Converse Intentional Properties Roderick M. Chisholm The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 79, No. 10, Seventy-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division. (Oct., 1982), pp. 537-545. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%28198210%2979%3A10%3C537%3ACIP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H The Journal of Philosophy is currently published by Journal of Philosophy, Inc..
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME LXXIX, NO.
10, OCTOBER 1982
CONVERSE INTENTIONAL PROPERTIES*
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F you can say truly, "I am thought by that person to be a philosopher," then you have a converse intentional property-that of being thought to be a philosopher. Other converse intentional properties will be suggested by the locutions, "is much sought after," "is generally disliked," "has a good reputation," "is one of the suspects." Such properties have been called denominationes mere extrinsicae. Extrinsic or not, they are properties. Suppose that, at 5 P . M . , Mr. Jones arrives at the belief that his brother is a thief. This may have the consequence that his brother who is 500 miles away immediately acquires the converse intentional property of being thought to be a thief. T h e problem of objective reference may now be suggested by asking: "How did Mr. Jones succeed in hitting the mark so perfectly and so quickly? How did he succeed i n making his brother-and possibly only his brother-then become a thing that is thought to be a thief?" Here we have a version of Wittgenstein's question: "What makes my thought about him a thought about him?"' One possibility is to reject our problem and to say: "Mr. Jones cannot confer upon his brother 500 miles away the property of being believed to be a thief." As philosophers, we should not take this possibility seriously. Another possibility is to say: "From the fact that Mr. Jones's brother can truly say 'My brother thinks that I am a thief,' it does * T o be presented in an APA symposium on Ontology and Intentionality, December 29, 1982. J . N . Findlay will be co-symposiast, and Panayot Butchvarov will comment; see this JOURNAL, this issue, pp. 545-551 and 551-553, respectively, for their contributions. I am indebted to Ernest Sosa and to Michael Zimrnerrnan. I "Was macht meine Vorstellung von ihm zu einer Vorstellung von ihm?" Ludwig Wittgenstein, Phtlosophical Inriestigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), p. 177. Compare T h e Blue and Brown Books (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), p. 39. 0022-362X/82/7910/0537$00.80
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not follow that he has the property of being thought to be a thief." T h i s would be like saying that, from the fact that a thing x is larger than a thing y, it does not follow that y is smaller than x. SOME PRESUPPOSITIONS
We assume, then, that if Mr. Jones believes with respect to his brother that he is a thief, then Mr. Jones's brother has the property to being believed to be a thief. We also assume that Mr. Jones has a belief which is such that (a) he can know by reflection that he has that belief, and (b) it is in virtue of his having that belief that he can be said to believe his brother to be a thief. Of course, one could believe one's brother to be a thief without knowing that one believes one's brother to be a thief. If, unknown to you, the man in the mask is your brother, then you might believe your brother to be a thief without knowing that you do. But you will then have some belief (perhaps the belief expressed by "That man in the mask is a thief") in virtue of which you could be said to believe your brother to be a thief and which is such that you can know by reflection that you have that belief. We may put this presupposition by saying that every belief has a n intentional object to which the believer has direct access. We assume, further, that Jones can believe his brother to be a thief even if his brother is not a thief. (But we do not assume that Jones can believe his brother to be a thief if he doesn't have a brother. For if he does not have a brother, then the belief he would express by saying "My brother is a thief" is not a belief with respect to his brother; the fact that Jones has the belief would not imply that he has a brother.) EXPLAINING HOM'
Our question takes the form: How it is that a person x succeeds in causing a person y to have the property of being F ? Let us consider briefly the general nature of such how-questions. We begin by considering an example. Suppose I just caused you to be the only one in the building to be standing. How did I do it? A possible answer would be: I did it by sitting down at a time when (a) you and I were the only persons in the building, ( b ) we were both standing, (c) no one was about to enter or to leave the building, and (d) you were such that you were going to remain standing. (We may also put the example by saying that that event which was my sitting down caused you to be the only one in the building who is standing.) O u r answer to the question " H o w did I cause you to be the only one who is standing?" does not make use of the concept of causing someone to be standing. Let us generalize upon the nature of this answer.
