Critique of Dialectical Reason Volume Two

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VOLUME 11 (Unfinished)

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE Edited by Arlette Elkalm-Sartre

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Translated by Quintin Hoare

VERSO London

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New York

First published as Critique de la raison diale( (ique. tOIne 11, by Editions Gallimard This edition published by Verso 1991

© Gallimard 1985 Translation © Verso 1991 All rights reserved

Verso

UK' 6 Meard Street, London WIV 3HR

USA. 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001-2291 Verso is the imprint of New Left Books

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Sartre,Jean-Paul/905-1980 Critique of dialectical reason. Vol. 2 (unfinished) The intelligibility of history 1 . �larxism. Dialectical materialism, history

I. Title

n. Elkaim-Sartre, Arlette

Ill. Hoare, Quintin IV. Critique de la raison dialectique. English 335.4112 ISBN 0-86091-311-2

US Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sartre, Jean Paul, 1905[Critique de la raison dialectique, English]

Critique of dialectical reason / Jean-Paul Sartre. p.

cm.

Translation of: Critique de la raison dialectique. Contents.

- v. 2. The intelligibility of history (unfinished)

/ edited by Arlette Elkaim-Sartre : translated by Quintin Hoare Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-86091-311-2 (v 2) I. History-Philosophy materialism.

2 Existentialism

l. Elkalm-Sartre, Arlette.

B2430.S33C713

3. Dialectical

n. Title

1990

142' 78-dc20

Typeset in Time� by Panting-Green Publishing Services, London Pr in te d in Great Britain by B iddIes Ltd

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Editor ' s Preface

IX

THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF HISTORY I Is STRUGGLE INTELLIGIBLE?

Conflict, Moment of a Total ization or Irreduc ible Rift?

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Three Factors of D ialectical In telligibility Un ity of Str.uggle as an Event Inadequacy of Analytical Study The Labour Conflict Relation , Constitutive of Human History Forma l Con tradiction in Marxist Theory

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Relation s between the Indi v idual Conflict and the Fundamental Conflicts of the S ocial Ensemble

Incarnation and Singularization Immediate Totalization: Incarnation Mediated Totalization: Singularization Impossibility of a Conceptualization of the Fight Conclusion

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17 17 22 34 45 50

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Intelligibi li ty of the Con flict w ithin a Pledged Group

51 51

Indeterm ination and Con tradiction The Common Individual Realizes the Practico -In ert as Pure Ne gative Praxis Un itv a s Me a n in g of the Antagon istic Relation Does the Victory of One Sub-Group o ver Anoth er Always Ha ve a Mea n in g? Conclusio n

73 90

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The Unresolved Struggle as Anti -Labour

95

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Are Social S trug gle s Intelligiqle? (A Hi storical Study of Sov iet S oc iety )

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58 63

118 118 121

The Three Phases of Historialization Un ifica tion by the Future From the Government of Men o ver Things to Bureaucracy: P raxis and Praxis-Process Ambigu ity of the Latent Conflict The Open Conflict, Progress towards Un ity Conclusion

124 147 166

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THE TOTALIZATION .. OF .. ENVELOPMENT IN A DIRECTORIAL SOCIETY: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DIALECTIC AND THE ANTI .. DIALECTIC

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S i ngularity and Incarnation of the Soverei gn Prax is

187

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Incarnation of the Sovereign in an Indiv idual

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Con tingency and Appropriateness of the Incarnation The Personal Equation: Ne cessity of Deviation Mean ing of D eviation: Ma n Is No t Made for Man

198 215 219

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The Totali zation-of-Envelopment, an Incarnation Incarnations

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228

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The Spiral : C ircularity and Alteration

235

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The Three Factors of Unity

246

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Obj ectiv ity and Idiosyncrasy (an Obj ecti ve Drift: Stalinist Anti -Sem iti sm)

263

Di alectical Intell igibi lity , a C i rcular S ynthe s i s of the Disorder of Order and the Order of Disorder

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Mean ing of the Total ization-of-Envelopment

281

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Being of the Total ization -of-Env elopment: H i storical Idealisms and the Situated Method

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The Being- in-itself of the Totalizatio n - of-En velopmen t Can Only Be Vainly Ain1ed At D eath, Experience of Noth ingn ess-in - itself as a Window on to Being-in - itself: History R iddled with Holes The Being - in - itself of Praxis-Process: an Exterior Lim it of In teriority and an In terior L imit of Exteriority

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302 3 09

315

SINGULARITY OF PRAXIS: DISINTEGRATION OF THE ORGANIC CYCLE AND THE ADVENT OF HISTORY

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Autonomy and Limits of Praxi s in Relation to Life

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Questioning the Category of Unity : Practical Organ i sm or First of the Machines

347

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U nity as an Inv ention

355

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Es sences as Labour and Alienation

366

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Dialecti c al Comprehen s i on , Control of Positive Reason i n the Name of the Totalizing Temporalization

369

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The Two Pra xes

381

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Conclusions : Safeguarding the Organism, an Irreducible Determination of Action

384

ApPENDIX

The His torical Event

3 97 40 1 402

Time

Progres s Progress [Abundance, Progress, Violence] The Idea and its Hi storical Action [Th e Wo rd ] Totali zation in Non-Dictatorial Soc ietie s Plan Totalization [in a Capital i s t Sy stem] Th emes [An Example of A l te rat io n and Unification by the Machine: the Appea ra n c e of Radio and Television] An Example of Unifica t i on Totalization: [the Hi story o f] Venice An Order Totalization -of-Enve I opment Is H i s tory Essential to Man? History Appeals to History Science and

417 421 425

426 428 430 431 434

437 441 44 2 446 447 450 45 3

Translator' s N ote

455

G los sary

456

Index

461

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That was the question to which Sartre intended to fi nd an answer by the end of thi s second volume of his Critique, - drafted i n 1958 b ut never fi n i shed. The plan he had in mind at the outset can be reconstructed , thanks to clues present in the exi sting tex t. It compri sed at least two major section s , one dealing w ith synchronic totali zati on , the other with diachronic total izati on . The former was to be developed through two main examples , moving from the more integrated to the less i ntegrated en semble : (1) Rus s ian society after the Revolution (directorial soc iet y); (2) the bourgeoi s democrac ies (non� di rectorial societi e s , which he al so call s ' di s united ' ) . But only the first of the se example s is fully covered in the body of the text. As for the contents of -the projected second section , it is hard to work out what they would have been . As with the examp le of bourgeoi s societie s , al l we have i s an outline in l ater notebooks ( 1 96 1 2), the s ubstance of which i s inc luded here in the Appe nd i x . However, a number of comments anticipat­ s ugge st that he taken together with these notebook s ing its thrust meant to interrogate H i story in a still broader fashion : on p . 77, for exampl e, he speaks of studying wars between nations , on p . 1 18 of world hi story , and on p.300 of comparativ e hi story . Th is would no doubt have obl i ged him to re structure h i s work , as we can verify by reading ( i n the Appendi x ) hi s drafts for a reorderin g of this kind. I have ende avoured to indicate th i s i n a number of editoria l note s . Howeve r, since the present editi on i s not a c ritic al one I have refrai ned from pronou nc i ng on any theore tical problem s pos sibly c onnec ted with the autho r ' s he sitatio ns on th i s po in t. S uch as it i s , the te xt repre sents the d i rect contin uati on of the first vol ume announced on the l atter ' s last page s and i n the Introd uction serv ing both vol umes: namel y , the progre s s i ve movement of criti cal i nvestigatio n . It takes the form of a final draft one l ast reading might simply have re moved a few �tylistic fl a w s . I n fact a rereading did take OES HISTOR Y HA VE A MEANING?

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

place , probably i n 1962, when the author began taking notes again with a v iew to continuing h i s w ork. B ut his aim then was to refresh his memory of the w hole and re fi ne certai n ideas , rather than to achieve a final form : he added a dozen or so notes, b ut m ade few correction s . The mass of h i storical , soc iol ogical and scient ific work s the author would h av e been obl iged to read ( and perhap s of specific studies he would hav e been i nduced to write) in order to complete h i s u ndertaking see , for example, h i s notes on the history of Venice ; he was al so reflecting upon Chinese history feudal France , the history of colonialism, and societie s ' without history ' was too immense for a s ingle i ndi vidual . This i s what he often said to explain h i s abandonment of the work. It mu st al so be rec alled that The Family Idiot, the third volume of which appeared only in 1 972, had been held up until the completion of Words in 1963 and required further research . The poi nt of departure for th i s second volume i s the following . S ince �

History is horn and develops in the permanent frame�v()rk of a field of tension engendered by scarcity,

reflecting upon its intelligibility involv e s first answering the preliminary question : are strug gle s intelligible ? Here again , the procedure moves from the s i mple to the complex : individual combat, struggle of s ub-groups within an organ i zed group, struggles in w hole societie s . The in itial p lan underlying the work en ables us to identify certain maj or div i s i on s and the ir s ubordinate parts . I have attempte d to translate the se into titles and sub- ti tles , i n the hope that this w ill make the book m ore m an age able and perhaps easier to read. S ince none of these can be attributed to the author, no p urpose would be served by p lacing them in brackets : indicating the fact here should be sufficient. At the end of the v olume, the re ader w il l find a gl o s sary of the main noti ons/tools u sed in the work as a whole. Asteri sked footnotes to the text are the author' s own , while my editorial notes are numbered. Arlette Elkai"m-Sartre

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The Three Factors of Dialectical Intelligibility intel l igibil ity w hether we are dealing w ith constituent Reason or constituted Reason i s defi ned through totali zation. This i s s imply prax i s achiev ing unity on the bas i s of specific c ircumstances, and in rel ation to a goal to be attained. Contradictions, v i a the praxi s of the practical organism, are defined as moments of this prax i s . They spring fro m the fact that the l abour bro ught to bear upon the practical field i s an irreversible temporalizati on . Th us any tran sformation accompli shed i n the field by action , or in action through synthetic unification of the field, must appea r as a partial devel opment of that totalization i n progres s w e might term the practical interac tion between the subject and the field in view of a future objective to be attained , a fut ure product to be reali zed . And the intelligibil i ty of thi s p artial development lies in its v ery contra­ dic tion : as a l ocal determination of the field, for example, it is endowed with l imits and its negative particularity ; as a moment of act ion , it i s the action in its entirety at thi s moment of its temporalization . In fact, its s ynchronic particul arity refers back (with or without a gap , thi s will have to be seen) to a diachronic particularizati on o f prax i s : thi s i s a totali zed total ization onl y at the ambiguous instant w hen i t i s suppres sed by being resumed in its to tal product. B ut at present (th i s functional pre sent i s defi ned not as an instant, but as a partial operation : hence , as a temporal ­ ization in progress) prax i s i s contained in its entirety, with its past and its fut ure objectiv e, in the prepara tory task that it i s accomp li s hing: i n other word s , in the total ization of the field and the ' promo tion ' of a sector or zone of that totalized unity . To that exten t, there fore, the ' pri vi leged ' sec tor i . e . that whic h i s work ed, highl ighte d as a mean s to be con­ stru cted and as a form agai nst a sy nthet ic bac kgro und is the field as a whole, viewe d as the very mean ing of its p ractic al uni ficatio n of the IALECTICAL

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BOOK

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III

moment, while at the same time it discards into the indistinctness of a background all that is not presently emphasized by work. But this discarded ensemble is also the field. Thus the emphasized sector, in its manner of being the totalization of the field, is negated by the less distinct or previously worked zones: its mere highlighting con­ stitutes them dialectically as the totality of the field that encircles it and from which it is differentiated by a kind of retraction that isolates it. In fact, temporally, the ensemble already worked or not yet worked represents against it the diachronic totalization of praxis, in so far as it already has a future and a past. This ensemble tends to negate the singularized form and reabsorb it into itself, just as this will anyway be retotalized with everything once the object is entirely manufactured. And when I say that it tends to negate it, I am referring not to some kind of Gestaltist magic, but on the contrary to the simple effective force of praxis as such. It is the living totalization which engenders and sustains tensions in the field it organizes. And it is through action itself that sector A, for example, stands opposed: (1) to other specified sectors (B, C, D, etc.), via the mediation of the totalized field; (2) to the totality in fusion of sectors B C D , as a background seeking to reabsorb the fornl it sustains; (3) to the synthesis of praxis and the field, in so far as it also appears as a particularized reality and one that is posited for itself as such; (4) to itself (since it is posited at once as the present meaning of the total­ ization and as a particular, 1imited being: in other words, a singular totality); (5) to the actual development of praxis, which must negate it and break its limits in order to transcend it. But contradictions are at the same time relations to the totalizing movement, and ultimately express only the intelligible relations of the part to the whole and between the parts themselves, in so far as they are realized in a singular temporal­ ization. This general intelligibility is in fact concretized, in our example, as comprehensibility. This means that the ensemble of these shifting oppositi ons can be decoded in the light of the projected aim and the transcended circumstances. In short, there is contradiction at each moment of action, since the latter requires at once totalization and particularization (of a sector, a state, a detail, etc.); and it is as the original structure of praxis that the contradiction is intelligible and establishes the latter's intelligibility.

Unity of Struggle

as an

Event

But if it is true that totalization, particularization and contradiction are the three factors of dialectical intelligibility, how could we conceive of a struggle between individuals or between groups being dialectically

IS STRUGGLE INTELLIGIBl E)

5

intelligible? Of course, neither Hegelian idealism nor �external' dia­ lectical doglnatism bothers about the problem. For both of these, persons and collectivities oppose one another as the partial moments of a total­ ization that produces and transcends them. But since we have renounced any a priori to situate us in History, nothing can exempt us from critical investigation: how could we assert, prior to any examination, that struggle, as a binary praxis of antagonistic reciprocity, is assimilable to a particular in other words, that it is a specific moment of a kind of contradiction totalization? For the difficulties which arise, as soon as any attempt is made to effect this assimilation without critical precautions, are evident. If contradiction is action itself as a progression through splits and as a negation of these splits in the unity of their transcendence, how can we speak of contradiction when we are confronted by {"vo actions: in other words, by two autonomous and contradictory totalizations? To be sure, we have noted that antagonistic reciprocity is a bond of immanence between epicentres, since each adversary totalizes and transcends the totalizing action of the other. I This indissolubility has sometimes been taken for a unity: thus two wrestlers rolling on the floor of the ring sometimes appear, from a distance, like a single animal with eight limbs, grappling with some unknown danger. But this is because weariness or distance causes us to lose sight of reality: actually there is, if you like, a single movement of those two bodies but this movement is the result of two conflicting enterprises. It belongs to two practical systems at the same time, but for this very reason in its concrete reality it escapes each of them (at least in part). If the plurality of epicentres is a real condition of {"vo opposed intelligibilities (inasmuch as there is a comprehensive intelligibility in each system and based on each praxis), how could there be one dialectical intelligibility of the ongoing process? There are, in fact, two ways of watching a boxing match, and two alone. The inexpert spectator will choose a favourite and adopt h is poin t of view; in other words, he will consider hinl as the subject of the fight, the other being merely a dangerous object. This is tantamount to making the duel into a hazardous but solitary activity and to totalizing the struggle Yi'ith just one of the contestants. Enthusiasts or experts, for their part, are capable of passing successively and very rapidly from one system to the other. They appreciate the blows and parries, but even should they succeed in changing system instantaneously do not totalize the two oppose d totalizations. To be sure, they do give to the fight a real unity: as they leave they say 'It was a good fight ... etc.'. But this unity is imposed from outside upon an event. In fact, in so far as boxing is a

I.

CritIque of Diale( th al

Reason, vol.l. London 1976, pp 735 ff.

BOOK III

6

sport, a job (related to other jobs . manager, trainers, seconds, referees, etc.) and a s pe c t ac l e which c o rre sponds t o certain requirements of a certain soci e t y - in so far as, within the framework of a certain economy, you c an organi ze a bout and reckon on it drawi n g numerous spectators thi s bout itse l f, as an o bj ect i v e to be attained (with all the op e ra ti o n s you may i m ag in e, from the s ig natu r e of the contract to the re nt i n g of the hall and the p u b l i city ) become s an object. And it is l ikew i se as a particular object as an event that interests o r thri l l s and w i l l actu al l y take p l ace in a real and l i m i ted time ; as a certain o ppo rtu n i ty to see this or that boxer in action, etc . that the spec t ator s will go to see the fi g ht I n p a r t i cu lar , t he y w i l l make it the aim o f sometimes difficult un d e rta k i ngs (booking s ea t s for a c hamp ionship bout, etc .), an d in some cases the means to br ing off other undertakings ( bett i ng on one of the con t e s t an ts e arn i n g money by managing a tea m of boxers, etc . ) . An obj ect for individuals, defined as a totalit y by l an g u ag e , the press a nd groups and c ollective s the organ s of information ; then later d e s i g nated (in the past) as a unity i n i ts past-be ing b y memory ('It was the day of the Carpentier Oemps ey fight) the bout, i n itself, appears as one of th o s e mathemat i ca l s y mbo ls which de signate an ensemble of o p e r at io n s to be carried o ut, and figure as such in the series of algebraic equivalences w i th ou t the mathe­ matician ' s ev er act u al l y tro ubl i n g to carry out the i ndi c a ted ope rat io n s It is an obje ct to be constituted, uti l i z ed contempl ated , de signated. In other words, it figures as such in the activ ities of othe r s But no one i s concerned to know whether thi s reality the noetic and un i fi ed c orre­ spondent of individual and collective praxis is in itself, a s an internal operation to be carried out by two i nd i v i d ua l s in a state of antagonistic re c i pro ci t y a real u n i t y or an irreducible d u al i t y For me, t he ir bout is the spectacle that will fill my ev en i ng and n ec es s ar i ly have an outcome . For each of them, i t i s his bout, h i s perhap s sole chance to win a t it l e , his attempt to defeat the other and h i s pe r so nal risk of bei ng beaten . From a certa i n p o int of view, it c an be maintained that there i s not r eal l y any problem. Nothing, in fac t, prevents a practical ensemble de p e ndi n g on the angle of v is ion and the activ ities to which it is related from presenting itse lf as a more or less determined u n it y d u a l i t y or mu lti ­ p l i c i ty It is the present action which d ec i d es whether the obj ect i v e determ ination of my practi c al field i s the valley, the meadow or the blade of g ra ss . Only we shall not consider the probl em in thi s re lati vely simple li ght . We shall concern ourselve s albe it, of cours e , admitting that the fight may e x i st d i ffe re ntly for the backers or for the b oxers w i th k no w ing whether as a struggle, as an obj ecti ve act o f rec iproca l and ne gati v e totalization , it po s se s se s the conditions for dialectical i nte l ligib i l ity -

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IS STRUGGLE INTELLIGIBLE"

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Inadequacy of Analytical Study That it i s rational i s clear. To take an example of the s ame kind but one which involves opposed armed groups , the offi cer study ing the art of war can reconstruc t all the operations of the battle s of Leipzig or Waterloo, or better still of the French Cam paign. What does he do? He reconstitutes the material ensemble ( situati on of the armies, from their rel ation to their bases to the moral e of thei r so ldiers ; geographica l configuration of the battlefield; totali zed ensemble of circ umstance s ) . Thi s mean s that he total izes successively the practic al field of two contrasting viewpoints . On the basi s of thi s , he cons iders each manoeuvre as a concerted effort to achieve full use of the gi ven circumstances and mean s in order to obtain the destruction of the adversary . He thus gr asps each one through comprehension. B ut on the basi s of this historic al hypoth e s i s (in the absence of any ev idence to th e contrary , we con sider that the general staffs are made up not of traitors or cowards or incompetents, but of offi cers investing all their professional consciousne s s and all their p atriotism in the present undertaking), he review s al l possible manoeuvre s i n the situation under consideration , in order to determine w hether the one carried out in reality was indeed the best possible one, as it should (and c laim s to) be . These possibles have never h ad any real existence, but they have been highlighted in most case s by a hundred years of di scussion in m ilit ary academie s . Each of them is the source of another battle , with perhaps another outc ome . And e ach of them must be studied at once from the viewpoint of the modification it entai led in the group under consideration and from the viewpoint of the adversary ' s possible responses . Among the latter, a di stinction will be made , moreo v er, b etween more and less l ikely reactions . It is then nec e s sary to move back to the other epicentre ' s point of vie w and to envisage its pos si bles compre­ hensively. On thi s basi s , we m ay note that the real battl e bec ome s a particular case of a complex en semble of nX possibilities s trictly linked to one another. For the officer, in fact, the problem is not hi storical but practical: he thus envi sages for a given si tuation the ense mble of pos ­ s i ble manoeuvre s (among whi ch the real manoeuvre figure s ) , and for each of the se m anoeuvres the possible ensemble of ripostes with all the consequences whi ch the latter and the former entai l for each of the armie s . Hi s adv antage over the combatants deri ves from the fact that he know s the outcome of at least o ne real ensemble of pos sibl e s , and from the fact that the documents av ai lable to h i storian s give him a far more preci se and accurate knowledge of each army than that which the enemy general staff posses sed. The l ack of inform ation , the materi al difficulties , the specific interests and the i nterplay of pas sions wh ich actual l y c onfronted the armies in their hi storical singularity are fa ctors that he

BOOK III

8

envi sage s abstractly , but th at remain extran eous t o him. The temporal necessity of mov ing imm e d i ate l y to parry the attempt by one of the enemies to turn the left flank of the other no longer exists for him, nor that of fi nding the parry i n the m i dst of ig norance and error (in other words, on the bas i s of uncertainty , partially mistaken a�sessments, etc . ). inevitabl e and, w hat is more, desirable at a A c ertain schemati zation certain j uncture in the practical trai ning , on condi tion that a return is m ade subseque ntl y to the true contingenci e s and ambig uiti e s of the c oncrete" i s enough to transform the co m prehensi ve study of the bat tle i nto a formal theory , i nto a quas i-mathem atical calc ulus of pos sible s . ultimatel y w e find a calculus of The reality of the con fl ict fades probabilities. We know , moreo ver, h o w fi ghter plane s hav e machine ­ guns desi gned to fire in the direc tion of an enemy plane ' s probabl e position at a giv en instant and to correct the i r aim automatic ally if it i s mistaken. We are back at the e xample of the c he s s game .2 We should n ot, however, imagine that we h ave remained within dialectical rational­ ity . In the first place, it is not un i ty which has repl aced the dual ity of the real combat: it is a multiplicity of re l ation s among possibles . It i s enough to introd uce a few definitions, then it wi l l be possi ble to p ut the ensembl e of the se relations into a mathematical fo rm There i s no longer either attack or rip oste , but linking of a v ari able t o a functio n , or a function to a v ariable, or of sev eral func tions among themselves. We have av oided t h e scandal of irreduc i ble antagonism , only to lapse into conditionings in e x teriority . In other word s , w e are confro nted once mo re by ana1ytic Reason . B ut in addition , even i n th is po sitiv ist treatment of the q ues t ion (any way i n dispensable from the practical point of view) , the dyad renlains i n an abstract form. I n the n atural sci ences, it is at least theoretic all y p o s s i b le to choose the i ndependent v ariable . But in the anal ytical s tudy of an antagon i stic recip roc ity , the reconstitution of the en semble of possihle reci procal de term inati ons requ ire s one to transport oneself a t e ach instant from one group of vari able s to the other. If the i s envi s aged as a group of i ndependent ensemble x, y, z Army No . 1 v ari ables at instant t , and if the variation s studied e ntai l the con seq u ence s u, �, y i n Army N o . 2, we can eval uate the backl ash only by considering the group x I Y 1, Z 1 at instant f 1 in other word s , Army No . 2 as affected as the e n sem ble of independent v ariables by the other army ' s action whose vari atio n s will entail spec ific con seq uences i n Army No . 1. Of course , th e new v alues of the se v ariab l e s , and perhaps the ir relationship .

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ell" {i que. v 0 l. 1, pp" 8 1 2 ff

IS STRUGGLE INTELLIGIBLE'}

9

to the different function s , already inc l ude the modi fi c ation s u, p, y which have been the dec i siv e fac tors in these i nternal changes. It rem ains true, howev er, that the re s u l t s o btai ned w i l l be fal si fied if any attempt is made to reduce thi s twofold s y stem of rel ations to a si ngle one . We are certai n l y a long w ay fro m what m i ght be cal led the irreduc ible s i ngularity albeit a pure m u lti­ of epicentre s . I n simple terms , the obj ec t studied p licity of exteriori ty i s such that the backlash effects of the variations upon the variables must be envi saged on the basis of the v ariables which these variations have first modified, and taking these modified v ariables as independent v ari ables . Above all , this positiv i s t schema i s an in strument of practice . It i s orientated toward s future struggles whi c h will be more co mplex since they w i ll compri se with in them selves, i n the g uise of automa tic solution s, the question s rai sed in past struggl es . B ut it has definiti v e l y abandoned al l the c harac teristic s which make up the historical reality and temporal indi vidual ity of a partic u l ar confl ict. Thi s rea lity and thi s indi v i duali ty, in the guise of negative determ inations, come to the c ombatants from a tripl e scarcity: scarcity of time, scarcity of mean s , scarcity of know l ­ edge. They are grounded upon a more fundamental scarcity , which co nditions and grounds the conflict right back to its deepest source in the opposing interests , in the violence which brings the combatants i nto confrontation ( this scarcity , v ariable in nature , concern s the material conditions of their exi stence ) . A real combatant i s a violent, pas s i onate man , sometimes desperate, so m etimes re ady to meet death, who risks all to destroy his adversary but manoeuvre s in a time measured out to him by the rhythm of the other ' s attacks (and by a hundred other factors of e very kind) ; who has at his di sposal , for e x ample, men and arms i n limited numbers (which rules out certai n operations for him); and who strugg le s i n a variable but al way s profound i gnorance (ignorance of the enemy ' s real intention s , the real relation of force s , the real position of the adversary ' s and his own reinforcements , etc . ) which oblige s him to take risks , to decide what is most like l y w i thout hav i ng the neces sary e lements for cal c u l ating thi s , and to invent manoeuvres which take several ev entualities into account (if the enem y i s disposed i n a certain manner, the operation w i ll take p l ace in s uch and such a w ay ; if it i s discovered i n the co urse of ac tion that he i s disposed otherw ise, the operation i s designed to be cap abl e of instantaneous modi fication , etc . ) . It i s th is b l ind and passionate inv entor who gamb l e s i n uncertainty while attemptin g to l i mit the risk s , and all of whose ac tion s are c onditioned by external and interiori zed sc arc ity i t i s th i s man who m we cal l a fighter. Positive l y , his reality as agent deri ves from the synthetic tran­ scendence of these negative de termin ation s . O n e decides because one is ignorant; were one to kno w . the act of' 'vt'ill would be redundant: the thin g

10

BOOK III

would be done automatically. From thi s point of view , it must be added that his fighting activity as an effort to transcend ignorance i s itself defi ned by the antagonistic separation of the two adversaries : i n so far as the other, be ing (more or l e s s) ignorant of my action , provokes my ignorance of his own, I make myself into praxis thanks to him through the transcendence of this induced and i n teri orized ignorance . And each of our antagonistic acts, if it is to be dialectically comprehensible, m u s t be able to be unders tood in its inadequacy, in its impeljection and in its mistakes, on the basis of the negative determi nati ons which it preserves as it transcends them. The historical problem i s not just to know if operation x was the best pos sible in the given hi storic al circumstanc e s , but also to know why it and could not co r re s p ond did not corre spond to the practical and total izing schema which s ummarize s it in the lessons at the War Academy. In fact, the h i storicity of an action cons ists in the fact that it is never assimilable w ithout further ado to the best pos sible solution, since the best pos s ible solution can be found only if you posse s s all the elements of the solution , all the time required to assemble them into a synthesis which transcends them , and al l the calm and objectiv ity necessary for self-critici sm. Science is a nece s sary moment of action , but action is nece s s aril y transcended ignorance since it determines itself as the far side of knowledg e . Or, if y ou prefer, kno w ing is a practical illumination of knowledge by the ignorance that envelops it, in the movement which transcends both of them tow ards a future goal . If, then, the dialectical intellig ib i l ity of the struggle must be able to exist, it is at the actual level of the concrete , when the adversarie s, dominated by their twofold reciprocal action , know and do not know what they are doing. From the standpoint of each combatant, the differ­ ence between knowledge a nd i g nor ance between their be ing-a- subject and their bei ng-an-object, between the proj ect and the execution , etc. , is much less noticeable: the action carries every thing along, rationali ze s everything. Most of the time a boxer knows what he is doing ( in so far as what he doe s is the ongoing realization of his project, and not in so far as h i s act is an event which deve lops also in the autonomy of the objective m i l ieu ) ; but he has tro uble totalizing what his adversary i s doing, he is too busy th warting the latter's tactics to be able to reconstitute his strategy (it is h i s manager and seconds who carry out thi s totalizati on on h i s behalf and communicate it to him be tween r ou nd s ) . If he is n ot too clearly dominated, he often e ven believes himself the subject of the fight and sc arcely fee l s the blow s : he is amazed to learn that he has been defeated on points . This attitude is limited, but contains its own intel­ ligibility: it i s the objective and comprehensible development of one action, on the bas is of one epicentre , in so far as the agent is really the ,

I S ST RUGGLE INTELLIGI B LE?

II

suhject of the fi ght ( si nce even dom inated he adapts to the othe r ' s tactics and in thi s way a l w ays fo i l s the latter's attempts , l imits his o w n losse s , avoids th e worst, etc .). B ut if the bout must be dial ectical ly i n te l l i gible in other words , if it must reveal itself as a unity its inte l l igibi l ity must be that of a very parti c u l ar praxi s-proces s , s i nce the proces s i s defi ned here as the deteriorati on of one praxis by the other.

The Labour Conflict Re lation, Constitutive of Human History These comments allow u s to formulate the two essential problems . The fi rst i s this : as common i ndi v iduals , indi vi duals or sub-groups if common praxis acc entuates the i r role c an be the real actualization s w ithin a group of a deve l oping contradiction . We have already shown th i s , 3 and shall soon have occasion to stress i t further. B ut , i n order to be abl e to as similate a fi ght to a contradiction and its protagoni sts to the term s of the developing contradiction, it w o u ld have to be poss ible to v iew them as th-e transitory determ inations of a l arger and deeper group, one of whose c urrent contradictions w as actual i zed by the ir confl ict. Converse ly, the group would have to retotal i ze and tran scend the ir pitiless struggle in the direc tion of a new synthetic re unific ation of its practical fi e l d and an internal reorgani zat ion of its structure s . We shall h ave to determine whether thi s c ondition c an be fulfi l led , whether it is ful fi l led sometimes or alway s , and in th e e v ent of its be ing fu lfi l led what rel ation it implies between the antagon i stic couple and the s o c ie t y which maintains and surrounds the latter. I t w i ll also be necessary to redi scover in the singul ari ty of each struggle , on the bas i s of the group in which it i s engendered , the three feature s of dialectical intelli gibil ity : total i zation , partic u l ari zation and contradiction. The other problem is that of the objective proce s s . The struggle determines events , creates obj ects, and these are its produc ts. Further­ more , in so far as i t is itsel f an event, i t m u s t be seen as its own product. B ut al l the se products are ambiguou s : in suffi c iently deve loped , in an y direction whatsoever; undeterm ined by ov erde term inati on; non-human , because too h uman . B ut these non-comprehen s ible obj ects (or obje c t s w h ich appear suc h ) are in fact the factors and conditions of their subsequent h i s tory ; they mortgage the future and infect the struggle unleashed by them with the ir own opacity their i l l-posed question s , ill­ re sol ved problems and ill -performed l iquidation. They are obj ects of every kind , and th i s i s no place to attempt a c l as s i fication . These res idues

3

Critique, vol 1, pp.S24 ff

BOOK III

12

of struggle m ay in fact be any thing , s i nc e struggle s take p l ac e on all levels at once: the strange battle of V alm y and the no le s s strange Prus sian retre at, as muc h as some un dertak ing l ik e the National sabotag e d by a c las s enemy who has not been abl e Workshops in 1848 to prevent i t entirel y. Confronted b y these objects positivist Reason is quite at its e ase, since it aims to red uce the comple x to the le ss complex and if p o s s ible to it s basic elements. It w ill suc c e s s ive l y study the initial project, the ripo ste , the riposte to the riposte; it w ill be sati s fi e d i f it can 'expl ain' each of the ch aracteri stic s of the obj e ct under study by reduc ing it to the action of one of the g rou p s or to the react ion of the enemy g ro ups At the p resent moment of our di alect ical investigation, however, w e encounter these pr oduc t s of History as instances of ap oria� for, at the same time as ap pe arin g in the guis e of re s ults of a common enterpri se, they si m u ltaneously delTIOn strate that thi s enterpri se has never e x i sted , other than as the non-human reverse side of two opp osed ac tions e ach of w hich aims to de stroy the other. In the diale c tical persp ec tive , we encounter the se objects as hum an productions endowed w i th a fut ure (the N ationa} Workshops are defi ne d on the basis of a social n eed of the moment and as the ente rpri se w hich c an s atisfy that need). Th us, in them selves, they appear as totalization s in progre s s. If we l ook more closely, h ow ever, we perceive precisely even before knowing the circumstance s of the i r creation that thi s v isible fu t ur e is already (has always been) put out of play, reduced to a mere m y st i fyin g clue or secretl y deviated . Yet the objec t i s not a trap eith er i n other w ords , a h uman and thoroughly comprehensible con structi on . For, despi te the partial alterations and cancellations, someth ing remains of th e original proj ec t and the enterpri se retai n s a confu sed effi cac y le ading to unfore seeable ,

.

-

results.

B u t herein lies the problem: if History is to talizing , the re i s total­ ization of s truggle as suc h (it doe s n o t much matter, from the formal point of vi e w we are adopti ng, w hether this struggle is an ind ividual fi ght , a war or a s oc ia l conflict). And if this to tal i t y is d i alectical l y co mp re hen s i b l e it must be po s s ibl e throu g h investigation to grasp the individuals or groups in strug g le as de .facto co l l ab or a ting in a common task. And since the task is perpetually given, in the guise of a r e sidu e of be it even the devastation of a battlefield , inasmuch a s the two s t rug g l e advers aries c an b e seen as h av i ng j o in t ly burned and ravaged the fields a nd wood� , it must be p os s i ble to grasp it a s the o bj ecti fi cat ion of a work group, formed itself by t h e two a ntagon i st i c groups. B ut it is q ui te obvious that the j oin t devastation h as not been the obj e ct of a c o nce r t e d pra x i s, and that only topological unity, for example, c an giv e the battle-­ fiel d the aspect of a sYf.,tematically razed whole. As for the National Workshops and social o bj ect s born of a struggle, you could go so far as ,

IS STR UGGLE INTELLIGI BLE')

13

to maintai n th at these are hi storic al realitie s only in so far as the y d o no t con form to any of the projects that have realize d them i n reciprocal antagon ism . The y have a k ind of genuinel y h i storical e xistence in so far as , albeit m ade by men , th e y e s c ape them ( even if, like the Convention, they are themselv es groupings) witho ut thereby fal l ing back to the l e v e l of unworked m atter� in other w ords , in so fa r as the y de vi ate from al l t h e paths people may wish to assign to them , in order to tak e an unforeseen path of their own accord and produce results impos sible to conj ecture ; in so far, finally, as overdetermination and indetermination are manife sted in t hem as the production of these non-human objects through a surplu s of h uman l abo ur, and the ir non- signification is in fac t oversignification through interpe netration of antagonistic meanings. It i s not a m atter here of alienation (although, con sidering the facts in a less schematic light, alienation i s found unde rly i ng struggl e itself, as transcended and con ­ se rve d). Nor is it e ither i n animate materiality as e x teriority or seriality whic h robs each advers ary of hi s act. I t is e ach of them who robs the othe r of his act. It is i n the rec iproc i ty of the groups alread y consti tuted against serial ity and alienation that prec i s e l y th i s new and living process, w hich is born of man yet e sc apes him, is forged . These problems are of cap ital importance . It was enough to form ulate them for us to step ac ro s s a ne w thre s hold of critical investi gation. We have , i n effect� j u st encountered H i story. Of course, it presents i tself in its most abstract form. But the pre sent diffi c u lties are, as we s hall see, of a histori c al nature ; on the basis of the se, it wi ll p erhaps be possible later to formulate the problem of History's inte lligibi lit y . The e x ample of the fight shows us, in effect, that an infinite n umber of social objects and contai n as the ir i nner structure the twofo l d of the most varied kinds n egation of themselves and of each com pon e n t by the o ther. There is thu s at le ast i.e . before any concept ion of h istoric al fac tors and motive forces one certain aporia in every social ensemble : apparent unities an d partial syntheses cove r s plits of every kind and every si ze . Soc iety, from afar, seems to stand unaided� from close to, it is riddled with holes. Unle ss the hol es themselve s are, in some way, the appearance and th e tota l i zation is the unity. On the other h an d , however , we already know that confl i c t s and soc i a l strugg l e s as m uch as individual battles are all c onditioned by scarc i ty: neg ation of man b y the Earth being interiorized as a negation of man by man . Th us do w e begin to understand the importance of those fi rst experienc es wh ich are, in any case, so common th a t they have been reduced for eve ryone to th e level of mere dete rm inat ion s of lan g u age . At the t i me of study ing the i nte l lig i bility of struggles , i t i� as well to recal l that at all events struggles are never and n owhere accident� of h uman history . They pre c isely represent the manne r in which lnen live scarcity i n the i r perpetual movement to tran scend i t.

BO O K I II

14

of men with one another. We thereby signal a fundamen tal bond be t w een man and himself, through the interiori zation of man ' s re l ati on to the non-h um an objec t . The practical and technical re l at io n of m an t o t h e Univ erse as a fi e ld of s c arc i ty i s tr an sformed i n an d t h r o u gh w o rk ; and these tran sformations are nece s s ar i l y i nteriori zed ( alienation) as o bj e c t i v e tran sformations of i nterhuman re lati o n s , i n s o far as they expre ss scarcity. A s l o n g as as man ' s new re lation to t h e U ni verse h a s not re p l aced abundance scarc ity , the d i s p l acements of sc arc ity ( sc arc i ty of the prod u c t be c o min g s c arc i t y of t h e too l or sc arc ity o f man , e tc . ) are i n teri ori zed and tran ­ scended as displacements o f h u ma n s t rugg les . A l t h o u gh i t i s c l a s ses w h i c h thro u g h their oppo s i t i o n c reate s trugg l e , i t i s th e perm ane nt e x i st e nc e of the s e s tr u g g l e s wh ich c reates cl a s s e s a t a c e rt a i n l e v e l of the tec h n i c a l de v e l o p me n t o f prod u c t i on . Th e i nce st t abo o as Lev i - Stra u s s has shown u s , p re s e n t s i t se l f a s a c on fl i ct re fu s ed by a me d i a ted re c i p r o c i t y ( tho u g h it rem ai ns al ways poss i bl e ) ; O f , i f you p r e fe r as perh ap s the s i m p l e s t c u l t u ra l a ttempt to c orrect cha n c e b y a r e d i s t ribu t ion of certain good s . I n the s e c l as s l ess and someti m es h i s tory l e s s s oc i e t i e s , c onfl icts sometim es av oi ded by r i g o rous systems of med i ation s/compen sations rem a i n p r e s e n t as a s p e c i a l ten s i on in the group in question . For exampl e , American soc iologists hav e cl ea r ly shown how , i n c ertain group s, the by m aking the y o u n g b e a r the ful l e l ders ' monopol i zation of w o m en w e i g h t of sc a rc i t y determines a latent con fl ict between the generati on s . The institution s prevent thi s confl i c t from oc c u rr i ng as a rea l i ty , as a v i sibl e spl itting of soc iety into an t ag o n i s t i c generations . B ut it i s e x ­ pre ssed b y a mal aise of the en t ire s o c i e t y , wh ich a p p e a rs i n t h e re l ati on­ ship of young m en to o l d , of yo ung men to wome n , o f old men to women or women to o l d m e n and b e t w e e n y o u ng men . B u t at the s a m e time as w e grasp the twofo l d lahour cOf�flict re l a t i o n as c o n s t i t u t i v e of h uman h i s t ory , we must recogn i ze th at o u r h i s tory i s a singular case a m o n g a l l p o s s i b l e h i s to ri e s , and th at h i s tory i s a part i c u l ar re l a t io n a n d a p a rt i c u l a r c as e of t h e s y s te m s o f p o s s i b l e re l a t i on s w i t h i n practical m u l t i p l ic iti e s . Rec i proc i ty , for e x a m pl e i n s o far a s i t i s abl e a i s a v a l i d re l a ti on fo r a 1 1 p ra c t ic a l priori to be negati ve o r p o s i t i v e ensem bles . B u t i t i s not demon s trab 1 e a p r i o r i th at t h e w h o l e p ra c t i c al en semble m u s t s e c rete a h i s tory , nor e v e n that a] 1 p o s s i b l e h i stori e s m u s t Or, i f you prefer, struggle i s sc arc ity as

a re lat i o n s h ip

,

,

-

,

be cond i t i on e d by scarc i ty . The pre c e d i ng c o n s i derat i o n s are of i n te re s t

on l y i n so fa r a� they c l a i m to be l i m i tat i v e : th e y are u s e fu l to u s s i m p l y t o m ark the b o u n dari e s of o u r k n o w l ed g e and our a s s e rt i o n s . F or us� th e p rob l e m of the i n te l l i g i b i l i t y ri v e n

soc i e t i e s

c l ai m i n g

to

them se l v e s

of

i s fu n dam e n ta l .

the tran s form at i on s u n der w ay w i th i n For a theory

of prac t i c al

e n semb l e s

be u n i v e r s a l , h o w e v e r , the d e v e l opm e n t s e n v i s ag e d p re s e n t w i th a l l t h e c on t i n g e nt r i c h n e s s of a

s i n gularity .

I f one

I S S T R U G G L E I N T EL L I G I B L E?

15

wished to make struggle into a uni versal struct ure of all hi stories, it would be nece s s ary to prove that the only ori ginal re lation between practical organisms and the outs ide world which nourishes and maintain s them must be sc arcity . A l l we can say i s that thi s demonstration is not pos s ible today . However it may be , study of the intellig ibility of antagonistic rec iproc i ties (and, as a consequenc e , of human history) remains with i n the formal frame work of o ur critical investigation . A priori , thi s negative poss ible pre sents as much interest as its opposite . At thi s leve l, we can at once grasp the link between thi s intelligibility and that of the historic al proce s s . In the framework of scarc ity , c onstitutive rel ations are fundamentally antagonistic. If one cons iders their temporal development, they m an ifest themselves i n the form of the ev ent c onstituted by struggl e . B ut the latter even if, from a c ertain viewpoint, it must be possible to consider it as a unity engenders products which w i ll become the material c irc um stance s that other generation s thrown into other confl icts will have to transcend. What is more , in so far a s it outflanks each of its adversaries, it engenders itself as its own proce s s . We see thi s rigorously human e v ent, being produced beyond every prax i s as indetermination and overdetermination of its products and itself by practical s urcharges , simultan eou sly all through and from every angle referring back to praxi s (we c an and must interpret the material circ um­ stance s which c ondition it, or which it engenders, onl y through the transcendence that preserves them and that they orientate) and at the same time outfl ankin g its adversaries and through them becoming something other than what each of them proj ects . A s must now be c lear, thi s i s the very defi nition of the historical process, in so far as it i s an ongoing temporal i zation of human history . •

Formal Contradiction in Marxist Theory The sol ution of the problem if one exists while remaining theoretic al m u st have spec ific reperc u s s ions : it i s wi thin its framework that dialectical material i sm w ill have to find the principle of its inte lligibility. For if we cons ider the Marx i st interpretati on carefully , i t m ust be acknowledged that it relate s si multaneously to two term s that seem opposed , w ithout troubling to e s tabl ish the i r compatibil ity : while presenting the clas s struggle to u s as the motor of H i story , i t sim ultaneously reveals to u s the dialecti c al development of the h i storical proces s . Th u s our formal contra­ diction rec urs in the concrete ex ami n ation of Marxi st theory and we perceive , i n fact, that M arx di d not avoid it. In other word s , i f the clas s struggle i s to be i ntelli gible to the historian ' s dialectical re ason , one and thi s comes down to m u st be able to total i ze classes in struggle

B OOK I I I

16

discovering the synthetic uni ty of a soc iety riven through and through . There can be no doubt that Marx w as aw are of the problem: certain formulae we have c i ted pre sent the capital ist process as the development of an anti soc ial force in s ocie ty . 4 On the other hand, he al ways refused . to give any real ity to the verbal enti ty people call and quite rightly society : he saw it as j ust one form of alienatio n among others . The problem thu s remains open : since the dialectical contradicti on i s immanent - in other w ord s , s ince i t i s a rift maintained and produced by the unity it i s there a unity of the differen t c lasse s which s ustai n s and rends produces thei r irreducible confl icts? We shall exam ine th i s question in the paragraphs that follow . B ut i t i s nece ssary to recal l that our e x amination appl ie s to these historical confl icts onl y as an examp le enabling u s to el ucidate the problem we have just formulate d. In other word s , Marx i sts have concerned thems e lv e s w i th the ma teria l succe s s of their hypotheses . They have verified them by applying them to the data of h istoric al i n vesti gation and seen their v al ue as deriving from the n umber of facts they enable u s to regroup and i l l umine , as w e ll as from the possibilities they di sclose to prax i s . B ut the formal problem of intelli gibility has struck them as otiose, or at any rate premature . Later on, we shall see the h i s toricity of the di alectical investigation of H i story . It was legitimate for it to impose itself through its content and develo p through practice . B ut it i s preci s ely whe n the machine seems j ammed that i t i s appropriate to 5 unrave l the formal difficulties hitherto negle cted. Marxism i s strictly t ru e if History i s total i zation . It i s n o longer true if human history i s decomposed into a p lurality of indiv idual h i s tories ; or if, at any rate , within the relation of immanence which characterizes the fight the negation of each opponent by the other i s on principle detotal izing . Of cours e , it i s neither our project here nor a concrete pos s ibil ity for us to demonstrate the plenary truth of d ialectical m aterialism (we shal l doubtless attemp t this e lsewhere , in a book dev oted to anthropology: in other word s , to the concrete as such) . 6 Our aim i s sole l y to establi sh if, in a practical en semble riven by antagoni sms ( w hether there are mu ltip le c on fli c ts or these are re duce d to a s ingle one ) , the very rifts are totali zing and entailed by the totalizing movement of the whole . B ut if we actually e stablish this ab stract prin­ as movement of H istory and historical c iple , the material i st di alectic knowledge needs only to be proved by the facts i t i llumine s , or, if you prefer, to discover itself as a fact and through other facts.

4

London 1 963 , pp . 8 5 , 1 5 8 . 5 Criti q u e , v o l . 1 , Introduc tion (especially pp 40 ff. ) ; also p 80 1 n . 6. Th i s p roj ect w as never c arri ed out . See S artre ' s interv iew on anthropol ogy fo r Th e Pro h l e m of M e t h o d ,

Ca h i e rs de p h i losop h i e ( 1 966) , i n Situations

IX,

Paris 1 9 7 2 .

•

•

•

•

•

•

Incarna tion and Singula rization real l y an ongoing p ro c es s , i t operate s e ve r y where This means both that the re i s a d i al ec t i c al meanin g w het h e r it i s p l a neta r y , or has to become of the prac tical e nsemble even i nterpl anetary and that each indiv idual event total izes in i t se l f thi s en semble i n the infinite richness of its i nd i v i dual i ty From thi s point of vie w , at an i n i t i al stage of the critic a l i n q u i ry one m i ght ask oneself whether e ac h i ndiv idual strugg l e i s not, i n itself, the totalization of al l s truggles : in critical term s , whether the c omprehen s i on of a c onflict for example , the box ing mat c h we were di s c u s s i ng does not ne c es s ar i l y refer back to the totali zi n g c omprehen s i on of the fundamental confl ict s ( scarc i t y ) c ha r ac te r iz ing the s ocial en semble that c orre s ponds to it. At thi s l evel of know ledg e , we are not yet po sing the prob l em 0f the total i zin g uni t y at the heart of the negatio n of rec iproc ity : that q ue s t i on remains unans wered. At a sub s e q u ent stage , however, the ans w er w i l l b e fac ilitate d i f a s trugg le as any o l d even t in H i story appears to u s , i n the v ery irreduc ibi lity of its protag on i sts and the rift between them, as a total i z a t ion of the en semble of contemporary irreducibi l i ties and r i fts : in other wo rd s , as thou g h each of them w ere interprete d as the presen t s i gn i ficat i on (here and now) o f all the others , pre c i sely in so far as t he moveme nt of kno w ledge in order to reveal its own me a n i n g must go i n searc h of al l the other c on fl i c ts in w h i c h i t i s totali zed. We en c oun t er here , as a c ondi t i on of i ntelli gibi l i t y , the re c ip rocity ( of parti al event s in relat ion to one anoth er and of eac h eve nt i n relat ion to the total i zatio n of all to ta l i z a ti ons ) that c harac teriz e s s ynth et i c u n i fi c a t i on Let u s c on s i d er, for example, the boxing match th at i s c urrentl y tak i n g place before our eye s . I t matters little w het h e r such and s uch a title i s at stake . or whether it is j ust an y old fi g h t between profe s s i onal s or even F

TOTA L I ZAT ION

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between am ateur s . For from the very outset we understand that the deep truth o f every i ndividual fight i s competition for title s . Of course, most boxers know thei r abi lities and limit their ambiti ons . I f the y do not know them selves, the ir m anager w il l inform them; and, ultimately , it is he who chooses to ' pu s h ' o ne of h i s proteges or decides that another i s not yet ready to make h i s debut. B ut this is not where the problem l ie s . What counts is the fact that there e x i sts a competitive hierarchy recogn ized by all (even if the v alue of the ' holder ' of such and such a title i s contested) , w hich can even legitimately be seen as an objective structure of national and international soci eties and that every fi ght takes p lace at the v ery heart of thi s hierarchy : indeed, derives its meaning from it. For inform ed spectators, it is not j ust a q uestion of seeing two men trading punc h es, or even of seeing ' good boxing ' ; it i s a question of being present at an individual epi sode of an ascent, and at a moment which m ay begi n or acce lerate a dec l ine. Ascent and decl ine have any meaning , of cours e , onl y if they are to be understood in terms of the entire hierarch y . At a certain l ev e l , no doubt for exampl e with some bouts added to the evening ' s programme as fi llers the spectator has n o illusion s . Neither of the two men now fighting will go v ery far. Neither will rise very h igh, neither w i l l fall very low . These mediocre but solid boxers who know their j ob w i l l continue indefinitely to fi ght s upporting bouts on evenings when others are playing the star rol es . B u t even this qual i fi e s the m in term s of the hierarchical e nsemble : they represent the fi rst rungs tough and almost inert of the ceaseless to- and-fro mov e ­ ment which m akes up the world of boxing . And thi s necessary to tal ­ i zation of their bout, on the basis of all the i mmediatel y preceding and immediate ly following bou ts (tho se already announce d by the pre s s ) , fi nds its concrete and retotali zing s i gnification in t he v ery place this bou t occupies on the programme . The evening i s hierarchical a twofold hierarchy : build-up to the big fi g ht after the interv al , w ind-d o wn tow ards a nd thi s hierarchy i s lived i n tension by the spectator, a final bout whose attention grow s (in principl e , of course) from one fi ght to the next . Through h i s very anticipation of this hierarchy (the boxers will be more and more ski lful) and through his more or less i mpatient expectation - sometimes , too, through the lateness of half the spectators , who arrive i n the course of the evening, and through the obj ecti ve aspect of a half­ the initial bout on the programme i s synthetically united empty h al l with the re st as the first moment of an ongoing proc e s s . And , p reci sel y because of thi s , it i s an integra l part of th e temporal i zing totali zation . In other word s , it s ign ifies the w hole evening as it i s about to unfold. This does not , of cour se, mean that it c an announce the reali ty ( i n any case often hard to forecast) of the bouts that are to fo l low; s imply that , in thi s operation w hich i s the organi zation of an eveni ng of boxing, it has its

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I S S TR U G G L E I N T E L L I G I B L E ?

totalizing rel ation as a part to the whole by virtue of the fact (impo s s ible to ignore) that i t i s the beg in n in g . Thus the diachronic synthes is ( l iving hierarc h y that gradual ly be c o mes e s tabli she d) i s at one and the same time a re al p roduct of th e synchron ic sy nthes is (the o r g a n izer s hav e c hosen the bouts on the bas i s of the hexis and re p u t at io n o f th e fi ghte r s ) and the retotaliz ing te m poralization of the synchron i c h ierarchy . The beginning of the evening i s the te mpo r al e q u i v a l e n t of the first rungs of the ladder. Spectators , org an i zer s boxers liv e this h i e r a r c h y in its unfo lding and , if the bout lends itself to this , the e v e n t appears under dual contro 1 . At the s ame time as thi s ephemeral reali ty the first bout v anishes, de term i n i ng ( w i th i ts v ery di sappearance) and c onfirm ing its immutable place in the spatia-temporal h ierarc hy , the two opponents move up, m ov e down: in short , find themselves after the fight on a different rung . ( S ometimes they move up together a drawn fight, they or down together; u sually they mov e in opposite hav e fought w ell direction s . ) The winne r , for e x ampl e , we saw mounti ng the ladder, even though he s imultaneously remained on th e fi rst rung . Th i s c ontradiction is still perfectly i ntel lig ible it s i m pl y discloses a rather more d i s tant future . The spectators ' appl ause and the judgement of the experts w i l l ensure that next time he i s given a higher billing. Conversely , what would a c ontest for the title be , if the two boxers were not already at the top of the l adder? If they were not known? If their previous fi ghts had not remained i n people ' s memori e s ? If their s uperiority was not re a l ly established by the number of opponents de fe ated and reduced to vegetating i n obscurity (the e arliest of all, moreov er, often hav ing sunk back into anonymity ) ? These two men v ery much ( seemi ng l y ) at the ir ease, who c li m b into the rin g amid the applause in their brightl y coloured robes, are in themselves ' common indiv idua l s ' : they contain within them the opponents the y h av e a l re ady defeated and, v i a thi s mediation, the entire un i v erse of box in g . In another way, you can say that the hierarchy supports them: that they are its illuminated peaks. And yet again, w h at i s te s t i fied to by the ev ening itself an d the moment of their appearance i s the fol l o w i ng The p receding bouts hav e taken p lac e the y hav e come to an end, t he y hav e d i s sol ved i nto the total p r o c e s s The ir eng ulfment in the p a s t realize s the obj ective temporalization of the champions ' h i er ar ch i c al superiority , at the same time as it refer s back , through its deepest s ignificati on , to a real and e lapsed t emp o r al i z a ti o n : that w hich is i dentified w ith the profe s sional lives o f the two contestan ts (at le ast in the i mmediat el y precedi ng years) and which , amid countle ss v ic i s si tu de s , has c au sed them to realize the synch ronic hierar c hy thems elv es in a di achro ni c move ment, by pass i ng from rung to run g , thank s to th e fights they h ave won i n other words , at one a n d t h e s a m e time by meetin g increa s ingly skilful boxers and by �

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BO O K I I I

h av ing an inc reasingly prominent b i l l i ng on programmes . Thus the move­ ment of the ev ening replic ates the mov ement of their l ive s ; and the preceding bouts reproduce the h i s tory of the ir own fi ghts , the return to obliv ion of almost all those they have defe ated . If i t i s e stab l i s hed that the fi ght, whatever it may be, i s the pre sent retotali zation of all fi ghts; if it i s clear that it can be decoded only by th em; if i t has a mean ing only i n so far as i t i s put back in the rea l perspecti v e s of contemporary box i ng (number of boxers , v alue of e ach of them, national or international importan c e of b ox in g , passion or d i s ­ affection of the spectators, etc . ) then i t w i l l easil y be understood th at boxing in its e n tire ty i s pre sent at every instant of the fi ght as a sport and as a technique , with all the h uman qual iti e s and all the materi al condition­ ing (training , phy sical condition , etc . ) th at i t demands . Th i s must be understood as m e an ing th at the spectators have come to see . and the promoters h av e taken steps ( s ucces sfu l or otherw i se) to give them s ome good boxing . And thi s mean s a fi ghting p ractice (on the part of each of the contenders) wh ic h tran scends a learned technique , ev en while real izing i t wholly at every i n stant. The movement itself w i l l be in ven tion : choice of h i tting w ith one ' s left an opponent who has dropped h i s guard , perhaps as a ru se; risks i nc urred unw i ttingl y , etc . B ut all thi s cannot e v en be attempted w ithout an ensemble of techn ical acqu i s i tions · speed, and , at a sti l l deeper l ev e l , w i thout the h abit of punch , legwork , etc . puttin g all the w eight of one ' s body into every punch w i thout losing one ' s balance. B oxing consi sts in th i s , as hexl s , as tech n iq u e and as each indiv idual ' s e v er novel inv ention . One must not, of c ourse , be fobbe d o ff w i t h mere words : there are specific boxers , trai ners and m anagers ; and the progre s s i v e i m provemen t of such an d such a boxer ' s abi l i ty to punc h or ' duck ' i s an indiv idu al event in an i nd i v i dual l ife. B ut - and we shall the se indiv i dual s , l inked in group s , through hav e to return to th i s thou s ands of enc ounters and in al l the w orld ' s l oc ation s , h av e gradually perfected tech n iq ues. These techniques h ave been un i fi ed by profe�sional s who hav e become in structors or trainers . The synthetic ensemble first bec ame the unity of tricks of the trade , te aching methods, diets, etc . , before being theorized subsequentl y (more or less) v i a the medi ation of l anguages . And t h i s practical and theoretical uni fi cation was necess itated by the very fact of the fi gh t : i n other word s � by the obl ig ation for each of the antagoni sts to fi ght the other with h i s own technique . Here , we meet agai n wh a t we were mention ing earl ier: the syntheti c uni ty of the national and international organ izations which agree to formulate the body of rules to be observed an d t o real i ze - as the un i fic at ion of a practice and a theory w h at i s often c a l led th e a rt of bo xing . The soc i al object thu s cre ated pos sesses an objective re al ity as a co n s titu ted produc t . B ut fro m th i s ang le i t has on l y an ab stract bei n g , as an en semble of pos sible

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as mean i ngs and practic e s . At the same time, howe ver, it i s »'ho le real i zed and transcended power at e v ery instant, at every moment of train i n g , at e v ery tw ist and turn of a fi gh t . At once outs ide and inside : determi nation of the body , h exis , technical e xpert i se in short, slow production of a soc i al ma n , the boxer; and , at the same ti m e , omn ipresent e nsemble of theoretico-practical meani ngs t o wh ich everyone refers s i m u ltaneous l y ( from the manager to the spectator, b y wa y of the boxers , the trainers , the seconds , e tc . ) and which i s at once the transcended, since each punch i s understood and foreseen on the basi s of th at e n semble , and tran scendence, since it env e l ops the present bout and effects the concrete totali zation of all contemporary bouts . The boxer transcends bo x i ng , and bo x i ng env elops the boxer since it itself require s that transcendence . I t i s entire l y co ntained i n th at punch; but conv erse ly that pun ch ne i ther i s , nor c an be , any th i ng other than a req u i rement of box ing . From th i s point of v ie w , it i s necessary to point out at once that the ri ft repre sented , at the bottom of th i s i mmen se pit, by the fi erce antagon i sm of the two opponents can really occ ur ( whatever i t may fi nally be in i ts fundamental intel l i g i b i l ity or unintelI i g ibility ) on ly th rough the total izing un i fi c ati on of a techni que perfected by united organi sms . To go sti l l further, their v ery enc ounter can take pl ace only on the bas i s of an agreement ( which doe s not mean that th i s agreement i s al w ay s respected ) : to accept the ru l e s , to c ontend in th e sam e art. Thus each fi ght i s al l of box ing . It may be pre sent total l y and pos i ti v ely , as when the boxers are champions and dev ote all the ir feroc ity to ' defeating on e another. Or el se the total i z ation i s effected negati v e l y : the spectators gauge the i nadequacy of the fi ghters because , in their o p eration s , far less tran scend that theoretical and they do not even rea lize p ractical experience we have termed the art of boxing. B ut thi s does not mean that box i ng , as an art, as the 'noble sport ' , doe s not hav e a presen t rea lity , in the hall and i n the rin g . Quite the reverse : i t i s w hat determ in e s the lim i ts and capac ities of the two opponents ; it i s what defines the ir their career - through the ex i gencies and future place in the hierarchy p rotests of the hal l, as reg i s tered by the promoters an d man a gers . You m ay even feel its bulky pre sence, prec isely in so far as i t domin ate s the fighters w i thout thei r bein g able to tran scen d it; i n so far as i t po s sesses them through the en semb l e of the rul e s , ri tual s and aims to w hic h they submit , w i thout thei r interiori zing i t by the i r retota l i zati on of the prac tical fi e l d . Thi s bout in which the two begi nners are embroi led, each a v i ctim at once of h i s own blunders and the other ' s , has a reality al l the more stri k i ng in that suc h domi n at i on of the l abourers by their l abour, by produc ing th e i r future before the eyes of all ( they w i l l vegetate at the foot of the l adder or ab andon the profe s s ion) , causes i t to be seen and touched as a � i gn i fi c ation and as a de sti n y . For it i s a s i g n i fi cati on , i n so

22

B OO K I I I

far as it can be manifested through determ i nat i on s of l ang uage ( ' They ' re usele s s ' , ' The y ' re clapped out ' , etc . ) ; but it i s a destiny, in s o far as thi s pre sen t dominati on of the bo xers by box ing is direc tly g rasped as pre sence of the i r future m i sfortune . Thus the boxing match appears to a ll as a s i ng l e event which e l apse s i rre v ers ibly and pits singular indiv iduals against one another and as a ll of boxing , p re sent and implic ated in th i s s ame e v ent. In e v ery fight boxing i s incarn a ted, re alized, and e lapses as it is real i zed. I n every fight it i s the re , fi xed and totalizing, as the m i lieu that produces in its e lf, l i ke a w i dening crack, th e fi ght betw e en the se two s i ngular person s . No one c an understand the enth u s i asm of the spectators and very often of the boxers themselv e s i f he doe s not recogn i ze th i s twofold dimensio n of the match, a s well as the twofold pre sence of box ing. Thi s scrap w ould be devoid of intere st if it did not to ta lize , in its concrete temporali zation , thi s fi x ed and abstract w orld which retotal i ze s it. B ut thi s totali zation would remain schematic and formal (which i s the case when a boxer and hi s sparring partner g iv e a ' demon stration ' w ithout land ing blow s) if it were not incarnated i n the s i ngularity of an ' uncertain c onte st ' : i .e . one of inexhaustible e x uberance and , at the same time , at least parti al unpredictability . However, w e c an not den y that, for most spec tators , things do no t go further. Eve ry fi ght retotal ize s box i n g and all o ther fi ghts . B ox ing (as the obj ec ti v e hierarchy and ' ranking ' of boxers) in turn retotal ize s e very fight that elapse s . B ut i t doe s not strike them a s nec e ssary to wo nder w hether these organi zed rift s in the soc i al fabric are , in themselv e s , a totali zati on of all rifts i n that s am e ' soc iety ' . Or, in other words , whe ther the soc i al ensemble i s incarnated w i th the multiplicity of its c onflic ts i n such a singu l ar temporal ization of negative rec iprocity . At least i t i s not necessary for the afi cionados : but perhap s th is i s because they are themselves the fight in progre s s . On the contrary , i n certain mil ieux hostile to v iolent sports , nothing is more commonpl ace than to pre sent box i ng as a product of ' human aggre s sion ' and as one of the factors l i able to i n c rease thi s i nnate aggre s s ivene s s . Without l i ngering over th i s ideal i st and n atural i st notion of aggre s s ion , it i s worth noting tha t the v iolence of boxers i s l i nked to ongoing c on fl i cts in two different w ay s : that i s , directly and v i a a seri e s of med i ation s .

Immediate To ta lization : Inca rna tion I n a di rect se nse, the fi ght i s a publ i c incarnation of every confl ict. I t re l ate s , w i thout an y in termediary , to the i n terhuman te n s ion produced by the i nterio r i zation of s c a r c ity It i s th i s type of rel at i o n that we m ust fi rst .

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describe . What do we see? Men gathered to w atc h a partic ular duel with e ager intere st. B ut we already know that thi s duel i s the pre sent incarnation of a certain kind of regulated v iolence called box i ng . Now the ensemble of rules and technical i mperativ e s constituting th i s ' art ' deriv e s its ori g i n from a s y s tematic and continuous perfecting of the most direct and naked v iolence : that of unarmed men making them se lves into their own weapon s of combat. All soc ial g roup s known to us today are armed however rudimentary the i r technique may be . B u t in each the possibility remai n s , for indi v i duals pitted against one another b y anger, to return to a mode of combat which seems the original struggle , although thi s cannot be proved actual l y to be the fi rst confrontation between indi v idual s located in a field of scarcity . What i s certai n i s that , in ev ery braw l , the deep source i s al w ays scarcity . It would take too long to explain here the c au sal sequence through w h ich the challenge , for in stance , i s the tran s l at­ ion of human v iol ence as i nteriori zed scarc ity . B ut it w i l l easil y be understood how v iole nce , at fi rst practical and se lf-intere sted , may be posited for i tself as d i si n tere s ted v irtue , before an audience of v iol ent men . In fac t the disintere st i s a mirage : the fi gh ters w i sh to as sert them selv e s , e arn e steem and g lory , obtain a materi al advantage . It remains the c ase that the fi ght in itself i s ' gratuitou s ' . Victory does not directly g i v e the w inner wealth or the loser ' s woman . It i s n ece s sary to i ntroduce a complex soci al w orl d of j udge s , referees and spectators . There i s reward rather than conqu est. In certain cases (in a bout where the titleholder i s defeated b y the chal lenger) the loser h as the con solation of earning m uch m ore money th an the w inner. B y cutting ev ery link with immedi ate i n tere sts , by imposing the mediation of the entire group, by making the ' purse ' into a kind of bonus for merit, and victory (e xcept in the event of a knockout) into a pondered dec i sion by competent w i tnesse s , violence lose s its e xtreme urgenc y . It sheds the s i gn i fication s , form ing an i ntegral part of it, that blur it and refer back to moti ve s . Whatever the pugnac ity and anger of our fighting cock s may be , the y are rare l y separated by hatred. The pass ionate will to w i n , the fury , spring from the function in other word s , from the v i olence to be exerted rather than the v iolence springing from the anger: j ust the oppos ite of what happens in a braw l . At the same tim e , the en semble of prec aution s taken (glove s , gumshield, box , prohibition against dangerous blow s ) and the profe s s ional technique of the combatants con tribute to reducing the d i sordered aspect normal l y pre sented by street fi ghts . For on the streets , two angry indi­ vidual s w ho h url them sel v e s at one another are of e qual strength and respect no rul e s or technique. They may be paraly sed b y their m utual ignorance, rol l on the ground , k i l l one another or barely h urt each other, as chance will have i t . It i s not so m uch naked vi olence that emerg e s as a kin d of grote sque cal amity marking man ' s limits. S o e very thing

BOOK III

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consp ire s to bl ur that first i m age of conflic t. B e s ide s , i t i s not a spectac le but a fever. The onlookers m ay e i ther separate the combatants or e l se all pitc h into one another. The moment w he n confl ict nake d, freed from al l v i si ble c on straint, s trongly delineated by knowl edge , rule s and skills i s pre sented b y itself a s a sp ectac le corre sponds , in al l c ommuni ti e s , to a v alori zing acquisition of aw arenes s . Not onl y doe s the individual grasp h i m self in h i s action s as threatened by the v iolence of counter-men , and as h av i ng to re spond by a counte r- v iole nc e; he also g i v e s a va lue to defen sive v iolence (and even to offensive v i olence, in so far as h e doe s not reject the possibi l i ty of preventi ve aggre s sion ) . In the Manichae i s m of scarc ity , v i olence i s i n and the group the serv ice of Good . it i s G ood itself. The i ndiv idual does just the s ame assimilate s h i s h um an dignity to the counter­ v iolence which m aintains it. He dign i fi e s the l atter w i th the name o f strength . The u pright man must be strong ; strength i s the proof of h i s r i ght. 7 The reason i s simple : if he i s defe ated , he i s subj e cted to the other ' s ri ght , the Manichae i s m i s reversed, the defeated Inan m u st be w rong . Thu s that which w as merely a material con ditioning, p iercin g the i ndi v idual and opposing h i m to the Other, becomes a hexis that e xerc i se mu st deve lop and that must be able to c h ange into prax i s as soon as the si tuation require s it. Thi s i s w h y whatever the weapon s , whose ori g i n i s social the indiv idual who as s ume s violence first asserts h i s strength at the l ev e l of h i s weaponless nakedne s s . We shall see that there are a hundre d , a thou sand different w a y s to real i ze oneself as strong ( i n other word s , as Good making itself terrible) ; and that these depend upon the inherent structures of the group hence, ultimately , upon the ensemble of m aterial c irc umstances and of techniques . And there i s no que stion but that, in c ommuniti e s whe re the rul i ng c l a s s i s a m i l itary ari stocracy , the noble c annot be d i stinguished from h i s weapon s; he refu se s the nakedness of the fundamental combat pre c i s e l y i n so far as thi s combat qualifi es commoners , those w ho do not have the technique and sov ere ign use of the s word. B u t thi s i s not w hat counts here . The e s sential thin g i s that , by assuming v i olence in the guise of man l y strength , the indi v idual U u st l ike the group) po sits it for himself as hi s duty (to become stronger e very day ) and h i s privileged mean s . He neces sari l y m akes it i nto an object and , pre c i se l y i n so far as his Manich ae i sm detaches it from the parti cular or collecti v e i nterests it h as to defend, a dis intere sted v irtue. The fi ght as actual rec iproc al v iol e nce i s pos ited for itself, in warlike soc ietie s , prec i se l y in so far as v i olence . a mean s in the serv ice of Good -

7 . On the e th ic s of force and on these th ree types of v i ol ence, see Cah iel s p o ur u n e mora le ( written i n 1 947 ) , Paris 1 9 8 3 , pp 1 94 ff. , 2 1 6 ff. .

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25

I S S T R U G G L E I N TELLIG I B LE?

. has to become aware of itse l f as being ultimately the negative real ization of Good its e l f (through de struction of Ev i l ) and ev entual l y posits itself as an end . It would be wrong to think that the fi ght which take s pl ace in public , and w i th no other end than to e xist p ubl icly as an absolute e v e n t , i s charged w i th representing v i olence . For i t to rep re sent v iolence , in fact, the latter would have to be imag inary . B ut it really e x i sts and may be fatal , dependi n g on the mode of combat . It w ould be wrong ev en to say that the c ombatants presen t v iolence : th e y are too bu sy fi ghting , e speci a l ly i f the struggle i s hard and ri sks becoming fatal . What is involved i s not in any sense p l ay -acting, b ut rather a pel feet rea li=ation . * I n contrast to the uncertain encounters of war, the tou rname nt w as an opportun i t y for knights to re a l i ze v i olence in its regulated purity , in the form of a ' l aboratory experiment ' . You ri sked your l ife t o take anothe r ' s, but the fi e l d was c leared o f all those foot-soldiers al w ay s ready to hamstring the horse s , of al l those arc hers and even those ot her nobl e s whose interv ention c loaked or hindered th e true unfolding of the single combat . The soc iety that pos its its vio lence as an object m u st, on pain of lapsing i nto idea li sm , reali ze it as a materi al obj ec t in other words , as a public and free event. The v iolent ' g ame ' incarna tes the type of v iolence characteri zing the soc iet y in que stion : but th i s c h aracteri stic (to which we shall return ) , which refers back to practical nl ediations , lTIUst not prevent u s from seeing th at the public combat i s an embodiment, in front of everyone, of the fun damental v iolence . For the spectators hav e an ambiguous attitude . To li sten to them, they g o to see ' fi ne sport ' , ' good box ing ' ; they go to appreciate human c ourage , ski l l , inte l l igence , etc . And th at i s tru e . B ut the se qual itie s forms of technical and moral apprec i ation would not e v en have an y meaning , i f they were not prov oked by the reali ty of a dangerous struggl e . I t i s one thing to be moved by the imaginary representation of courage in the theatre ; [quite another] 8 to di scover courage gradual l y , w ithin an event w h ich i s actual l y tak i ng place a n d whose reality strikes you first. And, p reci sely , i t i s no g am e of che s s : the spectator sees men bleed , suffer, sometime s fal l ; he sees their face s s we l l beneath the blo w s unti l they burst. Precisely because the event i s not imaginary , moreov er, the spectator does not have the mean s to remain pas s i v e . The strength of the imag inary deri v e s from the unbridgeable di stance which separate s me from it in the theatre and reduces me to i mp o te nce B ut the spectator of that p uri fied brawl i s an actor, because i t i s real l y tak i ng plac e in front .

*

I n the same sense i n wh ich people speak of

8 . The manusc ript h a s · or ' here .

a

·

pe rfect c ri me ' .

26

B OO K l l I

of h i m . He e ncourage s the box e rs or finds fault w ith them, h e shouts , h e thinks he i s m ak i n g the e vent a s it take s place . H i s v iolence is wholly present and he s trives to commun ic ate i t to the combatants, i n order to hasten the co urse of the fight. That v iolence, moreover, i s not s atis fied w ith obj ecti v e l y helping the efforts of each antagonist. It would not be v iolence \\t' ithout favourin g , without prefe rri n g , w i thout opting to be parti san . The spectator chooses h i s point of v ie w : he acc laims the fighter who i s h i s compatriot or w h o se career he ha s follo�'ed; or else he make s h i s deci sion s , i n the course of the bo ut, for specific reason s . For e x ample , he cho se the boxer from Marse ill e s becau se he led for the first two ro unds; s ubseq uentl y , h e w il l persist i n seei ng him as the winner, not refuse to see the blows taken by h i s favourite and encourage h im j ust vocal l y , but b y a kind of pass ionate, v ain effort to endow h i m with h i s own w i l l . U lti mate l y he identifies w ith him , he fi ghts through h i m . H e i s himself the i ncarnation of v iolence , sometimes to the point of hitti n g h i s neighbour: a free-for-all in the hall i s al w ay s pos s ibl e, as a normal and fore seen result of the bout. At thi s lev el , it i s i ndeed the fundame ntal v io lence that i s incarnated. Ev en i f he has s ome empirical know le dge o f boxing, the spectator cannot appreciate the blows w i thout giving them, dow n there i n the ring, through the fi st s of h i s fav ourite s . He c annot maintain h is e nthusiastic parti s an sh ip w ithout sharing the fi ghter ' s anger. A s I hav e s aid, anger i n the ' combativ e ' boxer i s aroused by the first punch, sometimes even as soon as he c l imbs into the ri ng. Th is anger i s expre ssed by the sudde n , ' me an ' n ature of his attack , and th i s v i s ible e x pression i s grasped i n so far as i t arouses the same anger in the spectator . Th i s , however, does not spri ng from dan ger or the w i l l to w i n . It i s not a struggle again s t fear. It is the incarnati on of a pre -e x i st i ng v iolence which derives originally excep t i n from the very s ituation of thi s w itne s s , and persi sts i n h i m t he moments w he n i t can exteriori ze i ts e lf a s mal ai se , nervous tension , sometimes ev e n u nhappy pas s i v i ty . I n thi s sense, the v i olence of the crowd w h ich su stai n s the boxers , which suffu se s and i nspires the m , and which the y incarnate i n the ir bout i s that engendered w i thin e ach o f i ts members by soc i a l c on straints ; by t he oppres sion they have u nder­ gone; by the ali enati on they h av e experienced; by seri al impotence; by e x ploitatio n ; b y surplus labour; and , j u st a s m uch , by ' i n ner ' or personal con fl icts which merely tran sl ate those l atent co n fl icts into the domain of the indiv idual . The two boxers g ather w ithi n themsel v e s , and re ­ exteriori ze by the punches they swap , the e nsemble of tensions and open or masked stru ggle s that characteri ze t h e re gime under which we live and hav e made u s v iolent e v en i n the least of our desire s , even i n the gentlest of our care s ses. B ut at the same time, th i s v iolence i s approved in them . Through them , th at which is morosene s s , malaise , hatred not

•

I S STR UGGLE INTELLIG IB LE?

27

daring to avow itsel f, etc . , bec ome s courage, effectiven e s s , Manichaean v i rtue of s treng th. The audience p rodu c e s the boxers : not as everyone t rie s to do · by the enc ourag e ments and criticisms it be stow s up on them , b ut material l y and in a very re al sense bec ause it fi nances the v ast operation you may call world box ing. Thus the feel i ng each spectator h as that he himse l f i s the l i v i ng stre ng th of the fi ght, and t hat he insp i re s h i s fav ouri te w ith thi s stre ngth , i s not mi staken . It tran s l ate s a pr actical truth i n to ind i v i dual attitude s , and those attitude s (e nthusi asm , scream s , w histle s , etc . ) contain th e impl icit understanding of that truth : if these witne s s e s allow the m selves to shout, to rage , to rev i le , it is heca use they have pa id. B ut , c onverse ly , the boxers inc arnate i n a re al and dated co nfl ict the fundamental v i o l ence and the right to v iolence . Thi s inc arna­ tion tran sform s the whole hal l , for the crowd takes part in i t and its vio lence i s embodied i n the boxers . The fi g h t i s ev ery where , omnipresent war whee l s about. The crowd i s a c o l l ective w h i c h finds s imultaneous l y , down there in the ring , its un ity as a group and its inn umerable rifts. A spontaneous and shifting dichotom y tran sform s each neighbour i nto h i s ne ighbour ' s advers ary or ( i f the y are bac king the same fi ghte r) i nto brethren- in-arm s . Preci sely in so far as , i n a synthetic un i fic ation , the par t i s a total­ iz ation of the w hole (or of the overal l totalization ) , incarnation is an indiv idual form of total ization. Its content i s the to tal i zed ensembl e, or the ensemble in the proce s s of be ing total ized. And by thi s we do not mean th at it i s t he symbol or expre s s i on of t he l atter, but that it realizes i tse lf in a very real an d practic al sen se as tota lity produc ing itself here and noV\'. Every box ing match i nc arnate s the whole of boxing as an inc arnation of al l fundamental violence. And one m u st be c arefu l not to confuse the differen t procedure s of comprehension. For I do not say j ust that the fi ght refers to the contemporary ensemble of boxers, their hierarchy, their ranking s and th e secre ts of their art . Nor that th i s en semble refers to the contemporary form s of violenc e , as abstract and tran scend in g s i gn i fi c ation s to which the pre sent event m ust be rel ated. On the c ontrary , I say that the fight enc lose s the fundamental viol ence within itself, as its real substance and as its practic al e fficac y . It i s directly here and every where i n the hal l . It i s the very stu ff of the movement of temporal i zati on as production of the fi ght by the spectators and as un ifi c ation (and rec iprocal confrontation) of the spec tators by t he fi ght. A nd the re ason for th i s inc arnation i s not mysteri ou s , s ince it i s the diffuse v i olence of each spectator re total izing i t s elf, on the bas i s of organi z a tions and g roups that h ave set them selves up to furn i sh it w ith opportunitie s to ret ota l i z e i tse lf. And when we i n s i st on the pre sence ' in person ' and in i ts entirety of the fundamental v iole nce, th i s must not be tak en to mean that i t doe s not e x i st e lse»'h ere ; it i � s i lnply that we find

B OO K 1 1 1

28

thi s v iolence i s always en tire w herever it e x i s t s . P o s it i v i st Reason would obv i ou s l y confi ne itself to si gnal ling a host of conflicts prov oked by different fac tors, reduc ible at be st to a c ommon denom inator. J ust bec au se of th i s , it would debar itself from understanding how a partic ular fi ght re late s both to violence and, on the other h and , also to the vast network of organizations and federation s constituting the worl d of boxing. An act of v i olence i s al way s all of v iolence, because it i s a re ­ e x teriorization of inte riori zed scarc i ty . B ut th i s scarc ity i s nev er an abstract p rinc iple , or one e xte rnal to the soc ial en semble . At ev ery i nstant, it i s a sy nthetic rel ation of al l me n to n on-human material ity and of al l men among themselves through thi s m ateri ality , inasmuch as the ensemble of techni q ue s , re lations of production and h i storical circum­ stances gives th i s relati on its determin ati on and i ts unity . Th us the interiori zati on is th at of the particula r contemporary sc arc ity as an objective re al i t y ; and the v iolence of eac h individual exi sts only as the sw irling v i olence of all , s i nce scarcity i s defi ned through i t s re l ation to the number and needs of the men wh o today consti tute the so cial e nsemble under consideration . The onen e s s of thi s v i olence does not reali ze the un i fi c ation of i ndiv iduals and groups, since on the contrary it pits them agai nst one another. In each v iolent action , however, all i n and throu gh thi s deed - of all the v iolence e x i sts as unifi c ation oppositions w hich pit all men against each other and have prov oked it. I t i s enough to see how much oppre s s ion , al ienation and mi sery the act of a drunken father who beat s a child gathers within itself, in order to understand that all the soc ial v iolence of our sy stem has made itself into that man and h i s present rage . B ut we h av e spoken of incarnation : by thi s we mean to say that totali zation i s individuated. That fundamental v iolence e xplodes here and now , but w i th all the feature s of a here a nd a now : in other words , w i th the opaque richness of the concrete and its negative determ ination s . It i s a boxer from the Nord and one from M arse illes who are up ag ainst one another in fron t of the se Pari sian s , each of whom has come to watch the fi ght as a re sult of the development of h i s h i story , which i s stri ctly personal to h i m . With its i nc idents and its acc idents , the bout defines i tself as a s ingularity and, through its singul arity , a dated even i ng, fi lled w i th unique events , hence irreducibly i n d i v i d u al , even if i t i s strikingl y c ommonpl ac e ( Nothing very m uch happened . ' ' The bout s were pretty ordinary. ' ) . Thi s fight i s all v iol ence and, at the s a me time, it is o th er, i t can e x i s t only as i ts particular determ i n ation. I s i t to be understood that the fight bears the same rel ation to th e fundamental v i ol e nce as the indiv idual has to the concep t ? No: th i s rel ation which m i ght e x i s t at the l ev e l of anal ytic Reason in fact requ ire s thre e conditions to be fu lfilled in order to estab l ish itse lf. Even i f, i n the course of o ur inve stiga'

,

I S S T R U G G L E I N T E L L I G I B L E '!

29

tio n , the concept i s di scov ered i n the indiv iduated obj ect and as an e s sential structure of the latter, i t sti ll i n fact remains transcendent to it, as an abstrac t and already given rule, which s urv ives even if the contingent and empi rical l imits of the re al ity under con sideration are caused to v an i sh. Then the relation and thi s comes back to the foregoing c ondition - i s not created by action (it i s the obj ect wh ich can be c re ated, not the rel ation to the concept or the concept itself) ; it i s an ont ological and logical relation , which can y ie ld itself only to c ontemplative reason. * Lastly , the empi ri cal fe ature s o f the object fall outside the concept and manifest themselves in relati on to it as mere acc i dents; thi s defi nes the concept as an en semble of ab str act determi n ations of the type y f(x) or s i mp li es q that c an ha ve no material reality other than as a determination of language (or a transcendence of such a determi nation as a sign ifying unity ) . Th i s obv iously implies that the en semble of determ ina­ tio ns, within the concept, i s b ound by rel ation s of exteri ority . It i s a ma tter of fe ature s or charac teri stic s which present themselves in experi­ ence simultaneo usly or acc or di ng to an inv ari able order of succession, as i s apparent when you consider the concept of swan (tran sformed by the dis covery of black swans i n Aus tralia) or that of karyokine s i s . We can better show the mean i ng o f in carnation i f we contrast it to exemplification of the concept, as well as to the c onceptual ization of experience. Thi s incarnation, i n fac t, i s never contemplati ve : it i s prax i s or praxi s -proce s s . An act of v io lence never has witnesses. Of course, the pol ice w i l l seek the testim ony of i ndi ­ or tomorrow the h i stori an vid ual s who have been pre sent at the action w i thout taking p art in it. B ut these indi vidu al s do not e x i st. A nd thi s i s e ven the reason why testimony - whatev er its sourc e may be i s , on pri ncipl e , su spect. The so-called witne s s i s a participant: he i ntervene s to stop a brawl or e l se lets it run its course out of cowardice , sadism or respect for tradition. The proof

* I do not m e a n by th i � t h at the pr act i c a l stance

sh o u l d be q u i eti sm . The c o n c e pt , o r the re l a t i on o f the obj e c t t o t h e concept , m a n i fe sts its e l f in the c o u r s e of a s c i e n t i fi c i n v e s t i g a t i o n , for i n stance , w h i c h i mp l i e s an i nterrog at i on , a p roj e c t o f fi n d i n g the a n s wer, a c o n s t ru c t i o n of e x p e r i m e n t a l m e c h a n i s m s w i th the h e l p of i n strume n t s , etc . Th i s i s w h at occ urs , for e x am p l e . when the c h e m i s t seeks to dete rm ine w hether a g i v e n body be l o n g s to a g i ven c a te gory , and i s d e fi n e d b y a g i v e n c o l l e c t i o n o f p ropert i e s . There c an e v e n be a

de c i s i on at t h e ac t u a l l e v e l of the ontol o g i co - l og i c a l relat i o n s h i p , a s w h e n t he sc i e n t i s t ( i n the c a s e o f c e rt a i n s a l t s , e , g tartrate and para-t artrate ) decides to forge t w o c la s s e s i n ord e r to �at l sfy the p r i n c i p l e s of h i s

�c i e nce , whereas

e x pe r i m e n t a l d i sc o v e ry re v e a l s on l y one

No m at t e r . T h ro u g h act i v i t i e s , g ra s p i ng the concept t h ro ugh i t s o bj e c t re m a i n s the g o a l o f a proj e c t of c o n te m p l at i o n . bec a u �e the re l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h at obj e c t an d t h at c o n c e pt e v e n i f t h e y are

cal l y

deCided - are x i \'e n , estahlish ed: i t

i t � c o n c e p t . n o r the c o n c e p t t h a t

IS

n o t the obj e c t t h a t

reali:es p rac t i ­

eali:ed pra ( rh a lly i n the obj e c t . T h l � I ne rt i a c o n � t i t u t e � the I., c l e n t i � t h i m se l f a s a d e - � i t u ated i n v e � t i g at o r . We red i sc over the ' p u re be i n g ­ a l o n g � i de . ' t h a t H e i de g ger d e fl n e l., a� a IO) c i e n t i fi c att i t u de is

I

BOOK I I I

30

i s that most legi s lative sy ste m s have laws p rov i ding for sanction s agai n st persons guilty of ' non-as s is tance ' . In a b u ildi n g where certain tenants beat their children, sometimes to death, the other tenants are neces sari l y thrown into a situation w h ic h imperatively d emand s a choice : either to inform (but what rel uctance i s felt by many of those unfortunates v ictims of society as a w h ol e , who sympath i z e on prin ciple with one of their own battering h i s chi ldren , not inasm uch as he i s a chi ldbeater but inasmuch as he is a v ictim what rel uctance to hand over a comrade to the cops ! ) or e l se to m ak e the m se l v es accom p l i ce s . In e i ther case, they dec ide together or separately on the e v e n t . I f they a l l o w them sel ves to be hus hed by a too-weighty s i lence and the victim di e s ( as has been known to happe n ) , they are themse l ve s the executioners . For the very notion of compl i c i ty, s ide tracked by analyti c Reason , supposes t he imman ­ ence of the rel ationsh i p and not i ts exteriori ty . The ac complice real ize s the act in i ts entirety by h i s own practice , and no one can say a priori if he is m ore or l e s s g ui l ty th an the i ndiv idual whose hands acc om p l i she d the crime that depen ds o n h i s s i tuation w ithin the group or collective . Hence, no witne sses to v iolence , only participants . Non-v iolence, ev en an d e spec ial ly when it i s erected into a watchw ord, i s the choice of a complicity . Generally the non-v iolent pe rson make s hi m self the accom­ pl ice of the o pp ressor : i n other words , of the i n s titution alized, normali zed v io lence that selects its v i c ti m s * The braw l i s a common event. So me produce it w i th thei r ra g e , which i s the s udden exteri orization of a v iolen c e constantly suffered and interiori zed . Others w i th their fear, which spr i n gs from an anticipation of future violence , based on th e l iving memory of pa s t v io lence . Action and knowledge are fused i n t his event, as we have alw a y s s ignalled. And that mean s , in particular, that the reali ty produced i s lived ( i n other words acted , felt, known in the in d i s so l u b i l i ty of proj ec t s ) as dialectical development and as i rre vers i b l e temporai i zation , but not contemplated. The wi sdom of prax i s i s d e fi n e d b y the l atter and confi n e s itself to i l l u m in a ti ng the l atte r ' s progre s s , w i thout any separati o n . I t i s not a matter here of comparing ac t s w i th one another, in order to de r i v e a common concept : it i s p ar t ies , organ ization s , the pre s s , t he governme nt , that can re i n te g rate th is par t i c u l a r case i nto st a ti s t i c s a n d d r a w c onc l usion s ab o u t d e l i n q uen t or b a tt ered childhood . The partic ipants are act u al l y /i\'ing an ahsolu te . A n d the real absurdity would be to i n t ro d u c e , at the level of t h e ac t , s o m e re l at i v i s m or other. D o e s any o n e i m a g i n e y o u c o u l d di e o r se l l y o ur soul for the re la ti \'e? Th e fe ar w h i ch m ak e s a m an c ow ar d l y de spi te h i m s e l f doe s anyone i m ag i n e t h i � c o u l d be an y t h i n g b u t a fe a r of th e absol u t e ? A n d m u rder? H e re , we .

-

•

-

x

Th o u gh " u b v e r� i v e a d v o c a t e � o f n o n - v i o l e n c e do e x i q ....

,

I S STR U GGLE INTELLIG I B LE?

31

find again what I said i n Being and Noth ingness: rel ativ i sm i s a hi storical attitude that can be based only on the absolute character of dai l y , 9 immediate life . I n other word s , the relative is unintelligible if, before being relativ e to other relative s , it i s not first rel ative to the absolute . B ut thi s absolute must be understood : we are not thereby referred back to so me kind of theo logical dog matism or ideal i s m . The abso l ute i s above all the difference separating l ife from death in my own case and , for me , in every other case . It i s the gap between exi stence and Nothingne s s . I t is neither life that i s an absolute for a start, nor death : but death , i nasmuch as it come s to threaten fundamentally what lives ; or l ife , in so far as it i s stripped from the real by the death that threatens i t, and in so far as it can hurl i tself of its own accord to s hatter intentionally upon the reef of death. Thereby , it i s the ensemble of i ndiv idual s and things that threaten l i fe ; it i s the ensemble of those for whom you agree to g ive it up or risk it; it is the climate of v io lence which , in the form o f confl icts or fraternity -terror, defines life as risk of death and m ortal fate , death as the non- transcendable and threate ning term of every l ife . Every v i o lence­ event i s produced , lived, refu sed, accepted as the absolute : fi rst, because it actu al i zes in the present the diffused and c onfu sed ensemble of the multip le violences that have made me fundamental ly v i olent; then , because it ari ses absol utely and in the immediate as a strugg le for l i fe (and for the Other ' s death) , revealing for all the participants that the life of each can be based on the death of another (or others). Thu s , by conflict, life reveal s itself in its precious uniquenes s , in its i rreversibility , in its fragil ity , and in its fierce assertion of itself, through the alternative : k i l l or be k i l led. It matters little that the c onfl ict i s not in itself a mortal struggle : death i s there, i n the blood that flows, as the completion that w i ll not be completed , as the future truth that w i ll not be attained and, final l y , as the deep and fundamental truth . Death, c lean a nd bare as a bone , i s pre sent in the boxing match. Not j ust because a badly or too well placed blow can k i l l . Nor even because cases of blindne s s , madne s s lo wer forms of physi cal l iquidation are very c ommon in former boxers . B u t quite s imply because the act of punching is an act that gives death (someth ing implicitly acknowledged by the existenc e of gloves and protective gear) ; because the k n ockout always ri sked, always awaited by the crowd i s a publi c real ization of death . Symbolic real iz ation? No the man c ollapses and die s , it is the end of the battle . Whether he rev i v e s in the dressi ng-room or not, the sp ectator has fol l owed through a fight to its bit ter end : i n other word s , to the ambiguo u s mom ent when its pleni tude and its d i sappearance are produced by one another and simultaneous l y .

9 . B eing and No th in!:ness, London 1 9 5 6 , pp 5 2 1 ff. , a l so Cah iers pour u n e morale, p . 4 3 7 .

BOOK III

32

B ut thi s pre s e n t death i s ne ither death i n itse lf nor the concept of death : it re al ly i s that which threaten s a given individual (the child dazed by h i s father ' s b l o w s , the boxer, etc . ) . No one among the nei ghbours or i n the audience w anders off i nto abstract cons i derations upon dea th as by tolerating a child ' s agony or by such . Each partic ipant s impl y egg ing on the boxers invo lves h imself as a m urde rer or as a batterer (as i s proved c learly enough by the shouts repeated s o often during a fight: ' K ill him ! Kil l him ! ' or ' Go after him ! Fin i s h him off! ' ) , preci sel y because he perpetually sees himself as battered or as phy sically liquidated (by forced overwork , by a poverty arti fi cially mai ntained through a social choice, by the ever possible viol ence of the ' forces of order' or, if he makes common cause with oppress ion, by the v i olent actions of a revolutionary movement) . Down there he ki l l s , he i s killed, in each antagonist, and then h i s choice ends by making him a killer via his fav ouri te and a v ictim v i a the other: at h i s own peri l , s ince a reversal of the situation i s always possible . And i n so far as the conflict being settled in the ring is s ustained by each person with the whole audience and against h i s neighbours , that which i s produced down there , h ere and ev ery w here in the hall i s throug h those individual lives the concrete totality of life , of death , of the h um an relationship of life and death . No conceptual or merely verbal s ignification : w hat makes these lives into the i ncarnation of l ife i s quite s i mply the pas sionate seriousnes s of prax i s for al l the participants ; their present inability to tear themselves away from the fight, which for the moment they put above al l e l se , albeit knowing that they have concerns of a quite other importance . I t is as though, altogether, there had never been any outs ide; as though beyond the closed doors nothing e x i s ted, neither c ity shr ouded in darkne s s nor countrys ide around the c ity ; as though the whole of h um ankind had nev er been any thing b ut that handful of men produc ing that s truggle to the death as the incarnation of their destiny ; and as tho ugh, on the contrary , two b i l l ion men remained outside , lost i n serial di spers ion and imp otence, but total ized and fused in thi s un ique and cap i tal struggle whose stake w as nothing less than the fate of human ity. * From thi s latter angle, the total ity of non-spectators is total ized by the fight itself in so far as they the m s e lves become participants , directly through the boxers and indirectly through the mediation of the spectators . And the real basi s for thi s total i zation i s the fact that commentators are already recapitulating

*

I n fac t , the b o x ing m at c h i s a hla n k Manic h aeism : e v e ry one k no w s that G oo d w i l l

t r i u m p h over Ev i l . If the fav o u r i t e k n uc k l e s u n d e r in the l a st roun d s , the s p e c t ators w i l l a b andon h i m an d be I nc a rnated i n the other. The c a se i s m Ore c o m p le x wh e n loc a l patrioti s m i s i n v o l v ed . but d e fe at , i n s p i te of e v e ryth i n g . rema i n s rec uperab l e .

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the fight for radio l i s teners while it is taklng place: the fact that tomorrow ' s press will d i s seminate the re sults everywhere . Every non-spectator i s like a paler and paler reproduction of the sole living and practic al real it y : each spec tator as a producer and s upport of the fi ght . So each spectator gathers and fuses within himself these shadow s ; he total izes and com­ a max imum pre sses the max im um amount of practice and e xperience that w i l l be decompres sed into pal e abstract knowledge and at once lose its ontological status . B ut, for thi s very reason , there can be no ontological or logi c al preci sely difference between totali zation and incarn ation , e xcept that totalization operates only through the because it is concrete and real lim itati ons it imposes. In other word s , every internal totali zation (e n ­ veloped by the overall total i zation * ) i s effected as prax i s -proce s s of incarnation ; or, c onverse l y , every practical and c oncrete reali ty has no positive content other than the total i zed ensemble of all ongoing totaI i za­ tion s . This content makes its materi al ity , governs its temporal i zation and constitutes itself throug h it. Present without distance, since it i s made by the participants and not c o ntemp lat e d b y witnes se s , i t refers to no transcendent si gnification and there are never grounds - i n the moment of producti ve prax is for referring to alien c oncepts or rules : th e event produces its own rule . I f thi s rule is the art of boxing , boxers and spectators reproduce and real i ze th is art through real combat, transcending it by every invention and every tacti cal mov e . B ut thi s in c arnate d totalization , c ommon handiwork of the partic ipants , i s neve r named or tho ught during the operation : neither as total ization (at the expense of the limitations that incarna te i t) nor as incarnation (in o ther words as a simple, partic ular e ve nt) . If you want to i m agine participants takin g these extreme positions , they mu st be prescri bed e xtreme situations . It does indeed sometimes happe n that a foreigner, taken by a friend to a sp orti ng e v ent of a violent kind , sees in it, if i t is strictly lo ca l , only totalization (or at l east the national aspect of total izati on ) . For many North American s , it i s all of Mexico ( or al l of Spain) that i s revealed without words or concepts , throug h an unease in the fi rst c orridas they are shown . I recall for my own part hav ing perceived . rightly or w rong l y , it is of l ittle consequence heaven kno w s what Cuban savagery in the cockfi ghts of Hav ana. Those c ocks epitomized men. Conversel y , after the fi ghts , the b l in d violence of th ose h umanized creature s became a despite my s e lf I decoded gri d, a synthetic schema through which •

* We do not even know yet i f th e tota l i zation-of-envelopment c an e x i st . We shall see further o n that it i s the fo undati o n of any i n te l l ig ibi l i ty of H i s tory , and w e shall perce i v e i n ca rnated likewis e . th at i t i s - albe i t i n a d i ffe rent way -

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every t hing I saw. A kind of form less trage d y , floating between my eyes and the city , c au sed me to discover the pov erty , altho ugh the direct link betwee n it and fi ghts between animals w as not apparent to m e at all . t o I n fact, even for the forei gner, total i zation doe s not refer to any idea . The Cubans ' national s port referred me to tha t beggar. And the reverse was al s o true : i l l uminated by my recent e xperience, the beggar in turn i ncarn ated Cuba and its cockfights. If, on the contrary, you seek to reduce the fi ght to its nature as a strictl y indiv idual i zed event pitting thi s indiv idual , whose c areer you know , w i th that other one , and w ith the concrete perspectives that are going to open up for them you have to take the practical v iewpoint of the promoters and managers . In that case, it w i l l be indispensable to note that reduc tion to the s ingular i s effected by the intermedi ary of a new totalization . I f the promoters do not waste their time decoding the fight as fun damen tal v iolence, it i s bec au se the se lords of the ' Noble Art ' as common ind i v i dual s of their organizations , or all -powerful sovereigns ( and thereby sti l l c ommon ) , engaged in l e s s brutal but equally v iolent competitions with oth e r sovereigns m ake themselves the spokesmen of boxing itself. I t is totali ze d by their j udgements , and this enveloping total i zation reduces the present fi ght to j u st a little local event w ithin the total w orld of boxing. I t i s reall y a matter of confirm i ng forecasts , recl ass ify ing boxers , and determ i n ing each one ' s v alue and ranking as settled in the course of the event. B oxing is expre s sed through the promoter ' s asses sments, j ust as cap i tal i sm i s through the acts and w ords of the cap itali st . And , as we shal l s ee in a moment, i n bourgeo i s democracies capitali sm itself i s expres sed throu gh boxing. It c an doubtles s be concede d that mos t spec tators osc i l late around a middling position. B ut ( un le s s they ful fi l the required conditions ) none really reaches e ither of the extreme pos i tion s . In fact , it is not even a m atter of say ing that boxing and fun damental violence are present through the contest. Thi s conte s t is , ind i s solubl y , the singular confl ict between a young boxer from Martiniqu e and a Pari sian boxer, boxing itself produced in common by all the p artic ipants , and human v iolence exploding publ i c ly .

Mediated Totalization : Singularization It follow s from thi s that the relation s h ip between the singul ar fe atures and the i nc arnated to tal can no lon g e r b e defined as that between c ontingenc i e s and the concept or e ssenc e . We have in fac t seen that , in

1 0 . Memories of

a

trip to C uba i n 1 949

I S S T R U G G L E I N T E L L I G I B L E ')

35

re lation to the abstract uni versal , ev ery spec ification i s a contingency . Analytic Reason wil l explain thi s contingen cy by exte rnal fac tors , but has forever barred itself from see i n g it as a determination engendered by the univers a l i tself, re ferri ng us back ulti matel y thi s is the paradoxical to ' encounters unintelligibi li ty at the heart of pos itiv ist intell i gibil ity between serie s ' . In order to understand fu lly the real ity of incarnation , we must ask ourselve s w h ether c hance has the same meaning for d ialec ­ tical R ea son; whether it doe s not appear as hav ing a function of i ts own and thereby an intell igibility . We shal l return to thi s . I I Attending first to what i s most urgent, howev er, w e shal l simply p onder u pon the rel ations between the sing ulariti e s of the fight and the concrete u niv ersals that it totalize s . For that, we mu st aban don the description o f immediate total ­ i zation , which has furn i shed u s with the es senti al , and approach the problem of mediated total izati on. Th i s new totalization i s effected by the same p artic ipant s , but altho u gh produced by eac h of the ir gestures and through the project of total i zing human v iolence , it i s not prod uced as a pract i c al self-aw are nes s . It is the be ing itself of al l those men that i s totalize d : it appears i n the obj ect i tself and i s the rule of i ncarnation, but thi s rule doe s n ot constitute the object of a know ledg e ; it i s the structure itself of the lived and , as such , i s defined as the obj ecti ve and (for them ) imp licit determination of the practical field. Onl y an observer rigorou sly s ituated in rel ation to the multiplicity of participants , but outside th i s , w i l l be able to di scern the ensemble of medi ati ons through which these boxers , thi s boxing, these ' organizers and these spectators have rec iproc all y produc e d o ne another. O ur aim cannot be to o utl ine here a h i storical and d ialectical i nter­ pretation of boxing. We shal l l imit ourselve s to indicating what kind of re search shou ld make it pos si ble to ascertai n the tru e limits of the p rocess of i ncarnati on . Boxin g m ade its appearance in the East only recently . It i s an induced process the re , on e that de ve lop s i n the totalizing framework of c ompeti ­ tion i n al l domains w ith the capi tal ist We st. I t was born in our bourgeoi s s ocieties and must first be studied in th i s g uise. If it i s true, moreove r, th at such societi es are d i v ided into clas ses, some exploiting and oppress ing the others , bourgeoi s boxing must be stud ied on the bas i s of the real structure s o f the exploitati ve sy stem. At thi s level , we shal l observe that boxing i s an economic enterpri se , and that its entrepreneurs re crui t its workers among the exploited on l y to subj ect them to another kind of exploi tat i on . Most boxe r s i n fact , are of work i ng-clas s ori g i n , though ,

1 I

S e e n ote 9 7

on

p . 3 3 4 be l o w , abo L ' Idiot de la {anl ! I/e , v o l . 3 , Par i s 1 9 7 2 , p . 4 3 4 , n . 2

•

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sometimes the y are v ery poo r petty bourge o i s and in rare cases peasant s . T hese young men, formed by the v i olence to wh ich they ha ve bee n s ubj ect ed, are well fi tted to subj ect others to v iolence . What they w i l l incarn ate in their fights i s the same v iolence* that the ruling class e xerts against the labouri ng classes . We thu s see th at the fundamental v i olence i s singularized : it appears , in its h i storic al form , as th e violen ce of our society. B ut it m ust be adde d that thi s v i olence , when i t i s re as sumed in commo n by revoluti onary part i e s and trade union s , i s entirely absorbe d in social praxi s and become s the comm on source of class action s . Th i s means that indiv idual v iolence i s e xerted without manife sting itse lf through the action s of the group : the i ndiv idual outs i de common prax i s i s as i f relieved of al l personal rage . He has become violent at the l ev el of organized c ommun itie s , as a common indi vidua l. B y soc i al izing h i s a nger and return ing it to him as a deposit for whi ch he i s ans werable to h i s class, the workers ' organi zations release h i m an d al low him , moreove r, to choose as a prac tical free organ i sm all forms of positive reciproc i ty vis-a- vis his setti ng. The fut ure boxer i s already se lected by the materi al circum stance s of h i s own l i fe : i f he agree s to become a pro , it i s because he w an ts to s truggle free from his clas s ; and the reason why he wants to struggle free from h i s c l as s i s that h i s fam ily situation, the events of h is chi l dhood, have not all owed h im to integrate him self i nto i t . On the other hand, however, s ince birth h e has s uffered th e v iolence of oppre s s ion a nd exploitation , which has been interiori zed i n him as in h i s comrade s . B ut h i s personal hi story , by i sol ating him from other workers , al ienates h i m from th i s v i olence , whose basic ch aracter so lo ng as the combat group has not been formed i s t hat one can never de fi ne i t ei ther as wholl y pas sive and suffered or as wholly acti v e . This sti fl ing violence, which cru shes the indiv idual and at every instant ri sks e x plodi ng i n uncontrol led brutal i t ies, becomes at once the consequence and the source o f h i s n011integrati on : he turns i t back ag ainst h i s own peopl e . I n the same w a y , h i s fury i s directed at once against the rich who exploit h im and ag ai n st the workers who claim to prov ide h i m w i th the lTIodel of what h e must be and i n whom , prec isel y , he h ate s the image of what he will be . Th i s v iolence, for want of being s oci ali zed, becomes self-aware and pos its i t s e l f for i tse lf: more or less vaguel y , it sets i ts own norm s . Of co urse . -

N o d o u b t m o � t o f t h e t i m e i t I � o n e p o o r m a ll h i t t i n g a n o t h e r poor m a n o n e o f the e x p l o i te d h i t t i n g a n o t h e r o f t h e e x p l o i ted B u t t h e �e c x pre s � i o n � of v i o l e n c e are p re c i � e l y m o q c o m m o n i n t h e p r ac t i c a l c n � e mb l e a � a w h o l e Th u � Fa no n po i n t � o u t t h at t h e h i b t h e c o l o n i L e d m an c o l o n 1 7e d m an w h e n h e h a l., not re ac h c d t h e rc v o l u t i o n ary .., t age I nd u c e d v i o l c n ,- e . w h i c h i n h i m i � v i o l e n c e a g a i n " t m an ( be c a u"e h e h a � been m a d e I., u b­ h u m an ) . tl n d � an o u t l e t o n l y by a t t ac k i n g h 1 <'; /e l / o H ( I e h i .., brot he r ) *

--

-

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37

the re i s the poss ibil ity of some kind of fasci sm in th i s pass ionate moral ity of streng th and defiance . It i s at th i s level that common ground can actu al ly be found between param i l itary organ i zations of the Ri ght and the i solated v ictim s of bourgeois oppre s sion. In the case of a particu l ar i solated indiv idual , the v iolence w i th which the oppre ssive order has imbued ev ery oppre s sed indiv idual may be s iphoned off by the oppressors and tu rn ed v i a him against hi s class of ori gin . Whe re there i s no such enrolment, isolated e xplosion s of v i o lence (sc uffle s , braw l s . perh aps cri mi nal m i sde meanours) still repre sent a tran sce nding of the ori g inal situation ( membersh ip of the oppre s se d and exploited clas s ; non ­ integration into thi s class) and , as it were , an obsc ure de sire forc ibly to struggle free from the c l ass whence he sprang. Whe n, in the boxing-hal l s he frequents, the instructors pick him out for h i s agR ressiven ess, they w i l l real ly only be recogn i zing as a nece ssar y v irt u e of boxing what i s bas i c ally the individual v i olence of a des ire to e scape from h i s condition . It goes w i thout say i ng th at such aggression i s effec tiv e i n the ring only i f the indivi dual possesse s e xceptional phy s i c al ski l l s . B ut it would be wrong to th ink in term s of a chance conj unction : had he been weak , the lad would have found other outlets for h i s v i olence . Mo re s l y and adaptable but more re sentful , perhaps , h e would have pursued the same ends by roundabout mean s . F urthermore, part of the strength, ag i I ity and speed required by the � noble s port ' have to be de ve loped gradual l y by tra ining and the fi rst bouts . In th i s sen se , box ing prod uce s its man . Th is con tractu al moment one party ' s cons i dered project of making h i s v iolence into a commodity in order to leave h i s class ; the other' s project of purchasing that v i olence an d making it in to the source of h i s i s th e dec i si ve profi ts , as If it l1'ere th e lahour-poM'er (�f a l1'orker instant of inc arnation . B y inventing the idea of hav ing himsel f treated as a commodity , i n order to tran scend the stat u� of h i s class al l of whose b y al ien ating h i s v i olence , sel l i ng it, in members are commodities order to preserve it and henceforth be defi ned soc ially b y it alone the young man re inv ents box i n g , as the transcendence to \vards the univ ers al that w i l l pre serve his particul ari ties and as the chosen tra ns position of his ori g i nal al ienation. But i t i s prec isely l1'ith h is transcende d particu ­ larities that the fan s an d organ i zers wil l adopt h i m . Boxing i s not a clash of facel e s s strength s , it i s men who fi ght one another, i .e . conc rete by indi v i du al s div ided by the ir i nterests but different i n the i r re al ity v irt ue of the ir physiques , the ir characters and thei r pasts . In other words � i f box i n g does not p i t m a s s p roduce d robots agai nst one an oth er an d ' the be st m a n ' has to win in th i s h u m an due l . the sport v i a the mediation of req u ires i t to be a man who tri umphs the org ani zers an d par t i c i p a n t s over a n o t h e r m an by v i rt u e of h i s hu m a n q u a l i t i e s , i . e . b y v i rt u e of h i s i n t r i n s i c part i c u l ar i t i e � a n d t h e u s e he c an make of th em . Not j u s t if it •

-

BOO K III

38

i s a que stion o f physique through his qual i tie s ( si ze , reach , m uscul ature , etc . ) , but through the use h e c a n m ak e of the se and of h is weakn esses . Not j u st through learned techni que and ' natural ' ski l l , but through an ensemble of tac tic s (aggre � s ivene s s and caution , courage and ten a ci t y , etc . ) which deri v e from the psy c hosom a ti c partic ularities t he of the winner. B oth from his chi ldhood a nd i nd iv idual hi story adolescence and, at the s ame time , from h i s career as a boxer. I n t h e tac t i c of a ra t her po n derou s Scandi nav ian boxer forever dropping his guard, w ith the ai m of inducing h i s opponent to leave himself open as he throw s a punch and then ge tti n g i n a s t unn i ng jab a whole past is re flected. The idea i s to ' go for a big punch ' , at the ri sk of taking rather than g iv ing one . Th i s pre s upposes that the boxer has con siderable phy s ical res i li ence and confidence th at , therefore , the other ' s punche s w i l l barely shake h i m . Al s o , of course , inexhaustible courage and the strength of an ox though he i s not very mobile or dexterous , b ut rather slow i n h i s movement s and m a noeuvre s At the sam e ti me , h i s plan of attack i s q uite spec ific : to mak e himself a v ictim in order to w i n more eas i l y . There is a ce rtai n pas s i v i ty at the heart of th i s prac tice, which seems to come from a m i sery endured, a l o n g p a t i ence accompani ed by a pas s i ve but t h ereb y al l the stronger r age . Thi s tactic effec t iv e ly contai n s within it at once a terrible past, the harsh trav ai l of men , a nd the best technical use of the fig h ter ' s psychosomatic ense mble v iewed as an in strument of de struction . Thi s use i s partly dev i sed by the boxer, partl y e n cour aged by his manager. Produced by ci rc umstance s , i t produces its man . The very feature s of the boxer, what i s most ind i v idual about him , are disfigured by such a style of box ing . Taking punche s i n order to return them with intere st, he ha s a broken nose, puffy eyebro w s , caul i flower ears, etc . : i n short , a mean look invol untary mim i cry that sc are s the beg i n n e r but, to an e x perienced opponent or we ll ­ informed spectator, rev eal s from the o u t s e t h i s i n te n t i on s and the narrow lim its of h i s e f fi c a c y What i s more , h i s de s ti n y i s wri tten there , h i s sad destiny as a boxer and a m an . A s a boxer, he w i l l never c l imb to the hi gher rung s of t h e h i e r a rc h y ; h e crushe s begi nner s , but is a l w a y s be aten on poi nts by cl ever fi ghters who , w he n h e d ro ps h i s guard , h i t h i m w i th a l l the i r st re n gth w h i l e tak ing care not to let them se lves be h i t . A s a ma n the quantity of blows re c e i v e d mak e s h i m e xc e ptiona l ly p rone to d e t a c h m e nt of the r e t i n a , s hatt e r e d n e rv e s , or m a d n e s s . But b o x i n g n eeds th i s i g n o r an c e th e se i m p e rfe c ti o n s , th i s d a u ntle s s c o u r ag e , t h i s fe a r s o m e effi c ac y t h a t r i s k s be i n g t r a n s fo r m e d i n to i n e ffi c ac y . I t n e e d s it be c au se th e fi g h t e r m u s t be an i n d i v i dual , w i th the s y n t h e t i c en s e m b l e t h a t h i s p r a c t i c e re v e a l s and th at , in e v ery m o v e m e n t , u n i t e s s o m at i c � t ruc t u re s and h i s t o r y (the h i s tory r e s u m ing the s o matic s t ruc t u re s ) , pos i t i v e a n d ne g at i v e q u a l i t i e s , tac t i c s , the p a s t an d the '

'

.

.

,

.

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future di sclosed as de stiny . * In other word s , there are no contingencies here ; there cannot be any , s ince they are required as contingencies and transcended by a technique . Between the se two m i ddleweights , the differ­ ence of height, reach and musculature is con siderable : one i s tall , with an impre ssive arm ex tension but a relatively underdeveloped musculature ; the other i s of medium hei ght , w ith a shorter reach than the former, but he i s very muscula r. From the start , we know that these bodi ly structure s are transcended and preserved by tactic s that they impose and that are c ontin ually reinvented. We know that the former relies on h i s speed and legwork, seeking to score p oints w ith his left while keeping a s far away as p ossi ble from hi s opponent; and that the latter, his head tuc ked down between h i s shoulders , blocking p unches w i th h i s glov e s , walking rather than dancing , mov e s forward all the time , tries to get under his opponent ' s guard and work away at his body in the c l inche s . Ev erything i s inscribed in adv ance on the se bodies and these face s . For neither one of them i s any other tactic pos s ible, but e ach vici s situde of the bout require s the reinve nti on of all experi ence in a fe int, a side step, a lightning blo w , an accurate j udgement of di stances and ri sks . Moreover, thi s reinvention fun ctions prec i se l y as the synthetic actuali zation of each indiv idual history the bravery , coolheadednes s , skill , etc . , that will prob ably dec ide the final outcome and i s the v ery l ife of e ach fighter as a style of practice . At thi s level , the contingent differenc e s between the opp onents ( one i s fair, the other dark ; one pleasant-looking , the other unattractive) i . e . those that are not real ly relevant to the art of box ing are them selves required becau se they directly s ignify the reality of the indiv idual s as such. Actual l y , i t i s rarely possible to establ i sh a dialectical rel ation ship between s uch p s ychosomatic data and a boxer ' s c haracteristic style ( in particular, the ' nice ' look s of one or ' unattractive ' looks of another often very accurately e xpre s s transformations that have nothing to do with moral qualities : the former i s nice - l ooking becaus e his height and speed have sheltered him from blow s and thu s all owed him to keep his face unmarked, while the latter i s unattractive because he bears traces on h i s face of the v iolence of others ) . B ut though it is true that thi s golden-haired champion does not owe his v ictory to the fact that he i s

The i nte l l i gent, q u ic k boxer, by c ontrast, never in i tia l l y appears l i m i te d by a de stiny : h i s fut ure i s ope n , w i th v ar i o u s pos s i b i l i t i e s A n d i t i s prec i s e l y the intere st of box in g to p i t that open future aga i n st a c losed future . Noth i n g proves a priori that v ictory w i l l go to the more s k i lfu l . Perhaps h e i s too frai l - phys ic a l l y inferior to the other. It w i l l then be eno ugh for h i m to let h i m s e l f be caught once i n t h e trap of ' dropp i n g h i s g u ard ' ; e v e n if the fi rst fi v e rou n d s are h i s , h e ri sks bei n g destroy ed by a s i n g l e b l o w - by brute stre n g th . The contrast between the ri s k of being de stroyed by a s i n g l e right-hander and that of l o s i ng the fi ght on points i s prec i s e l y w hat makes a bo x i n g match. *

40

B O O K III

blond , it i s his blondne s s and striking he ad that concretize his v ictory for the p artic ipants and those who will see his photograph in the papers tomorro w. These feature s . offering them selve s up i m mediately to intuition , or indiv idual and effective transcendence of an indi­ incarnate prax i s v iduality as atemporal h exis : present, th at i s to say , at every s tage of temporali zation . From thi s point of v ie w , it i s also the requi rement of boxing that life should be incarnated in the face as condensed hi story and de sti ny , and that it should be transcended in practic e by the expres sion (s mile, look of intelligence, more or les s fei gned nastiness, etc. ). For the time being, the face thu s incarnates the ongoing temporal i zati on, whic h down to the very moveme nt of ' negation towards . . . ' it condenses through its physiognomy and the l atter ' s fleeting (hence, atemporal : the face i n the photo becomes a frequentative) changes . At thi s leve l , w e hav e thus encountered the necessity of contingency and the dialectical intelligibil ity of chance circ um s tance s . Far from hav ing to be eliminated as accidents of no consequence or meaning , produced by the encounte r of independent series , they a re required by boxing i tself in so far as they will be enve loped, uni fi ed and transcended by a hum an practice that they singularize and that, as a prax i s and like every prax i s , i s i n i tself the far side of every singularity . Every manoeuvre i s a rigorous determ ination of this body as a function of thi s hi story , and so on . B ut , at the same time , it i s o n e ski lful feint, one skilful s idestep, one ski lful piece of boxing . Incarnation i s precisely that : the concrete universal constantly produc ing itself as the animation and temporal­ ization of indi v i dual contingency . Hence , one punch , like one dance , i s indissolubly s ingular an d universal. In thi s sense, the fortuitous character of a bout holds for a l l the fortuities of all bouts: it i s a necessary structure of confl ict. B u t the necessity of thi s struc ture i s produced and grasped by the participants in the very individuality of the bout and as its character of an absolute event. In thi s s ing u l arity , all boxi ng and all v iolence are singularized and the lived singular reveal s their singularity . I f, in fact, we now return to the contractual moment which makes a y oung worker into a trainee boxer, we shall soon di scover that boxing as a quas i - insti tutional ensemble of intern ational organi zations and as a unity of events (matche s ) governing one another i s itself a sing ularity . Or, if you l ike , the moment of the abstract u niversal , an ofte n indi spen sable mediation in the development of an invest igation or c oncrete study , must d i s solve in the final movement of total ization . At the moment of concept­ ual izati on, in fact, for want of po s se s s ing the neces sary knowledge , we stumble over possibles i .e . here over an inde term ination of learning and are compel led to grasp the real ity under study as a particularization of pos sibles . Thi s i s the standpoint imposed upon u s by the narrow l imits of our know ledge , when we attempt to construct a theory of practical

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m ultipl icitie s . Perpetual ly encounteri ng unverifi able po ssibles obl i ges us to conceptual ize the dialectical investigation . A l i ttle further on , we shall see the di alectic di s so lve th i s conceptual formal i s m . At the point we have reached , what cou nts prov i s ionally i s to observe when the know l ­ edg e concerning a real proce s s i s sufficient that from the totalizing standpoint the poss ible i s a structure of the real . Thi s re lativ ity of the 1 2 possible to B e i ng wh ich we shall study in itself so me what further on make s the ab stract universal into a secondary structure of concrete totalizati on. Even w hen the positi v i s t hi storian studi es an ind i v i dual or a s ingular groupi ng , he conceives them both as exemplifications of pos ­ sible man , i . e . of the concept ( i ndividual man , man in society ) . Now Hi story as a di alectical movement (whether it is a questi on of prax is or of comprehen sion ) knows nothi ng other than the h uma n adventure . For Hi story , there h ave been (and could be ) no men other than those who have existed and defi ned themselves by the pos sible s they engendered . Pos s ible s , i n fac t, are prac tical de termi nations of the soc ial fie ld. The y are defined as objective margins of choice and depend on the singular totality in the course of totali zation as we l l as on each h i storical agent. Thus the enormous singularity th at is temporali zed by each of us as the h i s tory of humanity can never be anything other than an i ncarnation deciding concretely between the pos s ibi lities it engenders w ithin it. I t m ay be that other worlds e x i s t, but insuperable d i s tances separate them from ours for ever; at al l events , today we are tota l l y ignorant about the practical organ i s m s i n hab iting them. From thi s point of v ie w , whether we are dealing with an eternal pluralism i . e . an eternal impos s ibil ity of totalizing or s imply with a pre sent limitation of our prax i s and its sc ie nce, our adventure still appears as a particular cas e . In the h uman adven ture, however , the particular case doe s not e x i st as s uch , and all reality internal to that adventure must be conceived with its possibles as a p lenary i ncarnation of the ongoing totali zation . The outstan ding success of a fe w champions shoul d not h ide from u s the fact th at , i n a certain sense , the great maj ority of boxers are in a si tuation hardl y superi or to that of workers and often more precarious . Moreover, their years are numbered . They h av e ten or twelve years to s ucceed and then , if they have not ' made the ir name ' , caught by the ' age limit ' they re lapse back i nto the proletari at or v egetate on the margins o f bourgeoi s soc iety . They are not, of course , producers of cons umer goods , of commoditie s . B ut they are exploited: i n the form of de structi ve •

1 2 . S artre w as not to make an e x h au st i ve s t udy of poss l b l e s i n the p re � e n t work However, see p A I 2 i n the Appen d i x below , and footnot e 9 7 on p . 3 34 A l � o L ' Idiot de la famille, v o l . 2 , Pari s 1 9 7 1 , P 1 8 1 5 , n . 2 .

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B OOK III

v iolen ce , it i s indeed the ir l abour-power that they are sel ling. The numb er of profe s sional s m u l tiplies with the deve lopment of bourgeoi s society and the increased share of income it can devote to entertai nment . The immense and rapid dev elopment of sports i n the twentieth c entury i s directl y conditioned b y the second industrial rev olution , w hatever ne w v alues may al so be expre s sed in them . The grow th in productive strength - parti cularly notable w ith the appearance of sem i-automatic m achines create s j obs for fragmented or pauperized elements of the w orking clas s : they graduate to being servants of the bourgeo i s clas s . S uc h w i l l be the boxer ' s j ob . And if thi s labourer [travailleur] i s not a worker [ou vrier] , it does not follow that he s hould be treated as an unproductive laboure r, since he produces capi tal . For the boxe r gives more labour than he receives i n the form of w age s . He i s take n on by an entrepreneur, who gets him to box i n order to ' make money ' . B y exchang ing h i s labour­ power for capital , he reproduces money as capital . Promoters , hal I ­ owners , e tc. , l ive off the boxers . Training i s a kind of v i s ible c aricature of employment , for they are treated like some machine to be constructed and then maintained; and every thing i s calculated as a function of this them the greatest destructive efficac y , aim : to give and retain for taking account of their possibil itie s . To get at the truth of their c onditi on from both s ide s at once , m oreover, you could al so speak of licking a fi ghting animal into shape : training i s a human equivalent of stock­ rearing. It results in al ienati on of the individual from h i s own body , conceived as pure destructive power: all h i s activ itie s , all h i s needs, are s ubordinated to the instrumentali zation of h i s phy sical person . What may be decepti v e , here , i s the fact that the requirements of fi ghting i mply that the boxer should be kept ' in shape ' : in other words , should be got into top psychosomatic condition . If it i s true , however, that h i s body may be not to the env y of ev ery amateur sportsman from the bourgeoisie speak , of course , of workers stunted by the ir work it i s also true th at the goal of thi s treatment i s fi ghting and , if bouts are too frequent, they w i l l have the effect of des troy ing h i m phy s i c al ly within a fe w years . It would doubtless be possible to av oid such destruction by a c alculated reduction i n the number of annual bouts for each boxer, depending up on h i s particular characteri stic s . That i s doubtless the way th ings are done in the people ' s democrac ies . It i s al so what happens in the West w ith many amateurs workers or petty bourgeoi s who do not wish to ' turn pro ' . B ut when it i s a matter of profe s s i onal fight s , two factors combine to accentuate overw ork and o v erexploi tati on. On the one hand, o wners of ' stables ' , promoters of every k i nd, etc . , have the ir sights o n the s urplus­ v al ue produced . They determ ine the number of bouts per season and per boxer on the bas i s of demand i n other w ord s, of the fighter ' s popularity and the draw ing-power of h i s name . and also on the bas i s of pos sible

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matc he s ( i . e . combinations that w i ll excite curi osity ) . On the other han d, however, the boxers them selve s , when they have not achieved any real renown, are thei r own v icti m s . Only too often the promoter w i l l over­ expl oit a ' hope ' and tend to neg l ect the old l ag s who are no longer a seeking draw . So it i s nece ssary to thrust yourself forward con stantly one new fight after another and cl imbing back into the ring j u st a week after taking terrible ' puni shment ' , though still not properl y recovered from the blows received or else starve and ev entually quit the game . The alienation i s total . The grow ing l ad u sed to locate h i s value and h i s freedom in h i s indiv idual v iolence. He refu sed to bel ieve that he was accountable for it to his comrades or to hi s class. In the name of that and in order to escape the common ethic of strength a nd domination fate of the oppres sed, in whom he di scovers and detests hi s own wretched­ ness as a v icti m he sel ls h i s strength , h i s ag i l ity and h i s courage. He sells even that rage which make s him so co m bati v e . At once , it is n o longer h is , it i s taken from him . The as sertion of h i s sovere i gnty become s h i s livel ihood. Obedience replaces anarchi stic pride , lord l y w i l l shrivels before harsh disc ipline . The exercise of vi olence directed, channel led, orientated i n the direction of maximum profit for the promoters i s no l onger the easy demon strati on of a brutal s uperiority . It i s instead a painful and dangerous labour that i s faced i n anguish and often pits the boxer against a better-armed opponent : he learns the l i m its of h i s power through the sufferings inflicted on him. Th i s conj uring away of v iolence i s a constitutive element of the young man ' s new personal ity . That aggress ion he u sed to pos sess i s rea 11)' removed from him , confiscated and returned to him on the day of the bout. Exc ept in the ring. most boxers are courteous and gentl e . V i olence , in becom ing their dai l y bread, i s separated from the ir l i v ing real ity : it i s serious , like an instrument that must not be over-used, and at once loses its character of a w i ld and libe rating passion . Yet he regains i t when he c l imbs into the ri ng (s ince those who do not regain it are eliminated in adv ance ) . B ut now it i s public and soc i al i zed ; its mean ing has e nti re l y al tered. As l ong as h e remai ned in the working clas s , it was a lone l y indiv idual ' s bl ind , exp l os i v e react ion to exploitation . Once he i s a serv ant of the bourgeoi s c l as s , h i s fight in the ri ng incarnate s his fight for l ife in the bourg eoi s sy stem of competition . To te ll the truth , i t i s not a m atter of free compet ition . as de scribed by the economi sts of the last c e n tu r y . The re are tru s t s and semi-monopol i e s dec i s ions are t ak e n at the lev el of the promoters . It s h o u l d al s o be added th at t h e rul e s of the g a m e are m ore or less be n t b y such schem i n g . B u t such fe atures are common to al l s e c tors of the bourg e o i s econom y ; and if com p e t i t i o n doe s n o t re l ate directly to t he c u s t o m e r s , at least every boxer re lie s o n t h e fav o ur o f the c ro w d to i n fl uence h i s e m p l o y e r s . The ,

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BOOK III

employers , for the i r part, are d i rectly in contac t w i th the cu stomers : it i s up to them to know a nd cater for thei r taste s ; but v ia the cu sto mers ' mediation , the l iv ing commodities hope to as sert themselves vis - a - vis the employe r. W e grasp the order of metamorphose s : partic ular circ umstance s have de term ined that an i ndiv idual, as a loner , has fel t the common v iol ence suffered by h i s c lass and exteri orized it i nto uni versal and anarchistic aggres sion. Prec i sely by doi ng so he became if h i s phy sical abi l ities the unintegrated e lement who could produce ind i v idual allowed it v iolenc e : the very one box ing picks out and p i ts against other loners . H i s v io lence being, i n an d of itse lf, an ever frui tless sp asm to struggl e free from poverty and h i s milieu, he accepts that i t should prec i sely be the instrument for his promotion into the other c las s . In fact, the promotion does not really take place (except for a tiny m i nority) . He se l l s h i s v iolence, remai n s one of the exploited, and on the bo x i ng market fi nds the same competiti v e antagon i s ms that pit workers against one another on the l abour market. B ut with workers , years of trade -union e xperience and soc ial confl ict have at least e nded by reduc ing these antag oni s m s a nd developing a class soli dari t y . T he boxer, by contrast, a lone exploited indiv idual w ho from childhood has been unabl e to solidarize w i th the workers , e xperiences al l t he harshness of competition . What i s more , he produces thi s competi tion , undergoes it, and lives it, i n and through each of h i s fi ghts. W i sh i ng to knock out h i s opponent, it i s not j u st against the l atter that he struggles but a l so against h i s more favoured stable companions and more general ly against al l the boxers in h i s weight to prove he is worth more than the m , by waging a more div i sion bri l l i ant battle against the foe . Thus the v iolence wh ich , in e very fi ght, takes hold of him and h url s h i m against an enemy brother, was i n i ts ori gin the same v iolence that m oves from the oppre s sors to the oppre s sed, then bac k from the latter to the former, and make s i t pos s i ble to c a l l the oppos iti on between classes a struggle . For this v ery reason, i t already the incarn ated in the spec i fi c form th i s takes i n industri al soci eties interiorization of scarc i ty . B y p urchasing it, however, the bourgeoisie recu perates an d transform s it. A l i enated, the aggre s s i on of the oppre s sed individual i s changed into a competitive antagon i sm : commod i ti e s c lash as if they were men and each seek s to force up i ts price by destro y i ng or forc ing down the other. Th is i nv ersion of the struggle should be n oted : competi tion, i n a period of l i beral i sm , re sults i n l o wer pri ce s . Fi ghts , i n one sense , do not escape the general rule . I f there are too man y of them i f there are too many b o x e r s box ing ri sk� a m omentary deprec i ation . B ut in th i s i nc arna t ion of econom ic competitio n w i th i n a c l o sed fi e l d , the one who best a� serts himself w i l l sell hi m self more dearl y in the next fi ght. For, in the case of boxers , work ed matter doe s not serve as a

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mediation be tween men : it is men themse l v e s who are worked matter as men .

Imposs ibility of a Concep tualiza tion of the Fight The se few observ ation s allow us to under stand the extent to which, and why , boxing i s a s in gular reality , a totali zable proc e s s but one impo s sible to conceptual i ze . For, on the o ne hand, it brings out the v i rtue s that moments of v i olence rev eal : courage , coolheadedne s s , tenacity, etc . On the other hand, however, the se v irtue s , very real in the ri ng, are obj ectiv ely c ommodi tie s : the spectator pay s to enj oy human courage . People are taki ng part i n the publ ic alienation of free acti ons . In thi s ambiguous eve nt the bout the partic ipants thu s produce and grasp the reality of the ir own alienation : in other words, of the whole man down to the root of h i s freedom and the real ity of emancipatory v iolence . B ut the latter sets itself again st ali enation only to al ienate i tself stil l furth er. S hut in on itse lf, the event constitute s for the spec tators at once a participation in fundamental v i olence and a l ocali zation a di stanti ation of that v iolence which , by be ing channel l ed and c ontained i n an i ndiv idual contest, manifests itself as an e x ternal event, fi n ite and dated . Th e eve nt that i s temporali zed encapsulate s for everyone the indi vidual embodime nt of e ach of the adv ersaries: the singulari zation w ithin h im of the v iolence of the oppres sed and, thereby , hi s al ienation. B ut thi s temporali zation in carnates an ever true aspect of oppressive and exploitati v e s y stem s : alie nation of the v iolence of the oppre s sed . So long as the order of the oppressors i s kept operati v e by the pol i c e , the army and economic circum stance s ac ting in the ir fav our, the v i olence of the oppre s sed produced w i th i n them by r epr e s s io n [compression ] but reduced to impotence by that repression itse lf know s no out lets , no decompressive explosion s , other th an i ndividual and mostly hi dden acts, ranging from sabotage to theft, which se lf-destruct if the y are di scovered . I n effect, the v iolence w it hin them i s manifested and discred ited simu ltaneously and the workers , i mbued de spite th em selves w ith bourgeoi s ideology and v alues , j udge the se fruitle s s re volts with the s ame sev erit y as do the bourgeoi s . Of course , howevec the epoch which engenders box ing i s punctuat ed by gi gantic struggle s and the prol etari ats have become aw are of the ir class v iol ence. B ut it sti l l remai ns true that at moment s of downtu rn when th e o ld order i s re-estab l i shed agai nst them; when they are locked into the � price wage ' c i rcle of hel l and th e i r action on wage s, even when v i ctorio us , i s at once annul led by the action of the bourg eo i s upon prices v iolen ce grasp s i tself as impo tence , which i s s imulta neous ly true and fal se : true , i f we l im i t oursel ves to reg i stering •

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BOOK I I I

a quite pro v i s i onal moment of the struggle; fal se , i f we mean thereb y to unmask what has often been termed � the i mpotence of the common people ' . And , of course , bourgeois propaganda will seek to show the latte r i n the former. In so far as it s ucceeds and , i n moments of discourage­ ment immediately after a lost battle , the worke rs all ow the m selves to be suddenly j udged from th e \'ie�1/point of order and mystified, v iolence ' democratic ' l aw s - i s de-real ized by becoming di squal i fied. Its re al ity, if you prefer, is i t s loca l power of destruction ; its de -real i ty i s its global inability to make itself a n instrument of l iberation . Thi s di squal ifying de ­ real ization i s merely a mystifi cation , but i t h as all th e social rea lity of a my stifi cation. We l l , i t i s that very my stification that i s inc arnated by the fi ght: v io l ence that dom inate s two indi v i dual s , pits them against one another, and ends by bec om ing - for and thro ugh the partic ipants the real , riv en being that seeks to redi scover its un ity by amputation and li quidation of one of its halves . The res ulting phenomenon i s that this particular confl ict w i l l fi nd its sol ut ion in boxing , but that boxing is not a solution (prec i sel y in so far, for example , as the winner will have demonstrated, at the same time as h i s s uperiority to the other, h i s real i nabi lity to ri se to the higher run gs ) . The violence of the partic ipants i s si multaneously unleashed and de -real ized . It become s a show, without ceasing to be lived in it s explosive power. The event produced by al l i s q u ite real : re al the punches, the wounds , the inj uries perhap s , which w i l l bring the se boxers to a certain phy sical dimi nuti on , e ven to a certai n infirm ity ; real are the tactics of eac h , real the sufferings endured , re al the c ourage and doggednes s of each. B ut the ensemble of proh ibitions which reduce the conte st to a conventi on between repre sentati ves of the rul ing class , by i ncarnating total v i olence in th i s del iberate ly mutil ated v i ol ence , refer thi s absol ute , use l e s s adventure of two men back to all the participants i .e . the al ienation of as the incarnation of the ir radical powerle ssne s s their sole emanc ipatory power . Of course , th i s aspec t of box i ng i s not concerted ; i t i s by no mean s a matter of some kind of propaganda. B ut when propaganda e x ists el sewhere, we shal l see that everyth i ng incarnates It . It i s sti l l true that the c onte s t exc ites the participants . B u t it refers popular aud ience s back to the re al ity workers ' assoc i ations have already transcended : the antagon i sm pitting sel le rs of l abour- power agai n�t one another on the competitive m arke t . Th is competi tion i s mere l y a proj ecti on (on the labour market) or, if you p re fe r , only an incarnati on of the competi ti ve reg i me capital i s m itse l f e ng e n d e r s as t h e condition of its de v e l opmen t. Inasmuch as the i r i n tere st� pi t th e m against one another, the worke rs are i n a v er y real se n se men of c ap i t a l i s m and i ts product s . They con sti tute themse l v e � as 4 th e se n t e n c e i t pron o u n c e s upon itself' o n l y when th e y p r o d u c e agai n�t it ap p arat u s e s of s truggle and organ s of •

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un ion . We ll , it is not enough to describe what the popular audience watche s that c ompetition between two peers as the image or s ymbol of competition w ithin the same c lass, s ince it i s simultaneously a very real episode of th is ( the boxers , as we have seen , relying on the bout to improve their s ituation) and its pre sent incarnati on . Through thi s c ontest, the ' worl d ' of box i ng i s in fac t total ized as a m ultiplic ity of conte sts which , in each weight, pit eac h against all and each against the other, and can find a solution only in v iolence. These boxers , all riv al s , all pos s ibl e advers ari e s , all produced by boxing in s uch a way that they find thei r own life only in the destruction of the other ' s , * reproduce in themselves and by their actions the soc ial structure of the s ystem that has produced them. Through them , c ompetition as a fundamental relation between the indiv iduals of the dominant clas s ; as a relation imposed on the indiv idual s of the dominated clas s , and rejected by their w i l l to unite i s produced in all its n akedness as the c oncrete against exploitation ev ent that a popular audience approve s and s upports ( an audienc e , in other words , most of whose members c ondemn the c ompetiti ve s ystem and c ombat it by union) . And i t i s boxing ' s ambiguity to be , i n a certain sen se, made by its public . When a championship i s i nvolved, the bourgeois public stirs itself. Without any unease or contradiction , i t fi nd s in the c ontest unfolding before its eye s the dai l y reality of its struggles and its ethical v al ue s indiv idual i s m , etc . For it i s in this form that fundamental v iolence has i nteriorized itself and re-exteriorizes itself with in the bour­ geois class ( without, of cours e , taking account of the fundamental fact of oppre s s i on and exploitation as relations of thi s class to the other clas ses). For the popular audience, the manife station of naked v iolence constitute s itself contradictori l y as a determ ination of the common violenc e of the oppre s sed and thro ugh a de - realization as a transfer of all back to the bourgeoi s fi e ld of the c ompetitive market . The v i olence changes its nature as i t i s real ized, and i t c hange s them in their present reality . Accepted as a class revolt, it wins accep tance as an inter- indiv idual conflict and, very prec isely , as a c ompeti tion between men-as-commodities stimulated by the exploiting class , which even provides it w i th its rules . Thu s the bout is a singular proces s , based on the singulari tie s of the boxers , which takes place as a dialectical singulari zation of fundamental violence, through the sim ultaneous , contradicto ry incarnation of the different forms that pre sent-day society imposes on the l atter. Thi s

To be s ure , bo x i n g doe s not kill o n the sp o t : b u t it damage s . Above al l , moreover, the w i n ners he l p to elim inate the l o s e r H i s succ e s s iv e defeats w i l l eventu al l y refu se h i m any means of l iv i n g i n and through box i n g . He w i l l be e x pelled from h i s p rofession and have to d i e or fi nd anoth e r . *

48

BOOK I I I

inc arnation i s not simply a produc tion of dialecticall y oppos ed spec ifica­ tion s . Inasmuc h as it i s reali zed by the en semble of partic ipants , it is defined at the same time by its ambiguity . B y thi s , I do not mean j ust that the actual partic ipants give them selve s the determ inations of the col lective or group and of their reciprocal antagonism, through temporali zation of the produced event; but al so , and above al l , that the ir membership of differ­ ent c las ses and m ilieux produces the same event with a mul tipl ic ity of incompati ble meaning s , but w ithout these badly articulated incom­ patibi l ities achieving the defi nite form of contradiction s . The sy nthetic unity of the ev ent can thu s under no circumstanc es be expre s sed by a c oncept. On the contrary, we see the necessity of its s ingularization, and that i t bears w ithin itself the foundation of its ' ac c idental ' s ingularitie s . B u t thi s rapid de scri ption allows u s to understand better the relation ship between incarnation and the enveloping totalizatio n . Al l our v iolences are there , s upported b y the fundamental v iolence fro m which t hey derive; everything takes p lace in the insupportable tensi on of sc arc ity . B ut the different proj ec ts that combine to produce the event (from those of the organizers to those of the audience , pas s ing by way of the al ienati on of the boxers and their freedom) cro s s mediating fie lds which are them ­ selves concrete universals and totali ze them as they singularize them. This means that they preserve them as the s i n gular quality of the movement that transcends them. Everything i s gi ven in the least punch: from the h istory of the one who delivers it to the material and collectiv e c ircumstanc e s of that hi story ; from the general i n dictment of capitalist society to the singular determination of that indic tment by the boxing promoters ; from the fundamental v iolence of th e oppre s se d to the singular and al ienating objectification of that v iol ence in and through each of the participant s . And if ev eryth i ng w ere not present and tran ­ scended , the s ingular inventi on the unique and c oncrete reality that i s this punch, del i v ered on th is day , i n this hal l , i n front of this audience would not even be possible . The inc arnation as such i s at once unrealizable, other than as a total izati on of everyth in g , and irr educible to the pure abstract unity of what it total ize s . Its concrete reality i s , i n fact, to be an orientated totaI i zation . And thi s orientation i s precisely the other aspect of its s ingularity . The project i s s ingular by v i rtue of the quality that the transcended mediations give it; but these mediati ons are singularizing becau se it has singulari zed them by its very orientation . And s ince it is the confl ict that we are for the moment stud y i n g , as an event temporal ­ izing itself towards its suppression, Vle see that i t i s a proce s s by ov erdeterm i nation : in other w ords, by a mul tipl icity of antagonistic action s . For thi s reason , as a proce s s , i t appears as the product overfl owing an y human i ntention of all s ing ul ar i ntentions : i n other words , of al l the contradictory singulari zati on s of the totality .

I S STR UGGLE I N T EL L I G I B L E ?

49

Thus one can and should say , at the end of thi s critical investigation , that each stru ggle i s a singu lari zation of al l the circumstances of the s ocial ensemble in m ovement; and that, by thi s s ingularization , i t incar­ nate s the totali zati on-of-envelopment con stituted by the historical proces s . I have said , and repeat, that we have not yet proved that thi s envelopi n g total i zation e x i sts . B ut for the moment i t i s enough to make the observ ation that every singular totali zati on i s enveloping as a total ization as well as enveloped as a singularity. The fact is that, j ust as this fight env e lops all fi g hts particularl y those that are taking plac e e v e rywhere on t hi s same S atu rday evening so too each fi ght elsewhere envelops th is fight in its obj ective real ity . From th i s point of view, two dialectical procedure s a re possible o n the bas is of an identical soc ial reality . On the one hand, a p rocedure of dec ompressive expan sion which starts off from the obj ect to a rrive at everyth ing, fol lowing the order of significations (for exampl e, the banknote refers to a l l the economic, social and historical si gnification s we know) ; in thi s case, thought m ay be termed detotalizing and t he event loses out to the signified ensembles . On the other hand, a procedure of totalizing compressio n which, by contrast, grasps the centripetal move­ ment of all the s i gnifications attracted and condensed in the e v ent or i n the obj ect. If some Micromegas were to v i sit a boxing-hal l , i t would i n effect be necessary to exp l ain everything b y rel ations transcending the external facts , objects and significations . The mere sight of indiv iduals que uing i n front of the ticket office and e xchanging banknotes for entrance tickets could not be understood, w ithout reference being made to the prev ailing monetary sy stem and ultimately to the whole pre sentday economy. In the same way , the powerful bulbs lighting the ring must nece ssaril y re fer our interplanetary traveller to the c ontemporary state of our industrial tec hnology and physical sciences , etc . , etc . B ut all the se elementary and fundamental s tructures are directly gathered into the event itself, which i s exchange for the production of surplus - val ue entrepreneurs and , at the s ame time , uti lizes and thereby eve n uni fies in its singularizing movement certain technical re sources, grounded upon scientific knowledge . The se determinations them selves, interiori zed, sud­ denly help to s ingulari ze it; and grasping how they exerci se a spec ific acti on with in the incarnation i s preci sely a new dialectical procedure . The first procedure , w hich i s unfortunately that to which Marxi st ' an alyse s ' too often l i m i t themselve s , effectively dis solves the event into the en semble of mediations as non - sing ularized concrete total i ties ; the second - which alone i s capable of grasping the di alectical intel ligibility of an ev ent strives to di scover w ithin the event i tself the interactions con sti ­ tuting the sing ularity of the proce s s on the bas i s of singularizati on of the circumstances. I t is ac tually th rough the project w hi ch condenses them that the mediating fields receive a ne w status of efficacy. These last ,

50

B OO K I I I

remark s all ow u s to note another difference bet ween the concept and the inc arnation : in the former, the ' in ner' determ inati ons are un ited by bonds of exteriority; in the l atter, at al l levels, al l the determ inations are concrete and it is a bond of immanence that uni tes them.

Conclusion Our first inquiry h as allowed u s to establi sh a min imal intelligibi lity . Even if s truggle, as such, h ad to be revealed as refractory to any as a rift totali zation, it rem ains true that every struggle i s the incarnation of al l others : in other word s , at onc e of the fundamental scarcity and of the speci fic forms that contemporary society g ives to thi s scarcity . However, if the se c oncl u s i on s allow one to oppose positiv istic pluralism, and even if one can unde rstand a particular struggle as an incarnati on a nd singularization of the c lass struggle as it unfolds in contemporary societies, i t still rem ains the case s o l ong as we do not push our investigation further that the liv ing rift constituted by con fl ic t seems the insurmountable limit of the totali zing effort. I n particular, what could be the h i s tori c al unity of a soc iety c hopped up by clas s struggle s? And the term ' cho p up ' may even seem inappropriate : for it refers to a un ity ant erior to the muti l ations . B ut even if Engels was right, even if thi s unity did exist in the golden age of unrecorded H i s tory , it disinte grated so l ong ago that w e should waste o ur time if we sought to relate the divisions of all H i s tory to that lost pa radise of i ntelligible uniti e s . It i s w ithin the actual struggle that s ynchroni c totali zation must be able to operate , i f H i story is to be dialectically intelligibl e . And it i s in the thick of the battle that we must now seek it.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Indetermination and Contradiction we shal l attempt to impose a certain order upon thi s new in ve stigation : mediations are needed. It would be impossible to determ ine immedia te ly whether c lass conflicts , in a given societ y , con­ stitute or not the reali zation of a contradiction . For such a contradiction implies the e xistence of a totalization , of which each class w ould re p re sen t a speci fication excluding the other. Moreover, we do not yet ha ve the knowledge and instruments avail able that would allow u s to unmask this totalization : i . e . , for example, to dec ide whether nationa l unities exi st; or whether the nation is just a collective , and the indi­ viduals are bound to it only via the mediation of worked matter (by the soil and s ubsoil , in so far as th ey are exploited ; by the ensemble of geophysical and geopolitical c ondition s ; by t he heritage of prev ious generat i on s , etc . ) . Before tackl ing the pr oblem, i t seems pruden t to examine another, to which the solution seems eas ier. In the c ase of large historical ensembles . we do not know if the synthetic unity of the prac tical multiplic ities exists . O n the other hand, in innumerable particular c ase s it is possible for u s to study a conflict w ithin a real totalization . Frequent l y , in fac t, v iolent antagoni sms m anifest themselves with in organized or instituti onal group s and g ive rise to struggles whose intensity increases pari pas su with the i nte gration of t h e communi ties i n which they take place . S o our first que stion will be : should the s ub- groups in struggl e within an org anized group be considered as s i m ple agents of de structi on , w h i ch sap the comm on unity and will eventu al ly rend it apart ; or as me n taking re spons ibil ity for and real izing , throu gh the ir confl ict a contradict ion of the group , as a di alec tical mom ent of its tern poral i zation? OWEV ER,

51

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The answer is clear. Of course , for a s ituated dialectic , contradiction i s not an ab sol ute which a pri ori produces its me n. B ut converse ly, men within the group whethe r they are aware of it or not can enter into strugg le only by ac tual izing a contradi ction i n the proce s s of develo p­ ment. Let u s first note, in fact , that ev ery internal confl ict takes place between pledged individual s an d agai nst the sy nthetic background of fraternity - terror . Furtherm ore , each of the hostile sub- group s opposes the other in th e name of that u n ity which i t c l ai m s alone to repre sent. Each presents the other as a priori c riminal bec ause it breaks the common unity by its clai ms. At the s ame time, however, each opposes the other throug h the total izing prax i s of the organized group, in the na me of t h i s prax is and on the occasion of it: each s ub- group c l aims to give a different ori entation to the common ac tion . In th i s sense , the confl ict can never spri ng from differences (indiv idual or col l ecti ve) prior or ex ternal to the constitution of the group. At the outset, the mi lieu from which the i ndividual s of any sub- group eman ate matters l i ttle . The c h aracteri stic fe atures and hi story of e ach matter l i ttl e. Th e c onfl ict pits against one another common individuals tran sformed by the pl edge � prov ided with offi ces and powers who e x i s t as such only throug h the grou p and for the prax i s that i t has as signed itse l f; and who are defi ned as th e sam e on al l points except in relation to the precise obj ect of the di spute . Of course, all prior differences (orig i n , history , e tc . ) wi l l immediate ly be reactua lized by the con fl ict. What i s more , differences of condition (origi n , h i s tory , education , former m i l ieu , etc . ) often c ause o n e indiv idual or s ub-group to understand better th an others a particular aspect of the internal con trad i c tions . Th at does not al way s happen : in the Convention , Montagnards and Girond i n s al ike bel onged mostly to the intel lectual petty bourgeoisie . But when such factors do come into play , the ir ac tion at the outset is mere l y of a de te c t ing nature . Fo r the y are not recogn ized by the group , they are merely tol erated. In the integrated group , each person l i ves in c ohabitation with his own memories , w ith h i s character: h i s offic ial exi stence i s conferred upon him by action through an office . In a party in movement, the opposi tion between sectari ans and opportuni sts can reveal differences of c h arac ter� it can base itself upon - and be re inforced by these , but it c annot actual l y spri ng from them . The classi ficat i on i s c arried out through the h i s tory of conlnl on indil'idual5 l1'ith in t h e g ro up : i t i s through the i r fu nc t i o n s that they di scover the need for r e l axa t io n o r a t o u g h l i n e . Or, i f y o u like, t h e i r fu n c t i o n s require of them a certai n ac t i v i t y , through w h i c h the y s e e t h e objectives of the whole group . The v i c i s s i t u d e s o f th i s ac t i v i t y l ead t h em to cal l for an ori entati o n of the common p rax i s t h at w i l l al l o w t h em to perform the i r offi ce w i th s uc c e s s . A t the s am e t i m e � th e c ommon obj e c t i v e s are refracted t h r o u g h t h e partic ular obj e c t i v e s t h at are a s s i gned to t h e m . B ut al l th i s i s

I S S T R U G G L E I N T E L L I G I B L E ')

53

stil l just a static determination : there are ' hardliners ' an d ' m oderate s ' , that is al l . For thi s difference between common indiv idu al s to become an antagon ism , it i s precisely nece s s ary for the c ircumstances of the common struggle to harden the ir attitude s , by demanding new a nd urgent option s . In th is sens e , it can be said that the determination s of the common indivi dual are a product of his group work ; and that the practical evolution of the group obliges the common indivi dual to make his opti on on the bas i s of the determinations the group has inscribed within him . And, of course, the common individual i s only the inert limit of freedom : it i s the practical organ i sm that make s the option . B ut it make s it precisely on the basis of the determinations introduced into its sworn in erti a. Thu s con fl i c t s spring up on the basis of free option s : in other word s , of anxietie s , outbursts of anger, quarrel s and reconc ilia­ singular events tion s . B ut such form s of behav iour are stimulated by the evolution of common practice , inasmuch as th i s evol ution deman ds a perpetual re­ working of i nternal organ i zation and constantly provok es di s sati sfaction s , maladj u stments, disqualifications and reclassi fication s . The contradiction is rev ealed and s ustai ned by con fl ict, but the con fl ic t could not fai l to spring from the tran sformati ons of prax i s . It i s the rel ation ship of forces between the total group and the external gro up s , the rel ations between the group and its practical field, that decide . Through its directing organ s , the common praxi s slows down or accelerat e s , regresses or i s radicalized. I t i s necessary to i nitiate fi rs t one t urn , then another, and each time t he change s require a reclas s i fi cation of the personnel. Common i ndividual s are the produc ts of an action furnished w i th a certain rh ythm , which sought to attain certai n objectives by specific mean s . If the rh ythm , mean s and ends ( at least, the proximate ends) are tran sformed, i t i s necessary for the men to break down themselves and l iquidate their prior de terminati on s ; or for them to be liquidated (that may simp ly mean they will lose the ir posit ion and rejoi n the mass of mil i tants ) ; or for them to oppose, in the name of the prior determinations of prax i s , those who represent i ts new ori entation . And, of course , it i s not j ust a question of a confl ict between past and present, but everyth i ng i s i nv olved, nece ssarily. And i t i s not neces sarily the ' men of the past ' who h arm the evolution and success of praxi s , or the ' new men ' who expre s s the real ex igencies . I n fact , studying the real confl icts w i thin a group show s the extreme com� le x i ty of the options and the ir ambiguity : how the more ' con­ serv ative ' i s , de spite ev erything, innovatory and the m ore ' nov el ' imbued wit h routi n i s m and outworn tradi tion s . Prec i se l y for that reason and prov ided one doe s not imag i ne contradiction s as sharp and preci se as the i t is c lear that conflict i s the sole real Hegel ian the s i s and antithe s i s form a contradic tion \vi th i n a group -i n -activity could take; and, con­ verse l y , th at no con fl i c t i � even poss ible in an i n tegrate d community , if it •

BOOK III

54

i s not the actual ization by men of an objective contradiction. B ut, it w i l l be asked , in what l atent form does thi s contradiction exist prior to its v iolent actualization? * We shal l find the an s wer without difficulty , if only we consider a fe w very familiar example s. Here i s a banal one : the dispute over competenc y . In an organi zed group , one organism w i shes to deal with a matter while another claims j urisdiction over it. I f the c ircumstance recurs often, the riv alry of the two sub­ groups i s transformed into open warfare . B u t why doe s it rec ur? Most of the time, we find at the origin of the di spute a real but re l ative indeter­ mination of the re spective competenc ies . And w here can thi s indeterm ination come from? No doubt it may have e x isted at the outset. B ut th i s is rarer than people think : men always do everything they can in a gi ven situation . I n fact, the devel opment of common praxi s has created this indeterminatio n, by introducing un ­ fore seen changes into internal relation s . For example , the two bodi es c lash because the progre s s i ve improvement of l inks , effected with quite other intentions , has eventual l y brought them into contact. At the outset, they actually had identical functions ; but the diffic ulty of communication made both indispensable , s i nce neither had the mean s to carry out its activity on the terrain on which the other was operating. In other cases , the evolution of the global situation is marked by the appearance of new events w ithin the group. Inasmuch as they involve a certai n originality , the se events are relatively unforeseen : n o particular organ i s thus i n charge of dealing with them. B ut inasmuch as they also involve old with differen t c ompetenci e s thi s ti me significations , several bodies think they recognize matters here which come under their own j uri s ­ diction . Each organ i sm , sensitive to certain aspects, wishes to take the matter over, whereas in reality none i s q ual ified. The group w i l l have to reorganize and create ne w offi c e s , which w il l be defined on the bas i s of these new reali ties, or else it will proceed to a reconstitution of the old organisms. We shall return to thi s struggle , as s uch, and to its product . In the meantime , the se abstract example s suffice to show us the dialectic of c ontradiction . Clearly , it i s not explicit before bei ng assumed by praxi s . For example , the basi c form of the troubl e in our chosen e xample is an indeterminati on . But if we look at it more c lose l y , thi s indetermination (whether due to the mul tiplication of li nks or to a new and unforeseen s i tuation) i s an objective rea lity: obj ectivel y , for the s ituated observer or for the hi storian , there i s an indeterminate in other word s , in suffi c i entl y determined - relationship between the offices and •

* It goe� w i t h o u t say i n g t h at c o n trad i c t ions deve l o p an d , b e fore e n d i n g i n con fl i c t , re pre s e n t t h e i t s coh e s i on

l n nel

tension of the group . i . e oft e n ( l oo k i n g at th i n g s po � i t i v e l y )

a

fac tor i n

I S S T R U G G L E I N T E L L I G I B L E '?

