Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
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Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
Controversies (CVS) Controversies includes studies in the theory of controversy or any of its salient aspects, studies of the history of controversy forms and their evolution, casestudies of particular historical or current controversies in any field or period, edited collections of documents of a given controversy or a family of related controversies, and other controversy-focused books. The series also acts as a forum for ‘agenda-setting’ debates, where prominent discussants of current controversial issues take part. Since controversy involves necessarily dialogue, manuscripts focusing exclusively on one position will not be considered.
Editor Marcelo Dascal
Tel Aviv University
Advisory Board Harry Collins
University of Cardiff
Frans H. van Eemeren
University of Amsterdam
Gerd Fritz
University of Giessen
Fernando Gil †
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris
Thomas Gloning
University of Giessen
Alan G. Gross
University of Minnesota
Geoffrey Lloyd
Cambridge University
Volume 8 Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind by Yaron M. Senderowicz
Kuno Lorenz
University of Saarbrücken
Everett Mendelssohn Harvard University
Quintín Racionero UNED, Madrid
Yaron Senderowicz Tel Aviv University
Stephen Toulmin†
University of Southern California
Ruth Wodak
University of Lancaster
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind Yaron M. Senderowicz Tel Aviv University
John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam / Philadelphia
8
TM
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Senderowicz, Yaron M. Controversies and the metaphysics of mind / Yaron M. Senderowicz. p. cm. (Controversies, issn 1574-1583 ; v. 8) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Philosophy of mind. 2. Metaphysics. I. Title. BD418.3.S46 2010 128’.2--dc22 isbn 978 90 272 1888 9 (Hb ; alk. paper) isbn 978 90 272 8791 5 (Eb)
2010019176
© 2010 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa
To the memory of Henry Chaim Ehrenberg Opatov, Poland 1917 – Knittlingen, Germany 2009
Table of contents Acknowledgments Introduction 1. Introduction 1 2. Rediscovering old truths in a new idiom 3 3. Metaphysics and metaphysical controversies 5 4. The Kantian approach to the problem 6 5. Metaphysical controversies and relevant alternatives 8 6. The structure of the book 11
xi 1
part one. Outline of a theory of metaphysical controversies chapter 1 The Kantian framework 1. Introduction 17 2. Metaphysics and Kant’s image of science 19 3. The required revisions 20 4. The modified framework 22 5. The first antinomy: The explicit argument 27 6. The first antinomy: The implicit argument 29 chapter 2 The idea of controversy and metaphysics 1. The limits of Kant’s theory 35 2. The nature of controversies as polemical dialogues 37 3. Presumptions and the burden of proof 40 4. Radically opposed views and chains of controversies 45 5. The addressee 50 6. Persuasion and the rational support of reasons 51 7. Epistemic function 52
17
35
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
chapter 3 Intuitions, thought experiments, and controversies 1. Introduction 59 2. Intuitions and beliefs 60 3. The fallibility of intuitions 63 4. The emendation of intuitions 64 5. Intuitions and the role of imagined ideal cases 66 6. Objectual imagining, propositional imagining, and imagining ideal cases 69 7. Imagined ideal cases and perception 70 8. Logical matters and “matters of fact” 72 9. Types of responses to conflicts of intuitions 74 10. Controversial relevant alternatives 75 11. Conclusion 77
59
part two. The knowledge argument chapter 4 The polemical character of the knowledge arguments 1. Introduction 81 2. Kripke’s modal argument for dualism as a polemical argument 82 3. Nagel’s argument 88 4. Jackson’s knowledge argument as a polemical argument 91
81
chapter 5 The antinomies of consciousness and their resolutions: Phenomenal concepts, representationalism, and two-dimensional semantics 97 1. Churchland’s response to the knowledge argument 97 2. Jackson’s response to Churchland 100 3. The causal efficacy of conscious qualitative states 103 4. The paradox of phenomenal consciousness 107 5. The phenomenal concepts strategy 109 6. Tye’s PANIC account of phenomenal consciousness 114 7. The knowledge argument and two-dimensional semantics 116 8. Mind and illusions 122 chapter 6 A priori knowledge and the explanatory gap 1. Introduction 125 2. Levine’s argument 126
125
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3. Jackson: Serious metaphysics and conceptual analysis 131 3.1 Entry by entailment 131 3.2 Conceptual analysis 133 4. Chalmers: Supervenience and scientific explanations 138 5. Block & Stalnaker’s attack 140 5.1 The arguments against the epistemic version 141 5.2 The apriority of reductive explanations and uniqueness 143 5.3 The explanatory gap and two-dimensional semantics 146 6. Chalmers & Jackson’s response 149 7. Chalmers’s two-dimensionalism refined 153 8. Conclusion 158 part three. Personal identity and revisionary metaphysics chapter 7 Personal identity, self-consciousness, and bodily identity 1. Introduction 161 2. Strawson’s Individuals 163 3. Williams: Personal identity and individuation 169 4. Shoemaker: Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity 173 chapter 8 From transcendental arguments to revisionary metaphysics 1. Wiggins: Relative identity and personhood 181 2. Shoemaker: Quasi-memory and revisionary metaphysics 187 2.1 Wiggins on identity 188 2.2 Persons and their pasts 190 chapter 9 Neo-Lockeanism, reductionism, and animalism: The emergence of a new debate 1. Introduction 197 2. Self-identity and self-concern 199 3. Parfit and “what matters” 202 4. Perry; identity and “what matters” 205 5. Wiggins’s animalism 211 6. Conclusion 218 Conclusion References Index
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221 225 233
Acknowledgments I began examining the role of metaphysical controversies in the history of philosophy and metaphysics when I was part of the research project “Controversies in the République des Lettres” supported by the German-Israeli foundation. I wish to thank the German-Israeli foundation for their kind support. In particular, I would like to thank my collaborators in this research project Marcelo Dascal, Gerd Fritz, and Thomas Gloning. Marcelo Dascal’s exemplary knowledge of the history of early modern philosophy and of current philosophy of science, language, and mind, and his uncompromising criticism of my early views led me to improve this book significantly. The inspiring and intensive discussions with Gerd Fritz and Thomas Gloning helped me to formulate the thoughts expressed in this book. These ongoing conversations indicate how fruitful and stimulating an interdisciplinary intellectual project can be. Noa Naaman-Zauderer read parts of this book and her thoughtful comments helped me to shape its final version. I wish to thank her for many years of intellectual friendship. I wish to thank Shai Frogel, Ofer Gal, Cristina Marras, and Tzachi Zamir for their stimulating contributions to the meetings at Tel Aviv University and at Giessen University. I wish also to thank Liora Bilski, Eli Friedlander, Gideon Freudenthal, Ido Geiger, Zoe Gutzeit, Hagi Kenaan, Michal Kirschner, Vered Lev-Kenaan, Ofra Rechter, and Assaf Weksler for helpful discussions. Finally, I wish to thank Ilona, Assi, and Noa. This book would not have been written without their love and support.
Introduction 1. Introduction Metaphysics is an ancient discipline. In the first half of the 20th century, many philosophers considered it an outmoded discipline. Overcoming metaphysics is a theme expressed in different ways by logical positivists as well as by ordinary language philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, and their followers. Yet, in the second half of the 20th century, metaphysics was revived in various branches of analytic philosophy and, in particular, in the philosophy of mind. As is well-known, the logical positivists’ anti-metaphysical stance resulted from their attempt to provide an account of meaning that, in their view, was faithful to the methods and practice of the empirical and exact sciences. Philosophy had to provide criteria of demarcation that could distinguish between “real” science and “pseudoscience,” that is, between science and metaphysics. Interestingly, the philosophers who revived metaphysics at least partly share the logical positivists’ view regarding what the tasks of philosophy were. Many of them, who happily accept the title of ‘metaphysician’ today, especially philosophers of mind, locate metaphysics in the epistemic space that includes the empirical and exact sciences, even if they seem to believe that metaphysics is a discipline that has its own subject matter, or at least its own mode of approaching it. Moreover, these rather surprising relations between science and metaphysics are in many cases the subject of disputes between metaphysicians – philosophers who combine in their philosophical reflections both metaphysical contentions and information derived from scientific theories – and those philosophers who deny that this approach to philosophy is sound. The reunification of science and metaphysics in one of the most influential branches of analytic philosophy deserves to be understood. What makes this reunification possible? Is metaphysics distinct from the empirical sciences, and in what ways? How is it possible to integrate metaphysical contentions with scientific knowledge? These questions are rarely asked by contemporary metaphysicians. The reunification is usually seen as a reasonable step in the development of analytic philosophy. Quine’s (1953) attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction and the verificationist criterion of meaning is often pointed out as a significant step towards combining metaphysical reflections and empirical inquiries. By
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
undermining the basis for the criteria of demarcation, Quine’s arguments seem to facilitate the reunion. Yet the same logical and epistemic ideas led some philosophers to question not only the adequacy of metaphysics, but of philosophy as a whole.1 Moreover, according to the philosophers who practice metaphysics, the rehabilitation of metaphysics was required partly due to what they regarded as the demands of an adequate semantics for natural languages, which involved reinstating the traditional modal distinctions between the necessary and the possible. Some of these philosophers, most notably Jackson (1998) and Chalmers (1996), reinstate the a priori/a posteriori distinction. Needless to say, the distinction between necessity and contingency, and that between a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge were also within the scope of concepts attacked by Quine. A rational discipline that blurs the boundaries between metaphysics and the empirical sciences is bound to be puzzling. By addressing issues such as the mindbody problem, personal identity, the nature of mental representations, and similar topics, its domain of study seems to overlap with that of the relevant empirical sciences. By involving conceptual considerations or modal considerations, metaphysics seemed to be closer to logic and mathematics. But “matters of fact” and conceptual subject matter seem to be mixed together in the contentions that articulate metaphysical intuitions and in the reasons that support their acceptance.2 As is clear to anyone practicing metaphysics, the reasons that support the acceptance of metaphysical contentions, say, the claim that phenomenal properties are not physical properties, or that persons are basic particulars, are not empirical reasons in the ordinary sense. Similarly, the arguments that introduce the supporting reasons, although they apparently involve modal, conceptual, and logical considerations, are not of the same type of arguments as those used in the exact sciences. In other words, the reunion of metaphysics and the sciences is indeed a puzzling phenomenon. My intention in the present book is to fulfill one part of the complex task of describing the nature of the relations between science and metaphysics in
1.
See in particular Rorty (1980).
2. For example, according to Stalnaker (2001: 635–636): “Metaphysical disputes are of course always disputes about the natures of things – disputes where questions about what the world is like interact with questions about what we are saying when we say what the world is like. The positivists famously argued that metaphysics as an enterprise is founded on equivocation between semantic and factual questions – between questions that call for a decision about how to talk and questions to be answered by science or mathematics. If we are clear and avoid equivocation, they argued, metaphysics will go away. But if there is no general and absolutely neutral way to distinguish the semantic from the substantive questions, it may not be so easy to dispense with metaphysics.”
Introduction
contemporary philosophy. I will attempt to clarify the nature of metaphysical controversies and their significance to the rational nature of the metaphysics of mind. 2. Rediscovering old truths in a new idiom In the introduction to Individuals (1959), a landmark in the revival of metaphysics in analytic philosophy, Peter Strawson presented the following clarification of the significance and goals of what he called ‘descriptive metaphysics:’ The idea of descriptive metaphysics is liable to be met with skepticism. How should it differ from what is called philosophical, or logical, or conceptual analysis? It does not differ in kind of intention, but only in scope and generality. Aiming to lay bare the most general features of our conceptual structure, it can take far less for granted than a more limited and partial conceptual inquiry. Hence, also, a certain difference in method. Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in philosophy. But the discriminations we can make, and the connections we can establish, in this way, are not general enough and not far-reaching enough to meet the full metaphysical demand for understanding. For when we ask how we use this or that expression, our answers, however revealing at a certain level, are apt to assume, and not to expose, those general elements of structure which the metaphysician wants revealed. The structure he seeks does not readily display itself on the surface of language, but lies submerged. He must abandon his only sure guide when the guide cannot take him as far as he wishes to go. (1959: 9–10)
The task of descriptive metaphysics is to reveal the structures that ground the basic features of understanding and meaning. One can “take for granted” that one knows only part of what this conceptual structure involves. Reliance upon the actual use of words “is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in philosophy” (ibid.) only up to a certain point. For “the discriminations we can make, and the connection we can establish...are not far reaching enough to meet the full metaphysical demand for understanding.”(ibid.) Descriptive metaphysics does not differ “in kind or intention” from philosophical, logical, or conceptual analysis but only in “scope and generality.” Nevertheless, there is a certain “difference in method.” According to Strawson, concepts – at least some of them – are susceptible to change. But it is erroneous to suppose that metaphysics is “an instrument of conceptual change:” For there is a massive central core of human thinking which has no history – or none recorded in histories of thought; there are categories and concepts which, in their most fundamental character, change not at all. Obviously these are not the specialties of the most refined thinking. They are the commonplaces of
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
the least refined thinking; and are yet the indispensable core of the conceptual equipment of the most sophisticated human beings. It is with these, their interconnections, and the structure that they form, that a descriptive metaphysics will be primarily concerned. (1959: 10)
The metaphysician does not attempt to improve or revolutionize human thought and human language but rather to reveal the “commonplaces of the least refined thinking.” Strawson believes that it is unlikely that the metaphysician will be able to discover “new truths.” Nevertheless, the recovery of the “core of human thinking” is not a task that accomplishes once and for all what the metaphysician aims to realize: It has constantly to be done over again. If there are no new truths to be discovered, there are old truths to be rediscovered. For though the central subject-matter of descriptive metaphysics does not change, the critical and analytical idiom of philosophy changes constantly. Permanent relationships are described in an impermanent idiom, which reflects both the age’s climate of thought and the individual philosopher’s personal style of thinking. No philosopher understands his predecessors until he has re-thought their thought in his own contemporary terms... (1959: 10–11)
This oscillation between rediscovering the “central core of human thinking which has no history” and expressing it in “the new critical and analytic idiom that changes constantly” is both significant and puzzling. What is the method by means of which the central metaphysical core of human thinking is revealed? And what could be the basis for the assumption of the a-historical character of the metaphysical core of human language and thought, given that uncovering it “has constantly to be done over again,” since “permanent relationships are described in an impermanent idiom”? It could be assumed that the method Strawson has in mind is the method he used in his own investigations – a conceptual analysis that goes beyond the actual use of words, assisted also by philosophical thought experiments. The object of metaphysical inquiries – the conceptual structure that metaphysics aspires to reveal – is apparently not a historical entity. But metaphysical investigations are guided by the inquiries of previous philosophers. The descriptive metaphysician has to “rethink their thoughts in his own contemporary terms.” It should be noted, however, that ‘rethinking’ for Strawson is not equivalent to ‘interpreting others.’ ‘Rethinking’ apparently means to address the same conceptual structure that one’s predecessors aimed to reveal. Nevertheless, ‘rethinking’ cannot be severed from ‘interpreting others’, if the core idea that underlies the metaphysical endeavor at least includes rediscovering old truths in a new idiom. “No philosopher understands his predecessors until he has re-thought their thought in his own contemporary terms.”(ibid.) Yet, no philosopher can understand his predecessors without interpreting them. The question that naturally arises in this context is whether “rethinking” the “massive central core of human thinking which has no
Introduction
history” guided by interpreting one’s predecessors and one’s own contemporaries does indeed involve no novel components of content, as suggested by Strawson. 3. Metaphysics and metaphysical controversies Strawson’s approach to the practice and goals of metaphysics is not the only approach to metaphysics, but it does seem to express some widely accepted ideas. There is, however, one feature about which Strawson and those who share his views say almost nothing. The idea that in practicing metaphysics one aims to uncover the conceptual structure that has to be rediscovered again and again seems to imply either that there is general agreement regarding the content of this conceptual structure, or that there is a method available to all thinking beings by which it is possible to achieve general agreement. Needless to say, nothing is more remote from the present state of metaphysics. Nor can we say that this is a proper depiction of metaphysics in the past. There is not even one metaphysical issue on which there is general agreement. The disputed issues include the questions regarding the nature of truth, the nature of time, the existence of abstract entities, the nature of causality, of events and propositions, the nature of mental states and of the qualitative features of conscious mental states, the grounds that constitute personal identity, the fundamental concepts of existence and being, of the possible and the actual, and other metaphysical issues. Although metaphysicians appear to directly approach their subject matter from the depth of their own reflective capacities, in many cases, they are unable to argue for their views without arguing against a rival position. In other words, the past and present discourse of metaphysics is fraught with controversies. Understanding the nature of metaphysics cannot be disconnected from understanding the nature of metaphysical controversies and their significance to the rational and epistemic character of metaphysics. The fact that controversies are prevalent in metaphysics raises the question of whether there can be any progress in it. Indeed, it is not easy to comprehend the nature and possibility of progress in metaphysics. There are, however, some examples of significant changes in metaphysics that could be clues for understanding its nature. For example, in 1982, Frank Jackson, an eminent metaphysician, published “Epiphenomenal qualia,” in which he first presented the knowledge argument – the argument that aspired to establish the epiphenomenal character of qualia. Jackson’s argument was discussed and debated extensively. However, almost twenty years later, Jackson abandoned his earlier position.3 His new theory combines features related to a position labeled ‘representationalism’, together 3. See in particular his paper “Mind and illusion” (2004).
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
with Lewis’s (1983b, 1988) and Namirow’s (1980) ability hypothesis. As Jackson’s arguments (which will be discussed in Part Two) clarify, his revision of his position did not result from a blind leap of faith. As the extensive literature on the knowledge argument indicates, it would be equally mistaken to suppose that Jackson and those that followed him simply missed some good reasons that were already apparent in 1982. To be sure, these reasons were not beyond the reach of human understanding, and yet, at the time Jackson’s paper was published, they were not explicitly articulated by anyone in a way that clarifies their relevance to the problem at hand. These reasons only became available by virtue of painstaking and creative philosophical labor. It is widely agreed, I would assume, that Tye’s (1995, 2000) arguments for representationalism, Lewis’s (1983b, 1988) and Namirow’s (1980) arguments for the ability hypothesis, and Jackson’s (2004) arguments in his recent reappraisal of his earlier view are all novel philosophical contributions, even if one might disagree with what these theories assert. A close scrutiny of the development of the literature reveals two facts that need to be stated if one wishes to provide an account of the rational change that took place between these periods. Firstly, although the progress of the relevant empirical sciences formed a significant layer of the background knowledge that allowed these changes, the change itself was not generated by means of the discovery of new empirical evidence in psychology, neuroscience, or any other branch of empirical science. The arguments and counterarguments for and against the intended results of the knowledge argument and the philosophical method by which it is carried out do not directly involve the data contributed by the relevant empirical sciences. Rather, they involve puzzles that seem to go beyond what allows empirical warrant. These conceptual puzzles concern the nature of our modal concepts, meaning, conceptual analysis, scientific explanations, and scientific reduction. Secondly, the arguments that aim to warrant each of the respective competing positions are not merely based on conceptual analysis. They inherently involve criticism and denunciation of competing positions. As I hope to convince the reader, these two facts are connected to the nature of progress and changes in this field. One of my main claims here will be that the dialectical character of the metaphysical contentions can play a significant role in the reassessment of the rational nature of metaphysics, and the way in which metaphysics – together with the empirical and exact sciences – forms one unified body of knowledge. 4. The Kantian approach to the problem The claim that the pervasiveness of metaphysical controversies may serve as a clue to the discovery of the rational character of metaphysics is not novel in the
Introduction
modern history of metaphysics. One of Kant’s main goals in the Critique of Pure Reason and in related writings was to reveal the connection between metaphysical controversies and the rational and epistemic characteristics of this discipline. In Kant’s view, the prevalence of metaphysical controversies raises the question of whether it is possible for metaphysics to be a science. As is well-known, Kant believed that metaphysics, if it is possible, is a synthetic a priori science. As clarified by the arguments included in the “Dialectic of Pure Reason,” when one attempts to make objective judgments merely on the basis of the conceptual resources of pure reason, one is bound to be entangled in unresolved conflicts. Pure synthetic a priori judgments are possible only within the limits of possible experience. But Kant’s critique of metaphysics does not end with this contention. Its most interesting feature probably consists in the explanation of the role of pure reason in experience. In Kant’s view, a transcendental use of the ideas of pure reason and the concepts of the understanding, which transgresses the limits of possible experience, is unavoidable. This type of use leads to transcendental illusions that are rooted in our rational capacities. Although these illusions are unavoidable, they can be cured by means of a critique that assigns the proper role to each representation. As Kant’s arguments clarify, his transcendental idealism – the ontological position developed throughout his critical writings – is necessarily required for any possible resolution of the conflicts within reason. Though they generate transcendental illusions, the ideas of pure reason – the concepts of objects of reason (objects that we cannot know) – are not “mere figments of the brain.” (CPR B 371) Pure reason has a necessary but regulative role in the gappy continuum of objective knowledge due to the demand for a total and all-inclusive explanation of observed phenomena. Without using the concepts of reason, the experience of objects qua rule-governed enterprise would not be possible. And yet, the role of the concepts of reason differs from the role of pure and empirical intuitions as well as from the role of the pure and empirical concepts of the understanding. In examining the connection between metaphysical controversies and the rational character of metaphysics, my approach to the role of controversies in metaphysics is inspired by Kant’s theory. Following Kant, I believe that the fact that metaphysical controversies are no less prevalent today than in Kant’s time is important in order to reveal the rational nature of metaphysics. However, I distinguish between Kant’s explicit position regarding the role and nature of metaphysical controversies and his implicit position, which is revealed by the arguments that can be reconstructed from his writings. One type of argument that will be examined in the present book is connected to Kant’s antinomies and the solution he offers for them. An antinomy consists of two conflicting contentions, each of
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
which can be traced to a plausible metaphysical intuition.4 The arguments that support each of the conflicting contentions inherently involve the refutation of the opposed contention. Kant’s account of the antinomies uncovers the conflicts and their rational sources. But it also includes an argument for transcendental idealism. Kant justifies the acceptance of his novel ontological position also by claiming that a resolution of the antinomies is possible on the basis of his transcendental idealism. Interestingly, Kant does not present this argument as a metaphysical argument. Rather, he places it outside his discussion of the nature and possibility of metaphysics. Yet my claim is that the overall argument that begins by revealing the antinomies and then proceeds by arguing for a novel metaphysical position exemplifies a significant type of argument that is widely used in current metaphysics. This type of argument will be explored throughout this book.5 5. Metaphysical controversies and relevant alternatives One of the main concepts that I coin in this book in order to clarify the nature of progress in metaphysics is the concept of a controversial relevant alternative. I suggest that establishing a position as a relevant alternative is the type of epistemic achievement that best fits the actual way in which ‘progress’ is grasped by metaphysicians. Recognizing a position as a relevant alternative does not entail maintaining that the position is true. Rather, it usually means that the position is recognized as a plausible competitor in the field, that is, as a position supported by persuasive arguments. In addition, it means that any attempt to establish a position 4. In the present context, by metaphysical intuition I do not mean intuition in Kant’s technical sense, but rather ‘intuition’ in the sense that is prevalent in the current metaphysical discourse. See, for example, Jackson (1998). I discuss this concept in Chapter 3. 5. Why didn’t Kant explicitly discuss the features of the overall argument that he himself used in his critical writings? I do not wish to engage in speculative exegesis regarding his underlying intentions. Let us merely note that viewing the implicit argument as a metaphysical argument would have placed Kant’s theory within the dialectical process and not outside it. Kant believed that the antinomies of pure reason originate from a-temporal, abstract structures of pure reason. He believed that reason itself could not be dialectical in its deepest level. In the Critique of Pure Reason, he wanted to end the conflicts of reasons, that is, to bring reason to the state of “eternal peace”. Placing himself within the dialectical process apparently conflicts with this goal. Needless to say, metaphysical and ontological controversies did not end after the publication of Kant’s critical writings. Already in his lifetime, his own metaphysics and ontology were furiously debated. Yet, philosophers who refused to accept Kant’s novel ontology were nevertheless motivated by his arguments to develop their own positions. Kant’s arguments persuaded them to consider his theory as a relevant alternative to their own theories even though it was unacceptable to them.
Introduction
that competes with the relevant alternative has to address the reasons involved in the arguments that support the relevant alternative. A position is established as a relevant alternative not merely by virtue of its characteristic contentions, but rather by virtue of the arguments that support it. These arguments also usually aim to clarify why, given the shared background of the competing positions, the position is more plausible than its competitors. In other words, the arguments that establish positions as relevant alternatives are inherently dialectical arguments. I will discuss the concept of a relevant alternative in Chapter 3.6 I suggest that the following steps form a structure which clarifies the rational role of controversies in the epistemic changes in metaphysics: a. A metaphysical controversy emerges. The controversy has the following features: (1) proponents of each of the conflicting positions persuasively argue for contentions that articulate metaphysical intuitions emphasized by the position that they support; (2) the arguments that support each of the conflicting contentions inherently involve reasons that apparently refute the contentions supported by proponents of the competing position; and (3) given the state of knowledge within which the controversy emerges, it is not possible to rationally resolve the conflict by favoring one of the positions involved. b. Philosophers (the contenders themselves or other philosophers) present arguments that attempt to resolve the controversy by including various types of conceptual innovations. These arguments and the reasons used are motivated by the paradox or the aporia revealed by the controversy. The attempts to resolve the conflict either reinforce one of the old positions (by presenting a new version of it), or introduce new positions. The successful resolutions of the conflict, which are widely recognized as persuasive, establish (or reestablish) positions as relevant alternatives to existing positions. c. A new controversy emerges which involves the relevant alternatives that are introduced in stage (b) above. Kant’s implicit argument in “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” is a metaphysical argument that has the features of stages (a)–(b). However, his argument generated several metaphysical controversies in which he himself was involved either directly or indirectly, in conformity with stage (c).7
6. Clearly, a theory could also be considered important enough to require a response because one believes that it is bound to have “a bad influence,” or that it contains mistakes that are bound to tempt one to stride in hopeless routes of thought. But this is not the only possible response to a relevant alternative. The more interesting response inherently involves genuine metaphysical innovations. 7.
On this subject, see Allison (1973); Beiser (1987); Saner (1973); and Senderowicz (1998).
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
Probably not all metaphysical controversies have the above structure. Nevertheless, as I hope to show in Parts Two and Three of this book, the above structure can be discerned in some of the most interesting and stimulating controversies in contemporary metaphysics of mind. It might be argued that this structure is in fact a Hegelian dialectic in disguise. But this supposition is mistaken. Specifically, controversies that reach antinomic states do not impose their resolution, and in particular, they allow for more than one resolution. Controversies that reach an antinomic state may motivate attempts to resolve them. These attempts may share the recognition of the controversy’s underlying antinomic state and the fact that each position involved is a relevant alternative. But even this is not a necessary feature of metaphysical controversies. Normally, there are varied and conflicting ways of responding to a metaphysical controversy that, among other things, depend on the way the controversy is interpreted, and (if it is interpreted as an antinomy) on how the antinomy is interpreted. One of the interesting results of the theory developed in this book is that progress in metaphysics cannot be represented as a change from stages in which some conflicting positions are discernable to new stages in which novel positions supersede the former positions. The arguments that establish the acceptance of controversial relevant alternatives seem to be much more significant to the development of metaphysics. As noted above, a position is recognized as a relevant alternative not merely by virtue of the contentions that characterize it. Analytic philosophers in the 1940s and 1950s regarded Cartesianism, for example, as relevant to philosophical theories of the mind merely as the straw man that served to point out what was wrong with earlier theories. They did not view it as posing a challenge that raised intriguing puzzles conceived as relevant to the tasks the theories themselves were meant to accomplish. But Cartesianism reemerged as a powerful and intriguing relevant alternative to physicalist theories of the mind in the 1970s and 1980s. To be sure, this did not happen by virtue of Descartes’s original arguments. It became a relevant alternative to the contemporaneous positions by virtue of original arguments presented by some of the finest philosophers in the last four decades, some of which will be explored in Part Two of this book. The historical fate of Cartesianism or of Aristotelianism is a clear indication of the fact that positions need not be eliminated from metaphysical discourse when a competing alternative is recognized by most experts as a position that has better rational support. In contrast to the nature of scientific theories in the empirical and exact sciences, metaphysical positions may reappear time and again, not merely due to blind leaps of faith but because of reasons introduced by arguments that establish these particular metaphysical positions as relevant alternatives to the existing positions in particular discursive contexts. This inordinate
Introduction
history of appearance and reappearance of metaphysical positions has a rational character that at least partly consists in the polemical arguments that reintroduce them qua relevant alternatives. In other words, the intellectual history of the metaphysics of mind should not merely be depicted as a history of positions replaced by opposite positions, but rather, at least partly, as a history of their status as relevant alternatives. This history is constituted by dialectical arguments that establish certain positions as relevant alternatives at a given historical period and that undermine their power as such at latter times. 6. The structure of the book The book is divided into three parts. In the three chapters of Part One, I will present a theoretical framework that clarifies the rational and epistemic role of controversies in metaphysics. The framework consists of a modified Kantian account of metaphysics combined with issues pertaining to the pragmatics of controversies. In Chapter 1, I will develop a modified Kantian account of ampliative arguments in metaphysics. I will begin by pointing out the intricate features of Kant’s image of science and the place of metaphysics within it. I will then analyze Kant’s explicit argument in the “The Antinomy of Pure Reason, First Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas” and what I consider to be his implicit argument. Kant’s explicit and implicit views regarding the rational and epistemic role of metaphysical controversies in metaphysics leave out the features of real polemics. In Chapter 2, I will present some themes of the pragmatics of controversies that are relevant to controversies in the metaphysics of mind. I will analyze the features of the central dialectical argument – which derives from Kant’s notion of antinomy – which will be examined throughout the book. In Chapter 3, I will discuss the role of metaphysical intuitions, and of conflicting metaphysical intuitions in metaphysical controversies and in metaphysics. Given the fundamental role of the appeal to intuitions, the idea of conflicting intuitions seems to jeopardize metaphysics by opening it up to the hazards of ontological and metaphysical relativism. In this chapter, I will suggest a way out by distinguishing between shared rational intuitions and cognitive dispositions that vary with the cognitive differences between individuals. I will clarify the sense in which conflicting responses to possibilities are motivated by the incomplete and indeterminate character of our concepts as expressed in language. I will address the role of the unique type of thought experiments involved in metaphysical inquiries, and will discuss one of the distinctive features of metaphysical intuitions, that is, the merging of “matters of fact” and logical matter. In the final
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section of this chapter, I will discuss the concept ‘relevant alternative’ which underlies my account of progress in the metaphysics of mind. In Parts Two and Three, I will apply the theory developed in Part One to two examples of chains of controversies in current philosophy of mind. In Part Two, I will interpret a chain of controversies regarding the nature of consciousness that are motivated by Nagel’s and Jackson’s knowledge arguments and by Kripke’s modal argument. The epistemic changes related to this chain of controversies exemplify the strategy of descriptive metaphysics.8 In Chapter 4, I will interpret Kripke’s modal argument and Jackson’s knowledge argument as dialectical arguments of the type discussed in Chapter 2. In Chapter 5, I will address some of the polemical exchanges that refer to Jackson’s argument and to Kripke’s argument. These exchanges motivated interpreting these controversies as expressing antinomies (in the sense discussed in the first three chapters). The resolutions of these antinomies generated other controversies that widened the scope of topics addressed and added issues pertaining to logic and modality, scientific explanation, and related issues. These implications of the knowledge arguments and Kripke’s modal argument will be discussed in Chapter 6 where I will address the debates on the explanatory gap, on two-dimensional semantics, and on the concept of scientific explanation that evolved from the debates on the nature of consciousness. In Part Three, I will examine another chain of controversies related to the question of the connection between personal identity, self-consciousness, and bodily-continuity. I suggest that the epistemic changes motivated by these polemical exchanges constitute a revisionist approach to metaphysics, which differs from the descriptive approach. The debates to be addressed have motivated novel types of accounts of personal identity that transformed the questions addressed by metaphysicians. Whereas the early debates were between adherents of accounts of personal identity based on criteria of bodily-continuity (Williams), those that based such accounts on criteria of psychological continuity (Lockeans), and those that viewed persons as basic particulars (Strawson), the current debate is between the neo-Lockeans (whose views differ significantly from their predecessors’ views), reductionists (Parfit and his followers), and animalists (Wiggins, McDowell, Olson, and others). In Chapter 7, I will examine the positions of three philosophers who first started the debates on personal identity in analytic philosophy: Strawson, Williams, and Shoemaker. Particular attention will be given to Shoemaker’s 8. In the sense to be used here, descriptive metaphysics consists in the attempt to resolve metaphysical conflicts by constructing concepts and theories assumed all along to be implicit in our ordinary conception; that is, making these concepts explicit is at least partly motivated by the relevant metaphysical controversies.
