Cosmopolitan Justice

L'rZ

Xlcmbcr of thc Pcrscus Hooks Group

At1 rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America, Mo part of this pubficatiotl rnay be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, includrecordit~g,or any information storage and retrieval tystern, svithout permising ~~hotocopy, sion in tvriting from the publishec Copyright Q 2002 by Westview Press, A Member of the Perseus Books Group Westview 13ress books are available at special discounts for bulk purchases in the United States by corporations, institution\, and other organizations. For more information, please contact the Special Markers Ilepattment at Thc Perseus Books Grotrp, 11 Cambridge C:entes Cat-x~bridge, MA 02142, or call 1617)252-52%. Pubfished in 2002 in the United Statcs of America by Westview Press, 5500 C:entral Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the United Kingdom by Westview fjres.s, 12 Hid's Copse Road, C:umnor Hill, Oxford OX2 9JJ Find us on the World Wide Web at tvw\ltitvestviewpress.com library of Congress C:ataloging-in-PubIicati<>t~Ilata Moetlendorf, l9arrel. Cosmopolitan justice / Darrel Moellendorf. p, C171, Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBPS 0-8133-6556-2 (pbk.) - ISBN 0-8153-6578-3 1. Justice, 2. Tntcmatior.ralitn~. 3. Nationatism. X. Titile.

The gaper used in this publicatictn meets the requirements of the Arnerican Matiotlal Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials 239.48-1984.

To Bonnie and Murino

l Introductioi~:A Tale of Two Tei~dei~cies in International Law Justice in Philosophy and Law, 1 Statism and Cosmopoiitanism in Contemporary International Law, The Road Ahead, 6

2 Rawfsian Constructivism and Cosmopofitan Justicc Rawls" C~anstructivism,8 Rawlsk Justificatzon of E-fumn~z Rzghts, 9 Bemocracx IQ Egakztarian&m, 12 Justzce or Expedient?$ X 4 Cosmopolitax~Constructivism, 16 Universality and Political. Constructivism, 1 8 The Democratic G C I P Z G a~ P~ ~d~ Q ~ the Self-concepgzon o f Psrso~s,19 JustZfyZ~~g the Democratic G C I P Z G of ~ PPersons, ~ ~ Q ~20 CZharacterzzing the Nature of the Justzfication, 23 The Truth of the Principles of Justice, 24 Ttjleration, 26 Conclusion, 28

3 The Bardcrs of Justice Duties of justice, 31 Assnclative Dutzes and Dutzes ~ ( J u s t i c 32 ~;~,

l

2

Dzilties of Jzdstice and f nstz~tttions,3 3 Assocktlvr-l Dutzes avzd MoraE EqatzEity, 33 Assocktlvr-l Dutzes avzd A ttztades, 35

Global Justice, 36 The Global Associatzon, 36 A Failed Limitipzg Strategy9 3 8 The Questioil of Consistency, 39 Three Objections, 44 Dlsrnnce, 44 Degree of Assocl'atzon, 45 Moral Triage, 44 Patriotisxn, 47 Nationalism, 5 2 Protecsrionism and Immigration, S4 Protec~~zonism, 5.5 Immigratzon, 6 l

4 Global Egalitarianism and Imperialism Skepticism about Duties of Global Distributive Justice, 69 Rawls, 70 Barry, '72 Nardin, 74 Goodin, 75 W a l x e ~76 Egalitarian Principles, '78 Liberal EqatzEity, '713 Democratic Eq~daEitx80 T b o Objections, 13 f hirnary Goolhis, Capabilities, and Gender f"negualz;~y, 83

Problexns of Global Distri hutive jt~sticein Development, 532,

The C ~ s for e Debt C~ncelbation,92 The Costs of Global WnrmtBgf 97

5 Cosmpolitan Sovereiguty and Justified Xntervention The Concepts of Sovereigfzty and Intervention, 193 Sovereignty from the Cosmopolitan Point of View, f 04 The Statist Conception of Sovereignty, 1105 Soverelignty as Dclmipzi~tm,106 The Right to Share n Common Life Together* 107 I~depe;~dence, I Q8 The Cunstzttttion of Moral l3erscrnnli$y>I Q8 Tobera~zceand 131z.lralism,12 1 ReEa~zvtsm,X X 1 Pence, 1 X 2 S~ff-ernancipatk and Paternalzsm, 114 Anti-imperi~lism,l l C; Interventioil, 1 1 7 Basic Struct&tresand Government Polzctes, 1 17 Conditions c>( Justzfied Inir-ervention, 118 Per~n&szbleversus Ublzgnt~ryIn~eruention,I22 Intervention a r Xsalatian, 125 Conclusion, 126

G A Cosmopolitan Account of National Sctf-dctcrmination Cosxnopolita nisrn versus Nationalism, 1 28 National Self-deterntir~ation,129 The Probfem of Radnnal Revtsznn, X 30 A Non-~at;ioealzstAccount of N a ~ h n a ,Self-deterrninatir,n, l 13 1 Who Bears fie Right to National Self-determination?, 13l Nonterritorial-Based National Self-dererminatiw, 132 Territ-orial-Based National Self-determination, 134 The Right to Secede, 135 Constraz~it-S on the Right; to Secede, 137 Two Objections, 138 Two Altcrnntive Accoz.tnts of the Right to Secede, I 39

General Cbnlle~gesto the Right to Secede.' 140 Conclusion, 1 43 7 Political Realism, Pacifism, and the Justice of War Political Realism o r Politics without Morals, 143 Pacifism, 148 Skeptzcal Pacifism, 148 Normative i")acifism, 1SO

The Just Use of ~VilitaryForce, 15% The Statkt Account of Jlast Cause, 158 The Cosrnopoli&n Account of Jlast Cause, 1S9 Iznperz'alkm:nnd War, 160 The Gulf W-E~., 161 The Kosouo War, 162 Conclusion, 170

S Concludilzg Remarks: Toward an Egalirariaxz WrXd Carder Principles, Institutions, and Agents, 173 Cosmopolitax~Hope, 175

1 begail thinking about the ideas related to this book in 1990 as the United States was preparing far the Gulf War. During the time that I was a graduate student in the 19805, I had also spent a great deal of time srgarrizing opposition to U.f, foreign policy in Central America and southern Africa. The Gulf War was unlike most other U.5- orchestrated military campaigns during the decade that preceded it, insofar as it was ostensibly directed toward an unambiguously wicked ruler. Hence, it was not easy for sorne of us to account for our opposition to the war in a way that was convincing to others and ourselves..In an effort to do lust that, and to begin an account sf the principles of socialist internationalism, X wrote a paper called "Marxism, Internationalism, and the Justice of War," which was published in Science and fc3tcie~(58:3, fall 1994). Akhough f then thought that classical Marxisrn was more or less an adequate political philosophy, in writing tl-ris piece 1 came to believe that the determination of the justice of a war required an account of social justice. This, of course, f would not find in classical Marxism. In the summer of 1994, 1 had the good fortune of attending a National Endowmerit of the Humar~ities(NEH)summer serninar on the ff~undations of political self-derennination, hosted by Ailen Bucl-ranan at the University of Wisconsin, madi is on, I w0u1d like to thank the NEH for the support that pointed me in the direction of this bc>ok.Through participation in that seminar and discussions with Harry BrigX~ause,X came to a greater respect for egalitarian liberal accounts of justice. W r k that summer produced two papers that would be the basis of the present book. Chapter 2 of this book is a reworking of "Conscruccing the Law of Peoples," originally published in Pacific Philosophical Q ~ a r t e r b(?7:2,June 1996). The fc~ctrsof that paper was John Rawls"s Oxford Amnesty Lecture, "The Law of Peoples," Chapter 2 contains substantial revisions of tl-rat earlier article, in part ta take into account Rawls" bhook, The Law of Peop/es (Cambridge: klarvard University Press, f 399). Chapter 4 is a revised version of ""tiberalisrn, National-

xii

13~br;~cr?,

ism, and the Right to Secede," originally published in Philosophical Forurn (XXV1I:l-2, falllwinter 1996-1 9973, Chapter 5 incorporates material fi-om z "Applied ~ Ethics (Saxi Diego: my entry ""Imperiaiism'3in the E ~ c y c l c ~ p e dof Academic Press, 1998). People on both the political left and right wilI find various conctusions of this hook disagreeable, Although I have tried to b l low the arguments wherever they have taken me, I remain confident that this book sets out the principles of internationalism that tl-re left sl-rould be committed to, Pvlc~vingfroin the United States to South Africa made me aware of certain issues that X had previously nut considered and gave me the opportunity to hear new perspectives on old problems. It also presented me with a new group of interesting and supportive colleagues, 1 am grateful to IVichael Pendelbury for using his administrative acumen to arrange to give me the time to finish this book and to Brian Penrose far generously agreeing to rearrange his teaching schedule to make it happen. I would also like to thank University of tlre Wtwatersrand for granting me a sabbatical and supporting me with an Anderson-Kappelk grant, Over the past five years, papers that would become parts of chapters of this hook were read in many different forums, incfuding the Radical Philosophy Association in conjunction with the Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association ( APAj, 1495; the Society for the Prewith the Easterxi Division vexition of Nuclear Qmniclde in conjur~ctiox~ meeting of tl-re A13A, 1935; the International Network of Philosophers of Education meeting, Rand Afrikaans University, 1996; the Philosophical Society of So~ztherxiAfrica meetings in 1996, 1998, 2000, and 290 l ; the Spring Collaquiuxn hosted by the Departxnent of Philosophy, University of Natal, Pietermaritzhurg, 1997; the E3oernfk Research Seminar of the Department of: Philosophy, University of the Witwatersranrl, $997;the Departxnent of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1 999; the Eastern Division meeting of the APA, 1999; the Department of Phitosophy, Rand Al'rikaans University, 22000; the African Studies Serrtinar, Universiq of the Wirwatersrand, 2000 and 2001; and the Pacific Division xneecing of the APA, 2001. I would like to thank the o r w i z e r s of these events for providirlg trte with a forutrt to preserit my ideas, and the many participantsthe majority of whorn I do not know-for the discussions that have helped me irnprove my work, I am grateful to Kate Hofmeyer and Michael Mandlebaum for their research assistance as I was completing the manuscript along with trying to teach them something about Arrstotle and Kant. Over the years, many peopie have generously read parts of this hook or discussed various ideas co1itained therein with me. To all of them, thank you. Xn particular I would like tc-, thank Patrick Bond, Harry Brighcruse, Alten Buchanan, Steve CLarke, Omar Dahbour, Parker English, Patrick Hayden, Jason Hill, Andy Kuper,

Sharon Lloyd, Hennie Utter, jon Mandel, Rodney Pefkr, Brian Penrose, David Schmidtz, Ted Stolze, John Strernilau, ~MaryTjiattas, and Paul Vc~ice, J would also like to thank the faflowing people who commented on the proposal or the penultimate draft of this book for Westview: Wavid Crocker, Thornas Pogge, james St-erba, and Jerem); Waldroil, Three people were particularly generokzs with their time and tho~zghcs,reaciing all or must of the xnmuscriyt, f owe a special debt of gratitude to Bonnie Friedmailn, Thad ~Metz,and 1Vichael Peildlebury, No doubt there are many ways irr which this could have beer1 a better book, perhaps especially if I had Iisterled more carefully to those who discussed its ideas with me. But X shudder to think of what it- might have been without their help. Finally9 additional thanks are due to Bonnie Friedmann for living with my distraction and supporting me through it, especially during an exciting final nine montl-rs.

All human hebtgs are horn free and equal in dipzity dad I"Zghts, T h y are et~dowedwith rtrasrrrt ar~dC O ~ Z S C ~ d~ t~~ZdsCh~o ~ l dact towards orte atzother rn a spzrig nfbrotheri~ood, -Universal Cz~taratianof Human Rights1

This book focuses 0x3 matters of social Justice, Social Justice coricerns the morai. nature of the institutiotls that mediate interactions among persons. Altl-rough so-conceived social justice may be narrower in scope than justice per se, for the sake of simplicity 1 shall use the term justice as eq uivalent to soczal j~stice.At base our moral duties of justice are directed to other persons, but these duties are usually discharged tl-rrougl-s.conduct directed toward institutions, such as obeying existing institutional ruies, defying them, or advocating and aidi~lgin the csnstructioti of new institrrtit~nsthat will promote just interactions. For example, although a duty of ~usticeto others involves protecting them from criminal wrongdoing and apprehending the wrongdoer, this duty is discharged by paying taxes to support the potice and judicial system and by cooperating wit11 police and ~udicialinvestigations. It does not typically require that citizens police the streets. Duties of justice are a part of moralit!., hut not by any means the whole of it. Not ail moral duties to others are institutionalIy mediated. For example, a duty to tell the truth may be, and usualty is, satisfied without any reference to institutional rules at all.

This book is particularly focused on matters of international justice concerning the justification, content, and practical requirements of duties of justice to noncompatriots. Arguments about these matters fall within the province of political and moral philosophy. Justice is, however, a legal concept as well as a philosophical one. Some writers on international justice are concerned with making legal arguments about the existence, interpretation, and consequences of rules that govern existing institutions and patterns of international interaction. Although any distinction between moral and legal approaches to justice may be controversial, one way to think about it is that the former abstracts from existing institutional requirements and develops an account of the duties that persons owe to each other by considering the nature of justice itself; whereas the latter seeks a proper grasp of existing practices and institutions, endeavoring to understand what the rules that govern them imply about a person's obligation.2 As a philosophical approach to the matter of international justice, this book attempts t o answer questions such as, What is the justification for human rights? What duties of justice do we have to persons in other countries? What is the justification and limit of state sovereignty? When, if ever, are wars justified? The relationship between the philosophical conclusions to these questions and the legal treatment of similar issues is important. One position in contemporary jurisprudence, known as legal positivism, holds that the law can be known without a n assessment of whether it is just.3 Ronald Dworkin rejects this position, in part, by maintaining that certain moral principles are part of the law even before they are expressed in legal holdings or statutes.4 A philosophical approach t o justice may complement legal positivism by providing an account of what the law should be. It may also complement the Dworkinian approach by providing a justification of the principles that putatively are part of the basis of law. Either as an account of what the law should be or as a justification of what it is, there is a practical payoff to the philosophical account of justice. Therefore, it may prove useful as an introduction to subsequent chapters to consider some issues concerning the nature of international law.

IN

STATISM AND COSMOPOLITANISM CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Treaties, including United Nations (UN) legal documents, are one important source of international law. This body of law includes the UN Charter, which governs relations among all member states, as well as various covenants that govern relations among the signatory states. Within these documents there exists significant tension about the proper and ultimate

concern of international law. One conception of the basis of international law takes it to be based upcm the pril~cipleof self-determination a i d respect for the sovereigi~equality of all states. This view holds that the UN seeks above all to protect the interests of states as corporate bodies and seeks in particular to prevent them Irom unwanted interference by other states, 1 caXI this view statist, The fo1lowing two paragraphs of Article 2 of the UN Charter appear to be expressions of statism: 214): A11 members sfiall refrain in their internationat relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity a r political independence of any state, or in any mangler inconsistent with the 1)urposes t>f the United Nations." 217'): Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in lxatters wfiicfi are essentially witli~inthe dontestis j~trisdiction of any state t>rshall require the Members to submit such matters to settterncnt under the prescrlt Charter; but tliis principle shall nor preludicc tfic application of enlorcelnent measures under Czhapter VIIX.6

Paragraph 2(4) identifies territorial integrity and political independence as tlze two main interests of stales, These are not expressed as indirect interests of persons, but as interests of states, which the Charter in this paragraph seeks to deicnd from unilateral usurpation by other states, Paragraph 2("7 seeks to shield certain matters "essentially witlzin the dornestic jurisdiction" against collective UN interference, Again, it would appear that it is states3interests that are being protecsted.7 The application of paragraph 214) has protected states from interference by others and thereby given them broad license to pursue domestic policy goals in7 the manner seen fit by their leaders. One consequence of this is that persons seeking to changc the incernai order of' their state may not receive help from other states, whereas the state resisting the change may get help if it so wishes. Thus, the paragraph has been the basis fc~rcondemnation of what are considered to be indirect threats or uses of force by other states, such as actively assisting or encouraging civil strife or armed bands in other countries. Qn November 27, $948, the Gefieral Assembly condemned 121bank, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia for aiding Greek communist guerrillas.8 Although third parties trtay not aid revoirttionary moveirtents within other countries, those countries, being sovereign, may legitimately use force to suppress such movements.9 This is the significance of the language "in their international relations." The use of force internally is not questioned; there would be then no symrrtetrical condemnation of third parties who actively assisted or encouraged states in their internal struggles. The Soviet Union sought to justify its intervention into Hungary in 1956 with the claim that it was intervening at the inrvitation of the Hungarian government. The United

States defended its intervention into the Dominican Republic on April 28, 196.5, by claiming a ""threatto the Lives of its citizens, and a request for assistance from those Doininican authorities still struggling to maintain order.'""" The net effect is a bias in favor of existing state arrangements, Thus, statist international legal principles have conservative implications. Paragraph 214) does not impose an absolute bar against unilateral intervention, It would seem to perxnit unilateral intervention tlzat does not violate territorial integrity and politicai independence of a state and that is consistent with the pprrrposcs of the UN, Hence, it may not he entirely co1iservative in its effect. It is a matter of some controversy axnong international lawyers, however, whether unilateral interveiltions to promote justice would be permitted by paragraph 2(4).H Paragraph 2(7)seems to permit collective interventions that either do not affect matters essentially witt~inthe dornestic jurisdic~ionof a state or that are required by Chapter VII, In light of the reference to Chapter VZI, paragraph 2f7) is arguably more permissive of interventions than is 2(4j. The most relevant section in Chapter VII is Article 39, which permits the fecurity Council to authorize measures in the event of "'any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression'yin order to "'maintain or restore international peace and security."'qhe debate about the legality of unilateral intervention under paragraph 2(4) is paralleled by a debate about the extent to which collective intervention to proinote lustice is licensed bp paragraph 2(7).This paragraplz does not directly license interventions to promote justice. l 3 However, what are authorized are collective efktrts to restore international peace and security that have the effect of promtrting jrrstice, such as Security Council Resolution 940 on Haiti in 1994." In any case, it does seem as if paragraph 2j7) would not warrant an intervention to promote justice if in~rriationalpeace and security were not at risk,l-5 The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relatir>nsand CO-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations was adopted in 1970 as an elaboration of the yrinciples of the cllarter, In contrast to paragraphs 2(4) and 2(7),the declaration does lay down an absolute bar against intervention: ""NoState or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of otl-rer States." This is an unambiguous expression of statism, The United Nations came into existence at the end of the Secorid World VV;1r when the conscience of the world was horrified by the genocidal practices of the Nazi regime. Any consistent commitment to unqualified statism would have rendered the UN impotent against similar injtlstices in the future. Indeed, the post-war period also witnessed tl-re blossoxning of a very d i h r e n t conception of the basis of international l a w as a variety of statemerits affirming a commitment to international human rights were issued.

According to these statexnents, the claims of individut~lpersons constitute the basis of international legal obligations, This view is sometimes called "cosmopolitanism,'" The UN Charter expresses tl-re cosmopolitan perspective at several points. The preamble reaffirms "hllth in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in equal rights of men and women,'"Wrticle 55 commits the UN to the promotion of ""universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction to race, sex, larrguage, or religiort.'qVr~rticle56 expresses a pledge "to take joint and separate action. . . for the achievement ol the purposes set forth in Article 55." IX E-iowever, the content of this cosmopolitan commitment to human rights in the charter is left unspecified. The Universal Declaratio11 of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly fills out this content considerably, proclaiming rights to fife, liberty, security of person, recognition as a person before the law, ownership of property? freedom of expression, assembly, aizd association, and freedom from slavery and torture," The status of the declaration, however, is less than a law of trc;.aty,l{J though there is sorne det3ate about whether it rises to the level of custurnary inrternational law after more than fifty years of existence.21 The International Covenant on Economic, Sclcial, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Ri@ts offer interpretations of the charter's commitment to human rights that do have the force of treaty law a m o x their signatories. Protected by the first covenant are the rights to work uilder favorable conditions, to ~ o i ntrade unioils, to the enjoyment of the highest attainahfe stmdards of physical and mental lzealth, and to free compulsory primary education.22 The second cclveilant protects the rights to life, liberty, secmity of person, recognition as a person before the law, ownership of property, freedom of expression, assembly9 and associalon, and freedom from slavery and torture.23 As indicated earlier in ctmnection with the colztroversy surrounding the inlylicatiorzs of paragraphs 2(4) and 2(7),there is considerable legal debate about how to reconcile the statist proclamations on sovereignty with tlze cosmopolitan ones on human rights, both of which exist in contemporary inrternationat law. This book does not take sides on the legal questions, but seeks instead a plzilosoghicai defense and extension of tlze cosmopolitan conception of justice. For the reasons noted above, the successful defense of this perspective will csmpiement the efforts of international lawyers seeking to defend legal cosmopo!itanisrr7 by providing a moral ~ustificationfor their legal orientation. Similarly it will complement empiricai work in political science and international relations by providing the basis for a moral assessxnent of the events and trends that tl-rey study. Finally, far tlzose in policy studies, there are important implications of this account of what aught to be Jane to fulfil1 duties of justice to rtoi~compatriotr;.

Chapter 2 takes LIPfoundational issues in the justification of cosrrtopolitan justice, I defend a version of cosmopolitanism that draws heavily a n the political constructivism of John Rawls, Rawls himself, however, is no cosmopolitan. So, 1 find myself in the unenviable position of having to argrle for Rawls against Rawls, Chapter 3 attempts to arrive at a general account of the relationship between the duties of justice owed to compatriots and those wed to nomsmpatriots, It takes up matters of immigration firnits and econornic protectionism to show tl-re application of the perspective defetnded. Chapter 4 presents an account of the duties of egalitarian global distributive justice and applies the account to an analysis of imperialism, and to issues such as international debt cancellation and the assigrlrrtent of the costs of global warming. Cl-zaprer 5 deiiends a cosmopolitan account of sovereignty and justified intervention and looks at the example of the embargo against Iraq. Chapter 6 argues that cosmopolitans can amept a qrralified right to nacional self-determination and even secession. Chapter 7 defends the cosmopolitan account of just war against a statist rival account, as well as pofitical reaIist and pacifist challenges, and applies the accotmt to the Gulf War and tl-re Kosovo W ~ PFinafl~., , Ctlapter 8 concludes with some brief speculations about the institutional requirements of an egalitarian world order and offers reason to hope for such an order.

TWO

Ikcslitzul philosophers ex/?/irzilzwh?~~ m t .

IZOW mast

eZtC~t"rwork withi~tKawlss theur3~or

--Robct-t Nazickl

One of the fundamental tenets of eke cosrnopalitanism tl-rat I seek to defend is that duties of justice have global scope. John Rawls has developed a theory of ~usticefar domestic society that 1 find convincing in general terms, This theory is characterized by two principles of justice that require both respecting civil and dexnocratic rights and limiting inequalities in the Qissrihution of resources, Respect h r civil and democratic rights requires a political regime of corzstitutional democracy*The implication of the limits on sociaeconurnic inequalities is a xnatter ol debate among fal'tawers of Rawls, Rawls himself claims that the political regime must not be "directed by the inrterests of large concentrations of private econoi~icand corporate p ~ w m veiled frorn public knowledge and almost entirely free from accountability,"z Achieving this and other desiderata of equaliv, he believes, would require either a regime that permits property rights in productive holdings but limits their transfer-especially in inheritance nanskrs-or a market sc~cialistregime.' The cosmopoIitan view that I defend holds tl-rat tl-re content of tl-re above mentioned principles sl-rould apply globally, Rawls disagrees. He defends a theory of international justice that requires respect for a minimal set of human rights but requires neither constitutiorzal democracy nor limits on so-

cioeconurnic equality, In this chapter X shall argue tl-rat the justification of the principles of international justice-the law of peoples-that Rawls emptoys i r ~The Law of Peoples leaves h u r ~ a nrights on an rmcertain basis and that his reasons for excluding requirements of constitutional democracy and limitations on sc~cioeconomicinequalities are unconvincing. 1 shall defend an alternative justification that extends the requirements of justice globally to include requirernents of constitutional democracy and limitations on sc~cioeconomicinequality, I shall explain Rawls" cconstrucdon of the law of peoples and show the inadequt~cyof his refusal to incltide democratic and egalitarian principles. I shall also identify alternative principles that are among the elements of the cosmopolitan conception of justice. I shall defend an alternative construction procedure, which is based upon respect for persons and esablishes the alterrtacive princiyfes previously idetltified, I will hilow that with a defense of the universality of the democratic conception of persons and the principies that are derived from them, Finally J will argue that the account of this chapter, and not RawIs's, is consistent with the value of toleraeiort. The result, I hope, will establish the cosmopolitan conception of justice as superior to Rawls" [law of peoples.

Rawls terms his justification of yrir-rciplesof justice politicrll cu~zstructivism. 1st Political Lilieralism Ize develops a constructivist procedure for domestic societh which involves modeling a conception of persons according to values that are suppr>sedto be inherent in the democratic traditioi~,TTlll~ conception is used in a procedure, called the original position, that places persons bel-rirld a veil of ignorance so that they know nothing about their ahiliries, race, ethnicity, sex, or gender; their conceptions of the good; or their position within society' By setting aside knowledge that could serve as the basis for bias in decisionmaking, tl-re original position is designed to model. our convictions about fairness: What ideal types of persons in this ideal setting woulif settle on as the principles of justice amounts to a reliable indication of what justice requires of us in the here and nuw.h The principles of justice derived by this procedwe are meant to be political or freestanding-that is, not derived exclusively from any one of the many comprehensive moral, philosogl-rical,and theological doctrines that citizens c>f liberal democracies bold.' Rawis prefers a political csnceptian of justice because it affords the opportunity of wider assent to the principles of ]ustice, resulting in greater stability for tl-re order based upon them. It is useful to mmpare the construction of irhe Law of k o ~ p i e swith the one in Poljtial Liberakm, In Politiml Liberalism the original position is said to

mode) fair conditions among free and equal citizens because their representatives are situated symmetricany and equally, Citizens are modeled as rationaf by virtue of their representatives' full pursuit of their interests. Meanwhile the veil of ignomce xnodels reasombleness by preventing decisions based upon known advanrages over others. The original position in The Law ofPeo~plesis set up in an analogous inanner, except that seated behind the veil of ignorance are representatives of peoples, not persons.8 By peoples Rawls apparently means states motivated by a conception of justice with a citizemy in possession of comrrton sympathies,~awls"suse of ~POPIC'S i s best understood as part of his ideal tl-reary of international justice, He is, in other words, assuming that states comply with the principles of ~ustice,and in ordet- to signih that assumption he uses the term peoples. This explains why when discussing states that do not comply he reverts to terms such as outlaw states.10 The veil of ignorance prevents the representatives of peoples fi-om knovving the size or population of their territorh their level of economic develupment, or the extent of their natural resources.. They may assume that reasonably favurable conditions for democracy exist" and that peoples have an interest in preserving their territory as wet1 as the safety and security of their populatior~,IWowever, their fundarnental interest is in their conception of justice,"

Rawis's Jtrstzfication of Huma~zRights The first stage of Rawls's consuuction of tl-re law of peoples is the construction of an ideal theory in which universal compliance is assurned. The construction proceeds in two steps: The first is a construction that applies, with a significant caveat (see the section on Eg~litarianismin this chapter), to relations among liberal peoples; the second expands relations to include certain well-ordered nonliberal, or what Rawfs calls decent hierarctlical, peoples, The eight principles that Rawls suggests that representatives of liberal geoples would agree upon in the first stage of the origint~lposition are:

( 1 ) Peoples are free and independent, and their freedorn and indeyendence is to be respected by other peoples, (2)Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. (3)Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreemerits that bind them. (4)Peoples observe the duty of nonintervention. (Sj Peoples have the right to self-deknse but not to instigate war fc~rreasons other than self-defense, (6)Peoples are to l-ronor huxnan rights. (7)Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions on the conduct of vva r,

(8)Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unhvorable conditions that prevent their hwing a just or decent political and social regime.14 Rawls notes that a complete law of peoples may have to include certain ayprir-rciplesthat are not included in this list and that certairlr qualificatio~~s ply to these principles. Perllaps most important axnong tl-rese, principles (1) and (4) as claims of sovereignty do not apply to states that do not honor prir-rciple (6).'5The argument for this list is somewhat sketchy, hut is based upon the assumption of tl-re equt~lityof geoples.16 On this basis, classical or average utilitarianism is ruied out because it would sanction benefits for some peoples at the expense of others. This assumption may underwrite the justification of princiyles j l j through ( Sj, butit is less helpful in understanding why principles (6) through (8) are included, The justification of (6) is of particular importance, gven the role that it plays in limiting sovereignty Let%consider a possible justification of (6). In the original position, representatives of peoples are pursuing the rational interests of the peoples they represent under the constraints of the veil of ignorance, which precludes them from knowing the particular details of these peoples. Why would such representatives include a requirement that l-r~~man rights be respected? Human rights would not he secured by the assumption of the equality of peopies, since the former protects the interests of persons and the latter co11cerns the status of peoples, The equtllity of peoples is violated only if &ere is unequal respect for corporate bodies, not h r persons. Peoples may be respected as equals despite the fact &at some are viofators of the rights of persons. However9 the futldarnental interest that representatives of peoples would like to secure in the original position is the conception of justice of their peoples. Since respect for human rights is a commitment of the poliricaI institutions of Liberal peoples, all representatives of liberal peoples could a g e e that ( E ; ) is in the interest of their peoples, The cogency of this line of reasoning is dependent upon the sense of distinguishing peoples from states since, according to Rawis, states lack an interest in justice-17

A notable absence among these eight principles is one requiring constitutional democracy, If the above RawlsBn defense of human riglrts makes sense, namely3that liberal peoples have an interest in including their moral justice, then prepolitical coi~mitmentsin the principles of internatio~~al suxnably they would include the following principle as well: (9) Political arrailgemeilts are to honor the institutions of constitutioilal de~~c~cracy.

In order to avoid the limitations of Rawis" use of the term peoples, I substitute here the term polil.ical arrawrazents, which may include regional and global institutions as wefl as state institutions. Hence, (91 does not stipulate whether global justice permits, requires, or proscribes political organization in the form of states, Representatives of liberal peoples would include (9) for the sairte (presumed) reason they include (C;): It is part of the conception of justice of the peoples represented by the parties because tlzese are liberal peoples; and this conception of justice is the fundamental interest of peoples that the parties seek to defend. Thus, peopIes need not trtodify their condtlct in any way by including (6) or (9).Furthermore, since the shell of sovereignty protecting the internal affairs of the state has already beet1 pierced by (61, invoking sovereignty as reason far not including (9) is ~lnlikelyto be convincing. It is noteworthy that including (9) would bring the law of peoples more into agreexnent with what is, in Thornas Franck's interpretation, the g e ~ ~ e rdirection al of current international taw, "It is no longer arguable that the United Nations cannot exert pressure agai1rst governments tl-rat oppress their own peoples by egregious racism, denials of self-determination and suppression of freedom of expression, That litany is being augmented by new sins: refusals to permit demonstrably free elections or to implement their resuits."l~ In defense of Rawls's o~rtissiori,one Illight respond that since he makes much of the notion of a dernocratic peace,lg be must be includillg dexnocratic rights among the human rights l-ronored in (6). He admits that a democratic peace requires that pet-~plesobserve principles of constitutional democracy (as well as certain requiremerits s f distributive j~zstice).zo The problem with this view is that Rawis cfairns that decent hierarchical peoples will also honor (6).Although decellt hierarchical peoples have a basic struaure termed a cunsultatiotz hierarchy,21 they are not cornmitced to dexnocratic rights. Moreover, the human rights tl-rat tl-rey are committed to are minimal: the rights to tife, liberty (e.g., freedom fi-om slavery and freedom of conscience), and furmal equality (i.e,, that similar cases be treated similarly)," &~s, there is nt->reason to read a ct>mnnitme.tltto democratic rights into ( B ) . This, incidentalljr, suggests that RawIs is confronted with a dilemma. Either he must distinguish betweeri the international order required by tl-re law of peoples m d that required ior democratic peace, or he must require more of ( 4 )and thereby exclude decent historical societies from the agreement. For if (6) does not inrclude democratic rights, there is no reason to suppose tl-rat a democratic peace is possible between lihexal states and decent hierarchical ones, If (6) does include democratic rights, then decent hierarchical societies will not honor it. Presumably Rawls would wish to resolve this dilernma in favor of maintaining a rninixnal interpretation of (61, but this then calls into qliestlon ability of the law of peoples to sustain a peaceful international order,

Egalitarianism A second absence from Rawis" list raises other difficulties. The eight principles include no commitment to substantial socioeconaxnic equality. Principle (8)establishes a minimum requirement that a people be assisted ~ z pto the economic level required in order to realize the law of peoplesin pmtkular up to being able ta insthute regimes that respect human rights." It does not, however, req~tirea commitment beyond this minimum as is contained in justice as fairx~ess-Rawls's theory of justice for Qoxnestic society, Why wauldnk reasoning analagous to that which seems to he behind the inclusion of: ( 6 )require a more thoroughgoing commitmetlt to egalitarianism? I noted earlier that the parties in the original position represent liberal peoples, but with a significant caveat. The caveat is that, even in tile first step, Rawls does not require that the liberal peoples represented have a co~rtrnitmentto the strong egalitarianism contained in justice as fairness, In order to be represented in the first step of the construction, a people must be committed to (a) basic constitutional rights and liberties, (b) the priority of these rights over claims of the gelleral good and perfectionist values, and (c) a distribution of primary goods (including wealth and income) sufficient for persons to make intelligent and effective use of their rights and lii~erties.2" Rawls takes the egalitarian ixnpiications of tl-re fatter coxnmitment to be more substantial than many liberal democracies currently require, He takes it to require fair equality of opportunity in education, a decent distribution of income, sociev to he the employer of last resort, basic health care for all citizens, and public financing of elections." A ppcople need not be committed, however, to the most substailtial egalitarian principle contained in justice as fairness: the difference principle, that socioecorromic inequalities be to the greatest benefit to the feast advantaged rnembers of suciery.26 This suggests the ft>Ilt)wing two questions. Why does Rawls rey~zire among liberal peoples only a weaker comrrtitment egalitarianism rather than the difference principle? Why does the taw of peoples nut contain a requirement of egalitarian distributive justice stronger than (g), which would be consistent with the egalitarianism (although weaker than the difirence principle) that Rawls thinks libexrrlisxn requires? Satishing answers to these yuestions are not proffered by Rawls. The first q~zestionis significant because Rawls seerrts to show disregard frsr what rnany readers have thought to be among the most important accomplishments of justice as fairness, namely, an account that weds commitments to individual liberty and substantial equality jiri the form Of the difference principle). The closest he coxnes to an explanation in T h e Law of Peoples is breathtakingly brief: "Each of these liheralisms endorses the underlying ideas of citizeris as hec and equd persons an3 of society as a fair

system of cooperation over time. Yet since the ideas can be interpreted in various ways, we get different formulations of the principles of ~usticeand different conterits of public reason."" The argbtmennd Political Liberalkm, however, is precisely to sort out "deeply contested ideas about l-row the values of liberty and equality are best expressed in the basic rights and liberties of citizens so as to axlswer the claixns of both liberty and equaiity."l8 He holds that principles that include fair equality o f opportunity and the dilference principle are "more appropriate than other familiar principles of justice to the idea of democratic citizens viewed as free and equal persons,"23 111 ki Theor)i oJftrstice, Rawls refers to the conception of eqllaiity h a t includes these two principles as "democratic equaiity,'""" Presur~ablythis is beca~zsejust as the conceptio~~ of democratic citizenship abstracts from a person's social and natural advatltages for the purpose sf establishir~gpolitical entitlements, so tlre principles of democratic equality ahstract from these advantages for the purpose of establishi~~g socic->economic entitlements. In "The l,aw of Peoples," the 1993 lecture that preceded the book by the same name, Rawls offers a different reason for not ~ q ~ r i r i liberal ng peoples to observe the difference principle. "These features are not needed frtr the construction of a reasonable law of peoples, and by not assuming them our account has Seater generalitjr,""l This reason is given without any sort sf justification for why generalip should trump distributive j~zstice.It is worth considering how plausible such reasoning would he at the domestic level. Suppose Rawls argued that the principles of justice h r states shr>uldrequire respect for individual liberty, but include only minimal commitments to sociueconornic equality because such principles would have greater generality and w w l d meet with wider acceptance than those: requiring a stronger co~~rnitment to equality*I take it that the following response would be appropriate: A theory of justice is supposed to include an account of what people are entitled to, not what many people believe people are entitled to. It is simply beside the point when considering the plausibility of an account of justice to ask how rnany people are Likely to accept it. If this is a plausible response at the domestic level, 1 see no reason to believe that it is not also so at the global level. The second question raised above asked why tl-re law of peoples does not contain a requirement of egalitarian distributive justice stronger than (8) that would be collsistent with the egalitarianism (although weaker than the difference principle) that Rawfs tl-rinks liheralisrn requires. Rawfs seerns not to notice that the reason that representatives of liberal peoples would include a stroElger requirement is the same as the (presumed) reason that they include ( 6 ) and should include (9)-namely, such a reqirement is part of the conception of justice that iiheral peoples are assumed to he most interested in protecting,

Aithougl-2 a complete discussion of this matter will not be had until Chapter 4, the ahove considerations suggest that (8) should be replaced with the following: (8") Political arrangexnents are to honur principles of substantial egalitarian distributive justice. including both (8") and (9)accords well with the presumptiorz that in order for state coercion to be employed in accordance with lustice, states must adhere to hackground principles that treat individuals as free and equal persons. As with the fc~rmulationof (91, the formulation of (8") does not prejudge the question of whetller the political arrangernents must be global or can merely be state institutions,

justice or Expediency

Because Rawls represents peoples and not all the persons of the world in the original position, his justification of principles requiring respect lor persons is strained, To make c>n!y peoples, and not persons, the direct abject of inrternatiorzal justice obscures the fact that within regimes there may exist relations of unjust coercion. Rawls contends, ""No people has the right to self-determination, or a right to secession, at the expense of subjugating another peopleOm"3He cites as an exarnple the abrogation of the American Soutl-23right ta secede because it perpetuated institutions of slavery.3What one would have expected Rawls to say was that the right to self-determination may not be exercised at the expense of subjugating persons. Presumably9 l-re would not want to allow self-determination that was based upon the subjugation of a group of persons that did not rise to the status of peoples, Hi>wever, because his principtes of international justice, even at the first step, focus on corporate bodies-that is, peoples-and not persons, he has difficulty capturing respect h r persons. The omission of (g*) and (3) brings up a concern about unjust state coercion. Why, then, does he not include them? His expianation in ""The Law of koples," cited above, for includi~lgrepresentatives of peoples who do not hanor the dil'ference principle is telling. He is concerned that the principles following from an original position that included oniy representatives of egalitarian liberal peoples would exclude horn possible agreement many peoples who are neither qalitarian nor liberal. Tn other words, he tailors the first step to produce a result that would be acceptable at the second step. At the second step of the ideal theor); Rawls attempts to extend the Law of peoples to include decent hierarchical popfes. These are peoples who respect neither egalitarian distributive justice nor a fuiI set of civil and dexnocratic rights. The following characteristics delineate the class of decent hierarchical peoples: They are nonaggressive; they accept a minimal set of

l-rurnan rights wl-rich includes only tl-re rights to fife, liberty, and the same treatment as others in the same condition; they impose duties c>ntheir citizens to pursrte a commtrn g o d , hut these are not perceived as oppressive; and, finally, their judges and other representatives sincerely believe that the law preserves the common g<>od.34 Representatives of: decent hierarchical peoples would agree to principles ( l ) through (8) for the same reasons that representa tives of liberal dernocratic societies do. Principles (1)through (5) follow the assumption of the equality of peoples; and principles (6)though (8)col~formto the moral political cammitmex-tcs o l decent hierarchical peoples. Principles (8") and (91, of course, would not be agreeable to representatives of decent hierarchical peoples. This seems to explain why Rawis does not include them in the first step of the original position. Me wants the principles of liberal peoples to be agreeable to decent hierarcl-ricaf peoples. In other words, he sacrifices full justice fur wider agreement, In so doing, he neglects Kant's injunction not to advance a political morality that is tailored tct the concerns of the statesman, "'1 can indeed ixnagine a moral politz'cidn, i.e. soxneone who conceives of the principles of political expediency in such a way that they can coexist with morality; but 1 cannot imagine a political rtzoralijt, i.e. one who fashions l-ris rnoraiity to suit l-ris own advantage as statesmanem"3The goal of political morality shr>uldnot he to establish principles that leaders of unjust regimes are likely to accept, hut ones they ought to accept-that is, ones to which citizens mighc hold them accountable.36 These are good reasons to believe that the existence of decent hierarchical. peoples is impossible. For one, there is a conceptual problem. Consider the claim that a cl-raracteristicof such peoples is that they are not aggressive, I f Rawls is right that a democratic peace requires liberal, egalitarian, and demcrcratic peoptes,'7 it i s impossible chat decent hierarchical peoples could be a party to a democratic peace, There is also a practical prablexn. The claim that a society can be undemocratic and can iegally enktrce a conception of the good without a section of the population finding it oppressive i s unrealistic, Bruce Ackerman characterizes the problem quite well: The fact is that none of Ravvls's '""welit-ordered"hierarchies wil be free of ~~atives who are themselves inspired by liberal ideas of liberty and equality, Tltere is no Zslarnic naticm without a woman who insists on equal ridlcs; no C:o~~fucian scxiety urithout a man who denier, the need for dcferencc. Sometimes these liberals will be in a minority in their native lands; but given the way Ravvfs defines a "wefl-ordered" hierarchy, it is even possible that native liberals rnidlc be a rnajcjrity.38

I f decent hierarchical peoples are impc>ssihle5then it is all the more troublesome that Rawis tailors the outcome of the first step to match the outcome of the second.

Rawls asserts that the co~~structivist procedure is alterable according to the subject matter it is treating. The structure of the procedure is a function of the structure of the social framework a bout which the procedure is deciding. 1 add that in developing a conception of justice for the basic structure for the law of peoples, a r iiideed for any subject, constructivisln does not view the variation in numbers of pecjple alone as accounting for the approprhtetless t>f difkrent prir~eiplesin diflrrcnt cases. . . . Rather, it is the distinct structure of the social framework, and the purpose and role of its various parts and how they fit together, that exptains there being tlifferetlt priacil3tes for different kir~cfsof subjcctr.39

Rawls gives passing col~siderationto a cosmopolitan corrstruction of the law Of peoples, a construction that would include in the original position not representacives of peoples, but representacives of atf persons of the wurld.40 Such a construction ~rouICtallow the interests of persons to be directly represented and would, therefc~re,secure respect fc~rpersons among its resulting principles. Rawls rejects this procedure for the following reasons: On this account, the foreign policy of a liberal people-wfiich it is aLtr concern to elaborate-will be to act grad~~ally to shape all nat yet liberal societies in a liberat directiotl, until evetltuatfy (in the ideal case) all societies are tiberal, But this foreign palicy simply ~ S S U M I C Sthat only liberal democratic society can be acceptable. Witho~tttrying to work aLtt a reasonable liberal Law af Peoples, we cantlot ktlow ellat nontiberal sojciedes cantlot be acceptable, The possibility of a global original posttiorl does not show that, and we can't m~lcrcliyassume tt.41

This rejection is unconvincing, The cosmopolitarr procedure is nor based upon the assumption that societies must respect civil and democratic rights and principles of egalitarian distributive lustice, any inore than the consrruction of justice as fairness is based upon this, If there is a commitment to these principles, it is because they are derived from the procedure. There is, however, a fundamental difference b e e n Rawls's Law ofPeoples original position and the casmopoiitan original pc~sition,While Rawis's is based on tile assulnption of respect for peopfes," the cosmopolitan one is based on the assumption of respect ior persons. If it is the implications of respect fnr persons that we are wanting to work out, the straightest route to this is a procedure that directly takes into account the interests of persons. Consider further, tt-ren, the cosmopolitan construction that places representatives of persons in a global original position, Rawls supposes that realism requires a construction that does not cs~npletelycall into question the

international state system.43 Notlzing is lost by granting him that supposition, Take then persons represented as citizens of states without making any fr~rtherassurnptiol~sabout either the conditions of state sovereignty or the desirability of other political institutions. Indeed, ratlzer than having a second original position for international ~usticethat follows the one for dornestic justice, the single construction urlder cornideration may serve both purposes." The representatives in the present construction would be ignorant of which state the represented citizens inhabit, as well as the state's character, territory9 and population size, They would also be ignorant of the various naturat and social characteristics of the persons they represent. The cosmopojitan constmction reverses the prioriry of Rawlsss construction; the interests of persons are represented directly and the interests of corporate bodies are represented indirectIy9lust insofar as they serve the interests of their citizens. It might be objected that such a constructioi-r seems to allow too much knowledge behind the veil. fn particnlar tlrrat persons are known to be citizens of states might be tlzought to be uojusified. If this were the case, then our choice might be between Rnwlsss construction and a construction that represents all the persons of the world, in which case cosmopolitanism would opt for the latter, However, if the original positions of R Theory of jzasfice and Political LiberaEism-whi& employ representatives of citizens of a state-are justified, then this construction that utilizes the s m e reyresentatives rnust be as well, In the c<-~smopolitan construction, the original position situates free and eqrraf representatives of persons thought to be reasonable and rational. St~chrepresentatives would be far less concerned with the interests of peoples and far more concerned with the heedom and ability of persons to pursue their own conceptions of the good life within a fair system 01 cooperation. They would desire that the glohal order, which may i n c l ~ ~ dstate e and other political Institutions, reflect this concern, Representatives with the above inentioned concerns m u I d not be likely to limit state sovereignty only for violations of human rights, If the only way that rational persons could be prevented from living according to their reasonable collceptions of the good life were through the violation of their human rights, then rationality and reason would dictate forgoing the power of intervention once human rights had been assured, Ctearly undemocratic and nonegalitarian social orders can also prevent persons from living according to their reasonable conceptions of the good life, A prohibition against intervention into a state9s affairs would be an irratit~nalchoice in the absence of assurances of the kind that princigfes (g*) and (9) provide, In tlze absence of any knowledge of which state's citizens she represents, and of the state's stxial and political arrangements, the representative of persons w o d d want assurances that inrdividuals can freely pursue their rea-

sonable conceptions of the good life or that individuals may struggle against social circumstailces that make that pursuit impossible-and that in such a struggle they may, with justicle, request a i d reasonably expect aid. Thus, respect for huxnan rights, democratic governance, and tl-re principles of egahtarian distributive justice are individually necessary conditions far prohibiting all farms of irrtervention. Taken together they may not constitute a sufficient condrtion for prohibiting intervention, as the foreign effects of other domestic policies may also be a concern, This matter will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 5, The present constrt~ctionwould justify principles (6), (g"), and (9). What is mc->re,principle (6) would be expanded to included h r more than the minimal human rights that Rawls Lists. For example, &hind the veil of ignorance, representatives of persons would choose prohibitions against torture, arbitrary arrest, detention, exile, and discri~nination.In additiotl to these, basic security rights and basic s~tbsistencerights would also he chosen.4" For the sake of clarity, I sl-rall distinguish Rawls's ( 4 ) from ( G ; " ) , whicl-r requires that political arrangements l-ronur an expanded set of human rights as delineated, for example, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

For an account of justice to be cosmopolitar~it must be based upon conceptions that are ~zniversalin scope. The constructivist procedure that T defended in the previous section involves modeling a conception of persons drawn from the tradition of democratic citizenship. RawIs argues that this conception of persons is political in part because it is based upon a conception of citizenship implicit in the democratic tradition rather than upon metaphysical doctrines." On the basis of this, Raiwls cor~cludes,"justice as fairness is substantive, . . in the serise that it springs from and belongs to the tradition of liberal thought and the larger conlmunicy of political culture of democratic societies. It fails then to be properly formal and truly universal,""" If the conception of persons employed by cosmopolitan construetivisrn is merely a political-cuf turat artifact of the democratic tradition, tl-ren the account of lustice based upon them is not genuinely glob!, I believe that RawlsS appraisal of the lack of generality of the principle of justice derived by a political constructivist procedure that models conceptions of persons drawn from the democratic tradition is unwarranted. Rawfs employs the democratic conception of persons in his corrstructivism in order that the principles of justice derived from them will be acceptable in democratic societies, thereby rendering these societies more stable, if one distinguishes between two properties of the principles of justice derived by politi-

cal constructivism-naxnely, their acceptability to tl-rose who sl-rare certain conceptions that are part of the democratic tradition and their justification-then there i s the batsis for avoiding Rawls's unwarranted co~zclusic11z.48

The Denlocratic Conception and the Self-conception of Persons The cosrrtopolitan constructiorz might be objectio~zablebecause the democratic conception of persons rnay not correspond with a person" self-conceptioil-many traditional moral, political, and religious views hold that people are not all free and equal, One problem with this objection i s that appeals to conventional empirical conceptions of personl-rood and citizenship do not decide the suitability of employing a given moral conception of persons, The dem~)cratIcconception sf persons i s a moral ideal that is used to come t~ a clearer understanding of wl-rat ~usticerequires of us. It involves a rnoral psychology that explains why persons are thought by democrats to he free and equat, Cenerally speaking, morat ideals are not invalidated if people do not explicitly subscribe to them. For exatxnple, simply because someone believes special treatmeilt from me is undeserved does not imply that 1 am under nt->obligation to offer that treatment. This example, I hope, is suggestive of something that is important to bear in mind in discussions of tlie "imposition" of democratic conceptions of persons, To treat someone as demacratic equality requires i s sften to treat that person ;I$ worthy of greater respect than tlze traditional hierarchical culture allows, In Politicarl Libemlkm Rawfs distinguishes among three points of wiew:49 that of the parties in the original position, af the citizens in a well-ordered societh and of us. The first is an artificid psychology tl-rat serves as a device for constructing justice. The second is an ideal that might he (but is not yet) realized in the world. The third is the perspective (our perspective) from which the resuits of the construction arc to be assessed. The point of Rawlsian modeling is not to represent individualsbctual self-conceptions or the metaphysical conception of the self that i s affirmed by the tradition to which they belong, but to model d-re values that arc implicit in the functioning of democracies.s0 An exposition of a policical conception of justice has two sages. The first sets out the principles of justice as freestanding by basing them on political and not comprehensive conceptions of persons, The second develops an account of the conception's stability, which account involves appealing to an overlapping consensus.ji A concern appropriate to the second s t a g is that not all of us-that is, not a11 of the people of the world-will positively assess the result of the csnstruction because it i s the result of modeling values

that we d a not all share, That not everyone will positively assess the principles of justice does not impugn the appropriateness of the cc~nstructionat the first stage. The stabilbty that is generated by overlapping corrscnsus requires a political conception of justice that coheres with political conceptions of citizenship and society under ideat conditions, not necessarily conceptions cwrently held. Xn Political Liberalism Rawls recognizes tl-rat not every citizen of a state in the liberal democratic tradition will accept the two principles of ~usticethat are colzstructed from the original position. Many people will nut do so because they are unreasonable. Such citizens desire to impose their own cornprehensive doctrines on others, or the comprehensive doctrine that these citizens follow is unreasonable and does not overlap enough with the principles of lustice to allow them to afftrm both, In any case, parties to the original position of Political Liberalism would be all tile more concerned with securing such features of the two principles of justice as the full scheme of liberties, if they knew that in the real worfd there were unreasonable people who migllt try to subvert individual Iiberties.52 Therehre, concerns appropriate to stage two about the self-conception of persons and the resuitiq likeiihood of acceptance r~eednot forestall the construction at stage one.

Jtrstifying the Democratic Conception of Persons Rawls's political constructivism employs a concey tion of persons as possessing two highest order moraf interests. One is the inrerest in developing and exercising the power rationally to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good." The second is the interest in developing and exercising the power to apply and to act upon publicly achowledged fair terms of csoperation.54 Persons are equal insofar as they have the two moral powers to a requisite minimum degree to be fully cooperating members of society55 Defense of the democratic conception of persons involves, arnung other things, a defcnse of the two highesc order moral interests. Consider first the claim that persons have a highest order moral interest in developkg the capacities for rational fmatiorz, revision, and pursuit of a conception of tbe good, Afl persons tlecessarity value their conception of the good since this conception is the hasis for establishing what is of value in life.56 Anyone who has a conception of the good has an interest in the capacity to have it, since tl-re capacity is a necessary condition of tl-re conception, We necessarily value the capaciry that allows us to have a conceptiorz of what is valuable, Indeed, the interest in the capacity to have a corrception of tl-re good is more fundamental than the interest in the partict~lar conception that we have, since the hrmer makes the latter possibIe, According to this argument, the interest is arz objective one. A person has an

interest in the capacity to have a conception of the gaod even if she does not (as presumably she often dues not) think about the capacity and recognize her interest in it. In valuing our conception of the good, we take it to be correct or true. We would not value it if we believed it to be fundamentally mistaken, Since we are fallible and may be wrollg about what is truly of value, we also have an interest in the ability to revise rationally our conception of the good. Because this ability is directed toward rooting out errot; in our conception of what is most valuable in life, our interest in this capacity is of the higIzest value. We would not value our conception of the good if we did not believe it to be right, but the ability to revise rationalfy our conceptil>n of: the good-given our fallibility-is of greater vaiue than the particular conception of the good we have at any given time, beca~zsethis abilit]i alone gives us any assurance that our particular conception of the good is correct. Again, this is an objective interest, Its value derives from the value that a person places on the collception of the good, but does not depend on its recognrtron. There are, of course, many people who are so committed to their conception of the good that they believe error is impossible.. These people are wrong, not necessarily in wl-rat they believe to be gaod, but in their belief that they are infallible, Anyone who has an objective account of the good, an account that distinguishes between what is g r d and what is believed to be good, should be open to the possibility of error in belief, Anyone who has a subjective conception o f the good ought to accept that subjectivism may be wrong, Since all persorzs are fallible and value having the correct conception of tl-re good, all persons have a I-righest order interest in tl-re capacity to revise rationally their conception. Consider next the claim that persons have a highest order interest in the capacity to apply and act upon publicly acknowledged fair terms of cooperation, Generally comprehensive conceptions of the good contain some conception of the social good, social responsibility, or justice. Such a conception ol juseice provides one with a xnoral interest in living under a just sc~cialand political arrailgeme.tlt, since one has interest in what is good and the social good is a part of the overall good. Most conceptions of justice do not include an interest in the capacity to apply and act upon publicly acknowledged fair terms of cc-loperation, but the fact that they establish a basis h r an interest in justice is enough for this particular interest under corrtingent conditions tl-rat currently exist globt~lly. These contingent conditions may be characterized as fc->llows:S7 1, There exists moderate scarcity of resclurces, 2 , There exists a reasonable pluralism of comp~hensivemoral conceptions,

3. One may be justified in holding moral beliefs that one cannot rationally convince other reasonable and rational persons of, and vice versa. The first establishes a need for a distributive prirtcipie since there are insufficient resources to satisfy everyone" wants, The second indicates that there is likely to be disagreement about what the principle should be if those discussing it proceed on the basis of the conceptioll of the social good contained within tl-reir comprehensive conceptions of the good, The third establiishes that the disagreement mentioned in the second may not he rationally resolvable despite the fact that there may be a truth of the matter, AIthough the third speaks of moral beliefs, in fact tl-re condition is not peculiar to moral theorizitlg but is perhaps more pronounced there. For example, two scientists looking at the same ambigr~ouspiece of evidencr: may each be ~ustiliedin drawing different faccual conclusions, depellding on how they weigh different factors. This does not mean that there is no fact of the mattes. Xt means only that rational people may disagree on what the facts are. Sixnilarl~~ people may disagree about the facts upon which value judgments are based, In addition, people may disagree about the relative weight to give to two different values-hr example, the relative weight of the values of honesty and loyalty in friendship, If one has a conception of justice, then one has a highest order interest in the capacity to apply and act on publicly acknowledged fair terms of csoperation, given tlte above three contingent conditions. Any given person l-ras an i n t e ~ s in t the social got~d,or justice, in virtue of moderate scarcity and of having an interest in one% broader csnceptian of the good of which jrrstice is a part. This interest is frt~stratedby living in unjust circumstances. In light of condition 2, any conception of justice derived solely from the cornprehensive corzceptioll of another wilt potentially he at odds with one" sown conception, Should this be the case, recalling condition 3, it might not be rationally justifiable from within one's camprefiensive conception. Since each person is threatened by what appears tct be the imposition of ~znjust principles, each l-ras an interest in establishing principles that she can accept, If a set of principles is publicly acknowledged, this entails that there is broad public agreement that satisfies the interests of each person to live under just arrangements. The interest in such principles is of the highest order in the sense that it trumps an interest orre might have in p~~rsuing a sectarian conception of justice under conditions in which others do the same, since ttzese conditions pose the credible tl-rreat that one rnay end up living under what one takes to be unjust arrmgements. This inkrest exists even if one does not recog~lizeit, For example, one may wrongly reject condition 3, in which case one may believe that one's interest in justice is in a sectarian conception of justice that is not justifiable to others who hold reasonable cssrtprebensive conceptions of the good. Xn

this case, one is mistaken about one's interest in justice because one is mistaken about condition 3. In other words, c>ne9sinterest in a publicly acknowledged conception of justice is objective under the three contingent conditions noted. There is a second defcnse of an interest in publicly acknowledged fair terms of cooperation, Given human fallibility, any account of justice trtight be wrong. So, it is important that the principles of ~usticebe of the kind that can be widely scrutitzized in order tc-,eilsure their truth, since tc-,force people to comply with false (that is, morally wrong) prinrciples is odious. Such scrutiny must be public, because if it is limited to, say, a council of those with a particular comprehensive conception, it may make assumptions that are false.58 If one has an objective interest in a publicly acknowledged conception of justice, then one has an objective interest in the capacity to apply and act upon it, A conception of justice is not merely a theoretical idea, it is inherently action guiding. Hence, under the three contingent conditions noted earlier, whiclz X assuxne characterize our global condition, one has an objective iizterest in applying and acting upon fair terms of cooperation.

Characterizing the N a t ~ r eof the jtrstificatiun The upshot of the preceding argumeilts in deknse of the two highest order moral interests can be put in at least two ways, One might conclude that it is true that persons have highest order moral interests in the capacities rationally to h r m , revise, and pursue a conception of tl-re good and to apply and act upon publicly acknowledged fair terms of cooperation. Alternatively, one trtight conclude that it is rational to develop and ~rtaintainthese capaciries, Altllough tlrese two conclusions may appeal differentially to those with different meta-ethical convictions, I do not see a significant difkrence between them, hdeed these claims seem to be mutually entailing, ff one has sucl-r an interest, tl-ren ceritus paribus it is rational to pursue it; and what it is rational to purme is in one" interest, as loilg as one accepts the possibiIity of moral interests in addition to prudential ones.. If the preceding arguments in defense of the two l-righest order moral interests are sound, then the conception of persons used in political constructivism is, at least in part, true. If the csnception of persons is true, then its use cannot be ob~ectedto as being parochial and of limited applicabiliq, If it is true that persons have these interests, then the fact that the conception of persons originates in the democratic adi it ion cannot courlt as reason not to apply it etsewhere. Nonetheless, the conception of persons may remain political in three senses important to Rawls: Xt accords with the conception of citizenship im-

plicit in democratic constit~~tionalism; it does nut require denying any reasonable comprehensive conception of the good; and, it is emplc>yedonly to make a point about political moralityfVf:Rawls is csrrect in making these three clairns in Pslitz'caE Libemlisnz regarding the conception of persons, there is no reason to think that any of the three political properties of the conception have altered as a result of the justification that I have provicted for the conception." The first and the third would remain true so long as the conception originates in the democratic tradition and is applied only to matters of justice, The secolld remains true so Itmg as the conception of persons may be affimed from within any reasonable comprehensive conception of the good. I see no reason to think that because an argument has now been given to justify the cc~nception,it can no longer be affirmed from within the same comprehensive collceptiotis that had previously provicled affirmation for it. So, in supporting the universality of t l ~ econception of persons that serves as the basis for the principles of cosmopolitan justice, we do not sacrifice the suitability of the principles of ~usticeto be the object of an overlapping consensus,

The Trlrth of the Principles of Justice I l-rave been arguing that cosmopolitan constructivism could be defended against the cl-rargeof yarochiaiism by giving an accoutlc of how the conception of persons that it employs may be thought of as true and thus universally applicable, A corollary of that argument would seem to he that the principles of justice themselves are true. For it would seem strange to say that the principles of justice appropriately derived firc~ma true conception of persons are themselves not true because they are nut subject to truthvalue. Rawls, l-rowever, rnaintains that the principles of justice as fairness are reasonabie but not rrue.61 He seems to think that politicat harm would be done by asserting that the prir-rciples of justice are true, rather than reasonable. Presumably this is because such a truth claim may conflict with some reast>nable comprehensive conception, If he is right about this, it would provide the basis fc~ra challenge to the pwition that I arg~zedfor in the previous sections insohr as it would indicate deleterious political consequences c>f the position. h e place where Rawls s t a ~ his s w o r about ~ affirming the truth of: the principles of juscice is the bllowing passage: The advantage of staying within the reasonable i s that there can be but one true comprehensive doctrine, though as we have seen 111any reasonable ones., Once we accept the fact that reasonable pluralism is a permanent condition t>f public culture under free tnsdrutions, thc idea of the rcasonaMc is morc suit-

able as part of the bask of public justification for a constitutional reg~rnethan the idea of moral truth. Holding a politicat conception as true, and for that reason alone the one suitable basis of public reason, is exc;fusive, even sectarian, and so likely to foster political division.6"

The reasoning in this passage is, however, fallacious. It slides from holding a political conception of justice as true to holding a particular comprehensive conception as true. If a particular comprehensive conception were acknowledged as true, then other conflicting conceptions by implication would be taken to be false. Hawever* the trutli of the principles of justice does not entail the truth of any comprehensive conception in which it has heell afirmed. Consider three possible ways that a comprehensive conception might provide a basis fur affirming a political conception of justice, First, certain of the comprehensive conception*^ principlm may entail the principles of justice, Second, the principles of a comprehensive conception may simply be consistent with the principles of justice. Third, certain of tl-re principles of the comp~hensiveconception may appear to contradict the principles of justice, but the conception has the resources for aftowjng the principles s f justice to outweigh t l ~ eapplication of its own principles t l ~ a tseem to be in conflict. For example, the principle of utility may Ise in conflict with taking rights seriously, but a utilitarian might argue that the hest happir-ressr ~ a x i mizing strategy under tl-re appropriate circumstances requires following apparently nonutilitarian principles, The utilitarian may accept the great political virtue of the principles of justice in uniquely m k i n g possible the conditions of lair social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect, and this may receive a utilitariail justificatiotl,b? In each of these three cases, the trutl-r of the principles of justice Qaes not entail the trutl-r of the comprehensive conception within which it has been affirmed. Take the case in which the comprehensive conception entails the principles of justice: If the !latter are true, it does not fclllow that the former is, To claim otherwise is to cornmit the fallacy of affirxning the consequence Nor would the truth of the principles of lustice entail the truth of the comprehensive conception that affirms them in the case where the principles of justice are merely consistent with, or even appear to be in contradiction with, some o f the principles of the comprehensive conception. Rawls may have a different worry about the third case* If the principles of justice are thought of as true, this perhaps lalsifies those comprel-rensive conceptions that they appear to contradict, This depends upon the way in which the principles are affirmed within the coi~prekensiveconception. J assume that even if the principles of ~usticeare taken as reasonable, rather than true, they canntjt be affirmed from within an unmodified comprehensive conception with whch they stand in a relation of contradiction. For

this would involve tl-re l-rolders of the comprehensive doctrines in believing what-according to their comprehensive conceptions-they take to be false. Rather; any co~ltradictionbetween the prillciples of justice and the comprehensive conception must be resolvable in soxne manner, Utilitarians may follow f idwickss example concerning the morality of common sense and take the two prir~cipfesof jrisrice as middle axioms of utilitarian theory,b"~awls believes that it is possible for someone to affirm the pritlciples of justice taken as reasonable, even if they staild in contradictioil tc-i certain co~nrnitmentsof that person" reasonable comprehensive collception of the gaod." It is not obvious why it should be any harder to find the resources within a comprehensive conception to accept principles of justice as true rather than reasonable, in those cases in which the principles stand in apparent csntradictian to certain ctirnmitments of the comprehensive conceptions. k r even to find the principles of justice reasonable, one must nevertheless somehow render them consisteilt with one's comprehensive conception, In other words, if Rawls is right that it is possible to reconcile such comprehensive concepions with pritlciples regarded as reasonable, it must also be possible to reconcile them with ones regarded as true. Taking the two principfes of justice to be true need not commit one to a particular meta-ethical tl-reory of moral truth, although some constructivists have devefoped such theories,66 Raiwls's constructivisrn is not ineta-ethical, and he rightly wants the principles of justice to be compatibte with inany meta-ethical theories. To say that the principles of justice are true is to say nothing more than that they are appropriately derived from true conceptiorls of persolls. fn other words, asserting that they are true is not different than simply asserting them." Perhaps Rawls" concern is that taking the principles to be true contradicts those meta-ethical theciries that reject morai. truth, If it is skepticism, nihilism, or subjectivism that Rawls wishes to appease, he never says so. Given his arguments that the rnorai principles established by political constructivism are objective, although rrot true, it's doubtful that the followers of such views will go along with political corrstructivism, even if it denies the trueh of its product. Whether or not the principles of justice are true does not change their political character in the three selises important t~ Rawls. They accord with the conception of citizenship implicit in democratic constitutionalism, they do not require denying any reasonable comprehensive conception of the good, and they are employed only to make a point about political morality.

