal in force. In fact, transitivity - intransitivity, representing transition, exhibit a fairly balan ced distribution of markings on both the participatum and the participants, the reby iconically depicting the shift from the participatum to the participants. This technique also marks a turning point between constructions of government (e.g. valence) and constructions of modification (e.g. adverbials). Looking at one particular technique, say, "Cause and effect", we find that it aptly represents an invariant with corresponding linguistic variants again con tinuously ordered according to indicativity and predicativity. (German) : (1) i. Die Grossisten machen, dass die Ölpreise sinken "The wholesalers bring it about that the oil prices go down" (complex sentence, maximally predicative) ii. Die Grossisten lassen die Ölpreise sinken "... let... go down" (lassen as auxiliary verb, less predicative)
40
HANSJAKOB SEILER
iii. Die Grossisten senken die Ölpreise (one verb, umlaut, morphologically marked as causative) iv. Die Grossisten dumpen die Ölpreise (foreign word, unanalyzable, so-called "lexical causative", minimally predicative) Analogous continua between indicativity and predicativity can be observed for the other techniques as well — both intra — and cross-linguistically. If this is so, we predict that there will be overlaps in the linguistic coding as compared with our cognitive-conceptual space, where such overlaps do not occur. We have seen that the cognitive invariant "cause and effect" includes complex sentences as one of its coded variants. But complex sentences also ap pear under the technique "complex propositions" — and prototypically so. There is thus overlap. In a way, one might say that the linguistic codings produce a multi-dimensional space as compared with the two-dimensionality of our schema. On the other extreme of our causative continuum we found the so-called "lexical causatives". How can we draw a line between these alleged causatives and transitive action verbs? In a sequence of codings as arranged in (1), i.e. a continuum, it seems plausible that dumpen marks the end point. The continuum from i. to iv. exhibits a steady increase in grammaticalization. It operates on the parameter RELATOR that appears as bring it about that or to cause to and eventually ends up as an immaterialized, zero operator (Ch. Lehmann 1991b : 25 f.). Parameters can be over-extended or stretched. This is certainly the case when linguists are mislead into equating to kill with cause to die, or, when they even postulate causativity for such verbs as to sit under the odd paraphrase as "to cause one's body to 'rest upon the haunches'" (Wierzbicka 1975 : 520). Further overlaps are due to the fact that different techniques are not coded in disjunction, but quite often in combination with one another. On the other hand, there are also gaps. During the times of dominant structuralism it was con sidered unscientific to state that a language like Tagalog does not exhibit a clearly recognizable noun-verb distinction (Himmelmann 1991). Nowadays such assertions can be quite to the point, because, among other things, they may lead to inquiring into how these languages make up for the lack, e.g. by extension of one parameter in the technique "Orientation" ; in this case it would be the para meter "basic vs. derived". This amounts to saying that on the cognitive-concep tual level participatum and participants are distinct ; but on the level of linguistic coding it is not necessary that every language represents the distinction by a dis tinction between word classes noun and verb. A persistent endeavour to keep the levels distinct may help to settle the endless discussions about this problem.
CONTINUUM
41
It may also be helpful in statements of grammaticalization and of typology. To cite but one example : it has become customary to speak of "indirect case marking" when the morphological marking of case roles is on the verb instead of on the noun (Mallinson & Blake 1981 : 42 f.). On the cognitive-conceptual level we have the invariant "role assignment" (technique nr. 7). Morpho-syntactically there is an overlap between markings on the noun (= case marking) and markings on the verb (= cross-reference or agreement). Some languages exhibit one procedure to the exclusion of the other. Some other languages show a split along the parameter "centralized-decentralized" : decentralized participants are marked on the noun, centralized participants are marked on the verb. Typically, the maximally grammaticalized subject nominative is marked by verb agreement even in such languages that don't show any other verb agreement (English). And typically, a subject nominative has no case suffix on the noun even in such languages that otherwise do show case suffixes (German). This illustrates the pathway that grammaticalization has taken and is likely to take in analogous situations. 5.
Concluding remarks
1) We started from the assumption that the human mind has the ability to construct continua for the purpose of ordering the phenomena of this world. We set out to show the usefulness of such a construct. It is useful in leading us to distinguish between a level of invariance, where the continuum appears in its idealized form, and a level of variation, where continuity still obtains but over laps and gaps are not excluded. On this level it can be shown how semanto-syntactic phenomena that may seem to be disconnected otherwise, are related to one another : how verb classes are related to voice, voice to transitivity, transitivity to case marking, etc., but also distant relationships as between noun-verb dis tinction and voice, or causative and passive. 2) Taking up a question raised by G. Leech : "How do we demonstrate that gradients exist ?" The continuum appears to be the locus of linguistic energeia : gradual exfoliation vs. condensation ; substitutability between adjacent posi tions ; grammaticalization paths and paths of language change ; all amenable to empirical verification. 3) A note on the question of how we get to our cognitive-conceptual level : is not linguistic coding the only way of access ? Are we not moving in a circle ? — Yes, we are ; but in a non-vicious one. Initial observation of language data unveils the leading dynamic principles : indicativity, iconicity, predicativity, and the tendency toward gradient transitions. Rational considerations construct a lo gically consistent framework. Data from concrete languages can then be measu-
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HANSJAKOB SEILER
red against such a framework. This, and only this, is the sense in which we want cognition-conceptuality to be understood. We do not mean to rely on the results of adjacent sciences — psychology, epistemology, etc. — for confirmation. 4) Both conceptual and linguistic continua admit of indefinitely recove rable intermediate values. On the linguistic side this can be shown by pointing out that techniques, steps on the overall continuum, admit of subcontinua which, in turn, are bundles of parameters, which are again continua. The antinomy bet ween a continuum model and a model of "multiple discrete factors intersecting to yield a finely articulated range of possibilities" as evoked by R. Langacker can be resolved by introducing the notion of parameters into the dimensional model.
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REFERENCES Bisang, Walter. 1991. Verb Serialization, grammaticalization and attractor positions in Chinese, Hmong, Vietnamese, Thai and Khmer. In Seiler & Premper (eds.), pp. 509-562. Givon, Talmy. 1981. Typology and functional domains. Studies in Language 5.2, pp. 163-193. Himmelmann, Nikolaus. 1991. The Philippine challenge to universal grammar. Arbeitspapier Nr. 15 (Neue Folge), Universität zu Köln : Institut für Sprachwissenschaft. Hopper, Paul & Sandra A. Thompson. 1980. Transitivity in grammar and dis course. Language 56, pp. 251-299. Lehmann, Christian. 1991a. Predicate classes and Participation. In Seiler & Premper (eds.), pp. 183-239. Lehmann, Christian. 1991b. Relationality and the grammatical operation. In Seiler & Premper (eds.), pp. 13-28. Mallinson, Graham & Barry Blake. 1981. Language Typology. Cross-linguistic Studies in Syntax, Amsterdam et al. : North Holland Publ. Comp. Seiler, Hansjakob. 1983. Possession as an Operational Dimension of Language. Language Universals Series, vol. 2, Tübingen : Gunter Narr Verlag. Seiler, Hansjakob. 1985. Linguistic continua, their properties, and their interpretation. In Seiler & Brettschneider (eds.), pp. 14-24. Seiler & Brettschneider (eds.). 1985. Language Invariants and Mental Operations. International Interdisciplinary Conference held at Gummersbach/Cologne, Germany, September 18-23, 1983. Language Universals Series, vol. 5, Tübingen : Gunter Narr Verlag. Seiler, Hansjakob & Waldfried Premper (eds.). 1991. Participation. Das spra chliche Erfassen von Sachverhalten. Language Universals Series, vol. 6, Tübingen : Gunter Narr Verlag. Wierzbicka, Anna. 1975. Why 'kill' does not mean 'cause to die' : The semantics of action sentences. Foundations of language, 13 : 4, pp. 491-528.
IS THERE CONTINUITY IN SYNTAX ? PIERRE LE GOFFIC University of Paris III, France and URA 1234, CNRS, Caen
0.
Introduction
My aim in this paper is not to make propositions about continuity. Neither is it to give a mathematical or philosophical definition of it. Continuity, to my mind, can serve as "l'un de ces vocables, fort nombreux, auxquels il n'est demandé que de recouvrir d'un terme expressif une signification fuyante", as Guillaume said of metaphor (1968, p.171) : one of those intuitive and expressive terms which cover somewhat diffuse meanings ; it is possibly in this respect that it may be of some use to us. I wish therefore to put forward a criticism of discreteness, in those areas in which, wrongly or rightly, it is taken for granted. Thus, the question which I shall be examining is, in some ways, that single hour of metaphysics and critique in which one may indulge once a year, as Descartes is believed to have said. Is it really an established fact that there is, in language, a totally and indisputably dis crete framework or architecture ? 1.
Discreteness : a point of transition between two continuities
To begin, my representation of facts is extremely simple, possibly running the risk of over-simplification. I imagine language activity (in one certain respect, at least) as is represented in the simple diagram below :
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In this sort of double funnel, the left part shows the phases that precede any interlocutory language act, i.e., the person who is about to speak forms, some how or other, a linguistic project, and puts it into shape. In the right-hand part, the receiver, on the basis of indications provided by the first speaker, tries in turn to build up for himself a representation which he can interpret and make pragmatic use of. Well, I would say, loosely speaking, that there is continuity at the start and at the finish. Where discreteness comes in, — necessarily to my mind —, is at the point of transition between the two. This point must necessarily be discrete since it is the only objectifiable part of the linguistic process ; it is the visible part of the iceberg. Here, in order to proceed, to become objectified, the message must be translated into formal, usable symbols. This, I think, is a question of common sense, which does not mean that guarantors and authors could not be found for it. There is a filtering process (somehow or other) between all the diffuse elements of experience and intended meaning, and the coding into discrete units. Then, the movement is continued and shifts to the interpretation side. Here one could talk at length about the infinite or at least inexhaustible character of meaning, in this part of the language act. Thus the point of transition necessarily occurs. I feel that discreteness, if anywhere, is here, i.e., at this necessary, compulsory transition point, which is the condition of communication between two ill-defined worlds which I have no means of describing but to which one can apply, roughly speaking, the term of continuity. One could simply add that continuity, in all cases, is multiform, if only with respect to the time and space dimensions, and all the metaphorical uses made of these. Language has systems of automatic adaptation to continuity, and this seems to me to be one of the features which make the formal apparatus of enunciation such a remarkable device : it is perfectly adapted to continuity. The objects in the world undergo changes in space and time, and a number of linguistic markers (among the most basic in language) have, among other functions, that of maintai ning a kind of permanence in the changing of these objects, thus giving us the comfortable illusion of fixity and stability that suits our pragmatic needs, in a world which is neverthess in a demonstrable state of permanent change. There is thus a sort of contradiction, which could be (and has been) developed from a phi losophical point of view. There is a kind of automatic adaptation of language in some of its essential aspects to this shifting character of reality. I shall not go into details about this, the important point being at the moment that there is this neces sarily, inescapably, discrete point of transition.
CONTINUITY IN SYNTAX
2.
47
The degree of discreteness in linguistic coding
But let us now consider this point to see if it really is all that discrete. Of course I do not intend to completely refute the observations made above and I shall attempt to remain within reason. Discreteness, here, has two facets : firstly the use of discrete units (phonemes and morphemes), and secondly, the categorization of these units in terms of discrete grammatical categories. As to the first point, the units must be discrete in order to be interpreted. And in this respect I shall say from the outset that there is no discussion possible : should there be any ambiguity, it will be a genuine alternative ambiguity (cf. Le Goffic 1981 ch. 7 ; Fuchs 1991 pp. 112-113). There is no continuity from one phoneme to the next, from a linguistic point of view. There can be continuity in the physical production of sound, but there is of course no continuity in the phonematic interpretation of these productions. As to the second point, everybody agrees that a term can be characterized, for example, as a noun or a verb, and further as having such and such a function in a sentence. So far, one reasons in discrete terms, with necessary choices : a term is a noun, so it is not a verb ; it is subject and therefore not something else. Although language can provide intermediate stages (like the infinitive or certain forms of nominalisation, sharing nominal and verbal features), one ultimately reaches a stage of discrete categorization. I would now like to examine these two points more carefully. 3.
Are units totally discrete ?
I have just expressed the intention of not going against the necessarily dis crete character of phonemes and morphemes. However, there are a few small problems concerning morphemes. Roughly speaking, if the cutting-up into mor phemes were possible without any restrictions, we would have a stock of per fectly determinable words. So it would be possible, with a few arrangements, to draw up a typical, fixed Hst of the lexicon of a language. Now, when one looks at history, including the history one fashions as a speaker, it is clear that a number of problems arise. If things are to be absolutely discrete, this means that each unit is to be confined to its own place, like a cell or an atom, adjacent to the next one, and so on. The units will not touch each other and will remain by definition separate. Where the contradiction arises, is when one unit gives rise to two, in the process of dissociation, or conversely when two units become a single one, in the process of fusion. Now this does occur, and the history of language bears witness to this, if not abundantly, at least clearly.
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The relevant examples are habitually cast aside (although many of them are well established and well known), belonging to that minority of zero point some thing per cent which do not conform to the statistically normal situation used as a reference. The problem is that there is always a small fringe on the edge of the system which prevents one from encompassing it. This is a delicate problem, to which I am not sure what answer one could suggest from the outset, as it con cerns the status which should be given to that zero point something percent. In ordinary practice the rejection of these examples is a reasonably workable procedure. But this may be precisely the reason why it is ultimately impossible to encompass the system. So let us not cast them aside by principle. The history of various sciences may bring some support to the method of focusing on minority phenomena. I shall now proceed to a brief comment on a few examples, starting with cases of differentiation of units (leading to homonyms) : - the French verb voler : "to fly" and "to steal". We know that the flight of the bird is the primary meaning and that the language of venery (le faucon vole la perdrix "the falcon 'flies' the partridge", i.e. "the falcon, in its flight, gets hold of the partridge by force") gave rise to something which is accepted in synchrony as another separate unit ; - the French noun grève : "strand, beach" and "strike". The Place de Grève in Paris (strand along the Seine) was a gathering place in the XIXth century for workers wishing to stop work ; - in other cases differentiation led to graphic differences, as between dessin ("drawing") and dessein ("aim"), or between penser ("to think") and panser ("to dress (a wound)", related to pansement : "a bandage"). I still vividly remember my surprise (not to say my incredulity) when I discovered thai penser and panser were cognate, whereas panser, as in panser un cheval ("to groom, to rub down a horse"), had nothing to do with the panse ("belly") of the animal. Examples of this type abound, and detailed lists can be found in reference books (see e.g. Buyssens 1965, with numerous examples from English). Of the process of fusion, on the other hand, there are fewer examples : lan guage systems, supported by some Académie Française or other such social norm, offer more resistance to this type of process. Cases of fusion normally ap pear as reprehensible in the eyes of the norm, although they are fairly widespread : - a jour ouvrable ("working day") is a day when one oeuvre (old verb : "works"), but as it follows that it is also a day when the shops ouvrent ("are open"), it tends to be understood and used as meaning "openable day" ; - the adjective chaotique is found not only with its "genuine" spelling, which goes back to chaos, but also with the spelling cahotique, from the noun ca-
CONTINUITY IN SYNTAX
49
hot ("a jolt", "a bump"), as in un parcours cahotique ("a bumpy ride"), — which is a freak in the eyes of the norm ; - the verb dériver, as used in modern French, has a twofold origin, as Muller (1962) has explained : it is the continuation of the verb dériver ("to turn a river away from its course"), but draws at the same time on an old verb driver, of English origin ("to push" or "to be pushed" ; cf. Eng. to drive). The resulting meaning, a semantic cross between the two, is that of a slanting movement. Furthermore, it would of course be easy to elaborate upon the subject of fu sion between elements, taking into account the effect of associations governed by the subconscious, puns, etc. which channel semantic processes. Strikingly, there is no limit to the plasticity of semantic formations, and there is no unsurmountable boundary of contradiction : the fact that ils peignent can be said both of painters (verb peindre : "they paint") and of hair-dressers (verb peigner : "they comb") may well suffice to build up a unique semantic entity : a gesture common to those who use a comb or a paint-brush. In this matter, actual language data show more imagination at work than one can fancy (see Buyssens 1965 ; Le Goffic 1982). The essential point of all this is that it is not possible to "lock up" the stock of lexical items. In fine, a lexicon is a set of items in unstable equilibrium, in which the units exert upon each other conflicting or converging pressures (Le Goffic 1988) placing the system in jeopardy. This is how the system holds. One can, of course, take a stabilized viewpoint and ignore all this, which obviously gives a certain authority over the lexicon, but at the cost of neglecting phenomena which do exist, and whose neglect may prove harmful. 4.