55

the event. And the indetermination does not move from the function s to the object as would happen if competencies at th e outset had not been sufficiently de fined. It moves retroactively from obj ect to functions , bec ause it is the obj ect as a new conseq uence of action that make s the functions obsolete and di squalifies them . B ut the obj ect, as w i l l already have been grasped, is the incarnation of praxi s itse lf. Thu s it i s the whole action that calls into question its own attainment s , i .e . the i nner determina­ tions with which it has endowed itse lf. This mean s , for exampl e , that the historian , in order to bring the indetermination to l ight, will have onl y to compare the obj ective meaning of the event with the organ izational or institutional definition of the function s . Yet thi s indeterm ination although it i s an obj ective feature of the group ' s internal relations , inasmuch as they are entirely under the sway of its action remains , in thi s historical form , at the level of abstract signification s . It has been realized practically onl y through the activ ities of sub- group s ; it has been brought to life as hesitation; or, if you l ike , it has had prac tical real ity only in and by its interiorization . I n other w ord s , although it mi ght subsequently be eluci­ dated as structure , it i s concretely and at first manifested as behaviour. There is nothing surprising about thi s . Inasmuch as pledged inertia constitutes an ensemble of passive determ inations characterizing the common indi v i dual in everyone, the rel ationship between the obj ect and its determinations is obj ectively indefinite . We are in the domain of pas sive-being and syntheses of the inanimate . B ut inasmuch as th i s common individual must be s ustained and contin ual ly re-created by the practical organ i sm , this rel ationship of indetermination can be real i zed only in the form of a s ynthetic and liv ing rel ationship, in the course of the functional praxi s of indiv idual s or sub-group s . And of course, to realize it is to tran scend it, to m ake a practice out of what was a certain inertia, and to organi ze it i n immanence as the structure of a project: hen ce, continually to make it an internal relationship , in a relation of interiority with other interiorized relationsh ips . To transcend is not to liquidate a difficulty or resolve a problem, it i s s imply to constitute what has been transcended as a particular orientation of a praxi s . In the example chosen , transcendence will con s i s t i n the fac t that the sub­ group, negating the indetermination and profiting from it, will seek to appropriate a certain series of m atters, even though it i s not sure they are withi:t i ts competenc y . In thi s decision we m u st, of c ourse, see a singular­ ization of the common praxi s : the sub-group , in the name of common i nterests , e xtends its competency to new events through the project of contributing as be st i t can to organized action . We do not yet grasp indetermination (to c onsider this alone ) a s a contradiction . Moreover, it would be enough for the other sub-group never to have been created, for this appropri ation or amassing of functi on s , far from engendering di s p u te s ,

56

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to be ab le to be seen as a positive in itiativ e . Contrad iction will not appear even when the other s ub-group takes the same initiative, but at the prec ise moment when the same matter i s c l ai med by eac h s ub-group against the other: i . e . inasmuch as the indetermination transcended by both organisms become s the very mediation wh ich unite s them in antagoni sm. In other words, indetermination is never in i tself a contra­ diction, for the simple re ason that a contradiction exi sts only in so far as its terms are determined. B ut when common praxis has created organs (s imilar or different) which both claim the non-determi ned obj ect, the objective contrad iction becomes the me aning of their con fl ict. And thi s c ontradiction i s nothing other than the i mpos sibility , for two inte rnal structure s of the group , to be temporalized together i n thi s moment of the global temporali zation . However, it would be wrong to say that the se new obj ects reveal that impos s i bi l ity . Actual l y , they determine objecti vely and simultaneous l y the two [ sub- ] groups to rea l i ze it practical l y . And the practical real ization of an impossible coe x i stence prec i sely constitutes the confl ict. At thi s leve l , we c an make some pertinent comments . First of all , the origins of the conflict are free , contingent and anecdotal . They are free becau se each sub-group has assumed and interi ori zed the indeterm inati on . I t has made up its mind to it, without any doubt and after delibe ration . Without there even having been a ballot, the attitude of those managing the office has won the votes of the maj ority of coll aborators , or vice versa. The sub-group ' s self-as sertion i s what i s termed in an unfortunate l y too idealist manner esprit de corps . However, since each of the new events that are going to fuel the conflict i s i n itself a singularizing inc arnation of the total prax i s and its c on se­ quences , the matter will al way s present itself i n the form of contingent facticity . It i s a partic ular affair affecting indiv idual s or communities and - by v irtue of thi s very fact clear i n its deep signi fication ( i ndetermina­ tion ) , but compl ex and obsc ure as a singular event . For the actual beginn ing of the conflict it i ni ti ate s in so far as , against the background of fraternity-terror, each sub-group first w i shes for a negoti ated sol ution i s an ecdotal, because i ndiv idual i nitiative s , q uid pro quos and mis­ understandings help to envenom a di spute people woul d l ike to stop . B ut j ust as the singular ev ent i s the incarnation of that moment of praxi s (of the present relati on of its means , objecti ves and movement to the evolu tion of its practi c a l fie ld and enemy activiti e s ) , so too the m is un derstan dings and ' personal ity ' c l ashes w i l l disappear i n a flash if the y do not in themselves have a function of total izing incarnat ion : in other word s , if through them coe x i stence of the sub-groups doe s not reveal i ts impo s s i ­ bi l ity . When some G i rondin s , well be fore the great struggle s of the Convention , reproached R obe spierre for hav ing i nvoked Prov idence at the C l ub des J acobin s , th i s was j u st a n anecdote , an inc i dent quickly

IS STR UGGLE INTELLIG IBLE?

57

shelved . B ut in fac t th i s ' affair ' very preci sely incarnated the fu nda­ mental confl ict between a de -Chri sti anized bo urgeoi sie, which de spi sed the people and its s uperst i tions and a group of petty bourgeois whose p oli cy was above al l to make the Rev olution for the people and � consequentl y , to show consideration for popular bel iefs . The entire re li gious pol icy of Robe sp ierre , the entire futu r e confl ict that was to pit the athei st J acobi n s against the re ligious masse s , l-vere in thi s sally that had no aftermath . The y were there because they were realized in it : the acti on itself proclaimed its future contradictions in a total ization that liqui dated itself becau se it was at o n ce inevitab le and prematu re . Th us the confl ict makes the c ontradi c tion. I t i s men who dec ide that thei r coexi stence is impo s s ible ; and the y dec ide it in singu lar circum ­ stances , which are sometimes accentuated by singul ar feat ure s . For as long as the str u ggle lasts , it w il l alway s seem to other members of the gro up , and even to opportuni sts in the sub-groups , that the very con­ ting ency of events and the qual i fied freedom of indiv idual s e xpress the contingency of the confl ict i tsel f so that it i s al ways poss ible to put an end to it. B ut, in real ity , the i l l u sion deriv e s from the fact that deci sion s are ac tually taken by free practical organi sms, whether grouped or i solated. The se free acts of tran scendence , ho wever, are performed in so far as each person is in the serv ice of a non-transcendabl e pledged inertia. And thi s very i nertia, as material product of a free pledge is con stituted as a destiny of i mpossible coexi stence , inasm uch as freedom itself places it i n a relati on of immanence w i th that other inertia con stituted, for example , by the indetermination of powers . On the basis of that , we grasp the dual character of the struggl e : it free ly real izes the conflict but, to that very e x tent, it bec ome s a mediati on between the two c ontradictory terms of a non - tran scendable inerti a. Or, if you like, the abs olute necessity of that contradiction , as an obj ectiv e , internal struc­ tu re of the group , derives from a clash of inerti as constituted by th e sub­ groups th emselves in their free p ractica l nlovement. B y virtue of thi s , the common individual, through the action of the practical organ i s m , recei ves the new , c ommon determ inations that come to him from the group ' s global action and its internal con sequence s . Projects are l ike fields of force , whose practical ten sion connects and organizes inert data . And these data, in the framework of temporal i zation , manife st themselves as the u n i ty of a new object i ve structure and as the i rreversibil ity of prax i s - here , of the struggle . Or, if you l ike , thi s impo ssibil ity of turning back i s the express ion of ne w c irc um stances, inasmuch as they c onstitute a destiny through the non t ran scenda b ility of s worn i nerti a ( a s a practical aspect of the common i nd i v idual and as a formal ru l e of h i s future) . '

' ,

,

,

o

-

BOOK II I

58

The Com m on Individual Rea lizes th e Practico - Inert as Pure Negative Praxis The se few observ ations nece ssarily take us back to counter- fi nalities and collectives as inner cancers of the group. For, if we follow cl osely the appearance of an i nternal con fl ict, we soon see that it i s impossible for it to occur as an immediate re s ult of the global prax i s : mediation of the practico-inert is needed. Nev erthele s s , i n an integrated group , at the ten sest moment of its action, the practico-i nert i s not manifested as in a d ecompre s sed soc ial en semble w ithout pr ac tical i ntegration . In the la tter, as we have seen, what occurs i n front of everyone and through everyone is equival e nce of the practical agent and the i nert re ac tor, via the mediati on of worked matter. 1 3 In the full y active group, however, counter­ fi nal ities are produced onl y inasmuch as they are recovered and revived by a practice . Or, if you l ike , they are g rasped not as transformation and al ienati on of an action in the m ilieu o f mediating exteri ority , but as obscure and wholly immanent limits that freedom itself seems to give itself. It i s through q uestions l ike : ' Why didn ' t they go further? ' , ' Why didn ' t the y take it upon themselves to gi ve that order? ' , ' Why didn ' t they understand s uc h and su ch requirements of the situation? ' and other similar inquiries that an object ive limit of transcendence can be glimpsed. And this l imit, which at first appears negatively although it i s necessaril y tied to the s worn limit, seem s suffered by freedom prec ise ly in so far as i t i s produced by it. In the frame work of d e stiny, transcendence gives the tran scended its own non-t r an scendability . If we return to one of the ch osen examples that of two [ sub- ] groups in conflic t as a result of the relative inde term ination of their respective functions we shal l observ e , in effect , t h at counter - fi nality i s manifested only as reverse of the po s i tive results . Let u s consider, for example , the m u ltiplication of link s . I t may be a matter of a technical improvement i n the means of communication ( whether a re stricte d, ' priv ate ' group grows wealthy a n d di sposes of cars , planes and telecommun ications ; or whether a ' public ' group builds roads and c lears route s through the effective w ork of it s members , etc . ) . In other case s , i t will be a matter of rationali zation of ' internal relation s ' , ' contacts ' , etc . (The action of a one that has been constituted through the strongly integrated party m ost rigorou s central ization , which often impl ies that the base elements c omm uni ca te onl y v i a the summit can , by means of the transformations it imposes on i tself to attain its goal , i mpose either provi sionally or d e fini tive l y a certai n decentralization and , as a con sequence of thi s , a

13

Criti q u e , v a l 1 , pp 1 65 ff.

IS STRUGGLE INTELLIGIBLE"

59

m ultipl ication of di rect c ontacts with the base . It may equally well happen that a more or le s s clandestine group undertake s to make an inventory of its sub-gro ups or i ts members , and that it sets up linking bodies to c o -ordinate their activ itie s . ) Other conj unctures are possible too . A group may � take adv ant age ' of p ubl ic works that improve the tran sport sy stem , in order to serve the State, a parti cular clas s, society , etc . At any rate, however it may present itself, we are deal ing w i th a defi nite type of prax i s -proce s s . It i s prax i s , moreover, that i s first revealed in i t . What appears objective l y , in fact, i s a common acti on of i nternal reorgan i zation , i . e . a m i x ing of men accomp anied by a more or le s s con siderable labour that the se men , or ot hers linked to them , carry out upon inanimate objects . M oreover, thi s action i s in sep arable for those in the groups who are i ts beneficiarie s (as common indiv i duals) from its practical res u lts. Through the bodies that are constituted and the contacts th at are m ultiplied, the sub-groups in one comprehensive v i ew - grasp their leaders ' concern and the progress of their integration (they are better informed : for e x ampl e , the questi ons they ask and the reports they send up to the central organ i sms n o longer remain unans wered , or else the an swers arrive more s w iftly , etc . ) . B e sides , in th i s reorganizing activ ity the y are never i nert objects : prax i s as sumes and requ ires their participation ; the new l inks an d ne w means of tran sport are al so their instruments when they them selves have to take the in itiative in commun i ­ cating ; furthermore , t hey are furni shed by the reorganization itself with ne w function s , or e l se their functions pre s ent novel feature s which means that they i nteriorize the change and re -ex teriori ze it as a complex system of po wers and obl igations . Everything, i n short, i s action . The g lobal prax i s , by the leaders ' dec i sion (for examp le ) , engenders a global reorgani zation : th i s undertaking i s di versified at the level of the local sub-groups ; the y become aware of it precisely in so far as the y di scover them se lves in their new status as its products; and they acc ept respon­ sibi lity for it, while transcending it toward s more or le ss fre sh obj ec tives. From thi s point of v iew, the very di scovery by [ s ub- Jgroup A of a [ sub- ] group B which seems to exercise the same functions i mmediate ly and within the framework of a global enri chment of presents itself powers and knowledge as a pos itive gai n . The multiplication of l inks i s marked by a deta iled n ew awarene s s of a group that eac h sub- group used to grasp g lobally and in a fairl y rough-and -ready manner. Th e total ity on the way to total izilti o n arri ves for each and throug h each at the moment of differentiation. And th i s obj ective differenti ati on i s not an object of c ontempl ation , but a practical process on the way to reali zation . Yet counter-fi nal ity i s alread y given. Before the two sub-groups were brought into c ontact, thei r re spect i v e uti l i t y could not be denied; afte r ­ w ards , i t become� neces sary for one of them to be reabsorbed , or for i t to

B O O K II I

60

be l i quidated, or for third part i e s to fuse them to gether. I t may happen, moreover, that the fus ion i s dec i ded at the level of the two organ ism s and by s imp le a greem ent : thi s mean s that the former ex igenc i e s of acti on have not determ ined i n eac h of them a loc al particu lari sm (perhaps then j ustified) . B u t if thi s fusion by spontaneo us ag reement seems impo s sible i f the ir parti c u lar re ality , under the influence of the de velop­ to them ment of the globa l prax is and their acti v ities w i thin their re stricted practical field, has been pos ited for itself in i ts parti cularit y th en counter- fi nality i s undeni ab l e . The fu nc tion of each s ub-group, as untran scendable (b ut al way s tran scended i n its c oncrete reali zation) and determined inertia, finds itself abruptl y produced as s upernumerary by the abrupt appearance of the same function e/setvhere and as other. And thi s appe arance i s itself produced by the deve lopment of l inks , inasmuch as it is not j ust prax i s but also process : e . g . in asmuch as i t i s th is inanimate ensemble (the road , the rai l way, te lephon ic commun ic ation s, or the new s ystem as a real planning of l inks and as an objective structure of the total group) that i s establi shed through prax i s , and that in it at first inv i sibly serves as a mediation between the two sub- groups . What has occ urred, in fact, albei t the re sult of an action that we c an ass ume here to be as consc ious and long- s ighted as pos s ible , i s already . as synthetic un ity of the inert . a negative reversal of that ac tion . The road, for example , appears at once as the re sult o f a labour and as the prop of real actions (it i s true, in thi s sen se , that it i s the material form of regulated d i splacements , and the inert means actuali zed as a means throug h c oncrete undertaking s ) . B ut for thi s very reason , it i s also an i nert determination of the field of poss ibles for each common indiv idual of the grou p : i . e . for those very ones who do not be long to the sub­ group s u nder consideration ( whether they are integrated i nto ot her organ i s m s of the global group , or whether they constitute in the group itself a control led, directed but non -organized m u ltipl i c i ty ) . Thu s each of the se common indiv idual s finds h imself, from a certain moment on , defined in himself alongside all his other charac teri sti c s by the inert material pos s i bil ity of going from such and such a place ( where s ub­ group A i s t o be found) to s uc h and s uch another ( re sidence of sub-group B ) . If, as our hypothes i s has it, transport i s s w i ft and cheap, if the rea sons to underta ke the se trips are multiple , the ' dis - u tility ' of the movements becomes next to n i l . In that c ase , the road (or the ra il�!ay ) through all prax i s and common ac tion s as wel l as through a proliferation of ' private ' activ iti es i s cons tituted by I tse lf, an d for an y member of the group s , as an inert i ndeterm i nation of h i s re l ations w ith sub-group s A and B . Th i s i nde te rmi nation ente rs in the gui se of a p o s s i b l e into the framework of the passive - being he has given himsel f by pl edge . And i n re l at ion to th e two sub- group s perh ap s also , moreov er (depending on 4

-

I S S T R U G G L E I N T E LL I G I B L E ?

61

the case ) , for the i ndi viduals thi s indetermination , which co nstitutes them as re lativ e ly indetermi n ate , can be nothing other than a revenge of the practico- i nert and a new form of exteriority at the heart of the deepest interi ori ty . Neverthe le s s , thi s indetermination , as i nert pos sibility of a non­ tr anscendab l e fate, cannot by itself be con s ide re d as a contradiction Through worked matter, the relation s between the tw o sub-groups an d the ir members (between the sub-group s v ia the mediation of the members , between the members via the mediat ion of the s ub-groups ) should i n st ead be revealed as the foundati on of an infi nite ( a n d circul ar) s eriality This i s what h appen s moreover, i n looser, barely s er i ali zed groups , wh en one o r other of two institut ions i s s uperfluous and they are i . e . by the force of inertia maintained w ithout confl ict, by tradition r ep re sente d by the past. There i s no struggle, w ith item s of business going indi s crim inately h ere or there , or else each s ub- group referrin g them to the other. Eve ntual ly , e v e r ything i s engulfed i n the c i rc u l arity of impotence and each of the two organ s become s oth er and is no longer anything but the other o.f the other. B y contrast , in a ful l y ac tive group , where fraternity- terror is the deep bond (even i f it r emains fully ali ve hidden ) be t ween al l its members suddenly b r inging the two o r gan i s m s i nto contac t causes i ndetermination to appear as a negative action . In fact, this indetermination which will appe ar later and to th ird partie s a s an obj ectiv e st r uc ture is it s elf produ c ed in acts . For each non­ organized member (or each member belo n g i ng to other organisms) the possibility' of addressing themselves equall y well to sub-group A or to s ub-group B i s realized practically. It does not con stitute the obj ect of a c ontemplative learn ing , but the i ndividu al w i l l qu i te simply addre s s himself to on e or other accordin g to h i s conve nience; and one or other will welcome him and study h i s request, s uggestion or complaint, viewing the matte r as really b elonging to h i s competency. But it is preci sely the X addre s s e s himself to sub-group A , positive en semble of t h ese acts whic h takes the matter in h and in short� it is the normal course of pract i ce which , s udde n l y , appears to s ub-group B as a thre at to i ts very existence, i . e . to its function and i ts right t o e xer cise i t. We grasp here , in real life , the con stitution of a prax i s as a process : sin ce the two [ s ub-] groups e x i st, the acti on of one i s constituted i n spite of its elf as a v iol ation of the rights of the other; and thi s cons t itution as a real re lation to the other, ove r fl o w s the ac tion itself and i s not at first revealed to the agents. No more , mo reover, than to the membe r s of the i nj ured sub-group . In the imperious mov ement of common action and in the perspec tive defi ned by th i s action from the standpoin t of its particular and its overall objectives and of i ts immediate and its l ong term aims the group � through all its common i ndi vid ual s , produces .

.

.

,

­

62

BOOK III

itse lf for itself as pure activity and di scove rs material c ircumstances only inasmuch as its action transcends or modifies them . In thi s as sertion of praxi s by itself, constituted Reason is g rasped as constituent Reason; practice seeks to be practice and tran slucidity right through . The negative by default (lacks , i mpotence, l ocal setbacks) then appears as plenary and de structive activ ity. A piece of c l um sine s s or even an acc i dent for which nobody i s respons ible appears as sabotage or as an as sassination attempt. At a certain level of emergency , in the c l i m ate of fraternity-terror, any opposition as Merleau-Ponty has s aid i s tre ason . 1 4 And thi s i s not, as is too often thought, due j u st to the h i s toric al c ircumstances that define the situation. These c ircumstance s , on the contrary , acquire the ir effective­ ness only with i n the frame work of the fol low ing dialectical law : in a group in the m i dst of ac ti on, eac h common indivi dual is objectively produced as radically activ e , and everyth in g he produces is neces sari ly interpreted in terms of action . B y thi s I do not at all mean that the tru th of opposition i s treason, quite the contrary : j ust that, in the movement of practice , treason i s its lived reality . Thi s i s due to the fact that as we have j u st seen the inner counter-fi nal ities engendered by praxis never manifest them selves and prax i s , at whatever level , i s produced as the co­ ord ination of local and particular acti on s ; j u st as each of the se never encounters the practico- inert, except in so far as other actions produce it in them and h ide it. Thus the acti on of an organism i s i mmediate ly revealed to the riv al organism as hostile praxis : its goal i s to strip the latter on behalf of the former. B ut at once the antagonism intensi fie s . Each s ub- group , in effect, pursues the common aims of the group and, as a spec i fi c formati on made up of common indi vi dual s , incarnates the entire group , as the part incarnate s the whole . Thi s mean s , in particular, that i t produces for its own part and demands u n ity : i .e . max imum integration of the group , i n as much as common action has to realize i t i n the n ame of the objective to be attained. I t itself is that total izin g unity, i n the sense preci sely in which common action i s the very substance of its action; and it demands it of all the other sub- groups , inasmuch as sy stems of mediati ons and compen s ations , weights and counterweights , the ir poss ible have tran sformed from the outset or littl e by little confl icts i nto a real equi libri u m . I n thi s sense these contai ned oppositions do not trouble any sub-group, i n so far as eac h , by v irtue of i ts functi onal and practi c al s i ngulari zati on, realizes i n itself the total ity but in a speci fi c form and through a particul ar action , i . e . a partic ular determina­ tion of the total action .

1 4 . fI u m a n l .� m e et

le} I eHr.

Pari� 1 9 4 7

I S STR U G G L E I NTEL L I G I B LE?

63

Unity as Meaning of the A n tagonistic R e la tion B ut when we grasp two [sub - ] groups which live the common indetermina­ tion of their functions in the a stringent milieu of totali zing unity and in the practical perspective of that unity, e ac h of them a s an incarnation i s b rought into and as a particular p roduction of the practical unity contac t with another w hic h claims to produce the same unity. And, to be sure , the common praxi s pre se nts itself as being e verywhere the sanle, here and now . In an organi zed group, howev er, thi s mean s t hat each speci alized activ ity is integrated into the total unity, inasmuch as thi s specializati on i s a nece ssary differentiation of the totalizing act ion . The comm on individ ual and the s ub-group , as common , are the who le; and on this plane of the i mmediate , rec ognition of one by the other of one lot by the other lot is spontaneous : ' You ' re me ' . Thi s is what occurs, for exampl e , w hen certain i solated members of the gro up recognize one another in the thick of an indifferent or hostil e c rowd. In c oncrete and organi zed action, howeve r, mediati o n is neces s ary and only differentiati on of function s allow s the group ' s fundamental unity t o subs i st in eac h person a s the relation of the part to the whole . From the moment that this differenti ation no longer e x i sts * as soon as two parts, otherwi se di stinct, are objectively the same in their spec ific rel ationship to the whole in the course of totali zation, in a co ntext where e ach of the m ' d u plicates ' the other ( i . e . when no dual determination of that indeterm ination i s pos­ s ible) the same obj ective ly occurs as the other. It i s in effec t the s ame , not inasmu ch as i t is integrated in to th e s ame unity , but i nasmuc h as it i s sim ilar or e ven identical. The simultaneous exi stence of two s ub-group s finding themselves provided by H i story w i th the same attributions, when j ust one of them sh ould be e nou g h t o assume these, puts the practical unity in danger by the introduction of a dualism of ide n tity. The s ub­ groups are real l y and numerically two : i . e . they can be counted, s ince their re lationship of immanence (objectiv e c o-operatio n in the same total undertakin g ) i s , at leas t partially , transformed into a rel atio nshi p of exteriority . For resemblance and iden tity a re factors that are re v eale d to po sitiv i s t analysis. At the limit of the serial and the mas ses, we hav e found the proliferation of iden tical particles as a facto r and a product of the rei fi c ation of human rel ations. Thus indetermination i s a danger of internal rupture at the heart o f total i zation , even and above all if it

It c an , of c ourse, p u t up w i th the n umerical m u lt ip l ic i t y o f agents ful fi l l ing the s ame function , if the m u ltiplic i ty i s re q u ir e d by action. In that c ase , eac h i ndiv i du a l i s the s ame as h i s c o l leagues in terms of h i s spec ific functions; but i t is the sector in w h ic h he w i l l e x erc i se the m , for example, that w i l l differentiate h i m . *

64

B OO K I I I

appears as the historical product of that totalization itself. And this identity immediately appears as a threat: the i dentical is the Other, in a milieu where there are n o O t h e rs . B ut it i s a p articularly hateful and dangerous Other: each sub-group, inasmuch as it is identical to another, di scovers this other as its own reality become alien prax i s . And the practical ex istence of that other i s a danger n o t ju s t fo r the iden tica l and opposed s u b - g ro up , inasm uch as identity contests the un iquene ss of its relation to the totality in the c ourse of total izati on, but a ls o Jo r th e i . e . for the whole group , its e fficacy and its to ta lizatio n - oJ- en ve lopm en t al ms . Thus the ' momen t ' must be s uppres sed for the sake of the en semble . And in so far as a particular s ub-group seek s the death of the other, it really seek s it for the sake of the en semble , although it i s also impelle d to do so by a need, a pas s i on or an interest of its own . In the pol itical it s truggles ins ide a party which can be terrib l e and even bloody would be fruitle s s to try to distingui sh th e ambition of certain milieux , of certain faction s or certain men , from the ir asses sment of the party ' s policy . The error of bourgeois psychologi s m has been to separate i n every case ambition from programme. I t i s true that the v ery conditi ons of bourgeoi s parl iamentarism produce men who j ustify such a separation : their c areerism is empty, they grasp at any programme (though withi n the framework of the soci al princ iples that are based on bourgeoi s rel ations of production) . In periods when the pre ssure of H istory i s heightened and s truggles intensify , the ambitious individual i s not a psychological and abstract type : he i s , for example, a pol i tician who identi fies himself w ith a certai n programme and battle s rele ntlessly for the real i zation of that programme on the as s umption, however, that the political directives in question w i l l be real i zed by him . S uccess will thu s be hi s obj ectificati on . B ut thi s obj ectification wil l , at the same time , be the new and totalizing orientation of the p arty ' s praxis. It woul d be absurd to ascri be to S talin the ' w ill to rule ' . It would be wholly ideal i s t to see in him the mere incarnation of the h istorical proces s . The truth is that the hi stori cal process is made by Stal in ' s i ron wi l l and t h at thi s will i s preferred only and solely to the (albe it considerable) e x tent that it prefers to ev erything an objective programme, methods , a prax i s , pre ­ s upposition s , a way of posing and resolving c oncrete question s . To that extent and since certain m ateri al cond itions realize Stalin ' s adapta­ tion to his rol e as dictator the hi stori c al proc e s s su stain s and c arries the man who makes it. Thu s opponents become trai tors . Danger i s discovered and reinterio ri zed as hatred, at two levels of s acredne s s : first , inasmuch as the bond between the part and the whole i s th e fu n c tion of the sub­ group , i . e . a j uri dical power recognized by all common indivi dual s; secondly , i n as much as thi s ide nti ty consti tutes i n itself an inte rnal fracture •

I S S T R U G G L E I N T E L L I G I B L E '?

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of total ization as a sacred aim of the common indi v i dual and his s worn fai th . And thi s danger, as we ha ve seen, does not appear . o r at least not as a counter- fi nal ity produced by the evolution of common initially action , but rather in its twofold and sacred form ( the sacred i s amb ivalent) as the result of a negative act ivity . It is th e s ub-group that manifests itse lf as o th er i . e . as oth er th an all th e m em b ers of th e group and all the s u b - g ro up s inasmuch as it is produced by a deliberate prax i s as oth er th an some partic u la r s u b -group . The question of fundamental tre ason i s immediately posed: thi s usurpati on of functions i s neces sarily a m anoeuvre to break unity . A n d it is true o bjectively that the claim of each of the two organ i sm s up on the (partial or total) c ompetency of the oth er occurs through acti on s . I n the same w ay , it is true that this claim i s manifested as a rupture of unity , prec isely inasmuch as it introduces into i t a rec iproc ity of antagonis m , i . e . a pl urali ty of epicentre s . B ut it must al so be seen and this i s perhaps the e ssential thing that each of the e picentres enters i n to confl ict w ith the other in the name of un ity . Fo r s ince i t exposes the other ' s action for setting the d e struction of tha t uni ty as its objective, it seeks to l iquidate the enemy [ sub- J group (or at least reduce it to i mpotence , subj ugate it, i . e . reintegrate it into an org anized hierarchy ) in order to reconstitu te that broken an d threatened unity . In the chosen exampl e , each of the two wishe s to s uppre s s the d i s astrous indetermination that makes every common indivi dual into a member of two equivalent organi sm s , one of which i s s u p ernumerary . Th at indetermination , by itself, di sintegrates every commo n indi v idual . It creates i n him a po ssibility of choice , which free s him from the unitary harshne ss of the organization and allow s h i m , if need be , to use confl icts between the two rival orga n s to play h is ow n game (as a free and practical individual) agai ns t the group . In other case s , it e xpresses itself merely by a hesitation that impairs behav iour; but th is hesitation i tself marks the o bj ective dis solution of the c ommon indiv idual who, i n the exercise of h i s function s , fi n d s himself paraly sed by his dual d ependence . Thus all the moments of the conflict, all the tactics used by the two adversarie s , are defi ned by a sole , i dentical obj ective to re -establ i sh the but eac h attempts to re-establish it to h i s own co mpromi sed unity adv antage . From thi s point of view, it m atters l i ttle whether sub-group A or sub-group B w as initi ally re s pon sible . Or rather, the ' first wrong s ' , the ' fi rst skirmishe s ' , as anecdotal origin of the con flict , have a n importance for comprehen si on of the group and its prac tical movement. The anecdote i s in effect th e i ncarnation , i n its very contingency , of the global moment of praxi s . B ut so far as the confl ict itself i s concerned, the true ori g in neces sari l y l i e s i n each of the opposed s ub-groups , since e ach by its me re practical exi stence as sumes and transcends the practico-i nert i ndeter­ mi nation , organizes it i n the formal non-transcendability of the frame work

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of pledged inertia , and c annot avoid producing it in th e name of the group as a demand for unity . It i s here th at we can grasp the real bond between the confl ict and the c ontradiction within the group. Eac h of the opposed s ub-group s , in fact, i s reall y produced as an incarnati on of the group, and eac h trul y does i ncarnate it. For the simple fact of their be i n g placed in an antagoni stic rel ationship, while l im iting each to the surface as a re latively undeter­ mined mode of the totalizing action, actual izes in depth its relation to the ongoing totali zation : i t is its deep real i ty and its reason, p reci s ely in so far as it i s its objec t ification i n the i nternal milieu of the organized group . Within e ach sub group it i s the group that is fig hting to preserv e or re gai n its unity . In truth, moreover, it is really th e group that opposes itself. The two epicentre s are, in fact, each the centre of this totalization ' whose centre i s everywhere ' . And, of course , it is not a question of idealizing the contradiction, or of resorting to a h yper-organism. These organs are the incarn ation of the whole, inasmuch as they are produced as such, and it would be only metaphorically that one m ight say that the whole i s produced in them . The totalization i s incarnated in and th rough their particul ar activi ty and in their antagonistic practice s . B ut if it i s tru e that the y produce i t and that, once again , it i s men grouped in a partial organization who are the concrete origin of the whole confli ct it is also true that they are , as common and pledged indiv iduals , determined in such a way , at the innermost c ore of their freedom and throu g h it, that they necessari l y produce their free c laim. Ontologically , the pledge has produced the group in each and through eac h . Practic al l y , in the ev olution of common action, each sub-group defines i tself as the incarnation of the group by itself: in fact , inasmuch as it is a quest i on o f an ensemble of common indiv idual s exerci sing functions, the antagonism, the c laim and the intimate grasping of the group-in-totalization c ome to eac h e n semble t hroug h the other, at the s am e time as e ach produces them actively against the other Right i s disclosed when i t i s contested In this v ery conflict, through each sub-group , the group tends to reinforce i ts unity by violence, and ' fraterni ty -terror' i s actual ized. Unity , called into question , becomes the most immediate i nterna l re quirement. B ut this very tendenc y , because it occurs in a di s soc iation of epicentre s , p lace s the group ' s very exi stence i .e . its unity in the greatest danger. Yet there are not , there will not be two unities (unles s there i s a spl it, a schism but in that cas e it i s two whole group s that are r e formed as independent unit i e s ) Eac h sub-group, in fact , i n its strugg le a gainst the other refers not j ust to t he same obj ectiv e s ( at least to the s ame long-term objectives) , the sa m e praxi s , the same traditions and the s ame common experience but also to the same organism s , the same hierarc h y , the same global e nsemble of functio n s and the same personnel . Each struggles within the framework -

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of the rules and practices gov erning internal transformation s of the group. Each appeal s to the same superiors (if there are any ) , the s ame inferiors , the same organs of sovereignty (as a centrali zed unification of the ensemble) and the same i nternal opinion (as a totali zation of all common i ndiv iduals ) In this way , each accepts and reinforces by thi s acceptance all incarnations except one. Conversely at least i n a first moment of the con fl ict the whole group, in all its forms and through all its incarnations , recognizes the being-in-the-group of each of the warring s ub-groups . For the third party , as a c ommon indiv idual , the conflict i s at fi rst manife s ted as simple appearance . The rec iprocal negation appears as obj ective nothingnes s : it i s , for example , a m i s understanding it will be enough to refl ect, to explai n . In thi s very way , the practice of each organ and of all the c ommon indi v iduals unifies the adversaries by differentiating them. Each of the two incarnates the totali zation in its own way , and the e nsemble of the two must be capable of being totalized ( e . g . i nasmuch as both are attached to hierarchical unity as a s ynthetic rule of organizati on ) . Thu s the confl ict would not even be possible if unity did not ri se up against itself Far from the struggle , when i t appears, being in itself a rupture of unity , it is unity that make s it pos sible . Not only does thi s unity represent the i ntimate bond between each side and the group , i t also constitutes the meaning of the antagon i s tic relation itself. And the v iolence of the duality is j ust the unremitting effort to re store u nity The practical attitude of all , moreov er, first constitute s the struggle of unity against itself as a calm synthetic becoming , whose negative aspect i s merely a s uperfi cial appearanc e . In fact, thi s i ndetermination that i s real i zed by confl ict i s actually a unitary ach ievement of the group itself It c an be defi ned in the objective, as the permanent readaptation of institutions (or organs ) lagging behind the development of praxi s . And i t is actual ly a diffi culty that even if it must remain local charac teri zes the whole gro up , as a moment of its devel opment and as an exigency of the totalizing activity towards itself. Nothing prevents one calling th i s contrast (between ne w tasks and partl y outdated institutions) a contra­ diction , si nce it prec i sely pre sents itself as a synthetic and internal determination that only the synthetic unity of a praxi s can produce in itself. For what it i s , in short , i s a reperc u s s ion of worked material ity , ina�much as the latter in scribe s its determination s i n the framework of pledged i nertia. B ut for it really to involve a contradiction in the dialecti c al sense of the term , rather than j u st an inert adversity to be and this i s what transformed, it would hav e to become mo tive po�ver happens when the practical organs real ize i t in confl ict. The contradiction , as we c an see, i s ontologically ambi guou s in each of i t s term s : in each , it i s objective as inerti a and real as prax i s . Or, if .

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you l i ke , it i s a prax is that produces co ntradiction while thinking to s uppre s s it, but i n pr actic e manifests itse lf only as confl ict (acc i denta l c o n fl ict apparently and at first or s tru g g l e of Good against Ev i l ) . In fa ct, on the bas is of the p r actico inert de termination s being re s umed as a ntagoni s m through pledged pass i v ity , th e entire un i t y of the group i s called i nto que st i on by the struggle of its i n c arnations . It i s thi s practi c al ca l l ing into question, moreover, that prod uce s the l i v ing i nte l l ig ib il ity of th e contrad ictory : it is un i t y th at enge nder s the du al i ty of th e epicentre s ; it i s un i ty that i n them and in a l l i s pro d uc e d a s the absol ute exigency of tran scendin g the duality ; it is uni ty , fin al ly, that is inca rn ated i n each e p i centre as l i q u i da to r y v iolence . B ut i f the contradiction appe ars as a complex r ea l ity , one o f whose faces is the praxi s of struggle and the other the inert ex igency of the moment, th i s as you will h ave understood - i s because the group s unity i s never, i n fact, anyth ing other than its permanent practic e of reu n i fi c at i on . In th i s p erpetual movement, whose motor i s the c ommon ac tion , the least hy steresis, th e least di ffere n c e of phase the m ost i n s igni fic an t lack o f adap t a t i on are nece ssar il y produced as practical impuls i o n s On that bas i s , t he divergence of the s olu t ions proposed w h i ch reflects the diversity o f i nc arn ations produces itself as a conteste d uni fication . Whe n the org an s of mediation are effecti ve and the choice of a solution i s relat i ve l y s imple (when c ertain choices are easil y eliminated or one i s re v ealed as bei ng obv iously the only v al i d choice) the c o n trad i cti o n remains mask ed and i mp lici t , because the conflict has not m anife sted itself. So un i ficatio n , i n such circ umstance s , seem s to ha v e l iqui dated the div ergences without call i ng itself into question : it i s thu s , if you l ike to use the metaphor, the p racti cal substance th a t pro d u ces a nd l i quida t es mo mentary opposit i on s I n rea l i ty , h owever, we m ust understand that i t has i m pli c itl y involved i t self, j u st as much as in the case of conflicts but the situation h as al l o wed a cri s i s to be av oided. Conversel y , moreover, conflicts are inte l l i g i b l e in an o rgan i z ed group because they are pro duced as a mOInent of reun i fi c ation : the one in which materi al difficulties are of su c h se ri ousness they c an be re solved only by the l i quidat i on of certai n [ s uh-] groups i ncarnating their di fferen t aspect s . In c ase s where the t h i rd par ty s medi ation i s pos sible , i n fac t t h i s m e d i a t i o n c an s u c c e e d only as a rea l s y n t h es i s of the opposed viewpo i n t s . I n other w o rd s the me diated s ub group s by their s i tu ation i n s ide the g r oup , produce them s e l v e s as a total ization of th e problem but at the same t i m e , as i t s sin gulari zat ion. Or, i f you p re fe r the y ac t u al i ze the pro b l e m i n the p erspe c tiv e of a s i ngular s o l u t i o n and i n that very w ay a c c en t u a t e the i r s i n g u l ar i t y . The a n t ag o n i s m i s t h e n perfe c tl y i n t e l l i g i b l e , b e c a u s e i t e x p r e s s e s the i m p o s s i b i l i t y for thi s c o n c rete prob l e m t o re a l i z e al l i ts e x i g e n ci e s t h r o u g h a s i n g l e in c ar n a t i on i e a c c o r d i n g to a si ngle -

'

,

,

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.

,

'

'

'

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prac t i c a l p e rs pe c t i v e .

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I S S T R U G G L E INTELL I G I B L E?

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Th us the problem i s real i zed by antagon i sms as a mu ltiplic ity of perspectives and imperatives not throu gh the magic of some dogmatic ideali sm , but quite s imply bec a use it has its ori gin i n inert material i ty as a mediati on between several [ sub- ] grou ps and , conseque ntly, must be produced by the ac tion of these [ sub -] group s as a multiplic ity of ant agoni sms , before being bent back into a synthe s i s that transcend s and conserv e s everything. In th i s case , the present antagonisms are com­ prehensible in the perspective of a concre te solution that suppresses them as it organ i zes them : i . e . i n the m ovement of pre se nt and past unity bei ng transcended towards a future un ity. Solution as invention reconci l ia­ tion and comprehension are one and the s ame t h i n g : the partial appears as such through the total i zation that it provoke s , and that i s projected through it. The antagonism then appears for what it i s . In a certain way it is noth ing , s i nce t otal i zation makes it disappear i n aid o f a tigh ter organi zation . In another way , it i s the on ly mean s of real i zing the unfurling of p erspectives: for e ach one, it is a way of being produced i n the practical movement of a group that posits itself for i tself through it. But to po s i t itself, here , i s to determ ine itself, i . e . to neg ate . Th u s the incarnation of a perspective i s at once, for the ongoing un ity , the greatest ris k of being ri ven (i . e . the so urce of the w orst violence) and , simul­ taneousl y , what will rev eal itself as pure nothingnes s (reciproc al negation ) from the v iewpoint of the re al i zed mediation. The m ea n ing of the confl ict disappears then , since the compartmentali zation s are broken in aid of the . un ified s ynthe s i s : people no l onger understand l i teral l y why they were fi ghti ng . Th i s means that, from the standpoint of future plenitude , total ization w i l l appear never to have be en brou ght i nto pl ay other th an by unthi nkable li mits , by absol ute pos i ti on s that were merely un fulfi lment. Late r, the hi stori an reconstituting the truth will understand that these absol ute po s i tions were not t he mere , empty n egati vi ty that in a rev eal ed itself as their reality after medi atio n , but the neces sity totally practical total ization that ev erything , inc l ud i ng the negations th em selves , should real i ze itself th rough praxis , i . e . here through struggle. I t i s never t he actual difference th at posits i t s e l f for itse I f i n its negative de termination s . I t i s the sub-group that posits i t by positing i tself and th i s v e ry act of positing i s indist ingui shable from the first bl ows it stri ke s at its adversary . Thu s medi ation seems si mply to negate an i nconsi stent negation, to expl ode l i m i t s . In fact , th i s Hege l ian c onception could have a mean i ng only if th e di alectic were a transcendent real i ty , a s uprah uman d e v e l o p m e n t . To med iate i s not j ust to fu se the multiple a spects of the problem into a synthetic u n i t y i . e . fi nd the sol ution to i t . I t i s to h a ve th is solu tio n accepted by two [ s ub- J gro ups w h i c h _ a s s um i ng respon­ sibil i ty fo r the d i ffe re n c e s , have eventual ly produced th ems e lves i n their origin al i ty by the se v e ry d ifference s , i n as m u ch a s the y m anoeuvre to

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s uppre ss contrary perspective s . Contradiction i s born i n thi s way : it is neces sary for the sis and antithe s i s , in fac t, to be the twofold practical perspective that two ensembl e s adopt towards one another; the substance of contradiction is prac tic al rec iproc ity , i. e . the invention of de structive tactic s w hich in each are the actualization of the contradictory . Thi s i s why the limits separating one partial aspect from another are simul­ tan eously inc ons i s te nt negations , from the v i ewpoint of the mediation already accompli shed , and the sole h uman rea lity of the contradictory : i .e . its practical e x istence, by men and for them . From the point of v iew of the new unity , in fact, it seems that the di vergences (as inert givens of the problem) h ave engendered the conflict. B ut in fact, as we have seen , t he divergence is immediate ly practical and it is actuall y confl ict which determines it as contradiction , by communic ating all human v iolence to it. S imilarly , mediation in the more or le s s protracted struggle to which sees only a m uddled series of manoe uvres and it has j u st put an end counter-manoeuvre s , whose sole res ult was to 'harden pos itions ' and make conc il i ation more difficult by the day . B ut we now know that the most insignificant moments of the battle so far as both adversarie s are concerned are an incarnation of the entire struggle and a practical actualization , in this very presen t, of the contradiction in its dev elopment. No matter. It i s s ignificant that past struggles should present them ­ selves as a superficial disturbance of the unity of uni fic ation : i . e . that unity shou l d appear the s ubstance, and disunity the contingenc y that can occur on ly supported by the substance . For there have never been two each positing unitie s , j ust two w ay s of real izing the same un i fication itself as the exclusion of the other. Ev erything thu s take s place through the real unwinding of particular action s , produced by indiv iduals and the [ s ub- ] groups constituted by them as though unity itself were unfolding its own diffic ulties and sharpen ing them into contradictions , the better to specify them and finally break their l imits . For what must not be for­ gotten is that unity is practical : i t i s perpetually maintained and tightened by and for g lobal ac tion. If we had to accept it (other than meta­ phorically) as a s ubstantial real ity it would be impossible to understand it spl i tting and oppo sing itself. B ut if it i s , i n fact, the common project in e ach person here and every w here in the group then we understand that th i s project is precisely the sam e in the sub-groups obliged by the total dev elopment of prax is to produce them s e l ves as adversaries� and that i t con s ti tu tes the moti ve and signi fication of the con fl ict. These con s i derations authorize no ideal i st optimism . N othing proves that mediation must alw ay s take place . Quite the contrary , it pre sents i tself as a particular case of prax i s ; and we hav e envi sage d i t only the better to show the movement of total i zati on at the very heart of the confl ict. But it ofte n happen s t hat one of the s ub- grou p s l i quidate s the �

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other. I t goes without saying that everyth ing depends o n the circ um ­ stances and the structures . If the c onflict occu rs on one of the lower echelons o f a very stro n gly hierarchized group, mediation i s all the mo re l ikel y in that it i s often a recognized functi o n of certai n organs of the upp er echelons . Which does not mean that thi s medi ation i s neces s aril y a synthetic tran scendence of the oppos ing perspectives . The arbiter may be prejudiced i n favour of one of the advers aries. H i s concern for u ni ty may i nduce h im to do v i olence to both s ide s , without taking account of the parti al t ruth which eac h repre sents . He m ay inasmuch as h i s wo rk has produced him and prov ided h i m with certai n in s truments of action and not be capable of comprehending the prob lem ; m ay at once though t invent a fal se (Le. incomplete) transcendenc e . For he has to worry les s about the s ingu lar details of the conflic t than about the objective exigency that is manifes ted through him, as an e x i gency of the totalizing action itself at thi s stage of development. For example , he has to grasp , as fundamental unity of t he struggle , the practical obligation to adapt these organs to the new tasks that p raxi s throws up . When mediation i s imperfec t, the objecti v e problem of internal reorganization subsi sts in its ori g inal form or i n another: the s truggle con tinues bet w een the [ sub-] groups that started it, or else it is disp laced and shifts to another sector, or a gain it w idens and involves the entire group. A l l thi s i n no way prevents the prac tical deve lopment from rem aining intelligible. The comprehension of action obv iously implies that of its fa ilure : the latter, in other word s , presents itself as a comprehen sible limit of compre­ he n sion , in so far as this is defi ned as the project re veal ing itself on the basi s of i ts objectives and through ac tion ; there i s a s igni fi cation of every fai lure and e ach one incarnate s , in the group , the v ery difficulties of totalization . In the same way, if medi ati on does not occur and the two s ub-gro u p s rem ain confrontin g each other al one either for lack of med i at o ry organisms or be cause, ultimate ly , th e str uggl e through them pits one p art in te l l i gibi lity doe s not the refore of the group aga i n st al l the rest disappear. At first, in fact, ab sence of mediation i s a real factor onl y if mediation is pos sible but re fu sed. If the struc ture s of the g roup do not di s ­ inc l ud e thi s pos s ibili t y, the movement of comprehension m ust regardin g a non-be ing of exteri ority compr ehend the rea l movement that engenders a non-mediated confli c t. Thi s means that the objective ex igenc y will be grasped, v i a the adversari e s ' action s , as demanding th is struggle in a group de fi ned by these structure s . And as these structures and th is e x igency are p roduced at di fferent moments of the totalizing praxi s , the comprehension of this struggle i s identified with that of the global praxi s as an ongoing temporalization. On the other hand , in thi s struggle which for want of arbi tration r i sks becoming a struggle to the

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death , it would be tempti ng to believe that we shal l fi nd noth i ng re sembling the intell igib i l ity of mediatio n a s a prax i s of dialectical reuni fi c ation by inve ntion of the solution to the problems . B ut that is only partially correct. To be s ure , it may happen i n spec i fi c circumstances that the conflict ends in a schism . The break-up of a group obv iously cannot pass for a po sitive sol uti on of its contradiction s : on the contrary, it manifests the non -tran scendability of the positions taken up. B ut we must first understand that every unificati o n , by the movement that d i s sociates i t w i thin the group , really places itself i n d anger. The oppos ition between sub-groups is actually the only way i n w h ic h the grou p c an ac tual ize the practico-inert ris k s of break -u p determine d at every moment by action . I n other words , that opposition i s reuni fi c ation itself, inasmuc h as circum­ stances obl ige it to split with i n the totali zation . In that c ase, it i s easy to understand that the sch i sm i s determined at once by the problem itself (inasmuch as th i s does not incl ude a solution i n the c irc umstance s in which it i s propo sed) , by the i mpos sibi l ity recogn i zed i n practice of l iqui dating e i ther one of the adversaries , and by what we shall call the fragi l ity of t h e g roup. Thi s frag i l ity has come to it through action . It has been slowl y determined by the internal action of counter- final ities . It ends up qua lify ­ ing (by brakings , s udden starts , reversal s , losses of speed , etc . ) the prax is that maintains and aggrav ate s i t while transcending it. The slowness and insecurity of communicati ons between Rome and Byzantium , the geo­ p olitical and soc ial necessity for those two rel igious centres to live two separate hi storical destinie s , the very clear- c ut differences that pitt ed Eastern again st Western Christians al l the s e were factors of break - up w ithin Chri sti an i ty . But the se factors the m selves h ad been at l east partiall y engendered by the Church ' s prax i s : the c onstruc tion of B yzantium was a rel igious act, which until the sch i sm nev er ceased to intensify its counter­ final ities ; evangel ization of the East and Barbarian convers ions accen­ tuated the heterogeneity of the ' mi lieux ' and through a quite norm al the n e w faithful transformed the faith . B ut if one seeks to backlash understand how the prax i s of the Church M i l i tant progress i vely defi ned i tself, starting from its origi n s , by tran scendence and uti l ization of situati on s that it was produc i n g , one w i l l gradually see frag i l ity being engen dered as an obj ecti ve struc ture , changing i nto fi s s ure , be ing re solv ed as break-up: all that, of course, i n partic u lar acts and through them. At once, sch ism appeared a s a solutio n . That which, for a th ird party , to ok place as a break - up was prod uced b y eac h re l i giou s comm unity as an a mp u tation . Each recovered i ts u n i t y puri fied by the expu l s ion of the other. Each defi ne d itself as p e rp e t ua t in g the unity o f the or i g i n al Churc h . And, indeed, each l ived and reali zed th i s di s s oc i a t i on as a reun i fi c ation . Fronl the standpoint of each g roup , the prax i s was not fu n dament a l l y

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diffe rent from the exclusion through which a community recov ers its i ntegrity by expelling unassimi lable elements . B ut the difference i s apparent to a third party , because thi s time the exclusion was reciprocal * H enceforward , the problem of intell igibil ity i s tr an sformed : it is no longer a q uestion of showing that dual ity i n u nity i s intelligible, since there are prec isely (l'VO dist i nct uniti e s . It is sti l l nec e s s ary to understand the proce s s that tran s formed the split un i ty into two separate w ho le s : i . e . the final pass age from struggle to separation B ut i n s o fa r as praxi s actual i zed inert obj ec t i v i ty , the intel l igib i l i ty of the ruptu re remain s whole. The twofold dec is ion as the fi nal moment of totali zati on actualized th i s last state of intern al obj ectiv ity . B etween the sub - groups in conflict, the prac tico - i nert had become the sole real mediati on. In othe r words , it i s never the strugg le that directly produce s the rift , as it remain s a unifi catory movement to the end . Quite the contrary : it i s the mean ingle s sness of the s t ruggle and the impo s s i b i l ity of effectively that are actual ized and transcended by the p u rsuing it and winning rupture. So we find here the moment of the anti - dialectic alien ation of the fighters by the counter- fi n al ities secreted by the fi ght as fai l ure of the an t agoni s t ic dial ectic , and the transcendence of thi s negation by the rupture that actual iz e s i t i . e . causes it to pass into the world of human prax i s as ' aufgehohen ' . The anti -dialectic a s mediation by the practico i nert i s incorporated by the dialectical movement of dec i sion, which tran sform s this non-human mediation i nto two human refusals of any medi a t ion .

.

�.-

­

.

•

Does the Victory 0 One Sub-Group over Anoth er A lways Have a Meaning ? On the other hand , when one [ sub- ]group gains v icto ry by l iquidating the othe r, one cannot avoid po s ing the question of tran scendence. For it i s abov e all a synth et i c reunification of the split unity And th i s v ictory in the te m pora l i z ation of the str ugg l e w ith in the group places itself beyon d the ac tual confl ict, as its term and its sol ution I ndeed, the ri sk of break-up for all tha t the confl ict may re e merge for other reasons and i s , so far as thi s spec ific event i s concerned, between other organs totally annih ilated. In thi s way the i rreversib i l ity of temporal ization i s h i ghl i ghted : th is ' afterwards ' i s con stituted as the diachronic total ization of a l l the s ynthetic al ly l inked ' he/ores ' that culminate in i t (we sh al l .

.

-

I n c e rtain c a se s , t h e e x c l u s i on re m ai n "i u n i v o c a l b u t t h e e x c l u ded are 5, ub�eq u e n t l y regro u p e d to c o n � t i t u t e a s c h i s m at i c gro u p . *

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come back to thi s point when w e speak of diachronic totali zation and its intelligibil ity 1 5 ) . For the v ictori ous sub-group is itself produced by its v ictory as oth er than it w as . Its importance w ithi n the group has grown steadil y ; its v ictory has determined new atti tudes towards i t (hostile or friendly, respectful or indignant, uniform or themselve s contradi ctory, i t m atters little) o n the part of all the other sub- groups and al l the common indiv idual s . In other word s , its reali ty -for-the -other, the n e w obligations created by its n e w situ ation , the ensemble of communication s that have been establ ished (between i t and everybody , between it and the total­ ization) , the internal currents, the tensions everything i n short, right up to the modifications introduced by the very fact of its v ictory into the structures of common action everyth i ng de s ignates it as the distinctive pro duct of its victory. It has to interiori ze i t as a new i nner ten sion i .e . as a redistribution of force s i n its i nternal force field in order to re­ e x teriorize it as the practi ce that its new status demands . In short, in a certain man ner i t envelops with i n itself the sub-group i t has j ust de stroyed. At first, i n fact i n the event of destruction aimed at the organ w ithout affecting the individuals i t m ay perhaps incorporate part of the members of the liqui date d organization ( sometimes even the majority ) . B ut above all it necessarily i nherits whether the liquidation concerned the sub-group as such, or w as accompanied by an e x termination attributions of the v ani shed organi sm, and must fulfil the functions the l atter u sed to fulfi l . * So i t will aggregate i ts own offices w ith those of the defe ated body , and thi s aggre gation can not be maintained for a moment w i thout a syn thetic rew orking of all offi c e s i n relation to one another. B y this very mean s the victor acquires a growing complexity , s i nce ultimately by the ex igency of common praxi s it i s g iven notice to ab sorb and repre sent the d i s solved communi ty w i thin a new unity . In certain countri e s , the Communist Party or some other authoritarian and central ized left­ wing party has eliminated the formations of the Far Left (leftists) , along w ith the democratic parties (soc ial democracy , etc . ) that u sed to consti tute the right of the Left . All these parties u sed to govern together a nd, de spite their differences , praxis unite d them . When a series of c ontradi ctions i nduced the strongest to l iquidate the rest, re maining al one i t found itself compelled to become at once i ts own right and its own left. Or. if you prefer, prax i s itself generated within it a sectarian

* At least prov i s i o nally and u ntil the g ro u p as a w ho l e has shared out these att r i butions

among v ari o u s s u b - g ro u p s , or c re ated a new s ub- gro u p to fi l l them w h i c h no longer h as to ( o r is deemed not to h ave to) oppose the old one .

1 5 . See Preface above .

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lefti sm, a right opportun ism and a central and centrali zed mediation , whose function finally revealed itself in all its c om ple xity . For it was neces sary to reconcile the e x tremes ; to e xploit their divergences ; to uti lize one or other of them when prax is required a change of personne l , wi thout ever allowing a s uccess to ben efi t one wing at the expense of the other in short , to di scover the situation , the problems and the obj ective exigenc ies w i th the he lp of the practical knowledge of both i n order to realize a l l pers p ectives before uniting them in the s ame tran scendence . Thi s centrali zed, authoritarian party , re fusing con fliets , interiorized the opposition while submitting it to the iron rules of un ity . It interiorized i t in order to make use of it, i n so far as by liq u i dating the other parties , more harmful than useful to prax i s it had to fi l l th e void cre ated by a control led differentiation. One m u st not im ag ine a concerted operation . B ut, for exampl e , when the right of the left exi sted , in every c i rc um stance it us ed to adopt a position that became ' ri g hti st ' for the opportunists of the Communist P arty . The l atter would be reassured, despite them selve s , because th i s position re straining, or more flex ible, or s i mp ly dic tated by the i nterests of broader layers of the population was actual l y adopted, and its actualization obliged the Communi st Party to decl are itself i n relation to it. B ut at once th i s he s i tant or timid p osition was being real ized i n and by a political group alien to t he Party, and in rel ation to which they defi ned themselves neg atively (as temporary al lies , etc . ) . They had no need themse.lves to produce that particu lar po litical motion , since the ri ght w as taking care of it and th e Communi st Party would ' tak e it into account, in o rder to preserve the union of the popular partie s. So they would n ot recognize it as their ini tiative and, i ndeed, it was not theirs. Their opportunism , c ut off from them and negated , would be developed in and through another sub-group partly ' fellow -travelling ' , partly hostile. As for them, there fore , they could inte grate them selves strong l y into the Party their p arty and manifest, on the contrary , the common intran sigence (or a commo n flexibility, inasmuch as th is presented itself as provis ionally neces sar y i n order to keep al lies). The void on the right which they had contributed to produc in g i n the undifferentiated un i ty of a battle or a coup d' eta t abruptl y qualified them . With no b ody any longer putting fo rw ard oppor­ tun ist mot ion s , they bec ame the opport uni sts they were . The adv e rsary ­ al ly had formerly i ncarnated the i r apprehensions about the rapid pace for example of col lec tivization in the country s ide . Once he disappeared, th at apprehen s ion which had formerly b een th e i r s as other became their own apprehension. Th rough them , the s oc i a l -dem o c rat i c party reappeared i n a fo rm ob v i o u s l y m o re ' i ntegrated ' and without r e al contours i n s i de t h e C omm uni st Part y . Of c o u r s e d i s t i ng u i s h i n g i t from t he re st s uch i nteri orization i s at the s am e t i m e a de n at u ri n g . I t i s i n the name of "

,

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the Party ' s aim s that opportunism will be produced i n partic u l ar attitude s and propositions (this simple fact must suffice to differenti ate it: it i s a n attitude that has really been de fined for Communists , by th e m and withi n the Party , i n the perspect iv e of common objective s ) . Thi s producti on , though , has been effected through liquidation of the adversary and as interiorization of an absenc e . I t may be arg ued (and thi s is true) that th e circumstances of the ir p ersonal h i story and above al l, as we have see n, the ir function s in the Party and the ir history as common indiv idual s had already determi ned the m as opportun ists . B ut it can equa lly wel l be arg ued that without the Communist Party victory thi s opportunism woul d not hav e had the opportunity to manifest itself i n practice . W h ich mean s , i n real i ty , that it vvo u ld not have been e v en as hexis. For each member of the Party would have remained s ubj ect to a c ertain pre s sure internal to the latter, and itself conditioned by the pre sence of the allie d groups. However, if it is certain that the v i c torious sub-group transcends itself by transcend i ng the defe ated one , whose tasks and functions it ass ume s in a new unity , the liquidation of one of the terms of the split unity b y the other can be cons idered i n itse lf as a tran scendence only if, through it, the prax i s of the whole grou p is tran scended towards a moment of tighter integrati on , more adv anced differentiation and greater effective­ ne s s in rel ation to its Inain objective s . Ev erything comes back to wonder­ ing whether victory al way s has a m ean i n g : i .e . if it al way s expresses a progre s s , from the stan dpoint of common action. * Perh aps o ne might be tempted to reply that th i s depends on situations and circ umstances and doubtless one would not be whol ly wrong . Yet the problem of inte l lig ibi lity must be e nv i s aged i n an a priori critical inve sti gation, i n this case as in al l others . And that mean s , here , that it is neces sary to determine the limits with in which the varied po ss ibi l ities resulting fro m vic tory must be kept , if they are to be i nte l l igible. There are two attitude s that must be rejected equal l y , bec au se both rest upon dogmatic pre suppos itions : op timism and pess imi sm. Pe s s imism , in the c ase that concerns u s , is le ss the as serti on o f Ev i l tha n a di sorder which allows Ev il to tri umph more often than Good . Go od must be understood as the steady progre s s of the undertaki ng � Ev il as i ts regre s s ion and i nvolution . From th i s poi nt of v i e w , v ictory depending on fortuitous circum stanc e s , on acc i dents is in itself accide ntal . Not onl y i s it not i n itself t h e deep mean ing of the struggl e , but we may c onceive to o that it probably has n o signifi c ation (other than that of the dated event

*

I am h e r e t a k i n g

·

progre � s ' i n i t � s i m p l e q � e n s e . I m e a n by the w ord : irre v e rs i b l e

p r o g re s � i on t o w ard� a fi xe d e n d .

I

e de v e lopment of the act i n pro g re s �

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wh ich has made it possible ) . We must poin t out, however, that we are not yet cons idering the struggle i n large en sembles presenting them selves (at least at fi rst s i ght) as non-total i zable , but in the i ntern al force field of the practical total ization cal led a group . It i s al re ady obvious that the inten sity and v iolence of thi s struggle will be proportionate to the urgency of i ts tasks, the external dan gers and its intern al strengt h of integration . And the latter, i n turn , expresses the determination of the c ommon i ndividuals and the ir pledge to c arry the enterpri se through. Victory , of course as a fina l moment of temporali zation is singu lar: it appears as a un ique a nd dated event manifesting its c ontingency rather th a n its necess ity . B ut al so , no one is crazy enough to expect it to appear with the abstract harshne s s , rig our and transluc idity of a log ical consequence. The human event is at once contingent and necessary . Its facticity product of the fundamental fac tic ity of hi storical agents c an be defi ned as the nece s s i ty of its contingenc y . B ut inasmuch as it i s actualized as the in carnation of a group i n action it manife sts the i . e . of an ongoing totali zation contingency of its nece ssi ty : that i t is nec e s sary for its nece s sity to take the form of contingenc y , preci sely in so far as thi s n ece s s i ty i s produced as a real determi nation of the concrete . Everything i s ne w in th i s victory, but i t cannot be produced without inc arnating as an i nternal and local temporal ization a certain moment of the ongoing total ization . The v ictor i ncarnate s the group , prec isely in so far as the v ictory is a triumph of unity over di s soc iation . Converse l y , victory can fal l only to the sub­ group that incarnate s the true movement of prax is to reabsorb its i nner dual ity. If we imagine a cl ash between patrols during a war, it is and has often happened perfectl y conce ivable that the weaker and less well-armed un it will defeat an adversary superior in every re spect, thanks to an element of surpri se for which it is not even re spon sibl e : the chance of their resp ective route s has simply meant that it saw the other patrol before being s potted by it. In th i s case , the outcome i s non ­ signify ing . But that i s because i t i nvolves two micro-organisms w hi c h do not belong to the same ensembl e , and whose c l ash can only be acc idental. If t he fi nal v i ctory of one arm y over another i s e nv i saged , or of one group of nation s over another, we shal l see that the question i s posed 1 very differe ntl y . 6 B ut i n any case , these two patrol s are lost i n the solitude of a no-man ' s- land . F rom th i s standpoint, moreov er, chance take s on a signi fication agai n . S uch skirmishes are dubious i n them selves an d fundamental l y , si nce the patro l s are l i nked only by i nert or practico­ inert mediation s ; if one of them is de stroyed by ' th e hazard s of war' , the neces s i ty of that destruc tion is located at a lo wer level i t i s the

1 6 . T h e �e q u e � t l o n s were n e v e r d e d i t w i th , s i n c e t h e w ork rem a i ned uncom p l e te d .

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objectification of a concerted proj ect (the chosen route) an d its alienation in the p ractico- inert, inasmuch as the nature of the terrain p l aces one o f the patrol s at the mercy of the other. On the other hand, when i t i s a matter of one sub -group strugglin g against anothe r, the struggle i s kept ins ide t h e group; and i t i s produced , of course, on the basi s of counter- finalities and make s itself the fre e expre s s i on of practico - i nert exigencies. B ut even were no organ o f mediation to e x i st, even were no concerted mediation to be attempted o r pos s ible, i t sti l l prec i sel y remai ns the case th at struggle i s itself a medi ated activ i ty. For i t take s place i n a human and practical m i l ieu. A l l the other sub- groups , i nasmuch as they total i ze each i n its own way the develop m ent of the confl ict w i thin t he perspect ive of their ow n obj ectives and the objectives of the group ; all the common indiv idual s , i nasmuch as e ach of them i s the group itself here and now ; the total ize d en semble of these indiv idual s and these [ s ub- ] groups� finally the grou p i tself, i nasmuch as it supp ort s , encompas se s and penetrate s each enem y [ sub- ] group th rough the practi cal unity of the total i zing action : al l the s e consti tuent and cons ti tuted d i alectics form the mov ing field of the battle, tw o the l i v ing de n s i ty of the mediati on s . Thi s s i mple oleograph m i l itary facti ons vy ing for command in a be si eged city during the i s al l that i s needed to show from the outset to wh at ' Ital ian w ars extent interna l struggle is a function of common action . In fact, it i s through the vic i s si tude s of the defence m growing pres s ure from th e enem y , proble m s of supp l y , aborti ve sort i e s , attacks repul sed . that th e struggle of the two factions unfolds, as a se ri e s of internal determination s i nscribed tran sversally w ithi n every mi litary operati on and ev ery even t : i n short, as a lateral temporal i zation wh ich often remains h idden from the hi storian by the overall temporal i zation, or appears as a s i mple s i ngul ari zatio n of that common temporal i zation i . e . as a certain s econdary q ua l i t y of si ngulari ty . If, on t he oth e r h and , on e con s i ders i t i n itself, the whole common event i s pre sent in i t at ev ery i n stant as i t s fundamental structure , its meani n g , its ' c urvature ' and i t s i nti mate contexture and i s what de c i de s on its ten s i on . From thi s s t andpo i n t , t he v icissitudes of the partic u lar struggl e are determ i ned b y th e common event, v i a wh ose med iation a mi stake on the part of the faction i n po wer i s produced as an obj e c t iv e superio rity of the rival faction . For th i s ver y re ason we enc o unter another mediation , s i nc e s u c h s u periori t y i s obj ective only by v i rt ue o f the attitude of the s o l d i e r s defe n d i ng th e town and to a variab l e extent that of the c i v i l i an s . A l l t h e s e men i n groups or masses - determ ine the s u p e ri ori t y of t h e s u b - g ro u p which has not gone w rong , in asmuch a � the y are the m s e l v e s p o l a ri z e d by t h e s tru g g l e agains t t h e be s i e ger. A nd the i m po rtance of t h at s u pe r i o r i t y , i t s obj e c ti v e fo rc e , d e pe nd s upon t h e o bj e c t i v e � eri c u s n e s s of t h e m i stake (for the outcome �

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of the common fight) and upon the urgency w ith which its real and pos sible consequences are l ived by all incl uding the ' forces of order ' , i . e . the coercive bodies at the di sposal of the faction i n power. Thi s practical attitude (which engenders a regro upment i n the total izing organ ­ izat ion itself) i s the product of a twofold move ment of i nteriorization and re-exteriorization for each [ s ub- ] group or co mmon indiv idual of the global event itself. If some a ttack has almost s uc ceeded because a particular spot was left unprotected or c au ght off guard, the c apture of the town which suddenly became the immediate future , but was finally is av oided (perhaps through an initi ative of the opposing faction ) preci sely what i s tran sformed i nto i nternal ten sion. It i s discovered as an immedi ate ly pos sible though at the last mome n t rejected de stin y , but one which may impose itself from one i nstant to the ne xt. The rejection of that destiny , for each i ndiv idual , is identical to h i s rej ection of death for himself and all his fellow-c itizens. And the distrust, the anger at their leaders and the ho pe pl aced i n the rival faction are budding actions i .e . the practical inception of an internal reorgan ization. Via the medi ation of all, the ev ent determ ines the sub- groups i n struggle , favouring one and handicapping the other. Thi s twofold determination is fundamental . I n an organized group , in the absence of any arbitration and i n c ases w he re schism is impo s s ible (the s iege of the town , for e x ampl e , would make it inconceivable : the threat of total ex termi nation represented by the enemy i s inte riori zed i n the tow n as indi s soluble unity until vi ctory) , the liquidatory sub-group imposes its unifi cation on the other thanks to the s upport ( taci t or effective) of the community as a whole or i n its maj ority . No bid for power is conceivable so long as the com munity as a whole back s the organisms th at make i t effecti v e . Or else, if c hance and the p ractico-in ert allow one faction to destroy the other, it w i l l be destroyed in its turn and the community wi l l restore the old forms . Within the group, action i n its pre sent re ali ty as a particular synthes i s of positive and negative results - controls the struggle of the partic ular organs through each indiv idual . Conversely , each faction fights against the other by seeking to win allies . It is not nece ssarily a matter of gaining the support of the total ity of common indiv idual s (for examp le, of the rank-and-fi le soldiers or of the ' humbler classes ' in the town) . B ut the fi ght for a lliances reveals the actual structure of the group (and its hi storica l signification) through the option s manifested in it. For, by the se options , the h ierarchy of powers re -produces itself in practice and confirm s itself. In certai n cases , it w ill be enough to ens ure the support of other sub-groups directly above or below i n the hierarchy . The total i ty of common individual s , grasped precisely outside of the organs that separate them and as semble them according to ru le s , may not count for anyth i n g . At other ti me s , it alone

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decide s . It i s the ensemble of c i rcumstances ( present and past) which decide s , in the l i ght of the future as de stiny an d po ss ibi lity . For u s , in any case , one thing counts and one alone : al l ianc e s w ill be forged on the basis of various condition s that m us t be s i multaneously given. F irst, a certain homogene ity between function s and proj ects : i t must be pos sible to reconc ile the practical perspectives of each organ as such . Secondly, a 1 7 real agreement between interests. We saw earl ier what an intere st i s . In a sub-group , it i s its objective be i ng in the internal field, inasmuch as it e scape s it and is threatened by other s ub-groups and, at the v ery same time, constitutes itself as the obj ective pos s ibil ity of increas ing i ts action and incarnating the totalizing action more w idely , more preci sely and more effective l y . So what we have here i s the victory of one faction over another, manifesting itself as a general reorgan ization carried out i n a common perspec tive by an en semble of united organ s, and in thi s sense be ing produced as the reappearance of the reun ified unity in the v ictorious sub-group, inasmuch as it d irects the battle . In thi s sense, the l i quidation of the defeate d sub-group fol lows hard upon i ts dt's- incarna tion . Re­ grouping them selve s around the othe r, the organisms or common indi­ v idual s strip the defeated s ub-gro up from without and from w ithin of i ts power l ike w i se to incarnate the di ssoc i ated unity on the path to reunification . B efore the last as saults, it i s alrea dy no longer anyth ing but a body alien to the group, w hich the community is obliged to digest or eliminate in order to achieve its reunification. The third condition i s the emergency or as we have seen the exigencie s of the ongoi ng action , its risks of ending i n fai lure , etc . The bond that unites the se conditions i s naturally dial ectical , and they all react upon one another i n the synthetic unity of prax i s . B ut the fundamental dec i sion belongs to the common action ; or rather, every other condi tion is like a threshold to be crossed, and the level of thi s thresho ld varies according to the common emer­ gencies and common dangers . From thi s standpoint, the v i c tory by l iquidation is di alectically intel ­ l igible . For i t is produced as the reunification of the di s soc iated unity , through the regrouping of organs and indi v idual s according to ne w common perspectives, and under the interi ori zed pres sure of the emer­ gencies and dangers characteri zi ng the development of the total prax i s . To be s ure , there are pas sive resi stances related to the practico-inert. The impotence of certain organs , in institutional ized group s , corre sponds to the strength and efficacy of the apparatuses of coerc ion control led by the sovereign or the ruling sub-group s . Traditions can separate and often brake movements of reun ifica tion , etc . In all cases , howev er, i t i s

1 7 . Cntlque , v o l . l , p. 1 97

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a question of th resholds to be crossed which common dangers c an lower. The orga ns of coercion , by interiorizing a partial defeat of the community , can be turned back ag ainst the power they support. Traditions can be dis solved within the ongoing u n i fication . S ub-groups in fusio n c an be constitu ted, by the d i ssolution of s u b-groups organized and separated by the l i mits of their powers . And so on . Thu s victory is a t ranscendence by diffuse mediation of the entire grou p : v i a thi s mediation , one of the te rm s of the contradiction l iquidates the other; but by this l iquidation and even in the event of its occurring as extermination it absorbs it and itself becomes the synthe s i s th at transcends at once the the s i s and the an tithe s i s . It is also nece ssary for thi s transcendence of itself and the othe r to be practical: i . e . to be realized through co ncerted manoeuvre s , operation s and a tac tic . It i s not eno ugh for the oppos itional faction to benefi t pas s ively from the adv antage gained by the rulin g faction ' s m i stake s it must exploit it. We are returned here to free praxi s , to invention , to singular incarnation. Pe rhap s the actual history o f thi s facti on, the di sagree­ men ts that paralyse it, the m i l ieu where it has recruited its members (and, for example , a certain i deali st tim i dity , whose ori g i n is to be sought i n the material c i rcumstances c onditioning that mil ie u , or else a certain incompetence wh ose source s are similar) , or simp l y the internal structure of t he sub-group (the difficulty of l iai son and the s lowness of communications resulting from thi s , which i n tu rn conditions the pos s i ­ bil ity of taking dec i sions) perhaps all the s e factors , still others, or j u st one of them , are expres sed by an ill-adapted prac tice , l agging behind events and p erp etual l y ineffective , or e ven by nega tiv\e re s ults . B ut it m ust first be obs erved that the errors, failings and g aps of thi s pr ax i s are precisely intelligible as negati ve determinations, i n so far as thi s prax i s i s in fact praxis-process; hence in so far as the i n ternal compos i tion of the sub-group , and its objecti ve re lati ons with all the other organs , con stitute an inert objectiv ity e n countered as th e immanent limit of its practic al transce n dence. For there real l y are transcende nc e , invention and illumination of the prac tical problem (by th e sub-group, and by the common indiv idual s who are its members ) . B ut what i s alway s striking after the eve nt, in common prax i s , i s that it al way s pre sents itself as a free tran scendence transcendi ng materi al c ircu m stances but going to a certain poin t and n o further. even taking From the s itu ated v iewpoi nt of the h i s torian , i n fact account of all that we do not know and the imperfections of our i ntellectual tools i t i s often obv ious that those respon s ible for an action ' could have ' undertaken it on rather di fferen t grounds, taken account of ri sks that the y neglected , calc u l ated th e objective res ults of the action thanks to that and to the choice of more performed , and above al l

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effective means - carried it through to its di stant completion, i nstead of halting on the way. I n the a c tual c onception of a plan there is a negative determination, an imperceptibl e limit thatfor us i s confused w ith in vention itself. B ut invention i s preci sely onl y another name for the dialectical transcendence of a given [d' un donne] . And i n so far as it i s preci sely i .e . the e n semble of soci al fields in a th is given that it transcends perspective that i s actuali zed through the proj ect it remains qualified by the data [les donnees] that it synthe size s . I n so far as the end i s a synthesis of the mean s , action i s the synthetic unity of th e given e nsemble (exigencies, ris k s , difficulties and av ailable mean s ) , inasmuch as it tran ­ scends the l atter towards that end. B ut transcendence is nothing but transformation i nto co ncrete prac tic e : each operation i s totali zation and c ompre ssion of all the g iven into a transce ndent relati onship of regulated transformation of the practical fi eld. Thu s the l im its of tran scendence are, on the one hand, the transcended data and, on the other, the transcendent s tructures of the practical field: you do not transcend any old thing tow ards any old thin g , but preci se l y th is towards that. Compre­ hension of the l imits of action i s alway s pos sibl e , s ince comprehension i s nothing but praxi s grasping itself on the bas i s of determined ends and limits that singularize it. I n a room c ontai ning a damaged fan , to compre­ hend the action of the man who gets up to open the w indow despite the w in d and rain mean s rec alling i n the c omprehen sive proj ect the fact that the fan i s out of order. Like w i se , to comprehend a leader taking a certain dec i sion, whereas the obj ective s ituation s ugge sted another ( and d oubtless better) one , i s to i nteriori ze i n the comprehensive proj ect the fact that the absence of certai n intellectual tool s , or the pre s ence of a c ertai n hexis based on the i nitial pledge , must have restricted from w i th i n the range and wealth of options . It must als o be rem embered that there i s no comprehen sion based on negations of e x teriority : the absence o f too l s s hould s i mply prompt a a wholly external qualification reproduction of ideative and practical approaches on the bas i s of the tool s actually used. B ut we can precisely grasp the sign i fi cation of these - and of their ' avai l ability ' to the agent o n the bas i s o f the latter' s h i story, inasmuch as this i s grasped through that o f t he group , as a s i ng ular incarn ation . Thus, to comprehend how the s ub-group exploits the situation and , for example , the advantages thi s offers it i s to comprehend an action i n its two aspects: i .e . in what i t has that i s new and irreducibl e , and al so in the determinati ons sing ulari z i ng it. It must be added , moreov er, that the determinati ons mark insuperable limits fo r th e moment, but do not strictly dec ide the act. There are these frontiers , these ' habits ' , these pre cisely i n so far as mean s and the s e ex igenci e s of the obj ect. B ut a ction tran scend s its own l i m i ts and envel ops them, onl y to fi nd them

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the practical again as enveloped limits of their own transcendence option remains unpredictable , inasmuch as it is pos itive singularity and concrete novelty . Thi s unpredictabi lity i s an actual datum of compre ­ hen sion , prec i sely in so far as the latter far from pre senting itself as a present i ntuition constitute s itself as an undertaking that i s temporal i zed right up to the last moment of the prax i s to be comprehended . In short, the common indiv idual or the sub-group freely adopt as their own and as free determinations of themselves the inert structure s that condition them . And if one wi shes to grasp the ultimate mean ing of these, one w ill be referred bac k to the whole group and its hi story : i .e . s i multaneously to its practical temporal ization and to the counter- finalities thi s has secreted in it ( as well as to any prev ious attempts to s uppress these counter­ fi nal itie s ) . It is freely that this faction leader has de luded himself about the pos s ibil ities of h i s � band ' . It is freely that he has neglected to exploit thi s or that advantage . B ut th is mistaken asse ss ment gathers into itself, inc arnates and reproduces the sub-group as a whol e , including even its fundamental re lationship to the group that has produced it: this i s what make s it comprehen sible. In other words and sticking to our example i t has really underestimated the adv antage that the errors of the ri val faction gave to its own faction . But in so far as th is undere stimation is a deep expre s s ion of the obj ective structures of the adv antaged sub-group and its deep relationship with the group , it reveal s the sub- group ' s destiny as it produces it: to be defeated , because it let the opportuni ty s l ip . B ut by letting it slip, the sub-group proc laimed itself defe ated : it reproduced its ori ginal re lationship with the group i n the practical shape of hesitation, l ack of self-confidenc e , respect for legal ity , timidity in the face of the sovere ign faction, or quite simp l y incompetence . And thereby i t revealed a certain truth of the struggle : namely , that the group which had produced it could be inc arnated in i t only as an incarnation defe ated in adv ance; that the moment when the e nsemble of common individual s turned away from the ruling faction , to place the ir hope s i n the rival faction , could be on l y prov i s ional . The ambiguity , the transitory diffi ­ culties, the c omp lex problems that the oppositional faction had actuali zed in practice by its struggle desi gnated it from the outset, albeit invisi bly for defeat . It turned out , for example , that counter-fi nal ities had decided a di ssociation of unity that automatically pitted a solid organ , sol i dly s upported and eq u ipped with every tool, agai n st a secondary sub­ group , badly armed, whose internal unity itself was compromised by this abrupt promoti on . The latte r not widely known detached i t from the other s ub -groups an d made i t i ncapabl e of real ly attracting the tru st of all or w inning seri ous all ies . Or e l se i t found itse l f so s ituated, between the total i zed ensemble of common individual s and the rul i ng facti on , that its very si tuation debarred it from oppos i ti on : the rulers i mposed th emselves

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as an in carnation and an y opponents, by re veal ing themselv es as such , would hav e al armed al l their pos s i ble al l ie s ; the sl i ghte s t decl ared res i st­ a nce would have constituted them as fa cti ona lis ts hence , would h av e turn ed the common indiv idual away from the m, i n the name of the c ommon prax i s . The fact remai n s th at lat er, in an uncertain battle , the group did turn for an in stant tow ard s the m ; but their ' fatal ' hesitati on was a re- e xteri ori zation of the mistrust t he group had shown towards the m , which they had i nteriori zed as lack of confidence , inferiority com ple x , defeati st behav iour, etc . Through them, the group ' s ori ginal m i strust contrasted with t he c urrent tru st it di splayed in them and di squal ifie d it. I n a certain way , however, through that undere stimation the group reac he d a true es ti m ation of its relation ship w i th the sub­ group : it -vv o u ld n o t fo llovv it i n t o action . Fi rst , bec ause the atti tude of the ' factiona l i sts ' was not capable of swaying it. S econdl y , bec ause the trust it currently di spl ayed towards them was mere ly negative: only a fleetin g mi strust h ad turned the grou p away from i ts real leaders . The fi rst factor m ight appear l ike an outdated s urv ival , exerc i s i ng its brak i n g power: the group had changed, but the sub-group ha d kept its old determ ination s . And it i s true that there was a l ag here. B ut th e second factor refers u s back to the current c orrespondence betwee n the group and the sub-group . In positive term s , it may be said that through their he sitations the facti onali sts real i ze the v i s i bIe inc arnation of the group ' s actual1y un­ shaken tru st i n its leaders . There remain s , however, a slight gap between the diachron ic and the synchronic (we shall stud y th i s problem in its entirety below 1 8 ) , and i t re mai n s the case that th i s gap al l o w s a phantom of indetermination to subsist. The group tu rns to the factional i sts because of their attitude yesterday or the day b efore , but the fac tionali sts , disconcerted by the indiffe rence it di splayed to wards them the n , are not there to meet i t . And although there i s a p erfect correspondence between the ir hesitati ons and the entirely temporary character of the group ' s trust, it may be wo n dered whether an other faction , of a different cal i bre , would not have taken adv antage of thi s ral ly ing to their cause and on certain c ondition s tran sformed the temporary i nto someth ing defi nitive . In other wor d s , the group has dia c h ron ica l(v made other factionaI i sts impossible� but although i t h as hardl y c h anged , or the change is sti l l superfi cial · in the present and syn chronically i t doe s not reproduc e th i s impossibi l ity in its ful l rigour. I con fine my self here to signal l ing the ' gap . It represents , if y ou l i k e , th e ope n ing oj Histor)' . In an y c ase, it doe s not s uppress intel l i g i bility , si nce i t i s itse lf the product of a di alectical temporal i zati o n . O n l y , th e ope n in g i s secreted as inert objectivity, or i f

1 8.

S ee Pre fac e a bov e .

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1 you prefer (we shall come back to thi s) as dead-po ss ibility. 9 In s hort , it is the stronge st, craftiest and be st armed which wins . It crushes its ad versary becau se it invents the best manoeuvre s ; because it i s not fooled by the trap s l aid for it; because the losers fall regularl y into the t rap s it prepares for them . B ut it is endowed with th is strength and intelligence and skill via the mediation of the entire group : i . e . they express its mode of recruitment, its h i story , the ev olution of its structure s , and i ts fundamental relati onshi p w ith al l . And its victory i s not a con sequence of the past: requ ired by the developments of common praxi s already in scribed in the se devel opments , albeit invi sible it i s an ex igency of the future . We hav e shown that the struggle i s i ntell igible. B as ical l y , the fact i s that unity i s di ssoc iated within a vaster unity , i .e . that of the total ization­ of-envelopment. The inte l l igibilit y of the struggle appears as soon as it i s deciphered on the basis of th i s to tal i zatio n , and in the perspectiv e of the common prax i s . The total izing unity i s the permanent med i ation between the two terms of the di s soc iated unity : on the bas i s of it, the confl ict appears as sole possible soluti on to an i nert problem engendered by the counter-fi nal ities of praxi s . At thi s level , the rift take s on a ne w me aning: it i s the practical and h uman reinteriori zation of the separati on in exteriori ty produced by the practico-i nert . Th i s separation or negation of exteriority i s real i zed in molec ular solitude as a pure and s i mple absence of re lation ship between the term s (or, wh ich c ome s to the same thing, as a rei fication of relation s : we have seen th i s i n the practico- inert moment of investigation ) . Against it, the struggle i s produced as a negation of i . e. as a synthetic relation to t wo epicentre s immanence and thi s negati on of immanence reas sumes the separation of exteriority in the form of a twofold rev erse attempt at reuni fication . Contradiction appears here as the mean ing of the confl ict, i . e . as the h uman mov ement that tran scend s the ri s k of non -relati on towards the practical relation of the rift. Hatred, will to murder, refusal of reconc i l i ati on , are born as the human interiorization of inert material ity , when thi s materiali ty makes itself i n v i sibly into mediation i n the mil ieu of fraternity -terror. So the inte l l igibility of the struggle appears , when it i s considered through its very t ran scendence, as the unfur ling of the problem that mediation wil l refurl in the complex unity of a sol ution . And the c omplex si gnifi cation of i ts epi sode s , of its sinuositie s , of its rev ersal s , i s yielded up if one adopts the v iewpoint of the group turning back , after reuni fication, to the h i story of th i s action i n action and grasping itself as producing thi s d i s soc iation withi n the unity of one total i zat i on . In other words , the •

19

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totali zation-of-envelopment i .e . the integration of al l concrete indi ­ v i dual s by prax is has nev er ceased to be ev ery where as its own cause ( we know now what these metaphorical term s mean here , so we use them w i th out fear of mis understanding) and as its own mediation . B eneath the rift of antag o n i stic di s soc iation , we fi nd not the infinite v oi d but unity again , and human prese nce . The fi ssure between the enveloped incarnations al lows the p lenitu de of the unity of immanence to appear as a total iz i n g and singul ar inc arnation of all incarn ations taken together. B ut this investigation of intelligib i l ity should not make u s , therefo re , fal l p rey to optim ism . It i s true that v ictory c ome s to the v ictor v i a the medi ation of the whole group, and that it inc arnate s a moment of the totalizing activ ity as prax i s -proce s s . B ut th i s does not mean that it reali ze s a progress of the group towards its own obj ecti v e s : a priori we can dec ide nothing. The c ircu m stances of the praxi s and its material c onditions alone can tell u s . For nothing pro v e s that the l iquidation o f a sub-group doe s not expre s s an invol ution of prax i s . Perhaps it disappe ars not because it arouses mistrust, not be cau se it i s s acri ficed in the name of unity , but a m i d general indifferenc e , because the members of the gro up unle s s an unforeseen and lose confidence in their c om mon activ ity considerable c omplication of the conditions of praxis (the appearance , on the outside , of new enem ie s , new problems) create s a more or l ess definitive, more or le s s deep , gap between the commo n means of the group and t he e xi gencies of the practical fi e ld surrounding it. Then the conflict still springs as i n all other cases from i nternal problem s , but the struggle i s c onditioned by the fact that the group is dominated by the adv ersary , o r overwhelmed by i ts own action . The choice it m ake s of one or the other s ub- group , and the feature s of i ts implic it mediation , then expre s s its bew ilderment. The struggle and the v ictory remain perfectly intell igible , but they are the intelligible product of thi s bew i lderment and will contribute to aggravati n g it. Perhap s , by this tac it choice , the group has pas sed j udgement upon itself. Nothing prove s , moreov er, that each of the two organ s in confl ict repre sents a l ucid and valid perspective a partial but precise option. I t i s generally the contrary that occurs . The sub-group s , when a practi co­ inert dange r contrasts them as partial v iewpoi nts , as a practic al and dis sociated unity, are already products of the group ' s history and their own history . The obj ec ti v e difficul ti e s that they interiori ze and re­ e x teriori ze in conflic t are defl ected from their true mean ing by the v ery structure of the sub-group s , whether the struggl e adds adv entiti ous signification s to them as it i s real i zed or whether i t takes place as an impoverishment o f the problem. Thu s the real , d e e p conflict can be expressed b y abstract an d scholastic o ppos iti on s : it c a n happen that people fight ov e r myths an d absurd ' opini ons ' , or over the a r t i c l e s of a

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dogma. Natural l y , this mythologi zation of the con fl ict ' s obj ect cannot prevent it from be ing a deep real ity , or from bringing us back through prax is to the level of need . Equal l y natural l y , its scholastic and abstract character i s itself inte l ligible, since it refers u s both to the tools of kno w ledge and action produced by prax i s itself and , equally , to the ensemble of contemporary structures and the hi storic al conj uncture. Nevertheless, the inte l l ig ible fact that i t e xp resses itself on an abstrac t terrain , through the c lash of feti sh i zed symbol s , cannot be held as irrelev ant to the nature and meaning of the confl ict. To tel l the truth , it cannot expre s s itself otherw i s e . B ut this mean s that it can manifest itself only in an altered form ; that it produces itself by producing the prison which encloses it; and that it partly loses its signification , i n so far as th i s symbolic expression i s posited for itself. A s a result, every operation - in both [sub - ] groups remai n s intelligible on the bas i s of the deep move­ ment that e ngenders it, but becomes bogged down and goe s astray , lead ing the entire confl ict rather further astray. People cou l d k i l l one another over the sex of angel s and that reflected a deep malai se of B yzantine society . B ut it i s precisely one of the meanings of that mal ai se that peop le could kill one another at B yzantium and at that moment of its hi story o ver the sex of angels: i .e . that a theologian s ' di spute had to be burdened with al l the real div i sions sapping the city and the Empire , or e l se contradictions be allowed to fester beneath that overstratified society . The polari zation of practical forces b y s ymbo l s must neces sari ly enta il a partial loss of energies: in that case , the v i ctory remains intell igible - but its meaning i s as c onfused as that of the confl ict. It woul d actual l y be far too simple to consider, i n the name of a tran scendental dogmati sm, that these m ythological form s of struggle are epiphenomena : a mere i neffectual expre s sion of the real tran sform ations taking place. I n fact, if we are to pu sh material ism to the end, as we m u st, we shal l recogn i ze that the se fet i shes are things determinations of matter, the synthetic unification of inert diversitie s and th at the se things w i l l act as th ings upon adversari e s . I n other word s , struggle and v ictory are alienated i n adv ance. But thi s alienation of e very struggle (despite , as we shall see, the progre s s i v e growth of awarene s s ) is the very character of what Marx caIl s pre - hi s tory . Even the re v olutionary struggle produces its fetishes and is alienated in them . Even in the Communist Party , people struggle over the sex of angel s . This does not at all mean that History has no meaning (thi s fun damen tal problem 20 which we shall tackle l ater cannot be dealt with on this superfic ial

2 0 . S e e P re fa c e abo v e ; a l so , i n t h e Append i x be l o w ( p p 402-24 ) , S artre ' s n o t e s on •

Progre s s ' .

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and ab stract level of our h i storical investigation ) , It tnere ly means that i t i s not a priori nece ssary , in a conflict between sub- groups w i th i n any i .e . a group, for one of the two adversaries to repre sent progre ss progress for the group towards its common obj ectiv es or for the v ictory really to represent ' a step forward ' . Of course, i t i s al way s even in possible in rel i gious di sputes to cons ider that one v iewpoint repre sents the effort of certa i n sub-g roups, th e most abstract myth emanating from certain milieux , to reconc ile dogm as with practical and scientific Reason (however obsc ure thi s may sti l l be) . For the most part, moreover, the effort actual ly does unite the s ub-group s drawn from the ' ri s ing c lasses ' . B ut the question i s not so c lear . I n so far as each organ of the group take s part i n the con fl ict, the struggle i s ob scured by the very fact of the alliance s contrac ted: sti l l intel l igible i n terms of the structures and circ umstances , but often di sconcerting and paraly sing for maski ng the r eal the c ombatants , because the e x i stence of feti shes interests of the s ub-groups and the group itself gives an often monstrous c h aracter to the antagoni stic groupi ngs. Proust, for ex ampl e, enjoyed showing the ti ght synthetic interconnectio n , b ut perfect heterogene i ty , of the anti -Dre yfusards . And this interconnection can be comprehended. The fact that serv ants who were the slav es of a dec lining ari stocracy along w ith certain big bourgeoi s who had pas sed from a profound v ulgarity to a fal se culture and from that to s nobbery should seize the opportunity to weld them selves to that v ery aristocrac y goes w ith out say ing. B ut it i s no less i mportant that the i n ternal exchange s , osmoses , etc . , should be effected under the practical code of anti -Semiti sm and in relation to the fet ishized Arm y . The Dreyfu s Affair, as a contingent a nd necessary inc arnati on , occ urred as the final battle waged by the radical bourgeoi s i e to driv e the repre sentatives of the landed ari stocracy from the key posts it still held . B ut grouping s were formed on the bas i s of Dreyfu s ' s own case , the Honour of the Arm y , or pure Justice , and that i s what gave th e struggle its wavering aspect (which in fact reflected the actual ambi guity of French society). I shal l not labour thi s example , which goes beyond the present framework of our inve stigation , s ince i t 1 2 refers to the problem of the struggle s between groups within a soc iety . B e sides assumin g a clear awarene s s i n the two sub- groups of the common objectives and real factors of the confl ic t the liquidation of one sub-group by the other (eve n in the positive h ypoth e s i s of a group i n the th ick of ac tion) a priori harbours t he danger of de v iating the common action . The oppos ition may have its function, obl ig ing the leading bod ies to tran scen d themselves and tran scend i t b y mak ing them selves mediators

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(through the devising of more c omple x plan s ) . Once liqui dated , we have seen how it reappears i nside the v ictorious sub-group, albeit in another form . So long as it existed outside, the c ontradiction was c le arl y defi ned. From the moment it i s interiori ze d, th i s contradiction beco me s unclear and i s real ly produced as ambiguity . Not (which would be of l e s s importance) because the opposi tion has to be sem i -c landestine or entirely clande stine, depending on the sub-g roup ' s deg ree of inte g ration; but bec ause the di ssidents are tied to those in the maj ority b y what you might call adhesions. A common history has first made them the sam e, as 22 we have seen . After the victory , they want to remain the sa m e unti l the total praxi s i s c ompleted. And i f they oppose the majority , it i s prec i sely within the perspective of, above al l , preserv ing unity . Thus the oppos ition in the v ictorious sub-group re main s wi t hout re al ity i n so far as the d i s s idents refuse to be an opposition or hav e a ' fractional acti v ity ' : i .e . in so far as they are i n full agree me nt w i th the majori ty about sacrificing their own conception of praxi s to the un ity of the sub-group. Th i s i s expre s sed in v arious way s . In partic ular, i f they dare to propose a mo di fication of the plan worke d out under the majority ' s control , thi s modification must be nulli fied if it i s not adopted by a majority . Which, i n fact, mean s that it will eventually be rej ected unanimou sly . B ut in th i s way practical reason i s subordinated to the inert structure s of the s ub­ gro up . The proposit ion i s in fact never rejected only b ecause it i s becau se by being unrealizable , but also and sometimes primari ly enacted i t would modify the i nternal structure s . Beside s , t hose in the maj ority evaluate it t hrough the structures that have produce d them , with their i ntel lectual tool s . Thus the contradi ction never s urface s , s ince i t i s refused by everybody at once : by the majority in the name o f the plan of action , and by the minority inasmuch as it above all refu ses to be a min ority . S uch perpetual ly stifled oppositions and c ontradic tions never­ the less expre s s objective and internal diffic ulties within the sub-group. Op e n confl ict and transcenden ce via mediation [repre sent] the on ly h uman way of as suming them i . e . of channel ling them to t he practical , i n order to reveal and re sol ve them . To real ize a totalizing unity agai nst them immediately (without the mediation of confl ict) means to contain the m for the momen t but, in t he overal l temporali zation, to aggrav ate them . B y refusing to assume them , the s ub-group pursue s its action acc ording to the principles and me ans and as a function o f the ends that it has set itse lf. However, since s uch diffic ultie s expre s s within i t certain ex i gencies of the grou p ' s total izing action , and consequently certai n i nternal v ariations of the wh ole comm uni t y , the sub-group ' s ,

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2 2 . Cri tiqu e , v ol . l pp . 3 7 2 ff. ,

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acti v i ty deviates becau se it seeks to rem ain the same. The dev iatio n com e s to it from outside : i . e . from the e xternal tran sformatio ns of th e prac tical field that the grou p seeks to m odify , inasmuch as these are inte riori zed by al l the common indi v i dual s and, through them, re­ exter i ori zed even if they do not act together as a pro fou nd mod ifica ­ tion of the s ub-grou p ' s situation, or rather of its rea lity . (We shall see furthe r on, in re lation to soc ial confl i cts , the group of Sov iet leaders transformed in its very real ity i .e . in i ts relations with the en semble of Sovie t citi zens just by the counter-fin alities of its prax i s . ) It chang es becau se it remai ns the same, it strives to remain the same in order not to break unity . Yet if the sub-g roup as such i s a direc ting body, it play s the role of organi z i ng and co-ordin ating parti al ac ti vitie s i n o rder to integrate them into the overal l prax i s . So i t dec ides the latter, within the narrow l i mits imposed by c ircum stances and the situation. The deviation of the sub-group ' s p articular practice i s nece ssari ly repeated, though to a lesser degree, in the group ' s prax i s . B ut thi s deviation remains sufficient, in certain sp ecific circumstan ces, to lead the common p raxi s to oth er objectives or to failure . A di alectic i s actually establi shed between the transform ation of praxis , under pressure from the transcendent, the deformation of the internal dev iation by this tran sformation, and th e action of the transformed dev iation upon the prax is in transformation .

Conclusion These observations allow u s to reject pes simism and optim ism al ike. The confl ict i s int elli gible on the basis of the totalizing praxis , because it i s the prac tical assum ption of the inert oppositions that action ' s counter­ final ities produce. And it i s i n th i s sense that the dissoc iati on of unity i s a certain moment of a reuni fic atory enterpri se, even though thi s dis soc iation i s constituted not magically and ideal l y by unity being d i s s oc iated, but by the un ificatory project of the two practical unitie s , autonomou s as organisms and initi ally undifferentiated inasmuch as both by pledge are the same common indiv idual (prior to any s ubsequent functional differentiati on s ) . In this sen se, unity i s the conflict' s ma trix and destiny (at least for the hi storian who studies it in the past) ; and the solution as a practical reunification contai ns within it, in the guise of i nert and re­ organi zed structures, all the oppositions prev ious ly reproduced and h umani zed i n the binary movement that has engendered the rec iproc ity of antagonism. Furthermore , total izing comprehens ion of the struggle implies th at it i s grasped as a m ediated oppos ition , even if the organ s of med i ation are lacking , inasmuch as it c annot e x i st or develop in one direction or another w i thout the continuou s mediation of a ll the common

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indiv idual s . It i s in thi s realistic an d practical sense that we m u st understand how unity produces and mai ntain s its own rift s . B ut although comprehension is always a prio ri pos sible , prov ided only that we have the nece ssary informati on at our disposal , thi s dialectical rational ity of internal con fl icts i n no way prej udges the ir development or their outcome . Dev iation s , errors and failures , far from el udi ng comprehe n s ion , form an integral part of it. It i s even possible , in certain case s , to comprehend why a confl ict unwi sely embarked upon , on the bas i s of insurmountable difficulties, reflects the slow degradati on of a community and ends by hastening its total destruction. B y thi s , moreover, I do not mean j ust that the degradation and negative course of the conflict are the mere prac tico­ i nert obver se of what we hav e cal led prax i s-proc e s s . I mean rather that i n praxi s as such , in the choice of mean s , in the determination of immedi ate and distant objec ti ves , etc . , th i s degradation produces itse lf as a qual ifica­ tion of its own transcendenc e . It i s what w i l l , in fact , manifest i tself through in stance s of defeatist behav iour, ov ere stimation or under­ estim ation, etc. as the deteri oration of practical fields and i n struments in t he actual h ands of those who use them . In th i s sense , even ' loss of contact ' as a real and obje c tive separation of the central organ s from the base i s an intel l igible fac t in the perspective of the totalizing temporali zati on . Not j ust bec ause above all it i s an interi orization of the total hi storical process by a defin i te group, hut also because thi s inte riori zation i s practical. The objecti ve hiatus separating the base from the summit i s never grasped i n its inert reali ty as a breach of continuity : o it i s real iz e d by acts and their results (orders not fol lowed , p as siv i ty or hosti l i ty of the rank and file, cards not renewed, joining other gr oup s , etc. ) . At t he same time , it characteri zes the actual behav iour of the warri ng sub-groups their leaders osci l lati ng between i neffective authori ­ tarian i sm and a dangerous ' tailism ' , etc. Th e strugg le itse lf languishes and bec ome s strati fie d, so to speak. Or, quite to the contrary , it takes on a characte r of bitter fe roc ity at the summ it. In short, whatever their circumstan ce s and evolution may be , the internal con fl icts of a group are total ly inte l l igible bec ause , the group being totall y practical , i ts practico­ inert determinat ion s never reveal them sel v e s e xcept as the m aterial and abstract conditions of its praxis. In th is sense they bec ome factors of intelligibi l i ty , sin ce we have to di scover them i n the midst of action i n order to find the movement of the project th at transcends them , by positing them i n order to suppress them . From th i s point of v ie w , even chance i s inte l li gible by which I mean ' C l eopatra ' s nose ' , or ' the grai n of sand i n Cromwell ' s urethra ' si nce i t i s c i rcum stance s and dangers reproduced as organized confl icts that in each �ub -group , and v i a the med iation of all the rest, deci d e the e x ac t i mportance o f the indi v i d ual ac ti on. The ' grai n of sand ' wa s important

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only because Cromwell ' s regime c o u l d not surv ive Cromwel l , which was due preci sely to the fac t that it was not supported b y the soc iety that had engendered it. In short, it was brought down by its own contradiction s, which were the practic o - i nert re s i stance of the base as s umed by the practical transce nde nce . It obv i ously remai ns the case that Cromwell co uld have died five year s later. As I have already said, I am far from sharing Plekhanov ' s fine indifference and declarin g, l ike h i m , that the outcome would have been j ust the same . That i s anti-historical and i nh uman dogmat i s m : the fortune of the particula r men who wo u l d have died under Crom wel1 duri n g those five extra years j u st does not interest Plekhanov . B ut that i s not what we shall say . To be sure , at a certa in leve l of abstrac tion the outcome would have been the s ame. At the lev e l of concrete total i zation, i t would have been at once the same ( i nasmuch as i t co ntains within i tself the abstract struc tures of inertia) and different (for the concrete men who wo uld have lived it) . For us , however, the import­ ant is sue lies el sew here . I t i s that we should be able to de fine dialectic al l y , on the basis of a prac t i c al comprehension of the undertakings and conflicts as well as the structures - of the group and s ub-groups, the necessary margin of inde term in ation in which chance ( i . e . a series al ien to the en sembles cons idere d) may operate . In a durab l e , aware group , s upported by its base and strongly i ntegrated, thi s marg i n i s reduced to the minimum: i t is as close to zero as pos s ible . S icknesses and deaths do not thereby disappe ar b u t they lose all historical effi c acy . A system of replacement i s already created , and the urgenc y o f the s ituation forces the su cces sors to continue the policy of those w ho hav e left the scene . We shall see later that the diachronic s ynthes i s i s cros s-hatched by 23 death s and birth s , i . e . by generations (a di sconti nuity in continuity ) . B ut the problem doe s n o t e x i st at the level of the directing organs of a s trongly integrated group , where the dead man will be replaced by a contemporary often one of his closest col l aborators who has shared h i s experience and as siste d him i n his acti v ity , so t hat the d i sappearance of individuals doe s not s uc ceed even i n infl ecting a policy or creating a di sconti n ui ty . When it doe s , however, s ucceed i n doing so, th i s i s because the role of the i ndiv id ual i s already grea ter an d, by v i rtue of that, t he deeper unity of the group more precarious . It is even po s s i ble , on the bas i s of circum stances and the c ommon act ion, to determine the lim its wi thin which change can occur. If Stal i n ' s death marked the end of Stal i ni sm , that was bec ause in a v ery real sense Stali n i s m s urv ived on ly

S art re t ac k l e � t h i s que st ion on p . 3 1 2 be l o w p p . 4 3 6 ff. 23

See a l �o

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2 through Stal i n , and because for re ason s I h ave set out e l sewhere 4 he inc arn ated organ ic unity i n the e yes of the Soviet rul i ng group and reali zed i t by terror. C uriou sly , but very in telligently, that i ndi v idual re al i zed in h i mse lf and through h i s acts the sacrifice of every indiv idual - by himself and by eve rybody to the unity of the leadership. B ut the end of Stal inism apart from the fac t that i t repre sented a slow and diffic ult tran s formation, w hich at least initiall y as s umed the maintenan c e of certain practices and certain pri n c iples was , unl ike the death of Cro mw e l l , not the end of the regime . H i s ag e made i t pos si ble at any momen t: the date was a chance one , but the i ntell igibi lity of that chance was due to the fac t that Soviet society , sti l l masked by the centrali zed bureaucracy , was already de -Stalinized; or, if you prefer, to the fac t tha t Stalin had ceased to be useful (or perhaps ceased to be more useful than harmful) , yet the prax i s of those last thirty - five years h ad integrated the leading group so that it could not transform itself i n S tali n ' s l ifetime . And Stal i n , a product of hi s own prax i s , w as producing their past i n the form of a contin ued prax i s , a future already i n v i s ibly conte sted. Eve n that was no acc ident : thi s gap thi s fai l ure of the leader to adapt to the situation h i s praxi s had produced was i ntel l igible only at the conc l u s i on of a long and pai nful rei gn . It was then and then alone that p raxis and hexis were strictly equivalent , and every new i n vention was only the re­ exteriorization of the interiori zed com mon past. B u t , preci sely , thi s old age of the leader placed him at death ' s door. Thu s indetermination as a historical factor was contained within the n arrowest l imits ; or rather, i t formed part of inte lligib i l i ty . For, i n t he ru ling circ les, one e lement of the con fl icts in progre s s was preci sely the expectation of Stal i n ' s death i . e . the predictabil ity of the event, but relativ e unpredictabi lity of i t s date . The fundamental character of the internal struggles, however, was conditioned by Stal in ' s o l d age , since i t was that old age which created the objective contradiction between the pol icy of the leaders and the n e w Sov iet real i ties . Thus , step by step, we could show h ow i n e very case i t is the actual hi story of the group , in its dialectical intelligibility , that defi nes the role it l eav es to c hance and , at the s ame time, determines th e function i t assigns to the l atter: i . e . the objective which chance i s charged w i th real izing. If chance is i n deed gi ven a task, t h i s i s because the balance of forces and the compl e x i ty of the struggle do not a llow praxi s to accompl i sh ev erything by itself. B u t however surpri s i ng the outcome ma y appear to con temporaries , chance as an intervention of the practico­ i ne rt at the heart of th e dialectic merely e x ecutes the verdict delivered by prax i s itself. Even if i t w ere to dec id e the annihilati on of one 24

I n Th e Sp ec (re

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sub-group and the tri umph of another, that would s impl y mean that, for sp ec ific reasons , the whole group must ha ve dec i ded to leav e things in the hands of chance divesting itself i n the l atter ' s favour of its own mediating powers .

2 H E R E remain s our second que stion. 5 With i n the group the warring accompl i sh by s ub -groups v i a a kind of negative coll aboration their v ery antagonis m a c ommon anti-labour. For if we use the term labour for a material a qu ite s uperficial and practic al defi n ition operation aiming to produce a certain obj ect as a determination of the practical field and w ith a view to a certain e nd, we must call the dual antagonistic activity anti - labour, s ince each sub-group i s striving to destroy or dev iate the obj ect produced b y the other. B ut thi s anti-labour i s producti v e : the struggl e , as a rec iprocity of l abours that destroy one another, objectifies itself i n an ensemble of products which , henceforth , occupy the ·internal fie ld of the common group and c ontribute to i nflecting its action. Actuall y thi s dual attempt at destruction i s never entirely s uc ces sfu l : it never achieves a rec iprocal nullification of the realities produced . And even were it t o achieve thi s , the labour of destruction pres upposes an expenditure of energy, an acc umulation of means and a transformation of the practical field: in short, the constitution whether by degradation or d i s in tegration of new realities inside the group. When, for example , the leading body i s riven by v i olent con fl i cts , i . e . when i t divides i n to sub-groups c lashing fundamentally over the c ommon praxi s , it o ften h appens i n the period that precedes the liquidation of one s ide by the other that every proj ect (economic plan , law, temporary and directly applicable measure or, i f we are dealing w i th a part y , action programme ) , as soon as it i s put forward b y one faction, finds itself rejected by another, while a third s imultaneou sly j udge and participant trie s to make itself the mediat or, in order to impose i tself on the former two. The outcom e of

2 5 . S ee , on p p . I I - 1 3 above , S artre ' s outline of the two problems he con s i ders e s sential for the inte l l i g ibi l ity of H i story .

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these variou s stances i s : an in itial project of s ub- group A , a co unter­ proj ect of s ub- group B , a conc i l i atory project of sub-group C . Th i s last w i ll in turn be modi fied by each of the two former conte s tants , both because each will seek to win it over and also because neither will w i sh to leave it the merit of its arbitrati on. The product of th i s shiftin g struggle will in one way o r another bear the mark of the three sub­ group s , b u t it w i l l n o l ong er c orre spond to the i ntentions of an y one of them. Each of its determ i nations will i n so me wa y be the negation of a certain propos ition, perhaps inc orrect or dangerous , but rati onally con­ ceived, c lear and equipped w i th a s ignificati on. What i s more , there w ill have been o th er propositions i n the c ourse of the bargaining that were the negations of tho se negation s , and so on . We do indeed have the image of a collaboration, but in reverse . As for the object, the se negations determ ine it i n its concrete real ity , but the y prevent it from bein g related to any human intention, any g lobal proj ect . Moreover, the antagoni sm s present have managed to achieve the nullifi cation of certai n in i tial di spos itions , with the res u l t that the object i s quali fied a lso by a parti al indetermi nation . An indetermi nati on and al so an overdetermination , as we saw earl ier. Whether it i s a decree , an admini strative measure or a law , its application sti ll has to be ensured. A t thi s new juncture in the name of those same confl icts the executive foul s up . Thi s i s at least a p ermanent possibility, freq uently reali zed. At thi s l evel, reali zati on makes the obj ect produced into a monstrous and deformed reflection of a project that had itself pre served only a confu sed signification : the c ycle of inhumanity i s compl eted . Let u s recall the e xample i s di stant but one of the cl eare st how the proj ect of establishing National Workshops c oncei ved by Louis B lanc , already rendered unrecogni zable by amend­ ments introduced i n the A s sembl y , was i n t o the bargain sy stematical l y sabotaged b y Marie and h i s collaborators . I s i t enough , then, to study the conflicts inside an organized group for the deformity , the semi ­ effectiveness , the total i neffecti veness and the counter-effectivenes s of the products of an ti-labour to find a new s igni fication , and for the opac ity of these c onfu sed w orks to rec over a dialectical inte l l igibility? We need onl y pre s s ahead with our crit ical i nve stigati on i n order to perceive that the answer i s affi rmative . There i s , to be sure , no que stion but that the product thu s d i s fi gured belongs to no body , and cannot be interpreted as the objectification of a project. B ut that i s not the i s sue . I t i s simp l y necessary to know whether - as i n the abstract h ypothes i s of two non -total i zable [ sub- ] group� - we must enumerate the changes it has undergone and rel ate them to more or less independent, more or le s s i rredu c i ble factors : i . e . to la yers of signi fi c ation that cannot be fu sed in a synthe s i s . Or w hether, on the contrary , on the bas i s of the total i zati on-of-envelopmen t, the monstro us

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product can itsel f be grasped as the d ialectical total ization of the two antagon i stic tactics in th eir irreducibility. For i n the produced obj ect, prec isely inasmuch as it is no longer direc tly as simil able to a which h uman proj ect constitutes a real determ i na tion of the prac tico-inert, th is irreducibi lity is objecti fied and al ienated i nto a multipl icity of interpene­ tration . For we have already noted that the synthetic unity of the inanimate itself produce s an i nterpenetration of mean i ng s , through the reciprocal acti on of synthesi s and pas s iv ity. Thus the s uccessive deformations of the initial plan hav i ng been acts of war, each of which conditio ned the other an d aimed to destroy it i n the pas si v e synthe sis con stitutin g the final obj ect assume the status of a quality s ustained by obj ective inerti a. As s uch, each extends through the other, or rather a u n ique quality of the object (a particular feature of its deformity) fuses them together. The whole struggl e has objectified and alienated itself in its product. And undoubtedl y , thi s can j u sti fiably be env i s aged as a practico- inert reality . So we might say that, as s uch, it e scapes intell igibility . B ut in an integrated g roup that i s only partially true . For the product , w hatever its worth and whate v er its deform i tie s , is utilize d. If it is a law or d ecree, these are app lied. In short, they become bad means for a free praxi s , j u st as in the constituent dialectic the instrument integrate s itself i nto the praxis of the free org ani sm and becomes a structure of the act. Of course, the results may be n egati ve. The crea tion of the National Workshop s after the mutilations and transformatio ns u ndergone by the in itial plan h ad as its direct con sequence the in surrection of June 1 848. On the one hand, howev er, certain leading circles were expecting thi s rev olt of the poor and did not fear to p rovoke it; on the other, we have j ust seen that the inte lligibility of Hi story i s in no way l inked at least at thi s level of our critical investigat ion to the problem of i ts ultimate aim s . So what needs to be pointe d out is that the product i n so far as it is at one and the same time an inert re sult of an ti- labour and a mean s i ntegrated i nto a new action - pre sents itself as a re interiorized obj ectifi cation of the conflict and , conseq uentl y , as a negative (through worked matter) yet practica l ( through its reintegration into prax i s ) unity of the duality . Or, if yo u prefer, the product of anti -labour i s neither more nor les s signifying , i n relation to the reciproc ity of antagonism, than is the too l a produ c t o f commo n labour in relation to the rec iproc ity of mutual aid . Intelligibil ity , to be sure , fal ls to a lower lev el; but this i s not due to the conflict as such . The decrease of level would be exactly the same if we attempted to grasp a united group through the in struments it forges w ith the agreement of all its m embers . It i s j ust that we grasp the practico-inert as a product whose uti l izati on is in progress , and that we endeavour to comprehend it i n the twofold move­ ment whereby th e group produces i t and , preci sely by doing so , make s i tsel f its produc t. A pas s i v e synthesis rev ital i zed by ac tion , i t i s •

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transcended inertia that constitutes w ithin it the fundamental support and secret l im it of its intelligibility . We shall return to thi s point w hen we have to show how the two di alectics and the anti -dial ectic separating 2 them are totalized i n the synchronic totali zation . 6 Prec isely because it is a pas sive and rev ital ized synthes i s , * however in other word s , becau se it function s despite its defects of construction; becau se it liv e s despite the malform ations that make i t unv iab l e (and, n aturally , al so because of th em) thi s product is maintained and preserved i n its be ing by the totalizin g prax i s , i .e. from another viewpoint by al l the common indiv iduals, at least until it explodes and perhaps causes the group itself to e xp l ode. And through thi s i nert perseverance in its being, it reveal s another type of medi ation of the group between the s ub-groups in conflict. In other words , the group by m ai ntai ni ng it i n its i nternal manifests a real adaptation of the product of anti - l abour to the fi eld common s i tuation, i nasmuc h as i t is actualized by all organ s and all common indiv i dual s . There is a practica l m eaning of anti - l abour that dia lectical Reason can d i scover and positi v i sm w il l not di scover. I shall take j u st one e xample , a contemporary one : the emergence i n the U S S R of the i deological monstrosity of ' socialism in one country ' . Critic al investi gati on will show us : ( 1 ) that thi s slogan w as a product of the conflicts rendi ng the leading bodies ; (2) that beyond and through these conflicts , it represen ted certain contradictions and transformations of Sov iet society as a whole; ( 3 ) that inasmuc h as it s urv ived, it created in other other verbal formulae that supplemented and corrected i t w ords , enriched knowledge and practice by transcending the monstrosity and transform i ng it i nto truth . We have no i ntentio n , of course, of going into the e x traord i n arily complex history of the con fl icts that divided the Sov iet leaders after Leni n ' s death , let alone of emb arking on a dial ectical interpretation of th ose conflicts. We are s imply taking an exampl e , which we shall cons ider not for its own sake but for its pedagogic v al ue . 1 . Trotsky h ad no more i l l us ions than Stalin about the situation of the U S S R i n those difficult years . He had once bel ieved that the Revolution would break out i n Germany and other bourgeoi s democrac ie s , and th at thi s intern atio n al i z ation of the w orking- c l as s victory would modify the co-ordinate s of the Russian problem in the short te rm . B ut events had * For o ur purpo s e s , i t matters l ittle when and by whom . I t i s o f n o i m portance whether a part ic u lar l aw functions after the l i q u idation of one of the [ s ub- ] g roups and even after the d i s appearance of the tw o adv e rsari e s . What counts i s that i t g i ves i n form ation abo ut them even i f they are destro yed and forgotten - i n as m u c h as a pra x i s prese rv es its ac t u a l i t y ; inasmuch as i t i s a function and creates dutie s , i n a s m u c h as i t reg u l ates the c o m m u n i c ation of goods , men or verbal determ i nation s . -

26 . S ee be l o w , pp. 2 7 2 ff.

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disabused h i m . He was as con scious as Stal in of the temporary ebb of the European workers ' movements . For both of them , the U S S R stood in morta l peril. Al one and e nc ircled by formi dable and hostile p o wers , it needed to increase its industrial and m i l i tary potential albeit a t the cost of the most extreme sacri fices or resign i tself to d i s appeari ng. At most , i t could be add ed that the c ircumstanc e s defining thei r former activ ity had made the em igre Trotsky more aw are of the i mportance of the forei gn re volutionary movements, whi l e S tali n who had practically ne ver left Russia was more ig norant about Europe an d more mistrus tful . B ut Stal in did not claim that a Communist order could be achie ved in the U S SR, w i thout simultaneously bei ng in stal led on a un iversal scale. So the two l eaders and the fractions the y repre sented co uld seem ingly agree on a m i nimum programme, as req uired by th e ac tual si tuation : to embark at once o n bui lding the new soc iety, w ithout fo r the time b eing rel y i ng on any o utsi de help; and to sustain the rev olutionary ardour of the mas ses by indicating the direction i n which that construction should proceed i n short, by show i ng them a future . I t wa s neces s ary to tel l the R u s sian peo ple, simultaneously : ' We must hold out ' and ' We can construc t ' and ' It i s b y constructing that we shall hold out ' . B ut those v ery simple e x igenci e s did not i mply t hat bui ld i ng thi s powerful Russia on the twin basi s of i ndustry and armaments should go beyond the stage of w hat we migh t term a pre - social i sm. The working c lass would appropriate the i nstruments of l abour, and i ndustrial ization w ould be accompanied by a progres sive i nstal lation of the structures and i . e . once cadres which, once the i ntern ational situati on had changed revol utions occu rred e l s e where in the w orl d would allow the e s tabl i sh­ ment of a truly social i s t society . The re was another point, t oo, on which i t was possihle for S tal i n and Trotsky to agree : poverty c annot be social ized . Despite the threat fro m a broad , it was neces s ary to embark on the d ifficul t s tag e o f pre - social i st accumulation . And Trotsky , of course , w as the first to insist on the need to carry the proces s of collecti v i zation an d industriali zation through to the e nd. The two men d i s covered th e same pressing needs and the same obj ecti ve exigenc i e s . Fo r both , the p rax i s of Revolution in t he USSR had to be both defen sive an d constructi v e . Rel iance on one ' s o wn resources , moreover, would last as long as the c irc umstances that made i t nece ss­ ary . The confl icts actual ly developed i n other sphere s . The two men represented two contradi ctory aspec ts of the s truggle that the revolu­ ti onaries had waged in the past against Tsari sm . Trotsky , a remarkable m an of action when circumstances req uired it, was nev erthe les s firs t and foremost a theoretic ian , an intellectual . In ac ti on he remained an intel­ lectual , which meant the ac tion had to be radical. S uch a structure o f prac tice i s perfectly v al id prov ided i t i � adapted to circ umstances , which

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i s what al lowed h im to organize the Army an d w i n the war. B eh ind that lay emigratio n . The exiled re v o l u ti o n arie s , w ithout actual ly losing contact with the Russ ian masses, for a t i me had closer l i nks with the working-clas s parties of the We st. The internationalism of the rev o l u ­ tionary movement w as the real stuff of the ir experience . A n d Marxism, as a the ory and as a practice, appeared t o them in its un iversa lity . Universal i sm and radicali s m : these, i f you l ike , were the way in which Trotsky inter iori zed his encirclement by the W e s t and his e x i l e itse lf, which tended to make h im , l ike all em ig res , an abstract universal . The theory of permanent revol ution was sim ply t he articulation of these int e r i o r i z e d c h arac te ri stic s by d e term i n atio n s of Marx ist la n g u a ge and as a m atter of fact the theory actu al ly cam e from Marx . The only th ing t hat came from Trotsky was the imperative but th is was every th ing urgency tho se the ses as sumed under h i s pen . In a s in g le dialecti cal m ov ement, the Revol ution had to be pe rpetually intens i fied by tran ­ scending its own objectives (radic alization) and progre s s ively extended to the entire uni verse (uni versal i zation ) . A nd that meant before 1 9 1 7 that the pro letarian Rev olution would take p lace in Europe , in a highl y industri alized country . We all know how a ston ished t ho s e ' W e s tern i z ed ' figure s were , when c irc um stance s led them to take power in an under­ developed co untry . I t w i l l be rec alled how they hesitated and env i saged creating tran s i ti onal form s , unt il events obl iged them to pre ss ahead. S tali n , by contrast, al ways represented an intermediary between the e m i g r e leaders and the R us s i an masses. H i s task w a s to adap t directives to the concrete s ituation and the re al men who w o u l d do the wo rk . He was on the s ide of those men . He knew the Russian m a s s e s and , before 1 9 1 4 , did not hide the somewhat contemptuous m i s trust he felt for the em igr e circ le s , with few excepti ons. The hi story of h i s confl icts with them after 1 9 05 i l l uminates what we mi gh t call hi s practical parti cu iari s m . The important th ing for h im w as to c arry out instruction s vvith th e m eans a t hand. He kne w t h o s e mean s and reckoned th at the em igres did not know them . For h i m , M arxi s m was a g uid e to tacti c s , rather l ike C l ausew itz ' s On War. H e had neither the c ul ture nor the l e i s u re required to a p p rec i at e its theoretical d imension . Though he adm ired Len i n , S t a l i n w as shoc k ed when he wrote Ma terialism and Enzp irio -criticisnl and t h o u g h t it a w a s te of time . I n t ha t s e n se , the un i v e rs a l ity of M arx i sm altho u g h , of c o u rse , h e spoke abo ut it c o n s ta n t l y e l uded hi m . I t w a s ac t u al l y i nc arnated hy him , i n a prax i s al w ay s s i n g ul a ri z ed by the c i rc um s t an c e s i n wh ich it w as produced (Tsar i s m � rap i d i n d u stri al i zati o n , but immense l a g beh i n d the We s t ; fo re i g n c a p i t a l ; pr o l e ta r i a t s ti l l w e ak and i mmature, albe i t g ro w i n g i n n u m b e r s � b o u rgeoi s i e p r a c t i c a l l y non - exi stent, or made u p of � c om prad o rs ' ; o v e r w h e l m i n g n u m e r i c a l � upe ri o r i t y of the pe a s an t c l as s ; pol i t i c a l power of the l an d l o rd � ) . Th e s e c i rc u m s ta n c e s , m o re o v e r , h ad a ,

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101

d u al aspect: o n the one hand , they neces s itate d a constant a daptation of precepts forged in the stru ggle of pr oletarians against capital i s ts in the Western democrac ie s ; on the other hand, for a person fi ghting day in and da y out and ex ploi ti ng them for hi s ac tiv ity, they revealed contrary to the expectations of the em igres and co n trary to the letter of Marx i sm that agric ultural Rus s ia was ripe for a workers ' Revoluti on . So th e two men were div i de d far more by the practical schem ata through which they grasped any situati on than by abstract principles or ev en a programme . Through both of them al ike , praxi s was constituted as a vol untari sm. B ut Stal in , hav ing spent twenty years as a party m i l i tant, w as an iron- fi ste d opportun i st. Not that he did not have wel l -defined obj ectiv e s but those objectives were a lready i ncarnated . The e s s ential th ing was to save what had been achiev ed, and that could be done on ly by buil ding a defensive apparatus . Wh at he wanted to preserve at an y price was not p ri nc ipl e s , o r the movement of radic al ization : it was the incarnation s o r, if you l ike, the Revol ution itself i nasmuch as i t was in carn ated in that particu lar country, reg ime, or internal and external s i tuation . He would comprom i se on everyth ing, in order to pre serve that fu n damental bas i s . I n order to save the nation that was bu il ding soc ial ism, he woul d abandon the principle of national i tie s . Collectiv i zation ? H e would push ahead with i t when circum stance s required, in order to ensure th at the to wns were supp l i ed. Industrial ization? After initiall y braki ng it, once he had understood i t was nece s s ary he would try to pursue it at s uch a rapid rate that the targets of the first p lan s would not be met; and he did not hesitate to extract e x tra labour from the workers , w hether directl y by rai s i ng their norms or indirectly b y Stakhanovi sm and the re-e stablishment of piece work . What he hated abo ut Tro ts k y was not so much the m easure s he propo sed as the ov erall praxi s in whose name he proposed them . If, when Trotsky began to adv ocate them , he w as initi ally hostile to stepping up industrial produc t ion or mov i n g to wards col l ecti v ization� th i s was becau se he understood the i r proponent ' s g l obal project. Th i s sou ght to ind ustrial ize and col lecti v ize with a v iew to an ever m ore inten sive rad i c a l i z ation of revol utio n a r y prax i s at least, it was in th i s form that S tal i n grasped Trotsky ' s intention . So what h e fe ared was a Revol ution heading for defeat, t hrough attempting to remain an abstract dialectic of the universal at the very momen t when i ts incarnation had singularized it. Obv iou sly th i s view was never expre ssed i n s u c h term s o r in any other verbal form u lati on . S tal i n s impl y �aw an absolute difference between p r ac t i ca l arran gelnents or operations advo­ c ated by T r ots k y a nd the same th ings i mplemented l ater by himse lf. In the former case th ey were alarming , i n a s m u c h as t h rough them The R evolution tended to l o ok upon the c o n c re t e s i tu ation of the U S S R as a means of real i z i ng i t s e l f. I n the l atte r case , though th e y led to i d ent i ca l -

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measure s , the y w ere reas s uring, bec ause they sprang solely from concret e e x igencies . A s advocated by Trotsky and t h e Left, collecti v i zati on was a leap i n the d ark a practic al assertion that no form of defence e x isted apart from al l - o ut attack . S tal i n too was hard and aggressive. He wa s we}] abl e to g o over to the offensive when nec e s sary . B ut s uch a priori determ ination s of prax i s , the direction of temporali zation or future schemata o f action alarmed him, because he graspe d the s i tuation in terms of w hat w as to be pre served, consolidated and developed, rather than what was to be created. Thi s difference w as to rec ur, of course, on every level of practice . It was prec i sely what prev ented analytic Reason from understanding anything about the struggle i n which the two adv ersarie s successively, and sometime s s imultaneously , adopted more or less similar position s , while each neve rtheless pre sented h i s own as the oppo site of the other ' s . Initially, however, Stal in i n the gui se of a ' ce ntri st ' and mediator exploited the c on fl ict between Right and Left rather than seeking to involv e him self i n i t. The Right, too, struc k him as abstract i n its lack of trust and insti nctive opportuni sm . It wanted a breathing-space, and only gradual pro g res s toward s real soc ialism . In s hort , with thi s s imple idea that the rev olutionary seizure of power should be followed by an evolution , it was reproducing the desire that most of the B o lsheviks had dis played before the seizu re of power: to periodize thi s outrageous Revo l ution that was taking pl ac e i n an u nderdev eloped c ountry . S talin was no more th e m an of post-re v o l utionary evol ution than he was the man of permanent rev olution . He wou ld not radical i ze rev ol utionary praxi s as such , because c i rc umstances were against it. For example , he would not hesitate greatly to widen the salary -range , in order to stimulate production throug h competition. O n the other hand, ho wever, he would radicalize the con­ structive effort required of everyone. From the moment when these two praxes c lashed that of Trotsky , monstrositi e s made their and that of S tal in s upported by the Right appearance. And these monstro sities h ad a qui te specific character, proper to thi s v ery strug gle . Each fac tion propose d the same re spon se to the s ame objecti v e exi genc y . B ut s ince thi s similari ty of short-term aim s hid a radical di vergence over longer-term obj ecti v e s and over the v ery meaning of rev ol utionary prax i s , each faction was induced to inte n s ify the immedi a te differences o v er concrete p roj ects and reproduce there and then , th rough a tangible incarnation the deeper differences over practical orientation s . Thu s , in its designatio n of the immedi ate objecti ve and the mean s of ach ievin g i t , the majority hardened by th e m i nority ' s i ntroduced the provocation , which they had them selv es prov oked fol lowing hypothes i s : rej e cti o n of moti v e s and d i stant aim s that m i g h t lead oth ers t o j oi n them . T he effectivene s s of thi s manoe uvre was based

I S STR U G G L E I NTELLIG I B L E ?

1 03

on the absolute neces s i ty of preserving the unity of the leading bodie s , desp i te the conflicts u nder w a y . Or, if you like , of transforming the maj ority i nto unanimity . I n that way , the minority would wear itself out, forever s uppres sing itself after every debate . Or e l se it would frankly declare itself to be an oppos itional faction and ami d the besetting thereby acknow ledge itself as splittist and ' anti -party ' . As dangers Merleau-Ponty has put i t , oppos ition woul d be defined as treason. Waged at every level and over every obj ective , this struggle interests u s here only inasmuch as it p roduced the s logan ' S oc ialism in one country ' . Thi s formula w as a monstrosity i nasmuch as it said more than was nec essary . In other words , it fals ifi ed the precise exigencies of the s i tu ation by g iv ing them a synthetic unity whose motivations were contemporary , but whi ch claimed to be based on di stant obj ecti v e s and the total prax i s in its future tem poralizati on. It was a manner of speaking : ' Let u s rel y only on o u rselves ' . B ut that very manner c ontained a v erbal formulation pre senting i tself as a theoretical evaluation of the possibilities of soc iali sm, though it was i n fact a manoeuvre to put the m inority on the spot. For them , adopting i t meant a priori renouncing the idea of a practical interdependen ce of the international proletari ats. At a yet deeper level, moreov er, it m eant rec ognizing that everything and fi rst and foremost the w orking-class m ov ements of Western Europe had to be subordinated to the constructive defence of the US SR , which obviously meant in turn that the S ov ie t Communist Party had to e xert a real dictatorship. over the Communist Partie s of Europe and through them mobilize the proletariats to defend the U S S R , even if in a national con text their revolutionary intere sts did not c oincide w ith the imperatives and exig encies of that defensive tactic . In other word s , it meant deciding that the revolutionary offensive o f a E uropean proletariat w ithin a national and po s sibl y the rev olutionary seizure of power c on text were not neces s arily the be st w ay s of defending the Revolution . It meant admitting that the socialist Revolution w as universal and internation al only when it remained ideal i . e . before its incarnation . And that once it was incarnate d, it was present as a whole in the s ingle country that had made it and was continuing it, through the specific tasks that its own structure s and H i story i mposed upon it. B ut, precisel y , rec ognizing thi s meant rej ecting en bloc Westernism, u niversali s m , and the postulate that the proletari ats in the great industri al i zed countrie s had taken their emancipation further than the y oung pr oletar i at i n the US SR and by taking power would dispose of an economic and technological power that should make them the true animators of the i nternational Revol ution . It meant renouncing internati onal i sm and ' Permanent Revolution ' . There in l ay the trap . Trotsky , l ike Stal i n , recognized the e x i gen cies of the situation about these objecti ve exigencie s there could be no di sag reement. B ut b y

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presentin g the m in the form of a dogma, the major i ty obliged Trotsky either to disown h i s practical pri n c iple s , or to refuse th e practical content of the do gma ( even though h e acc epted it as a response to the temporary e x ige ncies of the s ituation). Ag ain s t univers al i st radical ism , Stalin i nfelicit­ ously defined what might be termed a particulari st radic ali s m . And, of course, that monstrou s obj ec t did not remain at the le v e l of a verbal formulation . Inasmuch as i t was to define a propaganda, a permanent character of p r axi s , and a certai n future, i t could be termed an institutio n . And th is w a s i ndeed the root of the institutional ization of the Rus sian Revolution: for m a i ntai n ing also meant consol idating, and in the soc ial sphere consol i dating meant stratifying. We shal l re turn to thi s . B ut in thi s new object we c an a lready see the i Inplicit coe x i stence of Sta li n i sm and Trotskyi s m . The real rel ationship between the U S SR a nd the We stern proletari ats in a more or less di stant future could have been left unde ter­ mined (preci sely bec ause , for the Sov iet l e aders , i t w as the object of a real igno ranc e ) B ut its dogmatic determination inc arnated T rots ky s revolu­ tionary international i s m as a rejected position . And no pos itiv ist Reason can comprehend that pre sence of Trotsky at the heart of a determinatio n i n their that disowne d him, since presen ce and interior negation indis soluble synthesis - repre sented the s ingular incarnation of a multi­ dimensional c o n fl ict, i . e . its total i zation i n the obj ect by the t)lVO adversaries . 2 . B ut the con flict i tsel f was a t otali zation through t he adversaries of a contradicti on i n the Party ' s common p r a x i s Thi s contradicti on i n turn interiori zed a real but l e s s compressed, more diffu s e , c l ash that w as produced and lived by Soviet so c ie t y itself, thr ough the ongoing trans­ formatio n of i ts outworn institutions . Desp i te the inte gration achieved b y the reg i m e it goes w ithout sayin g that Sov iet society could in no way be seen as an institutional group: it w as riven by struggle s , b y its practico­ i nert div i s i on s etc . B e s i de s , we hav e not yet even begun to inve s tigate social uni ty . I f i t exists , thi s m u s t obv iously be differen t from the unity of groups . B ut whatever form m ay be taken by the struggle s , the v arious c onflicts , the se r i al ities or the gro up relations in a giv en society , what intere sts u s here i s the t otal i z ing interiorization of thi s divers ity by the Party and its l e adership : i . e . by the sov ereign group . ( a) Any positi v i st h i story that sought to exp la i n the S talinist slog an by the internal w e akne ss and i solatio n of the U S S R arou nd 1 925 30, and regarded thes e as passively suffer ed, would miss the cruc ial point Of cours e , everyone did s uffer poverty , they all did suffer i solation ; but at th e same tim e the se conditions were products of revolutionary prax i s What i s more , inasmuch as they were produced and pre served with a v iew to be ing transcended, they rep re se nted a mome nt of that praxi s i tself. Poverty , shortage o f technician s and cadres , enc irclement : these were mortal dangers for the Revolut ion , and at the sam e time th ey \1Jere '

.

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,

,

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.

I S STRUGGLE INTELL I G I B L E ?

1 05

the Revolution itself coming into being i n a particular si tuation . The Allies wou l d have helped a bourgeoi s democracy that endeavoured to carry on the war: as bourgeoi s , they would have been favourable to the overthrow of Tsari sm . The trea ty of Bre st-Litov sk and the B olshevik seizure of power were acts th at i n them selve s entailed ci v i l war, econo mic blockade and encirclem ent : not j ust passively s uffered as a condition , but produced by a praxi s whose obj ectives were long-term one s . Rus s i a ' s poverty i n 1 924 , the absence of cadre s , the encirclement : these were the Revolution itself on the m arch . In taking powe r Leni n knew what he was doing; the B ol shev ik P arty kne w likewi se : their praxi s was constituted by having to pas s through that needle ' s eye in order to go bey ond it. What the Soviet revol utionarie s were perhaps less prone to mention though they certainly accepted its results was that th e Russi an Revolu­ tion itself, as prax i s , was partly responsible for the defeats and divis ions of t he Western proletariat : because of the abortive attempts i t sti mulated more or less everywhere (Hungary, German y , above all Chin a); because of the debilitatin g con flict that sprang up everywhere bet ween s ocial democracy ( which s i mu ltaneou sly betrayed the working class and repre ­ sented the intere sts of an ' el i te ' of pe tty-bourgeois and craft workers ) and the new Party identifying w ith the U S S R ; and , finally, because of the v i olent reaction s of a frightened bourgeoi sie and the tran sformati on of certai n bourgeois democraci es into fascist state s. In other words , the Revolution , incarnated in the centre of the world as a long- term praxi s defi ned by . definite material circum stances , could not itself develop by its actual course, albeit i n c ontradiction w ith without engendering its leaders ' project the impotence of foreign proletari ats . In thi s sense , it can be said that its incarn ation was in direct contradiction with its as a practical co n sequence of the un iversali zation. And th i s situation seizure of power in turn conditioned the USSR ' s relations w i th foreign proletari ats . The contradicti on here derived from the fact that the prole­ tarian Revolution in the U S S R , in stead of bein g a factor in the liberation and emancipation of Europe ' s working-c las s masse s as i t should have been was achiev ed at the cost of plunging them into rel ati v e impotence . * * There are m an y oth e r factors (te c h n ical tran s formation s , etc . ) th at c an ac c ount for thi � i m pote n c e B ut the key t h i n g i s t h at t h e se fac tors w e r e a l w a y s reg ro uped in re l a t i on to the R u s s i an R e v o l u t io n . The e v ol ut ion of i n d u stri al i zation and M a l th u s i an i sm i n France are sufficie n t determ i n at i o n s to e x pl ain the d i v i s io n s of our work i n g c l a s s . B u t the v i o l ence of i n ternal con fl i c t s i s prec i s e l y due to the fac t th at these d i v i s io n s of a tec h n ical and c raft ori g i n i ntersect w i th p o litical d i s p u te s , whose deep s i g n ifi c a t i o n i s a lways d i ffe ri n g att itudes tow ard s the U S S R . N at u ral l y , we are he re e n v isag ing the U S S R i n the first phase o f t he R e v o l ution . The subsequent and cru c i a l l y i mportan t ac h i e v e m e n t s that it h a s m ade s i n c e

t h e n , d i re c t l y or i n d i r ec t l y ( de fe at of N az i sm , t r i u mph of c om mun i �rn in C h i n a, emerge nce o f

al though they were the Th i rd World ) , d o not h av e to be taken i n to c o n s i d e ra t i o n , b ec a u se pre sent i n embry o i n the p e ri o d i n q ue st i on - they d i d n ot yet appear e x pl i c i t l y . -

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B OO K I I I

O nce i nteriorized , this contradict ion was manifested as a con fl ict, and thi s con flict was preci sely the one we have j ust been outlining . On the o ne hand, i n fact, even if i t had no expectat ion s of them , the revolutio nary go vernment was obliged in practice to help foreign proletaria ts as much a s it co uld. On the other hand, the relative weakne s s of those proletar iats , the strength of the bourgeoi s regimes , threats of w ar and the economic blockade constrain ed the Soviets to the most extreme prudence . Perhap s helpi ng one proletariat in its rev olutionary fight would indeed have encoura ge d all the others to act . B ut s ince they were paral y s ed even by their div ision s , the only foreseeable result might well have been a regroupm en t of the capitalist powers and w ar a w ar that the U S S R coul d not hav e won i n the exi sting situati on, and that would i n any case hav e made soc ialist construction far harder, whatever the outcome of the given the fi ghting. Thi s difficulty was never to be resolved, bec ause b alanc e of force s between the U S S R and the bourgeois democrac ies it was in reality insoluble. S tal i n h imself, despi te innumerable acts of treac hery , di d s ti ll he lp the C h inese, S panis h , etc . to the extent he believe d possible w ith out provoking armed i ntervention by the West; while Trotsky himself, i n exile, entrusted the proletariats of the e ntire w orld w i th the task of defending the US SR i n the event of its c om i ng u n der attack, because despite ev erything the foundations of soc i al is m did exi st there . F rom thi s point of view , ' soci al i sm i n one country ' w as the product of rev olutionary praxi s reflecting upon its effects and the contradictions i t had engendere d . Synthetically , and approaching the dogma v i a the B ol shevik Party ' s interiorization of these contradictory re s u lt s , it can be grasped in its intell i gibi lity as an attempt to lift the mortgage of inter­ n ational i s m , w h ile retaining the U S SR ' s abi l i ty to give as sistance to foreign rev o l utionary parties i n accordance with its mean s and the ri sks involved. What was con sciously broken was any relation of re ciproci ty : if the US S R could build socialism on its o w n , i t did not really need to aid w hen i t could foreign help; and if it still had to intervene revol uti onaries i n danger in the capitalist nation s , this was its mission , its 'generosity ' . I n short , the leaders h ad a free hand. The s lo gan theorized the practical neces sity . The Trotskyist Left , had it been in power, would not hav e adopted it ; but if you di scount p ers onal factors (le s s significant in this case than in man y others) , its policy towards the European and Asi atic Communist Parties would doubtle s s not have been perceptibl y different. An d at all events that praxi s would have had to produce its own theoretical j u stifi c atio n : i n other word s , in term s of our earlier discus sion , i ts own idea of itself. Thi s idea, of course, w ould not hav e been expre s sed by the s logan ' social i sm i n one country ' . B ut it would have contained the same contradiction , albeit as i t were in reverse . Radicalization and universali zation would at first hav e been affirmed, but

I S S T R U G G LE I NT EL L I G I B L E ?

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these would then have imposed thei r own l imits in the l ight of the situation . No doubt it c an be said that such an ' ideation ' of p raxis would have been more in l ine with rea lity, more true . B ut that i s only because we have hypotheticall y s uppressed the other term of the confl ict. Without the radical Left, Stalin would undoubtedly also have given an i nter­ pretation of the totalizing prax i s more i n line w ith the truth . Conversel y , if we v i suali ze a maj ori ty led by Trotsky in confl ict with a Stal ini s t minority , the si tuation would have obliged Trotsky to formulate h i s praxi s provocatively, i n order to compel S talin and h i s allies ei ther to capitulate or to proclaim their treason . (b) Thi s conflict pitted men against one another: i .e . practical bei ng s , irreduc ible to ideas or even to a common activity (h yper-organ i sm) . B ut they had first m ade themselves i nto common individuals , so that their s i ng ular indiv idual ity as free practical organ i s m s was , as we know , perpetual transcendence of the i nert e x igenc ies of their p ledge at the same time as the realization of these in every concrete circ umstance . Wh en we go more deeply i nto the c ircumstances that pitted them against one another as common indi v id uals i . e . as members of an integrated Party i n which they occupied functions defi ned by the group as a whole in the course of past struggles then the fun damental situation that su stained and produced those co n fl icts take s on a historical density as a diachronic totali zation of the past by the present. For the i solation of the U S SR after the Revo lution was not simply what we have j ust seen it to be : the res u lt both sought and suffered of a re volutionary praxis ( sought, i nasmuch as there was Revolution and negation of the bourgeois order with in the foreign nations themselves ; suffered, inasmuch as the repercus sions of that negation pl aced the Revolution in danger) . In short, it could not be reduced simpl y to the isolation of the first social i st country within an ensemble of capi tal ist powers . Had Engl a n d been the fi rst to make the Rev olution , as Marx sometimes env i s aged , it would have produced thanks to its insulari ty, as well as to the development of its indu strial technology (and to many other factors , of course ) an other socialist isolation ; it woul d have been encirc led oth erwise . Soviet isolation was first and foremost that of a monstrosity : an underdeveloped country pas s i ng without tran sition from the feudal order to soc ial ist forms of production and ownership . Th is at once refers us back to the past, to Tsari s m , to the econom ic structure of the country before 1 9 1 4 , and to foreign inve stments (the exi stence of such investments expla ins , i n fact, the particular feroc ity of certain econom ic and financial groups against the Soviet s ) . B ut the se rel ations with the outside worl d were real l y rooted above all in the ec onomi c and soc ial h i story of Rus sia as a whole, seen in the contex t of i ts geopolitical situat ion (inasmuch as that si tuati on conditioned •

BOOK III

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hi storical trans formations and was condi tio ned by them) . We should no t b e worr ied about introducing a diachronic p ersp e ctive here , e ven though w e have yet to s ubject it to critical i nvesti gation For what i s involve d here i s not match i ng it to synchronie s , bu t simp l y sho w i ng how in a manner that remains to be determ i ned - it constitutes their dep th . I n fac t, what counts i s the fact that Rus s ia ' s relati onship w ith Western Europ e was l ived by the Russ ian people through a h i story that produced the Tsaris t Empire as a gigantic mediation between Asia and Europe , and a s a pe rp et u al l y contested synth e s i s of European and Asiatic population s Sometimes th is changing relationship woul d pass from negative to positiv e and v ice v ersa. Sometimes it would present it s el f as a v ari able combina­ tion of two contradictory attitude s ( inasmuch as it was produced i n Russia and by the R u ssian people ) : on the one hand, fasc ination with fore i gn technolog y , political sy stems and c ult u re ( al w ays m ore adv ance d than i n the Russ ian Empire) and , as a con sequence , the sustained effo rt by the rul ing c lasses and the i ntel lectual s to as s im i l ate E urope ' s contribu­ tions ; on the other hand, howev er a mi strust and particulari s m that were b ased on the radical differences between the sy stems , thei r respect i v e rel ations of production , and their ' s uperstru c ture s ' ( i n c l u d i n g , es p e c ial l y their diffe rent rel i gion s ) In thi s perspectiv e , the conflict we hav e taken as an e xample assumes i ts singular historic al depth : a universalist ideo l ogy and practice, born in the most industrialized countri e s of Europe and imported by circles of revol utionary i ntel lectual s tow ards the end of the ninetee nth century , i n a co untry that its economic and geopoliti c al s tructure seems to desi gnate , i . e . as a nation so i n the name of Marxi sm itse l f, as a partic u larity ' ba ckw ard ' that Marxi st prac tice (mob i l i zation of the working-class ma sse s , etc . ) doe s not seem to be able to develop there , at least not without pro found modi fication s . For Tsari sm, perched on top of a bo u r ­ geo i sie that w as beginn i n g its dev e l o p ment, maintained itself by police methods which enforced c l ande s t i nity ( at first sight, the opposite of mas s action) . The Marxist e xperienc e , by contrast , involves open strug g l e (ev en if rep res sion tem p orar i l y obl iges organ ization s to reconst i tute themselves c l ande stinely ) . It i s the actual experience of the pro letari at , as engendered and developed by industriali zation , in the context of demo­ cra cies forming and evolv ing u n der the pres s ure of that same industrial ­ i zation . Acc l i mati zing Marx ism was thus bound to mean particularizing it, sin c e i t would be a�ked to guide rev ol utionary prax i s i n a feudal cou ntry whe re the proletariat repre s ented practically noth i ng , wh i l e the rural m a s s e s c o n s t ituted v i rtua l l y the to t a l i ty of the pop u l at i o n B e fore 1 9 1 7 , however R u s s i an Marxi s m was s t i ll un iversal ist and abstract, since it w as a d o c tr i ne and a strategy for working-class m i l i tants i n tel ­ lectual s and em ig res . After t h e Revol utio n , i t be c am e the bas i s of the .

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I S S T R U G G L E I N T E L L I G I B L E '>

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cu lture of the masses. Its sy stematic impl antation in the Russian people was conditioned at once by educ ation, inasmuch as th is was defi ned by the rulers ' prax i s , and by the con stant growth of w orking-clas s conce n trations i . e . the draining off of pe asa nts into the factorie s . These sti l l so uncouth , so hasti l y ma nufactured and so close to the workers peasantry transformed Marxism as they were be i ng imbued with it. It was incarnated b y becoming a popular and n ational culture , when in Europe it was sti l l j ust the theoretico-prac tical movement of Hi story. To speak in Hege l i an term s ( w hose ideal i sm i s too flagrant to be a problem ) , i t was the ohjective spirit of a people . It became a dogma preci se l y inasmuch as i t al lowed those mystified peasants to l iquidate all dogmas; it was v u lgari zed as i t k nocked the rough edges off them; i t was alienated in them as it emanc ipated them ; it was o s s i fi ed as they tran scended and reinv ented it in every s y s tem ati c decoding of their experience . At the same time as it was i ncarn ated, i ts intimate character which was ' the becom in g-world of philosophy ' contributed to giv ing it, in the e yes of all, a new preponderance as reality lived and perpetually p roduced by the Soviet masses . In the name of its own princ iples , the universali st Marx i sm of the West was s ubordin ated to a particulari st Marxism : a product di stil led by the R u s s i an people and by the Rev ol ution entering upon its constructive phase . Thi s was the prime inversion . The incarnated and thu s singul arized universali ty bec ame the truth of the abstract universal . I t was for the U S S R to comprehend the re volutionary movemen ts of the West, s ince they s tood on thi s s ide of the seizure of power whi l e the Russ i an Rev o l ution had passed be yond i t. The v ast h i storical transform ati on of th at soc iety produced w i thin it t he transformation of Marx i s m , i n asmuch as it caused i t to become the i .e . i nasmuch as prax i s conferred its ideology of that transformation new feature s upon it. The universal , subordi nated to the s i ngularity and contai ned w ith i n it, directed and tran sformed in conformity with the transformations of that singular hi story ; on the theoretical and cultural l eve l , th i s was already the obj ective real i ty of the s logan ' social i sm in one country ' . And, at that l evel , the conflict was c l e arly desi gnated. By bein g incarnated in an underdeve loped country as i ts culture , the theoretico­ practical en sembl e that was Marxism di s soc iated its un ity as a uni versal i st dialectic i nto two particular universal i tie s . The un i v ersality of the several re vol utionary movements of the We st became abstract, and saw itself refused the right to interpret dialectic al l y S ov iet hi story as a non­ privileged hi storic al proces s ; its singular i ty l ay in being an abstraction trail ing behind the h i storic al and conc rete development of i ncarnated M arx i sm in th e USSR rece i v i n g its knowledge from the l atter in stead of illuminating it th rough re search . The universality of R ussian Marxism , on the other h and, w as to al ienate i tself i n the hi story of the U S S R ,

B OOK I I I

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preci sely inasmuch as it obj ectified itself i n it. I n thi s sense , the slogan ' soc ialism i n one country ' w as at once the definition of that al ienated Marxism, the object of H istory rather than i ts know ledge, and simul­ taneously its first theoretico-practi cal product the first determ ination o f that uncouth c ulture. No doubt things would h ave been different if a sequence of rev olution s , diversify ing the incarnations of Marxism, had al lowed it to redi scover v i a new contradiction s a liv ing and concrete u niv ersalit y . Thu s the h i storical and revol utionary i solation of the U S SR, the ebbing of the rev olutionary m ov ements , the capitali st encirclement, the singularization of Marxism by the Russian masses , and the emanc ipation of Marx i sm through alienated Marxism : all these were parti c u l ar deter­ mination s e ach of wh ich expressed al l the others . I t i s at thi s level that we fi nd, readopted in the form of practical atti tudes, the fun damental determ ination of Soviet man : the nationalism suffered and proclaimed through sociali sm; the particularism interiorized as an incarnation of th e universal ; the national pri de ( " this people is the guide of al l peoples ' ) , combined with a l uc i d awarene s s of technolog ical backwardne s s ( uni­ versality was already present, albeit in a wholly modifi ed form , in the way in which Lenin already insi sted strongl y on the need to learn from experts in the U SA ) . From thi s s tandpoint, moreover, the liquidati on of the ' lefti st ' opp o s i tion was to have the effect not of suppre s s ing the contradiction that produced those men, but of defining S tal in i sm ever more clearl y inasmuch as i t reproduced the contradiction with in itself. I n the same way , Trotsky in e x i le redi scovered v ia Trotsky ism the abstrac t universal i sm of Marxism . He di sincarnated it, a s a theoretico-practi c al schema, and interpreted the soc ial evolution of the U S SR in the ligh t of universal Marx i s m . B ut he did not e l i minate the contradiction entire ly and h i s attitu de tow ards the U S S R refl ected , through its oscillat ions an d hesi tation s , the fact that - despite everything Trotsky ism could grasp Sov iet society in the course of its con struction only as a dev i ation operating on th e bas is of a rea l incarnation . (Even if the B ure aucracy was to strip them of the i r rights, the foundation s of soc i al i sm had been laid; Trotsky gav e one of h i s works the significant tit l e ' The Revol ution B etrayed ' . ) In that sense, the confl ict between the Third and Fourth I nternationals found its origins in the tens ion th at, before World War I , pitted the em igre i nte l lectual s a ga in st the m i l itants working in R u ssia. tran s ­ Born of th i s t en s i o n the sub sequent struggle incorporated it forming and rad i c al i z i n g i t , and endow ing it with i ts fu l l meaning . Inasmuch as S talin an d the S tal i n i s t bureauc rac y made themselv e s i n to the i nstr u m e n t s of that p a rt i c u l ari z a t io n o f the uni versal i n th e U S S R Soviet m an who w as t he p ro d u c t of a p art i c u l ari st p rax i s and of Marx i s t in fl u ence among the m a s s e s reC()M n i� e d h imself' in h is leaders . ,

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I S S TR U G G L E I N T E L L I G I B L E ?

1 1 1

All the European revolutionarie s , by contrast , who wi shed to ado pt the Russian Revol ution as a capital moment of H i story , a universal trans­ formation , w h i le simultaneously retaining fo r the European proletariats the ir absolute autonomy within the framework of an I n tern ational of the old ( universal ist) type, recognized their practical exigenci e s i n the activ ity pursued by Trotsky . Trotskyism , in short, to a certain extent represented revol utionary Europe stri v ing to release itself from the Sov iet grip. I ndeed , the actual Trotskyi sts the activ i sts constituting the rank and fi le were ' Westerners ' . B u t the contradiction was not th ereby transcended nor cou ld it be because the e n tire practice of the Fourth I n ternational was i n fact deter­ mined by a conflict that p itted two leading factions of the S ov iet Revolution again st one another: first within the U S S R , then on both s ide s of the frontier, and al way s about the Revolution as an incarnation . Fr o m this v iewpoint, th e slo gan ' social i sm in one country ' defi ned Sov iet man as he was produced , and as he produced himself, theore tically and practicall y between the w ars . And the overdetermination of that object the trace s that both adversarie s left upon it became a pure determina­ ti on . That i s to say, seen from the standpoint of the who le grou p ( the Party and its all ied sub-partie s in the US S R ) , the oversi gnifying gap between the ex igencies of prax i s and the dogma that defi ned the practical solution became a simple sign i fication of the w ay in which that country stil l traditional i st and peopled b y i l literates absorbed and assim i l ated, all at the same time , a transformation of its secular tradition s, a traditional w ithdrawal into its she l l , and the acquisitio n of new tradition s v ia the s low absorption of an intern ationalist and uni v ersal i s t ideolo gy i llumin­ ating, for peasants sucked in by industry , the passage from rural labour to factory labour. The slogan was deformed because , at the level of the leaders ' con fl ict, it repre sented the product of contrasting activitie s . From the viewpoint of the Party i .e . of the ensem ble of obj ective the givens ( i n teriori zed , as it were , by a systematic reto talization ) deformi ty w as in itself a practical and comprehensible signification . In its uncouth , mi sguided crudity , i t s ignalled the reincarnation of Marx i sm through men whose wild volun tari sm and youthful barbari sm it ex­ pre s sed by th e ve ry deviations it received and transmitted . Thi s mon­ stro s i ty , unintel ligible as a verb al idea or theoretico-practical pri nciple , w as comprehensible as a totalizing act which , at that precise moment of action , kept together and united the theoretical and the prac tical , the universal and the singular, the traditional i st depths of a s till ali enated hi story and the movement of cultural eman c ipati on , the negative move­ ment of retreat and the positive movement of hope. Its singul arity as an ideologi c al devi ati on w as a total ized total izati on , s i nce it e xpre ssed and simultaneously rei nforced revol utionary p raxi s i n the hi storical sing u lari ty .