A theory of international justice fc~undedon respect for persons ought to irrcsrporate the value of toleration. Rawls seems to believe that a require-

ment tl-rat regimes be committed to principles (G"), (g"), and (9)would violate the principle of toleration," TTh seems to me to he a misui~derstai~ding of what toierance requires, In any case, it stands in csntradiction to the account of tolerance that is developed in Political Liberalkm, Rawls" claim &out the demands of toierance in Tbc. Law of Peopbs is wrong, hut expticable by the construaion that he employs. In Politkal Lz'beralism tolerance requires a freestanding political conception of justice that is not justified solely by reference to any particular comprehensive collception of the good, This is required because there are a variety of reasonable comprel-rensiveconceptions of the good, 'Thus, it is not in general unreasonable to affirm any one of a number of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, We rectlgnize that our own dc~ctrinehas, and can have, for people generally, no special claims on them beyond tl-reir own view of its merits."~"~would be unreasonable for the state to endorse any one particular comprehensive conception of the good life, since this would suggest that all of the others were false and since there are no final noncontroversial grounds upon which to base such truth claims. If the state were to endorse any particular comprehensive doctrine, it could not maintain this without being oppressive- that: is, without placing unreasonable demands on those wl-ro adhere to other comprehensive doctrines,7"eason, then, demands state tolerance-lack of endorsement-of any particular comprehensive doctrine, What is required is a set of principles of justice that do not require for heir justification any one coxnprehensive pilit osophical conception of the good exclusively and that can be affirmed fmm within any reasonable co~nprehensivedoctrine." However, reason does not demand equal treatment far unreasonable coxnprehensive doctrines. In cases wlzere sucl-r doctrines lead to injustices, the doctrines themselves may have to be denied.72 W t h respect to individual actions, justice defines the limits of tolerance, h line of reasoning analogous to this is developed by Will Kymlicka in a discussion of the value of culture. H e argues that liberals should value cultural membership more highly than they often have because culture provides the context in which clioices between a variety of conceptions of the good life take on meaning," KymIicka argues that cultrtral membership is r that culture corztributes to that individ~~al's important to liberals i n s ~ f ; tas capacity for freely cl-roosing and pursuing a conception of the good life. Protecting cultural membership does not, tzowevet; entail respect for those activities, practices, or institutions of a cuittrre that restrict this capaciq of individuais.74 By analogy there are many activities, practices, and institutions that liberals should not tolerate, specifically those that violate the principles of lustice. The point is that the limits of tolerance with regard to activities, practices, and instit~~tions are set by the principles of jtastice. In The Law of Peoples Rawls seeks to establish that the limits of tolerance extend to decent hierarchical societies.75 So the principles of interna-

tional justice must be such that tlzey can include decent hierarchicai societies in additir3n tc-,liberal ones, This he takes as important because he Ltelieves that judging such peoples by liberal values will be damaging to their self-respect (where ""self" refers to the people ");.S f have already noted, there are got~dreasons to believe that decent hierarchical societies are impossible, So it is bp no trteans obvious that the principle of tolerance developed in The taw of Peoples in practice broadens the basis of agreement &out principles of international justice. Frctm the perspective of cosmopofitan jusrice there is a more significant problern with Rawlsk extension of the limits of tolerance to regimes that are organized arr~undcomprehensive conceptions of the good and lacking an endorsement of democratic institutions, Such regimes are internally unreasonable, intolerant, and oppressive by the standards of Polificai LihercnlIsm. To be "tolerant" of such regimes is akin to being ""tolerant" of unjust actions or oppressive cultural practices* In short, there are no good reasons for being so. In fact, just as institutio~~alizing an arrangement that permitted individtxals to be unjust could be seen as being complicit in the injustice, so institutionalizing principles of international conduct that licensed oppression could be seen as being complicit in the oppression. Rawls finds his way into this problem because he represenrs the interests c>f peoples in his constmction. This allows him to assert that just as there are trtany reasonable individual cs~rtprehensivemoral doctrines that should be tolerated, so there are many state ideologies that slzould be tolerated.77 This statism subordinates the interests of persons to those of peoples, and that is prima facie incompatible with respect far persons.

1st sum, Rawfs" statist account of the law of peoples appears ill ftrunded. Not cmly are Rawls's eight principles insufficiently sensirive to the situation of individuals within a stare, but his omission of principles ensuring democratic govertlance and egalitarian distributive justice is ad hoc, This, however, does riot impugn the political constructivist project either in gerieral or with regard to this particular subject matter, An alternative construction procedure is viable. This procedure derives three important principles of the cosmtrpolitan conception of ~ustice, The implication of this argurnent is significant h r a theory of incernationai justice, The cosmopolitan construction can justify human rights hut and will also require de~rtocracyand egalitarianism, Principles ( G " ) , (P), ( 9 )are part of the cosmopolitan theory that X have been defending and will continue to deknd in subsequent chaptms. If a concern for human rights is admitted as limiting what can be done in the name of sovereigzity, then de-

rnocratic and egalitarian concerns about the treatment of persons should count as limiting sovereignty as well. Where any one of these three principles is not observed, there would appear to be a prima facie case for other states not compjying with the principle of nonintervenrion. This alone does not Licellse intervention in such cases. Other necessary cmditions for ~ustified intervention apply as well. Those conditions will be defended in Chapter 5. For now, further concerns remain about whether justice to noncompatriots is co.tlsistent with justice to compatriots. This and other matters are discussed in Chapter 3.

THREE

T&e problcrn nf est~blishi~zg a perfect cwil C O I I S ~ ~ L U C I OzsI Z sub~~rdiizate to the problem of a law-govenzed external relatzonship wtrh other S ~ M Cr ; k~~ zY~ Cl Si U,~ Z ~ ~be C I salved L ~rzlcssthe Eaitter is also sc-ilve~l.

Jn Chapter 2 J argued that a broadly Rawfsian political constructivism entails three important principles of cosmopolitan justice: commit~nentsto l-ruxnan rights, democracy, and socioeconomic equality. X also argued that the conception of persons that Rawlsian political canstructi\lism employs is true, regardless of the fact that it is also consistent with the undertying conception of citizenship in constitutional democracies. The cosmopolitanism I am defending might be challenged on the following grounds: The present account has derived principles of justice where justice sirnply is not an issue because duties oi justice are not global. Alternatively, even if there are global duties of justice, these are necessarily trumped by the morally prior duties of justice that compatriots and co-nationals owe to one another, In this chapter 1 shalf argue that duties of cosmopolitan justice exist because the condition that gives rise to duties of justice, nainely, the appropriate form of association, exists globally. This claim is compatible with the view that we have special duties of justice to compatriots. 1 shall argue, too, that duties of justice to coinpatriots do not necessarily take precedence over duties of justice to noncompatriots. Additionally, 1 shall a r w that there are no duties of justice among persons simply by virtue of the fact that they share a common nationality Finally, 1 shall apply this per-

spective by analyzing the justice of protectionist trade policies and restricted immigration policies. Readers with an interest in technical aspects of the claim that duties of justice are associative duties wilt be especialfy interested in the next section, TX~osewl~oseinterests are focused xnore particularly on policy matters may skip this section withorn losing the gist of the main argument,

Duties of justice are a subset vf all moral duties, Justice is not the whole of morality; its object and scope are narrowec In order for one to be bound by a duty of justice to another, that other must be the right sort of thing and must: be in tl-re right relation to tl-re one bound. This accords wit11 certain relatively strong moral intuitions: I am not bound by duties of justice to rocks and plants to treat them a certain way, but f may be bound by duties of juscice to other persons to treat rocks and plants in a certain wayfor example, by not depleting natural resources. Nor am I hound by duties of justice to intervene intct the affairs of intelligent beings with whom we l-rave no intercourse but oniy an awareness of their existence-say, inteiligent beings on the secoild piailet orbiting some distailt star. 1 may, however, he hound by broader moral duties, for example, to do them n o unnecessary harm. The subject matter under discussioil can be narrowed even further. I am interested in matters of social justice. Matters of social lustice concern whether the principles and institutions that dominate our social and poIitical life are just. For purposes of brevity, however, 1 shall refer to duties of social lustice simply as duties of lustice, Tf person A owes a duty of justice to person B, then A has a duty to observe the established institutional principles that ensure B is being treated justly or to advocate for tine establishmerit of ~ u s principles. t This conception of justice is s o ~ ~ e t i mcalled es an institutional conception."ecause duties of justice are so often not distinguished from more general moral duties-a lack of distinction that creates confusion-it is worth emphasizing the distir-rction. T wish to draw attention to two distingtnisl~ingproyerfies of duties of jusrice; j l j Duties of justice are geilerated by associational relations; and, (2) they are duties requiring action toward persons indirectly insofar as they require obeying or advocating just institutions or principles to govern tl-re association. There are other features of duties of justice that are not a concern here. I have asserted that duties of lustice are moral requirements of a special sort that we owe to other persons, but not to all otl-rer persons, Why isn't justice owed to all persons? This question requires an examination of the above stated distinctive properties of duties of lustice.

Associative Dcrties and Duties of Jtrstice In one sense the duties of jtistice are conventional, This is not to say that they are not real. Rather, it is to say that such duties cannot be claimed as entitlements that one person may use to hind all other persons simply by virtue of the nature of her personhood, On the contrar?; duties of justice arise between persons when activities such as politics or commerce bring persons into association. Persons may be brought into association without any s f them intending to bring tl-re association about, This is especially the case when economic activity has consequences far those not directly invr~lvedwith it-in the language of economists, when the activity produces ""externalities." For example, C and D may be involved in ongoing commercial activity that causes serious harm to D's neighboxs without either C or D knowing it. In this case, C and D are in association with D's sneighhors. An association is trtore than mere interaction, but the difference appears to be one of degree.Vwr~people may interact on a temporary basis when, for example, one helps the other. They are slot thereby in an association. If? however, estahiisfaed social practices or institutions regularly affect the highest arder moral interests of a person, that person is in association with all of the others who act within the constraints of those practices or institutions, That duties of justice differ from other moral duties insofar as they require assc3ciation is a paint made by Htrrne: Suppose, that several families unite togecl~erinto one society, which is totally disloined from ait others, the rules, which preserve peace and t>rcter,enlarge thcmselvcs tu the utrnost exterlt of that society; but beeornixlg entirely useless, lose their force when carried one step further, But again suppose, that several distinct societies maintain a kind t>f intercourse for mutual convetlience and advantage, thc boundaries of justicrc still grow Iargcr, in proportion tu largeness af men" view and the force af their mutual conexions.4

Because associations affect a person" moral interests, tl-rey naturalty yield moral questions tl-rat do nut arise between nunassaciates, namely, questions &out the mc~ralityof the principles that govern it or the justice of the association. The fact that persons are associated makes it sensible to question whether the institutions or principles that govern tl-reir association are just. No such question is sensible in the absence of an association.$ h number of philosophers have had di6culry accepting the claim that associations generate new duties.TThe view that under cr~nditionsof association questions of justice arise is plausible only if it is plausible that persons already have generai morai duties to one another, In other words, duties s f

justice presuppose more general xnoral duties. General moral duties explain why there are mtlral duties at all among associates, The fact c~fassc~ciatinn expfains why some s f these duties are digerent than those that exist hetween persons wllo are nut associates. In sum, then, duties of justice are duties about the nature of an association and about the principles that guide its institutions. Such duties arise if and only if tl-re hlfawing two conditions are met: Persons are in association with one another, and persoils in getleral have moral duties to one another.

Duties of Justice and lnstitu tions Not all associative duties are duties of justice, Duties of justice are directed toward the general institutions of public life. Duties to obeh or construa, just public institutions are particularly important because, in the words of Rawls, the efkcts of the institutions and principles of association "are so profound from tl-re start." As Rawls puts it, The intuitive notion here is that this structure contains various social poslrions and that men born into different positions have expectations af l i f e determined, in part, by the politicat system as well as by economic and social circumstances, In this way tile institutions of society favor certain starting gtaccs over others. These are especially deep ineclualities., Not only are they pervasive, but they affect men" iinital chances in life*'

Institutions that endure and dominate public life are particularly significant because of the profound effect that they have on one" moral interests. Questions of lustice are questions about the appropriate rules or principles for governing enduring associations that dominate public life wl~osebenefits, and especially burdens, are not easily avoidable, if indeed they are avoidable at all. For, although, the burdens of a speci5c association dominating a particular public life can be avoided by emigration, this offers no way o f avoiding the burdens of associations that dominate public life in general.

Associative Dtrties and Moral Eglrality The claim that we owe some, but not all, persons duties of justice may be said to be inconsistent with a fundamental commitment to the moral equality of all persons. Samuel Schemer puts the challeng as follows: "'Xf all people are of equal value and importance, then what is it about xny relation to my associates that makes it not merely permissible but obligatory for me to give their interests priority over the interests of other people?""

Two persons who are morally equal do not necessarily deserve the same treatment from me, Eyuality requires, rather, equivalent treatment in equivalent circumstances. X may, for exampie, have a duty tcl give the one $50, but not the otl-rer, If X borrowed $50 with the promise to repay it, the claim that I have a duty to pay the one $50 but have no corresponding duty to the other does not contradict the principle of moral equaliw The latter principle would be violated by the claim that my borrowing from and promising tc-, both under similar conditions generated a duty to one but not to the other. Likewise, duties of justice to some, but not ail persons, do not violate the principle of the moral equality of all persons. This principle would, however, be violated by a claim-which 1 d o not make-that our membership in asst>ciations only generates duties of justice to some of the persons with whom we are associated, The fact of association pius the eritirlemerit of all of the associates to equal respect produces duties of egalitarian justice, Because of the asstanzed moral equality of: all members, there is a strolig presumption against establishing the institutions of an r-lssociation in a way that systematically denies some associates opportunities that are available to others. A n o t k r challenge to this account is that even if egalitarian justice is dependent a n the moral equality of all persons and even if assaciations do produce duties of justice, the existence of the association itself cannot be ~ustified.9If the association cannot be ~ustifiedand if one assumes the moral equality of all persons, then special duties of justice to associates cannot be justified. Xt is true that duties of justice do not justify the existence of an association; tl-rey a s s m e its existence. Xt is false, however, to suppose that the association needs moral ~ustificationin order to render associative duties consistent with the moral equality of all persons. Consider the following example, Through no choosing of their own, a few people wind up together in a lifeboat in the middle of an ocean. Perhaps they were unconscious wfien loaded into the lifeboat by the ship's herr>ic crew, Tn any case, they have a store of provisions to distribute and ration, Assuming the moral equality of persons on board, each of these persons has a duty to the others to abide by a fair system of ratir>ning, Make no mistake about it, abiding by the system wilf entail sacrifices on the part of those who could c)verpower the rest and simply appropriate the rations fs~r themsefves. Moreover, the duty to abide by a fair system of rationing is owed only to other members on tl-re lifeboat, not to all persons, Hence, one can start with the nvrmatively unjustified fact of association and derive duties limited to associates that are perfectly consistent with the moral equaiicy of all persons. X 1 this is the case, then duties of justice, as associative duties, are not necessarily ir-rconsistent with the morai equality of all persons,

Associatz'ue Duties

and At2i;eudes

Duties of justice depend upon two sbjective factors, gelleral moral duties among persons, such as duties of equal respect, and the fact that tl-rere is an association among them, This account of associative duties is contrary to some accounts in contemporay philosophy that require associates either explicitly or implicitly to have certain attitudes in order to have an associative duty. Yael Tamir argues, "Our obligation to help fellow members derives horn a shared sense of membership rather than from, the specific nature of their actionsewwRonald Dworkin holds that the requisite attitudes need only become apparent as the result of interpretative activity, but must he there nonetheless: "The members of a group must by and large hold certain attitudes about the responsibilities that they swe one another if these responsibilities are to count as genuine fraternal It is plausible that certain rrtoral duties are generated by their bearers. For exarrtple, if I declare my adherence to the terms of a contract, then I have generated a duty to fulfil1 its terms, The duty here, however3 follows not from my attitude of willingness to accept the terms of the contract, but from my declaration that I will. My a t t i t ~ d edoes not generate the duty, nor can it change it if I later find the terms troublesome; rather, tl-re act of declaration generates the duty, To take the appmpriate attkude of the person bound to be a necessary collditiorz of the existence of a duty is to take duties to be mind-dependent, Mind-dependent accounts of duty seem unable to account for an important fact about the nature of moral duties, namely, that we are bound by duties regardless of whether we happen to believe that we are or want to be. So, a mind-deycndent account of associative duties would seem to render them less than duties. This appears to be a problem with Ta~rtir'saccount, Dworkin, however, is not claiming tl-rat duties are mind-dependent, He requires a certain sort of recipmcity such that duties of justice are dependent not on one's sown attitudes, but 0x1 the attitudes of those to whom one owes the duty,"" It is intuitively plausible that certain duties depend upon the attitudes of the person to whom one owes the duty, For example, compare two differe~itcases in which E is helped by F. fn one case F helps E because it is in F 3 self-interest to do so. In another case X; helps E because F is concerned far E, It is plausible that E awes a debt of gratitude to F only in the second case, Even if some moral duties may be dependent upon tl-re attitude of tl-rose to whom the duty is owed, there are good reasons to believe that this is not true of duties of justice. If duties of justice required appropriate attitudes (even if these were only implicit) on the part of the person to whom the duty was owed, the kinds of associations that might be criticized as unjust would rlarrow beyond the Iimits of what is intuitively plausible, Recall the

example of C's and D's cornrnercial activity giving rise to externalities that harm I)" seigbbors. P>% sneighbors may not even know of: C's a d D's existence, and therefctre have nt:, particular attitudes towards them, hut that Qaes not irnply that neither C nor D are bound by ~usticeto compensate them for the harm tlnat they sufkred, Likewise, a father may be bound by duties of ~rrsticeto support his children even if there is no Iove between them. In sum, taking duties of justice to require the right attitudes axnong the associates cannot explain our moral intuitions about such duties. With the distinctions betweeri duties of jtxstice, other associative duties, and general moral duties in Xzand, in the next section I slzail argue that given current global conditions duties of global justice exist,

Prominent contemporary political philosophers have usually focused their efforts on establishing theories of social justice for states.13 There arc obvious Rasons for considering the character of state institutions. States are incontrovertible examples of enduring associations, Until the latter part of the twentietlz century, state institutions were the most general politicai institutions with police powers, and ecoinomies were studied as snational (or state) economies. Nevertheless, these reasons do xiot compel us to restrict our attention to justice witlzin a single state. Because the history of the expansit~nof capitalism indicates that the moral interests of persons throughout the w r l d are affected by an expanding economic assuciatietn, there are gaod reasons for the investigation of justice at the global level.

The Global Assocz'a8ion In the history of the relationship among persons in Europe, tlze Americas, AGica, and Asia, three periods are especially imporcant with respect to the global character of: economic associatiain: colonial conquest, early-twentieth-century imperialism, a d late-twentieth-ce~ituryglabalization. -In the first of tlzese periods, tine industrialization of Europe and the development of the New World were paid for with the lives of millions of African sIaves.l"n the second, characterized by tlze classical tlzeorists of imperialism as the export of capital, hancial concerns from European and North American centers traveled to the far corners of the globe in the search far pr06ts.l' This brought the imperialist states and colonies into even closer association, In the third period, globalization has brought people from around the world into closer economic assc~ciation.According to the World Bank, foreigzi direct investment (FDf) reached a record level in 1995 of $90

billion, these FDX flows have been the rapid globalization of production, the increasing integration of developing countries in buoyant world trade, and the i~nprovedecorzomic policies of recipients.'""h~o~~e analysts contend that globt~lizationhas not amounted to much of an increase in the amount of trade around the globe in comparison with the period stuclied by the cfassical theorist of imperialism, but it has at the very least caused an increase in the abi'frty to effect economic changc at a distallce through installt global communicatic>n and 24-hour global money markets,l7 The influence of international financial institutions (srlck as the Xnternational Monetary Fund and the World Bank) over the policies of developing countries has hectlme extensive as the debt of those countries has increased, Jn 1995 the dclebt-to-export ratio for developing countries was 1SO percent, for Sub-Saharan AGica it was 277 percent. Irlternational financial insticutioils set conditions for loans, which conditiails constrait1 the sort of domestic redistribrrtive mechanisms and instjtutions that are possible in developing countries. Consider, for exaxnple, three constraints that developing countries confront if seeking egalitarian schemes of distribwion: the need far foreign capital investment, if the ecoElomy is to grtjw; the general trefid of ateaching expenditure-cutting requiremenrs as the condition of imernational loaos; and the progressive reduction of trade barriers, allwing capital to be more of these constraints can result in punishment by mobile, The conjunctio~~ disinvestment for states that pursue egalitarian courses of development.18 Economic association is often thought of as involving a set of principles for the prduction and distribution of goods, However, goods are not all that is distributed. As of 1990, carbon dioxide concentrations were increasing at .4 percent per year.1' At that rate, by 2030 the concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will be double that of 1990." There is widespread, although not unanixnous, agreement in the scientific coxnmunity that the effects crf this doubling will include a dohal mean temperature rise of 1.5 to 5 degrees Celsius,zThere is somewhat less agreernent a b u t the consequences of stlcb a wanning, but many scientists predict significant climatic changes with tremendous costs to current patterns of crtlp gowtlr and rising sea levels that could cause serious flooding in low-lying regions.22 Global warming seems to pose a threat to most everyone. In addition to the three periods in the history of capitalism bringing persons around the globe into closer ecollomic association, the distribution of pollutants in the atmosphere has also brought people into an unavoidable association affecting their highest order moral interests. One Inay conclude that the global ecollomy has had a substmtial impact on the rnoral interests of persans in virtually every corner of the world, B t ~ e to this association, I claim that duties of lustice exist between persons globally and not merely beween compatriots. The effects of glttbal economic

instit~~tians and principles on the fife prospects of persons are, in Rawis's words, 'profound from the start,'Tl"o understand the effect that the location of one's birth has on one" sife prospects, csnsider the trtagnitude of global inequality. For example, Switzerland" per capita gross national product (GNP) of $37,280 is the highest in Europe, and its infant mortality rate is 7 in 1,OBO;z' Mozambique' per c q i t a GNP is $80, the lowest in subSaharan Africa, while its infanc mortality rare is 277 in 1,000." The duties of the globally well-czff with respect to such inequality will he the subject matter of Chapter S.

A Failed Limiting Strategy The thesis that people have duties of justice to noncompatriots has been criticized because there are no global institutions that enforce such obIigations. For reasons that will become clear, T use the awkward compound term justice-positiuzsm to refer to this position, The failowing claims by Brian Barry serve as examples of justice-positivism: Accorcting to Kawls, a society is a scheme t>f social cooperation, and from this fact we can generate, via the noticjn of fair play, principles t>f justice. But cIcarl.)r,any actual society sixnpIy generates urhatevcr i s generatect by its actual cooperative practices. If it provides retirement pensions out af social sectxriry taxes, it is utllair to be a free rider. And so t>n,'j

Barry has reiterated this point: "'If 'I ask why I am obliged to contribute to the ojd-age pension of someone I have never met and have no particular inrterest in who lives in Rotherham, but not to the perision of so~rtebody equally distant to me who lives in Rennes, the answer is tl-rat I belong to the same scheme of social insurance as the first but not the second."zTThe upshot of these argrirnents seems to be that duties of distributive jrtsticel corrceived of as requirements of fairness at least, arise only within an already existing institutional framework of reQistribution.27 Thus, if the current system of global association does not already csntain institutions that enforce duties to noncompatriots, aypeals to fairnefs are insufficient to justify them, Insofar as the ir-rternational situation contains no such institutioils, there are no duties of cosmopolitan j~zstice,Barry3sclaim are directed m l y to duties of distributive justice, but X can see nu reason wl-ry tl-rey would not he generalizable to all duties of Justice, since the claim is not abom the content of the purported duties, but their existe~icein the absence of established instit~~tions of enforcexnent, Barry seems to conceive of the duties of fairness as associative duties and to take the requisite association to be 21 lega1-political framework, f call this

position justice-positivism because it is analr~gousto the position of legal positivists. Legal. positivists usually defend an identificatory theory of the law, which h ~ I d sthat something is the law only if it is the product of an accepted rule of recognition, A rule of recognition is what a polity (or its relevant leaders) takes to be the appropriate procedure for generating lawselg So, one stands under a legal duty only if there i s an institutional procedure accepted by society's kaders that says that m e does. Justice-positivism maintains that one stands under a duty of justice only if the institutions have beer1 deveioped to hold us accountable, Justice-positivism is, however, more radical than legal yositivism. Advocates of legal positivism maintain the separability thesis, the view that a rule's Iegaiiry and its justice are distinct matters.zT'irh allows them to invoke moral theory to criticize as unjust prevailing legal convention. Justice-positivism does not have the resources for criticizing prevailing legal and institutional convention since there are no duties at- lustice in the absence of instit-utionaliy required duties. This counterintuitive csnseqtlence is the principle weakness of justicepositivism. As ordinarily understood the requirement of Eairness has two aspects: It proscribes shirking, requiring fair play rmder the principles of social cooperation; and it requires giving each his or her due. We may say that a certain rule is unfair when, for example, it treats equals unequally, or rests on a distinctiorl that is moratty arbitrar!; s r is trtereiy the product sf unequal power. Tbe fact that we ernploy this second aspect of fairness to criticize existing principles of cooperation suggests that it is mare fundamental than the first. Barry, however, snly sees the first aspect of fairness. ft i s no criticism of the claims of global justice to observe that institutions of redistribution do not exist, far it is precisely the ftzirness of existing international inexisting stitutions an3 policies of distribution that is in question.3"f institrltions do not conform to principles of justice, then the duties of justice require their reiorm or the construction of alternative on@s,31

We live in different associatioils that establish various claims of justice. Some of us live in cities; some of us also live in provinces for states) with substantial detegated powers. We all. live in sates (or countries) that cf aim soxne final sovereign authorit); m d we live within the global economy, The existence of multiple associations sugests the possibility of conflicting claims of justice: What one owes in virtue of ~nernbershipin one association may be incompatible with wllat one owes in virfue oi inembership in mother, For example, our duties to compatric~tsmay seem to conflict with our duties to noncompatriots,

A frequently ernplayed fraxnework for discussions of this potential conflict is that of general and special moral duties, This permits an analogy hetween the duties of jtistice within the state and the inoral duties to one's family, Often both are taken. to be examples of special moral duties. The task of moral theory then is to reconcile these special duties to the more general demalld that morality makes upon ~zsdue to the fact that all persuns (and even many nonpersons) are the ob~ectof moral regard, fametimes defenders of cosmopolitanism invoke this analogy, For example, Martka Nusshaum claims: 1301itics, like child care, will be poorly done if each tl~inksherself eclually responsible for all, rather t l ~ a ngiving the irnrnectiate surroundings special attention and care, To gtvc one%sow11 sphere special care is justifiable in untversalist terms, and I think t l ~ i sits most c-oil-tpelilingjustification. To take one example, we do not really think our own children are morally rntjre important than othcr people's cl~ildren,even though almost all of us wlzo have cl~ildrenwould give our: own cfiildren far more love and care than we give others'. It i s good for cl~ildren,on the wl~ole,that things work this way, and that is why our special care is good, rather than seifish.32

Nusshaum invokes the analogy to render special and general moral duties consistent, showing the former as iltsances of the latter by invoking an argument that is traceable at least as far back as Henry Sidgwick.3 "clre often the ana!og?i is invoked to point to a practical dilemma that requires L I to ~ sacrifice the generai demands of morality in favor of the stronger special ties of fk~mily,state, a r nation.34 If one draws a distinction between duties of justice and other morizi duties, and if one quite reasonably supposes that at least some of what we owe families a r ~ dfriends is not characterized by juscice, then it foXLows chat there is the possibility of deep conflict witl-rin our moral Iives, Antigone's plight would have no dramatic purchase cm us if we did not recognize that there may be times in which doing right by our families rnay conflict with duties of justice. As an account, however, of the sclurce of tensioil between what we may owe compatriots and what we may owe no~~cornpatriots, the comparison to the tension between duties to one's bmily m d friends and general moral duties is misguided. For if there is tension between tbe claims of compatriots and of ntrncompatriots, it is a tension wzthirt justice, not beween general and special morality, The source of the tension is not captured by noting that we have general moral duties to all persons f a i d mally nonpersons) and special duties to those with wi.tom we have special ties. The sorirce s f the tension stexns from our membership in multiple politico-social associations, each of which yields duties of justice. Failure to appreciate this latter point has sometimes led advocates of cssmopolitanis~nastray. Barry, for

example, delivers a rhetorically powerful blr~wagainst statism and nationalism in the name of lilnz'versal morality-which he takes to be the basis of cosm0politanism-but concludes by asserting that dgties of justice are owed only to compatriots.3" 7i,mistake the source of possible tension between the claims of compatriots and noncompatriots is to he misted about the sorzrce of its resolution. Scheffler claims, "Part of what it is to have sucl-r [special/ responsibilities to c>ne%aassociates is to he required, within limits, to give their interests priority over the interests of non-associates, in cases in which the two conflict,"36 IPerhaps tl-ris is wl-rat special duties entail. It does not follow, however, that certain responsibilities of justice require that the interests of compatriots be given priority over dufies to noi~compatriots.Once the conis recognized as flict between the claims of compatriots and nonc~mpatFj~t$ a conflict wiEhin justice, there is the basis for a possible resolution, Gonlliccs within justice are resolved by appealing to more fundamental considerations of justice, The practice of legal decisionmaking illustrates tl-ris point. Consider the matter of contract law When C and E3 enter into a contract, say, to exchange goods for money, each of them acquires an entitlement over the other tlaat other persons do not have. Stxppose G is tl-re purchaser, f he is entitled to the g<~ads contracted from H. Meanwhik, H is entitled to the price of the corrtract, J is not entitled to either the goods frcm H or the price of the contract from C, Hence, H and C have duties of justice to each other that they do not have tc>J. There is no reason to conclude, however, that these additional: duties release them from their duties to J, G may not stop paying taxes, some of which is redistributed to J, in order to gather tl-re funds to meet the obligation to W. To generalize, new or local duties of justice are acquired within a hackgrour~dof the more ge~ieraiduties of bstice, and as such tlaey rnay not contravene these rnore general duties. When claims of justice made by compatriots and noncompatriots conflict, resolution is often possible by appealing to m r e fundamntal or background considerations of justice. This assertion does not, however, entail that the claims of compatriots invariably trump the claims of noncompatriots or vice versa. It is an assertion about the manner of resolution, not its outcome. There are tl-rree possible accounts of the relationship between duties of justice that we owe compatriots and those that we owe nt>ncompatriots. First, accounts may take duties of global justice to be primary and attempt to explain state justice as consistent with this. Robert Coodin adopts this strategy when be takes the duties that compatriots owe each other to he assigned general duties.3' The duties tl-rat compatriots owe each other exist because all persons owe all other persons duties, but the state system is a generally reliable mechanism for ensuring that people enjoy that which they are owe& Because duties of ~rrsticeto compatriots arise within

the background context of duties of cosmopolitan justice, we are nut relieved of the latter duties in order to fulfil1 the former ones. On the contrarh there exists a standing duty to a!! persorrs, which duty requires action if a state fails to provide persons in some other country what they are owed. Second, accounts may take the duties of justice at the state level to be primary and attempt to derive global, or inteniational, duties of justice against the backgtround of duties of ~usticewithin staees, Rawls's theory of justice is an example of this.% For purposes of ideal theory at least, the nuties of justice that compatriots OM~(:each other can he established without consideration of t l ~ epossible competing claims of nancompatriots, After having settled what justice requires of compatriots, matters of justice herween peoples may then be addressed, The most prornisirrg account of the relationship between duties. of justice to compatriots and to noncornpatriots is the tl-rird, to take neither the duties o f global nor domestic ~usticein general as primary. According to this account, there is n o standing preference for eitl-rec the global or domestic claims. This does not mean that there are not background, or f~rndamental, commitments of justice that can serve as the basis for resolving disputes beof tvveeri them, Rather, adjudicatiori is on the basis of the basic cox~sideratio~is justice implicated by the particular dispute. These mi&t involve arguxnents about underlyini;: deeper ccjmmitments, consistency of commitment, and priority of commitment, without assuming that such considerations aiways fall on the side of the claims of compatriots or those of tloncompatriots. There are problems with trying to establish that the duties we owe either to compatriclts or to noncompatriots are more fnndamental. This can be illustrated by revisiting the example of contract law 1 presented earliec Why are we justified in claiming that the duties of justice that G and E3 owe each other in virtue of the contract may not trump the noncontractud duties that both owe to jf? The justification can invoke at least twa considerations." First, the noncontractual duties of lustice that both G and H owe to J are more gerieral than the contractual duties: The latter duties they owe only to each otlzer, the former duties they owe to jf and to each otl-rer, Second, the duties that they owe to j are temporally prior tc-, the duties that they owe to each other as the result of the contract. Cr>nsiderations of generality and temporal priority batl-r point in tl-re same direction. Hence, tl-rere are compelling reasons for beheving that G and PZ may not leave their precontractual duties to J ur~frtlfilledin order to hifill their cor~tractuatduties to each other, In otl-rer words, the pre-contractual duties to J (and to each other) provide the background for assessing the duties that they may incur as the result of colitracting with each other. When considerarions of generality and temporal piority conflict, our intuition~are far less clear. Debates about justice in federal states reflect this, S~lyposea federal state brings together formerly indeperident states. Claims

about what a citizen or resident owes all other compatriots may have the virtue of being mcxe getleral than what that person owes those in his or her province (or state), but such claims may not be temporally prior. Xmagine, for exa~nple,that prior to the federation, melllbers of the independent states had duties of justice by virtue of their associatioil, which they did not have with citizens of s>therstates who later became compatriots. Establishing the more fundaxnencal commianetlcs of justice accordir~gto which disputes can be adjudicated may be a more complicated matter far federal jurisprudence than for contract law, since merely prioririzing the rBore general and the prior over the more specific and the later does not provide a distinct answer to the question of what the background considerations of justice are, An answer requires in addition some account of the more basic co~~rnitments of justice that are at stake in any particular dispute. Similar problexns arise wl-ren considering the duties of justice owed to compatriots and to noncompatriots. Considerations of generality point in favor of noncompatriots, while considerations of temporal priority point in favor of compatriots, On the one hand, the fact of a global economic association entails that citizens and residetlts may not attend only tc-,the duties that they owe to compatriots, for this would he an arbitrary limitation of the xnore general demands of justice, On the other hand, citizens and residents of states have duties to compatriots flowing from their pc>liticalassociatioll that they d s not have to noncompatriots, since they exist in political. association with cotllpatriots but: not the other. They may have duties of global justice to extend the scope of political association, but this will not resolve csnf-licts. Rather; it will produce new conflicts akin to those of federal jurisprudence, Therefore, disputes over what is owed to compatriots and what is owed to noncampatriots cannot be rest>lved by finding an agreement beween col~siderationsof generality and tempord priority. We are sorneti~nesrequired to privilege the ctai~nsof noncornpatrims when doing so is ~ q t t i r e dby background or futldamental commitments of justice, VE"e shalf see specific examples of this when discussing protectionism and irnmigration. Alternative15 we may have duties to compatriots that we do not owe to noncompatriots because of our different associations with them. We shatl consider this when discussing patriotism, Appeal to hackground or fundamental considerations of lustice to resolve disputes between the claims of both groups involves appeals to the basic consideration of jristice at stake in particular disputes without any reason to believe that in general the resoIution will f~avorthe claims of compatriots over noncompatriots, or vice versa. An important methodological point hilows h m this. Since we may not say that in general tile claims of one group override the clairns of the other, it is ixnpossible to give an account of the dtlties [>wedto members of one of the two groups, in eases of conflicting claims, without considering the clailus of members of the c1ther.40

The position X have been arguing for in this section is consistent with the approach taken in Chapter 2 that requires the original position to be gobal horn the start." Ai"rnalternative csnstructivist approach to gIobczl justice would develop the principles of domestic ~uscicein a first sitting of an original position and tbe principles of global ~usticein a second sitting." However, this procedure m u l d allow that principles of dornestic justice could be derived without considering competing claims from noncompatriots,

Many theorists wilt want to deny the corzclusiorz f reached in the previous section and trtaint'ain the view that the itlterests of compatriots necesstlriiy trurnp the interests of noncompatriots, In this section X briefly consider and reject three such arguments, more extensive consideration of the claims of patriotism and natiorzalism will. follovv,

The thesis of the previous section might be denied 01% the grounds that the force of duties of justice varies inversely with the distance of their object frorn the person obliged: The greater the distance, the less strong the duty, Because we are in closer proximity to most of our compatriots than to nonco~rtpatriots,our duties of justice then are strolzger to the compatriots. This criticim fails lor two reasons. First, a general principle of compatriot priority cannot he premised on prcjximity, as many people live near borders and are therefc~recloser to certain noncompatriots than to compatriots. A U.f, citizen living in fan Diego is closer to the Mexican citizen Living in Tijuana than to the U.S. citizen living in Anchorage, Proximity would provide little justification for limiting that person" duties of justice at the U,S.-Mexico border. The second reason that this criticism fails is that there is nt>good reason to suppose that duties of justice do vary inversely with distance, If the duties of justice have only a subjective basis, they may. Xn other words, if we suppose that we only have duties of justice to those for whom we believe or kel that we have such duties, and if generally we believe or feel that we l-rave weaker duties to tl-rase further away, then it would be the case that our duties of justice vary inversely with distance. EIowever, the supposition that duties of justice have only a subjective basis is implausible because of its counterintuitive implications. X f duties of justice are subjective, then it is impossible for us to be mistaken about what we believe or feel our duties to r as our be, Although we might coirte to change our minrds about t ~ u duties

beliefs and feelings change, we could not claim that we changed our minds because our earlier conception of what our duties were was wrong. Our earlier conception would have been right so long as we had it, The counterintuitive implication could be avoided and tl-re position salvaged if our duties of justice, rather than being subjective, really did vary inrversely with distance, evea if we happeri not to think so. Perhaps duties of justice lose their mornentum due to rnoral friction over great distances. It is unclear, though, what the language of moral friction is a metaphor for. Morer~ver,if the account of the drlties of justice that I provided earlier is approximately correct, then this characterization of them is wrong, We have duties of justice to those persons whose moral interests are a&cted by our business of living. There may be some correlation between those who we affect and their distance from us, but it i s the effect, not the distance, that is the basis of the duty,

Degree of Association The problems with the first objection suggest a second one, Because of the tighter association of interests tl-rat we share with compatriots, we are required to give priority to their interests over those of noncompatriots. There are two responses available to this criticism. One parallels a response to the first criticism, which is to challenge the prexnise that we share a tighter association of interests with all compatriots than with any noncompatriots, State boundaries have long been unreliable indicators of the boundaries of cornmon interesrs. Does the fisl~ennanin Maine have more tightly bound interests with the movie producer in Haliywood than with the fisherman in Nova Scotia? As a result of the global ecsnmy, there are increasing numbers of noncornpatriots with whorn our interests are rnore closely bound ttlan with our compatriots, Dehra Satz prcjvides a nice example: Consider whether a l3etroit automaker really shares a closer refadonship with a Vermont cheesemaker than with a Korean autoworker, Even though the Detraiter and the Vcrmonter share a political state, she and her Korean counterpart are el-nbedded in a web of relationships in wfiich the actions of each c-an sigtiificantly and often directly afiect the well-being of the other. Organizing by Korcan autoururkcrs irnpraves nor only their own level of urell-being but also that of their A~nericancounterparts.43

Since the criticism relies on a dubious prexnise, it is itself dubious. The second response is to challenge the inference, There is no good reason to think that a tighter association shauld entail that the interests of one" close associates shoulct be given pritrrity over the interests of other as-

sociates. f uppose that Johannesburg were to erect restrictions on wllo may move into the city from the surrounding countryside in order tc-,protect the local ~ o b sfor the local people, This would give priority to the interests of locat. residents over those of other citizens and residents of Sauth Africa. It would also be inconsistent with the ey ualiry of all citizens under the law,

M oral Triage A third objection relies on tl-re nation of moral triage. The idea is that to w e a duty of justice to everyone else in the world would be overwhelming, So, we are justified in expending greater time and resources in fu1f"illingthe if time and resources are limduties of justice to our c t ~ ~ t ~ p a t respecially i~ts, ited. Such a criticism might be motivated by a concern typically raised against utilitarianism, that its conception of duty would have us maximizing the happiness of sentient beir-rgs in far away places and never engaging in activity t12at makes our personal lives meaningful," In order to have the time and resources for meaniqful personal lives, one might assert that it is necessary to focus on fulfilling only duties to persons who are near to us. I have two responses. First, suppose that it is true tl-rat owing a duty of justice to everyone else in the world would ieave personal lives crushed under the weight s f moral responsibiliw It does not f<-,:ollowthat triage requires that we give priority to one's compatriots. A justified systexn of triage involves combining factors such as need with the likelihood of success. Many of those wit11 the greatest need are in the developing countries, far from those with the greatest means in the more developed countries. It might he countered that the likelikoc~dof success is greater when acting on duties to t3ne"s compatriots beca~zseeffective institutions of national justice exist, white effective systems of international ~usticedo not. Indeed tl-ris is oft-en the case, but under existing conditions hifilling duties of justice to noncompatriots keqnently involves domestic acticln-----notinternational action-such as supporting national legislation and policy that does not give priority to the interests of one" scornpatriots over the duties of ~usticeowed to noncompatriots, So, the existence of institutions of national justice does noc cut completely in the direction of helping only compatriots. The secc)nd rcspcjnse is to note that the criticism seems, in many cases at t tl~osecriticisms of least, to get the duties of jristice wrong. There is r ~ e r i in utifitarianisxn that contend is requires that personal lives be wllally devoted to maximizing general happiness, leaving neither time nor resources for personal pursuits.45 This, however, entails only chat cosmopolitan justice must not have maxixnizing dexnands, that it rnust not require that one's duty to others he to maximize, say, their welfare. It does not entail that we must ignore our duties to ail others in order to live rewarding lives. Effec-

tivefy acting on duties of justice, unlike otl-rer rnoraf dtlties, requires effective institutions. Typically9states have population sizes that would crush individual lives under the weight of moral resporrsibiliw if meeting a duty of justice required a person to carry out distinct actions with respect to each compatriot. Justice does not require this, Rather, in a just state we often meet our duties of justice to others by obeying the laws that requife us not to violate the rights of others and to contribute to the national treasury through taxation, When injustices exist, our duties of justice to our compatriots require that we play some role in developing just institutions or policies. This may involve as muck as organizing and agitating or as lirefe as advocating and voting. The international crondition is one in which there are few, if any, effective institutions of justice. So, the duties of global justice require us to pLay a role in developing just global institutior~sand to support just domestic policy that afkcts noncompatriots, Should just globt~linstitutions come into being, there is no reason In principle to suppose that fulfilling the requirements they wt~uidplace on us would prevent individuals from living rewarding fives any rnore than obeying just state institr~tions woutd,

Some defenders of patritrtism contend that appropriate love of: country places duties on citizens to give preference to the interests of compatriots over noncompatriots, even if this violates duties of impartial justice," b v e of country, however, need not be unconditional. There is no contradiction in asserting that the demands of:patriotism must be limited by the demands of justice.47 There is no reason why our love lor a person, for example, should cause us to refrain from moral judperlt of that person3 conduct. Xf one loves a person, one wants what is best for that person, It does not b l low that one will withhold judgment when that person does wrollg. Far from requiring one to refrain horn morally judging the beloved, love may even encourage this. This is, of course, an old theme, Aristotle says of friends, "They may be said actually to restrain each other fro^^ evil: since good men neither err tkexnsefves nor permit tl-reir friends to erra9'48 There is no reasorr to suppose, then, that a patriotism limited by the demands of justice is impossible. Indeed, it seems more plausible to maintain that appropriate love of coulltry by no means ilnplies giving priority to the interest of compatriots over duties of justice; rather, it implies that one seek to make me's country just, Srlppose that one responds that such a conceytion of patrimism leaves it denuded because it potentially involves refraining from supporting the policies of one's country when they conflict with the just claims of other states," If love fur a person or country does not re-

quire that the lover refrain frorn making impartial moral judgxnents about the beloved, then it is only blind loyalty, not patriotism, which is denuded by a withdrawal of support for a countrp when it coirtmits an injustice, There are more plausible accounts of the duties of yatriotisxn tliat are based upon the fact that compatriots exist in a common political association.q"f we have democratic drrties to our compatriots, it is quite plausible that we have dtrties to limit inequalities so that they are consistent with healthy democratic politics. The idea is that sufficiently large sacioeconomic inequdities give rise to inequalities in power that corrupt democratic processes, or may render the worst-off eitl-rer una ble to participate, because of educational and other disadvantages, or unwilling to participate, because of a justified loss of faith in the political process, These reasons are not sufficient, however, to justify the view that redistributive claims of C O E ~ ~ patriots necessarily trump those of noncompatriots, It might he claimed that my cosmopolitanism is too moderate. Perhaps I have conceded too much in recognizirtg a class of special claims of justice that can be pressed by compatriots but not by noncompatriots.fi If state borders are morally arbinary, why should one" dduties of justice be any different to those who are inside them than to those outside them? It is not state borders, however, that are the basis of the distirtction X have drawn. Rather, the fact of political association serves to distinguish the different duties. Still, it trtight be pressed, if state borders are arbitrary then so are the divisions between political arrangements that exist within borders, This may be true, but it dcres not entail the conclusioil that there are nt>differences of duties to compatriots and noncompatriots. There are two reasons for this. First, earlier I argued that the xnere fact of association among persons regardless of the justification of the association can prc~duceduties. The fact of the rrtatter is that compatriots have one kind of association and noncompatriots have another, These generate different duties. Second, states may be effective and efficient institutions, or part of an effective institutional arrangement, for protecting persons' human rights and their claims to a democratic voice in the pofitical instifutions that a f k t them, If so, then there would be duties of justice to compatriots to ensure the equal value of the institutional means for participating in pofitical life, In the next cl-rapter E shall discuss in greater detail the redistributive clai~lrsthat noncompatritrts may make. By way of comparison with the claims in the name of democratic politics, T mention here only the principle of fair equality of opportunity. Suppose tliat substantial inequalities in the conditions of adults are morally justified. A theory of justice that permits substantial inequalities in one generation on the basis of desert or permitting consensual transactions will have to ne~~tralize those inequalities for the next generation in order to remain consistent with the moral equality of persons. The fact that a child's parents were more deserving (however that

is measured) does not entail that the child should have a l-read start in fife. Alternatively, if it is permissible for autonomous adults who choose, and do not prevent others horn choosing, to engage in pursuits that lead to a privileged social status, this must be in part because no one started out with institutionally s e a r e d advantages that made their privilege more likely, Hence, even for theories of justice based upon desert s r freedom of corrtract, the rnorai equality of persons requires a commitment to fair equality of opportunity as one of the principles of justice.51 Fair equality of opportnnit)l requires that the permissible inequalities in one gerieration not affect the chances of success in achieving permissible positions of privilege in the next generation, Fair equality of opportunity is only a minimally egalitarian distributive principle beca~zseit merely limits the permissible effects of inequality ft)r subsequent jienerations, but does not limit the extent of inequality in the present generation, Although fair equality of opportunity is minimally egalitarian, the present global distribution of resources deviates massively from it, Xf equality of opportunity were realized, a child growing up in rural Mozambique would be statisticalty as likely as the child of a senior executive at a Swiss bank tct reach the position of the latter's parent. Because of differences in educational and health infrastructures and in effective cqacities far meetil~gsecurity and subsistence needs, children in the poorest developing countries are very far from having the saEBe opportunities for success that the privileged children in the developed world enjoy. Achieving fair equality of opportunity globally would require significant wealth transfers from the wealthiest persons of the developed world to tl-re developing world to support educational, health, food, and security programs, Consider the relationship beween the claims that csmpatriots map make on the basis of democratic duties and those that noncornpatriots may rnake on the basis of fair equality of opportunity, Claims are competitive when frrlfillment of both requires drawing on the same stock of resources, ~zsually money. The claims of cornpatriots to social conditions permitting politicat. equality and of noncompatriots to fair equality of opportunity are competitive, When claims are competitive, establishing a resolution is urgent. Tn such cases, tl-rere are three possibilities for resoIution: ( I fThe background commitments of justice require fulfilling one kind of claim, but not the other; ( 2 ) the background commitments of lustice require fulfilling both claims and it is economicalty and politically feasible to generate tile resources to d o so; (3) the hackgmund commitments of justice require fulfillir~gboth claims hut it is not fcasible to do so, in which case one rBust he met at the expense of the other: or bar11 rnust be only partially fulfilled. 1 have argued that there is no reasoil in general to suppose that the duties of justice to cssrtpatriots that originate frcm a common political association

trurnp tl-re duties of justice to noncompatriots, or vice versa. Are there reasons in this particuiar case far believing that justice requires a prior commitment to either compatriots or n o ~ ~ c o ~ rtrim? t p a Richard Miller argues that giving cornpatriots privilege is required by a rnorality of equal respect, because compatriots of all cc-~untries(even the per capita poorer ones) should appreciate the importancr: o f maintaining mutual trust and the appropriate incentives for obeying the law, both of which dorneftic rediscribution effects.$': Efowever, persons in all countries (even the per capita wealthy ones) should also appreciate the importance of ensuring that positions ot privilege in the global economy be equally open to all. X see no reason in this case to give privilege to either the claims of compatriots or noncompatriots. If this is right, then the first of the three possible resolutions is ~lx~avaiXabXe. If claims are competitive, and if both are required by justice, then it is best for institutions of justice to ensure that both be fulfilled. In the case under discussion, it would be best if wealth in developed countries were directed so as to achieve both a just political system among compatriots and eqrrality of oppc>rtrmity in the global economy. S u p p s e that there were compelling evidence that, due to the resistance of those with greater resources, this was unfeasible, This would be a moral Ir~ssthat should be recc>gnizedas such, Moreover, it would be an woidable foss caused by those resisting, which means that they are responsible for an injustice, Be that as it may, is there some nonarbitrary way to decide wllich duty should be sacrificed in the supposed circumstance? If we are considering the matter hom the perspective of which duties wealthy persons in developed countries should meet, principles of triage would cut in different directions, The geatest need is likely to be among noncompatriots where deprivatio~lis greatest, The most effective response is Iikely to be among compatriots where extensive state institutions of redistribution exist and can be operated or built upon, Effective response, hawevet; may weigh more heavily than extent of need because what is i~nportantis achieving what justice demands. So, tl-rere rnay be reason to prefer compatriots in this circuxnstance. I wish to stress, however, that this is not a justification for gving priority to domestic duties of justice over global ones. ft is merely an atteErtpt to ttnderstand what should be done when those with sociai power refuse to meet their duties, In fact global, distributive justice requires more than rrterely respecting equaliq of ol,porturticy: It requires limits on global inequality, I shall discuss this in Chapter 5, If it is the case that a duty of justice to noncomgatriots requires limiting global, inequalities, then such a duty wouM corrtpete with the d ~ t yof justice to cornpatriots to redistribute wealtll in order to achieve political justice, and the paints about competitive claims made in the previous paragaphs would corrtinue tct apply

The nationalist positions that challenge the argrlment T have beer1 making are those that hold that one's co-nationals are to be preferred in matters of justice over those who are nat co-natitznals, CO-nationals are distinct from co~rtpatriots,Compatriots are members of the saErte system of governance, the vast majority of which are multinational. Go-mernbersl~ipin a system of governance is not a necessary condition for co-nationality, The criteria for judging whether two people are compatriots is wholly objective: Tt depends upon their citizenship or residency status, This is not true of tlze criteria for co-nationals. A common view among theorists of nationalism is that in order to he a member of a nation one must identify oneself as such.'g Not all compatriots tl~enare co-nationals, and some co-nationals may not be coxnpatriots, I shalt consider two distinct nationalist challenges to the pc>sitionthat I am defending. Strong nationalism holds that duties of justice arise only amtrng those who share a national culture, Weak naticinalism does not limit duties of justice to co-nationals, but X-rolds tltat co-nationals ought to be gven preference over others in matters of justice. Since 1 take duties of justice to arise out of associations, trty view trtigflt appear to be particularly vulnerable to these nationalise challenges. Indeed Tamirr, for example, argues tbnt duties of justice arc associative duties and that llations are associations that generate such duties. Arguments from the objective good of cultural membership, examined in Chapter 7 , may provide the basis for national self--determination, but they do not make the case for preferring one" so-nationals in matters of justice. For exaxnple, Will Kymlicka argues that persons require a cultural context in order for options to have meaning.s"Tf autonomy without meaningful choice is impossible, then autonomy without a culture is impossible. This claim, however, does nut entail that co-nationals ought to be given preference; it is a clairn about the objective good of cultural membership. The claim might provide support for state policies to defend natiorzal cultures impartially. It does not entail tlie view that one ought to be partial. to one's CO-nationals. Strong nationalism tnight be thought to fc~llowfrom the claim that goods are only intelligible from wi-rhin the context of a culture," In other words, if cultural relativism about lustice were true, then one might think that the duties of justice are limited to co-nationals. There are, however, two problems wit11 this view. First, iftthe claim that the intelligibility of goods requires a cultural framework is entailed by a more general claim that goods are speis false because there is a global cific to associations, then strmg ~~atiorzalism association that also has standards of: the p o d that apply cross-culturally. Second, the meta-ethical position of cultural relativism does not necessarily entail limiting drities of justice to me's culture. ff it is a cultural beiief that

duties of justice exist toward persons wl-ro are not members of one" culture, then, according tc-,cultural relativism, they do. Cu'itural relativism alone will not suffice, but in cs~rtbinationwith the empirical premise that all national cultures take duties of justice to be limited to co-nationals, it entails tlie strong nationalist limitation, Even if the meta-ethical claim were true, the empirical one is surely false. For exarrtple, at least some of the theoreticians of Afrikaner nationalism seemed to think that they were doing right by Africans through their policy of the ""self-determinatian"" of ""independent'" homeiands. Hence, this argument in defense of stroElg nationalism fails. Weak nationalism is intuitively rnore plausible but no less fraught. An analysis of Thomas Hurkats defense of weak nationalism reveals gr~blems characteristic of many nationalist a~uments.58He employs an analogy to the family?a common argumentative strategy among nationalists. The analogy is meant to show that just as one is morally required to show some preference for c-me%family members, so one is required to show some greference for one" sco-nationals, The first difficulty for all such arguments is that the intimate relations of xnucual dependence that ofrelt are the basis of familial preierence are generally lacking In relations between most co-nationals, the majority of whom are invariably strangers to one another. Hurka is able to avoid this problexn with the claim that neither familial nor co-national preferences are based upon the intimacy of the relationship, but upon a shared history of activity with mutually beneficial results. The truth of this clairn would seem to establish nations as associations generative of moral duties. Establishing the claim, hc~wever,is probiematic. In order to illustrate the shared histow of activit-y,Hurka does what many nationalists do: He blurs the distinction between co-nationals and compatriots.s%is example of a shared history of activity is the creation of the Cmadian health care system, Although commonly referred to as a "national heatich care system," this merely trades on the ambiguity of the term nation in common usage. In fact, the system was created by a state institution, the parliament, is funded by federal taxes, and is available to Canadians no matter what tlleir nationality. Suppose we grant PIurka, despite his example, that natioilal activity does yield benefits to members analogous to the benefits yielded by familial activity. This would establish nations as associations and, tl-rerefore, the existence of special duties to co-nalionals. It does not estabish that these &ties are duties of justice, Recall that duties of jtistice are directed toward the institutions of public I r k . These are institutions wielding political and social power. The claim that the (assumed) duties of co-nationals are duties of justice entails that public institutions may have a national character, inay enforce certain national conceptions of the good over others, and therefore grant privileges to those who adhere to such conceptions that are not granted to others.

Here a comparison to familial duties is useful. Many people think we have moral duties to family members-whatever the source of such duties-that we do not have to others. This does riot entail that political power may be used to grant privileges to fa~nilymembers. Even on the assumption that ftzmilies or nations generate special moral duties, an additiortal argrlrrterit is required to establish that these are duties of justice, The claim that we have some special relationsl-rip to, or concern ftlr, anotl-rer person does not establish the claim that political and social pr>wer should f a v ~ that r persult over others." To believe otherwise, is to fail to see that dttties of justice cannot sirnpty be assimilated to the broader class of moral duties. Indeed, nepc>tismis generally regarded as an affront to justice, if national duties are similar to familial on=, then the use of public institmions to favor co-nationals is equally suspicious, It is possible to generalize the lessons learned from analyzing the claims of weak nationalists, Two problems confront the weak (and if the weak, then also the strong) nationalist position, One is establishing nations as associations at all. Efforts to do this often conflate the distinction between conationals and compatriots. The other is establishing that the supposed moral duties we owe associates are duties of justice, Xf one fails to distinguisl-r between tl-re duties of justice and other moral duties, one rnay faif to see that duties of justice, unlike others, are directed toward our relations with orhers as rrtediated by political and social institutit>nsand pojicy. In arguing that public instit~~tions and policy should be designed to prefer some class of people over others, it is insuf cient to establish that one has certain moral duties to a particular class that one does not have to the ~ h ers. For wllat must be establisl-red is not just how ilzdz'vidglals slloufd conduct themselves, but t l ~ wpublic i n s t i t ~ t i o ~should s operate. In general, equal respect for persons establishes a powerful defeasible presumption against the operation of public instit~itionsto prefer some class of persons governed by them over others; such prekrences are tainted with the suspictoxt of uxifair or irtvidious discrixnination. Insofar as nationalists advcjcate using state power on behalf of co-nationals, they need especially convinciw reasons if they are to overcome the presumption against discrimination. Appeals to the special duties of individuals to m-nationals on the analogy of the special duties to fa~nilyrnembers wifI not do. There is a special problem of accounting far the nature of putative natiorial moral duties for those nationalists, such as Tarnir, who hold that one's national identity is a matter of individual choice," This view entails that one: can opt out of one" dduties of justice by changing one's mind about one's ideaitity As I insisted earlier, generally moral duties are not demands that one can free meself of merely by changing one's mind. Suppose that a person is coi~vincedby a utilitarian account of moralify that entails a duty to maximize happiness, but in the face of circumstances that person decides

that this account of the demands of morality is wrong. She may change her mind about what morality requires of her, but this does not imply that what morality really requires has changed. A possible rejoinder to this criticism is tl-rat there are certain duties that one can opt out of by a change of identity. A person resigning from a club can change identity from member to nonmember and is thereby relieved of the duties of membership, In light of the example of philosophical orientation in the previous paragraph, this rejoinder suggests it is llecessary to consider whether one" snational identity is more like one's philosophical orierrtarion or more like one's status as a member of a club, If nationality were indistinguishable from citizenship, it would he ciear that national identity would be mtlre like one%status as a member of a club. In both cases there would be objective processes bp which one acquires or sheds one's ikntity. This is lacking wllen one adopts or renounces a philosophical orientation. Doing this m e ~ l ychanges haw one thinks &out the worM and one" self, If one takes the primar)i marker of one's nationality to be subjective, then national identity looks rnore like a philosophical orientation. As I argued in the previous paragraph, a change in one% philosophicat orientation does not change one's duties. Thus, the objection remains that no mt~ralduties can Row frorn national identity, subjectively construed.

