De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism

^ 40:1 (2006) 143–165 NOUS

De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism* JON TRESAN University of Florida Metaethical Internalism, as here understood,1 says that moral beliefs require motivational or affective states (‘conations’); e.g. that believing that x is right requires having a pro-attitude to x. (The kind of modality involved is metaphysical or conceptual; it is consistent with Externalism that moral beliefs nomically require conations.) Cognitivism says that moral beliefs are mental representations, like typical nonmoral beliefs such as that snow is white, the bridge is stable, my cats are eating, etc.2 Internalism looks unfriendly to Cognitivism. Indeed, Noncognitivists often take it as a premise, Cognitivists as a threat.3 This appearance is not hard to understand. For if we suppose that moral beliefs are conations (call this ‘Conativism’4) we seem to have a fine explanation of Internalism: they require conations because they are conations. And it isn’t clear that Cognitivists can either call upon the explanation from Conativism, or rival it. They can call upon it only if they can say that moral beliefs are both representations and conations (e.g. that the belief that x is right is both a representation of x as having a certain property and a pro-attitude to x). But such states, ‘besires’, are surely odd. If Cognitivists can’t call upon the Conativist explanation of Internalism, can they at least rival it? There are two reasons for doubt. First, any non-besirist explanation seems to run afoul of a plausible metaphysical principle (call it ‘Separability’) to the effect that there are no necessary relations between distinct things (i.e. for any x and y * For helpful discussions and feedback, thanks to Simon Blackburn, David Copp, James Dreier, Kirk Ludwig, Crystal Thorpe, Gene Witmer, and, especially, Alan Kim, Geoff Sayre-McCord, and Keith Simmons. (This paper developed over so many years, and so many discussions, that I despair of remembering all who helped. I apologize to those I’ve missed.)

#2006,

Blackwell Publishing, Inc. 143

144

NOUˆS

which are wholly distinct, it is possible for x to exist without y and vice-versa). Secondly, any non-besirist Internalist Cognitivism apparently would have to posit (in Mackie’s words) ‘intrinsically action-guiding’ properties: properties which necessarily inspire conations in anyone who represents them as instantiated.5 If moral properties aren’t intrinsically action-guiding it’s hard to see why Internalism would hold: why wouldn’t it be possible to represent those properties as instantiated without having the relevant conations? And such properties are surely prima facie odd, as Mackie himself emphasized. Internalism, then, apparently forces Cognitivists to say something weird. If they accept Conativism, they must say that moral beliefs are besires. If they eschew it, they must deny Separability or posit intrinsically actionguiding properties (if not both). Noncognitivists are placed in no such position by Internalism. They can give the Conativist explanation (thus allowing them to affirm Separability and avoid intrinsically action-guiding properties) without being forced into besires. We can capture the main elements of the foregoing considerations in the form of an argument (call it ‘The Argument’): (1) Internalism is true. (2) If Internalist Cognitivism is true then moral beliefs are besires, in violation of Separability, or about intrinsically action-guiding properties. (3) Moral beliefs aren’t besires. (4) Moral beliefs aren’t in violation of Separability. (5) Moral beliefs aren’t about intrinsically action-guiding properties. So, (6) Cognitivism is false. This paper defends Internalist Cognitivism from any such line of reasoning.6 In a nutshell, I suggest that The Argument gains illegitimate plausibility from a failure to distinguish two kinds of Internalism, a ‘de dicto’ and a ‘de re’ version. When we consider the plausibility of Internalism, i.e. (1), we (implicitly) attend to the de dicto version. But when we turn to Internalism’s implications for Cognitivism we attend to the de re version, and only it can underwrite (2). Since de dicto Internalism doesn’t support de re, The Argument collapses: either (1) or (2) is unsupported, depending on whether the ‘Internalism’ meant is de re or de dicto, respectively.7 Section I explains these two kinds of Internalism and shows that (2) is false of de dicto Internalist Cognitivism. If so, then a de dicto reading of the Internalism of (1) won’t suffice to make The Argument work; support for de re Internalism must be found. Section II argues that that’s bad for The Argument, since traditional Internalist intuitions—those about ‘amoralists’—

De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism

145

support de dicto Internalism at best. Section III notes an evident truth which ramps up the implications of de dicto Internalist Cognitivism. This allows us to supplement the rather bare-bones picture offered in the first two sections. The supplement, though, suggests certain challenges to Internalist Cognitivism; most of the section describes and replies to them.

I. De Dicto vs. De Re Internalism Internalism says that moral beliefs require conations. But this claim admits of a de dicto and a de re reading. Consider the two interpretations of (7) Planets require stars. in (8) and (9) (8) Necessarily, planets are accompanied by stars. (9) Planets are necessarily accompanied by stars. Despite their superficial similarity, (8) and (9) are worlds apart in their meaning, as is shown by the fact that (8) is true and (9) false. (8) is a de dicto necessity, which tells us that the conditional proposition if a planet exists then so does a star is necessarily true. That’s true: how could there be a planet if there aren’t any stars for it to orbit? But (9) is a de re necessity, which tells us something about the individuals which, in the actual world, are planets: they, necessarily, have a certain property, viz. being accompanied by a star. But that’s false: for every planet, there is a world at which it exists and there are no stars (e.g. at which it is the only thing which exists). (Throughout this paper I use the term ‘‘accompaniment’’ to mean co-existence, where the identity or distinctness of the relata is left open. That is, y accompanies x iff if x exists, y exists.) ‘‘Moral beliefs require conations’’, our initial statement of Internalism, also admits of a de dicto and a de re reading, as follows.8 de dicto Internalism: Necessarily, moral beliefs are accompanied by conations. de re Internalism: Moral beliefs are necessarily accompanied by conations.9 This section argues that premise (2) of The Argument is false if the Internalism is de dicto: de dicto Internalism commits a Cognitivist neither to besires, violations of Separability, nor intrinsically action-guiding properties. Since, concessively, I wish simply to grant that (2) is true if the Internalism is de re, my first task must be to display the possibility of mere de dicto Internalist Cognitivism (i.e. plus de re Externalism10).