Problems of grammatical categorization
A noun is a noun, a verb is a verb. Here again, this works in 99 % of the cases. This is important, sufficient perhaps, but one wonders what is to be done with the 1 % which does not work. Cases of terms difficult to classify are not ex ceptional, and one could draw up a catalogue, which would probably be most instructive. What is to be done with debout (originally a prepositional phrase de+bout, but generally considered as an adverb, with uses very close to those of an adjective : être assis ou debout, "to be sitting or standing") or with plein "full", commonly regarded as a preposition in plein les poches (lit. "the pockets [being] full" ; note the word order and the invariability of plein), etc.? This list could easily be lengthened, but I wish to concentrate on a few examples, beginning with that of the word pas. The story of how the word pas, which originally meant "a step", came to designate the negative, is fascinating. Je ne marche used to mean "I do not walk", and ... pas, "...(not even the minimum distance of) a step". Then pas became an obligatory part of negation, along with ne. There was ensuing competition bet-
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ween the two, and finally in modern French, as we know, pas has more or less ousted and replaced ne. It is the pas which often represents negation in everyday spoken French. This is, to be sure, an extraordinary trajectory, resulting in a change of cate gory, since everybody agrees that pas is an adverb in this second use. Remarkably, this occurred in an area where one would expect logic to be most readily found. The logical operator of negation is somehow linguistically cut up in French, and shredded into two pieces. This historical and synchronic treatment of negation in French is a kind of slap in the face to this logic which we all need. Now is it possible to process a system in which changes of such magnitude can take place without resorting to continuity ? Once again, I use a term which would require more clarification, — which I am not in a position to provide. It is clear, nevertheless, that this type of question cannot be avoided. Can a system in which such phenomena occur be totally locked into a discrete perspective ? There must be, somewhere, an opening for transition, a possibility of continuity. To escape this, one might say that this is History, even ancient History, since the facts involved here extended over seven or eight centuries. But is there anything which allows one to say that changes of the same type are not taking place currently, though invisibly from a synchronic point of view ? This assump tion would imply that language itself (French) has changed on one essential point since the period when it allowed this type of evolution. What evidence do we have to claim that language has changed, qualitatively, since the Middle Ages, so that it no longer provides openings for this sort of evolution ? Thus, if one wishes to re ject the example of pas, one must prove that language itself has undergone a change, which demand may not be easy to satisfy. The word pas thus still raises problems today. Should one say about this example that one swallow does not make a sum mer, I would reply that, in this domain, it does : a single example suffices in fact to raise a problem concerning the quality of language. Were there but this single case, in the whole of French or indeed in all the languages of the world, I think that the problem would be raised all the same. But there are many more. Quantity and measure, for example, are not easy to categorize in surface terms. They are part noun, part adverb. I shall simply say that beaucoup and longtemps are obviously noun terms, but their functions show a mixture of nomi nal and adverbial features. Thus, in the field of quantification, I might, if I wished to use a somewhat provocative type of speech, say that discrete filtering, here, is not particularly successful. The number of difficulties regarding categorization, as can be seen, cannot be restricted to a narrow list, and I tend to think that this number is directly related
CONTINUITY IN SYNTAX
51
to the number of difficulties in syntax. In other words, I wonder whether every difficulty in syntax does not have something to do with problems of continuity. 5. The example of Fr. que Last, I would like to say a few words about Fr. que, the well known "complementizer", as the generativists call it : the wide range of its uses and the difficulty to break them down into separate units make it a particularly appropriate example for a discussion about continuity. If one attempts to outline the general functioning of the term, a certain num ber of uses can be retained as basic (cf. Le Goffic 1992) : a) the interrogative pronoun as in Que fais-tu ? ("What are you doing ?"), Que faire ? ("What is to be done ?") or, used indirectly, in Je ne sais que faire ("I don't know what to do" ; indirect interrogative examples are more difficult to find). b) "relative without an antecedent", as in Advienne que pourra ("Come what may" "Come whatever may [happen]"), parallel to the use of qui in Rira bien qui rira le dernier ("He who laughs last laughs longest"). In fact this type of use, confined to proverbs or limited phraseology in the case of qui, is nearly totally obsolete as regards que : the example quoted above is practically unique ; it is nevertheless structurally important. As has often been noticed, this label "relative without an antecedent" is inappropriate : the demonstration of this can be given easily, though indirectly, by considering the use of qui : in Rira bien qui rira le dernier, and more obviously in Embrassez qui voulez ("Kiss whomever you want to"), qui does not belong to the paradigm of the relative (it could not be object), but to that of the interrogative. For that reason, I call the qu- words occurring in these structures integrative pronouns (following Damourette et Pichon). c) the relative pronoun : le livre que j'ai lu ("the book which I read"). d) the "completive", as in je dis que ça va ("I say that it is all right"). A second train (series of uses) must be added, not with the pronoun que but with a homonym, the (indefinite) adverb of quantity que, which goes back to the Latin quam (and not quid or quod, which are the etyma of the pronoun que) : a) que exclamative adverb of degree as in Que c'est bon ! ("How good it is !"), Que d'efforts il a dû faire ! ("How many efforts did he have to make !"), which can also be found in indirect uses under certain conditions, as in Vous savez que d'efforts il a dû faire ("You know how many efforts he had to make"). b) que integrative adverb, as in 77 ment que c'est une honte ("He lies to which degree it is a shame"). This example (colloquial) may seem marginal, but it
52
PIERRE LE GOFFIC
is at the base of a whole series of extremely important and indisputable uses, viz. comparatives and consecutives : Paul est plus grand que Jean, "Paul is taller than John", i.e. : "Paul is superiorly tall, [in comparison with] to which degree John is tall". We thus obtain six types of examples which I readily consider basic : Que (1) (2) (3) (4)
pronoun : Interrogative : que faire ? ; je ne sais que faire Integrative : advienne que pourra Relative : le livre que j'ai lu Completive : je dis que ça va
Que adverb : (1) Exclamative : que c'est bon ! ; vous savez que de mal il a eu ! (2) Integrative : il ment que c'est une honte ! ; Paul est plus grand que Jean Here, it seems to me, are most propicious grounds for a debate about discre teness and continuity. What unity is there to all this ? It is certainly to be found in the basic fea ture of indefiniteness, in other words in the scanning ("parcours", "Verlauf') of all possible values. The whole series of the qu- terms {qui, que, quoi, quel, quand, as well as, though less apparently, où, comme, comment, combien, wi thout forgetting que as an adverb) have in common this indefiniteness, this scan ning process, applied to various domains : animate vs inanimate beings, quality, time, space, manner, quantity, degree). All the uses of que (pronoun or adverb) can be derived from that basic fun damental value. Let us start with the pronoun. In the interrogative, the quest is open and presented as requiring an ans wer. When I utter Que fais-tu ?, I am in search of "whatever you are doing", i.e. of the right instance X to validate "you are doing X", and it is urgent that you, the interlocutor, should "clock in". In the integrative use advienne que pourra, on the other hand, there is no urgency since any value settled for will do, as any value that validates "pouvoir [advenir]" ipso facto validates advienne ("let it come, let it happen"). In this type of use (as in rira bien qui rira le dernier), the indefinite value of que (or qui) is particularly perceptible. What now is the relation between a relative and an indefinite pronoun ? How can a relative stem from an indefinite ? This is an important and delicate position. I will adopt the following line of explanation : the qu- relative is still (logically, at the start) an indefinite pronoun, whereas the antecedent is the term which fulfills (saturates) it, and somehow provides the apropriate value, the ans-
CONTINUITY IN SYNTAX
53
wer to the question raised by the indefinite. So it seems that the relative is the re sult of a kind of capting process exerted by the antecedent upon an integrative, the result being the development of an apparently anaphoric relation. Latin examples would bear witness to a state of language in which relative pronouns and their socalled "antecedents" are clearly autonomous, the latter being often not before (ante) but after the former, thus clearly appearing as the saturating term, the res ponse (and not as the antecedent of an anaphoric relation). One can reasonably as sume that this represents an early stage of the formation of our relative system, but of course many aspects of the process (e.g. the above-mentioned change of the paradigm) are yet to be elucidated. As now regards the completive, it appears at first to be completely sepa rate. There is no indefinite value perceptible, no anaphora, the que has no func tion, it is said to be a different part of speech, etc. But here again, if one looks ca refully — and history bears this out — the completive appears to be related to the other uses of que : it is a kind of degenerated relative or integrative. To take an example of this "degeneration" (one of those troublesome atypical examples which are generally discarded by grammarians, who hardly ever venture to cate gorize it) : C'est une chose étrange que cet aveuglement (lit. "It is a strange thing that this blindness", i.e. "this blindness is a strange thing"), or Qu'est-ce que la métempsychose ? (lit. "What is it that metempsychosis ?", i.e. "What is metempsychosis ?"). What, here, is the que ? One is led to assume an ellipsis of the verb "to be" (Qu'est-ce que la métempsychose [est] ?), which hypothesis is supported by the fact that the verb être comes out clearly if the sentence is modalized : Qu'est-ce que la métempsychose pourrait être d'autre ? ("What else could metempsychosis be ?"). Ultimately the underlying structure is something like ce que cet aveuglement est, est une chose étrange ("what this blindness is, is a strange thing"), ce que la métempsychose est, est quoi ?, in which modern French requires ce que in place of the underlying integrative (obsolete) *que N est (as in advienne que pourra, quoted above ; parallel to Eng. what N is). One step further, one finds je dis que S, with the typical completive que, nevertheless analyzable as a degraded integrative (je dis (ce) que P [est], lit. "I say what S is"). Besides, a relative que with ellipsis of être will yield a completive in Il a cette particularité qu'il est gaucher ("he has that particularity that he is lefthanded") = il a cette particularité que IL-EST-GAUCHER [est], the clause following que being the subject of the elliptic verb "to be", que being the relative, whose antecedent is cette particularité, and whose function is "attribute of S" : "5 (=il est gaucher) est cette particularité". In fact the number of que items labelled comple tives which do have antecedents is very high : I shall only mention the numerous cases in which the completive has to take the form ce que (e.g. Je tiens à ce que vous veniez "I insist that you should come").
54
PIERRE LE GOFFIC
Turning now to the adverbial que, exclamative as in Que c'est bon !, it is a homonym of the pronoun que, although related to it. But here again we come across the fact that quantity, as I mentioned above, is something which involves both noun and adverb categorization. In fact que has nominal features in Que de gens se trompent ! ("How many people make mistakes !"). Besides, it is often (optionally or necessarily) replaced by ce que {Ce que c'est bon Î, with a relative que), in which case it may be difficult to categorize them as pronominal or adver bial : Vous ne pouvez pas savoir ce qu'il a pu f aire comme bêtises ("You cannot tell what mischief he has been up to"), Vous ne pouvez pas savoir ce qu'il est ennuyeux (" You cannot tell how boring he is"). As regards the integrative use of the adverb que, as in 77 ment que c'est une honte !, or, in a more important field, in comparative (correlative) clauses like Paul est plus grand que Jean, it still retains its value of "adverb of indefinite de gree" : Paul is taller that John, whatever John's tallness may be. To summarize briefly : the major distinctions usually recognized about que appear as mere salient stages. My position is that it may well be possible to find a gradation, possibly continuous, between them (as well as ambivalence phe nomena : in Qui as-tu dit que tu voulais voir ?, "Who did you say you wanted to see ?", the highly controversial nature of que seems to me to be at the intersection between relative and completive functions). I wish to conclude, once again, not with a proposition about what continuity is and how it should be processed, but rather, a tone below, with a criticism of discreteness. Ultima verba : whenever a problem arises involving possible con tinuity, it is always possible to try and defend discreteness by taking smaller units, by refining down to smaller terms. Thus one succeeds in breaking up what see med to be a continuous, dynamic entity, into a more manageable series of small discrete units. This reminds me of the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. Perhaps there is a kind of false problem in this opposition between the terms of continuity and discreteness. What I wish to emphasise is that the discrete catego ries which we work with are too approximate, if not basically inadequate, and I do not think linguistics has anything to gain by ignoring the existence of the zero comma something percent.
CONTINUITY IN SYNTAX
55
REFERENCES Buyssens, Emile. 1965. Linguistique historique, Paris : P.U.F, et Bruxelles : P.U. Culioli, Antoine. 1990. Pour une linguistique de l'énonciation, Paris : Ophrys. Damourette, Jacques and Edouard Pichon. 1911-1940. Essai de Grammaire de la Langue Française (7 vol.), Paris : d'Artrey. Fuchs, Catherine. 1991. L'hétérogénéité interprétative. In H. Parret (ed.), Le sens et ses hétérogénéités, Paris : éditions du CNRS (coll. Sciences du langage), pp. 107-120. Guillaume, Gustave. 1969. Langage et Science du Langage, Paris : Nizet, Québec : Presses de l'Université Laval. Le Goffic, Pierre. 1981. Ambiguïté linguistique et activité de langage, Thèse de Doctorat d'Etat, Université de Paris-VII. Le Goffic, Pierre. 1982. Ambiguïté et ambivalence en linguistique, DRLAV 27, pp. 83-105. Le Goffic, Pierre. 1988. Tensions antagonistes sur les systèmes : les rapports entre diachronie et synchronie. In A. Joly (ed.) La linguistique génétique : Histoire et Théories, Lille : Presses Universitaires de Lille, pp. 333-342. Le Goffic, Pierre. 1992. Que en français : essai de vue d'ensemble. In Subordination (Travaux Linguistiques du Cerlico, 5), Rennes : Presses Universitaires de Rennes 2, pp. 43-71. Muller, Charles. 1962. Polysémie et homonymie dans l'élaboration du lexique contemporain, Etudes de Linguistique Appliquée 1, pp. 49-54.
THE USE OF COMPUTER CORPORA IN THE TEXTUAL DEMONSTRABILITY OF GRADIENCE IN LINGUISTIC CATEGORIES GEOFFREY LEECH, BRIAN FRANCIS AND XUNFENG XU Lancaster University, UK 1.
Introduction
This paper explores the empirical analysis of non-discrete categories in semantics, and in linguistics generally. The classical, Aristotelian tradition re quires linguistic categories, like other categories, to be identified by a set of pro perties giving sufficient and necessary criteria for membership. Contrasting categories, so defined, have disjoint membership, and clear-cut boundaries. This view of linguistic categories is convenient for logical processing, but unrealistic. Various theories or tools of analysis have been proposed to provide an alternative view of linguistic categories in terms of non-discrete modelling. Examples are : Rosch's prototype theory of psychological categories (Rosch 1978) ; Zadeh's (1965) fuzzy set theory ; Bolinger's (1961) concept of gradience ; Quirk's (1965) notion of serial relationship. More recently there is the work of Lakoff (1987), Langacker (1990) and others within cognitive linguistics. These approaches to non-discrete categorization seem to be dealing with the same phenomena in somewhat varying terms. For the present purpose, the focus will be on gradience, the phenomenon of a scale (or gradient) relating two contrasting categories in terms of relative similarity and difference. Gradience means that members of two related categories differ in degree, along a scale running from "the typical x" to "the typical y". From an informal point of view, the more closely one examines linguistic categories, the more one tends to discover gradience, and the less one tends to believe in the "classical" Aristotelian view. However, one problem is : how do we demonstrate that such gradients exist ? Semantic gradience, assuming it exists, is a mental phenomenon, unamenable to observation. Therefore, to sub stantiate the claim that a gradient exists between two categories, we have to provide indirect evidence of its existence. For example, we may carry out elicitation procedures : experiments, tests, or surveys which elicit responses from na-
58
GEOFFREY LEECH, BRIAN FRANCIS AND XUNFENG XU
tive speakers of the language, given an appropriate stimulus, such as the visual objects used in Labov's (1973) investigation of the non-discrete semantics of the word cup. An alternative method, and in some ways a better one, is to examine the linguistic productions of native speakers in natural circumstances, when they are unconstrained by experimental conditions. In both cases, we study the obser vable reality of "parole" (or "performance") as an indirect means of reaching the underlying reality of "langue" (or "competence"). The second of these alternatives is the one pursued in this paper. It means studying the texts people produce, whether these texts consist of spoken or written material. Techniques of such text analysis have greater power than for merly, through the recent development of computer corpora 1 : large collections of machine-readable texts or text samples which can be searched and manipulated by computer. Such corpora are often designed to contain a "balanced" sampling, so as to be broadly representative of the language, or at least of some text types of the language. The present study is based on the analy sis of a one-million word corpus of written British English which has been widely used for linguistic research : the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen (or LOB) Corpus2. A second problem is : how can we give a precise description of such nondiscrete phenomena as gradience ? How can one be exact about phenomena which, it seems, are by their very nature vague and indeterminate ? We will argue that precision is possible : that by studying the distribution of such phenomena in a sample of texts, one can arrive at a reasonably precise statistical model of their occurrence. This model can then, if desired, be tested on further data, or can be adjusted experimentally to provide a better fit to the corpus data. It may be objected that such a model is a model of language in use, and does not give access to the underlying cognitive realities. This is true : the factors showing up in the corpus data may have varied explanations. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect that non-discrete cognitive phenomena will be reflected substantially in the way native speakers make use of their language in actual performance. The contrary position — that this is not a reasonable expectation — is one that needs special pleading, in accordance with "Occam's razor". However, those who find this type of argumentation troublesome may simply be willing to accept that the results of corpus analysis
1) Two books which explain recent developments in computer text corpora, with particular reference to English, are Johansson and Stenstrîm (1991) and Aijmer and Altenberg (1991). A view of the current state of the art in corpus analysis is given in Leech and Fligelstone (1992). Of more particular relevance to the present paper is Leech (1992). 2) Details of the LOB Corpus are provided in Johansson etal.(1978).
GRADIENCE
59
are a contribution to the theory of language performance — and let the matter rest there. 2.