The kinds of domestic policy questions that are especially important frorn the cosxnopolitan perspective are those afkcting the interests of noncompatriots. Cosmopolitanism is mast controversial where it refuses to grant privilege to the interests of c s ~ ~ p a t r i oover t s the duties owed to noncompatriots, Two examples are imxnigration and protectionist trade policy, Restrictive immigration policies have the effect of denying noncompatriots the opportunities for development and advancement that an econorrt); of a country offers its citizens. Protectionist trade policies increase the costs of importing goods into a country and therefore reduce trade opportunities for other countries-which rBay have the effect of also reducing employment opportunities and living standards in those countries, Restrictive immigration policies and protectioilist trade policies complemerit one another. The former policies discourage immigrants from looking for work in a new country, while the latter policies reduce emplr~ynnentopportunities in the would-l-)e i~migrantskcountry.If either is employed by a relatively more developed csuntry against a relatively less developed one (as is typical), it will protect the privileges of the cidzens of the more developed country from competition by the citizens of the less developed. Both kinds of policies then raise questions of global distributive justice. More-

over, it seems reasonable to suppose that protectionist trade policies, by reducing opportunities in the targeted country, increase incentives far persons to immigrate, even illegally, in p~lrsuitof a better life, To this extent the analysis of restrictive irnxnigration policies may fallow that of restrictive trade policies, bm restrictive immigration policies raise several additioilal questions. These include the justified limits on the right to inove freely, the rights of states to protect national cultures, and the rights of states to protect their institutions of justice. I shalt begin hy discussing the relatively more simple matter of protectionism and build L I ~ O I -that E discussion to address the more complicated matter of immigration,

Protectionist trade policies have the n a m protectiorrist because they shield domestic goods from foreign cornpetition, if tlte rime is rlot used merely pejoratively, it is significant because it suggests that the standards for measuring whether the policy has been effective and whether it remains necessary are whether the dolllestic goods have irt fact been sl-rielded from coxnpetition and wllether they continue to need to be. Trade tariffs increase the price of imported guods, thereby reducing demand for them and probably increasing demand fc~rIoa1 cheaper counterparts. Such policies protect the interests of local capita tists wlzose return on investment depends upon the profitability of the business in which they are inrvested, They also protect the interests of local workers whose lobs may be threatened if the profitability of their emlsfoyers is threaeened by imports.62 This explains the cross-class enthusiasm for " b y locally'kcinpaigns in many csuntries around the world, The losers in the protectionist game are the capitalists and workers in the countries whr~seexports have become the object of protectionist tarif-fs, as welt as the consumers who fail to receive the benefits of inarketplace c o ~ n petition, Capitalists lose because they lose market share in anotller country. Wiorkers Lose because a smaller market share meails less production, and less production ineans fewer employees. The more Lzrgent claims of injustice are rnade by the unemployed and poor who sufkr more greatly than the capitalists as a result of protectionist policies, Prcttectiani~yr~liciesviolare a principle of fair equality of opportuniy S~lchpolicies create different sales conditions for producers of equivalent goods, thereby affecting their abitity to succeed. If this were to occur between two different dosrtestic producers, it inight be described as a failure of equal protection under the law, Since one3 place of birtl-r is moralty arbitrary, it sl-rould not affect one's life prospects or one's access to opprtunities. There is considerable consensus about this if the principle is applied to

compatriots. Citizens of a state ought not to be disadvantaged in the pursuit of their goals simply because of the region of the state in wl~ichthey were born. Protectionist trade policy exemplifies how domestic prrMic palicy can negatively effect the interests of noncomp~teriotsby endowing one's place of birth with moral significance. Advocates of prstectionisnl typically rest their position on one of three arguments. First, they might assert that because citizens and residents pay taxes to their government they deserve to benefit from its policies. This, however, does not imply that pr~tecticjnistp~IliCiesare justified, For there remains the question of what sort of benefits a citizen is entitled to. Payment of taxes alone does not establish such an entitlement. Just because I pay taxes does not mean that I am entitled to be provided with the job of my choice, Ss, the fact that citizens and residents of one country pay taxes, and tl-rose living in anotl-rer country do not, does not establisl~an entitlement of the former to be protected against the competition of the lattcc The claim to an entitlement generally requires justification independent of taxpaying. Typically, payment of taxes is an obligation incurred by virtue of the provision of the entitlement, rather than the grcjund of the entitlement, A secorrd defense s f protectionism is that irnport tariffs are justified because producers in certain otl-rer countries have an unfair advantage over local producers. This response is most dubious when what constitutes the alleged unfair advantage is poorer working conditions and environmental standards in foreign countries. As X noted earliea; ordinarily tl-rere are two distinct ways of understanding Oirness and therefore its denial, unfairness. One way to understand unfairness is as an advantage due to a vZoliktion of an established rule. Tlze other is as an advantage due to the enforcement of an established rule or practice that is unbir. The charge of unbir advantage must be examined in light of both of these senses. The first sense of unfair advantage conjures up images of a race in wl~ich one" (opponent has cheated by, say, taking illegal perhrmance-enhancing drugs. This sense of unfairness applies only to the opponent who is not playing by tlze established principles of the game, In tlze absence of a cornmon set of constraints, If one prodwer does not accept constraints imposed ~lponthe other, there is no ~znfairadvantage in the first sense, It might well be better for workers and for the enviranxnent if the constraints governing the one governed both, but In the absence of global Iabor and environmental iaws it is not unfair in the first sense that they do not, If, however, it would be better if all prodticers adhered to stricter enviroilmental and labor standards-which are not currently in place globally-is it unfizir in the second sense if some producers do not? The argument that it is can be put in tl-re form of an analogy. X I laws perxnitting racial discrimination are in place, a beneficiary of those laws has an unfair advantage in the second serise over a victim of those laws. The advantage is unfair

because the law itself is unjust, Similarly, tlze absence of environmental and labor protections in some states is an injustice, giving producers in those states an ~znfairadvaneage over producers in other states, The obvious question far the arguxnent in tlze preceding paragraph is whether this rather odd analog); is apt, ?-cl be clear, it is an analogy between, on the one hand, the victim of racially discriminatorq. laws and the person in a country with strong environxnental. and labor laws, and, on the other hand, between the beneficiary ( ~ racially f discriminatr>ry laws and the worker in a country lacking strong environmerital and labor laws, Xt argues that just as tlze beneficiary of raciaily disaiminatory laws has an unfair advantage over the victirn, so the working pmsotl living in a state lacking strong environmental and labor laws has an unfair advantage over the working person living in a state with strong laws. Notice that the victim of racially discriminatory laws is unequivocally disadvantaged by tlzose laws. There are, presumably, employme~ltand educational opportunities that simply are not available to that person, Moreover, the beneficiary of racially discriminatory Laws is unequivocally advantaged by these laws, having been freed from possible competitors in the labor market. However, working people in states with strong environmental and labor laws are not unequivocally disadvantaged by these. Many persons living in states without strong environmental and labor laws are not unequivc~callyadvantaged by working in low-paying and unsafe vvt~rkconditions and Living in unhealthy environxnetlcs, The claim of unfair advantage in the second sense is dubious because the advantages are, at best, mixed blessings. The analogy simply i s not apt, A tlzird defense of protectionism is advanced in tlze name of egalitarianism. Consider the following claims by Richard Falk: The structures of regional and glsbat economic governance are taking root in a variety of settings, inclutling the European Commutlity, NAFTA, the economic surnrnits of the Group of Seven, the nascent World Tradc C)rganizrzrian (WTC)), Illy.iFNortd Bank. The rationale for such fraltlevvorks is almost entirety market-t~rientecf.and ecc>nomistic,empbasizitlg cc>nrributions to trade and investtnent, efficieneies of producttor1 and cfistribution, and proced~rresfor reduc~ngthe relevance af sovereign states, especially their intrusion of peopfesrienrecf protectionist, social, and local factors that l~elpt l ~ eweak withstand thc strang,6?

Falk's position seems tct be twfoid. First, protecdonism is in the interests of the disadvantaged and the partic~tiarlyvulnerable in a count^^, because it shields tlzem and their employers from global market competition. Second, free market trade serves only the interests of the already privileged capitalists who are able to exploit their srrperior market access.

The claim that protectionist policies can benefit tl-re disadvantaged may have some force from a parochial perspective, that is, if one is consideriq only the disadvantaged of a particular countl-y, ff local employers are protected from global market competition, then they might employ those whom they would not employ under global competition, or they might employ them at higher w a F s than they would under globai competition, Restricting access to this market involves restricting the access of emplr~yersin other countries. So, once the perspective is broadened beyond the borders of one country, it is less plausible that protectionism benefits the disadva~ztaged.64 The second challenge concerns the beneficiaries of free-market trade policies, The claim, if taken as a factual one, is that only the iitlterests of the capitalist class are served by these policies. If my analysis in the previous paragraph is true, this claim is false. Indeed, it is neither the case that only capitalistsYnterests are served since their employees gain jobs, nor true that all capitalists interests are served since competition requires losers. If the challenge is taken as a normative claim that justice requires a more egalitarian international distribution of wealtl-r than the market produces, I would agee, The: giohal market does not ensllre equaliry of opportunith let alone limit inequalities. Protectionist policies do not serve this hnctiorz either and cannot therefore be justified on tl-ris basis. If the criticism is that under current regimes o f '"free trade" the interests of more powerful capitalists in weaIthier countries are served because multilateral tariff reductiorz plans require less-developed countries to be the first to reduce tariffs, this is a powerful indictment of such regimes, but not necessarily a defense of protectionism, The criticism can just as readiiy support the requirement of a more fair tariff reduction plan. a l e important westion that is suggested by the Falk qrrotation is, What counts as protectiorzism? ff a country passes product safety laws that prohibit certain sorts of products and many ol the producrs tlzat would be prohibited by those laws are of foreign origin, does this count as a protectionist law? Increasingfy such laws are being challenged within the World Trade Organization (WTQ) and even being struck d o m e The fact that a Law restricts certain kinds of dangerous content in goods a r goods manuf,2ctureQ ~lnderexploitative conditions is not sufficient to rnake it protectionist, If the Law is stated in general terms without identifying specific countries of origin, then it would apply equally to domestically and foreign-produced goods, If it does not single out foreign-produced goods for special restrictions, then it is not protectionist. Additionally, if its goal is to protect public heclith or to discourage certain kinds of activities of production, then the measure of its success is not in how well it shields local producers from competition, but how welt it contributes to tl-rese other goals, If the taw turns out to be ineffective in meeting such goals, then it would lose its ~ustification, despite the fact that it rnay protect local producers. So, a criticism

of protectionism does not entail a criticism af legislation to ensure product safety and decent working conditions, WTO practice to the contrary notwithstanding, It is so~netimesnoted that current ""freetrade" rcegimes are directed more toward eroding existing legislative measures ensuring health, safety, and decent working conditions, than toward real prc,tectir>nism.65 To the extent that this is true, such regimes cannot be justified on grounds of fair equality of opportuniy The discussion of what counts as protectionism suggests a possible dekrlse of trade tariffs that i s not protectionist, The reasoning involves the claim that tariff barriers for products created in states with unsafe enviranmental practice and exploitative working conditions help to promote birness for those who live and work in such conditions by providing incentives for change. Sometimes advocates of such policies refer to them as "fair trade9\ather than ""protectionist" policies." The goal of fair trade policy is to protect the interests of noncomgatriots, not domestic interests. This entails a significant difference for the monitoring and evaluation of whether the trade policies remain justified, Protectionist policies would serve their goal as long as the threat of competition existed and the policies reduced that threat. Fair trade policies would serve their goal as iong as they were directed toward states with unsafe eenvironxnents and exploitative working conditions and they could reasoilabiy he thought to be improving those condititjns. Contrary to the analogy discussed in the second defclise of proteccionisxn, the present account shows the unfairness of iireetrade is not in the advangaga that it confers tc-3those living in countries with unsafe environments and exploitative work c~nditions;it Iies instead in the disadvantages to those people, who might be tl-rought of as coxnparabie to the victims of racially discriminatr>rylaws rather than to the beneficiaries, One might suspect that this a m ~ u n t to s a distinction without a difference. If protectionist policies serve their goal as long as the tl-rreat of competition exists and the policies reduce that threat, and if fair trade policies serve their goal as long as they are directed toward stlates with rmsafe environments and errploitative working conditions, the two policies may heyuently yield tariffs on the same range of products, For it is states with unsafe environmental practices and exylt~itativeworking conditions that often pose the greatest competitive threat. This much is true. However, the katttre that discinguishes the protectionist and fair trade rationales for import tariffs is that the fair trade rationale takes such tariffs as justified only if they serve to promote improved condkions in the targeted state. So, even if a competitive threat exists from a country with fewer environmental protections and inferior working conditions, if import tariffs will not improve these conditions then they are not justified, according to the fair trade account. The fair trade position is superior to the protectionist position since its success is not ~neasuredby whether it protects the privijeges of compatriots

but whether it improves the conditions for those wllo are (typically) worse off than one's compatriots. It does, however, raise moral problems of its own. Consider the analogy between those persolls living in states lacking enforcement of strong environmental and labor laws and tl-rose who are the victims of unfair racial discrimination, The problem with this analogy is that those persolls living in such states are not unequivocally disadvantaged by the lack of enforcernent, while those who are the victixns of unfair racial discrimination are, Let" accept that the absence of enforcement constitutes an injustice suffered bp persons living'~~ithout the protection of such Iaws, This lack of enfarcexnent might nonetheless give them a certain advantage with respect to states that enbrce strict environmental and labor laws. It might encourage investment for production and therefore employment, which is precisely what the protectionists are worried about. Tile fact that the citizens of states lacking strong environmental and labor regulations, unlike the victims of racially discriminatory Iaws, are not unequivocally disadvantaged iltdicates a flaw in the analogy between them, Hence, the remedies offered in the two situa~ionscontain a disanalogy as well. The victim of racially discriminatory laws is unequivocaily advantaged by the destruction of such laws, IF the imposition of protective tarifk against csuntries with explr~itativework conditions and unsafe environmental policies helps to improve these conditions, it may also reduce ernployrnexlt in already poor countries as they lose some of their competitive advantage. So, the viccims of these conditions are not umquivocally advantaged by successful fair trade policies. The adoption of intevnutiorrnl envirmmental and labor sandards bears some advmtages over bilatercsl approaches to establishing incentives for healthier and less-exploitative prt.>duction. The adoption of certain basic ~lnil'ormproduction standards bllowing for variations in, sap, the level of minimum wages among stares, but not in standards of basic safety, age of employment, and freedom of association and coliective bargaining) may raise production costs ;It developing countries relative to those of developed countries and reduce some of tl-reir competitive advantage, but it need not equalize costs. Moreover9 it would reduce opportunities for any one particular state to undercut allother by employing substartdard conditions.67 Proper monitoring of such standards by a truly representative international institution could also help to prevent powerful states horn merely imposing rules on weaker ones as may rnore readily occur in bilateral relations, So, again the blessing is mixed, but rnore positive, Although international labor and environmental standards may increase unemployment as the result of cost increases, they may aIso produce greater security against being undercut and against being subjected to the wishes of dominant powers, The problems with fair trade policies identified above suggest that they can at best be only a partial solution to ~znderdevelopmemand poor envi-

ranmental and working conditions in poorer countries, Developing countries need access to a globally financed, sustainable development fund, which would give them the resources for economic growth within the co11straints of xnore favorable environxnentai and working conditions, Indeed, this is the remedy mast consistent with justice far the persons presently Iiving and working in these unfavorable conditions. I shdl defefid this proposal further in Chapter 4. A second arguably nonprotectionist defense of trade tarii-fs is found in the underdevehpment literature, Trade theories of underdevelopment hold that due to the higher wages in certain countries the price of their commodities will be higher, which fc~rceslower-wage countries to pay more for their imports. The result is unequal exchange,hTrade tariffs rnight be advocated in less-developed countries to shield them from the effects of unequal excl-range. This justification of trade tariffs more closely resembles protectionism than does the fair trade justification because it serves the interests of compatriots as opposed to noncomyatriots. However, the tariffs are employed to protect those in lower-wage countries rather than liigfierwage ones, So, arguably they do not violate fair equality of opportunity. It is debatable whether the unequal exchange account of underdevelopment is correct. One problem with it is that it is based upon the assumption of perfect capital mobility generating e q u d rates of profit around the worici, but a lack of labor mobility that is supposed to generate wage differentials. It is not obvious, however, that wage differentials would come to be in a world of perfect capital mobility," lf we assume, however, that the ~lnequalexchange thesis is roughly correct, trade tariffs would establish friction for capital: mobiiit): but tlzey do not presenc the only remedy to unequal exchange, Indeed, Arghiri Emmanuel, who first developed the thesis of unequal exchange, argued that the remedies to it are economic diversitication ta send up prices of exports and send down prices of imports, or institmions of dobal redistribution to compensate persons in lw-wage countries far the inequality they suffec'o Moreover, global redistribution is xnore appropriate than tariff erection since it places the responsibility for the well-being of persons within the larger economic association of the dlcrbal economy rather than the state econo~rty,

Jmmigration restrictions share the problem s f inequality of opportuniy that taints protectionist trade policies. Because limitatiolis on imrrtigration impose barriers to the pursuit of goals on soxne people because of where they are born, but not u p n others, they have the effect of distributing opportunities for personal advancement in a rrtorally arbitrary way. In addi-

tion to this, restrictive irnmigation policies appear to be a blatant violation of the right to fi-eedom of movement, Suppose that the charge of violating freedom of trtovement is challenged in the following way Freedom of movement is valuable only insofar as it permits people to pursue opportunities, Hence, citing a policy far violating heedom of movement is redundant if it has already been cited for violating a prillciple of fair equality of opp~rtitnityThe pre~niseof this arguxnent, however, does not entaiI its conclusion. The reasstl is that a policy may deny pursuit of opportunities jwlriclz the premise asserts to be the problem with restricting free movement) to all persons equally. Xn such a case tlzere is no inequality of opportunit)p, hut there is denial of permission to pursue opportunities, Equality of opportunity is a distributive principk, for it is sensitive to differences in the distribution of opportunities but not to the lack of opportunity per se. So, we can, witlzout redundancy, charge restrictive immigration policies both with vioiating a principle of equality of apportunity and violating a principle of freedom of movement. One might try to reject tlze idea of treating imxnigratian policy as a matter of justice at all, IWichael Vl"alzer argues that the effects of immigration controls on would-be i~nmigrantsare riot a matter of justice, but of charity.71 If this is the case, then the principles of fair equality of opportunity and freedom of movement simply do not apply, Walzer" view is that the morality of immigration is a questio~iof the demands of moral duty, the duty of mutual aid or charity, but not ducies of justice, Charity is both less demanding and more permissive of discretion than is justice. Walzer's argument, though, seems to eridorse justice-positivism about duties of justice to nancompatriots, He contends that duties of cosmopolitan justice would arise only if there were already a system of global governance, "If , . . ail human beings were members of a global state, state membership would clearly have been distributed equtllly; and there would be notlzing more to do.'"72 However, as I argued earlier, the fact that institutions to enforce duties of global justice do not exist in n o way entails that the duties do not exist. Hence, Walzerk refusal to view immigration as a matter of justice to noncompatriots is unjustified. The kernel of truth in Walzerk view is that qriestions of membership are questions of the dernands of m u t ~ ~ aid a l or charity when the would-be members are not part of a broader association generating duties of justice, Jf two societies existed in isofation frosrl one another, then persons in the one society would not be under a duty of justice to admit persons of another sc~ciety,This would, as Walzer believes, be a matter of charity. There are at least four reasons that might be offered for placing some restrictions on ixnmigration. First, limiting irnmigration is sometirnes a response to demands from citizens and residents, who are taxpayers, for protection against cornpethion from noncompatriots who are riot taxpayers.

Paying taxes, so tlle argument goes, confers an entitlement to be protected that citizens and residents may invoke, and that prospective immigrailts may not invoke, As I have argued, payir-rg taxes does not generally establish an entitlement where one does nut exist for other reasons, So, in order to defend immigration restrictions, an independent argument is needed. The second reaison for limiting immigration invokes the economic interest of citizens." Ctlrrent citizens rnight be economicatly harmed by immigration in one of two ways. They may lose their jobs to immigrants who underbid them in the IaEtctr market, or they inay be cosrtpelled to accept lower wages in order to compete with immigrants who underbid tlzexn. Both of these possibilities assume that immigrallts will pri~narifyseek jobs held by cunlent citizells, rattler than, for example, start their own businesses and eventually become employers themselves. They assume furthermore that labor unions will be either unwilling or unable to organize immigrants in order to bring their wages up rather than the wages of current citizens down, It is import,mt to make expiicit these assumptions, because the force of the criticism diminislles as tlle plausibility of the assurnptions dim. There arc reasons to doubt that immigration has a generally negative impact on the economic we[!-being of citizens of the state to which immigration is directed.74 Suppc>sefc~rthe sake at-argument that it does, The reason offered far restricting immigration, then, is that it hurts the economic interests of xlative workers. The reason Etas inerit only if the relevant economic interests are entitlements of justice, Do persons have an entitlement to be protected in their jobs from noncompatriot Labor market competition? Assuming that the labor market is a just institution for seiecting employees among compatriots, the clairn that there is sucl-r an entitlexnent would have to be that market competition from nc~ncompatriotsis unjust. However, it is hard to find a reason why market competition for jobs wc~uldhe ust titled among compatriots, but not between compatriots and noncompatriots, The same reasons that count in favor of market competition in the one case do so i r ~the other, Market competition makes ernployer choice efkctive, ensuring that control over resources (not necessarily ownership) is effective. Competition helps emplt~yersfind the persons with the appropriate skilis at the best price, thus increasing the efficiency of the enterprise. Competition is not, of course, without its costs. There cannot be competition without L~>sers. Egalitariarls point to such costs to make the case that the labor market must he complemented by redistributive mechanisms. If the efficiency benefits of competition are significant, and if costs generally can he ameliorated, then such costs do not outweigtn the benefits. Moreover, since effective control over resources and efficient enterprises seern to be necessary for an ef6cient economy, a lack of competition would probably result in a Pareto inferior distribution of resour~es~75

The advocate of restricted imrnigration might respond tl-rat tl-re losses to efficiency are justified in the name of a greater socic~economicvalue, for exampie either lustice or equality It has often been argued that the labor market is unjust since it rewards persons on the basis of talents and abilities for which they are not responsible. It is sheer luck that one was born with marketabIe talents or into a FarniIy that cultivated abilities. Those who are lucky would appear, then, to be undeserving of any greater share of resclurces than the unlucky, Assuming that this argumeilt is souild, it still does not make the case fclr restricting labor market competition to compatriots for two reasons, First, the very same considerations of luck underlie the contention that compatriots should not be privileged in matters of justice over noncompatriots, simply by virtue of being born on the right side of the border-something for which they are not responsible. Second, by arguing against the justice of tl-re labor rnarket in toto, the argument proves too much for the typical advocate of restricted immigration who would like to preserve the market between compatriots, b~ztnot between c o ~ ~ p a t r i o t s and nuncompa triots. The argument for limiti~~g immigration in the name of equality fares no better, Qn the assumption that labor market comyetition from immigrants will lower wages for native workers (as noted above, this is not obvious), income and wealth differentials within a country may g o w as the result of permissive immigration policies., If we suppose that a policy is ~znj~ist if it makes tl-re least advantaged even more disadvantaged, then perhaps Less efficiency is the cost of ensuring distributive justice. This argument is, however, plausible only if one adopts a parochial perspective that takes the least advantaged to be tl-te feast advantaged among one's compatriots. Those immigrants who would uilderbid current citize~lsin the labor market are quite Unless the least-advanpta~zsiblyimproving their condition bp i~nmigra~ir~g. taged compatriots are less advantaged than potential immigrants, restricted immigration does nc~tprotect the least advantaged. (Open immigration does not necessarily serve the i n ~ r e s t sof the least advantaged either, since often they cannot take advantage of the liberty to immigrate, However, I have been arguing against restricted immigration a n the basis of fair equality of opportunity, not the benefit to the least advantaged,) If either of the previous two arguments in defense of immigration restrictions were sound, govertlments would be permitted broad latitude in limiting immigration. They csuld do so whenever current taxpayers demanded it or wilenever the economic interests of current citizens and residents were threatened, As we have seen, the arguments are nat sc~und.There are, however, two additional reasons for limiting immigration that would offer far less tatit~~de to governments than tl-re previous two. A common practice among states is to ii~nitimmigration on the basis of nationality. Insofar as the practice is a case of preferring cs-nationals over

others, it is unjust.76 An advocate of such a policy might argue that it is justified not because co-national preference is justified, hut because the survival of the national crilture of a group of citizens within the state kstifies it." 7If we suppose tl-rat one's culture provides one with a context in which choices have meaning,7Qhen preservation of a culture is required to preserve the liberty of the members of that culture, Moreover, if, as Rawls argues, a theory of lustice that takes seriously tlze Ereedom and equality of all persons prioritizes liberty over socioeconomic equality,7Qheil cultural preservation may be more important from the perspective of justice than equality of opportunity Hence, an appeal to fair equlllity of opportunity woufd not justify open immigration in those cases in which immififation woufd threaten the survival of a local culture'8" The benefts of cultural survival, however, would stiH have to balanced against the costs of limitations on freedorn of xnovexnent. Setting aside reasonable concerns about restricting freedom of movement, the force of the claim that cultural survivaf may trump fair eyualiv of spportunity is significantly more limited than it might aypear. Restricting immigration on this basis is justified only if the cultural surztivat of some g o u p of citizens is threatened, Immkration could not be Iilnited simply because citizens wished not to commingle with those of certain racial, ethnic, or national origin, or simply because they wished to maintain cultural purity or dominance. Since there is quite a lot that can be done short of restricting immigration in order to ensure cultural survival, it woufd be a rare circumstance in which the requirements of cultural survival justified restricting immigration.81 Additionally, recognition of tlze good of culture in providing a context lor the exercise of xneaninghl choice does not justify indefinite protection of a culture, It only justifies protection during the lifetime of tbose members of that culture who are too old to assimilate into antjther culture.82 In other words, the trumping power of an appeal to cultwal srurvival is further limited to those rare circumstances in which immigration would threaten the survival of the culture during the fifetime of aduft members of tlzat culture, Hence, altlzough cult~~ral survival in principle may provide a reason for hrgoing fair equality of opportunity, the circwnstances in which it woufd actually require this with respect to immigration policy are bound to be extrexnely rare. Even where they exist, freedom of xnovexnent may still compete with cultural survival as a reason nat to restrict immigration. A further reason for restricting imrrtigration is to protect lust state institutions. If open immigration policies would Oustrate tlze capacity of the basic structure to satisfy the entitlements of justice that citizens and residents are owed, then immigration may be li~nitedto the extent, brrt only to the emrnt, necessary h satis$ing those entitlexnents.8' Un'tike the second argtzment, this one is not based merely on the defe-rrse of the interests of compatriots; it is based on the duties of justice owed to

citizens and residents, Why sl-rould the claims of protecting the institutions of justice take priority over the claims of noncompatriots to equality of opportunity and freedom of movement? The govern~l-rent'scollection of revenue is justified in order that those taxed may fulfil1 tl-reir duties of justice to other persons through the exercise of government policy. Assuming that this is an effective way of ensuring that many just entitlements are protected by states, and assuming furtlaer tl-rat global institutions exist to protect whatever entitlements cannot be protected by state goverments, then each state would be justified in spending its revenue both to support and to protect those state institutions that carry through on the duties of justice that citizens and residents owe each other and to pay its citizens' and residentsbsltare In support of gfobal institutions. State policy could be directed to protectirtg institutions of justice under these condirions for two reasons. First, tl-ris ensures that citizens and residents receive their just entitlexnents. Second, ex hygothesi nt>ncitizensand residents are likewise receiving their just entitlements from other state and glc~balinstitutions of justice.. Such global conditions would not result in inequality of opportunity since under such conditions opportunity would not be a function of where one was born, Although it would permit some restrictions on fi-eed01l-r of movement, this would not affect opportunities since the requirement of justice would he satisfied in all states and globally effective institutions of justice would exist, AltI~oughthis would involve some Iimitatior~son freedom of movement, restrictions are substantially less evil where those who are limited are not ottlerwise victims of injustice. The picture painted above is, however, far from reality Most states do not ensure that the just entitlements of citizens and residents that they could protect are protected. On the contrary, many states are systematic vi01ators of these entitlements. Moreover, institutions of global distributive justice barely exist at all. Since limiting immigration under actual circumstances enforces inequaiity of opportunity, the case for it in the name of protecting just state institutions runs perilously close to the protection of undeserved privileges. However, there may be merit in such a policy despite this danger," firnitkg immigration may preserve something of value even to those who do not enjoy it, namely, examples of mtrre just institutions. Imagine the case of r-t state statisfying the principles of egalitarian distributive justice. h may be true that those fortunate enough to be born in such a state have no entitlement to more opportunities than those who are born into bitter poverry in the developing world. However, the toss of an egalitarian model of wealth distributioil would not only be a loss for the citizens of these countries, but for humanity in general sincc we have yet to corrstruct enduring exaxnples of egatitarianism.X-5 Moreover, the inequality of c>pportunity that would be mairltained by protecting just institmions may be partially mitigated by the pursuit of orher matters of international jrsrs-

tice, for exaxnple the advocacy af institutions of global distributive justice. Finally, lest it be thought that such compromises reveal the impracticality of the goal of cosmopolitan justice, it is worth noting that this problem exists precisely because justice is lacking in sa many states af the world and there are no global institutions of wealth redistribution. If the effects of where one is born were not "m profound from the start,'-there would be far fewer material incentives to leave one's country af birth.

J have defended the existence of duties of justice to noncompatriots and the claim that these duties are consistent with the existence of duties of justice to compatriots as well. Moreover, one cannot rest on arguments in defense of policies henefitiw compatriots if tl~osepolicies violate duties of justice to noncompatriuts. Rather, when the justified claims of either compatriots or noncornpatriots affect the other, the claims of both groups have to be assessed in fight of background considerations of justice that do nt>tcategarically weigh in favor of one p a r v or the other. Jn the exlet chapter I shall further explr~reduties af global distributive justice in particular,

Natiorzal bourzdartes have become so porous that tradttzo~zaldistirzctiorzs between / o w l , rzatzortal, iizterr~atlorzalissues have become biglurred, I3c>lictesformer!)! corzscdered kn be excEastveEy matters of "rzationaE capzam'' PZCIMIhave apt ~ m p a c0t2 t the ecologzcal husw of other nutiorzs 2dez1elcrpmetzt arm! s~rvival.Gort~ersely~ the grt~wzrzgreach of sc~nze ~sagio?rs" policies-ccorzon~tc~ trade, motzeary, arm? most siectoml policzes-ztzto the ""sovereign" terrztory of o&cr tzaLiorzs E t m i ~the ufiiicted rratio~zs'of"licsrzs in deuisz~zgrratio~zalsolutiorzs to their ""owrz"probfenzs, --The World Commission on Environment and Dever1apment1

In Chapters 2 and 3 I defended principfes of cosmoplitan justice and their corresponding duties, The arguments have been mostly concerned with justice taken generally. in this chapter f direct our attention to arguments about distributive justice in particular. It is possi"ole that there may be surnething exceptional about duties of distributive justice that limit their application. X shall argue that duties of global egalitarian distributive justice exist, respond to skepticisrn about duties of global distriburive justice, and tl-ren focus on the principle and object of distributive justice. Later, 1 apply the conclusions of moral theory to a matter of social theory, the theory of imperiafisxn. Finally, two issues of importance to development are discussed: the indebtedness of many developing societies and the costs arising from gltlbal warming.

Consider three possible worlds. Xn the first an international system of states exists, each in possessic->nof weif-working institmions of political and economic justice, Individkial rights are upheld, democracy is operative, and global institutions enmre that inequalities around the giobe are limited, The second is like the first hut without the institutions of global distributive justice, So, although justice, includirlg egalitarian distributive justice, is approximately satisfied within each state, gross inequalities incompatible with egalitarian distributive justice exist between persons internatioxlally The third possible world is our own, IVany states have imperfect cornmitments to political justice; many others have n o such commitment, A commitment to global egalitarian distributive justice is almost nowhere to he found, Znternationaily, extreme inequalities exist. The United Nations Developmerit Program notes that the assets of the wrld's 358 billionaires exceed tl-re cornbined annut11 incomes of countries accounting for 45 percent of the world's population,z that 1.3 billion people riow live on less than 5370 a yeaq3 and cliat 59 countries are worse off according to the human development index tl-ran they were ten years ago.4 These huge inequalities have dramatic effects on the life prospects of persons. Qxle example of this is access tct rieeded medical care. In Uganda the public l-realth budget amounts to $12 per citizen per year." According tc-,one study, only 1 percent of the new medicines patented between 11375 and 1997 were for tropical diseases.Wasity curable but deadly diseases such as sleeping sickness go untreated in Africa because the purcliasing power of persons there can command only 1 percent of world drug saies.7 According to the World Health Qrgarrizatian, 8 trtiltion children die each year befure the age of 5 from curaMe diseases." In seeking to remedy the injustices of our wrtrtd, should we set as our goal the first possible world, which includes a system of just states and institutions ot global distributive justice, or the second, which contains only just states? There is practical import to deciding whether a commitment to gtoba! egalitariaxiism is appropriate, I f it is, then efforts to realize such change must necessarily l-rave an international dimension, Notice that the difference betcveen the first and second possible worlds is not a difference about the scope of the values of liberty and democracy, nor even equality If one upholds the second ideal, one takes the universality of the value of equality seriously, Any state that fsils to institute principles of egalitarian distributive justice is in that way uniust. Rather, the difkrencr: between the first and second ideal concerns the scope of ducies of distrihtive justice. The first ideal maintains, while the second one denies, that persons have duties of distributive justice that extend beyond the frrontiers of

the state in which they reside, I turn now to an examination of various skeptical arguments concerning the first ideal,

John Rawis maintains that a duty of assistance exists to other peoples only if their society requires resources to establish just 0 2 decent social and political institutions, According to this account, n o duty of distribrrtive justice is owed to persons in other countries, no matter what the inequt~litiesmay be, if the social and political arrangements of their state are just or decent." Rawls contrasts this view with a cosmt~politanaccount of distribrrtive justice that takes persons as the object of duties of distributive lustice and their well-being as important, Rawls maintains something akin to the second ideal described above, while cosmopolitans maintain a versic~nof the first. RuwlsS reasons for limiting the duties of distributive justice are nut entirely clear, because his chief arguxnent involves drawing conclusions from two hypr~theticalcases,""n the first case, two lust or decent societies decide to industrialize at different paces and save at Jifferelit rates. As a result, although they once l-rad the same Ievef of wealth, over time one is twice as wealthy as the othec In the second hypothetical case, two just or decent societies respond differently to their commitment to equal justice for women, producing diffcrential population growth and resulting, once again, in one being twice as wealtfiy as the other. In bcxh cases Rawfs emphasizes that, because the societies are just or decent, they are free and resporlsible for their own decisions. Indeed, tlzis seexns to be his primary point, Because the various persons are responsible far their differential wealth, it would he wrong to tax the wealthier society to support the poorer, I, have three responses to his view First, the ability to take responsibility for one's ends is a fcature of the model of persons that I defended in Chapter 2; so Rawls's criticism might be thought to have particular purchase on my account of cosmopolitanism. That very model of persons, however, is RawlsS own model for purposes of domestic justice. On the domestic level Rawls thinks that persoils are responsible foir their own ends and that duties of distributive jrlstice exist.11 Consider the following two cases in the arena of domestic justice, each roughly paralleling one of Rawls's hypothetical cases in international justice. First, imagine two young persorls with roughly equal opportunities and native endawxnents. One elects to pursue a l-righly pressured and lucrative career, while the other prefetrs less wealth and greater leisure. Second, imagine two wclrrren with roughly equal opportunities but both of modest means, The one elects to forgo inotherhood and pursue a career tl-rat substantially increases her income and total wealth, The other prefers to have a large hmity and is thereby unable to improve her ecsnomic conditiorz.

Rawls, rightly X believe, does not think that tl-rese difkrences in preferences entail that the more prosperous have no duties of distributive justice whatsoever to the less prosperous, Why is this? Rawis's account of the co1zstructivist procedure of justification places parties behind the veiI of ignorance with respect to, amoilg other things, their abilities, dispositions, and conceptions of the good. 717 light of this ignorance, parties choose principles that require institutions to maximize the hie prospms of the least advantaged regardless of their abilities, dispositions, and conceptions of the good, This procedure is justified on the following grounds: We do not deserve our place in the tlistribution t>f native endowmetlts, any mare than we deserve our initial starting place in society. That we deserve the superior character that enables us to make the effort tu cultivate our abilities is also problematic; for such character depends in good part upon fortunate fanily and social circumstances in early life far which we can claim no credit.12

If one cannt>t claim that uile deserves those dispositions that cause uile to be successful, then one cannot clairn the entire fruits of one's success, That which makes one successful can also be put to work for the good of otlters. ""Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, rnay gain from their good fcrrtune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out,'"3 Hence, any restriction against redistribution on the basis of one's resyonsibiliq for one's character vanishes* Nor would it be consistent with the reasonable pluralism of conceptions of the good to allow social institutions that reward some reasonable conceptiorzs of the good at the expense of otl-rers. If an original position for global justice includes representatives of pers m s rather than corporate entities, it would seem similar reasonitlg should prevail. If persons cannot claim responsi"oifty for tl-re abilities and dispositions that when harnessed l e d to successful economic development fur states, then there is no reason to suppwe that those who are successful ought to be able to claim tl-re full fruics of their success. The fact that the success was caused by their talents and dispositions does nat relieve them of distributive duties tct others, Additionally, if global reasonable pfurafism is to be respected, institutions must not allow some reasonable conceptions of the good to flourish at the expense of others. Secsnd, deperidiclg s n how m e csnceives of the goods of distributive justice, it may be a rnistake to take Rawls" first illustration (of two societies with apparently different industrializationlleisure p~ferences)as an exampie containing inequalities. Although one Illight suppose that the per capita gross domestic product (CDP) in tl-re one socieq is higher than in the other, il~dicatil~g inequality, the amount of leisure time available on average is higher in the poorer society, Jf leisure is taken to he a primary good (a pro-

posal that Rawls neither endorses nor re~ectsl"),then the ofifsetting averages of wealth and leisure may indicate rough equality between persons, Finalry, wharclver persuasive power RawIs's two examples have is due, X helieve, to the fact that currently duties of distribtrtive justice are discharged primarily at the state level. If a scheme of distributictil and redistribution is just between compatriots and it suits their preferences, then why should a global scheme be imposed upon them? In Chapter 3 X granted that because we exist in political association with our compatriots, we have a duty to them to ensure that they have the means to play an active role in the politics of wciety. So, there is a place for state-level distributive principles. Duties of distributive justice, however, arise out of economic association. As capitalism globalizes, it makes more sense to take the primary locus of duties of distributive justice to he the planet rather than the state. in sther w r d s , irlstituti~nsof distributive justice increasingly sl~ouidbe giabal rather than national-in whicl-r case, regardless of whether state institutions of distributive justice pre-exist global ones, the morally fundamental duties of distributive justice (apart from those arising from political association) are at the globt~l,not the state level,

Brlan Barry argues that a principle of disrributive justice must fulfil1 the requirement of reciprocity. Intuitively the principle of reciprocity is attractive as a means far ensuriilg respect far persons, A distributional principle that allows some to gain at the expense s f others is one that does not treat everyone with equal respect. This intuitive defense of reciprocity says nothing about the heilchmark against which gain is to he measured. Yet, a benchmark is vital for determining whether reciprocity is met, Barry r ~ a i n rains that reciproci~requires that a principle of justice ensures that all parties gain in comparison to a prior state of actual holdings. Given current world co~~ditions, any principle requiring redistribution would not meet this reyuirernenc of reciprocity* The extent of increased cooperation that wo~tldreally be 111utuafly beneficial is probably quite limited. In particular, redistribution on the insurance princ~ple seems to have little appeal to rich countries. In the foreseeabfe future, aid to thc needy is goir~gto flow from, say, the United Stares to Bangladesh rather all the parties stand than vice versa. The conditions for reclprocity-that prospectively to benefit from the scheme-simply do not exist."

If this were the appropriate way to understand the reciprocit-y requirement, it wouid look as if no principle of egalitarian distribution could be applied domesticaily in any of the capitalist societies since the very wealthy

would not benefit h m redistribution to the poor, Tfius, duties of egalitarian distributive ~usticewould be almost completely inapplicable and where (if anywtlere) they applied, ironically, would only he in states in which great inequalities requiring redistribution did not exist. In otl-rer wards, they would be applicable on]); if they were already approximately satisfied, and inapplicable otherwise. Gases of what most people would think of as indisputable advances of justice, such as the abolition of slavery in the United States and the elimination of apartheid in South Africa, would not satisfy this account of reciprocity. Is it true that almost all cases of egalitarian distributive justice violate the rey uirement of reciprocity ," The answer depends on the benchmark against which gains required by reciprocity are measured. Barry measures gains against the benchmark of actual holdirtg-s of societies prior to redistribution. Afcernatively, gain might be measured against the benchmark of equal holdings of individuals. Recording to this benchmark, a principle of distributive lustice violates the requirement of reciprocity only if it permits some to be worse off than tl-rey would be under conditions of equality. So, unless the globally wealthy could substantiate the very implausible claim that sorrte pritlciple of giobal redistrihutioti would feave them worse sff than under conditions of equt~lity,they rnay not clairn tbat redistribution violates reciprocity. The benchmark of equality asrtollg persons has several virtues in corrtparison to the benchrnark of the prior holdings of societies. First, its object of concern is persails, not states, which is consistellt with cosmopolitan justice based upon respect for persons. Second, it conforms to rrtany people's intuitive sense that redistributive principles need not ensure tbat tl-re already privileged benefit, Third, it does not privilege existing holdings, which may be the product of all manner of injustices, Most important, it better conforms to our notions of the moral equality of alf persons and of the moral arbitrariness of distinctions of social class, physicai and mental prowess, and psycholugiclaf dispositions, ff alf persons are moraflg equal, and if the benefits of the social class that one is born into, one's physical and mental prowess, aild one% ppsychological dispositioil toward work are all undeserved, then it would make no sense to use actual holdings, which reflect these differences, as a benchmark. In respoildiilg to Barry, Thomas Pogge argues that the appropriate benchmark against which to measure whether reciproci~has been satisfied is the condition of a society if it were "existing in perfect isolation with ia propor~zonateshare ofthe wc>rEdS natural asset~~"16 This benchirtark has the drawback of measuring the holdings of societies rather than persons; but, because it speaks of "proportionate shares," it can be transfated into individualist terms. So, translated it would state that the benchmark is the equal hotdings of natural assets between persons, assuming their society existed in isoia-

tion. Stated in tlzis way, however, tlze requirement of societies existing in isolation is superfluous. The key question is whether persons have an equal share of natural assets. The substantive difference then between Pogge's benchxnark and xnine is that Pogge's involves a comparison against equalify 'To determine whether a distribution of global wealth of natural assets -sc.>nly, or resorirces meets the criterion of reciprocity, why compare it to the condition of individuals, when natural assecs alone are equalized? The more appropriate comparison is when all distributed resources arc equalized. f ustice is to govern the benefits and burdens of an association. Its principles then must govern the fruits of the association, not merely natural assets. In sum, Barry" shim that principles of egalitarian dubal distributive justice violate reciprocity is goundless once the appropriate benchmark for measuring reciprocity is established.

Err).Nardin" saccount of international lustice is based upon his account of international society, which he takes to be a '"practical association of states."17 He distinguishes between practical associations and purposive associations. Purposive associations establish rules to serve a common purpose, Practical associations establish rules, based u p o ~ mutual ~ restraillt and toleration of diversity, which enable associates to get along despite lacking a common purpose.18 With this d i ~ t i n c t i ~inn mind, one might think that only pnrposive associations are based upon a conception of: the common good, but Mardin tltinks not, In practical associations the common good is "'not a set of aims to be achieved through cc~operation"but '% set of values defined by common laws. " Upparentiy, in practical associalions the common good is a set of procedural values none of which is valued yrimarity for its own sake but each valued insofar as It permits members to pursue their own substantive csmmitments in a just fashion. lnternatior~alsociety, because it is so diverse, is more appropriately tlzought of as a practical association, rather than a purposive one. Much of Nardin's basic outlook is consistent with the accouxlt of cosmogolitanism that I endorse. The cosmopolitan original position does not assume that persons share practical aims. Indeed, a central concern of the cosmopolitan perspective is to establish an institutional framework for ensuring himess under conditions of a plurality of world views and personal aims. One basic difference, however, between Nardin" account of internatiorlal justice and cosmopolitanism is that his account of iIlternationa1 ]ustice is statist; the international association is an association of states, nut of free and equal persons. As it turns out, however, this is not the premise upon which he opposes claims of global distributive justice.

Mardin" case against global distributive justice is based upon the assertion that a strong commitment to egalitarianism is incompatible with a practical, association. This is a significant claim because if it is true, there is a fundamental incoherence in the cosmopolitanism f have developed that is based upon fairness to persons with a plurality of aims and that advocates duties of global distributive justice, Nardin's views come out when criticizing socioeconomic rights as reflecting '% pyurposive conception of society," Here apparently is the reason why: '"Btthough such rights constitute part of the common good, they are nevertheless a subordinate part: substantive or external goods wlzose pursuit is subject to tlze constraints of impartiality, noninterference, and mutual accommodation that constitute the core of the commoil good of formal equals,"""" Nardin's distinctiolls are not entirely clear, but his view seems to be that claims to a fair share of the object of distributive justice, unlike political and civil rights, are cIairns to substantial, and not merely procedural, got>ds,'l The view that claims of distributive justice necessarily are claims to a substantial and not merely procedural good is false, The most obvious exaxnple is the principle of fair equality of opportunity Intuitively, its most plausible justification is to establish a fair system of competition for goods. f t is not valued for its own sake, but, like liberty, it is vatued so that the terms of association may be fair, Later I shall argue that the difference principle is also required if an association is to he treating morally equal persorzs fairly. Neither egalitarian principle is justified by rekrence to a particular individual's aim or a substantive account of the good. On the contrary, they are both procedural requirements of a fair mode of association. For this reason Nardin's rejmion of global egalirarianism faits.

Robert Coodin offers an account of tlze special duties that we owe to fellow citizens that is premised on the state playing the role of proteaor of the general duties that all owe to afl.22 The duties of dt~mesticjustice are taken to be assigned general duties and can be overridden by the general duties when circuxnstances demand, He illustrates the position with the exaxnple of establishing a iifeguard to fulfil1 the duty to help others in need, Beachgoers are relieved of helpir~gswimmers, an instance of their gexieraI duty to help others in need, because a lifeguard is assigned tlze role of fulfilling that general duty, By analogy then, citizens of a state are relieved of their duties of justice t o w a d citizens of other states beca~zseeach state is assigned the role of fulfilling these duties, It is perfectly coherent, then, to acknowledge the universal scope of the values of liberty and equaiiry without being cornmitted to the international scope of duties of justice since individual states

assure tlrat justice is done, Coodin allows tlrat citizens of one state may be obliged to fulflll duties to citizens of antjther state in those cases when the Iatteer state is unwilling or unable to do SO, just as beachgoers have some kind of obtigation to attempt to save drowning swimmers when the lifeguard is unwilling or unable to do so. Coodin" smodel offers a way for someone coinnlitted to cosmopolimnism to aiiirrrl tlre itlscrtnmental value of the incernacional state sysem in realizing values with a universal scope, The model might adequately explain bow duties such as respect for civil and democratic rights are fuifilled by support for just state institutions. Goodin claims that a consequence of the model is that ordinarily there are no duties of global justice, induding apparently distributive justice. '"States are assigned special responsibility for pmtecting and promoting the interests of those who are their citizens. . . . But ordinarily no state has any claim against other states for positive assistance in promoting its ~ ) w ncitizensYinterests: that is its ~ ) w nrespc1nsibijity,"23 The extension of tlris reasoning to distributive justice, lrowever, is unwarranted. X I the dtities of distributive justice require a redistribtrrive mechanism, then there must he a pool of resowces into which those obliged pay, and from which those who are owed may draw if one awes, but does not contribt~te,then one's duty has not been inet. State institutions only draw on the rescjurces t ~ citizens f and residents of each state; whatever redistribution they effect is only f'ulfilting the duties that those citizens and residents owe to each other, The resources distributed by tlre Mozambiquean state do not fulfil1 a well-t>ff Swiss" duty of distributive Justice tc-, a Mozambiquean because that Swiss has not contributed to the pool of resources that the Mozambiquean state is distributing. Only glr~balinstitutions can carry out redistributive duties among members of a global system,24 So, Goodin" snodel of duties to compatriots as assigned general duties cannot justify the daim that ordinarily duties ol global distributive justice do not exist,

~MichaelWalzer's criticisms of global distributive Justice are based upon his account of distributive justice generally, Distributive justice requires a set of co~nrnolzmearzil~gsthat are culturally bound,L" making it, tlren, in his terms a "thick morality. "2,"Political communities are hound by common meanings or thick moralities, The only plausible atternative to t l ~ epolitical community is humanity itself, the society of natiotls, the entire globe, But were we to take the globe as our setting( we would have to tmagir~cw l ~ a does t not yet exist: a cornrnurlity that in-

cludcd all men and women everywilere. We would have to invent a set of cornnion meanings for these people, avoiding if we could the stipulation of our swtl values. And we would have to ask the members of this I~ypotheticafcornmuniry (or their t~ypothcricalreprcscnrarivcs) t o agree axnong thcmsclves on what dlstrib~rtivearrange~~ients and patterns of conversion are to count as just. . . . But whatever the hypothetical agreement, it could not be enforcect urittzour breaki r ~ gthe political monopolies of existing states and ccrltralizir~g power at the global tevet. Hence the agreelnent (or the enforcelnent) wo~ild make not for complex but for simple equality-if power was dominant and widely shared-or simply for tyranny-if power was sctzcd, as it probably would be, by a set of international burea~rcrats.~7

There are at least three separate but related claims here. First, standards of justice require political communities. Second, the existing globat arrangement does not give rise to standards of lustice; these would have to be "invented," Third, an arrangement of global redistribution wc~uldprobably result in tyranny, I shall examine each of these claims. According to the first claim, staildards of justice are irrrmanellt in the practices and beliefs of a political. com~rtunitySince political communities contain a plurality of perspectives on the cornmitinents of tl-re community, there is room for dispute on the basis of the communitfi values. Walzer provides two kinds of argurnerits for the first:claim, One is that different societies, such as Actlens in the fifth century B.C. and medieval Jewish communities, employed different standards of justice.2TThe other is that standards of global Justice based upon a construcdvist procedure would have no purchase on ordinary people in their particular cukures. ""Even if they are cornmitted to impartiality, the question most likely to arise in the minds of the members of a political cc~mmunityis not, What would rational indivictuals choose under universalizing conditions of such-and-such a sort? But raeher, what would individuals like us choose, who are situated as we are, who share a culture and are deterrni~tedto go on sharing it?"zv Neither argument is convincing. Suppose that it is a fact that different political communities employ different standards of justice. It does not follow that standards of Justice are limited to political comrrtunities. People's csnception of what they owe each other may typically be drawn from the cultural framework of their political commlmity, but it does not foIlow that what they owe each other necessarily is iirnited to this fra~rtework.Justification for duries of justice xnay hisrurically have been made largely in terms of cultural self--understanding, but this does not rule out a culturally neutral philosophical account of the duties of justice, This is corznected to the second argument. Suppose it is true that people rarely ernploy arguments based upon universal principles to settle claims of justice. It does not follow that they could not or should not. Moreover, in the above quotation Walzer

seems to be basing rnoral atrguxnentation on cultural l-romogeneity,There are increasingly fewer places in the wortd where such hom~~geneity exists, This is one of the strmgest reasolls to look for impartial principles of justice. jusWalaerk ssecond claim, that there is no global standard of distrib~~tiwe tice, is probably meant to follow from the first, with the additional p ~ m i s e that there is no global pofitical cssrtmunity So, with the first claim drawn into doubt, the second is to that degree weakened. There are further reasons for doubting the second cfaim, I argued in Chapter 3 that a global economic association exists, If this is true, and if all. persons are deserving of equal respect, then we cannot avoid standards of global justice that seek to establish. fair terms of association among persons, It may indeed be the case that separate political communities engender particular duties of justice among compatriots, but this is consistent with there being global duties as well.30 Walzer" third claim is that a system of enforcing duties of global justice would probably be tyrannical, This is needfessly pessimistic. If a just doha1 situation indudes states with the powers to enforcr: democratic and human rights and a syslexn of glob! wealrh tax and transicr, there wouXd be multiple sites, or spheres, of political power. In addition, the existence of institutions of wealth redistribution at the state level, which are subject to democratic control, gives reason to believe tl-rat the scale can be extended. So, Walzer" sskepticism about duties of global distributive justice is unfounded.

With various skeptical challenges to global distributive justice out of the way, I turn now to the questiw of which principles of distributive justice apply to the global association. I shall. follow Rawis's termincrlog): and csnsider conceptions of ""liberal equality" and ""dennocratic equality,""" One way to answer the question at hand is by fvclasing on a different one: Which principles of justice would be chosen by represeritarives of all persons of the world in an original position that included a veil of ignorance, rendering them ignorant of various matters such as the race, gender, citizenship stams, psychological dispositions, physical prowess, and conceptions of the good of the persons whurn they represent?

Liberal Equality Distributive principles of liberal equtllity l-rold that the distribution should be to everyone's advaatage in the sense that it is efficient, or Pareco optimal," and that the resulting inequalities should be artached tct offices that are open tct aII under conditions of fair equality of opportunity" The re-

quirernent of fair equality of opportunity entails more than merely nondiscrimination among applicants for positions of privilege. It requires that a person's chances for successfully attaining a position o f privilege should depend upon neither social fortune, which includes tile paretlcs' level of privilege and the country of birth and education, nor certain aspects of natural fortune, including sex, race, and ethnicity, Fair equality of opportunity is consistent with the principle of self-ownership in that it permits unlimited inequalities on the basis of talents and abilities, if the influences of Eortune are neutralized. Fair equaliry of opportunity would require significant reforms to the current glohal economy. As I suggested irt Chapter 3, one way to imagine fulfiflment of the goal is that a child born in rural Mozambique would he statistically as iikely to beco~nean investment banker as the child of a Swiss banker. Xn order far this to come about, a great deal would l-rave to be spent on infrastructure-. among the world" spoor, Educational opportunities would have to be equalized across the globe and between the sexes, health care access and facilities would have to be approximately equal, m d all persons would have to he free of persecution on the basis of race, ethnicit5 gendet; religion, and political affiliation. Fair equality of opportunity is only minimally egalitarian since it ailows for unlimited inequalities of outcome within a generation; but in light of current global inequajities, its requiremerits would be very demanding, In a cosmopolitan original position, what sort of considerations would count in favor of liberal equality? The requirement of Pareto optimality makes serise since a suboptimal distribution is one in which at least one person is worse off, and representatives would be loathe to permit this. Fair equality of opportunity makes sense because representatives will be ignorant of the social and natural fortune of those whom thep represent, So, they will not want tile distribrxtion to depend upon tl-rese matters, The underlying idea is that uile cantlot claim to deserve things such as ptace of birth and education, race, or parents' privilege. Hence, these things should not be the basis of a distribution. Tl-ris shows why even distributions of goods according to criteria such as desert or consensual transfers should inrclude a requirement of fair equality of opportunity Suppose desert is tznQerstood in terms of socially valuable work. A distribution according to desert coutd not allow a person" starting pc>sitions in developing socially valuable skills to be determined by, say, the parents>rivifege. For in that case, the distribution would not reflect desert, or not desert alone. Alternatively, if there is to be intuitive appeal to the claim that persons should have what thep would have as the result of consensuaI. transfers, it must be the case that both those who did well as a result of the transfers and those wl-ro did nor started out with the same opportunities. Otherwise the outcome would be the producr not merely of consensual transfers, but undeserved

privileges as well, Hence, once an individual" initial social fortune, sex, race, and ethnicity are recognized as undeserved, fair equality of opportunity becomes a pr~ceduralrequiretxlent of any system of fair competition for scarce resources.

Democratic E quality Democratic equality not only equalizes the starting point s f competition, through fair equalicy of opyortuniv, it d s o restricss the degree of i n e q u a j i ~ of outcomes by putting talents and abilities to work not only for their possessors hut for others as well, Intuitively this is consistent with the democratic ideal that everyone, regardiess of talent and ability, may be equal citizens. Just as the conception of democratic citizenship abstracts lrom a person" social and natural advantages for the purpose of establishing political entitlements, so the principles of democratic equality abstract from these advantages for the puryose of escablishhg socioeconomic entitlements. If the representatives in a cosmopolitan original position are also ignorant of the talents and abilities of those whom they represent, they will want the collective set of talents and abilities to benefit all, not just their possessors. P-Tence, they will not see inequalities as justified because of a person's talent. Nor, however, will they settle on a requirement of equal distrib~ltion,if this is suboptirnal. If the representatives have no knowledge of the prdabilities regarding how talented those whom they represent are, it: would seern to be rational fc3r them to be cor~servativein their calculations and to look to tl-re advantage of the least well-off, Hence, they would require that institutions structure whatever inequalities of distribution that result froin differer~tialendowmex~tsof talents and abilities to the maximum benefit of the least advantaged over the course of their life. This is the difference principle.3" This conclusion could be reached in a different way,3" global economic association exists, Assuming that all persons deserve equat respect, what principles would establish a h i r distribution of the benefits of tile system? Equal respect demands that all, despite differences of social and natural fortune, should have equal oyyortttnie)l to benefit, Otherwise the distribution would be influenced by morally arhimry properties of persons, Equal respect also demands that equality of outcome be the benchmark against which all principles governing the distribution be measured. Principles permitting the talented and able to benefit withirut limit would permit a distrib~1tio11 on morally d i t r a r y dihrences. 12 principle requiring equality of outcome, however, is less preferable tl-ran one that allows inequalities that are to the maximum benefit of the least advantaged. Although this Iatter principle allows inequalities, it is fully consistent with equal respect for persons:

Those who are least advantaged cannot rationally complain about its application, for they couid not do any better; and those who are more advanedged have nu trtoral grounds for demanding more privileges than the principie permits becmse they may not claim to merit more bp v i r t ~ ~ofe their talent [X good fortune, Hence, the principles o f global distributive justice constituting democratic equality are sttperior to those of liberal equality. Tf fair equality of opportunity alone requires extensive structural changes in the world economy, its conjunction with the difference principle is even more demanding. Not only must the opportunities between the chilcSren in rural Mozambique and Switzerland be equalized, but the inequalities of outcome must be so limited that they are to the maximum benefit of the least advantaged. Recall that the assets of 358 billionaires exceed the cornbined anmzal inco~rtesof countries accounting for 45 percent of the wc~rid's population. Evidence of inequality, however, is not evidence that the difference principle has not been satisfied, Ratheq what is required is some reason to believe that the fot of the least advantaged couid be better. According to various estimates, a 0.1 percent tax on foreign exchange transactions, the strcalled %bin tax, would yield between $56.23 billion and $200 billion a year, which could be directed trtward sustainable developmetlc initiatives that would produce significant p i n s for the least advantaged'3-i Invoking the Tobin tax is not memt to suggest that it is the policy that would maximize benefits to the least: advantaged, but trterely to show that there is reason to believe that current inequalities do not do so. Realizing the difference principle is unlike realizing fair quality of apportunity insclfar as it requires not only wealth transfers for the infrastructure, which ensure opportunities across the globe, but also a global institutional structure that limits wealth inequalities. Perhaps under ideal conditions this could be a system of limited properrf rights, but in order to remedy existirlg unjust inequalities sorne sort of tax and transfer systern is probably required.

Two Objections

The above defense of dexnocratic equt~lityas the standard of global distributive justice might be criticized in at Least two ways. First, some writers defend a gnlsal minimum floc.>rprinciple instead of the global difference principle.3" ~ninimumfloor principle, like the difference principle, is focused not on equality of starting positions in cornpetition for privileged positions; rather, it limits the inequalities that might arise in the course of that competition by stipulating a minimal condition that all persons inay with justice e q e c r not to fall below. Typically minimum floor principles contain a requirement that basic needs for securily, nutrition, and l~ealtbcare be met. In light of cwrent deprivations globally, a commitment to a minimum floor

principle would require significant redistribution from the weatfhy to the poor in order to meet the unmet basic needs of the latter. Sometimes the global minimum floor principle is prekrred because the difference principle is considered too egalitarian." The case for a minimum floor involves the argument that it is mistaken to employ the benchmark of equality in measuring acceptable inequalities, as the argument for the difference principle does, OnXy agreements about redistribution rnade in light of knowledge of current holdings are reasonable,3Udditionaily, the argument maintains that if one starts with a benchxnark of currefit holdings, then a mitlixnum noor principle would be chosen, The problem with this position is that the benchmark of existing holdings, as I argued earlier, insulates from moral criticism holdings that may he the product of all manner of injustice, Since the starting point of deliberations affects the erid point, the benchmark of existing l-roldings allows that moral1y arbitrary properties, such as social privilege, may affect the ultimate distribution of resources, Additionally, if knowledge of current holdings is permitted to parties searching for agreement on principles of dissributive justice, there is tlo guarantee that a minimum floor will be selected or that any- agreement at all will he reached.3" Why sl-rould tl-re parties settie on such a principle? The rich may want sometl-ring less redistributive, say inere fair equality of opportunity, and the poor may want something more redistribmive, for example the difference: principie. So, not only is the employment of the benchinark of current holdings inappropriate in determining a distributive principle, tlzere is reason to doubt that its employment would yield any sort of agreement at all, If the benchmark of equality is employed, there are good reasons for thinking that the representatives in the cosmopolitan original position would choose the difference principle over the minimum floor principle, &sent knowledge about per capita GDP levels and the pesceritile composition of glr~balinequality, it would he rational for tl-rem to choose equt~lityof outcome over the minimum floor since there is nt>guarantee that the iatter would maintain the positiorz of those w h o ~ nthey represent. In other words, the rninixnurn floor could be below equality, Additionally, it would be rational for them to choose the difference principle over equality of outcome since no matter who they represent, the difference principle will allow for improvements over equality of outcome, Asstitning tran~icivity~ the difference principle is superior to the minimum floor principle. Another criticism of the differencr: principle charges it with being insufficiently egalicarian. Henry Shue defends the minimurn floor principle over the difference principle on the follc~winggrounds: Instead of providing a floor. . . Kawls ~ o v i d e snty s rope, llitcbing the worst-c>ff (in a rather loose way) to all the better-off. Whenever the better-off improve thcmsdvcs, tllc rope of justice requires that rhc worst-off st~ouldbc pulled up-

ward too, by at least a little. But the Rawlsian theory contains na provision that everyone" head must, for a start, be tletd above the surface of the water.40

Shue's metaphor of tlze rope, lzowever, can be misleading, Althougl-s.it captures the aspect of the difference principle that requires growth in inequalities to belietit the Ieast advantcaged, it does not capture the aspect that req~zires such inequalities to maximallqj benefit the least advantaged, This is crucial to recognizing the egalitarian nature of the difference: principle, If one employs the metaphor then, it should be adjusted so that: the rope the difference principle would exnpfoy to pull up tlze worst-off raises them higher than the ropes of any other principle, The upshot of the requirement that i n e ~ a j i t i e shr;? to the maximum hnefit of the least advantaged is that in comparison to other principles, the difference principle most helps the least advantaged. The second oh~ectionto the delense of democratic equt~lityas the principle of global distributive justice is that it places too many demands on individuals to give. Stmley Hoffman puts it as fc~tluws:"A donor would have to give, almost autoxnatisaily, precedence to otl~ers,all of tlze others abroad who are puorer, before using any of his own resources for domestic self-improvement. Before I can spend a periny on the poor in the Appalachians, I have to spend all X can on those who are infinirely poorer in Bangiactesh. That is not the way politics can work."'41 Hoffman seems to be supposing that in a distrihutively just WCITX~, ir~stitutionswould distribute wealth more or less with the results that they achieve now, and that it would be up to individuals to donate their wealth to the poor of the world according to the demands of justice. This, however, ifnistakes the object of criticism in the claim that the current global distribution is unjust, The injustice does not fie in a failuse of people to give (or, a failure-. of charity); it lies, rather, in a failure of institutions-such as markets-to distribute approprktely (a failure of justice). Xf the inequalities of the current global distribution are unjust, justice does llot require that the rich give more, it requires that the poor get more prior to individual acts of charity This is the way that the politics of justice work. Politics can work this way at the level of states. f a , X see no reason to suppose that it camot work this way at the global level, Additionally, although, as 1 argued in Chapter 3, there Inay be democratic duties to meet certain distributive requirements to compatriots in particular, duties of distributive justice are best seen as duties of global justice, given the existencr: of a global economic association,

Primary Goods, Capabilities, and Gender Inequality The Rawlslan c o n c e p t i ~of~ ~democratic equality includes fair equality of opportunity and the difference principles, The deiense that f have been of-

fering of these principles does not necessarily entail a defense of Rawls" account of the object or the goods of distribution, kcording to Rawls, principles of justice govern institutions that distribute primary gosds, which include rights, liberties, opportunities, income, wealth, and the social bases of self-respect.42 Persons in different circurnstar~cesdue to disease, educatiox~albackgrounds, or even pregnancy, who are equals wllen measured in terms of primary goods, may nonetheless be uilequsl in their capacities to convert their holding into freedoms." "cause of this rernainrir~ginrequalit-p, not cqtured by measuring inequalities in primary goods, Arnartya fen argues tl-rat the measure of distributive justice should he capabilities or powers. In the context of internationat policies, the difference introd~rcedby concentrating on primary powers as apposed to primary goods is rather significant, Calorie and nutriticsnal requirernet~tsas wet1 as needs tsf clorl~ingand shefter vary with climatic conditions. Social devclogxncnts Itkc urbanization bring about additionaI needs, and thus a lowering of primary powers given the same availability of primary got1ds.44

It is not clear to what extent there is a principled difference between Rawls and Sen, Rawls admits that equalizing powers of need fulfilfment should be a distributional collcern at the ievel of assessing just legislation jassuxning principles of justice and a just constitution have been chosen).45 Gcnerally3Rawls's worries about the capabilities approach seem to be practical. "iBy embedding primary goods into the specification of the pritlciples of ~usciceand ordering the basic structltre of society accordingly, we may come as close as we can in practice to a just distribution of Sen3 effective fi-eedoms.'""awls seems to want to keep the theory simple in order to be useable, To simpiifi matters, persons represented in the original position are assumed to be normally acrive and fully cooperating members of swiety with equal capabilities." Primary goods are defined as the social conditions or ail-purpose means required to realize the interests oi citizens.48 Thus primary gosds are taker1 as requirements for the exercise of capabiIities, inucb as Set1 wants. However, equalizing primary gosds only equalizes capabililies if persons are assumed to be in equal conditions, The difference between Rawls and Sen appears to come down to the b l lowing: According to Rawls, the simplifying assumption that citizens have approxirna tely equal capabilities is ernplayed as a matter of practicality so as to keep measurements of equality clear and easy; Sen" point is that what counts as equal under a simplifying assu~nptionis not rlecessarily what counts as equal in the real world. One apparent advarrtage of Sen's view is that in the non-ideal global setting in which we live, it is the case that, due tct a variety of circumstances,

people with the same resources will have different capabilities of converting these Into freedoms. The special burdens of women are a case in point, In Martha Nussbaum% swords, "Women who have traditionally not been educated, for example, may well require xnore of the relevant resources to attain the same capability level,"" Additionally, according to Sen, the fact that women in Asia and North Africa have higher morbidity and mortaliv rates than xnen is evidence of ""disparities in the elernencary capabilities to avoid escapable morbidity and preventable mortality." The point in both cases is that if men and women of the same social class are compared with respect to the primary good of wealth or incoxne, ixnportant inequalities may g<>uilnr>ticed, Jean Drsze and Amartya Sen have revealed extensive discrimination against wrjmen in parts of the develc~pingworld through their ""missing women" index.sl The index takes 1,022, as a base female-to-male ratio, the ratio in the poor countries of sub-Saharan Africa, which have relatively kwer biases againrst women in the distrihutior~of food and health care. They then calculate the number of women a country would have if its female-tr>-male ratio were the same as sub-Saharan Africa, The difference between the number of wsmerl a country would have accordirtg to the base ratio given its popufatian and the number it does have is the number of women missing, pxesumably due t o unequal distributions of h o d (within families), health care, and infarxticide. Pakistan, at 2 . 9 percent, has the highest proportion of missing women of m y country52 The primary goods approach, however, is also able to identifiv. women" toppression, NussbaumS criticism suggests that wealth and income are the only primary goods that Rawlsian fustice seeks to distribute. RecalI, however, that Rawls recog~lizesopportunity as a primary good. With that in mind, it would seem possible to identify inequality of opportunity between woxnen and men as the salient moral fact behind the existence of missing womeil, The capahilities approach is not free of problems. Sen is not aftogether clear wlletl-rer what is motivating his position is an appreciation of need diffetrentials or differentials in the powers or capahilities to convert resourcm into freedoms. H e sometimes writes irt ways that higlllight the former: ''Such a lormufation will be sensitive to differences in people" needs'"j3 The difference between the two views might be thought to be minimal, since freedoms night be thought of as freedoms to meet needs,5W~awever, one significant liability of introducing needs into the account is that it makes the capabilities a p p r o a d vulnerable to being collapsed into a kind of welfarism that Sen wants to avoid.5-% A major problern with weffarist approaches is that they do not regard persons as sufficiently responsible lor their disadvantages. For example, on an equal distribution of wealth, someone who has cultivated a taste ktr caviar and champagne may be less happy

than another person with tastes for beer and chigs,'"f distributive justice should aim at the distribution of welhre, then these two people with different tastes wr~utdhave to be made equally happ5 rather than equally wealthy. Takiw the object of distributive justice to be weaifh and income, rather than welfare, holds persons responsible for their ends.57 A person who develops expensive tastes, say for caviar and champagne, cannot claim more resources to satish those tastes. That person is responsible for thern, and it is no concern of justice whether they are satisfied. Now, if justice requires attention tct all capabilities of need fulfillment, then the capabilities for fulfilling expensive and cultivated needs would be nu less important than those for fulfilling basic needs. E-fence, the capabilities approach would suffer a similar problem as welfare approaches, One response availabte to Sell is to trtainuin that lustice should be directed only to a limited set of basic capabilities h r need fulfiIIment.58 In various places he offers examples of a few capabilities of need fulfitl~~~ent that everyone should have equal power to fulfiI1. These iltclrtde the following: ( I ) tl-re ability to meet one's nutritional requirements; ( 2 ) the wherewithal to be clothed and sheltered; (3)the power to participate in the social life of the community; ( 4 )the capability to avoid: sharrte from hilure to meet social conventions; and (S) the capability to retain self-respect.59 Part of the problem with this short list, however, is that it is nat clear how justice appljes to inequalities in csnditions once the basic capacities are inet, What is tile measure of difference among people who all have the capacities for meeting basic needs"t this s t a g additional capacities must he introduced, The trick is to estl-tblish a set of capacities that are nut simply basic, but that also do not place cultivated expensive needs on a par with rnore basic ones. The problem csnfronting the capabilities approach can be summarized as follows, The relevant capabilities for distributive justice are either a small set of basic capahilities or a larger set that includes capabilities that may not be esseritial to life. The first disjtinct entails the problem of evaluating distributions once basic needs are all met, The second involves tlze problem of placing hasic needs and expensive, cultivated needs on par. A possible resolution to the problem might be to select a set of capabilities that approximately correspond to Rawis's set of primary goods-in other words, taking the relevant capacities that a theory of distributive justice should be corrcerned with as the capacities to fulfil1 the needs associated with converting the primary goods to hecdoms, It would dso have the virtue of keeping the theory of global distributive justice squarely within the durrtain of the political conception of ~usticein the Rawlsian sense. Tn other words, tl-ris may provide tlle basis of a rapprochement between Sen and Rawls.

