Creative Virtualities in Human Self-Interpretation-in-Culture: Phenemonology of Life and the Human Creative Condition Book IV (Analecta Husserliana)

CREATIVE VIRTUALITIES IN HUMAN SELF-INTERPRETATION-IN-CULTURE ANALECTA HUSSERLIANA THE YEARBOOK OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RE...

Author: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka

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CREATIVE VIRTUALITIES IN HUMAN SELF-INTERPRETATION-IN-CULTURE

ANALECTA HUSSERLIANA THE YEARBOOK OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH VOLUME LV

Editor-in-Chief: ANNA- TERESA TYMIENIECKA

The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning Belmont, Massachusetts

For sequel volumes see the end of this volume.

CREATIVE VIRTUALITIES IN HUMAN SELF-INTERPRETATIONIN-CULTURE Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition (Book IV)

Edited by

ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA The World Phenomenology Institute

Published under the auspices of The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning A-T. Tymieniecka, President

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS DORDRECHT I BOSTON I LONDON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Phenomenology of life and the human creative condition I edited by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. p. cm. (Analecta Husserliana ; v. 52-55) Papers presented at the Second World Phenomenology Congress, Sept. 12-18, 1995, Guadalajara, Mexico "Published under the auspices of the World Institute for Advances Phenomenological Research and Learning." Includes index. Contents: bk. I. Laying down the cornerstones of the field -- bk. 2. The reincarnating mind, or, The ontopoietic outburst in creative vinualities -- bk. 3. Ontopoietic expansion in human self -interpretation-in-existence -- bk. 4. Creative vinualities in human self-interpretation-in-existence. ISBN 0-7923-4445-6 (hardback: alk. paper: bk. I). -- ISBN 0-7923-4461-8 (hardback: alk. paper: bk. 2). -- ISBN 0-7923-4462-6 (hardback: alk. paper: bk. 3) -- ISBN 0-7923-4545-2 (hardback: alk. paper: bk. 4). I. Phenomenology--Congresses. 2. Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938-Congresses. 3. Life--Congresses. 4. Creative ability--Congresses. I. Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. II. World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning. III. World Congress of Phenomenology (2nd: 1995 : Guadalajara, Mexico) IV. Series. B3279.H94A 129 vol. 52-55 [B829.57] 142'.7--DC21

ISBN 0-7923-4545-2 Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers, P.O. Box 17,3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada by Kluwer Academic Publishers, 101 Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A. In all other countries, sold and distributed by Kluwer Academic Publishers, P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

Prepared with the editorial assistance of Robert S. Wise Printed on acid-free paper All Rights Reserved © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.

97-2276

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS THE THEME

IX

xi

PART ONE THE ETHICAL IMPULSE IN HUSSERL: INDIVIDUAL, CULTURE, HUMANITY ELLA BUCENIECE / The Ethical Evolution of Mankind in Husserl's Phenomenology GARY E. OVERVOLD / Husserl and the Tradition CHRISTINE SPAHN / Der ethische Impuls der Husserlschen Phanomenologie

3 13 25

PART TWO VALU ATION , CULTURE, IDEOLOG IES JOHN FRANCIS BURKE / Phenomenology and Multiculturalism: Moving Beyond Assimilation and Utter Diversity Through a Substantive Pluralism OCTAVI FULLAT I GENIS / Our Values of Expectation/ Expedition: A Study of their Hebrew Origin ENRIQUE DUSSEL / Arquitect6nica de la Etica de la Liberaci6n: Para una Etica de la Vida del Sujeto Humano CARLOS 1. RAMOS-MATTEI/Value Orientation and Human Creativity ZOFIA MAJEWSKA / Roman Ingarden's Philosophy of Culture: An Attempt at a Reconstruction JIM I. UNAH / On the Alleged Dilemma in a Work Being Both African and Philosophy

v

85 95 125 161 177 193

VI

T ABLE OF CONTENTS PART THREE THE MEANDERS OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S ATTUNEMENT AND INTEGRATION WITH OTHERS WITHIN THE CULTURAL HARMONISATION

KRYSTYNA DANECKA-SZOPOWA /

Commonplaceness as a 215

Difficult Situation for Man MAXINE SHEETS-JOHNSTONE /

On the Significance of

Animate Form

225

MARIA LUISA PFEIFFER /

Heart Transplantation: A Cor-

poreality Perspective CHRISTER BJURVILL /

243

Analyzing Images of the Future: The

Ironic Twist

259

R. TELTCHAROVA-KOURENKOVA, E. PLEKHANOV and s. SISOV A / La Phenomenologie de la Formation: Les Aspects

du Probleme

281

PART FOUR MISSING AND RETRIEVING THE SPONTANEOUS PARTICIPATION WITH THE OTHER WITHIN THE CULTURAL NETWORK OF LIFE

lSi' ov A / The One and the Many in the Schizophrenic Life-World: The "Zenonian Syndrome" BRUNO CALLIERI / Phenomenological Psychopathology of Interpersonal Communications: A Point of View EDUARDO BOLIVAR / On Human Alienation: A Phenomenological Inquiry of the Schizoid Personality MIGUEL JARQUIN MARIN / La Profundidad: Un Enfoque Dimensional de Mi Encuentro con el Otro MARY ROSE BARRAL / Intersubjective Communication and Psycho-Impairment E V A S YR

291 295

301 319

337

PART FIVE MORALITY OSCILLATING BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL

The Language of Evil: Hannah Arendt and the Abstract Expressionist Response to the Second World War

STEVEN ZUCKER /

345

T ABLE OF CONTENTS YUDIT RONEN / Foreknowledge, Free Will and Modal Logic FREDERICK SONT AG / Nothing In or Out of the World is All

Good or All Bad, All Gods Included INDEX OF NAMES

vii 359 369 377

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Words fail me to express the warm friendship and hospitality exuded by our Mexican hosts at our Second World Congress of Phenomenology in Guadalajara Mexico, September 11-18, 1995 ... a gathering of a worldwide phenomenological community sharing in the seminal ideas of the Phenomenology of Life and of the Human Creative Condition. Thanks are due from the Institute as well as from all the participants, who enjoyed the beautiful buildings, campus, and atmosphere of the Universidad del Valle de Atemajac - where the congress was celebrated - to Doctor Santiago Mendez Bravo, the Rector, Dr. Cesario Hernandez, Vice-Rector, and Dr. Xavier Rodriguez, chairman of the Department of Philosophy, as well as to our co-organizers of this event, Dr Sergio X. Vazquez and our longtime collaborator in the Institute, Dr. Miguel Jarquin Marin, both from the Institute de Terapia Gestalt Region Occidente (INTEGRO), for their dedicated efforts to assure a perfectly smooth running of the Congress. We owe gratitude for their generous hospitality to the families who took foreign participants into their own homes, offering them a real taste of the Mexican spirit, culture and warmth. This will remain long in all our memories. Moreover the enthusiasm of our Spanish-speaking dialogue led to our organizing of a Sociedad Iberoamericana de F enomenologia. My repeated thanks go to our assistant editor Robert S. Wise, and our administrative assistant Louis T. Houthakker who works on the premises of the Institute, for their expert and careful work in finalizing the Congress's preparations and logistics. Mr. Wise and Miss Isabelle Houthakker prepared the index and deserve, appreciation for the copyediting and proofreading of the volume. A-T. T.

ix

THE THEME

PHENOMENOLOGY WORLDWIDE

Creative Virtualities in the Human Self-Interpretation in Culture

Culture, which manifests the circuits of the human spirit, is the historical process of human self-interpretation-in-existence. Having its source in the creative virtualities of the human condition, it partakes of all the rays of its realization, of all the lines of unfolding in which the human being - the self and the other - weave a common web sustaining their strictly individual progress. Thus, all the rays thrown out from the creative forge of the human being find their role within the fabric of culture, which involves progressively wider circles of human community, and which is transformed by drawing upon the life of the spirit of individual human beings - human beings whose self-interpretation-in-existence calls for integrative attunement with others in their progress and changing life conditions. Thus, into the consideration of culture there enter all the rays of philosophical reflection: moral, aesthetic, metaphysical, epistemological, semiological, cognitive, etc. Our present day culture stands under the gaze of penetrating scrutiny. Will this vision of the philosophy/phenomenology of life encompassing the entire manifestation of the human spirit in life, while bringing it to the creative forge of the human condition in which all the rationalities of life find their common, harmonizing encounter, elevate present day culture? In fact, one would superficially believe that our present day humanity has dethroned the human spirit, undercutting the very foundations of the validity of truth, moral values, principles. It seems that present day humanity does not seek to discern what is beautiful and true and what is not. It is functional and pragmatic usefulness that seems to dominate the scene of human evaluation and transaction with other human beings and animals. That popular taste seems to favor elementary drives, extirpating fine feelings from its sphere of experience and replacing them with common instincts. It has detached our humanity from the works of the human spirit in its "higher" aesthetic, moral and intellectual circuits. The culture of the mind is naturally meant to disperse the light of the spirit through life's involvements; human rapport, appreciation and enjoyment of life being seemingly at their height when sharply differentiated xi

xii

THE THEME

from the rationalities of the bios. Thus, the life of the spirit is often situated on the one side of a gulf opposite science with its rationalities. Present day human attitudes favor the strictly elementary and seem to invite culture's reduction to science. In other words the great metaphysical questions we raise, those of telos, of sense, the prospects of human life often find answers involving scientific conceptions. These, however, are at least incomplete, if not fragmentary, and in principle hypothetical and in view of the prevailing outcry against what has been known as "high culture", the prevailing questions remain. Is humanity, disabused of ideals, higher aspirations, and values by downgrading them to "illusion", going to abdicate its crowning mission? It is here that the unprejudiced vision of life projected in our work throughout the three preceding books comes into its own. Already in Book I (Laying Down the Cornerstones of the Field) we have delineated the compass of this vision, in which plumbing bios responds to the great claim of life's self-individualizing principle for the ascertaining of the role of the unity of all living beings. This principle also deciphers the harmonizing effect of the common source of the entire human universe of life in the glorious manifestation that is the human spirit. It is toward its highest circuits that the human soul naturally aspires for fulfillment. In this collection we focus on the various perspectives of cultural differentiation, its ethical and moral modalities, the meanders of individual attunement to others in propitious as well as adverse situations, and numerous other perspectives in which the flow or ebb of the human spirit manifests itself in the human orbit, and thus do we vindicate culture as the sitio or roots of human reality. A-T. T.

PART ONE

THE ETHICAL IMPULSE IN HUSSERL: INDIVIDU AL, CULTURE, HUMANITY

ELLA BUCENIECE

THE ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF MANKIND IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

Wir sind also - wie konnten wir davon absehen - in unserem Philosophieren Funktionare der Menschheit. (Edmund Husser!)

"We have had thousands of purposes so far, because there have been thousands of peoples. Yet, what is lacking? It is bridles for thousands of heads - one single purpose. Mankind has no aim of its own as yet. Tell me, my brothers: if mankind has no aim - does it exist at all?"! wondered Nietzsche, formulating, in effect, the following paradox: does the general notion of mankind (or humanity) serve as a sort of bridle for nations and for the essence of individuals, or is it rather the task and responsibility of the existence of human beings. Perhaps "humankind" is a metaphor applicable to individuals, and we think (or fail to think) about mankind in terms of our understanding of separate men and women, thus fostering (or failing to foster) the formation of the spiritual atmosphere of the Earth. If metaphor is a transposition, a meta-phore transposition (Ubertragung) - of meaning from one thing onto another - perhaps "mankind" acquires its meaning by way of a transposition from individual beings? Today, when "mankind has reached the state of reasoning called postmodernism" (Vaclav Havel), and when we brood over the death of the subject and the end of history - is not the death of humanity an inevitable consequence of this line of thought? True, Nietzsche in the aforementioned quotation asserts that mankind has not been born, that it is as yet non-existent and that the birth of humanity may foster the re-birth of individual human beings. I hold that the postmodem notion of the subject's demise is not to be taken as a philosophy of death per se; its chief thrust is to establish the fact that word meanings are subject to changes - they are likely to be transposed - and that the total clarity of terms is but an illusion. "Mankind" and "individual human beings" are terms of such an essential and unique nature as to defy attempts to be couched in the language of worn-out and dated metaphors. Once again we have to remind our3 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 3-11. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

4

ELLA BUCENIECE

selves of Nietzsche who held that the way to established truth is closed at a time when the empirical reduction of knowledge and a preposterous ideologizing of truth is taking place. (Truths are but illusions of which it has been forgotten that they are illusions; they are dated metaphors that have lost their sensual force - coins with nominal inscriptions worn off, no longer capable of serving as currency - just a piece of metal.) The transposition of meaning from an old term and the old truth onto a new one should not be taken as involving the separation of both: it means, rather, the explication of those features that distinguish them one from the other. Metaphorology, in distinction from the Western metaphysical tradition does not differentiate between the physical and the metaphysical, the sensual and the a-sensual, the truthful and the false; it does not elevate one feature over the other, but postulates the equal significance of them all. In performing the transposition of meanings postmodernism has problematized certain salient features of the present situation - the impossibility of grasping the one and only truth, of getting ahold of one single meaning of anything. Umberto Eco in Foucault's Pendulum has convincingly demonstrated that all of us - neo-cabalists and post-modernists, bankers and paupers, artists and bureaucrats - that all of us are inextricably bound together in space and time by our day-to-day routine activities. In a similar fashion we can discern in the history of the European religious orders of the whole gamut of modem ideas, values and artefacts - beginning with Mozart, Einstein, Napoleon and the bodyguards of the Russian Tsars, Stalin, Hitler, including instruments of torture, the Eiffel Tower and IBM computers. All these various things are compressed and explicated as being meaningfully equal within every half-circle of the pendulum's movement. Yet, the most unnerving feature of the whole process of differentiation and transformation movements is the central point of the pendulum connection, the balance point, the life-centre, or in the words of Eco, "this Non-Movement, Cliff, Guarantee" - it is like a shining mist, not a body; it is devoid of form, weight, quantity, quality; it sees not, hears not, feels not. It is not located in one place - in time and space; it has no soul, no reason, no imagination, no views; it does not obtain of materiality or of eternity. It is neither darkness nor light, neither falsehood, nor truth. 2 Is it really possible that there is such a life-centre, and is it a feasible task to try to harmonize and to hold together all these fearful artefacts of human

THE ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF MANKIND

5

hands, and mind? And is there really any need to do so? Eco's answer is that the centre, though its meaning has undergone deconstruction, is unavoidable all the same, because it is simply "impossible not to explicate the identical once you have indulged in the opportunity to reveal what is different". The sense of the unity of humankind on account of those features that are different, the notion of humanity as the pivotal point of human beings, has entered the 20th-century European thought by way of the criticism of Eurocentrism. This process, which manifests itself in the form of the explication of the meanings of various incompatible systems of thought, proceeds at a time when Europe is beginning to look for its roots and to ponder its historical identity; its main thrust, though, is directed towards the present epoch and the personal existence and responsibility of every man and woman. Husserl's phenomenology plays a distinguished role in this self-reflective process of establishing the new European identity in consonance with the whole of mankind. Husserl is one of the few thinkers who has thematized the structure of "European humankind". Husserl is also the author of the notion of the "Europeanization of mankind" and of "humanized mankind" as the highest form of community; he has also particularly stressed the role of philosophy in the creation of such a type of humankind. These questions are dealt with in the following works: The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, 'The Crisis of European Humankind and Philosophy" as well as in the essays and lectures of 1922-1937, collected in Vol. XXVII of Husserliana and in a separate edition Aufsatze und Vortrage (1922-1937). Although the theme of mankind in its present and historical forms appears only in Husserl's later works, this should not be taken as witnessing the birth of a new trend within phenomenology. Here, as elsewhere, Husserl develops the theme of the constitution of transcendental subjectivity; only in this case subjectivity is placed within the historical world. History for Husserl is not just an object for intentional investigation, alongside other similar objects which can be cancelled in the course of ongoing analysis. Viewing history as intentional history is a method of phenomenological analysis; it is also an indispensable vehicle for the self-understanding of philosophy and a means of radical decision (Entscheidung). Husserl's notion of historical being is tied up with the teleology of European history (this problem is discussed in Analecta Husserliana, Vol. 9 and in my articles in Analecta Husserliana,

6

ELLA BUCENIECE

Vols. 27 and 37). Here I just want to emphasize - in consonance with E. Straker - that "Husserl's conception of history is not a naturallycentered mundane teleology like some tendency of the history of philosophy to come into its own in the form of Phenomenology in order to acquire tranquillity. The tendency of Husserl's philosophy is not to come to an end, but rather to come to a 'tum', or the 'last tum "'. 3 It is Husserl's phenomenology as the "Last Turn" that brings subjectivity both into history and into life by opening up countless possibilities for the production of forms of life as "self-critical infraformations" (selbstkritischen Infragestaltungen). Mankind is one such self-critical infra-formation. I am not inclined to agree with some interpretations of Husserl (1. Derrida, M. Rubene), which attempt to tie up Husserl's thought with that notion of subjectivity that has evolved within the Enlightenment tradition of metaphysics and rationalism. I hold that A-T. Tymieniecka's interpretation of phenomenology within the "phenomenology of life" and its dimensions is a much more agreeable approach. Husserl does not develop the description of humanity from the starting point of an a-temporal subjectivity; he considers it as one of the chief tasks of the present-day philosopher by posing the question: "But what about ourselves - philosophers of the present time - what could it mean, what must it mean for us - the awareness of this on-going process? Do we intend to discern only one academic line here? Can we tum back again in such a simple manner to our profession - our 'philosophical problem', our formation of a single philosophy?"4 Husserl's answer to this kind of self-posed questioning is that presentday philosophers are not moved (berufen) by universal cognitive desire, but by mankind, because we bear responsibility in our philosophical endeavours - in "our true being as philosophers, in our inner personal calling" (eigenes wohrhaftes Sein als Philosophen in unseren innerpersohnlichen Berufenheit)" - "for the true existence of mankind" (for das wahre Sein der Menscheit). What is mankind, this entity to which even philosophers are related as functionaries and not as law-givers? Is it the totality of all human beings as some kind of physical body, or is it humanity as a specific essential characteristic of the human species? Aristotle's lost dialogue "On Philosophy" contains a reminder about the catastrophes that have periodically annihilated civilizations and describes the stages by which the survivors have managed to restore the previous state. Deucalion, after the deluge, when starting every-

THE ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF MANKIND

7

thing anew, first provided the primitive means of sustenance, then developed the arts, and then - in the third stage - began the formation of city-states by finding a way to join separate parts into one single whole. This art was called wisdom. 5 Wisdom enabled the gathering together of a diverse population so as to form a unified whole. Thus, questions concerning mankind are identical with the problem of the meaning of the world as such. MANKIND AND PHILOSOPHY

Greece is the birthplace of the European mankind's humanity - not just in a geographical sense but with regard to particular individuals and communities. During the 7th and 6th centuries B.C., the Greek nation produced a new kind of awareness about the surrounding world (Umwelt), which later came to be called philosophy. Initially "philosophy" designated a universal science, a science about the whole world (Weltall), about the unity of everything-that-is (Allenheit alles Seienden). It is at this point that the origin of spiritual Europe is to be found; born within one nation and moving along the course of history, it has acquired the supra-national form of the European spirit. Husserl, who postulates the existence of many different "mankinds", (Menschenheiten) establishes the meaning of "humanity" as consisting of a socially united creative (generativ) group of individuals, which corresponds to the essence of human beings. This is why Husserl talks about mankind as a "humanity of reason" (Vernunftmenschheit) and why he allots such a prominent place to philosophy as a formative factor for mankind. On this account Husserl has been accused of holding Eurocentric views, because philosophy - according to him - is an exclusively European phenomenon. It has to be remarked, though, that Husserl did not have in mind the geographical Europe. This is not a reference to an anthropological entity, such as, for example, in the case of "China", or "India". The meaning of Europe does not consist in its locality (Bodenstiindigkeit) as it was naively assumed by 18th century Rationalism. "Europe" is pregnant with a certain set of normative ideas; it is the process of Europeanization (Schauspiel der Europaisierung); it is the manner according to which other "mankinds" express their own absolute meaning, demonstrating thereby that they are not historically senseless but are part and parcel of the World Sense (Sinn der Welt). Thus, Husserl is far from equating historicity and humanity, because it is only

8

ELLA BUCENIECE

through the power of Reason that human beings show forth their historical telos and their humanity. At the same time this is also a requirement of responsibility (verantwortliche Rechenschaft) from individual persons for the implementation of the historical process. Husserl's notion of European humanity is closely connected with the original establishment (Urstiftung) of that mode of philosophical and scientific inquiry which tends to establish the unity of everything-thatis (Allenheit alles Seienden). Just a morphological joining together (morphologische Aussenbetrachtung) of various entities fails to produce unity; only inwardly developing norms - and not ones introduced from outside - are capable of performing the task. Norms and ideas are not tied up with empirical, finite entities; they grow out of the meanings that develop from intentional relations with objects, and therefore obtain an intentional infinity. With the acquiring of his first set of ideas, Husserl says, the human individual is turned into a completely new being - he moves outside himself, and this is the factor that makes humanity possible. Initially mankind is generated as a "philosophical and scientific humanity".7 Husserl does not rule out the role of the family, the tribe and the nation as formative factors for the generation of the sense of unity; yet these are communities of a closed type and the chief element cementing interrelations within them are natural interests - those of self-preservation, not of self-transformation. In contrast, professional communities tend from the very start to engage themselves with "cosmological" matters, e.g., the first communities in Ancient Greece deserving that name were "cosmological" - these being groups of mathematicians and astronomers. It is interesting to note the rich semantic spectrum employed by Husserl for the designation of mankind: Pre-scientific mankind, special mankind (besondere M enschenten), total mankind (gesamte M enschentum), European mankind, scientific, philosophic mankind, cultural, finite mankind. Husserl has often been accused of the absolutization of the normative aspect and ideation (Ideation) of life. Yet, he clearly indicates that individuals are variously oriented towards the world - they either consider it as an end, or as a means, they find it meaningful or meaningless, interesting or uninteresting, private or communal; they either embrace everyday routine or are constantly striving towards something new. 8 All these attitudes and many more are to be found on the world horizon. Husserl's ethical normativism differs from Kant's universal rule - "Act

THE ETHICAL EVOLUTION OF MANKIND

9

only in such a way that your action may become a universal law" , which, indeed, may sound a bit too idealistic these days. Husserl's normativism does not envisage rigorism and makes no demands upon human beings to engage in the formation of universally applicable rules. Husserl's normativism is based on personal awareness of the universally existing regularities. The presence of normativism within the notion of humankind is connected with its Greek origin and subsequent historical continuity; this is why his sympathies lean towards the theoretically-reflexive tradition, though he does not set it above any other. The flow of consciousness allows for no hierarchial structuration. In his lecture "Die Krisis des europaischen Menschentums und die Philosophie" Husserl discusses three universal and equally significant traditions: 1) general natural tradition (allgemeine natiirliche Einstellung) which is of the religious-mythological type; 2) theoretical tradition, which can be recognized as the professional trend (beruJseinstellung), and 3) tradition which marks the transition from a theoretical to a practical approach 9 (not from natural to theoretical) which is a kind of synthesis of interests and the task of which is to serve mankind by way of fostering the transition from natural to ethical humanity. This is a new type of praxis - it is a criticism of all the lives and life-aims of various cultures challenging existing value systems. It also involves criticism of mankind itself with the aim of its elevation (zu erhohen). This kind of criticism is not destructive; it envisages betterment in consonance with the existing life-norms; it is based on the absolute responsibility of each individual by using the medium of critical reflection on theoretical precepts. Humankind involves a specific art of life, which, having originated in ancient Greece, is not exclusively limited to the European scene. It is accessible to all human beings, not just Europeans; in fact, Husserl is quite ironic about the "good" European indulging in self-flattery and selftitillation. It is worth noting that in discussing the notion of mankind, Husserl modifies his conception of philosophy as a strict science. In his work "Die Krisis ... " Husserl admits that "the dream of philosophy as a serious, strict, even apodictic science - this dream has come to an end". Could it be that the end of the dream of philosophy as a strict science would entail the rejection of philosophy itself?, for Husserl has always insisted that philosophy is inseparably bound to its Greek origin and its scientific characteristics. Husserl does not reject the scientific features, but he allows for a certain transposition of meaning issuing from the

10

ELLA BUCENIECE

theme of mankind. In his 1922-1937 essays discussing "the human mankind" as the highest form of values, Husserl defines mankind through the notion of philosophy: " ... mankind that lives and develops towards genuine humanity is the one for which philosophy as the Wisdom of the World (Weltweisheit) has acquired the form of philosophy as a universal and strict science".10 True, Husserl adds that this kind of selfestablishment of philosophy is for the time being just an ideal. It may seem quite strange that Husserl makes use here of the notion of the ideal, which runs counter to the very gist of the phenomenological method; yet, there may be an explanation for this, seeing that philosophy in ancient Greece was a genuine mankind-forming factor, whereas in the present situation it is just an ideal, waiting to be realized. For this reason philosophy as a strict science should become a "technique" in the present situation - a know-how, an art in consonance with the Greek notion of 'techne'. In particular, it should become an ethical technique which may serve as a self-formative technique for genuine humanity (die Technik der Selbstverwiklichung echter Humanitat). Thus, mankind is a transposition, an extraction (Ubertragung, Hinausfohrung), a metaphor of the finite character of human beings. Of course, it may be pointed out that Husserl's texts contain few metaphors and that - in general - his manner of thinking is conceptual and not metaphorical. The metaphorical and conceptual approaches are not mutually exclusive. It was Nietzsche who first attempted to pull down the classical juxtaposition of the extremes. Derrida has said that "there are fewer metaphors in philosophical texts in those cases when the text itself in immersed in metaphor". I suggest that Husserl's texts are "immersed in metaphor".l1 His phenomenological analysis is always metaphorical; transposition of meaning is discernible in epoche and reduction as the procedure of ratiocination; description is not a script, it is not the theme of a philosophy of language or a discourse; it is the expression of the essence of a phenomenon and the explication of its sense; in this way the meaning of description also gets transposed. Mankind is a metaphor of the human being and the task of human existence which philosophy helps to explicate. One can agree with Husserl that European philosophy has grown weary of its own rationality, of its "goodness" and of its successes; it is yearning for the different, for "the other", for the marginal. And these considerations are also marked by notions of communication, of coexistence and moral responsibility.

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Today, when the human brain is challenged by the computer, the memory of which can be extinguished at a tum of the switch, the most important function of mankind is remembering; for it is only the human being that is incapable of consciously forgetting something that it has become aware of. Husserl's radical approach to the problem of the original meaning of philosophy is morally a very responsible stance. The cycle of humanity exists only in so far as there is continuity with the original source and a universal human communication in the present, even if the consolidating factor is existential pain. Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Latvian Academy of Sciences NOTES Nlcse, F., Til runilja Zaratustra (Friedrich Nietzsche. Thus Spake Zarathustra) (Riga: 1939), p. 70 (in Latvian). 2 Eko, U., Majatnik Fuko (Umberto Eco. Foucault's Pendulum) (Kiev: 1995), p. 11 (in Russian). 3 Straker, E., "Einleitung zur Zweiten Auflage", in E. HusserJ, Die Krisis der europiiischen WissenschaJten und die transzendentale Phiinomenologie (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1982), p. xxxi. 4 Husserl, E., Die Krisis der europiiischen WissenschaJten und die transzendentale Phiinomenologie (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1982), p. 17. 5 Veman, Zh. P., Proishozhdenie drevnegrecheskoj misli (1. P. Vemant. Origin oj Ancient Greek Thought) (Moscow: 1988), p. 89 (in Russian). 6 Holenstein, E., "Europa und die Menscheit (Zu Husserls kulturphilosophischen Meditationen", in Phdnomenologie im Widerstreit (Frankfurt am Main; 1989), pp. 40-63. 7 Husserl, E., "Die Krisis des europaischen Menschentum und die Philosophie", in Husserliana VI (The Hague: 1954), p. 323. 8 Ibid., p. 327. 9 Ibid., p. 329. 10 HusserJ, E., "Die hohere Wertform einer humanen Menschheit", in AuJsatze und Vortrdge (1922-1937), ed. Th. Nenon und Hans Reiner Sepp (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), pp. 54-55. 11 Derrida, J., "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy", in Margins oj Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 258. 1

GARY E. OVERVOLD

HUSSERL AND THE TRADITION

This essay will consider Husserl's standing in twentieth-century philosophy. But it will not try to assess his importance. Rather it will address the question of whether he is a thinker committed to fulfilling the mandates of the past, a philosopher whose vision of philosophy was dictated by his predecessors, or whether, to the contrary, Husserl broke free from the mission determined by philosophy's history and tradition and promoted a vision that set new standards and different goals for the discipline. In one sense the answer to this question seems rather obvious. If one studies the opening lines of "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" (1911) the answer is plain. If one reads Ideas (1913) or First Philosophy, or The Paris Lectures (1929) or the Cartesian Meditations (1931) the answer seems apparent. Husserl sees his Phenomenology as fulfilling the goals and needs of the tradition; his work will fulfill/complete tasks begun by the ancient Greeks. But this answer, certainly the right answer for most of Husserl's career, is greatly complexified by the ambiguous and unresolved claims of The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology.l It is this text, with its complex and thoroughly controversial claims about meaning, context, and history, which transforms the question of this essay into a significant one.

That Husserl is a "world-historical" philosopher is non controversial. Why he is so designated is more debatable. One line of controversy concerns whether Husserl is the last, great expression of the Rationalist tradition or whether he represents the inauguration of a dramatically new, distinctively original development in philosophy. Whether Husserl is the "last of the past" or the "first of the new" is certainly undecided in the literature. The advocates of either side make up an honor role of the significant philosophers of the twentieth century. The controversy over Husserl's standing, obviously enough, turns on 13 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 13-23. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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what criteria are used to measure the features of the new. Two metaphilosophical topics, foundational ism and representationalism, have focused this issue of the "new" for many. In one fairly well known version of the discussion, Richard Rorty and Charles Taylor have engaged in this debate. Both agree that the two topics are central to characterizing Modern philosophy, that is, philosophical views from the late sixteenth/early seventeenth century until quite recently. And both claim that overcoming and/or rejecting these two conceptual commitments is characteristic of what is distinctively contemporary. They differ, though, in what they regard as the primary commitment. Rorty argues that anti-foundationalism is the more primal rejection, Taylor claims that anti-representationalism occupies that place of honor. In this essay I propose to discuss Husserl's views in relation to these two criteria. My strategy is this: if Husserl is understood to advocate antirepresentational and anti-foundational theses, then the discussion of his standing in history should be settled. He is on the contemporary side of the divide. If he should be seen as defending representational and foundationalist theses, then he is allied with the tradition. And, of course, if he advocates one and not the other, then we can understand something about the confusion in evaluation I mentioned in the first paragraph. I would introduce a third major conceptual issue to this discussion. In many ways the major ideology of so-called postmodern philosophy has been Historicism. From Heidegger's consideration of the historicity of the meaning of Being and Scheler's discussion of the forms of value and of society, to the archaeologies and genealogies of Foucault and the deconstructions of Derrida, we see a great consistency in insisting that the limiting context of philosophical claims, conceptual and ideological claims generally, is history. More specifically, it is the historical eras which give us the determinative contexts within which claims are made, and the peculiar temporal complexion of issues and constraints are the factors which define the meanings of truth and power in a specific setting, and thus the meaning of any "text" which is found in that setting. Historicism, of course, is not unique to the twentieth century. Already in the Renaissance, Vico held a demonstrably historicist view; Nietzsche and Dilthey give us fully developed theories closer to our own time. But the absorption in Historicism, the extremely widespread subscription to it as the correct meta-theory, is a twentieth-century phenomenon. The reasons for such widespread subscription to Historicism are many but I think one can see a rather direct connection, by way of consequence,

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between it and the rejection of foundationalism, especially, but the rejection of representationalism as well. Oversimplified, if one rejects either of these and is not inclined to either skepticism or conceptual anarchy, then the only plausible constraint and criteriological restriction on rampant subjectivism are the assertions and events of the past - those which are the setting and set the context within which the speaker, thinker, author makes his assertions. I believe this prevalence of Historicism gives us another angle on the topic of Husserl's standing. If he were to advocate Historicism, especially if he were to advocate some form of radical historicism, then, whatever the ambiguities on the other two conceptual issues, foundationalism and representationalism, he would be solidly encased in the central commitment of the post modem and, to that extent, his affiliation with the new versus the old would be settled. A Husserl as radical historicist is a Husserl who has taken leave of the tradition; he must be accorded the status of a truly contemporary philosopher. II

In many respects, the involved matrix I have set up seems a bit beside the point. We are familiar with Husserl's concept of "constitution" and that would strongly suggest that he certainly can NOT be enlisted in the camp of the representationalists, and then neither in a representationalist theory of perception (as with Locke and his successors) nor in some representationalist ontological theory (as with Descartes and his successors). There is little chance Husserl will be thought of as a representationalist in any of the familiar senses. Whatever the final standing of the real world, we constitute it and all its meanings in our experience. Husserl, from at least the "Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness" (1905), is clear on that. One might say that already in the Logical Investigations of 1900 we have a description of experience that is incompatible with all standard forms of representationalism. Equally, concerning foundationalism, when we remember Husserl's strenuous insistencies and hyperbolic claims made for "absolute groundings," "first philosophies," and "rigorous science," and all the related notions of proof, evidence, reason, apodicticity, the quest for certainty, etc., which attend those claims and insistencies, the question of Husserl's foundationalism would seem equally uncomplicated. From the 1907 lectures, The Idea of Phenomenology, to the 1911 "Philosophy

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as Rigorous Science" to The Paris Lectures (1929) and the subsequent, 1931, Cartesian Meditations - and thru all the material in between, there appears to be great consistency on the topic of the utter need for and complete possibility of "a firm foundation for philosophy." But the case concerning foundationalism is more complicated than my summary would suggest. Other than a shared "picture," there is no one version of foundationalism. Certainly we can see that the kinds of foundationalism which endorse first principles or the will of god or a world of unchanging forms or the development of the Absolute receive no endorsement from Husserl. But the type of foundationalism we find in Descartes or in Kant equally clearly we do find. We know from the various stratagems he used to introduce his phenomenology, that he cast it sometimes as a development of Descartes, e.g., Cartesian Meditations, or Kant, e.g., Experience and Judgment. However, for the present case, and given the restrictions of space, let us concede that Husserl is a foundationalist of SOME SORT and leave the precise determination of WHAT KIND to another time. Equally, and finally, the question of historicism would seem to be settled. After all, Husserl castigated it as incoherent from early, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" (1911), to late, "Phenomenology and Anthropology" (1931). It is, as he said repeatedly, a view that is internally self-contradictory and hence, logically incoherent and absurd. This neat resolve of the problem I posed at the beginning of this paper, however, won't stand up. The problem with the resolution proposed in the last paragraph is that it does not take account of the apparently radical and confusing transformation of Husserl's phenomenology presented in his last work, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. We need to examine the claim that Husserl apparently evolved into a (kind of) Existential Phenomenologist and radical Historicist in this final expression of his philosophical career. I would underscore that if this conclusion can be sustained, we are viewing a transformation at least as remarkable as that between the later and the earlier Wittgenstein, and far more consequential than that between the later and the earlier Heidegger. For if Husserl really did subscribe to the two items I just mentioned, his last work is not only a repudiation of the founding ideas and fundamental orientation of his earlier work; it is also a repUdiation of the tradition. The topic is one announced decades ago by Merleau-Ponty and more recently by, among others, David Bell and James Edie? Their claim is

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that Husserl's notion of the source of the "meanings" constituted in experience changed. Or, better put, he came to see that the constitution of meaning was, first and fundamentally, set in the Lebenswelt, and, second, and much more consequential for the revocation of his earlier beliefs, that the meanings fundamentally and basically constituted in the Lebenswelt are all given to us from historical, cultural, practical, and social settings. In other words, though we may "put" the world together, although we may "constitute" it, we use as ingredients that our time, our society, our culture give us. Thus, even though there may be some "time escaping" transcendental function of constitution which is characteristic of reason, or more generally characteristic of any form of cognition, the "material" constituted is always temporal, historical, finite and contingent. Constitution is no longer an accomplishment of the Transcendental Ego; it is rather a social accomplishment; constitution is accomplished by a "we," not by an "I." Thus any adequate account of this world and our experience of it must be historical, which is but another way of stating the Historicist thesis. And, further, if we were to explore in more detail the specifics of how we constitute this Lebenswelt which is our own, we would have to understand the insertion of tradition and historical "pre-judgment/prejudice" into our lives as well as the configuring role played by expectations. In other words, we would need to make sense of our actual, existential situation. We would move our phenomenological investigation from the "view from nowhere" to the inescapable conditions and restrictions set on us by the undeniable and non-ignorable fact that we are creatures of time and place, and hence, creatures bounded by history and finitude. The Transcendental Ego has become the Existential Subject. So claim Bell and Edie. III

One of the discordant notes on the Historicist interpretation of Husserl certainly is sounded by the fact that his contemporaries, those who would be familiar with his work and its exposition, acknowledged no transformation. An anecdote relayed by John van Buren in his recent book The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King 3 concerns a lecture Husserl was to give abroad. Heidegger had accompanied Husserl to the Freiberg train station and on the way Husserl outlined a familiar theme - how he was going to show in this lecture the way to ground the sciences

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in the radical foundations of pure phenomenology. As the conversation progressed Heidegger asked "how does this affect the historical sciences?" and Husserl supposedly said, "I forgot these." If one reads Husserl's introductory remarks in Part I of The Crisis one hears echoes of themes sounded in "Philosophy as Rigorous Science." Philosophy has its inherent telos, a telos which is reason itself, and the present crisis in European Humanity is a byproduct of the rampant mysticism, irrationalism, skepticism which has become all too fashionable. One must rediscover the "hidden telos of reason itself," a telos that is essential and necessary in order to right philosophy and thereby restore to European Humanity the vision that has underlaid its entire cultural history from the ancient Greeks forward to the present day. In Chapter 15 of Part II titled "Reflection on the method of our historical manner of investigation," one encounters the familiar collection of Husserl designators for evidence, method, proof, etc. - "consummate clarity," "apodictic method," "apodictic steps," "absolute success," "apodictic beginning," and on the following page, "the teleological unity of history understood as the hidden unity of intentional inwardness.,,4 And he sums up this section by saying: ... this makes it clear that the peculiar truth of such a "teleological consideration of history" can never be decisively refuted by citing the documented "personal testimony" of earlier philosophers. This truth is established only in the SELF-EVIDENCE of a critical over-all view which brings to light, behind the "historical facts" of documented philosophical theories and their apparent oppositions and parallels, a meaningful, final harmony.5

Part III of The Crisis gives us a familiar sounding discussion of the reductions, of Transcendental Subjectivity and of constitution, of epoche, of the correlation of ego-cogito-cogitatum. What sounds a new theme is a new kind of concern with "the we-self," i.e., with the standing of the Other and the connection of this topic to the Lebenswelt and to history. I do not believe this discussion can at all sustain the interpretation of those who would make Husserl a Historicist - but let me return to this topic after I make a couple of remarks which suggest to me that Husserl has not "converted" to Historicism. In the text of the Vienna Lecture of May 1935, "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity" (which is appended to the English translation of The Crisis), a lecture which in all significant respects was the text of the so-called Prague lecture Husserl delivered 6 months later and which in tum served as the basis of The Crisis of European

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Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, we find a familiar and telling conclusion: In order to be able to comprehend the disarray of the present "crisis", we had to work out the concept of Europe as the historical teleology of the infinite goals of reason; we had to show how the European "world" was born out of ideas of reason, i.e., out of the spirit of philosophy. The "crisis" could then become distinguishable as the apparent failure of rationalism. The reason for the failure of a rational culture, however, as we said, lies not in the essence of rationalism itself but solely in its being rendered superficial, in its entanglement in "naturalism" and "objectivism".6

It takes only memory and virtually no interpretation, to hear in this passage the echo of the text of "Philosophy As Rigorous Science" from 1911. Finally, let me discuss one more passage, one which David Bell takes as very important and one which numerous other commentators wishing to find transformation, or at least defeat, in Husserl, are fond of citing. In Appendix IX, titled (rather misleadingly) "Denial of Scientific Philosophy. Necessity of Reflection. The Reflection (Must Be) Historical. How Is History Required?" We find the following first sentence: Philosophy as Science, as serious, rigorous indeed apodictically rigorous, science - the dream is over.7

Unfortunately for the interpretation I mentioned, the quote is invariably taken out of context. I am not the first to point this out; already more than twenty-five years ago, Spiegelberg did so in his History of the Phenomenological Movement. 8 Husserl is characterizing his contemporary situation and showing how the current philosophical scene is hostile to a variety of past models of philosophical inquiry. He goes on to claim that we must understand our history in order to: " ... clarify our unclear consciousness of our telos ... " (394) and in consequence of this we can perceive how" ... the validity of the sense of philosophy's end remained continuously unbroken ... " (394). I suppose if we were to find this note thoroughly unambiguous, Husserl should make utterly clear that he does not personally subscribe to "the end of the dream." He doesn't explicitly announce that, but certainly the more plausible interpretation of the passage is, as I said, to read it as a commentary on his time. But even if it is his own claim, even if he meant the statement as a confession, considering the huge number of pages he wrote in his 45year career, it wouldn't be that surprising to find that he, too, occasionally had a bad day and got discouraged on a project he alone seemed to be

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pursuing. At the most, "the end of the dream" claim is isolated; more plausibly, it is merely a report of the scene around him. IV

I have spent some time suggesting textual evidence which contradicts any claim that Husserl transformed his view of phenomenology and of philosophy in The Crisis and became a radical historicist. And considering the way I have presented my argument, the refutation sounds about as difficult as "shooting fish in a barrel." I do think there is rather more to the story than this - but I think the argument of the critics has been misplaced. I don't think Merleau-Ponty or Bell or Edie should have been arguing that Husserl changed his view. More plausibly, perhaps Husserl SHOULD have changed his view and then for no better reason than to make consistent the introduction of the Lebenswelt as the Urgrund of meaning and the consideration of History and the They, the social Other, as co-constituters of the meaning of the phenomena. The topic of the sources of meaning is introduced obliquely in The Crisis. Husserl has taken the reductions a step further than that of any earlier text: he has reduced the ingredients of experience back to their fundamental grounding in the structures of the lived world, the forms of life which are characteristic of Every Man independent of the special worlds which that creature may construct. The lived world will have the structures of space, time, motility, sexuality, order, etc. which serve as shared and common human ground for mutual understanding. It is the world of ordinary language, shared by all, the home and nest out of which grow the special and technical vocabularies of the special sciences and any of the other individuated and idiosyncratic forms of discourse .... We may trace the beginning of the thematic of the Lebenswelt back to Ideas II when Husserl pointed out the need for a genetic phenomenology to supplement the static analyses that had been the hallmark of the work in his mid-career, that is, in the period around the time of Ideas I (1913). In concept, and by definition, a genetic analysis must involve time and hence history, thus the emphasis on genesis invited a tum to the stages of the constitution of meaning. The irruption of interest in the Lebenswelt has been said to be a response to encouragement by Husserl's relative thru marriage, Hugo von Hoffmanstahl, but whatever

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its incidental cause, that area of analysis was a rather predictable outgrowth of his earlier work. Anyone who reads The Crisis chapters dealing with the Lebenswelt will have to agree that the notion of layered, additive, genetic, historically developmental meaning is the operative view of constitution in the Lebenswelt. This is not controversial. The controversy concerns the structure of that meaning - is it purely factual, historical, contingent and the source of the meaning - again, is it merely factual, historical, contingent. If the meanings that make up the intelligibility of the world must be traced back to their founding in the Lebenswelt, and the structures and content of meaning in the Lebenswelt are merely contingent and accidental, and their source is only historical and incidental, then a radical historicism that easily outstrips Dilthey, and introduces a degree of contingency into intelligibility that out-radicalizes Heidegger is present. In such a case, we would have to look to a Nietzsche, a Foucault or a Rorty to find a position as thoroughly free of the type of necessity Husserl had previously advocated for his entire career. But from what I've said so far, I think it is rather that the "radical historicist Husserl" is the more difficult interpretation to sustain. So the question then is NOT "is there a developmental structure to the Lebenswelt?" Rather the question is: "what is the source of and the status of the intelligibility that arises in the Lebenswelt?" Can one see necessary structures in the formations (genetic, hence, historical) that inform the Lebenswelt? It is not enough to say that they are historical; one must figure out what "historical" means for Husserl. And when we do that we see that historical does not mean "contingent, accidental" (this is a view of Heidegger's and others' that Husserl rails against in "Philosophy and Anthropology," in "The Vienna Lectures" and in the earlier cited sections of The Crisis). In the case of Husserl's Crisis, to say "all is historical" is really to say that constitution is genetic (and not just static) and there is a domain (which, in Husserl's view, Heidegger misconstrued) that is the origin of all forms of meaning - i.e., the Lebenswelt. But that point of origination is, however odd it sounds, bound to an ahistorical necessary pattern which is essence of reason, which is followed or exemplified or instantiated by the temporal, historical genesis of meaning. The necessary pattern of development is not the kind that Kant claimed since there are not empty containers (forms/ concepts) waiting to be filled with sensory content. Rather what we see

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in historical genesis is a dynamic pattern inscribed in the structure and meaning of reason itself.

v In conclusion, we return to the question framed at the beginning of this essay: was Husserl's position primarily that of a contemporary philosopher, what we have come to call a "post modem philosopher," one committed to a new vision of the field? Or was he rather a philosopher who was bound to the completion of tradition, subscribing to a vision with a 2,500 year history. Ifhis view would have been that of the "historicist" described above, his philosophical vision would surely have committed him to the new, the view beyond tradition. And although we may not have complete resolution on his subscription to foundationalism, certainly he then would have had to cast it in a manner very different from the typical forms of foundational ism in order to make it fit with Historicism. If these suggestions for interpretation could have been sustained, it would be secure to associate Husserl with the new. And in an appreciation that would resonate with Kierkegaard's Romantic Irony, we would see, with some considerable poignancy, how he must have gotten there. Husserl's adoption of a truly radical view, Historicism, would have occurred in the mid-nineteen-thirties, decades after the Historicist view had rather strikingly entered the scene and a half-dozen years after it had become virtually dominant. The major force in sweeping all before it was the acceptance and influence of Being and Time (certainly, though, reinforced by the work of other "heretical" phenomenologists such as Scheler). In a rather arresting way, then, Husserl's nemeses, the so-called "younger phenomenologists" referred to derogatorily in "Phenomenology and Anthropology," would have been the ones who taught him how to fully understand the radical motivation of phenomenology. After 45 years of strenuous work, Husserl would have finally come to see what, really, were "the things themselves." Of course, if such a transformation of Husserl's thought were correct, it would constitute an about-face which would make Bertrand Russell's shifts mere child's play, Heidegger's "tum" uneventful, and Wittgenstein's reversal perhaps its only chief competitor among contemporary philosophers for the record of "maximally changing your mind." The acceptance of radical historicism on Husserl's part would also clearly

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signal the failure of the CartesianlKantianlPlatonic rationalism which Husserl had nurtured since at least the Logical Investigations. So it would be news. But unfortunately for those who like their history served ironically, I don't think the texts will take the reading that The Crisis reverses a lifetime's work. We may want to agree with David Carr, the translator of The Crisis, and see the text as twisted in internal stresses and potential inconsistencies, a text fundamentally flawed by a failure to work thru and realize the full implications of its own discoveries. 9 Perhaps Husserl SHOULD have been a radical historicist, but there is very little reason to think he actually was one. That honor belongs to the heretics. Clark University NOTES I The text now available contains material not published by Husser\. The first two parts of the book were published in the journal Philosophia in 1936. The English translation is: The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1970). A new edition of the original text has recently appeared as Husserliana XXIX. E. Husserl, Die Krises der europiiischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phiinomenologie. Ergiinzungsband: Texte as dem Nachlass (1934-1937) Hrsg. von R. N. Smid (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993). 2 M. Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), esp. the Preface. David Bell, Husserl (New York: Routledge, 1990), Chap. IV, "The Individual and The Lebenswelt," esp. pp. 215ff. James Edie, Edmund HusserI's Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1987), esp. Chap. 5 and Chap. 7. 3 John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1994), p. 219. 4 Op. cit., p. 73. 5 Ibid. 6 Op. cit., p. 299. 7 Op. cit., p. 389. Also, see Carr's note on p. xxi of the Introduction to his translation of The Crisis on how to interpret "dream is over." 8 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 2 vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960). 9 See the Introduction to his translation of The Crisis.

CHRISTINE SPAHN

DER ETHISCHE IMPULS DER HUSSERLSCHEN PHANOMENOLOGIE

l.

ETHISCHES DEN KEN ALS URSPRUNGLICHER GRUND DER HUSSERLSCHEN PHANOMENOLOGIE

"Phanomenologie" - die "Wissenschaft von den reinen Phanomenen", wie sie Edmund Husserl in seiner Freiburger Antrittsrede von 1916 charakterisiert,l verlangt die vorurteilslose Beschreibung der Phanomene als unmittelbar Gegebenes sowie die Ablehnung einer dahinter verborgenen, unzuganglichen Welt der Dinge an sich. In der Betrachtung des sich uns zeigenden "Phanomens", welches nicht eingeschrankt zu verstehen ist im Wahrnehmungsfeld der reinen Sinnesdaten, sondern all das umfaBt, was uns 'erscheint', sei es durch die Sinne oder durch die Leistungen der Vernunft, d.h. auch all die Vormeinungen und Vorurteile, mit den en wir im alltaglichen Lebensvollzug zu tun haben, vollziehen wir phanomenologische Anschauung, d.h. phanomenologisches Erkennen. 2 Das durch Husserl im AnschluB an die deskriptiven psychologischen Analysen seines Lehrers Franz Brentano begriindete phanomenologische Denken rekurriert auf den Doppelsinn des Phanomenbegriffs als "Korrelation zwischen Erscheinen und Erscheinendem"3 und betont die darin eingeschlossenen intentionalen Grundstrukturen, die von den nicht trennbaren noetisch-noematischen Voraussetzungen der Zweiseitigkeit des Phanomen-Begriffs auf eine urspriingliche Einheit verweisen. 4 Die Aufdeckung und Analyse der Erfahrungsstruktur, die sich zwischen Subjekt und Welt entfaltet, und welche sich als Intentionalitatsgeflecht von universaler Reichweite offenbart, war in den letzten Jahrzehnten Gegenstand einer umfassenden Husserl-Forschung, der durch die VerOffentlichung der Manuskripte in der Husserliana-Reihe immer weitreichendere Blickwinkel des phanomenologischen Denkens offenbart wurde. Vielfaltig sind die Themen, die behandelt wurden: Logik und Bedeutung, Probleme der transzendentalen Subjektivitat, Intersubjektivitat und Lebenswelt, Urteil und Wahrheit ... , urn nur einiges zu erwahnen. Es verwundert zunachst, daB die Husserl-Forschung bislang auf die in der intentionalen Grundstruktur implizierten ethischen Elemente nicht naher einging. Gerade der phanomenologische Ansatz,

25 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 25-8\. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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der sich intensiv der Erforschung der BewuBtseinsstrukturen der Subjektivitiit oder den Problemen der intersubjektiven Erfahmng widmet, soBte eine Hille an Gedankenansiitzen zu Fragen des menschlichen Handelns beinhalten. Eine systematische ethische Lehre bzw. eine ausgearbeitete Handlungstheorie ist bei Husserl jedoch nicht zu finden. SoUte dieser einfluBreiche Denker auf ethische Problemansiitze in seinen umfangreichen Manuskripten verzichtet haben? Warum haben sich bislang die Husserl-Interpreten vor einer ausgiebigen Auseinandersetzung mit Fragen zur Ethik in Husserls Schriften gescheut? Hier mussen wir heraussteBen, daB die Begrundung einer wissenschaftlichen Ethik fOr Husserl stets ein wesentliches Bestreben seiner phiinomenologischen Forschungsarbeit war. Die erste Vorlesung uber Ethik datiert im Jahre 1889/90, auf die bis 1902 fOnf weitere folgten. Husserl gilt jedoeh heute gemeinhin als Begriinder einer reinen Logik, die mit dem Erscheinen der Logischen Untersuchungen 1900/01 ihren Ausgangspunkt nahm. Diese "Versuehe zur Neubegriindung der reinen Logik und Erkenntnistheorie"s sind entstanden aus Husserls Einsieht, "daB die Logik unserer Zeit an die aktuelle Wissensehaft nieht hinanreiche, welche aufzuklaren sie doeh berufen ist.,,6 Das phiinomenologisehe Bestreben ist, eine "Philo sophie als strenge Wissensehaft" radikal zu begriinden durch Ruckgang auf die letzten Voraussetzungen der Wissensehaft. 7 Mag Husserls innovativer Bedeutung zur Jahrhundertwende auf dem Feld der reinen Logik und Erkenntnistheorie, insbesondere seiner Psychologismuskritik, zwar uneingesehrankt zugestimmt werden, so durfen wir dennoch nieht verkennen, daB jene erkenntnistheoretisehe Sieht von Husserls Veroffentliehungen sieherlieh sehr einseitig ist und an einer neukantianisch inspirierten Terminologie haftet, wie sieh spatestens seit dem Erseheinen der "Vorlesungen uber Ethik und Wertlehre" (1908-1914) im Jahre 1988 in der Edition der HusserlianaReihe belegen laBt. 8 Bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt waren die Sehriften zu Fragen des Verhaltens und Handelns nur in Manuskriptform zugiinglich, welche Alois Roth 1960 teilweise zu einer systematischen DarsteBung verarbeitete. 9 Die vor mnd dreiBig Jahren erschienene Untersuchung ist auch die einzige, die sich eingehender mit der Problematik von Husserls Auseinandersetzungen zu Grundfragen der Ethik befaBt. Hans-Georg Gadamer bezieht sich 1982 auf diese Schrift mit der Bemerkung, "daB Scheler in dieser Hinsicht auf Husserls Spuren wandelte."lo DaB das Gebiet des Emotionalen fOr Husserl eine wichtige Forsehungsrichtung

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darstellt, beweisen unter anderem die umfangreichen Gemuts- und Willensanalysen der Ethik-Vorlesung von 1920. Es handelt sich urn Prolegomena zu den Phanomenen der Gemiits- und Willensregungen, die derzeit fUr die Husserliana-Ausgabe vorbereitet wird. 11 Eine systematische Analyse der Bereiche von Emotion und Stimmung sowie deren Beziehung zur theoretischen Vernunft in Husserls Phiinomenologie stand bislang noch aus. Doch gerade aus dem gegenseltlgen Verwiesensein beider Teilbereiche einer umfassenden Vernunftkonzeption soBte die Perspektive eines ethischen Entwurfs ersichtlich werden. Dieses philosophische Vorhaben wird in seiner Tragweite nur dann verstanden, wenn Husserls Methodenkonzept der Phanomenologie zu Grunde gelegt wird. Wie es schon der Untertitel der Formalen und transzendentalen Logik, "Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft" andeutet, ging es Husserl primar urn den Entwurf einer umfassenden Vernunfttheorie. 12 In einer Tagebuchaufzeichnung vom 15.9.1906 bezeichnet Husser! "eine Kritik der Vernunft, eine Kritik der logischen und praktischen Vernunft, der wertenden uberhaupt,,13 als seine Hauptaufgabe. Diese schon friih sich abzeichnende Grundeinstellung verdeutlicht, daB die AusfUhrungen zur Ethik nicht isoliert betrachtet werden durfen, sondern unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Wechselverhaltnisses zur "Kritik der Vernunft". Damit ist einmal gemeint die bewuBte Abgrenzung gegen Kants Vernunfttheorie, zum anderen die Besinnung auf die urspriingliche Bedeutung von Logik und Wissenschaft, die in der Neuzeit aufgrund der Eliminierung des Subjekts aus dem Bereich des Forschens zur Abkehr von Fragen nach Sinn oder Sinnlosigkeit des faktischen, menschlichen Daseins fUhrte. Die Ethik und damit die Fragestellung nach lebensbedeutsamen Problemen scheint demnach in Husserls Idee der Phanomenologie eine zentrale Rolle zu spielen. Eine Beantwortung dieser lebensbedeutsamen Fragen ist jedoch auf die Methode "strenger Wissenschaft" angewiesen. 1m Logos-Artikel von 1911 verlangt Husserl hierfUr nicht nur die Orientierung an theoretischen Interessen, sondern daB sie "in ethischreligi6ser Hinsicht ein von reinen Vernunftnormen geregeltes Leben gewahrleisten solI" .14 Die methodisch erneuerte transzendentale Phiinomenologie sol1te als eine neue Philosophie die Einheit von Philosophie, Wissenschaft und die durch verniinftige Einsicht bestimmten Daseinsformen des europaischen Menschentums wiederherstellen. Die Krise der Kultur und des menschlichen Daseins zu uberwinden ist der Zentralgedanke von Husserls "Kritik der Vernunft", denn die Vernunft

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laBt "keine Unterscheidung in theoretische, praktische, asthetische und was immer" zu, vielmehr geht es ihr urn das, "worauf der Mensch als Mensch in seinem Innersten hinaus will, was ihn allein befriedigen, 'selig' machen kann".15 Vor aHem in der Krisis-Schrift von 1936 steHt Husser! riickblickend seine Kritik der erstmals in der Friihzeit des Griechentums ins Dasein tretenden menschlichen Vemunft dar: "Die AusschlieBlichkeit, in welcher sich in der 2. Halfte des 19. Jahrhunderts die ganze Weltanschauung des modemen Menschen von den positiven Wissenschaften bestimmen (... ) lieB, bedeutete ein gleichgiiltiges Sichabkehren von den Fragen, die fUr ein echtes Menschentum entscheidend sind."16 Das Thema des "echten Menschentums" ist das die Phanomenologen interessierende, die sich verantwortlich fUhlen "fUr das wahre Sein der Menschheit, das nur als Sein auf ein Telos hin ist (... ).,,17 Der Mensch und die Menschheit stehen im Mittelpunkt der spaten Geschichtsauffassung Husser!s, die nicht zufallig entstanden ist, sondem im zahen Ringen einer iiber 30 Jahre andauemden Forschungsarbeit, an deren Beginn das Grundthema der Phanomenologie steht: die Intentionalitat des BewuBtseins, die in der Evidenz griindet. In welchem Verstandnis kann nun aber das ethische Element in der Husserlschen Phanomenologie uns heute dazu verhelfen, bestimmte Handlungen bzw. Handlungsanweisungen besser zu analysieren oder zu verstehen, als dies Modelle einer Pflichtethik, beispielsweise der deontologischen, oder aber auch der teleologischen vermitteln? Diese Pflichtethik ist fUr Scheler die negative andere Seite einer "Einsichtsethik",18 die der sittlichen Wiirde des Menschen allein angemessen ware und dem Personsein gerecht wird. In der Ablehnung einer Pflichtethik durch Scheler manifestieren sich jegliche Facetten der entschiedenen Zuriickweisung einer Ethikkonzeption, die auf dem Pflichtbegriff beruht, eine Kritik, die sich von Schiller tiber Nietzsche bis hin zum phanomenologischen Denken zieht. Diese Ethik, die in ihrer autoritaren Grundkonstitution den Menschen in seinem ureigensten Sein sittlich zu entmiindigen trachtet und jegliche individuelle Regung auBer acht HiBt, wirkt in dem Ver!angen des unmittelbaren Befolgens der innerlich bindenden Handlungsprazepte eher bedrohlich auf den HandlungsprozeB ein. Was ist dem Sein des Menschen nun aber angemessener? 1st es der Gesetzesgehorsam, der sich schon in den Schriften des Alten Testaments kundgibt oder ist es das Eingehen auf die individuellen Besonderheiten

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des Einzelnen in der jeweiligen Verflochtenheit mit den Intentionen, Bestrebungen und Handlungen der anderen? Wir konnen an dieser Stelle weiter fragen: Welche Auffassung von Ethik ist dem individuellen und gesellschaftlichen Fortschritt besser gediehen: uneinsichtiges Befolgen von unmittelbar praktiseh niitzliehen Regeln, die unter den Pramissen des "Sollens" zu sehen sind, oder aber die Sieht des Menschen in seinem phanomenologischen Sein, welches immer auch heiBt, daB etwas "siehtbar,,19 gemacht werden solI, was bislang noch als verborgen gilt. Und gerade die mensehliche Existenz verlangt in ihrer vielschichtigen Erfahrungsbreite ein ethisehes Verstandnis, das die Moglichkeiten des "Aufdeckens" beinhaltet. Betrachten wir das augenblieklich gangige Wissenschaftsverstandnis, so sehen wir, daB offensichtlich in den Einzelwissenschaften, die sich explizit mit dem Menschen befassen, so die Medizin, doch eher ein utilitaristisches Verstandnis vorherrschend ist. Nicht anders ist es aber, moglicherweise jedoch weniger bekannt, in den Bereichen, die die seelische und geistige Entwicklung des Menschen zum Inhalt haben: Piidagogik, Psychologie, Soziologie sind vor allem angesprochen, Disziplinen, die zum groBen Teil in einem naturwissenschaftlich, verhaltenstheoretisehen Sinne operieren. Kann uns hier die Phanomenologie und zwar eigens die von Husserl konzipierte phanomenologische Philosophie vielleicht dazu verhelfen, neue Sichtweisen zu entwickeln, die dem Menschen in seiner beziehungsreichen Seinsweise gerecht werden? Husserl hat zwar nie ein geschlossenes ethisehes System entwickelt. In seinen Schriften finden sich jedoch zahlreiche Anst6l3e, die uns ein intensives Bemiihen auf diesem Gebiet vermuten lassen. Es sind Impulse, die uns Husserls Entwurf einer Phanomenologie iibermittelt, "ethische Impulse", die von Husserls Schriften ausgehen und seinem Denken wie "eine tiefere Bedeutung" zu Grunde liegen. Der "Impuls" als ein au13erer oder innerer Antrieb, Ansto13, ein Kraftsto13, der eine bestimmte Bewegung zur Folge hat, la13t sich in zwei Elemente zerlegen: dem Beweger und der jeweiligen Bewegung. Husserl hat zweifellos als "Beweger" einen ethischen Impuls in seinen Schriften zum Ausdruck gebracht, der aber, wie ich meine und durch die eher geringe Beschiiftigung mit Fragen der Ethik in der Sekundarliteratur bestatigt finde, in seiner eigentlichen Auswirkung bislang nicht erkannt wurde. Sicherlich hiingt dies auch mit der Uniibersichtlichkeit und der mangelnden Systematik von Husserls Arbeitsweise zusammen sowie mit der Fiille der iiberlieferten Manuskripte. Zeigt sich uns in diesen Werken

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so mancher Gedanke als offenkundig und altbekannt, wie die (wohl als einseitig zu beurteilende) Sicht der logischen Analysen oder, beim spaten Husserl, die Darlegung des Begriffs der Lebenswelt, miissen wir in punkto der ethischen Uberlegungen in der Bedeutungsanalyse der Schriften tiefer gehen. Dieser "ethische Impuls" der Husserlschen Phanomenologie eroffnet die Tragweite einer Sicht der Welt und damit auch des Menschen und der Wissenschaften yom Menschen, die einem utilitaristisch gepragten Denken kritisch entgegentritt. 2.

MENSCHENSICHT UND WISSENSCHAFTSVERSTANDNIS

Ethisches Fragen und Forschen begleitet Husserls gesamtes Schriftwerk. Offensichtlich wird dies aHerdings erst, wenn man die posthum veroffentlichten Manuskripte unter dieser Leitphrase liest. Mag dies in seiner fruhen phanomenologischen Phase noch sehr unter dem EinfluB einer Konzeption der "strengen Wissenschaft" stehen, beispielsweise in den Vorlesungen zur Ethik und Wertlehre von 1908-1914, die den Versuch der Parallelisierung von Logik und Ethik zum Inhalt haben, offnet sich seine Sichtweise in den Manuskripten, die zwischen 1913 und 1917 entstanden, in den Ideen II unter dem Titel Die Konstitution der geistigen Welt veroffentlicht wurden und die Grundlage einer "Phanomenologie der Person" zum Inhalt haben. Nicht unberiicksichtigt darf bleiben, daB Husserl, unter dem Eindruck der Ereignisse des Ersten Weltkrieges, der geistigen und kulturellen Krisensituation der Zeit durch die KaizoAufsatze, 1923124 verfaBt und herausgegeben als die Fun/ Au/satze uber Erneuerung, begegnen mochte. In den zahlreichen Studien zur "Phanomenologie der Intersubjektivitat,,20 weist Husserl die wechselseitige Beeinflussung von "Ich" und "Anderer" auf; die Mitmenschen werden im handelnden Miteinander im Rahmen der "sozialen Akte" insbesondere in den beiden Texten zum Gemeingeisr 1 beschrieben. 1m Spatwerk wendet sich Husserl dann vor aHem dem Verstandnis der phanomenologischen Philosophie in der Gegenwartssituation der Zeit zu. Die Krisis-Schrift steht hier als das bekannteste Werk im Mittelpunkt; nicht weniger interessant ist der 1934 verfaBte Aufsatz Uber die gegenwiirtige Lage der Philosophie. 22 Aber auch in seinen Briefen und anderen Zeitdokumenten, die seit 1994 in einer zehnbandigen HusserlianaDokumente Edition erschienen sind, au Bert sich Husserl personlich und aussagekriiftig zu ethischen Fragestellungen. 23 Versuchen wir eine vorlaufige Quintessenz der angesprochenen

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Schriften zu ziehen, konnen wir feststellen, daB diese sich primar mit dem Menschen und einer moglichen Wissenschaft vom Menschen befassen. Die objektiven Wissenschaften sehen ab von der Perspektivitat und der Situationsbedingtheit des Seienden, das sie behandeln. Hier setzt Husserls Objektivismuskritik ein, die, wie ich meine, auf einem in seinem Scnriftwerk nicht immer klar explizierten Willens- und Handlungscharakter der Intentionalitat beruht, wie er bereits in der EthikVorlesung von 1914 thematisiert wurde. 24 Der "Wille" der handelnden Person muB deshalb als Ansatzpunkt fUr die Erforschung des menschlichen Wesens gelten. Zunachst bewegt sich Husserls Ethik jedoch im Rahmen der traditionellen philosophischen Frageansatze nach formalen Disziplinen und im Bemiihen urn eine Parallelisierung von Logik und Ethik. In diesem Zusammenhang schreibt er in der Ethik-Vorlesung von 1908: ... so tritt doch in der Neuzeit immer dringender das Bestreben hervor, dieser praktischen ethischen Disziplin, die ihren empirisch-anthropologischen Charakter nicht verleugnet, eine apriorische Ethik zur Seite zu stellen, ein System absoluter und reiner Prinzipien praktischer Vemunft abzugrenzen, die, von aller Beziehung auf den empirischen Menschen und seine empirischen VerhaItnisse frei, doch die Funktion iibemehmen sollen, fiir alles menschliche Handeln, sei es nur formal oder auch material, absolut normative RichtmaBe anzuge':Jen. Also die Analogie mit der Sachlage in der Logik springt in die Augen.25

1m Gegensatz zur utilitaristisch gepragten Ethik ist Husserls ethische Intention zunachst eine rein wissenschaftliche. In den Jahren zwischen den ethischen Vorlesungen von 1902 und 1908/09 befaBt sich Husserl vorwiegend mit der Fundierung einer phanomenologischen Kritik der logischen Vernunft. 26 Sein Ziel war jedoch eine universelle Vernunfttheorie, deren Komplement in der Ausarbeitung der axiologischen und praktischen Vernunft bestand. Diese Phanomenologie der Gemiits- und Willensakte erarbeitete er in den Vorlesungen von 1908/09, 1911 und 1914 bzw. in Forschungsmanuskripten. 27 Die Absicht dieser zur intellektuellen Sphiire parallel und analog verlaufenden Ausfiihrung verdeutlicht Husserl wie folgt: Ersetzen wir die reine Logik durch reine Ethik, reine Asthetik, reine Wertlehre iiberhaupt, Disziplinen, deren Begriffe nach Analogie der reinen Logik streng und von aller empirischen und materialen Moral usw. unterschieden definiert werden miiBten, dann entspricht der Erkenntnistheorie oder Kritik der theoretischen Vemunft die Kritik der praktischen, der asthetischen, der wertenden Vemunft iiberhaupt, mit analog en Problem en und Schwierigkeiten wie die Erkenntnistheorie. 28

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Husserl verkennt dabei aber nicht, daB der logischen Vernunft eine Vorrangsstellung zukommt: Die Logik wird zum Leitfaden der Begriindung seiner phanomenologischen Ethik. Parallel zu Denken und Erkennen sind auch Werten und Wollen BewuBtseinsakte "von etwas" und intentional auf einen Gegenstand gerichtet. Sie tendieren auf ErfUllung und Evidenz des Gemeinten als "wahr" oder "falsch" bzw. "gut" oder "bose". Die Wahrheit ist als eine absolute, fUr aIle verniinftig Erkennenden anzunehmen. Deshalb miissen auch die Akte des Wertens und Wollens wie aIle anderen BewuBtseinsakte den Gesetzen der Vernunft unterstehen. Eine weitreichende Fragestellung ist die nach der Vereinbarung dieser Dominanz der logischen Vernunft mit dem Parallelismus der Vernunftarten: "Diese universelle Herrschaft der log is chen Vernunft kann niemand leugnen. MuB das aber besagen, daB eine praktische und axiologische Vernunft in Analogie zur logischen keinen Sinn habe?"29 Diese "Allherrschaft der logischen Vernunft,,30 ist zwar unbestritten, weil die Vernunftideen sich als Voraussetzungen fUr logische und wertende Urteile erweisen, die unter theoretischen Prinzipien stehen. Eine Untersuchung der reinen Vemunft ist demnach in jedem FaIle eine logische Tatigkeit. Der Bereich der Gemiitssphare soIl aber nicht nur als ein besonderes Anwendungsgebiet der logischen Vernunft betrachtet werden; Husserl miBt ihr Eigenstandigkeit zu. Wie soIl nun aber diese phanomenologische Gemiitssphare methodisch untersucht werden? Logisch denkend und erkennend bezieht Husserl sich einmal auf den Bereich des theoretischen Erkennens, zum anderen auf die Sphare des Wertens. Die Akte des Urteilens und Wertens als psychologische Gegebenheiten sind analogisierend betrachtet - auf die idealen Ziele der Wahrheit und des Wertes gerichtet. Entsprechend werden formale Gesetze fUr verniinftige Urteile bzw. Gesetze fUr das Sollen und fUr den Wert aufgestellt. Husserl konstatiert die Notwendigkeit in der neuzeitlichen Philosophie, Ethik als eine (historisch gesehen) praktische Disziplin durch eine apriorische Ethik zu erganzen. Sie erwirkt "ein System absoluter und reiner Prinzipien praktischer Vemunft (... ), die, von aIler Beziehung auf den empirischen Menschen und seine empirischen Verhaltnisse frei, doch die Funktion iibernehmen soIlen, fUr alles menschliche Handeln (... ) absolut normative RichtmaBe anzugeben.,,31 Die Schwierigkeit einer Konstitution dieser formalen Praktik hebt Husserl mit Hilfe des Vergleichs der ethischen und der logischen Prinzipien hervor. Traditionell gesehen sind logische Prinzipien formale Gesetze, ethische hingegen sind

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nicht-formale, materiale Gesetzlichkeiten. Eine echte Analogie fUr Prinzipien und Theorien des logischen bzw. ethischen Bereichs ist deshalb unter diesem Kriterium nicht festzustellen. Bei der Realisierung des Analogiegedankens weist Husserl auf gewisse Hindernisse und Schwierigkeiten hin, insbesondere, was die Unterscheidung zwischen Aktinhalt und Aktgegenstand anbelangt. Die logische Bedeutung bezieht sich auf eine bedeutete Gegenstandlichkeit. Die Analogie mit der praktischen und axiologischen Dimension fordert die Analogisierung zwischen Wollen als Akt und dem Willensinhalt, korrelativ zu einer Trennung von Urteilen und Urteilsinhalt im logischen Bereich. Daraus ergibt sich die ZusammengehOrigkeit der Willensmeinung mit dem Sinn, des EntschlieBens mit dem EntschluB, des Handelns mit der Handlung. 32 Urn diese Verhaltnisse genauer zu bestimmen, ist jedoch eine umfangreiche Analyse der Wesensstrukturen des BewuBtseins erforderlich, wie sie im Bereich der Willensphanomenologie erfolgt. Fur Husserl stellt sich hier die Frage: Inwieweit sind Gemuts- und Willensakte objektivierend? Husserl zufolge sind sie dies nicht, d.h. sie sind in zweifacher Sicht auf Akte des Vorstellens und des Urteilens angewiesen. Zum einen sind sie fundiert in den objektivierenden Akten. Ein Gegenstand oder Sachverhalt muB vorstellend oder urteilend gegeben sein, bevor man sich auf ihn wertend oder wollend beziehen kann. Zum zweiten wird das wertende GefUhl erst durch objektivierende Akte in eine Werterkenntnis umgewandelt. 33 Problematisch ist die eindeutige Vorzugsstellung des Urteils in der Konstitution von Akt und Gegenstand. AIle Wahrheiten werden in Urteilen ausgesprochen, auch diejenigen, welche von Wertungen, Wertmeinungen und -geltungen ausgesagt werden. Die Kontroverse des Verhaltnisses von objektivierenden und wertenden Akten impliziert die Frage, die im logischen Umfeld verwurzelten Begriffe Erscheinung und Bedeutung auf das axiologische Gebiet zu ubertragen. Bevor wir naher auf Husserls Entwurf einer phanomenologischen Ethik in ihrer Doppelung von wissenschaftlichem Anspruch und lebenspraktischer Bedeutsamkeit eingehen, wenden wir uns den willensphanomenologischen Analysen in der Ethik-Vorlesung von 1914 zu. 3.

DIE KONSTITUTION VON HANDLUNGSWILLEN UND ENTSCHLUSSWILLEN

1m § 15 der Ethik-Vorlesung von 1914 charakterisiert Husserl den phanomenologischen Willen in seiner Zweiteilung:

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a) Der Handlungswille ist aktuell ausfiihrend und verwirklichend. Dem Handlungswillen geht der EntschluBwille voraus. b) Der Entschluj3wille ist auf ein kiinftiges Schaffen gerichtet und impliziert somit eine nachfolgende Zeitstrecke. Dieser auf die Zukunft gerichtete Wille ist durch die "schopferische Intention" gekennzeichnet und erfiillt sich in der ausfiihrenden Handlung. Beiden ist gemeinsam, daB das Eigentliche und Wesentliche der Willenssetzung das schOpferische "Es werder' ist. Husserls phanomenologischer Wille ist auf die "individuelle, reale Wirklichkeit"34 und nicht auf eine ideale ausgerichtet. Zwei maBgebliche Aspekte sind daran beteiligt: zum einen das, was Husserl als die "schopferische Realisierung" bezeichnet, zum anderen, daB dieses SchOpferische "auf eine kiinftige Zeitstrecke" festgelegt iSt. 35 Der Bereich des rein Analytischen wird bei der Auseinandersetzung mit dem phanomenologischen Willen teilweise verlassen. Vielmehr gehen Husserls Betrachtungen nunmehr weit in die BewuBtseins- und Aktsphare hinein, wenn er schreibt: "Die Willenssetzung ist Setzung der Verwirklichung. Aber Verwirklichung sagt hier nicht bloB Wirklichwerdung, sondern Wirklichmachung, Leistung der Verwirklichung. Das aber ist etwas Ureigenes, das eben in der Eigenheit des WillensbewuBtseins seine Quelle hat und sich nur da verstehen laBt.,,36 Hier wird deutlich der Wirkungskreis des Gemiits erkenntlich: Die Setzung des Willens ist nicht thetisch wie das "Urteil" zu verstehen, sondem aus dem Potential der BewuBtseinsakte der subjektiven Tatigkeit ergibt sich das Produkt der Handlung als ein Wirkliches. Der thetischen Setzung in der Urteilslogik steht hier gegeniiber "die unvergleichliche Eigentiimlichkeit der Willenssetzung als schaffender Setzung.'>37 Die Wahmehmung auf der Seite der Akte ist dabei nicht durch eine Passivitat gekennzeichnet, sondem in jedem Stadium des Handlungsablaufs hat diese "den Charakter einer aus der schOpferischen Subjektivitat entquollenen, deren Objekt infolge des schopferischen 'fiat' iSt.,,38 Dem BewuBtsein bzw. der subjektiven Entscheidungstatigkeit kommt die richtungsweisende Stellung zu. Dieses erlangt die GewiBheit des zu Realisierenden dadurch, daB der Wille als WillensgewiBheit das Kiinftige festsetzt, so daB dem BewuBtsein folgende Intention unterlegt werden kann: "Weil ich es will, wird es sein." Der Wille au Bert hier "sein schopferisches 'Es werde!' ,,39 Dabei wird die Vorstellung der Realitat und des Gewollten vorausgesetzt, d.h. daB das reale Sein doxisch bewuBt sein muB, damit eine schopferische Verwirklichung iiberhaupt erst

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einsetzen kann. Dies widerlegt die gangige Auffassung, daB Husserls BewuBtseinsphilosophie sieh allein in einem idealen platonisehen Ideenhorizont bewegen wiirde. Vielmehr sehlieBt die Auslegung zur Willensphanomenologie das doxisehe Sein und dessen lebensweltliehe Verwirkliehung ein. Das seh6pferisehe Wesen der Willenssetzung ist wie wir oben er6rtert haben - zum einen als "aktuell sehaffendes" im Verstandnis eines ausfiihrenden, verwirkliehenden Handlungswillens, das ein "originares Handeln" impliziert, zu verstehen. Zum zweiten kann es auf kiinftiges Sehaffen geriehtet sein bzw. einen Vorsatz ausfiihren, wie es bei jedem auf zukiinftiges Handeln geriehteten EntsehluB der Fall ist. 40 Husserl nimmt zur Unterseheidung von Handlungs- und EntsehluBwillen die Analysen zur Zeiterstreekung der Handlung hinzu. Am Ende des Handlungsgesehehens steht die fertige Handlung, die "selbst nur seh6pferisehe Vergangenheit (ist), eventuell iibrig lassend ein bleibendes Resultat als Werk, ein dureh soleh einen seh6pferisehen ProzeB Gewordenes und als das Charakterisiertes.,,41 Die Thesis des Willens erstreekt sieh nieht nur auf das Gegenwartige mit dem seh6pferisehen Beginn, sondern sie sieht ab auf eine weitere Zeitstreeke mit ihren jeweiligen Inhalten. Das bereits Gesehaffene steht in einem Horizont, der bewuBt ist als "Willenshorizont" in einer "antizipierten Willenskontinuitat.,,42 Husserls Handlungstheorie der Spatzeit ist bereits vorgezeiehnet, wenn er an gleieher Stelle sehreibt: "Mit der seh6pferisehen Gegenwart eins ist eine seh6pferisehe Zukunft, die hier in der Handlung in eigentiimlieher Originaritat als solehe konstituiert ist." Das Gegenwartige bzw. das Jetzt ist nieht statiseh festgelegt, sondem wandelt sieh standig in neue Jetztpunkte bis zum Ende des Prozesses urn. Das Ergebnis einer Handlung, die auf Wertverwirkliehung geht, ist unter diesem Bliekwinkel nieht endgiiltig festgelegt. Vielmehr unterliegt es der M6gliehkeit der Revision und Veranderung, die dem willentliehen Erwagen und Entseheiden des Subjekts untersteht. Der Handlungsbegriff ist dureh die Struktur des Wollens konstituiert, was sieh insbesondere dadureh auBert, daB sieh im Augenbliek des "aktuellen Sehaffens" in der Handlungsphase ein "Jetztpunkt" zeigt, in dem der Wille in seiner "sehOpferisehen Originaritat,,43 lebt. Das ist aber nieht der alleinige Teil des Zeitpunktes; hinzu kommt ein "doppelter Horizont von eigentiimliehen Willenswandlungen" - wie Husserl an gleieher Stelle sehreibt - in dem sieh die drei Zeitstufen treffen: bewuBtseinsmaBig konstituiert sieh im augenbliekliehen Jetztpunkt das "seh6pferisehe Vergangene" und das "Seh6pferisehe der Zukunft". Das

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"Jetzt" ist dadurch charakterisiert, daB es sich in einer stetigen Verwandlung und Neugestaltung befindet, bedingt durch den Willen, der aktiv sich "nicht nur auf das Jetzt (... ), sondern auf die weitere Zeitstrecke und ihren Gehalt" erstreckt. 44 Dieses unmittelbare "Jetzt" geht in ein sich immer neu zusammensetzendes "Jetzt" tiber und organisiert das "Noch-nicht-Gewesene" in das "Jetzt-seiende" urn, wobei es sich erst zu einem wirklich Geschaffenen herausbildet. Der in Husserls Phanomenologie vertretene Begriff des "Horizontes,,45 zeigt hier eine besondere Stellung: Der "doppelte Horizont" stellt sich dar im "soeben Geschaffenen", das vergangen ist, und dem "Zukunftshorizont", der durch allmahliche Einengung der Zeitstrecke der zu vollbringenden Willensleistung sich immer mehr verktirzt. Am Ende des Handlungsablaufs ist die Handlung nunmehr nur noch "schopferische Vergangenheit" mit einem unter Umstanden bestandigen "Resultat als Werk". Die Handlung ist in diesem Sinne abgeschlossen. In ihrem Verlauf konstituierte sie sich durch die Umgestaltung der zahlreichen Jetztpunkte. Zwei hervorzuhebende Orte sind allerdings bei diesem Handlungsverstandnis fixiert: "Anfangspunkt mit dem ersten" und gewissermaBen den schopferischen UranstoB verleihenden fiat und Endpunkt mit dem Charakter "Es ist vollbracht".46 Dieses sich zwischen den beiden Fixpunkten abspielende "Willenskontinuum,,47 ist nicht zu vergleichen mit dem bloBen Ubergehen yom "Jetzt" zum neuen "Jetzt", wie es sich im normalen ZeitbewuBtsein verhalt: Die Willenskontinuitat "entquillt" vielmehr "aus ihm vermoge der eigenen Willensschopfung.,,48 Die Handlungsstruktur wird dadurch zu einem kreativen Konstrukt, dem die Willensentscheidung und -leistung des Subjektes vorangeht. Willensrichtung und sch6pferisches "Es werde!" vollziehen sich in der Konstanz und Kontinuitat der Willensmomente, d.h. "mit jedem neuen aktuellen Schopfungspunkt erftillt sich eine vorgangige, auf seinen Gehalt gerichtete Willensintention.,,49 Husserl rekurriert hier auf das Verhaltnis zwischen Intention und ErfOllung. 50 Der Intentionalitatsbegriff ist nicht mehr allein in dem "Sich-richten-auf-Etwas" ausgelegt, wie beim Verstandnis der objektivierenden Akte. Zwar ist jeder Wille sich seiner "Sachen" bewuBt, setzt aber die Vorstellung des Gewollten voraus sowie ein Glaubensfundament fOr das reale Sein: "Wo nicht schon Realitat gesetzt ist bzw. irgendwie doxisch bewuBt ist, kann nicht schopferische Realisierung anheben."51 Der Wille ist nicht auf weitere Willensintentionen ausgerichtet, sondern auf die Wertgegenstande, auf das Gewollte. Er ist dabei "schopferisch erfOllt auf die jeweilige Jetztphase

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des Vorgangs und 'intendierend' auf den ganzen Rest des Vorgangs als zu realisierenden."52 Der Intentionalitatsbegriff im Rahmen des vorstellend-erkennenden Denkens ist erweitert durch die schOpferische Aktion. Es verschrankt sich hier sozusagen der Bereich von objektivierenden und nicht-objektivierenden Akten: Der "Einsatzwille" (fiat) zu Beginn der Handlung hat die Willenskontinuitaten zur Folge. 1m Handeln wird jedoch nicht der zukilnftige Wille ausgefiihrt, sondem das jeweils gerade Getane. Die ursprilnglich von Husserl mutmal3lich postulierte Parallelitat von logischem und axiologisch-praktischem Bereich st613t dabei auf die Kontroverse von Formalitat und Materialitat. Es sei festgehalten, da13 der thetis chen Setzung der Urteilslogik im Handlungsbereich eine schaffende Setzung des Willens entgegengesetzt wird. Dies ist zweifellos ein neuer Gedanke in der philosophischen Tradition. Dieser als "sch6pferisch" zu kennzeichnende Bereich ist begrundet in der Bedeutung der Subjektivitat. Das Handlungsverstandnis Husserls macht eine deutliche Trennung zwischen objektivierenden Akten und Gemiltsakten trotz allem schwierig, da eine Willensthesis auf den gewollten Vorgang ausgerichtet ist und "demgema13 auch nur durch den Willen Seinswerdendes (ist) und ( ... ) durch ihn den Gewi13heitscharakter kilnftigen Seins (hat).,,53 Das Sch6pferische des Willens, der sich auf eine vor ihm liegende Zeiterstreckung festlegt, umfa13t einen weiteren Horizont, als dieser yom Willensthema vorgezeichnet werden kann. Der Intentionalitatsbegriff mu13 in diesem Zusammenhang in einem gr613eren Rahmen verstanden werden, der den Bereich der Akte und des Gemilts mit einbezieht. Der auf Kunftiges ausgerichtete Wille wird dabei gefa13t als "schopferische Intention" ,54 die sich in der verwirklichenden Handlung erfiillt. 1m Zusammenhang des Verhaltnisses von Intention und Erfiillung wendet Husserl den aus dem Bereich der objektivierenden Akte stammenden Begriff der Evidenz, der dem Urteil die Richtigkeit vermittelt, analog auf die Gemtitsakte an. Bereits Brentano erkannte diese Relation des Problems der Richtigkeit im Gebiet des Wertens und nannte das "Analogon der Evidenz die richtige und als richtig charakterisierte Liebe."s5 Kritisch merkt Husserl allerdings an, da13 Brentano auf Grund von Begriffskonstruktionen auf diese Lehre stie13. Husserls phanomenologische Analyse hat vielmehr die "eine wahre Kritik der wertenden Vemunft"56 zum Ziel. Sie steht zweifellos am Anfang der Ausarbeitung der Axiologie und Praktik, die aber schon fruh gepragt ist yom Begriff der Liebe, der fUr Husserl im Jahr 1914 allerdings noch ein "Mysterium" iSt. 57 Wir halten fest, da13 Husserl in seinem willensphanomenologischen

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Exkurs von 1914 die Signifikanz des intentionalen Aktlebens der Subjektivitiit exponiert, deren Willenssetzung im Aktionsradius des Gemiits in ihrer zeitlichen Erstreckung als stets neu konstituierte und schaffende angesehen werden muB. Die Analyse der Handlung ist temporiir ausgerichtet: EntschluB- und Handlungswille sind die wesentlichen Komponenten des agierenden SUbjekts. Der Handlungsbegriff ist in dieser Interpretation nicht statisch, sondem, bedingt durch die sich in der Zeit abspielenden Modifikationen im WillensprozeB, dynamisch bzw. genetisch zu verstehen. Dieses phiinomenologisch charakterisierte Handlungsgeschehen gestaltet sich zwischen zwei festgelegten Polen: Anfangs- und Endpunkt. Das Resultat einer der Handlung vorausgehenden Willensintention ist von vomherein nicht eindeutig festgelegt, sondem unterliegt den situativen und willentlichen Interessen des SUbjekts. DaB bei diesem HandlungsprozeB auch die Einwirkungen der Umwelt mit in Betracht gezogen werden mussen, ist offenkundig. Hier ist die Handlung, und dies sei kritisch vermerkt, nicht allein der Aktivitiit des SUbjekts eigen, sondem die "Reize" der Um- und Lebenswelt kennzeichnen das subjektive Tiitigsein als "VerauBerung". Husserl erkannte wohl nach den streng wissenschaftlich durchgefuhrten Untersuchungen zur Parallelitiit von Logik und Ethik die Einseitigkeit seines Ansatzes. Dies mag ein Grund fUr seine Zuwendung zu eher lebensweltlich ausgerichteten Analysen gewesen sein. Die Ausfiihrungen zum Begriff der "Liebe" mogen uns hierfur als Grundlage dienen. Dieses als "Analogon zur Evidenz" betrachtete Konstituens fordert die Erforschung der Person in ihrem Zusammenwirken mit den anderen geradezu heraus. Husserls Wesensanalysen zum phanomenologischen Willen sind grundlegend fur die Konzeption der forrnalen und materialen Praktik. Die formale Praktik ist unmittelbar bezogen auf die praktischen Moglichkeiten des handelnden Subjektes, weshalb ihre Erganzung im Blick auf eine materiale Praktik gefordert ist, deren Gegenstand das ethisch wollende Subjekt ist. Bevor wir uns dem Entwurf der formalen und materialen Praktik zuwenden, der auf den Untersuchungen zum Wertund Willensbegriff aufbaut und auf das empirische SUbjekt zuriickfiihrt, sei noch erwiihnt, daB Husserl im § 17 der Ethik-Vorlesung von 1914, "Die Parallelen zwischen Urteilsmodalitiiten und Willensmodalitiiten", ausfUhrlich auf mogliche Abwandlungen des Willens (z.B. Uberlegen, Entscheiden, Vermuten) eingeht, wie sie bei der Begriffsanalyse im §13 angedeutet wurden.

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Namentlich mochte ich mich hier auf den §17 Cd) beziehen, in dem die "Willensnegativitat", insbesondere die "Unterlassung", thematisiert wird. Diese als Gegensatz zum Tun verstandene Willensablehnung kann als eine Negation des Tuns auch den vorangegangenen Willen bzw. die Vollendung des Handelns verneinen. Die durch die Worte "ich will nicht" ausgedriickte "Privation" beinhaltet ein Nicht-Wollen. Husserl beriihrt diese GesetzmaBigkeit, aber nur urn darauf zu verweisen, daB er diese nicht in den Bereich einer formalen Ethik rechnet. Die am Beispiel der Willensnegation aufgefUhrten Willensmodalitaten veranschaulichen, daB sich mit dem Bestreben der Parallelisierung von Urteils- und Willensmodalitaten die phanomenologische Ethik in ihrer teilweisen Unabhangigkeit von formalen Gesetzen verstehen und den subjektiven Komponenten das weitere Augenmerk zuwenden muB. Diesem Problembereich werden wir uns im folgenden Abschnitt zur formalen Praktik zuwenden, wobei der Leitfaden der Interpretation in der Erorterung der Position der Subjektivitat beim HandlungsprozeB liegen wird. Wir konnen hier nicht im einzelnen auf die komplexen und umfangreichen Analysen zur Analogisierung von Logik und Ethik in den Vorlesungen zur Ethik und Wertlehre von 1908-1914 eingehen, sondern versuchen vielmehr in einer moglichst elementaren Ausdrucksweise Husserls Sicht einer phanomenologischen Ethik in ihrer Doppelung von wissenschaftlichem Anspruch und lebenspraktischer Bedeutsamkeit herauszuheben. 4.