An Example of Gradience : the English Genitive and of-Constructions
To illustrate the proposed method of investigating and measuring gra dience, we will consider the case of the English genitive construction (as in the president's speech), and compare it with the frequently synonymous English ofconstruction (as in the speech of the president). For convenience, we distinguish these two constructions by the formulae : [X's Y] and [the Y of X]. The question for which we seek an answer, using corpus analysis, is : what determines the na tive speaker's choice between one form rather than another ? In practice, gram marians have identified a number of criterial factors, of which three of the most important are : (a) The semantic category of X For example, it is often claimed that if X has human reference, [X's Y] is normally preferred to [the Y of X] : George's car rather than the car of George. However, this is not the whole story, as [X's Y] is sometimes used with non-hu man reference, e.g. the earth's orbit, and [the Y of X] is sometimes used with human reference, e.g. the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. (b) The semantic relation between X and Y For example, the typical semantic relation between X and Y in [X's Y] is supposed to be "possession", as in George's car. On the other hand, even with a human X and a non-human Y, there are some semantic relations which favour the of-construction : the photograph of George will typically be preferred to George's photograph if the meaning is "the photograph representing George". (c) The kind of text type (style) in which the construction occurs It may be claimed, for example, that the genitive is more likely to occur in certain types of writing (e.g. popular journalism and broadcasting) than others. There are many other factors which might be added to these : there is, for example, a syntactic factor that might be added to the above three : (d) The ratio of the length of X to the length of Y For reasons of functional sentence perspective or end-weight, we expect [X's Y] to favour a shorter X and a longer Y, whereas [the Y of X] will tend to favour the opposite. Thus, other things being equal, this would give a higher li kelihood to John's second wife than to the second wife of John, but a lower like lihood to Napoleon Bonaparte's wife than to the wife of Napoleon Bonaparte. Some corpus-based quantitative studies of the genitive have already been carried out (Jahr Sorheim 1980, Altenberg 1982), taking into account the above
60
GEOFFREY LEECH, BRIAN FRANCIS AND XUNFENG XU
factors and many others1. We will not attempt more than the analysis of the three factors (a)-(c) above. However, the innovation of the present study is that we employ a statistical technique, logistic modelling, which enables a number of factors and sub-factors to be simultaneously built into the model, and to be included or excluded from consideration at will, so that we can derive from the classified corpus data the model (given those factors and sub-factors) that best fits the data. One complication is that each factor itself can be thought of as represen ting an ordered categorical scale. For example, factor (a) above is not just a yesno matter ("X is either human or non-human"), since the likelihood of choosing [X's Y] is apparently conditioned by the degree to which X tends towards human reference. If X refers to an animal ("a lion's strength") or to a human or ganization ("the government's policy"), this may be intermediate, in likelihood, between a human noun and an inanimate or abstract noun. However, the model itself can decide on the relative levels of likelihood associated with different classes of noun, showing the linear relationships between these sub-factors (which we will call levels) on an interval scale. 3.
Technique of Analysis
The basis for the model is the calculation of the ODDS in favour of the genitive, i.e. :
for any combination of factors. From the corpus can be derived the optimal values for the factors and their levels, as well as interaction effects between them. So, for example, it is possible to determine which of the factors, and which of the levels within the factors, are the most important in determining the choice either of the genitive or of the of-construction. Further, it is possible to place the factors and levels in an order of importance ; to discover whether any factors or levels are redundant to the analysis ; to use a significance test (in the present case chi-squared) to determine the goodness of fit of a model to the data. The statistical model will, so to speak, "map" the gradience between the two categories.
1) Existing corpus-based studies of the English genitive are Jahr Sorheim (1980) and Altenberg (1982), Altenberg's study being of 17th century English.
GRADIENCE
61
Note, however, that the model is not entirely governed by predetermined objective criteria. In two respects, the human analyst has to intervene to make decisions. First, he/she decides (preferably after an informal analysis of some part of the corpus) which are the factors and levels which play a principal role in determining the likelihood of choice. According to Altenberg (1982 : 296), there are over 40 factors that might affect the choice of the genitive. But for practical reasons, at present, it is necessary to restrict the analysis to the three factors which we believe to be the most important. In the longer term, we will need to experiment with different factors, adding some and possibly subtracting others, to see how a better fit to the data can be obtained. Secondly, the analyst has to decide how to classify each example in the corpus by reference to the factors and levels included in the model. In some cases this decision is virtually automatic (e.g. in deciding whether a noun has human reference or not), whereas in others it requires judgement. There is nevertheless a hope that the analysis of examples will be objective enough to be largely capable of exact replication by different analysts1. 4.
Step-by-step Methodology
In the following, we detail the techniques of analysis in the order in which they were undertaken in our experimental study. i) Selection of appropriate textual data We decided to use the LOB Corpus (see 1 above) of written British English as our source of textual data. It was clearly impractical to use the whole of the corpus, so we chose several sections of the corpus of equal size : viz. parts of sections A, B and C for journalistic writing, J for scientific and learned wri ting, and K for general fiction2. In choosing these three stylistically contrasting text types, we had in mind the need to test the influence of style, or text type, on the odds in favour of the genitive.
1) Some aspects of the classification of examples are more problematic than others. We can generally expect consistency between different analysts for Factors (a), (c) and (d). For Factor (b) (semantic relation between X and Y), the criteria for judging membership of classes have to be clarified — by reference, for example, to paraphrase or entailment tests — if inconsistency is to be avoided. Even then, some residual cases may be unclear. Evidently there is fuzziness or gradience even in the classes which are necessary to the definition of gradience itself. 2) The sections of the LOB Corpus chosen for this experimental analysis correspond to those chosen from the Brown Corpus by Meyer (1987) in his research on punctuation.
62
GEOFFREY LEECH, BRIAN FRANCIS AND XUNFENG XU
ii) Classification of examples For the purposes of this analysis, it was necessary to focus on those occurrences of [X's Y] which could, in principle, be replaced by [the Y of X], and those occurrences of [the Y of X] which could, in principle, be replaced by [X's Y]. The use of "in principle" here does not mean that each example had to be transformable, in its context, into an example of the opposite category. Rather, it means that we limited the analysis to transformable classes : i.e. classes of the genitive or the of-construction for which members of the opposite category also occur. For example, the possessive genitive is a "transformable class" because alongside possessive examples like my best friend's house there are also examples such as the house of my best friend. The fact that some examples of the possessive (e.g. Richard's new car), especially in their context, would be difficult or impossible to transform acceptably did not enter into the analysis. On this basis we excluded classes (such as the use of of with quantifiers some of many of, etc.) which were non-transformable, and arrived at the follo wing classification of the examples according to the three factors and their constituent levels. (In the tables, we add the frequency of each category in the sample for [X's Y] and [the Y of X] : Factor (a) Semantic Category of X [X's Y]
[Y of X]
223
186
H
Human nouns - including names
A
Animal nouns (excluding human)
3
26
0
Organization nouns (collective)
24
76
P
Place nouns - including names
28
61
T
Time nouns
13
41
C
Concrete inanimate nouns
0
467
B
Abstract nouns (excluding time)
1
399
Total
292
1256
GRADIENCE
63
Factor (b) Semantic Relation between X and Y [X's Y]
[Y of X]
POSS.
Possessive
115
391
SUBJ.
Subjective
82
160
OBJE.
Objective
0
262
ORIG.
Origin
55
31
MEAS.
Measure
13
41
ATTR.
Attributive
7
89
PART.
Partitive
20
282
Total
292
1256
Factor (c) Text Type (or Style) [X's Y]
[Y of X]
Journalistic style
177
456
Learned style
41
638
Fictional style
74
162
Total
292
1256
It is useful to add a few words here on Factors (b) and (c). Factor (b) : The classification of levels under Factor (b) needs some ex planation. Possessive is understood broadly to include all relations which entail the paraphrase "X has (a) Y", apart from those in the attributive and partitive cate gories. E.g. : the banker's son the orchestra's music stand the mind of the reader Subjective applies where there is a sentence analogue in which X is the subject of a verb corresponding to the head of Y. E.g. : nazi Germany's request Lawrence's imagination the formation of the heavy elements Objective applies where there is a sentence analogue in which X is the ob ject of a verb corresponding to the head of Y.
64
GEOFFREY LEECH, BRIAN FRANCIS AND XUNFENG XU
E.g. : the inverse distribution of plants and animals [Coleridge's] definition of the secondary imagination the amusement of passers-by Origin applies where the construction entails "X is the originator (author, causer, maker, etc.) of Y". E.g. : Chaucer's poem the music of these three composers the opinion of the council Measure applies where X provides a measurement (in terms of time, dis tance, etc.) of Y. E.g. : last year's average wage yesterday's encounter the deplorable Homicide Act of 1957 Attributive applies where Y describes an attribute of X : Y has an abstract noun as its head, and the sentence analogues are both "X has (a) Y"and "X is Y'", where Y' is the corresponding adjective. E.g. : Mark's blindness the immensity of her work the extraordinary instability of the Anglo-Saxon public Partitive applies where there is a sentence analogue "X has (a) Y", and where, in addition, the semantic relation of Y to X is that of part to whole. E.g. : Michael's face the Football League's Division Two the foyer of the Leopold Hotel Factor (c) : It is already worth noting from the figures under Factor (c) that there is marked inequality between the frequencies of the genitive in the different styles. The Journalistic text type accounts for 60.62 per cent of the total number of genitives, as compared with 25.34 per cent in the Fictional texts, and 14.04 in the Learned texts. At this point it is also worth noting the important role of the computer in making the analysis practicable. By means of a concordance programme, it was possible to locate all examples of the genitive and the of construction, and to inspect their context, with little trouble. Also, the concordance programme allo wed us to encode each factor and level in an abbreviated way, and to sort the examples on the basis of these codes. In this way, it was relatively easy to verify the classifications, to check them for consistency, and to count the number of occurrences in each class. In principle, we could have undertaken the analysis
GRADIENCE
65
without the availability of the machine-readable corpus ; in practice, this task would have been Herculean, and would have been prone to error and inconsis tency. iii) Tabulating the results of the analysis As a result of this analysis, we arrived, in effect, at a 3-dimensional matrix, with each cell containing a numerical value (viz. a frequency count). For the purpose of input to GLIM, the result could be prepared as a set of three 2-dimensional tables, one for each pair of factors, as shown in Tables 1-3. Table 1 : Observed Proportion of the Genitive in Journalistic Style H
A
0
P
T
c
B
TOTAL
POSS.
46/72
0/0
8/33
16/43
0/0
0/28
1/57
71/233
SUBJ.
36/50
0/0
4/13
8/0
0/0
0/7
0/28
48/106
OBJE.
0/13
0/2
0/6
0/2
0/0
0/25
0/54
0/102
ORIG.
36/48
0/0
4/6
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
40/54
MEAS.
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
7/19
0/0
0/0
7/19
ATTR.
3/7
0/0
3/7
0/3
0/0
0/12
0/21
6/50
PART.
2/9
0/0
3/13
0/3
0/0
0/24
0/20
5/69
TOTAL
123/199
0/2
22/68
24/59
7/19
0/96
1/180
177/633
Table 2 : Observed Proportion of the Genitive in Learned Style H
A
0
P
T
C
B
TOTAL
POSS.
8/43
0/7
0/9
1/8
0/0
0/65
0/59
9/191
SUBJ.
13/28
0/13
1/3
2/3
0/0
0/29
0/23
16/99
OBJE.
0/11
0/3
0/1
0/1
0/0
0/75
0/53
0/144
ORIG.
13/23
0/0
0/4
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
13/27
MEAS.
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
3/29
0/0
0/0
3/29
ATTR.
0/1
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/12
0/20
0/33
0/0
0/112
0/27
0/156
3/29
0/293
0/182
41/679
PART.
0/6
0/0
0/2
0/9
| TOTAL
34/112
0/23
1/19
3/21
66
GEOFFREY LEECH, BRIAN FRANCIS AND XUNFENG XU Table 3 : Observed Proportion of the Genitive in Fictional Style H
A
0
P
T
C
B
TOTAL
POSS.
31/50
3/3
1/2
0/3
0/0
0/9
0/15
35/82
SUBJ.
17/20
0/1
0/1
1/2
0/0
0/8
0/5
18/37
OBJE.
0/5
0/0
0/0
0/1
0/0
0/4
0/6
0/16
ORIG.
2/2
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/3
2/5
MEAS.
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
3/6
0/0
0/0
3/6
| ATTR.
1/2
0/0
0/0
0/1
0/0
0/4
0/6
1/13
| PART.
15/19
0/0
0/0
0/2
0/0
0/53
0/3
15/77
| TOTAL
66/98
3/4
1/3
1/9
3/6
0/78
0/38
74/236
iv) Using GLIM for statistical modelling The statistical package GLIM (Francis, Green and Payne 1992) was used to fit a selection of statistical models to the observed data. The techniques used are described below in section 5. v) Drawing conclusions from the analysis This, like the previous step, is crucial in the methodology, and is explained in section 6 below. 5.
Statistical Modelling
The idea of statistical modelling is to present a simplified representation of the underlying process by separating out systematic features of the data from random variation. To do this, a probability model is chosen to represent the ran dom variation ; the systematic features of the data are represented by a (hopefully small) number of parameters. So, the statistical task is to find a statistical model which is parsimonious (has a small number of parameters) but which fits the data well according to the underlying probability distribution (GOODNESS-OF-FIT). Thus Occam's razor plays an important part in statistical modelling. As an example, one of the classical statistical models is simple linear re gression, where the probability distribution is the Normal distribution, and the mean of the Normal distribution is modelled by a regression equation — a linear combination of variables with unknown regression parameters. More recently, techniques have been developed for modelling proportions, or ratios of counts. These techniques use the Binomial distribution as the proba bility distribution, and model the probability of a particular outcome as a func tion of a set of explanatory factors. A common model relates the probability of
GRADIENCE
67
an outcome to a linear combination of explanatory factors through the logit function log(p/(l-p)), or log-odds ratio (Collett 1991). We therefore try to cons truct a linear model predicting the log-odds ratio for any combination of factors. We then try to build a model for the probability of the English genitive construction. The simplest model is that the probability is constant and is not de pendent on the semantic category, the semantic relation or the style. The varia tion in the proportion of English genitive construction for each combination of factors would then be just Binomial variation. This model can be tested, a good ness of fit measure calculated and the model rejected or accepted, and a new model tested, and so on. More generally, we model the probability of giving the English genitive as a function of a set of individual characteristics. Formally, we assume that the probability of giving a particular response for a particular cell i is pi. For each cell of the table, we observe the number of genitive constructs Ri and the total number of constructs Ni. The logistic model assumes that : Ri is distributed with a Binomial distribution with mean pi Ri ~ Binomial (pi, Ni) Pi is related through a function f(.) to a linear function of the explanatory factors
where the bj are unknown parameters to be estimated. f(pi) is taken to be the logit function
Following the usual GLIM convention, each of the potential explanatory factors was converted by GLIM into a set of dummy variables, one dummy va riable for each level of the factor. A backward elimination procedure was adop ted, with the all two-way interaction model being fitted at the initial stage. At each subsequent stage, the least important variable or interaction was selected and removed from the model using the GLIM scaled deviance (likelihood ratio statistic) as a criterion for comparing nested models — a difference in scaled deviance between two models (the smaller of which has s parameters less than the other) will have a chi-squared distribution on s degrees of freedom if the term removed is unimportant (i.e. its parameters can be set to zero). The proce dure was terminated when all remaining variables were significant. For further details of logistic regression, GLIM and statistical modelling see Aitkin et al. (1989), Agresti (1990) or the new GLIM4 manual (Francis, Green and Payne 1992).
68
GEOFFREY LEECH, BRIAN FRANCIS AND XUNFENG XU
The results of the analysis are shown below. Table 4a shows the analysis of deviance table. We can see that starting from the all-two-way interaction mo del, first the CATEGORY by STYLE interaction is removed, then the RELATION by STYLE interaction, and finally the RELATION by CATEGORY interaction. We are left with a final model involving the main effects of CATEGORY, RELATION and STYLE. Table 4b shows the effect of removing each of these terms from the model. All terms are seen to be important, and the model cannot be simplified further. Does the model fit well ? The scaled deviance from this model is 63.01 on 71 degrees of freedom, which provides the goodness of fit test for the final mo del. This value is compared with a chi-squared distribution on 71 df. Its 95 % percentage point is 91.67, and as 63.01 is substantially below this figure, the model fits well. We can assess the importance of each of the terms in the final model by further examination of Table 4b. All factors are highly significant, and all are very important in predicting the proportion of genitive constructs. However, when CATEGORY is excluded from the model, the scaled deviance changes by a massive 361.0 on 5 degrees of freedom (72 for each degree of freedom). This makes CATEGORY the most significant term. The next most significant term is STYLE, and finally RELATION. Table 4a : Analysis of deviance table Difference in scaled deviance from previous model
Difference in df
p-value
39
12.32
10
0.2642
35.14
51
14.88
12
0.2481
63.01
71
27.87
20
0.1125
MODEL
Deviance
df
CATEGORY+RELATION+ STYLE+CATEGORY.STYLE + RELATION.STYLE+ RELATION.CATEGORY
7.94
29
CATEGORY+RELATION+ STYLE+RELATION.STYLE+ RELATION.CATEGORY
20.26
CATEGORY+RELATION+ STYLE+ RELATION.CATEGORY CATEGORY+RELATION+ STYLE (final model)
GRADIENCE
69
Table 4b : Effect of deleting terms from the final model Term deleted
change in deviance
change in df
STYLE
70.28
2
p<0.0001
RELATION
88.33
5
p<0.0001
CATEGORY
361.0
5
p<0.0001
p-value
The final model can be presented in the following way. If we now define pijk to be the probability of obtaining the genitive construct for CATEGORY i, RELATION j and STYLE k, then the model can be written as :
The estimates of these effects are given below in Table 5. Table 5 : Estimates of parameters in the final model Parameter name
Description
Estimate
Standard error
K
constant
0.33
0.18
CATEGORY(l)
Human
0.0
CATEGORY(2)
Animal
-1.73
0.67
CATEGORY(3)
Organisation
-1.38
0.28
CATEGORY(4)
Place
-0.87
0.28
CATEGORY(5)
Time
-0.85
0.37
CATEGORY(6)
Concrete
-13.38
28.92
CATEGORY(7)
Abstract
-5.80
1.01
RELATION(l)
Possessive
0.0
RELATION(2)
Subjective
0.86
0.24
RELATION(3)
Objective
-10.85
22.55
RELATION(4)
Origin
1.11
0.30
RELATION(5)
Measure
0.0
RELATION(6)
Attributive
-0.48
0.50
RELATION(7)
Partitive
-0.53
0.33
STYLE(l)
Journalistic
0.0
STYLE(2)
Learned
-1.60
0.24
STYLE(3)
Fictional
0.44
0.25
70
GEOFFREY LEECH, BRIAN FRANCIS AND XUNFENG XU
These estimates can be used in a number of ways. First, they can be used to construct fitted probabilities for any cell in the three-way table. For example, the fitted probability for place as object in journalistic style can be obtained by calculating the fitted log odds ratio for the required cells (0.33-1.38+1.11+0.0 = 0.06), then calculating the odds-ratio (Exp(0.06) = 1.06), then calculating the fitted probability (1.06/(1+1.06) = 0.515). Table 6 contains the fitted probabili ties for every combination of STYLE, RELATION and CATEGORY. Table 6 : Fitted probabilities for combinations of the 3 factors CATEGORY STYLE RELATION POSS 1
2
3
B
H
A
0
P
T
C
0.582
0.197
0.258
0.369
0.000
0.004
0.580
0.000
0.010
0.000
o.ooo
0.000
0.013
|
-
|
SUBJ
0.767
0.367
0.452
OBJE
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
ORIG
0.809
0.428
0.514
0.640
-
MEAS
-
-
-
-
0.371
ATTR
0.462
0.132
0.177
0.265
0.000
PART
0.451
0.127
0.171
0.257
-
0.003
0.000
0.002
POSS
0.219
0.047
0.066
0.106
0.000
0.001
SUBJ
0.399
0.105
0.143
0.218
0.000
0.002
-
OBJE
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
ORIG
0.461
0.131
0.176
0.264
-
MEAS
-
-
-
-
0.106
-
-
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.006
0.000
0.015
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.019
ATTR
0.148
0.030
0.042
0.068
PART
0.142
0.028
0.040
0.065
POSS
0.684
0.276
0.351
0.476
SUBJ
0.836
0.474
0.561
0.682
OBJE
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
ORIG
0.868
0.537
0.622
0.734
-
|
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.003 -
MEAS
-
-
-
-
0.478
-
-
ATTR
0.571
0.191
0.250
0.359
0.004
PART
0.561
0.184
0.242
0.349
-
0.000 0.000
0.004
GRADIENCE
71
Secondly, the estimates can be interpreted directly as log-odds ratios. As an example, the parameter for ATTRIBUTIVE is -0.48, so the log-odds ratio for ATTRIBUTIVE compared to POSSESSIVE is -0.48, and the odds-ratio is 0.61, which is close to 0.66 — two chances for ATTRIBUTIVE to every three chances for POSSESSIVE, assuming the levels of STYLE and CATEGORY are held constant in the comparison. They can therefore be used to order the factor categories in increasing likelihood of using the genitive, after controlling for the effects of the other factors. 6.