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1 12

BOOK I I I

i . e. in the particularity of its objective task s , inside of its incarnation the community u nder con struction and outside in the practical fi e ld. Thus the theory of gold as a commodity i s comprehen sibl e , i nasm uch as it i s the idea of a certain monetary practice at the time of the ex ploi tation of the Peruv ian mines. This should not be taken to mean that the idea i s in conformity true, or self-ev ident , or i n the case that concerns u s with the pri nc iple s of Marx i s m . Or even th at it i s ' v al id ' in the long term , i . e. effec tive without too many counter- fi nalities . The hi stori an will s imply comprehend i t in a s ingle totalizing ac t, because he w i l l see i t not as a scientific assertion but as prax i s itself dev iating and g oing astray , on l y to find its way ag ain through its own contradictions , i .e . through conflicts betw een common indivi dual s . In asm uch as the factors are diverse , within a totali zation i n p rogre s s , we m u st know that each one of them i s a particular expre s s i on of that totali zation. So comprehension w ill con s i st in grasping each fac tor as a perspective at once objective and s ingular upon the developing whole , and in totalizing the se perspectiv e s b y the totalizatio n that each of them s ingulari ze s , w hich i s al so an envelo ping though s ingular s ynthe si s of all these s i ngulari zation s . Thereafter, of course, complementary con s i de ration m u st also be given to the s logan (or any other, similar product) in its development as a process. I t w as hardened by its duration (by its past; by the s trati fi cation s that it helped to produce and that s ustained it) . It borrowed its ossified p ermanence from the inerti a of language and the pledged pas siv ity of common i nd iv idual s . A s such i t e xerci sed powers , developed its co unter­ fi naliti e s , help ed to create the practi co-inert of constructive activ ity in the Party and in the new society . B ut thi s ne w problem of the relation­ ship between the dialectic and the anti -di alectic i s not yet w i thin our competency , though our inv e stigation wil l soon lead u s to it. What we have striven t o show i s that , w ithin a group, the meaningles sne s s of any giv en product of secret con fl icts appears at the l evel where the product has been constituted not by one act (or by an ensemble of solidary activiti e s organi zed around a common aim ) but by at least two actions , each of which tends to cancel the other, or at least to turn it i nto a me an s for destroying the other agent. And thi s i s the level , of course, at whic h practices are produced in the ir concrete real ity as groups of people them selves de termining their activ ities on the basis of a s ituation. B ut these people have been produced as common individua ls inside the group as a whole . Their di spute s l ike the anti -labours which culm inate in the product under con s ideration confront each other through their funda­ mental unity (for instance , as leaders of the Bol shevik Party propel led, after the sei zure of power, i n to the urgent task of pre serv i ng what had been won by bui l ding the future s ociety ) . A s s uch, they are li ke wi se s upported by al l common indiv iduals ( at the v arious lev e l s o f h ierarchical

I S STR U G G L E I N TELL I G I B LE ?

1 13

organization ) , inasmuch as these constitute the group . If, moreov er, i n the fi rst period of struggle s uch s upport is gi ven simultaneou s l y to both adver­ saries , this i s because each indiv idual is common by v irtue of his pledge to maintain the unity of the totalizing group. It is al so because the confl ict expresses, in the form of a real and public contradiction , the implicit and non-themati zed contradiction that pits each indiv idual again st himself in his movement to interi ori ze the objective difficulties of common praxi s . From thi s point of v i e w , through its c ommon ac tiv ity the group s upports the monstrosities g e nerated by anti -labour. It decides irrev ocably whether they are v i able or stillborn . And when it s upports one of these monstrosities i .e . when it adopts it and real i zes i t i n detail through its prax is thi s praxi s i s in itself tantamount to comprehension. Each common indiv idual and each s ub -gro up supports and nouri shes the mon ­ strosity , i n asm uch as i t pre sents itself as an intelligible and practical transcendence of their contradiction s . Thi s certainly does not mean that s uch transcendence i s the true synthe s i s of, and solution to, the objective di fficu ltie s . Ye t the monstros ity i s comprehen s ible throu gh and by v irtue of the interiorized contradiction s of eve ryone , as the re-ex teriorization of these i n an undertakin g . For the contradicti on is implic it and enveloped i n everyone . It occ urs as a determination of c omprehens ion ( among other aspects), i . e. as an invisible l i mi t o n freedom and an immediate fami liarity w i th the obj ect produced. I n the case that concerns us , the limit was due to the neces sary vul garization and partic ulari zation of Marxism, as the first phase of a c ulture . The particularization and v ulgarization of the uni versal were the contrad iction itself, b ut enveloped, since i t at the s am e time expre ssed everyone ' s l evel of culture : i . e . their implicit familiarity , never seen or mediated, w ith themselv e s . B ut i n thi s neg ative frame work , incapable at first of grasping the ab s urdity of the slog an ' socialism in one country ' , they recognized its posi tiv e aspect. For if i t was true that the situation , taken i n the abstract, did not neces s ari ly i nvolve th at dogma, and if it was ab strac tly possible to base propaganda on nlore mode st reasons for acti ng a nd hoping, everythi ng changes once we look at the concrete people who made the new Marxi sm and, i n the name of the very i d eas Marx i st education had produced i n them, pro­ c l ai med an absolute certai nty . For them , in fact, the n egative moment had been transcended . Purs uing the Revolution meant building a new order. A s Trotsky was later to express i t : ' The masses needed to breathe . ' This meant t hat their simpl i stic c ul ture prevented them from beli eving i n the positive v alue of a s ystemati call y pursued liquidation of every last trace of the old order. I n their eye s , that order had already di s appeared. S o it was not the situation that required thi s obj ect, but the actual men who lived it. B ut since they made it as they lived it, we might more accuratel y say that the ab stract exig encies of the si tuation became clear ,

1 14

BOOK III

and were imbued w ith (often contradictory ) significations by becoming concrete exige ncies through liv ing men . Thi s product bec ame inte l ligible i n term s of the totali zing group, inasmuch as i t was acknowledged and supported by common indiv idual s , i .e . inasmuch as they re -produced it as a respon se to their own exigencies . And thi s was j ust what the sub­ group whose m anoeuvre came off was counting on . It h oped to be borne along i n its operation by the participation of all . There i s still, of course , the case where the confl ict is adopted as its own by the entire group, and w here every common indiv idual belongs to one camp or the other. In s uch circumstance s , the inte l ligibi lity of products tends to disappear. B ut thi s i s because a split i s immi nent. I n fact, i n the event of one sub-group restoring u nity by l i qu idating the as we have s een has to be a permanent mediator. other, the group Thi s preci sely as sumes that the es sential integrity of the practic al and it i s thi s i ntegrity which renders the community is preserved products of anti -labour intelligible . In effect, they become the chosen i nstruments for an operation b y the group upon itself. although such consi derations 3 . Final l y , it should be pointed out take u s to the threshold of diachronic totalization that if the monstrosity survived, it was to be reorgani zed by common prax is and lose its immediate uninte l l ig ibili ty by being integrated i nto a new intelligibility. Praxi s re -establi shed its prac ti c al truth by correcting its own dev iations , and the origin of thi s correction lay in the deviations themsel v e s . B ut the irreversibility of temporali zatio n made i t impo s s ible to turn back the clock. So the correction had to function by way of an e nriching tran­ scendence , which preserved the deviation at the same time as endowing it with truth through a someti mes v ery complex sy s tem of additions, developments, compensation s and transmutations. The sl ogan ' soc ialism i n one country ' actuall y involved a certain i ndetermination from the outset, s ince the word ' soc iali sm ' was fairly a mbiguous . In Marxist writi ng , the words ' soci al i sm ' and ' commun i sm ' are , i n fact, often used interchangeably to denote a singl e social order: the s ociety that th e proletariat has the task of real i zing i n the future . I n thi s cas e , the word refers as much to the withering away and disappearance of the State as to the eli mination of classes , and the owners hip by all workers of thei r instruments of labour. On the other hand, however, inasmuch as social democrac y too identifi es w ith thi s key word but claims it w i l l reach the soci ali st society at the end of a long reformi st evolution , the term ' social is m ' undergoes a slight alteration i n that it can serve to denote the reformi st i l l u sion of soc ial democrac y . I n thi s case, the term ' communism ' will have the adv antage over it of exactnes s : i t w i l l denote the order in que s ti on prec i se l y in s o far as thi s can be reali zed only through Revol ution .

I S S T R U G G L E I N T E L L I G I B L E ')

1 15

Thus the word ' socialism ' , as employed in the slogan we are cons idering , was di sting uished from the word ' communism ' by a s light indeter­ mination . Thi s seman tic distinction was soon to be made sharper, becoming a difference i n the struc ture of the objects des i gnated and in t he moments of temporal ization. In other word s , ' soc ialism ' gradual l y took on a new accepted meanin g : it w as what comes before the communist order or, if you like , the trans ition between capita l i sm and c omm unism . * Thi s tr ans i ­ tional order, despite everything , was beyond th e revolutionary seizure of power. It was characterized by a neces s ary and fundamental tran s­ formation of t he re latio n s of production : soc iety as a w hole appropriated the means of produc ing. Ye t the S tate c ontinue d to e xi st. It w as the bo dy by whose agency the proletariat exerc i sed its dictatorship. That meant, of course , that classes were not l iquidated far from i t . In particular, h idden in the dep th s of the ne w society, the representati ves o f the oppre s sor classes united and constituted counter-revolutionary force s . Later S tal in w as not to shrink even from adding that class confl icts intensify as soc ial i st achievements grow in number and i mportance. S u ch harassed by enemies w ithout and w i thin ; characterized by a a s y s tem stren gthened S tate apparatus , at the ve ry momen t w hen tran sformations of ownership were i nitiatin g the pro gressive w ithering away of that was neces sarily riven by contradi ctions . I ndeed, offic ial apparatus Marx i sts graduall y began to rai se the question of ' the contradictions of socialism ' . Taking on these new mean i ngs under the pre s s ure of circum­ stance s , the term ' soc ial i sm ' changed i ts signification . I t came to denote more narrowly ( but sti ll inadeq u ately) the s i ngular order that w as pro­ gressively e s tabli she d i n the U S S R , and that pre sented i tself as transi­ tional . Did th i s , therefore, s imp ly i nvol v e mov ing bac kwards an d c hanging t he content of the concept ' soc i al i s nl ' , unti l it meant merely what we earl ier termed the ' pre-social ist o rder' ? No. The term ' pre- social i sm ' , by its very make -up , involves a serious error of assessment. For, in a sense , there i s only one pre-social ist order and that i s capital i sm itself quite s impl y bec ause i t comes before . B ut when the proletari an Rev olution i s made , social i sm i s already there . For what characterize s i t fundamentally i s ne ither abundance , nor the total el imination of cl asse s , n or worki ng­ c l as s sovereignty even though the se features are in dispensable, at least as di stant aim s of the e s sential transformation . It i s the eli mination of

*

S i m I l a r d i st i n c t i o n � m ay be fo u n d i n a n u mber of a u t h ors , e v e n before 1 9 1 4 . B ut

t h e y then had o n l y a l o g i c a l an d p h i losop h i c al v a l u e Term s w e re d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n t h e name o f theorie� The nov e l t y app e a red w h e n , in the n ame o f a dog m a ( ' soc i a l i s m i n o ne c o u n t ry ' ) , the d i � t i n c t i on b e t w e e n soc i a l i sm ' an d . c o m m u n i � m ' took on a p rac t i c a l and ·

pop u l ar v a l ue : when i t �erved to denote s t age s i n t he e v o l u t i o n of S o v i e t soc i ety .

1 16

BOOK HI

the coll ecti ve in po sitive term s exploitation and oppre s sion , or appropriation o f the mean s of production . B ut thi s appropriation whatever the d i s tre s s of a country rav aged by w ar, whatever the dilapidation of its indu stri al in stal l ations may be - was accompl i shed as soon as the Sov iets took power. I t was never cal led into question , w hatever meaning people might seek to assign to the emergence of a bureaucratic layer re serv ing a con s iderable share of surpl u s -val ue for itself. And the only real danger it ran could be id enti fied with those imposed on Sov i et soc iety as a w hole by capi tal i st block ade and enc irc le­ ment an d the efforts of the enemy w ithin . In fact, it rea lly was a soc iali st order that w as e stablished in the U S S R . Ho wever, that order was charac ­ teri zed by the practical nec e s s ity (a neces sity of freedom) of either di sappearing or becom ing what i t was through a giganti c and bloody effort. That collective appropri ation of rui n s beneath the fore ign threat h ad to be changed progres s i vely , through the l abour of al l , into a common ownership of the most powerfu l means of produc tion. And i f i t was nece ssary to build social i sm in one country , th i s was prec i sely because soc ialism appeared in its most abstract and impoveri shed form in a country whose i solation it adopted and accentuated. Th us the fonnula, wh ich was fal se, became true prov ided social i sm was made i nto a p raxis ­ process , building an order on the basi s of machines and a fundament al sociali zation of the land, in emergency conditions and through the perpetual sacri fi ce of every thing to the most rapid i ntensi fication of production rate s . Doubtle s s its bas ic contradicti on lay i n being simul­ taneously a s w i ft v i ctory , s wiftl y institution al i zed , and an undertaking stretc hing over sev eral generation s . But the emergency con ditions w i th the p ractical conseq uence s the se entai led (com m andi sm, authori tari an planning, ideal i st v ol untari s m , strengthen i ng of the State apparatus , bureaucracy , terror, etc . ) nece s s aril y entered into the de fini tion of that order- undertaking , since they were what brought it about as a conse­ quence of the terror it inspired i n the bo urgeoi s democrac i e s . So what was left as a di stant objective as th e non - i ncarnated other s i de of the dai l y struggles and of the whole undertaking was the comm unist orde r i tself. This i s w hat sti ll de fined i tse lf, abstract ly , as internationalization of the Revol ution, d i s appearance of the S tate, abundance, l iberty . Social­ ism , in th i s theoretical synthe si s , was e s sential ly h omogeneous with comm u n i s m , in so far as the radical tran sform ation of econom ic and soc ial struc ture s was carried out i n the v ery fi rs t years of the Revolution . It was q uite simply the mediation bet w een the ab strac t moment of 5 0c ia li;:a tion and the concrete moment of conl m on en.loynlen t. This meant that i n certai n h i s torical c i rc u m stances it could be a s y nonym of Hell. Th u s t he S ta l i ni st form ula at fi rst fal s e , then nl ore and more true eventually decayed and lap sed i nto an h on o r i fi c role w h e n the s i tuation

I S S T R U G G L E I N T E L L I G I B L E '?

1 17

no longer j u sti fied it: i . e . when the Chinese Revol uti on and the appearance of the people ' s democrac ies i n Central Europe aboli shed ' soc ialist i so l a ­ tion ' a n d required another prax i s on th e part of the Sov iet government. Meanwhile, of course , the counter- fi nal ities of that tran scended p ra x i s had transfonned the USSR : strat i fi c ations , practico-inert struc ture s . That s i n gular incarnation was progre s s i v ely s i ngu J arized i n the proces s of instituti onal ization . The adaptation of such a highly specific real ity to the new e x i genc i es w as to be long , arduous and obstructed . The fact remains that what w as es sential had been preserved . The tran sformation s might be v iolent, but they wou ld no longer have the character of a revolution. I n this way , the m o nstrou s slog an ac q u i r ed i ts pra c tic a l truth, because i t had truly been the idea of th at m o ns trou s, inevi table transformation : of that de viant prax i s , whose s ing ular dev i ation was none th e less the real it y ( hence the truth ) of the inc arnati on tran scending itself in an undertaking that it cond i ti oned from the outset, and th at remained qualified by it. Thr oug h the twin total ization synchron ic and diachron ic hi storical Reason thu� g rasps the product of anti -labour as al so both i n the parti c u lar moment and throughout the temporali zati o n the i ntel l i gible outcome of the common unity and the totalization-of-env el opment.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

The Three P hases

0

27

His toria lization

example has onl y a limited scope , s i nce strugg le appears i n it only as the avatar of an already integrated group . What we have b asical ly shown i s that if s ynthetic unity already exists , as both effect and condition of a com mon praxis , internal confl ict as the practical assumption of the counter-fi nalities secreted by ac t i on in its movement of antagoni stic reciprocity as i n its obj ective products i s only an incarnation and a hi storialization of the global totalization , inasmuch as this m u st also total ize its disassimilated and waste products . And we have clearly noted that totalization is not an ideal and transcenden t movement, but o perates th rou gh the d i scre t e acti vities of individual s on the basi s of the common pledge. B ut although i t frequently occurs i n concrete e xperience and at al l level s of p ract i c e i n s hort, alth ough it be longs to the proper domain of History, a s a con di ti on and consequence thi s priv ileged of the g l o b al evol ution of the society where i t occ urs case in which un i ty precedes and engenders i nternal discord can obvious ly present i t s el f onl y a s a specifi cation of the hi storical proce s s . And since the e n s e m bl e s w hose s tructures and te mporali zation the historian has to stud y al way s pre se nt them selv e s at least a t first sight as deprived of true unity , the intelligibility of social str u ggles seems very hard to defend . * And how about o ur regressive investigation? What has it taught u s about ' societie s ' i n the strictly h i storical sense of the term ? HE FOREGOING

* I am s pe aki n g h e re only o f national ensemb l e s , bec au se critical i n v e st igation has to pass throu gh n ation al h istories before tac kl i n g t he problem of so-c al led worl d ' or ' un i versal ' h i story . ·

2 7 . See Preface abo v e , and plans for the projected w ork i n the Appendi x below .

1 18

I S STR U G G L E I N T EL L I G I B L E ?

1 19

Nothing yet , e xcept that they seem to be characteri zed simu ltaneou s l y by a un ity of immanence and by a multiplicity of exteriority , whether we are dealing with a Flemish city in the fi fteenth century or with ' France ' between 1 7 8 9 and 1 79 4 . For there i s a relation ship between the city or nation and the en semble of to wns or nations that surround it; and th is interiorized relati onship manife sts itself i nasmuch as it i s grasped by the multipl icity in question as i ts objective practical unity . B ut it w i l l be pointed out, of course , th at series extend and ram ify throughout the entire society . So thi s interiorization unless it i s carried out by a speci fi c group - will be metamorph osed in the milieu of rec urrence i nto a serial bond of alterity . In the s ame way , the institutional en semble m anifests as s uch and i n the constituted bodies that are charged with apply ing the law a certain sovereign integration of the soc ial pl ural ity. As we have already 8 2 noted, however, the sovereign ' s power rests on the impotence of serie s . It i s as an Other that the practico-inert individual i s the servant of the law s 9 2 and lets h imself be man ipulated by forms of other-direction. What have we see n , i n fact? Groups that are heterogeneous (in terms both of their origin, structure s , obj ective and speed of temporalization and of the nature , extent, intensity and i mportance of the ir action s ) and sometimes condition one another more or l e s s directl y , sometime s oppose one another, and sometimes ignore one another, but are all themselves drawn from series and seem poi sed to l apse back into seri ality . Apart from that, the mediation of worked matter alw ay s and every where between indiv idual s �nd even between groups ( when the se are not directl y deter­ mined i n mutual solidarity or reciprocal opposition) create s the pas sive unity of the practico-inert , through alteration and reification of the immediate bonds of rec iprocity between men . In certain cases , as we have seen and particularl y when clas ses enter into struggle via the mediation of organized groups the un ity of the group i s refl ected in the i nert depth s of the col lective as a possibility of un ity for each individual (as a 3o pos s ibi l i ty of transforming his O ther-being i nto common individuality) . Were the whole class to liquidate its seriality, however, it would sti ll be the case that exploitati on , oppre s s ion and the struggle against oppre s sion are conditioned by the practico-inert rift. I n the organized group , the latter only ever appears through a praxi s that has already taken it over. In ' societies ' , however, the practico- inert i s an obj ective reali ty that mani fests itself i ndependentl y , in and through the alienation of every prax is . It i s individual practice that seems taken over and absorbed by inanimate matter.

28

Critiq u e . vol . l , pp.60 I ff.

29

Cri tiq u e . vo l . l , pp . 25 3 ff.

3 0 . Critiqu e , vo l . l , p p 67 8 ff.

1 20

B OOK I I I

Thu s clas s confl ict too appears as a transcendence and taking over of counter-finalities by each clas s and against the other. In real ity , howev er, comb at g roup s , parties and union s , far from emanating from un ity , s trive to real ize t he un ity of one c las s as a practico-i nert seriality ag ai nst the other. S imilarly , the bas ic ( albeit most abstract and di stant) aim of every class organ ization to s uppre s s the other class or (which comes to the same thing) s ubj ugate it defi n i ti vely and constitute it as a slav e demanding i s not, as in the organ i zed group, i mposed by the its en slavement practical nece ssi ty of re-e stab l i sh ing unity of acti on . On the contrary , it is in order to reali ze [th i s aim ] that unity of action i s established in each c las s; and it i s the actual rift of the practico-inert that produces it, as the so le c onceiv able means to create a society governing its m ateriality , in wh ich man i s the permanent mediation between men . Here , i n short, two antagonistic un ities are invented, in opposi tion both to one another and to a serial ity of impotence produced by a practico- inert p roce s s . Or within the group , if you prefer, confl ict was a moment of the con stituted dialectic . B ut how sho u ld we conceive the dia lectica l i ntel l i g ibil ity of that negative rec iproc ity wh ich is instal led on the bas i s of an anti ­ dialectical break separating the con stituent dialectic and the c onstituted dialectic ? I s History not perhaps, at the level of large e n semble s , an a mbiguous interpenetration of unity and plural ity, dialectic and anti­ dialectic , meaning and mean i ng le s s ne s s ? Are there not , accord i ng to the circum stances and ensemble in question , severa l totalizations with no relation between them other th an coexistence or some other relationship of exteriority? Is it not up to the h istorian alone , in h i s historical i nve sti gation , to determine the d irections in which a s ingle prax i s ­ process sees itself res umed and retotal ized at different leve l s , and to demarcate the s igni fy ing conste llations to which a single event give s ri se in the most di sparate m i lieux? If we were to accept th i s the s i s , we shoul d be return ing by a detour to historical neo-pos itiv i s m . For m any modern hi storians admit, more or less i mpl icitly , what m ight be termed dialectical sequences w ithin a h i story that remains p l ural i stic and analytical . Before dec i d in g , however, we must recall that men m ake History in so far as i t make s them . In the pre sent i nstance, this means that the practico­ inert i s en gendered by the counter- finalities of p rax is prec i se ly in so far as seri alities of impotence, by producing the impo ss ibi l i ty of l iv ing , g iv e ri se to the totali zing unity th at transcends them. Thu s the m ovement of hi storial i zation has three phas e s . In a first phase , a common praxi s transforms soc iety by a total izing act ion whose counter-final ities trans ­ form the re su lts obtained into practico -inert one s . In a s econd phase, the anti social force s of the practico- inert impose a negativ e unity of self­ destruction upon society , by usurping the unifying power of the prax i s that has produced them. In a thi rd phase , the detotal i zed unity is retotal ized

I S S TR U G G L E I N T E L L I G f B LE?

J21

in the common effort to redi scover the goal by stripping it of counter­ finalitie s . This i s w h at we must study more c losel y . B efore embarking on 3 1 the mo s t complex and most the examp le of bourgeoi s democrac i e s let us return to the Russian Revo l ution, b ut thi s time to spec ious cons ider it through the history of Sov iet soc iety in all its dive rs ity .

Un ification by the Future The goal of the proletarian Rev olution w as to al low the construction of a s ociety in w hich the worker would have permanent and integral control over the process of producti on . From thi s poi nt of v ie w , common ow nership of the in struments of labour coul d be cons idered th e on ly poss ible means of achiev ing such control. B ut however neces sary thi s radical change in the relations of producti o n might be, it represented only a n1eans. It was the basic immediate goal, in the sen se that the revol utionaries could achieve it in the first years fol lowing the seizure of power. B ut the history of the U S S R i s there to show that nothing had yet been achieved: genu i ne contro l over their labour on the part of the workers also requ i red them to have a direct grip on the economic process, which pre supposed a certain pri or accumul ation of production goods. In thi s sense, the j oint decis ion by the Party and the sovereign organ s to st e p up as far as p o s s ible the drive to industrial i ze and co llecti v i ze ,did not aim j u st to pre serve the foundation s , through perpetual tran sformation and enrichme nt of the economic mean s . I t pre sented itself whose a s the only route leading to m an ' s control over production mean ing c learly had to be the suppre s sion of anti -human mediations (by worked matter) and l iquidatio n of the practico- inert as a field of h uman alienati on. This had to mean also that practi c al freedom implied that the workers should have a common rel ation to their work such that they would have the abi lity to suppre s s its counter- final itie s , or at least pre vent these from ever being able by aggregating into an inert heap t o reconstitute the anti - dialectical rift with in the new dialectical re lation­ shi p u niting the practi cal organi sm to the common i nd i v i dual . In any case , it was th is that was inv olved, as m uch in this fundamental form as in other incarnations at other lev el s of prax i s . For example, it was th is that w as m eant by the progre s s i v e witherin g away of the State , which through progressive liqui dation of the defeated c las ses and the retreat of penury woul d gradual l y become a u seless facto r of al ien a ti on, an

3 1 . S e e Pre face abo v e and , in th e A p pe n d i x be low , Sartre ' s note s on " Tota l i zation i n

N o n - D i c tatori al S oc i eties '

1 22

B OOK I I I

absurd and harmful intermedi ary between the producer and production. This sovere ign prax is (and by sovereign I mean at pre sent the CPS U , as it developed and changed between the Rev olution and 1 954) w as total izing for a spec ific society , and through it for al l soc ieti es , in that it attempted to give the en semble of disparate collectiv es and groups cal l ed Russia the means that would forge its human un ity , on the basis of a given historical situation . If y ou pre fer, there was a real and present unification of that multipl ic ity by the fu ture. And the future here w as neither a simple ev entual ity nor a dream, nor even the hope of an indiv idual or group. It was the di stant, absolute goal (posited simultaneously as the inev i table term of ' pre-history ' and as an i mmediate and fundamental exigency of present needs , as wel l as of sufferings and conflicts ) , abstract, not conceivable but ri gorous , on the bas i s of whic h the practical hierarc hy of objectives assi gned b y the sovere i gn to the rul ed colle ctivi ty was ordered. And each producer w hatever hi s attitu de, i . e. whate ver the nature of hi s grasped this future ( a common work and h i s degree of emanc ipati on direction of the final ly shaken heav y e nsem ble ) through the very materiaIity of the productive effort (advers ity -coeffic i ent of the obj ect under construc­ tion, grasped through hardship and e xhaustion; incre ased e xhau stion and hardship, as a function of the destituti on fol lowing the years of c i v i l war) . If he agreed w ith thi s praxi s (we shall speak i n a moment about opponents, groups and clas ses which rejected it or rej ected it in th is form without rej ecting the ultimate objective), national unity woul d first appear to h im as a future synthe s i s manife sting itself inexorably through a kind of convergence of all i ndiv idual destinie s . Mil l ions of mo ti ves were embarked upon traj ectories i nflected tow ards one another. In each generation the motives exp loded, expelling ne w motives , and thi s change of motives was accompan ied by a c lo ser conv ergence of mov ements . At this lev e l , if the indi v i dual was not i ntegrate d i nto the sovereign (albeit approv i ng h i s prax i s ) , the action i mposed up on him or s impl y the wo rk that prov ided him with the mean s of reproduc i ng his l i fe took place simu ltaneously as free assent in practice of a Soviet citizen and as the inexorable obj ective orientation of his destiny through his dai l y life . i . e . the soverei gn praxis From th is point of view, the convergence grasped as irresistible force of the hi storical process was the same in every w orker: there was a single contin uous draw ing c l oser of al l destini es in re l ation to each indiv i dual one. Thro ugh the temporal l y regre s s i v e hierarchy of objective s , the future goal designated the past as ' national ' preci sely bec ause it was i n itself the ex ige ncy of a suppres sion of nationaliti e s . Through thi s i nternati onal i sm a futu re unity of peoples the Sov iet citizen di scovered that h is country was designated {by H i s tory itse lf) to draw all nation s into the conv e rgence of a s i ngle destiny . A t the time of national i sm , thi s people w as di scov ered as the

I S S TR U G G L E I N T E L L I G I B L E ?

1 23

nation that \vould save al l o thers from their national sol itude s : as th e ch osen people, in short, w hose sufferings and hero i sm had to be commensurate w i th its respon sibi l ities. Th is desti ny could appear only in the perspectiv e of a national pe rsonality (the very one which would on e day disappear in world un i ty , but w hich at the moment of construction - was on the contrary described in itself by the e pic of the Revolutio n ) : i . e . a hi storical past in scri bed in the materi al ity of pre sent circ umstances . Future h i s tory of the U S S R and past hi story of Russia were illuminated by a rec iproc it y of l i ghts . But if the unity of past history was d i sclosed as the l iving depth of an ambiguous mul tiplic ity , th i s was because the inert unity of the soc i a l pas t (as a pas sive synthesi s of worked material ity ) was rean imate d and reconstituted i n the indefi nite of its former moments, as produc ing and undergoing in i ts dep ths the unitary e x i g ency of it s future destiny a nd the actio ns capable of preparing obscure ly an d ind irectly the Revolution. The abstract and my s tical uni ty of Ts ari st mytholo gy (the Russ ian peop le), lit by the s ingularity of the national destiny, became a kind of d im awareness (devoid, however , of ac ti v e awarene s s ) that the Rus sian s have a lways h ad of their extraordinary task. In thi s , properl y speaking, there was neither mystificati on nor ' feti shi za­ tion ' . It was more a matter of the nece ssary interaction b etween tw o popular cu lture s (one folkloric, but parti ally alienated by the religious and social ideolo gy of the old regime ; the other material i st, but imbuin g the peop l e on the bas is of so ve re ign deci sions and with the inflexibil ity of p raxis ) , of which th e new w as sing ularized by the old inasm uch as it rati onal i ze d it. At the j unc ture w e are considering , in fact, for the peasant too hastily transformed into a worker by industriali z ation, receiving a Marx i st educatio n and thanks to i t interpreti ng the historical s ingularity of the Revolut ion in term s of the eco nomic and soc ial circum stances that had made Russia i nto that p artic ular country , torn by those particu l ar contradictions came to much the same th ing as see i ng h i s country i n the gui se of the chosen nation (even if he h ad m ore or l e s s liquidated his rel igious bel ie fs an d given up ' prac ti sing ' ) . But the ed ucation itself, inasmuch as i t was received, was produced in everyone as praxi s of the sovereign , as a unification undergone and assumed by a taught culture . It was al ready , in short, a synthe s i s of al l into one : an effort to make each prac tical organ i sm , through t he i nteriorization of an ensemble of the or ­ etico-practical schemata and determ i n ati on s , into a common indivi dual . S o it would seem , a priori , that the sovere ign praxi s forged unity at the same level as th e seri al di spers ions and against them. Thi s , moreover, i s what the offic i al propaganda proc l aimed , at h ome and abroad . Th e elec toral sy stem was d esi gned , in fact , for majori ti e s to be so great and min oritie s so ti ny that i n practice the latter tended to be null ified and the former to become tantamount to unanimity. The aim here was not j u st to

1 24

BOOK III

show that the popul ation s upported the government ' s pol ic ies a big maj ority would have been enough for that . It was actually a m atter of retaining the electoral s y stem , while repl ac i n g the massify i n g di spers i on of bourgeoi s vote s (the electoral body i � nece s s ari ly a co llective i n capitali st democraci e s ) by a prax i s -proce s s of re unifi cation . The res ult o f the v ote, i n the U S S R , was to re flect everyone ' s vote bac k to them as the action of a c ommon indi v idual in a g roup, or more prec i sely sti l l as the unanimous act upon w h ic h any eve n minimally durable grouping re sts : as a pledge (for wherev e r unanimity comes from , it can emanate only from a collecti v e ; i t can be produced only i f ev ery v ote r aims to achieve agreement w ith al l the others , even at the cost of cons iderable s acrifices) . It mattered l i ttle, for the moment, th at thi s unanim i ty w as more or less a fac; ade , or even that the soverei gn was counting on serial impotence to real i ze i t i n reality . What counted was the determination to fi nd the uni ty of an entire society , by integrating it i nto an irreversible praxi s . The univers alist culture of a bourgeois democrac y g i v e s everyone at least at fi rst s i ght timeless orders . Through cul ture and propaganda, the sovereign group in the U S SR gave ev eryone c oncrete , dated tasks : i . e. tasks that w ere determine d i n relation to a more or l e s s s hort-term obj ectiv e , and with i n the perspecti ve of the fi n al aim as the parti al ac tiv ities whose i ntegratio n would cause the total prax i s to progre s s and whose absence w ould risk p rovoking its regre ssion. I n thi s w ay , every p ractice h ad to be i ntegrated into the totali zing temporali zatio n wi th a positive or negative sign . And th i s determination in pos i tivity or ne gati v ity was itself temporal­ izing , since i t m arked the functional ity or counter-functionality of practice in rel ation to the orientated development of the total izing p raxi s .

From the Government of Men over Things to B ureaucracy : P raxis and Praxis -Process Thu s the sovere ign prax i s d i d i ndeed aim to p roduce unity . B ut i t was i ts very movement which , via the attempted totali:a tion , was to constitu te the practico-inert field by developing its counter-finalitie s . For when S tal i n died , the appropriati on of land and machines remai ned col lective. On the other hand , control of production had passed entirely i nto the h and s of the rul i ng bure aucracy . We find ourselves i n the presence of a new h i storical fac t : the radical separatio n of appropria tion and rule . The whole French Revolution and al l of the bourgeoi s nineteenth century were charac teri zed by the identi ficati on of ruler and owner. Thi s identification w as even j u stified theoretical l y : it was e xplai ned that the o wner was personal l y interested in a w i se adm i n i �trati on of the p ubl i c weal; and that, ultimate l y , he alone could take command of national affa i r s , s i nce

I S S T R U G G L E INTEL L I G I B L E ?

1 25

h i s particular prosperity was a function of the general securi ty and prosperi ty . It is striking that sociali st doctrines and Marxi sm itself had only to pre serve thi s fundamental relationship: i n theory, the com­ munity of workers i s the owner of the means o f produc tion ; for th at very reason , this co mmunity m ust command and control the proces s of produc­ tion . And thi s relationship i s based on a twofo l d inte rest. On the one hand, it i s the organized community which alone can decide upon a truly conlmon management it i s its own end. On the other hand, the new ownershi p sy stem , by s uppressing the mediation of the practico-inert (for exampl e , by refu s ing the regulatory or pseudo -re g ul atory ' mechan i sms ' of the market and other collectives ) , i n the shorter or l onger run al l o w s the united producers to construct a se lf- aware economy , which contains within i t and d ominate s the inerti al forces it use s , w ithout ever all owing them to be po sited for themselves as inhuman mediations between men . Th us unity of production and management mus t c haracterize the soc i al i st order: social i st man i s h uman because he govern s th ing s ; every other order is inhuman , to the (variable) extent that things govern man . Now the fact is that, as soon as the Rev o lution took place , the B o l shevik Party was driven by the dangers pres sing i n on it to reduce to a minimum the g overnment of men by thing s . It was not enough w ith a stroke of the pen to wipe out small and med i um individual ownership. The in terest of the Rev o l uti on was to realize c ommon ownership i n all sectors including the rural sectors and to repl ace small farm s by l arge ones every where : first of all , becau se necessarily for exampl e i n the kolkhozes c ommon ownership of l and and machinery enlarged the enterpri se; secondly ( we are dealing with a circular c onditioning), bec ause producti v ity is theoretical l y * higher in l arge e nterprises than on small farm s . S o , from the outset, there was an apparent m atch between feature s imposed on the leaders ' prax i s by th e situation and the funda­ mental aim of the soci al i st revo l ution . Even before the movement of industrial ization achieved its ful l tempo it was neces sary , o n pain of death , to reduce the effects of the practico-inert to a mini mum . In short, as one s oci ol ogist has recentl y remarked * * to it was neces s ary transform an economy in itself i nto an economy in itself and for itself. •

. .-

* I s ay ' theore t ic a l l y ' , bec a u �e the p r i nc i p l e i s t rue on l y in the abstract . An e n s e m b l e o f h i st o r i c a l c i rc um s t ance s ,

partic u l arly

the a t t i tude o f the

rura l

app i J ca t i o n In Rakos i ' s H un g ar y , the p ro d u c t i v i ty of the kolkhozes

all d u e

al l o w a n c e b e i n g m ade - th an t h a t of the

course, was the p a s s i v e re s i stance o f the **

[ N ote m i s s i ng In

m an u script . The

c l a s se s , m a y d i s tort its

was on average lower holding s . The reason , of

s u rv iv i ng p r iva te p e a s an t s . We shal 1 come bac k

to th i s .

s o c i o l og i �t i s R a y m o n d A ron . s e e , i n p a rt i c u l ar,

Eig h teen Le( tures on Indus trial SOL iety , Lon don 1 967 ]

BOOK III

1 26

B ut it w as preci sely through interiori zation and tran scendence of the practico-inert sector that the ruling prax i s , i n the course of its deve lop­ ment, was to secrete in S oviet society i . e . i n the practical field where it was exerc i sed ne w practico- i nert concretions and new rifts . For it should be noted that if the Stal ini st sy stem was characterized by unity (in a permanent relationship of circular conditioning) of the se two feature s ownership of the instruments of labour by all; rule of a relati ve narrow the ori gin al connection between those two features is group over all not even conceivable other than as the result of a unify ing praxi s , even though i t appears at the same time as an inert characterization of the reg ime or, if you like, a process . The hi storian , soc iologist or econom i st grasps the unity of these signifi cation s , each of which has a meaning only through the other. At the s ame time , however, he discovers that th is unity i s merely a pas sive synthesi s , borrowing its synthetic power from praxi s itself and i n scribing it in inert matter. The system , as a proces s , w as produced as it produced. For, at the outset, the leadership found itself confronted by two major diffi culties. First, it had to modify entirely the demographic aspect of the c ountry , preci sely inasmuch as it attempted to provide it w i th industrial plant. It had to create its c adres from scratch and increase the size of the working clas s considerably. It might have asked for help from a proletariat already emancipated by social struggle s , had the Revolution taken place i n an adv anced c apitali s t country . B ut it could not expect any from those w orkers , m an y of whom were sti ll illiterate and remained peasants even in the factory . In a certai n w ay , i t can be maintained that Rus sia forged its working clas s after the October Revolution. Those rustic s trans­ formed into townspeop le were to emancipate themselves on ly pro­ gressivel y , and s lowly , in the course of the terrible effort demanded of them which could not in itself be considered revol utionary . * T h e idea entirely accept­ of workers ' self-management, workers ' counc i l s , etc . abl e in 1 95 8 had no meaning in 1 93 0 , when the S oviet worker was painfully freeing himself from the peasant gangue and h omogeneous working-c lass concentrati ons were sti l l an e mpty dream . This emergent class sti l l uncertain , and whose most advanced elements had either disappeared in the upheaval s of the civil war or fo und them selves exhausted by ten years of fierce struggle could not counterbalance the strength of the Party by exerting a constant press ure on the rul i ng strata. In the same way, the lack of cadre s , the time th at had to be put into making a tec hnician , and the i ncompetence of the firs t hastily formed engi neers , al l req u i red of managers th at they shou l d as sume every

*

Le t

U \)

'iay that i t i � u s e fu l t o t h e R e v o l u t i o n ' t h at i s a l l .

I S STR U G G LE INTEL L I G I B L E ?

1 27

function i n turn . Their authority could not initially be limited by their competency ; on the contrary , the scope of their competency was deter­ mined by their authority . This meant, i n effect, that the leader produced hi s sovereignty as omnipote nce , despite himself and i n the absence of res i stance shown by men ; but at the s ame time he speedi l y had to accumulate re sponsibilities and practical knowledge , i n order to over­ come the re si stance of thing s as quickl y as possible . Through th i s rel ationship with the led, the mai n feature s of the leadership w ere gradual ly produced. First, a reversal of Marx i sm i n practice took the form of the pol itical as serting its predominance ov er the economic . For, on the one h and, the l ack of technic i an s obliged the pol itic ians to take hence , to take them as politicians. On the other technical dec i sions han d , pl anning which was simply revolutionary praxi s itself, inasmuch as it contin ued the Rev ol ution by other mean s h ad both immediate and long-term aim s of a political nature . The point was to save the regime . B ut this regime was incarnated i n a certai n society that had to be defended. S o the point was actual ly to provide a spec ific country , the U S SR, w ith a c ertain industrial and mil itary potenti al , which was deter­ mined in the light of internal possibil iti e s but al so of rel ation s with external powers . More generall y , i t can be said that the distribution of resources (between consumption and investment) and of investments between the v arious sectors did not become e stabli shed as a simple economi c fact (in the way that things occur or seem to occur i n a bourgeoi s , democrac y ) . Instead , they were the object of a genuine deci sion, which took account synthetical l y of the needs of the popUlation (i . e . the minimum level beneath which di sturbance s would thre aten, or pas sive re si stance, or a real di minution of l abour-power) ; of armament needs (inasmuch as such needs are directly l i nked to the armaments of foreign powers , and to the international conj uncture ) ; of the obligation to develop capital equipment ( in connection with the economic blockade, l ater with the pos sibil ities for external trade , later still with the exigencies of a pol icy of expan sion and aid to underdeveloped countries) : i n short, of directing the Revolution (maintainin g , consolidating and deepening it, and extending it to the whole worl d ) . The volun tarism of the S talinist period produced itself on the basis of the se practical ex igenc ie s . On the one hand, i n fact, the ' directory - of-all ­ work ' that e stablished itself i n the leading strata of the Party learned to demand e v eryth i ng of itself i .e . to replace al l the m i s sing or defaulting technicians duri ng the tran sition period. On the other hand, the pas sivity of masses i n mid mutation placed the leaders i n a situ ation where they were demanding everyth i ng of the se masse s , wi thout giving them the least responsibi lity in exchange . Final l y , subordination of the economic to the pol itical was i n practice tantamount to subordinating ' i s ' to

1 28

BOOK III

' ough t ' . The absolute necessity of cutting corners (combined develop­ ment) and l eaping over a fi fty - year lag to catch up the We st depri ved p lanning of al l flexibi lity . There was no attempt (because they had neither the mean s nor the ri ght to m ake it) to allow the different economic sectors to determine the ir pos sibil ities and needs themselve s , in a reciproc al and at the very least prov i sional i n dependence albeit with a v ie w to gatheri ng the e sti mate s together s ubsequently at the top . Centrali zation , necessary at the tim e of the c l andestine struggle, retained its necessity i n the period of con struction. Possibi l ities were defi ned on the basis of exigencies , rather than the other w ay ro und . You must, so you can . B ut the very development of industry , precise ly inasm uch as it w as in i . e . with the common pra x i s - reacted upon the l i ne with the p lan rul ing strata to stratify them and multiply the organs of rul e . I n fact, the characteri stic common to all l arge industrial enterprise s whether c apitalist or of a sov iet type at that prec i se moment of technology and production was the fact that they required a considerable devel opment of the function s of control , admi n istration , co-ordination and rati onalization (preparation of tasks , simplific ation of serv ice s , etc . ) . I n one way or another, moreov er , as Lukac s explained, ev ery industrial complex of any size , if i t i s to develop or even maintain itself, requi re s spec iali sts to resort to a kind of economic combinatory . H i s mistake was to limit the use of that combin atory to capitalist enterpri s e s . I n fact, i t was literally indispens able to Sov iet planning, even th ough i t was not al way s applied to the same problems. Fi rst borrowed from the priv ate enterpri ses of the c apitali st worl d , it developed independently . Planni ng implied an algebra of organization and a calculated determination of al l pos sibilities , on the basis of a calculation of the i nternational conj uncture and its repercus ­ sions on the n ational si tuation . And organization , of course , as a structure of pledged i nertia, i s identic al with the calculation that i s its practical its deciphering and that furnishes the guidelines for its know ledge constitution . We know thi s type of objective though t: economic calcul a­ tion is to organizational groups in indu strial societies \vhat abstract knowledge of kinship relations i s in certai n ' archaic ' societies . Based on the pos sibi l ity of establ i shin g or reveal ing rules i . e . inert s y stems of relations them selve s based on pledged i nertia its guidelines are basical l y the minimum of synthe sized pas si v i ty (on the bas i s of the already existing organizational ensembles) that prax is must transcend towards the practical situation , i n order to adapt itself to it by a ne w creation (of a new organ izati on ) . The organizational schema i s th u s worked matter. I t i s the inert, ab stract ensemble of the general po ss ibi l ities for org anizing pledged inertia and thus in itself that inertia , but tra n sported to the level of abstrac tion at which (for the calcul ator) it w i l l be the express condition

I S S TR U G G L E I NTELLI G I B L E ?

1 29

of tran scendence of the status quo . In short , the organ i zational schema represents the i nerti al determ ination that the organ i zer has himself pro­ duced by his prax i s , and to serve that praxi s which represents the framework indi spen sable for any transcendence but, for that very reason , strictly l i mits the pos sibilities for i nventi ng replies to every si tuation. The leadership i s produced in the very inertia that w il l gradually de fine it i n the process of determining relations between the led. I n other word s , it interiorize s thei r pledged or serial inerti a (we shall return to th i s ) , i n order to be able to re -exteri ori ze it transcended and negated by the invention of new groupings operating on the basi s of that seriality. What illustrated most tel l ingly thi s petri fying backlash of prax i s upon itself, I thi nk , was when the l eaders confronted the question of wage differential s . The princ iple of the Bol she v iks in 1 9 1 7 and even after that was, as far as possibl e i n th at fi rst period, to equalize i ncomes ( i . e. the share s of the national income alloc ated to each i n div idual ) . B ut, as we have seen, the proletarian Revol ution , because it was incarnated, pre ­ sented i tself with s ingu lar ex igencies deri v i ng from the singul ar s ituation in wh ich i t developed whose s ingularity necessarily contradicted the Bol shev iks ' principle s . It was not true that these could be preserved and the Revolution be saved. B ut it was not true e i ther that the i ntegrity of the revolutionary development could be saved i f they were thrown overboard. It was necessary to choose between di s i ntegration and devia­ tion of the Revol ution. Dev i ation al so mean s detour: Stalin was the man of that detour. ' Hold on ! Produce ! . . . Later generations will go back to princ iple s . ' And thi s was right, except that he did not see how in thi s very way he was producing generations which contained w i thin them as the i nert materiali ty of the circum s tances to be transcended the devi ation that had produced them and that they interiori zed (j u st as the development of c ulture and rai sing of l i v ing standards was mak ing it poss ible for universal princ iples to reas sert themselves and come i nto conflict w i th particulari s m but that i s another topic ) . The leadership put its intran sigence into pre serving, at any cost, a real i ty (rather than a pri nciple) : col lective ownership of the mean s of production , inasmuch as thi s had been reali zed in that moment of Hi story and in that particular country . The only way of safeguarding that reali ty , moreover, was to increase pitile s s l y , day by day , the rate of production. S o what empty scruple would preven t them from introducing w i de wage di fferential s , once they were conv inced that h igh wages were the best i ncentive to produce ? Here agai n , w e may observ e that the practical field they organized propo sed to them and often i mposed upon them the chosen solution. Today, the S ov iet leaders l i ke to speak of interesting the masses in production , and the decentral i zing measure s taken by Khru shchev , among

1 30

B OOK III

others, have this aim . B ut thi s i s because the present standard of liv ing, technical i mprovements and mass culture make decentralization possible and nece s s ary . In fact, formulated in the se di screet and almost ari stocratic term s , the question being posed i s that of total contro l over production. Ever since the masses became aware of the situ ation and themselv e s , there has existed only one way sufficient and necessary to ' intere s t ' them i n producing , which i s to g iv e them control over mana gement. After World War I, however, the l ack of education and indifference of that working c lass in ful l cris i s of growth , together w ith the poverty of the workers , made it quite impossible to awaken a common interest in increasing the rate of production . In the period following the Revolution, the politici zed, emancipate d worker alre ad y found a new contradiction within himse lf: inasmuch as he wanted social i s m , he could accept intensify ing h i s production for the common good and re stric ting h i s consumption; but inasmuch a s socialism was a /so, indeed i n his e yes firs t and foremost, the end of overwork and underconsumption, his individual needs came into contradiction with his prax i s as a common individual. At once, he no longer identified so closely w ith revolutionary construction as he had done with the soci al movement (as a negation of the bourgeoi s order) before the Revoluti o n . B efore the Revo lution , his personal demand was the common demand (once competitive antagonisms had been overcome by trade-union tie s ) ; and the common demand had the t riple effect of m ai ntaining mass agitation, contributing to working-class e mancipation, and if the bosses yielded shaking the s ystem . After­ wards , since the common activ i ty was a planned construction, the soci al­ i s t indiv idual w as relegated to the level of the contingent. H i s real exigencies were presente d to him as alw ay s capable of being reduced, preci sely in the name of the com mon obj ecti v e . B ut s ince the common objective w as such that the means of att aining it were the object of economic calculations which speciali sts or specialized bureaucrats alone could carry out, it was not even h e as a common individual or the unified ensemble of h i s comrade s who determined the norms , the y ield and the distribution of inv e stments . H i s fate came to him via the sovereign, in the form of a strict determination of objectivity . H i s task s were fixed for him, on the bas i s of stati stical data establi shing the exigencies of plant to be produced, armaments and consumption , and it was through simplified re sumes of the se calculated data that they were communicated to him . Thi s i mplied a reification of the citizen ' s relations w ith the sovereign . The former was defined through the latter' s calculations as a mere unit of p roduction and cons umption . B e tween the two of them , there w as the mediation of the Plan : an ambiguou s real ity which was both the v ol un­ tari st political proj ect of a certain rul i ng m ilieu and a t th e same time at least as it pre sented itself through the instructions imposed on th is

I S STRUGGLE I NTELL I G I B LE?

131

factory or that combine the s imple , rigorous determ ination of the conditions to be ful fi lled by each and every one in order to s ave the U S SR ( the foundations of soci al i sm) . The most emancipated workers were thu s stripped of their rights to control and leadership, not by a del iberate operation on the part of the leading organ s but by the gro wing di sproportion between the requirements of the economic combinatory and their rel ative ignorance of these problem s . * Their obedience to the sovereign was reifi ed (as m uch as in capitalist sy stems , but in a qualitatively different w ay ) , inasmuch as it w as lived as subm i s s i on to phy sical law s . Through planning , in fact, the full rigour of economic l aw s that liberalism was so fond of evoking was redi scovered the sole difference being that thi s rigour was perceived through a system , w hereas the liberals grasped it in pure exteriority . The organ izers of the Pl an and the producers who realized it could be compared to the crew of an aeroplane struggling against a storm and grasping the ' facts of nature ' in practice , inasmuch as they had already been fi l tered and reas sembled by the inert synthesis of the system , whereas the Homo oecononl icus of li beralism was , so to speak, outside s ubmitted to natural force s w i thout mediation , both he and the works he erected outside himself. In any case , a first inert con s traint created a kind of void between managers and producers , which determ ined the former to assume the functions that the latter could not exercise. We have still spoken onl y of the c onscious core of the emergent working clas s . B ut let u s not forget that non-agricultural j ob s (tertiary and secondary) went in four years ( 1 92 8 32) from ten to twenty million (out of a population of 1 5 1 million person s ) , and from twenty to forty ­ five million between 1 9 3 2 and 1 95 5 . S ince ' service s ' were l e s s de­ veloped (we shall see why) than in the bourgeois democracies , most of the newly ' urbanized ' j oined the workers of the ' secondary ' sector. For the period that interests us ( 2 8 ' 3 2 ) , the doubling of the working class had the result of paraly sing it. The newcomers torn from agriculture ; illiterate , or barely knowing how to read and write ; brutall y changing their rhythm of work and w ay of l i fe ; lost were unable to conceive or unders tand the common interest of workers , unti l a l ong and diffic ult adaptation had made them aware of their new condition. When the leaders are reproached, moreover, with having deprived the m of their rights , I am tempted to ask: ' S upposing that these rights had been acknowledged, how and w ith what i ntellectu al tool s and in the name of wh at unity would they have exercised them? ' It i s obviou s , moreover, that their demands if they had been able to get a hearing would h ave •

'

* [Note m i s sing i n m an u script . ]

1 32

B OOK I I I

been of a negative kind. Those new workers cost a lot (especially i n heav y industry ) , so the w age had to be low; and they were exhausted by the effort asked of them . So the y w ould hav e demanded l e s s work and h igher wage s . It goes w i thout saying that such demands could not but express the reality of their n eeds, so they were perfectly j u sti fied . B ut it al so goes w ithout s ay i ng that since they did not present themselves i n the context of general control over production hence i n connection w ith positive adj ustm ents to the Plan the y were determined for the leaders as pos sible fetters on i n du striali zation . S o planning took account of m inimum needs in order to avoid demands and the pos s ibil ity of a w orki ng-class res i stance that would find i ts unity in struggl e : hence , as obj ective and negativ e elements that i t should be pos s ible to contain by a minimum expenditure . The barest rational ly calculated s ati sfaction of n eeds , combined with propaganda and coercion, s ufficed to prev ent a negative unity of tho se workers sti ll not very aw are of their c las s or their rights . Yet education aimed to transform those social atom s i nto common individuals. B ut it e ndowed them with the i r common real ity inasmuch as they had to contribute to mai ntai n ing and tran scending the norms of the Plan . Thi s pos i ti v e synthes i s pres upposed that mass ify ing force s would continue their massi ficati on from below , and of these force s the most important was the monstrou s growth of the secondary sector. So, for some , propaganda and education could i nculcate the duty of produc ing. B ut the interest in producing could not b e realized, at the leve l of the masses, as an obj ective condition of their work. They were sti l l too b ackward to be able to demand control over the process of production , while the government was too poor and the P lan required i n vestme nts that were too gre at i n the capital - goods and arm aments indu stries for i t to be able even to env i s age rai s i ng the real standard of l i v in g i n proportion to the progress achieved i n i n du strial i zation . More­ over, a ri se of that kind could not occur of its own accord , i n a s ystem re sorting to commandi s m i n order to c lose a half-century gap and rush through the stage of accumulation . Opening up wide w age differentials w as a m eans born of poverty _ The same with productivity bonuses, Stakhanov ism, emulation . The aim was clear : ( 1 ) To give anyone the chance to i mprove h i s own l i v ing s tandard , seeing that i t was impossible to rai se e\'erybody ' s . B y thi s method competi tive and antagoni stic prac ­ tices were reintrod uced , not at the level of the capital i st market ( which no longer exi sted) but i n the actual factory , at the lev el of production . Everyone co u ld be better paid , i f he i m p o s e d upon hi m se l f a harde r effort; b u t i n th e e n d o n l y 5;onl e \v ou l d b e n e fi t from the bonuses and i n c re a s e s . ( 2 ) T h e pre sence i n a fac tory of a core of ac ti v i s ts c on tri b u ted i n i t s e l f t o r a i s i n g n o rm s . T h e r e b y i t i n tro d u c e d a negati v e inte re st for ,

I S S TR U G G L E I NTEL L I G I B L E ?

1 33

the other workers : they would work more so tha t th eir }1'age wou ld not go down . In short, that whole mandarinate of heroes of l abour, Stakhan­ ovite s , acti v i sts and S talin prizewi nners ; that refu sal to level wage s at the base ; that working-c las s chin [rank] (where wag e differences were further accentuated by the opportunity , for the elite , to enjoy spec ial adv antages - e . g . an apartment, etc . ) ; all th at emulation the y tri ed to stimulate by c ompetitions between factorie s or by honori fic di stinctions (inclusion on the roster of merit, etc . ) al l that was constituted by the leaders ' prax i s , i n an effort to vertical i ze the voluntari sm of producti on (by means of an el ite that would ' rai se ' or " drag along ' the base), for w ant of having the means to stimulate a profound mov ement in the masses by ' intere sting ' them in producing. The leadersh ip ' s prax i s had to confront a funda­ mental option . S i nce it was i mp o ssible to obtai n in creased productiv ity by mere coercion, it was nece ssary to choose stim uli an d incen tives. B ut the necessiti e s of indu strial izati on prevented them from tel ling the masses they would improv e their lot inasmuch as they increased the rate of production. So all that was left was a choice between princi ples (the egal i tariani sm of 1 9 1 7 ) and the on l y poss ible stimu l u s ( which was not a sly return to capitali st c ompetition, but integration of a managed competi ­ tion between workers and on the terrai n of work into the system) . The practical aim which made it neces sary to choose the second term of the alternative was thu s certain ly not to introduce a strati fied h ierarchy into the world of work . I t was a matter rather of setting off a to- and-fro movement between base and elite , and compen sating for the present m isery by open ing up a field of l i ving poss ibi lities for everyon e. B ut whatever the objectiv e might be , i t had to be real i zed i n practice through a strati fi c ati on . The constant growth of the secondary sector in fact necessitated the creation of an ever more extensive s ystem of bonuse s , distinctions and privi leged positions without there be ing any chance of those already occ upied becoming free again ( i t was y oung men who occ upied them , they were not going to reach retirement age for a long time) . The effect of th i s ' creami ng ' of the masses was to produce a vol untari st elite in the image of the ruling group s . For its members, it }1'as true that they would improve their lot by partic ipating in industri al ­ i zation w i th al l the ir strength : the common in terest and the indiv idual i ntere st coinc ided. B u t only indiv idual s inasmuch as the y constituted thems elves as s uch aga inst the masses (denying that they were part of could them ; becoming if not bos ses, at least obj ectively pacemakers ) achieve thi s fus i on . For thi s very reason we find i n them inasmuch as they inte riorized the sovereign ' s voluntari sm and re-exteriori zed it in the i r own work a very singul ar synthe s i s , proper to the ' S oviet el ites ' , between i ndi v i dual i sm (ambition, personal intere st , pride) and total ded icati on to the c omm on cause , i .e . to soc i al i s m . B u t i n so far a s it was _.

1 34

B OOK I I I

the leaders who had dete rm ined for them the p o s s i b i l i ty of e m e rg i n g from the masses , t hey were hand in g l ove w i th the s o v e re i g n And in so far as the leaders ' p ra x i s had stimul ated th e e lite in the v olunta r i s t pe r s p e c t i v e of b u i l d i ng social ism, they conce ived the construc tion of the soc ial i st society only throu g h that sove r ei g n praxi s . For those two reasons, their dis c ip line was m i l i tary They temporali zed the prac t i ca l enterpri se represented by their life i n the total i zing milieu o f the g lobalizing tempo r alizat i on They assimilated the i r p r o g res s i v e elevation in the h ierarchy to the pro g re s s i ve realization of socialism in one country . Thus the leade rshi p recruited its own a u x i l iar i e s and created them in the p ers p e c ti ve of i ts planning a c t i v i ty as voluntarist pro d uc t s of its sov­ ere i g n t y and a s the depos i tar i e s of its inflex ible w i l l . The Plan created the man of the Plan . B ut the Plan was a praxi s of men. Conve r sely , however, the ensemble of rulin g and admini strative org an s s uffered the backlas h of i ts praxis : i t q u al i fied itself and determined itse l f by i t s wage po l ic y In that hierarchical soc iety that it create d b y w i d e n i n g wage differentials and m u lti pl y i n g honours , the ruling gro u p fo und i t s e l f objec t i v e ly modified by the h i era rc h i cal s tructures as determ ination s of the social field i nto w hi ch i t w as inte g rate d I t w as d es i g nate d no l on g e r j ust a s a rev o l utionary ensembl e , which d rew its s overe i gnty from i t s praxi s , but as an institutional ized sovereig n , w h ose power w as objecti fi e d and determined by the pl ace the directors o c c upied at the apex of the h i erarchy For how could you conceivab l y create a h i e r a rc h y , w i thout thereb y defining yourse l f as the man ( or men ) of the top rung? How could you distribute hono urs , i f you did not enj oy the h i g h e s t hon ori fi c d i s tinc tion s ? How could you dec ide the to p of the l adder and the bottom rungs , w i t h o ut u l t i m a te l y creating all the intermediary run g s ? How could you define wage increases as a re compens e , w i thout attrib ut i ng to yo ur­ self the h i g he s t w ages ? It is pointle s s in fact to imagine that a g roup of poor revoluti onaries , w ithout pr i v i l e g e s , refu s i n g al l d i st i n c t i ons as Lenin was coul d , to serve the needs o f praxi s engender a s oc i ety of d i g n i tari e s in which merit w as ce remon i ou s l y recom pe n sed. Yet the grea ter t he dan g e rs that were run by the regime a nd the more ar d u o u s th e effort req u i re d , the more bl atan t th e c e r emon i al had to be . Thus pra x i s d ev e l o p e d i t s co u n t er final i ty : via the i nte rmediary of the volunta ri sts whom it disti ngui shed and rai sed above t he common rut, it transfo rm ed i ts a g e n t s i nto dign itaries . Social s trat i fi c atio n becam e at once t he ob lig atory m eans of real i zing econ o m i c grow th by p l an n i ng i n that u nd e r de ve loped coun try and · a s a conse quen ce entai led by prax i s b ut not w i l led by i t the p rac t ico - i nert and an ti -soc i al i st re s u l t of th e sear ch for incenti ves , i n a si tuati on wh i ch d i d n o t al l o w interes ti ng th e mas s e s i n pr od uc tio n. In th is first stage of our inve stigation , w h at interests u s primari ly i s to .

.

.

,

.

.

.

,

-

I S STRUGGLE INTELLI G I B L E ?

1 35

find the factors which conditioned the appearance in the USSR of a prac tico-inert, and of fi ssures between the social mil ieux. We have , in fact, just seen the birth of those layers of soc i al inertia termed strata ; and i t must above all be appreciated that this stratifi c ation occurred as the process of praxis. For the separation between managing functions and the right of appropriation assu redly represented a structure of negati ve inertia. A n impassabl e internal l im it on the rel at ionsh ip between the masses and the administrators . In short, a rei fication. B ut planning, in itself, at once constituted that proletariat formed out of he terogeneous layers and constantly growing as a collective . The internal structure of that enormou s mass in perpetual di sequilibrium was the practico-inert res ult of a practical process. For the Plan antic ipated the creation of new fac torie s or enlargement of the old one s , so it was directl y concerned to create working-class jobs for certain members of the peasant population. That meant ensuring that these new j obs would find occupants , and com mitting the neces sary expenditure to e n su re that every occ upant would have the right tool s and to make a ski l l e d worker out of an agricultural labourer. Eventually , the leaders would themselves define the rural zones that could support an exodus . Perhaps they would even sov ereignly fi x the contribution of each province , acc ordi ng to its h uman resources and the rel ationship between its population and its production ( itself j udged from the standpoint of the requirements of the Plan ) . Of course , these dec isions could be taken by different bodies at the top , and this possibi.1ity was itself an e xpression of managerial inert- being , to which we shall return . No matter. Even if certain aspects of the task were defined by various s ub-group s, u nity remained intact, because the central body had defined the general l i ne , the objective s and the glob al exigencies of the future undertaking (Gosplan ) . The activities of the sub-groups had the aim of ensuring the specification of praxi s . The y operated on the twin fundamental bas i s of s ynthetic unity of the Plan (which, in an already form , require d fi nal global and concrete though les s detailed adj ustments ) and sovereign power. Those two bases were one and the same : the central managing group c reated subaltern positions for the Plan and by it; so prax i s , while bei ng obj ectified in the current Plan , was still and a lways praxis when it created organs of its own for itself ( albeit on the bas i s of an already received and inert hierarchical structure) . It was at the level of the demographic upheav al which i t had produced in its entirety , and above all of the soc ial consequence s of the latter, that it found itself undergoing as a material , inert c irc umstance to be tran scended and altered its own results. Ho w did th i s come about? The reason was c learl y the fol lowing. H i story has two principle s . One i s human ac ti vi ty , si m ultaneo u s l y all and nothing , which w ithout the i ne rtia of things would at once evaporate like a vol atile spirit. The other

1 36

B OOK I I I

is inert matter, w ithi n the agents themselves and outside them, which supports and dev iates the whole practical edifice at the same time as hav i ng stimulated its construction ( inasmuch as it was already a s ynthetic and passive dev iation of the previous prax i s ) . Thus every action of the g roup upon inanimate matter (by which I mean a col lective as m uch as a lump of coal ) has as its nece ssary con sequence the interiorization, within the group itself and in a form defi ned by i t s prev ious structures , of the very inertia in w hich its praxis i s obj ectified. And throug h the internal transformation of the group interiorized inertia wil l dev iate praxi s at its source and be re-exteriorized as dev iated praxi s . The fact i s all the more intelligible in that the g roup , as the prac tical free organism, re­ exteriori zes its inertia to act upon the inerti a outs ide v ia the mediation of a directed inertia. At the level of interaction, moreover , you necessarily find in the case of individual work the unity in exteriority of the physico­ chemical world, but i n the case of common work the unity in exteriorit y of the phy sico-chemical world and the human world (inasmuch as th i s is strewn with worked objects which make medi ations between m en ) . I n 1928, the i l l i teracy of the peasants represented a serious danger for the Party ' s agrarian polic y . B ut on thi s terrain (where we shall meet it again) , it was a negative m aterial given for the leaders that they inheri ted without hav ing produced i t, that they discovered as a passive res istance to praxis , and that was characteri zed at once by its universali ty and its dispersion. Furthermore, that inertia was m erely a lack. B ut w hat was invo lved here was not an external negation, as when Marx explains the emigration of the Ancient Greeks b y their ignorance of the prac tical applications of the nat ural sc ience s , but an in ternal negation : i .e . one that was discovered and constitu ted by the action which revealed it, c ame u p against i t and grasp ed it within itself as the absence of a means , the pre sence of a ri sk and the urgency of inventing a recompen se. Ap art from this neg a tive element, positi ve and practical features were discovered. The peasant from a given region, who practised a given c ulture i n a specific conte xt, was characterized by a way of life a mixture of abi li ties and inerti a, or rather an ensemble of abi lities based on the inertia these had graduall y produced (e . g . the c apac ity to work in conditions that woul d be almost unendurable for town speople; but, c onversely , determination of a rhythm as a practical schema and inert l im it of temporal ization ) . It was the ruling prax i s that deprived those very features as organic re si sta nce to a new qual i fication of their work , and as an inanimate brake on their adaptation to working-c lass life of their practical aspect, v iewing them instead on ly i n term s of their inertia. I n real ity , the peasant' s abilities were useless to him i n the factory , since they were exc lusive ly a means o f c arry i ng out his wo rk as a farmer. So what was left was the determ i nations on w h ic h th ey were based

I S STRUGGLE INTEL L I G IB LE ?

1 37

particularly the rhythm of work , which by now was only the diffic ulty or non-po s sibility of adapting to production norms. Lastly , i t must be adde d that the peasant, at the beginning of his ' urbanization ' , remained above al l a peasant. Lost i n the ' landsc ape ' of the working-class s uburbs , he worked to live and could not at first feel his sol idarity with that universe . That sense of being lost (which, of course , tended to d imi n i sh in the case of a partic ul ar indiv idual , but remained constant in the working-class mas ses as a whole, or even increased along w i th the tempo of urbanizati o n ) was a suffered rel ationship between the new worker and his new milieu. Or rather, it was the neg ative relati on re sulting from their being brought into c ontact: through being brought into contact in this way ( i n accordance with the Plan), the material milieu as a medium for inert syntheses bec ame a mediat ion between men (habi tat, factories, mach ine s , etc . ) . These i nert determinations were the basi c rel ationships upon which all others were e stablished. And it i s easy to see that they we re produced by praxis . B raking action and resi stance of th e organ i c rh ythm , di sorienta­ tion, etc . , became negati ve real ities in the milieu of the working-class concentrations ; and the latter were not inert groupings around the towns, but demographic c urrents determ ined and controlled by the leadership. * Among the elements of those inert determinations , moreover, certain elements in other milieux (in the rural areas ) could be alive and play an active role in production . The e ssential thi ng was that sovereign action produ ced a new mi lieu (the working-clas s concentrations ) in ful l evolu­ tion, w ithin which i t maintained a s ingular curv ature -tension; and that, through thi s ten sion and this inne r c urvature , the previous determi nations were modified by one another and constituted inert concretions and braking or deviating mechani sm s . In short, a prac tico- inert fie ld . And this field drew its uni ty from the totalizing prax i s : that alone al low s us to call it a system , a proces s, or simply a mechan i s m . B ut it dre w its being from the inerti as reas sem ble d an d fu sed together by that practical s ynthesi s . In other word s , for the Russian working c lass of the thirties it became a source of p ermanent atomi zation or seri ali zation , so that th is c lass imbued w ith an i deology simpl ified and modi fied fo r propaganda purpose s could find its unity only outside itself, v i a the mediation of the sovereign . Above al l , moreover , that transcendent and su perficial uni ty in fact represented on ly the uni ty of the sacrifices that were demanded of i ts members , whereas the true relations w i th the leadership •

*

The l atter, i n fac t , d i d not c o n fi ne i t s e l f to i n c re a s i n g urban i zat i on . It a l s o contro l l e d

and l i m i t e d i t i n t h e c a s e of e ach spec i fi c town , tak i n g a l l fac tors i nt o a c c o u nt (for e x amp l e ,

s imu l tane o usly the n e e d s of i n d us try and t h e h o u s i n g s h ortage ) I t w a s forb i d d e n to re s i de i n M o s c o w if o n e was not req u i re d to l i v e th ere hJ' a sp ecific fun c tio n or joh .

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remained prov i sional ly reified. My stifying mirage of transcendent unity ; rei fied relation s with the leaders ; internal structures of atomization and serial ity; perpetual i ntermingling as a re sult of new arrival s : that was the reality of the working c lass during i t s cri s i s of growth . That was what a priori made it inconc e ivab le that it s hou ld seize the lev ers of command and e xerc i se dictat orship on its own. That was why the leaders were constituted by it, as exerc ising that dictatorship in its place preci sely in so far as, by its mode of recruitment, they constituted it as i ncapable for the time being of con trolling production . So there w as a reciprocity of conditioning in inertia, at the very heart of the total action and th e practical fi e ld that th is had determined . It was the workers who made the leaders, in so far as the leaders made the working-class concentrations . To go stil l further, howev er, i t i s necessary to understand that the features in scribed in that w orking c lass w hich did not find any assi stance even in its trade unions refl ected a still deeper given, which was no more or les s than the very c ircumstance revolutionary activity sought to transcend. (1) From the outset, the ' underdeve lopment ' of the U S S R w as neces sarily transferred on to the demographic terrain, b y an extra­ ordinary numeric al di sproportion between the non-agricultural and the rural workers : i n the domain of c ustom s , culture and revolutionary consciousne s s , thi s led to radical differenc e s . (2 ) The stat e of emergency and all the dangers neces si tated an unprecedented acceleration of the proce s s of urbani zation : the working c las s w hich had m ade the Revolution was , you m ight say , i nvaded and dismembered by barbarians . Thus praxis integrated the countryside w i th the tow n , tending thereby to produce a new balance in w h i'ch the masses freshl y emerg ing from the hinterland would become partiall y urban i zed, whereas the urban masses - invaded would lose their autonomy and thei r unity . That gap between the rural i mmigrants and the o l de s t workers was simply an incarnation and reflecti on of the gap to be fi lled between the current si tuation of i ndustry and the s ituation it was supposed to achieve by the end of the Plan . Moreover, even assuming s i nce thi s was the aim of prax i s that the g ap between those two moments of production woul d be fi l led five years l ater, it sti l l remained the c ase that it had been interiorized by the working-class masse s , inasmuch as they had rece ived with i n them selves more alien elements than they could absorb . Everything has its price. To act mean s to i nteriorize a contradiction through the v ery ensemble of the acts that suppre s s it externally . The industrialization of that agri c ultural country was through the urbani zation of the peasants the ruralization of the working c l as s , and the prov i sional lowering of its p olitical and cul tural lev el i n favour of its growth . Thi s was al so si gnalled by the fact that production increased much faster th an prod uctiv ity . Thu s the prov isional features of the w orking c las s were the metamof-

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139

p hos is into pre sent and reified hum an re lations of a synthetic rel ation ship between the economic situation in the U S SR as a practico-inert reality in 1 92 8 and its future situation (in 1 9 3 3 or subsequentl y ) as an objective defining the soverei gn prax i s . The fact that th is class provi s ional ly had to presen t th ese features w as , wi thout a doubt, inevitable . B y thi s we mean that, in the frame work of that praxis and on the basis of the circum ­ stances }'vh ich engendered it, urban ization had to be accomplishe d in that way a nd in no other. B ut that doe s not at all mean that we should present i t as ' typical of (or a m odel for) industrial growth in socialist countries ' as though i ndustrial growth first exi sted as a n economic proce s s determin­ i ng i tself, and as though its determ ination s were modi fied in one way or anoth er depending on whether it occurred in a sociali st country or i n a c apital ist country . Th is non - s ituated and , therefore , even non-human vie wpoint i s that of eco nomi c soc i ology . B ut it c an be said to rejoin the anti -human dogmati sm of the tran scendent dialecti c. For, instead of show i ng necessity as an ensemble of objective practi co-inert connections alienating prax i s , it is pre sented to u s as preceding and conditi on ing the latter. According to th i s hypothesi s , the Sov iet leaders were in the service of that transcendent growth : it was reali z ed by them in so far as it constrained them to rea l ize it whatever they might do . And , of course , the sociolog i sts do not at all deny that there i s a history of that growth , they simply confine themsel ves to observ i ng that this history i s not their departme nt. That i s enough to signal the autonomy of their economic and soc i al mod el . B u t the y forget that this model could not stand up , i f it were not the inert obj ectifi cation of a un ity; and that th i s uni ty can precisely b e noth ing but sovereign activity transcending the present towards the future . In v ain do th ey pre sent i t i n its autonomou s functioning, determining it through stati stics : they w i l l lose sight of its signification, if they do not agree to see in it the tran sformation s of a practico-inert by a h istory. To suppress Sov iet hist ory ; to forget that indu striali zation was accompl i shed practical l y under foreign bonlbard­ m ent (and interrupted by a devastating war); not to take account of the conseque nces it had externally (ebbing of the working-class movements , fasc i sm , etc . ) , which al so reacted upon it; to forget the evolution of the revol utio nary parties, thei r contradictions , etc . : that amounts to c on sider­ ing an i nert sum, without taking account of the orientated tot al ization which produce s i t by its operati ons , s upports it and tran scends it. And when Raymon d Ar on , for e xample , points out that there are oth er types of soc i ali st growth (the countrie s of Central Europe, China), he forgets that th ose other type s w e re p o s s ible with their negative aspec ts , as with only i n so far as t h e y w e re grafted on to the thei r po s i t i v e as pec ts Sov iet ' m ode l ' : i . e . i n s o far as the indu strial i zation of th e U S S R was nece s sary to pro d u c e them and sustai n the m ; i n s o far as e v ery o ne of the -

BOOK III

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depth of the world and m u s t at ev ery mo ment re solve proble ms to which it gives birt h, w i thout h aving been aware of engendering them . The proces s (and from thi s v iewpoint what econom i sts call growth is a proce s s ) i s the e xteriority of praxi s , inasmuch as i t rev eals itse l f at the heart of its interiority . A l l industrial societies are doubtl e s s charac teri zed today b y growth . * B ut thi s growth ( something true also , as we shal l see , of bourgeoi s soc ieties ) i s th e exteriority of a prax is which in given circumstance s, w ith speci fi c technologies striv es to overcome scarc i ty . The un ity of the process i s the projection into the inert of the synthetic unification of the total izing praxis. Thu s , to return to our e x ample (Sov iet planning as prax i s -proce s s ) , th e Russ ian population and the farmlands that fed it were totalized at every moment by th e managers . For the immediate practical fi eld of the latte r ( inasmuch as t he temporal izati on of the most urgent undertakin g an d its spati alizing ex tension determ ined one another rec iproc al ly) was preci sel y the entire nation, with all its re sources and all its pr oblem s , grasped through the ac compl i shed Revol ution , the objectives to be attained an d the interiori zation of the threats hang ing over it as a re sult of capi tal ist encirc lement. S o i t got its alienations and dev i ations from t he inert concretions it produced in its practical fi e l d , rather than as in the cas e of the indiv idual from outside . In particular, the l eading group was in the practical field that i ts own action transformed, and was what was affected by the inert determinations its action produced in the field . So p raxi s was to be dev iated by stratifi c ation of the group, and the group was stratifie d preci sely i n so far as the need to increase production was expre s sed in practice by a series of m e a s u re s whose prac t i c o - i n ert res u l t w as work ing-class impotence and a hierarchy of wage s . So the dev iation of praxis was n ot direc tl y the consequen ce of i ts deve lopment. But it independently bec ame an i nstitution a l i zed p ra x i s recogni::ing itself i n the chin [rank ] it had e s tabl i shed de spite itself when the leaders were tran sformed b y the who le soc iety and w i th it: whe n they ceased to be revol utionaries and became di gnitaries of the Revol ution . In other words, i n a social i st soci ety and during the period of command ism the practical agents are i n s i de the i r own praxi s and undergo the backlash of the chan ges i t inaug urates, v i a the mediation of the practico -inert. Prax i s , moreover, c h anges in turn on ly v i a th e interm ediary of tran sformation s affecting the agents . Pra x i � makes s oc iety ; society , within the framework of prax i s , ma kes the l eaders in its image� and the leaders chan g e praxi s , as a func tion o f the i r new he�ris . B u t th i s precisely mean s th at the re l ationsh ip b etween ruler and rule d pre sents itself as a rec iproci ty of ,

*

[ Note m i s � i ng i n m a n u s c r i pt . ]

I S STRUGGLE I N T ELLIG I B LE?

1 43

totalization . The rulers make themse lves rulers of those parti c ul ar ruled via the mediati on of the practico-inert. Industrial growth, to be s ure , compri ses a fi rst phase term ed that of acc umulation , in which it is nece ssary to build the factories and manufac ­ ture the machi ne s to manufacture machines . I n that first period , invest­ ment goes primari l y into heav y i ndustry . It i s characteri zed by a fi rst demograph i c mov ement: growth of the secondary sector at the expense of the primary ; a l arger number of workers is necessary bec ause there i s a larger number of factories in absolute term s . In the second phase of growth , however, a new progress i s realized by the increase of ' produc­ tivity ' . The latter impl ies the appearance of another demographic current. To be s ure, in so far as the numerical dimi nution of the rural population must be compensated for by intensify ing the productiv ity of the agricul­ tural l abourers , the primary sec tor continue s more or less to supply the new recruits for the secondary sector. B ut as the size of the farms or farm ing groups requires a permanent labour of control and organization , and as at the same time one of the es sential factors of productiv ity is the co-ordination of efforts and preparation of tasks , the tertiary sector grows at the expense of the secondary . There i s a circularity , since productivity requires fewer manual workers and more white-collar workers . In the USSR, commandism, through a combined development, sought to carry on simultaneously the struggle to acc umulate production goods and the s truggle to i ncrease productiv ity. For that reason , th e strongest demographic . current went from the primary to the secondary sector. There exi sted, moreover, an instinctive re luc tance among the leaders to multi ply unproductive jobs ; at the same time, as we have mentioned, there were not e nough cadre s , despite an admirable effort to develop technical schooling. A s a consequ ence of this twofold practical determina­ tion , the en semble of political and admini strative organs was constrained to as s ume the function of the hi gher tertiary sector. Thi s was in l ine , moreover, with the other obj ec tive of praxi s : to preserve the political character of planning . The techn i c i an determined what was , the politician determined what could be done , in the light of what had to be. B ut the very necessity of construction obl iged them to demand surplus labour from the workers as we ll as from the peasants . The worker, according to Marx , receives a wage representing a les ser value than that which he has produced; the remainder, in a c apitalist society , goe s to the bos s and is partl y reinvested in the enterpri se. Th i s is what makes acc umulation possi ble. In a period of soc iali s t accumulation , however, could things be otherwise? How could plant be developed, if the value con s umed by the producer were equal to that which he had produced? All the same , it w as not a matter of e xploitation . Th rough the Plan , i t was the w hole to reinvest the collec tiv ity which decided in the interest of all

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B OO K I I I

diffe rence between the v al ue cons umed and the v alue produced. B ut thi s collec tivit y was not mature enough to control its leaders , sti l l less to manage i tsel f. Was it not at the s ame time nece s sary to create that working clas s , which was to eInanc ipate itse lf through work and culture? So the leaders were awkwardl y si tuated : as a sin gul ar group determining if a bourgeoi s democrac y for everybody the use to be m ade of what might be cal led surplus -val ue. This highly singular were involved s ituation was defined by their very action. It was neces sary to take or else give up the idea of power, exercise it, dec ide sovereignly defending the rev ol utionary achievement. O n the other hand, however, they were constituted by the very task they as sumed as the all ie s of the future community against the present masse s . And by ' future com­ munity ' I do not mean , of course, the far-off communi s t society , but simply these common indi v idual s marked by the s ame h exis , aware of their duties and their ri ghts , transformed by c ulture , each of whom might be a speci fic example of w hat is called ' S ov iet man ' fitted, as of now , by their capabilities and knowledge to support their leaders and, preci sely by doing so, to control them . In short , I mean these young Russians of 1 9 5 8 , suc h as thei r leaders have v ery genuinel y attempted to produce them and such as they h av e indeed produced them in real i ty . They make Terror pointles s , and perhaps they will soon make i t i mpos s ible . In 1 93 0 , however, the leaders deri ved their i sol ation from the masses they had forged, and re-exteriorized it in di strust and coercive measures. Here again, it i s neces sary to understand that fir st fi s sure which sprang from action itself. Los s of contact with the mas ses was not m ainly , or first, a consequence of the Terror: it was its source. For praxi s was producing masses with whom the leading revoluti onarie s no longer had any pos sible contact. First, bec ause their s ituation and their activity obl i ged the m to take part of the value they produced from them (to fix even the scale of the exaction) , in order to reutil ize it arbi trari ly (arbi trarily onl y in so far as , for those masses, their power was arbitrary and j ustified solely by the future outcome). Secondly, becau s e their pre-revolutionary formation, their struggle s , their Marx i st culture, and the ir interiori zed violence would hav e brought them far closer to any proletari at i n a capital i st country than to those millions of lost peasant s , many of whom had undergone the Revolution without making it, or else had been too young to take part in it, and who could not expres s the desperate v iolence that spri ng s from misery other than against the very regime that was making them into workers . At the same time, however, the constructive mov e­ ment they embarked on , with all its revol utionary v iol ence , carried them ahead with respect to the still negative phase of the working-clas s movements abroad . For the se i solated group s, the only pos sible justi ­ fication o f their authority was the objective process . The prac tical

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succes s of the October Revol ution proved that the time had indeed come for the seizure of power. The leaders would be qualified they would if they achieved truly represent the intere st of the working class indu strial ization : i . e . if prax is was a rigorous technique , based on preci se meas urements and calculations . Soverei gnty was j u sti fied by absol ute objectiv ity , and the manager was dis solved into h i s activ i ty i . e . i nto the strict determination of a plan that l iquidated him and di ssolved him into himself, as the mere detector of the obj ecti v e . B ut in proportion as the leading individual was obl iterated, the leading function was affi rmed and had to be respected by all . The hierarchical s y stem was constituted in circularity . Without a do ubt , the neces sity of introducing emul ation (as we saw earlier) did determine a hierarchy at the lower echelons ; moreov er, the latter did desi gnate the leading circles as the upper ranks , sti l l vague but to b e defin ed and made spec i fi c ( relationship: functi on H wage ( ) rank ) . Conversely, however, that h ier­ archized power was i tself undoubtedl y the res ult of the leaders ' author­ i tari anism, which merely expres sed the need for vol untaris m i n a s oc iety stirred as it was by v arious movements remained where the base temporarily cut off from the s ummit. More deeply still, the stratifications of the summit e xpre ssed the reinteri ori zation by prax is of a political nece s sity. In order to pre serve the predominance of the political (construc­ tion of the sociali st world) over the econom ic and the technical ( i n order to eliminate the risk of a government of experts, i . e . of a technocrac y ) , it was nece s sa(y in that society in the throes of development that the leaders should not participate in the universal nlobility of those c la s ses in fus ion. Their action had to be adapted at every moment to new c ircumstances , to be enriched , and on occasion to be di savowed without hesitation; but the extreme flexibility of that action neces sari ly depended on the personnel being mai ntained in their posts . The latter had to be the permanence that produced, controlled and directed change . If personnel changes had been too frequent, there wou l d hav e been interference between the se and the metamorphoses of growth transforming the country : oscillations the result would have been paraly s i s or instabi l i ty fol lowing no inner law . For thi s v ery reason , it w as quite simply growth that inscribed itself upon the leaders as its own rule as the permanence it required , in order constantly to adapt to its own problems and to world conj unctures in the same way that their own revolutionary culture was limited , reinforced and i l luminated by the lack of culture of the mas se s ; and in the same way that, rec iprocal l y , thi s c ulture alone bec ause it was rev oluti onary defi ned the lack of c ul ture of the masses h istorically , not as the mere absence of universal tools but as its temporary inab i l ity to understand the meaning of the Revolution i n progre s s . Thu s a certai n political ac tivity, born i n given c ircumstances and

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exerted by rulers recruited by the forme r praxi s , determ ined withi n the practical field the en semble of the ruled as integrated into an irrevers ible temporal move ment rather than (as in other societies) into a cyclical m ove ment of repetition. Thanks to that, a nation was no longer a being and thi s enterpri se aimed to construct but a making , an enterprise political ly the economi c foundations of soc ial life . On this bas i s , praxis designated the sovereign reali zing it as a political gro up assuming economic and techn ical functions: i .e . one that l i mited and controlled the production of tertiary cadre s , and absorbed into itself al l those produced by the terti ary sector, by integrating al l high functionaries i nto the Party . Thi s di strust of the pure technician (combined w ith the fact that years were needed to produce h i m, since it was nece ssary fi rst to produce his training) , b y obliging the members of the sovereign to concern them­ selves with everything , defi ned their practi cal characteristics for them: a hasty , disorgani zed c ulture , acquired as ne w questions were posed; and v oluntarism ( the technician was a potential s aboteur, inasmuch a s he was the person w ho dec l ared: ' You can do t ha t and no more ' ) . A sovereign whose practical fi eld was the total ity of national activ itie s ; who embarked upon a gig antic undertaking st rug gled agains t the scarci ty of time as much as against that of tools or consumer goods ; who combined the political and sovereign functi on w ith tho se of the terti ary sector (administration, co-ordination, org anization); w hose voluntarism itself as an interiorization of the scarcity of tim e , and as the consequence of a produced simul­ void separating the m asses from the man agers taneously, at the cost of the most terrible e ffort, a permanent trans ­ formation of Soviet society and an ever m ore developed strati fication of the leading circles , which con sequently p itted the slownes s, l ack of initiative and monol ith i sm of their admi n istration against the mobil ity required of the ruled by the sovereign , their fl exible movements and their adaptabil ity (as m as ses stirred by prov oked c urrents) : do we not here recognize the Sov i et Bureaucracy , as its functions of leadership without appropriation had m ade it, i n the irrev ersible temporali zation of an for the time activ ity that mobili zed the masses w i thout being able being to be controlled by them? And that Bureaucracy was the inert­ being of the sovere ign, i ts inanimate m ateriali ty (as we have s een, it was the rebirth of the coll ecti v i ty within the sovere i gn ) . B ut ther e would have been no total ization if those practico- inert structure s had derived from its prax i s as mere suffered effects . In fact , there was a di alectical movement of interiorizat ion and re-exteriorizat ion . I t i s neces s ary to say at one and the same time that the sovereign was burea ucra tized by activ i ty and that it bureaucratized itselffor activ ity . Truth to tel l , however, thi s latter v iewpoi nt risks leading us astray . In reality, bureaucrati zation was under no c i rc um stances the sovere i gn ' s

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aim , not even as a mean s of governing . B ut via the mediation of inert material ity , which as w e have seen exists even in the best integrated group s , bureaucracy became the sy nthetic meaning in exteriori ty of all the measur es the sovereig n took in the practical temporal ization. To c ite j ust one example , it was v i a the medi ation of the masse s ' ine rtia that the fierce will to save the Revolution became an ideal ist voluntari s m on the sovere ign ' s part, expre ssed by the proud consciousness of alone being that Revolution ( as a practical temporal ization ) . It was throu gh that final ity , ev erywhere pre sent and everywhere dev iated , that the be ing-in­ exteriori ty of prax i s i . e . the b ureaucratic status of the group drew its inert un ifi cation from its objectives and acts , as temporali zed i n teriority. And b ecause it was constituted as a counter- finality through the orientated acti vity of the agent s , it nece s sari ly re ferred back to the ai m s of that acti vity as its foundation, its positive means an d its permanent unity . So it makes no differenc e whether the histori an settles the meaning of the ac tiv ity and goes on from there to its counter-finalities , i . e . to the external apparatus i t constituted for itself; or whether he begins by s tudy ing the tran sformations of the external apparatus a nd then goe s back to the acti vity, as the princ iple they required prec i sely in so far as they had refract ed and dev iated it and, in thi s degraded form, it deter­ m ined their inert unity .

Ambiguity of the Latent Conflict ,

As for the l atent conflict which , i n the practical field, pitted the workers against the managers (we know there had been sabotage more or les s ever ywhere, on several occasions John Scott gave an eye-w itnes s account of instance s at M agnitogorsk and the confl ict could take other forms too, suc h as pas sive resi stan ce, moonlighting, black-marketeering, etc . ) , we now understand th at th i s was the readoption as activ i ty or as of the practical fe atures more or les s expl icitl y qualify ing activ ity p racti co- ine rt rift engendered by the common praxi s . The latter produced the workers by the w ork i t ass igned to them; it produced the leaders by the workers ' pre sence in the practical field. In so far as the clas s -being of the workers and the bureaucratic -be ing of the bosses were projections into the practico - inert of the synthesi s i n progre s s , and in so far as workers and leaders conditioned one another rec i proc ally in their being via th e med i ation of the pas s i ve e x i gencies of worked matter, the latent con fl i ct a s pas sive re s i stance of the former and as a uthoritarian ism of the l atter was an assump tion o f the set oppositions i t was attempting more or less clearl y to transform i nto a fi ght. Th i s l atent confl ict, h owev er, was not comparable to those we

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cons idered earl ier. The others ( w i thi n the B o l shev ik Party , for example) had occurred ins ide a g roup whose unity they expres sed . Here , the unity sti ll exi sted but it was no longer that of th e common i nternal field. I t was the un ity of the leaders ' ac tiv ity and of the prac tical fi e l d . Prax i s , by objectify i ng it self, const ituted a practical fi e l d i n which the managers and the managed were simultaneous l y integrated . I n other words , in the politico-e conom ic combinatory the calcul ators were elements of the c alculat ion, which dis solved them into itse lf onl y to reproduce them i n direct connection with the other elements it tran sformed i n its field. In other words , t he con fl ic t no longer had the same meaning. The l eaders would have l iked to dissolve certa in practico-ine rt structures, not because of their i nertia but because as such and in gi ven circum stances - they could constitute a braking sy stem t hat slo wed down t he acti vi ty undertaken. From thi s v iewpoint, they could be i nduce d to increase the construction of workers ' housing in order to av oid a concentration of m i serie s . They could also, through propaganda, create the superfici a l i l lusion that the working class was a group and i ts members were common i ndiv idual s . At the same ti me , however, they wanted to nlai ntain the serial ities of impotence , whose origin was the h eterogeneity of the working-cl ass concentrations , and which made any concerted ac tiv ity practically impossibl e . What i s more , by virtue of its inerti a that mass became an apparatus you could operate like a lever , provided only that you knew how to use the pas s ive force s of seri ality. I t was then integrate d i nto t h e c ommon prax i s l ike a hammer in the hands of a c arpenter; it w a s transcended and obj ecti fi ed i n the re sults it in scribed in the practical field. However parado xical i t may seem , i n fact, the l eading group totalized the v ariou s series as seri e s . The meas ures taken to ac celerate production in a given sector, to tran sfer a certain amount of labour from one sector to another, and so on , enc l osed wit hin them selves and tran sc ended the anticipation of serial reaction s , and the procedures to ne utral ize these (or use the m ) on the bas i s of a p ractical know ledge of the s tructures of seri al ity . B ut could the sovere ign be said to total i ze the series , since th i s was defined as the fleeting or wheelin g u n i t y of detotali zation? That dep ends on what you mean by ' total ize ' . If you were to mean by it that the leader dis sol ved inertia i n order to unite the O thers in a pledged group, it goes wi thout saying that any such attempt dangerous to the reg i me was a priori rul ed out, except in its mystifyi ng form ( and another ve ry sec ondary form th at we s hal l ex amine in a moment ) . I ndeed, th is re al total i zation would have had the effect of changing an inert lever into a com m unity forg ing i t s own sovereignty . B ut if we con sider the word s us ed by the l eade rs - the masses, publ i c we at once observ e that they op inion, the p eopl e , the workers , etc . were chosen because of' the ir ambiguous s i g n i fi c at i o n . I n so far a s the se

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words were materi al and inert re al itie s , whose mean i ng created the synthet ic unity , they see med to re late to total i zed obj ects . B ut the ac tion that used and tran scend ed them di sc losed at the same time that the y referred to sc atteri ngs m ediated by inanimate matter. Yet that ambiguity was reveal i n g . The serie s was total i zed by the sovereign in the s ame way in which a mathem ati cia n total izes ari thmetical recurrences by the notion of tran s fi n ite number. These numbers are a practical transcendence i n the sense that they are defi n ed, bas ical l y , by the en semble of operati on s they enable one to perform . As tran scendence pre serv es the transcended, moreover, the prac tical modal ity of the operations on transfinite numbers i s determ i ned by the real structures of the seri e s . V i a the mass medi a, the government addres sed itself to serie s expli citly targeted as such , and i t s acti v ity aimed to obtai n a gl obal re sult through the tran sform ation of seriality i nto other- di rection . So tota li zati on appeared on ly at the ori g i n and at the end of the proce s s : at its origin, since the movement propagated was the object of a sy nthetic proj ect relatin g i t to the total ity of the practical fi eld; at its end , s ince in the event of a succe s s the series would be objecti fi ed in a total i zable outcome . For example , a given collective (the workers who work in the blast furn ace s ) , if h and led capably, would produce ten mill ion ton s of pig-iron by the end of the fi v e-year p lan . And those million s of tons re pre sented in one sen se a scatteri ng of exteriority that corresponded exactly to the seri al scattering. But in another (and the most i mportant) , they w ere total ized by the practi cal transcendence that was already transform ing them into machine s v i a the medi ation of another work ing-c lass collective. In thi s sen se the total i zation of the series in its product was carried out against itself, since it had been objecti fied in that product as a series and the en semble of worked matter re flected its al ienation to it. So what was i nvolved was actual ly a n operation directed by the sovereign against the masses ; and one that consequently mai ntained them in the separation o f alterity , the better to make use of them. B ut th i s obj ective character of the ac tiv i ty ( whose orig in was accumulatio n ) was not accompan ied b y a premeditated attempt at oppre s sion . S im i l arl y (and i t i s to these groups, selec ted from the col l ectives by the sovereign , that I was referri ng earli er) , acti v i sts and other propagandists created soon-to-be-fragmented nucl ei of unity around their person s, j u st long enough for these local and positive regroupings to thw art the spontaneous formation of negative g roup s . 1\10reov er, the pyramid of organ s cons tituting the Soviet hierarchy al so had the effect of removing the cream from the m asse s , depriv ing them of the ir most active elements ; and of preventing insurrectional regroupment by creating fi elds of possibil ities and a future external to the work i n g c l a s s for the ' e l i tes ' . A s s uming the need to make the latter carry out surp l us l abour, and adapting their praxi s to the i nstab i l i ty and -

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impotence of that giant col lective in mid growth, the leaders were obliged in practice i . e . by the sy nthetic coherence of their project, and b y the efficac y achieved with i n th is project by the pas sive sy ntheses i t re total ized by transcending them to re -exteri ori ze the original contradi c ­ tion of the post-revolution ary period as a latent but con stantly pre sent oppre ssion . In th is they were re spon si ble for the at least partl y confl ict, inasmuch as the y soug ht reunification of the field. In the hi storical c ircumstance s of Russ i an industrialization , the meaning of their prax i s ( which does not mean its truth or its j ustification ) was to destroy those workers as free practical organisms and as common indi­ v i dual s in order to be able to create man out of the ir de struc tion . Of ' course, that i s what they are reproached with . And our intenti on here i s not to defend them. That they s i nned all the time and every where i s obvious just as it i s obv ious at every moment of every hi storical process , for all rulers and sometimes al l the ruled. It will be nece s s ary later on to ascertain what a s in i s , and ou r h i storical investi gation w i l l doubtless lead us to pose thi s question from a formal poi nt of v iew . 3 2 B ut i n any event, h ere the s i n may h ave lain (assuming that we already know what a sin i s) i n the harshne s s of the oppre s s ion, or in the concrete use of the organs of coerc ion . Oppres sion was i t s elf the basic characteri stic of a praxi s whose aim was to real ize the ph ase of acc umulation along with the phase of produc t ivity . Lenin ' s s logan about ' Sovi ets plus electri fica­ tion ' has often been quoted , and people have sought to deriv e a n argument from it against the princip le of S tal i n i s t oppression . It should have been realized, they say , that those two conditions are dialectically l inked and the powers of the sov iets should have been i ncreased pari passu w i th e lectri fication . B ut that woul d hav e been pos s ible only i f the working c l as s had remai ned more or less homogeneous : onl y if the l abour begun by the fathers had been conti nued by workers ' son s . People forget that rapid in dustrial i zation exploded the structure s of the working clas s , drownin g the old workers i n a tide of newcomers . Emanc ipation was indeed to be real, as a l ong-term proces s . However, although workers aware of the ir condition and the future to be defended did increase as an abso lute quantity , thei r proportion - w ithin that amorphous mass suffering from overexpansi on remai ned more or less identical . It is only since Stal in ' s death th at the radical tran sformati on of that c las s and the high level of its cul ture have been re vealed. So the lead ers ' prax is was qualified as oppre s s i v e , by virtue of th e

3 2 Th i � comment g i v e s a h i nt t h at the whole i n v e st i gation of the C, itique i � a l o ng de to u r i n ord e r to tac k l e once m ore the prob l e m o f eth ic s i n h i story . ra i s ed i n 1 9 47 in Cah iers pOllr une m ora le

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neces s ities i t engendered w ith in i t i n the internal m i l ieu of its total ization. It i s a l so neces sary to understand the ambiguity of that oppress ion. For if it was genuinely necessary to obtain ' at al l costs ' ( S tal in ' s watchword in 1 92 8 ) an almost unendurable ten s ion of the work i ng-class fo rce s , and if for t hat purpose i t became nece s sary in practice to maintai n the serial ity of impotence , it must al so be recogni zed that the sov ereign ' s mistru st spran g from the i nternal imbal ances of a working c la s s that it was itself i n the process of forging . Moreover, at the same time as it was maintai n i ng recurrence by practices often involv ing poli ce repre s s ion, it was striv ing to la y the fo undations for a true soc i al i st commun ity , through a consider­ able effort to rai se the cultural level of all . It thereby encountered again both before the l atent confl ict and beyond i t the common unity of the ruled, i nasmuch as they themsel ves direct l y bec ame the goal of its prax i s and no longer j ust its mean s. Thus the ambiguity of t he l atent confl ict pitting the B ureaucracy agai nst the workers was encountered again i n the implicit contradiction of bureaucratic prax i s . Or, if you l ike , the pos sibi l i ty of confl i c t w ithi n the practical field was given, with al l its amb igu ity , in the contradiction that was temporal i zed within the total i zing praxi s . the Conversely , if we consider the other term of the confl ict working-class mas ses we shall fi nd that s ame ambig uity . Cons idering first only the nucleus that made the October Revolution, it has to be recognized that the contradiction emerged within it on the morrow of victory . For at the moment of insurrection it was the masses which led ' the apparatus ' ; and the organi zed movement was profoundly tran sformed, i n so far as the masses tran sformed them selves into organ ized group s . Without a doub t, the sovereign real i ty of the permanent group the Party was grasped deep i n the heart of seri ali ty as a pos s ible unity of s erial i ndi vidual s through suppress ion of the series. I demon strated 3 thi s e arlier. 3 There can also be no doubt that thi s schematic e x i stence of its own total ized unity was l ived from w i th i n , and un der the pressure of revolutionary c i rcum stances, as a factor of a total i zation in progres s . Yet thi s totalization , when i t took place under emergency condition s , aimed to s ubmerge the Party or render i t usele s s . The Party control led and guided onl y i f it coul d adap t : i . e . tran scend its own l imits under the revolutionary i mpetus . The B o l sheviks took charge o f the spontaneous organi zation s when the y became aw are of the real l imits their prax i s had received, and when th ey rei nteriori zed those l imits by t ran scending them : i n other words , when the y renounced al l ' stages ' i n fav our of tak i ng power alone and organ i z ing the soc ial i s t rev ol ution . I hav e shown elsewhe re wh y the masses are necessarily radical i n the •

3 3 . Critiq u e , vol . l , pp .4 1 4 ff.

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34 movement of d i s solution of serial itie s . Rea lity, at the level of serial impotence, i s the imp ossibil ity of l i v i n g . The common awake ning to power through liquidati on of alterity and destruc tion of the practico- i nert is accompanied by a metamorphosis of rea lity : the latter, a practical field of common power, become s the man i fest impo s s i bil i ty of any imposs­ ibil ity of l i v ing . Precisely i n so far as the y can want noth ing w i thout e xploding the sy stem , the mas ses, as soon as they unite to demand s o m e th in g , are led by the ir v ery un i fi cation to demand eve ry th ing . And e ve ryth ing , in Party terms, i s the seizure of power and the construction of a new regime. But in so far as the Party take s control , av oids the reefs of dual power (sov iets and government apparatus) and retai n s leadership of the movement, it involve s i tself in a transformed pra x i s that i s go ing in turn to be determined not j u st by its conscious aims but by i ts limits , and that w i ll define the Party i tself in i ts ne w s ingularity . i . e. from the dec i si on to R ight from the seizure of power, i n fact rad ical i ze its goal it i s defi ned by its contrad iction w ith the movement to l iqu idate seri e s . And th i s contradi ction is due prec isel y to the fact that i t too total i zes the popular demand s , but as a Party . For the se demands , i nasmuch as they are the very movement of the united and revolutionary masse s , are atemporal . It w o uld be inaccurate to say that the groups i n formation demand everyth i n g at o n ce . B u t i t would be an even more s erious mistake to thi nk that their demand takes the form of a long -term constructi ve project. I n real i ty , there is an i mmediate and contradictory relationship between the obj ec ti v e which i s plenary h uman izati on of the sub-human through sati sfaction of h i s need s and the practical constitution of the popular group s , which i s that selfsame plenary humani zation but through the v iolent pas sag e from impotence to common praxi s . In the c l imate of fraternity -terror, i ndeed, man is b o rn as a p ledged member of a sovere i g n group . B ut thi s m an c an be reall y and by suppressing his entirel y humanized onl y by sati sfying h i s needs misery . However, not only are the material condi tion s for satisfying them not g iven , but i n addi ti on the d istinctive feature of rev olutionary s i tuation s i s th at in a c l imate of v iolence , and political and soc ial a lost war or economic cri s i s has depri v e d the country of a ten sion consi derable part of i t s re source s . S o when the impo ssibility of living i s no longer j ust the nece s sity of dying your life , day after day , under the domi nation of an oppre s s i v e and exploitati ve c las s whe n it means instead a real risk of famine or i mmedi ate death under the pre s s ure of such threats the mas ses g roup together and organize to m ake that impos sibi l i ty impos sible w h atev er the c i rcumstance s . And the very 3 4 . C r i tiqu e . v o l 1 , p p . 405 -7 .

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momentum of their reg ro upment radicali ze s thei r praxis to the point of mak ing them demand everyth ing. The atemporal c h arac ter of th i s demand i s due to the fac t that the worker freed from the practico- inert as serts himself as a man confronting death , whereas he i s a man onl y in order to die : no s ystem , no pol icy and no government can at pre sent give him the mean s to live as a man . So Everything i s s imultan eously given and refu sed; immediate and out of re ach ; l i ved and realized in rev ol utionary pra x i s , vainly demanded by hunger and mi sery . B ut thi s contradicti on i s reversed. The leaders , by ad opti ng the radical demands , necessari l y commit them selves to a long-term prax i s . In them , the Rev olution-as-apocalypse becomes a temporal undertaking. ' Every­ thing ' becomes the final as an immediate obj ective of the masses obj ective of an organized activity . And the immediate objective must be s ince the to re store an order. A ne w order, as suredl y , but one which inheri ted mi sery i s that of the ancien reg ime , sometimes temporari l y made worse resembles the van i shed order in that it i s the coerc ive organization of penury , and real ity once again become s the impo s s ibil ity of l iving. So i t i s impo s s ib le for the revolutionary groups not to produce themselves as in confl ict with the leaders they have given themselv e s . The latter have to inc arnate the impossibi l i ty of any i mmed iate ameli ora­ i . e . reas sume the negati ve powers against which the oppre s sed tion clas ses rose up. B ut that nece s s ity of vegetating in m i sery at the very moment of v ictory " it i s sti l l popular praxis that create s it, in so far as it goes to the political extreme (overthrow ing the regime, tak i ng power) in order to realize the econ omic extreme. It i s popular prax i s w hich in the practical sy nthe s i s by bring ing those factors into con tact cons titute s that revolutionary paradox and that pennanent contradic tion between the radical i sm of the here and now and the rad ical i sm of the long-term undertaking . It i s popular prax i s which produces leaders and pits them against the mas ses in the proc e s s of fus ion , j ust as it groups the masses by dis solv ing series and pits them again st the leaders emanating from them . On the other h and, the workers cannot enter i nto total confl ict w ith the leaders , in s o far as they produce ill themselves the contrad iction that p its them against the Party . At the same time they are the temporal under­ taking, inasmuch as th i s gives itself its own knowl edge and engenders and di scloses i ts own temporal ization . In other word s , they are the men s imul taneou s l y of the imm edi ate need and the long-term obj ective while as class individual s they are the med iation between the two . In other word s , tho se producers are aw are th at there i s an identity between the u l timate aim of the un dertak ing and the most immediate goal of the need , at the moment when reality i s i mpos si bil ity of l i ving . The pos s ibil i ty of tran s l ating a single objective into t wo language s and en vi sag ing i t turn and t urn about in two sy stems the instant and the ,

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w a s clearly shown by the enthus i asm of the Russ ian temporali zation proletariat when the fi rst pyatiletka was deci ded i n October 1 9 28 . Th e cryin g needs of the undernouri shed (beyond a certain thre shold, of cour se, short of w h i ch such ac tiv ity ceases to be pos s ible) were de­ velop ed and temporal i zed i nto a practica l tension . It was then a questio n of the sati sfaction of all the needs of everybody be ing the deep mean in g of that total mobi l i z a tion . The i ndiv idual ' s need would not be as suaged, but it became the v e c torial ten sion of his effort and was tran sposed into prac ti cal radical i s m i . e . i nto vol untarism . In th is practical form (one of whose aspects was to be the Terror) , i t part l y (and temporarily) lost its phy siological urgenc y . In the perspecti ve of soc iali st con struction , under­ would be borne no uri shme nt whi c h had prev iously been unbearable for a ti me . In the c o ntext of th i s v oluntari sm of conscio u s workers , the unity of masses a n d leaders was real i zed . But obv iously the organ ism would i tself fi x d e fi nitively the threshold that could not be cros sed (exhaus tion, sickn e s s , or con s tan t hunger, etc . ) . B y thi s re lap se i nto the immedi ate ( i nto the phy siological necessity of i mmedi ate sati sfaction) the opposition of the mas ses to the leaders was resuscitated in un ity . That means there was a w hole dialectical movement here . The rank and file recogn ized their l e a ders because they r eadopted their project. They ohjectifi ed thei r hun ger by interiorizing t he leaders ' vol untari sm . Tension - which was re al i z e d by tran scendence and preserv ation of the need , i n and through the undertaking thus became an objecti v e reality within them, at once the same and oth er and (in certain circ um stance s that i t woul d take too long to enumerate ) possible alienation . B ut prec i sely because they rec o g n i zed the soverei gn ' s po wers through the un ity of" the undertaking , they d e m anded of him and often a gai n s t him the means to pursue i t . Need i tself was objecti fied. It was lived as suffering and danger , and at the s ame time defi ned as that which h ad to be as s uaged i f the rate of product i on was to be i ncreased. On thi s point, moreover, they found a common l a nguage w i th the leadership, whi c h like w i se reckoned that con sumption c ould not be lowered beyond certain limits w i thout comprom i s ing pro ductivity . The source of opposition was neither i n the lang uage nor i n the intention s : it lay simultaneously i n the determination of the standard of living below which it was no l onger po s sible to produce and , ev e n i f agreement was ac hieved on that point, i n the s l owne ss of organ i zation , the difficulties of supply and the errors of bureaucrac y i n s hort , everythi ng that consti tuted the sovereign as inferior in fact to i t s funct ion . The deep difference was there . In a system of capi tal i st expl o i t at i on , penury , discomfort and mi sery are recognized as the normal and constant product s of the soc iety . In the system of soc i ali st con structi o n , however, they were attributed to the faults of groups or of me n , or to the partic u l ar nec e s s i ties of the m oment. In so far

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as the opposition of the emancip ated prol etaria t would be able t o manifest itsel f e xpl icitl y and fi nd its organization and its e xpre s s i o n , it would perhaps radical requi re a change of the leading personnel and a re working of the Plan ; but it would not go b ac k either on the revolu­ t ionary basi s o f t he regime or on the necessity of pursuing the u nde rtak ing i n itiated. The prac tico-in ert that the workers wanted to s uppre s s was not so much the sc lerosi s of the leading layers and the serial ities in the labo uring c las s . It wa s rathe r the en sembl e of sec ondary counter­ final ities ( de la y s , waste , lack o f co-ordination, lethargy or c a reeri sm of loc al functionaries ) , which were by and larg e con sequences of the bureau­ cratic sy stem h ence, of p rax i s -p rocess itself but which in th e immedi­ ate , spec i fic i n stance alw ay s presented them sel ves as remediable . On th i s point too , moreover, the frictions presuppo sed a certain uni ty , since the disti nc tive feature of that burea ucrac y (not , as has been c lai me d , of every bureaucracy * ) was to pro seclit e bureaucrats burea ucratic all y i . e . to attri bute mi stakes to men rather than to the sy s tem that produc ed them . It is well k nown that i n the soc iali st democrac ies under Stal i n i sm , men and were sometim es changed spectac u l arly i n order to change things so metime s i n order not to change them . To be sure , the unity of the leaders and the rank and fi le w as not t hat of members of a group . At the level of the n ucleus of revolutionary workers , however, it must be noted that interiori zation by both leaders and rank and file of the original contradictio n of soci al ism hence , the adoption of the same i n ner con fl ict by the leaders and the rank and fi le would have made it pos s i ble to av oid oppression in the true sense of the term . For, i n so far as rejecti on of the impo ssibi lity of liv ing bec ame volun tarism by being tempora li zed, it was po s s ible to imag ine a cen­ tral i zed, tough, authoritarian praxi s , but on e supported (and thereby control led) by t he rank and fi l e them sel v e s . Rec iproc ally , the l eaders would ha ve taken more care to search out and s upp ress abuses , if these adj ustments ha d been demanded i n the name of the common volun tari sm by a working class of which th ey had been sure . At thi s level , the latent co n fl i c t would thus have m an i fested itself w ithin the un ity of the co n s truc ti ve prax i s , by i nte l l i gible produc ts and not by m i s shapen

* The b ure d u c r ac y , a'-, i n e rti a o f the s o v e re i g n , doe s n ot rise u p ag a i n st i tse If i n t h e h i stor i c a l g ro u p i n g s t h a t l i v e t h rou g h a p e r i o d o f �tab i l ity . O n t h e contr ary , i t e xpres �e s t h at �ta b i l i t y ( wh i ch m ay be a � lo w m o v e nl e n t o f i n v o l ut i o n . for e x a m p l e ) and the l atter refl ec t s

e v e ry th i n g i � al l r i g h t ( at l e a � t tOI the b u re a u c rat . w h o fi nd � h i s j u �t i fi c at i o n in t h e C O u r � e o f t h i n g � ) T h e S t a l i n i �t b u re auc r a c y i s i n pe rpe t u al c o n t rad i c t i o n bec a u li e it it

c om h i n e � t w o i n c o m p at i b l e fe at u re � i t i s a \'o/ul1 fari H hu r('oll( I GC)' I n i t , t h e re are ,l m u lfolleo u ,l \' c o m b i n e d t h e fierce " t ac t i v i s m w i th i n e rt i a . O r rather . t h e l atte r I S the mean s -

of t h e fornle r . Th u " , perpet u a l l y , b u re a uc rat I c a c t i v i �m d e n o u nc e � the b u re a uc ra b .

1 54

BOOK III

was c l ear l y sho wn b y the enthusiasm of the Russian te m p o r a l i z a t io n pro l etari a t when the fi rst pya tiletka was de c i ded i n Octo ber 1 9 2 8 . The c ry i ng needs of the underno uri shed ( be yond a certain thre shold, of cours e , short of whic h such a c tiv i ty ceases to be possible ) were de­ veloped and t emporal i z ed into a practical tension . I t was then a q u e st i on of the sati sfaction of all the n eeds of everybo dy b eing the deep mean i n g of that to t al mob i l i zati on. The indiv idual ' s need w ould not be as suaged, but it became the vectorial tension of his effort and was tran sposed into practi cal r adical ism i . e . into vol untari sm . In th is practical form (one of wh ose aspect s was to be the Terro r ) , i t partl y (and temporar ily) l ost its ph ys i o l og i c al urgenc y . In the perspecti ve of soc i al i st construct ion, under­ nouri shme nt - which had previo u s l y been unbearab le would be borne for a time . In the conte xt of th is v oluntari sm of conscious workers , t h e u nity of masses an d le aders was real i z ed . B u t o b v i o u sl y the organism would itself fi x definitively the thre shold th at co u l d not be cros sed (exhaustion, s i c knes s , or con s tan t h ung e r , etc . ). By thi s rel ap se into the immedi ate ( i nto the ph y sio l ogi c al necessity of i mmedi ate sati sfaction ) the oppo sition of the masses to the leaders was re susc itated in un ity. That means there was a whole dial ectical movement here . The rank and fi le recogn ized their leaders because they readopted their proj ect. They ohjectified their hung er b y interiori z ing the leaders ' voluntari sm. Tension - which was re a l i zed b y t r anscendenc e an d preservation of the need , i n and t h rough the unde rtaking thu s became an o bj e ctiv e reality with i n them , at on c e the sanz e and o th er and (in certain circ umstances th at it would take too long to enume rate ) possible alienation. B u t prec i sely because the y rec ogni zed th e sovereign s p o wers t h ro u gh th e unity of the undertaking, t hey demanded of him and often ag ainst h i m the means to pursue it. Need itself was objecti fi e d It w as lived as suffering and dange r , and at the same time defi ned as that which had to be as suaged i f the rate of pro d u c tion was to be increased. On thi s point, moreov er, the y found a common l ang u age with the leadersh i p , which likew i se reckoned that cons u mption could not be lowered beyond certain l imits without compromising productiv ity . The source of opposi tion was neither in the l a n g uage nor in the i ntention s : it lay simultan eously i n th e determination of the stan dard of l i v i ng below wh ich i t was no longer po ssi b l e to produce and, even if agre e me n t was ac hi eved on th at point i n the sl owne ss of organi zati on, the diffic ulties of supply and th e errors of b u reaucracy i n short, everyt h i n g that constituted the sovereign as inferior in fact t o its funct ion . The deep difference was there . I n a sy stem of c api ta l i st exploitati on , pen u ry di scomfort and m i se r y are recogn ized as the norma l and constant p r odu c t s of the soc iety . In the sy stem of s oc i a l i s t c o n s truc t i o n , however, t hey were attr i b ute d to t he fau lts of g roups or of m e n , o r to the p art i c u l ar nec e s s i t i e s of the m o m e n t . I n so far '

.

,

,

1 55

I S S T R U G G L E I N T E L L I G I B L E ')

as the opposi tion of the e manc i pated proletari at would be abl e to ma n i fe st itself expl ic itl y and find its organi zation and its expression, it would req uire a chan ge perhaps rad ical of the lead ing personnel and a re working of the Pl an ; but i t w ould not go back e i ther on th e revolu­ tionary basis of th e regim e o r on the nece ssity of pursuing the undertaking i n i ti ated. The p ra ctico-inert that the workers wanted to suppres s w as not so much the sclerosis of the leadi ng layers and the seria l ities i n the lab ouring c l as s . It was rather the ensemble of secondary counter­ final i ties ( de lay s , waste , lack of co-ordination , letha rgy or careeri s m of local functionarie s ) , wh ich were by and large con sequ ences o f th e bureau­ crati c system hence, of praxis -process itself but which in the i m medi ­ ate , spec i fic in stance alway s presented themselves as remediable . On thi s point too, moreover, the fri ction s pres uppo sed a certain uni ty , s inc e the dis tinctive feature of tha t bureaucracy (not , as has been c laimed , of every i . e . to bur eaucracy * ) w as to p rosec ute bureauc rat s bureau cratic a lly attribute m i stakes to men rather th an to the sy stem that produced them . It i s well known th at i n t he soc i a l ist democ rac i e s un der Sta l i n i s m , men we re sometimes change d spectac ul arly in order to change th ings and sometimes i n order not t o chan ge them . To be sure , the unity of the leaders and the rank a nd fi le was no t that of m embe rs of a group . At the level of the nucleus of revol utionary wo rkers , howev e r, it must be noted that interiori zation by both leaders and rank and fi le of the ori ginal contradiction of soc ial i s m henc e , the adoption of the same inner confl ict by the leaders and the rank and fi le would have m ade it poss ibl e to avoid oppress ion in the true sense of the term . For, i n so far as rejection of th e impos s ibi l i ty of l i ving bec ame vol u ntaris m by b eing temporalized , it was pos sible to imag ine a cen­ trali zed, t ough , authoritarian prax i s , but one supported ( and thereby control led) by th e rank and fi le them sel v e s . Rec iprocal l y , the leaders wou l d hav e taken more care to search out and suppre ss abuses, if these adj u stments had been demanded in the name of the c ommon v o luntari sm by a working c lass of which they had been sure . At thi s level , the latent con fl ict would thus have manifested itself w ithin the unity of the construc tive pra x i s , by inte l l i gible products and not by m i s shapen

*

T h e b u re au c r ac y , as i n e rt i a of the s o v e re i gn . doe s not rise u p a g a inst i t se If i n the

h i sto r i c a l g ro u p i n g � t h a t l i v e t h ro u g h a p e r i od of stab i l i t y . O n the contr ary , i t e x p re s s e s that s t a b i l i t y ( wh i c h m a y be a s l o w movemen t of i n v o l ut i on . fo r e x a m p l e ) an d t h e l atter re fl ects the b u r e a u c rat . w h o fi nd � h i s j u �t i fi c at i on in the bure a u c racy i s I n perpe t u a l c ontrad i c t i on b e c a u � e it

i t : e v e ry t h i n g i � a l l r i g h t ( at l e a q t(n

C o u r�e of t h m g s ) .

The

S t a l i n i st

\'o/ul1 lari \' 1 h u re a lu ra( y I n i t , t h e re are \ l m u lt(J n e{)u � l.\ com bi ned t h e fi e rc e � t ac t i v i s m w i th i ne rt i a . O r r a t h e r the l at t e r i s t h e m e an s

c o m b i n e s t w o i n c o m p at i b l e fe at u re s

it

is a

.

of t h e forme r T h u s , p e rpe t u a l l y , b u re a uc ra t i c ac t i v i �m den o u n c e � the b u re a u c ra t � .

1 56

BOOK I I I

mon sters . Work ing-class pre s sure would in fact have tended to s uppress a ny way bureaucratic exces ses and to limit h ierarc hy . In s uch a case abstract, since it s ignal s the beginning of i ndu strial i zation the struggle as a latent contradic tion in the leading groups and in the masse s ( i . e . in i ndi viduals suffering their impotence) can be said to be in itself" a factor o.f un ity : it does not supp re s s the authoritarian commandism or the p l anning carried out by the guiding cen tre , but i t makes oppress ion u seles s ; perhaps (as ideal i sts who have not understood the fact of industrial growth have w i shed) it make s i t pos s ible to i ncrease the powers of the soviets in direct proportion to the progress of el ectri fication . We know , however, th at this nucleus was shortl y to explode under the pres sure of immigrant s , and that the leaders would have to handle a volatile, uneducated , disunited mass l i able to change from one day to the ne xt. Most of these workers were not rev o l utionari e s . Before the seizure of power t hey had been peasants , and eve n if the y had - se t the red cock loose ' on big farms or in chateaux , such ac ts of v i olence had expresse d an uneducated revolt: though they m ight lead to the appropriation of seigneurial e state s , they at all events coul d not spontaneously transform themselves into a vol untarism of industri a l production . Si milarl y , those new workers would cle arl y long remain urban i zed peasants, and their class consciousnes s could not be formed for long years to come. And what could i t be , anyway , in those earl y stages ? What would its practical content be , si nce the sei zure of power was an accompl i shed fact ; s ince the exploiting c lass was defeated ; s ince those peasant s , dri ven from their v i llag es by m i sery or brutally tran sported, saw work i n i ndustry despite especially i f you think of the prodi gious effort everyth ing as a c urse that was asked of them rather than as a duty or an honour . B ut without yet understanding what the Revol ution w a s , they were not unaware that i f they revolted they would be counter -rev olutionaries . That reg ime which was proletarianizing them was the same one which had driven out the landlord s . The leaders ' mi strust of tho se yoke l s , most of whom were still under the sway of the Orthodox Ch urc h , was i nteriori zed in each one of the newcomers as mi strust of the rest. In that social i st country achiev in g fu ll employment , thi s m i strust which engendered oppres sion - p l ayed the role of competitive ailtagoni sms in the c apital i st world : it serialized. Ev e ryone became once again th e O ther for h i s n e ighbour: not the Other who cou ld be taken on in his p lac e , but the O ther who could denounce him or whose imprudence cou ld provoke an arrest. In that i mmense collective, ins urrecti onal unity was not even imag inable . Radical po werlessness was l i ved as res i gnati on , or i n extreme case s tran sformed i nto pas sive re si stance. I n other word s , po werless ne ss to r i se up w as re ­ exteri ori ze d as powerlessne s s to produce , while someti mes i nd i v idual violence was e xpre� sed by an act of sabotage .

I S STR U G G L E I N T ELL I G I B L E?

1 57

So the confl ict exi sted, but it h ad n o n ame . Oppress ion was not exploitati on, there w as no c lass struggle, and anyway the w orking class e x i s ted in itself but not for itself. On the other hand, the newcomers , wh atever their atti tude towards the regime , were simultaneously seri alized in rel ation to one another ' b y the ir origin and h i stories and by the lea ders ' operations and uni fi e d by the sovereign praxi s (p rec i sely in so far as th is treated them as inert seri al uni ties ) , inasmuch as they were i n tegrated into the practical field it de limited: i . e . into the country , as an en semble of materi al givens (shortages and re source s ) , accumulated goods and men. Thi s i ntegration in no way prej udged their real rel ations w i th any particular practico-in ert ensembl e or group. It mere l y meant tha t ev eryth ing alw ays came to them v i a the mediation of the sovereign, i . e . v i a sov ere ign determi nation s of the practi c al fi eld . If it was a matter of founding a city around b last furnaces or steel works , t h e burea ucracy took c are of tran sporting the m to the site ; it dist ributed m akeshift equipment to them (tents at M agnitogorsk) ; it had already decided to build fl ats ; it woul d achieve tha t with numerous delay s for which i t alone was responsibl e . It was the leadership which took c are of s uppli e s , or set tas ks and norm s . If need be i t w ould have a double track bui lt, to replace the single track upon which t he frei ght trains initial l y tra velled the ones that transported the coa l or the steel . A s th e w orker became ed ucated, as he assimi lated h i s craft experience and hi s cult ure gre w , he dis covered him self more c learl y within a sy stem un ified an d constituted by two centres of production, 2 ,000 kilometres apart. One of these, sit uated in the Vra l s (Magnitogorsk) , was constituted around i ron deposits (extractive industrie s , steelwork s ) , while the other (Kuzbas) had been the latter sending fue l to the founded in the v i c inity of coa l mines former, the former sending back to Kuznetsk surplus iron extracted from the Vral s . On the basi s of th i s , the worker grasped h i s own p ractic al field as a tiny determination within the sovereign field. Hi s work was fore­ s e e n . The practico-inert exigenc ies of hi s m achines ( we spoke of this 35 earl ier ) directl y expres sed the inv i sible synthetic exig ency of the sovereign. Those machine s we re foreseen by the Plan , constructed in conformity with it, and their ex pectation (they awaited their worker) w as a p assivization of the sov ereign ' s expectation . They made them sel ves the conducting m i l ieu of that unitary praxi s that c ame to seek the worker out , right to the foot of that Magnetic Mou n tain where he had been transported in anticipation of the needs of production . H i s life , i . e . h i s fo od and the satisfac ti on of all his othe r needs, depended upon the way i n which he would ful fi l h i s presc ribed task (which had de sig nated him in -

35

Critiq u e , v o l . l pp. 1 8 5 ff. ,

BOOK III

1 58

adv ance) ; and that pre scription was a mere spec ifi c ation of the overall plan . B ut even h i s zeal could not ensure that he would m an age to surpass - or merely attain the norms determined by the sovere ign. Even that depended on the rate of extrac tion of coal at Kuzbas , and on the transport. I n practice, moreov er, that universal dependence did not estab­ l ish any solidarity between him and other workers in other sectors of produc ti on . What he needed w as i ntensive work by the Kuzbas m iners , by the rail w aymen , by the train drivers and - inasmuch as he w as personally designated to have a fl at by the building workers . In fact, that soli darity i n reverse led everyone to dem and the most i ntensive effort from everyone el se, so that he woul d be able to reproduce hi s life by pushi ng h i s own effort to the max imum . I t was with the leadersh i p that the worker felt some soli darity . In order to be able to accompli sh the task it h ad pre scribed for him , he expected of others exactly ytJ hat th e leadersh ip expected of them : the max imum the ' op timum variant' . Leaders hip was a mediatio n be tween me n by thing s, since i t stirred the practico-inert by transfinite o perati ons . It was al so a medi ation between things by men , s ince the worker i n the M agnitogorsk steelworks depended on the Kuzbas mines and the frequency of transport and at the same time on the min ers themselves . S i nc e i n both case s , moreover, the dependenc e turned into a dependence vis- cl - vis the sove reign, that manipulated inertia through i ts very serial i ty reve aled the sovereign unity of the man ipulatin g praXIS. B ut i f seri e s were in practice totali zed , the serial i ndividual nev er­ i n and through h i s radical theles s rem ained the man whose freedom alienation realized his serial -being through an other-direction that reveal ed itself a s a fascination with total i ty and an infini te movement propagated under the sovereign ' s infl uen ce. Thi s meant that the serial indiv idual was determ ined inasmuch as he existed as O ther for the sovereign itself: i . e . for a praxis -knowledge that pre sented him with h i s particu lar prac tical field as already totalized by the leadership and wit h h i s seri al-being as expressly aimed at. I n that sen se , the practical totali zation he c arried out at every moment (when he conduc ted himself in an y way as a seri al being ) was a totali z ati on of the already total ized . (In the same way , the practi cal fi eld of ch ildren i s the total i zation of a fi eld already expl ored by the i r parents , wh ere the objects it di sc loses are already seen , already named, and have an already settled usage .) I n that sense, if the propaganda had succeeded he grasped the sov ere i gn ' s total ization as the depth of h i s own total ization . H i s practical field was the country , as it was for the Pol i tburo and its ex pert as s i stants , and if he had been abl e to de velop h i s know ledg e and fu ncti ons i n fi n i te l y " he would merely have redi scovered the total depth of h i � own fi e l d . In a certain w ay , t he sove reign total i zation was h i s p owerle s sness and i g nor•

I S S TR U GG L E INTELLIG I B L E?

1 59

ance : he was det ermined by it in h i s negati v e particularity . I n another w a y , however, it was his pos sible knowledge and h i s own partic i p ation in the praxi s of al l. For individual s , the sovereign was the mediation between their ig norance as particularity and their total know ledge as possible total ization of the country b y each and every person . On the oth er hand , the totali zation of serie s , thoug h pure ly operational , was manifested to every serial individual as a r e c uperation of the infinite flig ht by the sovereign ' s totali zing prax i s . Thus serial-being was lived as org anic-being . As we h ave seen , thi s i s the very nature of othe r-directed 36 activity . Foll owing the above de scription, however, it rem ain s the case that the leading group ' s total ization was retotalized b y the individual preci sely in so far as thi s retotali zation w as already foreseen and prov oked in the leadersh i p ' s totalizing prax i s . Although there was a reciprocity of reflection here , how ever, the leading group rem ained the Other inasmuch as the indiv idual w as h i mself maintained and conditioned by o thers and in the mi lieu of a lteri ty . From thi s standpoint, th e two totalizations presented themselves si multaneously as the same and as oth er: or, if you like , the indi v i dual lived the total ization of h i s practical field as being deciphered and explained elsewhere , in tho se radically other beings who se sovere ignty was l i ved as gro up power through serial powerlessne ss. At th at level, alte rity appeared as a sacred c h ar acteri stic: totali zation of th e i ndiv idual practical field remained a syn the s i s at the s urface of a synthes i s-in-depth w hose type of being was . the s acred. Obviously, thi s c har a c teri stic wou ld h ave di s­ appeared in the event of rev olt and ins urrectional di s s olution of al l series. W e are reall y accounting here for a particular alienation : inasmuch as an individual ' s daily activity tota l i zed him , the country remai ned profane ; inasmuc h as that obscure total ization was carri e d out in the fu ll clarity of a sovereign totalization that escaped it, the country became s acred. B ut we have also noted the complementary prax i s . Activi sts provoked ephemeral di ssolutions of seriality at strategic points that the g overnment had carefully determined and that figured as s ynthetic obj ectives in its totali zing praxi s . In such regroupments, as we have seen , fraternity­ terror reappeared w i th the sovereignty of each person, as a common i n di vidual readopting the dec i sion of the P arty or Pol i tburo. At that lev el , the indi v i dual reabsorbe d the s acred inasmuch as h e di s solved seri al ity and dee p ened h i s practical fi eld. There was homogeneity between h i s own totalization and the sovereign ' s . What i s more , the mov ement of h i s own total ization (inasmuch as he h ad the importance of s ome dec i s ion - for society as a whole and for himself as a m ember of it ex plained to 3 6 . Critiq u e , vo l . l , P 65 5 .

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BOOK III

him) made it into a kind of moment of the sov ereign total ization: a kind of stage on the infinite route that would make it pos sible to reali ze thi s in its entirety . A dialectic was establi shed between those two contradictory rel ationships of the indi vidual totalization to the comm on total ization (alterity and the sacred, on the one hand; radical homogeneity , on the other) through a new attempt at total ization by the indiv idual (or in local groups) . The new tran sformations resulting from this are , for now, of little concern to u s . Th e example was s imply designed to i ndicate : first, that the sovereign totalizati on integrated non-totali zables in practice ; secondly , that it determined itself as a function of the singul ar totaliza­ tions which retotalized i t, and did so in such a way that the retotal ization w as in conformity with the chosen objectives . And reciprocally that, in a society thus i ntegrated, each person was as a S ov iet citizen a t the very least, through other-direction, an intermedi ary between the serial Other and the common indiv i dual s ince he totali zed his practical field w ithin a global totalization that he revealed and transformed by each of his activitie s , and s ince he acted in any case as an agent already foreseen and guided by the totalization in progre s s . Yet each sin gular totalization , as a transcendence of the sovereign totalization towards a particul ar goal ( work , wage , liv ing standard , etc . ) , appeared in turn as a totalization of the totalizati on i .e . as an ultimate totali z ation . Thus the Leadership ' s totalization , embrac ing individu al s and groups , found its concrete reality onl y i n the diversity of the concrete totalization s that retotalized it, each from th e standpoint of a l ocal praxi s . I n this sense, however,. it can be said that the sovereign totalization was s imply a praxi s whose objective was to be real ized by the fore seen, accompl i shed unity of its retotal izations (be they seri al , or common, or singul ar) . The heterogeneity of the series and group s did not count, since the sovereign took account of thi s or rather rel ied upon it . in order to realize its own objectives. As soon as that heterogeneity entered i nto the practical reckon ing, it became a nece s sary moment of totali zation : the means of orientating and limiti ng (etc . ) retotalization s , of opposing or fostering them in the direction of the project. Everyth ing went on as though each individual lived under the pres sure and in the l ight of a sovereign totalization , in which he figured as a total ized e lement; and as though the sovereign totali zation h ad grasped i tself as a proj ec t of pas s ion and i ncarnation, s ince i t caused itself to be retotal ized by everyone as a non-transcendable total ity . B y th is, I do not mean to refer back to any kind of pre-establi shed h armony or social optimi s m . I t i s s imply a m atter of s ho w i ng that, i n a society ch aracteri zed by the presence of a sovereign , historical s ignific a­ tion whatever it may be and from wherever it m ay emanate require s to be comprehended i n the twofold movemen t of retotal ized totalization

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161

and totalization of the direc ted retotal ization s . After that, dreadful di sputes m ay ari se, and c lan struggle s , police oppre s s ion and class confl icts m ay grow worse . A l l we mean is that these very struggles can take place onl y within the framework of a retotal ized totali zati on . I t is at this level that contradi ctions explode , at this level that groups form to oppose the sovere ign , prec isely because it i s at this level a lso that the sovereign prax i s has previousl y been able to succeed, i . e . achieve its objectives through directed retotalizations . The positi v i st histori an has di s torted H i s tory and made comprehension impos s i ble , whenever he has shown the organized forces ' project determining ' the masses ' , or ' public opinion ' , or an y category of indiv iduals or groupings , in the same way that a phys ical factor c an condi tion the variations of a ' natural proce s s ' . He has suppres sed any pos sibility of totali zation, b y suppre s s ing one of the essential moments of historical prax is and remaining bl ind to the fol lowing obviou s fact : inasmuch as H i s tory s tudies th e action of action upon action , the milieu in which any gi ven praxi s may cre ate any other in accordance w ith strict predictions i s neces sari ly that of retotalization . From this standpoint, confl ict and the stage s of every struggle are comprehens ible : these rec iprocal retotali zati ons of each oppos ing prax i s by the other, when they are themselves retotalized, likewi se constitu te a contradictory milieu where each action creates the other as its practical null ification. So the con fl ict with the sov ereign took place w ithin the practical field, and in the produced and revealed unity of that field. The l atter was originall y j ust the moving synthe s i s of the environment by an action in progre s s . B ut the contradiction was due here to the fact that in that unified env ironment, as particular determinations of the field, there were men i . e . several sovereign s (inasmuch as each had his practical field) . Thi s would sti l l be only a partial expl anation if those men had been enemie s of the sovereign: i . e . had negated the practical field embracing them and had had to be negated by it. B ut the reality of oppressive commandism was more complex . B y v irtue of the oppre s s ion that kept them in seriality and by that very means extracted the maximum effort from them - the leadership w as against them. They interiorized w ithin them their statu s as means · i . e . as reified individual s , as transcended tran scendence whose sole freedom seemed to be to y ield themselves up whol l y to the sovereign prax i s , and to flee reification in the alien voluntari s m that imbued them . On the other hand, however, those means of praxis were al so its ends . A s forced l abour (or rather, forced consent to the mode and to the norms of l abour) proceeded and the first re sul ts of action made themselves kno wn , Soviet man was created. H i s pride sprang from h i s first achievements (although and above all because most of them , e . g . the g igantic M agnitogorsk steel work s , were not de stined direct l y to rai se h is standard of l i v ing) . H is toughness was j ust

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i nteriorized oppre s sion ( he was tough on himself and discipli ned, quick to denounce as s l ackness the relaxation of h i s neighbour, who throug h the inverted solidarity e stabli shed by the sov ereign ri sked s lowing down the rate of production for everyone) . H i s passivity (entirely temporary) vis-a- vis the man agers w as not j ust the interiorization of his impotence, but als o a fundamental convi ction acquired gradually that transform ation of the leading personnel was in through culture itself less i mportant than industrial growth ; and that, a s s uming the system was to be saved, the indiv idual and col lectiv e task s , the effort to be contributed and the standard of l iv ing would be more or less the s ame at the same moment of sociali s t construc tion. I am not saying that this ' Sov iet man ' the first really to defi ne the present i n terms of the future (and on the bas is of the past) and his individual future in term s of the social i s t future had been created cheaply . Perhaps in many cases he had even appeared onl y w ith the second generation , i . e. with the sons of the pre-war immigrants . It remain s the c ase that thi s type of man would never hav e been produced i n a bourgeoi s democracy . For oppres sion make s no difference to the fact of common ownership of re sources and the instruments of labour; and the oppressi on t hat cau ses peop le to work for the benefit of bos se s i s one thing, while that which causes fathers to work for the benefit of their son s , the latter for the benefit of grandsons , etc . , in the perspective of a growing l i beration , i s another thing . Thus, little b y little, the newcomers or their children adopted the v iewpoint of the rev olutionary workers , apart from the fact that they had the sen se of a constant and constantly reformi s t evoluti on , w ithin a State that they were retaining (along with the pious myth that it would wither aw ay of its own accord) because that State had emerged from a revolution that they had not made. Thi s sing ul ar m i xture o f conservati sm and progre s s iv ism was the interiorizati on of the totali ty w i thin each individual . It expre s sed the very mean ing of prax i s : to progress in order to maintain (the essenti al conque sts ) ; and to m aintain in order to progress (stratifications born of hierarchi zation , as a mean s of i nciting to produce) . At the sam e time , i t reali zed the true relation of the urbani zed peas ant or h i s son to the Rev ol ution , as an insurrectionary sei zure of power fol­ lowed by a radical c hange i n the re lations of production. Preci sely, it was not he who had made it, but the education given h i m by the sov ereign born of it, as well as the need to save the meaning of h i s own l ife together with the objective reality of the new regime al l en sured that this rece ived (or suffered, if you prefer) order was neverthele s s adopted and could not conceivably be called into questi on . Or, i f you prefer, education and propaganda h ad eventuall y determ i ned in each indiv i dual a zone of almost p ledge d i nerti a that was preci sely the Revolution itself, inasmuch as by every concrete action he transcended it

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i n its original abstraction and in its past bein g � inasmuc h as it w as the distant aim of his undertak i n g and his life h i s no n - transcendabLe destiny; i n short , i nasmuc h as he realized what others had est ablished as an absolute but ab strac t be g i n n i ng From th e moment w hen he was himself involved and with a s in gle m o v e men t gr as ped hi s prac t ic a l field as a singul ar d etermination o f t he s o v ereig n field and h i s own life as an undertaking in p rogress a limited singularization of the sovereign tempo ral ization his oppo s i tion to the sovereig n was w aged in th e n ame of the as i n a bourgeo i s s overeig n itself. There were n o fl ats , for ex amp l e not de mo crac y because it was in n obo dy ' s i nterest to b uild any , but because the s overe ig n and planne d dec i s ion to stag g er their construction over month s o r years had not been realized. Yet t he conflict remained l atent, in the S talin ist period, s ince vol untari sm was an optimistic dec i s ion : every­ th ing was a /ways going wel l . The demands of the m asses can be i nterpreted as a first control exerc i sed o ver the sovereig n in the n ame of its own projects and the praxis that was realizing them . B u t since o p t i m i sm was a l way s the source and the result of Terror, * the confl ict remained at the level of a passive re s i stance at the very heart of the masse s ' voluntaris m . And that re si stance as an inertia provoked (by bad working condi tions , etc . ) and mai ntained (as an anonymous man i fe station) was m e re l y the interiorization withi n the u nity of the p ractical field of that other i nertia : bureaucratic sclerosi s , turn ed back against itself by the very peop le i t affected as th e i r negat i on by the sovereign . Through the intermediary of the se increasingly consc ious men , S ta lin i s t praxis a cc umu l ated in its pract i cal field tran sformati on s that ne gated it; and th i s negation w as turned back against it thro ugh t he n ew ge nera tion s of workers . Conversel y , howev e r that ne gati ve project preci sely inasmuch as i t was contradicted by hierarch i z ed stratification s was explicitly c on tai n e d i n the sov ereign praxis as one of its l o n g - te rm obj ecti v e s . First, b ec a us e that p rax i s had taken over the t heory of w ither i ng aw ay of the St at e even th o u gh p resent c irc umstanc es s e em e d to it to require th e latter ' s rei nforcement. Secondly , because the v ery effort demanded of the workers i n a period of accumula­ tion ( alo ng w ith all the p r ac t i cal features emanatin g from thi s voluntar­ ism , authoritari anism , centralization , terror) w as e xpre s s ly given as tem ­ p ora ry . F i n a l l y because when the emergency dimini shed (because the U S SR h ad caught up) , al though the State would still subsist, the a p p e aranc e of t ec h n i ca l cadre s and the hum a n and professional culture o f the workers w ou l d combine to make the b ureaucratic gov ernment and the strati fied -

.

-

,

­

,

,

,

,

*

I nasm uch as i t occ u rs a� a fundame n t a l feat ure of pra x i s (decis ion

0 11

its pOSSibi li ties ) ,

at m o m e n t s w h e n pe s s i m i 5 t i c fore c a s t s s e e m the m ost l i ke l y . I t s s a v age c haracte r deri v e s

from the fac t t h a t i t be ars w i t h i n i t p essi m i � m an d de s p a i r as net!.uted thre a t s .

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hierarchy less and less effective , and would obl ige the ru l ing personnel to disappear or adapt the forms of government to the circumstance s . Thus the contradict ion of S talinist command i s m was th at its aim was to make itself useless , through the tran sformat ion to which it subjecte d both the ruled and the country ' s industri al and military potenti al . Thi s contr a­ diction , moreover , was just an expressio n of the fundamen tal contradic tion of socialist construct ion in the period following the sei zure of power. On the other h and, bureaucrac y obv iou sly as serted itself at the s ame time, and in so far as it was hierarchized S tal inist commandi sm tended to fav our certai n social layers . B ut this w as because prax i s , b y determin ing the fi e ld of the practico-ine rt , had via the intermediary of the whole practical field " produced Soviet bureaucrats in s uch a way that the y as similated the common interest and the private interest. For we know that these two interests were in contradictio n i n the working mas ses during th e phase of pre-revolutionary construction. B ut we al so know that the appearance of working-class hierarchy had ten de d to create a s ystem o f recompenses such that for some of the workers the contradiction had been removed: to work the be st and the faste st was to be the be st paid and most honoured . Preci sely in so far as stratification had frozen the hierarchy , the latter tended to maintain itself for itself and against the masses, and at the same time for the greater effica cy oj" the common praxis s uch as that efficacy might appear to bureaucrati zed agents . B ut the l atter, in the very act that consol idated their power (and by it ) , l imited i ts duration : they had become aware of thi s (at least the more cultivated ones which does not mean the highest in rank) , since all the ideology the y h ad been taught explained how their power was ' for a lim ited time ' and almost of an ' interim ' kind. The y could bu ild the U S S R but not con struct a clas s : their very action prev ented them from doing so, despite the pri v ileges it conferred on them. Their b ureaucracy consecrated the separation between management function s and mode of appropri ation i n a certain phase of industri al growth (whether planned or not , as we shall see ) . At the same ti me , howev er, it showed by its effects on the ruled the prov i sional charac ter of th is d i s sociation in a socialist s y stelTI . So it can be s aid that emancipation of the Sov iet worke r though di fferen t from the emanc ipation of We stern workers pronounc e d sentence upon the B ureaucrac y . It must be added, however, that it did so simultaneously upon that bureaucrac y and through it and as a practical con sequence that the latter had already ac cepted ( at least i n pri nci ple ) . *

T h i s d o e � not at a l l n1e a n t h a t e l i m i n at i o n o f t h e B ureauc rac y m u s t n e c e ... s ari l y be a c c om p h -.. h e d t h r o u g h "i om e q u i e t p r o g re s � . C i rc u m s tanc e l., a l on e c an dete rm i n e t h e �pee d *

a n d v i o lence of t h at e l i m i n at i o n

A l l t hat c an be s a i d i 5, t h at the e n �e m b l e o f t he p roc e s s -

m ore o r l e � � c om p l et e a g re em e n t , o r -

s h o u l d be � e c n i n t h e c o n t e x t of a I

a

s e r i e � o f d i ffi c u l t ada p t at i o n li o r bloody d i �t u rb an c e �

e[ormi.\ l prax i � .

IS STRUGGLE INTELLIG I B LE?

J 65

The more thi s whee l ing, omnipre sent contradiction th e contradiction of helped to con struct the unity of the m en it had planned growth produced , i . e . of the ru lers and the ru led , the more strongl y and clearl y did it manifest its elf. In thi s sense not j ust at the begi nning for the revolutionary nucleu s , but gradual l y for a ll i ndividuals and all g r oup s through th e partial re i nforcement and parti al dissoluti on of seri alities it was th e tota l i z ation in progress tha t c l arified the con fl ict, by tighte ning the inte l l igible un ity . Let us simp l y r ecal l that thi s tota l ization did not d i s solve the c ollec ti y e s . nor was it the un ification of a multiplicity i n to a group . It was actual l y that of every s overeignt y de fining its practical field i n a fundamental ly un ivocal rel ationship. The practical field was engendered b y prax i s and tran sformed perpetuall y by it. If it was right t o speak of a tr an sformation of the ag ents (a nd of prax i s ) by the field, thi s transformation did not break the un ivoc al nature of the fundamental re l ation . The reaction was in fac t produced by bri nging di sparate e lements into con tact w i th i n the fi e l d . It was activ ity , through its temporal profi le and its qu al i fication (objective s , te ns ion , etc . ) , which real i zed that 4 bri n ging into contact ' , as a synthetic i mmanence of exteriority . And it was th rough th is synthesi s that exigencies appeared against a background of interiorizati on of the exterior (e. g . i nasmuch as quantity mil l i on s of ton s of steel or pig - i ron - was interiori zed as a scarcity, a possibi l it y , an impo ssibil ity, a mean s , or a short-term ai m , in the determ i n ation by praxi s of its new goal s * ) . If the se exigenci es transformed the agents and through them dev iated praxi s , they di d n ot thereby te stify to a rec iproc ity . For they were simp l y praxi s i tself, refracted by the materi al . So man was prod uce d v i a the i nt ermediary of h i s product, without thi s o peration nece s sari l y pre ­ su ppo s ing a feti shizati on of the l atter. I t is in term s of th i s non ­ rec iprocity that the relations between the ruled and the sove re i gn must be considered . Inas much as the ruled were inert , manipulated seri al itie s , the ir rel at ionshi p with the rul ers was univoc al . S eries are nlatt er worked by tran sfinite op eration s ; and the exigencies they man i fe st as such are the i nert exige n cies of every pas sive sy nthesi s , i n asmuch as i t refers p raxi s back to it s agents but overturned, pas s i v i zed an d produc ing i ts own counter- final i ti e s . I n the case that concerns u s , it was i ndeed the fundamental con tradiction of soc i al i sm that was turned back agai n st its bui lders , in the form of passive i mperati ves . And it was the se imperati ves that would transform the sovereign, through its very attemp t to adapt its as a free practice to them . In the same way, the individual worker -

*

I t i � sy n t h e t i c un i t y i n t o w h i c h i t i s i n teg rate d , rathe r t h an s o m e k i n d of d i a le c t i c

of N ature w h i c h h e re e nd o w s q u an t i t y w i t h a prac t i c a l q ua lity _

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transcendence through work (or through sabotage , etc . ) of the situ ation that had produced him could not thereby establish even a relationship of reciprocity w ith the sovere ign . Yet he w as free, he acted, he submitted or res isted freely (i . e . by assum i ng his imp otence or h i s pos sibil itie s ) . No matter. We know that he was seen, fore seen , produced and provided with a destiny by the s overe ign, and that h i s own practi cal field had i tself been defined as a spec i fication of the total field. The sovereign prax i s i mbue d the indiv idual and organi zed h im along with the disparate ens emble of the practico-inert. If he objec ti fied himself as a free practice , the sovereign was the Other by which the entire world became other ( i . e . alienated to an i nv i si ble presence ). If he real ly wanted to be united with the total field and as sume the i mperativ es of production as h i s own, then he became the sovereign as Other. Thi s circular and non-reciprocal unity suffices for intelligibi l ity as a di alectical totalization : ev ery object in the fi e ld was a total ization of a l l the others and their contradiction s ; but non­ rec ip rocity pre served a hierarchy w ithi n the total ization .

The Open Conflict, Progress towards Unity Nevertheless, i n the practical field we have been cons idering, we have not encountered a real autonom y of the practico- inert (as a source of confl icts between groups or c las ses ) : i . e . a genuine res i s tance of the prov i s i onal result of activ ity to that activ i ty itself (inasmuch as i t was incarnated simultaneous l y i n the sovere ign and in the ruled). In the example considered, however, s uch autonomy did ex ist: it was what led to the veritable civil war that pitted the sovereign and the working class again st the peasants . From as early as 1 9 2 3 , Trotsky and h i s friends h ad wanted to put an end to the NEP. They had been the first to i n si st on the vital necessity of planni ng , which alone would enable the U S S R to catch up industrial l y . B ut even at the purely theoretical level of thi s still abstract project, the practical unity of the i r proposal h ad created new synthetic and inert connection s w i thin the field. The development of already exi sting indus­ tri al centre s , and the creation of new centre s , had no sooner been merely conceived than they h ad presented themselve s as exigencies . Here we grasp the most typical ex ample of an intern al synthetic con nection : the mere mul tipl ication of machines entailed the nece ssity of m u l tipl ying the operators . Not because the mach ine in itself, as a fragment of inert matter, pre se nted that ex ige nc y ; but because, as social and worked matter, it was the inert s upport of a pas s i v i zed human de sign ( th at of the managers, the eng i neers and the bu i l ders ) which constituted its unity. And when it had been l i v i ng and concrete , this de si g n had con si sted

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precisel} in determin ing the number of operators as accurately and economical ly as pos s ible , on t he bas i s of the object created and its functioning. Through these multiple exigenc ies which gre w , moreover, i n proportion to the number and nature of the machines abstrac t men would be designated as operators required in the perspecti ve of indu strial ­ ization . It must also be noted that quite i ndependently of the s ystem characteristic s and circumstances v ary from one country to another. The USA, a country of immigration , experienced an i n fl ux of fore ign workers during its p eriod of acc umulation . Rus s i a , encircled and poverty ­ stricken , lived o ff its own res ource s : thi s circumstance reflected the hosti l ity provoked by its historical transformation s . So the new machines could demand operators only from among the Sov iet population itself, meaning that every i ncrease demanded in the world of workers was necessarily accompanied by a diminution i n the number of agricultural labourers. The heterogeneity of the se factors w i l l be noted: machine s ; the blockade and m i l itary encirclement, as a foreign riposte to the October Revolution ; the underdeveloped ch aracter of the country , which implied that industry ' s re serves h ad to be s ought i n uneducated rural m a s ses formed by centuries of feudal i s m . If the ensemble of such di sparate facts consti tuted a fi rst neces s ity , thi s w as because the practic al synthesi s of the project establ i shed connections of immanence between them . Through s uch connection s , moreover, new basic rel ationships were disc losed. These bas ic relati onships were in themselves of a mathem atical and 10gis ti � typ e, meaning that (taken i n i solation) they were the prov ince of anal ytic Reason . There were x w orkers and 2x jobs to be fi l led: thi s quantitative rel ation ship became a practical neces s ity for the peasan ts only i n a praxi s that had the aim not j us t of filling all the j obs , but ac tuall y of multiplying them . In the same w ay , the strictly negative rel ationship : ' there was no forei gn immi gration ' became a negation i n interiority ( i . e . concerned every Ru s sian peasant in the innermost depths of h i s individual person) preci s e l y in so far as praxi s decided to take men where they were . We thus arrive at the very o ri gin of the practico-i nert the interiorizing integration of rel ations of p ure exteriority and thi s origin reveal s to u s the fundamental contradiction of human h i story . 37 B ut we shall return to thi s . Let u s merely note that Trots ky ' s project implied a potential unification of peasants and workers , in the sen se that the latter were to be multiplied thanks to a selection made from among the former. At once, as we have seen , the new workers and through temporari ly took on the m the ensemble of the working-cl as s masses characteri stic s , a h exis, of peasants . B ut preci s e l y in so far as they did so,

3 7 . See Append i x , p .4 5 0 , ' I s H i story E s senti a l to M an ? ' .

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the peasants ' were workeri zed ' ( i f on l y i n thei r reactions of negati ve v iolence) , inasmuch as for eac h of them the pos s ibil ity of work ing in a factory could not be excl uded a priori . Thi s project of Trotsk y ' s i mplied simultaneously a kind of osmo s i s and a progre s s i ve careful blending of p opulation s . B ut the necessities, as internal relations of exteri ority , multiplied. I do not know whether Trotsky had fore seen the e xtraordinar y movement of urbani zation which quadrupled the non -agric ultural l abourers in less than thirty years . At all events , he could not h ave been unaware that the demographic tran sformation would be profound. Whether he h ad en­ vi saged th at the sovereign praxis would rai se the number of workers from ten to th irty or from ten to forty - fi ve mil lion , he had not been unaware that he woul d be able to reduce the number of rural producers only by rai sing their productivity . Among the new workers , furthermore , many were assigned t o heavy industry. Thi s meant that the buyi ng power of the working-c las s masses was reduced : the urban centre s could not exchange s low con s umpti on goods for foodstuffs , s ince the light industri al sec tor was deli berate ly maintained in a s tate of underdeve lopment. Thi s meant preci sely that the tow n s did not have the wherew ithal to buy the p easant crop s (or, at least, the fraction of those crop s that they ne eded). For th e Left m inori t y , there was onl y one solution: collecti v i zation . Here ag ain, it can be observed how the second l ayer of what w i ll l ater be the practico-inert i s cons tituted t hrough action . For i t was the proposal to i nv e st above all in heav y industry Ca proposal j usti fied by c ircumstances of another order : encirclement, etc . ) which abruptly i ntroduced a lacuna i . e . an i nert breach of continuity into the exchange flows between town and country side . To tell the truth , these flows had already grown scarce. The bl ack ma rket, the re storation of medi um property, etc . al l these factors , together w i th other, di sparate one s such as deterioration of help ed to bri ng the problem of s uppl y to the the m eans of tran spo rt fore , ri ght from the reg ime ' s very first year s . Yet i f (an abs urd and purely economic hypothes i s ) cons umer-good indu s trie s and transport had been developed, exchanges would have increased s wiftly . The regime would not h ave resi sted , but would have col lapsed under the i mpact of other forces ( such as the foreign arm ie s ) . The fundamental option in favour of heavy indu stry was expre s sed by the inert negation of ex­ c han ge s : there was something on one s ide and nothi ng on the other. Trotsky had seen on l y one solution to that twofol d con tradiction : to increase producti vi ty . F or the inert negati on w as going to be transformed i nto an exigency : the bre akdown of exchange� ri sked destroy ing the towns i. e . the vvho le r eg im e We see the contradi ction ari se that was to p it country people against to w n -dwellers . The former, scarce ly out of the held the fate of the latter in feudal era, sti l l i n spite of them selves -

-

.

