Critical Theory and the Literary Canon
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Critical Theory and the Literary Canon
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Critical Theory and the Literary Canon E. Dean Kolbas
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All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Copyright © 2001 by Westview Press, A Member of the Perseus Books Group Published in 2001 in the United States of America by Westview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the United Kingdom bv Westview Press, 12 Hid's Copse Road, Cumnor Hill, Oxford OX2 9JJ Visit us on the World Wide Web at www.westviewpress.com Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kolbas, E. Dean. Critical theory and the literary canon / E. Dean Kolbas. p. cm. Revision of the author's thesis (doctoral)—Cambridge University. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8133-9813-4 1. Criticism—History—20th century. 2. Canon (Literature). 3. Literature, Modern— History and criticism—Theory, etc. I. Title PN81 .K595 2001 801'.95'0904—dc21 00-053181 The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. PERSEUS
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Contents Acknowledgments Introduction Part One 1
vii 1
History, Politics, and Culture
Canons Ancient and Modern
11
Antiquity and the Middle Ages, 12 Modern Literary Canonizing, 17 Canonical and Cultural Crises, 21 2
The Contemporary Canon Debate
25
Justifying the Western Canon, 26 Opening the Canon, 36 Representation and Pragmatism, 44 Conclusion: Ideological Proximity, 56 3
Cultural Reproduction
59
The Familiarity of Canonical Works, 61 Canon Formation and Social Relations, 72 Whither Aesthetics?, 79 Part Two Critical Aesthetic Theory 4
Critical Theory and Canonical Art
83
Aesthetic Autonomy and Radical Critique, 84 The Dialectic of Aesthetics and Politics, 92 Historical Content and Canonical Change, 98 5
Subverting the Canon: Sociology, New Historicism, and Cultural Studies
103
The Anti-Aesthetic Impulse of the Sociology of Art, 104 v
Contents
VI
New Historicism and Aesthetic Heteronomy, 113 The Extorted Reconciliation of Cultural Studies, 119 6
The Boundaries of a Critical Theory of Canon Formation
125
Limited Literary Horizons?, 126 Canonical Reproduction and the Limits of Critical Theory, 133 Conclusion: A Canon of Art, a Politics of Ends Notes
References Index
139 145 167 179
Acknowledgments This book is the result of research done at Cambridge University that was originally submitted as a doctoral thesis. Although it has been substantially modified and rewritten to be more suitable for publication, its essential content remains the product of work that was done there. Even the most hermetic research is never a purely solitary endeavor, and 1 owe a great deal of thanks to friends, faculty, and administrators for their advice, encouragement, and patience. Above all, I am indebted to my supervisor, Simon Jarvis, for his invaluable guidance and critical attention. I am also grateful to Graham McCann, Silvana Dean, and the Fellows, porters, and staff of Queens' College for all of their help, as well as Christopher Norris and Ato Quayson for examining my work so closely. I would also like to thank my editors at Westview Press, David McBride and Kay Mariea, and my reviewers, Noah Isenberg, Geoffrey Gait Harpham, and Douglas Kellner for their suggestions and support. I am also grateful to Sharon Dejohn for her meticulous copyediting. A number of friends deserve special thanks for their help and advice over the years: Mark Fenwick, Richard Jones, Alex Rehding, Paul Stephenson, Despina Christodoulou, Julian Murphet, David Mikosz, Tiffany Stern, Heather Wolfe, and Sam Gibson. In ways that are perhaps less direct, but no less valuable for being so, many wonderful teachers and professors have also influenced me throughout my education: David McLellan, Chris Taylor, Sean Sayers, Thomas Cox, Ed McCann, Richard Prizant, Carole RosenKaplan, and the late Chet Lieb. Finally, I want to thank my wife, Paula, and my parents, Eugene and Deanna Kolbas, for their love and support. This book is dedicated to them. £. Dean Kolbas
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Philosophy that satisfies its own intention . . . has its lifebiood in the resistance against the common practices of today and what they serve, against the justification of what happens to be the case. -Tlieodor Adonio, "Why Still Philosophy" 0962)
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Introduction A "literary classic" is a work considered first-rate or excellent of its kind, and therefore standard, fit to be used as a model or imitated. —The Oxford Companion to English Literature <1985)
In the past twenty years, the controversy over the literary canon has generated a wide range of critical commentary, from editorials and polemics in journals and newspapers to theories and case studies in seminars and symposia. By some accounts, the Western canon—the corpus of works comprising the "classics" of art and literature, the very summit of cultural achievement in the West—once thought of as timeless and universal, is now being undermined by the combined forces of feminism, multiculturalism, popular culture, and relativistic literary theories that have occupied schools and universities since the 1960s. By other accounts, the canon has been dominated by "dead, white European males," excluding authors and artists from social groups that have historically been marginalized or that do not conform to the interests of the dominant culture. It is therefore condemned as an elitist, patriarchical, racist, or ethnocentric construction. In both cases there is agreement that the current impasse over the literary canon signifies a change in society at large because the monuments of the old order are thought to be giving wray to new canons, greater cultural diversity, and changing political values. One of the main objectives of this book is to explain how and why these two lines of argument have been both historically and politically suspect, largely for neglecting the material processes of canon formation. A critique of the current debate will demonstrate that their apparently antagonistic positions actually have a number of ideological assumptions in common. In particular, there is a widespread belief that literary canons are maintained by the authority of educational institutions and can therefore be changed, or preserved, by engineering the classroom syllabus accordingly. It is also believed that canons and works of art in general represent specific cultures or social groups, such as women, African 1
2
Introduction
Americans, and even Western culture as a whole. In contrast to these and other related suppositions, I will make a case for a sociological and historical understanding of canons that is confined neither to schools and universities nor to social representation but that stresses the material reproduction of culture in the process of canon formation. An alternative account of the historical constraints and material conditions of literary canonization will clarify the means by which only a limited number of works of literature become canonical. In addition to cultural reproduction, the very concept of a canon necessarily involves qualitative judgment, because to be canonical also means to be exemplary. Sociological views of the literary canon that overemphasize the institutional processes of canon formation tend to discount or neglect the distinctive, aesthetic aspects of canonical works of art. In contrast to such viewrs, this book will suggest that critical theoiy—and particularly the work of Theodor Adomo—offers a unique understanding of art that salvages the aesthetic content of canonical works yet avoids lapsing into reactionary glorifications of them. I will also showr how the critique of politically "committed" art in Adorno's work may be extended to the instrumental justifications for revising the canon that have been evident throughout the contemporary debate about the canon. Although the Frankfurt School has excited much academic interest in recent years, virtually no attention has been paid to its potential relevance to this debate. 1 The purpose of bringing critical theory into the socalled culture wars is neither to establish new grounds for adding more works of literature to the canon nor to exploit its insights for the sake of legitimizing the received canon as an indivisible whole. Rather, it is to introduce a distinctive perspective that exposes many of the major claims made about the canon that fail to live up to what they promise. Where some critics extol the humane and democratic virtues of the Western canon, critical theory suggests how in the name of culture they end up betraying it. Where others believe that a gender-balanced, populist, or multicultural canon would help to foster equality by being more socially representative, the critique of politically committed art and instrumental justifications of literature implies that these arguments are no less culpable than the cultural hegemony they seek to vanquish. Ultimately, this book hopes to demonstrate that the critical theory of art and society can illuminate the very concept of a canon as well as the controversy surrounding it. Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of the contemporary debate on canonical literature is that the terms in which it has been framed have been consistently oppositional: The polarized rhetoric of critics across the political spectrum has practically determined from the start that the dispute would remain unresolved. Whereas some of these critics denounce
Introduction
3
any attribution of value to canonical works as inherently biased or ideological, others reserve skepticism for the reputedly progressive effects of debunking them. When one critic speaks of the loss of standards of judgment, another reacts by emphasizing the exclusions that those standards have reinforced. Some have appealed to the democratic legacy and humanistic virtues of the Western tradition; others have invoked cultural difference and otherness against its hegemony. And whereas certain academics continue to analyze and evaluate works of literature in isolation according to their intrinsic aesthetic quality, others insist on disrupting formalistic interpretation, preferring instead to situate texts within a social and historical context, to highlight their aporias and silences, or to reverse the relation of what is central and what is peripheral about them-— all in opposition to hitherto orthodox literary criticism which, it is believed, has implicitly favored canonical over non-canonical works. Nevertheless, both liberal pluralists and conservative humanists, to use a familiar shorthand, seem to share a surprisingly uniform conception of the canon itself, as either a singular legacy of artistic excellence or an elite body of works whose privileged station must now be exposed in the name of social justice. Because the debate has been couched in explicitly political and highly polemical terms, it is necessary to inquire into the political assumptions that inform it. Where political arguments are being made, the actual merits of their claims need to be politically assessed. If one of the central tasks of a politically informed cultural criticism is to unveil the ideological homogeneity behind an illusory diversity or the appearance of difference,2 then the common assumptions and political limitations of these arguments must be exposed. Chapter 1 begins by showing how the idea of a canon originated in antiquity as a concept with various, and sometimes contradictory, meanings: from simple tools of measurement to sophisticated artistic models, from standards of moral behavior to the legitimization of political authority. By the Middle Ages, the literary canon in particular was being used in European schools as a pedagogical device for those with access to formal education. Later, with the formation of the modern nation-state and the rise of professional criticism, it also acquired the nationalistic and exclusive connotations that are still in evidence today. Ending with a brief review of some of the major precedents for challenging established literary canons, the chapter provides historical background to the current situation, as well as a point of reference for several arguments made later in the book. Chapter 2 is a critical survey of the contemporary debate itself. To elucidate the ways in which conservative and liberal, humanistic and pluralistic conceptions of the canon actually disclose their own ideological affinities, I analyze in detail the specific claims for endorsing the Western
4
Introduction
canon as it stands or for "opening it up" to be more culturally diverse and socially representative. In particular, the methodological assumptions and political implications of each position reveal that—in spite of their apparent opposition—they tend either to conceive of the process of canonization in idealistic terms or to appropriate canonical works for their political or pedagogical utility, hi either case, ideological assumptions are taken for granted and the material constraints of canon formation are left unexamined. Because most of the arguments regarding the canon have occurred in the United States, especially within its universities, the controversy is usually taken to be an issue of educational reform; it is sometimes even dismissed as a "local debate" with little or no consequence outside of the academy. 3 Not only can doubts be cast on the accuracy of this assumption, but its narrow historical and sociological vantage point circumscribes an understanding of the socioeconomic foundations of canons as much as the material basis of canonization as a process. In Chapter 31 attempt to correct for this myopia by widening the scope of the debate and considering the diverse forms of cultural reproduction and institutional legitimization that are necessary for the canonization of any work of art or literature. Insofar as the very idea of a canon implies that certain works are more worthy of imitation and continual exegesis than others, canon formation involves the reproduction of, adaptation of, and familiarity with canonical antecedents, whether literal or figurative, direct or indirect, or within the same genre and medium or not. Social and institutional theories of art, such as the sociology of literary reputations or Pierre Bourdieu's model of the field of cultural production, can help to explain the mechanisms by which canonical works become culturally familiar. Among the questions raised by such approaches is whether there has ever been an academic "monopoly" on literary consecration. If not, or if this monopoly has since dissolved, then more consideration must be given to other cultural forces and non-academic institutions that also affect canon formation, including the publishing and entertainment industries, the mass media, and the commodification of culture in general. For all their advantages, however, sociological accounts of literary reproduction have tended to put aside the question of the aesthetic content or quality of canonical works, highlighting instead the social and ideological functions of art. Indeed, they sometimes go so far as to suggest that there is nothing distinctive about canonical works of literature because there is nothing uniquely aesthetic about "works of art" at all.4 To address this tendency, in Part 2 I begin by considering the aesthetic content and significance of works of art that conventional literary sociology neglects. I therefore reconsider canonicity through the lens of crit-
Introduction
5
ical theory, particularly the literary criticism and aesthetic theory of Theodor Adorno. Although the vast majority of critics seem to believe that canons and canon formation are primarily the domain of formal institutions of education, the members of the so-called Frankfurt School perceive the judgment and fate of works of art to be a complex sociological and historical process that is confined neither to a single institution nor to any one field of cultural production. In answer to the radical educational reform proposed in 1969 by Helmut Becker, who proposed to "abolish education according to a fixed canon and instead to provide a program of varied course offerings, i.e., a school with a wide series of choices and extensive internal differentiation within the individual subjects," Adorno replied, "It seems to me that as much as all this may be desirable, it remains too much embedded in the institutional framework of the school." 5 To go beyond that framework without abandoning the aesthetic content of art, in Chapter 4 I introduce the most relevant aspects of critical theory to the current debate. Specifically, Adorno's—and, to some extent, Walter Benjamin's—conception of the social, historical, and philosophical significance of the work of art stresses its cognitive and critical attributes, avoiding both the naive celebration of Western culture and the simple condemnation of canonical literature as essentially ideological and therefore bankrupt. The autonomy of art, as Adorno understands it, is also applicable to the political assumptions of the current debate in general, because overtly political or pragmatic justifications for opening the canon may be subject to a similar critique as that of socially "committed" art, largely for adopting a specious and unhistorical idea that artworks are necessarily socially effective, practical tools, or that canons should be faithfully representative of society as it is. Instead, I suggest that the political claims for art by both left- and right-wing critics (even though the latter would deny that their claims are political) contradict the very concept of art in modern society, especially when it is confined to strictly pragmatic functions or justified in instrumental terms. No less problematic is the argument that takes the modernist criteria by which art has been judged to be simply prejudiced and disposable. To the critical theory of art, what is called the "truth content" of works is taken as historically objective and, in part, materialistically determined. If different elements of that content are revealed over time in fragments and changing configurations, or "constellations," rather than entirely and all at once, then works of art and literature can be neither condemned as totally ideological nor glorified as the immortal monuments of culture. Ultimately, I will explain how the concept of an historical constellation of elements may be a suitable metaphor for canon formation itself.
6
Introduction
Although Chapter 4 is in part a critical response to the ideological proposals and justifications for either revising or leaving intact the literary amon, Chapter 5 is a rejoinder to the sociological arguments that attempt to go beyond those proposals. In particular, I show how the sociology of art, new historicism, and cultural studies implicitly or explicitly try to subvert the high regard traditionally accorded the canon. Sociology generally finds the evaluation of literature to be dependent on its social effects or reception, which suggests that the qualitative content of wrorks of art is merely a function of their institutionalization. On the occasions when it does examine the specific content of an individual work, more often than not sociology uses it merely to endorse its own empirical priorities and theoretical aims rather than to perceive what aspects of the work may not readily conform to the immediate conditions of society. Similarly, with its emphasis on social context and the mediations of texts, new historicism tends to give up the distinction between works of literature and other historical documents, even though its practitioners might pay lip service to the idea of artistic quality. This is largely due to the disregard of aesthetic autonomy in new historicism and its substitution of heteronomy as a more realistic or accurate category with which to understand literature. Even more directly, the discipline of cultural studies appears to abolish any canonical distinction at all, bridging the gap between "high" and "low" culture by giving cultural phenomena or popular works of art—literary and otherwise—the same critical treatment that canonical works have routinely received. Critical theory, however, anticipates many of these arguments, and it also reveals how each of them betrays itself as ideological to the extent that works of art are made to conform to the very social order they tacitly hope to transcend. By the end of Chapter 5, the advantages of a critical theory of canonicity should be clear. Without succumbing to the conservative fetish of canonical art, critical theory nevertheless salvages whatever truth content can be found in art. Nor does critical theory resort to an instrumental justification, or idealistic program, of canon revision in the interests of social justice, since it recognizes the critical value of art's autonomy as well as the objective determinations of canon formation. Equally, critical theory avoids the ideological aspects of the sociology of art that emphasize its institutionalization over its transformative impulse, and that therefore ultimately legitimize the status quo. In spite of these advantages, however, the critical theory of art is itself open to criticism on several grounds, the most relevant of which I assess in Chapter 6. Among them are what has been described as the limited literary horizons of Adorno's aesthetic theory, or its narrow focus on works of art and literature that are already part of the Western canon; the supposedly outdated, modernist emphasis upon the category of "the work of art,"
Introduction
/
which is believed to make Adorno's aesthetic theory less applicable to "postmodern" society today; and the questionable notion of totality, or a uniform socioeconomic order that is thought to permeate society on every level. In addition to these familiar objections, certain remaining ambiguities and inconsistencies are also examined, including Adorno's equivocal assessment of artistic reproduction and its role in canon formation. Finally, I consider whether the apparent limitations of a critical theory of canonical art are in part due to the inherent tensions—or objective contradictions—of canonicity itself, which are not to be erased in the name of logical consistency but rather highlighted by any account that would be truly critical, As long as the discourse about literary canons continues to be dominated on the one hand by the rhetoric of liberal representation and the social utility of art and on the other by the irreproachability of Western cultural monuments, there will continue to be space for a perspective that is neither pragmatic nor idealistic, neither conventionally political nor politically aloof. Despite its own shortcomings, and the historical and material conditions working against it, critical theory provides such a perspective. If critical theory helps to move beyond the limited terms of the canon debate and the false opposition of its cultural politics, then explaining how is a worthwhile task. It should be reiterated that this book is primarily concerned with the literary canon and the contemporary arguments about it. Although it is increasingly evident that this debate has ramifications for disciplines beyond those specifically concerned with the study of literature—as witnessed by recent studies in political theory, sociology, U.S. history, and Western music 6 —these subjects, with the exception of the latter, have generally not been concerned with the aesthetic quality or content of the works comprised in their respective canons. Nor have they generated anything like the volume of commentary and critique that has been devoted to the literary canon. For these reasons, in this book I focus on arguments concerning canons of art and literature alone. The question as to whether the arguments made here can be extended to canons in other areas is therefore left open.
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PART ONE
History, Politics, and Culture
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1 Canons Ancient and Modern For Polyclelus taught us all the symmetries of the body in his treatise, and confirmed his testimony when IK sculpted a statue according to his own rules, and named the statue, as he had his treatise, the canon. —Galen, De placitis Hippocrates et Platonis (second century A.o.)