Conclusions Drawn from the Analysis
In a sense, no conclusions need be drawn, since the statistical model is it self the final result of the analysis : a three-dimensional model of the gradient relating the genitive to the of-construction in English. It is useful, however, to pick out from this result some of the important features of the gradient, as revea led by the model. These are conclusions which could not have been arrived at by non-empirical means : the use of corpus data was a necessary means to this end. Conclusion I : The model fits the data well, on the basis of the goodness of fit test. Conclusion II : All three factors (a)-(c) are important factors in determining the choice between the genitive and the of-construction. Conclusion III : The order of significance of the factors is : Factor (a) (Semantic class of X) - most significant Factor (c) (Style, or Text Type) Factor (b) (Relation of X to Y) - least significant Conclusion IV : Within Factor (a), the ordering of levels in terms of the fitted probabilities of choosing a genitive in preference to an of-construction is as follows : 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
X is human X is a place X is a human organization X is animal (but not human) X is abstract (apart from time) X is concrete and inanimate (apart from place)
(H) (P) (O) (A) (B) (C)
72
GEOEFREY LEECH, BRIAN FRANCIS AND XUNFENG XU
The existence of a gradient between the two constructions is particularly clear from the characteristics of this factor. Level 1 (human X) makes a very strong contribution to the choice of the genitive — and thus confirms the stereo typic explanation of the genitive given in many grammar books. On the other hand, the fact that levels 2, 3 and 4 identify classes associated with quasi-human characteristics 1 is evidence for the genitive's being in this respect being a "fuzzy-edged" category. At the bottom of the gradient, levels 5 and 6 (especially 6) make a negligible contribution to the choice of the genitive — or, to put it dif ferently, overwhelmingly favour the choice of the of-construction. Oversimplifying, we might see level 1 as the "hard core" of the genitive cate gory, level 6 as being the "hard core" of the of-construction category, and levels 2-5 as being intermediate. (The level "time" where X is a temporal expression is not included in this ordering, as it cannot be separated from the level "measure" of Factor (b). In fact, both "time" and "measurement" are anomalous in this mo del, and appear to suggest the existence of an independent class of genitives. For this purpose, however, we need a larger sample). Conclusion V : Within Factor (b), the ordering of levels in terms of the fitted probabilities of the selection of the genitive in preference to the of-construction is as follows : 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Origin Subjective Possessive Attributive Partitive Objective
(ORIG) (SUBJ) (POSS) (ATTR) (PART) (OBJE)
The position of the level of "Origin", rather than that of "Possessive", at the top of the scale is something of a surprise, but it is worth remembering that the stereotypic genitive category "possessive" is defined in a broad way here, and is by no means restricted to possession in the sense of ownership. Also, with Origin at the top of the scale, it is possible to interpret the above ordering in terms of a single notional gradient of "power/influence/dominance", clearly as sociated with the corresponding gradient of "humanness" we find in Factor (a).
1) Not only animal and organization nouns, but also geographical nouns often have quasihuman implications, as illustrated by the following examples : E.g. : Huddersfield's long history the Earth's development
GRADIENCE
73
That is, the presence of "Origin" at the top of the scale may have a connection with the observation that the originator of something — its creator, begetter, author, etc. — has the primary influence over it. The subject of a verb (associated with level 2) is also typically the agent — the participant in an action who wields power, in contrast to the powerlessness of the object (placed at the bottom of the scale). It is striking, in this context, that the verb-object relation is overwhelmingly (though not inevitably) associated with preference for an ofconstruction, just as the subject-verb relation is overwhelmingly (though not inevitably) associated with preference for the genitive. Conclusion VI : Within Factor (c) STYLE, the ordering of levels with reference to the fitted probabilities of preferring a genitive to an of-construction is as follows : 1. 2. 3.
Fictional texts Journalistic texts Learned texts
As Table 6 shows, the remoteness of the learned text-type from the other two is very noticeable : further research over a wider range of text types might reveal a more general trend for the genitive to be favoured in more informal styles (influenced by the spoken language), as contrasted with more formal styles of writing (cf. Altenberg 1982 : 299). Conclusion VII : From the data, the fitted probabilities of the genitive for any construct re ferring to a concrete object, or where the semantic relation between X and Y is objective, is very close to zero. We have observed no occurrences of a genitive in either of these two groups. It may be that the occurrences of genitives in these two groups is rare, or possibly we have stumbled on a discrete linguistic rule. Only analysis of further data will reveal the truth. 7.
General Conclusion
The technique of logistic modelling, as a way of extracting a gradience model from corpus data, has been applied in this paper only in a limited, expe rimental way. However, the results are encouraging, and strengthen our intention to pursue this line of inquiry further. One of the strengths of this technique is that it yields a precise way of measuring how far a model approximates to a theoretically optimal way of ac counting for the data. Hence, if we take the present study as a starting point, we can experiment fruitfully with the addition of new factors (e.g. we are already working on Factor (d) mentioned in section 2 above), or with the refinement of
74
GEOFFREY LEECH, BRIAN FRANCIS AND XUNFENG XU
the existing Factors (a)-(c), all of which have proved important. With every modification of the model, it is possible to find out exactly how far and in what respects that model improves the result, by achieving greater goodness of fit. Another way of extending the analysis and testing the results further is to make use of fresh corpus data. By taking a new corpus sampled from the same text types, we could test out the validity of the model, by predicting its perfor mance on the new data. Alternatively, we could extend the range of corpus data to new text types, and especially to samples of spoken English, which might show a rather different pattern of distribution from the written data so far analy sed. A third promising line of further research based on this model is the inves tigation of other assumed cases of gradience in language performance. These may belong to any of the strata of language. For example, on the syntactic level, we would like to investigate the choice of the zero relative pronoun in English, as contrasted with one of the pronouns who/whom/whose, which, or that. Here there is a multiple contrast rather than a simple binary one, and so a further stage of analysis would be to use the same method to investigate the choice (say) bet ween who and whom, or between which and that. On the level of graphology, the choice between the use or non-use of a comma at certain syntactic positions (e.g. in coordination) could be investigated by the same means. On the lexical level, the choice between quasi-synonymous words (such as nearly and almost, or between appear and seem) lends itself to the same treatment. The suspicion is that this method of analysis will reveal patterns of linguistic choice in performance to be far from chaotic : that they will show considerable stability across different users, different contexts, and different time periods. The evidence of many corpus studies so far undertaken, often using simple quantitative measures, has pointed clearly in that direction1. Such studies also demonstrate clearly the need for the non-discrete modelling of linguistic categories in performance. Two questions of interest remain : (i) How widely will the technique illustrated here be applicable to natural language phenomena at various levels ? And (ii) how far will it now be possible, with the aid of corpora, to make precise predictive statements about linguistic phenomena which up to the present time have been studied only broadly and impressionistically ?
1) A recent bibliography of corpus-based publications (Altenberg 1991) lists many examples of such studies.
GRADIENCE
75
REFERENCES
Agresti, A. 1990. Categorical Data Analysis, New York : Wiley. Aitkin, M.A. ; D.A. Anderson ; B.J. Francis and J.P. Hinde. 1989. Statistical Modelling in GLIM, Oxford : Oxford University Press. Altenberg, B. 1982. The Genitive v. the Of-Construction : A Study of Syntactic Variation in 17th Century English, Lund : CWK. Altenberg, B. 1991. A bibliography ofpublications relating to English computer corpora. In Johansson and Stenstrîm, pp. 355-396. Bolinger, D.L. 1961. Generality, Gradience and the All-or-None, The Hague : Mouton. Collett, D. 1991. Modelling Binary Data, London : Chapman and Hall. Francis, B.J. ; M. Green and C.P. Payne. 1992. The GUM4 Manual, Oxford : Oxford University Press. Jahr-Sorheim, M.C. 1980. The s-Genitive in Present-day English, Oslo : Department of English, Oslo University. Johansson, S. ; G. Leech and H. Goodluck. 1978. Manual of Information to accompany the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus of British English, for use with digital computers, Oslo : Department of English, Oslo University. Johansson, S. and A.B. Stenstrîm (eds.) 1991. English Computer Corpora : Selected Papers and Research Guide, Berlin & New York : Mouton de Gruyter. Labov, W. 1973. The boundaries of words and their meanings. In C.J.N. Bailey and R.W. Shuy (eds.), New Ways of Analyzing Variation in English, Washington D.C. : Georgetown U.P., pp. 340-73. Lakoff, G. 1987. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, Chicago : Chicago U.P. Langacker, R.W. 1990. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, vol. 1 : Theoretical Prerequisites, Palo Alto : Stanford U.P. Leech, G. 1992. Corpora and theories of linguistic performance. In J. Svartvik (ed.), Directions in Corpus Linguistics, Berlin & New York : Mouton de Gruyter, pp. 125-148. Leech, G. and S. Fligelstone. 1992. Computer and corpus analysis. In C.S. Butler (ed.), Computers and Written Texts, Oxford : Blackwell, pp. 115140.
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Meyer, C.F. 1987. A Linguistic Study of American Punctuation, FrankfurtMain : Peter Lang. Quirk, R. 1965. Descriptive statement and serial relationship, Language 41, pp. 205-217. Rosch, E. 1978. Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch and B.B. Lloyd (eds.), Cognition and Categorization, Hillsdale : Erlbaum, pp. 27-48. Zadeh, L.A. 1965. Fuzzy sets, Information and Control 8, pp. 338-353.
A "CONTINUOUS DEFINITION" OF POLYSEMOUS ITEMS : ITS BASIS, RESOURCES AND LIMITS JACQUELINE PICOCHE University of Amiens, France
I propose to begin with a demonstration (as hawkers say to boost their wares on street markets). I am going to build, under your eyes, a "continuous de finition" of the French verb marcher ; after which we shall be able to start theori zing and deal, as promised, with the basis, the resources and the limits of this type of definition and, moreover, show its specificity as compared with other methods currently used by fellow linguists. 1.
How to build a "continuous; definition"
As a springboard I shall take the following article, photocopied by permis sion of the publisher, taken from a dictionary which, in other respects, I greatly admire and use daily : the Petit Robert (PR) (1987 edition). M A R C H E R [maR e]. v.intr. (Marchier « piétiner », trans., XII e ; frq. •markôn "marquer, imprimer le pas"). I. (XVe). ♦ 1o Se déplacer par mouvements et appuis successifs des jambes et des pieds sans quitter le sol (V. Marche, pas). Enfant qui commence à marcher. «Je ne puis méditer qu'en marchant » (ROUSS.). Manière de marcher : allure, démarche, marche. Marcher à petits pas rapides. V. Trotter, trottiner. Marcher d'un pas lent. Marcher bon train, vite. V. Presser (le pas). Marcher avec peine. V. Traîner (se). Marcher en boitant ; avec une canne, des béquilles. Marcher dans la rue, sur une route. V. Déambuler, promener (se) ; piéton. Marcher à reculons : reculer, rétrograder. Marcher droit* (1, II). - (Danse) Faire des pas ordinaires. Marcher sur la pointe des pieds. ♦ 2° Avancer (en parlant des êtres animés). Marcher à quatre pattes*. Acrobates qui marchent sur les mains. - (Animaux) Animaux qui marchent sur les doigts (V. Digitigrade), sur la plante des pieds (V. Plantigrade). ♦ 3° Aller à pied. Marcher vers la ville. V. Diriger (se), rendre (se). Fig. « Le monde avec lenteur marche vers la sagesse » (VOLT). - Marcher au supplice. Marcher sans but, à l'aventure. V. Errer, flâner. - Marcher sur qqn, aller vers lui avec violence, hostilité. Marcher devant, derrière qqn. - Fig. Marcher avec qqn, la main dans la main, comme un seul homme : être d'accord. ♦ 4° (Troupes). Faire mouvement, Marcher sur une ville, contre un adversaire. Marcher au combat. V. Monter. ♦ 5° Fig. et fam. (1852). Acquiescer,
78
JACQUELINE PICOCHE
donner son adhésion (à qqch.). V. Accepter, consentir. Marcher dans la combine. « Non, monsieur ! je ne marche pas !» (MALRAUX). - Croire naïvement quelque histoire. Il a marché dans mon histoire. Il ne marche pas, il court : il fait plus encore que marcher (Cf. Donner dans le panneau, se faire avoir). 0 Faire marcher qqn, obtenir de lui ce qu'on veut (par la force, la menace, la persuasion, la ruse). Spécialt.Abuser en faisant prendre pour vrai ce qui ne l'est pas. V. Berner, tromper. « Le prince se moquait d'elle et la faisait marcher » (MADELIN). ♦ 6° S'avancer dans un véhicule, à cheval. Nous avons très bien marché au début, mais à Lyon la voiture est tombée en panne. ♦ 7° (Choses). Se mouvoir de manière continue. Automobile, train qui marche à 150 km à l'heure. V. Rouler. ♦ 8° Fonctionner (en parlant d'un mécanisme). Montre, pendule qui marche mal. Faire marcher une machine, une radio. ♦ 9° Fig. (1865). Produire l'effet souhaité. Ses affaires, ses études marchent bien (Cf. Ça carbure, ça ronfle). Ce procédé, cette ruse a marché. Marcher comme sur des roulettes*. V. Aller. II. MARCHER SUR, DANS... ♦ 1o Mettre le pied (sur qqch.) tout en avançant. Défense de marcher sur les pelouses. - Loc. fig. Marcher sur les pas, sur les traces de qqn. V. Imiter. -Marcher sur les brisées* d'un rival. Marcher sur le corps, sur le ventre d'un concurrent. V. Passer. -Marcher sur des charbons* ardents, sur des oeufs*. ♦ 2° Poser le pied (sur qqch.), sans idée d'autre mouvement. Marcher dans une flaque d'eau. Il a marché en plein dedans. Marcher sur les pieds de qqn. 0 Fig. Marcher sur ses principes. V. Fouler, piétiner. ♢ ANT. Arrêter (s'), stopper. - HOM Marché.