A deiensihle account of global distributive justice is of obvious importarxcr: to moral tlzeory. What may be less obvious is that it is also of importance to social theory. By applying the conclusions of the above argument in defense of the democratic conception of equality, certain atrtbiguities in the theory of econornic imperialism can be resolved.

Empirical Theories Empirical theories of economic imperidism, both Marxist and non-iwarxist alike, aim to explain the causes a114 effects of the export of capita!, Classical tlzeorists typically see the cause in the development of finance capital that results in the ~ v e r p r ~ d u c t i oorn underconsumption of goods.60 The classical theorists view the chief evil consequence of imperialism to be the inevitability of w;~T,~I The post-Wc~rldWar If theorists, at least those with some connection to IVarxism, usually attempt to account for different effects, in particular the role that the export of capital from states with inore developed econoxnies to those with less-developed economies has played in the underdevelopment of the lesser-developed economies, Investment theories take the cause of underdevelopment to be the repatriation of the profits accrued in tlze less-developed economies to the advanced developed economies," Trade theories place the cause of underdevelopment in the higher labor costs of the goods produced in the more developed countries, requiring them to fetch more when tlzey are exchanged with goods produced in the less-developed economies.G Both kinds of theories provide rcasolls ftrr csndemnivtg imperialism on the basis of the resulting inequalities. Not all postwar Marxists, lzowever, agree that the development of the more developed economies was purchased at the price of the underdevelopmerit of the less-developed econo~rties~64 Bill Warren, far exrzrmple, takes imperialism to be simply the spread of capitalism, which, foliowing Marx, be claims is historicalfy progressive on cultural, economic, and potitical grounds. For example, capitalism encourages individual develop~rtent,it increases praductivity, and it encourages parliamentary dexnocracy, These are empirical cIaims, and Warren contends that the record of development verifies them, I f the claims are true, then a moral evaluation of the above-mentioned goods may find that they amount to evidence fur the progressive nature of imperialism, Warren seems tc, think quite reasonably that these goods are valuable in themselves, and that Marxists ought to find them especially attractive because tlzey both constitute tlze ethical foundation of socialism and are necessary pre-conditions for it,

The Role of Moral Theory Although the best h o w n postwar Marxist theories of imperialism ailn to condemn it, is is nat surprising that there should be some difference of [>pinion c>nthis matter among those who usually maintain both that capitalism is historically prc~gressiveand that it is ultimately to be csndemned. Marxists have Long disagreed among tl-remselves about tl-re point at wllich capitalism ceases to play a progressive role and is to be replaced by socialism. It might be thought then that what is at issue between underclevetopment theorists and Warren is straightforwardIy empirical: If the facts bear out the existence of underdevelopment, then imperialism is to be criticized, I shall argue that an analysis of the issue shows that it is not resolvable by empiricat verification, Prr~gresscan be made on these matters, however, by an appeal to moral theory. There are important ambiguities in the meaning of the term zkvrderdeueloped that affect how one determines whether it exists. Presumably, for underdevelopment tl-reorists the term does not mean that a certain. state is merely less developed than others, Such an interpretation would take the moral, and herice the political, sting out of the term. Nor can the term mean that a state is less developed than it should be, For although this incorporates some moral evaluation, it does not assign responsibility for the mc~rallyundesirable condition of certain states to the more developed ones. There arel rather, three possible meanings of the term underdevelc~pedconsistent wit11 the moral orientations and political objectives of underdevelopment theorists, It that a national economy is less developed than would have may mean (I) been the case absent econornic relations with more developed states; (2) that an ecoilclmy is subject to unjust ecc~nt>mic relations; or (3)that an economy is in its development by unjust relations internationally. co~~strained Ou the first meaning, a theory of underdevelopment would have to give a counterfactual account of why the state" economy would have been more developed in the absence of relations with the trtore developed economies. Failing such an account there is the possibility tl-rat the less-developed econ[>my woufd be even less developed still without the relations in question, However, it would be difficult to substantiate such an account. Comparing the development hislory of two different economies, one allegedly underdeveloped and the other not, would be inadequate as there would be too many variables that might be the cause of the difkrent levels of developmental success. The same problem arises in comparing the two different periods in the development of the same economy Because there are multiple causes for the level of developmerit of an economy and solrte hctors play a role at some point and not otl-rers, it would be tre~nendouslydifficuft to find two periods that were the same in every respect except that in one period there was interaction with a inore developed state and in another period

there was not. Without isolating for such interaction, tl-rere rnay be multiple explanatians for the different levels of devel~~pment in the two periods, Hence, whatever disadvantages may be suspected, it is possible that the less-developed country wuutd be even worse off without those reiations with a more developed coutltr)l, None of these problems arise if u~derdevelopedis wlderstosd to mean either subiect to tinjust relations or constrained by unjust relations. Boch of these interpretations, however, require an account of why the inequalities are ~lnjustsince the rBere existence of inequality is not sufficient to claim injustice. In this case part of the identificato~y-theory of underdevelopem is narmative, A theory of global distributive justice: is required in order to identify underdevelopment.H The theory clarifies when rmequal relations constitute ~lnderdevelopment,Xn light of the argument presented earlier in this chapter, ifthe global distribution of wealth and income violates either the fair equality of opportunity or difference principles, it is unjust, Given the facts regarding international inequality and good reasons to believe that this situation does not maximize benefits to the least: advantaged, there are good reasons to believe that the current glc~baldistribution of wealth is unjust. The fact that distributive injlistice exists internationally provides important evidence for underdevelopment on either of the last two accounts, On the one accclunt, underdevelopment exists if global distributive injustice exists, On the orher, it exists if the inrjustice exists and the inequalities produce deveir~pmentalconstraints, Althougl-r the latter account is more demanding since it has empirical as well as llormative criteria, it is pfatrsible that the unjust ir~equalitiesof the current global economy meet the higher standard, In Chapter 3 X suggested that there are three constraints that developing countries confrant if seeking egalitarian schemes of distribution, The first is the need for foreign capital investment if the economy is to grovv. The sectmd is the general trend of altaching expenditttre-cuttitlg requirements as the condition of international loans, Tbe third is the progressive reduction of trade barriers, allowing capital to be rBore mobile. These constraints might punish by disinvestmem those states that pursue egalitarian courses of development. So, either of two plausible identificatory theories of underdevelopment, when applied to existing global inequalities, provide grounds for claiming that underdevelopment exists. The account tl-rat includes tlse exnpirical criteria as welf as the normative is arguably more-. consistent with the tenor of the accounts of underdevelopment since it identifies not only the evils of injustice but also their effect on the development path of a state, which is typically a chief concern of undel-development theorists. PIowever, nothing of the moral point is lost if the theory that includes m l y the normative criterion is adopted. Both of tl-rese identificatory theories of underdevelopment are dependent on a theory of global distributive justice that takes inciibiduats as the primary holders of both duties and entitlements. Talk about imperialism,

however, usut~llyinvolves ciairns tl-rat certain states are tl-re agents of irnaperiailism, and others the victims. The origin of this probably lies with the classical theorists who view imperialism as another stage ("the higt?est stage"") ccapitalist developxnent in which competition axnong capitalists is backed by state-power in the international arena. Althc~ughstates may in certain ways be agents of imperialism through policies encouraging the export of capital and protecting it after export, it is the impact of inequality on the life prospects of individuals, not states, that is the proper object of moral concern. Also, it is individuals who primarily bear the duties of international distributive justice. Xf global inequalities are unjust, it is tl-re persons who benefit from them who bear the weight of moral responsibility of imperialism. A plausible identificatory theory of underdevelopment is neutral to the causal accounts of underdeveiopxnent, but corresponds with the general view of underdevelopment theory that uney uaf outcomes from the ~ l a t i o n s between more and less-developed countries are unjust. Although the account of imperiaiism that X have been arguing for is consistent wit11 clre claims of underdevelopment thet-~ry,it does not necessarily gainsay Warren's contention that capitalism still has a progressive role to play in developing the less-develi~pedeconomies, To see this, one need only compare the role that a moral critique of imperialism plays in a critique of capitalism with the role that the eclassical Marxist critique of exploitation ptays. Xf capitalism requires unjust exploitation, remedying explr~itatiannecessarily requires doing away with background conditions of diffe~ntialprivate ownership of capital. Remedying economic imperialism, however, requires the estabtishxnent of inrernational institutions and policies of wealth distribution that conhrm to the demwratic conception of equality," This does not directly decide the empirical matter of whether the global fair equality of opportunity and difkrence principles are consistent with globt~lcapitalisxn, nor does it address the matter of property relations withill states, It is a matter far e ~ ~ p i x l ctheory al to jrrdge whether or not differential private ownership of capital is necessary at a particular stage in the developmetlr of a national econc>myor in internatioilal society in order to best realize the requiremerits of democratic equality The existence of an economic class that privately controls the lion's share of the world's wealth, however, means that there is a powerful group of people with economic interests opposed to glt~balegalitarianism, It is on the basis of this tl-rat Kai Nielsen contends that socialism in Wstern industrialized countries is necessary far effecting the distributions required by principles of egaliarian ~ustice." It is true that a society containing an economic systexn in which eicl-rer profits did noc exist or were controlled publicly would contain one less source of resistance to international egaiitarianism, However, establishing the existence of a powerful sokirce of

opposition to fiiobal egalitarianism is insufficient for asserting that doing away with that source will constitute an improvement from the egalitarian point of vievv, An economic system without the private accur~ulationof profits xnay be so inellicient as to provide even less to the least advantaged, even though it may create @eater equality. This is why one must rely on empirical theory to establish that socialism would be better than capirafism in realizing the demands of glr~balegalitarian distributive justice.68

Public discussions of the injustices of colonialism, imperialism, and the slave trade sometimes raise a different kind of inoral claim than the oxie X have been defending: Those living in states that have benefited from past imperialist and colonial relations owe regaratioils, as a matter of remedial justice, tct those fivirtg in states or regions who have suffered horn that imperialism.@ Some might think this is a more radically egalitarian demand than the accauilt that 1 have defended; in fact, such a demaxld is neither more egalitaria~inor more plausible. 11 the remedy for imperialisxn were reparations for past injustices, the duty to correct the injustice would be fulfilled once the compensation for past ir~jrtsticeshad been paid. There would be 1-10 guarantee that future economic relations would be to the xnaxiinum benefit of the least advantaged. Hence, on this account remedying the injustice of imperialism may provide one-time relief for millions s f disadvantaged people, h i t it would nut secure long-ccnn prospects for them in the way that inscicueions governed by democratic equality would, There are very good reasons to believe that after a one-time compensatctry payment, inequalities would csntinue to grow in the lassex faire global market, Those who are lucky in certain ways, whether in terms of natural ability or investment timing, benefit from the market, and those who are not so lucky do not, Since the more resources one commands the more one can earn in market economies, tl-re beneficiaries of luck are more likely to be further rewarded. Hence, after a une-time payment of reparatio~is,inequalities wc~uldcontinue. The establishment of international institutions tlrat conform to the democratic conception of equality would be of more lasting benefit for the least advantaged than a one-time paymerit would, Oue xnight believe that tl-rase who live in states tl-rat have benefited from injustices in past generations owe a debt of reparation as a matter of justice to those who are descendants of the victims, on the moral ground that successor states are also successors to obligations.70 There are, however, two main problems with this view One is ideatihing the persons harmed to whom reparations could now be paid, Clearly the dead ancestors were

l-rarmed, for exaxnple tl-rose who suffered as a result of the siave trade, It i s doubtful, however, that their descendants have been harmed by past injustices, especially on the plausible premise that those now living would not be alive if the injustices had not occurred.71 Akthough cotanialism and slavery generated racist social and poiiticai systems in mmy states, it is only aspects of these subsequent racist systems that can be said to harm present generations, not colonialiism and slavery. The other problexn i s that claims from past generations may lose their force under changed conditions over time. For exatrtple, if the claim was tc) a patch of property under conditions of plenty, a claim to that same property may nor exist under subsequent conditioils of scarcity.72 Hence, there may have heet1 a debt owed by the dead beneficiaries of colonialism to the dead victims that simply cannot be satisfied by a paymerit from the descetidants of beneficiaries to the descetidants of the victirns. There are debts outstanding that time will not allow to he made right, When we are confronted with the facts of the African siave trade, the reasons for considerable rnorai anguish are made even greater by the realization that it is a wrong that can never be made right, E-Tistov is full of such exarrtptes. We may hope, however, that consideration of: the countless debts that will never, and can never, be repaid provides motivation for us to adopt principles of ~ustlcethat will prevent similar injustice from recurring. Mthorigh reparations cannot be demanded as a matter of justice for harms done to past generations, they might save as a symbolic expression of regret fc~rthe countries\npaid, and unpayable, debts.73

P ~ o s ~ or: e ~GLOEAL s DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN DEVELOPMENT J have defended the democratic conception of equality for the global arena. Current global economic rdations apparently 30 not realize this ideal, Most people in the twency-firs-century world live in conditions of underdevelopment, Efforts to raise standards of well-being among persons in developirtg societies encounter many problems due to the re'lationsltip between developed and developing countries. I will present a rnorai analysis of two such problems: the inhbtedness of developiq countries and the costs arising from gltjbal warming.

The Case for Debt Cancellation One of the ways in which global inequalities get perpetuated is through transfers of wealth from regimes in the developing world to financial in-

sticutions in the developed world in order to service the debt of the former, Governments in the developiilg world maintain very high levels of foreign indebtedness that cause significant outflows of wealth. Xn 1995 the average deh-to-exporc ritcios of developing countries was 150 percent, for sub-Saharan Africa it was 270 percent.74 Servicing this debt involves a flow of wealth from the globally poor to the globafly wealthy. Tl-re debt problem originated with loans from private banks under circumstances that were usually beyond the control of developing countries and extremely adverse. These circumstances included: a long-term decline in export prices of commodities manufactured in developing countries, protectionist policies directed against developing economies in developed countries, large increases in de~nandsfor services in developing countries due to rapid urbanization, and increasing costs of imports to developing economies due to oil price increases.75 As their debts to private banks grew, developing countries took out additional loans from the International Mor~etaryFund (IMF) in order to have the cash to meet their repayment scl-redules. There have been two significant consequence of this process. One is an ever-increasing indebtedness. For example, between 1 982 and 199 1 the accumulated debt of sub-Saharan hlrica grew from $57 billion to $144 billion.7qI1is amoux~tedto an increase in the ratio of debt to GNP froin 60 percelit to 1 10 percent.7Vc has been estimated that ""out of the $1,200 billion which tl-re 'Third World owed in 1990, only $400 billion constituted the original borrowing, The rest consisted of accrued interest and capital Iiabilities.'"'" The other consequence was the introduction of forms of IMF conditionality known as economic structural adjustment prograxns on indebted countries as a requirement of loans, These structural adjustments typically involve cutting public spending, exercising inonetav restraint, increasing incentives for exports, implementing deflationary econuxnic policies ii~cludingwage restraint, and devaluating currency.7" Scrlictural adjusment progritins ofr-en have profound effects on economies and the Iives of the paol: b r example, consider tl-re conclusions drawn by the Uilited Nations Research Instirute for Social Development (UNRTSD),after fifteen or so years of IiVF-required structural adjustments: The Ievel of living of the majority of the population in African and Latin American countries has dcclir~cdmarkedly over the past decade, Per capita tncame in rmst of tltese countries during the early 1990s was tower than in 1980, and the average income in the poorest strata much lower. Alinirnum uragcs stood at half or less than half of their former value. trttcmploymcnt in the formal sector was often IIILIC~I hi&er than at the outset af the debt crisis, altl~ougl~ in relatively more successful cases this problem had been resolvecf in part by gencrarir~ga grcar many new jobs which, were badly paid.80

The working poor and their children lrave been particularly threatened by the unemployment and erosion of living standards caused by structural adjustment: programs. Even though debt servicing has exacted such suffering in the developing world, is amounts to only &out S percent of tlre annual income of the largest developed ecunomies.83 The ecor~omichavoc that structurai adjtistment programs have wreaked lras weakened instit-t~tiansthat are necessary for justice and has paved the way for all manner of intolerance in many parts of the developing world, The UNRTSII) report continues: A4ultiple survival strategies also weaken the kinds of institutions which modern societies liiave tlevelspe~tfor the defetlse of group interests, Trade ut~ions, farmershssoctations, rnutuat insurance societies and so forth depend for their effectiveness on the coil-tmitment and financial support of their rnelnbers. As professionai t>r work piace identity erodes, however, and as the interests t>f mcmbcrs becorne more diffuse, these institutions lose much of their ability to represent their constittxents in forrnal bargaining processes. . . . The erosion af a structure t>f modern interest groups in many indebted Tl~irdWorld countries affects the srrcrlgth of poiittical parties and thus the capacity of political systems to create stable governing coalitions,. . . On a deeper Level, t-towever, the sliiarp sense t>f uncertainty and insecurity generated by recession and restructurir~g-by tliie threat of unemployment, the collapse of wages and the detertoration af public services-provides fertiie ground for fundamentalism. As many states tt>seboth capacity and legitimacy, tiiiere has been a resurgence t>f regtonaI, religious and ethnic mwcmcnts, most particularly i r ~Africa and the forsl-ter Soviet bloc. Sometimes people reactivate traditional ties for very practical reasons: they are the t>nlyavailabte way to fill tile gap in social service provision left by the witlzdraural of the nationat govcrnxnent.8z

Fbtndamen~alistand traditiorlalist world views rarely endorse eq~zaIrights and opportunities for women, So, structural adjustment programs pose a particular threat to women, f ince it is widely recognized that equality of opportunity for women plays an important role in reducing fertifity rates,g%uch threats may contribute to the pressure of gloM population growth as well. 11' the aims of deveioprnent include increasiw the well-being of persons, but especially the least advantaged, and consolidating just state institutions, then, give11the evidence of the preceding paragraphs, it seems reasorrahle to conclude that tlre cancellation of debt is necessary for the achievement of from the perspective of economic and social development.X"dditit>nally, the democratic csrlception of equality, the inequalities that debt servicing perpetuates canllot be jttscified, Since the debt burden is unjust by a defensible standard of gIubal distributive justice, and it frustrates the aims of development, there is a csmpeiling moral case for debt cancellation.

One criticism of the case for debt cancellation is that it simply ignores the fact that indebted states find themselves in the position that they are in as the result of a series of corrsensual agreements, Justice in contracts requires that they l-ronor their debts. The justice of a contract, however, depends not only on whether it is the pmdttct of consensus, hut on the background conditions in whii-h it is agreed upon. When one party places another in a weaker bargaining position, the contract may be void due to duress, When one party takes advantage of another" eexceptionatly weak conditions, the contract map be nrllfified as u n c ~ n s c i ~ n a hAspects le~ of duress and U ~ C O I Z scionability, but especially the fatter, exist in the relationship between developing countries and financia't institutions in developed countries, The glohally wealthy are remiss in their obligations of distributive justice to the gltlbally poor, Xnsofar as the financial institutions have taken advantage of circumstances of extreme deprivation that were largely beyond the control of poorer countries, the ~ s u l t i n gcontracts are unconscionable, Insofar as these contracts have placed the indebted countries in a11even weaker position, subsequent contracts with the same institution are void due to duress. When these conditions exist, there are no moral gounds for enfarcing service of the debt that the indebted countries owe financial institutions. Barry criticizes tlze call for debt cancellation on two gounds: that it is statist and that it does nothing for the poorest countl-ies." Presumably the claim that it is statist derives from the fact that it is states that would he reIieved of the debt. However, tlzis is to misunderstand an imporrant justification of debt cancellation, For the case it1 favc~rof cancellation need not be made on the basis of what is owed to states (a statist claim), evexi though it is their debt that would be canceled, but on the basis of eke effect of debt servicing on the lives of persons. E-fence, the denrand for debt cancellation is fully consistent with a cr,smqolitan conceptioli of justice that takes persolis as its object of moral concern. The claim that debt cancellation would not kelp the poorest countries is simply implausible, The most indebted countries are those in sub-Saharan Africa; these are also among the wt>rld5spoorest countries. Of course, rrltimately the question ought to be, would debt cancellztrion help the poorest people of the world? If it frees national budgets to address poverry alleviation, then it at least has the potential to help the poorest people of the world, h final criticism of debt callcellation might be extrapolated from Garrett Hardin" account of ""Lifeboatethics." Hardin develops a generat argument against I-relping the poor of the world by callsidering the strain on the global environment of a country such as India that is projected to grow by I S million people per year. ""Everyone of the 1.5 million new Lives added to India's populatiun puts an additional burden on the environment, and increases the economic and social costs of crowding. Hawever humanitarian our intent, every Indian life saved through medical or nutritional assistance fro117 abroad diminishes the quality of Iife for those who remainr, and fclr

subsequent generations.""x The general claim is that any activity, including debt cancellation, of helping some of the world's poor, has unintended perverse consequences of imperiling others in future generations of the poor. This claim is based upon three premises. First, deprivation in the form of starvation, for example, is unavoidable due to environmental limits, in particular a scarciq of food resources, Second, helping some to Iive increases the nuxnber of people in the next generation, Finally, due to environrnentat limits, an increase in the number of people increases overall deprivation. Giveii the data, the first of tfiese two prelllises appears to be false, Sen, among others, makes a convincing case that tl-rere will be no food shortage for the foreseeable future.87 What is more, debt relief is necessary for development, and tilere is a well-known correlation betweerr development and declining fertility rates." In other words, it is possible that after debt cancellation, countries will develop and ferlility rates will decline, thereby s t a v i q off scarcity in coming generations that may be prc~jectedon the basis of current fertility rates. Suppose, again for the sake of arguxnent, that debt cancellation did increase the overall number of per~pleon the planet in future generations. Does this arnourlt to sufficient inoral reason not to caxlcel the debt? It might, but only if those who control tl-re resources that might alleviate suffetring may rightfully claim exclusive control over those resources. If, however, those who are now suffering and will suffer have a claim to some s f those resources, tben there rexnains a rnoral reason to cancel the debt, In other words, there may be moral reasons apart from the consequences of debt canceliation for why it should be cancefed, ff present and hture claims that enable resource control are unjustified, tben those who lack control may have a moral case. According to the democratic conception of equality, the present day globally wealthy have not met their duties of distributive justice to the globally poor, If debt cancellaeion helps to redistribute in the right direction, it is justified. Hawevet; we are supposing that this results in more poor in the next generation. This does not relieve the present generation of the globally wealthy of their duties, altllaugh it would appear to increase the extent of the duties of the next generation, Imagine the process of redistributic>nand papulation growth continuing until the environmental limit, the carrying capaciv of tlze Earth, is reached. Hardin's point would seem to he that the wealthy may with justice protect themselves in an emergencp situation. i f their control over the resources is not just, l-rowever, this sixnply does not follow. A more plausible conclusion is that triage is called for, a distribution that would allow more people to live adequate lives (assu~ningthat some definition of this is possible), rather than one permitting fewer to live more privileged fives. This conclusion accords better with equal respect for persons and the moral arbitrariness of the existing glttbal distribution of resources.

The Costs of Global Warming One significant fact of present day global inequalities is that persons in the wealthiest countries of tl-re world amount to 25 percent of the world" population, but use 80 percent of the world's commercial energy resources. On average each person in a developed cstmtr)r consumes 32 barrels of crude oil per year, while each person in a developing country consumes 3.5 barrels per year, One consequence of this is that 40 percent of all carbon dinxide in the atmosphere is the product of 11 percexit of tire world" popunlation." If the developing countries develop using technology that has resulted in current levels of carbon dioxide emissions, the negative enviranmental consequences, particularly for global warming, may be extensive, Currefitly carbon dioxide collcexitrations are increasing at 8.4 percent per year,"Ut this rate jwith~)utsignificant increases in emissions from the developing world), by 3030 the concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will be double that of 1990," There is widespread, although not unanimous, agreement in the scientific community that the results of this doubfillg will include a global mean temperature rise of 1.5 to 5 degrees Celsius,Y2 To get an understanding of what this means, consider the U.S. Matianai Academy of Sciences explanation: The current average gtobat temperature i s about 14°C (57°F).A 3*Grise W O L I ~ ~ create conditions that some organisms have not had to contend with in the last 100,000 years, If r l ~ etemperature rises 4 C, the earth wsutd be warmer tl~anat any rime sir~ecthc Foccne period, 40 million years ago. In thc rnidsr of tfie last glaciation, when IIILIC~ of North America was covered by ice, the average temperature of the earth was only about 5 C colder than it now is, . . . Moreover, the projected rate of warmir~gis 15 to 40 times faster than natural u~armings after major ice ages and rn~xchfaster than what most species living on earth today have bad to lace.93

Although the consequences of the temperature rise are somewhat more contri~versialthan the prediction of the rise itself, many scientists expect sigtlificant sea ice trtelting and a rise in the glshal mean sea level, as weil as extensive agricufruraf disglacement,94 Less certain are the ecsnosrtic costs of relocation due to flctoding and of changing agricdtrrral yields due to temperature rises.Y" Despite this uncertainty, there are two reasons to expect that tl-re glr~ballypoor will suffer the most as a result of global warming. The first is the general problem that when two people experience the same harm, the one with fewer resources suffers the most since a greater percentage of that person" resources (assuming there are any) goes to repairing the harm, The second is that according to some pro~cctions,climate change will disproportionately harm

the l-ralf-billion poorest and hungriest farmers of tl-re world since many of them have been, and others continue to he, forced onto the marginal land with fewer resources to cope with clirr-ratic char1ge.96 In light of these facts and pro~ections,I wish to defend two related claims &out global distributive justice in development. First, it would be unfair for the developing countries to have to absorb the entirety of the costs of the technology for sustainable development, or development tl-rat does not result in significant further aggravation of the problems of global warming, Second, persons in the developed countries should subsidize the costs of responding to the effects of global warming ior persons in developing countries. I defend each position in turn, 11 the process of global warming is not to be accelerated, developing countries, which are currently experiencing the largest increases in population growth, must either develop no f ~ ~ r t h or e r develop using new and costlier technologies than were used bp the developed countries, The first option is morally indefensible. In order to benefit the Ieast advantaged globally and to provide the econoxnic basis for stable dexnocratic regimes, development is necessary. Justice requires development, but an important question of justice remains: Should the developing countries bear the entire costs of sustlainahle development or should these be subsidized by tl-re developed world? The answer to this question has afreadt; been provided by my defcnse of the global difference yrirtcipie, ff global inequalities are to be the maximum benefit of the globally least advantaged, then sustainable deveioyxnellt in the developing world must be subsidized by the globally wealthy. Otle way (but perhaps not the only way required by justice) for persolls to meet their duties of global distrihurive justice is for them to contribute to their country's fund that subsidizes sustainable development in develc~pingc o u r ~ t r i e s , ~ ~ This is required by the dexnocratic conception of equality; otherwise, developing countries muse either develop more slowly due to the burdens of higher costs for cleaner technc-~logies,which will slow the improvement of those living in poverty, or they must develtrp in a way that accelerates gtobal warming, which is undesirable both because of its effects on clre globally least advantaged and its more general effects. Turning ROW to the matter of how the costs associated with repairing the damage of global warming should be assigned, consider the foflowing reasonable principle a b u t financial responsibiliry for the cost of harms suffered: Where causal responsibility fclr harm can he established, all and only rl~ose causally responsible should be made to absorb the costs of the harm in proportion to their causal responsibility, The idea behind this principle is that financial responsibility iies with causal responsibility Earlier I noted that 1 1 percent of the world's population is responsible for 40 percent of the currerlt carbon dioxide emissions, FtjlIowing the above principle, it may seem that this 1 1 percent ought to ~znderwrite40 percerit of the costs of repairing the

damage of global warming in the developing world. Although I defend this position, there are several complicating factors that require sorting out, One can be seen by way of example. Suppose that a person in a developing country decides to construct a I-rouse near an eroding seashore, when the risks associated with doing so should be known to a reasonable person, 1st this case, such a person has assumed the risk, and the responsibiiity of others to absorb that person" costs vanishes. f a , there may be instances in which, due to the assumption of the risk, those who are harmed as the result of global warming could not reasonably expect to have their costs subsidized. However, cases like this are probably exceptions to the general rule, If so, they do not threaten the general application of the principle that financial responsi bility lies with causal responsi bitity. Another complicating factor is that, arguablh persons in the developing world have contributed more than 60 percent to clre problem of global warmiilg when one coilsiders not merely greenhouse gas emissions but also deforestation. The forests of the world piay an important: role in absorbing carbon dioxide, and carbon dioxide is released when forests are burnt, One UN study concluded that tropical fc>restsin the developing world are disappearing at a rate of 1 1 million hectares per year, At that rate tropical rain forefts will disappear from sewetlceen countries within the twenty-first century."" The causes of rain forest defc3restation are several, iltcluding commercial logging and farming, industrial development, and poyulation growtlr among subsistence farxners, who require the former forest land lor brmland and the wood for fuel." Yn short, dehrestation is often the product of poverty and efforts at economic develop~~ent. Insofar as the current world distribution of resources is unjust, then deforestation is often a strategy far hettermeilt or survival under conditions of injustice, It woulid not be fair to hotd persolls in the developing world responsible for the eflects of strategies brou&c on by background conditions of injustice, There is a final matter that is more troublesome than the previous two co~~plicating factors. Even if persolls in the developed world are causally responsible far apyroximarely 40 percent of the global warming, this is the result of more than 100 years of indtxstrialization, So, the class of persons causally responsible is much larger than the class of persons cwrently living in the developed world,fOOIf financial responsibility is supposed to be based upon causal responsibility, it would he putting m extra burden on those currendy living in the developed world to make them financially responsible for ayproximately 40 percent of the costs of global warming. A measure more consistent with that principle would have been tc, make paymeilts proportional to e ~ ~ i s s i o into n s an international insurance fund com~~encing with tlre dawn of the industrial revolution, Although the principle that those who are causally responsible should be financially responsible does not require that persolls now living in the de-

veioped countries sl-rould be financially responsible, that principle along with three additional considerations establish goc,d grounds for believing that the 11 percetit in the developed world should bear 40 percetit of the costs. First, someone must bear these costs. If they are not absorbed by the I 1 percent, they will be by the remaining 89 percent of persons in the developing world, either through repairs and re'location or through additional l-rardships in living, Tliat 89 percent, l-rowever, are no more responsible for the historical backpound of the problem than are the I 1 percent. So, the v e v same csnsiderations that militate against the f I percetit paying 40 percent also militate against the 89 percent paying 100 percent. In other words, the principle that only those who are causally responsible for a harm shc~uldbe financially responsible in proportion to their causal rcsponsibifity also would be violated if persons in the developkg world had to pay the full costs of global warming. Second, given the facts of global inequality, persons in the developed world general'ty are in a better position to pay than are persolls in the developing world, The rnore the developing countries fay out in covering tl-re costs of dohai warming, the less they will have to direct toward developlnerital projects, k r ~ a k ethe developing world completely responsible fclr the costs of global warming could retard devefoprnent for a long tirne, Thirdly9 if neither of two given parties are causally responsible for a harm, and if one of the two parties must r~everthelesspay, and if allocating the costs to one would seriously affect tl-rat party" well-being due to desperate circumstailces, then the party in the better position to pay ought to pay, Why? The most minrimal reason is that public policy ought not to create undeserved suffering on the part- of those who are already suffering the most. One way of seeing the plausibility of this principle is to imagine what is involved in denying it. Suppose that someone asserted that: burdens should be assigned so as to create undeserved suffering among those who are suffering most in order that others suffering less or not at all do not have to bear those burdens. Such a claim amotmts to asserting that public policy rnay make the worst-off even worse off. If my earlier argurnents are sound, this is incompatible with equal respect for persons, Hence, it seems reasonable to require that the I 1 percent of the world's poprrlatiorz living in developed countries should be financiafly responsible far 40 percent of the costs of global warming in the developing countries,

I have argued in defense of the first of the ideal worlds that I sketched at the beginning of this chapter. This ideal includes globaI duties of distributive justice, not merely state-bound duties, The upshot i s that there i s a duty of

distributive justice both to oppose those policies and institutions that are currently wreaking such havoc on the lives of the least advantaged throughout the worId, and to engage in a process of transformation to, and corrstruction of, global instit~ltionsof egalitarian wealth distribucioa. One final point. is worth noting. I have adopted an individualist view that the fundamental objects of the duties of distributive justice are persons, not collectives such as states. One consequence of this focus is that, so Long as state institutions mediate inter~lationalihligatioils between persoils, particularly unjust (or even highly inefficient) state institutions may provide reasons for not undertaking the international wealth tritnsfcrs demanded by justice. Barry has argtred athewise, but this is consistent with his view (at the time, at least) that the fundame~ltalobjects of the duties of internatioilal justice are states.20l just as a reasonable expectation that someone will squt~ndermoney is not a reason not to transfer rnoney owed according to justice, so, according to Barry" view; an expectation that a state wili not distribute rnoney to the needy is not reason x~otto trax~sferthe amount owed it according to justice. XI' t l ~ efundametlral objects ot the duties of international justice are persons, then a transfer effected through unjust (or highly inefficient] state institutions may x~otreach the intended objects but may instead end up topping off already full pockets. Thus, special problems of non-ideal lustice arise when corrupt states mediate the transfers. iaccept that such circu~nstancescsrlstitrlte some reason klthough whether or not sufficient reason depends uyon the circumstailcesf to reject otherwise justified transfers. 1 doubt that there is a nonvague criterion of what counts as sufficient injustice jot- ineficiency) for vitiating a duty of global distributive justice. The rnere passibility of corruption, however, is no reason f
Tilere are few guestzot.zs which nzore requlre to be taker2 itt harzd by ethi c ~ dad ! ~ ~ I i t i philosophea, c~! wzth a vzew to establish sonze r d e or critertotz whereby the justzfiablerzess nf irzterverzzrzg iiz the affairs nf other coaa~ztrtes,r;ki"t~i (what ss sclmedinzes jf~blyas quest-~orzabEe) t63~/ U S G ~ fiabLef~asof refraZrzEttg fronz irztervet~tzcjtt,may he brczught to Q dcfirzite atzd mtiona! test* --John Stuart Mill1

In previous chapters 1 have Laid out various principles coilcertling what persons owe one another in the casmopolitan framework, If all went well among persolls, and just institutior~sat tlze state and global Ievef were in place and functioning, there would be little need to take up the subject matter of this chapter, Whether owing to weakness in the governing structures or oppressive control over them, the fact i s that states often do not establish principles that ensure these entitlements. Hence, it is necessary to reflect on what should he done in order to respect these rights. The issue of sovereignty arises in this context, For it i s possible that, although persons are not receiving their due because of weak or oppressive state structures, others may do nothing about it because the principle of sovereignty protects the state frosrl intervention by outside parties, In this chapter I sl-rail argue that states with unjust basic structures and those engaged in international injustices are not protected by sovereignty," shall present the case for this and look at the problems with a number of

arguments that are critical of the position, The upshot of this, however, is not that outside intervention is justified whenever such injustices exist, On the corltrar5 I shalt defend three additional necessary conditions for ~ustilied intervention,

THECONCEI~TTS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND ~ N T I E K V E N T ~ ~ N

Throughout this chapter X use the term sovereignty to mean what soxne writers have referred to as external sovereignty3 Sovereignty as a concept of international political morality concerns the authority of a state to rule without the intesve~itiollof foreign states or regional or global governmental bodies. To attribute sovereignty to a state in this sense is to say that it has a certain moral status, namely, that there is a domain of influence in which its power ought to he final. Sovereignty is a relational property involving a state, one af its doxnains, and atl-rer governing bodies that may attempt to intervene in that domain. Although some writers limit sovereignv to a relationship of authoriq over persons, this seems to me to be too narrowe4A sovereign state may exercise amhority over various domains: certain activities, certain people, or certain territories. When a state is sovereign with respect to some domain, other states may not intervene in that domain without the consent of the state. in atl-rer wards, sovereignty lixnits justified state intervention. Intervention is any nonconsensual activity by another state or regiollal or global governing body that usurps power aver a domain reasonably claimed by a governing state. The requirement that a domain be reasonably claimed excludes, fc~rexample, sates claiming the right to govern in a territory acquired by unjust conquest. What counts as a reasonable claim aver a dc~mainis often a matter of relatively noncoiltroversial nt>rms of internatiorlal csnduct; for examgle, a state may not reasonably claim powers to tax citizens oi another state who are neither residing nor employed in its territory. This is nat to say that what counts as reasonabie is always noncontroversial, Disputes over secession typically involve csntroversial claims over domains by bath the established state and the seceding party, Because of the range of state activith I doubt that a complete and general. account can be given of reasonable claims to domair~s.In any case, this is not my concern in the present cl-raprer, Countermeasures are retaliatov acts for violations of principles of international law According to the ioregoing definition of intententiort, such activity is often interventionary-5 Giveil certain violations of international law, countermeasures may be justified where, absent those violations, interve~itionwould otherwise not he justified. In this chaptef; however, I shall

discuss only tlze morality of interventions that are not warranted by principies of countermeasure. Sa, when I use the term iittterventiolz here, I am not referring to activities of countermeasure, which may have different justifications than those discussed in this chapter, IVilitary ir~tervetltioninto an area reasonably claimed by the state is intervention insofar as it ~1surpsgovernance of that territory I,ikewise, the funding of political parties by a foreign state is incervetuion if it is contrary to state policies for funding parties. A state may intervene into the domain of another stare without intendkg tct do so when, for example, in exercising its police powers it unintentionally pursues a suspected criminal into the territory of another state. This would count as intervetltiotl, albeit unintentiwal, because it usurps the police powers of the latter state. The account of intervention f propose is nonmoralized; in other words, interference in a domain reasonably claimed by a state is still intervention even if it is justified. Settling the matter of whether an activity is an interve~itiondoes not settle the moral matter of whether it is permissible. fn corrtrast, a moralized account of intervention would hold that interference in the domain of a state only counts as intervention if it is uiljustified. A moralized corrception of kterve~itionis counterintuitive, for it would entail that the prosecution of a just war, surprisingly, would not be an act of intervention. It seems more sensible to hold that whether an act is an intervetltion is independent of whether it is just,

SOVEREIGNTYFROk4 THE COSMC~POLITAN POINT O F VIEW The cosmopolitan conception of sovereignty holds that an intervention into one of the domains reasonably clairned by a stare is a violation of sovereign~ if and only if the intervention will not attempt to advance the cause of justice either in the basic structure of the state or in the international effects of its doxnestic policies." sstaightfarward argument in defense of this conception can be made by invoking the value of justice, Basic structures that are comparativefy just, where the relevant csmparison is tct the structure tlzat the intervention would effect, and that do not lead to international injustices should be protected since their alteration would come at a cost to justice itself. One way of protecting such arrangements is through the claim of sovereignty, Sovereignty protects such arrangements from the claim that other states or governing bodies have a right to change them. If a principle of international political morality granted that an unjust basis structure was witlzin the domain over which a state has sovereignty, tlzat principle would be protecting injustice. Providing the blanket protection of sovereignty to a comparatively unj~lstbasic structure or policies with ~znjnstinternational ef-

fects is wrong, It may inl-ribit tl-re cause of justice. Xt is better that tl-rese receive no such protection, Eor this allows that e&rt to alter them, even from the outside, may be permissible, Whether d ~ alteration e is, in fact, permissible depends upon other considerations as well, which X shall explore, Most writers on the subject of sovereignty would disagree with the argumerit in the preceding paragraph, Since f seem to be offering an unpopular view* X shall spend considerabte time demonstrating what X take to be the flaws of the various arguments that contradict the cosmopoiitan conception of sovereignty.

What 1 call the statist conception of sovereignty holds that a state has moral authority over a domain in virtue of exercising supreme de h c t o (although not necessarily always ~znchallengerl)authority over that domain. The difference then between the cosxnopolitan and tlze statist conceptions of sovereignry has to do with the warrant for the authority against intervention. The cosmopolitan conception takes the warrant to be lustice alone, while the scatist conception takes the warrant to be the fact of political control. The statist corrceytion entails a11 a hsolrrtist interpretation of the principle of nonintervention, According to the view that claims of sovereignty are justified if the cIaiinant controls the domain, there is nothing that the claimant can do, apart From loosing control of the domain, to render the claim null and void.7 Hence, sovereignty over the domain licenses the state to do as it wishes in the domain. However, conceptions of sovereignty can be partially statist without being absolutist, Some people advocate a restricted starist conception, which altaws far a dimin-tuion of authority if a limited set of moral requirements is not met, especially if the state is engaged in gross violations of human rights on the order of genocide.. This is perhaps best referred to as ""a mixed conception" since the authority of the state stems fi-om two sources: the fact that it exercises de facto authority to minimal moral requirements.8 X shall treat mixed conand its adhere~~ce ceptions togetl-rerwith statist conceptions, because both differ from the cosmopolitan conception in allowing the fact of political control to provide some warrant for a claim of sovereignty. The statist conception of sovereignty is not completely antithetical to the goal of justice. It does not block progress toward justice by political processes within the state. Rather, it functions as a side constraint to the achievement of a rnore ~ u s order, t X3ursuit of this end may not involve the intervention of outside agents. Seen in this way, sovereignty is a right that states may claim reffardfess of their political or mural character,

Recall that sovereignty as moral concept concerns the authorr'iry of tl-re state to govern witht>utintervention, nat the power tc-,do so. This is ail irnportarlt distinction, in part because economic developments a re eroding the power of states to govern without being subject to a variety of constraints. This is particularly the case in those developing countries pursuing a d e v e l o p ~ ~ estrategy ~it called "moderzzization by internationalization."Vhese Qevelopxnents may encroacl-r, on the power of the state vis-h-vis various international actors, and some argLle the sovereignty of the state is thereby also reduced.1" It does not foifow, however, that because a state l-ras lost tile power to do something it has thereby lost tl-re moral authority to do it. The transfer of power need not invt~lvethe transfer of moral authority, The thief who steals my credit card may have the power to use it, but does not possess the moral authority to do so. Indeed, some will want to criticize tl-re loss of state power in the regime of globalization on the basis of the ideal of state sovereignty, So, the fact that states may be loosing power under glctbalization does not entiljl that the statist conception of sovereignty is false, The statist conception of sovereignty enjoys widespread acceptance by statespersons. Jt is able to garner substantial support from them because it allows that the internal policies of a state shall not compromise its sovereignty, I shall analyze here various arguments offered in deknse of the statist conception, or its corollar)i the absolutist interpretation of the principle of noaintervention-whic11 also arnoum to challenges to the cosmopolitan conception that I hawe already defended, Ti, refute these arguments is part of a complete defense of the cosmopolitan conception of sovereignty. The arguments are of two main kinds, One proceeds by appealing to various considerations of justice, the same value appealed to in the cosmopolitan conception. These argtlments, I believe, rely on implausible accounts of the elernents of justice or of tl-reir xnoral prioriq, The other kind of argument q p e a l s to some value other than justice as the basis for sovereignty, In response, I shall r-~rguethat it is implausible that the other vduc trumps corrof the siderations of justice. The upshot, I l-rope, amounts to a ref~~tation various ways of denying the cosmopolitan conception of sovereignty,

Sovereignty as Dornililttenz The classical defense of the statist conception of sovereignty is based upon an analogy to prc.3perty.11Just as the right tct property entitles the owner to exclude others from rlsitlg that property and to do whatever is desired with it, so sovereignty entitles the sovereign to be free from interference and to carry out governance as seen fit, In both cases, having the right entitles the bearer to do the wrong thingel.?

There are two related probiexns with this analogy.23 First, a right to property that includes the right to do whatever one wants with it is untenable, The law of nuisance is one example of a widely accepted practice of limiting a property owner?s use-rights by the interms of others. Second, and more to the point, property rights are justified to the extent that they protect import,mt moral interests of individuals to live as they choose, Indeed, limits on property rights are justified in terms of balancing the ownersYillcerests against the claims of the nonowners, for example when ownership creates externalities. The only important moral interests associated with tl-re power of a sovereign are those of self-governance. A ruler who is not an agent of the people has no moral interest in sovereignty to balance against the interests of the ruled, and therefore not even a prima facic ciaim to sovereignty A ruler who is the agent of the ruled possesses a prima hcie claim to sovereignty that may be balanced against the daims of others falling within the claimed sovereignty This sort of balancing, however, undermines the statist conception of sovereignty, far it concedes that the sovereign" aaurhority to act is limited by the interests of others.

The Right to Share a Common Life Together One influential account of sovereignty is based upon the claimed right of states to protect a political order and territory on behalf of its citizens. Michael Vlialzer defends this account by employing what he calls " h e dt>mestic analogy." A man has certain rigfits in his hoil-te, for exail-tple, even if he does not own ir, because neither his life nar his liberty is secure t~ntessthere exists some physical space witl~inwhich he is safe from intrusitjn, Similarly again, the right of a nrtriorl or people not to be tnvadect derives frorn the comrnorl Iifc its members have made a n this piece of land-it had to be made somewfiere-and not from the tegat title they bold t>rdon" bbold,l4

According to Walzerssaccount, states have the right to be free from aggession, or the imminent threat thereof, because individuals have the right to share a common life together and the state by the csnsent of its citizens protects this individual right95 Walzer's account requires an account of justice that either ranks the right to share a common life together above all other csrlsiderations of ~usticeor includes only this right, Neither, I-rowever, is plausible. Consider tlze example of a state that, in an effort to preserve a shared way of life fc~rsome of its citizens and residents, violates the human rights of others living in its territory

by, say, racialIy discriminating against tlzexn. In suck a case tlze riglzt to share a common iik together should not trump the rights of those who would be racially oppressed. 15 the right to share a commtln life together canriot plausibly be taken as more important tlzan certain other considerations of justice, then it surely cantlot be taken as the only consideration. The fact that the right to share a cssrtmon life together cannot pla~zsibly rank higher than at teast some other considerations of justice does not necessarily reveal a disanalogy between a right to norrintervention and a rigbt to privac~,as asserted by the domestic analogy" On the contrary3 the analogy may stand if Walser also misinterprets tlze license that privacy allows. For example, just as a right to privacy may not provide License to injustices such as domestic viatence, so a rigbt to nonintervention may not provide License to injustices such as racial discrirnination.1~This, of course, is no relief for Waizer3 argurnent since it contradicts the claim that sovereignty is simply a function of the right to share a common life together,

Independence One influential defense of the statlst conception of sovereignty is that it is a requirement of an independent state in an international cammunit); of states,j7 This claim, lzowever, is tautologous and begs the question, If being independent is taken to mean tlzat no other state rnay exercise authority over another sovereign state, then all sovereign states accwdine; to either the statist or the cosmopolitan concegdon are independent. The issue is whether all states should be independent, even those maintaining un~ustbasic structures. Perhaps the advocate of independence would want to argue that independence is a value that trrirnps other corrsiderations of ~ustice.I can see m l y two reasons for valuing independence, One is tlzat being independent is intrinsicalfqi valuable because It m o u n t s to sharing a common life togethet; However, the value of sharing a common tife together, as we have just seen, does nut trurnp other considerations of justice, The second reason is that independeilce is necessary in order to asswe that just institutions are maintained, The idea is that self-goverrrmce is the best guarantee of justice. If this is tl-recase, tl-ren br from uuxnpir-rgother considerations of rustice, independeilce is valuable only insofar as it serves them. So, according to either account of the value of independence, it is wrong to see it as trumping other considerations of justice,

The Constitution of Moral Personality An alternative account of sovereignty involves avoiding altogether the claim that state sovereignty rests on the rights of individut~ls,One argument

of this sort has a Hegelian pedigree and involves a central claim-what I cail the constitutive claim-that moral personhood can only come to be withi17 a state.18 Mervyll Frost csntends that this entails that persons are noc prior to states,lYFrost seems to claim further that the lack of priority of persons means that the claims of persons may not trump the claims of a state (insofar as this norm is a settled one of the sovereign state-system)..'() Furtllermore, moral personl-rood requires not merely a state, but a sovereign state." The corollary to this is supposed to be that intervention into the a f i i r s of a sovereigrl state cannot be justified on the basis of protecting justice Ear persons. This argument requires several responses. First, the conclusion, as stated in the corollary, begs the question, If respect for state sovereignty is morally required, there is no reason why the conception of sovereignty employed must be the statist rather than the cosmopolitan one. According to the cosmopolitan conceptlan of sovereignty, intervention into the affairs of a sovereign state also carxnot be justified in the name of protecting persons since sovereign states, by virtue of l-raving just basic structures and policies with just international effects, already generally afford persons protection or at least do them no ur~jtistharm. Furtlzer problems arise from Frost's apparent belief that tlze constitutive claim entails the claim that persoils are not prior to states and that this entgils the view that the claims of persons inay not trump the claims of states. Remember that the constitutive clairn says that moral personhood can only develop within a state. It is not clear whether the cc~nstitutiveclaim is memt to be stating a causal or a logical truth. The claim may mean that states alone bring pqrsons into existence, or that the existence of a person entails the existence: of a state. Accc~rdingto the h m e r interpretation, one could imagine: persolls without stares; but it would be a contingent truth, due to certain causal processes, tlzat persons have states. According to tlze latter interpretation, one could not even imagii~ea person who is stateless: It would be a contradiction, like trying to imagine hutrtan beings that are not animals. It seems unlikely tlzat Frost would he rnaking a claim such as the latter interpretation, for it is very difficult to think of how one might plausibly argue that a stateless person is a contradiction. On the other hallit, one could present a more plausible causal argument to the effect that if the ration31 capacities of persons are to develop, then state processes of recognition are required, If Frost means that ~ n I ysates bring into existence persorzs, then it would be true of any given person (P,) that there would be some state (S,) to which she was not prior to in two ways. P I is not temporally prior to S, (P, did not exist before S, since effects may not proceed their causes); and I), is not causally prior to S, (P, did not cause S, since effects do not cause their causes). P I may still, however, be either temporally or causally prior to some other state, S,.. In other words, according to the causal interpretation of tlze constitutive clairn, persons may indeed be prior to many states,

naxnely, those states that did not cause thexn. So, Frost's claim tl-rat persons are not prior to states req uires a qualification, Frost's argument about the moral status of persons and stares trades on an axnbiguily in the tenn prioritjj, ftigpose the qualified ciairn about temporal and causal priority is true, that P, is neither temporally nor causally prior to S,. It does not follow that the moral claims of P, may not trump those of S,. Consider the example of the temporal and causal priority of parents and their children. Children are neither temporally nor causally prior to their parents, Nonetheless, moral claims of children may sometimes trurnp tl-rose of their parents. Would the inference to moral priority follc3w any more easily from the less plausible logical interpretation of the constitutive claim? If Frost means that the e x i s ~ n c eof a person entiiils the existencr: of a state and not viceversa, this means that for any given person (P,) there would be some state (S,) to which P, was not logically prior since S, does not entail P,. Some persons, though, must still be logically prior to S, since there can be no states without persons as citizens. In other words, S, entails P,. So again, only a qualified version of the priority of states would be true. Stippse this qualified claim is true: Persons are not logically prior to states in the sense that S, does not entail P,. It does not follow that the moral claims of P, may not trump those of S,. Consider the following example. The existence of a human being entails the existence of at least one animal, namely, that human being. Tl-re existence of an anirnal does not entail the existence of a I-ruman being, It in no way follows that the moral claims of human beings may not trump those of animals, Tn sum, regardless of whether the constitutive claim is taken to be asserting that states bring into existence persons or that the existence of persons entails the existence of states, neither interpretation implies that the moral claims of persons may not trurnp tl-rose of states. The final problem with Frost" skvv is that ke takes the claim that individuals are not morally prior to states to mean that irtdividuals without states I~aveno rig11ts.Z~intuitively~ this seems implausible. Not only does it mean that one encountering the mythical Robinson Crusoe or the Wild Child could not by any deed violate their human rights (since they have none), but also tl-rat tl-rose who are really without a state have no rights. This would include, for example, the population of countries where, by most accounts, the state has disintegrated. Examples in Africa such, as Somalia come to mind. Frost might respond that it" not an actual state that is required but simpty the recognition of sovereignty in a state system. This, however, will not do for two reasons, First, if the conslitutive claim has any plausibility at all, it seems to be because real states do have real legal processes that recogllize the claims of individuals, thereby in a sense bringing persons into existence,

The assertion that persons may be constituted in the absence of these processes undermines the constitutive daim. Secondly, the response implies that "citizens" tof pofiries that are not rect~gnizedas states have nt> human rights, This would include, far example, the "citizens" of the former Transkei, whiGh was accepted as an independent state only in the propaganda of the apartheid regime in South Africa.

Tolemnce and Pluralism Another charge against the cosmopolitan conception of sovereignry is that it is ill-suited to our world, in which people are organized into states often conceptioris of the social pursuing different, legitimate, but i~~compatible good. In tl-ris world the substantive universalism of cosmopolitanism would amount t o intolerance of different legitimate conceptions of: the social good-2TThis argurnent either rests on an indefensible view of tolerance or begs the question. Tolerance is a political virtue requiring the acceptance of, and nondiscrimination toward, ways of life that respect the dea~andsof lustice. As such it is a virtue that is constrained by justice, Permission of unjust acts is not tolermce. It is either regrettable as an all-things-considered necessity, or it is a moral failure, In either case, permission of mjtist acts i s an injustice to those who l-rave suffered, A state is not tolerant if it perrnits a murderer to murder; nor is internatioilal society tolerant when it permits, say, the systematic violations of h m a n rights. Beca~zseof the force of these considerations, advocates of tolerance often allow that sovereignty should be lirnited by respect fc~rhuman rights." Howevel; if the above argumerit offers support for constraining sovereignty in order to protect human rights, it would be question-begging nor to constrain sovereignty by orher components of justice in the absence of an argument that human rights considerations exhaust corisiderations of ~tistice,l"

The challenge to the cosmopolitan ctonception tof sovereignty in the name of relativism is that because there i s xio universal standard of justice, an absolutist interpretation of the principle of nonintervention is morally superior to the license that the cosmopolitan conception gives to intervention, Unlike the criticism based upon pluralism, which "noids that there are mltiple and incompatible conceptions of the social good, the relativist chaltenge is based upon the claim that mtlral truth varies with cultural tradition, hence there is no universal staridard of justice,

The only issue I take with this substantive meta-etlzicai claim here is that if the account of persons I offered in Chapter 2 is sound, then relativism is false, Even if the substax~tivemeta-ethical clairn a bout relativism were true, however, an absolutist principle of nonintervention would not follow Gom it, a 011the contrary, in order for the principlu~)fnonintervention to be secure, it needs to be based upon a universal moral claim that states ought to be protected against intervention. Suppose that whatever a cultural tradition holds to be the mtlral truth is the mtlral truth, If it is a cultural belief in a particular state that it is permissible to interkre with the affairs of another state, tlzen it is permissible for that state to do so, The clairn of relalivism, therefore, cannot secure an absolutist principle of nonintervention,

Peace One common defense of tlze statist conception of sovereignty focuses on the threat to peace char exists when the requirements for sovereignty include the claims of justice, A conception of sovereignty reqttiring that the demands of justice be met would be inappropriate in principle, so the argument might go, because it would justify too many military interventions; and it would be even more inappropriate in practice because it is much more open to hypocritical abuse by states than one which granted all states sovereign status. Rather than Limiting the power for state abuse, as a tlzeory c>f justice is meant to do, it expands it.2" Considering first the question of principle, two responses are in order. First, from the claim that rnititary intervention into a domain over wlzich the state is sovereign suffices to render that intervention unjust, it does not follow that i~ititaryinterventiorz into a domain over which the state is not sovereign is just. Lack of sovereignty rnay be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for justified military intervention.2Wtber corzditions, stich as the reasonable belief in the likelihood of successfully establishing a more just order, may also be necessary, If some ground is given way to permissible interventions, there is no reason to s u p p s e that ail ground is lost. Secsnd, even granting that necessarjTconditit>nsother than the Iack of a claim to sovereignty exist, there may nonetheless be interventions tlzat are justified on the cosmopoIitan conception but not on the sratist one. Such interventions might be referred to as "humanitarian interve~itions"because they are justified in part by comparative injustice, The justification of tlzese interventions must rely in part on a claim that justice at least sometimes outvveighs peace," Is this a plausible claim? The value of peace is twofold. First of all, peace is valuable because human life and well-being are vajuabie, The disruption of peace involves sufkring and death. Secondiy, peace is also of value ir-tsofar as it provides pro-

tection to just institutions. This latter value expresses its instrumental value, If this were the onIy reason for valuing peace, then it would be a simpie argtzrnent to establish the greater weight of Justice, For if peace were valuable only insofar as it served justice, it would have no value in circumstances in whi6h achieving justice required viole~lce.Peace, however, has intrinsic vdue as wefl. Because of this, there is room for disagreement on the relative weight of peace and justice, Pacifists clairn that political violence, even if it were to achieve the aims of justice, is not Justified. X maintain that it is sometimes justified to Etit1 and cause suffering in pursuit of political values, in particular the value af justice. I shall defend this view in Chapter 7 where 1 focus on the use of violence for political ends. ivy argument here will be, of necessity, sketchy and will simply involve appeals to examples.. ALI that is required to establish the clairn that justice sornetixnes outweighs peace is to demonstrate that there are times when it is right to kill if necessary to prevent or overcome an injustice, Consider, for example, the case of cl-rattei slavery. Thase wlso deny tliat justice ever outweighs peace would have to maintain that even if the only means by which a system of chattet slavery wuId be overcome vvas by violence, tIlere would still he no case for violence because of the greater value of peace. Another, more mundane, example is law enforcement. The person who values peace over justice would have tct say that Iaw enforcemerit inust be nonviotent, even if that means that the guilty are nut apprehended. Neither of these examples will convince the confirmed pacifist, Any attempt to do that would require addressing the substantive claims of pacifism. I suspect that for a great many people, X-rowever, examples such as these demonstrate that, samerimes at least, the value of justice outweighs that of peace. Perhaps someone will clairn that real peace is mtrre than the absence of violence: It includes social arrangements of mutual respect or even rnutual caring,M X>the extent that this is true, it does not take away from the point that I am arguing because it suggests that lust, or proto-just, relations are constitutive af real peace, If this is tire case, then there is littie or no room to oppose the violent pursuit 01 justice on the grounds of valuing peace, for the pwsuit of just relatio~issimply is the pursuit of peace, The advocate of peace may respond that the ends of peace, such as mutual respect, cannot be achieved by violence. This would appear to be an empirical question. It seems to me to he implausible to clairn that violence has never served the cause af justice, Was not the military dekat af the Nazi regime an advmce for justice? The advocate of peace, however, may maintain that it is ntjt an empirical question after all because the conception of peace may be one of mutual respect and caring, wllich is rnore dexnanding than the appeals to justice that I have cited, I doubt that mutual c a r i q is a feasible, or even desirable, goal for polities the size of states; and equal respect for persons is

the very foundation of tile account of cosmopolitan justice tl-rat X have been defending, The practical criticism asserts that the statist conception of sovereignty is more aypropritlee than tile cosmopclliran m e because it fimils tl-re power of states to exercise violence in a world in which states are known to he ready to rationalize their violent practices, The force of this critic is^^ is based on a consideration of tile costs of the actual employxnent of tile cosmopoiitan conception of sovereignty, What the criticism ignores, however, is that there are costs to the statist conception of sovereigtlty as well. Even in the absence of hypocritical misuse, tlw statist conception is insensitive to injustices when in fact ii-rtervetltion could do something about them, So, while the practical criticism may state a truth about the cosmopolitan perspective, there is no reason to think that only the cosmopolitarr perspective involves costs when practiced. Moreover, the costs of the two conceptions are importantly different. The criticism of the cosmopolitan conception is that it involves costs when it is mkused to ratioxlalize unjust intervexitions. The statist conception involves costs in its normal use; it is meant to be insensitive to injustices, Hence, it would not be surprising to find that the practical costs of the statist conception would occur with greater regularity than those of cosmopolitan conception.

