Defending Albion: Britain's Home Army 1908-1919 (Studies in Military and Strategic History (Palgrave Macmillan (Firm)).)

Defending Albion Britain’s Home Army 1908–1919

K.W. Mitchinson

Defending Albion

Also by K.W. Mitchinson COTTON TOWN COMRADES SADDLEWORTH, 1914–1919: The Experience of a Pennine Community During the Great War GENTLEMEN AND OFFICERS: The Impact and Experience of War on a Territorial Regiment PIONEER BATTALIONS IN THE GREAT WAR EPÉHY RIQUEVAL VILLERS–PLOUICH AMATEUR SOLDIERS: A History of Oldham’s Volunteers and Territorials 1859–1938

Defending Albion Britain’s Home Army 1908–1919

K.W. Mitchinson

© K.W. Mitchinson 2005 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2005 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–3825–3 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mitchinson, K. W., 1951– Defending Albion : Britain’s Home Army, 1908–1919 / by K. W. Mitchinson. p. cm. – (Studies in military and strategic history) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–3825–3 (cloth) 1. Great Britain – History, Military – 20th century. 2. Great Britain – Defenses—History – 20th century. 3. Civil defense – Great Britain – History – 20th century. 4. World War, 1914–1918 – Great Britain. I. Title. II. Studies in military and strategic history (Palgrave Macmillan (Firm)) DA69.M57 2005 940.3⬘41—dc22 10 14

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For my parents When the day that they must go hence was come, many accompanied them to the river side, into which, as they went, they said, ‘Death, where is thy sting?’ And as they went down deeper, they said, ‘Grave, where is thy victory?’ So they passed over, and all the trumpets sounded for them on the other side. (After John Bunyan, The Pilgrim’s Progress)

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Contents List of Illustrations

viii

Preface and Acknowledgements

xiii

List of Abbreviations

xiv

Introduction: The Invasion Issue

1

1 Supplementing the Home Army

13

2 Planning for Defence

34

3 Mobilization and New Auxiliaries

52

4 Protection Companies and Invasion Scares

76

5 The Home Army in 1915

98

6 Reforming and Expanding the Home Army

123

7 Restructuring and Compulsion

147

8 ‘A Sham or a Real Thing’? The Volunteer Force in 1917

166

9 The Diminishing Threat

178

Epilogue

194

Appendix I

Extra Reserve Battalions

205

Appendix II

Home Defence Scheme, July 1914

206

Appendix III

Provisional Units

208

Appendix IV The Home Army in November 1918

209

Appendix V

211

Coastal Fortresses and Garrisons

Notes

213

Bibliography

248

Index

254

vii

List of Illustrations 1 The pre-war Territorial Force was often accused of being ‘plagued by inexperience and youth’. Perhaps in an attempt to demonstrate both maturity and sophistication, these young soldiers of the London Regiment pose with pipes at their 1913 annual camp. (Author’s collection) 2 Six scouts of the London Scottish rode to their 1913 camp at Abergavenny on motorcycles. These privately owned machines, all of which are of different make, illustrate the problems Territorial battalions experienced in trying to secure a degree of homogeneity in much of their pre-war equipment. (London Scottish Museum) 3 Providing sufficient accommodation for the burgeoning New Army and Territorial Force was a major problem for the War Office. These Birmingham Boy Scouts are erecting huts for troops of the home army in February 1915, possibly on Cannock Chase. (IWM Q53647) 4 In August 1914, the Fusilier Brigade of the 1st London Division was deployed to guard the railway network which would carry the BEF to Southampton for embarkation. These Third Line troops of the 2nd (City of London) Battalion (Royal Fusiliers) are thought to have been billeted in railway carriages at Epsom for a period in early 1915. (IWM Q53968) 5 Using what are probably jam tins as ‘grenades’ and almost devoid of other equipment, Territorials of the 11th (Co. of London) Battalion (Finsbury Rifles) take part in a cheery bomb and bayonet charge for the benefit of the camera. The First Line battalion, which in 1914 was meant to be part of the Central Force, was transferred to the 54th (East Anglian) Division in April 1915 and landed at Suvla Bay in August 1915. These troops are probably the Second Line in training near Ipswich. (IWM Q53973) 6 The exclusive Territorial battalions of the London Regiment placed great emphasis on their men’s physical prowess. Inter-regimental speed marches, tugs of war and efficiency competitions were annual events. Several units also ran Schools of Arms. This photo shows what is probably the London Rifle Brigade’s Third Line at Tadworth giving a fencing exhibition. (IWM Q53850) 7 With the 1st Battalion already overseas and soon to see action on Messines Ridge, members of the Second Line London Scottish enjoy their beer ration on Wimbledon Common in October 1914. Despite viii

List of Illustrations ix

8

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Kitchener’s assurance that First Line units of the home army would not go abroad until their Second Line was trained and equipped, some of the Scottish are still in civilian clothes. Presumably the boy was not on strength. (IWM Q53967) The good-natured pre-war rivalry between Territorial battalions continued into the war. Having equipped themselves with blankets as kilts, scarves, towels and shaving brushes as sporrans, and pillows and swagger canes for bagpipes, these 1916 recruits to the Reserve Battalion of the 5th (City of London), demanded a transfer to the London Scottish. (Author’s collection) Having first erected the pontoon bridge, sappers of the 3/1st London RE haul their tool carts across it in October 1915. Owing to the shortage of equipment, Second and Third Line RE spent much of their early months of training undertaking far more mundane duties: they were used extensively on wiring and digging coastal defences. (IWM Q53809) A battery of the 2/2nd Co. of London RFA training in 1915. These Second Line men are members of either the Woolwich or Eltham batteries and are practising with a 15 pdr. Most first line RFA units of the home army used 15 pdr guns rather than the 18 pdr issued to Regular batteries. Depending upon exactly when in 1915 the photo was taken, these gunners were probably fortunate to have any sort of working gun. (IWM Q54287) Personnel of the Territorial Force, Kitchener’s Army and the VTC were often used to clear up after Zeppelin and Gotha raids. These Territorial troops are going through the debris of a house near King’s Lynn in January 1915. (IWM Q53589) A task common to all infantry units of the home army – digging. Troops of the 3/22nd (The Queen’s) London Regiment practise trench construction in September 1915. Many Third Line or Reserve battalions of the Territorial Force were used to dig coastal defences as part of their training. (IWM Q53838) In the days before wearing a brassard became compulsory, members of the Wandsworth Home Defence Battalion practise with dummy weapons under the eye of their Commandant, F.A. Webster. (IWM Q53426) The 3/11th (Co. of London) Battalion (Finsbury Rifles) undergoing rifle instruction in the autumn of 1915. By that time, the supply of SMLEs had improved for troops serving with the Expeditionary Forces, but most training units were still using the older pattern Lee Enfield or weapons purchased from overseas. (IWM Q53823)

x List of Illustrations

15 VTC despatch riders, some perhaps anticipating a chilly alfresco night, on parade in November 1914. (IWM Q53425) 16 Elements of the 2/1st Kent Cyclists in April 1915. In addition to the ten Territorial regiments which formed cyclist battalions, there were another four Territorial cyclist units. Their role was to patrol the coast during the Precautionary Period and, if an enemy landed, to deploy as skirmishers and provide a link between the forward defenders and reinforcement units of the Central Force. (IWM Q53673) 17 Rare photos of a 3rd (Special Reserve) Battalion in training. These men are from the 3/Bedfordshire at a camp probably in the Harwich area. These photos were taken in October 1915. Fourteen months into the war, the only pre-war Special Reservists still with 3rd Battalions would be recovering wounded or instructors. Although these battalions were filled with recruits, their emergency role as coast defence troops was a vital element in the home army’s strategy. By late 1915, 3rd Battalions generally possessed sufficient equipment to allow rudimentary training with specialized equipment but it was not until mid-1917 that Field Marshal Sir John French, C-in-C Home Forces, expressed contentment with the number of machine guns available for coast defence. (IWM Q53842/Q53844) 18 Like all home service units, field ambulances trained with whatever supplies they could obtain. Most of their medical work involved dealing with scabies, flu and tonsilitis but they were also responsible for inspecting billets and VAD hospitals, for checking the quality of food supplies, arranging bathing facilities and organizing the disinfecting of clothes. There was a perpetual shortage of MOs and the units for which they were responsible were frequently scattered up to 20 miles from the ambulance. (IWM Q53720) 19 In late 1916 a scheme was prepared by which up to 26 MG companies would be sent from the MG Training Centre at Grantham as reinforcements to Eastern, Northern and Scottish Commands. In an emergency, the Commandant of the Training Centre was to requisition sufficient private cars to convey four companies; the remaining units were to move by rail. Motor MG batteries patrolled the Lincolnshire area as part of their training. (IWM Q53903) 20 By late 1917, cyclist units were the front line anti-invasion forces of the home army. The sergeant is probably a member of the 2/1st Dorset Yeomanry which converted to a cyclist unit in July 1916. (IWM Q30429) 21 The call up notice for a Special Reservist of the 3/Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. Most such notices were despatched on 4 August

List of Illustrations xi

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1914. Officers of the Special Reserve were ordered to report on 5 August but to avoid congestion at regimental barracks, other ranks were instructed to report to their depots on the fourth day of mobilization. Harry Mottram, a spinner from Mossley, was killed while serving with the 1/LNL in October 1915. In the early weeks of the war members of VTC could be seen digging holes and trenches in just about any open space that attracted them. Dressed in what was hardly suitable attire, this group, which is probably a mixture of Volunteers and Class III National Reservists, is indulging itself on Wandsworth Common. (IWM Q53418) Once an official scheme was organized, members of the Home Counties VTC spent an enormous number of hours digging the London Defences. On some weekends as many as 10,000 Volunteers were estimated to have been working under the supervision of Royal Engineers. These are members of the United Arts Volunteers working near Woldingham in Surrey. The extent and complexity of the defences is clearly apparent but the last trench was not dug until 27 October 1918. (IWM Q23549) British and Dominion leave troops queuing at a currency exchange hut at a London terminus. A member of one of the National Guard’s Station Companies supervises the queue and will direct the men to nearby hostels or vehicles that will transport them to other main line stations. During the war, about six million men passed through the hands of the Victoria Station Company. (IWM Q30513) After much prevarication, in 1917 the War Office finally agreed to recognize the formation of Volunteer Motor Corps. In an emergency, these units were intended to transport Volunteer battalions to their war stations but they were also used to carry convalescing soldiers on day trips and other, similar, social occasions. These cars and motorcycles belong to the Optimists Motor Transport Section. Volunteer Motor Corps were kept in being after the Volunteer Force had been disbanded as the Government foresaw their potential in the event of post-war transport strikes. (IWM Q53963) In the event of Zeppelin raids or fire, London’s National Guard VTC had a squad trained to remove bed-ridden cases from St Bart’s Hospital. This artist’s impression shows a remarkably youthful group of men armed with poles to carry the patients and their mattresses. (Daily Graphic) The United Arts VTC, familiarly known as the Unshrinkables owing to their uniform of a white sweater, leaving their new HQ, the Royal Academy, for a Sunday morning route march in October 1914.

xii List of Illustrations

28

29

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31

During the early weekends of the war, the streets and parks of London were filled with thousands of part-time ‘soldiers’ of the home army seeking recognition and a role. (IWM Q23527) Officers of the home army. Many Commanding Officers appointed to Second Line Territorial units were ‘dugouts’ or former colonels of Rifle Volunteer battalions. Colonel Patterson of the 2/10th Manchester was one such case. Having seen the battalion through its formative stages, and as a coast defence unit of Southern Command, Patterson was too old to go abroad with the unit. He subsequently joined the RAMC. Most of the youthful officers photographed at Crowborough later served in France. (Trustees of 10/Manchester Regt) In contrast, these officers of the 3rd Volunteer Battalion The Cheshire Regiment are considerably older. The CO, Major H. Wilbraham, seated centre, had been commissioned originally in the 2/South Lancashire and retired from the Regular Army with the rank of major in 1879. Captain P. Witter, seated second from left, was caught by the 1918 increase in the upper age of conscription and joined an OTC in August. (Private collection) Armed with six Lewis guns, this group is thought to be a platoon of the Kent Volunteers on fire watch and anti-aircraft duties in London. Several companies of the capital’s Volunteers were attached to the London Fire Brigade and did much useful work during Zeppelin and Gotha raids. (Private collection) A wonderfully telling and sentimental interpretation of the end of the Volunteer Force.

Preface and Acknowledgements Despite the ever increasing number of books on the Great War, the work of the home army and the difficulties of balancing the demands of the foreign fronts with that of home security have been largely ignored. This book makes no attempt to examine how the authorities dealt with the aerial threat or of the activities of the navy; neither does it cover the complexities of British Governments’ quests for security in Ireland. Instead, this volume looks at the sometimes bizarre and often bewildering contradictions in the response of the political and military powers to the more conventional expectation of an enemy march on London. Much of the original encouragement for the work came from Dr Gwyn Bayliss, former Keeper of the Department of Printed Books at the Imperial War Museum. My sincere thanks to Dr Bayliss, Mary Wilkinson and the staff at the Imperial War Museum (IWM) for their assistance and courtesy. The Trustees of the museum have granted permission for the reproduction of many of the photographs used in the book. Thanks are also due to the Trustees and staffs of the London Scottish Regimental Museum, the National Archives (Kew), the National Archives of Scotland, the National Army Museum, the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (King’s College) and to the County Record Offices and other depositories which were scoured for relevant papers and documents. I acknowledge their assistance and permission to quote from the many papers examined during the course of this research. I am indebted to Professor Ian F.W. Beckett and Dr John Bourne for their contributions to and assistance in the preparation of this book. Their scholarship, advice and generosity have been much appreciated. The errors that remain, are of course, my own. Although I have been unable to trace him, I would like also to acknowledge the contribution to the study of Britain’s home defence made by Dr Howard Moon. Thanks, too, for the help given by Neil Barrow, Kate Booth, Janette Chantry and Leslie McDonnell. Finally, to JB for her unflagging encouragement and tolerance.

xiii

List of Abbreviations AAG AC ACI ADM ADOS AG AQMG ASC AWOL BEF Bn CAB CID CIGS C-in-C C-in-CHF Co. CO CRP CUST DCLI DCIGS DGTF DGTVF DMO DMT DORA DSD FM GHQ HF GOC GPO HAC HO IWM KORL

Assistant Adjutant-General Army Council Army Council Instruction Admiralty Assistant-Director Ordnance Supply Adjutant-General Assistant Quartermaster General Army Supply Corps Absent without leave British Expeditionary Force Battalion Cabinet Committee of Imperial Defence Chief of the Imperial General Staff Commander-in-Chief Commander-in-Chief Home Forces County Commanding Officer Command Reinforcement Pool Customs & Excise Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff Director-General Territorial Force Director-General Territorial and Volunteer Force Director of Military Operations Director of Military Training Defence of the Realm Act Director of Staff Duties Field Marshal General Headquarters Home Forces General Officer Commanding General Post Office Honourable Artillery Company Home Office Imperial War Museum King’s Own Royal Lancaster (Regiment) xiv

List of Abbreviations xv

LGB LMA MO MP NAM NAS NCO NDA NDC NR POW PRO QF QMG RAMC RB RDC RE RFA RFC RGA RNVR RO RSM SAA SMLE SR TF TFTR VAD VF VFO VR VTC WO

Local Government Board London Metropolitan Archives Medical Officer Member of Parliament National Army Museum National Archives of Scotland Non-Commissioned Officer National Defence Association National Defence Corps National Reserve Prisoner of War Public Record Office Quick Firing Quartermaster General Royal Army Medical Corps Rifle Brigade Royal Defence Corps Royal Engineers Royal Field Artillery Royal Flying Corps Royal Garrison Artillery Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Record Office Regimental Sergeant Major Small Arms Ammunition Short Muzzle Lee Enfield Special Reserve Territorial Force Territorial Force Technical Reserve Voluntary Aid Detachment Volunteer Force Volunteer Force Order Veteran Reserve Volunteer Training Corps War Office

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Introduction: The Invasion Issue

The threat of invasion from across the Channel or the North Sea was a consistent cause of worry to the authorities of the British Isles from the Roman to Victorian eras. Whether real or imagined, this fear had scored deeply into the psyche of the British people and, at times, what amounted to almost popular xenophobic paranoia compelled Governments to follow policies which by preference they might rather have rejected. Additional expenditure on the army and navy might have satisfied the alarmed citizenry, but administrations were forced to cut back on other projects or massage existing budgets to protect against the perceived danger. The nineteenth century experienced several periods of acute public anxiety which prompted successive administrations to pay heed to an increasing popular clamour for greater security. By the early years of the twentieth century, both Government and military thought had all but discounted the viability of a successful enemy invasion. Nevertheless, blatant demagogic propaganda and rather more discreet, articulate pressure, combined to refute Whitehall’s view and forced the War Office (WO) and Governments to plan and prepare for what they considered to be a remote eventuality. On the eve of war in 1914, the defence of the United Kingdom was the responsibility of the Royal Navy, two divisions of Regular troops and approximately 270,000 men of Britain’s principal auxiliary, the Territorial Force. In general terms, the nation had implicit faith in the navy and, after its shortcomings in South Africa and subsequent reforms, acknowledged the improving worth of the army. Public sentiment towards the Territorial Force was not so accommodating. The home defence army was widely ridiculed for its youth, inefficiency and consistent failure to reach what was considered by many to be an inadequate establishment. 1

2

Defending Albion

Most of the men who chose to enlist in or register for the several home defence formations raised before or during the Great War had reached maturity within an extended period of international suspicion and tension. The nineteenth century had witnessed such unprecedented technological innovation that the feasibility of a ‘bolt from the blue’, an invasion without a previous declaration of war, had become implanted in the minds of the British public. Such a move, it was argued, would catch the navy by surprise and land an army of sufficient strength to overwhelm the paltry home defence forces assembled from Regular and Militia units. Although short-lived, the ‘invasion panic’ of 1859 had a significant outcome as far as the concept of a defence force consisting of partially trained local citizens was concerned. Having earlier, arrogantly, dismissed the proposal, the War Office and Government subsequently allowed the creation of the part-time Rifle Volunteers.1 This was an acknowledgement that, at least for a time, the emphasis for home defence had switched from the navy to the army. With the Regular Army scattered over the Empire, an increase in the balloted Militia politically unacceptable and the navy facing increased technological competition from France, the inexpensive alternative was to raise a volunteer citizen force for local defence. The idea of a nation-in-arms was not new but in late Victorian Britain, the concept impelled added interest. The country became increasingly split between those who wanted a large conscripted force for home defence and those who believed a substantial number of Regulars and Militia, supported by local amateur volunteer bodies, would be sufficient to repel any invasion or raid. Besides, so this latter school argued, if the navy had failed to prevent an enemy landing and lodgement, it meant that the fleet had already been defeated. As Britain could then be forced into surrender through blockade and starvation, it mattered little whether the home forces were large or small, conscript or volunteer. Countering this argument, the supporters of a conscripted force for home defence, and indeed of conscription in general, believed that military training would bring the nation and army closer together. This was a development considered by many militarists, nationalists and even liberals to be crucial both to the moral well-being of the country and to its social evolution. Although not a militarist society, late nineteenth century Britain was not immune to the philosophy that war could prove to be economically, socially and strategically beneficial. Whilst accepting that a conscript army might not be ideal for policing the far flung Empire, its proponents nevertheless argued that sacrifice and duty were the prerequisites for citizenship. Ignoring the potential

Introduction: The Invasion Issue 3

dangers of offering the working classes the advantages of training in arms, and the theory that conscript armies would prove too unwieldy on a modern battlefield, the pro-conscriptionists felt that as a world power Britain must be prepared to challenge not only the navies of her Continental rivals but also their huge armies.2 Pressure for a more effective system of auxiliary home defence and for increased expenditure on the Regular Army grew as Britain’s international isolation became more apparent. What might have been seen as ‘splendid isolation’ by the jingoists in the music halls, was by the late 1890s proving to be a fundamental and, for the time being, an intractable dilemma for Britain’s military and naval chiefs. The very first task allotted to the newly created Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was to investigate the likelihood and the potential success of an invasion of Britain.3 In 1903, it concluded that the War Office’s dragon of a full-scale French or German invasion attempt was finally slain and, as a consequence, it was considered safe to dismantle London’s defences.4 The report had calculated that to have any chance of success, an enemy force would have to be some 70,000 strong; this would require over 200 ships and an embarkation period of 48 hours. There would be ample time for the navy to intercept the invasion fleet and for the Regulars and Volunteers to deploy along the coast. The committee’s conclusions were accepted by the Government and appreciated by the War Office but their implications and practicalities really did little to lessen the country’s immediate strategic difficulties. When Richard Burdon Haldane accepted the Seals of Office in December 1905, he inherited a War Office which was largely unprepared for anything other than colonial wars.5 The fundamental intention behind Haldane’s army modernization plans was to create a professional, fully equipped striking force supported by a territorially organized second line capable of reinforcing and expanding the spearhead. The first line had to be capable of rapid overseas deployment and the second of defending the British Isles against raids with the minimum of assistance from the first. If this objective was to be realized, and with a minimum of financial expenditure, it would require reforms which would amount to little short of revolutionary.6 Haldane first announced his intention of creating an auxiliary territorial reserve to complement the Regular forces in February 1906. Supported by Viscount Esher (who had, in fact, first suggested the idea), Haldane repeatedly expounded his theory that Britain’s imperial requirements and its geographical position necessitated a highly trained professional force supported by a home defence army of part-time

4

Defending Albion

soldiers.7 His initial plans were aimed at creating the machinery by which the estimated 50,000 trained reinforcements needed to sustain a 140,000 strong expeditionary force to India could be sent abroad. It was quickly acknowledged, however, that the proposed Territorial Force would be unlikely to provide men in those numbers.8 While Haldane worked to draw up his proposals during 1906–1907, the fear of invasion continued to occupy the minds of Fleet Street editors and would-be novelists. Although the British press had generally welcomed the new era of apparent co-operation with France, public opinion refused to believe that the threat of invasion, whether by France or Germany, had disappeared. Erskine Childers’ 1903 tale, The Riddle of the Sands, was followed by a rush of invasion novels and novelettes such as Le Queux’s The Invasion of 1910. Lord Roberts, the figurehead and principal mouthpiece of the National Service League, called for boys to perform rifle drill and for the raising of a ‘Home Defence Army’ of one million men raised by universal service. Roberts’ stature and oratory, complemented by powerful articles in The Times from its widely respected military correspondent Colonel Charles à Court Repington, as well as the plethora of alarmist novels, combined to arouse enough anxiety to force the Committee of Imperial Defence to undertake a further invasion investigation.9 A further difficulty requiring resolution was the fundamental question of how an expeditionary force could be supplied with sufficient trained drafts without, at the same time, leaving the British Isles undefended against a large-scale raid. The Regular Army had little faith in the Militia or the Rifle Volunteers either as a source of adequate reinforcements or as bodies with sufficient training and technical skill to defend Britain against a determined incursion. With roughly 35 per cent of its strength annually joining the army,10 the Militia served as a useful recruiting agency for the Regular Army, but it was essentially an anachronistic organization. Industrialization had caused it no longer to mirror the concentrations of population and its long 28 day annual training was ill-suited to an urban based population. The distribution of Militia battalions also reflected its original Southern bias: the Manchester Regiment, for instance, had only two battalions and the Northumberland Fusiliers a mere one.11 To all intents and purposes, the War Office considered the Yeomanry, Militia and Volunteers to be virtually useless as fighting forces yet, despite their acknowledged limitations, the organizations still commanded considerable support in high political circles.12 Any attempt to abolish or reform them would inevitably arouse intense, emotive opposition.