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thei r hands . When we say ' in spite of them sel ves ' , we do not mean to give the im pre s s ion that despi te everything they were fav ourable to the new regime; but s i mply that they were i ndifferent to it, and that thei r acti v ities in them sel ves aimed ne ither to preserve nor to de stroy i t . The h i s torian Lefebvre has shown admirably how between 1 7 89 and 1 79 7 the French peasantry made its o w n Revolution , i ndependent of the urban or at least not under ­ Revolution and not perceived by the bourgeoi s stood : thi s was one of the reasons for Thermidor. It would have been the same after 1 9 1 7 i n the U S S R , if the sov ereign h ad not embraced the total ity of the country in its prax i s . Trotsky env i sa ged two main measure s . Not being able to prov id e consumer good s , i ndustry would s upply machinery to the country side i . e . it would speed up the mechanization of agriculture: right from the fi rst P l an , i t was n eces sary to envisage bui ldi ng tractors . But thi s mechani zation, accompanied by education of the rural population, could be accompl i shed only in and through col l ecti v­ ization: trac to rs , adm i rably suite d to the great Rus sian plain , lost all utility in a sy stem of small i ndiv idual ownership ; on the ot h er h and, the productiv ity of a few l arge collecti ve and mechanized enterpri ses would easily demon strate to the i ndiv idual i stic small proprietor the technical and ec onomic superiori ty of the kolkhoz over e xp loitation o f the land by small plots . Thi s operation would ha ve a fourfold advantage : it would brake the development of the kulak s , which was threaten ing the regime; i t would i ncrease production; it would make i t pos sible firmly to e stab­ lish State control , al ways more capabl e of superv i s ing l arge establi shments than the p lethora of indiv idual enterpri ses ; and it would al low the S tate to increase the share of the harvest which i t had to exact by decree. The se four practi cal adv antages were complemented by two further one s of a less direct kind, in the shape of mechanization and collecti v i zati on : the se contributed to bringing agricultural l abour closer to urban l abour, by making the peasant into a dri ver of machines ; and they smoothl y accompl i shed the un ification of the social i st s y stem of ownershi p . Within the project, you can see the moments at wh i ch soverei gn prax i s uti l i zed the practico-i nert in formation , and those at which it was con sti tuted as a human re lation between the sovereign and the citize n s . Th e increase in productiv ity due to mechan i zation was a quantitative re lation shi p , which coul d be establi shed by a comparison in exteriority: i n a g ive n regi on , the average production of the s mal l peasants was so much ; in th e same region , for the same crop, that of the large enterpri ses was so m uch . An d i . e. of a th i s l atter average tnerely laid bare the re sults of a mach ine physico-chemical sy stem whose i nert u n i ty de ri ved from h uman labour and the objecti ves purs ue d . B ut w e at once see that the machin e itsel f was quite i ncapable of multi pl y i n g the yi eld, an d th at it was the man oj" that machin e w h o could rai se ( or not) agri cul tur al productivity ( per ,

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hectare or per worker, according to the case ) , depending on whether he had understood the machine ' s use , appreciated i ts advantages and accep­ ted its constraints . Hence the mechanization of agric ultu re became simultaneously the inert ex igency of a system i n danger of not surv i v ing fam ine , and the synthetic enterpri se of educ ators seeking to conv ince men by establishing human re l ations with them . Trotsky ' s project was rej ected. It s radical i s m on the morrow of the NEP alarmed S tali n and the B ukharinist Right . B ut abov e all , it took no account of an essential factor : scarcity of time. Even had a start been m ade in 1 924 on developing the industri e s nece ssary for mechanization of agriculture, it would not h ave been po ssible to outstrip the peasant movement i tself: thi s was proceeding towards consolidation of small property and capitali s t concentration (of which the kul ak s were the first agents ) , and in 1 928 i t suddenl y confronted Stali n w ith the fa it accompli of the ' grain strike ' i . e . a mortal threat to the towns . Con s idering things from the standpoint that concerns u s , thi s movement though stric tly conditioned i n itself occ urred as the re sult of a real indeterminacy of re lations be tween the so vere i gn and the agricu ltural m as se s . It i s no part of our plan , i n fact, to stud y the proce s s whereby , in underdeveloped countrie s, the di s memberment of feudal property i s fo l ­ l owed by a concentration of holding s, which may lead to the c on stitution of a rural bourgeoisie. What i s certain i s that thi s pro ce s s can develop to the full only i f the peasant world remain s re latively autonomous withi n the nation : i . e . only if the S tate does not interve ne in a system of e xchanges , sales (by the poor peasant) an d purchases (b y the rich peasant) that culmi nate s in a capital ist restructuri ng of landed property or, of cours e , if it favo urs such a regrouping. The autonomy of the proce s s in the U S S R te stifi ed to the relative impotence of the sovereign . Once power had been seized, to be sure , the rural population as a whole belonged to the practical fi e ld. B ut the e x i stence of a unified practical field must never b e confused w ith total exploitation and total control of thi s field. Everyone to borrow the example from the constituent dialectic - can see how much indetermination or ignorance his own field envelops . S uch ill -known or unknown sectors , moreover, obv iously corre spond to an inadequate deve lopment of prax i s : to the absence of techniques and instruments t h at would allow zone s of i ndependence and darkness to be illuminated and conditioned . The formal unity of prax is i s not com­ promi sed, since when all i s said and done th is geography of the non­ determ i ned pu rely and simpl y reflects back to it its powers , its knowledge and its organization : in short , its present level of development. W hat may be in danger, however, i s the con cre te success of the action . The ' grain strike ' of 1 9 2 8 was an i nc arnation of the main features of prax is up to that date . I n the fi rs t place , the and instruments

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Bolshevi k desire to make the Revol ution through the worki ng class and in th e urba n centres ( i . e . a dec i s ion in sharp contrast with th e one Mao Tse - tung was to take a few y e ars later, although that co ntrast itself should be i nterpreted in terms of the deep di fferences separating the two countries : i n particular, the Rus sian revolutionary movement was in sep­ arable from the rapid development of i ndustry between 1 900 and 1 9 1 4 ) . In the second place as a con sequence of that practical determination an imperfect knowledge of the peasant c lass and inability to predict its rea c t ions after di stribution of th e l and. In the third place, the inert break we have signalled i n the movement of exchanges , whose orig in lay i n the need to i ndu stri al i ze as fast as pos s i bl e . I n the fourth p lace , the inadequacy of the ac ti v i s t cadre , in re lati on to the v astne ss of the country and the number of peasants (which m erely i ncarnated, in anothe r form , the di sproportion between the rev o lutionary c las s i . e. the working-class masses and the gu ided c l ass , which then represented almost the entire pop ulation). Fi nally , the s lowness and i nadequac y of transport a sector alw a ys sacrificed by Sov iet pl anners hence the scarc ity and difficult y of commun ications. B as icall y , we encounter here in the form of lac ks i . e . inert ne gations the very l imits prax is gave itse lf, at the moment when it determined itse l f pos itively in re l ation to its mean s and its objective s. Moreove r, we know that these li mits themselves ori gin ated in the material circumstances that praxi s tran scended, negat ed an d pre ­ served with i n itself as its spec i fication . On thi s bas i s , we see a practic o - i nert zone of separation produce and con sol idate itself, as a negation of al l prax i s at the heart of the practical fi e l d . The capital ist regrouping of l and holdings was, in fact, a seria l proce s s : i t marked the impotent i solati on of the poor peasants. It was this i solation that produced ku l ak s when c i rcum s tances fav oured the m ; and eve ry concentration was the starti ng-point for fre sh concentrati on s , i n so far as the enrichment of the ric h gradual ly determ ined the impoveri shment as a mediati on of men by the of the poor. B ut thi s seri al mov ement lan d manifested itse lf on ly as an automati sm escaping hu m an control . An d this negati ve determinati on constituted it im manentl y , originating as it did from the fact that the movemen t occ urred w ith i n a p ractical fi eld subj ugated in its totality to th e sovereign ' s control . In other word s , th i s grasped in the prac tical fi e l d as a neg ation of the new rec urrence sov e rei g n · was for the sov ere ign, prec i s ely by v i rtue of thi s , hi s own inn e r negation . B ut thi s negatio n could take place onl y w i thin the u nity of p rax i s and the practica l fi e l d , as a non -rec iprocal recondi tioning of prax i s b y the conten t of its fi e l d . At the s ame time� moreo ve r and becau se every pra x i s i s a pract ical seiz ure of i t s objec ts th e negat ion man i fested itself as a �pe c i fic at i on ag ainst the bac kgroun d of the total fiel d ; and the total fie l d de s i gnated i t as an object po s iting itsel f fo r itself, •

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and hav ing to be di s solved into the total i ty . Or, if you l ike , the entire field man i fe sted itself as the i nert exigency that thi s foreign concretion should be di s solved. Th is retotali zation by the exigenc y lnanife sted itse l f, for exampl e, as a problem of supply ing the town s and, via th at problem , as an immedi ate call ing i nto question of the construction of soc ial ism through i ndu strial i zation. You can see t he order of condition­ i ng s and their circularity. ( 1 ) It M'as the so vere ign praxis that conditioned the appearance oj" th e practic o - inert as a coun ter-finality. For in the event of a bourgeois rev ol ution , the deve lopment of heavy industry wo uld have had neither the same e x tent nor the same urgency nor the same unity of man agement. M arket mechan i sm s ( and foreign invest­ ments) would have intervened to regulate exchanges. A l ight industry would undoubtedly h av e been consti tute d, to respond to the deman d of the agri c ul tural l abourers . A certai n harmonization would have taken place between i n dustrial capital i sm and the concentration of landed property . The peasants woul d h ave sold their h arvest to the town , since i n a bourgeoi s soc iety sel ling would have been the ir spec ific intere st. At the same time, the intensi fication of exchange s would have intensi fied the concentration of holdings and the expropriation of the poor. (2) It was the practico- in ert which put pra x i s i n danger of shatterin g , by the negative infl uence it exerted upon its principal means (the labour-power of the workers ) . For t h e rec urrent movement of concentration developed simultaneously as a re sult of the di stribution of l and , and as the conse­ quence of a de fi c iency on the part of the authoritie s . The latter reflected two pre - e x i sting feature s of that un derdeveloped country at once : the poverty of transport, and the numeric al di sproporti on between the urban and rural populat i on s . Moreover, prec i sely in so far as the sovereign sought to suppre ss that pov erty by increas ing i n du s tri al production , and to dimi n i sh that di sproporti on by pushing ahead w i th urbanization , i t i ncreased its own de fi c iency s i nce i t had to mobilize its po sitive forces for the enterprise of i ndus tri al ization. B ut this defi c iency inasmuc h as i t was l ived and suffered; was transformed i n to a problem; engendered a new awarene s s � and was to be re -exteriorized as solutions (good or bad , i t matters l ittle) in its practico - inert consequen ce became the in ner vice of t he action and its in trinsic ris k of fai l i ng radi cally . I t w as thus integrated into unity , as the fl e e ting disunity that pl aced unity i n danger. What i s more , i nasmuch as sovere i gn prax i s encountered the threats of famine as o n e concrete and unive rsal ri s k i n al l the towns , coun ter­ fi n a l i ty robbed the action of i t s u n i t y and was inte grated i n t o i t as the u n i ty of i t s negat i on . The m e re fac t that th e seri al e v e n t was then called a g r a i n s trike ' - w h ich i mp l ied an agreemen t , organ i ze d group s , a clas s shows the e x te n t to which the l eaders had a con sc iousne s s , e tc . synthetic re velation of t h e d a n g e r - and through i t of i t s determining '

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conditions inasmuch as it appeared to th em through the re frac ti v e an d teleolog i c al medium of the ir own action. B ut, in fac t, th ere was n o grai n strik e. There was a comp lex process (a regrouping of land hol d i ng s , the eme rgen c e of a new soc i a l order in the c ountry side a ne w dependence of th e poor vis - a - v is the rich on the bas i s i . e . o f the pas sag e from of a tran sformation of the property sy stem feudalism to the bourgeoisie and through thi s contradiction a m istrust of the re g i me s t ax col lectors : i t was not onl y , or mainl y, the old traditi ons of the a n c ien reg im e that e xp re sse d themselves th rough this m i strust, which primarily reflec te d the incompatibi lity of the order bei n g built in the coun t ry s i d e i . e . the c oncentrat i on of holdings as a collective with the order bei n g b u i l t in the tow ns , i . e . socialism) whi ch was basically noth i ng but the dec ay of a s o vereig n ac ti v i ty le ft neglected for want of the means to pursue it. Howe v er i t was not wro n g to spe ak of a ' stri ke ' . Th at w as not w r o n g from the s t a n dp o i n t of the sovere i gn and the towns, and i n so far as the urban ensembles saw s u p p l y from the as a neces sary m eans n o t just to s t a n dpoin t of social i st construction liv e , bu t to win the hattles they }1-'ere waging . It w as not wro ng for the so le rea son that, in the m i l ieu of ac tion, every t hing i s al w ay s action (p o s iti ve or negat i v e ) , and the more urge nt praxi s is, the mo re the re s i stance of the in ert ina s much a s it nece ssari l y manife sts itself through men appears as sabo tage. T hus it was that when the eng ineers c ame to explain to R akosi . after a few months ' work, that the su bs o i I of B u dapest was n ot suitable for the construction of a metro , he had them ' thrown into pri son : through them , it was the subsoi l he was i mpri soni ng. Vol untari st optimism i s necessari l y Terror: it has to underestim ate the adversity -coefficie nt of thing s . Hence. i n the name of its confi dence in man ' s po we r, it i gnores the re s i stance of inertia , counter- final ity , or the s lown e ss o f osmo si s and i mp reg nat i on (inasmuc h as the y incre a se the scarcity of t i me ) : i t know s on l y treason . In th i s sense to o i . e. in its inner temporal ization action i s M anichaean , as M a l r aux said. In the truth of the s ove re ign action, which was of a prac t i c a l te xture , the c omp lex process that turned the peasant c l ass up side down was th us a lready a unitary prax i s of counter-revol utionary groups , from the moment its con sequences endangere d soc i ali sm . From thi s v iew point, such a stance was the begi n n i n g of a pract ical re u n ifi ca tion of the peasantry thro ugh c oe r c i o n A certain dimen s i on of black h umour may be detected in th i s last observ ation. B ut the humour w as w ith i n p raxi s itself. Le t us recall th at the g ro up- i n - fu s i on i s b or n when th e c o l l ecti ve inte riori zes an external threat of e xt erm i n at i on as a r adical l y n eg a t i v e to ta I i zation . Pra x i s had to e xplode or d i ssolve w i th i n i ts e l f the practico - inert i t had p ro d uced : in a fi rst moment it gave i t the n e g at i ve un it y of a g roup, and was to s e e k itse lf to prod uce an o th e r u n i ty i n t h e rural c l asse s . ,

'

,

.

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Collecti v i zation , as we have seen, al lowed control to be increased . I t was to be the starting-point for a sov erei gn operation that rai sed the share of agrarian produce requisitioned by the S tate from 1 7 per cent to 3 5 per cent, w h i le it also had the immedi ate pol i tical aim of suppre� sing the kulaks and tran sform ing the capital i st concentrati on already under way i n to a s oc i al i st concentration . B ut the scarc i ty of time i . e. the urgency of the danger in 1 928 w as grasped in practice as an obl igation to collecti v i ze u nder compulsion : i . e. without mec han i zation and w i th o u t preliminary education. The re sult of the se acts of coerc ion i s we l l known - two type s of u nification . On the one hand, tran sformation of t he rural masses into communities grouped on large farm s and strictly control led ( first by the ' forces of order ' , then by the establ ishment of the MTS 3 8 ) ; on the other hand, beneath that sup erfi c i a l integration into the system , the emergence of peasant units ( usual ly strictly l ocal ) of re s i stance , sometime s co-ordin ated by authentic counter-revol utionaries. In a word, the sov erei g n ' s brutal i ntervention transfo rmed the practico-i nert i . e. the re s i s tance of th i ng s , and of men as medi ated by things into human g ro ups th at u n i ted against its prax i s . The sc arc ity of time, combi ned with the scarc ity of re sources, tran sformed the contradiction i nto a contl ict . B ut thi s very conflict, as a contradiction adopted by the protagon ists, although even more dangerous for the glo bal praxi s neverthe l e s s repre ­ sented a hi gher d e g re e of i n te g ra t i o n In the first pl ace, i t contributed to reducing the heterogeneity of the worki ng-class masses. They supporte d the sovere i gn w i th a common enth u s i asm , inasmuch as a common danger th reatened them . U rban i zation w a s c a rried on through the infl ux of l abour from rural areas , yet u n i ty was ach ieved in the towns against th e country side . ( I t matters l i ttl e th at people u sed to repeat piou sly at the time that the reg ime ' s only enem i es were the k u l ak s : e v ery o ne k ne w that a ny peasant was a potential kulak ; and they knew too that any enem y of the regime, i f he was a peasan t , would be treated as a k u l ak . ) In th e second p l ac e , the rural col lecti v e w as broken . The s it uation , every where identi cal , prov oked i d e n t i c a l reacti o n s in th e n e " ' groups: in that identit y , however, the c ondit ion s for an organi zed re s i stance were partial ly gi ven . The res u l t s are wel l known. The pea sants de stroyed crop s and stock with the ir own han d s , and in the years 1 9 3 2 3 fam ine raged . If the regime d i d not founder in th i s venture , i t was fi rst and forenz osl bec ause the un ity of w or k e r s and peasants ( w h i c h had al l owed th e October Revol u­ tion ) had become impos s ibl e . I n 1 9 1 7 , the i ntere sts of the se two classes had coin c i ded . I n 1 9 3 0 , they w e re opposed . The worke r� . ge neral l y i n agreement w i th soc i a l i z at i o n of the mean s of produc t i o n , d i d not ag r ee .,

.

3R

M ac h i ne a n d

Trac tor S t at i on s , e � t a b l i s hc d i n 1 9 2 9 and abo l i s hed i n 1 9 S 9

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w ith a peasant resistance that w as defi ned for them as a rejection of soc ial i s m . That disagreement, m oreover, w as signalled i n practice by the fact that the workers ' interest required massive and immedi ate requi sitions . I f the y were to carry out surplus labour on behalf of the national community , the rural labourers would have to agree to feed them by surplus labour. The sov ere i gn ' s vol untari st and coercive poli c y th us i nc arnated their own ex igencies they recognized it as emanating from them . The other reason the regime was sav ed was the impos s ibi lity for the peasants to pursue their practical unification through an organization bran c hing out al l across the coun try w ith common objecti ves and s logan s . A s a re sult, the di spersion of groups (replacing that of i ndiv idual s) retotal ized , as a negati ve condition of the peasant defeat , an en semble of givens already total ized but ot herw ise by the sovereign prax i s . The v astness of the co untry , the di versity of its l anguages and nationalities , and the lack of communicati ons ( shortage of transport) , affected the rebe ls as m uch as the sovereign. More even, since the latter had acces s to certain mean s (telecommunications , etc . ) that were not available to the former. The fact that the Revolution w as above al l urban (a fact that then seemed natural , but today s i ngularizes the R ussian Rev olution China ' s Revolu­ tion was rural) marked the l im its of Russia ' s underdevelopment. B efore 1 9 1 4 , an i ndu stry had exi sted and had been developing rapid l y , creating sizeable worki ng-class concentration s and thu s determ ining an immen se difference between the tech nologi cal , cultural , political , etc . level of the tow n speop le, and that of the peas ants . The l atter refused to go back to the anci en regime they hated (so that the Tsari st counter-revolutionaries, although they had an ideology and sometime s a certain experience at their disposal, could not really attempt to organize them ) , but they did not have the tools that would have allowed them to counter soci al ism with an action programme based on bourgeoi s liberal i sm . So the main aspects of what has mi sleadingly been called t he ' peasant w ar ' sporadic and ' suicidal ' acts of destruction , then pas s ive res istance - accurately expres sed the ' tow n countryside ' relation ship through revolu­ tionary prax i s . The peasants d i d what they could against the reg ime. They had to lose, because they cou ld do no more : i .e . preci sely in so far as the reason for their defeat (impos sibility of uniting in a broad organ ization or of becoming clearly aware of a common obj ecti v e , l ack of educati on, i l l iteracy , technical shortcomings and lack of weapons) was quite simply the underdevelopment that had conditioned and produced the October Revolution, and that the revolutionar y sovereign transcended and preserved i n i tself i n so far as its main aim was to s uppre s s it. The leade rs , with the inadequate m ean s av ai l able to an unde rdeve loped country , struggled to break the re si stance of men who were the v ery incarn ation of that underdev elopm ent. When the y tried to s uppre s s Russian

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p ov erty , they s aw ri sing up again s t them the men produced by that poverty :

through these men , poverty and past oppre s s i on bec ame human to fight against them. C onversel y , it was the scarc ity of time that was incarnated i n the atro c ious brutal ity with which they repres sed e v ery attempt at rebe l 1 i on , inasmuch as thi s s c a rc ity itself depended on two fac tors : the tw i n emergencies of the external threat and the i nternal d anger. B ut both the se emergencies were conditioned by underdevelopment: i t was nece ssary t o industrial ize fast , because the gap between the U S S R and the capitali s t powe rs was too g re a t ; there was n o time to dev elop consumer-good i ndustri e s � it w as nec e s sary to col l ectivize by force, bec ause tractors were lacking; there �vas no time to educate the peasants . Conversel y , that brutality was to unify the sovere ign act i on ' s sty le . The B ureaucracy assumed its dictatorship on behalf of the prol etariat, an d could m aintain i t onl y by l atent oppre ssion of the w orking c las s and open oppression of the peasant c lass . * It was thro ugh the stru g gle ag ainst the peasants that the dictatorship was to be radical i zed , everywhere and i n al l sectors , as Terror. It w as on the bas i s of that Terror -- which nece s s itated a consoli dated power . that the i mprov i sed h ierarchy was gradually to become o s si fied . On thi s bas i s , fi nal l y , Terror (we hav e seen by what 9 3 mechan i sm in a previous chapter ) as a sovereign p raxis was interiori zed and became a wheel i ng exterminat i on inside the sovereign org an s . The i nternal Terror, as a praxi s of radical and i f need be v iolent integration , reproduced the mov e ment of the ex ternal Terror, as a radi cal unification i f need be by viol ence - of practi co-inert diversities. And that interiori za ­ tion wa s here ag ain c omprehensible. The sovereign could make i t self int o the strict and inflex ible u nity of its practical field only if it was in itself pure unifying power: i . e . synthetic p raxi s vvithout any passivity . A s , i n fact , p assiv ity was al ways pre sent .... as a m u l tipl ic i ty of common ind i ­ v i dual s the soverei gn w as always invol ved i n reducing the inertia th at gnawed at it. It reduce d itself both in order to unify the practical field, an d bec ause the diversity of t he prac tical field actuali zed the sovereign m ultiplic ity prec isely i n so far as prax i s realized the uni fication of the field. I t was in order to appl y draconian measures that the leaders had to ' act as one ' ; b ut it w as on the occasion of the conception and application of the se measure s that they rediscovered th emselves (or could redi scover themsel v e s , th at was eno ugh ) as several . U n i fication of the practical field by pure sovereign power of sy nthes i s , and reun i fication of prax i s diversified by the very object it had disso l v ed in the to ta li zation in progress , �

*

&

..

Th e reverse i s a l so tru e , of co urse

3 9 . Critiqu e , v o1 . 1 , pp . 5 9 1 ff

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constituted dialectical moments of the temporal ization. To thi s extent, it can be said that th e con fl ict was a progre s s towards un ity : it substituted a c lass struggle for an inert impo s sibil ity of ex­ changes. Moreover, the c lasses in question did not rea lly stru ggle agai nst one another: the working c l ass was in ful l growth , wi thout any stability, s u ffu sed b y series and by serie s of series; the peasant c l ass was charac teri zed by its own di spersion. In real ity, the con fl ic t appeared through the mediation of the sovereign . It was the l atter that gave the i nert rel ation ship its aspect of a syntheti c nece s s i ty , by making s upp ly of . the towns by the countryside i nto an emergency ( i . e . by transformi ng on the bas i s of its own objecti ves the constant diffic ulties of exchange into a v i tal question) . The sovere ign a medi ator between the c lasses established a reciproc ity as fi rst moment of the confl ict, w here there h ad been on l y a break . In order to av oid the peasant class making itse l f into the desti ny of the working c l as s , i t was to use its coercive apparatus in the l atter ' s name in order to m ake it into the dest i n y of the former. B ut the con fl i ct h o wever bloody it may have been was not liquidatory i n its actual aim. It was a question of contro l l i ng and increasing agri cul tural product i on and of perm itting State organ s to lev y the maximum percentage s , but on no account of s uppres sing the peasant c lass i n the way the bo urgeoisie was s uppres sed as a c l ass . In fact , i ndustry made it pos sible to begi n the motorization and mechani zation of agriculture; s o gradual l y working-class production, inasmuch as it was uti l i zab le by the peasants , was to j u stify the ' leadersh ip ' of the urban workers . In so far as that mechani zation which i s far from hav i ng reached comp letion is s til l be ing carried on today , we can see i ts goal and its limits . Beneath the unity of coerc i on , it seeks to introduce a dra vv i n g together of men not by a l l owing them to di scus s thei r re specti ve points of v iew , but by produc i ng them in such a way that the peas ant, as a special i st in agric ultural mac hinery , differs l e s s an d les s from the worker, as a spec ial i st in urban machinery . So it i s neces sary to be ar in mind the to tali z ing but singular c haracter of sovereign praxis i n the field. Even as it brought the field ' s antagon i sm s to fruiti on (in order to transform i nto confl i c t the prac tico- inert th at w as in d anger o f rending i t apart; and in order to m ake itself, simultan eous l y , into the two adver­ saries , the synthet i c unity of each of them , and the coerciv e force that in itself determ ined the orien tation and outcom e of the strugg l e ) , i t intro­ duced despi te ev eryth ing i nto the peasa nt clas s , redefi ned by the oppre s­ s i on exerted upon i t , no t j ust a Mar xi st c ul ture whic h , if redu ced to i tsel f alon e , wou ld not even h ave been as s im i l ated m but, by slow i mp regn atio n , the mea n s of prod u c tion that were to prod uce both increase d p rodu c tiv ity and the man of th at incre ase, the man of the kolk hoz, prop el led b y his own tool s into the prod ucti v i ty battl e and de fi ned , l ike the

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worker, by the struggle he was engaged i n . The coerc ive apparatus woul d be able to slacken its g rip , if not i n the l i fetime of that generation, at least when the new one h ad taken over from it for those young kolkhoz inmates had known co llecti vi zation from chi ldhood, they had seen the appeara nce of m achi nes and the generalizati on of the i r use. So there woul d be homogeneity of the c las ses , a permanent pos sibility of i nterpenetration , and ultimately w ith the industri al i zation of agricu lture the differenc e between town and country side would tend i n practice tow ards zero. Naturally , the se implications of that praxis are admi ssible only prov ided that certain prec i se re serv ations are formulated. I n the first place, the i ndustrial i zati on of agric ulture c an not be con s i dered as a specific re sult of p lanne d growth. In the countries of advan c e d capit alism, i t i s some­ time s c arried out at a far faster tempo . To be s ure, productivity alw ay s increase s more slowly i n the primary sector. I t nevertheless rem ai n s the case that i n the U S A 6 ,900,000 farmers today feed 1 65 , 000,000 people , whereas in the U S SR 50, 000,000 rural labourers are necessary today to feed 2 1 5 ,000 ,000 i nhabitants . I n fact, the i mprovement of productiv ity i n the Sov iet primary sector i s far from corre sponding to the ve ry real i n crease i n the n umber of agri c ultural machine s . I n 1 9 5 8 as i n 1 9 2 8 the problem of agri c ultural productivit y albeit w ith far less urgency remains i n the forefront of the government ' s c on cern s . B ut these re serv ation s are expl icable i n s o far as they al low the sovereign prax i s to be i nterpreted i n its exteriority : i . e . make it pos sible to determi ne the qual i fications that it rece ived fro m the counter- final itie s engendered by its practical field or, if yo u like , from its refl ection upon itself through the inert m ateriality i t had synthes i zed . Coerc ion , at the same time as it prevented i n adv ance any pos iti v e action on the part of the oppre s sed, or perhaps even any intention of grouping i n order to act, maintained those upon which i t was exerci sed i n a state of permanent resi stanc e . S ince thi s res i s tanc e , moreover, was i n s eparable from impotence ( since con straint, under the seeming unity of the production group, maintained serial ity ) , i t was characteri zed as pas sive re sistance . Nothing was don e against the regime something was simply not don e , certain instructions were not carried out. The appearance of trac tors di d not regroup farmers , whose rel ation to the machines which had come from the tow n and required additional work and a retraining of workers was ambiguous. They were mistru sted and also ren ted out as they were by the State Tractor S tatio n seen as a new mean s of control and press ure . Yet i t could not be denied that they i n c re ased productiv ity. For s uch an i ncrease to condition a rai sing o f prod uction level s , however, th e rural popul ation i . e . would would indeed have had to we Jcome them w ith enthusiasm have had to have accepted entire ly the soc ialist sy stem and State req u i s i­ tions. So the two orientat ions of the sovere ign prax is (forced col lectiv iza-

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tion and grad ual prov i s ion of the means to w i n acceptance for col lectiv iza ­ tion) tended through its re sults to confl ic t with one another. The new generation on the kol khoze s , however, no l ong er cal l s into question mechani zation or col l ective ownership o f the land : the sy stem itself has ceased to be an i ssue. Yet although it has been produced by m otorization , Marx i st education , e tc . , it sti l l bears the m ark left upon i t by the impotent rage s and misfortunes of the previous generation. At th e de sp ite the m easures taken by Khrushchev , and in pre sent stage it partic ul ar the di sso lution of the MTS (hence , decentralization ) demonstrates , i f not a nati ona l l y based separati s m , at least a kind of particulari sm. Only recentl y , Pra vda was repeati ng some strange state ­ ments made by ko lkhoz chairmen , aimed at nothing l e s s than securing the autonomy of kolkhoz sov iet s , from top to bottom . We m ight say that these statements i f, as their publication i n Pra vda suggests, they reflec t a general te nde ncy denote a kind of cla ss consciousness among the peasants. These men . technic i an s , educated i n M arx i sm, ma ny of whom as the leaders fores aw in 1 9 3 0 are ' S oviet have studied in the towns me n ' : tirele s s workers, courageous, vol untari s t and conv inced of th e need to increase foo d production . A t the sam e time, howeve r, they have inte riori zed the Terror the ir fam i l ies suffered, i n the very di stance they maintain with re spect to their fe l lows i n the towns . Uneduc ated, their fathers rejected compul sory e x tra labour a nd the new sy ste m of owner ­ ship . Educated, the sons w i l l agree to i ncrease producti on; they w i l l defend collectiv ization itse lf; and the y w i l l support the Soviet sy stem. B ut in them you can discern the consciousne s s , as a singul ari zation of Sov iet pride , of hav ing reached maturity and of rej ecting within the soc ial i st system and the better to defend it the tute l age of the workers. Thi s atti tude o n the part of the kolkhoz workers which m u st engender new change s i n the sov ereign prax i s i s thus an obj ectification unl ike that which occurs of S tal inist prax i s . B ut th i s obj ecti fi c ation when, for exampl e , the i solated worker or re stricted group see o u ts ide is exteriority robbing them of the ir work or its objective results rea l i zed as i n s i de exteriority . That mean s that th is hexis of the peasants wh ich can itse l f become action incarnate s an d encapsulate s w ith in itse lf th i rty years o f th e sovereign prax i s , and at the same time pronounces sen te nce u pon it. In short , the conc l u s ion i s a retroac tive totali zati on. So the amb i v al ence o f the rural popul ation ' s atti tude pre sent s itself as the privileged sig n ({lcQ tio n of the sovereign ' s contradiction s ( i nasm uch as the se were e xpre s sed i n i ts former action ) . We s a y privileged and not definitive, s i n c e nothi ng al l o w s one to predi ct that t h e devel opment of indu s triali zation in the tow ns and i n t h e country side will not e v entual l y re a l i z e t he u n i t y of S ov i e t men . I n that case , and from the standpoint of that ne w re s ul t , the prax i s of th e leaders between ] 928 and 1 95 0 would

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receiv e new q u al i fi c ation s . B ut thi s further devel opment form s part of w h at, follow in g so many others , we have c al led diachro nic total i z atio n . It i s throug h ne w circum stanc e s , u nfore seeable problems and an ori g i nal prax i s that such q ual i fi c ations w i l l c ome to the former prax i s and it w i l l receive them pas s i ve l y , s i nce it w i l l not h av e produced them . The pri v i l ege d s ignifi cat i on i s the inner c onc l u s i on of the prax i s , i nasmuch as i t i s the prov isi onal l i m i t of the practical telnporali zation , and refers s o le ly to the re l ations of i mmanence (po s i tive or negative) that h ave real l y been e stabl i shed i n the prac t i cal fi e l d .. an d in the sovere i gn ' s i nteriority in the course of prax i s itself. In that sense, the present h exis of the peasan t c las s tota l i ze s retrospec t i v e l y both the pos i t i v e succes ses and the negativ e l i m i ts of the Stal i n i s t Terror, in so far as it s i gnal s the amb i guity of S o v i et soci ety as a whole at the same time as the po s s i bi l ity , under certain c onditi ons, of accomp l i shing ne w adv ance s . Withi n gro ups formed b y c onstrai nt, the effort of coerc i v e unificatio n has a l l o w ed large farm � tha t could use tractors to be set up and maintaine d; and under pre s sure from the S tate apparatus , these g ro ups have acq u i red the i r practical u n i ty through the p rogre s s of industri al i zation, whi ch has al l owed m otori ze d app l i ances to be produced . B ut thi s oppre s sion even if i t has negati vel y allowed fam i ne and the col l apse of the syste m to be av oided has , th anks to th e resi s tanc e engendered by i t , rendered i tself incapable of ach iev i n g total integration of the peasant c l a s s i nto the ' cl a s s l e s s society ' , and thereby of basing the increased level of agric u l tural production upon i ncreased prod ucti v i ty . And what determines the i nner, pri v i l eged s i gnifica­ tion here i s , o f course , the double changeover (change of gene ration s , change of leaders ) . I t nev ertheles s rem ains the case that the c l as s confl ict - i nasmuch as i t sought, and m ade i t po ssible ( de spite al l parti c ul ari sms) , to transform Russian peasan t s i nto Sov iet men · m u s t be inte l l i gible eve n i n its o utcome , as a means of un i fi cat ion determined by the sovereign prax i s and in return q ua l i fy i ng it by i ts counter- fi n al i tie s . Its shadow y face the half- fai lure retro spe c t i v e l y retotal i ze s the i nner exteri ority o f ac ti oI4 inasmuch as that half- fai l ure has p roduced both a si tuat ion an d men who tran scend i t by l i v ing i t . The i m m anent negations contai ned b y the pri v i leged � i g n ification g i v e w ay retro spec t i v e l y to the syn thes i s of paras i tic counter- fi nal i ti e s , born i n and throu gh the sovere i gn unity : i n short, the p ro c e ss is to ta li:ed. The po s i tive struc ture s al l o w the obj ecti v e mean i ng of th e undertak ing th at h as been condensed th ere and to day i .e . i t s own mov eme nt, p a �\ t and i n th e past, of total i z ati on to be redi scovere d . And � of co urse , the se two d i rections of the retros pec tive study a re who l l y i n separabl e � as the y are a l s o i n the action o f the young k o l khoz w orkers , who retot al i ze them by trans cend ing them . Th u s , w i th i n a s o v erei gn prax i s , the tran sformation of the prac tico­ i ne rt i n to a m ed i ated c l a s � strugg l e rep re sented a dial ectical pro g re ss _.

I S S T R U G G L E I N T E L L I G I B L E ')

181

toward s i nteg rati on . The soverei g n sought to l i q u idate the practico-inert concretions that it had i tself produced while secreting i ts counter­ a mediation of the i nert between fi nal i ti e s . B ut as the practico- i nert expres sed its pass ive re s i s tance through the men medi ated , the men Terror was the sovereign ' s effort to l iqui date the inert concre ti on by act i ng on the men it produced (and ultimate ly by actual l iq uidation of tho se indi v i dual s ) . The sovere i g n ' s v i c tory , albei t Pyrrh i c , ill uminates for the balance of force s was in i ts the true mean i ng of the s truggle favour from the outset . B y th i s , however, we obv iously do not mean the mere numeric al re lation, for the l atter would have operated against the working-class masses and lead i ng bodies . The notion in question ac tually expresses a complex, dialectical relati on i n each of the protagoni sts between dynamic density (or men as medi ated by the me ans' of com munica­ tion ) , the po s sibi l i ti e s for organization and reorgan i zation , emergenc i e s , the enthusiasm that such emergenc ies condi tioned i n everyone singly and collective l y , and the concrete mean s of mob i l izing all force s by a programme of demands and action in which the graded obj ectives of prax i s found the ir unity in the most d i s tant obj ecti v e . If the sovereign won, it was bec ause the se conditions were real i zed for i t but not for the oppres sed . Indeed, despi te the grav e dangers of 1 93 1 2 , the u n i ty of the practical field was never compromi sed by the confl icts in progre s s . For the peasant mas se s , there was nothing to choose between l acking the material means to unite and not hav i ng the theoreti c al tool s that would have permi tted them to become consc ious and form ulate a programme . The technical and c u ltural underdevelopment of the rural m asses w as by the i mposs ibil ity of in the ir practical den1ands expre ssed constructing their unity around a programme . Li teral l y , the peasants did not want collecti v i zation (espec ially i n the brutal form that the sovereign gave it), but they were not consc ious of what they did want bec ause they could not want an ything. The tru e kulak s , obv iously , struggled to keep the ir property . B u t the poor peasant could defend neither land th at he d id not posse s s , nor the pri nciple of bourgeois property (which he d i d not know ) , nor especially that con tinuous sl ippage which stripped him of h i s wretched patch of land and added it to the rich man ' s estate . Peasant re s i s tance was defeated because i t was }vithout principles . B ut i t was w i thout pri nc iples because , i n spite of tradition s , local i ntere sts , con ­ straints and mi stru s t , the rural population could nowhere fi nd an y funda­ ment al reason s to be i n oppo s i tion . Peasant re si stance was tra nscended from the outset b y the sovere i gn prax i s , becau se the former was o u tm oded and the l atter progressive. I do not give these w ord s an absol ute s i gn ifi ca­ tion. I cal l ' progre s sive ' ac ti vities which, within a total i z i ng p rax i s and for a gi ven soc i al field, allow the proj ec ted total i zati on to be advanced , or at al l e v en t s real i zed . I c al l ' o utmoded ' those w h i c h , w i thout real l y bei n g •

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able to produce the di sintegration of the g lobal prax i s , expre s s i n practice the i mpediments of a practico- inert whose origi n is to be sought (in part, at least) in the material c ircumstances that gave ri se to the prax i s itself. To the extent (always incomplete , except when i t i s a matter of abstract examples) to which the total izing e nsemble prax i s , practico- inert an d prac tic al field can be considered as an is olated sy stem, the fate of thi s resi stance , however fierce it may be , i s decided in advance . It has a chance of w in ning p rov isionally, at that only if i t benefits at the right moment from outside assi stance . In thi s sense although i t has been invented by everyone , l ived, and real ized by free (and sometimes heroic) undertakings - it i s contain ed in the sy stem of brakings and accelerations that prax is itself engenders, be it only to reabsorb the m , on the basis of the material c ircumstances that have g iven ri se to i t and the obj ecti ves it has set itself. From this standpoint, pr axis doe s indeed appe ar l ike an enormous ' feedback ' machine , whose u n i ty i s the determ ination of c irc ulari ty ( i . e . the transformation of the cycle of repetitions i nto spiral s ) . Nevertheless, thi s aspect of action i s prec i s ely its i n side exteriority . When the sov ereign organized its con straints and began collectiv i zation, it simultaneously knew and did not know i ts opponents ' destiny. In so far as it was aware of the ou tmoded aspect of their resi stance , it foresaw their fi nal defeat. B ut i n so far as the sovereign did not know an ensemble of factors , some of which were internal to its action and e ngendered by it, others of which (provoked by that prax is or not) were external dangers i n so far, too , as the very n ature of the practic al prevented the sovereign from knowin g the signification and efficac y of its v ictory itself, as an object real izin g the totali zed objectification of the act and creating in th at very way , and for others , an unforeseeable afterl'vards the sovereign was deciding i n the dark . Its project, beneath the abstract and mendacious obj ectivity of economic c alculation, recovered the hazardous aspect that characterizes every h uman undertaking : it i s neces sary to take ri sks an d to i nvent. B ut not to gamble , as people say , since gambl ing pre supposes alternatives al l of whose term s are defi ned. Here , the final re sult, even if it was abstractly fore seen (victory ) , was in practice unforeseeabl e : hence , undetermi ned for those men i n asmuch as they posses sed those in tellectual tools . The best tran scending their own too l s , but wi thout i nventing others , merely d i scovering their l imits we re to be able to sense the outcome n egatively. We thu s di scover the human feature s of prax i s , as a l i ved aspect of prax i s -process and as the motor of the process itself. I t goe s w ithout saying, more over? that this ignorance i . e . the prec i se margin of indetermination of the future w as itself an acceptance by the agent of the materi al circum stance s : of those very c ircum stances that defined and l i m i te d hi s adv ersary ' s resi stance . For the s i tu ated h i sto rian , it i s th u s not an obscurity (as for the agent) but a tran s l uc id intelligibil i ty .

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Conclusion We have just shown that i n a soc iety whose sovereign i s a dictator, far from break i ng the practico-inert rifts, con fl icts and disharmon ies unity of prax i s -process a re at once the consequences of that unification and the mean s it chooses i n order to tighten up sti l l further. Thus the h i stori an must be able to comprehend dialectical l y i n the very un ity of a soverei gn prax i s w ith the proce ss that constantly overfl o w s i t and that i t con stantly reintegrates i nto i tself the v as t h i stor ical upheaval which, between 1 9 1 7 and 1 9 5 8 , has produced Soviet soc i ety as we see it. These conc lu sion s are no t in thems e l v e s either op timi stic o r pessimi stic. We do not claim that the stru ggle was not atroc iou s , or that ( i nn ume rable) i ndiv idual d i saste rs do not i rrem ediably damn certai n practices (we shall 0 return to the i ndiv idual fai l ure a t the heart of a common prax i s4 ) . At the level of dial ectica l investigat i on we have reached, we do not even have the right to say that i t was impossible to proceed otherw ise (nor, more ­ over, the opposi te right : we simply do not yet know anythi ng about the possibles 4 1 ) . We have s impl y d i scovered that the sovereign prax i s , what­ eve r it was, alway s presented i tself i n the form of a total i zat i on . And i n i t i s o ur o n l y its very nature of prax i s - process, we have establ i shed that i t was inte l l igible as a constitu ted dialectic. Before optim i sm going on to the examination of a non-dictatori al soc iety , however, a n umber of points ought to be c l arified.4 2 �

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40. See pp. 3 1 3- 1 4 be low . 4 1 . S ee footnote 9 7 on p . 3 3 4 be l o w . 42 . If we fo llow the orde r of the work as S artre conce ived it in h i s last p l an ( see Append i x , p .446 be low ) , i t see m s that the i n terrogat i o n of synchron ic tota l i zation ( i n te l l i g i bi l ity of s truggles) in non-d irectoria l soc ieties ( wh ich i n th i s p l an he cal l s ' d i s un ited soc ieties ' ) would have found its p l ace he re . Then he would have gone on to t he diachronic ( ' b u t prec i se l y it i s H i story ' ) , hence , to H i st ory : an d then to the problems of the total i zation-o f-e nvelopment, which are c o n s idered be l o w but o n l y i n reg ard to direc t oria 1 soc ieties. It i s an open q ue st ion w hether this p l an w o u ld have s u rv i v e d . For, i n the case o f d i s un i ted soc i e t i e s , we do not find the u n i ty to be re stored of pledged g roups or the ' un i fi c at i o n by the fut u re ' of d i rectorial s oc i e t i e s , wh ich through struggle s make the total i z ing project inte l l i g i b l e ; i n ste ad , i t i s w o rked matter that u n ites these d i s un i ted s o c i e t i e s , by th e agency of men ( see Appen d i x be l o w , pp.4 3 3 ff. ) . We observe from the p l a n , moreover, t h a t c l ass strugg l e s w o u l d have been stud i ed aga i n i n the part dealing w ith the totalization -of-enve l opmen t . It should al so be pointed out that i n the notes p ub l i shed i n the Append i x ( w h i ch we have arranged i n the most l i ke l y chron o l o g i c a l orde r) , S a rtre fi rst concerned h i m s e l f with the d i ac hron i c ( h i storical event, progre s s , etc . ) - which l e d h i m to confron t the fundamen tal problem of the mean i n g of H i �tory - before return i n g to h i s p l an . total ization i n non­ d i rectori a l soc ieti e s , and the total i zation -of-en v e lopm en t . w h i ch he � ometl mes calls a ' system '

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actual ly i s what we have called the to ta lity4 3 - of­ e n v e lopm e n t? What type of obj ective real ity doe s thi s synthe s i s possess? B y what expedient, i n what perspective and to what observers (or what agents ) doe s i t reveal itself? As suming that there ex ists a formation of th i s k i nd i n the bourgeois democrac ies , we may surmise that it w i l l be difficult to grasp and fix it, if we have not first studied i t i n the obviou s l y l e s s complex structures that define it at the level of directorial soc ieties . 44 So i t w i l l be enough to go bac k over our exampl e and l ook in i t for th i s total ization . We already know , in fact, that i n Soviet society every loc al prax i s , every singul ar destiny, i s an incarnation of the tota l i zing prax i s and of the overall process. In practic al terms that mean s the fol low i ng : as soon as a system ari ses at the heart of that society i n movement, whatever its scale and complexity may be thi s sy stem collects with i n it all the feature s of the prax i s -proce s s grasped in its total ity . The practico- inert i tself, as we have seen, inasmuch as it i s produced by the counter­ fi nalities of prax i s as a loc al determination of the practical fi e l d , turn s back to the sovereign as an i n e rt syn th esis (general1 y as an exi gency or a danger) the very action through which a practical field ex ists : i . e . the spati al izing temporalization of the fundamental project. However, it must be noted that every incarnation , being a singularization of the praxi s -proces s , real ize s within i t that prax i s -proce s s in its integral ity

43

Or rather ' tot a l i zation '

See e n d of th i s paragrap h , and pp . 49, 85 -6 and 1 1 7 abo v e ;

a i "o p p . 2 2 8 and 27 8-9 b e l o w 4 4 . The t erm s ' d i rec tori al ' or ' di c tatori a l '

soc i ety are u s e d a l most i n d i scrim i n ate l y ,

s i n ce the � o v e re i gn m a y be a re s tricted gro u p o r an i n d i v i d u a l The es�e n t i a l th i n g m o s t of the t i m e i n S artre ' s c h osen e x am p l e i " the concen tration of powe r � , as he �tre s s e s i n a l ater p a s sage ( see h i s foo tn ote on p . 2 7 3 be l o w ) . 1 87

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(without there nece s saril y be ing any awa rene�s of th i s re ali zation ) . Th i s i s what we pointed out in rel ation to the example of box ing , when we stre ssed that the pre sent i ncarn ation is not a particular concre te c ase of 5 which the total izing prax is -process is the ab strac t concept .4 That mean s very concrete l y that the totali zation -of-envelopment, if i t exi sts , must not ens uring the or even a sy n thetic schema be a mere ru le temporal ization of particular ev ents from outs ide . It can be real ized as a s ingu l ar i ncarnation at a given moment, and in a given fac t (or a given onl y if it is i t se lf, in itself, sin gul ari t y and incarnation . Th i s , action ) moreover, i s what constitute s its h is toric i ty ; and it i s i n the name of this h i storic ity that we di scover th e R u s s ian Re v o l ution as a un ique adv enture and the S tal i n re gime as a quite s ingular phase of its dev e lopment. It remains to be ascertai ned whether the se e xpre s s ions do not hide a feti shi sm of History , and whether the de my stified h i stori an does not have to stick to pos i tivist nom inal ism . Now the prac tical reality of the totaliza tion-of-envelop ment i s proved by the dialectical investigation i tse lf. For we have pointed out that eve ry incarnation i s tied in two ways to the hi storical e nsemble : on the one hand , in fact, it real izes i n itself the l atter' s conden sation; on the other hand, it refers back in a decompre ssive blossom ing to the en semble of practical significations which determine it in its belonging to the social and historical field.4 6 Thi s particular box ing match take s p l ace in a c lim ate of i nternational tens ion (for examp l e , on the day of the Ansch l u s s ) : the small n umber of spectators i s the incarnation h ere and a t th is mo me nt of the anx iety of the French . However, at the same time as this i s l ived by the organizers i n the form of poor takings , and by each heJe spectator through the rather di smal look of a hal l normall y ful l to bursting it neces sari l y refers back to di stant events , which preserve a relative autonomy even as they determ i ne i t in inferiority , and to the hierarchy of the incarnations produc ing it i n sectors of the same size or larger dimension s . The spectator, back home , w i l l say : ' There was nobody at the fight. ' And h i s w ife w i l l answer: ' The c i nemas are empty too. What can you expect, people are staying at home . ' And if the tension contin ue s , luxury store s and entertainments w i l l experience a cri s i s that i s already taking shape and can be fore seen through the fiasco of the sporting event. Thi s cri s i s refers back to the deeper structu re s of the French economy and , on the other ha nd, to the prax i s of the govern ­ ment (foreign pol i c y , etc . ) . I t matter� little here whether serial elements or groups are invo lved : -

45

S e e p p . 2 8-30 abo v e .

4 6 . S c e p . 49 abov e .

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what counts i s the simu ltaneous twofold reference to the interiority of the singulari zation and to the total ity that envelops it. We sti l l do not know for the moment if, in a bo urgeoi s soc iety, th i s totality i s attainable. The sign i fi cations refer to one another, to be sure , but everything may v an i sh into the serial or into th e void. B ut for anyone who, through his actions, realizes i n the U S S R a n event of any kind an i ndividual one i n the practic al field, thi s event i s i n immanent relation w ith the whole i n exteriority and i n i nteriori ty . That means it is defined in rel ati on to the sovereign prax i s and as a s i ngular determination of the uni fied practical field. No doubt, the extreme diversity of i ndiv idual de s t inies can be pointed out: a stone ' s throw away from the s teelworks on the S iberian the ' shaman casts his spel l s ' . I t i s eas y to p l ain, and i n the Ural s i magine the di sorder of the u n i verse i n formation that is Magnitogorsk, with its Sov iet workers ( displaced population s ) , its labourers recruited on the spot ( S iberi an peasants ) , its foreign v o lunteers (of great technical an d professional val ue) and its squads of pri soners sentenced to forced labour (mostl y ' common cri m i nal s ' ) . B ut even thi s disparate nature i s not a plural i sm . Everyone i s determined by ev eryone else and , through the interiorization of hi s relation s with everyone ( through the sovereign praxi s ) , realizes a singular incarnation of S oviet soc iety at this moment of its construction . The pre sence of foreign vol unteers and the survival of shamans demon strate how far behi nd the society sti l l i s the gap between the e x i sting structure of S iberian groups and that of Magn itogorsk, as a Soviet tow n under c on struction . In the same way , therefore , th ey all incarnate the sovereign prax i s , e i ther inasmuch as i t builds in conformity w ith the Plan it has decided upon , or inasmuch as it restrai n s itself by deve loping its counter-final iti e s . And they a ll refer bac k to that totalizi ng prax i s , inasmuch as it polarizes all the signi fi c ations of the field and no one or nothing i s defi ned exc ept on the basi s of it and as an e vent of its interiority. And what e veryone refers to i s i ndeed a s ingu l arity of envel op­ ment, rather than some dogmati c , de-situated rule . I t i s upon the basi s of the local admini strators ' decree itself prov oked by a hierarchized series of dec i sions taking u s back to the central organ and to the sovereign deci sion , inasmuch as thi s i s the transcendence of a new aspect of the i t i s upon the bas i s of th is decree , the n , that the prac tical field exhaustion or di scontent or incomprehension of some particu lar peasant, urbanized too fast, will be expre s sed objectively by an act of sabotage . I n other word s , th is specific ac t of sabotage refers back to those speci fi c , dated consequences ( unique i n the temporal i z ation under way as i n the spati al i zing rearrangement that underpi n s it) of a particular (and equal l y unique) admini strative measure motivated , as we have j u st see n , by a particular reconditioning of prax i s by its fi e l d and b y the tran scendence - as a s i ngular i n vention of the sovereign of th i s recondi tioni ng . •

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Of course, what may strike y o u here is the fre quentati ve or even universal nature of the decree, at any level whatsoever of explanation of it. I t generally presents itself . except at the moment of choice of presen t individual s by an equally presen t individual - as a j udgement of a hypothetical and norm ative type: ' all xs must be ys , i . e . ' if m i s x, m m u st be y ' . B ut when the decree turns thi s face of u ni v ersality toward s those s ubject to it which may deceive them it i s the indetermination of knowledge that confe rs thi s abs tract genera l i ty u pon it. In particular circum s tance s , thi s inde termination mig ht be rediscov ered as a lacuna w ithin concre te totalitie s . For example, an order from Army Headquarters stipul ates that th e Se ventieth div i sion w il l be transferred to suc h and such a district and quartered in s uc h and s uch a town . Head­ quarters knows the di vis ion ' s officers , bu t does not k now the other ranks except as unit s - It kno w s that the divi s ion i s ' at full strength ' . I t has further information at its disposal allowing it to determine the morale o f thi s mil itary unit ( i .e . a complex relation that we do not have to determine here ) , which means that it deci de s to position i t here or there depending on the c ircumstances . What i s involved here i s a singular rea lity, conc eived as such b y Headquarters (it has a history , in term s of which i t i s evaluated as the mean s for a new local praxis ) . B ut this reality i s that of an insti tutional framework fi l led by me n. B eing i ncarnated by thes e men and in th i s practical fi eld , the i nsti tution al framework has becom e an indiv iduated reality. However, if thi s unity prevents Headquarters from transform i ng its indeterm ination of ignorance into universality , we can sti ll see the strict identity between its fundamental ignorance here and in the ev en t of un iversa lization . It i s pointle ss to stipul ate in the order: ' If any soldier bel on g s to the Seventiet h , he will be transferred w ith it, etc . ' That i s pointle s s since the whole i s institutionally defi ned. B ut it i s j ust a matter of originally identical formu lations transformed by the synthetic ensembl e that integrate s them . Conversel y , there exist numerous universali st commands in the Arm y . Yet it knows exactly th e n umber of men , sub-gro ups and groups wh ich make it up the difference here comes from the circumstanc e s . For e x ample , the command may b e addre s sed v i a the hierarchy and directly to the indiv idual s them selves : e . g. concern i ng behaviour to be observed in town, on leave, etc . In that case , it is addres sed c urrently to 6,75 2, 3 09 men* (and perhaps depending on its nature to the ' rookie s ' who will repl ace those demobbed, whose number i s l ike wise determi ned) . B ut the totalization v an i she s under the universali zation , i nasmuch as the order has to b e accompl i shed b y indi v i dual s as such ( i nasmuch as e veryon e , for exampl e , '

* I am , of c ourse , p i c k i ng a n um be r at random

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has to shine h is shoes or sow the buttons back on h is j acket) . And on the civi lian although the goal being aimed at i s an overal l effect population, for example or a serial or synthetic one (the pre sence of a mil itary d ivision each of whose individual members i s ' impeccable ' will help to increase the confidence of the urban workers, inasmuch as it i s likewise i ncarnated pre sence of the sovereign and the discipline observed allows them under certain conditions to gauge the regime ' s strength), * it i s thi s very population that w i l l be serial ized or united by its objective movement to synthesize into on e common reality e ach soldier ' s i ndi vidual attitude : his casualnes s or th e care he devotes to h i s turn - o ut, the behav iour he maintains toward s hi s commanders , towards c i v ilian s , e tc . The soldier i s the target of his superior officers ' order, as the individual through the mediation of the population mean s of provoking surrounding h im a synthetic tightening of unity whose very movement implies unification of the sold iers by the group (or series) c onstituting their human m il ieu . B ut thi s o rder from the supe rior offi cer is aimed at the sol dier inasmuch, preci sely , as he remains unknown i n his individual reality except by the j un i or offi cers who have to deal with restricted groups . Thus these str ictly indiv iduated soldiers are aimed at as universal s , inasmuch as thei r given indiv iduality i s s im ultaneously pointless and ignored here and inasmuch as their behav i our as common indiv iduals has to be the same every where as a practical transcendence of that g i ven . In a more genera] way, a de c i s ion by the sovereig n can in exteriority have the appearance of u niversality. A law duly pas sed by the competent assembl ies a s proposed by the e xecutive may s uppress or limi t the right to strike for all public employees . We come back even in the grounds , f(x) . I f x i s a public for it, if there are any to the formula 'y employee ( i . e . fulfi l s certain a bstract conditions , enjoys specific advan­ tages in return for performing certain serv ices ) , he cannot be a stri ker. B ut thi s universality i s in fact a histori cal and singular determination . Neither the sovere ign nor the con s tituted bodies obedient to i t are reall y thi nk ing about strikes in general or servants of the State in general. From their point of view , the law i s a response to certain soci al disturbance s

* I f we a s s ume th at the workers a re supporte rs of the reg ime , what i s involved here i s a synth etic

unification of th e to wnspeop le : confidence gathe rs them together. I am

s im p l i fy i ng c rude l y , of course. Conve rse l y , the dep l oyment of disc i p li n ed m i l i tary u n i ts , united to the p o i n t of automat i s m (or the mimed rep resen ta tion of automat i sm) , helps through the v ery unity th i s man i fe s t s - to increase serial i mpotence among the d i scontented, e g . amon g the pea s an t s . I n a peopl e ' s w ar - i . e . when th e nati onal l iberation army i s poor i n men and i n arm s , but s u stained, fe d and h i dden by the ensemble of the rura l population

�

the struggle itself i s a uni fication of the peasants : they u n i te i nasmuc h as they protect the army ' s un ity . For th i s un ity to s urv i ve , howev e r, an i ron di sc ipline must be e stabli shed in th e m i l i tary gro ups

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or to a strike that h a s just taken place . It sho w s , at thi s prec ise moment, the given (and s ing u l ar) rel ationship between the various forces. (Can the ' forces of order ' i mplement a general requisition order in the event of a strike? What reacti on m ay this action prov oke in the v arious social strata? And so on. ) Mo reover, i t singulari zes and re alizes on a specific point the conception of the S tate that the sov ereign formulate s : i . e . in the l ast resort its pol iti c al pra x i s ; and th is in turn re fle cts i n depth the historic al conj uncture ( i . e . once agai n the rel ationship of forces , but env i sa ged in the l ig ht of the economic and social ' whole ' and the direc tion of socio-economic changes), which i s at its own lev el equally singular. Thu s the decree or l aw has thi s dual character of determined indetermi nation , into which we shal l go more deeply when 7 4 we tackle the problem of the concrete universa1 . These examples show , in any case , that the sov ereign itself depending on the c ircumstance s and the practic al exigencies can treat the ruled as memb ers of m ore or l e s s integrated units, or addres s them in their ( individual or serial) i ndetermination through the medi ation of the purely inert result in which their e fforts are objecti fied. It can deci de , i n the event of war, that ' the c i v i l i an p opu l ation of s uch and s uch a district will be ev acuated ' ; or, on the c ontrary , decree in a plan conceived in peace­ time that ' the number of ton s of pig-iron produced in x years w i l l be s uch and s uch ' . At a l l events , it i s not unaw are that it i s imposing a task upon a speci fi ed ensemble (or one whose very growth i s spec ified ) . In the l atter case , univers a lity comes to men through in ert matter, i . e . through all the identical ton s of pig- iron they have to produce and through which - as their future obj ecti fi c ation the sovere i gn grasps them as undeter­ m ined means. B ut whether the order i s aimed at a group or a c ategory , it i s actually a matter of p roducing a unique and defi nite outcome in particular circumstanc e s . Grasped i n exteriority , i . e . i n the in stant or which comes to the s ame thi ng outside temporalization, the mi lli on s of tons of pig- iron are exteriority unified by a pas sive s ynthes i s : if the •

47. It w i l l be tac kle d on ly i n directly he re , i n the pages that fo l lo w . See a lso pp . 40 ff. above . On th i s subj ec t , see L ' ldiot de la

famille ,

v o l . 3, p . 4 3 1 , n . 2 '

' He n c e , i n every

totalization i n pr ogre s s , it i s a l w ay s n e c e s sary to env i sage, i n their dialectical re l ation s , the d i rect

relationship

between

the

general

totalization

and

the

si ngular

total izat i on

(a

tota l ization of the s i n g u l ar by the c on c rete general ity) - i .e . be tween the w h o l e and the part - and the one betw een the macrocosmic totali zation and the m i c rocosmic tot al ization , th rough the m ediation of the c onj uncture : i . e . of the con crete uni vers a l produced by the l atter, retotal i zed by e v e ry part , and determ ining the i n d i v i dual s ingularity at once by the c o nj unctural event (a t o t a l ized i n c arnation of the total i z at i on) and b y th e general aspect of the world ( i . e . by the re al relat i on sh ip between all the p arts, not in asmuch as they d irec t l y e x pres s the whole , but in asmuch a s the y d i s t ingui sh them �el v e s fro m it b y th e i r mov ement to retota l i z e it them )

-

to re - e xterior i z e it inasmuch as it has c aused itself to be interiorized by

' See al so ' L ' Ec ri v ain et s a l angue ' , in Situations IX , pp . 6 2 ff.

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synthe s i s itself di sappears , the physico-chemic al en semble i s le ft. B ut if they are con s i dered w ith in th e practical totali zation , they encounter the unity of the mean s at the heart of the living end. They exist, in fact, as means neces s ary for certain practical realizations ( i . e. the q ua n tity of an d certain pi g-iron p roduc ed will be pre c i sel y what heav y industry sectors of light i ndustry can and must absorb in the same moment of the temporali zation); and, at the same time, they a re intersected as ends ( i . e . as i ntermediate objectiv e s) b y another unity (or rather by th e same , but at anothe r stage of circularity) which synthes izes them in the form of as means of p roduction demanded, for passive exigencies (those tons example, by such an d such a re g ion in the course of industrial ization requi re those means of trans p ort as the spec i fi c ensemble that wi ll allow them to ful fi l their function s ) . In th e other example chosen ' ev acuation of the civilian population ' the l ocal militar y authoritie s and th e soldiers who obey them are s ubordinated as synthetic en sembles to the task that must be accompli shed through them . The civilian popul ation , a s obj ect of the action and as its end, becomes the transcendent un ity of their p lurality (of their series , p erhap s ) ; and it is t he pre serv ation of this unity as a constant signi fication of (during the evacuation) that w i l l realize their acts and as a final outcome (if it i s achieved) of their activit y the g enuine and synthetic obj ec t i fi c ation of the practical multiplici ty that they were at the outset. From this point of v iew , down to the lowest level (or almost) , it is the job to be done which determines the agent in the s o he i s guise of an obj ective exigency reactualized by t he officer determined only by an abstract relation , one that appears acc i dental . It i s often ' a chance ' i f one regiment rather than anoth er fi nds itself i n a p articular sector at the moment when the enem y , on the bas i s o f plan s d e v ised i nde p endently of the se non-signify ing facts , launches operations which neces sitate a certain n umber of ripostes and parrie s (and, for example, create the urgency of an evacuati on of civ i lians under imminent threat of bombardment) . Thu s th e attack (or the information which causes it to be anticipated) , the task , the terrain and the l ie of the l and, etc . , determ i ne an objectiv e exigency that i s deciphered in the obj ect and becomes the sole practical determinati o n of agents otherwi se totall y undeterm ined. B ut the fact i s that the agent i s actuall y o nly an inertly de fined instrument: the genuine concrete i s those women and those children in blazing h ouses . The relative indetermination of the agent comes from the plenary and concrete determinat ion of the situation and of the civilians who risk death each one of whom specifies the death he ri sks , moreover, by h i s age , h i s s e x , h i s state of h ealth , an d h i s situation i n the s p atiali zi ng force field that enc loses him . Yet the soldiers of the regiment are not any old soldiers , preci sely i n

_.

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so far as it i s ultimatel y the free practical organism which executes th e task s adopted by the common indiv idual. Th is observ ation starts off anew the c ircul arity of incarnation, since in its concrete and objective truth the task that determines the soldier in h i s abstract being becomes again , by being executed, a concrete rel ation between concrete indi­ v idual s and between groups . It is with h i s whole person , h i s whole hi story , al l hi s mean s , that one particular soldier will manage to save one particu lar o ld man ( or o n e particular defence sub-group, one par­ ticula r popular ens emble ) ; with the fatigue itself of the preceding march ( the very o ne that led him, on orders, to thi s sector) , which itself i s no longer a chance but the prec ise ( and, a s a rule, strict) re sult of h i s biological temporalization i n the framework of a campaign or a war. B y the final in ven tion , the soldier and the civilian he snatches from his blazing hou se con stitute, in positive rec iprocity and thanks to mediating third parties (officers, other soldie rs, other c i v ilian s , wider and d eeper e xigencies at the level of social defence ) , a concrete and strict unit y , whose synthetic totali zation is the behavio ur in ven ted by both (by each other and togeth er) . And i t is very preci sely these rec iprocal and common acti on s , neces sari l y individualized by the free transcendence of c ircum­ stances, which are in rea lity aimed at by the order decreeing the evacuatio n of a particular population . In the order given by the general , the indete r­ mination of the s oldier springs from ignorance of the strict c ircumstances that will nece s s arily occur i n an absolute concreti on, but at the same time from the empirically obvious fact that application of the decreed measures could not be ach ie ved, even for a moment, except as a u nique and strictly indiv idual determ ination of men by these contractions of space -time, of the paths traced i n space-time b y these men. Universal ity through the neces sary ignorance of the commanders i s onl y an economy of mean s . B ut i t doe s not refer to any spec ies or genus . Thi s abstract determinatio n i s swallowed up and di s solved by the true practical temporalization of the agents. The lower a spect of the order may , through urgency and need to achieve a saving of time, take the form of an abstract i ndetermination and, thereby , seem to i ndicate a gen us. However, we know that the sam e order, as an inv ention of the leaders (at whatever level they may be) , i s a singular production : i . e . a concrete and unique respon se given by an original and incomparable group to diffic ulties strictly da ted and condi­ tioned by histori c al circ um s tances ( i . e . by circumstances that will n ever be found again a s th ey are) . The planning bodies , for example, will suddenly be obl i ged to introduce an important adj ustment in the plan c urrently being implemented. B ut we know already that the organs of praxi s have bee n singu l arized by it, and that they will i nv ent by tran­ scending their own intellectual tool s ( i .e . h ere by u s ing the m ) . We know

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too (to remain in the interiority of the field) that these difficulties reflect counter-fi nal ities and the practi co- inert that these produce , inasmuch as the same activity which produc e s its own men secretes its own v iruse s , on the bas is of the partic ular c ircumstances that give rise to it. At the level of discovery of the probl em and i nvention of its s olution by the men of that problem and of that solution , * we again fi nd incarnation as c ircularity (it will be transcended and ' overtaken ' by the dec i sion ) , and thi s incarnation produces its own knowledge : it i s revealed as scarc ity of this time , in th is irreversible temporali zation , at this moment of the temporal ization. Thus the deci si on whether i t is an indiv idual sovereign ' s or a group ' s i s p roduced by and for the person or persons who take it, as an individuality. In thi s perspective , it matters very little that the data of the problem should be statisti c s and that it should be e laborated by the economic combinatory of which we have spoken . The s ynthetic truth that i s revealed through these fi gures is the very specific threat (for e xample, in those months in the summer o f 1 9 28) that a historical res i s tance of the peasant class in th is lived prese n t would place the town s on the brink of famine , and socialism on the brink of rui n . And the bru sque deci sion urgently to take up Trotsky ' s pl an again and e mbark, al l out and without preparation , on collecti vization of the land and forced industrial ization, was preci sely historical and sin gular in a twofold manner. First, in fact, a prax is took shape through inn umerable difficu lties as the sole response possible (i . e . considered as such by the sovereign) to the danger that threatened ; ,and thi s prax i s , un aw are of i tself in many sec tors , was to begin the grandiose, terrible and irreversible temporalization that in History was to take the name of Stalinism . On the other hand , however, the hi storical m oment of that dec is ion was al so that of the sudden left turn which cast the ' Righti sts ' in to impotent oppo s ition . Trotsky was stil l in the U S S R , but he remai ned under house arrest. Thu s , via this new circumstance and the dec i s ion that transcended it to negate it, it was the total victory of S tal in the individual over al l his adversaries that was realized. The di alectical meaning of th i s v ictory i s c lear. Stal in had rel ied on the Right to exclude Trotsky from the government because he was hostile b y nature (i . e . by the int eri ori zation of h i s praxis as a militant) to princ iples , to radic ali sm, to the Permanent Rev olution . It was not the

* We are not i mp l y i n g by th i s any pre-e stabl i shed harmony : they are the m e n of that prob l e m , because i t i s i n them as the i r l i m it as wel l as outside them as the i r product. So this reci proc al i nc arn ation m ay very w e l l h a v e as i t s re sult ( i n s pec i fi c c onditions ) i nabi l i ty to fi n d a v i ab l e s o l u t i o n ; or the i n e v i table de v i at i on of any n e w aware n e s s , by t h e i n te l lectual too l s that produce the prac t ic al c oncepti o n s , and that i nteri orized pra x i s h a s produced i n e v eryone .

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content of the Trotsky ist projects that repelled h i m , it was above a ll the i ntrinsic nature of the praxi s expres sed i n them. In fact, he did not understand h i s Left opp onents and, without being strictl y s peaking oppor­ tu n i stic, the only dec i s ions that inspired him with confidence were those dema n ded by c ircumstances . When the ' grai n strike ' required energetic measures, it did not seem to h i m that the circumstance s prov ed Trotsky right : for him, it was a matter o f embarking o n a concrete u ndertak ing the need for which was vouched for by the urgency of the danger. Nothing to do, according to him, with any intellectual apriorism : the ide a was the thing itself. B ut prec i sely bec ause he wan ted to d i scover the practical idea in the materiality o f current e x igenc ies, he detached himself from the Right, which likew i se struck him as pu rely theoreti c i st, s ince its project ( social i sm at a snail ' s pace) was the product of general considera­ tions regarding u nderdeve l oped countries and the Revolution inasmuch as it h ad occurred in the l arge st of all i n Russia. Their c aution was p recisely w hat the dan ger of 1 92 8 condemned: their caution, inasmuch as it was theoretical inertia i .e . a practical instrument limiting adaptation to reality * rather than S tali n ' s dec i sion to be g uided ( w ithi n the perspective of buil ding s oc iali sm ) by materi al i mperatives and con struct h i s praxis upon these . In s hort, it was the drama of 1 928 that liquidated Zino viev and Kamenev . B ut it l i quidated them through Stalin : not inas ­ m uch as S talin was to be the i nstrument of the situ ation of H istory as Marxi sts too often think: but, on the contrary , inasmuch as Stalin made himself the m an of the situ ation by the reply he gav e t o the exigencies of the moment. I n other words , the day when the first Plan was dec ided, a

* For, i n oppo s i n g an y overhasty socia l i zation , the B ol s h e v i k R ight refe rred to the fo l low i n g princ i p l e of Marx a nd E n ge l s : i n order to m ake the tran s ition to c o m m un i s m , you m u st h ave reac h e d a very h i g h l ev e l of p rod uction . (The id e a w as p resent in M arx as early as 1 844, i n ' Econom i c s and Po l itic s ' - which the B o l sheviks d i d not know but it c ropped u p again in Enge l s ' s ' An t i - Dtihrin g ' . ) Th i � pri n c ip l e , obv i o us i n itself, was neve rthe less s u sc e pt i b l e of d i ffere nt app l i cat ion s : for it c o u l d j ust as w e l l l ead to Kame nev ' s c autiou� s l o w n e s s as to the Trotsky i s t de te rm i nation to do everyth i n g p o ss i b le to pres s a head. In �o far a s the ' R i ght ' u se d it to j us t i fy its oppo s i t i on , i t w as congealed i nto a partia l tru th ( i e . a truth from w h i c h the righ t i st oppo si t i on c l aimed to e m anate as it� only pos s i b l e c o n � equenc e ) ; at once , i nasm u c h a s i t preve nted t h e d i s s ide nts from conce i v i ng of other pos s ib i l ities , i t became a non-tran scendab l e i n e rtia - i . e . an i ne rt determ i n at i on of Io) worn pas s i v ity . And it wou l d cert a i n l y be abs u rd to i ma g i ne t h at the pract ical att it ude of the r i g h t i s ts de ril,'ed from t he princ i p l e On the contrary , it was that att i t ude w h i c h h ad decided upon the latte r ' s /i n1 l ted, n e g a ti v e uti l i zation . Mo reover, I t i 5 nec e s s ary . o f co u r� e . to go bac k to the h i s tory of the rev o l u t i on ary movement, inasmuch as i t was i n carnated a /so i n these m e n , i n order to d i scov e r and c omprehend the i r prac t i c al determ inations B ut the c i rc u l arity re mained genuine , i n t h i s c a s e as i n othe r� : t h e opt i on - p l edge , con�t ituted thro u gh a lim ited and a p riori as se r t i on of the princ i p le , w a s pre c i se l y w h at confe rred upon i t i ts i n e rt r i go u r and its non- tran�cendab l e n e g at i v e ac tio n . On t h i � ba s i s , th e princ i p l e as an obj ect i v e i m po5s i b i l i t y of adapt i n g tran s fo rmed the option i nto a de5t i n y �

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spec ific and i ndiv i d ual ized pra x i s replaced a hesitation and greater or lesser osc i l l ati on s (the se too g iv en ri se to, in the ir singu larity, by the fact th at the leaders were s imultaneous l y Len i n ' s successors and the heirs of the NEP) . But th i s prax i s function ed by a rec astin g of the leading group occurred as a recasting of that group) , (and in a c irc ular manner which rep laced collective leadership by the sovereignty of a si ngle i ndiv idual .

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Contingency and App ropriateness oj" the Incarnation part of my intentions to explain here the origin of that dictatorship of an indiv idual , any more than to give the signifi cation 4 of the cult o f personality : I have attempted that el sewhere . 8 What matters here i s something quite different. Every contemporary reader takes for granted, in fact, that it i s the movement of society and the recastings of the field by common praxi s which decide the indiv idual ' s power and ro l e in the v arious social sectors . Th is determination of indiv idual power, and of the efficacy of an action u ndertaken by a single person (or on the initiative of one leader) , is not nece ssarily the same (proportionately speaking ) for a given society , i n a gi ven peri od, i n th e different branches o f h uman acti vity . If, w i thin the directive organisms, the sovere ign i s an individual (a common indiv idual ) , thi s is because the type of integration demanded by their prax i s and their o bjecti ves can be realized and guaranteed only by abandonment, i n favour of a single indiv idual , of the powers sp ec ific to e ach. Thi s abandonment , of course , i s fol lowed by the rev erse gesture of the g ift: to each , the sovereign gives back all or a p art of hi s form er powers , but as a gratuitous gift emanating from his free sovere i gnty . Certain imbalance s , insol uble con fl i cts , or invas ion of the group by the practico-ine rt , lead to thi s transformati on . B ut th i s does not mean that the soverei gn ' s power is anything other than common , or th at h i s sov ereignty i s not a condensation of the sovereign powers of the group . It i s s impl y that its strength and efficacy derive from the fact that, w ith his backing , the en semble of the directorial gro up or group s has as si gned itself new structures which lapsing into i nertia T IS

48

NO

I n Th e Sp C{ tre

of Sta lin 1 98

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- ground his free mediatory acti vity upon the impotence of the common individual s , and upon th e neces sity of overcoming these passive resis­ tances by the dual mean s of an ever more e xtensive integration and a multiplication of mediated relations . The sovereign, in a sense , is su stained by the serialization of the sub-groups exerci s ing power inasmuch a s , in given circ um stances , he i s th e on ly one through whom this seria lization can be dissolved and the gro ups reconstituted. And, in fact , he unremittingly pursue s this dissol ution of series and these regroupments, by his totalizi ng praxi s and for it. B ut di s solution and regroupments ali k e alwa y s remain prov i s ional , and are limite d to making a spec ific action pos sible . A s soon as the sovereign w ithdraws, in fact , c ollectives reappear. And thi s i s al so the mean s of realizing his praxi s sovereignly, through the wheel ing impotence of his collaborators . What matters, in any event, i s the fol lowing. A s a common individu al , S talin was not a mere person . He was a human pyramid, deriv ing his practical sovereignty from al l the inert structures and from all the support of every leading sub-gro up (and every individual ) . So he was everywhere, at all level s and every point of the pyramid, since hi s totalizing praxi s was transcendence and pre servation of al l structure s , or - if you l ike since his praxi s was the synthetic temporalization of that entire inert structuration. B ut conversel y , inasmuch as he was not just a man cal le d S talin but th e sovere ign , he was reto talized in h im self by all the complex determ inati ons of the pyramid. He was produced by everyone as interiorizing in the synthetic unity of an indivi dual the strata, the hierarchy , the zones of c leavage , the serial configurations , etc . , which were preci sely the passive means of his action and the inert directions of the regroupments he carried ou t. I n other word s , as soon as S talin had taken personal power, h e was incarnated in the p yramid of ruling bodies and that pyramid was incarnated in him. Thi s c ommon indiv idual , as a sovereign , was in addition a c ollecti ve indiv idual . Howeve r, thi s reci­ procity of incarnation sti l l remains abstract , s ince it does not take account of the historical reality of S talin , a m i litant formed on the basi s of h i s milieu and his chi ldhood by the circ um stances of his past struggle. The sovereign , that collective and c ommon individual , w as incarnated in an indi vidual unique in the world whose hexis (as mere interiorization of the conditi onings h e had transcended) was as original as hi s physiognomy or his physiological con stitution . This means that , as happens with every incarnation , S tal in was more and something other than that sovereign as common-collective we have j u st described . O r rather, that in his concrete exi stence he was the facticity of that sovereign prax is and that pyramid. Let us fi rst understand by th i s that the facticity of the incarnation was exclusive of any reciprocity . I t came to that vast stratified bure aucracy through the man who headed i t . From thi s standpoi nt, S tali n was

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every where : not j ust on all the wal l s as peerless face of the S ov iet a dventure, but as a structure of interiori zed inertia in everyone . In everyone , he w as the living (and deceptive) image of pledged passiv ity , and also the c oncrete unity of al l w i l ls occurring in indiv idual s as a strictly indiv idual but other will ( i . e . as a concrete imperative ) . B ut thi s time there w as no totalizing s urge that could flow back from the s ub­ groups over the sovereign , since it was his pas t, his b ody, his face , that realized the supreme incarnation ; or if you like s ince those partic ular features had been con sti tuted in him by h i s former praxi s , i .e . before he exerci sed h i s sovere ignty and in a different society . He nce , this factic ity indeed seem s an irreduc ible. It is not even certai n, moreover, at this stage of our investi gation , th at the different traits which make it up are not irreducible s with respect to one another. * B ut the first observ ation to be made is that sovereignty realizes the sociali zation of the indi vidual exercising it. Thi s means , in the first place, that there cannot be a priv ate S talin who m ight at least abstractly - be separated from the publ ic S tali n . Hi s facticity as a hi storical person is intimately integrated with h i s prax i s , becom ing its qualification. Hexis, as interiorized past (with its habits and instruments , etc . ) , i s indis solubly tied to the common individual, to the point w here every sovereign practice far from be ing a free tran scendence by the practical organism of pledged ine rtia i s a unitary transcendence of the common indiv idual as a singular indiv idual and v ice versa. In other word s , spec i fic functi ons in groups , inasm uc h as they existed before the arrival of the person c urrently exerc i s ing them an d inasmuch as they will subsist after h i s departure for other posts or h i s death, rel ate to th e common individual with a certain indeterm ination as a singularized and constitute him individual . And during the entire time th at he fulfi l s hi s function the singularized individ ual , although ultimately reali zing each task as a concrete determ ination of the temporalization , remains separated from h i s function by thi s very s l i gh t gap thi s imperceptible yet fundamental void which i s constituted by the presence of an inert pledged (hence untranscendable) determination at the heart of prax i s , which tran scends it as a movement only to find it again in all the objec tives pursued . On the contrary , Stal in sovereignly con stituted the type and the organs of his power: in short, the si ngular real ity of that power . And although the operation had taken p l ace through proce sses of s ubs idence , collap se , stratification , regro upment, etc . , in the bureaucratic pyramid, it never­ thele ss remained the s ynthetic unity ( i . e . the use there) of those s ub-

Inasm uch , of course, as they al l refer to d i achronic structures and o u r investigation has not yet led u s to the bas ic q uestion : is the re a dia ( hronlc total izat i on? *

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s i dences , etc . B u t the concre te synthetic unity of the soc ial trans ­ form ations w h ich gave ri se to S tali n ' s person al power was necessaril y i ncarnated by th e sovereign ' s person his h i storical an d bod i l y person inas much as tha t power was preci sely a s i ngular and chanc e event, not yet an institu tio n ( thi s de scription would be worthless i f it w ere a matter of a dauphin re ceiving the throne as h i s inheritance after his father ' s death * It was e stabl ished by Stal in and disapp eared wi th him. A lthough Khrushchev hol d s a plurality of office s , h i s v ast power is in no way similar to Stal in ' s power. A nd even should he e xerc i se a persona l power (an unlike l y e ve ntual i ty ) , he would exerc i se it in a socie ty w hose ossified struc ture s (on c ertain points ) and w hose propens ities jac ilitate the seizure o f po wer by an i ndiv idual , whereas Stalin l'vas es tablish ing the sovere ignty of an individua l within a prax i s that seemed to excl ude any personal dictatorship. Th us , not only was it practi cally impo s s ible at least i n to determine wh ether the way i n whic h a d eci sion had certain case s b een appl ied ( i ts b loody brutal ity , etc . ) rep resented the p ract ical reac tion o f the leading e n semble to the urgenc y of the dangers or S talin ' s own way ( inasmuch as it re-exteriori zed the interiorization of a pa st practice) , but the same d i st inction was equally impo s s ible to estab l ish in each leader (or adm i nistrator, from the highest to the most h umble ) . For e ver yone held h i s powers from Stali n and , by v irtue of that very fact, was buffeted ab o ut by Stalin ' s v oluntari sm. At the same tim e , e veryone w as formed by hi s own prax is and h i s possib i l ities for acti n g w ithin a society struc�ure d in a spec i fi c way . B ut this pr ax i s and its po s s ibilities inasmuch as they we re constantly interiorized, in the iner t, as a past transcended and preserved had cons tituted him in fact as a more or l e s s distant and indi re ct emanation of Stali n . It w as Stal i n , to whom he imposed obedience; Stalin , who through him was sacred; and S talin alon e , who ever y where set in motion and particularly the re , through him the sy stems of balance and social compe n sation throug h which his activ ity was c arried on . I have shown e l se whe re how , in the ascend ing relat ion (from th e secondary leader to Stalin ) , the local offi c ial was cancelled as an i n dividual in S ta l in himself, grasped not as a pe rson but as the biological reality of maximum social integration.4 9 Co n versel y , he was Stalin in pers on in his relation s with his s ubordin ate s . This meant -­

-­

A lthou g h e v ery re i g n has its ( olou r deriving from the k i ng , the re rem a i n s - des pite everyth ing and up to the end (j u st re member the future Lou i s X V I ' s emoti on at the death of Lou i s X V : h i s ang u i sh i n the face of power) - a g ap between pe rson and s o v erei g n , i n the v e ry sense we have j u st defined i n re l at i on to othe r offi c e s The so v e reign- individual i s sacred for him s e lf. h e k nows in h im s e lf the ambivalence of the fo, ac red. *

49 .

The Spec tre o} Sta li n ; and also Critiq u e , v o l 1 , p . 6 5 5

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that his prax i s of its own accord reproduced the sing u lar quality intrinsic to Stalin : at once because it was the constant ex igency of the Sovi et adventure ( sc arcity of time) , and becau se Stalin posse ssed it. In the i ndi stinctn e s s of the indiv idual sphere, the power (as a functi on ) , the voluntarism ( a s speed of temporal i zation) and the sav age w il l of Stalin were one and the same thing. Hence, w i th i n the framework of hi s common i nd i v iduality, [the local official] received as untranscendable e xigencies c ertain absolutely concrete determinations, which qual ified him as the e x te nded creation of whom Stalin was the creator, and as the incarnation of that soverei gn here and now, before those people individual . A l ienation here corre sponded to absol ute concretion : Stalin was incarnated in the l oc al leader as an O ther. It remained the case, however, that i t would nowhere be pos si ble to differentiate that i nert though singulari zed alterity of p ledged inerti a, even i n the c ase of a deci sion taken at the local level . Stal in gave the Revol ution his own past as a common p ast. At once , the s ingular and concrete n ature of the leadin g praxis i s apparent to u s . That real incarnation of an abstract Revol ution had to be by produc ing, on the basi s of previous singularized i n such a way c ircumstance s , its own means of struggle that it would be obl i ged to push integration to the l imit and be incarnated in its turn i n a person . B ut we are not going to ponder here at the ri s k of di sappoi nting over what would h ave happened if S talin had died i n S iberia, i f Trotsky had been s upported by the maj ority , etc . Would another Stal i n have been found? Would Trotsky eventuall y have taken on the role of person al sovereign? Would he have been led to take practically identical dec i sion s? Would he have been able to attempt another pol icy? Would the Russian Rev ol ution u ltimate ly have fai led? etc . We are not yet cons idering the problem of p o s s ible s. 5 o Moreover, Stalin ' s practical rol e , and his real importance i n socialization , the conduct of military operations, etc . , still seem ill defi ned. Sometime s , for exampl e , he i s portrayed i n his office following the German adv ance on a glo be and demon s trating a can­ tankerous incompetence (restrain i ng or bl ocking the in itiative of hi s military commanders ) ; s ometimes, on the contrary , knowing everything, dec iding everything, organ izing everyth i ng . The historian will as sign him his true p l ace l ater on . The key thing is that th is soci ali st soc iety i .e . , among other thi ng s , th i s society which env i s ages people through the soc ial mil i e u that produces them , and reduces to a minimum the h istorica l importance of individual s should be obl iged, by the nature of i t s undertaking, to determ i ne a t all leve l s its practical currents and its own

5 0 . S ee footnote 9 7 on p . 3 3 4 be low

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reorg anizations through the mediation of an individual . If you like , the most important thing is not to know whether Stal in was competent or not, when it was a matter of conducting a war. It i s to real ize that the group of m i l itary leaders , even if ultimately tak i ng the dec i s i on s , found i t self constitutional ly obl iged to take them through Stalin : i .e . to provoke a synthetic retotal ization in him of the plan of attack they had already drawn up . And th i s retotali zation could be only hypothetical ly an incarnation of the original plan : i t had to contain more and l e s s than the l atter; it had to expre s s the lim its and the style of l i fe that characteri zed Stalin. Th is observ ati on i s val i d , of course, for al l the other sovereign dec i s ions , from the Plan down to its detailed application s . In th is s en se , we can understand what that need to be i nc arnated i n one man meant, for the u nity of prax i s and the prac ti cal field. Inasmuc h as i t was that man , the t otaI i zing temporalizati on had to take on feature s which did not spring from its inner conditioni ng s . Incarnation was required , so that the un ity of the practical organ i sm should be conferred upon the acti v ity of the organized groups . B ut with thi s unification through the concrete i ndiv idual , other aspects intrinsic to the practi cal organi s m found themse lves con­ ferred upon prax i s and singulari zed it despite itse lf. First, those deriv ing from the human condition (en semble of determ ination s - l imits c haracter­ izing human organi sms i n a certain peri od) and [above al l ] the pos sibil ity o f growing old and dying . The sclerosis of soc iety would be incarnated i n the ageing of Stalin; and the l atter would maintain i t beyond the time when new contradiction s , w ithout him, could have exploded it. Further­ more , the end of one phase of the Revol uti on would coinc ide with the s overeign ' s death . Our i n v esti gation has shown , in fact, that S tal i ni sm o utlived itself, masking the new structure s of th e society produced ; and that the end of Stal inism can we l l and tru ly be identified with S tal in ' s death . Hence , i nc arnation was introducing (at least between the firs t and s econd phas e s of the S ov iet experience) that di scontin uity or rupture wh ich comes diachroni cal l y to men from deaths and birth s , but which for a given moment of temporal ization i s not nece ssari ly the mode of development of prax i s . I n the s y stem in movement of the sovereign p ractice and its organs , that death of Stalin was the i nner limit of the fi rst p hase , inasmuch as i t already posed the probl em of succes sors and constituted for a l l Soviet c i ti zens (even the opposition ) a death at the he art of thei r life . There would be an a.fter"t'ards , unknown to everybody , which would be constituted on the bas i s of obj ective circ um stance s , to be sure , but fo llo1t\'ing a rup ture that made it unforeseeable . Thu s the o ri gi nal phase of prax i s had to be incarnated i n the te mporal izati on­ towards-death of h uman l i fe . A d i alectic was e s tabl i shed betw een , on the one h and , the fi nitude of a l i fe and i ts term i n a l d i s app e a ranc e an d , on the

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other, the marc h towards its term o f the prax i s of acc umu lati on . Death , as radical negation of an organi s m , ov ertook v ictory , as a pos itive succe s s of the first moment of i ndustrial izatio n . B ut that i s not all . A s I hav e shown else \v h ere , the e ssen tial nature of fac tic i ty i s for eac h i ndiv idual th e n e cessity of h is contin g e n cy . 5 1 Th i s should be taken to mean that each of them is n o t in a position to fo und h is O l1'n exis ten c e ; that it eludes him , in so far as he ek-sists it; that it i s characteri zed finally by a singular involvement i n the world , whic h a pri ori excludes any a e ria l l'i e w . There i s an indi v idual only through th is fi nitude ; only through the s i ngularity of th is viewpoi nt . And al l the sub sequent tran scendence s , far from s uppre s s i ng the origi nal facti c itie s, preserve the se in themselve s as the very e x i gency that qual i fies actio n and pre- sketches the content of change s . So it i s not a matter o f knowing whether hi storical l y an d practically an other could have played Stal i n ' s role, or whether Stal i n could have pl ayed h i s own differently : th at i s a que stion we shall di s c u s s l ater o n . B ut what i s given i n each person i s mere ly t h e ir con tin g e n cy, which mean s pre c i sely in so far as Stal in i s not his own foundatio n and h i s facticity c o n stitute s him as a certa in indiv idual among others , who does not deri ve from him self the reasons for his differences ( i n re lation to oth ers ) and h i s origi nality (in the sense i n which every determ i nation i s a negation ) . that the total prax i s of a soc iety in the course of i ndustrial i zation i s imbued , down to i t s deepe st l ayers , with th i s conti ngenc y . Far from presenting itself as the engi nee rs of the Pl an would l ike as the n ecessary respon se to questions posed by the neces sary development of objectiv ity , the praxi s appears in t he very ri gour of i ts temporalization as perfectly incapable of founding its own exi stence : i . e . as deciding ac tions to be taken and resolv ing problems on the bas i s of a past that e l ude s i t , and through indi v i dual lim itation s which prevent it from g rasp ing the field of options as a whole. Now , as we have already sh own, there can be no doubt but that prax i s - even the prax i s of an organ i zed e nsemble of groups and sub-groups pre sents i tse lf as a con servative tran scendence of a factic ity . What gives ri se to it, in fac t, an d what l imits while d etermining it, are former circumstances , inasmuch as they reveal them s e l v e s thro ugh needs and the ori ginal project seeks to c hange them . I n thi s way , an en semble of practical tools are con stituted, amon g other things� which obl ige agents to comprehend the ev o l ution under way thro ug h the ine rt subs i stence of the circumstances th i s e v o l ution has to change . Yet th i s unden i able nature of every prax i s i ts cont ingency as an h e i r fi nds i tsel f con s i derabl y re inforced (beyon d wh at prax i s in general can req u i re) when an indi v idual

5 1 . I n B einR and Not)u n g n e5 s , p p . 79 ff.

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inc arnates thi s contingency by hi s own : w hen the ignorance and bli n dne s s i ntrinsic to every undertaking that casts itself towards an ins uffi c iently determ ined future are identi fi ed w i th the ignorance , the bli ndne s s , th e inte llectual limits and the obstinac ies of one particular i nd i v i dual . There c an be no doubt but that thi s rei nforcement can and must h ave positive re sul ts (at least i n the ' ascending ' period of ac tion). It was the Russian Revolution ' s fortune that its v ol u ntari sm should be incarnated i n the w i l l of the ' Man of Steel ' . B ut by th e same token , certai n negati ve features found themse lves e x aggerated by singulari zation of the sovere i gn . Stal in be ing less cu ltured than Trotsky , the sov ereign as a whole would reproduce h i s shortcom ings . The bureaucrat t ired out and, as c irc umstance s permitted , hastily acq uiring knowledge that was al ways new and alway s inadequate would be characterized, inasm u ch as he yt'as Stalin h imself, by a un iversal incompetence . Marx i sm o s s i fi e d into a hardened dog ­ mati sm . We kno w , of course , that th i s was a practi cal nece ss ity and that c ulture had to be vulgari zed i n order to rai se the level of the mas ses rapidl y . Peasants in the proce s s of urbanization had made Marx ism benefic iari es of thi s absolute ly new i nheritance : crude , but their sons popu lar cul ture would fi nd again, i n an expanded form , the e x i genc ies of revolutionaries under Tsari sm. On th e other hand, howev er, that dogmatic crudeness was prec i se l y a feature of S tali n the m i l itant: a man of action for who m pri nc iples had to remai n un shakeable , si nce it was impos sible to act and at the same time call them into question. Likewise typical of Stal in was the con stant invention of ne w principle s , which were added to the others without contradicting them (or w ithout it being permitted to make the contradicti on s expl ic i t ) , and whose sole function was to furni sh a theoretical j u st i fi c ation for an opportuni s tic dec i s ion. Empiri cism and pedantry : thi s mixture was not rej ected, of course , by circumstanc e s , but its ac tual source was Stal i n himself. And when ev ery ­ thing had been said to e xplain the appearance of the slogan ' Soc iali sm i n one country ' , the re still remai ned that elusive residue that was the S tal i n i st incarnation : after al l , it was Sta lin who h ad invented it. These comments lead further. If it were poss ible (though despi te appe arances th is p ossibi lity i s rare l y given ) for the hi stori an to make a prec i se inventory of Vl'hat circum stances demanded, and if on thi s basi s h e could con struct if only as a n abstract schema the programm e that could have been re alized by taking account on ly of the objective ex igenci e s , then in the case of the sovere i gn-indi vidual it might be p o s sib l e to e xplain b y c o nti nge n c y by the fi nitud e of th is man ,. the gap b etwe en this m i n i mum p rogr amm e and the one that was actu ally imp le­ men ted . Th us i t i s t ha t for man y non- Stal i n i st M arx ists, i n dust ria l i zat i o n and col lecti v i zatio n nece s s itate d an unbe l ie v able i n tens i t y of nati onal effort in the U S S R , so coul d n o t de v e lop w i thou t cons train t . Peas ant •

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resistance too struck them as inevi table, and th e immed iate creat i on

(from 1 92 8 on) of large agricu ltural farms as the only w ay of ens uring food s uppl ie s. They simply wondered wheth er it "vas not possihle to avoid the propaganda l i e s , the purge s , the pol ice oppre ss ion in work ing­ cl ass centre s , and the terri ble repression o f peas ant revolts . In so far as most concl uded that these ' e xcesses ' were in fact i nev itable , it can be as a process of said that they acquitted the fi rst ph ase of soc i alism accelerate d gro w th and blamed Stalin alone (or, which comes to the same thing, his entourage and his adv i sers ) . For my part, I am not try ing here to determ ine what cou ld have heen a voide d. A l l that matters to me is the fact that (in a way which in spite of everyth i ng is fairly v ague, and for good reason : the real h i story of the Pl a ns and their implementation i s sti l l more or le s s i naccessi b l e to us) the singularization of soverei gnt y leads to posing the p roble m of a deformation of prax i s by the sovereign. He ' di d ' both more and le s s th an nece ssary . In the absence of accurate doc uments, it i s h ard or ev en i mpossibl e to determine th e momen t at wh ich the s l ippage began , which perhaps made inev i table in th ose circun1 stances the great purges of the last pre-war years . B ut prec i sely in so far as the ex igency of those purges and th e ' Moscow Tri al s ' was not contained in the totalizing obj ec tiv ity of i ndustri al gro wth i n a n underdeveloped country , the origin of the sl ippage must be imputed to S tal i n , for the simpl e reason th at he was at once the sov ereign total ­ i zation and the singu lari ty o f an indi vidual . In th i s way, it seems that we are reintroduci ng a kind o f po siti v i st an al y s i s at the heart of the dialectical movement : w i th more fl e x ibil ity , more fores ight, more re spect for h uman li ve s , one would have been a ble to obtain the same re s ult (collectiv i zation , for example) witho ut shedding a drop of blood ; but Stal i n more infle xible , becau se more narrow-m inded and less imaginati ve took to an ex treme the tendency of Russ ian constructi v i sm, w h i c h was to sub ­ ordinate man to the con struction of mach ines ( i . e . subord i n ate me n to worked materi al i ty ) ; by h is dec ision , producti on prono unc ed sentence upon men and condemned them to death i f that was more con ven ient. Do we not find again here two series of independent fac tors , and thereby that irrational at th e heart of positive Reason : chance ? Let us temporari ly leave chance aside . 5 2 Let us j u st exam i ne the tw o serie s of fac tors and attempt to determine if they are re al l y independent. Let us conced e wh ich seems most like l y b y far that the e x igencies of the proce s s did not enti rely j ustify Stali n ' s proce dure s . If prax is ( l ike truth for Hege l ) hecanle, tha t meant that the re s u l ts obtai ned by Stalini st

5 2 . S e e foot note 97 o n p . 3 3 4 . al so " I � H i �t ory E '-l se n t i a l t o M an " - i n A ppe n d i x b e l o w , p 450.

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coercion even if quanti tatively th ey were indeed those that industrial ­ ization as a whole req uired ; even if the n umber of ton s of pig-iron produced in 1 9 3 4 was exactly what the experts could fore see and demand * were dIfferen t from the real i zation s that the prax i s -process of safe­ guarding soc ialism demanded. W e have seen , in fact, th at they were not mere quantities , but were determined at the heart of total ization by the ir relation s of interiority with all the othe r parts, i n all the other sectors . From thi s v iewpoint and for soc iali zation as the liberation of man ten million ton s of pig-iron obtained by thre ats and bloody measures of coercion (e xec uti ons , concentration camps , etc . ) were on n o account comparable to ten mill ion ton s of pig- iron obtained in the same perspective and by an authoritarian government, but without coerc ive meas ure s . This transformation of the re sult by the use of v iolence had to have its repercussions i n the immediate and di stant future . The internally linked ensemble of the se transformations and their consequences , moreover, could in the long run con stitute a deviation of prax i s . We have already seen prax i s dev i ated by its own re sults (for example, when the hier­ archization of w ages led to the stratification of soci al layers) . B ut at least that was only an i nternal reaction of the global action to its counter­ fi nal ities. In so far as the purges and trial s hav e to be blamed on Stal in, however, the dev iation resulting from them must be attributed to factors that were personal , and for that very reason extraneous to the revol u­ tionary totalization . However, let u s have a closer look . What came from prax is itself was the fact that, through i ts temporali zation, it had eng e ndered c ircumstances s uch that the organs of sov ereignty had no other means of s ubsisting and acting than to res ign their powers into the hand s of one i ndiv idual . What w as involved here was i ndeed a fundamental i nner characterization of that praxi s something wh ich was al l the clearer, in that it had ari sen in total contradiction w ith the conception of the Party (centralized democracy with a collective leadersh ip) and as th e o n ly outcome . B ut from the moment when prax i s demanded th e facticity of the as an immediate counter­ individual sovereign , it contai ned w ithi n it fi nal ity the need to bear the mark of an i ndiv idual ity . It i s strictly speaking conceiv able , i n fact, that a proj ect produced by an o ffice each detail of w hich has been fi xed by a ll the coll aborators , after di sc u ssion, and above al l after a systematic el imination by everyone of the personal should be able to present itself as a strictly factor of each individual obj ective respon se to the objective exigencies of praxi s and its field. B ut th i s i s because the unity of the common individual s has been accompl i s hed •

*

Actua l l y , we know that th i s was not the c a s e

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over the negation of every concrete person . Thus an attempt has bee n made to real ize p ure a nd anonymous action , which i s determined or quali fied only in accordance w ith its obj ect. * The tr uth i s that , in so far as thi s attempt has been s ucces sfu l , it has been confi ned to pro duci ng a practical abstraction. It w i l l be nec e s sary to resort to mediated i nc arnati on s in order to obj ectify it i n the fi el d . Th is matters l ittle , however. If this anonymity thi s suppre ss ion of men , in fav our of a calculated system can appear at a certain stage of the programme ' s con struction , it i s all the c learer that the personal factor cannot be elimi nated if the sovereign is one person. S uch e l imination presuppose s a wheeling reciproc ity ; a certain distance between ev erybody and ev e rybody else: i n short, plurality and - i n a certain w ay - an i ntegrati on that i s not y e t too ' extensive ' . B ut when the system as a whole demands a personal sov ere ign i n the name of maximum in tegration , and so that he can be at the apex of the pyramid - the living s uppre s s ion of every multiplic ity ; and when the constructiv e effort of the U S SR implies that thi s society which has driven out every organici s t i deology fi nd s its unity in the biological indissol ubility of a n i ndiv idual ; then i t i s not even conceivable that thi s i ndivi dual could be , in him self and i n h i s pr axi s , eliminated as an idiosyncrasy i n favour o f an abstract obj ecti v i ty . To be s ure , he does not know himself in his p arti culari sm: S talin did not know S talin and was concerned only with the obj ective c ircumstanc e s . B ut it i s preci sely when he does not kno w himself that the i ndiv idual - whether or not he i s sovereign - i s summed up in h i s particularity. In a leading body , i t i s prec isely in so far as everyone k no w s each other ' s h exis that thi s can be el iminated . Well , on the bas i s of thi s , everything takes on another meanin g. To those who sa y that an o ther woul d have had greater abi litie s , broader vi e w s , more e xten s i ve knowledge, etc . , w e shal l repl y - w ith out entering into a discussion of pos sibles53 that this othe r, s uppos ing he h ad exi sted , would have bee n prec i sel y an other: i .e . he would not have opposed S talin like pure objectiv ity opposing idiosyncrasy , bu t l i ke one singu larity -

* W e saw earl ier, and s h a l l see again l ate r, th at even so one doe s not escape the

s i n gu l ari zation of prax i s as c ommon praxis For i t i s not w h at objec t i v ity demands , but what these g i v e n men determ ine , o n the bas i s of e x i ge n c ies w h ich the y h av e gra�ped th roug h th e i r i n te llectual too ls . It rem a i n s the case, of c ours e , th at th e obj ect it s e l f corre spon d s , in its v e r y textur e , to the stru c t ures of th e c on temporary age n t s . B u t this does not imply that y o u c an avoid a c e rtain inequality betwee n the e x i gency (of the obj e c t . for th ese g i ven m en in th is given h i stori c a l c onte x t ) and the response (of this c o l le g ial gro u p , w h ic h has sou ght to e l i m i n ate an y perso nal e q u at i on , but h a s merely s u ppressed s i n g u l ar d i ffe renti at ions w h i l e pre s erv i n g the c om m on s i n g u l ari ty o f s truc t u res and pl edged i ne rt i as ) . 53

S e e footnote 9 7 on p 3 34 below .

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oppos ing another s i ngularity . When Stalin ' s policy i s attacked , Stalinists often reply : ' Perhaps , but i f Trotsky had been in power, we should be honouring the memory of the late Rus sian Rev olution like that of the Pari s Commune . ' I do not k now i f that i s true or fal se. Above al l , moreover, w e shall be see ing how much importance shou l d be attached to ' ifs ' . B ut the argument does have a merit (albeit one not reali zed by those who use it) . Th i s i s the fact that i t preci sely contrasts the ' pa r­ ticularity ' Trotsky with the ' partic ularity ' S tali n . ' Ye s , Trotsky was more intelligent, m ore c ultured and, m oreov er, a n excel lent organ izer; but who knows whether the radical i sm he e xpres sed, and which formed part of ? ' So we should be wrong to claim that the system h i s idiosyncrasy required a man , as an i ndeterminate bearer of praxis, rather than Stal i n . I n fact (and even in thi s form we shall see that it is only half true) , if the sy stem requires a man , the latter w i ll in any case be a strict synthe s i s of specific determ in ations (transcended in h i s idios yncrati c temporal­ i zati on). The indiv idua l required by the system will be determ ined, and w i l l determ i ne praxi s by his v ery determination. All that can be said, i n s uch a case, i s that his determination is certain , but in relation to the e x i gency of praxi s indeterminate . As a consequence , the idiosyncratic determination of the totalizing praxi s and of the s y stem through it i s inevitahle, although at the outset it remai n s indeterminate . The first phase of socialization will bear the mark of a man Trotsky or Stali n or which mean s that thi s vast common undertaking cannot some other give itself a sovereign-indiv idual without itself becom ing , through c ertain of h i s faults and excesses, that indiv idual in person. What i s involved is a case of overdetermination of History : praxi s i s obl iged to receive more and less than it has asked for; it demands to be integrated through the m ediation of an i n d i v i dual , but i s abruptl y ind i v i dual i zed . For the absolute model of integration i s the clas s ic example of idi o­ s yncras y , and these two characteri stics condi tion one another reci procal l y . I f the proce s s of p lanned growth could be directed by an angel , moreover, prax i s would doubt l e s s have the max imum of unity combined with the max imum of objectiv ity. The angel would never be blind, or pig­ headed, or brutal : in e very case, he would do what ought to be done. For thi s very reason , howev er, angel s are not indiv idual s . The y are abstract models of virtue and wi sdom . In a situat ion, the genuine indiv idual ignorant, anx ious, fal libl e , disconcerted b y the s udd en urgency of danger - w i l l react (d epending on hi s h i story) at first too softl y , then, on the point of being overwhelmed, too brutal l y . Those jolts , those acceleration s , those brak i ng s , those hairpin bends , those acts of v i olence which characteri zed S tal i ni sm they were not al l required by the obj ectives and e x i gencies of sociali zati on. Yet they were i nevi table , inasmuch as that s oc ial ization demanded, i n its fi rst phase , to be directed by an i ndi v i dual . .

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We have reduced the role of chance w i thout eliminating it. We have s i gnalled that the nece s s i ties of integration made that chance , whatever i t might be, necessary. The fact remains that the content of the chance does not seem determi ned by exigenc y . However, let u s return once again to the circumstances that t ipped the bal ance i n favour of Stalin. fi rst and foremost that the sovereign For it should be recal led totali zation , even when the s overe ign i s a group , i s in itself already s i ngularized. Not only does i t relate to particular objecti ve s , but i t al so relates to them i n a particular way. We have seen that one of the aspects of political conflicts within the B olshev ik Party reflected a certain s i ngular s ituation defi n i ng the party ' s hi storical action. B y v irtu e of th i s s ingularity , praxi s escaped i tself and was overwhelmed : if it had been able to recover and adopt it, i n fact, it would have become a feature of the final objecti ve rather than a qual i ty of the acti on. Precisely i n so far as thi s singularity was a determination of the practical w i thout being a practical determina­ tion, prax i s as a whole closed up and became a proces s . For if we take the lead i ng group in its objective real ity inasmuch as the observer or hi storian s i tuate s himself outs i de i t and its sovereignty it stri kes us as a practical community formed by exfol i ation from seriality, by dis sol ution w ithin it of the alterity of impotence. The B ol shevik Party was consti tuted through a w hole history that inc l uded becomi ng aware (for every member) of the R u s s ian s ituation, m i l itant activ ity i n Russia, the 1 905 Revoluti on , confl icts among exile s , tens i on between the rev olu­ tionary emigration and the militants who stayed i n Rus s ia, the War, the fal l of Tsarism and the October Revolution. That mean s , first of al l , that thi s practical group defined itself by tran scendence of its serial-being. And th i s being had defi ned itself i n alienation as a determination of the practico-inert field. This field i tself was constituted at once as class­ being and national-being. Thi s should be taken to mean that the class­ being of the proletari at as a series was particul ari zed by the synthetic en semble of the economic , social and pol i tical development that was contai ned and determined by the hi storical frontiers . And we do not mean j ust the c irc um stances so often mentioned: numerical weaknes s of the bourgeoi sie and proletariat; pers i stence of a feudal S tate and a landed ari stocrac y ; rapid i ndustrializatio n , but inadequate and dependent upon foreign capital ; contradi c tion in the peasantry between a tradi tionalist conservati sm and a genuinely revol utionary v i olence ; specific features of a working class in m id formation and w ithout real homogeneity , etc . We are all uding also to characteri s tics of a geographi cal and ethnic nature ( s ituation of Russia as a Eurasian nation , national minoritie s , etc . ) , as well as to h i s tori cal and cultural determinations that depended on the se (economic , political and cultural relations w i th other countries) and the speci fically Russ ian contradictions that were the result ( ' European '

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tendency to uni versalization ; particulari st tendency to wi thdrawal into itself) . These ch aracteri stics cannot for a moment be envi saged as separate factors : they e x i sted, in fact, on ly in so far as they were tran scended by col l ective or indiv idual activ ities which preserved them by transcendi ng them (that of the B aku worker seeking to unite w ith othe r workers who did not speak h i s l anguage; that of th e bourgeoi s employer who depended on European capital and remai ned i solated , cut off from the great economic c urrents of the We st by the pol iti c a l and soc i al predominance of the big fe udal landlords ; that of the revolutionary inte l le c tual s , spri nging from hesitating b etween a movement ' towards the people ' and a Marxist Chri stianity or anarchism but spec ifically Russ ian doctrine borrowed from abroad , etc . ) . Each of these acti v ities was in its s ingulari ty the express ion of a l l the others and the ir practical compre­ hension . Free prax i s , in fact, was o n l y a totalizing transcendence of all the condition s we have en umerated� and these conditions thems elves were only the ensemble of al l free practices , i nasmuch as they were mediated by worked matter and inasmuch as the y were al ienated in the practico-inert by be ing obj ecti fi ed in it. Th us every totalizing activity was a practico-inert element o f a detotal ized series at once in the outpouring of its free total izing proj ect toward s an objective goal and in its nece s sary al ienation . From thi s standpoint, the revolutionary mov ement as a pledged , then organized, group was simply the transcendence o f this al ienation and this neces sity in the comm on ten sion of Fraternity-Terror. A s suc h , it preserved all its characteristic s . That mean s , i n the first plac e , that the worker or intel lectual who entered th e movement did not thereby los e the total ized structure s which caused h im to real i ze his serial -be ing through the total izing project that attempted to tran scend it. So everyone , although c h anging by v i rtue of the oath s worn into a common indiv idual , remained a singular and al i enated total i zation of al l the other totali zations. The new awarene s s which was a common prax is was not the de-situated contemplation of c lass -bei ng or the hi storical en semble . The proce s s was revealed by the indiv idual s it had produced or, if you l ike, who had produced themsel ves by produc ing it: i .e . it was itself the l imit and spec i fi c qual ity of its revelation , inasmuc h as it had marked in an inde lible way the practical organi sms it had produced. In o r der to make this reflex ive reversal more eas i l y comprehens i b l e , we shal l express i t in terms of pure know ledge and say that every m i l i tant deci phered the practico-inert proce s s through and by the p r inciples and pres uppos i tion s , the schemata and the tradi tion s , th at thi s process had produced in him, so that total i zation was circular. Depending on the v i ewpoint , i t i s j ust as poss ible to see refl ection as retotalizing the condi tion s total i zed by th e unrefl ecting project, as it i s to see the synthetic total ity of the

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i n th i s very transcendence the tran scen ded con ditio ns as tota l izin g deciphering carried out by refl ection . From thi s s tandpoi nt, it w as not j ust Stal in but before his v ictory all the members of the sovereign who were singul ar. It was the sovere i g n itself whose prax i s was doubl y s ingular: on the bas i s of the com m on stock of former c irc um stances , and as a singu lari zed product of th e i r conflict s and shifting al l i ance s . Now , in th i s en semble of organi sm s , i t may on the one hand be con s i dered that ev ery c ommon individu al w a s appropria ted to the e x i gencies of the ru l e d , because he had l i ved a n identica l past with them, and on the o th er hand that certai n individu a l s or groups w ere more specific al ly close to the masse s , because they h a d l ived that common past i n a certain spec i fi c way which caused them to comprehe nd better the situation and the demands of th e ruled. From th i s po int of v iew , we have al ready seen that S tal i n defeated Trot sky precise ly in so jar as the proletarian Revol ution , hy heing horn R ussian , w a s national ized and , observ i ng the ebb o f th e revolutionary mo veme nts partl y the outside , undertook a movement of w ithdrawal i nto i tself product and partly the sourc e of Soviet mi s trust of th e European prole­ tari ats . In other words , when the Re vo lution M'as in carnated in the USSR, it a utomatical l y effected a weaken ing of the i nternational i st em igrati on i n favo ur of the nati on al mi l i tant s . Th u s , from the moment of Leni n ' s death , there was an obv ious adaptation of Stal i n , the Geor g i an mi litant, an d of the rev olutionary i nc arnation . We hav e seen , moreover, that the country even in its working-class e l ite was hostile to theory, to univers al i sm ( an intellectual form of international i sm ) and to radi c a l ­ i sm , and pre pared to comm i t i tself to a cautious , pragmatic construct i o n of its new order. Nothing aston i shing i n the fact that the ruled fou n d S tal in here , s i nce he h ad li ved the same past as th ey and in the same way . His sin gularity as a retotali zation of h i s practical tho ught by h i s met the i r own, and that of the sociali zation under w ay . past acti on s And it was i ndeed as a repre sentative of R u s s i an parti culari sm be l iev i n g in dO[?nlaS and m i stru sting theories , imbued with the singularity of th e problem of soc i al ization in Russia ( i . e . with the fundamental singul ari t y of Rus sian event s ) , conv inced that no We stern conception cou ld fi n d a field of appl i c ation in that complex coun try as sured both of the tech n o ­ l ogical and c u l tural inferi ority of the Rus s ians compared with othe r European s and a t th e sam e time of thei r h uman supe riority (energy , courage , endurance , etc . ) it wa s indeed as a pat ient m i l i tant , sl o w ­ witted , tena ciou s , seek ing to discover the Russ ian truth proge s s i v e l y , that he had found the nece ssary al l iances in the Party and even i n th e factori es to get rid of the Right and Left theori sts who oppo sed one another in the name of th e same univer sal ity . From that moment on , i t can be said that the re v o l u ti onary incar n ation had ch osen the s i ng u l a r �

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over the univ ersal an d the national over the international . And Stal in , before be ing the sin gul ar chosen, appeared as the incarn ation of the common choice of the singu l ar. To be sure, it i s not because it \vas choosi ng i tself i n its s i ngularity that the prax i s of socializati on made the choice of a singu lar sovereign. We know th at Stal in ' s authori ty came from the emergenc y , and from the need for coercion in an inc ipient soc i al i st order that was interiori zed i n the leading organisms i n the form of an ever stricter e x igenc y of integra­ tion. The Terror chose itself through Stalin. B ut even Stal i n ' s place was marked by the combination of these two movements . The Terror was born of the emergency , the latter of the en circlement and b l ockade henc e , of forced singu larity . On the other hand, the national singulari za­ tion .. as di strust of foreign c ountri es and i ntel l ec t ual s contai ned w i th i n itse lf, as wi thdrawal into itse l f, the elements of a s oc i al attitude : suspicion . S u spic ion , as a serial rul e , at once demanded its opposite, the man who was above al l suspicion : he alone would be allowed to escape the round of s u spects . Of course , suspicion could ari se with max imum intensity on ly if the singulari zation of experience found itself fac ing an objective emergency requiring Terror. Th at v ague distru st of foreign lands and all that recal led them was tran sformed, i n the contraction of th e m ilieu that was the inner structure of Terror, i nto vigilance against traitors . And was certainly not devoid of th at di s tru st in the contraction-terror obj ective foundation : foreign countries were stil l to be feared, so long as the gap had not been c l osed between the ir potential for war and industrial prod uction and that of the USSR. And as the very meaning of planning was p recisely ( i n its urgenc y) to close that gap as soon as pos sible, at ev ery moment of h i s own productive ac tiv ity each person encountered the un i ted bourgeoi s democrac i e s , as external source s of the intern al coercion that was impo sed upon h i m . Furthermore , the counter­ revol utionaries were or had been hand in glove with the foreigner s , as the c i v i l war had proved; faced w ith the growing dangers , moreover, ev erybody thought that the country was teeming with spies . B ut that mistrust, as an inner consequence of s i ng ul ari zati on, was preci se l y one of Stalin ' s typical atti tude s : i . e . a sediment of h i s hi story . And w i thout going i nto h i s l ife in detai l , it i s well enough known that this mi strust was produced and mai ntained i n the articulation of Georgian particulari sm and R u s s i an national uni ty ; theory (concei ved as a negati ve dogmat i sm from which there was no dev iati ng) and praxi s ; the emi gration that gav e h im orders and the m i l i tan ts left i n R us s i a who obeyed him . It i s here that we touch on the fundamental nature of the sovere i gn incarn ation. The common prax i s demanded to be channelled i nto an i nd i v id ual prax i s , and thereby to s ubm it its i nner necess ities to the synth eti c un i ty of a contingent facti c i ty { in jac t , ja c ed tvith the difficulties

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of in tegration , the constituted dialectic sought to dissolve itself in th e constituent dia lectic , to return to th e womb that had produced it) . Th i s meant that it submitted itself to a sovereign-indi vidual whose qualities (hexis) ov erflowed ac tion and were someth in g other than what it demanded i . e. the (both more and les s ) , which ob li ged the common pra x i s sovere ign group s imultaneou s ly to adopt dev iation s whose ori gin was a s ingle person and to consider thi s phase of temporal ization as l i mited by death (by the death of a single person ) : i . e . to accept the ri sks of disi ntegration in the future (and i n a changed si tuation) i n order to avoid them in the present. B ut if it i s true that by be ing incarnated in this way praxis gave itself a deep structure of contingen cy, it i s not true that any old indiv idual as contingent was fit to become its sovereign (and I am speaking, of course, only of the fe\lv persons who could garner Len i n ' s heritage) . Totali zing action, in fac t, al so has its contingent singularity ( which, as we shall see , appears mainly to diachronic total ization ) , w hich, for its part, is i n no way e xcl usive of its dialectical intell igibi lity . The study of Europe in 1 9 1 4 might show that the feudal structures of Russia could not res i st a world war, and that the balance of forces within a historical situation de signated her a lone to make t_he proletarian Revolution. Diachron ic total i zation mi ght show , s ub sequentl y , the strict bond between proletarian revolution s and the underdevelopment of the countries that make them (and which , parado x ical l y , are the least pre­ pared, it seems , to make them) . Yet it wou ld sti l l remai n the case that revol utionary praxis and the total movement of society i n sp i red by it were the u n ique (which will remain unique, because it happened first in time) and singular incarnation (the other planned constructions w i l l occur i n other c ircumstance s , and first of all they w il l occur after th is one, which at once means they w i l l take Russian methods for a strict model and stri ve to benefit from the Soviet experience in order to avoid errors ) ; and that these features of uniquenes s and singulari ty , far from being mere inert qualities di sclosing them sel ves to the contemplation of historian s , reveal themselves on the contrary by their h istorical efficac y . Unique , the Russian Revolution could be crushed : the policy of the bourgeoi s democracie s was guided by th i s characteriz ation , and that same pol icy interiorized as m i s tru st was to s u stain the Terror. Earl iest in time , the October Rev ol uti on would g i v e the US SR an unconte sted leadership over the social i st world, etc . We have seen , furthermore , that thi s hi storical uniquene s s nece ssari l y had to be l i ved and real ized as a n ation al particular,i sm. Th us contingency i . e . the indiv idual qualities of sovereig n pra x i s was c i rcumscri bed and determined. The R u s sian Revolution rejected Trotsky bec au se Trotsky was the i nternational Revolu­ ti on . An undertak ing which launched i tself i nto the unk nown , and cou ld refuse neither back ward steps (as was seen w i th the NEP) nor comprom ises

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(as was seen with the princ iple of national itie s ) if it saw the se as a practical nece ssity, it needed the rigi dity of dogmas al l the more i n that it did not apply them. It kept them i n v i olable precisely in so far as it departed from them, so as to be able to return to them afte r s uch temporary detours . Hence, it demanded a sovereign who would be a dogmatic opportunist. Which meant , bas ical l y , that th is sovereign had to have a keen awareness of the orig inali ty of the Russian experie nce ; and that he had both to keep Marx i sm out of range as the distant , uni versali st signification of that experience and at the same time s ubordinate it to the latter, withi n prax i s , as a practical and changing i l l umi nation of events (i . e . one suscepti bl e of being tran sformed at an y moment by them) . It demanded though I shal l not insist on thi s a mil itant known by the militants , knowing them and forged by mil itancy (he al one could integrate the Party ) . He was requi red too by the j ob he would perform ( i .e . by the additional labour he would impose on the workers and peasants , w ith all the well-known con sequence s ) as i nflexible , coolheaded and unimaginati ve. Finally, the very fact that the e xperience was singu lar demanded that he should adapt action to singular circumstances , without any reference (other than formal ) to principles , and that the mi stru st engendered by isolation res ult and source of national s ingulari zation should be lived i n practice by him as h i s own singularization. I n so far as praxi s demanded integration , it demanded al so that its common orienta­ tions should become , u nder the constraint of biological unity , qualities i ndis sol ubly l i nked to the sovereign ' s personal action. And i n so far as the se qualities came to the sovereign person as a retotal ization of h i s current praxi s by his re vol utionary past ( i . e . b y the common past of the Revolution) , the exigencies of total ization did not re late to a contingent exteriority a happy chance that had s upposedly prov ided the sovereign indiv idu al with these qual itie s but, quite the contrary , to a certain way of h av ing transcended an d preserved the common past, whose partic ularity appeared in the l ight of the c urrent prax i s as the developed truth of the former practice and experience . Thu s , not only did prax is require indiv iduality inasmuch as this was forged by prax is (hence , inasmuch as its hexis was the sediment of prax i s ) , and so require itself retrospectiv e l y ; but it was al so current action that gave its mean ing and its tru th to the prac tical experience of the individual it selected.

The Personal Equation : Necessity of D eviation Can we say , then, that S tal in was required, even in what was most singu lar abou t him , even in the determination s that came to h i m from h i s milieu, from h i s chi ldhood . from the pri vate feature s of h i s adventure

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(for ex ample, attendance at the Semi nary, etc . ) ? Was that Georg ian fo rmer seminarist real ly necessary? There w i l l be a temptation to an swer yes , if one of the themes developed i n The Pro h l em of Method is recalled.54 I showed there , in fac t, that the c h ild, through h i s family situation , reali zes the singulari zation of general itie s (mi l ieu and via the c lass , nati onal ity , etc . ) . Thi s i s what al lowed us to v ie w milieu psychoanaly s i s as one of the medi ati on s neces sary with i n the Marxist interpretation. So some may perhaps seek to fi nd in S tal in ' s rough chi ldhood , inasmuch as it was interiorized as harshnes s , a factor of his future adaptation to revolutionary praxi s . And that is perfectly correct. Nevertheles s , a relative autonomy of med iated sec tors must be considered here , with in the l i ving totality . Th i s does not mean that each i s not in the other, but it doe s at all events imply their practical irreduc ibility : i . e . the impo ssibility of di s solv ing them into a moni sm of homogeneity . In othe r words , Stal in ' s harshne s s and i nflexibi lity , i nasmuch as they had their source in his earli est ch ildhood , were indeed the re s ults (the pre serv ative transcendences) of the soc i al contradicti on s whic h , taken in their ful l dimension s , were certai nly among the fundamental factors of the Russian through that rough chi ldhood Revolution. More acc urate l y , the child and through the v iolence of h i s revolt inc arnated and singularized the practical totalization constituting that moment of Russia ' s h i story . How ­ ever, i n so far as that chi l dhood tended to structure all h i s behav iour without discriminati on inasm uch as it occ urred as a ch ildh ood and with the specific features of that age th i s mediation between the i ndiv idual and h i s soc i al basi s was al so a separati on that posi ted itself for itself, unl e s s the ai m of the h i stori an (or mere ly the friend or e nemy) i s to comprehend the i ndiv idual through his biography. For in the latter cas e , since the ai m remai ns singularization of the soc i al , w e shal l end up meeting al l medi ations in each one , inasmuch as we are seeking there only th e syn thetic founda tion of idiosyncrasy . I hav e shown i n The Problem of Method how the vario us mediation s , through a practical and si ngular tran scendence, are organi zed i nto a pl ural ity of irreducible dimensions eac h one of which contains al l the others and refers back to all the others . 5 5 B ut if our ai m , as in the case of totali zation of prax i s by the sovereign-individual , i s to show on the contrary th e socia lization of the sin g u l ar , i t is only the person ' s revol utionary past that i s called into question , inasmuch as it makes the q ual ity of h i s c urrent prax i s (for example , the fact that Stal in was ac ti ve in Russia, inasmuch as he was thereby predi sposed to understand better and fav our the current of

54

S e e Th e

55

Ibid.

Prohlem ()f Meth od, p p . 5 7

ff.

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nati on al i solationism). For i t i s that past al one to which the e x i gency of common ac tion refers . In other words , there i s no irreduc ible give n , i n the sense that every sep aration i s also a med iation and every medi ati on i s itself mediated (autonomy doe s not imply an uninte l l i g ible plural i sm ) . * In a previously spec i fied perspective of study , howev er, the totalizing dialectic encounters irreducibles (vary i ng i n accordance wi th i ts object) , simp l y because the se sectors are produced by med iations that do not refer to the synchron i c total i zation in progre ss (even if, as we shall see , they may be recuperated by diachronic total ization ) . 5 6 From thi s point of view , in relation to the prax i s that began in 1 92 8 there are idiosyncrat ic and relative ly opaqu e g ivens, although from another p oint of view they can regain their i ntel ligibil ity . In real ity, it i s not a mat ter of the pas sage from one order of facts to another. Chi ldhood i s a soc i al fact and the i ncarn ation of the proc e s s under way , j us t as the acti on of the adu lt soverei gn i s . Rather, these are con tradictions inherent i n any irrevers ible temporal i zation which as we shall see shortly obl ig e the hi storian to vary h i s v i ewpoints, and to total ize the same soc ial and practical evoluti on in different way s acc ording to the incarnation s under con sideration . From the viewpoint of the dialectical biograph y of Stal in , noth ing can be understood i f you do not go back to th at chi l dhood and that mi l ie u . B ut if the situati on in 1 92 8 i n fac t re quired the sov ere i gn ' s inflexibi lity , th i s requirement left undetermined the question of the indi vidual ori g i n s of that inflexibi l i ty . And since the latter could become the h exis of the person req�ired on the basi s of an in finity of conceivable c h i ldhood s , everything happened as though its gene s i s be ing un important - it were presenti ng i tself as a g iven character trait. For that very reason , moreover, i t wou ld al so and nece s sari l y pre sent itself as not bein g exactly the inflexibility requ ired. If engendered by the prax i s demanding i t , it mi ght perhaps have been so. B ut i n so far as it came , de spite everything, from elsewhere ( i . e . from that same praxi s , but inasmuch as a certain relation of anteriority v ary ing according to circumstances made it o th er than itself) , its practical obj ective could not ori ginally be the di ffi cult con stru c ­ tion of a new society ; and the very situation that required i t impl i ed that it was not fitted for its task, but merel y more or l e s s u nfitted . Which, of course , pre s upposed that the sovere i gn-indiv idual would progressively adapt himself to prax i s , in so far as prax i s adapted itself to h i s pre­ fabric ated idiosyncrasy. From one compromi se to another, the balance

U n like posit i v i s m . which e n u me rate s charac te r tra i t s w i t h out there being any p o s s i b i l ity o f moving fro m o n e to anot h e r : ' He w a � an ant i - S e m i te ; h e l i ked tenn i s ; h e had art i s t i c t aste s . *

.

.

,

5 6 . See Preface .

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would fi nally be achieved by a transformation of the man and a dev i ation of the undertaking . B ut it is here , prec i se l y , that the spurious rationality of Plekhanov must be rej ected , si nce in fact he s imply referred back to a positi v i st irrational . He sought to e l im i nate from praxis even wh en the sovereign any personal equation , at least at th e level of was an indiv idual History : i . e. once triv ial detai l was di scounted. N ow there are two ways of attempti ng s uch an e l imi nation : h i s own and another, even more extrav agant. B oth formal ly conce ivable, but in practice absurd . It cou ld be arg ued in fact though no one , I think, has done so that i f all the pos s ible vari ations of inflexibility , i n qual ity and in quanti ty, had been produced in the U S S R and had produced the ir men (one for each) by plac i n g them in a pos ition to take power, common prax i s , throu gh a ' struggle for l ife ' th at would have pitted all the se i nftexible s against one another, would itself have chosen the indiv idual variety that exactly suited it. In other word s , it would be a que stion here of an infinite serie s , in which the characteri stic required ( and the man , its bearer) would nece ssari ly be contained as one of th e possibles . Te leo­ logic al adaptati on since i t i s ass umed to be lacking i s rep laced b y a rational selection . Thi s Darw in i sm of the sovereign-person i s i n itself so absurd that it has never been imagined , other than here precisely as an e lement in a reductio ad absurdum . B ut should Plekhanov ' s Lamarckism be seen as any less idiotic? He imagines Napoleon being ki lled at Toulon, 57 and Augereau or Moreau repl ac ing him. 5 8 It had to be one of them, since the bourgeoisie demanded a personal sovereign. Now thi s i s to assume not merely and we have criti c i zed him on this point that the consequences of such a change of dictator are h i storicall y i n si gni ficant, but also that es sentially A ugereau or Moreau would have adapted to the ex igenc i e s of the Therm idorian bourgeoi s ie without dev i ating them; that they would have been able to fi ll the post the y had taken; that they would not at once have been overthrown by other general s ; that they would have ended the wars or carried them through v ictoriou sly i n any case , th at they would not hav e lost them thanks to a serie s of i l l -j udged battl e s , and above al l to the Arm y ' s mi strust. It i s no use here replying that the Therm idorian bourgeoi sie had to support the dic tator (who alone would give it the regime it required) , an d that th e A rmy as such had to win the battles (given its structure , its i ntere sts and the new function it

5 7 . I n 1 7 9 3 , when the c i t y was taken from the royal i �ts, Bonaparte was only a c aptain o f a r t i l l e ry 5 8 At the t i m e al ready outstand ing genera l s . We m ay reca l l that Moreau, who s upported the 1 8 B rumai re, was B onaparte ' s r i v al .

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e x e rc ised in the nation ) . For the dic tator was prec i se l y required when the common forc es n e eded his nledia tion to carry on the ir ac tion. That mean s this mediation was not sy mbo lic but practical : in other word s , the sov ere i gn-individ ual had to ac hieve the integration of th e nati onal forces or disappear, ru ining the nation . And th i s , of cours e , was due to the very circumstance s that had structu red the soci al pow ers of the directi ng groups and the society ruled in such a way that prax i s would be either paraly sed or ce ntrali zed in the hands of a single person . So Plekhanov ' s error i s manifest. B ecau se he did not understand that soc iety turn s i tself into an indiv idual in the person of the dictator, and that in the se condition s the latter ' s practi cal role i s vital , he imagi ned that anybody would serve the purpose prov ide d he was present at the right moment. So that ul ti mate ly h i s Lamarckism (the function create s the man who exer­ ci ses it) conv erged with the Darw inism we have rej ected: the hi storical proce ss is neither inc arnated nor i ndiv iduali zed ; as a general and abstract movement, it m'ay pick up a man at one moment and as sign him a sovereign function ; but th i s man w i l l be produced by h i s function, hence adapted to it; and if a fe w contingent qualities overflow h i s acti on (one be ing more combative , another more peacefu l ) , at a l l events the process under way w i ll by i tself correc t his temporary deviation s . That means concei ved as uni versal that the proce s s uni versal izes the action of spec i fi c indiv idual s .

Mean in!? of D eviation : Man Is Not Made for Man B ut i f we admit that the circ umstance i .e . the mov ing structure of dec ides the individual ' s powers ; if we hold to be a soc iety in action strict con sequence of that experienti al truth the fact that t hese powers can be immense and consequently demand abilities; if, on the other hand, we are conv ince d by the en semble of our di alectical studies that the adaptation of the man to his function - whe n it i s a question of is a adul t s , and when it i s the function that produces the functionary difficult process (because of the interiori zed past) and often very slow (because of the re sistance of that structured past) ; if we observe as we that th is adaptation , if i t takes place, dev iates the have j u st done function precisely in so far as i t tran sform s the indiv idual ; and if, fi nal ly, ag a inst Plekhanov ' s uni versalization ( i . e . decompre s s i on and detotaliza­ tio n ) , we pit the concrete and inc arnated totali zation : then we must re cogn i z e sim u l ta n eo u s ly that nothi ng can limit a priori the agent ' s ro le i n a gi v en hi storical en sembl e � and that when the en semb le req u ires of the sov e re i gn - i nd i v i d u al a genui ne ahilit), human hi story i s no l onger defi ned mere l y by the s carc ity of products , too l s , etc . , but a ls o , s uddenl y , ,

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BOOK

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III

by the scarcity of men . Th i s means that if it i s inflex ibility which i s required, not only w i l l a ll v arietie s of i n fte x ibles not be found, but perhaps there will be j ust one or sometimes none at all. I n any event, the men who w i l l be i n a pos ition to e xerc i se power will certain ly repre sent a number of practical pos sibil iti e s i n fi nite l y small in re l ati on to the totali zed series of po s s ibles of that kind. And every re al ized po ss ibi l ity - if it were to be rep laced in the total series would be separated by an infinity of possibles from the other reali zed possibles . At these momen ts of social izati on of the indiv idual and indi v i dual i zation of society , t he candidates for sov ereig nty are rare. None serves the purpose ful l y . And the one who comes close st to the model re q u ired, even if he take s power, dragged down by scarc ity of time will be gin h i s operati on before he has been able to adapt himself to the e x i genc ies of prax i s . It i s a strict nece ss ity that H i story , when it i s determined by scarcity of men, should be totali zed by a sovere ign whose rel ati ve unfitness for his function s i ncarn ates and singul arizes that iron l aw of scarcity . As we have seen, scarcity a dialectical fact, the interiorizati on of a practical re l ati on affects all sectors , al l levels and all between the man and the field realiti e s , depending on what circ um stances demand. And every tim e i t s igni fi es that th e world is n o t made for man . * Under the rubri c ' sc arcity of mean s ' , it i s possible to c las sify the scarcit y of instruments (worked matter) that i s one of the factors in the c onsti tution of clas se s (by e xploitation) and in the present case , after the overthro w of the l andow ner and bourgeois regime that determines the nece s sity of the con struction of machines to make machines and tool s . B ut thi s scarcity of mean s in turn «ffeets and defi nes man , if man i s to be a means ( in the •

It i s an e x perience marked j u s t as m uch by s uperahundance of men. For, in the funct i o n a l , prim ary re l ation s h ip of �c arc ity ( i t would be p o s s i ble to find a s m an y e x ample s , albe it m ore compl e x , in seco ndary and te rt i ary s c arc i t y , etc . ) , it m ay h appen that the government t ak e s men as independent v ariab l e s : in a bes i eged med i e v a l c i t y , as i n a mode rn n at i o n at a t i m e of economIC rec e s sion , the experb w i l l conc l ude that there are useless m o u th s . I n othe r word s , the ir s u rp l u s character ( in re l ati on to re s o u rc es ) , far from be ing compe n � a ted fo r by the ir p racti c a l util i ze d , become� a dangero u s l y powerfu l brake fo r an y common prax i � attempt ing to correct the in1perfection� of the fi e l d or to destroy c o u nter- fi n a l i t i e s , at the ( neces r;; ary) pri c e of a terrible , savage effort ( fi gh t i n g w ithout e ating m ore than once a day , if we go bac k to the e x am p l e of the peo p l e u n d e r s iege ) . The l iberatory or reg u l atory action d e s i gnate � its own wdste- prod uct s . It i s a l w ay s pos s i ble to c a �t th e se out of the C I t y ( in th e capital i �t period , th i s means allo w i n g the price i nde x to rise and pov e rt y gradua l l y to l iq u i date the s u rpl u s ) . B u t e v e n these p ru( th e L in the l r b l i the cas ual n e � s , are not a l w ay s e ffe c t i v e ( o r provoke rebe l l i on and the re g i m e ' � overthro w ) S c arc i ty and s u perab undance o f m e n are often l i n k e d . moreove r . Too m any c andidate� for a post. but none fu l fi b the req u i red c ondit i o n s . Depending on the c a s e , the post w i l l n o t be ' fi l l e d ' or it w i l l be fi l led bad l y ; and i t w i l l be nece s � ary to e n v i �age tran s fe rring the ' un l ucky candi dates ' to other �ector� , and perhap� to reskill them i n work - w hich presupposes a !'Joc i a l e x pendi ture . *

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sense in which the sovereign serves prax i s and i s a medi ato r between groups) . If i t is true that there are not enough men or not the right men - for a spec i fi c undertaking, we sense through thi s scarc ity the incarnation of the fol lowing historical truth : man , as a product of the world, i s not made for man . * Th is experience constitutes the supplementary signification which, at moments when the c onduct of nati onal affairs i s entrusted to a person or a spec ific ari stocracy (the Venetian Sen ate and the Counci l s emanating from it) , charac teri ze s H i story itself. The men H i s tory make s are never entire l y those n eeded to make Hi story , be they even as unriv al led as Stal in or Napoleon . Of course , the complex n ature of the m i l i tary dic tatorship ( s upported by the bourgeo i s and the Army) proposed the war; of course, it rendered war easier to make than peace ; of course, Napoleon ended up wishing (but too late) to cal l a hal t to the bloodshed� an d , of course, the weight of the past re interiorized in the enen1Y camp by tense and shifti ng relations among the al lies (con fl i c ts that w ar alone could re solve) and by a stratification of i nternal structures (militarized nations and econom ies : arming and feedi ng the troops, realiz ing block ade economies, etc . ) , and retranscended in a proj ect to carry the war through to the end al most from the outset left little chance for negotiations ( w hat happened w i th al l the v ariou s meetings and treati es is well known) . There can be no doubt, however, that peace was req u ired in the shorter or longer term by the bourgeoi sie which had supported the coup d' e ta t and that i t would have been easy to get the offi cers to accep t i t ( whi l e as for the men , they were worn out and peac e was the only thi ng they wanted) . Th e man of peace ( that Robespi erre would doubtle ss have been , j ust as he had been the man of w ar against the suspected pac i fi sts of 1 7 94 ) was in any event not Napoleon . S ince the bl oodletting of the Terror, he had been absent. And the most remark abl e war leader of modern times w aged war to t he bitter end with a people who wanted peace, while at the same time endowing the l atter with institutions at once republican * * (universal i st) and dictatori al (centrali zation ) ; at once pe acefu l (the Code has surv ived him, and has surv iv ed a century in which our w ars for once have taken up less time than t he periods of peace) and military (the idea being to standardi ze men by sta ndardizing cul ture and educ ation , etc . , a n d to as under the Roman emperors return the indi vidual to his property as his j uridical and inal i enable ,

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l N ote m i ��i ng i n nl a n u lo, c r i p t . l * * I e . bo urg e o i � . The Code w a � bourg e o i '; , s i nce it re al i zed the w i s h of the C onst ituent A s s e m b l y i t w a � a c a� u i s try o f pri v ate propert y . I t w a s m i l i t a r y , be cau5 e i t re d uc e d the p rov i ded prop e l (V w a s, � c ru p u lo u� l y re spec ted - allowed pe r�on to h i s propert y , w h i ch prac t ical r i g h t s ( freedom ) o f the person to be re d uced to zero *

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particularity , whi le stripping hiln of his practical reality or channell ing h i s actions to the gov ernme nt ' s adv antage : Civ i l Code, e tc . ) . So far as S talin is concerned, we have seen which c ircumstances the incarn ation to b e a »'ithdra»'al i n to at the outset requi red themselves. And we hav e seen how universal Reason as an abstraction of the dialectic was on Trotsky ' s s i de , but not that concrete Reason which reveals itself as i t i s formulated. To take j ust these few examples, however, s uch a withdrawal did not demand pushing c ultural i solationism to absurd lengths. S imilarl y , the difference in liv i ng standards between the Western worker and the Soviet worker w as so great at the outset that the s ituation proposed the ' iron c urtain ' : but it di d not de mand that endless lies should be told about the condition of European workers . Especial l y since a few years l ater the Russ ian people brought i nto c ontact w i th c api tal i st nations by the armies o f occ upation w as by and large (and contrary to Stal in ' 8 apprehen sion s ) not at all tempted by the regimes i t di scovered. In other words , the offi c i al veil of lies and omissions could have been lifted progressively, espec ial ly after the 1 945 contact. I t was S tali n h imself who maintained i t : who systematically developed Sov iet society ' s particulari st mi strust (the objective reason s for which we know) , and transformed it into acute spy-mania around 1 95 0 . H i s ever-pre sent fear of a pos s ible i n fl uence of European culture was , in a sense, onl y the development and ne w orientation of his rej ection (between 1 924 and 1 9 2 8 ) of universal i sm . We know that thi s was to give ri se to the radical negation of cosmopolitanism (merely a cruder form of universali sm) in favour of national cu lture s . Yet the about importing US SR was not embarrassed - and yvith good reason foreign technology ; and the s itu ation would have required her to be able to import and transform into her own substance fore ign c ultural v alues too . Its ex trao rdinary industrial growth for which Stal in, as sovereign and incarnation of Russian society , was prim ari ly re spon s ible l ed the country in around 1 950 to requ ire a policy of expan sion , while the leader and the organs of hi s p o wer continued, in the ir mi stru st, to pursue a policy of withdrawal . And it w as S tal in again , through h i s hatred of al l internati onal i sm (as a un i vers a l link be tween sociali st nations and revolutionary partie s ) , who forged a po litica l anti -Semitism at the very time when economic evol ution was tendi ng to make rac ial anti- Semitism disappe ar. I t i s l i kel y that the i n signifi cance of these facts would have am used Pl ekhanov . Con struction was proceeding at fu l l ti lt, the b u i l d i n g of soc i alism w a � continuing - th a t »'as », h a t l-t'o u ld h a v e co u n ted i n h is eyes . B u t he w o u l d s i m pl y have been unaware of the s l owne s s w i th which s oc i e t i es in g ro w th d i s so l v e the ir re s i d u e s as t h e v e ry stri k ing e x am p l e of Am erican Puri tan i sm prove s : that athe ist re l i gion which has not y e t m a nag e d to d i s sol v e i t se l f i n to p ure athe i sm , a n d remai n s l i ke a ,

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at the very heart of al l the numerous contemporary pl edged i nerti a conversions to Catholicism. * I n other word s , he would have been unaware of the ' diachron ic ' , or wou ld have got rid of it by simpl y mentioning the re s i stance of superseded significations , as if such re si st­ ance were not a capi tal factor of H istory . We shall return to thi s . 59 For the moment, let u s note that Stalin dead i s still i nteriorized in the maj ority of Soviet groups and individual s , and that practice still re­ exteriori ze s him as hysteresis of the re sponses adopted i n rel ation to problem s . He still represents inert individuality in certain c ases of collecti ve practice (and it matters l ittle , as can easily be divi ned, whether the pre sent agents hated him in h i s lifetime or not : the absence of an organ ization gives indiv idual opposition the status merely of a ' subjecti ve ' i n spite of himself and , above mood; because of thi s , Stali n ' s enemy al l , w i thout knowing i t is Stalinized) . Excesses and fail i ng s if the sovereign -indiv i dual manages to hold on and attain part of the obj ectiv e s set obviously go i n the direction of the exigenc ies of soc i al praxi s . Stalin ' s relative l ack of education was a n egative element. B ut it protected h im from universalism : from that universalism which the Revolution rejected , ev en while formally i nvoking it ( ' Workers of the w orld , unite ! ' ) . Conversely, h i s crudity and oppor­ tuni stic dogmati sm were useful to a w orking class that needed to believe to be sustained by dogmas defining a hope . B ut i nasmuch as they manifested a lagging behind of the indiv idual i n rel ation to the determ ined e x igencie s . of action, the y dev i ated the latter precisely i n so far as the y made it easier. In that sen se , as I have said, the psychoanalytic i nter­ pretation of Stalin as an i ncarn ation of Stalinism remain s i nopportun e . First, because biographically important factors (and ones that, from the

* I t is not tru e , as M ax Weber bel i e ve d , that Protestantism was at th e origin of c ap i talis m . B ut the oppos ite is not true either I n realit y , the y reflected their ex igencies to one another at the outset and de ve loped by v i rtue of one another. B ut it was c ap ital i s m which repre s e nted the relatively independent variable - to s uch a po int that the p rogre s s i v e seculari zation o f economic s ectors ' ou g ht ' to have h a d as its logical conclusion t h e definitive liquidation of religion ( by its w i thering away ) . From th i s standpoint. Protes tan t i s m - w h i ch i n other respect s , at the m oment when it m ade its appearance , r ep re sen t ed a braked the adv a n c es of irre l i g ion by p re serv ing rev o l ut i onary advance towards athei sm the pure , univ ersal i stic , e g al itari an Reason and the sy stem of v alues that s prang from the synt h e s i s of the i n d i v idual w ith u n i versal ity as a sa cred abstraction . S o , as h a s been repeated ad nauseam, the movement to wards the future i s re a l i z ed as an e volution or, when urg e n t , as a revo l uti onar y upheav a l ; but as a past, out worn s i g n i fi c at ion w hose inert mat eri al ity ne v erthele ss sti l l c arrie s wei ght , it rem ai n s one of the most effective b rakes on fut u re a c tio n . -

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5 9 . Th i s s u bj e c t l i n ked to diachronic total i zation , was not i n fact dea l t w ith in the pre sent work ( see Prefac e ) . H o w e v er, see " Th e H i s torical Ev ent ' in the Appen d i x , pp . 3 97 ff. belo w . ,

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individual ' s v ie wpoint, i ncarnate both what he has been made and his current praxi s) like , for example , his relation s with women and h i s sexual life are practi call y w i thout infl uence o n the practical total­ ization, or from the standpoint of the soc ial tas k have only an anecdotal importan c e . * S econdl y , because the h i s torical problem i s not form ulated as anal ysts l i ke to imagine. Even if it were to be establi shed that Robe spierre suffered from an inferi ority c omplex, it was not that complex w hich made the Terror. It was the neces sitie s of the practical field and the ex igenc i e s of a praxi s seeking to save the revol utionary gains, at a moment when the country was thre atened w ith inv asion and rav aged by c i v i l war and when terrible struggles were raging among the R epubl ic an s themselves, even within the Convention . It was the ex igency of the towns ( food supp l i e s ) and the re si stance of the c ountry side to req u i s iti ons. It was the ambi g uous conflic t ( which later would deci dedly be a class struggle) that pitted the sans-culotte s against the J acobi n s . It was the necess ity for a petty-bourgeoi s government to keep the rich at arm ' s length and, at the same time, to channel and direct towards its own ends a Terror of popular ori gin which - despite a few temporary lul l s had not s topped growing s ince the tak i ng of the B asti l l e . Certain men (Robespierre and others ) had to i nv ent governmental Terror ( as a praxi s transcending and utilizing these contradictions for the s afety of the Republic ) i nasmuch as it had to be organ i zed and con sequently inten­ tional as a practical exteriori zation of the obj ective dangers they had interiorized. In so far as a complex w ould have sent some of them back ( i . e . wo u ld have had the strength to send them back) to their priv ate particularity i n the v ery c ourse of the work they were dev eloping, these men would thereby have ceased to be common individua ls and would have fal len o utside collective action (as happened to S ade , who w as president of the Societe des Piques before re l apsing i nto non ­ communication) . Thu s, any interpretation of praxi s -proces s as a glohal ensemhle that

* I am th inkin g , i n part i c u lar, of the s u i c i de of h i s secon d w i fe , which was a , es u lt of p r i v a t e and p ubl ic fac tors (to w i t , Stalin ' s conj ugal l i fe and the d readfu l wave of re pre s s i o n that was j u st beg i n n i n g ) . B ut th i s result was not, i n i ts turn , an orig in . P e r h ap s it affected in Stalin that reality atroph ied by ac ti o n the p r i vate i n d i v i d u al Perhaps the ' i n c ide n t ( wh i c h , taken i n itse lf, w a s a s i n g u l a ri z i n g i nc arn at i on of the s u c c e s s i on o f s u i c i de s that dec i m ated t h e B o l s h e v i ks b e t w een 1 92 8 and 1 9 3 5 ) part l y p r ov o k e d the one and on l y m a la is e of w h ic h S t a l i n g av e a g l i mpse throughout h i s e n t i re prax i � as a sove re i g n , and w h ic h l e d h i m to propose h i s re s i g n at i o n to the Po l i tburo . A t al l e v e nt s , t h e epi sode was settled at th at v ery s ame meeting s i nce i t co u l d not be otherw i � e For g o i n g i nto re verse w o u l d h a v e m e an t the reg i m e ' s downfal l . Perh aps t he y m i g h t have avo i de d l aunc h i n g the m se l v e s s o v i o le ntly i nto repre s s i o n . Once they had begun , h o we v e r , t h e y h ad to conti n ue : w h i c h meant t h at on the contrary , i n te g rat i o n was t i g h t e n e d rou n d the l e ader who h ad taken re s p o n s i b i l i t y for thi s p o l i c y Afte r a �hort s i l e n c e , Mol otov be g ged S t a l i n to re tai n h i s function s . .

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d id not l imi t itself to comprehendi ng it on the basis of itself (i . e . on the bas i s of the factors we have described) would immediately take u s back to subj ecti v e i dealism. Conversely , howev er, the dogmatic attitude of Plekhanov tends to wards obj ective ideal i sm : p ushing it to its ultimate implications would lead , i n fact, to the idea that every prax i s i s always everything it can be and everyth ing it must be and that it alway s finds all the men needed to direct it (or the men chosen al ways adapt them­ selves to their functi o n s , and in the shortest possible ti me) . I n fact, if it i s admitted th at real H istory is at the level of soc i al struggles ( rather than, as he beli eve s , at that of the practico- inert) , the importance of the sovere ign - indiv idual (or of the restricted grou p that exerc i ses sovere ignty) - i . e . the scarcity of men manife sts itself in the dIfferen tial : i . e . in the g a p separating the obj ective ex igencies from the real ization . And i n the w orld of scarc ity thi s gap ultimatel y mean s o nly the deviation of praxis by its incarnation . We shall see later that th i s dev iation manifests itself also when sovere ignty i s not incarnated in an indi vi dual . 6 0 B ut let us for the moment stick to our investigation. In the case of a sovereign­ i . e . the di fferential is a individu al , deviation into parti al s uccess s trictly intell i g i ble meaning of certain practical totali zation s. Hi storically, as we have seen, and thro ugh the c oncrete exi gencies they determ ined, these constituted themselves in certain c ircumstances as demanding such and such a sovereign . Thus the indiv i dual ization of power is i n itself c omprehen sible . Neverthele s s , from th i s fi rst standpoint, inasmuch �s i t i s required by one moment of a prax i s conditioned by a whole past, it l imits itself to illumi nating the facticity of praxi s and i l l um inati ng itself through the latter: every praxi s i s an inheritance, every agent an heir. As conditioned by former circumstance s and the en semble of the field ' s materiality , the nece s sity of withdrawal into self and the nece ss ity of oppre s sion (one consequence of which might be Terror) manifested themselves as the facticity of the Russian Re volution through the facticity of Stal i n , its product. On the other hand, h owever, the incarn ation here manifested through the differe ntial it cau sed to appear in the re sults a radical c ondition of that prax i s : the fact th at the action of men is conditioned by their own scarc ity . There i s a poverty of h i storical praxi s inasmuch as it i s itself a struggle ag ain st poverty , and th i s poverty as an inner dialectic of scarcity al ways reveal s itself in th e re s ult, which will be at worst a term inal fai l ure and at best a de viation . And it matters little th at praxi s , in its former developments ,

Doubt l e s s an al l usion to the S tate i n bourgeois democ rac i e s ( see Preface) S ee a l so Sartre ' s footnote on p 2 7 3 be low . 60 .

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mig ht be partly re sponsible for th i s pov erty (as can be seen when a gove rnment ' s mi stakes and u npopularity deprive it of its mean s of defe nce) . For if it i s true that every praxi s , by interiori zing its poverty, take s responsibi l ity for i t, i t i s al so true that it can do noth i ng but give it fo rm , ne ve r create It . In that sense, S ta l i n and the Stalinist dev iation ( i . e . the dev iation to th e i n all limited extent that i t can be attributed to S tal in) expre s sed dialectical intelligibi lity the i nteriori zed need for Sov iet praxis not to be just the planned industriali zation of that country , in tha t peri od , after tha t rev o lutio n , and under the threat of that enci rc lement, but to be also the reincarnation, in indiv idu al c on ti ngency , of its own incarn ati on. S uddenly , however, Stal i n as an indi v idual i zation of the soc i al : i . e . of praxi s as poverty inc arnated the dialecti c al inte l l igibi l ity of all the inner povertie s of th e practic al field, from the shortage of machines to the peas ants ' lack of education . B u t an incarnation i s not a symbol. He did not l imit himself to tranquilly reflecting those shortage s . If he incarnated them, he a lso synthetically added the shortage of men, through his own i nadequacie s inasmuch as the se would produce dev i ations . Similarl y , the genuinely Stalinist dev iations (the differenti al ) , considered in their outc ome , were someth ing other than the global devi ation that constituted the R u s s i an Revoluti on as the proletarian Revoluti o n incarnate . Yet they incarnated it, inasmuch as they were its radical i zatio n . Inc arnated and singulari zed, the working-clas s R ev o l ution dev iated to the point of demanding the sovereignty of a s i ngle person . And this sovere ign , born of a dev i ation , pushed it to the b itter end and revealed i n the very contingency of h i s p olic y , i . e . of h i s own facticity , that praxi s as an incarnation dev iated by its own counter- fi n al i ties , by its herita g e and by the ensemble of the practico-inert had to lead to the ultimate concrete indiv idual i zati on , by virtue of the very c ontingency of the unforeseeable and differential dev i ations which it had nece ssari ly given itself without knowing it, through t he idiosyncratic mediation of the required sovereign. B u t let us be clearl y understood : the individual and chance character of praxi s can under no circum stances sign ify that it devel ops according to no law s . Conti ngenc y appears only through strict ex igencie s . Through al l its dev iati ons an d al l i ts s i de trac ks , we shall see later on that the historical process continues on it s path . Only thi s path i s not defined a priori by the tran scendental di alectic . It i s real ized and determined by prax i s , i . e . through correction s , rectifications and minor alterations ; by agreed detours and even sometimes by calculated regre s sions across the generational rift, which al one create s the nece ssary perspecti ve for new sovereigns : the tiny distance that allows them , in the name of c ommon obj e ctives , to assess the sl ippages and dri ft of the former prax i s . We shal l return to these problem s concerning diac hronic •

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totali zation . 6 1 Far from submitt ing History to c ontingency to c hance I have sought to show how Hi sto ry inte grated chances and conti ngency as the manifest signs and nece ssary c onsequences of its own facticity . There are too many men . The majority remain undernouri shed. B ut there are not en ough men to make a rigor ous hi story on a dai l y bas i s . Th i s does not mean , however, that it i s i mpo ss ibl e to fi nd rigour, by taking broader and more abstract v iew s . Or that al l of prax i s , including its dev iation s , i s not intelligible dialectical l y . History i s not rigorous i n so far as re stricted ensembles are being considered becau se dialectical and totalizing reasons (not chance c irc um stance s ) oblige it always to be real ized as a chance inc arnat ion i n relation to the obj e ctive s that are the source o f prax i s . It i s not rigorous , because it always proceeds via mistake s and correction s ; because i t i s in no way a universal schemati sm, but a unique adv enture unfolding on the basis of pre -hi storic circ umstances which in themselves a nd in relation to all obj ective s and al l practices constitute a weighty and ill -known inheritance of fundamental dev iation s. In a word, S talinism save d soc iali zat i o n by dev iating socialism. Its succe ssors remain , who have received from it the means to c orrect that dev iation.