146

NOUˆS

A. De Dicto Internalism Without De Re It’s probably easiest to see why de dicto Internalism doesn’t suggest de re if we consider another case in which a de dicto Internalist Cognitivist thesis obtains. Consider, then, (10). (10) Necessarily, wishful beliefs are accompanied by conations. (10) is true. A belief is wishful only if caused by a wish, and wishes are conations. And wishful beliefs are representations, as evidenced by their truth-aptness. If all Mary’s evidence points to her having cancer, but (ignoring it) she gets herself to believe that she is healthy, then she has a wishful belief. In the normal case this belief will be false (though it need not be). Hence, de dicto Internalist Cognitivism is true of wishful beliefs. However, the corresponding de re Internalist claim, (11), is false. (11) Wishful beliefs are necessarily accompanied by conations. One can believe in one’s own health wishfully or not; it’s the same belief either way. (10) does not itself give any support to (11). The combination of the truth of de dicto necessities like (10) and the falsehood of the corresponding de re necessities like (11) is perfectly coherent, indeed commonplace. Consider whether, necessarily, if I have a favorite belief I have conations (of course it is so). Or consider deeply felt, calming, or universally reviled beliefs. In each case we get a de dicto Internalist thesis but not a de re one. My favorite belief need not have been my favorite; deeply felt, calming, and universally reviled beliefs need not have been so. Examples could be generated indefinitely. (There are also examples outside the realm of beliefs; substitute ‘‘propaganda film’’ or ‘‘tourist map’’ for ‘‘wishful belief’’ in (10) and (11) and you get propositions which are, again, true and false respectively.) The mere obtaining of a de dicto necessity like (10) gives us no particular reason to expect a de re necessity like (11). There is no general reason why we ought to move from de dicto Internalism to de re. B. De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism Without Besires, Violations of Separability, or Intrinsically Action-Guiding Properties Let’s return to premise (2) of the The Argument. It tells us that Internalist Cognitivism demands besires, violations of Separability, or intrinsically action-guiding properties. De dicto Internalist Cognitivism demands none of these things. Let’s go through each in turn. Besires. Consider (8), our true de dicto thesis about the planet-star relation. Why doesn’t it suggest that planets are stars? There are two parts to the answer. The first is that the necessity is de dicto: its source is not in the modal relations between planets and stars but in the concept planet. If it

De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism

147

were a de re necessity it might preclude their distinctness, but the necessary truth of a proposition about their relation itself suggests no such thing. The second part of the answer is that the relation the concept requires, at least so far as (8) tells us, is accompaniment. So (8), though consistent with planets being stars, does not demand that they be. These reasons apply to de dicto Internalism as well. First, the source of its requirement lies in the concept ‘‘moral belief’’, not (at least so far it tells us) in the relations between moral beliefs and conations. The existence of such a requirement doesn’t demand that moral beliefs be conations. Secondly, the relation required is accompaniment. This is consistent with Conativism, but doesn’t demand it. (Likewise, de dicto Internalism about wishful, favorite, etc. beliefs has no tendency to yield that such states are conations.) Separability. There would be violations of Separability if moral beliefs and conations—the states themselves—are distinct, yet bear necessary relations to each other. The thesis that there are such relations is de re Internalism, not de dicto. Intrinsically Action-Guiding Properties. Internalist Cognitivism is thought to require these, since otherwise it would be inexplicable why we couldn’t represent the relevant properties without having the required conations. But, for all de dicto Internalist Cognitivism says, we can represent those properties without having the conations. It just tells us that, then, the representations would not be moral beliefs. Just for instance, de dicto Internalism is consistent with the property of rightness being a perfectly natural property—e.g. optimificity. That property is clearly not intrinsically action-guiding: representations of it can exist unaccompanied by the relevant pro-attitudes. De dicto Internalism tells us not that such representations are impossible, but that they aren’t moral beliefs. Likewise, wishful beliefs require conations but are about modally uninspiring properties. Those properties could be represented without the relevant conations, though such representations would not be wishful beliefs. De dicto Internalist Cognitivism, then, doesn’t require besires, violations of Separability, or intrinsically action-guiding properties. Premise (2) fares poorly when the Internalism is de dicto. C. The Silence of De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism If de dicto Internalist Cognitivists are thus committed neither to de re Internalism, besires, violations of Separability, nor intrinsically action-guiding properties, what are they committed to? Very little, actually. The main thing is that moral beliefs are representations—which is just Cognitivism. De dicto Internalism adds only two things: moral beliefs are accompanied by conations, and are conceived by us precisely as so accompanied (perhaps inter alia). Neither of these things tells us much about moral beliefs themselves: the first because it was already obvious (even Externalists grant it), the second because it leaves open the nature of the things thus conceived.

148

NOUˆS

It’s worth elaborating briefly on de dicto Internalist Cognitivism’s impressive silence. First, it leaves open what account of representations we accept. Just take whatever theory you think best of mental representations in general, and apply it to moral beliefs. Secondly, any such theory will undoubtedly include certain determinables—e.g. content (truth-conditions). De dicto Internalist Cognitivism is silent about the determinates of these determinables, the properties idiosyncratic to moral beliefs. Consider, for instance, your belief that racism is morally wrong. According to Cognitivism, this is a representational state which has some content, that racism has some property (call it ‘‘F’’). Now so far as the abstract thesis of Cognitivism goes, F could be anything—natural or nonnatural, one which vindicates consequentialism, deontology, virtue ethics, or what have you. And de dicto Internalism doesn’t narrow the range of options regarding moral content (the truth-conditions of moral beliefs) available to Cognitivists as such; consequentialists, deontologists, virtue ethicists, etc., all can accept de dicto Internalism and their account of moral content will have just as much (or little) going for it as it ever did. Likewise, the de dicto Internalist thesis that, necessarily, wishful beliefs are accompanied by conations is simply silent about the content of wishful beliefs. (Since I don’t want any Cognitivist alienated from de dicto Internalism simply on the basis of their account of moral content, throughout I’ll leave the details of F unspecified; fill them in however you like.) De dicto Internalism, then, is impressively silent about the nature of moral beliefs. In itself, it tells us no more than Externalism. It isn’t committed to besires, violations of Separability, or intrinsically action-guiding properties. In fact, it’s committed to very little. II. Traditional Internalist Intuitions are De Dicto The soundness of The Argument requires that the Internalism of (2), and thus of (1), be de re. But is de re Internalism plausible? This is an enormous question. Here I focus on what I think is the most (or at least a) natural and obvious route to Internalism, viz. consulting our intuitions about so-called ‘amoralists’. I argue that, given how amoralists have traditionally been approached (in particular, the questions asked about them) our intuitions about them (about the answers to those questions) at best support de dicto Internalism. Implicitly, our questions are designed to test de dicto Internalism, and only that. Amoralists are prime candidates for moral beliefs except conatively. They play a role in metaethical literature to this day. Sigru´n Svavarsdo´ttir, for instance, describes ‘‘Patrick’’, who—apparently competently and sincerely— tells us at length about what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, but has none of the typically accompanying pro- and con-attitudes.11 Suppose that upon reflection about an amoralist you intuit that she lacks moral beliefs. This is an