DIE PHANOMENOLOGISCHE ETHIK IN DER DOPPELUNG VON WISSENSCHAFTLICHEM ANSPRUCH UND LEBENSPRAKTISCHER BEDEUTSAMKEIT

Zwei Wesensziige in Husserls Denken lassen sich fUr die Konzeption einer phanomenologischen Ethik feststellen. Zurn einen ist es der Gedanke einer "strengen Wissenschaft", dem Husserl ein Leben lang verhaftet blieb. Dies ist auch noch in den Schriften zur Selbst- und Fremderfahrung der Cartesianischen Meditationen zu erkennen, wo Husserl sich immer wieder auf die "apodiktische Erkenntnis, als die allein echt wissenschaftliche"S8 bezieht. Dieser Riickgang auf ein fundierendes Axiom, das er in einer "universalen Selbstbesinnung" sieht, ist das Ziel seiner Phanomenologie. Letztbegriindete Erkenntnis verwirklicht sich in dieser "Selbsterkenntnis, zunachst einer monadischen, und dann

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intermonadischen". In diesem Rahmen ist auch das phanomenologische Wissenschaftsverstandnis begreiflich zu machen. Diese umfassende Selbsterkenntnis als universale Besonnenheit ist die "Philosophie selbst und umspannt aIle selbstverantwortliche, echte Wissenschaft.,,59 Husserl geht diesen Weg weiter und legt in der Krisis-Schrift die Krise der Wissenschaften "als Ausdruck der radikalen Lebenskrisis des europaischen Menschentums" und deren "Verlust der Lebensbedeutsamkeit,,60 aus. Phanomenologische Wissenschaft bezieht sich auf den "Sinn des Menschen.,,61 Diese auf den Menschen und die Gemeinschaft ausgerichtete Komponente ist das zweite Element in Husserls grundlegend ethisch orientiertem Denken. Am Ende der Cartesianischen Meditationen spricht er davon, daB das "an sich erste Sein, das jeder weltlichen Objektivitat vorangehende und sie tragende, (... ) die transzendentale Intersubjektivitat, das in verschiedenen Formen sich vergemeinschaftende All der Monaden" ist. Gerade in diesem Bereich ereignen sich "die Probleme der zufalligen Faktizitat, des Todes, des Schicksales (... )". Die dort benannten "ethisch-religiosen Probleme" sind gestellt auf "den Boden",62 von "echter Wissenschaft" und "Leben swelt", die in der KrisisSchrift expliziert wird. 1m folgenden solI diese Verflechtung der apriorischen Sphare mit den 1ebenspraktischen Voraussetzungen und Erfordernissen analysiert werden. Es wird sich zeigen, daB die von Husserl nie ausdrlicklich systematisierte phanomenologische Ethik betrachtet werden muB in der Verschrankung von "reiner" und "empirisch-humaner" Ethik. Sie zielte daraufhin ab, die Neukonzeption eines phanomenologischen Gedankengebaudes zu stlitzen. Die Husserlsche Ethik wird zu einer "gegenwfutigen Aufgabe der Philosophie".63 In dem Aufsatz "Uber die gegenwartige Aufgabe der Philo sophie" (1934)64 au Bert sich Husserl liber das Ziel einer "theoretischen Praxis". Theoretische Erkenntnis und praktische Ausrichtung werden von ihm als Zusammenhang erfahren. Wahrend sich die theoretische Erkenntnis "rein am Sein und Sosein als Ziel einer erkennenden und das Erkannte sichemden Praxis" orientiert, ist das Ziel der "theoretischen Praxis" die "Neubildung des Sinnes Welt als thematisches Feld der wissenschaftlichen Urteile, des Sinnes Seiendes".65 Auf diesem Hintergrund miissen die Ausfiihrungen Husserls zur Aprioritat der ethischen Gesetze verstanden werden, die der Perspektivitat der Weltsicht zugrunde liegen. Zeigt sich die "theoretische Einstellung" in ihrer Konzeption weitge-

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hend als "unpraktisch" fUr das menschliche Leben, indem sie iiber Reflexionen zu den Tatsachlichkeiten der Situation (etwa iiber Mittel-und-Wege-Entscheidungen bei einzelnen Handlungsablaufen) hinwegsieht, verwirklicht sich die "natiirliche Einstellung,,66 als diejenige auf die Welt hin orientierte Haltung, die alle menschlichen Aktvollziige fundiert. Diese Vollziige schlieBen die Entscheidungen ein, welche auf die yom SUbjekt verantworteten Leistungen zuriickgehen. Die "Welt" ist das Korrelat der natiirlichen Einstellung, die im phanomenologischen Verstandnis neu geschaffen werden solI. Wissenschaft und Philosophie erganzen sich. Der Mensch, der im gegenstandlichen Bezug zur Welt lebt, nimmt seine Umgebung jeweils perspektivisch und okkasionell wahr. Der subjektive Akt wahlt den jeweiligen Standpunkt bzw. die "Gegebenheitsweise" aus. Am Beispiel der "Gegenstandswahmehmung" laBt sich die Kontroverse von apriorischer Gesetzlichkeit und perspektivischer Weltsicht veranschaulichen: Die "Welt" als Fundament besteht ursprlinglich als "Boden" aller Erkenntnisformen, und eben so ist der einzelne Gegenstand absolut in vorgefaBten Gesetzlichkeiten gegeben. Was sich daran modifiziert, ist die personliche Sicht des Subjekts, in dessen Entscheidungsbefugnis und eigenem freien Vollzug es liegt, bestimmte Gegenstandlichkeiten zu praferieren bzw. diese auch wertend und handelnd zu intendieren. 67 In diesen Relationen miissen im folgenden Husserls AusfUhrungen zur Gesetzlichkeit von Ethik und Wertlehre verstanden werden, in denen er immer wieder auf die Grenze der freien Subjektivitat stoBt, die mit apriorischen Voraussetzungen nicht analysiert werden kann. Vermutlich war diese Schwierigkeit auch die Bedingung dafUr, daB er etwa zeitgleich mit den Ethik-Vorlesungen urn 1908 bereits das Problem der "EinfUhlung,,68 erorterte, sich 1910111 iiber "natiirliche Einstellung" und den "natiirlichen Weltbegriff,,69 au Berte und 1914 in den Ideen II eine - wie ich es nennen mochte - erste Konzeption einer "Leben swelt" formulierte. 7o Am Begriff "Wert" ist ersichtlich, wie diese Gegenstandlichkeit doppeldeutig aufgefaBt werden kann: einmal als objektive, reine Gesetzlichkeit, die apodiktisch gegeben ist, zum anderen in der Mehrdeutigkeit des personlichen Bezugs zum objektiven Wert. Diese Parallelisierung von Ding- und Wertwahmehmung resultiert aus Husserls Erorterungen zur Analogie von Logik und Ethik.71 Die Vielfaltigkeit der Entscheidungsmoglichkeiten im Rahmen der praktischen Moglichkeiten bedingt, daB die Aprioritat der Wertprinzipien

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immer wieder an ihre Grenzen stoBt. Eine objektive Hoherwertung eines zu erstrebenden Gutes muB nicht gleiehzeitig zu einer praktisehen Bevorzugung fUhren. 1m Vergleich zum logisehen SehluB in einer Pramisse steht der "VernunftgesetzmaBigkeit" die motivationsbedingte GesetzmaBigkeit gegenuber, die durch "Wertgrunde" bedingt ist. Der SchluB beim Vollzug der Pramissen ergibt sich jedoch nieht logisch selbstverstandlieh, sondern die spezifisehe axiologisehe Erwagung des urteilenden Subjekts nimmt EinfluB auf die Wertung und kreiert einen weiteren Bereich der Entscheidungsmogliehkeit. Naehdem das Wertsein von Dingen bzw. Handlungsvorhaben mehrfaeh bestimmt sein kann, zeigt sich auch beim Vergleich von Werten eine untersehiedliehe Tendenz. Das "Gute" als ein Absolutes festzulegen erweist sich in der HusserIsehen Ethik nahezu als unmoglich, da diese normative Sieht die lebensweltliehen Belange verkennen wurde. Die "Rangverhaltnisse" der Werte liegen demnaeh in einem "Zwisehenbereieh" von reiner Vernunftsphare und lebenspraktischen Erfordernissen: Relationen wie "gleieh", "besser" oder "minder" ersehweren die Verwirklichung einer exakten, ethiseh gesollten Vorgabe. Die Komplexitat des Wertseins eines zu erstrebenden Gegenstandes bzw. eines intendierten Handlungsvorhabens ist verwurzelt in den wertgrundenden Teilkomponenten, die wiederum dem pers6nliehen Vorziehen unterliegen, sowie in den Wert- bzw. Handlungsfolgen, die je naeh subjektiver Wahl untersehiedlieh ausfallen. Diese "Wertkomposition" ist entseheidend fUr die Werte sehaffende, freie Personliehkeit, wie sie HusserI ab den Ideen II besehreibt. Eine Erweiterung der ethisehen Wertlehre ist nahezu zwingend fUr die Vorlesungen der Jahre 1908-1914, die sieh primar die Parallelisierung von Logik und Ethik zum Ziel gesetzt haben. Mag diese wohl eine wesentliehe Voraussetzung sein fUr eine der Tradition gegenuber fundiertere Sieht der Ethik, so maeht sie zugleieh aueh deren Grenzen erkennbar und fordert die eingehende Untersuehung der Subjektivitat heraus. Werte sind keine starren, den Dingen und Gegenstanden der Welt vergleiehbare Gegebenheiten. Die phanomenologisehe Sieht in der Zweiteilung von Vernunft- und Lebenswelt vermag dieses Faktum zu veransehauliehen. Logisehe Urteile und Aussagen im Bereich der Gemutsakte sind gebunden an Vergleichung und Abwagung von Werten und ihrer Komponenten. Das jeweils "Beste" bzw. das "hoehste Gut" ist - nieht wie es vergleiehsweise in der Antike als "Eudamonie"

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bezeichnet wurde - abhangig von der aktuellen Situation, des lebensweltlich-faktisch gegebenen Ausschnitts der Existenz einer Person. Dieser Ansatz HiBt die Husserlsche Ethik bedeutsam erscheinen fur das gegenwartige Denken, in dem durch die Komplizierung der Tatsachlichkeiten von Technik, Umwelt, Medizin etc. eindeutige Handlungsnormen nicht mehr ausreichen und ethische Entscheidungen aktuell revidiert und neu erschlossen werden mussen. Zwar rekurriert gem jedermann auf gewisse unbefragte, reine "Werte", wie z.B. Humanitat und Lebensbejahung, die sich jedoch als Formulierung so leer, formelhaft und abstrakt ausnehmen, daB sie erst durch ihren aktuellen Bezug im Bereich der wertenden und handelnden Personen und Personenverbande der Probe zu unterziehen sind. Werte werden in phanomenologischer Sicht weder durch reine Verstandeserkenntnis noch durch Sinneswahmehmung erfahren. Wert und Werterkenntnis stehen vielmehr in einer Wesenskorrelation zueinander. Das Subjekt erfaBt die Werte fUhlend und intendierend, wobei sich Gemuts- und Vemunftkomponenten verschranken. In dieser "Wertnehmung" wird der Wertgehalt als etwas der Erfahrung bereits Vorgegebenes, als etwas Apriorisches aufgenommen. Die "Bedeutsamkeit" der Werte fUr das einzelne Subjekt bewirkt jedoch, daB diese einer Veranderung zu unterziehen sind, die jeweils yom einzelnen "Ich" bzw. yom Subjektverband ausgeht, und welche schOpferisch aktiv die Werte im Verstandnis einer "Emeuerung" modifizieren. Das gefiihlsmaBige, emotive Erfassen der Werte fordert die Bevorzugung oder Nachsetzung bestimmter Wertgehalte in einer Entscheidungssituation. 1m Bereich dieses intentionalen Fuhlens erweitert oder verengt sich die Wertsphare maBgeblich durch die menschlichen Primarempfindungen Liebe und HaB. Zwar werden die Werte von den Menschen produktiv "entdeckt", d.h. sie sind bereits implizit gegeben und mussen lediglich phanomenologisch "aufgedeckt" werden, aber sie k6nnen yom Menschen sch6pferisch verwirklicht und weiterentwickelt werden. Die Entdeckung der Werte ist ein geschichtlicher ProzeB und schlieBt diverse Wertrangordnungen ein. Werte gehen ihrer Erkenntnis bzw. Verwirklichung grundsatzlich voraus. Deshalb verandem sich auch nicht die Werte an sich, sondem lediglich das BewuBtsein von ihnen. Husserls Ethik fragt nicht im KantischenSinne "Was sollen wir tun?", sondem bezieht sich auf das menschliche Wesen und auf die Frage nach dem Sinn des menschlichen Daseins. Der nachste Schritt vollzieht sich von der

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realen Werterkenntnis zur Realisierung des Wertes. Das "Gute" an sich ist formal gesehen stets unverandert, erhalt aber in der subjektiven "Bedeutsamkeit" durch die individuelle Wahl eine bestimmte Rangstellung. Nicht das "Gute" an sich ist hierbei maSgebend, sondem das Wollen und Tun des Guten, das als praktische Moglichkeit in der Wahl existiert, auch neben einem zuruckgesetzten Besseren. Das "praktisch Gute" ist demnach auch nicht immer das "Beste", was zur Wahl steht. 1m "Gesetz der Absorption" spricht sich das aus, was die Erwagung neuer praktiseher Moglichkeiten, d.h. ein "Sollen unter Vorbehalt" impliziert. Dem Subjekt stehen diverse Entscheidungsspielraume zur VerfOgung, die es letztlieh zu einem "kreativen Handeln" herausfordem. Das Bessere der Wahl "absorbiert" hier sozusagen alles andere, was als "gut" zu bezeiehnen ist. Husserls phanomenologisehe Ethik der Werte fordert die Fundierung in einer allgemeinen Axiologie. Neben dem Problem der Werte an sich und deren Erkenntnis spielt die Frage naeh den Rangordnungen eine wesentliehe Rolle. Der Sehwierigkeit in der Unterseheidung von formalen und materialen Werten bzw. deren Realisierung liegt die Freiheit des mensehlichen Willens zu Grunde, die sich nieht nur deskriptiv darlegen laSt, sondem im phanomenologisehen Sinne den Grenzbereieh der Religion beruhrt. "Gut" und "Bose" sind dabei nieht primar als "Eigensehaften" zu Willensakten aufzufassen, sondem gehen tiefer zuruck auf die urspriingliehen Einstellungen der handelnden "Person". Die Freiheit des Willens ist hierbei nieht nur ein Attribut, sondem ein Wesensmerkmal der Person. Husserl hat dies in seinem Argumentationsgang in dieser Form nieht ausdriieklich formuliert, jedoch zielt meine folgende Interpretation daraufhin ab, Freiheit und - davon ausgehend - "Kreativitat" als Charakteristika der ethisehen Person zu sehen.72 Gerade in einer Zeit, in der die iiberkommenen Wertvorstellungen einer Gesellsehaft nieht mehr zureiehen fOr die Bewaltigung einer wirtschaftliehen oder politisehen Situation - wie es sich urn etwa 1920 aufgrund der Verfassungskrise des Deutsehen Reiehes dureh die Niederlage im 1. Weltkrieg zeigte - war es mehr denn je vonnoten, neue Ethikformen fOr das Auslegen und Verstehen der Zeitsituation zu konzipieren. Sittliche Normvorstellungen und lebenspraktische Bedingungen in eine vemunftige Relation zu bringen, forderte eine Ethik, die beide Komponenten zu verbinden vermochte. Husserls phanomenologisches Programm einer einheitlichen "Kritik der Vemunft" ist aus

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dieser Zeitlage entstanden, mit der Intention, die damit verbundenen Probleme einer neuen Handlungstheorie zu umreiBen. Sein Entwurf einer umfassenden Axiologie und Praktik bringt dieses Bestreben nachdrucklich zur Geltung. Wie bereits erortert, lassen sich mit formalen Gesetzlichkeiten Gegebenheiten der Lebenswelt durchleuchten und verstehen, andererseits sprengt die Bedeutung der SubjektiviUit den Rahmen normativer Vorgaben. Ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der menschlichen Handlung im Aktvollzug ist hierbei der Wille, dem Husserl einen spezifisch schopferischen, d.h. aktiven, auf freiheitliche Realisierung angelegten Gehalt zuerkennt. Der Verwirklichungsbereich ist zunachst einmal individuell, d.h. weniger auf eine ideale, denn auf eine personliche Wirklichkeit ausgerichtet. Dieses als schopferisch zu kennzeichnende Handlungsgeschehen steht in einem "Willenshorizont" des Subjekts und ist genetisch zu verstehen: Das Gegenwartige ist in einer steten Umwandlung begriffen und kann kein fUr aile Vollzugsbedingungen endgultiges Resultat liefem. Der Grundzug der vemunftig handelnden Person ist die "Einsicht" bzw. das Erwagen gewisser Handlungsalternativen unter Vemunftkriterien. Der Vergleich mit der Logik, bei der ein ausgesprochener Satz entweder nur wahr oder falsch sein kann, ist insofem irrefUhrend, als eine Willensentscheidung nicht allein in einem Gebiet des "entweder - oder" bzw. "wahr - falsch" liegt, sondem vielfaltige Altemativen beinhaltet. Der Gegenstand des Handelns ist unter einer jeweiligen individuellen "Perspektive" zu betrachten. Dieser auf eine zeitliche Situation bezogene Hinblick wird gewahlt durch den subjektiven Vollzug. Das SelbstbewuBtsein der handelnden Person wurzelt im Erkennen der perspektivischen Erscheinungs- bzw. Gegebenheitsweisen des zu erstrebenden Gegenstandes. Er ist demnach nur fUr das Subjekt situativ vorhanden. Dies besagt fUr die Lebenswelt als den "Boden" der Wirklichkeit, daB diese ist, auch wenn sich die Einzelerfahrung der Gegenstande verandert. Ebenso verhalt es sich mit dem einzelnen Gegenstand, der auch dann ist, wenn sich die Erscheinungsweisen verandem. Fur die Ethik hat dies zur Folge, daB eindeutige Handlungsanweisungen fUr das Subjekt nicht gegeben werden konnen, weil es jedenfalls in phanomenologischer Sicht - uber die Entscheidungsvollmacht verfUgt, in welcher Erscheinungsweise es den Gegenstand intendiert. Diese Anweisungen sind stets Moglichkeiten des freien subjektiven Aktvollzugs. Die Freiheit in der Wahl der jeweiligen Perspektive begriindet die Freiheitlichkeit der Person. Das Vermogen, die

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Einstellungen und Perspektiven zu weehseln, ist nieht daran gebunden, sieh nur auf einen Gegenstand zu beziehen in immer gleieher Siehtweise. Die Komplexitiit von Zusammenhiingen erlebt das Subjekt im Handlungskreis eines "Horizontes". Er ist als stets neu zu erfahrender Handlungskreis nieht isoliert, sondern erstreekt sieh in einem "Universalhorizont", d.h. in der Welt selbst als absehlieBendem Umkreis aller mogliehen Handlungsanweisungen. Die "Welt" ist hierbei nieht eine lose Aneinanderreihung von Gegenstanden, sondern das subjektive "Wie" des Erseheinens von "Welt". Das phiinomenologisehe "Ieh" kennzeiehnet Husserl hierbei als eines, das in der Lage ist, das eigene Leben kritiseh zu beurteilen. Diese Fiihigkeit unterliegt einem steten "ieh kann", das abhiingt yom individuellen Vermogen und der spezifisehen Fuhlbarkeit fUr Reize der Umwelt. Eine Handlung ist dann als die "VeriiuBerung" zu verstehen, als in ihr der spezifiseh personelle Kern der Person fUr die AuBenwelt erkennbar wird. Das gesamte Innenleben des Subjekts wendet sieh im Handlungsvollzug an die Objektwelt (wobei dies naturlieh aueh verstellend gesehehen kann). Die Freiheit der Person ist dureh diese Potentialitiit des "ieh kann" entseheidend gekennzeiehnet. Fur die Ethik heiBt dies, daB sie als "apriorisehe Wissensehaft der humanen Geistigkeit,,73 spezifiseh ausgeriehtet ist fUr geistige Individuen, die ein BewuBtsein der "kritisehen Lebenssehau" bereits internalisiert haben und in der Lage sind, als phiinomenologisehe Philosophen sozusagen "lehrend" auf andere Subjekte einzuwirken. 5.

"ERNEUERUNG" 1M PHANOMENOLOGISCHEN LEBENSPROZEB

Das Fungieren der Husserlsehen Ethik wird zur Aufgabe der gegenwiirtigen Philosophie. Diese wirkt im Impuls einer "Erneuerung" gestaltend auf die vorhandene Welt ein. MaBgeblieh ist, daB diese Bewegung yom Individuum ausgeht, das selbst erst fUr sieh erkennend und sehOpferiseh willentliehe Akte vollzieht. In der Idee des ethisehen Mensehen ist dasjenige vorausgesetzt, was eine "kritisehe Erwiigung" ausmaeht: GefaBte Entsehlusse konnen sozusagen bejahend erkannt bzw. verneinend verworfen werden. Einen endgiiltig reinen ethischen Zustand, wie er in einer axiologisehen Idealsphiire gewiihrleistet ist, kann dieser ethiseh strebende Mensch nieht erreiehen, wei I sieh Streben und Mensehsein in phiinomenologiseher Sieht in einem lebendigen ProzeB vollzieht. Das Erlangen eines finalen, statisehen Endzustandes wurde

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diesen Vollzug zum Erstarren bringen. Der phanomenologische Lebensbegriff zeigt sich als ein unabgeschlossenes Stromen, in dem der Einzelne sich stets als Kampfender oder Strebender nach einem die Wertgehalte steigernden Leben bemiiht. Husserl ergriindet den phanomenologischen Lebensproze13 in den 1923/24 verfa13ten Kaizo-Aufsatzen iiber "Erneuerung des Menschen und der Kultur", die erst seit ihrer Veroffentlichung 1989 in der Husserliana-Edition 74 einem breiteren Publikum bekannt geworden sind. 75 Sie zahlen zur "mittleren" Schaffensperiode Husserls, in der er vorwiegend durch Vorlesungen und Manuskripte wirkte. Man darf jedoch die vermittelnde Stellung dieser Artikel nicht unterschatzen, da sie ein wesentliches Verbindungsglied zwischen dem 1914 sich ausgestaltenden Lebensweltbegriff und dessen Fortfiihrung in den zwanziger Jahren darstellt, eine Entwicklung, die in der KrisisSchrift ihren Hohepunkt erfahrt. Husserls Fragen nach einem Neubeginn der Philosophie, nach einer existentiellen Neufindung des Denkens und nach dem Telos der Vernunft der europaischen Menschheit, welches durch das Versagen der neuzeitlichen Kultur- und Wissenschaftsentwicklung unerreicht blieb,76 haben ihren zeitgeschichtlichen Hintergrund zu Beginn der zwanziger Jahre. Mit dem sich herausbildenden Krisis-Motiv der europaischen Wissenschaft sind entsprechende ethische Implikationen verbunden, die erst unter Zugrundelegung von Husserls Personen- und Fremderfahrungslehre verstandlich werden. Die "Kaizo-Aufsatze" sind von dem Gedanken bestimmt, da13 allein eine strenge Wissenschaft der einzelpersonalen sowie der gemeinschaftlichen Erneuerung ein Fundament verleiht. Vorwiegend in seinen Korrespondenzen urn 1920 au13erte sich Husserl iiber seine Haltung zum Kriegsgeschehen der vergangenen Jahre und formulierte dort erstmalig den Ausdruck "Emeuerung". In einem Brief von 1923 an Albert Schweitzer wird ersichtlich, was Husserl unter diesem Thema versteht: "Emeuerung im Sinne ethischer Umkehr und Gestaltung einer universalen ethischen Menschheitskultur." Die Positionsbestimmung der "Erneuerung", die sich auf die politisch-soziale Situation der Zeit bezieht und deren ethischer Gedankengehalt das Individuum, die Gesellschaft sowie die Menschheit zum Gegenstand hat, steht unter zwei Kriterien. Sie wendet sich (a) gegen die wissenschaftlichrationale und technische Inbesitznahme der Welt und beurteilt (b) den Zustand nach dem Kriegsgeschehen, der die moralische, religiose und philosophische Not der Menschheit bekundet. Husser! fordert, in einem

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Brief an W. Bell im J ahr 1920, daB fUr die erforderliche "ethischpolitische Erneuerung der Menschheit (... ) eine von klar fixierten, hochsten ethischen Idealen getragene Kunst universaler Menschheitserziehung, eine Kunst in Form machtvoller literarischer Organisation, die Menschheit aufzukHiren, sie aus Wahrhaftigkeit zu Wahrhaftigkeit zu erziehen" gewahrleistet sein muB.77 Husserls Entwurf einer phanomenologischen Philo sophie erfahrt, wie mir scheint, zu Beginn der zwanziger Jahre den wesentlichen ethischen Impuls in der Reflexion der Krisensituation der Zeit. Die Methodik der "strengen Wissenschaft" gibt Husserl bei diesem Gedankengang nicht auf, im Gegenteil: Nur eine "strenge Wissenschaft" biirgt fUr die adaquate und sachliche Beantwortung der lebensbedeutsamen Fragen. Die Idee, daB Phanomenologie sich aber auch auf die Ausgestaltung der menschlichen Gesellschaft und Kultur berufen muB, reift erst mit der Konzeption des "Erneuerungsgedankens" heran. Ihre eigentliche Aufgabe und Berufung findet die phanomenologische Methode in der Erziehung des Einzelnen und, im Individuum wurzelnd, in der Ausformung und Entfaltung einer humanen Menschheitskultur. Wir wollen uns nun dem Impuls der "Emeuerung" widmen mit dem Ziel, den ethischen Gedanken, den Husserl mit der Phanomenologie verfolgte, weiter darzulegen. Hierbei stiitzen wir uns auf die Analysen zu Husserls Personen- und Intersubjektivitatslehre, die uns den Weg zur individuellen Lebensform und zur Wertform einer humanen Menschheit unter Erorterung des umfassenderen Zusammenhangs der "Erneuerung" veranschaulichen. Das ethische Problem der "Emeuerung" ist in den Kaizo-Aufsatzen zentrales Thema; im Logos-Aufsatz und in der Krisis-Schrift wird die praktische Frage nur beiHiufig erortert. Aus diesem Grunde sind die Artikel der Jahre 1923124 fUr unsere AusfUhrungen zur Husserlschen Ethik grundlegend. Die "strenge Wissenschaft" solI das Wesen der verniinftigen Humanitat in der Beurteilung und Orientierung der Praxis nach allgemeinen Vernunftnormen festlegen: "Nur strenge Wissenschaft kann hier sichere Methode und feste Ergebnisse schaffen; nur sie kann so die theoretische Vorarbeit liefern, von der eine rationale Kulturreform abhangt."78 Die durch eine eidetische Methode analog zur reinen Mathematik ausgearbeitete Wesenswissenschaft verwirklicht sich in der reinen, apriorischen Ethik, die aIle Vernunftarten umfaBt. Das ethische Leben ist gekennzeichnet durch eine stetige Erneuerung und ein andauerndes Werden zu einer vorgestellten Zweckidee hin. Die "Wissenschaft von

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dem gesamten handelnden Leben einer verniinftigen Subjektivitat"79 schlieBt Logik und Axiologie ein. Eine Wissenschaft, die fUr eine "Idee des Menschen" das lei stet, wie die reine Mathematik fUr die "Idee der Natur", wurde nicht konzipiert - so ist Husserls Auffassung. Die empirischen Wissenschaften (z.B. Psychologie, Soziologie) reichen fUr dieses Unterfangen nicht aus: "Hier fehlt eben die parallele apriorische Wissenschaft, sozusagen die mathesis des Geistes und der HumaniUit: es fehlt das wissenschaftlich entfaltete System der rein rationalen, der im 'Wesen' des Menschen wurzelnden 'apriorischen' Wahrheiten (... )."80 Urn eine Begriindung dieser universalen Wissenschaft bemiiht sich Husserl bereits in seinem friihen Bestreben, Logik und Ethik zu parallelisieren. Diesen Gedanken nimmt er in den zwanziger J ahren wieder auf, diesmal mit einer gezielten Hinlenkung auf die Perspektive des menschlichen Wesens. Grundlegend fUr dieses philosophische Projekt ist der Dualismus von "Natur und Geist". Den Gegensatz von "Natur und Geist" arbeitet Husserl in den Aufsatzen von 1923/24 weiter aus, wobei er das Fehlen einer der "Idee der Natur entsprechenden wissenschaftlichen Erforschung der "Idee des Menschen" und der Gemeinschaft beklagt. Die Vorherrschaft der exakten Wissenschaften und das Uberwiegen der "Technik der N atur" ist offenkundig. Dabei nimmt er den Gedanken der analog zur "kausalen Gesetzesordnung" bestehenden "geistigen Realitat" auf, die "ihre Innerlichkeit hat, ein in sich geschlossenes 'BewuBtseinsleben', bezogen auf ein 'Ich', sozusagen als einen aIle einzelnen BewuBtseinsakte zentrierenden Pol, wobei diese Akte in Zusammenhiingen der 'Motivation' stehen." Gerade die innerlichen Momente sind es, die die einzelnen, getrennten Realitaten bzw. die Ichsubjekte in Wechselbeziehung treten lassen durch "Einfiihlung": "Soziale BewuBtseinsakte" bewirken eine neue Form der Verbindung von Realitaten im Sinne der "Form der Gemeinschaft".s' "Erneuerung" des individuellen Menschen sowie der vergemeinschafteten Menschheit wird zum zentralen Thema der Ethik, die sich aus zwei Komponenten konstituiert: "Die reine Ethik ist die Wissenschaft yom Wesen und den moglichen Formen eines solchen Lebens in reiner (apriorischer) Allgemeinheit. Die empirisch-humane Ethik will dann die Normen der reinen Ethik dem Empirischen anpassen, sie will zur Fiihrerin des irdischen Menschen unter den gegebenen (... ) Verhaltnissen werden. ,,82 Die wissenschaftliche Ethik, die Husser! vor Augen liegt, ware als eine "apriorische Wissenschaft yom Wesen der humanen Geistigkeit,,83 zu verstehen. Was ist damit gemeint?

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Die Frage nach der "Emeuerung" bezieht sich auf die Tatsachlichkeiten der aktuell-zeitlichen Kultur, diese werden wertend beurteilt im Blick darauf, wie eine Reform dieses Zustandes eingeleitet werden kann. Die Begrundung dieser Wissenschaft ist der erste Schritt und die Voraussetzung fur eine tatsachliche Emeuerung. Urn eine prinzipielle Ethik zu begriinden, muB jede, mit Antizipationen behaftete Evidenz, einer "aus letzten und aus den Ursprungsquellen vollkommenster Intuition"84 zugefUhrt werden. Der Moral ordnet Husserl hierbei eine eher untergeordnete Rolle zu als ein "ganz unselbstandiger Teil der Ethik", die als Wissenschaft das gesamte handelnde Leben der Subjektivitat unter dem Gedanken der Vemunft beinhaltet. Die Ethik teilt Husserl in eine Individualethik und in eine Sozialethik. Die Gemeinschaft charakterisiert er als "personale, sozusagen vielkopfige und doch verbundene Subjektivitat", zusammengehOrig durch "soziale Akte". Das handelnde Leben in der Gemeinschaft interpretiert Husserl in "Analogie zum ethischen Einzelleben": "Eine Menschheit kann wirklich, und muB, als 'Mensch im groBen' betrachtet und dann gemeinschaftsethisch als sich moglicherweise selbstbestimmende, somit auch als sich ethisch bestimmend-sollende gedacht werden.,,85 Hier liegt, wie ich denke, eine Tendenz vor, die Wesensbeziehung eines subjektiven und gemeinschaftlichen Handelns nach dem Modell der "Teile-Ganze-Beziehung" zu behandeln. "Emeuerung" wird in diesem Rahmen zu einem sozialethischen Grundproblem, dessen Erorterung die Auseinandersetzung mit den individualethischen Fragen voraussetzt. Die hochste Wertform ist fUr Husserl der "ethische Mensch", dessen personliche Wertentscheidung bestimmend werden kann fUr die Selbstregelung des individuellen m6glichen Lebens. Jeder einzelne mag sich fUr Werte einer bestimmten Art entscheiden, die als Handlungsziele gewahlt werden konnen. Entsprechend fallt die subjektive Willen sentscheidung auf die Verwirklichung dieser Werte im Blick auf das kunftige Leben. Eine existentielle Moglichkeit der Realisierung der einer Person eigenen Wesenszuge ist fur Husserl der "Beruf". Die Selbsterneuerung und Selbstgestaltung ist die Grundlage fUr die Beschreibung des Individuellen. 86 Husserl charakterisiert die Wesenszuge fUr die Idee des ethischen Menschen, wie er in der ihm eigenen Form des Werdens seine Gestalt erfahrt. Hierzu gehOren vor allem drei maBgebliche Faktoren: Selbstbesinnung, person ale Aktivitat, Willensstreben. Ethisches Leben verwirklicht sich nur aus diesem "urspriinglichen und dann immer wieder zu reaktivierenden Emeuerungswillen,,87 heraus. Das Moment der

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freien Entseheidung kommt hier zum Tragen. Dureh die "freie Urstiftung oder Urzeugung" wird jene "universale Selbstbesinnung,,88 in Gang gesetzt, die die Entwieklung zu einem ethisehen Leben ermoglieht. Die einzelpersonale Gestaltung eines ethisehen Lebens ist als willentlieh und aktiv zu kennzeiehnen. Sie entwiekelt sieh weder von selbst, noeh kann sie sozusagen von "au Ben" manipuliert werden. Der eigene vemunftund willenssetzende Akt des Subjekts ist vonnoten, urn die Kontinuitat in der "Emeuerung" zu gewahrleisten. Die Freiheit zu handeln, gtiindet allein in der Person, die als Trager ihrer Verantwortungen das gesamte eigene Leben im Sinne der phanomenologisehen Vemunft gestaltet. Die in Einsieht vollzogenen Vemunfterwagungen bei der Vorbereitung und Planung des Handelns wenden eine zufallige Reehtfertigung abo Selbstregelung ist unablosbar verbunden mit dem "VerantwortliehkeitsbewuBtsein der Vemunft" oder dem "ethisehen Gewissen".89 Wir wollen den Gedanken der Verantwortliehkeit kritisch begrenzen und uns auseinandersetzen mit den spezifisehen Mogliehkeiten der freien Selbstgestaltung. Der Mensch handelt vorwiegend von seinem Ieh-Zentrum aus: Er ist gewissen Trieben, Neigungen und Affekten unterlegen. Dieses namentlieh passive Tun kann er dureh Selbsterkenntnis, -kritik und -wertung in Frage stellen und dementspreehend eine Willensentseheidung treffen. Die Freiheit des Mensehen in seiner Willensausriehtung liegt darin begtiindet, daB er jederzeit gefaBte Entsehliisse "inhibieren" kann, d.h. diese bejahend erkennt oder vemeinend verwirft. Diese "kritisehen Erwagungen,,90 begleiten den fUr das leh-Leben geltenden Handlungswillen. Eine Realisierung der "freien Selbstgestaltung" fUhrt "zur obersten Wertform des ethisehen Mensehen.,,91 Der Zustand der vollkommenen ethiseh reinen Handlungsfahigkeit wird nieht erreieht, da das Wesen des Mensehenlebens sieh in einer unaufhorlichen "Form des Strebens" befindet. Streben ist naeh Husserl stets auf das Erzielen positiver Werte ausgeriehtet; negatives Streben ist letztlich nur "Wegstreben von Unwertem" und Ubergang zu einem positiven Streben,92 welches stets neu motiviert werden muB. Dieses Streben verharrt nieht in einem statisehen Ist-Zustand, sondem es durehlebt in seinem zeitliehen Fortgang vielfaltige Gemiits- und BewuBtseinszustande. Der Gesiehtskreis der mogliehen Handlungsaltemativen ist gekennzeiehnet dureh das Eintreten wirklieher und praktiseh moglieher neuer Werte, die den subjektiven Horizont des SUbjekts erweitem und verandem konnen. 1m Zuge der personellen

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Selbstgestaltung existiert der Strebende in einem steten Bemiihen urn die vemunftmiiBige Ausrichtung seines Lebens, ja, dies geht sogar soweit, daB "das Subjekt lebt im Kampf urn ein 'wertvolles', gegen nachkommende Entwertungen, Wertabfiille, Wertleeren, Enttiiuschungen gesichertes, sich in seinen Wertgehalten steigemdes Leben, urn ein Leben, das seine fortlaufend einstimmige und sichere Gesamtbefriedigung gewiihren konnte.,,93 Die hochste Stufe in der Entwicklung ist die "freie Spontaneitiit", bei der das Subjekt nicht mehr den Trieben ausgeliefert ist, sondem frei und bewuBt danach trachtet, "in verschiedenen moglichen Formen, sein Leben zu einem befriedigenden, einem gliickseligen zu gestalten".94 Wir miissen uns an diesem Punkt die Frage stellen, ob die hochste Wertform in Husserls Ethik vielleicht doch wieder nur in dem alten griechischen Ideal der Eudiimonie wurzelt, oder ob seine philosophischen Intentionen moglicherweise weiter reichen. Die Lebensform des ethischen Menschen ist nach Husserl "die einzig absolut wertvolle".95 Diese ethische Lebensform bleibt eine Gestaltung moglichen Menschenlebens im apriorischen Sinn. Die praktische "Emeuerung" dieses Lebens geht aus von einem "verniinftigen Menschen",96 dem "Vernunftmenschen", von dem Husserl voraussetzt, daB er selbstbestimmend "das praktische Wahre und Gute als das Beste seiner jeweiligen praktischen Sphiire nach Kriiften einsichtig zu erkennen und danach zu verwirklichen beflissen iSt.,,97 Diese Ansicht setzt natiirlich ein hohes MaB an Selbstkritik beim Einzelnen voraus. Mit seinen Uberlegungen tangiert Husserl eindeutig den Bereich des absoluten Vollkommenheitsideals, im Verstiindnis "absoluter theoretischer, axiotischer und in jedem Sinne praktischer Vernunft.,,98 Ein wahrhaft human ausgerichtetes Streben" verwirklicht sich in der "Gottesidee",99 die den Bereich der Endlichkeit und der Praxis verliiBt, urn dabei auf das religiose Wesen der Person einzugehen. Dieses ist das "echte und wahre Ich",100 welches von jedem Menschen, mehr oder minder bewuBt, in seinem Streben intendiert wird. Das Ideal bleibt ihm stets unerreichbar, wiewohl er das relative Ideal versteht als das "Ideal des vollkommenen menschlichen Menschen",IOl d.h. demjenigen, der nach den fUr ihn individuell erreichbaren Gewissenseinsichten strebt. Deutlich wird hier die von Husserl vorgenommene Zweiteilung des menschlichen Strebens: einmal genetisch orientiert im Bereich der ihm denkbaren praktischen Gegebenheiten, zum anderen statisch als feste, ideale, sozusagen unerreichbare Idee. Zur niiheren Kennzeichnung zieht Husserl den Vergleich mit dem "paradiesischen Menschen" heran, als

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eine "kaum zu erweisende Lebensform".I02 Das Irren ist fUr jedes Menschenleben unvermeidbar. Die als relativ zu verstehende Vollkommenheit des Menschen ergibt sich vielmehr aus seiner eigenen aktiven Selbstkritik: "In seiner reflexiven Bezogenheit auf sich selbst lebt er nicht bloB naiv dahin und in seine auBere Umwelt hinein."I03 Das Ideal, nach dem das Streben ausgerichtet ist, wird dem Subjekt aber nicht von au Ben aufgesetzt; es ist vielmehr als ein dem menschlichen Wesen innewohnendes Leitbild zu betrachten: Dieses a priori in ihm ruhende Ideal schopft er also in urspriinglichster Gestalt aus sich selbst, als sein wahres und besseres Ich. Es ist in der absoluten Fassung das Ideal seines eigenen, vor sich selbst absolut gerechtfertigten, nur in absolut zu rechtfertigenden Akten lebenden Ich. Hat er dieses Ideal einmal erahnt oder erschaut - dann muB er auch einsichtig anerkennen, daB die ihm gemaBe, die ethische Lebensform ( ... ) die einzig schlechthin gute, die "kategorisch" geforderte is!.]()4

Dem Menschen kommt nicht nur IndividualiUit in puncto seiner ihm eigenen Wesenszuge zu, sondern, und dies betont Husserl ausdrucklich, auch im Umkreis seines "individuelIen und jeweils konkret bestimmten kategorischen Imperativ(s)."lo5 Die Aufgabe der Ethik ist es, die im Wesen des Menschen verankerten apriorisch moglichen Lebensformen kritisch zu systematisieren sowie die inhaltlichen Besonderungen und Differenzierungen zu beschreiben. Wir fUhlen uns erinnert an Husserls fruhe Bemuhungen der Formulierung eines "materialen Apriori" im ethisch-axiologischen Bereich. Das "praktische Menschheitsideal", welches das Subjekt anstrebt, ist betitelt durch das kritische Ubersehen und Uberdenken der personeIIen Akte sowie durch die entschlossene Aufnahme der erkannten Vernunftnorm in den Willen. Dieses gesamte Leben, das der Mensch uberschauen soUte, ist fur ihn eine "gegensUindlich konstituierte Einheit" .106 Erschwerend sind hierbei die menschlichen Gemutslagen sowie die Gegebenheiten der Praxis. Husser! zieht wieder die aus den Vorlesungen zur Ethik und Wertlehre (1914) postulierten Gesetze der formalen Praktik (Absorption, Summation, Willensgesetze der Wahl) heran. Praktische Werte sind voneinander funktionell abhangig. Der "Gutwert" des hochsten der Werte absorbiert die Gutwerte alIer geringeren. Verfehlt fUr die menschliche Wahl ist es, einen absorbierten Wert dem eines hoheren praktischen Guts vorzuziehen. Ebenso ist das "Summengut", d.h. die kolIektive Verwirklichung der praktischen Guter von hoherem Wert als jede einzelne der Teilsummen. Diese sich darin ausdriickende Aufeinanderbezogenheit der moglichen "Gutwerte" bzw. Zwecke des handelnden Subjekts

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bedingen die Unmoglichkeit, einzelne Werte fUr sich allein zu verwirklichen. Die von Husserl in diesem Argumentationsgang benannte "Zufriedenheit" begriindet sich "in der einsichtigen GewiBheit, sein ganzes Leben in groBtmoglichem MaBe in gelingenden Handlungen vollfUhren zu konnen, die hinsichtlich ihrer Voraussetzungen und Ziele vor Entwertungen gesichert waren.,,107 Der Blick auf das Ganze muB bei der Handlungsentscheidung gewahrleistet sein. Je bewuBter der Mensch die Moglichkeiten seines im Unendlichen liegenden Lebens und Handelns erkennt, desto offensichtlicher wird fUr ihn auch die Einsicht in die Zahl der moglichen Enttauschungen, was wiederum eine Unzufriedenheit mit dem eigenen Handeln einschlieBt. Hier ist das "VerantwortlichkeitsbewuBtsein der Vernunft" bzw. das "ethische Gewissen" maBgeblich, welches besagt, daB Handeln so vorbereitet und ausgefUhrt werden solI, daB es nicht dem Zufall unterworfen sein kann. Der Mensch befindet sich im phanomenologischen Verstandnis in einer steten humanen Entwicklung. Diese ist organischen Entwicklungsvorgangen insofern entgegengesetzt, als sie nicht auf eine festgelegte ausgereifte Gestalt hinfiihren kann. Die "Zweckidee" ist eine "im eigenen verniinftigen Erkennen frei gestaltete, selbstbewertete und im Willen selbst vorgesetzte".108 Der ethisch strebende Mensch wird damit "Subjekt und zugleich Objekt seines Strebens, das ins Unendliche werdende Werk, dessen Werkmeister er selbst iSt."I09 Der kiinstlerische Bereich, der hier im Blick auf die Lebensgestaltung der Person angesprochen ist, rekurriert zugleich auf den schopferischkreativen Impuls der menschlichen Wesenheit, die, wie wir es deuten, als das Herzstiick der individualethischen Konstitution des Lebensprozesses angesehen werden muB. Husserl formuliert damit seinen - an das Kantische Wort anlehnenden - "kategorischen Imperativ": "Sei ein wahrer Mensch; fiihre ein Leben, das du durchgangig einsichtig rechtfertigen kannst, ein Leben aus praktischer Vernunft. ,,110 Diese Formulierung setzt ein hohes MaB an Selbstverantwortlichkeit der einzelnen handelnden Person voraus, aber auch das Zugestandnis der Unvollkommenheit, jeweils das in der Zeit "Bestmogliche zu tun."lll Die Entwicklungsform der ethischen Menschheit ist ein praktisches Vernunftideal, das den Menschen "als praktische(s) Apriori,,1l2 bewuBt ist. Die Individualitat des Einzelnen rechtfertigt die personliche Gestaltung des konkret festgelegten Imperativs. AuBerdem ist das zu beriicksichtigen, was die wissenschaftliche Ethik als prinzipiell und formal fUr das "We sen" des Menschen apriorisch postuliert. Die Freiheit

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des ethisch handelnden Menschen ist ein zentraler Gedanke nicht nur in den Kaizo-Aufsatzen. Er zieht sich von den Ideen II bis hin zur spaten Krisis-Schrift. Ethisches Leben erfahrt seine Rechtfertigung aus einem stets wieder zu aktivierenden Willen zur "Erneuerung". Dieser Wille entwickelt sich nicht von selbst in passiver Hingegebenheit, sondern aus dem eigenen Antrieb des individuellen Subjekts, das schopferisch tatig wird. Eine "freie Urstiftung oder Urzeugung,,1l3 gewahrleistet die Selbstbesinnung, die Voraussetzung ist fUr die Entwicklung zum ethisch selbstverantwortlichen Menschen. 114 Die Gestaltung des eigenen Lebens im Streben nach einem universalen praktischen Ideal der Vernunft untersteht in Husserls phanomenologischem Gesamtprojekt der fundamentalen Grundidee der "Humanitat", die wir insbesondere im Blick auf die Menschheitsidee spezifizieren wollen. AIle Kriterien, die die Entscheidungs- und Handlungsfahigkeit einer Person bedingen, dtirfen jedoch nicht auBer acht lassen, daB dieser Handelnde fUr sein Tun und Uberlegen in die Verantwortlichkeit gezogen werden muB. Der Gedanke eines Handelns, das die Folgen und Nebenfolgen mit bedenkt, ist bei Husserl, beispielsweise im Vergleich zu seinen Erorterungen tiber Probleme der Analogie von Logik, tiber "EinfUhlung" und "soziale Akte", nur wenig ausgepragt. Zwar auBert er sich bisweilen tiber mogliche Aktfolgen, die je nach Erreichen oder Verfehlen des besseren Gutes richtig oder unrichtig sein konnen. Nach einer ausgearbeiteten "Phanomenologie der Verantwortung" wird man allerdings vergeblich suchen. 115 Dies ist urn so bedauerlicher, weil das Tragen von Verantwortung zur moralischen Grundverfassung des Menschen gehort, die ihn zur ethischen Person bildet. Hier mtissen wir einraumen, daB Husserl dem Gedanken der "Selbstverantwortlichkeit" insofern Rechnung tragt, als er fUr die ethische Selbstreflexion und -konstitution tragend ist. Man kann ihm insoweit zustimmen, als eine unter dem Blickwinkel der Selbstgestaltung vollzogene Selbstverantwortlichkeit auch implizit fUr das Gemeinschaftsleben begrtindend ist. Husserls Hauptfrage ist in diesem Kontext: Wie werde ich ein verantwortlicher Philosoph? Das Leben, das aus dem Geist der "Emeuerung" in der Welt und mit den anderen besteht, ist ftir Husserl ein Leben in vemtinftiger Selbstverantwortung. Das SUbjekt weiB sich als Ursprung seiner Akte. Eine vollkommene Verantwortungslosigkeit kann es deshalb nicht geben. Das verantwortliche Leben ist auf das Lebensziel hin ausgerichtet: Das Subjekt "bildet, gestaltet als aktives primar nicht sich, sondem Sachen zu Werken."116 In der Besinnung auf die Ermoglichung

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und Rechtfertigung des Zieles vollzieht sich die Reflexion auf das gesamte Leben des Ich. Wir miissen uns aber in einem entscheidenden Punkt von Husserl abgrenzen: Die phanomenologische Diskussion des Verantwortungsbegriffes rekurriert vornehmlich auf die Verantwortung fUr die individuelle Lebensgestaltung und beriicksichtigt zu wenig den Blickpunkt der Mitverantwortung. Diese einseitige Sicht des Phanomens der Verantwortung mag sicherlich darin begriindet sein, daB Husserls Entwurf einer phanomenologischen Ethik schwerpunktmaBig von der Perspektive des Subjekts ihren Ausgangspunkt nimmt. Die anderen Personen tragen vorwiegend eben nicht zur eigenen Selbstwerdung bei: Es ist vielmehr das eigene "Ich", das sich aus immanenter reflexiver Erkenntnis und aus seiner personlichen Willenskraft heraus zu einer ethischen Person heranbildet. Die handelnde Person versteht sich selbst vornehmlich von den ihr zugehorigen Zielen her. Das Geben von Rechenschaft fUr das eigene Tun und Wollen vollzieht sich ansatzweise sprachlich in der AuBerung: "Ich tat es, weil ... ". 1m gleichen Sinne ist die ethische Reflexion zu verstehen, die das motivierende "weil" untersucht und kritisch priift in der Besinnung auf den Wert der Giiter. In diesem Begriindungsversuch eines ablaufenden Handlungsprozesses bezieht sich der Verantwortliche auf seine inneren Beweggriinde, die moglicherweise beim Vollzug der Handlung schon mit eingeschlossen waren, mehr oder minder bewuBt. Wir stellen zusammenfassend fest, daB Husserls Rekurs auf eine philosophische Selbstbesinnung allein (a) eine Deskription der inneren Motivationen des agierenden Subjekts vermissen und (b) die Frage der Mitverantwortung im faktisch-situativen Fall unberiicksichtigt laBt. Dabei halten wir fest, daB Husserls phanomenologische Sicht der Person, die sich in "absoluter Selbstverantwortung" Rechenschaft iiber ihr eigenes Leben gibt, im Bereich der traditionellen Definition des Menschen als animal rationale verbleibt, wobei ratio im Sinne der Vernunftperson verstanden wird. 117 "EinfUhlung" und "soziale Akte" fiihren tiber die Subjektbezogenheit hinaus - sozusagen von einer Individualethik zu einer Sozialethik. II8 Ein Spezifikum der Husserlschen Ethik ist dieser explizite Weg: Erst nach Selbsterkenntnis und Selbstgestaltung des eigenen "Ich" kann das Subjekt iiber sich hinaus zum Personenverband gelangen. Die oben ben ann ten Modalitaten bewegen sich im psychischen Raum. "Fremderfahrung" bezieht sich wesentlich auf die von Husserl in den Kaizo-Aufsatzen

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benannte "empirisch-humane Ethik". Das "Ich" wird hierbei weiterhin als ein Teil der Gemeinschaft betrachtet, wobei das Erfahren der anderen Personen als eine Sozialerfahrung zu verstehen ist. Apriorische Uberlegungen spielen aber auch hier eine Rolle. "Soziale Erfahrung" besagt die Veranschaulichung der Gesetze des Ethik- und Wertbereichs in der Praxis bzw. respektive die Verdeutlichung des Sinnes dieser Prinzipien. Dies zeigt, wie Husserl auch hier mit einer Verflechtung von Aprioritat und Lebenswelt arbeitet. Ausgehend von der "Dingwelt", mit der jeder einzelne verbunden ist und die nach Gesetzen der Kausalitat wirkt, ist es der Bereich der praktischen Aktivitaten in der Vergemeinschaftung mit anderen, der sich auf erstere Welt aufstuft. Eine verbindende Kraft ist hier die "Liebe". 1914 sieht Husserl diese noch als ein "Mysterium" in Analogie zum Evidenzbegriff der reinen Logik. Evidenz impliziert die unmittelbare, intuitive Einsicht in die Sachverhalte sowie die unausgesprochene Deckung mit ihm. "Liebe" ist in der Sphare des Psychischen als der zentrale Verkniipfungspunkt zur Gemeinschaft festzulegen. Die Intentionalitat - urspriinglich verstanden als das "Gerichtetsein" des SUbjekts auf den Gegenstand hin - erweitert sich zu einem "intentionalen Streben", das den Kontakt zu den anderen Menschen herstellt. Den Personenverband beschreibt Husser! nicht als etwas statisch Vorgegebenes. Vielmehr nimmt der Begriff des "Lebens" bei der Konstitution der Gemeinschaft "eine zentrale Bedeutung ein". Die Begriffe "Leben" und "schopferische Spontaneitat" hangen eng zusammen. In diesem Rahmen gewinnt die Husserlsche Handlungstheorie erst ihre volle Bedeutung. Das wiIIentliche Handeln der Personalitaten ist stets als eine in die Zukunft weisende zu verstehen, was bedeutet, daB Handlungsziele und -verwirklichungen nicht normativ angezielt werden, sondem den Stromungen des Lebensprozesses unterliegen. Genau dieses Phanomen versucht Husser! mit seiner phanomenologischen Konzeption zu fassen. Das "Ich" und die anderen Subjekte bewegen sich dabei in einem "Ineinander", dessen Kundgabe vorwiegend eine leiblichpsychische und eine sprachliche ist. Wesentlich bei der Ausdifferenzierung von einer Individual- zu einer Sozialethik ist die Zugrundelegung der beiden "Ichformen": das natiir!iche und das transzendentale Ich. Wahrend sich das erste in der alltaglichen Welt eher unreflektiert bzw. passiv hingegcben verhalt, zeichnet sich das zweite durch die Fahigkeit zur philosophischen Reflexion aus. Erst durch diese Selbstkonstitution

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des psychophysischen "Ich" entsteht im BewuBtseinsleben die Welt als eine "intentionale Einheit". Dieses "Ich" ist aufgrund von phanomenologischer Epoche in der Lage, sich zu einem "ethischen" auszudifferenzieren. Erst auf dieser Grundlage ist das "Ich" fahig, sich selbst zu gestalten. Freie Entscheidung und "urspriinglicher Emeuerungswille" fUhren zu einer "Selbstbesinnung", die zu einem ethischen Leben in phanomenologischem Verstandnis weiterleiten. Das Ziel ist der "freie Mensch", der seine Entschliisse und Handlungsvollziige kritisch reflektiert, aufheben und neu gestalten kann. 1m Streben werden dabei die Giiter intendiert, die ein das Leben in seinen Wertgehalten steigemdes Moment inne haben. Dieser Wertgehalt ist bei Husserl eindeutig yom Verstandnis der Humanitat her bestimmt. Selbstgestaltung und "Emeuerung" konnen nur von einem Menschen ausgehen, der nach Gesetzen der Vemunft reflektiert und handelt. Deshalb kann das Handeln unter humanitaren Aspekten niemals destruktiv und lebensvemeinend sein: Es verwirklicht sich erst in einem Streben, das den LebensprozeB fOrdert im Sinne einer lebensbejahenden, als "positiv" zu verstehenden Einstellung. Diese kann allein von dem "hoheren Ich" ausgehen. Fehlentscheidungen, der EinfluB von Trieben und Affekten sind dabei zum graBen Teil schon ausgeschaltet. Diese gehoren dem rein passiven, den Umwelteinwirkungen hingegebenen Menschen an. 1\9 Der von Husserl intendierte Zustand bleibt jedoch ideal und damit in einem Gebiet der reinen Aprioritat. Selbst das "ethische Ich" kann sich diesem Zustand nur annahem, d.h. nach ihm streben. Die Gottesidee bietet sich fUr Husserl als Hilfe an, jenen nie zu erreichenden Wert zu charakterisieren. Diese unerreichbare Idee ist statisch, wahrend sich das Streben des Einzelnen in der praktischen Lebenswelt genetisch abspielt. Auch hier ist wieder erkennbar die Zweiteilung der Husserlschen Ethik. BewuBtsein und Vorstellung yom anderen Ich verhindem, daB dieses sich unmittelbar dem erkennenden Subjekt offenbart. Der Andere wirkt auf das "Ich" eher als eine Spiegelung des eigenen Ich, die jedoch genaugenommen nicht als eine tatsachliche angesehen werden kann, da der Andere in seiner Eigengesetzlichkeit betrachtet werden muB. Ein AnalogieschluB kann hier nicht angewandt werden, die Auffassung des Anderen ist vielmehr eine ahnliche, die keinen Denkakt mit einschlieBt. Dieser Wahmehmung des Anderen steht als zweite Moglichkeit die Erfahrung als sprachliche Verstandigung gegeniiber. Als einzelner tragt der Mensch bereits den Sinn, der wie ein gemeinsamer Geist (ein

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Gemeinsinn) aIle Subjekte verbindet, in sich. Er ist demnach mit den anderen auch unausgesprochen zusammengeh6rig. Eine "ethische Menschheit" in Husserls Verstandnis ist einer reinen "Wirkungsgemeinschaft" in kausaler Sicht entgegengesetzt. Der motivation ale Bereich fordert psychische Elemente der Kommunikation, wie z.B. "Beriihrung" in sozialen Akten. Diese sind durch Liebe und Sympathie ausgezeichnet. Der allen gemeinsame Geist, d.h. der "Gemeingeist", bewirkt, daB das Subjekt als ein funktionelles in seinen willentlichen Bestrebungen zu einem ausfiihrenden Teil dieses Gemeingeistes wird. Der in den Logischen Untersuchungen ausgefiihrte Gedanke von den "Ganzen" und den "Teilen,,120 erhalt hier seine Anwendung: Die iiberpersonale Ganzheit, d.h. die Menschheit als solche, schlieBt einen identisch konstituierten Willen in sich ein, der sich auf die Einzelsubjekte verteilt. Diese wirken jedoch wieder derart auf die Menschheit in ihrer Ganzheit zuriick, daB sich diese aus den Subjekten gestaltet. Die Menschheit wird zu einer ethischen und humanen durch den EinfluB der phanomenologischen Philosophen, welche die durch eine Methodik strenger Wissenschaft gewonnenen Erkenntnisse in die lebenspraktischen Verhaltnisse einbringen. Hier schlieBt sich auch die Spaltung der beiden Ethikformen in der Aufgabe einer gegenwartigen Philosophie. Sozialitat als die Voraussetzung fiir kommunikatives und ethisches Handeln fordert eine vielfaltige Verbindung der Subjekte untereinander. Verstehen und Kommunikation ist bei Husserl stets unter dem Begriff der "Deckungsgleichheit" - ein dem logisch-mathematischen Bereich entnommener Ausdruck - subsumiert. Die sprachliche Verbundenheit ist eine "besondere Deckung", in welcher der Aktvollzug der Rede beim Gegenuber auf Mitvollzug und Zuhoren angewiesen ist. Auch der Zuh6rende ist nicht passiv zu verstehen; erst in der Aktivitat des Aufnehmens und Eingehens auf die Mitteilung entwickelt sich in einer "Ich-Du-Beziehung" ein "Wir". In dieser als "Beantwortung" zu verstehenden Reaktion hat das andere Subjekt durchaus die M6glichkeit, bejahend oder vemeinend zu agieren. Die Bedingung der Husserlschen Ethik liegt in dieser Verbundenheit der Ich-Subjekte. Primar wird sich durch die Selbsterkenntnis der "ethische Mensch" bewuBtseinsmaBig und sprachlich den anderen erOffnen, die auf einer ahnlichen Entwicklungsstufe der Erkenntnis ihrer selbst stehen. Diese daraus entstehende Gemeinschaft steht in dem gleichen Werdens- und EntwicklungsprozeB wie das einzelne Subjekt. Sozialitat und gemeinschaftliche Erfahrung ist angewiesen auf eine zeitliche bzw. geschichtliche Entwicklung, wobei

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die Sprache - wenn es auch bei Husserl nur an wenigen Stellen ausformuliert wird - die Erfahrungswelt maBgeblich bestimmt. Husserls ethische Konzeption geht aus von der Verschrankung eines wissenschaftlichen Anspruches und der lebenspraktischen Erfordernisse. Dabei bezieht er sich auf die Eihigkeit des Menschen zur Selbsterkenntnis und Selbstbesinnung. Der Mensch wird phanomenologisch betrachtet: schOpferisch und zu kreativen Handlungen fahig. Diese KreativiUit ist jedoch nicht von vornherein vorauszusetzen, sondern in der Unabgeschlossenheit eines Lernprozesses anzusehen, der sich aus den Erfahrungen friiherer Handlungsvollziige formiert. Wie sich eine Theorie der Handlung rekrutiert, leitet Husserl aus der Logik ab, und er versucht, diese analogisch anzunahern an eine wissenschaftliche Ethik- und Wertlehre. Obgleich diese Analogisierung Schwierigkeiten bereitet und nicht vollstandig gelingt, sind zahlreiche Erkenntnisse fUr die Klarung des Handlungsablaufs ausschlaggebend (z.B. das Absorptionsgesetz). Husserl gelangt auf diesem Weg zu einer Strukturierung der Handlung, wenngleich er feststellt, daB der Subjektivitat eine zentrale Rolle zukommt, die nicht mehr allein prinzipientheoretisch geklart werden kann. Daraus entwickelt sich der Entwurf des schopferischen Willens, der die freiheitliche Verwirklichung der Person beinhaltet. Husserls phanomenologisehe Sieht der Person zeigt, daB diese nicht - wie im Kantischen Verstandnis - an Handlungsanweisungen gebunden ist bzw. sich an Normen orientieren muB, deren Verfehlung mit Sanktionen verbunden ist, sondern aufgrund der Eigenstandigkeit in der Wahl der eigenen Perspektive Wahlfreiheit hat und Werte auch in einer Rangfolge intendieren kann. Der subjektive "Horizont" ermoglicht erweiterte, tiber genormte oder anerzogene Verhaltensweisen hinaus gehende Sichtweisen und Handlungsalternativen. Husserl war, so scheint mir, von Anfang seines philosophischen Denkens an auf diesen "Sinn des Menschenseins" orientiert. Seine Ethik, die, urn es noch einmal zu betonen, niemals als System ausformuliert wurde, sondern lediglich in seinen (aueh weniger bekannten) Schriften in Interpretation erortert werden kann, ist daher auch nicht als eine "Naturethik", als eine "moralistische" oder "Metaethik" zu verstehen, sondern als eine Ethik, die sich primar mit dem Sinn des menschlichen Daseins beschiiftigt. Dies jedoch nicht in dem existenzialistischen Verstandnis von Sartre und Camus, die von den lebensweltlichen Erfahrungen der Absurditat und Sinnlosigkeit des Daseins, von einer "Nichtungsstruktur" des Menschen ausgingen. 121

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Husserls Ethik der Lebenswelt basiert auf dem Fundament der "Sinnerfahrung" des Daseins. Grundlegend dafUr ist die teleologische Ausrichtung des menschlichen Handelns, das im "Lebensstrom" seine Orientierung erfahrt. Dieser EntwicklungsprozeB ist niemals abgeschlossen und das "Ideal" als der Mensch, der sich dem "Gott" nahert, ist denn auch nie vollstandig erreichbar. Diesem phanomenologischen Menschen wird jedoch weit mehr Freiheit zugesprochen, als es eine normative Handlungstheorie postuliert. Das Verm6gen des "ich kann" ist nur insoweit ausgepragt, als es der aktiven kritischen Selbstbesinnung des Einzelnen unterliegt. Es handelt sich hier urn einen ethischen Menschen, der nicht mehr allen passiven Str6mungen willkurlich ausgeliefert ist, sondern aufgrund seiner "Vernunft" abwagt, entscheidet und handelt. Das Streben des "Ich" ist in diesem Rahmen stets als positiv zu verstehen. Die Tatsache, daB Husserl von einer als sinnvoB erfahrbaren Welt ausgeht und die "Liebe", d.h. die ethische Liebe, als die zentrale und verbindende Kraft in der intersubjektiven Gemeinschaft sieht, schlieBt von vornherein aBe lebensverneinenden Tendenzen als "Unwertes" aus, von dem wegzustreben ist. Damit sind auch die menschlichen Affekte betroffen, die in Handlungsvollzuge entwicklungshemmend eingreifen, z.B. wenn Macht- oder Gewaltinteressen Vorrang haben. Der Einbezug der "ethischen Liebe" in Husserls Konzeption verwirklicht eine "IchDu-Beziehung", auf deren Boden sich die Menschengemeinschaft ausdifferenziert. Kein SUbjekt ist hierbei isoliert zu sehen. Der "Gemeingeist" versteht sich als das "Ganze" im Verhaltnis zu den "Teilen" der einzelnen Personen - jedes "Ich" ist verbunden mit den anderen personalen Objektivitaten. Husserl stellt mit seiner Ethik eine Konzeption vor, deren Grundlagen in Analogie zur reinen Logik und Gesetzessphare wissenschaftliche Kompetenz gewahrleistet, zum anderen aber die Perspektivitat und Vielgestaltigkeit der Lebenswelt in ihrer zeitlichen Veranderung berucksichtigt. Dies macht wohl auch das Spezifische dieses Gedankenansatzes aus, obgleich die gesellschaftlichen Folgen und damit eingeschlossen das VerantwortungsbewuBtsein fUr diese Konsequenzen weitgehend unberucksichtigt blieben. Hier k6nnte man sich eine phiinomenologische Erganzung denken, die fUr die Einzelbereiche des kulturellen Lebens intra- und interpersonelle Folgerungen erarbeitet. Die Notwendigkeit einer solchen Erganzung und WeiterfUhrung der Ethik mag zu Husserls Zeiten aber noch nicht so spurbar gewesen sein wie heute, seit der

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Moglichkeit der akuten Lebensgefahrdung der gesamten Menschheit und der nahezu uneingeschrankten technologischen und medizinischen Handlungsspielraume und -perspektiven. Hier fehlt Husserls Konzeption der konkrete Anwendungsbezug zur Wirklichkeit. Vielleicht kann aber sein kreativ orientiertes Modell im Zusammenwirken mit Einzelwissenschaften (ich denke z.B. an die Psychologie, Padagogik und an die Kreativitatsforschung) sowie anderen Ethikkonzeptionen (z.B. der Verantwortungsethik) neue gedankliche Dimensionen erschlieBen. Leitfaden in diesem "kreativen Ansatz" sind "Ausdruck" und "Motivation", "Wille" und "Leben", "Gemeingeist" und "Humanitat". Hochste Wertform der Husserlschen Ethik ist die "humane Menschheit", verstanden als eine Reprasentanz des Gemeingeistes: Philosophen, die sozusagen eine Ethik im phanomenologischen Verstandnis intemalisiert haben und ihre Einsichten lehrend vorleben. Philosophie, Phanomenologie, Ethik - diese drei Bezeichnungen stehen bei Husserl fUr die eine Sache: die gegenwartige Aufgabe denkender und fUhrender Menschen in der Krisensituation der Zeit. In diesem Rahmen erscheint mir Husserls Ethik die Brucke zu seiner Krisis-Abhandlung von 1935/36 zu sein. Neben dem einleitenden Charakter (der Untertitellautet: "Eine Einleitung in die phanomenologische Philosophie"), eignet ihr eine lehrende und aufklarende Tendenz. Zum Gefolge des Verlusts an Lebensbedeutsamkeit rekurrieren die Wissenschaften nur noch auf normative Vorgaben und technische Aufgaben. Die Fragen nach "Sinn oder Sinnlosigkeit dieses ganzen menschlichen Daseins" und damit einhergehend eine Orientierungshilfe fiir die Lebenswelt werden zum zentralen Ausgangspunkt der Schrift. Husserls Handlungstheorie ist nur dann in ihrer vollen Tragweite zu verstehen, wenn man sich sein Gesamtkonzept vor Augen halt. Es findet in der Schrift von 1935/36 seine Abrundung. Zusammen mit dem Aufsatz von 1934 Uber die gegenwiirtige Aufgabe der Philosoph ie, bildet sie den AbschluB von Husserls philosophischer Gesamtintention, die ich vorwiegend als eine "ethische" verstehe. Dies soIl zum AbschluB dargelegt werden. 6.

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Unter Zugrundelegung des Gedankens eines "Vemunftauftrags des Menschen" und der individuellen und gemeinschaftlich-kulturellen Emeuerung etabliert Husserl seine spate Ethikkonzeption, die unter dem

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teleologischen Ideal des geschichtlichen menschheitlichen Wollens und Handelns des "echten Menschentums" steht. Durch Erfahrungen des Ersten Weltkrieges und dadurch veranlaBte Auseinandersetzungen mit Fichte wird fUr Husserl die phanomenologische Ethik zum Ausdruck der Idee der Phanomenologie als solcher. Die Vorstellung der apriorischen Wissenschaft als "mathesis des Geistes und der Humanitat" und einer damit verbundenen historischen Wissenschaft von der "Idee des Menschen" ist die Vorausseizung fUr eine Konzeption der "Emeuerung", die die Reformgedanken beinhaltet. Diese beruft sich auf die sich im Gegenzuge zur Gegenwartskrisis von Kultur und Wissenschaft herausbildenden selbstgestalterischen, schopferischen Krafte des Individuums. Husserls Entwurf bleibt ein Ideal. Bedenkt er doch mit seiner Vorstellung des "selbstverantwortlichen Philosophen" und der "Wissenschaft aus absoluter Selbstverantwortlichkeit" nicht zureichend die Folgen, die aus einem als politisch-aktuell zu verstehendem verantwortlichen bzw. verantwortungslosen Handeln resultieren, das letztendlich die gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit bedingt. In dieser "Letztverantwortung", d.h. der Rechenschaft iiber die "letzten" Griinde, entdeckt zwar das "Ich" seine Einzigartigkeit, welche der Einmaligkeit der Welt entspricht. Aber gerade sie ist fUr das jeweilige "Ich" nur der Ausschnitt aus einem Gesamthorizont. Husserls Untersuchungen zur Ethik sind in der phanomenologischen Forschungsliteratur bislang nur vereinzelt diskutiert worden, obgleich sie in seinem Gesamtwerk eine zentrale Stellung einnehmen, wie ich auszufUhren versuchte. Die Thematisierung der intrapersonellen Vorgange, der Person-Umwelt-Beziige sowie das Bemiihen urn deren Fundierung in einem "streng wissenschaftlichen" Verfahren offnen fUr die ethischen Denkansatze im 20. lahrhundert neue Perspektiven gegeniiber dem traditionellen philosophischen Denken im Blick auf die Stellung des Menschen im Geflecht von Wissenschaft, Technik und Gesellschaft, Standpunkte, die auch von den Einzelwissenschaften aufgegriffen wurden. 122 Diese k6nnen wir an dieser Stelle nicht weiter erortem. Wir wollen vielmehr resiimierend mogliche Perspektiven einer phanomenologischen Ethik und Handlungstheorie entwerfen. Zu Beginn unserer Untersuchungen verwiesen wir auf das Grundthema der Phanomenologie: die Intentionalitiit, die wir im Verlauf der Erorterungen unter verschiedenen Blickwinkeln beschrieben und analysierten. Auch H.-G. Gadamer spricht von "Husserls Aufzeigung der verhiillten Intentionalitaten,,123 und Eugen Fink, dessen Kritik Husserl sehr schatzte,

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deutet in seiner Studie Die phiinomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwiirtigen Kritik (1933) drei Konnotationen der Intentionalitat an: (a) die psychische (rezeptive), (b) die transzendentalaktintentionale (unbestimmte) und (c) die transzendental-konstitutive (produktiv-kreative ).124 Fink fUhrt aus, daB mit den unterschiedlichen Termini nicht mannigfaltige Intentionalitaten gemeint sind, "sondern das eine Leben in verschiedenen Stufen."125 Die traditionelle HusserlInterpretation ubersah, wie mir scheint, weitgehend den dritten, von Fink genannten Sinngehalt des Intentionalitatsbegriffes: Produktivitat und Kreativitat, Elemente, die beide die Aktivitat, welche yom Subjekt ausgeht, implizieren. Diesen Sachverhalt unterstreicht Fink: "Der Ubergang von der vorlaufigen aktintentionalen Auslegung der Subjektivitat (nach der Reduktion) zur Erhellung des konstituierenden Wesens der Intentionalitat vollzieht sich nicht nur als eine Differenzierung, eine Enthullung innerer Implikationen, sondern vor allem als eine Ausweisung des produktiven Charakters der transzendentalen Intentionalitat. 126 Ein weiterer Sinngehalt ist in diesem Kontext bedeutsam: Intentionalitat verwirklicht sich nicht nur in erkenntnistheoretischer Sicht, sondern ist gestaltend fUr das "eine Leben". Gemeint ist das ganzheitliche Leben der Person, welches die psychische Konstitution der Innenwelt und das AuGen der Erfahrung umschlieBt. Wir nehmen als Grundlage fUr unsere abschlieBenden Ausfuhrungen den Intentionalitatsbegriff, urn davon ausgehend die Segmente des GefUges einer Projektierung der phanomenologischen Ethik und Handlungstheorie zu einem Ganzen zusammenzufUgen. Der Begriff Handlung wird von Husserl selbst nicht haufig verwendet und spielte auch in der Sekundarliteratur bislang eine eher untergeordnete Bedeutung. 127 Unsere Auffassung ist, daB Husserl den Handlungsbegriff aus der Intentionalitat in der Dreigliederung Akt, Vollzug, Ergebnis entwickelt. Handlung ist aber stets mit dem Willen der agierenden Person verbunden; beide Teilkomponenten der Intentionalitat stehen in einem engen gedanklichen Zusammenhang. Die Intentionalitiit wird in diesem Kontext zu einem ethischen Phanomen, das gepragt ist durch den Willensund Handlungscharakter. Dieser Interpretationsansatz ist das zentrale Motiv der Husserlschen Ethik. Das Handlungsgeschehen muB im Bereich der "Motivation", d.h. der Gesetzlichkeiten im geistigen Verstandnis lokalisiert werden, Elemente, die ein kausales Determiniertsein unterbinden. Der praktische Bereich der handelnden Person ist offen und solI seine

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Begrenzung erst durch die willentliche Setzung erfahren. Der ethische Mensch untersteht in Husserls Sicht dem Vermogen zur Ausubung und Realisierung des eigenen Willens, der dadurch zu einem freien Willen wird. Aber nicht nur der Wille, der sich nicht auf einen bedingungslosen Gesetzesgehorsam verHiBt, sondern den Forderungen der faktischen Situation folgt und zwischen Handlungsalternativen und -perspektiven in subjektiver Gewichtung wahlen kann, gehort zu den Wesenszugen der phanomenologischen Person. Elementare Charakterzuge sind Produktivitat und Kreativitat, welche die ethische Grundsituation des Menschen auszeichnen. Fink hat diese Wesenselemente zwar 1933 aus dem Intentionalitatsbegriff herausgearbeitet, ging aber nicht naher auf den Gedankenzusammenhang mit der tatsachlichen Lebenssituation des Menschen ein, die als notwendige Konsequenz fUr die Interpretation einer phanomenologischen Ethik zu denken ist. MaBgeblich fUr die Konstitution der Person ist jedoch ihre geschichtliche Entstehung im Blick auf das Ideal einer vollkommenen ethischen Personlichkeit, die das ihr eigene WertbewuBtsein erst entwickeln muB, urn die Werte, die sie zu setzen beabsichtigt, in sich zu entdecken. Das personale Leben manifestiert sich im Zuge der Selbstbesinnung in "radikaler Selbstverantwortung" und in Gewinnung des SelbstbewuBtseins. Die phanomenologische Person in ihrer Doppelung von Vernunft und Ethos ist in der Lage, in den Formen der Selbstregelung, -gestaltung und -erneuerung ihre Handlungen willentlich auszurichten, zu steuern und verfehlte Handlungsentscheidungen kritisch zu verwerfen bzw. situationsbestimmt zu korrigieren. Handlungskreis und praktisches Wirkungsfeld werden aber nicht nur beeinfluBt durch den Willen des einzelnen Subjekts. In gleichem MaBe fungieren die Interessen der anderen Mitmenschen. Die sinnverwirklichende Tat findet ihre Position in einer Phanomen%gie des Miteinander. Husserl widmet zahlreiche Analysen dem Verhaltnis von "Ich" und "Du", fUr das man die Applikation einer spezifisch dialogischen Struktur annehmen kann. Diese Beziehung, die auch reale, leiblich-spurbare Komponenten in der "Beruhrung" beinhaltet, ist durch die Spezifika der "ethischen Liebe" bzw. der Sympathie und der Sprache ausgezeichnet. Mit beiden wird die Zentrierung auf das Subjekt uberwunden. Wir haben, unter der Berucksichtigung, daB Husserl in seiner Intersubjektivitatslehre weitverzweigte Studien zu diesem Themenkomplex anstellte, diese Besonderheiten fUr eine phanomenologische Ethik und Handlungstheorie herausgestellt. Allerdings mussen wir

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kritisch vermerken, daB die Transformation der Deskription einer "IchDu-Beziehung" auf das Gemeinschaftsleben und auf die "hahere Wertform einer humanen Menschheit" von Husserl teilweise etwas dunkel und willkiirlich, ja nahezu mystisch anmutet. Die beiden Texte zum Gemeingeist,128 die die wesentlichen Gedankenziige einer Handlungstheorie auf der Ebene der gemeinschaftlichen Idee beinhalten, helfen hier nicht entscheidend weiter. Vielleicht mag dieser Umstand dazu beigetragen haben, daB die Dialogstruktur in Husserls IntersubjektiviUitsanalysen zu wenig publik wurde. Husserls Ethik und Handlungstheorie geht von dem Fundament der "Humanitas" aus. Sein Gedankenansatz beruft sich grundsatzlich darauf, daB der Mensch als solcher "gut" ist und das "Gute" als "Keirn" schon immer in sich tragt, das durch verniinftige Selbstreflexion und VerauBerung in der verwirklichenden Handlung zum Ausdruck kommt: "In jeder menschlichen Seele liegt - das ist der Glaube - ein Beruf, ein Keirn, der selbsttatig zu entfalten ist, zum Guten. In jeder liegt beschlossen ein ide ales Ich, das 'wahre' Ich der Person, das sich nur in dem 'guten' Handeln verwirklicht. Jeder erwachte Mensch (der ethisch erwachte) setzt willentlich in sich selbst sein ideales Ich als 'unendliche Aufgabe,.,,129 Man kann aus diesen AuBerungen Husserls schlieBen, daB sich der Entwurf seiner Ethik und Handlungstheorie nicht an unerreichbaren normativen und imperativen Gesetzesvorgaben ausrichtet. Vielmehr nimmt sie realistisch die tatsachliche Wirklichkeit zum Ausgangspunkt fUr ethisch-moralische Beschreibungen. Jedes "Ich" hat konzeptionell zum gleichen Zeitpunkt einen unterschiedlichen ethischen Entwicklungsstand, sei dieser nun ein "aufkeimender, ein "erwachter", ein "ringender" oder ein "kampfender" .130 In der Ubemahme einer Funktion in der menschlichen Gemeinschaft wird die Person zum verantwortlichen Trager seiner Handlungen: "Funktion bezeichnet die praktische Bestimmung des SUbjekts, die Hinordnung auf einen Zweck, und zwar unter dem Gesichtspunkt eines besonderen Zweckes, der dienend ist fiir einen umfassenden Zweck des gesamten sozialen Verbandes."l3I Die Gesamtheit der Personen bildet die "vergemeinschaftete Menschheit als iiberpersonale Ganzheit",132 die im Sinne des "Gemeingeistes" zusammengehalten wird und unter der Kondition der "Humanitas", der Menschenliebe, steht. Husserls Konzeption einer phanomenologischen Ethik und Handlungstheorie mag zwar durch ihre Bezugnahme auf eine "neue" Form der Praxis realistisch und wirklichkeitsnah anmuten, da sie partiell die

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Faktizitiit der lebensweltlichen Grundsituationen des Menschen beschreibt. Auch geht Husserl von den individuellen Wesensziigen der Person aus und vermeidet dadurch das "Uberstiilpen" einer abstrakten Gesetzlichkeit. Seine "empirisch-humane" Ethik stoBt aber an die Grenzen der Vielfalt der lebenspraktischen Moglichkeiten und bleibt im Gedanken einer "Phiinomenologisierung" der Menschheit letztendlich eine Utopie. Aus diesem Grund muB Husserl immer wieder auf die "rein wissenschaftliche" Ethik rekurrieren, von deren strenger Wissenschaftsform er wiihrend seiner gesamten Forschungstiitigkeit iiberzeugt war. Diese Kritik iiuBert H.-G. Gadamer 1974 und vermerkt als Grund fUr Husserls Denken, das im Rahmen einer Vision verbleibt, die Basis der "strengen Wissenschaft", da "( ... ) Husserl ein geradezu missionarisches BewuBtsein hatte und daB er das Ganze der menschlichen Kultur von da aus heilen wollte."J33 1m gleichen Aufsatz stellt Gadamer die Frage, "( ... ) wieweit sich Husserls Theorie fUr uns fruchtbar machen liiBt.,,134 Gadamer rekurriert auf Husserls Begriff der "Leben swelt" und auf die Krisis-Abhandlung, welche die Verengung der Fragen nach der menschlichen Existenz in Folge des auf die Galileische Physik gegriinde ten Wissenschaftsverstiindnisses aufzeigte. Das AuBerachtlassen der Sozialitiit und der lebensbedeutsamen Problemkonstellationen mag uns heute nach wie vor beschiiftigen. Urn so wichtiger ist das Herausarbeiten der Frage danach, "welches echte Motiv Husserl mit seinem Thema 'Lebenswelt' verteidigt hat.,,135 Gadamer gesteht zu, daB man damit womoglich erst am Anfang einer neuen Forschungsabsicht sei. Wie k6nnte diese konstruiert werden? Gadamer bezieht sich auf einen von Husserl bereits in den Prolegomena verwendeten Begriff: die "Anwendung" von Wissenschaft. Dabei riiumt er der Methode der kritischen Selbstbesinnung durchaus ihren Platz ein, urn der "Expertengliiubigkeit" im gesellschaftlichen ProzeB zu begegnen: "Ich glaube in der Tat, daB wir nur auf dem Wege iiber diese immer schon in unserer Praxis gelegene Selbstaufkliirung dazu gelangen konnen, den objektivierenden Leistungen der menschlichen Vemunft ihren angemessenen Platz anzuweisen. (... ) Es gilt, politischen Sinn, den praktisch-politischen Sinn, in seiner Legitimitiit auch innerhalb der objektivierenden technologischen Zivilisation anzuerkennen. Er allein kann fUr ihre sinnvolle Anwendung, Fortfiihrung, Forderung und Begrenzung einstehen.,,136 Wir erganzen Gadamers Forderung nach der Stellung der objektivierenden Vemunftleistungen im Blick auf das Ethos des Menschen, wie wir es im Fortgang unserer Analysen herausgearbeitet

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und strukturiert haben. Zwei, von Gadamer genannte gedankliche Motive interessieren uns fUr unsere ausblickende Fragestellung: der "politische Sinn" und die "Anwendung" der Wissenschaft. Husserls Projektierung einer "theoretischen Praxis" besitzt fUr Gadamer einen "sittlichen Impuls",137 bei dem es urn die Frage des Menschseins geht: Anwendung von Wissenschaft ist erst dann verbiirgt, wenn an alles technisch Machbare die Vernunftfrage der Selbstverantwortung gestellt werden kann, urn verantwortungsbewuBt die Zukunft der Gesellschaft zu gestalten. DaB die Phiinomenologie und die der philosophischen Richtung Folgenden diese "gegenwartige Aufgabe der Philo sophie" leisten sollen, ist Husserls Ansinnen. Hier setzt Gadamers Kritik an: "Kann die Phanomenologie die Wege der Menschen in der 'Lebenswelt' allein dadurch leiten und bestimmen, daB aIle dem Philosophen folgen, der sich seIber seine eigene Rechtfertigung findet, indem er die komplizierten Beziehungen zwischen dem 'praktischen Wissen' (... ) und der stolzen und strengen Wissenschaft iiberschaut C••• )1"138 Diese von Husserl als "Selbstbeziiglichkeit" der Phanomenologie reflektierte Problematik zeigt uns auf, daB das Wissen iiber unsere praktischen Entscheidungen allein die Anwendung der Wissenschaft nicht verantworten kann. Die Begrenzung des Autonomieanspruchs der Wissenschaft mag durch die Phanomenologie und zwar insbesondere durch ihre ethischen Gedankenmotive und Beweggriinde geschehen. Das Thema der "Lebenswelt" akzentuiert in diesem Rahmen nur den Anbruch eines neuen, phanomenologisch gepragten Denkens, fUr das sich Gadamer in den siebziger Jahren erganzend "im Sinne unseres praktischpolitischen Menschseins den alten Impuls eines echten sensus communis,,139 wiinscht. In unseren Analysen zur Husserlschen Ethik und Handlungstheorie haben wir diesen Gemeinsinn bzw. Gemeingeist dargelegt und aufgezeigt, wie dieser von der Idee der "Humanitas" gekennzeichnet ist. In den von Gadamer geauBerten Gedanken zum praktisch-politischen Sinn und zur Anwendung der Wissenschaft scheinen mir zeitnahe und aktuelle Probleme angesprochen zu sein. Deshalb mochte ich auch die Forderung unterstreichen, daB eine ethisch ausgerichtete Phanomenologie in un serer Zeit nichtsdestotrotz entscheidende Impulse fUr ein zukiinftiges Denken geben kann. 140 DaB diese primar als ethisch zu denkende phanomenologische Philosophie ein politisches Potential beinhalten muB, ist die unumgangliche Konsequenz, die als Desiderat in der phanomenologischen Forschung seit geraumer Zeit besteht. 141 Husserls

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phanomenologische Ethik und Handlungstheorie mag uns als Grundlage dienen fUr eine Phanomenologie der politischen Welt. Ihre Aktualitat kann sie aus dem Umstand erfahren, daB sie, unter dem Leitgedanken der "Emeuerung" stehend, dazu beitragen kann, staatliche Machtorganisationen transparenter zu machen und abzubauen, da in ihrer Konzeption der kritische und selbstverantwortliche, sich selbstgestaltende Mensch, der sich durch Vemunft und Ethos auszeichnet, gefragt ist. Husserl hat die politische Dimension seines Denkens auf der Grundlage einer phanomenologischen Ethik in ihrer durchschlagenden Bedeutung wohl nicht erkannt. 142 Ich sehe jedoch hierin die Chance, phanomenologisches Denken fUr un sere Zeitsituation wieder fruchtbar zu machen. Niirnberg, Germany NOTES 1 Edmund Husser!, "Die reine Phanomenologie, ihr Forschungsgebiet und ihre Methode", in: Aufsatze und Vortrage (1911-1921), hrsg. von Th. Nenon und H.R. Sepp, Dordrecht 1987, Husser!iana XXV (im folgenden abgekiirzt: HUA), S. 69. 2 Vgl. zum Begriff "Phanomen" den Beitrag "Phanomen", in: Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie. Darmstadt 1989, Band 7: P-Q, S. 461-483. 3 E. Husserl, "Die Idee der Phanomenologie". Funf Vorlesungen, hrsg. von W. Biemel, Den Haag 1950, HUA II, S. 46. 4 Vgl. Klaus Held, "Husser!s Riickgang auf das phain6menon und die geschichtliche Stellung der Phanomenologie", in: E. W. Orth (Hg.) Dialektik und Genesis in der Phiinomen%gie, S. 89-145, Freiburg 1980. 5 Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band: "Prolegomena zur reinen Logik". HUA XVIII, hrsg. von Paul Janssen, Den Haag 1974 und: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, Tiibingen 1980, S. VII. 6 Ebd. S. V. 7 "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft", in: AuJsatze und Vortrdge (1911-1921), HUA XXV, S. 3-62, hrsg. von Th. Nenon und H.R. Sepp, Dordrecht 1987. 8 Edmund Husser!, "Vorlesungen iiber Ethik und Wertlehre (1908-1914)", HUA XXVIII, hrsg. von Ullrich Melle, Dordrecht 1988. 9 Alois Roth, Edmund Husserls ethische Untersuchungen. Dargestellt anhand seiner Vorlesungsmanuskripte. Den Haag 1960. Hier werden auch auf Seite X die Vorlesungen zu Fragen der Ethik, wie sie im Laufe von Husserls Lehrtatigkeit (von 1889/90 bis 1924) abgehalten wurden, dargestellt. Roth geht in seiner Untersuchung nicht auf die Probleme der Konstitutionstheorie ein und beschrankt sich auf die ethisch-axiologische Parallelitat zu dem, was Husser! fUr den doxisch-theoretischen Bereich der "Logischen Untersuchungen" erarbeitete. Kar! Schuhmann verweist darauf, daB es auBerdem eine verschollene Vorlesung tiber "Die Freiheit des Willens" gab, die zwischen 1892 und 1904 elfmal gehalten und ein

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zwolftes Mal angekiindigt war. Der Zusammenhang mit Studien iiber Schopenhauers Willenstheorie sei hier offenkundig. (Husserls Staatsphilosophie, Freiburg/Miinchen 1988, S. 33). 10 Auch Hans-Georg Gadamer raumt der Position der Husserlschen Ethik eine hervorgehobene Stellung im Rahmen der phanomenologischen Ethik ein, vgl. "Wertethik und praktische Philosophie" (1982), in: Gesammelte Wake 4111, Tiibingen 1987, S. 204f.: "Seit der Veriiffentlichungen der Husserlschen friihen Gedanken zur Ethik bei Alois Roth kann iiberhaupt kein Zweifel mehr sein, daB Scheler in dieser Hinsicht auf Husserls Spuren wandelte". 11 Das Manuskript zu der Vorlesung von 1920, "Einleitung in die Ethik", findet sich im Husserl-Archiv in Leuven unter der Nummer MS. F I 28 und MS. A IV 22 (vgl. "Einleitung des Herausgebers", HUA XXVIII, S. XXXIV, Anm.1 und S. XLV, Anm. 4 und 6). 12 Edmund Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunji. HUA XVII, hrsg. von P. Janssen, Den Haag, sowie Tiibingen 1981. Den Zusammenhang von Kritik der Vernunft und Ethik behandelt auch Gerhard Funke in seinem Beitrag "Kritik der Vernunft und ethisches Phanomen", in Phiinomenologische Forschungen Band 9, Freiburg 1980, S. 33-89. Zur phanomenologischen Kritik der Vernunft vgl. auch Karl Schuhmann, Die Dialektik der Phiinomenologie 1I; Reine Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologische Philosophie. Historisch-analytische Monographie iiber Husserls Ideen I, Phaenomenologica 57, Den Haag 1973, S. 6-35. 13 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906107. HUA XXIV, hrsg. von U. Melle, Dordrecht 1984, S. 445. Bereits am 8.XII.1903 schreibt Th. Lipps in einem Brief an Husserl: "Wie ich hore, sind Sie jetzt mit der Logik der sittlichen Erkenntnis beschiiftigt. DaB es dergleichen fiir Sie iiberhaupt gibt, ist mir eine Gewahr, daB wir auch in diesem Punkte zusammenkommen werden. Leider kommt in meinen 'Ethischen Grnndfragen' diese Logik nicht zu ihrem vollen Recht." (Husserliana-Dokumente Band lIf, Briefivechselll, Dordrecht 1994, S. 122; im folgenden abgekiirzt: BW). 14 "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft", a.a.O. S. 3. 15 Edmund Husserl, "Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phanomenologie." HUA VI, hrsg. von W. Biemel, Dordrecht 1954, S. 273. (1m folgenden wird zitiert nach der Meiner-Ausgabe, Hamburg 1982.) Erwahnenswert ist der Brief Husserls an die "Ethical Union" vom 18.1X.1927. Husserl wurde gebeten, dem "Ethical lectures Fund Committee" beizutreten und lehnte ab, da er "an dem absoluten Wert der positiven Wissenschaft und ... ihrem Bernf als Norm einer rationalen Kultur zu dienen zweifelt, ebenso wie an der gegenwartigen Lage der Ethik: "Die ethische Bewegung war und ist offenbar von der Uberzeugung geleitet, dass eine Ethik als positive Wissenschaft ein festes Fundament fiir eine ethische Praxis abgeben konne. Aber ist eine so1che Ethik als eine skeptisch unangreifbar begriindete Wissenschaft vorhanden, besteht eine Aussicht, dass sie als positive Wissenschaft besser zu begriinden sei als sogar die exakten Wissenschaften, diese jetzt von Skepsis durchsetzten? (... ) Eine ethische Bewegung ist sicherlich brennend zu wiinschen - aber es will mir scheinen, dass sie, wie die Dinge jetzt liegen, nur von grossen und guten Menschen ausgehen kann, die kraft ihrer machtigen Personlichkeit und als Vorbilder iiberzeugen - nicht aber ... von uns Professoren." (BW VIII, S. 39-41, a.a.O.).

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Krisis (Meiner-Ausgabe) 1982, S. 4. A.a.O. S. 17, vgl. hierzu die Ausfiihrungen in der Einleitung der Formalen und transzendentalen Logik (Tiibingen 1981, S. 1-15), in der HusserI nach einem historischen Riickblick zum Verhaltnis von Logik und Wissenschaft auf die Krise der modernen wissenschaftlichen Kultur eingeht, die in einer immer tiefer reichenden Spezialisierung der Einzel- und Spezialwissenschaften resultiert. Bereits 1929 ist sich HusserI dariiber klar, daB "echtes Menschentum und Leben in radikaler Selbstverantwortung (... ) und somit auch wissenschaftliche Selbstverantwortung (nicht getrennt werden kann) von dem Ganzen der Verantwortungen des Menschenlebens iiberhaupt" (S. 5). 18 Max Scheler, "Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertlehre. Neuer Versuch einer Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus", in: Gesammelte Werke Band 2, Bern/Miinchen 1980, S. 15. 19 Griech.: phafnein - sichtbar machen. 20 E. Husserl, Zur Phiinomenologie der Intersubjektivitiit. Texte aus dem NachlaB. Drei Bande, hrsg. von I. Kern, Den Haag 1973, HUA XIII-XV. 21 Ders.: "Gemeingeist I. Person, personale Ganze, personale Wirkungsgemeinschaften. Gemeinschaft - gesellschaft", HUA XIV, S. 165ff., und "Gemeingeist 11.- Personale Einheiten hOherer Ordnung und ihre Wirkungskorrelate", S. 192ff. 22 Ders.: "Uber die gegenwartige Lage der Philosophie (1934)", in: HUA XXVII, S. 184-221. 23 Ders.: Briefwechsel, Husserliana-Dokumente Band III. In Verbindung mit E. Schuhmann hrsg. von Karl Schuhmann. Dordrecht 1994. 24 HUA XXVIII, S. II, S. 34Off., S. 334. Zum Willenscharakter der Intentionalitat vgl. auch Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Hamburg 1985 6 , S. 81-92, S. 23lff. und HUA VIII S. 98ff., S. 152ff. 25 HUA XXVIII, S. 11. 26 Diese Kritik der logischen Vemunft findet sich in der VorIesung "Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie" (1906/07), HUA XXIV, hrsg. von Ullrich Melle. Dordrecht 1984. 27 Die Edition dieser BewuBtseinsana1ysen aus den lahren 1908-/914 ist in Vorbereitung. Vgl. hierzu die "Ein1eitung des Herausgebers" in HUA XXVIII, S. XXXVIII, Anm. 1 und 2. 28 HUA XXIV, S. 381, Erganzende Texte, Beilage XIII (zum 6. Kapitel): "Phanomenologie und Psychologie. Phanomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie. Phanomenologische gegeniiber empirischer Deskription." 29 HUA XXVIII, S. 57 16

17

30 31

A.a.D. S. 59.

A.a.O. S. 11. 32 A.a.O. S. 48ff. J3 Husserl befaBt sich mit der Problematik der objektivierenden und der nicht-objektivierenden Akte bereits in der Vorlesung von 1908/09, vgl. §5 und §12 der HUA XXVIII. Auch in der Vorlesung von 1914 halt er an seiner Unterscheidung noch fest, formuliert a\lerdings in den Ideen I: "Nach all dem ergibt cs sich, daB aile Akte iiberhaupt - auch die Gemiits- und Willensakte -, objektivierende sind, Gegenstande urspriinglich konstituierend, notwendige Quellen verschiedener Seinsregionen und damit auch zugehoriger Ontologien. (HUA III, S. 272). Die Distinktion von objektivierenden und nicht-objektivierenden Akten wird von

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Husser! erstmalig in der V. Logischen Untersuchung entwickelt. (vgl. LU 1111, "Untersuchungen zur Phanomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis", Ttibingen 1980, 5. Kap., §37, S. 477ff.). In der Auseinandersetzung mit Brentanos Lehre, daB aile Akte, die keine Vorstellungen bilden, in diesen fundiert sind, resultiert die These, daB aile nicht-objektivierenden Akte in objektivierenden griinden. Diese Argumentation ist zuriickzuftihren auf Husser!s Unterscheidung von Qualitat und Materie des Aktes im §20 und der Beschreibung ihrer Verhaltnisbeziehungen im 3. Kapitel der 5. Logischen Untersuchung. Die eigentlich "ethischen" Akte sind ftir Husser! nicht Vorstellungen und Urteile, sondern wertend-ftihlende und wollend-handelnde Akte, d.h. die nicht-objektivierenden. Die Existenz von ethischen Prinzipien ist angewiesen auf eine Geftihls- und Willensvernunft. Die intellektiven Akte des Fragens und Vermutens zahlt Husser! zum Zeitpunkt der Logischen Untersuchung noch zu den nicht-objektivierenden. In den Ethik-Vor!esungen der HUA XXVIII ist die Trennung zwischen Verstandesakten und Gemtits- bzw. Willensakten offensichtlich. 34

A.a.O. S. 109.

Ebd. A.a.O. S. 107. 37 Ebd., Hervorhebung von der Verfasserin. Ebd. 39 Ebd. 40 A.a.O. S. 107f., S. 109. 41 A.a.O. S. 110. Auch in seinem Spatwerk bezieht sich Husserl tibrigens immer wieder auf die Parallelitat des logischen und willentlichen Urteilens. In der Formalen und trunszendentulen Logik heiBt es im §63 (S. 149f.): "In der aktiven Bildung von neuen Urteilen aus schon vorgegebenen sind wir ernstlich erzeugend tatig. Wie bei allem Handeln sind die Handlungsziele, die zu erzeugenden neuen Urteile im voraus in Modis einer leeren, inhaltlich noch unbestimmten und jedenfalls noch unerfiillten Antizipation uns bewuBt, als das, worauf wir hinstreben und was zur verwirklichenden Selbstgegebenheit zu bringen, eben das sich schrittweise vollendende Handeln ausmacht." (Vgl. auch Erfahrung und Urteil §48, S. 235ff.: "Das erkennende Handeln parallelisiert mit dem praktischen Handeln".) 42 Ebd. 43 A.a.O. S. 110. Der Tatsache, daB Husserl darum bemiiht war, eine Konzeption des phanomenologischen Handelns zu entwerfen, die zu einer phanomenologischen Ethik iiberleitet, widerspricht D. F011esdal in einem Beitrag: "Rationalitat in Husserls Phanomenologie", in: Vernunfi und Kontingenz. Rationalitdt und Ethos in der Phdnomenologie. Phdnomenologische Forschungen 19, hrsg. von E.W. Orth. Freiburg 1986, S. 35-52. Der Autor, der nebenbei bemerkt, daB Husser! "im Vergleich zur Logik und Erkenntnistheorie nur wenig zur Ethik geschrieben" hat (S. 47), stellt die These auf, "daB Husser! gar keine Theorie der Handlungsrationalitat entwickelt hat" (S. 51), die jedoch fiir eine Theorie der Intersubjektivitat und Einftihlung maBgeblich ware. Ich denke, daB man nicht davon sprechen kann, daB Husser! "eine sehr kognitive und passive Haltung zu Fragen der Einftihlung und der Erfahrung von Anderen hatte" (ebd.). F011esdal iibersieht m.E. vollkommen, welche Beziehungen zwischen den willensphanomenologischen Analysen der Vor!esungen bis 1914 und den Erorterungen zur Intersubjektivitatsproblematik bestehen, insbesondere den "sozialen Akten". Dieser Konnex 35

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driiekt sieh natiirlieh explizit in Husserls Sehriften nieht aus, kann jedoeh entspreehend naehkonstruiert werden. 44 HUA XXVIII, ebd. 45 Der Begriff "Horizont" ist zentral in Husserls Phanomenologie. Auf die Zusammenhange von Horizont und Zeitliehkeit verweist insbesondere Gerd Brand: Welt, Ich und Zeit. Naeh unveroffentliehten Manuskripten Edmund Husserls. Den Haag 1955. Die Zeitliehkeit sieht Husserl als die Urform des welterfahrenden Lebens, in dem das fungierende "Ieh" in "stromend-lebendiger Gegenwart" ek-statiseh und immanent ist (vgl. S. 79) Unabhangig von einer Ubertragung auf die Willensproblematik stellt Brand fest: "Konkrete Gegenwart als lebendig-stromende Gegenwart, und das ist die einzig wirkliehe Gegenwart, hat also immer schon eine gewisse Breite. Eine nur punktuelle Gegenwart, die nieht in einem lebendigen Horizont von Soeben und Kommend stiinde, ist nieht aufweisbar." (S. 78). Dieser Horizont wird von Husserl untersehieden in den Innen-und AuBenhorizont. Der Seinssinn, in dem der Gegenstand das Thema ist, ist sein Horizont. Neue Bestimmungen in den Mogliehkeiten des noeh versehlossenen Seinssinns klarlegen, heiBt, den "Innenhorizont" des Gegebenen ersehlieBen, wohingegen der "AuBenhorizont" durch die Zeitliehkeit vorgegeben is!. (V gl. Edmund Husserl, Zur Phiinomenologie des inneren ZeitbewujJtseins (1893-1917), hrsg. von R. Boehm, Den Haag 1966, HUA X. ders. ErfahrunR und Urteil. UntersuchunRen zur Genealogie der Logik, red. u. hrsg. von L. Landgrebe. Hamburg 1985 6 .) Lesenswert ist der Beitrag von Gerd Brand: "Horizont, Welt, Gesehiehte", in: Kommunikationskultur und Weltverstiindnis. Phiinomenologische Forschungen 5, hrsg. von E.W. Orth, Freiburg 1977, S. 14-89. 46 HUA XXVIII S. 110. 47 A.a.O. S. III. 48 Ebd. 49 Ebd. 50 Darauf hat er schon in der Vorlesung von 1908/09 hingewiesen, S. 340-345. Wesentliehe Auseinandersetzungen mit dem Verhaltnis von Intention und Erfiillung finden sich bereits in der 6. Logischen Untersuchung. Allerdings verweist Husser! in der Vorlesung von 1908/09 auf seine "Tausehungen" in den Logischen UntersuchunRen: "Von besonderer Wiehtigkeit ist es, urn nicht in die lITe zu gehen, falsehe Analogien zu meiden. So ist die Erfiillung, welche bei allen Aktgattungen als teleologische Annaherung an das Ziel der Richtigkeit auftritt und iiberall analoge Verhaltnisse begriindet, nieht zu verwechseln mit dem, was wir bei Wiinschen und Wollungen als Erfiillungen bezeiehnen. In diesem Punkt habe ieh mieh aueh in meinen Logischen Untersuchungen tiiusehen lassen. Die Uberzeugung vom Sein des Erwiinsehten, die vordem fehlte, Iritt etwa ein, und mit dieser Wandlung in der objektivierenden Unterlage hangt wesensgesetzlich zusammen die Wandlung des Wunsehes in Erfiillungsfreude. Das ist aber etwas ganz anderes als die Erfiillung, welche das Wesen der Begriindung, der fortsehreitenden Evidentmaehung ausmaeht bzw. der Auswertung oder Entwertung." (S. 343). Auf die Probleme von Intention und Erfiillung geht Husserl aueh in der Vorlesung "Analysen zur passiven Synthesis" ein, die er 1920/21 zum erslen Mal gehaJten hat. (V gl. HUA XI, hrsg. von M. Fleischer. Den Haag 1966.) Dort heiBt es auf S. 83: "Intention auf Erfiillung ist Intention auf Selbstgebung". Dies bedeutet, daB die Intention auf ihren meinenden Gegenstand geriehtet ist und nicht nur "leer" meinend tatig wird, "sondern zu ihm selbst, das is! zu einer Anschauung, die ihn selbst gibt, die in sieh BewuBtsein der Selbsthabe ist." (Ebd., vgl. aueh die Beilage VII: Glaube und Intention, S. 364f.).

74 51

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A.a.D. S. 109. A.a.D. S. Ill. 53 A.a.D. S. 109. 54 Ebd. 55 A.a.D. S. 344. Bei Brentano finden sich diese Ausfiihrungen in "Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik", a.a.D. S. I 83ff. Der Begriff der Evidenz wird vornehmlich in der 6. Logischen Untersuchung im Zusammenhang mit dem Verhaltnis von Intention und Erfiillung untersucht. 1m 5. Kapitel iiber "Das Ideal der Adaquation. Evidenz und Wahrheit gibt Husser! die Definition: "Die Evidenz ist ( ... ) der Akt jener vollkommensten Deckungssynthesis." (S. 122). Der Wahrheitsbegriff manifestiert sich "als Korrelat eines identifizierenden Aktes (als) Sachverhalt, und als Korrelat einer deckenden Identifizierung (als) Identitat: die volle Ubereinstimmung zwischen Gemeintem und Gegebenem als solchem. Diese Ubereinstimmung wird in der Evidenz erlebt." (ebd.) Der Evidenzbegriff muB jedoch in der Entwicklung des Husserlschen Denkens gesehen werden. In der Formalen und transzendentalen Logik nimmt dieser namlich einen "Doppelsinn" an: "( ... ) neben dem der urspriinglichen Selbsthabe von wahrem oder wirklichen Sein auch den der Eigenschaft des Urteils als vermeinter kategorialer Gegenstandlichkeit (Meinung), an eine ihm entsprechende Wirklichkeit in urspriinglicher Aktualitat angemessen zu sein. Evidenz besagt im letzteren Faile also das urspriingliche, in aktueller Adaquation erwachsende RichtigkeitsbewuBtsein." (S. 113f.). Wahrend der Begriff der "Liebe" in den lahren 1908/09 fiir Husserl noch ein "Mysterium" darstellt, laBt er doch schon seine Bedeutung im Rahmen der Personen- und Intersubjektivitatslehre vorausahnen und ihn in die Nahe mit dem "Wahrheitser!eben" bringen. 56 HUA XXVIII, S. 344. Zudem ist Husser!s Auffassung, daB hier noch "der analytischen Forschung groBte Aufgaben" bevorstehen. Melle verweist in der Einleitung zur HU A XXVIII auf die Vorlesung "Logik als Theorie der Erkenntnis" von 1910111, S. XLI. Dort heiBt es im Blick auf eine wissenschaftliche Ethik (MS. F I 12, S. 53a): "Aile Ethik und Politik verfahrt in der Tat konstruktiv. Aber eine wissenschaftliche Ethik und wissenschaftliche Praktik der Gemeinschaft erfordert Wissenschaftlichkeit solcher Konstruktionen und dazu bedarf es, wie wir mit Evidenz sehen, einer wissenschaftlichen Axiologie und Praktik, ja noch weitergehend des ganzen Systems wissenschaftlicher Dntologien. Davon haben wir freilich noch so gut wie nichts. DaB es sich aber hier urn durchaus notwendige Ziele unserer Erkenntnis handelt und urn Ziele, von deren Stellung und schrittweiser Realisierung die hochsten Interessen der Menschheit betroffen sind, brauche ich nicht zu sagen. (Vgl. S. XLIII). 57 Ebd. 58 Cartesianische Meditationen (Meiner-Ausgabe), a.a.D. S. 155. 59 A.a.D. S. 161. 60 Krisis (Meiner-Ausgabe), a.a.D. S. 2ff. 61 A.a.D. S. 14. 62 Cartesianische Meditationen, a.a.D. S. 160. Mit dem Begriff der "Religion" in Husserls Phanomenologie haben sich nur wenige Interpreten befaBt, u.a. Stephan Strasser: "Das Gottesproblem in der Spatphilosophie Husserls" in: Philosophisches lahrbuch, 67. lahrgang, Freiburg u.a. 1967, S. 130-142. Dbgleich der Begriff der "Religion" in Husserls Phanomenologie bislang nur selten besprochen und analysiert wurde, spielt er eine wohl tiefergehende Bedeutung, als es bisher 52

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angenommen wurde. Insbesondere dureh die Herausgabe des "Briefweehsels" wird erkennbar, daB der Gouesbegriff und die Religion sogar als das letzte "Telos" seiner phanomenologisehen Philosophie angesehen werden kann. Hier waren weitere Studien notig, auf die wir in unserem Text nieht eingehen konnen. Husserls ethisehes Bemiihen sollte jedoeh nieht als letzte Stufe in seiner Phanomenologie betrachtet werden. Dies zeigt sieh schon daran, daB er seine "Mission" als "gottgewollte" versteht: "Wie haben Sie sich damit abgefunden, daB ieh selbst die L(ogisehen) U(ntersuehungen), die Ihnen in der Hauptsaehe als ein befriedigendes Ende gelten, nur als einen Durchgang fUr eine hohere Entwieklung werte, von der ieh so sieher als ich lebe iiberzeugt bin, daB sich erst in ihr meine wahre gottgewollte Mission auswirke?" (BW IV, S. 412, in einem Brief an A. Metzger, 4.1X.1919, a.a.O.). Es seien in diesem Zusammenhang weitere Korrespondenzen erwahnt, z.B. in einem Brief an l\kesson vom I. VIII.l932, in dem Husserl sich fiir die Zusendung von Norstroms Schrift "Religion und Gedanke" auBert (BW VII, S. 3), sowie in einem Brief an den Pater Feuling vom 30.III.1933, in dem sich Husser! fUr die phanomenologische Aufnahme der Gottesfrage in einem seiner Referate bedankt, als "die in der Tat im Systembau der phanomenologischen 'Methode hochste und letzte Frage'." (BW VII, S. 87) 1m gleichen Brief sehreibt Husser!: "Phanomenologische Philosophie als eine im Uncndliehen liegende Idee ist natiirlieh 'Theologie'. (Fiir mich sagt das: echte Philosophie ist eo ipso Theologie)." Aber da die Phanomenologie "Dynamis", d.h. "im Werden" ist, "diirfen aueh die auf Gott beziigliehen Satze Ihres Referates nieht als meine theoretischen Lehren verstanden werden. Ich wollt ieh ware so weit!" (ebd., S. 88). Eine ahnliehe AuBerung iiber das noeh nieht ermogliehte Konstituieren einer Phanomenologie des Religiosen finden wir bereits 1919 in einem Brief an R. Otto vom 5.111., der das Bueh Das Heilige. fiber das Irrationale in der Idee des Giittlichen und sein Verhdltnis zum Rationalen, Breslau 1918, 2. Auflage, verfaBt hatte: "Es mochte mir seheinen, daB das Studium der Phanomene und der Wesensanalyse sehr viel weiter fortgesehritten sein mtisste, ehe eine Theorie des religiosen BewuBtseins als philosophisehe Theorie einsetzen konnte." (Ebd., S. 207). Nieht nur R. Otto wandte sieh mit religionsphilosophisehen Fragen an Husserl. Aueh E. Brunner (September 1921, S. 41), W. MundIe (24.X.I92I, S. 197), R. Winkler (3.XII.1921, S. 299), BW VII, a.a.O., siehe aueh den Brief Husserls an A. Grimme vom 8.VI.I918, BW III; S. 83, a.a.O.). Husser! grenzte sieh beztiglieh religionsphilosophiseher Fragen entsehieden ab: "So kann man z.B. von der Religionsphilosophie Sehelers (oder Stavenhagens, oder J. Herings) spreehen, aber mit Phanomenologie in meinem Sinne hat sie niehts zu tun." (BW VI, Brief an E.P. Welch vom17.121.V1.I933, S. 458, a.a.O.) We iter heiBt es tiber die Stellung der religionsphilosophisehen Probleme: "Die philosophisehen Probleme ersehliessen sich mit ihrem echten Sinn als transcendental-phanomenologisehe in einer wesensmassigen systematisehen Stufenfolge. Es zeigt sieh dabei, dass die religios-ethisehen Probleme solche der hochsten Stufe sind. (Sie sind also als wissensehaftliche nieht so billig zu haben, wie es der im Grunde naive Ontologismus Schelers meinte.)". Zur "rationalen Wissensehaft" als "ein ewiges (zeitloses) Produkt Gottes" vgl. den Brief Husserls an Car! Stumpf, 1919 (nieht abgesandter Entwurf), BW I, S. 174-178, a.a.O. 61 Diese "gegenwartige Aufgabe" kristallisiert sieh im Spatwerk Husserls als das Zentralthema heraus. Neben der Krisis-Sehrift bieten hierftir die NaehlaBtexte der HUA XXIX zahlreiehe Belege, fUr deren Interpretation eine eigene Untersuehung vonnolen ware.