Introduction: The Invasion Issue 5

As it was widely accepted that the Volunteer battalions and batteries were in need of radical modernization and restructuring, and with the backing of a committee under the chairmanship of Viscount Esher created to examine Haldane’s proposed reforms, opposition from supporters of the Volunteer movement was overcome relatively easily.13 Although there was a rearguard action by some of the movement’s diehards, and fewer members than anticipated were actually to make the switch from Volunteer to Territorial, the conversion was reasonably straightforward. Soldiers signing for the new Territorial Forces (TF) were to enlist for an initial four-year engagement, attend annual camp and perform a specified number of drills each year. As an inducement to former Volunteers to enlist, their initial term of the engagement was to be for one year. Proponents of the Militia, however, which included several members of Esher’s committee, demonstrated greater resistance to its proposed demise. With the help of a suggestion by the Director of Military Operations (DMO), Major-General Sir Spencer Ewart, which had ‘worked like magic with the Generals’,14 the opposition was disarmed and the Militia was all but converted into Special Reserve (SR) on the battalions based county regimental system.15 Equally importantly, Ewart’s solution not only paved the way for the elimination of the Militia, but also solved the problem of how to supply any expeditionary force with drafts. Historically, the Militia and the Militia Reserve had produced a reservoir of partially trained men to fill up the Regular battalions on mobilization, a function which Haldane’s new Special Reserve was now to fulfil. Moreover, the Special Reserve cadres would also sustain those Regular units once they had gone overseas. Haldane announced that the Territorial Force was to be relieved of that responsibility and its role would now be purely one of home defence. Apart from their role as draft finders, the 74 draft finding Special Reserve battalions were also designated roles as home defence garrisons. Similarly, although Haldane did intend that they might be sent to the Mediterranean as garrison battalions or to the Continent for line of communication duties, the 27 Extra Reserve battalions were also allocated home defence duties.16 The personnel of the Special Reserve was to be made up of volunteers who enlisted for six years and who would be required to do six months full time basic training and then three to four weeks annual training. Special Reservists would, therefore, remain essentially civilians, but were to receive weekly army pay and be called up on mobilization. The other ranks were to be commanded by officers drawn from a new branch of the Reserve of Officers known as the Special

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Defending Albion

Reserve of Officers but Haldane also hoped that his new universitybased Officer Training Corps would provide a steady supply of officers for the Reserve. Initial proposals required Special Reserve officers to complete a 12-month basic training period and then attend annual camp and other occasional training schemes. In order to secure these far-reaching reforms in both the Regular and home armies, Haldane had been forced to accept that the number of elected members on the Territorial county associations, the organs which were to run the TF, would be considerably reduced. This meant that he had sacrificed one of the principal tenets of his new force. The Secretary of State had intended that the army as a whole, and the home forces in particular, should forge an essential link between the military and society, to form what he described as a ‘close and organic relation with the life of the nation’.17 He favoured the concept of a nation-in-arms, but wished to avoid the Continental model of vast conscript citizen armies, creating instead a compact force based on voluntary service and organized on a regional basis.18 Disappointed as he was with the need to compromise, Haldane expressed the hope that between one-sixth and one-quarter of the new home force men would actually opt to undertake a foreign service obligation.19 Nevertheless, Haldane emphasized the new home defence role of the Territorials in the hope of persuading the Rifle Volunteers, many of whom deeply resented the reforms, to enlist in the Territorial units. The home army was to have an establishment of almost 303,000, organized in 14 divisions and 14 cavalry brigades. Yet, despite the terms of service intentionally being no more onerous than those demanded of the Volunteers, the target figure was to prove overly and disappointingly ambitious. Haldane’s final scheme was a somewhat disingenuous compromise intended to appease both supporters and opponents of the new home army but at the very time of the Territorials’ birth in April 1908, the second invasion inquiry was taking evidence and the role of the Territorials was already under considerable scrutiny. Admiral Sir John Fisher, the First Sea Lord, had thoroughly resented the founding of the new inquiry.20 During its course he continued to insist that the prevention of an invasion remained the preserve of the Senior Service and that only the navy had any understanding of the impact and significance of recent technological advances. Evidence submitted by Lord Roberts to the investigation outlined the National Service League’s assertion that Germany’s modern railways, docks and ocean-going liners could allow them to land 20,000 soldiers on English shores within the space of one hour.21 Repington, of The Times, argued for a TF of 800,000, while Roberts renewed his call for the ‘Million Men

Introduction: The Invasion Issue 7

Standard’. The navy’s representatives retorted that Repington and Roberts had taken no account of the difficulties an invasion fleet would encounter during its crossing and did not appreciate the recent changes in fleet deployment by the Admiralty.22 The navy’s defence was actually assisted by a declaration from Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, the architect of the High Seas Fleet, who claimed that Germany was dumbfounded by British fears of a German invasion and insisted that the number of British residents in Germany’s harbour towns would make preparations for a ‘bolt from the blue’ impossible to cloak.23 This second inquiry reported in October 1908, six months after the TF had begun to recruit. The committee supported the findings of its predecessor by concluding that a successful German invasion was an impossibility. Despite the Admiralty’s acknowledgement that swarms of fast, purpose-built torpedo craft would severely hamper the fleet’s efforts to defeat a raid, the WO decided that a home army of two Regular divisions and 40,000 local auxiliaries would be sufficient to repulse a landing.24 This last conclusion ignored the protests of the General Staff which had argued that to leave two divisions of Britain’s already small army at home would ‘devalue’ the country’s use as a potential ally to a European power.25 The report did criticise the sanctioned establishment of the Territorial Force and dismissed its actual strength as totally inadequate but, having anticipated the criticism, the War Office had previously prepared a paper outlining the importance of the Territorials to home defence. The War Office review was drawn up by the Director of Military Training (DMT), Brigadier-General A.J. Murray, and represents the military’s first real consideration and assessment of how Haldane’s new home army could be utilized.26 It set out the various options which the War Office considered might be thrown up if Britain did become involved in a war with a Continental power and drew lines demarcation line of where responsibilities for home defence should fall. It also detailed where enemy forces might be expected to appear, in what numbers and how the home army should react. Murray believed that war would be preceded by a period of worsening international relations and recommended that during this time, what he called the Precautionary Period, the Territorial Force’s Special Service Sections, which amounted to a total of only 1486 all ranks, would patrol the East Coast and 45 battalions of the Special and Extra Reserve be put on standby to replace the departing Regulars of the Expeditionary Force. At this time, the remaining 56 Special Reserve battalions would not have been called out and the Territorials would not have been embodied.

8

Defending Albion

Murray then went on to express concern at the presumed inefficiency of the new Territorial Force and made several recommendations. Without the assurance of improvement, he predicted, ‘… any plans are mere paper plans and the safety of the country is jeopardized’. He suggested a speedy selection be made of which Territorial units should be kept embodied for Field Army purposes when the Expeditionary Force left the country and urged that as far as possible, Territorial formations should be kept intact and not dissipated as garrison troops. The defence of ports was not to be their task but that of the Special Reserve battalions. These units were not, by virtue of their character and their primary purpose of reinforcing the Expeditionary Force, suitable for field army purposes. If war did follow the declaration of the Precautionary Period, and the entire Expeditionary Force had not yet embarked for the Continent, Murray admitted that he was working in the realms of speculation. When he circulated his paper the authorities had little idea how long it would take Territorial units to mobilize but Murray ‘hoped that we shall at any rate be no worse off than we were with the Volunteers’ and worked on the assumption that about one-third of the Territorial establishment would reach its war stations on the first day of mobilization and another third, two days later. The likelihood of the remaining third even existing, let alone turning up at a war station, was entirely discounted. With the Special Reserve battalions being available for garrison duties by the fifth day, Murray estimated that by the fourth day, nearly 14,000 Regulars of the two divisions not ear-marked for the Expeditionary Force, and almost 87,000 Territorials would be on or near the coasts. Once the Special Reserve units, with estimated battalion establishments of 800 and a total of 63,000 men were in place, over half the Regulars and over one-third of the Territorials would be withdrawn. The total number of coastal garrison defenders in all Home Commands would then amount to 125,085 men. Throughout the paper, Murray emphasized the need for a reduction in Haldane’s stated period of six months post-mobilization training for the Territorials. He wanted the Regulars to be released for overseas service as quickly as possible but warned that the Territorial formations in the six Home Commands into which the British Isles was militarily divided, would probably need a stiffening of Regulars. The DMT’s faith in the auxiliary force was harsh, but probably realistic; he worked on the assumption that one Regular soldier was the equivalent of three Territorials and was also critical of the physical distribution of the Territorial units. Murray recommended that the assumed deployment of the Territorial Force should be reviewed but

Introduction: The Invasion Issue 9

wanted to retain the principle of allocating a proportion of Territorials to all Home Commands. To ensure the rapid arrival of troops at any of the likely landing places, Murray proposed that the 4th and 6th Regular Divisions, which at the time were still not scheduled to be part of the Expeditionary Force, should assemble in Aldershot and London, and that the Special Reserve be called out as soon as the overseas force had embarked. He suggested two mounted brigades and two divisions of Territorials should go to Ireland to replace departing Regular units and also recommended that a Central Force, comprising troops of London and Aldershot Commands and a further allocation of Territorials, should be available for rapid deployment to the East or South Coasts. To re-emphasize his concern about Territorial efficiency, Murray concluded with a warning: Lastly and most importantly [we must] hasten by every means … the arrangements for placing the Territorial Force in the field on the order being given to mobilize for Home Defence. In this connection it may be necessary to bring to notice of HMG that unless it is possible to count upon the Territorial Force for effective use from the very onset of hostilities any plans which may be drawn up can only prove unsatisfactory.27 Worries about the state of some harbour defences did prompt the military and naval authorities to undertake some improvements on coastal sites but the overriding message from Murray and his colleagues in the War Office was clear: viewed in isolation the auxiliary home army was unsatisfactory but if supported by two Regular divisions and the navy, it was just about adequate. Public fears were not allayed by the report’s findings. Another rash of invasion stories, both in the illustrated mass market weeklies as well as the more responsible broadsheets and periodicals, again fanned national worries about a ‘bolt from the blue’. Rumours that a substantial ‘enemy’ force had evaded the fleet and landed during the 1908 manoeuvres were repudiated by the First Lord, but the agitation refused to subside.28 With such unlikely bed fellows as Baden-Powell and H.M. Hyndmann,29 the National Service League’s complaints of the inadequacy of the home army continued to gather momentum. The ratchet was further turned by the public antagonism between Admirals Fisher and Beresford over the composition and preparedness of the fleet, and by Lord Roberts’ refusal to be dissuaded, despite a personal appeal from the King, from delivering an alarmist speech in the Lords.30 Roberts’ subsequent oratory

10 Defending Albion

described portentous scenes of a bestial, rampaging invading German army supported by 80,000 trained soldiers already resident and working as waiters in Britain.31 Not all of the military establishment agreed with Roberts’ insistence on a home army of one million men. In July 1909, Spencer Ewart, the pro-conscriptionist DMO, asked: What is the use of an army which can only be used on the assumption that the Germans have defeated our Navy and gained a footing … . Home defence is the most poisonous fallacy ever produced by man. … It will never be justifiable to raise more men for home defence than the irreducible minimum which must in any case be kept at home to hold our naval ports, prevent raids and preserve public order.’32 Ewart may have disparaged the idea of a large army for home defence, but the public remained concerned at the perceived lack of preparedness. A sensationalist, yet ultimately mediocre, ‘invasionist’ play, An Englishman’s Home, played to packed houses in January 1909 and was adopted as a recruiting aid by the County of London TF Association. The Harmsworth and Northcliffe newspapers added their contribution by publishing articles calling for a strengthened Territorial Force, and a combination of pressure groups ranging from the National Service League to the Navy League, contrived to whip up public outrage at the increased level of German capital ship construction.33 The first seven weeks of 1909 witnessed a net increase of 30,000 men to the Territorial Force and forced Haldane to ask Parliament for an extra £400,000 in the 1910–11 Estimates.34 He also announced that every Territorial unit within its respective self-contained division had been allocated a war station either on the coast or as part of the mobile Central Force.35 Haldane’s punishing national round of speeches to promote public interest in the Territorials had thus seemed to pay off and, indeed, had even helped to quell some of the more strident opposition to the reforms from within the Cabinet itself. In early 1910, the number of part-time soldiers had reached 276,000, still about 10 per cent below establishment but apparently heading in the right direction. In 1910, when recruitment to the Territorials showed a marked decline, the National Service League unleashed a sustained campaign of criticism against the new home army. Its constant sniping and denigration of the Territorials probably did affect recruiting but both Roberts and Repington always insisted that their criticism was intended to

Introduction: The Invasion Issue 11

awaken the nation to the inadequacies of the existing system rather than as opposition to the Territorial Force per se. Haldane tried to counter the League’s hostility by allowing General Sir Ian Hamilton to write what virtually amounted to a Government publication entitled Compulsory Service.36 Even thought the book attempted to dismantle the League’s polemic by arguing that national service was too expensive and unsuited to Britain’s unique defensive requirements, Haldane had never entirely ruled out the possibility of having to accept a degree of compulsion and indeed, by 1910, a majority of the General Staff was known to favour its introduction.37 Yet, even if Haldane had himself believed unreservedly in its necessity, to have attempted to convert Britain into a major military power would probably have ended in political catastrophe. Compulsion would have split a Cabinet of any party and even the supporters of such a scheme admitted that its introduction would at least temporarily weaken the army by adversely affecting voluntary recruitment, and thus the security of the Empire.38 It was against this background of unresolved naval and military disagreement, of impassioned argument over the necessity of compulsion and of a nation emerging from a period of prolonged and proud isolation, that Haldane’s reforms of the Regular and home forces should be viewed. From the Saxon fyrd, the Elizabethan trained bands and the Militia, to the nineteenth-century Rifle Volunteers, the concept of an auxiliary home army was well founded. Britain was a country used to accepting military activity as an essential part of national life and which although not militarised in the Prussian sense, was not unafraid or illprepared mentally for war.39 It was also a nation which, although riven by internal political and social discord, remained essentially patriotic. That patriotism had manifested itself in the popular culture of the early twentieth century as, indeed, it had throughout the previous generations. Men had been prepared, admittedly not always with obvious enthusiasm, to train and practise their martial skills on village greens and sandy shores and the existence of local companies had served to reassure the populace against foreign attack. On the other hand, they had at times been both fêted and ignored by authority, derided by those who viewed them as tools of government repression and dismissed by others as pretentious, foolhardy misfits. The popular perception of the auxiliaries changed little during the Victorian era but, to all governments, they were a convenient means by which they could save money and simultaneously reassure the occasionally panic-stricken public. The War Office might have ceased to believe in the possibility of invasion but important sectors within society were not quite so easily persuaded.

12 Defending Albion

In addition to those younger men who volunteered to enlist in the home army, Haldane believed there existed a significant reservoir of trained soldiers, albeit possibly in their middle-age, who might wish to recapture the comradeship of service and feel that they could still be of use to their country. Educated against a background of imperial rivalry and diplomatic brinkmanship to believe in Albion’s infallibility, these ageing former servicemen would be required merely to transfer their inbred hostility from one putative challenger of Britain’s perceived position of world hegemony to another. The Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, gave his full support to Haldane’s programme of army reform, partly because operating an efficient army and navy had the added advantage of curtailing if not containing expenditure which could otherwise be diverted for social measures. The public, however, needed to see concrete evidence of Britain’s security from attack. The might of the Home Fleet and the physical presence of the coastal forts provided such testimony but the home army was a different matter. Britain’s long coastline invited invasion or raid and if an attacker evaded the fleet’s watchful eyes, crucial coastal facilities or even London itself might be threatened. Haldane had attempted to mollify public anxiety by replacing the ridiculed Volunteers with the more compact Territorials but he was treading upon a potentially rocky road. The tradition of men serving as defenders of their own hearths might have been well established but so too was its martial inadequacy.

1 Supplementing the Home Army

The Edwardian public knew little of the extent of military planning or of the petulant and irascible relations between the two armed forces. The press and regular squabbles within the House of Commons drew attention to the political, and to some degree the strategic differences, but the detail remained a mystery. Since it had come to power in 1905, apart from a small cabal within the Cabinet, the Liberal Party had little knowledge of how far Britain’s military resources were earmarked for use on the Continent. Had it known, Herbert Asquith’s administration might well have fallen.1 Preferring to keep his party largely ignorant of a likely Continental commitment, the Prime Minister nevertheless regularly and publicly expressed his confidence in Haldane, in the necessity of his reforms and in the ability of the home army to defend the shores. Haldane harboured no doubts about the indispensability of his work, but as accusations of his Germophilia grew increasingly frequent and as criticism about his reforms’ creations mounted, Asquith’s confident support became essential. The original antipathy held by former members of the Militia towards its successor organization persisted long after the Special Reserve had begun to recruit in 1908. The thrust of the criticism centred around Haldane’s perceived misplaced optimism for the SR’s continued development. Something like 35,000 of the initial 55,000 recruits were in fact militiamen who had transferred to finish their terms of service and about 10 per cent of the remainder had been discharged on medical grounds soon after attestation. Furthermore, over 6100 recruits quit the SR for the Regular Army before completing their initial six months’ training, a drain of qualified men which was to become a persistent feature and complaint throughout the Reserve’s existence. Too many recruits were also physically poor specimens. Members were supposed to 13

14 Defending Albion

be at least 17 years old, but in reality many were mere boys of 15 or 16 who joined the organization as an alternative to the workhouse. Moreover, because recruits enlisted for general service, on mobilization they could be posted to any battalion or regiment. Even if he was drafted to his own 1st or 2nd Battalion, the Special Reservist would not know his officers, Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) or even most of his comrades. With so many pernicious faults the Special Reserve was, to its critics, a dangerous and useless deception because it wasted money and fooled the public into assuming that it was a trained and efficient force. The former Secretary of State, Arnold-Forster, asserted that in some places 90 per cent of the existing strength had ‘no intention of going through the Special Reserve any more than they have of going through the Salvation Army’.2 Haldane was further ridiculed for his frequent assertion that the paltry number of 100 non-Militia officer recruits would be hugely expanded within 12 months by an influx of men from the universities’ officer training corps, for the infantry’s poor state of training and for the state of the Special Reserve’s artillery units which rarely had the opportunity to practise with live rounds.3 There was also some contemporary confusion over the precise function of the Special Reserve and Extra Reserve battalions. Haldane again explained that the 27 Extra Reserve units might well be sent abroad but he did not deny the suggestion that some of the 74 3rd Battalions might also serve overseas.4 This was a departure from their original stated purpose but Haldane emphasized that their primary and secondary functions as draft finders and coastal garrisons had not been superseded. Although Haldane did not go into detail, it is probably safe to assume that if some of the battalions were sent overseas, garrisons for their war stations would presumably have had to found by the derided and consistently under strength Territorial Force. The credibility of this expansion of the Special Reserve’s role was questioned by, amongst others, George Wyndham, the Unionist spokesman on military affairs.5 He argued that if it was now to perform a triple role of ‘grinding out the drafts’, provide garrisons for UK ports and perhaps serve abroad, its establishment would have to be increased.6 At full strength, each battalion was supposed to muster 550 men but on mobilization the posting of Army Reservists not immediately required for the Expeditionary Force was expected to expand each battalion to about 1500. Given this entirely unproven establishment and the possibility that an undisclosed number of units might be sent abroad, doubt was cast on the ability of a Territorial Force with an unachieved establishment of just over 300,000 to provide a would-be invader with an

Supplementing the Home Army 15

adequate deterrent. Moreover, if the proposed mobile Central Force was, as some believed, to require another 200,000 troops to repel a raid of 70,000, in their existing attenuated forms and further handicapped by an acknowledged lack of horses, the Special Reserve and the Territorial Force would clearly be found wanting. Haldane estimated that if the entire Expeditionary Force went abroad, about 40,000 Regular troops, largely Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA) and Royal Engineers (RE), would remain. He struggled to defend the existing size and quality of the home defence auxiliaries and accepted that a total of perhaps 345,000 men would be adequate to resist a raid of 70,000. The concentration of this force would necessitate port garrisons and line of communication troops having to ‘flock’ to augment the 100,000 core of the Central Force.7 This could leave ports, naval bases and arsenals virtually denuded of defenders. The Admiralty and War Office were awake to the possibility of the enemy striking at several places simultaneously, perhaps with a major landing to draw the Central Force and then launching smaller raids against selected vulnerable points. The assumption that the expanding Special Reserve battalions and the Territorial Force could cover all eventualities would mean stretching their resources to an untested degree and the gullibility of the public beyond the realm of reality. Critics who continued to regard the pre1908 structure of home defence as the ideal, pointed out that in the year before Haldane’s reforms the Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers totalled 349,141; in 1911 the Special Reserve, which was not, of course specifically for home defence, and the Territorial Force came to a combined total of just 330,610.8 At the instigation of the Adjutant-General (AG) and the Chief of the General Staff (CIGS), a small committee was established to examine the existing structure of the Reserve, to make recommendations and, above all, to report quickly.9 Haldane largely accepted the committee’s findings, offered some radical solutions to address the shortages of officers and men,10 but waited until March 1911 before announcing that the establishment of the 27 Extra Reserve battalions would be increased from 500 to 750. He believed the additional men would allow the battalions to fulfil their function as coastal garrison units or line of communication troops more efficiently. Instead of merely echoing the committee’s supposition that the extra men would be found by simply enlisting ex-Regulars, he went a stage further by declaring that they would be drawn from members of a new reserve he had conceived two years earlier. The 200 ex-Regulars that were to be recruited for each of the Extra Reserve battalions and those sufficient to make up 10 per cent