Introduction
Brown-Brownson (body exchange) thought experiment, and the way in which it influenced the debates on personal identity and bodily continuity. In Chapter 8, I will examine the exchange between Wiggins and Shoemaker on the identity of persons. I will show how Shoemaker’s earlier position could be interpreted as involving the notion of ‘relative identity’ that is attacked by Wiggins, and how his revised account aims to avoid the commitment to relative identity. This criticism was one of the grounds that motivated Shoemaker’s shift from quasi-transcendentalism to his neo-Lockean physicalist-functionalist account of the identity of persons. Shoemaker’s novel account introduced the concept of ‘quasimemory’ into the debate. This is a concept of a memory-like state the existence of which does not imply personal identity, and that therefore seems to make a noncircular definition of personal identity in terms of such states possible. This concept, the content of which apparently conflicts with our ordinary grasp of personal identity, had a significant role in setting a new agenda for the debates on personal identity. In Chapter 9, I will clarify how the new stage in this chain of debates evolved from the early stages. I will first examine Williams’s puzzle of personal identity as presented in his paper “The Self and the Future.” (1970). This puzzle has the features of the modified Kantian antinomy. I will proceed by interpreting Parfit’s reductionist approach to persons and personal identity in “Personal Identity” (1971) as an attempt to resolve this puzzle. I will then show how Perry’s (1972, 1975, 1976) and Lewis’s (1976) neo-Lockean modifications of Shoemaker’s definition of identity and of the continued existence of persons can be viewed as a polemical response, both to Shoemaker and to Parfit’s arguments. I will conclude this chapter by examining Wiggins’s arguments in Chapter 6 of the first edition of Sameness and Substance, which aim to clarify why his animalistic position should be preferred over the neo-Lockean position and the bodily-continuity position. Taken together, I hope that the three parts of the book clarify the role of controversies in the metaphysics of mind. Before I embark on the tasks set out in this introduction, may I add one last preliminary word. In this book, I have chosen to focus on controversies and the metaphysics of mind, and on a particular type of argument that is significant in facilitating an understanding of the significance of controversies in the metaphysics of mind. I wish to stress, however, that this by no means entails that controversies are significant only to the metaphysics of mind. I hope that what I will present in the following chapters will at least indicate how the type of analysis conducted here can be extended to other branches of metaphysics.
part one
Outline of a theory of metaphysical controversies
chapter 1
The Kantian framework 1. Introduction Throughout his career, Kant’s account of the nature and possibility of scientific and ordinary knowledge was linked to his account of the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. In the Prolegomena, Kant declared that Hume’s doubts regarding the knowledge of causal relations arose him from his (pre-critical) dogmatic slumber. Yet, in a 1798 letter to Christian Grave, six years before his death, Kant writes that it was the Antinomy of Pure Reason that “first arose me from my dogmatic slumber and drove me to the critique of reason itself in order to resolve the ostensible contradiction of reason with itself.” (Br 12: 258; 552) Kant’s antimonies articulate abstract conflicts of pure reason, and yet they can easily be traced to real polemics. As he expresses in the question that he raises regarding the possibility of metaphysics as a science in the passage below, Kant attributes considerable significance to the fact that metaphysical contentions do not enjoy universal and lasting acclaim: If metaphysics is a science, why is it that it cannot, like other sciences, attain universal and lasting acclaim? If it is not, how does it happen that, under the pretense of a science it incessantly shows off, and strings along the human understanding with hopes that never dim but are never fulfilled? Whether, therefore, we demonstrate our knowledge or our ignorance, for once we must arrive at something certain concerning the nature of this self-proclaimed science; for things cannot possibly remain on their present footing. It seems almost laughable that, while every other science makes continuous progress, metaphysics, which desires to be wisdom itself, and which everyone consults as an oracle, perpetually turns round on the same spot without coming a step further. Furthermore, it has lost a great many of its adherents, and one does not find that those who feel strong enough to shine in other sciences wish to risk their reputations in this one, where anyone, usually ignorant in all other things, lays claim to a decisive opinion, since in this region there are in fact still no reliable weights and measures with which to distinguish profundity from shallow babble. (4: 256)
The failure to obtain universal and lasting acclaim is contrasted with “hopes that never dim but are never fulfilled.” In Kant’s view, the tantalizing oscillation between hopes that motivate one to pursue metaphysical knowledge, and the
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
recurring failures to achieve such knowledge does not amount to a history that manifests “real” progress. Metaphysics has obtained nothing that is “universal and lasting.” Yet, in his view, metaphysics is open to genuinely new ideas, the path to which involves uncovering the nature of metaphysical controversies.1 Clearly, in Kant’s view, the rational task faced by philosophers is to overcome the recurring controversies, which was a task he believed his critical theory to have fulfilled. Yet, although his theory did not enjoy the universal and lasting recognition he aspired for, I will attempt to show that his implicit views can serve as a valuable framework for an account of the rational role of controversies in metaphysics. The term ‘controversy’ will hereafter be used as involving defeasible reasons for holding opposed views, the adequacy of which depends on the historical context. Although Kant does not explicitly acknowledge the defeasibility of metaphysical theories, this idea is implicit in his writings. The apparent “conflicts of pure reason” involve contentions supported by equally plausible arguments. The balance of reasons seems to lead to skeptical despair, and yet, by introducing his novel ontology he explains away the plausibility of these reasons, and resolves the conflict. The revolutionary shift does not render these contentions meaningless. Yet Kant’s alternative rules out the reasons that support them qua good reasons. Hence, the reasons used by the arguments are defeasible in a unique sense; they lose their hold upon us by means of a theory that undermines them qua reasons.2 The idea that metaphysical theories are defeasible seems to entail that they express possibilities similar in kind to empirical possibilities, the only difference being that they are not empirically testable or refutable.3 Yet the philosophical theory that analyzes the logical and epistemic features of metaphysics – Kant’s critical theory – was not conceived by him as being defeasible in the same sense.4 1. Kant’s controversy with Eberhard addressed Kant’s claim to novelty. See Allison (1973), Eberhard (1789a, 1789b, 1789c, 1790), Maaß (1789, 1791). On this subject, see also Senderowicz (1998). 2. In fact, Kant seems to distinguish between three distinct epistemic levels or rational perspectives: the rational perspective, which Kant dubbed ‘the dogmatic view’, that is assigned to holders of opposed views involved in a controversy; ‘the skeptical view’ from which one recognizes the insolvability of the controversy; and the critical view that aims to clarify how the rational debate could be settled, why it is unavoidable, and in what sense is it rationally valuable. The reasons involved in each of the first two rational perspectives, the dogmatic conviction that the controversy must be resolvable in one’s own favor, and the skeptical conviction that it is irresolvable are defeasible reasons, although they are not recognized as such by those entrapped in these rational perspectives. 3. See Popper (1963a, 1963b) 4. As we shall see in Chapter 3, it is indeed difficult to grasp how such a theory is defeasible. Nevertheless, the interplay between ‘defeasible’ and ‘not defeasible’ is an inherent feature of metaphysical inquiries and theories.
Chapter 1. The Kantian framework
Kant’s explicit view appears to be that the series of attempts ceaselessly frustrated by contrary attempts is a sign not of progress, but rather of epistemic stagnation. Nevertheless, I hope to show that one can extract an implicit argument from his account that allows one to locate the notion of progress in the historical process itself. In order to reveal Kant’s implicit argument my first task will be to differentiate between those features of Kant’s position that are responsible for the supposedly ahistorical nature of metaphysics, and those features relevant to the possibility of genuine epistemic change. After stating the main themes of my reconstruction of Kant’s theory, I will single out the implicit argument by interpreting one antinomy. 2. Metaphysics and Kant’s image of science According to Kant’s theory, our a priori capacities allow one to reveal the comprehensive system of concepts and questions with which metaphysics deals at all times. These include the ontological concepts that are part of all claims to knowledge. The differences between the validity of the metaphysical claims and mathematical or empirical claims require an account of the differences between the types of use of the ontological (pure) concepts that equally belong to the various rational fields. One type of use, namely, empirical use, constitutes the conditions for the possibility of empirical knowledge. Another type of use, the transcendental use, is empty use.5 The criteria of demarcation between science and metaphysics are linked to the distinction between these types of use. The critical theory within which one purportedly solves the relevant metaphysical disputes “once and for all” involves an account of the nature of mathematical claims and empirical (scientific) claims not merely in order to uncover the features of the “good” sciences and to spell out what is “bad” in metaphysics, but also in order to set the limits with which the metaphilosophical theory is not allowed to conflict. Even if one assumes (as does Kant) that knowledge gained in the empirical sciences and in mathematics is incomplete, this incompleteness does not allow one to rationally hold views that conflict with what is known in the empirical sciences and mathematics. As noted above, the criteria of demarcation between science and metaphysics are linked to the distinction between the types of use allowed by the ontological concepts. Yet, although these criteria single out the epistemic gap between the 5. See in particular the chapter “on the ground of the distinction of all objects in general into phenomena and noumena” in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. On this subject, see also Senderowicz (2005)
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
validity of the ordinary scientific claims and the metaphysical claims, they do not lead to the elimination of metaphysics. In this respect, Kant’s image of science is notoriously complex. On the one hand, knowledge is feasible only in mathematics and the empirical sciences. On the other hand, empirical and mathematical knowledge is incomplete. The gap between what can be known and what one aspires to know is filled by illusions of knowledge and generates metaphysical controversies, but it also indicates the necessity of the regulative use of reason involved in ordinary and scientific empirical knowledge. In other words, the demarcation between science and metaphysics separates the empirical and exact sciences and metaphysics, but does not undermine the unity of the rational enterprise that involves them both. To be sure, this is not a harmonious unity. As I hope to demonstrate in the following chapters, conceiving of science and metaphysics as separated by a gap that does not undermine the unity of the epistemic endeavor that includes them both is a powerful and fruitful idea. 3. The required revisions As noted above, Kant believed that a priori grounds distinguish science from metaphysics. My suggestion is to suspend judgment on this matter. As far as the goals of the present inquiry are concerned, we cannot make a decision on this matter in advance without assuming that the controversy regarding the possibility of metaphysics has been resolved. The normative claim to a priori demarcation may therefore be replaced with the descriptive claim that a gap between science and metaphysics could be detected by spelling out the way in which new contentions are established in metaphysics and in the sciences.6 The gap may shift with the historical evolution of science. It has to be rediscovered and restated in each historical context. We must assume, however, that throughout history, the various disciplines conceived as metaphysical have been similar enough to justify their being depicted as such. Some of the features of Kant’s official position therefore need to be modified. These features are: 1. The scope of the subject matter of metaphysics; 2. The claim that there are criteria for demarcating or distinguishing between metaphysical claims to knowledge and empirical or scientific claims to knowledge; and 3. The implicit claim that metaphysics does not allow real progress. 6. I will address the alternative descriptive demarcation between science and metaphysics in what follows.
Chapter 1. The Kantian framework
Regarding the first feature, Kant’s theory of metaphysics comprises three themes: rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology. Metaphysics can be separated from logic and ontology.7 Yet, separating between the questions regarding the nature of truth, meaning, the infinite, abstract objects, the reality of relations, and similar questions, and the issues addressed by metaphysics seems to be particularly wanting when one considers the metaphysical controversies in which Kant was personally involved.8 Moreover, the fact that the questions regarding the nature of meaning and truth are involved in the disputes that Kant addresses in the dialectic is manifested in the solutions that he offers for these disputes.9 These solutions require substantial changes, debatable in their own right, in the concepts of objectivity, empirical knowledge, the nature of space and time, and all the other issues related to the doctrine of transcendental idealism.10 Finally, the 7. In his prize essay “What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany since the Times of Leibniz and Wolf?,” Kant defines metaphysics as “the science of advancing by reason from knowledge of the sensible to knowledge of the supersensible.” (Ak. 20: 260) In contrast, “ontology (as part of metaphysics) is the science that comprises a system of all concepts and principles of understanding, but only insofar as these extend to objects given by the senses and can, therefore, be justified by experience.” (ibid.) According to this classification, ontology is part of metaphysics. Yet this characterization presumably results from the polemical intentions of this essay. For in the Metaphysics Mrongovius (from 1782–1783) ontology is characterized as the science of the properties of all things in general (Ak. 29: 784) and is, therefore, more general in scope than metaphysics. 8. The controversy between Kant and his collaborators and Eberhard and his collaborators specifically addressed the features of Kant’s theory of judgments, and in particular, Kant’s distinction between synthetic and analytic judgments. Kant believed that his theory was not controversial, but that it was, rather, part of a well-established logical theory. Yet as Kant’s controversy with Eberhard demonstrated, Kant’s theory of judgment was controversial. On this subject, see Allison (1973), Senderowicz (1998). 9. Kant’s solution to some of the metaphysical disputes addressed in the first Critique involves the account of meaning presupposed by him. The fallacy involved in the paralogism is characterized in the second edition of the first Critique as a fallacy per sophisma figurae dictionis. It presupposes that the subject term could be considered as having two meanings, as a transcendental I and as an object that could be given in intuition. See CPR B 410–412. Kant detects a similar dialectical fallacy per sophisma figurae dictionis in the case of the cosmological inferences that are involved in the antinomies of pure reason. See CPR A 499–500/B 527–528. 10. The ideas that ‘object’ has two meanings, and that a priori concepts have two types of meanings related to two types of use – transcendental meaning and empirical meaning related to transcendental use and empirical use of a pure concept – are essential to Kant’s theory as well as to the solution he offers for the metaphysical disputes that he addresses in the first critique. The two meanings in which an object should be considered, a distinction that is sometimes expressed as a distinction between objects in the logical sense and objects in the real “weighty” sense, is essential for the division between things in themselves and appearances. As I showed elsewhere, the very idea of transcendental idealism involves a distinction
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
questions pertaining to the nature of meaning and truth are crucial to the most central distinction in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, namely, that between analytic and synthetic judgments. This distinction cannot be disconnected from the issues with which metaphysics is concerned. Kant’s views on this matter may very well be plausible, but they are not indisputable, and the controversies concerning these topics cannot be divorced from the dispute on other metaphysical themes.11 The second issue that requires revision concerns the criteria that allegedly distinguish between metaphysical knowledge and empirical (scientific) knowledge. According to Kant, synthetic judgments involve a relation between concepts and sensible intuitions. One can have knowledge of objects and objective states of affairs only by means of judgments that subsume sensible intuition under concepts either directly or derivatively, that is, by means of the schematic ostensive exhibition of a concept “in concreto,” or by being connected to experience. According to Kant, this condition cannot be satisfied by metaphysical judgments. This theme is connected to the previous theme, and it has to be suspended together with the first theme. When one tries to account for metaphysical controversies, it is preferable not to suppose that this epistemic criterion belongs to the indisputable background of general agreement presupposed by the parties involved in the controversy. Given the realistic stance of current metaphysicians, the verificationist and anti-realist views on meaning that are linked to this criterion are controversial, to say the least. The last issue that requires revision concerns the possibility of progress in metaphysics. The previous revisions facilitate the conceivability of epistemic change in metaphysics. As I already noted, whether or not it actually provided comprehensive answers to the problems of metaphysics, Kant presented a new metaphysical account of space and time, attributed new meaning to the concept of an object, to the subjective features of experience and to many other metaphysical topics.12 4. The modified framework So far I have addressed those features of Kant’s theory that need to be amended. Below are the features of Kant’s account that need to be sustained in the proposed modified framework. These include: related to the distinction between ‘mere possibility’ and ‘real possibility.’ This distinction is based on the distinction between the transcendental meaning and the empirical meaning of the pure concepts. See Senderowicz (2005), Chapter 2. 11. I argued at length for their plausibility in Senderowicz (2005). 12. The concept of progress that is suitable for metaphysical inquiries will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
Chapter 1. The Kantian framework
4. The idea that the rational demand for complete explanation connects the empirical sciences and metaphysics. 5. The differences between the methodologies and grounds of evidence related to the exact and empirical sciences and to metaphysics. 6. The view that coherentism is the type of epistemic justification that fits metaphysical claims. The explanatory link that connects empirical and metaphysical issues involves two ideas, one that is central to Kant’s account of experience and another that represents the “pure employment of reason.” Regarding experience, Kant makes two distinct claims. Experiences of objects must include causal relations. Knowledge of causal relations is limited to the application of concepts to indefinitely extendable temporal series of sensuous objects, events, and processes. Each event causes other events, and in turn has a cause. The occurrence of the cause explains the occurrence of the effect, and is itself explained by the occurrence of its own cause. Yet, in Kant’s view, that knowledge of causal relations of this type is necessary in order to have experiences of objects and objective states of affair does not entail that a comprehensive explanation of the occurrence of an event is feasible.13 In Kant’s theory, the notion of a comprehensive explanation is based on the pure employment of the ideas of reason. In contrast to the understanding – the faculty of judgments – reason is the faculty of inferences. It does not unify sensible data, but rather the judgments of the understanding. Although these two conceptual capacities are relatively independent, they are not mutually exclusive or unconnected. The epistemic continuum consists of judgments that subsume objects of sense perceptions under pure and empirical concepts as well as reason qua faculty of inferences that involves the idea of complete (total) explanation. The concepts of reason cannot be exhibited in perception, in contrast to the concepts of the understanding. Yet the formation of empirical concepts, which are used by the understanding in order to make empirical objective judgments, is regulated by the rational capacities of reason. Representations that belong to the faculty of reason seem to stand for objects and objective properties, and nevertheless, knowledge of their existence is empirically undecidable.14 According to Kant’s theory, one could explain why an event E occurred by referring to its cause C. C cannot explain the occurrence of E independently of the fact that the occurrence of C itself requires explanation. But the concept of an 13. It should be noted that this rational gap does not necessarily entail the demarcating criteria between science and metaphysics. 14. To be sure, this gap is related the underdetermination argument, of which Kant was implicitly aware, as indicated by the relevant passages from the appendix to the dialectic of pure reason and the first and second introductions to the Critique of Judgment.
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indefinitely extendable series of sensible events related as explanandum and explanans does not require an unconditioned explanans as one of its conditions. As Kant notes, a conditioned analytically entails some condition, not an unconditioned. (CPR A 308/B 364) The additional demand for an unconditioned explanans is based on (a) the principle of pure reason, according to which “...when the conditioned is given, then so is the whole series of conditions, subordinate to one another, which is itself an unconditioned, also given (i.e., contained in the object and its connection),” (CPR A 307–308/B 364) and (b) on the regulative use of the concepts of reason in constructing scientific theories. Features such as simplicity, overall unity, and parsimoniousness guide the formation of empirical concepts and the construction of scientific theories. Though these are clearly relevant to the content of the causal concepts involved in causal explanations, they are not concerned with the application of concepts to experiences, but rather with the way in which empirical concepts are arrived at. The account of the concepts used in ordinary and scientific judgments must involve the inferential (explanatory) links between these judgments that are inherently connected to the idea of an unconditioned, but should not undermine the relative autonomy of the understanding qua faculty through which concepts are applied to sensible data. The pure use of the concepts of reason seems to have existential implications. These are due to the link between the logical maxim of pure reason that requires one “to find the unconditioned for conditioned cognitions of the understanding, with which its unity will be completed” (CPR A 307/B364) and the principle of pure reason mentioned above. Kant believed that the link between the logical principle of pure reason and the logical maxim of pure reason is both natural and deceptive. The maxim of pure reason presupposes the principle of pure reason. But the link between the logical maxim and the logical principle of reason responsible for the alleged existential implication (the givenness of the unconditioned series) is in fact the main source for the various transcendental illusions.15 The regulative employment of the concepts of reason is unavoidable. But it must be clearly distinguished from the constitutive role of the empirical use of the concepts of the understanding.16 For Kant, this distinction delineates two distinct intellectual fields with distinct types of validity. Yet, given my previous suggestions for revision, we may sustain the epistemic distinction between the two respective layers of explanation by pointing out the distinct types of grounds of evidence connected to them without rendering the existential implications of the 15. On this subject, see Grier (2001) and Allison (2004: Chapter 11). 16. The account of how the content of empirical concepts used in scientific explanations is connected to the demand of reason for a complete unconditioned explanation is explicated in detail in the appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic.
Chapter 1. The Kantian framework
claims involved in the higher level illusory. In other words, we may maintain the epistemic continuum of the two respective intellectual fields while acknowledging the epistemic gap that this continuum contains. The demand for knowledge of the unconditioned applies to the domain of empirical knowledge, that is, to what is given in empirical perception. But the theories and explanatory moves that are typically part of the metaphysical inquiries are separated from those of the empirical sciences.17 Being “merely” conceptual does not entail that one’s knowledge in these matters is a priori certain.18 It indicates the partial autonomy of the activity of metaphysical inquiries in the epistemic continuum that includes both metaphysics and the sciences. The objects of metaphysical inquiries need not be non-sensible. A position that attributes the ontology of sense data to the empirical sciences involves the relevant idea of the unconditioned. It is, therefore, metaphysical in Kant’s sense. The reasons that are the basis for the acceptance of such a position cannot merely consist of observational data that involve the application of concepts to sense impressions. As noted above, in Kant’s theory, a priori criteria distinguish between empirical knowledge and pretensions of knowledge of the unconditioned. Although I suggested that we need to suspend this claim, this does not entail that one cannot extract ideas from Kant’s theory that are useful for a descriptive account of metaphysics. I suggest replacing Kant’s principle of demarcation with a weaker principle that concerns the type of evidence that can be provided and the type of experiments that can be conducted in metaphysics. Although science and metaphysics are connected by an explanatory link, it does not follow that the evidence used in metaphysics is of the same kind as that used in the ordinary sciences.19 The metaphysician may be assisted by empirical evidence. Yet, empirical observations are almost never the data that warrants a metaphysical position. 17. The current metaphysical controversy regarding subjectivity and qualia is probably the most notable example in this respect. I will discuss this issue in Part Two. 18. As Popper notes (1963a: 199), although philosophical and metaphysical theories are irrefutable in the logical sense “...if we look upon a theory as a proposed solution to a set of problems, then the theory immediately lends itself to critical discussion – even if it is nonempirical and irrefutable.” 19. I am not suggesting that this is explicitly acknowledged by current metaphysicians. Many of them regard metaphysics as a proper extension of the so-called “hard” sciences. The fact that the only type of experiments used in metaphysics are metaphysical thought experiments, and that the only type of evidence are intuitions (not in the Kantian technical sense of this term) is not regarded by them as entailing the distinction between metaphysics and the sciences. But it is questionable whether the role of thought experiments in physics is the same as that in metaphysics. I address this point in Chapter 3.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
Metaphysical inquiries are conceptual investigations connected to the rational demand for complete explanations of observable phenomena. These explanations inherently involve the idea of the unconditioned. But metaphysical investigations are “merely” conceptual, and the experiments used in metaphysics are thought experiments that aim to uncover one’s intuitions regarding one’s conceptual scheme.20 Regarding the justification of metaphysical propositions, the only available notion of justification is that of internal coherence: But pure reason is a sphere so separate and self-contained that we cannot touch a part without affecting all the rest. We can do nothing without first determining the position of each part and its relation to the rest; for, as our judgment within this sphere cannot be corrected by anything without, the validity and use of every part depends upon the relation in which it stands to all the rest within the domain of reason. (4: 263)
Coherentism was recently attacked by many philosophers.21 Yet given that perceptual evidence is almost never the evidence that supports the acceptance or the denial of metaphysical propositions, the only available type of justification for metaphysical propositions is internal coherence. Below are the propositions that constitute the modified version of the Kantian framework: 1. Controversies in metaphysics cannot be isolated and disconnected from disputes regarding logical issues, meaning, truth, the nature of explanation, etc. 2. Metaphysical claims should not conflict with scientific claims. They must cohere with them. 3. There are no a priori criteria for distinguishing between science and metaphysics. 4. It should not be assumed that there is no progress in metaphysics. 5. An explanatory continuum connects science and metaphysics. It affects the concept formation of the empirical concepts used in empirical explanations of scientific phenomena. 6. The type of evidence and the type of arguments that are characteristically used in metaphysics and metaphysical controversies are different from those used in the empirical sciences. 7. The canonical type of justification relevant to metaphysics is that of internal coherence.
20. I will address this issue in detail in Chapter 3. 21. See Bonjour & Sosa (2003).
Chapter 1. The Kantian framework
5. The first antinomy: The explicit argument Kant’s official account of the role of controversies in metaphysics involves his transcendental theory. The question that I will address now is whether his relevant claims allow one to uncover an account of the role of controversies in metaphysics that does not entail his transcendental theory. By analyzing the first antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason, I will show that such an account is indeed feasible. Making the complex structure of Kant’s argument explicit is important not merely in order to elucidate Kant’s hidden view, but also to clarify the role of metaphysical controversies in metaphysics. The first antinomy addresses the question of whether the world has a beginning in time and is limited in space. The thesis (hereafter T) is that the world has a beginning in time, and is limited in space. The antithesis (hereafter A) denies that it has a beginning in time, or is limited in space. Below is the argument for the temporal part of the thesis.22 For if one assumes that the world has no beginning in time, then up to every given point in time an eternity has elapsed, and hence an infinite series of states of things in the world, each following another, has passed away. But now the infinity of a series consists precisely in the fact that it can never be completed through a successive synthesis. Therefore an infinitely elapsed world-series is impossible, so a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence; which was the first point to be proved. (CPR A 426/B 454)
The argument for the antithesis is as follows: For suppose that it has a beginning. Since the beginning is an existence preceded by a time in which the thing is not, there must be a preceding time in which the world was not, i.e., an empty time. But now no arising of any sort of thing is possible in an empty time, because no part of such a time has, in itself, prior to another part, any distinguishing condition of its existence rather than its nonexistence (whether one assumes that it comes to be of itself or through another cause). Thus many series of things may begin in the world, but the world itself cannot have any beginning, and so in past time it is infinite. (CPR A 427/B 455)
Kant’s argument implicitly addresses the question of whether the notion of a temporal series of objects and events can satisfy the following claims: (a) that actual infinity is impossible, and (b) that the coming to be of an event or an object, including the world conceived as a whole, must have a sufficient reason. The 22. The argument for the spatial part for the thesis and the antithesis depends on the argument for the respective temporal part. Since my intention is to analyze the argumentative structure of the first antinomy, and since the spatial part of the argument does not involve any feature that is not involved in the temporal part, I will not address the spatial part of the argument here.