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V gl. HUA XXVII, "Uber die gegenwartige Aufgabe der Philosophie" (1934), S. IS4-22l. Zur "gegenwartigen Aufgabe" der Philosophie vgL auBerdem die Briefe Husserls an J. Pos yom J.lV.1923 (BW IV, S. 439), sowie an E. Spranger yom J.lX.191S (Entwurf), worin es iiber die "reine Phanomenologie" heiBt, daB sie "aile Welten" umfaBt als "die apriorische Wissenschaft von der Innerlichkeit, in der allein aile AuBerlichkeit, aile ObjektiviHit sich konstituieren kann. (... ) Die Phanomenologie ist keine vollstandige Philosophie, aber sie leistet das erste, schwerste und umfassendste Stiick der Welterkenntnis, die im tiefsten Grunde Weltverstehen is!. Sie zeigt, wie alles Sein und Seinserklaren sich auf ein Verstehen und verstehendes Aufklaren zuriickbezieht und in gewisser Weise darin auflos!." (BW VI, S. 420, a.a.O.). Fiir ein "echtes Menschentum" ist nach Husserl der Gedanke der "Autonomie" von ausschlaggebender Bedeutung. Ca. 1935 heiBt es (an einen anonymen Briefpartner): "Der Sinn dieser Ausfiihrungen war darauf gerichtet, schlieBlich die Teleologie klarzumachen, die im Verfall und Zusammenbruch der eur(opaischen) Kultur, in der Blindheit fiir eine autonome Philosophie liegt und dann notwendig eine Motivation schafft, durch die Erkenntnis freigelegt und allgemein zuganglich wird, daB nur eine absolut radikale Autonomie des Menschen und ihre Funktion, eine Autonomie von universaler und radikaler Wissenschaft, aile Spannungen iiberwinden, und insbesondere die zwischen Religion und Wissenschaft ... " (BW IX, S. 521, a.a.O.). Hierbei fungiert der Philosoph "nur als ethische Personlichkeit oder er ist nichts." (BW III, Brief von E. und M. Husserl an Ingarden, 13.XII.1933, S. 294, a.a.O.). 65 A.a.O. S. IS7. 66 A.a.O. S. IS5. 67 VgL hierzu die Analysen zum Personbegriff in "Die Konstitution der geistigen Welt", a.a.O. 6' Zur "Einfiihlung" vgL insbesondere HUA XIII-XV. 69 Zum "natiirlichen Weltbegriff" vgl. z.B. HUA XIII, Text Nr.6: "Aus den Vorlesungen: Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie. Wintersemester 1910/ II, S. III ff. 70 "Die Konstitution der geistigen Welt", a.a.O. 71 Vorlcsungen zur "Ethik und Wertlehre", HUA XXVIII, a.a.O. n Die Rede von der "Kreation" (als dem kreativen Produkt) und der "Kreativitat" (als kreatives Vermogen) bei Husserl ist nicht neu. Eugen Fink (1959) weist in seiner Bedeutungsunterscheidung von "Konstitution" darauf hin, daB diese soviel wie "Produktion" heiBt: "Das Leben der transzendentalen Subjektivitat ist als ein 'produktives Leben' charakterisiert" (S. 227f.), und: " ... die konstitutive Interpretation desselben (des transzendentalen Lebens) weist es als Krealion aus. Wie hart auch immer und doktrinar eine Bestimmung des Wesens der Konstitution als produktive Kreation klingen mag, so ist zumindest die Gegensatzlichkeit zum rezeptiven Erfahrungsleben angezeigt." ("Die phanomenologische Philosophie Husserls in der gegenwartigen Kritik", in: Studien zur Phiinomenologie (1930-1939), Phaenomenologica 21, Den Haag 1966, S. 79-156, S. 143), und: "Bei Husserl schwankt der Sinn der transzendentalen Konstitution zwischen Sinnbildung und Kreation. Und letztlich bleibt auch der Seinssinn des allumgreifenden Gesamtlebens unbestimm!." Finks Begriff der "Kreation" ist begriindet in der schwierigen Begriffsbestimmung der "Konstitution" bei Husserl, die sich zwischen den beiden Extremen "Kreation" und "Korrelation" des Gegebenen zu dem "Wie seiner Gegebenheit" bewegt. 64

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Ebenso hat Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka mit ihren beiden Banden LOROS and Life, Dordrecht 1988, das Konzept eines kreativen, schopferischen Menschen in der Phanomenologie Husserls vorgestellt. Auch in neueren Konzeptionen zur Handlungstheorie wird von einem "kreativen Ansatz" ausgegangen, z.B. bei Hans 10as, Die Kreutivitiit des Hundelns. Frankfurt 1992. 10as' Ausgangspunkt liegt jedoch im Bereich des Pragmatismus. 73 Kaizo-Artikel, HUA XXVIII, a.a.O. S. 9. Zwar laBt sich nach Husserl das "echte Menschentum" und eine radikale Selbstverantwortung nicht trennen: "Gentigt uns nicht die Freudigkeit der Schopfung einer theoretischen Technik, der Erfindung von Theorien, mit denen man so viel Ntitzliches machen und die Bewunderung der Welt gewinnen kann - konnen wir echtes Menschentum und Leben in radikaler Selbstverantwortung nicht trennen von dem Ganzen der Verantworlungen des Menschenlebens tiberhaupt - so mtissen wir uns tiber dieses ganze Leben und diese gesamte Kulturtradition stell en und durch radikale Besinnungen fUr uns, einzeln und in Gemeinschaft, die letzten Notwendigkeiten suchen, von denen aus wir zu den Wirklichkeiten urteilend, wertend, handelnd Stellung nehmen konnen." (Forma Ie und trunszendentale Logik, a.a.O. S. 5). Allerdings gesteht er ZU, daB "wir so nur letztzuvcrantwortende Allgemcinheiten, 'Prinzipien' (gewinnen), wo doch das Leben in Entscheidungen des' Augenblicks' besteht, der fUr Begriindungen in wissenschaftlicher Rationalitat nie Zeit hat. (. .. J Welche Probleme sich da weiter ergeben fUr die Sache der Selbst- und Menschheitserziehung, das ist eine Sache ftir sich (... )." (ebd.) Das Leben der vergemeinschafteten und sich gegenseitig zu Verantwortlichkeit verpflichtenden Subjekte ist das Leben in der Form der echten Humanitat: "Aber Selbstverantwortung ist fUr den Menschen, der Mensch ist im gemeinschaftlichen Sein und vergerneinschafteten Leben, eins mit der Verantwortung vor Anderen und mit dem Verantwortlichmachen der Anderen." (HUA XV, Text Nr. 25: "Normstruktur der Personalitaten. 22. November 1931 ", S. 422.) 1m Mittelpunkt steht das Charakterisieren der "Willenshabitualitaten", "welche die Struktur des echten Menschen ausmacht und der echten menschlichen Gemeinschaft als eine Normalitat (... )" (a.a.O. S. 423.). Die Selbstverantwortung hat dabei "ihr Feld in der Totalitat des Seins, in der Totalitat des Lebens. und wieder bezogen auf die Totalitat der Lebensumwelt." (a.a.O. S. 423, Anm. I).

Edmund Husserl, Auj~'iitze und Vortriige (1922-1937). Mit erganzenden Texten HUA XXVII, hrsg. von Th. Nenon u. H. R. Sepp. Dordrecht 1989. darin: "Ftinf Aufsatze tiber Emeuerung", S. 3-94, Beilagen I-XI (S. 94-124). 75 Das Thema der "ErneuerunR" spricht die tibemationale Bestimmung und Bedeutung der Phanomenologie an. Es ist crstaunlich, daB Husserl dieses Thema 1923 in einer auslandischen Zeitschrift behandelte, sich jedoch in seinem naheren Wirkungskreis tiber politische Fragen wenig auBerte (vgl. auch Schuhmann 1988, S. 28f.). In den Briefen an W.P. Bell aus den lahren 1918-1925 finden wir wesentliche Gedanken zur Idee der ""Emeuerung" ausgesprochen (BW III, S. 3-58, Dordrecht 1994), so z.B. am 19.IV.1919: "Es handelt sich nicht urn die Rettung von Deutschl(ands) polit(ischer) Zukunft ... sondem urn die Rettung der deutschen Nation vor volliger physischer u. ineins dam it moralischer Verelendung. (... ) Wo aber ist, fragt man sich dann, der allein Heil bringende Gegenstrom moralischer u. religioser Emeuerung? (... ) Wer rettet das deutsche Volk nach seinem wahrhaftigen Sein, seinem geistigen Eros, wer die Kontinuitat der deutschen Geistesentwicklung?" (a.a.O., S. 5f.). 1m Zusammenhang 74

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mit der "ethisch-politischen Erneuerung der Menschheit" (a.a.D., S. 12) schreibt er am II.VIII.l920: "Gerne haUe ich mich mit Ihnen noch iiber Zeit u. Ewigkeit, iiber Philosophie und Erneuerung der Mensch(h)eit, iiber die religiosen Bewegungen in D(eutschland), iiber das Werden des neuen Menschen u.s.w. unterhalten. Ich habe iiber Vieles nachgedacht, u. aile Theorie gilt mir nichts, es sei denn fiir eine neue Welt." (a.a.D., S. 16). Beziiglich der Kaizo-Artikel geht Husser! auf seine Grundintention ein: "Ich wahlte das Problem der 'Erneuerung' (sc. der europ(aischen) Kultur - Kaizo heisst im englischen Doppeltitel 'reconstruction'), und das interpretire ich als das ethische Grundproblem, und zwar als individualethisches und als socialethisches." (a.a.D., S. 45). Auch in einem Brief an Th.G. Masaryk ist das Thema der "Erneuerung" von Bedeutung: "Man kann die Jugend fiir sie gewinnen, wenn man ihr nur sichtlich macht, dass die echt wissenschaftliche Philosophie die Richtung halt nicht auf theoretische Specialitaten, sondern auf die letzten und hochsten Ziele alles theoretischen, aber auch practischen Menschheitsstrebens; vor all em aber: dass echte Philosophie durchherrscht ist vom Ethos radicaler, in jeder Hinsicht riicksichtsloser Wahrhaftigkeit, der jede Pose und Phrase zuwider ist." (Brief am 2.III.1922, BW I, S. 115). Uber das Elend der Kriegsfolgen und eine daraus folgende "Idee der Erneuerung" finden wir eine ausfiihrliche Schilderung in einem Brief an Hocking vom 3. VII. I 920, BW III, S. I 63f. Man sollte jedoch zur Frage der Nation den Text Nr. I: "Menschliches Leben in der Geschichtlichkeit" vom August 1934 heranziehen, hrsg. in HUA XXIX, 1993, S. 3-17, wo Husserl auf die Fragen des Menschen als Vernunftwesen in der Nation und auf die Nationen in Koexistenz mit anderen Nationen (politische Geschichtlichkeit) eingeht. 76 Vgl. Beilage X (zu S. 94): "Zum Versagen in der neuzeitlichen Kultur- und Wissenschaftsentwicklung, das Telos der europdischen Menschheit zu verwirklichen. FiinfTexte." (1922/23), S. 113-122. 77 Brief an A. Schweitzer am 28.VII.23, BW VII, S. 253 und Brief an Winthrop Bell am II.VIII.20, BW III, S. 12, a.a.D. Winthrop P. Bell war Husserl ein "lieber englischer Schiiler und Freund" (BW I, S. 115, a.a.D.). 78 HUA XXVII, S. 6. 79 A.a.D. S. 21. 80 A.a.O. S. 7. 81 A.a.D. S. 8. 82 A.a.D. S. 20f. 83 A.a.D. S. 9, vgl. auch S. 40: "Die volle Ethik umspannt die Logik (logische Kunstlehre) in allen iiblichen Begrenzungen, ebenso die Axiologie (Wertelehre, speziell die asthetische) wie auch jede wie immer zu begrenzende Praktik." 84 A.a.D. S. 20. 85 A.a.D. S. 22. 86 Der Begriff des "Selbst" ist maBgeblich vertreten bei Rudolf Eucken, der zur Jahrhundertwende auch Husser! beeinfluBte. 87

88 89

90 91 92

A.a.O. S. 42.

A.a.D. S. 43. A.a.D. S. 32. A.a.D. S. 24. A.a.D S. 26. A.a.D. S. 25.

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Ebd. Ebd. "5 A.a.O. S. 29. YO A.a.O. S. 33. 97 Ebd. "8 Ebd. 99 A.a.O. S. 34. 100 Ebd. 101 Ebd. 102 Ebd. IOJ Ebd. 104 A.a.O. S. 35. 105 A.a.O. S. 41. 106 A.a.O. S. 31. 107 A.a.O. S. 32. 108 A.a.O. S. 37. 109 Ebd. 110 A.a.O. S. 36. 111 Ebd. 112 A.a.O. S. 37. 113 A.a.O. S. 43. 114 Der ethisch selbstverantwortliche Mensch steht im Mittelpunkt der Husser!schen Analysen. Die Bedeutung der Subjektivitiit erkannte er bereits in den Vor!esungen zur "Ethik und Wertlehre". In den Kaizo-Aufsatzen wird dies noch offensichtlicher: "Wir nennen jedes (auch das nicht vollig konsequente) Leben der Selbstregierung, gemaB der kategorischen Forderung der ethischen Zweckidee, allgemein und im weitesten Sinne ein ethisches Leben; sein Subjekt, als sich selbst zur ethischen Selbstzucht bestimmendes, eine - wieder in einem weitesten Sinne - ethische Personlichkeit." (a.a.O. S. 39). Diese "Selbstzucht" ist in dem Sinne zu verstehen, daB "die zum Wesen des Menschen gehorige Fahigkeit des SelbstbewuBtseins in dem pragnanten Sinn der personal en Selbstbetrachtung (inspectio sui) und der darin griindenden Fahigkeit zu reflexiv auf sich selbst und sein Leben zuriickbezogenen Stellungnahmen bzw. personalen Akten: der Selbsterkenntnis, der Selbstwertung und praktischen Selbstbestimmung (Selbstwollung und Selbstgestaltung)" in Erscheinung tritt (a.a.O. S. 23). 115 Vgl. auch HUA VII, S. I 97ff. 116 "Konstitution der geistigen Welt", a.a.O. S. 83. 117 Heidegger setzt sich im "Brief iiber den Humanismus" kritisch mit der Auffassung des Menschen als "animal rationale" auseinander, vgl. S. 13ff. (Frankfurt a.M. 1981 8 ). Einen anderen Weg beschritt hier, etwa zeitgleich mit Husserl, Max Weber, der 1919 erkannte, daB eine einheitliche Ethik fUr die sich zu relativer Eigengesetzlichkeit herausdifferenzierenden Bereiche des Kulturlebens nicht mehr ausreicht. Weber, der gerade die voraussehbaren Foigen des Handelns mit in den Handlungskalkiil einbezieht, konnte damit eher eine zukunftsbezogene Ethik begriinden. Diese Ethik wird zu einer politischen Verantwortungsethik, die jedoch eng verschrankt mit der Wissenschaft ist. Wiihrend in Webers Konzeption die Personlichkeit des Politikers eine tragende Rolle erhalt (d.h. ein handelnder Mensch, der auch Verantwortung iibemimmt), bleibt es bei Husser! beim "ethischen Menschen", der aile in sich selbst bildet und in dieser "Neuschaffung" auf

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die Umwelt wirkt. Dies mag ein Beweis dafiir sein, daB Husserls phanomenologisches Unterfangen trotz aller Bemiihungen einer Zentrierung des "Lebensgedankens" im Bereich der Ethik nicht iiber eine gewisse ideale Konzeption hinauskam. Max Weber wirkte in der Zeit urn 1919 vor allem durch die beiden Vortrage "Politik als Beruf" und "Wissenschaft als Beruf". Mit diesen beiden Schriften beginnt die Verantwortungsethik im 20. Jahrhundert (vgl. auch Wolfgang Schluchter, Wertfreiheit und Verantwortungsethik. Zum Verhiiltnis von Wissenschaft und PoUtik bei Max Weber. Tiibingen 1971). Weber formulierte, daB keine Ethik mehr fiir aile Bereiche gleiche inhaltliche Normen vorgeben konnte. Diese Spezifika der "Sonderethiken", wie sie gerade gegen Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts eine maBgebliche Rolle spielen, hat Husserl in seiner Tragweite nicht erkannt, da er der Phanomenologie als Universalwissenschaft die grundlegende Bedeutung zusprach. 118 Zum Begriff der "Gemeinschaft" vgl. auch den Kaizo-Artikel, HUA XXVII, a.a.O. S. 21, wo es heiBt: "Es gibt notwendig auch eine Ethik der Gemeinschaften als Gemeinschaften. Und im besonderen auch jener universalen Gemeinschaften, die wir 'Menschheiten' - eine Nation oder eine mehrere Nationen umfassende Gesamtmenschheit - nennen." 119 Diese vorwiegend positive Sicht der Subjektivitat bei Husser! ist nicht in jeder Hinsicht zu unterstiitzen. Demgegeniiber geht Kar! Jaspers zielgerichteter auch auf das "Bose" ein. 120 Vgl. Logische Untersuchung WI, a.a.O., III. Logische Untersuchung: "Zur Lehre von den Ganzen und Teilen". 121 Vgl. Jean-Paul Sartre, Das Sein und das Nichts. Versuch einer phanomenologischen Ontologie. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1993 (rororo 13316). 122 Ich mochte hier insbesondere die phanomenologischen Bestrebungen in der Psychologie hervorheben, die sich im AnschluB an C. F. Graumann konstituiert haben. Es sei verwiesen auf die Arbeit von Max Herzog iiber Phiinomenologische Psychologie. Grundlagen und Entwicklungen. Heidelberg 1992, sowie auf den Sammelband Sinn und Erfahrung (hrsg. von Herzog, M. und Graumann, C.F.), Heidelberg 1991, der sich mit den phanomenologischen Methoden in den Humanwisscnschaften befaBt. 123 H.-G. Gadamer, "Die phanomenologische Bewegung" a.a.O. S. 128. 124 Eugen Fink, "Die phanomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwartigen Kritik (1933)", in: Studien zur Phiinomenologie 1930-1939, Den Haag 1966. Phaenomenologica 21, S. 143. Husserl hat Finks Kritik sehr ernst genommen. Dies beweist das Vorwort zu Finks Studien, welches Husser! verfaBte, in dem es heiBt: "Aile mir bekannt gewordenen Kritiken verfehlten den Grundsinn meiner Phanomenologie so sehr, daB diese iiberhaupt nicht betroffen wurde - trotz der Zitation meiner Worte. (... ) Auf meinen Wunsch hat es der Verfasser des nachfolgenden Artikels unternommen, die zur Klarung der prinzipiellen MiBverstandnisse notwendigen Auseinandersetzungen zu entwerfen. Zu einer solchen Aufgabe war er berufen (. . . ) und ich freue mich, nun sagen zu konnen, daB in derselben kein Satz ist, den ich mir nicht vollkommen zueigne, den ich nicht ausdriicklich als meine eigene Uberzeugung anerkennen konnte." (S. VIIf.). 125 Ebd. 126 Ebd., vgl. die Kritik Tugendhats, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger, Berlin 1967, S. 175, Anm.5.

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127 Die erwahnten Abhandlungen zur Intersubjektivitatsproblematik stellten den Begriff der phiinomenologischen Handlung nicht in den Mittelpunkt der Analyse. 128 HUA XIV, "Gemeingeist I", "Gemeingeist II". Vgl. insbesondere den raschen iibergang von §2 "Soziale Akte und Verhiiltnisse. (Die Ich-Du-Beziehung)" (S. 166f.) und §3 "Die praktische Willensgemeinschaft" (S. 169f.) 129 HUA XIV, "Gemeingeist I", S. 174, §6: "Die ethische Liebe". )30 Vgl. ebd. 1Jl A.a.D. S. 181, §9 "Sozialitat und Ethik. Die Funktion in der Gemeinschaft und die Pflicht. Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft." 132 Vgl. a.a.D. Beilage XXV "Vergemeinschaftete Menschheit als iiberpersonale Ganzheit (192111922)", S. 205-207. m H.-G. Gadamer, "Zur Aktualitat der Husserlschen Phanomenologie (1974)", GW 3/1, S. 165. 134

A.a.D. S. 167.

136

A.a.D. S. 170. Ebd.

137

A.a.O. S. 171.

135

138

H.-G. Gadamer "Die Wissenschaft von der Lebenswelt", a.a.D. S. 158. 139 A.a.D. S. 159 und S. 171. 140 Vgl. Strasser, Welt im Widerspruch. Gedanken zu einer Phiinomenologie als ethischen Fundamental philosophie. Den Haag 1991 (Phaenomenologica 124). 141 Vgl. Schuhmann, Husserls Staatsphilosophie. FreiburgiMiinchen, 1988 und K. Held "Husser! und die Griechen", in: Profile der Phiinomenologie. Phiin. Forschungen. Band 22, hrsg. von E. W. Drth. Freiburg 1989), S. ISS: "Eine angemessene Phanomenologie der politischen Welt und ihrer Konstitutionsgrundlage, der verrechenschaftlichten doxa, ist nicht nur deswegen seit langem ein Desiderat, weil die Phiinomenologie - das sagt schon ihr Name - zur Treue gegeniiber allen Phanomenen, auch dem des Politischen, verpflichtet ist; schwerer wiegt, daB dieses Phiinomen fiir die Phanomenologie mehr ist als irgendein Phanomen neben anderen. Es hat fUr sie zentrale systematische Bedeutung." Held betont das Gewicht des Politischen in der Husserlschen Phanomenologie, das Husserl selbst, wie auch den Bereich der Ethik, nicht explizit ausarbeitete. Die phiinomenologische Ethik ist jedoch als das unabdingbare Fundament dieses politischen Feldes zu betrachten. 142 Vgl. Schuhmann (1988), S. 18: "Das Wort 'Politik' kommt einer einschlagigen Zahlung zufolge in den ersten zwanzig Husserliana-Biinden noch nicht zehnmal vor."

PART TWO

VALUATION, CULTURE, IDEOLOGIES

JOHN FRANCIS BURKE

PHENOMENOLOGY AND MULTICULTURALISM

Moving Beyond Assimilation and Utter Diversity Through a Substantive Pluralism

Richard Bernstein has argued that in terms of contemporary philosophy, we need to move beyond both objectivism and relativism. By objectivism, he means the "conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness" (Bernstein, 1983, p. 8). By relativism, he means the "conviction that when we tum to the examination of those concepts that philosophers have taken to be the most fundamental - whether it is the concept of rationality, truth, reality, right, the good, or norms - we are forced to recognize that in the final analysis all such concepts must be understood as relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, paradigm, form of life, society, or culture" (Bernstein, 1983, p. 8). To cut between these extremes, Bernstein argues for a discourse of practical knowledge whose legacy in philosophy extends at least back to Aristotle. The elaboration of Bernstein's argument is not critical for the purposes of this paper; rather, I would like to suggest that his contrast between objectivism and relativism can be used in an analogous fashion to the lively ongoing debate over multicultural relations in politics, education, and other areas of American life. The contrast in this case is between assimilation and utter diversity. The assimilationist position holds that there is a prevailing culture, largely with Anglo-Saxon roots, that immigrants and minorities adapt to in order to be Americans. The American experiment, in this light, has been a "melting pot" in which many peoples have blended in terms of this culture. In education, the argument is that there is an identifiable intellectual tradition, European or Western in origin, that facilitates this assimilation. This position would be analogous to Bernstein's objectivism - that there is an anchor or universal for American culture and 85 A·T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV. 85-94. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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that public policy, educational programs, and social interaction should reflect this. The utter diversity position holds that there is no overarching culture in America which all groups should assent to and that instead the autonomy of each particular cultural group must be established. Indeed, from this view, there has been a dominant tradition in America - one which simply has superimposed its culture at the expense of all others - a universal by power, not by truth. To overthrow this cultural oppression, the task becomes in a "separate but equal" fashion to ensure that all cultural groups have political representation and that education curriculums in a mandatory fashion reflect the many cultures which comprise America. This position would be analogous to Bernstein's relativism that America is a collection of cultural groups whose fundamental expressions are so irreducible to each other that achieving a genuine universal community is impossible. The difficulty with the assimilation position is that it does not recognize how easily a dominant culture by the sheer sake of its power becomes a "universal" one. In tum, the arguments that there is a clear identifiable intellectual tradition which sustains this prevailing culture, this legacy from the past, are static suggesting that the "great books" themselves were not influenced by multiple cultures in the past and that somehow their past significance can be lifted from history and simply apply to us in the same way, without any sense that interpretation either then, now, or even in-between has anything to do with communicating them. The difficulty with the utter diversity position is that it does not recognize that there is anything which diverse cultures share beyond biological similarities or even that we should strive to explore other cultural backgrounds. Intellectually speaking, the insistence on expanding our curriculums to include a wide range of traditions meets the problem of a "pseudo-universalism," but if in tum it culminates in educational enclaves in which each group simply studies its cultural possessions at the expense of others because they are irreducible to each other, then we have not traveled very far on the road to a democratic political community. Each cultural enclave becomes a mini-version of the static "tradition" argument - no acknowledgment is made of how other cultures have contributed to one's own nor is there any insistence that the activity of interpretation itself might enable one culture to communicate itself, albeit imperfectly, to another.

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What I would like to suggest is the possibility of a middle ground between assimilation and utter diversity when it comes to multicultural relations. Instead of arguing for a universal perspective which subsumes particular cultures or that the very distinctiveness of particular cultures defies such a universality, the following pages offer a prolegomenon on substantive pluralism. From this outlook, 1) a democratic community is constituted and reinvigorated through the substantive contributions of diverse cultures, not in spite of them and 2) the distinctiveness of each cultural community is accented without completely separating each from the other. To articulate a substantive pluralism, I draw upon phenomenology and hermeneutics. To those uninitiated with these vital traditions within twentieth century philosophy, both phenomenology and hermeneutics strive to move beyond the dichotomy between the subject and the object established in modem philosophy by Descartes. Instead of identifying reality either as the subjectivity of a cog ito or on the other hand, as the "outside world" distinct from the subject, phenomenology maintains that one has a "consciousness-of" the world - reality is constituted in this entwining of subject and object. This emphasis on the "consciousnessof" things leads to the centrality of interpretation in terms of our understanding of reality. What hermeneutics dwells upon specifically in terms of interpreting texts, is not to figure out what an author's psychological intentions were, but what is the reality which is revealed in the text. In tum, this engagement of the text can only ensue through one's "consciousness-of" it: interpretation entails a "dialogical encounter" with the text (Madison, 1988, pp. 49-50). A hermeneutical phenomenology suggests that if we focus on the intersubjective character of human interaction - the intersecting of "consciousnesses-of" the world, we can elicit a sense of what diverse individuals share in common without purging their distinctiveness, and at the same time pinpoint this distinctiveness without abandoning the notion that at least some consensus can be arrived at between diverse persons or cultures. Put another way, individuals and/or cultures at least have lateral access to each other - not the universal over the particular or vice-versa - and their hermeneutical situation is the medium for this access.

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II

Four points distinguish a substantive pluralism from either the assimilation or utter diversity models of multicultural relations. In the material that follows, I have drawn heavily from works by Clifford Geertz, G. B. Madison, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Paul Ricoeur. Although technically Geertz argues from the stance of an interpretive anthropology and not from that of a hermeneutical phenomenology, his approach is so close to the latter that he can be considered a kindred spirit (Geertz, 1973). First, a substantive pluralism emphasizes the intersubjective character of culture. Rather than assuming that culture is an objective package which can be identified from a distance and therefore is accessible to anyone who simply wants to be part of the community - the assimilation model, instead culture is a set of shared meanings by a particular group of people whose content is reconstituted and revised daily. In contrast to the utter diversity claim that particular cultures are so unique that they are inaccessible to other cultures or for that matter to a universal social science, hermeneutical phenomenology emphasizes that if culture is an intersubjective creation between individuals, cross-cultural understanding can ensue between individuals of different cultures as long as we do not expect that perfect translation will be achieved. In terms of social science, even if a universal standard of culture is impossible, we can still make sense of experiences which are shared across culture. Clifford Geertz, for instance, defines culture as webs of human experience and the study of it not as "an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning" (Geertz, 1973, pp. 4-5). In contrast to analyzing cultures from an "objective" distance, MerleauPonty argues that we should engage cultures as a "system of symbols" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 115). This would enable us to speak of "totalities" or "articulated wholes of varying richness" in which one is not superior to the other (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 115). Ricoeur adds in tum that "The human condition is such that different contexts of civilization are possible" (Ricoeur, 1965, p. 280). Seen in this hermeneutical way, society or culture, according to Merleau-Ponty, is "a many-faceted reality amenable to more than one interpretation" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 118). The core of anthropology, therefore, becomes the "process of joining objective analysis to lived experience" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 119).

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The intersubjective basis of culture leads us to the second point of a substantive pluralism - the encounter with the other. It is one thing to suggest that a particular culture is a shared set of meanings within a particular group of people. The centrality of intersubjectivity to human relations also suggests a basis for persons of any distinct cultures to reach out to each other. Rather than contending that the identity of a particular culture is so unique that it cannot be possibly shared or translated to another - the utter diversity claim - encountering the other enables one to recognize the wealth of one's own tradition. Rather than the other being a threat, the other provides an opportunity for the cultivation of one's own tradition - cross-fertilization as a creative interchange. And on the other hand, this interchange does not lead to an identity which melds different perspectives as the assimilation stance would have it: again, the distinctiveness of one's own culture is reaffirmed through the interaction with the other. G. B. Madison, for instance, speaks of a fusion of horizons in which "a self which, in and by means of the dialogical encounter with the other, comes to a greater realization of itself" (Madison, 1988, p. 117). Geertz affirms that a semiotic concept of culture brings "us into touch with the lives of strangers" (Geertz, 1973, p. 16). And as opposed to the socalled objective distance of what Merleau-Ponty terms traditional sociology (Merleau Ponty, 1964, p. 115), Geertz claims that the interpretative anthropologist thinks not only "about" the other, but "with them" (Geertz, 1973, p. 23). There are then two sides to this encounter with the other. On the one hand, one finds previously undiscovered dimensions of one's self (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 120). On the other hand, the depth of one's own tradition is reaffirmed and in this sense only a "living culture" can interact with another - one "faithful to its origins and ready for creativity on the levels of art, lit., philosophy, and spirituality ... " (Ricoeur, 1965, p. 283). The interchange with the other, as Geertz puts it, makes "available to us the answers that others, guarding other sheep in other valleys, have given, and thus to include them in the consultable record of what man has said" (Geertz, 1973, p. 30). Third, a substantive pluralism neither claims there is a univocal truth applicable to all situations nor that truth is relative to each cultural situation - in this regard, it shares Bernstein's concerns about moving beyond objectivism and relativism. Instead, truth is lateral (MerleauPonty, 1964, p. 120): cultures are accessible to each other, but never is

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there a way in which they would be fully transparent to or translatable to each other. Geertz for instance, seeks within cultural patterns, "the defining elements of a human existence which although not constant in expression, are yet distinctive in character" (Geertz, 1973, p. 37). He adds that what we should be looking for then is the "systematic relationships among diverse phenomena, not for substantive identities among similar ones" (Geertz, 1973, p. 44). In a very hermeneutical vein, he continues, "It is thus not truth that varies with social, psychological, and cultural contexts but the symbols we construct in our unequally effective attempts to grasp it" (Geertz, 1973, p. 220). Truth is neither capable of being imposed universally not are particular cultures so distinct that truth cannot be pursued. Once truth is viewed not in a universal or particular but in a lateral fashion, then it is possible to have a cultural interchange in which cultural frontiers are erased and a world civilization emerges (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 124). For G. B. Madison, Merleau-Ponty's notion of lateral truth cuts between both the conception of modern rationality as uniform idea and those deconstructions of rationality which. lead to relativism and undecidability (Madison, 1988, pp. 70, 114-115). Whatever universality there may be in culture, it is only realized and sustained through what Ricoeur terms an authentic dialogue, not syncretism (Madison, 1988, p. 71; Ricoeur, 1965, p. 283). Fourth and finally, a substantive pluralism emphasizes that as much as human existence is meaningful, contingency, ambiguity, and uncertainty are integral parts of the human condition. In contrast to the assimilation stance in which there is "one best way" for pursuing cultural relations and the sooner newcomers or outsiders to the community adapt to that way the better, hermeneutical phenomenology'S emphasis on the plural ways of engaging reality suggests that there may be multiple characterizations of the same human experience and that human experience ultimately cannot be rendered ultimately in terms of an allencompassing reason. As much as "Reality itself is thoroughly pluralistic" (Madison, 1986, p. 45), this is not to contend that everything is relative and therefore there is no common ground between distinct cultures. To the contrary, as reviewed above it is possible for cultures to be translated into each other and this cross-fertilization actually sustains each culture. To contend that each culture should remain autonomous is to abandon reason for nihilism.

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III

The preceding section outlined, through hermeneutical phenomenology, the philosophical parameters for a substantive pluralism. Nevertheless, human beings do act also through other forms of understanding. That is why phenomenology tries to bracket "lived experience" to arrive at the meaning of a situation or a text. Consequently, it is important to examine the practical imperatives for pursuing a substantive pluralism as opposed to the assimilation or utter diversity models of multicultural relations. Empirically speaking, America is becoming more multicultural. The 1980s brought about the greatest demographic increase in minorities within the twentieth century (Barringer, 1991). Nothing in the 1990s suggests that this trend has abated. The labor force of the next century, in tum, will be increasingly composed of immigrants and minorities. Even if one pretends or hopes that a multicultural society is not on the horizon, daily life increasingly runs counter to such denial. The assimilation solution has simply not worked and shows no capability for having the creative resources for meeting ongoing challenges. The economic underclass of American society has a disproportionate percentage of Blacks and Hispanics compared to the overall percentage of these groups in the overall population. It is not clear that they have been assimilated, and if anything, their educational opportunities are increasingly inadequate for the high-technological, service job opportunities which increasingly comprise the job market. The push for "English as the official language" legislation actually reveals that English is not the only principal language in regions of the country with large Hispanic popUlations. Nor is it likely to be in the American Southwest due to the common border with Mexico combined with the steady flow of immigrants northward from Latin America. The difficulty with the assimilation model is that it promotes a tyranny over cultural discourse. The assumption remains that to be an American one just needs to learn English, study the Western tradition, and adopt prevailing American values. No doubt such advice is prudent since these factors are integral to the discourse of most workplaces and power structures, but it is a dated outlook of what America means. The utter diversity model does not offer much hope either for dealing with the increasingly multicultural character of the nation's discourse. If assimilation prizes uniformity in values and language, utter diversity

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champions difference to the point of anarchy. Certainly the cry for ethnic and racial distinctiveness is a direct response to the lack of access, especially by Blacks and Hispanics, to the country's political and economic spheres. But the recent popularity of neo-Nazi, Ku Klux Klan, and other fascist groups, as a backlash to affirmative action and other civil rights programs, also manifests with a vengeance the morality that cultural groups are so unique that there is no way they can communicate with others. Unlike the assimilation model, the utter diversity approach does recognize cultural differences, but it allows no opportunity for constructive discourse with "the other." What we end up with are cultural enclaves who can only be in anarchic contention with each other since it is presumed no mutual interaction is possible: interest-group competition, once given this racial/ethnic overlay, becomes a fascist corporatism. For instance, over the past three decades, affirmative action programs, electoral schemes designed to increase minority political representation (redistricting and plural voting plans), and even bilingual education programs have frequently been mistakenly viewed as the "entitlement" of minority groups, both by members within these groups and by members of the majority who claimed such initiatives constitute "reverse discrimination." From a substantive pluralist view, one pursues such public policies to ensure that our political practices are as inclusive as possible; ethically speaking, one cannot realize a dynamic democracy though group interaction if particular groups are intentionally or capriciously precluded from participating. But when cultural groups see such initiatives as an opportunity to get what is "rightfully theirs" - Gabriel Marcel's "having" - and not as an opportunity to engage in a constructive discourse with other cultural groups - Marcel's "being," then American politics is reduced to just being a cacophony of atomized cultural groups (Marcel, 1949). If assimilation permits only one type of discourse, with utter diversity genuine discourse is not even possible. Instead, I submit that a substantive pluralism offers a constructive alternative to either of the above alternatives. In a substantive pluralism, the values and standards of a political community are forever being reexamined and recast in view of the contributions made by cultural groups, past and present. America, in this light, is neither a uniform static reality, nor a collection of unamalgamated groups; rather, it is the reconstitution of a political community between its past and future members.

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Bharati Mukherjee speaks of how immigrants "are creating American culture, daily. It is not something static. But through our art, and through the dangerous, improvised lives that we have to lead, we are creating a new American culture" (Mukherjee, 1990, p. 9). This new American culture though, is not a creatio ex nihilo, but hermeneutically speaking builds upon the legacies of past Americans with quite diverse backgrounds. America's significance, thus, is neither captured by "speaking English only" nor by guaranteeing every cultural group its identity, but rather is revealed in the intersubjective interaction between the varied peoples who have come to this country for political freedom and economic opportunity. The challenge to the longstanding members of American society is not to petrify the success that their family or their cultural group has achieved, but to recognize that this legacy can only be carried on by individuals who, in all likelihood, will not be from "their background." In discussing what makes a good teacher, Sara Lawrence Lightfoot accents: "In some sense you have to see yourself reflected in the eyes of those you teach - or at least see your destiny reflected in them" (Lightfoot, 1989, p. 160). By analogy, what a substantive pluralism emphasizes is that being an American is the capacity to work through linguistic and cultural differences to find your destiny through and with "the other." In contrast to the overbearing uniformity of assimilation and the limiting parochialism of the utter diversity position, a substantive pluralism provides a sense of hope that multicultural relations can be pursued in a fruitful dialogue which will never culminate in complete unanimity nor a complete breakdown of interchange. Its emphasis on the finite, yet pluralistic character of the human condition offers the hope that an inexhaustible set of possibilities lies ahead for multicultural interaction (Madison, 1988, pp. 51, 115). Precisely because we are "inescapable acting and narrating beings," we have the wherewithal to find in our culture the resources for dealing with other ones (Madison, 1988, pp. 102-103). University of St. Thomas Houston, Texas

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Anzaldua, Gloria, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1987). Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958). Barringer, Felicity, "Census Shows Profound Change in Racial Makeup of the Nation", New York Times, 11 March, 1991, A1+(N). Bernstein, Richard J., Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983). Elizondo, Virgil, The Future is Mestizo: Life Where Cultures Meet (Bloomington, In: Meyer-Stone Books). Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Truth and Method. Trans., Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Crossroad, 1982). Geertz, Clifford, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973). Geyer, Georgie Anne, Americans No More (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1996). Kymlicka, Will, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, I 990a). Kymlicka, Will, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990b). Lightfoot, Sara Lawrence. Interview by Bill Moyers, in A World of Ideas: Conversations with Thoughtful Men and Women About American Life Today and the Ideas Shaping Our Future, ed. Betty Sue Flowers (New York: Doubleday, 1989), pp. 156-166. Madison, G. B., Understanding: A Phenomenological-Pragmatical Anaysis (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1986). Madison, G. B., The Hermeneutics of Postmodernity: Figures and Themes (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1988). Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, "From Mauss to Claude Levi-Strauss", in: Signs, trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 114-125. Mukherjee, Bharati, "Interview by Bill Moyers", in A World of Ideas II: Public Opinions From Private Citizens, ed. Andie Tucher (New York: Doubleday, 1990), pp. 3-10. Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971). Rawls, John, "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (Summer 1985), pp. 223-248. Ricoeur, Paul, "Universal Civilization and National Culture", in History and Truth, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1965), pp. 271-284.. Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur, The Disuniting of America (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992). Taylor, Charles, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Walzer, Michael, Thick and Thin: Moral Arguments at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). Workforce 2000: Work and Workers for the Twentieth Century (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hudson Institute, Inc., 1987).

OCTAVI FULL AT I GENIS

OUR VALUES OF EXPECTATION/EXPEDITION

A Study of their Hebrew Origin

I.

PRELUDE

Within the Indo-European tradition we find ourselves placed under the Latin influence and from this position it is necessary to consider the term prelude, instead of doing it out of verbosity and impudence. Ludus, the game, comes tied to the verb ludo, lusi, lusum, I play, I played and the already played. However, the semantic core of this verb contains more than one sema pointing to other meanings more or less related, such as to have a good time, to enjoy, to be entertained, to laugh at, to spend or waste time - "artem arte ludere" -, lie and even thwart - "ludere operam". Before such a varied number of meanings, the question An me ludit amabilis insania? - Am I being deceived by alluring foolishness? occurs to me in the form of a self-accusation. Prae I translate as before, expecting that or because of. Praeludo was to get ready, to prepare for something or, if one prefers, marked the "warm-up" which in our case is intellectual. Praeludium indicated what preceeds a performance, theatrical or not. With all of this we go on with the meaning which is what entices me. The prelude goes before what follows, which, incidentally, is not a presentation - that is, to make something present as a whole - but a modest "re-presentation", a copy, sketch, profile, imitation, translation or in some cases a parody of something of substance that we don't have direct access to, neither by flesh nor by understanding - Verstand and not Vernunft within Hegelian and non-Hegelian terminology. The destiny of the prelude is no other than preparing for the via crucis of the "re-presentation" remaining always pending the presentation, the immediacy of the values that have a value in themselves - and I am not writing by themselves - which is the subject that not only occupies us but concerns us as well. Because, can I be told what is educating, if our aims are simply there for no reason, almost bored by the passing of time? It seems that we would like extremes that are indisputable crowning points. The task or labour I am undertaking consists of pointing to a value that is most important for Western education, but which is not the only 95 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 95-124. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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one that matters to it. The title of this essay contains the thesis - thesis in Greek is the action of putting something - which I defend: "Our Jewish Values of Expectation and Expedition". Our refers to Europe and its diaspora, that is, Western culture, leaving aside other macrohermeneutics which men have given themselves, although they have done so blindly and without perceiving such a serious vissicitude. The great human groups have interpreted themselves, thus making meanings and values. The West is the child of Judaism, Hellenism and Romanism. In this present study I am keeping to the most important value of Judaism, if I am not mistaken. Europe, more than a geographical topos with inexorably fluctuating borders, is a mental construction cum Jundamento in re, that is to say, with a real basis but in the end something constructed mentally. IndoEuropean space; Jerusalem, Athens, Rome; invasions from the East with the Benedictines saving what they could; Islam as the enemy which forces consciousness of a European whole; pilgrimages to Santiago de Compostela; universities; Italian Quattrocento; the Enlightenment with Peter the Great; the French Revolution; the Industrial Revolution; Liberalism and Socialism. Europe, the cradle of the West, is at the same time a process of identification and distinction, a social-historical ecosystem and a unity of opposites. Well, I am searching for a constant value within this construction and for this case, I will point to the Jewish Weltanschauung as one of the original reference points of the macrocivilization. But, what is value? The only certainty is that it provides a never-ending topic for discussion. To start with, value comes from the Latin valeo, valui, valitum, to have a value, to be strong or vigorous, to be well, to have power, to be healthy. So "valere ab oculis" meant "to see well". A value that is not resistant or strong looses ipso facto its value, at least that is how it was established by the speakers' community that gave it such a significant-significance. We can disembowel and assassinate the child that the significant carried in her womb, but for this one needs the courage that would lead to the infanticide of this foetus of the West. Economic values, esthetic values, ethical values. I take value in its absolute normative sense, in other words, its ethical and universal significance as observed by Kant in Grudlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. An absolute value cannot be replaced by anything else. Therefore human dignity is an absolute value while that of sardines is relative. Nietzsche

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mocked absolute values, for him all values were relative to the historical genesis of the human mind. In consequence, all values were reduced to that of sardines. From Judaism I will only emphasize the paradigm concentrating on the figure of Abraham on account of his being such an objective figure in the anthropological time of Jewish people. What is the so-called Jewish figure of Kairos? It is expectation and expedition. Expectation is the term rooted in the Latin spectare, to look, examine, contemplate, observe, appreciate, draw in, refer to, consider or to have as a goal. "Spectatio pompae circensis", the view of the circus games. Ex: from, from the inside of. The ex-pectatio, the expectation, is the ecstasy that ventures what is to come as the essence of anthropos. This, the human being, consists in an unavoidable way of future time. The Jew would reaffirm that the future categorizes man - the Hebrew man, of course - more than the present or the past. One must live from - ex - what one is and what one has been, with a view to - spectatio - what is waiting for us, which in its extreme consists of apogee and summit. Only the value that comes from what is to come deserves absolute respect, present and past values are no more than museum exhibits or stuffed birds. And so, waiting for, waiting and hoping for eskhaton, the last, and for the parusia, for the fulfilling presence. Expectation does not define a value that produces sedentaries. It is not a passive look, but a constant setting in motion. Jewish values engender nomads and adventurers, from here comes the other face of Jewish values, expedition. Of the ex from ex-peditio I spoke about earlier. From the Latin word pes, with genitive pedis, we have the Spanish for foot, "pie". An ex-pedition is nothing other than putting the feet forward, from here to there and even from yonder to over there - in the French sense of ailleurs -, always towards a residuary space, unknown and foreign, with fantasy as the only access even if it is in the end, uncertain. Thus ends the prelude and it is now time to initiate the representation. II.

MAN'S TIME

Time is the category sine qua the human phenomenon cannot be understood, it is the most important anthropological category. But when pronouncing the significant time, one is astonished because one finds oneself sent into a multi-form meaning. Already the Greeks realized such

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a semantic wealth in the center of temporality that they could not help creating various significants-significances of such singular reference as time seems to be. Khr6nos, the devouring duration, relentless, of everything that moves or shifts; a time that tries to be objective. Ai6n, the time of biographical life, the destiny of a flesh and bone existence of one who has to face death. Kair6s is the time of the moment, of opportunity, the favourable chance, the time to dance or reap the harvest. Kair6s leads the way enthusiastically towards a point, it has a sense of direction. Moira, the part one is inexorably given in the passing of History; destiny. However, time can take us unaware, moving to Kairotes, novelty and surprise. For this reason it is not surprising that the temporal also looks towards something better, becoming Elpis, hope, hope thrown to its height, to its limit, to the Eskhat6s. Also, what does one hope there, beyond the horizon? Pleroma, plenty and consumation which is Parusia, definitive presence, that is, the manifestation of that which, with the passing of time, is always hiding. Time, in its various meanings, Hellenic or contemporary, concerns us in full. Why? Precisely because we ask questions. The animal that inquires confirms its temporality. At the beginning of Was ist M etaphysik?, Heidegger writes: Every metaphysical question can be asked only in such a way that the questioner as such is present together with the question, that is, placed in the question.

Man is the only beast that asks, and this fact means that, in the action of asking, the human being manifests himself, becoming Dasein, intelligence of the being. In the end, the formal structure of no matter what questioning implies a horizon of intelligibility that settles in the prebeginning of the asking itself. Asking includes the pre-beginning of asking as well as the time in which one inquires and also the time in which one expects an answer. In the Sophistes e Peri tou 6ntos - 246,a -, Plato refers to a "gigantomakhia peri tes ousias", a battle of giants around the being. What battle? Precisely the one that confronts the being to the nothing; in this fight I see the source of time, its course. Man is a gigantomakhia in his pre-origin. How does he cope? Where does the transit that forms him get its strength from? Conscience, however, is only present conscience, the conscience of now. So it seems, at least at first. The present encompasses a double no: no to the absence of the already accomplished and no to the distancing from the "what-is-to-come". The destiny of the present

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is to finish the past and to open the future. If we accept this continuity of time, due to the act of conscience, the present stops being everything and is overwhelmed by the being. In Genesis - 11,7 - of the Jewish Torah we read: And Yahweh Elohim formed the Adam from the dust of the Adamah and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, thus the Adam became a living creature.

Elohim forms Adam, and makes him precise, different, pulling him away from the dough of the Adamah and, as if this were not enough, blows air and fire into him, - "life breath" -. The Hebrew verb Naphoah, that has the noun Napah - blacksmith -, mixes air and fire, it is the untouchable in an inebriated movement. Removed from the Adamah, the Adam becomes himself, entering in that way into the duration experienced as such, as a course. The Adamah did not go any further than being in itself; the Adam - the human -, instead, is ec-static, is for. And so the verse by Quevedo sounds quite good: Soy un fue y un sera y un es cansado.

I just wrote quite good because of tiredness. This is already an interpretation of anthropological ecstasis: the I am, the shall be and the was. About twenty kilometers from Zamora there is an eighth-century Visigothic church, San Pedro de la Nave. Harmonic, exact, peaceful. It takes a space with no pretensions of greatness; it charms by its humbleness. Nevertheless, the importance of San Pedro de la Nave is not the space it takes up, but the time it accumulates. It is a concrete time, as long as we understand concrete in its etymological form. Cum and crescere, with and grow, became in Latin concrescere, which participle was concretum, what has grown by mass. San Pedro de la Nave is now the result of a temporal growth as a whole. Its space is the where of the result of growing. The important point is the time passed since the then of the eighth century until the present of almost the twenty-first century. We could not count on San Pedro de la Nave without human memory. Kant already realized the supremacy of time over space when he remarked, in Kritik der reinen Vernunft, that understanding can never work without a reference to time. In this way, Kant already had the feeling that being and time were connected. Aristotle and his pupils stay behind, with their naturalization of time, and the possibility of making act of conscience and time inseparable remains open. Does anything happen

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away from time? The Aristotelian ti to on - what is the being? - opens to: what is time? After Kant, Husserl sees in Logische Untersuchungen something inherent, interior to the subject, while Heidegger, still under the influence of Husserl, publishes in April 1928 some studies about the intimate conscience of time in which he supports that the subject is, himself, time. According to Heidegger, the temporal succession does not exist on one side, nor, on the other, the modes of conscience through which time would be perceived, but there is only one process of temporization. Biography, and History, are kairological - from Kairos - at the point where they establish their relationship to time, a relationship that is the conclusion and accomplishment of a time which is by itself indetermination in the face of the future. We are not placed in time, time lives in us, building, in this way, civilization, but perhaps, as Nedoncelle states in Sensation separatrice et dynamisme temporel des consciences, there is also an existential time, related to self-choice, that, going further than worldly time, goes towards a transhistorical future. Being is, in the end, coherent memory within the already been, what one is now and what one aims to be. Bergson distinguishes, in L'Evolution creatrice, between "le clos" and "l'ouvert", all creation ends up getting lost in imitation, in repetition, in fabrication - a closed world -, but then comes open time that changes everything, always inventing, creating without pausing, living on aspirations. Ilya Prigogine, the philosophical chemist, states in La Fin des certitudes that nature itself is no longer automatic and all cognizable but has turned into permanent invention, submitted to the game of probability. Conscience, body, world. My time does not rise from the absence of the world and even less from the absence of my own body, which is meditation. We have time at our disposal because we count on body and world; but temporization is inevitably the transcendence of the present. Khronos ends in Thanatos, but what about Kairos? Life ends in death, but existence is not bound to the defeat of death. We belong to the world but it does not belong to us, we are stateless, foreigners to the world, Heideggerian Unheimlichkeit. St. Augustine, commenting on Genesis in his Confessions (Chapter XI) writes that heaven, earth and time are created semel et simul. We cannot count on time without the world, but as Husserl remarks in Vorlesungen zur Phiinomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, it is not devoid of a conscience either, since time as such does not include

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the interpretation of time. It is in the Da-sein - the here and now of being - that the coming of the world and History takes place. The succession of temporality does not include by itself its significance. Without conscience, we miss the sense, the "what for". Khronos is "before-duringafter" while Kairos is "not-yet". Conscience brings the "not-yet" forward. In everyday life we only find dispersion and therefore the incomplete and the unfinished. Time only takes a significance from the future, as St. Paul portrays in the letter he sends to the Christians of Philippi (III, 12-14): I do not reckon myself to have got hold of it yet. All I can say is this: forgetting what is behind me, and reaching out for what lies ahead, I press towards the goal to win the prize.

In spite of Paul's faith, we must recognize that our main piece of information is worldliness. Nevertheless, our humanity can only be thought of as referring to a wide future that we cannot dominate. We do not have any other possibility than the one which makes possible the realities that make possible, experienceable realities, and that we can experience to the limit, but never to the "beyond". Both Gadamer Warheit und Methode - and the last Heidegger - Unterwegs zur Sprache - insist on the fact that possibility conditions of understanding can only be found in the historicalness of understanding itself, that is, in the temporal context of understanding, which means an always diverse understanding. Language narration, in consequence, is the historical place of comprehension. The Historie and not the Geschichte is the space of human clarification. Word and time are inseparable. Narrative makes sense objective. Ill.

PREGNANT WRITINGS

We have considered that the human being is time. Now it is a question of stressing that there are narrations that objectivize the collective experience of anthropological time and that such narrative objectivization is essential. The discourse that uses what the Germans call Rede, the Greeks Logos and the Latins Ratio does not reflect the complexity of the anthropos. This surpasses the concept. Imagination is far more important to clarifying the human, as Bachelard brings to our attention in his book La Terre et les reveries de la volante. Imagination surpasses logic because man exceeds reason. Narrative is the History of the human

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imaginative capacity. Language always ends up saying more than what it says. Using Hegelian terminology, I would say that the Vorstellung or figurative thought is more significative than the Begriff or conceptual thought. Besides, the question of whether the concept can exist without the support of the imaginative representation remains open. This question appears due to the fact that man, more than being formed by the possession of language, is formed by being able to present himself with the problem of language. Logic-discourse is rooted in lived experience, in the Lebenswelt. But from this "life-world" narration is born before logic-thought. We never perceive time directly, but through mediation, and narrative is the most significant. The volumes of Temps et recit by Paul Ricoeur explain this statement. Lacking the intuition of totality, we only have narration left. And so the doxa ends up defeating the episteme. The story is more attached to the life of men, such temporal beings, than to the logic of science. The Dasein has a hermeneutic structure, it exists as verbalizing. Talking is to be participated in, and more imaginative talking than axiomatic or empirical talking. An immemorial text is an answer to perennial questions and therefore asks for interpretations. Values express the self-comprehension that a historical group has had from itself and that has been shaped in a legitimating myth. The narration does not only accumulate information in the memory, but also forestalls behaviours that are justified by it. Following more or less the argument of Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, by Hegel, I mantain that narrative texts express reality as it is thought. The contradictions of the text of the origins - Genesis, or Odyssey, or Aeneid - stop being scandalous, becoming the objectivization, in time, of human historical reason itself. A text, or a part of a text, is nothing but an example that leaves to the hermeneutic - which can be the community - the task of the never ending gloss in search of a wealth meant to be unique. Greek thought defined man as zoon logon ekhon, as a living creature that owns the word. A word, nevertheless, does not talk about reality; Spinoza said graphically that the concept of dog does not bark. Language's duty is not to express reality, but to free us from its immediacy, and so to allow thought about it. Literature objectivizes the experience we have from historical time because we are not completely attached to it. The talked about is the inner experience of a group. Existential historicity is experienced through tales, myths and symbols. The writer of the Genesis in the story of Abraham does not work as a

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contemporary writer, since he writes, or re-writes, tied to the collective conscience of a concrete society that already sang its heart, in which pain, sin, death, pleasure, origin and end lived. The author or authors of the writing of the Genesis set off from an originally oral material to which he gives a poetical shape, starting from the living experiences of generations and generations. The three volumes of L'Idiot de lafamilZe, by Jean-Paul Sartre, mean to interpret Gustave Flaubert's work by analyzing his subjectivity with Psychoanalytic and Marxist methods. Madam Bovary is due to a cold, unaccepted mother, and to an oppressing father that gave Flaubert his literary inclinations. The case of the chronicle of Abraham stays apart from Sartre's etiological study. Abraham is not a concrete character, he is the symbol of the collective comprehension of the anthropological time lived by the Jewish people. Richard Rorty, in the work edited by Gianni Vattimo, Que peut faire Za phiZosophie de son histoire? - Seuil; Paris 1989, pp. 58-94 - distinguishes four typologies in the making of History. In the case of Genesis, I am concerned about the one that voluntarily wants to be anachronic and anti-historical and where narrations are necessary because they help to give significance to the problems that occur constantly throughout existence. What is the relationship between a presumed past and its literary representation? There is no relation other than life's meaning. Gadamer, in Warheit und Methode, draws attention to the fact that critical conscience can never completely free itself from the pre-comprehension that works as an existential prestructure. Genesis stands in the precomprehension of the world, being work marginalized from critical conscience. The past, in Genesis, always walks in front of us giving a meaning to existence, to its urges and astonishments. What Abraham's narration undertakes inevitably transcends the same relationship, in the end we cannot count on any other transcendence than the one that cannot be told, narrated. Talking, besides work and social institutions, has the task of inserting the subject in the intersubjective. The subject discovers his belonging to a concrete community with his group's foundational narrations. Only at the centre of a community of myths does the human subject become subject; without tradition both the historic community and the individual disappear. Without a conscience of belonging to something there is no human subject. The Pre-Socratics tried to point to the arkhe of everything, to Earth, water, air, to the undefined; and so did the Pythagorans with numbers and Heraclitus with fire, as the Eleatics with

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the Being. Secret and common origins open up communities, even if they are scientific ones. A contemporary author like Rene Girard does the same even if the subject changes. Both La Violence et Ie Sacre and Des choses cacMes depuis La fondation du monde settle the "rivaLite mimetique", with the subsequent violence, at the source of the civilization, of the group. Narrations that talk about origins talk about the never said; and even more, about the unsayable. How, against the earlier Wittgenstein, can we think and say what lies beyond language's limits? In the end, that is what Genesis talks about. Does not Heidegger, when he changes the being, even if it is a matter of a privileged being like the Dasein, into a phenomenon of the Being, play quite a similar game? The tales of the Dasein are narrations about the unsayable. But they are not able to form a people - not even the German people - because they are just someone's experiences. A pilgrimage to the origins becomes necessary. Telling, in its first meaning, is de iknym i, showing what surpasses all our sensorial organs; is, in consequence, epamakemptein, returning to the origin, to the foundation myth. Reading the Genesis narration on Abraham, we lack vision and only listen to whom it assures to have seen. It depends on us to accept or reject such testimony; at any rate, let us suppose we reject all testimonies from the origins: then we will not be able to justify our course, life becoming, in that case, an absurd and boring pastime or divertissement. Elohim, as a pre-origin of foundation myths, can only be told, but never known in any way. Vorstellung therefore, from God, but not Begriff. Thought approaches God only imaginatively, through anecdote. They are reallly language games, in the sense that the later Wittgenstein gives to them. When Mircea Eliade defines the human being as a "homo religiosus", she is just emphasizing the recitative primacy of the anthropological. Aristotle - Peri hermeneias, 17 a 1 - writes: Esti de logos apas men semantik6s.

The task of discourse is to designate something - someone, I would add. Narration leads towards something, but it never hands it over to me. Everything indicates that without the others, who read what has been written and accept it, there is no origin and only remains the an-arkhe, confusion, dissipation, turbulence, everyman-for-himself. The texts about origins are not descriptive, but they are not reduced to the emotional

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either, by not giving more information about the world. They are texts whose task is to plant themselves in a group, giving a significance to it. There is reference in their mythic language, but such reference does not point towards the sphere of the world's objects, but towards the imaginative manifestation of the always hidden, which is essential for the historical legitimization of a people. Faced with this literature, the act of listening preceeds the act of understanding. In this last one, the "I" dominates; in listening, however, the received has prerogative. Covering himself in mythical narrations, the human being understands himself, even if he does not appreciate worldly objectivity. This is because an exegesis of biblical texts as the one used by the Formgeschichte, or history of forms, is concerned with oral traditions that preceed written texts in an attempt to get closer to never told beginnings. In such narrations about the sources there is more talking to men than talking of men, at least formally. They are texts in wich sense has its representation. The origin of anthropological time is shaped differently in GrecoRoman Paganism - Odyssey, Aeneid - than in Sinai tic Judaism - Genesis. In the first shaping, everything is monochordic: Theos belongs to Physis, Deus is a part of Natura. That is not the case in the Hebrew literature of Genesis and Exode, where lahweh Elohim is wholly the other in relation to what exists. Later Christianity rises up from the contraposition, dialectically assumed, between the same of Greco-Roman Paganism and the radically different of Sinai tic Judaism. The biblical text is, initially, the whole of the oral traditions of the Hebrew people. From eleventh century B.C. (the Hebrews knew how to write from the thirteenth century B.C.) and through the centuries, the oral tradition is written in a multiplicity of narrative systems sometimes contradictory within themselves. There were many different versions of what the Hebrew Bible was to become. Finally, the writing of one unique text was imposed: the work of the Doctors of the Law and the Rabbi. We have to wait until the first century to have the definitive and closed canon, or model, of the Bible of the Jews. At any rate, the question is to be able to have access, in some way, to the oral tradition of the people's beginnings; it is there that this people starts being conscious of its existence and meaning. The Bible will be, inevitably, a text always open to exegesis. The initial narration and the consequent commentaries shape the tradition by which Israel gives itself a historical identity. The story of Abraham still belongs to the nomadic

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phase of an original clan, and a far more different narration of the writings referring to a sedentary Israel will be necessary. IV.

THE "MYTHOS" AS A SOURCE

The texts we have just been talking about contain origin myths. In such narrations roots the source of the group's understanding. The anthropos is the only animal that asks. Asking implies a conscious astonishment. The question implies both ignorance and a suspect of something. He who asks may not get an answer, that is his risk. He who interrogates breaks the zoological circuit of "stimulus-answer", since the possibility of the nothing stands in the middle. Nothing of, obviously, and not an absolute nothing. Nothing of is provided by the conscious act. Thanks to such a structure, man can make a projection in front of stimulation instead of limiting himself to reacting, which is what all other beasts do. The interesting thing about this is that, often, the human being ends up asking about himself, which implies not knowing oneself. None of the answers he gives himself satisfy him. From question to answer and from this again to question, and so on and so on ... endlessly. The anthropos only knows how to ask but he never gets the answer right. This situation becomes unbearable. How can one explain such an odd and insecure animal? Constitutive prohibition, which Kant would name the Categorical Imperative, places itself in the ontic principle of the human. We can not be what we are - beasts -, we must be the other. Being submitted to a behaviour with a universal designation, as Kant supports, requires not being oneself. The forbidding of incest or homicide is anti-zoological. Man is no more natural. The violence made to nature introduces ethics. That Cain kills Abel is something natural, given the circumstances in which the murder is committed, but is immoral as well, because it faces the prohibition that the origin's myth narrates. And the myth does not enclose legality, but precisely legitimacy. What is legal belongs to historical transformations; what legitimizes, instead, concerns the myth that initiates us. The foundations of civilizations rest on something irrational and indispensable at the same time. Consciousness of prohibition, that is what the mythic discourse narrates. In Plato's Charmide - 169 d -, Socrates refers, albeit obscurely, to conscience: To know what one knows and does not know.

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Conscience is inexorably conscience of the opposite. Apperception deprives us of narcissism or persistence in being what one is. And so the support of the moral, what has never been said clearly, can appear. The "know yourself" from the temple of Delfos, that impressed Socrates so much, shows the limits of the anthropological versus the theological. Accepting the frontiers humbly makes the justification of human existence possible. Man can do good in the same measure as evil, as Genesis II, 16-17 states: And Elohim Yahve commanded the man thus: - from every tree of the garden you may eat; but from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you must not eat.

Only disorder makes order possible. Without prohibition, there is no man. That is precisely what the beginning's myth tells. The myth narrates the anthropological situation itself in the act of being born, in its archaic and incipient state that foreshadows the final or scatologic state. Origin is the anticipation that makes humans exist in a constant "pre-occupation" and "pro-jection". Thanks to the myth we live for the parousia. The sense comes from an anteriority that is offered as a vocation or call to be men in an historic community. The anteriority that the mythical narration hides invites one to an unending conversion, a constant conversion to the other. Not everything thinkable is also verifiable; human destiny is not to be verified, but simply embraced. At this point, the consideration that Heidegger develops in Yom Wessen des Grundes becomes quite appropriate. He states that liberty becomes the foundation of the foundation, but since liberty is finite, since it is not its own origin, it turns out that as a foundation, liberty is Abgrund, abyss. The tragedy of the human. The foundation myth that must be embraced to legitimize the History of a people, of a civilization, is good and not right, is bondad and not justicia. The myth is attractive, but it is not an imperative by itself. It is Kant who gave a primacy to right over good. The good of the myth is lived as a lost object without which, nevertheless, we cannot go on with sense. Mythical narration is not experienced as a hedone, a successful relationship with time. In the end Aristotelian hedone is not an attitude in front of reality, but the attitude of reality itself. The myth is not shown as an actual, perceptible reality, but a distanced reality. Getting the myth is not the task of the empirical "I", but the task of the eschatological "I", since the mythic does not infer from our facticity, but is

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percieved as a tension between an end and a beginning that the ending itself asks for. Man, as a "being-in-the-world", is completely unable to go over History's horizon; the support of the moral, the meaning of the human being, is not historical, only eschatological. Pretending to understand the myth from what conscience is - psychology - only hinders the analysis; the myth must be approached from what conscience wants - moral. The human phenomenon is offered in significance nets that man has woven at the centre of the historical process, searching for its sense. The anthropological significance, nevertheless, that is searched collectively, surpasses the human. In the end, man does not start anything. Tradition owns its source in the pre-time and only has a value because there are people who adhere to it. It is, in any case, supposed that the intelligibility of the mythic comes from the outside even if it is not in the outside, as Heidegger, in Was ist Metaphysik?, proceeds when he questions himself about to einai and ta onta. The being is not the Being, but this pushes the being even if we never find the Being when we disembowel the being. This is what happens with that which strengthens the mythical narrations. Does the Being coincide with the nothing, and then is there nothing but beings? Is the nothing a support and foundation of the myth? Then, as Heidegger does, we will have to interrogate the nothing. Perhaps this nothing is nothing-of Eternity, becoming aware of the Eternal. In a study about time by St. Augustine in Confessions, - book XI, chapters 11 to the end -, the temporal process becomes unintelligible without referring it to the Eternal God. He writes in chapter XIII: Hodiemus tuus aetemitas .... Omnia tempora tu feeisti, et ante omnia tempora tu feeisti, et ante omnia tempora, tu es, nee aliquo tempore non erat tempus.

The temporal is defined relating to the eternal; time is a non eternal being. It is present, past and future. The mythical narration, temporal, either

hangs from the intemporal or lacks significance, becoming nothingness. In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger separates Temporalitat - horizontality in the horizon of time in which the beings that are not the Dasein, lay from Zeitlichkeit, ecstasis in which the Dasein exists as understanding of the Being. The concept of Zeitlichkeit fits the mythos better. The myth cannot be understood with the concept of truth defined as correspondence; in the myth the test becomes possible at the centre of an opening to the sense, to the communitary project. Knowing, in the myth,

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stops being grasping - Begriff- to become inhabiting; the myth becomes valid as an articulation of the self-understanding of a people; that is, a hermeneutic. Practical reasoning is unable to guarantee, contradicting Kant, the existence of one single reasonable answer. Resorting to mythical narrations seems indispensable. Mythical narration opens the space of the human faced by a world that appears threatening and unsure; the myths link present, past and future, thus introducing signification. The myths objectivize the collective conscience in its originary state. Enlightened reasoning is responsible for the historical loss of the myth as the main legitimizing resort for the valuing of existence. Mythical narration is justified because it is considered sacred, undeniable, unanswerable, and thus the shaper of a context of foundation of social reality on the basis of the sacred. In case we did not accept our Western foundation myths, we should invent some others, but this last choice will always be artificial. It is preferable to recover the values that come from Greco-Roman and Jewish mythology. In the present study I will stick to a Hebrew cosmovision. V.

THE WANDERING JEW

It is now time to clearly approach our Jewish values of expectation and expedition. The Hebrew Bible - from the Greek ta biblia, the books was formed from various oral traditions that were slowly and scatteredly fixed on words. The Hebrews knew how to write in the thirteenth century B.C. Some of the different written texts were selected and grouped, progressively, to reach the definitive text, The Scripture, made by the Doctors of the Law, the Rabbis or teachers. The first five books of the Bible - Pentateuch in Greek and Torah for the Jews - are formed by four different traditions intertwined among each other. They were written in Hebrew, a language that stopped being spoken in the fourth century B.C. The text entered our Western culture, informing it, through Greek and Latin translations. The most important of the Greek translations is the one made in Alexandria in the third century B.C.; in Latin, the main translation is by St. Jerome, who carried out his ardous task in the fourth century. Personally, I have worked with the French version of La Bible Dhorme, from the Pleiade, with the Catalan version Bfblia catalana, traducci6 interconfessional, and with the Spanish translation Pentateuco I, Genesis, Exodo, by Ediciones de Cristiandad, occasionally comparing these versions with the Hebrew text published in a

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bilingual edition - Hebrew, French - by the Jewish community of France - Editions Colbo. 1 The Jew lives obsessed by his origins, he is almost not interested in the end as a finishing. It is not strange that Ouaknin, in his book Lire aux eclats, - 1994 -, mantains that the categories of Hebrew thought are eroticism, fight, sense, enigma and dance. Everything hangs from the source and the origin, the "Bereshith bara Elohim"; everything lives in sequences: The whole, from nothing, and the rest. The imprecise anthropology of the Torah, with its elusive concepts of basar - that is not equivalent to soma or to sarx -, of nefesh - that does not coincide with psykhe -, and of ruah - that is not equal to pneuma nor no us - is an anthropology uncertain enough to leave naked the never-ending problem of the human phenomenon. The only certain point of reference is Elohim or Adonai, the mystery-source. The Hebrews appear in History around 1800 B.C., as a shepherds' community from the Middle East. Abraham establishes the beginning of the group, becoming its paradigm. Moses, around 1250 B.C., consolidates the clan or people of Israel, with the Torah, the Law of Moses. In 2000 B.C. in Mesopotamia, between the Tigris and the Euphrates, the Sumerian and Acadian civilizations have developed, with a cuneiform writing. Semite tribes from the Arabian desert went towards this wealth and finally founded Babylon. Hammurabi is the most famous king of the first dynasty. The clan of Abraham was one of the groups that settled in that opulence. In 2000 B.C. the city of Ur in Chaldea was already wealthy and powerful. The Semite nomads, upon invading the Mesopotamian space, happily established themselves in that fertile land. Around 1900 B.C., Abraham and his group settled in the area of Ur, afterwards migrating west, to Canaan. Living comfortably in Ur: The Eternal said to Abram - Abraham later on -: Leave your country, your kinsfolk and your father's house, for the land that I will show you (Genesis, XII, I). Abram went away as The Eternal had commanded him (Genesis, XII, 4).

Abraham started his adventure without knowing his destiny. He simply believed and hoped, as St. Paul reads: The God who makes the dead live and summons things that are not yet in existence as if they already were. When hope seemed hopeless, his faith was such ... (Romans, IV, 18).

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Lekh-Iekha, go away, have nothing to do with the known and loved, land, friends, language, culture ... , forget everything as much as is possible and leave for the unknown "to the land that I will show you", imagined land, not owned. The Hebrew text does not talk about giving him a new land, but only about showing it to him. Ec-sistentia. Ecstasis and nomadism of Abraham. Ad-ventura, to the things that are to come. Adventurer of what has been seen but never touched. The sure is lost in exchange for hope in the far, so far that maybe it will not be reached in the swollen womb of time and space. Abraham is in the measure of which he stops being. Always observing the horizon of the beings in case the Being rises. Insecurity, imagination and hope. It only has to seem tangible. In Ur, Abraham was only the being thrown to the artificiality of existence. From the Lekh-Iekha he turns into the being thrown to the world, but not being the world, his home, his residence. Already Abraham's destination is not to have one; instead of being he becomes having to be, remaining inexorably thrown at the future. Identity, against Greece, - Ulysses is the one who goes back to himself, to the known - is obtained, losing place and time. Fleeing or abandonment of location and concert or persecution of the becoming. The there over the here and the afterwards also privileged in relation to the now and the before. The destiny of Abraham is none other than that of always living in front of himself, far from the present. The Romans, however, existed firmly placed in presence. Abraham persists from the eskhaton. His wandering does not save him from his constant foreignness; from Haran to Canaan (Genesis XII, 4) where he is no more than a stranger among Chananean tribes, being forced to go from settlement to settlement. At the end of his life he must confess: I am a stranger resident among you (Genesis, XII,4). After this Abraham buried his wife Sara in the cave of the field at Machpela, facing Mamre. that is Hebron. in the land of Chanaan. Thus the field with its cave passed from the Hethites to Abraham for use as a burial ground (Genesis, XXIII, 19-20). He died .... His sons Isaac and Ismael buried him in the cave of Machpela, facing Mamre, in the field of Ephron the Hethite (Genesis, XXV, 8-10).

The adventurer only enjoyed a space that was his, and that space was none other than his grave, where he covered his death. Nothing else. His own space, but space for nothing. His destiny was to flee forward. Sein und Zeit, by Heidegger, ends with the queries:

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Is time a reflex ion of the horizon of existence?

The symbol of Abraham is the being hurled far from himself in search of the other. Such a search, or hurling, in its facti city, proves that Abraham is not placed towards the origin of having to transcend, because he is made of being already hurled into transcendence. The text Lekhlekha turns Abraham into being permanently guilty. Leave your country means having to live forevermore lacking, lacking the other. Man, as he is hurled into Hebrew time, is not time nor his own ruler either. Abraham becomes a con-vert, because his wish, as the Platonic Meno remarks, is a demand of the different. Abraham is pro-ject, that is, projectile, from his becoming aware of his essential exile; from one land to another, from one time to another as long as he is flesh. What is touched and what is worry in relation to what cannot be touched and what is not yet. The future questions no matter what the present. The project calms concern, even though the only future for Abraham is reduced to his death at Machpela. If he has any other futures, they will now come to him from beyond. Under the Abrahamic model, as Levinas writes in Totalite et Infini, moral does not belong to manifestation, but to assignation. Abraham is a called one who has answered his expectant destiny with expedition. There is no place on earth nor a moment of History that is his: God brought me out of my father's land (Genesis, XX, 13). Abraham lived a long time in the land of the Philistines (Genesis, XXI, 34). I am a stranger (Genesis, XXIII, 4).

Can time give a meaning to time? It cannot, answers Abraham. The question, given the direction of existence, parts from the now-oj-time, from the "go away", from the Lekh-lekha, but the answer is not in walking, since walking turns out to be only alarm and suspicion, and nothing else. Whatever is the sense of the being, it belongs to the arcane and the depth. Abraham interprets anthropological time, but only as a way towards that which has not been reached. The symbol refers to the being who is not yet touchable. The Hebrew symbol Abraham stops being Dasein - here and now of the being - becoming being-towards. The symbol does not belong to the symbolized, the order of the Being, because it does not surpass the statute of the beings. The Abrahamic place and moment are not being-here nor being-now either, but being-towards. A bizarre relationship, but however a relationship and not inherence.

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Relationship to the be-coming. The Abrahamic anthropos is a prisoner whose place ends up being a no-place, whose existence is based on the violence made both to topos and khronos. His effort is directed towards ensuring that the world does not act as a nuisance to eschatological travel. Abraham exists only in passing, as happens to the pilgrim; both state that one cannot live peacefully inside of the space-time. All places and all times are defined as a precariousness. The world turns out to be uninhabitable. Lekh-lekha. But flesh - place and time - is the condition a priori for existential nomadism. God does not belong to the world, even though temporality and the death it includes open to what is possible. Kairos at any rate, but never Khronos. Time, body and death do not ever point, by themselves, to the Absolute; it is through the being-towards and not through the being here that the totality of the possible is insinuated, that showing what the world covers with its veil becomes credible. Worldly evidence shapes the horizon in which the pre-supposition of the totally-other is born. Temporally we do not count on any other theophany that is not the Abrahamic expectation and expedition, which rest on the imagination of a voice: leave your country. God only appears in the provisional and fragmentary. In relation to the Absolute we do not have a phenomenon, neither perceptions nor conscience phenomenize it. The beginning does not coincide with the eskhaton; Dr remains inexorably behind. In the Odyssey, it is different: beginning and end embrace each other in Ithaca. The Abrahamic understanding of the Now-oj-time needs an arkhe and an eskhaton, but it does not give them to us. The multiplicity of moments is understood from the outside of diversity, even though without being able to abolish that diversity, and therefore success cannot be reached. Nevertheless, the horizon is surely a closure but not necessarily a negative closure, it can appear as a positive closure as well. The end of the ecstatic movement is the beginning of the opening to what fulfills the traveller. The positive obtains clarification from the negative, the New Land rises on the horizon from the negation of the Dr of Chaldea, the Old Land. Abraham sees death as the definitive trial on his own appropriation, as a proof of the fact that we will never own worldly things unless we have them in the form of a prolongation. Abraham is placed in History, but without owning it. Death is not necessarily nothing; it only shows that the human being is not his own ruler. Ontic poverty gives a meaning to the anthropological. For the Heideggerian Dasein, there is only non-ending while the Dasein exists, self-perceiving as waiting; from the moment in which

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it already waits for nothing, the Dasein ends and only death is left. With Abrahamic anthropology, however, looking at the phrase in which Pascal writes in Pensees (n. 149 from the edition of Louis Lafuma, du Seuil, 1963) becomes indispensable: Tout ce qui est incomprehensible ne laisse pas d'etre.

Hegel writes in Frankfurt am Main his Teologische ludenschriften between 1793 and 1800. One of these texts is The Spirit of Christianism and Its Destiny; he wrote in 1799. I use the French translation by Editions Vrin, from 1981. Hegel means to concern himself with the essence of Judaism and in order to do it, he works on the figure of the patriarch Abraham and defines him as separation. And he writes - p. 4 and p. 5 in the French version by J. Martin: Le premier acte par lequel Abraham devient la pere d'une nation est une scission qui dechire les biens de la vie commune et de I'amour.

Therefore Abraham is defined as a breaking, a breaking in relation to what was substantial to him: his life-community - landscape, family, culture and work - and a breaking as well of the harmony of the established, ordered and understandable that gave shape to a Khosmos. Abraham ne voulait pas aimer (p. 6, as above).

The patriarch abandons love, which was just what gave a unity and circular meaning to his existence in Mesopotamia. Abraham does not only leave Chaldean culture and his people, he also starts to be in a new way; he exists in the measure that he is exiled from the world, a world understood as a whole. I have read Hegel, not in a Hegelian way, but according to my aim. Abraham does not embrace the New Land because he lacks a description both of the u-chronia and the u-topia. The absolute does not appear in the hermeneutic of facticity. Perhaps we can only refer to the beingin-front-of-God parting from the being-towards-death, at any rate, concern and anguish are no more than pre-eschatological figures. Abraham, in the measure that he perceives himself as an exile from the world, cannot experience death as one more event, but as the last possibility. Abraham does not count on a descriptive language of the meta-historic. However, in his foreignness he is unquestionably forced to live in the world, but with the category of a foreigner, of an expectant in expedition. Possibly

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wisdom is not useful to be with God. Notwithstanding, we meet an intentionality that can only be thought of from transcendence, but never from the permanent "I" in exile. Time and provisionality coincide. Can time initiate the definitive? Abraham unfailingly lives, even if moving on, in some land and some time. The world is also for Abraham that further from which there is nothing. The world encloses the last horizon of facticity. Abraham's statute of the walker - who runs away from, and searches for the other - does not free him from daily life. His radical possibilities stand, finally, at a crucial point: his in hora mortis. The adventurer's statute is ambiguous enough to discover traces where the others do not discover anything but facts or dates. This much is true: Abraham is certain that from the Lekh-lekha, facticity becomes insufficient to interpret facticity. Abraham always exists in front of himself. What happens with his death? Does the meaning of death come from a not yet present afterwards? The restless conscience stands in front of itself. The world is the condition of meaning, but never consists of meaning. VI.

THE NOT-YET

Our Jewish values of expectation-expedition that we have just considered turn around a nodal center which is the not-yet. Western culture is unintelligible if we detach ourselves from our Hebrew heritage. As a norm, the two other sources of the West, Athens and Rome, have been more emphasized. This is why I remained in the Jewish source of anthropological time of the Western or Christian civilization. Our collective values do not come from the other day, but from immemorial times. I ask forgiveness from the positivists sociologists, who also have a right to exist in the historical flirtations but never, however, having any privileges. Science renounces hope, satisfying itself with hope in beings. Wisdom has been deprived of this foolish movement, that having started in time, pretends to jump out of time, and that we call having hope. What exists, on the contrary, can create the hope for strength. The biblical timespace is orientated: fall and exile, rescued and given direction. Eternal life and Kingdom. Nevertheless, experience is not significant by itself. When man exists placed in the world, he reaches no other thing than what has been reached through senses and reason. On the contrary, if he starts living by his conscience he settles into the opening of the noematic

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sphere. Heidegger, with his concept of Erschlossenheit, makes a pilgrimage closer to the origins; the Dasein undertakes acts of conscience because it was previously opened to the world. Such opening, nevertheless, is never an opening to the biblical Yahweh, so far from the being. The noematic sphere is the wall that separates the "I" from the world. But to the historic being-in-the-world of the anthropos sticks the beingin-the-limit and this second experience allows it to suppose the 0 Kyrios Theos even though never, in any way, Yahweh, Elohim or Adonai. When the sacred becomes a property of the world, the sacred belongs to the Pagan, to the Greco-Roman civilization, for instance. When Pascal, in Pensees refers to man as "animal without nature", whose essence is existing in situations, in an unavoidable wandering, in confusion between face and mask, he is pointing to a possible category that is nothing but daring to go even further than the being-in-the-limit. Abraham's fleeing from every geographic and historic concretion and his constant persecution of the In-finite, from which he lacks any intuition, leaves him in anguish. Angst and not Furcht - in front of the everything or nothing, which is not concrete at all. Because of his will, Abraham makes a self-projection in front of himself. However, his future stops being describable within space-time coordinates, where everything is limited no matter how wide the horizon opens. Abraham is on the way to a future beyond which there is nothing, because it is an in-finite future. Death? The being-for-death of Heidegger and the beingtowards-death of Abraham do not coincide. In the second case, everything is still possible. Worldly experience is not significant. In consequence, no other exit opens besides the abandonment of security, of memory and of the present as well. The gesture creates the meaning in Abraham's life, gestural expedition personifies the meaning of the expectation. "Leave your land ... for the land which I will show you" and "Abraham went away". Expectation and expedition. The gesture implies renouncing and desisting from every certainty and every shelter. On the basis of going away one can look onto new horizons. Abraham, after renouncing his Mesopotamia, alters his everyday relationship with the world, a relationship that becomes Un-zuhause already, the existential mode of the being-out-of-home, that turns into Unheimlichkeit, in foreignness and exile. Abraham was familiar with Chaldean culture; renouncing it, he enters into another way of being in the world. A more original way, based on being in the world but without planting his tent in any specific place. Abraham discovers the Geworfenheit, consisting of being-hurled, and

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he finds as well the Entwurf, the project. This is: "leave your land" and at the same time "to the land that I will show you". Expectation-expedition. Abraham walks in the present with a concern of not falling back in the having-been from Chaldea, and with the care of one who is a project for the future, for the New Land. Enlightenment and Marxism live from the Abrahamic categories, even if they do so in an imminent way, that is, Pagan. I am The Eternal who brought you from Ur in Chaldea so that you go to the new land (Genesis, XV, 7). I will give you and your descendants the land to which you are going (Genesis, XVII, 8).

Abraham exists according to the mode of un-finishing and not of consummation or conclusion. The beyond of the horizon he can fulfill is not any noema. The meta-horizon remains apart from all phenomenality, including the one given to conscience and not only to senses. For Abraham, there is only living kenotically left - Kenos was in Greek: empty, without base. Heidegger accustomed us to taking the term being not as the noun "the being", but as a verb, as transition, asfieri, as Werden, as Becoming. 2 The Judeo-Christian Bible, and even the narration of Abraham, make up a process, from the beginning: "In the beginning" (Genesis, I, 1) to the end or accomplishment "Amen. Come, Lord Jesus. May the grace of the Lord Jesus be with you all" (Revelation, XXII, 20-21). Biblical time runs from the origin to its end through the plot. Abraham takes meaning at the center of this processional category. If we accept Bergson's terms, according to Les Deux Sources de La Morale et de la Religion, the duree, or real time, helps us to understand the category of Abrahamic time, even if they do not coincide. Abraham's time does not depend on him, but on his conscience. It is an ecstatic time by itself, that only acquires value from the future. Abraham consists of being-able-to-be, due to his insertion in existential nomadism from the moment in which he decided to leave the Ur of the Chaldeans behind. Voltaire, d' Alembert and Condorcet conceive historical time according to the model of progress. Such a paradigm defines History as a journey of Reason towards transparency, bypassing prejudices and customs. Kant will take up this conception from the Enlightenment in the opuscule Idee zu einer allegmeinen Geschichte in Weltburgerlicher Absicht. This Enlightenment concept of progress is not exactly time according to

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Abraham's destiny. Neither Popper nor Prigogine nowadays, with their concepts of an open universe and an open society, identify with the Abrahamic paradigm of existential foreignness. For Abraham temporality is non-hiding, aletheia, or in Heideggerian terms, Unverborgenheit. The last afterwards is in the now, despite being veiled. In consequence, time is unveiling. Abraham, in his condition of being separated from roots, moves into the History of the definite, History never finished in History. Jewish time is finite, but it has a sense, a direction, significance. The Eternal brings the plans of nations to nothing; He frustrates the counsels of the peoples. But The Eternal's own plans shall stand forever. And His counsel endures for all generations (Psalm XXIII, 10-11).

The Greek translation by the Seventy turns the Hebrew word aharit into eskhaton. Aharit designates the last, the final destiny. Abraham has a value from ultimateness understood as destiny. He has a value beyond what has been given and what can be given. The provisional acquires significance on the horizon of the definitive. The being-in-the-world rests on facticity, but Abraham must exist in view of something that cannot be deduced from the History of facts. According to positivity, we are towards death, but with hope we remain open to The Eternal, well understanding that The Eternal, Elohim, is not part of worldly categories. If we did not take account of conscience, there would be no way of referring to the opening to the transcendent, to the radically different. Such opening only happens in the international game, in the temporal fleeing from oneself. Abraham ceases to be his own master, hanging from the strange, as he becomes aware of his abandonment of the security of Ur. At this moment, the future is no more a project, turning into a proposal or call. Abraham takes significance in the measure to which he denies himself within his historical temporality and listens to the different. The Abraham of Ur existed in and for the relative and contingent. The text of the letter to the Christians at Philippi helps to understand Abraham. St. Paul expresses himself like this: Forgetting what is behind me (ta opiso epilanthanomenos), and reaching out for what lies ahead (tois emprosthen epecteinomenos), I press towards the goal (Philippians, III, 13-14).

Both Abraham and St. Paul come into the epectase, the search that does not allow any rest. There is no arrival, only ways, unlimited opening,

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permanent tension towards the nec plus ultra that waits at the end of a temporally foolish hope. The philosophy of Jaspers also helps us in the understanding of Abrahamic time. It is a matter of a philosophy of shattering, "Leave your country" in Abraham, and of conciliation "for the land which I will show you", also in the Jewish case. Jaspersian conciliation cannot be reached, being only a matter of faith. Scientific wisdom remains enclosed in the world. It is wisdom about immanence, wisdom closed in on itself. But, one can also account for the challenge of the will, decided to leap, which discovers upon failing, the Being placed beyond the Being. So it is for Eckhart, Tauler and Ruysbroek and the rest of German mysticism. The truth of Abraham, despite all efforts, will never coincide with the truth of Meta-Being. The time of the Abrahamic paradigm is not ontological, as occurs in Hegel, not ontic as with Positivism, but is a constant hermeneutic, as the way towards consummation lacking any kind of security. Totalite et Infini, by Levinas, as he affirms the otherness of the non-synthesizable, of the unintelligible, of the completely other, breaks with the Western tradition of the theories of totality, in which everything is assimilated. So, Abraham's destiny, his meta-Ur significance, becomes plausible in the confrontation of an intelligible otherness, so different from that which we can understand. Qohelet, the author of the Ecclesiastes, begins his text in this way: Emptiness, emptiness, all is empty (Ecclesiastes, I, 2).

The Hebrew word hebhel does not point towards the nothing, but to banality and insipidness, to the vain, frivolous, insubstantial, empty and inane. Hebhel is the inconsistent, ungraspable. Hebhel makes indifferent the same ontological difference placing itself far from the nothing, as we have said, but also far from all the beings. These historical beings are hebhel, watched by the eyes of the one who makes a pilgrimage already after the terrible Lekh-lekha, the go away. Dailiness has lost its support, it has disappeared. Atmis is the Greek translation of hebhel, even if the Seventy translate it as mataiotes, fragility, vacuity, illusion. Abraham has nothing left but to run towards the out-time riding on a faith that rests upon a fragile hope. Abraham travels, continually shouting Marana-tha! Come Lord! The Hebrew Abraham is hurled to what there is, but with the imposed project of going away from whatever there is to surrender to the expedition of the new, of the other, of the non-being.

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And of the non-Being? Abraham has to go on ahead, always more, with cura, - the Latin cura, as well as the German Sorge, with which Heidegger builds one of the categories of the Dasein, which implies both concern and cure. Abraham, the traveller, is concerned in his task of curing himself from the beings. The anthropological structure of the Not-Yet has three components: radical possibility, radical heterogeny and, lastly, radical conflict. The first two components are included in the concept of expectation. The third one, the conflict of having to exist for the afterwards and not only for tomorrow or the day after, is taken by the concept of expedition. The homo hebreus survives from the sphere of total possibility, running the risk of clumsily denying what is real, what is touchable, which is precisely the unavoidable. Abraham avoids this obstacle because as he searches, he does not stop walking from one point to another, from one moment to another. He moves among the beings, even if he does not settle among them because his biography receives meaning only from the horizon of heterogeneity. This is an insurmountable conflict and disagreement as long as he lives in the Not-Yet. Thomas Muntzer, once he has been de-Marxified, follows, at least as an allegory, the Abrahamic direction. Campanella, Marx, Lenin, Mao, Pol Pot, on the contrary, do not. These last ones have made Abraham's time immanent, and in doing so, they have murdered it. Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Freud stand, from the beginning, at the antipodes of Abraham; we are not interested in them for understanding him. Does Abraham expect to reach what he has lost? Not in any way. Abraham wants nothing from what he has left behind. Abraham only has the future left. The time of the desperate is hell. It is completely different for Abraham, only the future remains for him. As he has hope, he denies denying - Hegelianism. Abrahamic hope existentially creates transcendence. Abraham does not hope for espoir, liberation, a matter of World War II, for example, and a Historical matter. Instead, Abraham has hope - ontologic order - in Yahweh, Elohim or Adonai. Abraham lacks calculations and skills. He is not satisfied by a story told by simpletons. He possesses memory of the future because The Eternal hurled him - Lekh-lekha - from daily life, introducing him in the memory of the total future and turning him into the only being with a vocation. There is no one better suited than St. Paul for understanding Abraham. Here is a text taken from his letter to the Christians at Rome:

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For the created universe - humanity - waits with eager expectation - apokaradoxia tes Ktiseos - for God's children to be revealed - apokalypsin ton Theou uion apekdekhetai - ... (Romans VIII, 19-20).

Levinas observes something similar when prolonging the analysis of Husserl and Heidegger when he sees in the other an excess of being, someone who stands beyond any date. Eliphaz, Bildad and Tsophar, Job's three friends, at first discover the right thing to do, which is none other than remaining silent, in front of The Absolute. Afterwards, they will start talking and will say the usual idiocies of the scientist and of the technologist faced with the Other. They mistook fact for significance. Abraham will live in desolation, but never, in any way, in idiocy. For Abraham, God is not because God's destiny is to love. The eternal ordered him: go away, leave, step aside from the beings. And Abraham obeyed, not because this was sensible or rational, but because The Eternal loved him unconditionally, without reasons, absurdly. Abraham obeys The Eternal without having any experience of him. It is total adventure. Abraham ends in pure exposition, following the same line in which St. John of the Cross writes in Subida al Monte Carmelo: Dios no cabe debajo de imagen ni forma .... En Dios no hay forma ni semejanza (II, 16,7-8).

In Homo Viator (Ed. Aubier, Paris, 1945; pp. 47-48) Gabriel Marcel undertakes the subject of hope in a way that helps to understand the concept of Abrahamic time. He distinguishes between esperer en and esperer que, between hope in and wish for. Abraham has hoped over any type of wishing. In Abraham, his being-by-vocation exceeds absolutely his being-by-fact, even if he cannot disregard everyday experience. Abraham has hope in a gift, in a present, and not in something that he is owed. In such a situation, frustration becomes always possible. In Hegelian terms, the relationship of Abraham with The Eternal does not belong to the field of feeling, Gefiihl, nor to immediate knowledge, Wissen, but to the field of wisdom, Erkenntnis, with this last thing in a metaphorical way, because the Jewish patriarch stands by himself beyond all good sense. Once more, St. Paul's letter to the Christians at Rome is useful: We exult in the hope of the divine splendour (Romans, V, 2).

Only hope. Abraham cannot consider facts or dates. Naked hope in The Eternal, who spoke and sent him away from certainty, who exiled him

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from the posita. To start walking to where? To what Leviticus (XIX, 1-2) orders: The Eternal spoke to Moses and said, "speak to all the community of the Israelites with these words: You shall be holy because I, The Eternal, your God, am holy".

And Abraham trusted the irrelevant, the incongruent, the irrational and the absurd. And possibly he reached salvation. Nonetheless, he settled, without doubt, in the Not-Yet. VII.

CONSUMMATION

It is not consumption, but consummation. I am not parting from sumere,

to take, but from summus, the highest point. Consummare meant, among the Romans, reaching the highest level of the podium; that is, finishing something. "Consummare dignitatem alicujus", writes Seneca, "raising someone's dignity to the highest degree". We have reached the highest point of our discourse, therefore we cannot continue. We would irremediably fall into emptiness. Education in the West lives a miserable existence in Post-modernity, deprived of universal and necessary values. This is because so many funny essays, that is, entertaining essays about citizens' morals, appear. With more or less humor some talk about the nothingness of historical living with colorful notes or self-serving values. Others, with a priestlike vocation, even if they are atheists, preach the conversion to fraternity, tolerance, democracy, just in case some fool or simpleton joins in. This issue is very serious. Nietzsche abandoned us in astonishment and fled, sheltering himself first in insanity and later in death. It does not appear to be sensible to pursue walking in the abyss of Post-modernity unless we do not care about education or the engendering of the human. Man is different from a sheep or a mule simply because he cannot continue unless it is from a Weltanschauung or omni-understanding of everything there is. Only from such a vast frame will what he does, what he thinks, what he feels, and what he decides acquire meaning. Is there a cosmovision that appears universal and necessary? I ignore it. But it is unquestionable that at this moment we lack it. These things being as they are, in need, on the one hand, of a Weltanschauung and, on the other, the plurality of Weltanschauungen, it suddenly occurs to me that the most sensible thing would be to refer to the cosmovision in whose center we have appeared. It is that in which

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we discover ourselves already planted. It is none other than the one we call Western Civilization, or simply Christianity - a term that now lacks a religious meaning, having only a cultural one. I cannot find enough reasons to pack up and abandon the West in favour of the Macro-civilization of Benares or the Macro-civilization of com, be it the Incas, Mayas, or Aztecs. There would have to be powerful reasons to detach ourselves from the hermeneutic that the Mediterranean basin and its inhabitants have given to us from the complex human phenomenon. Therefore I shall stay with Western global understanding as long as I am not given any argument that convinces me to start such a risky journey. In such matters, neither Plato - monotheism - nor Nietzsche polytheism - but Socrates searches for the total but without a meeting inside of space-time. Neither dictate nor outrage, but dialoguing humility. Nothing more but nothing less either. Jerusalem, Athens and Rome shape the three origins of Western Macro-civilization. This cannot be understood without returning to its proto-historical sources. The values of education in the West come from the myths that have given meaning to our eventful and contrasting History. In this essay we have already reached the summum within what we had undertaken. This was referring to the concept of anthropological time in Judaism, one of the three hermeneutic pillars of our civilization. Abraham has been the paradigm we have used in order to do so. What value? We are developed by direction. What we have been given is never enough. The future has more value than the present or the past. Progress. There are many different readings of Abraham's hopeful journey; Jewish readings, Christian religious readings, Islamic readings, Pagan readings from the Enlightenment and from Marxism. All these readings accept the value "progress". Gradior, gressus sum was among the Romans to go by foot, proceed, step, walk. Progredior, progressus sum, gave, in the participle, progressus, the one who has gone forward. The noun progressus marked forward movement, advance. Progress is walking forward because one supposes there is a "where" to go. The value of going forward. Non-value of the sedentary and conformist. Value of dissatisfaction, non-value of certainty. Value of fantasy, non-value of memory and sensations and perceptions. Of course, the West does not only rest on Abraham, but also on Ulysses and Aeneas. But in this essay I have stuck to the Abrahamic symbol to obtain an axios which, among others, supports us. The being and the Being of the beings

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produce dissatisfaction. Hope implies Utopia, as long as this is not useless or dangerous. Status viatoris with the condition that there is status comprehensoris. An aphorism by the Greek physician, Hippocrates, went like this: Ho bios brakhus, he de tekhne makra.

A phrase that the Latins translated as the better known: Ars longa, vita brevis.

Life is too short for such a long work. But Audentes fortuna iuvat, as Virgil wrote in the Aeneid (X,284).