Self-entat2cipation a d Paternalism One defense of the absolutist principle of nonintervention is based upon the principle of self-emancipation, This principle can claim the authority of John Stwrt Mill and Karl Marx,l"i"ilthough a just political order is a great good, an outside agent carrnit~thand it to a people: A necessary csndition is that the oypressed themselves bring it into bring. The plausibility of this increases if a just order itself requires either constant vigilance in dcfense of liberty or popular participatiorz in goverzlance. Perhaps the politicrtl virtues required fclr maintainir-tg a just order can only be taught in the school of political struggle, One can accept the claim that the virtues citizens must have to maintain a just order require participation in struggling for that order without accepting the conclusion that intervention on behalf of the struggle is never justified. Suppose that pc-~pularstruggle is a necessary condition for the maintenance of just imtitrrtions after a victorious struggle. Jt does not follow that victory without any outside assistance is also a necessary condition. The condition of p p u l a r struggle can be met in conjunction with outside intervention. Metreover, history is replete with examples of those who have struggled against oppression and lost. Xt is implausible to assert categorically that if they had been aided in their struggle, they would not have been able to achieve a more just social order, Consider the Spallish Civil War, tile Warsaw Ghetto, the Hungarian uprising of 1956, and so on,

Certainty tl-rere may be times wllen outside intervention would be so manipulative as to render advmces far justice impossible or improhalsle, h t this has to do with the character of the intervention, rlot with the requirement that those struggling win it themselves, The self-emancipation position Is unrealistic if it does not recqnize that sometimes, perhaps usually, those who lose just struggles do so not far lack of poiitical virtue but for Iack af military power. 32 Thus far I have argued on the basis of the supposition that p p u l a r stmggle is a necessary condition ietr the advancement of ~ustice,Although popuIar struggIe may often be required, there is no reason to believe tl-rat it is always required. The Federal Republic of Germany, certainly an advance over Nazi Germany from the perspective of justice, came into existence without a popular revolt against the Nazi regime. North Vietnam deposed the genocidal KX~xnerRouge in Cambodia in the absence of a popular revolt. So, whatever truth there is in the claim that pc~pularstruggle advances the cause of hstice, it would be wrong to elevate it to the status of a necessary condition. An alternative argumellt with a similar concern is that even if interventions might smetimes achieve a more just order, they remain nevertheless unjustifiably paternalistic." This is, however, to misuslderstand the Ilature of paternalism and thus tc-,miss what is morally troubling abr~utit. Paternalist actions or policies are those performed or enacted on behalf of the interests of others, but not by h e m , and that deny them the opportunity to choose. If the opportunity to choose is sufficiently important, then paternalisrrt is wrong even if the corzsequences are good. This wrong can be calftured in a Kantian manner by t l ~ eclaim that paternalist actions or policies treat a person merely as a means to the good of the consequences to he achieved. Interventions into the afhirs of another state may be paternalistic if the): in fact, deny those citizens stiffering tlie intervention the opport~lnity to choose their social structures, Elumanitarian interventions may however occur in a context in which there is popular dissatishction with the policies and institutions of the state but insufficient polilical or military power to change them. Such interventions would not be pater~lalisticsince they would be supporting popular choice rather than detiyillg it, Hutrtanitarian interventions, then, are not of necessity paternalistic, A rejoinder to my argumellt might be that such interventions are because there will be some individuals who do not nonetheless pater~~alistic share tl-re goals of the popular scruggle and are therelore denied tl-re oyportuniry to choose. However, these ""paternalistic" actions are no more troubleso~rtethan majority rule in de~rtocraticprocesses, For even these processes deny the rninarity the opportunity not to be governed by the practice, The mark of paternalism cannot simply he that some disagree with policy since then even the most libertarian policy achieved by a nonunanimous democratic vote would be paternalistic.

The anti-imperialist challenge bears some resemblance to the anti-paternalist one, However, rather than being a concern that intervention will deny citizens the opportunity to choose, it is a concern that intervention will either be contrary to what citizens actually choose or to what justice (especially globt~ldistributive justice) dernands.34 "Like the argurnent based upon the value of peace, this one requires both principled and practical responses, Assume that a xlecessav coxldition of justified intervention is a reasonable belief in the likelihood of success in establishing a inore just order, Then, most interventions directed toward some aspect of a more ~ u s tsocial ordet; but which are against the popular will, would be unjustified because often it would be unreasonable to believe that an intervention violating the will of the majoriey codd succed in establishing a lasting, more just order. The wrong of this sort of intervention is not captured by the cosmopolitan conception of sovereignty but by a criterion of justified intervention that corrtpIe~rtentsit, J asserted that rnost interventions of tl-ris sort would be unjustified, not that all would be. Such an intervention might not be unjust if its g ~ aisi not an enduring, more just order, but merely the prevention of an inlmanevit injustice, Consider the case of an intervention that is necessary to stop the irnminent threat of a popular but gross human rights abuse against a minority population, The great good of preventing atrclcities of this nature iri the short term is the goal, not the establishment of an enduring more just order. Although such an intervention might he justified, a criterion of justified interve~itioncomglementing the cosmopctliran conception of sovereignty would not generally license imperialist interventions if these are defined as contrary to the popular will of the citizenry, Where such interventions are licensed, it would be due to dire ernergericies that necessitate a shorte~term vision of the goal of the intervention. The cosm~politanconception of sovereignty also would not generally justify intervening when the goal was contrary to what global distributive justice required, since the intervention would typicalIy nut be an advance for justice, Again, exceptions are conceivabie to this general rule, Suppose the intervention wouM miaintiain conditions of international inequalit). corrtrary to the dernands of international distributive justice, but e s ~ b l i s ha more just domestic order in a particular state, as, arguably, the 1994 intervevition in Haiti did. Even though the goal is in one sense colitrary to jrrsrice, if the likely oufcome is a net gain from the perspective of justice (in this case a more just domestic order), then the cosmoplitan conception of justice would allow the intervention, assuming other necessav csndirions are met, The fact tl-rat an intervention is ixnperialist, then, does not entai! that it is unjust, even though such interventions typicalljl are.35 So much for the problems of what the conception wouXd allow in principle. Its actual application raises an additional probiern. MiIitarily weaker

countries with colonial pasts may fear tl-rat a principle permitting interventions in the name c~flustice will be used to rationalize military iiltervetltions against them that are in fact contrary to the goals of justice," Obviously, the possihifity of sucl-r duplicity cannot be ruled out by a theory, When we consider the extent tc-,which the Uilited States (ostensibly committed to the statist conception of sovereignty) was able to engage in imperialistic interventions in Latin America in order to prevent popular change," there is no reason to think that the cosmopolitan conception of sovereignty could not be abused or simply ignored.-3Vhis danger, howevet; must be weighed against the costs of not permitting an intervention when it would likely result in a more just state of affairs. The costs of not intervening are real and i m e d i a t e , and the danger that such an interventioil will enable other unjust interventions is hypotheticd and rerntrte. More important, whether a just intervention would provide the required precedence for a later unjust one is determined by the political and institutional capacity in the future to prevent unjust interventions. This capacity is a function of political organization and power, not moral principle,

Tl-re cosmopolitan conception of sovereignty entails that a state cannot claim the protecltion of the principle of nonintervention in one of its domains unless the intervention wili nt>t attempt t(>advance the cause of justice in the basic structure of the state OF the international effects of its policies. No doubt a main source of opposition to the cosmopoli"~anaccount derives frc~ma worry that it would license far t w many interventions since it makes it more difticult for a state to claim protection against intervention on the basis of sovereignry.i9 If we assume that a basic structure-. is comparatively unjust and therehre cannot claim the shield of sovereignty to prohibit interventions, it does not k~flowthat any sort of intervention against it is justified. Although the cosmopolitan conception of sovereignty may nullify one kind of argument against intervention, there may be several grounds for justified inrerventio~lthat cannot be met simply by demonstrating that a state may not claim tl-re protection of sovereignty, X shall turn now to the matter of when and what sorts of intervetltions are ~ustified,

Baszc Structures and Governnzent Potzcz'es In discussing the subject of justice, Rawh distinguishes the basic structure of society h m other aspects of the state and society, The basic structure includes the constitution and institutions that it malldates as well as the fuxldamental econornic institutions of the state. Government policy on tl-re other

l-rand includes the effects of governmental power (typically) within the limits of the basic structure, Since the basic structure does not crlver the whole of social and pofiticaf life, it is possible for governmental p ~ l i c yto he ~znjustin the domestic spl-rere, while the basic structure is not, For example, governmental policy may create a category of victimless crimes that may he unjust, Intervention that is directed toward overturning only a policy that is Lznjust in the domestic sphere and not a comparatively unjust basic structure is unjust, even when it is likely to be successful.40 The reasoil for this can be seen by reconsidering the arguments about paternalism and the right to share a common life together discussed earlier. These arguments do not apply to the cosmopolitan cc~nceptionof sovereignty because overturning injustice was not paternalistic when others could not do SO themselves; the rigbt to share a common life together cannot trump other csnsiderations of justice, When, l-rowever, the domestic injustice that a regime l-ras committed has not altered the ~usticeof the state's basic structure, the opportunity for those aggrieved to rectify matters in the arena of democratic self-governance is still there. It would be paternalistic to impose a just outcome on the citizenry in that case. Moreover, the right to share a common life together in the form of democratic self-governance must include, up to a limit, tl-re right to make moral rnistakes together. The appropriate limit is that the mistakes shr>uld not produce injustices in basic structure, When they do, the capaciy of the citizenv to engage in further acts of self-governance rnay be limited, At tl-rat point it can no lr~ngerbe claimed that selfgovernawe is harmed by interventioil,4' These sarne considerations do not hold with respect to domestic policy that creates injustices in tl-re international spl-rere. Here the aggrieved do not have a voice in the arena of self-governance. So, there is less reason to suppose that the normal mechanisms of self-governance will. arrive at ~ustice, and there is rnore rnoral reason to find ways to represent the interests of the aggrieved through interventionary activity, Althi>ugl-rintervention may harm self-governance, when self-governance is seriously harming others who have no voice in the process, intervention may be the only realistic way to prevent or remedy the harm,

Conditions of jtrstified Intervention Just cause for an interventioil exists if and uilly if the intervetltion is directed toward advancing justice either in the basic structure of the state or in the international effects of its domestic policies, Just caLzse is not a sufficient condition of intervention, however* because it does not require that there be good reason to believe that action will remedy the inlustice, that such action is necessary to remedy the injustice, and that greater harms wilt

not also be done in the course of attexnpting to rexnedy tl-re injustice. This suggests three additional necessary conditions of justified intervention. First, it rnust be reasonable to believe that the interventior~is likely to succeed. The reason for this with respect to military intervention is due to the prima facie evil of war, The evil of war can be justified only if, a n the basis of available informatiorz, there are good reasons to believe that it is likely to be successftri in prodtlcing a morally improved situation. However, analc3gous reasoiling can be applied to nonmilitary interventions. Such interventions are prima facie evils insofar as they usrirp what exists of democratic self-governance in a state, A nonmilitary intervention also can be justified only if, on the basis of available information, there are good reasons to believe that it is likely to be sllccessful in pmducing a morally improved situation. Whether there is a likelihood of success is typicalfy determined prospectively and is based upon conjectures about the balance of forces, the resilience of attitudes to change, and the similarity to other cases* There are three different ways that an expectation of success may go awry, First, there may be information relevant to tl-re estimation of success that is not availahle, in which case misjudwent about the likelihood of success is not a culpable error. Jn this case, it may be reasonable ttr believe that success is likely even thougl-r it is not, Second, there may be sufficient evidence about the Iikelihr>od (or lack thereof) of success, but uile may misjudge it. In this case one may believe success is likely when it would be unreasonable to believe so, Finally, the outcome may nut be as predicted even though there is no error of judgment because the judgment concerns probabilities. Jn other words, it may be the case that an intervention was in fact Likely to succeed, and it was reasonable to believe that it would, hut it noiletheless failed.. There is no error in judgment in this case, but rather a misfit: between what was likely to be the eoutcoEne and what came to pass, f ince there is no error in judgxnent, there is obviously n o culpable error, The second necessav colzdition ftrr ~ustifiedinterveiitior~is that it be of last resort. Witl-r respect to military interventions, tl-ris criterion ensures that the suffering caused by war is not unnecessary. With respect to nonmilitary inrterventions, it protects against unnecessary disruptions to what is left of self-government, What counts as a last resort is, however, relative to circumstances, Given an ir-rfinite amount of time and nt->costs asst~ciatedwith delay, no intervention is a last resort. However, there are often significant costs associated with delay, such as loss of opportunity or continued perpetration of in~ustices.Also there are sometimes reasonable calculations that no noninterventior1ary rneans will repair the inrjustices in the foreseeable future. When a large-scale huxnanitarian crisis is loorning, one wilere it is reasonable to believe that further diplomacy is likely to fail and where such diplomacy will consume the time necessary for a successful intervention,

then an intervention may be considered a last resort even tl-rough there is sclme remtlte chailce of success without it, Third, interventions must be proportional to the iniustice occurring, Military interventions ougl-rt not to repair an injustice at costs to human wellbeing even greater than the injustice itself. Nonmilitary interventions aught not to repair an injtistice at c ~ s t tc) s what is left 05 democratic self-government that are even greater than the injustice itself. Determining whether the evil of an intervention Is outweighed by the prospect of =medying an injustice is not a simple trtatter of measuring evils according to a cssrtmon standard. The evil of intervention may involve tl-rir~gssuch as loss of innocent life cor violations of democratic self-determination, and the evits of iiljustice may be violations of civil and dlnocratic rights or principles of distributive justice, There does not appear to be a csmmon standard among these eviIs. The exercise of moral ~udgnnentsensitive to the morally salient katures of a particular situation is the best that one can expect in these matters. Aristotle's remarks olx the importance of a flexible standard for particular cases in matters of equity are relevant here: 'Tor what is itself indefinite can only be measured by ail indefiilite staildard, like the leaden rule used by Lesbian builders; just as that rule is not rigid but can be bent to the shape of the stone, so a special ordinance is made to fir the circuxnstmces of the case."42 In defending these three additional criteria of ~ustifiedintervention, X have considered the similarities in the justifications of both military and nonmilitary interventions. There is also an imporfant difference as well, With respect to military interventions, the evils to be minimized are the loss of hutrtan life and well-being. Given the ever-present danger of these evits in military operations, it is reasonable to l-rold these criteria as absolutely necessary in the justification of military intervention, With respect to ntlnmilitary interventions, the evil to he avoided is m y disruption tct the processes of democratic self-governmce. Unlike the evil of rnilitary interventions? this danger is not always prc-.sent. When the injustices in the basic structure of a state make democratic self-governance coinpleteip impossible, then there is no such danger to be avoided, Hence, the force of these three criteria in restricting nonmilitary interventions varies in proportion to the degree of democratic self-governance that exists within the states. An additional word needs to be said about the criteria of proportionality and last resort with respect to military interventions. As long as healthy democratic institutions are in place within a state, there is a strong defeasible presumption against rnilitary interventions, There are two reasons for this. First, the loss of life incurred would be hard to justify if the ir-rjusticeswere less than the violation of democratic rights. Second, while democratic processes are stili in place, generally a society will be open enough for it to be reasonable to hope that nonmilitary means will effect changes in the direction of justice," This presumption is, however, defeafible, For example,

dexnocracies are capable of infringing on tl-re rights of minorities. When such inhingemeats are horrible enough and the possibility for nonmilitary change remote enough, then inifi~aryintervexition may be jrxstified, A case might be made for two additional candidates for necessary conditions fc~rjustified intervention: that the intervention must proceed under prayer authority and that the interventiorz must be intended to improve on injustice, The first would proscribe unilateral, and even collective, acts of intervention that were not authorized by the appropriate internatir>ilal body, The main reason in support of this condition is the good of international order. A world in which interventions occurred only if authorized would he a more orderly one than one in which unautbt>rized, but otherwise just, interventions occurred. The cost of this coilditioxl would be that otherwise just interventions would be prosfribed if they could not gain proper authority. In other words, this condition would tolerate a loss from the perspective of establishing and maintainitlg just institutic~ilsin order to maintain international order. The good of order bears some similarity to that of peace, Order is valued, in part, because the order valued is just.. Being disorderly in that context disrupts justice. Unlike peace, though, the value of order is eritirely instrumental, Consider an orderly unjust society where policies proceed according to the appropriate channels of authority. What sort of loss is there if this society becomes less orderly? The only loss that I caxz see is that the injustices would becorne worse, fewer people would get tl-reir due, or people would get less of their due. Trade-offs between order and justice then should be made in favor of jilstice, Proper authority is quite plausibly good in interventions-especially when the interventions are nnititary ones-although not a necessary condition of jrrstitication. Interventions proceeding under proper authority are more likely to be legitixnate in the global ~ommunity.4~ M~orer>ver,when there is proper authority for an intervention, presumably its justification has been sub~ectto multiple levels of review This might help to ensure that the necessary conditions are satisfied, and that the intervention is not merely servi~~g the interests of the intervening p a r v to the exclusion of justice. These desideram do not outweigh justice when an otherwise ~ustified intervention fails to receive proper authorization, There is no need to ensure justice when by hypothesis the intervention is just. The value of legitimac% like the value of order, is a function of whether the legitimate policy or arrangement is just. f a , legitimacy should not trurnp justice. The second candidate for addition to the necessary conditions for justified intervention is right intent.@ There are two potenEial problems with such a requirexnent: tl-re metaphysical one of the existence of intentions in corporate entities, and the practical one of determining a single intention when there are differing ones within a collective leadership. Perhaps such

problems are not insurmountable, Even so, there is a more significant moral problem with rewiring right intent. Assume that we can determine the intention behind state action, Although the intellt of a state or state institution may play a role in assessing the excellence or virtue of tl-re state, it has no rt>leto play in cclnsidering the justice of its actions, The justice of the action or policy of a state is a function of whether or nut actitjns owed to persons are performed, not wily tl-rey are performed. This is clear when we consider a matter of domestic justice. Whether a scheme fur political leadership selection is just depends ~zyorrwhether citizens participate in a democratic process. A democratic selection process may be enacted with the intention of s t a v i q off social unrest, but the process is not therefore unjust. The ixztentions of the state are of no intrinsic value f%omthe perspective of justice, One migllt abject that the intentions of the state are nonetheless of instrumental value firom the perspective of justice since they indicate the likelihood that the just cause will be realized. Although it may be true that intentions signal the likelihood of achieving ends, tl-rere are two considerations that count against requiring right intent, First, the requirement would be redundant since jrlst cause, reasonable betief in the likelihood of success, and proportionality together provide reason to believe that an injustice will be improved upon and that no unnecessary evils will be perpetrated, Second, the requirement is counterproductive since it wijuld prohibit frrlfillir-rg duties owed to others if they were not perforxned far the right reasons. In the above example, the institution of the demc~craticselection process would not be allowed because the inkntioll was wsong, Tb conclude, tl-rere are lour necessary conditions of justified intervention: ( l )At1 injustice exists in the basic structure or the international effects of policy; ( 2 )it must be reasonable to believe that the intervention is likely to reduce that injustice; (3) the intervention is proportional to the existing injustice; and (4)the intervention is a last resort after diplomatic means have failed.

Permissible verstrs Ohliptory Intervention Earlier T argued against the view that interventions against unjust basic structures are impermissible. The thrust of my argument seems to cssrtmit me to the view that, wl-ren all the necessary conditions are met, interventions against unjust basic structures are morally permissible. Howeveg are inrterventions in such cases merely permissible? Consider what justice demands of compauiots, Citizens and residents must pay taxes to support the police and court system of a country Payment of taxes for these purposes is a duty of justice that each citizen owes to ail others, so that when an injus-

tice occurs tl-re means to stop and remedy it are available. A citizen may not have a duty to help an individual suffering an injustice, hut does have a duty to contribute to the lustice systc;m that is meant to hefp. So, a citizen's duty to help may be thought of as discharged througlr financial support to the state agency that has a duty to beip. In tlze standard domestic case, when a person has a claim of justice then other co-members of the associatim that is covered by the yritlciples of justice have a duty to respect that claim. In other words, claims of justice entail duties on others, not mereiy permissions, ff citizens of:other states have a claim of justice to be yrotecred against itljustices, wl-ren tire state has failed to provide the prc~tectionor is constituting the threat, then there is a correspondiisg duty on noncompatriots to help remedy the injustice, This duty falls on all noncompatriots, but those who trtaly mt~steasify help are specially obliged to do so. Fulfilling the duty requires action by the states of those who are obliged. The state may be said to have a duty in virtue of its citizens having a duty.46 Not all duties of states to intervene, l-rowever, are duties to intervene militarify. The conclusion that imerventions may be rewired by duty, not merely permitted, rrtay be challenged in at least four different ways-ail of which, f believe, fail, First, it might be argued tl-rat fairness requires rnore of compatriots who, unlike citizens of different states, already participate in the same legal institutions. Fairness might be ti~oughtto require the actions called b r by the institutions, but na duty of fairness is required in tlze absence of common legal institutions.47 This is the position f call lustice-positivisrn in Chapter 3, It is wrong for two closely related reasons. First, it would render unintelligible the seemingly intelligible claim that persans can be under duties to others to construct just institutions, as when political reform or revolution is cailed for. Second, fairness is not limited to the duty of fair play under existing institutions. Consider the claim that it is unfair for institutions to discriminate on the basis of race. This claim would appear to have substance even when, indeed especially when, institiitiom are legally permitted to discriminate on the basis of race, A second reason to believe that intervetltions uilder the right conditions are perrllissible but not obligatory is also based on the fact that well-developed doxnestic legal institutions exist, but international ones do not, Duties of justice, it might be argued, although owed to other persons, in fact regulate our actions vis-8-vis institutior~s:We have duties of: justice to otl~ersto construct and respect just institutions. These are not, l-rowever, duties to all other persons, but only to thase persons with whom our activity places us in ass~ciation.If, for example, our commerce affects the moral interests of others, we have a duty of jtlstice toward them, The force of responsibility is directly proportional to the degree of association. Since we are in much closer association with compatriots than with citizens of other countries,

we are under duties of justice to tl-re former, but are simply permitted to treat the latter justly, X shall not take issue with the view that justice is convex~tior~al in the sense that the objection states; I defend this in Chapter 3, I do dispute the conclusion drawn from that premise. AIthough it may be true that we have different duties to persons depending upon our associations, if the association gives rise to any norrns of justice, they must be duties, not merely permissions, Consider the clai~rrthat we are permitted to treat others ~ustly, This claim is true of all persons (except in cases where doing so wc~uldviolate duties that we owe to other persons) and not simply those persons with whom we have some asst3ciation. If association gives rise to norms of justice and a difkrent moral relation tc-,those with whr~mwe associate, these norms must have the force of duties, not mere permissions. Jf they were mere perxnissions, they would be no different than the norrns governing aur relatioils with those with whom we do not associate. A third possible reason is that obligatory interventions might reyuke state leaders to act in ways that violate their duties to the citizens af their state." One inight trtaintain this p~sitionbecause one believes that statespersons have special duties to their constituency9 and that expendirlg human and material resources on behalf: of the cause of justice in other states violates a duty to expend those resources on one's own c0nstituen~)iThe first thing to note about this argtzment is that it denies even the permissibility af intervening in other states, not just the duty to do so. If expending resources on the cause of justice in other states violates a special duty of l e d ers to citizens, then doing so is not even permissible, In other w r d s , the argument entails isalationism. Suppose it is the case that statespersoils have special duties to their own constituency Does it follow that expending resources on the cause of justice in atlier states violates tl-rese duties? It does not, if tl-re expenditures are themselves required by justice. Suppose the statespersons have a kind of fiduciary relationsllip with their citizens. They are obliged to act on behalf of the interests of those wlio l-rave put tl-reir trust in them. This duty would not necessarily rule om expending resources on behalf of the cause of justice in other states because an agent's duty to act on behalf of those reyresented is constrained by duties to athers. Special duties that ane has in virtue of one's office do not amount to license to violate one% general duties. So, if expending resources on behalf of the caLzse of j~zsticein other states is required by justice, tl-ren wllatever the content of a statesperson's special duty to the constituency, it does not necessarily trump general &ties to expend those resowces. R. final reason to believe that interventions under the right conditions are permissible hut not obligatory is relevailt only to military interventions. The reason is the terrible fact that in militar). interventions, people die and

are seriously injured. A state may not, so the reasoning goes, require certain of its citizens to die for the cause of justice in some other state. This may be granted without damage to the claim that justice may require military interventions in other countries* Consider an analogy to domestic affairs. Perhaps a state may not require certain of its citizens to be police officers and thereby risk life and limb in law enfc~rcement,However, justice may still require tl-rat a police force exist and that adult citizens with the rneans to pay taxes support those who vt>luntarily become police officers. So, it is possible that corzscription to prosecute just military interventions in other states, on behalf of the citizens of tl-rose states, is not justified, This does nor undermine the claim that there is a duty tc-,intervene. The clairn that there is a prima facie duty to intervene to further the cause of justice is entailed by the claim that persons througilout the world have duties of justice to one mother regardless of whether they happen to live in the same countrya4YIf persons have duties of justice to those living in7 other states, then they are obliged to aid with the development and maintenance of just institutions, If no such duties exist, then statespersons are nonetheless permitted to intervene in the affairs of other states. 1 argued in Chapter 3 that such duties of global justice exist, ft follows horn the conclusion of that argument, tl-ren, that there is a prima facie duty to intervene in the aff2irs of states either with unjust basic structures or whose domestic policies create inrternational inr justices.

Advocates of the satist conception of sovereignty sometimes contelld that inrtervention is not the 0n1y means of effecting change in the direction of a more just order within a state; isolation can also be effective to that end,?'" have defined intervention broadly as any nonconsensual activity by another state (or regional or global governil~gbody) that lzsurps power over a damain reasonably claimed by the state." The consequence of this definition is that activities such as embargoes, which might he thought of as examples of isolation rather than in~rvention,are classified as interventions if they prevent effective control over a domain reasonably clairned by a state. There are two reasons that count in h v o r of taking embargoes as acts of inrtervention. First, given the growth of the global market, participation in it occurs by default fur nearly all states. Part of the powers of state governance, for example, is to negotiate trade treaties, It Is not the case, then, that thwarting the exercise of that power is a way of "'uptzolding the value of self-determination."Q Second, the effects of embargoes on citizens within countries may be just as harsh as a military intervention, or even harsher: Thus, embargoes raise many of the safMe moral issues as do inter-

ventians. For tl-rese reasons it rnakes little sense to appeal to isolation-in the form of embargoes-as means by which nonintervention can he respecred while pursuing the caLzse of justice, if intervention into the affairs of a state is imperxnissible, then an ernbtlrgo against that state is proscribed. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Utlited Natiotls has st~ughtto maintain an embargs against Jraq. Arguably just cause for this embargo exists in the lack of democracy and persecution of the Kurdish and other minorities in Iraq and in the threat that its weapons of mass destruction pose to citizens a i d residetits of sther states, Thus, the embargo is riot a violation s f the sovereignty of Iraq, Reasonable belief in tl-re likelihood of success for such a policy is less plausible, Suppose, for the sake of argument, that it is reasonable to believe that given sufficient time, this embargo will succeed in either forcing the leadership into reforms or trtotivating a popular rebellion against the leadership, therel-ty improving the injustices in the country, The embargo is nonetheless unjust because the wifering of innocents-especial ly many chi ldren-is disproportionate to the cause pursued, This ernbargo, which has slowed or stopped delivery of basic rnedical supplies, has, as of 1999, raised the inhnt mortality rate from 3.7 percent before the war to 22 percent, and cakzses the deaths of some 40,000 cl-rildren under 5 and same 50,000 older people each year,Ff Compare these figures with all previous deaths from weapons of mass destruction: The atorrtic bosrtbs s f Hiroshima and Nagasaki cslllbined killed 100,000 people, and no more than 50,000 people died from chemicaf weapons in W r l d VC"jr I, This justifies a startling conclusion about the embargo against Iraq: If t l ~ eU,N, estimates t>f t l ~ el~urnandamage in Iraq are even roughly correct, therefore, it would agpe2-l.r that-in a so far futile effort to remove Sacfctam from power and a somcwhat rnorc sctcccssful effort to consrrair~hixn rnilitarily-economic sanctions may well have been a necessary cause af the deaths af mare people in Iraq tl~anhave been stain by all so-callecI weapons t>f mass destruction throughout t>istoryC4

Unless the Jraqi regime represents an historically exceptional: evil, which is of course implausible, the policies that have produced so many d e a t h of innocents-even if they were not the target-is far beyond tl-re bounds of proportionaliry and therefore unjust.

The cosmopolitan conception of sovereignty holds that an intervention into one of the domains reasonabfy claimed by a state is a violation of sovereignty if and only if: the intervention will riot attelBpt to advance the cause

of justice either in the basic structure of the state or in its international poIicics. There are three additional necessary conditions for justified intervention: Xt must be reasorzable to believe that the intervexition is likely to succeed, the intervention must be proportionate to the injustice, and it must be a last resort. There are additional special issues related to the morality of military interventiorzs that will be discussed in Chapter 7. According to the cosmopolitan conception, tl-re underlying concern about sovereignty is a concern about justice. Perhaps, then, sovereigxlty is theoretically redundant, Consideration of the four necessary conditions for the ]ustice of interventions, however, suggests that there rnay still be a reason to use the language of sowreigllty when discussing interwntions. Withorn such language, calling an intervention unjust or unjustified would he ambiguous: Would it be a violation of sovereignty o r a hilure to fulfil1 one of the other tl-rree necessary conditions? Soxne precision is gained if we reserve the charge of a violation of sovereignty fc~rinterventions that do not aclvance the caLzse of justice, The reason for utilizing the concept of sovereignty, then, from the cosmopolitan perspective is simply in order to preserve the clarity of political discourse, not because it adds a substantial consideration to our political rmderstanding.

SIX

a n Accoun

llzdivzd~kalu~ell-bei~rg depsrzds on the succ~ssfzlpursuit of utorthuthske goals atzd relatzotzships. Coals r;ki"td rekat~o~zshtp~ are c ~ l t ~ r a l dc~erIy nzitted. Beittg social animals nzedrzs rrot nzerel~jthat the nzearzs for the satis+crzofz o(peopEe3 goals are more caslly ava~fabkewithrrt. societ3t. More cruczally st mealzs tl2at those goals themselves are (whet2 one reacljm he3rortd what is strictly rzscessdry fix htofogtcal survival) the creatures ofsociety* the prodi-tcts of culture. -Avishai *Margalitand Joseph XPazl

In this chapter X shall argue that a constrained right to national seff-determination, including secession, is consistent with the basic cornxnitxnents of cosmopolitanism, namely, that there exist duties of global ~usticebased ~ l p o nequal respect for persolls regardless of their citizeriship or national membership. In certain ways national self-deterxninatian is similar to sovereignty, including the manner in which it should he constrained. E.fei~ce,this accorrnt wifl be n o inore satisfactory to the nationalist than iny account of sovereignty is to the statist. It's not surprising that an account of cosmopolitan justice cannot accommodate the entirety of the nationalist perspective. What might be surprising is how much it cart accommodate,

~ O S M Q P O L I T A N X S MVERSUS

NATIONALISM

Jn Chapter 3 T argued that nations are not srssociatiolls that generate duties of justice, An important cilrollary of that conciusiolr is that there is a strong cle-

feasible presumption against policies that favor certain persons over others in virtue of their national identity These two claims constrain an account of natiorlal self-determination, Both of them are usually denied by natiotiatists who seek to jusCjfy the politicd project of constructing state institutions that reinforce (and enforce) the goad as defined by a national culture, The cosmopolitanism that I have been defending in this book is based on the thesis that duties of Justice are globt~lin scope, It does not deny that there may be duties of justice generated by smaller associations. In fact, I accept that there are political duties owed to compatriots that are not owed to noncornpatriots. The account, then, may appear to be merely contingently antinationalist. If the existence of duties of justice among comgatriots is consistent with cc-~smopolitanism,then perhaps duties of lustice among cs-nationals could be as well if, contrar)l to the argument that I gresented in Chapter 3, nations were associatims jienerating duties of justice, However9 the cosmopolitanism that I defend is not merely contingently opposed to nationalism, Nationalists propose conceptions of justice that are fundaxnentally at odds with tl-re basis of my account of cosmopolitanism, namely, that persons have a highest order moral interest in the capacity to revise rationaliy their conceptions of the good. Policies that reinforce a conception of the good provide disincentives to persons engaged in reflection on the cultual conception of the good that the state policies reinforce; therefore, these policies violate a fundamental com~rtitmentof the account of cosxnopolitanisrn that I maintain, 130ticiesthat require a sectarian justification are contrary to the highest order interest of persons to propose and abide by publicly acknowledged fair terms of cooperation.

For reasons that will become clearer in this chapter, f accept Will Mym-

licks" distinction between nations and cultural groups that coirte to be as the restilt of immigration.- N~?rit>ns, unlike i m i g r a n t groups, bad an existence in the territory of the state prior to the establishment of the state's structures.3 National minorities typically are made up of descendants of peoples who were conquered and forcibly illtegrated into tl-re state; less commonly they are made up descendants of peoples who voluntarily joined art expandirlg trtultinational federation. A nation has a measure of sell-determination when it exercises control: over some aspect of its political or social environment. Self-determination, then, is a relatio~lalproperty between a nation, some aspect of its political environment, and ocl~erpoliticaf agenrs, Up to the point of secession, selfdetermination is a kind of internal devolution of state sovereignty. A nation may be self-determining with respect to certain matters of policy and in re-

Iation to certain other nations or the state, A nation possesses tl-re right to selfldeterminatioil when it has the morai authority to exercise controt over an aspect of its pofitical or sociaf environment.

The Problem of Rational Revision The conception of persons that 1 have employed to justify the cosmopolitan conception of justice takes a person's ir~terestin the rational revision of the conception of the good to be a highest order interest. State neutralicy with respect to national culturai conceptions of the good is a necessary (political) condition of respecting this highest order interest, since state enforcemerit of such coliceptiolls would place obstacles in the path of those who rationally questioned such conceptions and would constrain those who did not accept them to act contrary to their heliels. As iong as such beliefs are consistent with the demands of justice, respect for the highest order interest in rational revision should perrnit them. Kyrnllicka argkles that cultural membership is a Rawlsian primary grjod.4 In order for individuals to make rational revisions in tl-reir conception of what is of value, they require not only the Creedoms of speech and association and a liberal education, but also a context in which life options have meaning to them. This context is a culture in which ways of life get presented to them. In addition, Kymlicka argues that one's own culture is important became cultmal calltexts are not easily replaced.5 Although individuals can move fronl one culture and language to another, far trtost people this is a burden and not merely an intellectual one. Rather, if Kymlicka is right about the importance of culture far providing the context in which decisions have meaning, it is a moral burde~iinsohr as it may affect the content of one's life plans and the direction in wl~ichone may revise them, This is a burden that one can voluntarily assume, as voluntary irnmigrants do, It is not a burden that, in the absence of solrte overriding moral interest, citizens should he required ta assume. So, altl1ougl-s.the stability of one's culture is not a necessary (psychological) condition of the ahiIity to rationally revise o~ie'scsnception of the good, it is highly desirable given the costs associated with assuxning a new cultt~ralcontext. However, tliis stability may not be purchased at the price of forgoing state neutratity with respect to riational cuiturai conceptions of the good." Now, it is not obvious how a state can coherently be in the business of both maintaining neutrality and providing for cultural stability This suggests some tension between the two derivative cc~mmitmentsof the highest order interest of persons in the rational revision of their conceptions of the good, One of the virtues of recognizing a constrained right to national selfdetermination is the relief that it provides for this tension,

A Non-nationalist Accotlnt of National Self-determination Jt rllipht he suspected that there is a sort of creeping nationalism in the claims of t l ~ eprevious seaion. After all, it would seem an easy step from the recognition of the primary good of cultural membership to the claim that states ought to endorse some cultural practices to the exclusion of others. Yael Tarnir takes this f ~ ~ r t hstep: er Individuals wish to be ruled by institutions tnformcct by a culture they find understandable and meaningful, and which allows a certain degree of transparency that facilitates their participation in public affairs. W1.ren they are able to identify el~eiri>wnculture in the political framework, when the political institutions reflect: famitiar traditions, historical interpretations, and norrns of behaviour, individ~ratscome to perceive themselves as the creators, or at least the carriers, of a valuable set of beliefs.;

The mere claim that cultural membership is a primary good, however, does not entail that state policies should preserve or encourage a llational culture. 0 1 1 the csntrarh both state neutrality and the enjoyment of:one's own cuiture are related to the ft~ndtlxnentaivalue that cosmopolitanism places on the ability to revise rationally one's Iife plans. State neutrality is required as a pofitical corrdition of the ability to revise rationally one's life plans. Moreover, the absence of state neutrality poses a threat to all of those cultures that are not =presented in the official conception of the good, On the other hand, the enjoyment of one's culture is a desideratum, at least given the psychological claim that it facilitates meaningful choice,

Who Bears the R%ghtto National Self-determination? The right to national self-determinatian is a group right. It is ascribed to, and exercised by, nations, nor individuals.Un individual might claim the right to emigrate or might claim ow~lershipof a piece of Land. However, on the assumption that a nation must be composed of at least two co-nationals, one person exercising a measure of control over the political and social environment is not exercising national self-determination, Both Tamir and Joseph Raz w u l d seem to disagree. They contend that the right to self-delerminatiotl is a cumulative individual rigl~t.Vntheir view?the strength of the claim depends, at !east in part, on haw many people are making it, Tile view that the bearer of:a right to national self-determination is an individual and not a nation (in Kymlickak sense) is both imglausihle and impractical, One person" shim to national self-determination is not merely weak, it is seliseless since that person is not a nation. Taking the size

of the group to be the detwxninarive property of a justified right, and failing to consider the group" historic relationship to the existing state, establishes inrcexitives to destabilizing actions and unjust policies. For exar~ple,it establishes an incentive to persecute a national minority to diminish its numbers through emigration or genocide. Alternatively, any given cultural group has an ince~itiveto promote immigration among its cohorts to strengthen its claim to self-determination.2" Although the right to self-determination is a group right, it need not suppose some extraordinary metaphysical,status of nations, such as personaliy. Not only would this be metaphysically dubious, it is also morally troublesome, as it may result in subordinating the moral interests of individuals to gortps.lt It is a group claim only because an individual cannot in the name of national self-cleterminatim make a cfaim agail~sta state. Any justification of such a claim that is to be consistent with the respect for persons xnust derive from the claim's service to the legitlinate interests of individuals.

Nonterritorial-based national self-determinatim assigns constrained authority to nations over certain institutions that typically are vehicles for the transmission of culture, especially educational institutions; but, it does not assign autkarirli;over (orwithin) any particular territory of its own or over other institutions of government, Such an approach to setfideterrnination is particularly appropriate where, due to urbanization and industrialization, there have been significant migraticrns of people within the borders of tile state. Recall the tension that I described above between the importance of both state neutrality and the existence of stable cultures. One arena in which it may he particularly manifest is the puhlic school system, for it is there that children during the hrmative years leave the influence of their parerits and come under that of public institutions. S~zpposingthat forxnal education is a powerful transmitter of culture, the state's commitment to neutrality might well seem i n c ~ ~ ~ p a t iwith b l e conditions that permit groups to maintain their culture, One model for reconciling these competing demands involves a distinction between state and national institutions, Citizens are not p e r m i ~ e dto opt out of support for, and obedience to, all state institutions, but they rnay choose certain natio~lalones that they will support and ohey,lTThe elemerit of individual choice establishes a quasi-market among nations, feading to competition in the provision of educational services. A person born into one nationality may deelare membership of another and vote on the level of national tax to finance the delivery of edwational and cultural services. A

person may elect national affinity, but may not elect to not support an educational system, Gonceivahly, one of the options to support would be a state educational systern that is x~ationallyneutral; although, at least with respect to the xnediuxn of instruction, such neuuality may be impossible, A nation may decide that it is unable to compete with vther nations or the state in the delivery of secondary and tertiary education and may choose only to tax its members for primary education and other cultural activities. In this case individuals who identified with this nation would be hound to pay proportional taxes either to another nation or the state for the support of its secondary and tertiary educational institutions, This model serves commitments both to state neutrality and to the maintenance of stable national cultures. It gets the state out of' the practice of transmitting national cultures, preserving neutrality; and it allows ix~dividuals wide latitude in deciding which cultures they wish to inl-rabit and support, Precisely because it is a market model, state coercion is minimized, An individual is, of course, not co~nptetelpfree to inhabit or support the culture of choice: That individual must choose among the national altltres with which sufficient numbers of vther citizens of the state identify, A set of options based upon other people's cultural preferences are given, and that person must weigh tl-re ixnportance of being a mernber of a particular nation that may9 say, tax its members more against other got~dsthat are mtlre desirable, A market among relativeiy equal persons has the virtue of alIowing the widest Iatitude of choice to its members. The latitude of choice under such a market is wider than what a democratic procedure for determining the distribution of state educational resources would allow because under a democratic procedure, even one that includes proportional representation, members of sufficiently small nation21 minorities will be certain to lose and thus not be given the choice to it2cur higher costs for the inairrtenance s f their culture, Taking seriously the value of rational revision of one's conception of the good requi~m~llore of a state's educational policy than a lack of culturally based oppression, It requires, at tl-re very feast, a citizenry aware of its political autonomy as watch-guard against unjust state infringement of its iiberties. Additionally, the inaintenance of a commitment to cc)smc)p~litanism requires a citizenry tl-rat is tolerant and knowledgeable of political and cultural differences that are compatible with justice, Thw, the national market in sch~oJSwuld not be an unregulated one. The state Iras a legitimate interest in supervising instructional rnetkods and curriculum to ensure tl-rat both autoilomy and tolerance are promoted. Qne objectior~to this inodel is that x~ationalcultures that are sufficiently fragile could not witl~standthe kind of competition tl-rat it perrnits, This claim is no doubt true, but its moral force is weak, There may be no way consistent with rleutral justice to maintain national cultures that

ciaixn insufficient numbers of people wishing to support them. The only remedy would seem to be state support, hut there is no satisfactory principle to determine how the state might apportion its support ft,r weak nations and preserve its commitment to neutrality. Suppose that the state were to offcr support in proportion to national membership, This has the virtue of being a k i d of equal treatment to all persons since a natic>nwith more members wauld receive proportionally more support. However, this would hardly improve the standing of tiny nations, It may even serve to make them less attractive than richer and more dynamic competitors, AIternatively, suppose the state were to allot equal expenditures to each nation, thereby giving the smaller ones help to the same degree as the larger. Under such a plan, the state would seem to he treating persons uneqriatly by giving some rnore support frir their culture than others, Indeed, any scheme of cross-subsidization for smaller nations would suffer from this problem, A potentially more serious objection to the rnodel is that it rnight not create a citizen-body sufficiently integrated to address political issues in commc-~nand to share the burdens of ~ustice,Allowing so much national self-Jeteminatim may destroy the political unity of the state, This is an empirical claim that may require the bitter test of experience to verify. If it is true, then there is a contingent incompatibility between national self-determination of this sort and cosmopolitanism, In this case, then, the tension between state neutrality and stable national cultures may either require other measures a r be irt-esolvabie, If indeed it is irresofvable, then the value of state neutrality wouId trump that of maintaining stabre cuItuses. There are two reasons for this, First, the former value is a necessary (paliticalf condition of the rational revision of one" conception of the good, while the fatter is desirable but rzot rzecessary, Secoxzd, the absence of state neutrality poses a threat to the stability of all of those cuilures drat are not included in the official conception of the good; so, neutrality contributes to cultrzraf sta bility.

Territorial-based national self-determination assigns constrained authority to nations over certain institutions within some particular territory of its own. This model is more Iikely than the previous to produce state institutions with a national flavor, even if their policies are consistent with a netttral justification. For example, state institufions in a self-determining region may require the national language as the oificial language and may include recogniticl12 of historically important dates of the natio~zas public

l-rolidays. X I the prirtciples of justice governing tl-re basic structtlre of the region are neutral with respect to the various reasonable cultural conceptions of the good, then this sort of national self-determinatim is consistent with cosxnopoliranism. Not everything that a governing natioil may wish to do would he permissible giver1 the constrairtt sated in the antecedefit of the previous sentence, S~tpyose,for example, that a nation wished to permit the practice of &male genital mutilation. Permissic->nfor such a practice is not within the authority of a nation to grant because the practice may result in severe short-term pain and hexnorrhaging and long-term problems ranging fmxn abscesses ta sexual dysiunction.fz There is no culturally neutral account of the benefits of the practice and na justification that would appear consistent with equaliw between the sexes.

The Right to Secede The most demandirlg kind of territorial based natiorzal self-determination is secession. In claiming a right to secede, a nation is daiming the right to establish suvereigncy over political instirt~tionsand a piece of territory. X will examine the right to secede for two reasons. First, if secession, being the strolzgest kind of territoriat-based self-determination, may be justified under certain constraints, then presuxnabiy weaker kinds, such as nationa! autont>my within the state, can also be ~ustified.Second, claims to secede are since the state has much the most controversial claims of self-determirtatic~rz more ta lose in granting secession tl-ran in granting autonaxny within an area of its territory, Because struggles around secession challenge the sovereignty of the state, they are more likely than other struggfes of self-determination to become violent. In order to clarify the moral basis of the right to secede, 1 make the following two assumptions. First, no inj~lsticeis being done by the natiorz seceding, either to those citizens of the state horn which it is seceding or ta those residing in the territory it is claiming. By this 1 mean acts that would be considered unjust independently of the act of secession itself, such as the unjust takings of productive resources or violations of l-ruman rights. Second, nt>injustice is being done to the natioil wishing to secede by the state from which it wishes to secede, Here I have in mind acts that are strmetimes thought to justirfy secession, acts such as widespread human rights abuses or unjust territorial occupation. The right of a nation to secede rests in part on the interest of persons in being governed by state structures to wllich they consent. This interest is derived from the highest order ixlterests of persons to propose and ahide by publicly acknowledged fair terms of cooperation; a lack of consent

amounts to a lack of agreement on tl-re terms of cooperation. The interest of persons in being governed by state strwtures to which they consent can often be protected by the right of persons to ellligrate and to change citizenship.24 If this is so, however, why is the right of nations to secede needed? After all, recognizing the rights of persons to emigrate and to change citizenship places sonle demands upon a state (even demands that some regimes have thought excessive); but the right to secede, which involves a claim to some territor); places even greater demallds upon a state. Addressing this questioti requires invoking a second reason in addition to the value of the consent of the governed: the value of cultural membership, as discussed earlier in this chapter. The ilrterest of persons in being governed by state structures to which they corrscnt and the value of cufturat membership together make up the basis for the justificlxeion of the right of nations to secede, Individual rnemhers of a nation are part of a cultural group that cannot simply be reconstituted by individual acts of emigration and citizenship changes. ff the members of a nation no longer wish to be governed by the current state, and if they do not have tile right to secede as a nation, then they are unable to satisfy both their interest in being governed bp a state to which they csnsexit and in xnaintaining their culture. If only emigration and changing citizenship were available to members of a naticzn who no longer consented to the government, then they would be burdened with a choice between fundamental interests: either maintaining their culture or living under a regime to which they did consent (assuming they could find one), A rigkt of nations to secede is justified because it secures both of these individual interests by ma king this choice unnecessary. There is an egalitarian consideration that can be brought to hear on the matter as well. fmmigrants are more iikely to have the option of continuing mernbersbiy in their culture after individually emigrating and going back to their country of origin. Citizens of a multinational state who are also members of a nation (in Kymlicka" sense) are burdened more heavily than those who are irnmigrants when the forrner citizens are required to choose between preserving their common culture and living under a regime to whiGh they consent. The right to secede may serve to avoid the necessity of such a choice, thereby promoting equaliyv between citizens who are members of llations and citizeils who are members of an immigrant group. These consideratiolis, then, do not support the right of immigrant comrrtunities to secede.j5 This is a special case in which the existence of differential entitlements is consistent with equal respect, Tbere are also practical reasons for not granting the right to secede to cultural groups that form as a result of immigration, Stxch a right would establish incentives to immigrate in order to make destabilizing territorial claims on a state and to close borders to forestaiI such claims.16

Constraints on the Right to Secede Might the right to secede endow rrtinority nations with excessive power" A minority nation might place heavy dexnands upon the majority; accompanied by the threat of exiting, The majority could, of course, refuse the demands and aIIt~wsecession tc) proceed. Perhaps the minrority claims natural resources or a manufacturing base, which would leave tl-re majority with a substantially reduced standard of living. Alternatively, the nation might be a majority whose ecsnorrtic power could be used to coerce the minority by threatening to exit unless injustices are accepted. Each of these examples suggests that the right to secede cannot he unlimited, but needs to be balanced with other consideratic.,ns of justice. This should cssrte as no surprise, A scheme of individuai rights is also a balancing act. The right to freedorn of expression is nut license to cause harm to another. Even though there is a right to free speech, not all speech is just; so also not aIf acts of secession are just, ever1 assuming a right to secede. The constraints on the justified exercise of the right to secede protect the legitimate interests of those individuals who do not support the secession.1' These individuals may be xnembers of two groups: citizens of the original state and persons residinf: in the territory claimed by the seceding nation. In justifjring the right to secede, I have assumed that the secession would result in 1-10 injustice to the citizens left behind it? the state, Tb understand the extent of this assumption, m d therefore the constraints on the justified exercise of this right, the legitimate security and material i n t e ~ s t sof citizens feft behind in the remaining state must be adumbrated, These include: ( l )the security of the state before hostile forces ( 2 )the justified claims of the state to resources ( 3 )tl-re justified claicns of tlze citizens of tl-re state to distributed resources

In addition, those residing in the territory claimed by the secedir~gnation must be assured that their rights are secure. These incIude: (4)the human rights of the residents of: the area claimed by the new state (S)tl-re equal democratic rights and privileges of all citizens, including natioilal minorities, of the new state. Clearly much of tl-re above Ianguage is contentious, especially interests one through three. It is possible to a g e e that justified claims must not he violated, as in ( 2 ) and (3), without agreeing on what co~-Isritutesa justified claim. It is best to understand ( 2 )and (3) as offering guidetines for debates &out the justice of a particular secession, These debates will have to pay close attention to the history and pattern of resource distribution in the

area, Taken together, these five interests constit~ltea set of constraints on the right of nations to secede, A secession that would create a new injustice by harming one of these five interests is proscribed, as would be a secession that would preserve a similar already-existing injustice when the likely outcome of preventing the secession would be the rectification of the existing inrjustice, Assuming a majority wishes to secede, secession is justified if and only if none of these five inceresrs is unjustly i-rarmed.18 The secand simplifying assrrmption that I utilized was that the nation wishing to secede was not suffering any iiustice at the hands of the state from which it wisl-red to secede, Is the nation" case for secession strengthened if its members are suffering an injustice? In one: sense tbc answer is no, The moral basis of the right to secede is not remedial, It stands regardiess of whether the nation is suffering an injustice, However, greater latitude might be given to tl-re seceding nation because of the injustice it is suffering. 'In particular, 1 have in mind lifting the constraint cclrresponding to f l ) ,Reference to a hypothetical example will show that this constraint can, under certain conditions, be lifted. Assume tl-rat the geographical area of a nation is occupied by the military of the state, and that the military is imposing restrictions on the civil and political rights of the nation's members. Resistance to such injustice is nut itself unjust; this includes armed resistance as a last resorr, Furthermore, as I argued in Chapter 5 where individuais can appropriately claim to be suffering an inrjustice, there is a duty on all others, not only compatriots, to come to their aid in cases in wllich the otl-rer necessary conditions of ~ustlfiedintervention are met. The state fc~rfeitsits right to appeal to the constraint associated with ( I ) , if the seceding nation may claim military assistance, However, constraints associated with the interest stated in (2) and ( 3 ) are still valuable protection against imperialistic outcoEEes of the war; The seceding rlatiori and its allies, b r example, would he bound to settle on just terms of resource division,

Two Objections

By way of drawing the argument to a close, X shall hriefiy consider two criticisms that are in certain ways peculiar to my defense of the justice of secession, First, it might he challenged that the right that I have defended has the peculiar character of ~ustifyingsecessio~~ under certain conditions, but of not satisfying secessionists who invariably are nationalists and would want to reject at least the constraint associated with (S). This may he the case, but the aim of the argument is not to justify nationalism; quite the contrary, I wish to show tl-rat tlie right to naliona! self-decermina~imc m be defended on cosmopolitan grounds. Nationalists may well reject many of the constraints that I put on secession, With respect tct the constraint associated

with ( S ) , such a rejection is probably based on a dispute about the value of state neutrality as a political condition for the rational revision of life plans, Hence, nationalists and cosrrtopolitans may disagree about the conception of persons (or its political ixltplications) that I defended in Chapter 2. Second, I have maintained that the claim of nations to secede is properly considered a right. It might be objected that such a claim may be considered a strong moral presumption, but not a right, There are two considerations that incline me to support the view that it is a right: The claim prcjtects fundamental irrterests of persolzs, artd the ciairn trumps conseq~zentialist considerations when no competing interest of Justice is at stake. For exarnple, if secession results in an overall lowering of the GNP for bath the new state and the ol& but it does so without harming just clairns to productive resources, it is not unjust, If one accepts this general line of reasoning, but not the view that tl-re claim is a right, then perhaps there is a controversy &out what a rights-claim amounts to. In any case, I do not see a significant practical, difference between a constrained strong presumytiorz in favor of secession and a constrained right to secede.

Two Alternative Accolrnts of the Right to Secede

The right of nt~tionsto secede that I have defended is a constrained one. It is constrained by other considerations of lustice, but requires no particular conditions o f injustice against the nation in order to be legitimately exercised. By analom one might consider no-Eault divorce, A ctmstrained right to no-fault divorce is one that is constrained in its exercise by considerations of justice, for example the financial obligation of one party to anothet; but need m t he motivated by any justiking gratmd, such as adulter); to be exercised. Compare my position to twa otl-rers. One, more permissive, takes the right to secede as absolute, reqliiring only the will of the majority a f the nation CO be exercised, The other, more restrictive, requires not onfy that obligations of Justice not be violated, but also that the right be exercised only as a remedy to existing injustices, Lenin sometimes argues for the right to secede on mtrral grounds, in addition to its strategic service in building international proletarian solidarity," When he does, he appeals to its derrtocratic value and seems not to see it as constrained by other csnsiderations of justice: "The class conscious workers do not advocate secession. They know the advantages of large states and the amalgamation of large masses of workers, But large states can be democratic only if there is complete equality among nations; that equality implies the right to secede."20 Sc~meof the difficulties with a trtore permissive positiorl are clear frc~mthe previorrs section. Secession may unjustly leave the remaining state with fewer

natural resources or a lower GNP than the original state. I am not claiming that an act of secession is unjust merely by virtue of its leaving the remaining state in either one of: these conditions, but that it may be. When secession is unjust, tlze will of those who wish to secede should be constrained on behaif of the legitimate interests of those who would be unjustly damaged.z" Atleu Buckanan argues for a more restrictive right of nations to secede. He contends that one of the following three conditions must exist in order for secession to he justified: ( 1 ) persistent and serious vidations of human rights, ( 2 )unredressed past unjust takings of territory, or (3) discriminatory redistribution.22 This more restrictive account seerns to place undue burdens on those who wish to secede. A comparison to a system of individual rights helps clarify this. A person's right to speak may be exercised if it does not co1lRict with the rights of others. To be ~ustifiedin speaking Ireely, one need not appeal to some injustice that will be remedied by exercising the right, Restricting a person's exercise of free speech is justified only by its detrimental effects o n the rights of others. Since secession protects important individual interests, and assuming that secession results in no injustices either to the citize~lsof the state from which the natioil is seceding or to the inrdividrrals residing inr the territory claimed, there wc~nldappear to be no gaod reason to iirnit or prevent an act of secession.

General ChaNenges to the Right to Secede There are two challenges to the general view that nations have the right to secede. The first challenge involves tlze feasibility of the right, The oughtimplies-can principle holds that if there are morally justifiable reasons fttr some course of action, then that action inust be possible; csnversely, if the course of action is not possi"oe, then it cannot be morally justified, A wellknowtl criticism of the right to secede is that it violates the uught-impliescan principle: To put it in the simplest possible terxns: there i s a very large number of potrntial rlations on earth, Our pianet also corltains room for a certain number of independent or autonomous political units. On any reasonable calculation, the former number (of potet~tiainations) is probably muclz, much larger tl~anthat of possible viable states. If this arguxnerlt or calculation is correct, not aII nationalisms c-an be satisfied, at any rate at the same time, The satisfaction af some spells the frustration t>f others,'"

This criticism calls far two responses, First, the logic of the argument is fallacious. From tbe fact that all acts of secession by nations are impossible it does not follow that any particular act is, To claim othenniise is to c ~ m -

mit tl-re fallacy of divisian. If a particular act of secession is possible, then the ought-implies-can principle is not violated. On what is, perhaps, a more chnritabie reading of the above argument, it might be taken as simply signaling a political coxnplication that at some point will arise if too rnany nations secede from states. Even a n this reading the criticism is weak, There are any number of individual rights that would be the cause of severe complications if too many individuals tried to exercise them at once. Consider how diifrcult everyday life would be if too many people decided to exercise their rights to freed~rtzof assembly by engaging in mass demonstrations. The recognition of a right does not constitute encouragemetlc to exercise that right, Therehre, a worry about the complications that would arise if it were to be generally exercised is not an adequate reason not to recognize it. A secsnd critic is^^ of the right s f nations to secede centers s n the problem of identifying nations. It might be argued that, unlike the bearer of individual rights that is not in question, the bearer of national rights is not always so clear. There may be difficult cases, Jf a nation cannot be adequately distinguished, then ascribing rights to it is irnpracticatl. Such an argument is wroilg to suppose that the bearer c>f individual ri&ts, the person, is not in question. Much s f the controversy surrounding abortion, euthanasia, and the treatment of animals centers on the nature of pwsoahood. Pointing out the controversy with individual rights is not merely a dodge of the criticism of national rights. The point is that in the case s f indivictuai. rights we are able to employ the rnoratl concept in a range of noncontroversiaf cases, even though there are disputes on a number of others. Likewise, there are undis~ puted examples of natio~ls;in general, the difference between a n a t i o ~and an immigrant group is clear. If there are difficult cases of idenfification, say Airican Americans, this should not discourage the use of national rights in the noncontroversial cases..

Jt is possibfe to defend the right of nations to self-determination without either assuming that nations generate duties of justice or advocating that state institutions and policies should r e i h r c e a nalional culture, Olle resemblance between the right of nations to self-determination and the sovereigz~tyof states is that both are constrained by considerations of justice, The upshot of the constraints on national s e l f - d e t e r m i n a is that cosmopolitails and nationalists wili no doubt part company on the westions of what a natiorl may with kstice require of those who fall under its authority and of wl-ren it may exercise its right to self-determinatian, but they can agree at least that the right of nations ta self-determination in principle may be claimed,

SEVEN

E>begirz with, there newr has beer$, rror is there t o d q ally ahsefzce of hostile foreigr~flowers t o prt~vokewa1":What is worse, the very dez~elopmerzr of the empzrc accr~i?zgfrom thetr rlt.~~>rf2oratio?z has ~ < ; " ~ O L I Cstill II worse wars wtthi~z,I refer t o the civtl wars utzd sc-ictsl r.cpresttzgs that involve em?$more wretched anxieties for human bebzgs, either shaket~by t h e ~ ractual rmpact, nr Il'vglzg u z f e ~ rof thetr rertewal. Massacres, frequerrt r ; k ~ z ~ Sl i W ~ E " ~ Zhardshzps ~ I ~ , $00 dire t o erzdure are but par$ o f t h e ravages of m r . 1 utterly gurzable t o descrtbe them as they &re,and as they ought trz be descrzbed; atzd everz if I shouEd try 20 knegb, where coaald I etzd? -St. Augustine'

In Chapter 5 I defended fcmr grounds for a duty to intervene Into the affairs of a state: comparative Injustice, reasonable belief in the likelihood of success, prr>yortir>natand last resort. f def'ended these with respect to military and nonmilitary interventions alike. Tl-tere are two challenges to any criteria that set out to limit the justified use of military fc~rce,One is the claim of political realism, which states that when it csERes to war no co11siderations of moral obligations to noncompatriots are relevant, The other is the view of pacifism, which holds that the use of military force can never f interbe justifiecS. In this chapter X: shall argrle that the grounds t ~ justified vention defended in Chapter 5 are applicable to determining whether a resort to war-interilatic~nal or civil-is ~ustified.I shall detend this view against the claims of political realism and pacif sm, and apply it to the Gulf

War and tl-re Kosovo War in order to shed light on both tl-re ixnplications of the view and the moral status of these wars.