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argument presupposes that it is generally agreed that these two claims are true. Yet, although the notion of a temporal series must be compatible with both claims, Kant’s argument aims to demonstrate that (T) and (A) are compatible either with (a) or with (b), but not with both. Now, (T) and (A) argue for the claim they defend by showing that a temporal series that has the property assigned to it by the proposition that is central to the rival position, say (T), entails that one of these features (a) or (b) cannot be instantiated. In the case of (A), it is the denial of actual infinity, and in the case of (T), it is having a sufficient reason. In other words, the overall argument of the first antinomy aims to demonstrate that the above two features of a temporal series of objects and events – a temporal series the reality of which is assumed to be certain – cannot be true together of the temporal series according to any of the two conflicting positions. In this sense, Kant’s argument addresses the conflict from the point of view of an outside observer, that is, a third, apparently neutral position. Kant’s argument does not end at this point but also includes his solution for the dispute. The solution consists in two steps. The first step is to identify a general principle that also seems to be part of the background of beliefs:
(P) If the condition is given (a temporal event), the whole series of conditions must also be given.
It should be noted that this principle neither entails the thesis of the first antinomy nor the antithesis. Its role in the argument is rather to provide reasons to believe that only one of the conflicting possibilities could be true, or that only one is false. For assuming that the givenness of the conditioned (an empirical event) entails the existence of the complete series of conditions, then either the beginning of the world is entailed by any temporal event, or an infinite series of events is entailed. Yet since neither (T) nor (A) is compatible both with (a) and (b), (P) cannot cohere with the idea that both are true. The goal of the argument is to reveal the need for a conceptual change required for the coherence of the rational grounds of the concept of a temporal series. Kant’s solution to the first antinomy – indeed his solution to all the antinomies – requires P to be abandoned. The solution first identifies a link between (P) and another claim: (Q) The objects and events that are given must be things as they are in themselves. Kant assumes that (Q) is presupposed by (P). However, let us note that (P) and (Q) do not have the same epistemic status. As noted above, (P) is a principle of reason. As Kant painstakingly aims to convince the reader in the first Critique, a direct or indirect perceptual experience that warrants the acceptance of (P) is
Chapter 1. The Kantian framework
inconceivable. On the other hand, (Q) at least appears to be based on common sense. But according to Kant, indeed according to many metaphysicians, judgments that are based on common sense or common practice are to be respected only up to a certain point. In the present context, Kant’s main idea is that (Q) could be abandoned. It could be replaced by a principle that entails its negation without being incompatible with the evidence that we have at our disposal: (R) The sensible things given to us are appearances and not things in themselves. 6. The first antinomy: The implicit argument Kant’s argument seems to address a well-defined subject. Its explicit goal is to resolve a conflict of reason within itself. Yet its additional goal, which is connected to its explicit goal, is to warrant Kant’s doctrine of Transcendental Idealism. The explicit goal is to provide a solution to a rational problem. We may assume that if the argument that establishes Kant’s solution is known to be sound, the argument does indeed solve the problem it is supposed to solve. But the argument is sound only if all of its premises are true. Yet as Kant himself attests, where metaphysical propositions are concerned, there is no epistemic ground other than coherence with the other propositions that may warrant them. What appears to provide an Archimedean point is the alleged incontestable certainty of (a) and (b). Yet, it should be noted that neither (a) nor (b) possess absolute certainty. Nor does Kant claim that they do. They are assumed to be better justified than either (P) or (Q). Kant does not argue for this claim explicitly. The argument implicitly presupposes that (a) and (b) are incontestable. Let it be noted that if the negation of (a) and the negation of (b) were impossible, there would be no room for an implicit argument. But arguments in metaphysics do not “prove” their conclusion in the mathematical or formal sense. This is central to the type of rationality that Kant attributes to this intellectual field. According to Kant, it consists of synthetic a-priori judgments, or at least of pretensions of such judgments. Metaphysical arguments are different from mathematical arguments.23 Clearly, the difference between mathematical and metaphysical arguments cannot consist in the claim that nothing can really be known in metaphysics. For this would have prevented Kant’s own position, indeed his resolution of the antinomies. There is no reason to suppose that the argument examined above, which points out the conceptual chasm associated with the 23. See in particular CPR A 712–713/B 740–741.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
rational conflict and the resolution of this conflict that introduces novel distinctions and novel concepts – Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism – belongs to the logical-mathematical type. In order to clarify Kant’s implicit argument, one must first spell out the main ideas that underlie Kant’s approach to metaphysics.
(1) The metaphysical concepts and propositions that articulate metaphysical intuitions (not in Kant’s technical sense) that form the core of our common sense and common practice at a given historical time need not constitute a self-consistent whole.
This is, in fact, Kant’s initial step. The conceivability of conflicting metaphysical conceptions is inherent to what is pre-critically conceivable.
(2) Metaphysical controversies are the locus of the conflict between these incompatible articulations of intuitions. They uncover the fact that the set of conceivable metaphysical possibilities at a given time need not be a consistent set.
The metaphysician cannot avoid the need to respond to the positions that conflict with her own. There are various types of available responses that result from the significance that the metaphysician attributes to the opposite position.
(3) The response inherently involves one’s own representation of the metaphysical controversy.
(3) is a blind spot in the rhetoric of the argument; that is, it is a part of the argument but does not have an explicit role in it.
(4) A key feature of the way in which metaphysical controversies are represented concerns the weight attributed by proponents to each of the beliefs that are part of the background of the debated propositions.
The attribution of weight is mirrored by the arguments that Kant used. It expresses what is believed to be rationally acceptable. The attribution of the degrees of weight to the background beliefs may coincide with the opponent’s assignment of degrees of weight to the background beliefs. Yet this is rarely the case where two conflicting metaphysical positions are concerned. Clearly, the assignment of degrees of weight to metaphysical beliefs is not disconnected from what is known in the mathematical and empirical sciences. In the case of the first antinomy, the denial of actual infinity was part of the mathematical knowledge of Kant’s time, that is, part of the background knowledge. Two other implicit assumptions that are parts of Kant’s argument are:
Chapter 1. The Kantian framework
(5) The weight of a metaphysical belief is partly determined by its connection to science.
(6) The attribution of degrees of weight consists in the way it figures in the overall system of metaphysical concepts and beliefs.
According to Kant, metaphysics is not a self-enclosed moving whole disconnected from what is known in the empirical and the exact sciences.24 Metaphysical contentions must cohere with warranted scientific theories. Yet even this supposition, which concerns the way in which knowledge is structured, involves the attribution of degrees of weight, which is in principle debatable.
(7) The attribution of degrees of weight is inherently connected to the interest that one has in the controversy, that is, to what one believes to be important.
Kant thought that the rationality of metaphysical controversies could not be disconnected from the interest that the parties involved have in the debate.25 This interest is connected to the human kind of desire and the human kind of (rational) will. This idea is sometimes expressed in Kant’s exegesis as the “primacy of the ethical.” It may therefore be assumed that the attribution of epistemic values to metaphysical beliefs is determined by two types of reasons. One type of reason connects the metaphysical beliefs, individually or collectively, to what is considered to be scientifically warranted. But in most cases, the connection to scientifically corroborated knowledge does not settle metaphysical controversies. The other type of reason connects the metaphysical beliefs to other metaphysical and ontological beliefs. The interest in metaphysical claims to knowledge affects the latter type of reasons. But normally, one is blind to the extent to which it affects one’s judgment. This sort of blindness is one of the main reasons why controversies in metaphysics and the attribution of epistemic values are indispensable for criticism in this field. A fundamental point that Kant’s argument reveals is the following:
(8) The assignment of weight to metaphysical beliefs can change.
Again, this is not an explicit part of the argument. Yet the conceivability of Kant’s own claim to a revision in our notion of objectivity, which is required in view of 24. It should be noted, however, that these commitments that reflect the primacy of science in determining the epistemic value of a proposition need not be shared by all proponents. For example, some regard religious beliefs to be more important than scientific beliefs. Yet, the Kantian model is more suited to the present practice of metaphysics in analytical metaphysics. 25. See in particular the chapter “The Antinomy of Pure Reason, Third Section, On the interest of Reason in these Conflicts” CPR A 462/B 490, and the chapter “The Canon of Pure Reason” in the “Transcendental Doctrine of Method” CPR A 795/B 823.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
the conceptual problems revealed by the metaphysical controversies, can be explained only if (8) is true. It may be assumed that each metaphysical position is bound to attribute degrees of warrant to the various metaphysical propositions that differ from the conflicting positions. The weakening of the epistemic value of some beliefs, and the strengthening of the value of other beliefs, can be accomplished by means of thought experiments, or by other means that reveal new possibilities or new conceptual connections. Yet, this must be done by considering the possibility of rival and incompatible positions that cannot merely be dismissed as contradictory.
(9) In some cases it is not possible to entirely eliminate the metaphysical intuition that grounds the conflict that one aims to resolve by dismissing it.26 The recalcitrant intuition is the basis for an illusion of reason.
This principle is central to the resolution of the conflicts of pure reason. As we shall see in Chapter 5, it plays also a significant role in current metaphysical debates. On the basis of Kant’s example of how innovations in metaphysics should be pursued, one can spell out one of the roles of controversies in metaphysics. The arguments that are acknowledged by metaphysicians as having the normative status of real metaphysical innovations, involve the recognition of a metaphysical problem for which there is no solution within available conceptual resources. The conflict is exhibited by controversies which the new position intends to resolve.27 The motives for constructing a metaphysical position cannot be disconnected from the problem that the relevant controversies reveal. I would like to suggest that this is central to Kant’s concept of metaphysics. Actual and imagined metaphysical controversies are inherently involved in the creative activity of constructing metaphysical positions and arguing for them. Kant’s argument in the first antinomy could be regarded as a paradigmatic example of one powerful type of argument that is used in metaphysical controversies. The explicit representation of the conflict misleadingly presents Kant as an outside observer. The conflict addressed by the argument in fact involves three distinct positions. The argument is intended to shift the justificatory degree of (Q) in order to explain away the metaphysical conflict.
26. In the case of the antinomies of pure reason, the intuition that one cannot eliminate is explicated as the supposition that objects are given to us as they are in themselves and not as they appear. 27. As Bennett (1974) notes, Kant’s arguments in the antinomies were apparently a response to the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence.
Chapter 1. The Kantian framework
Kant believed that change in metaphysics was possible, but only at the price of ruling out all further changes.28 We need not accept the elimination of the possibility of further changes in order to follow his example of how changes in metaphysics are feasible. Not all changes in metaphysics are similar to the radical type of change exemplified by Kant’s own critical philosophy. However, I suggest that the features that his implicit argument reveals could serve as a basis for the account of the rational role of metaphysical controversies in metaphysics, and of why they are both unavoidable and fruitful.
28. With regard to the explicit argument, Dascal’s claim that “...metaphysical controversies do not play any constitutive role in the actual progress of knowledge for Kant” seems to be true. See Dascal (2005: 4–5). Yet, as I have tried to demonstrate here, the explicit argument is in fact part of a far more complex implicit argument in which controversies have a constitutive role in actual epistemic changes in metaphysics.
chapter 2
The idea of controversy and metaphysics 1. The limits of Kant’s theory Kant’s theory of metaphysical controversies contains valuable insights regarding the role of controversies in metaphysics. Yet, as it stands, the theory is incomplete. It leaves out the features of real polemical exchanges. The need to supplement Kant’s theory with an account of the role of polemical exchanges requires some clarification. It might be argued that properties related to polemical exchanges are irrelevant to metaphysics. Features of real communicative exchanges seem to be irrelevant to what metaphysical contentions are about. The methods used by metaphysicians involve reflectively conceiving possibilities, presenting thought experiments, etc.1 Warranting metaphysical contentions seems to be based mainly on grasping how concepts are applied to possible cases, and how a proposition fits other propositions. That is, it is a type of warrant that seems to rule out the relevance of features related to real communicative exchanges. If polemical and other communicative exchanges have any role in determining the rational character of metaphysics, they must be added to the context of discovery together with other psychological and sociological features that seem to be irrelevant to the method of metaphysics and to what metaphysics is about.2 Kant certainly admits that they are relevant to metaphysics in this particular sense. However, a historical examination of the actual conduct of metaphysicians reveals that this objection is flawed. The methods used by metaphysicians do indeed partly abstract from features of polemical exchanges. Features of such exchanges may be irrelevant to what metaphysical propositions are about. Yet, as I hope to persuade the reader in Parts Two and Three of this book, a close examination of the actual way in which metaphysical theories are constructed, distributed, received, or replaced by other theories reveals that in arguing metaphysically, metaphysicians seem to be bound to argue dialectically, that is, to respond to real arguments presented by real philosophers with whom they disagree. The arguments presented by these philosophers exploit the range of layers of the contexts 1.
See for example Jackson 1998.
2. Cf. Rescher 1977: Chapter 8.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
of the exchange and of the background that determines the relevant community of researchers. These dialectical arguments are anything but a superficial layer of the theories presented and defended within this discourse. Traces of the polemical discourse can be detected in the formation of novel concepts, in the reasons that warrant the reception or denunciation of metaphysical theories, and in various other levels of metaphysical texts. How can the features of polemical discourse be involved in metaphysics qua rational discipline without entailing that metaphysical propositions are reducible to features of human nature or human discourse? The response I wish to defend here is that the issues with which metaphysics is concerned are bound to generate metaphysical polemics by virtue of the way they are presented to the human mind. Metaphysical polemics result from attempts to articulate the topics or issues that metaphysics is concerned with in the same way that they are presented to particular individuals in specific discursive contexts. They are anchored in the fact that concept formation and the presentation of metaphysical theories articulate the modes in which the topics of metaphysics are presented to us in particular discursive contexts. When confronted with the diversity of conflicting ways in which metaphysical intuitions are expressed, the positions based on them, and their histories, one is tempted to either endorse metaphysical or ontological relativism, or to be satisfied with one’s own position, and to dismiss the positions that conflict with one’s own as irrelevant. The significance of controversies to metaphysics is revealed when one realizes why an incompatible position cannot be dismissed as inherently irrelevant to one’s own position even if the warrant of a metaphysical contention must also have an intuitive basis. One cannot merely rely on how things are intuitively given since intuitions are defeasible sources of knowledge. Controversies are the discursive means through which other people’s contentions that conflict with one’s intuitions become relevant to one’s own conceptions. In this sense, they have an indispensible critical role in the pursuit of metaphysical knowledge. Paraphrasing Kant, it could be said that metaphysics without metaphysical intuitions is empty. However, metaphysics is to a certain extent blind without real polemical exchanges in which conflicting intuitions are articulated. In the present chapter, I will point out some features of polemical arguments relevant to my present concern. I will then clarify the features of the main type of polemical argument, the epistemic relevance of which to current metaphysics will be examined in detail throughout this book. The following chapter is dedicated to an account of the concepts of metaphysical intuition and metaphysical thought experiments. The study of arguments is a complex and an expanding field of inquiry. Since my intention here will be to spell out the features of a Kantian antinomy conceived
Chapter 2. The idea of controversy and metaphysics
as the form of real polemical exchanges, I will only discuss the issues related to this type of argument. In particular, my concern here will be with features of arguments presented in theoretical and epistemic contexts that are relevant to metaphysical polemics. Also, since my concern here will mainly be with metaphysical controversies between experts in this field, I will focus primarily on features of this type of controversy. My account will leave out many other important issues. Yet, I hope that what I say here will clarify the epistemic significance of polemical dialogues to metaphysics. 2. The nature of controversies as polemical dialogues What distinguishes controversies from other polemical exchanges? Following Dascal, there are three types of polemical dialogues. Dascal distinguishes between two macro-levels of polemical dialogues, namely, the ‘strategical’ level and the ‘tactical’ level (1998a: 19). At the strategical level, he differentiates between three ideal types of polemical dialogues: ‘discussion,’ ‘dispute,’ and ‘controversy.’ The criteria for this typology are: (a) the scope of disagreement, (b) the kind of content involved, (c) the presumed means for resolving this disagreement, (d) the ends pursued by the contenders, (e) the typical way in which the exchange ends, and (f) the cognitive gain (1998a: 21). According to Dascal, at the tactical level, three types of moves are employed in polemical exchanges: ‘proof,’ ‘stratagem,’ and ‘argument.’ Although each type of dialogue allows for the occasional use of the above three types of moves, each type of dialogue “has an inherent affinity with one of these types of moves.”(ibid.) ‘Discussion’ has an inherent affinity with ‘proof,’ ‘dispute’ with ‘stratagem,’ and ‘controversy’ is related to ‘argument.’ According to Dascal, a fundamental property that distinguishes controversies from discussions is that the former allow no solution. Arguments are the tactical means used by contenders involved in a controversy to persuade the addressee to believe that a proposition is true, while a proof purports to establish the truth of a proposition (1998a: 25).3 Controversies are also distinct from disputes. The stratagem, which is the typical tactical means used in disputes, “purports to cause a relevant audience to react in a certain way by inducing the audience to believe that a proposition is true,” (1998a: 25) while arguments “achieve their effect by providing recognizable reasons.” (ibid.) In other words, recognizable reasons are used in 3. It is important to note that the category of proof, identified as a kind of move that establishes the truth in the above sense, is not identical to the category of proof found in axiomatic systems, or exact sciences. If the truth of a proposition is established beyond reasonable doubt, the proposition might very well be false. ‘Beyond reasonable doubt’ is not equivalent to ‘beyond any possible doubt.’
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
arguments (in contrast to stratagems) in order to persuade without providing a solution (in contrast to proofs). Like proofs and unlike stratagems, arguments use reasons in order to persuade.4 The difference between proofs and arguments lies in the kind of relation that the reasons bear to the truth of the proposition. Although I basically accept Dascal’s typology, it raises some questions that are of interest to the present study. The main problem concerns his distinction between the types of reasons used in arguments and in proofs. Dascal’s view seems to be that proofs are truth-directed, while arguments are belief-directed. Yet, this distinction appears to collapse in epistemic contexts. If there is a distinction between purporting to establish that a proposition is true and persuading one to believe that a proposition is true, it seems that there should be a distinction between epistemic reasons for believing a proposition, and epistemic reasons for holding it to be true. But in epistemic contexts, in which the pursuit of knowledge is the goal of the exchange, no such distinction is available. Given the standard account of knowledge, epistemic reasons are reasons to believe that the proposition is true. Assuming that one ought to accept only the propositions that one has sufficient reasons to believe to be true, the recognizable reasons used in epistemic contexts to persuade one to believe that p are reasons related to the truth of p. Also, the distinction between the two types of reasons cannot be based on differences between types of epistemic warrant. Defeasibility cannot constitute the difference between arguments and proofs. In most empirical cases, the recognizable reasons are defeasible. Not all reasons to believe are epistemic reasons, since epistemic motives are often inextricably intertwined with non-epistemic motives. This is an important issue that deserves some attention. Non-epistemic motives are relevant to the account of the nature of controversies not merely where the fundamental layer of metaphysical intuitions is concerned. Entering a debate or ceasing to be involved in it is a deliberate act guided by several kinds of non-epistemic motives: one’s assessment of the personal gain of entering the exchange or terminating it, of the prospects of the sociological and institutional gain to the status of the position or discipline that one advocates, etc. There are cases in which it is difficult to distinguish between the epistemic and the non-epistemic motives. Nevertheless, this does not entail that the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic reasons to believe is lost. This distinction grounds an important type of critical argument used in epistemic contexts. These arguments criticize reasons that express commitment to non-epistemic motives. Arguments that utilize the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic motives are powerful critical tools. 4. Controversies therefore belong to the category of persuasion dialogues. See Walton 1998: Chapter 2.
Chapter 2. The idea of controversy and metaphysics
If one wishes to keep the distinction between the two types of use of reasons denoted by Dascal by ‘argument’ and ‘proof,’ then what distinguishes between them? My response to this question is limited to the metaphysical case. It contains two parts. First, although the idea that in epistemic contexts arguments aim to persuade the addressees merely to believe that p should be rejected, there is a type of acceptance of propositions that lies between acceptance as a mere hypothesis or assumption, and acceptance of a proposition as being outright true. Following Rescher (1977, 2006), this type of acceptance can be characterized as accepting p as a presumption. Accepting p as a presumption is not, properly speaking, a claim to knowledge, and yet it involves a provisional commitment to the truth of p and is related to the pursuit of knowledge. Arguments presented in controversies aim to persuade the audience to accept p as a presumption. Although accepting p as a presumption is not the same as accepting it as true, presumptions are not disconnected from truth. This seems to be close enough to Dascal’s formulation, as far as controversies regarding matters of knowledge are concerned. I will discuss the concept of presumption and its relevance to metaphysical controversies in the following section.5 Next, we should note that according to Dascal, one feature related to the distinction between arguments and proofs is the scope of the disagreement, that is, the way in which the parties involved conceive the disputed matter. I suggest that polemical exchanges that are extensionally equivalent to Dascal’s ‘discussion’ are polemical exchanges in which it is possible to address only the explicit topic of the exchange due to the features of the context and of the subjects discussed. In contrast, in another type of debate that is extensionally equivalent to Dascal’s ‘controversy,’ the overt disputed matter is conceived of as the tip of the iceberg, which is related to many other issues that cannot be separated from the explicit topic of the dispute. A polemic exchange may begin as one type of dialogue, and then become another type. At the initial point, the subject matter disputed explicitly is a particular topic. However, in contrast to discussions, the interlocutors’ choice of reasons in a controversy will be sensitive to the implications of these reasons for their entire position. By contrast, this type of sensitivity is not to be expected in the case of discussions. This difference between controversies and discussions also manifests itself in the motives of the interlocutors to continue the exchange, or to end it.
5. Presumptions have a key role in the project that Dascal calls ‘soft rationality,’ an account of rationality that he detected in Leibniz’s relevant writings. For the significance of Leibniz’s soft rationality to the pragmatic theory of controversies see Dascal 2005b, 2008b, 2008c.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
3. Presumptions and the burden of proof According to Rescher (2006: 1), “[to] presume...is to accept something in the absence of the further relevant information that would ordinarily be deemed necessary to establishing it.” Similarly, in Ulmann-Margalit’s view (1983: 143), “[presumptions] have to do with assumptions made ahead of time...a supposition not fully justified, yet not quite rash either.” The notion of presumption has legal roots and is nevertheless significant for a variety of cognitive and epistemic affairs. It is traditionally associated with the allocation of burden of proof. This seems to be a point of agreement between theorists exploring presumption. Many contemporary theorists agree that presumption has an important role in argumentation theory. Yet, as Godden & Walton note (2007: 313), “argumentation theory lacks a unified, robust account of the nature of presumptions.” My intention in this section will not be to pursue such an account. It is plausible to maintain that it is not possible to assign one concept of presumption to the various uses of ‘presumption’.6 In pursuing an account of the relevant concept of presumption, I will mainly refer to Ullmann-Margalit’s (1983) and to Rescher’s (1977, 2006) illuminating accounts. I will mainly attempt to clarify the characteristics of presumption that are relevant to the epistemic significance of metaphysical controversies. My main claim is that the acceptance of metaphysical propositions has certain features which render them similar to presumptions, though usually they are not conceived as such. The dialectical character of presumptions (to be explicated below) can clarify the motivation to integrate an account of metaphysical polemics in the account of the nature and content of metaphysical contentions. In the article referred to above, Ullmann-Margalit’s main intention is to clarify the role that presumptions have in a theory of action. According to UllmannMargalit (1983: 149), presumption formula should be represented by the string ‘pres (P, Q). P stands for the presumption-raising fact whereas Q stands for the presumed fact. For example, consider (1) below: 1. There is a presumption that a child born in wedlock is legitimate. In (1), the presumption-raising fact is ‘being born in wedlock’, while the presumed fact is ‘being fathered by the mother’s husband’. Ullmann-Margalit next interprets the presumption formula as the following rule:
6. As Freeman notes (2005: 23), there is an obvious difference between presumptions in the legal sense and presumptions in the epistemic sense. Presumptions in the legal sense are stipulative, which seems to distinguish them from presumptions in the epistemic sense. This may support the supposition that there is more than one concept of presumption.
Chapter 2. The idea of controversy and metaphysics
Given that p is the case, you (=the rule subject) shall proceed as if q were true, unless or until you have (sufficient) reason to believe that q is not the case. (1983: 147)
As Ullmann-Margalit notes (ibid.), the presumption formula is propositional. Nevertheless, in her view, presumptions are concerned “not so much with ascertaining the facts as with proceeding on them...”(ibid.) Although presumption rules are associated with inferences, they should be distinguished from them: To avoid confusion, let me draw attention to a distinction. Quite apart from whether or not presumption rules are about inference, there is associated with them a rule of inference. It is the formal rule governing the operation of the ‘pres’ operator: from (i) pres(P,Q) and (ii) p, it follows the (iii) pres q...(1983: 148)
Interestingly, Ullmann-Margalit’s view is that the presumption is not associated with any commitment to the truth value of the presumed fact: So the conclusion of the rule of inference associated with presumption rules is to the effect that a certain fact is presumed. But this is not to be confused with an inference to the presumed fact. And the question with which we started was whether or not what presumption rules are about is inference to the presumed fact(s). In answer to this question I submit that the presumption rule involves no commitment to, nor guarantee of, the truth value of the presumed fact q. It makes no claim upon its subjects’ cognitive or epistemic systems. The rule entitles one to hold q as true for the purpose of concluding one’s practical deliberation on the impending issue; it neither requires nor entitles one to believe that q. (1983: 149)
The distinction between presumption rules and any sort of commitment to the truth of the presumed fact, that is, of any claim upon the subject’s cognitive system, is somewhat surprising. This claim is plausible with regard to cases that are similar to the legal presumption of innocence. Yet it is questionable where other presumptions are concerned; for example, presumptions similar to (1). Clearly, presumption rules do not sanction outright commitment to the truth of the presumed fact. But the claim that the presumed fact makes upon our cognitive system apparently differs from that of a hypothesis or an assumption. In contrast to Ullmann-Margalit, Rescher places the type of commitment related to presumptions between outright commitment to truth and no commitment. He distinguishes between presumptions and assumptions as follows: Presumption is not the same as assumption – let alone presupposition. To be sure, in presuming something we assume (or suppose) it to be so: a presumption is an assumption (or supposition). But the reverse is not the case: not any old assumption (or supposition) is presumption. We can assume something to be so for the sake of discussion or argument or deliberation. But here the result is a mere hypothesis while a presumption is something we actually accept. (2006: 29)
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
Presumption is linked here to differences in types of acceptance concerning one’s commitment to the truth of the proposition: ... acceptance does not lie along a one-dimensional spectrum which ranges from ‘uncertainty’ to ‘certainty.’ There are not only degrees of acceptance but also kinds of acceptance. And presumption represents such a kind: it is sui generis, and not just an attenuated version of “acceptance as certain.” (1977: 42)7
As Rescher notes (2006: 6), “[...] presumption is certainly not knowledge: we do not know what we merely presume.” And yet, “[to] class a proposition as a presumption is to take a definite and committal position with respect to it, so as to say “I propose to accept it as true insofar as no difficulties arise from doing so.”” (2006: 23) Hence, in Rescher’s view (2006: 23), presumption is an epistemic category. A cognitive presumption stakes a claim that outruns the substance of actually available information; it is a proposition that, in suitably favorable circumstances, is accepted as true in the absence of any counterindications. (2006: 27)
In Rescher’s view (2006: 14), presumption and burden of proof represent correlative concepts. As he adds (2006: 19), the idea of burden of proof is not a strict logical concept: “[...] rather than being a logical concept, burden of proof is a methodological one. It has to do not with valid or invalid reasoning, but with probative argumentation in dialectical situations.”(ibid.) Presumption is a dialectical concept, and is central to Rescher’s (1977) account of the epistemic significance of controversies to ordinary and scientific knowledge. Arguments used in dialectical situations, that is, in controversies, aim to shift the burden of proof by providing reasons to accept p as a plausible presumption, and not to persuade one to hold it as being true beyond reasonable doubt. The weight of a presumption is determined by its plausibility or reasonability. However, plausibility should be distinguished from a measure of probability. Various features determine the plausibility of a presumption. As Rescher notes (2006: 40), the probative strength of confirming evidence substantiates the plausibility or reasonability of a presumption. In addition (ibid.), the plausibility of a contention may be based on “thesis-warranting principles.” In this context, inductive considerations such as simplicity, uniformity, specificity, definiteness, and determinativeness come into play. But according to Rescher (2006: 42), the plausibility of a presumption is not merely determined by inductive or probative features. Presumption and the correlative concept of burden of proof are, in Rescher’s view (2006: 22), pragmatic devices that pertain to language users and not to language as such. 7.
See also Rescher 2006: 23.