Universitat Aut6noma de Barcelona Translated by Rachel McCormack and Bibiana Morante Mediavilla NOTES I For the English translation we have used The Holy Bible. Translatedfrom the Original Languages with Critical Use of all Ancient Sources by Members of the Catholic Biblical Association of America, vol. I: Genesis to Ruth (Patterson, N.Y.: Anthony Guild Press, \953); and also The New English Bible with the Apocrypha (Oxford University Press, 1970). 2 English in the original text.

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ARQUITECTONICA DE LA ETICA DE LA LIBERACION

Para una etica de La vida deL sujeto humano l

El lunes 6 de marzo de 1995 comienza en Copenhage la Cumbre Social. Asistiran delegaciones de 180 palses. El tern a principal es: Mitigar y reducir la pobreza. Si en RIo de Janeiro se trataba de enfrentar las amenazas del medio ambiente, y en El Cairo la amenaza de la sobrepoblaci6n, en Copehague se busca enfrentar la pobreza y el desempleo,2 que se pueden expresar en la min mas grave amenaza del conflicto 0 desintegraci6n social. Un nuevo fen6meno, resultado de la globalizaci6n econ6mica, que se conoce como social dumping, y que consiste en la disminuci6n de los salarios, de prestaciones sociales y de otras condiciones de vida para poder competir internacionalmente. Con el social dumping se pauperizan incluso una parte de quienes participaban antes activa y directamente en el mercado global. 3

En un di
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teniendo claro que es un momenta necesario pero no suficiente. En el §2 reinterpretare el senti do de las morales formales, ya que son, en mi ipinion, la dimension procedimental de la "aplicacion,,4 del principio material (invirtiendo completamente la problematica tradicional de la cuestion), y tambien debe considerarsela como un momenta necesario pero no suficiente. Con esto habre dado un paso fundamental en la dialogo entablado. En el §3 integrare la intencion procesual del pragmatismo de Peirce, que la etica del Discurso ha sido la primera en articular a su arquitectonica, pero ahora diacronicamente como institucionalizacion del bien-valido. En el §4. situare el lugar trascendental, en primer lugar, de la conciencia historica de los actores principales (los dominados y/o exluidos), y, articulados a ellos y posteriormente, los "grandes criticos" recientes al sistema etico vigente, donde mostrare la necesidad de las mediaciones tematico-cientifica las mas variadas usadas por estas critic as (respondiendo a la critica de Tiircke en Sao Leopold05 ). Entre esos criticos, tales como Freud, Nietzsche, Foucauld, Hinkelammert, y muchos otros, dare relevancia central y fundamentalmente a Marx (por su claridad en anotar el momenta material-economico de toda etica de "contenido") y a Levinas (en su critica a la etica y moral en cunanto tales). En el §5 por primera vez, y habiendo integrado positivamente el pensamiento falibilista de Apel, mostrare el sentido del nacimiento de una nueva consensualidad intersubjetiva de las mayorias dominadas 6 (dominacion justificada por la mayoria de los sistemas materiales que ahora aparecen como "hegemonic os") y excluidas (exclusion supuesta en los procedimientos formales igualmente "hegemonicos"). Surge asi con claridad el sentido de una intersubjetividad anti-hegem6nica de los dominados y/o excluidos ante la intersubjetividad hegemonic a de los dominados y/o excluidos ante la intersubjetividad hegemonica. De esta manera subsumimos criticamente e integramos el "principio democratico" en los procesos criticos, normalmente por transformaciones de los movimientos de las mayorias, populares 0 rev indicativos, excepcionalmente (muy excepcionalmente, pocas veces durante siglos, pero siempre posible) revolucionarios. Es el tema de la "institucionalidad" futura decidida valida y consensualmente por la nueva intersubjetividad. No he negado la intencion de la etica del Discurso, pero se la ha subsumido en una arquitectonica mucho mas compleja, tambien material, mas realista y sobre to do mas critica. Creo que asi puedo mostrar por que la etica de la Liberacion no es anarquista, pero tampoco

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reformista ni necesariamente revolucionaria. 7 Este nivel sera denominado la "moral formal critic a". En el §6, solo ahora se puede entender el proceso etico-material y moral-formal consensual de liberacion propiamente dicho, que de-construye el sistema hegemonico, dominador 0 excluyente para reconstruir por "transformaciones criticas" si son posibles, 0 construir (no se puede re-construir en este caso excepcional, porque es nuevo) el "nuevo orden", en los diversos "frentes"g de liberacion po sible (ecologico, feministas, politico, economico, pedagogico, racial, etc.). Toda estas "transformaciones", 0 "construccion" del "nuevo orden", deberan contar con el principio de consensualidad, de la institucion de la argumentacion, etc., formales - que super a en mucho, pero no invalida, el antiguo principio de la fr6nesis, que sigue teniendo validez en el orden individual. Para dar alguna referencia esquematica propongo el siguiente esquema aproximativo (que por esquematico es insuficiente): Esquema 1. Representaci6n esquematica de los momentos de la arquitect6nica de una etica de la liberaci6n.

I

I IL Aclaracianes al esquema: §! Aspecto etico-material (10 buena); §2 aspecto moral formal o procedimental (10 valida); §3 procesualidad etico pragmatica (creaci6n institucional); a. proyecto etico (el bien-valida vigente); §4 criticas de 10 vigente como hegem6nico. como dominador a excluyente; A. El orden vigente aparece ahara como "Totalidad" (el sistema se manifiesta como 10 injusto-invalido); §5 aspecto formal critico de la intersubjetividad desde a alteridad (nueva validez anti-hegem6nica); §6 praxis de liberaci6n (nueva institucionalidad); b. proyecto de liberaci6n (el bien-valido futuro); B: orden futuro como la nueva legitimidad (B no es A); c. procesos hist6ricos futuros; d. proyectos futuros hist6ricos de liberaci6n (Los §§!-6 corresponden a los titulos de este trabajo).

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Por exigencia de espacio esta corta ponencia solo podni avanzar algunas tesis precisas, situando la tematica sin agotarla. Un analisis mas detallado de esta arquitectonica sera expuesta en los respectivos capitulos de mi Etica de la Liberacion (en la epoca de la Clobalizaci6n y la Exclusion) que estoy escribiendo. INTRODUCCION. ARQUITECTONICA FORMAL DE LA ETICA DEL DISCURSO

La arquitectonica de la etica del Discurso tiene un nudo critico (en cuanto no resuelto) en la cuestion de la aplicacion (Anwendung) de la norma basica de la mora1 9 procedimental (con otro sentido que en Aristoteles o Kaneo). Pero este "aterrizaje" (x del esquema 1) forzado (0 imposible) es el resultado de haber "despegado" (y) del suelo en un vuelo ambiguo. Lo inadecuado del "despegue" determina la imposibilidad del "aterrizaje". Es decir, la arquitectonica comienza por no subsumir desde el comienzo el sentido etico de la materialidad del mundo de la vida, y solo considera las condiciones de posibilidad universales de la validez moral de las decisiones, normas 0 maximas que se adopten en concreto. Lo empirico, historico, material no es negado, es simplemente relegado, ya que no tiene relevancia para probar la validez de la universalidad racional de la consensualidad formal intersubjetiva. La cuestion de la "validez" tiene absoluta prioridad con respecto a la cuestion del "contenido", de toda etica del "bien". La etica del Discurso, como Kant, no intentan entonces fundamentar una etica material. A esta tarea la declaran innecesaria 0 imposible, y por ella situan desde el comienzo toda la problematic a de la filosofia etica en el nivel de la moral formal, no viendo la importancia del indicado nivel de los "contenidos", de 10 material, de la eu bios (vida buena) 0 del "bien (good, das Cute). l,Quiza porque la muerte que enfrenta a la vida en los campos 0 las calles de Mali, Haiti 0 Bangladesh, la pobreza y el estado de no-derecho de los paises perifericos, no son hechos cotidianos masivos en Europa 0 Estados Unidos? La cuestion esta claramente planteada por el mismo Kant cuando escribe: Todos los principios practicos que presuponen un objeto (materia) de la facultad apetitiva como fundamento detenninante de la voluntad, son empiricos y no pueden dar {eyes practicas. 11

Y en otro texto anterior habia expresado aun mas explicitamente:

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Conservar cada cual su vida es un deber, y adem as todos tenemos una inmediata inclinaci6n a hacerlo as!. Mas, por eso mismo, el cuidado angustioso que la mayor parte de los hombres pone en ello l2 no tiene valor interior, y la maxima que rige ese cuidado carece de un contenido moral. 13

Esta posici6n es compartida con variantes por la etica del Discurso. Esto supone tres reducciones: 1) Las "inclinaciones" (la corporalidad (la Leiblichkeit del nivel neuro-bioI6gico) son patol6gicas, caprichosas, y, en ultimo termino, egoistas, particulares - no universales -, que no entran en la determinaci6n de la norma basi ca. 2) La "vida buena" de cada cultura tiene caracteristicas propias, sin poder ser fundamentadas racionalmente, ademas es imposible: a) determinar el contenido del ethos particular, y b) mas aun, cuando debe compararsela con el ethos de otras culturas (como acontece en el "sistema-mundo" desde 1492), es imposible poder efectuar un dialogo intercultural (ya que no se tienen criterios intrinsecos transculturales), 0 ponerse de acuerdo sobre de cual de dichas "vidas buenas" es la mejor. 14 3) La negaci6n de la sobrevivencia como principio etico material. 15 En efecto, Apel despues de haber definido la existencia de un nivel A de fundamentaci6n de la moral,16 se pregunta 6mo "descender" a 10 concreto: Es necesario, en relaci6n a la fundamentaci6n ultima del principio de la etica, considerar no solamente la norma basica de la fundamentaci6n consensual de norm as (reconocida en la anticipaci6n contrafactica de las relaciones de comunicaci6n ideales), sino al mismo tiempo la norma basica de la responsabilidad hist6rica, de la preocupaci6n por la preservaci6n de las condiciones naturales de la vida y los logros hist6ricos-culturales de la comunidad comunicativa real facticamente existente en este momento. Schon bei der Letztbergriindung des Prinzips der Ethik muss (eigentlich) nicht nur die in der kontrafaktischen Antizipation der idealen Kommunikationsverhliltnisse anerkannte Grundnorm der konsesualen Normenbegriindung beriicksichtigt werden, sondern auch zugleich die Grundnorm der geschichtizbezogenen Verantwortung - ja der Sorge - fiir die erhaltung der natiirlichen Lebensbedingungen und der geschichtlichkulturellen Errungenschaften der jetzt fatisch existierenden realen Kommuniationgemeinschaft. 17

Pero puesto a efectuar esa aplicaci6n para preservar "las condiciones naturales de la vida y los logros hist6ricos culturales" concreto, confiesa una y otra vez: Debo admitir que la elucidaci6n de las razones que me han conducido a distinguir entre una parte de fundamentaci6n A y una parte de fundamentaci6n B de la etica del Discurso no es todavfa completamente clara. Isofern habe ich auch das Motiv, das mich zu einer Unterscheidung zwischen dem

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Begriindungsteil A und dem Begriindungsteil B der Diskursethik bewogen hat, noch nichtvollig verdeutlicht. 18

Mas alin, "las condiciones de aplicabilidad de una etica de la comunidad de comunicacion ideal (... ) aun no estan, en absoluto dadas" ("eben die Anwendungsbedingungen einer Ethik der idealen Kommunikationsgemeischaft noch keineswegs gegeben,,).19 Es decir, como no se dan las condiciones situacionales y contingentes 20 (una de ell as es la no participaci6n de todos los posibles afectados en sus intereses 21 ) es necesario echar mano de una "etica de la responsabilidad" - de tipo weberiano -, para crear dichas condiciones22 de igualdad, de simetria. Aqui debe situarse la reaccion de Franz Hinkelammert, quien descubre en la etica del Discurso un modo no suficiente de articulacion de la etica material, cuando escribe: Una norma es valida solo en la medida que es aplicable, y es aplicable en la medida en que ella nos permite vi vir. Esto no niega la validez de la norma como punto de partida, en tanto se refiere a la decision de aplicarla. En todo caso, una norma bajo la cual no fuera posible la vida seria a prior invalida. Esto valdria, por ejemplo, en una decision universal de suicidio colectivo. Daher gilt eine Norm nur soweit, wie sie anwendbar ist, und sie ist anwendbar, soweit man damit [eben kann. Dies streit keineswegs die Giiltigkeit der Norm als Ausgangspunkt ab, wohl aber betrifft es die Entscheidung, sie anzuwenden. Eine Norm allerdings, mit der man unter keinen Umstanden leben kann, ware a priori ungiiltig. Dies wiirde zum Beispiel fUr die universale Entscheidung zum kollektiven Selbstmord gelten. 23

La conservacion y crecimiento de la vida es el primer criterio de verdad (teorica y practica), condicion absoluta de posibilidad de la existencia no solo de los sujetos de la argumentacion como tales, sino aun de los procesos mismos conceptuales y lingiiisticos. Seyla Benhabib indica aproximadamente el mismo tipo de critica, ya que el principia U de Habermas define a los participantes de derecho en la argumentacion como "los afectados en sus intereses": The interest that participants in a discourse bring with them to the argumentation situation are ones that they already have as actors in the life-world (... ) If, however, participants in discourses bring with them their own interpretation of their own interests, then the question immediately suggests itself: given that the satisfaction of the interests of each is to be viewed as a legitimate and reasonable criterion in establishing the universality of the norm, then is it no the case that universality can only result when a corresponding compatibility or even harmony of interests really exists in the lifeworld?24

La moral formal presupone siempre una etica material,25 que la determin a por su criterio de verdad universal y concreto, no solo en el senti do

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de que es aquello "acerca" 10 que se ha de argumentar, sino aun, y por ultimo, por el hecho de que la validez del "acuerdo" se decide desde (horizonte problematico), sobre (fundamento) y en (10 acordado en concreto) el "contenido" - que tiene autonomia en su criterio, principio e imperativos propios que hay que saber respetar -. §l.

EL ASPECTO MATERIAL DE LA ETICA iHA Y UN PRINCIPIO MATERIAL UNIVERSAL?

Hemos hablado en otros momentos del dialogo de la necesidad de una "economica trascendental", como correlato de una "pragmatica trascendental".26 Con ello queriamos indicar que 10 formal (1a pragmatic a) debia articularse a 10 material (un ejemplo decisivo que yo adelantaba era la economic a [Oekonomik]) , y que este nivel material era condicion ontologica 0 de sobre-vivencia con respecto a la pragmatica (asi como esta era condicion formal de aquella). De la misma manera, Karl Marx nos ayudo a descubrir la falta de atencion en la pragmatica de las condiciones materiales (de "contenido") de los mismos sujetos que argumentan. Ahora podemos formular la cuestion con mayor precision. En efecto, nuestra tesis podria enunciares as!: sl aspecto de "contenido" de la etica,27 abstractamente, tiene universalidad propia y determina siempre materialmente a todos los niveles de la moral form sal. EI aspecto "formal" de la moral (10 recto, right, richtig), el nivel de la validez (Gultigkeit, validity) universal intersubjetiva, abstractamente, determina por su parte formalmente a todos los niveles de la etica material. Se trata de una mutua, constitutiva y siempre presente codeterminaci6n con diverso sentido (una es "material", la otra "formal", originando como resultado una undiad real: el bienvalido 010 valido-bueno). Esta es una tesis fundamental de la etica de la Liberaci6n, porque 28 de esta manera se podra interpretar eticamente la "pobreza", la dominaci6n de la mujer en su corporalidad (Leiblichkeit), las razas no-blancas descriminadas, etc., desde el criterio material presupuesto ya siempre a priori en toda critic a (critic a negativa que parte de la "falta-de" realizacion material de los sujetos; es decir, de la infelicidad, sufrimiento ... ). El aspecto material de la etica (como Kant 10 indica en el texto citado arriba sin descubrir su relevancia) trata en ultima instancia de la conservaci6n y aumento de vida?9 Por ella no hablaremos solo de "vida" sino de "sobre-vivencia".30 El principio material de la etica, que cumple

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con el criterio de sobre-vivencia, podria enunciarse de la-siguiente manera: Quien actua (seria 0 eticamente) ya ha reconocido in actu las exigencias de la posible sobre-vivencia en una concreta vida buena (felicidad, valores, comprension del ser [Seinsverstandnis], etc.), que comparte con todos aquellos con los que forma parte de una comunidad de vida (Lebensgemeinschaft) cultural, historica, con una pretension de universalidad, co-solidaria con la humanidad como tal. 3l

Sin apoyarme 0 inspirarme en los neoaristotelicos (de ambas partes del Atl{mtico), deseo recordar sin embargo que la eudaimonfa de Arist6teles no era el "fin" de una raz6n instrumental weberiana, sino mas bien un telos,32 y tal como 10 expresaba Heidegger, una "comprensi6n del ser como poder-ser (Seinsverstandnis als Sein-konnen)".33 Esta tematica tiene que ser merecidamente repensada. 34 Deseo ahora referirme a los utilitaristas, que han side criticados desde Moore hasta Rawls. Dicha posici6n se remontaba a la tradici6n empirista - gracias a los cuales Kant se despert6 del suefio racionalista - que tomara al placer 0 felicidad como momenta exclusivo (en esta reducci6n estribara su error) del principio material de la etica, y tal como ya John Locke 10 indicaba en su An Essay concerning Human Understanding: Good and evil (... ) are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which occasions or procures pleasure or pain to US. 35

El utilitarismo de Jeremy Bentham, ingenuo en tantos aspectos, define de la misma manera el criterio de la etica: (... The) fundamental axiom (is:) it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong. 36

Por su parte John Stuart Mill declara: The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals utility or the greatest happiness principle holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. 37

El "placer" (como mera sensaci6n) 0 la "felicidad" (como "background feeling")38 indican ciertamente un aspecto subjetivo del "contenido" de la etica - cuyos conflictos, contradicciones 0 excepciones deberan ser tratados por la "aplicaci6n" del principio formal -, pero no es el unico aspecto de toda etica material. En efecto, todas las eticas materiales 39 nos recuerdan la condici6n onto16gica de posibilidad como necesidad de conservaci6n y aumento de vida, de "sobre-vivencia" de todo acto humano. Una fundamentaci6n

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de este principio material puede tambien argumentarse contra el esceptic0 40 (que volveni a hacerse presente 41 ) en terminos semejantes a la demostraci6n que realiza la etica del Discurso de su propio principio por medio de la autocontradicci6n performativa: todo el que actiia 10 hace por la conservaci6n y aumento de la vida, en concreto por algiin "bien",42 de 10 contrario debe dejarse morir (y aiin el que se dejara morir, se contradeciria performativamente 43 si intentara explicitar el motivo de su suicidio). Pero, sobre todo debeni argumentarse contra el cinico, que argumenta por su parte en favor de la muerte de los "sobrantes" que no saben 0 no pueden defenderse (como 10 expresa F. Hayek en referencia al mercado y la competencia). De todas maneras todos estos aspectos materiales son necesario pero no suficientes. Y por esto, es debemos articular, subsumir el aspecto material de la etica de "contenido" y no simplemente ignorarla, porque entonces no puede contarse con el criterio de sobre-vivencia que es el fundamental con respecto a todo otro criterio, principio, norma, decisi6n, instituci6n, argumentaci6n, etc., formales. Sin caer en darwinismos 0 naturalismo ingenuos puede afirmarse, ademas y a modo de ejemplo, que la neurobiologia actual nos da nuevos argumentos. El cerebro es el 6rgano que maneja, como ya he dicho, desde susfunciones superiores mentales, la sobre-vivencia, por una ordenaci6n de todas las mediaciones en cuanto son evaluadas, es decir, en tanto son situadas como "posibilidades" para la permanencia y crecimiento de la vida. Esto nos habla del principio etico material fundamental: The brain areas responsible for concept formation contain structures that categorize, discriminate, and recomibe the various brain activities occurring in different kinds of global mappings ( ... ) Given its connections to the basal ganglia and the limbic system, including the hippocampus, the frontal cortex also establishes relations subserving the categorization of value and sensory experiences themselves. In this way, conceptual memories are affected by values - an important characteristic in enhancing survival. 44

Se trata, como ya he insistido, de la permanencia y crecimiento de la vida segiin sus necesidades basicas articuladas a las exigencias econ6micas, culturales, politicas, religiosas, eticas_ El "sobre-" de la "sobre-vivencia" indica el ejercicio de las funciones superiores mentales del cerebro (repitiendo: conceptualizaci6n, competencia lingiiistica, autoconciencia, autonomia, etc.), el cumplimiento de las exigencias de los valores culturales, religiosos, esteticos y eticos de una cultura dada. Todo esto en un horizonte comunitario (la "comunidad de vida [Lebensgemeischaft] de la que he hablado en otros trabajos),45 intersubjetivo, hist6rico.

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Por todo ello podemos afirmar que el criterio de sobre-vivencia y el principio material de la etica ("Quien actua . . .") es estrictamente universal, valida para toda acci6n, de to do sujeto etico, y en vista del bien (la sobre-vivencia 0 permanencia y crecimiento de la vida humana), en ultimo termino, de toda la humanidad. Las objeciones son variadas. Por ejemplo, nadie puede en concreto indicar las determinaciones componentes de su propio "bien" de manera exhaustiva,46 dificil es que ahora yaqui alguien pueda decidir cual tipo de "vida buena" hist6rico cultural es la mejor; no siempre se encuentran criterios internos a la Sittlichkeit que permitan efectuar dialogos interculturales; etc. 47 Ademas hay personas que sacrifican la vida (por ejemplo los heroes), 10 que demostraria que la sobre-vivencia no es el primer principio. A todo ello responderemos que, en primer lugar, este principio es elfundamental y necessaria, pero esta lejos de ser suficiente, y, por ello, necesita de otros criterios y principios para su "aplicaci6n" concreta. Por otra parte, la cuesti6n no es determinar el "contenido" de esta "vida buena" (0 la mejor), 0 que tenga 0 no criterios internos 48 para el dialogo externo intercultural (para 10 cual Habermas ha dado buenas razones con respecto a la Modernidad 49 ), sino afirmar simplemente el hecho de que nadie puede obrar si no tiene en vista algun bien o vida buena. No importa cual, pero debe ser alguna. Y, por ultimo, nada mas alejado del egoismo, ya que es un principio material tambien intersubjetivo que tiene una pretension de universalidad 50 que alcanza por ultimo, potencialmente, la co-solidaridad con la humanidad (aunque puede restringirse como egoismo, etnocentrismo, nacionalismo totalitario, etc., y en este caso se opone a otros criterios 0 principios codeterminantes, y para ella es necesario el "procedimiento" racional formal que alcanza validez y juzga como "invalida" a la acci6n que afirma la mera particularidad ante la universalidad). EI momenta del contenido de la etica nos habla de la cuesti6n de la verdad practical; el momenta formal se refiere al tema moral de la validez. Ambos momentos son necesarios y se codeterminan para alcanzar una mayor suficiencia (pero todavia no completa, como veremos). §2.

FUN CION DEL MOMENTO FORMAL DE LA MORAL. UNIVERSALIDAD PROCEDIMENT AL

Por no ser suficiente el principio material para su propia "aplicaci6n,,51 concreta, para explicar sus conflictos, contradicciones, confrontaciones

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extemas con otras concepciones de la vida etica, con las excepciones, etc., es necesario el ejercicio del principio racional formal consensual de la intersubjetividad que alcanza validez moral. Pero, a diferencia de la etica del Discurso, que intenta construir una etica exclusivamente desde el unico principio moral formal, la etica de la Liberaci6n intentara subsumir todo 10 logrado por la etica del Discurso (incluyendo su fundamentaci6n formal 52) en cuanto al uso pragmatico del principio intersubjetivo de universalizaci6n (principio de validez kantiano transformado), pero invirtiendo su sentido. No se trata de que la norma basic a deb a aplicarse a 10 empirico-hist6rico, sino que, a la inversa, la norma basica formal tiene como funci6n "aplicar" el principio material. 53 Es decir, la intersubjetividad procedimentalmente adecuada alcanza la validez de un "acuerdo" material, en cuanto parte del criterio de sobrevivencia y del principio etico de contenido ("Quien actua ... "). EI aspecto formal de la moral parte del criterio de intersujetividad, de la norma basica pragmatic a 0 principio de iversalidad que alcanza validez comunitaria. Pero, repitiendo, se invirte ahora 10 que se ha afirmado al respecto, ya que se trata de un principio de "aplicaci6n" de la norma material. La norma material es la condici6n de posiblidad del "contenido" de la "aplicaci6n" de la norma formal, en cuanto que si se argumenta es porque se intenta saber como se puede (debe) sobrevivir aqui y ahora; la norma material da el "contenido" de 10 consensuado (en ultimo termino, una mediaci6n para la sobre-vivencia de los sujetos "necesitados" y por ello participantes), dentro del horizonte marcado por la "imposibilidad de elegir morir". El enunciado de la norma basic a 0 principio moral-pragmatico de la etica del Discurso es el siguiente: Quien argumenta c... ) ya ha testimoniado in actu C.•• ) que las reglas ideales de la argumentacion representan condiciones normativas de la posibilidad de la decision sobre pretensiones de validez moral en una comunidad de comunicacion C. . . ) de personas que se reconocen recfprocamente como iquales. 54

Lo ganado en los analisis de la etica del Discurso 10 debemos subsumir aqui, pero adem as no se 10 propone como el unico principio; tambien se redefine su funci6n,55 y, por ultimo, se articula la moral formal pragmatica con la etica material (hasta su instancia econ6mica, como veremos mas adelante). Aqui cabe destacarse que desde Arist6teles, el momenta formal de validez (analizado entre los latinos en la tematica de la conscientia) era

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complido por el "argumento pnictico".56 En efecto, la comprension del bien (horizonte practico que funcionaba como premisa mayor) era el punto de partida. EI acto de la razon pnictica guiada por la fronesis permitia aplicar el principio a la conclusion pnictica: la decision adoptada (la hypolepsis),57 cuya validez se la daba la fuerza del argumento practico. Como para Hegel, la razon practica (la praktikos logos de los griegos) trabajaba por dentro a la consecusion del "bien". Es decir, para los eticos pre-modernos 58 el momenta formal-racional estaba siempre integrado en la constitucion interna del bien 0 de su "contenido material". Como para la neurobiologia actual, ademas, dicho "bien" era apetecido, pero dicho apetito era "juzgado" - no era nunca meramente irracional como posteriormente para los empiristas -. La razon practica habia side analizada de una manera mas compleja e integrada (no asi en la Modernidad, en especial, desde la escision dualista kantiana), y el momento etico-material se articulaba con el momenta moral-formal. Hoy, es evidente, podemos efectuar transformaciones radicales a estas distinciones y llegar a una mayor precision, pero en la linea de la subsuncion organica, y no de continuar con racionalismos reductivos 0 eticas materiales irracionalistas de la incomunicabilidad. La razon practica es aquella que despliega el ultimo horizonte (la "comprension del ser" intersubjetivo, 10 material 0 el contenido, el "bien" por excelencia).59 La razon teorica funciona dentro de su horizonte y solo recorta sistemas abstractos de mayor precision y menor realidad. La discursividad practico-etica (material-formal) hay que distinguirla de la meramente teorica (0 cientifica). En este punto la etica del Discurso deberia superar un cierto racionalismo reductivo. §3.

LA PROCESUALIDAD DEL BIEN-VALIDO: LA SINTESIS ETICO-MORAL

En los dos paragrafos anteriores hemos considerado sincronica y abstractamente los aspectos material de la etica y formal de la moral. Ahora los consideraremos concreta, subsuntiva, procesual 0 diacronicamente en una unidad mas compleja. Determinado 10 valida segun las exigencias consensuales de intersubjetividad, 10 que permite la "aplicacion" del criterio de sobre-vivencia bajo el principio comunitario de la etica material, se debe ahora ascender hacia 10 concreto y asi se descubre que ya siempre 10 etico es procesual (el principio pragmlitico de Peirce). Valga esta cita para sugerir el tema:

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La categoria de 10 Primero es la idea de aquello que es tal como es sin consideraci6n de ninguna otra cosa (... ) La categoria de 10 Segundo es la idea de aquello que es tal como es en tanto que Segundo respecto a algun primero, sin consideraci6n de ninguna otra cosas (... ) Es la reacci6n [... J La categoria de 10 Tercero es la idea de aquel\o que es tal como es en tanto Tercera,60 0 Mediaci6n, entre un Segundo y un Primero. 61

El procesualismo pragmatico se establece principalmente en un nivel de 10 que W. James Hamaria veri-fication. A nosotros nos importa aqui un proceso practico de una etica material de "contenidos" (de liber-ation), y ademas formal consensual y critico, ya que los pragmaticos, desde Peirce 0 James hasta Mead 0 Dewey permeneceran dentro del horizonte del common sense norteamericano, progresista es verdad. 62 La articulacion del bien-valido (de la validez del bien) no se da siempre simultaneamente en el proceso diacronico. Esquema 2. Diacronia po sible de la validez y el bien. Momentos

§3

§4

§5

§6

Lo formal

Lo valido hegem6nico

Lo valido dominador

Lo no-valido antihegem6nico

Lo valida nuevo

Lo material

EI bien legitimo

EI bien ilegitimo

EI bien futuro

EI bien nuevo legitimo

Aclaraci6n del esquema: Los momentos §§ 3-6 corresponden a los mismos paragrafos de este trabajo y a los del esquema I.

Un buen punto de partida podria ser la definici6n de Habermas sobre legitimidad: Legitimidad significa que la pretensi6n que acompaiia a un orden politico (er6tico, pedag6gico, etc.) de ser reconocido como valido y correcto no esta desprovista de buenos argumentos; un orden legitimo merece el reconocimiento. Legitimitiit bedeutet, dass der mit einer politischen Ordnung verbundene Anspruch, als richtig und gerechte anerkannt zu werden, gute Argumente fiir sich hat; eine legitime Ordnung verdient Anerkennung. 63

Antonio Gramsci 64 distinguia entre un orden hegemonico (cuando ideologicamente tenia legitimidad, en el sentido de Habermas) y un orden de dominacion (cuando la coercion legitima, en el senti do de Weber, se transforma en coercion ilegitima; es el pasaje del nivel §3 del Esquema 2 al nivel §4).65 Procesualmente, entonces, el contenido concreto de un proyecto de permanencia y crecimiento de la vida humana, alcanza procedimental-

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mente validez intersubjetiva gracias a los diversos modos de argumentar en la comunidad de comunicacion real respectiva. El "bien" se va construyendo diacronica, historica y concretamente. En el nivel politico del capitalismo tardio (Spiitkapitalismus) (pordria ser tambien el del machismo erotico-familiar, el de la cultura elitista pedagogico-cultural, etc.) el "principio democracia" viene a reemplazar al tratado tradicional de la fr6nesis. De todas maneras sera necesario recordar que la validez de los acuerdos consensuales (sean normas, leyes, instituciones, acciones, etc.) son acerca de contenidos materiales. En este punto la economica, no hablamos de las ciencias economicas 66 (Oekonomik no la Wirtschaftwissenschaft), viene a significar un punto central del debate, y como tal inicie este dialogo desde el contenido material (technologico economico del capitalismo, desde la vision critica de Marx. 67 La valida politicamente hablando debe tener siempre y tambien contenido economico, como permanencia y aumento de vida, sobre-vivencia. La construccion de dicho bien comiin, bien-valido intersubjetivo, es efecto diacronico de un proceso historico, en el que el "estado de derecho" alcanza legitimidad porque un cierto niimero de bienes (vi tales, tecnicos, economicos, culturales, esteticos, eticos, etc.) son subsumidos efectiva a subjetivamente por los participantes, creando un "bienestar comiin" que hace aceptable al orden establecido, que funda materialmente (no solo en argumentos como piensa Habermas) la legitimidad consensual del sistema hgemonico. En el caso del capitalismo, el proyecto en el pas ado medieval y de los primeros siglos de la modemidad burguesa (libertad, igualdad, propiedad para todos) viene a constituirse como el substractum sobre el que la validez hegemonica se articula equilibradamente con el bien legitimo en la consensualidad mayoritaria de la poblacion de una nacion, de un Estado. El proceso de constitucion de un "estado de derecho" llega a un momento "clasico", cuando todos 0 la mayoria apoya can su consenso la legitimidad. El criteria de procesualidad se incluye en la definicion del principio respectivo: el bien-valido, por ser diacronico, historico, dialectico, no puede nunca asegurarse que 10 sea para siempre. Continuamente, entonces, puede tomarse invalido, ilegitimo, injusto. 68

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EL LUGAR ARQUITECTONICO DE LA ALTERIDAD CRITICA

Ahora, s6lo ahora podemos comenzar a vislumbrar la especificidad de la Mica de la Liberaci6n. Antes no podia comprenderse su propuesta, aunque 10 he intentado repetidamente en el curso del dialogo con la etica del Discurso. Creo que hasta ahara he fracasado por no haber expuesto pedag6gicamente con claridad las fases del tema. S610 ahora, repito, se podra comprender, por ejemplo, que el "heeho" de La pobreza69 en el capitalismo periferico (en el tiempo del capitalismo tardio [SpiitkapitaLismus] central) no es un hecho inmediato (que hubiera de situarse en 10 tratado abstractamente en el §l). S6lo ahora, a la luz del criterio y del principio material (de la comunidad de sobre-vivencia, de la felicidad subjetivamente y del bien objetivamente, en Ultimo termino de toda la humanidad), legitimado por la validez intersubjetiva del sistema vigente, puede descubrirse un hecho masivo: la mayoria de dicha humanidad se encuentra sumida en la "pobreza", "infelicidad", "dolor", la dominaci6n y/o la exclusi6n. EI proyecto ut6pico del sistema vigente (econ6mico, politico, er6tico, etc.) se descubre (a la luz de sus propias pretensiones de libertad, igualdad, propiedad para todos, y otros mitos y simbolos ... 70) en contradicci6n, ya que la mayoria de sus participantes se encuentran afectados 0 privados de la posibilidad de cumplir con las necesidades que el mismo sistema ha proclamado como derechos. Es desde la positividad del criterio etico de sobre-vivencia (y su principio respectivo en concreto) que la negatividad de la muerte, el hambre, la miseria, la opresi6n de la corporalidad par el trabajo, la represi6n del inconciente y la libido en particular de la mujer, la falta de poder de los sujetos de las instituciones, la vigencia de valores invertidos, el analfabetismo, etc., puede ahora cobrar sentido hieo cabal. "El Otro" - sobre el que tanto he insistido - aparece como otro que la "normalidad" expuesta en los § §1-3: el sistema normal, vigente, "natural", legitimo, aparece ahora como el "capital fetichizado" de Marx, como la "totalidad" eticamente perversa de Levinas, y por ello formal 0 intersubjetivamente perdera su validez, su hegemonia. Aparecera a los ojos de los dominados y/o excluidos s610 como 10 impuesto, como "validez dominadora". Aqui debe situarse la propuesta de Wellmer71 acerca de la validez universal de la "negaci6n de la maxima no generalizable": "jNo debes hacer infeliz a nadie; 72 no debes empobrecer a nadie (Marx); no debes quitar la vida (Hinkelammert)!,,73 Aqui debemos hacer un alto y ana tar un momenta esencial. a) La

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conciencia etica y critic a - que es el saber escuchar la interpelacion del Otro en su corporalidad sufriente - tiene como primer sujeto a los dominados y/o excluidos. Ellos tienen entonces una conciencia existencial, historica, concreta, es el caso de Rigoberta Menhu. 74 Es el comienzo 0 el estadio I del proceso de concientiza(:cw. 75 b) En un segundo momento, y solo aquellos que tienen alguna "experiencia,,76 del "nosotros" con los dominados y/o excluidos, se puede pensar reflexivamente la in-felicidad del Otro: es la critica tematica (cientifica 0 filos6fica propiamente dicha, pero ambas crfticas). Es la crftica tematica explicita (de krinein: separarse para lanzar un "juicio" desde el "tribunal") de los "grandes criticos", aun de los postmodernos. En efecto, para el racionalismo de la etica del Discurso,77 los criticos postmodernos pareciera que s610 se lanzan contra la razon en cuanto tal. En parte esto es cierto, pero debiera distinquirse entre la critica a la raz6n dominadora "comodominadora" (y por ella se torn a irracional) y la critica a la raz6n en cuanto tal. El racionalismo a ultranza rechaza toda critica a la raz6n sin advertir que la intenci6n de los criticos se dirige contra la raz6n dominadora (este es el caso de Nietzsche, que no distingue claramente entre la mera raz6n y la raz6n dominadora), y con ella se hace complice de la dominacion de la raz6n moderna (al menos no advierte suficientemente la dominacion eurocentrica 0 la del capitalismo, ya que este sistema no s610 coloniza como "dinero" al mundo de la vida (Lebenswelt), sino material y primeramente como acumulacion de plusvalor del trabajador y como transferencia de valor del capitalismo periferic078 ). La etica de la Liberaci6n puede subsumir la critica de los "grandes criticos" (Nietzsche, Freud, Horkheimer, Adorno,79 Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, etc., y particularmente de Marx y Levinas) en cuanto ell os critican aspectos de 10 que de "dominadora" tiene la raz6n moderna. Pero la etica de la Liberaci6n puede igualmente, contra el irracionalismo de alguno de estos criticos (en especial de Nietzsche y de los postmodernos), defender la universalidad de la razon "en cuanto tal". Este doble movimiento de subsunci6n y negaci6n es po sible (y no es po sible para la etica del Discurso ni para los postmodernos) si nos situamos juera, ante 0 trascendentalmente con respecto al sistema 0 mundo del bienvalida (capitalismo, machismo, racismo, etc.), desde la alteridad de los dominados y/o desde la exterioridad de los excluidos (posici6n del §4 con respecto a A del esquema 1, 0 como pasaje del §3 al §4 del esquema 2), en posicion critic a y deconstructiva de la "validez hegem6nica" del

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sistema (ahora como meramente dominador), y juzgando al "bien" del sistema dominador/excluyente como ilegitimo. Asi, aunque habiamos visto la importancia de la etica material (de un MacIntyre 0 Taylor) ahora puede ser puesta en cuesti6n desde los dominados. La alteridad del dominado descubre como ilegitimo al sistema material, el "contenido", eI "bien"so (10 que hemos IIamado en otro trbajoBl el principium oppressionis). De la misma manera, el principio de validaci6n intersubjetivo pragmatico, puede ser tam bien puesto en cuesti6n desde la necesaria exclusi6n de s afectados todavia no descubiertos como afectados en sus necesidades por el sistema dominador (10 que he IIamado el principium exclusionis). Se trata de una consensualidad intersubjetiva critica de sequndo grado. Los "gran des criticos" son el retorno del escepticismo que anuncia LevinasY Ellos son escepticos de la legitimidad del sistema vigente. Saber distinguir entre el esceptico desde la normalidad del sistema (§2), del esceptico del sistema como dominador (§4), es distinguir entre a) el esceptico, que merece ser refutado a los fines de la consistencia del propio discurso, b) del esceptico al servicio del cinico (que niega la racionalidad de la critica que lucha por el nuevo sistema futuro; es decir, este esceptico se opone al liberador), c) del esceptico critico 0 liberador de un acuerdo pasado (hoy dominador) que se ha tornado invalido en vista de la validez futura de un nuevo acuerdo mas justo (pasaje de A a B del esquema 1). EI pun to de arranque fuerte, decisivo de toda esta critica, es, entonces, la contradicci6n que se produce en la corporalidad (Leiblichkeit) sufriente del dominado (como obrero, como indio, esclavo africano 0 dominado asiatico del mundo colonial, como corporalidad femenina, como raza no-blanca, como generaciones futuras que sufriran en su corporalidad la destrucci6n ecol6gica, etc.). De dicha contradicci6n material nos habla el siguiente texto: Durante alios y alios consechamos la muerte de los nuestros en los campos chiapanecos, nuestros hijos morian por una fuerza que desconociamos, nuestros hombres y mujeres caminaban en la larga noche de la ignorancia que una sombra tendia sobre nuestros pasos. Nuestros pueblos caminaban sin verdad ni entendimiento. Iban nuestros pasos sin destino, solos viviamos y moriamos."

Desde la "no-conciencia" critic a se pasa ahora a la "conciencia critica": Lo mas viejos de los viejos de nuestros pueblos nos hablaron palabras que venian de muy lejos, de cuando nuestras vida no eran, de cuando nuestra voz era callada. Y caminaba

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la verdad en las palabras de los mas viejos de los viejos de nuestro pueblo. Y aprendimos en sus palabras que la larga noche de dolor de nuestras gentes venia de las manos y palabras de los poderesos, que nuestra miseria era riqueza para unos cuantos, que sobre los huesos y el polvo de nuestros antepasados y de nuestros hijos se construy6 una casa para los poderesos, y que a esa casa no podia entrar nuestro paso, y que la abundancia de su mesa se llenaba con el vacio de nuestros est6magos, y que sus lujos eran paridos por nuestra pobreza, y que la fuerza de sus technos y paredes se levantaba sobre la fragilidad de nuestros cuerpos, y que la salud que llenaba sus espacios venia de la muerte nuestra, y que la sabiduria que ahi vivia de nuestra ignorancia se nutria, que la paz que la cobijaba era guerra para nuestras gentes (. .. ).84

Es un criterio de "contenido", material, de corporalidad, de sobrevivencia, de etica material, en el nivel del "bien" - que quita validez al sistema 0 proyecto de "vida buena" que produce la probreza 0 la infelicidad de los dominados 0 excluidos (como imperativo universal negativo 0 prohibici6n de una maxima no generalizable, 0 de la simple "imposibilidad de elegir morir"): sean normas, actos, instituciones 0 argumentos, como en el caso del dapital-. Nadie como Marx ha mostrado en el ultimo siglo este hecho,85 porque toca una dimensi6n fundamental de la materialidad etica: la explotaci6n del sujeto Nico, miembro de la comunidad de vida, en su corporalidad a traves del trabajo cotidiano que se concreta en necesidades basicas no cumplidas: infelicidad (imposibilidad de vivir). EI sujeto etico del pobre se encuentra material mente oprimido y formalmente excluido. Habria entonces que desarrollar una analitica del criterio critico etico-formal y definir desde el al principio critico. Del criterio de sobre-vivencia se deduce ahora un criterio negativo o el criterio de prohibici6n de fa no-sobrevivencia, de la prohibici6n etica de empobrecer, hacer sufrir, provocar la muerte ... al Otro. EI principio etico-critico podria tener un enunciado aproximativo como el siguiente: Quien actiia etico-citicamente ya siempre ha reconocido in actu la dignidad de los sujetos eticos negada en una comunidad de vida hegem6nica que impide la sobre-vivencia de los dominados (imposibilidad de vivir), y en una comunidad de comunicaci6n real que los excluye asimetricamente de la argumentaci6n. 86

No es posible la critica indicada arriba sin el reconocimiento (Anerkennung) del Otro (del dominado/excluido en el sistema

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hegem6nico) como sujeto etico aut6nomo, libre, igual, posible origen de disenso y, por supuesto, de consenso. 87 El reconocimiento del Otro, la "raz6n etico-originaria" (de Levinas), es anterior a la critica y anterior al argumento (a la raz6n discursiva 0 dia16gica), esta en el origen del proceso, anterior a la interpelaci6n 0 Hamado del pobre a la solidariad en el sistema. Esta "conciencia etica,,88 se cumple antes que en nadie en la propia subjetividad (origen de la concientizaf;iio a la Paulo Freire siempre politica89 ) intersubjetiva 0 comunitaria del mismo pueblo oprimido y/o excluido. §5.

LA INTERSUBJETIVIDAD FORMAL ANTI-HEGEMONICA

Ahora en tram os en el estadio II de la concientizaf;iio. Los dominados y/o excluidos (movimientos populares, feministas, ecologistas, es decir, los sujetos comunitarios) alcanzan una conciencia critica tematizada, gracias al aporte critico explicito (cientifico 0 filos6fico del intelectual organico). Repasando, habria entonces tres momentos: a) Una conciencia etico critica de los dominados y/o excluidos mismos, pretematica pero sustantivamente originante; b) una conciencia explicita tematica (cientifico critica); c) una conciencia critico tematica existencial, hist6rica 0 pratica del pueblo mismo, Y, desde ahora en adelante, como en una espiral donde ya no se puede saber quien fue primero, el sujeto comunitario intersubjetivo de los dominados y/o excluidos se articular con los "intelectuales organicos" en multiples ocasiones. Es toda la tematica praxis-teoria-praxis que ahara es situada de manera completamente diferente por la etica de la Liberaci6n. Entonces, una vez iniciada la critica en los grupos de dominados, va creciendo lentamente una comunidad de comunicaci6n antihegem6nica (de los mismos dominados y excluidos) (el momenta §5 de los esquemas I y 2), que comienza a trabajar segun el "principio democracia" (intersubjetividad consensual que reemplaza el antiguo tratado de la fr6nesis) un proyecto de bien futuro (todavia no real pero posible: la utopia factible de liberaci6n 90 ) desde un procedimentaHismo consensual en base a acuerdos todavia no-valido para la sociedad hegem6nica, dominante. La procesualidad critica tematico-existencial crece desde los diversos "frentes de lucha" de dominaci6n y/o exclusi6n de la alteridad: desde los frentes er6tico (contra el machismo), eco16gico (contra la destrucci6n del planeta para las generaciones futuras), econ6mico (contra el capitalismo destructor de la humanidad y la tierra) etc. Ya no puede ser la

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aplicaci6n "normal" de la norma pragmatica en una sociedad en equilibrio, en "tiempos normales". Debe pasar a una "aplicaci6n" excepcional o "anormal" de la norma. Cuando la mayoria de un pueblo esta dominado o excluido el principio de universalidad cambia de sujeto, y desde la comunidad de comunicaci6n vigente hegem6nica pas a a ser ejercido por la comunidad de comunicaci6n antihegem6nica de los dominados y excluidos. La intersubjetividad tematica y refleja, autoconciente (concientizada) de los dominados y excluidos comienza ahora a comportarse como nueva inersubjetividad de validez futura. Es el proceso de liberaci6n propiamente dicho en su nivel formal-pragmatico. Ahora el proceso vuelve a cumplir los momentos indicados antes, pero de nueva cuenta y con otra naturaleza. La materialidad de la sobre-vivencia de los dominados y excluidos vuelve a repetir sobredeterminademente el momenta analizado en el §l. En la medida que es necesario "aplicar", contra el sistema vigente, el criterio de sobrevivencia, la intersubjetividad de los dominados y/o excluidos utiliza formal mente el principio de universalidad (de la nueva universalidad contra la antigua intersubjetividad dominadora) y procede a criticar el consenso valida vigente. Todo este proceso formal es ahora tematico, la deconstrucci6n de la dominaci6n cuenta con la articulacion interna del cientifico y del fil6sofo critico (s610 asi puede practicarse la etica de la Liberaci6n). Hay que distinguir claramente entre toma de conciencia pretematica e implicita - pero recordando que es el origen etico radical, y el ejercicio de 10 que hemos llamado en otro lugar la "raz6n etica originaria" - desde el reconocimiento del Otro (analizado en el §4), del momenta en que ahora nos situamos. No es 10 mismo una pura y universal prohibici6n: "jTe esta prohibido empobrecer a alguieni!", que el imperativo complejo y positivo: "jLibera al domindo, al pobre, al excluido!". Ahora es un llamado a la acci6n, a la responsabilidad operante, donde deb era mediar la tematizaci6n, articulaci6n cientifico-filos6fica, de lideres populares 0 de los movimientos y de "intelectuales organicos". Ni espontaneismo populista ni vanguardismo elitista. Como principio critico material y formal (el "principio liberaci6n [das BeJreiungsprinzip],,) podria enunciarse asi, y, por su parte, subsume a todos los anteriores: Quien actua etico-criticamente desde el reconocimiento de la dignidad de todo sujeto etico. desde la conciencia de la no-sobre-vivencia de los dominados (desde la imposibilidad de elegir morir) y desde la no-participaci6n de los excluidos ya siempre ha afirmado in actu la re-sponsabilidad 91 que comparte solidariamente con todos aquellos que han

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aJcanzado el mismo grado de lucidez, y la obligacion a realizar transformaciones (normalmente), 0 una construccion sistemica (excepcionalmente), a traves de las normas, acciones, instituciones, etc., de una nueva y mas justa comunidad de vida y de comunicacion futuras.

Ante la "imposibilidad de elegir morir,,92 hay que gestionar criticointersubjetivamente la "posibilidad de vivir" una alternativa concreta. El "Principio Esperanza" es el horizonte futuro positivo de algo mas complejo: el "Principio Liberaci6n". Habiamos mostrado en otro momento de este debate que el imperativo: "jLibera al oprimido y/o excluido!" (al "pobre" de Levinas, como la denominaci6n comtin de los dominados en general), presuponia ya siempre diversos niveles - que pueden servirnos como resumen de 10 que he expuesto hasta ahora -: 1) la comprensi6n de un bien imperante material (felicidad, riqueza, etc.); 2) la validez de un sistema moral formal consensual; 3) el descubrimiento del no-cumplimiento de dicho bien con respecto a los propios dominados (no-felicidad, pobreza, etc.) por parte de los dominados mismos, primero, y de intelectuales criticos, despues; en este momenta es que nace la conciencia de los "nuevos derechos"; 4) la negaci6n de la validez hegem6nica al descubrirse la exclusi6n asimetrica de las mayorias no-participantes; los criticos tematizantes se incorporan a la alteridad entre los dominados, y en la exterioridad entre los excluidos; 5) el crearse org{micamente la nueva intersubjetividad tematica critica (es toda la cuesti6n de la relaci6n entre "praxis-teoria", del "intelectual organico" de Gramsci, analizada ambiguamente era el problema del partido y de la "verdad" de la vanguardia en Lenin93); 6) el actuar comunitariamente por un proyecto de liberaci6n a traves de una critica de las utopias, y por una praxis institucionalmente constructi v a. EI concepto de "fetichismo" en Marx nos habla de todos estos niveles de la conciencia ingenua, falsa 0 critica. El proceso de "concientizaci6n" (en sus diversas fases y articulaciones, desde la existencial cotidiana del probre, hasta la tematica del intelectual y su retroalimentaci6n mutua y constante) es todo ese movimiento intersubjetivo formal consensual de los oprimidos que van trabajando por dentro el nuevo proyecto, la nueva validez futura, comunitaria, participativamente, en los niveles politicos, con sensu ales, tematico y organizativamente.

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Es es relaci6n y en el interior de esa intersubjetividad critico-comunitaria de los dominados y/o excluidos que la etica de la Liberaci6n debe jugar su funci6n propia. Se trata de argumentar en favor del senti do etico de la lucha por la sobre-vivencia y la validez moral de la praxis de liberaci6n de los oprimidos/excluidos. La fundamentaci6n del principio material y de la norma pragmatica formal es esencial para la constituci6n de la etica como teoria, como filosofia, pero su funci6n hist6rica, social ultima va dirigida a probar la validez etica de la sobrevivencia, de la vida humana de los dominados y/o excluidos. §6. LA PRAXIS DE LIBERA CION: LA NUEVA INSTITUCIONALIDAD DEMOCRATICA DEL BIEN-VALIDO FUTURO

Hemos llegado finalmente al tema nodal. 94 La praxis se ha tornado equivoca, ya que puede ser de dominaci6n y/o exclusi6n de otros, 0 puede ser praxis de liberaci6n (como transformaci6n Cfitica 0 cambio radical de estructuras) de-constructiva de las acciones, instituciones 0 sistemas de dominaci6n y/o exclusi6n. La praxis de liberaci6n es la mediaci6n propiamente dicha de la transformaci6n critica de instituciones 0 construcci6n del nuevo sistema. Aqui se deben tratar tambien las cuestiones eticas mas arduas. Asi, por ejemplo, la coerci6n legitim a del sistema se torna ilegitima cuando se ejerce contra los dominados y/o excluidos que toman conciencia y luchan por sus "nuevos derechos" (los niveles analizados en los §§4-5). Violencia es la fuerza ejercida contra el derecho legitimo (valido) del Otro. La coerci6n legitima se tom a asi dominaci6n violenta (represi6n publica) cuando se ejerce conta aquellos que han descubierto "nuevos derechos". El sistema vigente no percibe rapidamente el cambio de situaci6n. La antigua coeci6n legitima se toma ilegitima ante una nueva conciencia social. Por su parte, la defensa que los dominados y/o excluidos efectuan de sus "nuevos derechos" descubiertos no puede ser violencia (porque no se ejerce contra ningun derecho del Otro) , sino que es "justa defensa" con medios apripiados (que guardan proporci6n con los de la coerci6n ilegitima 0 vilenta, para ser efectivamente "defensa realista", estrategica y tacticamente, del propio derecho). La validaci6n de dicha acci6n defensiva de la comunidad de vida que promueve la sobre-vivencia y de la comunicaci6n antihegem6nica no alcanza validez desde su inicio en la comunidad dominante - siempre fue asi; no puede ser de otra manera -. No se trata de una "querra justa",95 ya que siempre

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la guerra es injusta porque es vilenta, sino que se trata de la "defensa justa" (justa coerci6n) de los oprimidos, excluidos 0 atacados en sus derechos. Por ser procesual la acci6n etica, ahora se ve claro que el punto de partida critico-liberador es la "normalidad injusta" y el proyecto es el de una instituci6n 0 sociedad mas justa, donde los dominados y/o excluidos seran parte constitutiva y participante en la justicia tambien material (flecha 6 del esquema 1; los momentos de los §§5-6 del esquema 2). La "aplicaci6n" formal del principio de universalidad en el proceso de liberaci6n, en la elaboraci6n del nuevo tipo de sociedad, etc., se juega en nivel formal de la nueva intersubjetividad, del "principio democracia". La nueva comunidad (de los dominados y excluidos) de ayer se transformani con el tiempo en la intersubjetividad 0 comunidad de comunicaci6n nueva, "normal". Son los movimientos sociales, grupos de presi6n, partidos politicos criticos, etc., que triunfan en sus luchas. Por su parte, el proceso se continua ininterrumpidamente en la historia. Historia de acciones individuales, comunitarias, institucionales, como sujetos etnicos, de movimientos sociales, de clase, nacionales, culturales, mundiales. Un acto, una instituci6n 0 un sistema podrian ser absolutamente juzgados como "buenos" 0 definitivamente "validos" al fin de la historia; es decir, nunca podra validarse absolutamente la bondad y rectitud de un acto 0 instituci6n: par su intenci6n, por sus consecuencias, a corto, mediano y a largo plazo a 10 largo de toda la historia mundia. Hegel incluy6 por ella en su etica la historia mundial, pero pretendi6 poder ejercer dicho juicio como "Tribunal de la Historia Mundial":96 es una peligrosa ilusi6n, en la que tambien cay6 el stalinismo sovietico y hoy intenta el caitalismo neoliberal al querer eliminar toda alternativa que pudiera superarlo. De todas maneras los criterios y principios materiales, formales, procesuales, criticos y de liberaci6n guian las conductas para determinar la validez etica de los actos en ese ininterrumpido proceso de reflexi6n, "aplicaci6n" y cumplimiento de las acciones que se realizan en vista de prom over el "bien-valido", 10 "validobueno", desde el criterio de sobre-vivencia y bajo la luz de la intersubjetividad consensual critica de las mayorias dominadas y/o excluidas. Mexico

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I Ponencia presentada en II Congreso Internacional de Fenomenologia, Guadalajara (Jalisco) septiembre de 1995. Quiero agradecer en primer lugar a los participantes en el Seminario de Historia de la Filosofia lationamericana (UNAM, Mexico), en especial a Juan Jose Bautista, Enrique Gurria, Mario Rojas, German Gutierrez, Rita Vergara, Marcio Luis Costa y tantos otros. Ademas, en este trabajo, para facilitar el dialogo, daremos a la palabra "etica" su sentido material de ethos 0 Sittlichkeit; a "moral" su sentido formal de validez intersubjetiva; reservando la "etica critica" para el §4. en adelante, sobre el que se construye el sentido de la etica de la Liberaci6n (no s610 critica sino trans-sistemica en casos muy excepcionales, ya que es "normalmente" tam bien una etica realista en las decisiones de "transformaciones criticas" institucionales). La etica de la Liberaci6n se diferencia de otras eticas porque propone en la sociedad una transformaci6n critica 0 por revoluci6n (am bas posiciones son posibles para ella) a partir de los dominados y/o excluidos como criterio formal. 2 Marx denominaba a ambos fen6menos como: pauper ante festum (el pobre antes del contrato de salario) y pauper postfestum (el pobre como desempleado despues de la "fiesta orgiastica" del capital). "Como tal, segun su concepto [el trabajadorJ es pauper, como personificaci6n y portador de esta capacidad de trabajo potencial por si, pero aislada de su objetividad" (Karl Marx, "Manuscritos del 61-63", en Marx, 1975, II, 3, I, p. 35). 3 Boltvinik, 1995, p. 47. 4 Mostraremos que este concepto, "aplicacion", debe cambiar de sentido. 5 Vease Tiircke, 1994. 6 Frecuentemente se opina que los oprimidos son minorias. Queremos enfatizar que son mayorias, pero entiendase tambien a las minorias oprimidas (como los gitanos), ya que a veces muchas minorias constituyen una mayoria. 7 Nuevamente, y por ultimo, deseo repetir que la especificidad de la etica de la Liberaci6n es partir desde los dominados y/o excluidos en tiempos normales (aqui tampoco es reformista 0 meliorista, sino que propone una transformaci6n parcial pero siempre critic a) o excepcionales, y no solo de la excepcionalidad misma. 8 Las "esferas" de justicia de Walzer, 1983, se transforrnan ahora en "frentes" de la "Iucha por el reconocimiento" (mas radical que la advertida por Honneth, 1992). 9 Ya hemos mostrado c6mo en el nivel de la fundamentaci6n Apel incluye momentos materiales (p.e. el reconocimiento de la dignidad de la persona) por 10 que caeria en una cierta contradiccion (vease Dussel 1993c y 1994). 10 Vease Apel, 1990, p. 24 (p. 30 en castellano). II Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, A 38 (Kant, 1968, VI, p. 127). 12 Esta angustia hoy es mucho mas espantosa que en el tiempo de Kant, ya que la mayoria de la Humanidad se ve lanzada en el proceso de globalizaci6n a una exclusi6n de empobrecimiento nunca observada antes. 13 Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, I, BA 10 (Kant, 1968, VI, p. 23). 14 Ambos argumentos en b) pueden ser refutados. La cuesti6n no es si tienen 0 no criterios para un dialogo intercultural, ni i,cul "vida buena" es mejor?, sino que: todo acto humano (he aqui la universalidad) presupone ya siempre a priori (un a priori historico pero tam bien ontol6gico) una "vida buena" como horizonte de sentido etico desde donde puede y debe actuarse. La universalidad de la etica material estriba en la irrevasabilidad (Nichthintergehbarkeit) de esta presuposici6n ontol6gica.

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15 EI ejemplo 0 argumento de la neuro-biologia (vease Edelman, 1988, 1989 y 1993, 0 Damasio, 1994) muestra hoy que la organizacion del cerebro humano responde universal mente al principio de la vida. Tanto la categorizacion estimulico-perceptiva como la conceptual, todo los procesos de evaluacion (del sistema limbico y la base del cerebro y sus articulaciones corticales), el desarrollo de los centros lingiiisticos fenomenos de la conciencia y autoconciencia, que permiten actos con autonomia, libertad, responsabilidad, son determinados por el criterio universal de la sobrevivencia de los sujetos corporales, siempre culturales 0 eticos (porque estamos hablando de "vida humana"). Las funciones racionales del cerebro (aun el uso teorico de la razon) estan determinadas por dicho principio de sobre-vivencia. Esto no quita, sino que da un ejemplo convincente, la funcion intersubjetiva formal de la consensualidad argumentativa como institucion para alcanzar acuerdos validos. La validez formal no esta refiida con la "bondad" de la sobre-vivencia de los sujetos (mas bien esta incluye en su materialidad a aquella como su mediacion formal). 16 En esta ponencia no volveremos sobre el tema de la fundamentacion. En Dussel, 1993c y 1994, hemos mostrado que la fundamentacion formal de Apel incluye momentos materiales (tales como el reconocimiento de los otros argument antes como "persona de igual dignidad"), 10 que significaria una cierta contradiccion. 17 Apel, 1990, p. 22 (p. 27). 18 Ibid., p. 26 (p. 32). 19 Ibid., p. 32 (pp. 38-39). "La razon de esto es simplemente que las condiciones de aplicacion de la etica del discurso no han sido todavia realizadas" ["wei I die Anwendungsbedingungen der Diskursethik geschichtlicht noch nicht realisiert sind"] (Ibid., p. 32; p. 40). "La applicacion del principio de la etica del Discurso - por ejemplo, la practica de una regulacion discursivo-consensual de conflictos estrictamente separade de la aplicacion de una racionalidad de negociacion estrategica - puede llevarse a cabo aproximadamente solo alii donde las relaciones mismas de eticidad y derecho locales hacen esto posible" ("Die Anwendung des Prinzips der Diskursethik - z.B. die Praktizierung einer diskursiv-konsensualen Konfliktregelung, die von der Anwendung strategischer Verhandlungsrationalitiit strikt getrennt ware - Hisst sich nur da - approximativverwirklichen, wo die lokalen Verhiiltnisse der Sittlichkeit und des Rechst dies von sich aus mitermoglichen") (p. 33; p. 40). La formula se repite frecuentemente: la aplicacion es imposible si las condiciones no estan dadas. 20 Vease Apel, 1985, p. 261. 21 En el Tercer Mundo frecuentemente no se cumple la condicion de la sobrevivencia (por pobreza) de los posibles participantes la comunidad real de comunicacion. 22 Vease esta problematica en mi articulo Dussel, 1994, pp. 87-92 (pp. 147-152). 23 Hinkelammert, 1994, p. 137 (en portugues, p. 97). 24 Benhabib, 1986, pp. 310-311. 25 Esta presuposicion es al menos implicita, cultural e historica, y inevitablemente ontologica, como veremos. 26 Vease Dussel, 1993. 27 Se trata del bien (das Cute, good) (y los bienes economicos tam bien) objetivamente, la felicidad subjetivamente, el bien comun (como sintesis) de la comunidad de vida (Lebensgemeischaji) (como sujetos) intersubjetivamente, los valores evaluativamente (posicion de un medio como mediacion para la conservacion y aumento de la vida), etc. Cuando hablemos de "vida" debe entenderse siempre en este trabajo vida humana, cultural,

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institucional (familiar, politic a, etc.), etc. Con esto abandonamos definitivamente el nivel "trascendental" y nos situamos en un nivel prdctico fundamental, que asume 10 material desde su punto de partida. '" EI tema se discutira en el .94. 29 Heidegger, comentando a Nietzsche, indica que "el valor es condici6n de aumento de vida (Steigerung des Lebens)" (Heidegger, 1961, I, p. 488); es decir, y en palabras de Nietzsche: "el punto de vista del valor es el punto de vista de las condiciones de la conservaci6n-aumento en referencia a las complejas estructuras de duraci6n relativa de la vida dentro del devenir" (F. Nietzsche, Der Wille zur Macht, A 175; en Heidegger, 1961, II, pp. 101 ss). Para Nietzsche la vida es "Voluntad de Poder" y por 10 tanto dominaci6n. Para el simple pueblo latinoamericano, la "vida" en su sentido fuerte es un impulso (Trieb) de extrema positividad etica. En este sentido, la mediaci6n tiene valor en tanto posibilidad actual para la vida. Es evidente que no hay valores sin intersubjetividad cultural, y por 10 mismo constituyen parte esencial del "contenido" de la "eticidad" hist6rico-concreta. 30 EI "sobre -" indica, primero, la vida desde las funciones superiores de la "mente" (como categorizaci6n conceptual, conciencia, competencia lingiiistica, autoconciencia, autonomia, etc.); en segundo lugar, aumento, desarrollo, nuevos procesos de innovaci6n o invenci6n culturales, politicos, eticos. "Sobre-vivencia" es conservaci6n y creaci6n de nuevas instancias de la vida humana. 31 Hemos transformado el enunciado del principio moral procedimental de la etica del Discurso en una posible formulaci6n del principio etico material (vease Apel, 1986, p. 161). 32 "La eudaimonia se encuentra entras las cos as dignas de honor y perfectas (teleion). Si es asi es porque es tam bien un principio (arkhe), ya que es en virtud de ella que obramos, y el principio y la causa de los bienes (agathOn) es algo digno de honor y divino" (Etica a Nicomaco i, 12; 1102 a 1-4). Vease mi obra Dussel, 1973b, pp. 32ss. n Vease: "La com-prensi6n como poder-ser" (en mi obra Dussel, 1973, I, p. 47ss, donde practicamos hace mas de veinte anos las tesis sobre Heidegger de Volpi, 1992). 34 La etica del Discurso no tiene conciencia refleja de sus presupuestos eUropeos, de su "comprensi6n del ser" hist6rica. Como veremos posteriormente, el maximo de critica posible (por diferenciaci6n del mundo cultural, 10 natural y 10 subjetivo) da una posibilidad de "distancia" del "mundo de la vida (Lebenswelt)", pero exige igualmente tener conciencia del eurocentrismo (etnocentrismo del sistema-mundo desde 1492), y esto no se ha dado explicitamente. 35 Libro I, cap. 28, §5; en Locke, 1975. En otro texto expresa: "Things then are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain" (Ibid., II, cap. 20, §2). 36 Bentham, 1948, Fragment, Preface, p. 3. 37 Utilitarianism, 2 (1. S. Mill, 1957, p. 10). lS A. Damasio escribe: "I call background feeling because it originates in background body states rather than in emotional states (... ) The feeling of life itself, the sense of being" (Damasio, 1994, p. 150). 39 Hoy has hay que dan importancia a la historia para redescubrir el sentido etico, como en los casos de MacIntyre (1981 y 1988) 0 Taylor (1975, 1989 Y 1992); las que describen algunas esferas de la justicia con Walzer (1983); 0 las anteriores eticas de los valores como la de un Scheler (1954); la de la Sittlichkeit de Hegel; etc. Sin embargo, las nombradas no tienen 10 que lIamaremos sntido "crHico", quiza con excepci6n de

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Walzer, aunque este no integra suficientemente el nivel formal procedimental. Desde un punto de vista critico (v ease §4. en adelante), las hay que desarrollan la etica con todo un sistema categorial sobre la materialidad intersubjetivo-comunitaria de la corporalidad de la produccion y acumulacion alienante desde la relacion del trabajo-vivo/valor, como la de Marx. 40 Es bueno no olvidar que la etica del Discurso es esceptica de las eticas materiales, y estas se yen exigidas de refutar dicho escepticismo, por las mismas razones por las que el pragmatismo racionalista refuta a los escepticos de la pragmatica. 41 Vease mas adelante el §4. Levinas advierte este retorno, pero ahora sabemos cuando esto acontese, y es como nuevo "escepticismo", el que surge ante el sistema vigente visto como "hegemonico" 0 de "dominacion" - es el escepticismo de los criticos de la razon dominadora, pero que a veces la confunden con la razon en cuanto tal -. Por otra parte, los antiescepticos no siempre tienen el criterio de discernimiento entre ambos escepticismos, y por ello pueden caer en un racionalismo acritico 0 articulable a la razon cinica. 42 Este argumento, por supuesto, se aplica a la etica del Discurso, que caeria en una contradicci6n performativa si no reconociera que argumenta tabien por motivos (razones, por un "bien", aunque mas no sea "el ideal de una vida racional" que es ya un contenido material) eticos, materiales, biograficos y hist6rico-culturales (europeos). 43 Obrar es postergar la muerte; es vivir; es afirmar la "imposibilidad de elegir morir". La muerte no se puede elegir, porque no es algo 10 que se elije, sino un absoluto dejar de elegiT. EI suicidio no es un modo de ser (el "ser-para-Ia-muerte" de Heidegger), sino el modo por el que simplemente se deja de seT. 44 Edelman, 1992, pp. 109-11 O. Xavier Zubiri es quiza el unico fil6sofo que supo situar desde la dec ada de los 50s. el problema del cerebro en una nueva teoria material del conocimiento, de la inteligencia-sentiente 0 de los sentidos-inteligentes desde su base neurobiol6gica (Vease Zubiri, 1981 y 1992). "EI hombre tiene cerebralmente una apertura intelectiva al estimulo como realidad (... ) Lo cerebral y 10 intelectivo no constituyen sino una sola y misma actividad" (Idem, 1986, p. 525). Sobre el tema se ha ocupado filos6ficamente entre otros Searle, 1984 y 1994. 45 EI pensamiento medieval 10 sabia muy bien, no seria necesario recurrir a Marx en este caso para problarlo. En efecto, se decia: "Es imposible que algun ser humano rea lice su bien (bonum), si ese proyecto no conviene con el bien comun (bene proportionatus bono communi)" (Thomas, I-II, c. 92, a.l, ad 3). 0: "No debe dejar de considerarse que el bien comun (bonum commune) segun la adecuada comprensi6n es preferible al mero bien propio, ya que cualquier parte fisica se ordena por instinto al bien del todo (bonum totius)" (Idem, De perfectiones vitae spiritualis, XIII, n. 634). Este "instinto" debe ahora reconstruirse desde la neurobiologia como la emotividad-evaluativa del sistema Iimbico y base del cerebro que se ordena a la sobre-vivencia. Es una "comunidad de vivientes" humanos, intersubjetividad de "contenido" (material) correlativa a la intersubjetividad de la validez formal. 46 Esto 10 sostiene por ejemplo Sartre, 1960, en cuanto a la imposibilidad de analizar en concreto, exhaustivamente, el horizonte mismo de la totalidad del ser en el mundo, aun con metodo psicoanalitico. Vease Dussel, 1973, I, pp. 50 y 57. 47 Algunas morales formales actuales enumera estas objeciones, sin caer en cuenta que la propia conciencia etica (Kohlberg) post-convencional es siempre un fruto cultural. S610 en el caso que se critique el eurocentrismo explicitamente se puede tener una

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conciencia Iibre de "convencionalismos". Ademas. como veremos. la conciencia critica antihegemonica (nivel del §4) se opone a la "universalidad" ejercida por una individualidad autonomamente etica. pero vigente. dominante, y seria asi posterior al nivel 6 de Kohlberg - por ejemplo -. Es decir. el intento de una etica "postconvencional" recae en ser un "convencionalismo europeo contemporaneo". 48 EI principio universal de la permanencia y crecimiento de la vida de la humanidad es un principio "interno" a cada cultura, que sirve de autocorreccion cuando una cultura "absolutiza" etnocentricamente sus pretensiones y niega a otras culturas. 49 Vease Habermas, 1981, I, II, III (I, pp. 85ss; 1,82 ss) en la discusion con Peter Winch. 50 Esta "pretension de universalidad" quiere indicar que un azteca, un bantu 0 un moderno (con diversas conciencias de diferenciacion de 10 natural, subjetivo 0 social [conciencia critica-teorica 0 moral], pero al mismo tiempo de 10 "sistemico" 0 como "exterioridad", en cuyo caso un critico [conciencia critica practica de la alteridad etica] egipcio del Imperio Medio puede ser mas "critico" que un moderno que apoya "universalmente" el status quo). que implantan su existencia desde una "vida buena". la intenta realizar como wilida para toda La humanidad. Claro es que cuando se enfrenta de hecho a otra cultura. 0 hay un conflicto irresoluble, debe echar mano de la intersubjetividad argumentativa 0 discursiva. desde los "recursos" (sources en el sentido de Taylor, 1989) propios. ya que no se cuenta con otros. Desde esta honesta y seria "pretension de universalidad" de todo ethos, es que se puede partir para un dialogo intercultural (desde donde debe aplicarse el principio formal de la norma basica etica de la etica del Discurso). EI etnocentrismo es la deformacion de esta "pretension de universalidad" honesta. necesaria, de toda "vida buena" - el dogmatismo 0 fundamentalismo es el pasaje de la "honesta pretension de universalidad" a la efectiva imposicion por la violencia de dicha "vision del mundo (We/tbi/d)" a otros -. En este ultimo caso la pretension de universalidad no se prueba argumentativamente (aunque sea con argumentos miticos, que son racionales), usa un medio irracional: la fuerza. 51 Por ahora "aplicacion" ira entre comillas. porque quiere indicar que no se trata de la aplicacion c\asica. kantana 0 de la etica del Discursos (applicatio, Anwendung). En estos casos aplicacion indica un movimiento de arriba (10 universal) hacia abajo (la maxima concreta). En cambio. dialecticamente. se trata de ascender de 10 abstracto parcial (la maxima particular en el todo universal: esto que debo obrar (parcial, abstracto. la maxima) como particularidad situada en el todo de la sobre-vivencia de la comunidad. de la nacion, de la humanidad (10 universal). Desde el horizonte que abre la "imposibilidad de elegir morir" se argumenta intersubjetivamente acerca de la manera con creta de efectuar una norma, accion, proyecto, institucion. "Aplicar" ahora es situar en un "todo" de posibiLidades para la vida. Ademas, el Otro como exterioridad, como otra razon "limite", impide la aplicacion tradicional. Sin embargo, dejaremos la terminologia en bog a para no confundir. Estos y otros temas seran profundizados en la erica de La Liberaci6n en elaboracion. 52 La etica de la Liberaci6n (en mi obra en elaboracion) intentara igualmente fundamentar el principio material de la etica, como he indicado arriba, desde la "imposibilidad de elegir morir" como eleccion posible. 53 En este caso la norma pragmatica (procedimentalmente intersubjetiva y simetrica para alcanzar una validez aceptable) es una mediaci6n no autonoma ni indiferente al

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contenido, cuya funcion es "aplicar" 0 subsumir 10 concreto material (la maxima) en 10 universal material (el "bien"). 54 Apeil, 1986, p. 161. Para la formulacion del Principio "U" en Habermas, vease Habermas, 1983 y 1991. Igualmente considerese la excelente critica de Wellmer, 1986. Consultese la obra de Rehg, 1994, y el numero completo del The Philosophical Form coordinado por Kelly, 1989. 55 Ya que si se a\canza validez intersubjetiva es sohre aquello en 10 que recae el "acuerdo" de todos: el "contenido" etico objeto de la argumentacion. Sin "contendio" no hay acuerdo ni validez. No puede tener validez un acuerdo "vacio". 56 Vease todo este debate en mi obra Dussel, 1973c. " Para Aristoteles, ademas, este acto de "aplicacion" del principio podia corromperse de no haber virtud 0 "temperancia" en el sujeto: "Por esto es que llamamos a la temporancia (sofrosynen) la que salva (s6zousan) la aplicacion prudente U"r6nesin). Lo que ella protege es la hyp6lepsis" (Et. a Nic6maco, VI, 5; 1140b 11-20). 58 Por ejemplo, para Thomas "el bien no cae dentro de la eleccion (ultimus finis nullo modo sub electione cadit)" (I-II, c. 13, a.3. c.), ya que es el principio primero material por excelencia, que, por otra parte, es universal y siempre ya presupuesto a priori. Por ello "el fin se apetece absolutamente (jinis appetitur ahsolute)" (De Veritate, c. 24, a. 6, r.). Por el contrario, "todo aquello que es obrado por nosotros es posibilidad (possihilia)" (Ibid., a. 5, c.). EI aplicar el principio en la deliberacion es "un silogismo acerca de operables (operabiLium)" (Ibid., c. 14, a. 5, c.) sobre "los singulares contingentes (singularia contingentia)" (II-II, c. 49, a. 5, c.). 59 Vease Dussel, 1973, I, p. 64. 60 Desde ya podemos anticipar que la "praxis de liberacion" debe situarse en esta "Terceridad": desde el mundo de la vida (Primeridad) irrumpe el Otro y su proyecto de liberacion (Segundidad) que desde su opresion 0 exclusion efectua un proceso practico de liberacion (Terceridad). Liberacion como proceso es Mediacion (Terceridad), y pasa de una situacion de opresion en el mundo (Primariedad) negada desde la anticipacion contrafactica de la utopia como termino (Segundidad). 61 Peirce, 1978, 1.66. Vease la magnifica interpretaci6n de Apel, 1981. 62 Cornel West, 1989, efectiia un interesante esfuerzo por reconstituir el pragmatismo. 63 Habermas. 1976. p. 271. 64 Vease en Gramsci, 1975, IV, pp. 3191ss. 65 En nuestra erica de La Liberaci6n en elaboracion daremos mayor espacio y precision al argumento, que estara contenido por entero en el capitulo 5, del tomo I. 66 Vease el trabajo de Ulrich, 1993, donde se debiera distinguir mejor entre la "economica (oekonomik)" como filosofia (parte de una etica material), la "pragmatica economica (oekonomische Pragmatik)" como ciencia economica-pragmatica, y el nivel propiamente "economico (oekonomisch)" de la materialidad efectiva de la produccion, distribucion y consumo como medios para la sobre-vivencia. 67 En todos mis trabajos anteriores presentados en este dialogo repeti una y otra vez el argumento, para mostrar la importancia de la etica material, y en especial la posicion de un Marx no standard sino reconstruido desde una lectura completa y paciente (V ease Dussel, 1990 y 1993). 68 Todo esto mereceria mayor analisis, pero la corta extension del trabajo nos exige remitir a la ya anunciada erica de La Liberacion.

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Vease mi respuesta a Apel en Dussel, 1995, §1, pp. 115ss. Esta utopia del sistema vigente de dominae ion 10 hemos esquematizado con a en el esquema 1. Por ejemplo, la economia neoliberal tiene al mercado total de competencia perfecta como este tipo de mito utopico - que es inconsistente y empiricamente imposible (v ease Hinkelammert, 1984). 71 Vease Wellmer, 1986, I: "EI program a kantiano". 72 Bentham propone como deber el universalizar la felicidad. EI enunciado de Wellmer es mas fuerte. Es decir, la prohibicion de 10 no generalizable por ser negativa admite menos excepciones (por ejemplo, no es generalizable: "jHaz infelices a los otros!"). Pero 10 que Wellmer no indica claramente es que dicha negacion se recorta desde la afirmacion material de 10 negado: si hacer infeliz 0 matar se juzga eticamente como no generalizable es por com parae ion a 10 generalizable (la felicidad como universalmente intentada, pero con dificultad de aplicacion concreta). Es decir, el principio positivo material de la etica (descripto en el §1) es sobre el que se funda su negaci6n (solo en este §4) como critica. 73 De otra manera. EI horizonte de la etica material queda enmarcada como posible desde el principio empirico universal de imposibilidad, en este caso como: "jEs imposible elegir la muerte!". La etica presupone esta imposibilidad, porque en casode suicidarse, el sujeto etico deja de vivir y por ello de elegi .. y la etica desaparece como posibilidad. Del cual se derivaria el siguiente principio: "EI que actiia afirma siempre la imposibilidad de elegir morir". EI principio cinico del sistema de dominae ion (0 excluyente), se enuncia: "En este sistema (p.e. el capitalismo) a la mayoria 10 es imposible vivir (que es la imposibilidad de la imposibilidad de elegir morir), por 10 tanto que muera" (como sugiere explicitamente Friedrich Hayek, el padre de la economia neoliberal). De la contradiccion entre "imposibilidad de (elegir) morir" y "necesidad de morir" ("imposibilidad de vivir") surge la conciencia critica y el reconocimiento de la dignidad negada de la vlctima. Se descubre la dignidad solo en su negacion, como la dignidad de la vida ante la posibilidad de perderJa (ante la muerte como robo [un modo de matar de a poco) del plusvalor del dominado, 0 tam bien eticamente como heroismo 0 martirio del liberador critico, y en todos estos casos como efecto de un acto injusto del que causa dichas muertes). 74 Vease Dussel, 1994, §2. 75 Vease Freire, 1968; adem as mi ponencia Dussel, 1994. §2. Ese movimiento, por el que el dominado que ha introyectado la ideologia dominante, se avanza hacia la tom a de conciencia critica desde la exteioridad, 10 hemos representado por la flecha cp (conciencia popular) en el esquema 1. Dicha flecha parte desde dentro del sistema dominante (cuadrado A), perfora sus limites y se vuelve reflexivamente como critica (.1$4). A esta flecha se incorporan los "grandes critic os" , simultanes y sinergicamente. 76 Esta "experiencia" no es la de Hegel en la Fenomenologia del Espiritu, sino a "experiencia" de haberse sumido, enterrado, vivido en el interior de los pobres, los necesitados, el pueblo dominado y excluido. Vease Paulo Freire, 1993. Muchos filosofos europeo-norteamericanos (y tambien del mundo periferico) no han "hecho" esta experiencia 0 no Ie dan valor etico-filosofico ninguno. Pero, ninguno de los "grandes critic os" a los que nos estamos refiriendo dejan de tener alguna "experiencia" (Marx por exiliado y junto a los obreros desde Paris en 1843, Levinas como judio trasterrado, Foucault como homosexual perseguido, etc., etc.). 77 Vease Habermas, 1988. 78 Vease mi obra Dussel, 1988, cap. IS. 69

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79 Estos representantes de la "Primera Escuela de Frankfurt", criticos de la Modernidad, les ha faltado la posibilidad de articularse a grupos historicos (populares, movimientos sociales 0 partidos politicos) con cuya subjetividad comunitaria hubieran podido jugar la funcion de "intelectuales organicos", La Alemania de su tiempo no les dio posibilidad. En esto se diferencian de la etica de la Liberacion. Sin embargo, eran todavia "criticos". La "segunda" Escuela de Frankfurt, aunque tiene muchos meritos, pierden en criticidad. '0 EI "bien" se torna equivoco: el "bien" del esclavismo de los Faraones se torna "sistema dominador" para sus esclavos. Vease Walzer, 1985, cuando escribe: "So pharaonic oppression, deliverance, Sinai, and Canaan are still with us, powerful memories shaping our perceptions of the political world" (p. 149). Walzer reconoce la deuda del pensamiento latinoamericano de liberacion, cuando cita a nuestro amigo Severino Croatto (p. 4). " Vease Dussel, 1993c. '2 Vease Levinas, 1974, pp. 2 lOss. En especial cuando escribe: "Le scepticisme qui traverse la rationalite ou la logique du savoir, est un refus de synchroniser I'affirmation implicite contenue dans Ie dire et la negation que cette afirmation enonce dans Ie Dit" (p. 213). "Lo dicho" se expresa en el sistema hegemonico (A del esquema /). "EI Decir" es la interpelacion del Otro, en §4, como exterioridad, que diacronicamente, desde el futuro, para el sistema que se torna de hegemonico en dominador y de legitimo en ilegitimo, por la presencia negativa del pobre, de la mujer objeto-sexual, etc., muestra la no coincidencia de la "razon dominadora como pas ado" y la "razon liberadora como futuro". EI que habita el mundo nuevo, con nuevos objetos no observables por el antiguo paradigma (para hablar como Thomas Kuhn), se torna esceptico de los momentos pasados de la razon que comienzan a ser superados: el escepticismo se vuelve a hacer presente cuando hay cambios radicales historicos. Ahora es un escepticismo que se identifica con la critic a etica del orden dominador. Por ella no acepta la "verdad" 0 la "ratio" de dominacion. i,No se encuentra todo esto ambiguamente por ejemplo en Nietzsche? 83 "En tram os otra vez a la his tori a", mensaje del Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (Chiapas, Mexico), en La lornada (Mexico), martes 22 de febrero (1994), p.8. 84 Ibid. '5 "Hecho" no inmediato, sino que mediado por los niveles ya indicados (de los §o91-3), y formalmente por las mismas ciencias re-constructivas materiales criticas. Asi Marx llamo "Critica de la Economia Politic a" capitalista a ese tipo etico de ciencia social. La etica del Discurso no ha dado los criterios suficientes para una critica material, como critica del "bien", porque solo ha postulado el efectuar una critica formal de validez (sociologica, por ejemplo, pero no economica). Es su talon de Aquiles, que pone a todo el proyecto en cuestion. 86 La comunidad de comunicacion hegemonica deja a los dominados en la imposibilidad de argumentar sobre su posibilidad de vivir. 87 No puedo aqui repetir 10 ya escrito en mis trabajos anteriores en este dialogo (Dussel, 1993c, §I; 1994, §2.3; y 1995, §I, pp. 116-119). 88 Hemos distinguido desde anti guo la "conciencia etica" 0 critica, que "oye el clamor del pobre", y la mera "conciencia moral" que aplica los principios morales del sistema (en 092). Yease Dussel, 1973, II, pp. 52ss. 89 Paulo Freire comienza su experiencia pedagogica desde 1947 (vease Freire, 1993), que culmina en su obra cumbre (Freire, 1968). Podria decirse que Rousseau, con el

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emile, di6 las bases para la educaci6n solipsista burguesa. Freire pone las bases para la educaci6n critica intersubjetiva y comuntaria de los oprimidos. Todo su elaboraci6n va mas alia del 6to. nivel de Kohlberg (vease Kohlberg, 1981 y 1987; y Habermas, 1983, pp. 127ss [pp. I 37ss)), ya que la conciencia etica llega a un grade no descripto hasta ahora; se trata de una "conciencia etica critic a universal antihegem6nica de los oprimidos". No es s610 individual, aut6noma y universal (yen el caso de Habermas discursiva en tanto intenta el acuerdo), sino que es adem as trascendente a la universalidad "dominadora" - de la que Kohlberg no tiene noticia -, y supone una "universalidad mundial" por sobre la conciencia modema (eurocentrica) post-convencional. Exige a los sujetos de una tal "conciencia etico-critica" una mucho mayor madurez, ya que deben oponerse a la "universalidad vigente": las individualidad e intersubjetividad comunitaria de estos criticos exige mayor claridad, un juicio social e hist6rico mas universal (cientifico y politico) y enfrenta muchos mayores riesgos. Es el caso de los heroes y martires significa la misma muerte, por haberse atrevido a tal "imprudencia", de levantarse contra las leyes del "orden establecido": son los Washington (USA) e Hidalgo (Mexico), Lumumba (Zaire) o la "Resistence franc;:aise" contra el nazismo, la resistencia contra Stalin, Oscar Romero (El Salvador) ante las dictaduras militares controladas por Estados Unidos 0 la rebeli6n de los indigenas en Chiapas en 1994). Ya expondremos en nuestra erim de la Liberaci6n estas cuestiones de una etica mas critica y liberadora que la meramente post-convencional (que es, de todas maneras, "convencionalmente" eurocentrica sin advertirlo, como 10 hemos advertido repetidamente). 90 Vease Dussel, 1973, II, §25: "EI Otro, el bien comlln y el infinito" (pp. 59ss). 91 Se trata de la "re-sponsabilidad" de Levinas, 1968, y no de Hans Jonas, 1982. 92 Repitamos. Es imposible elegir morir porque el que eJije morir no elije "algo", sino que elije el no elegir mas; elije no elegir: no elije. Cae asi practicamente en una contradicci6n performativa si pretendiera dar un argumento. i,Pero si no 10 pretende y simplemente se deja morir? 93 Esto 10 estudia el mismo Habermas pero sin la complejidad suficiente (vease Habermas, 1963 y 1968). 94 Vease Dussel, 1973, II, pp. 65-127; 1994, §2, b Y C. 95 Walzer intenta justificar este camino ambiguo (Walzer, 1977). 96 Rechstphilosophie, §347: el pueblo que es el Senor, el "Dominador (herrschende)" de la historia mundial es su Tribunal y su Juicio, ante el cual todos los otros pueblos "no tienen derecho alguno (rechtlos)" (Hegel, 1971, VII, pp. 505-506). BIBLIOGRAFICA CITADA Apel, Karl-Otto, Charles Peirce. From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981). Apel, K.-O., "i,Limites de la etica discursiva", en A. Cortina, 1985, pp. 233-262. Apel, K.-O., "Necesidad, dificultad y posibilidad de una fundamentaci6n filos6fica de la etica en la epoca de la ciencia", en Estudios ericos, trad. castellana, Editorial Alfa, Barcelona, 1986 (en aleman: "Notwendigkeit, Schwierigkeit und Moglichket einer philosophischen Begriindung derEthik im Zeitalterder Wissenschaft", en Festschrift Constantino Tzatzo, Atenas, 1980). Appel, K.-O., "Diskursethik als Verantwortungsethik - eine postmetaphysiche

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Transformation der Ethik Kants", en Fornet-Betancourt, 1990, pp. 10-40 (trad. castellana en Apel et alia, 1992, pp. 11-44). Apel et alia (Ed), Fundamentacion de la etica y la jilosofia de la lib era cion (Mexico: Siglos XXI, 1992). Arens, Edmund, Anerkennung der Anderen (Freiburg: Herder, 1995). Benhabib, Seyla, Critique, Norm, and Utopia. A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). Bentham, Jeremy, A Fragment on Government and An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948). Boltvinik, Julio, "La Cumbre Social ~Consolidaci6n del neoliberalismo?", en La lornada (Mexico), marzo 3, 1995, p. 47. Cortina, Adela, Razon comunicativa y responsabilidad solidaria (Madrid: Sigueme, 1985). Damasio, Antonio, Descartes' Error. Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: A Grosset, 1994). Dussel, Enrique, Para una etica de la liberacidn latinoamericana (Buenos Aires, II: Siglo XXI, 1973). Dussel, E., Para una de-struccion de la historia de la hica (Mendoza: Ser y Tiempo, 1973b). Dussel, E., Hacia un Marx desconocido. Un comentario de los Manuscritos del 61-63 (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1988). Dussel, E., "Die Lebensgemeischaft und die Interpellation des Armen", en FometBetancourt, 1990, pp. 69-96. Dussel, E., Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty y La jiLosojia de la liberacidn (Guadalajara: Universidad de Guadalajara, 1993) (Mexico) (hay traducci6n al ingles que aparece en Humanities Press, New York, 1996). Dussel, E., Von der Erjindung Amerikas zur Entdeckung des Anderen. Ein Projekt der Transmoderne (Dusseldorf: Patmos, 1993b) (hay ediciones en castellano [varias], frances, italiano, gallego, ingles [Continuum, New York, 1995], portugues). Dussel, E., "Proyecto filos6fico de Charles Taylor", en Signos. Anuario de Humandiades (Mexico: UAM-I, 1993c), VII-III, pp. 15-60 (en ingJes en Constellations, New York, 1995). Dussel, E., "Ethik der Befreiung. Zum Ausgangspunkt als Vollzug der urspriinglichen ethischen Vemunft", en Fornet-Betancourt, 1994, pp. 83-110 (trad. castellana en Sidekum, 1994, pp. 145-170). Dussel, E., "Die Befreiungsethik gegeniiber der Diskursethik", en Arens, 1995, pp. 113-136. Edelman, Gerald M., Topohiology: An Introduction to Molecular Emhryology (New York: Basic Books, 1988). Edelman, G. M., The remembered Present. A Biological Theory of Consciousness (New York: Basic Books, 1989). Edelman, G. M., Bright Air, Brilliant Fire. On the Matter of the Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1992). Fornet-Betancourt, Raul (Ed), Ethik und Befreiung (Aachen: Augustinus, 1990). Fomet-B. R. (Ed), Konvergenz oder Divergenz? (Aachen: Augustinus, 1994). Freire, Paulo, Pedagogia del oprimido (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1968). Freire, P., Pedagogia de la esperanza (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1993). Gramsci, Antonio, Quaderni del Carcere (Torino: Einaudi, I-IV, 1975).

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Habennas, Jiirgen, Theorie und Praxis (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, (963). Habennas, J., Erkenntnis und Interesse (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968). Habennas, J., Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976) (en castellano, Taurus, Madrid, (986). Habennas, J., Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981), I-II (ed. cast. Taurus, Madrid, I-II, 1987). Habennas, J., Moralbewuj3tsein und kommunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983) (ed. cast. Ediciones Peninsula, Madrid, 1985). Habermas, J., Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988) (ed. cast. Taurus, Buenos Aires, 1989). Habennas, J., Erliiuterungen zur Diskurethik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991) (parcialmente en ingles Justification and Application, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass); parcialmente en castellano en Escritos sobre moralidad y eticidad, Paid6s, Barcelona, 1991). Hegel, G.W.F. Hegel Werke in zwanzig Biinden. Theorie Werkausgabe (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971), I (l971)-XX (1979). Heidegger, Martin, Nietzsche (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), I-II. Hinkelammert, Franz, Critica a la razon utopica (San Jose: DEI, 1984) (trad. alemana Kritik der utopischen Vernunft, Exodus-Griinewald, Luzern-Mainz, 1994). Hinkelammert, F., I "Diskursethik und Verantwortungsethik", en Fornet-Betancourt, 1994, pp. Ill-150 (en portugues en Sidekum, 1994, pp. 73-1(6). Honneth, Axel, Kampf zum Anerkennung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992). Jonas, Hans, Prinzip Verantwortung (Nordlingen: G. Wagner, 1982). Kant, Immanuel, 1968, Kant Werke, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, I-X. Kelly, Michael (Ed.), "Henneneutics in Ethics and Social Theory", numero com pie to de The Philosophical Forum (New York, 1989), XXI, 1-2, 1989-1990, con articulos de H. Habennas, M. Walzer, A. Heller, S. Benhabib, Th. McCarthy, etc. Kohlberg, Lawrence, Essays on Moral Development (Cambridge: Harper and Row, 1981), I-II (1984). Kohlberg, L.-Colby, A., The Measurement of Moral Judgement (Cambridge (Mass.): Cambridge University Press, 1987), I-II. Levinas, Emmanuel, Totalite et Injinit. Essai sur l'Exteriorite, 3era. ed. (La Haye: Nijhoff, 1968). Levinas, E., Autrement qu' erre ou au-dela de l' essence (La Haye: Nijhoff, 1974). Locke, John,An Essay concerning Human Understanding, P.H. Nidditch (Ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). Macintyre, A., After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). Macintyre, A., Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). Marx, K., Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA) (Berlin: Dietz, (975), (l975)-ss (ed. cast. FCE, Mexico, I (l982)-ss). Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957). Peirce, Charles S., Collected Papers of Charles Peirce, C. Hartshonre-P. Weiss-A. Burks, (Ed.) (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1931), I (1960)-VIII (1966). Rehg, William, Insight and Solidarity. The Discourse Ethics of Jiirgen Habermas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

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Sartre, Jean-Paul, Critique de la raison dialectique. TMorie des ensembles pratiques (Paris: Gallimard, I., 1960) Scheler, Max, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (Berna: Francke, 1954). Searle, J., Minds, Brains and Science (Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press, 1984). Searle, J., The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge (Mass): MIT Press, 1994). Sidekum, Antonio (Ed), etica do Discurso e Filosofia da Libertaciio (Sao Leopoldo (Brasil): UNISINOS, 1994). Taylor, Charles, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). Taylor, Ch., Sources of the Self The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Taylor, Ch., The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Tiircke, Christoph, "Diskursethik als Dauerbegriindung ihrer selbst", en Fornet-B., 1994, pp. 235-246 (en portugues: "Limites do discurso", en Sidekum, 1994, pp. 41-52). Ulrich, Peter, Transformation der oknomischen Vernunft (Bern: Paul Hapt, 1993). Volpi, Franco, "L' esistenza como praxis. Le radici aristoteliche della terminologia di Esse e tempo", en Filosofia '91 (Laterza, Roma), 1992, pp. 215-254. Walzer, Michael, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977). Walzer, M., Exodus and Revolution (New York: Daniel Doron, 1979). Walzer, M., Spheres of Justice. A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983) (trad. cast. en FCE, Mexico, 1993). Walzer, M., Exodus and Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1986). Wellmer, Albrecht, Dialog und Diskurs (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986) (trad. cast. en Anthropos/UAM, Barcelona/Mexico, 1994; parcial en ingles, en The persistence of Modernity, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass), 1991). West, Cornel, The American Evasion of Philosophy. A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). Zubiri, X., Inteligencia sentiente (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1981). Zubiri, X., Sobre eL hombre (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1986). Zubrii, X., Sobre el sentimiento y La voLicion (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992).

CARLOS 1. RAMOS-MATTEI

VALUE ORIENTATION AND HUMAN CREATIVITY

For the development of this topic I will build on the idea of generational sensibility in Jose Ortega y Gasset. The idea of a generational sensibility implies a specific value sensitivity and this is my point of departure: how we are value-oriented in our dealings within our world and in our choice of style and norms in the organization of our life. Ortega y Gasset developed the notion of generational sensibility while working on his idea of "life as radical reality" and of living as systemic reality. This comes through, particularly in his essay on Wilhelm Dilthey.l Also, at one point in his career, at a relatively early date,2 he wrote an essay on the subject of values in which he followed Max Scheler, who had died a year before. In the following paragraphs I will argue that living has an objective reality and structure, one that is not fictional; as a consequence, human living is characterized by an inescapable need for "being in the truth". Accordingly, we organize our lives according to beliefs and practices which constitute our sense of reality and which in turn comprise a generational sensibility. This in turn implies the expression of a value orientation. Just as the ensemble of concrete practices and activities which together constitute generational sensibility are a particular nuancing or concrete expression of ideal purposes, in turn taken as absolute practical notions, ideas and beliefs, so do they express in a particular form, fundamental values. I will then conclude that the crisis in our present-day society is not necessarily a crisis in understanding fundamental values, but a crisis in the basic understanding of our particular world and its background of ideas, beliefs, and specific valuations. I.

LIVING HAS AN OBJECTIVE REALITY AND STRUCTURE, ONE THAT IS NOT FICTIONAL

The starting point for our understanding of life is the fact that one cannot live off fictions. This means: one may will fictions and one may escape to fictional worlds, and one may even take vacations from reality 161 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 161-176. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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every so often, so to speak, whether involuntarily or on purpose, yet, the truth remains, one has a radical need for being in the truth. "The life of a human being is in a fundamental way to occupy oneself with the things of the world, not with oneself", Ortega will say.3 The real world is that of "radical reality", our "being in the world": our primary condition is that of "having to deal with" the circumstances or world. It is not a matter that the failure of things as tools should then reveal their "existence as such" so that we should move from nonthematic consciousness to a state of "authenticity: in wondering realization of things as such". Man's first reality is that of having to deal with his "shipwrecked" existence. The circumstances or world in which we find ourselves are not constituted by things, but by asuntos, quehaceres, that is, by affairs, occupations, things to be done. This idea appears in Ortega's writings from 1910 on.4 While Nietzsche proposed that living always means the willing of fictions,5 Ortega y Gasset would stress the fact that in our everyday life, we cannot live off fictions, or mythologies, but off reality itself, off "things as they really are", which means, off the fact of so many dealings and so much "having to deal with". "[Nietzsche would say:] Live dangerously . .. this reveals that Nietzsche, his genius notwithstanding, ignored the fact that the very substance of our life is danger and so this turns out to be an affectation ... to propose to us as something new ... and original that we should seek to live in such a manner".6 If life consisted in man's existing within the certainty of fictions, then we would not find ourselves so perplexed and, at the same time, in such pressing need for dealing with our surroundings. To live means to find oneself as one related to circumstances or a world while dealing with it. At the same time, we notice its limitation, the limitation in all that is our surroundings and in all that we ourselves are and pretend to be. Thus, do we gain a first comprehensive understanding of the world and an orientation as to our future activity in that context. At the same time, we are aware of how incomplete that understanding is, both in terms of our circumstances and of ourselves. This is why we never "inhabit" the earth, we are never oblivious of our world, or comfortable with our world. 7 On the other hand, in our dealing in our circumstances, consciousness will always be a systematic understanding of our experience. Ortega will take this up in a phenomenology of consciousness: in order to understand something, even if in a preliminary fashion, we will never consider

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it in an isolated fashion, but in connection with so many other things; each object is always present to our minds in a context; in the context of a relationship with so many other things. This is a sign that our knowledge is not a capricious construct. 8 At the same time, consciousness will also be awareness of the limitation or incompleteness in our understanding of our experience. We will continually seek to obtain a better understanding of things and attainment of our wishes as to our future projects in our activity within our circumstances. Ortega speaks of "life as freedom and as adaptation".9 At times, we will feel ourselves capable of attaining our illusions and desires; at other times, we will feel that there is no other recourse, but to adapt to an adverse circumstance and do our best. But in all this, it is clear that we do not live off fictions. That is why we are always perplexed, never thoughtlessly comfortable. If our surroundings had a "being" (as for us), even as a fictional invention, then we would not find ourselves in such insecurity and in such an antagonistic relationship with our "habitat". If to live meant to have before us the evident "being" of things, together with a clear idea of ourselves in our own "being", human existence would be strictly the opposite of what it actually is. "A world whose being is known is constituted only of necessities".lo If our living meant only noticing our surroundings, in simple awareness, we would not have the experience that we actually have, which is the great and brutal difficulty of finding our way "in the world".ll And yet, we need to find our way in the world. We do not live off psychological interpretations, as a matter of fact, but off that need to find our way, which is our very "reality". Understanding will thus mean: knowing what our authentic attitude is toward things and our way of dealing with them in the future. l2 The need "to be in the truth" is therefore not a luxury to be indulged in, but a radical need in our life. It is in this sense that Ortega distinguishes himself by his idea of living as an objective reality, with its definite profile, architecture and manner of being. II.