De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism

149

Internalist intuition in the sense that its veridicality suggests Internalism. If a person who is nonconatively ripe for moral beliefs nevertheless lacks them, it must be because conations are necessary for them—and that is Internalism. But what kind of Internalism would be thus supported—de dicto or de re (or both)? A. Amoralist Intuitions Support (At Most) De Dicto Internalism To see why the answer is ‘only de dicto’, consider how, in general, we ought to proceed when our aim is to generate intuitions relevant to a de dicto or de re necessity claim. Suppose we wished to test (8) and (9) by thoughtexperiment. To test (8) we consider whether, possibly, something is a planet and unaccompanied by any stars. That is, we consider whether there is a possible world at which something is, at that world, a planet and unaccompanied by stars. To test (9) we consider something which is a planet, and see whether it could exist without a star. That is, with respect to something which is actually a planet, we consider whether there is a possible world at which it exists unaccompanied by any stars. The application of ‘‘planet’’ is either what we are testing (for requiring stars), or it merely determines what we are testing. Likewise, to test de dicto Internalism we must consider whether there are possible states which (at one and the same world) are moral beliefs and are unaccompanied by the relevant conations. We are, in effect, testing for the application of ‘‘moral beliefs’’. To test de re Internalism we would employ ‘‘moral beliefs’’ merely in picking out what we are to test. We would consider whether conations are necessary for the existence of those very things which, in the actual world, are moral beliefs. We don’t do that when we consider amoralist cases—and that is why traditional Internalist intuitions support (at best) de dicto Internalism. When we consider Patrick we consider only whether he has states which are, at that world, moral beliefs. Nowhere in the literature is the possibility even considered whether some amoralist like Patrick might have states which, though not moral beliefs at that world, are moral beliefs in the actual world. It is because we don’t consider whether such states are present, but only whether there are states which are at that world moral beliefs, that our intuitions can at best favor de dicto Internalism. The strong tradition of Internalist intuitions about amoralists, then, supports only de dicto Internalism.12 B. Stronger Internalist Intuitions Aren’t Necessarily Intuitions of a Stronger Internalism There are two ways in which the relevant thought-experiments can be altered so as to make Internalist intuitions even more powerful. It will be easy to see that they don’t affect the basic point: even with them, our intuitions at best support de dicto Internalism. The strengthening of Internalist intuitions they generate is a strengthening of the plausibility of the same kind of Internalism (de dicto), not a strengthening of the kind of

150

NOUˆS

Internalism supported. I’ll describe the two changes and then explain why they don’t help the case for de re Internalism.

(i) Moving to the community Internalism, as initially stated, says that moral beliefs require conations. It is silent regarding which moral beliefs require which conations. The first alteration exploits this silence. There are, of course, variations in the plausibility of Internalist theses which get specific on the point. Commonly noted is the relative implausibility of the Internalist thesis according to which beliefs to the effect that x is the right thing for me to do now require that the believer have sufficient motivation to x. Such a thesis is refuted by the possibility of akrasia, but that refutation doesn’t establish Externalism, since one can remain Internalist and allow for akrasia by, e.g., substituting ‘some’ for ‘sufficient’. What, then, is the weakest—and so most plausible—thesis still recognizably Internalist? Part of the answer, and one which tends to get overlooked by Externalists, is that such a thesis will allow for individual amoralists. It will not say that moral beliefs require conations in their every owner. Rather, it will tell us that moral beliefs in a community require conations in that community. Philippa Foot has pressed this sort of line and I think she was on to something.13 The basic idea is that for there to be moral beliefs certain practices must exist (or ceremonies, rituals, habits, customs, what have you, the crucial thing being that they require conations). Once these practices are up and going the conative condition is satisfied and there may be moral beliefs. A community characterized by practices will contain individual members who don’t participate in them, but pick up beliefs from those who do. Amoralists such as Patrick could be like that. If so, they have moral beliefs not because there are no necessary conative conditions but because those conditions are satisfied. To test this ‘community Internalism’ we must consider amoralist communities, not just amoralist individuals. If we stay at the level of individuals, then we render our intuitions moot as between community Internalism and fullfledged Externalism: both predict that amoralist individuals can have moral beliefs. And when we consider amoralist communities, Internalist verdicts are a lot more powerful. Foot suggests that the necessary conative background is a kind of custom with respect to certain actions (such as ‘‘killing, stealing, and lying’’). Everyone has a voice in the matter of whether or not these things are to be done; actions within this range are up for scrutiny, and by and large men take account of what others say about such matters. The actions are ‘passed’ or ‘not

De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism

151

passed’, and moreover people are accepted or not accepted on the ground that they do or do not do them.14

To test whether this ‘stage-setting’ custom is really necessary, she asks us to try to think the familiar setting away. Suppose, for instance, that no one took much notice of what anyone else did, except when it affected him, or him and his family. Cows and horses behave like this. Suppose that human beings did so as well? . . . In such [a] setting . . . people would not have a ‘say’ in what other people did as they do in a society such as ours. No one would be taught not to murder or ostracized for stealing; these things would be treated as the affair of the agent and his victim.15

In a nutshell, these Cow-people (or ‘‘Cows’’) are a community of Patricks, who’ve always been that way and never encountered anyone conatively different. If we imagine that otherwise they are just like us, our intuitions about whether they have moral beliefs may guide us to a position on Internalism. If we intuit that they have moral beliefs, we ought to accept Externalism: clearly if the Cows have moral beliefs, there are no conative requirements on moral belief. But if we intuit that the Cows lack moral beliefs, Internalism is probably the right conclusion to draw: given that the nonconative conditions for moral belief are in place, only their failure to meet certain conative conditions could account for the lack. To my mind (and many others16), an Internalist verdict about the Cows is far more plausible than about individual amoralists like Patrick. (ii) Adding inverted conations James Dreier has gone so far as to not only deprive his thought-experimental subjects of the characteristic conations, but to endow them with inverted conations. That is, Dreier imagines states (a) possessed of nonconative characteristics which—on the Externalist view—would be sufficient for their being moral beliefs, but (b) characterized by maximally strong conations of the opposite conative valence (pro- and con-attitudes flipped). He asks us to suppose we discover an isolated culture of mean-spirited folk who go out of their way to cause harm and humiliation at every opportunity, while shunning kindness and fairness and generally avoiding any action that would contribute to the well-being of sentient creatures. . . . [T]hey have never met people who feel differently. These Sadists call the things that attract them ‘‘gad’’ and those that repel them ‘‘bood’’.17

These Sadists, if we can really imagine them, yield the strongest pro-Internalist intuitions. They make Externalist moral belief ascriptions

152

NOUˆS

least credible. Externalists will say that the Sadists’ beliefs that x is bood (like beliefs that x is gut or bon) are beliefs that x is good: after all, the only differences are conative.18 But that just seems odd. Given the possibility of moving to the community and adding inverting conations, Internalism’s plausibility isn’t limited to the plausibility of Internalist intuitions about individual amoralists like Patrick. Moral beliefs require conations if the Cows lack moral beliefs; and likewise if Sadists’ bood-beliefs aren’t good-beliefs. To give Internalist intuitions a fair chance we must consider thought-experiments involving not only individuals who lack the relevant conations, but entire communities which lack them, and moreover have inverted conations. For our purposes, the crucial point is that neither moving to the community nor adding inverted conations changes the fact that the Internalism supported by the relevant Internalist intuitions is de dicto. When we consider the Cows we wonder whether they have states which—at the world at which they are amoralists—are moral beliefs. When we consider the Sadists, we think only of whether their beliefs that x is bood are beliefs that x is good at the world at which they have inverted conations. If the intuitive answer to either question is ‘no’, that is evidence for Internalism, but only de dicto Internalism. To get an answer relevant to de re Internalism, we must consider the further question whether the Cows have states which are moral beliefs, or the Sadists’ bood-beliefs are good-beliefs, in some possible world—including worlds at which they have the relevant conations. Such questions are neither natural, nor raised. We may have Externalist intuitions: we may think it clear the Cows do have moral beliefs and that bood-beliefs are good-beliefs. Or we may simply lack intuitions about the matter. But if we have Internalist intuitions, they are de dicto.