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61.

See p . 238 belo w , and Prefac e

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rev o lution was incarnated i n the Oc tober Rev ­ ol uti on. S tali n w as the incarnation o f that i ncarnation . Should one understan d that he was i n himself the totali z ation- of-en v e l opment? Of course not: but we had to unders tand the meaning of S tali n i s m , in order to understand the problem better. We see fro m th i s example that to tal ization is a singularizing inc arnation, since it presents itself in the case under consi derat ion as the i ndivi dual i zati on o f society in dial ectic al connec ­ tion w ith the soci ali zati on of the sovereign -individual . Yet w e al ready k now that the total izati on-of-envelopment can be neither a bei ng (tran­ scendental dogmati sm), nor an exi stent (hyper-org anicism), nor a r ule imposing itself on the s i n g u lar adventure (univ ersal i s m of exteriority ) . So it i s appropriate to as k one s e lf what kin d of objecti ve (and indiv idual) reality it doe s posse s s . Thi s question would risk remain i ng in soluble , if we had not already established that total i zation doe s not mean total ity . In other words, it actual ly belongs to the categ ory of o bjects for which we have reserved the name of prax i s-proc e s s . A pure and con stituent prax i s (for example , the wo rk of an isolated individual , take n by abstraction outside the s ocial condi tions of i t s exec ution : Su nday odd j obs , for i nstance) i s s eparab le from the practical a gent onl y abstractl y , u n l e s s i t i s cons idered as the sy nthetic unity of the transformati on s pas s i v e l y endured by the obj ect. In real i ty , it i s the living and uni vocal relationship ( w ith a halo of quasi -rec iprocity) bet ween the practical organ i sm an d worked matter, v ia the med iation of i ts field a nd tool s . It i s not poss ible to distingui sh man ' s ac t , for it i s abstract to di s tinguish the work from the nlaterial : the conc rete re al ity i s a - m a n - s h ap i n g -ma tte r - hy - h is - Ia bo u r . A s M arx showed clearl y , i t i s t he soc ial sy stem o f expl oitation whi ch , i n sp ec i fi c c i rcumstance s , turn s t he worker ' s l abour back against him a � a hosti le force . From t h i s viewp oi n t the s tructure of con stituent tota l i za­ tion i s q u ite diffe rent from th at of con stituted total i zati on . It i s O R K I N G - C LA S S

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not labour that total i ze s the agent, n or his obj ecti fication ( i . e . h i s i nscription in i nertia) . On the contrary , i t i s the agent who total izes h imself, th rough the limited tran scendence that proj ects h i m towards certain obj ectives and through the concrete l abo ur he carri es out i n the c ourse of temporal ization . Temporary un ity return s from the future to the pre sent and thereby determines the sign i fi cati on of the past, at the same time as the progressive movement of labouring temporal ization inc arnate s and supports throug h the diffi c ul tie s of co nstruction and the adv ers ity­ coefficient of matter - the s h ort-term and long-term obj ectiv e s as its future raison d' etre, i t s unity , the meaning of its orientation , the approximate determination of the total temporal i zati on and the deep si g n i fi c ation of its effort. Yet we should see here simply the practical agent himself, inasmuch as his reality i s s i mu ltaneous l y to be ' on deferment ' and to total ize himself constantly by ac tion . For each of us , it i s one and the same th ing to e x i st, to transcend oneself towards one ' s ends , to be total ized by thi s very tran scendence , and to produce the demoniacal , inverted refl ection of totali zation and the foundati on of H i story : the inert s y ntheses of worked m atter. I n short, from thi s viewpoint there are indiv iduals and that i s al l . Once i t i s a matter of groups , or en sembl es compri sing sovere ign groups and serie s , prax i s attai n s a re lati ve i ndependence which al l o w s it to pos i t i tsel f for itself and as an object i n the face o f every agent. It i s for thi s reason that we hav e been abl e to s i gnal a t wofold movement: [the agent] incarnate s the practical total i zat ion, it transcends him and he refers the matter to the ensemble of obj ective s tr ucture s constituting it. in eac h i n div i dual and for each A s we have seen , the reason is that common prax i s i s wholly immanent, i nasmuch as he i s a individual common indiv i dual and differentiation o f function s i s gi ven , as a superfi cial nece ssity that doe s not achieve either the absolute un i ty of sworn fai th or that Fraternity -Terror which i s the right and obl igation to be everywhere the sam e , here and there . In other word s , organic sol idarity i s only a redepl oyment of u n i ty . On the other hand , however, i n so far as the group i s di v i ded into sub- group s , and i n so far as the action of so me particular organ demand s the collaboration of some other and the synchroni zati on of the se two tasks can be reali zed on l y by a thi rd organ i t self control led, l ike the others , by an organ of co-ordination or the ac tion of each unity doe s not remai n the mere regulati on, etc . o bjectifi cation of a p ractical project. It becom es itself a passive object of control an d co-ordin ati on , adapted from outs ide to the needs of the en �emble . I n th i s sen se , the acti ve sub-grou p ( i nasn1 u c h as i t necessarily pr esen ts an inertia : multi p l i c i ty of i ts member s , phy si co-ch emica l ma ter­ ial ity of the biological organ i sm s , etc . ) itself bec ome s w orked matter ( i t i s of l i ttle i mportance , moreov er, whether i t consents to th i s w i th

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enthusias m or reluctantl y ) . It i s shifted, it i s ti ghtened up, i t i s i ncreased, it is modi fied from outside by creating e l sewhere another s ub-group whose function s , by thei r mere coexi stence i n a prac tical field , al ter i ts i t s re l at i v e own, etc . Lastly as all socio logi sts have already no ted permanence and the re l ative instabi lity of i ts members h i p ( some onl y pass through it, others stay there , but re tireme n t or d e a t h w i l l cau se them to s ink outside it) contribute in reciprocal c ombination to g i v e i t a kind of constituted or pre-institutional inerti a. B ut as every org an i s defi ned by its function and i t i s the l atter w h ic h i s c o nd i t i on e d from outs ide ( i .e . ins ide the group, outside the s ub -gro up un der con sideration ) , i t i s ulti­ mate l y the function i ts e l f wh i c h i n thi s form of predictable and modi fiable o bj ec t i v i ty be comes a p ra x i s -obj e c t . Th u s , p re c i s e l y in so fa r as each person g rasps him self obj ecti vely and ri ghtl y as incarnating t h e c ommon prax i s , he grasps h i m self al so as a cog i n an e x tremel y c omplex m achine , each element of which i s at once pas s i v e and p a s siv e l y c onditi oned by certa in o th e rs and for certain oth ers an e x ige ncy or prax is positively of condition ing . At thi s l e v e l , the del ay s , the counter-orders and h i tches , a whole braking of temporal i zation by spati al dispersion or the diffi c ulties of communi ­ e a t i n g the l ack of transport , the fatigue of long j ourne y s , etc . real ize constituted praxi s as a material and inert real ity to be constantly sustained and c orrected by human labour . We know . on thi s basi s - that thi s fi rst structure of pass i ve objectiv ity w il l soon be enriched by the determina­ tions of the prac tico-inert , through the counter-fi nalities of prax i s . It i s , in fact, w i thin the practical proce s s that determinations i n exteriori ty l odge themselve s , prec i sel y becau se sub-groups as med i ated by direct­ ing bodie s thanks to one another enter a st ate o f pass i ve e x teriori ty (and no lon ger one of mere differentiation w i thin a negat i v e i n t e r i or i ty ) T hr o ug h thi s en semb le , c ommon prax i s , by v i rtue of its v ery e ffic a c y i s burdened and darkened by its O\-1:n e.rteriority : i . e . p reci s e l y by the prac tico-i nert that will in flect it, and that i t w i l l h a v e to di ssolve i n order to recover i ts original orien tation . Th u s t h ro u g h i ts neces sary references to the other s ub-groups (from wh ich it demands such and s uc h a contribu­ tion, or w h i ch demand of it such and such a serv ice v i a the appropriate med i ati on s ) and to the s tru c t u re s of the en sembl e , the sub -group under cons ideration recovers a circ ular h i erarc h y of s ig n i fi cation s t ha t i s th e projection , on the level of the prac tic al community , of t he very th i n g i t i n carnates in its spec i fic action . Structures and s i gn ifications support in the between them a bond of exteriorized interiori ty which tends decompre s si on and scatterin g of the inert to tran sform i t s elf c o n s t an t l y into a total exteri orization of i nteriori ty ( i .e . i n to a d i s i n t e g ra ti on of the group ) . B u t p re ci s e l y because of th i s ri sk and as the deep m ean i n g of the ri sk i ts elf th i s i n te r i o r e x te r i or i zat i on of prax i s take s p l ace a g ai n s t a ,

-

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23 1

backgrolind of immanence. And th is immanence c an be only the living un ity of the c ommon activ i ty . The contradiction thu s manife sts itself in the fol l owing way. The ensemble of passive syntheses fornl an action group only if they repre sent, in a certain manner, the body of prax i s : the very inertia through which the s o l itary organ i sm as much as the c ommunity act u pon the inertia of the field. In other word s , so long as every sub- group really contributes to the c ommon action, prax is maintain s its exteriori ty ( i . e . i ts deterioration due to the waste s and tox ins it secretes within itself in the course of i ts effort to real ize its obj ectives) w i thin the frame work of its l iving interiority , i . e . of its di alectical temporal i zation : in the temporo- spatial fie ld, the temporal synthesis integrate s extens ion . B ut for every sub­ group , and for every member of the se sub-group s , this global unity of prac tical temporal izati on reveal s itself as the be yond of i nteriority , and they can refer to it only v ia the mediation of the practico- inert exteriori ty that gnaw s at the common field. In thi s sense , i n the movement of work , i . e . of compre s sion and incarnation, every s ub-group redi scovers in itself the unity of integration that i s the total becaus e it re-produces i t prax i s and i s th e same i n each. As soon as the delays , the l ack of s uppl ie s , the slowness of c ommunication s � etc . , steer i t back into hierarc h­ ical c hannel s , thi s praxi s , w ithout therefore be ing annihilated , p asses behind the exteriority that it s ustains , sometimes uses and transform s and that ri sks ruining it. At thi s level , there c an be an enve loping total ization onl y i f it satisfies the two fol lowing conditions : to take account in itself of decompress ion in ex teriority ; to in carna te , in the very movement of that integration , compre s s ion and incarnation as a c oncrete real i zation of the common praxi s within every sub- group. For in this way the totalization-of-envelopment w i l l disclose its real di fference from subordinate i ncarn ation s . I t s upports, by i tself and in i ts e l f, the hierarchy of s igni fying s tructures and the inert movement of the proce s s . S o through thi s high l y structured system it marks the place of every possible incarnation , and the ensembl e of correspondence s that makes of each in its place and w i thin i ts perspective the incarnation of all . In other words , this structuration i s preci sely what i s not found as an inert framework in secondary totali zations , because each of the se tran sforms such re lation s of exteriori ty i nto immanent and synthetic conditions of praxi s . * B u t it i s preci se l y what al lows them to e x i st, as a practic al ,

* Any s ub-gro u p , i n asmuch as i t has a n umher of membe rs, h i e rarch i zed or otherw i s e , and i t s fun c t i on delimits a portion of the practical fi e ld, likewise s u p port s - for e ach of the common i nd i v idua l s compos, i n g i t - a syste m of i n tenori zed e x teriority B ut these detai l e d struc t u re s do not nec es sari l y , or e v en freq uent l y , sy m bo l i ze the framew ork of the total i zing s y s te m .

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retotal ization of an ordered system : i n short, i t i s what produces thi s skeleton of i nert (but governed and perpetual l y transformed from outside) rel ations , without which the p o s sibil ity of any i n c arnation would not even be g iven. It m u st be added that it i s prec i s e l y th e be ing w i thout which the totali zati on-of-envelopment would v ani sh, but w hich in i tself and w i thout its po wer of practical uni fication would be scattered i n exteriority. Final l y , we h ave see n by what mediation s the real en sem ble of thi s practi co-inert gradually deviates the praxi s that engenders and s ustains it. We h ave shown, fo r example, how the first h ierarchical determination s of t he bas ic lev e l s h ad ended by tran s fo rming the sovereign. So the total izati on -of-envelop ment, inasmuch as it i s i mpl ied and aimed at by all the partial totai i zati on s , is prax i s itself inas m uch as i t engenders the corporeity that s u stains and dev i ate s it, and inasm uch as it attempts at every moment to di s solve its own exteriority into i mmanence . Th i s l atter point does not j ust pre suppose that prax i s i s objecti fi ed, su stained and l im ited by its obj ectification in the inert, in the shape of proce s s . It further implies that the incarnation of envelopment i s real i zed at al l levels of the practical proce s s as a medi ation and as a dissolution of the practico-i nert (or as its uti l ization) . A s we reject an y idealist i nterpretation, however, it goe s without s ay ing that th is d issolv ing mediation i s carried out by men . And s inc e we have not le ft the example of Sov iet s oc iety , thi s mediation was originally the ach ievement of the sove rei gn . B y this , we should understand his o m n ipresence a practic al corollary of h i s indissoluble un ity as an individual. For i t was because he could be ev ery where '1yvho lly that he occupied (by his image , by h i s speeches , by the propag anda i n the mas s media, etc . ) all pr emi ses. He was both the task and the observer who checked the work . He was the bo ss , the eyes and the impalpable s ubstance of the union i . e . the U S SR personified. He manifested himself at ev ery point of that d isparate ense mble, as the seam les s unity of that unde fi ned multipl i c ity. H is m i l l ion s of portraits were j u st one portr ait : i n every home, i n every office , in every work shop , i t re a li zed the presence of al l the rest, i n the form of a synthetic m i l i e u and an i nexorable s u rv e i l lance . Serial i zed by his presence in all terms of al l series , he w as a collective single­ handed ly� and that immediate , constan t pre s e nce contribu ted, when necessary, to maintaining rec urrence i n the deceptiv e guise of un ity . At the same time , ho wever, wherever integration w as real i zed to e xtremes , it was real ized by him or i n h i s pre se nce. H i s v o l untari s m was produced i n eac h person as an alterity of separation and as a w i l l to un ion . H e repre sented the identity of outs ide and i n s ide . The cult of h i s personal ity w as i n fact addressed to the obj ectifi ed interiorization of that enormou s temporal and spati al ev ent: the sociali zation of R u s s i a ( i .e . to Russia i nasm uch as th at ' fathe rl and ' w as soc ial ized , and to soc iali sm i nasmuch

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as its appearance i n the USSR added a new glory to the nation ) . So what

was the total ization-of-enve lopment during the S talin phase of socialist con struction ? It was Stal in , if y ou l ike , but inasmuc h as he was made and s ustained by the prax i s of al l , as the sovere ign uniqueness that was t o integrate i ts struc tures and c ontain its exteri ority . In other wo rds , it was first of a ll Stal in, inasmuch as the sovereign praxis of the leaders (of w hom he was one) proposed him an d u ltimate ly pro duced him as a non­ tran sc endable model of unity , and with the i l l u sory mandate to dis solve con stituted praxi s in th e dialectical inte grat i on of its free consti tuent pract ice. And in the total i zing movement it w a s then Stal in as a socialized indiv idual , i . e. one retotal ized by the con structive movement of all (or, at the very least, al l the directing organism s ) i n th at very constituent praxi s that through the common retotal i zati on became the simple reactual izatio n of con stituted praxi s : in other words , Stal in sovereignly determining the tasks of that society, in asmuch as it determined him itself and was interiorized i n him by the sovereignty i t al lowed him to take ; i n asmuc h as it in the ascending movement that produced and su stai ned him constituted h is depth . And then, in a new moment of that temporali zation, w ith the dev i ati on s imposed by his it was S tali n re -exteriorizing th at interiorized depth : i . e . transcending tow ards i ts idiosy ncrasy c ommon sol utions the common exigenc ies that retotalized h i m . At thi s m oment of prax i s , he soverei gnly took hold of the national field and by thi s very mean s integrated the practico- inert en semble into the un ity of a praxi s . We re di scover here the s c hema o f enveloping totalizati on, as we have indicated it in the abstract. However, in so far as it was produced as common prax i s maintaining i t s exteriority w ith i n the non ­ transcendable l i m its of an organic interiority , it w a s reactual i zed in every incarnation as a corporeal and v i s ible presence of unity . What i s m ore , i t was thi s biological unity that everywhere pres ided over the incarn ati ons ( i .e . the s ingu l ar total i zation s ) and gave them their mean ing and their orientation. In fact , this new moment of totali zation show s us Soviet society assim ilating Stal i n , being individu al i zed by h i m , making h is omnipresenc e into the proof that the agent ' s indis soluble unity was the truth of the apparent di spersi on of men and thi n g s . But this meant tha t, w ith the help of the lower leadersh ip bodi e s , thi s soc iet y ri ven b y through each of i ts membe rs conflicts grasped itself at the same time as a n ational personal ity , whose (whether sup porter or opponent) thoroughgoing i ntegration had been radical ized to become the idio­ sy ncras y of a s i ngle individual . For i f the circ u l ar movement of totali za­ tion i s grasp ed, there was a practical and dynam i c un ity of Stalin ' s retotal i zati on by the leading gro u p � and the soci al i st nation ' s retotali za­ tion by S talin : i . e . of the deep a s s i mi l at i on of a fatherl and as a semi ­ abstrac t enti ty w i th a person a s a n o n - tran sc endabl e l i mit of the c oncrete . •

2 34

BOOK I I I

B ut thi s sin gulari zation of a singul ar inc arn ation was a praxi s of the sovere ign, whose in struments were the mass medi a, ceremoni e s , acti v i sts, e tc . , and whose distant objective was the self-donlestication of indi ­ v i dual s . S tali n thou ght the withering away of the S tate wou ld begin once it became usele s s : i . e . once it had been ful l y real i zed (which meant: once it had imbued all sectors and been interiorized in a l l indiv idual s ) . When a l l individual s in a soc ial en semble were con stituted as common individuals in relation to that en semble , however vast it might be w hen they had interiorized it s constraints and c ensorships, to the point of transformi ng them into a ' second (or third) nature ' , i .e . into spontaneity then the S tate as a separate ( for all its extens ion) and spec i fic reality would no longer have any raison d' etre . Every indiv i dual, i n his very real ity , would be a fundamenta l re lation to so vereignty as other and ac t spon taneou s ly as an Other tha n himself. In thi s perspective, the cult of personal ity in stalled the sovereign S tate w i th i n ev ery indi vidual, as a cen sor and s uperego in th e concre te guise of a n Other : an Other completely indiv idual i zed w i th a face that photograp hers could m ake benevolent and l i keable who inh abite d them all as if to m ask from them the neces s arily abstract c haracter of duty. In thi s singu l arizing incarnation that was Rus sia on the march tow ards soci alism, every worker ' s obligation s were singularized by the face and voice of the one who imposed them. And th i s formidable sovereign strove to interiorize himself in every i solated or seri al ized molecule of the toi ling mas s e s , in o rder to become there the worker or peasant h imself as an O ther i . e . as a sacred personality so that the sovereign order could s imultaneously be heard by everyone on the radio an d be pronounced w ithin eve ry l i stener as h i s own sovere ign deci s ion , inasmuch as he himself was S talin : i . e . the indi s soluble organ i c incarnation of the social i st fatherland. B y thi s common impregnation of all indi­ v i dual s by the sov erei gn , Sov iet soc i ety through Stalin ' s mediation strove to bring the man of the masses closer to the common indiv idual of groups . The c ult of personality was the fi rst known attempt to change into a pledged group a soc iety in which , at the outset, the dis semination of farmers far outweighed ( in term s of the num ber of sc attered indiv i duals) the working - cl as s concentrati ons .

•

•

•

•

•

•

the total ization-of-envelopment was here the twofo l d move­ ment rising and fa l l i n g of groups escaping impotence (engendered by th e prac tico - inert) throu gh the mediation of an indiv idual sove reig n, who was soc ial ize d as an indi vid ual by becom ing the idiosync rasy of a nati onal soc iety : i .e . the omnipre sent inc arnation internal and external o f a regime , a lim itless task and a nation . In th e same c i rc ular perspecti ve, moving back agai n from thi s ind i v i duali zed soc iety to the soc ial i zed ind iv idual , we shall se e the new stratifi cations eng e ndered by h i s praxis transform the leading strata and , through i t , c hang e him as a practical and sovere i gn s upport for common action : hence , deviate the prax is that he p urs ued t h rou g h so c iety and soc i ety pursued throu gh h i m . We shall see the con sequence s of thi s de vi ation in the tran sformations of the prac tic al field and, by mov i n g down agai n from the sovereign to soc ie ty we as well as b y re- s i tuat ing soc iety in the modi fi ed fi eld shall fi nd i ts con sequences i n the human re l ations of production as i n othe r s e c to r s , on l y to return th ence to the con stituted sovereign and di scover i n h i m the modi fication s produced by h i s ne w retotal ization . If w e w e re to c arry on th i s circ ular e x ami nation l ong en ou gh , we should e v e n t u al l y fi nd a k i n d of hiatus betwee n the sovereign, the rea] state of s oc i e t y and the aw aren ess it had of itself. B etween 1 948 and 1 953 , S ta l i n ' s prax i s became a mon strous caric ature of itse l f. He cou l d not re solve the problem s p osed by th e exi stence of new soc i al i st S t ate s . The man of retreat and sol i t ude fe l t o nly mi stru st when Russia emerged from i so l a t i on : qu arre l w ith Tito, abs urd and c ri m i nal trials in the people ' s democ rac i e s , re surgence of p o l i t i c al anti - S e miti s m - no t h i n g w as l acking. The s a me mi s tr u s t l e d him to condemn M ao for want i n g to re sume h o � t i l i ti e s . A t h o m e t h e ri se of n e w generations and t h e grow i n g n umber of tec h n i c i ans al armed h i m : he re turned to Te rror and purges . The fact was that he had g ro w n o l d and b e c o m e t h e p u re p rod u c t of h i "i fo rmer HUS

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praxi s . In that body a nd brain worn out by thirty years of furious work, the old formu lae governing h i s stratagems the themes that were had become mortgages on the future : non­ organ ized in h i s action s transcendable inertia s . However, the soc iety he had produced required a policy radically different from h i s own. So thi s time the individuali zation of the man w as the result of his praxi s (on the bas i s , i t i s true , of phy siological age i ng ) . Thi s prax i s , as we have seen , was by and large w hat the situation required (give or take a ' differential ' ) . B ut inasmuch as it w as no longer i n carnated any where except i n him and inasmuch as it defined him by ne w l i mits , i solating him from the true soc i al mov e ­ ment it gave h i m th e tragic idiosyncrasy of impotence and fai l ure . Yet he was still the pri v i leged mediation , in a soc i ety that sti l l remained retotali zed by his sovereign indiv iduality . B ut S tal in became ossified in everyone as he became o s si fi ed in himself. For Sov iet man he bec ame the negative element separating him from others, from the practical field and from his own real ity : he was the source of ignorance and unaware ­ ne s s . In thi s last peri od totalization remai ned circ ular, even i f i t had the result of revealing an e xp losive contradiction between the sti l l v ery timid e x igencies of a world forged by Stal i n and the man Stali n as h e forged himself in forging that world and by the w orld he forged. For it was within the very unity of interiority , and as the last moment of the circuit, that the contradiction h ad to e xplode . Th us circularity alone can rev e al the total i zation-of-envelopment to u s . And as the l atter i s a movement never completed, that c ircularity in the perspective of temporali zatio n become s a spiral . Of course, this can under no c ircu mstance s mean that only c ircular rel ations exist in the society under cons ideration : the relation ships may be simply vertical , oblique or horizontal . Only i t must not be forgotten that they are establi shed through a movement of spati ali z in g temporali z ation , which gives a certain curv ature to every new fact. In other words, i n a society of the type we have j us t been study ing (and perhap s i n other societies 6 2 we shall come back to thi s shortl y ) , whatever the structure of the r elation s cons idered m ay be , they nece ssari ly parti cipate in the type of contraction or refrac ti on that constitute s the inner movement of the total ization-of-envelopment . Whatever, for example , the inc arnation un­ der considerati on m ay be, the agent works in a practical field enti rely conditioned by the sovere ign-individual . Moreover, he i s imbued w ith the propaganda of the mas s med ia. Fi n al l y , none of h i s actions i s quite i mmateri a1 to that soc iety so deeply integrated (amid the very con flicts

6 2 . S e e , i n the A p pe n d i x , the note s o n

pp.42R ff.

' Total izat i o n in Non - D i c tatori a l

S o c ieties ' ,

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that rend it apart) by emergenc y hence, to the sovereign himself or hi s local representatives. No more i s needed for his friendships or even h i s to have a loves whil e remaining horizontal relations of rec iproc i ty dimension of circularity. In other words , in o ne way or another every event however ' priv ate ' i t may be m u s t be considered as an i ncarnation. And each event, as an enveloped totalization , incarnates al l the others v i a the medi ation of the enveloping total ization . Looking at thi s more c losely , however, i t i s clear that the totalization­ of-envelopment i s not a praxi s ( i . e . the action of a free organ i sm ) , nor even a common prax is (in the sense i n which the action constantl y checked, co-ordinated and directed of a sports team, for example , can be so called) . There can be no doubt, to be s ure , that we are not leav ing the teleological sector: the action of the rulers has obj ectives, i t never ceases to be corrected , the action of the ruled too sets its own goal s . And it is certainly not the appearance of practico-inert concretions in the field of praxi s that could change thi s . When the practico- inert appears as a danger, a negative inerti a, a c ounter- finality at the heart of the practical field, the action sets i tse lf the goal of eliminating i t : that i s al l . Of course, we have noted that thi s action used to di stil its c ounter- finalities unwittingl y , and would then discover them through c onfl icts or inert negations of its obj ective . So already praxi s has marginal res ults that did not enter into the calculations of the experts . No matter. Necessity appears , inasmuch as action mediate s between separate elements of materiality. And the relationships th us e stabli s hed remain within the unity of a total ization, sinc e the y were produced by action and would not e x i st without its power of synthe s i s . In the s ame way , counter- finalities are destructive for the real and present men who struggl e against them . Formal l y , however, they endanger the overall unity only in so far as they attack its c ontent . For i n themselves they are fi n alitie s in rev erse , which could not exist outside a practical milieu and without borro w ing their negative being from the positive ends that agents seek to ach ieve. with the However, as we hav e seen , the obj ecti fi c ati on of praxi s en semble of c ounter- finalities accompanying i t has the re sult of c hanging the men who have undertaken it, and thereb y of devi ating i t without the knowledge of its agents . C ircularity appears here , since one i s moving from men to their practical field through prax i s , only to return from the practical field to men and to mod i fi ed praxi s . Now, on th i s occasion, the result of thi s acti on of men u pon them­ selves via the medi ati on of things is not j ust unfore seen, i t e scapes th e very ones who are its v ictim s ; or else , if they di scover it , it i s through a faint unease and by means of i n tel lectual tools that are them selves devi ated . We are at th e level at wh ich prax i s , as an immanent l i nk between man and things, produce s its own exteriority : i t has an outer

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guise a body. Thi s is what w i l l al low the c i rc ularity prec i sely in so far as the ensemble of these unknown modifi c ations is reduced to inert determ inations , strata and struc ture s . However, as we have see n , the agents maintain the uni ty of the action ; they ensure the interiorizati on of the exterior. B ut that itself transform s them , and within the still pre­ without ever ceasi ng to ac t and, perhap s , s ucceed the served unity ensemble i s i mperceptibl y transformed. After a few turn s , the se men have become other men intent on attain ing other obj ecti v e s by other means yet they do not even know it. Of course, I am takin g an e x treme because of their very distance case. D i stant obj ectives can remain more or le s s unchanged. B ut a swift flash of awareness fac ilitated by certain circum stance s : e . g . by a generational shift or a too blatant contradiction may lead to a rev i sion, and then the dev iation can be more or les s rapid. Everyth ing depends on the context. In its essence , however, i t remains the case that the spiral of envelopment manifests an alteration of praxi s through inner a nd non -con scious reaction s . Yet thi s reality in movement cannot be called practico-inert. What characterizes the practico-inert, despite everything, i s inertia. Here, from one end to the other, all i s action . In our chosen example, all is acti v i sm and vol untari sm. There i s not a sin gle one of the secondary and negative reacti ons which doe s not orig inate from praxi s and its power of unity. Totalization is temporalized preci sely in so far as total ized men are temporalized by action . Or, if you l ike , the totali zation-of-envel opment, which c loses upon agents and their metamorphoses , has as its real duration the dialectical temporal i zation of constituted praxi s . For the same reasons , you could not speak of alienation . Al ienation i s the theft or a of the act by the outside : I act he re , and the action of an other gro up over th ere modi fi e s the mean ing of my act from w ithout. Here , nothing of the k ind. The deteri oration comes from the inside . The agent and the praxi s w ere modified , to be sure , by the practico-inert but in i mmanence : inasmuch as they were working inside the practi cal field. Final l y , let u s not forget that the practico-inert, through seri al alteri ty , opens into indetermination and the universal (as undetermined ) . The total i zation -of-envelopment, by contrast, is the i ncarnation of H istory ' s factic ity by the facticity of an idiosyncratic ( an d wholly determined) c ontIngenc y . Indeed , the total izati on- of-envelopment represents the moment of temporal i zation in which the agent despite h i s s ucce ss (if he succeeds ) or perhaps because of it loses himse lf i n the act that produces h i m , derai ls him, and dev iates itse lf through him. Thu s i t i s th e act overflo"ving the man that i s total i zed . It retains within it its w aste s and di sas simi lation products , and i f it is tran sformed by them th i s i s because i t has gi ven them in and through practical integration · the inner unity that all owed •

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them to become effective . So although the deviations e sc ape the agent (himself transformed from within ) , it i s solely v ia the aspect of practical unity that we shall tackle the totalization-of-envelopment in our w hen it was a matter of hi storical inve stigation. The proof is that j udging the measure s taken by Stal in, his foreign policy , some demon­ stration or some statement made to the pre s s the action would appear ' to contemporarie s in the bourgeo i s democracie s as pure praxis , escaping determ inations of facticity and internal breakdowns of structure or balance. Western Communists saw there only an obj ective and rigorous re sponse to the spec ific and equally rigorous exigencies of the situation. Anti -Communists fi rst discerned the ' m anoeuvre ' (propaganda for dom ­ e stic or foreign cons umption , etc . ) . At the same time , in order to be able to j udge Stalin more hars hl y , they stripped all his praxi s s ince 1 92 8 of the ' pretexts ' of effi cacy and neces sity . Since ' manoeuvres ' are never required (at least in the specific form of their realization) s ince it was possible to halt the ' grain strike ' , for i nstance, without that headlong collectivization that pu shed the leaders on to the slippery slope of repres sion it was patent that the measure adopted, the agrarian policy p ursued, etc . , reflected Stalin ' s character a lone (or the ev i l nature of the Communists) . Conversely , after having long dec lared the five-year plans ineffecti ve for the simple reason that they did not be lieve in their s ucces s , when it became necessary to acknowledge the extraordinary growth of Soviet i ndustry they h it upon another expedient. Before 1 9 1 4 ( and thi s i s . a fact) Russia ' s industri alization had been growing very rapidly . Without the pointl e s s October Revoluti on , it would have carried on and the growth rate of production , under a c apitali st s ystem, would have been roughly equal in a given period to the soci al i st rate , while nobody would have re sorted to coercion . The point i s not to di scuss thi s futile and baseless hypoth es i s , but to indicate its function in the prop­ aganda war. If planning, and the bloody repre s s ion that accompanied it, led to nothing other than what a peaceful l i beral and bourg eois indus ­ trialization would have sufficed to produce , socialist commandism was not even required by the obj ective to be attained. It was mere l y the sy stematic application of intellectual theorie s by a handful of tyrants tyrannized by the most tyrannical of all . C uriously, by stripping an action of its real efficacy, you s im ultaneously wipe out the weight of things and their adversity-coeffi cient: the action i s no l onger dominated by the inert syntheses th at it create s . by its own obj ectification Ineffective and inexpert when i t was a m atter of building a new e conomy , had retained an absolute the B ol sheviks within thi s perspecti ve effecti vene s s when it was a matter of i mpri soning or extermi nating. The m ore gratuito u s the se crimes were , the freer the y became . Imagining the diffi culties of construction , one would at least be at l iberty to ask one self

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- in the name of those very difficulties whether measure s of generali zed repres sion were not going to compromise immediately ( I am not even speaking of long-term dev iations ) the economic growth of the USSR. If at the outset, however, you consider s uch growth as assured under any s ystem and whate v er may be the perspective s , you are coming back to Plekhanov and turning his arguments against Marx . The Plekhanov ist bourgeois m ake s the sovereign bodies s imu ltaneously into p ure ep i ­ phenom ena ( i n the domain of the econom y ) and at the same time into criminal and total l y responsible ( inexcusable) agents on the terrain of the repre ssive campaigns and the Terror. Ineffective as it was , th at Terror came from th em alone . Even w ithout it, the development of the USSR was assured . It did not manage even to slow the latter dow n . I n one domain , howe ver, its efficacy remained complete : the sovereigns re­ created and generalized the forced l abour the y were claiming to abol i s h , and they kil led . The se absolute acts all the more free in that they we re gratuitous were c haracterized by their sole efficacy: destruction . A nd the latter w as given, of course, as their o bjective . So the B ol shev iks different in thi s from the industrial bourgeoi s appear as ful l y respon sible for the negative and destructive praxi s imputed to them . The USSR appears through the mesh of the ir free acti v ities , which surround it. A nd thi s Shirt of N e s s u s transparent and corrosiv e , enveloping in a mesh of mortal activ ities that n ation independently pursuing its industrial growth - i s precisely the totality-of-envelopment, i nasmuch as it is m anife sted to the anti-Commun ist as freedom to do badly . Its immediate character i s to be a practical s ynthe s i s ; and i nasmuch as the anti-Commun i s t discovers i n the sufferings undergone w ithin the it or thinks to di scover it practical field by groups or individu al s , he deciphers these passions (in the literal sense) as referring h im back to the total izing and concrete action that provokes them . Thu s the common illusion i s that action as a pure force i s exerc ised upon its field i n the manner of the S toic ' cau se ' , w ithout undergoing the counter- shock of the changes it brings to it. It can be modified only by itself. And this control that it e xerc i se s upon itself in order to adapt itself to c ircumstance s represents the highest degree of praxi s , since it is a practi cal self- aw areness and reflection of the act upon itself. * B ut thi s ill u s ion would not even be po s s ible , if the investigation

* Th i s struc ture of the ac t ex i s t s , and w e have de s c ribed i t in relation to group s . I t e x i s ts a lso for the S ta l inist bureaucrat; i t i s even fet i sh ized u nder the n ame of sel f-criti c i s m ( i . e . i t i s transformed into a synth e t i c determ ination of v erbal matter and bec omes a th ing) .

B ut even were it to keep al l its tran s l u c i d it y , it i s sti l l n o t w hat i s i n q uestion . Though in terior to the tota l i zation-of-enve lopment, as one of its prac t i c a l struc ture s , i t i s covered by the mod i fi c ations u ndergone by prax i s -proc e s s .

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c arried out by the anti- Communist abroad (or his adversary the Com­ muni st) did not rev eal the U S S R to him i n the international practical field as pure praxi s without pas s iv i ty . Even today , after S talin ' s death, the sovereign sti l l reveal s i tself by acts (internal measure s , like dissolving the MTS ; measures vis-a - vis the outside world, like the unilateral s uspension of atomic te sts; practical achievements , like the launching of e arth sate l li te s ) w hic h seem separated by obscure periods of gestation. Thi s mean s that the main feature of the totalization-of-envelopment (in the case of dictatorship by a man or a party ) i s to produc e itself above all in relation to situated w itne s s e s as the unity of a pr axi s that i s. temporalized. Or, if you l ike, that the ex teriori ty of prax i s ( its e xterior­ being) is hidden within its v ery transparenc y . We have shown how practical measure s (recourse to bonuses and ' honours ' to stimulate produc­ tion) , by transforming the leaders from outside , deviated their praxi s through the fol lowing di stinction : a chin [rank] had to be re-establi shed, which would ultimately CREATE in every j ob an interest to be defended for i ts occupant. Or, if you like, the functionary ' s interest i s his own a l ienated obj ectification i n the m aterial and honorific adv antages of his function . For most observers , the stratification and the appearance of interests as a repercus sion of praxi s remained inv i sible . Communists saw i n the privileges of the B ureaucracy only the deserved recompense of the bureaucrats ' absolute dedication to s oc i ali zation. Anti -Commu n ists argued as though the material interests e x i s ted fi rst and the leading c ircles i n the name of these interes ts or, as w as u sually clai med, out of se�f- interest had allocated to themselves the lion ' s share (had s ys tem­ aticall y diverted the major share of the national income into their own pockets ) . The acti v i st illus ion i s here carried to its climax. It pres upposes a pe renniality of human nature (everyone pursuing their own i nterests ) , and praxis becomes the instrument of individual selfi shne ss or the particulari sm of certain gro up s . In other word s , the ambiguous position of t his B ureaucracy which has given itself interests on the basis of its absolute dedication to the Cause, and found itself ' interested ' even before understanding what was happen ing to i t all v an ishes , i n favour of a rapacious and logical activity that inflexibly combine s its means w i th a v ie w to attaining selfish ends , and u nfail ingly achiev e s i ts goal ; it i s not the prac tico-inert as being synthetic ally unified by praxi s that has dev iated the latter b y the transformation s i t has caus ed men to or at any rate from the moment the undergo , but from the outset obj ecti v e po ssibility for thi s w as given i t was the leaders who (w ithout changing themselves : they were already self-i n tere sted) devi ated praxi s i n favour of themselve s , and deliberatel y s acrificed the revolu tionary ideal to their own interests . In order to avoid fal l i n g either into thi s error or into transcendental

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dog m atism which will e xplain the entire ev olution of Stali n i sm by de ­ situated law s of e xteriority we shall say that the totali zation-of­ envelopment i s autonomous prax i s asserting itself as such, inasmuch as it produce s , undergoe s , harbours and conceal s its o w n heterono my as the passive and reactualized unity of its own by-p roducts . In thi s sen se , the totalization-of-envelopment re v eals itself as a dialectical link between the intended result ( with its fore s ee n con sequence s ) and the unfore seeable consequences of that res ult, i na s m uch as its incarnation i n the totalization of the practical field has to condition from afar all the elements of that field, includi n g the agents themselv e s . It alone allows in the temporalized spiral interpretation by one another of, on the one hand, the practic al organization of sovere i gnty as a function of the emergency and, on the other ( v i a a backlash), the appearance of a p roces s of stratification borrow ing its synthetic unity, i ts ori e ntation and its counter­ finality from action itself, and being produced at the heart of the latter as the actual waste-product of its temporalization . So we see forming as the interior exteriority of a v a s t common undertaking, as a function of it, and in the guise of its proj ection into the inert a v ast society-object, which will b e simultaneous l y a n i nert movement of industrial growth and, i n its own structure , a soc i al ensemble de fined by the separation of ownership and sovereignty . B ut we should lose the guiding thread of thi s i nvesti gation if we did not see that it i s the undertaking itself in its calculated resp onses to the v i tal questions posed by the practical field that produces itself and instrumenta lizes itself as this society -obj ect. More precisely sti l l , if we do n o t u nderstand that the signification of this society i s that undertaking as praxi s-proces s (as we attempted to show earl ier) , j u st as this society which make s its neces s i ty w ith action retaining the practico-i nert within it i s the destiny of this undertaking. Taken on its own, society w ould be a matter for sociology : you would l ink i nert syntheses together and sometimes unities without unity growth would lead to stratifi cation , sometime s stratification to growth , and sometimes they would lead to one another, depending on the soc iologi st. B ut the actual s ig n i fi c ation of a unitary phenomenon l ike an element of growth, or a determination of social morphology, must radically e scape sociology , s i n c e this sign i fi c ation necessarily refers back to the very source of the inert unity wh ich can only be action. The soc iologist i n thi s case is l ike a man pre sent at a game of bridge , who thinks he can con struct an absolutely objecti v e account by confin i ng himself to de scribing the movement of the c ard s , thei r s uccessive pos i ­ tions , the dealing of the packs , their s udden reas sembly and then their fres h div i s ion , w ithout ever mentioning either the pre sence of the pl ayers (with their eyes which see, their hands which p ick up) or the rules of the game (leav ing to future soc i o logists after a proliferation of mono-

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graphic work s on the shifting mov ements of playing-cards on so-called bridge tables the task of reconstituting these rules by a bold , d isputable and at all events di sputed proces s of deduction, which, moreover, would e stablish them as a kind of natural law : i . e . in exteriority ) . Conversely , however, if we were to consider prax is -proce s s l ike the S toic ' c ause ' , we should fal l into the error of S talinis m , which never knew itself as it was because it saw i tself as a bodi less activ ity . That kind of ideal ism w as not direct it had come from the situation. Obj ectivity i .e . for the leaders the practico-inert in the field was thei r raw material ; or, if you like , the obj ect upon which their efficacy was exerc ised. B ut as a re sult it fel l outside prax i s , which was nothing other than the synthetic and practical bringing into contact (through modi fication of the e lements of the field) of men , instruments and obj ects that until then had had no concrete contact . That bringing into contact itself (construction of a railway , for example) was defined on the bas i s of obj ective resources and ex igencies as the maximum (exactly calculated) of what could be done within the overall perspective (itself governed by common obj ecti v e s and the field as a whole) . Praxi s as a response discovered in objectivity , and as an economic calculus of obj ective pos s ibles c ould thu s be known as an obj ect onl y in its obj ectification : i . e . in its res ult. And, to be s ure, mistakes could be m ade . B ut these either had their origin in our nothingnes s (haste , lack of understanding , l ightmindedne s s , indolence , etc . ) or else they were bogu s m i stakes , hiding a counter-revolutionary act of s abotage . They could be eliminated by negation of the negation (coercion ) . B ut w hen a ful l y pos i tive operation had been obj ecti fied in its result, the latter was nothing more and nothing l e s s than the realization of the requi si te ex igency w ith the means available . Therein lay all the S talinist optimism: the constructors e scaped the consequences of the construction, the construction was in conformity w ith the objectiv e s of the constructors . To be s ure, the latter made themselves as they made thing s : but by m aking the right thing, they made themse lves in the right way . And when Stalin dec lared that History was a science , he meant that S talinist soc iety had no hi story (in the sense in which , prec i sely, H istory i s also destiny) . The S talinist made Hi story , but H istory did not make him . He foresaw deeds and reactions on the bas i s of rigoro u s arguments , but he was outside the domain in which Marx i sm applied. He could be neither an obj ect for a Marxist interpretation nor fore seeable as an object. He was a subject of History, and gov erned it as he liked . The cri s i s of M arx i sm came p artly from that : a bound ensemble of socialist nations escaped Hi story at the heart of H i story , since they claimed to make it w ithout undergoing it; and since M arxi sm (theoretico-practical) was obliged to i nterpret theoretical l y the bourgeois democrac ies, and to j u stify practically (at the cost of what deformations ! ) the activities of the •

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Sov iet leaders . I n short, Stal i n i st praxi s did not seek to as s ume its exteriority , and for that very reason lapsed into blindness: sel f-awareness w a s what it h ad to deny i tself. S o its attitude towards H istory , in the totalizati on-of-envelopment, became an integral part of i ts hi stori c des ­ tiny : i .e . of the being that the act had given it . The movement of circularity allows one , by contrast, to p as s con­ tinuously from being (as sustained and produced by the act) to the act (a s e xpre s sing its being by the v ery transcendence that preserv e s as it n eg ates it) . And it i s precisely thi s perpetual pass age i n the temporal s piral from the being of the act to the act of being, from the practical s i gni fi c ation of destiny to the destiny of praxi s ; i t is the impo ss ibi lity of considering for an instant the structured ensemble as a passive obj ect, w i thout at once rediscovering the group or groups as organizing them­ s el v e s for and through the undertaking; it i s the impo ssibi l i ty of total izing the res ults of action, without being referred back by these very results to their res u l ts at th e heart of the practical temporal i zation sedimentations , deposits , concretions , s trata, devi ation s ; i t is th at perpetual necess ity to climb to the apex of sovereignty , only to descend again to the base : it i s all of the se w hich constitute at once the mode of knowledge appropriate to the totali zation -of-envelopment and the type of objective reality that defines it. I n a certain way , it reali ze s i n practice the obj ective s of the agent s (the l e aders and the others ) ; i n another way , i t transforms them into other m e n d iscovering other res ults , but bel ieving they have attained their goal s s ince they have transforme d themselv e s at the same time as the se . I n short, men reali ze themselves by obj ectify ing themsel ve s , and thi s obj ectifi cation alters them (of course, in the abstract hypothesis of a complete totali zation , one not capped by other synthese s coming from e l se where ) . B ut as the alte ration comes precise l y from the realization, and s ince the reali zation i s altered in s ucce s s , between signifi cation and destin y a rel ation of deep intelligibi lity is revealed . Thi s particular s i gn i fi c ation h ad to produce thi s destiny : the l atter i s already found i n it a s i t s future being , through its present rel ation s with the practico- inert; and the destiny realized i s the signification of this s i g nification in the proj ected into the s e n se in which the objecti fied re sult represents practico-inert the limitation and deviation that this signification had to g i v e i tself, through the very praxi s that real i zed it . One can c l early see , for e xample , the link between th is society -obj ect ( S tal i n i s t s ociety) and th i s prax i s of planned and accel erated growth in th is underdeveloped soci ety ; and , equally wel l , the rel ation l i nking the past tran scended and pre served i n praxi s to the obj ecti fi cation of the latter as an inert synthesis i n B ei n g : i . e . in materiality , or which comes to the same thing i n the past. B etween the becoming-past of the act and the becoming -act (or

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inert structure of the act) of the past, there i s a reciproc ity of perspecti ve s ; pivot of praxi s and the as there i s between the sovereign-indiv i dual dev i ation undergone ; of signification and destin y and the bogus unity given by his common in teriorization to i nert and practical ensemble s : i . e . to w orkers undergoing their condition and producing (by realizing the latter prec isely through transcending it) thei r equipment and their means of s ubsistence . From thi s standpoint, the totali zation i s really exhau stiv e . Thi s should be taken to mean that it i s not the abstract interp lay of a formal signi fication and a very general destiny : it l eaves no e lement of the practical field (men, thi n g s , praxi s , practico-inert, series , groups , individual s ) outside it, and thi s for the reason that it is produced by all. Planning , as a determinati on of the ruling prax i s , w i l l remain j ust a do not dream if all the workers w i llingly or under constraint contribute to real i zing the Plan. Conversely, however, it i s inasmuch as these men endure in serial i mpotence (or for others who are acti v ists i n enthusiasm) pressures that transform them, and social reorg an izations that strip them of any power and re-create hierarchies , only to be v ictims i n the end of a s y stematic enterprise of ' po s se ss ion ' by the sovereign­ individual ; it i s i n so far as peasant revolts and the repres s ion of the se create that new man, at once loyalist and separatist, repre sented by the kolkhoz worker: it i s to tha t extent, in short, that thi s society -object ( with its oppositionists, i ts s upporters and its neutrals ; with its hierarchy , its astoni shing elan and its i nertia; with its rel ations of production, its rel ation ships between rulers and ruled, its ' infrastructure ' and its ' superstructures ' * ) has a reality, a practical efficacy, an idiosy ncrasy , a concrete wealth and a future. If we were to remain at the level of abstract structures and obj ectives, we should merely fi nd oursel v e s back with sociology . •

* I am using these te rm s prov i sion al ly . We shall see l ater on whether it is usefu l to keep them , or whether the perspective of c irc ularity does not remove a l l s i g n ificati on from the m . 63 63

S artre w a s not , i n fac t, te return to th i s problem i n the present work . B ut it may be

interesting in this c onnection to re ad h i s anthropology , i n S it u a tions IX.

1 966 Cah ie rs de Philosop h i e

i nterv iew on

•

let u s not now l apse into h yper-organicism. No s upra­ human synthes i s i s being re al ized here . Every one of the men who, i n their very movement, formed Russia as a soc ial ization in progre s s remained a free practical organ ism, transcending the circumstance s that had produced him , even if onl y to alienate himself in the practico-inert or to integrate himself into some group i n the form of a common indiv idual . Unity came simply from three factors. 1 . The fi rst i s that the ruling praxis was real , material and coercive, based on a party and a pol ice apparatus that gave it its true we ight. Orders were not mere verbal determination s , gracefully interiori zed by those who received them. And unity was not that of the ' kingdom of ends ' , or the unity which ideali sm terms a m utual agreement of minds : it cons i sted in an integrati on obtai ned by a labour by the pretty disgusting labour that cops execute upon suspects ( i . e . everybody) in a dictatorship (even a soc ial ist one) . B ut it real ly was a labour. Tracking do wn , arre sting, dragging off to or j ust watching, following , searching prison, beati ng al l th is was energy e xpended. And the blows or the years of impri sonme nt , the l ife i n the camp s those were real results , and there was a labour on the sufferer ' s part to reabsorb them as subm i s s ion . In so far as thi s twofold labour aimed to reduce opposition, moreover, it operated with in the broader frame work of the labour of the regi me ' s s upporters , who sought to preserve its unity and (while producing in accordance with the dynamic unity of the P l an ) exerci sed their control and cen sorsh ip rea lly upon each other and each upon himself. Th us prax i s was maintained by a labour of integrati on that was exerc i sed constantl y and was a material ac tion by man upon man , prov ok ing in the l abourer an expenditure of energy and i n the sufferer organ ic modification s . The unity of prax i s was thu s a materi al prod uc tion of men at work (and tak ing themselves as an obj ect of their work ) . I t was not a spontaneous unity , but estab l i shed. It wa� even that u n i ty ( any way in OWEVER,

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progress and never completed) as an onto log ical real ity of the common praxis con stituting, if you l ike , the fi rst appearance of the inert at the heart of total ization . And when I say ' fi rst ' , I mean only to mention the fundamental and logical priority of the abstract frame work w ithin which pas sive syntheses were in scribed. 2 . On the other han d , the creation by coerc i ve force and by al l form s of labour of a sovereign unity i . e . an institutional and practic al rel ationship between the sovereign and the practical field tran sformed for everyone the milie u of his life into a spatio-temporal determination of the sacred field of the sovereign-Other; and simultaneously con stituted the field of the i ndiv i d ual and s ub-group as virtually coinciding with the fi eld of sovere ignty (i nasmuch as ev eryone was himself, and inasmuch as he was the Other i . e . Stalin a mystifying unity situated at the infi nity it would of al l serial itie s : but this dialectic cannot be dev eloped here take us too far) . It i s not a question here , of course , of ' s ubjective ' determinations . Very really and very obj ectively in the field of sovere ign totalization and v ia the mediation of the sovere ign ( L e . via admini strative and pol ice apparatuses or propaganda organ s , etc . ) n othing cou ld be produced any�vhere w ithout provoking everywhere, from far away and without any practical rel ati on hav ing exi sted prior to thi s i n fl uence, an in ner modification of all h uman facts (from the organ ic and con stituent prax i s of that person to the practico-inert) . The logical fou ndation of that po s s ibili ty , of course , was the formal rec iproc ity that l inks anyon� to anyone (as I e stabl ished at the appropriate point). Every man is linked to every man , even if they are unknown to one another, by a reciprocal bond of i mmanence. B ut th i s fundamental bond i s entirely undetermined as much in its content as i n i ts sign (posi ti ve or negati ve) or spec ific ten sion (strength of the bond of sol idarity or antagoni sm) . Thi s indetermination of re alities in constant readiness to be actual i zed ( what at a fi rst e ncoun ter, for example, i s called a ' mutual liki n g ' or a ' mutual antipathy ' ) reveals through this new knowledge the re l ation ship of two persons as having always existed . 6 4 B y the judgement ' I don ' t l ike him ' , generally unmotiv ated , each ai m s at the other i n his total i zed past, and in hi s future conce ived as repetition . And precisely in so doing, he i s determined in the same way. ' From the day of h i s birth until the day of his death , thi s i ndiv idual i s made to be di sliked (or l iked) by that one ' gives way to an even more rigorous and objective determination , beneath the unifying and sovere ign action . This i s fundamental in the fi e ld , inasm uch as it every where marks the obj ective paths of im manent rel ation s . B ut the concrete un i fi cation of the field, through this infinity of

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infini ties of paths , produces every singular modifi c ation as having to affect all the occupants of the fi e ld (men and thing s , men via the mediation of things, things v ia the mediation of men) through the actualization of certain of the se paths. In that sense, rec iprocity is a relational milieu (like geometric space) i n which the act, by its very movement, creates thoroughfares . To take things at the level of the most abstract significations , stat istical data on individuals ' standard of liv ing do not have the s ame meaning at all if one tries to e stablish them (which i s , as everyone kno w s , v ery hard if not practically impos sible for want of a real term of comparison) for an ensemble made up of different peoples (the ' underdeveloped countries ' , Europe , or the entire popUlation of the Globe ) as they do in relation to the USSR. We shal l see what they signify in the former case : 65 but it i s immediately comprehensible prec isely because of the difficu lty of finding the common denominator between men whose w ay s of l i v ing are extremely different that quantitative relations should be e stabli shed in exteriority, and on the basi s of a certain character ( appare n t or profound, provi s ional or definitive : we s hall have to ask ourselves thi s ) of di spersion and detotal ization. Whereas, in the case of the U S S R , the quantitative appears against a background of unity and prepare s the unity of a soverei gn deci sion and its appl ication . Each person ' s standard of living conditions the production of al l. S o each person i s determined by all in the v ery perspective of the praxi s of socializatio n . In that sense, the averages are true . Of course, they do not y ield the concrete individual , and depending on the information available to them they sometimes do not take sufficient account of regional differences. What then? That means that other averages should be taken, nothing more . The standard of living at the regional lev el (even taking account of soci al categorie s) i s no closer to the indiv idual case : i t gives a better account of structure s , that i s all . B ut that typical living-standard which i s nobody ' s is in fact that of each indiv idual and of everybody . B efore knowing the averages calculated (which they w ill perhap s nev er know ) , all workers h ave reali zed for themselves a kind of average . D i s adv antag ed in relation to certain social strata which they envy, and i n relation to which they define their own purchasing power and the pos sibilities refused to them they are priv ileged in relation to other milieux ( albeit v ery slightly), on whom they are dependent (for production) and w hose destitution alarms them . [The salary of the individual] 66 priv ileged and disadvantaged all

65 . S artre w a s not to return to the problems of total ization at the l e v e l o f world hi story .

6 6 . S artre ' s manuscript h ad : ' Privi leged and dis adv antaged a l l at once , o ppressed [ . the s alary of the individual . " '

.

.

],

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at once, oppre s sed by some and subordinate to others marks the l atter' s obj ectiv ity at the heart of totali zati on : the synthetic ensemble of h i s powers and obli gations , inasmuch as they are determined on the basi s of Others . The rel ationship between his li ving-standard and that of the soci al categories immedi ately above and immediatel y below de fine s for him at once the real re lation of his objective existence to that of Others (through the wage , the sovereign determines for each person the qualification of hi s labour : i . e . turns his profe s s ional abi l ity in s uch and s uch a j ob into a quality -val ue ) and his opportunities for m ai ntaining his integration into the common praxi s (directly , and above all through h i s relation to the less adv antaged, since it i s ultimately thi s rel ation that obj ectively decides his attitude towards them if they carry on pas sive res istance or rebel openl y : for if the gap between their standard of li ving and his own i s narrower than it is between h i s standard of living and that of the closest people with pri v i leges over him and, of course, in the absence of any other factor then he can reveal himself objectively as ' one of them ' ; while in the oppos i te event, i n solidarity w ith the closest people w ith priv ileges , he w i l l be simultaneous ly against and the more aga inst them , the more them and s ubordinate to them ans werabl e to them he i s and the more h i s own wage , tied to his production , depends upon the ir labour) . B y thi s mean s , the wage of Others constantl y enters his own wage , and can even through the unrest provoked by its inadequacy reduce the purchasing power of the i ndividual under consideration without affecting h i s nominal wage. Thu s the misery of a particular agricultural province i s directly c ontained i n his purchasing power (in h i s real wage) as a thre at as the fragility of while the privileges granted to others are also to his living- standard be found in the immanent determination of that l iv ing-standard, as its unjustifiability . The demand (even implicit ; even unknow n to him self) that privi leges should be reduced to a minimum i s joined w ith this other demand: ' My s uppliers [of raw materials or food products ] must have enough to fi l l their be llies ' ; and to thi s third : ' My standard of living must be rai sed ' (numerous inqui ries have shown in the West, it i s that everyone , true , but the fact is not dependent on the system whatever h i s material situation and the radical i sm of his s ocial and political attitudes , demands an increase i n his real wage v ary ing between 25 and 3 3 per cent; thi s constant and immediate claim can naturally be more unyielding or les s so, depending on liv ing conditions ) . And the unity of the three demands tend s i n itself to e stablish a kind of unified wage , which would bring some down to a slightly lower l iv ing- standard i n order to rai s e the others to a higher lev e l . The unity of thi s ideal wage i s preci sely the womb in whose unity stati stical assessments of the real w age are produced. •

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Furthermore, the functionary himself without giv ing up h i s priv ileg e s - sees wages (as a share of national income strictl y defined by the Plan) as hav ing to be fi xed , taking account both of the ' voluntarist' hierarchy that has forged him and that he represents and of an adj ustment of liv ing- standards (by rais ing the lowest and freezing the highest; by an authoritarian lowering of all prices ; etc . ) such that nobody can be rendered incapable of working, by malnutrition or sic knes s . That propa­ ganda poster the Poles saw on the walls one day (at which they had a good laugh , and which was indeed laughable as a sign of the elimination of men by obj ects) ' Tuberculo s i s Holds B ack Production ' manifests at once a thoroughgoing ideal ist aberration and, in spite of everything , the exigency of a certain eq uality of condi ti o ns ( which does not mean i t can be achieved), in the name prec isely of production . One privilege , at least, should not be reserved for the ruling b ureaucracy : to be exempt from tuberculo s i s . If the Tuberculosis campaign could be brought off, the miner would be made equal to the minis ter at least i n thi s particular respect. Prec i sely, however, in thi s movement of internal reorganization of condition s ( i f not through wage s , at least as in the Pol i sh example through increased social services), the moment of stati stics i s indispens ­ able ; and it reveals the synthetic unity of the practico-inert, inasmuch as this i s maintained, forged and to a v ariable degree liquidated by praxis . in a people ' s democracy or the US SR is the The unity of av erage s inner unity of exteriority , inasmuch as it i s produced and reunited b y praxi s . If the di spersion of indiv idual cases of illness can be grouped into reg ion s and localized according to job, h ousing and social category , etc . , that is because already the sovereign praxi s has defined its own objective s . It already defines i tself by the obligation to improve conditions in the regions (before even knowing these, though a pre -statistical knowledge actually al lows it to determine them by and large ) ; to devote a larger share of income to building houses , clinics, etc . ; to struggle in the factories themselves against th e counter-finalities of certain jobs and the occupational illnesses caused by them ; lastl y to the extent that thi s is possible to rai se i n one way or another the living - standard of th ose social categories w here the scourge is most v irulent. Thus statistics are merely exteriority itself (at least, i n the case of the sovereign-individual ) being revealed through the interiority of praxis as itself constituted by relations of i nteriority between men and things , or between men via its mediation. It di scloses the practico-inert outcome at the heart of praxi s as the outcome of a unitary practice, and as a product of di sassimilation which reveals itself in the perspecti ve of an already constituted under­ taking that aim s to di ssolve i t . But s ynthetic inter-conditionings are not confined to big events that

TOT ALIZATION -OF-EN V E LOPM ENT

25 1

can be measure d . * The appearan ce or disappearance of a gro up modifies the deep reality o f any individual, even one situated outside this com­ mu nity . An intel lectual work published in cert a in circum stan ces albeit devoted to rela tively non-current question s such as the hi story of the Tsars , or to gi v ing an account of sc ientific experiments without any pro spect of immediate practical application sees its inn er meaning transformed to the point of changing its author i nto a counter­ rev olutionary or an oppositionist ( hence, a traitor) , for the sole reason that circumstances have changed and he i s changed by the m. Some historical work exalting the ' spontaneous ' resistance the Russian people put up against Napoleon during the Russian Campaign mi ght be e xtolled in 1 93 0 : it helped to glorify the popular epic , attributing to the people the merit that Ts arist historians used to c laim for the feudal armie s ; it was i n l i ne with the nationalist particularism of sociali zation ; and in the eve nt of w ar, it offered a model to the peasants. Fifteen y e ars later, however, in another practical concretion , it received from outside another signific ation . Distrust o f popular spontaneity was at its peak, the hie rarchical sy stem had become ossified and the cult of personality was being maintained by every mean s . The officia l version of th e 1 940 war was as follow s : it had been w on by the Rus sian Army under Stalin ' s leadership. The Russian Army was its soldiers , to be s ure , but only inasmuch as they were led by their officers . Ev e n if honour w as accorded to the Res i s tance and the activity of partis an s behind ene m y l ines, i t we nt without s ayi ng that the heroic peasants wag i ng that terrible struggle were i n spired and led by the Party . Fadeyev was obliged to correct h i s work The Young Guard, becau se he had not taken sufficient a ccount of the role played by the Party . What was at stake, i n that moment of exacerbated S talinism, was exactly thi s : any regroupment of the mas ses not carried out u n der the guidance of the established cadre s , be i t even to defend the regime, was seen as counter-re v ol utionary or at all events e xtoll e d fi fteen yea rs e arlier dangerous . On that basis, the work received a subvers ive content. And, let us be cle ar , it received it objectively. First, by v irtue of the very hostility that its republication w ould arouse among the bureaucrats and in part of the working popUlation ( the part that had ral l ied total l y to the regime and would see its obedience challenged) . S econdl y , bec ause for other c i rc les i t would represent p reci sely an element of demy stification and p erhaps regro upment. Let me be we l l unders tood. Thi s description of the dev i ation of the

* I c all tuberc ulo s i s an event and n ot a

state

of the society under c o n s i deration, i n so far as the l atter stri ves to reduce it and s uc c eeds - albeit to a m i n imal e x te n t - rather than enduring i t as an i nert burden .

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meaning of a work through the deviation of common praxi s i s a simple description of the data yie lded by dialectical investigation . By no means does it imply political and moral approval s uppres sing any even retro­ spective freedom of e xpre s sion, in that ultimately the work was b anned and i t s author forced to make self-criticism prec isely in so far as it might contribute to a new awarene ss and a correction of the dev iated action. B ut our problem is purely formal, and we must recognize that the s ignification of the work h ad really changed, for the simple reason that its relation to c urrent real i ty had been modified through modi fications to that reality itself. It was the other term that was transformed . B ut as the work a past and (in this strict sense) inert determination of c ulture did not cha nge, the relation altered. If this work (like Soviet encyclopaedias , or offic ial h istories of the B ol shev ik Party) could have been continually touched up, by the mere fact of its constantly checked adaptation to the synthetic milieu and its trans formations it would have remained the sam e , i n so far as i t would have become other. Thi s means that its living rel ation to the S oviet reader ( as a rel ation of univocal immanence and quasi-reciprocity) wou l d have remained constant, in proportion as it moved away from its absolute mean ing : i . e . from the meaning that had been e stablished at the moment of publication , through the dialectical i nteraction between the author ' s intentions and the exigen­ cies of hi s audience . In so far, however, as it persevered in its cultural being , the readers condemned it, cons ide ring that they had b een misled by sham appearances when they had approved it. For we have seen that at the s ame time as action dev iate s , it loses any chanc e of knowing its deviation. So it was not S ov iet society that could as sess its own drift in relation to its 1 925 reality or rather, it as ses sed that drift inasmuch as it appeared to be that of the book itself. For the s ame reason, all condemnation s are retro spective . Even if it i s a recent act which i s the object of the s anction , the grounds seek out past - hence, inert acts that the practical drift, inasmuch as it i s uncon scious , has constituted as c ulpable . From thi s standpoint , I cannot refrain from citing the e xample of an incident that occurred in the U S A , and that I came to know about (even though our inquiry i s devoted solely to the U S S R ) . For in the first place , we shall thu s be able to glimpse that this type of refringence of the practical milieu i s encountered in all societies, albeit in obviously differing forms. An d secondl y , t he case was absolutely typical . It involved a public official who was seriously harassed in 1 95 2 becau se he had sQouted ' Long Live Russia ' some ten years e arlier, when Field-Marshal Paulus surrendered at Staling rad . It was of no avai l for him to point out to the investigators and h i s s uperiors that the U S S R h ad then been an ally of the United State s . The others, as may be imagi ned, had not forgotten thi s . They had merel y not, jar their part, sho ute d

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' Long Live Rus sia ' on that day neither had anybody they had ever heard of. So the exi stence in the past o f that differential ( in si gnificant at the time when it appeared : people woul d have called it e xu berance, or perh ap s w i thout real anger progressive sympathies) becam e , through the practical milieu of 1 95 2 , the proof that the individual in question had lon g been an oth er, an enclave w i thin the nat i on. As may easi l y be s urmi sed, integration of the US SR by the praxis of socialization could only exagg erate that tendency of the past to make itself the denouncer of the pres ent. Some person who had been arrested for his links w ith the opposition between 1 927 an d 1 93 0 , but s oon rel eased, would often be arrested ten years l ater on the same grounds and thi s time executed. Thi s i s because, at the fl u id moment w he n tendencies had been c l ashing and the riv als (all of them , and each for the other) had incarnated i n a certain w ay the unity of communist praxi s , the fault ascribed to the accused man had been venial : he had made a m istake , he had let himself be seduced by an unv iable programme or specious propaganda, but how could tha t l ap s e ally him w ith counte r-revolution , the Right and Left oppositioni sts s ince the defeated leaders were still Communist s , who were seriously mistaken but not counter­ revolutionarie s ? Ten years late r, the exiled Trotsky w as objecti v ely and s ubjectively a tra itor for the Soviets. The Right oppositioni sts had been ex ecuted or else, like B ukharin, they h ad admitted their crimes . Ever closer integration around the s overe ign-individual ; oppre s s ion of the workers; Terror rebounding even on the B ureaucracy; the threat of w ar all these contrib uted to the radicali zation of grievances . B ut i f Trotsky was a traitor, if h e had been preparing his criminal actions s ince the death of Leni n , his supposed former ' allies ' had i n reality been h i s accomp lices and their so-cal led l ightmindednes s became in fact a treason . Of cours e , it will be said that this i s not true. Even i f Trotsk y ' s tre ason were to be admitted, in line with t he S talin i st propaganda , that would not nece ssarily imply the culpab ility of his allies in 1 927. Mistakes c an be made in good faith . B y thi s very judgement, however, we are s ignalling that our degree of integration into prax i s i s at the very least much low er that that of the Sov iet functionary or activi st . B ecau s e of the emergency , he defines his acts by their practical outcome they will be positive or ne gative and deliberatel y confu s e s their global sign ification w ith their i n tention . In a sense, as we saw in The Problem of Method, this attitude i s correct (more than ours , which remains ideal i st) on condition that the act i s viewed in its multidimensional obj ecti v i ty , or if you l ike at all the levels of its rel ations with the social en semble and with group s and individual s . 6 7 B ut

67 .

Th e Problem of Method,

p

98, n. 1

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since the only practical aim was to construct, the S talinist apparatus neve r o ssified round its priv ileges and identify ing w ith construction v iewed the act other than in its relations with the sovereign ( seen as a mere faceles s force) . On thi s bas i s , that so v ereign bure aucracy which sought to chang e men by acting upon the material conditions of their lives coul d not even conceive that the guilty might change, or adapt. I t endowed them with an immu table - being , because it grasped them on the basis of its own o s s ification : i . e. its alienation from the i nterests it had given itsel f. So w hat changed in the past of Sov iet individuals was no t j ust the material fact (the alliance w ith the opp ositionist becoming complicity with the traitor) but through b ureaucratic change s the w ay of evaluating them (rej ection of nuances : c omplicity became immutable , the di stant pas t alway s had more importance th an the present or, if you l ike, the immediate past). Whatever the individual ' s recent service record might be, moreover, it would be interpre ted on the basis of h i s old errors . If he had been successfu l i n the post to which he had been appointed b etween two purges , this meant that he was seeking to evade th e v igilanc e of the apparatus . How should the sti l l fl uid ense mble of hi s pre sent undertakings weigh in the bal ance, as compared with the v ast monolithic block of the old error? B y being interiorized, thi s way of j udging of j udging oneself ended up making Stalinist man into a n e xtraordinary contradiction . He was wholly thrown forward like a bridge towards the socialist future , and at the same time he rem ained indefinitel y what he was . His past, against all e xperience , became his unalterable law . For everyone was modified , even in his self-awarenes s , by a b ureaucratic ossi fication that inasmuch as he was n ot a bureaucrat was not produced directly w ithin him , but inasmuch a s h e was l inked to the B ureaucrac y , at least by the immanent rel ation of obedience determined h im from afar, whether he modified hims e lf to adapt to the modi fication of the other term and preserve the inner rel ationship that united them (command-obedi ence) or did not m an a ge to modify h imself and appeared in society itself as drifting beneath the weight of h i s old actions : i . e . as s uspect. In the former case , the induced tran sformation was absolute, the identity rel ative to the sy stem in which he was s ituated. In the l atter case , the transformation was graspable only in and by the change in the s y stem (and it s unawarenes s of changing ) , so it would be termed relative; on the othe r hand, to assert that identity rem ained absolute it was necessary oneself to be situated ou tside the system . In conclusion , therefore , it was merely a matter of different refe rence points . If one v iew s things in th i s way , it i s easily understandable that the members of the sy stem i n evolution should reasonably be able to rev erse the terms, treating as an absolute what we term rel ative ( and v i ce vers a ) . It goe s without saying, of course , that on

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thi s bas is a di alectic at once s ingular and polari zed by the orientated temporalization of everything i s establi shed, in e very gro up and ev ery indiv idual, between the absolute and the rel ative (whatever definition m ay be given of each of these) ; and thi s dialectic has to determine from afar certain transformations in other social categori e s . I think it i s worth recalling, to c onclude thi s section , that action from must be afar and via the mediation of the relation of immanence distinguished radically from all forms of direct activity of men upon 68 For it i s a matter of a supplemen tary things or upon other men. o u tcome of the sovereign praxi s of integration , rather than ordinary p ractice s (orders , obedience, con straints , i ndoctrination , explan ations, distribution of tasks, divi sion of labour as a function of the exigencies of material and equipment, profe s s ional activities, etc . ) . The totalization-of­ envelopment at least at the level at which we are consi der ing it: i . e. on produc es itself as a unity of the supposition of max im um integration astringency in the milieu in which indiv idual s live ( i . e . i n the practical fie ld such a s the sovereign has defined it, and such as it has de fi ned the sovereign). And its dialectical law perfectly intelligible , m oreover, since it i s quite simply the rela ti onship between a totality in the process of being accomplished and its p arts , and mutually between its parts via the intermediary of the totalit y demands that e v ery determination of the practical temporalization , wherever it may take place , be actualized as a determination in interiority by all the elements participating in thi s t e mporalization . I t must be added, howe v er, that certain type s o f internal can utilize this law to transform an activity above all i n struggle individual or group without seeming to touch them. Fo r example, a regroupment elsewhere of certain ensembles i s enough to fill a restricted co mmunity with ineffi cac y : to make it, desp ite itself, slip to the Far Left or the Far Right. On other occasi on s , provoking the disappearance of the most left- wing group has been enough to oblige the adj acent group to take on its role, despite itself (th i s misadventure happened, as i s well kn own , to Chaumette and Hebert after the arrest of Roux and Varlet) . 69 B ut thi s more or les s pragmatic use of the rule of totalization c an in any case appear only in the polarized m ilieu , and following integration (al though it can, subsequentl y , in tensify the latter) . 3 . The third factor of total izing unity is incarnation . B y thi s I no longer mean the incarna tion of the s ummit i . e . the soverei gn but

6 8 . Critique , v o l . 1 , p p .664-5 . 6 9 . The Hebertists, of course , hav ing helped to e l i mi nate the Enrag e s (Rou x , V arlet ) , adopted their pro gramme and were themselv e s condemned to death by the Rev o lutionary Tribunal in 1 794 .

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s i mp l y , at all levels, the retotalization of the totalization-of-env el opment by every event, every praxi s and every particular hexis . I shall not come back to thi s , since I have already spoken a bout it. I j u st w ant to note a few of its features , inasmuch as it occ urs in the polarized mil ieu of spatial i zing-temporalization. In so far as the unity of the drama, for th e individual , i mplies the diversity of levels at which it i s played, and in so far as every aspect of behaviour c an be considered at once as referring to the organic totality ( i .e. to the ensemble of significations of the whole person) and as incarnating i n a particular m i l ie u defined by its astringency and its degree of explicitness , involution ( or display), v iol­ that s ame free totali ty of the practical ence and radicali sm, etc . organism, to that extent the singular incarnations of the totality-of­ envelopment are rigorously grounded. I have shown else where how the intrusion of adults into the moral life of an adole scent c an be felt ethica lly as a condemnation and as an inj ustice, but lived sexually as a 0 7 s imply bec ause it has to grasp all rape. Sexuality , here, radic alizes conflicts as a confrontation of bodie s by de sire . So in so far as this intrusion must be felt by the body in its materiality ( and precisely in so far as adults hav e m ade impos sible a non-sexual incorporation of the condemnation: for example, by avoiding ' corporal ' mistreatment) this relationship of non-reciprocity w i l l be lived sexually. Sex, if you l ike, a pure w i l l be the form of incorporation . S uddenl y the intrusion practic al signification : the y have watched the child, caught him, forced open hi s drawer to steal hi s secrets from him take s p lace carnall y as penetration . The flesh realize s the metaphor by the only passion it knows. And the child ' s ambivalence towards adults w i l l become an ambivalent structure of desi re (horror of penetration b y the other; fascination by the role of rape v ictim ) . The whole e vent i s thus incarnated. I t i s other, and it i s total. If the anal y st intervene s , it w i l l precisely be to real i ze a C atharsis and e xplain as a synthetical l y bonded ensemble of transcendent s ignifications what sex ual procedures reali ze ful l y , but obscure l y . Thi s fleshing out of incorporati on has effectively radicalized the event. H av ing itself become the body , it w i ll be res u scitated in de sire itself by the orientation it g ives to thi s . And if by thi s very means the adolescent slides towards homosexual ity , he w i l l l ive as incorpora ted by carnal procedure s and the ir consequences (reactions of others) this rel ativ ely benign condemnation as a radical exclusion. I t i s not his free practice that set itself exclusion as an obj ecti v e , nor i s it some outraged unconsciou s . Sex and sexual life , however, being in themselves the source of a radical i sm and the domain of a mute violenc e , the sexualized

7 0 . In Saint Genet A ctor a nd Martyr, Ne w York

1 963 .

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offence was realized w ith maximum v i olence and as irreparable . Thi s example allows u s to u nderstand that every individu a l procedure repre sents , from the standpoint that concerns u s , th e re-pro duction of the social totali zation -of-envelopment in the form of an enveloped totaliza­ tion. Can it be denied, in fact, that sticking to our chosen example the praxi s of s oc ializing integration has to be i nteriorized in e veryone as incorporation? No doubt thi s incorporation i s complex for the very reason that s ymbo l s are replaced by real action s . It i s effected j u st as well by the interiorization of a ssemblies U ob skill) , b y fatigue , by affective procedures (that are n oth ing but l ived praxis) and occup ational illnesses, or by a certain way of reproducing w ithin [oneself] the u rgency and extreme speed of a constantly accelerated te mporalization as nervou snes s , instability or, on the other hand, voluntarist harshness as it is by a strictly sex ual procedure. Yet there i s no doubt but that sex uality i s affected. I h ave reported the case of those neo-proletarians peasants recruited from the hinterland by the new factories of Le Mans and trans formed into w orkers after six month s ' apprentice ship who became electrical welders and pa id for thi s overhasty transition from rural to industrial rhythms with the more o r le s s total ruin of their sexual life : the percentage of impotence (there, as i n S aint-Nazaire for the same j ob) i s considerable from the age of twenty-eight on. The exploitation of the peasant the violent action exerted upon h i s body, and upon the org anic rhyth m s defining his behav iour he lives radical l y , at the level of sex, as castration : in short, as an irreparable deficit. In others, however, l e s s radical sexual procedures can be found, and our experts think they c an detect traces here of that invisible and phantasmagorical reality they term the psychic j ust because radical passivity i s replaced by pas siv e procedures: sexual indol enc e; scarc ity and crude simplification of des ire , w hich when it does arise become s indifferent to its object; long periods of indifference; intermittent impotenc e , etc . In the forme r case , impotence was the direct, phys iol ogical result of adaptation di sorders . But the procedure s I have j ust enumerated are nothing different. Only, as the deficit i s not so great, the y are still lived in the form of a need-project (or rej ection of the p roj ect, through tem porary absence of the need) ; w hich means that the organis m remains defi ned by a relation to the future , instead of the future on thi s singular score being simp ly blocked by a total , inert negation. In the c ase of impotence a s it i s merely suffered, in the guise of an inert dete rmin ation of the physiological it can be sa i d that incarnation i s reduced to its simplest e xp re s sion; or, if you like, that it i s a matter of a negative ( and for that v ery reason abstract) consequence rather than a singularized totalization . Of course, this impotence is l ived in interiority as an incorporation of l i fe ' s m isery , exploitation and transplantation, and in turn as a moral diminution and

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inj ury to the living source of praxi s . B ut th e se are already incarnation s of the latter, in o th er practic al s ectors , whereas in itself it retains the indeterminatio n that characterizes e v ery deprivation. B y contrast, how ­ ever, in the case of the sexual procedures we hav e enumerated in which the practical and the physiological remain basical l y undifferentiated incarnation is whole, s in ce there i s a reassumption of the determination s suffered and the life imposed, but on the plane of sexuality. With out a doubt, sexual procedures in one w ay or another incarnated the accelerate d urbanization in the U S SR o f peasants recruited by industry and, as a con s equence , th e extraordinary e xodus of those w ho have s ince been called ' displ aced persons ' : i . e . at once the exodus , the difficulties of acc l im atization, and the reaction of the practical organism to those determinations undergone. Even if the l atter negates them, in fact , he interiorizes them to re-exteriorize them. From thi s very standpoint, h e radicalizes them. It i s perhaps on thi s plane that he will expre s s the that he does not have the rejection the irreconcilable opposition mean s to exp ress el sewhere . Or else, qui te to the contrary , a certain indifference to sexuality, riven b y v iolent, brutal and s implified desire s , may be realized i n some people as the inc arnation of activism : i .e . of a practice entire l y devoted to work and social action . This practice becomes a pure negative presence in the organi c milieu of sexuality . Howeve r, at precisely bec au se thi s pre sent ' negatite' i s not a pure the s ame time and simple destruction it i s re-exte rioriz ed in a twofold transcendence : one enveloping, the other enveloped . (a) From the former s tandpoint, sexual indifference ( since thi s i s our example) i s already preserved i n the so c ial a nd political praxi s th at transcends it. For at thi s level, celibacy as freedom to produce (or, if it i s a matter of ambiti on, as freedom to succeed by such productiv e activity) may find itself implicitly contained in the v ery temporalization of praxi s , as an immedi ate consequence o f the s c arcity of time . Circu m ­ stance s w i l l or w i l l not be able to explain afterwards thi s provi si on al option . It should above all not be thought , m oreover, that celibacy as an implicit option is a pure absence of any rel ation w ith marriage . T he sexual bond i s a real and constant determination of the reciprocal rela­ tions between men and women. It exists w ithin the practice of celibac y , because thi s practice i s an abstention in relation to an institutionalized and socia lized mediation of the carnal relation ship as a bond of funda­ mental reciproc ity . (It is well kno wn that thi s m ediati o n in every society , aim s to transform the ambiv alent reciprocity of the couple by creating on its behalf a sovereign mediation which God or the l aw transform s [the partners ] into pledged or common individuals . In oth er w ords, the couple institutionali zed v i a the mediation of a mandated third party constitutes itself as a unity of integration for th is third party : ,

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i .e . for the s overeign. And in relation to thi s mediated and non­ transcendable unity , each partner i s defined as the s ame c ommon indi­ vidual , here and now, as their p artner. I n fact, the non-transcendable unity of the couple i s an alienation, preci se l y in so far as it hide s reciprocity . The more thi s alienation reflects a social h ierarchy for e x ample, the s uperiority of the mal e the more rec iproc ity i s driven back into subterranean rel ations of eroticis m . B y contrast, the more social circum s tances highlight reciprocity , the more the s ynthetic institu ­ tionality of the couple i s fragile and the more its unity i s called into question. ) In the s ame way , the celibacy of pri ests i s not j ust an attitude towards their fundamental sexuality but a transcendence of that sexuality , in a sacrifici al perspective from the whose val ue itself must come fact that it i s preserved as it i s transcended. In short, even in the case of the young acti v i st set on celib acy (at least temporarily ) , the problem of sexual life i s imp licitly present through the very presence of the fl e sh (as a permanent p o s s ibility of incorporation) : w i l l he be chaste , or w i l l he confine himself to brief encou nters at the behest of h i s desire s ? The decision may be e xp lic it onl y in the case of deliberate chastity . Depending on the v arious v iewpoints (internal to Soviet society ) , the other option may appear a kind of blithe confidence i n life , or a ' mi litary leave ' , or on the c ontrary a pers i stence of the past, bourgeoi s customs , etc . And such v iewpoints, of course, are not those of j ust any old individual s , reacting at the whim of a more or les s innate ' character ' . Rather, they define the v arious in them selves , and on the plane of sexuality m ilieux and groups , and the functions differentiating them . The practical weight of such options (many of which are already passivized, particularly in the upper echelons of the hierarchy) w i ll partly decide the activi st ' s individual choice . B ut thi s i tself shows u s , in cro s s -section, his real relations with the v arious strata of society . Depending on whether he i s merely after an increased wage or wants to try and make a c areer, he will have contacts with different l ayers of the B ureaucracy . Conversel y , however, his contacts at least implicitl y , and inasmuch as h i s origin or original behav i our have themse lves determ ined these by defining him through a positi on (an inert perch) and through a particularization of the field of poss ibilities , themselv e s take acc ount of the open ing of his ambiti on . It i s w ithin thi s circularity that he decide s his praxi s , and his praxi s decides on h i s s incerity . Thus his sexual option even though it remains i mplicit neverthele s s s ucceeds i n situating h im in the social ensemble : above all , if he i s considered in his singularity a.nd in his devel opments (chastity can be a labour, and in a sense the practice of sex ual freedom can become one too) . On the level of the total prax i s that characterize s the indiv i dual and always mob i l izes h im as a whole what­ ever he may do (even, and above all , i f he wi she s to abstain) at the

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level even of the social , ethical options , or rel ations w ith i nstitutions sex i s pre sent as a synthetic determination in interiority , and as the rel ationship of reciprocal immanence of thi s man with any woman , inasmuch as every woman absent or pre sent, and i n one way or another - determines also his praxis-body as a carnal body . (b) B ut that partic ular totalization is the totalization of the practical organism as a free constituent prax i s . A s s uch, it might be compared to the totalization-of-envelopment (although one is the dialectic itself, as a free constituent fou ndation of intelligibility , while the other is the dialectic­ as-constituted-reason) . Moreover, the same sexual attitude can obviously be encountered again in the form of an enveloped totality. Whatever, in fact, his personal option m ay be, the fundamental exi stence of the sexes as a bond of reciprocity ( undetermined, of course , outside circu mstances and movement) disposes [the individual J i n hi s carnal depth and within the framework of the hi storical conj uncture to reactuali ze , by tran­ scending , the relation of immanence that condition s him in his fl esh by mean s of that particular woman : i . e. to realize himself as sexual behaviour at every ' opportunity ' , i n every encounter, i . e . ( outside of work) in a permanent way whether it i s a m atter of rejecting , renounc ing , seducing or brutalizing . Desire is at the bottom of these procedures : either as his own desire , or as the desire of the other troubling, alarming, repUlsive, 7 1 etc . I have expl ained e lsewhere how the body makes itself flesh . B ut it must be added also that the flesh becomes act, whi le retaining the opaque passivity of fle shly thickening , to the very point of orie ntating practically (towards the other ' s fleshly thickening) and revealing its own arousal. That i s what gives its deep meaning to the term (of ethical and religious origin) : ' the carnal act' . The body-instrument becomes facticity , inas­ much as it i s determined i n interiori ty by the concrete encounter of a particular oth er body (of the oth er sex ) and through thi s facticity transcended towards the other strives to wrest the other ' s body away from instrumental ity . The result, if the carnal act take s place , is that it i s the fl e sh being transcended i n its very s olitude and in its contingency towards the solitude and conti ngency of the other. So its ambiv alence i s understandable , since it is simultaneously action and pas sion . It i s , i n fact, the c arnal contingency of l ived experience being transcended by being turned into pas sivity , only to act through thi s very passivity upon the flesh of the other . And it s objective i s itself carnal , for we are beneath the level of corporeal instrumentality setting an abstract obj ective through its procedure s : i . e . outlinin g , within temporalization, a schematic future that every new w ay of behaving wi l l help to particularize. The object of �

�

7 1 . In

Being and Nothingness,

pp 3 8 7 ff.

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desire i s an immediately present concre te reality : the fl e sh of each person , in himself and in the other, inasmuch as it cannot be realized or even desired except through the movement of the instrument to become fl e sh in itself and in the other. Now this relation, as a reciprocal action , i s particularized in every case by a finite albeit hard to enumerate ensemble of factors . It matters little to u s . What counts for u s i s the fact that in the case of the ambitious y oung man we have env i saged, the carnal relation inasmuch as he i s one of its terms , and we are viewing him (abstractly) apart from the other has to incarnate i n turn h i s totalizing option . To the extent, for e xample, that he has produced himself, through his actual labour, as i . e . to the e xtent th at the en semble of hi s pro­ instrumental hexis cedure s , ins ide and outside work, tend to maintain (simultaneously as an en semble of motor habits, and a synthetic perception of the practical field and through it of his own body, and at the same time as a kind of pledged inerti a) the practical reality of his body as that of an instrument for directing instruments ( i . e . as inertia exteriorized and controlled by praxi s) and as efficacy of inertia moulded upon inert materiality to that extent, the thre shold to be crossed ( under the sway of need more than desire) in order to pass from instrumentality to the flesh w i l l be higher. And even were thi s thre shold to be cros sed, the sexual behavi our risks rem aining more instrumental than carnal. The offered passivity of the other appears like a l i ving matter to be handled; to be di spo sed in s uch yet carnal contingency i s not and such a w ay ; to be penetrated experienced deeply as such, but remains the abs tract prop of arousal . Of course, this sexual behavi o ur may be of v ari ou s kind s . What counts is that in the singular moment of the embrace or the care s s it resumes and, in a tran scending movement to realize itse l f and attain its goal, incarnates the boy ' s total behav iour. For if it were the mere inert outcome of hi s social acti v ities , we would not be able to v iew it as a l i v ing incarnation : at most, it would refer to the decompre s sed ensemble of practice s . B ut it i s a matter of the real relations between him and some woman or other, in their particular development and in their singular temporalization . Moreover, everything i s indeed singular, as the irrever­ s ible unfolding of an affair common to two indiv idual s . From the outset, the woman ' s physical and moral personality is already a kind of internal factor in the singularity of this young man ' s pre sent behaviour patterns with respect to his comrade s and himself. These relations whether he rej ects the woman or seduces her are a free practical invention , in so far as the flesh i s transcended toward s the flesh and the circumstances of their union (or conflict) simultaneously require certain behav ioural forms . B ut thi s very invention i s the proj ect that transcends and negates the former circ umstances , thereby preserv ing them as its internal

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characteri stic . In particular, it m ust be understood that the sexual rel ation of thi s indiv idual to thi s wom an realizes h i s practical relation of instru­ mentality with inert matter, as the actual limit of h i s arousal or as the particularity of his sex ual life . In other words , h i s total prax is is realized here, in thi s i nstant, in and by the se acts which pre serve a kind of private fal l outside the great historical singularity and in thi s v ery way undertaki ng in which he seeks to play h i s role . Not j ust in the strict realization of the ' carnal act ' , m oreover, but actuall y in the bound ensemble of behavioura l forms ( against a background of explicit or hidden reciproci ty of the sexe s ) w hich have prepared h i s union w ith this woman, and which by v irtue of that very preparation have given it a certain ethico-practic al struc ture . Indeed , if he has shown himself ' sly ' , ' boastful ' , ' cowardl y ' , etc . , or, on the contrary , ' frank ' , ' open ' , etc . , the se ' qual ities and defects ' which for the woman who lov e s him merely repre sent h i s private character, and concern only h i s priv ate rel ation s with her are on the contrary the actual re al i zation of his objective rel ation s with hi s work and his bosses : h i s pos sibilitie s of ' getting ahead ' and wresting himself away from the masse s , and as a function of this his opportunism ( i . e . the quality of h i s total praxi s and, at the same time, the signification of h i s social activ itie s) or, on the contrary , his sectarianism , etc . as the sexual rel ationship i s a Still m ore fundamentall y , moreover rel ation ship of contingency , arousal and flesh, but for that very reason i s perhaps the deepe s t incarnation of the relation of rec iprocity between ' human beings ' , at once as free organisms and as produc ts of the society in which they live it i s no t j ust the indi vidual who pronounces sentence upon himself and his human real ity through the relations he establ i shes : it i s society that causes i tself to be j udged by thi s free incarnati on . Not that ' worse ' or ' better' re lations cannot be found in other circumstance s , and by considering other coup les . B ut s i mply because the fundamental rel ation between the sexes i s defined as a field of poss ibles within the objective l imits set by the worst and be st coupl e s . The se limits , as i s w e l l known, for a specific soc iety and a specific moment are not so far aw ay from one another. Ev ery indi v idual , in every couple , condenses the sexual and conj ugal field by h i s very inc arnati on , inasmuch as he produces himself through the synthetic determination of the field and as the real ization of one of its possibilitie s . It will already be clear, in fact, that thi s v ery field as an integral part of the i s interi orized by everyone, inasmuch as rel ations of sovere ign field production , instituti ons, total i zing prax i s , education and traditions (rein­ forced or combated depending on the case ) produce him as a sexually soc iali zed ind i v i dual , de fi n i ng anew through him the fundamental relations hip between the sexes and gi v i ng th i s a ne w and singular promi nence, by virtue of the rec iproc al significations and reflections establi shed by each indi v idual between the sexual i n stitution and other I n stI tutIons . •

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enve l oping totalization is incarn ated by every singularity , and every singu l arity defines itself simultaneously as an incarnati on and an enveloped to talization . Yet there is nothing irrational here : neither Gestaltism nor any of tho se ambiguou s , v ague forms that strive to re­ e stab l i sh a h yper-organici s m , i n one shape or another. The se enveloped totalizations incarnate the totalization-of-envelopment for the sole reason that indiv iduals as practical org anisms are total izing proj ects , and there i s nothing e l s e to totalize in a society integrated by a sovereign­ except the totalization-of-envelopment i tself. The latter individual totalizes them (by concerted and co-ordinated acti ons and by the ex igen­ cies of the practico-inert, as well as by the determination in interiori ty of each person by everybody and everything) inasmuch as it produces them. They retotali ze it, inasmuch as it is through the practical transcendence of the interiorized factors that the y make them selves its products . B ut thi s retotalization enriches i t with the concrete ensemble of particular circum stance s and goal s . S o the totalizati on-of-envelopment i s found in every enveloped totalization as its s i gnification : i . e . as its integration into everything . It should not be thought, however, that the signi fication of envelopment i s to the enveloped incarnation as the abstract i s to the concrete . In a prax i s whose sov ereign is an indi v idual , the signification of envelopment i s itself indiv iduated: i .e . the as we have seen prac tical unity o f action i s al so the indis sol uble organic synthes i s repre­ sented by a man; and for thi s r eason the totali zing total i zation likewise defines itself by continge ncy , b y concrete factic ity , by the l i mits and riches of the singular . H owever, a s w e have also seen, although the sovereign praxi s can be described as i ndividuali zed (as praxi s of th is sovereign , obeyed by these men and not oth ers ) and thu s di scloses th e scarcity of men as one of the counter-finalities of h uman h i story , i t still remai n s the case that the praxi s o THE

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i s d efined i n th i s very singularity as an obj ective response to the real exigenci e s of obj ectiv ity (on the bas i s of the already posited goal s ) . S ingulari zatio n i s merely facticity as nece s s ary continge nc y , and as incarnation of a common action whose objective laws e manate from the external circumstance s , the aims and the counter- finalities secreted in the course of temporalization. * Here the i n th is hi storical conj u ncture objecti ve l aw s of the group ' s (or nation ' s) praxi s must be inc arnated by th e option of the sovereign- individual, and as posse s sing the dual aspect described earl ier: a fanning out of objective prescriptio n s c oncerning imperfectly determined i ndividual s or groups ; and the i ndiv idual temporal ­ ization of one option, through t ranscendence and actual ization of th is particular practical organ i s m . In thi s sense, we shall encounter in the constituted by the sovereign decree at once the common i n div idual and his speci fi c differential , a s a lag in this forged by c ircumstances perspective between his incarnation of the revolutionary past (and, beyond that even, of some v ani shed Ru s sia) and the actualization de manded by circumstances . It is remarkab le , moreover, that thi s differential i s grasped in the decree inasmuch a s i t offers i tself as common obj ectiv ity and as a universal l aw . I f no oppositioni st notices i t , at l east the falsely historian w i l l unearth it. B ut the key thing here i s th at idios yncrasy , as a differential , a ppears through an insufficiency or exaggeration of the pseudo-universal conten t of the l a w . A l l thi ngs considered , the h i s tori an declares (and even thi s i s with all the documents at his di sposal questioned , though eventually accepted) t hat the obj ecti v e situation did not require all those stipulati ons ; or that it requ ired sti l l more ; o r, above all (this i s the most commo n case) , that it required more , fe wer and somethin g e l se (w ithin the very l im its where idio syncrasy can play a p art) . Throug h these comparisons between obj ective , parti al l y undetermi ne d possibl es and obj ec ti v e exigencies (of imperfectl y determ i ned categories of men; or of the practico- inert i llum i nated by the obj ecti ves to be achieved), it i s paradox ical that one should be able to determ ine an idiosyn crasy. B ut the paradox di s appears when you reflect that s ince the i ndiv idual i s s oc iali zed in so far as he has indi v iduated h i s society , hi s idiosyncrasy i s precisely that objective lag (and considering the temporal i zation throughout its dev elopment that obj ective drift) , i nasm uch as it is not produced as a parasitic dev elopment of the practico-inert inside the fi e l d, but on the contrary re fers to a practical option : its immediate foundation. And thi s option inasm uch as it involves s ynthetic operations , a fi nal dec i s ion , and the formulation of a proj ect throu gh serv ice s and correcti o n s contributed

Leav i n g n at I on s , etc . *

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aside,

hy pothet i c al l y ,

tran sce ndent

acti on s

by

e x tern a l

g roup s ,

fore i g n

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by the sovereign i s i tself noth i ng other th an the s y nthetic temporalization of that decree , inas m uch as the un it y of the temporal develop ment gives the latter its s ynthet i c real ity ( through irrevers ible i ntegrati on) and its borrowed power to transcend itsel f. The sovere ign i s s imply the prac ti cal unit y of the proj ect, and thi s unity of l iv ing immanence characterizes i tself in interiority by the lags and drifts which sig nal the objective co ntent of the law or decree . Thi s orig inally s ignifi e s s i mpl y that it i s this particular so vere ign idiosyncrasy from which emanates THIS lag a/ the practica l with respect to principles an d objects. It i s pos sible , for exampl e , to consider that the way i n w h ich Stal i n concei ved and utilized the notion of ' opti m um v ariant ' (borrowed by h i m from th e first programmes of Trotsky and the Left before 1 92 5 ) clearly reveals h is characteri stic ' brutal ity ' . In the case of such a sovereign, how ever, what w ill bru tality be i f not preci sely a voluntari sm expressed in decisions by a g ap between the exigenc ies of the obj ective or the re al s ituation and the tasks (pointlessly m ultipl ied, p ointles sl y arduou s ) sovereignly exacted by the real praxi s ( s uc h as i t is , not s uch as i t ought to be)? Interiorization of thi s ' brutality ' for the oppositionis t , or for the historian con s ists in seeing it as the free future of sov ereign d eci sions and as the destiny of citizens . Hence, thi s simply means that its re- exteriorization i s fore seen , in measures to come (literall y to com e , for the oppo sitionist l i v ing u n der S tali n ; not yet stu died fu l l y by the hi storian of planned growth in the U S SR , so determi nin g the future content destine d to appear in his work) . The best exampl e i s p e rhaps S talinist anti - Semitism . If S talin had been oblige d to ans w er for his actions before some revolutionary court, he would have denied fi ercely having been an anti-Semite and to a consi derable extent h e would hav e been sincere . For anti - S em iti sm, in its basic form as racism (th is p arti c ular Jew i s irredeemably lost by v irtue of the e x iste nce within him of his race, which dri ves him to act badly : dri v e s him into anti -national o r anti social activ it ies) , was obviously conde mned by M arx i st ideology (as, indee d, by mere democratic l i beral ­ as a my sti fi c ation based upon posi ti v i st Reason). H i s attitude ism toward s the Jewi s h problem , the increasingly anti - S emitic measures he took against Soviet c iti zens of Heb re w origin that whole well -known ensemble was obj ec tively mo tiv ated in the s overei gn ' s eye s b y the politica l difficultie s which integrati ng Jews into the nation of soci ali s m caused. The link s (real or i m agined * ) between J e w s at home and i n the

It is true that, after the T � a rist pogroms, emig ration h ad the effec t o f p art ly dispersing R u s s ia ' s J e wi s h fam i l i e s - so that e very Jew h a s , or m ay h av e , a c o u s i n in the W e s t . B ut it i s also true that the se peopl e have l o n g been s eparated; that they n o l onge r h ave anything i n c o m m on ; an d that they no l onger com m u n i c ate ( p artly al so b e c au se of the Terror, w h i c h pre v e nts all S ov iet c it lzens from communic a t i ng fre e ly w ith other c ountri e s ) , *

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capitali s t nations and l ater the emergence of a Jewish state under the particular control of American capitalism ( v i a the mediation of J e w s in a l l thi s the United State s ) , the activities of the Zionist League, etc . repre sented to the s u spic ious S talin not j u st a possibility of n uc lei forming, but the real pre sence of a nucleus of traitors with in ( some active, others potential , all in cahoots). The old n ightmare of rev o l u ­ tionarie s was re incarnated here , i n an unexpected form : what the m e n of 1 793 used to call ' the em igre w i thin ' . The notion o f racism w a s thu s (seemingly , at least) not applicable . It s i mply happened that h i s to rical circumstances, by multip lying their l i nk s w ith the capitali st foe , h ad constituted a speci fic ensemble of S ov iet c itizens precisely the J e w s as a permanent danger to social ization . Thi s first meant that any spec i fi city had to be denied them (whereas the lingui stic or folkloristic spe c i fi cities of national minoritie s were developed) . Yiddi sh , for example, i f i t were to become the organ of a Jew i s h c ulture (with novel s and p l ays in Yiddi sh) , would heighten the integration of that harmful grouping and for that very reason its self-awarene s s as a spec ific ity . That culture and that l anguage could have only one res ult. B y uniting the Jew s against other Sov i et c itizens (or at least by i solating them from the l atter) they activ ated their links with other Jews those who spoke Yiddish and had created a Yiddish culture i n the countrie s hostile to soc ialization. Liquidati on of the specific tools of thei r culture , however, was accom­ panied by a police s urveillance that at once destroyed any pos s i b i l i ty of integration . The contradicti on was manifest: they were denied any c u lt ural autonomy , bec au se it p revented integration ; but they were denied i ntegra­ tion, bec ause their hi storical past already des ignated them as traitors and they had to be kept under constant surveil l ance . On t hat bas i s , of c o urse - w ithin the sovereign field, where relations of immanence conditioned everything b y everything from afar the opportunities for repres s i on and deportation multipl ied ad infi n itum . I ndeed, by virtue of the very c ontra­ diction of S talin ' s po licy and s ince the Jew s had to be de -lewified the ine s c ap able w ithout it being po s sible for them to be integrated sol ution was exterminatio n . A s s i mi lation, through total phy sical l i q uida­ tion of the assi milated , for the bene fi t of the assimi l ator ! In so far as thi s policy defined S talin above all the Stal in of h i s l ast years as a v irulent anti-Semite , it de s ignated him prec isely by the measure s he had taken and by those he would take (or that death would pre vent him from taking) . From that standpoint, we shal l recognize i n h i s policy towards the Jew s a n eo-an ti -Sem itism of a political rather than ethnic origin, springing from the suspic ion of the sovereign (and through him of the entire indiv iduated society) towards any soc ial ensemble that m ight regroup i ndependently outside the sovereign direc tives i n the name of a common hi storic al past or certain similariti es of situat i o n ; and

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at the same time from the particulari sm incarn ated by Stalin him se lf, who rejected univ ersali ty and outside the U S SR saw only the rotten w orld of capital i s m . (From the standpoint of that particulari sm, the l ink between a Moscow Jew and a Jew from Tel Aviv or Lo ndon could on ly be corrupting in the name of a fal se universalism, a Western bourgeois was seeking to corrupt a soc ial i st worker and universalism was repudi ated in the degraded form of cosmopoiitanism , etc . ) . It forms no part of my purpose to study the Je w i sh problem in the U S S R under Stal i n . The example intere sts u s here from another viewpoin t: it raises the question of the idiosyncrasy of the deeper lev e l s . S hould the historian content himself w ith reproduc ing poli tical anti ­ Semitism, in its real ity and its signific ations , as an immediately graspable idiosyncrasy of the sovereign: i . e . as a pattern of behaviour provoked by fal se problems and false ex igencies that only the sovereign and h i s team of secondary leaders could determine , inasmuch as they had them selves been produced by Terror, mi strust and anti-uni vers al i sm (a backlash of praxi s described above)? Or should he not ask himself whether that s uppo sed ' neo-anti- Semitism ' di d not spring from the old anti - S emitic rac i sm and derive its v irulence from that? The question i s rai sed, to tell the truth, on two distinct level s at first sight, at least. For if you look at the measures taken and their implementa­ tion as praxi s realizing i tself through the vertical regroupment it produces by its very temporali zation i n the v arious social layers there can be no doubt but that the sovere ign practice s were partly sustained by the young mistrust of encircled soci ali sm . B ut it i s even more obv ious that the se populations knew and shared the rac i s t anti - Sem iti sm of T sari sm, and had not been demy stified (even less so, in th at poli tical anti - S emiti sm made demystification imposs ible : educators c ondemned racism in word s , but - by v irtue of its very re semb l ance to Tsari st persecution the persecution of Je w s by the soverei gn obliged s uch education to remain a dead l etter) . In thi s sense , as you moved farther away from the top level (it i s pure l y prov i s i onally , moreover, that we are granting this level the benefit of the doubt) , the driving force for the subal tern official s and the mas ses was still rac i sm. Thi s was enough to transform the sov ereign practice , through the soc ial layers it regro uped i n the unity of a prov i s i onal temporali zation. Perhaps neo-anti - Semitism, as a pol icy towards the Jew s , w as real ly applicable on l y in so far prec i sely as at the lower level s of soc iety it qui te sim ply di s solved into rac i sm . I f that i s true , i t must be said that Stal in exploited the rac i sm of the masses (it matters little , from the standpoint we are adopting here , whether or not he meant to) and , there by , the socialist so vere i gn accepted such raci sm and by i ts acti on s helped to re inforce i t . Pop u l ar anti­ Serniti sm , i n the U S S R as e l sewhere , had actual l y had an economic

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foundation : the peasants had been anti - Sem itic when the merchants were Jew s . S ocial i zation, from the outset, had contributed to dissolv ing thi s foundation. What remai ned was the petri fi ed web of traditions (outdate d significations , activ i ty of the Church, etc . ) . The se too would have dissol ved i n their turn , i f the sovere i gn had not revived them by replacin g the v anished foundation with a political bas i s. Conversely, those anti ­ S emiti zed masses could hencefo rth espe c i ally at moments o f danger demand out of racism that the government shoul d organi ze pogroms , or sanction those which they carried out s pontaneou s l y . The campaign agai nst the Jews once more took on that diversionary aspect that it h ad alway s had, under all governments. B y reinforcing racism, pol i tical anti ­ Sem itism ended up di ssol v i n g i nto it. Th us the Stal inist option revealed more clearl y its idiosyncrasy . Rather than renounce political segregation, the sovereign ri sked a res urgence of rac i sm . Anti-Jew ish rac ism was thereby determined as l e s s dangerous for soc ial i sm than the free exi stence of Jewi sh communities or indiv iduals j oined together by c u l tural bonds . Thereby, the sovereign was called in to question . To be sure , S talin, under the pre s s ure of c ircumstances , had often compromi sed on principles (the les s he had respected them , the more dogmaticall y he would reas sert them , albei t with an imperceptible devi ation ) ; but here the gap was so big that i t had perturbe d hi s own troops (or, at least, the more enligh tened minority of the executive) . For S talin not to recoil a pri ori from those pol ice methods , which could have no other effect than to reawaken the rac i s m of the mas ses an d for the rebi rth of the old Ts ari st anti- Semitism not to strike him , at all events , as a regress ion on the part of the w orki ng classes and , as such, as a negative must S talin not have been won over, result to be avoided at al l costs s ubtly and right from his harsh Georgian childhood, to the traditional (rural or semi -rural ) forms of anti- Semitic raci sm? In order rea lly to have believed in the Jew i sh danger, i n the U S SR of 1 9 50 (even if Zionist fol l i e s , spying affairs , etc . , are taken into account) , revolutionary and partic ulari st mi strust were insuffici ent. Fo r i t was neces sary already (and i n all countri e s ) to be rac i st to c onsider that, out of all the specific groups (national mi norities, or c losed societies w ithi n the larger one particulari z ed by their working or l iv ing condi tion s ) , the Jew i sh group was dangerous by its nature i n order to attach any real importanc e to the poten tial relations that S ov iet Jew s might ( i f the regime were different) mai n tain with Western Jews . If the que stion i� posed i n th i s l ight , i t i s immediate l y clear that the s uppo sed political neo- anti­ Semitism i n the U S S R had al way s e x i sted in bourgeoi s countrie s , as one of the structure s of anti-Semitic rac i s m . For the bourgeois too , Jew s are coun tryless . I t was the bourgeoi s who fi rst condemned the universalism of Reason the very same that Stal i n termed ' cosmopol itan i sm '

TOT ALIZATION -OF-EN V ELOPM E N T

2 69

bapti zing it with the name ' Jewish Internati onal ' . It was the bourgeo i s ( w h ich was why M arx called anti- Semitism the soc ialism of foo l s ) who , confu s ing the international relations between capitalisms with the human re lations between Je ws be longi ng to different countri e s , first saw the Hebrew as an i ndiv idual i n the service of foreign i nterests, who se nay­ say ing univ ersal i sm sought to dis solve the parading as Reason national partic ul arity of what o ught to be h i s co un try . And this ' concep­ formu lated, as may wel l be imagined, in the less stupid anti ­ tion ' Semitic circles seeks to preserv e rac i sm while claiming to transcend it. For those who adv ance such propositions usual l y add that , for their own part, they would have nothing a gainst Jews if they woul d onl y leave the nati on on which they are battening, and go off to populate some new country or settle in I srael ; for i t i s not some internal virus , b ut H istory the ' d iaspora' that has made them what the y are . Thi s l atter point, though , was not accepted ful l y by Stalinist anti- S emiti sm: for i t woul d have meant allo wing Jew s to opt between Tel A v i v and Moscow , whereas it woul d h ave been an intolerabl e absurdity for a S oviet citizen even a Jew to have been able to sho w that in certain c ases it was pos sible to prefer a bourgeois democracy to the fatherl and of soci a l i sm . S o the US SR would keep i ts Jew s , in o rder to exterminate them . Hence , the sovere ign did not l imit himself · as we had initi al l y said to making use of the old rac i sm , in order to maintain a policy of repre ssion rooted in politics . In de fining that policy (by acti ons ) he actually reconstituted racist anti- Semitism in all its significatio n (and acros s all soc ial l ayers ) . He merely re served for himself and the ruling c ircles the option of concealing the baser currents, throu gh e l uc idation of hig her significati on s ; and of disgui sing the rac ist move ment in the historical interpretati on . We need onl y re- identify c irc ularity as a commo n law of the practical event and our investigati on , i n order to grasp the conditioning of the masses by the sov ere ign act (a political praxi s claim ing to be M arx ist) and the total i zing reconditioning of the sovereign by the masses reinforced in their rac i sm . For the intell igibility of the totali zati on-of-envelopment, thi s i s enough . Sta lin and h i s collaborators were retotali zed a s rac i sts by the masse s . The act , v i a the mediation of the whole soc iety , came back to them and determined them . You can see wh y inten tion , in this case, was i rrelev ant. If i t had not been racist at the outset, the ac t had sti l l obj ectively been the re sult of racism; above al l , moreover, through the very operati on of circ u l arity , th e intention was to become racist s ubsequen tly. You can grasp here from real life the extent to which the sovereign autonomy of prax i s was not incompatible with its s trict condi tioni ng . It was not nece s sarily as an interiori zation of popular reaction s , and as a tran ­ scendence of these , that rac ism was re-exteri ori zed as an intentional

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s ign ification ( among others) of acti on . Through th e action from afar th at h i s sovere ignty made pos sible, rather, the sovere i gn found himself qualifie d as hav ing to underta ke a pol itical campa i gn against the Jews in a soc iety whose masses revealed them sel v e s in a l l the ir ra c i sm , and that h e woul d h imself integrate by rac i st slogans (or sem i - rac i s t ones, to l eave the princ ipl e intact ) . Th i s meant prec i sely that he rein ven ted grassroot rac i sm, a s a means for h i s politica l campaign and , perhap s , as a poss ible procedure for inte gration . Gradual ly determ ined* by the c i rcumstances that gave rise to it, the obj ective it pursued, the means it created for i tself, the retotal i zation of grou ps and series that it effected , and th e intri n s i c currents whi ch thi s retotali zation prod uced and which in the form of exigenc ies retotal ized the s overeign through h i s under­ t ak ing th i s prax i s bec ame spec i fi ed in the c ourse of its spiral temporaI­ i zation and e nded up defining itself as a free choice of a single possible . For the choice did remain free, in the dialectical sense in which we understand it. I t transcended the pre sent towards an objecti v e defi ned by negation of the former c ircums tance s . An d by v i rtue of hav ing been chosen among others, th e most fa ra way pos s ible obj ective of that prax i s was and would remain defined by the option (what i s more , i t could not even be said a pri ori that new c irc umstances, in the historical c ontext, made it neces s ary to pursue i ts ai m ) . B ut throu gh the circular i nteractions we have pointed out (which were all syn th e tic and integra tive) and action found itself c ompelled to inv ent its sole current possible i nvent i t freely . For it transcended theoretical re s i stances in order to choose rac i sm as the sole po s s ible w ay of making that pol icy popular . Choosing it, moreover, it turned i tself into raci sm. Mental re serv ation s or cyni c i sm were merely verbal determ inati ons . When they did exi st, they showed the oppos i te of what the leaders sought to convey by them . The y confirmed that anti - S em i t i sm i s rac i s t throug h the des i re ev i nced by a particular indi v idual (at some informal gathering, or to h i m self) to take h i s distance as an isolated individual from the common prax i s : i . e . from the common indiv idual who was helpi ng, in him se lf, to real i ze it. The se ob serv ati o n s allow us to understan d t hat the second question we were posing j ust now may remain unanswered , from the v iewpoint of the synchronic totalizati on -of-env elopm ent. S ince c i rcu lari ty sho w s us th e transformation of neo- anti- Semi ti sm i nto raci sm as at once free and inev i tabl e , and s ince it al l ow s us to grasp i ts intel l i gibi l ity through the re lation s between totalities in progre ss and their parts � it matters l i ttl e whether S tal i n through the backlash of h i s prax i s chose o n e particula r action bec ause the inner tran sformations of the fi e ld had dissolved all -'

*

l N ote m i � s i n g i n m a n u s c ript }

J

\

TOTALIZA TION - OF-EN VELO PM ENT

27 1

pos s ibles save that one, or whether (in addi ti on to that free nece s sity of dev i ation ) references to the sovere ign ' s past have to be in troduced as supplementary factors . In reality as frequently if not always occ urs in hi story , as we shall see - there was an overdetermination . Po litical anti­ Semiti sm became rac i s t anti - Semiti s m through an inexorable dialectic . After th at, i t i s very pos sible even probable th at S tal in c arri ed to h i s grave the mark s of a childhood rac i sm that dared not spea k its name . From that vie wpoint, however, i t is a biograph y that historical research w ill illuminate : Stal i n ' s , of course, but not as a sovereign mediating between enveloped total i zation s ; rather, as a certain enveloped total iza­ tion incarnatin g the pos session of ev ery i ndividual by the s overeign­ person . Moreover, the incarnation can be studied only in th e mov ement of the diachron ic synthe s i s . B ut our historical investi g ation has not g i v en u s the tools for th i s n ew study. The fac t remains that, in a certai n way , a practising and u nconscious anti - S emite Stalin app ears as the synchronic and enveloped incarnation of praxi s -proces s , inasmuch as it i s made (in th is cas e) without knowing i tself and grasps the distanc e or the transformati on of i ts objects as a negative mov ement deriving from them , whereas th i s practical knowledge i s mere l y the fal se consc iousness of its drift.

•

•

•

•

•

•

, •

•

•

•

ITH THIS

last example we have closed the circ le , s i nce we have seen the s overeign as an enveloped totalization of his sovereignty . So now w e c an gather together in a few page s the concl usions of our i nvestigation of the totali ty -of-env elopment7 2 (in the case of a soci ety with a personal sovereign) . It i s an obj ecti ve and m aterial reali t y , man i fe sting itself through orientated tran sm u tations of en ergy. It would be quite i mpossible to escape i deali s m , if you forgot that everything be it a battle or an i s always h uman labour. In ev ery i nstance, reserves o f execution energy (in the organism at w ork , and i n the obj ects he work s as well as i n the tools that h e lp him w ork) are expended in order to rai se in specific proportions the energy potential of certa in prac tical realities (or to de stroy that of enemies or counter- fi nalitie s ) . Conversel y , however, we would lap se i n to the most ab surd meaningless ness if we did not define the ensemble of s uch transformation s w ithin the human perspective of a temporalization orientated towards a s eries of st aggered obj ecti v e s . For if we took these movements merely i n their stri ct phy sico­ chemical real ity, they woul d scatter beneath our eyes in molecu l ar agitati on s . We should redi scover the laws of Nature , but we should have lost the spec i fi ci ty of human i ntel ligibil ity . It must be added, moreover, that thi s observ ation i s v al i d for every practical mu ltiplicity . If the Un iverse i s ev erywhere made up of force fi elds ( fields of attrac tion , magnetic fields , meson fields, etc . ) , whatever the operation under con s idera­ tion may be , it w ill hav e to be seen as the temporal i zation tow ard s an obj ective of tr ansmutations based on the pri ncipl e s simul taneously of conserv ation of energy and i t s di ss i p at i on In the c ase of men , if the .

7 2 . See footnote 43 on p . 1 8 7 abov e .

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obje ctive i s positive it can be only a di spl acement of energ y resources , carried out i n one given sector at another ' s e xpense, i n order to w ard off an emerge nc y : i . e . suppre s s a scarcity . On th i s bas i s , however, as we have seen , since the domi nati on of m atter (even rel ati ve , or above a ll re lative) i s paid for in human al ienation (or alteration of h uman actions ) , 7 3 men at work mediated by worked matter consti tute the l aye r of the prac tico-inert that defines the first structu re s of praxi s and simultaneou sly ossifies them , re alizi ng the equiv alence of the agent and the acted i n strument. We shal l see whether, despite seri al ities and recurrenc e , bourgeoi s soc ieties manifest themselves as totalizations-of­ env elopment.1 4 At the level of our inve stigation , however, thi s totali zation i s the vast physico-chemical and practico-inert proce s s , inasmuch as al l that inertia of exteriori ty i s unified and i nteriorized i n the practical fiel d by a personal sovereign. It i s he assi sted by the organ s of leadership, who defi ne s the co-ordi nation, admi n istration , control and repre s s ion common obj ective (inasmuch as h i s torical circ um s tances , and the exigen ­ c ies of the workers and the practico-inert, designate him to ful fi l thi s ro l e as the personage who w i l l be least ill suited to h i s function) . Thi s tight, rigorou s unity , * i n i tial l y at least, doe s not so much defi ne the tasks as produce an inner synthetic m i l ieu where everyth i ng i s a function of everything, and every reality even a col lective determines the other realities from afar, in th e v ery i n tegration of the tempora lization towards an objective graduall y specified. N ev erthel e s s , although the te mporalization i s the e s s enti al determi n a­ tion here (as the metamorphosis of a society with its rhythm, its speed , etc . towards a goal ) , it must be pointed out that total i zations remain synchronic . For it goe s w ithout say ing that synchroni sm doe s not appl y j ust to the moment to the momentary cro s s -section i n a p rax i s under way for the moment i s j ust an abstraction. B y synchronism, we mean the dev e lopment of prax i s -process inasmuch as it is defined by an ensemble of the fol low ing : former circumstance s ; obj ectives defined in

* A less s t r iki ng e x a m p l e of au th o r i t a r i an i nteg ration c o u l d have been taken by r ec a l l i n g in bro a d outl i ne the h i story of patric ian V e n i c e . For what c o unts i s not abo ve all that a sinr:;le individu a l s h o u l d be in p ower ; i t i s t h a t the en se m b l e of true le aders ( an indi v i d u al or a v e ry res tr i c te d o l i g arch y ) shou l d de fi ne the rigour of i t s i nternal i ntegration by that of the i nte gration it imp o s e s upon soc iety as a who le ( and v i c e v ersa) . Of co urse , very d i ffe ren t

-

an d p e rh a p � i nc o m p ar ab l e - sy ste m s are i n v o l v e d

N e v erth e l e s s , for the

p ur p ose s of our study , the borderl i n e run s b etw een h i stor i c al soc i e t i e s defi n ed b y the conc en tration of powers and those defi ned by t h e i r s eparation . 7 3 . Critiqu e , vol I , pp 1 84 ff. 7 4 . S e e P re face

and the note s i n t he Append i x on ' Total i zation i n N o n - D ictatori al

,

(p.42 8 ) , T ota l i z a t i o n : [ th e H i story of] V e n i c e ' ( p p .442 ff. ) , and ' Total i zation­ of- Enve lopment ' (pp.44 7 ff. ) S oc i eti es

'

'

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terms of those circumstan ces (hence e x c l uding al l those that wi l l be defin ed s ubsequentl y , on the bas i s of the realization and transcendence - of the first) ; detail e d resources, whose scarcity gives the ac tion i ts p re sent urgen c y ; operations gov erning one another; and the permanency of certain operators (sovereign s ) . Thi s was how the p l an ned growth of i n a period of capital i st encircl ement and after the Soviet industry con s ti tuted a ' first stage ' of socializati on , conc luding rav age s of war with Stal in ' s death (i .e. its end w as marked not by objective e xigencies, but by the sov ereign ' s factici ty as its fatal conti ngency ) . Throughout the whol e of thi s stage the totalization-of-envelopment remained synchroni c , because it did not aim to integrate the re stricted tempora l ization into v aster temporal ensemble s , i n which it would be nece ssary to take i nto consideration ruptures between generation s, the passage of prax is i n to the past inasmuch as i t was taken over and tran scended b y the new and the emergence of ne w signi fi c ations retrospectiv e l y perso nnel d etermining the meaning of the e l apsed stage i n a univocal rel ation (the generational ru pture doe s not a l l o w the past to condition the present in continuity , i . e . synthetica l l y and totally ; the pre sent, on the other hand, constitutes the mean ing o f the past without the l atter hav ing any recourse other than a di stant future , where the di scontin uity of men w i l l allow th e past to be j u dged on appeal; and i t does so by the very fact of determining its own immediate pas t, sovereignly and without recourse ) . There was a unity of S talinism that was temporal , one of whose m ain features was that the past as an inner determ i n ation of the temporalization adhere d to the present w ithout any gap and , by forming the i nert determination of each and every person , itself produced the tools to eval uate it. So however craz i l y the machine might z ig zag , the tempora l ization remained a syn c hronic total ization because there e x isted a c ircularity between past wh ich made itself without and pre sent, and because that society never reall y disposed of the proper di stance fo r knowi ng itself determining its past. Thi s synchronic temporal i zation a mere real ization of an undertaking - does not a lways have the v ery c lear l imits that marked the first stage of Sov iet soc ializ ation. The action may become l ost i n itself, bogged down in its own waste -products ; or the drift may be s u ch th at it suddenl y c onsiders its past as other and defines itself in rel ation to that drift ; o r el se either intern al c ircum stance s (scarc ity of men or re sources ) or extern al one s (foreign interv ention) may disintegrat e it ( i . e . concl ude it with a fai l ure ) , which can al so be effected by the initial l y unnoticed devel opment of i nherited contrad iction s� or else , agai n , a more funda­ mental but i nte grated, m asked and totalized praxis - on the occasion of a sequence of gi v en c i rc um stanc e s may turn back upon the total i ty -of­ envelopment a nd total i ze it in its turn , tran sform ing the meaning of th e

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undertaking, its objectives and its mean s , w ithout the a gents hav ing a ny fee li ng of a genuine b reak (it seems to them, rathe r, that the obj ectives man ifest a di sturbing and une xpected ambigu i ty that they have become ' unrecogni zable ' ; by keeping the same slo gan s , a ski lfu l propaganda w i l l pers uade individual s that the y are the only one s who have changed) . In as much in itself as for the s ituated h i storian that case no precise moment (even approxim ate ) can mark the date of a tran sformation that was continuou s . What m ight b e called here (in a very different sense from that which i s u s uall y understood) the reversal of prax i s seems a re volution , howe ver, more than an evol ution ; but thi s revolution m ay rem ain m as k ed by the i dentity of certain enveloped total ities (wh ich, however, no l onger have the sam e mean i ng ) . In the c ase of the sovereign ­ individual , for examp l e , it has been known to happe n after a pal ace revol ution that some indi v idual , reduced to the most total impotence , is retained offic i al l y wi th his sovereign attributes to demonstrate the continuity of a pol i tic s . A thousand other c ases could be c ited . Dialectical inte l l igibility has nothing in common with the c ontemp lation of an order; or, i f you prefer, the positivist order i s an o uter skeleton supporting analytic Reason , while the di alectical order i s simply intellig ibi lity itself (Le . the circ ul ar synthe s i s of t he di sorder of order and the order of di sorder, i n the temporali zati on of envelopment; disorder i s ac tual l y an other order here , at the heart of prax i s , it i s the practical order as an o ther). For anything l ike the dial ec tical and synchron ic inte l l igibil ity of a soci ety i n development ( i n the case of a sovere ign-person ) to be pro­ duced , it i s n ece ssary and s ufficient for that developme nt to be produced even for a brief moment, before dis integratin g und er - to be real i z ed external pre s s ure or being rent by contradiction s ; an d for thi s real ization , as an orientated temporalizati on of a vast material upheaval , to be determi ned as a prax i s generated through everything an d ( i n immanence) i n everyone, via the mediation of a plan establi shed by the sovereign , w i l l be for everyone , and for everyone ' s mutual re lations whi ch retotal ized as a spec i fi c prax i s , and retotalizi n g as a fate . For the si tuated historian , i n te l l igibil ity i s in the rel ation of the t otal objective to the ensemble of former c i rc um stances, inasmuch as th i s re lati on i s tem ­ poral ized as a rel ation of prax i s to its obj ects and its products of d i s as simi l ation : i .e . as the structuration of a soci ety by the b i o l ogical unity of a sovereign , and the sociali zation of a sovere ign by the soc i al retotal i zation of hi s orders . If fai l ure or disi ntegration can be explained ( whol l y or i n part ) b y inner determi nations, th i s b rutal end will d i al ec­ even as i t used to be when tical ly help to cl arify the undertak ing marc h i n g to vi ctory . B ut i t may h appe n that the group ' s disappearance has � c inner relati onsh i p w i t h th e de vel opment of i t s prax i s . Although it

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does not involve a soc iety w i th a sovereign- indiv idual , I s h a l l cite the [fol lowing] e x ample , w h ic h c l ari fies the questi on quite we l l . Historians of Ancient Rome al l agree upon the fact that social str uggle s of growing feroc i ty were tak i ng place in Pompe i i at the time of the eruption that destroyed the c ity and its inhabitants . The outcome of the same con fl icts i n the conte mporary Roman worl d as a whole, moreover, certainly doe s make it pos s ible to determ ine the max imum possihle vari a tion for a specific case . The anni h i l ation of that tow n did not punch a hole in Hi story . If we at l east disposed of th e necessary documents , however ( wh ich i s not the case) , it i s not these abstract l imits things cou ld proceed only so jar which ground the inte l l igibi l ity of the antagon i sti c undertaking s . It i s in a very re al sense iron1 within the ir practical producti on of them sel ves to wards obj ectives in th e process of be ing prec i sely because th e more and more closely spec i fied. In thi s case destructi on of th at soci ety depended on socio-ph y s i c al fac t ors de fi n i ng the techni c al rel ati on of contempor a ri es to Nature , b u t not the s i ngularized action of that particul ar social group , since there was a real exteri ority of negation and it would hav e to be expl ai ned by a negation of exteri ori ty (as when yo u read in Marx that the colonization of A s ia M inor by th e Greeks was due to the fact th a t the l atter did not knovv h ow to appl y the the Pompei ian adventu re remai ns natural scie nces to technology) general l y inte l l i gible . Or rather wh i c h amounts to s ay ing the same thing in a more preci s e way its intellig ibility depends on ly o n itse lf. If dialectical i n te l l igibil ity must be able to be the characteris tic of Hi story for itself, thi s can on no account sign ify that H i story is sim p l e and harmonious; th at it develops w i tho ut c l ashes, regre s s ion or dev i ations; o r e ven at the leve l of synchron i c totali zati on* that i t has any meaning , or i s ' going somewhere ' . Moreo v er, i t does not mean ei th er that this inte l l igibil ity imposes itse lf, w i thout previous research and as a con ­ templ ative i ntui tion . The h i stori an wi l l find i t if he has the mea n s (which he does not al ways or e ven u s ual ly .. hav e ) t o recon sti tute the move­ ment of the enve loping total i zation. A l l we were try ing to say was that, in a practi cal sy stem with u n i tary sovereignty , the intel l igibil ity of the undertak ing doe s not depe nd upon i nte rnal contradictions , or upon contingency as the inev i tab i l ity of facti c i ty ( i . e . of the conc rete as such ) , or again upon th e fi nal outcome . So the total i zation-of- e nve lopment i s a mate rial ( i . e . h uman and prac tical ) real i ty , which ,. turn ing upon i tself draws i t s unity from its tran scendence to wards a g oal . T hi s is true at a l l its level s of depth . Transm utatio ns of en erg y , inasmuch as the y would appea r to p o s i t i v i s t

*

[ N ote m i � s i n g I n man uscri pt . ]

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R eason , would ass uredly v erify already e stabl ished ph ys ico-chem ical l aw s . B ut their irreversibi l i ty i . e . their order of succe s sion would at thi s level remain as an uni ntel l igible fact . Unintelli gible to th e positivist, since it i s a matter not of ph ysi co-chemical irreversibility (which finds its expl anation in th e actual features of the ' reaction ' ) but of an irreversibi lity whose princip l e i s not given to an alytic Reason. Th i s sign i fi e s prec isely that the materiality of suc h a real development i s dialectical . It occurs through the total materi al ity of man i . e . on the bas i s of the fact that p hy siologi cal and prac ti cal interiority i s the i nteriori zati on of the ' natural ' exteri ority ; and th at thi s i nteriorization i s simultaneously the source of the problems ( i . e . of the needs and the be ing- in -danger of i nteriority in exteriori ty) and the mean s of re sol v i ng them (at l east prov i s i onall y ) , s ince it is itself, in itsel f, a mediation between the inert and prax i s and through thi s radic al assertion of the unity of organic temporal ization : need as the negation of a negation . seeking to be satisfied and producing, Thus it i s through need it self through labour and through unification of the practi cal field , a government of man by worked matter strictly proporti onate to the gove rnment of inan imate matter by man ( i n short , the practico-iner t) that a prac tical con fi gurati on of exteriority (for example, a geography of resources : an i l l umination of the external possibil ities by a synthetic regrouping of the ' natural ' givens, in combination w ith tool s and tech­ n iques and on the basi s of the needs of an already structured social ensemble ) and a p rac ti c a l con figuration of soc iety (a div i sion of l abour on the basi s of techn ique s , serial ization, etc . ) are determined simul ­ taneously and by one another. B ut both the need and the praxis attempting to s ati sfy it are them selves a medi ation , and show u s a rudi mentary aspect of circ ularity . For it i s the organism and its needs that defi ne the re sources (in their contin gent di stribution : co nti n gent for the se given recondition the l atter, determ ined by technology organi s m s ) which and pas s w ith all their inertia (in the form of raw matter and worked matter) into the primary social structuration . In ou r c hosen exampl e , howev er which, be in g already more comple x , pre s upposes a prev ious hi story and a revolt of men agai nst the practico-i nert (in other words , the ri gorous , biological unity of the through i t , agai n st other men) sovereign was founded upon the urgent need to l i quidate the practico­ inert, as a legacy of the overthrown c las s . For i ts very being ( i f i t did not change ) would always condition the same soc i al structure s , whatev er the se might be cal led . That signi fied th e obl i gation for praxi s to transform equipment , re source s , productio n and the producers jointl y and , of course, by one another. The rad ical sig nification of thi s prax i s was th us unifi cation as tran scendence bei ng temporal i zed toward s a goal; and the sovereign was at once the organi zer of the integrated soc iety and its

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fu ture obj ective. At th i s level and by v irtue of the very fact that soc iety , despite the crazy swerves of the l eadersh ip and al l the mistake s and confl ic t s , did survive ev erything was recondi tioned and total i zed, at once by the labo ur of the apparatus w i th its coerc i ve organ s and by the practice of the rank and fi le. B ut th i s observ ation cannot l ead to optimism. By dissolv ing the inherited practico- i nert, th e sovereign and through it society in teriorized the soc i al struc tures i t had formerl y conditioned. And the transcendence of th i s interiorization i . e . its practical re­ exteriorizat i on had the re s u l t , in a rather different techn ica l contex t, of constituting another prac tico- i nert * that recondi tioned men, inter-human structure s , i nstitution s , and finally prax i s itself. Inas m uch as the l atter dev i ated con s tantly went back over the i nert concreti on s and di ssolved th em , and inasmuch as i t p rod uced others by counter-fi n a l i ti e s that re ­ exteriori zed the former c irc um stances ( i . e . the dissol ved practico-i nert) , circ u l ari ty manifested itself as an internal structure of the practical in the form of sp i rals - the movement of its total ity and became temporal i zation to ward s the objective. The axial direction repre sented under the pre s s ure of need, the practical tran scendence, i nasmuch as i t had posited its own and i n the emergency of the given situ ation goal s . I t was in relation to this direction that the ' drift ' o f the action itself took p l ac e , in so far as the interiori zation by c i rc u l arity of its own results depri ved it of the me an s to straighten the real direction and bring i t c l oser to the v irtual direction ; or, more prec i sely , constituted i t for i tself through n ew intel lectual tool s as al way s tran scending itself in the same dir ection . This totalizing reality was th us charac teri zed by the immanence of the bonds u n i ti n g the elements that made i t up ( syntheti c s tructure of th e fi eld) and, at the same time , by the presence of practic o-inert concretions producing col l ecti ves within i t and tending to reify human relation s . Th is contradiction , far from bei n g i n itself and formal l y the real destruc ti on of the tota li zati on, on the contrary con s tituted the motor of the temporaliz a­ tion . Wi thout the internal ex istence of the practico-i nert, the tota l i zation w ould be a total i ty or i t would not be at al l . It would not be , since the founded upon nee ds, re source s and tech ni ques is prac tico- i nert prec i se l y the pas sive synt hes i s on the basi s of which [the total i zation ] i s engendered, and which the latter then enve l op s and d i s s o l v e s . And i f it were to be encoun tered ( in inconceivable circum stanc e s , formal l y pos sible elsewhere ) , then c irc ulari ty would vani sh, along w i th the spiral of •

For e x amp l e , th e " n ece s s i t y ' of wide n i n g the sal ary range, or the . nece s s i ty ' of repre� sion ( to i nc re as e the mean� o f p rod uct ion ) , are i n part legac i e s of t h e abo l i shed reg i me , i n a�much as its o w n prac t i c o - i n ert remai n s . *

, I I

I ,

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temporal ized retotal ization s . We should be fac ed with a whol e : al iv e , as suredl y , but without any temporal and practical determination , since the onl y mediation between the fre e organi sms would be other equal ly free organ i s m s . So the practico - i nert appears in ci rc u l arity as what has to be d i s so lved by praxi s , and as the dete rm i nation of prax i s by itse lf in exteriori ty . It is what dev i ates praxi s , but i t i s al so what retains w i th in it the deep layers of pas si ve material ity ; an d i t is th rough its inert synthe sis that action can sovere ig n l y regu l ate the order and proportion s of tran s ­ mutati ons of energy . In th i s sense, the inertia of exteriority ri ses up from the phy s ico-chemical l ayers of the field to the sovereign organism s . To through the take j u st one examp l e , it was ' natural ' e xteriori ty which practico-i nert was to be found in the stratified hi erarchy of the Stal i n i st bureaucrac y . At the practical momen t of c irc ularity , however, praxis transcends its exteri ori ty towards ne w obj ectiv e s , thereby syn thet ical ly determining the opening of its practical fi e l d . It is w i thin th i s interiority that re l ation s of rec iprocal immanenc e are estab l i shed between al l the elements of the field. The e x i stence of series and col lectives change s not hing of thi s . The seri al impotence of this parti cul ar ind ividua l , and the reification of his rel ations with other persons within som e serialized en sembl e , do not imply that h i s other human rel ations are serial , nor (above a l l ) that his behav iour pattern s do not retotal i ze the totalization ­ of-envelopment even, and above a l l , with its structu res of seriality . Furthermore , in so far as serial ity becomes a way of rul i ng , the rel ati on s between seri al indi vidual s without losing thei r character of rei fi e d e x teriority , or ceasing to unite those indi vi dual s as Oth e rs by virtue of the sov ere i g n practice take on a character of quasi-in teriority . What seems more important is not to mi sunderstand the meaning [ of the term] ' c irc u l arity ' . For if we l ook at a single practical dec i s ion, there by internal rearrangement of the i s a moment of action in interiori ty field and a moment of determination i n ex teriority , in wh ich the ine rt i n fect through the agents themselves re sults of passive synthe ses with their inerti a the structure s of the praxis that has produced them. B ut thi s doe s not, therefore , mean that the sovereign activity has been interrupted , to make way for th i s skel etal image of itself. Quite the contrary ; i t carries on , and th rough it the inert strata of e xteriori ty are maintained in unity and rendered e ffective. Moreover, other actions spring from the sovere i g n : united in their ori g i n , and i n the ir basic objecti v e ; diversi fied by their i mmedi ate obj ecti v e s ; con nected by rec i p­ roc al e x igenci e s , which by virtue of a sl i gh t l ag , due to the pre s s ure s and order of the problems to be resolved are prod uced in th e moment of interiority , at the very time when the former praxi s i s al ready affected by the inerti a i t h a s c re at ed . So i t i s nece ssary to c o nc e i v e the c i rc u l ari t y of envelopment as actual l y constit uted b y se vera l c i rc u la r i ties , whose

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different l ag s make it impo s s i b l e simply to fi nd one circ le and tM'O complementary moments . Every element of e x teriority , w hatever the moment of its con stituti on, can directl y or ind irectly dev iate any parti al ac tivi ty even i f thi s occ urs much l ater. In the same way , every inert el ement i s associ ated w ith other elements to make up the skeleton that the sociolog i st w i l l study , w hatever the period of its sedimentation. B u t i f the se pas sive interconditi onings are pos s ible and if, through them , thi s i s the ensembl e of the skel eton infl uence s the tota l i zing prax i s because the partial activities se rve as a mediati on between the various sediments . It i s c l ear from thi s that a single total i z ing prax i s i s recondi­ tioned from within by deposits of differing ages . However, thi s makes no change to the l aw of circularity , since such deposits have been formed by the latter and recondition it through the c urrent mediation of spec i fi c ac tiv itie s , inasmuch as the se are integrated as i ts parts into the prax i s of totalizati on. S o the movement of circulari ty far from pre venting the most comp lex interplay of conditi on ings and rec on dition i n g s , w i th the temporal l ags and delays c h arac teri stic of certain reactions i s their sole foundati on . B ut precisely because it is prod uced as the intimate move ­ ment of temporalization , it i s in depth that the h i s torian m ust find i t; and the totalization-of-envel opment ( i n the case of a sovereign-i ndi vidual) first presents itself as an inextri cable j umble of inert deposits and action s . If it remains at the l e v e l of such emp irical knowl edge , History w i l l go astray . For it risks fading away before soci olog y , or j u xtapos ing institutions and practices, or deriv ing them from one another at random , so l ong as it has not understood the dialectical law of circ u l arity and i ts epi stemological c oro l l ary , th e l aw of circ ul ar interpretati on .

•

•

•

seek to grasp more c learly , on that bas i s , the mean ing of the totality 7 5 of envelopment as prax is -proce s s , we can adv ance the following rem arks. 1 . Thi s reality i s entire l y a h uman realization of man . For it can be produced and develop onl y by pos iting obj ectiv e s : i . e . by a negation of the past in terms of th e future . In other words, the v ery s tructure of its dev elopment the temporali zation i s spec ifically h uman. * Even i n the very heart of present reality, prax is -proce s s is defined by the future that comes to negate the pas t in it. Furthermore , nothing occ urs in it w hether in detai l or in overal l operation s that i s n ot engendered by human effort, by labour. Even i f it is carried out under coercion , this F WE

* This does not mean there i s no problem of tem porali zation. In fac t, the praxi s of

the free organism i s totali zed and objectified in i ts re sult v i a what we shall c a l l the constituent temporalization. Already in the c ase o f the g roup, however, and especi a l l y i n that of the total ization-of-enve lopment, the q u e stion of the c onstituted temporalization i s posed. The problem here i s to know how the tempora l i zation of enve lopment can be produced , inasmuch as it i s engendered by enveloped or constituent temporalizations as such , and how i t c an serve as a m i l i e u for the l atter. And also to know how c o n s t i t uent temporal i zations are rete mporal i zed i n thei r t urn , through i nteriori zation o f the temporalizing m i l ie u that draws them towards the c ommon obj ecti v e . We have already seen how th i s e ssentially d i alectical problem was rad i c aU y d i s t i n c t from another problem fam i l iar to all : how i s the u nity of time- space in phys i c s c ompatible w i th the m ultip l i c ity of constituent tem poral i zation s? Or ( i f you prefer) through what mediation s , and in w h at h i storic al c ircu mstance s , d i d the prac tical tem poralizations produ c e this abs tract determination as their inert c ontainer, and how was the operation possible? Th e re sponse to th i s second q uestion i s ac tual l y c on ta i ned in these s imple word s . the time of c l ocks i s a c ol le c ti v e , the time of the Other. The total i zing and constituted temporal­ hence - for eve ryone i z ation, howe v er, i s a synthetic , dialectical development an d would have to be fol lowed dialecti c a l l y to i t s genesi s , in re l ation to every h i storical total ization -

7 5 . S e e footn ote 4 3 on p . 1 8 7 above

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l abour i s agreed. Not as ha� too often been cl ai med because it is at al l e vents prefe rred to death ( I h ave explained how only spec ific c ircu m ­ s tances were ab le to determ i ne death as a pos sible term of an opti on 76) . B ut quite simply bec ause its e xecution is an i mmediate re ass umption of the goal . O r, if you prefer, bec ause the agent i s a man, and a man even a slave is s overe ign in his l abo ur , even if the practico- inert alienate s its re su lts as soon as the labourer objectifies himself in them , even if th e l abour is sold as a commodity , and even i f it ri ses up as a hosti le forc e and i s realized as a ' loss of substance ' . F or he has to pe1form that l abour which means that he wants to do so. An i ntegral prax i s , suffere d ( i nteriorization) and repeated (e x terioriz ati on ) by thou s ands or m i l l i on s of agents, for whom it becomes at once th e being ( seri al impotence, relap�e into hexis, fate as a s uffe red future ) and the act; the u nity of a fi eld to which all the agents belong ( i nc l uding the sovereign), where prax is itself de fines what mi ght be cal led the l aw of immanence Ca bond of i nteriority between e veryth ing and ev eryth ing) and the l aw of incarna­ tion : al l the se feature s of prax i s -process are exclusively h uman ( in so fa r as we know no practi cal m u l tipl icities other than h u man s ocietie s ) and , from the v ie wpoint of knowledge , are inte l l igible on ly for men (and for practical m ultipl icities of an e qual or greater mental dev elopme nt) . Every attempt to reduce th i s totalizing p rogres s to an ensemble of fac ts access ible to positive Reason alone wou l d end u p trans forming th e spec ific inte riority of hi storialization into pure exteri ority . The synthetic uni fication would thu s be reduced to the st ati stical truth s of positi ve Reason ( incomplete and irrati onal truths , since they derive the ir cohere nc e from synthet ic structures that they negate) . 2 . However, the rea l i ty of the dev iation ( as it i s produced in every spiral , and as it i s encap s u lated in the dri ft away from a given obj ective, fi xed at the o utset ) come s to impose a term on pure and s impl e comprehen sion, prec ise l y i n so far as acti on, e scaping, i s e xteri orized and come s to change from w ithout those who l ike a vis a tergo prod uce it from within them selves as their tran scendence . I n so far as you then re ac h a re s u lt that had not bee n either p roj ected or foreseen , or even di scovered along the way - and in so far as you can say that th ings h ave prod uced men and given them a fal se consciou sne s s of themselv e s , o f th e past and of thei r future obj ecti ves the total ization seems anti­ human . I say anti -human and not inhuman, for i t is not a matter o f a return to the natural world; and prax i s -proce s s , from th i s standpoint, does not re veal i tself as a vag ue block of inanimate matter. Quite the contrary : l ike the De v i l ac cording to th e Church Fathers , the exteri orit y 7 6 . Cl ;tiq u e , v o l

1 , p . 1 90

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of prax is i s parasi ti c , borro w i ng i t s efficac y and i ts be ing as we hav e seen from interi ority . I t is through a whol ly human field of imm anence and te leological uni fication that sediments are formed , via th e media tion of all fornls of activity . Prax i s . as i t approaches its goal , in practice constitute s an outside for itself and , prec i sely in th i s . rev eal s itse lf as human prax is; for on l y a h uman society c an establ ish synthetic re l ations of such a kind between inanimate obj ects, without presen t rel ations , that they wrest them selves o ut of their in erti a and mutual l y man i fest imperious exigencie s , whose origin is a need for exteriority awoken , sustained and uni fied by the astri ngent m i l ieu of practi cal synthese s . Pr axis -proce s s thus appears as a human proce s s , w i thout ceas ing to be human act i o n ; and action i s produced within it as burdening itself with the i nerti as freed by the dissol ution or t ran sformation of the i nert struc ture s of i ts field. Ev eryth ing has i ts cost , and the total i zation-of-enve lopment sho w s us at once re s u l ts and action paying its own e xpenses (for example, as s um i ng the sc arc i ty of re sources or equipment, and reduc i n g th i s gradual ly , at the price of be ing tran sformed itself by i ts own specific scarc i ty : the scarc ity of men ) . I t i s perfectly conceivab l e , to be sure , for the enveloping total i zation to be produced in itself and for itself: I n spec ific circum stances one s , moreover, which would pre suppo se a less pronounced emergenc y , a more homogeneous c ulture of both leaders and masses, less scarc i ty of men , etc . achieving aw areness of dev i ation (at whatever level thi s might occ ur) wou l d make it pos sible to control and reduce i t . B ut of course, a very great flu idity and quasi -homogene ity of soc i al milieux would be needed , and another relation from the outset between the sovere i gn and the ruled : i .e . a more advanced form of w i thering away of the State . Besi de s , even i f one then s ucceeded in con s tantl y rectifying the orientation of prax i s , the practical re sults might be more fav ourable but the circ u l arity as a formal struct ure would remain unchanged . And i t would l ikew i se rem ai n unchanged i n a more radical hypothesi s , which would require a techno l ogy and economy entire l y con scious of them­ sel v e � , as we l l as the app l ic ation of a tran sformed and developed cyberneti c s to the internal organization of an enterpri se-socie ty . For it i s not inconcei vable at least for certai n domai n s (part ic u l arly p l anning) to condi tion circ ularity i t self, and throug h i t determi ne a k ind of feedback. Indeed, s i nce praxi s -process i s c i rc u l ar, it i s itself a feedback: its con ­ seq ue nces react upon its principles and i ts outcomes upon the forces that have produced them . Th i s recondi tion ing in e x teriority of the ac ti on by itself v i a the age nts - is a feedback. I t w i l l simply be c alled negative , si nce its effect i s to w arp prax i s rather th an to correct i t . Hence, i t mi ght be i mag ined t h at a s o ci e t y i n w h i c h sc i e n c e and te c h n o l o g y were more adv anced, far from cl a i mi n g l i k e S t al i n i s t s o c i e t y t o e s c ape c i rc u l a ri ty ,

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would submit to i t i n order to gov ern it and , b y means of a system of compen s atin g dev ices, automatically correct the dev i ation by its effect s . B ut these two procedures i nterest u s only from the formal v iewpoint. For, in them se l v e s , it c an be said that they h ave a l w ays been u sed ( even criti cism used to e x i s t in the S tal i n period, wh i le as for feedback, it i s wh at democratic constitutions have often re sorted to in order to guard the State against the danger of its own pow er) an d, at th e s ame time, that nothing g uarantees that they ever will be ( i n the guise of sy stematic correctives of praxi s ) . These remark s refer u s back to t he problem of the meaning of H i story, and to d i achronic tota l i zation . What I wanted to point out was j ust that i n both cases (th e only conceivable remedi es for deviation , i n a period of scarcity ) the precondi tion for the procedure s de scribed above be ing app l ic able and e ffective i s prec i se l y the prior recogn i tion that the h i s torical proce s s i s that feedback: i . e. the discl o s ure of circ u l arity. The practical progress would be imme nse, and the dialec­ tical and formal tran sfiguration would be l i m ited, i f through the labo ur of men pra x i s -process con trolled its dev iati ons by a directed circularity. For with each new problem the wild c ircu l ari ty wou ld reappear, and the w h atever the sy stem employed , need for new adaptations . Moreover awarene s s as much as feedback, and because everything has its cost while s uppre s s ing the prim ary dev i at ion , wo uld engender a reflexive circ ularity w i th second- leve l dev iation s . 3 . From the viewpoi n t of hi storical knowledge , does circularity al low a total c omprehen sion of praxi s-proces s ? For we know that the com­ prehen sion of con stituted action s , although itself differen t from c on ­ s ti tuen t comprehen sion , i s nevertheless po s si ble an d wholly appropriate so long as an organ i zed action i s i n v o lved. Fo r comprehen s i on i s praxis i tself, nothing e l s e . A s con stituted comprehen sion of a comnlon prax i s , i t emanates s i mply from the hi storian , inasm uch as he can nlake himself into a common indi v i dual by v irtue of a p ledge . B ut the total i zation -of-envel opment comprises a turning back of the inert upon the agent, to recondition h i m . Is i t the task of com prehe nsion to grasp this proce s s of invol ution? We m ust frank ly rep l y : yes. For s uch recondition ing at al l even ts e l udes positive Reason. It i s true that it eventual l y constitu tes the ex teriori ty of the interior; but i t doe s not it�elf operate in exteriority . The determ i nations of agents by the practico-i nert the y have themsel ves estab l i shed are made through remote l inks , and b y the envel oped i nc arn ati on constituted by e ach of the ir behav i o ur pattern s . As we hav e seen , th i s i s h o w , for e x ample , the const i t ution an d stratification of the Stalin i st B ure aucrac y can be i n te rp re te d . S o i t wa� a matter of di alectical inte lligi b i l i ty, at all events . There w as i n te l l i g i b ility s i nce the proce s s of s t rat i fi c at i o n e n t ai l e d i t � own obv i o u sne s s � and this i ntel l i gibi l i ty was di alectical , si nce th e practico - i nert was refrac ted �

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through the dialectical medium of total i zati on and was effective b y virtue of it alone, i nasmuch as i t borrowed from i t its own s ynthetic acti v i ty . You w i l l say i t i s still the case that in tellig ible an d dialectica l perhaps do not neces sari ly lnean cOfl1preh ensible . I s it not true that these remote determinations are � in any case , not paras i tic upon ac tion practical activ ities at al l ? No d oubt . And this remark reveal s to us one important aspect of that society c lo sed upon itself, locked and bolted by its sovereign : i t sough t to integrate the field of the anti -di alectic into the totali zati on as a constituted dial ectic . For us , as we ponder i n the present chapter over the re lation s h ip between the dialectic and the anti -dialec ti c , here is a first example of their po s s ible relati ons . One closed upon the other, i n order to d i s solve and assimilate it. It succeeded only by the reali zation of a generalized c ancer. I n so far as the practico- inert (i . e . the anti -di alecti c ) was used and suffu sed by the dialectic , praxi s (as a constituted dialectic) was poi soned from w i th in by the anti -di alectic . The deviation was the anti -dialectical reconditioning of the dialecti c ; it was the sovereign prax i s , i nasmuch as thi s was (partial l y) i tself an anti­ dialectic . For thi s v ery reason , however, tho se vari ous transformations did not tran scend the l imits of consti tuted comprehension . For the l atter doe � not confine itse lf any more than constituent c omprehension does to grasping ac tion in its purity . On the contrary , I hav e shown i n The Problem of Method ho w the c omprehens ion of an indiv idual act (my i nterloc utor gets up to open the window) focuses at once u pon the pure mean ing of that act i . e . upon the temporal rel ation of the need to the obj ective , v i a the mediation of the mean s and upon i ts c oncrete real ity , i .e . its incarnation an d its dev iation ( there i s too much in it, or not 7 7 enough, or some thing el se) , If my friend s uddenly gets up , in the middle of an animated conversation , and rushes towa rds the w indow as though he were s tifl in g , the partic ul ar features of hi s conduct are auto­ matically revealed as not bei ng required by th e objective , or by the mere need for air s uch as I may ima gine it abstrac tl y . I f he i s suffoc ating, he should hav e thought so o ner about opening the window . If i t is v ery cold outside and the temp erature i s bearable inside, hi s haste cannot be explained by som e dangerous emergency . If he kno ws that I always feel ch i l l y , he could h ave a sked my opinion at the beginning of our conversa­ tion or after an h our. B ut precisely the se particu l arities in so far as they disting uish the act ion from its ' normal ' , abstract model refer me through a regre s s i ve act of comprehension to specific features of my interl ocutor: i . e . to w h at he h as him sel f m ade him self i nto, through the i nteriori zati on and tran �cendence of certain former condition ings .