WE ORGANIZE OUR LIVES ACCORDING TO THE GENERATIONAL SENSIBILITY

In having to find our way in the world and before the fact that our existence is turned towards the future, we will find ourselves not as isolated,

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empty selves, but as a "being-with", a coexistence with our circumstances, constituted on the "outside" through the horizon of our society, our historical moment, and the visualization of our possible self in a future modification of the present. Our present is the result of our past in combination with our visualization of the future, in terms of ideas, practices, beliefs. 13 In discussing Goethe, Ortega would develop this idea of a person's "inside": "You are like the landscape surrounding your body", he will say, after having pointed out, "Should you be persistent, we shall say that your soul is, of all the things with which you have found yourself, the most proximate to you, but it is not your own self".14 The interiority of the self is not its psychology, but its life; the self is interior to its living. It is not through psychological introspection, -then, that we will be able to catch our self, but through the analysis of our activity with things, which is our life - through the analysis of how that activity has come about. We should credit the early Christians for being the first ones to have this intuition of our peculiar manner of being and it is unfortunate that they never achieved a true understanding of their awareness of our life as biographical and as a process, as another type of being, other than "cosmic being". Their Greek milieu did not allow them that; in similar fashion Descartes later misread the self as "a thing that thinks". In Antiquity one thought from things, in terms of things, and so one had little awareness of one's own self, or of the psychic, or "spiritual" dimension of reality. For the classical thinkers, "The self lives directly off things and goes towards them and occupies itself with them while piercing through its own intimate volume just as the ray of sunlight goes through a piece of glass, without being held by it, without being aware of it".15 But the early Christians rejected all that physical world and for them, this cosmic world counted as nothing compared to the spiritual world. In this sense the Christians went through the same mental process as the Moderns, as in Descartes; they counted the "external" as nothing, and as doubtful, and in this way they discovered the self, and the fact that the self only counts in terms of a line of conduct, in terms of future comportment. 16 Thus the early Christians were well on their way to an understanding of reality, not as something corporeal, not even as something psychic, but as the result of a pattern of behavior, in their case, the behavior of man towards God, "Something so immaterial, that to call it spiritual is

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already to materialize it ... ".17 They were well on their way to a different understanding of things; the notion of substantial reality inherited from Antiquity was superannuated. But, with the Aristotelian renaissance in the thirteenth century, Christian thought never attained its "natural" destiny.18 After having gone through the experience of Descartes and Kant, we now see that the being of things, their sense and definition, their "substance", is not something that belongs to them, nor is it something that our subjectivity imposes on them, but something which comes about through our relationship with them. This comes about through an orientation of the will, but within the context of an activity which does not belong to the will, but, through the will as ascribed and subordinated to it, to the activity or "form of life". This reformulation of the question of Being which is also present in Heidegger, is implicit here, as it is to be found throughout all the other expositions by Ortega after 1924. 19 In his essay on Kant (1924) Ortega would point out that in the case of Kant, as long as reason remains theory, it will be irrational, because the ground for understanding will not be experience, since experience or reality will present itself as irrational. Before the chaos of experience, Kantian reason will elaborate the law of being, the definition of reality in "reasonable terms", from its own substance or ground - and this means that pure reason is a form of practical reason. 20 Pure reason works from an irrational point of departure, or background, insofar as it will develop its own rational constructions on its own. We are before the creative work of the will. In Kantian terms, reality - experience - is a chaotic material having no sense by itself, for which it is necessary to formulate a sense - a sense, not according to whim or fancy, but as a rational construction. Both Ortega and Heidegger will criticize this point in Kant; in fact, this is the whole point of Ortega's 1924 essay, in which he describes Kant's as "the philosophy of a Vi-king", that is, the philosophy of a blind conqueror. Kant will not ask how we should think, so that our thought will apply to being. For Kant, to know is not to mirror reality, but to construct a theory of reality. Knowledge, wisdom, will not mean seeing, but Ie gislating. 21 If it is true that experience is chaotic and the will elaborates modi res considerandi, ways of understanding things, this should not entail that things will be whatever the imagination fancies, even if under the guise of the necessary truths of reason. The need for being in the truth

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- the need to attain a satisfactory understanding of things - makes of rational interpretation but a moment in the history of man's endeavor to survive the shipwreck of his experience. Living means being interactive with our surrounding life world, which is defined and experienced through the set of ideas and beliefs or practices that we inherit from our cultural past. Such a response to our surroundings does not have to be of an intellectual nature: one may "think" through art, mythology, and so many other cultural traditions. But that is never enough; that is why we always feel the need to go back to those practices for their constant revision, something which arises, precisely, from our radical need for "being in the truth". This is how the generational sensibility is therefore explained: each generation takes up the ideas, beliefs and practices that it inherits and works on them in an attempt to establish the sense of our horizon of experience. Since that system of ideas and beliefs will always be wanting, each generation will visualize its niche within the dynamic work on the horizon of the lived interpretation of reality. This is how today an authentic artist will spontaneously wish to carryon his craft, not in the style of long gone centuries, but in an active dialogue with the way tradition has forged, established, the tradition of artistic activity up to the present. That is the sense of the idea of the generational sensibility. III.

GENERATIONAL SENSIBILITY AND JUDGMENTS OF VALUES

Ever since 1914, in M editaciones del Quijote, Ortega would emphasize the idea of culture as the t6 asphalts, the moment of "security", the "plank of salvation" from the shipwreck of one's existence in the midst of circumstances. 22 It is in that context that Ortega developed his idea of generational sensibility. Each generation will work from the background of a number of set ideas and practices; such was the case, for example, of the Romans of the republican period. 23 They illustrate the notion of our desire for freedom - the absolute value of freedom for us, and how this may be taken in different ways at different points in time. It is a systematic fact that living means to live together with other human beings; at the same time, it means to be in a virtual state of war with them. This is why the authority of the state is necessary, systematically so, and not from caprice. For the Romans, this was grasped in

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terms of believing that to ~e free meant to be governed by laws, to the disregard of a citizen's private life. And they had no notion of privileges; yet they rejected, by all means, monarchical government. In reading Cicero, one will see how he will invoke with great vehemence that desire for freedom, but always in terms of the authority of the magistrates. We may see how throughout a whole period of Roman history (approximately 500 B.C. to 45 B.C.) there was a common assumption in Rome: to be free meant to be under the law of the magistrates. By contrast, in seventeenth-century Europe, freedom meant the defense of a citizen's private life and the protection of the rights of minorities, apart from who represented the state, whether in the person of a monarch or a president. In both Rome and Modem Europe, there is a common background of fact: the need for state authority; in both, an absolute need for freedom; but, in each, there is a different way of taking up the translation of this "feeling" for how things should be. Each generation, then, represents fifteen-year periods of particular interpretation of the broader understanding of things.24 Ortega would relate culture to all types of activities by which we make sense of our lives and establish a future for ourselves. The topic of language will also illustrate this point. "We must ... see our life as an articulation of pragmatic fields. Now, then, to each pragmatic field corresponds a linguistic field, a galaxy ... of words".25 And speech, of course, is a species of doing, where caprice is impossible, even though there might be the possibility of inappropriate speech. And just as in language there is an objective grammar and a pragmatic system of practices which establish what can be said or what cannot be even thought, so for Ortega from 1921 on, reason and creativity are defined in their proper limitations by the very structure of our living. Our creativity will find its possibilities defined within that "ground" or presupposition, which is the socio-historical background for our living. Creativity will be relevant and take its proper orientation from the perspective of human tradition and within definite human practices. On the other hand, it is also true that human beings will take up irrelevant practices, that they can lapse into Heidegger's "fallenness",26 practice Wittgenstein's language on vacations,27 find themselves in great complications, be hard-headed, and do so inadvertently. Ortega would say: "Caprice is to do one thing among the many that could be done. To it is opposed the act and the habit of selecting, among the many things that may be done, precisely that which is called for. That

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act and habit of correct selection the Latins first called eligentia. It is, perhaps, from this word that our word int-elligence comes".28 Whether we like it or not, we find ourselves in the situation of having to be faithful to our experience and to the conditions of the real on which we think and about which we speak, and to the condition of the thought and the speech with which we seek to establish a program or scheme for our future, through meaningful activities - whether in art, technology, mythology, or philosophy. The activity of human beings is, then, not the process by which truth will come about (as the final attainment of a coincidence with what there is, or the coincidence of thought with reality), but as the ironic discipline by which human beings will fashion an "abode", su estar, their existence in the world. It is in this way that human activity should be seen as a work of "elegance", or of irony; both elegance and style are not possible without an "asceticism of expression".29 Thus, culture is not only tradition and an established socio-historical horizon; culture is also the target of possibilities which a person or a generation proposes for itself. Ortega points this out in his 1924 essay on Kant,30 and he will come back to it repeatedly.3' If living were meant to remain only within the confines of the tradition, then living would lose all sense. But the fact is that we always find the tradition insufficient and incomplete and this is why we will tend to wish to correct it. In speaking, for instance, we will need to say so much that words cannot express and in that eagerness, we will innovate within language practices. Just in proposing targets for our activities, we will provide new direction to the tradition, while remaining within it - it could not be otherwise. Indeed, before the experience of reality, we will be perplexed, let us say, before the experience of the color of this page. Should we seek to precisely name the particular shade of white of this page in contrast to all other possible whites, we will become mute and communication will be impossible. 32 It is in this sense that we may say that our reality is not constituted in our subjectivity, in our individual subjective "reason", but in the objective reason of our socio-historical moment: "It limits, with its features, the freedom of decision that moves our life and is, vis it vis our freedom ... our destiny".33 In the same way, generational sensibility is not a psychological fact. It is constituted by the cultural level of a generation - and let us recall

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that "culture" here means: what needs to be done, what is called for by the historical moment, and, also, what is rendered possible by the practices up to the particular time and place, which in turn determine the possible targets of activity. The will, like consciousness, does not move In a vacuum. That which we may wish to say and that which we can ever say (or do) is determined by that which is possible under the circumstances and by generational sensibility. To live is like being thrust on a stage in front of the public and having to find out the "correct" thing to do, the correct thing to say, according to a script that has nothing to do with our psychological preference or personal choice. 34 The "script" will acquire its sense, its direction, through our very engagement in the activity on the stage; it is in that context that our personal choice will reveal the need for justice, beauty, truth, etc., according to the action already taking place. As we evidently see, generational sensibility cannot be apprehended in terms of a psychological feeling for things. Rather, it is the result of our becoming aware of how things stand in our circumstance, which in turn opens up the possibility of what could be done, or should be done. Indeed, we spontaneously become aware of both our world and its possibilities, and then, we also hold in esteem the best possible outcomes for our activity according to that double understanding of what is and of what it could be. 35 We value honesty and pride, and prudence and style, but spontaneously see that in a given situation honesty is better than pride; prudence, worthy of a greater esteem than style. This means: we have a sense of justice, beauty, prudence, etc. and then we apply that to our specific situation; in the same manner we gain an understanding of what constitutes democratic procedures, what is a work of art or what counts as a correct personal relationship. The specific understanding of each case is made possible both by absolute meaning and by a pragmatic understanding of each situation. In the same vein, the value concomitant to each case derives both from pragmatic sense and from our absolute esteem for certain values. It is not the case that we hold certain persons, acts or things in high esteem because of simple socio-psychological prejudice, but our values are prior to our prejudices. Once more, our word "white" referring to this paper depends on our understanding of how the word "white" is used (an "ascetic practice", as we may recall); in the same way our sense or

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esteem for justice will depend on our specific understanding of how justice is practised, esteemed, and desired in our particular generation. In the same way that "white" is an absolute notion (which permits our use of the word, although it itself is ineffable), so our sense of justice and democracy, let us say, as being worthy of higher esteem than dictatorial regimes with law and order, depends on an absolute hierarchy of values (in the absolute need for state authority and a sense for freedom as declared before), even if the values themselves are concretely found within pragmatic human activities. IV.

PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: GENERATIONAL SENSIBILITY, VALUE RECOGNITION AND HUMAN CREATIVITY

If I say, "All palatial homes are spacious", my assertion will be readily understood and its meaning will go unquestioned. Of course, its intended meaning will also be nuanced according to each specific occasion. In order to understand the expression, one will need to know English; to catch its meaning, one will need to be familiar with human social interaction, the socio-historical background. The same applies to such expressions as "It is better to live and to live well, than to die and to die ignominiously", or, "Love is better than hatred". In the same way, one knows that 1 + 1 = 2, once one knows the "language" of arithmetic and its operations. In the same way, one applies mathematics to engineering, science, and so on, according to the sociohistorical level of the practice of those fields of human endeavor. It is in those fields of human endeavor that mathematical knowledge arose for the first time - as in ancient Egypt, or Babylon, etc. Thus, we recognize its objectivity, its truthfulness sub specie aeternitatis. The same may be said of our value recognition. In the desert, water may be more important than gold - survival, more important than style or civilized comportment. Nevertheless, we know that, in our everyday experience, let us say, under normal circumstances, it is more important to be a disinterested, civilized person, or that gold has more value than water. "All palatial homes are spacious"; in the same fashion, "A sense of the sacred implies a sense of respect for what calls for an absolute respect". There is a difference, of course. A palace will always be a palace, or a spacious home; that which is sacred may vary. In India, it could be a cow; for an American teenager, it could be a matinee idol;

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for a conservative Christian, it could be the rights of the unborn; and so on. Values are like colors. 36 We all know what "blue" is, aside from things that are blue. In the same way, we know what "sacrecP ' is, in contrast to "despicable", and we are able to see these notions nuanced according to each situation. Yet we all understand that heroic acts are unqualifiedly commendable, even if we do not agree with the ideals or the motives of the hero, so that heroism is to be preferred to mediocrity, or pusillanimity. Vital needs are of value, but civilized comportment and the value of human lives is of greater value. It is in this sense that one may say that in our historical dealing with things we have discovered different values at different times. In Homeric times one was not aware of Christian values, but that did not mean that Christians would be ignorant of the value of heroism. They would interpret it in another way and also discover the value of caring for others and of being unselfish. So, each generation and each individual will always be in a dynamic process of "coming from" and "going towards": we exit to the world through the beliefs and practices of our time and tend to aspire and seek the best, within the horizon of those beliefs and practices. Our sensibility is a priori governed by the projection of our imagination through our will, which leads us to "something better". That which should be "the better" is established by the very nature of the beliefs and practices which will motivate our fantasy and imagination. It is the horizon of values implicit in these beliefs and practices which contributes to the horizon of possibilities visualized by each generation and each individual as that which cries out to be done - the will is always unconditioned and unconditional - and which provokes a sense of shame if not taken up. Ludwig Wittgenstein, in the first stage of his thought, in 1929, would discuss the difficulty of speaking about good conduct as compared to, let us say, a good road"; that it would be ridiculous to expect everyone to agree on "the correct road, so that one should feel ashamed not to take it. Well, the fact is, generational sensibility does present us with "the correct horizon of possible lines of conduct" within which we should determine our lives, with the risk of shame if we do not rise up to the challenge. 37 But, we could object, it is not the experience of shame that we witness around us? That is why, to speak of values sounds so much like sermonizing: it feels like something foreign to our true willing. And it is true that we live in shameless times, all through the twentieth century,

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and, particularly, in Hispanic America. There is a reason for this, and once more, I will follow Ortega y Gasset. In 1951 Ortega would say: "Those who everyday repeat with moving piety that we must have Western civilization, seem to me like taxidermists that try in vain to set a mummy upright. Western civilization has died a beautiful and honorable death. She has died by herself: her enemies did not kill her; she has been the very force that has strangled her own [grounding] principles ... by proving, in the end, that they were really no such thing".38 That is one important reason for the fierce return to so much savagery, the so uncivilized conditions of living in our time. When past beliefs and practices are unquestioned, one will still find living a difficult endeavor, but one will feel a certain security and orientation. Such was the case of Goethe, who lived through a time of great change in European society, but who felt secure in tradition: "That which you have inherited from your forebears, conquer for yourself", he would say.39 Compared to Goethe, we do not, indeed, we cannot, find such words truthful: Greece, Christianity, the Modem Age, have little to offer us in the way of clarity and orientation, in our present practice of science, politics, law, art, and so on. It is in this sense that Western Civilization has become irrelevant, even if it could be shown to have been right and relevant for its time. This in tum explains the reappearance of savage conduct in the midst of the most advanced technology: just as happens in the desert, a desperate situation leads us to eschew the "normal" hierarchy of values in favor of finding immediate solutions. All these considerations are especially relevant in the context of Hispanic America. Let us once more think through the order of our lives and the order of values, and let us once more propose for ourselves a future in which living will not mean mere survival, but true living. This is the task set before our creativity at present. Santurce Puerto Rico NOTES 1 See J. Ortega y Gasset, "Guillenno Dilthey y la idea de la vida" (1933-1934), Obras Completas, Vol. VI, pp. 165ff. The development of his idea of generational sensibility is already evident in such early works as Meditaciones del Quijote (1914), Ibidem,

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Vol. I, pp. 31 Iff.; and El tema de nuestro tiempo (1921) Ibidem, Vol. III, pp. 14lff. See also El hombre y la gente (1934 through 1948), Ibidem, Vol. VII, pp. 69ff. 2 See J. Ortega y Gasset, "Introducci6n a una estimativa" in J. Ortega y Gasset, Obras Completas, Vol. VI, pp. 315ff. , J. Ortega y Gasset, "Kant: Filosofia pura" (1929), Obras Completas, Vol. IV, p. 58. He will repeat this idea throughout his writings. All direct quotations are my translations. 4 See for instance, J. Ortega y Gasset, Ada en el paradiso (1910), Obras Completas, Vol. I, pp. 464ff.; Meditaciones del Quijote (1914), I, 320; Que es filosoffa (1929) VII, 417; El hombre y la gente (1948) VII, p. 91. 5 "Nietzsche, if I recall correctly, would think this way: 'das Leben will Tauschung, es lebt von der Tauschung' ... and with this opinion I can do none else than respect it as much as possible without sharing it". J. Ortega y Gasset, in "Pr6logo para alemanes" (1934), Ohras Completas, VIII, p. 39. 6 1. Ortega y Gasset, Ensimismamiento y alteracion (1939), Obras Completas, Vol. V, p.307. 7 Ortega will make this point in dialogue with Heidegger in 1951, at the Darmstadt Colloquia. See his Pasado y porvenir para el hombre actual, Obas Completas, Vol. IX, pp. 617ff. 8 The immediate fact of consciousness is universal connection: J. Ortega y Gasset, "Guillermo Dilthey y la idea de la vida", Obras Completas, Vol. VI, p. 211. 9 1. Ortega y Gasset, "Vida como libertad y vida como adaptaci6n" (1940), Obras Completas, Vol. VI, pp. 83ff. 10 1. Ortega y Gasset, Unas lecciones de metajlsica (Madrid: Allianza Editorial, 1970), pp. 173-174. 11 Ihidem, p. 132. See also J. Ortega y Gasset, En torno a Galileo (1933), Ohras Completas, Vol. V, p. 22, El hombre y la gente (1948), VII, pp. 102-104. 12 See J. Ortega y Gasset, Que es filosojla (1929), Ohras Completas Vol. VII, p. 314; also his "Arte de este mundo y el otro" (1911), Vol. I, pp. 200ff; "Del realismo en pintura" (1912) Vol. I, pp. 567ff.; En torno a Galileo (1933) Vol. V, p. 84; "Introducci6n a Vehizguez" (1934), Vol. VIII, p. 479. 13 See 1. Ortega y Gasset, "Guillermo Dilthey y la idea de la vida" (1933-1934), Obras Completas, Vol. VI, p. 203. See also "Pr6logo a una edici6n de sus obras", Vol. VI, p.350. 14 "Pidiendo un Goethe desde dentro" (1932), Obras completas, Vol. IV, pp. 399-400. 15 J. Ortega y Gasset, Que es filosojla (1929), Obras Completas Vol. VI., p. 379. 16 Ibidem, p. 385. 17 See 1. Ortega y Gasset, En torno a Galileo (1933), Ohras Completas, Vol. V, pp. 125 and 154ff. 18 See J. Ortega y Gasset, Una interpretacion de la historia universal (1948), Obras Completas, Vol. IX, pp. 212-214; En lOrno a Galileo, Vol. V, pp. 91-92. 19 See J. Ortega y Gasset, Que es filosojla (1929) Vol. VII, pp. 333ff. 20 J. Ortega y Gasset, Kant: Reflexiones de Centenario (1924), Obras Completas, Vol. IV, pp. 46-47. 21 Ibidem. See also M. Heidegger, "La epoca de la imagen del mundo" in Sendas perdidas (Holzwege) (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1960), pp. 95-96.

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1. Ortega y Gasset, Meditaciones del Quijote, Obras Completas, Vol. I, p. 357. Ortega will use many other examples; the Romans are a good instance, insofar as theirs is a well-documented case. See his Del Imperio Romano, Obras Comp/etas, Vol. VI, pp.51-110. 24 The generational sensibility in terms of fifteen-year periods may be found in 1. Ortega y Gasset, "Pr610go a la cuarta edici6n de Espana Invertebrada" (1934) in Obras Completas, Vol. III, p. 43. 25 1. Ortega y Gasset, "En torno al coloquio de Darmstadt" (1953), Obras Comp/etas, Vol. IX, p. 643. 26 See M. Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) §§ 34--38, pp. 210--225. 27 See L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), § 38, p. 19. 28 1. Ortega y Gasset, "Origen y epilogo de la filosofia" (1943), Obras Comp/etas, Vol. IX, p. 349. 29 Ibidem. The context of this thought is the Darmstadt Colloquia in 1954 and Heidegger's presentation, "Bauen, Wohnen, Denken"; see "Building, Dwelling, Thinking", in David Farrell Krell (ed.), Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings (New York: Harper & Row, 1977) pp. 319ff. See also 1. Ortega y Gasset, Historia como sistema (1935), Obras Completas, Vol. VI, p. 29; EI hombre y la gente, Vol. VII, p. 252; Que es leer, Vol. IX, p. 754. 30 In its true sense, culture is that which is yet to be done, what demands to be done, at the particular socia-historical moment, Ortega will say. See his Kant: Reflexiones de Centenario (1924), Obras Completas, Vol. IV, p. 39. 31 See for instance, 1. Ortega y Gasset, "Miseria y esplendor de la traducci6n" (1937), Obras Completas, Vol. V, p. 439. 32 Ibidem, pp. 443-444. 33 1. Ortega y Gasset, Que es filosoffa, Obras Completas, Vol. VII, p. 435. 34 Ortega uses the example in ibidem, p. 417. 35 See 1. Ortega y Gasset, El tema de nuestro tiempo (1921), Obras Completas, Vol. III, p. 188. Early on, Ortega will speak of a "cordial a priori" for our acts of attentiveness and for our thinking. See also his "Coraz6 y cabeza" (1927), Obras Completas, Vol. VI, pp. 149-151; and "Guillermo Dilthey y la idea de la vida", Vol. VI, pp. 21 Iff. A recent book provides empirical support for this position: Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error. Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (New York: Grosset Putnam, 1994). 36 Max Scheler will dedicate many pages to the distinction between goods and values and use the analogy of color. I may wish for justice and seek for it in democracy or dictatorship; I may understand the good to be found in withholding the truth (in the case of a prisoner of war under torture and risking many lives if he speaks) and at the same time know the greater value of truthfulness. In the same fashion one may recognize so many shades of color or have the same object change colors, while understanding colors by themselves, even when they come to hold diverse meanings and senses according to circumstances (blue, the color of the Bourbons; blue, the color of a political party; blue, a "cold" color; and so on). See his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 5-30. 37 Ludwing Wittgenstein, in Conferencia sobre etica (Barcelona: Editorial Paid6s, 1990) p.38. 22 23

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J. Ortega y Gasset, "Pasado y porvenir para el hombre actual" (1951), Obras Completas, Vol. IX, pp. 660-661. This was originally an address at the Rencontres Internationales de Geneve, published in French as La Connaissance de l' homme au XXe siec/e (Neuchatel: Ed. de la Baconniere, 1952). 39 Ibidem, p. 660. Ortega will repeat this quotation in his other writings on Goethe.

38

REFERENCES Damasio, Antonio R., Descartes' Error. Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (New York: GrossertiPutnam, 1994). Dreyfus, Hubert L., Being-in-the-World (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990). Eco, Umberto, The Limits of Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). Eco, Umberto, Rorty, Richard et al. and Stefan, Colini (cd.). Interpretation and Overinterpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Edie, James M., William James and Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). Farber, Marvin, The Foundation of Phenomenology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1968). Ferrater Mora, Jose, De la materia a la raz6n (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1983). Gouinlock, James, John Dewey's Philosophy of Value (New York: The Humanities Press, 1972). Habermas, Jurgen, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1962). Heidegger, Martin, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982). Heidegger, Martin, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984). Husser], Edmund, Formal and Transcendental Logic (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969). Trans. Dorion Cairns. Husser!, Edmund. Ideas (New York: Collier Books, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1975). Trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson. Husser!, Edmund, The Crisis of European Sciences (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970). James, William, Pragmatism (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., ]981). Mer!eau-Ponty, Maurice, Phenomenologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, Collection TEL, 1976). Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Le visible et l'invisible (Paris: Gallimard, 1964). Nietzsche, Friedrich, Asi hablaba Zaratustra (Mexico City: Editorial Filos6fica, 1956). Ortega y Gasset, Jose, "Conciencia, objeto y las tres distancias", Obras Completas II, pp. 61ff. Ortega y Gasset. Jose. Concord and Liberty (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1946). Ortega y Gasset. Jose. The Dehumanization of Art and Other Writings on Art and Culture (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956). Ortega y Gasset. Jose. "La idea de principio en Leibniz", Obras Completas VIII. pp. 61ff.

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Ortega y Gasset, Jose, Man and People (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1957). Ortega y Gasset, Jose, The Origin of Philosophy (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1967). Peirce, Charles S., El hombre, un signo (The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce) (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1988). Scheler, Max, Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973). Schutz, Alfred, Reflections on the Problem of Relevance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Conferencia sobre etica. Con dos comentarios sobre la teoria del valor (Barcelona: Editorial Paid6s, 1990). Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Culture and Value (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968). Wittgenstein, Ludwig, The Blue and Brown Books (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960).

ZOFIA MAJEWSKA

ROMAN INGARDEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE

An Attempt at a Reconstruction Even a very ambitious attempt at investigating Roman Ingarden's academic work! does not include his work in the field of philosophy of culture. Simultaneously, his ontology and aesthetics inspire a large body of philosophical and detailed studies of culture. The thinker, who allegedly did not create philosophy of culture, finds his followers and polemicists among those who enter the cultural lists. By philosophy of culture I understand those concepts of culture which are created within the frameworks of particular philosophical schools. Philosophy of culture can be the result of an author's conscious intention as well as an indirect product, being an effect of studies of other philosophical fields. The very fact of using the word "culture" does not justify the statement that a thinker has created a philosophy of culture. And the term may also be used in a popular sense. I believe that only when the notions linked to culture are related to the central issues of a philosopher's reflexion or when he advocates a new approach to culture, do we rightfully assign his work to the field of the philosophy of culture, regardless of whether a thinker himself has done so or not. Ingarden used the term "philosophy of culture" rather marginally and understood it as a theory of a particular kind of man's creations. 2 There is no doubt, however, that Ingarden did not build such a theory in a systematic manner, although he was aware that some of the issues he discussed led in its direction. Ingarden did not cultivate philosophy of culture as a separate discipline, but it is implicitly present in his work. As a matter of fact, each philosophical discipline Ingarden worked in comprises elements capable of stimulating cultural considerations. I would like to point out, however, that the cultural aspect of his work is not exclusive and is only one of the many present in Ingarden's multi-topical work. Nevertheless, this aspect is significant since it permeates his writings, links with their central issues, and results in original solutions. A strong tendency to create disjunctive classifications of a philosophers' work may be justified as a means of ordering issues, but in the case of multi-aspect, rich inter177 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 177-191. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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disciplinary reflexions that would only lead to obscuring important achievements. The line of thought I am going to use while reconstructing Ingarden's philosophy of culture is not unique in the history of philosophy since one often not only reads works literally, but also interprets them and educes theoretical concl usionsl consequences. Ingarden was aware of the fact that some of his solutions to particular problems bear implicitly on more general issues. 3 He stated that whenever he perceived such a perspective, he tried to present it separately in order for it to constitute justification for less general issues. Simultaneously, the notional apparatus created within the framework of the existential and formal ontology of his Controversy about the Existence of the World4 was used by him to relate to more particular problems. He never acted automatically, though, and principally objected to both inductive generalizations and deduction. He was also always ready to revise theoretical solutions whenever they were not confirmed by practice. Philosophy of culture constitutes a level of considerations located between wholly general and particular problems (aesthetics, philosophy of language, metaphilosophical reflexion), in which Ingarden never worked systematically, but into which he entered many times on different occasions. We can decrease the risk of erring by inspecting the way Ingarden himself operated on the different levels of generality of his work as well as how he shifted from a general level to a particular one and back, the fact which allows for two lines of reconstruction. The hypothetical nature of the reconstruction does not differ much from Ingarden's manner of philosophizing since he very often supplemented his considerations with a condition of retractibility. THE CRITERIA FOR DIFFERENTIATING CULTURE

There is no definition of culture in Ingarden's philosophy. According to the phenomenological guidelines a definition should be a result of an artifact's cognizance and should not be assumed at the beginning of study, which might determine the wayan artifact is perceived. One may, however, distinguish certain criteria which served Ingarden in differentiating culture as a separate topical domain. These criteria fall into three categories: anthropological; existential; and axiological. It is only considering them together that allows one to explicate

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Ingarden's understanding of culture. The statement that man is a creator of culture appears to be trivial. However, the very fact of the human origin of an artifact does not automatically decide its inclusion in culture. The creations of culture are equiped with a special mode of existence. The solution to the problem of their existential status was Ingarden's original contribution to ontology. A new level of sense - purely intentional beings which personify qualities and allow for communion with them - is created on the foundations of the real world owing to human activity. It also explains why human life extends beyond the level of biological dynamism. CULTURAL CREATION AND COMMUNION WITH CUL TURE AS CONDITIONS OF HUMANITY

Ingarden's studies concerning man were twofold: ontological and cultura1. 5 Stressing the cultural tasks undertaken by man was one of the most characteristic features of Ingarden's anthropology. Man lives on the border between two worlds - the natural and the cultural - a fact which introduces a lot of tension into his life. Man becomes human in as much as he can go beyond the barrier of animalistic life and create his own world, different from the natural world. Man is a conscious being, but he also possesses a body. The notion of a conscious being denotes a being of a complex formal structure, comprising a stream of consciousness, pure subject and soul, on which personality can constitute itself.6 The functional unity of body and what is spiritual does not settle the question of the existential origin of both spheres and consequently suspends the issue of their existential dependence. The "0 odpowiedzialnosci i jej podstawach ontyc;:.nych,,7 treatise is a very important step towards overcoming this anthropological dualism. In it, Ingarden perceives man as a primal unity, a system relatively isolated and based on a multiplicity of subsystems. He does not overcome the dualism completely, though, as he himself distinguishes between bodily and spiritual subsystems which are relatively isolated. The essence of man as a bodily-spiritual being is also reflected in the character of man's creations. Creating objects useful for man from a biological viewpoint does not use up man's energy nor does it fulfil his ambitions. Man also produces cultural artifacts which fulfil his spiritual needs such as his longing for transcendent values. It is only

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owing to such creations that man fulfils his own being, becomes more perfect and generous, transcends animality and achieves the status of a person: ... an important point, we ourselves change under the influence of artifacts which we created and which we remain in direct and intuitive contact with. Thus, without our conscious will and knowledge we are reborn and changed through our mere effort of remaining in the service of the achievement of our values. We make ourselves fuller devoting our strength and efforts to creating man's reality as such. 8

Cultural creation is thus a peculiar gift. When it is directed outward it compensates our outward effort with the internal development of personality. Cultural artifacts are equivalents of acts of consciousness of exceptional creative potential. However, the creative powers of human consciousness are limited and they cannot bring into existence an autonomous being, only a heteronomous one. In order to render his artifacts intersubjective, man must record them and create their physical foundations. Accordingly, culture-creative behaviours enhance not only acts of consciousness, but also physical activities. "We do not walk the world in spirit only and if it were not for our clever and dextrous hands, and our agile yet sensitive eyes, and subtle ears, many of our creations would not have come into being at all.,,9 The relationship between a purely intentional artifact and its physical foundation can differ considerably in different domains of culture, the best example given by Ingarden being works of art. The closer the relationship, the more important technical skills and proficiency of hands or senses become in a given form of expression. However, if an artist loses his spiritual power, mere technical skills will fail him. Physical functions must be compatible with and subordinated to the emotional sphere. Cultural creation requires efforts of consciousness and body, but it does not constitute the domain of absolute creation, because it finds inspiration in the external world and acts of perception. It is difficult to make hasty generalizations, though. The role of imitative and creative factors varies in different domains of culture. In science Ingarden ascribes greater importance to the former, and in art, to the latter. Still, an artist must respect the requirements of a material and sometimes even the extraaesthetic function of his work (as happens in architecture). Hardly ever does a creative process comprise only one phase of the

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highest accumulated activity. Most often active phases are juxtaposed with passive ones, intermissions and distortions appear in the process. Even successful creative processes, that is, those resulting in valuable works of art, do not have homogenous character. There are surprises, too, masterpieces or failures which more or less embody values than the artist originally envisioned. I believe that yet another feature of Ingarden's concept of culture does not allow for treating creativity as spontaneous uncontrollable creation. Man does take intellectual, artistic and moral responsibility for his creations. Ingarden certainly perceives the power of individual activity/action in art, science, and language (even though the latter is a social artifact).lo The existence of culture, however, is not only determined by the outstanding individuals who create it, but also by those who are in contact with it. Man's creations, even though only heteronomous existentially, play a more important role in life than the autonomous artifact. However, as beings devoid of autonomous existence they "do not possess the power of reality independent of man and his spiritual acts. They can satisfy man'!,> aspirations to life above Nature only when his spiritual activity is exceptionally high. They fall into absolute non-existence as soon as man loses his will to transcend his simple innate nature and surrenders his creative active consciousness."11 Therefore, creation does not end with producing purely intentional artifacts, it is also necessary to maintain them in existence. Being not only existentially derivative, but also existentially dependent on acts of consciousness, culture may survive only at the price of the permanent and responsible activity of man. Without man's vivid contact with such works we would not be able to talk about culture at all, but rather about the dead world of its physical foundations. Ingarden's concept of creation and cultural reception eliminated the gap postulated between the two domains of human activity. The role of a culture consumer is comparable to that of a culture creator. A creator brings a work of art into being, a consumer maintains it in its existence. It is also from the latter that Ingarden demands co-creation and responsibility. Accordingly, the space of interhuman contacts becomes expanded with the forms of relations facilitated by cultural artifacts. "This specifically human reality is more permanent and longer lasting than the life of an individual man and ... constitutes a heritage for each of us, which can

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be found in the world as a gift from our ancestors, and rebirth of past epochs, and communion with people who have been long dead."12 Neither creation nor relations with culture should be, however, giving us the illusion that we live in a timeless world. We cannot make our own epoch absolute either, nor can we underestimate all past and future stages of development of culture. "Many a time did man reach the same peaks of culture, and having done so, tumble down again and pass away ... others will build on his grave, on the ashes of a culture that people will not know anything about.,,13 Ingarden strives to reconcile man with time and to show the unity of existing and passing away. Man should create artifacts and commune with them not in order to "kill time", but to make an attempt at reaching values while preserving the awareness of a lapse of time. It is only such an effort that will ensure his personality development, control over time, and freedom. In Ingarden's philosophy autocreative activities cannot be separated from culture-creative tasks. THE EXISTENTIAL STATUS OF CULTURAL ARTIFACTS

In his anthropological essays Ingarden did not neglect the problem of existence of cultural artifacts, even though in this particular context the issue was treated without the analytical inquiries which characterised his ontology. Das literarische Kunstwerk l4 discusses the problem of the existential status of cultural artifacts as well as of language. More systematic existential- and formal-ontological considerations of cultural artifacts were presented by Ingarden in Controversy about the Existence of the World. According to Ingarden, a complete description of an actual artifact should enhance its mode of existence, formal structure, and material content. Any artifact's mode of existence can be determined only in the abstract. Such a mode is not simple, however, and constitutes a coherent unity, on the second level of abstraction of which one can perceive more primal factors (existential moments). The distinction between four possible modes of existence emerges from Ingarden's existential analysis: absolute existence (timeless); existence beyond the limits of time (ideal); temporal existence (real); and purely intentional existence. The last of these exists in two variations of existential moments having the following characteristics: non-autonomy (heteronomy), derivation,

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non-topicality, independence, dependence for one set of moments; and non-autonomy, derivation, non-topicality, non-independence for another set of moments. 15 A purely intentional artifact finds its existential foundation in something outside. It must be brought into existence by something else. It lacks definite relation to time. It may constitute a separate entity in relation to the emotions which created it. Even when it is existentially independent, it requires the existence of other existentially independent artifacts since they are a requisite of its further existence. Ingarden distinguishes between monosubjective and intersubjective purely intentional artifacts. Momentary and transient, monosubjective artifacts are correlates of experiences of free fantasy. Among intersubjective artifacts he mentions purely intentional artifacts that are recorded and designed (like plans for real objects, e.g. technical constructions). The notion of a recorded purely intentional artifact has been applied to cultural artifacts. They constitute separate entities and accordingly are existentially independent. Their intersubjective accessibility is determined by their physical existential foundation. Simultaneously, the assumption of the existence of the ideal sphere played an important role in Ingarden's concept of intentionality, at least in the initial phase of its formulation. The existence of ideal notions provided an existential basis for intersubjectivity in meaning. 16 Later in his life the philosopher was ready to abandon his avowal of the existence of ideal notions,17 even though he never corrected or altered his early works. In the revised third edition of Controversy about the Existence of the World Ingarden stated that the criterion of separating domains of artwork is constituted not only by the possibility of an object's being subject to the general idea of an artwork, but also by the particular function artworks play in man's life. IS In his '60s lectures concerning the problems of the existential foundation of works of art, Ingarden did not adduce the existence of ideal beings, but instead distinguished the sUbjective and objective (physical and consciousness-related) foundations of artworks. 19 Without changing his position towards the modes of existence of cultural artifacts, Ingarden sought foundations for their existence in the real world, the world of a creator, the consumer, and material. The problem, however, proves to be complex since purely intentional artifacts realise values. The question concerning the mode of existence of values themselves also remained open in Ingarden's philosophy. Ingarden formulated the idea of the two-sidedness of the formal

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structure (also called the idea of double-subjectivity) in purely intentional artifacts. 2o The notions of forms of property subject and forms of property existence have a significant role in Ingarden's formal ontology. Purely intentional artifacts are subjects of property as intentional structures (as a variation of beings possessing particular existential status) and they are also the subject of their own content (they simulate the reality of a certain mode of existence, form, and content); consequently one can discuss them as being double-subjective. As intentional correlates they display a number of features: the fact that everything in them is conjectural (intentionally ascribed), possession of content, finally, double-subjectivity itself. Purely intentional artifacts simulate reality only in general outline since their content comprises spaces of underdesignation. 21 As much as the intention of the act is powerless against an autonomous artifact and cannot change it in any respect, so much is the creative power of consciousness revealed when confronted with purely intentional artifacts. Content-wise, a non-autonomous individual artifact is always in the course of constituting itself, activity which cannot be completed in any number of acts. Instead, whatever is autonomously individual constitutes in itself a being ready and complete in every respect; whatever is non-autonomous and intentionally created is in itself never ready and always in a state of creation. 22

Such is Ingarden's ontological argument for the consumer's cocreativity in the creation of a purely intentional artifact. Artifacts can be purely intentional either originally or derivatively.23 The latter derive their intentionality from that of other creations, e.g., literary works derived from linguistic creations. Intentional artifacts may comprise in themselves new intentional artifacts. Accordingly, subsequent levels of intentionality emerge, each possessing a twofold formal structure. Ingarden encountered certain difficulties while applying his general ontological considerations to thorough aesthetic analyses. He was aware of the complexity of the relations between purely intentional artifacts and their physical existential foundations. He did not wish to mechanically transfer his general solutions to diverse cultural artifacts, either. He regarded works of architecture as not possessing spaces of underdesignation, but he declared them to possess a purely intentional mode of existence, which raises significant doubts.

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However, Ingarden's conception could be maintained if one assumed that purely intentional artifacts are correlates of a special co-creative form of experience. Apart from works of art and language, Ingarden counted among cultural artifacts the following: academic works, religious systems, law, the state, public institutions, economic artifacts, and intellectual games; in other words, everything that is derived from the decisions of consciousness and requires further acts of consciousness in order to maintain its existence. While he did not make any thorough analyses in the field, he did certainly perceive the symbolic functions of real artifacts. The ontic status of culture does not change through the inclusion of meanings ascribed intentionally to real artifacts. It still remains a layer of sense projected by consciousness onto the material foundation. Maintaining the existential sameness of culture, we are simultaneously avoiding psychological (for it does not exist in us, but outside) and materialistic (for it is not something physical) reductionism. This is why I consider Ingarden's proposal very attractive despite its sketchiness (in relation to the sum of cultural artifacts) and the controversies over the assumptions it is based on. I believe that Ingarden' s considerations of the interspersion of domains of being allow for such a solution. Links between beings purely intentional and real can be examined from "synchronic" and "diachronic" angles, which leads straight to the notions of "cultural space" and "cultural time." These are the questions that Ingarden investigated primarily in his aesthetic works. The analyses concerning space are multi-aspectival and take into account: the spatiality of the physical existential foundation in works of art, the space presented in a work of art; the conditions of substantiation through the placing of a consumer in a real space. In Controversy about the Existence of the World Ingarden proved that there is a correlation between time and a mode of existence. A temporal being goes through a phase of topicality, and the moment of topicality demands the existential autonomy of the artifact to which this moment belongs. Cultural artifacts are heteronomous and are characterised by a moment of existential non-topicality. It might seem, then, that the philosopher excludes the problems of time from his study of culture. In his early works Ingarden discussed problems of time in relation to works of art. Do we then face incoherence here in his ontological and aesthetic statements?

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Purely intentional artifacts are admittedly non-topical, and therefore non-temporal, but the question about the relations between culture and time is not senseless because: - culture is a product of acts of consciousness of temporally definite subjects; - the perception of cultural artifacts happens in time; - assignment of culture to periods of real time is a consequence of the two above facts; - the content of cultural artifacts may comprise intentionally projected time; and - there exist multi-phase artifacts, in which ordering (the following of one part after another) creates an analog of temporal ordering. "By assigning cultural artifacts to certain periods of 'real' time as well as psychic structures, and processes taking place in authors (creators) and perceivers of cultural artifacts, culture acquires a temporal character and belongs to certain periods of historical development.,,24 That justifies the need for the notions of a cultural process and "life" of an artifact. The idea of the historical 'life' of works, their development, decline, decay, and renaissance, does not entail any effective changes in these works, and only reflects the change of attitude of consumers towards the works. In Controversy about the Existence of the World Ingarden took into account the possibility of a real existence of the world and of the purely intentional existence of culture. His opinions on aesthetic works delve into the field of material ontology (referring to the qualitative properties of cultural artifacts), and even allow for metaphysical interpretation; they discuss actual culture. 25 Even though Ingarden did not account theoretically for a realistic approach to the world, his aesthetic, axiological, and anthropological examination can be considered the first attempt at the grounding of realism. I find it significant that the culture's subject is not a pure, but a real "I" - a physically living person placed in a particular situation which is his condition biologically and culturally, and one whose decisions and activities are co-defined by this situation, but who is ready to take responsibility for his choices. If one wants to get to the philosopher's views, one should not omit what was formulated and expressed in his readings, lectures, or presentations in a variety of discussions. In these, Ingarden had the liberty to make statements unrestrained by the academic discipline which he

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imposed on himself in his great works with theoretical ambitions. Lectures and such did not have a final and definite character, but were rather suggestions to be examined and confirmed. Ingarden embarked upon his study of the literary work in order to determine whether a mode of existence peculiar to such a work could be ascribed to the real world. His fascination with cultural artifacts and the values embodied in them led him to make them an autonomous subject of his studies. Ingarden never finished his main work, but in his consideration of cultural artifacts in the last umpteen years of his life, he practically proclaimed himself in favour of realism, showing the complexity of links between cultures to be a purely intentional creation of the real world. AXIOLOGICAL UNDER-DESIGNA nON

Culture is a field for the realization of values. Man embodies these values in his works and communes with them. Ingarden postulated the existence of an objective hierarchy of values independent of man. The ideal of values which he assumed in his anthropological essays expressly shows Platonic roots. In many points, however, his axiological statements constitute a polemics with Plato - aesthetic values are perceived as autonomous in relation to moral ones, and there exist negative values as well. Personally, I believe that his most essential difference with Plato lies in the formulation of his statement concerning a mode of existence of values. Ingarden does not assent to axiological idealism. He is disposed to accept the existence of the idea of values whose content can be examined, an activity resultant from obtaining eidetic knowledge of values. That, however, is nothing peculiar since he accepted the existence of ideas of real as well as of purely intentional artifacts. But Ingarden does not ascribe ideal existence to values themselves; they are not general, but rather individual beings. "I have always meant these particular non-autonomous beings which manifest themselves in some individual, and particularly in real, artifacts; beings that are equally individual to these artifacts. ,,26 Considering the individual and nonautonomous character of values, while discussing their mode of existence, one must take into account a mode of existence of a value carrier and the way in which a value is present in an artifact to which it belongs. In view of these two aspects of the problem, there exists no sameness

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in mode of existence of a value and of its carrier. Different values may belong to one and the same artifact, and they can be present in it in different ways. The diversity and varied presence of individual values necessitates varied modes of existence of different types. None of the modes of existence specified in Ingarden's existential ontology applies, in his opinion, to autonomous values. That, in tum, leads to the necessity of a new notional formulation which would be in a position to express the existential status of values. Ingarden educed a postulate of partial problem solving in the theory of values of axiological pluralism. 27 He stressed numerous theoretical difficulties facing axiology, but simultaneously he was far from any skepticism and relativism. He formulated doubts only in order to find ways of overcoming them. He also attached much importance to intuitive cognizance of values. The relationship and qualitative differences between artifacts are much easier to find by means of visual contact with them than is the case with acts of discursive reflection. Some particular complications are caused by the fact that values of the same kind manifest qualitative differences (many forms of goodness, beauty) and that negative values are qualitatively founded (they are not based only on the absence of positive values). Ingarden does not negate the possible existence of undefinable values (based on primal simple qualities), but he still thinks that not all values can be reduced to such a material foundation. That, in tum, speaks in favour of the intellectual approach to axiological questions. A value constitutes a peculiar superstructure of what it belongs to. Therefore, if the problems connected with values refer to a qualitative feature of artifacts, then they should be examined from the material and ontological angle. Ingarden did not conduct a general philosophical study in this field. He may have lacked some theoretical base for formulating axiological questions. However, as I mentioned earlier, his aesthetics covered some ground in material ontology. In his detailed treatment of the axiological problems that concern moral, artistic, and aesthetic values (a system of aesthetically valuable qualities), he also projected the directions in which a material theory of values would develop. The axiological questions to which Ingarden did not give answers have far-reaching repercussions in the reconstruction of his philosophy of culture. Culture and its material foundation constitute artifacts of not only

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different existential status, but also of different axiological characteristics. He started from the anatomical descriptive study of cultural artifacts, but aimed at their axiological formulation. Such an approach resulted from his conscious decision, systematization of problems, and establishment of their logical ordering. Nevertheless, suspended questions concerning values rendered Ingarden's notion of culture underdeveloped. If it had not been his intention to construct a systematic philosophy of culture, it would certainly be hard to accuse him of not having done so. On the other hand, the realization of theoretical gaps in his understanding of culture may provide a stimulus to further study in that field. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE STRUCTURE OF REFLECTION ON CULTURE

In a brief article one may only draw attention to problems present in the work of this philosopher of uncommon constructive and analytical skills. I would like supplement these problems with an outline of the structure of Ingarden's reflection on culture. It covers: - the ontology of culture (the mode of existence of cultural artifacts, their formal structure and qualitative features); - the metaphysics of culture (the essence of real culture); - epistemology (ways of studying culture, questions about the objectivity of knowledge about culture); - axiology (ontology and the phenomenology of values realized in culture); - the phenomenology of cultural encounters (creative and perceptive); - the philosophy of particular domains of culture and problems concerning the relationships between them; - theory of the meaning and function of culture in man's life. The philosophy of culture implied in Ingarden's works operates on different levels of analytic inquiry. One encounters both subtle analyses of issues and mere lists of problems which should be examined in future study. Ingarden modified and refined the notion of intentionality derived from Husser!, making it an ontological cultural category. In his study of culture he never used transcendental reduction and constitutional considerations, applying instead the method of phenomenological inspection and description as well as the method of ideaization. He decidedly favoured structural

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study while treating genetic study marginally. The task of science is to formulate the results of cognition notionally, whereas an intuitive (often emotional) contact with an artifact under inspection should be a preparation for purely theoretical formulation. The reflexion of culture leads to a more profound knowledge of man. Cultural creation and reception are necessary for his maintaining individual and group identity. I believe that Ingarden achieved more than many of the philosophers who have cultivated philosophy of culture explicitly. He raised the problem of the existential status of cultural artifacts and suggested a solution devoid of psychologism and physicalism. Ingarden's very anti-psychologism justifies our reading here his works in a way that abstracts from the author's intentions and motifs. The richness and multi-aspectival nature of Ingarden's philosophy does not mean that there exist no discursive and underdeveloped places in it. Consequently, the construction of a philosophy of culture inspired by his ideas cannot work as a simple transfer. After all, philosophizing is, as Ingarden taught, an attempt at self-responsible thinking.

Marie Curie University Lublin NOTES I Danuta Gierulanka, "Filozofia Roman Ingardena. Pr6ba wnikni,!:cia w strukturp catosci dzieta," in: "Fenomenologia Romana Ingardena," special edition of Studia Filozojiczne (Warsaw: 1972), pp. 71-90. 2 Roman Ingarden, Studia z estetyki, Vol. 1 (Warsaw: 1957), pp. 249-250, 275. 3 Roman Ingarden, Studia z estetyki; Vol. 3 (Warsaw: 1970), p. 6. 4 Roman Ingarden, Spor 0 istnienie swiata [Controversy about the Existence of the Worldl, Vol. 1 (Krakow: 1947), Vol. 2 (Krakow: 1948). Further on I will refer to the revised 3rd edition (Warsaw: 1987). 5 Maria Gofaszewska points to Ingarden's incoherence in Controversy about the Existence of the World and Little Book about Man. Cf. Studia Filozojiczne, 1975: No.7, pp. 125. Wtadystaw Str6i:ewski argues with her conclusions: Wtadystaw Str6i:ewski, Istnienie i wartosc (Krakow: 1981), pp. 108-109. 6 Ingarden, Spor 0 istnienie swiata, Vol. 2, op. cit., Pt. 2, p. 194. 7 Roman Ingarden, Ksi(lzeczka 0 czfowieku, 4th ed. (Krakow: 1987), pp. 116-148. 8 Ibid., p. 24. 9 Ibid., p. 35. 10 Roman Ingarden, Z teorii j~zyka i jilozojicznych pods taw logiki (Warsaw: 1972), p.58. II Ingarden, Ksi(lzeczka 0 czfowieku, op. cit., p. 17.

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Ibid., p. 24. Ibid., p. 63. 14 Roman Ingarden, Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie. Logik und LiteraturwissenschaJt (Halle: 1931). Polish translation (Warsaw: 1960). 15 Ingarden, Spar 0 istni~'nie swiata, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 249. 16 Ingarden, Das literarische Kunstwerk, op. cit., pp. 374-379. Cf. 0 dziele literackim, 2nd edition (Warsaw: 1988), pp. 441-447. 17 Ibid., p. 14. 18 Ingarden, Spar 0 istnienie swiata. op. cit., Vol. 2 PI. 2, pp. 100-107. 19 Roman Ingarden, Wykfady i dyskusje z estetyki (Warsaw: 1981), p. 185. 20 Ingarden, Spar 0 istnienie swiata, op. cit., Vol. 2 Pt. 2, pp. 195-203. 21 Ibid., pp. 203-207. 22 Ibid., p. 207. 23 Roman Ingarden, 0 dziele literackim (Warsaw: 1960, 1988), pp. 190-193. 24 Ingarden, Spar 0 istnienie swiata, op. cit., Vol. 2, 2nd edition (Warsaw: 1962), p. 271. 25 The best proof are Ingarden's own analyses of particular works of art. 26 Roman Ingarden, "Czego nie wiemy 0 wartoSciach," Studia z estetyki, Vol. 3, p.236. 27 Ingarden discusses the essential problems of the theory of values in the mentioned work. Cf. ibid., p. 221. 12 13

JIM I. UNAH

ON THE ALLEGED DILEMMA IN A WORK BEING BOTH AFRICAN AND PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION

Philosophy is an English word expressing a Western European concept and it would be wrong to apply it to thought systems outside Western Europe. In other words, philosophy is defined tautologically as Western philosophy, which definition portrays the very notion of African philosophy as a misnomer. Again, it has been alleged that while philosophy is fairly well defined in Western Europe, there is no consensus amongst writers in African philosophy on the criteria of Africanity. There are works in philosophy done by both African and non-African writers. In each case, it is further alleged, works that are really philosophy in content are bereft of every iota of Africanity and, conversely, those that are African in content are devoid of every trace of what it means to be philosophical. The point at issue here is that if Africans and non-Africans can do African philosophy and if works on African philosophy can be done both in Africa and outside Africa, then, the notion of Africanity is reduced to a cultural designation. And since the cultural traits exhibited in a work could seriously erode its philosophical content, it would seem that there is a dilemma in a work being both African and Philosophy. The dilemma would appear to be compounded by the charge that certain writers labeled as ethno-philosophers often parade African myths, proverbs and subtle thought systems as philosophy. Moreover, Africa is a vast continent encompassing even those in the Diaspora. Consequently, any claim to African philosophy would be impossible to sustain given the vastness of the territory in question. Yet, it is quite possible to examine the different cultural attitudes and temperaments of the different peoples of Africa and come away with a predominant orientation of being that would be both transcultural and transhistorical. The regionalisation of philosophy which is not peculiar to Africa is a consequence of the discernment of a predominant orientation of being of a people inhabiting a vast territory. Besides, for philosophy to qualify as African philosophy it is not necessary that it 193 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 193-211. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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degenerate into a matter of unanimous agreement amongst every individual African. A return to the descriptive analysis of attitudes and temperaments in traditional philosophy will show that the alleged dilemma in a work being both African and Philosophy represents one of those subtle events in the metaphysical tradition calculated to obstruct access to a radical comprehension of African reality. The fruitful access to African reality does not reside in dichotomizing between the terms Western and African, much less in showing that the former qualifies for inclusion in the diverse activities which go by the name of philosophy and that the latter does not. The fruitful access to African philosophy is to guard it against the phantom of absolutes which haunts traditional ontology from the Greeks of Antiquity to the modem period, and to open up to the boundless opportunities offered by phenomenological philosophy now in our post-modem era. The task here consists in articulating and clarifying the allegations, illuminating attitudes and temperaments in traditional ontology to which devastating criticisms of African philosophy normally belong, and mapping out the direction of research in the field along the boundary already demarcated by phenomenological philosophy. THE ALLEGATIONS

The single most devastating indictment of the idea of African philosophy is, perhaps, the doctrine being fostered and constantly re-implanted by some modernist philosophers that a work cannot be both African and Philosophy. In the works of these philosophers, the impression is created that there is something in the word African which makes it etymologically incapable of being associated with the concept of Philosophy and, conversely, that there is an umbilical cord etymbologically tying the word Western to the term Philosophy. Professors Peter Bodunrin* and Gene Blocker are the prominent purveyors of what can be called the "dilemma doctrine" in African philosophy. In fact, the former has categorized himself and a few others - Kwasi Wiredu, Paulin Hountondji and Odera Oruka - as professional philosophers. 1 Now, with the inclusion of Professor Blocker in the team, Bodunrin is satisfied that they are doing in Africa "what Ayer did in Language, Truth and Logic, expounding, explaining and defending the views of a school".2 It is probably for this reason that Campbell Shittu

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Momoh labeled them as "African Logical neo-postivists",3 a tag that they seem to have accepted uncomplainingly. Before devoting attention to the dilemma doctrine, I consider it necessary to state with a broad stroke the general thesis of these modernist thinkers in African philosophy. Their thesis can be summarized thus: Autochthonous 4 African thought systems being bandied about by ethnophilosophers are not philosophical because they lack the rigour and argumentation which are the hallmarks of philosophy. Even if Africans can boast of rational, logical and complicated conceptual systems, not all such complicated conceptual systems are philosophica1. 5 Only philosophy in a debased sense 6 can pass muster as African philosophy, and since debased philosophy is not philosophy properly so-called, ethno-philosophers are labouring under delusion. While it is true that all peoples have primeval notions which they treat as traditional philosophy, civilized people do not bandy such traditional thoughts about or teach them in their universities, if only for the avoidance of anachronism. 7 Consequently, ethno-philosophy is an enterprise in anachronism, at best a pre-philosophy, a "crazed language" and "a self-deluding invention that hides behind its own products".8 From all this it follows that the notion of African Philosophy is a muddle-headed one incapable of precision and the tag itself a misnomer, since philosophy tautologically is Western philosophy.9 We shall treat the African orientation of philosophy sketched out by the modernists towards the end of the paper as we now return to their dilemma doctrine. THE DILEMMA DOCTRINE

Of the modernist philosophers, Bodunrin and Blocker are the ones who have stoutly championed the doctrine that a work cannot be both African and Philosophy. Of the two, Blocker is the most unashamed in the espousal and propagation of the doctrine. "By philosophy", Bodunrin declares, "I mean Western philosophy. . . . Whatever else may be philosophy, and it is not as if we are absolutely free to foist any meaning that suits our fancy on a concept that has its birth in another culture - whatever else may be philosophy and wherever else there may also be philosophy, Western philosophy, one may tautologically assert, is philosophy" .10 Having thus set the pace in what appears to be a marathon philosophical relay, Bodunrin handed over the baton to Blocker who took it

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upon himself to knock down all the barriers of finesse in the field of disputation and proceeded to dig the grave of African philosophy. According to Blocker, there are no clear criteria for determining what can be meant by African philosophy. All the specimens of African philosophy so far presented cannot pass for philosophy. What you really have are mythologies or subtle thought systems which could never qualify for inclusion in the edifice of philosophy. What this discovery shows is that only Europeans can competently do philosophy, since philosophy is an English word expressing a Western European concept. Besides, while philosophy is fairly well defined in Western Europe so that one is clear-headed about what one is talking about when one talks of philosophy, there is in Africa a curious fuzziness surrounding the concept of philosophy such that it becomes absolutely hair-splitting to associate it with available thought systems. By way of preamble, Professor Blocker enumerates some examples of nine specimens being presented as African Philosophy with a view to illustrating the dilemma "of anything meeting the criteria for being both African and Philosophy".!! The specimens include the work of Professor Elgood on Hare, while at the University of Lagos; Tempels' Bantu Philosophy; William Abraham's work on Leibniz and The Mind of Africa; William Amo's The Apatheia of the Human Mind; recorded Yoruba proverbs; Neo-Platonic writings of Alexandria; Sub-Saharan Islamic theology and history; and Marcel Griaule's Conversations with Ogotommeli.!2 From this list, it becomes easy for Professor Blocker to isolate those that are philosophical in style from those that are African in content. The point he makes here is that those works that are philosophical in style are not African in content and, conversely, that those works that are African in content are not really philosophical in style. As he puts it, works "which certainly satisfy the most demanding criteria for what is African . .. begin to slip away from the center of the concept of what it is to be philosophical".!3 The point is further illustrated in the following way: There are some works that are done in Africa by non-Africans which though they are assuredly philosophical in style are not African in content, such as the works of Professor Eigood on Hare while at the University of Lagos. The point of interest here is that not every philosophical work done in Africa can qualify as African philosophy. Professor Blocker is right here. This is so because for a piece of philosophical work to be African in content, it is not

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necessary that it be done by an African in Africa. Works on African philosophy can be done outside Africa, as William Abraham's The Mind of Africa beautifully illustrates. Even here, Professor Blocker endorses the contention of Dr. Momoh that one does not have to be an African to be able to do works on African philosophy.14 This proposition is equally true of other regional philosophies. One does not need to be a German to be able to do German philosophy any more than one has to be British to be able to do British philosophy. Evidently, therefore, the geographical origin of the author is not the determinant of the Africanity of a philosophy. Furthermore, Professor Blocker takes Placid Tempels' Bantu Philosophy as the prototype of a work done by a non-African, though "clearly less philosophical", but African in content. Again, there are works done by Africans which are "clearly philosophical" but which are not African in content in any way. Blocker cites Professor W. E. Abraham's work on Leibniz and William Amo's The Apatheia of the Human Mind as typical examples of true philosophical works done by Africans which at any rate bear no African cultural stamp whatsoever. This argument destroys Professor Paulin Hountondji's view that the criterion of Africanity resides, not in an alleged specificity of content, but in the geographical origin of the authors. 15 Blocker is not the only one who has attacked this view that the criterion of Africanity resides in the geographical origin of the authors. Olabiyi Yai l6 had earlier demolished it when he pointed out that the claim flies in the face of common sense and experience. Those who have contributed to the pool of British philosophy are not all Britons any more than all those who have done works on German or French philosophy are all Germans or French. There is in fact an Afro-centric philosophy now making the rounds that there is an African origin to Greek Philosophy, the latter of which is the fountain-head of Western philosophy. Professor Innocent Onyewuenyi l7 has directed his intellectual energy, in a new book, to making just this point. The work is an indirect refutation of the claim that Philosophy is a Western European concept. Now, Professor Blocker finally identifies works which he thinks clearly satisfy the criterion of Africanity, that is, what it is to be African in content, but which miss the mark of what it is to be philosophical, and asserted rather complacently: "Thus, the clearer the examples become of Philosophy the more dubious they become as examples of African and

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vice versa. The clearer the examples are of African the more doubtful they become as regards philosophy".18 Thus, if one follows the terrain of Professor Blocker's thought one gets the following mode of argumentation: Work has been done by African and non-African writers alike on an alleged African philosophy. Work has also been done by both categories of writers (Africans and non-Africans) on Western Philosophy. While the former satisfies the criterion of Africanity, the latter satisfies the criterion of philosophy. Whatever is clearly and authentically African cannot enter into the definition of philosophy and, conversely, whatever is clearly and authentically philosophical cannot enter into the definition of what it is to be African. Hence for Professor Blocker the more African "African philosophy" becomes the less philosophical it will be and, conversely, the more philosophical "African philosophy" becomes the less African in content it will be. 19 Blocker's main reason for maintaining this position is that what has been presented by African and some Western writers as "African Philosophy" is not philosophy proper but mythologies of "subtle thought systems". But philosophy, strictly speaking, is philosophy in virtue of "its reliance on analysis, debate, appeal to reason, argument and counter argument, which is not the predominant style of West African myths, proverbs and the sayings of certain wise elders".2o Another reason for Blocker's contention that whatever is autochthonously African cannot qualify for inclusion into the definition of philosophy is that whenever we use the expression "African", at least in connection with philosophy, we always imply "a cultural" designation, that is, Black Africa with its distinctive, non-European culture, thereby making philosophy a cultural affair whereas, in point of fact, philosophy is that "which typifies the thought of the tradition from Plato to Strawson".21 Blocker contends that it is only in a loose and debased sense (following Oruka22 ) that anyone can, without absurdity, refer to what is being paraded as African Philosophy, that is, myths, proverbs or subtle thought systems, as philosophy.23 For it is philosophy only as it is practiced in Western Europe that truly qualifies as philosophy. And the reason for insisting, as Professor Bodunrin did, that philosophy is basically Western philosophy is that philosophy is an English word expressing a Western European concept,24 and we scandalize the concept (i.e., philosophy) when we apply it to "thought systems outside the sphere of Western Europe".25 Besides, Blocker thinks that while there are elaborate thought systems in West Africa which are not clearly marked out,

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"there is a reasonably well-defined concept philosophy and the question is a conceptual one whether" these elaborate subtle thought systems satisfy the criteria for inclusion into that concept. 26 Blocker's answer is an emphatic No! In fairness, however, Professor Blocker concludes that there is today an emerging African Philosophy which is true philosophy on account of the fact that it employs the conceptual tools of Western Philosophy to analyze and clarify socio-political problems of contemporary Africa. As he says, The debate over African Philosophy is creating an African Philosophy. What I see emerging from the debate is a new and viable African philosophy which utilizes the traditional tools of philosophical analysis to clarify and offer solutions to social and political problems of contemporary West Africa. 27 DEALING WITH THE DILEMMA

Needless to say, there are a number of attractive distractions in Professor Blocker's dilemma doctrine in African Philosophy, such as the concluding remarks that there is now an emerging African Philosophy or that it is "silly to refer only to the traditional as culturally authentic". The point, however, is that a number of Blocker's claims are not sustainable. The claim, for example, that there are no defined criteria for determining what constitutes African philosophy is simply untrue and embarrassing. Dr. Campbell Shittu Momoh has delineated the canons and parameters for the study of African philosophy.28 Besides, there is a legitimate conception of philosophy even by Western writers, which treats philosophy as a first order activity or an activity toward synthesis. Professor Gordon Hunnings has observed, for instance, that in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle criticism always gravitated towards synthesis. 29 More than that, what Professor Blocker takes to be myths, proverbs or "subtle thought systems", have been aptly classified by Dr. Momoh under Ancient African Philosophy.30 Momoh takes real issues with those who label the concomitant elements of Ancient African philosophy (myths, proverbs and wise sayings which have metaphysical, moral, political, social, epistemological, logical, legal and even scientific implications) as traditional thought. In fact, Momoh would not endorse the locutions "traditional" and "thought" because, as he contends, they inhibit any genuine attempt to establish African philosophy as a respectable discipline. 3! In Momoh's words, the label "African Traditional Thought" has

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a pejorative implication in the mind of those who foist it on others. African philosophy cannot be treated with such disdain for in its ancient period, it dealt with the substantive doctrines and reflections that can be extracted from the "strenuous attempts of African elders to ponder over the mysteries of the universe, the hostility of the environment, the difficulties of living with fellow beings, human and non-human, the desire to establish and live in a stable society, the necessity to communicate freely with others, and to know and master the environment either through cooperation or by conquest. These strenuous attempts led to asking philosophical questions. African elders came up with answers to such fundamental questions, and it is these that constitute ancient African philosophy".32 The lesson to learn here is that African philosophy in its ancient settings may be shrouded in myths, proverbs or wise sayings but that underlying these myths, proverbs and wise sayings are heavy metaphysical doses, far-reaching epistemological connotations, cohesive moral injunctions, distinctive social, political, and legal principles, seasoned natural logic, and of course "African science - physical, chemical and biological". To say the same in a different way, advocates of African philosophy do not say merely that myths, proverbs and wise sayings constitute philosophy or African philosophy for that matter. What they say, contrary to the allegations of Professor Blocker and his African logical neo-positivist consorts, is that African myths, proverbs and wise sayings have far-reaching philosophical import. As Momoh writes, " ... myth, for an Uchi elder, is not an end in itself. The moral or metaphysical, and sometimes logical lesson to be imparted is the end. The myth is just a means, a sort of objective prop to hold the lesson together, to make it coherent, comprehensible, and acceptable".',3 On this count, it is erroneous and indeed mischievous to charge that advocates of African philosophy parade myths, proverbs and wise sayings as philosophy. More mischievous and curious is the distinction which Professor Blocker makes between what it is to be African on the one hand and what it is to be Philosophical on the other. From the way Blocker associates "subtle thought systems" or myths, proverbs and wise sayings with African and what it is to be philosophical with Western, the impression is created, erroneously though, that one could, by analyzing the label "African", decipher crude, subtle thought systems which cannot in any way enter into the definition of philosophy, and conversely, that upon

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analysis of the tag "Western" one could simply discern philosophy. In other words, Blocker seems to suggest that "Western" denotes philosophy and "African" subtle thought systems, such that the more African, African philosophy becomes, the less philosophical it will be, and vice versa. But we know for a fact that there is nothing in Western which says it is philosophy any more than there is anything in African which says it is mythology or subtle thought systems. Obviously, there are two main sources of Professor Blocker's error. One is the confusion of African cultural peculiarities with African belief systems before European contact with Africa. The other is the view that philosophy means the same thing for philosophers in the West. Blocker seems to think that whenever we talk of African philosophy in its ancient settings we often mistake African cultural peculiarities for philosophy, whereas in point of fact philosophy is typified by the "thought of the tradition from Plato to Strawson". Blocker argues that even if what is meant by African by the purveyors of African philosophy is not a geographical expression but a "cultural designation", the whole talk of a philosophy being culture-bound is suspect. For it is difficult to see, according to Blocker, how a people's cultural peculiarities can give rise to a unique philosophy. Granted that it can, Blocker hesitates, it is difficult to determine to what extent a particular cultural trait has influenced a people's philosophy since different philosophical traditions have borrowed from one another. Clearly, Professor Blocker is right in insisting that it is silly to regard only the traditional as culturally authentic 34 (if there is anybody who thinks so). He is certainly mistaken in thinking that being culturally authentic is synonymous with being unique. For a people's cultural peculiarities (i.e., corporate existence, respect for elders and constituted authority etc.) to influence its philosophy, it is not necessary that it be unique. The uniqueness question 35 is not synonymous with the question of cultural peculiarity. What advocates of African philosophy say, contrary to what Blocker thinks, is that "Even though propositions of philosophy claim timelessness and universality, they do have roots, and these roots are often psychological, cultural, political or experiential".36 Professor Blocker's error also stems from the belief that purveyors of African philosophy regard only the traditional to be culturally genuine. Blocker thinks that whenever one refers to what is African as a "cultural designation" one always implies "Black Africa with its distinctive, nonEuropean culture". But this is mistaken if one takes into consideration

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what positive workers in the field of African philosophy have said about the canons and parameters of discourse which classifies African philosophy into Ancient, Transitional and Modem periods. We have been told that while African philosophy in its ancient setting may deal with the unadulterated views and reflections of certain African sages on Man and his environment, African philosophy in its Modem period encompasses the theories of professional philosophers 37 on African philosophy be they Africans or non-Africans who have imbibed European culture in one form or another. Now what is in dispute is not whether the former (ancient African philosophy) could manifest instances of African cultural peculiarities, but whether in the case of the latter (modem African philosophy) one could still detect elements of what is African despite the fact that it has borrowed from other cultures. Blocker seems to agree (by his illustration with "indigenous African cloth") that there would still be traces of African cultural traits in modem African philosophy, its contact with European culture notwithstanding. His main quarrel is that we should not regard ancient African philosophy as philosophy in the real sense of the word, that until European contact with Africa (whereupon European culture intermingled with the African), Africa had no philosophy. The rest was mythology or subtle thought systems. And subtle thought systems are not the subject of philosophy. It is in this regard that Blocker's thesis on African philosophy amounts to a disguised denial of an African philosophy. In Professor Blocker's view, what qualifies as African philosophy is the devastating activities of the African logical neo-positivists and their European cronies. Until Africans started employing the conceptual tools of philosophical analysis in the tradition of the West, Africans had not been doing philosophy. But Blocker refused to mention that all Western Europeans do not entertain a single conception of philosophy. One only needs to look at the chaos and disorder of philosophy in the West to understand the disservice to African philosophy of Professor Blocker's thesis. Right from the inception of Western thought, philosophers have been disagreeing over the exact meaning and nature of their discipline. Plato and Hegel thought (in varying degrees) that philosophy was a "dialectical exercise which ended in synthesis, Bergson intuitive generalizations, Wittgenstein the exposure of nonsense, Moritz Schlick clarifications, Husserl phenomenological analysis of experience and Heidegger a paying of attention to Being's self-communication". The

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nature of disagreement among philosophers as to the exact meaning of philosophy is so deeply rooted that John Passmore had to write: "In fact, two very different forms of activity now go under the name of philosophy: one is essentially rational and critical, with logical analysis (in a broad sense) at its heart: the other (represented by Heidegger, for example) is openly hostile to critical analysis and professes to arrive at general conclusions by a direct essentially personal intuition".38 Even where philosophy has "logical analysis ... at its heart in the tradition of Plato, Hegel, Bergson, Kant, and Heidegger, among others, the goal of philosophy has always been synthesis". With Kant, Husserl and Heidegger, for instance, philosophy is a kind of reconstruction after an initial demolition exercise. For Plato and Hegel, dialectical exercise was to end in synthesis, a kind of new theory with which to reorder the world be it politically, socially, morally, economically, educationally or institutionally. It is, however, only with the positivists (in whatever prefix or suffix they distinguish themselves) that philosophy has become an exercise in hopeless and purposeless devastation. It is this latter and narrow philosophic career preoccupation that Professor Blocker's paper identifies with. When Professor Blocker says that "philosophy is an English word expressing a Western European concept" and that philosophy is so fairly well defined in Western Europe, he gives the wrong and dangerous impression that only a European man or one who goes shopping to Europe can competently do philosophy and that all or most European philosophers take philosophy to be pure analysis (criticism) without synthesis. Our analysis of the role of myths in the reconstitution of ancient African philosophy and the reality of Oriental philosophy as well as our X ray of the tradition of Western philosophy from Plato down to Heidegger clearly show that Blocker is in error. When Blocker talks of philosophy as "a reasonably well-defined concept" he means by philosophy logical analysis or criticism without synthesis which has no pride of place even in the tradition of Western 39 philosophy. NEED FOR AN ATTITUDE OF OPENNESS

The thing that we need in a world bedeviled by fanaticism and intolerance of opinion, a world where everyone wants to subject everything else to his ready-made artificial conceptual straitjacket, is a respectful approach to issues, things and people. A respectful approach to issues,

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for instance, would have informed Blocker that he was wearing the Kantian spectacles when he asserted that the more African African philosophy becomes the less philosophical it will be, and conversely, that the more philosophical African philosophy becomes the less African it will be: that the same is true for every philosopher in the West who is a product of the metaphysical tradition, and that it is the vogue in traditional ontology for a philosopher to discredit or repudiate as nothing whatever does not fit into his conceptual scheme. Come to think of it, is it not a truism (in the tradition of the West) that the more of a rationalist one becomes, the less philosophical empiricism then appears to be, and conversely, that the more of an empiricist one becomes the less philosophical rationalism then appears to be? It is in fact the case that the more of an analytic philosopher one becomes, the less philosophical existentialism then appears to be, and conversely, the more of an existentialist a philosopher becomes the less philosophical linguistic or analytic philosophy then appears to be. When, therefore, Blocker insists that the more African African philosophy becomes the less philosophical it will be, and conversely, that the more philosophical African philosophy becomes the less African it will be, he is merely betraying the philosophic climate under which he thrives. And this philosophy is a microcosm in a macrocosm, a limited perspective in philosophy which wants to arrogate to itself all that there is in philosophy. Nevertheless, Professor Blocker and his African logical neo-positivist cohorts, one should say, are fine philosophers. As they take part in a debate on African philosophy they are helping to recast African philosophy.4o What is lacking essentially on their part is an attitude of openness. Blocker and his African logical neo-positivist cronies are products of the metaphysical tradition. They are in fact men of the metaphysical era. Any suggestion for a change of attitude on their part is, ipso facto, a call for a reorientation, a request for the "saying of that which reveals itself to human beings in manifold ways", a plea for them to listen patiently and attentively to their fellowmen. In the case of African philosophy, it would be a call for an openness to the philosophical imports of African myths, proverbs and wise sayings in order to avail themselves of their metaphysical, epistemological and axiological messages and thereby increase the stock of mankind's spiritual heritage. For should we doff our hats for them on the platter of criticism, two points are in favour of using myths, proverbs and wise sayings which have philosophical significance as a point of departure: Criticism

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does not take off on a tabula rasa; and criticism without synthesis is sheer iconoclasm. POSTMODERNISM, PHENOMENOLOGY AND AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

The upshot of our current engagement is not that philosophy will become debased as Oruka contended,41 but that we are on the threshold of a new beginning in which there would be "fruitful dialogue between thinkers" across the cultural divide. Post-modernism is the name of a new orientation in philosophy sweeping across the globe after the decay of neo-positivist metaphysics. Going by its key assumptions set out in the turgid, vigorous, language of Patti Lather,42 post-modernism is not radically apart from the prime message of phenomenological ontology. I see myself arguing in a future paper that "post-modernism is Existential Phenomenology". Under such a scheme it should be possible to plot the graph of African philosophy and reap the fruitful results of ethnophilosophy, which has become a subject of much misunderstanding owing to the merciless offensives of African Logical neo-positivism, perhaps, less pejoratively called modernism. Luckily, modernism has faded into history. Neither postmodernism nor phenomenology (in the broad sense) would subscribe to the dilemma doctrine in African philosophy. Post-modernism thrives on the assumption that there is an "essential indeterminacy of human experiencing";43 that man is a constantly moving subjectivity; that ways of knowing are inherently culture-bound and perspectival,44 that what we know is but "a partial and incomplete representation of a more complex reality",45 and that the search for a "God's eye perspective", especially in our ways of philosophizing, is an exercise in futility. More importantly, postmodernism expresses the view that "the dualisms which continue to dominate Western thought are inadequate for understanding a world of multiple causes and effects interacting in complex and nonlinear ways, all of which are rooted in a limitless array of historical and cultural specificities".46 It is the thesis that "the categories of Western thought need de-stabilization".47 It is against "scholarship that makes its biases part of its argument", 48 and against "claims of totality, certainty, and methodological orthodoxy".49 And finally, postmodernism teaches that the lust for authoritative accounts has no place in inter-subjective experience, for truth lies, not

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only in the subjectivity of the existing valuing subject, but in intersubjective experience, since the latter expresses participatory values, that is, that which can elicit the consensus of community. It challenges us to connect research to our "theoretical and political commitments" and invites us to reflect on how "our value commitments insert themselves" into our philosophizing. Needless to say, anyone who is familiar with phenomenological literature in the broadest sense of the term would agree that if our characterization of postmodernism can pass muster, phenomenology and postmodernism dovetail into each other. An account of how the latter (i.e., postmodernism) is an internationalization of the former (i.e., phenomenological philosophy) will be dealt with in a proposed future paper. One should, perhaps, state unambiguously that the deconstruction of ontology by such phenomenological philosophers as Professor Martin Heidegger, of blessed memory, and a host of others in that tradition (after Edmund Husserl) delivered the master stroke in the destabilization of the categories of Western thought. The creative use to which those labeled as existentialist in continental Europe have put phenomenology has more or less moistened the soil for the flowering of postmodern philosophical transactions. Those who are intent on rubbishing philosophy by making it subservient to science through a theological dogmatism such as the neo-postivists no longer have any visible constituency. More pertinent, perhaps, is the need to remind our philosophic celebrities who bask in the euphoria of piecemeal criticism of received ideas or who revel in hopeless and purposeless devastation in the sacred name of philosophy that the perennial problems of philosophy such as the problem of being, how we come to know and how we ought to act in community are not obliterated in the phenomenological deconstruction of ontology. Heidegger's philosophy is a classic example. In the Daseinsanalytik of Heidegger, we see a theory of being, we see a theory of truth (a-Ietheia) as the "clearing concealing advent of being", we see an ethics (i.e., the concept of authenticity) and we can even decipher a social and political philosophy.50 What, may one ask, is the ethical doctrine of neo-positivism if not a consignment of man's moral experience to the limbo of emotive, petty quarrels over private personal preferences as in emotivism? What is its theory of being if not a metaphysic of total devastation? And what is its theory of knowledge if not a lullaby for science? Great traditions in

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philosophy such as Platonism, Aristotelianism, Kantianism, Hegelianism, Heideggerianism and our blossoming phenomenology are steeped in ontology, epistemology and axiology. While critical discourse is warrantable, a philosophy worthy of the name cannot just be content with being the rude errand boy of science. Indeed, philosophy as a "universal phenomenological ontology" should furnish the ground of all other ontologies including science, and not the other way around. Though they all err in conceptually freezing experience or, better still, in objectifying reality, the Greek pursuit of objectivity, the French anxiety for certainty in our ways of knowing and the Germanic passion for totality dealt extensively with what there is, how to know and how man should be. These perennial concerns of philosophy also occupied the thought of ancient Africans as encapsulated in myths, proverbs and wise sayings. It is this that ethno-philosophers have tried to document as philosophical possibilities. Postmodern African ethnographical findings should be treated as the raw data, the "unthought element of thought" which can readily engage the attention of phenomenology. Salemohammed has contended that " ... developments in post-Husserlian and postHeideggerian phenomenology and hermeneutics have shown to what extent fruitful dialogues can be established between philosophy and ethnography or ethnology".51 In case the whole brouhaha about ethnophilosophy is that it is not theoretically sophisticated and elaborate, Salemohammed makes the point that such a privation - assuming Blocker and Bodunrin are right - is its main advantage. As he says, not "overlaid with too many interpretations of theoretical elaboration, it is closer to an original social cultural experience. A phenomenologically oriented philosopher, concerned with origins, but concerned equally with looking at others as others, must find it irresistible for that very reason".52 The point to be made without absurdity at this juncture is that there are layers of truth to be uncovered in Black Africa with the phenomenological tool of analysis. Even the little we know of this marvelous way of thinking called phenomenology stands the risk of being swept into oblivion by the smug complacency that it has, at least, filtered into Africa. The advance of phenomenology should be guarded jealously against the superficial loquacity of a comatose positivism still making its final pulsations in Black Africa. For us in Africa, emphasis in research should shift from a preoccupation with authoritarian ideologies and philosophies to the rich and

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fruitful opportunities offered by African philosophy and phenomenology in a postmodern era in which the obituaries of the regimes of absolutes are being joyously written. I am calling here for Africans in the academia and research institutes to seek assistance in acquiring mastery of the techniques of executing a genuine phenomenological description. That does not commit me to saying, as do Professors Blocker and Bodunrin, that African philosophy can only emerge if, and only if, we employ the conceptual tools of Western philosophy in clarifying the socio-political issues in emerging African societies. Without discriminating the appropriate conceptual or methodological tool we run the risk of relapsing into traditional Western ontology and archaism. Needless to say, traditional ontology with its "lust for absolutes" and "regimes of truth" leads to authoritarian political attitudes and tendencies. The danger of using just any conceptual tool of Western philosophy is that we may unwittingly, as most of our scholars are wont to do, provide intellectual aid to militarism and totalitarianism. Africa must go back to genesis, to the absolute beginning in order to recapture its historical "being there". The way back to an absolute beginning is not to return to the era of the absolutes or to embark on a fruitless search for a "God's eye perspective on reality", but to garner, nurture and domicile the import of intersubjective experience. Since human life is more radically meaningful in community, effort should be directed towards the cultivation and domestication of whatever can elicit the consensus53 of community. The failure of social regimes in Black Africa is, in the main, attributable to the ascendancy of authoritarian militarism at a time when human communities everywhere are celebrating the decline of the absolutes of being. Arguably, both authoritarian and liberal political theories and practices have underpinning philosophies. 54 Authoritarian political theories and practices can be shown to be informed by traditional ontology with its pessimistic epistemology which insists on the apprehension, by a single knowing subject, of an all-encompassing reality. In the same way, liberal political theories and practices can be shown to arise from the phenomenological theory of being which encourages the "saying of that which reveals itself to human beings in manifold ways" and, by extension, enjoins the maxim "live and let live". Without going into sordid details, I say by way of conclusion that the philosophical landscape of phenomenology is rich. It can be put to creative uses. Its emphasis on intersubjectivity can help to build or design

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a theory of political consensus and consequently point the way to the evolution of stable democracies in African societies and, hopefully, assist African governments to engineer the creation of adequate opportunities for human transactions of all sorts. Phenomenology should therefore come to the aid of Africa. How it can do that is postscripted hereafter. POSTSCRIPT

Professor Martin Heidegger once made the point that the act of philosophic thinking called 'phenomenology' cannot be attained merely by reading philosophical literature. One needs to perfect the technique of phenomenological "seeing" under the tutelage of its celebrated masters. A host of us of the phenomenological bent in Africa came into the discipline through the consumption of philosophical texts. We are roused by what Phenomenology World-Wide is doing - hosting international congresses and creating centers and institutes for the dissemination of phenomenological information all over Europe. We want assistance in recapturing Africa's historical essence through the establishment of centers or affiliate institutes of Phenomenological Philosophy in African universities. That way, it would be relatively easy to assure the flowering of the phenomenological culture in Black Africa. University of Lagos NOTES

* Professor Peter Bodunrin is, perhaps, the foremost African philosopher. Besides being the author of controversial papers on African philosophy, he has been Deputy ViceChancellor, University of Ibadan, Nigeria and is now Vice-Chancellor, Ondo State University, Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria. I P. O. Bodunrin, "The Question of African Philosophy", in Readings in African Philosophy (An Anthology), ed by S. B. Oluwole (Lagos: Masstech Publishers, 1989), p. 149. 2 Ibid., p. 149. , C. S. Momoh, "African Philosophy - Does it Exist?", Diogenes 130 (1985), p. 74. 4 Bodunrin, op. cit., p. 154. 5 Ibid., pp. 159-160. fi H. O. Oruka, "The Fundamental Principles in the Question of African Philosophy", in Readings in African Philosophy (An Anthology), ed. Oluwole, op. cit., p. 149. 7 1. E. Wiredu, "An African Orientation in Philosophy", in Readings in African Philosophy, ed. Oluwole, op. cit., p. 99.

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8 P. Hountondji, "African Philosophy: Myth and Reality", in Readings in African Philosophy, ed. Oluwole, op. cit., pp. 115-117. 9 P. O. Bodunrin, "Philosophy as the Pivot in Economic, Social and Political ReOrientation of Society", The Searchlight: Journal of the National Association of Philosophy Students 2(4), p. 28. 10 Ibid., pp. 27-28. II G. Blocker, "African Philosophy", in Readings in African Philosophy, ed. Oluwole, op. cit., p. 190. 12 Ibid., p. 190. 13 Ibid., pp. 191-192. 14 Momoh, op. cit., pp. 101-102. 15 Hountondji, op. cit., pp. 120. 16 See Olabiyi Yai, "Theory and Practice in African Philosophy", Second Order: An African Journal of Philosophy VI(2) (1977), p. 7. 17 For details, see 1. O. Onyewuenyi, The African Origin of Greek Philosophy: An Exercise in Afrocentrism (Nsukka: University of Nigeria Press, 1993), p. viii. 18 Blocker, op. cit., p. 192. 19 G. Blocker, "African Philosophy", African Philosophical Inquiry 1(1) (1987), p. 3. (Henceforth all references to Blocker will refer to this article). 20 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 21 Ibid., p. 6. 22 Oruka,op. cit., p. 137. 23 Blocker (1987), op. cit., pp. 5-6. 24 Ibid., p. 3. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., p. 7. 28 Momoh, op. cit., pp. 73-104. 29 Details of this can be found in Gordon Hunnings, "Logic, Language and Culture", Second Order: An African Journal of Philosophy IV(1) (1975), pp. 12-13. 30 Momoh distinguishes three periods of African philosophy - Ancient, Transitional and Modem. For details see Momoh, op. cit., p. 79. 31 Ibid., p. 79. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., p. 84. 34 Blocker (1987), op. cit., p. 6. 35 Dr. Momoh has contended this issue with Professor Odera Oruka in "Modem Theories in an African Philosophy", The Nigerian Journal of Philosophy 1(2) (1981), pp. 17-18. 36 Ibid., p. 18. 37 Momoh, op. cit. 3S 1. Passmore, "Philosophy", Encyclopedia of Philosophy 6. Paul Edwards, ed., p. 218. 39 Momoh, op. cit., pp. 102-103. 40 Blocker, op. cit., p. 7. 41 Oruka, op. cit., p. 137. 42 Patti Lather is concerned, among other things, with research methodologies appropriate for a rewarding feminism.

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See Patti Lather, "Feminist Perspectives on Empowering Research Methodologies", Women's Studies International Forum 11(6) (1988) p. 569. 44 Ibid., p. 570. 45 See Gareth Morgan (ed.), Beyond Method: Strategies for Social Research (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983, p. 388). 46 Lather, op. cit., p. 576. 47 Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 245. 4' Peters, Michael and Viviane Robinson, "The Origins and Status of Action Research", The Journal of Applied Behavioral Sciences 20(2) (1984), pp. 113-124. 49 See Lather, op. cit., p. 577. 50 Bernard Dauenhauer and Karsten Harries, among others, have dwelt on the social and political commitments of Heidegger's philosophy. For details, B. P. Dauenhauer, "Renovating the Problems of Politics", The Review of Metaphysics XXIX(4), p. 626 and Karsten Harries, "Heidegger as a Political Thinker", The Review of Metaphysics XXIX( 4), p.642. " See G. Salemohammed, "African Philosophy", in Readings in African Philosophy, p.203. 52 Ibid., p. 204. 53 See Kwasi Wiredu, "Demoracy and Consensus in African Traditional Politics" and "A Plea for a Non-Party Polity" in Conceptual Decolonization in African Philosophy: 4 Essays. Selected and introduced by O. Oladipo (Ibadan: Hope Publications, 1995), pp. 53-63. (The author, in this piece, makes a solid case for consensus democracy as the best available option for African states.) 54 See Karl Popper, "The Sources of Knowledge and Ignorance" in Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 5-6.

43

PART THREE

THE MEANDERS OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S ATTUNEMENT AND INTEGRATION WITH OTHERS WITHIN THE CULTURAL HARMONISATION

KRYSTYNA DANECKA-SZOPOWA

COMMONPLACENESS AS A DIFFICULT SITUATION FOR MAN

1.

PLACE

In his Philosophie (1931) Karl Jaspers named and described the extreme situations (Grenssituationen): Suffering, Guilt, Death, Strife. Situation wie die, dass ich immer in Situation bin, dass ich nicht ohne ich nicht ohne Kampf und Leid Ie ben kann, dass ich unvermeidlich Schuld auf mich nehme, dass ich sterben muss, nenne ich Grenzsituationen . . . . Sie sind nicht uberschauber; ... sie sind wie eine Wand, an die wir stossen, an die wir scheitem (K. Jaspers, Philosophie II, p. 203). The situation I am always in where I cannot live without fighting and suffering, where I inevitably blame myself for everything, where I have to die - such situations I call extreme situations . . . . Extreme situations are unpredictable; ... they are like a wall against which you hit and smash yourself....

Man lives in these situations and realises himself in order to be himself. This is life at its highest level and greatest effort. All the four situations are marked by suffering, appearing in a darker shade. At the other pole of man's existence are the peak experiences (Maslow): Love, Beauty, Philosophy, Mysticism and others. In certain relations, especially mystical, religious or philosophical experiences, the entire world is presented as a one entity, as a single, rich, lively whole. In other peak experiences' especially in love and aesthetic experiences, one minute part of the world is perceived as if at this moment it were to constitute the whole world. In both cases the perception of an entity takes place (Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, p. 92). Peak experiences, when time vanishes and hopes come true (ibid., p. 240).

The ordinary existence of man falls between peak experiences and extreme situations (both being peaks) and can be seen as a gray plane without any expression, any boundaries, any shape. We call this commonplaceness. In everyday life nothing happens, whereas an opposite phenomenon can be observed in the case of a peak experience wherein everything is an event - "it happens to us by itself" (Maslow, ibid., p. 91). 215 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 215-223. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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LANGUAGE

The word commonplaceness exists in European languages and occupies a lot of space. Latin: quotidianus quotidie

- everyday, ordinary, common - everyday

French: quotidien, - enne de tous les jours journalier English: everyday, daily day in day out commonplaceness ordinariness everyday, daily quotidian ordinary commonplace workaday every day on week days workaday clothes

}

- eve'yday

} } } }

German: alltaglich alltage Alltagsbeschaftigung Alltagsgesicht Alltagskleid Alltagsleben Alltagssorgen Alltagsmensch alltatig

-

everyday, ordinary, common, daily on weekdays daily round of activity usual demeanor everyday clothes everyday life everyday concerns ordinary man something that takes place repeatedly, everyday

COMMONPLACENESS

Russian: jezedniewno jezedniewnyj powsjedniewnyj

217

- every day - everyday - daily, ordinary

Bulgarian:

- everyday

E~AHEBHO

E~AHEBHE

BCFKHAHEBHO Czech: kazdedennost vsednodennost

}

- commonplaceness

- commonplaceness 3.

DESCRIPTION

Method

We could try defining commonplaceness by means of the holistic method, taking into consideration the relations between commonplaceness and the reality in which we live. Phenomenological description seems to be adequate for describing commonplaceness - an intent look from the various sides, a method of a philosophical "boring" into the perceived object-notion. Ordinariness

Commonplaceness appears as: - ordinariness uniformity repeatability mediocrity similarity continuity (not interrupted by any events) triviality dullness - greyness - boredom (Moravia) - monotony.

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The ordinary is rooted in culture, creating culture itself, discovered by archeologists in objects of everyday use. We perceive it as being washed out of color, attraction, events, values. It exists as a sphere of unconscious values, unclear, unperceivable - hence the feeling of vagueness, axiological neutralness. We feel commonplaceness as a kind of worry (D~browska: "Again there's work with the gooseberry bush. I have to stop writing and tend to it." Journal I, p. 88, 1917). "At home as every day in the evening sifting peas" (ibid., p. 33). Worry and burden: "Even so I can hardly last through this day" (ibid., p. 168). Commonplaceness is a space of sinking into the mind, losing oneself, something that exists in a strange way like shapeless magma. At the same time this magma exerts pressure on us, sometimes pressure even as great as the pressure of events - and due to its stability and continuity, it persistently lasts and becomes greater. Hence suicides quite often result from an incapability to cope with commonplaceness. Commonplaceness is sometimes accompanied by a never-ending internal monologue which in the case of lonely people finds its reflection in an out-loud monologue or grumbling (Grumble Theory - Maslow). Commonplaceness in times of peace is weak, whereas during war it becomes concentrated and is woven with extreme situations as in death camps. Musicality Commonplaceness is like music and has its characteristic traits of movement, rhythm, and also its color, dynamics, agogue. It is a constant movement, shaped by various kinds of rhythms; they could be joint rhythms when commonplaceness is formed by an established dividing principle or a free rhythm (atactic) wherein there is no principle. The variable different rhythms of commonplaceness also form polyrhythmic structures with the different lines of movement taking place simultaneously. Even the greyest commonplaceness has its shades of grey. It can also change color and be depicted pointillistically by numerous colorful dots. Commonplaceness is a dynamic sequence ranging from piano pianissimo to forte fortissimo. This dynamic, colorful, mobile sequence of commonplaceness runs at different tempos (agogue), from very slow (len to) to quicker (vivace) and the quickest (presto vivacissimo). The rhythm of commonplaceness, the wave of variability or uniformity creates

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what A. K~pinski calls the rhythm of life. This rhythm that flows in time, the pulsing of energy and matter in events is the rhythm of the cosmos. Views

What do grown-ups say about commonplaceness? (1) "It's the necessity of taking up smaller or greater tasks in order to maintain something more than existence, also social status, cultural interests; it's a stream which would look the same if it weren't for the events taking place around us and in the world." (2) "It's a great toil, the soil of my life - everything repeats itself every day, what has to be overcome, completed. Everything has to be overcome mentally - everything is a reflex, for example putting on your shoes. Only thinking is easy; clear thoughts, this is happiness. It's as if I were born in some mechanism which is not adapted to inner reality, the spiritual one. I feel somewhat like a handicapped person. I have overcome this, it can't be seen - only keen observers could notice this (Zofia Nalkowska noticed it in my case). I feel like the mermaid in Anderson's tale stepping on a sharp knife. Commonplaceness is a never-ending form of pain." (3) "Commonplaceness is boredom. It's something from which you have to escape from time to time. Commonplaceness is an essential matter of life - as for my nature it is burdensome. It seems to me that commonplaceness well-accomplished is an important element of common reality. " (4) There is no commonplaceness - I'm always looking for something, I want to learn something, draw conclusions from the past. Such a commonplace thing, e.g., that I have to buy something - Well, I could do without these things that all other people are running after, I don't care about it. I'm always ready to create something new. Life is so rich that everyday matters seem so unimportant. What is important is what's happening in our country. I'm interested in people, I have so many emotions and experiences. I want to gain values, get to know other countries, customs, new people. I don't need any material goods or to possess anything." (5) "Lots of matters to tend to. Happiness and sorrow - a chance to meet an interesting person."

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MASTERS OF COMMONPLACENESS

The mastery of being oneself is the mastery of commonplaceness. Registered and unregistered. There exist over 200 journals of famous writers. This recording of everyday life, so different with its various shades of intimacy, expression, description, occupies a great part of our literature. Among the writers of journals were: Leonardo da Vinci, John Locke, Stendhal, Delacroix, Tolstoy, Kierkegaard, Kafka, Eliade and others. In Poland we have writers like: K. Tanska-Hoffmanowa, S. Zeromski, T. Makowski, Jan Leehon, Jan Cybis, Boy, Strug, Borowy, IHakowioz6wna, Tuwim, Parandowski, Iwasskiewicz, A. Kowalska, J. Zawieyski, Rudnicki, Breza, Kuncewiczowa, Szelburg-Sarembina, Konwicki, Brandys (these last two authors simulated their recordings), Dflbrowska, Nalkowska, Milosz. The most extensive (encompassing half a century) are the journals written by Nalkowska and D,ilbrowska both dealing with almost the same historical era. If one could read all the journals from all over the world, commonplaceness could be presented in its entire richness. Commonplaceness appears in them through words like: life, facts, world, reality. "In reality (what a dangerous word!)," wrote Gombrowicz (Journal 1953-1956, p. 259). Thanks to this hidden commonplaceness, those great words throb with life. "I must sculpt every single day because for me each day is a century," Mitosz says in his poem on Adrian Zielinski. A. Zagajewski, in his volume Canvas, wrote: "The living live so thoughtlessly, that the dead cannot stop wondering. And we lived like that too, lived like that too .... " Commonplaceness as a source of creativity and peak experiences, could have such a shape: "A poem is born out of a feeling of loneliness and as an escape from crowds, from power and weakness, from a happy and painful shock, but most surely from boredom and emptiness," writes K. IHakowioz6wna (Poems, p. 14). Boredom also found its place in A. Moravia's book entitled Boredom as well as in his book The Unconcerned. For Proust, commonplaceness is transformed in his auto-history, x-rayed by his thought reflexes so that it cannot be recognized any more in its pure shape, for commonplaceness is constantly found to be webbed, like a spider-web spun from one source. This is a commonplaceness sifted through an intellectual sieve, and due to this it acquires specific color and presents the colors of this alliance.

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For Kafka, commonplaceness (though "implanted" with metaphysics) is the only existing reality: "Many complain that the words of wise men are always only a parable and cannot be applied in everyday life, but this is the only thing that is given to uS."* For Nalkowska mankind is born out of commonplaceness: "In spite of everything my opinion about man even on this very day emerges in an undeformed state," she wrote, during the war. 5.

TRANSCENDENTALISM

What Do We Do with Commonplaceness? We often run away from commonplaceness in our dreams or we seem to wander from the present moment to a time in the past or future. We try to stop the present trends; this is a type of game with commonplaceness (Moravia in The Unconcerned). Sometimes we pretend there is no commonplaceness, that there are only events, values, ideas; or we will instead sink into commonplaceness like into a flowing river which keeps us afloat or drowns us. In the river of commonplaceness we perceive values like beauty, good, generosity, as small particles carried off by the current. Even if we notice the richness of the trend of commonplaceness, we have difficulties eliciting its values (because "evil is banal" whereas good is natural), and we still go on floating. We sometimes observe our everyday life through a viewfinder or binoculars: we touch commonplaceness and it escapes right through our fingers. We celebrate commonplaceness, cramming it into our customs, etiquette. Some people are concentrated only on events in their everyday life and they only want to find that which they are looking for. I call such "event men." Commonplaceness, though, calls for transcendence for not sinking into the river of common planeness, nor into a life of events only.