16 Defending Albion

of the 74 3rd Battalions would, he announced, eventually be composed of men enlisted from the Veteran Reserve (VR). Haldane estimated that about 10,000 of these former soldiers, all of whom would have served their time in the Army Reserve, would be forthcoming.11 In addition, he adopted all of the committee’s recommendations on changes to the duration of recruits’ and annual training. Apart from those who he expected would come from the VR, Haldane made no mention of how the additional number of men was to be attracted to the Special Reserve units. Besides the continuing shortage of officers, a position which some thought would be alleviated by the Secretary of State’s proposal to reduce the training period from one year to three months,12 the salient criticisms of the SR centred around the quality of recruit and the difficulties of building competence and esprit when companies could be only 30-strong on parade. Even the length of both the initial and annual training periods was acknowledged as militating against men who were in regular employment: those who could undertake the obligation tended to be the young, the feckless and the transient unskilled worker. The storm of protest over the SR’s apparent lack of progress showed no signs of abating during 1912, but many of the critics who could still not resist comparing the Special Reserve with the defunct Militia, were generally well-meaning. Some of those who were most hostile to the existing state were themselves Commanding Officers of 3rd and 4th Battalions.13 They preferred to see the SR succeed but were concerned at its low public esteem and how successive Governments had treated both the Militia and its successor as a ‘stepchild [for whom] it had constantly to apologise’.14 They wanted the Reserve to receive the same encouragement as the Territorial Force, a decent walking-out uniform and a higher public profile.15 Undoubtedly they had a case. There was still an unsatisfactory imbalance in the ages and types of men who joined and there was the added confusion of the differing lengths, frequency and quality of their training. Special Reservists who worked for the General Post Office (GPO) had to give up their holidays to complete their annual training, while their GPO colleagues in the Territorial Force did not. Furthermore, abolishing the Militia had certainly destroyed the ancient link between local forces and the landed families. Many of those ‘county’ families whose sons had traditionally joined the Militia now joined the Territorial Force. The result, despite the reduction in officers’ training period to six months, was a continuing officer shortage within the Special Reserve. The SR probably was more efficient than the Militia, and the Government did introduce the incentive of a £1 re-engagement bounty

Supplementing the Home Army 17

in May 1912,16 but there were still too many recruits of poor physical stature and too many others who transferred to a line regiment as soon as they had secured their training bounty. It was not, as one Member asserted, a force ‘simply and solely to catch the tramp [seeking] six months’ shelter and clothing’,17 but the Government did accept that it was a force which needed a revitalization and an injection of purpose. After all, if the Special Reserve scheme to reinforce the Regulars broke down, then the organization’s role as an integral element of the home army would be affected and the very departure of the Expeditionary Force could be thrown into jeopardy. Another of Haldane’s creations had, like the Special Reserve, suffered a similar experience of public derision and stunted development. The War Office had first begun to consider the Secretary of State’s proposal to establish a reserve for the Territorial Force in December 1908, the establishment of which had become an essential element of Haldane’s overall plan for the home army. Despite the failure of earlier attempts to create reserves for auxiliary forces, Haldane was confident that on this occasion a scheme was viable. Provision for such an organization had already been made within Section VII of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, 1907 and during the 1909 Army Estimates debate Haldane told the House: ‘We are organizing a new reserve of Territorials. We think that the men who pass through the [Territorial] Force with a good training should not be lost.’ He went on to suggest that former Territorials should be formed into a reserve which would increase the potential strength of the Territorial Force from 300,000 to 400,000.18 The intended size of the TF Reserve was somewhat at odds with the preliminary discussions already taking place within the War Office and there was no early public mention of the plan to form two other auxiliary elements which were certainly already under consideration. Nevertheless, the general principle of creating the Reserve was generally well received and it was made known that the next stage of the proceedings would involve negotiations with the county associations. The discussions already begun between the Army Council and the General Staff envisaged a TF Reserve of about 60,000.19 There was some opposition to immediately establishing the TF Reserve as it might have served as an inducement to the 86,000 ex-Volunteers who had joined the Territorial Force on a one-year agreement not to reengage but leave and enrol instead in the Reserve. A preferred option was a suggestion that only men who had served as a Territorial for two or three years would be eligible to join. This would, it was hoped, encourage the one-year men to serve in the home army until they

18 Defending Albion

qualified for the Reserve.20 There was some disagreement about whether TF Reservists should be allowed to camp with Territorial units and also continued argument about the intended size of the Reserve. Haldane was known to be thinking still in terms of 100,000, but the QuartermasterGeneral (QMG), Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Miles, thought this seemed unnecessarily large.21 There was an early lack of consensus over how the Reserve should be organized. Colonel Findlay, an Assistant Adjutant-General (AAG), wanted to see it formed into reserve units analogous to a mobilized Special Reserve.22 Lieutenant-General Miles fundamentally agreed, suggesting that on mobilization the number of TF Reservists required to bring Territorial units up to establishment would simply ‘move up’ to their parent unit. This would have the benefit of simplifying the storage and issue of clothing and equipment and thus reduce costs.23 General Sir William Nicholson, the CIGS, opposed this suggestion and recommended a more flexible approach. He preferred to see the TF Reserve as merely a register of trained individuals who would, in an emergency, be expected to serve in any of their county association’s units.24 Once general agreement had been reached within the War Office, in July 1909 the proposals were presented to the Territorial Force Advisory Council.25 With the exception of a few reservations regarding grants and conditions of service, the Council ‘cordially welcomed’ the War Office’s draft memorandum and copies were sent to county associations two days later.26 The Army Council’s overriding concerns were the costs and time necessary to establish the Reserve. In December 1909, Nicholson claimed that it was still impossible to estimate the expenditure required for the new reserve but warned that if it was substantial it would ‘retard the completion of the Expeditionary Force and the Territorial Force’.27 A minute by Haldane insisted expenditure must be restricted ‘to the absolute bare necessity or the projected 100,000 will cost more than we can find’.28 The Army Council’s concern over the passage of time was linked to the approaching termination of engagement of former Volunteers who had enrolled for two years. If the TF Reserve was provisionally established by 1 April 1910, these men could resign from the Territorial Force on 31 March and enrol immediately in the Reserve. Further draft proposals, many of which included suggestions culled from the county associations’ responses to a circular, were prepared and discussed within the War Office and the King’s approval was secured.29 On 7 March 1910, Haldane announced to the Commons, ‘Provision for the [Reserve] which the House sanctioned last year is now being

Supplementing the Home Army 19

carried a stage further.’ Enrolment in the TF Reserve would begin within a few weeks enabling, he predicted, the 14 Territorial divisions of the home army to be quickly supplied with ‘mature and trained men’ on mobilization.30 With the issue one week later of a Special Army Order authorizing despatch of the regulations to the counties, Haldane’s object had been achieved within the necessary time scale. Associations were informed that, although final decisions had yet to be made, they could immediately register the names of any soldiers whose terms of service were about to end. The regulations confirmed that the TF Reserve would be sub-divided into three sections: the TF Reserve itself, the Technical Reserve and the Veteran Reserve.31 Anyone who had served at least one term in the Territorials would be eligible to join the TF Reserve which, with an establishment of 100,000, was intended to reach 33 per cent of the Territorial Force’s designated strength. Men could enrol for between one and four years and, with the permission of the commanding officer of the Territorial unit, could volunteer for drills and camp. No soldier would be allowed to serve more than four years and the compulsory age of retirement was identical to that enforced in the Territorials. Provision was made for men to fire an annual course and retain their uniforms but the principal tenet adhered to throughout was that of minimizing cost. As an example of the official parsimony evident throughout the process, the department of the Quartermaster General had its way over the musketry course: former yeomanry, infantry and engineers were to be allowed to fire 20 rounds each year; other arms were permitted only ten.32 Despite a few unfriendly snipes from the Unionists, not all of whom were entirely convinced of the Reserve’s worth, the organization’s concept was well received both within the House and the country. Yet, within three years of its creation, the TF Reserve was acknowledged to be a miserable failure. At best it was capable of mustering a mere 2 per cent of its anticipated 100,000 men. Simultaneously with his proposal to create the TF Reserve, Haldane announced his intention of forming the other two reserves. In a circular letter to the associations in July 1909, the Secretary of State declared his intention of enlisting the help of certain men whose specialist skills would be able to provide essential auxiliary assistance to the Regular and home forces in times of emergency. In particular he wished to attract vets, doctors, civil and electrical engineers and railway, telephone and telegraph personnel to the new Technical Reserve (TFTR). The men need not have served in the military and the Army Council did not initially anticipate any burden of training would be laid at the door of the

20 Defending Albion

county associations. With a few exceptions the TFTR would be organized through the various technical and professional bodies representing the members’ diverse skills and a Technical Reserve Advisory Committee. When he made his announcement, Haldane clearly had little firm idea of how the TFTR would organize, mobilize or operate. One Government spokesman unhelpfully declared that the authorities were simply ‘leaving it to develop’.33 Several European powers, such as the Habsburg Empire, did have a similar organization but Haldane seems not to have thought of extending the British experiment further than a fairly loose liaison between the War Office and the Advisory Committee. In effect, all it would at first amount to was a register of men ‘who would be invaluable in time of war, but who would be very difficult to get unless we had them carefully selected in the intervals of peace’. Reaction to its proposed formation was largely muted but there was a general agreement that such a organization was desirable. Some county associations acknowledged it could be a very valuable force, especially for the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, but thought the men should have a certain degree of military training in peace time with the units to which they would be attached in war. At least one association went even further and suggested its members should attend at least one Territorial camp in order to learn military discipline. The Army Council was not impressed, dismissing the suggestion with the acerbic assertion that ‘discipline cannot be learnt by one day at camp’.34 Progress in developing the Technical Reserve was slow. Having been really little other than redundant from the start, the TF Advisory Committee ceased meeting in 1913.35 The only element which succeeded in establishing itself firmly within the broad spread of the county associations was the Voluntary Aid Detachment (VAD). Yet even this success had its limitations. The detachments were intended to care for sick and wounded Territorials of the home army within the immediate vicinity of their own areas and to provide personnel for hospitals and ambulance trains on mobilization. Organizing and administering the VAD as part of the Territorial Force Technical Reserve resulted in the inevitable calls from the counties for additional finance. The detachments relied upon voluntary contributions and, when in 1911 Haldane refused a grant of £5 per detachment, the counties had expressed concern about whether the units could be kept in existence. Furthermore, disputes over the certification of orderlies had done little to improve relations and morale.36 The disappointing failure to recruit men into the aid detachments appears to have been typical of the generally disappointing development of the Technical Reserve as a whole. There were attempts to identify

Supplementing the Home Army 21

certain types of dockyard artisans and GPO telegraphists but these were more to do with ensuring they would not be allowed to enlist if war came rather than to encourage them to register their willingness to avail themselves to the army. One fundamental reason behind the TFTR’s lack of attractiveness to skilled men was the practice and attitude of many artisan trade unions. Several of these associations were actively opposed to the Territorial Force and had, from its inception in 1908, campaigned to discourage their members from enlisting.37 Requests from Home Commands for county associations to compile registers of motorcycles and cars in certain counties fell largely on deaf ears,38 but one element which did eventually become a tangible part of the TFTR, but which had not only to struggle to gain recognition and acceptance from the War Office but also, like the Voluntary Aid Detachment, suffered a fitful development, was the Corps of Guides. The original idea for such a corps had sprung from the Surrey County Association when, in February 1910, its committee requested the authorities to give consideration to the sanctioning of a new organization which would be able to provide specialist local knowledge to commanders of the home army.39 The concept was that a Corps of Guides should be drawn from hunting men, farmers and the like, probably over military age, and who need not have any knowledge of the rifle or of military discipline. These District and Parish Guides would work under the supervision of a Chief Guide, who would in turn be responsible to the Territorial Force Association. A register of suitable men would be kept by each county and, to comply with the terms of the Hague Convention, they would be issued with a badge and hat.40 The initial Whitehall response was not encouraging. Major-General Archibald Murray, the DMT, wrote to Nicholson suggesting that as Territorial cyclist battalions were already supposed to be familiar with potential invasion sites, a corps of guides would be an unnecessary duplication.41 Twelve months later he again came to the same conclusion but did suggest an alternative scheme to Nicholson whereby every cyclist battalion in Eastern Command should attach 10–20 ‘intelligent’ men as guides to the HQ of the various mobile forces.42 The CIGS, the DMT and Brigadier-General Lancelot Kiggell, the Director of Staff Duties (DSD) who all believed that a group of untrained civilians would be more likely to ‘hamper rather than assist’ the home army, concurred with this solution.43 Furthermore, Kiggell thought it ‘unsound military policy to persuade individuals to undertake a measure of service which, while useless for military purposes, may be claimed by the giver as a fulfilment of their responsibility to the state’.44

22 Defending Albion

In contrast to the tardy development of the Corps of Guides, and the frequent squabbles between the various ambulance units which constituted the VAD, the third element of the TF Reserve, the Veteran Reserve, had been expanding with unanticipated rapidity. Former Territorials might have been disinterested in joining their own force’s reserve but they were demonstrating a remarkable willingness to enrol beside ex-Regulars and ex-Volunteers in a body which offered no social advantage, no opportunity to camp or drill and not even a promise of royal patronage. The Veteran Reserve had burst upon the national scene with a vigour and dynamism which had surprised even its instigator. Unaware that the year was to mark the peak in Territorial recruiting and eager to exploit the apparent success of his new force, in 1910 Haldane announced that registration for the Veteran Reserve would commence a few weeks after the Territorial Force Reserve itself had been established.45 Conscious that Territorials who had joined at the time of the force’s creation would be approaching the end of their four-year period of service in 1912, Haldane hoped those soldiers who were not prepared to re-enlist for a further four years, or who did not qualify for the TF Reserve, might commit themselves instead to this new organization. Away from Whitehall, and long before the formal declaration that registration for a Veteran Reserve was about to commence, other enthusiasts for the development of a citizen-based home army had already done a great deal of prompting and preparatory work. John St Loe Strachey, editor and proprietor of the Spectator and friend of politicians from both sides of the divide, had long deplored the apparent wastage of so many men under 40 years of age who annually passed out of the Regular Army. Strachey had spoken to Haldane on several occasions about a number of schemes designed to raise auxiliary formations for home defence and had convinced the Secretary of State that a register of former servicemen was a simple and cheap way of eventually utilizing these men. Haldane even speculated that they might be able to raise four divisions of fit and trained men to act as a third line behind the Regulars and Territorials. Until a survey had been undertaken to ascertain how many men might be willing to offer their services, Haldane refused to make any guarantees about attaching Veteran Reservists to particular or specific home army Territorial units. With the determined object of keeping costs to a minimum, neither was he prepared to commit himself to promises of equipping the VR.

Supplementing the Home Army 23

Haldane was later to retract his loose talk of a third line home army for such a project would require an organization far too expensive and complex for the existing financial climate. He did repeatedly stress, however, the importance of this new auxiliary to the wider concept of his citizen army: he wanted the veterans to become another link in the chain which bound the army to the nation and the nation to the army. The proposal also enjoyed the public support of Charles á Court Repington, although for Repington, and also for many other of the VR’s supporters, the scheme did not go far enough. When published, the official regulations reflected the War Office’s insistence that specific local duties for the VR would only be determined following consultation with the constabulary.46 The clear general intent was for the VR to remove horses and cattle from threatened areas and to provide guards for vulnerable points such as bridges, tunnels and gas works. Advocates of a more purposeful role for the Reserve were, however, encouraged by the hint that the younger and fitter Veteran Reservists might be used as reinforcements to the Regular Army and, more likely, to fill up vacancies and replace battle casualties in home defence Territorial units. The regulations allowed virtually anyone who had had some sort of military service to register his name. Officers who were no longer members of the Army Reserve or liable for call up were allowed to join, as were former Special Reservists and ex-members of the Militia. Former Rifle Volunteers were also accepted providing they were not already members of the Territorial Force or the TF Reserve. Various other classes of men were eligible, as was any individual who could produce to his county association a war medal as proof of former service. In order to celebrate official recognition of the movement, in June 1910, Surrey held a parade of 1300 Veteran Reservists drawn up in 14 companies on Horse Guards. Haldane was clearly surprised to witness so many veterans drawn from only one county within such a short time of the movement’s official inception yet, although evidently moved and encouraged by what he saw, he did not permit himself to be swept away by the occasion. His address was supportive,but peppered with caution: I think [this] may prove to be an historic afternoon … it may be that we shall from this day see our way to get together in a fashion that has not been dreamt of before …. It remains to be seen how we can turn your patriotism to the greatest advantage to the nation. The regulations are only a beginning … [they] give us ground upon which,

24 Defending Albion

possibly hereafter, we may proceed much further. You are that kind of reserve which, if properly utilized, may be the best guarantee of peace and security for the nation.47 Haldane also announced that Lord Roberts had agreed to serve as the VR’s Colonel-in-Chief and, in March 1911, in front of an audience in the Mansion House which included the country’s leading military and political notables, Haldane outlined some revisions to the earlier regulations. He underscored his previous emphasis on the Reserve’s importance as a social institution intended to create a tangible bond between those still serving and their former comrades, and to give members an honoured and privileged position at public functions. To encourage its development as a body of comrades he decided to abandon the upper age limit but still rejected the idea of demanding a binding agreement from members. Such an obligation would, in his view, run contrary to the conception underlying the VR’s formation and, more importantly, involve the Government in additional expenditure. Nationally, the county associations turned their minds to how men might be encouraged to register their names. A huge parade organized by the Surrey Association in May 1911 was attended by Generals Sir Ian Hamilton, Sir Spencer Ewart and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. It was addressed by Lord Roberts who used the occasion to suggest that 25,000 armed veterans should be employed as home garrison troops. He thought they could make a valuable contribution to home defence but that they should be kept distinct from Territorial units. This separation would release the Territorials for mobile warfare and preserve what he called their ‘elasticity and dash’.48 Veteran Reservists were invited to attend George V’s coronation parade in June 1911 and, as the result of the publicity gained, one MP speculated that ‘in the near future’ national strength could be as high as 200,000.49 Appeals for veterans to register appeared in local papers, post offices, police stations, public houses and public baths. Large firms and town councils were leafleted, Lords Lieutenant were urged to take a public lead, Old Comrades Associations were targeted and one Education Committee asked its Attendance Officers to gather information about ex-servicemen when on their weekly rounds. A resolution from the members of the 1st Volunteer Battalion Norfolk Regiment’s Veterans’ Association encouraged its members to join, and at least one northern council declared that the local Veteran Reserve company would be affiliated to the town’s Territorial battalion.50 Recruiting was given a further fillip in August 1911 when the organization’s name was changed to the more youthful and purposeful

Supplementing the Home Army 25

National Reserve (NR). A new set of regulations issued in November also persuaded thousands more of the doubters to sign. Although still describing the Reserve ‘primarily as a register of trained [men with] no further obligation for military service’, they did state that National Reservists might be utilized ‘either for active duties with the home defence forces or for other services’.51 This remained far from the categorical promise of involvement as part of the active home army many of the NR’s supporters urged, but it was progress. The most important difference between the original and revised regulations was the introduction of a classification system for members. Instead of simply maintaining a register, counties now had to enrol their members in one of three divisions. Class I was to consist of officers under 55 and other ranks under 45 who were considered to be physically fit enough to join a combatant unit. Class II was for officers between 55 and 60 and men between 45 and 55 who were fit either for combatant duty in garrisons or other fixed positions or for administrative work. Finally, Class III was to comprise officers and men not qualified to join the other two sections but who would become honorary members and be retained for ‘social and influential purposes’. By 1912, London boasted 36 National Reserve battalions, organized into seven brigades. Within this host, the City of Westminster had two battalions, each of eight companies of 100 men. The 1st Battalion comprised one company of Royal Navy, Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery, two of cavalry, one each of Guards, engineers and departmental men and one mixed company. The 2nd Battalion’s eight companies were all infantry. Company commanders were a mixture of former Indian army and British cavalry officers, with a smattering of senior ranks from regiments of the line. National strength was recorded as 76,00052 and most members had been issued with a badge, usually paid for by some enthusiastic local benefactor. The question of giving the National Reserve some real identity and of allowing its members to belong to an official, recognized element of the home army caused frequent exchanges in the House and a seemingly never-ending flow of county resolutions to the War Office. With the exception of a few counties which very early on decided to leave the questions of drills and uniform until men arrived at their depots on mobilization, the associations regularly raised the issues of the supply of rifles and the provision of service dress. At first the War Office rejected petitions requesting officers be permitted to wear the uniform of their former corps on National Reserve ceremonial occasions but, bowing to an outburst of protest, it relented

26 Defending Albion

and granted permission for officers to do so. Whenever proposed designs for other ranks’ ‘uniforms’ (usually comprising a belt, bandolier and cap) were sent to the War Office for approval, the reply was invariably disappointing: the War Office often retorted that gentlemen of decorum would object to wearing a ‘uniform cap with their normal plain clothes’, and that the buttonhole badge was sufficient under the Hague Convention for wearers to be treated as combatants.53 Furthermore, the idea that Territorial uniforms should be supplied to National Reservists was often criticized on the grounds of practicality. Uniforms were generally tailored for fit 18-year-old youths, not for portly middle-aged men. This argument had prompted Colonel Banon, an AAG, to explain to the Derbyshire Association why there was official opposition to providing service dress for Reservists: The sight of a body of old soldiers in plain clothes and medals is a much more dignified and inspiring sight than if they were clothed in badly fitting uniforms and out of date equipment.54 Although its representatives could provide a string of arguments, the principal reason behind the War Office’s refusal to provide uniforms was cost. It was again on grounds of cost that for the first three years of the NR’s existence the authorities maintained a stern opposition to providing separate funds for musketry practice. Haldane, and later Jack Seely, his successor at the War Office in 1912, gave repeated assurances that there were abundant arms and ammunition available in store which would be issued should an emergency arise but, they were not, both men insisted, available merely for practice.55 Haldane expected a good proportion of National Reservists would already be members of the 140,000 strong National Rifle Association. To encourage those who might otherwise not bother to join a club, the WO ruled that county association funds could only be donated to those rifle clubs which already contained a significant number of Territorial members. Encouragement to practise musketry was often provided by wealthy gentlemen who offered cups and prizes to teams winning competitions and to the men who trained them. Relations between the Territorials and those National Reservists who were dependent upon the use of Territorial ranges usually ran fairly smoothly, but the Oxford Association, for example, admitted that ‘knotty points were continually arising with regard to the granting of shooting facilities’.56 In another instance, the CO of the 5/Highland Light Infantry complained to his association that National Reservists were entering competitions with his