You will notice that it is divided into two main parts, introduced by the Roman numerals I and II, section I comprising the greater part of the uses of the verb, and section II singling out two prepositional constructions in which the compiler considers the idea of a progression in space to be neutralized. On reading the article one is struck by one major discontinuity and several minor ones. The major discontinuity occurs with 5. There is nothing to explain or even suggest what semantic continuity there could possibly be between the fact of "se déplacer par mouvements et appuis successifs des jambes et des pieds sans quitter le sol" ("to progress by lifting and setting down each foot in turn, never having both feet off the ground at once") and that of "acquiescer ; consentir" ("to acquiesce" ; "to consent") termed "fam. and fig." without the "figure" in question being in the least clarified. This is all the more surprising as 6 and 7 introduce once more uses comprising progress in space, thus semantically close to 3 and 4. Had the precaution but been taken, for 4, of quoting the military command En avant, marche ! ("Forward, march !"), one might have been able to see, in the consenting person, the image of an obedient infantryman. However, I do not believe this interpretation to be the most coherent with the rest. The minor discontinuities are to be found in 8 and 9, 8 "fonctionner" ("to work") having the possibility of being felt as a metaphor of 7 "se mouvoir de manière continue" ("to move in a continuous manner") and 9 "produire l'effet sou-
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haité" ("to produce the desired effect") as a metaphor of 8, although there is no thing to specify this. The reference to "aller" ("to go") which appears in 9, is a comparison, and a comparison is not a reason. Logically, if its definition is correct, the fifth acceptation should be treated as a homonym and appear as a separate entry. However, strangely enough, a par ticularly atomistic dictionary, the Dictionnaire du Français Contemporain (DFC), enters a single article, very close to that of the PR, which proves that the au thors sensed a certain continuity but were unable or unwilling to explicitate it. On the other hand, the Lexis provides three homonymic entries for marcher : 1) "se mouvoir en déplaçant les pieds l'un après l'autre" ("to progress by moving the feet one after the other") ; 2) "fonctionner" (of a mechanism : "to work") ; "faire des progrès" (en parlant d'une activité quelconque) (of some activity : "to make progress") ; 3) "donner son acceptation, croire naïvement" ("to give one's consent", "to believe naively"). To come back to the article from the Petit Robert, setting aside the case of "croire naïvement" which appears most inappropriately in 5th position, there re mains a discontinuity between sections I and II It is difficult to understand why "poser le pied sur" ("to place one's foot on") and "poser le pied dans" ("to place one's foot in") should be separated from acceptations I. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, by the non-spatial acceptations 8 and 9. The note "sans idée d'autre mouvement" ("without the idea of any other movement") for II.2 is questionable. One does not often tread in a puddle or on someone's foot without moving one foot after the other ! Therefore since, the homonymic solution being rejected, a single article must be subdivided, my first suggestion would be to list the spatial acceptations as opposed to the non-spatial ones. All the uses bearing reference to solid, ter restrial space — able to be measured in numbers of steps — and to animate beings moving upon it by means of their legs, setting one foot regularly in front of the other without ever completely leaving the ground (all of which terms are ex tremely long and complicated to define if one wishes to reach, by proceeding from one definition to the next, the layer of the "primitives") should be grouped together at the beginning óf the article. But firstly this reordering still fails to explain the major discontinuity in 5 and the minor ones in 8 and 9. 7 contains the adjective "continu" ("continuous") which heads in the right direction but is, it seems to me, insufficient. This notion should have been explicitly introduced right from 1 in order to bring out the mode of action proper to the verb marcher, which is an "activity" and not a "state", an "achievement" or an "accomplishment" and shows the verbal process in the progressiveness of its development, which is at the base of all the apparently "discontinuous" sense effects.
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It is the notion of continuous, regular and normal activity that implements the transition to 8 (concrete subject, machine, having, although inanimate, an internal activity, without progression in space) then to 9 (abstract subject, set of situations and human relationships which develop in time in a manner normal, regular and satisfactory to the person organizing them : a firm, business matters) and, to my mind, only in the very last place to 5 in which the subject is a human being who falls unwittingly into a plot, and acts in a manner expected by his manipulator, to the latter's greatest satisfaction. These sense effects are the result of the use of this basic mode of action, to the exclusion of other "semes" (semantic components), and, consequently, it is best revealed by these. But it is unfortunate that the presence of the other semes should have prevented the author from perceiving it or at least noting it in the uses involving movement. This proves the necessity of "shuttles" between the different uses of the polysemous item if one does not wish to overlook certain important semantic features. On the other hand, 1 includes the seme "without leaving the ground", which is not immediately obvious, and is obtained through comparison with other verbs of movement, notably courir ("to run") and sauter ("to jump"), other "activities" of which the mode of action is used in a quite different manner. Now if one compares these verbs not only in their spatial uses but in the whole of their polysemy, one notes that in French walking is a far less peculiar manner of getting about than running, trotting, galloping, jumping, creeping, swimming or flying. It is, par excellence, the normal way of moving, the least tiring, the most regular and the most efficient for the biped vetebrates that men are, a proof that language is anthropocentric, as one may have guessed. Whoever fails to make this understood in his definition of the spatial uses of marcher deprives himself of the ability to demonstrate how they engender the non-spatial uses, and to give a "continuous definition" of the whole. I am thus led to suggest for the verb marcher the following article : MARCHER V. intrans. I. Un homme ou un animal terrestre, muni de pieds ou de pattes marche lorsqu'il se déplace sur le sol sans le quitter, en mettant régulièrement un pied devant l'autre. Ce mouvement, et l'espace qu'il délimite s'appelle un pas. Le sujet se déplace progressi vement, pas à pas. A défaut de véhicule, c'est pour lui la manière normale d'avancer, la moins fatigante, donc la plus satisfaisante : Jean marche, son chien marche à côté de lui ; les fourmis marchent à la file. Divers compléments circonstantiels facultatifs peuvent préciser : 1) la manière de marcher : vite, lentement, à pas de loup, à pas de géant. 2) la partie du pied sur laquelle on prend appui (prép. sur) : marcher sur la pointe des pieds.
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Les animaux plantigrades marchent sur la plante des pieds ; les animaux digi tigrades sur les doigts de pieds ; éventuellement un homme peut utiliser aussi les mains pour marcher, c'est marcher à quatre pattes, ou même, exceptionnellement, seulement les mains : l'acrobate marche sur les mains. 3) la nature du sol sur lequel on prend appui : a) s'il est dur (prép. sur) : Jean marche sur le trottoir, sur l'herbe, sur l'asphalte. b) s'il est mou, si l'on y enfonce (prép. dans ) : Jean marche dans le sable, dans la boue, dans l'eau (dans ce cas, ayant mis les pieds dans l'eau, on marche en fait sur le fond). c) s'il s'y trouve un objet sur lequel le marcheur met le pied, soit par inadver tance, soit dans une intention destructrice ou méchante : Jean a écrasé un coquillage en marchant dessus — il marche sur la queue du chat, sur les pieds de son voisin. Par métaphore, dans quelques locutions plus ou moins figées, marcher sur peut signifier "détruire tout ce qui fait obstacle à l'action du sujet": Jean marche sur ses principes, sur les brisées de son rival, il lui marcherait sur le ventre, sur le corps (v. piétiner). 4) le lieu du déplacement : Jean marche à travers champs, dans sa chambre, le long de la rivière. 5) le terme du mouvement ; dans ce cas, marcher se substitue à aller, en produi sant divers effets de sens tenant à sa modalité d'action progressive qui montre l'action dans son déroulement. Dans certains cas, le sème "à pied" peut être neutralisé au profit de ces effets de sens : a) Jean marche vers son bureau, ajoute à va à son bureau le sème "à pied", et aussi la notion d'activité progressive. b) Les fourmis marchent vers la fourmilière plus expressif que vont vers la fourmilière. La modalité d'action du verbe est utilisée pour exprimer la ténacité et la persévérance de ces insectes. c) Garibaldi marche sur Rome beaucoup plus expressif que Garibaldi va à Rome, ou même se dirige vers Rome ; la modalité d'action est utilisée pour exprimer la progression régulière et puissante d'une armée (et peu importe que ce soient ou non des fantassins). d) Jean marche au feu, au combat, à la mort, à la gloire, au supplice : le com plément de marcher à est généralement quelque chose d'exceptionnel et de dangereux ; la modalité d'action est utilisée pour exprimer un effort héroïque, dans son déroule ment temporel. II. Un véhicule à moteur marche 1) il se déplace régulièrement : En ce moment, la voiture marche à 120 km heure — Le verbe marcher peut aussi s'employer avec des véhicules non terrestres : navire, avion, fusée, vaisseau spatial — Par métonymie, les passagers peuvent aussi dire qu'ils marchent : Entre Paris et Nantes, nous avons marché à 110 de moyenne ; nous avons bien marché. 2) il fonctionne (condition nécessaire pour qu'il se déplace) : cette voiture marche bien, le moteur vient d'être révisé : la modalité d'action est utilisée pour exprimer le caractère normal et régulier de ce fonctionnement.
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III. Un sujet marche sans se déplacer 1) une machine fonctionne normalement, régulièrement, par un mouvement in terne sur place (mouvement d'horlogerie, moteur qui tourne) ou une simple consomma tion d'énergie, de façon conforme aux plans de son constructeur et donc satisfaisante : ma montre, ma machine à laver, mon poste de télé marchent. 2) une combinaison quelconque produit l'effet attendu. a) un ensemble de situations et de relations humaines évoluent dans le temps de manière normale, régulière et satisfaisante pour celui qui les organise : L'entreprise de Jean marche bien, ses affaires marchent [ici la substitution de aller n'est possible que pour un sujet abstrait, et encore, pas sans complément, mais pas pour un sujet animé : Comment vont les affaires de Jean ? — Elles vont bien ! Elles marchent bien ! elles marchent !* elles vont — mais Comment va Jean ? Il va bien!*Il marche bien il marche]. b) (fam.) un être humain entre inconsciemment dans la machination de celui qui le manipule, à la satisfaction de celui-ci. Il croit naïvement ce qu'il lui dit, accepte ce qu'il lui propose : Paul raconte à Jean les histoires les plus invraisemblables, Jean marche toujours ! — Paul a fait une proposition à Jean ; Jean a marché dans la combine !
One may be surprised that this article includes not two but three main sec tions. This is because I am particularly partial to transitional uses, which confound atomistic lexicologists, and which I make a principle of highlighting. Now the motor vehicle, which presents the twofold characteristic of moving in space and of being a machine, provided me with an ideal transition between the spatial and the non-spatial uses of the verb marcher. I deliberately say "spatial" and not "concrete", "non-spatial" and not "abstract", so as not to be encumbered with con crete machines, abstract business matters and human beings concrete in some res pects and abstract in others. But it is quite obvious that the uses of "marcher" in I involving ground featuring various degrees of hardness, and limbed animals, are "concrete", and that the uses in IE are much more abstract. Further clarification could also be provided, at the risk of becoming so mewhat ponderous, about the relation between the full meaning of the verb marcher and its subducted meaning "fonctionner" ("to work"), which, according to the PR, is defined as "accomplir une fonction" ("to carry out a function"), which function is defined as "action, rôle caractéristique d'un élément dans un ensemble" ("action, characteristic role of an element within a set"). To be quite clear, it might have been advisable to introduce, in definition I.1. — at the risk of drawing protests from a few learned biologists — (hard luck for them! our definition is a purely linguistic matter, and does not come under the philosophy of science) the finalistic notion that feet are made for walking and that the walking animal causes them to fulfill the role ordained for them by the Creator, in the same way, (with subduction) as a machine "marche" ("works") or "fonctionne" ("functions") when it does that which its maker created it to do.
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Thus it is clear that, whenever possible, as in this case, I refuse the homo nymic solution and adopt a polysemous one. This is for two reasons, one nega tive, one positive : The negative reason is that this presents no drawbacks. I fail to see in what way a foreign user wishing to make sure that in such and such a context he can or must use the verb marcher should be any more confused by a single article divided into three sections than by three unconnected articles. The positive reason is that the whole is prior to and superior to the part and that the definition of each acceptation is improved by considering the polysemy as a whole. This type of definition substitutes intelligibility for absurdity. Instead of saying to himself "How irritating all these homonyms are !" the foreign user will be able to see the shaping of a symbolism of the verb marcher proper to the French language and as a result he will be able to enter more deeply into the language he wishes to acquire. It is now time to turn to the second part of this paper on "continuous defi nition", its basis, its resources, its limits and, I shall add, its specificity. 2.
Basis, resources and limits of a "continuous definition"
2.1. Basis The method used is inspired by Gustave Guillaume from whom I have bor rowed several theoretical concepts, of which it may be useful to clarify the termi nology : From section I 1 to section III 2, there is a continuous movement of thought which I call "kinetism". This movement may be held up at various points of its development, these interceptions being named "prehensions". Acceptation I (to move by means of the feet) is semantically the richest, I qualify it as the "full prehension", acceptation III 2 "to produce the desired effect" is semantically the poorest. I qualify it as a "subducted prehension". The semantic mechanism which comprises the full acceptation, the most subducted acceptation and the kinetism which unites them is the "potential signifícate" which then gives rise to the "actual significates", theoretically unlimited in number, corresponding to the various "prehensions" and to varying degrees of subduction. This outlook is dynamic ; it implies the existence of simple, deep-seated and unconscious mechanisms of tongue, which give rise to numerous and in finitely varied discourse effects ; it implies too, that the mechanisms of tongue can be reached by induction from the discourse effects. The diversity of these ef fects, the multiplicity of their contexts and of the synonyms which can be sugges ted for them, is not an objection to the theory of continuity. The validity of a pro position for a potential signifícate can be tested by its ability to account for all the uses listed for the word, and if necessary, to integrate new ones, and secondly by
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its specificity and the fact that it is inapplicable to any other word in the language. My humble experience in this field confirms my intuition that this is possible : I have never come across two words having the same potential signifícate. Consequently when one discovers (or thinks one discovers) the potential signifícate of a polysemous item, one should take care to write the definitions of the different acceptations in such a way that the transition from one to the other becomes intelligible as much in terms of syntax as in the designation of the semes. After this the synonymous definitions may be brought in, enabling the acceptation under consideration to be situated within a paradigm of interchangeable words. 2.2. Resources The mechanisms of subduction which ensure the continuity of numerous polysemous systems can proceed from richer concrete to poorer, or from concrete to abstract, or from richer abstract to poorer abstract. One of the main assets of these mechanisms is to elucidate the transition from the concrete uses to the abstract ones. The former, denoting particular and specific realities, can be defi ned by semes themselves definable by a long chain of arborescent definitions be fore reaching the layer of semantic primitives ; the latter, definable by a small num ber of semes, bordering the layer of semantic primitives and denoting general ideas, are like impoverished calques of the concrete uses. Metaphor, whether a genuine living figure, or whether lexicalized, is es sentially accountable for by this type of explanation. As they take their place in the shuttle between full meaning and subducted meaning, numerous fixed expressions, in which the word under consideration cannot be substituted for any other, show up hidden semantic features, and take their logical place in the ordering of meanings. Finally, the notion of kinetism fixes a compulsory order of acceptations, guaranteeing intelligibility, and this is not the least of its contributions. The example of the verb marcher has been chosen for reasons of simplicity. But the continuity of the acceptations of a polysemous item functioning by subduction is not necessarily similar to a row of trees along a road, with lines of perspective flowing towards the horizon ; it can also be compared to the rays of a star in relation to the centre, without any circumference linking them together. In other words, some items have several kinetisms proceeding towards very dif ferent subducted meanings. In this case, the ordering of the acceptations is freer than in the previous instance, but it remains essential to bring to light the paralle lism between subducted meanings and full meanings through the wording of the definitions. The full prehension is normally very rich, and may even never be completely realized in discourse. In this case I prefer to use the term "semantic ar-
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chetypes". This is true in particular of important concrete words, denoting natural realities, parts of the human body, and certain animals. 2.3. Limits Not all polysemous systems can be explained by subduction mechanisms. Some of them do not feature any degree of kinetism. This is the case in words of which the various acceptations have only a small number of semes in common ( in extreme cases a single one) which feature either as "genus" or as "specific diffe rence". In my Structures sémantiques du lexique français, I attempted to demons trate what made up the unity, in synchrony, of the polysemous items hôtel ("hotel", "mansion", "public building") and bureau ("office", "desk", "study", "board"). In the first example, I suggest the genus "bâtiment ayant une certaine importance et une certaine notoriété dans la localité où il se trouve, et abritant des êtres humains" (building of some importance and of some degree of recognition in the locality where it is situated, and sheltering human beings) ; after which it must be specified 1) that it is used to accommodate travellers, or 2) to house various administrative services, or 3) that it is a historical monument. A vague genus is thus specialized and enriched with extra semes by various established contexts. In the second example, which has an even greater tendency towards homonymy, va rious genera (a sort of table, a place of work, a set of people) have in common one specific difference : that of being dedicated to a non-leisure activity, involving pa perwork (or electronics) and organisation. There are even chain-like polysemous systems where one acceptation will have one or several semes in common with another acceptation, but not with all the others. Metonymy, whether a genuine living figure or whether lexicalized, is es sentially accountable for by this type of explanation. In cases such as these the lexicologist is much freer as to the order to adopt (although it is always preferable to proceed from the whole to the part, from grea ter to smaller, from the commonest to the rarest...) and as to the wording of his definitions. This indicates that this type of polysemy is not as strongly cohesive as the other. Experience proves that to insist upon weaving into the text of the defini tion a thread, of questionable thickness, linking one acceptation to another, some times gives strange results, more interesting from an etymological point of view than from a synchronic one. It thus appears that the homonymic solution is inevitable, or that it is found preferable for various reasons. The first type of polysemy (that of marcher) involves an experience of life seen through the mental structures of a certain linguistic community, one element of a greater "vision of the world", a spring of symbolism and poetry ever ready to burst out, or an original linking-up of concepts. In the second type, on the con-
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trary, (that of hôtel and bureau) the unifying principle is no more than a "common denominator", a sort of semic residue left behind by a disjunctive evolution. 2.4.