Poets, Saints, Philosophers In everyday life people live heedlessly (that is, at one pole). But one can also achieve mastery (the other pole). The mastery of being oneself (Jaspers, Rogers) is mastery of commonplaceness. It can be registered in recordings, literature, it could also be a transformation of commonplaceness into a holiday where everything is Happening and Meeting.

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This is the way saints live (Therese de Lisieux's "little way"), poets, philosophers and the sages the East (Tao, Zen). K. Dflbrowski: "We intuitively grasp elements of transcendentalism, elements of trespassing the temporary moment, elements of advancing into the unknown but 'greater' which could serve as evidence of man's feelings" (The Passion of Development, 1982). We have one recipe for life from Horace, "Carpe diem." In his essay on time Ingarden overcomes it by means of his own power. "I am a power that multiplies by itself; it builds itself and outgrows itself if it can just gather and not disperse into tiny seconds of succumbing to suffering and giving way to pleasure." This seven times repeated description of power leads to "producing good, beauty and truth." The values of everyday life emerge then, being supreme values. "A rigid bravery is in itself a mastery, which is achieved naturally by only few persons" (Zen). A poet of Zen says: never, never neglect your life though it does not last long life is volatile (but) it is the only life you have (translated by Czesiaw Mitosz, A Zen Harvest, 1988). Warsaw NOTE

* There are poets of commonplaceness, e.g., K. I. Gatczyilski: "Treatise on Furniture", "On All Things Which Cannot Be Unscrewed Easily". REFERENCES Dilbrowski, K., The Passion of Development (Warsaw: 1982). Dilbrowska, M., Journals (Warsaw: 1988). Gatczynski, K. I., A Selection of Poems (Wroctaw: 1982). Gombrowicz, W., Journals (Cracow: 1989). Harrigel, E., Zen (Warsaw: 1987). Ittakowioz6wna, K., Poetry (Lublin: 1989). Ingarden, R., A Booklet about Man (Cracow: 1972).

COMMONPLACENESS Jaspers, K., Philosophie (Heidelberg: 1973). Kafka, F., Journals. Kl!pinski, A., Melancholy (Warsaw: 1985). Maslow, A. H., Toward a Psychology of Being (Warsaw: 1986). Maslow, A. H., Motivation and Personality (Warsaw: 1990). Mitosz, Cz., Poems (Crrcow: 1987). Mitosz, Cz., A Zen Harvest (San Francisco: 1987). Moravia, A., Boredom (Warsaw: 1968). Moravia, A., The Unconcerned (Warsaw: 1971). Natkowska, Z., Journals (Warsaw: 1988). Proust, M., In Search of Lost Time (Warsaw: 1974). Quintus Horatius Flacous, Opera omnia (Ossolineum 1986). Rogers, c., Humanistic Psychology. Rogers, C., On Becoming a Person (H. M. 1961). Tao-Te-King, in: Literature of the World (Warsaw: 1987). St. Therese of the Child Jesus, The History of a Soul. Zagajewski, A., Canvas (Warsaw: 1990).

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ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ANIMATE FORM

Cultural anthropologist George Peter Murdock, in his well-known article "The Common Denominator of Cultures," stated that "what cultures are found to have in common is a uniform system of categories, not a fund of identical elements."} In my book, The Roots of Thinking, I pointed out that if Murdock's claim is true, then there is a common conceptual foundation to all human thought. In other words, in the most fundamental sense human thinking is everywhere standardized on the same model; such concepts as death, size, tool, and cleanliness are undergirded by a common referent. 2 Murdock furthermore stated that even with their theoretical differences, competent authorities agree that cultural universals exist. According to Murdock, the basis of these acknowledged universals "cannot be sought in history, or geography, or race, or any other factor limited in time or space, since the universal pattern links all known cultures, simple and complex, ancient and modem. It can only be sought, therefore, in the fundamental biological and psychological nature of man and in the universal conditions of human existence."3 Again, in The Roots of Thinking, I enlarged upon Murdock's claim. I pointed out that "once a standardized model is acknowledged on the basis of the cultural facts of the matter, and once Murdock's close and accurate reasoning is similarly acknowledged concerning where the common denominator of cultures must rest, it is a small step to hypothesize the hominid body as model. What, after all, could be a more universal condition of human existence than animate form? On the one hand, what is more biologically fundamental than the body? On the other hand, what in the most fundamental sense is more psychologically resonant than tactile-kinesthetic experience?,,4 What I'd like to share with you are some thoughts about animate form. We all know that there is a difference between a creature and a stone - between what is animate and what is inanimate - but we seldom ponder the difference or ask ourselves to specify concretely the complex dimensions of animate being. We tend simply to think of the animate as something living and perhaps also as something living that moves, and

225 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 225-242. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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let it go at that. An interesting case in point occurs in philosopher Hubert Dreyfus and anthropologist Paul Rabinow's joint book on sociohistorical philosopher Michel Foucault, though not with reference to Foucault but to his fellow French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty. After concluding that Foucault, though aware of Merleau-Ponty's "phenomenology of the body," probably found the "structural invariants [of that body] too general to be useful in understanding the historical specificity of body-molding techniques,"S Dreyfus and Rabinow make the interesting comment that "Reading Merleau-Ponty one would never know that the body has a front and a back and can only cope with what is in front of it, that bodies can move forward more easily than backwards, that there is normally a right/left asymmetry, and so on."6 They note, moreover, that although "body invariants can be described with much greater specificity than Merleau-Ponty achieved," a basic question still remains; namely, "What is the historical importance of such invariant structures?"? Dreyfus and Rabinow's observational comment and question are provocative. They suggest not only that we are not paying close enough attention to the body and that to do so might lead us to significant historical and pan-cultural insights, but implicit in what they write is the idea that what we have been ignoring is something under our very noses. How have we missed the fact that the body has a front and a back and can only cope with what is in front of it, or that bodies can move forward more easily than backwards? How have we failed to study the historical and pan-cultural importance of these invariant aspects of corporeal life? Clearly, it is time for us to consider living bodies and their dispositional powers. Clearly too, it is time for us to become familiar with the evolutionary heritage of living bodies and in so doing discern the importance of their invariant structures. Clearly, it is time to consider animate form. Let me begin with three different kinds of descriptions of animate form. (I should mention that the descriptions all focus on power because power is the subject of my most recent research and book The Roots of Power: Animate Form and Gendered Bodies. 8 Descriptions of animate form do not necessarily focus on power, or, if they do, they do not necessarily focus on the particular kind of power exemplified here. That the following descriptions are topically convergent, however, tightens attention to their singular purpose: to exemplify animate form.) I) "There is no mistaking a dominant male macaque. These are

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superbly muscled monkeys. Their hair is sleek and carefully groomed, their walk calm, assured and majestic. They move in apparent disregard of the lesser monkeys who scatter at their approach. For to obstruct the path of a dominant male or even to venture, when unwelcome, too near to him is an act of defiance, and macaques learn young that such a challenge will draw a heavy punishment.,,9 2) "He was an inch, perhaps two, under 6 foot, powerfully built and he advanced straight at you with a slight stoop of the shoulders, head forward, and a fixed from-under stare which made you think of a charging bull."IO 3) "To begin with, the soldier was someone who could be recognized from afar; he bore certain signs: the natural signs of his strength and his courage, the marks, too, of his pride; his body was the blazon of his strength and valour; and although it is true that he had to learn the profession of arms little by little ... movements like marching and attitudes like the bearing of the head belonged for the most part to a bodily rhetoric of honour; ... 'The signs for recognizing those most suited to this profession are a lively, alert manner, an erect head, a taut stomach, broad shoulders, long arms, strong fingers, a small belly, thick thighs, slender legs and dry feet.' ... Recruits become accustomed to 'holding their heads high and erect; to standing upright, without bending the back, to ... throwing out the chest and throwing back the shoulders .... [T]hey will be taught never to fix their eyes on the ground, but to look straight at those they pass ... [and] to march with a bold step, with knee and ham taut, on the points of the feet, which should face outwards.' ,,1I The first description is taken from a primatological study, the second from Lord Jim by Joseph Conrad (actually the novel's first lines), the third, from Foucault's Discipline and Punish. In a general sense, the different descriptions might be termed "scientific" (evolutionary), "literary" (aesthetic), and "cultural" (socio-historical). It would be surprising if anyone were puzzled by the described bodily comportments, acts, or requirements, or failed to perceive commonalities among them in spite of the different literatures from which they derive. But precisely on these grounds, we should wonder with respect to each of the three descriptive passages, why just these bodily comportments, acts, and manners of moving and not others? That is, why do these bodily comportments, acts, and manners of moving have the precise meaning and power they do? The passage from Foucault serves

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nicely to draw out the significance of the question. This is because, while both his own descriptions and the descriptions from the military manual he cites are highly detailed with respect to bodily conformations, carriages, and acts proper to a soldier, the semantics of those conformations, carriages, and acts are taken wholly for granted. Foucault nowhere spells out why it is that the body is the site of power relations or how it is that the body is accessible to disciplinary technologies. In brief, he does not ask, Why just these bodily builds, comportments, and manners of moving? Because he is remiss, however, we should not be. We should indeed ask the question, or rather questions: Why erect heads? Why forward-looking eyes? Why broad shoulders? Why thick thighs? Why laterally-turned feet? Why bold steps? Why not sunken chests, downcast eyes, drooping mouths, medially-turned feet, and stout bellies? What is unsoldierly about such a body? Our concept of power, like other fundamental human concepts, derives from animate form. Fundamental human concepts in fact derive from our primate evolutionary heritage, as do the correlatively fundamental behaviors that instantiate them, behaviors such as staring and standing erect for the purpose of intimidating or threatening others, for example. The animate is thus not arbitrarily animate; in other words, there is a builtin semantic specificity in the movement of living bodies. The previous descriptions give evidence of this fact. It is lamentable, then, that a philosopher of Merleau-Ponty's stature would affirm that "in man there is no natural sign," and that he would follow this affirmative with the statement, "It would be legitimate to speak of 'natural signs' only if the anatomical organization of our body produced a correspondence between specific gestures and given 'states of mind' " (italics added).12 The idea aside that we experience something definitively apart from our bodies called "states of mind," surely it is evident that the anatomical organization of our body, and in fact the anatomical organization of all animate forms, produces just such a correspondence. Surely it is evident that if bodily comportments and corporeal and intercorporeal behaviors were arbitrary with respect to "states of mind" - "states of mind" meaning ostensibly moods, feelings, affective tone, and the like, from pensivity to elation and more - we would find no primate and crosscultural commonalities in acts such as staring, advancing straight at someone, or comporting oneself in a soldierly manner. I3 Surely it is evident that if bodily comportments and corporeal and intercorporeal behaviors were arbitrary with respect to "states of mind," there would

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be no common ground for inventing a social communication system, or for a social life, much less a cultural tradition, to take root to begin with. Surely it is evident that the same or quintessentially similar anatomies, and the same or quintessentially similar physiologies, cannot possibly give rise to totally different tactile-kinesthetic and affective experiences. Darwin long ago observed that "Terror acts in the same manner on [nonhuman animals] as in us, causing the muscles to tremble, the heart to palpitate, the sphincters to be relaxed, and the hair to stand on end."14 Certainly in terms of human societies (and in terms of some nonhuman primate societies as well),15 there are cultural differences in bodily bearings and expressions with respect to "states of mind," but this does not make the "state of mind" arbitrary with respect to the body, nor does it make the body a merely superficial phenomenon on which "states of mind" are arbitrarily inscribed, culture by culture. "States of mind" are indeed rooted in "the anatomical organization of our body." They are grounded in animate form, in our being the bodies we are. How else explain the soldierly body that Foucault describes? How else explain why a soldierly body does not have a sunken chest and stout belly? Moreover how else explain why in hearing or reading descriptions of bodily comportments and corporeal and intercorporeal behaviors, whether those offered by primatologists, novelists, or Foucault, we need no interpreter, but know immediately - in our bones - what it is to stare and be stared at, what it is to be large, what it is to walk in an assured, majestic manner or with a bold step, what it is to charge like a bull. We know what it is because intuitively, we know what it is to be an animate form - perhaps even more keenly given precisely those fundamental primate behavioral commonalities such as staring and standing erect, a primate animate form. Indeed, that we in no way doubt that primatologists correctly understand and describe nonhuman primate behavior attests to an intuitive awareness of what it is to be a primate animate form. (There are two parenthetical comments I'd like to insert here. The first is that, just because societies differ linguistically is no reason to assume that they differ kinetically. On the contrary, all humans move forward more easily than backward; all raise their eyebrows in surprise; all eat by putting food into their mouths; all smile; all reach for things they want and back away - or run away - from those they fear. Everything is not culturally relative or culturally constructed. The second comment, put in the form of a question, makes the same point but from a quite different

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perspective. How could dramatists and choreographers possibly create movements, gestures, and intercorporeal spatial relationships that we as an audience intuitively understand as having a particular qualitative character or dynamic feeling if, subtending our particular cultural grooming, there was no natural concordance between our own everyday movements, gestures, and intercorporeal spatial relationships and particular feelings? In finer terms, and with specific attention to the emergence of modem dance, was not the discovery of its early pioneers precisely that everyday human feelings and moods have a certain felt dynamic that can be creatively elaborated in movement, and that with such formal elaborations in movement there is an aesthetic mirroring of the life of feelings? Perhaps the most concise way of summing up these parenthetical comments is to say that we are all of us first and foremost bodies, even though we are all of us indoctrinated into thinking that we are first and foremost minds (or linguistic founts), that minds have no essential relationships with bodies, and that bodies can in consequence be culturally inscribed in whatever way any particular group of minds in the form of a particular society deems proper. Now were we to begin actually fathoming what it is to be the bodies we are and how they are the foundation of "invariant structures," we would first of all attempt to make animate form explicit. We would pay attention to it and acknowledge the diversity of our experiences, personally in the form of our own bodies, con-specifically in our observations and interactions with other humans, and inter-specifically in our observations and interactions with other species. Given this empirical grounding, we could then attempt to comprehend it, study and analyze it to the end that our human form of life and the animate world of which we are a part are corporeally and intercorporeally illuminated. From this perspective, it is of the very nature of the task to pinpoint creaturely similarities and differences, that is, to understand ourselves in the context of an evolutionary genealogy with all its continuities and discontinuities, and, in the process, to give historical scope to those fundamental corporeal and intercorporeal ways of being that anchor our culturally universal humanness. This evolutionary dimension of the task is extraordinarily similar to the task phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl spells out with respect to understanding the origin of traditional practices, meanings, and values: "These [cultural] forms," he says, "have arisen as such not merely casually"; they have arisen "through human activity ... even though we generally know nothing

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... of the particular provenance" that brought anyone of them about. "In this lack of knowledge," he says, "[is] an implicit knowledge, which can ... be made explicit, a knowledge of unassailable self-evidence. It begins with superficial commonplaces such as that everything traditional has arisen out of human activity, that accordingly past . . . civilizations existed, and among them their first inventors, who shaped the new out of materials at hand .... "16 In short, what Husserl describes in terms of traditional cultural forms has its parallel in those fundamental behaviors and experiences that mark us as human. They too have arisen as such not merely casually; they too have a history; that history too can be made explicit. By opening the door to an evolutionary history, the study of animate form leads to the discovery and delineation of invariant structures that are in truth corporeal archetypes. These archetypes range all the way from "form values" - Swiss biologist Adolph Portmann's term for morphological patternings, attributes, and conformations by which one animal recognizes another as being, for example, sexually disposed, male or female, young or mature, the alpha member of the group, and so on l7 - to what may correlatively be termed "animate values" - postural, gestural, or otherwise kinetic patterns which articulate particular kinds of social relationships such as invitations, threats, reassurances, comfortings, assaults, or which are affectively expressive of feelings such as fright, sadness, surprise, disgust, and so on. A number of these archetypal expressions and/or kinetic patterns were first described by Darwin in his 1872 book The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. Since that time, the archetypal nature of many human expressions has been cross-culturally documented by ethnologists and psychologists. IS Archetypal animate values, however, pose a complex challenge for unlike "form values," in the strict sense of morphology, they are (or can be) differentially modified by cultures. Because the complexity of the challenge is rooted precisely in the fact that the natural and the cultural are densely intertwined, the challenge of distinguishing what is cultural from what is evolutionarily given is substantial. To take up the challenge, however, and to meet it successfully is ultimately to map our panculturally invariant corporeal heritage, thereby coming to know the idiosyncratic ways in which cultures have specifically reworked that heritage - by exaggerating, suppressing, neglecting, or distorting aspects of it. In effect, to meet the challenge is to comprehend how evolutionarily given corporeal archetypes give rise to culture-spawned ones.

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I would like to present a concrete example of the cultural reworking of a corporeal archetype in order to show specifically how fundamental cultural practices and beliefs derive from what is evolutionarily given, or in other terms, how animate form is indeed a semantic template, the standard upon which fundamental human concepts and comportments alike are generated. I would like to sketch out quite briefly how the evil eye derives from staring, thus how a heightened form of power relations derives from the natural power of optics that is part of our primate evolutionary heritage. According to ophthalmologist Albert Potts, the evil eye is part of the World's eye; the World's eye, he says, is the way in which "all the world exclusive of scientists looks upon the eye.,,19 The evil eye dates far back into antiquity - about 4500 years. It can be traced back to preSemitic Sumerian cuneiform texts. It can also be traced back to the Book of Proverbs in which one reads: "Eat thou not the bread of him that hath an evil eye.,,20 Not only is the belief old, but the idea that one can injure and even gravely harm others merely by looking at them is not peculiar to a single culture or even several cultures. It is found extensively in Indo-European and Semitic cultures. It has furthermore been studied by scholars from highly disparate fields: anthropology, religion, classics, ophthalmology, psychiatry, sociology, folklore (and now, to a limited extent, philosophy). What are the mechanics of this power? Where does this power come from? No one has offered an explanation of the preeminent power of the eye to inflict actual harm. On the one hand, there is only the vaguest suggestion by an anthropologist, quoting a passing reference in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, that in spite of its being a psychological rather than sociological phenomenon, the evil eye might be connected with "the naturally injurious power of a strange and staring 100k."21 On the other hand, there is a strongly compelling beginning account that initially claims that visual behavior exists along a continuum from seeing to what we might call "evil-eyeing," the act of staring being midway on the continuum. The account, however, veers off into a discussion of the "accusatory logic" by which a person attributes an accident or harmful incident to the gaze of another.22 Yet that the eye has power is in the first place experientially evident. The eye has power to see, to apprehend, to take in an entire scene, to seize upon the finest details. 23 Moreover, the eye has power to move. In fact, our discovery of its power to move is part of that repertoire of "I can's" that each of us discovers and consolidates in our infancy and that grounds

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our sense of ourselves as autonomous agents. In other words, our eyes are at our command, albeit in a thoroughly distinctive way from torsos and heads, arms and legs. Eyes furthermore have communicative powers. A poignant and eloquent testimonial to these powers is implicit in the remark of a young autistic person, who, though lacking normal social understandings, was acutely observant: "People talk to each other with their eyes," he said; "What is it that they are saying?"24 With specific respect to the power to control others, numerous descriptions of nonhuman primate visual behavior show clearly that by staring, one animal can convey to another that it wants the other to desist in some activity. This archetypal power of optics in human societies is no less evident, as witness not only empirical studies and reviews such as those of sociologists 25 and psychologists 26 that document staring as dominant behavior and lowering, averting, or blinking the eyes as submissive behavior, but those lucid and varied descriptions that philosopher JeanPaul Sartre gives of the Look and that testify to the painful extremities to which being in the eyes of another can lead.27 Clearly, staring is a means of controlling not simply what another does, but also how another feels. It has an affective as well as behavioral component. At the very least it is a way of making another person feel uncomfortable. Accordingly, if one wanted to augment one's power over another person, one might do it by intensifying what one's eyes can already do. In fact, it is not a great epistemological leap at all from the knowledge that one can cause another person to feel uncomfortable by staring at them to the belief that one could, or might, inflict actual harm on them by intensifying the stare. On the contrary, on an experiential scale, actual harm is an intensification of acute discomfort. The perplexing question is precisely how one intensifies the power of the eye. If we are to show how an evolutionary corporeal archetype can be culturally reworked, in this instance, how it can be radically exaggerated, we must consider how the transition from acute discomfort to actual harm - from staring to evil-eyeing - could possibly be effected, or how, in other words, one could be led to conceive of the eye as having power at a distance, namely, the power actually to injure others without touching them. Obviously, common experience leads us rightfully to believe that to harm someone, there must be contact. What is interesting is how a closing of the visual distance between persons draws on the very power of eyes that present-day, erudite Westerners readily acknowledge and esteem so highly: the power of eyes to shed light on the world, their power to

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see into the nature of things, the penetrative perspicuity of the visual sense. We in fact praise just this power in our upright selves when we praise that "we are born to see, bound to behold."28 The evil eye is in part a negative metaphysical reworking of this positive epistemological power of eyes to see into the nature of things; that is, the closing of the visual distance is at once a matter of corrupting the power of eyes to gain insight and of endowing a mere look with an intercorporeal power beyond the stare, namely, with the intercorporeal power to do evil, neither act - the corrupting or the endowing - being necessarily carried out in a conscious way at all. (I might incidentally note that the question of whether the evil eye was in fact a conscious power or not was discussed as early as the fourteenth century by an Arab historian.)29 To begin with, one already intuitively knows the intercorporeal power of eyes to intimidate and to threaten by staring. The evil eye is an intensification of this archetypal power, even a maximization to the fullest, since an evil eye can cause death. The intensification is effected by a kind of metaphysical borrowing, as it were. Not that the evil that the eye performs travels on light from the eye. Rather, evil replaces light as an emanation. Like light, evil is something that can radiate from the eye. Indeed, there is a metaphysical similarity in that, like light, the evil cast by the eye is non-material. Its non-materiality, however, does not cancel out its reality as an emanation. On the contrary, it speaks all the more eloquently of the numinous power of the eye to cast something from itself, to give off effluvia of one sort or another. In fact, in describing this discharging power, Sir Francis Bacon spoke of the eye as ejaculating evil. His choice of verbs was not altogether idiosyncratic: across a diversity of cultures, the evil eye is symbolically related to the phallus. 30 This symbolic relationship, and other intra-corporeal symbolic relationships as well, are well documented in the literature on the evil eye. Now, so long as erudite Westerners scoff at or otherwise ridicule folk notions such as the evil eye, and/or so long as they ignore such everyday, pan-cultural and primatological intercorporeal behaviors as staring, just so long will they fail to distinguish culture-spawned corporeal archetypes from those that are evolutionarily given, and in effect fail to understand how fundamental cultural practices and beliefs derive from our evolutionary heritage. At a finer level, they will fail to understand how in both a phylogenetic and ontogenetic sense, thinking is fundamentally modeled on the body. In turn, such concepts as the concept of power and of power relations will remain reducible to mere social

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constructions, and unexamined conceptual genuflections will be made to hallowed authorities who have never actually examined the living body but who pronounce upon it at times as if witnesses to gospel truths. In short, so long as we tum from the task of fathoming the bodies we are - and the bodies we are not - we will fail to understand animate form. Animate form is out there in the world for anyone to see. It is what humans and nonhumans are in the deepest possible sense. It is the generative source not only of our fundamental practices and beliefs, but of our individual and species-specific "I can's," those possibilities of being and doing that Husserl called upon us to recognize and which we have yet to comprehend. A corporeal tum should awaken us to the full challenge of animate form. Part of that challenge, as I hope to have thus far shown, is to uncover corporeal archetypes and to trace the ways in which cultures work and rework them, ultimately in life-enhancing and life-destroying ways, which is to say, ultimately into complex sociopolitical tapestries. There is a further way in which a corporeal tum can awaken us to the challenge of animate form. It is tied to the realization that nothing less than an acknowledgment of bodies as animate forms can possibly do justice to both our evolutionary and cultural heritages. Consideration of this aspect of a corporeal tum has sizable implications for typical Western metaphysical and political allegiances - by which, of course, I mean on the one hand the mind/body split and the privileging of highlife minds - with all their cultural connections - over low-life bodies with all their natural ones; and on the <;>ther hand, the hard and fast linkage of power with control, as if no other form or kind of power existed. In giving living bodies their due, we come to understand not only the multiple ways in which our own human natural history subtends diverse cultural practices and beliefs, but also the multiple ways in which our own human natural history is equally the foundation of other possible conceptual frameworks and comportmental traditions. Clearly, in turning toward the corporeal, as in turning toward the linguistic earlier this century, we awaken other possible conceptual frameworks and traditions because we tum toward something we have long taken for granted. In effect, with a corporeal tum, unlived lines of our bodies come to light leading us to new possibilities of being. Let me conclude by exemplifying the conjunction of our evolutionary and cultural histories in animate form in a human behavior closer to the hearts of contemporary academic Westerners than evil eyes. What I

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would like to show through a consideration of language is that, with the current emphasis upon texts, upon the primacy of the written word, upon language as speaking the subject, or upon language as a singularly human capacity, human language is actually being taken for granted. We do not only not consider HOW our form of language began, we also do not consider THAT it began. We somehow ignore the fact that at some time in our remote evolutionary history, language in the form of speech was invented; it was created from scratch. When we seriously consider this fact, we come to consider seriously both the primacy and the complexity of the articulatory gestures of speech. We approximate to an appreciation of their primacy and complexity when we experience the unfamiliarity of a foreign language. We are at a loss for words because we are at a loss to articulate the articulatory gestures of the language being spoken. Moreover not only are our tongues not fluent, moving with ease, but our ears cannot distinguish where one word ends and another begins. It is of great interest in this context to point out that almost 40 years of research in speech perception has conclusively shown that short of an intuitive awareness - or apperception - of the articulatory gestures of the speaker, a hearer cannot understand the language being spoken. 3 ! In other words, speech perception depends upon bodily familiarity with speech production. Now speech psychologists explain this remarkable finding in terms of there being a speech analyzer in our brain, in particular, "an internal, innately specified vocal-tract synthesizer ... that incorporates complete information about the anatomical and physiological characteristics of the vocal tract and also about the articulatory and acoustic consequences of linguistically significant gestures.'m In short, a "language module" in our brain decodes a speaker's speech for us and in fact distinguishes linguistically significant articulatory gestures from non-linguistic ones. This computational explanation of how we understand a speaker of our own language is clearly not parsimonious; along with cognitive maps and feature analyzers, it merely adds to an ever-growing number of hypothetical entities in our brains, thus enlarging still further what might well be called our cerebral mall. Most importantly, however, the computational explanation leaves out experience. Why indeed would one want to overlook or even deny the fact that when we learned our native tongue, we literally learned our native tongue: we babbled and cooed, we made sounds, we discovered ourselves as sound-makers and in the process learned what we could do with our tongues, our lips, and our vocal tracts. Why would one

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want to say instead that when we were very young, i.e., before we ourselves could speak, a language module in our brain came to life and began computing the articulatory characteristics of people who were speaking to us? Why, especially with recent international research on infants showing, for example, their capabilities to discern one phoneme from another and to recognize in a preferential way the language they have heard since birth over another language,33 why would one not rather say that through their own lingual explorations and experiments, and through their own aural abilities to discern and to distinguish linguistic features that they consistently hear, infants not only learn the phonemes, prosodic elements, and intonations of their parents' language, they come to know what they can do with their tongues. Their initial discovery of themselves as sound-makers leads to their discovery of themselves as articulators. They develop a repertoire of "I can's" with respect to the articulatory gestures of their culture's language. If speech perception depends upon speech production, then surely we must in part take a clue from infants in order to understand how language might have been invented. An awareness of oneself as a sound-maker was first of all crucial to the invention of a verbal language. An awareness of what one could do with one's tongue was equally crucial. And an ability to control one's tongue in certain repeatable ways was likewise equally crucial. The more one thinks seriously of what was necessary to the invention of language in the form of speech, the more one is also led to take a clue from I' Abbe de Condillac, a philosopher who began his eighteenthcentury account of the origin of language not with a certain view of language - to wit, it arose ready-made, a gift from divine providence, a gift which, translated into current cognitive modes, becomes a sui generis product of the human brain - but with a living scenario by means of which he literally fleshed out a recreation of its origin. Though not spelled out in detail, Condillac's reconstruction specifies how the new sound language was patterned on already existing natural sounds; it describes how certain lingual sensitivities and capacities were vital to the invention of the new sound language; it describes the central role of the tongue and the necessity of its flexibility; and so on. 34 In short, Condillac too, by his thoughtful reconstruction, implicitly emphasizes both the primacy and the complexity of the articulatory gestures of speech at the very dawn of language. There is one further perspective on the significance of articulatory

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gestures that I would like to briefly bring out. (For a fuller discussion, I refer you to The Roots of Thinking.) It turns on the fact that we tend to assume straightaway that the primary function of language is and always has been to name things. Recent research in anthropological linguistics confutes this idea. 35 Extensive studies of root forms show not only that the symbolic structure of primordial language was anchored in iconic sounds rather than in arbitrary sounds, but that the referents of primordial language were not objects but motional-relational complexes. Let me give an example. To make the sound "m," we press our lips together. All reconstructed "m" root forms refer to analogous bilateral relationships - "the fingers or hands in taking or grasping," for instance, or "two opposed surfaces in tapering, pressing together, holding together, crushing, or resting against." In primordial language, the sound "m" thus named a particular motional-relational complex. We might imagine its designating: resting against nest materials as in sleeping or pushing against the earth as in walking, for example; or pressing together as in copulating; or crushing as in chewing food or pounding one thing with another; and so on. In effect, what the linguistic reconstruction of the symbolic structure of primordial language shows is that articulatory gestures were of primary semantic significance, which is to say that the felt, moving body, the tactile-kinesthetic body, was the focal point of symbolization. It is of interest in this context to single out several observations made by neurologist Oliver Sacks in his clinical treatment of a person he calls Virgil, a person who, after forty-five years of blindness, has his vision restored. Sacks notes that Virgil has difficulty in synthesizing what he sees. 36 For example, he can see specific features of a cat - paws, ears, or legs - but he can neither readily nor easily see the cat. His knowledge of the world to this point has been tactile-kinesthetic, a sequentially built-up knowledge as distinguished from an instantaneous visual knowledge. But as Sacks points out, we precisely learn to see in this instantaneous visual way. We build up our visual knowledge of objects in the world, which is to say that our knowledge of the visual world as a world of objects as such is achieved sequentially; only after a long tuition is it instantaneous. And indeed, Sacks writes that, with his sight restored, it is not objects as such, but movement, colors, and shapes that intrigue and fascinate Virgil, and continue to intrigue and fascinate Virgil. To judge from infancy research over the last 20 years, the same can be said of infants. Sacks himself makes this very com-

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parison. In short, what language names is not the bedrock of the perceived world. The form of things has a physiognomic character, a certain qualitative presence that is the bedrock of our perception. Animate forms are exemplary in this respect. They are moving, distinctively dynamic presences that are alive with meanings. The term "animate form" is precisely an attempt to pinpoint the way in which we fundamentally perceive and understand ourselves and one another, and in fact all living creatures. It is an attempt to describe what we fundamentally experience. Its purpose is thus not to launch a new academic fad or buzz-word. It is ultimately to gain insight into the fundamental ties that bind all humans in a common humanity and a common humanity in a common creaturehood. In sum, we need to take seriously the fact that we all move more easily forward than backward, that we all close our eyes to sleep, that we all know what it is to stare and to avert the eyes, that we all know the power of touch as we know the power of size, that we all spontaneously learned to move ourselves, and more; and that we all too have possibilities of moving and being that exceed our habits and groomings. The term "animate form" adumbrates these corporeal matters of fact and possibilities. The task in mapping our pan-cultural heritage is to be true to these facts and possibilities - these truths of human experience and in so doing arrive at understandings of the origin of our culturally diverse conceptual and comportmental histories, and of our foundational capacities for change. To the degree that we lose touch with these facts and possibilities, with ourselves as animate forms, we lose sight of ourselves and others - other humans and other species - as Darwinian bodies, bodies that are products of a natural history, integrated wholes, whose mental powers and emotional expressions evolved no less than their physiologies and anatomies. 37 In a broader and equally significant sense, we correlatively lose touch with history, that larger, natural history not only of which we are irrevocably a part, but a history the recognition of which is integral to the very future of this planet. NOTES I George Peter Murdock, "The Common Denominator of Cultures", in Readings in Introductory Anthropology, 2 vols., ed. Richard G. Emerick (Berkeley: McCutcheon Publishing, 1969). vol. I, p. 324. 2 Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, The Roots of Thinking (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).

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Murdock, "Common Denominator", p. 324. Sheets-Johnstone, The Roots of Thinking, pp. 293-294. 5 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 111-112. 6 Ibid., p. 112. 7 Ibid. • Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, The Roots of Power: Animate Form and Gendered Bodies (Chicago: Open Court, 1994). 9 Sarel Eimerl and Irven DeVore, The Primates (New York: Times, Inc., 1965), p. 109. Eimerl and DeVore give a similar but differently detailed desription of a dominant male baboon: "Suppose that a dominant male [baboon] is annoyed by a squabble. Its first reaction will be to stare at the offenders. The stare is long and steady, with the animal's whole attention concentrated behind it. If the stare is not enough to quell the trouble, it pulls back the skin on the top of its scalp, drawing back its ears and opening its eyes wide .... If the facial threat is still not enough to impose order, the male stands erect, with its body tensed and the fur on its mane stiffened. A baboon may bark, take a few steps forward, slap the ground threateningly and take a few more steps. Finally, if it feels defied, it will give chase". 10 Joseph Conrad, Lord Jim. 11 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), pp. 135-136. 12 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 188-189. 13 Staring is in fact not limited to primates, both human and nonhuman ones. "Monkeys, by the way, are not unique in becoming aroused by stares and in using them reciprocally to intimidate predators. Animals as diverse as crabs, lizards and birds all perceive staring as a threat. Some fishes and insects have evolved protective spots that resemble eyes; these spots either avert attacks completely or redirect them to nonvital parts of the body". Ned H. Kalin, "The Neurobiology of Fear", Scientific American (May 1993) 268/5: 94--101, pp. 95-96. 14 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981 [1871]), p. 39. 15 For a discussion of cultural differences among chimpanzee groups, see Michael Tomasello, "Cultural Transmission in the Tool Use and Communicating Signaling of Chimpanzees?" in "Language" and Intelligence, eds. Sue Taylor Parker and Kathleen Rita Gibson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 274--311. 16 Edmund Husserl, "The Origin of Geometry", in Husserl: Shorter Works, eds. Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1981), pp. 255-270, p. 256. I7 Adolf Portmann, Animal Forms and Patterns (New York: Schocken Books, 1967). 18 See, for example, Paul Ekman, "The Argument and Evidence about Universals in Facial Expressions of Emotion", in Handbook of Social Psychophysiology, eds. H. Wagner and A. Manstead (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1989), pp. 143-164; "Facial Expressions of Emotion: An Old Controversy and New Findings," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B 335 (1992): 1-7. Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, "Universals in Human Expressive Behavior", in Nonverbal Behavior, ed. Aaron Wolfgang (New York: Academic Press, 1979), pp. 17-30.

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19 Albert Potts, The World's Eye (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1982), p.79. 20 (Proverb 23.6) 21 Brian Spooner, "The Evil Eye in the Middle East", in The Evil Eye, ed. Clarence Maloney (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 79. 22 Tobin Siebers, The Mirror of Medusa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 29ff. Siebers' book is, in fact, an attempt to understand the evil eye from the viewpoint of the doer, not the recipient, of the evil eye. As Siebers points out in the preface, "Although many studies of the evil eye exist, not one of them includes the perspective of the accused fascinator" (p. xii). 23 In this context we might recall the poet Giacomo da Lentino's wonder with respect to an adored woman: "How can it be that so large a woman has been able to penetrate my eyes, which are so small, and then enter my heart and my brain?" See loan P. Couliano, Eros and Magic in the Renaissance, trans. Margaret Cook (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 22. 24 Quoted by Uta Frith in her article "Autism", Scientific American 268/6 (June 1993): 108-114, p. 113. 25 See Nancy Henley, Body Politics: Power, Sex, and Nonverbal Communication (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1977); Barbara Lloyd and John Archer, Sex and Gender (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 26 Patricia Webbink, The Power of the Eyes (New York: Springer Publishing, 1986). 27 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956). 28 See Erwin W. Straus, "Born to See, Bound to Behold: Reflections on the Function of Upright Posture in the Esthetic Attitude", in The Philosophy of the Body, ed. Stuart F. Spicker (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970). We are in fact fundamentally beholden to our power to behold for it is that power that grounds our prized epistemological power to illuminate and clarify. 29 See Alan Dundes, "Wet and Dry, the Evil Eye: An Essay in Indo-European and Semitic World view", in The Evil Eye: A Folklore Casebook, ed. Alan Dundes (New York: Garland Publishing, 1981), in particular, pp. 259-260. 30 Freud remarked on the relationship saying that there is a "substitutive relation between the eye and the male member which is seen to exist in dreams and phantasies". Sigmund Freud, "The Uncanny", Collected Papers, vol. 4, trans. Joan Riviere (New York: Basic Books, 1959), pp. 383-384. Obviously the Oedipal complex as first formulated by Freud is a testimonial to this relationship. 31 Alvin M. Liberman and Ignatius G. Mattingly, "The Motor Theory of Speech Perception Revised", Cognition 21 (1985), p. 3. 32 Ibid., p. 26. 3J See Jacques Mehler, Peter Jusczyk, Ghislaine Lambert, Nilofar Halsted, Hosiane Bertoncini, Claudine Amiel-Tison, "A Precursor of Language Acquisition in Young Infants", Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, CNRS & EHESS, 54 Bd. Raspail, 75006 Paris, France. For a discussion of infant phonetic discrimination, see Peter D. Eimas, "Speech Perception in Early Infancy", in Infant Perception, eds. L. B. Cohen and P. Salapatek (New York: Academic Press, 1975), pp. 193-231. 34 Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, An Essay on the Origin of Human Know/edge, trans. T. Nugent (Gainesville, FL: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1971 [1756]).

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See Mary LeCron Foster, "The Symbolic Structure of Primordial Language", in Human Evolution: Biosocial Perspectives, eds. Sherwood L. Washburn and Elizabeth R. McCown (Menlo Park: CA: Benjamin/Cummings, 1978), pp. 76-121. 36 Oliver Sacks, "To See and Not See", The New Yorker, 10 May 1993, pp. 59-73. 37 As I pointed out in "Taking Evolution Seriously" (American Philosophical Quarterly 29/4 [October 1992]: 343-352), Darwin's thesis concerning the evolution of mental powers and emotions has never been disproved; it has only been ignored. See his The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex and The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals. See also The Roots of Thinking for more on Darwinian bodies. 35

MARIA LUISA PFEIFFER

HEART TRANSPLANTATION

A Corporeality Perspective

INTRODUCTION

Man is not a duality. This is a hackneyed phrase but is not something that is felt. We find constantly, on a daily and scientific level, that man's uniqueness is not obvious. Something is obvious when it is expressed in word, when this word turns into metaphor and in this metaphor the phenomenon appears. The metaphors of our world originate with medical science: we talk about sick societies, about healing the economy, corporations are organisms, etc. Medicine, as Foucault said (Rio de Janeiro, 1974), interferes in every field of human life, even to the point of overflowing into objects that were not medicalized and now are. When we speak about the body, we do so from a biological representation. 1 When someone says, for example, that man is only a body and nothing more than a body, that all forms of intentionality are corporeal, that all knowledge is corporeal, all action is corporeal, he is soon considered by most people to be a "materialist", "physicalist", "nihilist", "atheist", and especially "antispiritualist". The body: our own and others', are represented at present from only one dimension: the biological dimension that is prevalent in present medical technology. L6pez Ibor says that the experience of corporeality can be described using many archetypes 2 that are specific intentional elements of the constitution of the sick world. The revelation of heart disease is central for the sick person's life, it is a pathetic signification that afflicts every aspect of his life, particularly his life project. Today's medicine dictates man's life and death. 3 It has the right to define death, we are dead when a doctor says so. In the old days, the family doctor declared a person dead, but now he establishes death by interpreting signs specified by a measuring instrument. But medicine is also the master of life. Due to the new medical technology we are able to live longer. Organ transplantation is perhaps the most representative achievement of this technology. The possibilities of organ transplantation are fast increasing, but that does not mean that all the problems of medical transplantation are solved. 243 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 243-258. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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The question of organ transplantation necessarily confronts us with the old and always renewed interrogation: the body question. Phenomenological reflection has enabled today's psychiatry to see in corporeality a fundamental element of all personality analysis. The body, "operating intentionality" (Merleau-Ponty), is the center from which the world acquires its signification as time, space and intersubjectivity. This perception, to feel, to will, to remember, to imagine, to represent and so on, what we call perception and the representation of the perceived, constitute the world of every man. We can recognize the world as our own, as our property, when it has been constituted in an intentional equilibrium between noesis, noema and transcendence. In a healthy consciousness, these polarities disappear. Consciousness exists only through what it perceives, imagines, thinks and so on, and it does all this corporally, because it is in a body.4 After its constitution, what we recognize as our own is the world. It is clear that this constitution does not mean creation, invention, birth from nothing. The world is constituted in an intentional act, where in our own consciousness together with the consciousnesses of other men, signifies a shared world. When the body "intends"S a world, it makes us face the limit, it forces us to think the limit, it compels us to confront separation, the different, the particular. We need the subject if we consider the particular an "a-priori" or "a-posteriori" moment of the universal, of the absolute. We need it if we take absoluteness as the measure of reality. This measure comes from a non-corporeal consciousness. And when we need the subject, we also need the object. This is what has happened in the history of philosophy. The result was the identification of the subject with the mind, the psyche, the spirit, the soul, and the object with the material extensive corpus. 6 Among all of them is our own body. Between man and what he is not, his own body is in a peculiar situation. The body acquires double signification: object and subject. It can be focussed on as a thing-object or as "I". We have a personal experience of it as a different object, one that is different from the "I". A tenacious pain, fatigue, illness, a broken member, particularly a lost non-recoverable organ, these are the situations where the painful feeling of duality starkly appears. These feelings break the unity of the body's presence; the body becames a stranger, it is not possible to reduce it to a singular presence. The sick man refuses to "intend" a world from his illness. He then divides

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his intentionality and makes it dual. He identifies himself with the world constituted from his "soul", his "spirit", his "mind", and rejects whatever constitutes the sick "corpus", because this "corpus" is impotent, heavy. His body is not acknowledged, is denied, because it causes regret, since it impedes movement and creeps to death. Le Breton thinks that only when the human body is understood as some kind of alter ego of man, can organ transplantation be possible. This operation would be perceived as socially unacceptable if it were made on a man and not on a dissociated body.7 If we take into account Le Breton's formulation, organ transplantation is only possible if we accept man as a duality. That places us in front of many problems, since if we say that man is not a duality, we do not give the sick person the possibility of organ transplantation. At least, we may question its legitimacy, because it can transform man into a non-man, a man more dependent than before, a being without identity. BODY AND PSYCHE

Today's medicine for the most part accepts that man is a biologicalpsychological compound. This position tries to go beyond dualism and proposes, as a great advance, a psychosomatic medicine. From this medicine's point of view, the sick man who needs an organ transplantation, would restore his body's health through classic medicine but the psychologist should be alert because his organic sickness can cause a psychic illness. The organic sickness could be caused, in this case, by a psychic illness. s In fact, among the negative consequences of organ transplantations (mostly unknown consequences), many cases of neurosis and serious psychosis have been referred to. 9 What is the result of those arguments?: after transplantation, the person will be healthy, and then, with appropriate therapy, the psychic consequences of the transplantation trauma will be overcome. Organ rejection, the present great problem of transplantation science, is explained by medicine as a cellular incompatibility, and by the psychologist as the expression of a grief not worked through. Can we consider all transplantations on the same level? Though they are all possible from the representation of the body as an addition of parts, everyone has its own image. These results form the role that the corporeal variable represented by an independent organ plays in intentionality.

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The heart, the center of life, is "the engine of the machine", which is the body; it pumps the blood that runs though the body feeding it. And the man who suffers from a heart disease makes the disease the center of his life; he "intends" his own world around his sick organ. As a result of a heart transplantation there is a loss of identity, because identity depends on a "sense of ownership of the act of consciousness" (Vella). "This sense is precisely a property of the body in each act of identity". IO According to Vella, we recognize acts of consciousness as our own, only once our "I" structures are developed and the specificity of the "I" appears in an intentional experience that fundamentally compromises corporeality, in this case, the heart. But the heart is not only compromised because it is body, but because it is imagined to be the vital center of the body. The heart is a "symbol" of identity. It is the core of life, of feelings, of the "I". To change a heart means to be another, because I then exchange my life for somebody else's life. In every act of my life, i.e., whenever I eat, know, make a decision, these acts make me someone else; but this takes place without my noticing it, it is part of the "selfmaking work", it is a moment of the Hegelian denial that allows me to take possession of my own identity. In the case of an organ transplantation I am already, in some way, another, the other who has a sick body, and this fact is prior to the transplant. The illness itself divides me, disjoins me, alienates me, deprives me of my identity; in the illness "I do not recognize myself'. The "I" separates itself from the sick body and divides itself into two: a suffering, impotent, limited "I", and an all-powerful, unlimited "I", that means an "I" that can despite the ballast of its body, change it for another. This is Descartes' idea: the spirit settles down with sovereign freedom and can discern itself from the body, the spirit can exist without the body and live beyond death.ll Descartes identifies the "I" with the "psyche" - as psychologists and psychiatrists do. Identity belongs to the psychic order, the body is the element that accompanies it more or less obediently. This makes it possible to accept that we can "change" a body without changing identity. But, although this corporeal representation is accepted by doctors and patients, the body appears as very symbolic in the case of heart transplantation. This reveals a significant intentionality to the world. The

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sick man wonders if after the replacement of his heart, he will be the same, if he will not be actually another. As an answer to these questions, after a transplant many feel that another person has settled down in their body. For example, they may be men in one half of their body and women in the other one. In this case, the transplant does not fulfill its purpose: to give back identity. It does not repair the world that the illness has disjointed, but on the contrary, the intersubjective world is converted into an intrasubjective world, in other words into a pathological world. Identity has a close relationship with body appropriation. In this sense we may say, for example, that a blind man from birth can be a healthy man or a sick man. The blindness can be a "life style" or the motif of a disjunction of the "I". Does the man who will have a transplant have this option? In his case, to accept the illness as a "life style" means to accept death. Maybe rejection is the culmination of an identity denying process. We can compare this process to suicide in some depressed people: the act of recovering their own life. Illness does not occur as an alien thing that invades us, it is not the mere misfortune of a machine that stumbled on something in its way, neither is it a "self-punishment" nor God's malediction. Illness is the necessary result of our corporeal condition, our limitation, our mortality. If death is inherent to life, the first step towards it is illness. A heart transplant is paradigmatic: first, because it affects the very center of life and consequently puts it totally in check, even obliges medicine to change the concept of death; and second, because the heart illness does not fit with the idea of illness as a damage caused by a foreign thing. Heart illness always engages the total significance of life, and it is not enough to "kill the alien". To replace one's heart with someone else's means to replace one's life with another's. This kind of argument does not appear in the case of a prosthesis. That does not have a history behind it and it can be incorporated in a swallowing act, like food. It is not possible, however, to think that I am swallowing another person, unless we return to certain ceremonial rituals that are alien to us. If not, we shall feel like the patient who said: "It would be much better in my mind if I had an artificial heart, it would not be someone else's heart but a spare one". The body's appropriation required not only in a heart transplantation but also in any kind of organ transplantation depends on the body's image. Rejection is a manifestation of the impossibility of restoring the

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body's schemaY The close relationship between the body image and the body schema is evident. According to Merleau-Ponty, one's body image is not a matter of acquired objective or accurate knowledge concerning the body, indeed it is fundamentally not a matter of reflective knowledge at all. Before reflecting about the body, a man builds up a familiarity with his body. This takes place at the prereflexive level. The individual body is a lived body (Leib). The body image is pictured in the light of the lived body, the objective picture of the body comes later, after an explicit reflection on one's own body and its situation in the world. In the transplantation of a kidney there is not such a strong identification with the organ, not only because of the kidney's lack of an intentionally defined function and a traditional significance, but also because whether it works or not, it is not perceived as being essential for life. It happens the same with the eyes, nobody asks if the donor was really dead. It is no different with blood: first, because it is not necessary that the donor actually be dead and second, blood is not identified as life's seat, as in the old Jewish and Greek cultures. 13 Since Christ's blood acquired a new significance of health, Christ's blood spilled on the cross is the life of the Church. The Catholic Eucharist is the transubstantiation of the bread and wine into Jesus Christ's body and blood. For Christians then, to give their blood is to repeat Christ's deliverance. The factors of an organ's significance, self-image, and the organ's relationship with the cultural reality of the patient will make organ transplantation possible or impossible. Ebrahim Moshin said, referring to organ transplantations in Muslim culture: "The Qur'an emphasizes that it is God Almighty Who bestows and causes death. Death is thus the inevitable reality that each and every living being has to face" .14 "The problem that organ transplantation poses to the Muslim mind may be summarized as follows: Firstly, since whatever humans own are considered to be a trust endowed upon them by their Creator, it would therefore be a breach of trust to give consent for the removal of parts from their bodies, while still alive, and for transplanting in order to benefit their children, siblings or parents. Secondly, Islamic Law emphasizes the sacredness of the human body. Thus, it would be an act of aggression against the human body tantamount to its mutilation if organs were to be removed after death for the purpose of transplantation" .15

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In Japan, organ transplantations are forbidden, because the organ donation violates the dead's body integrity. The redefinition of death as brain death is compared to murder. For the Mayas the heart was historically the seat of courage and feelings, that is why they extracted it after death. The Egyptians thought to preserve the heart from death, by putting a gold beetle, its symbol, over a mummy's thorax. Hindu and Buddhist Tantrism places in the heart's lotus energy's center. For our Greek-Jewish-Christian culture the heart has always symbolized the affective and emotional center: Eros' arrow pierces the heart, Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary reveal their hearts in Catholic iconography, and our love songs speak of it over and over. For the primitive Greeks and Hebrews the heart was the place of all man's intimate personal experience. Apart from being a seat for feelings and emotions, it was the same for the mind, intelligence and moral sense. "Even more, we could say that in the Old Testament the heart more understood than felt".16 In the Fifteenth Century, belief in the soul's immortality disappeared; it was replaced by belief in the body's immortality and permanency. Transgression is no longer sin but illness and death. Death began to be associated with the idea of downfall and guilt. In contrast, as medicine was the science that defeated death, it began to take possession of life. Since the Seventeenth Century, the body has been atomized by science, the corpse is dissected and the soul disappears definitively. Life and death are now in the hands of medicine. The body's science becomes anatomy (dissection) and physiology (animated anatomy), and the body begins to be thought of as a sum of parts. Since then, for medicine, death is not the last moment of life but the first one. Medical science builds the body from the corpse, rebuilds it from a representation. When its joins the parts that death has separated, it supposes that it has a lived body (Leib). Medical science imagines man's creation to be an enormous patchwork. The body is transformed into a biological organism, that is to say, into the organization of biological elements, such as organs, systems and so on. The functions that belonged to the soul: to know, to imagine, to think, are now products of the nervous system. The brain occupies the central place which was previously occupied by the heart. The heart is associated with what is not essential in men and, also with what brings us close to the animal. For to be a man is to think, to reason, to measure, to relate.

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This kind of significance does not appear only at the cultural-historical level. Stern found that the heart is felt differently according to education level and the subject's personality. For some people it is a threatening organ and its working might have fatal implications for the organism. Others consider the heart as a process placed in the center of their personal equilibrium. The heart has kept beating for some, then, especially for those who live life more simply: the less instructed, the not "civilized"; and when reason begins to stagger, the heart recovers part of its lost splendour. Although the old symbolisation of the heart as the center of life was changed, at a popular level the "human" is in the heart. It is said "I have you in my heart", "He has a pure heart", "He thinks only with the head, he has no heart", "She is cerebral, cool" (meaning that she does not have a heart or feelings). The one who "has no heart" is more "inhuman" than the one who has no intelligence. 17 We identify brain, mind, reason. We associate life, considered as our pre-rational, intuitive and spontaneous reality J8 with the heart. We do not call an idiot "inhuman", nor someone very intelligent (rational) "human". Humanity is associated with the affections and the seat of affection is the heart. However, the symbolic value changes, the heart-life relation is different from the brain-mind relation. Someone with a diminished or damaged brain becomes an idiot, loses intellectual capacity, acquires even something of an animal condition, that is to say, loses his human qualities. But someone who suffers from heart disease does not lose his humanity, his human condition, he is only closer to death, which, in the case of brain damage, is not so. So the mind, reason, continues to be identified with the "I": the mad are not associated with lost body but with lost reason. THE BRAIN

Today's science underlines the central role of the brain, especially of the brain's convolutions in the cortex in man's behaviours and reactions. No doubt, the perception of the brain and its functionning has changed. The brain from being a fairly insignificant mass became "what manages the body". Descartes compared the brain to the complex and very ingenious system of the fountains of the gardens at Versailles. He wanted to show the brain's complexity and perfection. At the end of the last century the brain's working was compared to a telephone central,

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today it is with a computer and its hardware and software systems. This central place of the brain, at least on a scientific level, has modified the historical image of the heart. The role of the brain in the old science and philosophy was quite controversial. 19 Hippocrates, in Morbo Sacra, underlined the importance of this organ, but Aristotle denied it any importance, he established the seat of feelings and intelligence in the heart. The relationship of man essence with the rational is as old as philosophy. Life was not essential to man. Existence, life, began to acquire hegemony in philosophy between the two World Wars. Stress on existence only added stress on the character of the "act", not only for the Greeks but also for the moderns. The essential remains beyond the "act", however, because it is eidetic. Classical philosophy and its "beloved daughter", science, opted in favour of the permanent; contemporary thought emphasizes the value of the contingent. But on the scientific level, the influence of rationalism is still in force, i.e., the idea that the brain's function is essential and the heart's function is circumstantial. A man is a man without a heart, but he cannot be a man without a brain. The brain, the mind, have occupied the place of the soul, the spirit, and the heart is identified with the body. For science, to have or not to have a body adds very little to man's essence. Descartes defined man as "a thing who thinks" and Saint-Exupery, more poetically said "The essential is invisible to the eyes". This brain's role as the protagonist of life, has changed the concept of death. Death was traditionally associated with the heart-beat, but today it is declared when the brain stops functioning. We are dead although our heart beats. However the images of life and death are not different, they are united with the heart. The beating heart is a synonym of human life. This is the origin of many of the questions of prospective transplant patients, such as: "Did they extract the heart while he was alive?", "What is a coma?". The answers mixed personal, religious and ethical convictions, and fundamentally modified the symbolisation of life and death. It is no coincidence that the donation of organs is silently refused in spite of intense advertising campaigns. 20 Can we speak here of an organic mind that refuses the mere mechanical repair of illness?

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We can say that the body with a transplant is imaginary, in the Sartrean sense of the "absent donne". The imagination is an intentional orientation that starts from the absence. It is an elevation of consciousness to reality's nothingness and not a "presence of the mind". The imagination is a militant power serving the future, which we anticipate as the real that comes as an absent-real. The transplant patient aspires to corporeal unity, for a free lived body; his real body is an imprisoned one, the split body of his illness and he does not feel himself identified with this body. The imaginary body is the body that "I am not". The body schema modifies itself with the illness, loses its intentional equilibrium; the sick man cannot constitute worlds but reduces these worlds to only one, one which is completely dependent on the illness. His freedom diminishes, his imagination diminishes, his projects diminish. His body schema can no longer have implicit knowledge of his current and possible position for action. The body transforms itself from an "intentional subject" into an "object of attention"; time in a time of the illness and space remains reduced to the dimensions of the organism. 21 Moreover, we can say that the limits of space are those of the sick organ, and as all the body's zones do not have the same figurative weight, we must take into account the degree of significance of this organ for the sick man. At a symbolic level, the heart has a degree of significance greater than the brain's. We can say, then, that the sick man, "makes flesh" a corporeal representation upon his consciousness of the organ and his corporeal unity. This means that he is constantly confronting his body schema with his imaginary body and the organ transplant appears to him as the possibility of identifying his body again. The organ transplant is the promise to recover a non-sick condition. The sick body craves after the transplant, the appropriation of a metaphoric identity, heiress of the singular history of the fated man. The imaginary body, that the sick man wants to recover after the transplant, is one of his own, it depends fundamentally on the representation of the heart that comes from perception. This perception is what we call the movement of corporeal intentionality constituting a world of its own. The heart, then, can appear as: - the producer of symptoms and as an object of diagnosis in the case of illness. In the case of a transplantation it is submitted to certain

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legal criteria. It has no relation to the affective sphere. This is the objectivized heart of science. - The center of the affectivity. It is the heavy heart of sadness, the heart that feels pain in grief, that gallops with emotion, that leaps with joy. A heart overflowing or empty. This is the objectivized heart of feeling. - The heart as the foundation of life, the center of the world, sacred space, the marker of time. This is the heart that objectivizes the mystery of origins. As we have seen, the representation that the transplant patient chooses has historical-cultural origins that are mixed with personal, religious and ethical convictions. The represented body, as imagined by the sick man, is the healthy body from which he has constituted his world. But the body and the world that he will recover after the transplant, will never be his previous body, it will be "someone else's" body. DUALITY AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

We can consider a transplant only when we are sure that we are facing a sick man. This sick man does not have an ill psyche in a healthy body or just the opposite, a healthy psyche in a sick body. If either were so, medicine should fight against sickness and not for the sick man. Sickness would continue to be something that comes from the outside (psychic trauma, shock) or something that anyone may "incorporate" (microbe, bacterium) and not something that a man "is". In that case, this man will go on being separated into body and soul, individual and society, man and environment. But really, we are not interested in the illness, we are interested in the sick man and his intentionality which constitutes his own world. As a matter of fact, the sick man constitutes his world and not a world where others are present. The anguish, the craving for freedom, the "cannot", the discovery of the situation "of exile", the bridling with death, makes the sick world lack certain intersubjective characteristics. Organ transplantation should really involve intersubjective presence, because it is an act between two persons who constitute one world: the world of the terminal disease, the world of the only possibility of life, the world of giving and receiving. This is a world marked by fear, anguish, but by the significance of the act of giving life, recreating life, saving another from death, too.

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Death is the metaphorical shared moment that gives way to the constitution of a world by donor and recipient together. But in the case of the heart recipient, the donor is always cadaverous and anonymous, so the "one who gives to another" is a ghost that the recipient necessarily "needs" to imagine and recreate. Only what partakes of significance can be given and received. In this case, what was given was transformed so as to find a place in another. Borges says: "We can only give what we have given. We can only give what already belongs to another". The "shared space" between the heart's donor and the recipient is an organ as the fountain of life, a body that is a sum of organs, that must be unified, that must be integrated into a corporeal schema, into that of the recipient. And this is only possible intersubjectively. An intersubjective relationship offers the only possibility of going beyond the dualism that sentences the sick man to solipsism. CONCLUSION

When intentionality constitutes a world from the body, the heart fulfills a symbolic intentional function in it too. Only then can we understand the transplant patient's world. From which heart does the patient symbolize the world? The function of the healthy heart is not identical for each subject, and the perception that we have of our organs is far from being homogeneous. Phenomenologically we describe perception not as a sensitive representation but as a movement of intentionality. This leads to a different noematic pole, depending on the one who "intends". We will take into account the cardiac rhythm, the size, the blood pressure to determine the constituted world of this defined intentionality, and also whether the patient feels his heart to be heavy or light, opened or closed, huge or small. But intentionality is not always seen as constituting a world from the body: "first intentional consciousness" (Merleau-Ponty). Intentionality is usually described as willpower, as a work of a spirit or soul that "makes use" of the heart, in fact, that "makes use" of each organ for a different function. The body, the heart, in this case, is a transcendent instrument, a regulator pump of the blood. This quite accurate image, of a "machine" body, as Descartes has described it, is typically dualist. This makes the sick man live his illness almost as if it were alien, foreign to him. "The lived body is reduced

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by estrangement (Entfremdung) to becoming a 'thing",.22 However, "all the movements of our body are at our disposal from a shared significance".23 When I analyze the movement of my hand, I see that when I stretch it out to grab something, I do not see my hand, but the object. I do not write "with my hand", but with a pencil, it is my hand that writes, for my hand is myself. Just as the movement of the hand is not foreign to itself, neither is the blood pressure associated with the hearts, or its blood pumping rhythm, foreign to the heart. These are its part of intentionality. The part that the heart comparts ("part-com")24 is part of the total significance of this life, with which it is compromised. The organ transplantation does not modify the man's organic body. The sick man significantly constitutes the world from his sickness. The organ transplantation modifies the world that the sick man will "intend" after the operation, which will not be the same as the one he intended when he was sick, but neither the same as the world intended before his sickness. When ill, particularly when it is with a terminal disease, I alienate my perpetual power of giving me "worlds" for the profit of one of them. This privileged world loses its substance and ends in being only "a certain anguish".25 Merleau-Ponty demonstrates that the body is the human condition, the place of its identity; if we add or take something away, we modify its relation to the world. In this sense, an operation lasting only a few hours for an organ transplantation or a prosthesis implantation can affect a person's whole existence, depending on the subject's personal history. The level of rejection depends on the level of "incorporation" of the transplanted organ. 26 According to which image is this incorporation possible? And what image must I incorporate? We have seen that some civilizations or religions forbid "the incorporation" of a foreign organ, we also have seen that we all are afraid of losing our identity. It is clear that, in spite of the modem scientific paradigm of the corpus as machine, "something" in us resists. Contemporary man's corporeal schema is dissociated from his corporeal image, but the "healthy" man keeps this unitary schema that allows him to go on being himself in spite of the separated image. There is a pre-reflexive intentionality that maintains all reflexive intentionality. Merleau-Ponty speaks about an "interior diaphragm" that, more than determining the contents of sensation, "determines what our reflexes and our perceptions will see in the world, the zone of our possible operations, the scope of our life".27 The action of

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this "interior diaphragm" underlines the interaction of the process in a third person and of personal acts in a shared medium. As a consequence, in the interior of our pre-objective vision we enjoy an autonomous existence that can avert rejection through the attitude of the whole person. The sick person separates his "interior pulse", his corporal schema and his corporeal image. The transplant can serve to heighten this dissociation, for it offers the sick man a non-identical identity. This is the reason for its failure. Medicine offers a psychical identity, that is "interior", immanent, separated from the body. But identity is an aspect of corporeality. The body is pure openness, transcendence, intentional consciousness. When the heart is considered as a living center, there is no longer a redoubt of immanence and it begins to become the nucleus of transcendence. From this point on we may begin to think of organ transplantation as possible. As long as we cannot live our body as a prior unity, it will be impossible to solve the serious questions that organ transplantation evokes. Today, organ transplantation is only a conflict-laden answer to the problem of the illness. University of Buenos Aires NOTES I Calvi, in Foucault's wake, extends this biological representation to the economy and society: "The 'everyday body' (Korper) is the living body as reduced by estrangement (Entfremdung) to become a 'thing' for the biological sciences, as well as for the order of economic production and societal arrangements". Lorenzo Calvi, "A Clinical-Noematic Report", Analecta Husserliana, Vol XVI (1983), p. 204. 2 Right side does not have the same signification as left, the distribution of the "algias timopaticas" has no relation with the distribution of nervous root. 3 Cf. Jose Mainetti, (ed.), La muerte en medicina (La Plata: Quir6n, 1978), Mainetti calls such death, "medicalized death". 4 It is interesting the way Angelergues describes the body-word relation: "Les systemes sensori-moteurs (notamment, mais pas seulement) son! la formalisation que nous faisons de ce qui du corps ouvre it la chose, alors que les systemes pulsionnels sont la formalisation que nous faisons de ce qui du corps ouvre it I'objet (au sens metapsychologique du terme)". Rene Angelergues, "Le Corps en psychiatrie", L' Evolution psychiatrique 49:2 (1984), p. 550. 5 I mean the corporeal acts that are "intentives", as Zaner says, and that conform to the first intentionality, the corporeal intentionality. Cf. Maria Luisa Pfeiffer, "La condi-

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cion corporal", in M. L. Rovaletti (ed.), Psicologia y Psiquiatria Fenomenol6gica (Buenos Aires: Facultad de Psicologia) (September 1994), pp. 158-168, and "Cuerpo e Intencionalidad", Revista de Filosoffa, ano XXVII, No. 81 (September-December 1994), (Mexico City), pp. 514-522. 6 "Je suppose que Ie corps n'est autre chose qu'une statue ou machine de terre, que Dieu forme tout expres, pour la rendre la plus semblable a nous qu'il est possible; en sorte que, non seulement illui donne au dehors la couleur et la figure de tous nos membres, mais aussi qu'il met au dedans toutes les pieces qui sont requises pour faire qu'elle marche, qu'elle mange, qu'elle respire et en fin qu'elle imite toutes celles de nos fonctions qui peuvent etre imaginees proceder de la matiere". Rene Descartes, Traite de l' homme, Oeuvres, Vol. XI, p. 120. 7 David Le Breton, Anthropologie du corps et modernite (Paris: PUF, 1992), p. 233. 8 It is interesting to remark that in this simple meaning schema all relations are causal. 9 J. Waisse, "Du fond du coeur", L' Evolution Psychiatrique 57 (Paris), 3, 1992, pp. 387-403. 10 G. Vella, "Depersonnalisation somatopsychique et troubles du schema corporel", Rev. Franraise de Psychanalyse, Lyon, 1962, p. 523. II Descartes says that the sovereign freedom of the spirit lets us "distinguish ourselves clearly from· our body, being able to exist without it and survive death", Rene Descartes, Meditationes de prima phi/osophia, Oeuvres, Vol. IV, Secundae responsiones, Propositio I. 12 The body schema refers to the implicit knowledge that the person has of the position of his or her body. Body image is the picture that the person has of the physical appearance of his or her body. See Moss, Donald, "Brain, Body and the World", in Ronald Valle, and Steen Halling (eds.), Existential-phenomenological Perspective and Psychology (New York: Plenum Press, 1989). 13 The refusal of Jehovah Witnesses to allow blood transfusions is due to their keeping the old belief of the Jewish people that blood is the life that runs through the body. Due to this, blood is the property of God (Gen 9,4). According to Hippocrates the blood lodges the spirit, which is why the spirit can be disturbed by bad humours. 14 Ebrahim A. F. Moshin, "Organ Transplantation and the Ethico-Legal Dilemma of Muslims", unedited, II Mundial Congress of Bioethics (Buenos Aires, September, 1994). 15 Ibid. 16 Manuel Guerra, Antropologias y Teologia (Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1976), p.233. 17 "Having a heart" is taken here symbolically, not organically. 18 This kind of life was called by Nietzsche the "Will to Power". Cf. Maria Luisa Pfeiffer, "La voluntad de poder y la verdad", in M. Cragnolini, G. Kaminski, Estudios actuales sobre Nietzsche, Vol. III, Buenos Aires: Ediciones del CicIo Basico Comun, 1997. 19 The Epicureans and the Stoics also considered the heart as the seat of the intelligence. For Empedocles "thought is the blood that surrounds the heart". 20 That is not as we may think an LDC problem or a primitive cultures' question. This phenomenon has been clearly defined in the USA and Europe, where it is possible to set up enormous and massive advertising campaigns in favour of organ donation. 21 See U. Galimberti.: Il corpo (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1987).

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Calvi, op. cit.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p.174. 24 The Latin cum means "with". 25 Mer1eau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception, op. cit., pp. 98-99 26 A blind person "incorporates" a cane. This cane is a transcendent reality, a foreign reality that Heidegger calls a utensil. It "completes" his corporeal schema and begins to be part of his corporeal image substituting for an absent potency. The cane can be assimilated with a prosthesis, but when we set up a prothesis we do not transplant it. 27 Cf. Socratis Delivoyatzis, La dialectique du phenomene (Sur Merleau-Ponty), (Paris: Meridiens Klincksieck, 1987). 23

CHRISTER BJURVILL

ANALYZING IMAGES OF THE FUTURE

The Ironic Twist

1.

THE PHENOMENON OF THE FUTURE

"Que sera, sera. Whatever will be, will be. The future's not ours to see. Que sera, sera." This is the refrain from a Doris Day song on the lips of many people in the middle of the '50s. The song was about a mother teaching her little daughter not to bother too much about what will be or not; the best thing to do for the future, she was told, was to rely on amor fati. This lesson very clearly communicated an educational message of undisputed optimism, and also a kind of naive and irresponsible happygo-lucky attitude. I have since that time often recalled and reviewed the message of this particular song, putting myself the question: Will it (the future) just be, really? Is this the right thing to communicate? Is this the best way of preparing our children for the future? Is this the best philosophy of life we could teach the young generation? How does this undisputed optimism correspond to the attitudes of young people of today? In a number of empirical studies (see Bjurvill, 1992, 1993 and 1995) of young Swedish people's visions and values of the future, I discovered quite another message contradicting the notion of "que sera, sera" and this has been a good reason for me to question the whole issue of popular and modem messages for the future. Because what I found was rather a kind of hard-rock message telling me that there will be no future at all (cf. the theme of Sex Pistols), i.e., an undisputed personal and also global pessimism, and this was specifically found among young people in the lower social groups; or the message told me that in spite of the global pessimism, it was still up to everybody to shape their own personal future in one way or another, i.e., a personal optimism, and this message was typical for young people in higher social classes. In order to properly describe these contemporary and post-modem images of the future I decided to make use of a phenomenological analysis. To that end, I started by asking myself: What is the future but fictions, i.e., ideas and feelings of something that has not yet happened? 259 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 259-280. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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And precisely because of those fictions, the images of the future could be of certain phenomenological significance even if, at first sight, they may look like being just the opposite of what Husserl and other phenomenologists constituted as a phenomenon, i.e., the directly experienced, the thing that is in front of your nose. But what is this thing called future? You cannot experience it with your senses, but you may direct yourself to it in other ways, for instance by your wishes and guesses. It is (!) in front of your nose and you have to face it, whether you want to or not, and this makes it not only constitutional but also intentional and existential in the most typical phenomenological way. It (the image of the future) is in fact the most self-evident example of intentionality and existentiality that could ever be found. Thus, it would be hard to think of Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre, some of the pioneers of phenomenology and existentialism in this century, as not having observed this very fact. Of course they have; throughout the modem history of phenomenology internal time-consciousness and lifeprojects, i.e., images of the future, have been analyzed, both by them and by others, from both logical and existential points of view. Husserl's concepts of retention and protention have special relevance for this, so has Heidegger's and Sartre's notions of destiny and identity. Also the notion of being-in-the-world, especially the life-world, is of certain significance for the image of the future and the intentionality of it. One time aspect of the life-world is the future, and others are the present and the past. Living in the life-world therefore means living in two different worlds, and that means in its tum viewing life with both of your eyes, as it were, one for the present-future and another for the present-past. Physically (looking) we know that it is impossible to direct the two eyes in various directions, but mentally (viewing) it is maybe difficult but not at all impossible. And this kind of "seeing" is exactly what you have to do when coping with time and space in all its range. As an illustration of this typical vision, you may look at a picture of Sartre en face; then you see that his eyes are not quite parallel, they squint. He is the perfect man with which illustrate this split vision of the future, the very incarnation of it. To speak in a manner close to his, you could say that "the future is not what it is, and that it is what it is not". These dialectics carry out the essence of the images of the future. (A) Internal time-consciousness and the constitution of it was one of Husserl's parade-horses and he wrote on it from the very beginning; for instance in his collected papers from 1893 to 1917 (see Husserl,

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1966), you will find the article "Zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstsein". Also in one of his most central and also transcendental books, [deen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie of 1913 (see Husserl, 1950) he explicated the ideas of transcendental time-consciousness, trying to extend the horizons of both time and space. I quote: Ich kann meine Standpunkt in Raum and Zeit wechseln, die Blicke dahin und dorthin, zeitlich vorwiirts und riickwiirts richten, ich kann mir immer neue, mehr oder minder klare und inhaltreiche Wahrnehmungen und Vergegenwiirtigungen verschaffen, oder auch mehr und minder kare Bilder, in den ich mir das in den festen Formen raiimlicher und zeitlicher Welt Mogliche und Vermutliche veranschauliche (p. 59). (I can change my perspective in space and time, orienting me spatially here and there, temporarily forwards and backwards, I can always create more or less distinct and elaborated perceptions and ideas, or more or less distinct images, by which I can imagine the constitution of possibilities and probabilities in space and time.) (Translation mine.)

Speaking about the dialectics of time and of the split vision of it, there will be no doubt that Husserl saw an essential relationship between intentionality and temporality although, as I see it, he was far more concerned with the present and the past, and the constitutional correlation between them, than with the future specifically. In fact, his protege Heidegger paid far more attention to the future as an aspect of internal time-consciousness than did Husserl himself. (B) To Heidegger, the image of the future was the guiding principle of being in the world, and almost on every page in his book Being and Time (1978) you will find allocutions on the importance of the future. In §§78-83, particularly, he speaks of the Dasein's being directed to the future, taking into consideration what the human being could be ("seinkonnen"), not only what it would be, and of the personal time-transcending project as the very essence of Dasein. It is explicated like a modus vivendi, i.e., a way of living or coping with life, to follow a definition of the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1990). It is the operating agent in man. Heidegger says that this Dasein is essentially in front of itself and has thrown itself into its own possibilities, its could-be. Its operating principle is grounded in anticipants and expectations. To him, Dasein was the operator of the outmost creative significance for the human being, and speaking of the creative condition of man, you have to pay the greatest attention to this very dynamic and behavioral principle ruling the being of man. But as always with Heidegger, there is also a dialectic and disabling principle, non-creative by nature, pulling one

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back to the status quo. Dasein, and internal time-consciousness, on the one hand, is ruled by the first principle and is constituted by its orientation toward the present-future dimension of time. The vulgar timeconsciousness, on the other hand, is ruled by the second principle, the disabling one, and regards the present-past as the essential feature of time, particularly the pure present that has its complete structure destroyed when one is simply one-dimensional. Das Man, for instance, having a vulgar time-consciousness and being one-dimensional, adapts to life as to clockwork slavery, being like a wandering pointer always in an inauthentic state of repetitiveness going round and round without really seeing the point of it, but also without really being able to stop it. Coping with the internal time-consciousness trying to create the conditions of living, on the other side, means reactivating Dasein and living an authentic ("eigentlich") way of life, taking a personal responsibility for decisions and actions. The way to be trapped or "gefallen", in contrast, is to live inauthentic ally ("uneigentlich"). In that case you reactivate "das Man", giving up an identity of your own and just following the mainstream with others. In the long run this is to give up life and settle down in a mental state of lethargy and nausea, quite passively being like the living dead. (C) To Sartre this theme of a modus vivendi was exaggerated even more. The operating agent situated between being and nothingness (see Sartre, 1981) meant the struggle of being on the road, always trying to move away from a special kind of status quo or facticity, trying instead to go for the restless change, both personally considering the Self and socially regarding the Other. Being trapped was to him to get lost in facticity forever. In contrast, the transcendence of mind meant opening up the doors to nothingness, getting access to the future. Existence preceeds essence, he said, meaning that living on the road was far more important than standing aside watching things going on. Running the personal life-project, always looking ahead of you, this was his point of departure, breaking the borders of the future, coping and shaping with the limits of living. Some people consider Sartre's modus vivendi as an almost hysterical striving for transition, a restless going. Calling it hysteria is maybe saying too much too, but nevertheless there is both a significant physical and also an emotional constituent in his experience of time, not only for an intellectual such as for Heidegger and specifically for Husserl, and this is seen quite clearly in his descriptions of viscosity, for instance. The experience of time can be viscous, he said, meaning that we from the very beginning are projecting our-

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selves toward the future but also at the same time are kept back by the viscosity of the past. We feel plugged, so to speak, or attached by the viscous past, and try to escape from it. But in vain, because the very project is invaded by parasites, viscous little nasty things, until it gets totally disoriented and lost. The fear of getting lost in viscosity is ontologically due to the fear that the mobility of the pour-soi would be trapped by the facticity of the en-soi, that is, of viscous temporality. Fearing viscosity is fearing time to be viscous, he said, and that in its tum meant fearing getting lost in the past. Urging transcendence here, is just another metaphor for striving to fulfill the creative potentialities in man. If Heidegger could be regarded as a philosopher deeply involved in the problems of human creativity, Sartre was involved to an even greater extent. Looking forward into the realms of the unknown future, as he did in his big scientific project, is really a very creative enterprise. (D) Two other, and more contemporary, phenomenologists (Schutz and Luckmann, 1974) stress the same priority of the futureness of time: "In all our thinking in the life-world we are, above all, directed toward the future" (p. 19), they say. Here we can notice the concept of life-world. This is a concept also used by Husserl in his later writings indicating a somewhat new direction for phenomenology. From the beginning you could say that phenomenology was a philosophy of mind, what we could call a theoretical philosophy. Developing during the twentieth century you could see a shift in interest tending toward a more practical philosophy, i.e., a philosophy of life or a phenomenology of life. This shift was also indicated by Heidegger and Sartre, not the least the latter, in their writings on the theme of the modus vivendi, living and coping strategies, even if they did not use the word life-world explicitly for this purpose. This word has been more and more included in phenomenological philosophy in the second half of the century at the same time as the locus of interest has been directed to more social issues in investigations. This may also explain why phenomenology nowadays is of growing interest for sociologists and social welfare researchers as well. The concept of the life-world is the kind of dynamic concept that can draw attention in many fields of research, the field of future studies also. As we have already seen, internal time-consciousness is of significant phenomenological interest, so also is the creation of images of the future. Now, what is the practical and moral significance of it for being in the life-world? Seeing the significance as an example of modus vivendi, which means that you are both facing the future and

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also coping with it in various ways. Facing it means taking into consideration expectations and anticipations, as an act of consciousness; coping with it means that you either act upon these expectations and anticipations, or you do not. In whatever case, you make a choice, by taking either a passive position or an active one. Taking the active position, you are turning the image of the future into an authentic modus vivendi, being serious according to the notions of identity and destiny. Taking the passive and inauthentic position, this is to avoid the problems of identity (the present) and also destiny (the future), making yourself blind because of the troubles it will cause you to interfere with the things going on. Describing the practical significance in that specific way, i.e., in terms of facing and coping, you have made it a question of morality and existentiality, i.e., a problem of modus vivendi, or the way of being in the life-world, including for example such stances as optimism and pessimism respectively. 2.

OPTIMISM VS. PESSIMISM

The phenomenological analysis of images of the future might reveal many things but these will always cluster around some essential parts, i.e., figure-constituents, depth-determinants and color-components. That is, your vision - or in this case, your picture of the future - can be deconstructed according to figure, depth and color. The figure will tell what objects are on your mind, the depth will give the frame of reference for your figure, and the color will show what you consider the outcome will be, if it will be good or bad. The results of this analysis will come up with a picture and also with a mixture, particularly regarding the color of the picture, i.e., of optimism and pessimism. This mix, or split, is a most crucial constituent of the phenomenon of the future pointing to the difference between the essence (facticity) and existence (transcendence) of being. This ontological split seems to have been a quite ordinary split in human life since the very beginning of time. Fred Polak, in his historical survey The Image of the Future (1973) makes a conceptual distinction, but also a correlation, between essence and influence on the one side, and optimism and pessimism on the other side. Being an optimist or a pessimist you can be so for the sake of essence, for what has to be, but also for the sake of influence, for what ought to be, he says. Essence is about facing the facts, considering them as good or

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bad; influence is about coping with the facts, trying to interfere with them or not. According to this, Polak speaks of man, "split man", facing two different worlds, one present and another future, and also as "moral man", coping with various moral alternatives and acting upon them. In defining future man in terms of split man and moral man, you have made visions and values of the future into a very clear existentialistic phenomenon. Moral man has to cope with the dilemma of what has to be and what ought to be, i.e., moral obligations. Polak gives a special reference to Kant's categorical imperative when defining moral implications like this: Man, in his process of ethical development, is no longer simply split man, capable of dividing his perceptions into two realms. He now becomes moral man, responsible for the use to which he puts his perceptions and powers for reaching the Other and better (p. 13).

Trying now to give you a schema of mixed optimism and pessimism, think of a four-field table with two crossing lines, one for split man and another one for moral man. Or, if you want, with one facing-line and another coping-line. Each line is dichotomized, the horizontal facingline in negative-positive extremes (essence) and the vertical coping-line in active-passive ones (influence). In this schema you get four cells (A-D). A is a combination of negative visions and positive actions, a kind of active, but absurd, living strategy. You act, but you do it against the odds. B is a combined active and positive look on life, a real optimistic life-strategy. This is the cell of influence - optimism as described by Polak in the quotation above. This is also the cell where the so-called "challenged conquistadors" belong, people strongly committed to both an omnipotent belief in success and also extremely committed to the use of personal power and action for fulfilling success. These people are not to be seen as absurd optimists, like those in A, they are real optimists but also a little crazy or even mad. Being challenged they see no barriers whatsoever and this omnipotency and also egocentricity gives them a trait of unrealistic activism that may not always be so very sympathetic. If it ends with just a neurotic cry for optimism, what is the point of it, one may wonder. You can cry too high to be heard, can't you? C, on the other hand, is the opposite of B. This cell stands for a passive coping strategy together with a negative outlook. This is the very pessimistic way of living. This is the cell of what we may call "candidates for suicide", i.e., those people who cannot see any meaning in life whatsoever and having resigned totally, are just waiting for the end. These

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candidates however, do not at all resemble those candidates for suicide that we used to speak of as Japanese kamikaze pilots, who are more like the optimists in A, and maybe more those in B. D, finally, is also a passive coping strategy but in this case mixed with a trust in a better state of order shaped by forces outside yourself, e.g., God, or the state, or something else with great power and influence. This is the cell of amor fati, or if you prefer, of "que sera, sera". Belonging here also is the image of "Vaya con Dios" (Go with God), that too a popular tune from the' 50s. By means of this schema, let us now try to identify who respectively is optimistic man and pessimistic man. Who is who, really? This question is not to be answered in a unilateral way. Future man is not onedimensional man, you need at least two dimensions to define him, i.e., not only visions but also actions. However, it seems to be quite clear that optimistic man here has to be the man in cell B, this man is univocally an optimist. It is also quite obvious that the man in cell C is the pessimistic one. But what about those in cell A and cell D? Well, the short answer will be that both of them are split men, split between facing and coping strategies. The man in cell A is facing the future but has not much belief in it; nevertheless, he is coping with it actively, trying to change a bad situation into a better one. The color is black, but there is also a kind of vital energy breaking through the darkness. I would like to call him an absurd optimist, a man putting action to its very edge. The man in cell D is opposite to that in A, facing the future positively but coping with it very passively. Maybe he is to be called an eschatological pessimist. He represents the kind of person confident that things run well as they do and will continue to run even better without his help, the happy-go-lucky person. Now, looking a bit more carefully at this schema with four cells, I have myself come to regard the company in cells A and D as more important and interesting than that in cells Band C. How could that be? Well, one argument could be that we normally identify optimists as B-persons and pessimists as C-persons, also that we normally dislike the pessimists and like the optimists. Who would not like to be an optimist? But is it that easy? Are the optimists and pessimists to be identified solely along that diagonal going between Band C? What about the diagonal between A and D? Is that line maybe a more significant line for identifying optimists and pessimists? In other words: Do we mostly identify ourselves with the persons in A, B, C or D? I think the answer will be: in A or D, more seldom in B and not at all in C. I

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also think that many people would admit that they circulate between the cells, being sometimes in-between them all and most of the time in A. So. I want to make a big X here, crossing the schema with two diagonals, arguing for one diagonal, the A-D one, to be the most significant one in order to differentiate between optimists and pessimists. Thus, we have earlier spoken of A as an optimist and D as a pessimist. However, could it not be likewise right to identify A as a pessimist and D as an optimist? As we have seen there is for both of them a mix of optimism and pessimism, and what says that one special mix should have priority over another one? This question brings in another dimension, viz. the evaluation of facing and coping respectively. If you give priority to coping over facing, then A is an optimist and D is a pessimist. And vice versa, if you put visions in the first place and actions in the second. This question of priority gives a very deliberate aspect to the image of the future. Can you act without having a vision? And can you have a vision without acting upon it? The answers to these questions lead into moral philosophy and existential analysis. This might reveal that it is possible to act without having a vision, although it is hard to do so in the long run: just think of the myth of Sisyphus. If you on the other side put emphasis on visions over actions, you may end in daydreams finding your confidence in meditating like Diogenes. Let it suffice here to say that in the long run it is very hard to keep going like Sisyphus. He is the archetype of the absurd optimist. But what about living like Diogenes, making a virtue of quietism, is not that kind of attitude even harder to cope with? If we think of him as a person having a vision, should he not try to act upon it in order to realize it? How can we understand his passivity and impotency? Had he like Schopenhauer come to see the life-world as an arena of conflicting visions ("Vorstellung") and actions ("Wille"), impossible to resolve, and therefore withdrawn to his ivory tower? Diogenes was not on the move like Sisyphus, he was sitting or lying, just letting the world go round. And still one has to also consider him as an optimist. This seems to be a paradox, or does it not? You have to stop here and consider the phenomenon of hopelessness. Is Sisyphus a hopeless guy? I would say yes. He very well knows that his project is a hopeless (and also an endless) one, and still he continues to run it. He is hopeless but not helpless, so he goes on in spite of all barriers, waiting, and waiting, and waiting. For what? You tell me! I would not say for better times, that would be too simple, and

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also wrong because these better times will not come. Maybe he is waiting for Godot (in the play of Beckett), or maybe it is for Bardot (in her earlier days we will say, she was also a phenomenon of the '50s). Whoever it is, or whatever it is, the waiting is there and you have to do something while waiting. And this doing might be rolling a stone like Sisyphus or cultivating your own garden like Voltaire's Candide, or something quite different, of course. As you may see from the schema, you find hopelessness, and the hopeless guys, in cell A. The absurd credo of their philosophy of life sounds like this: "We cannot do it. Let's do it!" But can we not find this also in the other cells? Well, certainly not in cell B, which is the cell of hopefulness in the full sense of the word. The credo is here: "We can do it. Let's do it!" What about cell C? This is, of course, the most typical place of the most outspoken hopelessness regarding visions and actions both. Still I will not speak of hopeless guys belonging to this particular cell. The people we find here are more like doomed dolls, puppets on a string, just waiting for the end to come. They are both hopeless and helpless. The moral credo for them is: "We cannot do it. Let's forget it!" In D there is helplessness but not hopelessness, because here you are waiting for the re-start to come, a new start maybe, or maybe a new life beyond the present one. But the point here is that you do not start this new project by yourself, others do it in your place. So instead of hopelessness, you have here helplessness. The credo is: "We can do it. You do it!" Now, what about Diogenes, who is placed in this particular cell? He is not a totally hopeless guy as you know from the myth. He is waiting for the sun to shine, waiting for the great emperor Alexander to step out of the sun, and this is something to wait for. He is however most of the time acting very passively and one has to consider him a helpless guy just waiting for the world to be, not letting it disturb him too much. 3.

CINDERELLA UNPLUGGED

Another mythical person to be introduced here is "Cinderella". As you know this girl lost one of her shoes when running home from a party with the prince. Both the shoe and the dancing I will use here as symbols for another story, that of a modern Cinderella who is a symbol of the young generation of today, unplugged, i.e., free and independent, but also a little mysterious like an X.

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This X was exactly the problem confronting me in my analyzing images of the future for the first time. The messages said that it was quite in order to think of a hell of a mess for all of us and at the same time of a personal paradise for oneself. This was the most common message given by young people born in the '70s, and I must say it was a bit frustrating. How was that to be interpreted? Were they all cynics, or did they belong to quite another generation with quite different visions and values, and also a different language, one that was hard to understand for the grown-up generation? As you know, it is not only the future that is unknown and therefore problematic to handle and to understand, but this is also the case with the young generation. To the grown-up generation the young are indeed a phenomenon that is hard to understand. Trying to do it you are met by a double haze, or "Schein" in German, that you have to break through. In English we could call it an X. This X is a concept, or a label, that belongs to the young generation of the '90s and refers to people of 20-30 years of age. (You have also a generation Y referring to people of the ages of 10-19.) One of the elaborators of this X-concept, perhaps the first one, was Douglas Coupland (1991), who described this generation as highly free, mobile, autonomous and in some aspects also anarchistic, I would say loving the fleeting flux of being (Heraclitus) and hating the Great Plan of Being (Plato). The most significant feature of this generation is that it is highly unpredictable. Coupland refers to the young American generation of today. I maintain that his descriptions are valid for the European one as well, at least it is so for Swedish youth. The meaning of X, in my experience, is that it is a generation of visions and options but not of values and actions, and so these young people tend to end up in a mental state of nihilism and indifference being lost in a world with no future, either seeking momentary mental kicks or just letting things happen. In general, you do not find much of an optimistic and social struggle spirit in these visions of the future; what you find is a spirit of powerlessness and alienation and also frustration determined by the fact that these young Swedish people see no way out of the misery. This pessimistic vision of the future is confirmed by different studies of the future conducted in other countries, especially the West-European lands. It is very clear that these people can split the future and its problems, but they cannot hit them, not even touch upon them. They are out of fighting shape and can thus be labelled with an X. This X stands here for the refusal of individuals to understand e(x)odus or e(x)ile, but also e(x)perimenting.

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(1) One very recent example of generation X's ambiguous attitude is the Spanish film "Historias del Kronen" directed by Montxo Armendariz. It fits almost perfectly into the paradox I am speaking of here. It also perfectly illustrates the two following X-prototypes. (2) One such prototype can be taken from the novel El Labirento de la Soledad (The Labyrinth of Loneliness) by the Mexican writer and Nobel Prize winner Octavio Paz, describing young Mexicans living in the Southwest of the United States. he calls them "pachucos". At the same time they are both dandies and anarchists living in opposition to most of the American mainstream attitudes. Like dandies they dress in the most sophisticated (American) way, but like anarchists they behave in the most non-American way. In that way they want to contradict themselves in order to create chaos. They are themselves a double-cross like cool and gloomy clowns, pretending to make people laugh but in fact making them scared. (3) Another X-prototype is the Cinderella unplugged, or what I hereafter will call just the "cinderellas". As you will see, the cinderellas and the pachucos are almost of the same kind. Like the original Cinderella the modem cinderellas are identified by means of a missing shoe but also by interrupted dancing. But where the original Cinderella was an innocent girl who lost one of her shoes by accident, the modem cinderellas are sophisticated ladies dropping their shoes on purpose in order to e(x)periment with the people trying to get too close to them: "Don't touch me! Do touch me!" That is the ambigious message they give you. They won't get plugged; well, at first sight it looks like they want to, but in fact they won't, and so will end up by cutting off the line to commitment. Here we see a very good example of coping with ambiguity, both by means of an ironic twist and an erotic one. This kind of double-twisting seems to be a very essential feature of the cinderellas and of generation X as a whole. There will be no doubt that the X in the case of Cinderella stands for se(x)uality. The cinderellas are really very unpredictable, and also very sexy. They want to dance, or do they? Who knows? They never will tell you exactly. What you have to know, however, is how to do the double-twist, that's the name of the game for both these cindies and the dandies mentioned before. They say they want to dance the lambada or salsa, but out on the floor they do the mazurka or polonaise, something totally unpredictable. Take French rock'n'rollers. They are charming, of course, and also very attractive, but the problem is that you never know how to dance with them, you do

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not even know for how long they will be on the floor. Like a flux the cinderellas may suddenly just disappear from the scene. Those are the rules of the game. That is: no rules at all. Now, this generation X, what kind of people are they? I think you cannot be too categorical in making up your mind on that very question. When I first analyzed this phenomenon, I was perplexed by the twist in it, saying that you may think of a future paradise for yourself (a me-optimism) while thinking of a hell of a future for all of us (a wepessimism). How to handle this conflict of visions and values while avoiding egoism and cynicism, I could not imagine. Now I have realized that these young people have to do the best they can and cope with this paradox in one way or another. Obviously one way will be very ironic and also by double-crossing things, ending up as paradoxical messages. The ironic twist is thus to be regarded as one of young people's most frequently used tool in order to protect the real thing from the virtual one. It is the same with the erotic twist. Together, this double twist gives you a virtual message instead of a real one. We all live in a virtual reality, generation X will say, we need it as an arena that both protects us and allows us to play games that we both want to play and do not want to play. Being in-between seems to be one way of handling it. No-one should blame them for that kind of behavior. Maybe it is the proper way of coping with complexity and virtuality. 4.

THE YO-YO GENERATION

Let me state this matter of virtuality and complexity like this: (a) how do we interpret the fact that the young generation mixes optimism for the personal future and pessimism for the general one? and (b) how do we interpret the fact that the young generation, e.g., people born in '70s, generally speaking is a more pessimistic one, and the elder generation, e.g., people born in the '40s and ' 50s, is in general a more optimistic one? Should not - by nature - the younger generation be more optimistic than the elder one, and should not - by logic - the young generation be optimistic both for their own personal future and for the general one? We should not, however, be too sure that we can resolve these questions by appeal to either nature or logic. It might be that to say it with a paradox, the future is too serious a subject to speak of seriously,

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and that young people when facing the future are simulating or coding their messages about it, in a phenomenological sense, giving them an appearance or virtuality that the analyst has to deconstruct or decode when interpreting them. Probably you have to consider here a certain kind of faking or twisting of the messages, including in them elements of satire, irony, understatements etc., in a word; of "spitting ness". I here think particularly of the kind of British sense of humour displayed in TV programs like "Spitting Image" and "Not the Nine O'clock News", produce by John Lloyd at the end of the '80s and having the former prime minister Margaret Thatcher as their political target. I also think of the spittingness of the Monty Python group, manifested so typically in the film "Life of Brian", especially in the closing scene showing Jesus crucified and the mob singing "Always Look at the Bright Side of Life". This was really a spitting image and very grim humour. I mention these examples to point to a similar tendency of spittingness in young people's images of the future. The messages communicated by them are always more or less like spitting images or fictitious provocations. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1976) calls it "eine Anziiglichkeit aus der Ferne", a provoking message from the future serving as a mirror for the present to recognize itself in. And to learn from. I have already said that the young generation could "split" the future, but they could not hit it, they could not even touch upon it. I now want to add to that row of verbs the word spit, not just because of the onomatopoeic use of language, but because of the real fact of it: it is possible to split it (the future) but not to hit it, so what you can do is to spit it (the present). I could have added a fourth one: to shit it, both the future and the present, but maybe that would have been too rough. Or maybe not? Because what I have found to be typical for the young generation and the images of the future expressed by them are exactly these words of split, spit and shit. But not hit. Instead of hitting reality they seem to make use of spitting it and shitting it, in a way of yo-yoing it. And in doing this they seem to be in good company throughout history with various so-called lost generations. For example, in Europe the young generation of the '20s was said to be a such a lost generation. What happened during World War I was more than enough. How could young people believe in a future after such an awful war started by the grown-up generation? After World War II there was the same kind of frustration and pessimism. But not only do world wars foster frustrations and disappointments, up till now this generation has

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not had any wars of the same magnitude and gravity and still we see clear tendencies of pessimism in young people in both Eastern and Western Europe. But the young generation of today is at least not lost by war, maybe it is not even lost by anything. Maybe they are just rebels without a cause. They are what is called a yo-yo generation, swinging from one point to another, an esoteric and very adaptive, not to say opportunistic group of young people moving quite freely and independently. They are like yo-yos going up and down, twisting and spinning, self-controlling. This should not be misunderstood as saying they are some kind of marionettes in the hands of someone outside themselves. On the contrary, the yo-yo generation is self-regulating, making a virtue out of an authentic way of life, but also being quite conscious of the fact that the freedom they try to execute is a tricky one. They are out for handling various small-scale projects, yo-yoing the near future, not being too serious about the long-term future. Tricky freedom ... , the scent of it has been followed to its most extreme by Janis Joplin when in 1970, the same year that she died, she sang about "Me and Bobby McGee" on the LP "Pearl". Here I want to quote just one line: "Freedom is just another word for nothing left to lose". It is hard to think of anything more opposite to the lines of "Que sera, sera". Doris Day and Janis Joplin stand as two very significant representatives of quite different outlooks on life, the first one telling a very optimistic story, the second one a very pessimistic one, belonging to the lost generation and the people who really shit the future. This kind of shitting pessimism is not significant only for the generation X, it is significant for the generation Y as well, i.e., for those people between 10 and 20; at least this is the fact when considering youth studies conducted in Sweden. Most of these people are to be identified as pessimists of the C type in the schema given earlier. But this seems also to be the fact with the American generation Y. In September 1995, the Carnegie Foundation presented an alarm-report showing that a high number of young American people in the age of 10 to 14 were running a big risk of being overtaken by an accelerating use of drugs and being involved in criminality. If parents will not spend more time together with their children and take greater responsibility for them, this generation will be another lost generation, the report concluded. Taking this as an example of the shitting pessimism of generation Y and X, I now want to turn back to the generation X specifically and to the yo-yo phenomenon, more exactly the yo-yo optimism. One can see

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this phenomenon as a shifting between the attitude that places one in cells A and D, being now an optimist of type A and now one of type D. Now, it is a rather personal interpretation and generalization of an attitude originally described and elaborated among others by the Portuguese youth researcher Jose Machado Pais (1995) who has studied the living conditions and lifestyles of young people living in the periphery of the European Community, in this particular case in Portugal. He found these people to be marginalized, both by age and by influence, but also characterized in a way by actively yo-yoing the future as a way of coping with it: To swing back and forth - like a yo-yo - is characteristic of current young lifestyles, subject as they are to an ethic of experimentation (at work, in love, etc.). This ethic is founded on a modern hedonism whose essential features are omnivorous consumerism, feeding desires to experiment everything, a multiple identity, leading to a diffuse self, in which desire constantly wavers, and sensibilities mutate from day to day. [... J Under this hedonistic ethic, reality (topia) exists principally to feed dreams (utopia), not so much with the good it yields, but mainly with the bad, because this dictates that illusions be redrawn. This utopification of reality, the swing between a material yo and a mental yo, is another characteristic of the "yo-yo generation" (pp. 206f).

This swing is just another way of twisting the image of the future, of ironically treating reality, of experimenting with ambiguity. For example combining optimism (one yo) and pessimism (another yo) seems to be one way of coping with reality without resigning oneself to a sheer utopification of it. I now would like do make some further comments on these specific mental and material "yos". It is very easy to identify optimism and pessimism in terms of material, i.e., economical values only, and also to consider only short-term optimism and pessimism instead of long-term anticipations. This is the instant part of it. Different from this is the constant part of it. As an example of the instant feature of pessimism, being more local and shortterm by nature, I will give you some headlines in an article in the Los Angeles Times from September 19, 1995. In Section D (Business) of the paper one could read: "Consumers Downbeat about State's Future.lTimes Poll Finds Californians Increasingly Pessimistic about Recovery. Sentiment Could Chill Christmas Spending." On a question put like this: "Three months from now, do you expect California's economy will be better than now, worse than now or about the same as now?" 59% of the respondents answered "same", 21 % "worse" and 18% "better". This is a good example of yo-yoing the near future. Despite

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the small differences in numbers between worse and better, as you can see in this statistical survey, percentages are an often-used index of material pessimism (or optimism), but also, as will be shown later on, not the only one and absolutely not the most instructive one, because beside this materialistic index you have to have a mental one; not an index of course but an image, and a more constant image than that one, taking into consideration more mental constituents of the future, the mental yos. Now, these mental yos may be of an instant kind as well, and as a brilliant example of such a yo-yoing of the very near future, I will give you the point of a short story on instant pessimism told by one of the most famous Swedish poets of the end of the last century: Gustav Froding. The title of the story is "The Pessimist". The story is about a man walking in a park and feeling sick of the burning sun, trying in vain to find a place to sit and rest in the shade. The only place left to him is a bench in the middle of the sun, and placing himself there he gets into a miserable mood concerning life and its meaning, and so begins complaining about all there is around him. However, after some hours the sun has gone and he finds himself sitting in the shade. He is now feeling more comfortable and in quite another mood, enjoying life and the people around him. So, in just a few hours there has been a shift in mood from pessimism to optimism. 5.

THE END OF TRANSITION?