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In Rescher’s view, the main feature that validates a presumption is its usefulness or pragmatic value: ... the justification of presumption is, in the final analysis, purposive – a matter of future efficacy within the context of purpose in which the practical presumption at issue figures. (2006: 48) A cognitive presumption as such is not a thesis or theory: it represents a practical policy – a modus operandi. (ibid.) ... what justifies one’s making presumptions about factual matters, in the wake of acknowledging that presumptions are not established and certifiable truth? The answer is that presumption is not so much a matter of evidentially probative considerations as of procedurally practical ones. Presumption is a functional, purposeserving device...epistemic presumptions serve as tools to facilitate the objections for which such cognitive practices as communication and inquiry are instituted. And the validation of a mode of practice is always ultimately pragmatic. (2006: 49)
In Rescher’s view, the cognitive role of presumptions is not limited to a particular epistemic field. Cognitive presumptions shape Rescher’s epistemology as a whole. His examples include presumptions such as that regarding the evidence of the senses, and he presents no metaphysical example. Yet, there is an apparent similarity between his account of presumption and the nature of acceptance of metaphysical propositions. The acceptance of metaphysical propositions share many features that are assigned by Rescher to presumptions in general: a. Metaphysical propositions are accepted as true in the absence of the further relevant information that would be deemed necessary to establishing it. Probative and inductive evidence contribute to the plausibility of a metaphysical proposition. But these are not sufficient for accepting them as being outright true. b. Metaphysical propositions are not mere hypothesis or assumptions. They are accepted as true though not as being outright true. c. The acceptance of a metaphysical proposition is linked to the allocation of the burden of proof to those that disavow them. d. Metaphysical propositions are defeasible. Arguments can be produced for accepting them or for disavowing them. Although the acceptance of a metaphysical proposition seems to be similar to the acceptance of a presumption, there also seem to be some differences between the two. It might be objected that, in contrast to Rescher’s account of the nature of presumptions, the acceptance of metaphysical propositions cannot merely be identified with pragmatic value even if their acceptance is similar to the acceptance of a presumption. What is accepted when a metaphysical proposition is accepted seems to extend far beyond human needs and practices. If the claim that the acceptance
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
of a metaphysical proposition means acceptance of it as a presumption, which entails that the reasons for accepting a metaphysical proposition consist merely in its pragmatic value, this claim begs the question. As a response, I submit that the acceptance of a metaphysical proposition cannot be justified merely by pointing out its pragmatic value. And yet, the acceptance of a metaphysical proposition cannot be disconnected from the practical dimension. The practical role of metaphysical propositions in cognitive matters is discernable, for example, in issues such as the unity of science. Needless to say, the acceptance of metaphysical propositions is a source of motivation for a variety of ethical and religious concerns. Note that granting the apparent similarity between metaphysical propositions and presumptions need not be linked to the ubiquitous epistemic role assigned by Rescher to presumptions. Rescher’s standpoint is, in this sense, opposed to Kant’s position, which distinguishes between reason and the understanding. We may suspend judgment on the question of whether presumptions indeed have the ubiquitous role that Rescher assigns them. How could metaphysical propositions be analyzed as presumptions? Consider the following example. Materialists hold that all the properties and objects that our world contains are physical properties and objects. This claim is sometimes stated in terms of possible worlds: Every world that is minimally a physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter of our world.8 In this case, the presumption-raising fact is the main thesis of physicalism: All the objects and properties in our world are physical. Clearly, this claim is not an empirical generalization. It is indeed supported by the success of the physical sciences in explaining physical phenomena without violating the closure thesis (according to which all physical phenomena are explainable merely on the basis of physical properties and relations), but this evidence does not in itself suffice to establish its outright truth. The main thesis of physicalism is a defeasible proposition. The presumed fact in this case is, for example, the contention that conscious phenomena are physical states, properties, and processes. Both the presumed fact and the presumption-raising fact could be challenged. Evidence could be raised against the presumed facts, and, given that enough presumed facts were defeated by contrary evidence, it is more plausible to abandon the presumption-raising fact. Presumptions are defeasible. They are accepted as true unless there are plausible reasons that rebut them. What, however, is the nature of the reasons that can be used to rebut a presumption? This question has an easy answer with regard to ordinary presumptions such as the above (1). In order to rebut the presumption that a child born in wedlock is legitimate one could use empirical evidence, 8. A minimal physical duplicate of a world is a world that contains only physical objects and properties. See Jackson 1998; Chalmers & Jackson 2001.
Chapter 2. The idea of controversy and metaphysics
observations, etc. If it is established, say by means of DNA tests, that a child that is born in wedlock is not legitimate, it would be reasonable to abandon the presumed fact that the examined child is legitimate. If in most cases in which children born in wedlock are examined and revealed to be not legitimate, it would be reasonable to abandon the presumption-raising fact. What, however, are the types of reasons that could be used in order to defeat a metaphysical presumed fact or a metaphysical presumption-raising fact? It should first be noted that the above type of empirical counterevidence clearly will not suffice in order to rebut metaphysical presumptions. There are, I suggest, three types of defeaters of metaphysical presumptions. A metaphysical presumption is disavowed if one reveals its inconsistency with a stronger presumption, that is, a presumption that is more plausible than the first one. A metaphysical presumption could also be questioned on the basis of the metaphysical intuitions invoked, for example, by metaphysical thought experiments, or by other means. Finally, a metaphysical presumption could be undermined by means of arguments introduced by opponents representing competing and incompatible metaphysical positions in metaphysical controversies. The third type of counterevidence is related to the fact that presumptions are not merely defeasible but may also conflict with each other. However, in cases in which there are two or more conflicting presumptions, which one should be accepted? Given Rescher’s account, the answer seems quite simple: the presumption that is more reasonable and plausible. Yet this response is not always helpful when the conflicting presumptions of proponents involved in a controversy are at stake. One cannot assume that plausibility is an objective, quasi-objective, or intersubjective feature of presumptions that is shared by all interlocutors. Each of the proponents may view some of his presumptions as being more reasonable and plausible. In the metaphysical case, the weight of the presumption is determined by empirical information, metaphysical intuitions, as well as one’s practical motives. Opponents involved in controversies could therefore differ in how they assess the weight of their presumptions. The problem raised by such cases is not merely that we do not possess a neutral objective or quasi-objective basis for determining the plausibility of the competing presumptions. The idea of a presumption is correlated with that of a burden of proof, and it is not clear in this case how the burden of proof should be allocated. I will discuss metaphysical intuitions in Chapter 3. In the final section of this chapter, I will clarify how the burden of proof is allocated in cases of metaphysical controversies. 4. Radically opposed views and chains of controversies Controversies are discursive phenomena. They are always carried out by proponents and opponents by means of oral and written acts of communication.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
However, who are the proponents and opponents involved in metaphysical controversies between professional philosophers? Surely, these are individual philosophers presenting arguments for and against some theses in particular discursive contexts. Their aim is apparently to persuade the opponent or the audience to accept the theses they support and to abandon the theses they criticize. Yet, this account does not suffice as a description of what such controversies involve. Contenders may, indeed, defend their own presumptions and attack the presumptions of their opponents. But they may be conceived as representatives of philosophical or metaphysical positions qua something that is shared by other individuals in different historical phases, and not merely their own particular view. In controversies, according to Dascal, contenders hold radically opposed views. With regard to controversies between representatives of opposed metaphysical positions, I suggest that commitment to radically opposed views is commitment to incompatible metaphysical positions. Positions are social, cultural, and historical entities, but they cannot be identified with any set of statements explicitly held by their representatives at a given time; they involve unarticulated intuitions that await articulation, explicit beliefs, and implicit commitment to ethical and religious values, preferences, and principles of relevance.9 Where metaphysics or philosophy are concerned, the titles of such positions are terms such as ‘Platonism,’ ‘Aristotelianism,’ ‘Cartesianism,’ Kantianism,’ ‘Hegelianism,’ ‘Neo-Lockeanism,’ that is, positions that are named after the authors of philosophical systems. Alternatively, they are referred to by means of terms such as 9. Hamblin (1970, 1971) devised the concept of ‘commitment store’ or ‘commitment set’ that allegedly includes a store of statements of the totality of an arguer’s commitments during the sequence of a dialogue. As Walton notes (1998: 43), Hamblin’s notion of commitment was meant for dialogues in which information is exchanged. These dialogues differ significantly from persuasion dialogues, which also include disputes. According to Walton (1984, 1998), where persuasion dialogues are concerned, the relevant concept of commitment differs from Hamblin’s concept. For example, according to his loophole or way-out principle (1984: 138), a respondent should reject or withdraw from any statement that together with other statements implies the opponent’s thesis, either directly or indirectly. I suggest that this violates the sincerity condition, which should preferably or at least ideally be posited in epistemic contexts. Yet, in my view, the idea that one’s commitments may entail statements that are incompatible with one’s own position is significant. Given that one’s commitments do not merely include some statements that one formulates but also every statement that is entailed by one’s commitments, the notion of a well-defined set of commitments is groundless. In particular, assuming that rational creatures are not committed to contradictions when they explicitly conceive them as such, and assuming that some of the statements to which one is committed might entail a contradiction, the strict notion of commitment cannot have clear boundaries. I suggest that commitment should be replaced by presumption, which means commitment to statements that inherently depends on the information extracted from the argumentative-dialogical context that shifts with the evolution of the dialogue as new arguments are presented in it.
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‘Empiricism,’ Rationalism,’ ‘Nominalism’, ‘Realism,’ ‘Logicism,’ ‘Representationalism’, or ‘Disjunctivism.’ In this case, the title of the position originates from the propositions or properties that identify the positions, and distinguishes them from other positions. These propositions are normally associated with a certain theoretical approach to a given set of philosophical or metaphysical problems and questions. Positions can evolve out of positions by means of some distinguishing features. The variety of Kantian positions and Wittgensteinian positions may illustrate these types of positions. Similarly, the varieties of functionalism, representationalism, or HOT theories of consciousness in the philosophy of mind illustrate the same type of phenomenon. Positions in metaphysics are expressed by means of statements that belong to a given natural language. Although technical language is often used, the purpose of introducing new terms is to refine and improve existing vocabulary. Metaphysical positions usually have a claim to what we all mean by what we say, whether we know explicitly what we mean or not. Some of the relevant characteristics of ‘position’ are the following: 1. A position does not normally have clear boundaries, but can be distinguished from rival positions due to the following facts: (a) Each position has a set of propositions expressed in some natural language that are conceived by the supporters of the position as being particularly significant and important. I will refer to this set as the ‘core set’. (b) Some propositions that belong to the core set are incompatible with propositions that belong to the core set of the rival positions, or imply propositions that are either incompatible with a proposition that belongs to the core set of the rival positions, or with propositions entailed by propositions that are in the core set of the rival positions. (c) The propositions that belong to the core set are linked to other propositions that can be expressed in some natural language, and may also include observational statements. 2. A position need not be introduced to the public as a comprehensive worldview. In metaphysical controversies, the explicit topics of the exchange are normally propositions that are explicitly disputed. I will refer to them as ‘symptoms.’ Symptoms indicate the differences between positions.10 The symptomatic propositions need not be part of the core set of the position, but are linked to the core set. 10. These could either be statements acknowledged to be such symptoms at the beginning of the controversy, or statements that are revealed to be a matter of disagreement as the controversy develops. The notion of a symptom is akin to that of ‘thesis.’ See van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1984: 85) and Walton (1998: 39). I prefer the term ‘symptom’ for the following reason: It implies the link between the explicit topic of the controversy at the beginning of the controversy, and the position that lies in the horizon of the intention involved in the act of
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
Metaphysical propositions do not face reality in isolation. They receive support from each other. What representatives of a given position accept as their presumptions is not the same as what the rival position or positions accept as their presumptions. Arguments are used either in order to establish the symptomatic propositions (or propositions that are entailed by them), or to undermine them. Nevertheless, in certain cases, one must distinguish between the explicit and implicit goals of arguments used in a controversy. The explicit goal is to advocate acceptance or denial of the symptomatic proposition. The implicit goal is to undermine one position and to establish the competing position.11 If the explicit goal is accomplished, this does not entail that the implicit goal has been achieved. The implicit goal lies in the horizon of the intention involved in the act of persuasion. Controversies between representatives of incompatible positions involve the positions themselves. This fact has significant results regarding the way in which controversies belonging to this type reach their closing point, as well as the nature of this closing point. Consider, for example, the account of this issue by the representatives of the pragma-dialectical theory. According to the theory defended by van Eemeren & Grootendorst (2004), there are 15 rules of critical discussion. Rule 14 is the following: a. The protagonist is obliged to retract the initial standpoint if the antagonist has conclusively attacked it (in the manner prescribed in rule 9) in the argumentation stage (and has also observed the other discussion rules). b. The antagonist is obliged to retract the calling into question of the initial standpoint if the protagonist has conclusively defended it (in the manner prescribed in rule 9) in the argumentation stage (and has also observed the other discussion rules). (2004: 154)
According to van Eemeren & Grootendorst (2004: 151), the protagonist has conclusively defended an initial standpoint if she has successfully defended both the propositional content called into question as well as the force of its justification. The rules suggested by van Eemeren & Grootendorst are useful in ordinary cases of critical discussions. They are, however, inapplicable to the way in which controversies between representatives of metaphysical positions end, and they are unable to clarify how such controversies evolve from each other. Let us note that it is not clear what ‘conclusive’ means in this context. It may be assumed that the conclusive defense of a position consists in the presentation of persuasive arguments arguing. In other words, the term is sensitive to the fact that controversies tend to develop from one given topic to many other topics that are related to the positions taking part in the controversy. 11. Arguments used in controversies usually comprise both goals.
Chapter 2. The idea of controversy and metaphysics
that the other party is currently unable to counterattack. However, in many cases, the mutual recognition of the participants that the antagonist or the protagonist have presented persuasive arguments for the position they support does not result in the attacked party’s retraction of her initial position. Nevertheless, this should not be depicted as an irrational move on the part of the attacked proponent. Rather, this move may reflect her presumption that the current absence of good reasons that undermine the persuasive power of the arguments presented to attack her position does not entail that such reasons will not be available at a later time, and that the current non-availability of such reasons does not suffice to undermine the strength of the presumption in favor of the attacked proposition. The controversy between the parties involved may be stopped but not terminated. It may be stoped without the losing side retracting the proposition she defends. This situation can be compared to the differences between winning a battle and winning a war. The battle may have been won, but the war lingers on. A new controversy addressing the same issues between different representatives of the same positions, in which different presumptions are challenged, may emerge out of the first controversy. The new controversy may also spread to other topics that were not explicitly discussed in the initial controversy. Yet the explicit topics discussed in the new controversies are inherently related to the results of the first round of controversies in a way that allows a rational reconstruction of this development. I will use the phrase ‘chain of controversies’ to refer to a class of controversies that evolve from each other and are linked to each other. Normally, in metaphysics these are controversies between incompatible positions represented by different representatives of the positions in each stage of the development of the chain. Let us sum up this section by noting that one way of pointing out why arguments used in controversies do not provide solutions consists in the distinction between their explicit goals and their implicit goals. A successful argument cannot be evaluated without noting how it enhances or diminishes the plausibility of the whole position that is part of the horizon of the intentional act. Nevertheless, in assessing the results of a controversy, particular attention should be paid to the way in which the arguments used affect the plausibility of the positions involved, and motivate the contenders or the non-active audience to either accept or reject them.12
12. According to van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 34, a conflict is resolved “only if somebody retracts his doubt because he has been convinced by the other party’s argumentation or if he withdraws his standpoint because he has realized that his argumentation cannot stand up to the other party’s criticism.” This, I suggested, is a rather narrow conception of resolution. In fact, where metaphysical controversies are concerned, complete resolution is very rare. Nevertheless, as I hope to show in what follows, controversies motivate significant changes even when they are not completely resolved. On this issue see also Walton (1998) Section 7.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
5. The addressee According to Perelman (1982: 11), “argumentation is intended to act upon an audience, to modify an audience’s conviction or dispositions through discourse...” In controversies, one party endeavors to persuade another party by means of reasons. However, who is the addressee that one is trying to persuade? To what audience is she speaking? The addressee might be the opponent herself, that is, the person criticized by the contender. But this is not always the case in public controversies in which messages are publicly distributed. Indeed, in public controversies, contenders directly address and interpret what their opponents say by exploiting the variety of layers of meaning of their opponent’s symbolic message. But in addition to the contenders themselves, controversies held in public contexts also involve an audience, comprised of observers that are not actively involved in the exchange but are exposed to it. In many if not most such controversies, the agent that one intends to persuade is not one of the contenders but rather a competent audience of observers.13 As Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca note (1969), an audience is constituted by agreements. The agreements that constitute audiences naturally differ between audiences. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (ibid.: 28) distinguish between the type of argument addressed to a specific audience, that is, arguments that aim to persuade, and the type of argument addressed to an audience that transcends all specific audiences – the universal audience. The latter type of argument includes arguments that aim to convince rather than persuade, that is, “to gain the adherence of every rational being.” (ibid.) Which audience is addressed by the arguments presented by contenders involved in metaphysical controversies? In Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s terms, it might be supposed that the audience is the universal audience that consists of all rational beings. But what is a universal audience? One way to interpret this term is to claim that arguments that are meant to convince the universal audience should be arguments that address any rational being whatever her presumptions might be. Another way is to maintain that the arguments that are meant to persuade every rational being hold with respect to all such beings even if not all rational being would necessarily be persuaded by them. The use of arguments in metaphysical controversies is clearly not merely intended to persuade a particular audience but to convince all rational beings. Yet the arguments presented in real controversies address the universal audience if at all, in the second of the above suggested interpretations. These are arguments that are meant to persuade a particular audience although they are meant to be valid for all rational being. These two apparently conflicting features presumably reflect the arguers’ presumptions that there is no point trying to convince all possible rational beings whatever their 13. See van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 99.
Chapter 2. The idea of controversy and metaphysics
presumptions might be in order to establish what they consider to be the most plausible resolution of a conflict for any rational being.14 Particular audiences are constituted by particular agreements, and the agreements relevant to the audiences that speakers and writers address in metaphysical controversies is constituted by agreements of what they accept as their presumptions. The audience may consist of supporters of one of the contenders, intellectually mature ordinary agents who are not familiar with the matter at hand, professional philosophers from a specific philosophical genre, agents who share the same religious background, scientist from a certain discipline (physicists, cognitive scientists, and neuroscientists), students beginning to form their intellectual identity, and so forth. The nature of arguments is naturally also determined by the identity of the intended addressee. The choice of rhetorical means, the types of moves used, and the type of information exploited and distributed are adapted to the intended addressee – the agent that the interlocutor intends to persuade by means of her argument. For example, if the opponent’s arguments criticize a religious position held by the contender, the goal of her response need not be to persuade the opponent, but rather to enhance the self-assurance of the audience of observers who share her religious views. Alternatively, her goal might be to persuade an intellectual audience that supports neither her position nor her opponent’s position. The identity of the intended addressee can be revealed by examining the means used in the communicative exchange of symbolic messages. For example, a contender who wishes to persuade her opponent will avoid insulting her opponent and will refrain from invoking arguments that ridicule her opponent’s position. On the other hand, such rhetorical means might be used for an audience consisting of non-active neutral or supportive observers. 6. Persuasion and the rational support of reasons In a controversy, the parties involved often tend to articulate their differences in terms of the propositions that each one accepts or denies. However, their differences also consist in what each contender accepts as good reasons. The contender that recognizes the differences in how she and her opponent conceive reasons to be good or bad does not normally think that the reasons she provides would only be valid for her. It might be supposed that a rational dialogue is not possible in 14. According to Frogel (2005: 47), the speaker of a philosophical text is obliged to present herself “as one whose objective truth alone or...fear of illusion is what motivates and drives...” Interestingly, this characteristic may hold with respect to the above two suggested interpretations of the universal audience.
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contexts in which the disagreement concerns the adequacy of the available reasons. In these contexts, there is clearly a temptation to depict the recalcitrant opponent as irrational, so that one would lose the motivation to try to persuade her in a rational way, that is, by using reasons. But in many cases, attempts to persuade the opponent do not stop when contenders realize that the reasons considered to be “highly convincing” are not regarded as such by the opponent. This is probably the most baffling feature of controversies. The differences between contenders are not merely limited to the matter under dispute. They also include the rational support for or against the issue at hand. How can the dialogue continue when this type of difference is revealed? How can one persuade one’s opponent in these contexts? On the one hand, contenders should attempt to persuade their opponent by means of reasons, that is, in a rational way. But, if the rational support provided by the contender’s reasons is interpreted differently by the contender and the addressee, it seems that arguments cannot be used for persuasive purposes. My response to this query will be limited to the case of metaphysical controversies. One source of the above puzzle is presumably the tendency to view conflicting metaphysical positions as incommensurable. But this view is misguided. Metaphysical controversies are not based on theoretical solipsism. The language of metaphysics that combines scientific, technical, and ordinary discourse makes it possible for there to be radically opposed positions without entailing that there are no points of intersection between them. Radically opposed metaphysical positions cannot fail to have points of intersection if they have a claim to the most basic features of being (there is only one being!), thoughts about being, and the language in which they are expressed. The common background suffices to assure the possibility of persuasion in contexts of disagreement such as those of radically opposed metaphysical positions. The goal of persuasion, in this case, is not merely to validate a statement by using reasons, but rather to lead the opponent or the audience to also accept these reasons qua good reasons. Validating the proposition and establishing the reasons qua reasons are not two distinct acts. By using reasons in particular dialogical contexts, contenders attempt to establish the matter at hand and to persuade the opponent or the audience to accept them as good reasons. 7. Epistemic function Controversies do not allow a solution. Yet given that controversies motivate epistemic changes, whether or not they allow solutions may change over time as a result of these epistemic changes. The responses that are available within a controversy and to a controversy are context-bound, and depend on the actual state
Chapter 2. The idea of controversy and metaphysics
of knowledge, and the theories, concepts, methods, and procedures with which contenders are familiar. If persuasion as rational activity is feasible, there must be some recognizable reasons available to advocates of the opposite position that are linked to reasons provided by the contender’s argument. Ordinary knowledge of meaning does not merely allow incompatible positions but also makes it possible for a person to criticize a position from another person’s standpoint. It is a truism that ordinary knowledge of the meaning of a statement does not involve the explicit knowledge of all the statements implied by it. Arguably, contenders do not know some of the implications of the (symptomatic) statements of the positions they hold. In the ideal case, a position is internally complete if it can account for all the facts, phenomena, problems, and questions it purports to deal with. We may assume that no position is internally complete at any given point of time relative to what is conceivable by experts who advocate it and those experts who dispute it. The concept of conceivability-at-a-given-point-of-time is distinct from timelesslyconceivable.15 The rational support one could provide for a position on the basis of what is conceivable-at-a-given-point-of-time t differs from the timeless concept of a rational support. Conceivable-at-a-given-point-of-time indicates what is explicitly and reflectively available to contenders, that is, what is really conceivable to them. Being conceivable-at-a-given-point-of-time t and having the respective rational support at a time t may converge with timeless-conceivability and the respective timeless rational support. At least, there is no reason to suppose that they will never converge. Yet, what is conceivable-at-a-given-point-of-time t may differ from what is conceivable at an earlier time t-x or later point of time t+x and, therefore, also from timeless-conceivability. Naturally, the rational support for a given statement will change due to the changes in what may be really conceived. By contrast, timeless-conceivability is unaffected by the time something is conceived. Conceivable-at-a-given-point-of-time also makes it possible to distinguish between what is conceivable from within a given position, that is, from within the core set that makes it the position that it is, and what is conceivable from within the position that is incompatible with it. Where metaphysics is concerned, it is questionable whether timeless-conceivability allows conflicting positions, that is, if one assumes that all the relevant information is available to all contenders. It is possible to add that given conceivability at t may differ from conceivability at a later time t+x, contenders may not be aware of the scope and force of the internal difficulties, problems, and questions before the controversy begins.16 15. For a similar distinction, see Block 1990: 57. 16. For a closely related claim, see Freudenthal (1998: 158). As Freudenthal claims, “the opponent ... does not necessarily know all the statements which are or can be integrated into this system.”
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
By ‘real-possibility,’ I mean ‘conceivable-at-a given-point-of-time.’ ‘Real-possibility’ as used here is an epistemic modality. It stands for the conceptual capacities actually possessed by experts that advocate or oppose a given position; that is, the concepts they can explicitly conceive and employ by making judgments and by presenting arguments, and which are accessible to cognitive employment. Propositions that employ concepts and distinctions that are not available “yet” to the experts but can nevertheless be added to the position without conflicting with the core set that identifies it do not represent really possible states of affairs. Clearly, what is really possible may change in the course of time. In order to have some conception of an actual case of epistemic change that might be motivated by a controversy, let us first introduce a distinction between two kinds of arguments that might be used by contenders in controversies: (A) Arguments that aim to reveal internal difficulties taken by the arguer to be unexplainable by the position X that she is attacking. However, the reasons used in her argument do not use the presumptions related to her own position Y (presumptions that are incompatible with the position attacked). Such an argument might either use statements that are presumed to be compatible with the shared background (as represented by the contender) or with the core set of attacked position itself.
Type (A) could be regarded as providing direct support for the arguer’s position only if one assumes that either position X or position Y is well-founded, but not both; that is, if there is no third alternative.17 Such cases are clearly very rare. A second type of argument is the following: (B) Two contenders S1 and S2 argue for two incompatible positions P1 and P2. Both acknowledge the need to provide an explanation of a given fact f stated in their common language. An argument used by S1 has the following features: (a) it points out the fact that f is unexplainable within P2, (b) it demonstrates how f is explainable by using reasons related to propositions that are either (i) presumed by S1 to be part of the core set of P1 (and are not part of P2), or (ii) reasons related to propositions presumed by adherents of P1 and P2 that together with some commonly accepted novel reasons support the plausibility of a presumption that is part of the core set of P1 (and not of P2) and that explains f.
Clearly, successful arguments that belong to type (B) undermine P2 by providing support to S1’s position P1. But this is not the only significant feature of this type of argument. Representatives of incompatible positions naturally differ in the propositions that they accept as presumptions. They will naturally tend to view the propositions accepted as presumptions that are part of the core set of their 17. For a similar view, see van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 173.
Chapter 2. The idea of controversy and metaphysics
own position as more plausible than those that are part of the core set of the rival position(s). Yet, this does not entail that all presumptions have equal normative status and that the contenders involved in the controversy are not aware of the differences in the normative status between the presumptions related to each position. To take one example, the presumptions shared by property dualists do not have equal normative status and equal plausibility as those of the supporters of physicalist/functionalist positions in analytic philosophy of mind. Although dualists may be convinced that what they presume is more plausible than what physicalists and functionalists presume, this does not entail that they are not aware of the fact that their position is the minority position. This difference is significant to the allocation of the burden of proof. Arguments of type B are particularly effective in shifting the burden of proof to the majority side. They do this by attempting to persuade their target audience that the propositions that both parties presume to be true cohere better with the propositions that are part of their core set than with those that are part of the opponent’s core set. The arguments that aim to shift the burden of proof to the majority side must therefore be sensitive to the agreements that constitute their target audience (in Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s sense). Positions are constituted by the conceptual links between the variety of presumptions (the presumption-raising facts) that form their core set and also by the links between the presumed facts. Hence, by connecting the propositions that are part of the core set of their own position to those that are presumed by both parties the users of type B arguments render their position relevant to that of the rival and incompatible position. There are at least three different types of ‘epistemic change’ within a controversy: (α) A phenomenon that has not been explained by S1 by using the rules, principles, available concepts and theories of her position P1 (that constitutes what is really-possible for her) is explained by applying the already established principles, available concepts and theories, types of arguments and existing evidence as a result of a challenge posed by the opponent.
(α) is probably the weakest case of growth of knowledge. It requires only the application of existing types of reasons, procedures, methods, and theoretical knowledge. (β) Certain phenomenon that has not been explained by S1 by means of the rules, principles, and theories that are really-possible within her position P1 is explained by using new concepts and principles, new types of arguments, or even by employing new methods as a result of a challenge posed by her opponent S2. In providing these novel explanations, S1 acquires new beliefs without having to revise her old beliefs, in particular those beliefs that belong to the core set of her position, which comprises the statements that she accepts and her opponent rejects.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
Type (β) represents a case of what might be called ‘growth of knowledge within the position.’ The opponent’s challenge initiates the discovery of new explanations, and new reasons without having to give up the propositions that are questioned by the opponent. (γ) Suppose that the positions P1 and P2 held by two experts S1 and S2 respectively are distinguished among other things by the fact that the core set of P1 includes {p, q, r...} that S2 does not accept. Difficulties and unanswered questions revealed by the arguments presented by S2 are within the scope of what S1 regards as the desired goals of her position, of what from her own standpoint she has to address in order to defend her position. It is not really possible to resolve these difficulties without eliminating some of the propositions that belong to the core set of the position.
The epistemic relevance of controversies is most notable in the epistemic changes of type (β) and type (γ) that are motivated by arguments belonging to type (B). The most interesting class of such changes includes changes that are motivated by arguments that belong to type (B); that is, arguments that render a position internally relevant to an opposite position. A unique kind of epistemic change is generated by arguments which the persuasive resolutions they offer to problems recognized by supporters of a given position as internal problems of their positions provide direct support for the opposite position. However, if the arguments used by S2 belong to type (A), the result will be different. These arguments point out the difficulties involved in S1’s position without rendering S2’s position relevant to S1’s position, and therefore, without providing direct rational support for S2’s position. Equipped with the above distinctions, it is now possible to point out the interesting feature exhibited by a modified concept of a Kantian antinomy, that is, an antinomy conceived as a polemical phenomenon. A modified Kantian antinomy is a case in which arguments used by representatives of P1 against P2 and by representatives of P2 against P1 both belong to type B. In other words, an antinomy is a case in which (distinct) arguments used by S1 and S2 challenge some of the presumptions that are part of the respective core set of each of the respective two incompatible positions P2 and P1. By virtue of the arguments used by each contender, they are recognized to be internally relevant to the contrary position. The burden of proof lies, in this case, with both sides. This type of antinomy could be viewed as a pragmatic antinomy. As we shall see in the following chapters, interpreting a polemical exchange on a given metaphysical issue as an antinomy in the above sense is a useful rhetorical move that motivates the introduction of significant epistemic changes by means of an argument that aims to resolve the antinomy. There is more than one type of response to an antinomy, depending on how the antinomy is interpreted.