Poetry in general was a gift to the world and to nations, and not the private inheritance of a few refined, cultivated men. —The Autobiography of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1832), vol. II, book x
Before assessing the contemporary debate over the Western literary canon, it is necessary to understand the precise meanings of the word canon. Although new studies of specific incidents of literary canonization have been appearing with increasing frequency, most of them concentrate on the fortunes and fate of individual authors, texts, movements, or genres; to date, few have attempted to trace the origins of the term itself and its subsequent transformations. 1 My purpose in this chapter, therefore, is to provide a brief historical overview of the changing definitions and connotations of the term canon, with particular emphasis on the variety of uses to which it has been put. This chapter begins by surveying the origins and evolution of the idea of a canon from antiquity to the Middle Ages. I will show that the creation of vernacular literary canons came only after the institutionalization of the vernacular languages, the consolidation of modern nationstates, and the spread of nationalist ideologies. The eventual establishment of modern canons of literature depended on other economic and sociological factors, such as the rise of professional criticism, the growth of the publishing industry, and the commodification of culture in capitalistic societies, none of which, of course, has been exclusive to any single It
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Canons Ancient and Modern
nation-state. Bringing this historical account up to the contemporary canon debate, the notion that the crisis of canonical legitimization todaysignals a deeper cultural crisis is assessed in the third part of this chapter. In light of challenges to the Western canon that have periodically occurred throughout its history, I consider suggestions as to what makes the present controversy different from those that have preceded it before analyzing, in the following chapter, the specific arguments for and against diversifying the literary canon today. Antiquity and the Middle Ages The definition of canon ultimately derives from the ancient Greek word kanna, which referred to useful types of reed, the straight stalk of marsh plants with firm stems. The related Greek term kanon metaphorically and metonymically extends that use to include straight rod, bar, or ruler, as well as rule, standard, and model. In architecture it acquired the meaning of the right measure and, in the arts, correct proportion. The latter sense was developed most explicitly in antiquity by the celebrated sculptor Polykleitos. It has been remarked that the fifth century B.C. was the prime period of classical sculpture, in which an artistic realism and universalism were established that would profoundly influence the future course of Western art.2 Polykleitos of Argos, whose statues were among the most copied of antiquity, exemplified this ambition. His sculpture of the Doryphoros, or spear-carrier, has been famous since its completion for exhibiting "a harmony of design . . . never before attained in Greek sculpture," so much so that successive generations of artists took the figure as their model. 3 Indeed, representations of the Doryphoros appeared in reliefs, altar friezes, and other statues, as well as on coins and engraved gems, well into the first century B.C. and after. Although only copies of Polykleitos's work now survive, literary and archaeological evidence has led one critic to surmise that the Romans admired it "almost fetishistically" and considered it "an ideal model for all sculptors to follow (words like lex, magister and exemplum are used of the Doryphoros)." 4 In Book XXXIV of his Natural History (first century A.D.), Pliny the Elder refers to the Doryphoros as "the statue that artists call the Canon, since they draw their outlines from it as if from a sort of standard." Thanks to this one work, he continues, Polykleitos "perfected the art of sculpture." The statue is sometimes claimed to have been the sculptural illustration of Polykleitos's only known book, now lost, entitled Kanon, in which he expounded the theoretical basis of his technique. A manual detailing the precise mathematical measurements and "ideal proportions" of the human figure, it is thought to have provided a "practical working
Canons Ancient and Modern
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blueprint" and aesthetic standard for other sculptors to follow. 5 The sculptural technique that was to follow his own example was thus given didactic exposition: The technical procedures needed to achieve a perfected naturalism, or formal realism, are supposed to have been contamed in the Kanon, whereas the Doryphoros itself was meant physically to exemplify the artist's conceptual ideal. Art historian Brunilde Ridgway alleges that the sculpture did not represent any particular individual but rather "the athlete or the Olympic victor par excellence," and has described it as the epitome of idealization, since the body is seen as a sequence of interrelated measures that create the total harmony of the figure. . . . As such, no human being could ever look like the Doryphoros, and the statue assumes the value of a Platonic idea, of which this world can only afford vague copies.6 Indeed, the concept of a canon may be interpreted as the very archetype of Plato's conception of the Ideas or Forms, the perfect ideals that constitute true understanding and are to be followed as standards, even though they may only be imperfectly approximated. In the Protagoras, Plato explicitly invokes Polykleitos and implies that he is the exemplar of all sculptors, just as Homer is of poets (U.311c-e).7 Of course, Plato also notoriously banishes from his ideal city-state the artists and poets who trade in "mere appearances," who fashion "phantoms far removed from reality" and whose "creations are inferior in respect of reality," thereby leading its citizens away from truth, excellence, reason, and the good (Republic, book x, 11.605a-c and 607a-608b). Nonetheless, because it is founded on the mathematically ideal proportions of the human form, Polykleitos's Kanon can be seen as embodying the Platonic truth of sculpture in classical Greece. Even though Plato bans all those ignorant of geometry from entering his Academy, Polykleitos and his followers would not likely have been excluded. The same could be said of the ideologically sound artist in Plato's ideal republic, because the exclusion of artists was neither automatic nor absolute: Plato does allow the "encomiasts of Homer," for example, to make "the best possible case" for the "goodness and truth" of his poetry (Republic, book x, 11.606e-608b), although the precise manner in which their appeal to truth would be justified was left unspecified. Many passages in the dialogues do imply that canonical artists and poets such as Homer are legitimate to the extent that they convey the ideals of austerity, goodness, and truth—in short, the Platonic conception of knowledge—rather than being merely "delightful" or appealing to "the childish loves of the multitude" (Republic, books iii, U.398a-b, and x, U.608a-b).8
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Canons Ancient and Modern
As codified by Plato, excellence, beauty, justice, and goodness were each forms of the idea of truth, which ideally had to be comprehended by anyone who would be genuinely knowing and just. The notion of artistic excellence therefore mingled closely with that of knowledge and morality. Indeed, in the contemporary plays of Euripides, the term kanon is employed specifically as a measure of moral behavior. In the lament following the sacrifice of her daughter, Hecuba reflects that "good nurturing teaches noble behavior, and if a mail learns this lesson well, he knows what is base, measuring it by the standards [kanoni] of the honorable" (Hecuba, 11.601-602). Likewise, the Epicureans, who believed the highest good to be personal happiness, also thought of a canon as a moral and conceptual ideal. In the century after Polykleitos's Kanon and a generation after Plato, Epicurus wrote a treatise on natural philosophy called Of tlie Standard, a work entitled Canon. Although the work no longer survives, Diogenes Laertius described it as follows: Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our sensations and preconceptions and our feelings are the standards of truth; the Epicureans generally make perceptions of mental presentations to be also standards. . . . By preconception they mean a sort of apprehension or a right opinion or notion, or universal idea stored in the mind (Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers in Ten Books, book x, 11.30-34). Although otherwise opposed to Plato's philosophy, the Epicureans clearly shared with him the notion of canon as a standard of truth and exemplary form of knowledge. However intangible or idealistic it may have been, the standard was thought to be universal, in spite of the fact that ancient Greek society was based on slavery, depriving an entire class of people from access to such knowledge. Already in classical antiquity, then, the concept of a canon combined artistic excellence with morality and truth with ideology. Apart from its philosophical foundations, more mundane material factors also affected which specific works came to be considered canonical in antiquity. In addition to abstract artistic and moral standards, classical scholarship began to play a practical role in the preservation, reproduction, and potential canonization of works of literature, philosophy, and history. Scholars of the Library of Alexandria, for example, had been cataloguing, copying, and editing texts as early as the third century B.C. Zenodotus of Ephesus, librarian during the reign of Ptolemy II, was among the first editors of Homer, and the poet Callimachus produced a 120-volume critical catalogue—the Pinakes—of some of the library's vast contents. These and other Alexandrian scholars devised lists of the most distinguished writers in various genres ranging from poetry and philoso-
Canons Ancient and Modern
15
phy to oratory and history, making qualitative distinctions and thereby either reconfirming or helping to shape, at least implicitly, the earliest literary canons of antiquity. 9 In later centuries, the Romans appropriated the concept of canon by adapting Greek models for their own purposes. The word itself was transliterated—kanon became Latinized as canon. Just as they followed Polykleitos's example of sculpture, so the Romans imitated, recreated, and transformed Greek poetry: The Aeneid combines thematic and stylistic elements of both The Iliad and The Odyssey; the Georgics reproduce the poetic modes of Theocritus, as the Eclogues do those of Hesiod; Seneca recreates the Sophoclean and Euripidean tragedies; Plautus and Terence adapt Menander's comedies; and so forth. Selected works were considered valuable enough to be worthy of imitation, so their reproduction came to be a mark of canonical distinction. The reproduction of wellknown works, however, also had ideological functions, because the appeal to historical precedent often legitimized contemporary political power as much as literary practice. In The Aeneid, for example, the founding of Rome and its imperial dominion was glorified by association with the hallowed Homeric epics and justified by poetically inscribing the lineage of its emperors back to Aeneas's divine parentage. In the current canon debate, it is precisely such ideological associations of canonical works that has attracted the most criticism, as will be seen in Chapter 2. Around the beginning of the first millennium, the discrimination between "ancient" and "modern," classic and contemporary, major and minor, authors was beginning to be formulated, and the first explicit distinction of a whole literary canon, as a collected body of texts, was made. In the first century A.D., Quintilian already counted Cicero among the antiqui, and in the second century, Aulus Gellius coined the term classicus to differentiate the ancient model authors. In his celebrated study, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages (1953), E. R. Curtius explains that the classic writers were always the "ancients." They could be acknowledged as models, but they could also be rejected and superseded, in which case there is a "querelle des anciens et des modernes." This, he finds, has been a constant phenomenon of literary history. 10 Indeed, the roots of subsequent canon debates lie partly in such ancient versus modern distinctions, which have been subject to change according to the various uses to which literature has been put in different historical contexts. By the fourth century A.D., the canon was understood to be a comprehensive list of books for study, such as those of Christian literature. The long history of the formation of the authoritative biblical canon, not officially finalized until the sixteenth century, has been recounted elsewhere.11 Of more relevance here is the subtle shift in definition: Without abandoning the sense of artistic or moral exemplars, the early medieval
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Canons Ancient and Modern
canon became a list of works for pedagogical instruction in the liberal arts, and especially in grammar, the study of wrhich involved literature as much as linguistic practice per se. 12 The authors studied in medieval schools included pagan cind Christian writers, both of which were taken as authorities. Indeed, it was characteristic of the early Middle Ages that all auctores, or curriculum authors, were perceived as equally valuable, that each one was believed to be timeless. Lists of selected auctores were devised as examples to learn from and to follow, and although the lists differ in points of detail and were periodically challenged, a remarkable degree of consistency is also evident, as certain authors reappear on list after list across Europe from the fifth to the thirteenth century and beyond. In various combinations, those lists included Aesop, Homer, Plato, Terence, Cicero, Virgil, Horace, Livy, Ovid, Seneca, Lucan, Statius, Cato, Juvenal, and Boethius. As late as the fourteenth century, the esteem in which many of the same writers were held was confirmed in Dante's Inferno (canto iv, 11.88-90) and Ptirgatorio (canto xxii, 11.97-108), as well as Chaucer's The House of Fame (book iii, 11.1460-1519). Even into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Curtius shows, European cultures still followed a canon of authors that largely resembled the thirteenth-century list of Hugh of Trimberg. 13 For the duration of the Middle Ages and into the early m o d e m period, then, the secular canonical auctores were used for a variety of pedagogical purposes. To scholars, they were authorities of general and scientific knowledge as well as sources of wisdom and general philosophy; to students, they provided moral edification as much as grammatical models; and to artists, familiarity writh them was virtually prescriptive for poetic composition. This remained the case during the initial flowering of vernacular literature, of which the Italian language developed the first European vernacular canon, which included the works of Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio, and later Ariosto and Tasso. However, according to Curtius, to survive in a climate dominated by the study of ancient poetry, even vernacular poetry had to "legitimize itself through model authors who could serve as a standard for Italian literary practice as Virgil did for Latin." 14 Just as Virgil and others had appropriated Greek models, so Dante followed his Latin precursors. Indeed, Inferno is in many ways a poetic elaboration of Book VI of The Aeneid, while the Divina Commedia on the whole is infused with Virgilian motifs. In English, just as Shakespeare had absorbed Plutarch, Seneca, and Ovid, so Dryden and Pope self-consciously developed the pastoral style of Theocritus and Virgil; in French, Racine recreated the tragedies of Euripides, as Moiiere did the comedies of Plautus and Terence; and so on. By the end of the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance, then, vernacular literature had become canonical largely by association with, and imitation of, the
Canons Ancient and Modern
17
ancient classics, as Latin literature had done before with Greek literature: The poets of antiquity were emulated as authorities to legitimize contemporary literature and the values it was thought to embody. Thus, even canonical change, it seems, was dependent in some degree on canonical precedent. Modern Literary Canonizing The imitation and adaptation of ancient literature, however, was only one of the means by which vernacular works acquired esteem. So common was the practice throughout the Renaissance and the neoclassical revivals of later centuries that imitation was insufficient by itself to make a work canonical; otherwise any number of those modeled on the classics might have been considered so. Clearly, more than imitation alone was required. At least three major features distinguish modern literary canonization from the ancient and medieval periods. First, certain material and social conditions developed that changed the nature of literary production, distribution, and reception. Second, the incorporation of the modern nation-state and its increasing influence as a primary form of cultural identity helped to fix distinct national canons. And third, the comparatively recent creation of specific courses dedicated to the study of secular literature in schools and universities—in a manner quite different from the medieval concern with grammar—further helped to canonize selected works in nationally standardized curricula. (As shown in Chapter 2, the latter in particular has been at the heart of the current controversy and often commands the rhetoric that surrounds it.) To clarify the relationship of these developments and how they have influenced the history of canon formation, each is considered in turn. As it had been throughout the Middle Ages, an educational function remained associated with the classical canon that was reserved for a privileged social elite. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, "from the Italian humanists to the English humanists and beyond," according to Joseph Levine, "there was complete agreement that the classics were meant to instruct the young in all that was required to govern." 15 But with the gradual expansion of literacy, the publishing industry, and the reading public throughout this period—as well as yet another conflict between the followers of the ancients and proponents of the moderns—devotion to the classical canon began to be seriously questioned. Unlike the twelfth-century querelle, the "battle of the books" in France and England, as memorably portrayed in Jonathan Swift's A Tale of a Tub (1704), revealed not only a crisis of literary and pedagogical values but also that conceptions and uses of history, the success of new forms of scientific knowledge, and the ever-increasing publication of literature were all un-
18
Canons Ancient and Modern
dermining the authority of the old order and its long-established canon of antiquity. 16 The material changes and revolutionary consequences brought about by publishing, beginning with the invention of the printing press in the 1440s, is known well enough not to require repetition here. 17 Although its most profound effects were not immediate, in time it would transform both the mode and content of literary production, as well as the social significance of printed material as such, Alvin Kernan claims that only after the print revolution did the definition of literature, which had formerly embraced any and all written material, narrow to mean works of a particular quality, as generally distinct from historical, scientific, and other texts concerned more with facts than eloquence of expression. 18 By the eighteenth century, he argues, the "most radical tendency of print and its logic of multiplicity was to destroy the canon of courtly letters centered on the classics and in a revolutionary, democratic manner to level all books in a continuous surge of new, ever-accumulating print products." 1 9 How "revolutionary" (or even effective) the leveling of books really was, however, is open to debate. The assumption is that the mere fact of numerical proliferation is necessarily "democratic," without regard to who is controlling the press and in what interests. Nonetheless, the boom of literary production in this era is beyond dispute. Among its social consequences was an apparent anxiety of the learned class, expressed in England, for example, by Alexander Pope's Dunciad Variorum (1728) and much of the work of Samuel Johnson, whose essays, and especially prefaces, eventually collected as The Lives of the English Poets (1779-1781)—written originally at the behest of publishers—self-consciously confirmed a canon of English literature by investing it with critical authority at a time when it was believed to be threatened by the growing deluge of printed material. If the literary canon were entirely at the mercy of print alone, however, this tendency might have succeeded in engulfing it long ago, but its preservation also depended on other factors. Stimulated by the burgeoning publishing industry, the occupations of professional writer and critic first developed in Europe in the eighteenth century.20 The enormous growth of literary criticism and the activity of formally editing literary texts, often with the scholarly apparatus of detailed annotation, further helped to bring modern, secular, vernacular literature into the canon. The market for new books and newly edited editions of classics bound writing directly to commercial interests as never before. In England, the expiration of the 1695 Licensing Act made way for the creation, under pressure from publishers, of the Copyright Act in 1709. Comparable laws were passed in France and Germany in 1777 and 1794, respectively. Written works were officially deemed to be the property of their authors, legally protected as commodities for exchange little
Canons Ancient and Modern
19
different, in principle, from manufactured goods or other commercial products. 21 In addition to such laws, the printing press itself had helped to commodify the art of writing into books with "a real marketplace value, and therefore property to be bought and sold in a way that an oral poem or the few copies of a manuscript never could be." 22 Emergent industrialism, together with the corresponding rise of a new class of professionals, fostered the commercialization of literature and criticism. Socioeconomic factors also gradually switched the interest of the reading public to a national vernacular literature more in tune with modem commercial interests: Writers and publishers realized that no books sold better than those that could be widely read and enjoyed, compared to the relatively limited audience for Greek and Latin classics. Apart from the expanding market for vernacular literature in the eighteenth century, the national significance of literature has perhaps been the single most effective means of reinforcing a specific literary canon in the modern era. Although some vernacular poets had been highly regarded and widely imitated in the later Middle Ages (e.g., Chretien de Troyes, Dante, Boccaccio, Chaucer), the consolidation of independent states and their respective nationalist ideologies, combined with the growth of publishing and professional criticism, ultimately began to fix multiple and distinct national canons. The French and English literary canons, for example, began to coalesce during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the economic power and national identities of France and England were becoming established. 23 In Germany, a national literature developed in earnest in the nineteenth century, when increasing nationalism helped to found a distinct canon of German literature. Indeed, celebrations of major literary figures such as the "Schillerfest" of 1859 were used explicitly to fuel nationalist sentiments of unification and constitutionalism. 24 The role of nationalism in modem canon formation is more clearly illustrated in the following examples. Two recent studies demonstrate that the commemoration of poets in England became conspicuously frequent after the eighteenth century, when a national pantheon of writers began to form. Andrew Sanders has found a metaphor for the formation of the canon of English literature in Poets' Comer of Westminster Abbey, the same site in the capital where the monarchy is invested with its authority. From Dryden (1700) to Milton (1737), Shakespeare (1741), Thomas Gray (1771), and Samuel Johnson (1784), selected authors increasingly earned the posthumous homage of tombs, monuments, or plaques placed in honor of their literary achievement. 25 In Michael Dobson's account, the formation of Shakespeare's reputation demonstrates how he had become "the centre of English literary culture" and his works "national treasures" in the century after the Restoration. From Augustan adaptations of his plays and revisions of his
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Canons Ancient and Modern
image to appropriations of his work for a variety of purposes, culminating symbolically in David Garrick's Stratford Jubilee of 1769, Shakespeare was ultimately enshrined in Britain as "the transcendent personification of the national ideal." 26 Also around this time, English literature first began to be formally studied alongside the ancient classics. Revealingly, teaching rhetoric and belles lettres using modern English writers first occurred not in England but in Scotland, at the universities of Edinburgh and Glasgow in the mideighteenth century, largely to help assuage resurgent Scottish nationalism and mitigate the Jacobite threat to restore the Stuarts. From the start, the academic study of English literature had clearly ideological intentions. In England itself, literature in English was sporadically studied throughout the nineteenth century at the University of London, women's extension schools, and mechanics' institutes, either to illustrate the history of the language or as a means of "social improvement." But not until the attempts to establish an Honours School in English Literature at Oxford—first in 1887 and then, successfully, in 1894—did the national canon find a place in English academia. 27 Cambridge University followed suit at the close of the First World War, when "English Literature rode to power on the back of wartime nationalism." 28 Although it has been remarked that the introduction of English as a full university subject was "the most important attempt to fix a canon of English literature," no less important was that its study "was from the outset all about the legitimacy of national origins." 29 In this regard, the United States furnishes perhaps the paradigmatic case of modern canon formation. Whereas in England the nationalist appropriation of literature largely preceded its eventual accommodation in the university, in the United States both nationalism and the formal academic teaching of literature more closely coincided. In spite of Emerson's declaration in "The American Scholar" in 1837 (see Selected Writings, 1992) that Americans had listened too long to the courtly muses of Europe, for most of the nineteenth century American education remained focused on the classics of antiquity and works of English literature, even though a great variety of native writing was already flourishing. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the study of English literature in the United States gradually supplanted the study of Greek and Latin classics, less for its "literary" value than for its linguistic, grammatical, and oratorical example. And even though a handful of courses concerned with Amerkcin literature as an independent subject had appeared sporadically in the late nineteenth century, a specifically American, as distinct from British, literary canon began to be institutionalized within academia only in the first quarter of the twentieth century, with the outbreak of the First World War and the consequent demand for overt patriotism and
Canons Ancient and Modern
11
"civic uplift." 30 However, just as in Europe, canon formation in the United States was not determined solely by the syllabus. Other accounts also cite the impact of the publication of influential works such as The Cambridge History of American Literature, first published in 1917, which codified the American canon and helped to establish an independent American literary tradition. 31 In the interwar years, the combination of isolationism and nationalism was sometimes potent enough to confound clear distinctions between a purely literary canon and that of historical documents or political tracts. In an article entitled "An American Canon" in the Saturday Reviezv of Literature of October 15,1927, Henry Canby ranked the Declaration of Independence alongside works by Emerson, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, and Sinclair Lewis, while Daniel Marsh's The American Canon (1939), published on the eve of the United States' entry into the Second World War, is entirely composed of patriotic political texts. Examining what were thought to be the essential qualities of American literature, whole schools of academic criticism and literary theory arose during and after the war which, combined with the anti-communist hysteria of the Cold War, only strengthened the resolve to establish an independent American canon. Influential critical works included Yvor Winters's Maule's Curse (1938), F. O. Matthiessen's American Renaissance (1941), and Henry Nash Smith's Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth (1950), to name only a few. In this context, T. S. Eliot's 1944 lecture, "What Is a Classic?," in which Virgil is regarded as the truly universal poet and Latin as Europe's universal language, can be read as a reaction to the heightened nationalism of its time, when Europe was torn apart by war. By the mid-twentieth century, nationality had come to be among the most dominant forms of social identity in Europe, North America, and much of the rest of the world. 32 It has permeated the content and function of education at every level, especially in the humanities, where the study of literature is usually placed. To that extent, the transformation of literary canons in modernity has been profoundly influenced by the prescribed values and priorities of the state, where the inculcation of abstract aesthetic ideals has given way to fostering a sense of shared identity by appeal to national history and distinct cultural heritage. Combined with the other social and material changes rehearsed above, the fragmentation of a single, universal canon of antiquity and the Middle Ages seemed complete. Canonical and Cultural Crises If this historical account of the changing functions of the canon has so far presented a smooth chronological narrative in which the meaning of the
22
Canons Ancient and Modern
concept appears to have continuously evolved and expanded to include a greater and greater diversity of literature, then it might be fairly accused of being far too linear or progressive. Indeed, canon formation has been fraught with episodes of ambiguity, unrest, and even radical contention throughout its history. In the literary history of the West, at least, counter-canonical movements are nearly as old as the idea of the canon itself. As mentioned above, the distinction between the inherited literary excellence of the antiqui and the comparative merits of contemporary literature had occurred as early as the first and second centuries A.D., when poets deemed classicus scriptor were implicitly taken to be superior to more recent ones. A certain tension is found in the very contrast between "modern," with its suggestion of immediacy and originality, and "ancient," with its implication of historical influence and artistic imitation. The twelfth century witnessed the first great querelle in the universities between ancient and modern, classical and contemporary, canonical and novel writers and works. If the Renaissance was the "rebirth" of antiquity in the arts and literature of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europe, then the critique of scholasticism and humanism in the early seventeenth century, exemplified by Francis Bacon's Novum Organum (1620), sowed the seeds of modern scientific reaction against ancient traditions. At the turn of the eighteenth century, the rational skepticism of the Enlightenment undermined the old order of courtly letters, as illustrated by the "battle of the books" in France and England. The foundation of courses for the study of modern vernacular literature at universities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was yet another controversial challenge to the long supremacy of classical studies and, by implication, to the classical canon. And with the rise of artistic modernism, the Romantic verse and sentimental novels of the Victorian era were themselves opposed, and eventually superseded, by avant-garde artists and what came to be the modernist canon. Figures like Matthew Arnold and T S. Eliot long ago perceived a "crisis" in contemporary society, as did F. R. Leavis, whose "Great Tradition" attempted to preserve critical judgment and reaffirm a specific literary heritage in an age of presumed cultural and spiritual decline. 33 In the United States, courses in "General Education" using the "Great Books" of Western literature were offered as early as 1915, not least to help counteract the cultural crisis in the West marked by the First World War. In short, mere have been many moments in history at which prevailing values, literary conventions, and accepted classics of literature were, in varying degrees, disputed or undermined and to which the rhetoric of "crisis" has been applied, whether contemporaneously or retrospectively. And these are only the betterknown examples of when the boundaries of the canon were redrawn or its specific content scrutinized and revised, if not contested and condemned.
Canons Ancient and Modern
23
Given the number and variety of precedents, then, it should be clear that the idea of a cultural crisis is by no means a novel one, and that criticisms of a traditional canon, on whatever grouiids, have a history as much as the concept of the canon itself does. Indeed, it has even been suggested that the literary canon is actually defined by attacks upon it.34 Nonetheless, to deny that there is anything distinctive about the current debate, to dismiss the sense of urgency it has aroused in conservative and liberal polemics, would be to assume a conception of history in which radical challenges to the canon are mystified as natural recurrences and the social, cultural, and institutional changes of which they are a part are oversimplified as historically continuous or commonplace. What needs to be asked instead is whether the latest challenges to the canon may signify something new. Today, critics who view the debate as signaling a serious crisis have given many diverse reasons for its cause and why it is unprecedented. George Steiner, in Real Presences (1989), Alvin Kernan, in The Death of Literature (1990), and Sven Birkerts, in The Gutenberg Elegies: The Fate of Reading in an Electronic Age (1994), attribute the latest crisis, at least in part, to the threat posed by modern electronic media that is undermining the traditional appreciation of literature. Many critics, from Allan Bloom in The Closing of the American Mind (1987) to Gregory Jay in American Literature and the Culture Wars (1997), have traced the latest assault on the traditional humanities directly to the social upheavals of the 1960s, including the impact of feminism and the Civil Rights movement in the United States. John Ellis, in Literature Lost (1997), and Hilton Kramer and Roger Kimball (1995), editors of the journal The New Criterion, charge the degenerate influence of "theory" in the universities for attacking democratic values, paralyzing standards of judgment, and deflating the high esteem in which canonical works of art and literature have historically been held. John Searle, in "The Storm Over the University" (1992) and W. B. Carnochan, in The Battleground of the Curriculum: Liberal Education and American Experience (1993), believe that the rhetoric of crisis is due to the decline in national consensus on the policies and purposes of higher education in general. In "Minority Discourse and the Pitfalls of Canon Formation" (Fall 1987), Cornel West attributes the controversy to the decolonization of the Third World; the shattering of white, male cultural hegemony; and the rise of academic interest in popular culture. In Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation (1993), John Guillory refers to the waning cultural capital of the "old bourgeoisie" and the rise of a new, professional-managerial class that has little need for the literary canon. In Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991), Fredric Jameson argues that capitalism thrives on pluralism and populism just as diverse commodities flourish in new and open markets,
24
Canons Ancient and Modern
markets in which the hierarchy of values that the canon represents has, supposedly, no place at all. To Harold Bloom, in Tlie Western Canon: The Books and School of the Ages (1994), the whole notion of a crisis in literarystudy is as much a "journalistic event" as a real institutional problem. To cite a single reason for the current controversy, however, would be to oversimplify a complex cultural and historical process. It is rather more convincing to recognize that several probable causes—including broad institutional changes and material developments, general ideological shifts, and specific socioeconomic tendencies—have all converged to undermine whatever confidence there once was in a singular and venerated literary heritage. Although the increasing political recognition of social diversity and the consequent revisions of the classroom syllabus are certainly involved, I argue in the following chapters that they are insufficient by themselves to have altered the literary canon or broken it up into a plurality of separate ones. Rather, such academic strategies may be better understood as symptoms of other, broader changes affecting modern capitalist societies. A materialist critique of the specific terms of the contemporary debate, including the implicit assumptions and explicit justifications of recent arguments both for and against "opening" the canon, will help to disclose what those changes are as well as their ideological manifestations. Such a critique is developed in Chapter 2.
2 The Contemporary Canon Debate
Cecil Graham.- What is a cynic? Lord Darlington; A man who hum's the price of everything and the value of nothing. Cecil Graham: And a sentimentalist, my dear Darlington, is a man who sees an absurd value in everything, and doesn't know the market price of any single thing. —Oscar Wilde, Lady Windermere's Fan (1892), Act III
Although speculation about the origins and causes of the current canon debate has been wide ranging, the arguments within the debate itself have been more limited. In the last twenty years of the twentieth century, one aspect of these arguments has been remarkably consistent: The rhetoric within them has tended to be quite clearly divided between mutually antagonistic positions. On the one hand are conservative critics who attempt to justify the continuing importance of the Western canon on the grounds of its permanent greatness and the edification that its study will yield, either to individuals or to society at large. They perceive the argument that alternative texts have been undeservedly neglected as symptomatic of the loss of academic standards and the collapse of aesthetic judgment in the face of extrinsic political pressures. On the other hand, liberal critics argue that the canon should be more representative of the true diversity of society and the wide span of its cultural heritage, that the canon should include writers previously excluded from literary history and the educational institutions of the dominant culture. They find the reverence accorded the Western canon indicative of elitism, patriarchy, and ethnocentrism, each of which is antithetical to the egalitarian ideals of democratic societies. They have also discredited the assertion that aesthetic judgments or works of literature can ever be totally aloof from political interests. Although the stalemate between these two 25
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The Contemporary Canon Debate
positions is familiar, and their opposing arguments might appear to be irreconcilable, what has not been recognized is how much they actually have in common. Rather than adopting a middle course between the extremes or attempting to harmonize the opposing views, this chapter demonstrates the ideological proximity between defenders of the Western canon and those who would "open" it in the name of diversity or pluralism. A critique of the range of arguments in the debate will show that, despite their apparent opposition, several ideological assumptions are shared by liberal and conservative critics alike: Both groups either conceive of the function of the canon in idealistically aesthetic terms, that is, without sufficient recourse to the historical and material constraints of canon-formation, or appropriate canonical literature for the purposes of political or pedagogical pragmatism. In this chapter I highlight the ideological proximity through aii analysis of several foundational assumptions in each of their respective arguments, including the notion that canons are formed by means of historical struggle and inter-artistic competition, making some authors and works more worthy of longevity than others; the idea that works of literature represent narrowly defined social groups in the same way that democratic institutions are thought to represent specific constituencies; and the belief that either preserving or changing the literary canon will necessarily preserve or change the society in which it functions. This critique will pave the way for the introduction in Part 2 of the critical aesthetic theories of Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin, which provide a radically historical and materialistic account of canonical literature that neither liberal-pluralist nor conservative-humanist arguments are able to do on their own terms.