By looking at these two examples, what you have to consider when speaking of images of the future are instant streaks of optimism and pessimism depending on shifts in sentiment or mood. This is in fact very true but nevertheless rather uninteresting. More interesting are the constant beliefs that are inherited in them for a longer period of time. And concerning that constancy of images of the future, you may find that the young generation is far more interested in its mental aspects than its material ones. In a big-scale survey carried out by the Swedish Institute for Futures Studies (see Andersson et al., 1993) the results indicated a shift in values from more materialistic ones (earlier) to more mental (post-materialistic) ones (now). The most optimistic visions concerning the personal future were about health, education and social relations, not as much about job-careers and money-making. Of course, speaking about generational issues, it is the constant features that remain the focus of our interest, not the instant ones. But the generation X and the

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yo-yo generation are characterized by certain such constant features, otherwise we could not speak of them as generations. As you already may have noticed, the difference between the yo-yo generation and the generation X is not too great. They seem to belong to some kind of post-modem phenomena of the '90s, and also to the same kind of sub-culture. But it is not only a phenomenon of modernity, or post-modernity; very typical for the '90s, it is also a phenomenon of eternity. Thus, it might be that the young generation always has been like rebels without a cause or what we could call notorious pessimists and maybe the grown-up generation always has been what we could call rhetorical optimists. As you well know, already Socrates spoke of the young generation as a lost generation, one of notorious critics, he also spoke of the grown-up people, especially the sophists, as rhetorical lunatics. (See, for example, the Phaedrus dialogue.) Because of the fact that the young are due to take over from the old Phaedrus, it is perhaps quite in order to mourn a little about the lousy things that are left to them, whereas the elder generation thinks they are leaving a set table to the young ones which they just have to sit down at. Maybe this will explain why the pessimism of the young ones is a notorious one, and also an ironic one. But how is the optimism of the elders to be interpreted? As a rhetorical one, and likewisely as ironic? To me, the answer here is yes. The rhetorical optimism might be interpreted as a mechanism of defence and also as an instrument of power, in both cases psychological phenomena working to maintain a kind of justification of the future's being more good than bad. In both cases optimism and pessimism work with an ironical twist and as endpoints of a swinging yo-yo. In people born in the ' 40s and '50s, i.e. the grown-up generation, I have found apodictic evidence for what I here call rhetorical optimism. (See, e.g., Bjurvill, 1993.) These people very often talk as parents and stress their genetic duty to give their children optimism even if they in their heart do not believe in it. This talk is just a confession of lips and not authentic talk. It is rhetoric. The same can be said of the pedagogical optimists communicating the classic message from Plato that knowledge determines actions, so-called educational determinism. Teachers, like anyone else, have to believe in what they are doing, but when they say that if you learn the right thing, they talk against better knowing, because they know very well that this platonic sentence is not correct. Many times you have to act against your knowledge, this is quite clear. Therefore, the talk of the pedagogues is rhetoric also.

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Not even political optimists will go free from critics. Political talk is per definition always optimistic, otherwise politicians would not get many votes, and an electioneering campaign is an almost super-optimistic affair. But broken political promises and suspicious projects are undermining political credibility and authenticity, and political power always tends to overrule political will. Around the comer hides the striving for power, and political will is put aside until it is time for the next election. In that way also political optimism turns out to be just rhetoric. As a fourth example of this rhetoric, that of the psychotherapists, for lack of a better name, could be given. I then think of the positive-thinking promoted by various optimism consultants selling an optimistic message to those who want to pay for it. In the society of today, both the European and also the American, this promotion of optimism seems to be an accelerating big business. Optimism for sale! Be happy, don't worry! Those people selling this message are mainly psychologists but also educationists travelling around the country giving their lectures on positive thinking. And you get it if you pay for it, that's the point. You may also get it just by calling a certain telephone number, then you will get half a minute of optimism for five dollars, and a minute for ten. This kind of psychotherapy or pornography, or whatever else you may call it, is really very sick, but nevertheless there seems to be an extended social and psychological need for it. Now, what has this grown-up rhetorical optimism really to do with the notorious pessimism of young people? Well, those groups of opinionmakers that have the most influence in shaping images of the future are those four P-groups mentioned above, viz. parents, pedagogues, politicians and psychotherapists (maybe also priests, and why not philosophers and peers as well). And if these groups fail in authenticity and the young generation no longer believes in them and their rhetorical talk, then this may result in pessimism of a notorious type and display itself as an ironic twist. If grown-up communication fails to be true, there will be a break in transition from one generation to another, not to say an end of it, and that will, of course, mean a great problem regarding both the socialization and education of the young generation. Are there any alternatives to this break in transition? No, really no. We cannot expect the young generation to be me-pessimists just because they are we-pessimists. Nobody would gain from that. Neither can we expect the grown-up generation to be we-pessimists just because they are me-pessimists, many of them. None would gain from that. What it is

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all about, is perhaps a matter of psychological defence both for the parents, pedagogues, politicians and psychotherapists, one for getting through, of keeping going and smiling. And no one could really blame them for that. Positive talk is their job. The problems will arise first when these groups lose credibility and authenticity; when the talking and the thinking do not correspond, then they are no longer true to themselves, but let ultimate goals sanction dirty means, and then we all know what is going to happen, i.e., they have to break all the rules and start playing a dirty game at very high costs. And also when the saying and the doing do not correspond to each other in a reasonable way, then inevitably the young generation will see through this inauthentic transitive game, and start the ironic twist all over again. So in the end, the ironic twist will show itself to be an ambiguous, and also proper, response to ambiguous signals. The signals of the rhetorical optimism of adult people, a kind of hypocrisy, as it were, are met with the ironic twist by young people, responding by yo-yoing optimism and pessimism in the most idiosyncratic way. This idiosyncrasy will display itself as a kind of coping with a virtual reality much the same as the grown-up generation's attempts at dealing with it. We are all involved in the games of virtual reality, because it gives us protection and allows us to use a medium to communicate our most intimate thoughts and feelings, our wishes and guesses for the future, for example - an area of the life-world that otherwise probably would have been closed to other people. Analyzing images of the future is to reveal the idiosyncratic elements in them. Describing them is exposing their essential features, giving them principles and examples, i.e., reducing the idosyncrasy. This is what I have tried to do so far in my essay when displaying the ironic constituents in images of the future. I could have stopped there but my reason for not doing so is to ponder the social and educational implications of the dominating pessimism in young people's images of the future. This pessimism and sense of powerlessness is, of course, not acceptable to a society bearing democratic and humanistic values. Certainly, the grownup generation has a natural responsibility to frame some kind of positive response to the pessimism of the young ones, to contribute to the socialization of young people into a future they will believe in, both for their own sake and also for the sake of others. But can they, and will they contribute to this effort? Those P-groups I have spoken of earlier, do they have the will to commit to such an educational program? I will not try

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to answer that question here; let me just raise it and add that in order to carry out this effort you have to take into consideration the whole range of the area of philosophy of education, including both epistemology, the theory of learning and understanding, social behavior, values clarifications etc., etc. What you would need in the schools of today is therefore a program for "preparedness for the future" furthering certain ends and means of both intellectual and moral significance. In such a program the elaboration of young people's visions and values of the future should have a very important role to play. This is not the place for a more detailed description of such a program. Let it be enough to say, that although the pedagogues sometimes hesitate over educational determinism, i.e., optimism, they have no real alternative but to believe in the progress of knowledge as a kind of lifelong learning, although they see many times that knowing does not determine acting, at least not in a unilateral way. This counts especially for moral knowledge, but sometimes also for intellectual information. Still, they have to believe in educational optimism and determinism, at least as an "as-if" phenomenon, i.e., a moral obligation of acting as if things could work out. Halmstad University Sweden REFERENCES Andersson, A., Furth, T. and Holmberg, I. (1993). 70·talisler. Om viirderingar jorr, nu och i framtiden. [People born in the '70s. On past, contemporary and future values.] Stockholm: Natur och Kultur (in Swedish). Bjurvill, C. (1992). "Black and White: Split Visions of the Future among Swedish Teenagers and Adults". Reprints and Miniprints (Malmo, Sweden: School of Education), No. 742. Bjurvill, C. (1993). "Images of the Future: Optimism and Pessimism in Various Swedish Age Groups. A Methodological Study". Reprints and Miniprints (Malmo, Sweden: School of Education), No. 766. Bjurvill, C. (1995). "Banana Split. Some Notes on Visions and Values of the Future". Reprints and Miniprints (Malmo, Sweden: School of Education), No. 793. Coupland, D. (1991). Generation X: Tales jor an Accelerated Culture (New York: St. Martin's Press). FrMing, G. (1995). "Pessimisten". In: Klipp av Hans Sax ["The Pessimist." In: Excerpts by Hans Sax] (Stockholm: Wahlstrom & Widstrand), pp. 73-711 (in Swedish). Gadamer, H-G. (1976). Vernunji im Zeitalter der Wissenschaji [Rationality in the Century of Science] (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp) (in Gennan). Heidegger, M. (1978). Being and Time (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).

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Husserl, E. (1950/1913). Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie (1) [Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology Vol. I] (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff) (Husserliana 3) (in German). Husserl, E. (1966/1893-1917). Zur Phiinomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstsein [The Phenomenology of Internal Time-consciousness] (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, Husserliana 5) (in German). Lee, P. and Lee, D. (1995). "Consumers Downbeat about the State's Future", Los Angeles Times, September 15, Section D. Pais, I. M. (1995). "Growing Up on the EC Periphery: Portugal", in: L. Chisholm, P. Buchner, H-H. Kruger and M. du Bois-Reymond (eds.), Growing Up in Europe (Berlin/New York: W. de Gruyter), pp. 195-208. Polak, F. (1973). The Image of the Future (Amsterdam: Elsevier). Sartre, l.-P. (1981). Being and Nothingness (London: Methuen). Schutz, A. and Luckmann, T. (1974). The Structure of the Life-world (London: Heinemann).

R. TELTCHAROVA-KOURENKOVA, E. PLEKHANOV AND S. SIS OVA

LA PHENOMENOLOGIE DE LA FORMATION

Les Aspects du Problerne

Depuis que l' auto-institution et l' auto-realisation de 1'individu dans les activites civiles, morales, et juridiques ont pris Ie rang des valeurs fondamentales pour les Europeens, les voix critiques adressees au systeme de la formation, a ses methodes, a ses objectifs et a ses resultats se font entendre. Aujourd'hui l'opinion est tres repandue qu'on se trouve en presence d'une crise profonde de la formation, qui est incapable d'accomplir les taches qU'elle s'est donnees, a l'Occident comme en Eurasie. Les rHormes dans Ie domaine de la formation qu' on entreprend dans nos pays a la recherche d'une reponse adequate aux exigences de l'avenir, ont pris un caractere permanent, ce qui peut etre interprete comme une preuve indirecte d'etre accule a l'impasse. II est evident que ni Ie progres apparemment impressionnant des technologies pedagogiques s' appuyant aux donnees de l'anthropologie biologique recentes, ni I'equipement des classes de techniques audio-visuelles et d'ordinateurs, n'ont donne de resultats radicalement nouveaux. Des tentatives persistantes visant a realiser des approches et des principes non-traditionnels dans la formation, des orientations a un enseignement "innove", "developpant", "critique", "actif" etc., ne sont pas non plus susceptibles de modifier Ia situation en general, si on ne Ies considere pas dans Ie contexte d'une analyse phenomenologique concernant les origines culturelles et historiques de la decadence de la formation modeme. Dans la philosophie europeenne, Ie merite du diagnostic de la crise de la civilisation occidentale appartient a des penseurs se ressemblant peu, tels que Nietzsche, Spengler, et Jaspers. Mais c'est seulement Husserl qui a developpe ce probleme conformement aI' ordre methodique de la reflex ion phenomenologique, ayant montre que Ie monde europeen, ne, historiquement, de l' idee de "1' objectif infini de la raison" vit sa crise spirituelle comme une crise du rationalisme tombe en "naturalisme" et "objectivisme". L'ensemble de problemes phenomenologiques de la formation, n'ayant pas trouve sa concretisation the mati que dans les oeuvres de Husserl lui-meme, peut etre pourtant explicite et developpe conformement a ses idees, sous plusieurs aspects. Le present materiel est une tentative 281 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 281-288. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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d'interpreter d'une fa~on etoffee les aspects possibles de la phenomenologie de la formation. Avant tout, la phenomenologie de la formation peut etre consideree comme une transformation spirituelle et culturelle de l'Europe, dans la structure de laquelle les symboles philosophiques de l'image et de la lumiere jouent Ie role des coordonnees-clefs de sens. Si on presente la formation, ou plutot l'instruction, comme une forme particuliere de la rationalite, constituant un type de spiritualite europeenne, on doit reconnaitre que c'est Socrate qui etait Ie premier a soumettre la tache gnoseologique de la connaissance de soi aux enjeux de la philosophie pratique, orientee a l'ideal de l'homme rationnel. Le rationalisme ethique du penseur d' Athenes, reunissant necessairement Ie savoir objectif et Ie bien moral, est devenu la tradition du Siecle des lumieres en Europe, une tradition qui a connu des essors triomphaux et des chutes siderantes mais qui a toujours ete fidelement suivie. Dans l'eidetique de Platon et des neoplatoniciens, dans la doctrine d' Aristote sur la forme, dans l' idee chretienne de l'image de Dieu, dans l'imperatif moral kantien et dans l'Esprit absolu hegelien, l'interpretation de la formation comme d'une determination interieure, a laquelle l'homme aspire et qui est transcendante a sa nature physique exterieure, a trouve 1'expression la plus impressionnante. Dans la semantique des langues europeennes, Ie terme "formation" a acquis une stable signification portant sur Ie surgissement des formes culturelles opposees aI' amorphie naturelle. Pourtant Ie destin historique de la partie europeenne de l'humanite s'est lie directement aux valeurs du rationalisme des xvne_XVIII" siecles qui avait concretise et en meme temps retreci Ie sens de la formation. Dans la mentalite occidentale, la formation s'associe depuis lors a la raison, d'un cote, en tant que l'origine essentielle de l'homme, et de l' autre cote aI' education et a la civilisation en tant que mesures normatives des valeurs, propres a un nouveau type culturel europeen et Ie distinguant des autres cultures. La philosophie classique, qui voyait la difference entre un savant et un ignorant uniquement dans Ie niveau de la perfection de la raison, et qui reconnaissait la raison comme la marque gene rique de l'homme, ne l'identifiait pourtant pas a l'instruction. La raison est la possibilite de l'individu de devenir homme, tandis que l'instruction est une qualite de l'homme proprement dit. De plus, "hom me instruit" et "Europeen" sont synonymes. Ainsi, dans les doctrines du contract social et de l'utilitarisme ethique des xvne-XVnI e siecles,

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l'instruction est presentee comme un des fondements d'une societe civilisee et d'un homme civilise. L'education d'un homme occidental, c'est l'instruction envisagee sous l'aspect d'un interet personnel correctement compris, coincidant miraculeusement avec I' interet commun. Ce n' est pas par hasard que Ie Siecle des lumieres a ete nomme Ie Siecle de I' egolsme raisonnable. Dans la conscience europeenne classique, I' instruction et I' education sont des marques constitutives de I 'homme occidental et de l'Europe, considerees comme une donnee culturelle civilisee. L' analyse phenomenologique des concepts "homme instruit" et "societe instruite", formes dans la conscience europeenne, nous introduit dans Ie domaine des problemes culturologiques, tres importants pour nous montrer Ie role et la place historiques de l'Europe dans Ie monde culturel contemporain. Aujourd'hui, d'apres Husserl, nous sommes contraints a constater qu'a l'age du postclassicisme, la valeur de l'image spirituelle de l'Europe, ainsi que du canon rationaliste dans l'instruction, s'avere problematique. Si l'homme des xVne-XVIII e siecles pensait vivre dans un monde raisonnable et par consequent, anthropomorphe, I'homme modeme revele la resistance et l'independance des choses. Le monde ne peut pas etre entierement reduit aux constructions de la raison; les choses ont leur propre langue dont Ie sens n'est pas concevable une fois pour toutes. Le reel ne peut plus etre reduit au rationnel. C' est pourquoi l'instruction n'est plus un garant de l'unite de l'homme et du monde; une lacune toujours croissante entre ces deux nous pousse a la recherche des fondements plus profonds de l'etre humain dans Ie cadre de la phenomenologie. En tenant compte de la critique approfondie de la raison entreprise par la philosophie transcendentale contemporaine, nous partageons I' opinion de A-T. Tymieniecka sur la necessite d'elucider la nature et Ie role de la raison dans l'ordre universel de la vie. La nouvelle phenomenologie fondamentale peut devenir une phenomenologie de la vie en contournant Ie rationalisme exclusif et se toumant vers Ie Logos de la vie, puisant en celui-ci les origines des sens esthetiques, poetiques, moraux et intelligibles, et communiquant ainsi la plenitude a l'etat humain (human condition). Dans Ie contexte precite, Ie sens ne peut plus etre identifie a la verite, ni l'instruction a la rationalite, selon leur interpretation classique. Le premier pas que doit faire I 'homme instruit contemporain c' est de se refuser a !'identification a soi des choses; ce pas communi-

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querait un nouveau sens a l'appel husserlien "en arriere aux choses elles-memes", et permettrait d' engager un dialogue avec I 'univers et de restituer la realite dans toute la diversite de ses perspectives. La nouvelle formation suppose que Ie savoir-faire de dialoguer avec Ie monde permettra a l'homme d'elargir les horizons de l'intersubjectivite, ce qui est necessaire dans la situation de l'eloignement ecologique et culturel. La signification la plus connue de la formation entend I' activite pedagogique de la societe de creer un systeme institutionnel d'enseignement et d'education. L'histoire de la pen see pedagogique europeenne est integralement liee a l'histoire de l'ecole. Envisagees du point de vue des attitudes phenomenologiques, celles-ci peuvent reveler la logique et Ie sens intrinseques des transformations de la formation depuis que son destin s'est trouve lie a l'approche scientifique de l'etude de l'homme et de I 'univers. Si la naissance d'un nouveau type de rationalite europeenne sci entifique remonte, selon Husserl, a Galilee, alors c' est Comenius, dont La Grande Didactique sert de modele de compte rendu des principes philosophiques d' objectivisme et d' empirisme dans I' education et I' enseignement, qui est Ie pere de la pedagogie scientifique de fait et de droit. Son systeme de formation, cree conformement aux exigences de la methode induction experimentale de Bacon, determine que la tache de I' ecole est un "perfectionnement des actes humains", conformement aux pures et necessaires theses de la raison. Le fondateur de la phenomenologie transcendentale n' a pas reussi a realiser I' idee de faire valoir Ie role de I' education occidentale dans le destin historique de la culture europeenne. 11 y a pourtant dans la litterature philosophique un ouvrage, unique en son genre, qui a anticipe Ie diagnostic phenomenologo-intentionnel de la crise de la formation. 11 s'agit du livre de V. Rosanov, Les Crepuscu/es des lumieres, qui a vu Ie jour en 1899. Rosanov a cree, conformement aux traditions du transcendantalisme chretien, un tableau precis de la vie decadente de l'esprit europeen de la fin du XIXe siecle. Se rejoignant a l'idee de Husserl, qui voyait dans cette fatigue de l'esprit une grande menace pour l'Europe, Rosanov parle de l'absence de fondement spirituel qui entraine l'indifference aux valeurs et aux ideaux du passe, et fait naitre une vision du monde pessimiste et froide envers la valeur sacrale du ciel et de la terre. Le feu de Prome-

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thee s' est eteint. L'indifference et l'impuissance interieures qui frappent Ie monde europeen au moment ou il se trouve devant des dangers historiquement sans precedent, engagent la raison a expliquer les causes de la condition actuelle de I' education. Telos et Ie concept intrinseque de la culture europeenne, ainsi que de la culture rosse, se constituaient sous Ie signe du rationalisme. L'idee de la suffisance de la raison a soi-meme etait tres repandue dans la nouvelle philosophie europeenne, au moins jusqu' au moment ou Kant, opposant la raison theorique a la raison pratique, en a indique I' erreur fatale. De toute fac;on, depuis Rousseau, Ie rationalisme dans la formation porte les traits distinctifs de I'alchimie pedagogique. Comme Paracelse, qui faisait des recherches pour creer un etre artificiel dans un matras, Rousseau, plonge dans son imagination, isole des hommes vivants, a cree Ie personnage d'Emile, ce veritable Homunculus de la nouvelle Europe. L'idee d'un citoyen nouveau, cette fiction qui pourrait conclure un contract social pour Ie reveur de Geneve et habiter sa republique hors des traditions de son peuple, hors d'un mouvement historique integral, est devenu Ie but des efforts persistants de la formation scolaire. Contrairement a l'intention de Rousseau, Ie principe de conformite a la nature dans l'education, contient une orientation peu naturelle, affectee, qui coupe Ie lien organique entre l'homme qui se forme et Ie monde de la vie, l'experience intentionnelle de l'intersubjectivite culturelle et historique. D'une fac;on definitive, Rosanov fixe son attention sur la fracture des fondements et du sens de l'education religieuse et rationaliste. Si la formation chretienne, qui part de I 'Eglise et de la famille, a pour origines la foi, la chastete et l'amour, et trouve Ie chemin vers l'ame d'un individu, restituant l'image integrale de l'homme, la nouvelle formation europeenne se trouve artificielle et pleine de raisonnements dessechants qui augmentent a mesure qu'elle se lie plus etroitement a l'Etat. Suivant la voie indiquee par Rousseau, on peut considerer comme un pas logique la transformation de l'ecole en une institution administrative a la suite du passage de la formation geree par l'Etat. Hegel a raison d'attribuer a Rousseau Ie merite de l'elevation de la pen see pure et de la volonte au rang des principes de I 'Etat, la, OU il correspond a sa notion. La nouvelle ecole a exclu Ie principe de I'individualite de la formation, principe qui est sa supreme et sa profonde determination et qui a eprouve Ie manque de culture a l'Occident comme en Russie. La formation, pour redevenir la formation d'un homme cultive, doit retrouver sous sa tutelle des institutions ideales, qui conservent I' absolu

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et l'inconditionne. L'Etat ou l'absolu et l'universel ne sont qu'une convention se voit incapable de creer un ideal significatif sur Ie plan personnel, de donner it la formation un sens interieur. Les institutions ideales de l'education telles que la famille, l'Eglise et l'Universite, dont les ideaux sont si divergents, rendent de la spiritualite aux expressions du visage humain, sans pourtant les faire fondre. Dans la nouvelle culture europeenne, puisant aux trois grandes sources: I' Antiquite, Ie Christianisme et les Lumieres, se sont formes naturellement les types de formation classique, religieux et reel, qui contiennent, chacun it sa maniere, un ideal integral et eleve. Chaque ecole peut atteindre son but educatif - la conservation et Ie developpement de l'individualite dans la personne, si elle se fonde sur un amour pour I' ideal et la comprehension du sens et de la valeur de la culture, it laquelle est lie Ie type de formation choisi par l'individu. Les realites de l'epoque postmodeme ont depasse les projets les plus audacieux des penseurs du XIX e siecle, ce qui a exige des corrections de la structure de la mentalite occidentale. Le xxe siecle s'est manifeste comme un siecle de l'homme de masse, et du totalitarisme politique. Les etudes modemes de la societe des masses entamees par J. Ortega y Gasset dans son ouvrage La Revolte des masses (La rebelion de las masas) permettent de comprendre plus profondement Ie destin de la culture rationnelle europeenne et, en meme temps, du type de formation occidental. Non seulement l'ecole n'a pas su eduquer les masses, mais I'homme des masses, qui a pu acceder it la formation, y a apporte son propre esprit, l'esprit des etudes non-obligatoires, des connaissances superficielles et eclectiques, de l'instruction formelle. La formation des masses et de l'homme des masses propose un sujet riche mais peu etudie dans la sociologie phenomenologique; l'analyse des formes quasiculturelles de la formation presente encore plus d'interet, et se trouve en rapport avec la mythologisation ideologique de la conscience dans les conditions d 'un totalitarisme politique. Un autre aspect de la phenomenologie de la formation se presente si on I'envisage comme une condition de la subjectivite individuelle orientee vers I' enseignement, et independante des formes exterieures de sa realisation. Traditionnellement la pedagogie tendait it s'appuyer sur la psychologie, se declarant, non sans raison, psychologie appliquee, pratique, du domaine de l'enseignement et de I'education. Dans ce sens, la critique husserlienne de la psychologie empirique conceme egalement la didactique scientifique. L'idee d 'une psychologie purement

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phenomenologique, comme produit de cette critique, pourrait etre utili see de fa~on efficace pour construire une pedagogie phenomenologique. L'eidetique de la formation se manifeste comme une des formes de l'experience phenomenologique qui revele l'invariant de la structure de la subjectivite individuelle orientee a acquerir et a assimiler des savoirs, des valeurs, des actions pratiques. La concentration de l'ego dans Ie cogito est une elaboration des taches de la formation. Le foyer de la formation a trouve sur Ie plan des interets vitaux et des besoins significatifs de l'individu. C'est pourquoi la phenomenologie cognitive de la formation doit expliciter la condition du moi-centre (qui con~oit Ie monde conformement aux objectifs de l'enseignement de l'ego), constituant d'une fa~on synthetique sur la base des modes intentionnels universels tels que la perception, Ie souvenir, la pen see imagee et logique, l'imagination et d'autres, une education-cogito (conscience orientee vers l'education). A notre avis, une description integrale des contenus des "education-noematique" et "education-noetique" de l'intentionnalite de I' education est necessaire et possible. Puisque la formation en tant que processus intentionnel se realise par un moi-sujet dans les horizons des autres moi, son analyse purement egologique s'avere insuffisante. Proprement dit, la formation est l'introduction du moi dans Ie monde potentiellement infini du savoir et des valeurs personnifies. Le degre de la realite des autres moi, conditionnee par leur thematisation sur Ie plan de l'intersubjectivite, peut etre tres different, mais une orientation vers un dialogue est toujours necessaire dans la formation pour conserver la continuite phenomenologique, qui lie notre subjectivite a l' experience historio-culturelle. La phenomenologie intersubjective de la formation prendra du fond si elle interprete I' enseignement et I' education comme un processus de relations entre sujets, comme une formation de la subjectivite humaine dans une communaute spirituelle. La phenomenologie intersubjective de la formation a assez d'experience dans l'argumentation methodologique et pratique pour realiser ses propres principes, afin de se declarer comme telle. Nous pensons aux etudes magnifiques de l'ecole americaine de psychologie (A. W. Combs, C. R. Rogers, A. N. Maslow, et d'autres) et surtout aux ouvrages de R. B. Burns qui ont effectue un apport precieux au devenir du mouvement humanitaire dans la formation en Russie; ce mouvement est connu sous Ie nom de "pedagogie de la collaboration".

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La methodologie phenomenologique permet de surmonter les contradictions de deux approches. Ainsi la phenomenologie nous apprend a vivre des eidos, a sentir des idees, a saisir des evidences de I' essentiel. La reflex ion de la conscience creatrice individuelle se realise ici, conformement au savoir normatif et universel. A notre avis, "1'ensembIe des instruments phenomenologiques" porte en lui l'idee d'une union methodologique des analyses sensuelle et substantielle. En partant des evidences premieres du monde de la vie et de la subjectivite pure, I' orientation phenomenologique aide Ie pedagogue a voir Ie fonctionnement reel de la conscience. En etudiant I' experience unique et incomparable de chaque conscience, la phenomenologie s'approche de pres de l'analyse de la vie spirituelle a travers les evidences du savoir essentiel. Si Ie processus traditionnel de la formation a affaire uniquement avec Ie savoir tout fait, les methodes phenomenologiques permettent de developper Ie resultat par un processus qui saisit la dialectique de l'universel, du particulier et du singulier. A l'enthousiasme, au devouement et aux emotions du professeur qui anime Ie materiel educatif, la phenomenologie ajoute la possibilite de vivre les notions, c'est-a-dire, de faire surgir leur subjectivite. C'est la phenomenalite qui contribue a l'initiation aux divers processus de la naissance du savoir, aux differentes formes de son expression et de son existence. Ainsi la phenomenologie de la formation ouvre la voie vers la culture, qui doit etre presente dans Ie savoir, et donne a la formation une essence culturelle. Conformement a cette these, l'humanisation du savoir s'unit avec la phenomenologie du contenu et des methodes de la formation. L'assimilation des savoirs ne se reduit pas, dans ce cas-ci, a la memorisation mechanique. Le pedagogue-phenomenologue anime dans les informations qu'il transmet, l'intersubjectivite culturelle et historique. Dne pareille transformation du processus d'enseignement est capable de developper chez les eleves la reflexion et Ie savoir capables d' apprecier I' element spirituel de la multiplicite des phenomenes culturels.

Le Centre russe de phenomenologie et de l'education Vladimir

PART FOUR

MISSING AND RETRIEVING THE SPONTANEOUS PARTICIPATION WITH THE OTHER WITHIN THE CULTURAL NETWORK OF LIFE

EVA SYRISTOV A

THE ONE AND THE MANY IN THE SCHIZOPHRENIC LIFE-WORLD

The "Zenonian Syndrome" This contribution concentrates on the analysis of the so-called Zenonian syndrome, which the author considers as one of the essential specific features of schizophrenic thought, self-reflexion, the solution of problem situations and social experience. She bases her work upon longitudinal analyses of schizophrenic cases that were conducted during psychotherapy as well as upon the results of formally logical and experimental studies. The term the "Zenonian syndrome" has been chosen by the author (first in her monograph: [The Possibilities and Limitations of Psychotherapy of Schizophrenic Diseases], Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague: 1965) after Zeno's well-known logical paradox "of dichotomy" which says that there can be no true motion in as much as reaching the end of a course first involves covering an infinite number of halves of the course. The schizophrenic is not capable of setting a limit in the processes of thought, decision-making and action. He cannot arrive at a definite conclusion because prior to arriving at one there are a vast number of other conclusions. In fact, the schizophrenic moves in the region of "multiple value logic". The possibility of forming compact relevant structures (or conclusions) to cope with the infinite number of random variations that impede any motion forward is here minimalized. The schizophrenic is unable to find a limit and a structure in the semantic field. The overlapping of various systems, the diffusion of their dimensions and, thus, in fact, their logical destruction goes on with scarcely a break. The schizophrenic cannot solve a task, not because he is incapable of the generalizing process, but because he cannot determine the structure and the limits of such a task. This description of the Zenonian syndrome has an affinity with the analyses of Matte-Blanco and Kasanin, which show the schizophrenic to regard all possibilities as being simultaneous and relations as being symmetric - which makes the solving of a problem impossible. The Zenonian syndrome expresses the enmeshment of the schizophrenic in semantic and pragmatic paradoxes which prevent him from making any sort of choice. At the same time, the 291 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 291-293. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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syndrome expresses typical changes in the time structure of his cognitive and emotional processes, their time contraction, disruption, with temporary hypertrophy (condensation) and with at the same time confusion, collapse, and finally the atrophy of time horizons followed by the impossibility of any project. There is no distance, no discourse, no future. There is the territory of silence. From the perspective of our Zenonian syndrome diagnosis, schizophrenia appears to be the extreme culmination of a disintegration occurring between a set of random variations and the structural components not only of the cognitive processes, but also of the whole Life-World of the patients. On the other hand, it must be stressed that this same "Zenonian syndrome" has not only pathological, but also positive features when compared with our habitual cognition, which is mostly of a reproductive nature and which is regulated by ready-made rules without much creative invention. The Zenon ian syndrome involves an entanglement of all of the conventionally known and learned. It is a collision with a limit, yet, and the same time, a radical transcendence of all limits, the invasion of endless possibilities, which in schizophrenia remain shapeless, or are "crystallized" into pathological or original neologisms in the course of psychosis. The disintegration of all our necessarily consistent and partial views in schizophrenia is accompanied by an immense tension and a tendency to shape amorphous materials into original ellipses of the conventionally recognized limited life horizons. It is one of the essential tasks of psychotherapy to make use of the moment of creative invention, present especially in incipient schizophrenic psychosis, to bring this invention to the level of consciousness and to help the patient find his way from the set of random variants yielding hypertrophic possibilities and amorphous "discoveries" to structured, even if temporarily so, and dynamic meaningful wholes that yet preserve the originality of the stirring that makes something new possible.

Charles University Prague

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REFERENCES A list of the author's publications exploring the concerns of this article. (English translations of the titles.) 1. The Possibilities and Limitations of the Psychotherapy of Schizophrenic Diseases (Prague: Czech Academy of Sciences, 1965). 2. The Imaginary World (Prague: Mlada franta, 1973). 3. Normality of the Personality (Prague: Avicenum, 1973). 4. The Zenonian Syndrome (Prague: Czech Psychology, 1976). 5. "Psychosis and Artistic Inspiration" in L' Eidos de l' art (Krakow, 1985). 6. The Cracked Time (Martin: Osveta, 1988). 7. Man in Crisis (Prague: Karolinum, 1994). 8. The Poem as a Home in the Homeless of Paul Celan (Prague: Association of the White Raven, 1994).

BRUNO CALLIER I

PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS

A Point of View Investigating the psychopathological aspects of interpersonal communication implies the widespread phenomenological study of loneliness, as it is quite paradigmatically manifested in those existential modalities defined as "schizophrenic". Granted that, as a psychopathologist, I tend to attribute it meaning pertaining to whatever world the patient lives in, considering its irreducible unique singularity. I try to understand both the objective mental state and the meaningful structure of situations, events, encounters and feelings experienced in his historical becoming, his inner life history (die innere Lebensgeschichte, by Ludwig Binswanger). Moreover, I take into account the values and projects of which the patient is aware and toward which he is oriented. Those that inspire and often condition his actions, decisions, achievements are considered; in other words the world in which he exists, his Lebenswelt, or rather his becoming wordly (the Verveweltlichung of the acute description still valid today given by Jurg Zutt over forty years ago). In reality, man is not merely a someone having certain features (whatever they are), but he is, ex toto genere suo, the birthplace of the conditions of his being-in-the-world and being-the-world,l his being wordly (since his birth), the irreducible I-ness (Ich-heit) of the world, of his world, his "experienced wordliness" (the erlebte Welthaftigkeit of Zutt's anthropology), his "embodied wordliness" (Zaner, 1964). In this perspective the various worlds lived in and observed by the psychopathologist who is not completely trapped in the "weft" of taxonomy and in the golden cage of reassuring nosology are understood in their authentical existential meaning. Whatever its expressive modality (delusional, maniacal, melancholic, obsessive), the constitutional sense of these experienced worlds may be deciphered by such a psychopathological understanding. This, beyond any Kantian Vernunft and Verstand (Ricci Sindoni, 1995), lies in that ineluctable horizon where consciousness and language meet on common ground: consciousness not as mere vigilance, language not as mere verbalizing. Here the need for reason 295 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 295-299. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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is not inspired by the search for truth but for meaning. As Hannah Arendt said (1954): Reason unaccounted for by communication is "unreasonable".... On the other hand. it is rather evident that "communication" doesn't arise from the public and political sphere but from the personal encounter of the Me and the You. This relationship of mere dialogue, above all others, is the closest to the primary experience taking place in the inner dialogue constituting thought.

So the meaning of intersubjective encounter is disclosed in the fullness of its becoming interpersonal, no matter what its original regio psichopatologica is. In fact, all speech, to some degree, is both monologue and dialogue, either in a mutacic subject or in a logorroical one, a confused or delusional one, a glossolalical or dissociated one. The very intimacy of the "inner word" doesn't at all exclude that I might be referring to myself as someone else (this reminds me "Sei romanzi fra due secoli", by Alfredo Panzini) and that I might be activating and establishing a signal from my consciousness to my consciousness: a signal characterized by silence and significant pauses (silence also talks, as Giorgio Manganelli wrote). Of course, every word represents a subject's movement away from himself, creating alterity despite its presupposition. However, is merely speaking to someone who responds and questions (everyone, of course, in his own way) communication? Do we actually establish dialogue even if for a few minutes? Do the importance of the message for me and the other lie in what I cannot express or in what the other, the You, cannot understand? Can silence be considered dialogue? Or is it, almost always, a pause? As a psychiatrist, though, it seems that with every person I meet what I express is monologue whereas what I communicate is dialogue. The dimension of listening (Corradi Fiumara, 1985) represents the intention that animates every speech (verbal or non). For some, in particular, some adolescents and many melancholics, it is very difficult to catch (and determine) the degree of loneliness connected to every word and to the silence that binds or separates the actors (Greimas). We neither can nor have to ignore, underestimate, minimize, banalize that very clinical experience that brings us face to face with soliloquy publicly articulated through that mental suffering that is able to elude and ignore our presence. We could say that the monologue is articulated either in a situation of loneliness (Fromm Reichmann, Callieri and Frighi) or in a specular one or with an imaginary interlocutor different from the Me

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in the mirror. The soliloquy, despite its rich literary tradition and its phonetically being described as a concrete discourse, implies the negation of an interlocutor's presence. In other words, soliloquy is the spoken negation of the proximity of the other, of his "face": therefore of an absent presence. This paradoxical ambiguity, in its clinical incarnation, may induce us to clarify, individualize and focus the hidden intention, more or less conscious, which animates this particular way of withdrawing from or refusing communication. The hallucinatory conversation of soliloquy cannot be fully assimilated to an imaginary encounter; it lacks spontaneity and the freedom of a conscience able to acknowledge and want "imagining". So, we may either be trapped in a pseudo-dialogue with a fascinating pseudoother or we may be influenced by a mental automatism, like de Clerembault's thought, without being aware of it. This situation - the delusional hallucinatory monologue - may be easily distinguished from a child's or an adult's "normal" monologue. They freely indulge in this flow of words although they continue to dispose of themselves in every moment: anyhow their speech is self-sufficient, it doesn't need an answer. To one extreme, for some patients, especially the schizophrenic, every verbal act is tendentially soliloquized. It seldom represents an answer to questioning voices, both internal or external, authoritative, exhortatory, insulting, hostile, heavenly or demoniac. In this case the speaker's worldliness is undebatable; it is clear verification of heuristic (also ethical) validity of the anthropological theories regarding interpersonality. The refusal of one's becoming worldly, in a "temps fige" (Le Guen), often irreversible, almost always requires syntactical articulation. This is characteristic of the most elliptical and apparently most unapproachable language (for example, in Antonin Artaud) and of the most neologistical, paraphrenical, dissociated, cryptical speech. Verbalism allows that some deep autistic withdrawals from worldly reality remain silent for the others, without losing the pleasure of listening to oneself. It is almost a verbal auto-eroticism as we can notice in some "expression flows", recently highlighted in Sergio Piro's and Amalia Mele's research study (1995). It appears that verbalism is the loneliest expression of the word; even though Lacan said: "Meme s'il ne communique rien, Ie discours represente I' existence de la communication". A delusional subject may refuse the other's real word, but he may not be able to renounce to speaking on condition that he hears the

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expected answer and not the unacceptable and insufferable negation of it. As Maurel said: "11 laisse se de gager de lui Ie verbe, dont la nature meme exprime un project de rencontre". The monologue expected to be solitary and symbolic of isolation and feeling numb (Binswangerian Verfestigung), also denotes a sign of "worldliness" in progress, in that its spoken form "in horto concluso" is sufficient to indicate it. So it takes us again into the world of interpersonal communication, also considering the most radical unreality of delusion, and into the partial ambiguous reality of "theatricalism"; therefore this offers both the interlocutor and the listener only a surface without the substance of a really significant word. Monologue fully eludes dialectics of communication: it is neither an authentic dialogue nor a real loneliness. It is this very incapacity to open ourselves to communication that forms the inner feature of schizophrenic language. This is not to be interpreted only as an expression of an underlying thought disorder. It must be correctly interpreted as an expression of a (more or less) failed reality of interpersonal communication, of a (more or less) distorted position of relationship with the world (the "rapport sensitive delusion" by Ernst Kretschmer), of a (more or less) damaged or coerced "becoming worldly" (the Verweltlichung by Jurg Zutt, 1952). With respect to the traditional monodimensional concepts of the individual as a private incommunicable entity, as "individuum", we have to suppose another's existence as being essential for the very individual's structure: esse est coesse (Marcel), Mit-dasein (Binswanger), beingbetween-us (Buber); see furthermore Max Scheler, Franz Rosenzweig, Eugene Minkowski, Viktor Frankl, Clemens Benda, etc. The world of things, of anonymous Mit-sein, turns into a world of relationships, of being-for, being-among, being-with. So it seems that we are drawing (thanks to the developments of phenomenology; for example, one can think of the establishment of Alter Ego) to consider dialogue not only as a means of communication between two distinct individuals, but also - essentially - as a way to assert the dual reality, the anthropophenomenological coexistence of presence (Cargnello, 1977). Surely there are many other ways for psychopathology to enter the world experienced by one who suffers from mental illness. In particular, these come from sciences of communications, cybernetics, analytical philosophy (as Sergio Moravia clearly shows), the concept of neuronal mind (Edelman), group therapy and the new perspectives of psychotherapy (for example corporeal analysis - Reich, Lowen, etc., efr.

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O. Rossi). At this point it seems opportune to indicate briefly the full validity of anthropophenomenological access to interpersonal communication, which in my opinion represents the fundamental point of Psychiatry approached from a human perspective. The truth announced by Plinio in XI Historia mundi ("Profecto in oculis animus habitat. Ardent, intenduntur, humectant, connivent. ... Hoc cum auspicimus, ani mum ipsum videmur attingere"), as valid today as twenty centuries ago, emerges at this point. (Translated by Maria Gabriella Foia) NOTE I Heidegger said: "A simple sight of the ontologies now existing is sufficient to see how the lack of understanding about being as being-in the world coincides with missing the phenomenon of worldliness" (Essere e tempo, p. 110. Milano, Longanesi 1970).

REFERENCES Arendt, H., L'interesse per la politica nel recente pensiero filosofico europeo (1954). Trans. Ita!' A. Dal Lago, Aut-Aut, pp. 239-240,31-46, sett.-dic. 1990. Ballerini, A. and B. Callieri (eds.), Breviario di Psicopatologia. La dimensione umana della sofJerenza mentale (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1996). Callieri, B., Percorsi di uno psichiatra (Roma, Ed. Universitarie Romane, 1993). Callieri, B. and L. Frighi, "Aspetti psicologici e psicopatologici della solitudine", Giorn. Psichiat. Neuropatol. 90 (1962), p. 227. Callieri, B. and L. Frighi, "Aspects psychologiques et psychopathologiques de la communication verbale", Vie Medicale 41 (1960), p. 25. Cargnello, D. Alterita e alienita. 2° ed. (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1977). Corradi Fiumara, G. Filosofia dell'ascolto (Milano: Jaca Book, 1985). Downing, G. II corpo e la parola. Pref. R. Speziale Bagliacca (Roma: Astolabio, 1995). Fromm Reichmann, F. "Loneliness", Psychiatry 21 (1959), p. 1. Le Guen C!. "Le temps fige du schizophrene," Evol. psychiat. 29 (1958), p. 701. Lowen, A. La depressione e il corpo (1972) (Rom a: Astrolabio, 1980). Mele, A. and S. Piro, I mille talenti. Manuale della scuola sperimentale antropologicotrasJormazionale (Milano: F. Angeli, 1995). Ricci Sindoni, P. Hannah Arendt, Come raccontare il mondo (Rom a: Studium, 1995), p. 101. Zaner, R. M. The Problem oj Embodiment. Some Contributions to a Phenomenology oj the Body (L'Aja: Nijhoff, 1964). Zutt, J. "Der asthetische Erlebnisbereich und seine kankhaften Abwandlungen", Nervenarzt 23 (1952), p. 163.

EDUARDO BOLIVAR

ON HUMAN ALIENATION

A Phenomenological Inquiry of the Schizoid Personality Much has been said about human alienation in our time. I believe that the best way to approach this difficult subject, pregnant with philosophical and psychological implications, is to try to approach it in its most concrete manifestations. In this sense, the best approach might be to try to analyze this phenomenon in terms of the most representative expression of universal modern alienation. I think that this concrete expression of the more general phenomenon of human alienation in our times is to be discovered in a particular type of personality. I am referring to that type of personality which Robert Laing, the Scottish psychiatrist, defined in terms of the "divided self", or, in more traditional psychiatric terminology, as the schizoid personality. It is our intention to describe this type of character pathology in psychoanalytical and phenomenological terms, in order to arrive at an understanding of modern man's spiritual crisis. Not very much was said in psychoanalytical literature, if hardly anything, about this particular psychopathological structure, to wit, the schizoid personality organization. It was Helen Deutsch, as well as Fairbain, who brought up for the first time, the fact that there existed such a nosological entity. Helen Deutsch, in particular, expressed the view that there were certain types of patients who exhibited very definite and unique characteristics, different from those mentioned in traditional psychoanalytical literature, including by Freud himself. According to Helen Deutsch, these patients were characterized by feelings of depersonalization, lack of reality and fleeting affective "chatexis" of the outside world. l They were described by her "as if" personalities, borrowing the term from the philosopher Vaihinger. These individuals look "normal" to outsiders, but those who knew them deeper, who were more in contact with them, could detect "something wrong with them".2 This would be detected despite the fact that it was almost impossible to pinpoint what it was that was wrong, since outwardly they seemed normal and there were no major intellectual or behavioral disturbances that could be detected by an observer. And yet, the lack of intense affective relationships with others, the 301 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 301-317. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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imitative character of their behavior, the narcissistic indifference behind the mask of adequate social adjustment with the environment, creates already an uncanny atmosphere of inauthenticity in their way of relating to others. 3 It is "as if" these type of persons are not what they pretend to be, and pretend to be what they are not. It is Deutsch's contention that what characterizes these patients' behavior is not so much the repression of their instinctual and emotionallife, as in the case of the hysterical patient, but rather this inability to have a real experience of life, of relating to others in a genuine sense. 4 In other words, these patients show a pseudo-affectivity which seems to be the outcome of an extremely impoverished emotional life. The narcissistic shallowness of their affectivity is something they share with some psychotic patients. Nonetheless these patients are not psychotic. By the same token their lack of real genuineness and radical inability to relate to others in an authentic manner, prevents us from classifying them alongside the classical neurotic patient described by Freud. Deutsch interprets the pathology of these patients in terms of an inability to identify themselves with a parental object. 5 This lack of identification which would give stability to their superego and depth to their inner life, is what makes them search desperately for an object in the external world with which they could identify themselves. Thus they try to compensate their lack of autonomy and self-identity by establishing very intense relationships, seemingly, with others, which ultimately are as fleeting and superficial as it is to be expected in anyone whose manner of relating to the world is so devoid of spontaneity and freedom. There is, indeed, an incredible mimicry in these patients. Their identification with others is of such a nature that they believe and react to others as others expect them to react and behave. Moreover, their entire behavior, their overall attitude towards the world, entails an existential surrender of their individuality to the demands of the Other. It is "as if" they live outside themselves. Using a Hegelian terminology, their being is not a being-for-themselves-and-for-others but merely a beingfor-others. Therefore, we should ask ourselves: What is the kind of being of such a person? In other words: What is the real self of such individuals? Do they really possess selfhood, can we ascribe to them an authentic existence? From the very start we have to deal with an ontological problem which transcends the psychological realm, even if we need to describe this type of personality in psychological terms. The problem

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to which I am referring relates to the ontological structure of the schizoid's being. For what would be the nature of a being which consists in appearing as it is not and not appearing as it is? What is the existential status of a self whose self appears as a false rather than as a true self? At this point it might be appropriate to introduce Winnicott's important concepts of the "true self" and the "bad self". We should try to describe briefly in psychological terms what Winnicott understood by both concepts, without going, at this point, into the ontological and existential connotations of these terms. According to Winnicott the true self would be the outcome of the child's identification with a "good enough" mother, that is, a mother capable of adjusting her behavior to the earliest needs of the infant. The true self, then, would represent the expression of the child's spontaneity: "a child, whose earliest instinctual needs are accepted by the mother".6 By doing so, the mother would create an "illusory space", where the child could feel his omnipotence and develop a feeling of being able to create and control his environment. This, of course, would eventually lead to a sense of well-being and instinctual freedom, which characterizes mental health. As opposed to the true self, the concept of the false self entails an environmental failure. 7 The false self is the outcome of a mother unable to react to the child's need, a mother who substitutes the creative spontaneity of the child by her own gesture, thus creating an atmosphere of coercive compliance. 8 The child is forced to hide his feelings and instinctual urges if he wants to receive his mother's love. As a result of this, a compliant attitude is set up, once and for all, as an organized defensive structure. The defensive structure will become the false personality of the future schizoid. The child is, somehow, forced to identify with her non-responsive or extremely overwhelming mother, in order to secure her love and acceptance. Later on in life he will feel compelled to identify and even imitate others, thus surrendering his authentic needs, and ultimately, his whole personal existence to the world. Thus arises the false self, as the outcome of an environmental failure which prevents the subject from asserting the true self and establishing its identity. And yet a mere overall psychological description of the schizoid personality can only serve as an introduction to a phenomenological classification of the structural patterns of this type of characterological organization. Otherwise we would fall short of understanding the profound metaphysical grounds underlying the schizoid personality.

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Therefore it is my view that we should go beyond a psychoanalytical description of the dynamics of the schizoid's existence into a phenomenological analysis which would enable us to disclose the essence of this form of alienated human behavior. This, on the other hand, would also help us to go deeper into the nature of man's alienation as a being extricated from itself. Nevertheless, in order to accomplish this, it is my contention that it is indispensable to depart from certain premises based upon an ontological phenomenology. In view of this let us start by stating that man's being is a being whose being is a lack. His being is pervaded by nothingness. Man's desire is to search being, since his being is precisely a lack of being. Therefore man's being is "desire": a desire of being. His desire is to become the being which he is, for the being which he is, is, precisely, the being which he is not. His being being a lack, man's being is, as Sartre stated,9 a being which is what it is not, and which is not what it is. Insofar as man is considered as consciousness, man is a for-itself in need of becoming a for-itself-in-itself; for it is only by acquiring the thickness and solidity of the world of things (in-itself) that man, as subjectivity (for-itself), can attain the plenitude of being. Since a for-itself-in-itself is, precisely, the exclusive mode of existence of the Absolute, man's desire to become this Absolute is an impossible project doomed to failure and inherently condemned from its very start. It is at this point that we have to begin to understand the fundamental predicament of the human condition. Insofar as man's being is defined by his desire of being, his essence will be defined in terms of his desire. The dialectics of his desire, in its urge to overcome his radical ontological lack of being, condemns man to exercising his freedom in order to realize his essence. Therefore his being is a historical being. This justifies Ricoeur's statement that man's essence is "the history of his desire".l0 It is through history that we will find the unfolding of the same drama: Dasein's struggle to encounter his real self, and his desperate search to give a foundation to his life and a meaning to his existence. The failure of this heroic enterprise will result in the drama of neurosis and, ultimately, in its most radical and absolute from: human madness. Both neurosis and madness are the extreme forms of man's ontological alienation. We have to view neurosis, then, as the failure of man to obtain authenticity in his life. Neurosis is the failure of man's being in its search for fulfilling his destiny: it is the victory of nothingness over being. Sartre has defined man as consciousness, as pure subjectivity, and

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using a Hegelian terminology, he speaks of man as a being-for-itself, as opposed to the inert and solid mode of existence of things, which he calls the in-itself. We can hardly agree with Sartre's concept of man as a being-for-itself, for man is an incarnate being, not a pure consciousness. Man is a psychosomatic subject, and Freud proved it without doubt. Because of this, because man is not a pure, ethereal being, but a being which has a body, it needs to be said that his self is a bodily self. Therefore we have to understand man, as Merleau-Ponty suggested, as a being-for-itself-in-itself. 11 Sartre's concept of man's condition is the ontological version of a schizoid's conception of reality. His ontology of the in-itself and the for-itself is a theoretical expression of the schizoid split of reality in terms of opposing poles unable to be reconciled. The dialectical synthesis in Sartre becomes merely the project of a synthesis, rather than a real dialectical synthesis. In any case, it is true that if we were to accept Sartre's equation of the for-itself with subjectivity and the in-itself with thinghood, then the Absolute will be the only possible reconciliation of man's dialectical contradictions as embedded in his finite condition, a contradiction which characterizes the schizoid's mode of existence. It is true that we agree with Sartre in that man's project is the project of becoming the idealized image of himself: the project which stems from the narcissistic passion of becoming the whole foundation of his existence. Nonetheless, this does not entail that we have to accept the total divorce between the in-itself and the for-itself, as implied in Sartre's ontology. Because man's essence entails a lack of being, man seeks to become what he is not, to become an ideal totality, an absolute being. Yet, man's nothingness is not absolute nothingness, for nothingness is always the nothingness of being; in other words, the being of nothingness is the nothingness of being. Man's mediation between his consciousness, as a for-itself, and the world as the in-itself, is his body. Man's body, insofar as it shares the materiality and extension of the things of the world, shares with the world the structure of thinghood. On the other hand, insofar as man is spirit (a consciousness whose essence is the very negation of the density and thickness of the in-itself) he is a free being whose freedom annihilates thinghood. Nevertheless, man is not pure spirit: man is a being in-itself and for-itself; he is body and soul, spirit and matter. The schizoid divorces both. The dialectics of mind and body is being split; man becomes a disembodied self estranged from his body. He carries his body as a ghost might carry his "mortal coil". His body

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acquires the opacity and thickness of matter, the inertness of the initself. On the other hand, the subject, as a disembodied self, acquires an ineffable and ethereal reality. In fact, it lacks the consistency and permanency of the real. The feelings of depersonalization and derealization that the schizoid neurotic feels at times have very much to do with the lack of rootedness of his body, which ceases to be the center of gravity of the subject. The schizoid does not really have a real feeling of his own body, and this is why he carries his body as a slave might carry a heavy burden. He actually becomes imprisoned within his body. His body becomes part of his false system. It becomes the outer appearance that he presents to the world: it is the self in its pure externality. The schizoid's detachment from his body, as Laing suggested,12 has a defensive function. The embodied self is more vulnerable to the world, for he will feel more intensely threatened by external dangers, whereas the disembodied self will feel more secure and protected, since he does not have a real experience of his body. On the other hand, as Laing suggested, the sense of being real, of "being biologically alive and real",13 which is experienced by the embodied self, will be absent in the schizoid. Being detached from his body precludes the schizoid from establishing a real intercourse with his world, since his body is the mediating element between the subject (as a for-itself) and the world (as the in-itself). Hence the body becomes part of the external materiality of the world, sharing the inertness of its being at the same time that it shelters the subject against its threats. Therefore incarnation never really takes place in the schizoid's existence. The for-itself is separated from the in-itself: it is divorced, split, detached from it. There will never be communication between both worlds. Since nothingness is not and being is, an unabridgeable gulf will separate being from nothingness. Just as the body is divorced from consciousness (according to Sartre's ontological principles), the for-itself will be separated and split from the Other. We have, on the one hand, the for-itself and, on the other hand, the Other. There will be beingfor-itself and being-for-another and no possible communication between them. The Other, by merely looking at me, will freeze my being, and cancel my autonomy as an independent self-consciousness. The Other, by the magic power bestowed by Sartre on the "look", will alienate our being and transform us into objects. 14 This deadly look will not only reify our being and render our soul naked to the piercing glance of the Other;

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it will make us, as well, merely objects in the face of the Other's look, which becomes now an absolute subject. Thus the schizoid is caught up in the dilemma of being himself, in which case he will become the subject, whereas the Other becomes his object, or else, he becomes an alienated, reified being, when he is looked at by the Other. The contradiction of looking-being-Iooked-at is never resolved in Sartre. In fact, it does not admit to any possible resolution. Either we are a for-itself (as the subject of the looking) or a for-another (as the object of being looked at). The master-slave relationship is being reenacted again at the level of the human gaze. The schizoid is unable to resolve Sartre's dilemma as a result of his being unable to deal with his powerful repressed drives. Both his aggressive and his sexual repressed urges make him feel perpetually guilty and ashamed under the scrutiny of the Other's gaze. The act of looking represents, ultimately, an act of self-assertion. "I look the other in the face": "I look at the other face to face". This means that I can stand my ground in the face of others, and that I have a clear consciousness, free of guilt. But it could also mean that I have no reason to be ashamed of myself, that I do not entertain any forbidden thoughts, that I have no evil impulses that I may wish to conceal. Nonetheless, what if these forbidden thoughts, these evil impulses, these debased and sinful feelings dwelt in the inner depths of ourselves? What if I really had thoughts that made me feel guilty and feelings of which I might be ashamed? I would certainly avoid looking at others; in fact, I would lower my eyes in fear and shame. We all know how a man who is ashamed of himself tends to lower his eyes in humiliated and debased surrender to the Other's judgment. He could hardly "maintain his look". He would remain paralyzed under the harsh judgment by which he expects to be rejected, and which he perceives as being reflected in the Other's look. At this point, when the subject declines to hold the Other's look, he becomes a being-for-another, an object looked at by a subject, whose being is thus objectified. The schizoid would pretend to be, or at least make an effort to become, invisible to the Other's gaze. He would conceal himself in any way possible and thus avoid being seen. The false self is constituted as the neurotic solution to the constant fear of being destroyed and alienated by the Other's look. In other words, the inauthentic self offers a false image of oneself, an appearance hiding one's own being, instead of disclosing it. The internal contradiction in which the schizoid has been trapped

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consists in the fact that, by relinquishing his individuality, by hiding and concealing his true self (i.e. the spontaneity of his feelings and drives), he becomes a being-for-another, and cancels his being forhimself. He appears, he acts, he thinks in terms of the Other. His self has surrendered to the world of others, to the doxa of the world. This is, as said before, what Heidegger expresses in terms of "falling into the world".15 In inauthentic existence, Dasein's being becomes a-beingfor-another, in that his being is a perpetual surrender to the will of the Other; it would have acquired the status and characteristics of what Heidegger defines as presence-at-hand, which is the essence of objects existing within-the-world. Thus man's would lose the dimension of being a transcendental subject. Moreover, in surrendering to the Other, he would have internalized this Other within himself. He would have actually become "other than himself". He would have become incapable of a synthesis between his need to assert his individual being and ontological autonomy, on the one hand, and his powerful urge to deny the existence of others as independent beings, on the other; he would be incapable of accepting the "contingent necessity,,16 (using Merleau-Ponty's terms) of his condition. In other words, he would be unable to accept his ontological nature as that of a being in a world with others, with whom he needs to coexist and communicate, whom he loves and hates, and whom he ultimately seeks and needs for the recognition of his self. He would refuse, as well, to accept his existence for others and the selfhood of others. The paradox of this peculiar mode of existence lies in the fact that the narcissistic refusal of the Other's existence runs parallel with the identification with the Other. The for-itself retreats into seclusion since it hides itself from itself and from others. Yet, in doing so, he surrenders himself to others; he becomes the soul of the Other. He offers his self as the ultimate sacrifice to save his self from others and from the world. The dialectical contradiction of the neurotic amounts to the fact that he has to choose between a solipsistic existence divorced from the world, enjoying only the empty freedom of his seclusion, or the life of someone who is the slave of another and is at the mercy of a feared and powerful master. In fact, because of this basic ambivalence, and due to the radical psychological split, he lives in both dimensions at the same time. His arrogant narcissistic detachment coexists with an abject, submissive dependence. He is not authentically free, and yet he is unable to truly depend on anyone. In fact, he is not one because he is not the other.

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He betrays both himself and the Other. The Other is betrayed because the schizoid offers a false appearance of himself on the basis of what he feels towards this Other. He is submissive and docile, while hating and resenting the Other. With respect to himself he betrays his most noble ambitions and moral commitments, in that he renounces to be himself, to be truly a person. In other words, he rejects his existential commitment to others. His life is this perpetual betrayal of life itself. While the for-itself is being reduced to the schizoid's repressed true self, the false self represents and stands for his being-for-another. In hiding himself from and avoiding the other's look, he takes refuge within himself through narcissistic and schizoid defenses. And yet the other's look has been internalized. He becomes a spectacle to himself. The scenario has been displaced. He is not only an object for the Other (having acquired the qualities of thinghood); he has even become an object for himself. It is, in this sense, that the superego acquires not only an auditory quality, as Freud said, but a visual dimension as well. The false self, insofar as it takes upon itself the characteristics of the superego, becomes an active source of threat. It protects the true self from external threats only insofar as it becomes its own source of threat. The subject now becomes someone who is being looked at by himself. The synthesis which he fails to accomplish outside himself, he succeeds in accomplishing in a protracted manner within himself. He has become the caricature of what Merleau-Ponty defined in terms of a being-for-himselfand-for-another.!7 This basic split takes up two distinctive forms. In the paranoid, the threat of the Other arises in external reality; in the obsessive-compulsive it comes from within, for the Other has been internalized. The self-accusations of the obsessive are the indictment of the Other as represented by his superego. In any event, the schizoid loses the Other both outside and inside himself. Therefore the Other, as a real being, is only hated and feared, while the Other inside himself (as represented by the Lacanian ego ideal which directs his desire towards a higher ethical life) is equally lost. In fact, even his urge for perfection will be cancelled, for whatever is desirable and valuable will be denied, thus turning his wishes and values into the target of envy and hatred. An ethics of asceticism is developed whereby the schizoid would renounce all desire. We know, however, that not to desire - to renounce desire - is still to desire, even if it is to desire not to desire. The ethics of asceticism leads the neurotic to give up all sources of

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pleasure in reality. In the case of obsessive-compulsive characters, we can even find an extreme case of the pathology of duty. Their ethics is a formal ethics. As opposed to this, we can observe, in the perverse form of character pathology, an opposite state of affairs. The pervert follows a hedonistic ethics, for he follows the pleasure principle to its limit: to the very limit of going beyond life itself into death. What must be stressed is the fact that the dichotomy between the being-for-itself and being-for-another has inexorably led either to the cancellation of desire, as in the schizoid, or to the cancellation of any internal or external moral law, leading to perversion. In perversion the Law has been abolished. Pleasure has found its kingdom. Pleasure and death meet in mortal embrace, for the limits of pleasure are pushed away indefinitely and will not be admitted except for the ultimate limit imposed by death. Ironically, death has overcome life, and the pervert is willing to sacrifice everything, including life itself, to the highest aim of his narcissistic passion: desire has become the bad infinity, for reconciliation between desire and the Law never takes place under the conditions of human alienation. Under these conditions desire is reduced to biological pleasure, i.e. to an unlimited need for gratification, whereas the Law becomes an alien command, a heteronomous principle of coercion (the archaic superego of psychoanalysis). Yet, a normative ethics of duty which is not supported by desire is ineffective and empty (something that Kant did not see), whereas the hedonistic adherence to the pleasure principle leads to self-destruction and mortal decay. In reality, the only ethics that can satisfy man's condition is one by which what we desire and what we ought to desire can achieve a dialectical synthesis. This entails the thesis that what we desire is ultimately what we ought to desire, and that what we ought to desire should become our own desire; in other words, we should desire what we ought and ought to desire what we desire. Ultimately, what I am trying to depict is an ethics based on the acceptance of desire, insofar as desire does not tum against life itself, and takes itself as a goal of the ethical life. In other words, I am here referring to a morality whereby a man can feel free to desire, at the same time that he is able to put forward his desire as a regulative principle of his ethical life. The norm has to become the source of the moral action and not an empty juridical injunction. Since man's essence is to desire, to accept the morality of desire is to accept not only the metaphysical basis of his existence, but also a will to fulfill his essence. Psychoanalysis, is, indeed, as Sartre stated, in need of an ethics. This manner of ethics

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could only be one in which desire becomes its own law. If moral and spiritual perfection are to be regarded as our ultimate goal, as the highest form of "noble existence" (using Scheler's term) then desire should not turn against itself. And yet desire, if it is to be true to itself, cannot alienate itself from its own law: namely, that which in limiting desire, supports desire itself.ls This ideal will be, on the other hand, fashioned after a Kantian idea. In other words, it should be a regulative principle of our ethical life, never to be attained, however, because of the radical finitude and alienation of human existence. Since man is a contingent being, the finitude of his existence, marked by death as its absolute limit, interdicts at every moment his desire for inmortality. Yet, it is only in and through an infinite life, that he can really fulfill the expectations of moral perfection, for perfection would demand an infinite time, as Kant understood it in the Critique of Practical Reason. Moreover, since desire is, by definition, a desire of itself (desire to perpetuate itself eternally), any limit to it would be an unacceptable threat to man's narcissistic passion. This is the other seemingly insoluble dilemma of man's moral existence. Freud spoke of this matter as the "indestructibility of the instincts", an unfelicitous naturalistic turn of phrase. Having in view that we are condemned to die and that we are thrown into a world where we have to coexist with others whose desires will limit ours, we have to face the fact that the problem of violence and aggression in history might never be resolved. Desire aims at the infinite transgression of the Law, and the Law is that which limits desire. A solution of this radical dilemma is improbable both in history and individual human existence. But this is tantamount to saying that wars and neurosis, as the most dramatic expression of our radical ontological alienation, might never be totally overcome. It might be easier to understand now how the schizoid structures have, at their basis, a primary ontological uprootedness. The basic lack in the ontological structure of the schizoid personality is originally expressed by his radical inability to relate genuinely to others. The schizoid either relates to another by establishing a symbiotic dependence on him, something which he himself abhors, or he runs away from others by enclosing himself within himself through the agency of the false self (thus hiding himself from the threat of the world). This hiddenness of the self in the schizoid personality-organization was sufficiently described in the

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previous chapters. Kierkegaard described this hiddenness as a state of "shutupness". The schizoid takes a distance from others. Anything which threatens this distance, which narrows the limits of his space, will be perceived by the schizoid with fear and resentment, as a threat involving an unbearable emotional impact. Needless to say that this severance of his links to others and the world will be the source of the schizoid's emotional emptiness, of his affective barrenness, of his loneliness and solitude. All this leads to a general sense of deadness and a pervasive feeling of derealization. Once the ontological structures are weakened in some respect, his isolation and the loss of his world will take the form of deadness and emptiness. The world would no longer be "cathected", to use Freud's terminology, or to put in Merleau-Ponty's words, there would be no "erotic perception" of reality.19 But once this erotic sense of the real is lost, the things of the world and the world at large lose their interest, the solidity of things disappears, and a sense of loss in meaningless life starts to prevail. Things lose their contour, colors fade away, the limits of things blend with each other. The world is still there and yet not totally so; things appear albeit without any significant appeal to the subject. One after the other make a claim on his attention and ultimately their presence is registered, though it fades away against the background of the world, as silhouettes not clearly defined, as shadows perceived in a dim light. Perception is always a creative act whereby the subject of perception does not merely react mechanically to the external stimulation, but recreates the object, in responding according to the particular history of the subject and to the appeal of the objects. The world is offered to each of us as endowed with values, values that appeal to us according to our personal characteristics and with respect to our individual perceptual history and openness to the world. In the eyes of the schizoid, the particular structures of objects are lost, only the general ones being preserved. A given house will be just a house; a particular landscape will be merely a landscape. Objects are perceived by him as stationary or moving bodies, whereas its individual characteristics would vanish in the overall, impersonal apprehension typical of him. The schizoid perceives a world of things and people, in which they are devoid of any meaningful relation to him. It is only the "contour", the "shape", the external limits, the surface of bodies without density, without depth, that he is capable of grasping. For the schizoid man, a woman will be a human being with anatomical features distinguishing

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her from men and making her recognizable as a woman. Yet her femininity, her "womanhood" would be lost. Therefore she would have no appeal to him as a man, even if he can aesthetically, in an abstract manner, recognize her particular beauty. There will be no emotional connotations to his aesthetic perception, no erotic arousal of feelings, no overt reaction to her physical beauty and carnal appearance. Objects are usually perceived but devoid of meaning, empty of internal relationships and of any appealing character. In other words, the "value" of objects would be lost, and therefore they would appear to the schizoid as utterly indifferent. The world of things and others, in loosing their provocative and appealing character to our sense, would become a desert where shapes and forms delineate themselves without neat and well defined boundaries, indeed, it would be a world of "phantasms" and pure appearances, without shading, without depth, without interiors. This would explain how superficial is the schizoid grasp of others, however high his intellectual level may be, and how external and banal are his judgments and perception of people and things. Thus the world presents itself to the subject as devoid of meaning. The schizoid senses, at the same time, that he has lost the meaning of the world; in fact, he feels that life itself has lost all meaning. In cutting off his links to the world, in severing his emotional and affective ties responsible for his being-in-the-world, the schizoid loses the meaning of the world, as well as the meaning of his existence. For man to exist is to exist in a world consisting of things and fellow human beings. Once all of this is lost, the meaning of life is radically lost too. Interestingly enough, Sartre's ontology is the most paradigmatic example of the schizoid's perception of the world. In fact, it is its most outstanding philosophical expression and, therefore, serves as well to illustrate the view of the schizoid's split I am presenting here. In Sartre, as in the schizoid, being-in-the-world, as the main ontological structure of Dasein, has been split into two different and opposing ontological structures: the for-itself (Dasein) and the in-itself (the world, the things of the world). Hence the opaqueness and thickness of the in-itself represent exactly the schizoid's perception of the world as a massive, opaque form of existence, where thickness and impenetrability prevent him from perceiving the inside, the internal aspect of what it offers to him in terms of solid, frozen structures. On the other hand, the dialectic of man's relatedness to others, the ontological structure of his existence as a beingfor-itself-and-with-another, is also split into two contradictory opposites.

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The for-itself is constantly threatened by the Other. As I pointed out above, Sartre is of the opinion that the Other, by merely "looking" at us, can reduce our life to "thinghood", thus freezing it under the magic power of this "look". This reification of our existence, the objectification of the for-itself, will take place, as we know, by the mere fact that the Other is "looking" at us and turning us into an object. This is what has been described as the sense of "petrification" of the schizoid: his fear of being turned into a "stone" by the Other's look. Now, this state of affairs can be reversed by me by just looking at the Other, by transforming myself into a subject, as I deprive him of his subjectivity. He would thus become an object subjected to my piercing look, which steals away all subjectivity from him. We can see here the Hegelian Master-Slave struggle-to-death, where two self-consciousnesses face each other in terms of an irreducible endeavor to dominate the other. Herein the Master can only preserve his individuality as long as the Other's individuality is destroyed and cancelled. As I said earlier, there is no reconciliation in this battle for supremacy, for none of the combatants would accept the rights to individuality and the freedom of the other. But this is precisely what happens in Sartre's presentation of the foritself's confrontation with the Other. This is exactly what takes place when the schizoid perceives the Other. The Other will appear to the schizoid as a threatening and alien presence endangering his most secret needs, to be an autonomous self. Hence he must hide his self from the intruding look of the Other, which makes his existence manifest for what it is. In fact, when he faces the Other, he feels naked and powerless, ashamed and impotent, as if under the scrutiny of a castrating glance. The schizoid has to hide himself from external intrusion if he is to preserve his selfhood. Otherwise his self will be reduced to the degraded status of a thing. The paranoid fear of being looked at and the feeling of sexual shame characteristic of some neurotics are the outcome of this fear of being pierced through. This explains the fact that they are suspicious that their sexual phantasies and resentful hatred may be discovered by others looking at them, and of the threat of possible punishments resulting from it. Ultimately death and castration anxiety are based upon this, namely, the fear of deadly punishment by the Other. The punishment for the crime, however, can be experienced in different forms. The schizoid fears that he would be transformed into a thing by the Other's glance. Yet being transformed into a thing is yet another

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way in which castration and death take place, for a thing has no life, its existence is the deadly existence of the inanimate. There is only one course of action by means of which the schizoid can avert this dreadful punishment: he can become a thing himself; he can become dead; he can live without feeling alive, while feeling that the others are not alive either. Under these conditions, however, how can he be destroyed? No one can kill a dead man, or threaten the life of someone who has no real life. Not only might his selfhood be preserved in this fashion, but so might his life too. Paradoxically, by becoming less than a subject, less than a man, not only can he preserve his subjectivity and humanity, but he can even save his life (Being) and the entire meaning of his existence. Let me now take up again the subject of our inquiry, namely human neurosis. The schizoid realizes that the paradise of inexhaustible satisfaction can only be fulfilled, at best, in a world shared with others, a context where danger and threats to his ontological and psychological selfhood can be permanently encountered. The schizoid runs away from this surrogate paradise, for he does not dare to transgress the limits of the Law and risk enjoyment, even at the cost of death, as the pervert does in an earthly version of Adam's fall. He avoids altogether the dangerous pleasures enjoyed by those who dare to challenge the prohibition of the Law. He surrenders to the Law. He runs into a hell of his own making, for he is unable to face the real hell of death. He would rather internalize his death, or appropriate and deny it by living symbolically his death throughout his life. To this end, he creates for himself an imaginary paradise: the schizoid's version of the paradise, one in which isolation stands for security and loneliness and emptiness for freedom. In reality he thus creates a living hell for himself, where he would live in "fear and trembling", never to be consumed by the flames of the passions (as one can imagine hell), but rather to be enslaved and starved to death by an existence whose internal, barren and desolate nature has a paralyzing and deadening effect. As Tillich put it, the neurotic "avoids non-Being by avoiding Being",20 and in so doing, he would be found to encounter precisely the same nothingness, whose uncanny nature made him retreat into despair. The neurotic defenses against the perils of the world have thus created for himself another reality, much worse to endure, much more outrageous and painful than the unexpected imaginary threats that he might have found in the real world. In surrendering his project to be himself, he

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has condemned his life to utter, agonizing pain. His pain is excruciating, especially because it must be carried forever towards infinity. The sentence of death is not to die, and yet to die forever, beyond that limit which is death itself. The sentence for his crime is without absolution and without redemption. It is to be carried forever into an imaginary, unlimited space and beyond the end of time; for his pain shares with the eternal the very same nature of eternity: its duration throughout infinite time. There is no more horrible sentence that can be carried and endured by men that the pain of those who cannot live and cannot die. It is only for them that the doors of heaven seem totally forbidden. Now it is possible for us to understand what Kierkegaard categorizes as "shutupness", as that condition defining neurotic existence (and, in particular, the schizoid's mode of being). The schizoid avoids being "engulfed" by the others by retreating and surrendering his individuality and his moral commitment to being himself. The feeling of being "entrapped" and "engulfed", described by Laing, can be explained only if one understands the ontological foundations of the alienated structure of Dasein. This is precisely what I have endeavored to do here.

Sociedad Iberoamericana de Fenomenologia (S.l.F.) NOTES I Helen Deutsch, Neurosis and Character Types (New York: International University Press, 1965), p. 265. 2 Ibid., p. 263. 3 Ibid., p. 264. 4 Ibid., p. 265. 5 Ibid., p. 257. 6 D. C. Winnicott, The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment (New York: International University Press, 1980), p. 146. 7 Ibid., p. 149. 8 Ibid., p. 148. 9 1. P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 79. 10 P. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy (An Essay on Interpretation) (Yale University Press, 1978), p. 176. II M. Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 372. 12 R. D. Laing, The Divided Self (New York: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 69. 13 Ibid., p. 67. 14 1. P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p.257.

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15 M. Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1962), p.220. 16 M. Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1962), p. 398. 17 M. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (Northern University Press, 1968), p.80. 18 I am using "supporting" now in a Lacanian sense. The infinite should be a telos which guides the moral ethical life of man as a normative Telos towards which he transcends himself, and yet, as opposed to Kant, the infinite cannot be external to the process, for it is constitutive of the very transcendental characteristic of existence. 19 M. Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1962), p. 157. 20 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (Yale University Press, 1978), p. 16.

MIGUEL JARQUIN M.

LA PROFUNDIDAD

Un enfoque dimensional de mi encuentro con el otro Desde mi estrecha prisi6n llame a mi Senor y el me contest6 desde el espacio en libertad. (Viktor Frankl)

La palabra profundidad se puede usar de muchas maneras. Expresa una realidad cuando nos referimos a una forma espacial: la tercera dimensi6n. Es la linea de los cuerpos perpendiculares a una superficie dada. Es una hondura. Manifiesta tam bien una acci6n; es un quehacer para ir mas alla de la superficie, de aquello que aparece en primera intancia; es cavar para ir a 10 hondo. Es penetrar. Representa ademas, una cualidad ya sea del pensar 0 del sentir, en su senti do restringido. Digo por caso, un pensador profundo 0 un dolor profundo. Estas acepciones y otras mas, me incitaron a tratar de indagar un poco en esta experienci<: que desde joven me llama la atenci6n y me maravillaba ya, en aquel entonces, aunque tam bien me llenaba de pavor. Me aterraba. Me fascinaba. Hoy en dia, es una de las vivencias que mas me llenan de gusto por vivir, sin qui tar por eso, la angustia que me acompaiia frente al misterio. APROXIMACION FENOMENOLOGICA

Helado bajaba el viento por las faldas del cerro del Cimatario, mientras en sus crestas calvas asom6 la palidez de la aurora, montada en el sol, nave de fuego anaranjado. El dia abre sus petalos y a pesar del frio que me entume las manos, no podia detenerme mas y quise escribirte 10 que me acaba de suceder. Antes que nada, perd6n por empezar asi mi carta. Paso a saludarte, segun el protocolo. Hola Jorge. No quiero demorarme mas. La que me pas6 es majestuoso. Sofie. Imagine. Invente. No se; pero se que estoy vivo. Oyeme bien: estoy vivo y de ninguna manera deseo detener la hermosura de 10 que acabo 319 A·T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husseriiana, Vol. LV, 319-335. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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de experienciar. Mi ser se ha expandido. Es algo asi como si mis brazos se abrieran enormemente, tal como si fuera un condor azul pardo con su collar blaLo, su pico de arco iris y al abrazar el universo, me fundiera en el blancor de la nieve que habita la montana. Ay Jorge, realmente no se ni como empezar. Ayer, tumbado en la espesura de mi cama, sin a1canzar a dormirme y sin estar despierto del todo, me fui hundiendo. Un valle esmeralda pintado de regocijo, salta del fondo velado que 10 cubria y se tina de frescor. Inundada de ilusion aparecio la figura de mi amada. Era polvos de estrella en medio del efervescer ardiente que 10 envolvia todo. Carnine. Nos abrazamos y en la pradera surgio incandescente la pasion. Mis labios, pincel de acuarela, empezaron a dibujar el firmamento de su cuerpo y ante mi caricia, brotaba de cada poro el tallo suave de una esperanza. Sus brazos se extendian como dos banderas ondeando al ritmo de la brisa y sus senos se hinchaban como la vela de un arco empujado por la nifaga del deseo. Mis manos abiertas, alas de aguila, saltaron sobre la sombra de su paloma en el vientre y regresaron a posarse en la cumbre de sus pechos. Cada cuerpo era una voragine hasta que estallamos en un haz de mil colores. Ella y yo celebrabamos la fiesta de nuestro cuerpo encendido en un castillo de fuegos artificiales. Mas tarde vino el solaz. Nos penetramos y empece a descender en el aposento de su interioridad. Traspase la piel y empece a buscar en las aguas profundas de su intimidad. La carcajada se volvio sonrisa. La llamarada, fuego perenne. La algazara, alegria. El yo, til. El til, yo, y siendo yo, en mi totalidad de mi, soy ser-nosotros, por el encuentro, en su totalidad de ella, siendo til. Ahora si siento todo el universo a la luz de su ser, sin dejar de ser yo; estaba inundado de paz, bebiendo de su agua lozana, extraida en 10 recondito de su enigma. Desperte con el airecillo del amanecer. jFeliz! He vivido la experiencia de encajar mi cepa en su vientre. Todo yo punta de una saeta, convertido en corsario, navegando hacia la profundidad de sus mares. jQue dicha poder anclarL Asombroso. Al mismo tiempo, prendido a su cuerpo, era un ave atravesando el firmamento, hundiendome en el abismo de las alturas. De la sima de la intimidad, saltaba a la cima de la exterioridad. La cofia de mi raiz se extendia hacia el dardo en la copa de mi arbol. Tierra y cielo; el mismo espacio para nutrirme y ensancharme.

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Ahi, sobre la tierra, abrazado a1 azul estrellado de su cuerpo y cobijados por el gris ambar del atardecer que platinaba las hojas en el espinazo de la sierra, naci6 una serenidad que acogia nuestros suspiros en una danza suave y ritmica. El estallido se tomo temp1anza. La mudez, silencio. EI revoloteo, vaiven. La pasion, abrigo. jAmigo mio!, el amor es amor en toda su dimensi6n, cuando se vive con el ser amado y una vez mas, en el encuentro, el mundo se toma hogar. En este ensuefio, el alba me tom6 de sorpresa. Cavar. Volar. Aparentemente dos experiencias contradictorias. Rasgar la tierra para ir a guardar el grano en la oscuridad y el silencio, es paralelo a sembrar los caminos del infinito ribeteado de luz y musica. AlIa, afiejo el saber que brota en la alegria de vivir. Aca, Ie pongo alas a mis proyectos para hacerlos realidad. Aprendo que vivir la profundidad es ser sembrador. Es esparcir por todos lados, con las manos llenas de estrellas, como platos de arroz, el gusto de ser y vivir con plenitud en toda mi integridad. Amigo de busqueda: no dejes de prodigar la miel que se cultiva en la pausa, ni abandones la empresa ruidosa que baja en la catarata del trabajo diario. Conservate y entregate en medio de la superficie monotona de la gran ciudad que en su hervir asfixiante, todo 10 carcome y devora. Protege tu secreto sin olvidar jamas la espuma de la olas que transportan la generosidad de la palabra. Rezumete agua bendita, al final de cada dia en la playa que siempre confia. Abandona tu cansancio en brazos de su arrullo. Despliegate en la posibilidad total de tu ser. Nacho. EL SENTIDO DE LA PROFUNDIDAD

Esta experiencia hipnagogica que acabo de narrar, esta llena de riqueza para damos luz en nuestra aproximaci6n al senti do de la profundidad. Recuerdo en mis afios de bach iller, una pregunta que expresaba constantemente en clase de filosofia: l,que es la profundidad? EI profesor solo me decia que era la cualidad de la filosofia. Me quede sin una respuesta que me satisficiera. Mas tarde qued6 ligada a la experiencia comunitaria del compromiso. Era la epoca preparatoria a los movimientos sociales y estudiantiles que irian de 1965 a 1968. Me decia en mis momentos de cavilar: hay que vivir profundamente. Cada instante en su plenitud porque es este y nunca mas. Habia que comprometerse sin guardar nada para si. 0 todo

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o nada. La profundidad, se alcanzaba, tirandose un clavado en el oceano del compromiso. Nada de medias tintas. Lo contrario a la profundidad era 10 mediocre, 10 chato. Deseo compartir con ustedes, el reto que inicio ahora, para encontrar un sentido a la realidad, cualidad 0 vivencia de la profundidad. Despues de estudiar el pensamiento de Descartes y descubrir la enorme influencia que tuvo en la posteridad, me decidi a saber mas de eI. Aun me maravilla las grandes aportaciones que sus estudios de 6ptica nos proporcionan y me preguntaba c6mo podrian ligarse con los fen6menos estudiados por los psic6logos de la guestalt en el campo de la percepci6n. Me imagino el mundo carte siano colocado en dos coordenadas, tal como el las visualiz6 en su geometria. Ahora bien, si yo me quiero ver en un espejo bajo su modelo, no puedo hacerlo. Yeo un maniqui. Su espejo es plano. Es un espacio de dos dimensiones. En cambio, en nuestro mundo, si yo me yeo en el espejo casi diria que siento mi proio vibrar, como en el ejemplo de Merleau-Ponty al ver un hombre con su pip a, no s6lo yeo el reflejo de este y su pipa, sino parece que capto el calor que bulle en la luna. En el mundo cartesiano, nada es de carne; to do son lineas y figuras. Al querer Iiberar al espacio, 10 dej6 sin profundidad. Su obra es un ensayo que no acepta 10 visible y 10 reconstruye segun su propio modelo. Lo visto es 10 pensado. Por eso en su Tratado de las pasiones del alma nos ilustra acerca de c6mo Ia raz6n gobierna al cuerpo. En el, el mapa crea la realidad. Por este camino no hallo claridad, pero s! un aprendizaje: l,que me puede ensenar al ver? El mundo de la pintura me abri6 otra alternativa. l,Que sucede con ese famoso punto de la perspectiva? Es algo as! como el centro de un disco que atrae mi vista y llama mi atenci6n. Es un embudo en el que converge 10 ancho y 10 largo, elevandose al infinito. Es una ventana en la que me introduzco mas alIa de 10 plano. El punto de perspectiva es la clave de toda visi6n. Aqui se inicia el mundo de la ilusi6n. Kohler narra una investigaci6n ligada a la experiencia de la visi6n, con respecto a los hechos llamados post-eJectos de las figuras. Gibson en 1930 encontr6 que si miramos durante un lapso una curva que geometricamente es parte de un circulo muy grande, se hace gradualmente mas plana; se aproxima en su aspecto a la linea recta. Si despues se examina una recta que pase por el medio de la curva anteriormente

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vista, esta parece curva en direccion opuesta a la primera curva, como en la figura siguiente: 1

La profundidad es la ilusion de una ilusion. En un cuadro, yeo la profundidad y no existe. Es una dimension en la que yo soy en la pintura. He observado los cuadros y las fotografias de caballos y de otros ani males en movimiento y si tienen las cuatro patas en el aire, parece que est{m saltando y no corriendo. Para lograr este efecto, es necesario que al menos una pata toque la tierra y otras vayan en el aire. Solo asi se capta el movimiento. Es otra ilusion, puesto que no existe, sin embargo, yo vivo la experiencia del movimiento que me evoca aquel cuadro. La profundidad es una dimension de limite entre el hombre y su mundo. El color, han afirmado algunos pintores, es el lugar donde se junta el cerebro y el universo. Por eso hay color envoltura que pinta al espacio-envoltura y el color que llega al corazon de las cosas. Existe un color que solo roza la superficie de las cosas y otro que va a la profundi dad 0 mejor dicho que permite emerger la profundidad que de-vela el ser del otro que hace patente su mas alIa de la fachada. En un texto sumamente revelador, Merleau-Ponty escribe: Yeo la profundidad y ella no es visible, puesto que se encuentra entre nuestro cuerpo y las cosas, y estamos pegados a el ... En la linea que une mis ojos al horizonte, el primer plano esconde para siempre a los otras pianos y si lateralmente creo ver los objetos esealonados, es porque no se oeultan del todo; los veo entonees uno fuera del otro, de aeuerdo con un aneho eortado de otra manera. Siempre sa esta de este lado de la profundidad 0 mas alia ... 2

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Aprender aver es la antesala de la experiencia de la profundidad. Abundando en una idea de Perls, considero que el "neurotico" no puede profundizar. Su vida toca su propia superficie. No vive. Mecaniza su proceso de irla pasando, aburriendose y neg{mdose a vivir plenamente. Su crisis existencial manifiesta su vivirse parcialmente. El paso anterior a la profundizacion, que es saber distinguir su figura primordial, no esta desarrollado y por tanto, no sabe discriminar: vive en la confusion, en la mediocridad. Asi como en la imagen del cuadro, en que ha de haber un contacto con la realidad; la vivencia del neur6tico adolesce de el. Parece que esta saltando, hace piruetas para escabullirse, trata de concluir cada experiencia sin lograr alcanzarlo. Es un maripos6n, para emplear el termino popular que describe al varon que no puede echar raices con nadie, ni crear relaciones permanentes. Es el aventurero incapaz de ligarse en un acto de libertad en el que se comprometa enteramente. Es la mujer que tiene que ejercer su poder de seduccion una y otra vez para demostrarse a si misma que es valiosa y creer que sus conquistadores en verdad la necesitan. Ambos viven brincando y la vida, aunque da saltos de vez en cuando, es movimiento; es una carrera de fondo. Una representacion altamente sugestiva del mismo Merleau-Ponty me apuntala en esta refIexion al decir que la profundidad ... es mi participaci6n en un ser sin restricci6n, ante todo el ser del espacio mas alia de cualquier punto de vista ... 3

Aprender a profundizar es aprender a ver mas aila de La apariencia aL ser; mas alla de la ideologia, al hombre vivo en carne y hueso en el abanico de sus posibilidades y en el centro de sus realizaciones, saber y testimoniar que afortunadamente es mas de 10 que aparece a nuestra primera mirada. La terapia es ese instrumento que propicia al hombre al mirar, encontrarse consigo mismo en todas sus dimensiones como 10 explica Zinker en su propuesta sobre las polaridades. La terapia recupera el poder que el hombre ha perdido por la dispersion, colocandolo al servicio de la propia reconstruccion y en su volver a amarse 0 empezar a amarse con toda la fuerza de su decision, como un ser que nace y emerge a sus propios ojos, como un ser que vale la pen a de ser amado por ser el mismo. La terapia es una obra de amor que lleva a los hombres a amarse a si mismos. Las cosas brotan a mi vista como rivales porque estan en su lugar. Algo semejante sucede con mis sentimientos hacia los demas ya que mi corazon, cuando no sabe ver, precisa todo en su lugar. Todo son

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cosas para e1. La profundidad puede salvarnos. Delaunay 10 expreso soberbiamente: La profundidad es la nueva inspiracion. 4

Esta nueva inspiracion me lleva a saber que la profundidad en mis sentimientos, es la propiciacion de mi ser-en-el-otro. La profundidad es la vida de la conciencia en el universo. No basta darse cuenta de . . . , es necesario saber con que intensidad ha de realizarse y sobre todo, despues en donde sembrare para florecer. Esa tierra abonada es la profundidad. El terapeuta es un hortelano que prepara el surco. Yo no voy a la profundidad, es mas bien ella quien me habita. Es el horizonte de mi existencia. Estoy traspasado por la profundidad. Es ella la que me permite emerger. El artista pinta para surgir. Con su herramienta esculpe al mundo y en el, a si mismo. Cada arte moldea al artista. El terapeuta hace y se hace a si mismo en su labor. Asi como el pintor vive en la fascinacion, el terapeuta puede hacerlo si aprende aver elevarse de la profundidad, la chi spa de la vida que palpita en su paciente como un diamante escondido. En la encrucijada del movimiento y el espacio, se engendra la dimension de la profundidad y en su despliegue, aparece la irradiacion de un si-mismo. La profundidad existe en el mundo del hombre. Es el espacio donde se personaliza. La terapia es cooperadora para que la persona recupere ese espacio en donde cada hombre accede plenamente a su vocacion de hombre. LA ESFERA DE LA VIVENCIA

Los estudios de Phillip Lersch sobre el matiz de las emociones, me han aportado mucho para mi investigacion. Las emociones no solo se distinguen por tener distintas cualidades endotimicas, sino tambien por el grado de profundidad que alcanzan. Precisa decir que es el grado en que la cualidad endotimica especifica para cada emocion, impregna de algun modo toda la vida animica. Percibo presente aquel sentido de expansion que habia enunciado y ahora se confirma. Lersch define asi la profundidad: Una emocion es tanto mas profunda cuanto mayor territorio de la vida animica esta incluido en su esfera y recibe de ella su colorido y matiz. 5

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Si tenemos una vida animica profunda, los contenidos parciales de nuestra experiencia cotidiana, recibinin una cualidad de totalidad, de significacion, de trascendencia y de relacion reciproca. Se de algunas personas que al oir una sinfonia quedan impavidas. Como reza el dicho popular ... por un lado les entra y por el otro les sale. En cambio seglin sus biografos, el Leon Rojo de Alemania, Beethoven, al componer la novena sinfonia, se fue inflamando de una emocion que Ie llevo primero a pensar en la grandeza del hombre. Su encuentro con la fuerza y debilidad de la humanidad 10 trans porto al segundo movimiento en el que el am or reline al universo y grita Dios es amor. En el tercer estadio piensa en Dios. l,Que seria el hombre sin Dios? Al contemplar la luz de la melodia sintio que Dios gobiema al Universo. El amor nos salva del absurdo y nos redime. Habia agotado todos los instrumentos y al no caber mas en el, llamo al propio hombre para cantar. Todo esto l,a dondo iria sin la alegria? Era el himno profetico que antecederia a Scheler en contra del deber kantiano que achataria el gusto por vivir. Es la oda al brotar el nuevo dia. La profundidad es la amplitud en que vivo mi proceso de personalizacion. En este sentido, profundidad es grandeza. Las vivencias profundas tienden a dejar una huella en nosotros. Son testimonio. Expresan la impregnacion de totalidad con que nos experienciamos a nosotros mismos. Baste contrastar la alegria con la diversion, el amor con el enamoramiento, por citar algunas emociones. Las emociones tienen una serie de vertientes, tal como aparecen en el siguiente esquema:

-Contenidos del horizonte vivencial _cualidad -Tonalidad { (Temple actual) endotlmica -Profundidad

Emociones -Contenidos del centro vivencial

-Moci6n

-Intensidad mocional. Configuraci6n mocional

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Cada hombre es capaz de experienciar en formas especificas y diferentes sus vivencias. Ya por su realidad 6ntica, personol6gica, circunstancial, educativa, etc. Pero estoy segura que hay un momenta a partir del cual, cada uno decide expansionar esa capacidad 0 reducirla. Existe una capacidad vivencial y podemos aprender a desarrollarla o a bloquearla. Hay personas que pueden llegar a la incapacidad vivencial 0 impotencia emocional para quienes hay un vacio axiol6gico como 10 demuestra Camus en su obra El extranjero 0 como el personaje de Ibsen en su drama John Gabriel Borkman que reclama: Desde el tiempo en que tu imagen empez6 a borrarse en m! he vivido como bajo un eclipse de sol. En todos estos alios cada vez me ha costado mas el amar a una criatura viviente, hasta que al fin ha lIegado a serme imposible. Ni a personas, ni a animales ni plantas.

Para ellos, su fondo vital ha perdido resonancia sin que el sujeto se de cuenta. Caen en la indiferencia. Puede quedarse en 10 que se llamaba antes sentimiento de la perdida de sentimientos. Un caso es la autoaniquilaci6n, en la que el sujeto se vive como esteril. Puede ser el m6vil de una criatura sistematica y demoledora que se venga con resentimiento de 10 mas noble y digno que hay en los otros; de aqui resulta su ironia y cinismo. Sucede tambien en el caso de la pedanteria 0 la realizaci6n de muchas actividades sin alma. Por ultimo el esplin con el cual un individuo demuestra cuan aburrido 0 indiferente Ie deja todo. Pasare a un nuevo estadio que es el umbral de la vivencia, llamado por Klages, Excitabilidad emocional personal. En estos hombres, motivos insignificantes despiertan sus sentimientos, mientras en otros se requieren de motivaciones mas fuertes. Este termino expresa la relaci6n entre la magnitud de los estimulos y los sentimientos producidos. Ejemplo claro tenemos en la diversidad de materiales inflamables. No hay que confundir encender con permanecer. La tercera perspectiva desde la cual se atisba la vivencia, es la profundidad. Por un lado hay sentimientos mas profundos unos que otros; por ejemplo el odio, el amor y la alegria, a diferencia del enamoramiento, el placer y la burla. Por otro lado varia tambien segun la realidad de cada persona. El neur6tico no puede distinguir los niveles de profundidad de sus vivencias, ni de sus relaciones. Confunde una relaci6n inmediata con una de tiempo y se entrega sin mas. S610 encontrara heridas en su vida y apareceran las famosas decepciones. El verdadero amor no es fuego de paja. Requiere su tiempo de afiejamiento y cuidado, tal como 10 apuntaba Mounier:

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Un gran amor siempre empieza por entrar a hierro y fuego.

El hombre en franco proceso de desarrollo, sabe distinguir estos niveles y hace de su vida y sus relaciones, un proceso gradual de profundizaci6n. Anecdota ilustrativa usa Antoine de Saint-Exupery en el dialogo del zorro y el principito. Aquelle pide ser domesticado. Para ella hay que irse acercando poco a poco. Cada vez mas. Aprender a comunicarse en un tiempo, para que el coraz6n se prepare esperando la Hamada y salte de gozo ante la presencia del amado que se aproxima. El neur6tico en su falta de autoapoyo, se prodiga desparramandose. Considera que asi 10 tendran en cuenta y sera requerido por los demas. S610 se habra regalado a un desconocido que mas tarde 10 botara y desechara como lata vacia e inservible. Ya 10 us6. Puede tirarlo a la basura. La vivencia profunda no depende de su bondad 0 maldad sino del nivel de entrega como 10 intuy6 Don Miguel de Unamuno. Mas min, su intensidad es 10 que Ie da su sentido etico. En los temperamentos con vivencias profundas, la intimidad, en la que resuena como valioso 0 no el horizonte objetivo de la existencia, es el punto culminante y el nucleo en torno al cual gira y se proyecta la vida del hombre. 6

En torno a la profundidad se abre el horizonte de valores en que el hombre centra su existencia y a la luz de los cuales orienta su vida. Es una persona con fundamento. Este hombre sabe que en cada de-cisi6n se juega el peso de su historia. El neur6tico no puede elegir, porque sabe que definirse es entregarse. Su vida superficial 10 distrae para no donarse. No quiere ser libre. Jaspers, en cambio, revela la identidad de la libertad: Esa libertad no esta vacia, esta vinculada solo a 10 trascendente, es por de pronto realidad del alma, profundidad de contenido, seriedad del obrar interior. 7

En el sentido antropol6gico, el hombre se va hasta el fondo del por-venir, construido en cada presente, vivido en toda su anchura. La profundidad es la ramificaci6n de mi ser. Me parece un faro que ilumina el proceso de personalizaci6n: darse es el unico media de crearse como persona. LA PROFUNDIDAD, EN LA DESPERSONALIZACION Y LA PERSONALIZACION

La terapia no busca el afuera de la actividades en movimiento, sino sus signos ocultos. Por eso es un aprendizaje a la profundizaci6n. A veces

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olvido que el sufrimiento en el camino de la personalizaci6n, se debe a que cada hombre tiene dificultades en alcanzar el centro de su ser. Tambien se que 10 importante es c6mo cada quien se trans-forma. C6mo cada quien se metamorfosea. El terapeuta es el visionario del cambio y no puede darse a otro como persona, si no se conserva a si mismo, es decir, si no permanece como diferente. Recuperar el pensamiento simb61ico es una de las tareas urgentes de la terapia. Volver a jugar con nuestras fantasias es vital en nuestra sociedad tecnica y creativamente empobrecida. Asi podremos rescatar nuestra capacidad de autorrepresentaci6n. En el simbolo, me identifico y me reconozco. Todo esto s610 es posible en el espacio fertil de la profundidad tal como nos 10 muestra Wilson Van Dusen en su hermoso estudi'J La profundidad natural en el hombre, en don de ha echado mana del pensamiento fecundo de Emmanuel Swedenborg, pensador sueco del siglo XVII y de Gabriel Marcel, fi16sofo frances del Siglo XX. Para abrirnos el apetito, cito un texto suyo muy orientador: EI hombre encuentra el camino hacia su destino s610 en la medida en que 10 acompaiia la capacidad de escuchar la voz del ser y la facultad de admitirlo como un poder transformador. 8

El recobrar la busqueda de la vida interior, es salvaguardar a ese "otro yo" que soy yo mismo en mi dimensi6n secreta. El camino de la profundidad hacia si mismo, esUi, sembrado de espinas. Al recorrerio, dejamos jirones de nosotros y aprendemos a caminar con heroismo. Nuestro ser es un castillo 0 como 10 llama SaintEx, una ciudadela; y no la conocemos ya que no Ie hemos explorado, ni fecundado. La persona me parece vista, como un ser-hacia-otro y en el otro polo se caracteriza: por el latido de una vida secreta en la que parece destilar incesantemente su riqueza 9

Con estas palabras describe Mounier la vida personal en su dimensi6n de repliegue que no es 10 opuesto a la comunicaci6n, sino una pulsaci6n complementaria. Asi nace el-sobre-si, conocido como recogimiento. Es el cruce donde se unen la vida exterior y la interior. EI hombre puede olvidarla y vivir tan s610 en la superficie. Es la diversion de Pascal, el estado estetico

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de Kierkegaard, la vida inautentica de Heidegger, la alienaci6n de Marx, la mala fe de Sartre. Este hombre vive expulsado fuera de S1, confundido en el tumulto exterior. Es el hombre de la distracci6n. La vida personal empieza con la capacidad de romper con el mundo exterior, de recobrarse, de recuperarse, con miras a recogerse en un centro; a unificarse. En esta experiencia se fundan los valores del silencio y del retiro. Quiero invitarlos a revalorar el sentido del odo, el gusto por el tiempo que corre y la paciencia por la obra que madura. No es una rumiaci6n fetida. Un acto 10 inicia y un acto 10 cierra. AS1 fIorece mi presencia dirigida al mundo. Este recogimiento persigue en las profundidades mi presencia activa y sin fondo. Es el lugar donde habita mi libertad y es por S1 mismo, no inventariable. Hablo ahora de el-en-sf, que es la vida del secreto. Las gentes totalmente volcadas al exterior, expuestas permanentemente, no tienen densidad. Se agotan pronto. La reserva en la expresion, la discrecion, es el homenaje que la persona rinde a su infinidad interior ... 10

Aparece el pudor como uno de los temas privilegiados en las escuelas personalistas, ya que este expresa el sentimiento que tiene la persona de no agotarse en sus exteriorizaciones y de verse amenazada por quien qui era confundir su existencia manifiesta, por su existencia total. El pudor corporal, no expresa impureza, sino que soy infinitamente mas que este cuerpo mirado 0 tornado. Siempre soy mas de todo 10 que puedo ser percibido. No estoy avergonzado de mi desnudez, sino de que crean que eso es todo 10 que soy. Ante el amado, la desnudez se torna transparencia y mi cuerpo poes1a. La intimidad surge como la alegria de redescubrir las fuentes interiores y refrescarse en elIas."