Chapter 2. The idea of controversy and metaphysics
The most modest type consists in the attempt of one of the contenders to reinterpret the contentions used in her opponent’s argument that challenges her presumptions in a way that coheres with her conceptual framework. A second type of response introduces new concepts and distinctions that provide better support for one of the existing positions. A third type of response consists in the introduction of a new position P3 that differs both from P1 and P2. The new position includes some new core propositions that are not acceptable to S1 or S2. This kind of response, which could be called ‘the revisionary response,’ characterizes Kant’s argument for Transcendental Idealism. In Part Two of this book, I will examine controversies in which the response to conflicts interpreted as antinomies belongs to the first and to the second type. In Part Three, I will examine the revisionary type of response. However, before addressing these interesting issues, we must examine the notion of intuition in metaphysics and metaphysical controversies. The next chapter is dedicated to this task.
chapter 3
Intuitions, thought experiments, and controversies 1. Introduction Intuitions are indispensable to metaphysics. Yet metaphysical intuitions often conflict, and are prone to generate metaphysical controversies. Surprisingly, the nature of conflicts between intuitions and their relevance to metaphysics has been overlooked by current metaphysicians.1 The minor attention paid to the role of conflicting intuitions in metaphysics is presumably due to the belief that such conflicts merely indicate the fallibility of intuitions. Indeed, most of the topics with which metaphysics is concerned do not belong to the contingent kind. The theories regarding ‘substance,’ ‘property,’ their connection to ‘possibility,’ ‘necessity,’ ‘actuality,’ ‘existence,’ ‘being,’ ‘causation,’ ‘identity,’ and so forth, do not merely hold in this or that possible world.2 But intuitions may be the grounds for false contentions even when the judgments that they motivate are not about contingent states of affairs. One of the conflicting statements or beliefs that are based on intuitions may be fallible in the sense that it does not express a possibility. The fallibility of metaphysical intuitions is indeed significant for an account of their role in metaphysical controversies. Yet, fallibility does not suffice to clarify the role of conflicting intuitions in controversies. In order to clarify what is at stake let us begin by noting that, in many cases, conflicts between intuitions are conflicts between the articulation of intuitions by metaphysicians that have equal claim to the supposedly shared ordinary conception.3 Given that intuitions constitute what seems to us most obvious and central, 1. There has been much philosophical discussion regarding the role of intuitions in philosophy and in the epistemology of modality. See in particular the collection of papers edited by M. De Paul and W. Ramsey (1998), and Levine (2004). However, there has been almost no discussion of the nature of conflicting intuitions and their role in metaphysics. Yablo (1993) is an important exception. 2. It could be added that these terms are ‘semantically stable’ in Bealer’s sense (1999: 23). An expression is semantically unstable if the external environment makes some contribution to its meaning. It is semantically stable, if the external environment makes no such contribution. 3. In some cases, these are conflicts between the intuitions of one and the same subject.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
conflicts between philosophers that have equal claim to the supposedly shared ordinary conception may lead to radical skepticism regarding the very possibility of metaphysics. Conflicting metaphysical intuitions seem to jeopardize the very foundations of metaphysics as rational and objective enterprise.4 How can one know that one’s own intuitions are reliable if one lacks the means to rule out the reliability of the contrary intuitions that have equal claim to the (allegedly shared) ordinary conception, that is, the reliability of what seems most obvious and central to someone else? Given this type of conflict, if intuitive seeming is not open to critical and rational arguments, metaphysical knowledge is not possible. In the next sections, I will attempt to clarify how the above puzzle could be resolved by examining the similarities and differences between intuitions and beliefs. I will assume that cognitive presumptions are belief-like states. I will then examine the role of a unique kind of metaphysical thought experiment, with which I will be concerned in other parts of this book. I will conclude this chapter by spelling out the nature of one type of progress exhibited in metaphysics, which is inherently linked to metaphysical controversies. 2. Intuitions and beliefs According to Bealer (1996a, 1996b), intuition is propositional seeming.5 Regardless of whether or not all intuitions are states that have propositional content, it is clear, I suppose, that the intuitions relevant to our present concern motivate assertions that have propositional content.6 How are intuitions related to beliefs that have propositional content? According to Jackson, the purpose of conceptual analysis in serious metaphysics is to reveal our shared ordinary conception. “But how should we identify our ordinary conception?,” he asks, and goes on to answer: 4. Cf. Yablo 1993: 37–38. 5. Not all metaphysical intuitions are propositional. Some of them concern entailments. For example, the knowledge intuition related to the knowledge argument, which will be discussed in detail in Part Two, consists in the entailment of the statement that Mary does not know what it feels like to see red tomatoes by the description of Jackson’s imagined situation. But the notion of propositional seeming suffices to clarify the distinctions with which I am concerned in the present section. 6. Some philosophers distinguish between intuitions of objects and intuitions of facts or propositions. For example, Kant’s explicit notion of intuition seems to be of the former kind. In the Critique of Pure Reason, the term ‘intuition’ (Anschauung) is defined as a singular and immediate representation of an object (A 320/B 377). I will not discuss this distinction in the present context.
Chapter 3. Intuitions, thought experiments, and controversies
The only possible answer... is by appeal to what seems to us most obvious and central about free action, determinism, belief, or whatever, as revealed by our intuitions about possible cases. Intuitions about how various cases, including various merely possible cases, are correctly described in terms of free action, determinism, and belief, or, as it is often put nowadays, our folk theory of them. (Jackson 1998: 31)
In Jackson’s view, intuitions are my intuitions or yours: “...my intuitions about possible cases reveal my theory...likewise, your intuitions reveal your theory”. (1998: 32) But how can they form the basis of an objective endeavor, as Jackson believes they do, if intuitions reveal my theory or yours? His answer is: To the extent that our intuitions coincide, they reveal our shared theory. To the extent that our intuitions coincide with those of the folk, they reveal the folk theory. (1998: 32)
This characterization apparently allows for the possibility that different people’s intuitions may either coincide or fail to coincide. My intuitions or your intuitions may reveal our shared conception if they happen to coincide, and if they coincide with the folk conception. But there is no assurance that they will coincide. Conflicts between intuitions are conflicts between what “seems to us most obvious and central.” It might be suggested that such conflicts must result from differences between the explicit responses and the intuitions themselves. This appears to be a promising suggestion, though one must carefully examine what it involves. There are indeed cases in which it is possible to detect differences between a person’s intuitions and her responses. For example, according to Jackson, A person’s first-up response as to whether something counts as a K may well need to be discounted. One or more of: the theoretical role they give K-hood, evidence concerning other cases they count as instances of K, signs of confused thinking on their part, cases where their classification is, on examination, a derivative one...their readiness to back off under questioning, and the like, can justify rejecting a subject’s first-up classifications as revealing their concept of K-hood. (1998: 35)
Some of the overt responses of a given subject may conflict with her overall responses. In Jackson’s view, ...extracting the cases that count as K’s from a person’s responses to possible cases is an exercise in hypothetico-deduction. We are seeking the hypothesis that best makes sense of their responses taking into account all the evidence. (1998: 36)
Clearly, a person may fail to grasp how her responses are connected. It is questionable, however, whether intuitions can be uncovered by conducting the above
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
type of investigations. Such investigations seem to presuppose that intuitions can be revealed by examining a given person’s responses up to a given time. But the above sort of tests cannot distinguish between one’s immediate responses that are expressions of beliefs or habits and the articulation of intuitions.7 Intuitions, however, should be distinguished from beliefs and habits.8 Consider, for example, Gettier cases. Before being exposed to Gettier examples, most epistemologists believed (or presumed) that the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge were justification, truth, and belief. After Gettier introduced his examples, most epistemologists changed their beliefs regarding the conditions that constitute knowledge. Clearly, before Gettier, epistemologist did not entertain the belief that the traditional account of knowledge does not suffice for knowledge. Before they were exposed to the Gettier examples, no such dispositional state, belief, or belief like mental states was part of their cognitive system. No such state influenced their deliberations and actions, or was expressed in their utterances. However, before Gettier introduced his examples, did they have the intuition that eventually led them to judge that the traditional account of knowledge does not suffice for knowledge? The question is a bit puzzling, and yet, it is reasonable to suppose that they had the intuition all along.9 Being exposed to Gettier’s examples did not generate the intuition. In this case it is reasonable to suppose that their previous beliefs had changed due to the intuition that they had all along, that is, the intuition invoked or made explicit by Gettier’s argument and
7. It should be added that it is difficult to explain modal errors. As Yablo notes (1993: 32), “What makes us hesitate is not that conceiving can sometimes lead astray, but that we have so little idea how this happens.” 8. Bealer also distinguishes between intuitions and beliefs. But in Bealer’s view, the ground for the distinction consists in the fact that “... belief is not aseeming; intuition is. For example, there are many mathematical theorems that I believe (because I have seen the proofs) but that do not seem to me to be true and that do not seem to me to be false; I do not have intuitions about them either way. Conversely, I have an intuition – it still seems to me – that the naive comprehension axiom of set theory is true; this is so despite the fact that I do not believe that it is true (because I know of the set-theoretical paradoxes).” (1996a: 123) In other words, according to Bealer, the feature that distinguishes intuitions and beliefs is the plasticity of beliefs. My reasons for distinguishing intuitions and beliefs differ from Bealer’s reasons. Intuitions, I maintain, are not cognitive states similar to beliefs, and they are open to change. 9. I am not suggesting that whenever a change in philosophical or metaphysical beliefs is discernable, the intuition was there all along. As I will clarify later, there are cases in which the intuition is missing before the argument.
Chapter 3. Intuitions, thought experiments, and controversies
the examples he employed in it.10 Clearly, if they had the intuitions and did not have the belief, then beliefs should be distinguished from intuitions.11 3. The fallibility of intuitions The temptation to confuse intuitions and beliefs is presumably due to the features they share. The articulation of intuitions consists in judgments that are naturally accompanied by the formation of beliefs that have the same content. Like beliefs, they seem to have mind-to-world satisfaction conditions, and they are as fallible as beliefs are. Nevertheless, intuitions differ from beliefs. In order to pursue an account of the feasibility of resolutions of metaphysical conflicts, let us first attempt to grasp what constitutes the fallibility of a metaphysical intuition. We might first note that intuitions do not face the tribunal of reality in isolation. Intuitions manifest hierarchical order and complex relations of dependencies that allow one to rule out an intuition that conflicts with other intuitions that seem more central and important. In this sense, they parallel presumptions. Some intuitions are context-dependent in the following sense: Given a particular epistemic and discursive context, subjects are prone to intuitively respond in certain ways. Yet, when one changes the context by conceiving or imagining new possibilities, or by adding new empirical information, the context-dependent intuitions lose their hold upon us. Clearly, context-dependent intuitions are fallible. Context-dependent intuitions differ from intuitions that do not vary from context to context. There is no reason to suppose that all intuitions are contextdependent, even if we arguably lack reasons that prove that some of our intuitions do not vary from context to context. Some intuitions may be stable and will not change when the context changes. But which intuitions belong to the former type, and which belong to the latter type? In some cases, there may be reasons to distinguish between the two types. Yet, given that at any given point of time we do not possess the comprehensive evidence required to determine which intuition is context-dependent and which is context-independent, we might fail to know which of our intuitions is context-dependent and which is context-independent.
10. It was on the basis of this intuition, not on the basis of a definition of knowledge that the Gettier examples were conceived as counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge. 11. Let it be stressed that the fact that we must assume that the intuition was there all along in cases that are similar to the Gettier case does not entail that all changes in what one believes or presumes are changes in which one is bound to assume that the intuition was there all along. I will address this point in what follows.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
Discursive contexts also include polemical exchanges. By revealing the inconsistency between one’s intuitive responses that have equal claim to ordinary conception, by pointing out the relevant features of contexts, and by providing conceptual information relevant to the disputed issues, polemical arguments can rationally motivate changes in ways one responds to possibilities. In particular, as the conflicts between metaphysicians’ intuitions that have equal claim to ordinary shared conception indicate – the kind of conflicts with which I am concerned in the present book – we cannot suppose that the allegedly shared conception is coherent. If two conflicting contentions articulate conflicting intuitions, which one is the reliable one? Let us assume that we lack the empirical means to determine which of the conflicting contentions is true. Whether conscious states are identical to physical or functional states can hardly be determined merely by appealing to empirical considerations. Similarly, whether personal identity consists in psychological continuity, bodily continuity, or the continuity of one’s life as a human being is not determined merely by means of empirical information. One may contend that what may determine the matter at stake in such polemical exchanges are possibilities that have not yet been conceived. The introduction of such new possibilities (by means of thought experiments, or by other means) may reveal the connection between one of the disputed intuitions and the shared intuitions. The appeal to new, as yet unconceived possibilities is indeed a significant move in the attempt to resolve conflicts between intuitions. It may support one of the conflicting intuitions and uncover the unreliability or emptiness of the opposed one. But, as many real cases testify, such a move almost never suffices to reveal the unreliability of opposed intuition. The new conceivable possibilities could be interpreted in conflicting ways by also invoking issues that pertain to the deepest level of thought and language. I will address this important issue in detail in Sections 4–6 below. 4. The emendation of intuitions The distinction between context-dependent and context-independent intuitions, on the one hand, and intuitions and beliefs or acquired habits, on the other hand, might suggest that the ordinary shared conception contains the resources to provide a rational resolution to conflicts that do not allow for empirical resolution. This type of resolution shows that the responses of one of the interlocutors express beliefs and/or intuitions that could be ruled out in the face of other intuitions that are already at our disposal. However, some of the most interesting metaphysical conflicts cannot be resolved in this way. As we shall see in the following chapters,
Chapter 3. Intuitions, thought experiments, and controversies
in these contexts, intuitions seem to pull in conflicting directions due to features of the current scientific and ordinary conception. Such conflicts indicate gaps in the shared ordinary conception, that is, the sense in which it either lacks rational unity or is indeterminate. The articulation of many philosophical or metaphysical problems involves the recognition of such gaps. They are grasped as philosophical or metaphysical problems when one realizes that it is not possible to reconcile the conflict by using the available established means. The recognition of such gaps often (though not always) results from relevant polemical exchanges. A rational resolution of such problems requires a unique type of creative act that goes beyond the state of the ordinary conceptual framework at a given point of time. It often involves the introduction of new concepts and distinctions. It seems that being persuaded or dissuaded by means of arguments involves appealing to one’s intuitions and, yet, in these cases there are no relevant intuitions. Nevertheless, even in these cases, arguments that attempt to resolve the conflict are available. These arguments are not merely based on the appeal to intuitions. They involve the introduction of new concepts and distinctions that are, properly speaking, not part of the shared ordinary conception. The recognition of the conflict that indicates the gap is the first move in such arguments. The other move aims to persuade the addressee that a resolution of the conflict is feasible by means of the new concepts and distinctions that the argument introduces. This type of argument seems to have the features of an argument to the best explanation.12 As noted above, intuitions are not identical to beliefs. Yet, when they are made explicit, they may generate beliefs and presumptions. Moreover, because they are connected to non-epistemic motives and practical concerns, that is, to the variety of institutions and practices that characterize one’s own form of life, intuitions may generate patterns of thought that preclude change despite the persuasive rational force of the argument that advocates it. Although we possess the rational capacity to pursue an impartial viewpoint on a disputed matter, we do not possess a viewpoint that can escape from our dispositions. The rational amendment of intuitions must be carried out from within one’s cognitive system. A single critical persuasive argument rarely suffices to amend intuitions. Nevertheless, we possess the capacity to amend our intuitive responses on the basis of enough persuasive arguments assessed as such from an impartial viewpoint, which attempts to leave out all non-epistemic motives, subjective goals, and so forth. If a person is presented with a sufficient number of persuasive arguments, she is expected to rationally amend her responses. Following Kant, one may assume that awareness of this rational ought is part of our first-personal capacities. Nevertheless, it is in a sense also third-personal: consciousness of 12. See Swoyer 1999.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
oneself from “outside” one’s desires and goals. This unique view possessed by rational creatures (and which other animals presumably lack) attempts to abstract from all sorts of particular dispositions without losing hold of the world. This is a point of view from which one may criticize others or even oneself. Yet, there is no assurance that a person would necessarily amend her psychological dispositions as a response to persuasive arguments. The rational power of persuasive arguments is not equivalent to causal power. It motivates or inclines one to freely abandon the old dispositions by operating from within one’s cognitive system by means of rational intuitions, and not by means of imposition. The possibility of modifying intuitions is significant to the controversy-based approach regarding progress in metaphysics. The reality of such changes is corroborated by the history of this discipline, and there is no need to examine whether or not any changes are motivated by metaphysical controversies. Rather, it is important to search for the role of controversies in pursuing metaphysical knowledge. There are two questions that arise in this context. The first one concerns the features of the epistemic contexts within which metaphysical investigations are carried out. The second question is whether the unique features of these epistemic contexts entail that metaphysics has unique subject matter. 5. Intuitions and the role of imagined ideal cases One significant feature of the epistemic contexts that are unique to metaphysics – in particular to the metaphysics of mind – is that investigations that belong to this type often appeal to intuitions aroused by thought experiments that involve imagined ideal or technically impossible cases.13 Clearly, metaphysical investigations that aim to reveal the theories implicit in our ordinary conceptions are not limited to these types of cases. They also make use of ordinary examples. Nevertheless, in many cases, some of which will be examined in what follows, the imagined ideal or technically impossible cases serve as paradigms around which a complex discourse evolves.14 Where metaphysical intuitions are concerned, the imagined case, the assertions that it motivates and the assertions it entails seem 13. By ‘technically impossible cases’ I mean cases the possibility of which is conceivable though we do not possess the technology to realize them. 14. Consider, for example, Descartes’s dream argument, Locke’s example of the cobbler and the prince, Shoemaker’s Brown-Brownson case, and the imagined ideal case involved in Jackson’s knowledge argument. All of these represent imagined ideal or technically impossible cases around which a whole discourse evolves. In Parts Two and Three I will examine the controversies that evolved around some of these cases.
Chapter 3. Intuitions, thought experiments, and controversies
to comprise one whole.15 Yet, although the intuitive response to an imagined ideal or technically impossible case is linked to the assertion that it motivates and to the entailment of other assertions, each appears to be logically independent of the other. The imagined case is represented with the intention of rendering some interpretation of an ordinary sentences true in the imagined situation. But the imagined situation seems to contain “more” than what is graspable merely on the basis of the concepts of the intended interpretation that guide the act of representing of it. Though contenders may agree that the given sentence is true in the imagined case, they may disagree as to which sentences are entailed. Leaving out confused thoughts, or the inaccuracy of slapdash responses, these differences reflect conflicting interpretations that cannot all be true. Nevertheless, it is not possible to determine merely on the basis of the imagined case which propositions are expressed by the ordinary sentences. For example, consider Jackson’s knowledge argument, which will be discussed in detail in Part Two. Jackson invites his readers to imagine that Mary, an exceptionally brilliant scientist who is locked in a black and white room in which she has spent her whole life until the day she is released, already knows all the facts about the physical information related to the perception of objects.16 Knowledge of all the relevant physical facts is apparently an ideal possibility. Given this imagined ideal case, one is asked to consider the question whether Mary learned anything new when, upon her release, she saw the red color of a tomato. Imagining this case in the context depicted by Jackson seems to motivate the acceptance of the following statement:
15. As I noted above, in Bealer’s view (1996b: 4–5, 2002: 74) a philosophical intuition is a propositional seeming. Seeming is understood “not in its use as a cautionary or “hedging” term, but in its use as a term for a genuine kind of conscious episode. For example, when you first consider one of de Morgan’s laws, often it neither seems to be true nor seems to be false. After a moment’s reflection, however, something happens: It now seems true; you suddenly “just see” that it is true. Of course, this is intellectual seeming, not sensory or introspective seeming.” (1996b: 5) He distinguishes between physical intuitions (When the house is undermined, it will fall) and a priori intuitions (Something cannot be true and false at the same time). In Bealer’s view, “a priori intuitions about hypothetical cases are often being erroneously called thought experiments.” (ibid.) He seems to believe that thought experiments involve physical intuitions (intuitions about laws of nature and about the physical behavior of objects) and that the former should be distinguished from a priori intuitions. As I hope to convince the reader in the following chapters, at least where metaphysical thought experiments are concerned, it is not possible to separate physical intuitions from a priori intuitions. 16. See Jackson 1982, 1986.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
(1) A person may know all the relevant facts about the physical features of the perceptual mechanisms involved in the perception of physical objects, but will nonetheless learn something new upon seeing red objects for the first time.
Many philosophers agree that (1) is true. Yet, as the controversies that evolved around the knowledge argument clarify, they disagree on their interpretation of (1). Philosophers tend to provide conflicting answers regarding whether (2) is entailed by (1).
(2) Experiences instantiate non-physical (qualitative) features.
Some philosophers believe that (2) is entailed by (1) while others deny this. Jackson’s thought experiment is in fact contrived to motivate one to entail (2) from (1). But the majority of philosophers deny that (2) is entailed by (1). Physicalists deny this entailment, even if they accept that (1) is true. Yet even they disagree on the interpretation of (1). For example, they may disagree as to whether the qualitative features of experience are representational (physical) features of experienced objects and states of affairs, or intrinsic non-representational (physical) features. Assuming that contenders have a claim to the meaning of ordinary sentences, such conflicts between interpretations at least indicate differences in their beliefs or presumptions regarding the meaning of (1). Clearly, knowledge of meanings must include the ability to correctly apply terms to objects and properties in a variety of contexts. Yet, such knowledge does not suffice to rule out conflicting interpretations.17 We do not seem to lose touch with ordinary language. Yet, as I noted, philosophers may agree that some interpretation of a given sentence is true in the idealized, imagined context, that is, an interpretation that seems to be the ordinary one, and nevertheless disagree as to which statements are entailed. Their conflicting assessments of (1) and (2) indicate that differences regarding the use of words in these contexts are not dichotomous. Although they seem to agree on the use of some sentences (namely, that the intended sentences that depict the imagined case are true), they do not agree on what is entailed by it, and, in many cases, cannot really state precisely how their conceptions differ. Their attempts to produce arguments for and against (2) are meant to rule out the conflicting interpretations and to explicate what (1) involves, not by means of an arbitrary 17. Some philosophers, most notably Kathleen Wilkes (1988), believe that many metaphysical thought experiments are flawed due to the fact that the relevant context of the thought experiment is not determined. In contrast, it could be argued that good metaphysical thought experiments are as determined as they could possibly be. They represent possible situations by using the relevant available conceptual means, even if they do not suffice to rule out conflicting interpretations.
Chapter 3. Intuitions, thought experiments, and controversies
stipulation of what it should mean but, rather, by means of the painstaking and creative act of analysis. As we shall see in what follows, this is highly significant for grasping the role of polemical dialogues in metaphysics. 6. Objectual imagining, propositional imagining, and imagining ideal cases Two interconnected questions about intuitions arise in these epistemic contexts. The first question concerns the type of epistemic role of the imagined ideal case in the thought experiment with respect to the judgments and entailments that it motivates. The second question concerns the fact that metaphysical investigations revolve around ideal possibilities or technically impossible circumstances that can be merely imagined, that is, that leave ordinary use behind. I will consider these questions in turn. In imagining ideal possibilities, one is guided by the use of sentences of a particular natural language. But as is clear from what I have said so far, the imagined case does not merely serve to make what is conceivable independently of the act of imagining more vivid.18As Yablo notes (1993: 26), we may distinguish between propositional imagining and objectual imagining; that is, between imagining, say, that the tiger is behind the curtain and imagining the tiger itself. As Yablo adds, only the former has alethic content – the kind that can be evaluated as true or false –, while only the latter has referential content – the kind that purports to depict an object (ibid.). I suggest that imagining a situation is objectual imagining, which is the type of imagining relevant to modal and metaphysical inquiries. But it is guided by propositional imagining. In imagining situations, we may imagine them as determined by the concepts that guide the construction of the situation without imagining all the properties instantiated by the objects involved in the imagined situation. The fact that the understanding guides the imagination in representing the imagined case might blur the gap between the imagined situation and propositional imagining. The imagined case is represented with the intention of rendering a given proposition true in that context. Nevertheless, the imagined case seems to allow for a gap between one’s beliefs as to what the sentences that one is using mean and what these sentences actually mean. The gap could be explained by supposing that the ordinary conception implicit in ordinary knowledge of 18. Let it be noted that imagination should not be confused with a faculty of our mind that inherently involves sensible presentations. Though it may also involve such presentations, it doesn’t have to involve them. It should rather be conceived as the capacity to represent what is neither remembered nor perceived “as if” real.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
meaning is not fully determined, even if it may contain clues or restrictions of how one has to pursue its completion. 7. Imagined ideal cases and perception The differences between imagining ideal or technically impossible cases and propositional imagining are helpful in explaining the clash between philosophers’ responses to possibilities. The imagined situation seems to provide a shared background that is similar to that provided by the perceptions of objects and states of affairs. This background allows different interlocutors to rationally debate issues that are of a most abstract nature. Nevertheless, it is important not to confuse the role of imagination with that of perception. To imagine, even objectual imagining, is not equivalent to perceiving “as if.” When one imagines a brilliant scientist who knows every physical fact about the perception of red objects, the imagining person does not “as if” perceive anything. The gap that separates the imagined case and the concepts that guide the imagining of the case seem to suggest that imagining ideal or technically impossible cases has the same features of perception. The gap appears to be similar to the gap that, according to some philosophers, separates the conceptual capacities and the sensible capacities involved in perception. But a gap between concepts and perceptual information, if such a gap exists, is not the same as a gap between intended interpretations of sentences and imagined ideal cases. Confusing imagination and perception blurs the epistemic role of imagined ideal cases and the nature of controversies that evolve around them.19 Supporters of underdetermination arguments maintain that perceptual information is open to conflicting interpretations. But even if one grants the claim that the imagined ideal case allows the conflicting interpretations by virtue of its being underdetermined, in these contexts, underdetermination cannot be the same as that involved in perception. In the perceptual case, sensible data, which is what words are about, is underdetermined. In contrast, the imagined ideal cases may allow conflicting interpretations due to the fact that meaning is partly indeterminate. The fact that the choice between the conflicting interpretations is not “merely arbitrary” indicates the differences between the articulated beliefs involved in the intention to represent an ideal imagined case and the content of what one represents. Though these differences seem to be similar to the differences between beliefs about the content of perception and the content of perception, it is more reasonable to suppose that these differences are related to the fact that in imagining 19. Modal mistakes are different from perceptual mistakes. See Yablo (1993: 32–33).
Chapter 3. Intuitions, thought experiments, and controversies
an ideal case one represents situations that are intentionally represented as involving concrete individuals and properties though, properly speaking, such individuals are not given to one as they are given to us in perception. The appeal to imagined ideal cases, contemplating their features by linking them to ordinary states of affairs, seems to be a source of information that guides the attempts to look for a better defense of a given position. But reflective contemplation of ideal possibilities may be informative, sometimes contrary to one’s expectations. It may reach beyond the intended sense, even beyond shared ordinary knowledge of meaning. It allows conflicting interpretations without rendering the choice between them arbitrary. And yet, one cannot decide on a disputed matter merely by contemplating the features of the imagined case. These reflections suggest that the interplay between language and the capacity to imagine ideal cases operates in two opposite directions. Imagination is guided by concepts, but it may also inform our beliefs regarding the meanings of words. The interplay between imagination and conceptual capacities seems to be consistent with a central feature of meaning. Yet, the apparent similarity between cases in which the appeal to imagined ideal cases informs our beliefs and cases in which beliefs regarding meanings change in the face of new perceptual and scientific information might be a source of confusion. I assume that it is widely agreed that explicit beliefs regarding meanings are open to various kinds of changes. Yet this feature is usually depicted as linked to progress in the empirical sciences, to etymological investigations, and so forth. Here again one must be cautious not to confuse the empirical and the metaphysical context. Assuming that perceptual objects are fully determined, one can maintain that ‘water’ now refers to the same liquid that filled the oceans and lakes 2000 years ago, even if our beliefs about the meaning of ‘water’ differ from Aristotle’s (false) beliefs. Yet, the type of changes relevant to the differences between our beliefs about the meaning of a natural kind term such as ‘water’ and Aristotle’s beliefs is not of the type of changes that are relevant to metaphysics. Metaphysics is not unconnected to empirical knowledge (rather, as I suggested, it presupposes empirical knowledge). But to the extent that changes in explicit beliefs regarding meanings result from controversies that address idealized cases, the metaphysical case differs from the empirical case. The role of intuitions regarding imagined ideal or technically impossible cases seems to support the view that this type of investigation is an a priori type of investigation. Idealized cases are naturally linked to ordinary cases given that ideal cases are idealizations of ordinary cases. Conflicting intuitions regarding such cases are naturally also relevant to ordinary cases. But the attempt to resolve such conflicts merely by appealing to intuitions regarding ordinary cases might be hindered by the gap that separates idealizations and ordinary cases. Idealizations and technically impossible cases are not empirically testable. Another way
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
to respond to such conflicts is by means of dialectical arguments, and it is interesting to note that the relevant dialectical arguments usually do not make use of the methods that are used in the natural sciences. The nature of dialectical arguments encourages the view that metaphysics is the a priori layer of science. As we shall see in the next section, there are additional reasons to hold this view.20 8. Logical matters and “matters of fact” The differences between the role of perception in empirical knowledge and the role of imagined situations in metaphysical thought experiments may lead to the conclusion that metaphysics is not a genuine branch of science. In the present context, I will not attempt to argue for the scientific adequacy of metaphysics. Rather, like those that practice metaphysics, I assume that it is indeed adequate. In the present section, I will clarify the sense in which the themes of metaphysics are unique, as revealed by the conflicting intuitions that motivate metaphysical controversies. Does metaphysics deal with unique issues? Consider the issues involved in the metaphysics of mind. Metaphysical inquiries appear to be about the same topics studied in psychology, the cognitive sciences, and the brain sciences, which are questions regarding the ontological character of the human mind, the nature of experiences, representations, and personhood, and other related issues. The uniqueness of metaphysics cannot merely consist in the claim that it is concerned with the most basic features of the entities investigated by psychologist, cognitive scientists, and neuroscientist. There seems to be no reason to suppose that the empirical sciences are not concerned with the deepest layers of the domain that they investigate.