Justifying the Western Canon Although canonical change has a long and varied history, as shown in Chapter 1, the latest reaction to canon revision did not begin until the 1980s. One of the earliest arguments came in 1984 from William Bennett, then-chairman of the U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities, in To Reclaim a Legacy; A Report on the Humanities in Higher Education. As a condemnation of the state of liberal arts education in the United States, it provoked a variety of reactions and counter-reactions attacking and defending its pronouncements. Bennett's essay mourns "the decline in learning in the humanities," caused largely by "a failure of nerve and faith on the part of many college faculties and administrators." Traditional academic standards and attention to classic literature have been diluted by the contending pressures of multicultural and feminist rewritings of literary history, the rise of cul-
The Contemporary Canon Debate
27
tural studies courses, and the retreat of senior faculty members from teaching general education to professional specialization. In Bennett's view, what is wanting is adequate "educational leadership," one that instills the virtues and "common culture" of Western civilization, its "lasting vision, its highest shared ideals and aspirations, and its heritage." As a corrective, he advocates a reverential regard for canonical authors— from Homer and Plato to Twain and Faulkner—because "the highest purpose of reading is to be in the company of great souls." Bennett also deplores "the tendency of some humanities professors to present their subjects in a tendentious, ideological manner," apparently unaware that the idolatry of canonical works is itself an ideological position. 1 Bennett's understanding of the "great tradition" of "the Western mind" is such that the value of the canon resides in little more than cultural appreciation. Consequently, it works at the expense of any critical engagement with canonical works, whose specific content might not simply affirm the idea of a singular tradition and may even have critical functions itself, rather than being mystified as spiritually edifying. To the extent that Bennett's argument takes the works' cultural transmission as unproblematic and their worth as simply given, it is also unhistorical. As one of his critics remarks, "in Bennett's view, liberal arts study lost its institutional legitimacy, intellectual credibility, and pedagogical integrity. . . . [But] Bennett never examines either the historical development of the 'liberal arts' or the social functions of such forms of study in the past or in the present; he simply asserts their value." 2 Moreover, Bennett targets teachers and professional academics as solely responsible for the decline, without regard to the changing socioeconomic conditions that may have compelled the very increase in specialization he laments. As will be seen again and again, the exaggeration of the role of formal education in the formation of canons is a chronic symptom of the current debate. Nonetheless, Bennett's observations clearly demonstrate that the ideological status of the literary canon—that is, the degree to which it legitimizes the status quo—has been a central preoccupation in the contemporary debate, whether denied by its apologists or emphasized by its detractors. Equally enamored of the purity and virtues of Western civilization is Lynne Cheney, Bennett's successor as chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 1988, she published a report entitled Humanities in America, followed in 1989 by 50 Hours: A Core Curriculum for College Students, both of which reiterate Bennett's arguments about the purpose of the literary canon. Cheney likewise criticizes esoteric scholars who, she believes, "reduce the study of the humanities to the study of politics, arguing that truth—and beauty and excellence—are not timeless matters, but transitory notions, devices used by some groups to perpetuate 'hegemony' over others." As an alternative, she advocates a sort of populist
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The Contemporary Canon Debate
humanism, arguing that "what gives [the humanities] their abiding worth are truths that pass beyond time and circumstance; truths that, transcending accidents of class, race, and gender, speak to us all." 3 Cheney justifies the study of the canon by appealing to the idea of a singular, unified tradition. Of all the world's civilizations, she writes, "the one that has shaped our [American] culture most profoundly arose in the West." With neither recourse to the actual heterogeneity of "the West" (or, for that matter, the United States), nor hermeneutic skepticism as to how, precisely, "enduring human questions" can be gleaned by confronting the "basic landmarks of history," Cheney's proposals for educational reform would replace historical analysis and critical reflection with an unthinking consensus. 4 If the pedagogical recommendations and historical assumptions of officially empowered administrators are at all troubling, then the writings of various contributors to journals like The New Criterion have pushed the rhetoric of terminal decline to an extreme. Founded in 1982, The New Criterion continues to publish book reviews and cultural commentaries mourning the degeneration of traditional art and values in the United States. Its primary editors, Roger Kimball and Hilton Kramer, denounce the "radical assault on cultural life" espoused by left-wing artists, academics, and intellectuals, whose "liberal fascism" is reflected in the defunct policy of affirmative action and the jargon of political correctness, both of which, they maintain, have become sclerotic and undemocratic. They believe that academic "radicals," in spite of their professed iconoclasm, have become "the establishment," against which The New Criterion provides the voice of reason and sobriety.5 Like Bennett and Cheney, Kramer and Kimball stand in "principled opposition to the politicization of culture," which they see as promoted by the "cynical obscurities of deconstruction," the anti-elitist agenda underpinning cultural studies, and the "baleful influence that the social sciences themselves continue to wield [on the humanities] with such devastating results." The arts, they maintain, "have become hostage to ideology." 6 Blinded by their own polemic, however, they fail to admit the ideological assumptions behind their own posturing: According to them, all other accounts and criticisms of the arts are ideological; theirs alone remains pure. Of course, a monolithic and unpolitical idea of tradition is itself subject to criticism, especially when it is recalled that canon formation has been a dynamic and political process throughout history, which makes the claim of rescuing the arts and humanities/rom politics and ideology misconceived, if not futile. It is by now a truism of literary theory that all texts arise within a political context and therefore inevitably harbor some political content—whether explicit or implicit-—even despite the specific intentions of their authors. Nevertheless, James Tuttleton, an-
The Contemporary Canon Debate
29
other contributor to The New Criterion, denies this as "a point of view that only an activist political ideologue of some stripe could hold," while in the same breath commending the supposedly apolitical innocence of canonical figures such as Shakespeare, Milton, T. S. Eliot, and Ralph Ellison—as if Henry V, Paradise Lost, The Waste Land, or Invisible Man were without political content! 7 To keep politics out of the study of the arts and humanities, to preserve the canon untarnished by the corrupting influence of latter-day theoretical fashions, Kramer and Kimball advocate treating the arts "on their own terms, according to aesthetic rather than political criteria." Kramer in particular argues that "art must be defended and pursued and relished for what it is rather than as a political instrument in the service of some other cause." However, in defining what art is, he offers only vague platitudes: "a source of spiritual and intellectual enlightenment... a special form of pleasure and moral elevation . . . a spur to the highest reaches of human aspiration." 8 The inadequacy of these criteria is thrown into relief when they are applied to some of the most canonical literature of the modern age. For example, it would be difficult to reconcile Crime and Punishment, A Season in Hell, or In the Penal Colony with Kramer's "inspirational" values. Indeed, to do so would be antithetical to their specific content, in which humanistic beliefs are themselves seriously questioned, if not undermined. Even so, it must be appreciated that arguments for preserving the autonomy of art from explicit politics are not exclusive to humanists alone. The critical theory of the Frankfurt School also maintains the importance of aesthetic autonomy, albeit on totally different grounds and for completely different purposes (see Part 2). Yet the apparent likeness in this regard of both left- and right-wing critics, particularly regarding the Literary canon, reveals the specific historical and material conditions that have coincided with the current debate, such that both may be reacting to the same socioeconomic tendencies. What distinguishes their arguments, however, is whether those tendencies are described simply in terms of declining academic standards or as symptomatic of wider historical, institutional, and materialistic conditions of modern capitalist society. Apart from denying the political aspects of works of literature and literary evaluation, the arguments exemplified by Bennett, Cheney, and the contributors to The Neiv Criterion view the Western canon to be historically transcendent. But other arguments in defense of that canon have developed into fully formed theories that allow for a degree of historical contingency. Superficially, Harold Bloom's elegiac account of the fate of the canon may appear to share the dubious assumptions of conservative humanism. His best-selling book, The Western Canon (1994), is an explicit reaction to left-wing literary critics, whom he collectively brands "the
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The Contemporary Canon Debate
School of Resentment." It offers an extended reflection upon Bloom's personal canon, comprising twenty-six novelists and poets, with Shakespeare at its center (approximately 800 more writers also deemed canonical, or at least having the potential to become so, are listed in the appendices). Like Bennett or Kimball, Bloom promotes the cultural monuments of the Western tradition and condemns the reduction of aesthetics to ideology, against which he urges a "stubborn resistance" to preserve literature "as fully and purely as possible." He believes that "we are destroying all intellectual and aesthetic standards in the humanities and social sciences, in the name of social justice," even though the Western canon exists "precisely in order to impose limits, to set a standard of measurement that is anything but political or moral." 9 Here, however, Bloom differs markedly from the humanists insofar as he denies that the canon stands pragmatically as a moral exemplar or educational guide to the heights of human achievement: "Whatever the Canon is, it is not a program for social salvation," because reading Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, or Tolstoy "is not going to make us better citizens." 10 From the start, therefore, Bloom wants to distance himself from both cultural moralists and the politics of the debate as a whole: I am not concerned . .. with the current debate between the right-wing defenders of the Canon, who wish to preserve it for its supposed (and nonexistent) moral values, and the academic-journalistic network . . . who wish to overthrow the Canon in order to advance their supposed (and nonexistent) programs for social change." Such hermetic aloofness, however, is itself indicative of Bloom's own peculiar conception of aesthetics, as well as of its unspoken ideological premises. Bloom concedes that the canon is never really a stable structure. However, although it is in constant historical flux, it cannot be simply forced open. Because no canon of secular literature is ever closed, what is now described as "opening up the canon," he argues, is simply redundant. Nor can the canon be prescribed too specifically, since it exists more as an ideal than as a fixed entity. The historical instability and indefiniteness of the canon leads Bloom to develop his own theory of canon formation. Faithful to the classical idea of kanon and its function, Bloom situates the literary canon firmly in the realm of the arts: "The deepest truth about secular canon-formation is that it is performed by neither critics nor academies, let alone politicians. Writers, artists, composers themselves determine canons, by bridging between strong precursors and strong successors." 12 In his account, competition is intrinsic to the arts, and the "intercanonical" influence between, or "ongoing contest" among, writers
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is the fundamental basis of all canonization. Indeed, there can be no "strong, canonical writing" without the process of literary influence. 13 The idea of literary "strength" enters Bloom's formula of canonicity because he believes that interartistic influence and competition throughout history are the key to canonical greatness. The agon—ancient Greek for struggle or contest-—between strong writers inspires the highest aesthetic achievement because, as Bloom puts it, "the aesthetic and the agonistic are one." Thus, literary history is neither a narration of self-begotten authors nor an illustration of innocent artistic borrowings: "Tradition is not only a handing-down or process of benign transmission; it is also a conflict between past genius and present aspiration, in which the prize is literary survival or canonical inclusion." 14 In short, canon formation is the result of artistic strife, not of gradual accretion or humanistic inspiration. Bloom's theory, however, underestimates the historical development of literature as a specialized form of artistic production with its own social determinants, including levels of literacy, access to materials, and the necessity of publication. The very argument for isolating the arts from their socioeconomic context is itself an historical development, dating back through fin de siecle aesthetieism (I'art pour I'art) at least as far as nineteenth-century Romanticism and the "cult of genius" in the late eighteenth century. By adhering to an absolute "autonomy of the aesthetic" and deriding the "flight from or repression of the aesthetic" in current literary criticism, Bloom betrays his own aesthetic idealism, treating literary production in an historical and material vacuum. Consequently, he oversimplifies the theoretical contributions of new historicism and Marxism, as well as categories such as "cultural capital," each of which has illuminated various factors involved in canon formation, including its socioeconomic conditions. 15 Moreover, Bloom's theory about the historical agon between writers and artists, or between readers and canonical texts, is so individualistic that his conception of the aesthetic amounts to little more than solipsistic pathos. For example: "The mind's dialogue with itself is not primarily a social reality. All that the Western Canon can bring one is the proper use of one's own solitude"; "the self, in its quest to be free and solitary, ultimately reads writh one aim only: to confront greatness." 16 Ironically, Bloom confesses that all his "passionate proclamations of the isolated selfhood's aesthetic value are necessarily qualified by the reminder that the leisure for meditation must be purchased from the community." 17 Given his impatience with the idea that social, political, and economic factors impinge upon literature, canon formation, and aesthetic value per se, this remark is more than a little self-contradictory. Bloom's definition of the individual as wholly "against society" is therefore entirely in keeping with his "agonistic" aesthetic theory and its unspoken political sup-
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positions. The belief that the aesthetic is "an individual rather than a societal concern" simultaneously negates its social import and obscures the institutional and material means by which the literary canon is reproduced. (Both ideas are taken up in the following chapters of this book.) The relentless use of expressions such as the "competition" and "conflict" between writers, the "struggle" and "survival" of texts, or the "individual enterprise" and "self-reliance" of authors perhaps best discloses Bloom's ideological assumptions. Whereas Bloom resigns himself to an isolated individualism, another prominent literary critic considers the functions of literature much more broadly. Indeed, fewr critics have reflected so thoroughly upon canons and canon formation as Frank Kermode. In several books and articles, he has examined a variety of means by which certain works of art and literature become socially sanctioned as canonical, including the historical and institutional ones that the critics discussed so far invariably omit. More nuanced than Bloom and more open-minded than Bennett or Kramer, Kermode admits of an element of contingency and even fortuitousness in the formation of canons (his use of the plural alone distances him from their narrow singularity). In his most detailed account of canon formation, Forms of Attention (1985), Kermode maintains that the reputation of artists and books is initially made according to a confluence of judgments of "mere opinion," but only when their esteem becomes institutionally validated as knowledge by academic professionals do they become canonical. Although he ackiiow ledges the difficulty of sharply distinguishing knowledge from opinion, the important insight here is the recognition that works of art are subject to social and institutional confirmation: In thinking about canonicity in the history of the arts and literature, we have at once to reflect that our canons have never been impermeable; that our defenses of them are always . .. provisional. .. . Canons . . . are of course deconstructible; if people think there should not be such things, they may very well find the means to destroy them. . . . [T]he idea of tradition has never been so weak as it now is, the sense of a literary past less strong.'8 Kermode, however, avoids resignation, adding that "canonicity still seems an important preservative and, though under repeated attack, still potent." 19 Its import hinges on its practical necessity. Like the concepts of artistic movements and literary genres, Kermode finds that the concepts of canons arid historical periods are distinct but interrelated tools with which the past is organized. They are needed for describing, understanding, and reconstructing history, literary or otherwise. Because "we haven't enough memory to process everything," he
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writes, "canons are useful in that they enable us to handle otherwise unmanageable historical deposits. They do this by affirming that some works are more valuable than others, more worthy of minute attention." 20 Unlike the humanist critics, Kermode does not naively presuppose the ideological innocence of canons or what they represent; he is merely making the case for their inevitability, whatever their particular political content. And whether one thinks of canons as objectionable because formed at random or to serve some interests at the expense of others, or whether one supposes that the contents of canons are providentially chosen, there can be no doubt that we have not found ways of ordering our thoughts about the history of literature and art without recourse to them. That is why the minorities who want to be rid of what they regard as a reactionary canon can think of no way of doing so without putting a radical one in its place.21 However, the extent to which the pragmatic utility of canons may itself be an ideological assumption is not considered by Kermode. Books held to belong to the canon are granted not only high value, but "an almost rabbinical minuteness of comment and speculation"—"every word, every letter, is subject to minute commentary." 22 Kermode argues that constant textual attention, particularly scholastic attention, is the most fundamental mode of canonical preservation, and that only interpretation maintains the life of a work of art from one generation to another. Whether or not this adequately explains the means of canonical longevity, it says little by itself about why certain works more than others attract such attention or how they are singled out for scrutiny in the first place. Kermode does propose one reason. He suggests that there will always be more and new things to say about canonical works. Indeed, "this is what it means to call a book canonical." From artists to lay readers, professional critics to academic expositors, "all grant to the text something like omnisignificance, all have canons of interpretation that are permissive rather than restrictive." 23 This is not simply a matter of an individual reader's open-mindedness or creativity. Rather, it is assumed to be a quality inherent to the canonical text itself: "the book is a world, capable of being exfoliated into a universe." 24 Interpretive possibility is believed to be endless, if not without constraint, since Kermode does not believe that anything at all may be said of a work, even a canonical one. The limitations of interpretation, he argues, are imposed by earlier interpretations: "all our interpretations depend in some measure on historical interpretations; of these some survive and some do not . .. and communities maintain, with indefinite but quite powerful criteria, some [interpretations] and not others." 25 Nevertheless, Kermode finds that canonical
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works have "an inexhaustible potential of meaning," that they are "full of senses only partly available to any previous reading"; interpretations "constantly change though their source remains unchangeable." 26 Taking the example of Hamlet, which he regards as "unshakably canonical," Kermode demonstrates how Shakespeare's play offers interpreters the possibility of saying an incredibly wide range of things about it. He explains that the general shift in exegetical priorities, from the emphasis on dramatic character in nineteenth-century readings of Hamlet, to an emphasis on "the actual language of the play, its very texture" in those of the twentieth, is indicative of Hamlet's flexibility, its openness to interpretive appropriation. To fit the changing needs and interests of different generations, "there must be new appraisals, and they will be possible only so long as new relations, new adjustments of centre and margin, are perceived in the play and given licit expression in commentary." In short, "the canonical work, so endlessly discussed, must be assumed to have permanent value and, which is really the same thing, perpetual modernity." 27 Unlike Bloom and others, therefore, Kermode recognizes that interpretation does not occur in a social vacuum as a solitary, individualistic enterprise. As he writes in "The Institutional Control of Interpretation," valid interpretations depend on the sanction of certain social institutions, a professional community with the authority, though not undisputed, to define a subject, impose valuations, and validate interpretations. Indeed, the very definition of what it is to be canonical itself involves interpretation. Kermode locates such authority and relative consensus specifically within the academic community, in universities, colleges, and other associations of higher learning. So the question of which works are accredited as canonical is determined largely by the "tacit knowledge" of academic professionals and, less directly, by the control of appointments and the awarding of degrees. 28 Just as he admits of historical changes in what constitutes the canon, Kermode links them to corresponding changes in the institution of criticism: "The intrusion of new work into the canon usually involves some change in the common wisdom of the institution as to permissible hermeneutic procedures." But in terms of radical innovations within the academy-—even those that aim to unsettle or discredit institutional authority (Kermode cites as examples the influence of Barthes, Lacan, Derrida, and Foucault)—the institution is expected "to contain or control" them. To Kermode, this is easily done because such radical forms of criticism are "not, in the end, subversive at all" and because there is an "underlying continuity," he believes, between such criticism and the "traditional modes" of interpretation from which they try to distinguish themselves. Thus, even anti-canonical criticism ends up merely lending
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canonical texts "another span of life," adding another chapter to the history of their interpretation. 29 If this were all that radical literary criticism amounts to, it would be a troubling thought indeed to more than a few of its practitioners. In the process of attempting to explain the relation between canonical and institutional "change," therefore, Kermode actually minimizes the possibility of any substantial change at all. He does this by discounting the radical critiques of social institutions that post-structuralist or Marxist theories have offered. He is not troubled by the "necessary conservatism" of learned institutions because, he believes, "it is by recognizing the tacit authority of the institution that we achieve the measure of liberty we have in interpreting. It is a price to pay, but it purchases an incalculable boon." 30 Elsewhere, he declares that "there must be institutional control of interpretation," and that all institutions "are bound to be reactionary in some sense." While remaining open to the possibility of new canons to suit, for example, feminists, African Americans, or Derrideans, Kermode believes that truly "revolutionary revisions would require transfers of powers" and "a reign of literary terror." He concludes that "absolute justice arid perfection of conscience are unlikely to be more available under that new dispensation than they are now." 31 Ultimately, therefore, Kermode betrays himself as an apologist for the status quo, keeping the institutions that he believes are responsible for sustaining the canon intact, so as to avoid what he believes would only be worse—and apparently destructive—alternatives. Before leaving Kermode's account of canon formation, a few of the methodological assumptions and political implications underlying it need to be examined. First, in direct contrast to Bloom, he takes for granted that the responsibility for shaping and perpetuating canons falls squarely on the academic establishment. However, such academicism disregards the wider social, institutional, and historical factors that also affect canonization, factors that are explored in Chapter 3. Although Kermode recognizes and describes changing interpretative values—as read out of, or projected upon, canonical works—his partiality for the academic severely limits an explanation of the social, historical, or economic rationale that helps to determine such changes, that is, one that might explain why critical emphasis fell upon the characters of Hamlet in the nineteenth century but moved to the actual language of the play in the twentieth. Second, the idea of inexhaustible interpretive potential, "omnisignificance," or timeless modernity is also vulnerable to criticism. If a close reading of canonical works is thought to yield greater depth or ambiguity, metaphorical complexity, or varied allusions than a reading of other texts, Kermode does not make it clear on what grounds, methodologically, the
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distinction is to be determined. How exactly is the richness of canonical versus non-canonical texts to be compared or quantified? Moreover, the perpetual modernity of canonical literature means little more than constant contemporaneity in Kermode's account. As long as the interpretation of canonical works has been ratified by academic institutions (i.e., converted from mere opinion into "knowledge"), canonical works will remain relevant and are therefore condoned. However, this argument ignores the extent to which academic institutions may have an interest in sustaining certain hermeneutical categories that are less threatening to the status quo (and, conversely, proscribing interpretations that are deemed too radical, as Kermode himself suggests). It also neglects the degree to which the specific content of the works themselves might challenge such institutional complacency, as in the case (at least in principle) of avant-gardism. Finally, both for viewing canons as practical necessities with which to organize history and for suggesting that they survive only if constantly made relevant to contemporary interests, Kermode's explanation of the value of canonical works is ultimately utilitarian, an instrumental justification that obscures what other, non-instrumental roles canonical works of art may have. Insofar as works of art, particularly in modernity, are not strictly functional and may even be antithetical to useful application— whether pedagogical, practical, or political—their utility is questionable. In this regard, Kermode's pragmatism is not far from many of the arguments for opening the canon to greater cultural diversity. To summarize the arguments so far, humanists such as Bennett, Cheney, Kimball, and Kramer take the Western canon to be irreproachable and to exemplify the social and moral virtues of Western civilization. By contrast, to Harold Bloom the canon confirms an individualistic, socially insulated sphere of private aesthetic experience by remaining aloof from all social concerns. To Kermode, the canon changes incrementally over time, but only by the authority vested in the institutional powers that be, even though such change may work at the cost of engaging critically with canonical works that might provide a radical challenge to authority. In spite of these differences, however, their common concern is to justify the canon as it stands by keeping it beyond all political concerns—liberal or radical, explicit or otherwise. But in a practical sense, their anxieties about the fate of the Western canon may well prove to be exaggerated, especially if the perceived threat from political ideologues and liberal pluralists turns out to be less serious than feared and even closer to their own positions than they would suspect. Opening the Canon Although the justifications for a traditional, Western literary canon reviewed so far span from unhistorical humanism to aesthetic idealism to
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pedagogical pragmatism, the range of liberal arguments for opening the canon is broader still. Given the often alarmist tone of the traditionalists, it is unsurprising that the rhetoric of the liberals has been prone to overreaction, especially in the early years of the contemporary debate, when theoretical discussions of the nature of canon formation were relatively scarce. Although political arguments for fundamental curricular reform in the United States go back at least as far as the 1960s, stemming in part from the Civil Rights movement, they were not initially or explicitly concerned with the literary canon as such. The phrase "opening the canon" seems to have been coined in 1979, and the first large Modern Languages Association forum that explicitly made the canon an issue was not organized until 1982.32 Since that time, the comparative absence of literature by women, racial or ethnic minorities, non-Western writers, homosexuals, and the working classes from literary anthologies, histories, and course syllabi has tended to arouse a certain indignation over the very idea of a canon. For example, George McFadden claims that "the establishment of a privileged canon is repugnant in itself; it promotes elitism, ethnocentrism, and surrender to the institutional machine." Paul Lauter asserts that the literary canon is simply "a means by which culture validates social power" and that it has invariably worked to the "progressive exclusion" of literature by women and ethnic minorities. To Lillian Robinson, the "nature of the existing canon" is "fundamentally elite" and must therefore be challenged. 33 It is believed that opening the canon will redress its imbalances and render it more democratic by making it more accurately representative of true social diversity. However, the proposed means by which this could or should be done are often insufficiently articulated and theoretically underdeveloped. The premise that the canon is essentially elitist and actively exclusive is sometimes taken for granted or simply asserted, rather than scrutinized. There is a tendency to caricature the literary canon throughout history as largely comprising "dead, white, European males." Ironically, such rhetorical shorthand itself homogenizes the canon as much as the humanist arguments for a singular Western culture have done. The new critical orthodoxy is that factors such as the race, class, gender, or sexual orientation of authors are not only essential to the content of literature but also determine whatever esteem a work acquires by appealing to certain socially arid institutionally empowered groups that share those identifying characteristics. A sort of conspiracy theory arises as to how "the Great Tradition" is created and maintained, which must now be demythologized to expose the latent social interests that it is thought to serve. Because it has been politically constructed, the canon must now be politically deconstructed. As much as the Western canon has been depicted as internally homogeneous, it has also been argued that the canon actively homogenizes so-
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cial diversity by overlooking—if not erasing—the existence of disenfranchised communities, their distinctive histories, and the cultural diversity of the society in which they live. So Robert Weimann asks, What else is the projection of a canon, if not—in the language of poststrueturalism—the attempt to homogenize discursive space, to suppress discontinuity in favor of some stabilizing hierarchy, to assert some transcendental signified, some unexamined authority such as "order" or, as obvious alternatives, "experience," or "human nature"? And is not, then, this type of authority easily used as some universalizing tool of obliteration, expropriation, and exclusion?-1* Or, as Jan Gorak has summarized in The Making of the Modern Canon: It is asserted that the modern canon exists only in order to conserve existing institutional practices and definitions; that it requires teachers of the humanities to transmit time-honoured platitudes; that it favours a privileged set of writings that alone constitute "literature," while conspiring to conceal the way those writings become the basis for the curriculum; and that it compounds these sins of omission and commission by employing methods of reading that remove favoured authors and texts from processes of struggle and conflict.33 Although doubtless true of some reactionary arguments used to justify a traditional, Western canon, as shown above, it is unclear whether such social consequences are indeed inevitable, or that canonical works cannot also have critical, as much as ideological, potential. Ultimately, an underlying yet problematic assumption persists of a correspondence between the interests of the author and the values of the social group he or she is thought to represent. A great number of studies presume such a relation and therefore attempt either to expose the complicity of specific canonical works with the status quo, to prescribe alternative texts to "counterbalance" the canon by appealing to distinct aesthetic criteria and cultural traditions, or both. 36 For example, Bruce Franklin suggests that the study of literature has been "primarily a means for students to become acculrurated into the class to which they aspire." He therefore urges teachers and professors to resist using it for "subtly propagandizing" their own class interests. 37 Similarly, in a brief analysis of modern literary canon formation, Richard Ohmann finds the ideology of bourgeois individualism operating in many of the most esteemed works of late twentieth-century American literature, such as the novels of Sylvia Plath, J. D. Salinger, and Saul Bellow. The publishing industry, too, insofar as it is saturated with the values of the professionalmanagerial class, influences the reputation and esteem of chosen works.
