D-day deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy invasion

D-DAY DECEPTION

Praeger Security International Advisory Board Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) The´re`se Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

D-DAY DECEPTION Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion Mary Kathryn Barbier

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL Westport, Connecticut

•

London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Barbier, Mary. D-day deception : Operation Fortitude and the Normandy invasion / Mary Kathryn Barbier. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978–0–275–99479–2 (alk. paper) 1. Operation Fortitude. 2. World War, 1939–1945—Campaigns—France—Normandy. 3. World War, 1939–1945—Deception. 4. Normandy (France)—History. I. Title. D756.5.N6B347 2007 940.54’21421—dc22 2007027854 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2007 by Mary Kathryn Barbier All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2007027854 ISBN-13: 978–0–275–99479–2 First published in 2007 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 The author gratefully acknowledges permission to reprint portions of this book that first appeared in ‘‘Deception and the Planning of D-Day,’’ The Normandy Campaign 1944: Sixty Years On (Routledge, 2006).

Contents

Acknowledgments

vii

Chapter One: Setting the Stage

1

Chapter Two: Devising a Plan

11

Chapter Three: Threatening Norway

41

Chapter Four: Deciding How to Implement Fortitude South

63

Chapter Five: Putting Fortitude South into Play: From the Beginning until D-Day

74

Chapter Six: Continuing the Deception

106

Chapter Seven: Reacting to the Deception

148

Chapter Eight: Assessing Operation Fortitude

182

Glossary

197

Notes

203

Bibliography

247

Index

257

Acknowledgments

This project would have not been successful had it not been for the help and support of so many people. First, let me thank Dr. Andrew Wiest, my first mentor, for suggesting that I investigate Operation Fortitude. He patiently guided my steps and helped me to organize my ideas and conclusions throughout every stage of this project. Second, I would like to thank my other mentor Dennis Showalter, who has read many versions of this manuscript and who provided numerous useful suggestions, all of which helped make the manuscript better. This manuscript would not have seen the light of day without Andy and Dennis. Special thanks go to Dr. G.D. Sheffield and Dr. Nigel de Lee who suggested several valuable avenues of research and identified the availability of important interviews at the Imperial War Museum’s Sound Archives. I conducted research in several archives in the United Kingdom and the United States. The staff at the Imperial War Museum was always helpful and patient. It was a pleasure to arrive each day and find the requested materials waiting for me. Equally, the staff at The National Archives, formerly the Public Record Office, was efficient, professional, and helpful. I would also like to thank Seb Cox at the Air Historical Branch Library and the archivists at the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University, the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, the Beinecke Library at Yale University, and at the Library of Congress. I would like especially to thank Mitchell Yokelson at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. Mitch made my research at the National Archives easy. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge an important group who provided me with funding that enabled me to conduct additional research and to make revisions

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to the original manuscript. I would like to thank Professors Paul Kennedy, John Lewis Gaddis, and Theodore Bromund of International Security Studies (ISS) at Yale University for awarding me a two-year postdoctoral fellowship. Their belief in and encouragement of my project was immensely beneficial. In addition, through their efforts, I also received additional funding from Smith Richardson Foundation. The Smith Richardson Fellowship financed an additional trip to the archives in England, which facilitated the final substantive revisions. I gratefully acknowledge permission to reprint portions of this book that first appeared in ‘‘Deception and the Planning of D-Day,’’ The Normandy Campaign 1944: Sixty Years On, Routledge, 2006. I would like to thank my colleagues at Mississippi State University for their support and advice and my editors, Elizabeth Demers, for her belief in this project, and Haylee Schwenk, for her valuable help in the final stages of production. I would also like to thank my family who believed in me. Without them, I could not have accomplished all that I have. Special thanks to Dr. David I. Hall, who pushed me to finish the manuscript and who helped me to have confidence in myself when I was overwhelmed by this whole process.

1

Setting the Stage

Returned to-day from my long trip. I saw a lot and was very satisfied with the progress that has been made. I think for certain that we’ll win the defensive battle in the West, provided only that a little more time remains for preparations.. . .In the West: I believe we’ll be able to beat off the assault. —German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, January 19, 19441

D-Day, June 6, 1944, marked the day on which British and American forces launched a major amphibious assault against German troops stationed in northern France. Following massive naval bombardment and airborne attacks along the coast, Allied soldiers landed on the beaches of Normandy signaling the commencement of Operation Overlord. The invasion of Normandy was, however, a long time in coming. The June 1940 forced evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) from Dunkirk had made the British more determined than ever to defeat their German enemy. After fighting the Germans with little help for almost two years, the British gained an unexpected ally in the Soviet Union. On July 19, 1941, approximately one month after the Germans invaded the U.S.S.R., Josef Stalin made his first request for the British to establish a second front by attacking the Germans in western Europe. Although they immediately began shipping supplies to the Soviets, the British did not consider it possible to establish a second front in 1941. The United States’ entry into the war in early December did not make the immediate establishment of a second front any more feasible. Neither Britain nor the United States had the forces available to launch a major offensive in late 1941 or early 1942. 2 Consequently, because he was unwilling to approve an operation when the forces necessary for success were unavailable, Winston Churchill reasserted Britain’s strategy to attack the ‘‘periphery of Hitler’s empire.’’ As the German offensive in the Soviet Union continued, Stalin renewed his requests for an Allied attack in the West to draw enemy forces from the Eastern

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D-DAY DECEPTION

Front. Thus began a series of debates between American and British military and political leaders over their future war strategy and the establishment of a second front. Churchill walked a fine line during this time. Although he remained committed to the invasion of Europe, he did not believe that British or American forces were ready for such a major undertaking. While Allied military leaders drew up plans for Operation Sledgehammer, a small scale invasion of France to be carried out in the fall of 1942, and while Stalin continued to push for Allied action in 1942, Churchill approached President Franklin D. Roosevelt with the possibility of invading North Africa that year.3 Finding an unexpected ally in Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s most trusted advisor, Churchill argued convincingly that the inequality of troop strength between the Allies and the Germans made a 1942 cross-Channel invasion impossible. Persuaded by Churchill and Hopkins, Roosevelt insisted that Allied forces mount an alternative offensive in 1942; therefore, the president presented several options to his Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included among the options was Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa. Although he strongly supported mounting a crossChannel invasion as soon as possible, General George C. Marshall, Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff, reluctantly endorsed the North African operation. Both Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that the North Africa campaign would constitute the main Allied offensive in 1942, but it would not be the only one. The belief that the possession of a port was essential to a successful landing along the French coast prompted the British to authorize a raid by British and Canadian forces against Dieppe, a German-held French port. Numerous problems plagued the raid, and casualties were high. The British and Canadian failure to launch a successful raid against Dieppe in August 1942 reinforced Churchill’s fears about a major cross-Channel attack and his belief in amassing an overwhelming force before attempting to invade France. In addition, the disaster at Dieppe would later bolster British demands for a cover plan to mask the real invasion when the time came. The failure at Dieppe did not, however, cause a postponement of Operation Torch. In November 1942, British and American forces landed in North Africa. Although the campaign lasted until May 1943, it did not satisfy Stalin’s demands for a second front. Allied leaders had not, however, abandoned the idea of invading France. They prepared plans for Operation Roundup, a cross-Channel invasion, which they slated for implementation in 1943. Churchill had committed himself to a second front in 1943, but he remained unconvinced that the operation would be feasible even then.4 In January 1943 Churchill, Roosevelt, and their military and political advisors met in Casablanca to discuss the direction of the war. The defeat of German forces in North Africa and in the Soviet Union had weakened the enemy’s position, which Churchill had previously claimed was a condition necessary for the launching of a second front offensive. A few months earlier, although he had suggested to Stalin that the Western Allies would invade France in 1943, the British prime minister did not make a firm commitment to the operation. During the Casablanca Conference, however, the British proposed the invasion of Sicily, instead of France, as the major Allied offensive in 1943. Their proposal presented a serious challenge for Churchill

SETTING THE STAGE

3

and his advisors, who had to convince their American counterparts that Operation Husky would not interfere with the promised second front. Although Marshall, in particular, needed convincing, Churchill’s fears that a cross-Channel operation in 1943 would end in disaster remained. Despite Marshall’s objections, Roosevelt accepted Churchill’s arguments that it was important to build on the momentum that Allied forces had in the Mediterranean, that the defeat of the Italians would open the area to Allied shipping, and that control of the region would facilitate an expansion of the air offensive against Germany. Following the Casablanca Conference, Allied troops under General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s command began preparations for the invasion of Sicily. On July 10, 1943, Allied forces landed on Sicily and began a campaign that quickly resulted in control of the island. After much debate, Allied leaders decided on July 20 that the next logical step was to take the offensive to the Italian mainland. On September 3, 1943, as the British Eighth Army landed in Italy, the Italian government concluded negotiations that resulted in the transfer of its navy, merchant marine, and air force to the Allies and in Italy becoming a ‘‘cobelligerent against Germany.’’ On September 9 American troops landed at Salerno. Although Allied forces no longer faced Italian troops, the fight for Italy did not prove to be an easy one. Because of the staunch German resistance, by late 1943 the Allies had only advanced seventy miles north of Salerno and were still eighty miles from Rome. Allied troops finally took Rome on June 5, 1944, the day before the commencement of the Normandy invasion.5 Throughout the summer and fall of 1943, as Allied troops fought first in Sicily and then in Italy, military leaders worked on a plan for the invasion of France. As the campaign in Italy continued and demanded more and more resources, Stalin’s vision of a second front in 1943 became increasingly unlikely. Although Stalin fumed about the delay, Churchill, Roosevelt, and their military advisors remained committed to the invasion of France. In November 1943 at Teheran, Churchill and Roosevelt renewed their pledge to Stalin and promised to launch Operation Overlord in early May 1944. Conditions in Italy and shortages of landing craft, however, delayed the invasion until early June 1944.6 Although American and British military and political leaders had debated the second front issue for several years, they had to accept the invasion of France as a way to placate Stalin, but more importantly, as a way to bring the war to Germany and defeat to Adolf Hitler. Unfortunately, based on preparations underway in the United Kingdom, the Germans had concluded that the enemy would land a large number of troops in northwest France in the summer of 1944. The Germans also realized that weather conditions would limit when the invasion could occur.7 Fearing that the establishment of beachheads along the French coast would be difficult, if not impossible, because enemy forces would greatly outnumber the invading troops, Allied planners, particularly the British, concluded early on that Operation Overlord needed an insurance policy. They had to keep the Germans from moving reinforcements into Normandy for as long as possible both before and after the commencement of the invasion. First, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, then

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D-DAY DECEPTION

Colonel John Bevan and the London Controlling Section (LCS), worked on a deception plan, eventually called Operation Fortitude, which they hoped would increase the odds of Overlord’s success. The British were not new to the use of deception plans. They had used them with varying degrees of success since early in the war, particularly when launching an operation in which their forces were greatly outnumbered. By falsifying the picture of their preparations, they hoped that the enemy would make specific mistakes that would help their military operation. The British successfully developed a strategy for disguising military intentions that a staff, which had the confidence of the commander in the field, could plan and implement using specially trained and equipped forces. Early in the war, the British had established a network of organizations that contributed to the creation and implementation of deception plans designed to help the military engage the enemy in battle. The Double Cross or Twenty (XX) Committee, a branch of MI 5, the British security service, had the responsibility of running captured enemy agents who became double agents. Beginning in 1941, three MI 5 operatives—Lieutenant Colonel T.A. Robertson, Captain J.C. Masterman, and J.A. Marriott—with the help of a team of case officers ‘‘looked after’’ the double agents and utilized them as a useful means of communicating information, or misinformation, to the enemy. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) provided information based on intercepted radio transmissions, particularly after cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park broke the Germans’ Enigma cipher in December 1941. Although the Double Cross Committee, along with a group called the W Board, provided the double agents with information and misinformation, neither organization determined British ‘‘deception policy.’’ That job initially fell to the Joint Inter-Service Security Board, which the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee created in February 1940, but the British had been implementing deceptions even earlier. Between 1939 and 1941 General Sir Archibald Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief Middle East, created ‘‘A’’ Force, a special deception section run by Lieutenant Colonel Dudley Clarke. Because of his successes in the Middle East, the Chiefs of Staff solicited suggestions from Clarke. Following recommendations made by Clarke in October 1941, the Chiefs of Staff approved the formation of the London Controlling Section (LCS), which assumed control over the establishment of deception policy and the development of deception plans for particular operations.8 Two organizations provided an important connection between ‘‘A’’ Force and the LCS. The Middle East Intelligence Centre (MEIC), which began operating in Cairo in June 1939, ‘‘co-ordinate[d] and furnish[ed] intelligence both for GHQ Middle East and for the Joint Intelligence Committee in London.’’ By November 1940 the Combined Bureau Middle East (CBME) joined the MEIC in Cairo. The CBME was the ‘‘centre of all cryptanalytic activity, directly linked with the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park.’’9 Wavell put Clarke to work immediately upon his arrival in Cairo. Clarke’s first job was to build up the number of forces available to Wavell by notionally suggesting the existence of new formations. By increasing the size of Wavell’s force, Clarke hoped to accomplish two objectives. He hoped to deter an enemy attack, and he wanted to use

SETTING THE STAGE

5

deception to help Wavell’s upcoming offensive. ‘‘A’’ Force initiated its first plan in November 1940. Wavell, who was planning an attack on Italian forces at Sidi Barrani in Egyptian territory, saw the need for a cover plan. ‘‘A’’ Force planted misinformation with identified Axis sources in Cairo and through diplomatic channels and instituted administrative measures consistent with the impending embarkation of a large force. In addition, ‘‘A’’ Force used dummy radio traffic to simulate the withdrawal of British forces from the Western Desert. Although the British achieved surprise when they attacked Italian forces on December 9, 1940, the existing evidence does not prove that it resulted from the cover operation.10 ‘‘A’’ Force launched a second deception, Camilla, a few months later to cover the British assault on Italian East Africa. The deception included supplying British units with maps and guides to British Somaliland, the radio transmission of deceptive information, the circulation of rumors in Cairo, the leakage of information, and the misplacement of certain documents that pertained to the impending British offensive. Although Camilla was instrumental in enabling British forces to achieve complete surprise when they launched their offensive against Italian East Africa, not all of ‘‘A’’ Force’s deception plans had the desired effect. Despite its early successes, it took time for ‘‘A’’ Force to create a well-organized, effective deceptive operation. In 1941, after successfully implementing Camilla, ‘‘A’’ Force experienced a series of setbacks. The simulation of an attack against the enemy’s lines of communication between Tripoli and El Agheila had no effect on Axis operations. After the fall of Crete to the Germans in May 1941, ‘‘A’’ Force attempted to discourage a German assault on Cyprus by ‘‘inflating the notional size of the garrison.’’ ‘‘A’’ Force also initiated a complete visual deception program that included camps, divisional signs, and transport for viewing by enemy agents and air reconnaissance, the issuing of movement and administrative orders, and the flooding of the airwaves with radio signals. Allied officials in Cairo conveniently ‘‘lost’’ the defense plan for Cyprus. ‘‘A’’ Force’s efforts to protect Cyprus proved unnecessary. Documents captured by the British a short time later indicated that the Germans did not have plans to invade the island.11 Both the Cyprus operation and Crusader, which the British launched a month later, demonstrated deficiencies in British intelligence gathering and counterintelligence work. ‘‘A’’ Force tried to mask a British offensive in the Western Desert by suggesting an imminent assault to keep German forces on the defensive for four months. On three separate occasions the British ‘‘notionally mounted and stood down’’ the attack. By the time they launched Crusader in November 1941, the British Eighth Army exhibited a ‘‘combination of high morale and overconfidence.’’ Although the British had good intelligence on which to rely when planning Crusader, the offensive did not proceed as envisioned. The British had placed too much faith on their own intelligence in 1941. Even though they were good at intelligence gathering, the British were not, in 1941, good at operations.12 Despite its setbacks, ‘‘A’’ Force’s responsibilities increased, resulting in the creation of a separate organization to handle tactical deception in the field. Two developments late in 1941 provided more avenues for the designing and implementing of future

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deception operations. The first was the creation of the London Controlling Section (LCS), the organization that acquired the task of developing deception plans. Second, in December 1941, ‘‘A’’ Force and other British deception groups received an important boost when cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park broke the Abwehr Enigma cipher. Consequently, the deception planners had access to German intelligence when planning future deception operations. In the spring of 1942, a combined effort by the LCS and ‘‘A’’ Force resulted in the development of a cover plan for the British attack on Madagascar. The deception implied that the British would land in the Dodecanese Islands. The placement of enemy defenses indicated that the deception apparently contributed to the German conclusion that the Dodecanese Islands were threatened. Because the Germans had placed their garrisons in Leros and Rhodes on alert, British troops met no opposition when they landed on the beaches of Madagascar. A second threat to the Dodecanese Islands during the summer did not, however, achieve the desired result. During the spring of 1942, the LCS instituted a second deception operation in an attempt to persuade the Germans to reinforce Norway. Although they placed their forces in southern Norway on maximum alert during the first two weeks of May, the Germans did not increase the number of formations in the Scandinavian country.13 While the British took a serious approach to the use of deception operations in the Mediterranean Theater, the system apparently broke down with regard to the August 1942 Dieppe raid, which was in fact the second assault planned against the French port. For several reasons, the British cancelled the original operation, Rutter, on July 7, 1942. The troops who had been trained for the raid were reassigned to various postings around the United Kingdom, and British military officials briefly debated the wisdom of remounting the cancelled assault. Despite strong opposition and lack of consensus, Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten decided to proceed with the raid against Dieppe. He failed, however, to consult security experts, and his use of deception included releasing his plans to the Germans. Mountbatten had suggested the Dieppe raid would constitute part of a deception to hide the actual targets of the operation—St. Nazaire, Alderney, and Boulogne. The fact remains that the assault was launched against Dieppe and had disastrous results. The failure of Mountbatten to consult the experts for the creation of a cover plan, among other equally important factors, doomed the raid to failure. The disaster at Dieppe reinforced the growing perception within the British intelligence and military community that adequate use of intelligence and deceptive means was crucial.14 Despite the Dieppe fiasco, the British continued to devise and implement cover plans for the Mediterranean Theater. In August 1942, ‘‘A’’ Force and the LCS initiated a deception operation designed to mask the invasion of North Africa (Operation Torch), which Allied officials planned for November. The plan had several interconnected operations. According to the first scheme, the Allies planned to launch major operations against northern France in the fall of 1942 in order to tie down the large German force located there. To mask the concentration of personnel and shipping for Torch, the second plan implied preparations for an attack on Norway. The goal of the third operation was ‘‘to allay Vichy suspicions’’ and to

SETTING THE STAGE

7

conceal the final destination of the invasion force by suggesting a threat to Sicily and southern Italy. The final part of the plan implied the reinforcement of Malta to conceal the buildup of forces on Gibraltar. The overall operation had varying degrees of success. Although they maintained their force in northern France, the Germans never seriously considered the area threatened. The threat to Norway was moderately successful. In addition to declaring the Trodheim-Narvik area protected and the Swedish-Norwegian border a prohibited zone, the Germans expected an attack by ten Allied divisions. The lack of an attempt to intercept the Allied convoys entering the Mediterranean and the lack of preparations by the Vichy and the Germans indicated that they did not expect an attack against Northern Africa. Finally, according to German appreciations, they expected the Allies ‘‘to relieve Malta,’’ but they ‘‘were otherwise undecided as to whether the assault was to be made on Sicily, Tripoli or even Crete.’’ 15 In addition to the cover plan for Torch, the British also implemented a deceptive cover for the Battle of El Alamein in October 1942. Churchill suggested that the cover plan contributed to the British success at El Alamein. Following the lead of their allies, the Americans carried out some minor deception experiments in the Battle of Tunisia with varying degrees of success.16 By the summer of 1942, the Americans had not, however, had the same sort of practice with developing and implementing cover plans as the British had. In fact, since Operation Torch was the first Allied campaign in which the Americans had participated, they had not had the opportunity to institute the necessary organizations in time to have gained experience that was comparable to that of the British. Consequently, as the Allies began preparations for the cross-Channel invasion during the summer of 1943, the British took the lead in determining the deception strategy for the Allied effort and in developing the cover plan that would subsequently be implemented. Initially, only a few Americans participated, and generally, they were ‘‘students or members of a joint staff under British command.’’17 The LCS initiated several other major deceptions during 1943, both with and without help from ‘‘A’’ Force. Between March and July 1943, the LCS implemented the Barclay deception that they designed to cover the invasion of Sicily. Barclay had several goals that included threats to ‘‘pin down enemy forces in the south of France and the Balkan peninsula; to weaken the garrison of Sicily and retard its reinforcement, especially by German troops; and to reduce to a minimum air and naval attacks on the shipping being assembled for the assault on Sicily from Britain, North Africa and Egypt.’’18 According to the deception, if the Allies attacked Sicily, it would be a diversion to draw Axis forces from other, more important areas. Barclay also simulated preparations for Allied attacks against Sardinia, Corsica, and the southern Balkans. The plan suggested first that the assault, which the Allies would only launch when no moon was visible, would come in late June, and then that the Allies had postponed the attack for four weeks. Evaluating Barclay after Allied troops had landed in Sicily, the LCS concluded that the deception had been a success for several reasons. First, the Germans had sent reinforcements to the Balkans.

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Second, the Axis divided its reserves in Italy between Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily. Finally, information obtained from captured documents and prisoners suggested that Axis forces had been surprised both by the date and by the scale of the Allies’ attack.19 After Allied leaders had decided to invade Italy in early September, the LCS and ‘‘A’’ Force implemented a supporting deception that continued the threats to Sardinia and Corsica. In addition, the plan indicated a possible Allied landing at Crotone, which is located on Italy’s heel. Allied forces successfully landed in Italy on September 3 and 9. After the landings, the LCS concluded that, because of the limited amount of time for implementation, the deception had not been as successful as the previous one. According to the LCS, ‘‘nevertheless, some degree of surprise was obtained and opposition during the early stages was confined to that of a single German division. Later information indicated that a German division had been moved from the west coast to the heel shortly before the Salerno attack.’’20 In addition to implementing deception plans to provide cover for the invasions of Sicily and Italy, Allied officials decide to initiate a series of deceptions designed to suggest the possibility of a large-scale cross-Channel invasion in 1943. The deception, Operation Cockade, which fell under the direction of Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate), otherwise known as COSSAC, included deceptions aimed at three different locations, all of which commenced during the summer of 1943 and culminated in September. Operation Starkey indicated an amphibious threat by British troops to the Pas de Calais area; Operation Wadham suggested an assault against Brittany by American forces; and Operation Tindall intimated a British assault against Norway to seize the port and airfields at Stavanger.21 G-3 Operations of General Jacob L. Devers’s command received the responsibility of implementing Wadham. By displaying dummy landing craft, dummy aircraft, and real gliders, along with the transfer of false information by double agents and the flying of aircraft into enemy radar range, G-3 attempted to suggest the placement of an American amphibious force in Southwest England. No real troops were involved in the implementation of Wadham. Despite American efforts, the Germans did not reinforce northwest France. They did, however, maintain twelve divisions in Norway during Operation Tindall. Hitler’s preoccupation with Norway persuaded him to consider any threat to the country seriously. Consequently, he generally maintained a particular troop level there throughout the war.22 Although Wadham and Tindall were purely deception operations, Starkey united deception with a ‘‘large scale movement exercise by the Army, combined with actual sea and air operations to simulate a real intention to carry out a cross-Channel operation.’’23 Of the three threats, the LCS considered the one to the Pas de Calais to be the most important. The shortage of landing craft, however, made it unlikely that the Germans considered the threat to be anything other than a large raid. Although it elicited a few minor German responses, Cockade failed to achieve its objectives. Despite its failure, Cockade proved useful. It provided the LCS with

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experience in creating a deceptive threat to Norway, and it demonstrated a German sensitivity with regard to the Pas de Calais.24 Following Cockade, Devers ordered his new permanent Cover and Deception officer to study the results of the operation and make recommendations for improvements to facilitate American participation in future deception endeavors. In the study, the officer recommended that the general ask the War Department ‘‘to activate, equip and train a field deception unit capable of simulating one corps, consisting of one infantry and one armored division, by means of prefabricated portable dummies together with the appropriate radio communication.’’ On January 20, 1944, the 23rd Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Special Troops, Army, was activated. By March 1, 1944, the War Department activated a sonic unit, which was attached to the 23rd.25 The American 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, which was an unorthodox unit, included 82 officers and 1,023 enlisted men, many of whom were artists, actors, engineers, designers, advertising layout men, electronic wizards, writers, architects, and special-effects experts. It was, however, some time before these units could play an active role in Allied deception operations. When it took to the field, the 23rd, instead of avoiding enemy fire, invited it. Their mission was to divert enemy attention and to protect the lives of the combat troops on the front lines. The men of the 23rd ‘‘never wore their own sleeve insignia, camouflaged their vehicles with the markings of other outfits, operated at night and in strict secrecy, and were under orders never to divulge the nature of their mission even to superior officers in their own army.’’26 Although they did not participate in the cover plan for Operation Overlord, a small part of the 23rd landed in Normandy shortly after the invasion began; the rest arrived over the next few weeks. The men of the 23rd ‘‘served under fire with four armies in five European countries during five major campaigns from D-Day until the end of the war.’’27 While the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops did not provide cover for the Normandy invasion, another American unit, the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion, did participate in that deception, but because of the nature of the invasion’s cover plan, final decisions were not made until the eve of implementation. In fact, the LCS continually reassessed and made changes to the plan after its commencement. Despite the mixed results of the deception plans developed and implemented by the LCS, British military leaders believed that a cover plan for Operation Overlord was essential. Drawing on their own experiences, as well as those of ‘‘A’’ Force, members of the LCS went to work on a plan in the fall of 1943. The LCS created the Fortitude deception plan that Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) accepted and helped to implement. Fortitude was by far the most ambitious plan created by the LCS during the war. Because Fortitude was much more complex than most realize, the following discussion presents a detailed examination of Fortitude from the planning stage through its conclusion in the fall of 1944. Particular attention is paid to the previously neglected Fortitude North. In addition to examining the operation from the Allied perspective, the discussion examines the German responses before, during, and after D-Day, June 6, 1944. After

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exploring numerous primary sources, particularly the Wingate and Hesketh reports and Ultra intercepts, this work concludes with an analysis of Fortitude’s contribution to the Allies’ victory in Normandy, as well as an examination of reasons, other than the deception, that explain the Germans’ behavior toward Normandy during this period.