C. The Argument’s Dilemma: De Dicto or De Re Internalism? Returning briefly to The Argument, proponents face a dilemma. By ‘‘Internalism’’ they can either mean de dicto or de re. If they opt for the former, they leave (2) hanging; if the latter, (1). I suspect few will respond by trying to show that mere de dicto Internalism renders (2) true after all. This leaves them with the challenge of supporting de re Internalism. But in doing so they must go beyond the strong tradition of Internalist intuitions in the literature. And where else would they look? III. Disanalogous Internalist Cognitivism and the Distinctive Cultural Depth of Moral Socialization Internalist Cognitivism is a bare-bones picture (henceforth, ‘Internalist Cognitivism’ means ‘de dicto’). There are a number of directions we could

De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism

153

go in to flesh it out. We could make the case for Internalism and Cognitivism (I’ve touched on this only in recounting how amoralist arguments for Internalism go). Another way would be to describe the Internalist requirements in more detail; that is, get specific about just which conations bear which relations to which moral beliefs. Yet another way would be to say more about the content of moral beliefs (by, inter alia, looking at normative theory). All these things must be done—elsewhere. Here I’ll go in a different direction. I’m sure it’ll have occurred to many that there is something inappropriate or potentially misleading in the use of concepts like wishful belief to model metaethical Internalism. The point was to give uncontroversial examples of ‘further entailing’ concepts—those which apply to representations and further entail conations—to make us comfortable with the suggestion that the concept moral belief is a further entailer. But there is a significant difference between the two cases. In a nutshell, there are no wishful that-clauses, but there are moral that-clauses. Describing this difference adds significantly to the bare picture offered by Internalist Cognitivism so far, and also suggests challenges to Internalist Cognitivism. I describe the addition, then the challenges, and how they can be met.

A. Disanalogous Internalist Cognitivism Let us call a concept of the form belief that s a ‘belief concept’, crucially including that it is unmodified (nothing like ‘moral’ or ‘wishful’ appears prior to ‘belief ’). So, e.g., belief that snow is white, belief that the bridge is stable, belief that my cats are eating, are all belief concepts. There are English sentences—moral sentences like ‘‘racism is morally wrong’’— which, when they appear in the that-clause of a belief concept, entail that the state the concept applies to is moral. I could say that I have the moral belief that racism is morally wrong, but the modifying ‘‘moral’’ would be superfluous: that it is a moral belief follows from the that-clause. To deny this is to allow (insanely) for possible states which are (at one and the same world) a belief that racism is morally wrong but not a moral belief. In this, moral belief concepts are significantly distinctive. There is no (English) sentence s such that, necessarily, if a state is a belief that s, it is a wishful belief. Sometimes the that-clause will strongly suggest that the state is wishful; e.g. where it is the belief that that random lottery ticket I bought is definitely going to pay off massively tomorrow. But there is no necessity. Likewise, with the other uncontroversial cases of de dicto Internalist Cognitivism. So the thesis that Necessarily, if a moral belief concept applies to something, it is a moral belief

154

NOUˆS

is aptly termed ‘‘Disanalogy’’ (and is true). Note that Externalist Cognitivists and Noncognitivists can, and given its plausibility ought, accept Disanalogy. (I should point out that the phrase ‘‘moral belief concept’’ is pressed into service not because it is perfect, but because it is convenient. Really what is at stake are unmodified belief that m concepts, where m is a moral sentence and ‘unmodified’ means nothing outside the that-clause provides information about the state it applies to. So Disanalogy tells us that, necessarily, if an unmodified belief that m concept applies to something, that thing is a moral belief.) Disanalogy makes moral Internalist Cognitivism much stronger than wishful Internalist Cognitivism. Disanalogy gives us a whole host of Internalist necessities which strictly speaking don’t come with Internalism alone. Not only is it true that, necessarily, moral beliefs are accompanied by conations (this is true regarding wishful beliefs as well), it is true that, necessarily, the belief that racism is morally wrong (etc.) is accompanied by conations (and nothing like this is true regarding wishful beliefs). Disanalogy thus gives us an interesting addition to Internalist Cognitivism. (Of course, these necessities, too, need fleshing out along the lines mentioned in the first paragraph of the section.) Disanalogy can make Internalist Cognitivism seem questionable, for two main reasons. First, it may support a thesis which directly refutes Internalist Cognitivism. Secondly, Disanalogous Internalist Cognitivism (i.e. Internalist Cognitivism plus Disanalogy) may portray moral belief concepts (or moral beliefs themselves) as suspiciously, mysteriously distinctive among belief concepts (or beliefs). I describe and reply to these challenges. Replying to the second allows us to flesh out our picture of morality a bit more.

B. The Argument from Essentialism The first challenge is that Disanalogy may support the claim that moral beliefs are necessarily moral beliefs (call this ‘Essentialism’). Before considering how it might, note that Essentialism is fatal for (mere) de dicto Internalism. De dicto Internalism says that necessarily moral beliefs are accompanied by conations. Add Essentialism—moral beliefs are necessarily moral beliefs—and you get de re Internalism: moral beliefs are necessarily accompanied by conations. So if Disanalogy supports Essentialism, it supports de re Internalism (assuming, as I do, de dicto Internalism). And if so, it can supplement The Argument with precisely what it needs. (Alternatively, Externalists could combine Essentialism with de re Externalism to yield de dicto Externalism. Either way, Essentialism is fatal to Internalist Cognitivism.) Does Disanalogy afford Essentialism any support?19 We can move from Disanalogy to Essentialism if we suppose that moral belief concepts apply