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Periodicals like the Neu> York Times Book Review, for instance, inadvertently reinforce the values that certain books are thought to represent by encouraging their success with favorable reviews. 38 More than simply explaining the process that leads to mass readership for relatively few books each year, Ohmann argues that publishers and periodicals affect the canon of "serious" literature as well. By reaching the majority of America's elite intellectuals, he writes, a major Times review could help put a novel on the cultural agenda and insure that other journals would have to take it seriously. . . . If a novel was certified in the court of the prestigious journals, it was likely to draw the attention of critics in more specialized and academic journals . . . and by this route make its way into college curricula, where the very context.. . gave it de facto recognition as literature.3'* Like Kermode, then, Ohmann ultimately turns to academia as the final arbiter of canonical status. Other studies have similarly sought to expose the concealed, and specifically conservative, interests behind canonical authors and works. Among the more celebrated is Jane Tompkins's thesis of the manufacture and maintenance of Nathaniel Hawthorne's reputation, which discloses his connections with prominent New England publishers, politicians, and reviewers, both contemporary and over successive generations. Arguing that "the reputation of a classic author arises not from the intrinsic merit of his or her work, but rather from the complex of circumstances that make texts visible initially and then maintain them in their preeminent position," she takes Hawthorne and his books to represent the class interests of an American "dynastic cultural elite" that came to identify itself with him and his works. Thus, "Hawthorne's canonization was the result of a network of common interests—familial, social, professional, commercial, and national—that, combined, made Hawthorne a literary and cultural artifact, a national possession." 40 Although, like Franklin and Ohmann, she can be criticized for too neatly equating the ideological values of a canonical author and his or her works with the presumed values of a particular social group or class, Tompkins denies that hers is a crude conspiracy theory, claiming that "a literary reputation could never be anything but a political matter." 41 Nevertheless, her conception of what exactly is political about the reputation of a canonical author is itself subject to criticism to the extent that it promotes a theory of canon formation based on interest group politics and the modern liberal ideology of which that politics is a part (see below). Arguments such as these perceive few functions of canonical literature beyond propaganda in the service of narrowly defined social interests. As a consequence, their proponents do not sufficiently consider whether
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some aspects of particular works might not immediately or evidently serve the status quo, or indeed whether other aspects may even serve the critical purposes in which they are interested. The implication is that those books left unpromoted by the publishing industry or academic institutions are likely to be freer of ideological liabilities because their political unorthodoxy is taken as the reason for their exclusion. In some degree, however, "the ideological burden of canon-formation," as John Guillory has described it, may be inescapable, even if it is not obvious. 42 Contrary to reactionary fears, academic critics generally seem to be more interested in reading the canon differently than in adding to or subtracting from it. A common method for doing so has been to situate canonical works in their historical contexts, often by studying them in tandem with other, comparatively neglected contemporary works. For example, Charlotte Pierce-Baker urges what she calls "a new narrative quilting of voices" in the teaching of literature, so as to "validate and valorize understudied authors and literatures simultaneously with traditional ones that we all know." She encourages historical, "ensemble" analyses and believes that pairing books from within and without the canon is more fruitful than studying canonical works in isolation. Her examples couple lane Eyre with the contemporaneous Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, and The Great Gatsby with Their Eyes Were Watching God.43 Paul Lauter likewise argues that "the best lens" for reading the traditional canon is provided by "noncanonical works," which "teach us how to view experience through the prisms of gender, race, nationality, and other forms of marginalization." Indeed, the sheer variety of texts studied, he believes, will provide a "more comprehensive view" of the cultural issues and circumstances of a given period. 44 Toni Morrison also believes that extending the study of American literature into "a wider landscape"—one that includes racial questions as an essential component of canon-formation—will render that literature "a much more complex and rewarding body of knowledge." 45 And, with particular attention to English Romantic poets, Marilyn Butler suggests that those who have been "installed as canonical look more interesting individually, and far more understandable as groups, when we restore some of their lost peers." Instead of narrowly studying in succession "the old thin line of national heroes" that have made up the canon of English literature, she believes that historicizing them would be "richer and more credible." 46 Rather than simply debunking the traditional canon, then, these proposals aim to nurture a critical sensibility responsive to cultural pluralism and more conscious of a literary work's social and historical context. Although commendable as far as they go, these proposals do not address several practical and theoretical difficulties. If alternative texts are selected on the basis of the identity of their authors, then certain additional
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criteria—such as aesthetic criteria—have to be employed at some point to decide which particular works from the vast range of alternatives should finally supplement canonical ones. The fact of previous neglect is insufficient justification by itself, because, for example, any number of female authors have been forgotten, but surely not every one of them can now be taken as canonical. Nor is it evident that the study of a variety of roughly contemporaneous texts necessarily translates into "more comprehensive" knowledge. Indeed, whether exposure to sheer literary variety alone—especially if confined to contemporaneous works—amounts to either greater comprehensiveness or critical understanding is debatable. It may turn out that the American "landscape" of race in literature is not, in fact, a very wide terrain of critical inquiry but rather a limited ideological horizon in itself. Because the arguments often appeal to the idea of historical accuracy, the question is raised as to what sort of historicism would best serve critical knowledge, an issue that is analyzed in Chapter 5 with specific reference to new historicism. Moreover, the alternative selections are often already regarded as estimable literature, that is, institutionally endorsed anyway; but even if they are not, the textual or critical alternatives are understood largely in relation to the existing canon and therefore risk remaining subordinate to it, rather than being equally valuable or of comparable interest. Finally, in the pedagogical terms in which these prescriptions are made, it is doubtful whether much more is actually changed than literary anthologies, histories, or syllabi. Without a conception of the canon that goes beyond the schools and takes into account the broad historical development of social relations, institutional structures, and the material conditions of artistic production, such recommendations will be politically limited, and even deceptive. In addition to the strategy of enlarging the canon with exemplary but hitherto neglected works of literature, there are also arguments for opening the canon to once-popular texts by apportioning them a degree of critical exegesis normally reserved for works of "high" culture or those that have historically been viewed as "Literature" proper. For instance, Morris Dickstein suggests that, in comparison with the canon, little attention has been paid to popular ctilture and works on the margin "between high and popular art," works that intrinsically "bring into question the hierarchical basis of the canon itself." In an effort to define a more pluralistic version of literary history, he studies the influence of Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe—"perhaps the most famous book of the eighteenth century"—alongside Matthew Lewis's Gothic novel, The Monk (1796), which was also "immensely popular" in its time, although it has only lately begun to attract serious critical attention. 47 To demonstrate and help redress the exclusion of female writers from the canon, Nina Baym likewise appeals to the criterion of popularity in the cases of Susannah Rowson and
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E. D. E, N. Southworth, two of the most "widely read" American novelists of the nineteenth century.48 One of the most conspicuous cases of the academic neglect of a popular novel is that of Uncle Tom's Cabin, whose canonical status many critics have asserted, not only for its tremendous popularity, but also for its political impact in the nineteenth century, Of course, popularity alone does not provide sufficient grounds for canonization, otherwise every work that had once been popular could be regarded as "canonical." Therefore, critics have either applied the customary tools of academic criticism to popular literature (e.g., Dickstein), or devised different criteria to justify the inclusion of popular works that had failed to follow earlier conventions. Tompkins provides a clear example of the latter strategy. To justify why Uncle Tom's Cabin ought to be as canonical as any of the novels by Hawthorne or Melville, she appeals to a set of aesthetic criteria distinct from what she takes to be the gendered and elitist values of aesthetic modernism. For Tompkins, "the work of sentimental writers is complex and significant in ways other than those which characterize the established masterpieces," and she urges that "we can and should set aside the modernist prejudices that consign this work to oblivion." 49 To evaluate Stowe's work effectively, modernist aesthetic standards of judgment such as abstractness, intricacy, and political aloofness need to be replaced by sentimentality, domesticity, popularity, and political effectiveness. Analogously, Lauter makes a case that certain common categories of historical periodization in American literary history, such as "Puritanism" or the nineteenth-century "Frontier Spirit," have helped to produce "a distorted canon" that is exclusive, unrepresentative, and historically inaccurate. In contrast, he believes that different thematic classifications like colonization/decolonization, urbanization, and what he calls "the color line" would make the canon and an understanding of American literature "inclusive and explanatory instead of narrowing and arbitrary." 50 Such alternative criteria would force a complete revision of the canon and the terms in which individual works are evaluated. Doubts, however, can be cast on whether different evaluative criteria or organizational categories would really be any less narrow, arbitrary, or exclusive than those they are intended to displace. Arguments that attempt simultaneously to delegitimize specific aesthetic qualities or canonical authors (e.g., modernist) and canonize others (e.g., female, minority, a n d / o r popular) on different grounds (e.g., historical accuracy, social representation, political effectiveness) are logically flawed. As Guillory has shown, to supplant one set of texts, or one set of evaluative criteria, for another cannot be sustained as a means for creating a more democratically inclusive canon because, having already deconstructed or historicized the claims to aesthetic merit of the hitherto canonical, any al-
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tentative canon becomes equally subject to criticism.51 Such strategies are ultimately self-contradictory, devising new terms of exclusion in the guise of historical accuracy or social justice. Furthermore, the assumption that certain criteria, like those taken to be uniquely modernist, derive from simple prejudice or automatically bar some works while valorizing others, is also problematic. To assert that allegedly non-modernist qualities are comparatively innocent of "prejudice" is a disingenuous way of suggesting that those qualities are themselves beyond social construction or political bias. Conversely, the assumption that modernist qualities like abstractness or formal intricacy are either inherent to particular texts or solely beneficial to specific social groups is tautological, unhistorical, and itself exclusive. It is an assumption that prejudges canonical works on the basis of predetermined social categorizations and discounts the possibility that such qualities may also be found in works traditionally regarded as non-canonical, including sentimental novels and other popular literature. The claim that certain aesthetic properties have necessarily excluded popular wrorks from the canon ignores the degree to which those properties have themselves been historically determined by material circumstances, rather than being arbitrary—a crucial point that is more fully discussed in Part 2. Like the weakness of Kermode's theory in explaining the historical shift in interpreting Hamlet, the claim that popular works have been excluded from the canon on aesthetic grounds fails to grapple with the reasons why those properties may have become standards of judgment. When critics like Tompkins advocate "setting aside" modernist prejudices, as if overcoming modernity were simply a matter of willpower, they betray their own unhistorical idealism. Although the mere popularity of a work is a suspect criterion for canonization, equally common and no less problematic are explicitly utilitarian, political justifications for inclusion in the canon. In Against Literature, John Beverley makes a case as to why the Latin American testimonio is a valid, but relatively neglected, literary genre. Because of its direct political commitment, he believes, the testimonio fails to conform to the bourgeois, colonial tradition of European literature since the fifteenth century, within which direct political intervention in contemporary affairs has rarely been a measure of literary merit. By contrast, Beverley argues, a work like /, Rigoberta Menchu (1983) has been politically effective, not only for contributing to the struggle for liberation in contemporary Guatemala, but also because it challenges the cultural authority of literature itself: Rigoberta Menchu uses the testimonio as a form of literature without subscribing to a humanist ideology of the literary, or . .. without abandoning her identity and role as an Indian activist to become a professional writer.
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. . . The aversion or ambivalence of the testimonio toward literature suggests that cultural democratization must involve not only changes in what counts as literature, but also that literature itself . . . may in the process lose its centrality and authority as a cultural practice. Where literature in Latin America has been (mainly) a vehicle for engendering an adult, white, male, patriarchal, "lettered" subject, testimonio allows for the emergence—albeit mediated—of subaltern female, gay, indigenous, proletarian, and other identities.52 The implications for the literary canon are obvious: If active intervention in contemporary politics were the primary grounds of literary evaluation, perhaps very little of the Western canon would remain intact. Underlying this type of argument is an assumption that the content of bourgeois European literature is not, or cannot be, as political or radically significant as the explicitly political content of post-colonial works like testimonies. It is not even considered whether testimonies might have certain ideological tendencies themselves, including the disguise of their own mediations by affecting immediacy. (Beverley's passing admission of Latin American literature being mediated is more subterfuge than critical analysis.) Ultimately, arguments like his construct a false dichotomy between politically effective, committed literature and that which is detached, "humanistic," and therefore supposedly inert, even though the boundaries of the two can be much more porous, as discussed in Chapter 4. Moreover, transforming the canon on the grounds of political recognition, representation, or effect also has other ideological consequences. Representation and Pragmatism The preceding criticisms reveal a variety of methodological problems with the specific grounds for opening the canon, but there is a common rationale underlying nearly all of them: the modern discourse of pluralism that is rooted in the tradition of political liberalism, including its foundational suppositions regarding social representation and political praxis. But the assumptions of liberal pluralism itself are vulnerable to critique, especially when applied to literature and the presumed functions of art in general. Since the claims of the contemporary debate have been made in explicitly political terms, the actual or would-be results of opening the canon must be politically assessed as well. That canons are formed because they allow communities to define themselves remains a pervasive belief in the current debate. However, this axiom neither clarifies exactly what constitutes a "community" in the instance of literature nor admits of its irreducible heterogeneity. In addition, the presumption of self-definition is politically oblivious and mysti-
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fying, neglecting the variety of socioeconomic, historical, and institutional constraints on such autonomy. Attempts to revise the canon (or, at least, the syllabus) by appeal to the self-representation of social communities caii be deceptive. For instance, in Loose Canons, Henry Louis Gates writes that, in the traditional Western canon, no women or people of color were ever able to discover the reflection or representation of their images, or hear the resonances of their cultural voices. The return of "the" canon, the high canon of Western masterpieces, represents the return of an order in which my people [i.e., African-Americans] were the subjugated, the voiceless, the invisible, the unrepresented, and the unrepresentable.53 Rather than limit his argument to the idea of communal autonomy alone, Gates makes the further suggestion that the reflection of racial and gender identity is a condition for political agency and social change. Just how effective or comprehensive such change has been or can be when superimposed on literary history, however, remains to be seen. It is claimed that marginalized groups especially benefit from symbolic representation by giving them voice where they had none before, but it may also have inadvertent consequences as far as it leaves untouched the reproduction of social relations, the economy in which it operates, and the pragmatic rationale by which it functions. The gesture toward a more representative and accurate literary canon, in which the greatest variety of social groups can find their own traditions reflected, also presupposes that a primary function of the canon is to mirror society's diverse, multicultural character. Although they are made in the name of political justice, equality, or emancipation, it is far from certain that claims for literary representation necessarily amount to substantial political praxis. Granted, in certain circumstances recognition may indeed be politically significant, but only an impoverished conception of politics would equate literary representation per se with political praxis. The reflection of social diversity, however "accurate," may well even impede political potential by reducing it to an empirical confirmation of the status quo instead of enabling its transformation. Even if the canon had historically formed according to prejudice, it would be simplistic to suppose that a more representative literary canon in the schools will now begin to redress social injustice in society at large. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that the canon has already become noticeably multicultural, but how much social equality has been achieved as a result? Without a critique of the whole socioeconomic order—including its structural dependence on the division of labor, the dominance of pragmatic, means-over-ends rationality, and the global commodification of
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culture—revising the canon in isolation amounts to little more than symbolic change, treating a symptom in lieu of the system. The vast majority of critics and commentators imagine that a canon's formation, alteration, reproduction, and preservation depend primarily on institutions of formal education, a narrow academical conceit shared by liberals and conservatives alike. However, alterations in syllabi or anthologies do not guarantee canonical prominence for historically neglected or marginalized works, any more than they necessarily effect significant social change. In fact, despite reactionary fears, modifications to the canon, or rather the syllabus, are usually minimal and easily assimilated within the educational establishment. For example, the controversial curriculum revisions at Stanford University in 1988, which intended to supplement the syllabus of standard classics with multicultural literature, resulted in only one of eight academic "tracks" differing markedly from the earlier curricular requirements for courses in "Western culture." 54 Because it leaves intact the economic structures that help reproduce social inequality, symbolic representation in the literary canon often ends up merely as a token concession—accommodating a few different books on some reading lists, or a few new classes in various schools and universities, as if social or political change were only to be achieved in a localized, piecemeal manner. On the contrary, it may well be that, in the words of Martin Luther King, Jr., "no great victories are won in a war for the transformation of a whole people without total participation. Less than this will not create a new society; it will only evoke more sophisticated token amelioration." 55 It is a sad irony that liberal-pluralist critics today seem to have forgotten his counsel. Partly for these reasons, more radical critics have been suspicious of simply augmenting "Shakespeare and company" with a few textual alternatives. Mas'ud Zavarzadeh and Donald Morton, for instance, argue that the supposedly sweeping changes within university curricula are actually allied with the very norms and traditions they had intended to supersede—a gradual "reformism" that only "relegitimates the dominant ideology." They believe that the liberal faculty majority at several prominent U.S. universities has contrived "merely to trade one set of studies (authors, texts, canons) for another, purposely leaving intact the overall institutional system for constructing student-citizens as bourgeois subjects and willing servants of the status quo." 56 However, like the position of more moderate left-wring critics (e.g., Franklin, Ohmann), this argument insinuates that successful curricular or canonical change could somehow be innocent of ideological tendencies, and that canonical texts could only work in the service of the establishment, whether liberal or conservative. If they would dispense with the canon entirely, though, even nominally radical critics might inadvertently comply with the sta-
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tus quo in spite of themselves. By sacrificing the aesthetic import of literature in the name of critique, they lose in the process a form of criticism that is potentially even more subversive. Ultimately, modifications to the canon for solely pedagogical purposes, like the project of literary representation, can actually perpetuate the social injustices they intend to overcome if they neglect wider socioeconomic factors. Pedagogical arguments for inclusion ultimately rely on the faith that social justice or emancipation will come with fair and equal representation, or that an adequately pluralistic canon can actually represent, if not foster, genuine equality. Yet, conversely, it may be argued that in a truly free, substantively democratic society, as opposed to one that is but formally equal, fair representation would come with social and material justice, rather than vice versa—if representation itself would then even remain an issue. Indeed, the very concept of social representation, not least when applied to works of art, is more problematic than is usually admitted. The notion that a particular literary work actually "represents" a specific social constituency remains theoretically unsupported, perhaps especially when historically distant works are thought to represent particular social groups today. For instance, it is far from clear that the Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass (1845) speaks exclusively for African Americans today, or Margaret Cavendish's The Blazing World (1660) for women in general, any more than Tom Jones (1749) or David Copperfield (1850) necessarily represent the interests of white, Western males. The assumption, of course, is that distinct social groups today have a cultural affinity with the content of such works or the identity of their authors, that people today share the same cultures, experiences, and traditions as their literary forebears. However, such beliefs may owe more to recently constructed traditions than to any direct historical continuity or unmediated social experience. 57 If the notion of commonality or cultural relationship is taken as the primary social significance of literature, then it seems at least as probable that members of various social groups in the West today would have as much an affinity with the novels of James Joyce or Thomas Pynchon—not because of common characteristics of personal identity, but because they are similarly embroiled in modernity (or postmodernity), with all the sociological, technological, and psychological repercussions (and even problems regarding identity) that that implies. In the contemporary canon debate, reference is often made to distinct canons that represent specific genres or literary traditions. African American, feminist, and homosexual critics all speak of independent and unique literary traditions that are in need of recovery or that are in the process of being recovered. Indeed, the assumption is so common that the existence of such independent traditions is generally taken for
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granted. 58 That historically marginalized social groups are now discovering and celebrating their own, distinct literary canons and traditions, however, signifies something more than the self-motivated political activism of professional literary critics. By their own admission, women have been excluded from the literary canon, yet they are beginning formally to institutionalize canons of their own. As Hilde Hein writes, "women who aspire to artistic prominence have in the past been forced, as much as they are able, to conform to the male-identified canons," but, she continues, "it is now possible to challenge that requirement and to propose that alternative, non-canonic modes of expression . . . be equally valorized." 59 Regrettably, in her account the material conditions underlying this possibility are not even considered. If cultural and material reproduction is a necessary condition for the canonization of any work of literature, then it must be asked what social, historical, and economic conditions have lately enabled the relative success of women to establish "their own" canon. One cinswer lies in the expansion of capitalism into wider and diverse markets, which demands an ever-increasing production of commodities, including cultural commodities. As Henry Louis Gates notes in the preface to The Norton Anthology of African American Literature (1997), the success of African American literature in the 1990s is partly owing to its growing prominence in the marketplace. Rather than develop this essential point, however, Gates immediately moves on to consider the impact of black literature on college curricula and in literary anthologies, returning the problems posed by literary canons to the mundane issue of reforming the syllabus. As much as opening the canon on the grounds of representation is thought to be politically empowering for certain communities, therefore, it may also be a perfect stratagem for actually accommodating disenfranchised groups, heterogeneous cultures, and diverse artistic forms under the rubric of a single ideology (liberalism) and dominant socioeconomic system (capitalism). But the terms of "representation" that have circumscribed the canon debate seem to imply that sheer force of numbers—in sales, literary prizes, or entries in anthologies and course syllabi—is tantamount to canon revision, In essence, the conflation of social representation with the literary canon entails either a denial of the division of labor as an integral element of artistic production and reproduction or a failure to acknowledge class as an aspect of social identity that is categorically distinct from others, such as race or gender. On the one hand, the uncritical assumption of radically separate cultural traditions does not necessarily account for the division of labor that constitutes even those social groups that have historically been marginalized. Although it is done in the name of social, symbolic, or cultural emancipation, the construction of multiple canons according to
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categories of gender, race, ethnicity, or sexuality remains ideological by obfuscating or legitimizing class hierarchies, even within the social groups they are thought to represent. As long as alternative canons maintain class privilege, they remain just as hierarchical and elitist as the singular canon they sought to overcome. The actual degree of equality or emancipation resulting from the establishment of different canons is therefore, almost literally, immaterial. Rather than stop with piecemeal, pragmatic, pedagogical engineering on the grounds of representation in school syllabi or literary anthologies, any truly critical account of the canon must be pushed farther to focus on the material basis and historical development of social stratification—including that of artistic production per se—to which the very existence of canonical art itself attests. On the other hand, the methodological failure to acknowledge class as a categorically distinct type of identity also ends up severely curtailing the critique of injustice and inequality that is claimed by opponents of the traditional canon. According to Diana Coole, the categories of difference and identity such as race, gender, and sexuality cannot be treated in the same way as class because the latter, particularly the working class or underclass, is not a "life-form" whose "otherness" needs to be recognized; on the contrary, it demands to be transformed. The liberal virtues of tolerance and respect for social diversity, she argues, are patently inappropriate when it comes to class, and a celebration or fostering of difference becomes simply nonsensical. For economic inequality is patterned not as a plurality of horizontal diversities, but according to a vertical scale of more and less Respect for those on lower echelons is patronizing; tolerance for those above, irrelevant... Rich and poor do not simply belong to different groups, but are divided according to the requirements of a system where the gains of the better-off are often made at the expense of the worse-off.60 Similarly, in Democracy Against Capitalism (1995), Ellen Meiksins Wood points out that the liberal politics of identity reveals its theoretical and political limitations when class differences are accommodated within its idealistically democratic vision: "The class relation that constitutes capitalism is not, after all, just a personal identity," it is also "the constitutive relation of a distinctive social process, the dynamic of accumulation and the self-expansion of capital." 61 These arguments should be extended to the literary canon debate because the dissimilar nature of class identity highlights a fundamental contradiction of liberal-pluralist arguments for opening the canon. If "representation for the marginalized" is the primary justification for making the canon more inclusive, and the working class and underclass