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D i al ectical comprehension discloses the pre sent v i a the future , and the past via the present: as soon as he gets up , suffocati n g , it passes from the open win dow to h i s red, s weating face and awaits h i m in the depths of the immediate future; at the same time, however, it plun ges into the past i n order to find, through v ar ious memories ( ' He is al way s like that ' ) � the source of so m any hasty , uncontrolled behav iour pattern s , so much abruptne s s , and that odd unawareness of h i s body and its needs which never manifest them selves other than at the last mome nt, when they have to be satisfied urgent l y . There i s comprehen sion, for the simple reas on that th i s s l ight maladj ustm ent i s real i zed in the form of behav iour patterns . The abruptnesse s , the haste , etc . , are action s : they tran scend more basic condition s , defend them selves against them, negate the m , preserve them, and try to adapt to t hem . So the circum stance itself i s merely an abstrac tion for me mere l y the back-mean ing of a behav iour pattern a nd I never e ncounter i t except i n thi s active form . It doe s not manifest i tself either to me or, abov e all , to itself in the form of a state . Wel l , the s ame i s true for consti tuted comprehension and for recond i ­ t ioned praxi s . There i s a Sov iet model-society that the sociologist c an reconstruct, if he has stati sti cal information at his disp osal , and that he w i l l view as a prop for a process (grasped i n exteriori ty) of p l ann e d industrial ization . B ut the so c i ol ogist wi l l throw light on this soc iety by that i s h i s adopting a non-di alectical and non-comprehen s ive a ttitude right . The obj ect described belongs to positive Reason : it can be seen with the eyes of a positi v i st . If we return to the concrete , however i . e . to H istory w e grasp thi s social ensemble only throu gh the dev i ations of common prax i s and p arti cul ar act i v ities. To be sure , i t i s neces sary first to que stion the soc iologist and to con s i der w ith him h i s abs tract model , the strati fications s igna l l ed by the difference i n l i v ing standards , honour s , powers , etc . B ut that i s j u st i n order to be able to re in teriorize [ this model] at the heart of gro ups or common individual s , as the abstrac t mean ing of the dev iation that man i fests i t self as a liv ing feature of praxis . In real ity, the movement of c i rculari ty i nvolve s the estab l i shment of exteri ori ty only as an abstrac t , schemati c geography of deposits , strata and sedimentations. If you l ik e , i t i s the time of the an ti - d i al ecti c : the h i storian ' s comprehens ion has rnoved from former circumstance s and the chosen objecti v e to the boun d , un i fi ed di versity of detai led ac tions (de s ti ned to prod uce the means for the mean s of attai n i n g t h e objective ) ; and he has grasped in the very obj ectification of the agents through t he re s u l t s ac hieved the am b i g u i ty , or the uncertai nty , o r the contra­ dictions , that characteri ze these fi rst groping s . Th i s i s where a " soc io­ l ogical ' st udy c an prov i de h i m w i th the �ystematic e n � e mb l e of the g ap s between fo rec a s t s and ac h i e v e m e n t s : s uc h gap� as a n inert ske leton of

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a b stract signifi cations w i ll constitute the model-society . B ut thi s moment of the anti -dialectic i s there only to g uide re search . H i s to rical comprehension goes back to sovereign acts ; it comprehends them i n their as cons tituent partic ulari ty w ith respect to the new objectives and comprehens i on does for the indiv idual with re spect to the past they i l I uminate . For the latter appears , in its transcende d but pre serv ed abstraction , through particulari ty and as its source . The past presents i tse lf to comprehension as the new foundati on which such act s have ga ined , on the basi s of which they have produced them selves, and which they maintain in their very transcendence w ithout thei r author knowing it . And thi s ab stract foundat ion of man, h i s praxi s and the knowledge that c an enl ighten h im , is prec isely the social model e s tabli shed by the sociologi st, but it acquires reality only as an abstract re verse s ign ification i ll um inati ng the dev iat i on of the sovereign ' s action s , t h o se of the leading group s , an d everyone ' s : what the h i storian w i l l be able to grasp by moving down c omprehen sively from the sovereign praxis to the masses and the new m odi fic ations of the practico -inert , and then moving up a g ain through new abstrac t , statis tical determinat i ons to the s overe ign reconditioned by new re s ults of its action. S o c ircu l ar intelligibi l ity is always comprehensive, s i nce the h i s tori an never has to deal w i th any ­ thing but prax i s and discovers the inert l ike a residue at the bottom of the cruc ible of action. S o the movement of h i s c ompreh e n s ion i s regressive, then progressive; for he will di scover the inert by the dev iation, and interpret tbe l atter by the former. 4 . This comment on comprehens ion has brought u s to a compari son between indi vidual action and the sov ereign total ization , which will enable us to cl ari fy further the meaning of this totali zation. For if i t is true th at the env eloping total ization confuses u s by virtue of the element of i nh umani ty i t secretes , i t m ust be pointed out that the dev i ation of praxis i s not something l i nked sole l y to common actions or col lective venture s . The circular and the exteri ority of interiority already reveal themselves even at the level of constituent praxi s . We noted thi s in pass ing , when we returned to the example of The Pro blem of Method. In connecti on with that anyw ay v ery ambiguous example, however, i t might be thought that the only alteration of indiv idual prax is was its alienation in the practico- inert, and that its onl y source of dev i ation lay i n the i n t eriorizatio n by the agent of former alienation s . I n reality, it i s true that the mo st general foundatio n of i ndiv idual deviati on s is the former or immedi ately future al ienation , which in fact , and by the introdu ction of tran scende nce ( the realm of the practic o - i nert, and the third party ) obv i ou s l y exclude s the circula r struc ture of the dev iated praxi s , even if method ologica lly the circul arity of the inquiry i s preserv ed by the h i storian . B ut c i rcul ari ty also characte rize s certai n aspects of indiv idual

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prax i s . From th i s v i ewpoint, the un iversal case of fatigue i s c haracteri st i c . Here , of course, it i s a questi on of consideri ng abstractly the relationship between work and fatigue , without referring to any particular kind of society ; or if it is a matter of our own, without know ing whether the w orker is a smallholder, whether he owns the tool s of h i s trade (as some tax i-drivers o w n their tax i s ), or w hether he sel l s h i s labour-power as a commodity . What counts i s that since everyth ing has its cost (a synthetic pri nc iple defi ning prax is in a field of scarcity, and i n terms of the princ iple of conserv ati on of energy) , any trans formati on of the i ndividual practical field (e . g . any accumulation of in itial l y di spersed energy re source s : harv e sting, gathering in, etc . ) i s effected as a tran smutation of energy. Hence i f the worker i s v iewed as a man , rather than j u st a i t implies for the agen t an expenditure oj' certain energy potential en ergy (ox i di zation and ' burni ng ' of certain re serve s ; i ne v itable wastage of part of the energy in a degraded form , through rai sing of the outs ide temperature , transpirati on , etc ; production through c ombustion itself of waste-products , SOIne of w hich are qui ckly eliminated while others remain for a greater or lesser time ) . On the most fav ourable assumptio n , this expenditure is the exact equiv alent of the energy costs of the o u tcome that was proposed ( i t is the i deal case we shall consider: in real i ty , there are false costs w h ich may be con s iderable ) . And if the outcome i s despi te everything a profit, thi s mean s that from another standpoint (th at of need, or sales , or the protection of crop s , etc . ) and upon an oth er terra in it appears as pure creation as a sudden i ncrease i n the desirable potential . I t al so mean s that thi s increas e i n the new field u nder con sideration finds itse l f constituted by c irc umstances as tran ­ scending the l osses it has caused for the worker. B ut need an d danger create emergency conditions in any soc iety . When famine threatens or an enemy w ork i s harsh : one spade - stroke - or a hundred of them to dig a ditch are not enough ; ten thousand are needed to rai se an earth rampart, and i n the shortest time pos sible . S o every indiv idual repeats h i s ac tion as often as circ um stances require it; and eac h time he repeats i t hi s fatigue gro w s ( his reserv e s mel t away , w aste-products and tox ins accumulate) a nd makes reproduction of the same action more diffi c ult (preci sely becau se of what every worker experiences as a � loss of sub s tance ' : ' I need to restore my strength ' , people often say ) . In real ity , th ings are not so simple . There is a p sychophys iology of fatigue , and its profile in the course of a working day inc ludes s l ack periods and others of sudden increase. What rem ains c rucial is the fact that the accompl ished action , through the i nert modi fication s it provoke s in the subj ect (a negative inerti a of absence of the reso urce s cons umed and presence of toxins and waste -products in the organism , as counter-

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fi nal itie s : means of n o longer be ing able to work) , m akes the latter less and less c apable of reproducing it. S ince fatig ue has qu alitati ve effects , it is above all the fac t t h at the action itself is modi fi ed ( as in the case of the sovereign-indiv idual ) b y the effect of its re s ults upon the practical organ i s m : once a certain threshold has bee n cro s sed , gesture s become les s prec ise and less effective, attention slackens, etc . If he i s free , the worker s top s , saying: ' I ' m not doing anything usefu l any more . ' I f h e i s not free , or if he keeps working away but lacks se lf-control , the risk of m i s takes gro w s , as doe s the n u mber of ' botc hes ' actually produced . Any one of the se ' botched ' obj ects can prov ide us w i th an objective example of the deviation . For a gi ven worker, the goal was to increase hi s hourly produc tion i n order to obtai n a productivity bonus, so it was a matter of producing x perfect i tems i n the eight hours . The x i tems will have been produced , but the percentage nix of ' botched ' items denote s t he deviation. Through fatigue , the obj ective is altered and become s : not to let go, to han g on, to s tick at all costs to the planned number of operati on s, etc . B lind e xhaustion, w andering attention and above all con traction of h i s field are bound to create ' botc hes ' , si nce these are now the tool s of h i s trade . Intent on transcending them , however (by keeping hi s eye s open , remembering all the instruction s , etc . ) , he no longer maintains the nece s sary d i s tance to become aware of them ( L e . to become aware of the fact that an impoverished man i s w orking in h i s place ) . O bj ectivel y , as the supposed tran scendence of h i s dimini shed functions i s i n reality only thei r pure and simple exerc ise (the only way for attention to real i ze its deficiency i n a period of pres s ure i s to struggle agai n s t t h i s , m obi l i ze itself totally , engross i tself so intensely in taking account of everything an d be so aware of its tasks that it realizes i n al l h i s gesture s and through the fight it puts up the deficit for which it i s seeking to as a dev i ation inscribed i n worked matter compensate * ) , the ' botch ' (an d as the synthetic unity of a counter- fi nality) e l udes the worker, prec isely i n so far as the worker has as sumed himself such that his real acts and their objecti fi c ation mu st elude him . Moreover, at the heart of this relati onship between the man and h i s work represented by fatigue , we fi nd the true probl em of the practical total i ty as a respon sibil i ty . I t is not j ust a matter of re ferrin g back to Kanti sm ' s pos i ti v e intention (he h as tak en the ri sk of doing bad work ) . Fatigue is prax i s at a certai n moment, and the man i s qual ified at thi s moment by h i s w ay of livin g his fatigue : in relation to h i s ph y s iological s truc ture s and the past the se h ave

*

I d o u bt l e s s do not n e e d to p o i n t o u t t h at I am n o t tak i n g attention as a fac u l ty - or

e v e n a fun c t i o n - but as the w h o l e of pra x i � , i n a s m uch a s i t p ro d uc e s i t s o w n org ans o f c on tro l and c o n d i t i o n 5! t h e m by i t s total de v e l opment

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interiorized ( i l lne s se s , inj urie s , work acc idents ) , but at the same time also in relation to the internal fi e l ds that constitute him ( interiori zation of th e soc i al , tran scendence, etc . ) and to the multidimens ionality of h i s person al s ign i fi c ation s through the form s of behav iour that ac tual i ze them. Everyone produce s h i m self and re-produces himself wholly i n his o wn re s istance to fatigue ; and it i s at this practical level th at he him self and l1r'ithout knowing it pronounce s sentence upon hi s ori gi nal i ntention (i.e . dec ides in practice whether he was wrong or right to set h imself that i ncrease in production as a goal * ) . So c ircularity e x i sts in indiv idual praxis and , i n a certain way , consti tutes its basis inasmuch as it manifests itself as fatigue . So it is not someth i ng speci fi c to con stituted prax i s , even though practic al multi ­ plicities i n all their forms reproduce and amplify it as a fundamental structure of the ir total izing temporal ization . R ather, i n a certain way it i s the practical rel ation of the agent to worked matter. And its ve ry princ iple is that, in the energy transm utation, there i s and i s not equivalence ( independently of an y � di s sipation ' ) between the energy supplied and the energy received. For t hat which i s supplied as an expenditure m ade by an organ i sm (or practic al multiplic ity) w i th a v iew to producing a re sult is characteri zed for the organ i s m (or m ultiplic ity ) and in the fi e l d of sc arcity as an inert impos s ibility (temporary or definitive) of re-producing the result obtained, or of produ c i ng other trans formations in other domains. Absorbe d by worked matter, i t becomes in i tself the passive synth e s i s of exteriority . Expended by a whole or a tota l ization , its defic it is produced in the organi s m (or practi cal multi­ plicity ) as the appearance of exteriori ty at the heart of a practical synthes i s (not j ust as a lack , but also as a pre sence of waste-products ) . I n other words , i n these transformati ons there i s an expenditure which is a material and practical fact, sin ce it pre s upposes a worl d of objective s � exigencies and ri sks compell ing continu al option s and an economy of resources and an organic (or social) memory of that e xpenditure , i nasmuch as it i s l ived, for example, as an impossibi lity of c arry i ng out a new piece of work, thus as an absenc e of practical connecti on w ith some particul ar new ex igency of exterior objectiv ity . C irc ularity , for the organi sm , i s rooted in what we may term the costs of ac tion - and , for totalizations in progre s s , the costs of History . Th is compari son ha d the a im of helping us to comprehend the rel ation -

Tak ing the e x ample ab� trac t l y , I am natural ly not speak i n g abo u t the indiv idual ' s soc ial respon�ibi l itie s , i n a soc iety that seek s to pu�h the growth of the gene ral rate of prod u c t ion to the l i m it . Let u s mere ly note that the prac t I c al sentence of which I am speak i n g , in a concre te soc iety . i s obv i o u s l y conditioned by the w orke r ' s re lation to his c l a�s and , thro u gh th i s , to the soc i a l e nsembl e . *

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sh ip between the human and the anti - h uman (prax i s and anti -prax i s , di alectic and anti -dialectic) at the heart of the total ization-of­ envelopment. For in a certai n way , and even outs ide of any al ienation (although al ienation i ne v i tably capture s it an d is u s ually its source), the indissoluble unity of the human and the anti-human manifests itself at every moment of daily l i fe, and in all the indiv i dual s we encounter. To te ll the truth, it i s thi s very unity that make s the man . Th is one laughs too much , that o ther one talks too loudly or too quietl y , thi s th ird one i s too c l ums y . One takes s uch precaution s in tran sport i ng a frag ile object that he ends up breaking it, or e l se he fi les away a v aluable document so carefully tha t he no longe r knows where he has h idden i t; the other organizes a recepti on but i s too an x ious for ev eryone to enjoy themselves - he spoi ls ev eryth ing by his eagern e s s . Pointless to multipl y examples: it i s our very l ife . And these inadequacies or these excesses , thi s maladj u stment at the heart of adj ustment, i s prec isel y in everyone w hat he does not know or what he learns from other s : his exteriority , inasmu ch as it reveals itself as an i nner limit of h i s practical i nteriori t y . Perhaps an analyst, at the end of a th erapy, might be able to rev eal s uch secret since they_ are our inertias and defic its. B ut we do not see our own and we grasp those of others only through spectac l e s , o ur v ery eyes dev iated prax i s , as the abstract s igni fication of that deviation . I n other words , th e Other offers h imself up to my investi gation as a p rac tic e , and on ly as such (even when he undergoe s the coercion of oppre s sors or of the practico.-inert) ; h i s exteriority is merely the differen tia l of h is practice. So the acti o n itself of my friend provi de s hi s or of this pas ser-by obj ective and h i s drift away from it. B oth the s ignification and the anti­ sig n i fi cation . are offered in the i ndis soluble unity of the investigation . Accord in gl y , that signification overwhelmed b y counter-finalitie s , al­ be it remaini ng prac tical , lose s its log i c al rigou r : active and pas s ive present themelves to comprehen sion in the u nity of mean ing . Thi s woman pas s ing i n front of me i s certainly mode st and decent; she work s , and her serious face and unobtrusive manner show that she h as l i ttle taste for scandal . Yet she is dressed in gaudy fabri cs and wears a loud, vulgar h at. Thi s apparel te stifies to an action of which it is th e re sult: she has she has chosen them . Through purchased the dress and the headgear that action, however, something of its pas s ive determi nations dev iating the action that tran scends them has been i nc arn ated in the v iolent cl ash between the b right red and the app l e green , in the con trast between that ' l oud ' h at and that casual , unselfcon sc ious head. The passiv ity of worked matter, and the i nert synthe s i s of the � cut ' , e x p re s s pretty acc urate ly the very i nerti a th at the young woman i nteriori ze s : i n that sense, her c lothes are th e exteriority of her action . This e x teriority can be gra sped , more ­ over, i nasmuch as the clashes noted abo ve refer back i mmediatel y to the

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action (the choice, the purchase) and its drift, at the same time as to the transcended inertia that it contains and reactualizes as a dev i ation . It i s bec ause she i s indifferent to her toilet and quite devoid of narc i s s i sm or coquetry, it i s bec ause she doe s not even i mag ine rel ating those fabric s to herself i n short , it i s because of her inexperience and naivety (the counterpart to her true, practical seriou sne s s as a mother or a worker) that she has let herself be seduced by the crude fl as hiness of the fabric s and the ' am u s ing ' shape of the h at, and h as let the sale s woman palm them off on her. She was thinking about owning them l ike a bit of that l iv e ly joy of which she know s nothi ng rather than about wearing them. Yet thi s di spl acement of the i mmediate desire i s l ik e a distraction at the heart of the real act ion, s ince she did i n fact v ery rati onal ly - go to acquire some c lothes and so replace an outworn dress and headgear. Her action was premeditated s he h ad to save up for three month s . Hence, in so far as the person is reactu al i zed inopportunely i n that distrac tion , her action undergoes a sli ght dev i ation w h i le remaining l argely un­ c hanged . And although the maxinl and the objective remain the same, the chosen obj ec t i s altered by the w ay of choosing it: dark, plain dresses and neutral h ues w i ll be neglected in favour of that bl aze of colour. In a sense, however, i t c an be said that she has performed the action she w anted to perform . She has spent her sav i ngs (amas sed for that purpose) on buying a dress and hat. That dress and that hat h av e been chosen in her meas urements from thi s point of v iew they suit her. What is devi ated i s a more veiled, and v aguer, intenti on of her w hole person in al l circum stance s . In her way of behav ing, observ ing the ritual s and c ustoms of her m i l ieu and speaking, a single concern alw ays reveal s itself: not to ' draw attention to herself' ; ' to be j ust like everybody el se ' . And i t i s indeed true that she normal l y goes u n noticed. I t i s in so far as thi s aim remai ns impl icit when she i s choosing clothes that it may be unfu l fi l led. And it i s in the clash between her unobtrusive behaviour and her shocking atti re that the synthe sis by praxis of two aspects of her hexis will manifest itself: through the practic al option of the purchase , indifference to herself (and the very crude taste of her intuitive delight in the object) i s combined w i th her w i sh to be unobtrusive , as what for the ti me being obsc ures her (whatever the other, deeper rel ation s between the se gi vens) and deviates her action towards an obj ective with unfore seen consequence s . In fact, preci sely because the woman is not ri c h , it will be the scandal necessary for her to wear the Sh irt o f Nessus unti l the materi al wears out. If the wom an perc e i v e s that she i s scandal ou s . she w i l l strive to become more unobtru sive sti l l . R ather than j ust modest, she w i l l become h unted. B ut her unease - making vi sible to all the fact th at she is n o t c u t o u t to wear t h a t o utfi t w i l l y i e l d her u p defencel e s s l y to every eye . Th i s si gnifying l ayer pre sents i t se l f, of c ourse� in unity with

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the rest i n the fi e l d of our investi gation . And thi s other too : those clothes hav e not been made by her and expre s s l y for her; they are not unique item s of fi nery , of the kind that expose the folly (the asoc i al nature ) of those who rig them selv e s out in them. They are ac tual ly standardi zed products , and in making them the manufacturer has aimed at a certain social category . Which one ? H e i s not quite sure himself: he j ust knows that in some shops, products of that kind al ways fi nd takers . So the obj ect designates its purchaser and c l as sifies them soc i ally : it w i l l , for examp l e , fit the youth, gaiety and exuberance of women of the town v ery poor and v ery crude, with paint inches deep on their cheeks for whom scandal i s one means among others to attract c l ient s . The exteriority of prax i s i s rev ealed b y thi s last contrast, wh ich i s soc ial . Through the deviation of prax is , the purchaser causes herse lf to be des ignated by her c l othes as be l onging to a soc ial category of which it is obvi o u s from her behav iour and her e xpre s s ion th at she has never been a member. And what de signates her as such is the j udgement that other soc ial strata del i v er upon the borrowed c ategory , which manifests itself i n the possible options that society proposes to it (in this instance , through the c lothe s made for person s bel on ging to thi s category ) . Of cours e , the options retain - but recondition the aspiration s speci fie to con sumers from the category in q uestion . Thi s complex s i gn i fi c ation the demand, the reconditioning of the dem and by a confection reflecting c ertain prej udice s , the non-conscious acceptance of thi s recondition ing by those who express the demand is sociality as a pas sive synthe si s of w orked matter, or (if you prefer) it is th is materiali ty as a social idea. It goes w i thout saying that it organi zes i tself independently in the s i tuated investigation with the three other sign ify ing layers . It then becomes a false de signation or rather fal se soc ial identity - of the person , and al so an overarching rel ationship between the woman and the soc i al ensemble that must situate her. Th at i s enough : the cruc ial th ing i s th at all these s i gnifi c ations organi zed i nto the concrete un i ty of the person, her feature s , her gesture s , her dre s s and her hat constitute a very real obv iousnes � , or even the person herself, in asmuch as she i s produced i n a practical field of social temporal i zation. B ut th is obv iousne s s can no longer be termed a significa tion , in the sense in wh ich the un ity of s uc h signification s involv e s the dev iation of each one by each and every other one . Th at i s why we shall call this situated relati on to the soc i al future surroundi ng it, in the obv iousness an d intelligib i l i ty of i ts concrete presence , the meaning of the person rather than the si gnifi cat ion of her behav iour. For it i s enough to imagine the rationality of the options for a ri ch woman , a c u stomer of the great couturi ers , acc u s tomed from c h i l dh ood to re flect the taste of h e r c l as s in her o w n taste , i n orde r to u n d e r s tan d the di fferen c e . I n th e l atter c a s e ,

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everyth i ng i s s ign ifying; the mean i ng , i f it e x i sts , i s else where . In the former case , we do real l y see the exteriorization of interiority but on ly i nasmuch as th i s exteri orization i s s im u l taneou s l y rec aptured by the i nteri ori zing unity of indiv i dual praxi s , an d d i l uted in other layers of signification that dra g i t toward s soc ialization . Here, the anti -human i s the dress turning upon the w oman and de s i gnating her ( i n vain) as a whore. The human i s the woman mystified by her own m odes ty , loving the fabric an d fal l ing into the trap of obj ectiv ity , to end up wearing it as the uniform of a group that i s not her o wn ; and i t i s the woman reproducing herself beyond that dress (but transformed by i t de spite every thing), and agai nst that choice now become a pas s ive sentence i n h er modesty and her d i scretion as an unobtru s i ve person , because sh e h as neither the taste nor the time to think abo ut herself. An d i t i s al so profoundl y (human and anti -human s i m ultaneously) the humble t aste legitimate , yet my stify ing . . . and mysti fied · for something that, i n its obj ecti v e , stands out against the greyne s s of l ife . For that bad tas te that 4 vulgarity ' i s si mpl y the v ague presentiment of beauty . It i s at thi s l evel i . e . at the level of mean ing and no other that the question i s posed of the perso n with her obj ectives rational l y de fi ned, never whol l y ac hieved or wholly unachieved; al wa y s overwhelmed by the transcendent mean i ng of what she rea lize s , and nev er bei ng anything other than what she doe s , i . e . what she doe s with what has been done w i th her; human , prec isely , as a s uspended synthe s i s of the human and the anti -human human , inasmuc h as she e l udes herself and i s unaw are of herself, i nasmuch as she recov ers , kno w s hers e l f and controls herself, i nasmuch as in that very control her praxi s i s dev i ated : i n short, always rei nteri orizing her exteriority and then re-exteri ori zing i t at a secondary level by becoming reflexively aw are of herself. And i t i s , i ndeed, on the bas i s of th i s c ircu l ari ty that we compreh end a man: we grasp h i s ac tion through h i m , we grasp him through h i s acti on . The mean ing i s the both regre s s i ve sy nthetic indi c ation of the tasks to be ac compl i shed and progre s s i v e . adopting thi s time the Taking the term in th i s sen se, we c an say v iewpoint of hi storical reco n structio n that pra x i s -proce s s i s d i s c l osed as a temporali zation that has taken the form of realization of a mean ing . It i s not ye t, of course , a matter of the diachronic problem of the mean i ng of H i story , but quite simp l y of the synchroni c me aning of a limited, elapsed temporaii zation . From th i s standpoint, although H i sto ry manifests itself as prax i s -proc e s s i . e . (even in the case of n1axinl unl i ntegrat i on ) as a loss oj contro l; as an ac tion that e scapes itsel f and overfl ows and c ongeal s its agent; as ignorance , non-consc i ou sness or fal se con sciousne s s , i . e . a s p ra x i s that doe s not recogn ize i tself and /or that v e ry reason i s human , it i s nev erthele s s di s -order in soc i al en semb l e s ,

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inasmuch as the se pay the co sts of the order prov i s ionally establi shed among thing s , and it i s the al terati on of th is real order through the progre s s iv e inten s i fication of soc i al di sorder ( w ith or with out a pos s i ­ bility of correcti on ) . Meaning, as an orientation of the temporal spiral , i s itself a prac ti cal s ignifi cation and can be comprehended only in and through temporalization . All those , for examp l e , who pre sent what they cal l ' S tal i n i sm ' as a strict mechan i sm th at starts as soon as it is wound up , l ike a mus ical table-mat, are losing s ight (because of the real sc lerosi s of the l ast years ) of the fact that i f Sta l i n i sm as a theoretico­ practical unity of all the re sults ach ie v ed ( i n the actual order th at they were) , the operations that enabl ed them to be achieved , the means used, the resources e xpended , the transformations of the agents by their action , can be and the theories engendered by and for the action i tself de scribed in the form of a perm anence ( inert struct ure s , repetition s , frequentati v e s ) , th i s mechani cal inter-conditioni ng of the elements that m ake i t up i s j ust a purely theoretical v ie w , or (if you p refer) a cro s s ­ section of pra x i s -proc e s s i n the last momen ts of its temporal ization . For - however, and v i a whatever m ediation , I may combine the notions of pl anned growth in an u nderdeveloped country , bureaucrac y , ideal i s t voluntari sm , cult of personal ity , etc . ( I am choosing the se determinations at random and si mply as exam p le s ) the constituted ensemble w i ll present itself as a prototype. I shall thus be abl e to try and find it again more or less deformed i n ot her hi storical cases (to the point where some observ ers thi nk they c an infer the fol l ow i ng l a w from their compari s on s : the di ctatorship of the Communist Partie s i s the best or onl y way for underdeveloped countries to achieve their i ndustrial ization most rapidl y ) . For th i s very reason , however, the prototype as an object of concepts (albeit syntheti cal l y l i nked) loses its temporal determ inations and is uni versal i zed. It repre sents , in the last resort, the exteriority of the process i n asmuch as it has been separated from practical i nteriority . It becomes a sig n ification agai n, in the sense that the bound ensemble of verbal formulation s relati ng to an in animate and atemporal obj ect ( i . e . conceived i n its re lative permanence and by prov i si onal l y abstracting fro m the temporal i zation that produces it, wears it away and de stroys it) can be strictly - for exampl e , to a tool or a physico-chemical fact defined as the abstract s ign ification of that object. B ut mean i n g has d i sappeared with Hi story . For what we shall c a l l meaning i s the indis­ sol ubl e uni ty of Stal inism with the unique an d p eerless temporal i zation that consti tute s it. If you like , it i s the perfect revers i bi l i ty at the heart of t h at uni ty of two movements : one regre s s i v e , moving back from the sclerotic prac tice s of 1 95 0 to th e evol ution that began in 1 928 (or perh aps in 1 9 1 7 , or even earl i e r : i t i s h i s toric al comprehens ion that w i l l determine the d ate ) , a� if to i l l umi nate every re volutionary action from

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the outset by the future Destiny of the Revol ution ; the other progressive, which in the c ircul ar comprehension of a unique adventure sees the through tox ic secretions and counter- finalitie s, at gradual production the same t i me as through the extraordinary v ictories of the struggle against scarcity of dev i ation s, always practical , al way s indiv i du al , always invented as nl u c h as suffered, whose ensemble will become Stalin ism as a system when they are already p art of the tran scended past. In short, the mean ing of p l anned growth as a venture of the U S SR in its fi rst phase i s S talinism, inasnl u ch as i t i s simultaneously today the future of a past temporali zation and the past of the present temporalization ; inasmuch as its gene s i s and its degenerati on are integrated into thi s schematic s y stem , in order to become its concrete (hence temporal) depth , its i diosyncras y and its determination (as a negati on and as a rej ection of the uni versal ) . I t i s (to u se a word that has j ust been of use to us) S talini sm-as -a-ve nture , contain ing w i thin it its o wn temporal i zation, and not S talinism -as-a-prototype (a schem a whose elementary rel ations condition on e another horizontally , w i thout the sources of its being and found simu ltaneously being sought i n the vertical i ty of the temporal ized past). From thi s v ie wpoint, it can b e said that the meaning of prax i s -process i s e very where within i t , in so far as a limited temporal ization is inc arnated i n its interior. It is thu s th at the mean ing of the ancien regime (to anticipate o ur further inve stigation 78) , o f the minor German courts , of Protestantism in the early eighteenth century , of the clash between � reason ' and ' tradition ' , as w e l l as of the soc i al h ierarch y and the status of the arti st, etc . , i s tempora lly reproduced in our ears by the p lay ing of an a B ach fugu e on the h arp s ichord . Throu gh this retemporaliza tion incarn ati on of B ach ' s l ife itself the co n cept ual e nsemble we have j u s t de scri bed i s re incarnated as an ongoing proce s s -praxi s t h roug h our tirfl e . w ithout kno w ing the piece p l ayed, or even perhaps And in so far as ever having he ard many B ach c ompositions we recogn ize that the work be long s to the baroque ei ghteenth century , th i s movement of the inc ipient century is ' pre sentified ' as the tran scendent meaning of the fugue : a fin ite synthe s i s of an o bject (th e fug ue , with its law s , its structure s , etc . ) and of a prax i s (the perform ance equi v alent for the l i stener to creati on) contain ing the total i ty of that hi storical movement between the two end l i m its of i t s actualization . al though it i n fact 1 have not scrupled to choose this e xample -

7 8 . N a m e l y , of the d i ac h ron i c . O n m e an i n g in h i �tory . � e e t h e fra g nl e nt H i s tory App e a ls to H i story ' i n t h e A p p e n d i x , p 45 3 b e l o w , a l s o the n o t e s o n Progre � s , p p . 40 2-24 ·

below.

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as sumes that we have already reached a l ater, and more con c rete , point i n our critical investigation be cau se here it repre sents li ttl e m ore than an image . I wanted to give an intuitive i dea of the real enj oyment of a h i st orical mean ing . However, re turning to the case th at co ncern s u s that of personal sovereignty it w i n be noticed that the h i s torian h i mself real i zes the retemporal ization of the enti re prax i s -proc e s s , when he tem poral izes h im sel f i n th e pre sent b y operati ng as a h i storian: for ex a mpl e , by producing the l i m i ted acti v i ty that consi sts i n reading documents or e ye - witne s s ac co unts and recon stituti ng a s ingle ev ent through the divers i ty of source s . I n the act of reading, for e x ample , the mean ing i s given in every para graph, as a l i nk between the future-as­ dest iny and the future-as-product : inasmuch as th is paragraph c an be comprehended only through the unity of the b ook , and the l atter only thro ugh much v aster prac tical u n iti e s . The mea n ing i s th us n o t the object of a c oncept, but an indi v i dual re al ity enc losing its own tem poralization wit hin the l i mits of its reactual ization and through the re-production of certain envel oped totalities ( i n principl e , all of them : but as we are here ado pting the v ie wpoint of the s i tuated histori an , we ta ke ac count of the re so urces he has at h i s dispo sal and the e xigencies specific to h i s i nquiry ) . The hi storian ' s e xp l an ation of that mean ing w i l l be dialectical , i n that it will bring out its secondary structures as the di ffer ent internal pro files of the temporalization, i n the s ynthetic un ity of the fi n al o utcome. W ill it be said that there are several mean ings of the synchronic totalization ,rather than just one? That i s as you like. Or, i f you prefer, there are i n deed several meaning s v ery different from each other, too for the various levels and sectors ; but in each , preci sely ( inasm uch as the part of a whole i s th at whole i tself, if not in the determ i n ation th at produces it at least in the substanc e th at i s determi ned) , the unity of the tota l meaning i s to be found as its foundati on and its prod uct . Con verse l y , that total meaning itse lf must be grasped as th e m ed i ation between all the partial meaning s . I t i s ofte n , moreover, the j ux tapositi on of th e se that will fi rst as an e xigenc y , then as an in venti on bri n g forth th e total i zing meaning as first a medi ation , the n a substantial foundati on of e ac h . T he same real ity wi l l be a to taliza tion-oJ-e n velopment, i n a sm uch as i t i s produced by the temporali zation of the hi stori cal agents , and a meanin g , i nasmuch as i t i s reactual ized by the labou r of the si tuated histori an . B ut it shoul d not be conc l uded that this mean ing i s relative to the knowledge the hi stori an gain s of it. It must first be n oted th at it exi sts implicitly in and through every partic ular ac tion and in the v ery inte riori ty of praxi s - in asm uch a s ev ery envel oped total i zati o n incarn ate s al so the rel ation of the latter to the future , as a product and as a dest iny ( a de stiny th at c auses itself to be produce d ) ; i nasmuc h a s e v ery one i s actual i zed th rough the rhyth m of the temporal i zati on , i ts sl umps and i t s

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accelerati o n s , etc . In short, e very real stage in a h i storical venture has its taste , which i s the objective pre sence of the whole i n everyone . And that taste explan ation of which i s prevented by the lack of a nece ssary i s the meaning ' s actuality. Henc e , i t i s not that the h i s torian di stance constitutes it: he confines hi mself to e xplaining it. In re lation to him, th i s practical determ inati o n has become an object. B u t i t i s not the hi stori an who is respons ible for thi s objecti ficati on : it is s i mply produced by the metamorphos i s of praxi s i n to a past. And, which come s to the same th ing, by the realizatio n of the objecti ves set . The at least partial historian u ncovers, explai n s that is all . H e re stores for everyone an obj ecti v e m ode of be ing of the h i stori cal total izati o n : its being -already­ past ( we shal l return to thi s being i n our study of d i achronic totalization) . And it can doubtless be said that the struc ture s he uncovers are a function of his know ledg e , the materi al s he has at his di sposal , hi s the social and practical intellectual too l s , and through all th is en semble to which he belongs . B ut thi s comment cannot re lativize the ' meaning ' of the recon structed praxi s-proces s . For if the histori an circum scribes the mean ing of the totalization by his as sumptions and methods , thi s determ inatio n s ituate s him i n rel ation to the en semble being studied as much than i t s ituate s thi s ensemble in and m ore relation to him. What i s rel ativ e in the obj ect, and provisional too , i s the l imitation of mean ing ( i . e . its determination as a negati on ) . More appropriate procedure s , unpubli shed documents , the liquidatio n of certain c las s prej udices ( whose source i s the v ery society that has produced h im 79) , w ould make it pos sible to deepen and enlarge his re sults : i ntegratin g into them, for e x ample, other facts th at contradict them, but w i th i n the very unity of a synthe si s foundi n g and supporting its own contradicti on s . Furthermore , as we shal l see later, the reactualization of o n e total ization can take o n its true scope o nl y i f i t i s carried out agai n s t the background of human h i s tory as a whole . The broade st hi storical syntheses are still to come : they depend on fu ture methods and the methods depend on them. In th i s situated inquiry , therefore , it i s the obj ect th at situate s the scholar i n relation to the future . As a unique and concrete real ity , and as a total i zati on total i zed by Uni versal H i story , it prescribes an infinite task for h i m . Th is mean s that it refers via the pre sent generatio n to the seri e s of future generati ons , and defines the hi storian i n relation to the hi storian s of tomorrow and the day after as being noth ing except l-vhat h e has disco vered. In th is perspecti v e , it c an be sai d that it is Being that de fi ne s knowledge as re lati ve (in asmuch as the l atter i s the obj ective bond j o i ning the reality uncovered to the

79

Th at i s t o s a y , produced the h i storian .

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h i storian who uncovers i t ) . Kno wledge but not th e kno"H/n . What i s i n fact revealed through the situated recon struction i s that part of B e i ng which the chosen perspective allo w s to be d i scov ered. And th i s part of B e i ng i s total l y and fully rea l . All th at i s re l ative i s the l imit which separates w ithin it the known from the unknown, and re flects other limits : those of pre sent-day h i s torian s . It i s th i s limit whic h w i l l give way , inasmuch as it i s a determ i nation of the known (hence a negation of al l th at rem ai n s to be known ) through a negation of a negation th at the i n refere nce to a fu ture where the known be i ng demands right no�' pre sent h i stori an wi l l no l onger be . Yet the h i stori an , inasmuch as he belongs to a ne w undertaking, transform s the past event i n to i t s mean i n g . B ut th i s is in asmuch as that h i s torian as a partic ipant i n the pre sent undertaking of all and , i n th i s contributes to the prax is- proc e s s , i s gui se , even as a h istorian temporal i zed i n the tempora l i zation of env elopment and toward s i ts short­ term and long-term ai m s , and in h imself and through all h i s acti v ities make s him self an enveloped total ity . For through History in progress, 8o the meaning of compl eted H i s tory i s tran sformed. I shall g i v e j ust one e x ample , but it i s a striking one, which we shall e xam ine in detail at the diachronic moment of our d i al ectical inve sti gation. Let it serve here as a s i gn and as a schema. Past h i story i s a pluralist h istory . Separated by obstacles that they do not have the means to overcome on a day-to-day bas i s , peop l e s e xcept in the case of great m i grat ions and i nvasions form re l ati vely closed e nsembles . And each i s d i stinguished from the others by irreduc ible parti c u l ari ties : i t i s the se , in fact, which first stri ke you and which foreign trav el lers re po rt. Th i s pl ural i sm i s tending to become reduced . However, up to (and inc luding) the nineteenth century , reason s that we shall have to adduce kept the A s i an conti nent de spite coloni al and semi -col oni al pene tration - and the ' We stern worl d ' in a re lative state of non-communication . The en semble of present factors involved in the ' One World ' (an industri al rev o l ution req uiring a global economy , through and by v i rtue of imperial i sm ; regroupment and dec ol­ oni zation of the colon i al or sem i -co loni al peop l e s ; indu stri al i zation of the underdevel oped coun tries under commun i st control ) i s for the first time lead i ng the h i storical proce s s to total ize the concrete , present humani ty : i . e . the two thou sand mi l l i on men today working on Earth , whose needs , l abou rs . the products of those labours , and the vari ous soc ial orders they generate . re act upon one another, upon the condition of every indiv idual . an d for the fi rst t i me w i t h i n t h e unity of a mut ual con dition i n g . Con �eq uent l y , th e fo rnl er p /ura /i,\ fn i,� a u n it}, . Fi rst , because •

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See t h c fragnl c n t H I '-I t O I y Appca l.\ to H i " t o ry ' i n the A p pen d i x . p -1-5 3 be l o w

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the un ity i n progre ss makes pos sible c omparative soc iology and com­ parati ve h i story (we shal l see the sense i n which the compar i son i s true and concrete , and the sense in which i t i s abstract). Secondl y , because these separate ensembles are constitu ted as con vergent by their future u n i ty . Pre c i sel y in so far as thi s ' One World ' of our bloody struggles and of our i nd i s soluble terrestri al unity - i s constituted our all iances through u s as thei r Destiny , it creates them in th e past as h aving t hat Destiny as their fatality and as their product. A reclas sifi cation is carried out, which without neglec ting the negati ve practices of separation , tends to pl ace the accent on the positive ignoranc e and rej ection rel ations between groups, between tribes and between nation s . The h i s tory of trade, of communication route s (Si l k Road, etc . ) , of the c u ltural l i nks establ i shed by wars , etc . in short, of mutual i nterpenetrat ion� and the i r consequences for each en semble , and ultimate l y for al l becomes the c ruc ial th i ng� not a pri ori , because i t i s the h i story of the positive, but because the ' One World ' of 1 95 0 has made that posi tive into the truth of H i story . We shal l return to this , as I have al ready sai d . B ut what matters here i s the fac t that one c hanges the mean ing of a past totalization (indirectly) b y acting upon the pre sent si tuation (and, through reperc u s ­ sion, upon the past-being i n i ts mean i ng ) , but not by rounding upon that mean ing i n order to know i t . I t i s not the historian who imposes the convergence of their practices upon the former en sembl e s . He discloses it, on the abstract terrain of ri gorous rec on struction of the past, because he con stitutes it through a temporal ization that enve lops him and total ize s h i s partial ac tion w ith those of al l the others . This influence of the future on the past, far from ideal iz ing the meaning (as a pre sent re sidue of a total ization that was , an d as a permanent po s s ibil ity of its reactualization i n the form of a temporal ization strictl y c onfi n ed with i n our temporal iza­ tion ) , con fi rms the real ity of its being . Th i s heing , in fact, s ituates those who want to know it, thro ugh its pas s i v e res i stances and through the more or l e s s superfi c i al truth s it y ields to them . It i s si tuated only in action and th ro URh it (and we shall see that it changes the action pre c i sely i n so far as the action can ch ange i t ) .

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8l

onto log ical ob serv ati o n s allow us to tackl e the main question, the one th at must prec i se l y di sti ngui sh the s i tuated dialectic from any ideal i sm (be it a material i st dogmati sm or a h i s torical re lati v i sm ) . For we h ave to ask ourselves , on the basi s of what we have establ ished about th e that form - in-the-past of the total ization-of­ being of m eaninf? envelopment what the real- being of that total ization i s , as an ongoing pr axi s -proces s . I am not hereby i ntend ing to study ontologically the complex structures that consti tute thi s real-being : i . e . the dialectical u nity of the human and the ant i -human in al l thei r forms , i nasmuch as th i s rests upon the practical un i fi cation of physico-chemical (and zoolog­ ical ) exteriori ty i nto a milieu ( l ater i nto a field) by the organ i s m , and upon the recondition i ng of the organ i sm by the phys ico-chemical through the indispen sabl e synthetic unity of the m ilieu and the field. Th is difficult problem bel ong s to an ontology of H i story , not to the critique of di alectical R eason . What counts for us is simpl y to determ ine whether it is neces sary to env i sage the total i zation-of-enve lopment through a po siti­ v i st nominal i s m , or in the per sp ective of a radicaI i zing real i sm . Th i s moment of our critical investigation i s c ruc ial , since it determ i n e s the relations bet ween Being and Knowledge, and s i nce it cal l s into que stion again the v ery fou n dation of the si tuated di alecti c . For the latter ri sks appe aring as a phenomenologi c al i deal i sm , so l ong as the rel ation uni ting situati on and totaI ization has not been c l ari fi e d . HESE

81

Th i � chapte r appeared in S artre ' � m a n u � c r i p t as s e c t i o n 5 o f the fo re g o i n g n u mbered

seq uence

H o w e v e r , the a rg u m e nt b e c a m e w i d e r I n sc o p e as i t w e nt a l ong , and c h a n g i n g

n I n to a n i n de p e nde n t c h apte r h a � a l l o w ed the v an o u s po i n t � treated to be t h ro w n i n t o � h arpe r re l i e f b y g I v i n g the m the i r o w n s u b-di v i s i o n � . I t w i l l be n o t e d that t h e arg u me n t doe 5 not re m a i n c on fi n ed to t h e e x am p l e o f d i re c to r i a l S O C I e t i e s .

the

sec ti o

30 1

BOOK lII

3 02

Th e B e ing - in - itself of th e To ta lization - o.f- En velopment Can O n ly Be Va in ly A im ed A t Whe n we say that the dialectic i s situated, what are we try ing to convey? Just th i s : that hi storian s cannot look at th ings ji'om th e standpoint (�f the in h uman in order to know and comprehend h i stori cal re al ity . There are two ways of de -situating yourself with re spect to the object. One i s to turn yourself into Nature and see yourself produc ing human hi story as one of your d i alecti cal hypostase s . The other l e � s eas i l y detectable is to reject the situation as a rec i proc i ty : in other words , to situate the event or obj ect bei n g studied i n re l ation to the re searcher and h i s re search, yet w i thout situating the re searcher and h i s di s c i p l i n e w i th i n h i stori cal deve lop­ ment through the e x igenc ies of th at ev ent or object and the way in which the se are sati sfied. The former type of de- s i tuation l eads to the dialecti cal dogmati sm of the o u tside � the latter to the dogm atic and positi v i s t ideal i sm of conserv at i v e hi stori an s . At all e v ents , the de - s i tuation en ds i n as m uch as it i s the ac tual object di sclos ing by po sit ing obj ecti v i ty as an absolute rea lity . If the re searcher (or the en semble of i tse l f re searchers who make up the current sc ienc e ) is de- si tuated in re l ation to the obj ect under consideration ei ther because he con s i ders prax i s ­ process from the standpoint of ' n atural ' exteriori ty , or because he has a priori establ i shed himse l f in truth itself as an etern ity contemp lating the the object lose s change from the v i ewpoin t of what doe s not change part of i ts qual ification (its h uman meaning and its structure of practical i nteriori ty in the former case, its real ity as a tempora l i zation in the l atter* ) , but wins ( i l l usorily , of course ) the absol ute autonomy of its be ing . Th i s passage to the ab sol ute de rives sim u l taneous l y from scien ­ ti stic dogmatism and from the hi storian ' s negati on of the re lations of immanence bi ndi n g him to hi s object. For the l atter takes its be ing from Nature an abso l ute be i n g , and an ab sol ute knowledge of the mode s it I N atu re 1 engenders - or from Truth � as ab �ol ute sub stance of the appari tion s i t prod uces an d i l l um i n ate s and as an etern i zati on of their be ing as an eternal object of knowl edge . B ut, i n addi tion , the breaking of the bond of re c i proc ity confe rs in both cases a rec i proc a l in dependence upon the obJ ec t and upon the re searc her an i n dependence that i s re c i procal in �o far as i t i � reduce d , bas i c al l y , to the abs tract negation of m utual dependen c y . Th i s spl i t , maintai ned \vi th in a rec iproc ity that i s nece s s ary to the � i tuation . seem s to re al i ze the separation of B e i n g an d

*

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i � 1 0 "' ( , tem pora i i n.lt i o n i �

t ra n 'i fo rm e d i n to p h y � i c o - c h c nl l c a l t i m e . a n d c o n vc r ... e l y . t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f t e 1 n p o ra l i 7 at i o n

'

by t h e e t e r n a l m u l.,( affe c t the agent � p r ac t H.: a l re a l i t y . t o t h e v e ry he art o f h i � fre e d i a l e c t i c

TOTA L IZAT I O N -OF- E N V EL O P M E N T

303

Knowi n g , which dev e l op i n para l lel but autonomous l y . We di scus sed these v iews at the beginning of the present work /Q and showed how the dialec tic could not be the object of a critical i n v es tigation outside the prac tical mi l ieu of which it i s s i m u l taneou s l y the action (inasmuch a s it gives itse l f i ts own l aw s ) , the know l edge (as dialecti c a l control of action by itse lf) and the cogn itive law ( inasmuch as know ledge of the dialectic require s a dialectical tempora l i zation of know ledge ) . The fundamental i dentity of Doing and Knol1Jing th u s presented the rel ation­ ship between a praxi s and the hi storian study ing it as the bond of interiority l i nking fl'VO actions through a spatio-temporal gap ; and thi s bond of i nteriority (which i mp l ied that the hi stori an should be questioned about the prax i s of h i s own society) was ultimate l y nothing but the situation of the two agents with respect to one another, i nasmuch as thi s must be determ i ned on the bas i s of the hi storic al en semble . Thi s bond of dependence , as we have seen, did not impl y an ontological re l ativism. Preci se l y because h uman actions were i n v o l ved, the practica l reality of each e l uded the other on pri n c i p l e . Or rather, we were abl e to as sert that onto l ogical autonomy - and con seq uentl y the irreducibil ity of B e i ng to being-known - so l on g as the object of knowledge was bei n g temporalized w i thin a larger soc i al ensemble, and s o l ong as i t was defi ned solely by h uman co-ord i nate s : i . e . as being in its objective reality and in its autonomy a mere determination and a singu l ari zing incarnation of the tempora l ization i n progre s s , i . e . of the tota l ization-of-env e l opment. It is at th,i s l e v el , however, that the que s tion of idea l i sm and real ism w i l l be posed. For as soon as we recognize the e x i stence of a tota l i ty-of­ envelopment, 8 3 con s i dered as the tempora l i zation of the prax i s-proce s s , we di scover th at our analysis situs [an a l y s i s of the s i tuation ] was incomplete , and that it can emerge from i ndetermination onl y by c a l l ing the ontological reality o f the env eloping tota l i zation i nto que stion . An attempt has been made to avoid thi s problem by reduci ng the totali zation - of-env e l opment t o be i ng mere l y the ideal unity of enve loped totali zati on s : prax i s -proc e s s would then be l ike a monadic un iverse re flecting i ts e l f differently in every monad and not ex isting outside its various refl ectio n s . At the same t ime, by a c onverse movement, every agent, every acti v i ty , e very event and every product i s here reduced to being j ust a determ ination of the human m i l i eu . It i s not prod uced in the v o i d of uni v ersal exteriority but carved into the s o l idi ties of the practical ternporal ization , from which i t receives i ts exi stence alon g with i ts its gradient, profi l e , speed, etc . The h uman ( i . e . the hi storical

8 2 . Critiq u e , v o l 83

1 , " I n trod uc t i o n '

S e e footnote 4 3 o n p 1 8 7 a b o v e

B OO K I I I

3 04

prax i s - process) i s here a fi nite but limitless solid (whose re lations with the non - human no on e can thu s define , even as a prob lematic limit), producing its own spec ifications , i ncarn ati ons , etc . , in the way that the substance produces its mode s for Spinoza. This w ay of s uppre s sing diffic ultie s by remov i ng the means of unmasking them employs a con­ ception of H i s tory that may seem c lose to our own , but i s in fact radically opposed to it. Th i s conception actually rests upon a system of metaphors , whose metaphorical character is concealed and which end up being taken literall y . What such metaphors e xpre s s is true if you bear in mind that they expre ss i t metaphorically. To give an e xample of s uch terminolog y , the truth of its content and the dev i ation of the true by language , let u s imag ine we wanted to expre s s from th is v iewpoin t the differences separating the l i terary vocation in the U S S R from its counterpart in the bourgeoi s democrac i e s , during the second half of the fi rst s tage of soc ialism. We should show, among other things, how the s ingular obj ective of the Sov iet writer i s neces sarily a spec ification of the common obj ectiv e (v ia the medi ation of sociali st real i sm , etc . ) ; how the ori entati on, speed, urgency and rhythm of the creativ e temporal ization are determi ned by the sovereign and common temporali zati on (rhythm of planned growth) that nouri she s and sustains i t ; and how literature ( as a complex ensembl e of soc i al re lati on s s ituating the wri ter under consideration with re spect to his col leagues and the reading publ ic) i s at the same ti me metamorpho sed i nto a nece ssari ly progressive movement, i . e . contribute s to the advances of soc ialist con struction and progresses directly and indirectly through those very adv ances . So the temporal pro fi le of h i s l iterary l ife merges w i th the ri sing curve of l iterature , inasmuch as th i s di scip l ine is itself carried along by the ri s ing industri al potential , standard of l i v i n g and cultural level . The writer does not real i ze hi s fu l l floweri n g the great val ue of the work s produced i n hi s m aturity, or the i ncrease i n h i s audience (numerically) and h i s infl uence over h i s rea ders i n the same way that h i s colleagues i n the bourgeois democracies woul d : s i mply as the results of h i s personal labour, hi s experience and h i s age , and of some fav ourable conj uncture creati ng a temporary need on the publ ic ' s part to receive the very ' me s sage ' he is able to del iver. To be sure , he does not discard any of the se factors , in some of which he take s great pri de ; but he sees h i s merits and h i s succes ses above all as the products of the s uccesses obtai ned in al l domain s by the and th e i ncarnati on sovereign p l an n i ng . Moreover, as the writer a member of the leading strata has made h i s choice to wri te i n h i s non -tran scendable inerti a as a c ommon i nd i v idua l , and as thi s opti on has i n the last re sort determ ined on l y the particu l ar wa y in which th i s common indi v i dual wil l serv e the aim pursued by a l l , the movement of h i s l i fe i s rea l i zed as a s i ng ulari zing -�

TOT ALIZATION - OF- E N V ELOPM E N T

305

incarnation of the movement of sociali zation , and hi s own s uc cess as the inca rnated tri umph of the prax i s -proces s . You w i l l recognize th is language. It i s our own , it i s that of all dial ecti c i an s , and indeed it pre sents no danger i f you see it as merely an ensemble of swift, picturesque phrases, which save time and are annulled in the very act of comprehen sion . B ut if it i s to be taken l i terally, it plunges us back i nto an idealist, unpri ncipled optimism . For if you take the words as they are i . e . without correcti ng them you are i nduced to identify realism w i th human ism . The i nternal l imit of every situation is actually the relation ship of men with one another, directly or v i a the" intermediary of human thing s ; or else the relationship between men and h uman th ings, directly or v ia the mediation of other men . This is what ' humanist real i sm ' (that ideal ism of the h uman) e xpresses through i nto the i mages which make pra x i s -process as a hunlan -reality s ubstance of particular ac ts and local events . Now i t is quite true that i n a prac tical field unified by the sovereign ­ indiv idual every particular real ity i s c onditioned from with i n by an es sential s tructure of the field: the re lation s of immanence between everythi ng and everything e l se . B ut it is al so true that we sho u l d l apse back into the GestaI ti st i l lusion if we forgot that a totali zation in progress is not a totality , and th at the elements of the field are discrete realities which produce their integrati on agai n st the m ulti p l icity that affects them , by transcending [ the latter] w ithout s uppressing it. Above al l , the total izing temporalization is a result i n progress the result of particular acti v itie s , and of the sov ereign pra x i s inasmuch as thi s rec onditions them through the organ s of propaganda or coerc ion with w hich it has provided itself but it would be a terrible m istake to see i t as the temporal evolution of some hyper-organi sm imposing itself on its social cel l s . Acts are autonomous and discontinuou s . They ari se every ­ w here at once. Eac h , to be sure , total izes the others by incarnating them . Each modifi e s the milie u surrounding each of the others . B ut these i nc arnations have nothi ng to do with the production of fi n ite modes by a s ubstance . They are real ized in di scontinuity as autonomous transcen ­ dence s , and most of the time what recondi tions them is the ensemble of the material c i rcumstance s that they sim ultaneousl y tran scend and pre ­ serv e . From thi s v iewpoi nt, on the contrary , i t i s neces sary to return to the pri me truth of Marx i s m that it is men who make History . And as it i s H i s tory that produce s men ( i n asmuch as they make it) , we u nderstand as self-evident that the ' substance ' of the human act, i f such a th i n g were to exi st ( i f the biological organism could be de s i gnated by th i s name , without fear of mi sunderstandi n g ) , would 0 11 the con trary be the non ­ human (or, at a pinch , the pre - h uman ) , inasmuch as it i s preci se l y the d i screte materi ality of ev e ryone. Through the act , an organi sm makes

3 06

BOOK I I I

itse lf" a man , by interi orizing an d re-exteriorizing the tec hniques and the c u lture which de fine man in th ese h istorical circumstances and with i n the ( s i multaneou s l y human and non -human ) perspective of reproducing his l ife ( sati sfying hi s needs ) . Pre c i sely in so far as the indiv idual i s the product of his product (and in so far as the ac ti on of the productive process i s inscribed in h i s very l ungs o r i n h i s l iver occ upati onal i llne s ses, etc . ) , he i s the produc t of a certa i n man and a certain w oman. If his parents are affected i n the ir very bodies by the conditions imposed upon them by the exig enc ies of the sovere i gn ( and, through these, of the p ractico-inert) , moreover , he w i l l inte grate hi mself into th e practical synthe s i s with a certai n n umber of negati v e features , which he doe s get from the social, to be s ure, but v ia the animal intermedi ary of an inherited constitution . If it i s true that nature and culture are indi ssolubl y l inked in each and every p erson, thi s also means that c ulture runs natural risks : that it i s i n mortal danger in eac h and every biolog ical indi v idual ity. We have already seen that thi s jacticity of prax i s i s incarnated i n the fragi l ity of the sovereig n - i n div i dua l , i . e . in the depen ­ den c y of the prax i s-proce s s i n relation to one phy s i ol ogical organ i s m . To be sure , one death has never sufficed to ov erturn praxis entirely . B ut it i s sti l l the case that the sovereign ' s i s reinteriorized by ev eryone , then re ­ exteriorized as modificati o n s of varyi ng importance , depending on the circ umstances of the total izi n g activity and its obj ectives . So inasmuch as the individual integrates fun damentall y no n -hum an elements into the human synthe s i s , and i nasmuch as his specifi c features repre sent hi s initi al c irc umstances tran scended and pre served and the source of fundamental dev iations , throu gh which hi s several practices h av e been constituted (and which we i n heri t as incarnated culture and as accultured nature ) ev ery soci al man m us t be de fi ned as a certain real ity of the material univ erse producing itself in and through its relation to all the others (from the s ame sovereign fi e l d) as transcended nature . B u t through thi s irreduc ible materi al i ty whi ch characteri ze s the agent and rea lizes the act that tran scends it the indiv idual and the group s , through the practical field and beyon d its l imits , maintain an ontological rel ationshi p w ith exteri ority : i . e . w ith the whol e of the worl d . The be ing-i n-th e - worl d that defi nes the practical organ i sm and c i rc um scribes i ts fi e ld of action i s coupled with a being - i n - the-mid st-of­ the - world by v i rtue of which it receives the sam e status as al l other real itie s . The mere possib i l i ty that a cooling of the s un might stop H i story is and leave i ts diac hronic me aning for ever undec ided enough to cons titute him (even if i t never happens) as an exteriori ty in relation to his h istory. For i n th i s c ase he w i l l not compl ete it, b ut ne ither w i l l he be de stroyed b y it (as w ould happen if an atomic war were to cause the d i sappearance of humanity ) . S o H i s tory become s the

TOTA L I Z A T I O N - OF- EN V E L O P M E NT

307

undertaking you pursue all oth er th ings being equal, an d whose chances of succeeding (assuming that a goal i s proposed w e shall c o me back to 84 thi s ) depend upon the maintenance of a statu s quo in at least th i s sec tor of the Uni verse : i . e . of an ensem ble of energy tran smutations operating in exterio rity* and w ithout any te leological determi nation . * * S o bein g - in -the -midst-of-the - world as an e xteri or limit upon being- i n ­ the - world marks each and every one of u s and constitutes the tran sce ndent aspect of our materiality . Thi s doe s not real ly involve anyth ing fu nda­ mental l y ne w . We hav e already seen the practical o rgan i s m in danger in i ts prac tical field. In this field , moreover, which defines i t s powers , danger even phy s ical i s a h uman danger. The only difference is th at be ing- i n - the-m i dst-of-the - worl d as a limit upon bein g - i n - the - world determines us in relation to our impotence. In that sense, the transcendent be i n g of ind i v idual s and groups canno t be l i ved or known as s uch within the i nteri ori ty of the field. Except in one spec i fic c i rcum stance in which it i s inc arn ated as a negation , and to whi ch I shall 5 8 ret urn short l y , it i s interiori zed and re -ex teri ori zed practically and

be a ' d i a lectic o f N ature ' , not h i n g w o u l d be a l tere d in t h e c onditions we h a v e j us t described . Furthermore , sc ient i fi c and tec h n i c al advances i n d ubitably have the effec t o f e n larging the prac t ical fi e l d , and perhaps w i l l i n fac t m ake i t pos s ib le l ater on to a v ert s o m e d i s asters B ut th i s i s not the re al q u e s t i o n Eve n i f, contai ned i n germ i n h uman k n o w l e d ge there were a prac t i c a l pos s i b i l it y for m an ( o nc e a certa i n � c i e n t i fi c and techn i c a l l e v e l was reach ed ) to s u rv i ve an y s i dere a l c atas t rophe , n ot h i n g w o u l d y e t prove th at s u c h catas trophes w o u l d w a i t to OCc u r u nt i l we h ad the m e an s to avert the m . N o t h i n g wo u l d prove it , bec ause n ot h i n g ca n pro v e i t t w o d i ffe re nt series are i n v o l v e d . So if the ensemble of c o s m i c c i rc u m stances re a l l y all owed u s to reach a c e rtain threshold and pass be yond i t , the c o nd i t i o n s that gave u s the opport u n i ty of pe rpetuat i ng ourse l v e s wo u l d mark u s in e x te riority n o m ore and n o le ss than the catac l y s m that destroyed o u r spe c i e s . * * The mod i fi c at i o n s w h i c h e x peri mental b i o l og y m ay introd uce i nto t h e generat ion and deve lopment of the e mbryo are i rre l e v ant h e re . To be s u re , i nasm uch as they deri v e from the appl ication o f tech nology and w i l l be conditioned by s o c i a l i m p e rati v e s , they m u st be c onsidered as social. How e v e r , e v e n if peop l e h ad s uc c eeded i n prod u c i n g l i fe and th ereby c reat i n g ' s y n th e t i c men ' , these n e w i n d i v i d u a l s - as produ c t s of a soc i e t y , i .e of a concrete u n i ver-;al ity - wo u l d be determ i n e d , even i n their v ery emerge n c e , by soc i a l i t y B ut each of t h e m , i n h i s very we i g h t and a l so L n h i ") frag i l ity , t h r ou g h t h e l a w s t h at had d i rected h i s de v e l opment - l aw s of inert matter an d l a w s of l ife - would ( e v e n i f as a m an of anti-ph y s i s ) rem a i n bo und i n transc e ndence to the U n i v erse , j u ")t l i ke that Chinese v ase or t h at block of ste e l I n o the r w o r d � he wou ld be prod uced - and be pre serv e d i n h i s real i t y - i n re lation to an i n fi n i ty of e x teri o r i t y w h o s e c haracte r i �t i c fe at u re ( seen through our s p y- g l as s ) i s to s u stain o r de s tro y prac t i c al i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h eq ual i n difference : i e to b e a l l at once h um an , i n h u m an . pre - h u m an , tran s - h um an and n o n - h u m a n *

I f the re

w e re

to

,

,

Th i s topi c , w h i c h be l o n g s to the d i a c h ron i c , wa� not i n fac t dealt w i th i n the pre �ent work A l l us i on i s m ade t o i t on p . 3 3 5 b e l o w the e s se n t i al a i m of H i s to ry-as-an-undertak ing i s l in ked to the e x i stence and the perception of d i achron i c mean i n g , i e of ' the ax i a l d i rec t i on i n re l at i on to w h i c h e ve ry p o s s i b l e d r i ft , today and i n the i n fi n i t e fut u re o f i nte r i o ri t y . c o u l d be d e fined ( a n d c o rrec t e d ) , . 8 5 . S e e p p . 3 0 9 ff. below i t i s d e ath w h i c h , l i ved a s an ab s o l u te e x te ri ori t y w i th i n i nte ri o r i t y , g I v e s the e x peri e nce of t h e e n v e l op i n g rot a l i za t i on ' I., be i n g- i n - I t�e l f. 84

'

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teleolog ically as a de facto lim it to our power: i . e . as a human determ ina­ tion of technology by soci al hi story and the hi story of science , and and which i s indeed simultaneously as a frontier to be pushed back al way s heing pushed hack. Moreover, we now understand that th i s tran scendent limit doe s not confine i tself to d eterm i n ing e veryon e (or the mere sum of all indi ­ v idual s ) from outside, but i s the be ing- i n -the-mi dst- of-the - world of praxis ­ pro cess itself. For the l atter, when it succeeds, imposes i tself in a re stricted sector of B ei n g ; but its triumph over thi n g s , within th i s sector, presupposes th at it is tolerated by the U n i v ers e . In other words, prax i s ­ proces s i s grasped, i n its i nteriori ty , as making itself through its products . B ut i ts tran scendent qual i fi c ation constitute s it as a real ity that i s not the foundation of its own pos sibil ity . Th i s real ch arac ter of its be ing eludes it, as it e l udes the indi vi dual . Prax i s -process cal c u lates and takes i ts ri sks in a given situation, e . g . by transcendin g a contradiction of the practico­ inert or by giving itsel f the task of sati sfy i n g a need. Whol l y defined jor itself by thi s tran scendence that bri ng s a future obj ective i nto relation w i th a pre sent danger or a need (and thu s encounters the ri sk that the agent may no longe r be ab l e to act or even l i ve but an interiori zed ri sk, i .e . one integrated i nto the fi e l d as a posi t i v e or negativ e e x i genc y ) , i t engenders i ts own knowledge to avoid the interior pos sibi l ity of fai l ure or disintegration, and has neither the need nor the l e i s ure to grasp itse l f from outsi de as a dead-pos sibi l i ty defi ned in exter iority on the bas is of undi sclosed regions of the U n i verse . Yet although thi s po ssi b i l ity remains a more or less formal determi nat i on so long as a circumst ance has not realized as a threat-to-man so me transformation of the si dereal fi eld be i ng - i n-tran sc endence i mbues and qual ifies prax i s -process within its v ery interiority . For prax i s-process prod uce s itself in a world where the en semble of cele stial and cosmic rev olution s , by v irtue of the con­ sequences th ey are i n the proce s s of enta il ing , pronounces sentence upon it, upon its possibles and upon its obj ecti ve s . 6 8 So human ideal i sm i s wrong tw ice over. The practical integration of indi v idual s could not l i q u i date the mul ti p l i c ity of exteri ority that charac ­ teri ze s th ose same ind i v i d uals as substances . The totali zation-of­ envelopme nt e x i sts and i s de fi ned with i n th e fi n i tude of in teri ori ty of the un dertaking (in short , it prod uces thro ugh its objectives , the material ity of the fi e l d , etc . its o w n l im i t s ) . For that very reason� thi s finitude becomes a s truc ture of exteriority in its be ing - i n -transcendence . The fe ature spec i fi c to prax i s -proc e s � i s th u s , from the o ntol og i c al v iew point, -

8 6 . W h i c h i s a l so a ' re a l i sm '

the h u m an .

S e e abo v e , p . 305

t h i s h u ma n i s t re a l i � m i � a n i de al i sm of

T O T A L I Z A T I O N - O F- E N V E L O P M E N T

3 09

the opposite of that which Hegel ascribes to th e movement of c on sc ious­ ne s s in Th e Ph enomenology of Mind. For idea l i s m sees be i ng - in - itself a s an abstract moment that of e s sence of the ' becoming-other ' of the l i v i ng substance. It contras ts w ith the for- itself i n dis soc iation , as the raw give n of obj ecti ficati on al ienated to the negation which repeats and posi ts itself i n the unic ity of the subj ect. Total i zation will be c arried out at the moment when with the i n - itself tran scended and preserved in the for- itself be ing i s reali zed as in- itself and for- i tself: i .e . as absolute ­ subj ect contain i ng i ts own determi nations with i n itself, and defi ned by the consciousne s s of bei ng its own mediation i n its beco ming-other. Roughly speak ing , be ing - i n - itself as an e ssence i s that outer aspect of B e i ng that consciousness takes back into itself since it c an e x ist only for consciousn ess. In our dial ectical inve sti gation , however, we fi nd the being- in -itself of prax i s -process as what mi ght be termed its unas s i ­ milable an d non-recuperable real ity. And thi s being - i n- itself, as an exte ri or l i m i t of totali zation , real izes itself as an interior l imit of tran scendent e xteriori ty ( it produces itself on the basi s of the di spersion of e xteri ority as a limi tation o f that di spersion by a development in interiority). A s a twofold l i mit, however, being- in - itself can not pre sent itself to in ve sti gation , as we have seen . A s a revelation immanent to the prac tic al fie ld, the being - i n-e xteriority that defines its ontolo gical statu s el udes it by v i rtue of its v ery structure . It c an at best be aimed at abstractly (as i s the c ase here ) , through v erbal form u lati on s . As an i nteriority produced as a l imit upon the infinite ' natural ' di spers ion, it coul d be the obj ect of a concrete knowledge only if th i s as Nav i l le would l i ke c ame tow ards i t fro m the infi nite hori zons of th e Univers e . B ut thi s infin ite thought wou l d a t once swal l ow i t up as a moment of its prac tical field. For the uni verse of dispersion, as object of a practical thought, would become a fi eld un ified by prax i s ; and h uman h i story would no longer contrast with thi s as the limitation of e x teri ority by interiority, but a s a local event contrasting with the total fi e l d . So what i s rev ealed to us i s not th e a nteriority of be ing- i n - i tself i n re l ation to being­ for- itse lf, but its autonomy. Not only doe s i t not need to be known in order to be , but i t on prin ciple elude s knowledge. �

D eath , Exp erience of Noth ingness - in - itself as a Windolrv on to Being - in - itself: History Riddle d with Holes You will perhaps ask how i t h a ppen s that we can so m uch as speak albeit formal ly and wide of the m ark about th i s ontological status , since i t s very real i ty i mplies that it transcends knowledge. The an s wer to that i s , fi rst , that th i s non-kn owable i s not an i rrational : i t merel y si gnals the

3 10

BOOK III

impos sibi li ty for H i st ory to be at once, and for itself, immanence and tran scendence . I t i s usele s s , of c ourse , for the pol itician or technician to try and determ i ne the limits of prax i s -proce s s : at least, it i s useless in present c i rc um stance s and al l things be ing equal , moreover s ince we have no know l edge of a sidereal catastrophe that m ight threaten our species (or slow evol utions certainly preparing our disappearance) . B ut philosophical refl ection ( whose practical function we shall see more 87 c learl y in a forthcoming c hapter ) i s led to to talize the arguments agai nst ideali sm by aim i ng wi ldly at th i s ontologic al tran scende nce : the be ing-in-itse l f of the enve loping total ization . Ahove all , moreover, as I h ave al ready mentioned , th ere e x i sts at least one case where we experience absol ute ex teriority w ithin interiori ty : this s p ecific case (but one w h i ch i s reproduced everywhere, at ev ery in stant) v io lent death is to give it first in al l its ori ginal comple x ity condemning an indiv idual or group to utter fai l ure . For such a death is realized as the incarnation of the enveloping totali zation inasm uc h as it is in itself, rather than as a determination for itself o f i ntersubjectivity. If, for ex ample , you fi rst take the simple case o f an acc i dental death ( whether it be that of a ti ler h av ing a fal l or a motori st invol ved in a col l i s ion), the utensi lity and the counter-final ities that are the immedi ate source of thi s death (a brick came away under the worker ' s foot� the car was a standard mode l and all cars of that model had the same defect, which etc . ) do not manage to give the death a human character (nor comes to the same th ing here an anti -human , practico-inert one ) . Or rather , yes, such a death i s wholly human : social en sembles c hoose their deaths (by applying different selective system s : the distribution of dispensaries , increased occ upati onal risks in a capitalist s y s tem thanks to competi tion and in a soc i alist one to e xhau stion caused by the accelerated growth of indust ry and so on) and c ertain men chose this death through the i r own battle against the inert exigenc ies of their task . The practico -inert goe s further, i t de si gnates its v ict ims : a supplementary determination w i l l be enough for the choi ce to be real ized by the e v ent (the brakes drag to the left, so all purc hasers are de signated as belon ging to a serie s of possihle deaths ; the determination fo r th is particular one w i l l come from addi tional c i rc umstances, which for the i r part de fine p oss ible but i ncompletely determi ned death s : slippe ry road , rai n , hai rpin bends, lack of road signs, etc . ) . So it is perfectl y le g itimate to see every -

8 7 . The topic w a s n o t to be s t ud i e d i n the p re s e n t work , but i t \V a � broac h e d i n a l ec t u re t h at S a rt re g a ve i n 1 95 9 ( on e y e ar a ft e r the p re s e n t t e x t w a s w r i t te n ) , e n t i t l e d ' Wh y Ph i l o � o p hers ? ' and p u b l i � hed i n Marc h 1 9 84 in the j o u rn a l Le Dehut. S ee a l s o t h e i n t e rv i e w o n a n t h ropo l o g y i n Situ a tio ns, IX.

TOT A L I Z A T I O N - O F- E N V E LO P M ENT

3I I

death as a soc ial and huma n product taking place as a temporal i zed real ity within the interiority of the enve loping temporal izat ion. Th is w i ll be the viewpoint of the legi slator, m agi strate or technic ian , for example. I n a certain way it is also partly the v iew point of parents and cl ose re lat ive s, who al ways (more or less vag uely) have i t in for the collectivity that has al lowed a p articul ar individual to die (the ear fac tory , which has abnormally increased the ri sks inherent i n driv i ng a motorcar� t h e whole soc iety, which thro ugh its lack of organi zation has al lowed him to run u sele ss dan g ers or exhaust himself by t o i l � a nd so on )� for the tech nic ians wh o cou l d have saved him but did not try ( the doctor who treated him, th e trade union whic h should lon g ago have insi sted th at the m anagement should take safety measure s , ete . ) ; or directl y for the roadhog ' who killed hi m ' or the foreman who se idiotic order forced him to do a dan gero us job that ended in the fatal acc ide nt. I n th i s way , people make death into an event in human h i s tory or rather an event in the indivi dual l ife . And they are righ t . With the advances of medic i ne (wh ich accompany the deve lopment of i ndustry ) a particular i llness goes into dec line or disappears , while another occupationally based and th us direct l y connected w i th the u se of certain machines to manufacture c ertain products makes its appearance. The acc umulation of capital m ake s i t poss ible to increase th e share of revenue distributed t o unproductive people , so to increase the number of doctors , etc . From th is viewpoint, we shall say that every v iolent d eath i s the incarnation o f the inner l imit to the enveloping total izati on . The boundaries of the practical field are touched, but from wi th in in immanence and death pre se n t s i tself as a destruction realized through the p ractical relations o f men w ith one another. A t the sam e tim e , however, death i s grasped by the surv i vors ( some ­ times eve n by t he person who i s about to die , if he become s aw are of his fate) as a pure and simp le deficit: both in relation to the group which needs these men and can no longer use them (in history , it often happen s that a revolutionary party is s y stematically deprived of its el ite s through decimation, continual death sentences, etc . ) and also in relation to the actual agent (be i t an indiv idual or a sub- group) who is s ubtracted o r stolen as if by a trick from his own future : i . e . from his dest iny and his practic al objectiv e s , from his ' rendezv ous w i th H istory ' , and from the life he had already traced for himself. From thi s ne w stand po int , comprehension in interiori ty fi nds its limit: If men are mortal , that death in other words , those two acts by l i v i ng sentence and that ex ecution people exerci sed upo n a l i vin g person can and must be comprehended . Death i s a mean s of H i s tory , or life and death occupy a specific (and al way s very complex) place i n th e system of v alues prod uced by praxi s­ proce s s . B ut death itself i s not a prod uct of H i s tory : on the contrary (at least in the case of h uman h i story ) , i t i s what produces H i story . The

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strugg l e to gov ern th ings and enslave them to needs i s produced as the labour of mortal organ i sm s , for w hom the non- sati sfac tion of certain needs entai ls death . And the s truggle of men among themselves v i a the mediation of th ings a nd for the government of th ings draw s its urgency from the danger of death. A tran spo s i tion of emergencie s , under pre s s ure from the danger of dy ing, leads men to produce f'o r others the death they w i sh to avoid themselve s . And the rev olts provoked by th i s oppress ion draw their c l i mate of fraternity-terror from the twofold thre at of death (dy ing of famine or povert y ; dying through extermination ) . Thi s interior­ i zed threat i s itself fraternity-terror, as a new di spl acement of mortal fragi l ity: the interiorization of death becomes a punish ment by death of sec e ssions and betrayal s w ithin the c ombat group . B ut however that may be , death a s a determ inati on of the human c ondition i s a qual i fi c ation of H i s tory in transcendence, si nce it is its (uni versal ) pre sence which obl iges us to m ake a h istory of morta l organism s : i . e . a h i story , every praxi s-process of which i s defined i n terms of the nece ss ity of dying. And the neces si ty of dying i s itself de fi ned as a nece s sity for every indiv idual (and every group) to disappear in the c ourse of its own ac tion ; to v acate the premises the theatre of its functions before i t has completed its role (or sometime s lon g after: at al l events the gap e x i sts) ; which signifies conversely for every praxi s the nece s s ity of be ing de serted along the way by i ts agent and continuing as an inert prax i s (of the same kind as counter- finalities ) , or of disappear­ ing ( leavi ng unresolved the practical q ue stion i t sought to re s o l v e ) , or of bei ng taken up and de v i ated by others . From thi s standpoint death e ntai l s tho se faults i n H i story (connected w i th new births) which people cal l ' generational c onfl icts ' and which are the source of the comple xity of 88 diachron ic synthe ses. Throug h his death , the agent has thi s destiny : to and what no one w i l l fi nish beg i n or res ume what he does not fini s h ( since h i s replacement w i l l dev i ate the prax i s ) . Thi s mean s that he must h i m self pursue h i s ac tion , bearing in mind h i s ever poss ible death ( i . e . make h i s w i l l , or if he i s a sovere ign ensure h i s succe s s ion , e tc . ) ; hence , he must qual ify it i n its h i s torici ty on the bas i s of a trans-h i s torical condition . * Through the very modali ties of the transmi s s i on of powers

*

That S c i e n c e may one d a y b e ab le t o pro l o n g l i fe i s a p robabi l i t y t h a t i n n o w a y

alte rs t h e fu n d am e n t al q ue s t i on . For, s o l o n g as m a n i s m o rtal i n a fi e l d of s c a rc i t y , th i s q u e st i o n c an n ot fi n d i t s an s w e r in an y v ar i a t i o n o f h i s l i fe - s pan . M o re o v e r , I re fu s e to e n v i �age t h e h y po th e � i � of an i m m o rta l i t y tec h n i c al l y ac q u i re d i n t h e m i d s t o f a b u n d an c e : t h i s w ho l l y i n d e term i nate d re a m , i f i t w e re one d a y to be re a l i z e d , w o u l d s i g n a l t h e end o f h unlan h i.\ tory , t h at i � a l l Furthe rmore , an i m m o rt al i t y hecome i n th i s way w o u l d n e c e s � ar i l y re tain i t s forme r m o rta l ity a � t h e ori g i n a l s ou rc e of i ts d e v i at i o n s .

88

L ' ldiot de la /am ille , v o l 3 , p p . 4 3 6 ff

TOT A L I Z A T I O N -OF-EN V E L O PM E N T

3 13

i . e . thro ugh the agenf s antici pation of h i s own disappe arance , and through h i s transcendence tow ards a modi fied, altered and continued prax i s the action itself" rec�ives its intra- hi stori cal de scription as non­ historic ity . Actually, it orientate s itself in re l ati on to a certain h uman fac t - which in real ity is the man ' s disappearance and makes it i nto the agent ' s permanent po s s ib i l ity. Wel l , on the one hand this disappearance i . e . as a naked i s a radical negati on . A s a c ontingent brutality manifestation of facticity it i s unas simi lable and non -tran scendable, and at the very heart of H is tory man i fests itself as a rupture of the synthetic l inks of i nteriority . * From th i s point of v i e w , it fundamentally e l udes comprehens ion . On the other hand, it al ways manifests itsel f as a cessation of History, even or above al l if it is the hi storical struggle that has provoked i t . Not on l y has the indiv idual been stri pped away from Hi story , but H i s tory required h i s death ( inasmuch as he i s the v ictim of a s y stematic repre s s ion) o n l y in so far as it - and al l h uman are at once tran scendent conditions an d tran scendent aims in death s rel ation to H i story . Conditioned by death , Hi story through the prax i s ­ proces s o f the temporary v i ctors real izes i tse lf b y depri v i ng the adversarie s of any h uman pos s ibil ity of making H i story . And thi s permanent de fi c i t remai ns su stai ned by th e s ubsequent deve l opment of the prax i s-proces s , whatever it m ay be , as the i n ert unity of a l ac una in the h i storialization of that society (these men were missed hy their practical group , thei r fam i l i e s , etc . ) . I n the unth i nkable moment when death reveal s the conditioning i n exteriority of a l l h uman action ( i t seems that his former actions were tolerated by circ umstanc e s , s i nce they already c ontained the danger that came to an end through thi s death) w hen , by a my stifying paradox , the mortal act (or the acc ident) occ urs as a retotalization of a whole man and , by that very retotal i zation which attacks h i s i nnermost being, transforms him into nothingne s s : i .e . i nto an inert and non-totalizable lacuna, pos iti ng itse lf at the heart of immanence as a non -tran scendable tran scendence H i story reveal s itse lf to warring indi v i dual s and group s as riddled with holes . Its death s are b i l l ions of holes piercing it. And each time , through that fundamen tal poros ity , the frag i l ity of the prax is -proces s pre sents itself e xperientially as the un i­ versal presence of i ts be ing-in-exteriority. Through the pitile s s nece s sity of h i s death -agony , a traveller l ost i n the de sert experiences the non­ humanity of the Un iverse, and the reby the tran scendent l i mit of the

* A death , as a ne gat i v e and s oc i a l e v e nt , become� the term o f an i n fi n i t y o f re l at i o ns

of i mmane nce between age n t s Th i s p a rt i c u l ar d e ath re s u l t s i n t h i s p art i c u l ar p ro m ot i on a n d

the l a t t e r c h an g e � t h e l i v e s of al l t h e s u bord i n ate s . I n i t s e l f, however, t h e de ath o f th i s o r t h at p e r s o n pre se n t s i ts e l f a s t h e c e 'i s a t i o n o f al l re l at i o n s o f I mm a n e nc e .

for

h im ( no t for h i s w o r k , w h ate v e r th i s m ay b e )

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human adventure manife sts itself to h im i n its ful l horror, as h i s impos s i bil ity of l i v ing and as the impossibi l ity of be ing a man . B ut an insurgent arrested by men , sentenced and kept i n c ustody by men , an d grasps no differentl y know ing that other men w i l l put him to death ( through the fai lure of h i s attempt and the inev i table ' ph y s i cal l iquidation ' that wil l follow i t) the i mpo s s ib i l i ty , for him s e lf and those he was seeking to deli ver, of l i v ing and of be ing a man . For w hat i s l i ved and experienced here as the being - i n-itself of H i s tory i s not, of course , the ensemble of m i s take s and bad luck that led the rev o lt to d i s aster. The fac t i s that through th i s en semble of errors and counter-fi nal ities the re sult c ome s inexorab ly to the agent as a de finiti v e i mpos sibi l i ty of acting h i storical l y , tran scend ing hi s defeat or draw ing the neces sary experi ence from i t to continue the strugg le : i n s hort ( i n so far as th e others are ' a nt i -men ' for h i m ) , as an i m pos s ibility for him and h i s all i e s to make human h i story . If the strugg le c ontinues w i thout h i m , h e may transcend th is experience by utilizing h i s death by mak in g i t into an exemplary act. But prec i se l y in so far as he makes use of i t and h i s comrade s outside can exploit the popular indi gnation, thi s means that the deep meaning of the event i s l ived by the masses themselves as a non ­ transcendable , shoc king inner fault of H i story ; as an abrupt, terrify ing apparition of the human adventure as c onditioned i n exteriority . Thu s , through fai l u re and death , the being-in-itself of H i story as i rremediable reveals its omn ipresence (that death facticity of h uman organ i sms poisons everyth i ng ) : i t i s th e human adv enture , inasmuch as i ts onto ­ logical status come s to i t also from the outside world. Thi s experienc e , moreover ( which m a y be more confused and, in the last resort , man ifest itself in connection w i th anyth i n g , throu gh the mere i nterplay of impl ications of s ynthetic rec iprocity between death s as spec i fi c , dated events and fai lure s , etc . , inasmuch as , even w ithout costing human l i ve s , these end up in carnating death ) , yields us no i ntuitive kn owledge . For we know noth ing of death : not in the sense that there i s anyth i ng to know about it ( leav i n g aside the biological knowledge that allows i t to be defi ned) , but preci sel y becau se it is noth ing , or i s the as practical existence in a field of tran sformation of man ' s h uman i ty into a mere inert l acuna. We do not comprehend i t , not i nteriority becau se it i s some my stery s urpas s ing human Reason , but merely becau se factors in exteriori ty real i ze i n a certain case the rational (in the positi v i st se nse) but non -comprehen s i ble possibil ity that comprehen s ion should be for ever impos si ble . Th i s experience terri fie s , because i t i s that of Noth ingness - i n- itself as a window on to B e i ng-in- itself. Th i s signifies that in every case i t d i s rupts and rends an op timi stic re lativ i sm w h ich at once re-forms . Th i s re l at i v i s m i s as ch aracteristic of c e r t a i n Marx i s t s as i t i s of bourgeo i s

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h i storians . Material i st dialecticians are even espec ial l y l i able to develop it. In vain do they define B e ing through prax i s , or j u st through efficacy : the fact remains that they see the whole c omplex of proc e s se s as be ing w i th in totali zation (whether the y cal l it that or someth ing e l se ) ; and that the form ula ' be ing i s acting or be i ng-acted ' i s the principle of a pragm ati c i deal ism, i n the s ame way that the other form ula, ' be i ng i s percei v i n g or being percei ved ' , grou nds intel lectual i stic i deal i sm . At th i s level of optim i sm , there i s a refusal to take account for the ontological status of me n of the i r tran scendent determ inations of non-human ity . Or rather, everyth i ng i s i ntegrated. Of course , the acti on of previous circum stances i s studied, and it is shown how the cond itions of l i fe and its reproduction , the contradi ctions between the producti ve force s and the re lations of p roduction , etc . , are the very basi s of History by virtue of the c lass struggles they e ngender. B ut the en semble of these factors al ready belongs to the practical field: tool s and machine s undoubtedly determine phenomena as differen t as the quan tity of production , the di v i s ion of l abour, the partic ul ar form of exploitation , etc . Doubtle s s , moreover, in a society that has not become aw are of its contradicti ons and thei r true conditions , the condi tioning of the pol i tic al by the ec onomi c (for e x ample) may more or less escape notice . Raymond Aron has spoken of soc ieties that h ave an economy in itself, but w h i c h becau se the y do not kno w i t (do not have the tool s that would all o w them to become aware of 89 it) wi l l not tran sform it into an economy for itself. U sing thi s vocabulary, w e could equall y wel l speak of events in themselves ( i . e . eve nts whose meaning , and whose importance or efficacy, remained unnoticed at the ac tual moment when they were occ urring) and events for themselves ( where i n action produce s i ts own knowl edg e not just i n order to cast l i ght outs ide , but i n order to control i tself) . In a w ord, the theory of dev i ation that we hav e advanced ( and, in a general way , our whole attempt to show Hi story inasmuch as it overflows itself) cou ld be expres sed in term s of in- itself and for- itse lf. I have further described the practi co-inert, and the dri ft that it conti nuou sl y engenders i n prax is i tself, as ' e xteriori ty ' .

Th e B e ing - in - itself of Praxis -Process : an Exterior Lim it of In teriority and an In terior L im it of Exteriority H o wever, th i s exteriority and th i s in-itsel f have on l y a relative mean ing here . For let u s remember that praxi s -process re sumes everyth ing in g 9 . See e d l tor ' � n o te on p 1 25 above

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interiori ty . N ot only can the in - itse If ( i n thi s sen se c lose to Hegelian i s m ) sometimes be dissol v ed at least partly into the for- itself, but even in itself it acts through its i nert relati ons of exteriority o n l y becau se it has been produced at the heart of a synthet ic immanence that closes ove r it and serves it as a conducting med ium. It i s more or l e s s unified, precisely among the s y nthetically united in so far as it uni fi e s ( i . e. determine s ) term s of a multipl icity the omnipresent unity of a re i fi c ation. Th u s , in "'orked matter, inert exteriority (under the pre s s ure of the pas sive sy nthe ses that give it form ) ac ts upon man and the human v i a human mediation , inasmuch as needs as hi storical l y conditioned and pra x i s itself give it its efficac y . The error of naive materialism, as we have seen, i s to believe that phy s ico -chenl i cal proc e s ses as such c ondi tion action and techniques, whereas ri ght from the univocal relation of the practical organism to its field of acti vity - i nert material i ty i s already i mbued with human signification s : i . e . already "'orked. However, we sh o u l d ri sk avoiding t he pitfal l of such an ideal i st materialism o nl y to fal l into t hat of an instrumental i st h uman i sm i f beca use we never enc ounter material inertia excep t through the sign i fi cation s th at un ify it ( w hich holds good, of course , through hodologica}9 0 determinations of e xtension, for the env ironment whatever it may be : i .e . for any real i ty grasped in terms of the being - i n-the-world of men of a g i ven epoch ) we were to reduce th at inertia to the pure and s i mpl e being of those s i gnificati on s , inasmuch as they posit themselves for themsel ves in the world of men . For such i s indeed the c ontradiction that pits h i storical real i sm radicall y d i s ti nguishing being- in- itse l f from being -known or be ing-acted (or kn owing and acti n g ) against the s ituated method, which bri ngs to l ight signi fi cation s , law s and obj ects in so far as it rev eal s them by modify ing them and be ing modi fied by them. Each of the two positions i s truth i n i ts elf, but each w i thout the other s lips into error and turn s i nto one of the fam i liar form s of i deal i sm . Our abstrac t investi gati on of Being - in - itself serv e s prec isel y to show the synthe s i s of the two tru th s in a total i zing onto logic al truth . For the real m i stake would be to be l ieve that the be i ng- i n - itself of prax i s -process, inasmuch as it ari ses wi th i n the exteriority of Nature , must be cons idere d o n l y a s the absol ute exteriori ty of the mate riality of the practical fie l d ; or, if yo u prefer, con s i dered on ly as if it were red uced to the ensemble of ph y s ico- c hem ical determination s , or in a more exact

90 . K u rt Lew i n ( 1 890- 1 94 7 ) , fo u n d e r of t o p o l o g i c a l p � yc h o l o g y , i n fl u e n c e d by the •

G e stalt m o v e men t , d i st i n g u i �h e d

a

t h reefo l d s e ri e � o f c o n c e pt � · topo l o g i c a l ( re p re " e n t i n g

t h e � truc t u re s o f acti v i t y ) . v e c t o r i a l s e n t i n g t h e pat h � w h e reb y t e n s i o n s

a re

( I t � c a u s a l de term i n at i o n ) a n d hod o l og ic a l ( r e p r e ­ re � o l ved ) . I Tra n5 }

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i rreversi ble tran s formations of energy, w hich constitute hi story­ way as -a-proces s , thro ugh the l abours and struggle s of men and through the catastrophe s ( fl oods , fire s , etc . ) which destroy all or part of tho se labours (and whose negativ e efficacy i n the prac tical field can be limited by human activity ) . In real ity , in order to s uppre s s the significations and practical orientations of s uch transformation s , it i s necessary to have chosen a perspective a selective viewpoint. And thi s perspec tive i s that of know ledge , for it i s knowledge alone that c an sy stematical l y set as ide an en semble of structures in the name of its right to select. I n other words , it inv olves taking an overv iew of the whole uni verse from the vievvpoint of a p ositive Reason that make s i tself blind to s i g n s , that takes the v i e wpoint of mi neral s or with respect to life and the human atom s , and th at (as knowledge of the human by the physico-chemical ) finds in man on l y that same phy s ico-chemical . This attitude entirely de spi te itself has the result of treating the p roducts of handicrafts and industry as the physiocrats once used to do. For, if the heing of or at least reduced to what appears of them significations i s negated then the spec ificity of the worked \vithin the interiority of the field obj ect as such ( i . e . the gatheri ng together of its dispers ion through a passive synthes i s , and the rel ative i solation that allows its elements to c ondition one another i n a pre -establi shed order) m ust be dis solved radically under the ac ti on of mineral Reason. For the ensemble of the se mo dification s is reintegrated into the immense di spersion of exteriority , and its c onditionings in exteriority are enoug h to e xplain the s uccession of the se movements. To be s ure , specific changes were nece s s ary to produce thi s particular local vortex whi ch exteri ori ty w i l l soon di s solve into its elements . B ut those very changes ( which define them selves, w i thin the interiority of the field, as action or labour) in the Daltonism of mineral Reason are reduced s imply to their non - s ignifying e xteriori ty : i . e . to tran smutations that fi nd thei r source in other, earlier transmutation s . From this stan dpoint, H istory i s only a local dream of matter: there remains the phys ical uni verse , th e sole reality. Precisely , however, the being - i n - i tself of the historical totalization cannot sign ify its non-being or its heing-known through the anti­ hi storical Reason of pure exteriority . The be ing - in - itself of prax i s ­ proces s i s precisely independent of any knowledge . It i s the lim itation of the i n terior by the e xteri or, to be sure , but i t i s also th at of the exterior by i n teri ori ty . Th i s mean s that the c onditioni ng of the total ization-of­ envelopment in its being i s produced in e x teriori ty , as a determination by phy s ical forces of a sector of the U niverse on the basis of which it is n ecessary and pos s ib l e ; and th at th i s totali zation e ngendered from top to bottom through the concate nation of the se factors w i l l ari se as the necessary med i ation between them selves and the i r passive un i ty as a

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sy stem . From the viewpoint of exteriority , the moment of signification i s required as a neces s ary condi tion for the tran sformation of ore into an i ron bar or, through al loy s , into steel ; for the l i quefaction of air; or for the path of certain w av e s . If you l i ke, phy s ico-chemical cond ition s ( for example) account for everything except for what w ith in the physico­ chemical is the negation of natural un iversality : for example, of the unique fact that , in a certain sector of the materi al di spersion , the ensemble of combined factors have produced the liquefaction of air, in conformity with the great law s of phy sic s and chemi stry but against all probability. So being-i n - itself itself produce s the significations that engender its interiority only it engenders them on the bas i s of the Universe. On the bas i s of the Universe , a certain sector i s si ngular ized by the apparition of l ife ; and th is life produces in thi s sector (on Earth , natural but improbable for ex ample) through a fi rst interiori zation modifications of the milie u (e . g . of atmospheric pressure or the oxygen content of air) , which condition an evolution in interiority whose profile i s itself unique and , in its interi or l imit, improbable . It i s on the basi s of universal exteri ority i n an en semble of worlds in wh ich al l living kingdoms and h istori e s are distri buted in s uch and such a way , and which determines each of the s e adv enture s in relation to all the others ( i n its rhythm , its acceleration and its chances of s ucceeding) as a produc ­ tion error, or as the result of exceptional chances, at the same time as it realizes itself wholly as the de stiny that can engulf them and agai nst in short , it i s on the basis of al l which they wage an uncertain battle these beings and of B eing as a whole that human hi story produces itself, at the furthest point of the local movement of ex teriori ty, as determined in exteriority to the very h eart of its interiority by the exterior (from this standpoint, for example, it i s the ensemble of the cosmic processes that i s to be found in the very di stribution of m ineral re sources , inasmuch as the se govern Hi story ) and in in feriority through infinite exteriority by all the adventures of life on other planets ( if there i s l i fe elsewhere : but if, against al l probab i l ity , the onl y place where the Univ erse has produced life as its own local interiority were to be the terrestrial Globe � even that woul d be a qual i fication interior to Hi story by virtue of the absence of exterior interiority ) . At this leve l , interiority re mai n s a linz it upon the exterior, in the sense th at goal s are produced in the interior of H i story and without being able to tran sform the Univ erse into a prac tical field, or at least for the time be ing to have themselves ack nowl e dged , shared or combated by other groups purs uing other h i storie s e l sewhere . So exteriority produces i n exteriority a certain i nteriority that escapes i t � and whose uniqueness i s signal led in exteriority by the im probabi l i ty of t h e c oncate nation s that i t in turn prod uce s . On the bas is of the fi n i te an d l i m i t l e s s di spers ion of the co�mos . a be i n g- i n -

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itself i s engendered who se relation -to-i ts-goal s i s real hut in itself (inasmuch as its total be i ng is not as an interior l imit to exteriority a heing-comprehended) ; whose mea n ings , as real medi ation s between exterior condition ings and the ir s y stematic reconditioning (in its very improhahility ) , receive their ontological status as a limit in interiority separating two proces ses of exteriority from the cosmo s ; and whose ensemble of immanent relations i s determined on the bas i s of the original sector as indi s solubly l inked to mean i ngs and goal s (as the generatri x of those transcendences of B eing by itself, through the ne w structures determ ined by interiori ty : e . g . l ack , all the categories of negation, and as a call ing into question of the unity of interiority by the ri sk universal bond of exteriority between all natural processes inside and outside it) . The being- in- itself of praxis -proce s s i s the strict equivalence between the total i zation-of-envelopment in the Univ erse and the Universe in the total ization-of-envelopment. A s deeply and traditional ly ideal ist habits of thought ri sk obscuring thi s ontological investigation in the reader ' s eye s , I think it will be made c learer if it i s tran scribed for a moment and in the guise rather of an image or metaphor i n term s of transcendent knowl edge . Most readers of science fiction are, in fact , seeking to recover an awareness of the bei ng - i n - itself of our hi story . B ut their idealist habits oblige them to conceive this being- in-itself merely in so far as it appears to some Martian (a 1 9 5 8 Micromegas) general ly endowed with an intelligence and a scienti fic and technical level s uperi or to our own , who thus reduces h uman history to its cosmic provincial i sm . *

*

In rea l ity , the ide a l i s t character of works o f sc ienc e fi c tion doe s not o r i g inate sole l y in

bourgeois ideal i s m - i . e . the ideo l og y of the W e stern w orld . It springs d i rect l y from a relation between East and We s t . For, in a certain way , We sterners fe e l uneasily that the s oc i al ist world - even if it has so far used them very bad l y , and even i f it does not have at its di sposal the empiric a l kno w ledge We stern re se archers h ave acc um u l ated over the past hal f-cent ury possesses cogn i t i v e too l s that al l ow it to comprehend and s i tuate both the ensemble and the de tails of c ap ital i st evolution between 1 9 1 7 and 1 95 0 . On the other h and, the emp i r i c i s m of ant i - Marx i st i n te l lectuals w as ori g i na l l y a re fu s al to u se the enem y ' s princ i p l e s , w h i c h after a c e rta i n t i m e became an incapac ity to t h i nk the e v o l ut i o n o f the world s ynthet i c a l l y ( that of the West and that of the East s i m u ltaneou s l y : i .e i n the latter case an inability to comp reh end - and consequent l y transcend - those who comprehended that emp iricism , i . e . knew its origin and its ro le i n the c onfl ict rending the world and ev ery We stern soc iety ) . That i nc apac ity i s fe lt as a malaise. One of the re asons for the Ame rican G reat Fear w as the confu se d feel ing in e ve ryone of be ing an ohject o f H i story , of w h i c h the Sov i e t s w e re the subject. For some month s n o w , people h ave been d i sco ver i n g i n the East too that History has been m ade in the darkne s s and that soc i a l i st man does not know h i m s e l f: but th i s a n x i e t y i s of a very di fferent orde r. For i f he doe s not yet know h i m se l f, at least the man of the peopl e ' s democracies has not l o s t the inte l l e c t u al tool : he needs only to re le arn how to use i t . And so long as he h as not

done so , he w i l l be ab l e to say - and i t w i l l b e true - that no h u m an g roup today i s any longer c on s c i o u s of i t s e l f or other group s : i n s hort , t h at H i story re mains the same b attle between

b l ack men in a p i tch -dark t u n n e l that it h a s been for fi fty years ( i t i s

also a v a st

pro g re s s i n the

3 20

B OO K I I I

For th i s Martian, therefore , or th i s Ven usian , who has long known the an techniq ue of inter-planetary nav igation , we are - for example an imal spec ies whose sc ientific and i ntel lectual development have been retarded by certain circ um stance s . He knows these circ umstance s , he has di scov ere d our slow-wittedn e s s and the factors conditioning it: factors , of cours e , that he sees as connected w ith the s truc ture of our planet, and that he knows do not exi st e l sewhere or at any rate not on the planet he inhabits . So he sees man , in the very compari son he immediately estab li shes between him and the inhabitants of other heaven ly bodies , as a cosmic product retai ning with in him the partic u l arities of h i s prov ince - and, for example, the absence of certain s ubstances h ighly nece ssary for cerebral and nervous ac tiv ity . The differences in our respective physiol ogical constitution s , histories , leve l s of development, etc . , ass uredly do not prevent him from comprehending u s in our practical reality as indiv idual s who are making a h istory in common . B ut the particular goal s we pursue w i l l , i n a whole number of case s , rem ain alien to him: our ae sthetic pleas ure s , for example , if h e has different sen se s from ours . S o he w i l l define our goal s in exteriori ty , without stripping them of their character as goal s , but without being able to share them . He w i l l merely note that the inhabitants of thi s underdeveloped planet have certain behavioural pattern s orientated towards certain obj ec ti v e s ; and that certain systems of soc ial options or v al ues condition the hierarchy of our preferenc e s . B eing unable to share some partic ular goal , he w i l l grasp our praxis i n a gi ven c ase as h exis . He may say : ' men like alcohol ic dri nk s ' . The characteristic so etched no longer has anything to do with the evidence accompany ing a man ' s comprehension of another man ' s goal s ; it refers to our cosm ic factic ity , i . e . to the fact that a certain cosmic scarcity (absence of certain s ubstances , or presence of negative elements) has produced th is half-failure : man . * In the same way, moreover, for th is product of a high industrial civil ization , our inter­ minable h i s tory endlessly dragg ing itself toward s a level that M ars

ac h ievemen t o f consc i ousnes s : b u t th i s con trad i c t i on in any c as e ope rate ") to the advantage of the soc ial i st forc e s ) . I n a word , he w i l l be ab l e to rec ognize that pre sent- day H i story i s m ade in non- knowledg e; but t h i s observ a t i o n - whatever d i sq u i e t and whatever rebe l l i on it may entail - h a s noth i n g i n c ommon w i t h the fee l ing that i s so common in bo urgeo i s soc ietie s : ' th ey can th e ori: e u s , for th ey have the tool and we do not' . To a great e x tent, it i s g loomy dream s abo ut t h i s strange s ituat i o n ( o f g roups whose object i v ity i s i n the h ands of t h e i r e nem ies ) w h i c h h ave i n fl e c ted nov e l s of s c i e n t i fi c pred i c t i o n ( w hose ori g i n h as man y other sourc e s , thoug h these are of no i ntere st here ) t o wards the idea l i 'i m that c h arac terizes mo st of them , and s ho w s men <;een by anti-men ( i e . by men con structed d i ffere nt l y : more powe rfu l , m ore l uc i d , but genera l l y nasty ) . * It goe s w ith o u t r;; a y i n g that I l e ave to the M arti an the re spon s i b i l ity for th i s defi n i t ion of m an i n i nteriority of e x teriori ty

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surpas sed three centuries ago has the tw i n determination of a practice ( i t is made) and a factual g iven (his knowledge o f h i s torical conditionings allows him to grasp the fetters that prevent men from adv anc ing more s w iftl y ) . In this way , our backward , prov i nc i al history seem s to him also in its cosmic conditioning of exteriority to contain w ithin it a negative force ( that he di scovers in interiority and through c ompari son, but that i s only the pure absence of what, on Mars , i s a favourable pre sence ) . In the same way , that which in the interiority of human for ex ample , history can in n o case be taken as a real determination ignorance of ex teriori ty for h i m become s a substanti al qual ifi cation of praxis -proces s . B y ' ignorance of exteriority ' (wh ich I mentioned earl ier9 1 ) I mean , for example , the fact that i n such and such a specific period as a function of the positive dev e l opment of technology and culture s uch and s uch a society finds itself at one particul ar scienti fi c level and n ot at another. As I have sai d , the italicized phrase ' and n o t at anoth er ' can on no account be cons i dered (in i nteriori ty) as re lating to a real condition of bac kwardnes s : a negative and active i mpeding factor (it is not for want of aeroplanes that Napoleon lost the B attle of Waterloo) . B ut thi s s ame ignorance , when it re veals itself to an exterior agent who knows what we do not know , become s a deep opacity , shado w s in our understanding , a negation of interiority in our hearts . The transformation is real. For if as in the colonial w ars of the nineteenth centu ry the n ati ves do n ot know how to handle fi rearms and are incapable of m anufacturing them , in the rel ation of thi s ignorance i s constituted by the colon ial troops antagonistic rec iprocity as a practica l inferiority of the other. For the Martian of sc ience fi c tion ( whether he wishes to c onquer or to pacify E arth) , our ignorance whether it helps h i m to enslave men or prevents them from understanding h i m - w il l become a determination of every one of us by the culture of Mars : hence , a negati ve particularization. At the same tim e , th is inter-planetary traveller (as numerous a uthors have de scribed h im to u s ) , hav ing made inter-ste l lar space into h i s practical fi e l d with Earth ins ide it is not unaware that we are threatened by a cosmic catac lysm (whi ch the M arti an s have long been able to avoid) . Prec isely in so far as he sees our hi story emerging from the terrestrial silt and draw ing its cosmic partic ulari ties and its negations from that mud, he grasps it as anach ronistic in view of the danger that threaten s it : the coll ision that may destroy i t, and that it has not yet gi ven itself the mean s to avoid. If the catastrophe i s a l ong-term one , he see s us as involved in a race against the clock . Shal l we win? Here prediction stops , even for a

9 1 . I n C ritiqu e , vol

1 , p . l 0 3 . S e e a l s o B e ing and Noth i n g n e s s , pp 5 2 1 ff. , and Ca h ie rs

POUl u n e m ora le, p p . 3 0 6 ff. , 347 ff.

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Martian , since the question i s settl ed also in interiority . H istory i s , in itself, its own acceleration. The fact remains that the w itne s s can particu larize the es senti al fragi l ity that is prope r to all hi stories . In our case, i t is constituted as a still uncertain rel ationship w ith a ri sk of which we are unaware. It indiv idualizes our adv enture on the bas i s of the cosmos , and we shal l for ever be those who w i l l peris h to the last man in that inter-planetary colli sion or tho se who w i ll manage to survive it. So through the myth of the Martian, a whole history in exteriority made up of traps , ambushe s , and possible or certain rel ation s with other practical organ i s m s inhabiting other planets , and revealing thi s character of man (which we are prone to take in interiori ty as the mark of the universal ) to be an idiosyncrasy produced by the cosmos itself a whole exterior history, unified by the reassumed con sequences that i t produce s in its interior, i s constituted and con stitute s us as cosmic individuals. If we leave the Martian for now in the property-room, thi s myth for al l its childishness w i l l at least have rendered u s one serv ice : we shall have understood that the being-in-itself of prax is -process i s the founda­ tion of any pos sible obj ec ti v i ty of our hi story for a witnes s external to the human species . It remain s the case that man can not, under any circ um s tance s , make himself into that w itn e s s . 9 2 If he increases his technical and scienti fic know ledge, it is the scientific and technical knowledge of all that he w i l l be dev e loping and we shal l not l eav e the c ircl e of interi ority . The sputnik enlarge s the practical field, but i t doe s not leave it. And then, of course , the Martian ' s v i e wpoint w hatever h i s i s a particularization and putti ng into kno w ledge of the Univ erse perspecti v e of certain rel ations . The disc losure effec ted is a situation : i . e . it rev eal s the Martian through men as much as the l atter through the former. B eing-in- itself overfl ow s the knowledge he acquires of it, by v irtue of his fundamental nature : he i s the particular centre of infi nitely infinite rel ations with the whole Universe. Thus , to take j ust one example , certain human goal s are defined by the inhabitant of M ars as obj ective but alien goal s : he does not share them . B ut the goal s of the praxi s ­ proce s s , as con sidered in their being-in-i tself, are neither in terior nor alien ; they do not take part onl y in hexis , or in the guise of immanent obj ecti yes in praxi s alone. Or rather, precisely bec ause our investigation bears on the c onditions of B e ing and not on those of Know ing , the y are at the same time immanent and transcendent , in the v ery indistinctne s s

9 2 . On the i mposs i b i l ity fo r m an to make h i mself i nto h i s own w i tne s s , i t i s inte resting to read Frantz ' s di alog u e s w i th the Thirti eth C entury in Th e Condemn ed of A /tona (New York 1 964 ) , wh ich S artre wa� writing at the s ame t i m e .

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of their ontological status . Transcendent in their immanenc e , s i nce the c haracter of non- shared goal s nece s s ari ly refers to the agent who does not share , so their being-in-itself - as grounding the permanent po s s ibil ity of not bei ng shared is the mere ontological affirmation of themselv e s , i nasmuch as (by virtue of the very fact of ari sing i n the U n i v erse) they overflow any immanent relation with the group or social e nsemble that whether or has posited the m . Immanent i n their transcendence , since not the y are known by a w itness, and whatever may be the re servation their inner relation or rej ection expressed by that witne ss if he exi sts to the agent remai n s etched in the ontological affirmation o f tran­ scendence, as the mediation required between a given series of physico­ chemical tran sformations and a gi v en sy stem of energy tran smutations fl ow ing from it: thi s re lation repre sents the irreducible structure of the act, the obj ecti v e moment of prax i s as necessity of freedom . We mean and temporari ly i solated by this that the sy stematized res ults of mere natural transm utations could neither realize themse l v e s (improb­ abil ity ) nor maintain them selves (pre s s ure of universal forces) if prax i s ­ h exis did not exi st, at once as a being constituted on the basi s of the U niverse and as a creative qual ified and limited by other historie s and regulatory transcendence of exterior being tow ards itself. Hence , our investigation of limits through its fail ure to hit the mark reveals the pre sence within being-in-itself of the infinite cosmic di spersion , as an absolute condi tioning of human history by the uni versal force s of non-hi story (and the presence of the m ultiplicity of nonhuman historie s as a l imit i n exteriority and as an external internal relation : the possibility of one day being in the field of another species a priori modifying th e h uman object) . Converse l y , however, it at the same time discloses the transcendent (and no longer for-itself, for-man) reality of the e nergy transmutation orientated by a future objecti v e : i .e . the teleological structure of certai n cosmic sectors . Th i s mean s neither that the se teleologic al sectors have themsel v e s been prepared and defined a priori by agents ( which would be absurd and return u s to theology) nor that there i s i n ' Nature ' in the sen se i n which Enge l s understands it a teleologic al princip l e , albeit embryon ic ( which as I hav e already mentioned as an i nner, material content of our v ain investigation of l imits in exteriority can be neither as serted nor rejected) . It simply mean s that if we consider a sector whose main feature s al l ow life , and in which life through an embryonic circ ularity continually modi fies these feature s ( albeit in its most elementary form s , and by the sole acti on of choices of foodstuff, combu stion , producti on of waste s , e tc . ) it i s necessary to view as an absol ute real ity the apparition of practical , tool-mak i ng org ani sm s with the i r own temporal izati on , the trans ­ formati on of the sector by their waste-products, and above all the ,

B OO K I I I

3 24

inlprobahle * physi co-chem ical system s that the se organi sm s engender and imbue m ore or less w i th their own c ircularity . The t eleological s tructure ( hen ce , History , at least in a fi e ld of scarcity) i s not just an i nterior re l atio n of the organ ism to its goal s : i n certai n sectors , it i s the inner limit of interiority of exte rior being. Within the indi stinctnes s of Being, the exteriority of di spersion produces thi s i nteriority (or at any rate makes it possible) ; plunges into it and transforms it i n to a world m arketplace battered by every cosmic wind ; constitutes its destiny by its permanently revocable tolerance; and makes itself into the universal factor of the hi stori cal idiosyncrasy ' s outs ide . Rec iprocall y , it i s entirely marked in in feriority by these c ircum stances of control, orient ated condi ­ t ionin g , passive synthe s i s and ' feedbac k ' , as it i s by i nterior l imits of the exterior. I t i s untrue that the human adventure i s , from thi s viewpoint , an adventure of Nature (or the Univ erse) , as peop l e too often ten d to repe at. For that i s to confuse the sector of our act ion and its interiori zation (practical field) wi th the infinite di spersion in exteriority that we wrongly unify ( i n signi fication) by the word Universe . * * We shoul d l im it ourselves to s ay ing as any real i s m requires that the being-in-itself of human activity , even if replaced in the myriad of worlds, i s an abs olute with in its own sector and in its own p lace. Whether or not there are other practic al m ultipliciti e s , the h i story of man re s i sts its determination in exteriority and remai n s as the absolute ce ntre of an infinity of ne w relations between thi n g s . We can no w understand that the movement of our investi gation , although it has yi elded us formal si gnificati ons , c ontrasts with that of Hegelian ideal i sm . The transcendent bein g of H i story i s being-in-itself assimilating the being-for- itself of interiority w ithout modifying its tel eological structure , and becoming the being-in- itself of that being -for­ i tself prec i sely i n s o far as al l human action ( whether in d i v idual or com m on; w hoev er the partic ipants may be , and w hatever awareness they may have of their act and its s i gni fi c ation w i thin the interio rity of the i ts structure of with i n interiority practical field: i n short , whatever re flection upon itsel f m ay be) must eve ntual ly e ither be e ngulfed in ideal i ty , dream and epiphenomenal i sm , or e lse prod uce itsel f in exteriority ,

*

I m probab l e

w i th

re s p ect

to

p u re l y

p h y � ic o - c he m ic a l

tran sform at i o n �

More

or

l e � s p robab l e - O r a b s o l u te l y c e rt a i n - w i t h r e s p e c t to t h e e n sem b l e of c o s m ic m u lt i p l i c i t i e s

of t h e g a l ax i e s , i f s u c h e x i s t : a s c i e nc e t h at c o u l d e x t e n d determ i n e w h at c h a n c e t h e re i � for prac t i c a l e n s e m b l e s to m o m e n h of o u r h i story . A n d i t m i gh t thereby i nc re a l., e t h e i n te r i o r i t y I n t o e x t e riori ty . and v i c e v e rsa * * N ot t h at t h e re i s a p /ura li fl m e i th er, w h i c h w o u l d i nc o m m u n i c ab l e u n i ti es .

t o t h e m m i ght b e a b l e t o p a � � thro u gh t h e d iffe re nt i n te grat ion o f t h e l i m i t s of p re s u p p o s e

a

p l u ral i t y

of

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( and as a product of exteriority ) in the absolute so litude of being­ w ithout-a-witnes s , together with its immanent and re fl exive s tructure s . For the in-itself here comes to the for- itself from its absolute reality . The refl ection of prax i s upon itself is h um an , practi cal and s ituated in interiority. Produced as it is, h owever, within the decompre s sed tem­ poral ity of universal di s persion and i n relati on to c o smic transformations that , through it, become transcendent factors of hist ory its reality eludes it, ina smuch a s its know ledge comes from w ithin an d the l imits that determ ine i t c ome on pri nciple from the u nkn own and in practice una tta inable zone of exteriority ; inasmuch too as its temporal ization of interiority , by realizing i tself in a sector of exte riority , constitutes from afar ( and w ithout even su specting i t) certa in e xternal circum s tances as its destiny , and constitutes itself with its qual ities and its destiny on the bas i s of these c ircumstance s . Thi s freezing of the l i v ing structure s of i nte riority on the basi s of external being , and as an affirmation of t hat exte rnal being , can be g rasped from within in relation to the e xperi ­ ence s I hav e mentioned as our abandonmen t. I n exteriority , however, it presents itself only as being at once the affirmation of these structures and their l imitati on , on the bas i s of an external-being that supports them and reduces them to being what they are for themselves only through what they do not know about themselv es . In other word s , praxis-process has the onto logical statu s of absolu te-being, under its determ inati on s in ex­ teri ority , in so far as i ts being fundamental ly eludes m an ' s practice and knowledge : i . e . in so far as it i s fundamental l y the outs ide of the i n side . Of course , it will be clear that thi s elusive grasping o f oneself has noth ing my sterious or irrational about it. Practical know ledge can develop and extend to everything . B ut if i t i s to be realized, it must involve a fun damental ignorance: it cannot know the exteriority of its interiority . * However, as l ong as it is not objectified , thi s ontological transcendence i s not even an i ssue for agents , e xcept as an abstract l imit upon their possibil ity of action grasped in term s of death or circumstances l inked to thi s . For objectification would be the practical l ocal i zation of the human spec ies, at s uch and such a leve l of development, in the practical field of M artian s ( or others) discovering our limits and c ondi tionings as a means to be set in operation in order to enslave or destroy us. On thi s basi s , man ' s praxi s would involve - in the gui se of a v ital urgenc y and as his pri me objective the discovery of our cosmic c onditionin g s in order to act upon the se and shield them from hostile ac ti on . We enco unter science * Except, to a certain e x tent and in c ircum s tanc e s that we shall see , retrospecti vely . 93 of thi s i s one of the abs tract stru c t ures w h at we h ave cal led meanin g .

9 3 . See ' Th e Hi storical E v e nt ' . i n the Append i x , p p . 3 9 7 ff. below.

3 26

BOOK III

fiction again here , but we encounter too a feature described in connection w i th antagoni stic action s . As s uch objectiv ity alway s partial , anyw ay i s not g iven , any more than the real or p ossible threats emanating from cosmic forces , the tran scendence of being-in - itself reduc e s prax i s ­ proces s to interiority a s its practical rea lity. The absolute of exteriority as a nec e s s ary limit and a lack of know l e dge refers bac k to the absolute of interiority : it is what a pri ori we c annot take into account. If i n one thou sand or one hundred we knew about some di saster that was going to e xterm in ate our spec ies , the properl y h uman and years hi storical prioritie s of our pre sent situation would not change in any w ay . For the men of today , it would be nece ssary to l i v e , eat, work , and struggle against exploitation , oppre ssion and colon i al i sm . For the '� source of our pre sent struggles l ies not i n th eoretical princip les or va lues (principles and v alues that the imminent death of humanity m ight call into question) , but directly or by way of mediations in the absol ute urgency of needs . Thi s , moreover, is what makes the abs urd ity of the hypothe s i s all the more blatant. For the future catastrophe could be a practica l knowledge ( i . e . act upon men and transform their ac tion) onl y i f the ensemble of sc ientifi c and technical advanc e s already made it pos s ible to acquir e th i s . B u t s uch adv ances would not take p l ac e without an enl argement of the practical field (inter-planetary j ourney s , etc . ) , and the new priorities could manife s t themse lves only within a totalization­ of-envelopment modi fied b y the development of our power, and by the consequent alteration of our objectiv es and the i ntern al structures of our soc ial ensemble s . In reality , the present relation to our h i story of an unknown threat i s exterior and univocal . It qualifies the totali zation in progre s s from outside , it perhaps ass ign s it a destiny from o u tside , but the practical real ity of our action c annot be determined as a function of that threat. N ot j u st bec au s e we are i gnorant of it ( wh ich would be a negative factor of exteriority ) , but above all bec ause the positi v e fabric of our prax i s -process has been woven in s uc h a way that it leav e s no pl ace for it , as a condi tion of prax i s i n the interiority of the practical field. The se remarks , far from consti tuting prax is in interiority as an epipheno­ menon , re store to it its ab solute real i ty . And th i s reali ty i s i n scribed both in the i m m anence of the fi eld and i n be ing-in-itself. For in thi s action taken as a immanence whatever its profile in exteriority whole c annot be other th an i t i s ( wh ich does not prej udge the que stion of interior possible s ) . The en sembl e of prev ious c irc umstanc e s i . e . at once the ori g i nal sector and the ensemble of dev iated ac ti ons springing from it in fac t condition s the course of H i story , i ts speed, i ts rh y thm s , its or ientati on , and the regulated succe s s i on of its obj ectives . And it i s praxis itse lf wh ich , through the tran scendence of t he se c o n d i t i o n s , causes there to be a h i story i n th i s s e c tor. Without the reality o f prax i s - proce s s ,

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it would be imposs ible even to concei ve the internal and external real i ty of inert and improbable material c ombinations (machine s , etc . ) . Con­ versel y , interiority is itself a l imiting structure of being-in-itself, as we h av e seen . Thi s means that finality as an ab sol ute structure of be ing -in­ itse lf, and as a reason for the pas s i ve un ity of improbable combinations involves interiority as its immanent medium. For fi nality , even en­ v i s aged in its tran scendent being, constitute s itself as revealing­ transcendence of an ensemble of material circumstances on the bas i s of a need ; and as the illumination of thi s ensemble and itself, on the basis of determ ination of a future obj ectiv e . Thus , even in the in-i tself, immanence i s a mediation between two transcendent state s . B ut j u st as the being-in­ itself of praxis -proces s is an exterior l im itati on of the latter, it i s pro­ duced as an interior limitation of exteriority . From the standpoint of knowledge th is mean s that a Mi cromegas c an grasp the interiority of the exterior as the meaning and as a limit of the proc e s s he i s cons idering , but he c an comprehend the movement of thi s history in i nteriority only by mak i ng him self (if he has the mean s ) interior to it. Thi s observ ation c an serve a s an approach for grasping and fi xi n g the onto logica l signification of the in terior l imit as a frontier of exteriority . In other word s , thi s i nteri ority i s produced in the in-itself as a l imit of d ispersion, a pas sive s ynthe s i s , a unity produced and maintained by s y stem s , and the relativ e i solation of a material ensemble . And the se feature s of the in- itself are real i ze d in it as alien, and as the results of a reflecting, conservative transcendence that w i thin the v ery fragil ity of its temporal ization affirms itself i n its independence as the indispens­ able autonomy of mediation. In other word s , interiority as a medi ation­ c um - rupture between state s and trans mutation s i s , i n itself, the limit of its being-in-itself in so far as , within the frame w ork of that being, it is not but interiorizes itself. Totali zation i s one moment of the proces s , but a heterogeneous moment in so far as far from being (even a total ity) it totalizes itself. B eing- in-itself i s every where , trans fi x e s everything, and i n a c ertain w ay c ongeal s everything ; but it i s its own limit, preci sely at the moment of mediation the law of th i s be ing i s to in so far as make itself. Thi s distinction c an be comprehended through an image : if, as I walk along the street, I see a c ertain employee s weeping the entrance of the same shop w i th the same ge sture s as she performs every morning at the same hour, her act becomes h exis and , through thi s hexis, I g li mp se her c lass -being. Yet thi s hexis (however real it i s ) and thi s c las s ­ being can be realized i n her, and for her, only through the reflecting tran scendence of praxi s . What holds good for these sti ll h uman features of B eing (prax i s as i nteriority and mean ing of h exis) we encounter again at the leve l of ab sol ute B ei n g : i t i s quite s imply the i n -itself c losing again upon the for-itself and keeping it within itself as its i nner l i m i t,

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wh ich can be l i ved only in the movement of a practical temporalization. These comments are enough to show that being-i n-exteriority , far from tran sforming i nteriority i nto a dream , guarantees it its absolute reality . For it produces w ithi n the universal di spers ion the practical total i za­ tion as i mpos ing the unity of its ends upon thi ngs ( upon certain e lements of the sec tor ) ; as an imp art er of mean ing , by v irtue of its very function ; and as having a meaning (and signi fication) only i n its i nteriority for agents · although its str uc ture of mediation , through a reflecting tran­ scendence, i s i n scribed i n bei n g - i n - i tself as an abstract determination . A s soon as there i s a h i story , the practical multipl ic ity through wh ich (and for which) thi s h i s tory exi sts finds itself defi ned and situated by the fi eld, that i t determine s . Each of the obj ecti v e s it pursues finds itself, to be s ure , defined i n exteriori ty by the entire Universe. B ut for thi s tran ­ scendent definiti on to be able to occ ur, thi s same objective has to be produced i n a re lationship of absol ute i mmanence , as the future determina­ tion of the need its sati sfaction by the mean s at hand, v i a the de facto givens characteri zing the si tuation. S im i l arl y , from the ontological stand­ point it i s doubtle ss nece ssary to con s i der that every agent i s the product, i n h i s needs as in h i s practical structure s , of an i nfini ty of material circ um stances which overflow i ng History , pre-hi story , natu ral history and even geology have produced him ( i n the real comparison that can al ways be instituted w ith other forms of l ife on other p lanets ) as being that and being only tha t; and which, as a g i ve n material ensemble (on the basis of which it i s pos s ible to go back ad infinitum i n phy sical time) , have already constituted i ts organic feature s , means of actio n , etc . , as a fundamental dev iation of every poss ible prax i s . B ut when you have gone back as far as poss ible then whe n , through ' the hi story of Earth ' and the hi story of all spec i e s , you have re-engendered the human species w ith its disti n g u i shing marks ( i n relation not j ust to the lower an imal s but to other possible practical organ i sms) and w i th its practical lags and its drifts nothing will prevent these features from being produced as practical .features , through the action which instrumentalize s them by transcending them towards its obj ecti ve and . in and through the use i t itself determ i ne s (on the bas i s of its goal , and i n makes of them rel ation to thi s) the drift that the y will cause i t to undergo. The bei ng of worked matter requ ires th i s leap o uts ide B e i n g , tow ards the B e i ng that i s prax i s itself as interi ority . And th i s pra x i s finds i ts li mits ( and the determined-being the se confer upon i t , on the bas i s of everything) from outs ide , only i n so far as it i s in i tself its own internal l i mits , on the basis of the transcendence of former c irc um stance s . S uch, therefore , i s the be ing - i n - itself of the total ization-of­ envelopment, i nasm uc h as i t i s aimed at from w i th i n by the agents of H i s tory . I t i s every w here . I t i s th e infi nite l y infinite depth of thi s

TOT A L IZ A T I O N - O F- E N V E L O P M E N T

3 29

totalization , inasmuch as its depth i s the Un iverse that conditions it fronl outs ide through an infin ity of re lations and i n thi s very way pu shes its idios yncrasy to the utmost. It produce s itself as the outer l im i t of the spiral , the dev iation and the futu re i l l umi nating it; an d at the same time as the radical spec ification of thi s drift and its meaning, by virtue of its emergence i n a defin ite sector of the world and thereby in the world as a whol e , as bei ng - i n-the-midst-of-the -world. So it i s at once dev i ation ( i n its relation to the H i story that produces it and that it produces ) and abandonment (as the other-being of th i s absol ute finality in a uni verse i ndifferent to its ends) . A l l thi s , of course, refers the absol ute of h uman h i story (or any hi story) back to i nteriority . I n other words , abandonment creates the absol ute of interi ority : i . e . grounds the immanent-being of all hi storical ends . At the same time , i t tran sfixes all i nteri ority , it i s ev erywhere : being - i n -exteriority i s the v ery being that makes the strength of our arm s , our exhaustion, the contin ued inertia of passive synthe se s , our m ultiplicity and , lastl y , our w aste-products and our drift . B ut we do not have any real expe rience of it, as an exteri or l im i t of interiority any more than as an omnipresent ine rtia trans fi xing immanence . We disclose as a inan imate materi al ity by working it in our practical fi e l d mediation between man an d the objects of hi s de s i re ; and as a mediation between men , already acted by men whose inert materiality i s already i ntegrated by the organ ic synthe s i s , and transcended by the act or engendered by serial (but still human) impotence in the practico- inert. Thu s the real ity of totali zation stems from the presence of the se two absolutes and thei r reciprocity of envelopment. If you now ask what i s the being of a h i stori c al event like the insurrection of 1 9 August 1 7 92, for examp l e , we can an swer that it i s in fact reducible ne ither to the ac tions of the participants ; nor to s uch aw areness of it as the latter, or w i tnes se s , acquired ; nor, agai n , to the con sequences it provoked (and which, ontol ogical l y , were homogeneous with i t) , i .e . i ts inner efficac y ; nor to the energy transmutations that produ ced it, and that it produced on the terrain of pu re ex teriority . R ather, it was all at once a moment of the as a total i zati on-of-envelopment grasped i n interiority Rev ol ution and , in its absol ute solitu de as i n its irreduc ible unity , the infinite determinati on by an infinity of exteri or relations of that idi osyncras y , inasm uch as its ends ari se in the Universe as ends not shared and it con stitute s itself as a unitary structure i n the midst of a di spersed uni v erse : i . e . as that l i ne w i thout thickne s s which i s the interior lim i t of al l exteriori ty . The total i zati on grasped i n i nteri ori ty i s praxis-process; but when it i s env i saged as a being-in-i tsel f containing with i n i t i ts being-for- itse l f, i t becomes as a v ain object of our aim what we sha l l c al l p ro c ess -p raxis . From the formal v i ewpoint which concern s u s , at any rate which i s that of the dial ectic it goes w i thout saying th at the ,

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BOOK III

critical investigati on has circumscribed the fi eld of the constituted dialectic . For we do not know the true l inks between the cosm o s and being-in- itself, except in their formal real i ty . The only domain i n w h i c h the dialectic rev eal s i tself as an absol ute movement of tempora l izati on i s the field of practical interiority , so our investigati on l imits and e stabl i shes i ts scope. We renounce the right to say anything about the type of rel ations u niting being- i n - i tself w i th cosmic forces and other prac tical multi p l ic i ti e s , i f there are any . We know that some of these relations have to be grasped i n pure ex teriori ty, and thi s know ledge i s fou nded on experience , s i nce c ertain dangers which manife st them sel ves i n the practical fi e ld ( and consequentl y are already interiori zed) pre sent them sel ves to us immed i ­ atel y as coming from pure exteriority. Storms and hail may appear l ike thi s to farmers , so long as their society does not hav e the means to control c l imates and atmospheric prec ipitation s . Thi s particular storm formed elsewhere , outside History . If i t never real ly belonged to the pure exteriority of t he in-i tself, thi s was bec ause i ts poss ibility (as a c om mon limit to our knowledge and our ignorance) was already give n , i n the soc iety w here it made i ts appearance . S i milarly , as we h ave see n , defeat and death (and al so, through the different structure s of the event, al l that directly or i ndirectly relates to these) make u s re alize the absolute but v ai n experience of tran scendent-being as a l imit of exteriority and a nul l i fi c ation of all comprehen s i on . Whether there are or can be other re lati o n s of another kind, i s something we can nei ther affirm nor deny a priori . * i s that these What we can say at any rate negatively an d formal l y

* To g ive a pure l y imag inary example of the se poss ible rel ations , it is w h at h appens i n s c ience-fict ion nov e l s when men d i scover that they (they and Earth) are i n the pract ical fie l d of an organ ic m u l t ip l ic ity w h i c h i s manoeuvring them by unknown mean s , and w ithout their being able to di scern it e xcept through c e rtai n i mprobable events re a l i zed by it i n the interiority of the human fie l d . From the v i e wpoint of in teriority , this exterior and e x teriorizing inte riori ty ( its be ing -an-object for the alien m u l ti p l ic ity) pre sents itse lf as a reversed dialecti c . I n other words , i t i s nece5,sary to grasp the interiorization of t h e e x te rior (integrat i on of the h uman fi e l d i nto the ' M arti an ' fi e l d . or any other of the s ame d i m e n � ions ) as a produc tion of e x teriority i n the i nterior (an apparition of synthetic and dialec t ical events whose te mporal ization. i n as m uc h a s it e xpresses that of the al iens penetrating our o w n , i s a source for us - by v i rtue , i ndeed , of its v ery u n i t y - of m a s s i fi c ation and re ifi cat i on of h u m an re l ation sh i p s , to the po i n t of c ompl ete atom i zation of indiv idual s an d d i s i ntegrat i on o f the p ract i c al fi e l d , or to the po i n t of t he i r total s u bm i s s ion to the cons t i tuted practico- i nert of th e exterior: i e . of the interior of the fi e l d e nvelop i n g our own ) . A s c an b e seen , th i s rev e rsed d i alectic ca n have i ts own in tellig ibilIty ( moreov er, it m e re l y radicaliLe s certain e x periences of the struggle men w age among them selves - e g . those of defeat) . Wh ate v e r its possible i n te l l i g ibility , however, we must rec og n ize that it has noth ing to do wit h the d i a lect i c a s an internal logic of action ; and at the sam e time , that i t h as nev e r ( ex cept i n sc ience-fi c t i on nov e l s ) been the object of a real i n v estig ation that would make i t pos s i ble to l eav e h uman interiori t y .

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c onditionings i n exteriority (or even , as explained in the footnote , through interiorizati on of the exterior, a synthetic pre sence of total exter iority at the heart of the human field) have at all events no feature in common with the di alectic of practical interiority . For as the l atter i s all that i t can be , it can be neither modi fied nor c ompleted by the absol ute tran sc endent, so the latter remain s heterogeneous to it. For an outside witne s s , it would be the object of another knowledge ; its relati on s w ith t he limit of i nteriority it s ustains would be of another inte lligibi lity . We shall return to th i s p roblem , of fund amental importance for pos i ng correctly the question of the diachronic meaning of Hi story . 9 4 For the moment, it is eno ugh to note that if temporalization involves dev i ati on s and i nstances of backwardne ss a nd ignorance , these are its own dev i ations and its own i n stances of i gnorance and b ack wardne s s . It engenders them as a di alectical total­ i zation, and through the circularity which produces the interior unity of exteriority as a deviation of interiori ty . Of cours e , the exteriori ty pre sent in the i n terior i s the very i n - i tself and di spersive structure of the U n i v erse . B ut, precisely, thi s i n - i tself appears only as a limit of exteri ori t y vai nly aimed at; and the exteriority of the interior appe ars and develops its efficacy w i thin the framework of immanence . What we c al l proce s s ­ prax is i s the hidden card the reverse s ide of prax i s -proces s . B u t despite everything, prax is -proce s s threatened, c onditioned , determ i ned from th e exterior and as a being-in-itself remains the formal foundation of its being-i n-the -midst-of-the-worl d ( if not of the latter ' s content), because it ens ures that there i s something i n the U n i verse l ike the reverse side of c ard s . * So the ontological pri macy of be ing- i n - itself i s transformed into a primac y of H i s tory . And the moment of prax is -proces s as an indi spensable mediation of action i s produced · as that of which being­ in-itself i s the i nfi n i te reverse side in and through the medi um of interi ority . For i t i s nece ssary for everything to be h uman in the total ­ i zati on of human history even anti-human forces, even man ' s counter­ for man to be able , in h i s being-in-itself of human ity (except death) exteriori ty , to produce himself as a l imit of interiori ty of the inh uman •

* I have al ready shown how the charac ter of ' de struc t i v e force ' . in the prac t ical

fi e ld , came from h u m an prax i � to the c atastrophes that overt u rned the l atte r ' s e ffects . 95 In a bsol u te e x teriority, there e x i sts an ana1 ogou� re l ation - but congealed in the i n - itself w h i c h determ i n e s the U n i v erse as i nd i fferenc e , a m i l i e u of abandonment, etc . , o n t h e basis (�f the l i m i t of e x teri o r i n te riority I n a certai n way , t h i s u n i fi c at i on of the d i �pers e d as s u c h by the absol u te b u t congealed u n it y of a �ol i tary ac t m a y appear a� the inert , n e g at i v e �yn t h e s i s o f the U n i v e rs e by th e H i !', tory i t c ru shes 94. S e e Preface abov e . a b o " Totali zat i o n -of- E n v e lopm en t ' be low 95 CritIq u e , v o l . I . pp 1 6 1 ff.

in the Appe ndi x , p . 447

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force s and , c o n sequently , as an absolute equiv alence between the human­ i zati on of the i nhuman and the i nhuman i zation of the human . B ut precisely because the inhuman i s everywhere in interi ority , as the re s i s tance of H i story and its fou ndation , but aht'ays transcended disclosed or secretly conditioning the drift s of action, and i n all cases bei ng effective through the l atter and by v irtue of it the dial ectic (rule of bei ng-in- int eriority) presents i tself to investigation as the absol ute of temporal izing tran scendence. The tran scen dence of be ing-in- itself to ­ wards being- i n -itse l f through i nteriority , proceeding from one abs ol ute determination to ano ther, can be only an absol ute efficac y . One would have to go bac k here to the anal y ses of existence as nihilation which I attempted elsew here : 9 6 but th at would be to m o v e beyond our prese nt argument . It i s enough to recal l here that praxi s springs from being-in­ i tself as its negation . Hence it i s n ot relative to the in-itself which i t negates , but makes itself' its negation absol ute l y by temporal izing i tself towards its objective ( which i s that same n e gati on , but etched into the in­ i tself) . The negati on of a d i spersion can be only the un ity which preserves thi s di spersion w i th i n itself at the s ame time as unify i ng i t (tran scendence and integration into prax i s) , or else the pas s ive synthes i s which i mposes i t s sway ov er that very d i spers ion. Need itself, moreover, i s already the unity of what i s m i s s i n g or the unity of what threatens i n teriori zed and re-exteriorized in the fi eld. Con sequentl y , being- in - i tself i s every where v isible t h roug h the transparency of prax i s . as a condition, a threat, an in strument, or a w orked produc t . B ut that astringent tran s ­ parency al one i s enough to tran sform i t : it i s al ways discovered through its fu ture , i . e . in asmuch as its inert metam orphoses becom e its hun1an .future t h ro u g h the prax i s under way. I t i s from thi s standpoi n t th at the o n to l og i c al status of the agen ts an d th ro u g h them of t h e to tal i za t i on i s the fundamental u n i t y of a contradi ction . The first synthetic tran scendence of di spersi on by prax is (based upon an organic integration of the diverse) i s the real productio n of mul tipl i c i ty . For the multiple i s real ized as exteriority onl y upon ( an d by virtue of) t he foundation of i nteri ority . Every relation of one elemen t of thi s multiple w i th the re st pres uppo ses a prac tical and formal synthesi s , an d a di spers i on ( no n - re l ati o n s h i p of te rm s ) ac c e pt e d as the content o f th i s synthe s i s . The re -tran scen dence of th e pure multiple by a fr e s h proj ec t of i ntegration prod uce s t h e i dent i t y of the e l e m en t s as c ontent o f the formal unit y , and real izes the quanti tative status o f the being - in - i tself on whose bas i s fre sh determ i n ati o n s (particularl y the passive s yn t h e s e s of w o rk ) w i l l be obt ain e d . B u t p rec i s e l y i n so far as praxi s produces -

.

96

R e r ng a n d NO fh i n g l1 {, "

pp 2 1 ff

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quantitative multi p l i c ities , the w orked being -in- itself modifies th e agents and transforms them into a multipl icity (the di spersion of organisms beco mes a n um erable multi p l i c ity within the i nteriority of the field) . The i nter i ority of the i n- itse l f as a quantity h as the effect of affecting every practical organ i sm with exteriority in relation to the others , and of introduc ing quantit y as an elem ent of separation b etvve en agents: i .e . bet�'een actions. Th i s fundamental rel ation ship between interiori ty and exteriority real i zed i n prac tice as a first c i rc ularity ( un i fication of the diverse by the multiple and by quantity ; actuali zation of the diversity of acts by the quantification of agents in terms of inert quantities) i s the ontologi cal an d practical foundation of the dialectic , as a totali zati on perpetual l y reconditioned by the d i spersion that it total izes and ceaselessly retot al i zing the multip lic iti e s that each of its practical synthe ses produc es w ith in interiority . Fr om th is v i e wpoint , !tfe as a fact of fundamental in tegrati on of the dispersed; as a harmonization of gu ided energy tran sformations is the un itary process grounding the di alectic (relation s betwee n m ultipl icities thro ugh the mediation of unity ; multiplicati on of unity through un i ­ fication ) . The future unity of proj ected obj ectives on the bas i s of need derives i ts real ity from the ontologi cal status of the l i ving be ing, and from the perpetuall y mai ntai ned un i ty cons tituting the be ing-in-itself of the agent and the transcendent framework of every temporali zation (for, once there i s need, the rel ation sh ip w i th the future as medium of the act i s engendered) . B ut the se remark s, far from s h o w ing a prime dialectic i n l ife , instead have the effect of as serting the autonomy of the constituent l inked to dialectic. The latter, as a m ere internal alterati on c i rcum stances of the shifting re l ationship between the biological organism and its m i l ieu, is prod uced and sustained by the organ i sm itse lf. B ut the tran scendent unity of ac tion c omes and grafts itse lf on to the i mmanent unity of life, prec i sely in so far as temporal iz ation (as a wrench away from the c irc ular time of the biological ) and transcende nce (as a non- integral organ i zati o n of the inorgan ic ) repre sent a fre sh soluti on - no t contai ned in the very pri nc iple of life to fre sh problems (posed bi ological ac tions of lower b y scarc ity ) . Th rough c y c l ical repeti tion the organ i sm re in­ l ife- form s and an archaic cycle of soc ial labo urs tegrate s tran scendence into immanence and vectori al temp oral ization i nto c irc ular temporal ity. B ut al ready, through the prax i s of th is particular organ i sm or that on e , etc . , there are severa l organi s m s . The prac tical u n i ty of the field produce s as a nl u /tip licity (hence as separation , antagonistic rec iproc i t y , etc . ) the di sper�ion of agent� (scarcity become s an inter-h uman force) . When . and , i n each person , anti - h uman brea king the c i rc l e of t h e soc i e t i e s w i t h o u t h i story , a soc ial e n s e m b l e is re a l l y o v e rwhe l m e d by i t � o w n m u l ti p l i c i t y , i n a s m u c h a s i t i s c ondi ti oned

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b y the real l abour of its organi sm s and the real products o f th is l abour a nd when the agents attempt to d i s solve it (they and Others ) by producing at that instant them selves as the elements of thei r own pr actic a l field the s t itch s l ip s . The organic c i rc ulari t y i s ma sked and dev i ated by the sp i ral s of reco nditioned condition ing. And the movement of p r ax i s whatever i t may be , canno t turn back into th e immed iat e un ity of the cyc l ical ; for that unity has shattered, and its fragme nts will become the o bject of a fresh attempt at unification, whose agents w i l l in thi s very w ay be divers i fi ed and come into confl ict with one another and attempt to take themselves as the obj ect to be unified while, correl atively, the t ype of passive synth es i s determin i ng the pract i cal fi eld i s modi fied by prax i s , and i mpo se s dev i ati ons and divi sions on prax i s which obl ige it to take itself as an obj ect T h ro ugh its re - m ul t ipl i cat i on b y the inert the p rac tical u n ity i s once more cal led into questio n , and its obj e ct i ve b ecomes its retotali zation through a praxi s that w i l l reo rgani z e it as a function of i ts tasks and worked matter. B ut the interpla y of the single a nd the multiple , in v olving the permanent dev iation of the former by the l atter (the uni t y of the multip le i s a multipl i cation of the single ) , induces t he practical movement inasmuch as it e xerts its own contro l ov er it, and has to control thi s control (as a new pl ural ity ) and so on and so forth never to c lose upon itself. From this standpoint, it can be said that Hi story appears as a brutal rupture of c y c l ical repetit i on : i . e . as tran ­ scendence and spiral ity . The se t wo featu res repre sent the inevi table recovery by prax is of its former c ondi tionin g . They are g enerato rs of i mmanence and , at the same time , of the pract i ca l fi el d : i . e . the sector of the dialectic and t h e anti -dialectic as determ inati ons of prax i s Maki n g oneself and overflowing ones e lf; gatheri ng oneself on l y to fl ee onese lf; h av ing oneself determined in the pre sent by a futu re determ i n ation , and t hus producing oneself as a movement towards the i nfi nite i n determ ination of the future ; r ea l i zi ng de velopment i n a spi ral , as a co m p romise between the ax i al l i ne running from th e need to the object i v e and the perpetually recommenced fai l ure of re w i ndin g on to one self (i .e . unifying the mult i ple by a conti nuou s displacement of q uanti ty an d scarc i ty ) ; in s hort at onc e t urn i ng and s i m u ltaneou sly fleeing l ike a sl ipping stitc h , engender i ng not-knotving, the n o t-knovvn and the u ncerta in (and, as we sha l l see , the pos sible an d the probable97 ) as determ ination s of be ing- i n - i n teriori ty ; prod uc ing l1'ith in immanence a reference back to lim itless temporal i zat ion ,

.

,

.

,

9 7 . S artre was n ot to re t urn t o i t i n t he p re s e n t w o r k ( � e e p p 4 1 . 8 5 , 1 R 3 , 20 2 . 20g . a n d 2 1 9 ff , a l � o Th e Prohlem of Method, p p 9 3 ff ) I n t h e m arg i n of h i � n o t e � o n t h e d i ac h ro n i c . fo u r m aj o r pro b l e m � t o b e de a l t w i t h are m e n t i o ne d , a � a re m I nde r ' Po� s i ble , C h a nc e . Progre s s . V I o l e n c e . C o n s u l t a l s o L ' ldiot de la f'a m i l l e . v o l

2. p 1 8 1 5. n.2

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(even if thi s would rece ive a limit in ex teriori ty from movements of i nert matter or th e proj ects of other pr actical multipl ic itie s ) it i s prec i sely al l t h i s that our critical i nvestigatio n reveal s to u s as an absolute event (or the advent of Hi story ) : i . e . as the tran sformation of the free constituent prax is into prax i s -process in other word s , i nto a constitu ted dialectic. It remains to be signall ed, of course, that the exi stence of a diachronic meaning of H i s t ory i s not even implied by the foregoing arguments , at thi s stage of ou r investigatio n . And by diachronic meaning we mere l y mean the ax i al direction i n rel ation to which one might define (and correct) any possible dri ft, today and in the infin ite future of interiority . We shall return to thi s problem , which require s inte l lectual too l s th at w e 9 8 have not yet forged for ourse] ves . Let u s rec all , furthermore , that this wholly formal charac teri zation of the totalizing movement has been made as a pure , empty abstraction from a standpoint of quasi ­ exteriority . I n the immanent prac tical fi eld , the goal i s under no circum­ the reduction of multipl i c i ty . Even stances i n itself and absolutel y when , as frequently occurs, unity posits itself for itself as an obj ective to be attained, or as a status to be maintained at all costs , it i s al way s on the fundamental basis of a concrete objecti v e : as a means of struggling against men or agai nst scarcity , or as a positive o rganization of the produc tive force s around the means of production . Genuine practical in order problems (how to i n dustrialize the U S S R while safeguarding to safeguard its social i st bas i s ; how to s upply a gro w i ng working-class population by a dwindli ng peasant population whose productivity i s not increas ing; and s o on and so forth ) bec ome gen uine historical problem s : was Stalini sm a dev iation? . . . What did the cult of personality s ignify? . . . What is the S ov iet ' bureaucrac y ' ? . . . and so o n . And the schematic c i rcularity of the single and the m ultiple in the immanent fi eld of scarc ity is only the skeleton of the movement of env eloping temporalization . The concrete and absol ute reality of Hi story can be only in the si ngularity of the prac tical rel ations un iting s ingular men to the singular objecti ves they pursue , in the s i ngularity of the conj uncture . The term praxis­ process has no function other than to desi gnate the totaliz ation-of­ enve lopment, inasmuch as it forges its pas sive syntheses and these rei ntrod uce multiplici ty (and, i n a more general way, extensive and intensive quanti ty) into i t , as an i nternal ri sk of rupture ( i . e . of multi­ pl ication and atomization ) . From thi s viewpoint, it i s al so nece ssary to signal an ontological l imit to totalization, s uch as thi s pre sents itself today to our inves tigation . Organi s m s , as active uniti e s of the inert m ultiplic i ty of their elements ,

98

S e e n ote � on ' P rog re � s ' i n A ppen d i x , pp . 4 0 2 ff. be l o w .

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can produc e only passive syntheses of phy s ico-chemical sub stances . It i s impossible to say today whether a temporary or a defi nitive inabil ity i s i nv ol ved: the c urrent state of the biochemical sci ences does not allow thi s to be determi ned. B ut at al l events . and even i f it were to be assumed that, i n a relatively di stant future (for we are in any case very far away from the sc ientific level that would at least allow u s to pose the question correctl y ) , h uman soc i eties i nheriting our tec hniques w il l be able to accomplish the s ynthesis of life it would sti l l remain the case that humanity has hi storically de fined i tself as arriving at the reproduc tion of organ i s m s ( i . e . of unity mai ntain ing itself autonomously w ithi n the framework of the l imited v ariations of a gi ven m i lieu) through the production of tools and m achines ( i . e. of i nert unity su stained by the i nertia of temporari ly as sembled materials) . To be sure , life reproduce s i tself. Spec ies some at any rate perpetuate themselves . And it is also true that we are able to act upon l ife either through life (grafts, hybrids, etc . ) or through inorganic subs tances (medicine, s urgery , biological e xperi ments on c hromosomes and the protoplasmic ' soup ' ) or through a comp lex praxis o rgan izing both types of conditioning in conjunction . B u t it remain s the case that i n all thes e activ ities l i fe i s a precondition which - in one form or another must always be given. To sow , seed is needed . To ferti lize a sea- urchi n w ith sea-water, the urchin i s needed. And whatever its goal and its technique, the praxi s modify i ng life i s similar in its fi rst moment to that which i s e xerted upon i norganic matter. I n its second moment, it entrusts the organic movement of life with the task of reali zing the outc ome of h uman acti on ploughing and sowing, acts that are exerted or could be exerted upon the prac tico- i nert i n accordance w ith its own l aw s of i nteriority . The gesture of the sower could be repeated identical l y if he were throwing lead s hot. I n real ity , its breadth and rhythm are conditioned b y the speci fi c characteri stic s of grai n (for example, its l ightness) , i nasmuch as these make it more or l e s s difficult to attain the obj ective aimed at . But these characteristic s are of a physical nature . Phy sical too are the positive and negati ve determinations of the practical fi eld (for example , direction and strength of the wind) to which the peasant has to adapt h i s behav iour. It is the seed itself that will see to the rest.

•

•

•

•

•

•

praxi s i s thu s charac terized as a rel ation between the organi sm and the i norgan ic , or as its rel ation to other organ i sm s v i a the common mediation of inorgan ic i nertia ( in the agent as i n the acted­ upon [les ag is ] ) . Prax i s i s in itself a degradation and a decompres s i on of organic i ntegration. A dec ompression, since it unifies as a function of perpetual ly future unities (the ends to be achieved) ; a degradation , s ince i t d oes not integrate inorganic substances i nto a biological un ity ( i . e . does not produce a bei ng whose ontological status i s equal to its own ) , but confines i tself to wre sting them from the w orld of di spersed exteriority and marking them with the seal of l i fe , w itho ut communicating th i s life itself to them . The se pas s iv e s yntheses h ave the object of mai ntaining the they practical organ i sm in l ife , and depending on c irc umstan ces s ucceed in two way s . When the organ ism direc tly needs inorganic substanc e s ( w ater, air, etc . ) , or when it protects itself again st over-abrupt vari ations in the surrounding mil ieu, worked matter direc tl y conditions life (puri fication of an air lad en with toxi n s , ventilation sy stems i n m i ne shaft s , etc . , or heating applianc e s , e tc . ) . When the organism nouri she s its own life w ith l i v i ng s ubstances ( which i s a feature o f hi storical facticity in man : he i s th e liv ing be ing who feeds off plants and animal s , but cannot b y himself directly r ealize the l i ving synthe s i s of inorganic substances ), pas s i ve sy nthe se s pl ay the role of practico - in ert mediations betwee n life and l ife . If, as a pure l y logical hypoth es i s , we envisa ge a l i v ing spec ie s on some other planet alread y hav ing the practic al pos s i bil ity of prod ucing l i fe from the inert , it w i ll be eas ier to grasp the spec ificit y of our histo rical prax i s (con s i dere d up to the prese nt con­ j unct ure ) . For the agen t who prod uces I ife by the integ ratio n of non­ liv ing tn ateri al s th ereb y de fi ne s a prax i s entire l y diffe ren t from our I S TO R I C AL

339

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own . * I n the first pl ace , h i s action is in tegrative: i . e . it confers its own unity upon the physico-chemical substances it assembl es (even if its aim was mere l y to use them for food) . The action of l i fe upon inorgan ic matter would here have the effect and aim of tran sform ing the latter into l i fe . The ohjectification of prax i s would take on a quite different si gnific a­ tion , since th is prax i s would be recovered and reassumed a s an immanent free organization by its very product. The action o f the li ving thing would become living, as the very being of an other l iving th ing; and i t would be reflected back to the agent in its singulari ty : i . e . i n its organic autonomy . Doing would here be the mediation between the li v ing be ing (as a producer) and the l i v i ng being (as a product, escaping the producer and real i zing h i s obj ectives through i ts own autonomy) . Th i s praxis would a s a rul e suppress neither sc arcity (everythi ng would depend on the chances of producing l i fe) nor the di alectic of the si ngle and the multiple. B ut it would reduce ( and co u l d suppress) the practico - i nert , since the origin of the l atter i s the w orked i norganic as a mediation between men ; and the creative prax i s would produce organ i sm s , as a mediation between other organi sms (obv iously th i s does not necessari l y impl y an y massive reduction of the pr acti co- inert, s ince production of the organi c from the inorgan ic may necessitate the accumu l ation of tool s and machines) . Final l y , i n so far as th i s creation was total i . e . the practical organ i sm could produce its cou nterpart the problem of scarc i ty of men as a conditi on of Hi story would tend to disappear. In any case , the rec iprocity of th e producer and h i s produc t ; the reversal of be ing - i n ­ ex teriority (the inert becom ing the matter of life in its be i n g - i n - itse lf) ; the progressive dis sol uti on of the practi co- inert; and , above al l , the subordination of action as a tran si tory medi ation to integrati on , an d to organ ic synthese s as a proce s s of immanence in short , all these features and many others that we c annot even concei v e - would have a s their inev itable consequence a profound tran sformati on of Hi story and the cons tituted dialectic . B ut the sole aim of th i s sc ience -fi ction hypothe s i s w i I 1 be to spec ify the singulari ty of our d i alectic and our h uman hi story . Different from tho se fi ctive organ isms in that we do not prod uce l i fe , we di ffer too from plants and perhap s from unknown organ isms on other pl anets in that we cannot re al i ze in ourse l v e s , and through the inner chemistry of the organ i sm , the l i v i n g synthe s i s of mineral s . We real l y act onl y upon th e

* I t i � nece � �ary to i m a g i ne . o f c o u rse . that the age n t doe s not con fi ne h i mself to re a l i z i n g the e lemen tary con d i t i o ns for the l i v l O g �ynth e � i s , but th at he possesse s the nece ssary techn i q ues a n d i n s trument� to g u ide - v ia a succe� �ion of a l read y l i v m g reaction� - th e p rod uced orga n i �m toward s an Id i o sy nc rasy de fi ned i n advance a s th e terminal objective .