] ~ ~ C ) L ~ " I " ~ CRAE L ALISM OR

] ~ ~ O L I " I "W~ICT S HOUT

MORALS

Political realism developed in the aftermath at-the two world wars and became the prevailing orthodoxy in policy circles inr the United States. It has both empirical a r descriptive aspects and normative or prescriptive aspects. As a nr~rmativeview3it holds that if there are any relevant moral considerations in the justification of state action in international affairs (including going to war), they are only collsideratiolis of what a statesperson owes the represented state. So, political realists may l-rold either that there are no moral considerations relevant to the deliberations about the use of military force at all or that the only reievax~tmoral corisiderations are the interests of one's own state or tl-re statesperson" d~utiesto tl-re citizens of that state. Political realists typically maintain that the object of foreign policy, including military policy, should be the pwsnit of national interests. On the face of it, political realism would seem an implausiMe view. War involves the intentional killing and destruction of infuastrwture, and results in psychological suflering far beyond the battlefiellf. How could anyone deliberating about engaging in war not be required to consider wllether it is right to treat others in this way? One way political realism is dekxided is by the claim that en~rtainirtg moral considerations when deliberating about war leads to bad consequences,Wwever, this is straightfowardly self-defeatir7g. Prociuction of bad consequences is only a colicern if one has a moral obligation to those suffering tl-re consequences, wl-rich is precisely what politicai realism denies. Occasionally defenders of political realism wilI suggest that only national inrterests can be considered in deliberating about war because there is no international consensus about morality and justice.TThere is, however, considera ble consensus codified by the Geneva Convention a bout the treatmerit of enemy soldiers. Political realists might urge that this is consensus about conduct in war, not about wl-ren to go to war, Still, even if there is little mt~ralconsensus about when to go tc-,war, the conc'iusion that there are no moral lirnitatio~isabout when to go to war is warranted only if moral principles require actual consensus for their justification. Tlzis argument is never made by political realists. There may be good reasons why pofitical realists do not try to justify the claim tl-rat actual consensus is a necessary condition of the justification of moral principles. For such consensus would be a very demanding requirement. It would meal3 for example, that principles that enjoy widespread but

noc unanimous support-such as that slavery is unjust-rare nor justified. Many strong and widely shared moral intuitions would fail this requirement. In addition, the requireme'it wt>uld have a troubling consequence for the Logic of moral judgment. One could not claim that any policy not enjoying either una~limoussupport or unmirrzous rejection was either just or ~lnjust.However, it seems perfectly sensible to say, and indeed the law of the excluded middle requires us to say, that such policies must be either just or unjust, So, this kstification of political realism fails." There are two defenses that some pr>litical realists invoke that have to JO with tl-re relationship between individuals and groups, One is the claim that goups, indudillg states, are llecessarily more inclined to act on their own interests than indi.crrduals."~fowever, unless the claim is that it is impossible for groups to set aside their own interests when they conflict with the interests of others, this only proves tl-rat groups are rnore likely to be evil than individuals, not that their actions are nat subject to moral ~udgment.Reinhold Niebuhr offers several reasons to believe that groups are likefy to he more self-interested than individuals, including the claim that when individuals serve groups they project their ego onto the g r o u p . V h a t may appear to he altruism then is merely another form of selfish attachment. This is, he believes, particularly apparent in patriotism that "transmutes individual unselfishness into national egoism."7 This may be an astute account of the psychology s f patriotism, hut it does not imply that psychological barriers prevent the individtlal policymaker horn seeing beyand the interests of the state. IUore plausibly, such people simply refuse to give the interests of noncompatriots the saiBe weight as those of compatriots. Additionally, the socialagicaX barriers that Niebuhr invokes are not insurmountable. He argues that the capacity for self-criticism is a necessary condition of ethicai actitrn and that states are incapable s f it, "iEven those tendencies toward sell-criticism in a nation which do express themselves are usually thwarted by the governing classes and by a certain instinct for unity in society."'x However, this analysis puts far too much power in the hands of t l ~ e"governing classes." Wars in democratic societies often meet with popular resistance, and policymakers may engage in rational evaluation of policy without engaging in public self-criticism. So, none of these reasons are sufficient for believing that it is impossible for states to act on anything btlt tlieir own interests. The second claim that realists make regarding the relationship between individuals and groups is tliat policymakers are entrusted as agents of citizens to act on their interests. George FeKennan puts the argument as folIOWS: "GOvernmee'it is an agexit, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of t l ~ enational society it represents, not to the rnoraX irnpulses that individuaj elements of that society may experience."VThere is more than one way to interpret Kennan's claim, He may he arguing that acting

on interests sl-roufd truxnp acting on moral principles because policymakers are entrusted to act on the former but not the latter. Alternatively, he may be saying that policymakers should act on common interests because they are the interests of ail and not on rnoral principles because tl-rey are not l-reld by all. Neither argument is convincing, Consider the first one, Xf J am given ficense by anotl-rer to act on that person3 interests in, say, seliing a house, this does not justifji my defrauding a ptential buyec The reason for this is that the komeower wsrild not be ~ustifiedin defrauding a seller; and if the l-romeowner is not, then the agent is not.1" Generafly the duties of agents to principals (in this example, homeowners) are limited by more genera! duties of all to all, What would be a violation of a duty to another if performed by a principal is a violation if performed by the agelit as well. The second argument must assume that moral principles are binding onXy if accepted, This assumption would permit an agent to violate a principle simply because the principal does not accept it. However, if this assumption were true, wrongdoing would be reduced to persons acting contrary to principles that they themselves accepted, This would require most of us to alter drasticany our sense of when trtorai criticism is justified. Hence, the assumptioll is implartsibfe, and the argument that requires it is unconvincing, E-Ians Morgenthau" ddefense of political realism is built on the empirical claim that politics is properly understood only when political agents are taken to pursue p o w e ~The ~ f reason why this is the sole way to understand politics apparently is that it is rational for politicd agents to pursue power a116 power alox~e.llThe claixn that an activity is rational is rnore than merely descriptive; it is prescriptive as well. Morgenthauk view is that the pursuit of power is not only essential for understanding politics, it alone is what political actors should Ise about.1" Hence, by invoking the raeionalicy of the pure pursuit of power, Morgenthau moves from offering an empirical theory of politics to a llormative one,l"Since anything other than the pursuit of power is irrational, states should consider nothing else when deliberating about going to war, IWorgentbau emphasizes what he takes to be the moral imglicatiorr of this position: "While the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of a moral principles, the state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringexnent of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself i n s p i ~ dIsy the moral principle of national survivale9'I5 The essential, but controversial, point in Morgeiltltau's account is that only the pursuit of political power cc-~nstitutesrational action in politics, There are two issues here, Why does the pursuit of power have any claim on rational action in politics? And, why does it lay an exclusive claim? Morgenthau is of little kelp on these questions, apart from his insistence that the laws of politics have their roots in unchanging h~zmannature.16

Perhaps he is relying on an ernpiricai claim tl-rat it is in tl-re nature of l-rumans to see the pwsuit of political power as a good. Some empirical evidence csuld be garnered for this claim hp noting that political actors have pursued power, often at tl-re expense of otl-rer ideals, This was a frequent theme, for example, in the literature and philosophy of ancient Greece, Evidence such as this, however, would be insufSicient to verify the empirical claim, for it does not show that those who are not political actors see the pursuit of power as good-and clearly many do not, An afternative strategy would be to argrle that there is soine conceptual connection between political power and tl-re good, just as an economist might claim that the good is what we prefec If it were conceptually true that the pursuit of power were good, then perhaps we could claim that it was rational, However, there are a number of counterexampl~to the antecedent, For example, tl-re pursuit of tlze power to enslave others is surely not good, Perhaps the hest way to interpret :Morge.tlthau\ view is as a metaphysical one along Nietzschean lines. The claim, however, that the will-to-power is constitutive of human nattlre would assert too muck since Morgenthau wants also to say, 'T~oliticalrealism is based upon a ptlualistic conception of human nature, Real man is a composite of "economic man,' 'political man,""moral man,? '"rrligious m a n , k t c . " ~ ~ If there are 1-10 good reasons to take the pursuit of power as an inevitably rational plan of political action for all persons, then there are no good reasons to take it as solely constitutive of rational political action, Even if one could find some reason to accept the former claim, accepting the latter would be difficult to reconcile with Morgexithau's avowed pluralism. If one sort of pursuit were solely rational in politics, another in economics, and ailother still in morals, then either the world would have to come to us neatly divided into political, economic, and moral corztexts or there would be rational grounds for not pursuing power in certain circuxnstances. 13ractical problems, though, cannot be so neatly distinguished. For example, many pc~liticajand economic matters have a moral dimension, Although Morgenthau might want to claim that a policymaker" role as political agent would be to pursue the goal of power, rather than to do the right thing? that would simply beg the question of why the person with power to act st~ouldassuxne that role when acting. In other words, it provides no way to limit a pr&lem as strictly political rather than as, sayv; moral. Therefore, Morgenthau" sattempt to evade moral norms fails, The most sophisticated attempt to establish tl-re realist- view did not receive as maily endorsements in the twentieth century as might have been expected. This is the view that states exist within the state of nature vis-Avis one another, and in tllis state xnorai principles toward otllers do not apply.18 Historically the view was first presented by Ftobbes and slightly refashioned by Hegel.1' In essence, the view is that among sovereign states

there is no higher autl-rority that can compel them to coxnply with a principle. E-Ience, states are in a state of nature with respect to one another, which is to say that they have the right to take up whatever means they choose in pursuit of their interests, even if those means include warfare, This position has been refuted by Charles Beitz.2We identifies two main parts of the Hobbesian argumem: first, a prelllise that states are in a state of nature with respect to one another; and second, that this entails that tl-rese states have no moral duties to one another. Beitz argLIes that neither the empirical premise nor the moral inference are warranted, Xn order for states to be in a state of nature with respect to one anotl-rer, they would, among other things, have to be independent of one another in the sense that they could order their Internal affairs and policies independently. This would mean that each in the pursuit of its OWII interests could threaten others without the expectation of harm to its internal afhirs. Given current levels of economic, political, and military integration, however, this is not the case. Even if' states were in a state of nature with respect to one another; they would be warranted in ignoring the rnoraf clairns of otl-rer states only if one is not morally obliged to do what is not in one's Iitlterest. This is because the Hobbesian point is that honoring the rnoral claims of others in a state of nature may nut resuit in reciprocation and xnay even result in punishment, Beitz" first point that states do not exist within a state of nature with respect to one another is convincing, and sufficient for refuting the Hohbesian arguxnent. If the interests of states are in various ways bound up together, then there exists various deterrents to harmful or threatening actic-tn, There is, then, reasall to believe that action directed toward realizing ~ h ers3nterests may nut be punished and may even be reciprocated, Beitz" second claim is that even if states did exist withir-r a state of nature, they would stili he warranted in honoring the moral claims of one =Iother since rnoraliq rnay require forgoing self-interest," There may be wiggle room here, however, for a modification that would preserve at least some of the Mrtbhesian point, One rllight allow that morality requires forgoing most of wllat may be covered under self-interest without allowing that morality rewires one to sacrifice one" life. In other words, there may be an agent-relative limit of self-sacrifice up to which, but not beyond, morality can make dexnands. For example, perhaps my duty to another to keep a promise should be relaxed if it turns out that it would have the unforeseen consequence of costing rne my life, Intcr~lationally,assuminrg what Beicz has proved false, namely, tbat a state of nature exists that licenses war, then perhaps states may be relieved of their obligations to one another if the result of lulfilling them wr>uldbe seric?usthreats to the lives of their citizens, I da not claim to l-rave proven tbat this is the case, but it seems plausible to me, If it is, then the case against the Wohbesian political realist must

rest entirely on the claim, which Beitz has satisfactorily establisl-red, that an internaticznal state of nature does nt-zt exist. Having surveyed the argumerits in defense of the view that states have no moral obligations to noncornpatriots in foreign policy matters, they all appear wanting. Without this claim, political realism loses its fc~rceas a plausible position. Moreover, since there are no good reasons to exclude colisicieration of moral obligations to noncompatriots in the assessment of hreign policy, and assuming that the pursuit of national interests may sometimes be unjust, the political realists' endeavor to jillstify foreign policy solely by an appeal to national interest is a failure.

Pacifism presents a different kind of challenge to the criteria that X estahlished in Chapter 5 for justified militas). intervention, Although there are many kinds of pacifisrn m d a variety of justifications, by pacifism I xnean the view that the use of military force for purpclses of settling political disputes is wrong.22 There appear to be two main kinds of arguments that pacifists use to reject just war theory, or the view that the limited use of military force may be justified, Sclme reject the theory's power to decide cases 0x3 the basis of its criteria. Others maintain that the theory is inseliisitive to a morally condemning kature of military conflict," 1 shall ct>nsider and reject versions of each of these ki11ds c~fargumellts. The first kind of argument i refer to as ""sqtical pacifism" since the point of this argument is that we sixnply are not in a position to know whether sufficient justice lies a n a given side to justify its war effort. Some of what Gandhi espoused amtrunts to arguments of this kind. The second kind a l argurnent holds that just war theory misses very important aspects of the morality of war and as a result fails tc-z see the main moral problem with war, icall this '"normative pacifism," While skeptical pacihm holds that we cannot know enough about the morality of a situation to justify engaging in war, normative pacifism holds that we can know enough about the trtorality of virtually any war to judge it to be wrong.

Skeptical Pacifism Jf we suppose that political life is sufficiently ambiguous o r complex, we might be able to maintain that we cannot know enough about the actions of others, the threats that they pose, or the institutions that they advocate to justify using military force in order to prevent them fi-om achieving their objectives or to sverturrr an order they have established. Olle of Gandhi's

justifications of satyagraha, nonviolence, was along these lines. ""Styagraha is literally holding on to f i u t h and it means, therefore, Truth-force, It excludes the use of vioience because man is not capa bfe of knowirtg the a hsolute uurl-r and, therehre not comyecent to punish,"" It is not entirely clear what Gandhi means by ""absolute truth," but I assume that his point is that in order to ernpltjy violence one must know that the other side is wrong and that one's cause is right, and that humans are in principle incapable of having such knowledge, Gandhi's claim is not a reiativi~tone. He is not claiming that there are many moral truths, nor is l-re espousing tl-re nihilistic view that there is no moral truth. On the contrary, he seems to suppose that there is a moral truth of the matter in a gven situation, hut in principle it cannot be adequately kntjwn by mere hutrtans. Additionally; he is committed to the view that if the moral truth of the rnatter cannot be known, tl-ren resorting to violence is not permissible. I see two problems with this position. First, the claim that violence is permissible only if the truth is known is itsell: a moral claim. A tl-roroughgoingrnorai skeptic will be unable to invoke such a claim kcnuse it cannot be known. A moral skeptic, however, may not be committed to thoroughgoir~gskepticism, and might, rather, profess skepticism about the moral character of l-rurnan conduct and institutions, but not &out all moral principles, Even if this is an &equate response to the first problem the secold is mtlre severe, The view that in principle we cannot know the rnoral truth about any of the actions of others, the threats that they pose, or the institutions that they advtjcate is simply wrong, Qne of the moments in Nobel Laureate Rigoberta Mencl-rfi's life that lead her ultimately to support the military struggle against the Lucas Carcia regime in Guatemala was the kidnapping, torture, and killing of her sixteen-year-old brother by the Guatemalan m y . Here is l-row she descrihs his torture before dying: Day and night they subjected hirn to terribfe, terr~btepain. "They tied hirn up, they tied his testicles, my brother" sexual organs, they tied the111 befiind wit11 a string and forced hirn to run, . . . My brother was tortured for sixteen mare days. They cut off his fitlgcrnails, thcy cut: off his fitlgers, thcy cut off his skin, they bumed parts of his skin. Many of clie wo~inds,the first ones, swelled and were infected. He stayed ative, They shaved his head and putfed it down t>neither side and cut: off the fleshy part of his face, My brother suffcrcd tortures on every part of his hod.?;, but they took care not to damage the arteries or veins so that I.te would survive the tortures and not die, They gave hirn food so that 11e" 1.told out and nor dic frorn his uruunds.zf

When confronted with descriptions such as these, it is hard to see how one might be skepticai sf the morality of the army's action. Nothixlg any-

one could do would make that person deserve such treatment, Therefore, it is simply false that in principle we cannot know the moral truth about any of the actions of others, the threats that they pose, or the institutions that they advocate. There may be times in which such knowledge is unavailable, but it would be grossly mistaken to believe that the unavailability of such knowledge i s a riecessary feature of our mt~rallives,

Nornzative Pacifism Nonnative pacifism holds that even "just wars" are morally impermissible because they involve the commission of wrongs not captured by the criteria of jtrst war theory, Robert L, Holmes offers an argumerit of this sort that presents a serious challenge to just war tl-reory. Holmes develops the following argument against ail modern wars, including wars that confom with the requirements of lust war theory: ( l j Killing innocent persons is presuxnptively wrong, ( 2 )war necessarily- involves the killing of innocent persons, therefcjre ( 3 )war is presumptively wrong." The point of the argumerit is not to defeat arguments for war in all imaginable circumstances, but to establish a presumytian against the justification of a war that ail proponents of war in particular cases must defeat, The first premise has basic intuitive appeal, Tfi killing innocent persons is not wsorzg, then it i s difficult to imagine what kinds of kiilings would be wrong; our intuitions against killing are strong enough not to countelzance that, The second premise is somewhat less obvious. An innocent person is a person who has done no wrong relative to the war." This would include all those who are fighting on the side of justice (if there is such a side) and employing just means, It would also include, Holmes argues, sofBe of the c s ~ ~ b a t a nand t s government leaders on the unjust side, since cornbatants are often forced by conscription to fight and leaders may oppose the war but seek to influence piicy from the insidc,2Wertce, even those fighting on the side of justice and ernploying just means will kill innocents, Is P-Tolmes"ssecrmd premise true? Some supporters of just war theory argue that soldiers, or at least those prosecuting an unjust war, are not innocent; so, a just war conducted only against soldiers does not involve killing innoceilts, or at least not intentir>ilally killing innocents. Elizdeth hscombe" view is characteristic: "What i s req~zired,for the people attacked to be non-innocent in the relevant sense, is that they should tl-remselves be engaged in an obectively unjust proceeding whictl the attacker has the right to make his concern; or-the commonest case-should he Lznjustly attacking him."29 This, however, simply misses one of the strongest points of the pacifist position: It is a fairly strung moral intuition, often codified as a legal precept, that appraisal of guilt or innocence for evil deeds

involves more than one's actions; it involves also tl-re mental state in wllich the action is taken, If one would not perform an action except under conditions of coercion, then m e map be doing wrong, hut one is innocetit of the wrongdoing. Consider the case of someone wllo is coerced at gunpoint to rob a bank, It is reasonable to excuse such a person of the wrongdoing hecause of the coercion, The closest case of this in wartime is the conscripted soldier who would not, but fnr the conscription, fight, Assurning that stiff penalties exist for evading coercion, such a soldier is in a situation pretty similar to the coerced bank robber, Hence, it is reasonable to excuse the soldier of the guilt of fighting in an unjust war, Holmes also suggests tbat a government official with same responsibiliry for the prosecutic~n01an unjust war may he innocent of the wrongdoing if that offrcial is at the same time attempting to reform the government's policy in line with tlze dexnands of justice, Although this case is far less intuitively obvious than the case of the coilscripted soldier, it may well he that such an official is innocent of the wrongdoing of the war since she would not choose to be involved in prosecuting the war and is attempting to use certain means to halt it, One problem for Holmes's argument is that it is faflacious. If all of the elernents or parts of sometl-ring have a certain property, it does not follow that the whole or the composite has that prclperty. If all of the team members are good players, it does not fclllow that the team is good. Or,if all of the parts of my car are lightweight, it does not follow that the car itself is lightweight, To believe otherwise is to commit the fallacy of composition. A whole can be more or less than the sum of its parts. So, even if all of the acts in a war are wrong, one might still question whether the war is wrong. More technically, war might be an organic whale whose overall evaluation is more positive than the evaluation of it parts.3" 'Holes is aware of this, but he contends that sometimes the properties of the parts infect the whole, as when unsafe brakes make the car unsafe,sTThe substar~tiveissue, then, is whether certain wrong acts in war, namely, kialing innocents, infect the morality of an otherwise just war. The fact that Holmes's argument as presented is invalid is not determinative of its h a t evaluation. For he could easily save the vcllidtq of the argument simply by recasting it as foltows: ('I) If war necessarily involves killing innocents, then it is presumptively wroilg; (2) war necessarily il~volves killing innocents; therefore, (3)war is presumptively wrong, When the argument is stated this way, it is clear that the substatlcive issue is whether killing inilocents in war infects the morality of an otherwise just war, The most important issue is whether the first premise of this revised argnment is true. If war necessarily involves killing innocents, wllat is its moral status? Three possible answers are most plausible: Either the kifiing of innocents considered alone is indeterminative of the overall r~oralityof war,

estabiisl-resthe immorality of war, or establishes a presuxnption tl-rat war is immoral. Elolmes" position is the third, which, compared with the other two, looks most plausible. To say that the killing of: innocents considered alone is indeterminative of the overall morality of war i s to give our inc~iitioils about killing illnocents too little regard, This suggests that there is nothing morally special about inrlocelit persons that r ~ a k e skilling them especiafty wrong, If this i s tl-re case, however, then the distinction between moral innocence and guilt has no presumptive significance, Given two difkrent sets of facts, one case involving killilllg the guilty and the other involving killing the inrtocenc, we would have nu basis for even a presumptive comparative moral judgment. This does not square with most people's intuitive sense of the matter. In comparison, the claim that kiHing innocent persons simply reliders the Iarger process that requires it wrong gives weight to tl-re moral stattls of innocence. However, it may give too much weight since it supposes that there are no circumsrances in which the evil of: killil~gan innmelit can be outweighed by a greater good, This supaosition does not bllow from the assumption that persons have a specia! moral status. Even if persons have a special mtrral status, it may be that helping a sufficient n~zmherof them avoid some terrible harm or injustice, outweigl-rs the evil of killing an innocent one. For most of US, our intuitions about this sort of thing are not settled. Ttle claim that killing innocent persons simply renders the larger process that warrants it wrong requires that these intuitions be settled, and it is therefore an implausible claim, The tzpshot of preceding arguments is that if war necessarily involves the killing of innocents, it is presumptively wrong. The force of the conditional, however, depends upon the strength of the presumption. Recall that Holmes allows that both solcliers prosecuting a war and government officials coordinating it may be morally innocent. What is the strength of the presumption against killil~ginilocents of these sorts? Consider two cases roughly analogous to the situation of the conscripted soldier and the reforming official. Gase 1: Xn the middle of the night a hatchet-bearing sleepwalker attacks my housemate. I do not know that the attacker is sleepwalking, hut I can repel the attack only by killing her. Case 2: A group of arrned thugs has already attacked my neighbor once, 1 see them coming for a second attack, I d o rtat know that one member of the group has b e n urging restraint, I can prevelit the imminent attack only by firing on the group, which will probably kill all of ttlem. Does the inrtocence of the person in each case prohibit that person being killed? Unless there is an absolute prohibition againss killing innocents-which Molrnes does not endorse-I can see no reason why, under the circuxnstances, appeclling to their innocence provides sufficient reclson to believe that it would be wrollg to kilj them.

One way to formutate the judgxnent that killing the attackers in the two cases above is permissable is that, when it is reasonable to suppose that a persons person is engaged in a potentially deadly, unjust attack on in~10~ent and tlle only means available for preventing the attack is to kill the attacker, then it is permissible to kill, In other words, the activity of unjustly attacking defeats the presumption of the wrongness of killing innocents. This principle justifies treating combatants as Legitixnate targets in a just war, The nt>rmativepacifist rna.); of course, reject the principle, but in doing so wr)uId also have to reject the permissibility of ki'tling the trturderous sleepwalker or tl-re conscience-stricken thug. Indeed, Halrnes asserts tl-rat the killing of*inntxents by an aggrsgSc is no worse than the killing at-innocent aggessors by those who oppose aggession.3z HoIxnes" point seems to be that tlle deknsive attacks against innocent aggressors xnay not be repelled by deadly force in the narne of protecring innocents since it constitutes an attack on ail innocent. So, to say that the one sort of attack is justified and the other is not is inconsistent, However, to focus only on innocence obscures a difference, namely, that some are innocent although their action is unjust, while others are innocent and suffering an uxljust harm, The normative pacifist xnight redy that this stili does not justif?r harming the perpetrator of an injustice in order to halt the injustice, because whether harm should be meted out depends upon whether one is morally guilty, Hence, harm should no more be meted out to the innocent attacker than to the harmed victims. Flowever, whether harm should be meted out to a person is not solely a matter of one" srtoral innocence. Certain actions may have costs, even tl-rough no one is xnorally responsible for creating those costs, In these circumstances, principles of*justice cannot avoid assigtling the cssts despite moral innrlce~iceall around. For some classes of accidents, no one is morally responsible: Everyone took proper care yet someone slipped and fell in a shop, or someone's iivestock got loose and trampied someone else's propcry. Who should absorb these costs: the persons who fell and wllose crops were trampled, or the sl-rop owner and the livestock owner? No matter what the answer is, someoile will be harmed who is, by hypothesis, morally inrnocent, If there are certain kinds of activity tl-rat are especialIy dangerous or socially disruptive, even with due care, it may be reasonahle to assign strict liability to those engaged in that activity, Strict liability assigns the cssts of the accident to the noninjured party, even if care was taken on both sides. In tl-\iscase, those who engagc in the activity may be as morally innocent as those who are made worse off by it when it goes awry, but the former nonetheless should bear the costs of the harm rattler tl-ran tllose who are victimized by it. The assignment of costs here is detached from moral guilt or innocence and is, rather, a function of certain norms, which may include the unfairness of making victims absorb

costs, tlze reasonabieness of giving incentives for greater care, and even the greater capacity of the one party to absorb tlze costs. When an inlxocent belligerent involved in an unjtist war poses crdible tlzreat to an innocent person, there wit1 be costs, Eitl-rer the innocent victim will likely be harmed or the belligerent repelled by deadly force will be harmed. Who should suffer this harmxf the assignment of costs were only a hnccion of moral guilt or innocetlce, tlzen clearly neither party should; but just as surely3somebody must, If, as I have argued above, in cases where there is no inorat guilt assigning costs shoulct be a function of sther considerations, it may be reasonable to hotd tlzat the innocent belligerent slzould suffer the harm.3"Making the belligerent pay through militarilg repulsing the attack may encourage gclvernments to think more seriously before engaging in unjust hostilities, thereby affording greater security for innocent victims and just arrangements, If eitlzer the innocent beitigerents or their victims must pay, then offering greater security to potential victims and just arrangements provides a good reasorr for maki~lgthe attackers pay*fn other words, making belligerencs absorb the costs of their injustices, even if they are innocent, is a way of enswing that injustice does not pay and that justice does. Hence, the presulnptive wrctngness of killing innocents in war is defeasible if those innocents are perpetrating injustices by deadly force-34 15 it is a matter of justice that illnocent belligerents, rather than their innocent victims, should pay the costs of the unjust attack, then it would he wrong for innocent victixns to have to pay the costs. This is significant as it entails that protecting innocent persons from attacks, where we are able, is not merely permissible but a duty of justice. To fail to offer such protection in the name of pacifism, then, is unjust, One way that Hofmes seeks to avoid the conclusion that the presumption against kiHing. innit~centsmay be overridden in cases in which they are pergetracing injustices by deadly force is by invoking the distinction between killiilg and letting die. Not Letting an innc~ce~lt person die is supererogatoryit is good to do, but not wrong if one fails to do it-but killing an innocent person violates a duty not to kill tlzat person and is therefore wrong." There are two problems with invoking this disti~~ction, First, we have a duty of jusi n others, g inchcling tice to prevent certain kinds of wongs h0177 ~ c c ~ ~ r rto civil and dexnocratic rights abuses and violations of egalitarian principles. When we fail to meet a demand of justice, we have violated a duty and not merely failed to meet a standard of supererogation, So, judging the killing of innocent betligerents engtrged in an unjust attack against the hilure to defend innocent victims involves weighing conflicting prima facie duties against each other, not weighing a duty against a principle of supererog~tion.Second, if, as X argued above, tlze presuxngtion against killing innocents is defeasible when necessary to protect innocent victims, then the weighing of the conflicting pri~nafacie duties should favor protecting the innocent victi~ns,

One might worry tl-rat, in seeking to justify tl-re defeasibility of the presumption against killing innocents, I have proven too much, for this might also justify the killing sf noncombatants in the name s f resisting an attack on innocents. This is not the case. The force of the argument that I have been making is specific: It is only that the presumption against killing innocent belligererits involved in an rmjust attack may be overridden in order to assign the costs of tl-reir attack to thern ratl-rer than to their innocent victims. From this it does not follow that noncombatants, other innocent persons, rnay he kitled in order to defend against an attack. Since there is a presumption against killing innocents and since noncombatants are not engaged in an attack, there are no costs to assign to anyone a n the basis of their conduct, Therefore, there are no grounds for defeati~~g the presumption against: killing innocetit noncombatants; and my argument is csnsistent with tl-re principle of noncombatant immunity, Ivy argumeitt has ntlt shown that the just war position is without moral costs. On the contrarq., it has accepted the ctaim of nonnative pacifism that even in a just war imocent persons wilI be killed. There is then some truth in the normative pacifist account: Even a just war cclmes at significant moral costs. So, too, does the pacifist position, which holds that the military force necessary to protect innocents rnay not be used, My argtxment is that justice weighs in favor of assigning the costs of an unjust belligerence to the perpetrators, even if some of them are innocent, rather than to the innt~centvictims. Perhaps the normative pacifist would respond that my position takes the existence of unjust belligerence as a given, whereas in fact the pacifist goal is to end all belligerence. The pacifist position is that if its goal were realized, there would be no situations in wltich tl-re costs of belligerence would have to be assigned to innocents since there would be no warfare. In comparison to an arrangement in which costs necessarily get assigned to innocents-the question is wlletl-rer tl-rey are assigned to those waging an unjust war or their victims-this is a superior ideal. Again, there seems to be some truth in the pacifist position. However, this does not settfe the matter, for it says nothing about what should be done when innocent persons are tl-re victims of unjust belligerence, Perhaps the pacifist would reply that if nonviolence had been practiced earlier, matters would not have come to this point. In any given case, of course, this may or may not be true. Assume that it is true. We may concllude then that it would have beeit better if nt>nviolettce were practiced since it would have prevented innocent persons from beir-rg killed. It does not follow from this that resorting to violence is proscribed. Among several alternatives, the fact that one is morally superior does not entail that the second best is proscribed. The foregoing argument established that it was better tl-rtlt tlze innocent perpetrators of in~usticesuffer than the innt>centvictims, So, if the nt>nvioleittalternative has nat been emptoyed, an appeal to fclrce is not therefore wrong.

The pacifist may respond, however, tl-rat tl-re admission of the superioricy of nonviolence clinches the pacifist case in another way Since it is practically ivossible both to prepare for war and for nonviolent resistance, and sixlee nonviolent resistance is superior, then preparations for war should be renounced in favor of the morally superior course of action. This argument bears some analogy to the following. Of several candidates for office, one i s clearly the best and another is second best. There is no proscription against voting far the second best. Indeed, in light of all alternatives but the best, one shc~uldvote for the second best. Assuming that one can only vote once, one should vote for the best. This version of the normative pacifist argument accepts my conclusions from above, that, in comparison to allowing inilc~centvictims to he killed by unjust helligeretlts, there are got~dreasons for defeating the presu~~ptive wrong of killing innocent persons; but since nollviolence can also protect innocent victims, it is preferable to killing the inilocent beliigerents perpetratirlg the injustice, Each of the following t h e e premises of this permutatiorl of the normative pacifisf argument require consideration; ( 1 ) A sociery cannot both prepare for vioIent and nonviolent resistance to inlustice; ( 2 )nonviolent resistance would be successful in warding off injustice; and ( 3 ) nonviolent means are better than violent ones, assuming both would ward off the unjust be1figerents. The first prelllise is most reasonably construed not as expressing a logical contradiction between simultaneously preparing for war and nonviolent resistance, but a practical or psychological barrier against doiilg both, This seems generalfy plausible, although there may he exceptions. The kind of effort, discipline, and training that wuufd be required to prepare a population for widespread nonviolent resistance to oppression would be enormous, Holmes believes that the eactics required would iltvolve "concerted actions by large numbers" "waged in " m m sstikes and boycotts,"& 611of those engaged in these activities would have to he highly disciplined to resist the temptatioll of answering violence with violence. It is unlikely that such discipline is possible if participants are open to tile permissibiiity of answering violence with violence, and even less likely if some are preparing to do so. The secorrd premise is required by the argument sirtce in its absence the choice would be between viofently and successfuiIy (assuming that the war would be un~ustwithout a reasonahfe belief in likelihood of success) repelllng unjust betligerents or nonviolently but unsuccessfully responding. Under these two scenarios, ~usticewould seem to incline toward making the innocent hut unjust belligerents absorb the costs of: their injustice, r make the case fc~ra nonvirather than the innocent victims, So, in ~ r d e to olent preparation in anticipation of uxal'ust belligerence, it must be reasonable to believe in the likelihood of the nonviolent fcl.spc>nsesucceeding, In assessing this, part of what has to be csnsidered is whether the populace is pre-

pared to sufkr tlze lzarrns that wifl be incurred by nonviolently resisting. In other words, the chance for success cannclt he calcullated abstractly, but must inrvolve considerations of this population under reasonably likely conditions of belligerence, It may be that the discipline required for nonviolent resistance to certaitz kinds of brutal injustice is simply not possible fcrr most people to sustain fc~rvery long without losing either patience or hope. Gatldl-ticomplained of those who were not true followers of satyagmha. All Satyagrafiis do not understand the full value of tfic force, nor have we rncrl who always frarn conviction refrain frorn violence, The usc of this forcc requires tfie adaptian of poverty, in the sense that we must be indifferent wbetl~erwe have t l ~ ewherewitl~atto feed or clothe t>urselves,During the past struggle, all Satyagrahis, if any at all, %.ere rlot prepared t o ga that Iength. Some again were only Satyagrakis so called, "They came out without any conviction, often with mixed mc~tives,tess often wit11 impure mc)tives,37

The point is that there may well he a tellsion betweell the popular demonstrations required to make pacifism work and the demands that a pacifist practice places o n its members. J f the pacifist position coErtes down to claiming that success would be possiHe only if people were rnore patient and more disciplined than they in fact now are, then it does not offer a serious aiternative to military resistar~ce, The third prexnise seexns true if and only if one is comparing two situations in which everything else is equaif but the costs to the innocent belligerents perpetrating injustices, Jn other words, if the choice were between nonvioielltly repelling the ixnposition of a grave injustice and killing the innocent perpetrators to do the same, then the former is preferable. It is doubtful, however, that tile only variable is how many innocent perpetrators of injusice will die, A shooting war will no doubt result in soxne deaths to irmocent victims, and nonviolent resistance may result in their deaths as well, perhaps many more, The truth of the third premise is h r less obvious if nonviolent resistance is likely to result in rnore deaths of innocent victims than a violent response to the injustice would. In this case, we must revert back to the question of what seems to be the most reasonable way to assign the costs of the attempted imposition of injustice, Once we think in tlxse terms, it seems more reasonable to assigtl those costs to the innocent perpetrators than to their innocent victims. In short, the truth of the third premise is contingent on the nonviolent patlz resulting in no rnore deaths to innocent victims than the military one. I see no good reasons to suppose that this will universally be the case, Similar csnclusions trtay be drawn, even if the additional costs to tlze innocent victims are not additional deaths hut increased brutaliry or a lung period of oppression, Costs such as these must he weighed against the costs of kitling innocent beiligerents,

There is enough room for skepticism about the second and tlzird of these three p ~ m i s e sthat the moral superiority of pacifism is douht-ful. This is not a fully conclusive argritrterlt against pacifism. However, it does point to problerm with its practice that have moral imporr, Pacifism may be too demanding in practice to garner and maintain popular support. Nonviolent resistance may involve ct~stson the side of innt~centvictims at least as great as a mifitary response, In practice tl-rese outcomes would be related, For as the costs of nonviolent resistance mount, the moraie Eor maintaining it is likely to wane, Hence, pacifism often may ~ f kno r reaI afternative to a just war. I have pursued several possible arguments for the superiority of pacifisrn over just war theoq and found them all wanting. There may be others that are better that f have failed to see, 11-1the absence of such argumellts, it is reasonable to csnclude that despite its moral costs, the lust war perspective, ernplaying the criteria that I established in Chapter 5, is morally pr&r&le.

In Chapter 5 X argued that intervention into the affairs of other states is just if and only if the imervention is directed coward advancing justice either in the basic structure of the state or in the international effects of its dr>mestic policies. This stipulates the enature of just cause in the case of interventions. I call this the cosmopolitan account of just cause. I also defended three additional necessary conditions for the justice of an interventioil: reasonable belief in the likelihood of success, proportionality, and fast resort. Here, X shall defend and apply these criteria as the requirements that states or parties struggling for state power must meet in order to be justified in =sorting to military f;~rce, Traditionally there are two main aspects of just war theory. The grounds upon which force may be resorted to are referred to as the principles of jus ad bell%%% while the limits of permissible conduct once war has begun are j2.45 in bello, The focus of this chapter is on the principles of jzils cad bdlum, The discussic->nof the four criteria in this section differs from that in Chapter S in two ways. In one sense, the focus is narrower since here the criteria are applied only to mifitary matters. Xn anotl-rer sense, it is broader since they apply not only to interventions but to any use of mifitary force for political ends, including civil or revohtionary war-.

The Statist Accou~ztof Just Cat*se The statist accournt of just cause for the use of military force holds that force is permissible only if the state has been harmed. Harm to states is usu-

ally understood to be aggression, where aggression is taken to be a vialation of territorial integriry or political sovereignty. States, it is claimed, have a right not tct suffer aggressitrn. So, aggression justifies a war of self-defense against the aggressor. Recall Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which 1 discussed in Chapter 1: ""All Members shall refrain in their international relations fmm the t h e a t s r use of h r c e against the territorial integrity or political sovereignty of any state, or in any rnanner inconsistent with the Purgoses of the United Nations.'"g This proscribes aggression, hut permits states to do as they please in matters of domestic policy without the fe~lrof intervention. lnsofslr as the statist account of ~ u s tcause protects existing states f%c-~m external threats and gives them license to he unhindered in their dealillgs with intenial threats, it is essentially conservative, It values the relative order and tl-re peace of the satzrs qzto over the estabtisl-rxnent of xnore just institmions, In a world fufI of injustice, this is a significant liability of the statist account. The probleiin of conserv~tcismis apparent in the justilication of the claim that states have rights, Either states have rights independently of the rights of individuals or their rights derive frvsrl the rights of individuals, According to the forrner, the claims of s a t e s may trump those of individuais, which leads to the practical problems of abuse of power and csnservatism, According tct the latter, however, states rights could be limited by the eextent to whicl-r tl-rey serve the rights and interests of individuals. This view suggests the cosmopolitan account of just cause. IVichael WaLzer might be thought to have dodged both horns of this dilemma by hslding that states have rights against aggression by virtue of the right of individuah to share a common Life togethec"W~-~uwever, the sharing of a common life is either more important than other claims of persons to lustice o r it is not, If it is more important, then the practical problems of conservatism reappear. I f it is not as important as the other claims of individuals to justice jMihich is t is what I argued in Chapter S),then the cosmopolitan account of ~ u s cause implied. Hence, Walzer is unable to avoid the dilemma,

The Cosntopolitat2 Accottnt of Just Caase According to tl-re cosmopolitan account, just cause for tl-re use of rnilitary force exists if and only if the intervention is directed toward advancing justice in the basic structure of the state or the international effects of its domestic policy, Assume that the UN provisions fc~rthe legitimate use of force arc to be justified by invoking a coxern lor the promotion or preservation ol individual rights, as Walzer argues. The thrust of the argument for the cosmopolitan acctlrint then c m be put as follows: There is nit) gwaratitee that states vviH re-

spect the requirernents of justice; and when in fact they do not, they lose any moral basis upon which to argue against intervelltion and to demalld protection from internal threats, The point s f the cosmopolitan accotmt of ~ u s t cause is that one needs to look at whether tlre jus~ifiedclaims of persons are met befare one accepts that sovereignty provides a shield against the use of military force; and this is precisely what the statist account ignores. Some might fear that an account of just cause that values j~~stice above de facto sovereignty would be tot> permissive of third-party interventions in the name of liberation. Xntervention does not receive anything like blanket sanction by the fUlf set of criteria that I set forth in Clsapter 5, These rnay be times when intervetltlon would be wrong, even though just cause exists, Hawever, the evil of the intervention would derive not horn a violatioil of the sovereignty of the iwaded state, hut from the violation of one of the other criteria for justified intervention.

imperialism and War One powerful criticism of the ~usticeof a war is that it is imperialistic. There are at least two characteristics of unjust imperialistic foreign policy One is the goal of benefiting from, or of maintaining, unjust global inequalities, This follows from the analysis of imperialism as unjust global inequality that I developed in Chapter 4. Another characteristic is the violation of democratic self-determination, This captures the sense that imperialist poiicies often involve overriding or disregarding the will
Jf this were true of a policy, then the moral force of characterizirtg it as imperialistic is unclear since there would be no misuse of urlequal power relations between states, One could stipulate that whatever a dominant power does in the foreign arena simply is imperialistic, but only at the cost of losing any moral punch to the claim. In order to preserve the force of the

punch, it is better to require that imperiafism be a policy that either effectively maintains or establishes unjust global economic distributions or that maintains or establishes domestic political or economic relations against the popular will of the residents. A war characterized by either of the two characteristics of imperialism is presumptively unjust.

The Gulf War The justiliication for the GLIlf W ~ Zafter , Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, was made oil statist grounds, On January 29, 1991, President George Bush delivered a speech containing the following justificatictn of the war: "The co~~rnrmity of rlations has resolrttely gathered to condemn and repel lawless aggression,"4f The focus a n aggression, however, ignored the fact that the restoration of the Kuwaiti government would do nothing to advance the cause of justice for most of its residents. In 1990 the government of Kuwait denied citizensl-riprights to two-thirds of its population because tl-rey were guest workers. Neither they nor their children would ever be eiigible to become naturalized citizens. These residents earned a fraction of what Kuwaiti citizens earned and, unlike citizens, could not own land, Additionally only male adult citizens were allowed to vote in the 1985 parfiarnentary elections, the last befare the war. Approximately 3.5 percent of the population l-rad the franchise in tl-rose electians.42 Since there would be no improvement from the perspective of justice by restoring the Kuwaiti regime to power, the war to do so lacked just cause and was tl-terefore unjust, Additionally, since Western powers had alIowed aggression carried out by its allies to go unchecked in other parts of the Middle East, it is reascrr~ableto infer that the main cause of Western action was to maintain favorable stability in this strategically important oil-rich region."" Stich stability hcilitates Western ecorromic dominance, but, as we have noted from the de~~ograptlics of Kuwait, also maintai~~s local political and econornic injustices. So, neither the publicly stated cause of acrion nor the probable underlying cause of action in the Gulf War were just, Ratbet; the war was an i~nperiafistone of mainte~ianceof unjtist (but favorable to the West) economic and political relations. From the mildusion that the war to restore the Kuwaiti reb. ~ i m ewas unjust, it does not follow that the frayi invasion of Kuwait was j~zst,Justi~e and injustice with respect to resorting to war are logical contraries, nut contradictories: Although two sides cannot both he just, it is perfectly possi ble for both to be unjust, Giveii Saddam Hussein" brutal treatment of political, religious, and ethnic minorities inside Iraq, it would have been crazy tc-,assume things w ~ ~ u improve ld much inside Kuwait under Iraqi rule. So, there was no justice to be found on either side in the Gulf War. Some may

recoil at the idea tl-rat when injustice in war is done, meeting force wish force also may not he just, but this fc~llowsfrom the restrictions that we put on resortixlg to war, ft may often be the case that the criteria that judge one side to be unjust wilt deliver the sarne verdict on the other side. In such cases, the way to justice is not through suppr>rtingone or the other side in the war? but condemning both.

The Kosouo War NATO's aerial war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was also justified on moral gounds. Javier Srjlana, the secretary-general of NATO, sought to justit)i the missicln in the hitowing manner: "FM the first time, a defensive alliance launched a rnilitary campaign to avoid a huxnanitarian tragedy outside its own borders, For the first time, an alliance of sovereign nations fought not to csnquer or preserve territory but to protect the values on which tl-re alliance was foundedeW44The war, however, met with critics from both the political right and left. Critics on the right condemned it as a war on behalf of ""a tiny former Q t t o i ~ a npossessiol~of no strategic importance or econornic value,'"$ For these critics the problem was that the war was about values, not natioilal interests.. Critics on the left charged, "The need to protect the Kosovars served as a pretext for NATO's hombardmenc, but its real aim was to secure its concr~fof this strategic region and to fortify an extensive NATO bridgehead in the heart of the Balkans. This action must be seer1 ixl the context of the expansion of NATO to include the larger Western-oriented states."& Hence, at least some of the critics on the right take the war to have failed the prescriptions of realism and some of those on the left take it to have satisfied them, and this is why each csiticizes tl-re war, Altl-rougl-rit might seem surprising that svrne of the cornmentators on the right could a g e e with some on the left about the morality of the war, they agree about this precisely because they disagree about its aim, Since, as I l-rave argued above, the realist dernand to excise moral considerations from the evaluation of the war is indefensible, the criticism coming from many on the left is the more important one for the moral evaluatisn of this war. In order to assess the criticism that the real aim of the war was to provide NATO with strategic corrtrol over the Balkans, we inust address two questions. First, is there suficient evidence to support the claim a b u t the aim of NATO? Secoild, if there is such evidence, how does it affect the moral assessment: ol: the war? fn other words, how does it affect a judgment s n the basis of the criteria of jus ad Etellurn? The claim about the real aim of the war can he read in two differeilt ways. The stronger interpretation is that NATO was exclusiveiy concerned

with strategic control in the Balkans. The weaker clairn is tbat strategic control was an aim, perhaps one without which they wouid not have gone to war, but nut their only ctzncern. The former is the strollger criticism because it entails that any humanitarian consequences of the war were strictly unintended, and we should not have been sailguine about expecting them, Jf, however, one aim alxlong others of the war was strategic, it is possible that among the others there was a l-ruxnanitarian one, and l-rurnanitarian consequences would have been more likely. Since actors oken have multiple motives, this would not be surprising, Without, however, prejudging the second question, it may be that in either case the strategic airns of the war infected its moral character, The aims of states in war policy cannot be perceived; they must be inferred from their actior~s.Even if feaders, such as Javier Solana, claim certain airns publicly, it is always possible that they intend to deceive or are themselves deceived about the real aims, The only way tc-,infer the airns is to consider which ones best explain the actions taken. So, we need to corrsider tlle events and actions tbat led up to the war, Ethnic Albanians make up 90 percent of the population of Kosovo. Most of the remaining 2 Q percent are ethnic Serhs. According to the 1974 constittttion of the Socialist Federal Rspublic of Yugoslavia (SFWf, Kosovo was granted substantial national self-determination under the status of an autonoixlous province of the Serb Republic (the latter being constitutionaflp recognized as a republic of the SFRYf. This autonomy secured for Kosovo its own national assembly, cc~nstitution,high court, police, flag, bank, universitl.; and academy of arts and sciences."" So, although not legally a separate republic in tlle SFR', Kosovo had most of the trappings of a republic. This arrangement came to an abrupt end in 1989 when Serbia, in a move that ~zsheredin a new phase of Serbian nationalism in the 990s, unilaterally revoked Kosovo's autonomous status, removing Kosovars from most public offices and thereby disenfranchising the ma~orityof the Kosovo pop~llatiorz,This actior~was met with strong resistance at the time, including a spectacular underground xniners strike, but Serbian nationaiists won the day." Kosovar resista~lceto the Serbiax~revocation of autonomy was largely peaceful until wound 1997, when the Kosovo Liberation hrrxly JKLA) stepped up armed resistance Largely with weapons obtained as the result of political chaos in neighboring Albania. The first serious public indication that NATO was prepared to go to war in the region was on October 12,1998, when it approved an activation order (ACTORD) for air strikes unless Yugoslav President SIobodan Milosevic ceased hostilities, withdrew certain troops that he had dispatched to Kosovo as part of a summer ofknsive against the KLA, and permitted the piacexnent of several thousand internatioilal observers fiom the Qrganizatioil for Security and Cot~perationin Europe (OSCE) to monitor compliar1ce.49

Tlze ostensilnle reason for ACTORW was to force Serbian compliance with UN Security Council Resc~lution1199 (which did not authrlrize force) that sought to avert the growkg humanitaria11 crisis before the onset of winter.50 The sit~~ation had become critical as a result of Serbia" summer offensive, which had destrved 200 villages, killed more than 1,000 people, and displaced somewhere around 270,000 people, including 70,000 who had fied the province, and 50,000 wlzo were surviving in the eiernent~,~' Whether the intentions of IVilosevic were to ""ethnically cleanse" the province of Albanians or simply to terrorize a population into submission is not clear. However, we knew enough about his practices in Bosnia to be reasonably worried about "ethnic cleansing" in Kc>sovo.In any case, even if his intent was ""merely" tto terrorize a civilian population, the conduct was despicable and involved significant hranan rights violations. It is, of course, possible that the concern registered by NATO leaders &out a humanitarian crisis in October 1998 was merely a pretext and that it was exclusively interested in strategic control in the Balkatls. Such an account of NATO" tl-rinking, X-rowever, would have to explain wlzy, once it had issued ACTORD, it did nat go ahead with the bombings. Pctssibly this was because of the lack of a U N mandate to use force. The problem with this explanation is tl-rat tl-re lack of a mandate for force had not stopped N N O from issuing ACTORD in tile first place, It is conceivable that it was hoping for a stronger pretext that would make bombing rnore acceptable to the rest of the world after having established the threat. However, if tl-ris were the case, NATO was handed the pretext by Serbia in January 1999 when the intematiorzai news brake the story of the discovery of the bodies of hrty-five Kosovars ayparently killed at close range by Seeb forces in the village of Racak.SWATO's reaction was not CO follow through on ACTORD, but to send rlaval forces to the Ahiatic Sea and to reduce the warning time prior to air strikes from ninety-six lzaurs to forty-eight.53 According to the thesis that NATO9$eventual aerial war was merely a pretext for establishing strategic prescncr: in the Balkans, one would expect a greater enthusiasm for unleashing the war that would make that possible. In the subsequent Rambouiliet peace talks, tile West continued to show a willingness to accc~mmodateMilosevic that is hard to square with the thesis that its sole concern was to gain a military foothold in the Balkans, According to one (possibly partial) account of the Rambouiilet talks, the Kosovo delegation's prompt and thoughtful responses to the peace terms were ignored h r days, while the negotiators waited witlzouc response from tl-re Yugoslav and Serb delegation, traveied to Beigrade to consult with Milosevic directly3 and then finally etigaged intensively with the Yugoslav and Serb delegation, which eventually made a submission that was largely incompatible with the principles of the peace talks.54 Why such solicitude, if NATO really only wanted to let the bombs faD?

Two other facts might be appealed to as evidence that NATO" real aim was solely to establish a strategic presence in the Balkans, First, at Rambouillet the Western negotiators seemed to insist on making NATO, rather than the OSGE, the occupying farce to carry out any agreed upon peace.W Second, countless other states, inciuding NATO states such as Turkey, have been involved in comparably despicable actions with respect to national minorities and NATO has done no~hingabout it26 Boch of these bcts are compatible not only with NATO being exclusively concerned with strategic matters, they are also consistent with it being co~~cerned about strategic matters among other tl-rings, The facts dtz nat bear out the claim that NATO" sole real aim was to esthfiish a strategic presence in the Baikans, Rather, most of the facts are better explained by the hypothesis that NATO was not safely concerned with strategic matters and was not particularly eager to go to war to gain a strategic foothold. The two facts noted in the preceding paragraph are equally well explained by this hpothesis, This is a significant conchsion to draw because it allows that it would not be completely coincidental if the war served humanitarian as well as strategic ends, If NATO3 r~otiveswere mixed and included strategic considerations as well as humanitarian concerns, l-row does this affect the moral character of the war? As one critic of the war warned, "'In pursuing a justified cause we should always be alert to the ulterior and vested interests which might distort it, seeking, so far as may be possible, to favor approaches which stymie those interests and mt~tives,"flThere is, however, nu g o d season tct hold that warring parties should have pure motives in a war; we should care less about their motives, indeed nut directly about their motives at all, and more &out the likely effects of the war and the alternatives to it. This is consistent with the claim of another critic: "lMtttives $0 rnattes; if only because tl-rey tell us a lot about what the actor will and will not do, and what the outcome is likely to be."sg If the war effort, despite the mixed motives of the warring part& is likely to overturn grave injustices that are otherwise without foreseeable remedy, worry about whether the warring party's intentic~nsare pure is inappropriate. Rather, the question to be addressed here is whether in iight of NATOS mixed motives, resorting to war satisfied the four criteria for jzas ad bellurn, Let us accept that NATO's motive far the war was twofold: the establishmerit of a NATO presence in the Balkans and the prevention of a hur~anitarian disaster, since to assert only tl-re first is inconsistent with certain facts about NATO's conduct. One can only speculate about the lorrg-term consequences of the former motive, but the great positive corrseyuences s f the latter are clear, By the time NATO began the aerial war, the Serbs had been engaged in an offensive in Kosovu for over a month. They had in fact been pursuing a NO-pronged strategy: obstruction in Ramhouillet and war on

the ground in Kosovo. Estimates put the number of people uprooted by the war in that month alone at 6S,000,SSBy this time nntlre than 250,000 peopie had been displaced. The rr.lemory of the Racak massacre and the rapes and massacres in Bosnia gave good reason to believe that serious human rights violations were occurring. Later this was at least partially confirmed by the Wcjrld Health Organization, which estimated that 20,000 women were viccixns of rape by Serbian forces in Kosovo in the several months prior to the NATO bombing campaign." Grave injustices were going oil, but any possible negative consequences of a NATO presence in the Balkans were uncertain, speculative, and distant. It is a rnistaken moral calculation to weigh uncertain, speculative, and distant evils over immediate and grave crnes. What is more, as I argued in Chapter 5, any protection that Yugoslavia could claim from sovereigcltp was rendered null and void by the injustices that were being committed, Hence, just cause for the war existed. Similar reasoning applies to the criterion of proportionality If injustices such as the destruction of hundreds of villages-rendering thousands of civilians homeless-~nurder, and rape do not merit an armed response, then it is difficult to imagine what does, It is, however, inconsistent with taking human rights seriously to corzsider proportiollality as strictly a utilitarian calculation, For example, if one were considering a war that sixnply involved deliberately attacking select civilian Serbian centers to effect terror in the Serbian population, this would not satisfy proportio~~ality, even if the action were likely to stop the humanitarian crisis on the ground, It must be permissible in the first place to kill combatants hefare one can justify doirsg so in order to avert injustices to x~oncornhatants. Proportionality comes into the rnorai evaluation of war in two distinct places. It is part of the doctrine of jus ad bellurn when it expresses the requirement that resorting to war be proportional to the injuftices occurring. It is part of the doctrine of @s in bello when it expresses the requirement that a particular practice in the prosecution of the war be proportionai to the justified war aims. So, in csncluding that resort to war met the requirement of proportionality here, I axn not asserting t l ~ a all t o l tlze means emplcryed in the war effort met that requirement, in particular the bombing of civilian areas in Belgrade, Were there grounds h r a reasonable belief in the likelil~oodof success in remedying the injustices that Serbia was perpetrating in Kosovo) One might be tempted to say that there obviously were since in fact NATO was victorious, but that answer is too glib for two reasons. First, when the war began, the bombing campaign provoked, and more importantly permitted, Serbian forces t ~ nthe ground in Mosovo to increase the intetlsity of the very activity that established just cause for the war in the first piace, This proved to he an even @eater humarritarian nightmare than what preceded the war. One critic of the war put the point succinctly: ("An equally important

NATO goal was to prevent the forced displacexnent of the Kosovar Albanians, At the vutset of the bombing, 230,000 were estimated to have left their homes. By its end, 1.4 million were displaced. Of these, 860,000 were outside Kosovo, with the vast majority in hastily constructed camps in Albania and iMacedonia."hl It is difficult to fathom that NATO intelligence was not aware of this probability Second, afthough regular and well-organid hostilities I-rave ceased in Kosovo, if one takes the broader view tl-rat the aim was to establish peace and tolerance in the context of a demt>craticand autonorBous Kosovo, this has not occurred and will not occur for the foreseeable hture.61 Kosovo will remain a NATO protmorate inside of Serbia for some time, Revenge attacks and deep mistrust make muttinational cooperation and governance nearly impossible. Given the experience of Bosnia being governed as a UN protectorate, the probability of a similar outcome in Kosovo must have been foreseeable.63 The criterion of reasor~ablebelief in the likelihood of success is necessarily prospective; it lctoks f(3mard to the cessation of hostilities. However, the evaluation of it is often retrospective: Would it have been reasonable at the time to betieve that success was likely? Given the two complications raised in the previous paragraph, two questions rr.lust be addressed: At what point in the future sl-rould one project in measuring the likeiihood of success? and, What shoutd count as success? The answer to the first yuestion must be that success should be measured at the cessation of the war since one cannot know wllether a party has succeeded until it is all over. Whether things will get worse before getting better is irrelevant to the assessment of whetf~erthe criterion will be met. As long as it is reasonable to believe that they will get better, the criterion is satisfied. Wit11 respect to the second question, sltccess can only reasonably he measured by the ~ttstifiedcause of the war, for this is the goal. To measure it by somethil-rg else is to shift the goalposts. So, in tl-re case of Kosovo, success sl-rould be measured by tl-re halting of the humanitarian crisis. This at least has succeeded, It would to believe that rnilitarily defeating the perpetrators of have been reaso~~able the injustices would achieve this since there were no other significant causes of the ir-rjustice. Even if the initial increase in the intensity of the attacks on Kosovars and the subsequent estabiishxnent of tl-re NATO protectorate do not calt into question whether it was reasonable to believe t l ~ a swcess t was likely, they may threaten the criterion of proportionality. For one might question whetl~erresorting to war-knowing the probabilities of these eventscould achieve sufficient goods to outweigh these evils. If those who were displaced are ret~iretedas a result of the peace and if the peace renders impossibie the continuance of attacks, then the short-terxn evils are outweighed by the long-term security. Although a lack of democratic self-deternination and an atmosphere of suspicion are far froin ideal, they are

surely better than a condition in which a military caxnpaign is coxnpletely disrupting civilian life and sowing the seeds of ethnic hatred. Tile final criterior~is whetl~erthe war was conducted as a last resort. Given an infinite amount of time and no costs associated with delay, no resort to war Is a last resort, However, there are often significant costs, including loss of military opportunity or perpetration of injustices, associated with delay, Tliere are sometimes reasonable calculations that no nonmilitary meails will remedy the injustices in the foreseeable future, Whether or nat a war is one of Iast resort rBust be judged i r ~relation to these considerations, The morality of the war in Kosovo has received criticisxn on the basis of the criterion of last resort. In light of: the account of negotiations between Yugoslavia and Serbia on the one hand and the Contact Group (representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germally, Ttaiy, and Russia) and NATO on the other horn October 1998 through most of the Rambuillet conference in February 1999, it seems clear that although NATO was willing to employ the threat of the use of force, they were not particuIarly eager to make good on it. Aher the slaughter in Racak, NATO did nor use force as might have been expected given ACTORB, Critics of the war argue that if at Ramhouillet NATO had not insisted on playing the role of enforcer of the agreement, a settlement w o d d have been possible," In march 1999, when Rannbc~uilletreconveiled for a second rr>uild, the Kosovo delegation accepted the peace terms of the February conference, which included significant concessions to the principle of special reprfientation far national groups within Kosovo rather than equal rights for all.65 The Yugoslav and Serbian delegation rejected many of tl-rese principles and instead made a proposal that Marc Weller, legal adviser for the Kosovo delegation at the conference, described as fc~llows: The draft proposed a fc)rmal subordinadc~nt>f Kosovo to Serbia, alnofisl~ecfrestrictions on the exercise t>f Federal fut~ctionsin Kosovu and correspondingly rectuecd the furlerions of the Kosovo assembly. The office OF the President of Mosovo would be abolished and the governil-tent reptaced by a weakened council of Ministers, There would be no Kosovt) C:onstitutional and Supreme Court, In effect, rhc draft urauiid have introduced a regixne of urhar external observers have described as an institutionaiized system of apartheid in Kosovt>*b"

According to at least one eyewitness, then, it was this sort of obstructionism, which involved diversion from the principles of the February conference, and r ~ oat dispute about NATO enftrrcernent of the agreement that led to the deadfock.67 Of course, it should not he forgotten that as the Yugoslav and Serb delegation carried out the obstructionism at the conference, the Serbs were waging an offensive on the ground.

The clairn that rnore should have been done to reach an agreement seems to be flawed in two ways. First, it presumes that Yugoslavs and Serbs were bargaining in good faith, There are good reasons to doubt this. Their actions suggest tl-rat they were happy to obstruct deliberations because they were making advances on the battlefield, Second, it ignores the mounting costs of waiting, Recall that in lust the previous month" soffensive, 65,000 people were rendered homeless, TI1e longer NATO waited, the more time the Serbs would have had to consolidate their position on the grouild and the inore Kosovar civilians would have been victims of the ateack, If the account that I acn relying on about the nattlre of the Yugoslav and f erhian rejection of the principles of peace turns out to be wrong and the determining issue was in fact whether NATO or OSCE enforced the peace, then the claim that the war was r ~ oone t of last resort has some merit, but the human costs of waiting would still stand. If, however, the account that X am relying on is correct, then it is ~ a s o n a b t eto judge the war as one of last r e ~ ~ r t . I have argtzed that NATO's war against Yugoslavia to stop the Serbim atrocities in Kosovo probably meets the four criteria for jus ad bellgm. It follows from this that resort to war was ~ u s tKeeping , in mind the distinction between US ad bellurn and jus in hello, it does not follow that everything NATO did in prosecuting t l ~ ewar was just. Before leaving the matter of the moral appraisal of the war in Kosovt~, there is one final issue to address. The war was bught a n behalf of the Kosovars, but largely not by tl-rem. The Kosuvars were tl-re principals but largely not the agents of the war, This fact suggests the possibility of the existence of prirtcipal-agent problems. Such problems occur in war when third parties figbting on the basis of an ostensibly just cause in fact pursue c>therends. When these other ends are unjust, the principal-agent problems may vitiate the justice of the cause, When the ends are not unjust, but merety different, the agents would seem to have betrayed the principals. If the cause of the Kosovar" struggle was to put an end to human rights abuses, then no such problem existed in that war, If, on the other hand, the struggle was one of national independence for Kosovo, then NATO betrayed the Kusovars since it not only stopped short of that but pushed an agreement prior to the war that ruled it out for at least three years. I argued above on the assurnpion that the cause of the war was to put an end tcz l~umanrights abuses, but a case could be made that Kosovars had the right to secede. They are a nation that pre-existed the formation of both the Socialist Federat Republic of Yugoslavia and the successor Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. moreo over, they made a declaration of independence in 1991. The KLA held secession as its goal, but NATO and the Contact Group steadfastly refused to take up that goal, Were the Kosovars betrayed by NATO? Assuming that Kosovar secessiczn would neither violate any justified Serbian interest in resources nor establish a regime that vio1atc;d the

rights af any of tl-re residents af Kosovo, they met with unjust resistance from Serbia to exercise their right to secede. In the end, Kosovo representatives in Rambrjuillet agreed not to secede t'or at least three pears after signing a peace agreement. ff they were under no duress by NATO to agree to this, but were merely corrvinced of its prudence, then there was no betrayal, Jf NATO placed them under duress, then NATO is g~ziltyof: betrayal. Weller does not discuss what went a n at Rambouillet with an eye to this matter, nor am 1 aware of anyclne else who does, This means that we do not know enough about the circumstances of this agreement to decide this mattef; So, altl-rough NATO's war seems to have satisfied the four criteria for jm ad bel/gm, in the end we do not know enough to make a final moral judgment about its conduct in this war,

1 have argued that the theory of jzxts ad be/lu~i[,which includes the cosmopolitan account of just cause, is the best approach for considering the morality of resorting to war, It is superior to political realism, pacifism, and principles of just war, which include tl-re statist account of just cause. Additionally, this theory finds the Gulf War to be an unjust war and finds the war in defelise of the human rights of the Kosovars to be just, although there may remain problems with respect to NATO%response to the Kosavarskclaims to secession, Cosmc->politanism,of course, looks forward to a just and peaceful world order, rather than one so ravaged by war-. I shall speculate about tl-re institutional requirernents af suck an order in tl-re next chapter,

But everz if the irztertded clhject hehittd the occurrerzce we have described were rrot to he achieved for the preserzG OY if a {~eoplruheuoluttotr or cotzstitutiolzal reform were ultimately ro fad, nr r(,after the !atter had lasted jCC)r a certaitz time, everyth:htrzgwere to be brought back onto its origirzal course (as politiciarzs izow claim to prophes3ff,our owrt phikoscsphical pxdictiorz stzll loses Izorze of rts force. For the nccurrertce t f z guestisrz is too mome~ztoaas, too s~ztt:lma$e/y stzterwavezz EOZ& the ir~ltlrests cclf Csuunar~ityand too wzdesprtrad itt its ittfluertce upotz all parts r ~ f the world for natzotrs rzot kn be remgttded of zt wherz favozdrabEe czrcumS ; E ~ I Z C C preserzt I"S t/2emselvk?s,urzd to nse up a~z~li make rerzewed attempts of the sanze kirzd as befc~re.