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are, quite rightly, considered to be historically marginalized, then it logically follows that these classes would also have to be fairly and equally represented in the canon. But since class differences are not marginalized in the same way as those of race and gender, because they emphatically demand—in the name of justice and emancipation—to be overcome (and to deny this would be a form of political complacency), then social representation alone is an insufficient basis for revising the literary canon. Representation in this context seeks only to legitimize empirically given social divisions rather than to transform those that call for change. Moreover, as examined in Part 2, the division of labor that facilitates artistic production and reproduction within any social group must be understood as an irrevocable aspect of each and every work of art, canonical or non-canonical, literary and otherwise. Even if the idea of social representation in the canon were not so problematic, other premises of liberalism are also suspect, methodologically as much as politically. With the claim that recent canon revisions have not attacked Western culture but have enriched the meaning of Western culture and its study, both the effects of opening the canon and the automatically progressive idea of pluralism are taken for granted. For example, in a review of Bernard Knox's book, The Oldest Dead White European Males, and Other Reflections on the Classics (1993), James Davidson writes that "the controversy over the canon should perhaps be seen as a sign of vigour rather than a portent of cultural crisis." Far from being threatening, "it stimulates change." 62 According to Jonathan Culler, the humanities ought to teach diversity because "a particular virtue of literature, of history, of anthropology is instruction in otherness: vivid, compelling evidence of differences in cultures, mores, assumptions, values." To him, the emphasis on plurality is "a major but difficult duty." 63 Or, as Paul Lauter argues, "difference, manifest in race, gender, class and certain other categories of experience and analysis, can and should provide a central way of thinking about collegiate educational programs." 64 By this logic, diversity and difference are assumed to be automatically or necessarily beneficial, in and of themselves. Ironically, the imperative of diversity has become virtually dogmatic, prompting the remark by Marjorie Perloff that the "opening" of the canon "should be understood less as a sign of 'the new openness' or of a healthy pluralism man of a 'piety' just as intense" as that of the conservative humanism it would replace. 63 That is because it condemns from the outset other accounts of the canon and its function that do not readily conform to the liberal precepts that representation, difference, and diversity are valuable for their own sake. The underlying assumption of such pluralism is that cultural diversity or radical "otherness" has endured in spite of changing social and material conditions and modern globalizing
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trends, including the ubiquity of financial markets, mass communications and a host of other economic, institutional, and technological developments, trends whose tendency is to accommodate any variety of cultures within a strikingly uniform socioeconomic order. Indeed, as historian Eric Hobsbawm points out, the politics of identity and pluralism have coincided with, and may be a function of, just such social and material transformations, as well as other profound sociological changes of the late twentieth century. 66 To the extent that cultural difference is lauded at the expense of recognizing its own historical determinations, it becomes an exercise in idealism, fetishizing diversity itself as an unhistorical constant without perceiving its material mediations in modernity. By closing off alternatives even while championing the toleration of difference, the rhetoric of pluralism also has other political implications. At its furthest extreme, it lapses into a culturally specific form of liberal pragmatism, sometimes referred to as market liberalism, that is especially characteristic of modern U.S. politics and economics. Given that the current debate has raged primarily in the American context, this is hardly surprising: Works of art, whose respective value is taken as culturally relative, represent distinct social factions that are in a permanent state of competition. Charles Altieri, for instance, claims that, [s]ince the valuing dimension of criticism is inescapably ideological, we could either hope to impose a single canon that we see as favoring our own concerns, or we could take a more complex stance emphasizing the liberal play of interests in society. If there are no longer any central stories that unify society but only stories that define the desires of distinctive segments in society, then our view of the canon should supposedly correspond to social reality, should perhaps parlay this fragmentation into articulate differences. Canons are simply ideological banners for social groups: social groups propose them as forms of self-definition, and they engage other proponents to test limitations while exposing the contradictions and incapacities of competing groups.67 However, such a sharp distinction between a singular canon and a multiplicity of separate ones amounts to a false dichotomy. Advocating the former is taken as but one more interested position among many, so it confirms the "liberal play of interests" of the latter from the start. And although both positions are admittedly ideological, the "imposition" of a single canon is, to Altieri at least, apparently more ideological than the "more complex" situation in which contending groups each have their own distinct canon. Ironically, Altieri's own conception of the function of canonical works ends up being decidedly monolithic. Not unlike Kermode's literary utilitarianism, Altieri believes that the canon works at
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"directing our actions" and enables us "to satisfy our interests." 68 In other words, its primary function is to serve contemporary needs, particularly those of pragmatism and individualism. Altieri explicitly acknowledges the influence of Richard Rorty, whose philosophical anti-foundationalism maintains that all truth-claims, including aesthetic judgments, are thoroughly contingent and freely open to a variety of applications. Rorty's ideal of "ironic liberalism" puts faitli in the ethical and educative potential of literature. Thus, he and his fellow "ironists" would use literary critics as "moral advisors" who are able to admire books which are prima facie antithetical [to each other] by performing some sort of synthesis. We would like to admire both Blake and Arnold, both Nietzsche and Mill, both Marx and Baudelaire, both Trotsky and Eliot, both Nabokov and Orwell. So we hope some critic will show how these men's books can be put together to form a beautiful mosaic. We hope that critics can redescribe these people in ways which will enlarge the canon, and will give us a set of classical texts as rich and diverse as possible.69 Such a synthesis, however, may do less to establish a rich and diverse canon than to classify the variety of works of which it is composed within a single comprehensive ideology. Rorty's own version of liberalism perceives the aim of a just and free society as letting its citizens be as privatistic [sic], "irrationalist," and aestheticist [i.e., subjectivistj as they please so long as they do it on their own time—causing no harm to others and using no resources needed by those less advantaged. There are practical measures to be taken to accomplish this practical goal.70 Whether it is even possible to isolate individuals so radically that their consumption of "resources" (including literary or aesthetic ones) has no social impact at all, subsuming the canon under such private and "irrational" purposes epitomizes the appropriation of literature—no matter how diverse or contradictory—by and for a single ideology. It is also characteristic of this assumption that whatever aesthetic value canonical works do have is entirely a matter of personal opinion. They are thereby divested of any rational, objective, or cognitive content beyond individual and subjective taste. hi this regard, Altieri seems to personify Rorty's ideal critic. In Canons and Consequences, he attempts to show how canonical authors from Plato to Wordsworth to Joyce can be worked into a "mosaic" of harmonious difference, such that their respective values converge to inform "our"
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own. 71 These values, however, are plainly ethnocentric. Altieri ends up homogenizing the non-identity of distinct authors and their works by finding in them only the liberal-pragmatic values that match his own. Accordingly, Plato is taken as dramatizing what philosophy provides "within the marketplace," Wordsworth's "empiricist commitments" force him to articulate his poetry through "private personal expression," and Joyce is "bound to a radical individualism" based on "personal singularity and contingency perfectly suited to contemporary tastes." 72 Without any regard to the historical conditions or material constraints of canon formation, Altieri even suggests that canons are the result of "competing choices," as if they were formed by the "invisible hand" of liberal economic theory 7 3 It is therefore unsurprising that Altieri explicitly invokes Harold Bloom, whose model of canonical "struggle" he adopts: "The very idea of a canon and the example it offers create the standards writers try to meet." Moreover, "canons make us want to struggle, and they give us the common questions and interests we need to ennoble that project."74 Like Bloom's, Altieri's rhetoric of "us" and "we" primarily signifies individual authors and their bourgeois critics, without any recognition of the positions they occupy in society. Altieri admits nothing of the social privileges, class distinctions, or division of labor that enable artists and critics to produce their work in the first place. As a theory of the function of canons and the nature of canon formation, it is totally bereft of an historical or materialist account of literary production and reproduction. In short, it is thoroughly idealistic. Without regard to those deprived of the means of authorial "struggle," the glorification of competition and the liberal "play of interests" remain as ideological as Bloom's own aesthetic idealism. It is no accident that the very language used by Bloom is repeated within the discourse of liberal pragmatism, because both are inclined to preserve an idealized private sphere apart from the social and material constraints they fail to recognize. The ideology of competition is made even more explicit in the work of two other advocates of opening the Western canon to greater cultural diversity. In Professing Literature, Gerald Graff gives an historical account of how the U.S. university and its curriculum developed out of a series of historical conflicts that have since been forgotten; the contemporary canon debate is merely the latest in this series of conflicts. He also finds that the "existence of a canon does not guarantee that it will be taught in an ideologically consistent way" 7 5 Because his concern is the practice and politics of teaching literature, however, Graff does not merely describe the process of literary institutionalization and its controversies; he also promotes a particular method to begin to resolve, or at least to accommodate, the latest impasse in literary studies, of which canonical legitimacy is but one example. He invites
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teachers of literature to "teach the conflicts/' the debates within literary criticism itself, because "it is doubtful that the traditional canon profits from being insulated against challenges." 76 More recently, in American Literature and the Culture Wars, Gregory Jay adopts the same practical program for dealing with challenges to the canon, but with even more explicit political goals in mind. His "multicultural pedagogy" and emphasis on the "cultural work" of texts would highlight the social effects and political impact of literature in U.S. history and entail the equal treatment of canonical and non-canonical texts in the classroom. To Jay, teaching the conflicts arid "institutionalizing the crises of representation" would serve as "a very useful device for addressing the public good"; it would encourage the discussion of "what the purposes of education in a democracy should be." 77 (In Cultivating Humanity, Martha Nussbaum similarly writes that the purpose of liberal education and teaching diversity is above all "to produce adults who can function as citizens," and "to prepare people of highly diverse backgrounds for complex world citizenship." 78 ) Not only would the teaching of literature be bound by pragmatic, liberal priorities, but the literary works themselves would be treated as "active agents in the sociopolitical process." By concentrating on the "use value" of writing, Jay suggests, "we may stop thinking in terms of canons altogether." 79 What is the ultimate goal of this pedagogical utilitarianism? Nothing more than "a comparative curriculum of connecting the differences, one in which the competing visions and rival representations can enter into dialogue with one another." 80 Doing nothing to challenge contemporary socioeconomic relations fundamentally, such pragmatism yields to political complacency. Whether or not the Western literary canon has ever been quite so "insulated" from challenges, Graff's and Jay's pedagogical program takes for granted and reinforces the liberal postulate of competitive group interests and the practical utility of literature. By systematically confusing the canon with the syllabus ("without a syllabus there is no canon" 81 ), their approach also repeats the narrow academic conceit that the university is the sole keeper of the canon. Like that of so many others, Graff's and Jay's microscopic view of canon formation remains confined almost entirely to formal institutions of education, with little or no attention to wider socioeconomic considerations. The pedagogical proposal to embrace any and all contributions to the discourse of social conflict not only threatens to collapse under the strain of its own weight but also presumes itself to be aloof from any complicity with the status quo. Even with the best of intentions, there remains an inescapable ideological component to such infinitely inclusive pluralism. As Terry Eagleton remarks, "seeking to understand everybody's point of view quite often suggests that you yourself are disinterestedly up on high or in the mid-
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die, and trying to resolve conflicting viewpoints into a consensus implies a refusal of the truth that some conflicts can be resolved on one side alone." 82 Moreover, the social agreement as to what constitutes literature, or what works specifically make up the Western canon, is believed to be determined by pragmatic expediency: a working consensus that can vary as often as its members change their minds. Allegedly benign, the neutrality of this proposal is actually false. It derives explicitly from the traditions of liberalism and utilitarianism, whose oppositional claims are a far cry from radical challenges to current social relations and the economic order that sustains them. Such pedagogical pragmatism may well contest hitherto orthodox methods of teaching, but it neglects the fact that the very concept of a canon, employed by and for artists since antiquity, long predates the foundation of universities. It also fails to recognize that canonical art and literature has since come to designate much more than simply tools for teaching. Indeed, at least since the advent of aesthetic modernism, the concept of art in general has resisted so banal and constraining a definition. By emphasizing social diversity, pluralistic adjustments to the canon are cloaked in progressive rhetoric. However, by eternalizing their own conception of social conflict as immediate, interest-group politics and cultural "competition," they end up reinforcing the ideology of liberalism, which takes the private rights of individuals to be inviolate, the recognition of their social identity to be a universal imperative, and the realization of that identity as best done within the market of competing cultural goods. When these concepts are applied specifically to art and literature, they may be better understood as peculiarly modem cultural expressions of the commodification of "difference" and the actual standardization of "diversity" to fit the market model of struggle and conflict. If so, they can hardly be taken as universal, neutral, or unmediated. Rather, the concepts of competition and conflict are themselves subject to changing social and material conditions. Apart from historicizing educational institutions at large or canonical works individually, then, contemporary critical discourse—including the debate over the canon—should also be historicized so as to disclose its axon objective conditions, as well as its unspoken ideological tendencies. In spite of certain episodic protests and spurious attempts at political intervention, the last two decades of the twentieth century witnessed the globalization of Western socioeconomic priorities and the triumph of U.S.style capitalism on an unprecedented scale. Professionalism and pragmatism now pervade the educational system at every level, including the study of literature and the humanities. In this environment, it is no surprise that so many critics-—whether ostensibly liberal or conservative— have yielded to the dominant ideology. But laying blame on literary critics
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alone would be as unconvincing as the charge that "a failure of nerve" on the part of professional academics is responsible for putting the canon in jeopardy. It would be idealistic to imply that critics or educators could simply overcome social, economic, and material conditions by fiat. And even though some liberal critics, such as Paul Lauter, have upbraided the "bottom-line thinking" and "managerial governing strategy" of university administrators, whose "marketplace ideology casts students into the role of 'consumers' of the 'products' offered in the grand store of the collegiate curriculum," 83 they fall short of being truly critical—of radically challenging the status quo—as long as the extent of their critique is limited to official educational policy or the promotion of difference, diversity, and literary representation that is anything but subversive. Conclusion: Ideological Proximity The polemical and rhetorical disagreements among left-wing and rightwing critics about opening or preserving the Western canon have obscured the similarity of their fundamental assumptions. But the limitations of the liberal-pluralist critique of the canon and its specific recommendations for making it more socially representative or culturally diverse are precisely what reveal its ideological proximity to the conservative humanism to which it is opposed. Equally, the implicit assumptions of the latter tend to betray a likeness to many of the common assumptions of the former. To summarize, at least five related points of intersection can be identified from among their respective arguments. First, it has been shown how several humanistic critics resort to unhistorical generalizations that the Western literary canon represents the whole of Western culture; they therefore glorify canonical works for embodying certain timeless and universal values that merit the deepest respect and closest study. Liberal-pluralist critics typically take alternative works to be ensigns of cultural identity, especially of social groups that have been historically marginalized but may now celebrate their heterogeneity and learn of their own distinct heritages. In either case, an idea of literary canons as essentially didactic and socially representative is adopted to fulfill certain culturally puristic functions—preserving what is thought to be an unadulterated cultural tradition—without necessarily realizing how canons are historically mediated by the division of labor, the professionalization of artists as wrell as of critics, and the commodification of culture in general. Whether hegemonic or marginal, artworks are consecrated and idealized, celebrated and fetishized, at the expense of recognizing the social costs of their enshrinement. Second, conservative humanists who take the Western canon to be aloof from politics and ideology end up endorsing a conception of aes-
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thetic value that is subjective and individualistic: The greatest literature is meant to be beyond public opinion or social constraints. On the other hand, liberal pluralists who would open the canon to the literature of marginalized social groups have found the purely aesthetic justifications of the given canon to be invariably tendentious. If the aesthetic "prejudices" of modernism, for example, are believed to have favored a narrow and exclusive canon, then they must be overcome by the initiative of critics and teachers. Yet both arguments fall prey to idealism insofar as material circumstances, modem and otherwise, are not perceived as essential to canon formation. In the first case, art itself is elevated beyond social scrutiny; in the second, critics, teachers, and the reading public are idealized as autonomous individuals who can make or break a canon by decree. Third, several literary critics have promoted a view of canon formation as an Oedipal form of artistic struggle, a contest in which only the greatest works succeed and therefore survive. Others have found that works of literature represent specific social constituencies and contending interest groups who vie with each other for political recognition. Common to each is the assumption that canons form and have formed competitively, as if in a literary marketplace. Characteristically modern and specifically Western social perceptions, political values, and economic ideals are therefore legitimized: The ideological tropes of struggle, competition, and success are reified as unhistorical constants that are universally valid and applicable, even to culturally and historically distinct works of art. Fourth, one conservative theory finds that canons are necessary because they are conceptually useful for organizing the past and because they maintain a contemporary relevance. Another, liberal perspective takes literature to be worthwhile only as far as it is politically productive, discounting works traditionally regarded as canonical for not being selfevidently socially effective or politically applicable to certain topical causes. In either case, the immediate utility of literature is taken for granted or promoted as its ultimate justification: If it cannot be proved to be methodologically useful or politically expedient, then it is irrelevant, obsolete, or ideological. However, as I argue in Part 2, the immediate utility of art and literature may well be contrary to the very concept of art in modernity, in which even the most emphatically useless objects are increasingly subject to instrumental rationalization. Finally, both those who defend the Western canon and those who would bring greater diversity into it share the conceit that formal institutions of education are its keeper, as if the preservation or reproduction of art and literature would end without the explicit sanction of schools and universities. More often than not, the debate has been reduced to an issue of educational reform. In the process, the wider issues regarding the sig-
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The Contemporary Canon Debate
nificance of canonical art in capitalist societies are neglected arid the political implications of art are diminished. This is perhaps the most salient indication that pragmatism has become the dominant political paradigm in the current debate over literature and the arts as well as in other areas where it is inappropriate. In conclusion, despite their apparent antinomy, the liberal-pluralistic and conservative-humanistic arguments for preserving or revising the literary canon betray several striking affinities. Essentially, they either conceive of the canon in idealistically aesthetic terms, with little or no reference to objective historical and material conditions, or they appropriate the canon for the purposes of political or pedagogical pragmatism, without regard to the functionless or mediated aspects of art in modernity. What tends to be neglected in eager claims to open the canon are the material constraints of canon formation. Because canonical works have historically been the source of imitation and reproduction over protracted periods of time, a necessary feature of any such work will be its historical persistence and broad cultural familiarity. But arguments that do admit as much are no better if they merely celebrate the monuments of culture and take their historical reproduction as unambiguous evidence of aesthetic superiority. What the latter arguments neglect is the potential of canonical works to become culturally inert or aesthetically sterile objects, such that they end up serving the most trivial purposes. By contrast, a materialistic, sociological, and critical account of canon formation will show on what specific social, economic, and institutional conditions it depends. These matters are the subject of Chapter 3.
3 Cultural Reproduction
"But Slutkespeare one gets acquainted with without knowing how. It is a part of an Englishman's constitution. His thoughts and beauties are so spread abroad that one touches them every where, one is intimate with him by instinct.—No man of any brain can open at a good part of one of his plays, without falling into the flow of his meaning immediately." "No doubt, one is familiar with Shakespeare in a degree," said Edmund, "from one's earliest years. His celebrated passages are quoted by every body; they are in half the books we open, and we all talk Shakespeare, use his similies, and describe with his descriptions." —lane Austen, Mansfield Park (1814), vol. Ill, ch. iii
Of poets who come down to us through distance Of times and tongues, the foster-babes of Fame, Life seems the smallest portion of existence; Where twenty ages gather o'er a name, T is as a snowball which derives assistance From every flake, and yet rolls on the same, Even till an iceberg it may chance to grow; But, after all, 't is nothing but cold snow. —Lord Byron, Dan Juan (7827), canto IV, stanza c
The terms in which the debate over the canon has been articulated, evident in nearly every example in Chapter 2, indicate a widespread assumption that canons are created and preserved primarily by the authority of formal educational institutions such as schools and universities. The prevalence of this belief may well be due to the social situation of those who hold it, the majority of whom are themselves professional academics; but that need not confine an examination of the debate to a critique of its participants or the conventions of their discourse, as if they existed independently of other institutions or apart from wider economic and historical contexts. No single judgment creates a canon, so the assort59
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ment of factors and range of institutions necessary to its formation must be acknowledged. The question as to which factors in particular predominate in different periods therefore requires sociological and historical investigation. This chapter examines two major sociological approaches to literary canon formation: Pierre Bourdieu's and John Guillory's. An analysis of Bourdieu's theory of cultural production will show that the reproduction and prestige of canonical works depends on a process of cultural familiarization that in turn depends on social confirmation and broad institutionalization. However, familiarity is insufficient by itself to explain canon formation because any number of works are continuously reproduced and institutionalized in one form or another, but precious few end up being regarded as "classic." Thus, a further aspect of canonization must also be taken into account: specifically, the qualitative distinctions made by those institutions empowered with the cultural authority to endorse a select body of works as canonical. Bourdieu's theory of cultural reproduction posits that an educational "monopoly" of literary consecration had once existed, but has dissipated since the nineteenth century. One of the weaknesses of his theory, however, is that it does not consider whether other institutions or forms of cultural reproduction may have supplanted academia's influence on canon formation. Although the material reproduction of literature has been under-acknowledged in the contemporary debate, the authority of educational institutions certainly has not. In fact, that authority is precisely what has attracted the political scrutiny of literary critics and social theorists, who argue that canons contribute to the reproduction of social relations and thereby help to maintain the status quo. Among them, John Guillory's work on canon formation is perhaps the most extensive and systematically developed. His alternative theory of the social significance of literary canons and its shortcomings is therefore examined in detail. By highlighting the social, symbolic, and especially material means by which certain works flourish over others, I will ultimately demonstrate how canon formation is an historically cumulative process, and that continual social confirmation over time is necessary for any work to be canonized. In conclusion, I also suggest that sociology, in its effort to explain the social rationale of canonical esteem, ends up with a highly restrictive concept of art. Although it does provide a necessary corrective to the aesthetic idealism of the current debate, literary sociology fails to give adequate consideration to the aesthetic content of canonical works. The social, historical, and political significance of that content—a feature of canonic ity no less important than institutionalization—will be examined in Chapter 4.