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You e x p l a i n h o w a person x performed a n act A if you cite a true proposition p which is such that: p implies x to have performed A; and p is equivalent to a proposition of the form, x performed act B u n d e r conditions C , where neither performing act B nor acting u n d e r conditions C implies or involves performing A.' More generally, you e x p l a i n h o w a n event e causes a thing x to be F if you cite a true proposition p such that: p implies x to be F; and p is equivalent to a conjunction of propositions of the form, e occurred under conditions C , where neither e occurs nor conditions C obtain implies or involves causing s o m e t h i n g t o be F. (We shall return below to the locution ' p implies x to be F'.) By its very nature, the answer to a how question provides occasion for another how question ( " H o w does he cause himself to have the property of sitting?"). And presumably every how question leads to some how question that can be answered only by sayi n g "He just does" or "It just does." But to the question, "How does one person cause another person to be the sole person who is standing?", we did not need to say "He just does." We provided an answer that did not make essential use of the concept of causing someone to be the sole person who is standing. In order to solve our present problem, therefore, we should try to follow a n analogous procedure. T o the question, "What are some of the circumstances under which one person can cause another to be believed to be a thief?", we should try to find an answer that does not make essential use of the concept of causi n g one person to be believed by another to be a thief. And, more generally, we would hope to do better than merely find an answer that takes the form "y is referred to by x as being a thief' or " x refers to y as being a thief." But is such an answer possible? THEORIES O F REFERENCE
We may distinguish five types of theory about the nature of that relation which holds between a thing x and a thing y when y can be said to be believed by x to be F. (1) T h e picture theory: x believes y to be F if and only if there is an inner picture P such that P pictures y to x as being F. (2) T h e inner-speech-act theory: x believes y to be F if and only if there is a sentence S and a language L such that (i) S says in L that y is F, and (ii) in an inner speech act x assertively utters S in L. 2 0 n e property may be said to imply another property if the first property is necessarily such that if anything has it then something has the second. And one property may be said to tnriolue another property if the first property is necessarily such that whoever conceives it also conceives the second.
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(3) T h e inner-system-of-representation theory: x believes y to be F if and only if there is an inner system of representation such that (i) that system of representation represents y to x as being F, and (ii) x accepts that representation. (4) T h e proposition theory: x believes y to be F if and only if there is a proposition p such that (i) p implies with respect to y that it is F, and (ii) x accepts p. (5) T h e attribution theory: x believes y to be F if and only if the property of being F is such that x attributes it to y. As formulated, the five "theories" are relatively empty. O n e may be inclined to say: "But surely there are still other theories of meaning!'' T h i s may be true, but, so far as I have been able to ascertain, there are n o additional answers to our question: "How does a person x cause a thing y to have the property of being believed by x to be F?" T h e picture theory would seem to have little promise. If we say that " a pictures b," we may mean either (i) that a and b have all their properties in common or (b) that they have only some of their properties in common or (c) that a represents b. I n the first case we have to say that nothing can picture anything other than itself; in the second case we have to say that everything pictures everything; and, in the third case, we are left with our problem. O n e might hope to spell out the inner-speech-act theory by means of some version of the "causal theory of meaning." But what version? And how would it be applied to our specific problem about Jones and his brother? At the moment, we have n o answer to these questions.3 T h e inner-system-of-representation theory is sometimes put in such a way that it presupposes the picture theory. I n this form, it would seem to be n o more promising than the picture theory. But it may also be p u t in such a way that it presupposes the innerspeech-act theory. In application to our problem, this latter version of the theory seems to come to the following: "To say that there is a n inner system of representation which represents y to x as being F is to say that x has certain thoughts that are related to y in the way in which a sentence is related to y when that sentence is such that in a certain language it says of y that it is F . " ~ T h e reader who is unconvinced should compare the criticisms of the picture theory and of the causal theory in Hilary Putnam's Reason, Truth a n d Hzstory (New York: Cambridge, 1981), p. 64ff. Unfortunately, I am not able to say what Putnam's own answer to our question would be. 4~ view of this sort is suggested by Peter Geach in Mental Acts (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957). Compare the following observation by Jerry Fodor:
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Consider now how our various "theories" may be applied to the question, "How did Mr. Jones bring it about that his brother took o n the property of being thought to be a thief?" They seem to leave us with how questions of the very sort that we were hoping to answer: "How does P picture y as being F?"; "How does S say of y that it is F?"; "How does R represent y as being F?"; "How does p i m p l y with respect to y that it is F?"; and "How does x attribute to y the property of being F ? " Each theory, as formulated, leaves us with an expression of the form, ' x refers to y as F '. Let us consider the nature of such expressions, for they lead us to the type of puzzlement with which we began. T h e point may be illustrated by reference to the inner-speechact theory. If the theory is applied to our problem, then it will include the statement There exists a n x and there exists a y such that x says of y that it is a thief.