Supplementing the Home Army 27

soldiers and winning too many prizes. In the interests of unit morale, he urged the committee to provide separate prizes for the Reservists.57 Linked to the issues of uniform and shooting was the obvious desire of National Reservists to form a corporate identity. Repington and other of the Reserve’s supporters had long been advocating such a scheme, believing it could most easily be achieved by holding regular company and battalion parades. Denied state money to finance headquarter buildings on the argument that because the Reserve would not be mobilized by units there was no need for them, many battalions and companies seized upon this proposal to demonstrate publicly the physical existence of the National Reserve. Some battalions even chose to create permanent facilities for their members and founded clubs which not only provided a focal point for battalion life but also, by proclaiming the NR’s existence within the community, acted as a strong inducement to recruitment. Successful clubs were established in many areas but, what was more important to many of the Reserve’s supporters was the War Office’s continuing disinclination to allocate its members specific mobilization roles at a time when the strength of most of the home army’s Territorial units was in marked decline. Echoing G.P. Gooch’s comment of a few years earlier that ‘long immunity from the realities of warfare had blunted our imagination’, Haldane attributed the post-1912 decline in Territorial Force recruiting to ‘a disease of ten years’ peace’.58 Although young men were demonstrating a growing reluctance to enlist in the principal home defence force, throughout 1911 and 1912 the enthusiasm of older former soldiers and sailors to register with the National Reserve remained largely undiminished. In July 1912, the War Office announced that the ‘response had exceeded estimated expectation’ and although disappointed at the very slow progress of the TF Reserve, it was content with the growing popularity of the National Reserve.59 In March 1912, Jack Seely, the Under Secretary of State for War, informed the House of Commons that of the NR’s total strength of 76,972, just under 28,000 were officers aged between 55 and 60 and other ranks between 45 and 55.60 Although immediately there were increased calls for the NR to replace the moribund TF Reserve, an idea categorically rejected by the War Office, Seely usually adhered to the line that the NR was a ‘military asset of the greatest value’.61 He would only go as far as to acknowledge the suggestion that in an emergency, members might promise to put themselves at the disposal of the military authorities for service within the British Isles.62 In this he was largely following the line of his predecessor. Haldane had also talked of the NR

28 Defending Albion

as having ‘awakened the nation in military matters’ and insisted that it had indeed become one of the recognized forces of the Crown.63 If that was the case, some argued, to what use was it to be put and how effective might the force actually prove to be? Was it merely as one MP claimed, a list that could be flourished in the face of the House of Commons to demonstrate there was no need for national service? Of equally persistent concern was the number of members who might prove to be of some military value. Rumours that Seely had persuaded 100 Chelsea Pensioners to join the NR in order to help to cover the deficiency in Territorial numbers, and the fairly widespread claim that 65 per cent of the National Reservists on parade in Hyde Park in June 1912 would be incapable of doing anything of value, fuelled suspicions that the Government really had no idea of what it wanted the National Reservists to do. The continuing rise in registration should be seen in the context of the decline in TF membership. The quality and size of the home army was a frequent topic of debate in Parliament and although sympathetic to its ambitions many MPs and military men remained extremely dubious about the value of the NR and indeed of the Territorial Force as a whole. The National Service League’s campaign for conscription remained insistent and, in warning against what many saw as an over-estimation of the NR’s potential, they had a point. It is possible that 70 per cent of those registered nationally were ex-Volunteers rather than former Regulars, but firm figures are hard to find. In Preston, 56 per cent of National Reservists were ex-Regulars, 44 per cent in Shropshire, 40 per cent in Liverpool and only 20 per cent in Southport.64 The remainder were thus overwhelmingly former Rifle Volunteers, men who in 1908 had not transferred to Haldane’s new force, or a smattering of ex-Volunteers who had spent a year or two in the Territorials. The majority of these men were of middle age, probably married, held steady jobs and were unlikely to be fit enough for immediate active service. If they were members of a rifle club they might have kept up their musketry but the War Office was sufficiently pragmatic to assume that 20 per cent of registered men would be of absolutely no military value whatsoever. What the military authorities required was some analysis of the Reserve’s composition and an assessment of how realistic it was to plan on the assumption that the NR might be used to bolster the home army and even, perhaps, an expeditionary force. In 1913, therefore, the War Office issued a new set of regulations65 and an instruction for the counties to undertake a survey of their National Reservists with a view to assessing how many members might be capable of performing a useful, albeit still loosely defined, role.

Supplementing the Home Army 29

For the purposes of the survey the War Office required the counties to reclassify their men into the following revised divisions: Class I was now to consist of officers and other ranks who satisfied the medical requirements for active service at home and abroad; Class II was for officers and senior non-commissioned officers under 55 and men under 50 years who were fit enough for a home defence combatant unit for duty in fixed positions or for administrative work at home. The new Class III was itself divided into three categories: the first two sections consisted of men who declined to undertake any obligation but who qualified by age and physical fitness for Classes I and II, while the third comprised those whose age or fitness precluded them from doing anything militarily useful. These men were to be considered honorary members and were permitted to attend parades and socials. Finally, the War Office not only wanted associations to categorise their men by age but also by training and occupation. The authorities continued to shy away from asking men to undertake a definite liability for military service but members who were eligible to register in Classes I and II were instead invited to sign an ‘honourable obligation’ to the effect that they would offer themselves for service at a time of imminent danger. In return for this undertaking and provided that they were deemed fit and accepted, on mobilization Class I men were promised a gratuity of £10 and Class II, £5. The regulations stated that men in these two classes would be used to reinforce the Regular Army and to fill up vacancies and provide for wastage in units of the home army. They would also be used to strengthen garrisons, guard vulnerable points and what were termed ‘other military duties’ in and around threatened areas. Deployed to guard strategic sites would, again, enable other elements of the home army to be used more effectively. Despite a great deal of grumbling about increased administration and a lack of government funds to cover it, most county associations had despatched their returns by February 1914. The survey and the subsequent classification revealed two important things about the National Reserve. First, recruitment had slowed from its boom period of 1911 and 1912 and second, that only about one quarter of the 200,000 registered men could be assessed as having any real military value. Seely’s analysis of the returns showed that nationally there were just under 14,000 Class I and 46,000 Class II men. The great majority of members were thus Class III, whose age or reluctance to commit themselves to the ‘honourable obligation’ made them of dubious reliability. Furthermore, evidence suggests that at the most, only about one third of the men in Classes I and II were ex-Regulars as opposed to former

30 Defending Albion

Volunteers, Militia or time-served Special Reservists.66 The relatively low number of men in Class I is perhaps surprising when considering annually something like 12,000 men left the Army Reserve. However, it was widely accepted that in total, only something like 5000 of these ex-Army Reservists would be fit enough, willing or able to fight in a campaign beyond four years of their release. The paucity of men to fill shortages within the already under establishment Territorial units was further compounded by the NR’s regulations which stipulated that men not required for Territorial units should be used to furnish contingents for the protection of local vulnerable points. The War Office had long anticipated using the NR in home defence protection squads but the 1913 regulations still failed to give a firm lead in defining, other than in general terms, what was meant by ‘vulnerable points’. To do so would, the War Office believed, involve an unwanted commitment to increased expenditure. The survey had, in reality, provided only a speculative idea of the organization’s potential for it was a ‘reserve’ in name only. Even if a man was reasonably fit, a proficient shot and an ex-Regular, it would of necessity be weeks before he could be efficient enough to take his place in an overseas battalion. As even the Territorials’ most strident supporters accepted the need for an intensive post-mobilization six month training period for its young soldiers, it was optimistic to assume that a 45-yearold family man could be ready in substantially less time than a fit 20 year old with probably no commitments. Few military thinkers were prepared to assume the NR would be capable of filling up the Special Reserve or Territorial units, believing instead that it would do no more than act as guides or orderlies in the event of invasion. During the Army Estimates debate of June 1913 Colonel Burn became one of several Members who expressed doubts: You cannot look on the National Reserve as a real reserve in the sense that men will be fitted to join the ranks in the event of our Expeditionary Force being ordered abroad. Many of them have never been in the army at all and they get no training year after year. How can men without uniforms, without officers and without training be fit to take their place in the Army and face a Continental foe?67 Despite these doubts, Colonel Banon continued to encourage the county associations to recruit. His message was simple and oft repeated. He stressed that the NR had ‘come to stay’ and anticipated 250,000 members by 1914. It had been created, he said, because there was the

Supplementing the Home Army 31

possibility of Britain becoming involved in a European war and because it was a ‘great pity to allow a large number of trained and active men to disappear into civilian life’. Exploiting its creator’s concepts of a citizen army and of a nation-in-arms, he continually stressed that the Reserve would bring the army into touch with the nation and that by giving ex-Regulars and auxiliaries an ‘honourable position in their country’, it would do much to ‘bring down any prejudice that still exists against young men joining the Regulars or Territorials’. Again echoing Haldane’s sentiments, Banon explained the ideal of continuity of service: youngsters would begin elementary military drill in the Boy Scouts, progress to the Cadets and, when old enough, join either the Regular Army, the Special Reserve or the Territorial Force. Having served their time in the active forces, men would pass through the Territorial Reserve and the three classes of the National Reserve. By ‘carefully, methodically and inexpensively’ registering the names of men in their final stages of services, counties would create a reservoir of trained men into which the AG could ‘dip on mobilization’. He intimated that apart from erstwhile infantry and gunners, former specialists could on mobilization act as medical orderlies, telegraphists, farriers, wheelwrights and clerks for the home army.68 Unpersuaded by Seely’s own public belief of a brighter future, calls to abandon the TF Reserve and replace it with a stronger and more dynamic National Reserve continued undiminished. The agitation coincided with yet more resolutions and expressions of discontent from the counties which demanded a more explicit definition of the duties the NR would be expected to fulfil should the Regulars and Territorials be mobilized. Typical of the calls for the Government to stop its procrastination came from a representative of the Leicestershire Association: I simply wish that the members of the National Reserve should know that it is recognized that they are a portion of the defensive force of this country; they want to prove that it is so, and they want to know that they will have real business before them on mobilization.69 This was echoed by a resolution submitted by the Council of County Territorial Associations clearly designed to provoke a War Office response: In view of maintaining the interest of the men and of leading them to believe in the utility of the National Reserve, the War Office [should]

32 Defending Albion

be moved to take steps to draw up schemes for utilization … such as: protection of the lines of communication, public buildings, power stations, of landing stations, the protection and distribution of food, technical services such as the RAMC [Royal Army Medical Corps], ASC [Army Supply Corps], remount duties, telegraphists etc., local guides and messengers.70 Similar sentiments were expressed by the Kent Association in February 1913 when, having enthusiastically registered over 5000 Class I and 2350 Class II men, it pithily minuted: ‘It is understood that the Government intend to make use of this force in some manner, but nothing is yet known except for reports appearing in the papers.’71 Yet more disdain was heaped upon Seely for his apparent support of the idea to use the NR to complete establishments for the Territorial Force and the Special Reserve. From his position as Chairman of the County of London Association, Lord Esher described the idea of using the NR as a ‘sort of bucket for filling up gaps’ in the Regulars and Territorials as ‘a very great error’. The National Reserve was not originally intended, he insisted, as a supplement to the Territorial Force and was a ‘distinct force … with an entirely distinct function’. Knowing that their units would be made up to strength from this reservoir of former soldiers, Esher argued, might cause some Commanding Officers (COs) to neglect Territorial recruiting. Such a policy would ‘take the steel out of Associations, out of commanding officers and out of the men themselves’.72 One critic thought it ‘ludicrous’ to contemplate putting old sweats into the same units as raw recruits or under the command of a young, naive Territorial officer, whilst another thought it was unfair to expect patriotic former soldiers to serve in such a ‘rotten organization’.73 Despite the seemingly relentless criticism, during the debate on the 1914 Estimates, Seely continued to express a remarkable confidence in the condition of the various home forces. He acknowledged the Special Reserve was some 13,000 short of establishment but was confident that as an identical number of National Reservists had agreed to serve overseas, the Special Reserve remained in a position to fulfil its designated function of rapid reinforcement of the Regular battalions and as coastal garrisons.74 He praised the patriotism and willingness of these National Reservists, especially as they were prepared to serve without ‘fee or reward of any kind in the meantime’. Seely next turned to the Territorials. He claimed that as 45,000 Class II National Reservists had undertaken to serve at home and the Territorial Force was, in his estimation, 56,000 under establishment, these Class II men would go a

Supplementing the Home Army 33

long way to making good the deficit. He was so convinced these Reservists would come forward on mobilization that he assured the House there was no reason for it to be ‘concerned’ for the state of the Expeditionary Force or for the defence of the British Isles.75 This did not satisfy The Times which could not resist again drawing attention to the Government’s perceived neglect of the home army. Impressed by the spectacle of the 1st London National Reserve Division arrayed for inspection on Horse Guards, the correspondent noted: ‘At present much enthusiasm and esprit de corps which might be usefully directed for the public advantage are officially neglected except when required to cover other official shortcomings.’76 The War Office, sometimes with a degree of grudging co-operation from the Admiralty, had, meanwhile, been devising plans by which the Special Reserve and the Territorial Force could be deployed in the event of an enemy incursion. The various schemes were designed to offer responses to several potential scenarios but, comprehensive as they were, the plans were often, of necessity, largely speculative. Besides the difficulties thrown up by the navy’s reluctance to offer much in the way of concrete assistance, the planners’ difficulties were compounded by the state of the army’s own home defence forces. The ‘Home Army’s’ constituent parts were under strength, indifferently trained, inadequately equipped, excessively youthful and, perhaps above all, ridiculed by many leading soldiers and politicians, the public and the press. Until or unless the quality and size of the home forces were perceived to have improved, public acceptance of the concept of despatching an expeditionary force to the left flank of the French Army was equally speculative.

2 Planning for Defence

Contemporary opinion within the War Office and Admiralty considered an enemy attack on Britain could take several forms. As one of the precautions against such an eventuality, the navy had classified ports and their facilities into either ‘Commercial’ or ‘Naval’. All the principal anchorages, particularly those on the East and South Coasts such as Hull, Harwich and Dover, were categorized as ‘Defended’; these included ports which were considered either liable or not liable to attack in the Precautionary Period. Despite much debate over which of the two services should be responsible for which aspects of ports’ defence, the traditional demarcation point of the high water mark was consistently retained. Above the high water mark, and further inland, the military authorities were chiefly responsible for the protection of vulnerable points, but the Police were also tasked to prevent acts of sabotage by individuals or small groups. The exception to this general rule was the railway network: in time of war it was to fall under the protection of the army. In addition, the military were also to assume responsibility for the security of signal stations, cable landing sites and the national telegraph system. In 1910, a committee drew up a list of sites whose security the naval and military authorities considered was essential. These were categorized into places of major importance whose protection would become the responsibility of the Government, factories and commercial buildings which were to be protected by the firms themselves and, finally, sites of lesser importance which included some government stores and private factories. Buildings and facilities within this latter group were also to fall under the Government’s aegis. The principal problem confronting the authorities was whether the army would be able to provide sufficient manpower to supply the necessary guards. To exacerbate 34

Planning for Defence 35

the problem further, Sir Edward Henry, Commissioner of Police, submitted a report detailing how Police resources were inadequate to prevent acts of sabotage.1 The military authorities were of course also concerned that if the Territorial Force was expected to cover the railways and other vulnerable points, its roles in coast defence or as part of the Central Force would be thrown into jeopardy. Although the War Office and Government were reluctant to commit themselves publicly to allocate a role for the NR, they believed the more physically active National Reservists could be utilized to assist the Territorials by covering some inland vulnerable points.2 Although the Sea Lords remained reluctant to discuss invasion matters with their counterparts at the War Office, more junior staff on both sides did regularly review the potential nature of the possible attacks both in the Precautionary Period and in the days following a declaration of war. The Thames, as well as other rivers or ports which were not considered likely to be the target of a large scale attack, were also thought to pose major problems. A German tramp steamer packed with 200 marines could steam innocently up the river in the Precautionary Period and create havoc around the Pool of London and Woolwich. The moral effect of such a raid and the loss of national prestige could have created significant problems for the Government.3 Other scenarios envisaged concrete-filled blockships being scuttled in the Tyne and Humber, attacks against lock gates by swarms of torpedo boats, hit and run attacks by armoured cruisers on shore establishments, mine laying in river estuaries, enemy submarines patrolling near ports, raids by vessels equipped to smash harbour boom defences accompanied by landing parties to destroy dock installations, and cruisers disgorging marines to capture merchant prizes in harbour. Attacks by enemy aircraft and even virtual suicide raids by expendable pre-Dreadnought battleships were also thought to be possible.4 Existing measures to counter the anticipated raids and, if necessary an enemy invasion, had been adapted since 1908 to accommodate Haldane’s reorganized home defence forces. The earliest plans, drawn up in 1908 by the DMT, Archibald Murray, assessed the strategic conditions and the general principles under which the home army would operate. The scheme was worked out on the assumption that the Expeditionary Force would depart overseas, but that the 4th and 6th Divisions would, for a period at least, remain in the UK. In the Precautionary Period, Special Service Sections of Territorial battalions would patrol the coast, while the 4th Division would come under the orders of Eastern Command. The 6th Division, less 18 Brigade and one battalion which were to be

36 Defending Albion

allocated to Northern and Scottish Commands, would go to Ireland. Forty-five Special Reserve battalions would be called out for draft finding: at least 12 of them would go to Ireland, 19 would be based at Aldershot and London, and the remainder divided between the various Commands. Schemes developed and matured during the next few years. Following the pivotal meeting of August 1911 when Sir Henry Wilson emphatically argued for the despatch of the largest possible Expeditionary Force, and as its critics’ concern about the inadequacy of the Territorial Force to fulfil its function of defending Britain’s shores grew, there was a slight shift of emphasis in the plans.5 The military authorities were not as concerned as the public about the Territorials’ worth, but Lancelot Kiggell’s contribution to a collection of reports submitted by General Officers Commanding (GOC) Commands argued that even after the six month working up period, it would be unwise to expect nine Territorial divisions to defeat four Regular ones. He did, however, endorse Haldane’s contention that the Territorial Force and the Expeditionary Force were both adequate to meet their existing requirements.6 Furthermore, the DMT thought that as it would mobilize within three or four days and Wilson’s plans for the Expeditionary Force did not envisage embarkation before the fourth day, the Territorial Force would be sufficient to deter any raid or incursion.7 The official belief that invasion was unlikely until Germany had achieved European hegemony persisted, yet it also held that if the Expeditionary Force was defeated on the Continent, the Territorial Force would be incapable of resisting an invasion. The logical development of the authorities’ argument was that as the country could not afford the BEF to be defeated in France or Belgium, money should not be diverted towards the home army at the expense of the Regulars.8 Although publicly it did not appear overly anxious about the overall state of the Territorial Force, privately the War Office did remain concerned about the force’s general efficiency. Reports condemned the quality of its officers and the perceived lack of discipline among the other ranks,9 but argued that in the face of political realities certain limitations had to be be accepted: To convert the Territorial Force or its equivalent into a force immediately ready and available for active service abroad as well as at home … would entail such a radical change in organisation and national sentiment, and such a large increase in military expenditure, that under existing conditions such a measure seems to lie outside

Planning for Defence 37

the range of practical politics. It is no good crying for the moon. We have to make the best use we can of the men and money at our disposal.10 Unsurprisingly, the DGTF, Major-General Bethune, believed that the Territorial Force was a better organization than the Regulars assumed but, in February 1912, the military authorities, too, felt confident enough about the low risk of invasion that they decided future planning for home defence should assume no Regular divisions would be available.11 In accordance with Sir Henry Wilson’s August thesis, it thereafter became an accepted principle of policy that the entire Expeditionary Force would embark. The 4th and 6th Divisions were no longer to be included in home defence schemes and all Commands were informed that they should make their preparations on that assumption and that only RGA and RE garrison units, Special Reservists and Territorials would be available for internal deployment.12 If it so happened that some Regular units were to remain at home, they were to be regarded as unexpected assets and be assimilated into the prepared schemes.13 It was widely acknowledged among the military authorities that the public’s perception of the Territorial Force had to be altered and that the nation had to be educated to the opinion that, despite the Territorials’ limited efficiency, the departure of the Expeditionary Force would not jeopardize national security. The GOC Eastern Command argued that if the CID and Government were to state that the navy’s command of the seas precluded an invasion of the UK at the onset of any war, and that the Territorials would only be needed, at that stage of hostilities to assist the Regulars to repel raids, then the nation would understand that a well-organized and equipped Territorial Force would be able to prevent raids on docks and other vulnerable points.14 The CIGS was not prepared, entirely, to endorse such an assumption that invasion was more likely in the later rather than the early stages of a war, but did accept the Army Council’s opinion that the possibility of an enemy raid of 70,000 men in the opening weeks was remote.15 Wounded as it was from the mauling it received at the August CID meeting by both Sir Henry Wilson and General Sir William Nicholson, the Admiralty resolutely refused to abandon its traditional blockade and raid strategy. During his term as First Sea Lord, Fisher had withdrawn the Pacific, South Atlantic and North American Squadrons, amalgamated the Australian, Chinese and East Indian Squadrons, expanded the Home Fleet and sought to redeploy capital ships from the Mediterranean to British waters. Despite the resultant growth in the number of ships

38 Defending Albion

now available for home defence, during the 1912 manoeuvres a ‘German’ fleet successfully evaded the Royal Navy to land a force of 28,000 men in the Humber estuary.16 The army was prepared to accept the outcome of the manoeuvres as a freak result but the event came at a time when the public was again registering concern at the quality of the Territorial Force. In 1912, only 155,000 of the 252,000 members attended camp for the full 15 days and another 6000 were reported to have gone absent without leave. Almost one-third of the force failed to pass the musketry test and Lord Esher publicly expressed doubts about its ability to attract the 60,000 required to replace annual wastage.17 There were more calls for the payment of a bounty and complaints that many soldiers who had attended camp regularly were personally out of pocket.18 Harold Baker, the Finance Secretary to the War Office, vehemently defended both the Government and the Territorials, arguing that the force was perfectly adequate for its responsibilities and condemned its opponents for their ‘hostile, vicious criticism … which discouraged men from enlisting or re-engaging’. Even a Liberal MP, Arthur Lee, railed against the Territorial Force’s ‘lamentable’ state.19 He criticised Seely for his ‘temerity’ in suggesting that this amateur force was adequate to repel picked professionals. Seely’s smugness in asserting that there were no grounds for reviewing the heavily criticised state of Territorial artillery was not well received, but he did win some support by agreeing with some of his critics that if was ‘disgraceful’ so many young men were not joining the force.20 In a crushingly condemnatory speech during the 1913 Army Estimates debate, the Unionist George Wyndham also thundered about the Territorials’ ‘ludicrous standards of efficiency’. When this criticism was coupled to the fact that only about 50 per cent of those whose period of service ended in 1912 re-engaged, the force was accused of being ‘plagued by inexperience and youth’.21 Public perception of the Territorials’ efficiency had sunk so low that one MP felt compelled to urge the Secretary of State to ban a review called, Territorials, or England’s Last Hope, which, he believed, was calculated to heap ‘ridicule and contempt upon the Territorial Force’.22 By September 1913 the organization’s strength had fallen to 245,779, with annual wastage running at 12.5 per cent. As if to underline the apparent lack of commitment, only about 1100 officers and 18,000 other ranks had fulfilled Haldane’s expectation and volunteered for foreign service.23 The obloquy reached a peak in 1913 and 1914 when it was admitted that 80 per cent of the men had served for fewer than four years and that despite vigorous recruitment campaigns, the force had never reached more than 81 per cent of