2

Devising a Plan

Truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies. —British Prime Minister Winston Churchill1

It is not difficult to understand why the Allied leaders believed that it was necessary to devise and implement a deception plan to cover their upcoming invasion of the coast of northwestern Europe. They had implemented some successful deceptive measures during the North African and Italian campaigns. The assault on northern France in late spring 1944 would be the largest amphibious operation ever attempted by Allied forces. In addition, the Allies would launch an assault against a strongly defended coastline in an area where the Germans were building the infamous Atlantic Wall. As the Allies defeated German troops in North Africa and then slowly advanced northward up the Italian peninsula, the enemy’s ‘‘sole remaining hope’’ lay ‘‘in defeating the Allied invasion in the West.’’ 2 The Germans expected the Allies to launch an assault against France in late spring 1944. They were, however, uncertain about the location and the time of the impending Allied invasion. Therefore, the Allied leaders, taking into consideration the heated debates that had occurred over the opening of a Second Front, as well as continuing British concerns over the possibility of Operation Overlord’s success, chose to create a cover plan, which was originally called Torrent, then Mespot, and, finally, Fortitude.3 Although Fortitude represented a deception, rather than a real invasion, Allied planners, who experienced difficulties similar to those encountered when they devised Overlord, spent over six months constructing a scheme that went through numerous revisions before the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved it. In terms of scale, the Fortitude deception was the largest of which we have knowledge. After all, what were they trying to disguise? They were trying to disguise movement of 3000 ships in a very small area of sea. The movement of 3000 ships into a funnel of

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sea about at its greatest 100 miles long and 20 or 30 miles wide. And these ships had to move from identifiable ports through confined waters to a single concentration area in a highly compressed space of time. They were also for example trying to disguise the movements of 13,000 aircraft. It was the largest invasion force that has ever been assembled in the history of amphibious operations.4

Creating a cover plan for the ‘‘largest invasion force’’ proved a daunting task, especially in light of the failed Cockade project from the summer of 1943, but the British approached Fortitude with vigor. Initially it was a British plan, but the Americans ultimately became ‘‘full partners’’ in its execution.5 In April 1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff ordered Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Command designate (COSSAC), to ready Overlord plans. After he and his staff completed their assignment and submitted it to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in mid-July, Morgan began constructing an invasion cover plan. In designing the deception, Morgan had to consider certain security factors—communications restrictions, particularly after the Overlord briefing of troops, and frontier closings in England, Scotland, and Wales. Colonel John Bevan, head of the London Controlling Section (LCS), argued against closing the frontiers too soon because it might alert the enemy to the time of the invasion more than the leakage of information after troop briefings.6 In presenting his thoughts about strategic deception plans for Overlord to Morgan, Bevan noted that he hoped for tactical, not strategic, surprise. Morgan received Bevan’s plan on July 14, but disagreed with it. Although he voiced legitimate concerns about the Bevan plan, Morgan’s alternative proved to be unrealistic. Morgan did stress, however, that the Allies would be unable to keep the buildup of troops a secret until D-Day. Consequently, he believed that they had to suggest another assault or assaults.7 Morgan and others had a high opinion of the German Intelligence Service; therefore, they believed that they had to deceive the Germans in three separate ways— intelligence, air reconnaissance, and spies. According to Sir Ronald Wingate, another member of the LCS, ‘‘this automatically implied an extensive program of visual misdirection,’’ which created a major problem for the Allies. The main concern for the Allied commanders remained Operation Overlord, which received priority over any available supplies. Providing troops, armaments, equipment, landing craft, and other supplies for Overlord took precedence over making them available for other operations, including the cover plan. As a result, the planners decided to coordinate planning of Overlord and the cover plan to enable the sharing of physical supplies whenever possible. Other obstacles, such as the failure of Allied officials to agree upon an overall strategic deception policy, hindered the development of a cover plan for Overlord. Not until the Teheran Conference in November 1943 did Allied leaders agree on an overall policy of strategic deception. Morgan and his advisors devised a temporary solution. They separated the strategic from the tactical planning. While they continued to work on tactical aspects of the cover operation, the planners shelved the strategic planning until after the Teheran Conference.8 Bevan devised a preliminary plan called Jael, which

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he submitted to Morgan on October 8, 1943. Bevan’s deception consisted of two parts. The first stage, during which the implementers would attempt to persuade the Germans to move their troops into areas other than Normandy, would end once the enemy had deduced that the main cross-Channel assault would be launched in 1944. The second part of the deception would begin at that point and conclude on D-Day. Bevan conceded that this plan contained certain weaknesses. Enemy reconnaissance flights could discover the real invasion preparations in England. The Germans could deduce a shift in emphasis from the Mediterranean to the European theater once the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander became known and conclude that the time of the Allied assault was approaching. Allied bombing and newspaper reports could spotlight the activity in England. In addition, although Bevan’s plan called for the simultaneous simulation of threats against the Axis powers from Norway to the Dardanelles, the availability of forces would limit Plan Jael.9 Meanwhile, Morgan, who did not agree with Jael, continued to work on his own cover plan, Torrent, also known as Appendix Y. Before submitting it to the British Chiefs of Staff, Morgan asked Brigadier Dudley Clarke, the leader of ‘‘A’’ Force,10 to review Appendix Y. Clarke, responding in a letter dated October 28, advised Morgan to clarify the object of his plan. Clarke suggested, ‘‘What you really want to achieve is, of course, to make him [the enemy] dispose his forces in a way in which they can do the least harm to your operations. I therefore think that it would have been better to have started with a short appreciation as to what you really want the German High Command to do.’’11 Clarke expressed his doubt that the original deception could be maintained after D-Day and his belief that the weakening of German forces in the invasion area should be of prime importance. He suggested a separate cover plan be devised for the post D-Day period with the object of hindering the movement of German reserves into the region. Referring to Husky (code name for the invasion of Sicily), Clarke advised that Morgan ‘‘adjust your cover plan dates to enable you to make full use of any exercises which the enemy might detect, especially if you use the device of postponing the date of the attack.’’12 On November 29, 1943, Morgan submitted Appendix Y to the British Chiefs of Staff. Because it was essential to prevent the Germans from moving ground and air forces out of the Pas de Calais area, the cover plan included the following objectives: a. To induce the German command to believe that the main assault and the follow-up will be in or east of the Pas de Calais area, thereby encouraging the enemy to maintain or increase the strength of his air and ground forces and of his fortifications there at the expense of other areas, particularly of the Caen area. b. To keep the enemy in doubt as to the date and time of the actual assault. c. During and after the main assault to contain the largest possible German ground and air forces in or east of the Pas de Calais for at least fourteen days.13

Recognizing that the buildup of real troops would imply an assault against the Cherbourg–Caen–Le Havre area, Appendix Y called for deceptive measures, such as wireless activity, to suggest concentration of forces in southeast England, which would

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indicate the Pas de Calais area as the target of an impending Allied operation. Although the majority of naval forces would be occupied with Overlord preparations, the creators of Appendix Y realized that naval forces were essential to a successful deception. Therefore, they suggested a concentration of short-range craft in the Ramsgate-Hastings area, with a follow-up force in the Thames Estuary ‘‘augmented with any available craft and dummy craft so that it represents an assault division.’’ In addition, they devised a plan for assembling as large a concentration of shipping as possible in the Thames Estuary–Great Yarmouth area in order to suggest specifically a threat to the Pas de Calais–Belgium area.14 Appendix Y also suggested several methods for enhancing the size of military and air forces in southeast and east England in order to make the threat to the Pas de Calais–Belgium area more realistic. The methods included wireless deception; camouflage and concealment; preparations for troop movements and accommodations; the imposition of visitor bans and restrictions in the deception area; deceptive lighting of ports, assembly areas, and transit routes; the simulation of concentrations of antiaircraft weaponry; sabotage by resistance forces in the threatened area; and an emphasis on civil defense and citizen evacuation in southeast and east England. Morgan and his staff acknowledged the difficulty in masking the invasion preparations in southwest and south England. Concerned that enemy radar and air reconnaissance would discover the buildup of short-range aircraft, they included measures to suggest that the aircraft would provide protection for the forces assembling in southeast and east England. In addition, the aircraft would increase the number of planes available for the air campaign against the Pas de Calais region prior to and during the amphibious assault.15 Crucial to any deception plan was the ability to deceive the Germans as to the exact time and date of Overlord; therefore, Appendix Y included several measures to accomplish that objective. First, to prevent the Germans from discovering the embarkation of assault and follow-up forces and the transportation of buildup troops to the coast, the implementers would manipulate the wireless traffic. In addition, they would use wireless transmissions to simulate the training and preparation of the deception forces to suggest a target date after the Overlord D-Day. Second, the planners hoped to persuade the Germans, using ‘‘large scale combined exercises in the normal course of training, and maintaining active sea borne and air reconnaissance during the winter and spring,’’ that the final invasion preparations were additional training exercises. Finally, Appendix Y suggested the increased restriction of enemy air reconnaissance over the real preparation site shortly before D-Day.16 Recognizing the necessity of pinning down German forces, both ground and air, in the Pas de Calais region during and after Overlord, Morgan included a provision for the continuation of the deception threat after Allied troops sailed for Normandy. This provision called for an assault force, which included one assault division and the necessary follow-up and buildup divisions along with adequate landing craft, to be housed in the Hastings-Harwich area. The physical display would contain whatever real craft could be spared and would be supplemented by dummy landing craft. Because most of the landing craft would be fake, the plan authorized the use of false

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wireless traffic to enhance the illusion that a real assault force was poised to attack the Pas de Calais. In addition to the wireless transmissions, the U.S. and British forces that were not yet earmarked for Normandy would simulate the follow-up forces.17 Appendix Y designated that the same command and control structure would implement Overlord and the cover operation. The plan divided the cover operation into three phases. The first, or preliminary, phase, which would end when the Rosyth force set sail, would begin immediately and include several features. The appropriate authorities would impose restrictions in the Wash-Bristol Channel area, as well as in areas where secret training was underway, in order to maintain security. Deceptive wireless activity would endeavor to accomplish the following: suggest the presence in the United Kingdom of additional forces trained for amphibious assaults and of an additional combined headquarters located in southeast England, and ‘‘conceal the true character of the amphibious training and to induce the enemy to believe that steps are being deliberately taken to conceal the concentration of aircraft in the South-East.’’18 To mask the meaning of wireless silence on D-Day, implementers would impose ‘‘intermittent and varied periods of wireless silence.’’ Deception forces would construct tented camps and deceptive lighting and magnify civil construction projects in the Thames Estuary region, including Yarmouth, to suggest the daily movement of one and a half divisions in that area. Deception forces would also assemble available short-range craft in the Ramsgate-Hastings area. Finally, while a concealment policy would be in place to mask real invasion preparations, implementers would use ‘‘judicious display’’ of the deception forces.19 The preparatory phase, which would commence at the end of the first phase, would conclude at zero hour D-Day, when the invasion forces landed on the Normandy beaches. The main aspects of the second phase included the following. First, participants would assemble dummy landing craft in the area around Yarmouth and Hastings in order to suggest that the follow-up force in the Nore (at the mouth of the Thames Estuary) was actually an assault force. A concentration of MT ships and coasters would simulate the presence of a follow-up force. Second, actual expeditionary troops in other areas would synchronize large-scale movements in southeastern and eastern England with forces not slated for immediate transfer across the channel. Third, crews would construct displays of dummy aircraft in the deception area to supplement the number of real fighter aircraft. Finally, the appropriate civil authorities would reinforce fire services and civil defense organizations and encourage voluntary civilian evacuation of the region.20 The final, or post-assault, phase would last until Allied troops had established a firm foothold in France. In order to perpetuate the threat to the Pas de Calais area during this period, crews would concentrate any craft not employed in the Normandy operation, along with fake craft, in the areas of the Dover and Nore commands. Troops not needed in Normandy during the first two weeks of the campaign and those not part of the expeditionary force would represent the presence of six divisions in southeast and east England. The deception implementers would use wireless and other deceptive methods to simulate any deficiency in real forces. Wireless activity,

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the display of dummy aircraft, and activity by real aircraft would sustain the threat posed by short-ranged aircraft. Finally, the plan suggested the implementation of bombing raids against the Pas de Calais to suggest assault preparations.21 Morgan and his staff attached three annexures to Appendix Y. Annexure I, ‘‘Long-Term and Short-Term Preparations for Operation ‘Overlord,’’’ first addressed a number of issues concerning the long-term arrangements, such as the camouflage and concealment of real invasion preparations and the discrete display of the deceptive preparations. The display of dummy craft, as well as provisions for additional troop transfer and accommodation, should suggest a concentration of forces, shipping, supplies, and craft in southeastern and eastern regions. Annexure I also proposed the utilization of written narratives for training exercises, involving all services, aimed toward the Pas de Calais. ‘‘Further, by making no effort to conceal the intensity of this training and exaggerating the scope of large scale exercises, the enemy command may gradually become accustomed to this activity and it will be difficult to distinguish between the final preparations for the operation and these training activities.’’22 Although the plan indicated that the use of air and sea borne reconnaissance and raids from the United Kingdom should be spread out as evenly as possible, those in the Pas de Calais–Belgium area should occur more frequently. Annexure I included greater detail about possible civil preparations than those included in Appendix Y and advised that they be undertaken to imply that the assault on the Pas de Calais would occur twenty days after the commencement of Overlord. The second part of Annexure I addressed the short-term preparations for Overlord. Included in this section was a provision that the lighting of ‘‘all ports, hards, transit areas, and assembly areas’’ in the deception area should be the same as that in other coastal areas in the United Kingdom, beginning at least three months prior to D-Day. The planners also stipulated that dummy artillery (see Figure 2.1) would be used to reinforce the antiaircraft concentrations in southeast and east England and what type of resistance activity would support the deceptive threat to the Pas de Calais. Finally, the designers of the plan provided more detail about the use of dummy aircraft to supplement the displays of fighter squadrons in the deception area.23 Annexure II, ‘‘Operation ‘Overlord’ Camouflage and Concealment,’’ supplied clarification about concealment, in Western and Southern Commands, and display of troop preparations. It also included information about the requirements for ‘‘discreet display,’’ which was slated for the deception area. a. Deliberately omitting technical camouflage advice and not using the camouflage surveys and schemes which were designed for concealment. b. Where possible, siting assembly and transit areas away from built-up and enclosed areas and by permitting a greater degree of concentration than would be acceptable if heavy air bombardment were expected. c. Carrying out day movements, between concentration and assembly areas and by arranging halting places on routes where concealment is difficult.24

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Figure 2.1 The planners hoped to fool German reconnaissance planes with this fake antiaircraft gun. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

The final provision in Annexure II suggested the implementation of ‘‘normal’’ camouflage and concealment by the air forces.25 Annexure III, ‘‘Operation ‘Overlord’ Information to Participating Forces and Civil Authorities,’’ noted that the 1943 exercise called Cockade had proven that attempts to put a cover story over on the enemy provided little benefit for the operation as a whole. Harlequin and Tindall had demonstrated that soldiers form their own opinions despite what information is presented to them by their commanders. Therefore, ‘‘it is almost certain that a proportion of those engaged in any operation will not believe in the operation as we hope the Germans may.’’ The only solution was to provide security adequate to prevent the leakage of information out of the country, especially in southeast and east England, where troops scheduled for shipment overseas at a later date and Home Forces units might be involved in perpetrating the deception. According to Annexure III, these soldiers must be convinced ‘‘that dummy equipment is part of the normal equipment of war, that it is used extensively by both sides in most operations, either to distract the enemy’s attention from important targets or to misrepresent intention.’’26 Therefore, security provided a key element in the success of the operation.

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On November 20, 1943, as noted above, Morgan submitted Appendix Y to the British Chiefs of Staff, who withheld approval until Allied strategic policy had been determined. They did, however, approve those aspects of the plan, such as some of the camouflage measures and the introduction of periods of wireless silence, because of the length of time necessary for them to become effective.27 Critics of Appendix Y included General Jacob L. Devers, the CG ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army), Colonel John Bevan, Controlling Officer London Controlling Section, and General Bernard Montgomery’s staff. Continuing to vocalize his disagreement with Appendix Y, Bevan provided three reasons for his objections. First, he stressed that acceptance of the plan should not come before the end of the Cairo Conference. Second, according to Bevan, ‘‘when in due course a tactical cover plan for Operation Overlord was prepared, there could be no question of simply adding it to the genuine plans as an appendix.’’ Finally, because the Allied position for the post D-Day period was unclear, Bevan objected to a scheme that dictated the cover plan after the landings.28 Bevan was soon able to exert his influence over the development of the final cover plan for the Normandy landings. Like Morgan, however, his design evolved before he received final approval from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. From November 28 until December 1, 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Premier Josef Stalin, and their advisors met in Teheran. One of the crucial debates during the conference revolved around the opening of a Second Front. By December 1 the Allied leaders had decided to launch Overlord in May 1944; the decision to postpone the assault for a month occurred later. They agreed that a separate landing in southern France to pin down German troops should occur. The Allied leaders also agreed about the necessity of a cover and deception plan for Overlord. Bevan attended the Teheran Conference, where he discussed the Allied situation in the Mediterranean with Brigadier Dudley Clarke, ‘‘A’’ Force Commander. Following orders received after the conclusion of the Allied summit, Bevan and his department commenced work on an overall plan of deception for the war against Germany in 1944.29 Before discussing the plan that was submitted a short time later, however, a brief examination of the importance of the London Controlling Section to the Allied deception effort is warranted. ******************* The London Controlling Section (LCS), formed on October 9, 1941, was the brainchild of Winston Churchill. During the first year and a half of its existence, the LCS, which had a staff of three, felt its way through unknown waters. Initially, the LCS functioned as an advisory body for the deception planners in the Middle East and India, served as agents for them with the Inter Services Security Board (ISSB), and proposed cover plans for amphibious operations. The LCS began to define its functions more clearly between June 1942 and December 1943. As a result of an increase in staffing, the LCS began to formulate the primary policy of strategic deception, as well as deception plans, and to serve as the conduit through which personnel implemented cover operations. It forged close ties to the Joint Planning Staff, the

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Service Ministries, the Secret Services, and the Foreign Office and provided advice about Allied deception policy for the war to the United States and Soviet Union. Negotiations among the Allies resulted in a delegation of power concerning the formation and administration of deception plans. According to Wingate, the agreement became ‘‘that the London Controlling Section was responsible for initiating policy and plans in regard to the war against German and Italy and that their counterpart in America, the Joint Security Control, for initiating plans for the war against Japan.’’30 Under the auspices of its new authority, the London Controlling Section concocted and implemented plans to cover the Allied landings in North Africa and schemes intended to limit the number of German forces opposing the Russians on the Eastern Front in 1943. As noted above, following the conclusion of the Teheran Conference, the LCS began to work on an Allied cover plan for 1944 that would include a specific plan to mask Operation Overlord. In order to construct the deception plan, the department reworked Bevan’s original plan Jael and renamed it Bodyguard.31 The process did not prove to be an easy one. The LCS faced a twofold problem. First, the plan had to convince the Germans to reorganize their forces so that few would oppose the Overlord and Anvil landings or the Soviet offensives on the Eastern Front. Second, ‘‘the tactical problem was, as soon as our preparations for Overlord and Anvil clearly indicated to the enemy our intention to take a crosschannel operation and an amphibious operation in the Western Mediterranean, to devise tactical cover plans to deceive the enemy as to the strength, objective and timing of Overlord and Anvil.’’32 The theater commanders received the charge of using real activities to pin down German forces in southern Germany and northern Italy and false operations in Scandinavia and southeast Europe. This responsibility of the commanders was a carryover from Bevan’s original plan. The new plan, however, contained two important features that the original one did not. First, the planners expected the enemy to conclude that the main Russian summer offensive would occur in late June and that Allied forces would not launch Overlord, a subsequent operation, until late summer. Second, the Russians would cooperate in the deceptive assault on Northern Norway (part of Fortitude North, see Chapter Three) and the coast of Bulgaria and Rumania. Despite the difficulties involved, the London Controlling Section submitted a plan of strategic deception, Bodyguard, to the British Chiefs of Staff within three weeks and received their approval on December 25, 1943. Two days later the British Chiefs of Staff forwarded the plan to Washington for examination. After Washington accepted the plan on January 18, the Combined Chiefs of Staff voted to proceed with Bodyguard.33 Plan Bodyguard consisted of several parts; the goal of each was to tie down German troops around Europe and to prevent their transfer to the invasion area. While the objective of Bodyguard was to focus German attention away from Normandy, only one operation, Fortitude, had a direct impact on the invasion site. Before examining Fortitude, however, a brief explanation of the entire plan is necessary. *******************

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Plan Bodyguard contained the following areas of secret activities: deception, security and counterintelligence, offensive intelligence, political warfare, and mayhem. The goal of the deception was to use any means possible to pass along bits of information to the Germans, who would assemble them and hopefully reach the right conclusion about an inflated view of the capabilities and aims of the Allies. Security and counterintelligence had the job of preventing the enemy from learning Overlord secrets by deceiving the Abwehr and other German intelligence agencies. Allied offensive intelligence had to ascertain the intentions of the Germans by using information gathered to identify and locate German forces, in other words, to construct an order of battle. The Allied political warfare organization, using propaganda, hoped to lower the willingness to fight and the morale of the German population and instill a lack of confidence by the people in the Nazi leadership. Finally, the Allies expected to use commando raids and resistance group activities to create turmoil in areas controlled by the Germans.34 The object of Bodyguard was to convince the Germans to place their troops in areas where they would cause the least problems for Allied operations. To accomplish this objective, according to a member of the LCS, Colonel Roger Fleetwood Hesketh, the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) received three tasks. First, SHAEF had to suggest that, in the event Germany showed any signs of weakening or withdrawing its troops in northwest Europe (which they expected to facilitate by bombing the war potential of Germany), the Allies had a plan that would allow them to take advantage of the situation. Second, using whatever means necessary, SHAEF had to suggest that the Allies intended offensives in a number of different areas. The Germans had to believe that British, American, and Russian troops were going to launch a joint offensive in the spring against northern Norway in order to open a supply route from Sweden. In conjunction with the Norwegian offensive, the Allies expected to obtain Swedish support and access to Swedish airfields in order to advance into Denmark. They also planned operations in Italy and the Balkans, including an attack against the Dalmatian coast by an Anglo-American force, one against Greece by a British assault team, and an amphibious operation by the Soviets against the Bulgarian-Rumanian coast. In addition, Allied leaders would approach Turkey about providing access to airfields for an attack on the Aegean Islands prior to the invasion of Greece. Finally, SHAEF had to convince the Germans that the cross-Channel assault would not come until late summer 1944 for a couple of reasons. It would take time to amass enough landing craft and to train the fifty divisions slated for the invasion and follow-up force. In addition, the delay of the cross-Channel invasion provided the justification for the Allied operations against Norway, Italy, and the Balkans.35 A message sent by the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin in November 1943 persuaded the planners to stress the above three themes. Information gathered by Allied intelligence late in 1943 indicated that the Germans believed the Allies would focus on a cross-Channel invasion in 1944 and had strengthened their defenses and troops accordingly. General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s appointment as Supreme Allied Commander helped the enemy come to their conclusion about the Allied assault.

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Other intercepted messages reinforced Allied beliefs that they had to focus German attention on areas other than Normandy.36 The London Controlling Section expected to accomplish two goals with Bodyguard. The first was to confuse the Germans about the site of the upcoming Allied invasion. To realize that aim, they designed threats to Italy, Scandinavia, and the Balkans. However, the LCS also had to address the problem of German troops already situated in northwest Europe, in or near Normandy. Consequently, in January 1944, hoping to mislead the enemy about the exact location of the Allied assault against northern France, the LCS and MI 5 began work on a plan to focus German attention on the Pas de Calais region, which was east of the intended Overlord invasion site. By February 1 the work of the two departments resulted in Plan Mespot, which included two separate deception threats, one to the Pas de Calais area and the other against Scandinavia. Because of his reservations about the Scandinavian action, Bevan insisted upon the inclusion of a diplomatic plan that suggested the possibility of obtaining cooperation from Sweden. Bevan proposed Plan Graffham as reinforcement of the threat to Scandinavia. 37 The LCS and MI 5 submitted Mespot to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which accepted it on February 10, 1944, and passed it on to General Eisenhower for fine-tuning and implementation. The LCS, because of feedback from Eisenhower and the Chiefs of Staff, revised Mespot, which evolved into Operation Fortitude, by February 23. There was little difference between the two plans. While Mespot had included an assault on southern France, called Anvil, the planners omitted it from the Fortitude scheme.38 ******************* The purpose of Fortitude, the cover plan for the invasion of Normandy, was to persuade the German High Command ‘‘to make faulty dispositions in Northwest Europe before and after the Neptune [code name for Overlord] assault.’’ 39 The strategy of the original cover plan was to hide the troops and preparations in southern and southwestern England and to show preparations in southeast England. The revised cover plan provided for an invasion in two or more areas, with the initial landing being a feint. After the original assault, a second landing would occur at Calais. Bevan, realizing that the troop buildup for Normandy could not be kept a secret, had expanded the number of troops involved in the deception to persuade the Germans that the forces were sufficient for two invasions—one led by General Bernard Montgomery with the 21st Army Group that consisted of British and American troops and the other by the First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG), which contained Canadian and American soldiers. Fortitude had several objectives. First, it planned to decrease the ‘‘rate and weight’’ of enemy reinforcements of the Normandy area. Second, the planners hoped to persuade the Germans to spend more time fortifying areas other than the Overlord site. Third, through decoy and concealment, the deception expected to decrease the enemy’s watchfulness while the Allies were amassing troops and launching Overlord (see Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 for a partial list of fake equipment constructed). Finally,

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Figure 2.2 Catalog of targets #1 lists details about the pneumatic equipment used for deceptive purposes. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

the designers of Fortitude expected to convince the Germans to keep their troops in areas away from Normandy.40 The fine tuning of Fortitude continued until the Allies implemented the plan, which was divided into two parts—Fortitude South and Fortitude North—‘‘but the keystone would be Fortitude South, the Calais hoax, to which something like 1,500 uniformed Allied personnel would ultimately become involved.’’41 On February 26 the Allied leadership allocated the ‘‘command and control of the Fortitude operations.’’ The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (G.O.C.-in-C.), Scottish Command, General Sir Andrew Thorne, received the responsibility for planning and control of physical aspects of Fortitude North, the deception aimed at Norway. SHAEF retained authority over the naval and air measures. The Joint Commanders—Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force (ANCXF), 21st Army Group, and Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF)—received orders to plan and control the physical parts of Fortitude South, the deception that targeted the Pas de Calais. SHAEF was to direct the double agents and other Special Means for both Fortitude North and Fortitude South. Between February and mid-July 1944, the Physical Deception Staff integrated the deception plans devised by the Joint Commanders with those constructed by the G.O.C.-in-C., Scottish Command.