T h i s statement has the following properties: (1) It does not imply that x is identical with y (one who affirms it may add, without contradiction, "and x is other than y "); therefore it allows that "action at a distance" which gave rise to our original problem. (2) It implies that there is something that is said t o be a thief and that there is something that says of something that it is a thief. (3) It involves the property of being a thief (one cannot grasp the statement unless one can conceive the property of being a thief). But (4) it does not imply that there is a thief. And one is left with the question: " H o w does x bring it about that y acquires the property of being thought to be a thief?" T h e other four theories are analogous. T h e first three theories-the picture theory, the inner-speech-act theory, and the inner-system-of-representation theory-have this limitation: each is such that, at the-present time, there seems to be n o way of elaborating it which does not leave us with an unanalyzed intentional expression of the form, "x refers to y as F." But this is not true of the proposition theory and the attribution theory; they can be elaborated in ways that are applicable to our problem. "Assume there are such things as mental symbols (mental representations) and that mental symbols have semantic properties. On this view having a belief inherits its semantic properties from the mental symbol that figures in the relation. Mental processes (thinking, perceiving, learning and so o n ) involve causal interactions among relational states such as having a belief. T h e semantic properties of the words and sentences we utter are in turn inherited from the semantic properties of the mental states that language expresses." "The Mind-Body Problem," Scientific Amerzcan, c c x ~ r v(1981): 114-125; the quotation appears on p. 122.
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O u r formulation of the propositional theory contains the expression ' p implies with respect to x that it is F ' . T h i s clause is capable of further analysis. thus we may say:
p implies with respect to x that it is F = dr There is a property Q such that: x and only x has Q; and p is necessarily such that it is true if and only if there is just one thing that has Q and that thing has F.
With this definition we have explained how it is that one thing may imply another thing to be F. Our definition may thus be said to tell us what it is for a proposition to refer to a thing.5 T h e propositional answer to our question may now be set forth as follows: x believes y to be F if and only if there is a proposition p and a property Q such that: (i) y and only y has Q; (ii) p is necessarily such that it is true if and only if there is just one thing that has Q and that thing is F; (iii) p is necessarily such that whoever conceives it conceives the property Q and the property being F; and (iv) x accepts p.
Like any theory, the propositional theory will leave some how questions unanswered. For example: "How does it happen that p is necessarily such that, if it is true, then something has the property of being F ? " But the theory takes us one step further than does any of the first three theories. We have said that every belief has a n intentional object to which the believer has direct access: one can know by reflection just what it is that one believes. T h i s means, in application to our formula, that the relation of acceptance that obtains between the person x and the proposition p is such that x can know by reflection that it obtains. T h u s , according to the proposition theory, there is a certain proposition such that Jones can know by reflection that he accepts the proposition; this may be the proposition he would express by saying "My brother is a thief." We are not saying that Jones can know by reflection that he believes with respect to his brother that he is a thief. For he cannot know by reflection that condition (i) above ("y and only y has Q") is fulfilled. But he can thus know that conditions (ii), (iii) and (iv) are fulfilled. I n other words, it is theoretically possible for him to find this out without making any empirical investigation of external things. What is it, then, that the propositional theory tells us about the world? T h e simplest way to look at the matter would seem to be ' A version of this definition may be found in my book, Person and Object (London: Allen 5 Unwin; L a Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1976), p. 29.
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this: persons are rational beings; rational beings are necessarily such that they can consider and accept propositions; and they are also such that, when they consider and accept propositions, they can know by reflection that they do. Propositions, in turn, are abstract objects that are necessarily such that they can be considered and accepted. It would follow from what we have said that certain abstract objects are such that people can know by reflection that they exist.6 T H E ATTRIBUTION T H E O R Y : ELABORATION
T h e attribution theory was p u t by saying: " x believes y to be F if and only if the property of being F is such that x attributes it to y." T h e expression ' x attributes to y the property of being F ' may be eliminated if we spell out the theory as follows, making use of the concept of direct attribution: x believes y to be F = dr Either (a) x directly attributes to x the property of being F; or ( b ) there is a relation R such that x stands in R to y and only to y, and x directly attributes to x the property of standing in R to just one thing and to a thing that is F.