Planning for Defence 39

establishment. In other words, it was no stronger than the Volunteers and Yeomanry had been ten years earlier. A less than empirical survey of Territorial commanding officers by the National Defence Association (an organization which had very close links with the Council of Territorial Associations), revealed that 85 of the 97 respondents claimed that their units were seriously deficient in musketry, marching and discipline. The National Defence Association (NDA), whose members included Lord Scarbrough, who was to become Director-General Territorial Force in 1917, and Charles Repington, subsequently drew the attention of the Prime Minister to these latest Territorial shortcomings.24 To inflame passions yet further, the 1913 naval manoeuvres were prematurely ended when the ‘enemy’ force again landed a substantial number of men on the ‘home’ shore.25 The ramifications of this operation threw up a significant paradox. The navy had persistently claimed to be able to prevent invasion and raids on Britain but had, at the same time, been advocating a policy of raiding German coasts, arguing that the High Seas Fleet would be unable to disrupt such amphibious operations. However, if the Germans were thought incapable of resisting a British landing on their short and heavily defended coastline, the Royal Navy was equally unlikely to stop a raid, or even worse, on the more exposed British shores. This anomaly within Admiralty planning was not lost on General Nicholson. He noted that if it wished to deploy a proportionally identical number of quality troops along her eastern and southern seaboards as Germany mustered on her single coastline, the army would require 30 Regular divisions. Neither could he see the purpose behind Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson’s preferred policy of raiding the German coast. Existing naval planning appeared to comprise a beach landing with no object other than to entrench and await the Germans’ response.26 Asquith concurred, calling Admiral Wilson’s plans ‘puerile and impracticable’.27 Partly as a result of Churchill’s pressure as First Lord of the Admiralty, and partly as a consequence of a small but significant growth of discontent within his own party28 concerning the Territorials’ ability to cope with a landing of 70,000 men, in January 1913 Asquith announced that another inquiry would convene. The committee reported its findings in April 1914, and although it largely echoed the conclusions of the earlier investigations, there were some important differences.29 While the inquiry was taking evidence Charles Repington opened a sustained barrage in The Times against the quality and strength of the home forces. The Territorial Force, he argued, should be between 500,000–600,000 strong and be raised by some form of compulsion.30 Supporting

40 Defending Albion

Repington, Lord Roberts again decried the effective strength of the Territorial Force, believing that as presently officered and organized it ‘would not have a chance’ of defeating 70,000 enemy troops. It was, he went on, ‘unwieldy and unpractised’ and likely to be more of a liability than an asset.31 Viscount Esher, who as Chairman of the County of London Territorial Association had personal experience of the problems encountered with recruiting, believed the force would never attain a peacetime strength of 250,000 and doubted its ability to defend Britain unless aided by Regulars.32 The widespread belief that the home auxiliaries would prove incapable of providing an adequate pool of thoroughly trained reserves, even after the six months Haldane had always insisted would be required, persisted. Seely, whose main object was still to maintain the Expeditionary Force at maximum strength, urged the committee not to prejudge the Territorials. He argued that the retention of two Regular divisions in Britain would, by removing the prestige of their being the mainstay of the islands’ defences, only further damage Territorial morale.33 Having been rehearsed many times before, the military arguments submitted to the inquiry were largely predictable. Evidence from the Admiralty, however, showed a marked shift from its usual stance. Their Lordships had already determined that torpedoes and mines posed too many dangers to ships working close inshore; it had consequently abandoned the policy of close blockade of a hostile shore in favour of distant patrolling aimed at denying the enemy access to and from the North Sea. Technological innovations and the failure of the previous two years’ manoeuvres had convinced the Admiralty that its ‘absolute guarantee’ of 1908 to discover and intercept a force of 70,000 men should be revised to a ‘reasonable expectation’.34 The navy again raised its concerns about the havoc a small enemy force landing from a single ship could wreak on riverside arsenals and docks, and about the disruption a strategically scuttled blockship might cause to shipping movements.35 Furthermore, the Admiralty pressed for the creation of a coast watch of auxiliaries and for much improved military security on East Coast installations.36 The navy’s evidence and anxiety provided a strong acknowledgement that it no longer considered countering invasion to be its sole preserve. After decades of self-indulgent limited co-operation, the navy was now anxious to increase the role and responsibilities of the War Office in the defence of the East Coast. Although the committee concluded a major invasion was unlikely, its final report recognized the need for armed guards at vulnerable points in case of surprise attack by a small force. The members decided that if

Planning for Defence 41

an invasion was attempted, it would probably be launched in the period between the despatch of an expeditionary force overseas and the six month working up period required by the Territorials. Seely consistently argued that the 10,000 Regulars already earmarked for the Central Force, and the Territorials who, it was widely but grudgingly acknowledged were showing signs of greater efficiency, would be enough to defeat the hypothetical invasion force of 70,000.37 There were others who could not face the prospect with Seely’s equanimity. Lord Roberts, not surprisingly demurred and called for a home defence army of 510,000. The unresolved argument over the number of troops required to defend Britain once the Expeditionary Force had sailed was to drag on well into the war and was ultimately to involve questions about the efficiency and strength of the home service Territorials, the war time raised Royal Defence Corps (RDC) and the Volunteer Training Corps (VTC). Another consequence of the conclusions drawn from the last pre-war invasion inquiry was Asquith’s decision to authorize the strengthening of some ports’ defences.38 Once Harwich had been redesignated as a ‘war anchorage’ in 1911, and as Immingham’s oil storage facilities were developed, the authorities’ concern at the state of the increasingly outmoded coastal defences grew. The decision to use Hull for fleet colliers and the 1912 decision to develop Cromarty as a port for fleet auxiliaries meant further thought had to be directed to the protection of East Coast facilities.39 In addition, a standing sub-committee of the CID established in April 1912 to investigate possible economies and to examine defences at Cromarty, Scapa and the Humber, endorsed decisions already taken by Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the CID, with regard to realigning Britain’s defences in preparation for a war with ‘a North Sea Power’.40 It also supported Hankey’s arguments that if Cromarty and Scapa were to be upgraded, economies would have to be made elsewhere and also confirmed his shift of emphasis from the Channel to the eastern seaboard. The Admiralty had earlier agreed to ‘considerable’ reductions in the artillery garrisons and armaments at Berehaven, Falmouth and Lough Swilly, yet, these amounted only to a possible redeployment of a mere 66 RGA gunners. It was suggested, therefore, that the Home Ports’ Defence Committee should consider what savings could be made by cutting back on the existing garrisons at Portland, Portsmouth and Plymouth. To develop the Humber defences further it was also agreed to build two 6-inch batteries near Spurn Point and to construct forts on Bull and Haile Sands.41 The problem of how to maintain observation and communications along Eastern and Southern Coasts had, in fact, been taxing the Admiralty

42 Defending Albion

for some years.42 The men manning the coastguard stations were naval ratings, about two-thirds of whom would be required on mobilization to provide crews for reserve ships. The remaining third was to be retained in coastguard stations which, in time of war, would become naval signalling stations. The navy hoped some Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR) men might be available for coast watching but considered their lack of special training made them of dubious quality. The Admiralty therefore proposed that certain chief petty officers would remain on duty at the coastguard stations during the Precautionary Period to liaise with Special Service Sections of recently raised Territorial cyclist battalions. Several county associations had attempted to form these units from 1909, but besides the usual problems of recruitment, the battalions also suffered from major and prolonged difficulties over the quality and style of bicycle. Moreover, it was acknowledged that as only about 25 per cent of men in the units would volunteer for Special Service Sections, large areas of the coast would inevitably remain unpatrolled.43 To help cover the deficiency, in May 1913 the army had outlined a scheme whereby the cyclist patrols would be supplemented by secret observers. These local men would remain in the area following an enemy landing to pass on intelligence to Report Centres in the rear. In February 1914, a joint Admiralty and War Office committee again considered the defensive arrangements for the principal and lesser ports of the kingdom and how a warning system for hostile raids might operate. The two services expeditiously agreed that if war came the navy should continue to man the 66 coastguard stations in Scottish, Eastern and Southern Commands; for additional intelligence gathering the services would have to rely upon the co-operation of the Territorials, Police and customs officials.44 The authorities may also have anticipated that any maritime county which had followed Surrey’s example and formed a corps of guides might have considered utilizing its guides for coast watch duties. Several other organizations were also offering their services as auxiliary intelligence gatherers. In March 1912, for instance, the London Committee of the Legion of Scouts and Guides submitted an application for admission to the Territorial Force Technical Reserve and a Northumberland village suggested a number of its inhabitants were willing to volunteer as cyclist scouts and guides.45 Despite reservations, the War Office sent a circular based very largely on the Surrey Association’s original submission, to county associations in October 1912. The Army Council warned associations that as no grants would be available for organizing or maintaining a corps of guides, any decision to form one would be entirely the decision of individual

Planning for Defence 43

associations. Whilst insisting that local knowledge was an integral part of all Territorials’ training, the Council acknowledged that a supplementary list of guides might prove useful. All registered guides had to be able to provide details of paths, fords, blacksmith and wheelwrights’ shops and anything else that might be considered useful to military commanders.46 Seely’s approval was probably given on the grounds of political expediency. The Secretary of State needed the support of the county associations in his attempts to keep the Territorials at reasonable strength and to administer the National Reserve. In view of the increasing growth in pro-conscription sentiment within the associations, Seely could not afford to alienate them further by loading yet more work upon these voluntary bodies. By insisting that the creation of a corps of guides was purely optional, he aimed to prevent an open breach. But Seely’s rejection of compulsion had to be balanced against the corps’ potential utility. Like the National Reserve, a viable Technical Reserve could relieve some of the burden on the under strength and increasingly youthful Territorials; it would also impose only a minimal financial commitment on the public purse.47 Another organization which would, in the event of war, inevitably become intimately involved in home defence was the Police. Discussions between the Home and War Offices about the function of the civil power in war had been in progress since 1909, and a 1912 circular which detailed the duties of the Police and the Special Constabulary was reissued in late July 1914.48 The booklet required the Police to work in co-operation with the military authorities, to provide guards for vulnerable points and to liaise on matters of security with factory owners and other employers engaged on government work.49 Chief Constables, whose powers had been recently strengthened by the Official Secrets Act of 1911, could take any measures they thought necessary to provide protection for strategic sites, to report sightings of enemy vessels and to keep watch on aliens. In rural areas the Police were required to inform Army Reservists when mobilization was underway, and in urban areas were expected to restrict the amount of alcohol consumed by reservists returning to their depots.50 The War Office also expected the Police to assist the military in gaining access to private land on which field defences were to be constructed, in obtaining JPs’ warrants to requisition mobilization animals and also to accompany the soldiers as they rounded up sufficient horses and vehicles.51 In view of the fact that many policemen were themselves Army Reservists and would thus be recalled to the colours, the role of the First and Second Police Reserves would be crucial in covering the gaps left by

44 Defending Albion

the departure of their full-time colleagues. The First Police Reserve was comprised largely of retired policemen who had registered a willingness to return to conventional duty during an emergency, but a Home Office circular of 1911 emphasized and specified the potential of the Second Police Reserve, or Special Constabulary, in guarding vulnerable points and quelling civil disturbance.52 The Specials had not actually been called out since the Fenian disturbances of 186753 but it was assumed that in the event of war large numbers of elderly former policemen no longer enrolled in the First Reserve, ex-soldiers and stalwart citizens would enrol as Specials and help maintain order and assist in the evacuation of threatened areas.54 In most areas, relations between the Police and the ‘military authorities’ meant, in effect, the local Territorial battalion. In those counties where a corps of guides existed the Police might have made a limited although probably loose attempt to liaise with the corps either through the county association or possibly through personal contacts between the Chief Guide and the Chief Constable. Although many associations chose to ignore the opportunity to organize a corps, nationally the body did made gradual, if uneven, progress during 1912. On the other hand, the TF Reserve, which was considered by county associations to be of greater importance than a corps of guides, experienced a far tardier development. Important as the Reserve was, associations were proving reluctant to devote time to establishing one without first securing an appropriate increase in central grants. A resolution passed at the December 1911 conference of county officials had reflected the widespread concern over the failure of the TF Reserve to attract recruits. Its abject failure led to a growing consensus that the National Reserve should be placed on a more organized basis and acknowledged as the true reserve of the Territorial Force. Only 87 soldiers in the County of London, which had a Territorial strength of nearly 30,000, had actually transferred to the TF Reserve between 1912 and 1913.55 Among the various reasons aired as to why men were reluctant to register for the Reserve was the accusation that some commanding officers were actively opposed to it. They argued that the annual camp, the culmination of the year’s training, would be devalued and disrupted if there were men present who had not in the preceding months performed the preparatory drills. There was a logic in this stance but the fundamental reason why men failed to enlist was because the regulations remained too discriminating. During the 1913 Army Estimates debate, Seely admitted bluntly, ‘The Territorial Force Reserve practically hardly exists because there is no inducement to commanding officers or

Planning for Defence 45

to county associations to form it.’ He believed the men were there and anxious to serve, but accepted that for various reasons, ‘financial and others’, they were declining to join.56 Few could argue with that assertion but, twelve months later when the Reserve was reported to have a national strength of 880 all ranks, Seely attempted to strike an optimistic note by announcing it was approaching 1400 and rising.57 His cheery tone sat uncomfortably with the knowledge that there were currently some 105,000 eligible former Territorials who had chosen not to enrol in the Reserve. Unpersuaded by Seely’s own public belief of a brighter future, calls to abandon the TF Reserve completely and replace it with a stronger and more dynamic National Reserve continued undiminished. Despite Seely’s apparent optimism, the War Office was undoubtedly concerned over the deplorable state of the TF Reserve and about the growing but almost entirely unregulated National Reserve. It was also equally anxious about the physical defences which might hinder a German raid and how the Central Force would respond to a landing if it came. Another indication that the War Office was realigning its defensive thinking from the South to the East Coast came when the Army Council requested information on which elements of the Lincolnshire Fens drainage system might be vulnerable to enemy sabotage.58 This enquiry was part of the current reappraisal of not only potential invasion or incursion sites on the East Coast but also of a general review of all Britain’s coastal defences. By 1911, most of the home defence schemes necessarily revised by the creation of the Territorial Force and the Special Reserve, were in place. Areas which were not considered to be major likely landing sites, but which might suffer a raid by marines landed from a cruiser, generally lost some of their defensive capability but did retain a fairly significant number of ground troops.59 In the more immediately threatened areas, a larger number of troops were to be deployed. Fewer than 700 Regulars were permanently stationed at the seven designated defended ports on the East Coast but this figure was to increase to over 1000 and was to be supplemented by 60 Special Service Territorials in the Tyne area alone during the Precautionary Period. By the evening of the first day of mobilization a total of 3700 Territorial cyclists were intended to be in position coast watching between Arbroath and the Thames and two Extra Reserve and 15 Special Reserve battalions were scheduled to be in position in and around the defended ports by the fifth day. They were to replace the ten Territorial battalions which were supposed to have arrived, albeit without their transport, by the evening of the first day.

46 Defending Albion

The Admiralty, however, believed these forces would be inadequate and in 1913 pressed for changes. In addition to a request for more coastal batteries, it complained that as the Regular garrisons of the existing batteries were frequently used for drafts, their crews were inefficient. Neither did it appreciate the several unit changes scheduled to take place in the personnel manning the land defences between the Precautionary and Full Mobilization Periods. Their Lordships also foresaw difficulties and perhaps competition between the two services in securing the necessary personnel and vessels for the ports’ Examination Service. Negotiations were in hand with the object of easing the possibility of friction but the Admiralty considered raising a force of over 1000 Royal Marines to replace the transitory RGA and RE garrisons, and another 700 Marines from the Volunteer Reserve to assist the Special Service Territorials in their coast watching duties. There was also a proposal to station a body of redundant marines at Harwich to act either as a striking force to bolster local defences or an amphibious raiding party.60 One proposal which was enacted was the deployment of submarine flotillas as an adjunct to the perceived inadequate number of shore batteries at Harwich, the Tyne and the Humber.61 By 1914, each of the defended ports had a wide ranging and extensive handbook detailing how it was to be protected. The books listed the strategically important and vulnerable industrial and munitions facilities, the practicable advantages and disadvantages of potential landing sites and the different types of possible attack. The location and strength of shore batteries and searchlights, where field fortifications were to be built, the number of troops and civilian labour required to construct and man them, the position of dummy batteries, the extent of local water supplies, an assessment of the local resources of meat, flour and vegetables, the proposed location of latrines, the position of existing communication links, the role and co-operation of the naval authorities in operating the Examination Battery, and the agreed responsibilities of the local Police, were all fully detailed. There were schedules for the arrival of trains bringing the Territorial units to their war stations and tables detailing the number of troops available from the Precautionary Period until the replacement of the Territorial battalions by Special Reserve units. Some of the books also explained the role of the Regulars. The four battalions of 18 Infantry Brigade, for example, were to assemble at Newcastle during the Precautionary Period as part of the Tyne Defences Scheme and were to act as a mobile force to supplement the Special Service Section of the Northern Cyclist Battalion. On the first day of mobilization, the Regulars were to be replaced by six Territorial battalions

Planning for Defence 47

of the Northumbrian Division. Once the Territorials, who it was assumed would be at no more than two-thirds of establishment, were at their coast defence stations or deployed at predetermined vulnerable points, the Regulars would return to barracks in York, Sheffield and Lichfield.62 In order to keep the local forces as strong and flexible as possible, garrisons of the fixed defences were kept to a minimum. As part of the Thames and Medway defences, forts at Sheppey and Sheerness were to have only one Territorial infantry brigade for immediate protection; the two remaining brigades of the division were kept as a mobile reserve and would be joined by the third once Special Reserve battalions had arrived to replace it. These Special Reserve battalions were, as elsewhere, due to arrive by the fifth day of mobilization but as two of their eight companies were to be kept as training units, only six of their companies would be available as fighting or protection troops. Although, strangely, in this potentially crucial area, the army still expected the Police or the railway companies themselves to protect most of the permanent way, responsibility for guarding bridges and tunnels in the area of operations did fall upon the military. Some Special Reserve companies were allocated to lines of communication duties for this purpose.63 Despite the comprehensive nature of the schemes for the defended ports, in 1914 both the War Office and the Admiralty considered parts of the East Coast remained vulnerable. Those defences covering the Channel, the Thames estuary and the Medway towns were thought to be efficient but those which stretched from the Tyne to the Forth were assessed as inadequate: a heavy battery was required at Felixstowe and additional guns were needed to protect both the Humber and Tyne approaches. There were some vague plans to deploy railway mounted guns and an armoured train along the East Coast but great stretches of the coast from Harwich to the Orkneys were still considered to be insufficiently protected.64 The invasion enquiry’s report of April 1914 had concluded that a surprise attack was very unlikely but that disruptive raids by perhaps as many as 20,000 men were a possibly. The report acknowledged the developing co-operation between the two services but urged yet closer liaison, and believed that the efficiency of the Territorial Force was improving. The committee also concluded that the weather, cyclist patrols, the coast watch, the Royal Navy and the nature of the East Coast’s shores themselves meant that a beach landing was very unlikely. It underscored War Office and Admiralty concerns about the limitations of existing coastal fortifications and, endorsing Asquith’s earlier decision to strengthen

48 Defending Albion

certain ports, recommended the concentration of available infantry and artillery at Harwich, the Tyne and the Humber.65 If an enemy force did land on the coast, it was the duty of the Territorial Force to meet and repel it. These so-called Local Forces were divided between the five mainland Home Commands and the London District. All other Territorial units were allocated to the Central Force. By 1914, this formation, which comprised three armies had, like the coastal garrisons, a detailed plan of operation. The plan had developed and evolved over the preceding five years and had to remain elastic in order to accommodate any additional Regular troops who might be kept at home when the Expeditionary Force departed. Nevertheless, the detail and planning it included was immense: the hourly capacity of railway stations, the extent of water, food and electricity supplies in the assembly areas, the availability of local accommodation for men and horses, the location of buildings that could be used for medical and veterinary units, the provision of rifle and artillery ranges and the routes by which those units detailed to march to their war stations would follow. The Central Force, which at full strength totalled over 7000 officers, nearly 188,000 other ranks and over 60,000 animals, consisted of the Independent Mounted Division of four brigades and two cyclist battalions, and three armies: First Army comprised the Highland Division and one mounted brigade; Second Army, the 1st London and Home Counties Divisions, three cyclist battalions and two mounted brigades; Third Army, of four Territorial divisions, two mounted brigades and one cyclist battalion. Two further divisions, the Wessex and West Riding, were to be attached if required to Second and First Armies, while the East and West Lancashire Divisions were intended to proceed direct to Irish Command. Central Force GHQ was housed in the Hotel Metropole, the Mounted Division was centred at Bury St Edmunds and the three Army HQs at Bedford, Aldershot and Luton respectively. Apart from the cyclist units, whose HQs were on or near the coast, the infantry and mounted brigades were all to be at their inland war stations by the fourteenth day of mobilization. Only one unit, a brigade of the 1st London Division, had a specific non-mobile role, that of protecting the railway lines running from the Salisbury and Aldershot area to London.66 The April 1914 invasion enquiry committee’s report had recommended that arsenals, munitions factories, oil tanks and other strategic sites should be guarded by armed contingents ready for immediate action.67 In addition to these essential facilities, the War Office remained concerned about the vulnerability of railway lines beyond the area

Planning for Defence 49

of operations. These lines would be crucial for transporting troop reinforcements but there were insufficient Territorials available for deployment along them. The committee’s stated faith in the improving quality of the Territorial Force was not matched by official figures on the force’s strength. Between October 1912 and September 1913, over 114,000 original Territorials became time-expired. Of these, almost 63,000 took their discharge; 37,579 re-engaged for one further year and another 9060 for two. This represented a severe loss of experienced soldiers from the force which was, in January 1914, over 63,000 short of its establishment of 312,400 all ranks.68 In view of the continuing poor Territorial strength returns, the War Office had again been forced to review the possible uses to which the National Reserve might be put. In addition to the Government’s early reluctance to allocate the National Reserve a definite role on general mobilization and to provide the inducements which most associations considered essential to maintaining the Reserve’s developing vibrancy, was its continued failure to allocate adequate funding. The issue of finance was aired frequently in Parliament and invariably aroused considerable controversy and passion.69 Frequent complaint of the Government’s financial stringency toward the armed forces and its alleged profligacy toward the social services, did not prevent associations from advocating that some Reservists should be awarded an annual retainer. Army Reservists were paid 6d per day in return for accepting the obligations required and many counties made the point that ex-Regular members of the National Reserve would be unwilling to undertake a firm commitment unless they too were in receipt of a retainer. The War Office resolutely refused to entertain such a proposal. The woes of the Territorials were exacerbated by the increasing pressure exerted upon the Government by the National Service League. With Lord Roberts as its figurehead, the League repeatedly stressed that compulsion was the only way by which adequate armies for overseas and home defence could be produced. Between 1908 and 1914, five bills proposing conscription had been laid before Parliament and in April 1913 a National Service (Territorial Force) Bill was introduced but withdrawn before a vote was taken. Roberts claimed not only did the Army Council support conscription but that ten county associations had also declared their support for it. Furthermore, nearly one-quarter of all members of the associations were thought to belong to the League itself. Increasing disquiet about a strength of only 236,389 in 1913 caused the Essex and West Riding Associations to pass critical resolutions drawing attention to what they described as the failure of the voluntary system.