20. Let it be noted that in order to endorse this view, one need not hold the assumption that conflicts between interpretations of ideal cases are in principle not resolvable by empirical means. An interpretation that is linked to empirical explanations may be favored over a conflicting one. We have no a priori assurance that such empirical resolution will not be available. Nevertheless, we have no assurance that a link to empirical explanations will be available, and in some cases it even seems highly difficult if not impossible to conceive of the feasibility of such a resolution. At any event, the actual practice of metaphysicians cannot really be described as the search for empirical explanations that may resolve metaphysical conflicts. The progress manifested by metaphysician’s intellectual activities is mainly the result of contemplation and of the dialectical exchange with other philosophers.
Chapter 3. Intuitions, thought experiments, and controversies
There is, however, one feature that is most notable in the chains of controversies that have unfolded in the philosophy of mind, which seems to be particularly important in clarifying the sense in which metaphysical investigations differ from empirical investigations. In the first section of this chapter, I noted that metaphysics is not concerned merely with what is true in a particular possible world. Yet, given the variety of available dualist and physicalist positions, if any of these positions is true in our world, then it is contingently true, that is, true in our world without ruling out the possibility of its being false in other worlds.21 This is, to be sure, a controversial position. Nevertheless, it seems to be consistent with the supposition that if metaphysics involves questions such as those related to the mind-body problem, it does not have a unique field of inquiry. The only difference between metaphysical investigations and relevant scientific investigations, if there is such a difference, is a methodological one. Some features of this field do not allow one to determine which of the competing positions has better chances of being true on the basis of empirical data. Metaphysical investigations about the nature of our minds are, therefore, investigations about factual matters. Yet, as is familiar to anyone acquainted with metaphysics, it must be noted that arguments for or against a metaphysical position inherently involve the appeal to logical matters, such as issues that address our modal concepts and logical concepts. To be sure, the logical, semantic, and modal theories are debatable on their own right. The fact that they motivate the acceptance of a given metaphysical position is considered in some cases as a reason to argue for or against the logical theory itself. This mixture of “matters of fact” (Are persons identical to their bodies?) and logical matters (What is the nature of identity?) is unique to metaphysical investigations and to the metaphysical intuitions invoked in them. I suggest that the uniqueness of the metaphysical intuitions related to the metaphysics of mind consists in, among other things, the inherent connection between matters of fact represented as imagined ideal or technically impossible cases and implicit or explicit commitment to a debatable logical theory. This explains why conflicts between attempts to articulate metaphysical intuitions are not merely conflicts about possibilities that could be classified as belonging to the realm of “matters of facts,” but are also conflicts that tend to expand to one’s logical intuitions.22 The differences between conflicting metaphysical intuitions cannot be explained by noting that intuitive responses to imagined cases express possibilities that are true in some world but are false in our world. Here the concept of possibility faces its limits of intelligibility. This further supports the view that metaphysics is not just an empirical discipline. The problem is not merely that we 21. In particular, see Chalmers 1996; Jackson 1998. 22. As shown in Chapter 1, this feature is central to Kant’s implicit argument.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
lack the proper empirical means to resolve the disputed matter. If arguments for and against the nature of some “matters of fact” involve conflicting attempts to articulate intuitions regarding our logical concepts, they cannot be merely founded on empirical means.23 9. Types of responses to conflicts of intuitions Let us attempt to relate the issues discussed here to those discussed in the previous chapter. Recognizing a conflict between intuitions may lead to at least four types of responses: a. One of the contenders presents arguments that aim to disavow an intuition by refusing to endorse some features of the thought experiments, or even by presenting the whole activity of conducting such experiments as groundless, that is, by rendering the possibility it allegedly represents and the link between the sentences that guide its depiction incoherent or empty. An example of this type of response is Dennett’s (1991, 2005) refusal to accept that arguments such as Jackson’s knowledge argument or Chalmers’s zombie argument are significant for the account of conscious states.24 The arguments used by such contenders are usually arguments of type (A) discussed in Chapter 2. b. The second type of response endorses the presumption that the ordinary interpretation of the sentence that describes the imagined situation is true. It nevertheless denies the controversial conclusion drawn by the opponent. This is achieved primarily by reinterpreting the relevant sentences with or without adding novel distinctions or forming novel concepts. In the first case, the arguments to which the contenders respond are arguments of type (A) discussed in Chapter 2, and the type of epistemic change involved fits type (α). In the second case, they are arguments of type (B), which fit type (β) discussed in Chapter 2. c. A third type of response also maintains that the sentences that describe the imagined possibility have a true interpretation which is incompatible with that involved in the argument being disputed. Yet, according to this view, the intuitions of the opponent require a deeper explanation than merely refusing to accept it. According to this view, these intuitions are natural though deceptive. They are the cases of a unique type of cognitive illusions. Kant believed that reason is a faculty that naturally involves such illusions which 23. Cf. Janet Levine 2004. 24. I will discuss Dennett’s response to the knowledge argument in Chapter 5.
Chapter 3. Intuitions, thought experiments, and controversies
we cannot avoid even if we can avoid the mistakes to which such illusions lead. Current examples of this type of response are Papineau’s (2002) notion ‘intuition of distinctness,’ which involves an illusion, Tye’s claim (2000) that the explanatory gap is a cognitive illusion based on our natural cognitive capacities, and Jackson’s similar claim (2004).25 This type of response usually involves arguments of type (A). The epistemic change related to the discovery of the illusion is that of type (β). d. A fourth type of response denies that we can establish one of two conflicting interpretation as the true one. Arguments that establish this conclusion are of type (B). This type of argument is close to Kant’s notion of an antinomy. Arguments belonging to this type of response aim to show that each of the conflicting intuitions is reliable. Nevertheless, given the available conceptual repertoire, it is not possible to provide better support for one of the conflicting views. Regarding the problem of consciousness, the position that maintains that we are unable to know how to resolve the conflict is called ‘mysterianism’.26 Yet mysterianism is not the only option here. As we shall see, if this move is just one step in an argument that motivates one to pursue an alternative theory, it involves the introduction of novel concepts and distinctions; that is, it involves significant epistemic changes. 10. Controversial relevant alternatives I will conclude this chapter by readdressing the notion of epistemic progress discussed in Chapter 2. I will attempt to clarify the notion of progress that suits metaphysics and metaphysical controversies. Arguments used in metaphysical controversies may involve or motivate epistemic changes. What could ‘epistemic change’ mean with regard to the articulation of metaphysical intuitions? A response should consider the type of change actually exhibited in metaphysics. At first sight, it appears that the notion of progress is hardly applicable to metaphysics. No attempt to establish a substantial metaphysical claim, to resolve a disputed contention, or to provide a solution to a metaphysical problem enjoys the status of being generally accepted among metaphysicians. This seems to be as true now as it was in Kant’s time. Metaphysicians more often than not dispute each other’s contentions and theories, and the solutions they offer for metaphysical problems. Nevertheless, the absence of general agreement among metaphysicians does not necessarily indicate a lack of progress. Upon a close examination of the discourse of metaphysics, it 25. I discuss these positions in Chapter 5. 26. See McGinn 1991, 1999.
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seems that even though metaphysicians seem to argue about almost everything, they nevertheless seem to agree, either implicitly or explicitly, on the importance and significance of a novel argument that introduces a novel problem, a novel way of presenting a problem, or a novel resolution of a metaphysical problem. They seem to agree that a given argument establishes a position as a relevant alternative to their own position, even if they deny the intuitions, do not share the view that the revealed problem is a genuine one, or do not agree with the resolution offered. Hence, it is important to distinguish between the significance attributed to such arguments and the acceptance of what they aim to establish. Such a distinction may serve to clarify a notion of progress that is relevant to metaphysics. Progress does not mean differences between statements generally assumed to be true by the members of a given research community at a given point of time t and statements that are generally accepted as true by members of the same community at a later time t’. Progress in this context does not involve changes in the general acceptance of a statement or a theory, but rather changes in the general acceptance that a given position enjoys the status of a relevant alternative. A controversial relevant alternative is not a generally accepted statement or theory, but rather a position supported by an argument or set of arguments that articulate metaphysical intuitions. It is generally recognized in the relevant community as being relevant and significant for the rational evaluation of the rational support that is provided by the articulation of metaphysical intuitions by adherents of other positions. A controversial relevant alternative is relevant to the account of the topics at hand, regardless of whether the conclusions of the arguments are accepted or denied, or even of whether one disapproves that the argument is sound. Controversial relevant alternatives effectively transform the horizon of real possibility. They are therefore recognized as important, even though they are nevertheless disputable. Clearly, a relevant alternative must have a certain degree of coherence. It must be able to shed light on the phenomena addressed, and it should be consistent with the background of the research community. The relevant alternative has competing alternatives. What renders the alternative relevant is that one has to consider it when establishing one’s own position, even if one’s position conflicts with the conclusion provided by the relevant alternative, or with its premises. Accepting a position as a relevant alternative at least implies recognizing that its intuitive appeal indicates real features of our ordinary conception, whether or not one accepts its articulated contentions. I suggest that establishing a novel position as a relevant alternative or an existing position in a novel way by means of persuasive arguments constitutes epistemic progress. The arguments that can account for the role of a relevant alternative in metaphysics are successful arguments that fall under type (B), which was discussed in Chapter 2. Contenders that respond to what they regard as relevant alternatives
Chapter 3. Intuitions, thought experiments, and controversies
(at least implicitly) represent them as presenting a type (B) argument, which is an argument that persuasively connects some features or states of affairs the existence and importance of which they accept as uncontroversial, and a substantial proposition that they intuitively reject. Not all arguments invoked in metaphysical controversies address an opposed position as a relevant alternative. Arguments can be used in order to undermine the position’s implicit claim to being a relevant alternative. But as we shall see below, this type of argument differs in its results from the type of argument that recognizes a position as a relevant alternative. Clearly, no philosopher merely aims to establish her metaphysical position as a relevant alternative. She normally aspires to establish it as the only true position. The ironic relationship between what the metaphysician aspires to achieve by means of successful arguments and what she actually achieves seems to be crucial to this type of inquiry. These ironic relations reveal the gap between one’s intuitions and the rational grounds of one’s presumptions. When one’s intuitions are at stake, one does not allow the opposed alternative to have equal claim to truth. But as far as the normative notion of progress is concerned, progress should also be evaluated in terms of the changes in the status of a position as a relevant alternative for the research community. 11. Conclusion In the following chapters, I will mainly address two types of epistemically effective arguments in metaphysics, namely, arguments that establish a position as a relevant alternative, and arguments that effectively respond to relevant alternatives. To be sure, an effective argument involves persuasive reasons that also motivate the acceptance of a certain position without addressing relevant alternatives, real alternatives or merely conceivable alternatives. But its persuasive force also depends on whether the argument can establish a relevant alternative by responding to competing relevant alternatives. To the extent that only one metaphysical theory is true, we cannot avoid the need to respond to competing alternatives. Yet, there is usually more than one effective response to a relevant alternative. Each of these effective responses is incompatible with the others.27
27. Though Hegel underscored the importance of the dialectical and historical characteristics of reason, the role of arguments in establishing and reestablishing positions, and the fact that there is more than one way to respond to a controversial relevant alternative, seems to rule out his position as a possible candidate for explaining the role of controversies in metaphysics.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
The issues discussed in the present chapter are rather abstract. However, I hope that my examination of some actual debates will help persuade the reader that the position defended here is a relevant alternative to the current conception of the nature of metaphysical controversies, conflicting articulations of intuitions, and their relevance to an account of the nature of this intellectual field. The following chapters are devoted to this task.
part two
The knowledge argument
chapter 4
The polemical character of the knowledge arguments 1. Introduction In Part Two and Part Three of this book, I will attempt to confirm the ideas presented in Part One by examining some debates in the current metaphysics of mind. In Part Two, I examine the controversies related to the knowledge arguments. Controversies pertaining to the knowledge arguments explicitly address the nature of conscious phenomenal qualities, but, as we shall see, they are not limited to this topic. One disputed issue is the nature of phenomenal properties. Another disputed issue is that of the nature and availability of psychophysical explanations. My concern in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will be with debates that address the first topic. In Chapter 6, I will deal with the questions related to mental causation and psychophysical explanations. The term ‘knowledge argument’ is usually associated with the argument in Jackson’s paper “Epiphenomenal qualia”(1982) (EQ). Knowledge arguments in the sense of the term used in this book are arguments that draw ontological conclusions from epistemic properties. Debates on knowledge arguments have a long history that extends beyond the last five decades. Nevertheless, though participants in the recent debate in analytic philosophy of mind sometimes refer to earlier positions in the history of metaphysics, the earliest arguments addressed are arguments that were first presented about 50 years ago. In other words, the recent debate on the mind-body problem is dissociated from the earlier historical phases of debates on the same topics. The recent knowledge arguments are arguments that dispute the feasibility of the most promising philosophical approaches to the mind-body problem presented in the 1950s and the 1960s: the identity theory and functionalism in the philosophy of mind. These were arguments that rendered the old ideas relevant to the main themes of contemporary physicalist positions. These positions were explicitly receptive to the novel scientific ideas that emerged in the 20th century in the computer sciences, cognitive sciences, physics, biology, and related disciplines. Though the issues involved in the arguments that challenged physicalism were not new, the reasons used to support them were novel
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
reasons that were able to challenge physicalism from within the physicalist’s scientific and philosophical framework. Jackson’s knowledge argument was preceded by at least two famous arguments that challenged the main presumptions of the physicalist and functionalist-reductive approaches to conscious mental states: Kripke’s modal argument presented in “Identity and necessity” and in Chapter 3 of Naming and Necessity, and Nagel’s argument presented in “What is it like to be a bat?”. These arguments seemed to present a new agenda of problems that metaphysicians and philosophers of mind needed to deal with in addressing the ontological features of the mind-body problem. The knowledge intuition – a feature of conscious mental states that was either dismissed or overlooked by most accounts of the mind in the 1950s and 1960s – became the main feature of conscious mental states that any account of consciousness had to address. As I hope to show in the present chapter, the persuasive power of the knowledge arguments can also be traced to their polemical structure. This chapter is dedicated to a short presentation of these arguments. There is a vast literature on each of them. As will be shown in the chapters that follow, they serve as the foundations for the later development of the philosophical discourse on consciousness. I do not intend to cover the complex issues, arguments, and conceptual changes related to these arguments in detail. Rather, I will focus on features that are relevant to the account of the nature of polemical arguments and polemical dialogues. 2. Kripke’s modal argument for dualism as a polemical argument In Naming and Necessity, Kripke’s main concern is with issues related to the meaning of proper names, natural kind terms, and the distinction between epistemic modalities and metaphysical modalities. The first two lectures include arguments that challenge a set of descriptivist semantic theories of proper names, and present an alternative account of the meaning of such terms. The third lecture extends this account to natural kind terms, and presents an argument for mind-body dualism using the results of the first two lectures. Though Kripke’s views on meaning and modality were immediately recognized as an outstanding philosophical achievement, his argument for mind-body dualism that is based on these views was debated by many philosophers. My intention in the present section will be to take a fresh look at his argument for mind-body dualism. I will claim that it establishes his position as a relevant alternative to a large number of physicalist positions that accept Kripke’s semantic and modal theory, and nevertheless wish to reject the dualistic conclusion of his argument.
Chapter 4. The polemical character of the knowledge arguments
As several responses to Kripke’s account attest, many physicalists tend to view his account of meaning and modality not merely as compatible with their physicalist and scientific positions, but as actually supporting them. For them, the fact that Kripke’s argument supports the opposed metaphysical position is therefore baffling. As I will attempt to show, Kripke’s argument exemplifies the features of the type B argument discussed in Chapter 2. Kripke’s argument is a polemical argument that addresses the identity theory defended by Place (1956), Feigl (1958), and in particular by Smart (1959). Kripke’s argument led to much discussion and attempts to refute it. Although the majority of philosophers of mind do not accept Kripke’s dualistic conclusion, many of them recognized its importance. They recognized the fact that if they wished to defend their position, among other things, this required a response to his argument. I will begin with a very brief review of Kripke’s account of meaning and modality. As Kripke notes, identity statements – statements such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ – express necessary propositions. Given that identity is a relation between an object and that object itself (and not a relation between the symbols that flank the identity sign), one cannot analyze proper names as having the same meaning as an identifying description, or a cluster of such descriptions. Say that Hesperus is the heavenly body that rises in the evening at XYZ, and Phosphorus is the star that rises in the morning at X’Y’Z’. If Hesperus and Phosphorus are different names of the same star, Hesperus is necessarily identical to Phosphorus (Hesperus is necessarily identical to itself). As Kripke clarifies, if Hesperus and Phosphorus are two names of one and the same heavenly body, one cannot substitute ‘Hesperus’ with an identifying description such as, say, ‘the star that rises in the morning at X’Y’Z’ or with a class of such descriptions. Note the four statements below: 1. Hesperus is Phosphorus. 2. Hesperus is the star that rises in the evening at XYZ. 3. Phosphorus is the star that rises in the morning at X’Y’Z’. 4. The star that rises in the evening at XYZ is the star that rises in the morning at X’Y’Z’. In contrast to the necessity of (1), statements (2), (3), and (4) express contingent propositions. A name is a rigid designator. It refers to the same object in all possible worlds. The fact that in contrast to (1), the sentences in (2) and (3) are not, properly speaking, identity statements, does not entail that identifying descriptions have no role in the account of meaning of proper names. According to one interpretation of Kripke’s views, the role of the descriptions involved in (2) and (3) is to fix the reference of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus,’ not to provide synonyms for these names.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
The distinction between the meaning of proper names and the way in which their reference is fixed is linked to another distinction that Kripke discusses in Naming and Necessity, namely, that between apriority and necessity. As Kripke clarifies, the content of a priori knowledge need not be a necessary proposition. Similarly, a proposition could be necessary even if it is not known a priori. (2) can serve as an example of the former possibility. If ‘the star that rises in the evening at XYZ’ is used in (2) in order to baptize the referent of the name ‘Hesperus,’ (2) does not express a posteriori knowledge. Although the identifying description ‘the star that rises in the evening at XYZ’ by which the reference of the name ‘Hesperus’ is fixed expresses a contingent property of the object that the name rigidly designates, the knowledge expressed by (2) is a priori knowledge. By contrast, (1) is an example of the necessary a posteriori. The differences in the ways in which the reference of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are fixed clearly indicate that one could be ignorant of the fact that (1) is necessarily true, and hence not know it a priori. The discovery that Hesperus is the same star as Phosphorus is, therefore, a significant empirical discovery. In Kripke’s view, identity statements could express a posteriori necessary knowledge. This claim appears to support the philosophical theories that maintain that knowledge of the identity of mental states and processes and of physical states and processes could be the result of scientific empirical investigations. Nevertheless, as Kripke aimed to demonstrate in the third lecture of Naming and Necessity, the same ideas that the distinction between a priority and necessity is based on could be used to challenge the identity theory. His argument addresses the identity theory explicitly. One version of the identity theory was presented by Smart in his paper “Sensations and brain processes.” (1959)1 In his defense of the identity theory, Smart begins by admitting that a correlation between mental states and processes, and, on the other hand, physical states and processes does not suffice to establish identity. An object or a process cannot be correlated with itself. He presents the main idea of his version of the identity theory below: Let me first try to state more accurately the thesis that sensations are brain processes. It is not the thesis that, for example, “after-image” or “ache” means the same as “brain process of sort X” (where “X” is replaced by a description of a certain sort of brain process). It is that, in so far as “after-image” or “ache” is a report of a process, it is a report of a process that happens to be a brain process. It follows that the thesis does not claim that sensation statements can be translated into statements about brain processes. Nor does it claim that the logic of a sensation statement is the same as that of a brain-process statement. All it claims is 1.
Large parts of Smart’s paper have the dialectical structure of objections and replies.
Chapter 4. The polemical character of the knowledge arguments
that in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain-process. Sensations are nothing over and above brain processes. (1959: 144–145)
The identity theory does not maintain that terms that refer to phenomenal features of experiences are translatable to terms referring to physical processes of the brain. Nevertheless, according to the identity theory, they refer to the same thing. Here one might contend that the epistemic differences between knowledge of, say, the phenomenal features of pain, and one’s ignorance regarding the nature of the physical processes with which pain is supposedly identical provides reason to distinguish between mental states and physical states. Smart responds to this sort of objection as follows: In short, the reply to objection i is that there can be contingent statements of the form ‘A is identical with B,’ and a person may well know that something is an A without knowing that it is a B. An illiterate peasant might well be able to talk about his sensations without knowing about his brain processes, just as he can talk about lightning though he knows nothing of electricity. (1959: 147)
Identity statements similar to ‘pain = C-fiber stimulation’ are contingent statements. Though Smart does not draw the distinction between epistemic contingency and metaphysical contingency here, ‘contingent’ apparently means epistemic contingency here: a person may know that something is A without knowing that it is a B. Hence, according to this position, although ‘C-fiber stimulation’ does not translate ‘pain,’ and although ‘pain = C-fiber stimulation’ is contingent, ‘pain’ and ‘C-fiber stimulation’ necessarily refer to the same features or properties of mental states. One supposition of Smart’s arguments, namely, that there are contingent identity statements, is refuted in the first two chapters of Naming and Necessity. But on first approximation, this seems to be insubstantial to the physicalist’s goals. For Kripke provides convincing reasons to suppose that there are a posteriori necessities, and it seems that this is precisely what the physicalist requires. For if it can be maintained that the necessity of ‘pain = C-fiber stimulation’ is compatible with its being an empirical discovery that ‘pain = C-fiber stimulation,’ then Kripke’s account of the meaning of names and natural kind terms and his distinction between epistemic modalities and metaphysical modalities seems to meet the physicalist’s goals. The apparent contingency of ‘pain = C-fiber stimulation’ appears to be insubstantial to her main thesis. Moreover, the physicalist clearly wishes to hold the view that ‘pain = C-fiber stimulation’ expresses a necessary proposition. It is in this context that Kripke’s argument takes a surprising twist. The theory of the modal and epistemic features of statements of identity is used against the
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
physicalist’s goal. Kripke first notes that the account of proper names qua rigid designators also applies to natural kind terms. Consider the following statements: 5. Heat = mean molecular motion 6. Light = a stream of photons 7. Water = H2O2 If each of these statements is true, the statement is necessarily true. Nevertheless, each of them expresses empirical (a posteriori) discovery. In each of these cases, the terms to the right of the identity sign are fixed in a different way from the way in which the terms to the left of the identity sign are fixed. ‘Heat’ is presumably fixed by ‘the physical phenomena that causes the sensation of heat’ while ‘mean molecular motion’ is fixed (qua theoretical concept) in a different way. It cannot be known a priori that ‘heat’ and ‘mean molecular motion’ express one and the same property. But, if (5)–(7) are true, then they are necessarily true. Consider the following statement: 8. pain = C-fiber stimulation It might be supposed that statements such as (8), in which the terms to the right of the identity sign refer to physical states, whereas the terms to the left of the identity sign refer to mental states, also express (if true) necessary a posteriori propositions. But according to Kripke, this supposition is false. For in contrast to (5)–(7), in which the reference of at least one of the terms is fixed by an identifying description that contingently applies to the object or property referred to, terms such as ‘pain’ in (8) are not determined by means of identifying descriptions that assign a contingent property to the referent: In the case of the identity of heat with molecular motion the important consideration was that although ‘heat’ is a rigid designator, the reference of that designator was determined by an accidental property of the referent, namely the property of producing in us the sensation S. It is thus possible that a phenomenon should have been rigidly designated in the same way as the phenomenon of heat, with its reference also picked out by means of the sensation S, without that phenomenon being heat and therefore without its being molecular motion. Pain, on the other hand, is not picked out by one of its accidental properties; rather it is picked out by the property of being pain itself, by its immediate phenomenological quality. Thus pain, unlike heat, is not only rigidly designated by ‘pain’ but the reference of the designator is determined by an essential property of the referent. (1980: 152–153)
‘Pain’ is picked out by the property of being pain that, according to Kripke, is ‘its immediate phenomenological quality’. By contrast, the referents of the terms to the 2. Kripke 1980: 129.