De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism

155

necessarily. If a state is actually a belief that racism is morally wrong, it is necessarily so; generally: If a moral belief concept applies to something, it necessarily applies to it. Call this thesis, ‘‘That-Clausem’’. Disanalogy and That-Clausem take us to the brink of Essentialism. For a valid argument—call it, ‘‘The Essentialist Argument’’—we need only add the unobjectionable assumption that for every moral belief there is a moral belief concept which applies to it. There isn’t a moral belief which isn’t a belief that racism is morally wrong, or that helping is morally good, or etc. (0.1) If something is a moral belief then a moral belief concept applies to it. [Assumption] (0.2) If a moral belief concept applies to something, it necessarily applies to it. [That-Clausem] So, (0.3) If something is a moral belief then a moral belief concept necessarily applies to it. [From (0.1) & (0.2)] (0.4) Necessarily, if a moral belief concept applies to something, it is a moral belief. [Disanalogy] So, (0.5) If something is a moral belief then it is necessarily a moral belief. [Essentialism; from (0.3) & (0.4)] Finding both Disanalogy and (0.1) plausible, my only option in defense of Internalist Cognitivism is to argue against That-Clausem. If we have reason to accept it, Internalist Cognitivism is in trouble. I’ll argue that we haven’t any such reason. (I should say that that’s all I’ll do. I don’t try to show we have good reason to reject it, since so far as I can see the only plausible basis for its rejection is Disanalogous Internalist Cognitivism itself.) C. The Insufficiency of Essences of Attitudes for That-Clausem A mistaken way to That-Clausem is to think that it can be supported entirely by considerations about the nature of attitudes, or of some attitude(s) in

156

NOUˆS

particular, like beliefs. Ultimately we need a link to certain concepts, and— unless one just asserts that that conceptual relation is of the essence of those attitudes, which is just to assert That-Clausem—one must reveal a property necessarily had by moral beliefs and sufficient for the application of a moral belief concept. At each point, the de dicto Internalist Cognitivist can grant the suggestion about the essence of the attitudes, and simply deny the conceptual link. Suppose, for instance, we begin with the assumption that beliefs are necessarily so. This falls short of entailing That-Clausem. All it establishes is that, e.g., your belief that racism is morally wrong is necessarily a belief, and that is consistent with the falsity of That-Clausem. That-Clausem says that that state is not just necessarily a belief, but a belief that racism is morally wrong. As an Internalist Cognitivist, I might agree that it is necessarily a belief; I will simply deny that, when unaccompanied by the relevant conations, it is a belief that racism is morally wrong. Likewise, suppose we start with the assumption that any belief with a certain content is necessarily a belief with that very content.20 Again, this falls short of entailing ThatClausem. It establishes only that, e.g., your belief that racism is morally wrong is necessarily a belief with a certain content. I might agree with that: I would just deny that, when a belief with that content is unaccompanied by the relevant conations, it is a belief that racism is morally wrong. We might suppose that any belief necessarily has the content and mode of presentation that it actually has. This is still neutral with respect to That-Clausem. It entails that your belief that racism is morally wrong necessarily has the content and mode of presentation that it actually has; but that leaves it open whether a state with that content and mode of presentation is a belief that racism is morally wrong. This reasoning applies no matter what we say about the nature of the attitude itself. Take whatever property F you like and suppose that the belief that racism is morally wrong is necessarily F: the de dicto Internalist Cognitivist can allow that.21 She will simply deny that being an F state is sufficient for being a belief that racism is morally wrong. What the proponent of That-Clausem needs is a middle property: one which is both necessarily had by the belief that racism is morally wrong and sufficient for being a belief that racism is morally wrong. Although purely psychological (including philosophical psychological) considerations might tell us which properties are in the first category (i.e. necessarily had by such states), it won’t tell us whether any of those properties are in the second category (i.e. sufficient for being a state of the relevant type). In order to show this second thing we must consider the concept belief that racism is morally wrong. An analysis of the states which are beliefs that racism is morally wrong will be inadequate for that task. (Likewise, an analysis of planets, the things themselves, won’t reveal what’s required for their being planets.) It is just a mistake to suppose that purely psychological considerations will settle the question of That-Clausem.

De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism

157

D. Does Denying That-Clausem Make Moral Belief Concepts Suspiciously, Mysteriously Distinctive? To get That-Clausem we need to say something about moral belief concepts. One might think such an account available from our account of belief concepts in general, concepts like belief that snow is white, etc. If an account of those concepts looks sufficiently well-confirmed as to be generalizable, we may be able to justify a thesis which tells us that belief concepts in general— even moral ones—apply only in virtue of certain characteristics of states. We could then combine that with our background theory of the attitudes, and get That-Clausem. For instance, suppose we find that that-clauses contribute only information about the content and mode of presentation of what they apply to. All that needs showing in order to establish ThatClausem is that moral beliefs have their content and mode of presentation essentially (perhaps because all attitudes do). Just how strong is the generalization from nonmoral belief concepts? I’ll grant that That-Clausenm looks strong: plausibly, the belief that snow is white is necessarily so, and so on.22 Shouldn’t we be suspicious of the suggestion that That-Clausenm is true but That-Clausem false? Shouldn’t we expect a deeply unified theory of belief concepts, rather than one which makes the vast majority of them not further entailers but a few of them so? E. Noncognitivists Can’t Say So First of all, intuitively not. For there is clearly something distinctive about moral belief concepts. The existence of metaethics is itself evidence of this. The range of commonly accepted metaethical views is truly astounding: think just of the differences between full-fledged Externalist Cognitivism, Internalist Cognitivism (of any variety), and Noncognitivism. Each of these views has been endorsed by many competent philosophers, but at least two must be quite mistaken. Surely something about the subject matter throws people off. In the face of that, it would be perverse to cast doubt on a suggestion solely because it makes moral belief concepts out to be deeply distinctive (e.g. by denying That-Clausem while allowing That-Clausenm). Indeed, the challenge goes the other way around: any view which entails that there is nothing deeply distinctive about moral belief concepts must offer up what it takes to be the source of the variety of metaethical views. Secondly, it is certain that Noncognitivists, at least, are unable to object to the denial of That-Clausem on the grounds that it makes moral belief concepts suspiciously distinctive. For their view makes moral belief concepts at least as distinctive. To see this, consider FIGURE A. To get the relevant taxonomy, we need only distinguish between what a concept applies to and what, if anything, it further entails. At least some concepts are ‘further entailers’, in the manner of planet or parent: they apply only if something further exists, beyond their application. Plausibly, nonmoral belief concepts are not further entailers: they entail the existence of nothing beyond the

158

NOUˆS

representation to which they apply. Externalist Cognitivism tells us moral belief concepts are like that as well—thus their overall account of belief concepts isn’t deeply fissured. De dicto Internalist Cognitivism puts conations in the further entail box, and this is the source of the complaint that it makes moral belief concepts out to be suspiciously distinctive. Externalists may thus worry. But Noncognitivists certainly can’t. Although their account of belief concepts is unified with respect to further entailments—moral and nonmoral alike lack them—it is riven in its account of the application states: nonmoral applying to representations, moral to conations. Noncognitivists are thus committed to the deep distinctiveness of moral belief concepts. So they can’t cite, as point against Internalist Cognitivism, the fact that it entails that very distinctiveness. MORAL BELIEF CONCEPTS ACCORDING TO ... NONMORAL BELIEF CONCEPTS APPLY TO FURTHER ENTAIL