T h e definition presupposes that direct attribution is necessarily such that, for every x and y, if x directly attributes anything to y, then x is identical with y. Hence the locution does not involve that "action at a distance" which gave rise to our original problem. T h e second clause of the definiens may be abbreviated by saying " x indirectly attributes to y the property of being F." T h e n we could say that x attrzbutes to y the property of being F ( x believes y to be F ) provided only that x directly or indirectly attributes that property to y. T h e attribution theory commits us to the existence of properties and relations. It implies that a person can directly attribute a property to himself and that he can know by reflection that he does this. It does not tell us h o w he is able thus to attribute the property to himself or h o w it is that he is able to know by reflection that he does. But it does tell us how it is that, by attributing a property to oneself, one may thereby also attribute a property to something other than oneself. What we have said about the propositional theory and the presupposition of rationality may also be applied, m u t a t i s m u t a n d i s , to the attribution theory. Rational beings are necessarily such that Propositions are sometimes taken to be concrete contingent things. If we were to combine this way of viewing propositions with the propositional theory of reference, then we would have to say, of them, that people can know merely by reflection that they exist.
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they can consider properties and attribute them to themselves; they are also necessarily such that, when they d o thus consider and attribute properties, they can know by reflection that they do. And properties are necessarily such that they can be considered and attributed. T h e attribution theory seems to have three advantages over the proposition theory. (1) Unlike the proposition theory, it provides us with a straightforward solution to the problem of the "he, himself" locution. What is the difference between saying, of a person x, that x believes x to be wise and saying, of x, that x believes himself to be wise? T h e answer is that, in the former case, we are saying "Either x directly attributes wisdom to himself or x indirectly attributes wisdom to himself"; and in the latter case we are saying "x directly attributes wisdom to himself." (2) T h e attribution theory provides us with a simple way of interpreting demonstratives. We may note, for example, that one of the uses of the locution 'I a m F ' in English is to express the property of believing oneself to be F. Again, one of the uses of 'That is F ' is to express the property of believing oneself to be such that the thing one is endeavoring to call attention to is F. I n explicating demonstratives in this way, we need not presuppose that such words have senses, and therefore we can avoid the problems involved in deciding what these senses may be. (3) T h e attribution theory, unlike the proposition theory, does not require us to assume that sentences containing demonstratives express propositions. Hence we can avoid such puzzling questions as: "What properties are implied by the proposition that I a m standing?"
I would say, therefore, that the attribution theory gives us the most plausible answer we have to the question, "How does a thing x cause a thing y to have the converse intentional property of being believed to be F?" T h e proposition theory gives us the next most plausible answer.' These two theories-the one making use of the undefined concept of propositional acceptance, and the other making use of the undefined concept of direct attribution-may be said 'Ernest Sosa has developed a "perspectival" theory of propositions which, if it is tenable, enables him to escape some of the difficulties I have attributed to the propositional theory. See his "Consciousness of the Self and of the Present," in James Tomberlin, ed., Agent, Language and World; Essays Presented t o Hector-Neri Castafieda (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982), and "Propositions and Indexical Attitudes," in Herman Parret, ed., Believing: Epistemology and Semiotics of Belief (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1982).
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to presuppose the primacy of intentionality. T h e other three theories-the picture theory, the inner-speech-act theory, and the innersystem-of-representation theory-do not presuppose this. But they have not yet given us any answer at all. RODERICK M. CHISHOLM
Brown University
AN ONTOLOGY O F SENSES*
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wish in this paper to consider the Fregean notion of Sense (Sinn) or Significant Content, as a candidate for a Universal Ontology, everything that is not a Sense being in some sense parasitic upon the Senses that inform it, and having its whole being in an attachment to such Senses. (This view would make Objects rather than Senses ungesattigt, or incomplete.) Senses attach to words and symbols and give them life, but they also give life and content to the many forms of conscious experience in which, as we say, they are enjoyed or understood, whether as attached to words, or in an unattached, naked form. They also give life and content to the many forms of behavior which express such enjoyment and understanding, including those which involve the use of words and symbols. T h e whole of conscious life may be regarded as a n enjoyment of Senses and, indirectly, of the references to the entities to which such Senses themselves refer. But the attachment of Senses is not solely to the minds that enjoy them or use them to animate symbols, gestures, and patterns of behavior, but also to the things and states of affairs that make u p the world that is there for us all, they all being matters that fulfill or illustrate Senses of various sorts, some rich in content and wide in extension, others geared to the most minute, vanishing particularities of things and situations. But whether they tell us much or little or hardly anything about the matters to which they attach, Senses nonetheless give to objects and states of affairs all they can have of lasting, substantial, discussable content, deprived of which they would become wholly nugatory. We may go further and say that it is only in virtue of the Senses which they embody and which are in this context spoken of T o be presented in an APA symposium on Ontology and Intentionality, December 29, 1982. Roderick Chisholm will be co-symposiast, and Panayot Butchvarov will comment; see this JOLIRSAL, this issue, 537-544 and 551-553, respectively, for their contributions. 0022-362X/82/7910/0545$00.70
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