Chapter 4. The polemical character of the knowledge arguments
right of the identity sign in (5)–(7) are not picked out by the essential properties of the referents, but rather by descriptions that fix the reference (‘heat’ is fixed by means of the sensation of heat). This difference motivates an argument for dualism: i. “To create this phenomenon [C-fiber stimulation, Y.S.], it would seem that God need only create beings with C-fibers capable of the appropriate type of physical stimulation; whether the beings are conscious or not is irrelevant here.” (1980: 153) ii. “...to make the C-fibers stimulation correspond to pain, or be felt as pain, God must do something in addition to the mere creation of the C-fiber stimulation; He must let the creatures feel the C-fiber stimulation as pain...” (1980: 153–154) iii. “[Therefore] the correspondence between a brain state and a mental state seems to have a certain obvious element of contingency.” (ibid.) Hence, by using his account of the meaning of proper names and natural kind terms and the reasons for the differences between epistemic and metaphysical modalities, Kripke’s argument draws ontological conclusions regarding the relations between minds and physical entities on pure philosophical grounds. It is important to note that Kripke’s argument could also be represented as a polemical argument against the identity theorist. As a polemical argument, its first premises express presumptions that he shares with identity theorists such as Smart: iv. ‘Pain’ is not translatable to ‘C-fiber stimulation.’ v. Given that ‘pain = C-fiber stimulation’ is an identity statement, if it is true it is necessarily true. vi. The knowledge that ‘pain = C-fiber stimulation’ is a posteriori. If true, it stands for an empirical discovery. But in addition, Kripke claims that the very reasons related to the intuitions that are the basis for the acceptance of (iv-vi) also require one to accept (vii), which is manifestly incompatible with the identity theorist’s goals: vii. The features of necessary a posteriori identity statements between natural kind terms, statements that express empirical discoveries, cannot be satisfied by psychophysical identity statements similar to ‘pain = C-fiber stimulation.’ Hence Kripke’s argument has all the features of a type B argument. By entailing a dualistic conclusion from presumptions that are acceptable to the physicalist – of course, a physicalist sympathetic to his account of meaning and modality – he renders the Cartesian dualist’s position directly relevant to the identity theorist’s position which is incompatible with it.3 Kripke’s argument at least 3. Clearly, the argument is ineffective with respect to identity theorists that are unmoved by Kripke’s modal intuitions and by his modal theory, such as Smart 2007.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
reveals the tension between the identity theorist’s modal intuitions and her metaphysical intuitions. As we shall see in what follows, some philosophers who accept the ideas involved in Kripke’s semantic theory nevertheless deny the soundness of his argument for mind-body dualism for a variety of reasons. At the present point, let us note that the argument is open to some objections. First, it appears that according to Kripke the term ‘pain’ designates only an ‘immediate phenomenological quality.’ Nevertheless, ‘pain’ also seems to refer to a functional property defined by the causal role it has in the cognitive system of the creature that experiences it, that is, by its role in producing a certain kind of behavior given certain perceptual stimulations and given the creature’s other mental states. In addition, even if the term ‘pain’ represents an immediate phenomenological quality, in normal cases, it also represents physical features of the bodies and nervous systems of those that experience pain. To be sure, this does not rule out the possibility that ‘pain’ represents a functional property, physical features of the bodies of those that experience it, and a certain type of immediate phenomenological property. But if ‘pain’ designates all of them, one has to face the task of responding to the question of whether the functional property and the immediate phenomenological property are one and the same property, or whether the term ‘pain’ as it is ordinarily used, is in fact ambiguous. It should be noted that in Naming and Necessity, Kripke did not present any argument to the effect that the immediate phenomenological quality designated by ‘pain’ could not be identical to a functional property. His argument for mental-physical dualism presumes rather than demonstrates the conceivability of the claim that C-fibers stimulation could exist even if the immediate (conscious) phenomenological property of pain does not exist and vice versa. What seems to be missing in Kripke’s account is an answer to the question of why the fact that ‘pain’ is picked out by an essential property of its referent, which is the immediate phenomenological quality, rules out the possibility that this phenomenological quality is in fact identical to a physical property of the brain, be it a functional property, or another type of property. Another feature that seems to be missing in Kripke’s argument is the link between the phenomenological quality designated by ‘pain’ and its inherent firstperson perspective. ‘Immediate’ in ‘immediate phenomenological quality’ seems to intimate ‘first-person access.’ But Kripke’s argument leaves the precise role of the first-person access to conscious mental states (such as pain) somewhat unclear. 3. Nagel’s argument Kripke’s argument for mind-body dualism in Naming and Necessity presupposes a background of commitments. Two features of this background need to be
Chapter 4. The polemical character of the knowledge arguments
pointed out: the realist (in contrast to anti-realist) stance regarding meaning, truth, and objectivity, and the alleged privileged role that the physical sciences have in one’s claims to truth and objectivity. It seems almost pointless to state these preconditions of his argument, since they are apparently shared by all those interested in it. However, they are not shared by philosophers from other traditions: idealists of various kinds, Hegelians, phenomenologists, and even by some philosophers from the analytic tradition. The background of agreements of his argument for dualism therefore effectively delineates a relevant addressee. The background of agreements of the discourse on dualism in recent analytic philosophy of mind is further clarified when one examines Nagel’s argument in “What is it like to be a bat?.” (1974) Nagel’s argument is not based on a complex account of proper names and natural kind terms. Also, in contrast to Kripke, he does not leave out the fact that mental states are also entities involved in the causation of behavior: I do not deny that conscious mental states and events cause behavior, nor that they may be given functional characterization. I deny only that this kind of thing exhausts their analysis. (1974: 437)
Two facts are left in the margins of Kripke’s argument, that immediate phenomenological qualities are properties of conscious mental states (and not of mental states as such) and that the awareness of these features involves the first-person perspective. These facts become the explicit topics of Nagel’s argument. The immediate first-person awareness of the qualitative character of experience that, in Nagel’s view, determines the subjectivity of experiences is claimed to be inexplicable within the conceptual resources of the physical and biological sciences. But according to Nagel, subjectivity is at least in some sense a feature of creatures that are also regarded as biological creatures: While an account of the physical basis of mind must explain many things, this appears to be the most difficult. It is impossible to exclude the phenomenological features of experience from a reduction in the same way that one excludes the phenomenal features of an ordinary substance from a physical or chemical reduction of it – namely, by explaining them as effects on the mind of human observes. If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must themselves be given a physical account. But when we examine their subjective character it seems that such a result is impossible. The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view. (1974: 437)
As the details of Nagel’s argument clarify, the single viewpoint is one of a certain type of biological or physical creature. Interestingly, although Nagel’s argument
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
aims to persuade his readers that a physical reduction of the immediate phenomenological qualities of conscious mental states (that have the status of a brute fact revealed by experience) is inexplicable within the available conception of physical reality, he does not abandon the link between the conscious subjective phenomena and the physical and biological character of the creature that has its own subjective single viewpoint. In fact, Nagel’s argument is as follows: 1. On the basis of our first personal reflective capacities, we can immediately know that our sense experiences have a phenomenological qualitative character. 2. Conscious mental states are also functional states. (1974: 437) 3. The physical and biological sciences can reveal the functional structure of the nervous system of bats, including the features of their sonar system. 4. We do not immediately know what it feels like to perceive objects and states of affairs by means of the sonar sense unique to bats. 5. We cannot know what sonar sensations feel like by knowing the functionalphysical structure of sonar system of bats. 6. Assuming that sonar sense perceptions have unique phenomenological qualities (as is the case with visual, acoustic, tactual sensations, etc.), we cannot know what it feels like to have these sensations, neither by imagination nor by any other first person cognitive capacity that we possess. (1974: 439) 7. Realism about the subjective domain in all its forms implies a belief in the existence of facts beyond the reach of human concepts. (1974: 441) 8. There are features of reality that are beyond human knowledge. We have reasons to suppose that such features are probably instantiated by creatures that have sense organs that we do not have. (1974: 441) Nagel’s argument is a metaphysical argument. It aims to establish a significant contention regarding the facts involved in conscious experiences by invoking intuitions regarding cases the nature of which cannot be determined empirically. Attempting to determine the qualitative features of the sense-perception of bats is similar to examining imagined idealized or technically impossible cases. Whether bats have unique sense experiences cannot be conclusively determined on the basis of the available empirical evidence. At first sight, Nagel’s argument appears to involve an inherent tension. One could ask how it is possible to know that there are features of reality beyond human knowledge. The fact that we have a subjective viewpoint as well as thirdperson scientific (physical) knowledge allows us to claim that we know from our own case that the immediate phenomenological qualities are somehow correlated with the functional-physical properties. But a central premise of the argument for the existence of features that we have no way of knowing is that the correlation between, say, a certain type of brain state and visual phenomenological qualities
Chapter 4. The polemical character of the knowledge arguments
is not equivalent to knowing that they must be correlated. Since the argument assumes that we do not know how to integrate the subjective viewpoint in physical reality, it seems that we are not allowed to claim that we know that a creature that is biologically different from us has sense experiences the qualitative nature of which we are incapable of grasping. The realistic standpoint regarding the subjective domain expressed in premise (7) does not suffice in order to claim that one knows that bats have sense experiences that are unknown to us. For it appears that in order to know that they have such experiences, we must know that the immediate qualitative character must be a feature of the experiential life of creatures endowed with an organ that functions as a sense organ. And since we do not know how to integrate the immediate phenomenological qualities of the subjective standpoint within the functional-physical account of the mind of any creature, we do not know that such features exist if we are not aware of them in the first-person subjective viewpoint. All that follows from Nagel’s argument is the mere conceivability of the existence of such unknowable features, not knowledge of their existence. This might be intriguing enough for the physicalist who shares Nagel’s background assumptions, but not as intriguing as the claim that such features exist. 4. Jackson’s knowledge argument as a polemical argument Nagel’s knowledge argument in “What is it like to be a bat?” was not meant to be an argument for the ontological distinction between the qualitative features of conscious mental sates and physical or functional states. By contrast, in EQ, Jackson’s intention was to present an argument for epiphenomenal property dualism, that is, to support the view that any conception of physical reality is bound to leave out the qualitative character of conscious phenomena that are immediately known to us by being reflectively aware of our own experiences. EQ in fact contains three knowledge arguments which I will name: ‘the simple argument,’ ‘Fred’s argument,’ and the “What Mary didn’t know” argument. In addition, it contains one argument for epiphenomenalism, in which the former arguments serve as parts. Jackson’s knowledge argument is usually presented as a deductive argument that entails the non-physical character of qualia from two highly plausible premises. Yet, as I hope to convince the reader, the argument for epiphenomenalism in EQ is in fact a polemical argument that also implies some views on the nature of the philosophical method that should be favored in this type of metaphysical investigation. The official knowledge argument, the “what Mary didn’t know” argument (the third knowledge argument in EQ) does indeed present a problem for the functional-physical reductive approaches to conscious
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
phenomena, but it does not suffice as an argument for epiphenomenalism. Epiphenomenalism was meant to be the solution to the problem presented by the second and the third knowledge arguments, and its recommended endorsement was based on additional implicit premises presupposed by the argument. That Jackson’s argument had this character was, as we shall see, significant for the complex polemical discourse that developed around it. Jackson does not base his argument on a complex semantic theory, or on an elaborated account of the meaning of ‘reduction,’ ‘functional role,’ or ‘functional reduction.’ ‘Physical information,’ which plays an important role in the second and the third arguments, is contextually described by Jackson as “the kind of information provided by the physical, chemical, and biological sciences.” (1982: 127) This sketchy characterization is not meant to provide a definition of ‘physical information.’ In fact, Jackson believes that his argument in EQ does not require a definition of the terms used in the premises: I do not mean these sketchy remarks to constitute a definition of ‘physical information’, and of the correlative notions of physical property, process, and so on, but to indicate what I have in mind here. It is well known that there are problems with giving a precise definition of these notions, and so of the thesis of physicalism that all (correct) information is physical information. But – unlike some – I take the question of definition to cut across the central problems I want to discuss in this paper. (1982: 127)
Why does Jackson believe that definitions are not needed? A clue could be found in his reasons for why the second and the third knowledge arguments are required. According to Jackson, the simple argument which qualia freaks base their position on is a perfectly good argument: There are many qualia freaks, and some of them say that their rejection of physicalism is an unargued intuition. I think that they are being unfair to themselves. They have the following argument. Nothing you could tell of a physical sort captures the smell of a rose, for instance. Therefore, physicalism is false. By our light this is a perfectly good argument. It is obviously not to the point to question its validity, and the premise is intuitively true both to them and to me. (1982: 127–128)
The task of the knowledge argument is not to convince qualia freaks that entail (a) non-physical qualia exist from (b) “nothing you could tell of a physical sort captures the smell of a rose...” Although, in Jackson’s view, the argument that entails (a) from (b), is “a perfectly good argument,” it has the following deficiency: I must, however, admit that it is weak from a polemical point of view. There are, unfortunately for us, many who do not find the premise intuitively obvious. The task then is to present an argument whose premises are obvious to all, or at least to as many as possible. (1982: 128 my italics, Y.S.)
Chapter 4. The polemical character of the knowledge arguments
In other words, the argument presented in EQ is meant to persuade those for whom (a) is not obviously (intuitively) true. Moreover, it has to persuade those who believe that (a) is obviously (intuitively) false that the conclusion of the argument must be accepted on the basis of what they regard as being obviously true. Presumably, definitions are not required by virtue of the fact that the unanalyzed premises of the argument that meet the requirements of the polemical context are accepted as true by all relevant disputants. Jackson’s second argument presents a thought experiment in which a person named Fred is assumed to be able to perceptually discriminate between two colors Red1 and Red2, which we are unable to distinguish. As Jackson notes (1982: 129), the intuitions that we apparently share is that Fred can really see at least one color that we are unable to see. After conducting the appropriate physical and biological investigations, we may discover the physical mechanism that underlies Fred’s perceptual ability, but we will still not be able to see the color that he sees. If our neural system is transformed by some kind of operation, we might be able to discriminate between R1 and R 2 as he does, that is, to see the colors that he sees. But once we are equipped with the ability to discern these colors, we have acquired knowledge of a new property. In the third argument in EQ, the reader is asked to imagine a brilliant scientist, Mary, who has been locked in a black-and-white room all her life. Any visual information that she receives from the outside world is provided by means of a black-and-white monitor. While she is locked in her black–and-white room, Mary learns all the physical information about the physical and biological nature of other people, including the physical information related to the perception of red objects. But Mary has never had visual experiences of red objects. After spending long and painful years in the black-and-white room, she is finally released. According to Jackson, when she sees red objects for the first time, she learns something new about how other people see red objects.4 Given that before her release Mary knew all the physical information about the physical objects and physical properties involved in seeing red objects, the property she discovered after her release, that is, the property linked to the experience of seeing red objects, is not a physical property.
4. Some philosophers have complained that Jackson’s thought experiment is poorly conceived. Mary may see color when she dreams, rubs her eyes, or has afterimages produced as a consequence of brightness or lightness perception (Thompson 1995: 264). Yet as Graham & Horgan suggest (2000: 61–62), this defect could be remedied by supposing that Mary has been completely monochromatic from birth and that her ability to see afterimages in color has atrophied (or by means of other revisions that are insubstantial to the point of the thought experiment).
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
Jackson’s thought experiment could be viewed as a paradigm of the use of ideal imagined cases in metaphysics. The third knowledge argument is clearly an idealization of Fred’s argument. It is supposed to invoke intuitions that Jackson believes entail that experiences instantiate non-physical properties, though, as we shall see in what follows, these intuitions are apparently open to conflicting interpretations. Jackson’s intended interpretation is expressed in the following argument: 1. Mary (before her release) has all the physical information there is to know about what goes on in the brains of subjects that see red tomatoes. 2. When she is released from her room, Mary learns something new about the world and our visual experiences, that is, what it feels like to see red things. 3. Therefore, there are non-physical properties instantiated by experiencing red things. Her knowledge of all the physical information about people’s perceptual experiences is incomplete knowledge of these experiences. (1982: 130)5 It should be noted that the second and the third arguments are not sufficient for establishing epiphenomenalism. If the premises of the third argument entail its conclusion, what Mary learns upon her release about other people’s visual experiences is not physical information. But even if one accepts the conclusion, it does not follow that the properties instantiated by other people’s visual experiences are epiphenomenal properties. Epiphenomenalism is entailed if one accepts at least two additional premises, both of which are not explicitly defended in EQ: the closure thesis, according to which physical changes allow only physical explanations, and the claim that phenomenal properties are systematically linked to physicalfunctional states and are “somehow caused” by these physical-functional states. Let it be noted that these contentions, in particular the second implicit premise, are controversial in their own right. These additional implicit premises are located at the margins of the knowledge argument, but are significant for elucidating its rhetorical character. They do not indicate missing steps in Jackson’s argument. Let us remember that the argument was intended to achieve a polemical goal. Rather, these premises indicate that the argument is intended to persuade a relevant audience that accepts these additional premises as being “obviously” true. The task of Jackson’s argument is, therefore, to persuade his relevant audience that given the unavoidability of the conclusion of the third argument, epiphenomenalism seems to be the only viable possibility open to philosophers committed to some form of a functional-physical account of the mind. It would, therefore, 5. Byrne (2002) argued that the knowledge argument is a nonstarter, since it “illegitimately draws a metaphysical conclusion – that physicalism is false – from an epistemic premise – that physically omniscient Mary would not know everything.” Yet, as Stalnaker notes (2008: 25– 26), “there is no mystery about how epistemological premises can have metaphysical consequences, since knowledge implies truth.”
Chapter 4. The polemical character of the knowledge arguments
be mistaken to suppose that the knowledge argument is meant to prove in the formal sense that non-physical qualia exist.6 Consequently, my suggestion is that the knowledge argument is a polemical argument presented in the context of a conflict between metaphysical intuitions which are meant to persuade the disputant, namely, the physicalist, that the epiphenomenalist’s disputed contention (that the qualitative properties of experience are epiphenomenal non-physical properties) must be accepted if its implicit and explicit premises are accepted. A precondition of the argument is that the premises of the argument are presumptions that are acceptable by all parties involved.7 At least one of these premises has the status of a perceptual or perceptual-like judgment.8 The other premise – that Mary knows all the physical information about the perception of red objects – is an idealization of ordinary cases. It has the status of a regulative idea that guides scientific investigations assumed to be shared by the disputants. The argument as a whole challenges the main presumption of the physicalist, and shifts the burden of proof to her side by rendering the dualist’s presumption directly relevant to the physicalist position on the basis of the presumptions shared by both parties. In light of the above clarifications, it can be seen that Jackson’s intended polemical argument against the physicalist has the character of the type B argument discussed in chapter 2. The premises of the argument are propositions accepted both by S1 (Jackson) and S2 (the reductive physicalist), and the conclusion is a proposition that belongs to the core set of P1 (Jackson’s epiphenomenalism). The argument established Jackson’s position as a controversial relevant alternative in the field. As I will show in the next chapter, the variety of responses to the argument indicates its success in establishing what some philosophers call ‘the knowledge intuition’ and, consequently, Jackson’s epiphenomenalism as a controversial relevant alternative.
6. As Jackson (1997: 569) acknowledges in his response to Churchland, a proof is not tenable in this context. 7. As Jackson notes (1982: 131), this is in fact what the modal argument lacks. Its premises are disputable. 8. The new information that Mary acquires is assumed to be connected to her perceptual capacities. As we shall see in the next chapters, this feature is important to many debates that address the metaphysics of subjectivity.
chapter 5
The antinomies of consciousness and their resolutions Phenomenal concepts, representationalism, and two-dimensional semantics
1. Churchland’s response to the knowledge argument In the present chapter, I will examine the controversies motivated by the knowledge arguments and their epistemic significance. The responses to the knowledge arguments and related issues that concern conscious experiences can be divided into at least three rounds of debates. The first round gradually motivated the view implicitly expressed by several philosophers regarding the extent to which the available conceptual means could deal with the problems of consciousness. As I hope to show, this lack of conceptual means is revealed by exchanges that have the features of the modified Kantian antinomy. The conflicting resolutions suggested for these antinomies generated a second round of debates on the nature of phenomenal consciousness. The third round probes deeper into the grounds of the conflicting intuitions expressed by the philosophers that participated in these debates. They address the basic semantic and modal concepts, and the variety of questions related to the nature of scientific explanations and, in particular, psychological explanations. It is possible to distinguish between at least two types of responses to Jackson’s knowledge argument. One type of response views the argument as valid, but maintains that at least one of their premises is false. A second type of response maintains that the premises express true propositions, but denies that the conclusions follow from these propositions. Each of these two types of responses is linked to a different type of polemical argument. In “Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states” (1985) (RQ), Paul Churchland criticized Nagel’s and Jackson’s respective arguments by using both types of responses.1 Churchland’s paper includes a significant 1. Though Churchland begins his paper with a short account of his views regarding reduction and elimination, his arguments do not involve his eliminativist approach. See also Churchland (1981). A claim central to his position is that “direct deducibility is an intolerable
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
contribution to the first round of debates on the ‘problem of consciousness’ pointed out by Jackson’s knowledge argument and by the earlier knowledge arguments. As we shall see, the difficulties revealed to the relevant addressee by this round of controversies motivated the later developments of this debate. According to Churchland, Nagel’s argument either commits an intensional fallacy or one of its premises is false. In defense of the first disjunct, Churchland construes Nagel’s argument as follows: 1. The qualia of my sensations are directly known by me, by introspection, as elements of my conscious self. 2. The properties of my brain states are not directly known by me, by introspection, as elements of my conscious self. 3. Therefore, the qualia of my sensation ≠ the properties of my brain states. (1985: 19)
Being directly known is not a feature of what is directly known, and the fact that in intensional contexts “there is a difference in truth value for two terms ‘a’ and ‘b’ [the “qualia of my sensations” and “property of my brain states” (Y.S.)] is hardly grounds for concluding that ‘a’ and ‘b’ cannot be coreferential or coextensive terms!.” (1985: 20) Nagel’s argument may be construed as having a different form: 1. My mental states are knowable by me by introspection. 2. My brain states are not knowable by me by introspection. 3. Therefore, my mental states ≠ my brain states. (1985: 21)
Here ‘knowable by introspection’ indicates a relational property of what is known.2 This construal eliminates the intensional fallacy, but “the reductionist is in a position to insist that the argument contains a false premise: premise 2.” (1985: 21) Nagel is therefore caught in a dilemma: either the argument is not valid, or one of its premises is false. Jackson’s argument is not open to the same charges. The intensionality of knowledge is irrelevant to his argument, and so is the fact that the qualitative properties are known by introspection. However, according to Churchland, Jackson’s argument involves two other shortcomings. Here is how he construes Jackson’s argument in RQ: 1. Mary knows everything there is to know about brain states and their properties. demand on reducibility.” (1985: 25) As we will see in the following chapter, the question regarding the nature of reduction and reductive explanations will become central to the debate on consciousness. 2. It is interesting to note that the term ‘qualia’ appears explicitly in Churchland’s first construal of Nagel’s argument and is omitted from the second construal.
Chapter 5. The antinomies of consciousness and their resolutions
2. It is not the case that Mary knows everything there is to know about sensations and their properties. Therefore, by Leibniz’s law, 3. Sensations and their properties ≠ brain states and their properties. (1985: 23)
According to Churchland, the premises express true propositions only if they involve an equivocation. The meaning of ‘know’ in the first premise differs from the meaning of ‘know’ in the second premise. In the first premise, ‘knows’ denotes knowledge of “a set of sentences or propositions, the kind one finds in written neuroscience texts, whereas ‘know’ in (2) seems to be a matter of having a representation in some prelinguistic or sublinguistic representation of sensory variables.”(1985: 23) According to Churchland, this kind of knowledge is ‘knowledge by acquaintance,’ which differs from discursive knowledge.3 In a later article, in which Churchland addresses Jackson’s response to his first contribution to the debate, Churchland (1997: 572) describes the differences between the two types of knowledge as being similar to those between a competent golfer’s motor representation of a golf swing, which constitutes her knowing how to execute a proper swing, and her discursive representation of the same golf swing. The differences between the two types of knowledge do not entail Jackson’s intended conclusion that Mary’s new knowledge constitutes knowledge of a non-physical property. Up to this point, it appears that Churchland’s argument against Jackson begs the question. Does Mary’s ignorance before her release merely consists in the fact that she does not have knowledge by acquaintance of experiences, or does she discover new properties as a result of the experiences she has upon leaving the room? A strong intuition supports the supposition that the latter possibility is the correct one. Upon her release, it seems that Mary had gained knowledge of new facts, and did not merely entertain a new type of knowledge – knowledge by acquaintance – of states of affairs about which she had already known all related facts before she was released. It should be noted, however, that Churchland’s argument does not end at this point. According to Churchland (1985: 24), Jackson’s argument, if it is sound, proves too much. Suppose that Jackson were arguing not against materialism, but rather against dualism. Let Mary now be a brilliant scientist who has learned from books and lectures everything there is to know about ectoplasm, which is the stuff from which non-physical entities are made. According to Churchland (1985: 25), there is still something she doesn’t know: What it is like to see red objects? The counterpart knowledge argument seems to be similar to the original one. It appears that in both cases she fails to know what it is like to 3. The terms ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ originate in Russell’s (1910) “Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description.”
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
see red objects. Having all the discursive information regarding ectoplasmatic objects, events, and processes leaves her in the same deprived epistemic situation that characterizes her counterpart Mary. It seems to follow that the fact that she fails to know what it is like to see red tomatoes cannot be explained by pointing out that her experiences instantiate non-physical properties. A more reasonable explanation would be to suppose that in both cases the differences between her knowing and not knowing what it is like to see red objects consist in the type of knowledge that she has in each case, and not in the type of states or events that she knows something about. Churchland’s argument is therefore as follows: 1. Mary1 knows (discursively) all the physical facts one could know about the experiences a person has when perceiving red objects, the physical information one could learn from lectures and books, but she does not know what it feels like to experience red objects. 2. Mary2 knows (discursively) all the ectoplasmatic facts one could know about the experiences a person has when perceiving red objects, the information about ectoplasm one could learn from lectures and books, but she does not know what it feels like to experience red objects. 3. The best way to explain what Mary1 and Mary2 both lack is to suppose that in both cases, they do not have immediate and first-person knowledge by direct acquaintance with the relevant entities. 4. If the knowledge that Mary1 lacks is knowledge by acquaintance of the experiences of red objects, then it must be admitted that the premises of Jackson’s argument equivocate the meaning of ‘know about,’ and therefore, the argument does not entail the intended conclusion. Churchland’s argument against Jackson also has the features of type (B) of polemical arguments mentioned in Chapter 2. The premises of the argument include statements that Churchland assumes to be acceptable by Jackson. The conclusion of the argument is a statement compatible with Churchland’s position and incompatible with Jackson’s position and, therefore, rebuts Jackson’s contention that the premises of his argument entail dualism. 2. Jackson’s response to Churchland Churchland’s response to Jackson’s knowledge argument was similar to Lewis’s (1983b, 1988) and Nemirow’s (1980) responses that also construed the argument as involving an equivocation on ‘knowledge.’ Yet, according to Lewis, Mary’s new knowledge should be classified not as knowledge by acquaintance but as ‘knowing
Chapter 5. The antinomies of consciousness and their resolutions
how’ (knowing how to imagine red objects, how to identify red objects, etc.). There is a difference between the two suggestions, but it should be noted that Churchland’s examples seem to blur the difference between Lewis’s ability hypothesis and his own knowledge by acquaintance hypothesis. Although he construes the difference between discursive knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance as a difference in the type of representations linked to the two kinds of abilities – discursive abilities and motor abilities – the difference appears to be a difference in abilities. One may grant the claim that motor abilities that constitute the golfer’s knowledge on how to execute a good swing involve a unique kind of prelinguistic representations. But this type of functional-representational account of the motor abilities of competent golfers seems to be irrelevant to the new knowledge gained by Mary after her release. If she has all the physical information about seeing red objects, the information must include the functional-representational account of motor abilities. The claim that the new knowledge Mary gained after her release cannot be construed in terms of differences between types of knowledge was central to Jackson’s response to Churchland. According to Jackson (1996: 568), Churchland’s construal of the knowledge argument misquoted the premises of his original argument. In Churchland’s construal, the argument was as follows: (1) Mary knows everything there is to know about brain states and their properties. (2) It is not the case that Mary knows everything there is to know about sensations and their properties. Therefore by Leibniz’s law: (3) Sensations and their properties are not identical to brain states and their properties.
By contrast, Jackson’s argument is the following: (1’) Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know about other people. (2’) Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know about other people (because she learns something about them upon her release) Therefore: (3’) There are truths about other people (and herself) which escape the physicalist story. (1997: 568)
There are clearly substantive differences between the two arguments. The conclusion of Jackson’s “what Mary didn’t know” argument was not the claim that brain states and their properties are not identical to sensations and their properties. This was, to be sure, the conclusion of the overall argument in EQ but not of the “What Mary didn’t know” argument. Jackson’s central point in his response was
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that after her release, Mary learned new facts, or new truths about other people and herself, something that is not possible according to Churchland’s construal. Given that Mary’s case is more aptly described as a case in which, upon her release, she gains new information about the experiences a person has when perceiving red objects, it is not clear how the new knowledge that she gained could be exhibited in her abilities, though as we shall see below, this was not necessarily one of the advantages of Jackson’s position. Should one prefer Jackson’s construal over Churchland’s reformulation? My suggestion is that from an outside observer’s perspective, there are no conclusive reasons to favor either one of the interpretations. More precisely, there are reasons to adhere to both incompatible positions. First, given the difficulty of depicting the knowledge gained by Mary upon her release as knowledge by acquaintance or knowledge how, it seems reasonable to deny Churchland’s construal. But, as I noted above, Churchland’s overall argument against Jackson’s argument did not merely consist of the claim that the argument equivocates the term ‘know about.’ According to Churchland, no less than the physicalist, the dualist is required to apply the distinction between the two types of knowledge in order to explain what is missed by a person who only has discursive knowledge. In his response to Churchland, Jackson disconnects the charge of equivocation from the counterpart knowledge argument directed against dualism. His reply to this charge (1997: 569) simply denies the possibility involved in the counterpart thought experiment: “Lectures about qualia over black and white television do not tell Mary all there is to know about qualia.” Yet, as Churchland observed (1997: 573–574), this reply begs the question. The most reasonable explanation that clarifies the differences between Jackson’s knowledge argument and Churchland’s counterpart knowledge argument undercuts Jackson’s claim that the differences between the types of knowledge are irrelevant to his argument. Why is it not possible to conceive of a brilliant scientist that has the same type of complete discursive knowledge about non-physical qualia that Mary has about the physical processes involved in perception and cognition? What could explain the contention that she does not know everything there is to know about qualia?4 If qualia qua epiphenomenal properties are unique types of objective properties (though not physical properties), there seems to be no reason why Mary in the counterpart argument cannot learn everything there is to know about them from books and lectures. If one denies that they are objective properties in the required sense, the most reasonable explanation of their being ‘not objective’ is that, in contrast to Mary’s knowledge of all the physical facts, the second type of discursive knowledge inherently involves first-person reflective capacities. But this opens 4. Compare Perry 2001: 163–168.
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Jackson’s argument to the charge that Mary’s ignorance about qualia may after all be due to the differences between types of knowledge. The reflections on the Jackson and Churchland exchange do not necessarily entail that Jackson’s contention that the type of new knowledge which Mary gained after her release cannot be said to be knowledge of new facts, but rather an intriguing question as to how immediate acquaintance and first-person reflective capacities are relevant to the knowledge of these new facts. For obvious reasons, Jackson’s argument minimizes the importance of the first-person reflective viewpoint that dominates Nagel’s argument. But it does not explain the role of the first-person viewpoint in the account of conscious phenomena. If conscious phenomena inextricably involve both qualitative features and a first-person viewpoint, the exchange leaves the outside observe without an answer as to how the two features of conscious phenomena are linked to each other. The exchange between Jackson and Churchland can therefore be described as a case in which each of the contenders is able to present a persuasive type (B) argument against the opponent’s position.5 The exchange can therefore be interpreted as exemplifying an antinomy in Kant’s sense. This was not recognized by the opponents themselves. Yet, as we shall see in the next sections, other philosophers recognized the antinomic nature of the exchange. 3. The causal efficacy of conscious qualitative states The antinomy related to the character of Mary’s new knowledge was not the only antinomy revealed by the debates on Jackson’s knowledge argument. Mental causation and the causal efficacy of the mental were the topic of another antinomy. Supporters of epiphenomenalism willingly admit that epiphenomenalism is an unappealing metaphysical position. By requiring the suspension of the intuition as to the causal efficacy of the qualitative features of conscious states, it blatantly goes against common sense. Endorsing epiphenomenalism on the basis of a persuasive argument seems to parallel conceptual shifts in science that do not agree with our pretheoretical commonsensical conception, such as those required by the spatial and general theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, etc. Yet, the question that was raised quite early in the polemical exchange on the nature of consciousness was not whether epiphenomenalism goes against our commonsensical conception of mental reality, but, rather, whether it is a coherent position.6 Clearly, the accusation that it is incoherent was not entirely new. The nature 5. Jackson’s polemical argument is the argument discussed in Chapter 4. 6. See in particular the exchange between Shoemaker (1975, 1981) and Block (1980).