I have sought to defend the view that duties of justice are global in scope and that these duties require adtlercnce to gelleral principles includiilg respect for civil and democratic rights and substantial sucioecol~omicegalitarianism. X ventured into certain policy areas, but have said notl-ring about the institutions of a global order that would satisfy these principles of ~tlstice, This Iacu~lamight be seen as undermining the argument of the book, but that would be to misunderstand clre relationship b m e e l t the justification of moral principles and the justificaticm of institutions. The latter justification req~ziresappeals to what is morally desirable and what is possible in the cir-

curnscances. Wthout a justification of moral pritlciples, any justification of institutions is incomplete, but a preliminary justification of principles can proceed witlrout an account of the institutions that would satisfy them, It is, however, necessary to underscore tlle preliminary nattlre of this justification of the principles of cosmopolitan justice. it would count as a decisive refutation of a moral prirtcipie if it were demonstrated that we could never expect to make progress in satisfying it, However, I believe tl-rat this would he a very difficult demonstration to make with respect to the principles of cosmopolitan ~ustice,Some tentative thoughts about the institutional requirements of tl-re cosmupotitanism that 'X have defended wit1 help to round out the picture of its feasibility and therefore its desirability. What sort of changes to the existing international state system are required in srder to progress toward an eg~litarianworld order? This question appears to beg another one, Would an egalitarian world order contain muitiple states or a world-state? Very fcw people who have thought about these matters at any length have considered the latter a real possibility, and with good reason.2 The practical problems of directly governing several hillion people seem inswmountable, and the threat to humall liberty of a hreaucratic state with global reach would be immense,Wn the other hand, states have, at times at feast, been able to ensure that civil and democratic rights are respected, Given the occasic->nalsllccess of states and the problems of a world-state, some role for states in an egalitarian world order seerns appropriate. It is equally clear, however, that the establisl-rment and maintenance of justice requires a significant re-canceptualization of the principle of state sovereignty, and the goal, of egalitarianism requires a coordinated international response, So, a system o l slates with scatis powers of sovereignty is as unsatisfactory as a global state. Two different versions of: the Kantian pacific federation of: states merit consideration."ne involves the assignment of responsibilities for meeting the just claims of persons to states, regional governing institutions, and global governing institutions, and for this reason has unflatteringly been dubbed a "new mecfievatli~m."~ Inter~lationalinstitutions may hest ensure dobai distributive justice, pollutioiz reduction, organized military respoilses to injustices, and the like. Some of these insritutions trtay be regional in scope, while others may be global, as tl-re issues warrant.V~orexample, regonai security arrangements and high courts might best serve the pmpose of promoting respect for hrlman rights since there is sften a stronger sense of cornrnon interests axnong neighbars. Global institutions are doubtless best suited for ensuring that duties o f global distributive justice are met and for the monitorirtg and enfc~rcernentof glsbaf poltution reduction plans. Additionally, tl-rere rnay be reasons to believe that tl-re dispersal of sorne governing powers should be along functional rather than territorial lines.7 Generally, the case h r particular regional or global governing institutions needs to be

made on the grounds of the existence of problems salient to justice requiring regional or global attention, Such problems may range from the international effects of domestic policies, to the inability to fulfill entitlements witl-rin state-based justice systems, or to the effects of transnational acrors," Where regional or global governance is desirable, the powers of sovereignty over the domain of goverrrmce should be transfemed the appropriate international bodies, Regardless of whicl-r particular international institutions are most appropriate, in order to be consistent with the principles of cosmopditan justice, regional and global, institutiorzs would have to be subject to mecl-ranisms of dexnocratic accountability, This axnounts to an extension of the principles of civilian control over the military, and democratic control over policy formation, into the international realm, An alternative version of the Kantian pacific federation downplays the role for international institutions in tllvor of building greater democratic accountability into existing and future multilateral agreements or regimes.9 The idea here is that a degree of dexnocratic accountability is possible without centralized institutions if she various decentralized agreements are public, allow for input and monitoring by nongovernmental agencies, and are susceptible tct pressure from global social movements, The decentralized scl-rerne is nut very lar from present reality, It simply calls h r broader inp-tu and monitoring over multilateral ageemeilts than exists now. Atthough the realism of the decentralized scheme rectmmends itself as a transitional measure, it hardly provides a satisfactary solution to the problems of global justice. Intcrnatir>nal institutions can most etficiently handle problems that are international in scope because of the action-coordinating and infonnation-slrrdring capacities of such insritutions,"0 more important, as I argued in Chapter 4, duties of: &lobal distributive justice canilot be met in the absence s f global institutions, Various multilateral agreements, even if susceptible to public scrutiny, are less able to ensttre that duties of distributive justice are discharged than is a global institution that administers a tax-andtransfer program, A piecemeal, decentralized apprsach will provide insttfficient guarantees that all persons throughout the world will contribute their s b r e to meet the just claims of the p t m to a portion of the global wealth, In addition, as F-tedley Bull observes, a mtlre just distribution of global wealth is probably necessary in order for consensus about the rexnaining important global issues to be possible. While the distributic~nof wealth, resources, and power in international society remains as uneclual as it is at present, the prospects of mclvernent towards a rnorc centralised global structure, basect upon a process of consensus, appears slight. It may be argued that if: such a 111ovement is eventually to take place, there must first be brought about a redistribution of wealth, amenities c>f Iife and power in favour of the states and peoples of the Third World.11

Witl~outa rnore just distribution of global wealth, attempts to arrive at global and even multilateral agreements about matters such as pollution corltrol or the justified grounds of interventio~tmight be viewed susyicic>usly by the global poor as covert attempts at imperialist control. Because the decentraiized scheme is ill-equipped to achieve global distributive justice, its abiIit)r to achieve Inany of the other aims of justice is also in. question, Would an egalitarian world order containing regional and global institutions as weft as constitutional democracies he a pacific union, or would it involve threats to peace such as those that characterized old-fashioned "mediaevalismw?I?22There are reasons to be l-rogeful about the peaceful nature of such an order. There is some reasoil to believe that constitutioilal democracies are Iess prone to go to war with one another than are other types of regimes.1' U,S, covert operations against dexnocratically elected governments in Chile, Gut~texnala,Iran, and Nicaragua, however, demonstrate that possession of a constitutional democracy is by no means a guarantee that a state will not suffer a vif~lationof its sovereignty at the hands of atlacher constitutional democracy. The problem is that constitutional democracies with capitalist economies contain a system of incentives for persons wit11 business interests in other states to advocate the use of state power to protect those interests. In other wards, such states contain a class of people who have an interest in imperialist wars. Imperialist wars are exterrtafities of a system in which profits accrue to private individuals.lTTtle only way to remove these externalities is through the establishment of an economic system that is not primarily based upon the profit motive or one that institutes public corrtrol over profits. A system of sociafist states may not be a requirement of a Qistrihutively just world order (I argued in Chapter 4 that settling that matter requires appeal to empirical coilsideratioils), but it would abolish one more incexitive for war. For this reason, as well as far egalitarian considerations, socialist states may be a desirable goal of an egalitariall world order.ls Two other features of this global order would tend to reduce belligerexice, A lust global distribution of wealth is likely to remove much of the desperation and resentment that is behind the various internecine conflicts in the world. Additionally, an order that can present a credible threat of the use of multilateral force against states with mjust basic structures or against rnilitary groups seeking to establish such structures could considerably reduce risky politicking fur unjust ends. A sketch of the institutionai structure for an egalitarian world order is unrealistic if tl-rere is no reason to believe tl-rat there are potential agents of change with an interest in such an order, Politics is by no mealls exhausted by political morality.l"n order for a desirable normative goal to be credible, there must be reasons to believe that its advancexnent will be in the interests of enough people with the power to advance it. One important insight that distillg~lishesMarx from earlier egalitarian thinkers is his claim

that an egalitarian order is possible because it would be in the interests of the working class." When changing an order is likely to meet with resistance from those who benefit from that order, a sufficient nu~nberof potential agents of cl-rmgc who have both moral and pmderltial reasons for wanting to see it brought into existence is required. Only some sort of globalization-from-belovv, then, presents a reaiistic strategy for a more egalitarian world arder.1" In contrast, Thomas Pogge proposes as a strategy for change '"earns of outstanding political philosophers and international lawyers. . . to develop mutually acceptable ideas towards a just warld order,"" "There are two problems with this suggestion, First, as a means for achieving institutional change, it is unrealistic to suppose that elite ageement rather than social and political power can unseat unjust privilege. Secsnd, any consensus between acadexnic philosophers and lawyers is far too narrow for the establishment of an overlapping consensus meant to stabilize an order based L I ~ O Fthe I principles of costnoyolitan justice. AII overlapping consensus around such principles, which in any case would be subsequent to achieving just institutions through social and political struggle, would require broad social dialogue. Given tl-re vast inequalities and otl-rer injustices of tl-re existing global order, there can he no shortage of potential agents who would find a more , against the policies and egalitarian order in their i n ~ r e s t sDemonstrations structures of existing international financial institutions such as tlie WTO and the World Bank suggest that there are real possibilities for change. However, as has sometimes been noted, such demonstrations, particrtlr-~rty when their primary participants are citizens of the richest countries, often express parochial and protectionist demands as much as cosmopolitm ox1es.20 Far exaxnple, dexnands to save tl-re jobs of workers of any state in particular, and to require developing countries to enforce strict enviranmental repiations without a significant increase in developmental assistance, are not ones directed toward cosrnoyolitan goats. In order for demonstrations against the current world order to pursue cosxnopolitan objectives, a sense of solidarity that transcends the interests of local colleagues and compatriots tnust be fnstered.2"

One could perhaps be forgiven for thinking that under present circumstances an egalitarian world order is irnyossihle, especially given the facts of international ineqttdit)" and the resistance to dexnands for fundaxnental change among those who most benefit from such inequalities. There are, however, good reasolls to hope for an egalitarian wc~rldorder. One is that,

by their nature, un~ustarrangements are unstable. Stxch arrangexnents produce resentment and utopian thinking about a more just order, which then motivate acts of resistance, Short of a global totalitarian order, where there is injustice in the global distribution of wealth there will be resistance, This suggests that ongoing peaceful reiations among persons globally requires an egalitarian order, A rnore just world order would not suffer from the saxne forms of instability as an unjust order, Tlie least advantaged in such an order wouId have no reasonable grounds k ~ resentment. I f that were the case, then neither r would the more advantaged since they cannot p1ausi"oly claim to deserve their advantages. Even if resentment per se cannot be eradicated, taking away the justified grounds of resentment would be an acfvance for the stability of a world order. Additiorzally, as T. argued in Chapter 2, if the conceptions of persons that tl-re principles of justice are constructed on are true, then there are rational gounds for all members of the g l o h l society to accept the principles of cosmopolitan justice, Moreover, the symbolic power of victories over i*scice, even if temyorary, can be enormously strong. Kant describes this as the power of enthusiasm." If #ant's words in tl-re quotation that opened this chapter are read as a prediction about the symbotic power of republican revolutions that would sweep aside arbitrary rule, he can hardly be accused of being unrealistic, The increased Iegitimacy given to human rights claims in international affairs suggests that m c e again arbitrary power is threatened. Perhaps we are witnessing the beginning of an era in which the claims of global distrib~ltivejustice will gain legitimacy. Tn short, the grounds for a realistic hope for an egalitarian world order exist because of the instability of all unjust orders, the greater stability of a more just one, and the symbolic power of advalzces in justice. This rBay seem insufficient in light of current ineyudicies and the resistance of the beneficiarks of such inequalities, hut reasons for hope need not be as strong as reasons for belief, -It is enough that ins~~bility may result in advances for ~usticeand that such advances are both inspiring and possibly rnore stable than injustice. Cr>smt>politanhope is rational just so long as the possibiiity of an egalitarian world ~ r d e exists, r

NOTE

1. Iatl Browntie, ed., Basic Documerzts c m Human Rights, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Czlarendon Press, 1992),22, 2. It may dtimatety be impossible to say very much about the difference between philosaphicaf and legat approaches to justice without beggng certain questions about, for example, the ctairns of natural law theory and Iegd positivism. The present formutation of the legal approach does not, however, assume a positivist account of the taw since the rufes that govern institution$ and existing practices may hc moral rules. 3,The most ccjmprehensive and powerful statement of contemporary positivism is H. I,. A. Hart" The Co~zceptof Law (C3xfclrd: Ctarerldon Press, 1986). 4, Konaid l)workin, Takintg K2gk;lt.s Serioz-lsiy (London: l>uckwortb, 1977) and Law's Empire (Cambridge, ?&ass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). 5, Leland Al. Goodrich, Edvard Hamhro, and At~neParrieia Simmons, Charter of the U~zz'tedN ~ ~ ~ u3rd I z ed. s , (New York: Czatuznbia Ur-riversityX3ress, 19691, 43, 6. Ibid., p.60, 7. Zan Browntie, ed., Basic Docz-.a.wze~zts in I~lzterr-zatiu~zd Law (Oxford: Czlarendon Prcss, 1983),40. 8. Goodrich, et al., Charter of the tbrzited Nations, p. SO, 9. Xbtd, 10. Ibid., p, 55. 11. There is a very extensive debate in the literature about this, For representative samples t>f t l ~ enegative answer, see :Vicfitaet Akehurst, ""E-lumat~itarianIntervention," in Hedley Bull, ed,, Intervention a'rz World Poka'tics (Oxford: Gfarendan Press, 19841, 95-1 3 8; and Ian RrovvnIie, "Humanitarian Intervendon," in i n ~ wand Civil War in the Moder~zWorid, ed. joltn Norton hiloore (KaXttmore: The Jafins Hopkins University Press, 1974), 217-228. For representative samples OF the affirmative answer, see Kicl~ardB, I,illicb, "Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Browt~tie and a Pica for Constructive AItcrnatives," in Law a d Ghil War in t??eModenz Wc~rEd,pp. 229-251; and Fernando K. Tesbn, Hz~nzwnztaritLanJnterventic~n,2d ed. (Xrvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Transnationaj Publisfiers, Inc., 1997).

12. Goodric-11, et al., C3arter o f t h e UtzitelZ ATaLE'ons, p, 293. 13. This point is emphasized by, amtjng tjthers, Gian Luca Uurci, "United Nations 13eacekeeping Operations in Situations of Internal Confhct," in inhe New World Order, ed. Xlortirner Scllars (C>xft>rd:Uerg, 1996f, 237-272; and Micbaef Cilennon, "Glennon Replies," hreigtz Affxks 78:4 (July-August 1999): 120-122, 14. Tharnas Franck secs this as carving out: a role for the coffectivc promotion of justice under 2(1;7f.See T I ~ o ~ n aFranck, s ""Beak It, Don't take It:," "reign AiFf~irs 78:4 (July-August 19999): 116-1 1 8. 1.5, hlichael W lkyle argues that ""treats to peace has come to be so tibertltiy inas to allow tnterventiorls to rectify huxnan rights violatiorls." terpreted, t~ourevcr~ See his "The New Interventionism," ~Meraphilosophy32: 1-2 (January 2001): 221, 16. Goodric-11, et al., The Charter ofthe Utzited N a ~ i o ~ zp, s , 25;. 17, Ibid., p, 355, 18. Ibid., p. 380. 19. Sec Brownlie, Basic Roczdments on Hzinzan Ri@l;s, pp. 25-27. 20. Ian Brawnlie, X'rinciples of P~bllicItztc~rfzatic~nal Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Cfarcrldon Press, 2 990), 570. 21. Kichard 1.3, l,illich and Hurst Manglum, Itztemational P-lzdman Kzghts, 3d ed. (New York: Idit:rle,Braurn and C ~ m p a ~ l 199.5), y, 166, 22, Browtltie, Basic Docu~nerztsclrz Human Kzghts, pp. 114-124, 23. Ibid., pp, 125-143.

CHAPTER 2 1. Robert Nozick, Afzarchy, S&te and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 183. 2. John Kawts, The Law of l%evples ((:ambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universitj. Press, 1999), 24. 3, John Kawls, A Tbeclry ofjusbce, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, 1999), xiv-xvi. 4. John Rawls, Political 1,iberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2993f, 18-29. 5. Ihid,, pp, 23-25. 6 , Ibid,, pp. 25-26, 7. Ibid,, p, 12, 8. Rawts, The Law of Z%eoples, p. 32. 9. Ibid., p. 23, 10, Ibid., pp. 4,90, 11. Ibid., pp, 32-33. 12. Ibid,, p, 29. 13. Ibid., p. 40, 14. Ibid,, p. 37. 1.5, Ibid,, pp. 27, 37-38, 80-81, If;. Ihid,, pp. 4C1-41, 17. Ibid., pp. 23-38, 18, Thornas Franck, ""The Emerging Right to Detl-tocratic Gavernance," T h e American Jozdmal of I~zter~tational Law 86: 1 fjatluary 1992): 85,

19. Rawls, The Law o(X3esples,pp. 44-54, 21). Ibid,, pp. 49-51. 21. Ibid., pp. 4.63, 22, Ibid., p, 65. 23. Ibid., pp, 105-120, 24, Ibid,, p, 14, 25. Ibid., p. SO, 26, Ibid., p, 14, especially fczotrlvte 5, 27. Ibid., p, 14, 28. Rawls, Pczligical I,ibercaliswz, p. 4. 29, Ibid., p, S, 30. Rawls, T"hest?f,pp, 65-73. 3 1,John Kawls, "TLze Law t>f 1)esple"" f2ritical Irzguiry 20: I (autumn 1993): 43-44, 32, Rawls, The I,aw of Peoples, p. 38. Etniphasis added, 33. Ibid., footnote 45. 34. Ibid., pp, 64-67. 35, Irnrnanuef Kant, "Perpetual 13eace: A l3hilosophical Sketch," in Kant"sf3olitzcaE Writi~zgs,ed. Hans X'Cciss, trans, H, B, Nlsbct (Cambridge: Cambridge University 13ress, I970), 118. Emphasis in t>rigit~al, 36, This i s consistent with Rawis? view that the princrples of justice should be chosen as if reasonabty favorable cc>nditionsfor tl~eiracceptance exist. If such cc>ndirians, in fact, do not exist, then the princrples are not akered, rather tang-tert1-t political reform ts rcquircd, Sec John Rawlr, "Reply to Habermas,"" The Journal of Phalusophy XCIT:3 (&$arch 1995): 252, 37, Kawls, The I,aw of Peoples, pp. 48-51, 38, Bruce Ackerman, ""Political I,iberalisms," "~ozilmalof lJhilosophy XGf:? (July 1994): 382-383* 39. Rawls, "The Law of 13eopfes," p. 40. 40. Rawls, The Law o(XT"eoples,p, 82, 41. Ibid,, pp. 82-83. 42, Ibid., p. 35, 43, Rawls, "The I*awof Pccljplcs," pp. 42-43. 44. X shall develop the point further in Chapter 3, but one virtue of the construction crrlder consideration ts that it allows US to weigh thc claims of cornpatriots and noncompatriots in the same procedure. For reassns that I l ~ o p ebecome clear in Chapter 3, E agree with Henry Stzue's contention that "it iris impossible tu settle the magnitude t>f one's sfuties in justice (if any) toward the fettt>wmembers t>f one's nation-state-or wllatever one's domestic society-prior to and independent of settling the magnitude of (me" sfuties in justice (if any) toward nonmembers," "The Burdens of Justice," The Journal o(X3hilosophy I,XXX:10 (C3ctober 1983): 603, 45. Sec R, G. Peffer, Marxisnz, Moralit3 arzd SCIG~QE ~ZISL~C /X%ince1011: B Princeton Ur-riversityPress, 19901, 24; Rawls, Political I,iberalism, p, 7;and Henry Skue, Basic Rights (Princetoll: Prir~cetunUniversity Press, 1 %O), 22-29, 46, Ibid., p. 29, 47. Rawls, “Reply to Habermas," p, 179, Sec also Rawlr, "The IAawof Peoples," p. 55.

48. A sisliitar point is made by Jiirgen Habertlias, The Inclzrsisn of the C)$her (Cambridge, Mass.: The M1T Press, 19981, 99. 49- Rawls, Political Liberalkm, p, 28. 50. Cllartes Beitz points out that evetin if the conceptions of person in the s r i ~ n a t position are more congenial to the self-conceptions of citizens of liberal deiliocracies, the conceptions themselves may still have crrliversal application. Chartcs Keitz, ""Cosiliopotitan Ideals and National Sentiment," T h e journal of Philosophy ldXXX:l0 (C3ctober 1983): 5%. 51, Kawls, Political Liberalkm, p, 64, Elsewllere Rawfs asserts tllat there are thrcc kit~dsof justification of the patittcal conception of justice in political lihcraiism, These are pro tanto Justification, futt justification, and pubtic; justification. See his ""Reply to Habermas," pp. 142-144, $2, Kawls, Political Liberalknz, pp. 64-65, 53. Political Liberalism, p. 74. 54. Ibid. SS. Ibid., p. 19, 56. Harry Brlghousc makes this point nicely. "A person who crrldcrstarlds the meaning of the idea of the good life wouiid seek one.. Tlzis almost tautolsgt>usclaim can be understood from within almost any conception of thc good." "Is Thcrc Any Such Thing As f301itical l,iheralism?" Pacific Phil;rsr~j2hiccllQ~darterjlS,7'$:3-4 (SeptemberlUece~~iber 1994): 330. 57, The first two are Rawis" conception of the circumstances t>f Justice, and the third is his account of the burdens of i~rdgrnent,See Political Libercirlism, pp, 66 and 56-57 respccdvelji, 58. John Sruart k1ilt tlrges, "It is always probable that the dissentients have something worth hearing to say for thcmsclvcs, and that truth would lose something by their siletince," "On Liberty in Utilitarianism," kin Otz Lztsertg; Essay on Rent??am,ed. Xlary Wamock (New York: hlcridtan, 19621, 176. 59. See Kawls, PcllzticaE Liberalism, pp. 1 1-12, where he sets out tile secotld and third conditions. However, fie is also concerned that the first condition obtains in order to make an t>verlappingconsensus possible. See atso f301zticalI,zh~mlisn?r,pp. 14O--144, 60, This point is also s~iadewith respect to the principles of justice by David Fstlund, ""The Insularity of thc Reasonable: Why Political 1,iberalism Must Admit the Truth," Ethics 108:2 (January 2998): 252-2E. 61. Rawls, "Reply to Habermas," p, 150. 62. Kawls, f301ztiulI,iberalism, p, 129, 63. Ibid., p, 157, 64, Henry Sidgwick, The Meti2ods of Ethzcs (Indiatinapolis: Hackett 1)ublisbing Ch., 198 X), 46 l. J. A. Mlrrtces aIso argues that tltilirarians may have good reasons for rejecting strict utilitarian justice in favox of cc>mpromise,See his ""The Economic Uses af Urilitarianis~n,""in U t i l i t a r i z a~zdBeysl~d,eds, Asliartya Sen and Rcrnard Wiliiarns (Caxnbridgc: Cambridge University Prcss, 19821, 81-82, 6.5. Rawls, Polil-ical LiberaEEsm, pp. 2 56-1 57. 66. Sec RonrtId h%ilo, ""Gontractarian Consrrucrivlsm," The Jciurfzal of Philnsophy XC1I:Lf (April 1995): 181-284, 67. Sec Paul Harwich, Trtath (Oxford: RastI RIackweit, 1990), chap, 1 for an accoutint t>f tlze minimalist conception of trutll.

68. Rawls, The Law ~(X'~esples, p, 59. 69. Kawls, 1301zticalLiberatkm, p. 60. 70. Ibid., p. 37. 7" Ibid., pp, 10, 1.54, 7%.Ibid., p. 152. 73, Witl Kymlickzt, Liberlalzsm, (Jonzm~$rzit~ attd Cz-tkure (Oxford: Ctarcndon Press, 1989f,chap. 8. 74. Ibid., p, 169. 7.5,Kawls, The Law of l%eoples, p. 63. 76. Ibid., p, 61, 77'. Rawls, "The Law t>f f3eoples," p. 66, footnote 55. 1 have been arguing that the prohte1-n with Kawls's account af toteration in his law af peoples is that it takes the object of tolerance to be the ideologies and practices t>f peoples. In contrast, tiberals usually extend tolerance anty to tlie opinions and practices of persons, The problem, as X sec it, is not with the political character of Rauds's liberalism, For an interesting attempt to argue that the political character of Rawls's liberalism is the sourcc of his misguided account of toleration, see Kok-Chor Tan, E~leratiorz,Rhersit34 and filobal Jz-astzce (University Park: The 13ennsylvania State University f3ress, 2000), 38-45.

1. Xxnmarluel Kant, ""lea for a Universal History," in Katzt's 13011iricaE iVritil.zgs, ed. Hans Reiss, trans, H, B, Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University 13ress, 1970), 4 7. 2. Thornas W, 130gge, "C:clsmt)polieanir;m and Sovereignty," Ethics 14)3:1 (October 1992): 50. 3,Judith l,ichtenberg employs the concept of world ta argue for a simitar tl~esis and notes that worlds "can have fuzzy edges" in '""NationalBoundaries and hforal Rsundartcs," in Round~ries,cds, Peter G, Brown and Henry Shue (Totowa, N.J.: Rawman and Littlefieid, 1982), 85. 4. David Hurnc, An Enquiry Gonceming the 13ritzciples nf ~Momls,ed, J, B, Scl~neewind.(fndianapolis: Hackett 13ubtisl~ing Co., Inc., 1383), 26. 5. Charles Beitz makcs a sixnilar point. Sec "Social and Cosxnopolitan lstbcralism," htenzatio~zal'Affiil-s 75:3 (July 1999): 539, 6. hfany of the reasons for this are presented wit11 soii'te clarity in Sarnuet. Sclieffler, ""E'milies, Nations, Strangers," The L,indley I,ecture, University t>f Kansas, 1994. 7, Rawls, A T i ~ e o go ~ f jz.rstice, p. 7, 8. Samuel Scbeffier, "Liberalism, Nationalism, and the State," in The Morality of Natz'orzalism, eds. Rohcrt hlcKirn and Jeff hilcMahan (Ncwr York: Oxford University 13ress, 1997), 204, 9. Sec I>avid Miller, Olz N a t i o ~ a l (Oxford: i~ Cfarerldon Press, 1995), 61. 10. Yael Tamir, Liberal Natiorzalism (Princeton: Princeton University 13ress, 1993f, 10%.

11. Ronald Dworkin, I,aw's Empzre (Calmbridge, hiass,: Harvard University f3ress, I981;), 199. 12. Ibid., pp, 198-1539, 13- There are, t>fcourse, several notable and valuable exceptic~nsto this rule, including (but not liiliited to f Czharles Beitz, Political T!?esl?t and Xtz~ernaz-l'o~zaI Relat i o ~ s(Prtnccton: Princeton University E>ress, 19799);Judith I,ict~tenbcrg,""National Boundaries and hforal Boundaries," pppp,79-100; Kai Nielsen, "Globat Justice, Capitalism and the Third World," in In~enzationalJz.rsttceatzd the Third World, eds. Robin Aetfield and Barry Wilkins (London: Routtedge, 1992), 32-33; R, C;, I>effer, Marxism, ~Mora.ali$y, l a d Socia1 Jsdstice (Princeton: 13rincetonUxlivcrstty Press, 19901, especially pp, 4114412; Thomas 130gge,Realking Rawis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 198q) chap. 21 ; Henry Shue, Basic Rights (Princeton: Princeton Universlry f3ress, 1980); and Fernando K, Tescin, A lJhilosophyof International 1 . a ~(Boulder: W"trtview Press, 1998), 14, Basil I>avidson, The A(1.icajt-t Slave Trade (Boston: 1,ittie Brown and Co., 198Q),especially chap, 3, section 4, 15. Sec Nikolai Rukharin, Izlzperialism l a d iVorld Ecorzonzy (1,ondon: Xlcrltn f3ress, 19%); Kuclolph Hilferding, E'it?anre G~apitar(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul IAtcI,,1981); j, A. H O ~ S OImperialism: I~, A ,5tzddy (Idondon:Janles Nishet and C:(],, 1902); V. I, Lenin, Imperialism: The Ni:63est Stage of C:a~~itaEknz, in f2otl~cted Works, vol. 19, (li"\foscow:I)rogress X3ublishers, 1964); and Rosa Luxemburg, The Accunzzalatiorz of Capital (London: Koutleclge and Kegan Paul Led,, I963), 16. World Bank, Debt Tables Extracts tittp:/lwwwworId~Y~2Obank/w0rId~%; 20I>ehr%21F~ablcs%2~lF,xtracts%2f~199Q, 17, See Anthony Giddens? extracted speech in ""Essential kiatter," UNRISLI News 15 (autumn 1996/1997). 18. The deveisprnentat path ccjnstrained by conditions such as these is sometimes Scc Adam Przewurski, et referred to as ""modernization by interr~atior~altzatian~~ at., S g s t a i ~ a h f eL>enzocracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 13ress, 1995), 4, ALten Buchanan i~iakesa st~liiiarpoint in ""Ravvls"s Law of Peoples: R~llesfor a Vanisl~ecfWestpl~atianWorld," Ethics I I0:4 (July 2088): 782, 19. National Acadeiliy af Sciences, O n e Earth, Otze Future: O u r Chafzcqing (Washington, l3.C: National Academy Prcss, 1990), 65. Global E~zvironrne~zt 20. Ibid., p. 68. 21, Ibid., p. 69. 22. Ibid., pp. 78-1 02, 23. UNICEF, ""The Progress of the Nations: Statistical Profile, t~ttp://wu~w, IdNICEE:%2Olstat/~tati~tica1%2Oprofile%20%0Eur~~pe. 24. Ibid.; ~ittp:l/www,tJPiiIC~EX;~2O/~tat/~tati~tical%2Qprofiie~Y02O%2OS~b hara, 25. Brian Barry, "Hulnanity and Justice in Cilobal Perspective," in inEt63ics, ECOr-tonzia, atzd the IAaw,Nornos XXIV, eds. j, Roiiand Pennock and John W. Chaprman (New York: New York University Press, 1982), 232. 26. Rriarl Rarry, ""Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique,"" it1 Global justtce, Nornos XLI, eJs, Ian Skapiro and Lea Brilrnayer (New XI&: New Yc3rk University Prcss, 1999), 59.

27. Barry has tried to argLte for international redistribution on the basis af justice as equal rights to natural resources. See lzis "Do Cout~triesHave Moral C3bligations? The Case aE World Poverty," in The 'Piz~zner1,ecarrlrs on Heaman Values, ed. Sterling it$, A4cMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah I)ress, 1981), 34-39, 28. H. L, A. Hart, The Co~zcr-lptof Law (Oxford: CIarendon Press, 1986), 92. 29, For cxaxnple, see j-rtlcs I,. Colcman, "Negative and Positive Positivism,"" in Rsnakd Dworkin and Canrct.mporaryJurzsprudence, ed. Marsl~attGol~en(Totowa, N-j.: Kowman and Allenhcld, 19133),28, 30, Thomas 130gge makes a similar point, ""Xstitutions tlemand moral reflection most clearly %.hen they, tike slavery, cstablrfh morally ob~cctioxlablepositions or distinctions-as in the case of feudal and caste systems, patriarclzal societies, t>r slavery* But institutions may also be fat~ftedon the basis of deprivations and inequalities they e$?g:.ndcvrew""Kawfs and Globat Justice," Carzadkn Jounzal o f IJhiEosophy 1 8 2 (June 1988): 228. Emphasis in originat. 31. Accorciing to Rawis" view, principles of justice are chosen regardless of actual institutions and even the felicity of actuat conditions to constr~xctionaf just insdtutions. If' infelicitous conditions, it1 fact, da nor exist, then the principles arc not altered, rather it>ng-termpolitical reform is recluired. See Jczht~Rawls, ""Reply to Habermas," The journal ofPhiknsq2hy XCIX:3 (Marctz 1995); 152, 32, Marcl~aC, Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,"" in For Love of C;ozkntr*):ed. Joshua Coben (Boston: Beacon Press, 19961, 1.3. 33. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics jlndianapolis: Hackett I)ubtisl~ing, Ch., 19811, 435436. 34. Alasdair hlacXxltyrc, "1s Patriotism a Virtue?" The I"tnd1ey X~ecrure,tittiversity of Kansas, 1984, 3.5. Rarry, "Statistn and Nationalism: A Cosmop~lita~l Critique," pp, 12-66. 36. Samuel Schefiler, "The Canffict Between Justice and Kesponsibilir);" in GlobalJzlcstice, Nomos XE,X, pp. 92-93, Schefflcr goes on to report (without endorsing) that, "It is, of course, tl~isfeature of special responsibilities that leads them to be invoked in opposition to claims of gfobat justrce." 37. K~obertE. C;oodin, "What 1s So Special About Our Felltjvv Cc>untrymen?" Ethics 9 8 4 (July 1988): 663-686. 38. l-he ori&nal positiorl for dornestic justice assumes that a domestic society is self-sufficient, See John Rawls, A T!?eory of JZ-LS~~CP, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass,: Harvarci University I?css, 1999),4, So, assessing cIajrns of justice axnong cornpatrit>ts does not require consideration t>f possible conflicts with noncompatriots, The originaI position for interrlational justice comes only after duties at the state level have been indepet~dentlyestablished. See Kawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, hfass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 30-35, 39. There is a third cc>nsideratianas welf, namely that justice in contract requires soil-te basic c-oil-tmittl-tentsaE i~tsticein order to assess the rnorality af contracts, and quite pIausibf~this it~voXvcswhat G , H, and J owed each other prior to any contracts. If a contract i s to be just, then it may not violate these comlnitments. 117 this example, tliiis consideration lines up with tl-tc other two, Sir~cemy point i s to slzow the greater ease t>f adjudicating disputes when the first two considerations coincide, X do not invoke this consideration here.

40. This methodotogrcat conclusion seems also to be entailed by Scl-teffler" claim that reconciling tlze duties of justice to compatriots wit11 those to noncompatriots, if both are taken to be associative duties, entails seeing both as 11-tutuatlyconstraining and practically competitive, See ""Liberalism, Nationalism, and tlze State," p 2204, 41. T"11ornas Pogge also takes this position, See ""Rawls and Globat Justice," pp. 227-256. 42, This is Rawls" procedure, See Rawis, The Law o(13esples, pp. 30-35, 43, I>chra Satz, "Equality of: What A~nongWhom?" in Glrrbal Jtrstice, Nornos XLI>p- 7.5% 44. Kcrnard Williams, ""A Critique of UtiIttarianistn," in Utili$arl;anismFor a ~ t d Against, eJs, j, j. C, Smart and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199S), 93-107, 45. Sidgwickk escape route is that "it would not under actual circumstances promote ~tniversathappiness if each man were to concern himself with the l~appinessof others as mueh as with his own," "dgwick, iuethods of Ethia, p. 431. 46. kiaclntyre, ""lPatriotism a Virtue?" 47. In various ways, and with different nuarlees, this ctal~nis defended by all of the fottt>wing:Barry, ""Satism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan C:riticlueW";Grgetl Habermas, "Citizi.,cnsktipand Natior-ral Iclentit-y: Some Reflecttons on thc Future of Europe," Pflraxk Intematic~rzal I2:l (April 1992): 1-19; and Stepl~enNatl~anson, ""lDaeEcnse of Moderate Patriotisi-t-t,"' Eghics 99:3 (Apr11 2989): 535-552, 48, Aristotle, Nicomczchean Ethics, trans, H. Kackham (London: The Loeb Clas2 93441,483, at 2 159b6-7, sic Librar.?~, 49. MacIntyre, "Is Parriatistn a Virtue?" p. 6, SO. See, for example, Richard kiiller, ""Cos~-t-tapotitan Respect and X3atriotic Czonccrn," Fhilc>sophyl a d Public Affairs 27:3 (summer 19%): 202-224; and Satz, "Quality t>f What Amc~ngWhom?" 67-85. 51. CI3artrs Jones, for example, refuses to rnalcc this concession. Sec his Global justice: llefe~tdingCr~smopolitanisnz(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 234-149. 52, Sirnon Caney defet~dsa global equality of opportunity principle in his ""Cosrnopolitan justice and Ecjualizing Opportunities," Metaphtlosophy 321-2 (January 2001 ): l 13-1 34* 53. hailler, 'Tosmopolitan Respect and X3atriotic Concern," pp, 2 14-215,21 8. 54, See Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 65; and David Miller, Olz Natiorzaligy (Oxford: Ctarendot~Press, 1995), 22, Sidgwick sees a tlistinguisbing feature t>f nationkrtoct to be "a eorlsclousncss of belonging to one another," Hcnry Sidgwick, Elements of Polibcs, 4th ed, (L,ondon: Macmillan and Co., Ltd,, I91 9), 224, SS. T'at-t-tir,pp. 95-1 16. 56, Will Kymiicka, Multi-f:ultural Citiserzshif~:A L.iberal TG~eoryof iWinurity Ri@$s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 199S), cliap. 4, especially pp, 4 2 4 4 . 57. Although not arguing far strong nationalism, Davtd Xlillcr makes thts point, See kiiller, ( I n Naitl'onalz'ty,p, 75. ~ i u o r a l i ~of 58. Thoxnas Hurka, ""The Justification of National P a r ~ i a l i r yit1~ The Natiorzalisnz, p. 153, 59. I?avid hillller is also guilty of thts when describing nations as active eornmunities. See XiIilier, OPIN a t l ~ ~ a l i tp, y , 24,

60. Tail-tir bases her view a n the special care existing between co-nationals. See Tamir, L.zberaE Hatzonalism, pp. 104-1 12, Davicf Miller involies the special feelitlgs that we have for co-nationals in 0 1 2 h"d$i:iotzalitg?, p, 70. 61, Tamir, L.iberal Natic~~zaEism, pp. 22-32, 62. Tltere is, af course, the proletarian internationalist claim that protectionist policies are not trr the long-term interest of the working class because they crndercut the basis af international proletarian sofidarity 63. Richard Falk, "Revisioning Cosxnopolitanir~m,"'in For Love n(C:nuzztry, ed. Joshua Colzen (Bostt~n:Beacon I)ress, 19961, 57, 64, Traditionally, egalitarians with an intcrnationalisr orientation tzavc favored free trade. See Karf hfarx, "Speech t>nFree Trade" (l 118481, in Sekected Writings, ed. Uavid klcLellan (Oxford: Oxford Ur-riversity X3ress, 19771, 269-270; V* I. Lenin, ""The Economic Content of Harodism" "(18951, in Coltectsd lYorks, vol. 1 (Moscow: Provess Publishers, 2960), 436; and V. I. Lenin, ""Re the hfonopoly of Fareign Trade" (l (19221, in Collected Works, vol. 33 (ibloscour: Progress Publishers, 2966), 457, &fore recently, both John Roell-ter and Philip van Parijs conclude that capital exports to Iess-devctapcct countries is generally egalitarian Erom the global perspective. See John Roemer "Qalitariatl Strategies," I3rfse.rzt (summer 1999): 74; and I3ltltIipvan Partjs, "Comment: Cltij.cnshtp Exploitation, "Unequal Exchange and the Breakdown of Popular Sovereigr~ty,"in Free iMczvervre~zt,ecfs, ESrian Barry and Rabert Gaodir~(Czollege Station: The 13ennsytvania State Universlry Press, 1992), 155-167. Thomas I)ogge atso criticizes prc)tectit>nismon global egalitariatl @;rounds, See his "Priorities of fttobat, Justice," M~blctaphzlosc-ighy32: 2-2 (January 2001.): 13. 65. Kim Moody and hfary McCinn, Urzz'o~zsalzd Free Trade (Iletroit: I,abor Notes, 19922 1-6. 66. For a defcnse of fair trade, sec Georpe F: DcMarrino, Global Ecoftom3~, Ciluhal Justice (London: Kouttedge, 2000), 207-215. 67. Eririka dc Wet, "I,abor Standards in the Globalizect Economy: The lnctusiorl of a Social Clause in the Generat Agreement of Tariff and TradeNc3rld Trade Organization," Hi!.ipnan RigCfts Quarterly 1 7 3 ( 1995): 45 2. 68. Argl~iriEmmanuel" Unequal Exchartge (London: Montlzty Review f3ress, 297%). 69, For a criricistn, sec John E, Rocmcr, ""Unequal Excl~ange,I,abor Migrations and International Capital Flows: A Theoretical Synthesis," Marxism, C;entraE Pla~zr-ti~zg,atzd the Sour'et E:col.torny, ed. Padma 13esai (Ca~nbridge,hlass.: The MIT Rcss, 1983), sections 3-4. 70, EmmanueI, U~zeqzlalF:xchange, pp. 262-270, 71. A4ic11ael Walzer, Spheres c j f Jztstice (New York: Basic: Boc~ks,1993), 33-34, 7%.Ibid., p. 3473. See E. H. Carr, The Twenty VearsYf:r&&(London: Macmillatl and Go,, Ltd,, 2939), 201. 74. Some of tlzesc reasons arc adumbrated in Xlichacl J. Trcbiiicock, "The Case for Liberal Zrnmigration Pol~cy,"in Justzce z;tz rl~nmi~qr~$iofz, ed, Warren E". Scfrwartz (Cambridge, Xlass,: Harvard "Uxlivcrsity Press, 199.51, 234-235, At least a partial defense of the claim that immigration Izarms tlze economic interests t>f native workers can he found in Susarl K, Vroxnan, "Soxne Caveats on the Welfare Economics of Immigradc~nL a y " in Jlusfice ia Immigratior-2, pp. 2 12-2 18,

75. Distribution A i s X3areto inferior to B, and B Pareto superior to A, if and only if U makes at least one person better off than A, and makes no one worse off, Since well-being i s a moral concern, Pareto superiority indicates not rnerely superiority from the perspective of efgciency but from the perspective of morality as welt, 76. Jean Hampton aIso argues for this conctt~sion,See Hatl-tpton, ""Xxi~~igration, Identitjr, and Justiccz," "1 J z ~ s t i ~~FeZImmigr~tiotz,pp. 67-93. 77. Walzer, Spheres of Justice, pp, 35-42; Rawis, The J,QW of Peoples, p. 39, f o s t n ~ t c48. 78. Kyrnfickat MzkEti-Czcltziral C:itizenship, chap. 4, especially pp. 42-44, 79. Rawls, A T h e o v o f jz.rstice, pp. 434-480. 88. Arguing from a similar moral premise as mine, Joseph Carens accepts this conclusion. Garens, ""AIlgrationand Morality: A 1,iberal Egalitarian Perspective," in Free iWovenzerzt, ecfs, Brian Barry and Robert Gocldin (College Station: The 13etmsylvania State University Press), 39. 81, One possibility, corlststent wit11 maintaining state neutrality is Ckto Baucrk proposal to perll-tit c~tizensto elect their national membersflip and to permit nations to tax ttlieir members it1 order to financc scl~ools(wt~ichmay be regulated by the state) and otl~ercultural institutions, at1 of which are tfistinct from state institutions, Sec Raucr, Die Na~iorzalit2tenfrageza~zdDie Soxialdemokrads, in Werkazdsgahe, band I (Wien: Europa Verfags-AC; Wein, I97.5."?),481415, 82. Arthur Ripstein, "Context, Gontinulty, and Fairness," in The Morality of ATatit~naEism,pp, 2 2 3-2 14, 8.3. Similar conclusions have been reactled by Joseph H. Czarens in ""Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Opcrl Borders," Review n f Polztics 4 9 2 (spring 1987): 251--273; and Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," p. 29. Peter Schuck seems to think ( ~ r o n g t yas~far as X can tell) that this is a concession to ijfibcral conceptions of community. Shuck, "The Transfc3rmacion of Immigration Law," Colzanzbra Law Review 84:1 (January 1 984): 87-88, 84, For a ~udgmentthat contradicts this view, at least with respect to institutions af distributive justice, see Czarens, "&figration and Idtoratity," p 42. 85, See Koerner, "Egalitarian Strategies," ppFp, 73-74,

1. The World C:ommissit>n on Environmet~tand l>eveft>pment,Our Conznzorz Pzdtgre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Z 98 7 ) , 312, 2. http://wwvv,ut1dp/undp%20~ortdQi;~2,0p~~~erty. 3. http://wwvv,t1ndp/~~ndp%20p0verty2CfcIoc-k, 4. http:l/wvc~w~undp/~tndp"/~2~~worIdUr;~20povcrty. S. Donaid G. LvIcNeil Jr., "West" LLrug Firms Play C;od in Africa," Mail a~zd Guara'irxrz (May 26-jrtnc 1,2000): 22. <)riginally published in The New York Times. 6 , Ibid. 7.Ibid. 8. "Wc3rld Heatth Organization," press release 64 by t l ~ eWHO jiMay 31, I999), See aiiso 1tttp://~ww.wfio.int./ar~f1i~e~/infr-pr-1999/enlpr99-64.11t1~l.

9, John Rawis, The JIaw of Pe~pkes(C:all-thridge, hfass,: Harvard University f3ress, 19991, 118, 10. Ibid., pp, I 17-1 18, 11. One t>f the virtues of taking primary goc~cfsas tlie measure of ~ustice,rather than ~ttiliry~ for example, is that it atlows for individual responsibility for ends setting. Sec Jofin Rawls, "Social Unity and Primary Goods,"" it1 CT;kilz"trzsmland Reyolzd, eds. Ail-tartya Sen and Bernard Williaxns (<:ambridge: Czatl-tbridge Universlry Prcss, 198.31, 168, 12. John RawIs, A Tbeor3~of Jztstice, rev, ecf, (Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, 19991, 89, 13. Ibid., p, 87, 14. John Rawls, ""Reply to Alexander and hfusgrave," in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, Afass,: Harvard University 13ress, 1999), 253. 15. Br~anBarryr, "Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective," in EtI?ics, Ecor-tomiw,l a d the Law,Noxnos XXZV, eds, J, Rolarld Pennock and jahrl W Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 19821, 233. Similar positions are also taken by Rriarl R. Ogcskin, ""The Xloraf Foundations of Foreign Aid," World L>evelopmerzt 24:1 (January 1996): 21-44; and Robert E, Goscfitl, "What Is So Special about Chtr Fellow Cocrntrymcn?" Ethics 98:4 (July 1988): 67'7. Response to this argumetlt can be found in Davicf A, J. Richarcis, "Intertlational l3istributivc justice," in EE~ics,Ecolzonzics, a12d t/?e JIaw, pp. 275-299; and Thornas Pogge, ""Kawts and C;lobal Justice," Canadiaz Jozamal of IVhilosophy 18:2 (June 1988): 248-249. If;. Ibogge, ""Kawlr and Global justice," pp.249, Fmpfiasts it1 original. 17. Terry Nardin, L a w Moralitg~tand the Relations of S&tes (Princeton: Princeton University Prcss, 1983), 14-15. 18, Ibid., p, 10-14. 19, Ehid,, p, 17. 24). Ibid., p, 277. 21. X3art of tile problem here is interpreting Mardin" pposlrion, However, the interpmetadc~nthat takes him as holding that claims to a fair share of the object of distributive j~tsticeare claiil-ts to substantive rather than procedural goods is consistent with a11 earlier distinction between ""values internal to rnora! life and the rule of taw" as characteristic of practical associations and vatues ""served by cooperation ajrncd at securing the ends such as urealth, status, power, or the propagation of particular religious t>r ideott~gicatvalues9$as characteristic t>f purposive associations, Ibid., p. 12. 22. C;oc>din "What Is So Special About Our Fellow C:ountrymen?" pp. 663-686. 23. Ibid., p. 682. 24, Henry Shue lias convincingly arguecf for an adctitionat tirnitadon to perspectives such as C;oodin's- With respect to global ecological problems such as ozone deptetion and climate change, "no stare is abie to protect its own people against the effects on planetary at~l-tospkereof the clioices of other states about whether to use CFC and to use fossil Euels." Sbcre, "boding Sovereignty: The Advance of Principle," in The iWoualzty of Natiorzarzsm, eJs, EZobert :VcKim and Jefl A4c:Uaban (Oxford: C)xfc>rd University Press, 1997), 3.53,

25. See hfichael Wakzer, Spheres ofjws~ice(New York: Basic Books, 191;3),chap, 3 , 26, A4ichaef Walzer, Thick and TI!?iitz (Nstre Dame: University of Notre l k m e Press, t994), chap. 2. 27. Watzer, ,Spheres usof Jwstice, p, 29-38. 28. Ibid., p. 69-74, 29, Ibid., p. 5, 30. Andrew Hurrelt makes an iil-tportant point: ""Indeed there is no reason in prir~ciplewhy ir~ternaIistor convcntionaIist accounts of justice necct to he confined within state borders and used to buttress communitarlan positic)ns." See his "Global Inequality and XnternationaI Institutions,"" Metaphilosc_sphy 32: 1-2 (January 2001): 43, 3 1. Rawls, Th'63&013f of J Z I S G I ' C ~ pp. 57-73. 32, 13areta optimality is a measure t>f eificietncy: A distribution is f3areto optimal if and only if no transkrs can be made witli~o~it lessening at least one person's welt being. 33. Several other writers have argued that a cosmopolitan origltlal position would yield the difkrexlce prir~ciple.Scc Rrian Rarry, The Z,ibera.aE TI!?rroyof jzastice (Oxford: CIaretndot~13ress, 19731, 128-133; Barry, Theories of justice (Berketey: University of Caiihmia Press, 19891, 189; Charles Reirz, I3oEliricaE Theol.3,a d Iitztenzatir~~zcal Ke.aE~ticzns(1)rinceton: Princeton University Press, 1979j, 150-1 53; K, C;, Peffer, Marxiswz, Morality and Social Jz4stice (Princetan: Princeton University Press, 1998), 4 8 4 4 12; and Thomas f30gge, Reczlizilzg Rawks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, t 98531, chap, 21, 34. Both Joshua Colten" b4DcmocraticEquality," F:thics 99:4 (July 1998): 727-75 1; and ''rehi. Scanlon's 'miversity of C3bjections to Inecluality," The 1,indley Idecturc, University of Kansas, 1996, prescrlt arguxnents for the difference princtpiie that do not rely t>nthe tjriginal position, 35. Philip Arestts and Malcolm Sawyel; "Hour Many Cheers for tfie Tobin Tax?" fkmhridge Journal of Economics 21 ( 19977: 763, C3n the Tobin tax see jail-tes Tobin, ""A Proposal for International Monetary Reforln," in Essays in F~corzomics: Theory atzd Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: The XZIT 13ress, 19821, 482-494. On the possible uses of the revenue acqtlired from the Tobin tax, see Xnge Kaul and John I,angxnare, "Potential Uses of rfie Revenue from a Tobin Tax," kin T h e Tilbi?z Tax, eds. kiahbub ~ t Haq, t et al. (Cdxford: Oxford University Press, 19961, 255-271. According t a Tobin" account, the goal of the tax is Iess to raise funds for tfevefoprnetnt and more to decrease the instability caused by short-term speculative investments, Whether it would also provide a disincentive for longer-term investment in other countries, particutarly the poorer ones, is an important issue. 36. See Thornas Nagef, Eqzdalit3t and Ikartiality (Oxford: Oxforci University f3ress, 1991f, chap. IS. A globat minitl-tum floor principle is also defended by Henry Shue, Basic Rights (Princeton: Princetor1 tirtivcrsity Press, 1980), 128; and R. Rrucc Douglass, "hternational Econamic Justice and the Guaranteed kiinitl-tum," The Revieu~ o f Politics, 4 4 1 (January 1982): 3-24, 37, Nagel, k;qz-talit3tarzd PartiaEity, chap, 1S, 38, Ibid.

39. Nagel is aware of this last possibility. See Equaligy and 13artiality, p, SO. 48. Sbue, Basic Kzgbts, p. 128. 41. Stanfey Hoffman, Duties Beyond Borders (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University 13ress, 1981), 155, 42. Rawls, Theol3f of fztsdice, pp. 54, 386, 43, See Amartya Sen, 7itzeqzlali2y Reexanzzned (Oxford: Cfarerldon Press, 19921, 33; and Sen, "Poor, Reiatively Speaking," in in~wsurcw,VaEg$w and Development (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984),336-337. 44. Sen, "bthical Issues in Income Llistribution," in inResc~z.lrrcri.s, klzdtrs and Deuelopnzent, p, 294, 45. Kawls, ""Stcial Unity and 13rirnary Goc>cts," p. 168, especially foott~ote8, For Rawls" account of the four levels af justification see Theory of J U S ~ Z F ~pp. , 171-176, 46. Rawls, The Law o(13espEes, p, 13, footnote 3. 47. Ibid. 48. John Rawls, ""Kantian Gonstructivis~~~ in &forat Tl-teor)~,""zknzal of Philosophy I,XXVXI:9 (September 198(f): 526-527, 49, Martl~aC. Nussbaurn, ""Human Capa biliries, Female Human Beings," in ivonzejt-t, Cl'ujtzare artd Revelopnzent, cds. hlartha Nussbauxn and Jonatfian Gloves (Oxford: Oxford University l?ress, 1995), 92. SO. Sen, Inequality Reexamined, p, 124, 51, Jean LlrPze and Arnartya Sen, Hurzger and lJuhlicActzorz (Oxford: C:Iarendon Press, 2989), 51-52. 52. Ibid., pp, 52-53, 53. Alllartya Sen and Bernard Williarns, "llntroduct~on: Utilitarianisil-t and Beyond," in liti/itandtzism artd R e j l c ~ ~p, d , 20. 54. In his more recent accomts of the capabilities apprc)acl~,Sen sometimes lsc~ks at frecdr>msas fseecioxns to meet nccds. Scc 7itreqzkalily Reexamined, p. 109, 5.5, Ibid., pp. 53-55, 56. See Sen, "hyuality af What?" in The T ~ ~ Z ~LZe cOt "~Tr won Hurna~zVaEgdes, ed. S, M. hlicMurrin (Salt Lake City: University c>f Utah 13ress, 19811, 324-325; and Ranalci Dworkin, "What Is Ecluality? Part 2 : Equality af Welfare," PI)tEossphy and Public Afhirs 1O:S ( S U M I M I C ~1982): 228-240, 57. Rawls, "Social Unity and Primary (C;oods," p. 169. 58. Serl sornctimcs takcs this gasition; see I~zsquakigyReexamifzed, pp. 1CJ8-109. 59, Sen, "Quality of What?" p. 328, and "Poor, Relatively Speaking," p 334, 611, See Nikolai Rukharin, Inzperialkm l a d iVorEd I.:corzonzy (Idondon: Xlcrlin f3ress, 1976); Kudolph Hilferding, F2nanre C~apital(London: Koutledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1981);j. A, Hobson, Iwtpo.riaEkm: A S t ~ d y(Idondon:Jail-tes Ntsbet and Co., 1982); and V: 1, Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Ckpitcklisnz, vof, I9 af Coliected Works (hioscow: Progress X3ublishers, 1964), The exception to this account of the ctiology of imperialism is Rosa IA~xemburg; see The Ac~am~.llation of Ckpl'tal (London: Rautliedge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1963). 61. The exception to this among Xilarxists is Karl Kautsky, "Ultra-Tmpcrialistn," New Left Review 5%:1 (January-February> 1970). Hobson also tlisagree~ithat war was illcvltahle; see Imperialknz: A S t ~ d ypp, , 94-96,

62. The following texts are a representative survey af the various fmm~xlationsof this theory: f3aul A, Baran, The PoliticaE k;cu~onzyof Crowtk~(E-larmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books Ltd., 197'88);Andre Gunder Frank, CapitaIz'sma~ztriUPZ$CYI~!~valopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Keview Press, 1969); and Imrnanuel Walfcrstein, The C:af~i$al&tWorlLZ-Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 63. The classic account is Arghirl Emmanuetk U~~zequal Excha~zge(1,ondon: Xltlntltly Review Press, 1972). 64. See Kohert Brenner" 'The Origins of Capitalist l3evett>pment:A C:riticlue of Neo-Smithian h.larxtsm," Mew I,efi Review 1 0 4 3 (July-August 1977): 2.5-92; and Bill Warretl's Imperzalism I?iofze?erof CApl'taIisrn (1,ondon: Verso, 1988). 65..John Rael-ner deveiaps a sophisticated n~odelof ill-tperialis~n,which takes inequalities as part of its identificatory tl~eory.See Roerner, Free to Lose (Cambridge, hfass.: Harvard University Press, 2 988), 1113-206, 66. One of Emmanuel" solutions for unequal exchange is similar to this remecty; see Er~equalExcha~zge,pp, 262-270. 67. Kai Niclscn, "Glohai Justice, Capitalism and the Thtrct World,"" in I~ztenza;eit~naE Jgstice and the Tk~zrdWorld, ecfs, Robin Attfield and Barry Wilkins (London: Rourlcdgc, 19921, 32-33. 68, A careful discussion of the claims of Alarxist theorists of the relative inefficiency of capitalism can be found in X3hilippe van Pztrijs" Rml fieenlcrnz ;Fur All: Ca~zjztstify Ckpitaltsm (Oxlorci: CIarendon I>ress, 1995), What ( I f A~.tythZ~zgf 286-233, 69, Some support for this view can be found in Jana Thompson, Jzastice ajt-td World Order (l,andon: Ro~itledge,2992), 78-79. 70. This moral principle might be thought one, wl~icfiis only sometimes applied. See Barry E. Carter and f%illip R. Trimble, Intenzatio~zalLaw (Boston: 1,ittle Brown and Co., 1991) 429433. 71 . Samuel C , Wheeler 111, ""Keparadc~nsReconstructed, " Amzerzcan f3hilosophiml Qzaartrrlj~34:3 (July 199q: 302-3 18. 72, jeremy Walcfrstl, ""Superseding Historic Injustice," Ethics 103:2 (Octc~ber 2992): 4-28. 73. Since apologies arc standardty onIy owed to those who are t~armcctby ones" actions, it seems to me that the morality of apologies for colonialism and slavery in prcvious gericratians is subject to roughly the saxnc account that X have givcn of reparations, 74. httr):/~~rld%2ORank/~~o1:ld%21F~ebt%2~~Tab1es%21FExtracts"/~2Oli996~ 7.5. Barry Witkins, "Debt and Underdevefopment: The Case f c x C:ancelling Third World Debts," h~nter~zaitl'onal Jz~sticeand the Thir~iw ~ r l dpp. , 271-172, 76, United Nations Research Institute for Social Developmet~t,StructwraE Adjustmefzt in a Chnl-zg"-lqWcjrltll, UNRISD Briefing Paper Series 4 (Geneva: UNRXSD, 19941, 12. 77. Ibid., p. 24, 78. Micfiael Barrat Brown, Fatr Trade (Idondon:Zed Rooks, 1993),42, 79, UNRXSLI, S~ructaralAdjzdstmerzr;t~za C:hangz~zgWc~rld,p, 3. 80, Ibid., p, 13,

8 1. Wilkins, "Debt and Underdevelopment," p. 18582. Ibid,, p, 20-2 1, 83. See Amartya Sen, Development As Freedcrm (New York: Alfred A. Mt~opE, 1999), 2 2 6-226; and the World Commission on Envirr~nmetintand Development, Our Conznzolz Future, p, 103-105. 84. Wilktns, "Dehr and Underctevclopmcnt," p. 184. Jcffrey Sachs makes an argLtment to tile sail-te conclusion about the particular case of debt cancellation for Nigeria; see ""l.;cryone Has an Excuse Not to Help Nigeria," B~usz'nessRay (June 22,2000): 15, 85. Rriarl Rarry, ""Staism and Nationalistn: A Cosmopolitan Critique,"" it1 Global justice, Nc>mosXI,I, ed. Ian Sbapiro and Lea Britmayer (New York: New York University Press, 19991, 28, 86, Carrett Hardin, "Lifeboat Etl~ics:The Case Against Helping the 130c>r,"kin WorM Hza~zgerMoral Qblzgatiot~,eds. William Aiken and Hugh La Fottete (Englewood C-Iliffs, N.J.: Prcndcc Hall, 1977'1, 18. Originally publisl~ectin Psychology Today 8 (1974): 3843,123-126. 87. SCII,ReueE~pn~e~zt AS h e e d o m , pp. 20.5-209. Sec also The World Coxnmtssion on Environment and l>evelspment, Oztr Cornmo~tFtktzbre, pp. 128-130, 88. Sen, I>evsEopmerzt As Freedonz, pp, 21 6-226, 89. National Academy t ~ fSciences, One Earth, Clne Future: Our Charzgi~g Global E~zvironment(Waskbgton, D.G.: National Acaden~yPress, 1990),53. 98. Ibid., p, 65. 91. Ibid., p, 68; and The World Commission on Environment and Ueveloprnent, CIS~T Gommorz Fzdtlz.tre, p. 175. 92. National Academy of Sciences, One EartC~,CIlw Future, p, 69. See also The World Commission on Environment and Devclopmcnt, Ozar C2nnzvuzol.t Fzatfdre, p. 176, 93. Natiorlal Acadcxny of Scicnccs, Chze Earth, Chze Fu~z.tre,p. 71. 94. Ibid., p. 70; and The World Commission on Environment and Llevelopment, Our Csnznzolz Future, p, 176, 95. National Acatlerny of Sciences, One Earth, Clne Fztture, pp, 78-102, 96. Ibid., p. 89. 97. Sec also Rcrnard E, Rollir~,"Environmental Ethics and Internrttiorlal Justice," in Problems of Itzter~zationaljustice, ed, Steven Luper-Foy (Boulder: Westview Prcss, 1988), especially pp, 131-1 39. 98. National Acatlerny of Sciences, One Earth, Clne Fztture, p. 117. 99, Ibid., pp. 118-1 19, Sec also Ben jackson, Povsrt31 atzd the I3Ia~zet(Iaondon: 13enguinBooks, 1990), 16-3 1. 100.1 owe recognition al this probteln to Henry S h e , "Globat and International Ine~luality,~' Intertzational Aff;clirs 7 4 3 (July 1999): 520, 101. See Brian Barry, ""Humanity and justice in C;!obal X3erspective," pp. 247-2511; and "Do Countries Have Moral IC)bligations? The Casc of World Poverty," in inhe 7"alztzo.r I,o.ctz&res osn I-lieama~z Valt#t.s, ed. Sterling hfcht~rrin (Salt Iske City: University of Utah Prcss, 1981), 4 0 4 2 , It2cccntly Rarry has come out strongly against statism, See note 85, So, the view expressed in these pieces may no longer charactcrizc his postdon,

l. John Stuart kiill, ""A Few Words a n Non-intervention," in Dlssertatic)ns and I>iscussions,vol. 3 f Boston: Witfiaxn V, Spenccr, 18641, 251, 2. RawIs takes the bask structtxre to be "the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and dcterxninc the division of political advantages for social cooperaticzn." Among major social institutic~nsKawIs inctudes "the political constitution and principal ecanorntc and social arrangements." John Rawls, A Tbeoq~of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, 1999f, 6. 3,Hedley Bull distinguishes internal and external sovereignty. See The AfzarchicaE Society (l,ondon: Mac~nillanPress Ltd., 19771, 8. 4. For example, Thomas X30gge takcs sovereignty to be a relationship of autfiority only over other persons. See ""Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty9'3thics 103:1. (October 1992): 57. S. The relaticonslzig betweet1 ccjuntermeasures and interventiczn is discussed by Fernando R, Tesitn, H-4~un~atzit~rian Itzterve~ztion:An 7nqzdiry i ~ t 7,aw o and ~Moraligy, 2d ed. (Irvington-an-Hudsc~n~ N.Y.: Transnational lkblishers, 19971, 1.35, C;. h f y position is ctase to that of Charles Beitz and owes a great deal to 111sarguments. But there seem to be three ways in which we differ. The first is that I take sovereignty to be authority aver a particular domain. A state may be sovereign in one domain and not another. Rcirz does not draw this distinction, The second difference is that 1 narrow the kirtds of coit-tparativedomestic inj~tsticesthat amount to forfeiturcs of sovereignty to those that arc properties of the basic structure, Third, I allow that internadc~nalinjustices may justify intervention. See C:harles Beitz, PulzticaE Theory a~zdInternational Relatiotzs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19791, part 2, Serious international injustices, ranging from war to pollution to distributive injustices to i~arboringinternational terrorists, may be perpetrated by the domestic policies of states vvitl~)ust basic structures, Henry Shue discusses pollution and sovereignty in ""l;;ocfing Sovereignty: The Advance of X3rinciple," in The Morality of Natio~ali~m, eds, Kobert McKirn and jeff McMahan (Oxford: C)xford University Press, 19971, 340-339, Andrew M~lper" disctxssion of imrt-tigration policy poit~tsto the. possibility of ir~tcrnatlrorlaldistributive injustices crcated by just basic structures; see "Rawlsian Globat Justice: Beyond the Law of 1)eoples to a Cosmopolltarl I,aw of Person," "~olitical Theory 28:5 (Clctobcr 2000):644-648. The effects are tirnited to tlzose t>f domestic poficies because criteria for responditlg to the t~nj~tst effects of foreign. poiicies are a matter of the doctrine of co~inter-measures.. 7,Vattel affirmed the relatiot~shipbetween statisrn and absolutism as follows: ""Every Nation vvilich governs itself, under whatever form, and wliich does not depend on any other Nation, is a sc_sverc?ig-nSgate, Its rights, arc, in the natural order, the same as those of every ather State, . . . To give a Nation the right to a definite position in tfzis great society, it nced ordy be truly sovereign and independent; it must govern itself by its awn authority and its own laws," E. dde Vattel, The Law of Natiotzs of lrhe Priitzc@Ees of Natural I,aw, voI, 3, trans, Charles G , Fenwick (New York: C>cean 13ublications, Inc,, 19641, 11, Fernando K, Tescin atso recognizes and criticizes the relattonsl~ipbetween statisrn and absol~ltisrnin his A Philosophy ofl~ilterrzatir~~zcaE Law (Boulder: Westview Press, 199S), 39-71.