En el hombre despersonalizado, este sentimiento se halla bloqueado. Aunque la fuente existe, la ha taponeado y su pozo se encuentra seco. Su oasis interior ha perdido la sombra y la frescura. Por eso se muere de hast10. Esta vaciedad nos ha llevado a perder la capacidad de sorprendernos. Este individuo no se asombra ante S1 mismo. Se ve chato y mon6tono. Este hombre no puede re-descubrir el mapa de su mente en cada momento. Vive desorientado. Sus voces interiores no 10 avivan, en todo caso 10 evaden y dispersan, si es que las oye. El hombre de todos los tiempos, tiene miedo de atreverse a habitar

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su morada interior. Adentramos en este espacio es prepararnos para la locura. La locura apoya el poder de convertimos en 10 que queremos ser. Hay otro tipo de locura, la despersonalizaci6n, en la que aprendemos y vivimos un mal modo de adaptamos a la compania de los demas. La locura en sus formas, engendra una vivencia de soledad. Van Dusen afirma que en el segundo tipo de locura ... el si mismo ha naufragado en su trato consigo mismo. 12

La locura es disociaci6n. Es el naufragio de si mismo. En el proceso de despersonalizaci6n, se llega a un sentimiento nihilista frente a la vida. Hay estados melanc61icos, con un impulso muy intenso al suicidio en los que el hombre esta en una desesperaci6n real y desesperanzadora. Para el ya no existe nada. Su profundidad es un abismo que los conduce al agujero destructor de la nada. El tampoco existe. Es una figuraci6n absurda de si mismo. Un sin sentido. Como escribiera Sartre, un milagro sin interes. En sus ideas delirantes, imagina su cuerpo podrido, hueco. El afecto que vive es la desesperaci6n. El hombre nihilista sobrevive mientras hay algun punto de apoyo. Cuando estas evidencias desaparecen, se derrumba por completo. Un ejemplo es el esceptico, en esencia, para quien nada es verdad. Termina derrotado en su evidencia intelectual. El escepticismo se vuelve una vivencia martirizante. No existe ningun apoyo del mundo. Ni siquiera de sl mismo. Por inseguridad e inconsistencia, busca refugio el hombre y se arma de una envoltura, como 10 es una concepci6n del mundo filos6fica sistematica. Algo semejante sucede en los procesos llamados esquizofrenicos, en los que a una epoca dolorosa de inseguridad, sigue otra de cierto contento en el delirio. En un momenta agudo con Juan, una persona psic6tica, ya intemada varias veces en distintos centros psiquiatricos, vivimos 10 siguiente: J:

Hermano Miguel, i,por que vienes? i,Por que todas estas viejas se asustan?

Son ur.as mujeres de la calle. Ahi andaban besandose en los coches. Prostitutas. Dios la castigara. Ahahhaha.

Se refiere a su esposa a quien golpe6, sus cuiiados y familiares de ella.

Profiere gritos estruendosos y potentes, acompaiiados de golpes fuertes en mi pecho y mis brazos. Empieza a hablar

332

MIGUEL JARQUIN M. en nahuatl e invocar a los dioses. Se dobla. Empieza a lIorar.

M:

iQue te pasa? ique sientes?

AI mismo tiempo me aproximo. Le doy una palm ada en la espalda. Lo invito a salir de la casa y caminar. Es alto, blanco, fuerte - como un roble. Salimos y empezamos a caminar.

J:

Miguel. Me prohibieron terminar el rito de purificaci6n para salvar el alma de mi madre

Entre sollozos. Su cara cambia. De la tristeza - puesta en un amarillo de pan de cera, a una cara roja y explosiva.

Ve, ve: en mi trabajo Ie digo a la gente que no com pre esa comi da putrefacta que esta enlatada.

Gesticula y prosigue con un timde voz atacante.

Todo apesta.

Sue Ita un grito estremecedor y - me abraza con una fuerza para - romperme los huesos.

M:

i Quieres hacer algo en ese momenta para mejorar esa situaci6n?

J:

Ahahah ...

Empieza a cantar en nlihuatl y bailar a mi alrededor en medio de la calle. Aplaude, agacha la cabeza y se dobla como danzante indigena.

Miguel a salvar el alma de mi madre. No me abandones. Consigue que regrese a la sierra y ill se mi compaiiero de ceremonia.

Se acerca. Me abraza y hunde su cabeza. Llora. Descansa. Respira hondo y me pide regresar a la casa de sus suegros y cuiiados donde vive con su esposa por el miedo a ser golpeado. Regresamos. Asombrados 10 - miran y me miran. Lo acompaiio a - su cuarto. EI pavor invade la sala. - EI se duerme. Yo me despido.

De esta experiencia deduzco que la profundidad en el sujeto despersonalizado, es vivida como impotencia que se convierte en energia aniquiladora. Es el hombre que amandolo todo, por su aprendizaje

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erroneo y su inde-cision, de-cide reducir al ser, a la nada. Como escribiera Marcel: ... 10 que no se hace par Amor y para el Amar, term ina, invariablemente, por hacerse contra el amor ... 13

Tristemente capto que la destructividad es el fruto de la vida no vivida. Su profundo amor se cambia en profundo odio. En el filme de BenHur, el capitan del barco azota en la espalda a Juda, quien se voltea y 10 mira con sus ojos inflamados de sangre y candentes de ira. EI romano dice al galeote judlo: ... estas lie no de odio. No 10 pierdas. Eso te hl! permitido sobrevivir.

Carl Rogers ha llegado a una descripcion paralela. Afirma que la enfermedad es el iinico camino que a algunos hombres les quedo para crecer. En el umbral de la experiencia personalizadora, podemos detectar que el nihilismo puede ser un escalon psicologicamente inevitable, cuando la vida desea llegar a la autoconciencia. Jaspers nos hace una semblanza de esta vivencia: Todo 10 nuestro, 10 definitivo ha de ser puesto primeramente en cuesti6n, ha de ser arrastrado al callej6n sin salida del nihilismo, si ha de originarse una nueva forma de vida. 14

Al nihilismo se Ie supera experienciandolo. Enterrandolo, para que al morir, surja convertido en vida nueva. En credibilidad esperanzadora. Hegel conocio el nihilismo a traves de 10 que llamo mediacion. Nietzsche fue quien Ie dio forma al pedir aguantar resignadamente todas las tempestades del nihilismo para precisamente en ellas conocer la vida y a pesar de to do eso, mantenerse en Sl mismo. El ser aterrado y perplejo ante el nihilismo pregunta: l,donde puedo encontrar apoyo? La terapia busca aportar un servicio para que ese hombre atonito y desolado, pueda en su profundidad, escarbar, hallar su propio autoapoyo y confiar en que los demas hombres estan de su parte. La terapia facilita el acceso del hombre a convertirse en senor de Sl mismo. Es una tecnica en favor de la vida. De la autonomla. Cerca del final de esta aproximacion, descubro que la profundidad es una senal en el proceso personalizador que me dice: afortunadamente aiin hay ser-mas-alla. No te detengas. Puedes seguir adelante en la realizacion de tu propio proyecto. Percibo con esto que otro de los fines de la terapia es ensenar al

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hombre el arte de amar, amarse y amar a los demas y por ende, a ser libre. S610 quien ama, es capaz de decidir. De asumir una de-cisi6n al servicio de la vida. Admiro al terapeuta que se convierte en un profesional en favor del amor, de la libertad y en el limite, de la paz, porque se vuelve un colaborador para que el hombre encuentre su lugar en-elmundo, como ser-en-el-mundo, y aprender a habitarlo y habitarse desde su propio poder hacia su poder-ser. La punta al otro extrema de la profundidad destructiva del hombre despersonalizado vivido en el aislamiento egoista, es el extasis, la experiencia mistica y creadora que hace de la locura, la vivencia plena del proceso personalizante. EI demente asusta con su poder a los normales y 10 encierran en el manicomio; el loco asusta a todos cuando es arrebatado en el carro de fuego y Ie piden que se cubra la cara por que la tiene plet6rica de luz 0 10 matan y 10 convierten en una hermosa leyenda. La profundidad me abre el espacio para vivir en el horizonte de mis posibilidades y creer en ellos. La profundidad es el trampolin del optimismo que se hace patente en la alegria. Profeticamente Rollo May apunta que la Alegria es la experiencia de la posibilidad, la conciencia de la libertad del que afronta su destino. 15

Mi profundidad ilumina la perspectiva ilimitada de mi autorrealizaci6n. Es tierra fertil en donde el terapeuta puede preparar el surco y el paciente, regocijarse al sembrar con sus propias manos. La profundidad se aloja en el misterio de las personas y he encontrado que cada hombre, desde su situaci6n, a su modo y por su propio camino converge hacia el cielo de la utopia en donde con muchas dolencias y cargados de fe, construimos la ciudad de la fratemidad. Para terminar esta exposici6n en medio de ustedes y ante ustedes, me voy a permitir recordar la cita del principio: Desde mi estrecha prison llame a mi Senor y el me contest6 desde el espacio en libertad.

Amigos, esa es la profundidad: mi espacio en libertad. NOTAS 1

2 3

Cfr. Wolfgang Kohler, PsicoLogia de La forma, Cap. III, p. 133. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ELo)o y eL espiritu, Cap. III, p. 35. Ibid.

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Delaunay, citado por G. Charbonier, Le monologue du peintre, p. 175. Phillip Lersch, La estructura de la personalidad. Parte General. Cap. II part. 2a, p. 191. 6 Phillip Lersch, Ob. Cit. Dif. Inds. D., p. 262. 7 Karl Jaspers, Entre el destino y la voluntad, p. 228. 8 Wilson Van Dusen, La profundidad natural del hombre, p. 13. 9 Emmanuel Mounier, El personalismo, Cap. III, p. 26 "A". iO Emmanuel Mounier, Ob. Cit., p. 27 "A". 11 Emmanuel Mounier, Ob. Cit., p. 27 "B". 12 Wilson Van Dusen, La profundidad natural del hombre, Cap. 9, p. 136. 13 Gabriel Marcel, El peligro de la tecnica para la obra preparada por Federico Delclaux, El silencio creador, p. 335. 14 Karl Jaspers, Psicologia de las concepciones del mundo, Cap. III A II, p. 395. 15 Rollo May, Libertad y destino en psicoterapia, Cap. 13,4, p. 203. 4

5

BIBLIOGRAFIA Charbonier, G., Le monologue du peintre (Paris, 1960). Dusen, Wilson Van, La profundidad natural del hombre. Cuatro Vientos Editorial (Santiago de Chile, 1977). Jaspers, Karl, Entre el destino y la voluntad. Ed. Guadarram (Madrid, 1969), Psicologia de las concepciones del mundo. Ed. Gredos (Madrid, 1967). Kohler, Wolfgang, Psicologia de la forma. Biblioteca Nueva (Madrid, 1972). Lersch, Phillip, La estructura de la personalidad. Ed. Scientia (Barcelona, 1971). May, Rollo, Libertad y destino en psicoterapia. Desclee de Brouwer (Bilbao, 1988). Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. El ojo y el espiritu. Paidos Studio (Barcelona, 1985). Mounier, Emmanuel, El personalismo. Eudeba (Buenos Aires, 1968).

MARY ROSE BARRAL

INTERSUBJECTIVE COMMUNICATION AND PSYCHO-IMPAIRMENT

Effective communication, a natural need for human beings, is of prime importance for mentally-healthy living; thus, Professor Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. She calls this possibility of intersubjective exchange "transaction." This type of relation refers specifically to a contemporary method of group therapy, "transactional analysis," which involves the participants in a free exchange of thoughts and feelings, gathered from each one's personal experience; such revelations are expected to bear as fruit a psychic improvement of mutual relations, domestic and social. This therapy is based on a special concept of the ego: each person lives three distinct stages, child, adult, parent, which must be wisely balanced. Tymieniecka makes use of the term "transitional relation" to express her conception of the intersubjective exchange which is the normal means of interpersonal communication. Yet, from her article, "The Moral Sense and the Human Person,,,1 it appears that she is not using the term in question either as used in psychoanalytical therapy, or as in simply normal relations. It seems that she wants to give it a new meaning, indicating something special, besides the exchange of ideas, impressions, and feelings as indicated above. This reciprocal relation should be promoted and stimulated to obtain the psychological betterment of the patient. How can it be realized? If we study Tymieniecka's detailed description of the various steps of the person's dissent towards the psychic and social disintegration she affirms is needed for the cure, it is very difficult to conceive how we can possibly return the "patients" to the vital/social well-being of coexistence, much less their own personal re-edification. But Tymieniecka proposes a method of assured success, if all the rules prescribed are faithfully observed. Her analysis of the patient's gradual loss of personal integration of the harmonious functioning of all the human faculties, accompanied by detachment and total indifference towards cultural objects, other persons and themselves, seems to indicate unequivocally the remedy: after the deconstruction, reconstruction follows naturally. Precisely because the patients have lost interest in their own life, even neglecting the most elementary personal cares, it does not seem possible to reactivate a fire already extinguished. 337 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 337-341. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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Tymieniecka's idea is splendid, but of very difficult actualization. That does not mean that the plan outlined is without merit. On the contrary, it will be most useful, but probably only in the cases of persons not totally deprived of consciousness of self, of hope, and of that self-love which is indispensable to life. She then introduces us to the psychiatrist, Kazimierz D~browski, an important support to her philosophical investigation. Two terms are used to describe the types of actions involved in the therapy; "deconstruction" and "construction." The human subjects, advancing in their progressive personal and social constitution of their selves, drop (deconstruction) programs and projects already surpassed. Pathology results only when, following a phase of dissolution, no constructive design follows. D~browski maintains that such a mechanism of deconstruction and reconstruction of the psychic design is the vehicle of human development. He also attributes the activity of this development to the psychic neuronal potentiality of growth. It is to this same potentiality that the creativity, to which we attribute such an important role, develops towards a progressive and constructive life-course. According to Tymieniecka, D~browski maintains that the development of the person, physiologically and socially, depends on the strength and intensity of the psychic/neuronal potentiality. When individuals improve, excel, and surge to a higher level or fall back for lack of vigor into a degenerative situation, it is still the original potentiality which is responsible for either results. The process construction/disintegration is then the means of personal development. Nevertheless, the neuro/psychic potential is not the sole factor of human progress. Society, the environment, the attitudes of the "others" toward an individual can either promote or impede growth, from without, while the creative impulse, always at work, depends entirely on the interior personal resources. The most surprising thing which Tymieniecka points out is that the psycho-neurosis, far from being a pathological condition, mental or emotional, is to be considered the vehicle for personal growth and development. There seems to be a problem as Tymieniecka says that we must consider that the phase of disintegration of the abnormal individual, if the societal conditions are favorable, added to the stimuli of creativity, may bring the subject to high levels of spirituality in a life which simultaneously will accede to normality. The puzzle is this: if the psychoneurotic is not sick, abnormal, why expect a return to "normality?" Perhaps the significance is this: the psycho-neurotic does not suffer a

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mental of emotional sickness, but is only in a state of crisis, which sooner or later will resolve itself. This supposition deserves serious study in the concrete. This theory, if accepted, would become the basis for a vastly different therapy from that which considers not the crisis, but the pathological condition in the person caught in a psycho-neurotic trauma. If this exceptional state - let us say "abnormal" for lack of a better term - were truly a phase in the psycho-social life of the individual, pretty much as other crises of life, the reaction of society would be quite different. The alienation which only too often afflicts the mentally ill would have no reason to be, because the "crisis" would be acknowledged as a result of the human condition. Cultures, specialized by regions and times, often define quite arbitrarily the norms according to which persons can be judged acceptable subjects for a given society. Speaking of nature and of the human condition, we need acknowledge the basic endowments of humanity which belong to every person and cannot be forfeited. The human characteristics can well be eclipsed by psychic crises, by sickness, and by innumerable events and situations inherent in the human condition, but human beings are not less human for whatever befalls them. When the animating spirit cannot manifest itself for want of body-soul integration, then an unusual condition occurs, clearly outside the norm, different from the habitual specific personal expression. Merleau-Ponty's notion of the various degrees of integration between flesh and spirit - body and soul - describes the varying levels of consciousness and will-acts. He states that when the integration fails totally the result is death. Tymieniecka, in her article, also refers to the persistence of the human essence, 1) in the will, intimately related to freedom, by which the patient may come to the decision of seeking a remedy to the affliction suffered; and 2) in the dignity proper to the person which is not lost, and cannot be considered lost even when the dissolution is such that it may seem useless to attempt a human contact, besides the purely biological one. This point is worthy of deep study. Tymieniecka thinks that in trying to reconstruct the lost personality of the patients it is necessary to build on the perfection already attained by them prior to the disintegration, and then aim the therapy to that which must be the pivot of their cultural, spiritual, aesthetic and moral life. She bases many of her reflections on the thought of Ludwig Binswanger, who joins the philosophical analysis to the psychiatric one in order to have a better grasp of the reality of human existence.

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Binswanger defines the human situation (as Merleau-Ponty also described it) in terms of the space/time of the Lebenswelt (life-world) and of individual action. That which is new in Tymieniecka's interpretation is the introduction of a specific study of the interior life of the person consisting of: 1. The conception of the inventive/creative self-interpretation in which the human being constructs his own existence; 2. The basic conception of the human person as the meaning-bestowing functional system with an inventive/creative agent at its center.2 The inventive/creative agent at the center would be the self - the conscious self - responsible for the total existential activity. These two main ideas warrant a full study, but, briefly, we can say that they require amplification. The notion of a system does not seem appropriate to a person gifted with a creative power giver of significant meaning. The system appears impersonal; could it be artificial? Leaving aside these observations, we consider the basic tenet of Tymieniecka's theory, her program for meeting the subjects on the brink of existence. As already noted, the rehabilitation needs to be worked out through an approach to the community by way of "transactional relation." This is not a new notion, for it has been known that the illness results from a refusal to communicate, hence the need for relation. Tymieniecka is firmly convinced that there is in each person a plan of life exclusively personal, yet related to the world, ready to be developed; this schema can be utilized in the therapy for the reconstruction of the lost identity of the patient. There is a great deal of valuable insight in these suggestions. As a theory, it is highly commendable; what is needed is the confirmation of its validity by a good number of trials. It is entirely possible that some subjects may respond positively to the treatment, but it is perhaps too optimistic to expect total success. It is reasonable to maintain the principles and the types of therapies devised as ends in view for possible future developments, in line with research and psychological advances, always conscious of the dignity of human beings, respecting them in all circumstances. Intersubjective relations require nothing less. This was but a sampling of Tymieniecka's thought; the full text of her lengthy article presents her theory in its most significant details.

Gannon University

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NOTES I "The Moral Sense and the Human Person within the Fabric of Communal Life," Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XX, 3-100; Reidel Publishing Company, 1986. 2 "The Moral Sense ... ," p. 47.

PART FIVE

MORALITY OSCILLATING BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL

STEVEN ZUCKER *

THE LANGUAGE OF EVIL

Hannah Arendt and the Abstract Expressionist Response to the Second World War

The unprecedented horror of totalitarianism which came to light in the United States during and after the Second World War necessitated a reconceptualization of evil among American artists. ** In a book review published in the Spring of 1945 in Partisan Review Hannah Arendt wrote, The reality is that "the Nazis are like ourselves"; the nightmare is that they have shown, have proved beyond doubt what man is capable of. In other words, the problem of evil will become the fundamental question of post-war intellectual life. I

While the use of mythology in American art at mid-century has been discussed in depth, especially in regard to Carl Jung and Joseph Campbell, this bid to place all but incomprehensible contemporary events into a standardized pattern gains a new dimension in the context of Hannah Arendt's concurrent investigations, albeit in the political rather than the artistic sphere. 2 Arendt's theories are integral to the shift by prominent Abstract Expressionists from what was essentially a Surrealist conception of evil to that of a more Existential one. This is an extreme and fundamental change since the two outlooks are very much in opposition. The former system as transformed by Jung is founded upon the idea that, as Stephen Polcari has written in Abstract Expressionism and Modern Experience, "the Collective Unconscious refers to and reveals psychic contents deeper than, prior to, and more fundamental than mere individual personality.',3 Conversely, Existentialism posits that an individual bears the full burden of responsibility for a meaningful existence regardless of innate genetic or racial influences. While there has been substantial research done on the influx of artists into the United States from fascist Europe, the impact of intellectuals seeking asylum must also be assessed. In his 1986 John Hopkins dissertation A Haunted Legacy: The German Refugee Intellectuals and American Social Thought, Wilfred McClay argues that Arendt's "work found a receptive audience in the United States."4 McClay contends that in reaction to totalitarianism abroad and increasing mass conformity at home Arendt emphasized the primacy of social plurality and the importance of the individual. For Arendt at this time (1940s-l950s), 345 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecra Husserliana, Vol. LV, 345-358. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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the "supreme expression of the human condition (is action)."s Through her criticism of the inappropriateness of contemporary mythological usage, dissemination of the German variant of Existentialism, and early accounting of totalitarianism, the impact of Arendt's writing was felt beyond the boundaries of politics, reaching into the realm of art at midcentury and perhaps in some sense helping to provide a philosophical justification for the radical iconographic shift which Abstract Expressionist painting and sculpture was then undergoing. War has long prompted artists to explore the subject of evil. In the visual arts, evil traditionally exists within some form of structural framework, be it religious or allegorical, and these contexts render it in some sense acceptable and even justified. This is due, at least in part, to Western culture's traditional moral foundation, the basic underlying assumption of divine mercy.6 Historically, painting and sculpture relies on either a religious or mythological structure for both meaning and, as Arendt noted, for boundaries with which to limit evil, to make it function as part of a larger system. Given this precedent it is not surprising that many of the Abstract Expressionists favored mythology as a framework for the expression of evil. This is not to suggest that interest in mythology was solely the result of an attempt to comprehend contemporary violence. Rather, myth offered a coherent and familiar structure that could rationalize chaos through its very sanction of the irrational among other purposes. This virtual celebration of the irrational was an idea that had most recently been developed by the Surrealists. As Mona Hadler has illustrated in her article, "David Hare: A Magician's Game in Context," although an American Abstract Expressionist sculptor, Hare's notion of evil was largely dependent on the Surrealist concept. He understood evil as "essential for the imagination."7 And as Stephen Polcari writes, "several Abstract Expressionists employed [mythology] to come to terms with, structure, and point a way out of the crisis that dominated their time."s In essence, the folkloric provided a degree of comfort through familiarity. It set out clear boundaries between good and evil. Campbell notes that at the conclusion of what he terms the "mono-myth" or the universal narrative, there is either final redemption and resurrection, or reunification and forgiveness, either way the certainty of the triumph of good over evil. 9 In an example of mythic evil, Seymour Lipton's lead sculpture Moloch III, 1946 makes reference to the Canaanite god of fire for whom children were burned to death in sacrifice. 1o Lipton wrote, "Moloch became imp or-

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tant to me in terms of hidden destructive forces below the surface of man. (As) war always seemed to break out against the logic and necessity of peace."ll The subject is chosen out of the need for "logic," though that very "logic" may be based upon a primal narrative. As a further illustration of this use of mythology, Mark Rothko's 1944 painting Tiresias draws on the classical tradition. 12 According to Sophocles, the hunter, Tiresias, is blinded by Athena (upon his seeing her bathing nude) and is later recompensed with knowledge of the tragic future of Oedipus and his son Eteocles. 13 As it was commonly portrayed, myth depicts a predestined future, a drama both inescapable and unalterable. In his book of 1949, The Hero with a Thousand Faces, Joseph Campbell refers to the "marvelously constant story," the wellworn paths, and the "thoroughly known" labyrinth.14 For the Abstract Expressionists mythic tragedy provided a model, reassuring in its predictability and reinterpreted against the backdrop of contemporary events. Difficulties arose from the use of mythology by the Abstract Expressionists as a structure to explicate contemporary turmoil. These were twofold. First, there was the problem of the use of mythology by the National Socialists in Germany and second, the increasing awareness by artists that recent events were so vast and so radically different from previous experiences of violence that the mythological vocabulary historically relied upon to contain evil had become inadequate. The magnitude of the evil perpetuated during the Second World War could not be contained by the old codes, necessitating an entirely new philosophic system. Hannah Arendt played a role not only in bringing to light the immensity of the totalitarian crime but also in offering a new alternative structure with which to react to these events and one which these artists did in fact at least partially adopt. ls Germany's interest in mythology though commonly associated with the National Socialists dates back at least as far as the early nineteenth century. An important example for the artists was Friedrich Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy, 1872. Earlier still, Richard Wagner's "The Ring of the Nibelungen" which was begun in 1848 was based on the ancient Norse saga, the Eddas. Like Wagner, Nietzsche conceived of a return to the archaic. He called for a "rebirth of German myth. Man today stripped of myth, stands famished among all his pasts and must dig frantically for roots, be it among the most remote antiquities.,,16 The Nazis took up Friedrich Nietzsche's call. Adolf Hitler, in his opening address for the "Grosse Deutsche Kunstausstellung" (Great

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Exhibition of German Art) held in Munich in 1937, spoke of an eternal art which elevated the collective national identity upon which it was based.I7 This racially oriented communal history was both the key to Nazi art policy and a central feature of that regime's ideology. The swastika is a prime example. In his essay "Abstract Expressionism" contained in the 1985 Museum of Modem Art catalogue, "Primitivism" in 20th Century Art, Kirk Varnedoe describes the Nazi emblem as "this ancient cosmological symbol [that] testified to a frighteningly successful revivification of the power of archaic myth.,,18 The Nazi myths of "Volk" and "Blut und Boden" (blood and soil) were only narrowly inclusive. Discussing art of the Third Reich, Peter Adam writes, each soldier, woman and child in painting was meant to elevate one group of people to the status of demi-gods, while condemning the rest to death. The evil of the National Socialist regime lay in the fact that, as Hannah Arendt observed, it decided who had the right to live. And art was used to drive this message home. 19

While the Nazis used mythology to establish a doctrine of racial superiority within Germany's borders, this same structure was used as evidence of that country's innate national aggressiveness by its enemies. Leopold Vansittart's book, The Black Record, for one, sought to prove that Germans were inherently aggressive. Arendt, however, dismissed the possibility of collective national guilt. As her friend Paul Tillich wrote, "(Arendt) repudiated the idea that a 'national character' or culture exists.,,2o In 1945, Partisan Review published the article, "Approaches to the German Problem" in which Arendt stated, "The talk of the 'eternal Germany' and its eternal crimes serves only to cover Nazi Germany and its present crimes.,,21 Here, in what would become an issue for the Abstract Expressionists, is the idea that the framework of the mythic as composed of innate traits removes free will and thus to some extent responsibility. In addition, by debunking this nationalistic jingoism Arendt disallows the reflexive differentiation of Axis and Allied mythology. In "Primitivism" in 20th Century Art, Varnedoe writes that the Abstract Expressionist's loose conception of lung included, "a belief in an innate 'racial memory. ",22 This understanding of Jung which Varnedoe links to John Graham may well have begun to seem uncomfortably similar to Germany's mythic "Volk." In Graham's 1937 essay Systems and Dialectics of Art, the creative act was seen as a means to "revivify contact 'with the primordial racial past. ",23

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Finally, Arendt's attack on the concept of an aggressive German national character undermined the Allied conceit of innate heroism. Indeed, not even the Allies were absolved from the need to address their own potential for evil. By perceiving evil as an inherent characteristic of the mythic human drama, a necessary component without which the fable would be impotent and meaningless, there is an acceptance, an acknowledgment, even a romanticizing of evil. It is seen as an inevitable, and natural presence, rather than an act of personal responsibility, something about which a judgment can be formed. Evil, within this mythic conception, must remain below a certain threshold (as it had historically) where it may simply be punished. It is, in essence, tolerated in the broadest view. In her essay, "The Concentration Camps," Arendt notes, There is a great temptation to explain away the intrinsically incredible by means of liberal rationalizations ... wheedling us with the voice of common sense. We attempt to understand ... in recollected experience that [which] simply surpasses our powers of understanding. We attempt to classify as criminal such a thing which, as we all feel, no such category was ever intended to cover. What meaning has the concept of murder when we are confronted with the mass production of corpses?'4

There is evidence of direct contact between Arendt and a number of prominent artists. The painter Lewin Alcopley was a close friend of Arendt and her husband Heinrich BlUcher since at least 1945 who was one of 12 founding members of the Club, the third and final manifestation of the artist's organization on Eighth Street in New York City?5 Irving Sandler writes of the Club, "The early lectures covered many facets of modem culture. Among the speakers were the philosophers Hannah Arendt, Heinrich BlUcher [and] Joseph Campbell.,,26 Speakers and members of the Club included the most prominent artists of the period (the de Koonings, Jackson Pollock, Louise Bourgeois, Adolph Gottlieb, David Smith, Franz Kline, Harold Rosenberg the critic, and many others). In a journal entry dated April 26, 1952, Jack Tworkov called the Club "an unexcelled university for the artist. Here we learn not only about all the possible ideas in art, but learn what we need to know about philosophy [and] mythology.,,27 Contrary to the common assertion that these artists were somehow unwilling or intellectually unable to grapple seriously with the literary and philosophical issues they drew upon, Thomas Hess recalls that when BlUcher spoke at the Club in 1949 on the subject of expressionist aesthetics,

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a young man got up and in a stylish stutter, began: "your ontological premise ... " and he went on to "teleology (and), eschatology." I was startled and looked around the room to see how my new-found ... artist-friends would take this vocabulary. To my surprise, they were beaming with delight. The artists doted on the talk, the more intellectual the better. At the Club (and) in bars (we) talked about James, Kierkegaard ... Camus, Hegel (etc.).28

BlUcher had come to speak at the Club by chance. Alcopley had invited him to come hear Joseph Frank and Meyer Schapiro discuss Andre Malraux's The Psychology of Art which BlUcher had studied. When the speaker failed to arrive, Alcopley suggested to Rosenberg and Motherwell that Blucher lecture instead. He was a success and was'invited to speak several times, as was Arendt. 29 There is substantial evidence which argues for these artists' interest in philosophy. Herbert Ferber had studied philosophy as an undergraduate in New York. And in 1947, Mark Rothko stated that art was "a means of philosophic thought," an idea shared by Newman and Lassaw. 30 Interest in political theory was also evident. According to the 1985 catalogue Flying Tigers, David Smith's small green bronze and cast iron sculpture, "Perfidious Albion (The British Empire)," 1945-46 "details the evils of colonialism and imperialism, The toothed base implies (perhaps) the tenacity with which 'mother countries' hold onto their colonies, the body - the Queen of England, and the trident - sea power.,,31 Additionally, although it has an older provenance, the title has been linked to James Joyce's Finnigan's WakeY Dorothy Dehner suggests that Smith clearly blamed England's imperialist history and continuing policies for helping to lay the foundation for fascism. 33 It is worth noting that by 1945 much of the second section of Arendt's book The Origins of Totalitarianism titled "Imperialism" had been published as essays. Here, Arendt directly addresses the economic roots of nineteenth-century British imperialism and particularly the issue of Ireland (recalling Joyce) as part of the foundation that made possible the political chaos of the twentieth century.34 While Arendt may not have been the immediate source for Smith, the strikingly coincidental dates in conjunction with the precisely matched subject suggests a community of interests and a receptivity among artists to Arendt's ideas. In fact, Varnedoe writes that Smith's focus on "capitalist exploitation [and] fascist totalitarianism - offered an implicit critique of the primitivizing idealism which sought a 'natural/universal, '" that is, which sought myth. 35 Arendt continuously published in American journals from 1942, and

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by 1951 she and BlUcher were regularly lecturing at the New School for Social Research in New York on the philosophy of S0ren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Nietzsche. 36 Art world interest in Arendt's periodical literature was substantiated in the short-lived art magazine Possibilities: An Occasional Review, which was edited by Harold Rosenberg and Robert Motherwell. This magazine, which was published between 1947 and 1948, and whose title attests to the increasing importance of Existentialism, included the following passage in an essay by Harold Rosenberg in the Winter 1947/48 issue, A magistrate in a totalitarian country was quoted recently as being shocked at the insistence of some women on tracing their condemned husbands: "When the husband is arrested, the wife sues for divorce and looks for another man."

Although uncredited, this sentence was taken from a review which Arendt had published in Jewish Frontier half a year earlier in July of 1947. In it, Arendt wrote, The most common and most important motive of the system of concentration camps is not even to inflict suffering. The main purpose is to make people disappear, and to make those left behind forget that they ever existed. Concentration camps cut off their inmates more definitively then death ever could; since they are established invariably for innocent people, whom accident rather than any specific deed chooses. The Soviet police (who had) used the (totalitarian) system since their birth could only stare in amazement at those Polish people who tried desperately to keep in touch with their families or friends under arrest. One examining magistrate, genuinely at a loss, exclaimed to the wife of a prisoner "what extraordinary women you are here! In our country when the husband is arrested, the wife sues for divorce and looks for another man. ,,37

What Rosenberg reiterates then is Arendt's argument that there has been a break with our historical understanding of evil. She writes, "all efforts to escape from the grimness of the present into nostalgia for a still intact past . . . are in vain. ,,38 Arendt's first important book, The Origins of Totalitarianism, was published in 1951 and was immediately hailed as the single most influential book on the theme of totalitarianism. Within a year of its publication it was reviewed by over twenty major newspapers and periodicals including The New York Times, The New York Herald Tribune, and the New Yorker. Many of the chapters had already been published separately as far back as 1942. Arendt posits that the recent invention of totalitarianism produced an evil that was rooted in base motive. That is, evil is banal. Totalitarian evil was seen as vast but superficial,

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"possess(ing) neither depth nor demonic dimension."39 Arendt rejected the idea that evil was primordial. The goal of totalitarianism was, as Arendt understood it, to change human nature, to strip the basic fundamental humanity of the individual, who is remade into a simple component of the state, one without conscience or sense of responsibility. She saw totalitarianism as the complete denial of the spatial and temporal requirements of freedom. Its mythology universalized both past and future by creating a heroic past that pointed to a pre-destined future. The totalitarian state "demolished all spaces which make human movement and interaction possible. Both freedom for thought and action disappeared" as inward manifestations of external deprivation. 40 Arendt argued that totalitarian evil broached historical boundaries thereby rendering the mythological structure too inadequate to contain the concept. It is understood as too forgiving. She wrote that until the totalitarian state of the twentieth century, "never, neither in ancient nor medieval, nor modern history, did destruction become a well-formulated program or its execution a highly organized, bureaucratized and systematized process.,,41 By the late 1940s artists began to abandon mythology. In 1946 Newman stated, Surrealist art ... contains all the weird subject matter of the primitive world of terror. But that time is over. The war ... has robbed us of our hidden terror, as terror can only exist if the forces of tragedy are unknown. We now know the terror to expect.42

In 1952 Clifford Still wrote, "We are now committed to an unqualified act, not illustrating outworn myths or contemporary alibis. One must accept total responsibility for what he executes."43 As demonstrated, the Abstract Expressionists were increasingly disenchanted with the mythic structure and were beginning to incorporate into their work certain aspects of Existentialist thought. While this turn to Existentialism has been documented, it has been explored largely in relation to the French school and specifically in regard to Sartre. However, given her record of lectures and publications on the subject, Arendt was perhaps as accessible to the Abstract Expressionists as was Sartre. Alfred H. Barr, Jr., in his exhibition catalogue for the Museum of Modern Art, The New American Painting: As Shown in Eight European Countries 1958-1959, significantly points to the structure that replaced

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the mythic drama. He writes, "Confronting a blank canvas they attempt to grasp authentic being by action, decision, a leap of faith, 'to use Karl Jaspers' Existentialist phrase. ",44 Jaspers was Arendt's doctoral advisor at Heidelberg and a close friend. Whether Barr's knowledge of Jaspers came from Arendt remains unresolved. However, Barr did visit the Club frequently and certainly read the periodicals in which Arendt published. In addition to her work as a political scientist, Arendt continued to build on the doctorate in philosophy she had received under Jaspers at the University of Heidelberg and on her earlier work with Edmund Husserl at the University of Freiburg and Martin Heidegger at the University of Marburg. In her useful 1946 article, "What Is Existenz Philosophy?," Arendt explains the term: "As distinct from existentialism, a French literary movement of the last decade, Existenz philosophy has at least a century-old history. ,,45 In a lecture on Existenz philosophy given at the New School in early 1952, Arendt again sees a division between the French and German schools. She understands Sartre to say, "engage yourself and produce meaning. Meaning exists only as your product." For Jaspers, in contrast, thought is the consequential element. Freedom is predicated on reason, on the ability to judge and finally for Arendt, the ability to act on that judgment. 46 This is not to suggest that Sartre was unimportant for the artists in New York. Newman had heard Sartre speak in the 1940s and David Hare and he were friends. 47 Sartre in fact played a primary role in the Abstract Expressionist "evolution . . . from a Surrealist to a more Existentialist orientation. ,,48 Indeed, Polcari notes a 1946 issue of Partisan Review dedicated to Existentialist thought and cites the literature of Sartre, Genet, and Camus. However, he overlooks the previously mentioned article by Arendt which appeared in the same issue. While the novels and plays of the French school were doubtless more accessible than Arendt's writing, the latter provided a far more direct response to the period's ubiquitous violence. By the middle of the 1940s and as a direct consequence of her inquiry into the causes of totalitarianism, Arendt had reformulated Existentialist theory to directly address contemporary brutality, and as such appears to be linked to the changes taking place in painting and sculpture at this time. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt understands the issue of freedom through the body, its surrounding space, and thus the

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potential for action. For Arendt, the totalitarian state and especially the concentration camp, achieves the complete restriction of the space required for thought, action, and thus freedom. Not surprisingly, the ideas of Hitler's architect Albert Speer, the man responsible for the design of totalitarian space, were antithetical to such autonomy. He wrote, Individual liberty is not necessarily the sign of a high degree of civilization. On the contrary, it is the limitation of this liberty within the framework of an organization which incorporates men of the same race, which is the real pointer to the degree of civilization attained. 49

Arendt's conception of freedom and its relationship to space is especially pertinent for the painting and sculpture produced soon after the war had ended. Just as the full cost of the war became widely known, many of the leading artists of the period rejected overt mythic imagery. This is certainly true of Jackson Pollock. In his very method of painting, action is dependent on space. From 1947, Pollock's radical strategy of approaching an enormous length of canvas not as a vertical, substantially figural and resistant plane, but rather as a literal ground, a kind of canvas arena, fostered the development of his signature technique of dripping paint. In Pollock's Autumn Rhythm, 1950, the artist's assertion that he was "literally in the painting" is evidenced by the gestural definition of dynamic space which functions as an indexical register of the artist's action. 50 In 1947 Barnett Newman wrote that, "'mock' mythology was replaced by the 'free splendor [of] open masses. ",51 In the same year and now adopting an Existentialist phraseology, he wrote that the truly elemental act was not social and therefore not of the mythic drama but rather was an expression of "self-awareness ... before the void.,,52 Newman stressed that the artist bravely stands before the firmament, establishes space and by so doing, lays the foundation for action, which Arendt defines as the basis of freedom.53 This renunciation of the construction of a universal primal memory called mythology replaces the oblivion of the passive archaic with present action which in these terms has political connotations as an element of freedom. Arendt's conception of liberty is rooted in Immanuel Kant's "definition of freedom as autonomy and spontaneity" and Heidegger's idea that only the creative force of action produces meaning. 54 Here then is what Robert Goldwater refers to as the "existentialist hero" who has constructed meaning from the void through the will to define space and

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in tum establishes the potential for action and freedom.55 Through her lectures, essays, and her book The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt helped to provide the Abstract Expressionists with a philosophical formulation that both sought to discredit the notion of a racial mythology and propose instead a structure where judgment and personal responsibility were paramount. In the final chapter she wrote, By pressing men against each other, total terror destroys the space between them. It destroys the one essential prerequisite for all freedom which is simply the capacity of motion which cannot exist without space. (Thus) in the perfect totalitarian government all men have become One Man. 56

It was precisely this idea of the "One Man," the unified collective, that Arendt so stridently argued against. Her experience with anti-Semitism and totalitarianism in conjunction with her conception of Existentialist theory, condemned American art's reliance on the mythic unconscious while reaffirming the autonomy of the individual.

The Fashion Institute New York NOTES

* I would like to thank Professor Mona Hadler and my wife Susan Koski Zucker for their guidance and support. ** The works of art that are discussed in the following pages are not illustrated. However, their whereabouts are noted. I Hannah Arendt, "Nightmare and Flight," Partisan Review, Vol. 12 (Spring 1945), p. 259. A review of The Devii'.\· Share. 2 See Kirk Varnedoe, "Abstract Expressionism," "Primitivism" in 20th Century Art, Vol. 2 (New York: 1985); Stephen Polcari. Abstract Expressionism and the Modern Experience (New York: 1991); Ann Gibson, "Editorial Statement," Artlournal, Vol. 47. no. 3 (Fall 1988). 3 Polcari, op. cit., p. 43. Also see Carl Gustav Jung, "The Concept of the Collective Unconscious," in The Portable lung, ed. Joseph Campbell, trans. R. Hall (New York: 1971) originally from a lecture given October 19,1936 at St. Bartholomew's Hospital, London. 4 Wilfred McClay, A Haunted Legacy: The German Refugee Intellectuals and American Social Thought (dissertation abstract: Johns Hopkins University, 1986). 5 Leah Bradshaw, Acting and Thinking: Reflections on the Political Theory of Hannah Arendt (Political Science dissertation: York University, Canada, 1984). 6 In Albrecht Durer's woodcut, Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse from the "Apocalypse" series, c. 1497-98 (British Museum, London), multiple evils incarnate charge down from the sky - but within a religious context governed judiciously by an angel and the ancient rules of sin and virtue. Francisco Goya, in his fresco Saturn Devouring One of His Sons,

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1820-22 (Museo del Prado, Madrid), also frames his image of evil in a pre-established mythology. Here, Saturn (Cronos), one of the Titans, son of the Earth and Heaven, devours one of his children - a God. This is one of the principal organizational themes of mythology as understood by Joseph Campbell. Within myth there is an inevitable dramatic cycle, as predictable as the seasons and rooted in the human psyche, within which evil is as necessary as good. See Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (Princeton: 1949). Modern examples include Pablo Picasso's 1937 painting Guernica (Museo del Prado, Madrid), and Thomas Hart Benton's Again of 1942 from the "Year of Peril" series (State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia). While each work refers to the contemporary violence of fascism, the obvious allusions to historical Christian iconography (the former refers to the massacre of the innocents, the latter to the crucifixion) attempts to place contemporary aggression within an ancient moral system. Arendt notes that "The one thing that ... made the traditional conceptions of hell tolerable to man: the last judgment [was] the idea of an absolute standard of justice combined with the infinite possibility of grace." Hannah Arendt, "Concentration Camps," Partisan Review, Vol. 15, no. 7 (July 15, 1948), p. 751. For a reproduction of the Diirer see Willi Kurth (ed.), The Complete Woodcuts of Albrecht Durer (New York: 1963), catalogue number 109. For a reproduction of the Goya see J. Tomlinson, Goya in the Twilight of the Enlightenment (New Haven: 1992). For a reproduction of the Picasso see William Rubin (ed.), Pablo Picasso: A Retrospective (New York: 1980), p. 342. For a reproduction of the Benton see Erika Doss, Benton, Pollock, and the Politics of Modernism: From Regionalism to Abstract Expressionism (Chicago: 1991), illustration number 4.28. 7 Mona Hadler, "David Hare: The Magician's Game in Context," Art Journal, Vol. 47, no. 3 (Fall 1988), p. 198. 8 Polcari, op. cit., p. 41. Stephen Polcari has carefully documented several of the key sources of mythology utilized by the artists: these include Franz Boas, an anthropologist at Columbia University, whose work on the primitive was of interest (his daughter was a friend of David Smith and Dorothy Dehner); the book, The Golden Bough by Sir James George Frazer which was owned and/or read by Robert Motherwell, Barnett Newman, Clifford Still, Jackson Pollock, Theodor Stamos, and Hare as was The Hero with a Thousand Faces by Joseph Campbell. In addition, Polcari lists Jackson Pollock, Adolph Gottlieb, Barnett Newman, Clifford Still, Seymour Lipton, Lee Krasner, Mark Rothko, and John Graham as all familiar with Jung. Polcari, pp. 38 and 43. 9 Campbell, op. cit., pp. 245-256. 10 "Sheet lead and poured stone" (collection of the artist). For a reproduction see Kermit S. Champa, Flying Tigers: Painting and Sculpture in New York, 1939-46 (Providence, R.I.: 1985), catalogue number 70. II Albert Elsen, Seymour Lipton (New York: 1970), p. 27. 12 For a reproduction see Cecile Whiting, Antifascism in American Art (New Haven: 1989), p. 175. \3 Campbell, op. cit., p. 154. 14

Campbell, op. cit., p. 25.

For an overview of Arendt's short essays during the 1940s, see Jerome Kohn (ed.), Hannah Arendt: Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954 (New York: 1994). 16 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. by Francis Golffing (New York: 1956), pp. 137-138. 17 "Der Fiihrer eriiffnet die Grosse Deutsche Kunstellung 1937," Die Kunst im Dritten 15

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Reich (Munich) Vol. I, nos. 7-8 (July-August 1937), pp. 47-61, trans. lise Fa1k in Herschel Chipp, Theories of Modern Art (Berkeley: 1968), pp. 476-482. 18 Vamedoe, op. cit., p. 652. According to Steven Heller the swastika is among the oldest of signs, the word is of Aryan/Indian origin perhaps explaining its attraction to Hitler. In this ancient context it was a symbol of the sun wheel, a sign of resurrection. Steven Heller, "Symbol of the Century," Print, Vol. XLVI, no. I, pp. 39-47. 19 Peter Adam, Art of the Third Reich (New York: 1992), p. 110. 20 Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (New Haven: 1984), p. 24l. 21 Hannah Arendt, "Approaches to the German Problem," Partisan Review, Vol. 12, no. I, p. 94. 22 Vamedoe, op. cit., p. 617. 23 Ibid., p. 617. 24 Arendt, "The Concentration Camps," op. cit., p. 745. 25 First phase: "Subjects of the Artists" school (organized by Baziotes, Hare, Motherwell, and Rothko; Still had helped and Newman joined later). The school closed after a single semester. Second phase: "Studio 35" run by Tony Smith and others. 3rd phase "the Club" at 39 East 8th Street. 26 Irving Sandler, "The Club," in Abstract Expressionism: A Critical Record, David and Cecile Shapiro, eds. (New York: 1990), p. 52. 27 Ibid., p. 56. 28 Thomas Hess, "When Art Talk was a Fine Art," New York Magazine clipping, p. 82, Hannah Arendt archive at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 29 Young-Bruehl, op. cit., p. 249 and a conversation with Irving Sandler (November 21, 1992). Polcari, op. cit., p. 117. (Estate of David Smith, #kI83), for a reproduction see Champa, op. cit., catalogue number 77.

30 31

Ibid. From a telephone interview conducted by the author on November 14, 1992. Ms. Dehner was married to David Smith during the period in question. 34 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1951), pp. 124-127. 35 Vamedoe, op. cit., p. 649. 36 Hannah Arendt Archive, Box 4, The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 37 Hannah Arendt, "The Hole of Oblivion," Jewish Frontier (July 1947), p. 23. 38 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, op. cit., p. ix.

32

33

39

Young-Bruehl, op. cit., p. 369.

Ibid., p. 253. 41 Arendt, "Approaches to the German Problem," op. cit., p. 95. 42 Champa, op. cit., figure 38. 43 From the Introduction of the Museum of Modem Art exhibition catalogue, The New American Painting: As Shown in Eight European Countries, 1958--1959 by Alfred H. Barr, Jr. 44 Shapiro and Shapiro, op. cit., p. 96. 45 Hannah Arendt, "What is Existenz Philosophy?," Partisan Review, Vol. 8, no. (Winter 1946), pp. 34-35. 40

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Hannah Arendt Archive, Box 45, The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Hadler, op. cit., p. 197. 48 Po\cari, op. cit., p. 354; Hadler, op. cit., p. 197. 49 Alan Balfour, Berlin: The Politics of Order, 1787-1989 (New York: Rizzoli, 1990), pp.72-73. 50 Jackson Pollock, "My Painting," Possibilities: An Occasional Review, no. 1 (Winter 1947/48), p. 79 (collection of the Metropolitan Museum of Art). For a reproduction see Irving Sandler, The Triumph of American Painting: A History of Abstract Expressionism (New York: 1970), plate 8-12. 51 Shapiro and Shapiro, op. cit., p. 157. 52 Barnett Newman, "The First Man Was an Artist," Tiger's Eye, Vol. 1 (1947), pp. 59-60. 53 Ibid. 54 Dana Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: Being and Politics (dissertation abstract: Princeton University, 1987). 55 Shapiro and Shapiro, op. cit., p. 133. 56 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, op. cit., pp. 466--467. 46

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FOREKNOWLEDGE, FREE WILL AND MODAL LOGIC

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to resolve the contradiction, on the face of it, between the omniscience of God and the freedom of choice given to man, for surely, so it seems, if man's actions are known beforehand to God, then those actions cannot have been made out of free choice. The discussion will be conducted according to the basic concepts of modal logic. THE LOGICAL PROBLEM

For the purpose of our discussion let us first analyze the term "logical necessity" by means of a simple example and thereafter apply this analysis to the problem in question. Let us assume that David is a bachelor. Consider the following sentence: (1)

A: David is a bachelor,

in contrast to (2)

NA: It is logically necessary that David be a bachelor.

Since David is a bachelor (according to our assumption), sentence (1) is true. But the sentence is not necessarily true, as it is logically possible to have a state of affairs in which David is not a bachelor. Thus, sentence (1) is contingent. It is not logically necessary that David be a bachelor: the state of affairs in the world is such that David is a bachelor but it is logically possible that a different state of affairs could prevail, one in which David is not a bachelor. Sentence (2) is, therefore, false. Consider now the following sentence: (3)

B: David is not married,

in contrast to (4)

NB: It is logically necessary that David not be married.

We can analyze this pair of sentences exactly as we did before. According 359 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 359-368. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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to the state of affairs in the world, sentence (3) is true, for David is, indeed, not married. But this sentence is not a logical necessity, for it is possible to have a state of affairs in which David is married. Sentence (4), therefore, is false. Let us now consider another sentence: (5)

A :) B: If David is a bachelor, then David is not married.

A conditional sentence is false if the antecedent is true while the consequent is false. Clearly, sentence (5) is true but sentence (5) is not only true, it is true analytically, that is to say, its truth value derives from the meaning of the words appearing in it. B is implied by the meaning of A, according to the definition of the word "bachelor". No matter what the state of affairs in the world may be, the implication between the two parts of the condition is true in any case. It is therefore possible to say that the truth of sentence (5) is a logical necessity. In other words, not only is sentence (5) true but so is yet another sentence: (6)

N(A :) B):

It is logically necessary that for David to be a

bachelor he not be married. But let us examine the following sentence carefully. (7)

A :) NB: If David is a bachelor, then it is logically necessary that he not be married.

This sentence is not true, for A is true while B is false (as was shown earlier in (1) and (4)), that is, the antecedent is true while the consequent is false. The conditional sentence (7) is, therefore, false. We find, then, that a distinction must be made between N(A ::) B) and (A ::) NB), for although the former is true, the latter is false. As to the claim that (7) is true since it is impossible for David to be a bachelor and yet married and following from this, if he is a bachelor then it is necessary that he not be married. This claim is mistaken. The mistake is a result of exchanging sentences (7) and (6). When we argue that it is impossible for David to be a bachelor and yet married, this means that the necessity applies to the implication in its entirety. But in this we confirm the truth of sentence (6) but not that of sentence (7). To put it another way: if David is a bachelor, this means that he is not married, but no more than that. If he is a bachelor, it does not mean that the claim that he is not married is a necessity, but the necessity does apply to the sentence as a whole: if he is a bachelor, then he is not married. 1

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Let us turn now to the question of foreknowledge and free will and let us attempt to apply the analysis above to sentences related to this question. Let us suppose that God knows that I will choose to do X. Consider the following sentences: (1')

C: God knows that I will choose to do X.

(2')

NC:

(3')

D: I will choose to do X.

(4')

ND:

The analysis of these sentences can be conducted in a manner identical to the analysis of the earlier sentences. Although sentence (I') is true (according to the assumption), sentence (2') is false. And although sentence (3') is true, sentence (4') is false. Let us now consider the sentence (5')

C ::J D: If God knows that I will choose to do X, then I will choose to do X.

Sentence (5') is true, but not only is it true but it is also necessarily true, for D is implied by C from the very definition of the word "foreknowledge" and therefore the sentence (6')

N(C ::J D): It is logically necessary that if God knows that I will choose to do X then I will choose to do X,

is true. It is impossible to have a state of affairs in which God knows that I will choose to do X and, in spite of that, I do not choose to do so. And yet, we cannot deduce from this that we have no free will. The claim that we have to struggle with is the following: if God knows that I will choose to do X, then it cannot be that I will not choose to do X. From this it follows that if God knows that I will choose to do X, then it is necessary that I choose to do X. My choice, therefore, is not free. But when we argue this, we are making the same error that was made earlier, namely, we have exchanged sentences (6') and the following sentence: (7')

C ::J ND: If God knows that I will choose to do X, then it is logically necessary that I choose to do X.

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Sentence (7') is false. The necessity is in the implication between C and D, that is to say, between the foreknowledge of God and my choice, and therefore (6') is true. But if God knows that I will choose to do X, this only means that I will choose to do X but does not mean that it is necessary that I choose to do X. The necessity applies only to the implication in its entirety, that is to say, if C is true, then D is true, but not that ND is true. The conclusion is that sentence (7') is false. The sentence which points to the contradiction between the foreknowledge of God and free will is (7'). According to this sentence, if God knows that I will choose to do X, then it is necessary that I choose to do X, and, therefore, my choice is not free. But, as we have seen, sentence (7') is false. In contrast to this sentence, (6') is true, for the implication between God's foreknowledge that I will choose to do X and my choice is necessary. But we have to remember that sentence (6') does not point to any contradiction between God's foreknowledge and free will. According to this sentence, in every possible state of affairs, if C is true, then D is true, but this does not mean that ND is true, that is, it does not mean that I have no freedom of will. THE PHYSICAL PROBLEM

It could be argued that our claim that there is no logical contradiction

between the foreknowledge of God and the free will of man is based on the use of the term "necessary" only in its meaning of "logically necessary", and it is always possible to contend that from a physical point of view the two things do not go together. The problem of foreknowledge and free will does not focus only on the logical contradiction between the two. There are indeed those who argue that even if it were possible to dismiss the apparent logical contradiction between foreknowledge and free choice, there is still a contradiction from the physical point of view. The claim is that if God knows that I will choose to do X then it is physically necessary that I choose to do X. There is a physically causal connection between God's knowledge and my actions. But the answer to this problem can be found in a manner parallel to the answer which we obtained with regard to the contradiction in logic. When we use the term "it is necessary that ... ", it could be that the necessity is not a logical necessity but a weaker necessity, a physical necessity (psychological or other, according to the context). In the words

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of R. Taylor: "It follows that not all necessity is logical necessity, nor all impossibility logical impossibility, and that to say that something is possible is to say much more than that it is logically possible".2 We will use the symbol "N*" for "It is physically necessary that ... ". We will apply to "N*" - "it is physically necessary that" - the same analysis that we applied to "N" - "it is logically necessary that". One must make a distinction between the sentence N*(p ::J q) and the sentence (p ::J N*q)

For example, let us assume that a ball is thrown by David (with no obstacles). Consider sentence E: (8)

E: The ball is thrown.

In contrast to sentence N*E: (9)

N*E: It is physically necessary that the ball be thrown.

Since the ball is thrown (according to the assumption), then sentence (8) is true, but one should notice that the sentence is not only not logically necessary, for it is logically possible to have a state of affairs in which the ball is not thrown, but it is not physically necessary either. There is no physical law which demands that a ball be thrown. The state of affairs is such that the ball is thrown, but according to the laws of physics, it is certainly possible to have a situation in which a ball is not thrown. 3 Accordingly, sentence (9) is false. Consider the following sentence: (10)

F: The ball moves.

In contrast to, (11)

N*F: It is physically necessary that the ball move.

The analysis of this pair of sentences is identical to the analysis of the earlier pair of sentences. According to the state of affairs in the world, sentence (10) is true, for the ball moves. But this sentence is not physically necessary, for according to the laws of physics, it is possible to have a situation where the ball does not move (for example, if it is not thrown). Sentence (11), therefore, is false. Let us now consider the sentence:

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E ::J F: If the ball is thrown, then it moves.

Clearly sentence (12) is true but this sentence is not only true in itself, its truth value derives from the laws of physics. According to these laws, if a physical object is thrown (and there are no obstacles), it moves. The implication between the antecedent and the consequent is true in any situation where the laws of physics obtain. Not only is sentence (12) true, but so is this sentence: (13)

N*(E ::J F): It is physically necessary, if a ball is thrown, that it move.

But let us now consider the sentence (14)

E ::J N*F: If the ball is thrown then it is physically necessary that the ball move.

This sentence is not true, for E is true, while N*F is false (as we showed above in sentences (8) and (11», that is, the antecedent is true, while the consequent is false. The conditional sentence (14) is, therefore, false. It follows then, that we have to make a distinction between 'N*(E ::J F), and (E ::J N*F), for it is possible for the first to be true and despite this for the second to be false. 4 Let us move now to the physical contradiction between God's foreknowledge and free choice. It is clear that the laws of physics are subject to the laws of logic. 5 It follows, then, that just as sentence (6) is true, so is this sentence (13')

N*(C::J D): It is physic -~y necessary that if God knows that I will chom- to do X, then I will choose to do X.

In contrast, we have the following sentence: (14')

C::J N*D: If God knows that I will choose to do X then it is physically necessary that I choose to do X,

which is not true. There need not be any conditional connection between God's knowledge that I will choose to do X and the physical necessity of my choosing to do X. This connection could arise if we explain God's knowledge of my

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actions in such a way as to show that God knows how He created us and how the manner of our creation physically determines our actions. But this is not the only theory which can explain God's knowledge, and there is no need for us to accept just the theory that requires physical necessity in our actions. It is possible to discuss the question of foreknowledge and free will in a manner parallel to the analysis presented here. This time, instead of using the operator "It is necessary that ... ", we shall use the operator "It is possible that ... ". When we use the term: "It is possible that ... ", we do not always mean a logical possibility (symbolized by M), sometimes the reference is to a stronger possibility like a physical possibility. We shall symbolize the term "It is physically possible that ... " by "M*". We have to make a distinction between the sentence "M*(p . -p)" and the sentence "p . M*p". For example, let us analyze the question: Is it possible for me to sit when I am standing? We will use the following symbols: i-I O(i, t) - I am standing at time t. Y(i, t) - I am sitting at time t.

Let us suppose that I am sitting if and only if I am not standing. Let us suppose that I am sitting (and not standing) at time t, that is: Y(i, t) . -(ai, t) It is clear that M*[Y(i, t) . O(i, t)] is false for otherwise it would be

possible to arrive at a situation the description of which contains a logical contradiction: Y (i, t) . - Y (i, t). "M*Oi, tOO means: It is physically possible for me to stand at time t, that is, I am capable, physically speaking, of standing at time t. We have to distinguish between: M*[O(i, t) . -O(i, t)]:

It is possible for me to stand and sit

at the same time, and [OU, t) . M*-O(i, t)]:

I am standing and it is possible for me at the same time to sit.

We cannot accept the former for it leads to a contradiction, but we can accept the latter for it is possible to have a situation in which I stand

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and do not actualize my ability to sit - a situation which does not go against intuition, and, in principle, it is of no importance to our argument whether we are speaking here of a possibility which is not logical. It is clear that we cannot accept the statement Nor is it possible to accept the statement But we can certainly accept the statement and the statement

M(C. -D). M*(C. -D). C .M-D, C. M*-D.

I can, of course, not choose to do X, but I do not do so because otherwise C would not be true. But the fact that I do not do so (and that I choose to do X) does not indicate that I cannot do so. Both logically and physically, I really can choose not to do X, but I do not act in this way because otherwise C would not be true. 6 OBSERV AnON AND FOREKNOWLEDGE

It follows from our discussion so far that if we carefully scrutinize the scope of the operator "It is necessary that. ... " (or "It is possible that ... "), then the foreknowledge of God is consistent with the notion of free will, both logically and physically. Our purpose has been to show that there is no contradiction between the foreknowledge of God and the free will of man. We could, therefore, in effect, conclude our article at this point. But the question of how God knows in advance of my actions, the relation between God's foreknowledge of my actions and the actions themselves, is also relevant to this article. If the answer to this question is that God created me in such a way that it is necessary for me to act in a certain way and, as He knows how I was created, He is bound to know how I will act, then really I have no free choice, but this does not stem from the fact that God has foreknowledge of my choice but rather from the manner in which He created me. It is certainly possible to say that God knows how I will act without saying that it is necessary that I be built in such a way that I will act in a deterministic manner. It could be said that there is no need to present the way in which He knows what my actions will be, because we are not capable of knowing His ways. But it seems to us that we can understand, at least in principle, how He can know future events in advance. We can say that God has the power of pre-cognition in that He sees and foresees the future. 7 Let us assume that God has the power to see future events (and this

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would, of course, stem from His omnipotence). He observes events in the future just as we observe events in the present. Events in the present are the cause of our knowledge. When I watch my friend reading a book, I know that my friend is reading a book. But that does not mean that he is reading the book out of necessity and not from free choice. Clearly, the sentence "If I know that my friend is reading a book, then he is reading a book", is true. It is even necessarily true (from the meaning of the term "know"), but the causal direction operates from the consequent to the antecedent: because my friend is reading a book, I know he is reading a book, and not the other way round. The event of my friend's reading the book is the cause of my knowing about it by virtue of my observation of him. It is clear that it is not true to say that my knowledge of the event is the cause of the event. Even though I know that my friend is reading a book, it does not mean that he is doing it out of necessity and that he could not, not read the book. He could have chosen not to read the book, but he did not choose to actualize his ability. Had he done so, I would have watched another event and I would not have known that he was reading a book. It is similarly with God. In contrast to human beings (at least, most of them) who are able to observe only events in the present, God, by virtue of being omnipotent, is able to observe events in the future. Just as events in the present are the cause of our knowledge of them, so events in the future are the cause of God's knowledge of them - He sees these events all the time. It follows, therefore, that if God knew in the past that I will choose to do X in the future, then it is true that I will choose to do X in the future, but this does not mean that it is not in my power to choose not to do X and that I act from necessity, but just that in the future I will not actualize this ability (not to choose to do X), for otherwise God would have known in the past that I would not choose to do X because He would have foreseen a different event. The causal direction goes from the future to the past. My choice to do X in the future is the cause of the knowledge of God in the past. My choice in the future to do X brings about the situation in which God knew in the past that I would choose to do X. The event described by D is the cause of the event described by C. 8 The theme of this article is expressed in the Hebrew verse quoted in Tannaic literature: "Everything is foreseen (tsafui) but the right to act is given".9 In the Hebrew original, the word "tsafui" has a double meaning: it can be rendered as "foreseen" or "observed". If we accept

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the claim that God foresees the future by virtue of having observed it, both the meanings combine to give the verse a deeper significance.

Bar-Ilan University NOTES 1 "NB" is true on condition that "NA" is true, but we have already seen that "NA" is false. 2 R. Taylor, "Freedom and Determinism", Metaphysics, second edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1974), p. 46. 3 Unless one accepts an extreme deterministic position according to which the throwing of a ball by David is necessary according to the laws of physics. But according to this approach, in any case man has no free will, not because of God's foreknowledge of events but because of physical laws which make his actions obligatory. 4 If we use the "possible worlds" semantics, then "N*p" is true if and only if p is true in every physically possible world, that is, in every possible world whose description is consistent with the laws of physics as they exist in our world. According to these semantics, it is obvious that in any world like this, if a ball is thrown, it moves and therefore sentence (13) is true. But it is not true to say, that if in the actual world the ball is thrown, then in every possible world it moves, for it is possible that in another such world a ball is not even thrown, so that there will be no movement of the ball. Therefore, sentence (14) is false. 5 Every world which is physically possible is also logically possible. 6 The use of operator "M*" can be of benefit in the solution to other problems which arise in the context of foreknowledge and free will. For example, Pike's claim that if God knew in the past that I would choose to do X, then if I can choose not to do X then I can change the past, a fact which is contrary to all intuition. See N. Pike, "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action", Philosophical Review 74:4 (1965), pp. 27-46. It is possible to deal with this problem using the term "It is physically possible that ... " but this is not the place to enlarge on this matter. The subject has been dealt with in an earlier article by the present author. See Y. Ronen, "Foreknowledge and Free Will", Iyyun 38: 1 (1989), pp. 61-66. 7 It is possible to explain the phenomenon of precognition by means of different theories such as those which analyze the concept of time in a different way to the one generally accepted, but this is not the place to go into the matter further. See Y. Ronen, "The Philosophical Implications of Parapsychology", Unpublished doctoral dissertion, BarHan University, 1986. 8 Indeed we see that the causality works backwards in time, for the action of my making a choice is the cause of God's knowledge and not the other way round. The effect (God's knowledge of the event) precedes the cause (the event itself). But it is possible to show that the concept of backward causation is coherent: different definitions have been given to the concept of causality, definitions which do not require the temporal precedence of cause to effect, definitions which use terms such as "bringing about" or "explanation". See B. Brier, Precognition and the Philosophy of Science (New York: 1974), pp. 76-101. 9 See Ethics of the Fathers, chapter 3.

FREDERICK SONTAG

NOTHING IN OR OUT OF THE WORLD IS ALL GOOD OR ALL BAD, ALL GODS INCLUDED

The good Lord blessed me that way, but he put sorrow in my heart to pay for it. It looks like a good thing and a bad thing always have to go hand-in-hand. You don't get the one without the other, ever. Erskin Caldwell, God's Little Acre

Only our human desire to have models of perfection causes us to keep trying to make our idols out to be pure. "If wishes were horses .... " Certainly the history of, plus the present escalation in, terror and human destruction gives us no factual bases for postulating that our current favorites (whether people or theories) are, "at long last," free of error, sin, and corruption. Any God worth his or her salt as a divine creative spirit, if we bother to ask, would spurn any notion of a self-inflicted 'purity'. How could any force which is physically, spiritually, or technically powerful enough to create all the possible worlds and untold galaxies postulated by theoretical physicists, particularly if using the means Darwin envisaged for creation - how could any free divinity conceive of a closed, fixed human world as the product of some divine perfection and then dismiss all his responsibility for pain and destruction? The mind of any universal creative force could have rejected, could have closed off, all openness. But given a divinity's freedom in his or her own nature, and given the chaos and indeterminacy we always face, that is hard to imagine. Manuals, computer instructions for the operation of all physical and human forces, these could have been placed in the first human hands. But considering how long it took, first to get to our present state of consciousness and then to reach any degree of understanding of ourselves and of the potential violence of the forces around us - that does not really seem to have been the divine intent. The fossils in any Natural History museum tell the story of a divine preference for struggle. Any stronger, more powerful, more intelligent person who tried to place all blame on someone weaker and less knowledgeable than 369 A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. LV, 369-375. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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himself/herself, such a one would draw indignation from any sensitive person. No creator of mixed worlds and natures could possibly be pure and uninvolved in our struggle and suffering. We now know that we began in no perfect Eden, drawing retribution simply for violating some stipulated command. We were too dumb for too long in our rise to our now often vague consciousness. Only Gods possess understanding from the beginning as a birthright. Ours came first, and still comes, only by intense, sustained struggle with complexity. Are we all, then, or at least some of us, to be commended for lessening the pain and the terror in the world just a bit, recognizing that it is often within our power to do so? We cannot recreate our world's structure, as some utopians once conjectured that we could, but we can alter it "for better or for worse." The evil and destruction and terror we face is partly of our own creation, modest or massive power having been placed in some hands. But the world itself in which we must live was, in its structure, not created so as to exclude evil and destruction. Any God we can conceive of must have elected to keep open the option for violence and the losses which evil actions cause. That is a fact about all Gods, and it is one which we must, or at least should, accept. Surely it must be true that any divinity adequate to the task of laying the foundations of this or of any world or universe would have no qualms about accepting that responsibility by virtue of his or her ability to command. We wish that some of us, or some God, could be pure. That would simplify our task of human understanding. But that cannot be the case, except in our dreams and hopes of gaining release from an often harsh and complex reality. The world we live in, both physical and religious, is a free process, filled with chaos, with accidents and contingencies. Some of this openness and lack of fixity leads to greater creative invention and artistic novelty. But this lack of fixity, which the Modem World thought would soon be left behind, could have been prevented and excluded in the first decisions which established the processes for our descent. This could have been done by any God powerful enough to specify the mechanisms by which our particular world evolves. Our creating divinity therefore must have rejected fixity and necessity and in doing so opened our future to novelty and excitement. But at the same time, risk, evil, and destruction lurk around every comer. No such divine source could be all good, since the routes opened for our evolution allowed for, and did not exclude, evil. Does that make

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God 'evil'? No, it merely makes any divine source which we can conceive of - one who freely created the options that eventually formed themselves into us and our world - neither all good nor all bad. Instead, we face a God of complex mixture, one who allows various degrees of freedom to govern our world's evolution and its process. You say: "That paints a radically different cosmology than the Modem Age's fixation with fixity." They thought that their modem, scientifically powerful Prometheus had stolen the divine fire again, this time for good. And then they went on to eliminate all Gods too, because they wanted to control the world themselves. At that you reply: "You want a God who is neither fully good nor fully evil, but one who himself arises from chaos as opposed to our current volatile form of order." But wait; hold your attack: On this revised account of origins, at least God can exist again after being exiled for so long. Why? Because, even if we don't find the universe to be fully under our control, still a world with such a mixture of good and evil, creation and destruction, could have a divine originator, one who is of mixed intent, one whose nature contains all this added complexity too. That is, Gods can return as creative forces, if men and women now find themselves stopped from creating utopias for themselves. Right. As Hume and St. Thomas agreed: If we simply accept nature as it is, if we neither demand nor appeal to origins from outside our natural order, there is no inconsistency in ceasing to demand, or even to inquire about, non-natural divine causes as originating our world. However: If the universe, as we now describe it, involves mixed principles, and if any "solution" to the question of "why" is ever to be found, then such complexity is not self-explanatory. Without a basic simplicity in our nature or in the various universes, the freedom we experience both positively and negatively - is not self-explanatory. What is weird and chaotic keeps asking for an explanation, even if no "final solution" is possible. A fragile balance, such as we and our world exhibit, can know no necessity or cause. Too many decisions need to be made and sustained in order for our community life to achieve any stability, or for the various alternative plans for our natural world to seek resolution and so to arrive at a certain independence. Viewing ourselves and our natural order in this way does not demand belief in anyone God. However, neither is divinity excluded from our considerations, due to the presence of destruction all around us. Why? Because the answer to the questions "why this

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particular universe at this time and place?" and "why is our human nature so fragile and creative and mixed in intent?" - these questions know no easy solution. Thus, they need a figure of sufficient majesty and power to accept responsibility for deciding on the present option from among all the possible structures our natural order might exhibit. Alright, so divinities of various sorts can possibly be reintroduced into the twenty-first century, although certainly not as natural nor as necessary nor as universally agreed upon. The ancient expectation of the Jew for the appearance of the long-expected Messiah can still develop, since we have no final, single explanation, as Freud expected we would have for all events, which would as a consequence have excluded religion. The Zen monk is vindicated. Since reason itself is in fact caught in insoluble contradiction, we must seek a way to block the hold these oppositions have on the human spirit. Christians and Muslims have a slightly harder time today. They have each announced the revelation of the plan for our release; yet our world seems to grip us even harder in its vice, rather than yielding to religious reconciliation. Predestinarian Protestants have a particularly difficult time now, since the experience of our world - both without and within - is anything but fixed. Popes cannot, or should not, speak with finality, since our world is not such that it can be comprehended with any finality. Our creator-God placed that self-limit on divinity'S powers as well. Who would know better than a divinity that finality has been ruled out - a much more exacting and dangerous world for Gods and for men alike. Of course, because Jesus was crucified, his disciples dispirited and dispersed, betrayal and inconclusiveness became a Christian theme. Expectation, hope for a radically revised future, a super-big-bang to reconstruct us and our too often violent world - that can still be believed in, but not as if it were some obvious fact which every rational mind could/should grasp. Yet such a religiously predicted outcome can be a hope, a belief in things no one can at present clearly see. Still, the kind of power and dedicated control which a freedom-Ioving-creativespirit needs, if he or she is to move the myriad aspects of possible universes to some kind of favorable resolution for us, this is the same vast and haunting power which is needed to bring a world or a person who is out of control back into some form of new or renewed life. The free world, our mixed world which does not necessitate God, cannot exclude the possible truth of the Christian message of love, for those who may have experienced its transforming and healing power in some

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present, past, or future form, whether physically human or spiritual in its origin. However, a religious solution, any religious solution, requires the belief that good can win out over evil - some day if not now. The Zen monk believes that this can happen for a few after their strenuous trial and perserverance. The Christian takes Jesus' resurrection as, at the very least, a sign of the eventual overcoming of our world's inevitable mixture of good and evil. And if any God is to play any part in this reversal, that divinity cannot be itself caught in a deadlock of hopeless mixture. If our world does not yield purity, and if any religious promise is to be fulfilled, there must be "a secret life of God" which the world does not now disclose, or at least seldom. So any creative, restorative divinity must work against the same odds and powers which it itself designed, or so the believer must believe. Most important, however, is that neither the Christian, the Jew, nor the Muslim, believes that the balance between good and evil is a standoff, that it is overall in balance, even if certain individuals may tend toward either sainthood or devil-standing. Within these three major religions there is, of course, a wide difference of opinion as to how heavily the balance is weighted, what their God's role can be in any radical reversal, and most particularly when and how this might come about and be accomplished. Yet the majority of the world's religions give their Gods the power to accomplish this fundamental revolution in the natural order, sometimes even holding firm to this belief in the dark days of doubt, e.g., the Jewish holocaust, Stalin's purges, senseless wars, brutal violence. Thus, the level of optimism which grips different religious groups and individuals will vary; that is, some are sure their time has dawned, while others either wait silently or protest the delay with its consequent and continued loss and destruction. "Religious faith" is not an absurd position, except in Camus' sense that we continue to demand meaning from a world which cannot or will not fulfill our demands. In any case, "faith" certainly involves belief in things which are not and cannot be fully seen in the present, although we may claim that signs have been given to some, e.g. Jesus' resurrection or Jahweh's covenant with, and blessing of, the faithful. Of course, one basic problem which complicates dealing with our experience of good and evil is that there is no single definition of either term, much as we wish there were and too often pretend that there is. Like "beauty," and all value (and disvalue) terms, we face no "beauty

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myth," no need to pretend that there is a single agreed standard of what beauty or good or evil is. True, there is no one, set meaning which is universally accepted for our norm. In fact, there is an indefinite plurality of overlapping definitions, but perhaps there still may be certain common qualities beneath the surface such that communication across divergent cultures is in fact possible, as it is. Around the world we vary in sizes and in shapes and in qualities. African beauty and English beauty are not outwardly exactly the same. Yet our life would be quite different, also less complex and less exciting, if it were not true that we respond instinctively to all types of beauty, both physical and spiritual, whenever they appear before us. And there is a mixture among the varieties as well as common features, not a total exclusion of one from another. What some are shocked with as being "evil," others find fascinating, even if never fully accepted as beauty. All crucial experiences come mixed, never pure, never separated and never singular. Beauties and evils are many, never one. Certainly, any God who sought to create such mixture and diversity (which cannot have happened by accident, the intricate technicalities being as fantastic as they are) must in its divine powers of infinite magnitude hold in its nature the sources of such grey complexity and cloudy variety of all these goods and evils. Still, it is left to us to act out these features freely, for good and for ill, in our own modest version of the free acts by which the original mixture of our Nature's components were established and the methods for our ascent (or corruption) outlined. No CD Rom listing of instructions for medical practice and medicines was included or available as we emerged from the swamp toward an often uncertain state of consciousness. No absolute avenues were outlined for our pursuit toward either good or evil, although many religious and cultural powers have been compounding various versions of ethical standards for our aid from "in the beginning." Terror and struggle and loss are still here, those very mechanisms which were involved in our physical-cultural descent. Nevertheless, many claim to experience a purpose in their world, even a love and a personal concern, which can be discerned by the discerning as a divine intention to create for us a new future. This, if true, offers us a foundation for a future hope of the possible eventual taming of destructive evil. This is "the day that God hath made," or will make possible, when the lion shall lie down with the lamb. Is our human patience and hope and belief "sufficient unto that day?" - given our present experience so often to the contrary?

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As a result of redefining good and evil, God's perfection is reconceived for the twenty-first century. What is 'divine' is: Most powerful, most free; most venturesome (he/she takes chances, but has no impulse to gamble. This is the intermediary position which Einstein did not distinguish); accepts danger and contingency, even terror; but also allows for compassion; capable of launching us and all creation down a long and perilous course toward some degree of precarious self-direction; also most free and so most loving, since love is free of demands when experienced in its divine expression; allows us to fail, to bind ourselves in a multitude of addictions; yet strong enough to save and to grant us new life; establishes an almost unimaginable evolutionary course, but allows independent life to emerge. At times, even degrees of the divine intelligence and freedom emerge, no longer unique for God but now entrusted to us - for good or for evil. Pomona College

This book is a sequel to: Volume LII: Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition. Book I: Laying Down the Cornerstones of the Field. and Volume LIII: Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition. Book II: The Reincarnating Mind, or the Ontopoietic Outburst in Creative Virtualities. and to Volume V: The Crisis of Culture. Steps to Reopen the Phenomenological Investigation of Man. Volume VI: The Self and the Other. The Irreducible Element in Man. Part I: The 'Crisis of Man'. Volume VII: The Human Being in Action. The Irreducible Element in Man. Part II: Investigations at the Intersection of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Volume XXVII: Man Within His Life-World. Contributions to Phenomenology by Scholars from East-Central Europe. Volume XXIX: Man's Self-Interpretation-in-Existence. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Life. Introducing the Spanish Perspective. Volume XXXIV: The Turning Points of the New Phenomenological Era. Husserl Research Drawing upon the Full Extent of His Development. Volume XXXIX: Reason, Life, Culture. Part I. Phenomenology in the Baltics. Volume XL: Manifestations of Reason: Life, Historicity, Culture. Reason, Life, Culture. Part II: Phenomenology in the Adriatic.

INDEX OF NAMES

-A-

Benton, T. H. 356 Bergson, H. 100, 117, 202-203 Bernstein, R. 85-86, 89 Bildad 121 Binswanger, L. 295, 298, 339-340 Blocker. G. 194-204, ::07-208 Blucher, H. 349-350 Boas, F. 356 Bodunrin, P. 194-195,207-209 Borges, J. L. 254 Madame Bovary 103 Brand, G. 73 Brentano, F. 25, 37, 72-73 Brunner, E. 75 Buber, M. 298 Bums, R. B. 287

Abel 106 Abraham 97, 102-106, 110-123 Abraham, W. 196-197 Adam 99 Adam, P. 348 Adonai 110, 116, 120 Aeneas 123 Akesson, H. 75 Alcopley L. 349-350 d'Alembert, J. 117 Emperor Alexander 268 Amo, W. 196-197 Andersson, A. 275 Angelergues, R. 256 Apel, K.-O. 125-126, 148-149 Arendt, H. 296, 345-358 Aristotle 6, 85, 99, 104, 128, 132, 135, 153,199,251,282 Armendariz, M. 270 Artaud, A. 297 Athena 347 SI. Augustine 100, 108 Ayer, Sir A. J. 194

-CCain 106 Caldwell, E. 369 Calvi, L. 256 Campanella, T. 120 Campbell, J. 345-347, 349, 356 Camus, A. 60. 327, 350, 353, 373 Candide 268 Cargnello, D. 298 Carr, D. 23 Cicero 167 Cinderella 268-270 Clerembault, P. de 297 Combs. A. W. 287 Comenius 284 Condillac, E. B. de 237 Condorcet, M. J. de 117 Conrad, J. 227 Corradi Fuimara, G. 296 Coupland, D. 269 Croatto, S. 155

-BBachelard, G. 101 Bacon, Sir F. 234, 284 Bardot, B. 268 Barr, A. H. Jr. 352-353 Barringer, F. 91 Beckett, S. 268 Beethoven, L. van 326 Bell, D. 16-17,19-20 Bell, W. P. 48,77-78 Benda, C. 298 Benhabib, S. 130 Bentham, J. 132

377

378

INDEX OF NAMES

-DM. 218, 220 D~browski, K. 222, 338 Damasio, A. 150 Darwin, C. 229, 231, 242, 369 Dauenhauer, B. 211 Day, D. 259, 273 Dehner, D. 350, 357 Delaunay, R. 325 Derrida, J. 6, 10, 14, 140 Descartes, R. 15-16,87, 164-165, 246, 250-251,254,257,322 Deucalion 6-7 Deutsch, H. 301-302 DeVore, I. 240 Dewey, J. 137 Dilthey, W. 14,21, 161 Diogenes 267-268 Dreyfus, H. 226 Durer, A. 355-356 D~browska,

-E-

Meister Eckhart 119 Eco, U. 4-5 Edelman, G. M. 151,298 Edie, J. 16-17,20 Eimas, P. D. 241 Eimerl, S. 240 Einstein, A. 4, 375 Eliade, M. 104 Eliphaz 121 Emile 285 Empedocles 257 Eteocles 347 Eucken, R. 78

-FFerber, H. 350 Pater Feuling 75 Fink, E. 36-65, 76, 80 Flaubert, G. 103 F0l1esdal, D. 72 Foucault, M. 14, 21, 126, 140, 154, 226-229, 243, 256 Frank, J. 350 Frankl, V. 298, 319

Frazer, Sir J. G. 356 Freire, P. 143, 155 Freud, S. 120, 126, 140,241,301-302, 305,309,311-312,372 Frighi, L. 296 Frooing, G. 275 Fromm Reichmann, F. 296

-G-

Gadamer, H.-G. 26, 63, 67-68, 70, 101, 103,272 Gaiczynski, K. I. 222 Galileo 284 Geertz, C. 88-90 Genet, 1. 353 Gibson, W. 322 Girard, R. 104 God 104, 108, 110, 112-114, 121-122, 164, 247-248, 266, 282, 326, 361362, 364-375 Godot 268 Goethe, J. W. von 164, 172, 175 Goiaszewska, M. 190 Goldwater, R. 354 Gombrowicz, W. 220 Gottleib, A. 356 Goya, F. 355-356 Graham, J. 348, 356 Gramsci, A. 137, 145 Graumann, C. F. 80 Greimas, A. J. 296 Griaule, M. 196 Grimme, A. 75

-H-

Habermas, J. 130, 134, 137-138, 153, 155-156 Hadler, M. 346, 355 Hare, D. 346, 353, 356 Harries, K. 211 Havel, V. 3 Hayek, F. 133, 154 Hegel, G. W. F. 102, 114, 119, 147, 150, 154, 156, 202-203, 285, 333, 350 Heidegger, M. 14, 16-18, 21-22, 98, 100-101, 104, 107-108, III, 116-

379

INDEX OF NAMES

117, 120, 132, 150-151, 165, 167, 173-174, 202-203, 206, 209, 211, 260-263, 308, 330, 351, 353-354 Held, K. 81 HeUer, S. 357 Heraclitus 103, 269 Herzog, M. 80 Hess, T. 349 Hinkelammert, F. 126, 130, 139 Hippocrates 124, 251, 257 Hitler, A. 4, 347, 354, 357 Hoffmanstahl, H. von 20 Honneth, A. 148 Horace 222 Horkheimer, M. 140 Houtondji, P. 194, 197 Hume, D. 371 Hummings, G. 199,210 Husser!, E. 3-11, 13-23, 25-81, 100, 189, 202-203, 206, 230-231, 235, 260-263,281,283-284,353 -1Ibor, L. 243 IHakowiocz6wna, K. 220 Ingarden, R. 177-191 Isaac 111 Ismael 111

-JJames, W. 137,350 Jaspers, K. 80, 119, 215, 221, 281, 333, 353 St. Jerome 109 Jesus Christ 248-249, 272, 372-373 Job 121 St. John of the Cross 121 Jonas, H. 156 Joplin, J. 273 Joyce, 1. 350 Jung, C. 345, 348, 356

-KKafka, F. 221 Kalin, N. H. 240 Kant, 1.8-9,16,21,27,96,99-100,106-

107, 109, 117, 125, 128, 131-132, 148, 165, 168,203,265,285,310311,317,354 Kasanin, J. 291 K~pinski, A. 219 Kierkegaard, S. 22, 312, 316, 330, 350351 Klages, L. 327 Kohlberg, L. 151-152, 155 Kohler, W. 322 Krasner, L. 356 Kretschmer, E. 298 Kuhn, T. 155

-L-

Lacan, 1. 297 Lafuma, L. 114 Laing, R. D. 301, 306, 316 Lather, P. 205, 210 Le Guen, C. 297 Le Breton, D. 245 Leibniz, G. W. 197 Lenin 120, 145 Lentino, G. da 241 Lersch, P. 325 Levinas, E. 112, 119, 126, 139-141, 143, 145,151,154--156 Leviticus 122 Lightfoot, S. L. 93 Lipps, T. 70 Lipton, S. 346 Lloyd, J. 272 Locke, J. 15, 132 Luckmann, T. 263 Lyotard, 1.-F. 140

-MMachado Pais, 1. 274 MacIntyre, A. 141, 150 Madison, G. B. 87-90, 93 ManganeUi, G. 296 Mao Tse-tung 120 Marcel, G. 92, 121,298,329,332 Martin, 1. 114 Marx, K. 120, 126, 131,138-140,142, 145,148,151,153-155,330

380

INDEX OF NAMES

Virgin Mary 249 Masaryk, T. G. 78 Maslow, A. H. 215, 218, 287 Matte-Blanco, I. 291 Maurel, M. 298 May, R. 334 McClay, W. 345 Mead, G. H. 137 Mele, A. 297 MencM, R. 140 Merieau-Ponty, M. 16, 20, 88-90, 226, 228, 244, 248, 254-255, 305, 308309, 312, 322-324, 340 Mill, 1. S. 132 Mitosz, C. 220, 222 Minkowski, E. 298 Moloch 346-347 Momoh, C. S. 194-195, 197, 199-200, 210 Moore, G. E. 132 Moravia, A. 220-221 Moravia, S. 298 Moses 110, 122 Moshin, E. 248 Motherwell, R. 350-351, 356 Mounier, E. 327,329 Mozart, W. A. 4 Mukherjee, B. 93 Mundie, W. 75 Miintzer, T. 120 Murdock, G. P. 225

-N-

Natkowska, Z. 219-221 Napoleon Bonaparte 4 Nedoncelle, M. 100 Newman, B. 350, 352-354, 356 Nietzsche, F. 3-4, 10, 14, 21, 96-97, 120, 122-123, 126, 140, 150, 155, 162, 173,257,281,333,347,351

-0Oedipus 347 Onyewuenyi, I. 197 Ortega y Gasset, 1. 161-169,172-175, 286

Oruka, H. O. 194, 198,205,210 Ouaknin, M. A. 110

-PPanzini, A. 296 Paracelsus 285 Pascal, B. 114, 116,329 Passmore, 1. 203 St. Paul 101, 110, 118, 120-121 Paz, O. 270 Peirce, C. S. 126,136-137 Peris, H. 324 Peter the Great 96 Picasso, P. 356 Pike, N. 368 Piro, S. 297 Plato 98, 106, 123, 187, 198-199,201, 203, 269, 276, 282 Pol Pot 120 Polak, F. 264-265 Polcari, S. 345-346, 353, 356 Pollock, 1. 354, 356 Popper, Sir K. 118 Portmann, A. 231 Pos, 1. 76 Potts, A. 232 Prigogine, I. 100, 118 Prometheus 284-285, 371 Proust, M. 220 Python, M. 272

-Q-

Qohelet 119 Quevedo, F. de 99

-RRabinow, P. 226 Rawls, 1. 132 Ricci Sindoni, P. 295 Ricoeur, P. 88-90, 102, 304 Rogers, C. R. 221, 287, 333 Romero, O. 156 Rorty, R. 14,21, 103 Rosanov, V. 284-285 Rosenberg, H. 350-351 Rosenzweig, F. 298

381

INDEX OF NAMES Rossi, O. 298 Roth, A. 26, 69-70 Rothko, M. 347, 350, 356 Rousseau, J.-J. 155-156,285 Rubene, M. 6 Russell, B. 22 Ruysbroek, J. van 119

-SSacks, O. 238 Saint-Exupery, A. de 251, 328 Salemohammed, G. 207 Sandler, I. 349, 357 Sara III Sartre, J.-P. 60, 103, 151, 233, 260, 262-263, 304-307, 310, 313-314, 330-331,351-353 Saturn 355-356 Schapiro, M. 350 Scheler, M. 14,22,26,28, 150, 161, 174, 298, 311, 326 Schlick, M. 202 Schopenhauer, A. 70, 120, 267 Schuhmann, K. 69-70, 81 Schutz, A. 263 Schweitzer, A. 47, 78 Searle, J. 151 Seneca 122 Siebers, T. 241 Sisyphus 267-268 Smith, D. 350, 357 Socrates 106--107, 123, 276, 282 Sophocles 347 Speer, A. 354 Spengler, O. 281 Spiegelberg, H. 19 Spranger, E. 76 SI. Thomas Aquinas 371 Stalin 4, 156, 373 Stamos, T. 356 Stem, O. 250 Still, C. 352, 356 Strawson, P. F. 198,201 Stroker, E. 6 Str6zewski, W. 190 Stumpf, C. 75

Swedenborg, E. 329

-T-

Tauler, 1. 119 Taylor, C. 14, 141, 150, 152 Taylor, R. 363 Tempels, P. 196-197 Thatcher, M. 272 SI. Therese de Lisieux 222 Tillich, P. 315, 348 Tiresias 347 Tomasello, M. 240 Tsophar 121 Tiircke, C. 126 Tworkov, 1. 349 Tymieniecka, A-T. 6, 77, 283, 337-

340

-U-

Ulrich, P. 153 Ulysses 111, 123 Unamuno, M. de 328

-VVaihinger, H. 301 van Buren, J. 17 Van Dusen, W. 329, 331 Vansittart, L. 348 Varnedoe, K. 348, 350 Vattimo, G. 103 Vella, G. 246 Vico, G. 14 Virgil 124 Voltaire 117, 268

-W-

Wagner, R. 347 Walzer, M. 148, 150-151, 155-156 Weber, M. 79-80, 137 Wellmer, A. 139, 153-154 Winkler, R. 75 Winnicott, D. C. 303 Wiredu, K. 194, 211 WiUgenstein, L. 16, 22, 104, 167, 202

382

INDEX OF NAMES

-Y-

Yahweh Elohim 99,104-105,107, 110, 116, 118, 120,373 Yai, O. 197

-ZZagajewski, A. 220

Zaner, R. M. 256, 295 Zeno 291 Zielinski, A. 220 Zinker, J. C. 324 Zubiri, X. 151 Zutt, J. 295, 298

Analecta Husserliana The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research Editor-in-Chief

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning, Belmont, Massachusetts, U.S.A.

1. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Volume I ofAnalecta Husserliana. 1971 ISBN 90-277-0171-7 2. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Later Husserl and the Idea of Phenomenology. Idealism - Realism, Historicity and Nature. 1972 ISBN 90-277-0223-3 3. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Phenomenological Realism of the Possible Worlds. The 'A Priori', Activity and Passivity of Consciousness, Phenomenology and Nature. 1974 ISBN 90-277-0426-0 4. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialised Studies Establishing the Field of Research. 1976 ISBN 90-277-0628-X 5. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Crisis of Culture. Steps to Reopen the Phenomenological Investigation of Man. 1976 ISBN 90-277-0632-8 6. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Self and the Other. The Irreducible Element in ISBN 90-277-0759-6 Man, Part I. 1977 7. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Human Being in Action. The Irreducible Element in Man, Part 11.1978 ISBN 90-277-0884-3 8. Nitta, Y. and Hirotaka Tatematsu (eds.), Japanese Phenomenology. Phenomenology as the Trans-cultural Philosophical Approach. 1979 ISBN 90-277-0924-6 9. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Teleologies in Husserlian Phenomenology. The ISBN 90-277-0981-5 Irreducible Element in Man, Part III. 1979 10. Wojtyla, K., The Acting Person. Translated from Polish by A. Potocki. 1979 ISBN Hb 90-277-0969-6; Pb 90-277-0985-8 11. Ales Bello, A. (ed.), The Great Chain of Being and Italian Phenomenology. 1981 ISBN 90-277-1071-6 12. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Philosophical Reflection of Man in Literature. Selected Papers from Several Conferences held by the International Society for Phenomenology and Literature in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Includes the essay by A-T. Tymieniecka, Poetica Nova. 1982 ISBN 90-277-1312-X 13. Kaelin, E. F., The Unhappy Consciousness. The Poetic Plight of Samuel Beckett. An Inquiry at the Intersection of Phenomenology and literature. 1981 ISBN 90-277-1313-8 14. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condition. Individualisation of Nature and the Human Being. (Part I:) Plotting

Analecta Husserliana 15.

16. 17. 18. 19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24. 25. 26. 27.

28.

the Territory for Interdisciplinary Communication. 1983 Part II see below under Volume 21. ISBN 90-277-1447-9 Tymieniecka, A-T. and Calvin O. Schrag (eds.), Foundations of Morality, Human Rights, and the Human Sciences. Phenomenology in a Foundational Dialogue with Human Sciences. 1983 ISBN 90-277-1453-3 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Soul and Body in Husserlian Phenomenology. Man ISBN 90-277-1518-1 and Nature. 1983 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Phenomenology of Life in a Dialogue Between ISBN 90-277-1620-X Chinese and Occidental Philosophy. 1984 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Existential Coordinates of the Human Condition: ISBN 90-277-1702-8 Poetic - Epic - Tragic. The Literary Genre. 1984 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Poetics of the Elements in the Human Condition. (Part 1:) The Sea. From Elemental Stirrings to Symbolic Inspiration, Language, and Life-Significance in Literary Interpretation and Theory. 1985 For Part 2 and 3 see below under Volumes 23 and 28. ISBN 90-277-1906-3 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Moral Sense in the Communal Significance of Life. Investigations in Phenomenological Praxeology: Psychiatric Therapeutics, Medical Ethics and Social Praxis within the Life- and Communal World. 1986 ISBN 90-277-2085-1 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condition. Part II: The Meeting Point Between Occidental and Oriental Philosophies. 1986 ISBN 90-277-2185-8 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Morality within the Life- and Social World. Interdisciplinary Phenomenology of the Authentic Life in the 'Moral Sense'. 1987 Sequel to Volumes 15 and 20. ISBN 90-277-2411-3 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Poetics of the Elements in the Human Condition. Part 2: The Airy Elements in Poetic Imagination. Breath, Breeze, Wind, Tempest, Thunder, Snow, Flame, Fire, Volcano ... 1988 ISBN 90-277-2569-1 Tymieniecka, A-T., Logos and Life. Book I: Creative Experience and the ISBN Hb 90-277-2539-X; Pb 90-277-2540-3 Critique of Reason. 1988 Tymieniecka, A-T., Logos and Life. Book II: The Three Movements of the ISBN Hb 90-277-2556-X; Pb 90-277-2557-8 Soul. 1988 Kaelin, E. F. and Calvin O. Schrag (eds.), American Phenomenology. Origins and Developments. 1989 ISBN 90-277-2690-6 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Man within his Life-World. Contributions to Phenomenology by Scholars from East-Central Europe. 1989 ISBN 90-277-2767-8 Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Elemental Passions of the Soul. Poetics of the Elements in the Human Condition, Part 3.1990 ISBN 0-7923-0180-3

Analecta Husserliana 29. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Man's Self-Interpretation-in-Existence. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Life. - Introducing the Spanish Perspective. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0324-5 30. Rudnick, H. H. (ed.), Ingardeniana II. New Studies in the Philosophy of Roman Ingarden. With a New International Ingarden Bibliography. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0627-9 31. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Moral Sense and Its Foundational Significance: Self, Person, Historicity, Community. Phenomenological Praxeology and Psychiatry. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0678-3 32. Kronegger, M. (ed.), Phenomenology and Aesthetics. Approaches to Comparative Literature and Other Arts. Homages to A-T. Tymieniecka. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-0738-0 33. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Ingardeniana III. Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics in a New Key and the Independent Approaches of Others: The Performing Arts, the Fine Arts, and Literature. 1991 Sequel to Volumes 4 and 30 ISBN 0-7923-1014-4 34. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Turning Points of the New Phenomenological Era. Husser! Research - Drawing upon the Full Extent of His Development. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1134-5 35. Tymieniecka, A -T. (ed.), Husserlian Phenomenology in a New Key. Intersubjectivity, Ethos, the Societal Sphere, Human Encounter, Pathos. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1146-9 36. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Husserl's Legacy in Phenomenological Philosophies. New Approaches to Reason, Language, Hermeneutics, the Human Condition. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1178-7 37. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), New Queries in Aesthetics and Metaphysics. Time, Historicity, Art, Culture, Metaphysics, the Transnatural. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1195-7 38. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Elemental Dialectic of Light and Darkness. The ISBN 0-7923-1601-0 Passions of the Soul in the Onto-Poiesis of Life. 1992 39. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Reason, Life, Culture, Part I. Phenomenology in the Balties. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-1902-8 40. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Manifestations of Reason: Life, Historicity, Culture. Reason, Life, Culture, Part II. Phenomenology in the Adriatic Countries. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-2215-0 41. Tymienieeka, A-T. (ed.), Allegory Revisited. Ideals of Mankind. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2312-2

Analecta Husserliana 42. Kronegger, M. and Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.), Allegory Old and New. In Literature, the Fine Arts, Music and Theatre, and Its Continuity in Culture. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2348-3 43. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): From the Sacred to the Divine. A New Phenomenological Approach. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2690-3 44. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Elemental Passionfor Place in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Passions of the Soul in the Imaginatio Creatrix. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-2749-7 45. Zhai, Z.: The Radical Choice and Moral Theory. Through Communicative Argumentation to Phenomenological Subjectivity. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2891-4 46. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Logic of the Living Present. Experience, Ordering, Onto-Poiesis of Culture. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-2930-9 47. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Heaven, Earth, and In-Between in the Harmony of Life. Phenomenology in the Continuing Oriental/Occidental Dialogue. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3373-X 48. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Life. In the Glory of its Radiating Manifestations. 25th Anniversary Publication. Book 1. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3825-1 49. Kronegger, M. and Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.): Life. The Human Quest for an Ideal. 25th Anniversary Publication. Book II. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3826-X 50. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Life. Phenomenology of Life as the Starting Point of Philosophy. 25th Anniversary Publication. Book III. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4126-0 51. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Passion for Place. Part II. Between the Vital Spacing and the Creative Horizons of Fulfilment. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4146-5 52. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition. Laying Down the Cornerstones of the Field. Book I. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4445-6 53. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Reincarnating Mind, or the Ontopoietic Outburst in Creative Virtualities. Harmonisations and Attunement in Cognition, the Fine Arts, Literature. Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition. ISBN 0-7923-4461-8 Book II. 1997 54. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Ontopoietic Expansion in Human Se/fInterpretationin-Existence. The I and the Other in their Creative Spacing of the Societal Circuits of Life. Phenomenology of Life and the Creative Condition. Book III. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4462-6 55. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Creative Virtualities in Human Se/fInterpretation-inCulture. Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition. Book IV. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4545-2

Analecta Husserliana 56. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Enjoyment. From Laughter to Delight in Philosophy, Literature, the Fine Arts and Aesthetics. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-4677-7

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