50 Defending Albion

When the resolutions were circulated nationally for consideration, the County of London Association, among others, went a stage further and called for some unspecified system (although the implication was clear), to provide an adequate army for home defence. However, after Lord Dartmouth had studied the county returns to the Essex proposal of January 1913, he concluded that the Council of Territorial Associations could not justify publicly declaring whether it was for or against compulsion.70 Resolutions demanding changes in the enlistment process were passed from association to association. Committees frequently pondered how to improve recruitment but usually came to the same conclusion: men who were not prepared to enlist or re-engage in peacetime would come forward in the event of war. Although their own county committee might advocate a system of compulsion for home defence, not all Territorial officers endorsed this opinion. In the North-East, for example, the commanding officer of the 6/Northumberland Fusiliers reported in fairly typical vein that pro-conscriptionist propaganda was having a detrimental effect on re-enlistment. The largest proportion of his men unwilling to re-engage for a further term came from one company which comprised men of a better standard of education on whom, the CO thought, ‘such propaganda is more likely to have an effect’.71 Yet, although unconvinced of the effectiveness of the existing system, the National Service League did not deliberately attempt to undermine or oppose the work or function of the county associations. Many of its leading campaigners were, after all, members of Territorial Associations. Seely’s responsibility for the defence of Ireland,72 and indeed for the army as a whole, came to an abrupt end when the mishandling of the Curragh Incident caused his resignation. The premature termination of his period of tenure meant that he was unable to accept his invitation to attend the Surrey auxiliaries’ Whitsun Camp at Stachey’s Newlands Estate. The county’s contributions to the home army assembled in the grounds, the high point of the occasion being the inspection of the various elements by the Adjutant-General. Strachey considered Lieutenant-General Sir H. Sclater’s presence to be essential for both he and Kitchener had been serving overseas for some years and knew little of the home forces or of their possibilities.73 Having observed the weekend’s activities, Sclater apparently later informed Kitchener of his positive impressions of the National Reserve’s potential.74 Strachey was delighted with the way the camp had gone and with the seemingly favourable impression the event had had on the guests.

Planning for Defence 51

Thanking Roberts for his attendance, Strachey enthused: The battalion [of National Reservists] you saw defeats the idea that old soldiers wouldn’t be of any use … . They seemed to have forgotten nothing of their cunning and it was a real pleasure to see them crawling through the woods or holding the outpost line … I believe that with proper officers such a battalion would be exceedingly formidable.75 A mere eight weeks after Surrey’s home army units had assembled and manoeuvred in Newlands, its National Reservists were guarding the estate and its surrounding strategically important sites in earnest anticipation of German saboteurs.

3 Mobilization and New Auxiliaries

The international situation deteriorated as July progressed. The decision by Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, First Sea Lord, on 26 July 1914 to reinstitute what had been a test mobilization rather than the usual annual naval manoeuvres, meant that the fleet was at its war stations by 31 July. The War Office, too, was preparing for what seemed the inevitable and on 28 July ordered Special Service Sections of Territorial Force units to proceed to their Precautionary Period stations on the coast.1 Forty-five men of the 8/Essex patrolled the coast near Harwich and thirty men of the Northern Cyclist Battalion watched the Tyne estuary. When they arrived at their designated positions, cyclists of the 25/London discovered many of the coastguard stations near Rye were already deserted; their naval personnel had already gone to man the naval war signal stations or were still with the fleet for the test mobilization.2 The Special Service Section of the 4/Buffs moved to their positions at Thanet wireless station and the cable landing point at Dumpton Gap and 102 men of the 4/Duke of Wellingtons arrived at Grimsby docks.3 By 2 August, Ipswich wireless station was guarded by a section of the 1/Cambridgeshire and, by the same date, 120 men of the 7/Black Watch were already at their position in Kinghorn Fort. A much larger number of their comrades in the 5/Black Watch had been manning sections of the Tay defences since Tuesday 28 July.4 Special Service Sections of the Black Watch had practised these moves earlier in the year, as indeed had the officers and men of those battalions whose sections had specific roles to fulfil in the Precautionary Period. The 1st London Division was tasked to provide one brigade to guard the railways between London and Southampton, the lines along which most units of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) would travel on their way for embarkation. The 1st London Brigade was a homogeneous 52

Mobilization and New Auxiliaries 53

unit of four Royal Fusilier battalions and had been informed of their intended role in February. Plans for detailing which battalion should guard which stretch of track, which stations, tunnels and signal boxes, had only just been finalized and on Monday 3 August the battalions entrained. Each platoon was dropped at its assigned position and by the early hours of Tuesday 4 August, 18 hours before the declaration of war, the vital lines were under guard.5 Two days after the declaration, the Cabinet was informed that the fleet was ready, the Regular Army was mobilizing, reservists were reporting to depots, the Territorial Force was being embodied and all coastal fortifications were on alert. Battenberg and the CIGS, General Sir Charles Douglas, agreed that it would be safe to despatch five of the six Regular divisions to France, with the sixth remaining at Harrow just in case the Germans did attempt a raid to disrupt mobilization.6 The new Secretary of State for War, was more wary. Supported by the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, who was probably more concerned about possible civil disturbance than an enemy attack, Kitchener decided for the time being to send only four divisions.7 Telegrams had gone out to Special Reservists and members of the Territorial Force instructing them to report respectively to their regimental depot or to their drill hall. For most soldiers of the home army, the telegrams were unnecessary. The Bank Holiday weekend marked the beginning of most of the Territorial Force’s camping fortnight. Some Special Service Sections had been ordered to their Precautionary Period stations before departing for camp and others, such as those from the 9/Middlesex left from it.8 Most battalions received orders to return to their drill halls on the Sunday or Monday, several units receiving them en route and stayed on the trains while they were shunted around and headed home. Others arrived at their camp, bedded down and were aroused by bugles in the small hours. They paraded and marched back to the local station. On arrival at their home station the men were either immediately dismissed or marched to their drill halls and told to report the following day. Mobilization orders arrived between 16.00 and 19.00 on Tuesday 4 August. Telegrams were sent immediately to members, notices displayed in Post Offices and even flashed on cinema screens. Mobilization schemes had been tested regularly and the operation slipped into gear. Drill halls in rural areas often housed only one company of about 100 men and there was little sense of press.9 Many urban battalions had only one drill hall which meant up to 1000 men were expected to report, undergo a medical and draw equipment. Troops were directed to their

54 Defending Albion

company table, went through the printed and rehearsed procedure and usually went home. Regimental histories are often coy about revealing how many members their battalions had on the declaration; with the Territorial Force as a whole over 63,000 under establishment, in some cases the numbers were significant. Some of the exclusive battalions of the London Regiment were almost 500 under strength, while many of the rural battalions comprising widely scattered companies, were only 700 strong. Highland regiments showed a similar weakness but those in the industrial heartlands – many of which were run on an almost feudal system of hierarchy – were generally a little better off. Some companies were known to be virtually at full establishment but it is unlikely that any Territorial infantry battalion was at its establishment of officers and men. Many were brought up to strength by 5 August as drill halls were besieged by former members seeking to re-enlist and recruits queuing to attest. Those units which had only one drill hall became so overcrowded that once the established members had drawn kit, and with exhortations to ‘Dubbin your boots!’.10 They were dismissed; those who had the room and those which had to be at their war stations by the first or second day of mobilization, retained them. To ease the overcrowding, many London battalions immediately requisitioned nearby schools and sent their men there. Troops were required to sleep in their boots and puttees and were to be ‘ready for an instant move’ but the early days of mobilization were generally remembered for an occasional route march and bath, evening communal singing and, after Kitchener had called for volunteers to serve abroad, in debate about whether their family and business commitments were more important than their battalion and their country. On 7 August, an invasion warning issued by some nervous War Office official compelled the recall of those men who were sleeping at home. From then on, all men were required to remain at appointed accommodation close to the drill hall. By that time, many battalions of the home army were already at their war stations. Mobilization plans for defending certain ports required some units to be at their designated position by the end of the first day of mobilization. These units were in the immediate or very close vicinity and were usually expected to march to their destination. Battalions of the Somerset Light Infantry and of the Devonshire Regiment in the Wessex Division had concentrated at Plymouth on 5–6 August, and those of the Northumbrian Division were on the coast defences by the same dates. Two battalions of the Black Watch were manning positions in the Forth Defences and units of the Welsh Border Brigade were in and

Mobilization and New Auxiliaries 55

around Pembroke docks by 7 August.11 By the fifth day of mobilization these formations were being relieved by battalions of the Special Reserve. As early as 5 August, 850 men of the 3/Border travelled to Shoeburyness as part of Thames and Medway Defences, and on 8 August the 3/Lancashire Fusiliers moved from Bury to Hull and the 3/Gloucestershire took up station at Woolwich Arsenal and explosive dumps on Abbey Wood Marshes.12 The 3/Gordon Highlanders went to Hartlepool, while the 3/Essex moved to Harwich on 8 August with 1300 men.13 These regimental Reserve and Extra Reserve battalions began their twin tasks of garrison duty and sending Army Reservists and Special Reservists to their Regular battalions. Of the 1300 Essex on 8 August, 850 were Special Reservists, one draft of 300 men having already been despatched to the 2nd Battalion. Similarly, on the same date, the 3/Gloucestershire had 380 Special Reservists and 550 Army Reservists. The 3/DCLI received so many reservists in the opening days of the war that it was forced to send many of them on to other regimental depots.14 Most reservists spent only a short time at their 3rd or 4th Battalions’ war stations and were quickly passed on to bring the Regulars up to strength or, once the BEF had gone to France, to replace battle casualties. The gunners of the shore batteries and the garrison fortress engineers close to where many of the Territorial Force units and the 3rd Battalions were soon to be stationed were in place with their mixture of Regular and Territorial Special Service Sections during the Precautionary Period. When full mobilization was ordered the units were brought up to full strength with, initially, the arrival of Regulars from depots who were then replaced by reservists. At Sheppey and Sheerness the five batteries of Regular RGA, one of which was an anti-aircraft unit, and the fortress company RE were supplemented by one Territorial RFA battery, one Territorial heavy battery RGA, two Territorial electric light companies RE, two Territorial works companies RE and, until the four Special and Extra Reserve battalions of the Rifle Brigade and King’s Royal Rifle Corps arrived on the fifth day of mobilization, the Middlesex Infantry Brigade of the Home Counties Division. By the second day of mobilization, the two garrisons had a total of 820 RGA, 319 RE and 1200 infantry.15 If garrison troops in the fortresses or defended ports happened to be cut off they were to subsist on the seven days’ reserve of preserved meat and biscuits permanently maintained within the stores and to ensure men and supplies could reach their war stations quickly and efficiently, the Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871 allowed the War Office to take control of the railways.16 To get the supply trains loaded and on their way on mobilization, the permanent cadres at three base supply and five

56 Defending Albion

main supply depots were expanded by the hiring of almost 1000 civilian loaders.17 One of the many mobilization problems was the need swiftly and efficiently to collect sufficient horses and wagons for the transport sections. Battalion HQ were supposed to carry sufficient kit and uniform for their full establishment but vehicles and animals had to be impressed locally. Registers of companies which owned horses were kept by county associations, but at the time when many firms were switching from horse to motor transport, many registers were years out of date.18 In contrast, the Liverpool Scottish in the West Lancashire Division acquired so many good beasts that a Regular battalion nearby immediately commandeered the entire collection and the Scottish had to begin all over again.19 When whatever horses that could be collected were hitched to the motley collection of civilian vehicles many battalions were forced to acquire, a unit on the move looked a bizarre sight: tradesmen’s vans still advertizing their wares, rustic farm wagons and a selection of corporation rubbish and water carts. Many of these improvised ‘army’ vehicles later looked particularly incongruous in a setting of the Egyptian desert, the dusty plains of India or the mud-splattered roads of northern France. Of more immediate concern to their drivers in August 1914 was the difficulty those acquired by the 2nd London Division had in struggling up Stanmore Hill on their way to St Albans.20 Another difficulty, and one which should not have arisen, was a shortage of uniforms and equipment. Blaming pre-war government parsimony, some county associations had failed to collect sufficient stores during peacetime; when battalions were brought up to strength, quartermasters’ stores were soon emptied. The many items of kit were supposed to have been supplied either by the associations through local suppliers, or by the Army Ordnance Department. This mixed procedure resulted not only in shortages, but also in confusion. When constituent units of the Central Force arrived at their war stations, they brought with them a great profusion and variety of equipment. Central Force’s AssistantDirector Ordnance Supply (ADOS) condemned the inefficiencies of the procedure and railed against a system which could allow supposedly fully mobilized units to report with insufficient horseshoes, obsolete artillery fuses and a variety of rifle patterns.21 Regimental historians later usually made light of these shortages, but they did seriously affect a battalion’s readiness and morale. Several battalions are known to have received batches of Class II National Reservists on the first day of mobilization. Amongst others, the West Riding Association had developed a system whereby its infantry

Mobilization and New Auxiliaries 57

COs knew how many of these men to expect when mobilization began. Other associations were not so advanced in their planning and their National Reservists reported intermittently. The actual mobilization process of existing members was required to be complete between twelve hours and five days, depending upon what and where their home defence role was. By the fifth day, battalions were assumed to be capable of movement. Other divisional units, the artillery, engineers and field ambulances were also usually short of their full equipment but the timetable required them to proceed to their war station on schedule. For many scattered battalions of the home army, the first point of concentration was their company drill halls, but for others the companies travelled to the battalion war station and concentrated there. Delays did occur: the Wolverton Company of the 1/Buckinghamshire was late having been shunted and left overnight in a railway siding and the 6/Devonshire also arrived late at its brigade rendezvous having detrained seventeen miles short of its destination. It had marched ten miles with full kit the previous day and only about half the battalion survived the second march. The CO commandeered cars for the stragglers and was later obliged to pay a bill for £150.22 When the 5/KOSB arrived at its Bannockburn war station, its billets were deemed ‘unsuitable and unsanitary’. The battalion marched on to seek better ones at Tillicoutry. The 9th and 10/Middlesex spent an uncomfortable night lying in the road in heavy rain because they could not get a train back from camp near Amesbury.23 Having been dispersed to guard vulnerable points on the way to their war stations, companies of other units, such as the 1/Cambridgeshire, did not concentrate as a battalion until September.24 Some divisions and brigades were scheduled to assemble at a temporary war station before proceeding to their permanent war station where they would spend their six months’ training period. Recruits would be taught their drills, shortages of equipment would be made good and the formations would develop a unity and esprit. The Highland Division, part of the Central Force’s First Army, assembled at Perth, Dunblane and Inverness before moving to its war station at Bedford. The arrival of the Gaelic speakers caused the local residents not only language difficulties, but also wreaked havoc with the town’s sewage disposal system.25 The 2nd West Riding Brigade of the West Riding Division, which was assigned to Northern Command, spent time on coast defence while the division’s other brigades remained guarding railways and munitions works at their assembly stations of Doncaster and Selby until October and November.26

58 Defending Albion

By mid-August, the 2nd London Division had assembled at its war stations around St Albans, Hatfield and Watford. This was the third of the four divisions of the Central Force’s Third Army. The fourth, the East Anglian Division, had its assembly position at Brentwood but its brigades were widely scattered: the Essex Brigade was stationed at Norwich, the East Midland Brigade went to Bury St Edmunds and the Norfolk and Suffolk Brigade guarded Felixstowe and Colchester.27 The infantry brigades were thus some distance from Divisional HQ at Brentwood, but this was the intended deployment and it was executed as the plans required. Other divisions, however, experienced significant dislocation to their established mobilization schedules. The three regiments of the Welsh Border Mounted Brigade were supposed to go to the Curragh on the tenth day of mobilization but in early September they went instead to join the 1st Mounted Division near Bungay, in Suffolk.28 Brigades of the East and West Lancashire Divisions were scheduled to travel directly and independently to Ireland. Billeting parties had indeed left for Limerick and elsewhere as soon as the mobilization telegrams arrived late on 4 August,29 but in mid-August, Kitchener announced that he would not send Territorial units to that troubled province. Relying on the Irish Reserve and Special Reserve battalions to maintain order once the Regular units had been withdrawn, he wanted the Lancashire Divisions to be deployed more effectively. The Liverpool Brigade was despatched to join the Central Force’s Second Army at Canterbury and the South Lancashire Brigade went north to augment the Forth Defences. The two battalions of the Border Regiment attached to the division went to their war stations at Barrow, and in October left for France and India.30 The East Lancashire Division had clearly been earmarked for overseas service and in September it became the first complete Territorial formation to leave Britain The Wessex Division came under Southern Command, with a role, if required, to reinforce Central Force’s Second Army. The division had assembled on Salisbury Plain by the fifth day of mobilization and awaited orders. As it was thought there was little likelihood of them being needed at their Totnes war station, the division’s cyclists had already been sent to the more vulnerable coast north of Scarborough.31 They served a more useful purpose watching the East Coast than their division, scattered between dispersed vulnerable points, was performing on and around the Plain. Troop accommodation in the area was limited and Kitchener was still intending to retain two Regular divisions. The War Office probably thought the Central Force was unlikely to utilize the services of the Wessex Division and so, like the two Lancashire

Mobilization and New Auxiliaries 59

Divisions, it was considered surplus to current requirements. The authorities thought the division would be of greater use replacing Regular troops withdrawn from India and, having reduced each battalion to an establishment of 800, it embarked in early October. Another formation which was not required at its war station was the Welsh Division in Western Command. The Welsh Border Brigade of the three Monmouthshire battalions and the 1/Herefordshire, went to its temporary war station at Pembroke Docks, but instead of next going to Liverpool, the four battalions were in the Northampton area by the end of August. They were joined there by the North Wales Brigade, which should have gone to Preston, and the Cheshire Brigade which should have been in Shrewsbury. Two of the division’s battalions left for France in November and another three, which were Army Troops attached to the division, the 6/Welsh, 1/Brecknockshire and the 4/KSLI, went to the East or France in October.32 By November, another two battalions of the South Wales Brigade had gone to Tunbridge Wells. These were sent to replace two and a half brigades of the Home Counties Division which had gone to India and two battalions of the Middlesex Brigade which had left for Gibraltar on 4 September. This division had returned from its temporary war stations on the Kent coast as scheduled on the fifth day and concentrated around Sittingbourne, Maidstone and Canterbury.33 It is difficult to understand why this division was selected for overseas service. On the Flanders Plain, the ‘race to the sea’ was underway and there were doubts in some quarters that the Germans could be prevented from seizing the Channel ports. If that scenario became reality, and the Germans launched an invasion across the Straits, a Territorial division fighting with local knowledge could have proved invaluable. Although there was concern that the enemy might gamble on an invasion, the War Office probably thought the risk of sending the Home Counties Division overseas was worthwhile as units of the other division in Second Army, the 1st London, were stationed fairly close by. The weeks between mobilization and departure overseas was for many battalions frenetic. All Territorial formations had anticipated the six month post-mobilization period as the time when they would hone and complete their training. The 2nd London Division had scheduled a progressive programme but this was thrown into chaos when so many of its battalions left for France long before the six-month period was completed. The London Scottish had devoted the first month to squad and section training and had been instructed ‘almost to utter weariness’ in elementary drills.34 Many battalions had been unable to practise any musketry and others had been dispersed over scattered vulnerable points

60 Defending Albion

which made anything more ambitious than company training impossible. There were moments of nervousness and of excitement when, for example, the 2nd City of London Fusiliers blazed away at a speeding locomotive, and when the 4/Dorsetshire carried out a nocturnal search for enemy spies allegedly ensconced in a house which, upon investigation, turned out to be populated by nothing more sinister than young ladies wearing night dresses. A squad of the 6/Manchester fired on a town councillor as he took an evening amble around a local reservoir causing him to rant to the press about ‘trigger happy Territorials’ and, when a submarine was reported to be trying to get under the boom nets at the Forth Bridge, the forts fired so zealously that their shells ricochetted and cut their way through the treetops of a nearby wood one hundred feet or more above water level. The ‘U-boat’ turned out to be an empty whisky bottle.35 A flurry of Whitehall instructions to capture the many German spies who were suspected of being at large caused the West Kent Yeomanry to apprehend an aged excursionist photographing a mediaeval church, arrest a naturalized German on five successive days, disrupt the Dover to London mail for several hours, detain a hearse until its contents were proved authentic and misinterpret the desire of a honeymoon couple for some arboreal seclusion.36 A more tragic incident occurred when troops of 1st London Brigade shot and killed a young deaf man who had failed to respond to an order to halt. The jury exonerated the Fusiliers but the Coroner recommended that troops be issued with written and verbal orders about when and where weapons should be used.37 Before many of the Territorial divisions had reached their permanent war stations, Kitchener had already decided he needed their services elsewhere. On the day he had taken the seals, Parliament approved an expansion of the Regular Army of 500,000 men, on 7 August the press opened the campaign to recruit the ‘first 100,000’, and, three days later, Kitchener invited the Territorial Force to volunteer for overseas service. In doing so, the Secretary of State was implementing part of Haldane’s original plan for the force’s purpose, but another integral element of Haldane’s vision, that of using the force as the foundation for sustaining the Expeditionary Force, was ignored.38 The reasons for Kitchener’s decision to create an entirely new army are well rehearsed: having been in India for several years he did not understand the depth and scope of the Haldane reforms; he discounted Territorial peacetime training as useless; it was so understrength and poorly officered that even the six month mobilization training would not bring it to efficiency; he resented the limited powers the War Office yielded over its administration and training and the influence wielded within the county associations