EXTERNALIST COGNITIVISM

DE DICTO INTERNALIST COGNITIVISM NONCOGNITIVISM

REPRESENTATION REPRESENTATION REPRESENTATION

Ø

Ø

CONATION

CONATION

Ø

Figure A

My own view is that Noncognitivism faces no big worry in holding that moral belief concepts are so distinctive. They can easily say—with, I take it, Simon Blackburn and Mark Timmons, e.g.23—that beliefs come in many ways, including both representations and conations. This may turn out ultimately untenable, but given that something is obviously distinctive about morality, it wouldn’t be acceptable to reject it solely on the grounds that it posits a suspiciously deep rift in belief concepts. Given the prima facie distinctiveness of the moral, induction from nonmoral to moral belief concepts just isn’t going to be very strong. (As with Noncognitivism, so with Internalist Cognitivism.) F. An Externalist Challenge from Moral Anthropology Externalists might still attempt to show that Internalist Cognitivism is committed to a mysterious moral distinctiveness. I pointed out that, intuitively, morality is distinctive, but that’s so vague. And their charge can be strengthened.

De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism

159

The dispute between Internalist and Externalist Cognitivists is over whether moral belief concepts further entail conations; they agree that moral beliefs are representations. Moreover, they agree that moral belief concepts are our standard concepts of moral beliefs. Even if we could pick out the belief that racism is wrong by using a nonmoral belief concept, we rarely if ever do. So much will be agreed upon everyone. (It will be agreed that this is so of the actual world. However, Externalists may say that it is necessarily true, whereas Internalist Cognitivists will say it is a contingent fact of moral anthropology, broadly speaking.) Combined with this agreed-upon fact, Disanalogous Internalist Cognitivism entails that our standard concepts of moral beliefs distinctively further entail conations. Whereas, when it comes to the representations which are nonmoral beliefs, their standard concepts are not further entailers, the standard concept of moral beliefs are further entailers. Now why would this be? Why here and not elsewhere? Mere appeal to ‘intuitive distinctiveness’ doesn’t go very far, for it leaves a mystery: why would our standard concepts of these representations, and of none or few others, be further entailers? (Although this consideration could be called upon to support ThatClausem, and thus Essentialism, I think it more directly supports Externalism. If Internalist Cognitivism can’t avoid the mystery, then it suffers no matter what the impact on Essentialism. Note also that if we can avoid the mystery, then we can also explain why denying That-Clausem isn’t suspiciously distinctive.) G. The Distinctive Cultural Depth of Moral Socialization But the mystery fades upon inspection. At the broadest level, the explanation is that moral beliefs’ conative relations are so much more salient than those of nonmoral beliefs; it is thus no surprise our standard concepts of the former, but not the latter, should be further entailers. This flows from the truism that concepts (their possession and use) reflect saliences. If the fact that a range of things is F jumps out at us it should be no surprise if we employ a concept of them which is, precisely, the concept of an F thing (perhaps inter alia). The pattern is abstract, but evident: To the extent that the members of a set S1 are more saliently related to an F than those of set S2, we’ll be attracted to a concept of members of S1 which further entails an F more than to a concept of members of S2 which further entails an F.24 If the difference in salience is great enough, our standard concept of S1 things may further entail an F, where our concepts of S2 things, standard or not, may none of them further entail an F. To illustrate. Some people have kids, others don’t; to us, that’s a very salient relation; so it’s no surprise that the concept parent has the currency it does (even if few other concepts further entail kids). Some large rocks are in independent orbit around a star, others aren’t; to us, that’s a salient relation; so it’s no surprise that the concept

160

NOUˆS

planet has the currency it does (again, even if few other concepts further entail stars). If we turn to moral beliefs, the explanation to expect, at the broadest level, is that moral beliefs’ conative relations are many orders of magnitude more salient to us than the conative relations of nonmoral beliefs. Intuitively that’s true. Even Externalists grant it; indeed, they are apt to call upon it to explain (away) Internalist intuitions (the Internalist incautiously posits a necessity when, in fact, there is only a strong contingency25). Internalists should begin by considering the actual relations moral beliefs bear—relations posited even by Externalists—and there find the explanation of the salience, which in turn explains why our standard concepts of these representations, but not others, are further entailers. If we take the possibility seriously, and consider why such saliences might obtain, initial doubts quickly turn to understanding. Although much of the answer must await a richer anthropology, at least a large part of the answer leaps out at us. I mean the cultural depth of moral socialization and moral self-guidance; roughly speaking, the fact that our moral beliefs have their home in our training people to love good and shun evil, and their then doing so. Moral beliefs are distinctive among representations in having their home in such practices. Other beliefs are not so monolithically associated with particular conations; consider the belief that snow is white, the bridge is stable, my cats are eating, etc. This explains why moral beliefs, unlike nonmoral, are standardly picked out by further entailing concepts. The relevant facts about socialization are these. If we want someone to (do what’s) F, we get them to recognize when they’re about to F, and to then acquire a (sufficiently strong) pro-attitude to so doing. Representations here play a linking role. Our ultimate aim is to get them to F, not acquire a representation. But in service of getting them to F, our aim is for a representation triggered by the actual option to F (that is, the agent recognizes such options), and which triggers a pro-attitude (she cares, or at least acts). If we had a device attachable to their heads that would get them to F regardless whether they recognize that that is what they’re doing then perhaps we’d want (ceteris paribus) to attach it. It’s moot, though, since in general we have no such device (guard rails on a cliffy highway are a cousin). In practice, our only hope is to enlist the support of their minds, and secure their behavior via their recognition of its possibility. Socialization is to modification of human behavior what damming is to the modification of rivers: contingently, but inevitably, it is the method we rely on. Think of the representation as a conditioned stimuli. Employing a representation such a way is socializing; its successful upshot is selfguidance. If Cognitivism is true, moral socialization is like that (substituting right for F, etc.). When we say ‘that was right’, while praising, demanding, or