I

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inorgan ic (or thro ugh i ts mediati on ) , yet we cannot directly assimilate mineral s . We l ive by con s um ing other l i ve s , but do not have the means to produce l i v in g syntheses. Our prax i s i s defined by th i s twofol d negative relation ship : we fas hion only the inert, we assim i l ate only the organic . [Were we] , l i ke plan t s , directly l inked to m ineral s ubstances , ac tio n w ould dis appear or be reduced to a minimum. Scarc ity could giv e way ( under certain condi tions ) to abundance . If we were capable of as directed integration producing l ife , however, l i fe would become the higher form of acti on ; or, if you l i ke , acti on would thicken into the immanent-being of the integrated organ i sm . What (for u s and in our hi story ) ensures that action whose original raison d' etre i s t o reproduce i s l ike a transcendence of the organi sm itself, and l ike the most l i fe com plete and autonomous form of the l i v ing temporalization , i s the fact that through it life doe s not move directly towards itself but, by virtue of the facti c ity of our organ s and our c ondition , escapes and place s i ts seal upon the i norgan i c . Pra x i s , as an intermedi ary between the synthesis in immanence of the living and the pas sive synthe sis of the inert, receives from the former the very possibi lity of proj ecting liv ing unity as its ultimate goal , and from the latter the rigorous permanence and the exteriority that allow the disclosure of obj ectives and means (for e x ­ teriority, as a synthetic negation at the heart of unity , allo w s the distance whic h engenders objectivity) . In itse lf, praxi s i s thus a synthetic mediation between interiority and e x teriority : thi s i s its autonomy i n rel ation to life. It i s itself, in itself, the unifi c ation of the unity of immanence with e xteriority . That i s what characterizes it i n co mpari son w ith the organic func tion . For th e structures of a prax i s impl y a reciprocal exteriority of its parts and at least as a moment positing itself' for itself a kind of temporary stability i n the orientated fl o w . A practical frame wo rk i s e stabli shed, as a structure of the practical temporalization at a particular moment of its dev e l opment; and, w ithin thi s framework , operations are governed and realized w hich eventual ly d i s s olve the frame\vork i nto themselve s , and posi t them selves as beyond the d i s sol ved framework while producing a ne w framed moment of actio n . The exteri ority of the part s i s prec isely the e xterioriza­ tion (of the organic i mmanence of functi on s into organ ized acti on) requ ired by the necess ity for a prax i s to be everywhere outside itself, i n the inorg anic di spersion that holds w i thin i t the interiority of its field. For the person who constructs an d uses a too l , contradictory neces sities mu st be united with i n the very structure of tran scendence. N o detailed operation can be attempted without a fundamental ri sk of failure , except on the bas i s of unity of the field, itself reali zed on the bas i s of the objecti v e : i .e . of the maintenance or future re stitution of organi c integri ty , despite the s urro un ding v ariat i ons . The result i s that eve ryth ing in thi s

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3 42

field i s a bond of synthetic im manence ev en negations. But as the uni fie d ensemble ne vertheless remains subj ected to its inorgan ic status ( i . e . the di spers ion of e xteriori ty ) , the partial operati on relate s to an exteriorized parcel oj" th e field: i . e . a un i fi ed � i solated parce l , whose u nified solitude i s itse lf the product of the two antagon istic , though solidary , statu se s . It isolates itselj" i n the infi nite di spers ion because of this dispers ion itself, which precisely allo w s th is to be exterior to that. It i s sti ll nece ssary that there sho uld be th ises and {hats . And the di spersion o f exteriority is pro duced a s an exteriority of the parts of an ensemble o nly if th e ensemble is u n ified as disp ersive, and if di spersion i s l i ved temporall y in every singular o peration as the unity of a local passi vity, as an a nd as the halt prov i s i onall y imposed upon i n fi n i te di spers ion atomization of the interior by the ext erior. However, the bonds of i nteriority are real ities. Their s ynthetic power to unify i s real , s i nce in a Universe that had de stroyed its men , as we have seen , fragments of p hysico-phy siological unity would subsist in the ir absol ute reality , even in the exterior tran sformations that would eventual l y d i s s olve them . Prec i s e l y , howeve r, the status of the bond of i mmanence i s rigorously practical. In the social fi eld, i f some par tic ular local transformation has the consequence of modify ing in its interiority a certain en semble from afar, without to uching it, through the mere reorgan izing effect it entai l s - thi s i s obviously because the modi fication has been constituted within a fi eld of action . In other word s , the distant modification modifies from afar the pre sent obj ect in its i nteriority , through th e m edia tion of an already constituent action (i . e . one already being exerci sed on a fi eld) . If some death of an unknow n person , which has taken place very far away from me in the M id i , has an i nfl uence o n my c ar eer and thereby on m y very real i ty , it i s via a system of in stitutions (constituting, for example, the law s of recruitment an d pr omotion i n a parti cular branch of the c i v i l service; or the more or l e s s immediatel y establ i shed , more or l e s s organized, c ustom s correspondi ng to the s ame problems in pri v ate enter­ prises ) . B ut the Institution - a s a reversal of worked material i ty gives human prax i s its in ert-bei ng, for the simple reason that it i mposes i t s in di spensable practical s y nthe sis on the m ultiplicit y of agents . Through the mediation of inert perm anenc e . it i s p rac tice that modi fi e s my l i fe . A s a functi on of th is practice cod i fi ed or tradi tional the official ' s death is reveal ed as an exigenc y that prov i sion should at once be m ade for h i s replacement (his action left i n abeyance , for example , itself designates as inc omplete and demanding to be completed at once in the movement of common temporalization the tasks with which he had recentl y been entrusted) . In an organi zed and functio n i ng s ystem , moreover, th i s ex igency itself becom e s the rea son why selective and restorative mechan­ is ms � w ing abruptly into ope ration (repl acements will be selec ted, in •

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acc ordance with a certain practical schema, to put the s y s tem back i n work i ng order at m inimum cost) . S o it i s the pract ical ten sion that e stabli shes the bond of immanence . In the e x ample quoted, of course , a prax i s highly conscious of i ts means an d its ends may be involve d : if, for in stance , I ha d l ong been desig nate d in ac cordance with the very ru les governing promotion in that branch of the c i v i l serv ice to take the dead man ' s plac e (if I were already h i s deputy , pri v y to al l his busine s s � etc . ) . in the very On the other hand, it may be a matter of a bo nd which interiority of the field e scapes ac tion itself overwhel med by its m u l ti ­ plicity (by the m ultip l icity of obj ect ive s , dangers , mean s , agents , etc . ) . We hav e giv en some e x amples of thi s , w h i ch could be multiplied ad infinitum , s i nce th i s immanence of everyt hing i n everything i s the law of interiori ty . B ut when the bond i s establi shed v i a pra x i s witho ut bei ng foreseen or projected or perhaps ever known by it, prax i s neverthel e s s remain s the c onducti ng medi um of i nteriori ty , inasmuch as it draw s everything in its temporal i zation towards an end. Thu s the bond of immanence as a producer of events an d objects i s itself a pri mary produc t : the di spersive multip li city at the heart of prax i s i s temporali zed in the practical torrent as a m u l tipl icity (otherw ise the re l ation of immanence would become an interpenetration) and as materi al in fu s ion of the future unity. It i s as a multiplicity ( a di spers ion already reunified by the prac ti c al s ynthe s i s ) that it receives and transform s uni fi c ati on (as a progress tOl,vards un ity) into a kind of �'i'andering un ity of th e di verse ev ery e lement o f the field being interior to everything , prec ise l y in so far as each remain s e x terior to all . I n the se few observations , I have been trying to stress the s ingularity of human prax i s . For the inner cohesion of action i s en sured by bonds of immanence . No w , w.e observ e that the se c an pre sent them selve s as the pre-uni fication i n progre ss of di spersion; but equa lly well as the relax ation of organic u n i ty and its transform ation into a practical unifi c ation , through i ts rel ation w i th the d i spers ive and v i a its first synthe s i s of e xteriority ( i . e . from the mome nt when , through n eed, the being-interior­ to-itself of the l iv ing creature becomes its be ing-outside-itself i n the fi eld of scarcity , and when in a form sti l l more organic than practical the restored organ i s m , as an implicit obj ective and as the organ i sm ' s future , finds itself separated from itself and re un ited, in its fi rst temporal ization , by the m i l i e u a s inerti a) . To e x p l ain what I mean more c learly (and returning, j ust as an example, to the sphere of kno w ledge) , we may note that pra x i s has forged its idea of unity by unifying; and that th i s very idea - as a schema re gulating all h uman acti v i ty i s the eq uiv alence between d i s i ntegratio n of the organic by the i norganic , and integration of the latter i nto a form engendered by the former. Nothing show s th is better than the unit y of Pl aton ic ' forms ' . or that w h i ch ph i l osophers s t i 1 1 often

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attribute to geometrical entities. For Li ard (albeit a positiv i st) , a geo­ metrical fig ure keeps its parts as a determination of pure space enlaced by a kind of cohe sive force, which i s its very be ing. Howev er, it goes without saying that its spatial esse nce make s it s u sceptible to infinite divi sion and , what i s more , that thi s infi nite divi sion i s an eternal and eternally pre sent feature of its e s sence . We find in th i s description what so man y other rationalists have said or implied (Spinoza, for instance, speaking of affirmati ve particular e s sences ) . There i s , as it were, an aberrant mirror-effect here , where in the figure is endowed with a being in actu (as people also put it) and th is act i s endowed w ith two simultaneous ontological statuses, whose incompatibili ty i s concealed from u s by leav i ng them in shadow . The fi rst i s prec i sely the being of the practical field duri n g the ac tion : in th is case , howev er, the act emanates not from the obj ect itself but from the synthetic (an d human ) movement that engenders it; it makes the geometrical object into a symbo l of worked matter; the human act here assembl es and contai n s , in the un ity of a gesture , the dispersion of exteriori ty represented here by infinitely divi sible space. In thi s form , the conception is adm i s sible. B ut the rational ism of es sences require s the act to be the unity that the obj ect imposes on itself of its own accord : the synthesis it realizes of its multiplicities of i nertia. Moreover, there i s no man to make thi s act, and thought i s on ly the place where this form i s actualized as unity of the diverse (and without the effective pre sence of diversity ) . Seen in thi s w ay (which i s , i ndeed, how i t i s seen ) , thi s activ ity of the i nert th is unification by itself of di spers ion , inasmuch as it remains wholly di�­ persion is not intelligible . It i s not a matter here of denying that unities can be produced in the Universe (the liv ing organ i sm is one such ) ; but of stres sing how th is common conception attribute s to the obj ect, in the form of a cohesive force, that wh ich i s the extended re sult of h uman action . This concepti on th us conceal s an underl y ing recourse to the un ity that produces itself: i n other word s , organic u n ity. Organi c i s t thought i s ev ery where , s l ipping i n beh i nd practical thought every time it i s a question of hypos tati zing action by cuttin g it off from the agent . In the example under consideration , howe ver, th e organ ic u nity of enve lop ment would not have been able to e stablish itsel f. For the organi sm , unity i s actual ly the perpetual re storation of unity. From th is v iewpoint, there i s n o di fference between its synthetic reality as a consi stency at the heart and the accompl i shment of its of temporal i zati ons of env elopment function s : eati ng to l ive, and living to eat, are one and the same thi ng. For unity manifests itself as the total i zati on of the function s that preserve it. These function s , moreover, c easel e s s l y turn back upon them­ selves in a c i rcularity that i s on l y the first temporal ization of permanence, s i nce the ir tasks are al way s simi lar and always con ditioned by the same

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' feedback ' . For we find in organ ic uni ty ne ither the On e-as - a-be ing nor the One -as-the -future - obj ect-of-an-act, but instead the i dentity of Onene s s [ Unite] as an ontological status and Unity as a perpetual repairing of damage . It i s hexis which real izes the l i v ing mediation be tween the tw o : Unity ceaseles s l y temporal i ze s i tself by function s ; but func tion s , through their infi n i te cyclical return, produce permanence as the ir temporal being ( i . e . as the inert limitati on of possible operations and of temporal ization ) . Hexis , as an eternal re turn , i s the permanent unity of the organ i sm inasmuch as it i s living ; i t i s l i fe itself, creating for itself its determination s even in the inerti a that may affec t it from of inertia. * B ut th i s h exis outside ( impo s s ib i l ity of adapti ng itse lf, when the vari ations of the m i l ieu cross ov er a certain thre shold) rejects the di spersion o f e x teri ority . It i s neither a MJhole nor a tota lizatio n . The whole, i f i t i s to have an onto logical statu s , must produce i tself through a continued but purely affi rmative creation as the new being of diversity ( w i th the d iverse no longer being an obstac le , [any more th an ] an inc itement, to uni ficatio n , but i n an i mmobi le tran scendence of i tself becom ing the means of which to tality as a real being i s the end, and fi nding i n th i s total ity as a realized end its meaning and i t s ra ison d' etre : as though totality had retrospectively engendered diversity on1 y to produce itself through the liquidation into i t of the di verse as such, and through its pre servation as a qual itative v ariety i n un ity ) . Total ization , for i ts part, i s tran scendence , alway s induced to retota l i ze itself and control its dev i ation s . For, although the agent ( s,imple or multiple) from which i t em anate s may himse l f be part of the practical field, total ization as a praxi s effects the i n teriori zing synthesis of extraneous elements ( i . e . of inorganic matter, and some­ times th rough it of biological processes ) . In thi s sense , it i s al way s a mere rem inder of de scriptio n s pre sented creative. These remark s earl ier99 al low u s to comprehend that h exis i s a whole onl y inasmuch as its total ization i s effected upon i tself and in its own interiority ; and (do we even have to add?) inasmuch as the pure [cycl ical character] without spirality of the total izing operation determines i t on the bas i s of a future of inert e xteriority (by v i rtue of thei r v ery identity , th e several operations alway s repe ated form a j u x taposition of destinies w i thout inner rel ations ) and a past o ss i fi ed ad infin itum (as an infi nite s uperpo sition of the same di gestion , etc . ) as though stri cken w i th immobil ity at the heart of i ts perpetual movement (thus people say ' my l iv er ' , ' my blood '

*

I na s m u c h as these d i sc l ose t h e m s e l v e s as the re v e rse s ide of an a d aptat ion to t he

spe c i fi c m i l i e u .

99

S e e , I n part i c u l ar, ' Introd u c t i on ' to Critiq u e , v o l

1 . pp . 45� 7 .

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and also ' my dige stion ' , to denote the k i nd of s ingular be ings that can be cal led frequentative s , and that change only to remai n the s ame i n th e midst of a changing environment) .

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

-

•

.

o THE

organ i c i st aspect of u n ity , as a s ynthetic c ategory of prax is an d knowl edge, i s at bottom only a determ i n ation of the inorgan ic by the organ ic h exis : inasm uch as it i s c ontained in the obj ective th at i l l uminate s (while simultaneou s l y de l i mi ting) the field, as '0.1hat is to he restored; and i n asmuch as ( l i ke a qual ity of the objecti v e ' s i l l umination and meani ng) it reverts to the un i fi ed obj ect. I n fact, if we l eave aside the sphere of arts whose objects are imag inary , human praxi s consti tuent and constituted can i n any case never prod uce a total ity in actu . For every total i ty forces its divers i ty back into productive� un ifying action . The One supports and produc e s the di verse. B y c ontrast, i n our inorganic products i t i s the diverse which pre-ex i st s . U n ity as a p as sive synth e s i s is etched into i t w i th the help of certai n temporary combinations (cohe s ion of a metal after casting) and is ultimately guaranteed by the inerti a of the di verse . So long as external circum stances do not di sperse these elements , they will remain bound together for the y are incapable of unbinding themselve s . I n a word , the terre stri al milieu acc ording to our investiga­ tion . produces h exis , t hat strange uni ty which takes itself as an end and automatical l y merge s with the i nternal mean s of preserv ing it. And human praxis , as a transcendence (and preserv ation) of h exis , c reate s total ization as an ever open , never fini shed, spirality of temporali zat i on . B ut the �'vhole as a h i dden struc ture of the category of synthetic un ity i s itself a schematic tool of thoug ht and ac tion , w ithout any real correspondence in the practical field. It has been produced by the transcende d organism, the transcend ing action and worke d materi al ity al l at once . When prax i s di s closes the produced object, i t s structure as a m ediation ( between two moments of the organ i c , v i a the inorgan i c ) causes i t to grasp the obj ect via life and at the same time, to q ual i fy l i fe by the o bjec t I t d i scov ers the uni ty of th e organ i sm throu gh the pas s ive s ynthe s i s of the i norganic . For p er p e t u a l l y produced, reproduced and re s tored th rough th i s unity _.

,

.

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cyclical changes is not a u nity for itself. Quite the c ontrary : within the interiority of the field it i s the coherence of the tool, together w ith the link between i ts practical determination s and the goal being pursued , which appear to underpin the pas si ve synthesis; while the latter, against the background of the practical field, yields its being-for-the -other (for the agent) as u nity ( which gives rise to a rev ersal and application of the unitary schema to the agent himself as an organism) . Prec i sely , however, thi s unity would collapse into a pseudo-integration, should we see it as merely an i nert synthe sis of di spers ion, the res ult of orientated transforma­ tions. In other words, the inertia su staining the p ermanence of properties i s disclo sed by action itself as an act producing that permanenc e . What is involved here is both a projection of organic life at the basi s of the s ynthesis as continued cre ation of a permanenc e ; and, at the same time, an impregnation of worked matter by the act (l abour) , which i s changed there into a passive structure prec i sely in s o far as it surrenders its tran ­ scendence to it. For organic l ife i s permanence as hexis : i t i s condensed into the renewed instant of pas sivity , and repetiti on of the same functional operations is transformed into a repetition of the creation of the same object. Here , the unity o f the whole is the projecti ve identific ati on in the of inertia, as a pure negation of change, w ith the affi rmative instant c reation of the obj ect by itself as a positive perseverance of B eing in its being. I t remains the case that the momentary unity of the implement (as pass iv e flashes of B eing ) , trapped by the infinite simal mome nt, would run the ri sk of having s uppre s sed the mu ltiplic ity of s ub stances only to replace it by the infinite di v i s ibili ty of time , and [cau sing u s ] to come up once more against the Cartesian problem (how to pass from one point in time to another) , if praxi s as a synthetic temporali zation did not integrate i nto the practical field the inert di spers ions of the time of thing s : enlacing i ns tants by the movement that tran scends them , and producing their succession (re lations of strict e x teriority between points in time) as a specific determ ination of unan i mous interiority . In the practic al interiority of transcendence (i . e . inasmuch as the object remains i n living hi story and i s sti l l active within it) , organi c life i s transformed after that obj ect into a total itarian , c ontinuo us creation of i ts being by itself. In thi s sense, the inertia of B eing is disclosed as identical to i ts affi rmation . * At the same time, as we h av e seen , integration and -

That does not signify that t h i s identi fi c ation is real, In the sen se in w h i c h we h ave s aid that t e leolo g ical structure s were abs o l ute l y real , righ t to the being-in-itse l f as a limit of interiority of the exterior . l OO Nor does it mean that it i s u nreal ( as a dream or fi ction may be) . S impl y , it dra w s its reality ( in the inferiority o f the practical fi e l d ) from the fundamental stru c ture s of prax i s , and - in the prac t i c o-i nert reversal - from i ts efficacy as a fac tor and qua l ifi c ation of the v arious specie s of al ienat i o n . *

1 00

S e e p p . 3 2 3-4 abo v e .

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transcendence of the i mplement reflect the action that p roduces i t and the action that uses it indi s solubly l inked as passive h umanity of the tool (and, as we have noted , as h uman efficacy of the inert: a magic power to 1 0 1 cut and c arve as the knife ' s g iven tran scendence ) . The se different unificatory schemata (as produced and c onditioned by the ac tion of w h ich they are the in struments of control and d i sclosure) c onstitute , in their turn , an efficacy of worked ma tter (inasmuch as it is defi ned as such, and from these angles, within the practical mul tipl ic ity : round the arrow poisoned with vegetable substance s disc ov ered and blended in a po siti v i st tradition of empiri c i sm and technicity , rel igious c eremonies are instituted to reactualize the abi lity to pi erce li ving bodies and poi son them, inasmuch as it becomes their practic a l real ity as petrified action ). Thu s the practical unification and the functional uni ty ( transcendence and organici sm) in prac tice reali ze the being-one of inert matter as a deep truth of its inerti a . Through it, in a rec iprocity of perspective s , the org anic becomes practi cal (hexis make s itself affi rmation as the act) and the practical organic ( the function of the tool , as congealed tran­ scendence and signification, becomes a function of an organ , as mysterious and conde nsed l i fe of a whol e ) . S o the v ery category of un ity far from being a mere transparent i s charac terized, like every human reality, as the twofold principle determination of worked matter by the organism (origin and final goal) and by action (as mediation ) , i nasmuch as the l aw of interi ority governing the practical field determine s the two aspects of thi s determination by one another and i n i mmanence . The unity o f a tool i s that : it i s an action which becomes an organic h exis by defi ni ng the s igni fication of the i nstrument; and i t is an organic , diffuse l i fe produced i n s ide the obj ect and within its v ery being, as an ontological function i .e . as a continued creation and as a total i ze d total ity . To be sure , investigation w i l l reveal other forms of practical synthe s i s : totalization-of-env elopment, incarnation , enveloped totalization, c ircul ar synthe s i s . Nev erthele s s , it must be noted that these different structure s which all relate to the dialectical development of praxis in the soc ial and refer us to a u n ification in progress and never to the hi storical field accomplish ed unification (except in certain relations to past-being that we shal l find in proble ms of diachronic totali zation) . 1 02 The truth i s that unity, as a practical category of labour and daily l ife , i s only a dev i ant determination of the agent by the specific feature s of h i s prax i s . B etween ,

1 0 1 . Cri tiq u e . v o l . 1 , p . l S 3 . n . S 8 . and p . S t 5 1 02 . See Appe nd i x , part i c u l arly t he fragmen t � ' H i �tory App e a ls to H i story ' an d H i story Essential to Man ? '

·

Is

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organic i ntegration, maintained and res tored by the hexis-fun ction , and totalization, as a temporalizing unification of the inorganic , unity i s required n either by analytic Reason (other than as a prel imi nary frame ­ work that anal y s i s w il l di ssolve) nor by di alectical Reason. Yet i t characterize s the human act as such, since the prac tical organism, as an agent objectifying itself in order to reproduce itself, has man w hose task i s to work upon the inorganic announced to i t through the inertia of pas s i ve synthese s . There in l i e s the source of al ienati on , as we have mentioned. Anti -human m atter - inasm uch as i t i s e x iled from the in the name of pure real m of e x teriori ty w i thout ever attaining l i fe unity (and, in every instance , w ith the con tent of th i s unity ) re flects man ' s anti -h umani ty back to all men as their true human re ali ty . It i s at thi s level that essences (pure practical ide as engendered by the worked obj ect in its pass ive action , i . e . as a mediation between men) exist; and also contemplative thought, as a pure alienation of empirical intuition (and the action that produces it) to those abstract, inert unities and to the rel ations of interiorized exte riority they mai ntai n (as the th ings which produce them through men) in the immanence of the practic a l fi eld. This c aptive thought i s also, quite simply , conceptual thought. Anal y s i s dissolves it into e x ternal re lations , the dial ectic e xplodes it by virtue of its temporali zing pow er. B ut i t i s continually reborn as man ' s ' natural ' in the totalizing thought, or rather as thoughts that things produce c ircularity by their recondi ti oning of men. We have already said thi s , 1 0 3 and shal l be returning to it. B ut what matters here i s that conceptuali s t intel lectuali sm as determ inations of the Logos by other passive syntheses through the agent represents a particularity , i . e . a negative l im i t , of human praxi s . It i s bec ause thi s prax i s , a mediation between two heterogeneous terms neither of which i t can produce , i s in itself a pas sage from the organic to the inorganic and on account of i ts twofo l d signification ( the organ i s m ' s becom ing- inert producing itself w i th a v ie w to organizing the inert) that the dialectical ensemble of i ts structures exi sts and conditions the hi storical adventure i n its spec i fi c i ty . Circ u l ari ty , al ienation , practico-inert , drift, etc . all these features hav e their source ( al though , of course , a w hole dial ectical progre s s i on and the synthetic combinati on of other factors are necessary to prod uce them) in the following basic charac teri s tic of human action : totali zati on an d tem poral i zation as tran scendence spri ng from need, i . e . from an expl o s i on of the organ ic cycle as h exis ; and this explo�i on conditioned by sc arci ty man i fests both the encompa s s i ng presence of i norgan i c e x teriority and , at the s ame time , the i mpo ssibility for these --

...

1 03 . C, i{iq u e . v o l

I . r p . 1 70-7 1

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partic ular organ i sms directly to tran sform m ineral s ubstance s into integral elements of the living substance. The organ i sm ' s immanent, univocal relation to the inorganic m i lieu ( w i th i ts u ses and its adversity­ coefficients) i s already the ac tion as a whole ; and it i s our history up until today , and very probably until tomorrow or the day after (we shall throughout the totali zing trans­ see w hat the permanence of a fac tor 1 04 signifie s ) . B ut by govern ing i ts formation of the whole practical field inerti a to act upon the inert, the practi cal organ i sm produce s its action as a non-organ ic efficac y . B iological integration i s projected as a totalizing temporal i zation ; and i ts objecti v e s , as future s ynthe ses of pre sent mean s , allow its organ ic cohe sion an d the deep solidarity of its organs to be used. However, by the very act which governs the organi sm like an s ustai n s a certain non-organ ic instrumen t, the latter - as an agent temporal reality . His own action i s a production of himself as a pas s ive synthe si s , v i a the inert uni fication he i mparts to the obj ec ts organi zed. To be s ure , the action break s the c y c l e of adaptation , i n w hich it is the Universe which upsets the balance and the organ i sm ch anges only to find itself i n the same objective relationship w i th the environment. Whereas the act re -establishes the rel ationship by acting directly outside i tself upon the Universe , and by re storing the former order or offsetting the changes that have occurred. I t i s this feature that make s the ac t i nto a tran scendence of organ ic l i fe , by giving i t as i ts fundamental structure of being a s yn thetic and practical rel ation between the interior and the e xterior. F,r om the moment w hen the org an i sm reali ze s modifications ou tside in the l ight of an objective , we can speak of an act. And this defi nition i s enough to show that the fi rst practices are far from beginning w ith the h uman species or even with m ammal s . If h um an acts alone concern us here , it i s because for reasons that i t i s pointles s to go into they are the onl y ones on Earth to be integrated into a h i s tory . B ut i f we cal l the modi fication produced an ohjectified act, we show by thi s that at a certain level of real ity the pas sive u n ity of the worked obj ec t is (grasped and contrac ted in the instant) the very unity of the act ' in p erson ' . Thi s is sti l l c learer when the tool i s considered as a materialized (inorgan i c ) mediation between the agent and the i nert thi ng . For the latter indicate s in its inertia and by its structure (pas sively borne ) the way i n which the worker can use it. The act i s an inorganic materiality , sealed i n thi s momentary form . For the existence of the tool make s us see that ac tion (whatever i t may be ) , as imposing a unity upon the

1 04 ,

Thi s prob l e m , l i n ked t o d i ac h ron i c tota l i za t i o n , w as not to be dealt w ith i n the

pre se n t w o rk .

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diverse, i s itself fragmented (w ithin unity ) by the diverse to be unified. There are diverse tasks , whose origin i s the qual i ty of the diverse materi al s . The total o peration i s temporaI ized as uni fication, but instal l s exteriority w i thin the temporal i zation itself. The nece ss ity (deri v ing from objects) of fi rst reducing some obstac le or other (by movements them ­ selves separate or sep arable ) , then resolving some difficulty (preparatory acti v ities ) and tackling matter w i th some treatment or other (purification , for example ) , manifests itself as an e xteriority (w ithin the interiority of the temporal izing movement) of every action . Let u s be c lear: in a certain s tate of technolog y , mean s of production, etc. , th is or that operation i s indispensable w i thin the framework of the activ ity whose aim is to re fine o i l . I t i s even possible that th is given action of a political nature (abandoning Venezuela, w i th all its unrest, and establi shing refineries on the calmer i s l and of C ura�ao) was i nd i spensable to S hell, as a huge c apital i s t enterpri se . B u t i t still remai n s the case that parti al actions reach completion at the heart of the total action. Even if, for example , one were to reduce to an infinite s imal i n s tant the moment separating con s tructio n of the o i l city at C ura�ao from the start- up of the machi ne s , and even if (as often happens) one were to observe that construction of the buildings overlapped with their use in the first refining operation s , the i n s tant when some particul ar segment of the total action i s s uppre ssed (because i t has reached its termin us ad quem) and some other i s produced i s in fact a double n egation : in it the terminus a quo negates and rej ects the termin us ad quem . The re sult of past action , as a former circumstance, participate s in the i nertia of the obj ect and i n the bei ng of the transcended past. Thi s i s well demons trated by the historical fact of the d i v i s ion of labour and its temporary conc l u sion (prior to automation) : i .e . the di v ision of l abour among men becoming a div i s ion among machines . A funda­ mental characteri s tic of the act i s involved here : i t can be reduced (depending on technolog y ) to a m ul tipl icity of tasks performed b y a m u l tiplic i ty of individual s . In o ther word s , the inert multiplicity of the diverse , by requalifying the act that tran sform s i t , de signates itself through i t as a possible mul tiplicity of agents (and one practical l y neces sary in general circum s tances ) . Of course , thi s new multi pl icity refers to a new integration : in order to rea l i ze th is particular pas sive synthesis (an alloy , a minting of coi n s , etc . ) , it is nece ssary to carry out the synth esis of the agents concerned. The obj ectiv e has to be all the more clearly defined since i t i s that of a plural ity, which could di sperse if it were imprec i se . The preparation of tasks and their di stributio n , the all instal lation and use of mechani sms of control and constrai nt, etc . this shows that the practical unity has merel y been di s placed . It come s to the multiple from the manager or the management bod i e s . No matter. In

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the movement of the di v i s ion of labour, the sy nthetic function of unity and control posits itself as e xteri or to the functi o n s of producti on . And as for unity cons idered inasmuch as it unite s the workers in the fac tory , for example it can be perfectly effective , in a given situati on, w hen it is merely the pas s i ve synthe s i s of an atomized d ivers ity . At th i s level if, for example , l abour i s c on si dered inasmuch as it produces unitari ly a certain re sult in a certain factory at a certain moment and in a partic ular capitali st society it can be observed (as we have already described at length) that the men are unite d by the machine s I 05 (the assembly line i s the unity of those doing as sembly w ork ) . Ev ery human operation is i solated from the next by the material , ine rt separati on of the two organi sms . Every operati on of one man i s j oined to e very other by the operation of a machine (for e x ample , the c ontinuous movement of the as sembl y line) to w hich i t i s homogeneou s . B ut precisely i n so far as there i s homogeneity between the specific operation of a c ompart­ mental i zed mac hine and the acti on prescri bed for an ind i v idual , thi s means that praxis itself i s basically the directed action of inertia upon i nertia. Or, if you like , in a fi e ld of interiority defined by need (hence , by the organi sm) and on the bas i s of the objecti v e , posited as meaning, the inert acts upon itsel f. Eventual l y , the orientation and unificati on special ized machine replace s human specialization (as a qual i fi c ation ) , with automation, and at a further level of technical i mprovement ' electronic brain s ' and the control of processes by cyberneti c s human l abour consists in bui lding the machine . B ut it i s the mac hine itself which assume s the whole activ ity of production (under the control merely of smal l team s ) . The bas ic po ss ibi l i ty of th is transformation was given at any moment in H istory (as a future possibility , whose reali zation could remain uncertain or be interrupted through the agency of e xternal e ven indiv idual praxi s the factors ) , in the sense that i n praxi s organism, by defining itself as directed inertia, con stitute s i ts e lf outside itself and through the exteriori ty of its unity as a m ach ine . The most backward peasant i n the world , when he uses h i s weight to fl atten fre shly dug earth (or to tre ad grapes ) , i s already behaving l ike a machine controlled by its operator. B y j umping on the ground or dancing in the vat, he e xpends certain re serv e s of energy to produce a physico-chemical result ( fl attening or crushing, by weight ) . And when he u s e s h i s fu l l weight to depre ss a lever, the machine i s there in its entirety . Trans­ mutatio ns of energy , the ac ti on of his weigh t upon the lever and throug h its techn ical use the rai s i ng of some c oncrete obj ect or other, al l th i s has j ust one mean i n g : the use of inerti a by organ ic inertia i n the 1 05 . Critiq u e , vo l . 1 , pp . 2 3 9 ff.

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direc ti on determi ned b y ' the un ity ' of the organism , i . e . b y the future restoration of its function s . A c tion i s d isclosed to us , through a critical and regre s sive investigation (starting from rohots as agents produced by action ) , as the inorgani c transcendence of the organi s m inasn1uch as it transfers the unity of i mm anence to exterior e lements in the form of a passi ve sy nthe s i s , and inasmuch as it defi nes by losing itself i n th i s obj ectification a spatio­ temporal field of i nteriority as a medi um for the relations between inert matter and men . The agent i s not directly identifi able with the organ i s m . Q uite the c ontrary , he man i fests himself i n action as a practical e x teri or­ ization of i nertia: i . e . as a mechan ical system, as an en semble of weight and counterweight, and as a so urce of energy (through combustion of certain substance s ) . And a l l the operations he carries out ( a l l the treat­ ments to which he subj ects th e raw materi al through the self­ modi fications he imposes on himself) are on prin cip le reproducible by a machine (if not at the moment under consideration , at l east as a basic possibility ) . From now on , moreover, n ot o n ly is there no action for which a phy s ico-chemical process i s not or coul d not be before long a perfect equi v al ent, hut also the perfecting of certain instruments makes it pos sible to exerc i se th ro ugh the intermediary oj' inert matter forms of control or action of which the organism alone woul d be inc apable . Final l y , by reducing an en semble of human operations (for example , an aerial duel) to what they also are positions i n a sector of practical extent it i s possible both to dissolve the human real ity of the undertaki ng (for example, its antagoni stic rec iprocity ) and , at the same time , to constitute through technique and calc u l ation, on the basi s of spec i fi c c i rcumstance s , instruments which modify their action depending on their positions or those of other materi al sy stems and which automatical l y take account of al l the mechanical rel ations that are estab l i shed in ensembles in movement (for e x ampl e , in ' fi ghters ' , machine-guns which automati c al l y c orrect the i r m i stakes and rectify their aim as a conse­ quence of these mi stake s ) . It i s the paradox of our actions that they can all be and most are in fact reducible to a s uccess ion of inert proc e s se s . Th e great shock of the nineteenth century which has been i n tensified i n the twentieth , with spec ialized mach ines was , through de -ski l l ing of the worker, the more general de-ski lling of a ll h uman activity : i . e . the di scovery of the per­ manent poss i b i li ty of break ing down an y prax i s in to elementary pro­ cedures each of which could be carried out equally wel l by a practical organ i s m or an Inorgani c s yste m . •

•

•

•

•

if we w ere to break human we were to leave it at that conduct down in the way beh aviourists do , or if we saw a h um an act as the mere assembl age (by bonds of exteriority) of simple or con ditioned re flexes we should see only the negative aspect of prax i s . Th i s aspect i s the most important as alway s when a di alectic i s involved because it man ifests at once materi ality , adversi ty and particul ari ty (and thereby freedom as a practical perception of contradiction s ) . B ut preci sely because i t i s a negative determination , the critical investigation must grasp it i n its relation with that of which it is the negation . Wel l , i n so far as the organi s m c an neither reproduce life with i n i tself on the bas i s of the i norgan i c , nor create it outs ide as a transcendence of pas si v e syntheses in so far, too , as all life i s in itself an integration and tran scendence of non - l i fe (not j u st because it has real ized the org anic synthe s i s w i th i n it, but because it is also, i n rel ation to exteriority , an exterior system) action i s produced as the negation of the organ ic by the organ i sm , inasmuch as the l atter i s attacked b y the exterior and inasmuc h as i t seek s , by exteriorizing itself, to recover the functional interi ority w hich deter­ mines it. So action i s a succe s s i on of i nert proces se s , in so far as the transcendence of the original s ituation towards the re storation o f interior­ ity in vents the unity of these proce s ses as the immanent meaning of temporal ization. On this bas i s , it matters l ittle w hether unity l i es in the apparent indis sol ubi l i ty of the moments of an action ( as might be thought, watching the feint or dodge invented at the moment of danger by the boxer in the ring) or whether it re si des i n their rec ompos i tion after anal y s i s has broken them down . Invention as s ynthetic unity at whatever level i t may be produced i s necessari l y the proj ection of the l i v ing synthes i s as an e x i gency in the fu ture . The uni fi cation th at causes a tool , a mach i ne or an action to be i n vented i s necessari l y the i ntrusi o n of l i fe , as a n exi gency of i n tegration , i n to the worl d of e x terior di spers i on . At the UT IF

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same time , however, what is integrated ( at least until the synthe s i s of l ife has been real i zed) i s nece s sari l y an ensemble of i nert processe s , whose unity of temporalization l ike its i nert spati al gathering cannot even be conceived without the s upport of the practical project. The agent relapses i n to the i norgan i c as a performer of h i s undertaking s . H e casts him self beyond the organism, by positing bio logical i n tegrity as an en d (in stead of l iv i ng it cycl ical l y ) and by producing on the bas i s of thi s living i ntegrity an absol ute category (whose origin i s neither the inert nor life , but the sh ifting relations between these two statuses) : the pas sive synthesi s , a petrifi cati on of the organi c by the inert and a subj ection of the i nert as such (and without modi fying it) to organic unity . Thi s practical category or rather, th i s syntheti c schema of all objectiv ity i s simultaneously : the producti on of a distance a perspective (or, orig inal l y , the pos sibil ity of a perspective) whose origin i s a double negation (the impo ssibil ity of an y distance -from -one self i n the org an i sm , and the non-organi c-be ing of worked matter) ; the fi rst illumina­ tion of the diverse from thi s perspective ( un ity , as an organ ic foundati on of the inorganic obj ective , every where reali ze s on the bas i s of the obj ecti ve be ing pursued and within the practical field prov i sional pas sive s ynthe ses , which l iqui date themsel v e s i n the temporal develop­ ment or are liquidated in favour of other equal ly provi si on al syntheses of the s ame kind, and repre sent the fi rs t regroupments quantities , unities of m u l tipliciti e s and of crowds grasped from afar, etc . : th i s i s perception itself) ; and the very framew ork of practical invention . For there i s no fundamental difference between knowledge and inven­ tion. Knowledge , s uch as we hav e j ust described it, i s the uni fication of the inert as div ersi ty of the practical fi e l d on the bas i s of an aim to be real i zed . Th i s unity , however, i s an inv ention . Fi rst of all , because it comes to the diverse through human praxi s . B efore the l atter, the diverse i s neither m ultip le nor u n ified, s ince these two practical notions come from a qual ification in interiority of exteriority . For thi s reason , to perceive (for exampl e ) i s to produce , in the s imultane ity of prax i s , a seri e s of possible syn th eses of materi al p luralitie s ; and these shifting unities are completed, pitted against one another, and interpenetrated , at the whim of movements of the body : i .e . of outl i ned synthetic reali zation s . The specific character of perception as a sh ifting unification of con­ trasting or interpenetrating uni ficati ons i s prec i sely that the disclosed fi e ld i s determi ned ac cording to differen t direction s and through various interpretative possibi l iti e s . B ut such inte rp retation s sti l l represent the outl i ne of a prax i s . Thus the mountai n s blocking the horizon reveal themselves in and through the mov eme nt of my eyebal l s . But th i s bod i l y mov ement sho u l d not be confu sed w ith the one whereby in Kant th e m athem a ti c i an engenders th e lin e . Fi rs t of all , bec a u se the o p a q ue ,

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substantial un ity of the mineral i s given before the movemen t, as a s yntheti c and mas s i v e pre sence in the practical field and upon the foundation of the fi e l d ' s un ity . In other word s , t he re lation ship between di spersi on and the organ i sm i n the prac tical fi e l d manife sts itself as an original presence in the field of di spersion , i n the form of blocks of quasi -unities in permanent di s i ntegration . * At once , the synthetic opera­ tion remain s inessenti al . It doe s not real l y en lace the various elements or which comes from th em . On the c ontrary , it realize their quasi - unity merges into them and is entirely d i s solved in the m . For th i s movement of the eyes i s not in itse lf con stitutive and unifying, in the sense i n w h ich the realized praxis can be . It refers to the pos sibility of a true prax i s , whose temporal ori entati on it real izes schemati cal l y . I n the case under c on s i de ration , it i s that of strugg ling up the s l opes of the mountai n , or that of c om i ng back down agai n . An e l ementary form of thought i s invol v ed here , and the sign in its simplest function: the mean ing of the block of c ompact presence i s defi ned by the acti ons that unified it with the other e lemen ts of the field. B ut the sol i darity of organic functions

* The q u as i - un ity o f the b l oc k i s a fundamental d i sc l os ure , n ot j u st bec ause the tot a l i zat i ng u n i fi c ation consti tute s the fi e l d of i mmanence i n w h i c h i t appears, but also bec ause th i s i ndi s t i nction i s prior - a l l at once - to e x p l i c i t s y nthe ses. to re a l i zat i on of the One , and to syntheses of deta iled un ities a l low i n g the d i sc losure of q u antity as a s i gn of d i spers i o n . I n real ity , the quantitative m u l t i p l ic i ty i s the res u l t of a prac t ic al ope ration l im i t i n g un ity by d i v i s i bi l ity , as it doe s div i s i b i l i t y by the u n i t y of i ndiv i s i b l e e l enl e n t s ; and i n th e form of summation ( m u ltipl i c ation and div i s i o n ) , prov i d i ng the s y n thet i c rule of its temporal izatio n . B ut m u ltipl i c ity , as a u n i ty of t h e diverse qua d i sunited - and of i t s e l e ments qua i nd i v i s ible ( more o r l e s s , re l ative l y or abso l ute l y ) - con s t i tutes for d i spers i on a p rivileged s t atu s : i . e orders it as an order ( re l at i o n s bet w ee n the m u lt i ple and the One ) . Plato saw th i s c l earl y : it i s already a q u e stion of worked m aterial i t y . Take away the l abour, t h e u n i t y spec i fi c to the p art di sappears and w ith it the div i s i b i l ity of the ensemble under c onsi de ration If the parts are l u re s , the ensemble i s wi th o u t parts . At o nc e , i t s part l e � s e x teri ority man i fe s t s itse l f as a q uas i - u n i ty . O f c ourse, these quas i - u n i ti e s reveal them­ sel v e s with I n th e un ity of th e pra l tieal fi e ld as a real and pre-quan titatire re lat i on s h i p between an org a n i s m and blocks of e x teriority . I n t h i s form - the most elementary - l abour, prope rl y speak i n g , h as not t rans formed inert m atte r. B u t already the i nert c oherence of bloc k s i s the gras p i n g of the i r c ompact emergence w i th i n the i nteriority of the field. A l ready Nature is o utside as our ignorance . A l ready t h e c l i ff, i n the i m m anence of rec i p rocal rel ation s , i s ( u lture or ( i f you p re fer) is illu m i n a ted hy cu lture . I n the be i n g - i n ­ itse l f o f e xteriori t y , i n fac t , the q u as i -un i t y of the compact pudd i n g formed b y m i neral ities i s i n d i s solub l y l i nked to quantity - as a complex re l at ion s h i p between m u l t i ple u n i t y and m u ltiple unities - as w e l l as to the d i s persed be i n g ' s rea l p u ] veru lcnc e (depe n d i n g on c ertain struc t ures o f B e i ng ) rather than i t s d i v i s ibi l it y , w h i c h refers o n l y t o a c e rtain h u m an operation at once al ways po� s i ble an d al ways l i m i ted by tec hnolog y . D i spers ion and opac ity t h u s i nterpene trate , as do oth e r stat utory q ual i t i e s o f B e i n g The pract ical operation see k s zones o f c leav age, and c h oose s i t r;; operat i v e perspect i ve s as a funct ion of these In th i s sense and by v i rt u e of al l the operat ional pos s i b i l i t i e � i t h arbo urs for th e practica l oJ)�an i sm and i n o n t ol og ic al i n d i s t i n c t i o n - the qua� i - u n i tary block of i n e rt opac ity i � the prac ti c al stat u s of i n o rgan i c matter (as p resent in the fi e l d , around the fi e l d , and i n the org an ism ) w h i c h c omes c losest to its ontolog i c al statu .;; of e x teri ori ty �

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allo w s actions ( as a sy nthetical ly bound en semble of inorgan ic procedures of exteriority ) to be performed in any way , by and in any part of the organ ic total ity . If the eyes fol low the sides of the mountain moving from the bottom up ward s , it i s the whole body which, thro ugh them , makes the climb. It i s the body which com e s down , if they come down. Thi s i s a matter not of a s ymbol , but of real izi ng an operation at th e least possible cost. If the real ascent were to be attempted subsequentl y , one would have to see i t as a resumption ( rather than a first attempt) which corresponds , moreover, to ev eryone ' s exp erience. The real undertak in g ( which brings the whole body into play ) al ways appears i n its relations (them se l v e s variable , and sometim e s founded upon the most v i olent contradictions) w ith th e same , inasmuch as the body has real ized it at les ser c o st in different circumstances . It i s manifestly at thi s level that though t, as a re l ation of the organism to s ignification s , is determined as action becoming its own knowledg e . The ascendin g mov ement of the eye is no t i n itself a thought. It has not been produced as a substitute for an impos sible operation. It i s the operation itself, dictated by circumstance s and reduced to its simplest expression . The movement i s real and produces an obj ective determina­ tion of B ei n g : the objective rel ationship between the mountain and the traveller (or the fugitive ) . At the same moment, however, through its functional un i ty , thi s schematic act i s determined as a certain way of real izing the undertaking : a way at once total and abstract i n relation to all others . So it refers back in and throu gh t he un i fication it effects to all the other ways of carry ing out thi s operati on : ways that h ave pas sed into it and are i nscribed by it i n the obj ect as its desti ny (to be accepted or rejected) . Thought appears here as the rel ation betwee n the real act of fol lowing the mountain s lope w ith one ' s eye s , the constitution in thi s very way of the mountain as ascending in its very being, and the ascent as a concrete and totali zing practice of the whole organism , now become the destiny o f th i s organ ism (the future of this movement of the eye s ) . The c l imbing movement of the eye s , as a schematic act of the whole organ i sm , produce s and di scov ers the mountain as a slope up which to struggle by rea lizing there in the simple temporal ization of th i s move­ ment the vvhole organ ism as d i sc lo s i ng the compact e x teriority of that threatening block b)' its abandonm ent 0 11 th e mountain itself, and the obligation of fi n ding th ere its de facto contingency and its sol i tude i n the indi spensable and peri lous un dertak ing of reaching the s ummit. Through the re al and p re sent (tho ugh sc hemati c) act, two objective rea lities are di sclosed, one as a mean ing [ sen s, al so direction] of Being, the other as the orie ntation of a future (or mere l y possible) ac tion. And the real invention of the present act (mov ement of the eyes) i s e x pres sed by a prac t i c a l i n ven tion in the field: i . e . by a twofold rec i procal determ i nati on =

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of matter by the total praxi s , and of the l atter by matter. The eye movement reveals that the mountain is a rising up of m atter (th i s is the mean i ng of the myth of the Titan s , and of O s sa on Pelion ) , in so far as th i s ri sing up is disc losed as an objective exigency through the future movement of the organism : of m y self, as far as my eyes can see , and lost - tomorrow i n those snow s . It i s a future operation that I sen se as my destiny ( wresting of the prac tical organism away from itself, to await the itself beyond the ordea l ) i n so far as the meaning of my effort i s d efi ned by that ascending structure of the ori entation of my prax i s mo untains . B u t the twofold determ ination i s uni fied as a re lation and in each of its term s , inasmuch as the perceptive interpretation invents its own practic al meaning for itself, b y inventing the unity to be produced ( and disclosed) within the inert materiality . I t w i l l be noted, however, that invention of the act of revealing and unifying transcendence i s not n eces sari l y real i zed under the pre s sure of ac ute dangers or immediate e xigencies . There i s no need whatsoever for me to struggle up the s lopes of that mountain tomorro w , in order to be able to realize its ' steepnes s ' . In thi s particular case , the prac tical relation is invented w ithin a co n text, as a fun c ti on of pos s i bi l ities as yet i l l defi ned, tradi tions and nece s s ities regu lating the relations between man and that massif w ith its peaks and i ts c hasms , without determ ining them enti re l y and in de tai l . In thi s case , we observ e : ( 1 ) that the unity of the material mean ing has a tendency to dissolve along with the urgenc y of the operation. I f I must go into ex i le tomorrow by cro s sing that partic ular pass , i t i s my sufferin g s , my exhaustion , and the dangers I shal l be experiencing tomorrow that will disclose to me the terrible negative unity of the mountai n . It i s enough to struggle up it, to cro s s the pas s , etc . , i n order to transform that block of opac ity into worked matter. I t i s final success that w i ll al so di sclose to me its positive unity : after al l , there are routes i n the mountain s and the mountain itself i s a route . B ut if I do not reckon to real i ze thi s undertaking b y bringing my whole organ ism into play i n every w ay in its facticity, the eye movement I make today i s only th e indication of a pos s i b l e re ading ( by others , perhap s ) . Hence , th i s reading v ani shes in the obj ective , but at the same time indicate s a practical direction for graspi ng the v ast objects ri sing before us . (2) On the other hand, the descen t is a on this bas i s possibility l ikewise defi ned and corre spond ing to a reverse movement of the reading . It matters little that, from a log ical viewpoint, you first have to go up before you can come dow n . Apart from the fact that there perh aps e x i st v i l l age s , meteorolo g ical stati on s , etc . , whose inhabi tants came up long ago and can now on l y remain at the top or go down which tends to make tho se two contrary procedures who l ly external to one another - there i s above a l l the fol lowing cons ideration : s i nce no ,

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concrete operation is required of the organism, real it y does not impose any priority . The truth i s , if I confine mys elf to grasping B eing through the perceptual undertaking, I c an equal ly w ell take a s ingle leap to perc h on the summit before coming down from it, or set off from the val leys and climb up. I n reality , every onlooker doe s both : through the two movements d i sclose s two opposite undertakings , and through these s imul­ taneou sly produce s two contradictory unitie s of the material block. M atter rises up proudly towards the sky (it is uprigh t, l ike a man) , and at the same time perpetuall y collapses : it is a frozen avalanche. B o th meanings interpenetrate eac h other, i n so far as our eye movemen ts succeed one another contradictorily and without any logic (at least, w i thout any logic determined i n relation to the object) . One i s organic and characterized by interiorit y . The other i s i norgan ic and characteri zed by di spersion in e xteriority. The syncretism of these meanings (an d twenty others l i nked to them) must make clear to us how the practical i s an inte r­ fi eld for any organism , as for any or ganized group penetrating multipl icity of the possible unities of the diverse . Every thing i s al ways rev ealed as united to everything , prec isely in so far as diverse and pos s ible actions n ecessitate and reve al s uch uni fic ations (and at the same time disappear, b ecause the real undertaking sets them aside ) . Stable forms are i solated as foundations and exigenc ies of t he ongoin g praxi s and it is praxis which dete rmi ne s , v i a the unity of the fiel d, the relations of immanence ( s ub s tance and form , whole and part, etc . ) which people have sought to hypostatize and substantivize under the name of ' Ge s talti s t ' law s . At the same time, it i s the i ndeterminations and s tase s of thi s praxis which by al low ing other undertakings to be outl ined ( and roughly begun or at once abandoned) and by definin g negatively the tolerated u ndertakings a l low the wanderi ng and interpenetration of partial unities within the un ification i n progre s s (hence , w ithin the immanence of the practical field) . The other essential feature i dentify i ng knowledge with invention (within praxi s ) i s the fact that the organic unity of the aimed-at obj ective, by be ing produced as an iner t synthe s i s of ino rganic material s , gives an ontological status w ithin the interiority of the practical field to the se unified diversiti e s , which i s real ized only through that u nity and which prec i se ly because it i s orig inal l y neither that of i nert matter nor that of life arises-in-the - world, in interi ori ty and in exteriority ( let us recall the absolute being of te leological determi nation s 1 0 6 ) , as a real and ne w determination , draw ing its real ity from its novelty an d its novelty from its reality. Who then could deny thi s novelty of passive syntheses

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inasmuch as they refl ect at once the organic , the i norganic , and the act as mediation ? In the combination of words ' pas s i ve synthesi s ' , an interior m ovement may be surm i sed : the synthe s i s m akes itself inert hence, loses its organic meani ng and its content so that inerti a should make itse lf unity and present itself really as an improbable , systematic order of the combinations of matter. The object a c aricature of life by non-life , by v irtue of its s tatus a wresting of inertia away from n aturalnes s e sc apes any idealist reduction, i n s o far as i t i s precisely not reducible to anyth ing : neither to the organ nor to pure di spersion. And it i s thi s irreducibil ity that , in itself, con stitute s the being -in-itself we were speaking of earlier. So any unity insi de the practical field is already determ ined by thi s new production constitute d by the field itself (or the organism negative l y defined by need and making itself i nto knowledge in order to give the environment the unity of thi s negation) . Furthermore , however, it produces itself in its most concre te determination, inasmuch as praxis is detai led and becomes ram i fi e d without di v iding under the s way of objective exigenc i es ( i . e . passive e xpressions of need by negations of inertia) . On this bas i s , every object i s at once produced (by labour) and a reality (i nasmuch as i t escapes l abour by its very being and gives inorganic -being to the organic uni ty that is de posited in it) . Well , every moment of praxis transcends and preserve s former c ircumstanc e s inasmuch as thi s moment as sumes the organic unity of these inorganic bei ng s : i.e. i nasmuch as it rediscovers the unity deposited in them as a mark by past labour, and ,inasmuch as thi s redi scovery is effected in a new movement of temporalization towards an end i . e . i nasmuch as it produces a new u nity on the bas is of a recognition of past uniti e s . This operati on is knowledge , prec isely in so far as it discovers the real such as it is (and not such as i t m ight mani fest itself through categorie s and principl e s ) . It i s an inven tion , in so far a s the c omplex c ategory of unity (as organic-inorganic , an d as a mediation by the agent) i s a c ategory of Doing in the absolute sense of the term : i . e . i n so far as it determines the orientation of an absolute production (or creation), i .e . the emerge nce irreducible , overflowing and transcending at the heart of immanence of those beings which impose themselves upon action and investigation , pas sive synthese s . To know i s to create , s ince knowledge i s a determination of Bei ng based upon the p ractical category of unity . D e facto , the uni t y of human expe rience is in fact a practical unification of the multiplic ities interior to the fi el d . Conv ersel y , to create i s to kno w , since i t involves produci ng ( through inert synthesi s) beings wholly extraneous to man a s a bi ological indiv idual , whose e x igencies as a re­ e x teriorizati on of practical interiori ty w i l l have to be learned ( i . e . determined by their negation, or in the practical transcendence that s uppre s se s t h e m by sati sfying them ) on the bas i s of a unification ' in

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progre ss ' : i . e . another s ynthetic , inert be ing i n the process of being manufac tured. The nec e s sity of the law s of Knowing i s s impl y the nece s sity of the law s of B ei ng, inasmuch as they manife st themselves in the field created by the agent ' s fre e praxi s and through the temporal ­ i zation of this action. At the same time , however, they may be identified with the l aw s of D o ing, i nas m uch as practice is preci sely the uni fication reali ze d by the agent on the basi s of the organ i sm ' s future and past unit y ; and above all i nasmuch as the knowable structures and processes of materiality are rel ations condensed and actualized by the unificatory i ntegration of the diverse into the practical field, and by the specification of detai l s . The en semble of sc ientifi c discoverie s i s so closely linked w i th the tools and techniques of the period that the sy stem of knowledge con­ stituted in the s ame period m u st be see n simultaneously as the techn o­ log ical and anthropological e xpre s s ion of men ' s rel ations with the world and one another, v i a the mediation of their techniques of constructio n ( i . e . v i a the te chniques allowing these too l s to be made , rather than those emanating from their use) and also as the rea l- being of the Univers e : not on the c ontrary as relative to science and technology, but as the uni fication of an absolute reality by H i s tory , manifest ing itself as an absol ute reality by v irtue of the H i story it produces for c on temporaries and men of the future thro ugh the agents of its unification. Whatever illusions there may h ave been at the outset, the discovery of America conquest was temporalized (as a diachronic proc es s : exploration exploitation of resources, e tc . ) as the discovery of a continent. And that v ast c ontinent itself crushed and of i tself annihilated whatever mi ght be left of medie v al i l lusion s c oncern in g the Globe . It was its being which dis sipated those outworn s ign ifications into non -being . B ut although its unity as a c ontinent was one of the zones of c leavage constituting the directions of being- in-exteriori ty , for that zone to exist as s uch and as a unitary determ ination men h ad to exist i n Europe : men who went to the Americas , through all the dangers of the sea, and constituted the peri lous term of the ir voyage into the unity of an objective. And other men h ad to e x i st i n America, for the l imit i n e xteriority running rou nd th e c ontinent to c on stitute it i n i nteri ority too , as a more or le s s spec ific practical fie l d of the ' nati ve s ' . If practical agents on Earth were to l ive and move about solely underwater, the whee ling obstacle c losed up on itself ( impene ­ th at the two Americas would con stitute to free movement trable) throughout all seas could be only a negativity (the mate rial combination of a type unsuitable for l i fe w i th its adversity -coeffi c ie nt) . Perhaps the continents would then turn out to be those v ast e xpanses of w ater (medium of al l h i storical events for those sub-marin e age nts ) the Atlan tic Continent and the Pacific Continent. And H i story woul d change , to the

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very extent that the biological condition would h ave changed th e geo­ graphical h exis; for practical multiplicities would be able to commun icate or fi ght on l y thro ugh the narro w polar straits , until such time as techno­ lo g y allowed them to perfect machines enabl i ng them to emerg e , c l imb on to dry land and l ive there (and to cross the solid element, i n order to go and attack their enemies i n the liquid e lement) . But that practical un i ty bel ated l y discovered i n its interiority, would al w ay s remain second­ ary in relati on to the u n i ty of water. I n other w ord s , its i nte riority would be integrated into the pra c tical field of agents as a separation crossed (a dangerous medi um of non-life , whose per i l s appeared in and through the machines striving to avert the m ) . To other organ i sms, differentl y consti tuted and possessing other technique s , the difference be t ween the s o l i d state, the l iq u i d state and the gaseous s tate might well appear secondary . I n that case, moreover, the precise l imits the continent sets to our efforts to enter it (through the efforts of those who i nh abit it) m ight well become bl urred and be replaced by other groupings . I t i s true that continents acquire their h i storical be ing (and recei v e the i r modifi ca­ tion in itself of gathered , configu red i nertia) on the bas i s of a c omplex and strictly h uman e nsemble (nav i gati onal techn i ques ; commerc i al geo­ graphy li nked to these technique s , and favouring one ' n ati on ' or another on the bas i s of the technique i n question; hum an confl ict s a r i s ing between c lasses inside the cou ntry , and between go v e r nment s representing the rul ing c lasses of the various countrie s , c rea t i n g commercial exigencies thro u gh the col lected pas siv i ty of the sea, etc . ) . B ut it i s equa l l y true that the complex of anthropological determ i n ations constituting the emergent l an d as a continent i s the v ery same wh ich under the pre s s ure of e x te r iority (th is partic ul ar e x ter i ori ty ) s uffered by o rgan i s m s whose specificities come from it has been con stituted as the i nteri ori zati on of a d i spersion of men on Earth and w i l l be re -exteriori zed b y the consti tuent discovery of the New Continent ( as i t alread y had bee n in, from the day s of Antiqu i ty) If, as and through , c ommerc ial voyages many hi storian s believe today the American Indians are Asian s brought by some mys t e rious exodus to the territories now de sign a ted by the name A nlerican , and i f geological upheav al s subsequently c ut them off from the i r reg i on of birth by s u b m e rg i ng all the solid 1 an d across which they had p a s s ed it can just as we l l be said that th e continent made them as it made itself. The extraord i nary soli tude of M aya hi story, for exam p l e , its al most total di s a ppeara n c e (other than as an objec t oj' scholarsh ip , but w i tho ut the re cip roc i t y s i g nalled above ) , an d the ex termination practi ces a d o pt e d by the Sp a n i a rd s after Columbu s ' s fai l ure , etc . - al l th i s acc urate ly re fl ect s the fact t h a t th e separation i nto continents, i n i ti a l ly not k nown and u l ti mate ly tran scen ded, was mean �lh i l e c o n st i tu t ed as th e destin v of certain soc i al groups an d ( for v ario u s materi al realO)on s that i t wou l d take ,

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too long to enumera te here) pronoun ced a death sentence upon them . Coloniz ation, moreo ver, i na s m uch as i t negativ ely consti tuted routes and itineraries cri s s -cro s s ing the World and was to become a factor of planetar y i . e . modern unificatio n ag ai nst itself (through its total overthrow ) coloni zation , i n the h i storica l ensem ble of i ts de velopm ent n ec e s s a ri l y had to base i ts elf initially upon th e d iv ision of l ands and continen ts , and upo n its re-e xterio rize d inte rior iz atio n . Thi s real , practical bond between the env ironment and the u n i ficatory o rgan i s m thus has noth i n g in common w ith those shown us by ' relati v i sm ' . In the rec ipro city of conditionings , i t can be seen that the surround ing produces the material content and that the surrounded organism gives unity to the force s condition ing it, through the biological structures and practical exigencies that these forces hav e themselves determined as the biological re al ity of its functi onal unity . The continent as a quas i - unity already has enough being to dete rmine in their ' n ature ' and in thei r practical organ i sm s , whose action w i l l be uni fied withi n its ' h i s tory ' practical field i n the practico-human form of a particular conti nent. At a l l events , th i s final (though perhaps te mporary , depending on tran s­ formations o f techniques and h i storical obj ecti ves) integration i s an invention of B eing , as i s c learly signal l ed by the l abour carried out on l an guage b y earlier generations : invenire (to find) i s the source of a French word meaning ' to cre ate ' . The ambiguity recurs even i n the term ' inventor ' which, i n its relation to techniques , signifies the perfection of a new method, a new proces s for raw m aterial s , etc . , and also (as can be seen from the sign '/nventeurs ' fi xed over one of th e c ounters in a French lost-property office) the d iscoverer of an object that exists, but i s h i dden or lost or forgotten . In the s ame way , to discover whi c h properly speaki ng mean s to rev eal reality by removing its ' cover' i s a verb commonly appl ied to invention by a c reator : gunpowder and t he compas s fig ure among Great Di scoveries, as though they had been mere l y h idden i n some basement where someone had found them. The fact i s that uni fi c ation of the means with a v iew to an obj ective i s a real l abour, which di scovers actu al i zed rel ations by i ntegrating their terms into an inert s ynth esi s . The most e lementary p rax i s of the organi sm is thus knowledge : unity of the fi e l d i s the background against wh ich the object ' s unification is produced (th rough a l abou r) . Nothing would be more absurd than to separate action and know ledge at the level of m a n u a l labour ( e v e n t he most primitive or fragmentary ) . Conv erse l y , however, the most abstract knowl edge i s action . The geometrical fi g ure who se" being - i n-act Li ard u sed to describe i s simply a passive synthe s i s effected by a generatin!: a ct: i . e. by a construction un ify i n g an en semble of po i nts or loc i by mean s of a ruler. And i t rem ains in its pas s i v i ty , as a new determination

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and selective el ucidati o n of an atemporal rel ation of exteriority , so long as it fi gure s as an organ ized e lement in a v aster undertaking bringing other more c omplex figures into pl ay (mathematical developmen t) . How­ ever, geometrical proof on the bas i s of a s ynthetic unification that is nev er con s i dered dialectical l y ( i . e . as such) re sts solely upon rel ations of stri ct exteriori t y . So ev en in geometry we encounter the i nd i s pensable unification con s ti tuti ng human prax i s , and the permanent possibi l ity pre c i sely i n the n ame of unity of re solving th e synthesis into an infin ity of re lation s of exteriority . How e ver, the needs of knowledge or practice deduct a spec i fi c number of determinations from the infin ity an yway indifferent of the se re lation s (every point of every figure has infinite l y infinite rel ation s w i th al l the other points i n space ) . So c hoice as a negati ve unity i s invisi ble and pre sent in exteriority itself, inasm uch as the latter suddenly reappears against the masked background of the unification of figure s .

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aim of the foregoin g commen ts i s to make u � understa nd th at the Cartes ians ' probl em (h ow to r ec onc ile freedom of opi nion w ith the etern a l bei ng of es sence s ) i s a fal se one. For every essence i s constitu ted on the bas i s of obj ects as the passive synthe s i s of its abstrac t determi nation s , inasmuc h as the combi nation of these qualities has to b e produced by a practical , autonomous operation (for un i t y deriv e s from the agent-organ i s m , not from the un i fi ed re al ity ) . If the object i n questio n i s a man or a cons titu ted grou p, i t goes w i thout saying that th i s obj ect bearing and creating i ts own unity itse l f sustai ns its own determ i nation s in the u n i fication of the org an i sm or of prax i s . At th i s level , h owever, s uch a synthetic production i s lived dialectical l y through the concrete . I t i s in no way comparabl e to the permanence of the inert synthes i s . Production of the e s sence i s , in th i s case , a specificati on of the relation of alterity . The knower situates himself as Other v is - a - v is th e known being, in so far as he con stitutes th e latter as the Other. I n the prac tical i nve sti gati on , t h i s O ther ( a s tran scended tran scende nce) produce s himse l f ( i n asmuch as h e i s no t compre h ended, but taken stock of) th rough th e rec i procal e x t e r i o r ity of h i s e lementary behav iour pattern s . From th i s standpoint an d f·o r the knovver these v ari ous determinati ons lap s e i nto the i nert , i nasm uch as the y are ex terior to one an other a nd the i r sole unity is th at of the agent (an ab stract u ni ty , grasped as a po i n t of common reference rat her than as a unifying acti v i ty ) . B y reprod uc i n g t h i s un i ty as a foundation for e mpirical determination s , the knol1'er produces t h e i r inert s ynthe s i s . For it i s on the basi s of the unity of h is field t h at he co l l ec t s the m , a s disparate ele ments whose synthetic fo und­ at ion i s prec i �e l y h i s o\vn prax i s ( on the bas i s o f future UDi t y as the organic de s t in y of h is o �'n organi sm ) . In th i s c a s e , the part ic u l a r e s sence of a n i nd i v i d ual - for e x ample i s quite s i mpl y the pa s s i v i zation o f h i s e x i stence and i t s project ion into the be ing of e x teri o ri t y . sin1 ul taneousl y HE FIRST

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w ith the uni fi c ation of the diverse through the unifying prax i s of the knowing organ i sm . The operation i s effecte d materi ally by th e production of verbal formu lations and their s ynthetic u n ification . Through the en semble of these form u l ations with the e x teriori ty of sentences re ­ an obj ect i s created producing that of elementary behav iour pattern s which i s neither the dialectical uni ty of a practic al l ife , nor the re­ grasping in exteriority of that l i fe by be ing-in- itself. Th i s obj ect i s the indi v idual ' s essence (or, at a more adv anced degree of degradatio n , hi s character) . This inert synthe s i s as a surrogate for the unifying prax i s , such as i t man i fe sts i tself i n the Other (prec i sely in so far as the knowing witnes s refuses to sh are the other-end s of th at Oth er) pos se s ses a prac tical efficac y that i s the meas ure of its truth . On the bas i s of well ­ e xecuted observations , I shall be able to defi ne a hexis , or an inert sy stem w i th cycli cal repetitions . I shall s ay , for example : he is brave and intelligent, but scatterbrained, etc . And the se ch aracteri sti c s w i l l reassume a living unity of rec i procal condition i n g in and throu gh m y action . I shall entrust him with my l i fe, but not m y secret s , i f I am his h ierarchical s uperior. This mistrustful trust as a quality of my relat ions w ith h i m i s the rei nteriorization of the di spersive unfoldi n g of qual i ti e s . And i t i s incontestable that i f the p a s si v e synthes i s (as dialecti cal reali ty ' s surrogate for my action ) has been properly effected, my behav iour by v i rtue of its practical succe s s w i l l d i scov er (di scovery - i n vention ) its truth. Thi s does not stop the e s sence from being a product: the product of m y l abour. Thi s l abour has necessari l y been carried out on the bas i s of my refusal to comprehend the personal aims of m y su bordinate , along with his ori g in s , the c irc umstances that have quali fied hi s project , and the dialectical development of h i s praxi s . It has turned o ut, at the ou tset, that our common social situation (as much as the practico-in ert condi ­ tioning our l abours) has i ntroduced a certain reification into our h uman relations . Th i s reification i s s i mply the rec i procal e x teriori ty which manifests itself i n rej ection of the other' s aim s . It may have quite a number of sources , depending on how deep i t g oe s , one of them (the most i mportant) p erhaps being the d i v i sion of society into c lasses and expl oitation. A t al l events, thi s reifi cati on i s interiorized and re­ exteriorized by practical knowledge . The res u lting con struction of the e ssence i s , above a ll , the search for a real means of u s i ng the i nferior as an instrument (or, negati vely, th e s uperi or: he i s angry , e spec i al l y i n the mornings ; on Fri da y s for reasons to do with h i s pri vate l i fe ' he ' s l ike a bear with a sore head ' � if you want to ask h i m for somethin g , Tuesday afternoon i s the best time , etc . ) . In conformi ty with thi s objec tiv e , moreov er, i t i s the co nstruction of a mechani c al equivalent for his actions . A s is we l l know n , however, the words are th e th ing : i n the absen ce of the i r obj ect , t he y de stroy it by pas sing themselves off as it; i n

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its pre sence , they cluster round its phy sical being l ike real qual ities (moreover, they are real qualitie s ) . In thi s sense the e ssence can be seen as the belonging, speci fi c to a given organism, of the inertia ( worked by Others) which constitutes its model in exteri ority . It w i l l be no ted , of cours e, that this pas sive synthe s i s as the truth of the actions of both of them (truth of the subordinate ' s action s, inasmuch as they j u stify the superior ' s prediction s ; truth of the s uperior ' s action s , inasmuch a s the se more complex acti v ities involve an integration of the inferior as a subal tern agent i nto the gl obal prax i s , and in asmuch as thi s prax is has succeeded) is l inked to the real , di alectica l praxis of the free organism throu gh a rel ation of immanence . In so far as thi s relation ends up producing itself as the essentia l for the known too (through the actions of others , which constantly refer to it) , the agent ' s rel ation to his particular e ssence m u st be seen as an important aspect of aliena tion . To be sure, when the es sence of i nert objects (which already present themsel v e s in the form of a passive s ynthe s i s ) i s involved , the i ntegration of words into the real s ubstance has the result of constituting a verbal body for that phy sico-chemical bod y . The agent makes himself a medi ation between these two determ inations i n exteriori ty . I t can legitimatel y be said that he determ ines verbal matter through the materiality of th ings . Pass i ve synthe ses , as a unificati on of the diverse (although re sulting from different operations when they i mpo se them selves upo n p hysic al bodies, for example, or u pon the verbal bod y ) , n everthel e s s remain fun damental l y i dentical, inasmuch as the i n facts and in words organization of the inorganic i s realized throu gh the passion of organic unity. S o the essence of i nert bodie s i s most of the time produced directly as a supplementary piece of w ork by the labour that i s c arried out upon them (ev en if thi s c ru de e ssence [essence , al so fuel ] later requires a speci al refining proces s , as a function of the ev olution of te chnique s ) . On thi s plane , there are not two truths . A person thinks with h i s h ands and with the tool they w ield; and thought i s forged by forging its object, which eventu al l y closes on it and the words it expre s ses. B ut w hen it i s a matter of practical organ i s m s , there are two truths both fo rge d by action and w ith a v iew to action one of which ex c l ude s the other. For the e ssence , a s a thought of inertia, i s an i nertia of thought. It contrasts absol ute l y with w hat we have cal led comprehension . And it i s here , in conclusion , that we shall di scover the mean i ng of th i s contra­ diction : how can the di al ectical unity of a prax i s recon stitute itself in exteriori ty through the inert movements of a machine?

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is prax is itself as accompanied by the s ituated ....,.,. observer. Its structure is the very s truc ture of direct action . I t gras ps the practical temporal ization on the bas i s of its ultimate, future term : in other word s , on the bas is of its end. And although the teleological c haracter of the act or its products can be observed from outside, without the witness taking up the ends being purs ued, the only way of aban doning thi s schematic determination i n fav our of grasping the operation con­ c retel y ( s ince pl enary comprehens ion i s comprehension of the c oncrete) the objective, and then come remai n s to ?dopt - albeit temporari ly back and i llum inate by its light the moments of the total ization (in order to be able, c onverse l y , to grasp the differenti ation and grow ing enrichment of the end by the mean s ) . Hence, in comprehen sion as the d ialectical grasping of an orientated temporal i zation the prob lem of the exteriority of action s is rel egated to the background. For we understood by thi s exteriority (generating an inert s uccession ) that every action was indepen­ dent as an isol ated ta sk to be performed at a certain moment and i n a c ertain order from every other previous or subsequent ac tion . To be s ure , it i s necessary to have obtained re sult M before undertaking th e construc tion of N which depends upon i t . But prov ided that M is given in the agent ' s practical e xperience and acce s sible , it matters l ittle to u s formally whether it has been produced by the prev ious labour of the same practic al organism or some other, or whe ther i t is the re su l t of an acc ident of nature . B ut if we l ook more closely at th is e x teri ority , we understand preci sel y that i t i s an exteriori zation of the organ i sm ' s mechanical (or ph ysico­ chemical) inertia, inasmuch as thi s i nertia is c losely applied to the i nertia of e x terior objects with a practical view to unify ing them . S o it is the mean s of un i ty , c h o s e n o n the bas i s of the future objective and i n th e O M PREH E N S ION

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light of this obj ecti v e ; and we must either see i t, on the bas i s of the goal , as the progre s sive realization of the transcendent proj ect, or e l se stop comprehending the action. And if we look more c losely sti l l , we observe that the i nerti a of the raw material defines the exteri ori zed inertia of the organis m . It i s the con fi g uration of the worked obj ect that governs bodily attitude s , inasmuch as the body ' s relation to the object i s governed by an aim . The man w ho brac e s himself agai n s t that rock i s a mechanical energy s ystem acting upon it in exteriority , in conform i ty w ith the princ iple of inerti a. B ut if this i s the case, and he can actually be replaced adv antageou s l y by a bull dozer, this i s because in the worl d of exteriority there is no way of acting on an inert body other than by communicating to i t as an inert body an exterior movement, received from the exterior. B y v irt ue of his reserv es of fuel and his abi l i ty to expend the se at the req u i s i te moment, man i s hi s own inertia and h i s own exteriority for h im self. He communicates h i s own movement to h i mself from outside , by burning h i s e ssence. B ut th i s way proper to the l i v i ng being of bei n g his own exteri ori ty c an , in itself, be conce ived onl y as an interiorization of the exterior by e xteriori zati on of the interior. In short, on the bas i s of the obj ecti ve we comprehend the exteriori ty of practical c onduct: it i s i nteriori ty produc i ng itself i n exteriori ty as a l imit j ointl y defined by the l i v in g body and the worked object. And by th is word interiority we do not mean to allude to some mysterious organic immanence or other, but simpl y to the fac t that integration of the inert into the orientated temporalization can be conceived only as a structure of interiority . In the s ame way , if it is true that the complex conditions of a craft worker can be broken down into elementary procedure s , eac h of which can be reproduced separatel y (and by another) , i t m ust first be noted that the tempor al exteriority of the succe s s i ve procedures is conditioned b y the ex teriority of the tasks , and the l atter b y the inert dis persi on of the raw m aterial . It would be conc e i v abl e for an logical l y , at least operation di rectly performed upon liv ing matter ( which is a synthesis) i tself to be synthetic , if it were directly to condit ion l ife . The fact that we act on l i fe by the inorganic (medicaments , surgery , etc . ) proves onl y , as I have already mentioned, th at we set i n train a tran sformati on which we are neither able to produce i n itself nor to control and which i s specifi cal l y organic . And i f synthetic action ( i . e . as a unity , impo s sible to break down , of uni fie d procedure s ) i s i mpo s sible for us i n this domain , it i s sti l l the c ase that the procedures which take persons or g roups for their obj ec t very often have to as s ume such a charac ter. S o this mean s that the practical mov ement i s rea l i zed as a pure temporali zati on , and that the di sti nction i nto before and after i s itself governed by the unity of the devel opment and the rec i p rocity of i m m anence of its conditionings. We

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are here simp l y recal li ng the structure of any prax i s particularl y soc i al prax i s in wh ich we have seen the future determ i n ing the past through temporal ization of the present. So if the procedure which produces in exteriori ty the re s ult M, as a fi rst prac tical synthe s i s , i s in itself separable from that which produces N , this is because the re sult M albeit a condition of N in itself remains exterior to the consequences produced . It is neces sary to dig this ditc h , if you want moist earth to c onstruct a r ampart or embankment. B ut the ditch i s not in the embankment, nor is the embankment in the ditch. And i f a truck bringing a load of earth i n fact s uffi ces to make diggi ng pointl e s s , thi s i s precisely because the earth i s in itself unaffe cted by the way in which we have obtained it. At mosL it might be said that the act is the tran sformation of this parti c ular matter inasmuch as it i s produced by an exterior energy source; and for that very reason the av atars of the raw material /all outs ide one another. Ex teri ority here comes from the di spersion of inertia as a feature of pas s i ve tem­ poral ity. * And i f we were to imagine a fable i n which an all -powerful d emi urge produced mod i fi c ati ons of matter by w i l led lightn i ng fl ashe s , the se fl ashes would be s ucce s s ive ( i n the temporal izing unity of the terminal obj ective) bec ause the succes sion of exteriori ty would be req uired by the material state s to be produced . S o ac tion d i v ides into exterior moments inasm uch as it identifies with the movements of its object. Fo r that very reason, however, comprehension restores to us the ind i s soluble unity in which an organism causes itself to be des ignated in i ts inertia by an exterior raw material , i nasmuch as thi s organism itself, or its restoration (or preservation), defines the operation on the bas i s of t he projected future (negation of the past) . What i s indi ssoluble i s the invention of this partic ular group of procedure s , inasmuch as thi s i nven­ tion (contin ual l y corrected and enriched by the movement of its reali za­ t i on ) defi nes i n unity an order of their s ucces s ion : i . e . determ i ne s , with a view to the goal , the nece s sary s ucces s ion of pas sive state s ( inert syn­ these s) which w il l ultimately produce the requ i red mod ification and its organic conseq uence ( pre servation of the li v ing being ) . And it is actually prec i sely th is which we comprehend : when we g rasp a gesture of the worke r and we b y the modification this produces in exteriori ty s uddenly comprehend its end and i ts beg inni n g , we may pos s i bl y be i ncapable o f predicting one by one the proced ure s that will en s u e , and unable to recover those that went before. B ut what counts i s the ' pre sence ' of the future in that gesture : i nasmuch as i t i l l um inate s the latter by s ubseq uent gestures and the goal ; and i nasmuch as it m akes the c urrentl y

*

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I t i s n o t part o f the � u bj e c t u nd e r d i �c u s s i o n h e re to s t u d y pas � i v e tem pora l i ty a s

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ach ieved result in t o a means, and thereby confers upon it its human signi fication - as transcendence ( surpas s al towards the future ) an d as exigenc y . I n a word , if every operation i s e x teri or to the rest, their en sem ble i s a tota li:ation . Not in the sense that i t would re ally be poss ible to unify them in their very multiplic ity , but in the sens e that each one, at the ve ry moment when it i s separated from the re st, can be c omprehended only in term s of the result be ing aimed at, which thanks presents itself as their total izing summary . In th i s to the organ ic end future objective, they are al l folded back into a relative indistinctne s s . Not that there i s no unit y , or that thi s unity i s not an order, but bec ause every moment appears there as an abstract structure and , above al l , as an option among v arious pos s ibilitie s . Fo r in that complex system it is above al l the re lations between rel ations that are elucidated in the order of a un ifying temporal i zation. It i s up to the real ization and i ts concrete problems to determ ine the p articul ar options and procedure s . Prax i s , through its fi nal ity , di scl oses the material ch aracteri sti c s of the object . It unfolds these one by one i n t he success ion of exteriority characte ri zing the in ert. B u t th i s success ion i s actual ly in tegrated i nto the interior temporal izati on , since the latter makes i t into th e time f'o r exploration w i thin the temporalizing i nvention . To give an example : the time of waiti ng wh en an experimenter has real ized the conditions for a chem ical experiment and brought substance s into c ontac t , i solating the m as he has decided thi s waiting time , therefore , which me as ure s i n exteriority the speed of the chemical reaction , i s like a re nding of the practical tempor al­ i zation (there i s nothing more to do , i t i s neces sary to wa it) by the exteriority of succes s ion s . At the same ti me , however, recovered and engendered b y the v ery synthes i s that it rends , th i s exterior time - ev ery inert instant of which i s li ved actively as separation , ilnpatienc e , etc . i s mere l y the ex terior limit of the interior temporal ization� or, i f you J ike, its way of integrating the time of th ings into itself as a direc t contact w i th the ir inerti a. In thi s sen s e , inertia in h um an ac tion i s to be c omprehended as i tself bei ng the fundamental act and th e sou rce of all ac ts . Through the me tamorpho s i s that creates prax i s before and beyond organ ic integrity , and in the latter ' s serv ice, the temporal ization ari ses as a synthetic and liv ing in version of the readings of success ion ; and the un ity of i n vention consi sts i n defi n ing on the bas i s of the pre sent pas s i v i zati on , an d in the l ight of the future the general perspecti v e of a treatment of th at material i t y . Th e determinations ( fi rst ab strac t , then gradually concre te ) of the moments of th i s treatment are prod uced ( in t h e temporal izing ac t i . e. prediction-production - an d then , later, i n of practical prediction the course of p articu lar opti ons) as neutral states. Th i s m u st be taken as mean ing that prax i s operate s the rigorous unificati on of practical inertia

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( govern ing the agent) with the inertia of th ings (i nertia of exterior processes). There i s a prediction of already united materia l sta tes (pas sive s ynthe ses of the exterior mu ltip le : i . e . passive sy ntheses of the bod y at work includi ng its too l s with worked matter) , each of whic h , in its unity , i s wholly unaffected by t he following state , inasmuch as both are taken in ab sol ute exteriority ; but wh ich, replaced i n the mov e ­ ment of creati on th at i s labour and in re lation to the unity that gives them their meaning , are all indicated as a precondition and all realized as an iner t de signati on-ex igenc y of the following moment. Conve rsel y , the latter as a procedure -s tate remains exterior to the prev ious one but, on t he actual level of temporal i zation, cond itions i t in interiority ( i . e . inasm uch as man as a hi storical agent is a mediati on between the se neutrals) . The costs ( i . e . i n one way or another the expenditure of energy) have been so great that the action is produced and c omprehe nded in its irre vers ibility . Ei ther the agent gives up but thi s mean s the ruin and d i sorgan i zation of th e temporal ization ( i ntrod uction of an inert not) or his only way of recuperati ng h i s lost strength (and more than thi s , perhaps ) is to push the ac t through to the end (between these two ex treme term s of the option there are others ; but they reffect one or other of them , to a greater or les ser extent) . In both cases , going back i s forbidden . In particular, the man who re l i nquishes an undertaking will for ever remain , in the h uman m ilie u , the person who began it. So that is what characterize s the comp rehended action . The organ i s m invents for itse lf in the unity o f the project the direction s of its own exteriori zation, inasmuch as it defi ne s the perspecti ves of transform ing passive materi ality with a view to a goal . And thi s immediatel y practical i nvention i s reali zed at once on al l level s . The body become s its own exterior source of energy , in order to communi cate i ts movements from the exterior as received impulses. The concrete in vention reproduces and s ustain s within itself the time of exteriority , as the sole milieu in which pas sive state s c an be foreseen and engendered on the basi s of the ir abstract schemata ; but th is exterior ti me , within the temporali zation, i s merely the production through labour of a mediation between the unifica­ tion in progress and the d i spers ion th at it is to gath er up . Tech nical thought, for example, after the syncretic movement of the project, must make itself in itself a succes sion of exteriority , s ince the thought of inertia is an inertia of thought. For dialectical comprehension , h owever, none of the moments of the metamorphos i s , none of its state s , none of its leve l s , i s isolated . The organism attacked in its biological functions negate s i tself as an organism and i ncapable ( i n the case of our Hi story ) of trans forming the i nert into organic itself make s itself inert and commits its subs i sting functions to producing and pre serv ing th i s inertia, wi th an act u a 1 v i e w to t r an s fo r m i n g e x te r i ori ty through ex teriori ty . -

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Through th i s neg ation of itse lf and the e x terior milie u , i t constitute s exteriori ty with i n itself and outside as the means of res toring to itself th e integrity of its organic function s . The fundamental choice of th i s passion , inasmuch as i t i s re al i zed through labour, i s s impl y th e action . B ut this ne w re lationship at once produces the new existent who i s t o realize it who i s ne i ther the organism nor the confuse d th e agent inertia of outside , but i s ac tual i zed in the l atter as a directed pas sion t o sav e the former ( i . e . to des troy itse l f on behalf of biological function s ) and , through thi s pas sion, determi ned as mediation (between the organ ic and the organic thro ugh the i norgan i c ) , transcendenc e , proj ect and tempora l ­ ization . None of the se determinations can charac terize the organism a s such, since each springs from its practical relation to e x teriority . In that sense, positiv i s t Reason can ignore them . That passion oj' though t (fo r, s ince the latter is the inertia of Reason , i t must as such be the obj ect of a constant option) is merely exteriority itself, as a prac tical rule fo r operations. It real izes the negation of the organ ism by itse lf, but at th e level of the i nert. As such, i t has no i n s trument for becoming aw are of the total i zi ng temporalization which governs and s ustains it, al though it lives that unit y as the very foundation of its reasons . It produces i tself as a time oj" succession of exteriority in the dialectical temporal ization : i . e . at the h eart of a Reason that knows it and uses i t , and that i t does not kn ow . Through this pas sive synthe sis of inert s uccess ion s , the agent knows himself and governs himself at the firs t level of action : i . e . in th e inertia of h i s procedure s . The infi n i te divisibility of inert time consti tute s the infinite d i v i sibi lity of behav iour, and through the homogen izatio n of the latter w ith worked matte r the practical equivalence of energ y sources. It becomes immateri al whether a given res u l t i s produced by a n organism expending its re s erv e s , or by a ny other energy so urce; im ­ material , too , whether the pas s i v i zed organism i s a medi ati on between a ll the s uccess ive s tates of the thing, or j u st the source of a phy s ico­ c hemical proces s . De facto, the organism is n o long er. Positive Reason does not know i t. There are only successive s tates of inert matter. Through th i s infi nite by me an s of the forged tool that is s ucce s s i on , dialectical Reason will make i ts detailed option s , i l l uminated by th e positi v i st Reason objective to be attained. I n partic u lar, d i alectical unity w i thin th e leads analytic Reason to perspecti ve of the project being ac tual i zed produce orienta te d phy sico-chem ical processe s , from which the fac tor s ' organism ' an d ' human agent ' are eliminated. Not because they do not be l ong to them (altho ugh the y might be onl y at the ir source ) , but becaus e they are an y way defined only i n e x teriority . Positive Reason a pas siv e synthe s i s of inert s uccessions func tions by i ts own laws of exteri ori ty within the unity of the dialectical temporalization, and prov ides i ts ,

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re sults as a func tion of that uni fied ex teri ority : so it can be cal led our as a Reason of fi rst mach ine . In re a l i ty , its hi storical devel opment exteriority (for it i s in th e exterior, rather than ' in us ' ) inasmuch as it i s guided by creative inventi on ( the uni fi c ation of exte riori ty in pass i v i ty ) , neces sari l y leads it to prod uce machine s . For machines are o nly itself as uni fied exteri ori ty ; and it i s itself onl y a machi ne for producing machine s . Between an electron i c brain and positive Reason , there i s equi v alenc e . Or, i f you prefer, one i s the Reason of the other. And for these two equal ly inert and materi al Reasons , each of which prod uces the other, un it y come s from the dialec tical interiority surrounding and sustaining the i r e xteri ority . I t is easy to understand, on thi s bas i s , that positive Reason as an objecti v e ru l e of interior ex teri ori ty i s at once the passion of the organ i sm prod ucing its own inertia as a contac t with things and, at the same time, the graspi ng of every practical action as a pure inert proce s s : i . e . an energy tran sformation. It c an also be compre ­ hended how the unity of its func tion ing come s to the machine (as a product of h uman labour) via analytic Reason ( whi c h i s here simpl y labour, inasm uch as i t make s itself ex teri ority and control s itse lf as such) , but not by virtue of it; and how , ultimatel y , i t remains unnoticed as long as the terrain of positi v i sm is not abandoned . Or, if you prefer, positive Reason is the permanent mean s of prax i s , but is not itself a prac tIce . A twin consequence flows from thi s observation , whose effect i s to bring the inert and the organic agen t clo ser. I t i s true that anal ytic Reason allows a rationali zation of action, by v i rt ue of its non ­ comprehen sion of the latter ' s s yntheti c c haracter and by v irtue of its molecular monism (which red uces th e element of action gesture , refle x , etc. to a mere tran sm utation of energy ) . B ut it is true also that tools (and machines too) are no more acc e s s ible , in concrete reality, to that Reason of di spersed exteriority ; and that as too l s and as machines they require comprehension (the very same th at unc overs the prax i s of men ) to come and disc lose them in the ir truth . For no one whether an econom ist or a technic ian; and in any peri od whatsoever, at the time of ' universal ' machines as much as at the time of automation who i s invited to v i s it a real ly mode rn fac tory , w ith the most up -to -date plant, can con fi ne h imself to studying the series of physico-chem ical processes wi th their various conditioning s . For h i s attitude (as a special i st who wants to knol1' the most - adv anced ' real ization i n h i s spec ialism) i s differential. H e reckons to asse s s ( i . e . m easure) the differences separating thi s establ i shment from those he already knows . F or h im , moreov er, the se differe nces must be advances. We know ro ugh l y what the se m ea s u ra b le adv ances c an be : lower costs, i ncreased productivity of the workers , better s afety an d h ygiene condition s , e tc . •

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And these very general re sults c an the mse l ve s be ac hieved only by detailed improvements , whose abstract feature s we rough l y know . The new machine consumes less . This means that it does the same work for a lower expendi ture of energy; or e l se that it involves some way of utilizing its waste-products ; or that its exterior a rrangements make it possible to organize the work ( and the div i sion of labour) in a more rational way that avoids time- wasting (and con sequen tly to reduce ' e xtras ' , and payment for ineffic ient work , in favour of inve stment) . Safety is improved. B y reducing the ri sk of accidents at work , you neces sarily reduce the expenses connected with them : i . e . there will be less compensa­ tion to be paid, and fewer of those ruinous strikes by which when a man has died the workforce seek s to prote st at the ri sks it is forced to run . Of course , it must be c learly understood that the expenditure or at involved in improv ing safety at all events remains lower than the average costs entailed by acc i dents before the most equal to installation of the new mach ine . Most of the time, for th is v ery reason, the problems of safety and productiv ity w i l l be fo und synthetically linked i n technological research : a combination will be sought that eliminate s risks all the better i n that it make s it possible to produce more , etc . The ensemble of feature s that we have bri e fl y enumerated remains i nseparable from teleolog ical s tructure s . Ev ery speci fic feature of the ne w mac hine m anifests itself in i ts inerti a as a response to an objective problem . The safety sy stem has been produced on the basis of stati sti c s for accidents at work, and in order to respond to the e xi genc ies of production : how to dev i se and con struct a new l ayout for the old machine s , enabling the costs entailed by accidents to be reduced , without the expenditure needed for i ns tall ation going beyond a specific threshold. I n th i s case , as we saw in connection with the steam-eng ine , the inventor invents by m aking himself into the i nert mechan i sm required by circ um­ I 0 stances . 7 And, for th i s very reason , the i nert mechan i sm is an inert synthesi s : i . e . the seal of finality marks it in its being ( w i thin the practical fi e l d and at the he art of dispersed e x teriority) . Through the inventor ' s mediation, the obj ective ex igency i s imprinted in matter as a negation of interiority , and as the conditi on for a tran scende nce of thi s matter by itself. And thi s tran scendence towards the exigency is effected by inert m ateri ality itself as a passion of the inventor, inasm uch as the l i ved un ity of th i s pas sion determ ines it sy nthetic ally and orientates it irreversibl y . From this standpoint, a change i n the c onditioning of the series bri ngs a different (in exteri ority ) en semble of chan ge s into the

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proce s s . It i s analytic Reason which determines thi s . B ut s uch changes are synthetic ally gathered up and grasped i n interiori ty by the di alectical praxi s , inasmuch as they directly find the ir s i gnification i . e . their un ity - in synth etic h uman facts : s uch as the need for manufacturers , at a given stage of c api talism, to reduce costs by increas ing produc tion . Moreover, the inventor as a singular i ndiv idual i s further conditioned by h i s own needs and by his desire (for money , glory , honours , etc . ) : i . e . by the i nc arnation i n h i s practical person of the objecti ve exigenc ies of the ruling c lass . Invention i s a mediation between th is incarnation and the ex igenc ies that it incarnate s . It has to enrich the inventor in proporti on to the adv antages it bri ngs to m anufacturers (of course, it is precisely not what i s produced; but the prin c iple of the latter is pos ited by the creati ve praxi s itself) . We have already shown how when a ' pri m i tive ' gives i nformation to an anthropologist an d describe s schematic al ly the soc i al structure s that a broad , dialectical tho ught he real izes i n practice with everybody sus tains and overflows a technical thought deriv ing its unity from i t , 1 08 Here we encounter the same which i t handles like an i nert object. duality . The thought of inertia as an i ne rtia of thought is at once the thought that thinks ( it analy ses the proc e s s , brings factors to l ight, determines al l the consequences for such and s uc h a vari ation of such and such an order) and , at the s ame time , the thought that is thought ( its inertia would di sperse it i nto non -thought, if the dialectical temporal ­ i zation did not grasp it and produce it in its orientated unity on the by basis of pas sive or l i v ing synthe ses, organ izations and ex igenc ies directing its inertia along teleological lines of forc e , albeit letting it string itself together alone in accordance with a necessity that the unifying s ynthesis has created i n it, through a total izing reconc iliation of its term s ) . It i s the thought of th ings and it is a thought-thing, an instrument perpetual ly acted- upon by the temporal ization of free prax i s . It is a technical invention and , as such , could not be the true know l ­ edge of molecularized e x teriority . At the s ame time , however, it i s wholly homogeneou s with other technical i nventions (as passive syn­ the ses) and reproduce s their being in the form of signifying determina­ tion s of verbal matter. However, in so far as its forged ( and inert) un ity i s what allow s i t to grasp [these pas sive s ynthe ses] i n the ir forged unity , th i s common unity i s pas sed over in silenc e : it does not belong to them . and , I t is they which bel o ng to i t, inasmuch as it c an be produced therefore , compre hen ded only by a dialectical Reason, i . e . a totalizing practIce . •

1 08

Criti q u e , v o l

L

p p . 5 00 ff

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Hence , an expert studying the adv antages of modern plant, in so far as he studie s the se with i n the te leological perspective of an improvemen t, has to comprehend the mach i ne s . H i s operation s of positiv i st ( and analytic ) intellection are merely the mean s necessary for real izing the process in its function , and determining its valu e as a re sponse to prior ex igencie s . He comprehends a machine ( some of its features have initially di sconcerted him, others may have e scaped him, others have manifested them selves solely as processes conditioned by others ) when he uncovers and unifies its structure s and movements on the bas is of the obj ectives p ursued by its inventor, and when he c an progre s s i vely enrich and concretize hi s knowl­ edge of the se obj ecti ves on the bas is of a more thorough investigation of the machine . It is c lear that the comprehension is not different in kind from that which uncov ers , in th eir deep sign i fi c ation, the acts of practical organ i sm s or organ i zed group s . Let u s add , moreover, that the technologi st and the h i storian of technique s must also comprehend the mean ing of such mechan i sm s , i n the same way that we hav e shown the mean ing of an action be ing grasped (its h exis di sclosing the drift of praxi s ) . To appreciate thi s , it i s enough to v i sit a mu seum of i ndu strial sc ience or technology in any capital . You will see that the form of these inert syntheses i s defined not j u st by their function s , but also by the option s of the soc iety they produced (we saw an example of this above : the fi rst c apitali sts of the ' i ron and coal complex ' rej ected the improveme nts to the steam -engine proposed by Franklin and Watt (the reburn ing of coal fumes ; a device to reduce noise) because those v i olent bourgeoi s saw the chimne y s , the black 1 fumes and the din as signs of the ir power 09 ) . I f you ask, moreover, where the difference l ies between the machine i n operation and the man i n action , we shal l say that from th is particu lar viewpoint there i s none . To be s ure , the m an i s a free practi cal organ i sm - i . e . a l i v ing integrati on that make s itself into a pas sion in order to act whereas the machine i s not. And it is he alone who could attempt pas sive s ynthese s , s ince in him exteriority i s i nteri ori zed and then re ­ e xteriori zed . B ut it i s not that which c ounts , nor the i n fi nite flexibi lity of his adaptations to the practi cal fi eld ( a machine too can be flexible; and when it involves � feedback ' it i s adaptable) . If the practical field is con s i dered from the standpoint of po sitive Reason , human ac tions do not differ at al l from the way s in which mac hine s behave . It i s true that the man is mis sing . However and th is i s the essential point if you con s ider the man or mach ine as a d i alectical intelligibility , i . e . in comprehension , then what counts i s the fac t that the succe s s ion of inert determ i nation s , proce sses and transmutations i s ri gorousl y and irreversibly orientated

1 09 . Cl l fiqu e . v o l

l . pp 1 9 3 -6

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toward s an end, by the synthetic , creati ve movement of l abour under the control of a po s i ti v i s t Reason always s uperv i sed by the totalizing prax i s . And i f it i s precisely th is which counts if, on the one hand, the inertia­ passion of the organ i sm must use e xterior mediations and c on struct too l s as its pre l i m i nary synthese s ; and if, on th e oth er hand, the most rational mach i ne (today , the e lectronic brain) e x i sts on l y as a real product of human l abour and can func tion onl y through the medi ation of the l abour impregnating it then human ac tion is effecti v e l y irreducible to any other process , inasmuch as i t i s de fined as a prac tical organ ization of inert multiplic ities ( w i th a view to an end concerning the organ ism) by an inerti a-passion and v i a an irresistible proj ect to integrate al l the eleme nts of the practical field: i . e . inasm uch as it i s tran scendenc e , temporal ization , unification, and totali zation. B u t since th at i s its spec i fi c re al ity , and si nce it i s inseparable from an organ ism producing its inertia and its own source of movement as e x teriori ty , as well as from the i nert el ements of the practical field, it matters l i ttle ultimately from the th at the elementary moments of form al v i e wpoint we are adopting action as inert proce sses should be directly engendered by one organism; that the ir e xteriority should make it conv enient or indi spensable to redi strib ute them among v ari ous organized indiv idual s , and thus rei nforce the ir temporal e x teriori ty by a spatial dispersion; or that w i th the division of labour pas sing to the mach ines the movements imposed by i ts structure as a pas sive synthe s i s upon an inert materiali ty should end up substituting themsel ves for the procedure s directly fol lowed by age nts . All the more as we have already pointed out in that the agent be longs to the practical field and, within the indiv i si ble un ity of this field, s uffers al l the repercuss ions of his action . S o when he perfects that mach ine for mak i n g machines which we have termed i nert Reason , it would be wrong to imagine that he h as stuck a gri d in h i s brai n or distorting spectacles on hi s nose. It is an obj ective machine , which is coexten sive with the whole practical field and condi ­ tions him l ike al l the other elements of that field. This means he i s him self s i tu ated inside all the practi cal synthe ses of the inert and in its very inertia. Or, if you prefer, the adv ances of pos i tive Reason (i . e . the accumul ation of rational , reasoning mac hines ) must be e xpre s sed for him by a con stant deepening of h i s determ inations in inertia. It is in the original fac t of life itself that analytic Reason di scov ers exteriority and , u l timate l y , the inorgan i c . On the other hand , the very un i ty of h uman praxi s the totalization i s what de fi nes action in its i rreducibility; th is praxi s produces and superv i ses ( we shall see in what sense) the de vel op­ ment of its science and techno log y ; and every s upplementary determi na­ tion in i n ertia of the organic body i s produced as a new condition ing of the latter i n e x teri ori ty , th us a l l owing the agent through a techni cal ac tion

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to govern h i m better and more intimate l y . Consequentl y , the moment analytic Reason effected a radical decomposition of the organism into the inorgani c , and of life into a phys ico-chemical proces s , would al so be the moment when that same organ i sm would be conditioned by its own prax i s with the help of all the inert e lements of the field, th us finding in its total reducti on to the inorganic through praxi s the power to transform inert substances into its own living substance . To be sure , th is ideal goal of technical and scientific progre s s can be envi saged here only as a hypo­ thesi s . Yet it has a clear signification. The pas sion - inertia of the organ i sm i s produced with in the frame work of prax is as inert Reason or exterior power over exteriority . Thi s Reason grasps it in the very field of its application as an ensemble of i nert proce s se s ( i ns ide , in the very meta­ bol i sm of life ; outside , in work procedure s themselve s ) . The inertia produced thus reacts upon it in the uni fied field ( and through unification of the field) and is radical ized. Preci sel y , however, thi s return i s the work of the practical totalization . It i s i n and through its irreducible prax i s that the organism d i sc loses itself to its means inert thought as an ensemble of passive synthese s . And the conditioning of the organism by the inert syntheses of material ity , effected under the control of acti on, must suc ceed in freeing praxis by affirming the commutativ i ty of al l elements of the practical field ( i . e . the ever-growing pos s ibility of replac ing one by another in some praxi s or other at some level or other of the means inert syntheses and according to spec ific rul e s ) . If the lim iting-moment of omnipotence i s envisaged , the striking thing i s that the practical field i s wholly subordinated to the organ i s m , precisely in so far as the latter has been broken down into non-organic proces se s . For action pre supposes the permanence of the practical organism, as an agent of transm utations and as an orientation of equivalence s . It is itself permanent because of the permanence of the initial obj ectiv es (which are neither achieved nor greatly transformed , though they are con stantl y modified) : i . e . because of the permanence of needs . The aim remains � roughly speaking, to ensure the pos s ibil ity of life to human organi sms i n a un iverse that long ago di sclosed its indifference to man ' s fate (roughly speaking, i t i s al ways in one way or another a matter of scarcity and its av atars , in a world governed by laws of exteriori ty ) . Despi te the bio logical organ i sm ' s d i ssolution into the inert, therefore , the practical organi sm remain s , because the l iv ing organ i sm with its functi ons and needs has not dis­ appeared e ither. And final l y , in thi s limiting case , the prac tic al field through a posi tiv ist dis solution of the organi sm-as-agent has become a vast network of mach ine s driven in sequenc e , whose aim (grasped in comprehens ion) i s to sati sfy the needs of the biological organism (which they negate) under the control of the practical organ i s m , wh ich the y c annot even reproduce. •

ex ample merely sho w s , by pu shing equivalence to the limit, that praxi s will develop the re lation of inertia between the organ and the thing in two different direc ti on s . For on the one hand the organ becomes inertia, in order to modify the thing ( as in original action ) . On the other hand, however, in th i s fundamental direc tion of the prac tical , a counter­ shock (spec i fi c , moreover, to exteriority as a relation ) i s given: the c onditioning of the organ i sm in reaction , via its inert being, by the inertia that i t works. Thi s counter- shock long main tained at the level of counter- fi nalitie s appears at first only as the source of negative mod­ i fications (passiv i zation of ever broader areas of the organism by work distortions and acc idents, occupational illnesses, etc . ) , which praxi s had only to seek to negate and if possible destro y . Or e l se it i s uti lized, but against the enemy (a weapon i s the adversity-coeffi cient of certain physico-chemical proce s ses bec oming a tool for annihilating the adver­ sary : i . e . the anti-man ) . At the outset, medicine itself hes i tate s . Either it thinks to heal the organic by the organic , or else it seeks to eliminate the inert re sults of a proce s s by mechanical mean s . Everything take s place in the shadow of fetishized prax i s . Yet the ne w di rection of action i s already present every where sometime s e xpl icitly , on other occasions i n an implicit state : guiding the reactions of the inert, predicting reper­ cu ss ions and u s ing them to reconditi on the organism, directly or indirectl y , through its inertia. The deve lopment of th is form of action (positi ve transcen dence of the negativ e of the prev ious praxi s ) must not be seen first as the possibi l ity of causing inert materia ls to be assimi lated by l i v ing organ i sm s. And that would any way not mean i n th is perspective of negation of a negation that the i nert would be rendered as simi lable ; simply that one would act hy the inert upon organic function s , in s uch a way as to give h uman organi sm s certain functions of plants . Whether thi s purely formal li mit can be ac h ieved or not, what counts today i s the fact HIS

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that, without nourishing the organism by th e inert, one acts by the l atter upon the former ' s functions, conditions them , regulari zes them , s lows down some of them and speeds up others , r ai ses the individual ' s practical abi l ities and endurance for a specific time, even begi n s to replace certain organs by inorganic sy stem s (which prove s not that organ ic life and the machine are ontologicall y equ i v al ent, but on the con trary that dialectical Reason , by direc ting the Reason of anal y s i s , better knows the margin of the internal and external vari ations w i thin which an organism can preserve i tself as such) . I t i s remarkable , moreover, that the pro gre s sive replacement i n the exterior of the practical organism by the spec ial ized mac h i ne (whic h be longs to praxi s type No. 1 ) should be contemporary w i th the fi rst serious attempts to repl ace in the interior an organ in its function s b y a machine that the whole organism controls and govern s . Hi therto, replac ement of the liv ing by the inert wou l d end in a net defi c i t (a war veteran ' s woo den l eg; the hook fi xed to an amp u tee ' s arm to replace hi s hand; the artificial an us of a cancer s ufferer which, unl ike the anal sph incter, all o w s all the matter excreted b y the inte stine to pas s through it) . Today , in a limited number of cases, the inert obj ect inasm uch as the organism surv ives as its s upport , its source of energy and i t s un ity can repl ace the organ by (more or less crude l y ) ensuri ng certain of its function s . In thi s case, action type N o . 2 is nec e s s arily grounded upo n the adv ances of prax i s N o . 1 . Th at i s not all . The inert object introduced into the organ i sm is the product of human l abour. I t has formed the obj ec t of re search and discovery. I t has been real ized by machines , them selves cons tructed through l abour. The circ ularity of the ac tion m anifests itself i n the fact th at th is machine introduced into us i s a product of human labour, and . w i thin the perspective of absolute equival ence of mean s carries out a l abour under c ontrol (the organi s m exerc i ses a first contro l , but i t i s medical prax i s which . i n real ity re alizes th i s control , through the organ i sm an d for ends already defi ned in the fu ture ) . I n other words , th i s machi ne i s an action of man at the heart of the organi sm . In certain condi tions and for certai n func tion s , the organ can be replaced by a prod uct of ac tion and the function by the action of this product. Th e action , as an ex teriorization of the inert by the organ ism , complete s the circ le by re in teriori zing itself. In order to re store organ ic integrity , or i n order to safeguard i t , it decides in certai n specific sectors - to replace life by the act. I t is in the perspectiv e of th i s g o v e rne d circulari ty ( w h i c h , however, mere l y uti l i zes one of the form s of dev i ant c i rc u la r i t y ) that everyth i n g becomes an ac t i n th e prac tical field, precisely bec au se thi s field i s defi ned by the c i rc u l ar recondition i ng s of the inert by i t se l f under the c on t r o l of prax i s , whose practical fi e l d u ltimate l y becomes the real hody ( a� fac t i c i ty and a�

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3 83

efficac y ) and whose organic bodies remain the negati ve foundati on as s ingularized facticity and need requiring satisfaction . S uch, therefore , is our praxis . On th i s bas i s , we have the neces s ary instruments to c omprehend its structures , and in partic ular the moment of construc tion of the means. It is the re storation and pre servation of the organ i sm , as an aim projected into th e future , which will determine the plac e of the mean s and its function in the m ilieu. I n other words , the practic al category of ' mean s ' is groun ded upon the heterogeneity of the milieu (as an i nert env ironment) , in re lation to the two term s of the action : the organism, and its need for restorati on of its functions and organ s . To be s ure , the mean s are not in the course of the totali zation heterogeneous to s uch and such a result whose achievement the y make po s sible. And these re sults wi th in the temporali zati on and before being have indeed received the s tructure of objectives. In real ity , ac hieved however, they are al so mean s . Ends i n rel ation to the present state of the as i s the practical fi e l d , they are mean s in relation to its future state latter in rel ation to some other state . B ut the whol e series i s s uspended from an end which is not a means for an ything, and refers to no state be cause i t is not itself a s tate : i . e. the organi sm, demanding its re storation and preserv ati on from the depth s of the future . We i n fact know perfect l y well that i n s ome societi e s the maintenance and reproductio n of life m ay be reduced to the status of a means (as i s the case when the wage al lows the worker j ust barely to meet h i s elementary needs , so tha t he can carry on h i s labour: he eats to live and lives to work) . B ut we are not placing ourselves here at the level at which technology brings abo ut a reorgan ­ ization of social en sembl e s , and i n the very c ourse of this reorgani zati on men are medi ated by things. The direct movement of praxi s remains that of an organism (or organized group ) striving to make its material milieu into a c ombination of i nert elements favourable to its life . S o the practic al field as a fundamental , real but abstract unification of all the surrounding elements i s the total ization of possible mean s ; or which amounts to the same thing the matri x of real mean s . Everything i s a possible means ( and s im ultaneous l y a poss ible risk) in thi s unity , beca use it is itself a heterogeneous mediation between two momen ts of life. So the four word s ' mediation ' , ' mi l ieu ' , ' intermediary ' and ' means ' designate one single reality : inert exteri o rity , in so far as t h i s conditions organic immanence as a bei ng-outside -one self-in -the- worl d , and in so far as the transcendence of the project causes i t first to be conditioned by the passion of the organism.

,

1

•

•

• •

•

•

, •

•

•

T HAS

doubtless already been noticed that I have not sought to plunge actions and machines back i nto the synthetic interiority of the h i storical field and the total ization -of-envelopment. We should then have observed that ev ery p roc e s s of exteri ority, inasmuch as it is interior to the unitary field, i s l inked to all others and all agents by bond s of im manence . We have already spoken , moreover, of the actio n from afar that i s typical in the common practical field. We have no i ntention of returning to that now , however, if only bec ause the complex developments of action through the various dialectical fields do not constitute the pre sent obj ect of our study . What matters to u s for the moment i s to define human prax is the only one we c an comprehe nd i n the immediate and fundamental simplicity of its singularity . And by that I mean the follow­ ing : since our i ntention i s to provide the formal elements of a theory of practical multiplicitie s , we h av e encountere d one praxis i n our investiga­ tion that of men. * The other possible type s of prax i s remain unknown, and can be abstractly addre s sed in their formal undifferentiation. If we w i sh in a radical way and within human experi ence to account for the formal pos sibi l ity that different m ultipl i cities may exist, d ifferently condi ­ tioned and bei ng transcended by different kinds of prax i s , we have on ly one w ay of doing it: by positive comprehension of the relations of our praxis with our c onditions of life , to stre s s what today make s our

whole c o m p l e x o f behav i our patte rn s of cert a i n

* The

i n se c t s and m am m a l s may

be c a l l e d act ion or ac t i v i t y . It can e v e n be noted that act i v ity on earth beg i n s w i th s i n g l e ­

c e l led c re a t u re s themsel v e � . At al l e v e n t s , the q u e s t i on s posed by s u c h a c t i v i t y h ave

w ith those that would be po sed by the e x i stence of practic a l m u l t i p l i c i t i e s w ho se tec h no l o g i c a l deve lopment wa s e q u al or s uperi or to our o w n , a lbe it d i fferently o r i e ntated by v i rtue of the di ffere n c e i n the organ i s m s and the prac t i c a l not h i n g

in

common

prob l em s .

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actions spec i fi c . Or, i f you prefer, we sha l l have comprehended human praxi s ful l y i n its determination i.e . in its limits if we see it m aking i tself by wre s ting itself away from a certain facticity : from the contingent (for u s , today) form of our neces sary contingency . Now the foregoi ng c omments have , on the one hand , revealed to us feature s characterizing every prax i s : for example, tran scendence (although thi s i s not neces sarily defi ned by the rel ationship of the organism to the inert) , synthetic unity , temporal ization , totalization , and fi nal ly as the di alectical Reason. B ut the se law of Doing, Being and Knowing comments h ave also made it possible, through the specific determination of the se schemata on the bas i s of factic ity, to singul arize our action as h i s torical agents , inasmuch as these agents are men of the present or a knowable past. And it i s precisely thi s overall determination that we can reproduce here , to conc lude this brief study . To be sure , we shal l not and by virtue of wha t therefore know in what other practical m ultiplicities (real or formal l y possible) differ from th is one . B ut we shal l know why thi s multip l icity produces its actions as a singularization of every po s s ible praxi s . We already know that a practical organism , e ngaged in a fi e ld of scarc ity i n the m idst of a universe of exteriority if, furthermore , it can reproduce neither outside itself nor w ithin itself the s ynthe s i s of l ife on the bas is of mineral substance s m akes itself i nto exteriority i n order to condition the exteri or and comm unic ate to it, through pas sive synthese s , an inert fi nali ty : the inert concern to pre serve life . We know too that action, as a mediation betw een the organic and the inorganic, i s entirely both at once; that it i s the i nertia of the organism engendering the organization of the i nert from the exterior; and that you c an c ut it at wi l l into inert segments (Taylori zation , etc . ) , or grasp it in the transcendent unity of invention i . e . on the bas is of its ulti mate aim , the preserv ation of life . B ut here precisely lies the fundamental character of human praxi s and its s ingularity : in short, inasmuch as man makes H i story, the fi rst determ ina­ tion of our historicity . A s we have j ust said, human praxi s has a non­ transcendable ai m : to pre serve l ife . * In other words , prax i s i s originally a rel ation of the organism w ith i tself, v ia the inorgani c mili e u ; when the aim is achieved, th i s rel ation i s s uppre s sed. We shal l return i n a moment to obj ectifi cation , so dear to Hegel and Marx . B ut we are obliged to -

* Not h i n g w arran ts the a s se rtion t h at th i � end wou l d rem a i n non -transcendab l e , e v e n i f h u m an ity one day fre ed i t s e l f from the yoke of s c a rc i t y . On the other han d . i t i s c lear that i t i s our o w n H i story - the h i story of need - w h i c h w e are de s c r i bi n g . and t h at the other, i f it doe s e x i st one day as a tran scendence of ' pre- h i story ' . i s as u n kn o w n to u s a s that o f another spec ie s l i v i ng o n another p l an e t

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acknowledge that the orga nism which re produces its l i fe cannot be objectified any where e xcept i n the inert ; at all even t s , it i s certai nly not obj ectified in its o w n re s toration or health . For if by an act, whatever thi s i . e . in fe eding itself, for may be , i t succeeds in reproducing i ts life e x amp le it return s to the funct i onal , cyc l ical unity from which need has wrested i t � and th i s unity , prec i sely because i t i s liv ing , preserves no trace of the i nert syntheses that have made it pos sibl e . From thi s v i e w­ point, action is fundamenta l l y the negation of a negati on, and n u l l i fi es i tself i n its outcome. To the organism in the course of assi mi lating organic products , i t remains a matter of i ndifference whether the se lay directly w i thin its reach, or whether i t had to chan ge itself in to an age nt in order to procure them . Ye t it will be said th at ac tion modifies the organs . That i s true , but we shall be coming to it. Let us for the moment simply note thi s pri mary characteri stic of the ac t : i t i s rel ativ e , tran s itory , and governed by l ife ; and i t i s abo li shed in l i fe , which dissolves i t into i tse lf as i t redi s solves and reas s imilate s its inert-being . A t all events , whatev er we ma y be able to di scover at pre sent, th i s evane scent character of action an inorganic i ty produced, susta ined an d d i s sol ved in it by the organism r emains its original, fundamental determination : i t can be disguised, but not suppressed. However, t h i s same action i s a tran scendence of former circ umstance s towards an objective only i n s o far as the tran sce ndence i s real and not i deal : mean i ng that i t has to be real i zed through a rigorous orientation of physico-chemical proces ses and the determ ination of parti al , i nert unities ( as particular means) w ithin the unity of the practical field . The passive syntheses thu s reali zed are not necessari l y , or even frequently , d i s ­ membered by s ati s faction of the organic need. Very often , on the contrary , they remain prec i sely becau se they can be used agai n . No w , we have already comm e n ted that the passive unity of the materi al combinatio n was right to i ts being -in-itsel f the absolute hallmark of its te leological charac ter. S o ac tion , which the organ i sm reabsorbs, produces absol ute real i ties i n the field of the inorgan i c , and i t i s these inorgan ic real i ties which are i ts ohjectification . At the moment of s uccess , the agent is d i s solved by the organ i sm and sim ul taneously pre served i n the form of a pas s i v e synthe s i s by the i norganic. Or rather, action i nasmuch as its inert outcome prol ongs it becomes the mere relation of the Io mechanical s l av e ' to the org an i sm . It i s th is heat, i nasm uch as it consti tute s the organism "s medi um of l i fe . B u t such a u n i v oc al and sy nthetic re lation (the organ i sm ' s func ti onal development i n a favourable m i l i e u ) no long er contains any trace of an ac t, but on the c ontrary i s the revers al of one : inertia putting i tself in the se rvice of l ife . In so far , however, as the se ' real izations ' are pos ited for them sel ves an d through a bond of immanence entail modifications from afar of

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oth e r obj ects and men w ithin the practical fi e ld, the action of each and eve ry person i s reconditioned by h i s own produ cts : in ert ex igencies develop , and it i s neces sary to readj ust, correct, oversee , etc . Th is ti me , mo reover, these actions are i mmediate ly governed by th e inert . Of cou rse , the y have meaning on ly in rel ation to the non-tran scendable ai m . Why sati sfy the pas si ve ex igenc ies of matter� un less by neg lecting them you ri sked death in the shorter or longer run? Yet it i s indubitable that an order of pas sive e x igencies i s con stituted at the l evel of the practic al fi el d , via the determination of products by one another and of men by the ir products . Thi s is the level at which we have seen the practico-inert app ear; the leve l , too, at wh ich groups w i l l form to break its carapace . All th i s interests us here on ly in so far as the action, absorbed by its end , i s nevertheless sustained, prol onged, posited for itself and developed by the very ex igenc ies of its products . These products include the agent h im self, whose ine quality w i th the organ i sm becomes more and more pro nounc ed. Hi s occ upational deformations qual ify him through h i s wo rk , and h i s technical ski l l s constitute a new hexis for him : practical and non-functional , alth ough it can act upon h i s functions (n ight work alters the hours and the qual ity of sleep) . S o the agent h as a twofold status in the organism itself: he i s d i s solved as acting; but he remai n s as hexis , and has h imself s upported as a pas siv e synthesi s b y the living synthes i s . Meanwhile, the pro gress ive complication of the reasoning mach ine , and of i nert Reason , tends increasing l y to e l i minate the organic as a support for the act, an d thereby tends to qua l ify the agent by h i s prac tical transcendence of inert gatherings more than b y his biological the orig i n . S o ev eryt hing occurs , bas ical l y , as though a new exi stent agen t were tending to detach himself, w ith wholl y original structure s , from the organ i sm whence he has emerged. The de facto effect of the divis ion of soc i al labour i s that a given agent will be remunerated for an action which has no direct l i nk w ith the reproduction of life (if, for example , he i s a worker in a factory making candles and h oly objects) and whic h , consequentl y , tends to present its own end as non­ transcendable: its spec i fi c obj ec ti fication as its ac tual reality . In e xploita­ tiv e societie s , more over (to c on si der onl y the se t wo examp les), it i s the role of certai n members of the rul i ng c l as s to engag e in activ ities posited in them sel ves in the i r absol ute gratui tousne s s ( arts , game s , sports , the gratuitous ac ts of bourgeois moral ists, etc . ) . A t thi s level, action claim s to be autonomou s : it receives its laws from its end and from the determination s of the practical fi e l d. Acting s eems the speci fi c func ti on of man , and practic al ideal i sm radic al l y separate s the action posi ting itself for i tself from the organism that supports i t . O n th e con trary , however, i t i s neces sary to poi nt out the fol lowing. J . The ac t i on p o s i ting i t s e l f fo r i t s e l f i s red uced t o p r o d u c i n g a ,

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passive synthesis , for it i s rigorous l y defi ned by the absol ute end i t has g iven itself. 2 . The agent of the action i s defined by thi s pas s ive synth e s i s given as its objectification , and the latter becomes the signifier of which through a c ounter- s hock h i s occ upational deformations (along with il lnesses and acci dents due to his occupation) become the signi fied. This mean s that the pas s i v e s yn thesis i s the robot engendering positive Reason, and reflecting to the person the i norganic image of his organ i s m . In the last resort, indee d , the action by positing itself for itself in exteri ority as a rel ations hi p of exteri ority would lose its rel ation to its ends , s ince noth ing in the world of exteriority (and ends not shared) c an favour one material combination with re spect to the others , or c on stitute some pos s ible proces ses as preferable to others . For there are no longer any standpoin ts from which it i s possible to prefer this to that. 3 . So the world of ends-in-them selves (as inani mate syntheses) does not have enough being , and although it form s constantly (at h ierarchized, diverse lev e l s of social praxi s , moreover) it could exist only in relation to a twofo ld foundation: perpetuation of the organism, as an end tran­ scendent to the action ; and the dialectic itself, as a law of creative transcendence of all mean s towards the end, and as di s s olving within i t al l i nert s ynthe s e s . 4 . Thi s i s what i s shown clearl y by the observ ations which led u s to discover the practico-inert . For at this level we see the action alienating itself into its products , and the latter through the co unter-fi nalities they develop as inert mediations between agents, and as an inert re-production of the agent who has produced them manifesting anti -human e xigenc ies : i . e . presenting the inert as the end to which organisms must sac rifice themselv e s . In industrial societie s , the agent ex ists for the mach ine; and his v ery labour, as labour-power, i s sold on the market as a quan tity of energy. Preci sely, h owever, the practico-inert is pos sible and the ex igenc ies of the inert take on a meaning because , bas ically , the en semble made up of the econom ic proc e s s and the organi zation of labour rela tes to preservation o.f the organ ism . I do not mean by thi s that the law s governing the en semble in que stion cannot, in specific c i rcum s tances, produce catastrophic ' cri ses ' , culminating in w astage of lives ; nor th at the rul ing c lasses are concerned w ith preserving the lives as such of the manual workers ; but simply that neither the practico-inert , nor oppression, nor exploitation , nor th is given al ienation, would be possible if the huge . ponderous soc io-economic mach ine were not su stained, conditioned and set in moti on bJ' needs . Whatever theft may lie at the v ery foundation of the wage , it i s in order to live (hence , in order to earn that wage and spend it on reproduc i n g his o w n l i fe) th at the wo rker sells h i s labour-

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power. And if machines give him orders , and are consti tuted for him as imperiou s ends , it i s in a mi lieu of scarc ity where the reproduction of h i s life i s at s take . Conversel y , the most gra tuitous labour that which seems to set its aim autonomously and c an whol ly suffice the labourer, is fundamental ly (and whatever the such as the labour of the arti st pas sion of the pai nter or sc ulptor may be) j u st a means of existence . What the painter may feel and thi nk matters little here . Objectivel y , it is still the c ase that the arti st se l l s his c anvases to l i ve , and that he makes them to se l l . Let me be clearly understood . He c an and must th rough art pursue certain cultural ends (we shall return to thi s) which are not direc tly linked to the sati sfaction of h i s own needs . A s we shal l see , however, quite apart from the fact that the real aim of art i s to recover the organic , and needs , and integrate these into the c u l tural field in new 1 1 0 form s , i n a society conditioned by scarc ity it remain s a labour which take s the sati sfaction of the artist ' s needs as a means to conti nue , precisely i n so far as those needs have chosen art as the means of satisfying them which appears immedi ate l y , in the si gnification of the painting or statue. In the s ame way , i n the alienated world of exploitation, we have seen when the s ati sfaction of needs i s assured practico-inert 1 1 I conditionings (e.g. interest or interests) replac ing organ ic ex igenc ies . Wel l fed , well c lothed, well housed , the man ufacturer purs ues h is interest : in other words , he is alienated into h i s property (the fac tory with its machines) and obeys its ex igencies. B ut apart from the fac t that the wage he gives h i s w orkers i s destined to maintai n their exi stence (as a means, it i s true , to contin ue the production of pas s ive synthes e s ) , it must be added that the v ery foundation of his interest remains the owner ' s own organic l ife , inasmuch as in the world of scarc ity and competition thi s too gives its urgency to the ex igency of the machine. The practico­ i nert, as a practical equivalence of the agent to h i s machine , can be con stituted only on the bas i s of an acti on pursuing with increasingly an ever identical and non-tran scendable goal : the c ompl icated means perpetuation of life . And it i s prec isely when the presen t forms of the practico-i nert tend , by virtue of their contradiction s , to make th is per­ petuation impossi ble (or le s s an d and less poss ible ) for the majority : it is then, and in th e name of th e need, that groups organize to smash these forms or modify them in p art. The bourgeois Rev ol ution, at a certai n l evel of hi stori cal signific ations, can be reali zed as the c ontradiction

1 1 0 . The m an u script ends w i t hout th i s re flection on art having been i n i t I ated . It w i 1 1 be found i n L ' Idiot de la farn ille , v o l . 3 , an i n te rpretat i on of A rt-as-a-neuro � i 'i i n Flaubert and

some of h i s contem porari e s , seen as an incarnation of the soc i al antinom ies of the i r period . I I I C, itiq u e , v o l 1 , pp. 1 97 ff.

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between the rel ations of prod uction spec i fi c to the ancien reg ime (l anded ari stocrac y , feudal ownership , l ocal parti c u l ari sms, etc . ) and develo p ­ ment of the productive forces (i ndustri al tec hniques , merc anti l i st uni ­ versal i sm , economic powers of the bourgeois i e ) . Thi s contrad iction could not i tself have been productiv e without the hunger of which it was both the source and the expres s i on . Between J une and October [ 1 7 8 9] , the bourgeoi sie won the fi rst round because the people lacked bread. In other word s , j us t as according to K ant the dove thinks it would fl y more eas i ly w i thout the air which su pports i t , so it i s often thought that the ac t would be p urer and its end more rigo rous w i thout its dependence , d i rect or i ndirect , [ upo n] the organism and its needs . B ut exactly the oppo s i te i s the case. There wou l d be no ac ts w i thout needs (at least i n the present state of org an i s m s and th ing s) not even a n y dream of acting. The most abstrac t, autonomous end ultimately deri v es its content and i ts urgency from nee ds . It woul d vanish along w ith them , and its autonomy would v ani sh w i th i t . So every s tudy taking as its object a theoretically autonomous sector of human acti v i ty must obv io u s l y determine thro ugh experience the l aws governing that sector. B ut nothing w i l l have been ach i eved i f this acti v i ty i s not attached to the ensemble of organ i sms and needs in relation to which it has been produced, and if the autonomou s laws in thei r autonomous governing i t are not explained simultaneously i nter-conditioning withi n the practical un ity and in depth as the un­ fol di ng of a pra x i s born of a need , defi ned by i t and receiv ing its fi rst multiple determ inat i ons from i nert e x teriority . A r elative autonomy of practical sectors , and at the s ame time a determ ination of the whole action by the need wh ich it transcends to satis fy , and preserves within i tself as its urgency and sole rea l ity: s uch i s the foundation of h i s torica l m ateri alism . It i s , of course, a m atter of h uman action, s ince nothing j usti fies the claim that suppre s s i on of scarc ity wou l d have the effect of suppre s s i ng all prax i s , i n fav our of a return to mere organ i c functions. B ut th is twofo l d determination i nasmuch as we have grasped it in i ts ori gin , in asmuch as we h ave seen it spring from circumstances th em ­ se l ve s , and i n asmuch as we h av e been able to follow the movement of its gene s i s - is produced as the fundamental inte l l igibi l i ty of that m aterial i sm . The scarc i ty l i ved in interi ori ty by the organ i s the inorganic produc ing i tself as a negati ve determinati on of th e organi sm . And thi s lacuna i n asmuch as the whole organ ism i s modi fi e d by i t is the need. B ut the need , i n turn . [ i n] po s i ting its s uppre s s i on as an absolute end v ia the inorganic m i l ieu i s th e materia/it}' of th e action , its rea l ity and i ts foundation, i ts su bstance, and i t s urgenc y . Throug h the ne ed. the indi­ whoe ver he may be , and however gratui tous hi s ac t may be v idual ac ts upon pain of de ath , d i rectly o r indirectl y , for h i m self or for others. -

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39 1

5 . B ut the real structure of the action c annot be grasped by positive

(or combinatory) Reason . On the oth er hand, however, ne ither its obj ec tifi c ation alienated in its product, nor i ts bond of dependenc e u pon the organ ism ( whether thi s grounds i t at th e start or re absorbs it at the fi nish) , w i l l be what m ake s it pos sible to determ ine the ac tion wholl y and in its spec i fi c reali ty : i . e . to comprehend it. The ac tion, as a mediation between the organic and the i norganic , c an be nei ther one nor the other. Moreover, even if i t were produced as the un ity of these two status e s , such a unity would itself be an entire l y new statu s , wh ich would reveal itself only to dialectical investigation . For what appears striking i s the fac t that the action i s tran s-i ti v e , whereas the i nert i s permanence (changes and wear come to it from outside) an d the orga n i s m repetiti on. Unity spring s , in fact , from the quarteri ng of the cyclical [ m ovement] b y changes of exteri ority (ph y s ic o-chemical tran smutations ) . The cycle is actually there , s i nce the end as an ultimate term will be identi fie d w ith the original term (the function before the nee d) : in other word s , since the organ i sm must be at both ex tremities of the process . Only thi s projected re s toration i s precisely not cyclical, since it depends on a never prev iously encountered d i spos iti on of the field ' s inert e lements ; and since, moreover, thi s disposition - inasmuch as it must be produced by the agent impl ies that the organism tran sform s itself in order to reali ze it, and i s tran sformed by its realization . In the mos t favourable h ypothesi s , the restored organ i sm i s oth er in an oth er milieu. Only the rel ation of the former to the latter can remai n identical . The irreversibil ity of processes of exteriority , inasmuch as i t i s produced and governed by a quartered and exploded cyclic al [movement] , i s preci sely that . i n its tran­ scendence of a given towards the devi ated reproduction of the same , which i s the prac tical unity (or , if you prefer, the ontological s tatu s ) of the action . In th is elementary moment, m oreov er, we grasp that the action as a proce ss under way can never be a uni t y , onl y a unificati on : which means that every moment appears as a divers i ty that w i ll fi nd its i n tegrati on i n the prev i ous divers i ty total integration hav ing to be the re storation of the organism . From thi s standpoint it will eas i l y be under­ s tood that every stas i s of praxi s , defi n i ng the agent and h i s act by the obj ec t they have produced , g i v es the dead unity of a pas sive synthesis for the real movement of unification. In the course of the temporal­ ization, in fact, it can be a m atter only of a certain material c ombination that w ill be found at a higher degree of integrati on in the fol lowing movement, and that deri ves its meanin g ( as a pas si v e tran scendence) only from i t s relation to the subsequent moment. The alienating halt the stasi s of the ac tion can derive from the soc i al order. At a certain moment of technology and soci al hi s tory , wage l abour i s de fined by tasks that are shared among the labourers , none of which in itself con stitutes -­

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th e total i zation of the undertaking and most of which are reduced to el ementary procedure s . The man whom the regime determ ines in h is rea lity a s an ag en t by the n umber of needles he fi xes hourl y on to nauti cal instruments , and in h is organism by the means it gives h i m to sati s fy hi s needs, i s al ienated and reified : he is an i ne rt synthe s i s . B ut, in him and i n all the others to let itself be precisely , praxis refuses limited to that. T he action struggles again s t its own alienation through matter (and through m en , it goe s w i thout s ay i n g ) , inasmuch as it pos its itself dialectical l y as the un ifying tem porali zation transcending and pre serving within it al l forms of unity . So the dialectic appears as that which i s tru ly irreduc i ble in th e acti on : between the inert s ynthe s i s and the functional integration , it as serts i ts ontological s tat us as a temporal­ izing synthe sis which uni fi e s itself by u nifying, a nd i n order to unify itself; and never lets its elf be defined by the result whatever it may be 1 - that it has j u s t obtained. 1 2 [The main ( 1 95 8 ) manuscript breaks off at thi s point]

se par at e d off the pre c e d i n g fi ft y - od d pages and made them i nto an i ndepende n t S ection C , bec ause t hey s ud den l y took on the aspect o f an autonomo u s , pa r t l y recapituJ atory , study of prax i s , w h e re a s w h a t was i n it i a l l y i n v o l v ed was S I m p l y to i n d ic ate a l i m i t to the ontology o f t o t a l i z a t i o n l i nked to one feat u re of p ra x i � . it s inabil ity to c reate l i fe ( s ee pp. 3 5-6 abo v e ) . Th i s s t u d y c o u l d we l l have been e n v i saged as a t ra n s i t io n to t he proj e c ted sec ond m ajor p art of the work, i n w h i ch t he q u e stio n o f d i achro n l c total i zation w a s to be p o se d ; for we m ay note t h e s tre s s o n t he tem po ral dev e lo p men t of t h e c o n � ti tuen t p ra x i s whose bas i c featu re s cond i t i o n the ad v e n t of H i story Howe v e r , the p rob lem of s ynchron i c tota l i zation i n non - d i rectorial soc iet ies - annou nced o n pp . 1 2 1 and 1 8 3 as be i n g p l a n n e d to fol low that of Sov i e t soc iety h ad not yet bee n b ro ac h ed

1 1 2. I

have

,

,

-

Th e in terest of' the reflections contain ed in th e follovving pages lies in th e ,(act tha t they g ive th e reader a glimpse of th e route along 'vv h ich th e author l1'as intending to lead him to the book ' s end. Ne verth eless , I hesitated hefore publishing the m . Sartre tvas fond of sa.,v ing that he thought as he wrote . What does that mean ? That he did not set dovvn on paper just ideas already formed o r in the process of germination . That instead it often happened tha t he 'vv o uld explore at length the possibilities of an argumen t, and simply break off If a difficulty arose (l1'ithout seeking to correct his attempt) , only to recommence his dia logue w'ith himself from scra tch on another sheet. Th us, more perhaps than .(or o ther ph ilosoph ers , th e status of h is notes remains in doubt. A . E . -S.

•

•

1 13

Has the effect of trans forming o ur own p ast ( ' 39 war tran sforming our pas t into an easy p rey ) : i . e . its sig n ifica tion. In short, of distinguishing the lived, which was neverthele s s the absol ute , from the real ity which was lived. And of rejectin g a s an i l l usion what was grasped as an a bsolute . Whether one submits (as was the case with u s in 1 9 3 9 ) ; or whe ther one acts and fail s (at bottom , failure necessarily condemns a conspirac y , and does so al l the more , the fewer the chance elements to which it i s due ; it makes the person who fai l s i nto someone who has lived h i s life as a myth ) ; or whether one succeeds (the triumphant v ictor i s other, and sees h i s quest as oth er : secret failure of victory ) . S o the fact i s that the h i storic al event , whatever it may be , gives our past its transformation by v irtue of the fact that it was not expected; or because even if expected it was the expected unexp ected. Wel l , this past i s the tran scended; but it i s als o the e s sence created beh ind us , which helps u s ( a trampo line of transcendenc e ) . We modify it ourselves in our liv e s , but (apart from a cri s i s , an adventure or an acc ident) generally do so contin uously . T he h i stori cal fact : Charles B ovary dis­ c overing the letters . So it i s understood that the h i s torical event rends the past. Well , the past i s being (a soc i al determination, a priori : the worker) , essence (conditioning of oneself by the matter one has worked ) , and a pledge ( membership of a group ) . 1 Wel l , being i s tran sformed 1 4 ( example : de-ski l l ing of the craft worker,

1 1 3 . I n the m ai n te x t of t h i s second vol u m e of the C ritiq u e , the t i t l e s and s ub-titles have a l l been inserted by t he e d i tor. In the frag ments whic h fol low , h o w e v e r , Sartre has u sual l y h i m s elf ind i c ated the topi c on which h e i s reflecting : o n l y w ord s between square brackets r e pre sent e ditorial addi t i o n � . 1 1 4 . I n the marg i n o f th i s sentence . S artre n ote d :

tran � form � it� c au � e . ' 397

' H i story ::::: feed back

The effect

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technological unemployme nt , etc . , etc . , through the transformation of worked matter) . The essence i s re versed : the m atter worked by me ass umes another mean ing in the c ontext. The anarcho- syndical ist trade unions , di scovering the masses and the i r im potence in 1 9 1 4 � grasped them selves as not having been ab le to adj u s t , as hav ing functi oned i neffectual l y when they had though t they were function ing to fu ll effect (bad faith : the truth was th at i n some way they had not been func tion ing exteri or to me a l l th at we l l ) . In a word , change s to the worl d tran sform me i n my es sence , which i s an inner re lation ship ( a negation retai ning w i thin i tself in order to tran scend) . For example , it was the appearance of the masse s singing the Marse illaise that stupefied the trade -union leaders and changed them . B ut the y had not made those mas ses , and the masses did not act d i rectly upon them . A s for the p ledge, they were not released from it, yet they were no long er obl iged to fu l fi l it, s ince i t was inlposs ible to ful fi l i t . A choice : you w i l l do what you swore to al l the same ( implicit pledge by Chal l e to the i n s urrectioni sts in January 1 9 60 : 1 1 5 ' Go home, A l geri a will remain French ' ) : you stick to it, in order to assert yourse lf. You may die (suicide ) : th at mean s you affi rm yourse l f by death as not changing. S u i c i de i n th i s case - an aggre s sive ac t against H i s tory . You choose the absol ute permanence of B eing . Dupery : you have chosen non -bei ng and being -an -object-.for future H i story . So the h i s toric al event appears as the e x teri or tran sformi ng interi ori ty from the interi or, but without any nece ssary action of the e xterior upon exteriority (prax i s -v i olenc e ) and w ithout an immedi ate act of i nterior­ i zation. The event comes like a th ief: An u ltimatum : e i ther I must be other (and there i s a good chance I w i l l not be able to m anage it) , which mean s make myself a n other, or I must k i l l myselL otherw i se I shal l re main in bad faith throughout m y l i fe . . . The bad fai th : Hi story i s absurd . An example : refusal to see decoloni zat ion ( and permanent a pol i c y of betrayal is attri buted to de Gaulle. A s trange re vol ution) s i tuati on : one i s disqualifi ed and at the same time free and povreli'ul. The European s of A l geria are disqua lzfied, but they can revolt and ki ll . C an choose to die ki l l i ng ( w h ich i mplies that they have lost and know i t : of the practic al interiori zati on a s a negation in th e nanze ql' being change ) . B u t you c an al so refu se to see your di sq ual i fi c ation as anything other than an acciden t that you can change and so 5 t and fast: betray aL etc . You act w i th the fee l i n g that you are re - establish inJ.? th e sta tus quo ( 1 3 M ay ) .

1 15

D u ri n g t h e "I o -c a l l e d . Da y � of the B arri c ade � ' i n A J g i e r�

the E u ro pean p op u l a t i o n to G e n e ra l de G a u l le ' � A l ge r i an p o J i c y

-

a

re ac t i o n on the part of

A PP EN D I X

399

So the historical event modi fi e s me according to the past ek-s tasis : i . e . in my being . B ut al so in the ek- s tasis of the future : (a) The most important th ing : i t c an destroy me or c hange me brutal ly in my i nertia and my pas sivity. 1 am impri soned. A war: 1 am killed. My intere s t : I am ruined . (b) B u t also it makes me , in the prax is of the social indi v idual , into an oth er. I become a warrior ( 1 940 ) , my concerns w i ll be other : to kill , not to be kil led, etc . This may solely affect the indiv idual in h i s indiv idual life : the ruin of my parents ( a soci al fact, but not neces saril y historical in the active sen se) c uts short my studie s, ob liges me to earn m y l i v i ng. (c) B ut , above all , I am involved in a changed society and one that gives itself other aim s . So I change . C ase of the man of the Left ( an SFIO soc i al i st) tran sformed by the general movement of H i s tory into a reactionary , albe i t remaining w hat he i s . Case of the Second International trade unioni st ( a craft w orker) . Case of the craft w orker and h i s means of action : a l im ited s trike , becau se he is needed; but - with spec ialized machines . a strike w i th out power. While the masses find their own riposte , there is no longer any spec i fi c remedy for the c raft worker. H i s strike become s a trap, w hich h as tens de-skilling and technological unemp loyment. So all that rem ain s i s to become l ike a new man. Try to get by, invent prac tices in a tran sformed practical field. (d) B ut the free practic al organ i s m is himself affected . A s a rul e he has freedom to adapt, on condition that he systematic al ly and dialectically carries out the liqui dation being , essence, pledge. If he doe s not do so in time, he pas ses i nto another soc i al c ategory (example : reac tionary , or less left-wing ) . In th is position, however, h i s intere s ts and need s lead him to perform acts and defend c auses which c an no longer be s uc h : reason leads him to use arg uments which are obsolete . A real trans ­ formation th rough transformation of the practical field. In other words : h i s obli gations obl ige h im to seek arguments or practic al defences which are no longer there . He has become stupid. And yet h e may rem ai n bril l ian t , impre s s iv e : people do not see his obj ective s tupidity ( which i s interiorized h e does not see i t either) . This radical tran sformation is rea l (dec l i ne in purchasing power, mobilization , etc . ) and material: for its source is al way s . more or less dire c tl y , transformations of worked matter. An e x ampl e : German indus­ trial expansion before 1 9 1 4 leads to the imperi al i st struggle for markets. Hence, war . Problem posed anew after defeat lead s to World War 1 1 . With a second sol ution still c apital i s t . Ruin of social democracy . Inasmuch as thi s tran sformati on i s materi al , i t i s incomprehen sible at

B OO K I I I

400

first for individuals and e nsemble s : comprehension i s prax i s . B ut we are at the level of the prac tico-inert, and i t i s the practico- inert which transforms itself in the individual (lesser evil ) , and tran sform s the social indiv idual and even the free practical organism. B ut the practico- inert i s anti -dialectical and not comprehensible: it i s reversal of prax i s , and counter-fi nality . S o the non-comprehens ible enters into the com­ prehe n sible and the modifi cation i s an unintel l igible theft. At the s ame time , it i s an apparition of the O ther (for example : advancement of the Arabs) as an other : i . e . the Other I become for myself springs from the revealed exi stence of oth ers . Of course , al ienation i s dai ly (example: a worker) . B ut the c hang e of al ienation come s from others ( a mob il ized w orker) . Lastl y , I am m yself respons ible and I fee l it ( the settlers in bad faith) . In a certain way, I produce the exterior object which c omes upon me l ike a thief and I grasp myself as producing it (even on the Left : the generals ' l revolt 1 6 was a reaction to an ac tion that had comprehended the v i rtual 1 7 1 certainty of that revolt) .

1 1 6 . I n A l g i e r s , i n Apri l 1 96 1 1 1 7 . Compare th i s w ith w h at S artre s a y s about the h i stori c a l event in L ' Idiot de la

fam ille , v o l .

3 , p . 4 3 4 . The thre e v o l umes of t h at w ork are i ntere s t i n g t o read as a

c om p l e m e n t to the Critiqu e of D ia le ctica l R eason . In t h e m , S a rtre went more deep l y i n t o es pec i a l l y

3 , where h e interpreted the ohjecti ve s ide of F l a u bert ' s n e u ro s i s . i . e . what it o wed to the soc ial en v i ronment and h i s t o ri c a l eve n t s . n u merous t h e m e s dea l t w i t h

h e re ,

in

v o l ume

•

There are several kinds in h i s tory . 1 . Time of the system : capital i s m . 2 . Time of secondary system s : colon i al i s m . I f capital ism can sustain th e cost of decolonization (even temporari ly i n the long run it c annot) , the secondary system i s overthrown ins ide capital i sm. 3 . Time of general and partial events : Algerian War - seven years »'ere n ecessary . 4 . Very swift time of the April m i l i tary insurrecti on ( won or lost in three day s ) , time of partic u lar men .

40 1

I

SIGNIFICATION A N D MEANING IN H I STORY

(a) First re sol ve thi s q uestion The s igni fi c at ion of a h istory i s not its mean ing . An arrested hi story (that of Pompe ii or the I ncas) has no mean ing for u s . It had one for those who li ved it in i n teriority It may have a signification : if we fi nd the en semble of factor s th at helped to arre st it. At the same time , the factors th at developed it. An example : agrari an society its ceil ing reached demographic gro w th (or a catas­ trophe a famine) , system no l onger functioning (institutions no longer allowing counter-measure s : stockpiling, etc ) signification. Meaning what i s l i v e d i n interiority . The meaning of an agrari an society may be its everlasting nature . Let us be clear : an archety p e , etc . (an ideology ) and a pra c tice of pre se r v ation In other words , mean ing i s a practice setting its goal v i a an ideology Neverthe le s s , mean ing may be partial (never fal se) or total , depending on whether it i s set on the bas i s of a total or a parti al conception of m an (for e x ample, the meaning of con s ervative hi stori es negating Hi sto r y i s partial : in them , Hi story i s made by negating i tself and c onseque n t l y escape s the prac tic al and becomes part of proc e s s ) . Moreover, as we sha l l see, the total meaning i s grounded upon need and the human re lation (Another examp l e : end of the ancient world. No meaning Or a Speng ler­ i an meaning. Or a meaning of universal h i s tory . ) (b) Progre s s cannot be a s ignification : it is lived i n interiority , a practical orga ni z ation of the total i z a tio n It i s an act. For it includes the future ( in the form of belief- wi l l ) . And , at the same time , a total i z i ng knowledg e : society is in progress and I continue i ts p rogress . l Whether History has a meaning : a d i alectical problem . I 8 To b e .

.

,

,

,

=

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.

.

.

.

.

1 1 8 . I n or de r to fol l o w the e v o l ut i on of S artre ' s th o u g h t regard i n g t h e re l at i on s h i p betw e e n d i alectic and H i story , a n d reg ard i n g prog re s � , see the 1 94 7 Cah iers pour u n e m orale, e spec i a l l y p p . 5 4-7 1 . 402

403

APPEN DIX

consi dered ins ide History , as a conception of totalization . B asical l y , a a mean i ng . B ut th i s i s not enough : the totali zati on under way totali zati on must be given as be ing th is particu lar totalization. ( Desti n y . Permanence . Decadence and invol ution . Progre s s . ) A t the s ame time as be ing a practice , however, meaning overflows the agent: there i s a dialect i c a l ri gour that e scape s . I make H i story , l ike everybody , but I am 1 not it: if it has a meaning, thi s is inasmuch as it i s . 1 9 -

II

PROGRES S IN THE U S UAL PRACTICA L SENSE

De facto , whether progre s s e x i st� i n H i s tory or not , the fact of g i v ing a

name to the total meaning of H i story is an extrapola tion of i ts primary mean ing . S o what i s progres s (non-relati ve : an art i s t ' s progre s s i s absol ute , fo r e x a mple) but i n s i de H i story ? Th i s bas ic notion is al s o a knowab l e , c o m p rehens ible and l ived reality : on the bas i s of the practical free organism . In so far as the organism reproduce s h i s l i fe and o n completing h i s effort fi nds h imself th e same , i t i s pos s i ble at a p inch to speak of a progre s s on the basis of a deterioration . B ut th i s is in order to re ­ establish what i s . The interest of th i s progre s s (progre s s of digestion : people hardly speak of i t i n tho se term s ) i s that it sho w s the nece s s ity, in order to defi ne progre s s , of an ori ginal term restored in the future . The progre s s after deterioration of an organic en semble i s a movement to wards its ,re storation . B ut the l i mit imposed here by re storation of the identical (in theory) causes progress to be given as lim ited. It i s a passage from the identical to the identical . Hence, a mean s and not an end . Ex trapolation, if the end i s infi nite l y di stant , makes the latter into a dire c t i ng i dea ( i n the Kanti an sense) an d progre s s into an end in i tself. Characteri sti c s of progre s s : 1 . A phenomenon of directio n . Goe s from x to y . Hence, observabl e : an o rgan I s m . (a ) Nutrition and as s i mi l ation . (b) Reproduction. Note , however: a recurren t phenomenon. Hence , one already observed on l1 un1ero us occasions. Even for re prod uction : rec urrence and pre servation •

•

1 19

·

I n se rt i on o n t h e bac k ( n orm a l l y l e ft b l a n k ) o f the prece d i n g M S p a g e :

Doe s H i s t o ry h a re a mea n i n g ? B ut " h av i n g " i � a b � u rd , I n re a l i ty

'

( a ) H i s tory , i f i t e x i �t � , i � t h e pe rnlan e n t p o '-, � i b i l i t y o f a m e an i n g for h u man l i fe

( b ) \1e a n i ng i � t h e p e rm a ne n t p o � � i b i l i t y . for t h e m an o f t h e pre 5 e n t , t h at a H i �tory

eXIsts .

,

BOOK III

404

of an order; the directing e lements protect the spec ific feature s . Orig inal l y : karyokinesi s reconstitu tion. Whence the idea of immortal ity. In case No . 1 (n utrition ) , the aim i s the preserva tion of order through an exterior change. The re sult, i n spite of everything, i s an interior change: ( i ) food : may be inadequate , adequate , poor or too abundant � causes disass imi la­ tion , and if it is too rich � karyokine s i s ; ( i i ) karyokinesis : mainte nance o f orde r, immortality , bu t i denti ty become s dua l . Order is not pre served, but recommen ced. I n sho rt , a complex fac t: identity i s aimed at , as against change , but ach ieved by change and at once changed in its v ery real ity . Changing to remain the same . At once , it remains the same an d changes . It is other and the sam e . Chang ing to remain the same mean s remai ning the same and chang ing . It i s opti ng for change ( rather th an for death ) . The wealth of th e organ i sm c ome s from the fact that it is a nihi l ation of identity , i . e . of inert- being. It i s inertia that i s lacking , and instead of he ing wi she s to reconstitute itself, and become s the po ssible of an organism that i s sim ul taneously al l inertia and , at the same time , an absence of be ing: i .e . an ab sence of inertia. B ut the orientated process i s not of it self a progre s s , although it show s u s the di al ectic of change and the i dentical , at the level of the single direc tion . Why ? B ecause there i s no fina lity . Even though , dialectical l y , we did see the end emerge at th is level . For there i s no perseverance of the organism in its being, s i nce the organ i sm has no being , merely a tendency to acquire i ts being to be that be ing which it i s not. So we do not have the i mmanent end that people suppose, but already in part a tran scendent end. The organ ism in the c i rcularity of its fu nction s , for e x ample, i s perpetual ly itself (it is itself: breathing, even when it breathes out or breathes in) at whatever moment it i s v iewed. Yet practi cal ly i t never stops changing. Th is means that the end is not in i t , but haunts i t . 2 . B ut th e term must really be posed as a n end. I t is not necessary to adopt th i s end, it i s enough to recognize i t , i . e . comprehend it. Analytic R eason can not comprehend progre s s : it i s an object of comprehension which , of course , fi rst means that on l y a praxis can recogn i ze progre s s . In other word s , progre s s i s a prac tica l structure in its dial ectical completi on . The progres s of c u l ture . B ut you can also worry about the progre s s of i l l iteracy . An end i s ascribed to a serial consequence of some gi ven pol icy. Actual l y , that i s not so wron g : a counter- final ity and sometimes (no el ite ) a fi nality. Enemy force s are progres sing (at the cost of heavy losses) insi de the country , tow ard s the capi tal . In th i s case, an orientated proce ss in space- time i s invol ved (advancing at such and such a speed) , but one wh ere space is gi ven as the dom in ant . (Time is cruc i al , and can lose o r win everything for that proc e s s . B ut the aim is to occupy s p ac e as quickly as pos s i b l e . In the c ase of d i ge s t i v e proc e s s e s , t i m e is -­

,

,

APPEN D I X

405

cruc ial re storation as fas t as poss ible space i s the mean s . ) A s s im i l ation to an end: the illness i s progre s s i n g (counter- final ity : the illne s s holds its total itary un ity from the retotali z i n g movement of the organism ) . I n �hort , at the poi nt we have reached : p rogre s s i mpl i e s a practical comp r ehen s ion ; - progres s comprehen sive study of a prax i s i n de v elopment ; - progress im p l ies a transcen den t goal first set; - progres s - con stituent dialectic; - progre s s contradiction between chan g e and permanence. In fact , i n th is contradiction a term al way s escapes man as an agent. Both the permanence of relat ions must adapt to the change (but i s al ways affected) and the change ha s to b re ak permanent s tructu r e s Hence, at the very sourc e (con s ti tuent dialectic) of the noti on, there is i n the very notion of progres s the idea of s omething e sc aping action being e x teriority w i th re spect to ac tion and yet a result of it. We can count upon man to accompl i sh his ai m , but something outside of h i m a nd us must (if you l ike) be a favou rable coun ter-finality. From th i s viewpoint, the tendenc y to i solate progre s s from the goal i s v ery s i gnificant: you make progre s s ; there i s progre s s . I n the child ' s upbri nging, i t i s ulti matel y (given thes e ai ms) the c urrent praxis which serves as a mean s ( apprenticesh ip : you do the work i n order to do other work) . Progres s i s grasped not s olel y i n some success ( a problem re solv ed) but in its speed, deci sivene s s , elegance , etc . The assumption i s thu s : making teach es you to make . T h e tool i s forged as it forges . B ut th is s ignifies a certai n inerti a at the basi s of a c tiv ity (motor h abits, mental schemata, etc . ) ; and thi s inertia itself ( i nasmuch as it will be someth ing to be transcended: both in order, v i a it, to manage the next exerci se, and i n order to tran scend yourself v i a the exerc i se toward s a new c omplex of schemata and set-ups) become s a moment of progre s s . S im i larl y , progre s s w i l l manifest itself inside the practical fi e ld through every moment of the reorganization. A tool i s made at every moment of the operation ; a certain state ( reco rded labour) of the inert , bringing the tool closer to its en d, represents a moment of progre s s . 3 . Progre s s i s originally the fact of direction, t he orientated proce s s called labour, grasped i n its development B ut this impl ies , at the v ery level of the free practic al organi sm , that progre s s i s dialectical: i .e . that the only te c hni q ue of progres s i s con tradiction . ( a ) Direct meaning of praxis : p racti c al field, c ontradiction s through determi n ation , etc . (h) Temporal l y : if there i s p r og re s s , there i s an irreduc ibi li ty of chang e , i . e . of one moment to the preced i n g moment : not a n i rrevers i bi l i ty (for you can _.

.

.

B OO K I I I

406

undo w hat you have done) but an inabi l ity to as sert the identity of M 1 w ith M . No caus ality . A dialectic . And non-retrogradab i l i ty : you can return to 0, but you are no longer the same. In ev ery sen se. Hence , ontological non -retrogradab i l i ty and irreducibi l i ty , in the sense of kn olA.'I­ 1 20 edge and rea lity . So progre s s cannot e xcept in v ery parti c ul ar i nstanc e s , and above a l l a s a momentary d etermination pre sent itself as c ontinuous growth . The fact of moving from one point to another (a s imple growth-c urve) cannot characterize a progre s s ive proce s s : that would be to forget co unter­ final ity . Practical field. Worked matte r. Counter- finali ty (e xpen ses ; or else, by ac ting upon a given e lement, you make some other element more frag ile, etc . ) . Reduction of counter- fi nal ity . Return to the task, but obligation to compensate . In short , constant contro l , constant correction . Even if you know in adv ance the moments o f l abour, the co unter­ fi nalities that w i l l dev elop, and the mean s to reduce them , it w i l l ne ver­ theless be neces sary to carry o ut the operation an e w , dialectical l y . Even if the circumstances are sti l l the same . ( B ut that i s an abstract : in fact , they are al w ay s new in some w ay . ) B ut how to know that a ne w (and perhaps stronger) contradiction w i l l bring you closer to your goal? You know it i f the op eration h as already been c arried out. Or if you c an see ahead. Regarding dia lectical predictability : it i s not, l ike anal ytic predict­ abi lity , the proj ection into the future of the pre sent invariant s y stem . The l atter i s nece ssary (w ith its mathematical apparatu s ) , but true prediction retain s it w ithi n itself: it i s a reasoned inv ention of the future . On the bas i s of relati vely fi xed structure s , and of invariant and combined el ements . B ut, above al l , on the bas i s of an ' i dle ' practica l movement, by an abstrac t operation producing an abstract future . In other word s , the dialectical future i s alone capable of j u stifying predi c tion : in order to be other and the same , I cast m y se l f tow ards a future that already reveal s i tse l f as the same and other. The irreducibi l i ty of the ne w woul d make prediction i mpos si ble, if m y re l ation to the com ing new were not already an irreduc ibi l ity . In short , if the practical organ i sm were not its own future . Or, if you l ike , if the dialectical

i n v o l I , a c r i t i q ue of the Cartes ian not ion of t i me as a h om o g e n e o u s c o n tin u u m - s u c h as is �ti l l ac cepte d , a c c or d i n g to the author, by contemporary M arx l �m and of the c once p t i o n of p rogre s s wh i c h such a notion d e term i ne s ' D ialec t i c as a movement of re al i t y c o l l ap se s i f t i me i s not d i alecti cal . . M arx i s m c aught a g l i m pse of t rue tempora l i t y when i t c r i t i c i z e d and de s t ro y e d the bou rgeo i s notion of p r o g r e � s - wh i c h n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e s a homogeneou� m i l i e u and co-ord i n ate s which w o u l d a l low u s to s i t u ate the p oi n t of depart ure and the point of arri val . B ut - w i thout e v er hav i n g said so - Marx i sm h a s renounced t h e s e studies and p re ferred to make u se of p r o g re s � ag a i n for its own be nefi t . ' ( Th e P, oh/em o{ M e th od. pp 9 1 -2 . ) 1 20 . S e e

.

,

"

"

"

"

A P PE N D I X

407

movemen t were not ori ginally the l i ved re l ation ship of the irreduc ible� predi cted future ( i . e . made pre sent to me, wi thout leaving the future and abstraction) , inasmuch as it create s the pre sent through determi nat ion of the past. X i s going to leave Y . He f()resees h i s re gret. B ut to fore see , here , i s not to know : it i s already to experienc e , as an emotional abstrac t , the irreducible novelty of h i s sol i tude . I h ave taken a negative e x ample as be ing simpler, but pos iti ve ones abound. In other words : in in teriority , quanti ty i s tran sformed into qual ity . S imply becau se it i s i nteri orized. The i ncreased quanti ty i s th us predictable by anal ytic Reason , on the bas i s of precise data . B ut through it (because di alectical Reason mai ntai n s unity) the q ual itati v e transformation must itself be foreseen : i . e . experien ced. The time of H i s tory i s a dialectic . B ut it i s a constituted dialectic . To foresee the pre sent - to comprehend the pre sent as it w i l l appe ar in the future . To effect the recl as si ficati on of forc es that wil l be implemented ) . 1 2 1 in itself (by p l acing one self i n s i de 4 . Intern al contradi c ti on of progre s s . Progre s s i s nece ssari ly a totaliza tion . For it i s pursuit of the re storation or e s tablishment of a totality (the organism re stores itself, in order to remain whole ) . A student advances to wards interiori zati on of a knowl­ edge that is a total i ty . Let u s take th i s example. We know : (a) that he will never succeed, should that total ity exist; ( b) that thi s total ity doe s not exist outside th e permanent totali zati on of totalization s ; (c) th at during h i s study, achieved science (as sumed to be total) i s tran scended by dev elopi ng sc ience ( which i s not taught) ; (d) that the student wants the s c ience only in order to tran scend it (for example, as a scienti st, he wants to go further) and not merely in order to apply it. For th i s very reason , however, every new degree of progre s s repre sents the totalization of acquired knowledge by that which has j u st been acquired. The new knowledge inc l udes withi n it all the old form s of knowledge that i l l uminate the new . The new know ledge i s a totalization of all the old form s set in motion by the re sol u tion of the new problem , which a s s umes s omething more i n addition . Conv ersel y , the novelty il luminates the old form s of knowledge : the fundamental i s in the future , because it i s the total . The ori gi nal fo undations are abstract . I n real ity, there i s alway s a circularity : the new turn s back upon the old, totali zati on; prax is which conditions it. ' Feedback . ' B ut c irc ul arity totalization. The enemy Army ' s progre ss tow ards the capital implies =

1 2 1 . T h i s paragra p h i s on the bac k o f t h e pre c e d I n g M S page .