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Figure 2.3 Catalog of targets #2 contains information about some of the pneumatic equipment used for deceptive purposes. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

Special Means adjusted the plans to their own methods for planting information with the Germans. Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ) received orders to employ resistance groups in the implementation of Fortitude. SFHQ was to coordinate bombing operations and supply drops to resistance groups in the appropriate areas.42 In addition, in March 1944, Eisenhower authorized the creation of the Special Plans Section by the Commanding General, FUSAG. The general recognized that the British had used cover and deception effectively in Africa. Not only did few American officers have experience with cover and deception work, but ‘‘none had planned and conducted an operation in the field.’’ Therefore, Eisenhower issued a directive ordering the creation of the Special Plans Branch.43 Attached to ETOUSA, the Special Plans Branch would be responsible for preparing and implementing the cover and deception plans for U.S. forces in the European Theater. Eisenhower’s directive noted the immediate mission of the newly created section. Although the Special Plans Section was given several duties, the most important ones were: ‘‘(a) to implement the cover and deception plans prepared by SHAEF which involve US troops not under the command of 21 Army Group and (b) to implement the cover and deception plans involving US troops under the command of 21 Army Group, as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group.’’ On April 7, 1944,

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Figure 2.4 Catalog of targets #3 includes details about fabric and mechanical equipment used for deceptive purposes. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

Colonel William A. Harris became the Chief of the Special Plans Branch, FUSAG. He received orders to organize a staff of not more than ‘‘six officers, one warrant officer, and seven enlisted men.’’ At the same time, Harris learned that Major Ralph M. Ingersoll, G-3, would be a member of his staff.44 ******************* One of the main difficulties in planning and implementing Operation Fortitude was the amassing of troops, equipment, supplies, and landing craft, in other words, what was normally needed for mounting an invasion. The planners, acknowledging the supply problem, included several methods for implementing the deception. The first of the resources slated for Fortitude was wireless deception. According to Wingate, the deception staff had to use one of three wireless methods to confound German Intelligence. One method was to send messages ‘‘in the clear’’ or in lowgrade cipher, which could easily be broken. Over time, the Germans could use intercepted transmissions to construct an Allied order of battle, which was the object of the Tactical ‘‘Y,’’ or Intercept, Service. When the volume of wireless telegraphy (W/T) and radio telephony (R/T) traffic was large, the German Intelligence Service would experience difficulty in distinguishing voices and ciphers. Therefore, it would attempt

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to reach conclusions about enemy activity by interpreting circumstantial evidence gathered by its ‘‘Y’’ Service. Wingate classified that activity as ‘‘the use of the Strategical ‘Y’ Service.’’ Finally, the Germans would implement direction-finding equipment. Using transmissions from two or more Allied receiving stations, they could ‘‘accurately pinpoint a sender at the intersection of their ‘bearings.’’’45 Each of the armed branches played a role in the use of wireless deception, though to varying degrees. Naval wireless emanating from the base proved more useful than that originating at sea, since vessels maintained wireless silence until engaged in activity. Because at sea wireless proved crucial at the commencement of an assault, Allied leaders staged several rehearsals of actual landings, which were incorporated into the deception. In addition, the planners learned early on of the importance of coordinating ‘‘live’’ wireless activity with the display of dummy landing craft to create the illusion of reality. Land forces played a greater role in the manipulation of wireless transmissions. The command of the forces involved was responsible for land tactical deception. Consequently, according to Wingate, ‘‘planning of wireless deception must be done on the same level as the real plan it is designed to assist.’’46 The implementers employed a variety of methods to attain high levels of realism—transmitters that could simulate six R/T stations; traffic recorded by officers and operators; special three hundred men signal units that could deliver R/T communications for three divisions. The Air Forces utilized two signal types—point-to-point (telephone or teletype traffic) and air-to-ground. The purpose of their wireless deceptive measures was to convince the enemy that the operational strength of the Air Forces was greater than it actually was. Mobile vans with special equipment simulated the peculiar sound emitted from a set operating in an airborne craft. The Air Forces also used measures to interfere with enemy radar and wireless beams. By varying the amount of traffic to mask the movement of aircraft, signalers caused ‘‘squadrons of aircraft to ‘appear’ in areas suggesting a move in another direction.’’ The Air Forces used similar methods to divert German forces away from an intended target.47 Although ‘‘A’’ Force had used wireless deception in North Africa, it had only been implemented once before the Fortitude deception. The Combined Signals Board initially handled problems concerning wireless deception. The Signals Security Committee, COSSAC, which operated under the Combined Signals Board, assumed that role during the fall of 1943. As early as December 1943, the Signals Security Committee had begun constructing schedules that included periods of intense, normal, and no wireless activity and directives for ‘‘deceptive wireless exercises and arrangements for the monitoring of enemy reactions.’’48 The schedules contained several periods of wireless silence, instead of no activity for ten days before D-Day, in an attempt to mask the loading of the invasion force. Since the restrictions on wireless activity interfered with troop training, the Signals Security Committee occasionally allowed wireless silence to be broken.49 *******************

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Because Fortitude was divided into two parts, the planners delegated responsibility for wireless deception to different groups. The Fourth Army represented the British forces for Fortitude North. CLH units provided wireless traffic for the naval assault forces. Wireless was particularly important for Fortitude North because the number of physical displays would be much less for its deception than those used for the Fortitude South story. General Montgomery, as commander of the 21st Army Group, was responsible for the Pas de Calais threat ‘‘and therefore all wireless deception required in connection with the false order of battle.’’ No. 5 Wireless Group transmitted wireless activity for British land forces, while the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur McCrary, represented American land forces during Fortitude South.50 In addition to wireless deception, the LCS had other channels at its disposal for Fortitude, including activities planned by deception staffs in Washington and the Mediterranean. The inclusion of false information in correspondence to prisoners of war for reading by German censors provided another avenue for misleading the enemy. The LCS also had use of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), the group that orchestrated sabotage and resistance groups’ activities behind enemy lines, and the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), which supplied propaganda to mislead the German population. To suggest the buildup of troops in areas where there were few, high fidelity loud speakers emitted recorded sounds of military activity, such as bivouacked or moving military forces—the sounds of tinkling mess kits, shouting soldiers, and moving tanks, or the normal pre-dawn noises heard on ‘‘assault-type’’ landing craft—clanking chains, revving engines, and so on. The American 23rd Headquarters Special Troops provided tactical special effects. Using inflatable vehicles, loudspeakers to project ‘‘military-like’’ noises, radios, and ‘‘artillery flash devices,’’ soldiers from the 23rd Special Troops followed orders to deceive civilian observers.51 The LCS had a number of physical displays upon which to draw. Debate ranged around the amount of physical display needed for a successful deception, as well as the Allied policy of concealment and display. In September 1943 COSSAC had initiated a concealment and display policy designed to mislead enemy German spies and reconnaissance aircraft. As they considered accepting Appendix Y, the Chiefs of Staff authorized the commencement of the COSSAC policy. Although progress had been made by the time the Combined Chiefs accepted Bodyguard, the ‘‘false’’ invasion preparations had begun to place a strain on available supplies, most of which were assigned to Overlord. SHAEF acknowledged that the construction of the physical deception could be limited by the priority given to the real invasion. After D minus 30, however, focus could shift to the deception, which would support the later invasion date for the Pas de Calais and alleviate the competition for supplies between the two operations. Brigadier R.T. Ransome, Q Ops, addressed several relevant issues in a memorandum to Headquarters, COSSAC, G-3 Division, dated January 12, 1944. Ransome inquired about the necessity of including medical evacuation centers, transit and reception camps for prisoners of war, accommodations for wounded prisoners, and provisions for ships and craft, in the operation. A SHAEF directive, which concurred

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with Ransome’s concerns about realism, made provisions for the influx of casualties and enemy prisoners into, and display of military stores in, South Eastern Command’s region.52 Reiterating the importance of realism, Ransome noted, ‘‘If visible arrangements are to be made by which enemy air recce [reconnaissance] is to be deceived, these deceptive arrangements must be ‘married up’ with movement. Otherwise in a few days it will be obvious that any camps erected for deception are in fact dummies.’’53 SHAEF expressed concern that supplies would be insufficient to complete preparations designed to deceive German air reconnaissance, as well as agents, and that the lack of completion should be concealed. The LCS did not, however, plan the concealment of all sites in east and southeast England. In a memorandum to GHQ Home Forces, Lieutenant General H.C. Loyd, Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command, identified four degrees of camouflage for areas exposed to enemy aircraft. Category A included fully concealed areas that were slated to remain thus for the duration. Category B contained areas that were partially hidden, but that would eventually evolve into type A. Category C areas, those that had been poorly chosen for camouflage or those that had been occupied for a considerable length of time, could never be fully hidden. Category D referred to permanent structures that dated back to the commencement of the conflict. Loyd also noted certain camouflage problems in his communication to GHQ Home Forces. Because of time restrictions and ‘‘administrative convenience,’’ the camps could not always be constructed with concealment as the priority. Expansion of camps outside of wooded areas to accommodate personnel and wire surrounding troop locations increased the possibility of enemy sightings.54 However, because of the story being passed to the Germans that the assault on the Pas de Calais would not occur until July, the physical development of camps in east and southeast England was to occur later in the spring. According to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C.), South Eastern Command, The picture that I wish to convey to the Germans at this date is that although the camps are not being allowed to fall into disrepair, there is at present no sign of their being occupied by troops in the near future. This is being effected by small routine repair parties of Royal Engineers or Pioneers carrying out work in the camps, and also by some camps being occupied from time to time for a few days by troops who may be training near them.. . .At some Hards, embarkation extension piers are being build and this will show up to any German air reconnaissance, and will give the correct impression that these Hards are to be used sometime in the future and are not being allowed to become derelict.55

The reference to ‘‘hards’’ in the GOC-in-C.’s letter suggested another resource that the LCS had at its disposal for the Fortitude deception—fake landing craft. ******************* In order to suggest their ability to transport an invasion force to the coast of France around the Pas de Calais, the Allies had to display sufficient numbers of landing craft. The limited number of craft available had affected the date set for the

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Normandy invasion. A surplus of craft for the deception display did not exist; therefore, the LCS had to use the next best thing—dummy craft. Two types of dummy landing craft, bigbobs and wetbobs, existed. A bigbob was a fake landing craft tank (LCT), which was made of steel tubing and canvas. Its buoyancy came from floats, and it had wheels, which allowed short distance movement, ‘‘over a reasonably smooth surface,’’ into the water. The craft measured 160 by 30 feet and weighed five and a half tons. British forces had previous experience in using bigbobs and looked to a report issued on September 19, 1943, by the Commander-in-Chief, GHQ Home Forces, for guidance. According to the report, having too many commanders from the different Allied services dictating the erection and placement of dummy landing craft caused organizational problems, and, as a result, GHQ Home Forces was ‘‘operationally responsible’’ for future operations. The training of the installation teams determined the length of time needed for the construction of a display. Adequate training was crucial because, in the interest of security, many of the displays had to be erected at night. Several factors affected the construction of bigbobs under the cover of darkness. If the amount of ground available for erection was too small, not enough craft could be built at night. Security prevented the use of suitable launching sites. The report suggested the consideration of the following for future fake displays: the severe limitation of enemy reconnaissance when the craft were built and embarked; completion of displays on dates required by the deception; and the effect of local security on the project. Finally, the report suggested cooperation from the Navy, which would have to supply one towing craft for each bigbob and would have to set the time for the launching of each.56 A wetbob was a fake landing craft assault (LCA), which was constructed of inflatable rubber. According to a South Eastern Command (S.E.) report entitled, ‘‘Notes on the Berthing, Mooring, Launching, Construction, and Maintenance of Wetbobs (Dummy Landing Craft Assaault),’’ the ‘‘peculiarities, scope and limitations of wetbobs’’ required the complete training of naval and military crews prior to the commencement of the deception.57 A deflated LCA measured approximately seven feet in length and two feet in diameter. A three-ton vehicle could transport ten to twenty deflated wetbobs. An LCA required 300–400 cubic feet of air for inflation. Using ‘‘exhaust gases from a 30 cwt truck,’’ a crew could inflate a dummy craft in fifteen minutes. It would take forty-five minutes if the crew used an 8 cwt truck. Crews used compressed air cylinders for periodic topping of the craft. After the initial inflating, wetbobs left in the water needed periodic maintenance. Inflated, the wetbob measured forty by eight by four feet and weighed two hundred pounds. Because of its light weight the LCA was susceptible to wind. A four-knot wind could capsize or toss one on top of another. Therefore, the report recommended that each craft ‘‘be berthed clear of everything and anchored well down from head, stern and sides with either mooring lines, or drogues, or a combination of both.’’ Crews launched wetbobs at night, but the type of mooring used dictated when they could accomplish their task. Tide did not affect the berthing of a craft to a central buoy, from which it was ‘‘allowed to swing to wind and tide,

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steadied by drogues at sides and stern.’’58 The display of bigbobs and wetbobs proved complicated and, in some cases, risky. ******************* In addition to dummy landing craft, Allied commanders authorized the use of dummy aircraft for both Fortitude North and Fortitude South. The deception planners limited Fortitude North to an aircraft exhibition on airfields in eastern Scotland. Although the presence of gliders would have made the displays more realistic, a surplus did not exist. Operation Overlord claimed all available gliders. Because troops for the Norwegian assault would embark in western Scottish ports, however, the LCS did not consider the absence of gliders a threat to the deception. Fake twin-engine Boston aircraft and Spitfires supplemented the exhibits in Scotland. Teams constructed the heavy wooden Boston aircraft in hangers during the day and transported them to airfields in the evening. Crews built the Spitfires, which were made of collapsible canvas, at night. Both dummy airfields and dummy aircraft, constructed of wood and canvas, made the Fortitude South deception more realistic. Poor camouflaging purposely exposed the aircraft to enemy reconnaissance. To facilitate the reality of the deception, a British unit already experienced at decoy displays received orders to provide lighting for the dummy airfields. This unit was led by Colonel John Turner and was known as Colonel Turner’s Department (or CTD). Turner’s department planned the placement of Q, or dim illumination, lights and fake recognition beacons alongside the phony runways in east and southeast England. Turner and his department first practiced using concealment and display (C & D) equipment in the fall of 1942 when they received orders to conceal aircraft and troop movement and preparation for the North African campaign and to mount a deceptive display of dummy aircraft between Hampshire and Kent to mask the direction of the upcoming Allied assault. Crews utilized heavy C type nets to camouflage U.S. aircraft at Portreath, but strong winds made covering them difficult. Lessons learned at Portreath resulted in the subsequent development of Z and twin engine nets. In conjunction with the concealment of U.S. planes at Portreath, Turner’s department assembled displays in east England—two squadrons of wooden Hurricanes at Dunkkerswell, Stoney Cross, Holmesley South, and Dunsfold airfields and on an open field near Dunsfold. The display at Dunsfold field proved the most difficult. The lack of a hanger for construction resulted in plane parts being camouflaged under nets by day and assembled under cover of night. Although crews frequently changed the configuration of the displays, failure to supply ‘‘movement, personnel, transport, tracks and litter’’ opened the deception to discovery by the enemy. German reconnaissance did not reveal the deception; however, the experience demonstrated to the C & D units the importance of ‘‘life,’’ in terms of movement, litter, and tracks. In February 1943 when the army held large-scale maneuvers in south and southwest England, Turner’s department provided nets and dummies for tactical aircraft protection. Using dummies made of light canvas, the C & D units displayed one squadron of Spitfires at Middle Wallop, Chilbolton, and Lasham airfields and one squadron of Mustangs at Stoney Cross and Hurn airfields. They used tree nets

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obtained from the Directorate General of Equipment (DGE) to hide ‘‘camps, transport and temporary accommodation in the field.’’ Despite the limitations of the exercise caused by poorly trained ground crews and a shortage of C & D units, the opposing force frequently bombed the display during the exercise.59 The real test came for Turner’s department with Plan Tindall, which commenced in Scotland in July 1943. Tindall was the cover for the Allied assault on Italy. Tindall’s implementers used a large glider force to simulate the preparations for an invasion of Norway. Turner’s department received orders to display dummy Boston aircraft—‘‘20 at Peterhead, 10 at Fordoun and 10 at Fraserburgh.’’ A shortage of vehicles to tow the gliders and material to construct dummy aircraft limited the displays to two gliders at each airfield. Although the crews produced and displayed fake Bostons, the exhibits lacked realistic support—transport, litter, and tankers. Failure to intersperse real antiaircraft guns amongst the dummy ones affected the apparent realism of the displays, although they did draw attention from enemy reconnaissance aircraft. Turner’s department received orders to mount a second deception, Starkey, in conjunction with Tindall. Designed to convince the Germans to divert aircraft from Italy to meet an impending Allied invasion against the Pas de Calais region, Starkey ‘‘included the concentration of dummy landing craft in ports and estuaries on the south coast, the movement of a force of army strength to embarkation points, and the concentration of aircraft, supplemented by dummies in the south and east of England.’’60 A shortage of fake craft severely hindered the cover plan. Consequently, the army abandoned the invasion pretense and enacted transportation and embarkation exercises from area ports and hards. Still hoping to engage enemy aircraft in an air battle, the RAF authorized the display of canvas Spitfires at Biggin Hill, Hawkinge, Hornchurch, Southend, Shorham, Friston, and Ibsley and fake Mustangs at Gravesend, West Malling, and Martlesham. Each well-trained C & D unit of six men succeeded in assembling eighteen aircraft, plus the necessary ‘‘transport, tank lorries, and litter’’ in one night. C & D units assembled protective decoy lighting at thirty-four sites, of which twenty-one were inland sites and thirteen were coastal ones. Detachments simulated army convoys and camps using ASQL—very light decoy lighting. The Flag Officer in Charge (FOIC) Portsmouth handled questions about the amount of lighting displayed. Although the Starkey cover plan was not considered a success because the Germans did not respond as the planners had hoped, Turner’s department and the C & D units gained valuable experience that they used for the Fortitude deception. In addition, they successfully convinced the army of the importance of decoy lighting for field protection and misdirecting enemy nighttime reconnaissance. ******************* The London Controlling Section hoped to use certain restrictions as indications of invasion preparation in the south and southeast England. In order to persuade the British Cabinet to impose a ban on visitors traveling to all coastal areas involved in both the Overlord and Fortitude operations, the LCS hoped to obtain support from

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the Supreme Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Major General R. H. Barker, Deputy Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate) indicated support of the proposed ban as early as October 18, 1943. Major General P. G. Whiteford, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence) Division, COSSAC, recognized the importance of tying restrictions on visitors’ travel in coastal areas to the Overlord operation. The issue of the visitors’ ban remained unresolved for some time, however, as evidenced by an appeal from Morgan to Lieutenant General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Deputy Secretary (Military) War Cabinet, dated February 1944, in which he reiterated the reasons why the ban should be put into effect. Eisenhower continued to press for imposition of the ban, which was finally authorized for commencement on April 1, 1944, for the area from the Wash to Land’s End, Cornwall, and an area of the Scottish coast next to the Firth of Forth.61 Because the Germans could construe constraints on troop leaves as an indication of an impending invasion, Allied leaders had to decide when and if to impose them. Extension of leave restrictions to the Fortitude areas appeared imperative to prevent compromising the deception. In addition, leave restrictions in Scotland and south and southeast England could help to promote the possibility of Allied actions against Norway and the Pas de Calais. Despite the benefits of restricting travel and leave, Allied leaders did not find it easy to impose them. Because the war-weary British nation and military viewed travel and leave restrictions as inconveniences, they had to be approved at a high level for use only when necessary. In addition, ‘‘there was difficulty in imposing the restrictions . . .in making them effective but at the same time drawing the minimum attention to them, thus avoiding causing enemy apprehension by leakage through the press, which would have been the case if public announcement had been employed.’’62 Debate over leave stoppage continued until the order was issued in a memorandum dated April 1, 1944. As early as July, however, despite the ongoing conflict, requests for the lifting of leave stoppages surfaced.63 In addition to travel and leave restrictions, Allied leaders had to determine when and if to impose two postal measures: censorship and the initiation of the ‘‘closed’’ address. The purpose of censorship was to prohibit the exposure of secrets by the troops, whereas the aim of the ‘‘closed’’ address was to prevent the location of particular units or formations from becoming known. Under normal wartime circumstances, the leadership generally imposed the two simultaneously. For deception, however, the purposes changed. Censorship became a security measure to learn if uninformed troops had guessed their real role in the upcoming action and if informed troops had released classified information. The ‘‘closed’’ address, on the other hand, assumed a purely deceptive function. The normal job of the concealed address was to mask the location of the troops, but the goal of the deception was to reveal it. Although certain units involved in the false order of battle would receive ‘‘closed’’ addresses, others, such as signal companies, would be subject to censorship, but not to concealed addresses. Allied leaders imposed the postal restrictions on Fortitude North only for the period prior to the Normandy invasion. Although the troops engaged in the

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Fortitude North deception experienced both censorship and ‘‘closed’’ addresses, the authorities did not impose them simultaneously. Because the Fortitude South formations were slated for future participation in the Normandy area, they received the mail constraints for the duration. Manpower shortages, however, resulted in the decision to discontinue concealed addresses on D-Day although the War Office did not enforce it until August 22, 1944.64 ******************* The London Controlling Section had other resources upon which to draw for the Fortitude deceptions. Perhaps the most important resource available to the LCS, according to John C. Masterman, a member of the Double Cross Committee, Sir Ronald Wingate, and Sir David Hunt, an intelligence colonel who served on General Montogomery’s staff, was the use of controlled agents.65 According to Hunt, controlled agents provided no doubt about the most effective means of planting false information on the Germans. . . .The answer is simply double agents. The Germans had got all the wrong ideas. They believed that the great success of the British intelligence service, which was of course their great bugbear and at the same time their great inspiration, they believed that it was all done by spies. Now in fact spies are not good at all in war. I don’t know about peacetime. But in wartime they never produce anything that is worth anything. The Germans alas fell for them, and they made things worse because first of all they had too much money. With all the money they got corrupt. They also recruited quite a number of anti-Nazis anyway. And secondly they began to pay their spies by their results. This is always totally fatal. The amount of rubbish that they believed is really very, very striking indeed.66

Although he personally did not believe that double agents could accomplish much in wartime, Hunt conceded that the Germans bought into the information that spies passed along to them. MI 5, the counterespionage agency of Great Britain, started using double agents early in the war. Shortly after the war broke out, members of MI 5 and Scotland Yard began to arrest German spies operating in Great Britain. The initial ‘‘Class A espionage’’ list included 356 names. From the beginning, a number of spies indicated a willingness to work as double agents. Receptive to the idea of using double agents, MI 5 planned to supply the messages that were sent to the spies’ controllers and hoped to maintain the links of communication between particular agents and their controllers, without the Germans becoming the wiser. In addition, requests for information by the Abwehr, the German secret service, would indicate enemy plans. To facilitate the successful establishment of a double agent network, the Directors of Intelligence formed the Double-Cross Committee, which was also called the Twenty (XX) Committee, in January 1941. MI 5, MI 6(British Secret Intelligence Service), the Foreign Office, the Home Defence Executive, and other intelligence departments all supplied members for the committee. The participants included Lieutenant Colonel T.A. Robertson, Bill Luke, Martin Lloyd, John Drew of the Home Defence Executive, Lieutenant Commander the Honorable Ewen

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Montagu, Norman Holmes Pearson, and Captain John C. Masterman, who became the chairman of the Double-Cross Committee on January 2, 1941. An American academic and member of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Pearson received assignment to the OSS’s London office. As time passed, three MI 5 officials, Robertson, Masterman, and J.A. Marriott, along with a force of caseworkers who were in charge of the day-to-day control, became responsible for the double agents. The Double-Cross Committee evaluated possible messages to be sent, coordinated them, and rewrote them when needed. The Committee also approved the MI 5 case workers, who were responsible for supplying the agents with material for their messages and for ascertaining that the information was sent in the prescribed form.67 In order to prove the credibility of the agents, the Double-Cross Committee approved the transmission of information about security measures being used in Great Britain. As mentioned earlier, the measures included the restriction of postal service to Portugal; the cessation of travel to coastal areas of England and to Ireland; and the censoring of diplomatic messages. The information, which could be verified in the newspapers, would suggest Allied attempts to hide invasion preparations. Once the agents had proven themselves, they could be counted upon to pass on reliable information. As Hunt indicated, the Germans accepted much of what their spies transmitted, and they seemed unaware that their agents had been turned.68 When LCS was planning the Fortitude deception, Colonel John Bevan and his colleague, Lieutenant Colonel H.N.H. (Noel) Wild, approached the Double-Cross Committee for assistance. Previously the Committee had used the double agents for defensive purposes, but the time was ripe for a change in how the Committee utilized them. The Committee welcomed ‘‘Wild’s scheme to integrate visual and wireless deception with that of double agents, the three being blended and harmonized to corroborate and support each other and add up together to a picture which would trap Hitler and his intelligence into a catastrophically mistaken reading of the Allied intentions.’’69 Working together, Bevan, Wild, and the Committee examined the files of possible double agents to be used in the Fortitude deception. Although they had many from which to choose, the men had to keep certain factors in mind when making their decisions. Having four to five spies and their networks operating at the same time in one operation might prove difficult. If the committee lost control of an agent, the Germans could discover the nature of the entire team. The speed with which the agents could communicate with their Abwehr controllers was another consideration. The coordinators preferred agents with radio transmitters over those who conveyed important information by letter; therefore, the agents with transmitters would send most of the material while the others would provide details by mail. The three main double agents chosen to work on Fortitude were Garbo, Brutus, and Tricycle.70 Before providing background information about them, a brief examination of a few minor players is warranted. *******************

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In September 1940 Hans Hansen, a Danish Nazi, parachuted into Great Britain, but British authorities promptly arrested him. After being held for a time, Hansen convinced B1A., the MI 5 section that controlled and operated double agents, that he was willing to cooperate. After being given the code name Tate and released, under supervision, in October 1940, Tate established wireless contact with his controllers in Hamburg and quickly became a main supplier of air raid damage information to the Germans. He also disclosed information about the movement of troops in southeast England. Tate communicated with Hamburg in ‘‘extremely low-grade cipher,’’ which indicated, according to Roger Hesketh of the LCS, the low level of importance given to him by Abwehr and which enabled the British Monitoring Services to keep track of his communications and report on them to MI 5. Because of the possibility that he might have been compromised in 1943 by a repatriated German prisoner of war, the Double-Cross Committee chose to limit Tate’s activities to daily weather reports and a small role in Operation Starkey. While the Committee debated Tate’s future, his German controllers sent him a highergrade code for subsequent communications. Consequently, the Double-Cross Committee and the LCS chose to include Tate in the Fortitude deception.71 Another minor agent chosen by the Double Cross Committee and the LCS, primarily because of her possession of a transmitter for communication with her Abwehr controller, was Lily Sergeyev, whose code name was Treasure. Treasure was a Frenchwoman of Russian origin, who had lived in Paris for most of her life. There she established herself as an artist and a journalist. The British secret service first began to notice Sergeyev in 1937 because of the activities of her uncle, General George de Miller, who provided leadership in Paris for exiled Czarist Russians. Sergeyev passed on her first opportunity to work for Abwehr when she was asked to supply information about the Spanish Civil War. When the Germans invaded Poland, she was in Lebanon, but Sergeyev decided to go to Paris and approach MI 6 about working against the Germans. Before she could contact an MI 6 operative, however, Paris fell to the Germans. Deciding that she needed help in traveling to England, Sergeyev approached an Abwehr agent and suggested that she spy on the English. Through her contact, Emil Kliemann, she convinced Abwehr in June 1943 to provide her with money and papers to facilitate her passage to England, by way of Spain. She also received secret writing materials and the name of a contact in Lisbon. In addition, Kliemann promised to supply her with a W/T set in England. Before her departure, Kliemann gave Sergeyev a diamond ring and pin and told her that he would send ‘‘a W/T set disguised as a gramophone to England.’’ Arriving in August 1943, Sergeyev contacted British authorities, convinced them of her willingness to work as a double agent, and began to operate under the code name Treasure in Bristol, England. Treasure reported her enlistment in the army service of British women and her establishment of a relationship with a staff officer in the fictitious American Fourteenth Army. Because she had not received the W/T set, Treasure returned to Lisbon in March 1944. She told her contact that she was in Lisbon as part of her job with the Ministry of Information. While in Lisbon,