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The Familiarity of Canonical Works Although the changing function of the term canon in different historical contexts has already been reviewed in Chapter 1, the specific social, institutional, and material mechanisms that preserve and transmit only a handful of books from generation to generation needs to be looked at in detail. By examining the material production, distribution, and consumption of literature, the social history of literacy, the political aspects of reading and writing, and the ideological role of schools and universities, literary sociology has done much to explain the determination of literary value, the hierarchy of genres, the definition of literature itself, and—by implication at least-—the social processes of canon formation. Few sociologists have done so with greater insight than Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu's model of culture attempts to capture both the social nuances and broad institutional structures that make up what he calls, generally, the "field of cultural production" within which aesthetic discourse and valuation is continually constructed. The literary field is but one among many fields of cultural production and is simultaneously distinct from and homologous with others, such as the artistic fields of painting and sculpture. The specific boundary or definition of a particular field is a condition of the field of cultural production at large, which is always already situated within the general economy of social relations. The theoretical model of the field can explain, for example, the historical genesis and socioeconomic rationale of the concept of "pure" art by dismantling the conventional belief in the lone artist or author as an independent "creator." It showrs how that belief actually coincided with the historical rise of the bourgeoisie to cultural dominance in Europe. According to this model, "the producer of the value of the work of art is not the artist but the field of production as a universe of belief wrhich produces the value of the work of art as a fetish by producing the belief in the creative power of the artist." To follow "the process of literary consecration in the diversity of its forms and its manifestations" and to observe "the fluctuations in the stock of different authors," Bourdieu devises a model of the process of canonization. A "genuine science" of the work of art such as this would thereby undermine conventional notions of artistic creation and expose aesthetic value as socially constructed and primarily ideological, that is, in the service of legitimizing and reproducing the status quo. 1 In Bourdieu's model, the field of cultural production is composed of the objective relations among a wide network of social agents and institutional components, each of which plays a role in the symbolic consecration of particular works of art and the formal recognition of individual
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authors and artists. It includes sites and actors as varied as places of exhibition such as galleries and museums; institutions of consecration like academies and salons; institutions for "the reproduction of producers" themselves such as schools and universities; and other, specialized agents, including dealers, critics and art historians. The vast array of official forms of recognition includes government arts councils, literary prizes, academic exegeses, and authorized biographies, not to mention translations and publication in multiple editions. Less directly, there are more subtle, but no less important, modes of evaluation such as staff appointments in relevant agencies and word of mouth among the literati. Of course, even forms of repudiation, such as negative reviews and censorship, also play a role in the success or failure of works of art and literature. Political revolutions and changes of regime; the symbolic minutiae of popular culture, including commemorative stamps, memorial statues, and the attribution of street names; mention in film and popular song; citations or allusions in the works of other artists, whether or not in the medium of literature: All combine in the logic of the cultural field to valorize or stigmatize certain writers and works, hi short, a whole "market of symbolic goods" operates to canonize. 2 Taking into account so many variables alone should deflate the academic conceit that the canon is primarily determined by formal institutions of education. Given the wide range of institutions and agents, types of discourse, and symbolic signification that informs the process of canonization, Bourdieu affirms that cultural familiarization is constitutive of any work that becomes canonical: The consecrated authors dominating the field of production tend also to make gradual inroads into the market, becoming more and more readable and acceptable the more everyday they seem as a result of a more or less lengthy process of familiarization, whether or not associated with a specific apprenticeship.3 In other words, consecrated authors become acceptable because they have become part of "general culture" through "a process of familiarization which may or may not have been accomplished by specific teaching." The effect of broad social familiarity is such that "one comes to see the works of art of the p a s t . . . through categories derived from an art of the past that has become natural." It is a process of "conscious or unconscious inculcation" that leads people generally to accept the established hierarchy of authors as "self-evident," both before and after periods of intensive canonical revision. 4 Socially sanctioned works of art become so deeply embedded within a collective cultural memory that they influence not only successive artists and authors (popular or otherwise) but also those
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who do not appear to participate directly within the field of production, such as amateur art enthusiasts, "casual" readers, or the public at large. Indeed, canonical art and literature can come to infuse the very language of a culture, as indicated by intertextual citations and linguistic devices, visual imageiy and symbolic codes, and popular myths and traditional allegories, not only within individual cultures but also between different ones. For example, Shakespeare remains the most frequently quoted single author in The Oxford English Dictionary, Dante's Inferno has crossed cultures as much as centuries to become among the most familiar portraits of hell, and accounts of totalitarian states today almost invariably evoke images from Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four or the novels of Solzhenitsyn. So culturally pervasive have canonical works become that art historian E. H. Gombrich dubs them "sources of metaphor." 5 (Lest this account of cultural pervasiveness be thought of as uncritically conservative or simply reconfirming a particular, hegemonic Western tradition, the point here is simply to account for how certain works become institutionalized as canonical, not to judge the legitimacy of the process.) Bourdieu argues that the discourse about a work "is not mere accompaniment, intended to assist its perception and appreciation, but a stage in the production of the work, of its meaning and value." A canonical work of art is not made or remade once, but "hundreds of times, thousands of times, by all those who have an interest in it, who find a material or symbolic profit in reading it, classifying it, decoding it, commenting on it, reproducing it, criticizing it, combating it, knowing it, possessing it." 6 Because it is entirely a product of social interaction, production, and reproduction, the question of a work's inherent value or the qualitative distinction between different kinds of artistic reproduction does not arise in Bourdieu's account; the argument here is simply that artistic longevity depends on continual re-creation, adaptation, and institutional confirmation. According to Andre Lefevere, "the 'intrinsic' value of a work of literature is by no means sufficient to ensure its survival. That survival is ensured at least to the same extent by rewritings. If a writer is no longer rewritten, his or her work will be forgotten." 7 In purely sociological terms, then, broad cultural familiarity is a crucial but overlooked index of canonicity. In fact, even Bourdieu fails to illustrate it in very much detail. However, canonical familiarization, as opposed to cultural familiarity in general, does not merely reflect the popularity of a specific work at a single moment of time or for a limited period. Rather, it is an historical process resulting from the continual reproduction of works in multiple contexts, as well as from the social confirmation across a range of variably influential institutions. The variety of ways in which certain authors are acclaimed and their works become familiar—both contemporaneously and over subsequent
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generations—is illustrated by the numerous studies of authorial reputation that have lately become fashionable. 8 With little regard to other forms of reproduction and cultural transmission, conventional literary histories have often been written as narratives of canonical authors influencing their artistic peers and successors ("the old thin line of national heroes"), as if they worked in a social vacuum; but the sociology of reputation has a much wider focus. For example, in The Politics of Literary Reputation, John Rodden surveys George Orwell's posthumous reputation by documenting an assortment of factors involved in his canonization, including the shifting justifications over time for the acclaim of different works within his oeuvre. He also shows how those justifications vary depending on who is making them (whether socialists, liberals, or neo-conservatives), which suggests that the potential for canonization may also rely in part on an author's or work's flexibility to ideological appropriation. Rodden pays close attention to the cultural minutiae and representations in various media, including newspapers and television, textbooks, and anthologies, from which Orwell's image has been constructed. 9 Similarly, in Creating Faulkner's Reputation, Lawrence Schwartz illustrates "the confluence of literary, cultural, and commercial forces" that shaped William Faulkner's rise to fame and critical reappraisal. Out of print and generally ignored in the early 1940s, Faulkner was proclaimed a literary genius in the United States by the close of that decade, when a combination of nationalist sentiment, supportive reviews, and publisher promotions-—each mutually informing—gathered momentum, culminating in the publication of Viking's best-selling Portable Faulkner in 1946. Intruder in the Dust (1948), which Hollywood quickly adapted for film, was "made into a publishing event" with the power of Random House applied "to insure its commercial success, to stimulate the Faulkner revival." 10 All of these factors, admittedly, explain only his popularity. However, Schwartz also details how professional critics and journalists, in addition to academics, consolidated Faulkner's status by making the case for his serious literary value. In the wake of winning the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1949, Faulkner was accommodated in the university curriculum, where he remains to this day. In addition to academic attention and critical acclaim, therefore, intergenre and intermedia rewritings play a significant role in the familiarity with and esteem for canonized artists and works. As reviewed in Chapter 1, historical examples of canonical reproduction abound from antiquity to the present. Homeric imagery was ubiquitous in ancient Greece and Rome, typically found on painted vases and temple pediments, in lyric poetry, tragic drama, and philosophical treatises, as well as in the painting, sculpture, and literature of the Renaissance and beyond. Likewise, the countless quotations, citations, interpretations, and adaptations
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of Shakespeare's works demonstrate not only his centrality to English and European literature since the eighteenth century but also his international dominance in theater, poetry, and professional criticism today. His plays are continually adapted for film, translated into dozens of languages, and published in hundreds of editions, prompting one critic to pronounce "Shakesperotics" an industry unto itself.11 Another illustrative example, if on a lesser scale, is Dryden's adaptation of Paradise Lost for opera. Beyond being merely a literary tribute from one poet to another, The State of Innocence (1674) served to reinforce Milton's reputation by adaptation into a new medium: Operas were a distinctively modern genre in late seventeenth-century England, and their librettos were often derived from classic texts, including works that were coming to be claimed as English classics . . . In choosing to base The State of Innocence on Paradise Lost, Dryden was declaring that Milton's poem had the status of a classic.12 In more than 300 years Paradise Lost has never been out of print, and Milton's poems, it has been remarked, were once so familiar that "they formed part of what one might call the national consciousness. Generations of literate Englishmen found resonant phrases from Milton on their lips." 13 Similarly, the reproduction of the Faust legend in Goethe's play, Gounod's opera, Berlioz's oratorio, Liszt's symphony, Thomas Mann's novel, and Murnau's and Svankmajer's films—to name only the most explicit adaptations—has only strengthened its reputation as a literary classic. Indeed, one scholar describes Faust, along with Don Quixote, Don Juan, and Robinson Crusoe, as one of the dominant myths of modern society.14 Today, the making and remaking of the novels of Scott, Austen, Dickens, and the Brontes for film and television continually ensure their familiarity, while the multiple editions of Ulysses, To the Lighthouse, and other "modern classics" contribute to their distinction over other published literature. The collected works of canonical authors in elegant editions also confer on them a certain prestige: "the uniform bindings confirm us in our belief that we are reading a classic, and they make the authors appear in some timeless space in which they all coexist together." 15 Of course, no single adaptation or edition of a work is enough to canonize it, because the means by which it is disseminated and becomes familiar—in whatever form—are many and diffuse. Moreover, the consecration of a work in one medium will often excite or rekindle interest in its antecedents, thereby furthering the potential for canonization by association with the already canonical. None of this, however, appeals to the sheer scale of numerical proliferation or the extent of cultural dispersion alone. Contrary to those who be-
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lieve that "it is in mass and not high or official culture that the value of literary canon formation is preserved," 16 the process of canonization depends no less on the relative authority of those groups with institutional influence on the evaluation and reproduction of selected works of literature. Populist optimism can be faulted for ignoring the hierarchical structure of institutions, including those in the service of "mass" culture. Bourdieu documents at length the conflicts of social and economic power involved in acquiring and maintaining such authority, and he shows how the institutional process of familiarization also relies on access to the established codes—including technical vocabulary and symbolic c a p i t a l necessary to participate in the appreciation (in both senses) of any work. Indeed, the struggle to establish a "monopoly of literary legitimacy" is itself a function of the logic of the field: "cultural heritage, which exists in a materialized and in an incorporated state . . . , only exists and effectively persists (meaning actively) in and through the struggles located in fields of cultural production; that is, cultural heritage exists by and for the agents disposed and able to assure its continued reactivation." 17 Cultural familiarity may not be transparently universal-—in the sense of being equally recognized across the spectrum of class, gender, and racial differences—but neither does it result from individual assertiveness, popular acclaim, or discursive contestation alone. Rather, the processes of familiarization are objectively bound to the structure of the field of cultural production, including the internal hierarchies and materiality (i.e., the modes and relations of production) of institutions within it, which are themselves situated within the wider economy. Liberal-pluralists who pronounce obscure works to be suddenly canonical or who suggest that aesthetic criteria hitherto used for literary evaluation can now be simply cast aside fail to perceive the intransigence of social relations and institutional structures or the dependence of canonization on broad cultural and historical reproduction. New or historically underappreciated works are unlikely to be canonized without corresponding social, institutional, and material changes sufficient to promote their reproduction, dissemination, and familiarization. The gesture of liberally claiming recent or "recovered" texts to be deservedly or spontaneously canonical—whether for exciting sudden critical interest or for representing culturally disenfranchised groups—is therefore misleading to the extent that it underestimates the control of institutions upon which canonization depends. Canonicity requires an historical quality that is not so quickly obtained. What newly acclaimed works lack—no less than those that have belatedly become, or had once been, popular—is a cumulative history, a continuum of judgments and rewritings over extended periods of time. Some of the feminist calls for a novel and distinct canon of female writers, for example, betray a misunderstanding of the historical depth con-
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stitutive of canonical works, Even though Aphra Behn or Alice Walker are currently enjoying critical favor, their longevity remains doubtful as long as they fail to become broadly assimilated, that is, as long as they lack an historical continuity of attention and reproduction. 18 The same could be said of the modern cliche "instant classic," an oxymoron that reveals more about the nature of today's cultural impasse than it does about the discourse of celebration or the cunning of marketing. Instead, it is indicative of the commodification of culture by which the historical distinction of canonical literature is effaced in a market flooded with cultural goods. It also discloses the inherent contradiction of canonicity per se, a matter that is addressed in Chapter 6. Bourdieu writes that "the history of the field is truly irreversible; and the products of this relatively autonomous history present a kind of cumulativity." In addition, "any interrogation [of the values of the field] arises from a tradition, from a practical or theoretical mastery of the heritage which is inscribed in the very structure of the field."19 Like artworks that are modeled on artistic precedent and tradition, even the periodic challenges to the authority of consecrated works require some measure of familiarity with the history of the field, without which legitimacy—including that of the challengers—will be impossible. In other words, according to the theory of the field of cultural production, "the practical mastery of the specific achievements inscribed in past and recorded works, codified and canonized by a whole corpus of professionals of conservation and celebration—historians of art and literature, exegetes, analysts, critics—is part of the conditions of entry into the field of production." 20 One cannot even begin to pose an effective challenge to a canon without in some measure entering the field of which it is a part. Therefore, successful challenges to the literary canon—whether to the authority of its keepers, to conventional evaluative criteria, or to its specific content—entail a high degree of proficiency within the literary field. Even canon revision depends in some measure on the canon itself. Rather than being a conservative restraint on the possibility of canonical change, in this model the very logic of the field keeps the canon relatively open. Change occurs not by unprecedented revolution, but by a gradual process of modifying the margins of the field. Nonetheless, it could be argued that contesting the canon from without, that is, from outside the confines of official cultural institutions, need not depend on canonical precedent, as in the arguments for wholly distinct, alternative canons of historically marginalized social groups. Yet even these challenges require symbolic capital to succeed, to achieve some measure of legitimacy beyond a small circle of initiates. Liberal-pluralists who advocate separate but equal canons obviate the theory of the field of cultural production only if "their own" institutions of cultural production were to
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exist in complete isolation from the dominant culture and its institutions, if they were devoid of social hierarchy themselves or could somehow maintain a canon independent of the means of cultural reproduction—all of which seems unlikely in a world where different societies are increasingly interdependent and even the most remote cultures are mediated by common economic principles and modes of production. Given the means of material reproduction and cultural transmission, the discrepancies of symbolic capital necessary for legitimization, and the social logic of canonical change, an adequate sociology of literature must historically consider which specific institutions most effectively determine these variables and therefore do most to canonize individual works at any given time. Unlike others, Bourdieu is ambivalent about how fundamental formal education remains today. His own diagnosis of the increasing "autonomization" of the field of cultural production, especially in Europe since the nineteenth century, precludes any clear certainty that the literary canon relies wholly on educational institutions. 21 In spite of advising that "it would be foolish to search for an ultimate guarantor or guarantee" of the power of consecration, however, Bourdieu does make some appeal to the authority of education, albeit in a very loose sense. The recognition of works of art as "art" begins, he alleges, with teachers and parents because they are in charge of "the initial inculcation of artistic dispositions." 22 But this assumption uncritically presupposes that education precedes culture or the processes of acculturation. It does not even consider whether the reverse may be true, or whether both may actually coincide. In fact, Bourdieu ultimately does attribute the highest power of consecration to educational institutions, writing that "it is impossible to understand the peculiar characteristics of restricted culture without appreciating its profound dependence on the educational system, the indispensable means of its reproduction and grow r th," and that "the educational system plays a decisive role in the generalized imposition of the legitimate mode of consumption." 2 3 In even more explicit terms, the process of canonization has led to "the constitution of a corpus of canonic works whose value the education system tends continually to reproduce by producing aware consumers (which means converted ones) as well as sacralizing commentaries." Thus, "the infallible sign of consecration" in the field of cultural production "is constituted by the canonization of works as classics by inscribing them in curricula/' even if belatedly.24 However, in Bourdieu's own account, the educational monopoly on consecration and canonization historically ended in the nineteenth century. In France, for example, the "monopoly holder of the legitimate definition of art and the artist" had been the Academic Frangaise; but its power was broken, Bourdieu suggests, with the "institutionalization of
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anomie which resulted from a field of institutions placed in a situation of competition for artistic legitimacy." 25 The dispersal of consecrating authority allowed those informal institutions invested with enough symbolic capital, such as the more influential salons of the bourgeoisie, to begin directly affecting the prestige of certain writers and artists. Bourdieu cites the example of Anatole France, who was initially praised by only a small but influential coterie of salon "habitues" before attracting public and critical acclaim and eventually winning the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1921. In addition to other non-academic institutions, the salons constituted "a field of competition for the accumulation of social capital and symbolic capital" that also exercised power over the field of cultural production at large, as well as other sites of consecration, such as the academies. 26 The collapse of the educational monopoly is therefore partly a condition of the increasing autonomy of the literary and artistic fields, which is a function of their relative independence from the conventional "field of power" in general, such as the state apparatus and the economy as a whole. 27 The process of autonomization is "correlated," Bourdieu argues, with the multiplication and diversification of agencies of consecration placed in a situation of competition for cultural legitimacy: not only academies and salons, but also institutions for diffusion, such as publishers . . . , whose selective operations are invested with a truly cultural legitimacy even if they are subordinated to economic and social constraints.28 For all these reasons, Bourdieu regards the power of the literary field by itself to be relatively "weak." Each of these assumptions—the collapse of the educational monopoly on consecration, the autonomy and diversification of the field of cultural production, and the competition for legitimacy—depends on the relative strength or cohesion of the literary or artistic field, which Bourdieu finds today to be characterized by "a weak degree of codification"; few fields, he claims, are as "little institutionalized." 2y Indeed, so incohesive and vulnerable to competition is the literary field in particular that even characterizing it as an "institution," he believes, is a mistake: There is nothing to be gained by replacing the notion of the literary field with that of "institution:" besides the fact that it risks suggesting . . . a consensual image of a very conflictual universe, this notion causes one of the most significant properties of the literary field to disappear—its weak degree of institutionalization. This is seen, among other indices, in the total absence of arbitration and legal or institutional guarantee in conflicts of priority or authority... 30
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Taken independently, of course, the power of publishers, promoters, critics, or authors, and the respective value of their symbolic capital, is insufficient to maintain absolute and unchallenged cultural authority, just as no canon is formed by individual judgments, no matter how assertive. However, if they are only weakly institutionalized when taken individually, it does not follow that they are equally ineffective when taken together, as an ensemble of institutions that are subject to common historical and economic tendencies and that share certain structural characteristics, in spite of their internal differences or sometimes disparate evaluations. If some concession is made for their collective influence and cultural impact, especially as they are falling under increasingly concentrated control, then the inflated rhetoric of a "total absence" of arbitration must be qualified, as would the disingenuous belief that a lack of consensus prevails today. Although the theory of institutional weakness goes some way to explain the diversity of factors that affect literary esteem and perhaps, by extension, the context of the current crisis of canonical legitimacy—since no single group, institution, or field any longer commands sole consecrating authority—it also reveals the limitations of that explanation. Bourdieu's account of increasing autonomization, the foundation of his whole sociology of art, is incomplete. Underlying its otherwise historical analysis is an unhistorical projection of the literary field of the nineteenth century onto that of the twentieth, at the expense of perceiving how the composition of cultural institutions and the mass media has changed in recent years, not least with their monopolization or formation into multinational conglomerates and cartels. Instead of seeing the academic monopoly of consecration as having given way to nothing but "weakness" and "anomie," it should be considered whether the collectivity of other cultural institutions and media has instead replaced the former academic monopoly with commercialism and commodity production. Insofar as the reproduction of cultural and artistic works, including the adaptation of classics into different forms, genres, and media, increasingly relies on the industries of culture and the attention of the mass media, it seems that cultural commodification has begum to fill the void. If that is the case, then the consequences of leaving canonization in the hands of institutions whose primary concern is profit rather than education—let alone critical thinking—need to be examined. The institutional process by which certain works of art become familiar is related to Bourdieu's conception of symbolic "aging," according to which consecrated works, by entering into the general culture and acquiring symbolic value, can also become devalued, "fossilized," and eventually supplanted by the work of younger artists:
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The aging of authors, works or schools is something quite different from a mechanical sliding into the past, it is engendered in the fight between those who have already left their mark and are trying to endure, and those who cannot make their own marks in stopping time, in eternalizing the present state; between the dominants whose strategy is tied to continuity, identity and reproduction, and the dominated, the new entrants, whose interest is in discontinuity, rupture, difference and revolution.51 This process does more than simply explain canon formation as an ongoing contest between the familiar and the unfamiliar, the novel and the conventional. The concept of aging also implies that established works can become "dated" and aesthetically neutralized when their potential to offer anything new—to remain compelling or critical—is diminished. The "wearing out of the effect" of canonical works, Bourdieu believes, "is primarily the result of the routinization of production associated with the impact of epigones and academicism, which even avant-garde movements do not escape, and arises from the repeated and repetitive application of proved procedures and the uninventive use of an art of inventing already invented." 32 In other words, the very process of familiarization that contributes to the canonization of particular works of art and literature also leads to their neutralization, or "banalization." When they become so familiar that they are reduced to simple cliches, memorized in disconnected segments in school, fetishized in lists of "greatest books," or regarded merely as sources of pleasure and entertainment, literary classics risk losing whatever makes them distinctive and distinguished, including their aesthetic force or potential for critical knowledge. As far as it dehistoricizes selected texts by elevating them into a pantheon of canonical authors, traditional humanistic and forrnalistic academic criticism also contributes to their neutralization. 33 Because canonical works are indeed often trivialized as filler for textbooks, used as resources for profit, or pragmatically reduced to being vehicles for preaching "traditional" cultural values (whether of dominant or marginal social groups), the concept of aging is especially revealing of the contemporary canon debate. Such aging is not only a matter of consumption and how works of art are used; it can also affect the production and specific content of the works themselves. When authors and artists remain attached to modes of production that have become dated, Bourdieu writes, "when they lock themselves into patterns of perception or appreciation that become converted into transcendent and eternal norms and so prohibit the acceptance or even the perception of novelty," both their own work and that on which it is modeled may become aesthetically sterile. 34 As much as they might complement or promote the status of canonical literature, the formulaic
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imitations of a literary classic can also dim its aesthetic power or distinctiveness. The stories of Edgar Allan Poe, for instance, now seem almost irretrievably old-fashioned and even tame in light of subsequent horror fiction, just as the film adaptations of the novels of Jane Austen, Charlotte Bronte, and George Eliot have rendered them almost indistinguishable from soap opera kitsch. In effect, the emulation, proliferation, and increasing commodification into different media that historical canonization requires can also be its undoing. As far as it cripples artistic innovation, stifles original interpretation, or suppresses critical understandings—merely reproducing the style of canonical works or the values that they are thought to embody—imitation has serious ideological repercussions. In the following chapters, I demonstrate that such aesthetic neutralization is, in part, what the critical aesthetic theory of Theodor Adorno tries to come to terms with. Before turning to that, however, in the next section I consider the ways in which canonization as a form of cultural reproduction may also reinforce the status quo by reproducing social relations. Canon Formation and Social Relations Although a sociological account of cultural production can illuminate canon formation as a broad historical and institutional process, tracing the means by which, out of innumerable published works, comparatively few acquire distinction, some of those accounts have found that process to have definite political and ideological implications. They have therefore looked in greater detail at the specific class functions of the canon, particularly at the institutional site in which it has been claimed to derive its authority. In Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation, John Guillory proposes a theory of canon formation that emphasizes the use of canonical works in schools and their role in defining what constitutes not just literature of exceptional quality but literature and literacy per se, which in turn works to reproduce class distinctions.-'5 Unlike the liberal-pluralist arguments he criticizes, Guillory's theory makes clear "the relative absence of class as a working category of analysis in the canon debate," and he suggests that the concept of cultural capital—derived from Bourdieu's sociological model—provides the basis for a more historical account of canon formation: "[Wjhile the debate seems to its participants to be about the contents of the literary canon, its significance goes well beyond the effects of any new consensus about a truly 'representative' canon." Rather, the canon debate signifies "nothing less than a crisis in the form of cultural capital we call 'literature'." [T]he problem of what is called canon formation is best understood as a problem in the constitution and distribution of cultural capital, or more
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specifically, a problem of access to the means of literary production and consumption. The "means" in question are provided by the school, which regulates and thus distributes cultural capital unequally . . . by regulating access to literacy, to the practices of reading and writing.36 What distinguishes the current crisis of canonical legitimacy from others, Guillory believes, is an unprecedented transformation of specific social relations, namely, the emergence of a technically trained professional-managerial class for whom "literature" designates the cultural capital of "the old bourgeoisie." Literature is a form of capital that is "increasingly marginal to the social function of the present educational system" because it is marginal to the interests of the new class itself.37 Far from indicating a "personal failure" on the part of individual teachers or the "degenerate influence" of relativistic literary theories in the universities, the declining enrollment of students for degrees in the humanities lamented by conservative critics is actually due to the decreasing value or relevance of such degrees—and of canonical works themselves—in the current economic climate, where job training and specialization are more and more becoming the primary function of education. According to Guillory, "the professional-managerial class has made the correct assessment that, so far as its future is concerned, the reading of great works is not worth the investment of very much time or money." Therefore, the true context of the canon debate is neither the conflict between progressive and nostalgic pedagogies, nor that between multiculturalism and Western culturalism, but "the transformation of cultural capital in response to social conditions." 38 The literary canon, however, does more than simply represent, or fail to represent, the interests of dominant or aspiring classes. In Guillory's account, it actually helps to maintain and reproduce class differences by direct and indirect means. "[I]n its concrete form as a syllabus or a curriculum [sic], the canon is a discursive instrument of 'transmission' situated historically within a specific institution of reproduction: the school." The social function of the school is "the distribution of knowledge by means of techniques of dissemination and rituals of credentialization." 39 Fluency in such knowledge is dependent on acquired familiarity with or evident mastery of the curriculum, and the institutional recognition thereof benefits especially those who reach the higher echelons of formal education: Canonical texts, institutionally preserved and disseminated, constitute the paradigmatic basis of literary language, the guarantor at the lower educational levels of simple grammatical speech, the exemplar, at higher levels, of more expansive as well as more elite standards of linguistic use (stylistic or rhetorical rather than simply grammatical norms)... 40
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As a sociological process, canon formation is "the institutional intervention by which the literary curriculum becomes the pedagogic vehicle for producing the distinction between credentialized and uncredentialized speech." 41 In Guillory's thesis, then, the canon is not simply a neutral, pragmatic device for organizing conceptions of literary history a la Frank Kermode, a political ensign of unambigtious cultural identity, or a even buttress to nationalist ideologies. More discreetly, it functions as a regulator of access to literacy, the means of literary production and consumption and therefore the means of social discrimination: "The literary canon has always functioned in the schools as a pedagogic device for producing an effect of linguistic distinction, of 'literacy'." 42 Because it is always historically determined, culturally dependent, and unequally distributed, literacy serves to distinguish the educated from the ignorant, the cultured from the philistine, those with cultural capital from those without. Guillory goes to great lengths to demonstrate that the historical definition of literacy both stems from and shapes the corpus of literary works that came to be regarded as canonical. For example, the formation of the English vernacular canon, he finds, was an effect of the translation of classical notions of literacy to the primary schools of the eighteenth century. The Newr Critics' revision of the canon redefined the cultural capital produced by literary study in the university to conform to their own values of aesthetic modernism. And the "canon of theory" that developed in the last twenty-five years of the twentieth century for postgraduate education exhibits the "technobureaucratic" priorities characteristic of the professional-managerial class. Each historical phase has in turn served to determine degrees of linguistic, literary, and theoretical competence and expertise at every level of education. Nevertheless, Guillory's specific conception of both literacy and canonicity imposes certain limits on his own theory of canon formation and its functions. He defines literacy as "not simply the capacity to read b u t . . . the systematic regulation of reading and writing"—including the production and consumption of literature— "the systematic effects of the educational system in the determination of who writes and who reads, as well as what gets read and in what contexts." 43 However, this definition remains so strictly tied to educational institutions in isolation that the other institutional forms also operative in canon formation are excluded from view: "The educational apparatus regulates, because it makes possible, access to this inheritable treasure. . . . There is no other access to works: they must be confronted as the cultural capital of educational institutions."44 Guillory's conception of literacy is therefore restricted almost entirely to that which is formally learned in official institutions of education; but if the school has indeed become "the exclusive agent for the dissemination of High Canonical works," then culture and education themselves become that which is only officially
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sanctioned as such. 45 And although he otherwise adopts Bourdieu's sociological model, Guillory does not consider whether the former academic monopoly on consecration may have long since collapsed, giving way to institutional weakness and "anomie," or may have been superseded by the monopolization of industries of cultural production today, as discussed above. That canonization is at least as much a function of artistic reproduction is not given much credence either, and Guillory maintains that "authors learn whom to read and how to judge in the schools," that they "confront a monumentalized textual tradition already immersed as speakers and writers in the social condition of linguistic stratification."*' Like Bourdieu before him, in all cases it seems to Guillory that the formal literacy acquired in educational institutions necessarily precedes cultural production and aesthetic consciousness. Guillory's specific idea of literacy thereby affects his conception of canonicity as well, such that an author or work is truly canonical only when studied in schools: "Even the judgement of recent but uncanonized work must eventually be validated in the passage of writers into school curricula in order for one to speak of canonicity. One should not forget that literary history is filled with the names of writers whose high standing with other, more famous authors was still insufficient to insure their canonicity."47 However, the history of literary curricula provides no shortage of counter-examples of authors and works that have indeed been taught in schools but that could hardly be described as "canonical," unless the meaning of the term is stretched beyond recognition. Peter Taylor's "The Fancy Woman" (1941), for example, has apparently been used for teaching American literature, and particularly techniques of writing, 48 but is that sufficient by itself to make it canonical? If one sign of canonization is imitation and rewriting—not in a purely linguistic sense, but in a variety of forms and by those with or without academic credentials—then its role in the constitution of literacy is but one of its social functions and a work's place in the school curriculum only one of its manifestations. Without offering an account of canonization that is more than just a function of formal education—that includes the processes of cultural, symbolic, and material reproduction at large—Guillory himself ultimate!}' confuses the canon with the syllabus, in spite of his own claims to the contrary. 49 Apart from these shortcomings, and unlike the case for social representation in the canon, Guillory at least recognizes that class distinctions are fundamental to any concept of a literary canon. The question of access to the means of literary production and consumption, of who is granted the opportunity to read and write works of literature, let alone interpret them, is logically prior to the question of which particular exemplary works should "represent" which specific social constituencies.