8. For various and different examples of the mixed conception of sovereignty, see Llavid l,uban, "just War and Human Rigl~ts,"in in~rztertzatiortalEthics, ecls, t:harles Beirz, et at. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I98Sf, 195-2 26; Laban, "The Romance of the Nation State," kin Irttemational Ethics, pp. 238-243; Hetinry Sfiue, "Conditional Sovereignty," Res Puljlica 8: 1 (1999): 1-7; and Mlchaef 'Wal~er,Just a d Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Rooks, 1977),108, 9. Adam X3rzeworski, et al., Sustai~zableDcnzocrac~~ (Calmbridge: Cambridge University I'ress, 19951, 4. 10, See Charles Ueitz, ""Ssvereignty and Morality," in in301itical Tk~enryTcjday, ed. Davtd Held (Stanfcjrd: Stanford University Press, 1991), 241, 11. Grotius employs the analogy to property in De Jzdre Belli et I k c k (London: John W, Parker, 285..2), book I, chap. 3, sections 21-12. 12, Friecfrich Kratocl~wil,""Sovereignty As l3ominium: Is There a Kight t>f Hurnanitarian Interventions?" in Keyolzd Wesphtllia? State Sovereigzty and fnger~zat i o ~ a Intervention, l eds. Gene M . 1,yons and Micl-taeI Mastanduno (Baltimore: Thc Jolins Hopkins University X3ress, 2"35), 26. 33. The analogy with property is also criticized it1 R. j. Vincent" Nhiorztervcntio~zarzd Irzterrzatiolzal Order (Princeton: Princeton University I)ress, 1974), 338-339. 14. Wafzer, Just and tbrzjust Was, p. 5.5, 15. Ibid., p. 54, 16. On the relatiotinsl~ipbetween privacy and tlomestic violence, see Susan Moller Okin, Jztstice, Gender, a~zdthe Parnilj! (New York: Basic Books, 19891, 228. A cornpartson of the faults of shielding the faxntly and the state frorn critiques of justice frorn the o~itsidecan be fo~tndin C>nara OWeill, ""Justice, Gender and International Roundartcs,'Yin Intenzational Justice l a d the Tjpird World, eds. Robin Artfieid and Barry Wif kins (London: Kc->utlecfge,19921, 59-6 1, 17. E H. Hinstey, Sovereig~zty,2d ed, (Carrrbridgc: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 226, 18. "Since the state is rnind abjectified, it is only as ane of its ~i-tembersthat the individual 11irnsell has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life.'". W, E Hegel, Philosophy of R z 8 t , trans, X hf. Mnox /Idandon:Oxford, 2967j, 256, paragraph 258, See also Mervyn Frost, Towards la Mornzatiue Ti?eor~jof f~ztenzationaE Relariocllzs /C:aii-thidge: Calmbridge University Press, 1986), I W- 17.5. 19. Ibid,, pp. 162-1 63, 24). Ibid., p, 183, 21. Ibid,, p, 17% 22. Ibid,, pp. 162-163. 23. See John Rawts, The I,aw of Peoples (Cambridge, hiass.: Harvard University 13ress, 1999), 59; and Terry Nardin, Law, iWoralit35 arzd the Kelatiorzs of States (Princeton: Princetan University Press, 19831, 233. 24. Kawls, The Law of Pecq~Ees.Sec also Atlen Kuchanan" '"RecognirionaI Ixgitirnacy and tile State System," Pk~ilosophyand Public Affairs, 28:1 (winter 2999): especially pp. 52-62, 2.5. If human rights are understood sufficientfy broadly then a conception of soverctgrlty that requires respect for human rights is a cosmopoiittan conccptioxl. This appear"to be Tes6n" position, See Hzkmartitcariarz Interuerztzon, pp, 117-129,

C:kartes Jones seems to take a position similar to this in his Global Jzrsdicer Defending Cospnc~polztanifnz (Oxford: C3xford Ulliversity I)ress, 1999), S0-84. 26. Vincent makes this rnistake in hroni~zterventic~n and Inter~zatiunalOrder, pp, 345-346, 27. Stantey Hoffman, Duties Beyond Borders (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syrac-use University Press, 1981), 57. 28. TesGn also rnakes this point, See A Philosoph~~ of I~zterrzacio~zal Law, p. 40. 29, The qualification "at least somcdmcs"" indicates that even the cosmopolitan conception t>f sovereigr~tycan allow that there may be times when the injustice that exists does not merit intervention. TIx necessary condition of proportionality? which is defended iacer is meant to proscribe interventions in such cases, 30, &fartin 1,uther King Jr., for example, clairns that "the aftertl-tathof non-violence is the creation of the beloved csmmuniq, while the aftermath of violence is tragic bit(New York: Harper and Row, 1958f, 102, terness," in Stride Eu~ardFree~i~m 31. ""Rt thc evil kof intervcntiorl on behalf of the oppressed] is, that, if they have not sufficient love of liberty to be abte to wrest it fro111 ~l-terelydomestic oppressors, the liberty which is bestowed on them by other hands than their own will have nothing reat, nothing permanent," Xlill, ""A Few Wc3rds on Nctn-intervetltiotl,"" p. 259. "Both for prod~rcriorlon a rnass scale of this communist consctclusncss, and for the success of the cause itself, the alteration t>f men t>na mass scale is necessar;v; an alteration wfiicli can anty take place in a practical ~l-tovetnent,a revolution; this revt>tutiotl is necessary, therefore, not only because the rulr"~tg class cannot be averthrown in any atker wajr, but also because the class overthrou~ir~g it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of agcs and bccornc fitred to found society anew," Kari Marx, The G'erma~zIdeology in The Marx-E~zgels Reader, 2d eci., eci. R ~ b ~C.r tTucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 193. Emphasis in original. 32, In corltrast &fill, seems guilty of remarkable naiveti wtzen he equates ability to govern with ability to vanquish an tjppressor, such as in the following claim: "The only test possessing any real value, af a people's having become fit for poputar institutions, is that the5 or a sufficient portion of them to prevail in the contest, are willing to brave labour and danger for their liberation." Mill, ""A Few Words on Nonintcrvcmion,"" p. 258. 33. Robert H, Jackson, ""Xternational Colnmunity Beyond the Czofd War," in Beyorzd Wesff~halia? S;tatr Sovereignty and Intenzafional I~ztewefztion, p. 76. 34, E. H, Carr insists that "pleas for international solitlarity" come frt_lmthe "dominant nations"; sec The Twenty Years' <(Jriszs(1,ondon: Xlaemiilan and C:o., l,cd., 1939), 109. 35. Apparentty this was the position of tl-tany in the Bririsfi 1,abour Party during Worlcl War If and was the positisln taken by Harofd l,aski in 11is pamphlet, "Is TIlis an Itl-tperialist War." See S. F. Kissin, War a~zdthe Marxasts, vol. 2 (t,ondon: Andrk Dccttsch, 19129), 91. 36, See Jackson, ""International Community Beyond the Czofd War," pp, 59-83; Christophcr Claphaxn, ""Sovereignty and the Third World State," PPo~icalSttadies 47 (Special Issue 1999): 522-537 and Ilavid Strang, "Contestecf. Sovereignty: The Social Ctznstructian of Colonial Imperialism," in inSovereigntyas Social Cnnstrucr, eds. Thomas J, Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (Cambridge: (:ambridge U~~iversity

Press, 1996), 22-49. For a quatified exception to the endorsement of absolute nonintervention out of a concern for t l ~ econditions t>f develo~>ingcountries, see S. C:, Nol~ttsh~tngu, ""Non-intervention: TEiical Rules of Disregardhand Third-World C:onRias," in inxights and Dzbties in North-Sozatj~Relaticlns, ed, hloorhead WrigEzt (1,ondon: hfactxillan, 19861, 132-158, 57, Vincent points out that the principle that American foreign policy was prell-tised on during the Cold War was not tile statist conception of sovereignty and its complcrncrlt nontntervcntion, but rather a Ioosc bipolar system that permitted intervention to prevent delectic~nsto the scl~erblock, Norzinterve$?tzcznand Iuternat i o ~ a Order, l pp. 351-35.3, 38, For an accc>utltof the recent bistt?ry of U.S. imperiafist interventions in Latin America see Noaln Ghoil-tsky3 E7"ztrtzi~zg the Ti~ie(Boston: S ~ ~ i End, t h 1985), especially chaps. 1-3, 39. R. J, Vincent hofds that a consequence of the cosmopolitan account i s that "there umutd be no end of wars of intervention."" Human Rlg.hi?.sl a d I~ztenzational Relatiotzs (Cambridge: Czarnbridge University Press, 1986), 117, 40, There is a difficult question of applicatic.rn herc. Xs thcre just cr-ttrse for intervention when the basic structure is just, but it is n ~ speratiot~al, t as when a state may have a just consttttltion that is ignored? When reaso~lablyjust electoral Iaws and procedures are in place but are ig~lorecf,as they were finr example prior to the 2000 etections in Zimbabwe, the question of just cause for intervention is partic-ctfarly vexed, 41. For a somewhat different argument to a slrnilar conclusir>n, see Buchanan, "Recognitional Idegitimaw and the State System," pp, 62-63. As far as X car1 surthat injustices be systematic is ~l-teantto acltieve the same mise Tesbn" rey~~irernent purpose. Sec Hzinzanitarian I~ttervention,p, 123. 42, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H, Kackbam (Cambridge, Mass,: Marvarci Urtiversicy Press, 19341, 3 17, at 1137b29-33. 43, A similar point is made by Teshn, Hunzanttc2rr"LanIrzterverzf;ic~rz, p. 125-126. 44. A good discussion of thls can be found in hfichael W. Doyle, ""The New 111terventionism," Metnphzlosophy 32: 1-2 (January 2081 ): 2 12-233, 45. TesCin refers to this criterion as ""disirzterestedness" in Huuna~zitariianIntervention, pp. 121-1 22, He secs this condition as being fulfilled by certain actions of the intervening party, nalnely if the intervention lasted no longer than necessary? if the party demanded no advantages, and if the party did rrzot seek domination. AI1 of these are important consideraticnns, but right intent is not neecfecf to ensure them, The rcquircxnent of proportionality can do this work rnorc straightfarwarctly stncc it ~udgesonly actions and not actions as signs of intent, 46. Henry Shue refers to such duties of states as ""service duties." See Basic Rights (I3rit1cetan:Princetot1 University 13ress, 1980), 151, 47. See Brian Barry, "H~imanityand justice in Global Perspective," in Wornos XXIIV, eds. J. Roland Pennock and John 'VV: Chapman (Mew York: New York University Press, 1982),232, 48. Jackson, ""Xternatinnal Coxnmunity Rcyorld the Cold War,"" p. 75. 49. A prima facie duty to intervet~eexists wherever there is an injustice to t l ~ ebasic structure of a state or in the foreign effects of dorncstlc poiiicy. An alt-things-consitlered duty would require that the t>tl.terjustifying ccjnditions also be met. Al-

thougl-t not drawing the distinction between priil-ta facie and ail-things-considered duties, Henry Shue also argues for t l ~ eduty to intervene in "Conditionat Savereignty," Hsewl~erehe liil-tits the d~rtyaniy to cases where basic rights are violated, See Basic RigC~ts,pp. 114ff. 580. Jackson, ""Xnternational Community Beyond the Cold War," p 880. 51, Although this is a hroad definition aE intervention, some define it even more broadly T'esbn il-taintainsthat criticis111 is a fort11 aE ""soft intervention" in in~uma~zz" p. 1.35. He also holds that intervention is cocrcivc, Hence, he is tarikzfz I~zterve~ztiorz, utinalnle to tlraw an important tlistinction between rational argumentation and coercion, Starlrcy Hoffman asserts that "refusing to ir~tervealc. . . is itself a form of intervention" kin l)z&t?esBeyond Borders, p. 34. If tl~iswere true, it would be imgossibte to distinguish intervention from nonintervention. 52, Jackson, "International CL:ommutinity Beyond the Cold War," p 882. 53. John kiuetiter and Karl Mueller, ""Sanctions af Mass Destruction," "reign Affairs 7738: (h1;ay/Junc 1999):49. 54. Ibid., p. S I,

1. Avishai kiargatit and Joseph Raz, ""National Self-Uetertl-tination,"Jsur~zalof Philosophy IsXXXVXT:9(September 199Cf):449, 2, Will Mymlicka, Mz4Eti-CZultz~rraECit&e~zshl'p:A 1,iberal 'iChesry of Xbll'tzority Righ~.s(Oxfc3rd: Oxfarct tirtiversity Press, 1995), 6-7. 3,This cfaim does not require that national groups conceived of themselves as nations prior to the existence of die state. Nations may still bc irnagined cornmunities in ZSene~tictAnderson's sense and the image t>f national community a mc~dern phenoil-tenon. See Anderson, 1urzagl'~zo.dGornmz~tzz'ties(Idandon:Verso, Z 993f ,6. 4, Kymlicka, Multi-C84ltziraE C2itize~zship~ chap. 4, especially pp. 42-44, and Liberalism, Canzmunit~~ avd Czalture (C3xford: CIarendon Press, 1989), Z 66-1 67. 5, Kyxnlicka, Multi-Cultural Gitketzship, pp. 56-57, 6. Kok-Chor Tan urges that placing value a n state neutrality is peculiar to political liberalism and not required of compreilcnsive Iibcrallrm. Sec his Toleration, Diversity$ aarzd CiEohczl Jwstice (Universitjr 13ark: The f3etinnsylvatinia State Universitjr Prcss, 200t)), 64-77. I disagree, As X have argued, state neutrality is a necessary (potitical) cc>tindition of the ability to revise nationally one" cc>tinceptit>nof the goc~d. Tl-tis ability is valued by both political and c-oil-tprehensiveliberals. 7. Yael Tamir, 1,iberal National-isnz (13rinceton:Pritincetan University f3ress, I993), 72, 8. X am rclyir~gcrgon AIIen Ruchanan" distinction bcrvcrecn indtvidcral and group rights. He distinguishes the two according to the object af ascription and the agent of cxerctsc. Individual rights are ascribect to individuals and are exercised by them; group rights are ascribed to groups and are exercised by them. See Secession (Boulder: Westview Press, 19911, 74, 9, See Tamir, Liberal Natic~nalism,p, 7.5; and Josepl~Kaz, The Moivclli~of Freedom (C3xford: Ctarendon Press, I 986), 209, See also Margalit and Raz, ""Nationat Self-Determination," p, 456,

10. These problems seem to 11ie to also apply to Christopfier Wellman's arguf-nent that the case for secessiot~tlepends in large measure on the size of the group wisl~ing to secede. See ""A llefense of Secession and X>ooi[liticalSetf-.DeterminationT7'Philosophy and Publzc Affiirs 2 4 2 (spring 199.5): 162-1 63, 11. This is aften raised as a practical problem for the view that there are groLip rights, For exaxnplc, sec Fernando R, Tesbn, A I3hllnscrphy of I~ztenzational1,aw (Boulder: Westview 13rcss, 19913),136. 12, This model is developed in Ckta Raucr, Die hTationalitlr"terzfragewzd die SozhEdenzokratie, in Otto Baaber Werkausgabe, band 1 (Wiet~:Europa Verlags-AG Wicn, 1975), especially pp. 40141.3. 13. An account t>f some of tl~eseproblems is presented by t l ~ eWorld Health Organization in Fact Slieet IFJ 153, http://www.wi~o~int/inf-fsIenlfact1S3,htmt. 14, For an acctlunt of the rights to emigrate and to change citizensl~ip,see Fredrick G. Wl~elan,"Citizenship and the Right to Leave," American Political Science Review "75:3 (September 1981): 636-653. 15. The argul-nent presented here for the moral difference between the rights af immigrant groups and nations does not rely upon Kytnticka's controversial emptrical claim that the former untike the latter are unabfe to maintain tlistinct cultural structures. A weakness of the way that X have presented the argument, however$is that the immigrant groups may tfevelt>p stable cultural structures distinct f r t m those of their homeland. In this case, individuals wilo wish not to be governed by homeland to wl~iclzto return. Arguing against the state may also have no cuft~~^a1 the rigtit to secede for such immigrant groups may rey~lireinvoking either tlie voluntary nature of immigration as does Kymlicka, Multi-C:uEtural Citizenship, p. 48, a r the destabilizkg effects of atlawing inirnigrants to secede. If;.These practical considerations miiitatc agajrlst exrcndir~gthe right to secede to just any group. Thus, my positic>t~differs from others who also argue for a nonrexnedial corlstralned right t a secede, but one that is nor limited to nations* Sec Llaniel Phitpott, ""lLlefense t>f Self-Determinadc)nfl' Eti~ics14)5:2 (January 199.5): 352-383; and Wellman, "A AX)efenseaf Secession and X301iricat Self-Determination," pp. 142-In1. 17. Tes6n also makes this point, See A Philosoph~~ of I~zterrzacio~zal Law p, 151. 18. hlargalit and Kaz argue that the right to sell-determination requires some sort of supermajority, '""ationat Self-Detertliinatron," p. 458. 1 do not fully address the question of whether simple or supcrmajority should be required to exercise thc right to secede, but it seems to me that, given t l ~ eprotectiot~to minorities under my argument, a simple majority would suffice. 19, The following quotation in the text seems to disprove Hurst Hannumk ccfairn that, for Lenin, support for national self-detertliinath was merely tactic-al. See Azatorzum~i,Soverez"gr?ty,and SelflDeternzkatiw (131ziladetphia:University of l3hiladelphia Press, t 990), 33. 20. V, X, Lenin, "More about Nationalism,"' in Collected Works, vol. 20 (Moscow: X3rogress Publishers, Z964), Z 10. Empliasis in original, In the tradition of ctasstcal Xlarxism, Idenin%posttiun is the most pcrmissive. At the other end uf the spectrum is Rosa Luxemburg, "The Nation State and the 13roletariat," in The Natiorzal &z*lsstion:Selected Writz~zgs,eci, Horacc R, Davts (New York: Monthly Review Press, 39761, 168-169, The record t>f the Bofsl~eviksunder Lenin%lead is far

from consistent on the itl-tplementationof the right to secede, For the record, see E. H, Carr's, The Bolshevik lif~vt~lzrtion 191 7-1 923, A Elzstc~r~~ of Soviet Kussk, vol, I (1,ondon and Basingstake, U.K.: h4acrnilitan Press Ltd., 19SO),chaps. 10-1 3. 21. An entirely different criticism of self-determination as a democratic right can be Eotlnd in Uavid Arcilard" 'TX)otical P11itosophy and the Concept of at Nation," TheJiiurnaE of Val;lkeIngzairy 29:3 (Septexnber 1995): especially pp. 3136-387, 22. See Allen Buchanan, ""Self-X>etermination, Secession, and t f ~ eRule af Z,avv," in The Mora/it_tj of Nationalism, eds. Roberr XfcKim and Jelf McMahan (New York: Oxforct University Press, 1997), 310. Uuclzanank requirement t>f justifying grounds in this paper sccrns to be rnotivritcct primarily by a belief about what is required in order for a prcjposat t>n secession to be accepted as international law. Atso, my proposed lack af justifying grounds, coil-tbined with the constraints af justice, tioes not fit neatly into Buc.hananasdistinction between substantive and proceduralist rnodels of a constitutionat rigfit to secede, See Buchanan, Secessiotz, pp, 132-135, 23. Ernest Geflner, ATaLE'ons and Matiu~zaEism(C3xford: Blackwell, 19831, 2. Em~ phasis i r original.

1. Sr. Altgusdnc, The City of God, Rooks 17-22, trans. (ierald G. Walsh, S, J., and Daniel J. Honan (New York: Fathers of the C:l-rurch, Inc., 19S4), 206, 2. Arthur Schlestnger Jr. is guilty of this whcn he invokes tfie ""ghastly consequences" "of seeing ioreign poticy in moral terms and calls the Vietnam War a "morality trip." See "National Ilr~teresrsand hloral Absolutes," in Ethics a d World lJvlztics, ed. Ernest W. l,efever (Baltimore: The Jobns E-iopkins University I)ress, 2972),27, 38, 3,Ibid,, p. 24; and C;eorge F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign f30ticy," b r e i g ~ z AffaEYS 64:2 (winter 1985186): 207, 4. I discuss the problems associated with the reqltirexncr~tof actual consensus in greater detait in ""Consens~tsand Gognirivism in Habertl-tas" Uisco~irseEthics," S O MAfiicatz ~ ~ Jo~nzaEof P?~ilusophy19:2 (June 200E1): 65-74, 5, Keinhotd Niebubr, iworal Matt arzd Immoral Scjciety (New York: C:lzarles Scribner's Sons, 19321, 48, 88; and E. H, Cars, Thc Twenp Years' Crisis (Iaondon: Macmillan and <:c>,, Ltd, 19391, 201, 6. Niebuhr, Moral Man, p. 48, 7. Ibid., p, 9%. 8. Ibid,, p. 88, 9. Kcnnan, "Itltlraltty and Fareign Policy," p, 206, Ftnphasis i r original. ~ 10. Also see Cliarles Beitz, Politial lif'heorya~zdInter~zatiunaERelations (Princeton: Pri r~cctontrrtivcrsity Press, 19"a9), 24, 1l, Hans Morgentl~au,Politi~-sAmong Natzons, St11 ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973),4. 12, Ibid., p, S, 13. Ibid., pp, 8, 22.

14. Justit1 Rosenberg notes that this move compticates our understanding of Morgenthau's theory considerably, For it is no ttjnger clear whether he is offering objective taws for llow all potiticat agents in fact do act, or for how to understand all action including tlcviatit)~~ from ideal laws, or for how they ought to act, See Rasenberg, The Empire of Civl'E Society (Idondon:Verso, 1994), 22-23, 15. ~Vlorgcnthau,PoEz'tics Anzorzg N a t i o ~ sp. , 8. 16. Ibid., p. 4, 17, Ibid., p, 14. 18. Carr mentions this view in The T w e r z ~YearsYGrkis, p. 204, as tloes Raymond Aron in Peace atzd Far: A Ti~eol.3,o(Inter~atz"ol.talIPelatio~s,trans. Richard Howarcd and Annette Baker Fox (Garcien City, N.Y.: DoulnfeJay and Co., 19661, 580. 19, See Thornas Hohbes, Leviathan (New York: Macmillan I)ubtisl~ingGo,, Inc., 1962), especially chaps. 13, 14, and 17; and C;. W. X;, Hegel, PhiEosaphy of Right, trans. T. Xf. Kxlox (Oxford: C)xford University Prcss, 1952), especially paragraphs 321-341). 20. Rcitz, Poiitical Tj~eorya d lyttenzational Relations, part 1, chaps, S and 4, 21, Ibid., pp. 56-58, 22. Jcnny Teichxnan, citing John Yoder, lists as many as ten differerlr kinds of pacifism, See f3aczfis;;snzand the Just W@r(Clxforci: Basil Blackwell, I,td,, 19861, 7-8. 23. There is at least one other possible justification of pacifism, nalnety, that althouglz tlze criteria of a ~ u s war t theory are correct, no war can meet these standards. I do not address this view here since my objective is to investigate cfiallenges to the theory of the just war; not prohlerns of its application. 24, hr. K. Ciandtli, No?z-VicnEe~zt Resistance (New York: Scfiocken Books, 195 if, 3. 25, EIisabeth Burgos-Uebrah ed., 1, Rigoberta iWaftch8, trans, Ann Wrigl~t(I,ondon: Verso, 19841, 174, Rcccntly David Srolt has chaIIcrlgcct the veracity of somc of Met~chti'sstories about her life, cbargitlg that they are rather more like composite sketches oE peasant life in C;uatemala. See Stoll, Rignberta Menclst6 and the Story of All Poor C;uatemala~zs(Boulder: Westview 13ress, 1999). T l ~ epoint that I am trying to make by referrit~gto these passages is slrnpfy that acts of torture and itttimidation of this kind, regardltess of specific details, are unambiguously wrong. 26. Robert L, Holmes, C h W&ra d Moralit>?(/13rinceton:Princeton University Prcss, 1989), 189. 27, Ibid., p, 186. 28. Ibid., p, 187, 29, Elizabeth Anscornbe, "War and Murder," in War and Moivcllit34 ed. Richard A. Wasserstrotl-t (Kelmont, Galif.: Wadswortlz 13ublishingGo,, Inc., 1970), 45, JeEfrie Murpl~yequates combatant status with guilt: without considering the mentat state of the combatant, See Jeffrie G , Murphgi, ""The Milling of the Zrznocent," in in>alayS MoraE Pr(>FIlems,3d ed., ed. Ricfzarct Wasscrstrom (Mew York: ;Macmillan 13ublistzing Co., 198.5), 331. Originally publisfied in T b e Monk$, 57:4 ( 2973): 527-550. 30, C)n orgarlic uholcs, scc G , E. hlaore, Principi~Ethica (Catnhridgc: Cambridge University 13ress, 1959), 27fk 31. Holmcs, (1fz War atzd lMora.ali0,p. 191. 32. Ibid., p, 21 1,

33.7111is line of argument also provides a response to Richard Nortl-tan's criticism that war involves killing tl~osewllo are nor responsible, See k;thics, Killitzg, a~zndWar (Cambridge: Cambridge University X3ress, 199S), 172, 34, This position is an example of what Ricl~ardWasserstrorn catis the moderate v i e 4 derived fro111 the principle that killing innocents is wrong, See Wasserstrom, "On the Morality of War," in War and Mrrtmlity, p, 100, 35. Holmes, 0 1 2 War and Morality, p, 21 0. 36, Ibid., p, 277. 37, Gandhi, Non-VioEerzt Resktance, p. 35, 38, Ixiiand M. Goodrich, FdvarcI Hambro, and Anrlc Patricia Simmons, C;j:lnrter of the United Natiorzs, 3d ecl. (New York: Columbia University f3ress, 1969),43. S ~ (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 39, kiicfiael Walzer, jl~sta~zdU I I ~ MWars 54-55. 40. Etlen Mciksins Wood, ""Kosovo and the New It~-tperialism,"Mont6313t Revieu, 51:2 (June 1999): 4, 411. Los Avzgeles Times, January 30, 2991, p. A I l. 42- Sec "Why War? Background to the Crisis,"" Mi~idkeEast Report 20 (NovemberlUecernber 1998): 167, 43, For an account of the threat of indigenous nationalism to U.S. interests in the Middle East and Israel's role as a barrier to it, see Noam Chomsky, The Fatef~ETriangle (Boston: South End X3ress, 19831, 20-27, Exail-tples of Israeli aggession incfude the 1956 attack t>nEgypt and the 1978 and 1982 attacks t>n1,ebanon; see pp. 98-1 03. 44. Javtcr Solana, "NATO3 Success it1 Kosovo,"" Foreign Affairs 78:f;O (November-Decel-nber 1999): 124. 45. Micfiael Mandle bacrm, "A Perfect Failure: NAY03 War Against Yugoslavia," Poreig~zAffairs 7 8 3 (September-0ctc)ber 1999): 8, 46, Fariq Aii, ""Sringtixnc far NATO," Mew Ideft Review 234:2 (htarctzlAprtii 1999): 64. 47. Branka kiagas, The Destr~-tcl.r'un of YggosEavia (Idandan:Verso, 19931, 20. 48. Xilagas gives an accclutlt of the strilie in The lles?strzdctic~rz of Yggoslavia, pp. 279-186. 49. "'Another Chapter <)pens in Kosovo,"" The I;corzonzist (C)ctober 17-23, 2998): 33; and Sofana, ""NATO" Success in Kosovo," p. 116. 50. Solana, "NATO's Success in Kosovo," p. 116 , 51, "Getting Ready for War," The k;corztlmiift(October 10-16, 1998): 32, 52. "'Kosovo on the Rrir~kAgain," The Ec.;corzornist(January 23-29, 1999): 27. 53. Ibid. 54. hfarc Weller, "T1ie Rambo~tilletCzanference on Kosovo," hztenzaz-l'ondAffairs '7.52. (Aprit 1399): 229, Weller served as legal adviser to t l ~ eKosovo delegation at the Rasl-tbouitfet conference, 55. This point is cmphasizect by Ali, ""Spr1gtimc for NATC),"" p. 61J; and Robin Blackburn, "Kosovo: The War of NATO Expansion," New Ideft Revieu, 235 (MaylJune 1999): 116, $6. See Gilbert Archer, "Is NATO" sI)nstaugl.tt a Just War?" lWonthE3~Review 51:2 (June 1999): 1 7. 57. BBtackhurn, "Kosovo: The War t>f NATO Expansit>n," p. B, 19.

58. Wood, "Kosovo and the New Imperialism," p. 6. 59, "The West versus Serbia," The Eco~.tonzPst(March 27-April 2, 1999): 29, 60, Helen Smith, ""nark Secret of Masovo" War," Mail a~zdG~arLllia~z ("April 20-2& 22000): 14-15, 6 1. ktandlebaum, ""A Perfect Fail~tre:WATO?sWar Against Yugostavia," p 3. 62. For an account of Kosovo a year after the cessation of the war, sec David Rahde, ""Kosovo Seething," breigtt AiFfairs 79:3 (hfajllJune 2OOtf)r 65-79. 63, For an account of Kusnia four years alter the ccssatian of the war, see I>avid (:handler, ""The Bosniatl 13rotectorateand t l ~ eImplications far Kosovo," New Left Review 23.5:; (hlayljune 1399): 124-1 34. 64. Btackburn, ""Kosovu: The War of NATC3 Expatlsion," p. 107; ALi, "Springtime for NAT'C)," p. 68. 65, Wetier, "The Kamhouillet Conference on Kosovo," pp, 234,241, 66. Ibid., pp. 234-235, 67. Christophcr X f i I I , the U.S. ambassador to hlaccdonia at the time and peace negotiator before and dt~ringthe Rarnbouillst conference, apparently agrees that the Serbian rejcetion of thc Ramboulllct peace pfarl was nor prima"1y d ~ r cto its requirement t>f a NATO gresetlce. See Tirn judah, ""Inside the KLA," T h New York Review of Rooks 44x10 (June 10, 1999): 21-22,

1, Ixnan-rtei Kant, ""The Curltest of Faculties," in K ~ p z t SPolitical Wri~i~zgs, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H, B, Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University 13ress, 19701, 185. 2, One notable exception is Kai Niefscn, "World Government, Security, and Global Justice," in inI"rt1bkemsof International Justice, ed. Stevetl Luger-Foy (Boulder: Westview Press, 19881, 263-282. 3,Kanrk criticism of a wortd-state is oft cited: "hutin light of t l ~ eidea of reason, this state [a federat union of states] is still to be preferred to an alnatgamation af the separate nations under a single power which has ovcrruted the rest arld created a t ~ n i v e r s a l ~ ~ ~ a n aFor r c hthe y laws progressively lose their impact as the government increases its range, and a soulless despotism, after erushir~gthe germs of goocIncss, will finally lapse into anarchy," "13erpetuat Peace: A 13Etilt>ssphicalSketcll," in Kant" Pcntaliricttf Writir~gsp.113. 4. For an account of the pacific fecferation, see ibid., pp. 93-130, 5. Hedfey BLII~,The Anarchical S o c i e ~(l,ondon: The ktact~~illan X3ress, Ltd., 1977,254. 6. There are various contemporary accounts of such a 111ultilayered federation. These do not offer the same institutional solcrtions, nor are they based upon the same ordering aE ~xaralprinciples, For exall-tptes, see Xlaniefe Arcl~ibugi,"From the Ur-rited Nations to Cosxnopcntlitan I>emocrac)r," in InC:nsmopolitafzIlevnocracy, eds. Darlicte Archibugi and lhvid Held (<:ambridge: 130fity 13ress, 19"35), 121-162; Ricl~ardFalk, This I.:ndatzgered P!a:wnet(New York: Randor11 House, 1972 1, especially chap. 7; Falk, Tbe Promzse of Wcjrkd Order (Brighton, U.K.: Wheatslleaf Books l,td,, 19871, especially chap, 11; Falk, ""The World Order Bemeen Inter-State Law and the I,aw of Hu-

rnanity: The Role af Czivil Society Institutions," Cosmopolitan Dcnzocrac3*,pp, 163-179; l3avid I-Ield, "Democracy: From Ciry-States to a Gosmopfi~anOrtleryYn Prc~spectsfir Dewzocrac~\ed, David Held (Stanford: Stanfmd Universil)l X3ress, 19931, 13-52; Held, "Democracy, the Naticm-State, and t l ~ eGlobaii System," in inPolitialTheory Toda?(:ed. David Held istanford: Stanford Universiw X3ress, 2 99 l), 197-235; David Heid "Democracy and the New International Orcfer," in C:osmopolit~cllzIlemocraq, pp, 96-120; Mary Kaldor, ""European Institutions, Nation-States and Nationalism," in (Josrnc9f)olit~~z I>enzocraczcy, pp. 68-95; and Thornas bggc, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignq," Ethics 103:3 j October 1992): 4 8-75; and Iris &tarion Vczumg, 1nd:Ez~sion a d B m o c r ~ c y(C)xlord: Oxford Urttvcrsiq Press, 20OCI), 265-275. 7 , For more on this, see Andrew Kuper" interesting suggestions in ""Kawlsiat? Global Justice: Beyond the Law af Peoples to a Cosmopolitan Law af Persons," Poligica1 Tb1-"ory28:S ((l)ctsher 2004)):657-658, 8. The role of transnationat actors is increaslngty studied in empirical international relations theory. A good survey of thc corltemporary state of thc debate can be found in Tl~omasRisse-Kappen, ed., Brzfzgi~zgTrarzsnati:~'o?zal Rekatiuns Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 9. jarnes Bohrnan, "International Regimes ancS Llernocratic Governance: 1301itical Equality and Influence in (;lobal Institutions," Intematz'o~alAffair?;7.5:; (July 19999 499--513, 10. Robert 0. Meohane and Jaseph S. Nye, "Transgovernmentd Relations," in lJerspectiveson Wcjrkd Politics, ect, bfichael Smith, et al. (Lt>ndon: C:roc>rn Helm Ltd., 198 l ) , 224-225, Xi~stittxtiansInay, of course, do more than merely provide for coorctinating action and sharing information. X do not mearl to be suggesting a theary of international institutions. For an interesting recent attempt at that, see Steven Weber, ""lnstutions and Change," in Mew Thinking hz I~ztenzationalRelatiorzs, eds. Micl~aelW. l3oyle and G. j u l ~ nIkenherry (Boulder: Westview Press, 19971, 224-265, 11. Butt, The Alzarchicclk Soczetai',p. 305, 12. Bull, for exalnple, warns a l tlte growth of private vialence. The Afzarchical Soczety, p. 268. 13. Michael Doyle, "Kant 1,iberat I,egacies, and Foreign Affairs, X3art 1," "Phiophy and Pzdblz'c Affairs 12:3 (slzrnrner 1983): 203-265, 14. John Rael-ner, A 1";zdture;For SociaEkm (Cambridge, hfass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 56. 1.5, For a defense of t l ~ eegalitarian virtues t>f socialism see my ""Liberal Values and Socialist Xfoclets," Tj~eoria89 (jutre 1997)):65-77, 16, Reinl~oldNiebubr, in his typical mangler, made this point well. ""The men t>f power in modern industry w o ~ ~not, l d of coLirse, capitulate slmpiy because the social philosophy by which they justify tl~eirpolicies had been discredited, Wlzen power is robbed a l the shilling arrnor of political, moral and pkiiosopi~icattheories, by which it defends itself, it wilt fight on without armor; but: it will be more vulnerable and the strength of its enel-nies increased," Reinhold Niebuhr, ltror~lXbia~zand Immoral Societ31 (New York: Charles Scrihncr's Sons, 19321, 33, 17. This point about Alarx is made convincingly by Hai Llraper, ""The Two Souls of Socialism," irr Socialknz frc~mBelow, ed. E, Haberkcrrl (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities f3ress, 19921, 2-33,

18. Richard Falk, among others, argues that there is a nascent movell-tent for globalization-frc~m-belc~w in "Tlze Wc3rlif Orcler Between Inter-State Law and the Law of Humanity: The Rate of Civil Soc~etyInstittxtions," p 1272. See also his I,aw zn an E m e r g i ~ gCr"loblal Village (Ardsitey, N,Y:Transnaticjnal I)ubtisl~ers,1998), 209-224, This point is also stressed by Iris :Marion Young in ItzcEtbsl'on and Dcmocrac35 pp. 271-272. 19- Thornas Pogge, "iMcorat X3rogress," in Problems of Intenzaz-l'olzdJustice, p, 301. 20, Kicharci Devetak and Kicharci Higgot, "Justice Unboutld! C;tobatization, Stares and the Transformation of the Soctai Bond," bztenzational Affairs X5:3 (July 1999): 493, 21. An interesting historical survey af attell-tpts to bulld such solidarity can be found in A4argaret Levi and l3avid Olsc~tlk'The Battle in Seattle," I%olz'tiwand Socl'ety 22133 (September 2000): 309-329, Kim hfoody sketcfies the ejel-nents af a program for inrernationaI social rnovernent crninnisrn in his Workers i~za IAea~zWorld (1,ondon: Verso, 1997), 269-292. 22. Immanuel Kanr, "The Contest of Facuitics," p, 183,

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NDEX

Ackerll-tan, Bruce, 1S Africa11 slave trade, 92 Albanians, ethnic, See Mosova War Anscornbc, EIizabcth, 150 Antigone, 40 Aristotle, 4'7, 120 Associatior~,degree of, 45-46 Associative duties, 3 I,32-33, 35-36;, 48 Rarry, Rrian, 38-39 and debt cancellation, 95 and global distrt hutive justice, 72-74 and universal morality? 3"lCl Basic structures of society, I 17-1 18, I 92(n2) Bauer, Otto, 1861n81j Beirz, C1iarles, X4L 118Q(nSO),192(n6) Rosnia, 164, I 6 7 Brigfihot~se,Harry, I sO(nS6) Ruchanan, Allen, 140, 196(nX), 198(n22) Bull, Hccilcy, l 7 3 Bush, (ieorge, I6 l Capabilities and distributive justice, 85-8 6 Capitalism, 87 Carbon dioxide concentrations, 37 Charity, 62, 83 Communities, political, 76-78

Compatriots and noncompatriots, S1 and compatriotsYt~tercstsas primary, 44-47 eorlflict of interests bctvc~ccn,40 and general vs, temporal duties of justice, 43 non primacy of either, 42,49-58 and patriotism, 48 source of tensitjn between, 4 1 Competition, job, 63-64 Compcrittve claims, 49 Go-nationats and compatriots, 51 and strong nationalism, 5 l-52 Consistcnq, 39-44 Constitutional democracies, I 0-1 I, 1'74 Consuttatic>nhierarchy, 1 1 Contact Group, 168 Contract Iavv, 41,42 Cooperation, 21, 22-23 Cosxnopolitan constructtvistn, 16-1 8 and democracy, 10-1 I, 28 and egalirarianisxn, 12-14 and expanded human rights, 18 and original position as gtobal from start, 44 and patriotism, 48 and persons as universally applicable, 24 and rights of gcrsolls not peoples, 16-17

C:ost~-topotitanism definition of, S and htltl-tan rights, S and intervention, 117, 126-127 and just cause for use of military force, 159-1 60 and justice dependent an global governance, 62 and Nardin, 74 and nationalism, 128-1 29 and peaceful wsrtd order, 170, 172-1 76 and privileges to compatriots over noncompatriots, 54-55 and sovereignty, 104-2 05, 126-1 27, 192(nQ),3 9441x29) and United Nations Charter, 5 See also Egalitarian world order Countermeasures (intervcaltion), 103-184 C:uttural membership, 130 preservation, 65 relativisxn, 51-52, val~te,27 Lkbt cancellation, 92-96 and dcvclopxnent, 96 and hefping poclrest countries, 95 and high levet oE developing world indebtedness, 92-93 ""lilcboat ethics" criticism af, 95-96 and lowered standards of living, 93 as statist, 95 and structural actjustxnerlt programs, 93,94 Declaration of PrtnctpIcs of Internationat Law C:oncerning Friendly Relations and Gooperation among Staler; in Accordance wit11 the Charter aE the United Nations, 4 Deforestation, 99 Degree of association, 45-46 Llemocracy, 10-1 1,28, 174 and conccptiorl of persons, 19-23

and equality, 13, 80-83 and fair opporcunith 48, 8 8 Developing countries and egalitarian schemes t>f distribution, 89 and favorable environmcnral and working conditions, 6 l Iowercct standing of Iiving in, 93 and "modernization," "6 and service of debts, 92-93 and sustaina bf e development fund, Q1 and undercievelspment, 87, 88-90 See also Debt cancellation; global warmi r ~ g Dihrence principle, 22, 13, 14 and democratic equality; 80 and fair ecluality of opportunity, 8 1 gliobal, 82, 98 and not egatitarian enough, 82-83 and substantive accounts, 75 as tocl egalitarian, 82 Distance, 4 4 4 5 I>tsrributivc justice and culttxratly bo~indmeanings, 76 See aEso Global disaibutive justice l3ominican Repubtic, 3 4 I>rkzc,jean, 8.5 Duties t>f justice, 3 1-36 assoc~ativeand attitudes, 35-36 associative and moral equality, 33-34 and degree of association, 4 5 4 6 and distance af their object, 44-45 generated by associatiorlal relations, 31,32--33,123-124 as globaI, 129, 171 and institutions, 31, 33, 123 and itltervention, 223 and morality 1, 31, 32-33 and moral triage, 4 6 4 7 and r-rationalism, 52-54, 128 and not violating rigfits of others, 47 and patriotism, 47-50 require actions towards person indirectt.)r,3 1.

temporal and generat, 4 2 4 3 See also (;fobat distributive ~ustice; Global justice Llworkin, Konald and associative duties and attitudes, 35 and rejection af legal positivism, 2 Egalitariat~ism,12-14, 78-86 and democratic equality, 80-81, 83 and fair equality of opportunity, 4849 and irnmigation, 66 and t t beral equality, 78-80 and practical association, 7.5 and protectionis~i-t,57-58 Egalitarian world order, 171-176 and rot~stitutionaldemocracies, 174 feasibility of, 172 and greater dernc~cratic accountability, 2 73 and just cfairns of persons, 172-1 73 and just distribution of gIobat urea1th, 173-1 74 and justification on moral princ~ples, 172 and Kantian pacific federation t>f states, 172-3 73 AlarxS view of and working class, 175 and 130gge\ plantling team of philosophers and lawyers, 175 reasons for hope far9 175- 1 76 and threat of muitilaterai force, 174 Etn bargocs, 12.5-1 26 Emmanuel, Arghiri, 61 Environmental and labor laws, 56-57 Environmet~talghbal ineclualities, 97 Ecj~~ality of opportunity and cultural preservadc~n,65 and democratic ey uality, 80-8 t and dcscrt, 79 and difference principle, 8 1 fair, 48-49 fair and liberal equatity, 78-79 and freedom of movement, 62,

and global marker, 58 and irnmigratiot~,61-62,66-67 and protectionist policies, 55-56 and substantive accoutlt t>f good, 75 Fairness, 3% 12.1 and redistribution, 39,183(n30) and unfairness, 56 "Faair trade" pprtlctices, 59-61 FaIk, Richard, 57-58 Family and analogy with nationalism, 52-53 Foreign direct investmet~t(FLIT), 36-37 Franck, Thornas, 11 ""Fee trade," 58,59 Frost, LMervyn, 109-1 111 Gandfii, hft>handas, 148-1 49, 1-57 Ge~lcraland temporal priority, 42-43 General duties, 7-5-76 Geneva Czonvention, 143 Genocide, 105 Global difference principle, 8 1, 98 See also I3iffcrence principle Global distributive justice, 50 and appropriate benchmarks, 73-74 and Briatl Barry, 72-74 and capahiiirics, 85-81; and debt cancellation, 92-96 equality, 80-83 and def~~ocratic and duty of intervention, 12.5 and equal respect, 80 and global insdtutions, 172, 173 and global warming, W-100 and Goodin, 75-76 and gor>ds,83-84 and immigration, 67 and just distribution t>f global wealtli, t 73-174 and liberal equality, 78-80 and 111edicat care, Q9 and nllnirnurn floor principle, 81-83 and Nardin, 74-75, 1871n22 ) no actual standard of, 77, 78 and present ineclualities, 69 and Kawls, "7-72, 1871n11)

and reciprocith 72-73 and socialism, 90-9 1 state's rote in, 76 and three possible worlcls, 69-70, 100 and Tobin tax, 81 and transfers by corrupt states, 101 and undcrdevciopment, 89 and Walzer, 76-78 and wornen, 8.5 See also Globat justice Cilobal economic association, 43 Global inequality, 38 Cilobalization, 36-37 Global jusdce, 2,26,34-39 and colonial period of ec-onoil-tic association, 36 and duties to noncompatriots, 38 duties of, 129, 171 and early-twetltietl~century imperialism, 36 and fairness, 38, 39 and globalization, 36-37 and institutional framework of redistri hution, 38 and intervention and sovercig~~ty, 116 and jusdcc-posttivistn, 3 8-39 and nationa t self-determination, 128 See also (;fobat distributive ~ustice Cilobal illarket, 58 Global minimum floor prir~ciple, 8 f -83 Global order. See Egalitarian umrld srcler Global u~arming,37, 97-1 00 ccjsts of subsidized by developed countries, 98-99 and deforestation, 99 environll-tentalconsecjuences of, 97 and greater impact of an poorer, 97-98 and hcip to developing courltries in light of, 98 and those causally resporlstblc to bear burden of, 98-100

Good, capacity for conception of, 20-21,180(nf 6) Goodin, ltobert and duties of compatriots, 41-42. and global distributive justice,

75-76; Goods of distribution, 83-84 Gulf War, 161-1 62 Haiti, 116 Hardin, C;arrett, 95-96 Hegel, Friedricfi, 109, 146, 193(n18) Hierarcl~icalpeople, decent, 11, 14-1 5, 27-28 Hobbes, Thornas, 146-1 48 HoMman, Stanley, 83 Holmcs, Rubcrt Id., 150-154, 156 Human rights and cosxnopolitanism, 5, 111, 193(n25) Rawls justification of, 9-10 and statism, 5 Hume, David, 32 Hungary, 3 Hurka, Tholnas, 52 Husscin, Saddam, 161 Immigration, 43,61-S7 and cultural survival, 65, 184(n81) and econoil-ticinterest of citizens, 63-64 and equalit5 Q4 and Srcedor~~ of movement, 61-62,

Q5 and ir~cqualityof opportunity, 65 -62 and job competition, 63-64 and just cntittcmcnt of citizcns and residents, 66 as tl-tatter of charity, 62 and nationality, 64-65 and right to secede, 236 and stare in$titutions, 66-67 and taxpayers' protection, 62-63 Impcrialisrx~,87-92 and emphasis on states not persons, 89-90 empirical tl~eoriesof, 87

and intervention and sovereigntjr, 116-1 17 and reparations, 9 1-92 and role of moral theory, 88-91 as spread of capitalism, 87 and underdeveiopmcnt, 87, 88-91) and war, 160-1 6 l India, 95-96 Institutions and conceptiorl of jusdce, 32 of public life, 33 International Covenant of Civil and 1301iticat Rights, S International Covenant on Econolnic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 6 International environmental and tabor standards, 60 International financial institutiot~s,37 International jusdcc. Sec Global jusdcc International law, 2-5 International Xifonetary Fund, 37, 93 Inrervetltion, 11'7-1 26 and basic structures, 117-1 18 collective, 4 and countermeasures, 103-104 defirrition of, 1Cl3 and duties t>f justice, I25 and ern bargacs, 125-1 26 and imperialism, 116-1 1 7 and improving upon j~tstice,12 1 or isofation, 125-1 26 j~tstifiabilityof, 117, 118-122 as last resort, 11"3120, 168-1 70 ~~~iiitary, 204, 112, 120, 124-125 moralizcci, 104 and paternalism, 115, I 18 pcrmtssil-tle versbts obligatory, 122-125 pri~zafacit? duty of, 125, 195-196(n49) and proper a~ttbority,121 as proportional to injusdce, 120, 166 and right intent, 121-122,19S(n45) and state tcadersbctions, 124 and success, 119, I67 unilateral, 4 See also Sovereignty

Iraq, 126, 161-1 62 Isolation, 125-126 jgs ad belizdnz grouncts of war, 158,

162,166, 169, 170 Jus in beElo grourlds of war; 159,166, 169 Just cause of war, See War Justice conflicts within, 41 tlistinctions between moral and tegat approaciles to, 2, 177(n2) tluties of, 31-35 or expediency in Ravvts original position, 1 5 failure of and globat distribution, 83 as fairness, 12, 38,24 moral duties of, 1 and pcacc, 113, 3 94(n30) political conceptiot~of, 19-20, 25 and relativism, 111 and states lacking interest in according to Rawts, 10 and totcrance, 111 truth of principles of, 24-26 and universality, I 18 See aiscr Duties of justice Justice positivism, 38, 123 and legal positivism, 38-39 Kant, Imrnanuel and criticism of world-state, 201 (133) and r-rew world order, 177, 176 and political rnoratir~~ 1S and power of enthusiasm, 176 and relationsl~ipwith other states, 30 Karltian pcacc fccteration of states, 172-1 73 and greater de~l-tacratic accountability, 173 and "new rnedievalism," 172 Kcnnan, Georgc E, 144-1 45 Mosovo Liberation Arll-ty (KLA), 163 Kosovo War; 162- I 70 and ctisgfacement t>f citizens and bombing, 166-167 events leading up to war, 163-165

as last resort, 168-169 and tiketillood of success, 167 and rneeting criteria for jzlls ad hellzrm, 169 national self-determination status of, 16.3 and ItlATC)" AACTORD activation order for air strikes, 163-164 and NATO" motives, 162-1 63, 164, 165 and proportionality, I66 and Ratl-tbouiltetpeace talks, 164, 16.5, 168, 170,2Cbl(nl;Z) and secession of Kosovo, 169- 1 70 and slairghtcr it1 Racak, 166, 16% Kuwait, 2 6 1 Kymlicka, Wij/f, 27 and cultural mcmhership as primary good, 130 and immigants and secession, 136, 197(n15) and nations and cultural p;rr>ups,129 and necessity of culturat context for meanings, 51,1 SO, 136 "Law of PcspIc" (KawIs) lecturc, 1 3 Law of l%eoples, The (Kawls), 8, 12-13, 14 and tjrigitlal position, 8-9 and toleration, 27-28 Legal approaclies to justice, 2 cosxnopofitanism, 3 poslrivism, 2, 38-39 Idenin,Viadimtr Illicit, 139 L.i heral ecluality, 76-80 2"iberals and valuing culrurc, 27 ""Lfeboat etllics," 95-96

Margalit, Avisllai, I28 hfarx, Karl, 2 14, 174-1 75 hlarxjsm, 87, 88, 90 hfenchti, Rigoberta, 149, 199(n25) Xlilttary force. See War Mitt, John Stuart, 102, 114, Ib"O(nSS), 194(n31,32)

Miller, Ricfiarci, 50 Adilosevic, Slobodan, 163, 164 kioral approaches to justice, 2 duties, 40 equality and associative duties, 33-34 interests, 20-24 personhood, 108-1 1l tlleory and role in evaluating impcriatism, 88-91 triage, 46-47 hrorality tfernancIsof cantlot be changed by change of mind, 33-54 and cfuties of justice, 1 , 3 I , 32-33 kiorgentbau, Hans, 24.5-1 46, 299jn14) Movement, frecdorn of, 62,65 Narciin, Terry, "7-75,187(n21) Natiotlaiism, 5 1-54, I84(n54) and analogy to family, 52-53 and comparison to club membership, 53-5 4 and ca-narjonajs, 51 and cosmopolitanism, 228-2 29 and cultural relativism, 51-52 and duties of justice, 51-54, 128 and public institutions, S3 strong, 5 1-52 weak, 52 National self-determination, 5 l, 128-14 1 as basis of internationaI Iaw? 3 as group nor individitat right, 131-1 32,196(n8) and immigrant grsups, 129, 136, 1931n13) and Kosovo, 163 and national cultures, 23 1 nonterritr>rial-bad, 132-1 34 question of \v110 bears right of, 131-332 and rational revislon and culture, 130,133 rigl~tto and others, 14 and secession, 135-141

and state and national institutions, 132-1 33 and state neutrality, 130-1.32, 135, 196fn6) territorial-based, 134-14 1 See also Secession IiJATCf (North Atlantic Treaty Cjrganization) and Kosovo, 162-1 70 See also Kosovo War Nature, state of, and moral duty, 146-148 Niebul~r,Reinhold, 144, 202jn16) IiJietsen, Mai, 90 Nozick, Rohcrt, 7 IiJ~lssbaum,hfartha, 40, 85

and killing or letting die, 154 and moral innojcence and l~arm, 153-154 and neighborl~oodarmed thugs, 152-1 S3 normarivc, 150-158 skepticaf, 148-150 and success of nonvtolrnt methods, 156-157 and superiority of nonviolence, 156 viability t>f as alternative to Just war, 157-1 58 13arettlt>ptimality,63,7W, 79, 186(n7.5), 188(n32) Paternalistn, 115, 118 X3atriotisrn, 43, 47-50? 144 Peace, 112-1 14 13ersons Organization for Security and C-:oop"ration ir~ Europe (OSCE), democrraric perception of, justifying, 163,169 20-23 Original pasition, cosmopofitan and global distributive justice, 101 moral status of and states, 109-1 11 and demc~craticecluality, 80 as global from start, 44 and rational revision, 130 and pcrsolls not peoples, 16-1 7 self-conception of, 19-20, 189(n51) and principles af justice, 78 and ~tnderdevelopment,89 Original position of Rawls" Law of Philosophy I%eoples, 8-9, 15, 16 and approach to internadonat eight principles of, 9-10,28 justice, 2 as complement to legal positivism, 2 Ought-implies-can principle, 140-14 1 and defense of costl-tapoiitanism, S Pacifism, 148-1 58 130gge,Thomas, 73-74, 17.5, 183jn30) and case of sleepwalker with tlatct~et, X301itical association, 48 152-1 53 and goat of ending all belligerence, communities, 76-78 conception of j usticc, 19-20 155 violence, 11 3 and Holmeskrgument against all modern wars, 1.50 PoIiricaI construcdvistn, 8, 18-26 and ability to be ccjoperative, 20, and Hoimes argument for nonviotet~t ~l-teans,156-158 21-23 and inability to ktlovv mtjrat truth t>f and nature t>f Justification of, 23-24 actions, 148-150 and conception of good, 20-21 and innocent bciitigercnts being rey uired to pay, 154-155 Politiml I,zheralism (Rawts), 8, 13, 17 and originai position, 9, 20 and innocent party in war, 150-1 51 and "just war" dtl.lesry, 148, 1.50, and three points of view, 19 and totcrancc, 27,213 155, 199(n23)

Political realism, t 43-148 and actual consetlsus and moral pr~nciples,143-144 and groups operating on awn interests, 144 and Kcnnan, 144-1 4 5 and hfargenthat~,145-146, 199fn14) and policymakers as agents t>f citizens, 144-145 and politics as pursuit of power, 145-146 and setf-criticism, I44 and states in "state of nature" wit11 moral duty, 146-1 48 Practicat association of states, 74-75 Praportionality and intervendon, 120, 166 Pratectionism, 43, 54-61 as benefit to tlisadvantagecf, 58 cotl-tple~l-tented by restrictive immigration, 54-55 and egalitarianism, 57-58 and enviranmcntal and labor laws, 56-S"Jr.59, QO-61 and "fair trade" policy, 59-61 and "free trade," 58 and payment of taxes, 56 and racial discrimination, 56--57' and trade tariffs, SS, 59, 61 and utleclual exchange theory, 6 1 unttair advantage argument for, 56-57 what counts as, 58-59 Public institutions, 53 f3urpssive association t>f states, 74 Racial discrimination, 56-57 Rail-tbauittetpeace talks, 264, 165, 168, 170,20l(n67) Rational revision, 130, 133, 139 Rau&s,John, 7 Rawtsian constructivism, 7-29 and affirming truth of principles of justice, 24-26 as alrerabiie according to subject matter, 16

and basic structures of ssctety; 11'7-118, I921n2) and constittxtional democracy, 10-1 1 and cosmopolitan constructivism, 16-1 8 and ctecent hierarchical peopk, 14-15 and cfifkrence principle, 12, 13, 14 and domestic vs, international scope, 7 and duties of justice, 33,42, f 83(n31) and egalitarianism, 12-14 and goods of distribution, 83-84, 85, 86 and j~tstihcationof fiul-nan rights, 9-1 C) and ""liberal equality" and "democratic equality," 78 and limiting duties of global distrib~xtivejustice, 70-72 and clri~natposition, 8-14), 16,28 and persons as political, 23-24 and rights of pcrsalls versus per>~>lcs and statism, 14, 16,21: and Sen, 84 and socioeconomic equality, 7, 12-1 4, 6.5 and toteration, 26-28, I 8 I(n77) SCTE" aka Pof itical constructivis~~~ Kaz, Joseph, 128, 131 Reciproc~ty~ 72-73 Relativism, 111-1 1 2 Reparations, 9 2-92 Respect, equal, 80 Kosenberg, Justin, I99fn14j Rule of recagnition, 39

Satyagral~a,249,157 Satz, Llebsa, 45 Scbeffier, Samuel, 33,41 Scccsston, 135-1 41 and Buchanan, 140 corlstrair~tson right to, 137-1 38, 139 general challenges to, 140-142 and Kosovo, 16 9- 170

and Lenin, 239 and ma~ority,138, I97(n18) and ought-implies-can principle, 140-141 and problem of identifying nations, 141 right to, 135-137 Sclf-dcterxnination. Sec National scl fdetermination Self-emancipation, 114-1 15 Sen, Amartya, 84-X6,96, 189(n54) Serbs, See Mosovo War Sbue, Henry, 82-83, 1"7;7(4), I79(n44) Sidgwick, Harry, 2 8*E(n44,54) and morality of cornmoll sense, 26 and special moral duties, 40 Socialism and egalitarian world clrder, I74 and global distri butlve justice, 90-91 Social justice definition of, 1, 3 1 global, 36-39 See also Duties of justice Socicleconorntc equality and inequality, 7, 12-14 and liberty, 65 and patriotism, 48 SoIana, Javier, 162, 163 Sovereignty, 102-1 27 and anti-imperiatisil-t, 126-1 1 7 as basis of international l a w 3 and costl-topolitan point of view, 104-1 C15 and independence, l08 and moral pcrsonhooct, 108-1 11 and paternalism, 115, 118 and peace, 112-1 14 and ptzwer vs, authority to enforce, 106 and property rights, I06-107 and Rawtsian constructivism, 10, 11 and retacivism, 111- 1 12 and sell-emancipation, 2 14- 115 and self-governance, 107, 118 and sl~aringof commtjn life together, 1117-1 C18 statist conception of, 5, 105-1 17

and tolerance, 111 and warrant of authority for intervention, 105.--106 See aEso Intervet~tion State institutions and immigration, 6-5-66 Statisrn conception of sovereignty of, 5, 10.5-1 1'7, I25,192(n7) and I3cclaration of Principles of lnternatiot~alI , a y 4 and human rigf-rts, S; and just cause of war, 158-259 and liability of conservatism, 2.59 and Kawls subordination of rights of persons to peoples, 28 and rights of and tndivldcral rights, 159 and Uttited Natiorls Charter, S, 4 St. Augustine, 142 Striictural adjustll-tent programs, 93, 94 Tamir, Yael, 3S and assoclarivc duties and nations, 51 and culture and politics, 131 and putative national rnoral duties, 5.3 and self-determinatim as inciividual right, 131 Ti~eouyof Jztstice, A ( R a ~ l s )13, , I7 Tobin tax, 8 2,188(n3.5) Tt~leration,26-28, 111,18 1jn77j Trade tariffs, SS, 59, 61 Uganda, 69 Uttcterdevefopmcnt identificatory tl~eoriesof, 89-90 and irnpertalistn, 8L 88-90 and theory t>f global distributive justice, 89 Unequai exchange and underdevelopment, 6 Z Uttiiaterai intervendon, 4 United Nations and Kosovo, 194 and prc)visions for legitimate use of force, 159 treaties of, 2-3

Ur-rited Nations Charter, 1 and C:hagter VIl, 4 and costl~opolitanistl-t,S and paragapk 2(4) on statism, 3-4, 159 and paragraph 2("7),S, 4 preamble and costl-topotiranism,S United Nations Development Prograxn, 69 United Nations Research Institute for Social Z>evelopmet~tJUNKISU), 93,534 United States and intervention in Soutl~ All-terica, 3-4, 117, 153S(n37) United Stares NationaI Academy OF Sciences, 97 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1, 5, 18 Universality and political constructivism, 18-26 Ur-riversalmorality, 4 1 Utilitarians, 1Q, 26,46, 188(n64)

Walzcr, hlichact, 62 and global distributive justice, 77-78 and just cause for military force, 159 and sovereignty, 107-108 and state and individual rigl~ts,1.59

War; justice of, 142-170 cosmt>politanacccjunt t>f just cause, 159-160 and Ciufl War, 161-1 62 and imperialism, 160-16 2 and justified eIatms of persons being met, 160 ""just war" theory, 150, 15.5, 158-1 70 and Kosovo War; 162-1 70 and pacifism, 148-1 58 and political realism, 143-148 popular resistance to, 144 and proportionality, l 6 6 and starist account of just cause, 158-159 See also Pacifism; blitieal realism Warren, Bill, 87, 88, 90 Weller, Marc, 168 Wc3men discrin~inationagainst, 85 and structuraf atljustnzet~tprograms, 94 Wortd Rank, 36-37,175 Wortd C:a~nmissionon Environment and Developxnent, 68 Wc3rtd fi-lealt1.tOrganization, 69, I66 Wortd Tradc Organizatlclrl (WTO), 58-59, 17.5 Yugoslavia, See Kosovu War