De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism

161

rewarding, and ‘that was wrong’ while blaming, forbidding, or punishing, we are socializing with the representations we’re inculcating. Moral beliefs play the linking role characteristic of all socialization. This is just what moral socialization looks like if Cognitivism is true. We thus avoid mystery. Why are moral beliefs, distinctively, standardly picked out by further entailing concepts? Because their conative relations are so much more salient to us than those of nonmoral beliefs. Indeed, notice that insofar as representations are important to us because of their socializing or action-guiding role, their conative relations will be equally important to us as their content. The point isn’t just to get us to recognize when we can do right; nor is it just to get us to do right when we see we can. It is to get us to do right, which involves both things. (Likewise, we would want our socialization-substituting device equally to detect an approaching option to F and trigger a pro-attitude to that option; failure in either task is failure. Guard rails equally must promote staying on the road, not plunging off it, and promote staying on the road, not prevent it.) It is no surprise that representations like this are standardly picked out by concepts which further entail those conative relations.26 H. Other Benefits for Internalist Cognitivism The distinctive cultural depth of moral socialization has (at least) two other potential benefits for Internalist Cognitivism. 1. It may turn the tables on Externalism. Not only does the distinctive cultural depth of moral socialization make Internalist Cognitivism unmysterious, it may even render Externalism itself somewhat mysterious. Given it, why wouldn’t Internalist Cognitivism be true? If moral beliefs’ conative relations are indeed equally as salient to us as their contents, why wouldn’t we tend to pick them out with further entailing concepts? 2. It is itself an interesting (if somewhat obvious) phenomenon, which can supplement the picture of morality offered to us by Internalist Cognitivism. Note that, however obvious, it is contingent and empirical, according to Internalist Cognitivism. It is not a priori whether moral socialization with those representations (the ones which are moral beliefs) really is so culturally deep (or even exists at all). It is nevertheless something you can know in your armchair, if you’ve been out of it recently. Of course, to refer to ‘‘the distinctive cultural depth of moral socialization’’ is only to gesture, even if at something obviously real. It too must be described and explained in detail—elsewhere.27

NOUˆS

162

IV. Conclusion The start of section III described further work Internalist Cognitivists must do to flesh out their account. Among these were saying more about just which conations are required by which moral beliefs, and about the content of those moral beliefs. I don’t want to end without pointing out how Internalist Cognitivists might proceed here. Notice that Noncognitivists already have to tell us about the first sort of thing, Cognitivists the second. Internalist Cognitivism is well-placed simply to inherit the best accounts of each, and combine them. When Noncognitivists spell out their view, they will tell us what conations they take moral beliefs to be. Allan Gibbard, for instance, says that ‘‘to think an act morally reprehensible is to accept norms that prescribe, for such a situation, guilt on the part of the agent and resentment on the part of others’’.28 Our de dicto Internalist inheritor substitutes ‘‘requires accepting’’ for ‘‘is to accept’’. If we judge Gibbard wrong, we accept the improved theory: Emotivists, Prescriptivists, Expressivists—all retain import even if Internalist Cognitivism is true. They offer candidates for the conations moral beliefs require. In the realm of moral content, our inheritor finds herself in the same position as any Cognitivist. As mentioned in the first section, Internalist Cognitivism is neutral on moral content. None of the classic disputes about moral content are settled by it (e.g. over consequentialism, deontology, or virtue ethics). Like any Cognitivist, Internalists must go through these disputes and their Internalism won’t guide them. But crucially, nor will it misguide them. They can simply plug in the account of moral content they favor on other grounds. I sometimes wonder why Internalist Cognitivism has been so neglected. The main answer, I think, is that interesting and obscure facts about those who reflect on moral beliefs (their concepts) are mistaken for interesting and obscure facts about moral beliefs themselves (their special modal relations with conations). If so, then what’s needed is a Copernican revolution in metaethics: we must carefully distinguish between facts about the object of inquiry and facts about us, the inquirers. Were this to occur, a theory which at first struck us as hard to believe—Internalist Cognitivism—would come to seem only natural. Notes 1

The Internalism of this paper is sometimes known as ‘appraiser Internalism about motivation’ (Brink) or ‘Judgement Internalism’ (Darwall). See David Brink, 1989, ch. 3; Stephen Darwall, 1995 and 1997a. 2 A cluster of properties is typically associated with these states: they are representations; descriptive; truth-apt; have a mind-to-world direction of fit; etc. Happily, nothing here requires a fuller explication, and I’ll proceed on the assumption that the general idea is well enough understood. Cognitivism, then, is the idea that moral beliefs have those properties to the same

De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism

163

degree as our typical nonmoral beliefs; for short, moral beliefs are representations. (Putting it this way makes the claim that there are moral beliefs neutral for Cognitivism; the question isn’t whether they’re beliefs but representations.) 3 For the Noncognitivist use of Internalism, see, e.g., C. L. Stevenson, 1937, R. M. Hare, 1952, chapter 11, Allan Gibbard, 1990, especially chs. 1 & 6, and Simon Blackburn, 1998, especially ch. 4. Also worth looking at is David Hume, 1888, III. i. I, although it is controversial whether Hume was a Noncognitivist. For Externalist Cognitivists, see, e.g., Richard Boyd, 1988, sections 2.6 & 4.7, David Brink, 1989, ch. 3, and Sigru´n Svavarsdo´ttir, 1999. Michael Smith calls the problem of reconciling Internalism and Cognitivism the moral problem; see Smith, 1994. For a nice account of the role of Internalism in 20th century metaethics, see the introductory paper in Darwall, et al, 1997c. 4 Conativism is distinct from both Noncognitivism and Internalism. Noncognitivism is a negative thesis: it says that moral beliefs are not representations. Given the possibility of besirism (see the text following), Conativism is not equivalent to this. Internalism is a modal thesis: it says that moral beliefs require conations; Conativism, on the other hand, is not a modal thesis: it says what moral beliefs are, not what they must be. (And Internalism is not necessary Conativism: remove the necessity from Internalism and you get the thesis that moral beliefs are accompanied by conations.) 5 J.L. Mackie, 1977, ch. 1. Notice that it won’t be enough to explain Internalist Cognitivism simply to suppose, with Mackie, that moral beliefs are about such properties, though there aren’t any. For Internalism does not say believing x is right requires believing that that belief requires a pro-attitude to x (which Mackie’s account could explain). It says believing that x is right requires a pro-attitude to x. If, as Mackie holds, there are in fact no intrinsically action-guiding properties, positing a mistaken representation of things as having them will not explain Internalism. 6 Others have defended Internalist Cognitivism from the sorts of considerations captured by The Argument. James Dreier’s work, especially 1990, had the most influence on the ideas of this paper. (It was thinking about how to preserve the Internalist Cognitivism of his view, without the Indexicalism, that I arrived at de dicto Internalist Cognitivism. It will be clear that de dicto Internalist Cognitivism isn’t committed to Indexicalism.) Frances Snare, 2001, pp. 51ff, anticipates the defense; he is an exception to the claim that philosophers have neglected the distinction between de dicto and de re Internalism (as is Jackson, 1998, pp. 160–1). 7 Because my objections to The Argument focus on (1) and (2), I assume throughout that (3)-(5) are true. 8 Special thanks to Keith Simmons for very helpful discussions of the de dicto/de re distinction as it applies to Internalism. 9 We could symbolize these claims thus: De dicto Internalism: &8x (MBx ) ’y Cy) De re Internalism: 8x [MBx ) &(x ¼ x ) ’y Cy)] MB: is a moral belief C: is a conation Naturally if anyone were to accept such a claim they would also posit some special relation between x and y. Articulations of the relation (as well as of the conations) would count as particular versions of Internalism. 10 Henceforth I omit the ‘mere’ as understood. 11 Svavarsdo´ttir, 1999. 12 It’s too hasty to infer from the fact that no one’s considered whether actual-world moral beliefs are identical to any possible state unaccompanied by the relevant conations that no one’s considered thought-experiments relevant to de re Internalism. Thought-experiments involving merely possible states could be relevant as well, since if de re Internalism is true of merely possible moral beliefs, it’s probably true of actual ones as well. But no one’s considered these