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In every society and culture, both education and artistic production have been a social privilege, a product of the division of labor and class relations. Any account of canon formation that leaves out this fact ends up ideologically legitimizing and mystifying that division. Even though Guillory takes the class function of literacy as the ultimate source of literary and canonical distinction, he does not give adequate consideration to whether social hierarchy and material inequality—as much as the promise of their transcendence—may be constitutive of artistic production per $e, both literary and otherwise. Indeed, in sociological accounts such as his, the specific content of works of art is discounted from the start. The linguistic and symbolic capital that constitute literacy, Guillory believes, are "ultimately more socially significant in their effects than the 'ideological' content of literary works." Moreover, "the form we call 'literature' organizes the syllabus and determines criteria of selection much more directly than the particular social biases of judgement which have been invoked to explain the canonical or noncanonical status of particular authors." 50 Of course, an account of canon formation that confines itself to the immediate social "effects" of art will have little concern for its specific content, especially where it is too abstract to have obvious or "direct" social consequences. But to deem literacy and cultural capital in general as "more socially significant" than the aesthetic content of individual works—even though the latter is less tangible than the social uses to which canonical works are put—is to resort to dubious epistemological and methodological assumptions that Guillory's thesis simply takes for granted. Among those assumptions is an empirical bias for the social reception of art, the immediate impact of artworks, and the conscious—that is, "learned"—intentions of authors. None of these factors, however, need be considered the only or even the most significant aspect of canonical art. That Guillory avoids considering the qualitative content of particular works is partly because his purely sociological vantage does not discern any single aesthetic property to be exclusive to an individual work of art. Indeed, in his theory, the very conception of a "work of art" is nothing more than a result of the circulation of cultural capital, the product of judgments made by those with socially recognized credentials such as education, training, or expertise in art history, interpretation, and criticism: "[WJhen aesthetic artifacts are certified as 'works of art', they become the bearers of cultural capital, and as such are unequally distributed." However, Guillory insists, "the aesthetic is not simply identical to the form of cultural capital embodied by works of art." 51 Herein lies the crux of Guillory's argument. The problem of the literary canon is not really about which particular works it comprises, nor about their specific content, but about hoiv the aesthetic as such is perceived and defined. Because
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"the relation between the aesthetic and the work of art cannot be defined as their absolute distinction any more than the experience of the aesthetic can be identified exclusively with the experience of a work of art," Guillory finds the whole discourse of the canon debate to be founded on the "illusion" that works of art are uniquely aesthetic: [S]o far as the object of sociology is concerned, nothing exists besides the cultural capital embodied on the one hand in the aesthetic disposition, and on the other in the cultural products judged according to the criteria internalized as the aesthetic disposition. It is easy enough to recognize here the largest effect of the discourse of canonicity: the illusion that aesthetic experience is really restricted to the experience of High Cultural works.52 To move away from this deception, an idea of aesthetic "experience" broadly conceived is substituted in lieu of the concept of aesthetic "value" which, Guillory shows, has historically been bestowed upon works of art only since the eighteenth century, when it came to be distinguished from specifically economic conceptions of value. The conflation of these two historically distinct notions of value today has led to the tendency in the current debate to regard any attribution of aesthetic value as ideological, either for disguising economic interests or for claiming as universal evaluations that are actually culturally arid historically contingent. 53 In contrast, Guillory argues that "the ubiquity of aesthetic experience" is such that it "utterly pervades the field of cultural production" and is neither simply ideological nor wholly relative. Instead, he finds that the "daily life" of an individual, whose preferences are greatly determined by objective social relations such as class, is "pervaded by innumerable and various aesthetic expressions, from the clothing he wears to the situation comedies which entertain him in the evenings." 34 So capacious an idea of aesthetics, however, is problematic when placed in the context of the canon debate. One consequence of discounting the role of artistic reproduction in canon formation and confining it exclusively to schools is that Guillory loses sight of the fact that works of art are precisely what are at stake as far as the literary canon is concerned. Certainly, anything from clothing and food to physical stimulation and the natural world can be said to have aesthetic qualities, but in what sense could these things be thought of as "canonical" or constituting a canon? In contrast to aesthetics as such, the very idea of a canon is historically and quite specifically bound to the qualitative production of works on the model of other works. Yet, for Guillory, the canonical or noncanonical status of a work is simply a function of ascribing a high measure of aesthetic value to it, regardless of its particular content or its historical impact on subsequent cultures: "[I]f it were possible to think of the
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aesthetic without also thinking of value, we would in effect have discarded the concept of the 'work of art' as we know it. For that object is by definition the embodiment of a quantum of aesthetic value." 55 Whether or not value is truly inseparable from the assessment or definition of art, in this hypothesis the work is reduced to an abstract quantity at the expense of its individual qualities or qualitative content, including its particular formal characteristics and the specific techniques of its material production. In his effort to clarify the social logic of distinction, therefore, Guillory ends up abrogating the qualitative distinction of art itself: There is nothing necessarily unique about the aesthetic content of canonical works because there is nothing distinctive about works of art at all; the aesthetic is distributed throughout a vast range of experiences, none of which is more significant than any other.56 This concept of the aesthetic is ultimately vacuous. If it were true, then canonical works that have permeated a range of cultures for generations, if not centuries or millennia, would be virtually indistinguishable from personal tastes in fashion and television shows, except that the former cany an ideological burden and the latter, supposedly, do not. The materia] conditions of this situation are recognized by Guillory himself to be the increasing commodification of cultural production, particularly in Western societies. The contemporary crisis of canonical legitimacy is largely owing to the pervasiveness of an economic process by which all products, artistic and otherwise, are measured by quantitative value or reduced to an abstract equivalence for the sake of economic exchange. The fact that "works of art continue to be exchanged in the marketplace as commodities which are commensurable with other commodities" has become—indeed has long been—"the inescapable horizon of social life," perhaps especially in the United States, where the canon debate has been most pronounced. 57 Yet the commodification of culture also accelerates the processes of reproduction by which more and more works become widely familiar and institutionalized, increasingly eroding the difference between the canonical and non-canonical, as well as between works of art and aesthetic experience in general. If the academic monopoly of canonical consecration has indeed been broken, as Bourdieu believes, then the extent to which the industries and media of cultural reproduction have taken its place must also be considered. Beyond Guillory's thesis, therefore, the contemporary canon debate signifies more than the rise of a technically trained professional class with little need for the literary monuments of an earlier bourgeois era. Instead, due to commodification's blurring of qualitative distinctions for the sake of economic exchange, the critical judgment of art seems to have become incapacitated.
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79 Whither Aesthetics?
By understanding how artistic reproduction, cultural familiarity, historical cumulativity, and the social relations of production are all essential to canon formation, the sociological theories reviewed above reveal the material constraints of canon formation. If the social mechanisms of that process are recognized, then the humanistic idealizations of the literary canon as irreproachable or timeless should be tempered, if not refuted. Equally, if the extent of historical reproduction and institutionalization necessary for any work to become canonical is appreciated, then the liberal-pluralist claims to alter the canon or spontaneously create alternative ones will also be understood to be idealistic insofar as they, too, neglect those constraints. Because canonization requires cultural dissemination and artistic reproduction, the degree to which the commodification of art and culture affects canon formation must be factored into any account of the literary canon. Although some critics have remarked that the commodification of marginalized cultures has indeed contributed to the recognition and canonization of authors and books that would otherwise have remained neglected, they have generally treated it as no more significant than other factors, such as their establishment within academia. 58 But if the academic monopoly on literary consecration—if indeed there ever was one—has actually eroded since the nineteenth century, then factors such as cultural commodification may now play an even greater role in canonization than academic institutionalization. For all their insight into the processes by which certain works are made culturally familiar and canonized, however, sociological accounts of canon formation take these processes to be the social or political limit of canonicity. Although they do, at least in principle, push the debate beyond purely academic discourse, they also reveal their own limitations regarding the specific content of individual works. In particular, sociological conceptions of the aesthetic find that to distinguish qualitatively between canonical and non-canonical works, or between art and aesthetic experience in general, is always and necessarily ideological for mystifying social relations in the name of detached "judgment." Guillory, for instance, believes that the canon serves primarily to reproduce social relations and perpetuate class distinctions via standards of literacy, and Bourdieu barely considers the qualitative content of works of art at all (see Chapter 5). Such conclusions implicitly or explicitly rule out the possibility that the aesthetic can also have a distinctive, non-ideological, cognitive content, and that individual canonical works can thereby also have a unique critical potential, subverting the status quo by pointing beyond
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it. In Part 2,1 show how critical theory, and especially Theodor Adorno's aesthetic theory, goes beyond the limitations of sociology. Even though sociological theory does much to correct the idealistic assumptions prevalent in the current canon debate, sociological theorists say nothing about the instrumental or pragmatic justifications of art that have also been shown to be characteristic of this debate. Chapter 4 shows how critical theory's unique conception of art establishes a framework through which a critique can be mounted of such instrumental and pragmatic justifications. It also sets the stage for a further critique of sociological accounts of canon formation that leave out the aesthetic content of works of art and literature. Without succumbing to the limitations of conservative humanism, liberal pluralism, or sociological empiricism, critical theory provides a reading of art in modern societies that can be extended to both the nature of canon formation and the prevailing assumptions about it.
PART TWO
Critical Aesthetic Theory
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4 Critical Theory and Canonical Art That tlte work of art lives on is due to the very moments that are suppressed when it is elevated to the Pantheon. —Theodor Adorno, "On the Classicism of Goethe's Iphigenie" (1967)
The preceding chapters have illustrated the contours of the current situation regarding the literary canon and exposed certain key assumptions in the rhetoric within the contemporary debate. To move beyond the idealism and narrow academicism of this debate, sociological theories of cultural reproduction were used to highlight the material conditions and constraints of canon formation. The sociological approach, however, reveals its own limitations when the social and institutional aspects of canon formation are emphasized at the expense of the specific content of individual works. Whereas liberal-pluralist and conservative-humanist arguments have tended to neglect the concrete means by which certain works become canonical, the materialism of sociology tends by contrast to empty such works of any social purpose beyond the reproduction of the status quo; the canon is redticed to being little more than a function of class distinction. What is not sufficiently considered in either approach is whether the very concept of art under modern socioeconomic conditions has far more radical implications when not limited to pedagogical functions or immediate political interests. The purpose of this chapter is to construct an argument for the aesthetic content of works of art by appealing to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, and particularly the aesthetic theory of Theodor Adorno. The first section provides an exposition of those aspects of his theory that are most relevant to the literary canon, with specific attention to the critical role of art in modern capitalist societies. I then demonstrate 83
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how the explicitly political justifications for revising the canon, as well as the instrumental applications of works of art in general, can be subject to a dialectical and materialist critique. Contrary to pluralist arguments for opening the canon on the grounds of social representation or pragmatism, Adorno makes the case that only the historical autonomy of art—free from social, political, and practical obligations—is truly and substantively critical of current social relations, and that any explicit political content, or direct political application, of socially "committed" art actually ends u p serving the social order it ostensibly seeks to overcome. Although originally articulated in response to the works of Bertolt Brecht and the theories of Georg Lukacs, among others, this idea remains strikingly pertinent to the canon debate today. Finally, to show that critical theory does not simply defend the established canon of Western literature nor automatically exclude works that have not historically been regarded as canonical, I examine in detail a notion of canonical change that is implicit to Adorno's and Walter Benjamin's theories of art. Essentially, the image of configurations, or "constellations," may be taken as a metaphor for canon formation itself. The attempt to read the aesthetic content of canonical works against the grain of critical orthodoxy or empirical sociology, with particular reference to class, capitalism, and materialism, is hardly unique to critical theory. However, its distinctive conception of history and modernity— and how they are inscribed in individual works of art—sets critical theory apart from other schools of interpretation, including those that appear on the surface to be quite similar, such as traditional Marxist or socialist literary criticism. It is hoped that this half of the book will also help to distinguish it further. Aesthetic Autonomy and Radical Critique A founding claim of critical theory is that society is increasingly administered in such a way as to compel social and intellectual conformity in every sphere of life.1 Modem advances in the industrial reproduction of culture are seen as wielding tremendous influence on consciousness and effectively accommodating opposition to the status quo. 2 The critique, or "refusal," of modern capitalistic industrial society is therefore taken as a form of resistance. Critical theory locates one avenue of potential resistance in the work of art, although without harboring any delusions about its actual impact in the face of such a totalizing society. Because canonical works of art are those that have become culturally institutionalized, as explained in the preceding chapter, and especially because they are being forced to fit into a "mosaic" of cultural diversity, as seen in Chapter 2, they are no more exempt from accommodation and administration than
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any other aspect of culture. In that case, what Marcuse writes of culture in general could be applied to the literary canon today: "The absorbent power of society depletes the artistic dimension by assimilating its antagonistic contents. In the realm of culture, the new totalitarianism manifests itself precisely in a harmonizing pluralism, where the most contradictory works and truths peacefully coexist in indifference." 3 To the extent that they are autonomous, however, works of art also provide a critique of the society that would absorb them. In his posthumous book, Aesthetic Theory, Adorno traces aesthetic autonomy as historically derived from art's partial liberation from its earlier cultic functions, which coincided with the emancipation of rational thought from the superstitions of the mythical world during the European Enlightenment. Because the concept of autonomy is a function of "the bourgeois consciousness of freedom," its social origins are based on class relations. 4 The historical development of art beyond religious iconography and the imitation of nature, for example, depended on three factors: the relative autonomy of the artist from the burden of common wage-labor, which expanded his or her creative potential; the imaginative, non-conformist perspective on the world that such independence affords; and the peculiar space occupied by the artwork in cultural institutions, which in turn allows the exceptional interpretative latitude that commentators have traditionally ascribed to art. However, to the extent that artworks are granted a special status as "Art," autonomy has also contributed to their fetish character, an irrational devotion that has supplied opponents of the Western canon with no shortage of reasons to denounce it. Due to its social quality, its dependence on the division of labor, and the fetish character of its objects, aesthetic autonomy is never "pure" or fully realized. Indeed, the autonomy of art in modernity is partly owing to the commodification of culture in general because cultural artifacts are treated, exchanged, and consumed as products not unlike those of modern industry, as Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital suggests. In Adorno's aesthetic theory, "the absolute artwork converges with the absolute commodity." Therefore, even autonomous works cannot be wholly free from socioeconomic constraints. Art is not fully autonomous because "absolute freedom in art" contradicts "the perennial unfreedom of the social whole." Because art is always socially produced, its distance from society can only ever be partial. Nevertheless, a degree of autonomy from immediate social interests remains, albeit residually, in spite of efforts to force individual works into various political roles, whether conservative or liberal, reactionary or progressive. And although it is necessarily circumscribed or "shattered" as long as society itself remains unfree, artistic autonomy "remains irrevocable," an irreversible historical
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fact.5 This point is crucial to the critique of political art and its relevance to the literary canon. Apart from its social and historical origins, aesthetic autonomy is the basis for what is perhaps the most vital aspect of art to critical theory: an intrinsic opposition to a society dominated by destructive instrumental rationality and founded on pervasive social injustice. This critical perspective furnishes art with its unique cognitive content, its capacity for being a valid form of knowledge, revealing certain historical truths about the world that other forms of knowledge, such as scientific or empirical forms, either inherently cannot provide or would approach in qualitatively different ways. Because the work of art criticizes reality, it represents "negative knowledge of reality."6 As a unique form of critical insight it acquires the capacity for being true, of illuminating both the material conditions of society and its inherent contradictions. Thus, "the truth content of artworks is fused with their critical content." 7 In particular, the truth content of art combines critical knowledge of economic relations that alienate people and the products of their labor into readily transferable objects, a critique of society and the existent world at large, and even a self-reflexive critique—an attack on the work of art itself. The first is an indictment of social relations that are reduced to the status of commodity exchange in which the irreducible individtiality of artworks is violated. "On behalf of what cannot be exchanged," Adorno writes, art must "bring the exchangeable to critical self-consciousness." In other words, "artworks are plenipotentiaries of things that are no longer distorted by exchange, profit, and the false needs of a degraded humanity." 8 This theme is largely in keeping with the traditional Marxist opposition between use-value and exchange-value, wherein the latter comes to predominate especially under the socioeconomic conditions of bourgeois capitalism, although it would be inaccurate simply to equate critical theory with Marxist orthodoxy. Art stands as a critique not only of the exchange principle, but also of society per se, insofar as the latter is organized on that principle. It is "the social antithesis of society," of society in its present guise. 9 The work of art remains effectively critical because it is simultaneously social and autonomous, thoroughly implicated in the society that it criticizes. According to Adorno, "art exists in reality, has its function in it, and is also inherently mediated with reality in many ways. But nevertheless, as art, by its very concept it stands in an antithetical relationship to the status quo." Art is social by its "opposition to society," but it occupies this position only as autonomous art; "it criticizes society by merely existing." 10 This critique becomes an indictment of what passes for "reality," of the status quo mentality that naturalizes given circumstances, however unjust or inhumane: "Today the socially critical aspects of artworks
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have become opposition to empirical reality as such because the latter has become its own self-duplicating ideology, the quintessence of domination." 11 The pervasive ideology of empiricism, of taking the world as it is found—the political expression of which is evident in pragmatism and the methodological influence of which appears in sociology—requires the most emphatic critical moment, a determinate negation of all that simply exists, especially when it excludes the possibility of what does not yet exist, of what could be. The potential of negation is expressed in Adorno's aesthetic theory as the implicit Utopian quality of art: "[T]he constellation of the existing and nonexisting is the utopic figure of art." 12 The motif of Utopia in critical theory is as central as it is necessarily inexplicit. It tends to work as a counter-factual signpost, guiding thought from the actual to the possible: "[T]he fact that artworks exist signals the possibility of the nonexisting. The reality of artworks testifies to the possibility of the possible." 13 In the face of the empirical world, the very existence of art, of that which has no immediate use-value, is almost miraculous. Its very being—or, rather, continual becoming —is enough to cast a glimmer of something beyond the given, to reveal the possibility of life free from sheer necessity. Indeed, one comes to understand the most profound implications of art only by contemplating its immaterial, Utopian content: "If thought is in any way to gain a relation to art it must be on the basis that something in reality, something back of the veil spun by the interplay of institutions and false needs, objectively demands art, and that it demands an art that speaks for what the veil hides." 14 The hidden side of reality is art's promesse du bonheur, the suggestion of a world without social antagonism, material want, or prescribed needs. However, because the Utopian moment of art is manifest only in appearances, as illusion, even aesthetic freedom is not innocent of ideology: "Stendhal's dictum of art as the promesse du bonheur implies that art does its part for existence by accentuating what in it prefigures Utopia. B u t . . . because all happiness found in the status quo is ersatz and false, art must break its promise in order to stay true to it."15 Consequently, the affirmative content of art is always suspect because, by both opposing the existent and promising a glimpse of Utopia, it also threatens to deny or diminish the actuality of social injustice, providing mere "representations of fulfilment" in its stead. 16 As long as domination persists in society and nature—including the division of labor that art is dependent on—the aesthetic promise must be broken, provoking an awareness of its social guilt, an injunction against itself. This insight bears on the current situation because to affirm canonical works as essentially objects of reverence or celebration, whether for the culturally hegemonic or marginalized, is to disregard art's inherent burden, the injustices of history that are masked by hollow veneration.