Specificity I shall attempt to situate this manner of defining polysemous items in relation to four others : that of Eleanor Rosch, that of R.Martin, that of Igor Mel'chuk and that of Charles Ruhl. * Eleanor Rosch. To my definition of acceptation I 1 it could be objected that there are irregular, abnormal and painful ways of walking. To this I shall reply that they are not prototypical and that consequently I have not to take this type of referent into account for a full definition. It is at the discretion of the speaker to produce in discourse sense effects at varying distances from the prototype, corresponding to "prehensions" at various points of "subduction". Am I therefore an adept of the theories of the American psycholinguist Eleanor Rosch, whose views have recently been expounded in an excellent book by G.Kleiber ? No, in spite of a few points of convergence. Her problem is that of categorisation. Which mental representations cor respond, in a certain society, to the various categories of referents? How can one account for the mechanisms of discrimination and generalisation which prompt the human mind to categorize and call the flying being which has just alighted on a branch animal, oiseau or moineau ("animal", "bird" or "sparrow") ? Her approach is based on socio-linguistic surveys. The result is less a definition of words than a description of their referents, of social and not encyclopaedic origin, rich in se mantic features, none of which are necessary, so that counter-examples occurring due to strict categorisation become harmless. It is a fact that my "full" definitions are "prototypical" and that my "prehensions", as they gradually eliminate different features, are not unlike Rosch's "degrees of typicality". But there are some major differences : My problem is not categorisation but polysemy. The semantic features which I retain in my definitions are dictated to me not by a survey on a representa tive sample of speakers, but by the taking into consideration of habitual occur rences, syntactic and lexical, idiomatic or otherwise, which the French language has woven around this word. The number of semantic features retained, indefinite in the first theory, is limited by phraseology in the second. The prototype theory is interesting essentially from a psychological point of view, and its linguistic repercussions are limited : this manner of processing meaning is referential and not differential, and fails to provide a universal model of lexical description. The method of the psychological test is suitable for little more than the intermediate categories of nouns with concrete referents : natural and man-made objects corresponding to what Aristotle called "species", but not for
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"genera" or for "sub-species". Abstract nouns and grammatical categories other than nouns are more or less refractory. It leaves no place for figures, for the fun damental linguistic phenomena of metaphor and metonymy. In short, it tends to take words for labels stuck onto the real world. A dynamic vision of the sign, on the contrary, held to be relatively inde pendant of its referents, enables one to suggest a "potential signifícate" for any word presenting a polysemy, regardless of its degree of abstraction or its place in a taxonomy, and can explicitate figurative meanings, the relation between concrete and abstract uses and the transition from one to the other. Hence a wider field of application and a more specifically linguistic approach : definitions of words, not of things. * Robert Martin treats the question of polysemy in Pour une logique du sens, in which, theorizing the habitual practice and terminology of dictionaries, in particular the metalinguistic indicators of "p.ext., p.rest., p.meton., p.anal., au fig." and by combining the criteria of "addition of semes", of "deletion of semes", of "modification" or "similarity of construction", of "restriction" or "extension" af fecting the subject or the objects of the verbs, he obtains the two large categories of "polysemy of meaning" and "polysemy of acceptation", subdivided into nume rous sub-categories, in such a way that according to him there are six different types of polysemy for the noun. This conception, well designed to satisfy logical minds, is based on a practice which has proved its worth over the past few centuries. To me, however, it appears deficient in two respects : firstly it assumes the "semes" used to define the words and their denomination to be uncontestable facts. Now, as we know, the number of distinctive semes which oppose one lexical unit to another of adja cent meaning depends on the number of these units and, the longer one makes the list — an open list in principle — of parasynonyms and antonyms, the more semes one discovers to integrate into the "sememe(s)" in question of the polysemous item under consideration. Moreover, a mine of "semantic features" hitherto generally unexploited can be found in the other "sememes" of the same polysemous item, as you have just seen with the example of marcher. Do they deserve to be called "semes", or should this term be reserved for the distinctive differential features which oppose parasynonyms? This point of terminology seems to me of little importance, and I think it would be convenient to call any element of meaning entering into a definition a "seme". Finally, semes are not expressed in a heaven-sent metalanguage, but with the words of natural language, which generally offers us, for a certain notion, a whole range of lexical possibilities, and the choice of one or the other of these
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possibilities is not without effect upon the coherence of the lexicographical treat ment of a polysemous item. Here thus are the two problems which the above theory has failed to solve. First problem : how, from amongst all the possible semes, is one to select the "right" semes, and how is one to denominate them in such a way as to elucidate the principle of unity one has detected (or thinks one has detected) through the va rious strategies of the analysis of meaning ? Second problem : the order in which one sets out the different sememes of a polysemous item is not without significance : there is a "right end" which one must hold if one wishes the skein to unwind correctly. Now the two metalinguistic indicators "par ext., par rest." in particular, as well as the operation of "subtraction" or "addition" of semes seem to be interchangeable in theory, whereas they certainly are not in reality. Semes are more like cells in a living organism than blocks in a building game ! Suppose you are responsible for the word terre ("earth"). I challenge you to construct an intelligible article starting with terre labourable ("arable soil") and terre à potier ("potter's clay") and, "par ext." and by "addition of semes" ending with the planet terre ("earth"). If one adopts the opposite order, everything becomes clear. How, then, among the different orders possible, is one to select the most intelligible? The theory in question fails to say or, more exactly, seems to consider the question resolved in advance by lexicogra phical tradition, and the order in which the different examples chosen are set out, indisputable. On these two points, I think I advance at least the beginning of a solution. * Igor Mel'chuk in his Dictionnaire explicatif et combinatoire du français contemporain, opposes "lexical items" : lexical units taken in a single specific acceptation, idiomatic or quasi-idiomatic, like lumière, coup de foudre, voie ferrée (light, stroke of lightning, railway), to "vocables" : set of all the "lexical items" of which the signifiers are identical and the significates directly or indirecly linked. The lexical item is the basic unit of description in the DECFC and the conditions of its use are examined with the greatest care and in the greatest possible detail. Grouping these together into "vocables" by means of "semantic bridges" is the very least of the author's worries, and he only does so when he notices the exis tence of semes common to two lexical items. But how has he chosen and denomi nated his semes ? This brings us right back to the problem referred to above. If he defines the parts with no consideration for the whole, the reconstructionof the whole will be largely determined by chance, and the parts stand a good chance of remaining "membra disjecta", which is in fact often the case, as one finds, for instance, in the DECFC, two separate lexical items, sur pied with no semantic
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bridge to the vocable pied, and one lexical item à la tête with no semantic bridge to the vocable tête, etc. One of his assistants, G. Dostie, at the congress of the Société de Linguistique Romane (1992) gave a paper, admirable in its kind, on the two lexical items je comprends ! and penses-tu !. She demonstrated their "discursive" as opposed to "descriptive" value by a study of their relation both to the situation of utterance and to the speaker, of whom they express the psychological state when faced with an element from the verbal or situational context, a reaction to circumstances about which he begins to think, quite comparable to that of zut ! voyons ! tiens ! ma parole ! écoute ! or better, to oui and to non, since these are illocutory acts of agreement or disagreement, of acceptance or refusal. After a study of their syntactic status, after putting them to various tests, and observing the principle of substitutability for the item defined she finally gave the following definitions of them : Je comprends ! : "J'exprime la croyance que la proposition, que je dégage de ton énoncé précédent, et que j'ai déjà évaluée, est vraie" (I express the belief that the proposition, which I infer from your previous utterance, and which I have already evaluated, is true). Penses-tu ! : "j'exprime la croyance que la proposition X, que je dégage de ton énoncé précédent, et que tu présentes comme possible, est fausse" (I express the belief that proposition X, which I infer from your previous utterance, and which you present as possible, is false). In the course of a discussion, I made her admit that she had no intention of establishing the least "semantic bridge" between these "lexical items" and the "vocables" penser and comprendre, because the speaker has not the slightest fee ling of a semantic kinship between these two units. After a night's reflexion I had a paper sent to her, written along these lines : Examples : (1) (1') (2) (2') (3) (3') (4) (4')
Ecoute, Jean, il faut partir ! (Jean ne réagit pas) Mais enfin, écoute-moi, écoute ce que je te dis, il faut partir ! Jean va réussir à son concours — Tu penses vraiment ce que tu dis ? Jean va réussir son concours — Tu penses ! — Penses-tu ! Jean a un mérite fou ! —Je comprends et je partage ton admiration Jean un un mérite fou ! —Je comprends ! Tu vois, Jean est dans le vrai pour telle raison—Non, je ne vois pas ! Voyons, réfléchis un peu ! ça se voit à l'oeil nu !
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Questions : I. Would you dare to say that (1) (2 (3) (4) and (1') (2') (3') (4') contain different and disconnected verbs, between which no semantic bridge is possible ? II. When a syntactician tells you : "verbs of which the subject is nonagentive cannot be passivated", as I have just heard, you accept this although the notion of "non-agentive subject" is completely unconscious for the non-linguistic speaker. Why, from me, do you not accept an explanation based on his linguistic subconsciousness, and why do you insist on his feeling the semantic link between two lexical items, which is moreover something highly subjective and variable from one subject to another ? If I receive an answer, I may have the opportunity of communicating it to you in another paper. * Charles Ruhl. About this last author, who is exploring a path very rarely followed these days, I shall only speak with precaution and reserve, because I only know his book On monosemy, a study in linguistic semantics through a long review by R. Landheer, and because between him and myself there is a major terminological obstacle since he calls "monosemy" what I call "polysemy". Having said this, I think I understand what he means because I went through that stage before reaching the theory I am expounding today. He postulates that words have a single meaning, general and highly abstract, which must be carefully distinguished from the contextual factors, which give rise to the multiplicity of meanings listed in dictionaries. Here I recognize the opposition between the "potential signifícate", a fact of tongue, simple, deep-seated and unconscious, and the discourse effects, infinitely numerous. The trouble is that in his analysis of the verb bear, this single meaning, which is supposed to unite all the uses in discourse is "so highly abstract that it becomes impossible to paraphrase it adequately". This reminds me of a paper that I gave at the beginning of my research on the verb voir ("to see"), at Robert Martin's seminar. To find the link between De ma fenêtre je vois le port (from my window I see the port) and L'histoire et la chimie ça na rien à voir ensemble (history and chemistry have nothing to do with each other), I found nothing better than the "highly abstract" notion of "relation", which afforded me a few well-deserved ironical remarks. Which transitive verb does not express the idea of "relation" ? and when several lexical items, likewise highly abstract, are to be found associated in the same sentence, one wonders what the context can contribute to each of them. It seems to me that the weak point of this type of explanation is that it treats the first of our two types of polysemous systems as the second, that it endeavours, for the powerful semantic machines that large polysemous items are, to establish a principle of static unity, a lowest common denominator, while in the case of
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these, kinetism, proceeding from the most complex to the most evanescent, is far more enlightening. Is this principle of dynamic unity an illusion or a truly fruitful explanatory principle, as I have the feeling ? This is what we shall see when I have finished exploring the meaning of particularly polysemous lexical words which are part of the first thousand on the list of decreasing frequencies in the TLF. This is what I am currently working on, with a single collaborator, with a view to elaborating a sort of dictionary, worded as simply as possible, aimed at serving as a basis for systematic teaching of vocabulary at all levels, starting from primary level, abroad and in the various countries of the French-speaking community, in particular in Africa.
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REFERENCES Dostie, G. La description sémantique de quelques expressions discursives en lexi cographie : "je comprends !" et "penses-tu !" dans le dictionnaire explicatif et combinatoire du français contemporain. A paraître dans les Actes du XXe Congrès international de la Société de Linguistique Romane, Université de Zürich, du 6 au 11 avril 1992 Douay, C. and D. Roulland. Les mots de Gustave Guillaume, vocabulaire technique de la psychomécanique du langage, Rennes : Presses Universitaires, 217 p. Dubois, J. et alii. 1966. Dictionnaire du français contemporain (DFC), Paris : Larousse, 1224 p. Dubois, J. et alii. 1975. Lexis, dictionnaire de la langue française, Paris : Larousse, 1950 p. Kleiber, G. 1990. La sémantique du prototype. Catégories et sens lexical, Paris : PUF, 199 p. Martin, R. 1983. Pour une logique du sens, Paris : PUF, pp. 63-83 Mel'chuk, I. 1984. Dictionnaire explicatif et combinatoire du français contemporain, recherches sémantiques (DECFC), vol. I, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 172 p. ; vol. II, ibid., 1988, 332 p. Picoche, J. 1986. Structures sémantiques du lexique français, Paris : Nathan, 154 p. Robert, P., A. Rey and J. Rey-Debove. 1987. Le Petit Robert, dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue française (PR), Paris : Le Robert, 2173 p. Ruhl, C. 1989. On monosemy, a study in linguistic semantics, Albany, NY : State University of New York Press, 299 p. Reviewed by R. Landheer, Journal of Pragmatics 15 (1991, febr.), pp. 210-215
THE CHALLENGES OF CONTINUITY FOR A LINGUISTIC APPROACH TO SEMANTICS CATHERINE FUCHS CNRS (URA 1234, University of Caen), France
0.
Introduction
For several decades linguistics has been marked by the predominance of discrete approaches. I refer in particular to hard-line structuralism, to the genera tive and transformational trends, and to the various ways of resorting to "classical" logical formalisms. In these approaches, continuity has no place : one works with classes of disjoint units or values, mutually exclusive, the characteri sation of which rests upon sets of necessary and sufficient conditions ; any attempt towards flexibility is seen as blurring the phenomena and leading to a drop in efficiency and scientific specificity. However, on the fringe of these mainstream trends, there have always been "dissidents", denouncing the "reductionism" of discrete processing methods (in particular in their hardest version, that of binary oppositions) advocating more flexible approaches to linguistic phenomena, and invoking more or less explicitly the notion of continuity. In Europe (these trends are probably not as well-known on the international scene as American schools), I shall quote in particular G. Guillaume's psychomechanics of language (with the notion of "kinetism") ; I shall also mention, in the domain of enunciative operations, the works of A. Culioli on the systems of non-binary values (the so-called "cam" model) and on the topology of "notional domains" ; I shall also refer, in the field of topology of languages, to the work of H. Seller's team at Cologne (the "UNITYP" theory). Since the last few years, it would appear that this marginal situation is in the way of undergoing a change : we are currently witnessing the emergeance of explicitly continuous methods of approach, particularly in the field of "cognitive linguistics (or semantics)" developing in the U.S.A. at a tangent from generativetransformational grammar. These various linguistic trends in favour of continuity themselves undergo cross-influences from theories which come from other horizons : in particular
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from logic (L. Zadeh's theory of fuzzy sets) and psychology (E. Rosch's theory of typicality ; the Gestalt theory). The fact remains that the notion of continuity is currently being put forward in the works of a variety of linguists, and is being invoked on all levels of lan guage analysis (I refer here to written language, without prejudice to works on oral speech, in particular on intonation). This is manifest in semantics proper, both lexical (cf. J. Picoche 1986 on the French lexicon, and herewith on the example of the verb marcher) and grammatical (cf. A. Culioli on the modality of pouvoir and H. Seiler on the relations of "participation"). But also on other levels, linked with semantics : the morpho-semantic level (when dealing with compo sitional mechanisms, and the fixing of expressions, one speaks of smaller or greater degrees of lexicalisation) the syntactic-semantic level (series of elemen tary conditions enable one to define the degrees of probability for occurrences of certain structures : cf. herewith G. Leech on the English structures "X's Y" and "the Y of X" ; see also G. Legendre 1989 and G. Legendre et al. 1990 on the unaccusativity of intransitive verbs) ; the pragmatic-semantic level (cf. G. Leech 1983 ch. 9 in which acts of language are treated as "scalar units" or C. Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1991 who invokes a "continuum" between question and as sertion acts ; likewise for the processing of figures of speech and non-literal mea nings : see for example G. Lakoff & M. Johnson 1980 on metaphors). As always, when a trend becomes a fashion, this new situation does not fail to bring with it some danger of fetishism. 1.
The linguistic phenomena
Let us note firsly that the phenomena which lead linguists to invoke conti nuity are generally located on the level of a semantic approach to language, and not on the level of reference to extra-linguistic facts. Indeed there seems to be a kind of intrinsic continuity in the world itself and in the perception of it, which is translated in language productions by phenomena of reference to the extra-linguistic, like : - the so-called "generality" phenomena : the naming of a referent corres ponds to varying degrees of precision, whether it be an object or a world situation (progressive precision being achievable by paradigms like the passage, for example, from genus to species : a tree —> a linden, or by syntactic means : a linden —> a silver linden —> a small-leafed silver linden —> etc.) ; cf. the example given herewith by R. Langacker : Something happened —> a person saw an animal—> a woman examined a snake—> a tall young woman carefully scrutinized a small garter-snake ; see also B. Pottier 1987 p. 307 : a knife—> an ivory flick-knife studded with rubies.
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- the so-called "referential vagueness" phenomena : for a given referent a certain denomination or qualification is more or less adequate (thus the word siège "seat" will be quite acceptable for a chair or an armchair easily identifiable as such, and less acceptable for a circular surface placed on a stand by way of a stool, and far less acceptable for a tree-trunk lying on the ground) ; see C. Fuchs 1986. - the indetermination phenomena (the unsaid, the implicit) : the semantic information communicated about a given event is more or less determinate (thus for example an utterance like Il est bien tôt "It is rather early" remains indetermi nate as to what time location point this anticipation is to be referred to : too early to get up (—> to get up on a day off —> to get up on a day off when the weather is bad —> etc.) ? too early to leave work (—> to leave work today —> to leave work today just when there is an urgent job to finish —> etc.) ? ; see R. Martin 1985 p.149. The active factor here is the infinite scale of communication situations and conceptualizations : this type of continuity (if indeed there is continuity) is not in language ; quite on the contrary, language resorts to discrete processes to construct "reference points" on this continuity : cf. R. Langacker herewith. In contrast with that extra-linguistic continuity, continuity invoked as speci fically linguistic is that which is involved in conceptualizing the world via lan guage, i.e. which is located on the level of meaning (and not on the reference le vel) and which concerns the link between signifiers and significates, between markers and underlying linguistic-cognitive operations. This level is generally considered to include : - so-called "semantic vagueness" phenomena : the signifícate of a sign (discrete by definition) is subject to varying degrees of "amplitude" (to use the ex pression of B. Pottier 1987), whether the sign be in antithesis to another (like tall / short) or whether it be a polymorphous sign, the meaning of which will be sha ped by the context (like the preposition de in French). - polysemy phenomena (distinct as such from cases of alternative ambi guity between two mutually exclusive significates) : the meaning of a single sign can be described in terms of a plurality of non-disjoint significates, whether it be a lexical morpheme like marcher (cf. J. Picoche herewith) or like cut (cf. D. Touretzky herewith) or a grammatical morpheme like the French adverb encore (cf. B. Victorri & C. Fuchs 1992) or like the English preposition over (cf. G. Lakoff 1987 pp. 416-461). Polysemy phenomena also include shifts of meaning in synchronic or diachronic usage of a sign, and figurative uses of a sign. - phenomena of semantic continuity within grammatical categories (categories of time, aspect, modality, quantification-determination, predication) :
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the values corresponding to the different markers of these categories are not dis joint (cf. herewith H. Seiler on predication) and it is possible to describe in topo logical terms the effects of continuity and discontinuity which characterize them (cf. herewith A. Culioli on pouvoir). Having made this distinction, it is nonetheless necessary to add that the boundary between the different phenomena mentioned above is not intangible : as J.M. Sadock 1986 notes, the boundary between generality, vagueness, polysemy and non-literal meaning is itself "fuzzy", that is, hable to variations ; this variabi lity, which depends on the metalinguistic demands one makes on the description, can be explained in terms of the different levels of interpretive depth (further de tails to follow). Let us add that linguistic continuity mainly concerns the link between signi fier and signifícate, but it can also concern the identification and categorization of the signs themselves (cf. herewith P. Le Goffic). 2.