408

BOOK III

organization of the conquered prov inces . The fall of the cap ita l i s aimed at as a negative totali zation (dis appearance of the means of defence) ; and al so positively as a total occupation , or (Pari s 1 940) the equivalent of a total occupation (w ith the industrial and developed zone in Army hands ) . This totalization is at once a totalizing reorgani zation of the practica l field, and a total ization of the time of the practical operation . The operation as s uch has alway s becom e : i . e . the pre sent p rax i s , as a temporal development, envelops the past praxi s w ithin i t. B ut imme di ­ the end in human progre s s , i . e . progre s s towards an end atel y achieved (Madame Bovary wri tten) i s in no way the real ization p ure and s imple of the pro-j ected end. It i s i t s totalization with all the totalizations of totalizations which hav e been its moments . In s uch a way that the contradiction of progre s s i s that predicti on i s nece s s ary : the end i s pro-jected i n order to be achieved , and, in a certain manner, something i s known, something i s pro-j ected; from another angle, howev er, the prediction the original pro-j ect or end - i s itse lf retotali zed by the end achieved and thus can i n no way predict its concrete retotalization . It predicts that it will be retotalized, but no t how . So in progress we go towards what we want (goal) and what we could neither want nor predict (totali zing end) . Furthermore , l abour transforms u s and w e arriv e other at the pursued end. B ut how to judge, in such conditions , whether there i s pro gre s s , sinc e but do not know in its total we know schematically in the abstract concrete reality the end which turns back upon the project, in order to absorb it and illuminate i t otherwise? In order to give ourselves become other another illumination of ourselves having an abstract proj ect at the outset? Here w e find all the difference that separate s the process of direction (going from the o rgan i s m to the organ i sm wh ere all thi s exi sts , but enveloped) from progress (as a pas sage by h uman praxi s from i t s abstract goal to its reali zation). Progre s s doe s not restore, it institutes . So we arriv e at the following first conclus ion. Progre s s is never a restoration . If it e x i st s , it is as orientated chan ge. And thi s real change (constant i rreducibility, irreversibil ity ) takes place towards a term that the free practical organi sm can know only in part. Thi s term , at the same time as it realizes the original prediction­ intention , envelops and transcends i t by totalizing it with all the s ubsequent moments that are i rreducible to it (temporal ity ) and w i th al l its re sults (inscribed in matter) and by incarnating it (contact w ith the world, unfore �een res ults ) . It i s alre ady not entirely [ a restoration ] for the

•

APPEN DIX

409

organism itself. For the re stored term , despite everything, implies a change ( as we have seen ) , and beside s , there i s a practi c al action in the fact (for example ) of eati ng . You transform the field : e . g . you c ancel the s urro unding food, and compe l yourself as a pure organ ism to abandon th e place or die (animal m igrations ) . In thi s case , however, how do you determ i ne whether you are going tow ards realization , or towards (for example) death or a les ser be ing? Who say s that what you want no longer existing , other than as a partial structure , in what you w i l l have done will not be a change s uch that: (a) in the simple st c as e , it contradicts the schematic beginning; (b) in the more complex c ase , it creates a practical individual radic a l l y different from the one existing at the beg inning? In other word s , what element of compari son will ensure that you decide you are getting c loser to a goal , such as it was originally given? If there i s repetitio n , progre s s may be noted : I foresee th e past. Hunting or gathering : repetition of the act . Known con sequence s . If th ere i s innovation (the hunter moves territory) : impo s s ible to be entirely sure of the result. Change of h unting ground s , change of weapons : unforeseen c onsequence s to be lotali z e d (I am not even th inking about incarnation action of the world but about e lements of the c irc uit: appearance of some different mode or other) . Introduction of the s l ave (for a fam ily) progre s s , but tran sform s its internal struc ture . Appearance of trade and trading posts for the Eskimos progres s and also de struction . The Danish economy i s introduced into the circuit. The reproduction of life (a direct rel ationship between you , your labour i n the env ironment, and your self) gives way to the indirect relationship: I produce for the other (divis ion of labour) , who in exchange c onditions me (rudi ­ mentary colonization) . I change my hunti ng ( walru s , seal , bear � fox, formerly de spi sed because its meat is poor) . I enter the c ircu it of profit; i . e . these pelts are sold not for the needs of others , which would still have been direct, but for the profi t of some people in a developed society where the sati sfaction of needs i s always indirect, as a (hidden) economic motor, and where acc umulation allows lux ury ( i . e . s ymbolic , rather than productive or reproduc tive) expenditure . Who shall say if thi s is progre s s ? And from wh at point of v iew? However, it m i ght be said that if need is satisfied more easily , and if th is is th e aim , studying the standard of liv ing al l ows one to pronounce . Cf. Eskimos : standard of li ving higher than an un skilled worker' s ? B ut are s uch compari sons really possib l e ? D o they have any meaning? Furthermore � i s thi s c hange that w i l l liquidate the superstructures ( Christian ity , money) an advance in this domain (pauperizati on) ? Lastly , does the change of diet (albeit lim i ted) not destroy the organ i s m ? The example must be taken up ind i v idual l y . O n the bas i s of trading

BOOK III

410

posts be ing set up, let us imagine a fami l y head te mpted to exploit their adv antage s : the idea of impro vement. In thi s sense , for the person who has hi storical awarene s s at the outset, progre ss becomes no longer maintenance by the ac t but a po si tive transformati on of the prac tic al field by me, of me by my total i zing effort, and of me by the practical field, leading to tran sformation of myself and the fie ld i n such a w ay that , be tween this new be ing an d thi s new field, the relations w i l l be better than between me and my fi eld. But thi s pre s upposes a hazard an element continually eluding me given that , even thu s , positive (purely positive) improvement is a gamble. Also, a calculation of the new counter- finaliti e s . No matter. What may it be, th is re lationship with someth ing other than me and my field, wh ich i s none the le s s me and my field? Two aspects : 1 . the most common : chang ing to stay the same. Here again, two aspects : (a) the field ' s resources increase , but also its counter- fi nalities or its re sources change. I pre serve the relationship: c hangi ng to stay the same . The image of c hange may be supplied to me by others , without my appreciating the consequences ( 1 8 30 : purchase of machine s ) . Enlargeme nt of the fi e l d

t

s i tuat ion 1

Narrowing

s i t uation 1 1

of the field

(b) The field ' s re sources dim i n i s h . [ Conditions J tougher. So I invent a too l ; or I tn ake (marginal ) sacrifices to remain alive or what I was . I t may move towards regression : I change by dimi n i shing , i n order to keep the minimum of what I call m e (perhap s the simple life) . 2 . Changing to improv e yourself: in power, i n effi cacy , or in interiori zed quali tie s (kno wledge , etc . ) . (a) Negati v e : Thi s i s sti l l simpl e . The si tuati on is unacceptable. An unacceptable prac ti cal field, because for e x ample food i s inadequate ( I emigrate , I ru in my ne ighbour, I invent a tool ) . Comprehensible, because I move from the non-human to the human . An out- of- work Ital ian from the South, I leave I taly or go up to the North , because I am o ther than an enforced idler; because as a man I consider my self a ltvorker. B ecause I want to real i ze my pos s ible , which is to work and reproduce my l ife . So I go to M i lan. B ut i n M ilan I am proletarianized (if I used to be a 1 22 peasant) and northernized. Rocco and his Bro thers : uprooting . An

1 22

F i l In by V i �c o n t i ( 1 9 60 ) .

APPENDIX

41 1

unpredictable tran sformati on. Th e person who ends up there will make me into an other, at the same time as real i z ing the pos si ble that I am . (b) Positi ve : Thi s is the harde st to grasp . Basical l y : I take adv antage of favourable c ircumstances to increase my potenc y , my efficac y , my as sets , beyond wh at (see I . (a) above) would be neces sary in a mi l ieu in growth to maintain me suc h as I am (changing to be the same). Changing to become o th er. Reason s : 1 . I t i s perhaps circum stances themse lves which obl ige me to do it. Th e ne lV in carnation in the practical fi e l d doe s not al low me to remain the same any longer. It i s nece s s ary to d i sappear, or el se to become much more effective muc h more powerful in the new so ciety than you were in the previous one . The proce s s embarked upon implies abandoning, one by one , all the set- ups and al i the struc tures that made me what I was ; and furthermore acce ding , in the soc iety itself, to a ne tt} level of p ower, wealth, etc . I buy a machine, but competition operates in suc h a w ay that this is not enough . I f I buy several , I beat my c ompetitors but find m yself at the head of a l arge enterpri se . To protect my intere sts I become quite othe r, with other interests and an other fragi lity. 2 . The main [reason] : Contradiction in u s between repetition and change . Ou r p erson i s repetition . Fo r e x ample : I sanctioned at the outset by recurring feasts am my birthday , or my name day . I am French and 1 4 J u l y . It is san ct ioned at the sam e time by rites of pas sage, which integrate devel op­ ment as being my essence. Initiation . Marriage, etc . In fi rm s , promotion . The source is the biological movement of the organism; and integration into a soc iety for which my education i s a cost, and whi ch consequently wants the expendi ture to have a return and pushes for more a nd more i ntegration. I must move from one (maintained) state to the other (as a producer, or at any rate a worker l i beral i f not manual) . Even thi s is a repetition: the c ommon ensembl e , today as yesterday , needs manual workers with the same techn ical abi lity (assuming that , over a short cyc l e , techniques do not change or bare l y so) . And the child already knows he is going to repeat (his father, or the people of h i s father ' s generation) . At the s ame time , however, he has to change h imself in order to repeat (apprenticeship, etc . ) and the change brings him into a c ertain ambiguous posi tion . It make s h im become what he i s : i .e . gives him the (p ast) es sence of his predecessors as a future . At the same time (diachron i c el ement) it pos its in the form of an es sence ( a transcended past) a less determ i ned future , whose origin comes from the (interiorized) contradictions be tween the teachi ng of s c i ence and technical innov ations . S o he \v i l l be be y ond hi s past e s sence : h e will tran s c e n d i t towards

412

B OO K I I I

himself ( actual ization). Thi s h imself i s an essence, but c onstituted contra­ dic tori l y by a past being ( that of fathers) and a poss ible . The possible i s beyond the tran scended being; but although rigorously given as a tra n ­ scendence towards , i t doe s not have the prec i si on of being . I t env elops that precision , transc ends it and keeps it, and mov es tow ards a state of greater prec i sion : well defined inasmuch as it will be greater precisi on , but in reality indeterminate (precision of instruments: but which ones? , etc . ) . In short , in so far as the child changes to be the same (as h i s father) he will affi rm his possibil ity of being other, inasmuch as he i s beyond his father to the e x tent that the emergent techniques are beyond the old one s . It goes without saying that thi s inc ipient movement can be carried out only in certain classes and at c ertain moments. The young w orker, before being a rev olutionary and in a period of technical stagnation , sees before him h i s father ' s destiny recommenced. That c an happen in the bourgeois class ( see Nizan ) . In short, his destiny i s h i s father ' s past (combi nation of the two e k - stase s : future and past) . This m ay bri ng about a rupture , through a rej ection of De stiny . B ut then, a rejection of one self: oneself ­ that was the possible beyond being ; by breaking one ' s being, however, one fi nds oneself on the naked path of one ' s own relation w ith the i ndetermination of a possibl e . What to become? So we hav e : 1 . continuously appearing progre s s (tran scendence without contra­ diction) . In reality , contradiction i s i nsta ntly given in the negation of the already given being . In a w ord, the self of a child i s the negation through transcendence of the roles that constitute the es sence he i s given (his father ' s being ) ; 2. catastrophic progress : the negation of Destiny dri v e s you to break the essence rather than transcend i t (you do both : you break, but you preserv e ) . N i zan retaining to the end a relationship with his father that ultim ately manifested itself i n his break w i th the Part y ( 1 9 3 9 ) : redi scovers his alienation . How ever, the broken esse nce c eases to be an element of direction ; between the past alienation and the new ali enation , there i s a transcendence w ithout any clear determination . di scontinuity In other words, continuity i s never re al ly continuous presupposes continuous transcendence or, if you like , presupposes refer­ enc e s of continuity . 1 23 B u t above all , from the outset, there i s an ontologic al interiori zation of the organic development , through negation and pre serv ation in tran-

1 2 3 . I n L ' Idiot de la fam ille , v o l

3 , pp.4 34-4 3 , S artre carrie s on h i s m e ditation on the

i nterplay of the continuous and t he di scontin u o u s i n h i s t or y - n o l onger s i mp l y at the l e v e l

of the c h i ld and the pre v iou s generatio n , but now co n s i d e r i n g the succe�S10n o f ge neral i on� .

413

A P P EN D I X

scende nce : of itself, the organ i sm i s a sys tem in progre s sive , then regressive, dev elopment. The regression i s grasped only dimly at the outset: the child fears death but n ot old age . Even the adult finds it hard to imagine . Trotsky : old age i s the most unpredictable event that can happen to man . He meant that forces i n mid development cannot transcend themselv e s towards the prediction of their regre s s ion (it i s on the basis of an incipient regression that it becomes possible for downcast spirits to foresee their decrepitude) . S o the c h i ld conceives change towards the plenitude of h i s being (when I ' m grown up, etc . ) . At that moment he is l 24 going (see B eing and Nothingness ) towards h i s being ( already alien­ ated: ' What w i l l you be when you grow up? ' ' I ' m going to be an admiral , a boxer, a pilot ' , etc . ), or perhaps : I wan t to be Chateaubriand and nothing else. ' Ro le of identifi c ation w ith the father, or of models . At thi s lev e l , being ( i n itself and for itself) becomes the reg ulating idea of c hange. It orientates transcendence . It alienate s . At the same time : v iolent negativ i ty (contrad iction s , etc . ) . Impo s s ibility for Flaubert to identify with h i s father as h i s e lder brother doe s . Th e se two aspects are linked : profound negativ ity of soci alized fac tic ity . Socialized facticity : not onl y am I not the fou ndation of my own e x istence , I am not even that of its soc ial predeterm inatio n s . Exampl e : for y o ung A lgerians s ince the Constantine massacre, 1 25 impossibility of demanding integration (not j ust out of resentment, but through disintegration of the concept) ; instead, they were (and other generations still more s o ) conditioned to demand i ndependence and the nation by their fathers ' defeat. However, at the same time they h ave been formed by previous c ircumstances and ass imi lation . Hence, catastrophic progre s s i nduced by consequences . What i s left? Ambivalence towards France. With every Frenchman who sees them as brothers , they have a feeling of brotherhood. And at the same time socialized facticity future. Their future : a future of change and repetition. And within , novel transformations of the situ ation (technology , Constantine mas s acre , etc . ) . It i s the e nsemble of thi s catastrophic s ide (a neg ation of s oc ialized facticity) and of thi s repetitive but actuall y c hanging s ide ( a realization of soci alized facticity by apprenticeship, and d isparity between the situa­ tion foreseen by the fathers and that l ived b y their children ) which constitutes progress, as a march towards everyone ' s being (at once determined and indeterm inate) . Synthetic organi zati o n of the whol e : '

1 24 . Being a nd No th ingness, pp. 1 24 ff. and 566 ff. 1 2 5 . The

refere n c e

i s to the h arsh

C o n s tanti n o i s i n May 1 945 .

repre s s ion

of the riots

which

oc c u rred in

the

B OOK III

414

(a) B iological change gives (maturation) identity as a reason for change (a rul e) . It i s the structure itself of progre s s . Nature . ( b) Upon this fundamental structure , every culture i s built. Apprentice ­ ship , exercise, rite of passage. Along with the myth that man is the adult ( an equ i librium until the beginning o f old age) . 1 2 6 Hence, soci al l ife a nd technical life upon the biological temporal stru c ture . B ut enti rely soci al ­ ized (hence, transformed) . Result: progre s s movement towards oneself, but a self in perpetual retreat. An attempt, in reality , at reali zing socialized facticity . Role s , att itude s , set-up s , knowledge . Aim : I ' m going to be a doctor, etc . Es sence of the past adult to be real i zed in the future . (c) Within the a priori gi v ens (essence of the adult, set -up s , etc . + a priori determinations of the child by family and social struc tures) , the true negatio n . Negation of the given as self-assertion . Hence, identifica­ tion w ith the father, and rej ection o f the identification; apprenticeship , and e sc ape from apprenticeship towards the assertion of a self who i s other. (d) Technical i ne q uali ties (differences between the tran scended world taught to him and the pre sent and evolv ing w orld) , grasped as means to transcend social ized facticity tow ards h i s own being (accepts soci alized facticity : I ' m going to be a doctor, but thi s doctor i s going to be better) . The e nsemble through actions and reactions , all comprehensible -thus consti tuting the s ingul ar progre s s of everyone towards h i m se lf. Of course , thi s m ust be in a c lass and at a hi storical moment in which the advances of technology and science are directl y util izable . Whence a circularity: the origin of social progress m ust be s ought in indiv iduals in progress . And , conversel y , the very i dea of personal progress its original i mpetus must be sustained by soc i al progre s s ( a society of repetition without technological progress suppre ssion of progress . Progres s pass age from potential ity to the act. Nothi ng more) . S o the fact that some people c an be defined as progre ss tow ards themselves depends upon soc ial progress , and refers u s to it. Conversely , however, social progres s must be to indiv idual progre ss as the organiza­ tion ( with its d i alectical reason and its practico-inert) i s to the practical organI sm . Example of progre s s : Verdi . (a) Free progre s s in the sense of de velopment of the sy stem up to about 1 8 70. (b) From Don Ca rlos on w ards : •

-

�.

1 26

S e e L ' Idio r de

la fam ille ,

vol. 3 , p. 1 2.

A PP E N D I X

Threats to him

415

Wagner Chamber mus ic M usical i nternational ism

Respon se : He i s , for him self, as simi lable to the N ation (Risorgimento . Viva Verdi Long live King Victor Emmanuel ) . And since politics is l inked to music Ca basic element) : musi c al national i sm . Theatre and bel can to. His ideological interest: to be the nati onal representative of Ital y , seen as hel can to and theatre . Minimal role of the orche s tra. H i s i nterest (himself as an inert reality in danger: his lEuvre) i s musical nationalism: no foreigners , secondary role for the orche stra. Hence, in the fi rst place negative : a sharp check . A marked contradiction : Wagner the symphonic and Gounod the intimist. B ut, prec isel y , to sa ve h i s intere st is to integrate the contradi ction into the work : Don Carlos. Hence, progress . What doe s this mean? He wants to keep l yric ism and singing. That i s the v ital thing . B ut it is neces sary to integrate harmony (ponderou sne s s of Don Carlos) and develop the role of the orch estra . I f he were to s ubordinate the v oice to the instrument, he would simply change and become a Wagneri an . B ut wanting to subor­ dinate the in strument to the line in order to enrich it, he creates a new ten s ion (Otello) and thu s progresses : for the pres erved u nity i s enriched (i ncreased complex ity i n the ten sion and order) . Thence, a new meaning sought : ' total opera ' , which i s modern but Italian ( i . e . voices predom­ inate ) . I n sum : a spontaneous progre s s , which could in itself have led him ( though less profoundly) to break the barrier between aria and rec itative (as earl y as Il Trovatore and La Traviata) , but in addition forced progre s s : changing and en l arging himself in order to remain the same while dev e loping the orchestra . On that basi s , a synthes i s (Fa lstaff) : the role of the orchestra, its dialogue with the c haracters , is more effective sti l l at allow i ng the integration and di s appearance of the rec itative. In terest (my inert real ity , m y seal) is i n danger. Progre s s cons i sts i n pre serving it as a regulatory i deal (it i s my project) , by introducing into it extern al modifications that ri sk destroying it. Progre s s : interi orizing the advers ary i n an undertaking which transform s interest (work don e) into an end (as serting it again by integrating the remainder without causing it to explode ) . A n e xample to be given for changing to stay the same . =

416

III

B OOK I I I

S OCIAL PROGRESS

S ocieties without progre s s : they need to be taken into account fi rst. The y are : societies without history (repetition) societies w hich deny their history (a past s uperior to the present) : agrarian soc ietie s , for example. The se societies are either with out real progre s s (the first kind) or h av e not reach ed any awarene s s regard ing progre s s . B ut in addition these soc iet ies as such are not neces sarily constituted so that progress would affect them . Soc ieties investing 5 per cent in the production of industri al goods , societies ha ving reached a ceiling (w ith agricultural production hav ing reached a ceiling , g iven existing t echniques ) , societies in regres sion (production hav ing reached a ceiling � demo­ graphic growth ) . These soc ie ties cannot progre ss . Progre s s c an be establ i shed only on their ruins. This means that another society w ith other structure s (and sometimes , in part, with the s ame men) i s e stabl i shed on the ruins of the former. And that it i s better. Or (more accurately) more advanced in the direction of th e final term. In the light of thi s , two que stions are posed : 1 . Wh o ori g inally fi xed the term? 2 . Who ben efits from progres s ? 3 . Progre s s over a short c ycle long-term progre s s . Problems : 1 . Compari son [between] continuous growth curve and real c urve ( V i l ar) . Progress over sho rt cycles not adm i s sible . In fact , contradictions. P assing from one c ontradiction to another : what i s progre s s , if the next o ne is more c atastrophic ( where is the progre s s in the passage from slaves to capitalism?) Econom ic, yes . B ut human (for those people)? Progre s s over l ong cyc l e s , very wel l . B ut : 2 . In that case, what i s the subject of the progre s s ? Who are the people making progress? Or who benefi t from the progre s s ? 3 . In the short cycle, counter- fi nalities do not allow us to ca lculate p rogre s s . [Th e problem] has to be env i s ag ed from the standpoint of the l ong cycle . In that c ase , however, progre s s e l ude s man : ( i ) because it cannot be foreseen over a long range . We c an say today that the appearance of mechani zation was a progre s s . B ut contemporaries? We c an c once ive of a fact of contemporary progre s s today , but that i s

APPENDIX

417

because we have discovered progre s s . Progre ss i s our m yth. 1 2 7 (ii) B ecause it i s c o nstituted , at l east partl y , b y the interplay of counter­ fi nalities that are not our own : in other word s , inasmuch as matter serves as a mediati on between men . (iii) B ec ause the men who w il l benefit from progre s s will be other than those who are v ictims of a catastrophe : the increase in w age s caused by the Plague certainly constitutes a progre s s (from the very general standpoint of humanism) but not for the workers whom the Plague killed. Does progress a natural dialectical necessity , or an action of praxi s ? 4 . What i s the aim of the orientated movement? Who can decide that it i s thi s or that? And how ? Social problem of progre s s . Conc lus ion : the ans wer is in the question w hich makes it hard to grasp progre s s ; which masks it, or constantl y brin g s it into question , or deprives it of all possibility ? The organization of need � l abour � practico-inert � counter-fi n al itie s/al ienations . Which ma kes progre s s genuine : the same organization of facto rs , but seen differently.

Science and Progress Reason for the progre s s of scienc e : it has to do with pure exteriority grasped as p ure exteriority . Henc e , quantity . B ut also the pos sibility of accumulating (which presupposes dialectical uni ty : you do not acc umulate w i thout a ten sion of the field). In a word , progre s s co mes from a rel ationship in exteriority with in a rel ation . Transition from the ancient world ( which i s already imbued with it) to the modern world: a reversal of dialectical interiority into e xteriority . (The phenomenon of the natura l bond: interiority . The phenom enon of exteriority: if it goes up, that i s because it i s pushed). Analytic Reason , etc . Will sc ience always remain l ike that (problem of the dialectic of N ature) ? Impossible to know. Mathematic s deal s with everything , you w i l l say . Yes , but in exteri ority: prov ided you exteriorize . In short, science i s exteriority itself di sclosing i tself every where . S cience : a dialectical invention of exteriority . How ? It i s contained in the moment of inertia of the organism, subsequently 1 27 . With re spe c t to the myth o f Progre s s as alienation, l i nked to the industrial revo lution , c ons ult L ' Idiot de la fam ille , v o l . 3 , pp.272-84 · ' Interest thus man ifests itse l f to the owner as a twofo l d alienat i on . to othe rs, through m anufac ture ; to man u facture, through all t h e others . It i s profit, as man ' s obj ective truth and an inh uman necess ity ; it is the inexorable ob l igation to adv ance . . . '

418

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transposed by the tool : an exteriorization of i nertia which i s tran sformed into an inerti a of exteri ority (homogeneity : the tool can be wielded onl y by an organi s m making itself passive) . Sc ience ( anthropolo gy i tse lf) is the exploration in exteriority of exteriority. Why in exteriority? It i s neces sary from the start to act from the exterior upon the exterior to interi ori ze it. A moment of pu re exteriority : the organism making itself inert in the face of the i nert, in order to seek the inert mean s to wield through its inertia. This practical moment is preci sely al so the mom ent of nascent analytic Reaso n : a totalizing organism, whose aim i s to reinteriori ze its totalization , make s itself e xterior in order to interiori ze the exterior. And, at that moment, the totalizing unity of interiority seemingly gives way to exteriority, but remains as the d irecting schema of the tran sformation. S o d i alect ical Reason directs the scienti fi c operation , but gives way to analysis. Sc ience is given at the outset: a practical inve stigati on of exteriority, inasmuch as I am exterior to it. The fact that in micro-physics one di scov ers an interiori t y o f the e xperimenter to the experiment is certainly striking, but does not modify the general i dea. The fact i s , i f you like , that at a certain lev e l praxis i s discovered (the lumi nous ray changes the movement of the atom ) , but onl y i n its results of exteriority. It merely reveal s that our exteriority i s a moment of the interiorization of the practical fi e ld. Hence, ( i ) a tendency to interiorization : an immedi atel y dial ectical tendency (anthropomo r­ phism) , c alled observation � ( i i ) thi s tendency i s al w ay s combated by th e need and search for tool s (higher ape s ) : the former, in fact, come s from a kind of percep tive interiorization of the field. We grasp it as an organism through our own. Hence, modifi c ations appe ar organ ic . B u t dec ompos ition by prax i s : need i s already a c onditi oning by the outside , and negation is to condition the outside by need . All thi s refers back to the very level of the organism that is constituted by the inert and the exterior (chemical products) and is of itself a totali zation of thi s exterior (an orientated maintenance of rel ationships , e xc hanges , the metabolism , etc . ) . So the child grasps di alectical Reason and analytic Reason at their source. Examples of scienti fi c exteriority : they are nothing but practical e lements - a transformation i nto something else. This means a constant struggle against the tendency to gi ve a synthetic and interior coherence (a circle) to the exterior. For the aim i s : how in in ertia to act upon inertia : hence , to c ut up inertia, to see i t as exteri or to itself, to eat i nto it. Hence, to show it as other than itself. A c ircle cannot have the coherence of a c ircle unl e s s it i s practical (i nasmuch as it is traced) . B ut this movement i n space explodes into points in the very movement which follo w s the line . And thereafter a n e xplan ation h as to be given for those points, suppressing the earl ier movement and consideri ng them as outs ide one another. S o the mov ement of sc ience, as soon as exteriority becomes aware of itself, i s in c ontinuous progress (not nece s s ari l y the total practica l

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m ovement, which for its part i s the di alectical ensemble o f thi s move­ ment and its exploitation with the res ult: a prac tico-inert). S cience is the permanent d i s solution of the p ractico-inert i nto its element of pure inertia. In that sense, i t i s the non -dialectical remedy for the ant i ­ di alectic (hence , a liberation of the dialectical movement) . In the practico-inert, it sees only the inert. The inert i s a pure quanti ty . [S cience] i s inertia seen b y itse lf ( i n reality , by a made i nertia : real but di sengaged). In other words, as soon as I transform the inert by the seal of prax i s , it becomes practi co-inert: ranged against me by the inert ' s turning back of praxis into a negative . B ut i f I maintain it in its inerti a, wh ile pres erving the simp l e unity of the re searc h , it i s gi ven as inert and the n e w elements di scovered are given only as inert and in ex teriority with re spect to it. Thi s means that they collapse into inertia, and consequent ly divide up ( analysis ) once I am pure inerti a of exteriority in relati on to them . On thi s basis , there i s accumulation. At once by new domains ( in the practical fi el d) being conquered for the inert , and by div i si on of the conquered inert ( div i s ion by itself) . However, permanently practico-inert character of scie ntific conquest: numbers are qualitative, inasmuch as they are totalize d in the practic al fi eld. [The fi gure] 3 i s a magical sin gularity (as a consequence of prax i s ) ; but remove the l atter, be exte rior, and the s ingularity collapses. Thu s , in the practical fi e ld, Engel s i s right and q uantity becomes quality. Conversely, however, it must be said (thi s is dialectical too) that every qual i ty can be resolved into a quantity . In other words, the qualitative moment (uni fication of the purely quantitativ e into the practic o - inert : machine s, etc . ) i s a practical product of acc umulation , and immediately disass imilable by a return to the quantitativ e . Thi s is what explains the paradox of quality : measurable or non -measurable? Answer: never measurable as quality, but measurable the moment before and after. Necessarily linked to the measurable, but on the basis of a dec ision of exteri ority. Science and praxis : science i s the moment when the residue of praxi s is no longer considered as prac tico-inert, but as p ure inertia of exteriority . In that sen se, the vici ssitudes of praxis creating the practico-in ert can condition scienc e : it creates new obj ects ( w i th counter- finality ) , but for sc ience the se are obj ects that it gives to be di s solved. First numbers then measurements and mathemati c s then measuring instruments . S c ience progre s se s by contradictions. B ut it remains inert in relation to these contradictions : the i rrational number. It i s not changed (prax i s ) , i t i s chri stened, th ereby breaking a mythical pseudo-unity of numbers . I n such a way that contradictions are re solved i n favour of the greatest exteriority , th e g reate�t inertia .

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The irrational number does not become a thing because it h as been named: it remain s the mere passive negation pitted by inerti a against a human totalization . Of cours e , it can be un i fi e d as a counter-total ization (made by man ) , like the fiendish chords peop le spe ak about in m us ic . B ut [th i s counter-totalizatio n] w il l also be broken . Not in fav our of a wider totalization that would be number (imaginary and real, finite and transfinite , rational and irrational , etc . ) but in favour of a constant maintenance of non-human inertia as apprehended by human inerti a. 1 2 8 In science, m an make s h imself into pure matter in order to be a non­ practical mediation (non- intentional, non -total izing) between two states of matter. Sc ience i s al way s open , s ince it does not totalize i n its c ur rent state . The scienti st to talizes i n spite of h im s e lf (praxi s ) , but not science , w hich expl odes his totali zation. And thi s openness re sults in its permanent progre s s . Accumul ation no s c ienti fi c counter-fi nality . Progres s in sc ience is straight ax ial c ertain, because the inertia of the known i s communi cated to knowledge ( under dialectical control) and thi s exteriority , maintained at the heart of the practical field by a fi c tive and totalizing destruction of the prac tical field itself (one o f its av atars given from the practical beginning : the organism making itself into inertia env i sages the e lements of the field that w il l as sist its inertia as i . e . accum u l ation as an inert) , engenders organization in exteriority an ensemble of knowledge . At least for a long wh ile: grand hypotheses are the organization in exteriority of the exterior, but they ari se after millenni a. The original s ystem i s an inert s y stem : the law an o utl ine of inertia as a practical element to be found . Y f(x) originall y mean s : upon what inertia should I act, in order to accompl ish my aim ? The inert in exteriority sought by prax i s is pre c i sely the independent v ari abl e . Thi s is on all level s . Gandhi looks in i nerti a at the c aste system and seeks the independent v ariable : it i s the caste of Untouchable s . Not that thi s i s not a resul t of the whole sy stem; but, for that v ery reason, if you act upon it - which though created by the sy stem supports and maintains its frame­ work . the lot comes down. At al l events , y f(x) is exteriority. If x changes to a spec i fi c extent, y change s to an equal ly spec i fi c extent. The contradiction of science (a propulsive contradiction) i s precisel y between its dialectical unity and its analytic accum u l ation . A twofold contradiction . On th e one hand, to be sure , al l sc ientifi c progre s s destroys a parti al total i zing unity hence , avoids t h e practico-inert: i .e . the anti­ dialectic . On the other hand, however, the un ity of sc ientific prax i s ( i . e . prax i s reduced to un i ty ) i s that of the practical field, and imposes

1 28

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acc umulation ( L e . the quality of quantity) w ithin the interior of this fi e ld (acc umu lation of known zone s accumulation of knowledge ) . S cience appears , from the fi rst human action, as the theoretical moment of practical action. B ut thi s theoretical moment has the same structure as the practical moment as a whole : inerti a seeking the inert. At thi s lev e l , however, the totalizing e lement ( the drive , the end) masks the aspect of prax i s masks pathos (a finger inerti a, j ust as in the act as a whole pre s s ing a button i s a button which pre s s e s the finger) . The moment of sc ience i s praxi s going back over its theoretic al moment to suppress the false totality, and to spec ify the moment of inerti as by thi s rejection of totalization. Sci ence is prax i s asserti ng itself through the search for conditionings in exteriority ; y f(x) : if I do th i s , that happens .

[Abundance , Progress, Violence] The man of scarcity , seeking his abundance , seeks it as a determination of scarcity. Not abundance for al l , but his ow n , hence the deprivation of al l . The initial aspec t n indiv idual s ; enough food for n 2 ; hence , possible e xclu s ion of the 2 , or consti tution of a group sh aring m 2 food out among m members ( undernourishment) is only a theoretical aspec t. The man of scarc ity does not remain in the c ategory that would be n m (th is category being n m people eating n m foodstuffs , or di spos ing of n m tools or means of protection) . In reality , the new princ iple given i s that certain people eat their fi l l , the others do not. And , of cours e , the minority (n m ) di sposes of goods , to the exclusion of the maj ority . So it constitute s itself of its own accord as scarce. Scarc ity moves from thi s moment of sati sfaction of needs to the m an who sati sfies them. The interiorizati on of scarcity in the first pl ace gi ves the sc arce obj ect its precious character. First, real l y : air i s not sc arce , food or tools are . The too l is valorized by scarci ty before being an object of exchange . S imply becau se it i s worth steal ing , w inning , obtaining at the price of h ardships (cost) . Th i s re lationship precedes trade : a battle between tribes the v ictory may cost dear. In short , scarce as a fi rst value object determining an acti on : i . e . a labour, whatever i ts modal ities may be (war, or abduction , sc arce obj ect generating a praxi s (it i s perhaps a i s labour) . Prec ious means of sati sfying need : i . e . perhaps the end) . B ut the minority owner of th is ensemble himself thereupon become s scarce . First, for the maj ori ty he is the image of the man they would l ike to be the man they cannot be , w i thout becoming a m i nority . In the second p l a c e he i s as similated to the scarcity of the obj ects he own s . The s c arce man i s the one for whom soc ially sc arce objects are abundant: he i s classified as scarce ,

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from outs ide , by the m aj ority . I n the third place, however here comes the mystifi cation thi s scarce nlan is accepted as such (whether he rules by force or is publicly inve sted with an office w hich gives him the right to ow n the scarce abundantly) . On th is basi s , h e interi ori ze s sc arc ity by and this i s ambiv al ent: it means the man becoming the precious man whose p ower is accepted, and of whom all the others are secret but sworn enemies ( without necessarily adm itti ng it) . In a p eriod of fam ine , the scarce man who does not have the right to be scarce (the merchant, the Jew) i s massacred; the man who does have that ri ght i s not . or more rare l y . The scarc it y of the scarce man itself becomes a va lu e , in the sense that it presents itself as worthy of an acti on. It i s an e nd: it pre sents itself as d emanding an action which w i l l , at once , win sc arce abu ndance and acquire that social scarc ity as a right (due to merits , social role, etc . ) : i . e . as an exigency of being accepted by those who lack the nece ssary . It cannot be deni ed that the div i s i on of labour intervenes here . Thd scarce man i s he who admini sters , whil e the others work ( for example) . He i s the leader who guides the e x pedition (and who has more than the others: cf. Lev i- Strau s s ) . Thus the interiorized sc arce man fee l s that his scarc ity is due to h i s weal th. He i s excep tional, becau se he o wns the scarce . And that e xceptional value i s recognized by society . Within him self the man fee l s l ike a j ewel , for example and what i s more , he i s called one . There i s a dialectic of scarcity , which moves from the recognized ownership of goods to the recogni zed ownership of abi l itie s (accumulation of cultural advantage s , e tc . ) . B ut at once the sc arce m an i s shown as the exception who must live in abundance : even if he doe s not have abundance, he has the right to i t by virtue of h i s scarcity . And people give them sel v e s scarce ab il itie s , in order to obtain sc arce provis ions (ambition, choice of the warrior profe s s ion : you acce pt what others rej ect death in order to h ave everyth ing) . At once, costs go u p in the owning clas s : everyone wants to be scarcer, and becom es it in the socia l order. (The oppres sed clas s c annot have the scarce man� i t wants to be him , or be blessed by h i s scarcit y until emancipation . To sho),t, the selis . ) A reversal : scarc ity (m odern society saints) w il l consi st in be ing worthy of ev erything an d accepting nothing . Th us scarcity an active element of h istory . Scarcit y i s not just th e milieu. B ecoming interiorized in the man of scarcity , it first constitute s an ini tial a ntagoni stic relation between ever y individ ual and each and ev ery other. In addition , however , i t constitute s in the dom inant group ambi tion , v i olence, and a determ inati on to go to the extreme l im its of the scarce. It does so, more over, through th is dialectical tran sposition : the man of the sc arce becomes the scarce man , and i s interiorized as preci ous .

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Of course , th is in no way mean s individua lism . Individual ism i s a form of interiori zed scarc it y belonging to bourgeois time s . It can equall y well mean fam i l y scarcity or clas s scarcity . You are what you hav e. Since the fami l y ' s (or indiv idual ' s) bei ng is its po ssessions, to pos s e s s the scarce i s to be scarce. A t once , th e scarce group ' s b eing is in danger in the world of the inert for it i s its good s , its property . At once, the scarce property becomes the interest of the group in que stion : i . e . its being, inasmuch as thi s is de fined in exteriority by the inertia of its posses sions. B ut it must be understood that the original force here i s n eed. Need is the primary drive . It feeds ambi ti on . Why? Not bec ause there is a need for the rich man . B ut underpinning h i s being as a rich man there i s his need which can be s ati sfied onl y bec ause he is among the scarce people who ha ve rare products in their posses sion. Because they live in abundance of scarcity. In other words , in order to have sufficienc y the y already have to be scarce . A system of constraints and myth s i s already needed , to deter the majority (the non-scarce) from demanding sufficienc y : in short, exploitati on , oppre s sion and m y s ti fication are needed . In a w ord , v iolence . And from thi s v i olence which the y do not remain an instant w i thout obj ectively e xercising ( whether they are aware of thi s or no matters little) springs scarcity-as -an - aim. When they want to be scarcer, this is on th e basis of the origi nal scarc ity of their being , which is undernourishment of the maj ority . I t i s th e v iolence of the maj ority ' s need that i s the rich man ' s nece s sity for counter- v i olence. Equal counter­ v iolence . Thi s , moreover, s i mply so that he has his suffi ciency. The ri ch man ' s scarcity i s a v iolence in actu (even when i t is exerc i sed by others mi l itiamen, centurions , etc . ) . I t i s the e ssential nature of h i s sati s ­ facti on . Moreover, i t repre sents the rich m an ' s foundation : i .e . need sati sfied by the permanence of v iolence, which w i thout violence would no longer be sati sfied (take away h i s weapons or his troop s, the rich man is impotent; a stratification of violence in exteriority and in interiority - thi s is the institution of h i s oppre s si on and the deepest l ayer of his being) . Thi s e xasperati on of need (the maj ority ' s ) , which i s the indi spen­ sable nucleus of the satisfacti on of his own need and i s thi s as violence to be exerci sed w i thout fl i nching is the v ery force that causes a person to climb all the rungs of scarc i ty . On the one hand, in the v ery struggle to be scarcer ( w i thin the group) there i s an ' all or nothing ' which come s into play . It i s neces sary to climb (by v iolence ) or ri sk returning to the level of need . Not because this happen s constantl y , or perhaps in the majority of cases (it is possi ble to stop w ithout tumbl ing al l the way do wn , to regre s s w i thout leaving the rich group , or to be helped by al lies - family, interested persons ) ; but because it is the di sclosed truth of the thing : the fundamental pos sibilit y that the latter impl ies . In the c ase of a stru ggle to be leader, no place i s left for the defeated man (exec ution ,

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enslav ement, ete . ) . Of course , thi s would be simply a psychological rather than a historical description , if we were not to add that the model of the scarce m an i s defined within the socio-economic s ystem that has been con sti tuted. It i s the model of scarcity in the sy stem (from scarc ity o f food to scarcity of time) which constitutes the interiorization of scarcity. B ut the problem lies elsewhere: it lies in the fact that the sy stem would not surv ive without the men it constitute s , who so far as the rich are concerned are the s ystem s tratified and its transcendence (towards another echelon of the sy stem) . A fall i n the rate of commercial profit can lead to a shift elsewhere only if the men involved are alre ady profit- men . B ut thi s must be taken as meaning the free and permanent transcendence of interest (pro fi t) . And in order to understand that profit is directly linked to v iolence , these paradoxes must be recalle d : progre s s towards abundance i s fettered (buying oil in order to sell it at a high pri ce , or in order not to sell it) becau se profit springs from the non-suffic iency of s atisfaction (worker and w age) and from non-abundance . The man of profit (the capitali st and h i s c ustomers , in a given period) i s not feudal man (the man of l and rev en ue ) ; but in both c ases he aspire s to super-abundance, becau s e he cannot hav e satisfaction alone without carrying on to the end of the system of scarcit y . Here, introduce everything that, in the s y stem itself, dri v e s him to rai s� himself.

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There i s a history of ideas . The y are not mere refl ecti on s , but action . S ee the meeting of the Jesuit i dea (good savage) already prax i s (Council of Tre nt) with the still pas s ive idea of Nature in the bourgeoi s i e seeking a mean s to pre sent itself as a universal clas s (reversal of pe s s im i s m : very i mportant) , and w ith the analytic notion of Reason � inertia and natural e x teriority . The represe ntation that Chri stians h arbour of t he Jew becomes con­ stit uent of the Jew . See Po l i akov : rac i sm . Semitism (p . 5 6, note on 1 29). Ma s si gno n The idea and the word (word : i nert and material condensation of the i dea; likewise syntax , language) . T here is a practico- in ert of th e idea . S o th e idea become s a hi storical moment of action , as worked matter. The word retaining the i dea: a material synthe s i s of various (different) meanings . Poetry and materi a l ity : poeti cal prax is uti lizes the inert synthe s i s (or rather the inert con tiguity of v arious seals imposed upon verbal matter) and make s it into a poetical synthes i s m i x ing hi storical meanings (general history , indi v idual hi story) and practical s igni ficati on .

h i s Histo ire de I ' an tis e m i t i sme, vol . 2 ( Paris 1 96 1 ), Poliakov , r u m in a t i n g on a p os�ible ' ki n sh i p ' between Jews and Ar abs as a h i �tori cal fac tor, disputes that th is i s of a b i o logical nat u re and speaks o f the l in g u i stic k i n s h i p between the two p e o p l e s In this c onn e c t ion he q uotes a te x t by L . Mass ignon, a comparative ana l y s i s of the S e m itic and Indo - European l anguage s ( in Essai sur les ()ri� l nes du lexique tee h n i q u e de la mystiqu e

1 29 . In

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m u � u lmall e ) .

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1 30 ] [ The Word

The w ord i s perpetually serializing and institutional . It i s the term of the series . Its reason . And I give it its meaning , because others as Others give it that meaning. If the w ord ' fl ower ' does not signify ' rain ' for me , it i s not first bec ause I would not be understood , but first because the others in the series give i t th i s meaning , w hic h there by e scapes from me . At the same t ime, however, u sing a w ord i s a prax i s , since i t tends to create a grou p . For the w ord tends simultaneously to mediate and create rec iproci ti e s . At the same time, it functions as a third party . Thu s commun ication i s effected n ot through the word, but by reference to th e word: at once as an insti tution, as a d irect rel ation to the conte xt, and as a serialized third party . The verbal institution i s the seriali zed third party . Which , no doubt, i s what every tool in the \\;orkshop i s . B ut th e tool has a more immedi atel y obv ious practical function (because of i ts tangible re sults and its v i s ibl e i nertia) . B y mean s of the too l , I make myself inert to act upon the inert. B y mean s of th e word, thi s i s less obvi ou s . Yet, of itself, it i s an i n stitution , inertia. And the first aim i s to awaken it as inertia in the other; or rather to affec t the other by this word transcending inertia. The written w ord would never have been invented (a material obj ect, a depiction on clay or stone) i f the sp oken word had not already been vvritten (potentially) . The s ame thing i s invo lv e d : determination of a breath through structures and hexes (phonetic s ) or determination of a stone , etc . In the former case, how ever, the materiality i s more tenuous ( in the sense in which a gas can be tenuous ) : not v isible . Hence , a transcendent, practico- inert word i s des ign ated and designate s . Inert, it marks my inertia to recall i nertia in the other: I m ake my self inert by speaking , but in order to aw aken i nerti a in the other. I t i s precisely a matter of practical acti vity utilizing inertia to transform the practical field dialecticall y . However: ( 1 ) the w ord i s thu s uti lized in a praxis (even if the latter ' s a im i s to pre serve seri alit y and the inert); (2 ) it awakens the inert i n the other, inasmuch as thi s i nert m ay be the be ginning of a prax i s : order; ( 3 ) it suppresses rec iprocity through apparition of the seri al i zed third party . Preserv ative character of the word : it recal l s in sti tutions and soc ie ty as a whol e . 1 3 Modern poetry: an attempt to play on the materi al ity of the word . 1

1 30 . S ee a l so Criti q u e , v o l I , pp . 9 8 ff. 1 3 1 . In L ' ldiot de l a fam ille , pp 9 29-3 4 , S artre carries out an anal ys is of t h i s game , into w h ich h e integrate s the imag inary : ' For me and for man y other people , the Chateau d ' A mboise i s l i nked with w ords l i k e fram boise [raspberry ] , hoise [ w ooded ] , hoise rie [panel l i n g ] , amhroisie [ a rnbrosia] , and A m broi se [Ambrose ] . It i s not a matter here of t he idiosy n c rat ic re l ation s w h i c h m ay have been forged i n the c o urse o f my pe rsonal h i � tory , .

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Let meanings i nterpenetrate v i a the practic o-inert (half inertia, half unitary seal ) with the ev i l spell o f material i ty . Meanings at once united and interpenetrating, without modifying each other (in stead of being pure exteriori ty) . Kindl ing word s by one an other. In short, u s ing the relationship between words so that each as i nert seems to make the ne gative synthes i s of its meanin g s .

b u t o f obj e c t ive , material re l ation �hips, acce s�ible to an y re ad i ng A s these h a v e not bee n e stab l i shed by an act of the m i nd, yet the y Impose themselves in an indisso l u b l e u n i ty , they may be te rmed passive syn th eses I n fac t . the more you aban don yourself to dreaming, the nl0re they e m erge

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A . S ynchronic 1 . Each person (priv ileged classes) i s a human pyramid. 2 . Each person (exploited classes) i s the base of that pyramid and constItutes It. •

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B . Each class constitutes the other. Error of Marxism : alway s to consider the exploiting c lass [as being] on the defens i v e : thi s i s correct, but i t must also be seen as a n agen t. A s such, it determine s the product (technical rev olution) and, at once, its product ' s product. B ut immedi­ ately the e xploited (the produc t ' s product) make the product and determine clas s : ( i ) inasmuch as acc umulation of the product pursues the economic movement (transition from fam i l y capitali sm to monopol y capitali sm ) ; (ii) inasmuch as the e xploited, in that he i s a certain product of the product, constitutes the exploiter as h i s p roduct (defines his struggles , his relations , etc . ) . c . The diachronic (we shal l put it last) . It i s the interiori zation of the

practico-inert. What doe s being French mean ? It is History (monumental past) as a dimension in depth , against the h istorical proces s . D . [ . 1 32 ] as an interiorization of the v iewpoints of others . .

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] as benefi ting in common from a situation (colonies) . Yes. And E. [ if they do not benefi t from them then ' proletarian nations ' : they make .

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1 3 2 . I m p l ied here . " Eac h c l a s s c onst itutes t h e other ' . 428

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u s e of th i s e n semble as a myth . In that case , totalization-of-env elopment : whol l y given every where that the incarna­ tion has a relationship in exteri ority with a larger incarnation . For example : incarnation as an unskilled worker and relationship w i th the whole working c las s ( ? ) . 1 33

1 3 3 . The q u e � ti o n m ark fi g u re � i n the m an u �cri p t .

1 . Retotalization in a dictatorial society . (Stalin . ) 2 . Retotalization in a non-dictato ri al soc i ety . Un ity and c l ass struggle .

A l ready , problem s . 3 . Retotal i zati on of several linked historie s . (Hi story of Europe , etc . its proletari ats an d its proletari at) : a pure query , so long as we do not know what H i story i s .

History , on the contrary , appe als to itse lf: e v erlas tingne ss of H i story (as consciousness negating death ) , temporal infinity. No end . And , on the other hand: Hi story r i gorous obj ectives (achi eved or not) and death fought against but determin ing . The constants of H i story : e x ample, death . With out death , anoth er Hi sto ry (or no H i story ) . A formal problem: i s the h i stori c al fact qual itati v e l y different today and ye sterday ? Or the same? Problem , for example, of greater con scious ­ ness (Marx ) : doe s that change prax i s ? The class acts , enlightened by scienti fic and prac ti cal kno wledge . Whereas a centu ry ago myth s , etc . , obnubi lated what was only intuiti ve prediction .

430

•

•

•

•

•

Totalization here doe s not mean suppress ion of confl icts , a medi ation; it means that ev ery confli ct i s the incarnation of the most general con fl icts , and of unity. What is totali zation in a capitalist system? Erroneous l y : indiv idual s . An indiv idual produ ce s tota lity . Indi vidual s : describe the forces of massification in a democrac y . Work c ontract, etc . 1 34 In Rep ly to Lefort. S tre s s the e x i s tence of the interiorized O ther i n everyone . as Impo ss ible to comprehend the status of the practical organis m social (a common indiv idual ) without starting from totalization. Here a system (capital , for examp le) . There i s n o atomic sol itude . There are only way s of being together. S ol i tude appears w ithin ways of being together. The ensemble has ways of being together [ensemble] at its di sposal : groups serialities (with the fami l i ar differences internal to groups and s eries) . S o the seri e s , in i ts ensemble, i s an inc arn ation of the sy stem. N aturally, thi s occurs on the basis of the relation shi p between the ensemble and i ts indiv idual me mbers . Circul arity : the series reconditions the e nse mbl e , as it does the exi st­ ence of the rei fied man within i t. The series is inert man : hence , m an-as­ worked-matter. It has a type of ac tion inasmuch as i t i s inert, since the series i s q u alified ; and thi s type o f action which i s w ielded like a tool i s defi ned b y society , but defi nes society itself and ac ts upon its h i story .

1 34.

In Situations VII, Paris 1 9 6 5 . 43 1

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Hystere s i s : [ for e x ample] mu sical instruments . Their reality retards the evolution of music, because they are made . They exist as such (inert) . They have to be changed. B ut they are institutions (a collective : seriality produced among the players of the se in struments) . The probl em of non-totalitarian societi e s i s , inter a lia : the relations h ip between series and groups , - the retotali zing factor of serie s , - the h i storical role of the serie s . a chain of There i s a h istorical l ife of the series (it changes modifications) . So there i s a serial transformation of institution s . Example : lingui stic s . A s such, [the series] acts seri al ly upon the total ity in interiority . B ut i t i s itself, in its life , prov oked to its serial action by the action of groups or seri e s . So the ensemble of the system , manifesting itself as an action upon the series, re sults in a serial response which deforms it (even if it is confirmin g : there is alw ays a deviation). Example : colonie s . Native seriali zation demographic (agricultural) movement. The population increase i s serial, an d quantity comes from q uali ty (a type of maintained , proletarianized society and an i mprovement [with re spect to] mortali ty , lack of hygiene , etc. : repre sents the colonized society ; an incarnation) . B ut quantity becomes quality : lowe ring of everyone ' s standard of l i v ing. Poverty . New serial facts : emigration to France . A fact of pure quantity , b ut [which becomes] quality : growing difference between the colonizing group and the colon ized group. More blatant inj ustice. Retotali zed i nto a gro up (constituted prax is) by the native , and into a counter-group by the settl er (the seriality of the settl ers d i s solv e s : a common threat, a common rel ationship with the metropoli s ) . The group dis s olves peasant seriality through people ' s war. 1 . The system i s invented, conce ived and put in place by persons : Leroy-B eaulieu , Jules Ferry . 1 3 5 Retotalization of the difficu lties of cap ­ ita lism (protected markets , protected inve stments) . 2 . It is reali zed by men : prax i s of a group (a society constituting i tself) , individual praxis . 3 . Theory and practical ideolog y . Imperi alism nationalism. 4 . The sy stem as - praxi s (an ensemble of groups that condition one another and know one another) , - praxi s-process (technique s , migrations { serial ization } ) , materiel ; men as practico-inert (an ensemble of inve stments seriali zed worked matter) . -

1 3 5 . The sy stem in q ues tion i s colon i al i sm . S ee Critiqu e , v o l . I , p . 7 1 4 .

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The praxi s of atomization of the nativ e (battles , ci v i i law , tribes supp res sed) . Atomization of the settlers. Impossible to act other th an serially (demography , European serial solidarit y ) . 5 . Reversal (new revolutionary prax i s . Groups . Anti-groups ). Contrast: A . Men are seeking to take responsibility for the economy . So the sy stem i s interiorized a nd re-exteriorized. Thi s i s S tal i n i sm or collective leadership . 1 3 6 B . They are seeking to set the s ystem on its feet. In thi s case, the s y stem incorporates the men and w orks throug h them . The totali zati on i s a proce s s- p rax i s . In thi s c as e : take up incarnation, circularity and retotalization again; but show that the s ystem i s incarnated by men, and that the drift is real ized by men , a gai nst the system. A . S talini sm : men take over everything as their own. So they have projects on the basis of the given practico-inert. These projects constitute a ne w system, inasmuch as the ne w practic o-inert is a link. B ut th i s s ystem (totalization-of-envelopment) i s at once the inner framework of the undertaking and its drift. It s upports the undertaking, expre s se s it and dev i ates it. B ut the undertaking close s over the s y stem, because to the end men are held responsible for the drift. Praxi s -proce s s . B . Men pursue various undertakings within the same practic al fi e ld. First unity : a practical fi eld. B ut thi s i s not a true unity . Merely a common determ ination . Received from outside . The field make s its elf inhabited for e veryone . Next: the u nity of the practical field ensures that e lements interior to the field are as worked matter elements of unity (each i s defined by the already populated field, and w ork s as a m an who has only these technique s and who , in a certain order, i s red undant) . At this level, ever yone i s already an incarnation . Collecti v e s emerge spon tan eously i nasmuch as matter serialize s . Institutions of stone . Everyone retotalizes i n h i s own way (by labour he produces or by technical i mprovement). And thi s retotality implies : (a) that he projects himself as a seal on to matter, which turns him back i n to a negation of man ; (b) at the same time , as such, he i s in danger (interest) in the field; (c) that these counter­ men are susceptible to accumulation . Quantity and inertia ensure that nothing opposes anything. So an ensemble i s constituted, medi ating between men and total izing (machine s , as a prod uct of the practical , turn back to men and totalize them ) . The practical field as be strewn and /

1 3 6 . S e e pp . 1 87 ff. above.

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worked by such too l s produc ing everything turns back to men an d qual ifies them from the interi or in exteriority. At this leve l , we have seri ality and the in stitution. And ev ery serial and in stituti onal ensemble does not en tirely hang together because of scarc ity . Hence , the group and the invention (which i s simul taneously a technique, an organi zation, and a decision on tho se sacrificed) . For example: the invention of p lough-s hared implements creates a fi rst s carcity of men . No t enough men in relation to the p l ough : men are s imultaneo usly scarce and redundant. Invention of s l avery . At thi s leve l , every group modifying th e institution works on the series . And transformation of the series and the insti tution by a group produce s the system . The sy stem is defined as a process of unintentional circularity , inasmuch as i t is on a large scale (puttin g a s l ave to work i s not inventing slav e ry ) , but intentional on a smal l scale (heterogeneous : qual ity depends on quantity) . Why a system? B ecause the unity of the practical fi el d comes back to the i nvention and qual ifi es it in the name o f a l l . The practical field comes back as mine , and as other v i a the Others - to me and qu alifies me as my-Other: i .e . qualifies me externall y but in immanence as the man (among others) of thi s fi e l d , and my practices as practices in this field. In short, unity i s the return of the practical field through the mediation of Others to its inhabitant , in order to qualify him in exteriority of i mmanence as an inhabitan t. In thi s way we shall a l l be inhabitants and the series i s consti tuted. I see my self as other i n the Other' s home . And the external threat may lead the practical field to create the group , but as other in i nteriority (a nation ) . From the moment when , in a fi e l d , money (for example) i s invented , i t becomes an institutio n . Either i t disintegrate s the group (if it comes from e l se where) or it adopts its circ u larity . Thi s mean s that monetary effects modify cau ses . Circularity (a s compl e x as you l ike) com ing to obj ects (imposing their prac tice s) from the exi stence of these obj ects in a dialectical field: that i s the syste m .

Themes 1 3 7 Incarnation Totalization -of-envel opmen t -

1 37.

Recap i t u l ation of the themes dep loyed n otably i n the study of d irectori al societies ( see pp . 1 1 8 ff. ab o ve ) , w h i c h S artre i n tended to r e ut i l i ze in h i � s t udy of bourgeo i s d emoc rac ie� .

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Total i zati on of ext eriori ty Tota l ization of interiority Anti -labour Immanence Tran scendence Ex teriority of immanence ( cf. totali zation of ex teriori ty) Tran scendent exteriority (an u nthi nkable l imit) Transcende nce and inte rnal ,l imit of practical freedom Unit y Unification Confl ict Contrad ictio l}r/ Totali zation and re total ization Retotal ized total /izat ion A l teration and /Al ienation Drift Dev iation I

/

In bourgeo i s democratic soc ieties , unificati on require s no n-un ity (as mas s i fication) . Regarding the v ote , as a unitar y dec i s ion to choose the sovere ignty of series ( i . e . non -sovereignty ). The serial man as a re total ization of serializati on : A . A man of the mas se s . ( Interchangeab i l ity in work . A mass con s u mer . ) B . A voter. C . Propaganda: he i s treated as an Other by adverti s i ng. Do as others do: become oth er. D . Identity agai nst unity . Thi s man i s a product. Of what? Of the mode of produc tion. So there i s unity of the mode of production . How? B ecause it i s : (a ) Conceived as a mediating rel ation ship be tween men . I produce for others in exc hange for what they give me . (b) Because its di spers i ve force has t o be retotal ize d by man . Organi zat ion . 1 . Every man in the group i s retota l i zed as an Other by th e practical fi e l d : i . e . inasmuch as I grasp h i m as an obj ect in my total izatio n . 2 . Every man re total izes the prac tical field i n retotal izing m e . En sembles of whee 1 ing tota1 i zati ons wh ich involve an agre ement: the prac tical field as total iz ing. E xam p l e : Eskimos . The Other i s th e S ame , in the sense that he i s subjected to the same dang ers . I n the Other who die s , I read my own death . In the Othe r who work s , my work . Man arri ves C () Il� ril lued. I n teriori zation of the prac t i cal fi e l d .

436

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3 . On this bas i s , confl icts or mutual aid merely e xpre s s the tran scendent

unity of the practical field. If the man of scarcity is redundant, it is within thi s practical ensemble. If he threatens me , i t i s inasmuch as worked matte r (the first synthetic union of the fi eld) de signates h i m as redundant for me , and me as redundant for him. Interi ori zation of scarc ity (in its concrete form s : scarci ty of fue l , food, women , etc . ) affects the counter-man of a wheel ing un ity . The fight, as a contradic tion ­ confl ict, i s capable of being total i zed on the basis of the practical field : hence , as common inerti a interiorized . 1 st common inertia, negative : I can go no fu rther, I ' m staying here , etc . 2nd inertia, positive : there are foodstuffs or elements capable of as suaging our needs ; th is conditions everyone , since it is why they enter into confl ict. And 3 rd inerti a, negated positive : there are not enough of them for coexi stence. an in different contiguity : ani mal s Very well . B ut coex i s tence cropping or grazi ng. Non-coexi stence a rej ected dual ity . Hence, in a certain way , unity i s posited as to be made (by suppres sion or h i erarchiz a­ tion). Unity re -exteriorized rei nteriorization of the retotal izati on of men by the practical field. Privative uni ty: reconsti tution (or constitu ti on ) of a community through suppre s sion of di sruptive e lements . The Chinese killing girl chi ldren: recon stitute the family as a practical unity . In addi tion , eve ry confl ict causes the total ity a s affected by th i s confli ct, existing within the confl ict to appear negatively. For if X and Y fight becau s e both groups are redundant, they are redundant for each other i nasmuch as all others are redundant for them . (The conflict takes p l ace for spec ific reasons between X and Y , but it cou ld j u st as well hav e been between Y and Z. ) Furthermore , they are redundant in relation to all others and show it (they disclose superab undance as being in them ) , so that the confl ict intere sts everybody and retota l i ze s the whole as hoping for a liquidation of certain e lements . At thi s moment , the whole become s an arbiter or i s dragged into the conflict. So scarc ity i s a retotal izing element, as a reciprocal condition l ived in the midst of third partie s . A s for the confl ict, it i s the bringing to l ight of the fundamental contradiction : i .e . the impossibility for X and Y to l ive together . B ut th i s contrad iction prec isely pre supposes the impossibil ity of not l iv ing together ( separation into two groups , sc i ssipari ty) , because of the practical fi e l d ( i t matters ] i ttl e whether separation i s due to the virgin fore st, the snow s , powerfu l neighbours , etc . ) . In other words , the confl ict expresses a retotal i zati on by the field, whi ch acts l ike the enem y wanting to mas s acre the lot . B ut : ( 1 ) it i s a retotal i zation in the inert; (2) al l are concerned, apart from X who are left undetermined. Th i s bri ngs about not u n ity of th e group , but immanence. We cal l immanence the relationsh i p of a practical ensembl e , in asmuch as the impossibil ity of l i v i ng togethe r in the field i s i t self defined throug h the impo s s i bi l i t y o f

APPEN D I X

437

not li ving together. Immanence i s not unificatio n , but a dead-po s s ibil ity of uni fication . It is the sealed inertia of the practical field ( its common u n ity ) , returning to everyone to create a milieu of interiority for all inter­ indiv idual re l ati on s , and oblig ing every group to present its confl ict with every other as a movement to w ards unity . Or, if you prefer, the common unity of the field return s to propose unification as a struggle : i . e . retot alizes itself as //S'omething to be tran scended by the unify ing prax is. It i s what is to be ttanscended towards unity . The latter is always given in the group , at once as already exi sting (it i s the inner inertia of prax i s ) and a s to be Te-establ i shed : a struggle against the Counter-man . B ut the practical field is not homogeneou s : it i s diverse , favouring some groups at the expense of others (nature cul ture ) . A s a conse­ quence, there is a quasi-hierarch y in immanence, to be destroyed or consolidated. Every new re ality appearing within the field modifies (too] s , slaves , etc . ) al l the sub-groups which occ upy it. Immanence is a tension that create s a dial ectic al reality . There i s a total ization , in the sense that every real ity tran sform s all others from afar. An ex ample : in a given practical field, with given prov i sion s , the increased birth rate affects my life and that of my chi ldren (whether or indirectly : standard of growing scarcity of prov isions directly l i ving) . I am altered by an event interior to the field, just as b y an event (an eruption) reaching the field from the exterior. Altered by : ( 1 ) everything that brings about the increase or decre ase in provi sion s : (a) transcendence but i nteriorized, (b) increase or decrease in the population minimum number for a given field; (2) every transfo rmation of rel ations between people (a tool , a machine , a differential in the mode of production ) t hat create s groups and serialities in immanence . In other words , in the fi eld of scarc ity an increase i n the number or p ower of my neighbours has the re sult of increasing the precariousness of my exist­ ence . For that power seeks both to produce more (a ceiling , though ) and to elim inate me . My alteration is suffered, and is what incarnates the transformation in me .

[An Examp le of A lteration and Unification by the Machi n e : the Appea rance of Radio and Television] J . Technological unemp loyment: [for examp le ] for music-hall troupes

in the Nord . 2 . Intensified serial ization of the l i stener (radi o + TV) . 3 . Constitution of re stricted g roups seri alization of groups (group­ series dialectic ) : ( i ) seriali zation of the instrument; (ii) economic neces­ sity : people form groups which are (a ) true : fri ends buy a set in common

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and entrust it to one of them , (b) false: cafes proj ect the showing to en semb les without unity but sti l l capable of fusing ; ( i i i ) seriali zation of groups ( s ide by side in bourgeois democrac y ) � ( iv ) possible regroupment (at the level of a pol icy : de Gaulle accentuate s seri al i zation , Castro does 8 1 the oppos ite , 3 etc . ) . B ut at th is l evel th ere is a concerted praxi s dissolving serial ization . For example : [gro ups ] are summoned t o unit y . B ut th e d issol ving prax is basicall y c onfi nes itself to serial izing the group i n so far as it groups the serie s : th is given small group i s integrated into the nation b y Castro ' s v o ice ; but i t i s inte grated as a serial group (thousands of other groups ) . S o you need a carn i v al , or the apocalyps e, or some upheav al , in order to make a compari son (one m il l ion people as sembled, etc . ) . 4 . In a bourgeoi s democratic society , the existence of a group or en semble o f i ndiv idual s owning a TV i s a cultural enrichment which, if I do not have one , causes me an i mpoveri shment. In a retotalizing ( in immanence ) practical field, it will thus be said that every increase i n the pos s ibilitie s of one ensemble is constituti ve of an impoveri shment of other ensembles inc luded in the field. That come s down to saying that in th e totali zation perpetual ly in progress , the i solation of one part create s a contradiction in the field . If the tiniest number owns a TV , it appears both as positing itself for itself within the t otality ( hence , a closed e lement of contradiction ) whic h , for its part, remains depri ved of TV , and at the same time as i nasmuch as it precisely is the totality repre senting the condition to which the totali ty must accede . If no practical frontier divide s the field, t he solution i s w ithout real violence : th e field organizes itself to be totall y supplied w i th TV sets (thi s does not mean that everybod y buys one , but people regroup to constitute buying group s , c l ub together, etc . 1 3 9 ) . In rel ation to the owner, equal ity replaces i nequality , in the sense that everyone will see TV . Differences persist (it is sometim e s more convenient to have one ' s own set; on the other hand, it will be adj u sted and serv iced better if i t is collecti v e ) . B ut these inequalities are secondary and negligible i n re lation to the aim ach ieved: watch ing the programme . H owever, they may bri ng structural problem s to light (without these nece ssarily being placed in the foreground) : collecti ve appropriation indiv idual appropriation. In thi s case , the poore s t are referred to their de stiny : sociali sm, which i s announced here (all the more so, in that it i s induced by another route ) . So inequal ity is found on another level . If the ensemble i s rel ati vely homogeneou s , the mode of appropriation will be the same (e . g . collecti ve) ; an d though

had been to Cuba in 1 960 . may recal l that th i � te xt w as w r i tten at

1 3 8 . S artre

1 39

We

th e beg i n n i n g of t h e s i x t i e �

A P PEN D I X

439

initiati ve may come from one c orner or another of the field, it w i l l l ate r be forgotten by those who have drawn the ir in spiration from it: it i s ine s sential . The re storation of total ity ( i . e . the new total ization) annih­ which i s forgotten. If the en semble i s i l ate s the original i nitiativ e heterogeneou s with an impassable threshold ( the weal thy ow ners the poor) the fact of total ization remain s , but now the contradiction is impas sabl e (temporari ly , but perhap s in the l ong run too) and in carnates c lass difference s , t:qr ex ample , or different levels wi thin a cl as s (we l l paid ari stocracy of tabour, unski lled workers ) which are i nc arnated in many other way s . In other words , the incarnation i s that of a contra­ diction. The disadvantaged are impo verished wit h re spec t to the advan­ taged. And thi s i mpov eri s h ment 1 . comes to them from outs ide and qual i fi e s them from outs ide ; 2 . incarnates in its singula rity a contradi ct ion extending to man y other sec tors ; 3 . but increases the ten sion of the contradiction; 4 . prov ide s the material and v i s ible s igns of it (aeri a l s on s ome roofs but not others) . Practical field as spati o-temporal . T ime , a l imit on space . S pace , a limit on time . Scarcity of time : you do not have time to do everything. Weal th : time- sav ing (gadgets ) . For a g iven e xtension , time i s scarce . Too scarce to be cro s sed (unity of a l i fe ) . For a g iven time, space is its limit: th i s time depend s in its temporal izing effi c ac y on the space env isaged (B razi l/USA) a nd the l abour suppl ied by thi s space . 1 4 0 5 . [Television ] l owers elites and rai ses po pu lar c ulture . For the television pr ogramme i s constituted at the level of the most numerou s (hence , least cultured) v iewer. B u t for h im i t i s culture (i nitiation into l i fe in common , the right note , pretty women, smart clothe s , etc . ) . For the bourgeois el ite : mindles sne s s . B ut we meet again the movement which , in re volutionary and underdeveloped countries, lowers the intel ­ l ectuals and rai ses mass culture . 6 . At the same time , howe ver, another contradiction : mass c ulture will be bourgeoi s . That means the dominant c las s finds a new means of diffusing its own i deology (i . e . the practica l j ustification of its prax i s ) . . . The part provokes the contradiction by posing a s the who le (uni versal c ul ture) . Th i s i s called ' integrating one ' s working class ' . B ut thi s integration i s fal se, because i t gives a c ulture of the advantaged to men who rem ain di sadv antaged. It gives the enj oyment of l uxury by sight, ,

1 40 . Th i s pa ragraph , wh ich i n the M S begi n s with a pare n th e s I s and h as no l ogical c o nnection w i th w h at prec edes i t , seem� to be the re su lt of an a � soc i a t i o n of i de a � , j otted d o w n there as a rem i n der.

440

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rather than by l ived real ity . There i s a working-class and peasant c ulture that i s pre vented from emerging or dev eloping. Hence , a contradiction between the universal and the class div ide . The l atter being deeper and more defi nitiv e . Howev er, even as the universal veils the struggle, this i s a s uperfic ial unificati on which brings out more clearl y the reality of the contradiction (bourgeois culture is exposed , as soon as the workers go back to work ) . In short, a false totalization (a total ization-manoeuvre); v acu ity of a bourgeois culture adapted for the pe ople, and true contra­ diction incarnated by a culture not concerned with truth . Proce s s : 1 . Prax i s : mass production. The cheapest pos sible, so already : the populari zed cul tural instrument. There are two logical way s of concei ving tele v i si on: e ither t otal distribution and popular c ulture (Castro) or i n a capi talist society an organ of restricted di stri bution of non-vulgarized bourgeois c ulture. But the second way is impo s s ible, by v i rtue of the v ery fact of the neces sary distribution of sets. S o industry imposes its culture . Capitali st mass produc tion massified bourgeoi s c ulture . Media­ tion : Pouj adist petty bourgeo i s i e . It is the latter, u ltimate l y , which receives its own culture (an impoverished, mass ified bourgeois culture) . In a word , the practico-i nert of production (machine s demanding their market) leads to the cultural practico-inert. It i s the necessity of producing a mill ion sets that produces that of produc ing a culture . With Castro , it is the opposite : production i s intens ified for culture . An interior practico­ inert. It may dev iate , but not initi ally gov ern , the p roces s . 2 . B ut mass production create s the mas s media . So class and govern­ ment propaganda c annot ignore these . Production t hus c reates a practico­ inert: TV as a talk ing machine, and thi s talking machine demands its own voice in the present situation of capital . And its voice i s govern­ mental , and a clas s ideology . It demand s its own voice , and its institu­ tionalization. It i s the machine that demands its own unity . On this bas i s : either the S tate directly , or interchangeable priv ate sets (competi tion barely differentiates them) . There are acc idents , of course : most of the directors harassed by McCarthy i s m worked in TV. S o rather more radical . But only barely, of course. Conversely , the public i s conditioned into e x igencie s . Serial exigencies: outrage . TV ' s prec autions . New ex igenc ie s : appearance of the spectacle in one ' s home. Idea of propriety (an i nterior practico-i nert) : someone come s into my home to insult me. And : I have paid . B ut exigenc i e s are v aried : confess ional (Catholic s , Jew s , Protestants ) , reli gious in general , clas s e s , opi nions . In short, it is a matter of unify i ng . Unify i ng poli c y : ideological propaganda, but without saying anything ; unity i s negative , and consequen tl y serial . S ay i ng what pleases everybody . B ut nothing pleases e verybody . So you have to s ay noth ing .

APPE N D I X

44 1

On th is bas i s , there is TV thought, TV behav i our , etc . , which be long to the practi co-inert. It i s s i multaneously other-direction and sensele ss di scourse . Unification by the mach ine: J . The machine" i s un ity. 2 . The machine' i s syn thetic : it puts i nto itself v arious interpenetrati ng practical signifi cations (government, mass media, etc . ) 3 . There i s on ly on e . It i s the same every where . You go and watch TV as such (c ompetition, difference be tween sets , etc . : practically neg l igible from the angle that concerns u s ) . 4 . Be ing inert, however, it un i fi e s v i a the seri al . 5 . Neverthele s s , in imman ence, rel ations between series are not serial and modifications are received in reciproc ity. And th is i s due t o the fact that everyone ' s prax i s interiorizes the practical field. On th i s bas i s , the series i s a synthetic and dialectical determination of the fi el d , at the same time as bei ng sealed i nerti a. In other words , the series has a twofold constitution : inert as a multipl icity sealed by ident ity , it i s active from afar as a part of the whole . In that sense, i t i s neither a total ity nor a totalization . The whole seri e s , considered as a tran sfi nite ensemble , i s a determinati on of the practical fi eld; as such it i s a part of the whole, an incarnation of the whole, and a retotal ization of the whole . In i mmanence , and considered b y the th ird party on the bas i s of the common field, the man of the series i s integrated into the unity of the field as the third party.

A n Examp le of Uni cation the bourgeois class threatens the nobility , the latter transforms its de facto state into a de jure state , the serfs and peasants are promptly con stituted as a clas s . Everything i s done from afar. Espec ially for the s erfs , however, there has been the disintegration of a serv i le but human bond, and the con sti tution of a still serial unity . The whole is sue i s that total i zation i s always ind irect: it i s effected by worked m atter, and with the medi ation of men . I t i s becau se the practical fi e ld i s a sealed unity that man turns thi s sealed unity back upon other men . In short , matter unites through the in termed i ary of man .

•

•

• •

•

Problem : totality-totalization. 1 . Numerous i sl ands inhab ited early on by a population of fi shermen­ sai lors. Unity of the practical fi e l d : i s l ands and raw material (sea). Sea - fi sh saltworks . Sparse crops (vines, v egetab l e s , fruit) . 2 . Unity of the practical field ti ghtened b y transcendent total izations : (a) Maj or centre s on the mai n l and: Aqu i l eia, Ravenna. Shortest route : b y the lagoon. Hence, coastal trade . (b) S altwork s . Exchange salt for manufactured obj ects . Equip fi shing and cargo boats . Practical field determined by th e exteri or. At once trav ersed and squeezed. Traversed : a route . R etota l i zation by trav e ller s . Reason : production/ communicati on : l ong , uncertai n roads . Coastal trade . Interiorization of the retotal i zation : ensuring coastal trade by their boats. Saltworks : likewise tr aversed ; a lready exchange , money , etc . So people do not reproduce their l i v e s . An already i n di r e c t sy stem . B ut in ternal retota lization by praxis . A S Y STEM . c oastal trade Saltw orks

�

salt

�

exch ange d

fini shed products · boats fi shin g

Fish in g as a reproduction o f l i fe depen ds on the saltwork s as mer­ chand i s e . B u t the s altw ork s al so make it po s s ible to monopol ize th e coastal trade , thus to s ubtract the practic al field of the lagoon from th e

44 2

A PPENDIX

44 3

mai n l anders (otherwise Aqu ileia and Ravenna wou ld hav e bu i l t boats) . Salt: the field i s traversed by the exterior and conditioned by i t. Precisely as a result of th is, it i s squeezed : conditioned , it seeks to escape its conditioning through coastal trade . For salt introduces tran scendence into immanence : dependence on a market. B ut the tradition al market (before th e invas ion s ) i s rel ati vely stabl e. And poor. What i s invol ved i s an arduous ex tractive industry . It extracts in order to give abroad . It en ters into a sy stem of di v i s i on of labour and commerce. On the other hand, by tran sporting trav e l lers and goods , it rec uperates the field : by plough ing forei gn waters on its Ol1r'n boats , i t turns them into the means of earning its liv ing. It transports the inert (trave l lers an inert) over its lagoon (an enlarged field) : the in ert traverses w i thout markin g. B ut thi s pas sage into a sector of practical ten sion which pas s i v i ze s it yields a return to the field. The salt (sold) gives the boats (the ir o wn ) , but the reproduction of life ( fi s h ing) i s at once dependent upon the external marke t. Fragi lity . The economy i s open , but the fi e l d i s totalized: islands (as a h abitat) , lagoon (as a conquest: knowledge of the lagoon neces sary for the coastal trade a channe l , etc . ) . How i s the totalization effected ?

I Quasi -perceptional tota l ization by every third party of every other, on the bas i s of the field. Community of the field throug h di versities : roug h l i fe , hence few differenc es in fortune . Do they form a group? A hi storian : ' They are not j e alous of each other. ' Rather, they form series of families w i th simi lar work , but are neighbours . Perhaps the saltworks are more or less common . Retotali zation on the bas i s of the fi e ld is th us effected b y the praxi s of everyone who grasps his l ife as contai ned in community with others on the island or the islands. R el ation s between i s l ands . The practi cal total ­ i zation i s farming and fishing at thi s level . With boats , total ization i s exte nded to the archipelago . A total i zing factor: marriages (between i s l ands , etc . ) . Total i zation of exteriori ty : the y are util i zed practical l y by wider org an izations , as producing salt an d coastal trade. The se are two ope rations which p l ace them i n the broad circ uit of the ancient econom y , but spec ial i ze them. So they grasp them s e l ves in prac tice as total ized people retotalizi ng . Interiorization, through practice , of the e xternal or tran scendent total ­ i zat ion . The tran s c e n d e n t totaI i zation is a direct uni fication (as m uc h i f it dre am s of massacre as i f i t says th e p roducers of salt, or coasta l trade).

B OO K I I I

444

I n proceeding to his labours , the producer of salt or the sa i lor re interiorize s the tran scendent unity into an insular practi cal unity , at the same time as he places thi s unity in danger bec ause of the whole economic c i rc uit. The lagoon is de fined as a lagoon th rough th e intermed iary of the mainland. Villages w ith l oc al headmen: hence , integrated communities. Serial ity of v i l lages, of families, of headmen and groups . Relations between seri al ities a nd groups defined by interiori zation : ( 1 ) of the geograph ical totality ; (2) of the geograph ical totality unv eiled abroad by a more cons iderable praxI s . Fifth-century invasions : integration by the Goth s in to the Ital ian kingdom. Little change (no crue lties on l and, no i mportance of the lagoon ) . The big chang es have li ttle effect on thi s small total ity , a nd its e conomic ac tiv ities because they are minimal surv i v e . Restoration b y Justini an ( 5 5 5 ) . The Veneto-I stri an region re -enters Roman unity . •

11

The migrations . Lombard kingdom (5 6 8 ) on the m ainland. Aquileia and Padua in the hands of the Lombards . Trans formation of the exterior: 1 . the lagoon becomes a refuge , a sanctuary; 2 . it remains in B yzantine hand s , and finds itself a neighbour to the Lombard kingdom . A . Refuge, sanctuary : it receives exile s (a massive exodu s ) . B u t the se are as simi lated . Or rather, the y are integrated and the y assimi l ate at the same time . R e lations b etween rich but unorgan ized indiv idual s and organized ensemble s . At the same time , thi s increases the real size of the inhabited region s , but within the ten sion of the totality . Noth ing is destroyed: the activity of the s altwork s remains preponderant. Moreover, there is homogeneity : the exile s disclose from outside (a tran scendent totali zation) the lagoon ' s character as a sh elter . B ut they disclose it to people who at onc e int eriorize it : th ey too , thou gh non-refu gee s , are l i v ing there sh eltered. And the refugee s , in pas sing from a transcendent state to an interior s tate , interiorize a total i zation of exteriority which i tself becomes interiori ty . On this basi s , the ec onomic , demographi c , etc . , tran sformati ons upheavals introduced by the exiles are always in immanence and total ized from withi n . The confl icts (fear that e x i l e may lead to reprisal s , greed , j eal ou s y ) are contradictions moving towards un ity . B . New relationship disclosed internal ly, i n immanence. A political re lationship (both i nterior and exterior) . The pol iti cal re l ation s h i p : a dual total izati on . •

-

APPENDIX

445

The l agoon remains under B y zantium (Ravenna exarchate) . It now has a nei ghbour (the L ombard kingdom) . These two rel ationships are novel. B efore , as we saw, the Veneto belonged whol l y to the Goth s or whol l y to the Latin Empire (J ustinian). S o that its ex ternal unity was e s senti ally economic and social (whence its total ization in i mmanence by a sy stem) . Furthermore , its unification was monovalent. Here , an am bi v alent unification : the Lombards and B y zan­ ti um. Two transcendent totalization s . For the Lombards , the Veneto i s a poor region which they leave to B y zantium � it i s too difficult to c apture for what it i s worth . For B y zanti um, on the ot her h and, permanent contac t with the enemy (a frontier zone) . This d ual totalization i s nece ssari l y interiori zed as a tension by Venetian soc iety . An autonomy threatened above a l l by the nearby Lombards , albeit under the protec torate of B yzantium (too far away to inspire fear) . First, a reg ional unity (the magister militum i s at Cittanova) . The tribun e s admini ster and del i ver j ustice under the authority of the B yzantine repre sentativ e . Then they e l ect a leader. Hence, factions already : terre strial i nterests ( in Charle­ magne ' s day : Doge Obelerio) mari time interests (for B y zanti um : the popul ation) . The dual totalization of transcendence i s thus interiori zed as ambiv alence (it i s politics: the great leaders at thi s time purs ue a cautious pol i c y treat y with Liutprand, the Lombard king) or as conflict. B ut the confl ict precisely repre sents , for e veryone , the ambiv al ence in immanence of a twofold transcendent determination . And th is con flict causes the struggle between the two transcendent force s to exp lode into a contra­ diction . The con tradi ction i tself (see M S abov e 1 4 1 ) i s a di s soc iation in un ity . Each facti on ' s interest i s to rend the other and l iquidate i t on beha lf of a common con stituted prax i s . At the same time , however, what i s involved i s no abstract, but a realistic determ i nation . Yet undoubtedly the population has interiorized fi de l ity to B y zantium, preci se l y in so far as i t ori entate s itself to wards maritime operations and the B yzantin e fl eets can protect it. It i s basical l y the economic situat ion that i s decisive. At the same time , the geopo l i tical situation (remoteness of B y zanti um , and difficulty for the Lombards to attack the vi l l ages forti fied camps) i s l i ved in interiority as independence , autonomy. And pol i tics becomes: e x igency of a medi ation between the factions (real ization of unity) which , through an ambivalent pol icy ( i . e. through a pol icy tou t court) , real izes autonomy under the protectorate. A l l thi s , of course , occ urs in the in teri or of inte riori zed upheav als (iconoc lasm , the controversy over Image s ) . Internal revolt and subm i s sion of D oge O rso.

1 4 1 . S e e p p . 6 3 ff. above .

BOOK III

446

A n Order Move on to totaI izations : 1 dictatorial 2 . d isunited so cieties 3 . generations (diachronic) B ut preci sely it i s H istory , so: 1 . Historical elements elements of H i story : (a) what Hi story and the histori cal are : societies without h i s tory , etc . ; (b) the possible , etc . , etc . ; (c) hi storic al l inks : infrastructures and s uperstructure s . 2 . Problem of totali zation : totali zation-of-enve lopment , IncarnatIon , S talin, c lass struggle, etc . 3 . The meanin g of H istory . .

•

•

•

•

I s never graspable i n transcendence . Other than for a partial totality (Venice at the outset) , by the greater powers (Ravenna ex archate Lombard kingdom) . Moreover, does not exist i n tran s cendence . A . For the transcendent totalization of all Hi story , who w i l l do it? See description of transcendence of exteriorit y . 1 42 B . For a p artial transcendent totalization. Interiority doe s not resemble extertortty . Venice seen by Liutprand i s an exterior object, with n umerous aspects either not eluc idated or merely not known , and characteri zed in rel ation to the Lombard kingdom (frontier zone of infl u ences defended by vain expediti on Ra venna neverthel e s s an x iety , pos s ible s urprise attack a bond of lagoon i=- dry land, etc . ) . Of course , transcendence i nteriority (relationship of negati on of interiority. Coe x istence is not contiguity ) , Of course, too , the tran scendent bond of interiority rei n teriori zed in i mmanence is one of the i nteri or bonds of the total ity i n the proce s s of totalization (geopol iti cal structure , internal di spute s , possibility or impossibility of an alternative pol i c y , etc . ) , I n thi s sense, it e xtends everywhere if it i s a th reat (everyone is a traitor, for example, in a revoluti onary mom ent : opposition i s treason , ev eryone can be the interi orization of the enemy ; moreover, ev eryone is that, as an Other i . e . inasmuch as he i s determi ned l ike me, by the enemy and non ­ broth er) , Totali zation of immanence can be reduced to being simply the retotalization i n interi ori ty of totali zations o f transcendence . B ut it reconditions them by a fresh confrontation ( B yzantium an d Lombardy confront each other in every group and every prax i s , but with different feature s ) . •

•

1 42 . See pp . 3 07 ff. above . 447

448

BOOK III

In short, the totali zation-of-envelopment is the i nteri or l imit of Immanence . For us, what does th i s mean ? That it i s impas sable. A Venetian ambas sador incarnates h i s country abroad; he is retotal ized as s uc h at home . A merc hant too. It i s possible to pass (exi l e fl i ght) the real limits , but: e ither a person remain s conditioned in interiority ( the exile who is merely Venice abroad) , or else integrated i nto another totalization he becomes a non-Venetian (exteriori ty of transcendence bitternes s , treason, natural­ i zation ) . Totali zation of immanence (and of enve lopment) what i s it? I t i s th e fact (from the standpoint of knowledge ) that we can interpret as its incarnation on the bas i s of the total izati on in progre s s any prax i s (incarnation) and any re lation (including that which i s institutional or seri al ) . B ut it must be understood that what i s inv olved i s a temporal­ ization : i . e . an interi or pas s age from m inus to p l u s , from p l u s to m i n u s , from a quantity to a quality , and v ice versa. I n short, thi s pres upposes a detotali zati on in act or threatening against which the totalization i s perpetuall y effected. Otherw i s e , there would be merely a totality . A priori we do not decide that the re should be a totalizing praxis : i . e . one giv ing itself the aim of totalizing. We say that a totali zation would be either usele s s ( a totality ) or pure repetition (societies of repetition) if ­ precisely detotalization did not appear at every moment. S o totalization i s the way in which detotality i s totalized; or agai n , i n which detotal iza­ tion i s retotalized. Thi s mean s : 1 . that total i zation i s never completed (otherwise : total ity ) . Let u s c learl y understand, moreover, that abundance or the end of pre-hi story change nothing here : a dialectical rel ationship i s involved; 2 . that detotal i zation never happens to the detotality ; 3 . that detotali zation is a product of total ization , which makes it alw ay s precarious (in the sense that total ization i s a practice : it produce s , so detotal izes through the increase of its product, for example); 4 . that totalization i s itself a product of detotali zation , in so far as the latter i s an ever-reducible dev iation or c ancer. S o total ization resembl es uni fication . B ut it i s not comparabl e to the rigorous unification of a body (an army, for example) attempted by groups in the government . Unification posits (partial) totali zation . Thi s mean s that so far as the decrees are concerned, the practical moment conditioning the reorganization implies total ization : i . e . a syntheti c grasping of the who l e in its disorder, as well as the comprehension of disorder by its reason s . Hence , a total i zation of detotal i zation . D i s organ•

A P PEN D I X

449

i zation of the Army ( lack of mean s of communication ; anarch y through a revolt of subordinate s , o r the leaders ' indifference ; intere sts of the Arm y , etc . ) i s the obj ect of a theoretic al totali zation : organization as an ] Thi s en semble (bound by links of immanence) of d i sorgani zation [ pre supposes th at they are themselves an organization on the way to di sappearing . Or, if you prefer: their exteriority is itself a fact of i mmanence. It i s an internal relationship inasmuch as they secrete it as an internal negation of exteriority . In other word s , the fact of anarchy is simultaneously the negati on of the parts who le relationship and the retotaii zation as exi sting throughout the Army of fac tors of anarchy (malaise) , .

•

.

.

•

•

•

No. I t i s the outside l i v ed as th e in side, th e inside l ived as an outs ide. It i s man ' s own e xteri ority (his being -an-obj ect for cosmic forces, for exampl e ) lived as his interiori ty . It makes h im, 1 4 3 ho wev er (by i nterv ening ) , but prec i sely as a being e x isting his own ou tside i n the form of i nteriorization : in short, as the being who cannot have an essence (for it is reall y someth in g else that he recuperates into himself as h i s be ing and not as his e s sence) . It makes him, as conceptual l y unable to think himself (since hi s being Pascal ­ i s alway s characterized by something fundamentally other than himself) . The free practical organi sm, abstractly con sidered (outs ide of h i s condi­ tioning by the exterior) , has a formal s ingularity. B ut this s ingularity remains uni v ersal and abstract, so l ong as its content which i s s ingular, because irreducible to an essence is not seen. ( A cha nce) i . e . hetero­ geneou s . For example : no l i nk between the human condition and its singular transcendence and the fact of belong ing to such and such a socIety or race . Yet H istory which makes man non -con ceptual comp rehends him ; or, if you prefer, the man made by H i s tory make s himself by making i t through transcendence . And tran s cendence totalize s the practical field and total i ze s itself as an interi orized exteriori ty . Thi s total ization makes the synthesi s of the heterogeneous . For example , ev ery man i s acciden ta l for h imself. He is bo rn . Here rather than there . And he i s , for himself, the person who is born . And that i s how he i s born a J e w . B u t he can no longer cons i der h i s b eing-a-Je w as a chance� for he e x i sts onl y in order to be a Jew (birth is not the apparition of a soul waiting in l imbo) . As •

1 4 3 . His tory makes m an . 450

A PPEN D I X

45 1

soon as the chance is pos ited , it i s negated. It is no l o nger to be found. In a certain sense, i t is an imagin ary backward extension of birth . B ut thi s chance unthinkable in isolation become s a determinati on demanded (in order to affirm or destroy it) from the moment of the proj ect. ' A Je w by chance ' : practically no Jew says th is, and th ose who do say it out of weariness do not think it. It i s the recuperation of ' former c irc um­ stances ' . S o H i story appears as the outside con stitutive of the in side, in the capaci ty of an undetectable , yet as sumed, c hanc e . For in the trans­ formation of my being-a-Jew into a status , by as suming it I cause thi s chance to sparkle. As suming it, it i s what I give mys elf as being able not to as sume it and (at once) what would then becom e a chance. For, in birth , it is only an imaginary chance. In reality , a rigorous necessity (obj ectiv el y : a son of Jew i sh parents , he i s a Je w ) . B ut by the fact of reassuming i t, I give it i . e . to th i s characteri s tic that of ' being able not to be as sumed ' : hen ce, a determination as c hance . At the same time , h owever, th e ch ance is wh at mak e s me comprehen sibl e (my rel ation s with I srael , i f I am Jewish , etc . , w i l l be unders tood : Aha ! he ' s a Je w ) . B ut precisely ' Aha! he ' s a Je w ' means not: on the basi s of an initial given , I understand the consequences (an acc i dent of birth from which ev erything w i l l flow) , but: he make s himself a Jew , and his relations with I srael are comprehensible on th at bas i s . He makes h i mself one , because he i s one ; he i s one, becau se he makes himself one . Chance i s n on­ conceptual and i t makes man non-conceptual ; conversely , however, man making himself disc loses chance in i ts dialectical inte lligibility . The same w i l l be the case in al l events : there i s a lway s (even wholly suffered apart from death) an appropriatio n . History i s es sential to man i n so far as it m akes him into the non­ es sential intelligible . Man i s never essential (other th an in the past) . He i s , in himself, a being -o ther (because he makes h i m se lf an interiorization of the worl d) ; but that being - oth er does not pre suppose that there is a being-yo urself bloc ked from underneath. Being-your self i s precisely the recuperation of being -other. It i s the dialectical mo vement of c ompre ­ hension . Th e inner contradiction between the universal and the singular i s real ized in interiori ty in everyon e , by the appearanc e of the new within repeti tion ( which remains a repetition) . For example : undernouri shment appearing (as a slow but novel c i rc umstance) in a cyc le of labours makes the l abourers c oncerned into contradi c tory , singular be ings (vis-a- vis the en semble) , through the l owering of th e ir productiv ity, etc . The contra­ diction i s bas ical l y between what comes from outside into the interior (conti ngent with re spect to a relative universal for ultimately the se labourers are si n gul arized at least by their l abour) and the ' primary custom ' repetition that comes from the ins ide . Or, if you prefer, between

B OO K I I I

452

what i s instituted (cycl ical labour and and its repetition s) and what, as yet, i s not. S tudy the passage of the event (meaningle s s) to the institution (s ignify ing ) , which i s effected through man and pres upposes a group and a serIes . 1 . The event i s meaningless (change of cl imate, etc . ). 2 . Lived, [it] transform s men who adapt to it (reorgan ize to negate it) and negate i t through a praxis (migration) that is a decree . In stituting group. 3 . Serie s � institution. Refracted praxis becomes an institution through the separation of everyone. •

•

•

It can exist as history (even dead) only in the interior of another h i story (today dead or living) which serv e s as a mediation for our own : Mayas Span iards contemporarie s . A s a consequence, the mode of relation which perpetuates a particular hi story in Hi story i s itself historical (that mean s it evol ves) . That also means that every history , as soon as relationships in the present or past are e stabli shed with other hi storie s , i s the incarnation of H i s tory . There are historie s , but e ach of these h i s tories (eve n dead and reabsorbed into the past) i s Hi story . (Temporal ) H istory appeal s to temporality as consciousness to consciousne s s : it can be comprehended and rev ived (by its practical e xp l oitati on ) only through a historical prax i s defining itself by its temporal development. An absolute mind w ithout developm ent ( intui tion ) could not comprehend Hi story . It has to be historical itself. Furthermore , a free practical organ i sm will be able ( i n mon uments , etc . ) to redi scov er the former pre sence of other free organisms, but not H i story itself. Th i s free organ i sm must himself be hi storical : i . e . h imself conditioned by the i nteriorization of h i s bond in e xteriority with the total ization ; him self an incarnation ; himself History. Converse l y , he di scovers him self as h i s torical in h i s own move­ ment of restoration of made hi story .

453

,

I n translating thi s second v o l um e of Sartre ' s C ritique, I have been helped enormousl y by b eing able to consult the Alan S heridan - S mith/lonathan Ree version of Volume One , and Ronald Aronson ' s perceptive Sartre' s Second Critique (Chicago 1 9 8 7 ) . I t seemed obviously best where possible to m ake the termino logy con si s tent between the two v olumes , but in a small number of cases readers will find a discrepancy . Like Aronson , and for the s am e reasons , I have preferred ' group-in-fu s ion ' as a rendering of groupe en fusio n , and i n general hav e sought to retain the active di men sion S artre so often stri v es to impart to h i s vocabul ary ( sometimes at the cost of l inguisti c orthodo x y or stylistic elegance) henc e , ' indetermination ' (rather than ' indeterm i nac y ' ) , ' to dev i ate ' in its trans itive sense , and so on . I have al so preferred ' s ingularization ' for singu/arisation, rather than ' individ­ u al i zation ' which breaks the l ing ui stic l ink with ' s i ngle ' and ' s ingularity ' . I have h yphenated S artre ' s totalisation d' enveloppemen t as ' totali zation-of­ envelopment ' , b y analogy with ' group-in-fu s i on ' . Although an attempt has been made to fi nd a s ingle Engli s h rendering for each French c oncept, there are certain words (conduite , for e xample : rendered v ariously as ' be ­ haviour ' , ' behaviour pattern ' , ' action ' , ' procedure ' ) where I felt that any attempt to do so would be self-defeating . I have not fol lowed Smith/Ree in i ndicating (by g i v ing the original term in brackets) whether ' tran­ s cendence ' translates transcendance or depassement. Square brackets indic ate inte rpolations by the editor or the tran slator. The glossary which follows i s basically a combin ation of Arl ette ElkaYm­ S artre ' s glo s s ary to the French edition of Vol ume Two with th at appended to the English edition of Volume One . S ince most readers of Volume Two are like l y al so to have Volume One , in cases of overl ap I have u sually preferred to give A . E-S ' s defi n i tion , which is often in fact e x tracted from S artre ' s own text ( i n which case it i s encl o s ed i n quotation m arks ) .

455

ac tiv i ty o f t he c ommon ind i v i du al , w ho free l y consents to a

active passivity certain

i ne rt i a ( d i s c i p l ine ,

d i fferentiation through h i s

function

w i th i n

the

g roup) in order better to serv e the common prax i s

adversity ... coefficient

term coi ned by Gaston B ache lard , re ferri n g to the amou n t

of res i s t ance o ffered by e x te rnal obj ec t s to the proj ects of the For- i t s el f ' the theft of the ac t by the outside: I a c t h ere , and the ac ti on of an

alienation

other - or a group - o ver th ere mod i fie s the meaning of m y ac t from wi thout '

a iter ity

a re lation of s eparat i o n , opposed to rec i proc ity

analy t ic

Reason

the form

of re ason

appropriate

to

the e x ternal

relat ions

w h i c h are the obj ec t of the n atural s c iences

anti ... d i alectic

i n te l l igible moment of transcendence by material i t y of ind i ­

v idual fre e prax e s , inasmuch a s the s e are m u l ti p l e

a n ti ... labou r

twofold ( or plural ) antagon istic ac tiv ity , which prod uce s obj ec t s to

be cons idered as the re s u lts of a negative c o l laboration that none of the adv ersaries rec o gn izes a s h i s own

A pocalypse

t he v io l en t proc e s s of d i s s oluti on of s eriality , unde r the p re s sure of

an oppos i ng praxi s ( see : group-i n - fu s i on )

c lass

the dev e l o p i ng tota l i z ation of three k i nd s of ensemb l e : i n s t i tutional ized

g roups , p l edged groups and seri e s

collect ive

t he two- way rel ation between a m ateri al , inorgan i c , work ed obj ec t and a m u l t i p l i c i t y w h i c h fi n d s i ts u n i ty of exteriority i n i t ' '

common i n d i v id ual

indiv idual whose prax i s i s common, an d who i s c r e at e d b y

a p ledge

comp rehension

the understanding of a prax i s in term s of the p urposes of i t s

ag ent or agents ( se e : i n tel l ec t i o n ) 456

G LO S S A R Y

constituen t d i alec tical Reason

45 7

tran slucid but abstract pra x i s of the i nd i v id u a l

c o n s i dered i n i so l at i on (or prac t i c a l organ i s m )

constituted d ialectical R eason

inte l ligibi l it y , based on c on stitue nt d i alectic a l

Reason, of every c o mmon prax i s

cri tical in vestigation

study ( i t s e l f dialec t ic a l ) o f the foundat ion s ,

fi e l d of

appl ication and l i m its of di alec tical Reason

desti ny

man ' s future, inasmuch a s i t i s inscribed i n worked matter

d iachronic m eaning o f History

' the axial direc tion i n relation to w h i c h one

m ight defi ne ( and correct) any p o s s ib l e drift , toda y and i n the in fi n i te future of interiorit y '

diac h ronic tota l ization

i nte l l ig i b le development o f a pra x i s -proc e s s acro s s

v a s t tempora l e n sembles i n w h i c h acco unt i s taken of the d i s continuities produced by g enerati onal s h i ft s

dialectic ( o r dialectical Reason) ekstasis

' the l iv ing logic of action '

Greek : ' stand i ng out from '

ensemble exigency

a collection of i n d i v i d u al s , however rel ated a nece s s ity impo s ed by the practi c o - i nert

exteriorityii n teriority

term s not to be understood i n a purel y s patial se n se : i n

a n ensemble, there i s a relation of interi ori ty between all the e l ements as d e fi ned and modified by their m embership of that e nsemble , and a relation of e xteri ori ty between elements c oe x i st i n g i nertly

facticity

the For- itse lf' s nece ss ary c onnec t i on w ith the In- itsel f

fratern ity-terror

s tatutory rel ation betwee n the m e mbers of a pledged g roup

inasmuch a s the ir new b i rth a s common indiv i d u a l s gives each the right of v i olence ov er the freedom of al l the others agai n s t the d i s s olution o f the g roup

gat h eri n g group

a seri e s c ap able of con stituting a group

an en semble each of whose members i s de term i ned by the others i n

rec iproc i t y ( i n c o ntrast to a seri e s )

gro u p - i n - fu s i on

g roup in the proc e s s of b e i ng constit uted by the d i ssolut i on of

seriality , under the pre s s u re of a n opp o s i ng pra x i s ( se e : Apocal yps e )

hexis

i nert, s table condition opposed to prax i s

i ncarnation

proce s s w hereby a prac t i cal real i ty env elops in its o w n s i n g u l arity

the ensemble of tot a l i z ation s i n progre s s

institution

g roup w h i c h de ve lops from a pledged g roup through the o s s i fi c ation

of i t s s tructures and the emerge n c e of soverei gnty and seri a l i ty w i th i n it

G LO S S A R Y

45 8

i n tellection

the e xp l anation of a prax i s , not nec e s s ari l y i n term s of the p urpo s e s

of i t s agent o r agents ( se e : comprehens i on)

i n terest

in a s oc i al fi eld c ond itioned by s c arc i ty and need , a relat ion of m an

to things s u ch that he s e e s i n them h i s b e i n g an d h i s tru th and , s e ek i n g to pre serve and deve lop the m aterial en s emble w h i c h i s him s e l f, fi n d s he i s whol l y s ubordinate to the e x igenc i e s of the prac tico- i nert

interiority

see : e xteri ori ty

(experience)

in vestigation

the pro c e s s of understanding H i s tory , as c orre s ­

ponding to th e h i stori cal proc e s s itself

med iated

reci p rocity

( in

a

gro u p )

hum an

rel ation

between

th ird

part i e s ,

pas s i n g v i a a l l the m embers of the group form ing the ' m i l i e u ' of t h i s rel ation

m ultipl ici ty

negatite

a c olle c t i on of ind i v idual s , how ev er related

c h aracteri stic of types of human activ ity w h i c h , while not obv i o u s l y

i nvolv ing

negative j udgemen t ,

any

nev erthele s s

contain

negati v ity

as

an

i ntegral p art o f the i r s truc ture : e . g . e x perience s i nvolv ing ab senc e , change, i nterrogation , destruction

n ihilation

proc e s s w hereby c o n s c i ou s ne s s e x i s t s , through m ak i n g a noth i ng ­

n e s s ari s e between i t a nd the obj ec t of which i t i s con s c i ou s n e s s

organized group Other

group based o n a pledge

c ap italized as a pronoun representing a person or an adj ec t i v e qualifying

one, s tre s s ing the l atter ' s rad i c al alterity : the other, inasmuch as he governs or i s c apable o f govern ing l atera l l y (or being gove rn e d b y ) everyone ' s acti v i ty

other-di rection

operation of a s o vereign group upon s erial ens embles , w h i ch

c on s i s ts i n c onditioning e ach b y ac ti ng upon the others , th u s fal sely produc i ng the seri e s a s a whole for each O ther c omposing it

passive ac tivity

act i v ity of the prac t ic o - i nert (of worked m atter i na s m uch as it

domi n ates man and of m an i na s m u c h as he i s governed b y it)

pled ged group

a group w h i c h d e v e l op s from a group- in-fu s ion thro ugh an

organ i zed di stri bution of rig h t s and duties enforced by a pledge

possi ble

a conc rete action to be p erformed in a concrete w orl d , a s opposed to the

ab stract idea of pos sibility i n genera l

p ractico-inert

' a gov ernment of m an by w orked m atter strictly proporti onate

to th e gov ern m ent of i n ani m ate m atter b y m an '

praxis

' an org a n i z i ng proj ec t w h i c h trans cends m aterial c o nd i tions to w ard s an

end and i n scribes itse lf, through l abo u r , i n i norgan ic m atter as

a

re arrangem ent

of the prac t i c a l fi el d an d a reu n i fi c ation of m e a n s i n the l ight of the e nd '

praxis-process

prax i s

of an

org an ized

soc i al

ensemble, w h i ch rec uperates

w i th i n itself - and tran scends - the cond ition i ngs and c o u nter- fi n al i t i e s w hi c h i t nece s s ar i l y en genders i n being temporal ized , and w h i c h dev i ate i t

GLOS SARY

p rocess-p raxis

459

prax i s -proc e s s no longer v iewed in i nteri ori ty a s a total i z ation ,

b u t in e x teriority ( inasmuch as i t ari s e s i n the d i spersion of the Un iv erse) ; as such, i t can only be aimed at

p roj ect

a c h os e n way of being, expre s sed in prax i s

scarcity

c on t i n gent impo s s i b i l ity of s a t is fy i n g al l the n e e d s of an e n semble

seria l ity

m ode of coe x i s ten c e , in the practico - i nert m i l ie u , of a h u m an m u l ti ­

p l i c ity e ach of whose members i s at once inte rc h ange able and other by Others and for him s e l f

sovereign

i ndi v i d u a l (or g roup) who ( o r which) m a n ipulate s serie s w i th i n an

i n s t i tutional g roup

s tatu te

c ondition of an i ndiv idual ( or ensemble) i n s o far as i t i s pre s cri bed by

the kind of e n s emble to which he (or i t ) belongs

structure

adopted i nertia,

ch arac teri s ti c

of orga n i zed

groups

and

open

to

i nv e s t i g ation by analytic Reason

sy nchronic totalization

dev e l opment of prax i s -p roc e s s i n a sm u c h as i t s temporal ­

i zation i s one and i t cont i n u o u s l y reu n i fi e s i t s means i n the l i g h t o f a common obj ec ti v e , on the bas i s of a defined en semble of form e r c i rc um stanc e s

temporaIization

' the p l ural ity of temporal izations together with tem poral u n i ­

fi c at i on ( a synthetic u n i fi c ation of the antecede n t by the conseque nt , a present u n i fi c ation of the new m u l t ipl ic i ty t hro ugh old framew o rk s ) ac tuall y c o n s t itute the evol uti on of h u m an i ty as the prax i s of a d i achronic gro u p , that i s to say , as the temporal aspect of th e c o n s t i t uted d i alectic '

third pa rty

e ac h of the members of a mul t ipl i c ity i n a s m uch as it total i z e s the

rec i pro c i t i e s of others

total ization

labour of s y nthe s i s and integrat ion on the bas i s of determ ined

c i rc um s tance s and in relation to an objec t i v e ; totali zation defi ne s prax i s i t s e l f ( for the d i s t i nc t i on between total i ty and tota l i zati on , see :

Critique, vol . l ,

pp . 4 5 ff. )

total ization-of-envelopment

It w o u ld be ra sh to seek here to fi x t h e meaning

of th i s concept. Throughou t th i s u n fi n i shed s econd v o l u me of S artre ' s Critique , i t rem a i n s the a n i m at i n g i n t u i tion w h i c h the au thor attempts to d e fi n e and deepen : at s take i s the i n tell i g i b i lity and mean i ng of H i s tory . Moreover, its s e n s e varie s depending on the re a l i ty under cons ideration . Th u s , in the case of an organ ized group , the total izat i on - of-e nve l opment i s s i m p l y ' the i n tegrat ion of all concrete indi v i dual s by prax i s ' (p . 8 6 ) . I n the chapte r on d i rectori al soc i et i e s , i t i s d e fi n ed as ' a uto n o m O u5 prax i s a s serti ng i t s e l f a s s u c h , inasmuch a s i t p r od uc e s , underg oe s , h arbours and c on c e al s i t s

own

heteron omy as the

pas s i v e and reactual i z ed u n i ty o f i t s o w n by -produ c t s ' , or agai n as " th e i n te r i or

e x teri ority of a v a st c o m m on undertak i ng ' ( p . 24 2 ) . B ut the se form u l at i o n s do not

hold

for

a

' d i s u n ited '

s oc i e ty ,

in

which

the re

is

not

one

c o m m on

G LO S S A R Y

460

unde rtaking , but a mere u n i ty of immane nc e . And w h at would be the c a se w i t h a l arger- scale ( di ac h ro n i c ) h i storical proc e s s ? The s e questions are t o uc he d on , but c e rtain l y not re solved, i n the n otes inc l uded in the A ppendi x above . A t v ari ous j u nc ture s , the author i ntroduc e s th e idea of corpore i ty t o help u s gra s p

the

what

total i zation - o f- e nvel opment

overflowed by the depth of the world,

might

mean :

c om m o n prax i s ,

produces i t s e xte riori ty a s i t s o w n body .

T h i s metapho r g i v es a gl impse of t w o e ssent i al featu re s of the total i z at i on-of­ envelopme n t : movement

its

prac t i c al

(c irc u l arit y

and

unity

and

dev i at i on)

its

m aterial i t y ,

whereby

it

and

might

also be

the

spi ral

apprehended

(p. 244 ) . It shou l d be po i nted out that i n the note s i n c luded in the A ppendi x above , the a uthor ident i fi e s total i zation- of-envel opment w ith s y s tem , which - l i ke the notions of overfl owed ac t i on and heteronomy - re turns u s to the ' to t a l i z at i on w i thout a total i zer ' w h o s e pos s ib i l i ty i s announced at the end of Vol ume One . Readers

will

also

fi nd i n the Append i x the m o re ge neral

s tatement :

the

tota l i zation -of-envel opm e n t ex i s t s i f any pra x i s or any re l at i on whatsoeve r c an be i n terpreted ' as an i nc arnation of the total i za t i on i n progres s '

( p . 448 ) .

Readers m ay a l s o re fer to the c hapter on the bei ng of the tota l i z ation-of­ envelopment ( p . 3 0 1 ) , which e x p l a i n s w h at th i s i n c arn at i on c ertain l y is n o t for the author ( a c ri tique of the Marx i s t d i alec t i c ) .

abundance 1 4 , 1 1 5 , 3 1 2 n , 34 1 , 42 ] -4 ,

B udape st 1 7 3 B uk h ari n , N ikol ai 1 7 0 , 25 3

44 8

bureauc racy 1 1 0 , 1 1 6, 1 24 , 1 46-7 , 1 5 1 ,

Algeria 3 9 8 , 400-40 1 , 4 1 3

1 54-5 and n , 1 5 7 , 1 63 -4 and n , 1 7 6,

a l terity 1 1 9 , 1 49 , 1 5 2, 1 59-60, 202,

24 1 , 2 5 0 , 25 3-4 , 2 5 9 , 2 7 9 , 2 8 4 , 295 ,

2 1 0, 232, 2 3 8 , 366

3 35

America 362-4

B y zant i um 7 2 , 8 7 , 444-5 , 447

an a l y t i c Reason 8 , 2 8 , 3 0 , 3 5 , 1 02 , 1 6 7 , 2 7 5 , 2 7 7 , 3 50 , 3 74-5 , 3 7 7-80, 3 8 2 ,

cap i tal i sm 3 4-5 , 4 2 , 46, 48 , 1 1 5 , 1 28 ,

404 , 407 , 4 1 7- 1 8 , 4 2 5

1 3 1 , 1 3 9 , 1 43 , 1 56 , 1 74, 1 7 8 , 22 3 n ,

Anschluss 1 8 8 anthropology 1 6 , 3 6 2-3 , 3 7 7

2 3 9 , 266- 7 , 269 , 3 1 0, 3 1 9 n 3 7 7 ,

ant i -dialectic 7 3 , 9 8 , 1 1 2 , 1 20 , 1 2 1 ,

40 1 , 4 1 6 , 424, 428 , 4 3 1 -2 , 440 C arpe n t i e r , Georges 6

2 8 5-7 , 29 1 , 3 34 , 400 , 4 1 9-20 ant i - l abour 95-8 , 1 1 2- 1 4, 1 1 7 , 4 3 5

C arte s i ans 3 4 8 , 3 66

ant i - S em i ti s m 8 8 , 2 1 7 n , 222 , 2 3 5 ,

c aste s 420 C a s tro , Fide l 4 3 8 , 440

263-7 1 A q u i l e i a 442-4

Cathol i c i s m 2 2 3 , 8 8 0

A ron, Raym ond 1 2 5 n , 1 3 9 , 3 1 5

C h aI l e , M aurice 3 98

A s i a 1 06, 1 9 8 , 299 , 3 6 3

chance 9 1 -4 , 1 93 , 20 1 , 206 , 2 1 0,

A s i a M i nor 276

226-7 , 45 1

Atla ntic 3 6 2

C h arlemagne 445

Augereau , P i e rre -Fran� o i s - Ch arles 2 1 8

C h ateaubri and, Fran�o i s - Rene de 4 1 3

A us tral i a 29

Chaum e tte , P i e rre- G aspard 2 5 5 Ch ina x i i , 1 05 and n , 1 06, 1 1 7 , 1 3 9 , 1 75 , 436

B ac h , lohann S e bastian 296 B aku 2 1 1

C i ttanov a 445

C i ty of E n d s 246

batt l e s 7-8 . 1 2 , 7 8 , 4 3 3 B l anc , L ou i s 9 6

c l a s s e s 1 5 , 3 5-7 , 4 3-5 , 47-8 , 5 0-5 1 , 1 1 4- 1 5 , 1 I 9-20, 1 64, 1 74, 1 7 7 , 2 7 7 ,

B o l sheviks 1 02 . 1 05-6 , 1 1 2 , 1 2 5 , 1 29 , 1 4 8 , 1 7 1 , 1 9 6n , 2 1 0 , 224n , 2 3 9-40 , 252 Bonaparte :

see

290n , 3 1 5 , 3 2 7 , 3 6 3 , 3 67 , 4 2 3 , 428 , 4 39-4 1 , 446

N apol eon I

C l a u s e w i tz , K arl von 1 00

boxing 5 -6 , 1 0 , 1 7-5 0 passim , 1 8 8 , 355 B raz i l 43 9

Cleopatra 9 ] cock fi gh t i n g 3 3

•

co l l e c t i v i zation 7 5 , 9 9 , 1 0 1 -2, 1 2 ] ,

B re s t - L i tov s k 1 05

] 6 8-9 , 1 7 4 , 1 76 , 1 7 8-9 , 1 8 1 -2 , 1 95 , 46 1

4 62

205-6 , 2 3 9 Col umbu s , C hris tophe r 3 6 3 c om m and i s m 1 1 6, 1 3 2 , 1 4 1 -3 , 1 5 6, 1 6 1 , I 64 , 2 3 9

comm un i s m 1 1 4- 1 6 and 1 1 5 n , 1 44, 1 96n, 25 3 Com m u n i s t Party 7 4-6 , 8 7 , 1 0 3 ,

I N DEX

Denm ark 409 d e v i ation 8 8 , 90, 1 1 0- 1 1 , ] 1 4, 1 ] 7 , 1 29 , 1 3 6 , 1 42 , 1 47 , 1 65 , 1 95 n , 207 , 2 1 5 , 2 ] 8- 1 9 , 2 2 3 , 225-7 , 2 3 3 , 2 3 5 , 2 3 7 -8 , 240-4 1 , 244-5 , 2 5 1 -2 , 26 8 , 27 1 , 2 7 6 , 27 8-80, 2 8 2-7 , 2 8 9 , 29 1 -4 , 3 04 , 3 06 , 3 1 2 and n , 3 1 5 ,

1 06-7 , 1 22 , 1 46 , 1 5 1 -3 , 1 5 9, 295 ,

3 2 8-9 , 3 3 1 , 3 34-5 , 3 45 , 39 1 , 4 3 2-3 ,

412

43 5 , 440 , 448

compe tenc y 5 4-5 , 6 1 , 65 , ] 1 2 , 1 27 compreh e n s ion 2 7 , 4 1 , 65 , 69, 7 1 ,

d i achroni c ( sy nthe s i s , etc . ) 4 , 7 3 -4 , 8 4 , 9 2 , 1 07 , 1 1 4 , 1 1 7 , 1 80 , 200n , 2 1 4 ,

8 2-3 , 8 8 , 9 1 -2, 1 1 2- 1 3 , 1 6 1 , 1 76 ,

2 1 7 , 2 2 3 , 226-7 , 2 7 1 , 2 8 4 , 294,

1 8 3 , 2 1 1 , 225 , 2 8 2 , 2 8 4-7 , 29 1 ,

298-9 , 3 06 , 3 1 2, 3 3 1 , 3 3 5 , 3 49 , 3 6 2 ,

294-7 , 305 , 3 1 1 , 3 ] 3- ] 4, 3 20 , 3 3 0 ,

4 1 1 , 4 2 8 , 446

3 6 8 -7 3 , 3 7 5 , 3 7 7-8 , 3 8 3-5 , 3 90 , 400, 404-5 , 43 1 , 449 , 45 1 , 45 3

dialectic 4 1 , 6 9 , 7 3 , 7 8 , 8 4 , 9 1 , 9 3 , 9 8 , ] 09 , 1 1 2 , I 20-2 1 , I 3 9 , 1 5 0 , 1 60 ,

Cons tantine 4 1 3

1 65 n , 1 8 3 , 203 , 206 , 2 1 7 , 2 2 2 , 2 2 6 ,

con s ti tuent (d i al ecti c , etc . ) 3 , 6 2 , 9 7 ,

247 , 25 5 , 2 8 5 , 3 02-3 , 3 05 , 3 0 7 n ,

1 20 , ] 7 0 , 2 2 8 , 2 3 3 , 247 , 260 , 2 8 1 n ,

3 29, 3 3 0n , 3 3 1 -3 , 3 3 5 , 3 4 0 , 3 50 ,

2 8 4-5 , 2 8 7 , 3 3 3 , 3 3 5 , 3 4 2 , 3 47 , 3 6 3 ,

3 5 5 , 3 8 8 , 404 , 406, 4 1 7 , 42 2 , 43 7 ,

405

44 8

con s t i tuted ( d i al ecti c , etc . ) 3 , 62, 1 20,

d i alecti c al (Re ason , e tc . ) 8 , 3 5 , 9 1 , 9 8 ,

1 8 3 , 2 1 3 , 2 2 8 , 23 3 , 2 3 8 , 260, 2 8 1 n ,

2 1 9 , 2 5 2 , 25 5 , 2 7 0 , 2 7 5 -7 , 2 8 0 ,

2 8 4-6 , 290, 295 , 3 3 0 , 3 3 5 , 340, 3 47 ,

2 8 1 n , 2 84-6 , 297 , 299 , 3 0 1 , 3 0 9 ,

407 , 445

3 49-5 0 , 3 6 5 , 367-9 , 3 7 3-5 , 3 7 7-8 ,

contingency 3 5 , 3 9-40 , 5 7 , 65 , 7 0 , 7 7 , 1 3 0 , 1 9 8 , 204-5 , 2 1 3- 1 4 , 226-7 , 2 3 8 , 260-64 , 2 7 4 , 2 7 6-7 , 3 1 3 , 3 5 8 , 3 8 5 , 45 1 contradic tion 3 -5 , 1 1 , 1 5 , 48 , 5 1 -7 , 6 1 , 66-7 0 , 7 4 , 8 5 , 89 , 1 06 , 1 1 3 , 1 3 8 , 1 5 1 , 1 5 6 , 1 6 1 , 1 65 , 1 67 , 1 7 4 , 2 3 1 , 2 3 6 , 2 6 6 , 2 7 4-5 , 3 3 2 , 405-6 , 4 1 2- 1 3 , 4 1 5- 1 6 , 4 1 9 , 4 3 5-6 , 4 3 8-40 , 444-5 , 4 5 1 Convent i on 1 3 , 5 2 , 5 6 , 2 24

3 8 2 , 3 8 4-5 , 3 9 1 , 403 , 405 , 407 , 4 1 4 , 4 1 7-2 0 , 4 3 4 , 4 3 7 , 44 ] , 45 ] di spers ion 24 8 , 2 5 0 , 3 09 , 3 1 7- 1 8 , 3 2 3-4 , 3 27-8 , 3 3 2-3 , 3 4 1 -5 , 3 4 8 , 3 5 5 , 3 5 7 and n , 3 60-6 1 , 3 6 3 , 3 70-7 1 , 3 7 3 , 3 7 9 d i s soc i ation 7 2 , 7 7 , 8 0 , 8 3 , 8 5 -6 , 1 64 , 309, 445 dogm at i sm 5 , 87-8 , 9 2 , 1 09, 1 3 9 , 205 , 2 1 5 , 2 2 3 , 22 5 , 2 2 8 , 242 , 26 8 , 3 0 1 -2 drift 25 2, 263-7 ] , 2 7 4 , 2 7 8 , 2 8 2 ,

Counc i l of Tre nt 425

29 1 -2 , 3 1 5 , 3 2 8-9 , 3 3 2 , 3 3 5 , 3 50 ,

counte r- fi n al i t y 5 8 , 6 0 , 6 2 , 65 , 7 2-3 ,

3 7 8 , 43 3 , 435

7 8 , 8 3 , 8 5 , 90, 1 1 2 , 1 1 7 - ] 8 , 1 20 ,

Dre yfu s , A l fred 8 8

1 24 , 1 3 4 , 1 40 , 1 47 , 1 5 5 , ] 65 , 1 7 2-3 ,

Dlihri n g . E u g e n 1 96n

] 7 8 , 1 80-8 1 , 1 8 7 , 1 89 , 1 95 , 207 , 2 20n , 2 2 6 , 2 3 0 , 23 7 , 2 4 2 , 2 5 0 , 2 6 3 ,

Enge l s , Friedri c h 5 0 , ] 96n , 3 2 3 , 4 ] 9

27 2 , 2 8 8-9 , 29 1 , 2 9 6 , 3 ] 0 , 3 1 2- 1 3 ,

E n g l and 1 07

3 8 ] , 3 8 8 , 400 , 404-6 , 4 1 0 , 4 1 6- 1 7 ,

e p i centre s 5 , 7 , 9- 1 0, 65-6 , 6 8 , 8 5

4 1 9-20

E s k i m o s 409 , 4 3 5

C romwe l l , O l i v e r 9 1 -3 Cuba 3 3-4 C u ra�ao 3 5 2

Europe 99- 1 00, 1 03 , 1 05-6 , 1 08-9 , 1 1 1 , 1 3 9-40 , 2 1 4, 2 2 2 , 248 , 3 6 2 e x te riori ty , e x te ri o r i z ation 8-9 , 1 3 , 29-3 0 , 44, 5 0 , 5 8 , 6 1 , 6 3 , 7 1 , 8 2 , 85 ,

Darwi n , C h arl e s 2 1 8- 1 9

1 20 , 1 3 1 , 1 4 1 -2 , 1 47 , 1 49 . 1 65 ,

de ath 3 0-3 2 . 20 3-4 , 2 8 2 , 3 09- ] 4, 3 3 1 ,

] 67-9 , ] 7 8-9, 1 8 2 , 1 8 9 , 1 9 1 -2, 2 1 5 ,

398 , 422, 430

de G a u l l e , C h arles 3 9 8 , 4 3 8 Demps e y , Jack 6

2 2 4 . 2 2 8 , 2 3 0-3 1 and n , 2 3 2- 3 , 23 7 , 24 1 -4 , 248 , 2 5 0 , 2 7 3 , 2 7 6-7 , 2 79-8 0 , 2 8 2-4 , 2 8 6-7 , 290-9 1 ,

IN DEX

463

29 3 -5 , 3 0 1 -3 , 3 06-7 and n , 3 0 8- 1 0,

40-4 ] , 4 8 , 5 0 , 6 3-4 , 8 1 , 8 4 , 86-7 ,

3 1 3 - 3 6 passim , 3 3 9-4 5 , 3 4 8 , 3 5 0,

9 3 , 95 n , 9 7 , 1 09, 1 1 1 , 1 1 9 , 2 1 6-2 1 ,

3 5 2-6 , 3 5 7 n , 3 5 8 , 3 60, 3 6 2-3 ,

2 2 3-7 , 2 2 9 , 2 3 8 , 24 3-4 , 26 3-5 ,

36 5-8 5 , 3 88 , 3 90-9 1 , 3 9 8 , 405 ,

267 , 2 7 1 , 2 7 5 -6 , 2 8 0 , 2 8 4 , 2 8 6-7 ,

4 1 7-2 1 , 4 2 3 , 42 5 , 42 7 , 429, 43 4-5 ,

2 90 , 294- 3 3 6 passim , 340, 3 5 1 , 3 5 3 ,

44 3 -4 , 447-5 3

3 6 2-4, 3 7 3 , 3 84-5 and n , 3 90 , 397-400 , 402-3 and n , 407 , 4 1 6,

fact i c ity 1 99-200, 204, 207 , 2 1 3 , 225-7 , 2 3 8-9, 260 , 2 6 3 -4, 274, 2 7 6 , 3 0 6 , 3 1 3- 1 4 , 3 20 , 3 39 , 3 4 1 , 3 5 9 ,

4 2 2 , 424-5 , 4 2 8 , 430-3 1 , 446-7 , 45 0-5 3 H ungary 1 05 , 1 25 n

3 8 2-3 , 3 8 5 , 4 1 3- 1 4 fatigue 2 8 8 -90

ideal ism 5 , 25 , 3 1 , 69, 1 09 , 1 47 , 2 2 5 ,

Fade y e v , Aleksandr 2 5 1

2 3 2 , 243 , 246, 2 5 0 , 2 5 3 , 2 7 2 , 295 ,

Fanon , Frantz 36n

3 0 1 -3 , 3 0 5 , 308- 1 0 , 3 1 5- 1 6 , 3 1 9

Ferry , J ules 4 3 2

and n , 3 24 , 3 6 ] , 3 8 7

Flanders 1 1 9

idiosyncrasy 2 1 6- 1 7 , 226, 2 3 3 , 2 3 5-6 ,

Fl aube rt, Gu stave 40 8 , 4 1 3

245 , 263-4, 267-8 , 2 9 6 , 3 2 2 , 3 24 ,

Fourth Inte rn at ional 1 1 0- 1 1

3 29, 340n

France x i i , 1 0 5 n , 1 1 9 , 1 8 8 , 4 1 3 , 4 3 2

Franklin, B e nj a m i n 3 7 8

fratern ity- terror 3 1 , 5 2 , 5 6 , 6 1 -2, 66, 8 5 , 1 5 2 , 1 59 , 2 1 1 , 2 2 9 , 3 1 2 freedom 5 3 , 57-8 , 1 1 3 , 1 1 6, 1 2 1 , 1 5 8 , 239, 25 8 , 279, 3 2 3 , 366, 435 French Campai gn 7 French Revol ution 1 3 , 5 6-7 , 1 1 9 , 1 24, 1 69 , 2 24 , 3 2 9 , 390

immanence 5 , 5 0 , 5 5 , 5 7 , 6 3 , 8 5-6 , 1 65 , 1 67 , 1 8 0, 2 3 1 -2 , 2 3 8 , 247 , 2 5 2 , 25 5 , 260, 26 5-6 , 27 5 , 2 7 8-9 , 2 8 2- 3 3 0 2 , 3 0 5 , 3 1 0- 1 1 , 3 1 3 , 3 1 6 , 3 2 3 , 3 26-9 , 3 3 1 , 3 3 3 -4 , 340-4 3 , 3 49-50 , 3 5 4 , 3 5 7 n , 3 60-6 ] , 3 6 8 , 3 70 , 3 8 3 -4 , 3 86 , 434-8 , 44 1 , 44 3 -5 , 447-9 Inc a s 402 indeterm ination 1 3 , 1 5 , 40 , 5 4-8 , 60- 6 1 , 6 3 , 65 , 67 , 84, 9 2-3 , 9 6 ,

Gandh i , Mohandas 420

1 1 4- 1 5 , 1 90 , 1 9 2-4 , 200 , 209, 2 3 8 ,

Genet, Jean 256n

247 , 25 8 , 3 0 3 , 3 34, 3 6 0 , 4 1 2- 1 3

Georgia 2 1 2- 1 3 , 2 1 6 , 2 6 8

i ndu s tri al i zation 99- 1 0 1 , 1 05 n , 1 08 ,

Germ any 9 8 , 1 05 , 2 0 2 , 296 , 399

1 2 1 , 1 23 , 1 2 5 , 1 3 2-3 , 1 3 8-9 , 1 4 1 ,

G i rondins 5 2 , 5 6

1 43 , 1 45 , 1 5 0, 1 5 6, 1 6 2 , 1 6 7 -8 ,

GospJan 1 3 5

1 7 1 -2 , 1 7 6 , 1 7 8-80, 1 9 3 , 1 95 ,

Goth s 444-5

204-5 , 207 , 2 3 9 , 2 8 6 , 295 , 2 9 9 , 3 3 5

Gounod , C harl e s 4 1 5 ' grain strike ' 1 7 0-7 3 , 1 9 6 , 2 3 9

inertia 5 3 , 5 5 , 5 7 , 60-6 1 , 6 6-7 , 8 9 , 9 2 , 9 7-8 , 1 1 2 , 1 2 8-9 , 1 3 5-6, 1 3 8 , 1 40-42 , 1 47-8 , 1 5 5 n , 1 5 8 , 1 6 2-3 ,

Havana 3 3

1 7 3 , 1 7 6 , 1 96 n , 1 99-200 , 202, 208n ,

Hebert, Jacqu e s - Rene 2 5 5

2 2 3 , 2 29-3 2 , 2 3 6-8 , 245-6 , 2 6 1 ,

H e g e l , Georg W i l he l m 5 , 5 3 , 69 , 1 09 ,

277 , 2 7 9 , 2 8 3 , 2 8 7- 8 , 29 1 -2 , 304 ,

206 , 3 0 9 , 3 24 , 3 8 5

3 1 6 , 3 29 , 3 3 9, 3 4 3 - 5 , 3 47-5 3 , 3 6 1 ,

Heide g ger, M artin 29n

3 6 3 , 3 6 8-8 3 , 3 8 6, 3 9 9 , 404-5 ,

h exis 20-2 1 , 2 4 , 40 , 7 6 , 8 2 , 9 3 , 1 42 ,

4 1 7-2 1 , 4 2 3 , 42 5-6 , 4 3 3 , 4 3 6-7 ,

1 44 , 1 67 , 1 7 9-80 , 1 99-200 , 208 , 2 1 4- 1 5 , 2 1 7 , 25 6 , 26 1 , 2 8 2, 3 20 ,

44 1 intel l i g i b i lity x i i , 3-6 , 1 0- 1 1 , 1 3- 1 5 ,

3 22-3 , 3 27 , 345 , 347-5 0 , 3 6 3 , 3 67�

1 7 , 2 1 , 3 3 , 3 5 , 40 , 49-5 1 , 6 8 , 7 1 -4 ,

3 7 8 , 3 8 7 , 426

7 6 , 8 0 , 8 5-6 , 9 1 , 9 3 , 9 5 n , 96-7 , 1 1 4 ,

h i e ra r c h y , h ierarc h i z ation 1 8 , 1 9 , 2 1 ,

27 , 6 6 , 1 3 3-5 , 1 42 , 1 45 , 1 49 , 1 5 6 , 1 62-4 , 1 66 , 1 7 6 , 1 8 8-9, 1 99 , 207 , 2 30-3 1 , 245 , 25 1 , 2 5 9 , 3 8 8 , 4 3 6

h i s tori al i z ation 1 1 8 , 1 2 8 , 2 8 2 , 3 1 3

H i story , h i s tory x i i , 5 , 1 2- 1 5 , 1 7 , 3 3 ,

2 1 7 , 225-7 , 244 , 25 5 , 260 , 269-70, 2 7 2 , 2 7 5 -7 , 2 8 2 , 2 8 4-5 , 2 8 7 , 293 , 3 30 n , 3 3 1 , 3 44 , 3 7 8 , 3 9 0 , 45 1 intere s t 2 3 , 8 0 , 1 25 , 1 3 2 , 1 64, 24 1 , 3 8 9 , 3 99 , 4 1 5 , 4 2 3 in teriori ty , i nteri orization 2 1 , 2 3 , 2 8 ,

464

IN DEX

30, 44, 4 7 , 49, 5 5 -6, 6 1 , 74-6 ,

Lon don 267

79-80, 8 2 , 8 5 , 9 1 , 1 1 3 , 1 1 9 , 1 2 3 ,

Lou i s X V 20 1 n

1 26 , 1 29 , 1 3 3 , 1 36 , 1 3 8 , 1 4 2 , 1 46-7 ,

Lo u i s XVI 20 1 n

1 5 5-6, I 62, 1 65 , 1 67 , 1 7 3 , 1 7 6 ,

1 7 9-8 0 , 1 8 8-9 , 1 95 , 1 99, 20 1 , 207 , 2 1 6 , 2 1 9-20, 22 3-4 , 2 30-3 1 and n , 2 3 2-4, 2 3 6 , 2 3 8 , 245 , 250, 2 5 4-5 ,

Luk a c s , Georg 1 2 8 M c C a r t h y i sm 2 5 2-3 , 3 1 9 n , 440

m ac h ines , mechan i zation 1 1 6 , 1 2 5 ,

257-8 , 260, 262-3 , 265 , 269 , 2 7 3 ,

1 3 7 , 1 43 , 1 49 , 1 5 7 , 1 66-7 , 1 69-70 ,

277-9 , 2 8 1 n , 2 8 2-3 , 2 8 5 , 2 8 7 ,

1 74 , 1 7 7-9 , 206, 2 20 , 3 1 1 , 3 1 5 , 3 2 7 ,

290-9 1 , 294-5 , 297 , 3 0 2-3 , 306-36

3 36 , 340, 347 , 3 5 2-5 , 3 6 3 , 3 6 8 , 3 7 0 ,

passim , 34 1 -3 , 345 , 3 4 8 and n , 3 49 ,

3 7 5 -6 , 3 7 8-80, 3 8 2 , 3 8 4 , 3 87-9 ,

3 5 2-6 , 3 5 7 n , 3 60-64 , 3 67 , 3 70 , 3 7 3 ,

3 9 9 , 4 1 0- 1 1 , 4 1 6 , 4 1 9 , 43 3 , 4 3 7 ,

3 7 6-8 , 3 8 2 , 3 8 4 , 3 9 8-9 , 402 , 407 ,

44 0-4 1

4 1 1 - 1 2, 4 1 5 , 4 1 7- 1 8 , 42 1 -4 , 42 8 ,

Magni togo rs k 1 47 , 1 5 7-8 , 1 6 1 , 1 89

4 3 1 -7 , 44 1 -5 , 447-5 3

Malraux , Andre 1 7 3

Ital y 444

Malth u s , Thomas 1 05 n

Italian War s 7 8

Manichaeism 24, 27 , 3 2n , 1 7 3

Mao Tse t ung 1 7 1 , 2 3 5 -

Jacobi n s 5 6-7 , 2 24 Jesuits 425

M arie (de S a in t-Georg es ) , A lex andre P i e rre 96

Jews 265-7 1 , 4 2 2 , 425 , 450-5 1

M ars , M arti an s 3 1 9-25 , 3 30n

J u s ti n i an 444-5

Marseilles 26, 2 8 M artiniq ue 3 4

Kamene v , Lev 1 96 and n Kant , Immanuel 2 8 9 , 3 5 6 , 390 , 403 K hrushchev , N ikita 1 29 , 1 7 9 , 20 1 kolkhoz 1 25 and n , 1 69 , 1 7 7-80, 206 , 245 kulaks 1 69-7 1 , 1 74, 1 8 1 Kuzbas, Kuznetsk 1 5 7-8

M arx, K arl ] 5- 1 6 , 8 7 , 1 07 , 1 36 , 1 96 n , 240, 2 69 , 2 7 6 , 3 8 5 , 430 M arx ism 1 5- 1 6 , 49, 1 00- 1 0 1 , 1 08- 1 5 , ] 2 3 , 1 25 , 1 27 , 1 44 , 1 7 7 , ] 7 9 , ] 96 , 205 , 2 1 1 , 2 1 5 , 2 4 3 , 2 6 5 , 2 6 9 , 305 , 428 M as s i gn on , Lou i s 425 Mayas 3 6 3 , 45 3

l abour, l abour-power 3 , 1 1 , 1 3 , 2 1 ,

Merl e au Pon t y , Mauri ce 6 2 , 1 03 -

42-4 , 46, 5 9-60, 95 , 97 , 99, 1 43 ,

Mex i co 3 3

1 48-5 0, 1 6 1 , 1 69 , 1 7 5 , 2 1 5 , 2 29-30 ,

M i c romegas 49, 3 1 9 , 3 2 7

240, 246-7 , 249 , 2 5 9 , 2 7 2 , 2 7 7 ,

Midi 3 4 2

2 8 1 -2 , 2 84 , 2 8 8 , 2 9 7 , 3 04 , 3 1 2 , 3 1 7 ,

M i l an 4 ] 0

3 34 , 3 4 8 , 3 5 2- 3 , 3 5 7 n , 3 6 1 , 3 64 ,

Molotov , Viaches l av 224n

3 6 6-9 , 3 7 3-6 , 3 7 9 , 3 8 2- 3 , 3 8 7 -9 ,

Montag n a rds 5 2

3 9 1 , 405-6 , 409 , 4 1 7 , 4 2 1 - 2 , 4 3 3 ,

More au , Jean - V i ctor 2 ] 8

443 , 4 5 1 -2

Moscow 1 3 7 n , 267 , 269

l an g u age 3 6 4 , 4 2 5 -7 , 4 3 2

Moscow Trials 206

Lam arc k , Jean- B apti ste 2 1 8- 1 9

mountains 3 5 6-60

Lefebvre, Georges 1 69 Lefort, C l a ud e 4 3 1

Napo l eon I 2 1 8 , 2 2 1 -2 , 2 5 1 , 3 2 1

L e ipzig 7

N ational Work s hop s 1 2 , 96-7

Le Mans 2 5 7

N a v i l le, Pierre 309

Len i n , Vlad i m ir I l yich 9 8 , 1 00 , 1 05 ,

Nazism 1 05n

1 1 0 , 1 34 , 1 50, 1 97 , 2 1 2

Leroy - B eaul ie u , P au l 4 3 2

Lev i - S trau s s , C l aude 1 4 , 4 2 2

Li ard, Lo u i s 3 44 , 364 l i beral i sm 44, 1 3 1 , 1 7 5 L i utprand 445 , 447 Lombards 444-5 , 447

N EP 1 66, 1 70 , 1 97 , 2 1 4 N e s s u s 240, 292 N izan, Pau l 4 1 2 Nord 2 8 , 4 3 7

Obelerio, Doge 445 o bj e c t i fi c at i on 1 2 , 4 8 , 6 4 , 66, 7 8 , 9 7 ,

INDEX

465

1 3 9 , 1 4 8 , 1 5 4 , 1 7 9 , 1 8 2 , 1 9 2-3 , 2 1 1 ,

3 5 9 , 3 64 , 3 6 8-9 , 3 7 8 , 3 80 , 3 8 5 ,

229 , 2 3 2 , 2 3 7 , 2 3 9 , 24 1 , 24 3 -4 , 2 8 6 ,

3 99�400 , 40 3 , 40 8 , 4 3 1 , 4 5 0 , 4 5 3

289 , 297 , 309 , 3 25 , 340 , 3 5 0 , 3 8 5-8 , 39 1

prac t ic o - i n ert 5 8 , 6 1 -2 , 6 5 , 6 8 , 7 2-3 , 7 7-80 , 8 5 , 92-3 , 9 7 , 1 1 2 , 1 1 9-2 1 ,

Orso Ipato, Doge 44 5

1 2 4-6 , 1 3 4-5 , 1 3 7 , 1 3 9 , 1 4 1 -2 ,

Orthodox C hurc h 1 5 6

1 46-8 , 1 5 5 , 1 5 7-8 , 1 64 , 1 66-9 ,

O s sa 3 5 9

1 7 1 -4 , 1 80-8 3 , 1 8 7 , 1 95 , 1 9 8 ,

other- d i re c t i on 1 1 9 , 1 49 , 1 5 8-60 , 44 1

2 1 0- 1 1 , 2 25-6 , 2 3 0-3 3 , 2 3 5 , 2 3 7 -8 ,

ov erdeterm i n at i on 1 3 , 1 5 , 9 6 , 209, 27 1

24 1 -7 , 2 5 0 , 2 6 3 -4 , 27 3 , 2 7 7-8 and n , 279 , 2 8 2 , 284-5 , 2 8 7 , 29 1 , 306 ,

Pac ific 3 6 2

308 , 3 1 0 , 3 1 5 , 3 2 9 , 3 30n , 3 3 6 ,

Padua 444

3 39-40 , 3 5 0, 3 87-9, 400 , 4 1 4 , 4 1 7 ,

Paris 2 8 , 34

4 1 9-20 , 425-6, 4 2 8 , 4 3 2-3 , 440-4 1 "

Pari s Commune 209 parti c u l ariz ation 4 , 1 1 , 1 08 , 1 1 0 , 1 1 3 , 267 , 3 2 1 -2

pra x i s -p roc e s s 1 1 , 29 , 3 3 , 5 9 , 8 1 , 8 6 , 9 1 , 1 1 6 , 1 20 , 1 24 , 1 5 5 , 1 8 2-3 , 1 8 7-8 , 207 , 224, 2 2 8 , 2 40 n , 242- 3 ,

Pascal , B l a i s e 450

27 1 , 2 7 3 , 2 8 1 -4 , 294-9 , 30 1 -3 ,

p a s s i v e - be i n g 5 5 , 60

3 05 -6 , 308- 1 3 , 3 1 5 - 1 7 , 3 1 9 , 3 2 1 -2,

Pau1 u s , Friedrich 2 5 2

3 25-7 , 3 29 , 3 3 5 , 4 3 2-3

p e a s ants 1 08 -9 , 1 ] 1 , 1 26, 1 3 5-8 , 1 43 , 1 5 6 , 1 6 2 , 1 66-8 1 passim , 1 89 , 1 9 1 n ,

proce s s 60-6 1 , 1 1 2 , 1 26 , 1 3 5 , 1 3 7 , 2 1 0 , 2 3 1 -2 , 440

205-6 , 2 1 0 , 2 2 6 , 2 3 4 , 245 , 2 5 1 ,

pro c e s s-prax i s 296 , 3 29 , 3 3 1 , 4 3 3

2 5 7 -8 , 3 3 5 -6 , 3 5 3 , 4 1 0 , 4 3 9

p rodu c t i v ity 1 2 5 , 1 3 3 , 1 3 8 , 1 40 , 1 4 3 ,

Pe l i o n , M o unt 3 5 9

1 50 , 1 5 4 , 1 6 8-9 , 1 7 7-8 , 1 80 , 2 8 9 ,

� Permanent Revolution ' 1 00 , 1 0 3 , 1 9 5 ,

3 7 5-6, 45 1

398

progres s 7 6 and n, 8 8 , 40 2-24

Peru 1 1 2

proletar i a t : see workers

P l an , p l ann ing 1 2 7-8 , 1 3 0-3 2 , 1 3 4-5 ,

Protestan t i sm 2 2 3 n , 2 9 6 , 440

1 37-8 , 1 40-43 , 1 5 5-8 , 1 66 , 1 69 ,

Pro u s t , Marcel 8 8

1 7 8 , 1 89 , 1 96 , 20 3-4 , 206 , 2 1 3 , 2 3 9 ,

Prus sia 1 2

245-6 , 2 5 0 , 2 8 3 , 2 8 6 , 29 5-6 , 3 04

Pl ato 343 , 3 5 7 n

rad i o and T V 3 3 , 4 3 7-4 1

p l ay ing cards 242- 3 , 3 3 1

Rak o s i, M aty as 1 2 5 n , 1 7 3

pl edge 5 1 -2 , 5 5 , 5 7 , 60, 66 , 7 7 , 8 2 ,

Ravenna 44 2-3 , 447

1 07 , 1 1 3 , 1 1 9 , 1 24 , 1 2 8 , 1 4 8 , 1 5 2 ,

rec iproc i ty 5-6 , 8 , 1 4- 1 5 , 1 7 , 3 6 , 6 5 ,

1 6 2 , 200 , 20 2 , 20 8 n , 2 1 1 , 2 2 3 , 2 3 4 ,

7 0 , 9 7 , 1 1 9 , 1 4 2 , 1 47 , 1 5 9 , 1 6 5 , 1 7 7 ,

25 8 , 2 8 4 , 3 9 7-9

1 94 , 208 , 2 3 7 , 245 , 247-8 , 2 5 6 ,

Ple khanov , Georg i 9 2 , 2 1 8- 1 9 , 2 2 2 , 225 , 240

Poland 250 Po l i ako v , Leon 425

2 5 8-60 , 262 , 30 2 , 3 1 4 , 3 2 1 , 3 29 , 3 3 3 , 340, 3 5 4 , 3 6 3-4 , 4 26 , 44 1

I

,

Robe spierre, Max i m i l ien 5 6-7 , 22 1 ,

I

2 24

Pompeii 2 7 6 , 402

Ro me 7 2 , 276

p o s i ti v i sm 8 , 9 , 1 2 , 2 8 , 5 0 , 63 , 9 8 , 1 04 ,

Ro ux , Jacques 2 5 5

1 20 , 1 6 1 , ] 8 8 , 206 , 2 ] 7 n , 2 1 8 , 265 ,

I I

R u s s i a , R u s s i an Revol ut ion : see U S S R

2 7 5 -7 , 2 8 2 , 2 8 4 , 2 8 6 , 302 , 3 1 4 , 349 , 3 7 4- 5 , 3 7 8� 80, 3 8 8 , 39 1

pos s ibl e s 7 , 8 , 1 5 , 40 , 4 ] , 60, 1 8 3 , 202 , 20 8 , 2 1 8 , 2 2 0 , 262 , 2 64 , 2 7 0-7 1 , 308 , 326, 4 1 2

Po uj ad i sm 440 practi c al org an i sm 3 , 1 5 , 5 3 , 5 5 , 5 7 , 1 3 6 , 1 94 , 200, 203 , 2 1 1 , 2 2 8 , 246, 2 5 6 , 260 , 26 3 , 289 , 3 06-7 , 3 22 , 3 2 8 , 3 3 3 , 3 3 9�40 , 3 47 , 3 5 0 , 3 5 4, 3 5 7 n ,

S ade , Marquis de 224 S aint- Nazaire 2 5 7 scarc ity x i i , 9 , 1 3- 1 5 , 1 7 , 2 2-4 , 2 8 , 44 , 4 8 , 50, 1 4 1 -2 , 1 46 , 1 65 , 2 1 9-20

and

n,

225 , 25 7-8 , 2 6 3 , 27 3-4,

2 8 3-4 , 2 8 8 , 290 , 296 , 3 1 2n , 3 20 , 3 24, 3 3 3 -5 , 340-4 1 , 3 4 3 , 3 5 0 , 3 80, 3 8 5 and n, 3 8 9-9 0 , 42 1 -4 , 434, 4 3 6-7 , 439

I

I ,

466

INDEX

sc ience 3 0 2 , 308 , 3 1 2n , 3 20�2 2 , 3 24n , 3 6 2 , 3 7 8-90, 4 1 1 , 4 1 4 , 4 1 7�2 1 , 4 3 0 sc ience fiction 3 1 9n , 3 2 1 , 3 25-6 , 3 30n, 3 40 Scott, John 1 47 series , seri al i t y , seria l i zat i on , serial­

Tel A v i v 267 , 269 tel e v i sion 4 3 7-4 1 Terror 1 1 6 , 1 44 , 1 5 4 , 1 63 , 1 7 6 , 1 79-8 1 , 2 1 3- 1 4 , 2 24-5 , 2 3 5 , 240, 253 Therm idor 1 69 , 2 1 8

be ing 1 3 , 3 2 , 6 1 , 1 1 9-20 , 1 3 8 ,

Th i rd International 1 1 0

1 48�9, 1 5 1 �3 , 1 5 5�6 1 , 1 65 , 1 7 1 �2 ,

time 3 7 2 , 3 7 4 , 40 1 , 404-5 , 407 , 4 24 ,

1 77�8 , 1 88 , 1 9 1 , 1 99, 2 1 0� 1 1 , 2 29 ,

439

2 3 2 , 245 , 247 , 27 3 , 27 7 , 279, 4 2 6 ,

T itans 3 59

4 3 1 -5 , 4 3 7�8 , 440�4 1 , 444 , 4 5 2

T i to , Jo s ip B roz 2 3 5

s e x ual ity 2 24 , 25 6-62

total i z ation- (total i ty - ) of-en velopm ent

S i beria 1 89, 202

3 3 and n , 3 4 , 4 8-9 , 64 , 8 5-6 , 96,

s i ng u l arity , s in g u l ariz ation 1 4, 1 7 , 2 8 ,

1 1 7 , 1 8 7-8 , 2 2 8 , 2 3 1 -3 , 2 3 5 -4 2 ,

34-6, 40�4 1 , 45 , 47-5 0 , 5 5-6 , 6 2 ,

244 , 255-7 , 26 3 , 2 69-70 , 27 2-4 ,

6 8 , 7 8 , 8 2, 1 0 1 , 1 04 , 1 09 , 1 1 1 - 1 2,

2 7 6 , 279-80, 2 8 1 and n , 2 8 3- 4 , 29 1 ,

1 1 7 , 1 29 , 1 63 , 1 7 5 , 1 7 9 , 1 87 -9 , 1 92 ,

297 , 3 0 1 -3 , 3 0 8 , 3 1 7 , 3 1 9 , 3 26 ,

1 94, 1 97 , 202-3 , 205-6 , 208 and n ,

3 2 8 -9 , 3 3 5 , 349 , 3 84 , 4 2 9 , 4 3 3 -4 ,

209- 1 0 , 2 1 2- 1 6, 2 2 0 , 224n, 2 2 6 ,

446-9

2 2 8 , 2 3 4 , 2 6 1 -4 , 2 7 6 , 3 0 3-4 , 3 1 8 , 3 3 5 , 340, 3 4 3 , 3 84-5 , 4 1 9 , 4 5 0-5 1 situated method, dialectic 5 1 , 1 8 2 , 2 1 0,

tre ac hery , treason 6 2 , 65 , 1 03 , 1 7 3 , 2 5 3 , 3 9 8 , 447 Trot s k y , Leon 98- 1 1 3 passim , 1 66-7 0 ,

2 5 4 , 2 7 5 , 29 3 , 297-8 , 30 1 -3 , 3 1 6,

1 95-6, 202 , 205 , 209 , 2 1 2 , 2 1 4 , 2 2 2 ,

369

2 5 3 , 265 , 4 1 3

social democracy 1 05 , 1 1 4 , 3 99-400 social i s m 1 1 4- 1 7 and 1 1 5n , 1 25 ,

T s arism 9 9- 1 00 , 1 05 , 1 07-8 , 1 23 , 1 7 5 , 205 , 2 1 0, 2 5 1 , 267-8

1 30-3 1 , 1 3 3-4, 1 39 , 1 42 , 1 5 1 , 1 5 4-6 , 1 62 , 1 64-5 , 1 69 , 1 7 2-5 ,

universal ( abstrac t, c on crete) 40 -4 1 ,

1 7 8-9 , 1 9 5 , 202 , 206-7 , 2 3 2-4 , 2 3 9 ,

4 8 , 1 00, 1 09- 1 0, 1 1 3 , 1 9 1 -2 , 2 1 3 ,

269, 304, 3 1 0, 3 1 9n , 4 3 8

440, 4 5 1

' Socialism i n One C o untry ' 9 8- 1 1 6 passim, 1 34

sovereign (action , etc . ) , sovereignt y 3 4 , 4 3 , 6 7 , 8 0 , 1 04 , 1 1 9, 1 22-3 , 1 27 , 1 30 , 1 3 3-5 , 1 37 , 1 3 9 , 1 4 1 , 1 45-8 3

urbanization 1 3 7-8 , 1 5 6 , 1 6 2 , 1 6 8 , 1 7 3-4, 1 8 9 , 205 , 2 5 8 U ral s 1 5 7 , 1 8 9 U S A 1 1 0 , 1 67 , 1 7 8 , 2 5 2- 3 , 266 , 3 1 9n , 439

passim , 1 8 7-227 passim , 2 2 8-9 ,

US S R (Ru s s i a, R u s s i an Revol ution,

2 3 2-7 , 240, 242 , 244-5 , 247-50 ,

S ov iet Un ion) 98-2 5 5 passim,

25 3 , 2 5 5 , 2 5 8-9 , 2 6 3-7 1 , 2 7 2-80 ,

264-7 ] , 3 04 , 3 3 5

2 8 2-3 , 2 8 5 , 2 8 7 , 2 8 9 , 297 , 304-5 , 3 1 2, 435

Val m y , battle of 1 2

S ov ie t man 1 1 0- 1 1 , 1 44 , 1 6 1 -2 , 1 80

V arlet, Jean 25 5

Sov iet Union: see U S S R

Venezuela 3 5 2

Spain 3 3 , 1 06 , 3 6 3 , 4 5 3

Ven ice x ii , 2 2 1 , 2 7 3 n , 442-9

Spen gler, O swald 402

Verd i , G i u seppe 4 1 4-5

Spi noza. B aruch 3 04 , 344

Victor- E m m anuel 1l 4 1 5

S takhanovi sm 1 0 1 , 1 3 2-3

Vilar, P ierre 4 1 6

S tal in, Joseph; Stal i n i s m 64 , 9 2-3 ,

v iolence 9, 2 3- 3 5 , 3 6 and n , 3 7 , 3 9-4 0 ,

98-25 5 passim , 265-7 1 , 2 7 4 , 2 8 4 , 295 , 3 3 5 , 43 3 , 446 S to i c s 243 synchronic ( total i zatio n , etc . ) 5 0 , 9 8 , 1 1 7 , 2 1 7 , 27 1 , 2 7 3-6, 294 , 297

4 3-8 , 66-70, 1 44, 1 5 2 , 1 5 6 , 1 7 6 . 207 , 2 1 0, 2 5 6-8 , 3 9 8 , 42 1 -4 , 4 3 8 , Vi sconti, L u c h i no 4 1 0 and n vol untari sm 1 27 , 1 30 , 1 3 3 -4 , 1 45-7 , ] 5 4 , 1 5 5 and n , 1 5 6 , 1 6 1 , 1 63 , 1 7 3 , 1 7 5 , 20 1 -2 , 205 , 2 3 2 , 2 3 8 , 250, 25 7 ,

Taylor, Frederi ck 3 8 5

2 6 5 , 295

IN DEX wage ( d i ffe re n t i al s , e tc . ) 4 2 , 45 , 1 29, 1 3 2-4 , 207 , 249- 5 0 , 2 7 8 n , 3 8 3 , 3 8 8-9, 4 1 7 , 424 W agner, Richard 4 1 5 w a rfare 3 9 7 -9

467

3 7 4 , 3 9 8-9 , 406 , 425 , 4 3 1 , 4 3 3 , 4 3 6 , 44 1 wo rkers 3 5-7 , 4 2 , 44 , 1 0 1 , 1 05-6 , 1 0 8 , 1 1 4- 1 5 , 1 26-3 3 , 1 3 5 -9 , 1 4 3-5 ,

W aterl oo 7 , 3 2 1

] 47-5 1 , 1 5 3 , 1 5 5-8 , 1 62-4 , 1 66-8 1 passim , 1 89 , 1 9 1 and n , 2 1 0 , 2 1 2 ,

W at t , J am e s 3 7 8

2 2 8 , 2 3 4 , 245 , 25 7 , 27 3 , 2 8 8-9,

Weber, M ax 2 2 3 n

290n , 3 3 5 , 3 5 3 , 3 7 5-6 , 3 8 3 , 3 87 ,

words 425- 7 worked matter 44-5 , 5 1 , 5 8 , 6 1 , 1 1 9,

3 9 7 -400 , 4 1 0- 1 1 , 4 1 7 , 4 24 , 4 29- 3 0 , 4 39

1 2 1 , 1 2 8 , ] 4 1 , 1 47 , 1 49, 1 65-6 , 2 1 1 , 2 2 8-9 , 27 3 , 2 7 7 , 289-9 1 , 29 3 , 3 1 6 ,

Zinov i e v , Grigori 1 96

3 2 8 , 3 3 4 , 3 39 , 344, 3 4 8-9 , 3 5 6 , 3 5 9 ,

Zion i s m 266, 2 6 8