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she met with Kliemann who provided her with a ‘‘wireless transmitter disguised as a receiving set.’’ He also provided money to cover some of her expenses. When she realized that Kliemann was offering her £1,500 in £1 notes, Treasure claimed that she would have difficulty returning to England with ‘‘such a large parcel of notes.’’ Before she returned to England, ‘‘Kliemann gave Treasure a diamond bracelet set in platinum for which he paid 39,000 escudos. He also gave her £300 in £10 notes and 20,000 escudos.’’ Thus, once she had established herself to Abwehr’s satisfaction, Treasure was in position to participate in Fortitude South.72 Several other agents, code named Gelatine, Sniper, Hamlet, Mullet, Puppet, Cobweb, Beetle, Bronx, Mutt, and Jeff were also available for the Fortitude deceptions. Because none of them had access to radio transmitters, which meant slow communication with Abwehr by mail, the LCS and the Double-Cross Committee slated them for small roles. None of these agents would be responsible for supplying crucial information to the enemy. Discussion of the agent Brutus, who participated mainly in Fortitude North, will follow in Chapter Three.73 ******************* One of the first spies to become employed as a double agent for the Double-Cross Committee was a Yugoslav businessman and playboy, Dusko Popov, who had proAllied sympathies. The Abwehr approached Popov about spying against the British in August 1940. After agreeing to become an agent, Popov contacted an MI 6 operative at the British Embassy in Belgrade, told him of the Abwehr request, and offered to work for the British. The Abwehr sent Popov to England on a business trip in December 1940. Upon his arrival in London, he met with Major T.A. Robertson,74 an MI 5 official, who put the Yugoslav through an extensive series of interrogations. MI 5 assigned the case officer, Bill Matthews, to work with Popov, who assumed the code name Tricycle. As part of his cover, Tricycle informed the Germans of his new position, assistant to the Yugoslav military attache´, and established himself as a reliable agent by supplying information about the strength of the post-Dunkirk British army. Tricycle maintained constant contact with his German controllers and frequently received requests for information in return. Few agents had the amount of direct contact with the Germans that Tricycle did. Popov made routine trips to Portugal, which made meetings with Abwehr agents easier. While in England, Popov established a network of agents, but enemy occupation of Yugoslavia caused the Germans to question his loyalty. The Abwehr eliminated Tricycle’s business in London and sent the agent to the United States in June 1941 with orders to organize a spy network there similar to the one in England, but on a larger scale.75 As a cover for his work in America, Popov became a Yugoslav Ministry of Information delegate. The Abwehr ordered the agent to gather information about Pearl Harbor for the Japanese. Popov informed the Double-Cross Committee, who contacted the FBI. Arriving in the United States on August 24, 1941, Popov discovered that J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI director, refused to cooperate. Hoover’s refusal to let Tricycle operate in the United States forced him by October 1942 to go to Lisbon,

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where he consulted with Abwehr controllers. He did not, however, return emptyhanded. Tricycle informed von Karsthoff, an Abwehr operative, about aircraft sent to England by the United States and about the British military buildup in Malta. By providing the Germans with that information, Popov helped to carry out Allied deception for the invasion of North Africa. During his meeting with von Karsthoff, the agent blamed insufficient funds for his lack of success in the United States. The Abwehr decided to send Tricycle back to England. After returning to England, Tricycle expanded his network and became one of the Abwehr’s most important agents. Popov recruited a number of subagents, including a British army officer (Dickie Metcalfe, code named Balloon), an Austrian woman who worked for MI 5 (Friedl Gaertner, code named Gelatine), and a Yugoslav who was close to King Peter (Eugen Sostaric, code named Meteor). He also convinced an Abwehr official, Johann Jebsen, to switch sides. Through Jebsen, code named Artist, Popov began to work with another agent, Freak, whom Abwehr had trained to operate radio wireless. Freak subsequently began to operate Tricycle’s wireless for him. Tricycle continued to communicate with Abwehr on behalf of the Double-Cross Committee. A trusted agent, Tricycle was ready by February 1944 to participate in the Fortitude deception.76 ******************* In addition to Tricycle, the LCS and the Double-Cross Committee chose Captain Roman Garby-Czerniawski, a Polish officer, to participate in Fortitude. Garby-Czerniawski had fled to France in 1939 and organized a network of spies for Polish intelligence. He approached an MI 6 representative and worked successfully for the British until November 1941, when betrayal led to his arrest by the Germans. After he was tortured in Fresnes Prison, the Germans believed that they had convinced Garby-Czerniawski to become a spy; however, the Polish officer had no real intention of working for the Germans. In July 1942 the Polish officer agreed to relocate to England as an agent for the Germans. After providing him with the equipment needed to build a wireless set, his German captors ‘‘allowed’’ Garby-Czerniawski, whom they renamed Armand, to escape on July 14, 1942. When he arrived in England several months later, Armand turned himself in to British intelligence authorities and offered to become a double agent. The DoubleCross Committee initially hesitated to accept the Pole’s offer, because he had been captured while working for MI 6. The Committee feared that the enemy would soon conclude that he had returned to work for them. The Committee finally agreed to use Armand and changed his code name to Brutus. Despite his apparent acceptance by Abwehr, the Committee was reluctant to use Brutus in deception operations. Brutus began to work at Polish Headquarters as a liaison officer with the Royal Air Force. In December 1943 Brutus informed the Germans that he had recruited a wireless operator, Chopin, who had retired from the Polish Air Force. Because of his position as a liaison officer, the Committee realized that Brutus was in a position to discover

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information about the upcoming invasion. Consequently, the LCS and the Double Cross Committee decided to include Brutus in the Fortitude deception.77 ******************* Arguably the most important double agent chosen by the LCS and the DoubleCross Committee to work on Fortitude was Juan Pujol Garcia (see Figure 2.5), who was known as Garbo.78 Born in Barcelona, Spain, Pujol, a Liberal who tried to stay out of the conflict that erupted in 1936, wound up serving both sides at different times before the Spanish Civil War ended. Taught at an early age to fight tyranny, the Spaniard decided to work against Adolf Hitler when war broke out in Europe. In January 1941 Pujol requested an interview with the British attache´ in Madrid. Because he refused to write down the purpose of his visit, Pujol failed to meet the British diplomat. Pujol admitted that he was unsure at that point how he could be of service to the British.79 Deciding that the British would take him more seriously if the Germans employed him as a spy, the Spaniard prepared to offer his services to the Nazis. He succeeded in establishing contact with an Abwehr agent named Federico, whose real name was Gustave Knittel, and offered to travel to

Figure 2.5 Juan Pujol Garcia, code-named Garbo, was one of the most important double agents to participate in Operation Fortitude. Courtesy of the National Archives (PRO), Kew, England.

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Britain as a newspaper or magazine employee. Under the guise of a foreign correspondent, he could obtain crucial information for the Germans. When he offered to travel to England as a foreign correspondent, Pujol obviously did not consider one of the most important obstacles that he faced: He did not speak English. Federico promised Pujol an answer when the Spaniard returned from a trip to Barcelona, which he did not actually take. From the beginning, Pujol succeeded in fooling his Abwehr contact. Time passed and Pujol did not hear from the German. Rather than press Federico for an answer, he decided to move to Lisbon, where his prospects might be better. Although he believed that an exit visa to Britain would convince Federico that he could obtain information for the Abwehr, Pujol initially failed to get one through the proper embassy channels in Lisbon. Taking advantage of an acquaintance, Pujol succeeded in forging a diplomatic visa. Posing as a chancery official, the Spaniard had two hundred copies of the form printed, although he only kept a dozen of them. Prior to his return to Madrid, however, Pujol received an official visa from the Spanish consulate.80 Arriving back in Madrid, Pujol arranged to meet Federico. During the meeting, he mixed truth and fiction and admitted that he had been in Lisbon obtaining a resident’s visa to prove that he could easily travel between Spain and Portugal. With the Spaniard’s position unresolved, the two men met several more times. Pujol realized, however, that it would be difficult to secure a job as a foreign correspondent; therefore, he had to devise another reason for traveling to Britain. During one meeting, he showed Federico the falsified diplomatic visa that he had acquired in Lisbon. The Abwehr agent accepted the document, which listed Pujol’s ‘‘assignment to travel to London on a special mission for the commercial administrative department,’’ as authentic. The diplomatic visa convinced Federico and his superiors to accept Pujol as an agent, and they supplied him with a code name (Arabel), invisible ink, secret codes, and $3,000 for his journey to England. Concluding that it was not yet safe to contact the British again, Pujol went to Portugal in July 1941.81 While he was in Portugal, Pujol pretended to be in England. He purchased ‘‘a Baedeker tourist guide to England, Bradshaw’s railway timetable and a large map of Great Britain.’’ After carefully reviewing the documents, Arabel communicated with Federico, who believed that the agent was in England, for the first time in October 1941. In addition to the information about where the Germans could collect his messages, the agent informed his superiors that he had recruited a KLM pilot to collect his letters in England and mail them in Portugal. The KLM pilot did not exist; Pujol posted his own communications. Over the next several months, Pujol invented three subagents who would supply him with information. Arabel’s messages, especially one about a convoy that had sailed from Liverpool, caused the British, who feared that a German spy was operating in England, much concern. Abwehr requests for more information about locations and movements of troops made Pujol think that the Germans were suspicious of him. In addition, he was concerned about his lack of knowledge of England. Because he had not established direct contact with

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the British, Pujol decided, early in February 1942, to request an interview with the U.S. military or naval attache´ in Lisbon. If this attempt failed, he had resolved to abandon his attempt to become a double agent. Pujol found the Americans more receptive to his request, and he related his tale to Lieutenant Demorest in the naval attache´’s office. After Pujol had proven his story, Demorest contacted the British. Demorest and Captain Arthur Benson, his British counterpart, arranged a meeting between Pujol and an MI 6 officer, Gene Risso-Gill. Three days later, the Spaniard received word that Risso-Gill and his superiors were sending him to London. Pujol, who traveled by way of Gibraltar, arrived in London in April 1942, where he met with Mr. Grey (Cyril Mills, an MI 5 case worker), Toma´s Harris, who became the agent’s primary case officer, and Desmond Bristow from SIS (Security Intelligence Service), who had been following Arabel’s messages. Pujol underwent debriefing from April 26 to May 11, 1942. Arabel’s interrogators quickly learned that he had brought an imaginary, but established, ‘‘ready-made espionage network’’ with him and that the Germans had not questioned the existence of the spy’s subagents.82 The subagents included two civilian couriers who carried Arabel’s communications between Portugal and England and ‘‘Agents ONE, TWO and THREE who were scattered around the country and were apparently able to report their own independent observations.’’ Harris and Pujol began to work closely together organizing the agent’s nonexistent network of spies, which Harris catalogued to prevent mistakes and continued to develop for future communications with Abwehr. Around this time, Mr. Grey suggested giving Pujol a new code name, and the two MI 5 case officers agreed on Garbo, a reflection of their esteem for the Spaniard and a cover that would hopefully protect him should his position be compromised. In the event the Germans discovered the existence of the double agent, the case officers hoped that Abwehr would conclude that Garbo was a woman. By the time the Chiefs of Staff approved the Fortitude deception, Garbo’s network included twenty-four invented subagents, which persuaded the LCS to include the Spaniard in the cover plan.83 ******************* In the midst of planning the deception, Bevan had to address an important issue. Because Fortitude North included participation by the Soviets, the LCS had to convince them to cooperate. Consequently, on January 30 Bevan and Colonel William H. Baumer of the U.S. Joint Security Control traveled to Moscow. Their mission was not an easy one. In fact, Baumer traveled to Moscow despite the fact that he had been unable to acquire the appropriate visa. After their arrival, Bevan and Baumer were unsuccessful in arranging a meeting with the proper officials for a week. Following a direct appeal to Stalin and Molotov, a series of congenial meetings occurred between February 7 and 14, and the men discussed the Bodyguard deception. Although a final meeting to confirm the plan was scheduled for February 16, the Soviets canceled it without an explanation. Finally, on February 24, the Soviets requested additional information. Bevan and Baumer did not receive further communication until midnight March 5, at which time they were given an hour’s notice of another meeting. At that time, without further discussion, the Soviets accepted the

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plan in its entirety. With the acceptance of the Soviets, Bevan and Baumer left Moscow on March 6.84 Upon his return to London, Bevan could finally prepare to put the plan in motion. The LCS and SHAEF included an air plan, naval diversionary operations, and a naval cover and deception plan to supplement Operation Fortitude, all of which will be discussed in the next few chapters. After February 23, 1944, with the acceptance of the Fortitude plan, SHAEF and the LCS had to concentrate on finalizing and implementing the scheme. Their intention was to implement Fortitude North to convince the Germans to believe that the Allies would launch two attacks against Norway, near Narvik and Stavanger, in May 1944. In addition, Allied planners hoped the enemy would conclude, based on the implementation of Fortitude South, that the main Allied invasion target was the Pas de Calais, that the assault on Normandy was a feint, and that the primary operation would come in July 1944.85 In order to discuss whether or not the Fortitude deception fulfilled its designers’ plans, further examination of both Fortitude North and Fortitude South is necessary.

3

Threatening Norway

Information about the concentration and preparation for invasion of the Scottish group of forces in the region of Edinburgh continue. Their strength is still to be regarded as five to seven divisions. There is no concrete evidence as to their target. It therefore remains undetermined whether reports about their proposed employment against Norway or Denmark are correct. The essential fact remains that in either case theirs could only be diversionary undertaking.1

As indicated in Chapter Two, the London Controlling Section (LCS) designed and implemented a second part of Operation Fortitude—Fortitude North. The deception planners devised Fortitude North with the object of convincing the Germans of three things: first, that the cross-channel invasion had been delayed; second, that the air campaign against Germany had precedence over an amphibious assault; and third, that Allied forces located in Scotland and Northern Ireland would invade Norway in May 1944.2 Although less is written about it than about Fortitude South, the less developed Fortitude North was still an important part of the Normandy deception scheme. Before examining the plan, however, it is necessary to examine why Norway was so important to both the Germans and the Allies. ******************* Desiring to deny the British entry into Norwegian territorial waters and expressing concern about access to Swedish iron ore supplies should British troops occupy Norway, Hitler made plans for the occupation of the Scandinavian country in the spring of 1940. Accepting the recommendation of the future commander of German forces in Norway, General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, the Fu¨hrer decided to ensure access into Norway by adding the occupation of Denmark to his plan. The German invasion of Denmark and Norway began on April 9, 1940. Although Denmark surrendered immediately, the Norwegians chose to fight. Approximately 12,000 British and French troops rushed to Norway’s aid, but they failed to force a German

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withdrawal. German forces made short work of their Norwegian campaign. On May 3 Hitler’s soldiers compelled Allied troops fighting around Trondheim to evacuate the country. Both Britain and France withdrew their troops from Narvik a week later after the Allied front in France failed to hold.3 German control of Norway, which had long-term consequences, demanded the presence of a large number of troops. According to Colonel-General Alfred Jodl, the occupation of Norway put the German fleet at risk, and as a result, they ‘‘had to defend a coastline of over 3,000 kilometers, and that meant that nearly 300,000 men were lying idle there. The decision, therefore, depended on really reliable information that Norway was threatened by actual danger.’’4 Why, therefore, was Norway so important to Germany? Finland’s supplies of nickel were essential to the German war effort. After gaining control of the Petsamo mines in Finland, Germany transported the nickel through Norway to its processing facilities. In addition, Germany received seventy-three percent of its iron ore from Sweden. Much of the ore passed through the ports of Narvik and Kirkenes en route to Germany. Initially, inland transportation of nickel, other essential ores, and raw materials from Narvik to Stavanger, or other southern cities, proved difficult. Because no railway lines connected Narvik in the north with southern cities, such as Trondheim, Bergen, or Oslo, Hitler instituted plans for the construction of the Sorland and Norland railways. The Fu¨hrer devoted much money and resources to several building projects in Norway, especially for the construction of railroads.5 Transportation of raw materials to Germany did not provide the only justification for occupation of Norway. According to Hitler, ‘‘Without the coast of Norway at our disposal, we should not have been able to launch our attacks against the ports of the Midlands and Northern Britain, and operations in the Arctic waters would also have been impracticable.’’ 6 General von Falkenhorst suggested another reason why Hitler was determined to hold onto Norway, even if it meant tying up troops needed on the Russian or Western fronts or, later, for the defense of the German homeland. The Fu¨ hrer denied von Falkenhorst’s requests to utilize some of his idle troops elsewhere. Hitler feared the loss of Norway, to which he would not consent, if he withdrew any forces. According to von Falkenhorst, ‘‘It was his own campaign, and he had figured it out for himself. Giving up Norway would have seemed to him an acknowledgement before the whole world that on April 19, 1940, he had made a mistake.’’7 ******************* Interest in Norway extended beyond the borders of Germany. Shortly after the war in Europe erupted, two factors persuaded the British government to focus on the coast of Norway. First, during the First World War the British had laid a minefield across the North Sea. In order to protect Great Britain, government officials made plans to construct another similar line across the North Sea. Doing so would, however, infringe upon Norwegian territorial waters. Second, Germany transported large quantities of iron ore from Sweden through these same waters. One way to limit Germany’s ability to fight would be to deny Germany access to Norway’s territorial waters.8

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France and Great Britain demonstrated an early concern for Norwegian independence by committing troops to the conflict in April 1940; however, they failed in their attempt to stop the German conquest of Norway. Being forced to withdraw from the country made the British determined to regain control of it from the Germans. From May 1940 until the end of the war, Britain instituted a series of campaigns against German forces in Norway. These campaigns, some of which only posed deceptive threats, culminated in Operation Fortitude North in the spring of 1944. Like Germany, Britain had a vested interest in the Petsamo nickel mines. Britain had nickel-mining concessions that predated the war. The status of the Finnish city, the mines, and Norway determined Britain’s access to the nickel.9 Consequently, Britain launched a series of operations designed to loosen the German hold on Scandinavia. Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who approved the commando raids and deceptive threats to Norway, often expressed a desire to launch an operation against German forces in Norway in order ‘‘‘to roll the map of Hitler’s Europe down from the top.’’’10 The prime minister believed that the Scandinavian Peninsula was strategically important.11 Britain’s first attempt to halt Nazi aggression in Scandinavia ended in failure; however, the British nation remained committed to fighting Germany, even if it had to do so on its own, which proved to be the case after June 1940. Militarily unprepared to return to France or fight against the main German army, Britain searched for other areas in which to pursue the conflict. Churchill and British leaders examined the possibilities of engaging enemy forces in the Balkans, North Africa, and Italy. However, closer to home was Norway. Churchill’s attention frequently turned to Scandinavia. A series of British operations against Norway beginning in 1941 resulted in an increase in the number of German troops in Norway from 150,000 to 250,000 by June 1942. These raids reinforced Hitler’s belief in the strategic importance of Scandinavia in general and of Norway in particular. On March 4, 1941, the British launched a raid against the Lofoten Islands, which persuaded Hitler to consider the possibility of a British invasion of Norway. In December 1941 the British launched Operation Archery, a commando raid against Vaagso. They succeeded in eliminating a garrison controlled by German troops and in destroying over 15,000 tons of shipping and key facilities that processed fish oil. Operation Archery caused Hitler to consider the danger of Allied threats to Norway and the northwest European coast and influenced his decision to increase the fortification of northwest Europe.12 At the same time as Archery, the British instituted a minor deceptive threat against Norway, Plan Omnibus. Double agent reports stressed a British plot to use Norwegian fishermen as pilots for the assault.13 The British reinforced the threat with Operation Hardboiled early in 1942. Hardboiled posed a ‘‘notional’’ menace to Stavanger, a city in southern Norway. The troops chosen to participate in the deception underwent training that they ultimately used in Madagascar in May 1942. Hardboiled gave the LCS experience that would prove useful as the war progressed. Utilizing misinformation passed by double agents, the British succeeded in presenting a threat that the German military took seriously. The Germans

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reinforced Norway, brought their troops in the Scandinavian country to ‘‘maximum degree of readiness’’ in May, and hastened their work on coastal fortifications in the area. In addition, the Germans transferred major assets of the German Navy, including the Tirpitz to Norway. Throughout this period, British commando raids continued, and targets included the cities of Svolvaer, Glomfjord, and Maloy.14 By mid-1942, Churchill authorized the development of an ambitious invasion plan designed to drive German forces from northern Norway and from Finnmark, the northern region of Scandinavia where Finland and Norway meet, and especially from the Scandinavian cities of Petsamo, Kirkenes, Banak, and, possibly, Narvik. Although work was done on Operation Jupiter, as the plan was called, the Combined Chiefs of Staff gave it little support. Initially, Churchill proposed that Jupiter be launched in conjunction with the North African campaign, but the Allies implemented Solo I instead. The prime minister returned to Operation Jupiter time and again. He repeatedly pushed for Jupiter, especially in the event that an invasion of the French-Belgian coast became impossible. Churchill, who had proposed the plan to President Franklin D. Roosevelt several times, did so again on July 27, 1943, and although he advocated Jupiter as late as January 1944, the prime minister never obtained the support from Roosevelt or the Combined Chiefs of Staff that was necessary to implement the operation.15 The Allies implemented plan Solo I in conjunction with Operation Torch, the campaign against North Africa. Rather than a plan for a real invasion of Norway, like Jupiter, Solo I was a deceptive one. Deception planners designed Solo I, along with its subsidiary plan, Solo II, as a protective operation to help mask the invasion of North Africa. The LCS used troops and shipping that were assigned to Torch and located in Scotland to create the illusion of a force poised to attack the TrondheimNarvik area. The deception planners used double agents, including Garbo and Tate who later played a role in both Fortitude North and South, to pass false information to Abwehr, the German Intelligence Service. To facilitate the fictional threat to Norway, some of the troops involved in the deception received mountain clothing. By early October, the Germans in Norway began preparing for an ‘‘imminent’’ invasion that did not come, at least not in Scandinavia.16 Because the Allies credited their deception planning with facilitating the invasion of North Africa, they decided to create another deception to mask the real invasion of northwest Europe. The Chiefs of Staff Committee, Offices of the War Cabinet, assigned the task of developing a plan to Lieutenant General Frederick Morgan, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate). In his report submitted on June 3, 1943, Morgan restated his instructions to create operations for ‘‘an elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending over the whole summer with a view to pinning the enemy in the WEST and keeping alive the expectation of large-scale cross-Channel operations in 1943. This would include at least one amphibious feint with the object of bringing on an air battle employing the Metropolitan Royal Air Force and the US 8th Air Force.’’17 Morgan devised a plan called Operation Cockade that consisted of three parts—Starkey, a fake amphibious assault on the Pas de Calais area; Wadham, deceptive preparations for a large-scale attack on Brittany; and

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Tindall, ‘‘a purely deceptive operation designed to pin GERMAN forces in NORWAY by giving the impression of preparations for a major BRITISH operation to take place about mid-September for the capture of the port and airfields of STAVANGER.’’18 Only Tindall is pertinent to the discussion of Fortitude North. Morgan designed Tindall to create a fictitious threat to southern Norway in the Stavanger area. The threat consisted of three phases and extended through the summer and fall of 1943. During the first phase, which ended in early September, British I Corps implemented a threat to Stavanger. The second phase began on August 25 and included an apparent postponement of Tindall. On September 10 phase three began with the reactivation of Tindall. This last part of the deception set the target date for the attack on Stavanger for November 5–6. After capturing Stavanger, the I Corps would move toward Oslo attacking the Lister Peninsula and Kristiansand along the way. Morgan used several methods of deception to implement Tindall. Double agents sent reports about the 49th, 52nd, and three other divisions, including one airborne division, which were training for mountain warfare in Scotland and were part of the fictitious British Fourth Army. Tricycle, a double agent who would participate in other deceptions, and others provided information about the movement of shipping and the deployment of troops. Colonel John Turner’s department was in charge of decoy lighting and deception and received the job of displaying real and dummy gliders and antiaircraft weapons on airfields. In addition to establishing displays on airfields and sending out radio traffic, the 52nd Division and a Norwegian brigade carried out a training exercise—Goliath—in October 1943. During the same month aircraft from the HMS Formidable and the USS Ranger attacked Bodo and Narvik. British agents infiltrated Norway, and Political Warfare Executive (PWE) messages to the resistance movement increased.19 Coordinated by F.O.I.C. Rosyth, General Officer Commanding in Chief Scottish Command, and No. 18 Group, RAF, and implemented by Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth, Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, and the Air Ministry, Tindall lasted from June to November 1943. Despite Allied efforts, Tindall, like the other parts of Cockade, did not succeed in achieving its objectives. German forces in Norway did not increase in number nor did they go on alert. In fact, they took little notice of Allied activities. The lack of German air reconnaissance during Tindall led General Andrew Thorne, General Officer Commanding in Chief, Scottish Command, to conclude that the operation had not succeeded. ******************* Although Tindall failed, Norway continued to occupy Hitler’s attention and to play a role in Allied deception operations.20 Tindall did, however, accomplish one important thing. It provided a rehearsal for Fortitude North and was ‘‘the first really inter-service cover plan.’’21 It also marked the first time in which the fictitious British Fourth Army made an appearance. The LCS would use the British Fourth Army again during Operation Fortitude North. In many respects, Fortitude North extended the threat to Scandinavia begun by Tindall, but it also expanded the scope of the failed plan to include northern, as well as southern, Norway.22

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D-DAY DECEPTION

As indicated earlier, the LCS devised Fortitude North with the object of convincing the Germans of three things: that the cross-channel invasion had been delayed; that the air campaign against Germany had precedence over an amphibious assault; and that Allied forces located in Scotland and Northern Ireland would invade Norway in May 1944. The purpose was to keep the twenty-seven German divisions stationed in Denmark, Finland, and Norway by 1944 in Scandinavia during and after the Normandy invasion. The Norway deception had a second purpose. Double agents would put across part of the plan’s ‘‘story.’’ Consequently, the LCS hoped the German intelligence officers would come to rely upon their agents who were operating in Britain, Portugal, Spain, and other countries to provide information about the buildup and location of Allied invasion forces in Britain.23 In devising the deception plan, however, the LCS had to consider certain problems. In a memorandum dated February 6, 1944, Colonel John Bevan, the LCS Controlling Officer, raised a key concern. According to Bevan, ‘‘It must be remembered that the Scandinavian threat has been three times mounted before, and though the strategic threat to Norway must always remain in the enemy’s mind, on this occasion it will depend upon his appreciation of our political action in Sweden, combined with his observation of shipping in the north and of the threat from Russia.’’24 The deception planners added a political element to Fortitude North in an attempt to convince the Germans that they should take the scheme seriously, despite the previous unfulfilled invasion threats against Norway. Initially, Fortitude North, considered in terms of Operation Bodyguard, only included an invasion deception aimed at the northern part of Norway. The goal was to open a ‘‘supply route to Sweden,’’ which, if successful, would result in Allied access to Swedish airfields for an assault on Denmark in the summer of 1944. However, acknowledging that the presence of German troops in southern Norway would probably prevent Swedish officials from cooperating with the Allies in this regard, SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force) modified the plan to include an assault on the southern part of Norway as well. SHAEF also recognized that preparations for the Normandy invasion would have a negative impact on the Norway threat. Therefore, SHAEF dictated that the threat to the Stavanger area be developed by D-Day minus 30 and that to the Narvik area by D-Day minus 17.25 In addition, ‘‘the enemy should be led to believe that we intend to allow this offensive to develop for six weeks until about ‘NEPTUNE’ D plus 45, before launching large-scale cross-Channel operations.’’26 A SHAEF document dated February 23, 1944, identified the ‘‘story’’ that SHAEF wanted to convey to the Germans through Fortitude North. Prior to the assault on northwest Europe, the invasion of southern Norway would occur and would include an attack on the ‘‘Stavanger area by one infantry division supported by parachute troops and commandos, followed up by one infantry division.’’27 The entire invasion force for the southern assault would include two corps. One would be a real corps consisting of one assault and one follow-up division. The other would be a fictitious corps made up of wireless traffic that would simulate the existence of three divisions. Skeleton crews using methods to suggest the activities of fully operational units