164

NOUˆS

either. (They would test whether states which are moral beliefs in some possible world exist unaccompanied by conations at some distinct possible world.) 13 Indeed the idea that moral beliefs may require conations, but not in their every owner, has a remarkable pedigree. Those who have spoken favorably of it include, in addition to Foot, 1978b, Blackburn, 1995 and 1998, ch. 3, sec. 3, Dreier, 1990, Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons, 1992, p. 174, Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, 1995, pp. 37–38, Patricia Greenspan, 1998, p. 106, James Lenman, 1999, and Gilbert Harman in his contribution to Gilbert Harman & Judith Jarvis Thomson, 1996, pp. 177–9. 14 Foot, 1978b, p. 203. 15 ibid, pp. 203–4. 16 See note 13. 17 Dreier, 1990, p. 13. 18 Almost the only differences: the Cows’ beliefs about their own states differ from ours (e.g. where we see that our good-beliefs are accompanied by pro-attitudes, they see that their bood-beliefs are accompanied by con-attitudes). 19 One might think Essentialism sufficiently intuitive on its own; see note 27. 20 Elsewhere I use the term ‘content’ to mean ‘truth-conditions’; here I use it to mean ‘propositional content’. 21 The exception, of course, being the proposal that F ¼ being a belief that racism is morally wrong. But that proposal is really just an assertion of That-Clausem itself (see note 27). 22 I will concessively grant that nonmoral belief concepts uniformly lack further entailments, but it isn’t obviously so. Think of other evaluative belief concepts, such as aesthetic evaluations (e.g. ‘‘N believes that x is beautiful’’) or concepts in which pejorative terms show up in the that-clause (e.g. ‘‘N believes that x is a jerk’’, or substitute for ‘‘jerk’’ a racial epithet). 23 See Blackburn, 1994, and Timmons, 2001. 24 ‘A concept of members of S1’ is a concept which applies to all and only such members. 25 See, e.g., Foot, 1978d, Boyd, 1988, and Brink, 1989. 26 This story also accounts for the greater intuitiveness of community Internalist verdicts over individual ones. Compare Foot: ‘‘we take it as part of the meaning of what we call ‘moral terms’ that they are in general used for teaching particular kinds of conduct; though nothing follows about what any particular individual who uses the terms must feel or do’’ (Foot, 1978c, p. 80). 27 Both That-Clausem and Essentialism are intuitive, but it’s worth pointing out the availability of a debunking explanation of such intuitions. It is that we simply aren’t interested in moral beliefs outside the context in which they are moral beliefs. (This explanation becomes more compelling if we endorse community, not individual, Internalism.) Though if Internalist Cognitivism is true there are such possible contexts, we simply have no occasion to think about them (except in philosophy). So it is natural that when we think of ‘the same’ state as a moral belief we take that to be a moral belief as well. These sort of interest-driven judgements about what is the same show up elsewhere as well. Consider, for instance, artifacts, such as cars. Are cars necessarily cars? At first glance it may seem so: how could that very thing sitting in the driveway exist but not be a car? And yet when we recall that being a car involves not just a certain arrangement of matter but certain intentions it seems that it may exist and not be a car. The same arrangement of the same matter brought together, by coincidence, in a universe without sentience, would not be a car—yet would be numerically identical to that object now sitting in the driveway. So cars turn out only contingently cars after all. The naturalness of thinking they’re necessarily cars is due to our utter lack of interest in those circumstances in which they aren’t cars. Such circumstances are so unlikely we don’t bother to take note of them, and that may distort our modal intuitions. Likewise, I suggest, with moral beliefs. 28 Gibbard, 1990, p. 47.

De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism

165

References Blackburn, Simon. (1994) ‘‘Attitudes and Contents,’’ in Essays in Quasi-Realism, New York: Oxford University Press. ———. (1995) ‘‘The Flight to Reality,’’ in Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory, eds. Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. (1998) Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boyd, Richard. (1988) ‘‘How to Be a Moral Realist,’’ in Essays on Moral Realism, ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Brink, David. (1989) Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Darwall, Stephen. (1995) The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’: 1640–1740, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. (1997a) ‘‘Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality,’’ in Darwall, Gibbard, Railton, 1997b, 305–312. ———. A. Gibbard, and P. Railton, eds. (1997b) Moral Discourse and Practice, New York: Oxford University Press. Dreier, James. (1990) ‘‘Internalism and Speaker Relativism,’’ Ethics 100: 6–26. Foot, Philippa. (1978a) Virtues and Vices, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. ———. (1978b) ‘‘Approval and Disapproval’’, in Foot, 1978a. ———. (1978c) ‘‘Hume on Moral Judgement’’, in Foot, 1978a. ———. (1978d) ‘‘Moral Beliefs’’, in Foot, 1978a. Gibbard, Allan (1990) Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Greenspan, Patricia (1998) ‘‘Moral Responses and Moral Theory: Socially-Based Externalist Ethics,’’ The Journal of Ethics: An International Philosophical Review, 2:2, 103–122. Hare, R. M. (1952) The Language of Morals, New York: Oxford University Press. Harman, G. and J. J. Thomson (1996) Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, Oxford: Blackwell. Horgan, T. and M. Timmons (1992) ‘‘Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The ‘Open Question Argument’ Revived,’’ Philosophical Papers XXI: 153–175. Hume, David (1888) A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby Bigge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jackson, F. and P. Pettit (1995) ‘‘Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation,’’ Philosophical Quarterly, 45: 20–40. Jackson, Frank (1998) From Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lenman, James (1999) ‘‘The Amoralist and the Externalist,’’ Philosophia 27: 441–457. Mackie, J. L. (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin. Smith, Michael (1994) The Moral Problem, Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell. Snare, Frances (2001) Morals, Motivation, and Convention: Hume’s Influential Doctrines, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stevenson, C. L. (1937) ‘‘The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms,’’ Mind 46: 14–31. Svavarsdo´ttir, Sigru´n (1999) ‘‘Moral Cognitivism and Motivation,’’ Philosophical Review, 108: 161–219. Timmons, Mark (2001) Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.