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In a famous passage that is often quoted but usually taken at face value, Walter Benjamin exhumes the collusion with cruelty and oppression that lies beneath the surface of every cultural artifact, even the most esteemed works of art. To Benjamin, the "cultural treasures" of civilization, the "spoils" of history, cannot be appreciated without horror because "they owe their existence not only to the efforts of the great minds and talents who have created them, but also to the anonymous toil of their contemporaries. There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism." Moreover, "barbarism taints also the manner in which it was transmitted from one owner to another," because all works that are celebrated or affirmed from one generation to the next exist in the continuum of history that is fraught with struggle, misery, and injustice. 17 The division of labor that allows the artist the means of aesthetic production but only a tiny fraction of humanity to perceive the true social and historical import of art also prevents the vast majority from realizing their own creative potential, which is likewise attenuated by the division of labor. It blocks an understanding of why the very production of art expresses something more than mere social privilege. Critics who would use Benjamin's insight as a slogan with which to dislodge canonical literature from its pedestal fail to realize that it censures not merely canonical "treasures" but any and all cultural artifacts that are idolized, whether paraded as ensigns of a unique social identity and cultural heritage or revered as fixed landmarks of a universal and immutable tradition. Nor is Benjamin's concept of "civilization" to be taken ironically, as if to connote only Western, white patriarchy and its canon, as either feminists or postcolonial theorists might argue. Instead, it broadly designates all hitherto existing societies and cultures, each of which has been constitutively hierarchical and socially oppressive. When canonical works are discounted by exposing their explicit or implicit prejudices—whether misogyny in Milton's work, phallocentrism in Lawrence's, or elitism in Eliot's—the wider social implications of their very standing as canonical literature are reduced for the sake of isolating individual ideological components. 18 But the social stratification to which the stature of canonical works points can itself lapse into uncritical affirmation if it is emphasized at the cost of their negative, critical content. Like certain vulgar Marxists, Benjamin could be accused of sentimentalizing the "struggling, oppressed class" as the true "depository of historical knowledge." 19 In contrast, Adorno is more cautious of the possibility that "sympathy with the degraded will reverse into concurrence with degradation," especially if, in the name of faithfully registering social inequality, tine promise of artworks is forgotten and the existing antagonistic world is inadvertently validated, in spite of intentions to the contrary.
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Art that makes social injustice its explicit subject matter risks trivializing real human suffering for the sake of aesthetic expression. That is why "the artwork is not only an echo of suffering, it diminishes it," too. 20 If the ideological characteristics of art are recalled, then the inescapable culpability of art becomes clearer. Owing to the division of labor, artistic production achieves a measure of autonomy, but it also reinforces that division. Autonomy enables a critical perspective on the social totality, but it also relies on a notion of freedom derived from bourgeois individualism. Although art's Utopian content preserves the promise of social transformation, it also jeopardizes consciousness of injustice if it merely sympathizes with the victims, rather than denouncing the source of their suffering. So thoroughly does critical theory expose any vestige of ideology that it even challenges the idea that art can be understood in purely aesthetic terms, without constant awareness of its social situation and collusion with injustice. The maxim that "art perceived strictly aesthetically is art aesthetically misperceived" implies much more than a simple amendment to the "disinterestedness" of Kant's Critique of Judgement, the nineteenth-century attitude of 1'art pour I'art, or sociology's latter-day critique of the "pure gaze." The actuality of a purely aesthetic understanding, like that of an ideologically untainted work, is precisely what the social debt and guilt of art necessarily refutes.21 The aesthetic thus occupies an extraordinarily delicate position: "If art cedes its autonomy, it delivers itself over to the machinations of the status quo; if art remains strictly for-itself, it nonetheless submits to integration as one harmless domain among others." 2 2 Whether social or autonomous, ideological or pure, celebrated or condemned, artworks are in constant danger of being politically accommodated and aesthetically neutralized, thereby losing what may be their greatest critical import. Both critics of and apologists for the literary canon underestimate the depth of this predicament. When liberal critics dissolve the autonomy of art within society so as to expose and denounce the ideological complicity and elitism of the canon, they sacrifice the radically critical perspective that artworks afford only to the extent that they are autonomous. A critique of the social totality—the whole stratified social order and its economic rationale—is abandoned in favor of showing how individual social groups have been inadequately represented in literary history and school curricula. Of course, such omissions are taken as symbolic of the wider lack of representation in society at large, within all its institutions, but the specific arguments for opening the canon, as reviewed in Chapter 2, have not been made in tandem with a critique of the division of labor that permeates society on every level and that is a condition for the production of art itself, including that of women, homosexuals, and ethnic minorities. Alternatively, when the Western canon is justified on the tra-
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ditional grounds of exemplary aesthetic value or cultural enlightenment, the inescapable social guilt of art is simply ignored, if not denied. The shortcomings of these positions may be clarified with reference to a key concept of critical theory: the relation of the universal and the particular. All artworks involve a dialectic through which "the particular becomes universal." Indeed, "the dialectical postulate that the particular is the universal has its model in art." 23 A work affords critical insight when it is understood within the totality of its social and historical situation, "in and through all its mediations, not in its individual intentions." 24 Tracing the particular characteristics of any distinctive work— the unique aspects of its form and content, the materials and techniques of its construction—is the means by which interpretation yields "theoretical insight," or the "good universality that does not leave the particular out but rather preserves it."25 For example, the objective, social content of lyric poetry—along with the novel, perhaps the bourgeois literary genre par excellence—is discerned through its most subjective, idiosyncratic qualities: "even the solitariness of lyrical language itself is prescribed by an individualistic and ultimately atomistic society." Therefore, "reflection on the work of art is justified in inquiring, and obligated to inquire concretely into its social content." 26 Analogously, the sense of isolation in Dostoevsky's work, or the solipsism of Proust's, is "socially mediated and essentially historical in substance." 27 In critical aesthetic theory, literature is limited neither to its overtly social subject matter nor to the individual interests or conscious intentions of its authors. Instead, critical theory perceives that "the entirety of society, conceived as an internally contradictory unity," is manifest in every work, in both its formal features and the social conditions of its production. 28 Artworks, no matter how unique, necessarily possess elements of social universality, but an effective critique will also construe the truth content of a work's particularity, its most singular characteristics. Indeed, in Adorno's words, "the principium individuationis, . .. which implies the need for the aesthetically particular," is "universal as a principle in its own right." 29 Conversely, the universal qualities that disclose the objective totality of social and historical mediation are realized "only in and through particular situations in their finiteness and fallibility." 30 In short, every work must be interpreted individually rather than having preconceived, abstract theoretical schema or predetermined political applications forced on it from without. Despite the dialectical relationship of the universal and the particular in every work of art, their unity is abrogated and necessarily "fails" as long as society remains socially divided against itself.31 In this context, the claim that canonical works such as Shakespeare's tragedies are simply "universal" is false to the extent that it glosses over peculiar elements
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that contradict that claim, including the social caste of characters within them or the very language in which they are written. Imposing an artificial universality on canonical works of art ends up serving only the ideological interests of the claimants. The opposite extreme, however, is no better. "Particularity in the bad sense," which emphasizes "the antagonistic interests of individuals," is evident today in the assumption that certain works can only or primarily represent specific social groups, such as women, African Americans, or European males. If the culturally specific elements of artworks are emphasized at the expense of their universal social content, that assumption is equally ideological. 32 As shown in Chapter 2, the emphasis on interest group politics, although confirming certain objective social divisions like racial or gender differences, inadvertently legitimizes other social divisions, such as class hierarchy and the division of labor on which it is based. Although "artworks are, a priori, socially culpable," Adorno suggests that "each one that deserves its name seeks to expiate this guilt." To do so, works of art bear witness to human misery and social injustice. Suffering, not celebration, is the "humane content" of art. 33 Like Benjamin's "angel of history," art cannot look forward without glancing back. "The reality of artworks testifies to the possibility of the possible," but at the same time, "the object of art's longing, the reality of what is not, is metamorphosed in art as remembrance." 34 hi distinctive ways that vary from work to work according to specific content, true art embodies the "remembrance of accumulated horror," the historical memory of "accumulated suffering"—not of one or another individual social group, but of humanity as a fragmented whole. 35 If the promesse du bonheur implies that "art does its part for existence," then remembrance of injustice is part of the debt to history which, along with the current productive capacity, is the basis of Utopian promise. 36 Benjamin implicitly qualifies Utopian aspirations that are without this sense of debt: "Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim. That claim cannot be settled cheaply." 37 As Habermas writes of Benjamin's conception of history: To all past epochs he ascribes a horizon of unfulfilled expectations, and to the future-oriented present he assigns the task of experiencing a corresponding past through remembering . . . [Ejach respective present generation bears the responsibility not only for the fate of future generations but also for the innocently suffered fate of past generations. 38
The obligation to the past, hope for the future, and critical demands on the present cannot be forgotten in striving for a truly rational and qualitatively just, as opposed to formally equal, society. Ultimately, the debt to all
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those who have suffered can only be paid by a reconciled future, in which all irrational and arbitrary social antagonisms, not only a select few, would be overcome and humanity would become truly emancipated. Adorno suggests that a liberated, reconciled humanity may someday be able to devote itself to the art of the past without guilt and thus "make amends to the dead." 39 The intention, of course, is radically Utopian. Like works of art themselves, the critical theory of art will indict reality, or the current form of society, until art's promise is fulfilled, for "the idea of art's implacable efforts has reconciliation as its end." 40 However, although art clings to the promise of reconciliation even "in the midst of the unreconciled," Adorno maintains that, for the sake of reconciliation, "authentic works must blot out every trace of reconciliation in memory."41 Like the promesse du bonheur that is broken by the continuing reality of barbarism and universal injustice, the reconciliation of irrational social antagonisms is impossible as long as current social relations and material conditions persist as they are, for "erecting truth directly amid the general untruth . . . perverts the former into the latter."42 Only when economic exploitation, the division of labor, and the domination of instrumental rationality and its ideology of pragmatism are vanquished might true social reconciliation transpire. Only then would art cease to be fetishized as inertly canonical, idealistically revered, appropriated as a pedagogical tool, or employed as a useful pawn of cultural politics. To anticipate an objection, it could be argued that the literature of historically marginalized groups, perhaps even more than that traditionally regarded as canonical, does indeed raise the specter of guilt, indict unjust social relations, and attempt to record and redeem the historical suffering of generations past, often even making these its explicit subject matter. In spite of the best intentions, however, this argument is potentially ideological itself, as explained below. The Dialectic of Aesthetics and Politics Because historical injustice is constitutive of true works of art, the plaintiffs against the Western canon seem to be justified in wanting it opened to those that have been marginalized, whether out of historical neglect or active prejudice. Although scrutinized in methodological terms in Part 1, the political justifications for inclusion of marginalized works have yet to be examined from the perspective of critical theory. First, it must be understood that the cognitive truth content of artworks, like the utopic figure of art, is manifest only indirectly and abstractly, an enigma that demands critical, philosophical interpretation to bring it to light.43 Critical theory attempts to preserve non-identity, or true particularity, in the face of empirical identity tliinking that conforms to the practical needs of an
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administered society and that simultaneously mystifies and legitimizes prevailing socioeconomic conditions. Art's own critique of these conditions is emphatically negative: "To survive reality at its most extreme and grim, artworks that do not want to sell themselves as consolation must equate themselves with that reality." 41 Indeed, this is the historical essence of aesthetic modernism and of any work that would remain critically distinctive in modernity: "[A]rt is modern art through mimesis of the hardened and alienated; only thereby, and not by the refusal of a mute reality, does art become eloquent." 43 To appreciate the relevance of critical theory to the contemporary literary canon debate, it is imperative to understand the concept of modernity as a qualitative, not a chronological, category.16 Dialectical materialism recognizes an historical differential between the general forces of production and the development of the cultural "superstructure" (to use the conventional terminology), insofar as the latter remains relatively autonomous of its material and economic "base." hi Marx's famous observation, "certain periods of the highest development of art stand in no direct connection to the general development of society, or to the material basis and skeleton structure of its organization." 47 In other words, the most modern or advanced works of art are those that transcend the routine modes and materials of production, whose aesthetic form is distinct from more common forms, either at the time of their inception or in periods thereafter. It is therefore not anachronistic to detect modern traits in pre-modern or classical art, just as modern works are likely to bear certain "classical" traits, because they are historically entwined. According to Simon Jarvis, in Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment the terms ancient and modern "do not designate given and radically separate categories, but are concepts which each rely on their counterpart if they are to have any meaning at all." 48 It is because of this that Adorno and Horkheimer are able to read the instrumental rationality of the modern bourgeoisie out of the ancient canonical myth of Odysseus. Another example is Adomo's assessment of Friedrich Holderlin's poetry as prototypically modern, despite being written in the early nineteenth century. 19 The interrelation of the modern and the ancient, the relevant and the outmoded, is thus the basis of art's unfolding truth content. It may also be the hidden rationale of canon formation in general (see below). Contrary to a widespread misconception, then, critical theory is not solely concerned with "modernist" works as such but with artistic forms of the past that must be read from the standpoint of modernity. As Peter Burger has remarked of Adomo's aesthetic theory, "the art of the past can be understood only in the light of modern art." 50 Because they continue to be reproduced in different forms and rewritten into the present, canonical works are especially affected by the dialectic of history in which past
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and present converge. With the material transformations of artistic technique, the history of artistic forms has been irrevocably affected, as evidenced, for example, by the impact of atonal composition in Western music, Cubism in painting, and the "stream of consciousness" technique in the modern novel. The obvious multicultural objection—that these forms are characteristic only of Western art, unique to Europe, the United States, and their environs—is true only to the extent that "Western" technology, institutions, economic systems, means of production, and forms of rationality have not permeated the globe, colonizing in varying degrees even those cultures that had once been remote. In ways that are distinct in every case, the most resonant art necessarily bears modern characteristics. Indirectness and mediation, negativity and fragmentation, as well as abstractness, dissonance, and difficulty have all become the marks of art in modernity, the source of its secularized, enigmatic quality. The collocation of any of these within individual works betrays the crisis of meaning of art in general, its evasion of simple or direct content, which is why authentic works of art cannot be "boiled down to some unmistakable 'message'." 51 Artworks are akin to riddles because their meaning is blocked, because they stand at a distance from the reality they signify, providing at best only non-discursive "answers" or promises as to their meaning or purpose. The negative, abstract, and fragmentary forms are repercussions of the socially mediated and cornmodified character of art, the last refuge of autonomy when culture itself has become thoroughly absorbed by a capitalism based less on a nominally "free market" than on global monopolization and the homogenizing principle of exchange. "Asociality" becomes the social legitimation of art because in a pragmatic, administered society, art "embodies what does not allow itself to be managed and what total management suppresses." 52 This is the basis of Adorno's critique of committed, or explicitly political, art, a critique that hinges on the idea of art without immediate social or political functions. In The Critique of Judgement, Kant proposes that true judgments of taste, and specifically aesthetic judgments, are "disinterested." Adorno both extends and refutes this claim by arguing on the contrary that aesthetic judgments are inevitably interested, even if only obliquely. Works of art are "purposeless" because they endeavor to fall "outside the means-ends relation of empirical reality." If culture and its products are dominated by commodity exchange and judged on the grounds of their social utility— that is, justified in pragmatic terms—then the critical truth content of art will reside precisely in its uselessness: "[T]he function of art in the totallyfunctional world is its functionlessness." 53 In other words, art criticizes society not by active intervention but by merely existing. Easily mistaken for complacency, this is, rather, a silent protest, "an apolitical stance that
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is in fact highly political," especially in the noisy arena of cultural politics, where artworks are ratified in the name of vested interests and claimed to serve individual social groups. Through its functionless presence, its dissociation from immediacy, and its refusal of practical utility, "the unqualified autonomy of works that refrain from adaptation to the market involuntarily becomes an attack," a critique of the totality of social relations that involves much more than social identity and its representation. 5 ' Of course, like the inevitably partial character of aesthetic autonomy, the purely functionless artwork is at best an ideal, because it is always already infused with social content. Nevertheless, the concept of the uselessness of art preserves a fundamental critique of society, both because idealism itself provides a kind of corrective in the face of the dominant ideology of pragmatism, and because the dialectical method to which it is historically linked erodes any static distinction between theory and practice, the ideal and the real, the universal and the particular, or the functional and the functionless. 1 have already shown that the aesthetic is thoroughly mediated by the totality of social relations, the division of labor, and the principle of economic exchange. Because each and every work of art is necessarily mediated by society, the truth content of artworks cannot be immediately identified. Indeed, "thought remains faithful to the idea of immediacy only in and through what is mediated; conversely, it falls prey to the mediated as soon as it tries to grasp the unmediated directly."55 Once this is recognized, the false immediacy of being directly functional, clearly representative, or conventionally political is exposed. By its "aversion to praxis," art denounces "the narrow untruth of the practical world." Artworks that serve immediate political ends "enmesh themselves in false consciousness" as a result of oversimplification, the attempt to grasp and forcibly alter mediated reality by immediate means. 56 Hence the appeal to formal negativity, abstractness, enigmatic meaning, dissonance, and so forth, all of which signify autonomous art's circumvention of immediacy, a political gesture that is never more than insinuated but is no less significant for being so. It is on these grounds that Adorno criticizes Bertolt Brecht, whose works, he finds, verge on political dogma. Compared to those of Samuel Beckett, the ingenuousness of Brecht's dramas displays a "political naivete" that could only give relief to the capitalists whom he opposes. 57 As with crude conspiracy theories, concentrating on the failures or corruption of a few individuals tends to disguise the systematic irrationality of the whole socioeconomic order, mistaking the symptom for the disease. Brecht's plays can be taken as a paradigmatic case of putting art to practical use but by which "political reality is sold short for the sake of political commitment." 58
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These arguments need to be extended to the arguments over the literary canon, not just because many of the works championed to challenge the orthodox canon are often (although admittedly not always) conspicuously political, but because—not unlike the rationale for socialist art in the 1920s—the blatantly political and utilitarian justifications for a multicultural and socially representative canon dispense with the autonomy and functionlessness of art that is so essential to its truth content in modernity. Those justifications are founded on a pragmatic liberalism that attempts to apply direct means for direct effects (e.g., rendering the classroom syllabus or literary anthologies more socially representative so as to "counterbalance" the canon), thereby sacrificing art's detachment from the practical world, a detachment that would provide a more fundamental critique of society as a whole. Critical theory exposes the socioeconomic root of artistic production itself—the division of labor—rather than taking it for granted and focusing instead on the affirmation of social identity and difference. Moreover, the doctrine of art's immediate utilitarian application in practical politics is deeply ideological because overtly political justifications of art, no less than the explicitly political content of artworks, substantively fail even where they appear practically to succeed. The assumption this doctrine harbors is that art can "speak to human beings directly," as though the immediate could be realized directly in a world of universal mediation. But it thereby degrades word and form to a mere means, to an element in the context of the work's effect, to psychological manipulation; and it erodes the work's coherence and logic, which are no longer to develop in accordance with the law of their own truth but are to follow the line of least resistance in the consumer.59 This is why Adorno condemns literalness in art as barbaric. 60 Of course, socially committed art, as much as direct interventions to justify it, need not have anything to do with conscious intentions to become a false politics; even the anti-ideological writer with the best ends in mind still "paves the way for the degradation of his own doctrine to ideology."61 By analogy, revising the literary canon for the sake of exposing or correcting social injustice ultimately jeopardizes its own objective. Even if such revision serves ostensibly progressive ends, it nonetheless accommodates itself to the practical imperatives of the administered world. The point is that any explicitly political intent in and for art is unwittingly self-defeating for diminishing the radical potential of the aesthetic before the established order it hoped to transcend. It is a "shortcut to praxis" that leads back to where it began. 62
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The context of this last remark is an essay in which Adorno attacks "the stubborn antithesis of committed and pure art" by appealing to the example of Paul Valery, whose art criticism highlights the distinction between the apolitical content of art and its political implications. 63 Contrasting too starkly between commitment and autonomy, as between functional and functionless art, is undialectical. The dialectic of political and pure art is exemplified by the bourgeois conception of Vari pour Vart, whose pretense to absolute autonomy is ideological for presupposing that art really could be "for itself." Conversely, political works and applications thereof may well lose the radical potential of the aesthetic, even in spite of nominally critical intentions. However, since every work of art has political implications, it is able to preserve at least a glimmer of truth, if only for alluding to the possibility of a truly emancipated future. Clinging righteously to one extreme or the other is as reckless as its opposite, either for denying the implicit responsibility of uncommitted art or for neglecting the tacit irresponsibility of that which is overtly committed. This insight is not intended to repeal the necessity that art remain functionless or apolitical to the extent that it is able, for just as "the demand for complete responsibility on the part of artworks increases the burden of their guilt," so "this demand is to be set in counterpoint with the antithetical demand for irresponsibility." 64 With this dialectic in mind, the critical theory of art should not be misunderstood as idealizing aesthetic purity in the manner of reactionary critics, who often resort to the apolitical purity of art in their defense of the Western canon of "high culture." In a passage that brilliantly captures the point, Adorno writes, the ideological concern to keep culture pure obeys the wish that in the fetishized culture, and thus actually, everything remains as it was. Such indignation has much in common with the opposing position's indignation that has been standardized in the phrase about the obsolete ivory tower from which, in an age zealously proclaimed an age of mass communication, art must issue. . . . [W]hat the two basic censorial positions of bourgeois consciousness hold in common—that the artwork must not want to change the world and that it must be there for all—is a plaidoyer for the status quo; the former defends the domestic peace of artworks with the world and the latter remains vigilant that the sanctioned forms of public consciousness be maintained.65 This is precisely why both conservative-humanist and liberal-pluralist critics end up on opposite sides of the same ideological coin. Because neither challenges the economic rationale of society or the division of labor,
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the reification of consciousness or the politics of means, the dominance of pragmatism or the nationalistic uses to which the canon has been put, they both comply with the status quo—whether by passive endorsement or by minimal intervention according to accepted modes of praxis. Historical Content and Canonical Change By now it should be clear why the direct social application or celebration of works of art and literature is anathema to critical theory. As soon as traditional aspects of culture such as significant artworks of the past are "idolized as relics," Adorno suggests, "they degenerate into elements of an ideology which relishes the past so that the present will remain unaffected by it."66 The "so-called classics," or cultural canon of art and literature, "whose immortality was once rashly proclaimed," become inert when drained of their critical capacity, treated as little more than