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would run the three notional divisions. The deception plan called for both corps to be located in Northern Ireland. During the three months following the initial invasion in the Stavanger area, the deception planners scheduled an increase in the size of the force to six divisions, including some mountain-trained troops. Working with amphibious forces, infantry troops would march on Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim to capture the airfields, the control of which would enable the Allies to execute air operations against German-held territories previously out of bomber range. After securing southern Norway, the Allies planned to launch an attack on Denmark.28 Approximately two weeks after the commencement of action against Stavanger, the Allies would launch a campaign against Narvik in northern Norway. It would ‘‘be mounted in conjunction with Russian forces. . .to open road and railway communications with Sweden.’’ Anglo-American naval forces would provide support for the invasion.29 One corps, consisting of one assault and one follow-up division to mount the assault, would include one full-strength division and one division run by a skeleton crew using wireless traffic. The assault division would set up camp near Dundee, Scotland, the follow-up division in Iceland. Two divisions would land near Narvik. After securing the area, they would drive inland along the railroad to Gallivare, Sweden, in the east. A Soviet force coming from Petsamo would meet the Allied force in Gallivare.30 The LCS basically devised a wireless deception plan to implement the story created by SHAEF. The Order of Battle identified the Allied forces required to achieve the deception under the auspices of the British Fourth Army. The Fourth Army, located near Edinburgh, first made its appearance in Scotland during Operation Tindall. Because the LCS logically dictated that the Fortitude North deception be conducted from Scotland, the scheme’s implementation fell under the control of General Sir Andrew Thorne, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Scottish Command. Thorne assigned the task of executing the plan to Colonel Roderick Macleod.31 Macleod, who later wrote an account of Fortitude North, claimed that he received his orders from Brigadier Richard Barker, the Signal-Officer-in-Chief, who directed him to proceed to Scotland to ‘‘represent an Army about to invade Norway with the object of pinning down the 9 German divisions known to be there and prevent them from interfering with the landings.’’32 According to Sir Peter Thorne, the son of General Sir Andrew Thorne, his father, as head of Scottish Command and Commander of the Fourth Army, was ultimately responsible for Fortitude North, but he let Colonel Macleod implement the deception with the general concept of the operation. 33 No matter who gave the orders, the fact remains that Macleod received the responsibility of directing the fictitious threat against Norway. In addition to the Order of Battle for Fortitude North, SHAEF developed a ‘‘Requirement for Military Wireless Activity’’ to indicate the designation of headquarters Fourth Army, along with specific corps and divisions, the area in which each operated, the date of commencement of wireless activity, and the resources available for the operation. The plan noted the scale and character of activity to be implemented. 34 The fictitious British Fourth Army began wireless activity on D minus 70. It consisted of three corps, only one of which, the U.S. XV Corps,

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was real. Commanded by Major General Wade H. Haislip, the U.S. XV Corps, consisting of three U.S. divisions, the 2nd, the 5th, and the 8th, established its headquarters in Northern Ireland. Slated to play a part in the southern invasion force, the XV Corps carried out the role of the ‘‘buildup corps’’ and helped create the illusion of an assault force preparing, along with other forces, to sail from Belfast, Mersayside, Rosyth, and Invergordon to attack Norway. At one point to reinforce the deception, General Sir Andrew Thorne traveled to Northern Ireland to inspect the XV Corps. Despite its participation in the deception, the XV Corps was actually in training for participation in the Normandy invasion. The fictitious British II Corps made up the southern assault force and contained the real British 55th Infantry Division, the notional British 58th Infantry Division, and the real 113th Infantry Brigade. The II Corps had existed prior to the implementation of Fortitude North. After the British Chiefs decided to disband the corps, the LCS chose to keep it alive notionally for participation in the assault on Stavanger. The British II Corps set up its headquarters near Stirling, Scotland, and commenced wireless activity on D minus 65. The northern invasion force, the British VII Corps, included the real British 52nd Lowland Division located near Dundee and a followup division, the fake U.S. 55th Infantry Division, situated in Iceland. The British 9th Armoured Division and the II Corps provided headquarters for VII Corps, which began transmitting wireless messages on D minus 60. While staff officers and division signals from the British 55th Infantry Division supplied headquarters for the U.S. 55th Infantry Division, one divisional section of the 5th Wireless Group did the same for the 58th Infantry Division and began activity on D minus 56.35 The Fourth Army Order of Battle included fictitious subordinate units in addition to the British II and VII Corps and the U.S. XV Corps. These fake units provided necessary services for the Fourth Army. For example, the 87th Field Cash Office handled pay for the phantom soldiers. Incoming and outgoing troop mail passed through the VII Corps Postal Unit. In preparation for the large number of ‘‘casualties’’ that would result from the Norwegian campaign, the 55th Field Dressing Station arrived on the scene. Antiaircraft, film and photographic, and Royal Engineers units also received postings to the Fourth Army. The deception included more than wireless and radio transmissions. To perpetuate the ruse and suggest the actual presence of nonexistent soldiers, the implementers leaked accounts of troop football matches and training exercises to local papers and radio commentators.36 Colonel Macleod collected a staff, including a second in command, Lieutenant Colonel S.B. Horne of the 3rd Carabiniers, to help him implement the deception. He assigned two majors to take on the corps commanders’ tasks. Major Rumsey and six junior officers set out to simulate British II Corps; Major Bowles with six officers did the same for British VII Corps. Placed in charge of British Fourth Army headquarters, Major Edwards worked closely with Major Wheeler, who represented the Adjutant General and Quartermaster General’s department, Captain Coxhill, who was in charge of signals, and Captain Skinner, the cipher officer. Captain Johnson joined the cipher staff shortly after Fortitude North began operating. Not all of the traffic generated by Johnson was in code. ‘‘Although his main task was to

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simulate radio traffic which by its intensity would suggest the presence of important and substantial forces to the Germans, Johnson interlarded this with unciphered messages and radio telephony which would fascinate the Germans.. . .One calculated indiscretion pointing at Norway was a hurry-up order for skis.’’37 Fortitude North included a number of facets and participation by different branches of the Allied armed forces; therefore, Scottish Command controlled only part of the deception: implementation by land forces. SHAEF oversaw the double agents, special means, and naval and air measures. The LCS created activities for the navy and air force to facilitate the deception. The Royal Navy, through wireless deception, created two forces that were responsible for transporting the invasion forces to Norway. Slated to participate in the northern assault, ‘‘V’’ Force trained with the 52nd Lowland Division while ‘‘W’’ Force practiced with the British 58th Infantry Division for the southern assault.38 During April and May 1944, the Royal Navy suggested that ships concentrating in the Firth of Forth and the Clyde were preparing to transport follow up troops to Norway. It also simulated participation in Fabius, a dress rehearsal for Neptune, and Veritas, air reconnaissance of Narvik in late April. The British Home Fleet received orders to create a threat to the Narvik area through periodic air reconnaissance and bombardment of the region during the last week of April and the second week of May. The role of the air force, however, was minor. The Royal Air Force (RAF) displayed fake aircraft on Scottish airfields to supplement existing concentrations of planes. It allowed occasional enemy reconnaissance planes to photograph the displays to reinforce the deception. In addition, fighter squadrons provided protection for ships in the Firth of Forth. The designers and implementers made every attempt to establish realism. Despite its minor role, however, Air Force preparations fell into two categories: ‘‘Real Measures’’ and ‘‘Deceptive Measures.’’ Under ‘‘Real Measures,’’ increased air activity would be made apparent in several ways, including a. an intensification of air visual and photographic reconnaissance of Norwegian airfields. b. raids by heavy bomber aircraft on selected airfield targets in Norway commencing on April 14th. This increased air activity must be consistent with the mounting of the proposed operation and sufficient to indicate our intentions to the enemy. c. Long range Air Sea craft and Air Sea Rescue Squadrons operating in Northern areas.39

Because the Air Sea Rescue Squadrons would be operating along the East coast, it was hoped that their activity would add credibility to the story being passed to the Germans. Other measures undertaken by the Air Force were more deceptive in nature. In conjunction with the increased presence of land forces in Scotland, an increased number of aircraft was warranted. Dummy aircraft would be used to supplement the displays. Appropriate signals would enhance the displays. ‘‘The W/T and V.H.F. deceptive signalling will be carried out by aircrews W/T operators of experience, augmented if necessary, by ground W/T operators. The operators will be changed frequently to simulate extra forces.’’40 The plan stipulated the number of aircraft to be erected at the various sites, as well as the dates on which the signaling should begin.

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Although implementation of Fortitude North required much preparation, Colonel Macleod received little advance notice before the plan was scheduled to begin. The LCS obtained approval for Fortitude in late February 1944. On March 4 Brigadier General Barker gave Macleod his orders, which set March 17 as the date for commencement of wireless activity; however, that date was subsequently changed to March 22. According to Barker, genuine British and American signals formations would take part in the deception by representing the fake divisions, corps, and army. He stressed the importance of precise wireless traffic because of the enemy’s ability at ‘‘interception and radio-location. They’ll have your headquarters pinpointed with a maximum error margin of five miles. And it won’t take them more than a few hours to do so. What is more, they’ll be able to identify the grade of headquarters—whether army, division, corps, or what not—from the nature of the traffic and the sets being used.’’41 Within a short time, Macleod had devised a program for implementing Fortitude North. He assigned code names to protect the groups concerned. Because the wireless plan he was ordered to carry out had been designated Operation Skye, Macleod applied the following names: Skye I to Fourth Army, Skye II to II Corps, Skye VII to VII Corps, and Skye III to U.S. XV Corps. He later affixed code names to the training exercises that his group simulated and issued a story to mask its activities. According to Macleod, ‘‘We have decided that the best cover story for our part of the business is to say that we are carrying out a series of large scale exercises with all services in different parts of SCOTLAND.’’42 Although Fortitude North was implemented mainly through wireless traffic, the plan had other integral parts—physical deception, political deception, and double agents. Before delving deeper into Operation Skye, a discussion of the other facets of the threat to Norway is warranted. As noted earlier, the RAF participated in visual deception by displaying aircraft constructed from wood and canvas on airfields primarily in eastern Scotland. By simulating part of an invasion force, the RAF hoped to convince the Germans not to move Luftwaffe aircraft from Norway.43 Air force personnel from Colonel Turner’s department built two different types of aircraft. They constructed canvas Spitfires at night and wooden Bostons by day in hangers and erected the displays at night when their work would be undetected by enemy reconnaissance flights. Normandy invasion preparations limited the resources available for the displays; therefore, Turner had to choose the sites carefully. He eliminated airfields in western Scotland because activity in the Clyde and other ports, which were preparing for the real invasion, made supplemental exhibits unnecessary. Focusing on the east, Turner chose Peterhead, Fraserburgh, and Fordoun. Peterhead held the largest display of dummy aircraft—two squadrons of twin-engined Bostons and eight Spitfires that were added to a real squadron housed on the field. According to Turner, ‘‘two real Bostons were also located at Peterhead partly to show life and also to send from them air signals specifically prepared beforehand to indicate reconnaissance reports, etc.’’44 Turner’s department assembled one squadron of Bostons at each of the other two sites.

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The biggest problem faced by Turner’s department was how to make the displays realistic. Placing dummy aircraft on ‘‘already occupied airfields’’ helped solve the problem. ‘‘The usual station transport and personnel . . .provided the ‘life,’ which dummy aircraft on dummy airfields lack.’’ In order to add ‘life’ to the dummy displays, Turner’s men added fake petrol tankers, vans, tins, and litter ‘‘to simulate the usual odds and ends always to be seen in the neighborhood of aircraft dispersal areas.’’ The department also exhibited realism by integrating the arrival of aircraft and vehicles, as well as reports from reconnaissance aircraft, with wireless traffic.45 A number of rumors spread throughout Britain about an upcoming assault reinforced the threat to Norway. Both General Dwight Eisenhower and King Haakon VII, the exiled Norwegian ruler, made speeches about the impending action. The king admonished the Norwegian resistance movement not to act too soon, but to wait for the Allied assault. In addition to his speech, King Haakon VII and the Crown Prince visited a Norwegian brigade attached to the 52nd Infantry Division. General Sir Andrew Thorne also contributed to the visual deception by traveling to Northern Ireland, where he inspected the U.S. XV Corps on April 12-14. Activities in Norway by the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and commandos increased. The RAF perpetuated the scheme by leaking information about training on the west coast of Scotland by air sea rescue craft and squadrons for operations in Scandinavia. It also increased photo reconnaissance of airfields, ports, and the coastal defenses of Norway. Using wireless, high frequency signaling, and call signs manipulation, the ‘‘RAF conjured up and maintained four squadrons of nonexistent A-20 Havoc light bombers on Scottish airfields.’’46 In the spring of 1944, the Royal Navy embarked on operations that bolstered the Norwegian threat. In April, aircraft from the Home Fleet attacked the Tirpitz. During the same month, the Royal Navy, using carrier aircraft, bombed shipping at Bodo and sent reconnaissance flights over the harbor at Narvik. The navy also helped simulate the training of assault forces preparing for an amphibious landing by providing the wireless traffic that would normally accompany a training exercise. ‘‘Wireless traffic between aircraft and the Home Fleet’s escort carriers’’ furnished ‘‘notional air support’’ for the troops participating in the exercise. American and British vessels enacted ‘‘mock sweeps in Norwegian waters.’’ By May the Soviet Union provided support for the deceptive threat. The U.S.S.R. demonstrated an impending assault on Petsamo ‘‘by a concentration of troops and ships in the Kola Fjord, by air and sea reconnaissance of the Norwegian coast, and by increased wireless traffic in the whole area.’’ The Soviets also let the Germans learn about an army of specialists being formed by the Soviet High Command by late June. In addition, the Germans discovered that Soviet reserves were being prepared for action in July 1944.47 ******************* Colonel Bevan, the Controlling Officer, voiced concerns that visual and wireless activities would be insufficient to convince the Germans that the Allied threat was real, especially after three previous threats failed to materialize. Soviet participation

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in the deception helped, but not enough. Therefore, the LCS added a political element to the plan—Operation Graffham, which was strictly a British, not an Allied, plan. The LCS believed that if Sweden could be persuaded that a real danger to Norway existed, the government would pass that information along to the Germans. Not only would the Germans be gathering information that indicated an impending action, but they would receive similar indications from a neutral nation. Although perceived by some as the diplomatic twin of Fortitude North, Graffham remained separated from the other scheme by one important factor—the absence of an American role in the diplomatic deception.48 On February 10, 1944, the LCS received approval for a plan to convince the Germans that the British were actively seeking Sweden’s help with the Allied— British and Russian—assault in the Narvik area and access to Swedish military facilities that were essential to the success of the Narvik operation. The British Chiefs of Staff proposed that the following bids be made to Sweden. The British suggested the interception of wireless messages by their own personnel from facilities in Sweden. They requested permission to obtain meteorological reports about Sweden and to install navigation equipment that would be operated by British workers and that would aid assaults on German targets. The Combined Chiefs of Staff rejected the interception of wireless traffic from Sweden. After examining the suggestions made by the British Chiefs of Staff, the LCS devised a seven-part proposal to present to the Swedish government. The proposal included the following requests: 1. permission for aircraft engaged in activities over enemy territory be allowed to make emergency landings in Sweden in order to refuel 2. access by damaged aircraft to Swedish repair facilities for a period not to exceed fortyeight hours 3. authorization for aircraft to carry out photographic reconnaissance flights over Sweden 4. approval for British transportation experts to devise a plan with Swedish authorities for the transportation of goods to Scandinavia after the Germans had withdrawn from the region 5. permission for Colonel H.V. Thornton, former British Air Attache´ to Sweden, to meet with Swedish officials 6. British manipulation of Norwegian securities 7. the establishment of false wireless traffic between the two capitals. British officials also considered adding a proviso to solicit for Norwegian exiles wishing to travel from Britain to Sweden.

Further consideration of the numerous requests led to rejection of the request for aid to Norwegian exiles and permission for aircrafts needing fuel or repairs to land in Sweden. British officials further decided not to present the proposals all at once, but to do so in stages. Operation Graffham began when the British Minister to Sweden, Sir Victor Mallet, traveled to London to discuss his role in the scheme. He returned to Sweden

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for his first meeting with Eric Boheman, the Permanent Undersecretary of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. At the meeting, which occurred on April 4, 1944, Mallet solicited permission for British transportation experts to consult with their counterparts in Sweden and for reconnaissance aircraft to travel through Swedish air space. The Soviet minister in Sweden voiced his support of the British proposals three days later. Although he officially relayed his government’s rejection of the reconnaissance missions, Boheman privately indicated that Swedish planes would take no action against British planes that violated the Scandinavian nation’s security. While his government agreed to allow British transportation experts to meet with Swedish authorities, Boheman, noting that certain matters could not be discussed, claimed the British would not find the venture fruitful. Despite the inauspicious beginning of Graffham, the British did not abandon the plan. After receiving approval for his trip, Colonel Thornton, who assumed the title of Air Vice Marshal for the duration of his visit, traveled to Stockholm, where he remained for at least two weeks, during which time he attended several meetings with Lieutenant General Bengt Nordenskiold, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Swedish Air Force. Because Nordenskiold was pro-Ally, the British hoped that the conferences between the two men would lend credibility to the story that they were trying to promote. Although he indicated a willingness to help the British in the event of a German withdrawal from Scandinavia, Nordenskiold could not provide the British with the sensitive security material that Thornton requested. The meetings between Nordenskiold and Thornton were not as successful as the British had hoped they would be. Although convinced that the Allies intended to invade Norway, Nordenskiold did not mention his conclusions or the nature of his conversations with Thornton to anyone. Failing to accomplish his goals, Thornton returned to England on April 30.49 Other parts of Graffham proved to be virtually ineffective also. The deception planners believed that the purchase of Norwegian bonds would indicate that an invasion was imminent; however, the acquisition of Norwegian securities by the British had little impact. In fact, it received no notice outside of Britain, where attention was minimal. Although low level Swedish officials gossiped about an impending Allied invasion of Norway, high level officials, with the exception of Nordenskiold, hesitated to believe the rumors. They believed an assault against Norway would be a diversion. The real attack would come on the European mainland. Sir Ronald Wingate, however, disagreed and claimed that both the Swedes and the Germans became convinced that a real threat to Norway existed.50 ******************* The deception planners did not, however, expect Graffham to work on its own. Graffham was only one part of the overall plan, which also included employing double agents to convince the enemy that the threat to Norway was real. Since November 1943, the LCS had emphasized Allied strength in the Mediterranean and downplayed the buildup of forces in Britain through information passed by double agents and foreign diplomats. However, the buildup of Normandy invasion troops

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made that story more difficult; Allied officials had to create an incorrect impression of these forces. The LCS realized that they had to pass the false Order of Battle gradually to the Germans; therefore, they decided to have double agents send the enemy pieces of information, not the entire picture. The LCS could only hope that the Germans would put the pieces together and construct the correct Order of Battle puzzle. Several double agents, with code names like Freak, Mutt, and Jeff, provided the puzzle segments. Although Mutt, an agent from Norway, supplied the Germans with false information about the movement of Allied troops in Scotland, he was a minor player. The Germans tracked the maneuvers of U.S. forces through reports gathered by the Abwehr from its agents. For example, German appreciations noted the transfer of the nonexistent U.S. 55th Infantry Division from Iceland to Scotland. Unbeknownst to the Germans, Freak, who reported on Allied troops stationed in Northern Ireland, never actually observed the forces he described. In March the Abwehr learned from Tate, another double agent, of meetings that Sir Victor Mallet, the British Ambassador to Sweden, attended in London. At the meetings, Mallet received information about his role in Graffham. The aide de camp (ADC) to Yugoslavia’s King Peter traveled to Scotland and reported the discovery of British II Corps headquarters near Stirling. He supposedly met an indiscreet officer from the U.S. XV Corps, stationed in Northern Ireland. From the officer, the ADC learned about the three U.S. divisions, 2nd, 5th, and 8th, that made up the corps. He reported that the U.S. XV Corps, which was part of the British Fourth Army, was undergoing intensive training. The ADC also informed his superiors that General Sir Andrew Thorne had inspected the American corps and been ‘‘favorably impressed.’’51 In April Brutus disclosed plans to his Abwehr connection to observe Polish forces in Scotland. He noted the presence of the headquarters of the Fourth Army in Edinburgh, that of II Corps in Stirling, and VII Corps in Dundee and identified their insignias, along with that of the fictitious 58th Division. Brutus’s reports reinforced those that the Abwehr had received from other agents, such as King Peter’s ADC, and helped add credibility to the information being sent to Germany. Brutus added to other intelligence already obtained by the Germans ‘‘by reporting on 16 April that an attack on Norway must be expected early in May and, on 4 May, that a Russian military and naval mission was established in Edinburgh.’’52 The Abwehr learned about the movements of General Sir Andrew Thorne, including his trip to Northern Ireland, and a Soviet liaison mission’s visit to the headquarters of the Fourth Army from observations made by Beetle, Cobweb, Humbert, Mutt, Jeff, Tricycle, and Garbo or those made by their subagents. One of Garbo’s fictitious subagents was a British sailor who had communist sympathies and who was attached to a ship on the Clyde. The sailor provided important information about Allied invasion preparations being made in Scotland.53 ******************* Established before the spring of 1944, many double agents helped pass the Fortitude story to the Germans. Throughout the war, the Abwehr sent numerous

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spies to Britain; however, according to J.C. Masterman, who was a member of the Double-Cross Committee, the British captured all of them. The captured spies suffered various fates; they were executed, imprisoned, or turned into double agents. Masterman claimed that by 1943 no German agents were acting independently in Britain.54 The Germans continued to send agents to spy on the Allies as late as mid-1944. Anxious about the upcoming Allied invasion of France and concerned about a ‘‘diversionary attack’’ against German forces in Norway, the Germans sent a number of agents to Iceland in April 1944 with orders to infiltrate the island nation. Authorities apprehended all of them. However, not all double agents were spies sent by the Abwehr. A couple, such as Garbo and Tricycle, approached the British because they wanted to spy on the Germans for the Allies. As might be expected, the British did not welcome these men with open arms. Each took his own road in convincing the British that they were sincere. As noted earlier, one of the reasons that the Double Cross System worked was that British intelligence succeeded in quickly capturing spies sent by the Germans. In some cases, however, Abwehr agents turned themselves over to British authorities upon their arrival in England. One example was a Polish staff officer, code named Brutus.55 Brutus was originally part of a Polish ring that was spying on the Germans. Unfortunately, the Germans arrested him along with other members of the ring in late 1942. The Germans placed Brutus and the others in prison. Some time later, the Germans offered Brutus the opportunity to end his incarceration. They would permit him to escape if he agreed to become one of their agents in England. Brutus finally agreed. Arriving in England, he immediately contacted British authorities. Not sure whether or not to trust the new double agent, the British watched him carefully and at first gave him only minor information to send to the Abwehr. Eventually, Brutus began to participate in the Normandy deception. He informed the Germans that the Allies had decided to delay the cross-channel invasion. Brutus placed the blame for the postponement on General Bernard Montgomery. According to the agent, the Allies had chosen Montgomery to lead the invasion force, but the British general refused to commence the operation until his forces were one hundred percent prepared. Garbo also informed the Abwehr about Allied preparations for the upcoming invasion, but that they were proceeding at an unhurried pace. As the spring progressed, the LCS realized that they would not be able to hide the troop buildup as D-Day approached; therefore, they had to discontinue sending invasion ‘‘postponement’’ information through the double agents. They feared that continuation would adversely affect the impact of the double agents’ messages to the Abwehr, which began seeking specific information from its spies. Brutus made several trips to Scotland, some at the request of his Abwehr contacts. While in Scotland, he ‘‘discovered’’ the location of several units of the British Fourth Army. After a trip to Scotland for meetings with Polish officers in early April, Brutus reported that the Fourth Army contained two British corps, the II and the VII, and an unidentified American corps. It also included a Norwegian brigade, the 58th and Lowland Divisions, and an unknown brigade in the Orkney Islands. Brutus went on to predict an Allied assault on Norway in May.