Underlying problematics
For a number of linguists using the term, "continuity" does not have a pre cise mathematical meaning ; as D. Kayser notes herewith, it often indicates a kind of dissatisfaction towards the more rigid classical discrete approaches. Should lin guistic science remain at this stage of intuitive — if not to say magical — incanta tions, it would run the risk of offering literature of a merely allusive type : meta phorical, non falsifiable, i.e. ultimately unscientific (however perceptive the in sight may be) ; this risk seems very real to me, as much for psychomechanics as for cognitive semantics — in this respect the reaction of R. Langacker in favour of the discrete is very significant. It is therefore necessary that the status of these references to continuity should be clarified from a formal point of view. However, before being in a posi tion to specify technically what mathematical continuity(ies) linguists are referring to, and within what type of modelisation (continuous or not) the different pheno mena they describe should be placed (these questions I shall leave to specialists), it seems to me that there is some necessity to clarify the problematics that underlie this appeal to continuity. They appear to be of two major types, namely, proble matics of graduality and problematics of movement. The first order of problems concerns facts of graduality : given two fixed points A and B represented as mutually exclusive locators, linguists are confoun ded by the existence of intermediate points, which lead them to think that there is not a total discontinuity between A and B but a gradual transition from one to the other, by a series of small successive jumps.
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The status of the intermediate points differs depending on the domains and the authors. In some cases they can be strict intermediaries, i.e. points distinct from A and B (here the term "gradient" is used, as by D. Bolinger 1961, to refer to a "scale of degrees" between A and B conceived as the two extreme "poles" of this "continuity"), in other instances they can be undecidable cases, partaking both of A and of B (here the term "fuzzy" boundary is used, as by L. Zadeh, between A and B, setting up a sort of mixed zone). The question of the finite or infinite, countable or uncountable characteristics of the intermediate stages, is ra rely brought up as such ; in practice, more often than not a finite number of inter mediate stages is deemed satisfactory. In actual fact it can be said that the problematic of graduality is nevertheless very often dealt with in discrete terms : A and B are generally each broken down into a set of more elementay features (particles or parameters), enabling one to de fine the relative similarities and differences between the different points of the gradient by means of characterisation of the "fuzzy" cases in terms of smaller or greater numbers of characteristic features of A and / or B possessed by each of the intermediate points. As I shall attempt to show later, the problematic of gra duality does not, in itself, compel the invocation of continuity, unless one wishes to contrast cases of graduality with cases of discontinuity. Let us note furthermore that facts of graduality can be processed in terms of probability (cf. for example G. Leech herewith). Continuity is also invoked in the name of a second type of problematic, which is that of a movement, conceived as imprinted in the very essence of lan guage : it is considered that, in tongue, units intrinsically possess the property of scanning in a dynamic way, a trajectory linking certain points, and that it is this very trajectory that constitutes their meaning. What is then challenged in the clas sical discrete aproaches is the static character of the semantic representations which they impose. This idea of dynamics can be invoked to characterize the meanings of units of tongue (lexical or grammatical markers, syntactic constructions) both in syn chrony (to describe the field of their semantic values) and in diachrony (to ac count for the historical shifts from one semantic value to another). Particularly illustrative in this respect is Gustave Guillaume's theory of psychomechanics : the basic notions of this theory are that of "kinetism" ("oriented dynamics underlying every linguistic phenomenon (...) the semiology of tongue in fact represents not states but movements which, intercepted by the momentary aim of speech, then determine particular sense effects", C. Douay & D. Roulland 1990, pp. 45-46) (our translation, C. Fuchs), that of the "radical bi nary tensor" ("the form of language consists in the setting up of an abstract rela tion between two adverse terms ; the dynamic character of the systems, which cor-
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responds to a two-way scanning of this binary relation, stems from the fact that the systems are responsible for representing thought in movement (...) the term of tensor refers to the operative nature of these movements as they shift successively from tension to distension", ibid. p.186) and that of "operative time" ("thought, in order to institute into language its own processes, and thus avoid having to perpe tually improvise its means of expression (must) mark and signify the stages of its progression. Operative time in system represents the patterned scanning carried out by thought and, in accordance with this marking, undergoes signifying inter ceptions which are its articulations (...) operative time is held to be the dynamic vector of 'genesis'", ibid. pp. 184-185). In a perspective strongly inspired by psychomechanics, let us also mention B. Pottier (1980, re-ed.1992, pp. 35-44) who classifies semantic categorizations of natural languages into five main dyna mic models, two of which are qualified as "continuous" (repectively "continuous binary" and "continuous ternary"). One notices that in this dynamic approach to semantics the questions of graduality bear a certain relevance, insofar as "prehensions" (or "interceptive cuts") are seen to operate in speech (i.e. when effective values are constructed in context) : these cuts may in principle be located at any point of the movement, thus defining a — theoretically — infinite number of intermediate stages between the two extreme points (or "maximised" positions) of the tensor. In many instances G. Guillaume insists upon the countlessness of the cuts, "the number of which — great, and historically greater and greater — tends theoretically towards the in finite, in the absence of any assignable limit" (1964, re-ed. 1969, p. 205) (our translation, C. Fuchs) : "Representations in tongue, limited in number, precede acts of expression, unlimited in number, which they make possible and condition" (ibid. pp. 149-150) (our translation, C. Fuchs). He notes in particular that these cuts can correspond to referentially opposite effects (cf. his famous example : L'instant d'après, le train déraillait "A moment later the train derailed" which can be interpreted as il aurait déraillé, si....(etdonc il n'a pas déraillé) "it would have derailed, if... (and therefore it did not derail)", or as il a effectivement déraillé "it actually derailed"). Another theory which is representative of this problematic of movement in language (and which aims to reach a much more operational level) is A. Culioli's theory of enunciative operations (cf. 1990 and herewith). The author describes with particular emphasis the "intuitive geometry" concealed in language, both on the level of categories (i.e. sets of markers) which, like for example aspect or modality, define a genuine "semantic topology" (cf. the notions of the open or closed "interval", of the "boundary" and of the "last point") and on the level of the set of values which can be associated with each marker (which can be qualified
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as a "distortion area", producing effects of contiguity and effects of disconnec tion). 3.
Arguments : the example of polysemy
In themselves, the two problematics which have just been referred to, both that of graduality and that of movement, do not by any means necessitate conti nuous processing : discrete linguistic analysis processes are perfectly appropriate, as are modelisations based on discrete formalisations (much less "costly" in many respects, than formalisms based on continuity). Setting aside at this stage the question of formalisation, I would like to com pare, on strictly linguistic grounds, the discrete perspective with the continuous, and put forward a few arguments in favour of the latter. As an illustration, I shall take the example of polysemy processing. To describe the semantic behaviour of a polysemous item, linguistic analysis begins classically by "marking out the meanings", which consists in the systema tic classification of the different meanings of the item : the finite list of separate meanings theoretically observable in actual contextual function thus becomes the set of potentialities of tongue (for a criticism of this process of backward invest ment of the tongue signifícate through the discourse effects, see M. Launay 1986). On the basis of such a channelling of meanings there are two possible ways of conducting linguistic analysis, while remaining on discrete grounds, which I shall call respectively "homonymic reduction" and "static polysemy". Homonymic reduction consists in processing as as many distinct units the different meanings (or the different syntactic-semantic behaviour patterns) of the item : for instance the verb marcher (as in the Lexis dictionary quoted herewith by J. Picoche) is treated as having a first unit marcher 1 (meaning "to progress by moving the feet one after the other") a second unit marcher 2 (meaning "to work" or "to make progress") and a third unit marcher 3 (meaning "to give one's accep tation") or again the verb devoir (cf. H. Huot 1974) as having a first unit devoir 1 (behaving as a full verb and signifying obligation) and a second unit devoir 2 (behaving as an auxiliary and signifying probability). This process of reducing polysemy to homonymy is all the easier to adopt as the item lends itself in addition to an effect of referential dissociation, i.e. allows distinct referents to be pinpoin ted (this in particular is the case for nouns referring to totally dissociated "concrete" referents like hôtel and bureau quoted herewith by J. Picoche). Let us say that differences (referential or syntactic, depending on the case) tend to prevail over semantic similarities (i.e. over the kinship of the significates) : the unity of the sign is negated and split up — itemisation is at a maximum ; this attitude is currently prevalent in a number of formal works, notably in computational
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lexicography, where "homonymic degrouping" is systematically practised (cf. G. Gorcy 1990). Static polysemy, on the other hand, attempts to describe the kinship bet ween the different meanings of the item, to clarify the relations which link them and to map out a kind of route, an itinerary, which makes the transition possible from one point (i.e.from one meaning) to another. This is being done in componential semantics, for example, in terms of addition and / or deletion of elemen tary semantic features known as "semes" (cf. R. Martin 1972 and 1979 or F. Rastier 1987). This process, motivated by the desire to uphold the unity of the linguistic sign, does make use of a certain notion of movement (a transition is im plemented from one meaning to another), which nevertheless remains within a discrete conception, i.e. like a succession of jumps between a finite number of states. The difficulties met with by these discrete approaches to polysemy include on one hand the number of meanings retained, and on the other the order in which one chooses to present them. In just the same way as dictionaries, linguistic stu dies give for the same items descriptions varying as to the number and order of the meanings. It is a well-known fact that the more acute the analysis becomes (i.e. in proportion to the raising of the level of the interpretation demand) the greater the number of meanings (or acceptations of meanings) becomes, and the more diffi cult it becomes to determine whether the new shades of meaning detected consti tute distinct meanings ; this brings a risk of atomisation, which if not undefined, is at least very far-reaching, and particularly detrimental in the case of homonymic reduction (where this atomisation leads to a proliferation of the units themselves). Moreover, the setting out of a "map of meanings" in static polysemy imposes very strict constraints : the choice of a starting point (the meaning considered as the "first" or "basic meaning"), the laying down of a single oriented itinerary linking all the points, and the impossibility of intermediate stops between two points. The acknowledgment of these difficulties implies that the variability of the stopping points and of the itineraries (i.e. of the meanings and of the links bet ween them) far from revealing a deficiency in linguistic analysis is on the contrary an integral part of the object under description, it manifests the pliability, the se mantic malleability inherent in linguistic units, and, proportionately, in the diver sity of the interpretation demand thresholds : "As the observer shows deeper in sight and sagacity, the discourse categories which he believes he can discern, pro liferate without a term being able to be assigned to this proliferation" (G. Guillaume op.cit. p. 206) (our translation, C. Fuchs). One possible way to integrate this variability into semantic analysis itself is to adopt a continuous outlook, in this case what I shall call dynamic polysemy.
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Let me emphasise the fact that the transition to a continuous dynamic repre sentation of polysemy constitutes, with regard to observable data, a jump or a kind of "theoretical bet". As several linguists note herewith (H. Seiler, G. Leech, J. Picoche), continuity cannot be observed in linguistic data, nor even deduced from it : what is visible on the macroscopic level of observables are discrete reference points. The transition to continuity is tantamount to proceeding to a microscopic, not directly observable level, on which a theoretical structure is suggested, the aim of which is to account, in a more precise way, for certain observed behaviour patterns. In the field of polysemy, a continuous dynamic approach (like, for example, that proposed by the Laboratoire ELSAP : cf. C. Fuchs & P. Le Goffic 1983 / 1985, C. Fuchs & B. Yictorri (eds.) 1988, B. Victorri & C. Fuchs 1992) amounts to processing the movement as primary and the stops on this mo vement as secondary and variable — a concept which, as can be seen, concurs with G. Guillaume's intuition concerning "kinetism" in tongue and the possible diversity of the "cuts" in discourse. The important point is probably not so much that of the countable or countless number of stopping points (i.e. of meanings) as that of their smaller or greater extension : the meaning of a polysemous item can be conceived not as a finite list of inter-linked meanings but as a "potential" of meanings in context, able to be represented as a multidimensional "semantic space" in which the meanings in context cover smaller or greater regions and the interpretation process can then be described as the movement which, relative to the contextual elements, constructs a dynamic upon this space (cf. modelisation suggested by B. Victorri 1988). From the point of view of linguistic theorization, the advantage of such a conception of polysemy (based on dynamic continuity) is that it enables cases of graduality to be opposed to cases of non-graduality. Linguistic observation of attested textual corpora (the only means of escaping the narrow framework of artificially manufactured examples) actually enables the following theoretical si tuation to be formalized : it occurs that two semantic values A and B which, in certain contexts, function as mutually exclusive, thus being able to give rise to alternative-ambiguities, function in other contexts as compatible on the interpre tation level (depending on the cases, they are neutralized into a neutral value, or blended into a resulting mixed value, or else indistinguished into an under-deter mined value) : cf. P. Le Goffic 1981, C. Fuchs 1988, C. Fuchs 1991a ; contex tual factors thus exist, some of which cause the interpretation to "tilt", in such a way that a discontinuity (a "catastrophe point") is introduced between A and B, while others, on the contrary, lead to a continuity between the same values A and B. Let us take as an example, the two values of the French adverb encore known respectively as "repetitive" (ex. Tu as encore fait une bêtise. "You've been
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up to something again") and "durative" (ex. Quand je suis entré, il était encore endormi. "When I came in he was still asleep"). These two values function as mu tually exclusive in ambiguous contexts like Je suis triste car elle a encore un petit linge autour de la cheville. "I feel sad because she (still ?) has a bandage around her ankle (again ?)". (The English translations "again" and "still" convey respecti vely the two above mentioned values — the ambiguity thus disappears in the translation) or like // a encore les quatre as. "He (still ?) has the four aces (again ?)." (Is a fresh card game being played in which he was dealt the four aces again, or is the same game being continued, in the course of which he still has the four aces he had initially ?). But in other contexts these two same values are not opposed to each other, so that it is not necessary to choose between the two when interpreting the utterance ; thus there is a neutralisation of the two values in Quelques averses se produiront encore, plutôt près des côtes "A few showers will (still) occur (again) in coastal areas" (Whether one undersands that "Fresh sho wers will occur" or "Showers will continue to occur" makes no difference, owing to the indefinite quantification of the subject), whilst over-determination (i.e. a blending effect of the two values) occurs in C'est une foule de la Chine, je la revois encore dans les images de la prospérité de maintenant. "It is a crowd from China, I can (still ?) see it (again ?) in the images of present prosperity" (it is at once and undissociably "I can see it again" and "I continue to see it") and underdetermination in La petite chienne, frémissante et extasiée : "Encore ! Encore ! Oh ! que j'ai peur !" "The little dog, trembling and ecstatic : Again ! Again ! (More !More ! ?) Oh ! how afraid I am !" (is the process repeated or continued ? In this case, the reference point is below the interpretation threshold at which the question can be raised). One notes incidentally that effects of over-determination are reminiscent of blending processes which function in puns, portmanteau words and in metaphors. Systematic linguistic analysis of contextual factors shows that the discon tinuities which polarize two values A and B by creating between them an effect of discontinuity cannot be described in strictly quantitative terms in a merely compositional outlook. Indeed, although discontinuity can be created by the interplay of several converging factors inducing in a "strong" manner a change of meaning, it also occurs that a very slight modification bearing upon a single factor is sufficient to induce such a change : this is the case, for example, in the transi tion from Tu t'es encore levé à 3h du matin ! "You got up at 3am again !" (repetitive) to Tu es encore levé à 3h du matin ! "You are still up at 3am !" (durative). It also happens that in a conflict between diverging factors, two "weak" factors override a "strong" competitor and thus cause the interpretation to shift. Let us consider, to illustrate this point, the following examples : in II s'est encore plaint "He complained again", the "passé composé" constitutes a strong
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factor in favour of the repetitive value ; in II s'est encore plaint après son départ "He complained again after his departure", this strong factor overrides the adver bial après son départ which tends nonetheless — weakly — to induce a durative value ; in II s'est encore plaint pendant une heure, "He (again ?) complained for an (other ?) hour" the adverbial pendant une heure constitutes a slightly stronger factor than the preceding adverbial in favour of the durative value which however remains less plausible than the repetitive (the influence of the "passé composé" remaining dominant) ; finally in // s'est encore plaint pendant une heure après son départ "He complained for another hour after his departure" the merging of two weak factors in favour of the durative value overrides the strong opposing factor constituted by the "passé composé". Let us note that the choice of continuity has common points with certain conclusions both in the theory of typicality, in questions of categorization, and in the Gestalt theory.The meanings marked out at the outset as relatively stable fixed reference points, occur in fact as maximum accumulation points cor responding in some way to particularly salient typical values (cf. C. Fuchs 1991b). J. Lyons notes on this subject that componential analysis is not "a tech nique for the representation of all and only the meaning of lexemes" but "a way of formalizing that part of their prototypical, or focal, meaning which they share with other lexemes" (1981, p.84). These typical values are constructed, through the action of contextual factors, as "well-formed patterns" (Gestalten), which show semantic stability owing to the converging of factors (all the factors "draw" the interpretation in the same direction) ; thus for example in On me fit encore le coup cinq ou six fois "The trick was again played on me five or six times" the lexical verb type (terminative punctual process), the tense (simple past with aoristic value) and the adverbial (which conveys a plurality of discrete occur rences) are three converging factors in favour of the repetitive value of encore ; li kewise in Or tandis que la transformation s'opérait, on ignorait encore son existence "Now, while the transformation was taking place, its existence was still unknown", the lexical verb type (stative non-terminative process), the tense (imperfect with value of non-accomplished) and the adverbial of time (marking a non-bounded reference interval) constitute three converging factors in favour of the durative interpretation of encore. On the contrary, intermediate meanings, va riably difficult to characterize and to delimit, illustrate various types of semantic "blurring" corresponding to non-typical and unstable semantic values, constructed by a set of conflicting factors which draw the interpretation in different direc tions (cf. examples above).