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of mental causation was central to the metaphysical debates on the nature of mind in the 17th and 18th century. Nevertheless, by using ideas included in the novel context in which it was presented, the reformulation of the difficulties linked to mental causation had a significant effect on the particular nature of the historical evolution of the relevant metaphysical concepts and the metaphysical presumptions to knowledge. As we shall see below, the accusation that epiphenomenalism is an incoherent position was made by Dennett (1991) in his response to the knowledge argument. Dennett’s response seems to be similar to Churchland’s. Both philosophers apparently hold similar philosophical views. Yet, Dennett’s response differs from Churchland’s. We can use the ideas developed in Part One of this book to point out this difference. In contrast to Churchland, who addresses Jackson’s position as a relevant alternative that requires a polemical response, that is, as a position that uncovers an important distinction, though in a twisted way, Dennett wishes to undermine Jackson’s position and similar positions qua relevant alternatives. Dennett raises two objections against Jackson’s argument. He first challenges the very idea of a metaphysical thought experiment and the supposition that it is possible to determine what is really possible merely on the basis of what is imaginable or conceivable, by telling stories such as that which the knowledge argument is based on. In Dennett’s view (1991: 400), whether Jackson’s intended conclusion (that Mary learned new facts) is true or false depends on the way Mary’s story is told. Dennett claims that the different ways of telling the story are bound to have conflicting results. It might be supposed that Dennett intends to support a physicalist interpretation of Jackson’s imagined case similar to Churchland’s interpretation. But this way of viewing Dennett’s response misses his main intent. He does not maintain that the other way of telling the story is mistaken. His argument is not meant to establish that Mary didn’t learn anything new, but rather “that the usual way of imagining the story doesn’t prove that she does.” (1991: 400) Thought experiments such as Jackson’s imagined case convey no decidable result. In Dennett’s terms (2005: 103), they are ‘intuition pumps’ that have limited rational import, and they are suspicious as grounds for determinable conclusions. That Dennett’s goal is to undermine the plausibility of his opponent’s position as a relevant alternative is clearly shown by the rhetorical means that he uses. The forms of speech that he uses seem to ridicule the opponent’s contentions. Though his arguments apparently respond to Jackson’s argument, his intended addressee is not a metaphysician or a philosopher, but rather cognitive scientists and philosophers from the anti-metaphysical camp, who view metaphysics as an ill-founded pseudoscience. Here is an alternative way of telling Mary’s story: Say that after her release, as a trick, Mary’s capturers present her with a blue banana. This will be her first
Chapter 5. The antinomies of consciousness and their resolutions
color experience ever. Given that Mary knows all the physical facts, she will realize that her capturers had tried to deceive her. For before her release, she already knew merely on the basis of her knowledge of physical facts that the physical color of bananas normally causes a particular type of neural processes in normal observers; by analyzing the physical signals emitted from the observed banana and by analyzing the physical processes that occur in her brain she will, therefore, know that the color of the banana she observes is blue and not yellow. This seems to be perfectly compatible with Jackson’s argument. To remind the reader, the argument does not challenge the feasibility of a functional account of thoughts and beliefs. This was crucial for its polemical purposes. But if Mary’s thoughts and beliefs must be realized physically, and if she knows all the physical facts, she will know what thoughts or beliefs a person has when she experiences yellow objects or blue objects. If the knowledge that b is a belief about yellow objects involves knowing what ‘yellow’ means, and if knowing what ‘yellow’ means is impossible without knowing what it is like to see yellow objects, it appears that if Mary knew what thoughts and beliefs a person has before her release, she knew every fact about the experiences of others.7 It seems that Dennett’s objection begs the question. Even if on the basis of her neural states and linguistic behavior, Mary had known what thoughts and beliefs a person has when she perceives red objects, she may fail to know some of the phenomenal facts involved in having such experiences. The physical and behavioral information that she has may suffice to indicate that the person she examines has beliefs about what ‘red’ refers to in that person’s language without fully knowing what experiences of red things involve. Mary could know that she was deceived because she knows what thoughts and beliefs she has. However, this does not entail that she knows all the facts about experiencing colored things. She may both know that she was deceived and nevertheless find out for the first time what it is like to experience blue things. But Dennett’s counter-thought experiment is linked to other, highly implausible, features of Jackson’s epiphenomenalism. These undesired features are stated in his second objection to Jackson. As he notes, if one assumes, as Jackson does, that the new facts Mary learns about color experiences upon her release are epiphenomenal properties of these experiences, 7. According to Robinson (1993), Dennett’s argument contains a confusion that rests on an ambiguity. Mary’s omniscience of physical reality consists in her theoretical knowledge (knowledge of all the relevant physical science). It is not knowledge of all the relevant information regarding physical particulars. Yet it is interesting to note that the relevance of this distinction to the knowledge argument was indirectly denied by Jackson (1998) and Chalmers & Jackson (2001). According to Jackson and Chalmers & Jackson, if physicalism is true about our world, the laws of the physical sciences and indexical information regarding our world entail all the facts about our world. I will address these contentions in Chapter 6.
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then the new beliefs she acquires upon her release must also be epiphenomenal. It may seem that this objection does not raise any new problem for Jackson. Yet, if the new beliefs Mary acquired cannot be realized in her brain or be causally relevant to her behavior, it follows that if a person feels pain, the qualitative features of the pain she is introspectively aware of are irrelevant to her physically realized belief system.8 The phenomenal properties of states of awareness cannot cause physically realized phenomenal beliefs. Moreover, the awareness itself cannot be realized physically. It follows that having experiences in the required phenomenal sense is completely irrelevant to the fact that she is physically disposed to react in a certain way. There is no contradiction in this possibility. Yet, this is a highly implausible result of Jackson’s position.9 Should one conclude that Jackson’s knowledge argument contained a mistake? I believe that different conclusions are in order. Dennett’s objections are appealing primarily with regard to Jackson’s epiphenomenalism, that is, with regard to the conclusion of the overall argument of EQ. It is far less appealing with respect to the claim that Mary learned something new upon her release. Philosophers exposed to this conflict seem to be torn between two intuitions related to conscious experiences that seem to pull them in two different directions: the ‘new knowledge’ intuition, and the ‘the causal relevance’ intuition.10 We have no empirical means other than the overt reports of the examined person or her neural states in order to determine whether she has acquired new phenomenal knowledge. But all physical information that is accessible to the third-person viewpoint was known by Mary before her release. The fact that it is impossible to resolve the conflict between intuitions connected to conscious mental states by attending to the third-person realm of information may lead one to suppose that the philosophical question regarding the nature of conscious mental states is a pseudoquestion. Similar reasons seem to motivate Dennett’s dismissive approach to Jackson’s argument and other similar arguments. However, from the realistic standpoint that is shared by most participants in the debate on consciousness, regardless of whether or not the topics involved can be decided empirically, the 8. As Robinson notes (2004: 71), the first version of this type of argument appears in Shoemaker (1975, 1981), that is, before the publication of Jackson’s original paper. As he notes (2004: 72), Dennett’s argument at least demonstrates that one cannot combine a reductivephysicalist account regarding thoughts and beliefs and non-reductive accounts of experience. 9. It should be noted that Jackson himself accepted this criticism when he abandoned his earlier position. See Jackson 2004. 10. As Stoljar and Nagasawa showed (2004), Jackson’s argument was preceded by several arguments that employed the knowledge intuition. Nevertheless, before the knowledge argument was stated by Jackson, the above two widely-shared intuitions were believed to be compatible intuitions.
Chapter 5. The antinomies of consciousness and their resolutions
problem is not a pseudo-problem. Whether it is a real problem depends on whether the knowledge intuition is as real as the causal efficacy intuition. The conflict between the knowledge intuition and the causal efficacy intuition, therefore, generates another antinomy which is even more intriguing than the first one. Both intuitions seem to be entrenched in our pretheoretical conception of conscious mental states. Yet one intuition seems to entail epiphenomenalism while the other leads to the opposite conclusion. 4. The paradox of phenomenal consciousness In contrast to Dennett, many philosophers of mind conceived of the puzzles related to the qualitative features of conscious mental states as anything but bogus puzzles. Jackson’s knowledge argument persuaded many philosophers that the qualitative features of conscious experiences convey unique type of information. However, if one accepts (a) the closure thesis, (b) that qualia are re-identifiable sensory types, and (c) that physical states of affairs are causally relevant to having qualitative experiences, how can one avoid Jackson’s epiphenomenalism? Epiphenomenalism is not merely an unappealing metaphysical option. As Dennett’s objection and similar objections clarified, epiphenomenalism about qualia entails that beliefs and thoughts about qualia are also epiphenomenal, and therefore, the qualitative features of experiences must be causally irrelevant to beliefs and desires involved in action and behavior. This conflict between equally plausible intuitions has the features of a Kantian antinomy. Concerning the antinomy generated by the knowledge intuition and the causal efficacy intuition, one side consists of the conditional contention that if the qualitative features of conscious experiences involve a unique type of information, they cannot be physical properties of objects, whereas the second side is that beliefs about the qualitative features of conscious experiences, say, that one is in pain, must be causally relevant to pain behavior and action. It appears that one cannot hold both sides of the antinomy. Yet, it is generally agreed not merely that conscious experiences have both features but, in addition, that they must have both. The first round of the polemical exchange on the knowledge arguments revealed the mystery related to the link between these features: how could they together be features of conscious experiences? Needless to say, not all philosophers that addressed the knowledge arguments reached the above conclusion. Dennett and his allies, for example, persistently denied that Jackson’s, Kripke’s, and Nagel’s knowledge arguments are significant to grasping the nature of conscious experiences. Churchland defends a milder position, namely, that Jackson’s knowledge argument uncovers a conceptual
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gap. But in his view, the gap could easily be filled by the available conceptual resources without adding conceptual innovations that will revise the physicalist position. Many other philosophers, physicalists and dualists alike, responded differently to the puzzles revealed by the knowledge arguments. Here is how Tye expresses the philosophical problem that he labels ‘the paradox of phenomenal consciousness:’ The cumulative effect of the considerations adduced so far is to put intense pressure on the view that phenomenally conscious states are physical, in any sense of the term ‘physical’, no matter how broad. Suppose now we throw in the towel on behalf of the physicalist and adopt an antiphysicalist stance: experiences and feelings have irreducible, nonphysical, perspectivally subjective features. This position, which is sometime called type dualism or property dualism, relieves the pressure from the problems of perspectival subjectivity, mechanism, duplicates, and the inverted spectrum. But it helps not at all with the problem of phenomenal causation...We seem compelled to admit that they way things feel and look and taste and sound and smell are causally irrelevant. As Frank Jackson (1982, p. 134) notes “[T]hey are an excrescence. They do nothing... But phenomenal qualities are not an excrescence. We know that the phenomenal qualities of our mental states are causally efficacious, just as we know that we have hands and legs, that there are rocks and trees. (1995: 56–57)11
In the above passage, Tye refers to the conflict between the knowledge intuition and the causal efficacy intuition. Clearly, whether the antinomy is real depends on how one articulates the intuitions from which it results. Some philosophers, most notably Colin McGinn (1991, 1999), maintain that the inherent puzzle involved in our notion of conscious phenomena is insolvable. Impressed by the intuitive appeal of the knowledge arguments, Tye and other philosophers believe that the paradox can be resolved. Given that a resolution is feasible, it has the status of a paradox or an antinomy only within the epistemic horizon of real possibilities that precedes the argument that resolves it. That it is genuinely conceived to be a paradox from the perspective of a given epistemic horizon of real possibilities indicates that its resolution required a significant transformation of the relevant conceptual state. It required adding novel conceptual resources and distinctions, and revealing new conceptual connections. Interestingly, although philosophers that share the view that the knowledge argument involves genuine philosophical puzzles normally agree on how they characterize the conceptual abyss it reveals, their resolutions conflict in many 11. Levine explicitly notes that the problem of consciousness has the features of a Kantian antinomy. According to Levine (2001: 9), “[the] mind body problem, at least with respect to the issue of conscious experience, presents us, in a way, with a Kantian antinomy.” I will address Levine’s position in the next chapter.
Chapter 5. The antinomies of consciousness and their resolutions
cases. As a result of the differences between these responses, new philosophical controversies emerged. As part of their background, these controversies are between positions that share the knowledge intuition that Jackson’s argument rendered relevant to the topics discussed by philosophers of mind. I suggest that the knowledge intuition is assumed in advance by many conflicting physicalist resolutions and the controversies they motivated indicate the epistemic achievement related to Jackson’s argument. Most philosophers of mind who are moved by the knowledge intuition are unmoved by Jackson’s intended conclusion. And yet, the wide agreement regarding the importance of the knowledge intuition and the gap it reveals in the current conception of physical reality indicates the epistemic change that it generated. The asymmetry between agreement regarding the puzzles that need to be resolved, on the one hand, and the conflicting resolutions suggested on the other hand, indicates the rational character of these types of controversies. The epistemic achievement is connected to a problem that is open to conflicting attempts to resolve it, which are allowed by the horizon of real possibilities from which it is conceived. Clearly, these were not Jackson’s intentions when he introduced his argument. Nevertheless, the cunning of critical rationality rendered the position his arguments supported, which entailed the epiphenomenal character of the qualitative features of conscious states, a relevant alternative to the set of positions with which it conflicted. In the next sections of this chapter, I will examine some attempts to resolve the antinomies revealed by the controversies generated by Kripke’s, Nagel’s, and Jackson’s knowledge arguments and the new controversies motivated by these attempts. 5. The phenomenal concepts strategy The first stage of the debates on the knowledge argument resulted in the relatively broad acceptance of the importance of the knowledge intuition to a philosophical account of conscious mental states. One type of physicalist response to the problems revealed by the controversies on the knowledge argument demonstrates how one can “have it both ways” by presenting new distinctions and conceptual innovations. This is one type of resolution of an antinomy. Loar’s response (1990, 1997) and Tye’s response (1995) to the knowledge argument are two significant attempts to present this type of resolution.12 But although their resolutions 12. Tye has significantly changed his position in his recent publications. His earlier resolution of the problem of perspectival subjectivity was based on the concept ‘phenomenal concept.’ He no longer believes that there are phenomenal concepts. See in particular Tye (2009). In the present book, I will discuss his earlier position.
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are physicalist, they are incompatible. There are other similar resolutions that differ significantly from theirs. In the present section, I will briefly examine Loar’s response. At the beginning of his (1997) article, Loar explicitly notes that the intention that motivates his arguments is polemical: to rebut the dualist contention.13 In contrast to Dennett and Churchland, Loar maintains that “The antiphysicalists’s phenomenological and internalist intuition are correct.” (1997: 597) However, [t]he idea is to engage them over the central point, that is, whether those aspects of the mental that we both count as phenomenologically compelling raise substantive difficulties for the thesis that phenomenal qualities (thus understood) are physical properties of the brain that lie within the scope of current science. (ibid.)
In Loar’s view, the central supposition that underlies the knowledge argument – the irreducibility of phenomenal concepts to physical-functional concepts – may lead those that are moved by it to endorse three incompatible positions: ...that consciousness and phenomenal qualities are unreal because irreducible; that they are irreducible non-physical-functional facts; that they are forever mysterious, or pose an intellectual problem different from other empirical problems, or require new conception of the physical. (ibid.: 597–598)
It should be recalled that Jackson’s argument in EQ contains four distinct steps, the simple argument, the Fred argument, the “What Mary didn’t know” argument, and the argument for the epiphenomenal character of qualia. The conclusion of the “What Mary didn’t know” argument conflated two claims, namely, that Mary had learned new facts and that these new facts could not be physical facts. The supposition underlying this conflation was that Mary’s knowledge of physical information before she was released is equivalent to all the physical information there is. As Horgan (1984) observed quite early in the dispute, the new facts Mary learned could have been physical facts. In Horgan’s view, the scientific theoretical knowledge attributed to Mary by the first premise of the knowledge argument is not equivalent to knowledge of all the physical facts. It is possible to distinguish between explicit physical information, which is information that is expressed by means of a sentence S “just in case S belongs to, or follows from, a theoretically adequate physical account,” (1984: 150) and ontological physical information, which is information that a sentence S expresses just in case “(i) all the entities referred to or quantified over in S are physical entities, and (ii) all the properties and relations expressed by the predicates in S are physical properties and relation.” (ibid.) This distinction undercuts the contention that Mary’s new information 13. The first version of Loar’s article appeared in 1990.
Chapter 5. The antinomies of consciousness and their resolutions
must belong to the non-physical type. In other words, according to Horgan (1984: 151), a person who has all the scientific (explicit) physical information could, nevertheless, acquire new physical information, that is, ontological physical information. But Horgan does not explain how the two types of information are related, and the sense in which the information acquired by Mary upon her release is indeed new physical information.14 These queries are addressed by Loar (1990, 1997) in his response to the knowledge argument. Loar (1997: 607) first denies that the puzzle revealed by the knowledge argument is resolvable if one endorses Nemirow’s (1980) and Lewis’s (1983b, 1988) ability hypothesis. Like Horgan, Loar wishes to show that an epistemic change is discernable in Mary’s overall cognitive states, before and after her release. This change concerns information and not mere abilities. Nevertheless, this change could be accounted for without involving the non-physical type of information. According to Loar, the account of the change in Mary’s epistemic states requires a distinction between phenomenal concepts and phenomenal properties. Respectively, he distinguishes between the two functionalist theses “that all concepts of mental states are functional concepts, and that all mental properties are functional properties.” (1997: 613) Loar rejects the first thesis but accepts the second one. The concept ‘phenomenal concept’ is not a functional concept and, nevertheless, the properties that phenomenal concepts refer to are physicalfunctional properties. In order to substantiate the distinction between mental concepts and mental properties, Loar first reveals the common features of Jackson’s knowledge argument and Kripke’s argument for dualism by identifying the implicit semantic premise that they both involve: (Semantic Premise) A statement of property identity that links conceptually independent concepts is true only if at least one concept picks out the property it refers to by connoting a contingent property of that property. (1997: 600)
According to Loar, the implicit semantic premise of both arguments could be denied without harming the unique mode in which phenomenal terms rigidly designate phenomenal properties (Kripke) or the new knowledge gained by someone who has experienced red objects for the first time.
14. It is interesting to note that when Horgan returns to discuss the knowledge argument (see Graham & Horgan (2000, 2005)), Jackson’s thought experiment is described as “...immensely powerful, but alas, currently its force is not sufficiently appreciated.” (2000: 59) Graham & Horgan believe that Jackson’s thought experiment poses a problem to physicalism which cannot be met by resolutions that are based on the concept ‘phenomenal concept’ to be discussed below. See also Raffman (2005).
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Loar’s concept ‘phenomenal concept’ does not imply the above semantic premise. It is basically a novel concept, although it does have its historical antecedents. It was not available to philosophers as part of the shared philosophical knowledge before it was presented in the debate on the nature of consciousness. As noted above, Loar assumes that phenomenal properties (qualia) are internal properties of the mind/brain and not features of objects in the world. According to Loar (1997: 601), phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts that pick out physical-functional properties of the brain. Recognitional concepts are not theoretical concepts. These are concepts that have the form ‘x is of that kind:’ Suppose you go into the California desert and spot a succulent never seen before. You become adept at recognizing instances, and gain a recognitional command of their kind, without a name for it; you are disposed to identify positive and negative instances and thereby pick out a kind. (1997: 600)
As Loar notes, recognitional concepts are generally formed against a further conceptual background, and are perspectival: Suppose you see certain creatures up close and form a recognitional concept – ‘those creatures1’; and suppose you see others at a distance, not being able to tell that they are of the same kind (even when they are), and form another recognitional concept – ’those creatures2’. These concepts will be a priori independent. Now the respect in which they differ is perspectival, in some intuitive sense. A recognitional concept is in part individuated by its constitutive perspective. (1997: 601)
Albeit their perspectival features, recognitional concepts could be applied outside their constitutive perspective in a way that allows for identity statements such as ‘that creature is one of those creatures.’ Phenomenal concepts qua recognitional concepts are also applicable outside their constitutive perspective. In order to rebut the dualistic conclusions of Kripke’s modal argument and Jackson’s knowledge argument, one must explain how phenomenal concepts could differ from physical-functional concepts. It seems intuitively clear that recognitional concepts generally differ from physical-functional concepts. But recognitional concepts other than phenomenal concepts refer to the properties they stand for via the contingent modes of presentation of these properties. The fact that phenomenal concepts do not refer to the properties they designate by means of contingent properties of these properties seems to be precisely the point emphasized by Kripke’s modal argument. In other words, phenomenal concepts seem to create a puzzle precisely because they refer directly to the properties they designate, that is, they capture their physical- functional essence. Nevertheless, they are conceptually independent of the physical-functional concepts that refer to the same properties. But according to Loar, the mutual
Chapter 5. The antinomies of consciousness and their resolutions
independence of phenomenal (recognitional) concepts and physical-functional concepts does not commit one to the metaphysical independence of the properties that each type of concepts designates. The distinctive cognitive role of each type of concept suffices to determine their independence without involving two distinct kinds of properties (1997: 602). This is, indeed, generally the case with regard to recognitional concepts. They have a different cognitive role than that attributed to physical-functional concepts. Here the anti-reductionist may raise the complaint that the physicalist views “depend on ad hoc assumption and that it is tendentious to suppose that phenomenal concepts differ from all other recognitional concepts in not having contingent modes of presentations.” (1997: 602) Yet, as Loar notes, the anti-physicalist and the dualist are in fact in the same boat. For the anti-physicalist’s account, no less than Loar’s physicalist account, involves phenomenal concepts that directly pick out nonphysical properties rather than properties that they refer to via the contingent modes of presentations of these properties. Given Loar’s account of phenomenal concepts, it is possible to maintain that Mary gained new conceptual knowledge upon her release without learning anything new about the properties involved in experiencing red things. The sentences ‘John feels pain’ or ‘I feel pain’ (uttered by John) and ‘a physical-functional processes of XYZ type occurs in John’s brain’ express the same metaphysical fact though they have different conceptual content. It is not difficult to see that Loar’s resolution of the puzzle echoes Jackson and Churchland’s controversy. Churchland emphasized the unique mode of knowledge involved in conscious experience and denied that Mary’s novel knowledge is conceptually novel, whereas Jackson, who insists that Mary learned new information upon her release attributed no role to the first-personal features of conscious experiences in the account of the phenomenal properties. According to Loar’s resolution, Mary’s novel knowledge is conceptual and, nevertheless, it involves the first personal mode of self-knowledge. Loar’s response to the knowledge argument and his resolution of the puzzle of consciousness therefore involve a significant conceptual change. If phenomenal concepts directly pick out physical-functional properties without involving contingent modes of presentations, the puzzle of phenomenal consciousness is resolved. But it should be noted that it is resolved only if the distinction between concepts and properties is drawn, and only if phenomenal properties involved in perception are non-representational properties of brain states and not of the perceived objects. One can deny that phenomenal concepts are functional concepts, and therefore also explain the first-person/third-person asymmetry only if this distinction is introduced. As we shall see below, these claims are anything but trivial.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
Loar’s response to the knowledge argument is not merely an attempt to resolve the puzzle of phenomenal consciousness. It could equally be viewed as an argument for the link between concepts and properties required by physicalism. That the intuitions regarding the nature of phenomenal states were mixed intuitions that equally involved (subjective) “matters of fact” and modal and semantic issues was clear to anyone considering Kripke’s argument, but it was marginal in the explicit form of Jackson’s knowledge argument. By connecting the two arguments, Loar emphasized the relevance of the modal and semantic layers of intuitions regarding conscious experiences to the metaphysical nature of conscious mental states. In order to solve the problem revealed by the controversies about the knowledge argument, the scope of issues addressed needed to be broadened. One had to add semantic, modal, and logical issues to the debate. As we shall see below, this is what characterizes the third round of the controversy on the nature of conscious mental states. 6. Tye’s PANIC account of phenomenal consciousness Before examining the later development of the controversy, let us examine how the knowledge intuition and the puzzles it involves led to conflicting responses. As noted, Loar’s response to the knowledge arguments was not the only response that attempted to integrate the knowledge intuition within a physicalist’s conception.15 Tye’s response to the problems related to the knowledge intuition was no less motivated by the intention to resolve the paradox of phenomenal consciousness. In the present section, I will briefly present his resolution. Tye’s earlier response is probably one of the most sophisticated so far. It consists not only of the introduction of novel concepts and distinctions, but rather integrates ideas gradually developed in the 1980s and early 1990s which opened up new possibilities in approaching consciousness. Tye’s resolution (1995, 2000) shares several things in common with Loar’s response. In particular, his resolution uses phenomenal concepts. Nevertheless, there are substantial differences between the two resolutions that result from the way in which the problem of phenomenal consciousness is depicted. According to Tye, there are in fact ten problems of consciousness, the most difficult of which is perspectival subjectivity.16 Yet in Tye’s view, the most 15. There are, to be sure, several other similar responses. See in particular Perry (2001) and Papineau (2002). I will address the differences between Tye’s and Loar’s responses in order to exemplify the different modes of resolving metaphysical puzzles. 16. See Tye 1995: Chapter 1.
Chapter 5. The antinomies of consciousness and their resolutions
promising way to resolve this problem is to address it only after providing an account of the other problems; in particular, the problem of phenomenal causation, the problem related to the diaphanousness of phenomenal consciousness, and the problem of ownership. Tye’s main idea is that the content of phenomenal states should be expressed in terms of his PANIC theory: Poised, Abstract, Non-conceptual, Intentional (representational) Content. “Poised” indicates their functional-causal role in mental processes. “Abstract” means “that no particular concrete object enters into these contents.” (1995: 138) Phenomenal states are representational, intentional states. Nevertheless, the content of phenomenal states is not conceptual. Tye’s reason for denying that phenomenal states have conceptual content is the non-doxatic character of their representational content.17 They are symbolic states and non-conceptual states. The non-conceptuality of phenomenal content allows for a response to the problem of phenomenal consciousness revealed by the knowledge argument. The main idea involved in Tye’s PANIC theory is that phenomenal properties are not instantiated properties of mental states, but representational properties that stand for external properties of objects. This was not a novel idea. The transparency of phenomenal states (the fact that the phenomenal character of phenomenal states varies with the way in which external things or physical states of one’s own body are represented) was introduced into the current debate by Harman (1990). According to Harman, phenomenal properties are intentional (representational) properties, not instantiated properties of phenomenal states. By integrating this supposition with other ideas, Tye’s account differs significantly from Harman’s account. The main difference consists in Tye’s claim to the non-conceptuality of sensory (phenomenal) representations of objects. Similarly, though Tye (1995: 165–171) partly endorses Loar’s account of phenomenal concepts, he integrates it into the theory that characterizes their representational content as nonconceptual and as endowed with perspectival subjectivity. Phenomenal properties are not properties of internal states of the brain but are representational properties of the (represented) external objects. This clearly conflicts with Loar’s position.18 Phenomenal concepts are either indexical concepts or predicative concepts.19 In contrast to Loar, they do not refer qua recognitional concepts to physical-functional states of the brain under a unique mode of presentation. Also, they do not 17. See Tye 1995: 104. 18. Tye (1995: 162) rebuts Loar’s (1990: 101) claim according to which “phenomenal qualities are psychofunctional.” Yet his account of phenomenal concepts as recognitional (indexical) concepts is similar to Loar’s account. 19. See Tye 1995: 167.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
refer to essential properties of physical-functional states of the brain, but rather to properties of the surfaces of external things. They refer to states characterized as having representational non-conceptual abstract content, that is, to sensory nonconceptual representational states and their unique modes of presentations. Acquiring such concepts requires having these unique types of symbolic (sensory) states. This seems to clarify the cognitive difference between Mary’s mental states before and after her release; that is, this resolves ‘Mary’s puzzle.’ Tye’s theory is a fine example of how a response to problems revealed by the set of controversies that revolve around a given case is based on philosophical ideas that gradually evolved in the previous discourse. Yet, as noted above, Tye’s resolution conflicted with Loar’s resolution. This led to a new controversy the explicit topic of which is the following: Do phenomenal states consist in nonconceptual representations of external objects, or are they non-representational internal states? The controversy regarding this question is also based on apparently conflicting intuitions. On the one hand, phenomenal properties appear to be properties of external objects: The redness appears to be a property of the rose, and pain is a property of my leg. Nevertheless, the redness of the rose feels like something, and pain feels like something. It seems that the fact that they feel like something does not consist in properties of external things or of representational properties. Rather, ‘feel like’ seems to refer to subjective states. And yet it seems that the redness of the rose would not have ‘felt like’ the redness of the rose if it did not somehow involve the representation of the rose. I will not address this issue in the present context.20 7. The knowledge argument and two-dimensional semantics According to Loar, the puzzle involved in phenomenal consciousness is resolvable if one draws a distinction between concepts and properties. As the context clarifies, the introduction of the distinction was motivated by Kripke’s and Jackson’s respective arguments. It was required as a response to the challenge these arguments posed to physicalism. That this was its motivational source does not imply that the distinction between concepts and properties could have been drawn only in the context of a response to these arguments. The distinction is not necessitated by a response to these arguments. Nevertheless, what rendered it epistemically significant and promising was that it could be used to resolve a puzzle that had jeopardized a widely accepted position. Loar’s argument was a type B argument. 20. Block (2007: 533) described the conflict between these two perspectives on consciousness as “the greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind – maybe even of all of philosophy...”
Chapter 5. The antinomies of consciousness and their resolutions
Its premises were similar to those of the dualistic positions that it rebuts, and, nevertheless, it entailed a physicalist conclusion by means of his account of phenomenal concepts. Clearly, by undermining the rational support for the dualistic positions, his argument rendered his position a relevant alternative to dualism. The attempt to resolve the problem Loar’s arguments posed for the dualist reexamined the wider background of semantic and modal theories. In the present section, I will shortly present another controversy that emerged from the previous one, namely, the controversy between Chalmers and Loar about what Chalmers labels the concept of ‘strong necessity,’ which is, in Chalmers’s view, a problematic type of modality related to positions that distinguish, as Loar does, between concepts and properties. In 1996, David Chalmers published The Conscious Mind (CM), which soon became a classic text in the field. Chalmers’s main aim in CM was to attack materialism. However, Chapter 2 of his book was largely dedicated to issues of logical and natural supervenience, reductive explanations, and to the introduction of two-dimensional semantics, which served as the conceptual background for eliminating the differences between ‘logical supervenience’ and ‘metaphysical supervenience’ and, therefore, also between ‘logical necessity’ and ‘metaphysical necessity.’ Chalmers’s overall argument aimed to disavow physicalism by claiming that conscious mental states do not logically (globally) supervene on physical states. That is, Chalmers claimed that one can conceive of a world that contains no conscious qualitative experiences which is physically identical to our word. Clearly the argument is successful only if conceivability entails possibility. Chalmers’s two-dimensional semantics aimed to clarify why this entailment holds. According to Chalmers’s two-dimensionalism, terms such as ‘water’ involve two dimensions of meaning: primary intension and secondary intension. The primary intension of a concept is a function from worlds to extensions reflecting the way that actual-world reference is fixed. In a given world, it picks out what the referent of the concept would be if that world turned out to be actual. (1996: 57)
For example, the primary intension of ‘water’ picks out in each world what the watery stuff is in that world. In our world, it picks out H2O. But in a different world, it might pick out something other than H2O. In contrast, the secondary intension picks out the same stuff in each counterfactual world as it picks out in the actual world. If ‘water’ picks out H2O in the actual world, it picks out H2O in every counterfactual world.21 21. Jackson (1998) developed a similar semantic view. I will address this issue extensively in the next chapter.
Controversies and the Metaphysics of Mind
Primary intensions determine the set of conceivable possibilities. According to Chalmers, primary intensions are what matters to the mind/body problem. If one can conceive a world physically identical to our world that nevertheless differs in the way consciousness is distributed in it, consciousness does not logically (globally) supervene on physical states and processes and, therefore, it does not metaphysically supervene on physical states and processes. If so, conscious qualitative properties are distinguishable from all physical properties.22 Clearly, the above claim is opposed to Loar’s main contention. In