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Like Brutus, Garbo received requests for specific information from the Abwehr. Supposedly unable to make the trip himself, Garbo sent subagents to investigate rumors of naval exercises in the Clyde area and shipping concentrations in Methil. He forwarded their reports, along with information about the sighting of the 52nd Lowland Division near Dundee from another subagent. Another of Garbo’s subordinates, after watching the training of naval assault forces near Greenock and land and sea exercises in Loch Fryne on May 10 and 11, suggested that Norway was an Allied target. The agent also noted the presence of arctic equipment, which suggested an operation against northern Norway. A message from Brutus reinforced the notion of a threat to that region. On May 4 he ‘‘signalled his controller that according to the Dutch Command a Soviet military and naval mission had established itself in Edinburgh, probably in order to co-ordinate Russian military naval operations in the far north of Norway with General Thorne’s 4th Army.’’56 The British also fed information to the Abwehr through an Austrian double agent who was operating in Lisbon. The double agent supposedly had a subagent who worked with the Fire Office Committee. He reported that the Ministry of Economic Warfare was seeking information about flour mills, bakeries, cold storage plants, and printing shops in two different regions of Norway—Narvik in the north and Aalesund, Bergen, Oslo, Larvik, Stavanger, Moss, Porgrund, Kristiansand, and Trondheim in the south. Those requests provided the Germans with one of the first indications that the Allies planned two separate attacks on Norway. The subagent later noted inquiries about similar information regarding northern France and Belgium. ******************* Although British intelligence could gauge the impact of the messages from double agents to Abwehr, the LCS was aware of the constant danger that the double agents could be blown. If that happened, the deception would be revealed. Therefore, the double agents made up only one part of the plan. The deception also included physical displays, a diplomatic plan, and wireless traffic. The wireless activity, slated to begin on March 22, 1944, required planning, practice, and precision. The signals groups simulated brigade exercises, artillery practices, amphibious assault rehearsals, and embarkation and disembarkation drills by wireless. The goal was to fill the airwaves with wireless traffic that would accurately simulate a real army’s traffic in various situations.57 According to Colonel Macleod, the wireless traffic consisted of three kinds of messages: ‘‘operational, training, and routine and administrative. All messages . . . would be within the framework of an outline plan for the invasion of Norway.’’ Signals operators used the most secret cipher for operational messages that were only sent by wireless transmission. Macleod devised a three corps invasion plan, and ‘‘messages went backwards and forwards regarding the plan, and details connected with it.’’ They used both wireless and radio to transmit training messages. Because of the possibility of voice recognition, ‘‘officers representing various commanders and staff officers stayed in those appointments.’’ The training messages

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began at a ‘‘comparatively low standard’’ and gradually improved ‘‘until they reached a high pitch of perfection towards the end of May, ready to invade Norway.’’ Signals operators sent the routine and administrative messages either in code or in cipher, depending upon the nature of the message. Messages traveled by wireless from army to corps to division to brigade and back up the chain to army headquarters. Macleod borrowed Scottish Command’s cipher staff, a Women’s Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS) officer in charge of ATS girls. The ATS staff remained with the deception implementers until July when Fortitude North merged with Fortitude South.58 The Fortitude North implementers created wireless traffic to simulate the following stories: the completion of collective training by the U.S. XV corps 45 days prior to D-Day; between 61 and 31 days before D-Day, the simulation of two brigades’ amphibious training by the 52nd Infantry Division and Combat Training Centre Troon; the completion of the same training by two brigades of an unnamed infantry division between D minus 31 and the start of the Normandy invasion; and the continuation of training by the same division for 15 days after D-Day, but in a different area. The LCS dictated a series of exercises to be feigned on specific dates by the notional 58th Infantry Division—April 14–25, exercises to demonstrate the division’s movement toward the Clyde from Aberlour; April 26, embarkation and disembarkation practices simulated by naval wireless activity; and May 1–31, mountain and ordinary training in the Doune area—and by the 52nd Lowland Division; April 5– 6, 12, and 20, assault brigade signal exercises; April 15 and 24, amphibious exercises by an assault brigade; May 7, signal exercise by a division; and May 10, amphibious exercises by a division, including follow-up brigades. A SHAEF directive dated March 23, 1944, dictated the culmination of the threat to Norway in two phases: 1) ‘‘by 1st May Fourth Army will be prepared to carry out a landing in Southern NORWAY’’ and 2) ‘‘by 15th May Fourth Army will be prepared to carry out a landing in Southern NORWAY and a landing by 7 Corps in Northern NORWAY.’’59 In order to provide the appropriate wireless activity, the signals operators established fixed nets from the British Fourth Army headquarters in Edinburgh to the U.S. XV Corps headquarters in Northern Ireland and to VII Corps headquarters near Dundee between 56 and 60 days before D-Day, with the United States providing the net terminals. The Fourth Army also established nets between II Corps and 55th Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, and the 113th Independent Infantry Brigade 65 days prior to the Normandy invasion. Scottish Command received orders to achieve a ‘‘high standard of collective training’’ by the II, VII, and XV Corps through wireless traffic by D minus 45. SHAEF ordered General Haislip, the commander of U.S. XV Corps, ‘‘to execute a succession of increasingly advanced CPX’s, commencing shortly after 15 March, and culminating in a Corps CPX [Command Post Exercises] about 15 April.’’ No. 5 Wireless Group received orders to help Scottish Command to monitor the CPX’s. Haislip also had a directive to establish a radio net with Fourth Army headquarters with activity to begin on March 22.60 Activity commenced throughout the British Fourth Army on March 22. Not only did operational and routine messages travel up and down the net from Fourth Army headquarters to brigades, some of the wireless divisions held brigade exercises, as did

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the 52nd Lowland and 58th Divisions. According to Colonel Macleod, ‘‘we had artillery exercises and even an artillery practice camp with shooting on a range, all by wireless.’’61 Although the operation opened ‘‘with a bang,’’ as Macleod claimed in his account of the deception, the colonel and his officers had to enact security measures to ensure success in the event that the enemy broke the codes and ciphers and was able to read the messages. Therefore, with the exception of signals training, all messages had to be militarily plausible. If they succeeded in reading the messages, the Germans had to be able to tell what type of headquarters sent them. The transmissions had to have a purpose; they could not be nonsense that could possibly jeopardize the deception. As a result, Macleod’s staff carefully constructed the traffic to be sent over wireless and radio. His staff utilized wireless silence periods to amass a surplus of messages. The signals operators did, however, send out a few ‘‘calculated indiscretions’’ designed to suggest the upcoming invasion of Norway.62 Signals operators from both the RAF and the Royal Navy transmitted messages as part of the deception. The RAF simulated the transfer of medium bomber squadrons to northeast Scotland. The display of real and fake Spitfires added validity to the wireless deception. The navy supplied evidence of invasion training to the enemy through wireless deception. ‘‘The Admiralty set up a number of CLH units, each of which was able to simulate the wireless traffic of a naval assault force capable of lifting an infantry division.’’63 The navy used two CLH units to fake the training of ‘‘V’’ and ‘‘W’’ Forces with assault divisions, the 52nd and 58th, in the Clyde area. In addition to wireless, the navy used the concentration of shipping in the Clyde and on Scotland’s east coast to feign the confluence of naval forces engaged in amphibious training.64 The amount of radio and wireless activity varied according to the schedule that Colonel Macleod received from Major General Barker on March 4. The schedule indicated periods of wireless silence, normal activity, and intense activity. Wireless silence generally indicated troop movements or the beginning of an operation. Intense activity occurred during the simulated training exercises. The implementers tried to suggest an impending assault with an increase in activity during the spring of 1944. SHAEF/18216/1/Ops, ‘‘Notes on Decisions Made on the 21st and 22nd March, 1944 Regarding Wireless Program for Plan ‘Fortitude,’’’ dated March 23, 1944, indicated the progress to be made with Fortitude, including amphibious, embarkation and disembarkation training, and troop concentrations, one for northern Norway, the other for southern Norway by May 1–10. The report also dictated both real and deceptive measures to be taken beginning in mid-April. The real exercises included an increase in visual and photographic reconnaissance over Norway, the commencement of heavy bomber raids on Norwegian airfields, and the initiation of ‘‘long range air sea rescue operations.’’ The deceptive activities included wireless support for fake bomber displays and ‘‘wireless traffic associated with the training of escort carriers and aircraft in Scotland.’’65 Throughout the period, SHAEF and the LCS continually evaluated the wireless situation and the overall deception plan and made changes in the transmission schedule in order to build up the force and to develop the threat to Norway by the assigned dates.66

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Colonel Macleod initiated a number of measures to make the deception more realistic. As noted earlier, General Sir Andrew Thorne traveled to Northern Ireland at Macleod’s request to inspect the U.S. XV Corps. SHAEF declared the Firth of Forth a ‘‘protected area,’’ which meant that people traveling into or out of an area within ten miles of the Firth of Forth needed a special pass. All those within the ten-mile radium had to submit to a security check. The purpose was to target the area as an embarkation site for the invasion of Norway. In an attempt to distinguish the Fourth Army from Scottish Command and to show the army’s mobility, Macleod moved VII Corps, with the exception of the 52nd Infantry Division that remained near Dundee, and II Corps, without the 55th Infantry Division, near Glasgow. Fourth Army shifted its headquarters from Edinburgh to Ayr on May 20 during a period of radio silence. Both locations were near the Clyde’s embarkation ports. In addition, the Fourth Army established a link with the 35th Tank Brigade, camped in Dumfries. According to Macleod, ‘‘7th Corps moved first on 1st May during a silent period, Corps H.Q. going to Beith. With Combined Operations H.S., on Loch Fyne we had practice embarkations on various large transports arriving at the ports.’’67 Practice in landing operations and inland ground gaining continued with Combined Operations in the Troon area. As Macleod related in his account, ‘‘We had a H.Q. ship and sent parties from 52nd, 58th and the wireless divisions ashore to establish beach heads and beach parties with wireless communications and calls for naval bombardments on enemy resistance, and then an advance inland. I was given a DUKW to run about in from the ship to the shore and then across land.’’68 According to Macleod, his fears that German reconnaissance flights would notice the sparcity of troops training on the coastal areas of Scotland did not materialize. The Allies succeeded in shooting down any enemy aircraft that flew over the area. Macleod confidently claimed that the Germans remained ignorant of the size of the actual Allied force perpetrating the deception. By the end of May, however, Allied intelligence indicated that the ruse in Scotland was no longer having an effect on German troop movement and was in danger of being discovered a deception; therefore, SHAEF ordered Macleod to cease the threat to Norway, feign a movement to the south to join the menace to the Pas de Calais, and merge with the Fortitude South deception. The movement of actual and fictitious troops to southeast England was a gradual process and will be discussed in greater detail later. Wireless traffic suggested corps training exercises during the middle of June. Macleod planned the movement of the Fourth Army by the end of June. Traveling in wireless silence, the transfer occurred during the middle of July. From this point until SHAEF terminated its activities, Fortitude North took on a more flexible role in the deception.69 ******************* Prior to the end of May 1944, although Allied intelligence indicated that the Germans believed the deception, historians continue to debate the credibility of the conclusions made by intelligence officials. As noted above, SHAEF intelligence suggested to Macleod that the activities executed in Scotland achieved the desired

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results. The Germans increased divisions in Norway from nine to twelve by midMay 1944. The German force, which included 58,000 Luftwaffe and 89,000 naval personnel, totaled approximately 372,000 men. The twelve divisions remained in Norway until the end of the war.70 In a letter dated July 18, 1944, to the Right Honorable Sir James Grigg, Secretary of State for War, Eisenhower acknowledged that Fortitude North had helped in the early phase of Operation Overlord.7172 Although he concurred, Sir Ronald Wingate also offered evidence in his report that indicated that the deception might not have been necessary. He claimed that captured German High Command documents indicated that the German had correctly located most of the fictitious formations in Scotland. According to Wingate, however, the German documents indicated that the Germans ‘‘feared a diversionary operation against Norway’’ before Macleod began to implement the deception. In a wireless communication, dated April 6, 1944, the Japanese Naval Attache´ concluded that the Germans did anticipate the possibility of Allied commando raids on the Norwegian coast with the object of cutting communications between the northern and southern parts of that country. A later communication dated May 16, 1944, from the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin to the Foreign Minister in Tokyo indicated the German belief that ‘‘the troops stationed in SCOTLAND appear to be held in readiness for a diversionary attack on NORWAY.’’73 Referring to Norway, Dennis Wheatley, a member of the LCS, claimed that the deception ‘‘led to one of the greatest coups that we ever achieved in deceiving Hitler.’’ 74 The available documents do not necessarily agree with Wheatley’s assertion. The evidence indicates that the Norway deception was not entirely fruitful. Hitler did not have the forces necessary to transfer to Norway to counter the Allied threat. The deception did, however, frighten Hitler enough to prevent him from removing any troops from Norway and Denmark.75 The evidence also suggests that although the Germans accepted the existence of the fictitious forces, including the British Fourth Army, they did not fall for the threat to Norway. The Germans realized ‘‘that the forces at General Thorne’s disposal were not enough to mount more than diversionary operations which the existing garrison of Norway should be able to contain.’’76 Radio reconnaissance indicated the movement of German troops south. The Germans failed to pick up much of British radio traffic originating in Scotland. Soviet radio traffic attracted the attention of Germans in Norway much more than that of the British did. Hitler kept twelve divisions in Norway ‘‘to protect his shipment of Finnish nickel ore, his northern flank, and his U-boat departures,’’ not because of the deception. Fortitude North did not affect German strategy in Norway; the Germans actually did transfer soldiers from Norway to Denmark and to the eastern front shortly before the Normandy invasion. The Germans were aware of some of the Allies’ deceptions, but Fortitude North was no more successful than Graffham. Although the Germans did not exclude the possibility of an Allied attack, the number of troops in Norway remained the same. Only their state of readiness changed.77 Included in the Wingate Report is a brief excerpt from a 1946 interrogation of Jodl in which the general claimed, ‘‘We kept 300,000 men in Norway during most

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of the war, when 100,000 men would have been sufficient had Norway been for us merely an occupational and security commitment.’’78 Wingate does not, however, present any information about the interrogation of Jodl—when or where it took place, who questioned him, what questions were asked, how he responded, or if Jodl just told his interrogators what they wanted to hear. One must, therefore, not place too much emphasis on the accuracy of Jodl’s statement. Jodl did, however, answer questions about Norway during his interrogation by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg on June 4, 1946. Dr. Franz Exner, Jodl’s defense counsel, asked him about the occupation of Norway. According to Jodl, the occupation of Norway put the German fleet at risk. The belief that the Allied threat was real justified the presence of 300,000 idle soldiers protecting 3,000 kilometers of coastline.79 Both the quotation in the Wingate Report and Jodl’s responses in his interrogation suggest that Jodl, at least, considered the threat to Norway real. The Germans, including Hitler, believed that the primary invasion would come in France. Any assault on Norway would be secondary. The German commander in Norway, General von Falkenhorst, in a report dated September 30, 1945, suggested that a large scale attack by the British was not considered a possibility in 1940, 1941, or 1942. Although the Germans believed an invasion of Norway conceivable in 1943, by 1944 they considered an assault on northern France more feasible than one against Norway. Von Falkenhorst claimed that he recognized by 1942 that Norway was a secondary theater and would not dictate the course of the war. According to von Falkenhorst, the British did not intend to invade Norway. He cited as evidence the lack of invasion preparation in Scottish or English east coast ports, which was indicated by air reconnaissance flights. Von Falkenhorst, like the LXX Corps commander and other German officers in Norway, recognized that an attack on Norway would have split the Allied forces and would have made an invasion of France more difficult, if not impossible. An Ultra intercept, dated March 22, 1944, acknowledged the possibility of Allied action against Norway, but did not indicate that it would be the anticipated Second Front. According to the intercept, the OKM noted the transfer of an English corps and an infantry division from Scotland to south England, which left four to six divisions in Scotland prepared for action. The OKM also cited the presence of one to two American divisions in Iceland, which it expected to be used in activity in the north, and of adequate shipping to transport troops to north, central, or south Norway ‘‘with the object of tying down German forces in northern area and preventing withdrawal of further forces from this area.’’ According to the intercept, the OKM believed that an Allied invasion of Norway would not be the main Allied operation.80 Von Falkenhorst and the commanders in Norway were not the only leaders to conclude that an invasion of Norway was not likely. Colonel Alexis Baron von Roenne, Foreign Armies West, deduced that an attack on Norway ‘‘did not coincide with his impressions of inter- and inner-Allied political rivalries.’’ Although he did not think that the Allied operation was possible after May 23, von Roenne concluded that the only real justification for an Allied effort in Norway was

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‘‘the interruption . . .of German sea communications, along the Norwegian coast, the containment of German armed forces, and an insurrection of the Norwegian population.’’81 In May, however, Hitler and his advisors believed that the Allied diversionary Norwegian assault would open the Second Front campaign. By the end of the month, however, Allied intelligence indicated that the deception was becoming untenable. As a result, SHAEF and the LCS decided to reduce the threat to Norway and gradually transfer both real and fictitious Fourth Army formations southward beginning in June for inclusion in the Fortitude South deception. Although the LCS devised a Fortitude North II plan, the decision to merge the original Fortitude North with Fortitude South basically signaled the end of the threat to Norway. Until the deception officially ended, SHAEF and the LCS only left a small force in Scotland that was available for the occupation of Norway should German troops collapse or withdraw from Scandinavia.

4

Deciding How to Implement Fortitude South

A military operation involves deception. Even though you are competent, appear to be incompetent. Though effective, appear to be ineffective. —Master Sun Tzu1

British and American leaders agreed during the May 1943 Trident Conference to schedule the invasion of northwest Europe for May 1944, a date that they confirmed with the Soviets six months later at Teheran. However, a number of factors, including the difficulty in amassing an adequate number of landing craft, forced postponement of the assault until early June. But whether the assault occurred in May or June, the planners of Overlord had to face certain realities. The Germans expected the Allies to invade northwest Europe in 1944, and, consequently, they had embarked on a plan to strengthen their coastal defenses in the West.2 In fact, the Allies, recognizing the Germans’ determination to thwart an assault on northwest Europe, tracked the buildup of enemy forces in western Europe. According to the GSI 21st Army Group Weekly Review for February 13, 1944, ‘‘The sole remaining hope of the German Army lies in defeating the Allied invasion in the West.’’3 A report issued less than a week later noted that 53 German divisions had been identified in western Europe and that, although new divisions had moved into the Bouches du Rhoˆ ne and Abbeville-Boulogne areas, the enemy had concentrated a large number of troops in the Pas de Calais region. The report concluded that ‘‘if there are to be no departures to counter-balance these arrivals, we may find a new development in the German policy for the defence of the WEST: an attempt to provide the much-publicised PAS DE CALAIS with defence in depth provided by infantry divisions in a layback role.’’4 Allied leaders acknowledged that, as the target date approached, it would become increasingly difficult to conceal the concentration of troops and ships in southern and southwestern England. Therefore, they ordered the London Controlling

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Section (LCS) to develop a deception plan that was initially intended to mask the buildup of forces for Overlord. Recognizing the inadequacy of such a plan, the focus of the deception shifted to a plan designed to suggest a different location and date of the Allied invasion. To accomplish this goal, Allied forces had to create another invasion force and choose another site for an assault. Drawing on intelligence reports, the LCS decided to create a threat to the Pas de Calais area. Located across the narrowest part of the English Channel, the Pas de Calais included good beaches and a port that would be essential for the expansion of the Allied operation. In addition, the area was relatively close to the border of Germany and would allow easier access to the Ruhr industrial region and Berlin than a site further to the west. As early as mid-February 1944, the Germans had begun to concentrate troops in the Pas de Calais area, which indicated the importance that they gave the region. Since 1940 the Germans had considered the Pas de Calais region the most strategically important part of France and had fortified it accordingly.5 By producing the illusion of an Allied troop concentration in southeast England, the Allies hoped the Germans would incorrectly deduce the size of the force available for an invasion of the continent. By the middle of May 1944, the enemy estimated an Allied invasion force of ‘‘56 infantry divisions, 5 independent infantry brigades, 8 airborne divisions, 8 paratroop battalions, 15 armored divisions, and 14 armored brigades.’’ In reality, the Allied force included 20 American divisions and 18 British and Canadian divisions.6 When they designed Fortitude South, which targeted the Pas de Calais, the members of the LCS hoped to take advantage of the Germans’ inaccurate assessment of Allied troop strength in Great Britain. Although implementation of the Fortitude deception began before it was accepted by the Combined Chiefs, the LCS did not issue the final plan until May 18, 1944.7 The LCS designed Fortitude South with several goals in mind, the most important of which was to convince the Germans that the invasion was going to occur in the Pas de Calais area, not in Normandy. If they could not convince the Germans that the Allies’ target was the Pas de Calais, then the LCS had to convince them that the main assault would be against the Pas de Calais. Any other attack would be a diversion. They hoped to play on the Germans’ preconceived notions of the importance of the Pas de Calais region. In addition, the LCS wanted to use the southern deception to ‘‘protect with decoys our hards and ports of embarkation on the South Coast.’’8 Because German guns could hit the area between Dover and Folkestone and because no large harbors existed between Folkestone and Chichester, the concentration of shipping for the invasion force had to be located in harbors in and west of Chichester. ‘‘If landing craft were reported on the east coast, north of the Thames estuary he [the enemy] would be likely to anticipate attack much more to the east than the Normandy coast, and if he was misled completely, he would probably keep troops in the Pas de Calais area for a considerable time after the actual invasion took place.’’9 By creating a fictitious force in southeast England, the LCS hoped to prevent the enemy from moving the ‘‘formidable’’ German Fifteenth Army, which included 19 divisions and which had access to an additional five panzer divisions in the area, from the Pas de Calais 170 miles southwest to the Normandy beaches. Therefore, the task

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of Fortitude South became the containment of enemy forces, especially three armored divisions, in the area north of the Seine River. The LCS gave the code name Quicksilver I to the part of Fortitude South that included the dummy force that would be situated in southeast England across from the Pas de Calais. The fictitious Allied army group would contain approximately one million men. Colonel Roger Fleetwood Hesketh and Colonel J.V.B. Jervis-Read, members of the Committee of Special Means (CSM), devised Quicksilver I, which presented a two-part story. During the first phase, which was before D-Day, Supreme Commander ordered two army groups, 21st British Army Group and First U. S. Army Group (FUSAG), to set up camp in southeast England. Once it was activated, FUSAG established its initial headquarters in Bryanston Square, London. FUSAG contained two armies, the Third U.S. Army and the First Canadian Army. The Third U.S. Army contained the XX and XII Corps, and the First Canadian Army included the II Canadian and the VIII U.S. Corps. Elements of the Ninth U.S. Air Force would be stationed with the two army groups. The story would change after D-Day. After the 21st Army Group drew German troops toward the Normandy area, the Supreme Commander would launch an attack on the Pas de Calais area with FUSAG. Prior to the assault against the Pas de Calais, the Allied forces would participate in a series of training exercises. Although Fortitude South would feature physical displays, like Fortitude North, it was basically a deception program presented by wireless traffic, which would be controlled by the 21st Army Group and by double agents.10 Devising an Order of Battle for Fortitude South did not prove easy. The Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander’s (COSSAC’s) deception staff had begun working on the fictitious Order of Battle during the summer of 1943. The staff had faced several problems. Although it assumed that the Joint Commanders would ultimately have responsibility for determining the Order of Battle, they had not yet done so. The failure of the Joint Commanders to construct the Overlord Order of Battle created another obstacle. Because the deception planners had limited resources, they hoped to include real invasion forces in the Fortitude South Order of Battle. Consequently, the deception planners relied on the development of the Overlord Order of Battle in order to devise one for Fortitude South. Because COSSAC acknowledged that adequate time was needed to present the false Order of Battle, he ordered wireless and Special Means to begin suggesting the existence of fictitious troops as early as September 1943, using Appendix Y, the COSSAC deception plan, as a guide. COSSAC decided that GHQ, Home Forces, would represent the fake army. As a result, on September 19, 1943, Home Forces established two wireless links to the 21st Army Group.11 As debate over the false Order of Battle continued, two separate plans emerged. Both designated an invasion force of two army corps represented by GHQ, Home Forces; however, they differed over implementation. One plan authorized enactment by II British Corps and one U.S. corps to be determined at a later date; the other by South Eastern and Eastern Commands, each of which would represent one corps. By December 3, 1943, however, officials chose the second option and authorized the establishment of a fixed line wireless network. By late January 1944, a change in the

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deception plan indicated the need for alteration of the Order of Battle. Major General Francis de Guingand, chief of staff for the 21st Army Group, suggested that the Pas de Calais be presented as the main Allied target after the Normandy invasion. Therefore, the initial landing force of six divisions would be inadequate. On February 3 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) changed the Order of Battle for Fortitude South to include a pre-invasion and a post-invasion story. The pre-invasion story included two armies, the GHQ army that would attack east of the Dover Straits and the real invasion force that would assault the area west of the Dover Straits.12 ‘‘After D-Day, the G.H.Q. Army, continuing its threat to the Channel coast East of the Straits, would ‘operate with four additional assault divisions which will be mounted in the Portsmouth area to assault South of Cap Gris Nez when the German reserves have been committed.’’’13 The proposal dated February 3, 1944, exhibited several weaknesses, one of which was repeated by the Fortitude plan. Neither scheme took ‘‘sufficient account of the story that would have to be told after D Day.’’ The planners would later realize the importance of addressing this oversight. In addition, the February 3 plan placed the fictitious GHQ Army under the 21st Army Group’s control prior to the Normandy invasion. Because the 21st Army Group could not oversee both the Normandy and the Pas de Calais invasions, the GHQ Army would have to shift to another command during Overlord. Although the change in command structure was possible, it would not enhance the ‘‘main’’ operation, the threat to the Pas de Calais. As a result of the problems of the February 3 plan, the Joint Commanders assumed charge of the ‘‘detailed planning,’’ and the 21st Army Group, commanded by General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, received orders to determine the final Order of Battle for Fortitude South.14 Two important changes resulted from the 21st Army Group’s assessment of the existing Order of Battle. First, 21st Army Group established two separate army groups, one for Overlord, the other for Fortitude South. ‘‘Second, it decided to build the Order of Battle wholly from real operational formations, that is to say, it dispensed with imaginary formations as well as with those under the command of Home Forces and under War Office control.’’15 Although European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA) controlled American formations in the United Kingdom, American officials, following suggestions from the British War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff, had activated FUSAG, which was to coordinate American field forces, in the spring of 1943. Initially a ‘‘paper organization,’’ FUSAG later took on an important role in the Fortitude South deception. FUSAG would include some real U.S. units that were designated as Overlord follow up forces. The goal was to convince the Germans that the two army groups ‘‘were in an equal state of readiness.’’16 By mid-May 1944, Montgomery’s staff had constructed the final FUSAG Order of Battle. FUSAG would contain an assault force, First Canadian Army, and a follow up formation, Third U.S. Army. First Canadian Army included two corps, the II Canadian, which was divided into the 2nd Canadian Infantry and 4th Armoured Divisions, and the VIII U.S., which contained three U.S. infantry divisions, the

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79th, the 28th, and the 83rd. The follow up force, Third U.S. Army, also contained two corps, the XX U.S. Armored and the XII U.S. The XX Corps consisted of the 4th, the 5th, and the 6th Armored Divisions, while the XII Corps also contained three divisions, the 80th Infantry, the 7th Armored, and the 35th Infantry. A SHAEF directive dated February 26, 1944, clarified the chain of command for the deception. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, as Supreme Commander, retained control of the implementation of the deception as a whole. He was responsible specifically for ‘‘the implementation of the plan by special means; political warfare and propaganda; and the occupation and Scandinavian operations.’’ The directive assigned the task of ‘‘directing towards the Pas de Calais the threat created by the forces under their control and for concealing the state of readiness of these forces so as to indicate ‘NEPTUNE’ D plus 45 as the real target date’’ to Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, the Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force (ANCXF); General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, the Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group; and Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford L. Leigh-Mallory, the Air Commander-inChief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF). Although they had the task of implementing the deception, the three commanders were ultimately responsible to Eisenhower.17 Although General George S. Patton would play a vital role in the FUSAG deception, Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, Commanding General, First U.S. Army Group, became ‘‘the commander charged with the operation in the Pas de Calais in accordance with 21 Army Group’s detailed cover plans.’’18 Plan Fortitude South evolved as D-Day approached. Although the LCS under Colonel John Bevan devised the original plan that was approved in February 1944, Ramsay, Montgomery, and Leigh-Mallory were each responsible for fine tuning and implementing the deception in their own areas. Fortitude South was a joint operation—all three military branches participated in some way. Allied leaders divided the Fortitude South cover plan into several different phases. The basic story of the deception fell into two phases. During the first, pre-invasion phase, the implementers, using whatever means necessary, were to suggest that the main target of the Allied assault was the Pas de Calais area and that the target date was D plus 45, or 45 days after the Normandy invasion. The planners expected the Germans to anticipate the assault as D-Day approached. During the second, post-invasion phase, Allied leaders hoped the Germans would reach the following conclusions. First, the purpose of the attack on Normandy was to draw enemy reserves from Belgium and the Pas de Calais. Second, after German forces had evacuated the Pas de Calais, the Allies planned to launch their main assault. Finally, Allied leaders hoped to persuade the Germans to anticipate the Pas de Calais invasion for as long as possible after D-Day.19 The deception planners assigned the code word Quicksilver to the numerous ways in which Fortitude South would be implemented. Quicksilver I referred to the two phases of ground force activities. Prior to D-Day, ‘‘the Supreme Commander has under command two Army Groups, the 21 Army Group, commanded by General Montgomery, and the First United States Army Group, under command General Bradley, which consists of the First Canadian Army with under command