Mobilization and New Auxiliaries 61

by civilians; he had been unimpressed by the Volunteers who served under him during the Boer War, and he had the traditional Regular soldier’s contempt of auxiliary forces. He dismissed the force as a ‘town clerks’ army’ and wanted to create an army which was recruited for overseas service and which was fully under War Office control. But, for the time being, the Territorial Force was all he had to protect the British Isles. This unpalatable fact was the determining element in his decision to ignore the existing potential framework for the army’s expansion. The Secretary of State could validate his decision to start afresh by highlighting how few Territorials – a mere 18,000 – had, in the pre-war period, accepted the idea of foreign service. In early August 1914, there was no evidence to suggest that the force would suddenly, en bloc, change its collective mind. In addition, regulations prohibited youths under 19 from serving abroad. An attempt to raise an expeditionary army from the Territorial Force, with its huge proportion of boys aged 17 and 18 years, risked a still birth. This very practical factor, and the possibility that insufficient numbers of eligible Territorials would decide to volunteer for overseas duty, weighed heavily on Kitchener’s mind. Moreover, his insistence that two Regular divisions should be retained at home and a speech he made later to MPs in June 1916, illustrate his deep concern about the possibility of a German invasion. Kitchener emphasized how: … the efficiency of the Home garrison was a matter of vital importance, for a raid … [or] an attempt at conquest might certainly have paralysed our industrial powers … The necessity for keeping these Territorial Divisions intact and at their war stations in day and night readiness for an emergency is a point which I think it well to mention …39 Kitchener might have been using the opportunity to counter continuing criticism of his treatment of the Territorials but there is undoubtedly more than an element of self-justification within his assertion. There were many in official circles who expressed deep scepticism about the likelihood of a German invasion; Kitchener remained unconvinced. He clearly had no love for, or indeed much confidence in the Territorials, but until the enemy had been emphatically defeated on the Continent he would not risk throwing the additional burden of army expansion, no matter how suited for it their supporters might claim them to be, on the county associations. The TF would suffer enough dislocation when members were forced to decide whether to choose the Imperial Service option or remain purely for home defence. To add to the Territorials’

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difficulties and wantonly or unnecessarily jeopardize its albeit, tenuous, integrity for the sake of the New Army could have precipitated a disaster.40 With the Expeditionary Force about to depart, the Territorial Force, with all its faults and shortcomings, was all Kitchener and the country had to secure Britain’s shores. That he did not expect to have to send Territorials abroad quickly, or disrupt their existing regional ties, is evident from Kitchener’s early statements. The day after the Secretary of State issued his invitation to opt for Imperial Service, the Army Council agreed that, where possible, units in the same division which did volunteer would be kept together. Given traditional War Office insensitivity to the importance of regional identity to auxiliary formations, this could perhaps be dismissed merely as a sop to please the members. But there was also a pragmatic necessity to the stated intent: the War Office needed the Territorials’ co-operation and this assurance was a means of appeasing those in the county associations who were disappointed at having been overlooked as the vehicle for the army’s expansion. On 15 August, it published a sympathetic clarification of its position which explained that Lord Kitchener understood the dilemma confronting the Territorials and that he did not anticipate all of them would be able to volunteer for Imperial Service. Neither, it said, did the Secretary of State want those who felt they had to remain at home to be forced to resign from their units. He wanted the force to be split into two elements: two battalions from a regiment should combine those who opted for foreign service in one battalion, and those who were to remain for home defence in another. Nor, the press statement explained, did the Secretary of State expect them to be sent abroad immediately; it was accepted they would need a considerable time for training and would only go when they had reached a level of efficiency which ‘would enable them to do credit to the British Army’.41 Kitchener was still insisting to senior officers of the 2nd London Division in late September that: ‘Not a man will leave [for abroad] until your Second Battalions are fully equipped and ready to take your place.’42 By that time, the London Scottish had already left the division for France, leaving behind a Second Line which possessed virtually no uniforms and even fewer arms. The percentage of men who did volunteer for Imperial Service varied from regiment to regiment and even between companies within individual battalions. In the same way as they were sometimes vague in stating unit strength on 4 August, some regimental historians were a little reluctant to admit how many of their members chose to remain with the home army. Initially the War Office stated that if 80 per cent of the

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men volunteered, the battalion would be kept in tact. Men in those units which failed to reach the target would be combined with others, preferably from the same regiment. There were undoubtedly dozens of battalions and supporting units which reached and exceeded the target, but there were also many which failed. Even the ‘class’ battalions of the London Regiment showed a marked reluctance: the Honourable Artillery Company later recorded that only 48 per cent of its men had volunteered, whilst the Civil Service Rifles did marginally better with a figure of 50 per cent; the London Rifle Brigade and the London Scottish each needed over 200 men from their 2nd Battalions to make up the numbers and the Rangers reported their initial figure as simply ‘not good’. Even if they did wish to volunteer, probably between 15–20 per cent were rejected for overseas service on medical grounds.43 The East Lancashire Division claimed that within a few days 90 per cent of its men had agreed to serve abroad but when the division was preparing for Egypt in September, hordes of National Reservists were drafted in to bring it up to strength.44 Overseas volunteers in the 5/DCLI were sent to bring the 4th Battalion up to strength and, among other regiments, the 4th and 5th West Kent also toyed with the idea of combining their men before an influx of recruits rendered the thought unnecessary. Concerned at the fairly tepid response, seventy battalions having volunteered by 25 August, ten days after its announcement that units needed 80 per cent of their men to volunteer to be sent abroad as a unit, the War Office reduced the required figure to 60 per cent. This was probably a more realistic figure and coincided with an announcement of a decision made a few days earlier which allowed those county associations whose battalions had volunteered to begin recruiting a 2nd Battalion. These Second Line battalions, as they became known, would serve as training units to keep the First Line supplied with drafts and, equally importantly, replace the First Line both at their war station and in the overall scheme for home defence. The announcement also came at the same time as disturbing news from France about the trials of the Expeditionary Force during the Retreat and as the formation of the New Army gathered pace. A recruiting fever swept the country which resulted in almost 175,000 enlistments in a period of seven days at the end of August and early September. The highest figure for any single day was reached on 3 September when 33,204 men enlisted, over 10 per cent of whom lived in London.45 Recruiting for the Second Line of several of the capital’s exclusive Territorial battalions had begun on 1 September; within two or three days they had reached establishment. There was a similar picture across

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the rest of the country. The unfashionable and much derided Territorials of the home army had to compete with the new military phenomenon of Pals battalions but even the least glamorous units which had traditionally struggled to attract and retain recruits from Britain’s dour industrial slums or widely dispersed rural villages reported buoyant figures. Although he continued to encourage the rapid growth of the New Army, Kitchener decided not to restrict unduly the expansion of the Territorial Force. Events in France during the late summer were forcing him to change his mind about their future deployment. When he had invited them to serve overseas, he had really only been thinking in terms of sending them to replace Regular garrisons withdrawn from the Empire or as line of communication troops in support of the Expeditionary Force. Mons and Le Cateau raised the disconcerting scenario that the Territorials might have to be rushed over to hold the line in France until the New Army was ready for the field. The country might be able to afford the loss of three or even four Territorial divisions to the Empire, but if substantial numbers of units were sent to France, gaping holes would appear in the existing scheme of home defence. Unless or until ‘the Germans regard it as an impossible operation’46 Kitchener remained convinced of the need to have a Territorial home army supported by whatever Regular troops might be equipped and available to assist to protect the coast. Yet, before Kitchener had begun to revise his ideas about the deployment and expansion of the Territorial Force, and long before the Expeditionary Force had experienced its unexpected Continental reverses, the Government and War Office had clearly begun to consider how some of the home army’s responsibilities might be undertaken by other bodies. Although there is no clear date of precisely when in 1914 it met, a conference at the War Office considered forming three Special Reserve divisions for service with the Central Force.47 The idea was rejected, probably because of the transitory nature of the battalions’ personnel but only three days after hostilities commenced, the UnderSecretary of State for War, Harold Tennant, announced a review was underway of how the National Reserve could best be utilized.48 This statement, which underscored the Government’s earlier reluctance to commit itself to establishing a specific role for the movement’s personnel, was supported by the Chairman of the Oxfordshire Association, Lord Saye and Sele. On 12 August he circulated all county associations declaring, ‘The time was not yet ripe’ for dealing with the employment of the National Reserve.49 By the time these announcements were in the public domain, several thousand Class I and Class II National Reservists

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had already joined Regular or Territorial units. Given the War Office’s reluctance to commit itself to a specific role for the NR, it is not surprising that thousands of members did not wait to be called up. Many of the ex-Regulars who presented themselves at the local barracks and depots were immediately posted to their regimental 3rd Battalions and were soon drafted to France as reinforcements. The early findings of Tennant’s intimated review appeared in the form of two War Office letters sent to GOC Home Commands.50 The Army Council instructed Commands to liaise with their respective civil authorities and warn them that military assistance would not be available to quell any local civil disorder. The local authorities were to be informed that they could request the help of Class III National Reservists over 50 years of age to guard against civil disturbance and protect vulnerable points; Regulars or Territorials designated for those tasks could then be released for other duties. In order to qualify for pay, these men would have to attest for one year or the duration but would not be supplied with uniforms or arms. Four days after despatching the second of the two letters, the War Office thought again and instructed Commands to suspend any action already taken on them. A set of revised instructions51 issued two days later put Class II National Reservists at the disposal of GOC Commands; they were told to utilize the men to form guards or to replace Territorials already detached from their own units to protect vulnerable points. These men were to be provided with arms and clothing. Any Class III men whose services might be requested by the civil authority or by local companies or individuals, would not be provided with arms and would receive only a brassard. They, like the Class IIs, would be attached to a local Territorial unit and a daily charge levied for their services. The Class IIIs were not, after all, to be attested and, as they were to be paid by their ‘employer’, the state was not prepared to accept any liability for them. Further instructions invited those ex-Regulars and NCOs of Classes I and II under 42 years of age who had not responded to earlier, informal exhortations, to join the New Army as NCOs; other members under 42 years in both classes were urged to enrol in regimental Reserve units currently in the process of formation. Those Class II men who were over 42 were told to enlist in Territorial units as supernumeraries and, after some official equivocation, were allowed to assume their former rank.52 This option was also made available to members of Class III, but they were to receive no gratuity. It was stressed throughout that these men were to be used solely for protecting sites of military importance; any water, gas or electrical company who wanted to use Class III men as guards would

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still have to pay. Thus, by the third week in August, those National Reservists who had chosen not to enlist until they were called were in receipt of their call up papers. They were under no legal obligation to respond but if they did, the Class Is and IIs would receive their gratuity. Events were now unfolding so rapidly that at least one association warned the War Office that congestion at the local barracks would cause a delay in processing its men. Nevertheless, Hertfordshire claimed that by midSeptember ‘practically the whole of Classes I and II’ had rejoined the colours and a ‘considerable number’ of eligible Class III had also gone.53 In view of the avalanche of demands made upon the county associations in the early weeks of the war, it is little wonder some of them temporarily lost interest in how their Class III National Reservists might be used. Faced with the tasks of bringing their units up to war strength and of fully equipping them, the associations had more pressing problems than concerning themselves with how their, often more elderly, former warriors might be used. There was also the disappointment at Kitchener’s decision not to use the associations as the vehicle by which the army was to be expanded but, in truth, the associations had undertaken little preparation to cope with a sudden explosion in numbers. It was perhaps ironic that Haldane, the man who had engineered the process whereby the second line army could reinforce the first, should have recommended Kitchener’s appointment as Secretary of State for War. Given the independence of the county associations and the alleged inadequacies of the Territorials, the Secretary of State’s decision to ignore the ‘town clerks’ army’54 and start from scratch to mould a new force suited to his needs for overseas service is perhaps understandable. To Kitchener, and indeed also to the many county association chairmen swamped by new recruits to their First, and shortly afterwards, their Second Line units, Class III men of the National Reserve commanded a low priority. Nevertheless, some associations decided not simply to await a War Office decision and, by anticipating the various uses to which their Class III volunteers might be put, began to organize their men into groups ready for later deployment. Buckinghamshire was one of the first counties off the mark in forming and deploying what were later to become known as Protection Companies. On 6 August the association decided to combine Class III members in adjoining parishes to form guards for bridges, waterworks and other essential sites. As the War Office’s stated intention for the National Reserve was to provide protection for vulnerable points, the creation of such local guards, albeit before ordered to do so, was predictable.55 Tennant acknowledged what became a gathering momentum

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when he told the House that the county associations had received instructions to enrol volunteers from Classes II and III for such work and that a considerable number of National Reservists were now so employed.56 Mobilization also brought the pre-war coast watch plan agreed by the Admiralty and War Office into operation but the withdrawal of many Naval Reservists, as well as the increasing demands on the Territorials’ existing manpower, meant that long stretches of vulnerable coast could not be patrolled as regularly as the scheme had intended. In early September, fishermen and other seafarers on the East and South Coasts were invited to form a civilian auxiliary which was to be known as the Coastwatch. Its members, who were generally older men often assisted by Sea Scouts, exercised the same powers as Special Constables. Besides reporting on aircraft and ship movements they could, under the Defence of the Realm legislation, stop and arrest people behaving in what they considered to be a suspicious manner.57 Although technically their jurisdiction was limited to quays and docks, pre-war suggestions of co-operation between the War Office and Customs officials bore fruit. In conjunction with the Admiralty, Customs House issued a number of circulars which eased co-operation between the authorities and detailed what their men and the part-time volunteers should be looking for and reporting on.58 Very little evidence has survived on the activities of the civilian Coastwatch but, like their counterparts in the Volunteer Training Corps, it gave men above military age the chance actively to demonstrate their patriotism and to participate in home defence. In and around Sidmouth, about 100 National Reservists acted as coast watchers under the ‘instruction’ of the Commandant of the Plymouth Fortress.59 The men were probably Class III National Reservists working on their own initiative and patrolling without arms or official recognition. Thousands of their comrades who were too old, medically unsuitable or in essential occupations which precluded their becoming members of Protection Companies, continued to parade and availed themselves to any water or railway company who wanted their reservoirs or bridges patrolled. Some armed National Reservists were certainly employed by water companies in South Wales but the Chief Constable warned the Home Office that unless it or the military authorities were prepared to underwrite the guards’ costs, the water companies’ payments would last only a few weeks.60 Occasionally Reservists formed parades with local Territorial units or, more commonly, with the local volunteer civilian defence corps. In many districts a natural convergence of the National Reserve

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with the Volunteer Training Corps developed and many senior officers of the NR who were too old for active service were frequently the driving force behind the creation of Volunteer units. The appearance of these new, local auxiliary groups should be seen in the context of the remarkable enthusiasm displayed by the civilian population for the outbreak of war, and in the importance, often fuelled by the regional press, of local identity and municipal autonomy in early twentieth-century Britain. Besides the four national constituent countries of the United Kingdom, there were emphatic regional divisions. Throughout the closing decades of the previous century, loyalty to the country and Empire was paralleled with an indigenous pride in county or borough. The spontaneous growth of the new civilian defence forces in towns and villages across the kingdom, as indeed had the growth in the Territorial Force and the National Reserve, reflected not only patriotic concern for national defence but also a fierce belief among the middle and artisan classes that their area should be seen to be making a contribution to national and local security. The enthusiasm with which Britain’s shopkeepers, factory owners and financiers re-embraced the traditional concept of a volunteer auxiliary demonstrated the same belief which had prompted their fathers and grandfathers to create the Rifle Volunteers: a country dominated politically and economically by the skills and enterprise of the middle-class had to rely on that same class for home defence. It became a point of contention among several of the new auxiliary groups to claim that they had been the first to form. There were several contenders including, for example, Bideford in Devon and a five man bowling team from Wandsworth,61 but the honour should probably go to the residents of Saughall and Mollington on the Wirral. The 5.00 pm edition of the Chester Courant on 4 August recorded that men of the two villages were already drilling in anticipation, should war come, of a German invasion; on the day following the declaration, fifty men assembled and registered their desire to form a citizen body.62 This claim to be the first of the groups was later acknowledged by General Sir O’Moore Creagh, one of the founders of the Volunteer movement.63 When a letter by Percy Harris, a prominent Liberal member of the London County Council was published in The Times on 6 August, national attention was drawn to the incipient movement.64 Harris bemoaned the hordes of men whose ‘potential energies are wasting themselves in crowding around and cheering at the palace and government offices, embarrassing the Police and in no way helping the defence of the country’. He went on to suggest the holding of parades in public

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parks where young men could be trained by old soldiers before being drafted into the Territorials. He thought the movement should be independent of the War Office and, through a system of inter-municipal benevolence, richer boroughs would be able to provide financial assistance to their poorer neighbours. Councils, poor law guardians, friendly societies and trade unions should, observed Harris, all have a part to play. In a less than politically adroit remark, he concluded his thesis by rashly suggesting the proposed London’s corps could be modelled on the Ulster Volunteers.65 Despite this unfortunate analogy, the letter spurred others to action; both Arthur Conan Doyle and H.G. Wells had letters printed two days later.66 Conan Doyle advocated the formation of what he described as civilian companies of the National Reserve. With the correct guidance and assistance, he believed, these groups would quickly be able to mount guards on lines of communication and even help to garrison fortresses. This ‘Landsturm’, as Doyle called it, would provide a ‘stepping stone’ for the younger men into the Territorial Force and thence ‘into the firing line’. Despite his call for guidance, Doyle accepted that the contemporary pressures upon the War Office precluded any Governmental assistance and insisted that the movement should be born by ‘independent local effort’. Wells followed a similar theme. He wanted men in the southern counties to be armed and to wear a badge in lieu of a uniform. Thus equipped they could assist in transport duties and even conduct guerrilla warfare. With considerable understatement he admitted that it would be ‘perhaps not a very effective fighting force’ but argued that it would permit the release of substantial numbers of men who were ‘now keeping order’. A third correspondent that same day wanted the creation of training centres across the country where businessmen could receive the rudiments of military skills. Such a movement would, he held, have to be universal and could even incorporate first aid training for women.67 On the day these letters were published, a preliminary committee comprising Sir Charles Stewart, the Public Trustee, General Sir O’Moore Creagh, Master Bonner and Percy Harris, met to discuss strategy. They agreed to approach Lord Desborough, who had already been drilling men on his Buckinghamshire estate, and to invite him to become president of the committee now dedicated to raising a civilian guard for the capital.68 Momentum continued to gather and on 10 August at a meeting under the auspices of the National Patriotic Association, Harris outlined the proposed scheme. This organization had developed from the Employers’

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Patriotic Association and was led by Sir George Pragnell, Chairman of the Employers’ Territorial Association. Pragnell was supported by other leading figures in the City as well as Sir Frederick Cook, Lord Desborough, Lord Lovat and O’Moore Creagh. Good wishes had also been sent by the Lord Chief Justice, Arthur Balfour, Lord Rosebery and prominent leaders of the Anglican and Catholic clergy. Harris’ suggestions were well received and the meeting resolved to form a London Volunteer Defence Force. With Desborough as president, O’Moore Creagh as military advisor, Harris as secretary and Bonner as the legal advisor, the committee decided to establish touch with the Territorial associations within the London area but agreed not begin recruiting until Kitchener had secured his 100,000 men. Harris’ scheme immediately attracted a great deal of attention across the City and the County of London. Within the boroughs, businesses and captains of banking and insurance houses displayed enthusiastic interest. Many of the leading companies soon began to hold classes and to drill their employees under the instruction of the old soldiers usually found on the staff of most large businesses. In addition, one Territorial association outside the capital is known to have sought War Office permission to assume responsibility for organizing the formation of a local defence corps, guaranteeing that it would not affect army recruiting.69 The Times reported it had been ‘inundated’ with letters whose correspondents ranged from elderly veterans to adolescent public school boys. Most of the enquiries and suggestions concerned the use of Volunteers to guard bridges and other important municipal sites, but at least one, from Colonel A.J. Fergusson, wanted Parliament to pass an act empowering local authorities to call out all able-bodied men for evening musketry practice.70 St Loe Strachey immediately pointed out that High Sheriffs already held ancient powers to call upon men over 16 to repel the King’s enemies.71 Sheriffs should, he argued, inform their Chief Constables that they would readily accept responsibility for assisting the Police by the temporary enrolment of suitable citizens. In view of the large numbers of Germans already in the country, the guarding of bridges by volunteers was, Strachey considered, a justifiable and legal precaution.72 In a further letter, Conan Doyle wrote that his local corps had enrolled 250 men in only three days, and expressed his concern that groups across the country were expecting too much from the War Office. For the time being, thought Doyle, the groups should be content with drill and in sending any eligible men on to the Regular or home armies. In other words, they should ‘wait in patience on the chance that they may some day be of service’.73 Wells was not quite so restrained. Although he

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insisted that all corps must operate under firm discipline and possess a uniform to save them from ‘butchery’ in the event of capture, he allowed that the uniform should be provided by the men themselves. It could consist of a tweed suit simply converted by the addition of red facings and felt hat. He went on to describe how the Volunteers would turn the countryside into a ‘bed of stinging nettles … as soon as rifles and ammunition came to hand’.74 Wells’ view of a belligerent and aggressive corps was criticised by Sir Foster Cunliffe. Cunliffe believed the movement was in danger of ‘travelling in a wrong direction’ and questioned the wisdom of Wells’ suggestion of using what Cunliffe called ‘quarter trained men’ in the role of ‘waylaying scouts’, or for ‘sniping … and hedge and ditch work’. To him, guerrilla warfare was the last resort of a country whose military organization was already shattered and would inevitably result in widespread civilian panic. He wanted all corps to be brought immediately under government control in order to avoid ‘waste and dispersion’ and argued that the War Office could not be expected to do anything more on the Volunteers’ behalf until Kitchener’s New Army was close to completion. When the authorities had more time the corps could then be co-ordinated with the other elements of home defence.75 In response to Cunliffe’s criticism, H.G. Wells maintained that irregular forces scattered among hedges could induce an ‘extraordinary check upon hostile scouting’; this was certainly preferable, wrote Wells, to the spectacle of the same men standing at their doors and gazing helplessly at the passing enemy. He insisted that he had no desire to interfere with the official war machine but did ‘suggest that too exclusive an insistence upon the “machine” may lead to the refusal and discouragement of much exterior enthusiasm without any corresponding advantage to the machine’.76 Individuals within the movement were already complaining of being ‘cold shouldered’ by the ‘machine’ and suggested that the War Office opposition to voluntary auxiliaries was merely history repeating itself.77 Discussions and arguments about the nature and possible role of the Volunteer movement were brought to an abrupt, albeit temporary, halt by an announcement from the War Office which banned such groups and their parades. The authorities had clearly been taken aback by the pace at which bodies of Volunteers were emerging and, amidst all their other problems and concerns, it viewed with misgiving any organizations which might, whether intentionally or not, interfere with recruiting for the Regular or home forces.78 Not surprisingly, the summary ban came as a surprise and disappointment to the movement. Some, such as the well-known barrister