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Conclusion The issues raised by continuity in semantic linguistics interface ultimately with the great issues of general linguistics. In synchrony, the Saussurian opposition between "tongue" and "speech" (or "discourse" in Guillaume's terms) appears in the problematics of continuity and discreteness. On the one hand, the continuous movement in tongue is contras ted with discrete cuts in speech ; but on the other hand, the finiteness of potentials in tongue is contrasted with the infinitude of possible effects in speech : the use of the system of signs, largely discrete, (but bearing within itself— as we have seen — continuity) by subjects in enunciative situations, and in a given speech context, is itself carried out within a continuous area of interplay, of shifting and distor tion. What is at stake here is the communicational dimension of language, and subject-to-subject adjustment. In diachrony, continuity appears as the actual condition for the evolution of the system as it undergoes the influence of various "antagonistic tensions" (in the words of P. Le Goffic 1988 and herewith). Here, clearly, continuity mani fests the living and evolutionary character of the language system, the items of which can undergo genuine processes of "semantic drifting" which cannot be ex plained in a discrete perspective. Finally, it should be recalled that another question central to the debate is that of the arbitrary nature of the sign : champions of continuity in linguis tics tend to emphasise the relativity of the theory of the arbitrary nature of the sign. Thus, one of the supporters of cognitive semantics, C. Vandeloise (1991, pp.9394) defends the theory of "motivation of grammatical categories". As he rediscusses L. Bloomfield's analysis (1933) of the opposition (arbitrary in the latter's eyes) between wheat (singular) and oats (plural), he invokes the "continuum which proceeds, from mass bodies like sand, made up of an infinity of small par ticles impossible to distinguish from each other, to entities like spinach (Fr. épinards — plural), composed of easily discernable identical parts which, however, taken separately, do not have (...) sufficient interest to be mentioned", and em phasises that "when a distinction within a continuous domain must divide it into two separate domains (...) the motivation is clear at the extremities of the conti nuum, (and) becomes more doubtful at its centre" : situated at the centre of the continuum, the two borderline-cases wheat and oats refer to cereals very much alike which nevertheless can be distinguished in that "it is wheat, with its elements more compact and less distinct, that is represented by a singular word, while oats, with its grains more scattered is represented in English by a plural word" (my translation, C. Fuchs). For another stand in favour of a certain motivation of the sign, see also B. Pottier (1980 re-ed. 1992, p.45).
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To end, we shall insist, as many authors of the present volume, upon the fact that continuity and discreteness constitute not so much two contradictory op tions as two modes of description which articulate and delimit each other — on the understanding, as R. Thorn recalls herewith, that it is always possible to materia lize discreteness upon a background of continuity, but not vice-versa : in this res pect, the emergence of continuity in semantic linguistics is a sign that a certain re cognition is being given to "the necessity of introducing, behind an apparently fixed structure, 'hidden' parameters of a kinetic order which explain its stability" (in the terms of R. Thorn 1974).
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REFERENCES
Bloomfield, L. 1933. Language, New-York : Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Bolinger, D. 1961. Generality, gradience and the all-or-none, La Haye : Mouton. Culioli, A. 1990. Pour une linguistique de l'énonciation : opérations et représentations, Paris : Ophrys. Douay, C. & D. Roulland, 1990. Les mots de Gustave Guillaume : Vocabulaire technique de la psychomécanique du langage, Université de Rennes 2 : Presses Universitaires. Fuchs, C. 1986. Le vague et l'ambigu : deux frères ennemis. Quaderni di Semantica, Bologna : Il Mulino, VII : 2, pp. 235-245. Fuchs, C. 1988. Représentation linguistique de la polysémie grammaticale. TA. Informations 29, Paris : Klincksieck, pp. 7-20. Fuchs, C. 1991a. L'hétérogénéité interprétative. In H. Parret (ed.), Hétérogénéités : ruptures, silences, ellipses, Paris : CNRS, pp. 107-120. Fuchs, C. 1991b. Polysémie, interprétation et typicalité : l'exemple de "pouvoir". In D. Dubois (ed.), Sémantique et cognition : catégories, prototypes, typicalité, Paris : CNRS, pp. 161-170. Fuchs, C. & P. Le Goffic. 1983/1985. Ambiguïté, paraphrase et interprétation. Modèles Linguistiques, Lille : Presses Universitaires, V : 2, pp. 109136/VII : 2, pp. 27-51. Fuchs, C. & B. Victorri (ed.). 1988. Vers un traitement automatique de la poly sémie grammaticale. TA. Informations, Paris : Klincksieck, 29. Gorcy, G. 1990. La polysémie verbale, ou le traitement de la polysémie de sens : discussion à partir des normes rédactionnelles du TLF. Cahiers de Lexicologie, XXX, 56 : 1/2, pp. 109-122. Guillaume, G. 1964, rééd. 1969. Langage et science du langage, Paris : Nizet, et Québec : Presses de l'Université de Laval. Huot, H. 1974. Le verbe "devoir" : étude synchronique et diachronique, Paris : Klincksieck. Kerbrat-Orecchioni, C. 1991. L'acte de question et l'acte d'assertion : opposition discrète ou continuum ? In C. Kerbrat-Orecchioni (ed.), La Question, Lyon : Presses Universitaires, pp. 87-111. Lakoff, G. 1987. Women, fire and dangerous things, University of Chicago Press.
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Lakoff, G. & M. Johnson. 1980. Metaphors we live by, University of Chicago Press. Launay, M. 1986. Effet de sens, produit de quoi ? Langages 82, Paris : Larousse, pp. 13-39. Leech, G. 1983. Principles ofpragmatics, London, New-York : Longman. Legendre, G. 1989. Unaccusativity in French. Lingua 79, pp. 95-164. Legendre, G., Y. Miyata, & P. Smolensky. 1990. Can connectionnism contribute to syntax ? Harmonic grammar with an application. Chicago Linguistic Society 261, pp. 1-15. Le Goffic, P. 1981. Ambiguïté linguistique et activité de langage. Thèse de Doctorat d'Etat de l'Université Paris VII. Le Goffic, P. 1988. Tensions antagonistes sur les systèmes : les rapports entre synchronie et diachronie. In A. Joly (ed.), La linguistique génétique : histoire et théories, Lille : Presses Universitaires, pp. 333-341. Lyons, J. 1981. Language, meaning and context, Fontana Paperbacks. Martin, R. 1972. Esquisse d'une analyse formelle de la polysémie. Travaux de Linguistique et de Littérature 10, Strasbourg, pp. 125-136. Martin, R. 1979. La polysémie verbale, esquisse d'une typologie formelle. Travaux de Linguistique et de Littérature 17, Strasbourg, pp. 251-261. Martin, R. 1985. Ambiguïté, indécidabilité et non-dit. In C. Fuchs (ed.), Aspects de l'ambiguïté et de la paraphrase dans les langues naturelles, Bern : Lang, pp. 143-165. Picoche, J. 1986. Structures sémantiques du lexique français, Paris : Nathan. Pottier, B. 1980, rééd. 1992. Théorie et analyse en linguistique, Paris : Hachette. Pottier, B. 1987. Seconde intervention à la table-ronde sur le vague. Quader ni di Semantica, Bologna : Il Mulino, VIII : 2, pp. 306-310. Rastier, F. 1987. Sémantique interprétative, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France. Sadock, J.M. 1986. Vagueness as a vague concept. Quaderni di Semantica, Bologna : Il Mulino, VII : 2. Thom, R. 1974. Modèles mathématiques de la morphogenèse, Paris : Bourgois. Vandeloise. Autonomie du langage et cognition. Communications 53, Paris, pp. 69-101. Victorri, B. 1988. Modéliser la polysémie. In C. Fuchs & B. Victorri (eds.), pp. 21-42. Victorri, B. & C. Fuchs. 1992. Construire un espace sémantique pour représenter la polysémie d'un marqueur grammatical : l'exemple de "encore". Linguisticae Investigationes, Amsterdam : Benjamins, XVI : 1.
PART II MODELLING ISSUES
WHAT KIND OF MODELS DO WE NEED FOR THE SIMULATION OF UNDERSTANDING ? DANIEL KAYSER University of Paris XIII (LIPN, URA 1507 CNRS), France
After having sketched the framework in which I wish to circumscribe the debate, I would like : - to show that the choice between discrete and continuous models for the re presentation of semantic information is not a matter of necessity as far as Natural Language is concerned ; - to explain that most of the arguments in favour of continuous models are actually arguments in favour of an (a priori unbounded) multiplicity of models, which by no means implies continuity ; - to stress some advantages that discrete models have over their continuous counterparts. 1.
The Framework
Natural Language Understanding is one of the most salient manifestation of Intelligence, and therefore, simulating this activity is a major challenge for Artificial Intelligence. However, understanding is not a process yielding a welldefined product ; nor is its completion a clear-cut event. A better goal, even if still not defined with absolute exactness, is to try to replicate the set of conclusions which are regarded as unproblematic by humans belonging to a given cultural group, when exposed to a short text. Psychological experiments could (and probably already do) confirm that for commonplace texts, there exist a large and stable amount of conclusions shared by every bona fide reader. The synthesis of a function : t e x t → s e t of c o n c l u s i o n s obviously requires intermediate steps. One of the usual steps is the translation of the text into some internal representation(s) from which an inference operator can be applied. The problem is whether this(these) representation(s) should be sought for under a discrete (e.g. formulas in a language) or under a continuous (e.g. functions operating on real numbers) form.
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Against Arguments of Necessity
We shall first argue that the issue is basically contingent, that is : some cri teria have to be defined, and experiments must tell which of the discrete or conti nuous models proposed so far — or which might be proposed in a foreseeable future— better satisfy these criteria. The discussion in this section will essentially be negative, i.e. we attempt to refute some of most typical reasons which have been given in favour of a necessary choice, whether for discreteness or for continuity. a) Ontological Arguments for Continuity The argument goes more or less like the following pseudo-syllogism : The world is continuous Language is about the world Semantic models must be continuous I believe there are at least five weaknesses in this way of reasoning : i) The world is continuous : a metaphysical commitment is hidden in this statement ; to be continuous is a property of a model, not of a physical entity ; unless we identify the world with a model, the statement is ill-formed. ii) Language is about the world : at best, language is about how we perceive the world, not about the world as it actually is (or, with respect to the above, as the current models of the world describe it). Therefore, our syllogism should read : We perceive the world as continuous Language is about the way we perceive the world Semantic models must be continuous iii) We perceive the world as continuous : this sentence is rather ambiguous ; does it mean that our perception organs provide us with continuous inputs (the elements of answer given so far by Neuroscientific evidence seem negative), or that our consciousness uses these inputs, whatever their nature, to obtain a phenomenal experience that has the features of continuity ? I am not certain that the latter sentence really makes sense. If it does, it clearly belongs to the realm of Psychology, where it might be backed up, e.g. by the experiments on mental rotation (Kosslyn 1980) ; but we must be very careful here not to confuse continuity with (possibly unbounded) multiplicity (this distinction will be presented in more details below in § 3). True continuity would suppose the ability, at least in principle, to recognize as distinct an infinite number of phenomenal experiences. iv) Language is about the way we perceive the world : this view is, at the very least, oversimplistic. Language is a convention, and therefore, even if we
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talk about what we perceive, this requires a transformation which might well affect the very nature of what is eventually talked about. The so-called SapirWhorf thesis went as far as to assert that linguistic conventions somehow regiment our perceptions. Even if the thesis sounds too extreme, it stresses the fact that the relation between perception and language is far from being a one-way mapping. To be more precise, I may use a sentence which clearly admits a continuous model, e.g. : (1)
the car is getting nearer
without having experienced any feeling of continuity : it may be the case that I me rely had two glimpses, from which I decided that (1) was the best way to reflect my perceptions. Conversely, even if there is such a thing as an experience of true continuity, I may choose to express it by a statement involving no "progressive" predicate (e.g. "it is brighter outside than inside"). v) Ergo, semantic models must be continuous. This reminds me of an argument given by Aaron Sloman some years ago : tornados are wet ; hence computer models of tornados should be wet too ! Obviously, a model must take into account some aspects of the phenomenon it is the model of, but it has not to replicate every aspect of that phenomenon ; otherwise, the only possible model would be identity, and the model would be totally worthless. Therefore, even if it was agreed upon that language reflects something continuous, this would not necessarily entail that the model of this thing should respect the feature of continuity. Another point might be timely at this point of the discussion : even conti nuous models are described in discrete terms ! The function f(x) = cos x where x e R is continuous, although it is easier to represented it by a (discrete) sequence of symbols than by a (continuous) two-dimensional curve. b) Ontological Arguments for Discreteness The argument here goes like this : Language is discrete The desired set of conclusions is discrete The intermediate steps must be discrete The premises can raise some objections : prosody is an important part of language, and it is not discrete ; membership in the set of conclusions is hard to decide by yes or no : a (possibly continuous) degree of confidence might better reflect human attitudes. However, the objections are not crucial : in most situations, the set of conclusions will not change whether the text is given in oral or in written form ; therefore the continuous aspects of the input hardly play a role in the phenomenon under investigation. Similarly, even if some reluctancy can be
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observed from some subjects towards some conclusions of the set, there seems to be an overall agreement on a sufficiently large subset for the graded membership problem to be safely ignored. What is however obviously wrong in the above reasoning is the jump to conclusions. It is often the case, in Operation Research, that in order to solve a problem on a discrete set, the solution of the same problem on a continuous set provides an invaluable help. Similarly as it were, in order to go from the literal in put "two thousands and eighty eight plus three hundreds and thirteen" to the literal output "two thousands four hundreds and one", the conversion into Arabic numerals might be appropriate ! The only lesson to draw from this discussion is that, if in order to go from the discrete to the discrete, a conversion into the continuous reveals necessary, there must exist strong arguments to justify this qualitative detour. c) Computational Arguments against Discreteness Let us briefly break down a last argument : Discrete models may receive a logical interpretation The kind of Logic required by the task is inherently incomplete Discrete models should be discarded Here again, there is nothing wrong in the premises. The inferences that we wish to perform could possibly be regarded as the deductive closure in some logi cal system. Clearly, Natural Language Semantics requires higher order Logics, which, since Gödel, are known to be inherently incomplete. The error is in the conclusion : no human being has ever been considered as "complete" and obtaining the set of conclusions generally agreed upon by humans does not require a complete theorem prover. Therefore, the incompleteness of the Logic has no impact on the feasibility of the task. 3.
Continuity versus Multiplicity
The discussion so far shows that no necessity forces the choice of the Semanticist towards either continuous or discrete models. The matter is therefore purely contingent. Which of these models — or which blend of them — will give the best results ? As will be discussed shortly, "best" can be understood in various ways. But let us first consider the more important issue of why continuity appears to so many scholars as an interesting candidate. We believe the appeal that continuity exerts on Semanticists to be more the result of a repulsion inspired by the philosophical truth-based theories, than by a genuine attraction to continuous functions. Now there are possibilities to reject
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these theories without embracing ipso facto a continuist point of view. In other words, there is more in discrete approaches than what the tradition has put into it. By "tradition", we henceforth mean the trend which extends, despite countless variants, from Montague and Davidson back to Russell, Wittgenstein's Tractatus, Frege ... and Aristotle ; this trend is described in various textbooks, e.g. (Cherchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990). Of course, if a position is taken that Semantics must describe "meaning" as, say, Botany describe plants, it is difficult not to concede that there must be some semantic support (the term of semantic space is already biased in favour of continuity) where meanings are "located", and that meanings behave in this sup port either in a discrete way (points, atomistic constructions, or whatever) or in a continuous manner (blobs with crisp or fuzzy boundaries, fields, etc.). There seems to be no third option. But, as any attempt so far to represent meaning yields paradoxes, we may question the basic postulate, i.e. wonder whether the construction of a semantic theory requires as a prerequisite to take "meaning" as an ontologically well-defi ned object. I have developped elsewhere (see, e.g. Kayser 1991) various argu ments concluding that meaning certainly is a convenient appellation in ordinary speech, but could not be a scientifically viable notion. Briefly summarized, the idea is that the requirements which seem normal to be expected from the meaning of a text, can only be met by the text itself. A metaphor — which must not be taken too seriously — consists in comparing meaning with fire. The early ideas that fire was an element (phlogiston) have had to be abandoned, and we now speak of the physico-chemical process of combustion ... but we still (rightly) use the word "fire" in our everyday life as if its reference was an object-like entity. Similarly, an object-like representation of "meaning" might work fairly well in coarse semantic theories, but we better forsake this view if we want to give account of the process of comprehension. Notice that the use of representations is not at stake here. The arguments developped in section 5 below can furthermore be understood as so many supports for a "representational" view of intelligence, contradicting thereby approaches such as (Brooks 1991) which promote the idea of intelligence without representations. What is at stake is whether any of the representations used for simulating the comprehension of a text deserves to be called the meaning of the text. Our ne gative answer allows us to open a third option into the debate, namely that using several representations, none of them pretending to be a representation of the meaning, could avoid both the paradoxes of discreteness and of continuity in a se mantic space. This explains the title of the present section : the repellent effect of
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the philosophical "tradition" in Semantics might lead, instead of choosing a continuous semantic support, to adopt a multiplicity of representations. Before comparing the merits of this view with the other options, let us delve a little more into its consequences. The problem that we tackle, viz. to go from a text to a set of consequences, can be solved if we find the right level where to factor out the inferential behaviour. There are obviously regularities in the problem,