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II Canadian and VIII U.S. Corps, and the Third United States Army with under command XX Corps and XII Corps.’’20 FUSAG would set up camp in east and southeast England. Assigned the task of providing support for FUSAG, the Ninth U.S. Air Force would establish positions in south and southeast England. After the Normandy invasion, the 21st Army Group would persuade German reserves to move toward the Allied beachhead, which would enable FUSAG and the Ninth U.S. Air Force to assault the Pas de Calais area. The armies involved would participate in invasion exercises prior to launching their attack. Wireless activity would supplement the ground forces’ training exercises during the pre-invasion phase and would indicate the movement of troops preparing to embark for the invasion. The wireless telegraphy (W/T) plan received the code name Quicksilver II. Ramsay, Montgomery, and Leigh-Mallory included two appendices with Quicksilver II. Appendix A demonstrated FUSAG’s false Order of Battle, while Appendix B presented a diagram of wireless communications for FUSAG. The wireless stations would initiate operations on April 24. The plan scheduled ‘‘two notional combined exercises, the first DRYSHOD the second WETSHOD . . .by the 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade assisted by Force G’’ for April 16 and 25. In addition, the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion and the Radio Contermeasures (RCM) Detachment, FUSAG, would contribute to the wireless activity.21 The presence of a second invasion force, FUSAG, required adequate shipping to transport the troops across the English Channel. The commanders assigned the name Quicksilver III to ‘‘craft indication.’’ They ordered that 270 dummy landing craft be displayed in Yarmouth, Lowestoft, Waldringfield, Wolverstone, Dover, and Folkestone to support the deception in the event the enemy flew reconnaissance flights to verify the existence of an invasion force in southeast England. According to the plan, ‘‘Naval wireless traffic proportionate to the number of craft will be simulated in the mooring areas, appropriate Army wireless traffic being linked to these flotillas as far as possible.’’ In addition, the groups involved received orders to install the necessary signs on roads and in special areas to further the embarkation picture.22 The creation of an invasion force, even a fictitious one, required an air component. Quicksilver IV, which referred to the threat to the Pas de Calais by air, included a general Fortitude air plan. ‘‘Prior to D-Day, air forces would suggest long term preparations for the D plus 45 target day in several ways. Fighter squadrons based in southern England would engage in flight training exercises. High Speed Air Sea Rescue launches and Air Sea Rescue squadrons stationed in southeast England would also practice. Fighters and bombers would participate in a ‘large-scale air operation’ in east and southeast England approximately three days before the Normandy invasion.’’23 ‘‘The aim of the operation will be to test the efficiency of operating fighter squadrons in ‘shuttle service’ from advanced bases whose position gives tactical advantage.’’24 ‘‘By using ‘careful manipulation of call signs, arrangement of deliberate indiscretions by R/T [radio telephony] and very strict orders as to the height at which aircraft are to fly,’ the air force would attempt to ‘conceal’ the movement of aircraft to Kent and the Thames Estuary from southern England. The construction of ‘dummy hard standings’ would supplement the normal activity

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on southeast England airfields. Small scale fighter and bomber practices would also occur in the same area and include ‘deliberate indiscretions on R/T and manipulation of call signs.’ Immediately before the invasion, the air force would drop bombs on beaches and rail targets in the Pas de Calais area as part of the tactical railway bombing initiative.’’25 Ramsay, Montgomery, and Leigh-Mallory conceded that the Germans would surmise that the Normandy assault was a major Allied operation. Therefore, because they agreed that steps had to be taken to maintain the threat to the Pas de Calais area, Quicksilver IV included measures for the post-invasion period. First, special means would reveal the purpose of the American air forces situated in southeast England. Allied forces would engage in practice exercises to ‘‘simulate normal Army/Air Force cooperation.’’ Bombers would execute operations that would not jeopardize Neptune, but would facilitate the deception. Allied leaders recognized that the Pas de Calais threat could not be maintained indefinitely; therefore, they suggested that the threat be climaxed between D-Day and two weeks after the invasion.26 ‘‘If and when it is decided that the threat should culminate, concentrated close support bombing attacks, consistent with the time, size and scope of the operation, should be undertaken.’’27 In order to perpetuate the menace to the Pas de Calais, the planners included Quicksilver V, which orchestrated increased activity by Combined Headquarters, Dover. Combined Headquarters, Dover (in reality, II Canadian Corps Headquarters) undertook special work to create the illusion of ‘‘extra tunnelling and the erection of further wireless stations.’’ New wireless circuits would go online to supplement the deception. The plan also contained a provision for nighttime activity, Quicksilver VI. Beginning in the middle of May, Quicksilver VI dictated the erection of night lighting installations at Breydon Water, Culton Broad, Benacre Mess, Whitehall Farm, Kirton Creek, Falkenham Marshes, Long Reach, and Trimley Marshes. The purpose of the installations was to suggest activity in areas, such as Great Yarmouth, Lowestoft, River Deben, and River Orwell, where dummy craft were located by ‘‘simulating vehicle lights and beach lighting.’’28 Fortitude South proved to be much more complex that one might suppose. SHAEF, in accord with the LCS, devised a wide-ranging strategic cover plan that incorporated implementation by all branches of the military. In addition to Quicksilver I–VI, the deception included naval diversionary operations, as well as several subsidiary plans. According to the Admiralty, ‘‘because the power of manoeuvre at sea was so limited and because it was vital to hold the enemy reserves in sectors other than that to be assaulted as long as possible, the need for cover and deception was paramount, both strategically during the preparatory period and tactically during the approach.’’29 The naval diversionary operations were supplemented by air sorties, but not by troop landings. Using sonic warfare, smoke, and RCM, the Coastal Craft Forces would simulate landing threats to appropriate beaches, other than those in Normandy. The purpose of the diversion was twofold. First, SHAEF and the LCS hoped to postpone the transfer of German reserves into the assault area. Second, by

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engaging enemy naval forces into a skirmish the night before, and during the day of, the assault, Allied leaders wanted to prevent the German navy from hindering the landing of both the invasion and the follow up forces. The plan was to execute feints against three German-held coastal areas: Operation Taxable near Cap Antifer, Operation Glimmer around the Pas de Calais, and Operation Big Drum, in which a force would serve ‘‘as a flank force on the western flank of our assault forces to occupy the attention of the enemy radar and confuse him as to the progress of the main assault forces.’’ Although the Big Drum force was not technically a diversion, it was going to operate like the other diversionary forces. Allied leaders hoped that Glimmer and Taxable would suggest the impending invasion in Calais and Cap Antifer with forces that were equal in size.30 The naval and air forces engaged in Taxable, Glimmer, and Big Drum would have access to a number of resources—sonic equipment to suggest the operation’s climax, RCM, smoke to hide the fleet from enemy sea and air patrols, balloons, and window and moonshine jammers—to facilitate their diversions. RCM could either disrupt enemy radar or simulate the presence of ships or aircraft. Window (metalized paper strips) jettisoned from high-flying aircraft would hinder radar transmissions that could not be jammed for one of two reasons—the frequency was unknown or the appropriate equipment was unavailable.31 British scientists Dr. Robert Cockburn and Dr. Joan Curran discovered that window could totally disrupt the enemy’s radar defenses, by ‘‘[blacking] out enemy radar screens, [snarling] direction-finding equipment, and [creating] so many false ‘echoes’ that confused operators would gain the impression that not hundreds, but many thousands, of bombers were attacking.’’32 When it was possible, Allied technicians would use medium power jammers to neutralize surface watching radar or gunnery control type radar, low power jammers on Seetakt or Wurzburg radar bands, or high power jammers for Wurzburg frequencies. In addition to obstructing enemy radar, Allied scientists developed ways in which to persuade enemy operators to see nonexistent craft on their radar screens. Low-flying aircraft could simulate the advance of both large and small ships by progressively dropping window. Aircraft carrying Type 660 (Moonshine) could also suggest the presence of vessels. Type 660 (Moonshine) was a ‘‘hand-tuned receiver transmitter which produces false radar signals representing craft disposed at intervals of range (i.e. in line astern).’’ Balloons could also be utilized to simulate ships. Reflectors placed inside balloons would ‘‘give a response equal to that of a 5,000 ton ship. . . .a craft towing one of these can also tow a float from which a second balloon is flown. For technical reasons balloons in any unit should be flown at three different heights, 350, 400 and 450 feet. . . .As well as producing a large echo normally associated with a big ship, these balloons increase range at which detection is likely for coastal craft from 15 to 30 miles.’’33 SHAEF realized, however, that jamming would cause the Germans to surmise ‘‘that something was happening’’ and feared that the enemy might ‘‘accidentally’’ discover the real Normandy invasion forces. Consequently, SHAEF planned to allow German radar operators to ‘‘discover’’ two fictitious fleets heading for Cap Antifer and Pas de Calais (Operations Taxable and Glimmer), rather than the actual invasion

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fleet. ‘‘All the signals which should have come out of a convoy would have come out of the force that was doing the deception.’’ However, the lack of available vessels dictated the use of aircraft ‘‘flying at more than 200 miles an hour to pretend to be ships on the surface of the sea traveling at five miles an hour’’ by dropping window or employing moonshine.34 The purpose of Operation Taxable was to convince the Germans that, around dawn on D-Day, Allied forces would land between Bruneval and Fe´camp. During the night before the real Normandy invasion, Special Force Task A would advance toward the area. Aircraft would simulate approaching ships and landing craft. After approaching as close as possible to Cap Antifer, the forces would ‘‘simulate ships and craft lying off the beaches after the actual retirement has been made.’’ If possible during the deception, Allied crews would lay mines in the waters around Cap Antifer. Before daylight, the force would withdraw from enemy gun range.35 Eight aircraft implemented Taxable. Divided into two groups, the aircraft flew orbits, during which they jettisoned large amounts of chaff, window, radar reflective foil. There were four aircraft flying in line abreast with one and a bit miles between them and behind them at a distance of four miles was another four aircraft doing the same thing. But the way the orbits were worked out, once every seven minutes the aircraft moved forward toward the French coast one mile. The effect of that was to produce this huge radar reflector that was moving toward the French coast at about five knots.. . .At the same time, one needed to give signals from the surface of the sea as well and again small craft like motor torpedo boats carrying jammers also carried echo systems by which a single boat would provide such an echo because the radar impulse coming in from the German radar station would be amplified, delayed a bit, and radiated back.36

Like Taxable, the goal of Operation Glimmer was to persuade the Germans that the Allied invasion forces were going to land in the Pas de Calais, rather than on the beaches of Normandy. Leaving from Dungeness, one group would target the beaches around Boulogne if the extent of enemy mines present in the waters permitted. Another group, departing from the Thames and ports along the east coast, would advance toward the Dunkirk beaches and those between Boulogne and the Somme. Allied deception forces would use the same methods as those dictated for Taxable to perpetuate the ruse. The only difference between the two naval diversions was that Glimmer omitted the laying of mines in the waters around the Pas de Calais.37 The object of Operation Big Drum was, however, different from that of Taxable and Glimmer. Instead of creating a phantom fleet on enemy radar, Big Drum dictated that a RCM force operate ‘‘on the western flank of the assault forces to engage the attention of and, as far as possible, jam enemy radar stations situated in the North-East COTENTIN PENINSULA.’’ Consequently, German radar operators would discern false information about the invasion fleets as they approached Normandy.38 The goal was to create confusion along the coast from the Cotentin Peninsula to Dunkirk. If German radar operators all along the northern

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French coast received conflicting images, then perhaps they would be unable to discern the actual invasion fleet heading for Normandy. The Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) had a role in the deception beyond facilitating the naval diversionary operations. Allied leaders assigned the Combined Signals Board, SHAEF, the task of preventing enemy radar or signals intelligence systems from determining information about the invasion fleet—size, composition, destination, and, most importantly, departure. The Air Signals Officer-in-Chief, AEAF, and the Director-General of Signals Air Ministry assumed the duty of implementing Allied plans for masking the invasion fleet. The chosen countermeasures had a twofold purpose. First, they were to obstruct the German early warning system by using air attacks to decimate German radar links on the northern coasts of France and Belgium. The Air Signals Officer-in-Chief, AEAF, and the Director-General of Signals Air Ministry chose targets that would leave holes in the German ‘‘cover of the approaches to the Baie de Seine and of its beaches.’’ The objectives also had to fulfill the SHAEF criteria that for every target within the Normandy area, two had to be selected in another area. Second, they were to prevent ‘‘radar-controlled gunfire against the seaborne and airborne invaders, to interfere with Germany Fighter R/T [radio-telephony] control, and to create diversions so that the enemy would be unable to appreciate our true objectives.’’39 The goal was to create as much havoc in the enemy radar system as possible, thereby protecting the real invasion fleet as it approached the French coastline. In addition to participating in the naval diversion plans, the AEAF developed its own airborne diversions—Operations Titanic I–IV. In order to entice German reserves that were south of the Seine River to join German formations stationed north of the river, Titanic I ordered the simulation of an airborne division parachuting into that area. Allied aircraft were to drop two hundred dummies, along with pintails and the appropriate noises, into the Yerville-Doudeville-Fauville-Yvetot area shortly before the Overlord forces landed. Two SAS (Special Air Services) groups would parachute into the same area to enhance the illusion of an airborne assault. Titanic II, which was canceled before June 6, targeted enemy reserves in the area east of the Dives River. Using 50 fake paratroopers, pintails, and noise, Titanic II hoped to prevent German reserves from traveling west of the Dives River. The goal of Titanic III was to spark a counterattack by enemy troops in the area southwest of Caen by dropping fifty dummies, pintails, and noise around Maltot and in the woods north of Baron. By jettisoning two hundred fake paratroopers, pintails, and noise near Marigny, Titanic IV hoped to prompt the same response from enemy forces west of St. Lo. As in Titanic I, two SAS groups would land and create havoc around St. Lo.40 Allied forces began implementing Fortitude South before SHAEF and the LCS had agreed to the final plans. They acknowledged that it would take time to suggest an Order of Battle for the Pas de Calais deception. SHAEF and the LCS worked closely together because the Supreme Commander received orders to implement the plan along with the LCS and the War Office. In addition to utilizing special means, they were able to take advantage of the existence of FUSAG, which the

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U.S. Army had activated on October 18, 1943. SHAEF hoped to use available resources to demonstrate ‘‘movement and administrative preparations,’’ which would imply the following: the Pas de Calais as the target of the main Allied effort; a delay in the end of Neptune arrangements; and the ability of Allied forces to launch an assault on the area east of Cap Gris Nez from D-Day on. By stationing FUSAG in southeast England, the LCS and SHAEF hoped to persuade the German High Command to delay the transfer of the Fifteenth Army from Calais to Normandy until after the Allies had built a strong beachhead that could withstand enemy counterattacks.41

5

Putting Fortitude South into Play: From the Beginning until D-Day

When you are going to attack nearby, make it look as if you are going to go a long way; when you are going to attack far away, make it look as if you are going just a short distance. —Master Sun Tzu1

Once the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved Operation Fortitude and the various commanders decided what forces were needed to implement it, they were ready to put the plan in motion. According to Colonel Bevan of the London Controlling Section, three things were necessary for a successful deception: ‘‘a good workable plan; a transmission belt to include what you call HUMINT, SIGINT and open sources, particularly diplomatic in neutral countries; and feedback from the enemy through ULTRA.’’2 The Allies intended to rely on all three as they implemented Fortitude South as a cover for the Normandy invasion. By March 1944, thousands of real and imaginary American soldiers began arriving in Great Britain. The real forces joined General Omar Bradley’s Twelfth U.S. Army Group, which had established camp in southern England, across the English Channel from the Normandy beaches. The imaginary forces received orders to report to the Third U.S. Army in southeast England. Because the Third Army could not be completely fictitious, SHAEF and the LCS decided to maintain the illusion by using nine divisions of the Third Army and two of the First Canadian Army and later by providing a high-profile commander. Although SHAEF initially kept his appointment as commander of the Third Army a secret, information about Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s command leaked to the Germans. Patton received the command despite his difficulties in Italy because the Germans, who considered Patton ‘‘the most able battlefield commander,’’ believed that he would command the Allied invasion force.3

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On March 30, the 21st Army Group convened a meeting at which two crucial parts of the deception plan were decided—the FUSAG Order of Battle and the locations of the divisions, corps, and armies involved. The group designated 2nd Canadian Infantry and 28th U.S. Infantry Divisions as the two assault divisions that would lead the attack against the Pas de Calais. The decisions about the Order of Battle and the troops’ locations furnished the operation’s foundation on which the wireless program and the Special Means plans could be based. Consequently, the Joint Commanders issued directions for the physical deception, although the Chiefs of Staff did not approve the Special Means plan for the controlled agents until May 18. Implementation of some aspects of the plan, however, did begin before its final approval. SHAEF and LCS chose the sites for dummy landing craft displays by the end of March.4 By May 11, 1944, SHAEF designated the commanders who would play a dual role—command Overlord formations and participate in the deception. SHAEF also indicated which formations they would command, their dates of release, and their probable dates of departure for command overseas. Patton received command of the Third U.S. Army HQ, although the Germans would have the impression that he was the Commander of FUSAG. Major General Troy H. Middleton received the command of VIII U.S. Corps, Major General Walton H. Walker of XX U.S. Corps, Major General Leroy H. Watson of 3rd U.S. Armored Division, and Major General Robert W. Crow of 6th U.S. Armored Division. The British commanders included Lieutenant General M. C. Dempsey of British Second Army, Major General C. Foulkes of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, and Major General R.N. Gale of 6th British Airborne Division. The arrival of American troops in Great Britain began to lend an air of realism to the deception. However, the appropriate departments had to make provisions for constructing the displays for the Fortitude deceptions. SHAEF began allocating equipment in late February. Under the terms of a directive dated February 26, 1944, the Supreme Commander received one hundred inflatable bigbobs. The Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force, the Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group, and the Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, together received several hundred fake landing craft and airplanes for the displays.5 A directive dated March 26, 1944, to the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief, South Eastern, Southern, and Eastern Commands and to the GSO.1, London District, indicated the methods to be used to accomplish the Fortitude South objectives. They included fake displays and the concentration of real troops in marshalling areas in eastern and southeastern England, as well as around London. The directive also called for the institution of a camouflage policy for the deception area. ‘‘The general policy in Eastern and South Eastern Commands and London District will therefore be to carry out the straightforward policy of concealment, restrictions, etc. for actual concentrations of troops and movement within their respective Commands and London District.’’6 Charged with perpetrating the threat to the Pas de Calais, the 21st Army Group, commanded by General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, had the authority to continue

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any measures already begun by dealing directly with the War Office and GHQ, Home Forces. Montgomery also had ‘‘direct control’’ of the specialist troops required for implementing Fortitude South. Before implementing the deception, however, Montgomery borrowed organization practices established earlier in the Middle East and formed a Deception Staff called G(R) or ‘‘R’’ Force.7 ‘‘R’’ Force ‘‘incorporated the wireless deception unit (No. 5 Wireless Group), the visual deception units (the camouflage field companies or . . .the special field companies, R.E.), and a sonic deception unit (a light scout car company), and, when necessary, coordinated the activities of the camouflage pool of officers and the camouflage staffs of formations.’’8 Colonel David I. Strangeways received command of ‘‘R’’ Force and instructions to implement the physical aspects of the Fortitude South deception.9 Strangeways later claimed that he reviewed and rewrote Fortitude South because the plan was too complicated. According to the ‘‘R’’ Force commander, people who did not have experience with deception had written the Fortitude South plan. Although the London office was unhappy with Strangeways’s changes, they had to accept them. Because he was responsible for overseeing the deception’s land displays, Montgomery agreed to the alterations. Ever confident in his own abilities, Strangeways said fifty years later in an interview, ‘‘Obviously I had been doing this kind of thing for what, three years it was. And obviously it was easier for me than it was for them. But they had to start from scratch without any experience, which is no criticism of them.’’10 The Joint Commanders believed that, because enemy reconnaissance would learn little from ‘‘land preparations,’’ and because an ‘‘elaborate physical deception’’ might reveal the deception, it was important to concentrate on the display of landing craft and the use of wireless. The War Office department (SWV8) that handled camouflage and all aspects of visual misdirection by technical means, from static production to tactical development, supplied 256 dummy landing craft (Mark II and Mark V, landing craft tanks, LCTs) for the displays on the coast of east and southeast England. GHQ, Home Forces, loaned the 21st Army Group two infantry battalions, the 4th Battalion of the Northamptonshire Regiment (also known as the 4th Northants) and the 10th Battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment (also known as the 10th Worcesters), to construct the bigbob displays. The 185 Camouflage Field Company, RE, later joined the 4th Northants and the 10th Worcesters in constructing dummy landing craft. In February 1944 the 4th Northants began sending 150-men groups to Ipswich to prepare for their part in the deception. In early April their training became even more secret with the ‘‘imposition of postal censorship.’’ The 4th Northants moved to Broadstairs on April 19 after being relieved by a Canadian division. Two days later, the battalion received orders to begin Exercise Flake, ‘‘the erection, launching and maintenance of a number of ‘mock-up’ landing craft, on the River Deben at Ipswich, at Oulton Broad in Norfolk, at Lowestoft and at Yarmouth.’’11 The 4th Northants erected a fleet of approximately 150 bigbobs. A bigbob was a fake landing craft tank (LCT), which was made from steel tubing and canvas. Crews attached the structure that was camouflaged to resemble a real LCT to large airtight drums, which gave it buoyancy. It took a crew eight hours to construct one fake LCT. Although the bigbob had wheels, which allowed it to be transported over short

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distances into water, it required 30 men to launch one five and a half ton craft, which was 160 feet long and 30 feet wide. Once it was in the water, a small craft towed the bigbob to its mooring. Although they launched the bigbobs at night, the 4th Northants continuously performed maintenance on the crafts during the day. To add a sense of realism to the displays, the crews used ‘‘smoke issuing from the dummy funnels, oil seeping from the sterns, washing flapping in the breeze and men rowing from craft to craft’’ to deliver the mail and supplies. The bigbobs did not prove to be as durable as the deception planners had hoped. At one point high winds tore numerous craft ‘‘from their moorings, and . . .beached them up creeks and on mudbanks, with buckled sides, torn canvas and funnels awry,’’ which could have compromised the deception had enemy reconnaissance planes discovered the damage. The 10th Battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment, or the 10th Worcesters, traveled to Harwich near Ipswich and underwent a period of extensive training on a tributary of the River Orwell. The battalion trained from January until April and constructed dummy landing craft, initially at dusk or early morning. As the battalion became more experienced, the men erected the dummy landing craft at night. The 10th Worcesters received orders deploying them to Dover, Folkestone, and Harwich. Forty-men crews assembled each bigbob in eight hours. The dummy craft even included fake antiaircraft guns. With training complete in May, the 21st Army Group set May 24 as the start date for the erection of the fake landing craft by the 10th Worcesters. The battalion did not, however, succeed in erecting all of the displays on time. Untrained sappers slowed down the completion of the display on the River Orwell. As the crews became more comfortable constructing and launching the dummy craft, they increased the number of craft launched each night to ten. The 10th Worcesters succeeded in displaying 122 craft by June 6.12 Dr. Peter Tooley was responsible for the bigbobs that the 10th Worcesters launched on the River Orwell. According to Tooley, My job was to climb up onto the rickety bridge some 20 feet above the water and maneuver the bigbob to its river anchorage using the assault boats as giant outboard motors. An air of realism was given to the dummies by flying the white ensign during daylight hours and lighting smoke generators in the funnels. Regular small boat services also called at each craft in turn delivering mailbags, ammunition boxes, and other ship stores. Also oilers and leave-boats were sailed around the fleet while skeleton crews moved around the decks.13

Erecting the displays of bigbobs proved difficult at times. Brigadier M.B. Dowse, General Staff, South Eastern Command, complained in a letter dated April 24, 1944, that lack of direction from above made the job more complicated than he had expected. ‘‘This lack of information available to Commanders concerned has not been for security reasons but because it has been impossible despite repeated attempts, to elicit a clear and definite plan from 21 Army Group.’’14 The majority of Dowse’s communication included a chronology of events beginning with the first request for the 4th Northants and the 10th Worcesters for special training. According

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to Dowse, he first learned that the 21st Army Group planned to erect bigbob displays at a meeting that occurred on March 21. Over a month elapsed before Dowse began to receive satisfactory responses to his repeated requests for information. The GSO.1, ‘‘R’’ Force, admitted that a ‘‘lack of co-ordination’’ created some of the difficulties that Dowse had been experiencing. Dowse obtained a promise that the 21st Army Group would supply the required information as soon as it could. Lack of 21st Army Group’s experience in creating bigbob displays may have resulted in the confusion about which Dowse complained. ‘‘R’’ Force was responsible for more than bigbob displays. It had to produce the illusion of another invasion force, FUSAG, by ‘‘providing troop concentrations, vehicle parks, guns, tanks and landing craft throughout southeast England.’’ 15 Deception crews erected fictitious troop camps that contained ‘‘tent cities,’’ field kitchens, ammunition dumps, vehicle displays, whatever was needed to add realism. Although they were empty, the canvas tent sides fluttered in the wind. The field kitchens’ chimneys emitted large amounts of smoke daily to suggest the preparation of meals for the forces that did not exist. American engineers orchestrated the construction of tracks connecting existing roads. Army trucks drove back and forth to leave visible tire tracks. Crews built hospitals and warehouses out of wood, wire, and canvas. ‘‘Shepperton Studios, movie-set designers, provided rubber tanks, artillery, trucks, and landing craft for FUSAG’s displays.’’ Using fiberboard, wood, canvas, and sewer pipe, Shepperton craftsmen constructed a dock and ‘‘a large oilstorage complex near Dover.’’ Although it appeared functional, the storage complex did not contain any oil. Both the King of England and Montgomery ‘‘inspected’’ the new dock facilities, while General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, addressed the workers who had constructed them during a dinner at a hotel in Dover. Although his remarks were specifically vague, the mayor of Dover noted the ‘‘opening’’ of the new dock. The presence of RAF fighter patrols enhanced the illusion.16 For examples of some of the equipment made for these fictitious camps, see Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. Some problems with the deception exhibits became apparent. Colonel Strangeways, ‘‘R’’ Force, claimed that he modified the displays of dummy barges because they were not important, which meant a waste of manpower and effort. Because the Allied air forces had restricted the number of enemy reconnaissance flights flown over southeast England, big displays proved unnecessary. ‘‘And what they’d forgotten is, is that their role is landing craft. Where the hell were the troops to come from to get onto them? And they’d forgotten to make any hards on the coast.’’ Strangeways approached Montgomery’s chief engineer, who suggested erecting fake hards. Objecting, Strangeways said, ‘‘You daren’t make dummy hards because, if they are dummy and they’re spotted as dummy, you’ve done the very thing that you shouldn’t have done. Better no hards at all.’’ Listening to Strangeway’s objections, the chief engineer agreed to erect real, rather than fake, hards.17 Deception forces implemented a series of field exercises in the Thetford area in the weeks prior to D-Day. On May 28 elements of an armored division appeared and remained in the area for two days as part of Operation Cabbage. Exercise Cheese,

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Figure 5.1 Germans flying overhead would have difficulty noticing that one of the two trucks in this picture is actually a dummy. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

executed on May 30, entailed the movement of an entire armored division into the Thetford area. The next day an infantry division transferred into the same area to fulfill Exercise Spam. The erection and placement of rubber tanks, artillery, trucks, and landing craft was not always successful. On June 1, 1944, Major MoneyCoutts witnessed an exercise by 23rd Headquarters Detachment U.S. Special Troops near Thetford. The purpose of the exercise was to ‘‘see how American devices simulated in the field, an armed division comprising 2 combat teams with another in reserve.’’ Although 23rd Detachment U.S. Special Troops successfully inflated a variety of dummies, one in ten had collapsed by the next morning. ******************* Because the 21st Army Group was responsible for southeast England, Montgomery had to make provisions for the concealment and display of troops, vehicles, and dummy aircraft and landing craft according to SHAEF’s plan. In March 1944 he issued orders in reference to camouflage policy. They included provisions for vehicles, tents, the polishing of vehicles and guns, washing, and smoke. Vehicles fell into two categories, A and B. Montgomery’s directive ordered that all vehicles be painted dark

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Figure 5.2 Nestled in a forest, this tank would seem real to German soldiers as long as they were unable to approach it. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

brown (SCC No. 1A) or dark green (SCC No. 7 or olive drab) and that windscreens be covered with material or dirt to prevent the reflection of sunlight. The general also ordered that tents be darkened with the same colors as the vehicles and that crews only polish necessary parts of vehicles and guns. Although crews received orders to conceal washing and cooking smoke, the desire to create the illusion of the presence of another invasion force in southeast England dictated the construction of physical displays.18 A directive dated May 6, 1944, from Strangeways to the First Canadian Army, the Second Army, Eastern Command, South Eastern Command, the 79th Armoured Division, and HQ GHQ troops, provided instructions for vehicle displays in southern and eastern England. The directive suggested the placement, when practical, of vehicles along the side of roads or in open parking places. In the area of South Eastern Command, 2nd Canadian and 4th Canadian Armoured Divisions of the II Canadian Corps and 43rd, 53rd, and 59th Divisions of the XII Corps received orders to place their vehicles in the open. The directive excluded marshalling areas from exhibiting vehicles. In the area of Eastern Command, the display area included Yarmouth–Deben River–Woodbridge–Debenham–Eye, but excluded the

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Figure 5.3 From the sky, this truck would look real, especially with tire tracks behind it, but an up-close inspection would reveal its true nature. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

Norwich Ipswich-Norwich road and the Norwich Yarmouth road. The directive prohibited the placement of vehicles on the main road that connected Yarmouth with Ipswich. ‘‘Formations and units of Second Army, 21 Army Group units under HQ GHQ Troops, units of 79 Armored Division’’ received orders to ‘‘‘show’ vehicles.’’ None of the displays could, however, prevent the movement of traffic on the roads involved in the deception.19 ******************* Allied leaders recognized the need for an air force to support the FUSAG invasion force. Consequently, they ordered the construction of dummy airfields in southeast England. The RAF installed decoy sites and lighting to augment the displays of bigbobs and to provide protective lighting for hards, areas where landing craft were loaded and unloaded. Because the Admiralty dictated that little light be used on real hards, Colonel John Turner’s department, which installed and operated the decoy lighting, could not use lighting that would attract enemy attention. Consequently, Turner and his advisers concluded that ‘‘decoys should simulate what might happen on a real hard if an attack took place.’’ Turner’s C & D crews left lights on vehicles

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Figure 5.4 An overhead view shows a jeep pulling a trailer of equipment in a small convoy, but in the close-up, the rear tire suggests that the convoy has stalled. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.

and lit a few small fires, which ‘‘became a main feature of the decoys,’’ but the crews only used lights and fires when an attack occurred in the area. Turner’s department was responsible for other types of lighting, as well, and received information about its role very early in the game. At a meeting held on February 24, 1944, the 21st Army Group and Turner’s department made decisions about the lighting for the bigbob displays. They divided the displays of lighting and fire into three groups. Group No. 1 provided protective lighting from Falmouth to Hastings. Group No. 2, responsible for the coastal area from Hastings to the Thames estuary, provided displays that were protective first, but that could become misleading ones if necessary. The planners concluded that it was impractical to reinforce the bigbobs in Folkestone and Dover with misleading displays of lighting and fire. Group No. 3 constructed displays to strengthen the concentration of bigbobs that were in waters north of the Thames by providing lighting that was intended to attract, not distract, enemy attention. Group No. 3 provided ‘‘hooding lighting along the banks of the rivers and Broads, with lines of vehicle lights leading towards the water. At specified times they were to be operated all night to simulate embarkation activity.’’ Although the local Naval authority controlled the displays in

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order to protect shipping and craft movement, RAF personnel from Turner’s department operated the night displays.20 C & D (Concealment and Display) units established other protective decoys at East Tilbury and Lower Hope Point to protect shipping concentrations on the Thames near Tilbury and Gravesend, three at Cobnor Point to protect the western side of the Chichester port and Portsmouth, and at Cuckmere Haven to protect the port and railway at Newhaven. C & D crews established QL/QF sites at Breydon Water (Yarmouth), Benacre Ness (Lowestoft area), Oulton Broad (Lowestoft), Whitehall Farm (River Deben Nore), Falkenham Marshes (River Deben Nore), Trimley Marshes (River Orwell Nore), and East Tilbury (Tilbury Nore) and QL sites at Churston (Brixham), St. Mawes (Falmouth area), East Cornworthy (Dartmouth), and Ruan Lanihorne (Falmouth area) by April 26, 1944. Decoy lighting proved to be an important component of the dummy airfields. Turner’s C & D crews placed Q lights, which provided dim illumination, alongside the runways, which bulldozers had created in various fields in southeast England. Next to the runways, crews installed fake recognition beacons and phony aircraft that they had built out of wood and heavy-duty canvas. Following instructions, C & D teams improperly camouflaged some of the planes. To add realism to the displays and fool enemy agents, ‘‘R’’ Force provided sound tracks that contained the noise of the revving of aircraft engines for crews to play. ‘‘At night, when a snooping Luftwaffe plane was overhead, salvaged automobile headlights mounted on wheels were dragged up and down the fake airfields, conveying the impression that planes were landing and taking off.’’21 Many of the decoy lighting displays required cooperation between Turner’s department and ‘‘R’’ Force. Interdepartmental rivalries resulted. Colonel John Turner and Colonel David Strangeways failed to see eye-to-eye on several occasions, which made cooperation difficult. Turner first complained about disagreements with Strangeways to the ACAS(G) on February 14. Following several discussions with the ‘‘R’’ Force commander, Turner believed that Strangeways wanted to commandeer some of his C & D units. According to Turner, he notified Strangeways of the Air Marshal Commanding 2nd TAF’s opposition and suggested that the 21st Army Group and 2nd TAF settle the dispute themselves. The movement of Allied troops into the Southern Command area created problems between troop camps and decoy displays. Turner reported efforts to solve the existing problem and to prevent future ones as more troops moved into the southern coastal areas. Colonel Turner wrote to the ACAS(G) on May 16, 1944, about various problems that his department had been experiencing, including difficulties with Lieutenant Colonel Strangeways, who ‘‘appears to be so embedded in his own worth that he tried to pull a fast one over T.A.F. and myself.’’ Turner complained that Strangeways attempted to commandeer all of the C & D units for deception purposes. Although the two men agreed that Turner would provide the equipment and training and that Strangeways’s men would provide deceptive lighting, Strangeways, operating contrary to the agreement and without notifying TAF, ordered his men to construct decoy lighting. Turner complained that Strangeways’s men ‘‘have no knowledge of

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decoy work and its difficulties, no experience, and no training in that line.’’ Turner concluded that Strangeways was ‘‘a careerist whose chief idea is to push himself. I may be wrong, but I shan’t trust him much in the future.’’22 Strangeways held an equally poor opinion of Turner. In addition to implementing decoy and deceptive lighting in southeast England, Turner and Strangeways had to make similar provisions for the Normandy beaches. Difficulties between the two men continued when Strangeways attempted to direct plans for decoy lighting on the assault beaches. Turner expressed his concern to Air Marshal Sir A. Coningham and to Flight Lieutenant A.P. Godfrey that Strangeways’s lack of experience with decoy lighting would result in the construction of sites that could easily be detected by the enemy.23 According to Strangeways, Turner had run, brilliantly, the decoy fires and things to divert the enemy aircraft when they were bombing England. And he had trained a lot of pioneers, etc. to do the job. I was going to have dummy bridges and things in the bridgehead. Sir John Turner. . .assumed that his pioneers would go over. And I said no. My own engineers, I mean real engineers, not pioneer engineers.. . .I had to say, I’m very sorry, but this is not going to be. I next told them why. They were pioneers; they’d not ever been in battle. They’d been bombed often enough, but they’d never been in battle. I thought it wasn’t fair to them.. . .Sir John Turner’s department was under the RAF. He was anti-bombing air side. It was a matter of pride, or, I can see it because this chap had built up a very, very fine organization. And he’d been thinking in terms of them all going overseas, you see, for the battle.24

When Strangeways attended a combined 83rd Group/21st Army Group meeting on May 20–21, 1944, he learned that the responsibility for decoy lighting on the assault beaches would fall to the RAF, which meant to Colonel Turner’s department.25 ******************* In addition to displays of landing craft, aircraft, army camps, hospitals, supply depots, and airfields, SHAEF and the LCS wanted the enemy to take particular notice of the concentration of forces in southeast England, and they decided that the key would be the commander of the First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG). Although SHAEF had already chosen General Omar Bradley as the FUSAG commander, by late April 1944 SHAEF realized the problem with their earlier decision. ‘‘There is a risk, previously accepted, that General Bradley would be identified by the enemy as Commanding General, First US Army, after D day. This might prejudice attempts to indicate him as Commanding General, FUSAG.’’ 26 Consequently, SHAEF ordered the 21st Army Group to change its plan and ‘‘suggest General Patton as the notional Commanding General, FUSAG.’’ SHAEF decided, however, to pass the information to the enemy by Special Means and not to make special arrangements to publicize Patton’s appointment. Believing that Patton was ‘‘the most able’’ Allied battlefield commander, the Germans quickly accepted Patton as the commander of FUSAG, the invasion force poised to attack the Pas de Calais. In reality Patton had received command of the Third U.S. Army. Consequently, although he secretly inspected the Third Army, Patton publicly moved around southeast England

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visiting FUSAG units.27 The deception planners used Patton and the Third Army’s training exercises and preparations for transfer to Normandy after D-Day to enhance the Fortitude story. Because Patton’s presence in England could bolster the deception, SHAEF did little to hide his visits to Eisenhower, Bradley, and General Sir Alan Brooke, but they were not always successful in limiting the general’s exposure at other times when it was desired. Patton, who became Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, met with Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder and on another occasion with numerous British generals and admirals as American soldiers on the Queen Mary watched. Contrary to Eisenhower’s orders, Patton agreed in April 1944 to attend the opening of the Knutsford ‘‘Welcome Club’’ for American servicemen. Although he was the principal guest, Patton believed that his presence would be unofficial and that no ceremony would occur. The event proved to be a fiasco. Not only was Patton greeted by a crowd, a band, and a British women’s auxiliary honor guard, but press photographers were also present. After receiving promises that the photographers would not take his picture and that the crowd lacked reporters, Patton agreed to make a brief statement, in which he insulted Russia. The story of his appearance became known inside and outside of Britain and landed Patton in trouble again. Although General George C. Marshall had the authority to remove Patton, he allowed Eisenhower to decide Patton’s fate. Several military officials, including Colonel N.W. Campanole who witnessed the incident, verified that Patton’s version of events was accurate. Eisenhower, after reprimanding the flamboyant general, decided that Patton was crucial to the campaign in Normandy. Eisenhower ordered that Patton’s participation in Fortitude continue, and the general remained Third Army commander.28 From the beginning, Patton found it difficult to hide his presence in Great Britain and to conform to the role expected by SHAEF. On February 8, 1944, in a letter about Patton’s secret presence in England, Colonel Harry A. Flint wrote, ‘‘Just got back from a landing show and found a note from Lee saying you were with him ‘incognito’. That work always makes me unduly discreet!’’29 Patton described his role to Major General Guy V. Henry in a letter dated February 26, 1944. ‘‘I had some very interesting trips while I was working as a decoy for German divisions, and I believe that my appearances had a considerable effect and probably ran up their railroad freight bill a good deal.’’30 The general made several references in his diary to being a ‘‘myth’’ and that his presence was a secret.31 While he seemed to relish his part in the deception at times, Patton was often frustrated with the necessity of remaining unobtrusive. He frequently complained about it in letters to his wife. On February 20, 1944, he wrote, ‘‘I wish I could stop being incognito.’’ A couple of weeks later, he complained to her, ‘‘This damned secrecy thing is rather annoying particularly as I doubt if it fools any one. Every time I make a speech I have to say now remember you have not seen me—a voice crying in the wilderness.’’32 Patton found it particularly difficult after the incident in Knutsford, which almost cost him his job. Eisenhower frequently complained to Marshall about his colleague’s indiscretions. On April 29, 1944, Eisenhower wrote,

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Dear General Marshall: This morning I sent you a telegram about the Patton case. Frankly I am exceedingly weary of his habit of getting everybody into hot water through the immature character of his public actions and statements. In this particular case investigation shows that this offense was not so serious as the newspapers would lead one to believe, and one that under the circumstances could have occurred to almost anybody. But the fact remains that he simply does not keep his mouth shut. I am waiting on an answer to my telegram to you before taking final action.33

Despite his frustration, Eisenhower believed that because he needed Patton in Normandy, he would have to leave him where he was and not send him stateside in disgrace. The Supreme Commander hoped that he would not have cause to regret his decision. ******************* The deception planners had more to worry about, however, than Patton’s alleged indiscretions. They were concerned about their ability to make the deception’s physical displays real enough to fool the enemy. To make the physical displays more realistic, planners devised wireless traffic for each of the real and fictitious formations participating in the deception. COSSAC (Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command), wrote the initial wireless deception plan, which dictated periods of wireless silence and intense activity for FUSAG and the 21st Army Group. According to the plan, each wireless silence period would commence on the first day at 0001 A hours and conclude on the last day at 2359 A hours. The length of the silent periods varied from two to ten days, with the first scheduled to begin on December 25, 1943, and the last to end on September 5, 1944. Within each period the participating formations began and ended at different times. Although SHAEF later approved exceptions to the silent periods, the only wireless transmissions approved by the original plan were those from sets with ‘‘dummy aerials for training and maintenance purposes.’’ When possible, the naval assault forces, participating in training exercises with their military counterparts, would observe the same periods of wireless silence, as would those air force groups that had direct wireless links with the army formations. The COSSAC plan also stipulated periods of intense wireless activity, with the first one commencing on December 29, 1943, and the last one ending on September 8, 1944. The intense periods varied in length from one to four days. According to the directive, ‘‘during these periods W/T (wireless telegraphy) nets will be worked to full capacity and R/T (radio-telephony) nets for at least eight hours per day.’’34 In the plan, COSSAC anticipated the formation and training of a ‘‘British wireless deception unit’’ by March 1, 1944. The 21st Army Group would command part of the unit, which would be able to simulate a minimum of two divisions, ‘‘for the purpose of covering the move of the Rosyth force, and for augmenting the wireless facilities of the notional assault and follow-up forces in the South-East.’’ Around the same time COSSAC expected the availability of an American radio deception battalion that would be ‘‘capable of simulating a corps of two divisions.’’ In addition, the 21st Army Group would receive orders to establish a fake combined headquarters at Chatham and to arrange its ‘‘military wireless component.’’

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In order to anticipate the enemy’s response, the 21st Army Group’s ‘‘Y’’ or SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) sections would intercept and evaluate the ‘‘deceptive wireless activity.’’ Furthermore, 21st Army Group would monitor the transmissions ‘‘to ensure that it is being carried out according to plan and that the necessary standards of wireless security and discipline are being maintained.’’ Finally the COSSAC plan instructed the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Force, the Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group, and the Air Commander-inChief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF), to provide ‘‘the detailed planning and preparation of the remainder of the wireless measures necessary.’’35 By late February 1944 SHAEF allocated deception units and equipment for the Fortitude scheme. The Supreme Commander received three deception units from No. 5 Wireless Group, which would establish one static monitoring section, one divisional section, and one monitoring section. The Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force, the 21st Army Group Commander-in-Chief, and the Air Commander-in-Chief, AEAF, received three deception units, which were the 3103rd U.S. Signal Service Battalion and two units from No. 5 Wireless Group. One unit would establish two divisional sections, and the other would set up one mobile monitoring section.36 The British War Office initiated the formation of a special wireless deception unit called No. 5 Wireless Group, the use of which it offered to SHAEF for the Fortitude deceptions. No. 5 Wireless Group, which the War Office ‘‘formed to enable wireless deception plans to be implemented with the maximum verisimilitude, coupled with the minimum demands upon man-power,’’ contained 295 members of all ranks. Using special equipment, the Group could transmit ‘‘recorded conversations . . . through normal Army wireless equipment.’’ Each installation would have the ability to represent at most six RT stations. No. 5 Wireless Group included Administration and Maintenance Sections and two companies. No. 1 Company, which contained, in addition to its headquarters, two mobile monitoring and one static monitoring sections, monitored wireless traffic to ensure that it advanced an accurate overall deception picture and that the melding of the Group’s individual RT nets with any CW nets followed prescribed procedures. The mobile sections conducted detailed studies of any formation’s communications picture that it intended to simulate. No. 2 Company included three divisional sections and a headquarters. Two general staff officers from each section, using information provided by No. 1 Company, constructed ‘‘schemes of a type in consonance with the training being carried out by the formation to be simulated.’’37 Each divisional section contained four recording and nine reproducing detachments. ‘‘Each recording detachment provides facilities to enable staff and regimental officers, and others required to record an RT conversation, to do so within the confines of one 3-ton vehicle.’’ The GSO (General Staff Officer) II and III from each section provided a script for RT conversations, which the recording detachments registered on records. The reproducing detachments played the records in the area where they were simulating a particular formation.38 In late February 1944, following a request from Major General C.A. West to the Under Secretary

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of State, the War Office assigned No. 5 Wireless Group to the 21st Army Group. SHAEF did, however, retain operational control of three sections—one static monitoring, one mobile monitoring, and one divisional. On January 27, 1944, Major General Harold R. Bull, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, informed the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army) that the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion, which would arrive in Great Britain sometime the next month, had received orders to report initially to the VIII U.S. Corps. It would fall under the command of a U.S. Army Group, when one had been formed. In January 1944, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur McCrary received an offer to command the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion, which the Pentagon had activated for ‘‘strategic operations.’’ According to James Bowman, a 3103rd radioman, the battalion was ‘‘designed solely to implement a major element of the Calais hoax.’’ As the leader of 3103rd Signal Service Battalion, McCrary commanded 708 men and 31 officers.39 The unit included over 200 vehicles, ‘‘almost one for every three men. The organization was to be based on the cellular radio team, and each team was to have seven or more men and two vehicles.’’40 For subordinates, McCrary had Major Alfred R. Braddock, executive officer, and First Lieutenant John Nichols, S-3 or operations officer. McCrary’s radio teams, which included a ‘‘cryptographic unit with coding equipment,’’ received training in using and maintaining the equipment, opening networks, practicing effective camouflage techniques, and exercising proper radio security. While the 3103rd’s B Company reported first to Northern Ireland and then to the British Fourth Army in Scotland for participation in Fortitude North, the remainder of the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion received posting to Headquarters, ETOUSA, and Headquarters, 21st Army Group. SHAEF ordered VIII Corps to release the 3103rd Battalion to 21st Army Group until it exhausted its usefulness. According to Major General Bull, the 3103rd received orders to simulate a two-division U.S. Corps through radio activity. SHAEF also dictated that the ‘‘battalion should be so trained that it can simulate, by radio means, any corps formation. A portion of the battalion should be trained to monitor the radio activity of the entire battalion to insure that necessary security, control and phasing are effected.’’ SHAEF expected the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion to be operationally prepared to commence operation in Great Britain by March 15, 1944.41 The 3103rd Signal Service Battalion had to undergo adequate training before it would be operationally prepared to commence its assigned role for the deception. Initially placed under VIII Corps for training and administration, the battalion spent the first month undergoing ‘‘specialist training as well as training in certain basic subjects required of all units stationed in the U.K.. . .The second month was devoted to specialist training and field exercises. Radio nets of a corps and infantry and armored divisions were set up and operated with dummy antennas.’’ According to its orders, once the unit was operational, the nature of ‘‘its operations probably would be that of simulating, by radio activity, a corps consisting of an armored division and an infantry division.’’42 In order to help the battalion become better prepared to fulfill its role in the deception, the Signal Intelligence Division (SID)

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monitored its progress and provided the unit with analysis reports on a regular basis. Officially organized on March 15, 1944, the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion received its mission on the same day. The unit would ‘‘simulate the arrival of a corps consisting of two divisions which would be going into its final training period.’’ The radio traffic designed to implement the plan would be classified as ‘‘traffic below division as low level traffic and above division as high level traffic.’’ 43 The preparations undertaken by the 3103rd met only part of the wireless part of the deception plan. Before the acceptance of the Fortitude Plan, the only deceptive wireless measure taken in England was the formation of Combined Headquarters at Chatham. Because it was responsible for the Pas de Calais threat, the 21st Army Group controlled all wireless deception necessary to build the fake Order of Battle. The Fortitude South Cover Plan included a diagram, ‘‘Wireless Layout S.E. Force,’’ which indicated FUSAG’s wireless links. The plan connected the main FUSAG link in Wentworth to that of First Canadian Army in Leatherhead and Third U.S. Army in Chelmsford. Some of the links connected two stations, while others constructed nets that linked three or four locations. Each FUSAG formation had its own link.44 By mid-March SHAEF made an adjustment to the schedule of wireless silence. According to SHAEF/18201/5/Ops, dated March 15, 1944, ‘‘21 Army Group are arranging to continue the wireless activity associated with the training of airborne forces up to and including D day with the object of not disclosing the fact that these forces are preparing to take part in ‘NEPTUNE.’’’45 As the date for the commencement of wireless activity approached, revisions of the wireless cover plan continued. According to a directive from General Bernard L. Montgomery, Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group, although the armies involved might establish lateral links, none would be set up between corps. The SO in C branch 21st Army Group had the job of assigning frequencies to the appropriate formations. In addition, ‘‘nets would begin to open on 24 Apr—starting with the lower formations and working back to FUSAG.’’ The directive also set some guidelines for the traffic. The First Canadian Army was responsible for ‘‘25% notional ‘real traffic’’’ and would receive help, if necessary, from the War Office authorized ‘‘dummy traffic.’’ The SO in C 21st Army Group agreed to provide whatever equipment and material was necessary. As part of its training, First Canadian Army received authorization to ‘‘operate down to Bn/Regt level.’’ Both First Canadian and Third U.S. Armies would receive signal instructions from FUSAG.46 The 3103rd Signal Service Battalion established seventeen radio teams at thirteen locations in East Anglia and southeastern England. According to its operational instructions, the battalion was to commence activity by its first net on April 20 and conclude operation on June 26, 1944. The RCM Detachment, Signal Section, HQ FUSAG, provided the battalion’s traffic schedules, as well as the plain text of the messages to be transmitted. By June 1 the unit was maintaining four cryptographic installations, and it would do so until the operation ended. While one of the cryptographic installations provided service for U.S. nets, the other three established service

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nets for British and Canadian units. The RCM Detachment’s mission ‘‘was that of providing the plan which would show by radio activity the formation of US units in East Anglia.. . .All units shown were to be typical US units arriving in the UK to undergo final training for an invasion.’’47 The Fortitude South wireless nets opened on April 26, 1944.48 Soon, southeast England was alive with wireless messages passing back and forth between the FUSAG command posts that did not exist to fictitious battalions and companies. In some cases, the signals operators transmitted the communications in ‘‘easily breakable codes.’’ The fact that the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion had studied the radio communications between real American formations enabled it to ‘‘plausibly imitate normal’’ wireless traffic.49 SHAEF continued to make adjustments to the wireless silence schedule until after D-Day. Recognizing that periods of wireless silence might indicate impending action, Allied officials constantly reevaluated the situation. By scheduling numerous periods of imposed quiet, they hoped to condition the Germans to their occurrence, and, consequently, the enemy would not connect a particular period of no activity with an impending assault. In early May Colonel David I. Strangeways from the 21st Army Group sent a communication, entitled ‘‘Pre-D Day Wireless Preparations,’’ to First Canadian Army, Second Army, No. 5 Wireless Group, and SO in C 21st Army Group. Strangeways indicated the threefold object of the plan: ‘‘(a) to achieve a measure of surprise by eliminating an ‘enforced’ wireless silence in the event of a postponement of D Day; (b) to cover the final moves of assault Corps; and (c) to overcome the obvious disadvantages of a prolonged wireless silence in the event of a postponement of D Day.’’50 Strangeways stipulated a number of changes in wireless activity to be implemented between mid-May and D-Day. According to the directive from the 21st Army Group, First Canadian Army received orders to simulate wireless exercises for 3rd Canadian Division beginning on May 30 and ending H minus 7 hours D-Day, which was seven hours before the commencement of the invasion. The directive ordered Second Army to suggest the movement of a headquarters during the period May 8–12 by ‘‘staggering the moves of their static links from High Wycombe to Tunbridge Wells.’’ Between May 11 and 16 operators from the 21st Army Group Signals would gradually assume responsibility for Second Army’s static links. While I and XXX Corps observed wireless silence beginning on May 27, VIII Corps not only had to maintain its own wireless activity, it also had to simulate wireless exercises from May 30 until H minus 7 hours D-Day. The directive assigned two tasks to XII Corps: to assume responsibility for I Corps’ static links between May 10 and 20 and to simulate 3rd British Infantry Division with wireless exercises between May 30 and H minus 7 hours D-Day. During the same period, No. 5 Wireless Group would ‘‘simulate one divisional and two brigade signal exercises of 51 (H) Inf Div.’’ The directive also made changes in the wireless schedule. The period of wireless silence that had been scheduled for May was eliminated. It scheduled several others instead—a general silence May 27–30 and two, May 17–20 and May 23–30, for the 21st Army Group’s fixed links. The directive indicated two periods, May 18

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and May 23-27, for ‘‘netting operational frequencies’’ and for intense wireless activity by the 21st Army Group.51 ******************* In addition to Patton and the fake airfields, landing craft, supply dumps, oil depots, and wireless traffic, SHAEF and the LCS decided to use double agents to reinforce the physical aspects of the Fortitude South deception. Special Means and the Double-Cross Committee had been cultivating several double agents, such as Garbo, Brutus, Tricycle, Treasure, and Tate, who would