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and JP, George Cave, advocated the complete abandonment of the concept and suggested disgruntled Volunteers should instead enrol in the recently revived Special Constabulary. The membership of at least two corps is known to have followed this course and immediately transferred their loyalty to the Specials.79 For its part, the London committee had never expected the authorities to provide anything in the way of material encouragement, but neither had it anticipated such determined opposition. General Sir O’Moore Creagh sought and obtained an interview with Kitchener during which he attempted to persuade the Secretary of State of the merit and value of bodies of Volunteers scattered throughout the capital. Given his attitude towards the Territorial Force, Kitchener was unlikely to allow an ad hoc rabble of unarmed civilians to run in competition with the established forces of the Crown. This concern was emphasized in a War Office letter of 26 August: The Army Council feel strongly that, if such bodies as that proposed are organized with the sanction of the War Office, it will inevitably tend to draw public opinion from the vital question of the augmentation and upkeep of the authorized Forces of the country.80 Kitchener and Reginald McKenna, the Home Secretary, had discussed the Volunteer issue several days earlier.81 Both had agreed that the movement was likely to inhibit army recruiting and was to be opposed by both the War and Home Offices. A circular discouraging the formation of such groups and authorizing the Police to remove any posters advertising their existence was sent to mayors and chief constables on 17 August.82 With Kitchener’s mind resolute, Percy Harris sought Haldane’s help. The former Secretary of State could do little except suggest that the committee approach Creedy, Kitchener’s Private Secretary. Creedy proved of little assistance and the movement appeared thwarted. Out of the blue, however, came a note from Tennant inviting Harris to talks on the whole Volunteer issue.83 The Army Council’s change of mind was not a complete reversal of attitude but it did provide the movement with a glimmer of hope. The War Office was no doubt angered at the number of civilians and longretired officers who claimed to know better than they how the defence of the British Isles should be safeguarded. No matter how patriotic their intent, many of the movement’s enthusiasts and proponents were undoubtedly militarily ignorant. Their dream of an army of irregulars supplementing the home army and creating havoc on the lines of communication of an invading force was grist to the mill to magazines and

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story books; to the Army Council, the threat posed by such groups was likely to be a danger more to the home than the enemy forces. If their continued growth was inevitable, the War Office preferred there to be a central body, run by reliable pillars, who would, should the Army Council ever devise a use for them, be responsible for the Volunteers’ administration. Tennant’s approval of the committee’s continued existence was a tacit acceptance that he could really do nothing to prevent the local groups from forming and would be unable to sustain a ban on them drilling in company yards or on village greens. Despite the War Office’s reluctance to accept the services of these untrained, ill-disciplined and disparate bodies of unarmed civilians, many of the membership remained undeterred and continued to parade and drill. Even some of the movement’s advocates acknowledged that ‘armed civilians are a danger to themselves and a menace to their friends’, and added that if the Government did allow a reversion to the old Volunteer system, everyone would become tolerably ‘safe from the dreadful fate of armed civilians’.84 Several corps, for instance the East Riding and Lincolnshire groups, continued to insist that they never intended themselves to be considered as a force for home defence, claiming they were merely providing men with the opportunity to drill and prepare them for possible military service.85 The theory held by some that a National Volunteer Guard could be formed within a month entirely ignored the fact that the Territorial Force, created to replace the creaking and inefficient Volunteer system, had been widely criticized for apparently failing to attain efficiency despite its six years of existence. Furthermore, the Guard’s advocates unrealistically argued that the alleged abundance of ancient instructors could rapidly and easily transform the citizenry into an armed and reliable part-time force. Other of the scheme’s proponents suggested landowners and others familiar with the use of firearms should offer their land and expertise to the Guard; rifles, ran the argument, would be supplied by the War Office and the ammunition by public subscription. German prisoners of war should, it continued, be forced to assist in running the rifle ranges in return for the ‘luxurious feeding’ they were currently receiving.86 Several of the movement’s supporters argued that it could be developed without the immediate assistance and support of the War Office: after all, throughout their existence the Rifle Volunteers had been dependent upon public subscription supplemented by only a small central grant. The historian H.A.L. Fisher also looked towards a districtfunded force. He thought the thousands of northern mill hands currently on short time would never enlist in the army unless they were

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made completely redundant. But, before that inevitability occurred Fisher, with a fine misconception of what the future demands of ‘total war’ would be, believed the men could be trained by the civic authorities in concert with local employers. When unemployment finally drove them into the army, they would at least be partially trained. Others, echoing Harris’ and Doyle’s earlier suggestions, thought that the patriotic concern already displayed by the larger employers should be further utilized to finance the Volunteer bodies who would thus be organized on the basis of mill, factory or office.87 The Central Committee repeatedly emphasized that the new auxiliaries would target those men over military age and those who were disqualified or unable to enlist for some other reason. The provincial press was already warning against using the VTC as an excuse by eligible men not to enlist in the army. One such editorial declared a man should not ‘shirk his responsibility or delude himself into the belief that he is obeying his country’s call’ by enrolling in a corps. An early set of rules for one Cheshire unit also emphasized it was ‘not intended as a hiding place for men who are trying to shirk and on no account must be used as such’.88 From the outset the Central Committee was fully aware that corps could become a haven for men who, although of suitable age, preferred not to join the army. Citizens reluctant to enlist could shelter behind the text of the committee’s own declaration that such men were indeed willing to defend their shores and merely needed a lead and instruction on how their home-based services could be best utilized. With the Territorials having already been questioned on their willingness to serve overseas and the New Army and the Second Line Territorials in existence really only in name, there seemed a valid and justified reasoning behind the argument that men who at least for the present were unable to join the army could still exhibit their patriotism by accepting some preliminary training. Individually some men might use the Volunteer corps as an excuse but to the War Office, if and when the age for enlistment was raised or conscription was introduced, at least a proportion of the new recruits would have some elementary military skills. As the weeks passed and the initial surge of voluntary enlistments declined, the War Office grew increasingly concerned at the number of men in the Volunteer corps who, for reasons best known to themselves, had so far resisted the call to enlist. By early September, then, a degree of recognition had been achieved. The War Office was prepared to tolerate the Volunteers provided it kept a careful eye on them and ensured they were not detracting from normal recruitment. To the Central Committee, this acceptance was a

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beginning to what they anticipated would develop into a wider recognition of the movement’s value. Until the War Office had the time and resources to do something more positive with the Volunteers, the committee thus became responsible for drawing up rules, regulations and conditions of affiliation for a national, rather than merely Londonbased movement. In the coming months it was to develop into a clearing house and central administrator for the groups and individuals seeking information on how to form and run a local corps. In keeping with his earlier role as the champion of part-time, auxiliary home defence forces, Richard Haldane, the Lord Chancellor, lent the committee two disused courts in the Royal Courts of Justice where, in the words of one of its instigators, it became ‘the first private organization ever entrusted by the state with the organization of a voluntary army’.89

4 Protection Companies and Invasion Scares

Mid-September reports of brisk recruiting to the New Army and the Territorial Force, combined with the failure of Germany to launch a disruptive raid, gave Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Cabinet, cause for reasonable optimism. He acknowledged that if Russia or France did collapse, Germany probably had sufficient shipping to transport 195,000 troops across the North Sea and to land them on the East Coast. He was also concerned about the extent of enemy mine laying and of the lack of practical intelligence reaching Britain from the German ports. Nevertheless, Hankey thought most of Britain’s ports were well defended, that transport to carry the Central Force to any threatened area was in place and, although he would have liked to see more wire and trenches on the beaches, was confident that invasion was unlikely.1 Hankey’s optimism was not entirely matched by by the CIGS. General Sir Charles Douglas feared that Germany might take a Clauswitzian option and risk an operation even though the probability of success was against it. He believed that the Germans were laying mines to a ‘definite system’, were conserving their own fleet whilst the state of constant vigilance was wearing down the Royal Navy and that their aircraft were probably in communication with espionage agents in the UK. If there was a stalemate in the West, or if they managed to drive back the Russians in the East, Douglas thought Germany might risk what he called a ‘gambler’s throw’ and invade. To prevent this Britain had to do all it could to keep the war going on the Continent. If the worst came to the worst, the BEF would have to return to the UK, a practicality which despite its enormous political consequences and military difficulties, was affirmed by Churchill.2 In a later paper at the end of September, Douglas again emphasized the problems confronting the home army. Including the Wessex 76

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Division, which would soon be despatched to India, there were, he estimated, about eleven and a half Territorial divisions and thirteen Yeomanry brigades. Within these formations there were, perhaps 120,000 trained men. Many of those would be required for local duties, leaving between 75,000–100,000 who might be concentrated reasonably quickly for the Central Force. Any estimation of their fighting quality was, Douglas argued, ‘mere guesswork’. Those Territorials who had opted for home service had lost almost all the equipment they might have been lucky enough to have, and some were entirely unarmed. Furthermore, the separation of the Territorial Force into home and foreign service had so disorganized the units that they were little better than useless. According to Douglas, the state of the Special Reserve was equally grim. Its battalions had lost many instructors to the New Army and 35,000 drafts had so denuded it of trained men that it would soon be incapable of even defending the coastal forts. Douglas continued to believe that the best defence for Britain was to fuel the war on the Continent but also recommended a redistribution of certain Territorial formations, especially around the Straits of Dover and the Thames estuary. Until sufficient home service men had reached efficiency, he wanted to keep the home and foreign service men together in the same units. Moreover, he wanted foreign service units to remain at home until their equivalent home service battalion had reached an adequate standard. Finally, he suggested speeding up the training of Special Reservists and to improve the readiness of the Central Force by using National Reservists instead of Territorials in guarding railways and vulnerable points.3 By September, an increasing number of National Reservists were being employed in protection duties: at the request of the GOC Dover Fortress, a 40-strong garrison of them was guarding Dover harbour; Western Command had ordered the East Lancashire National Reserve to find a guard of 136 men for the Manchester Ship Canal; 120 of Cambridgeshire’s Reservists were sent to Suffolk to guard points in Stowmarket and Lowestoft.4 These early local and district moves came with the tacit knowledge and approval of the War Office, but it was not until September that General Sir Francis Lloyd, GOC London District, assured members that the National Reserve would be officially and nationally called upon at the ‘earliest opportunity’ and in substantial numbers.5 Lloyd was actually a little behind events for, by the time he gave this assurance a War Office circular requesting associations to encourage ex-Regular NCOs on their registers to enlist as instructors to New Army units had already been issued and the call up of certain

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National Reservists was about to begin.6 Nevertheless, not all associations were organizing as promptly as the War Office wished. Perthshire initially resolved it would do nothing about forming guard sections until instructed to do so by Scottish Command and until it had arms for the men. A few days later the committee decided that War Office proposals for providing guards for vulnerable points were ‘practically unworkable in this county’.7 A fundamental problem facing associations with widely scattered units was one of supervision. Sporadic transport services meant county commandants were physically unable to visit the various sites and requests to their Commands for cars or motorcycles were usually refused. The problem was exacerbated by the continued shortage of junior officers who would otherwise have been able to relieve some of the burden and the fact that so many of the commandants’ own committees had themselves re-enlisted in the Regulars or Territorials. Unfortunately, many of these men were also local commanders and on their departure for service did not hand over their battalion or company registers. Coupled with a stream of often contradictory orders from Commands and the War Office, it is surprising that so many associations did actually manage to provide sufficient guards in August and September for their dispersed and numerous locations. By early October, Buckinghamshire had received orders from the War Office to provide a railway company comprising three officers aged between 40 and 55 years, and 117 other ranks. The association decided it would try to get Class II men for the other ranks, promising that they would be armed and equipped as Territorials. By the end of the first week of October, Hertfordshire had already mobilized, clothed and equipped a guard of two officers and 60 men; in London, over 2000 Reservists were guarding strategic sites within the capital and in the North-East just under 600 had become part of the home defence forces guarding the Tyneside shipyards and munitions works. One company of Cornish National Reservists was despatched to the National Explosives factory at Hayle for similar work.8 Few of these early companies received anywhere near full equipment. Originally the army described these guards rather quaintly as ‘watchmen’ and ordered them to be provided with uniform, cap, puttees and coat. It further decided that ‘any old equipment … would suffice’. By October it had provided scarlet armbands printed with ‘National Reserve’ for use by any association which could not yet supply uniforms. Railway companies came low on the priority list, and it was not until November that the War Office declared it would try to issue up to 50 per cent of the arms required by men on railway protection.

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Kitchener and General Sir Charles Douglas’ intention that Territorial units which had opted for foreign service would remain at home until their Second Line battalions had reached some degree of efficiency was quickly dashed. The departure of the East Lancashire Division in September was followed by not only the Wessex Division in early October but also by some of the West Country division’s own embryonic Second Line formations. Events on the Western Front in late September and early October not only caused consternation about how long the Regular Army might actually exist but also again raised the spectre of invasion. The German advance down the Channel coast during September and October opened new opportunities: the fall of Dunkirk or Calais, or even a stalemate in which Germany held Antwerp and Ostend, could allow her to outflank the previously assumed invasion route and take advantage of the fact that most of Britain’s defences were concentrated on a line Thames–Wash, rather than Dover–Thames. To heighten anxiety further, some artillery garrisons on the coast had been reduced to provide men for France and it was feared that the German fleet might be able to reduce the defences and land a force protected by mines and submarines of up to 100,000 men before the Grand Fleet could steam the 500 miles from Scapa Flow. Alarmed by the prospect, the Admiralty began a major redeployment of pre-Dreadnoughts and submarines towards vulnerable ports, expanded the coast watch and increased the frequency of North Sea patrols. In early October, the nineteenth century plan of constructing a pontoon bridge across the Thames between Tilbury and Gravesend, which would reduce the time and distance taken by the Central Force to reinforce troops north or south of the Thames estuary, was revived and construction work began. The concentration of the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow caused Kitchener considerable consternation. In response to an Admiralty paper in late October he predicted the removal of the fleet from bases further south might give the Germans the opportunity to invade: We have been buoyed up with the hope that a serious invasion of these shores was impossible, but we must remember that that has never been the opinion of German army and navy experts. … As soon, therefore, as men are available the German project of invasion of these shores will, in all probability, be tested. Their information on our military defences through spies may be considered to be absolutely complete, and the German opinion is that, once a considerable force is landed in England, they would have a fair chance of defeating the defensive forces still kept in this country.9

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Earlier in the month the Secretary of State had unilaterally abandoned the long established plan whereby the enemy would be harassed on their landing beaches only by small detachments of cyclists and skirmishers; the main British forces would meanwhile concentrate and then defeat the enemy as he marched inland. Instead, Kitchener decided that the Territorials should concentrate on the coast and meet and defeat the enemy on the beaches. The decision to immobilize so many Territorial units on the coast confounded politicians, the Committee of Imperial Defence and probably the C-in-C of the home army, Sir Ian Hamilton.10 The invasion anxiety reached a peak a little after mid-November. The German failure to break through to the Channel ports and the onset of winter suggested at least a temporary stalemate. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Commander of the Grand Fleet, endorsed Kitchener’s theory that a deadlock on land could cause the Germans to risk their ‘gambler’s throw’, and warned that the tides and moon would best suit the Germans on 20 November. Fisher, now returned as First Sea Lord, was equally worried. Kitchener needed little persuasion and ordered the deployment of 300,000 Kitchener and Territorial troops along the Eastern and Southern Coasts. The 20th passed without incident but the War Office and Admiralty agreed to change their minds regarding their earlier complacency about the adequacies of the Humber defences. They ordered the deployment of anti-submarine nets and the immediate construction of the proposed three new battery positions at Spurn Point, Bull Island and Haile.11 The alarm had also concerned Kiggell, the DMT, who revived the earlier plan of flooding the Fens. He sought and received detailed information from Chief Constables and drainage commissioners about how the inundating of certain areas could be effected, the impact such an action would have on transport, how long it would take to make the areas impassable and where defensive lines west and south of the affected zones could be drawn.12 The new measures and the realization that winter was hardly the season to gamble on the success of a cross-Channel invasion calmed Whitehall’s fears. This more amenable belief was also helped by knowledge garnered from a captured German document. Its contents were known only to a selected few, a group which did not include the Secretary of State, and concluded that even a large scale raid on Britain was too risky to contemplate.13 This information did reassure those privvy to it but Britain’s vulnerability had been earlier demonstrated when several East Coast towns came under fire from ships of the High Seas Fleet. As part of Hartlepool’s defences, Territorials of Durham Co.

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RGA manned 6-inch guns of the Heugh and Lighthouse Batteries. Three German ships fired 1150 rounds at the harbour, cutting telephone communications almost immediately.14 At the turn of the year, Zeppelin raids began which, again, exposed the civilian population to a previously unknown and unsuspected terror. One unfortunate sentry of the London Roughriders was accused of insobriety when he reported seeing lights and hearing engines in the sky but he was vindicated when news arrived that L4 and L3 had bombed King’s Lynn and Great Yarmouth respectively.15 It was no coincidence that at the height of the invasion scare and amidst concern at the increasing threat from the air and sea, the Government decided something more ought to be done about containing or utilizing the ever-growing number of Volunteer Training Corps. Disappointed by the Government’s early reluctance to allocate tasks to non-Class I or II men, and largely on their own initiative, unused Class III National Reservists and members of the Volunteer groups commenced parading and patrolling. Bridges, railway lines, reservoirs and other similar sites which were deemed to be potential targets for espionage activities were visited by groups of inspired and enthusiastic men, usually armed with no more than a pipe or a brush handle. At least those National Reservists amongst them had some military knowledge, no matter how distant or out of date it may have been; the Volunteers had little save their sense of duty and, perhaps, an appeased conscience. However inadequately armed or prepared they may have been, Volunteers were keen to be seen to be making a contribution to local defence. On occasions, though, their enthusiasm caused unforeseen difficulties. When one group’s offer to guard sections of the Great Western Railway’s track was declined by the company, its members instead seized on an invitation from their Chief Constable to patrol a local reservoir. The corps then demanded the Rural District Council construct them a hut, that the Chief Constable supply them with what they called ‘authorization cards’ and next proceeded to make life uncomfortable for guests of nearby houses by accusing them of trespass. When the Volunteers later began to bombard the district engineer with demands that he make safe the alleged dangerous and insecure manhole covers around the reservoir, the Council concluded the Volunteers were more trouble than they were worth. The Chief Clerk wrote to the corps thanking members for their assistance and assured them the reservoir no longer needed protection.16 Another corps indignantly refused to guard a railway viaduct, claiming it had not been raised to perform such duties; it did eventually allow its members to patrol the structure provided it was understood they were acting purely as private individuals.

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The Sussex Home Protection Brigade had no such reservations and recorded its frustration at the lack of response from the Southern Railway to its offer of providing over 200 would-be guards. One NorthEastern corps took it upon itself to organize the housing of Belgian refugees, and another was requested by the police to utilize its patrols to search for spies signalling to U-boats lurking offshore.17 From time to time, Class III National Reservists were invited to attend combined parades intended to spur recruitment for the New Army and the Territorial Force. On these occasions they stood alongside Kitchener and more senior units of the home army, feeling they, too, belonged to the Crown’s burgeoning armed forces and in the hope that they would eventually be uniformed and utilized. Besides the official assemblies (and entirely unrecognized by the War Office), ‘hundreds, if not thousands’ of National Reservists were also reported to be parading every Sunday on Wandsworth Common.18 This statement by the ‘navvies’ MP’ John Ward, precisely illustrated the contemporary public confusion over the residual members of the National Reserve and the emerging VTC.19 Thousands of Class III men had enrolled in their local Volunteer units and while both organizations remained without arms and uniform, there was little to distinguish a National Reservist from any other member of a VTC. As the War Office had no intention of using the elderly Reservists as combatants, it continued to resist demands that they be provided with uniforms. The somewhat motley appearance on parade of these veterans had earlier caused one observer to liken them to a ‘body of strikers’; stung by this and other similar affronts, the Huddersfield battalion determined to portray a semblance of uniformity and requested that members on parade should sport a bowler hat.20 Such events were sometimes a disappointment to the local populace who were by now used to cheering battalions off to war and often turned out in numbers to watch parades. On hearing military music one young patriot recalled being ‘thrown into a frenzy of excitement … I dragged on my boots and rushed out – only to find it was merely the local National Reserve being played to church by the town band’.21 Those National Reservists who were either still awaiting the call to serve or who accepted their age was against them, played a major role in the growth of the Volunteer movement. Once the majority of his members had gone into the army or Protection Companies, commandants of National Reserve companies sometimes formed a VTC from the remnant of their unit.22 When the local companies were later formed into battalions, their commanding officers, adjutants and quartermasters were often members of the NR. Later still, when the Volunteer Force

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became organized along county lines, several National Reserve county commandants acceded to the equivalent position in the new auxiliary movement.23 In the early days, though, it was very often at the lowest local level that the Reservists had a crucial influence. With their knowledge of drill, no matter how antiquated it might have been, they provided a core around which the small units could form, develop and mature. Their experience and skills were to prove invaluable assets to the instigators of the Volunteer movement, permitting the towns’ and villages’ businessmen, shopkeepers and traders to assemble and drill with at least an air of plausibility and dignity. The VTC knew the War Office was merely tolerating their existence but hoped that under the responsible administration of the Central Association, the Government would eventually go a stage further and ultimately, through material and financial means, actually encourage their growth. With so many of the First Line Territorials gone or about to go overseas, those enthusiasts with uncluttered minds believed the Volunteers should immediately be incorporated within the overall plans for home defence. In consequence, the three month period between September and November 1914 witnessed an explosion of corps of the strangest and even bizarre kind. Although several corps did describe themselves as groups of artisans and labourers, the educated, professional middle classes were the prominent and dominant figures in the revival of the movement, To many members, the corps was an opportunity to fulfil some repressed military ambition, to meet socially with colleagues, or to feel they belonged to something which contained an intrinsic patriotic worth. The Central Association was in no doubt what the real aim of the corps should be: their primary purpose was to assist the authorities in enticing men into Regular or Territorial units. All corps proclaimed this to be their principal ambition but some were unsure how much further they should go in defining additional objectives. The Essex Volunteer Regiment refused to be explicit about its duties: it merely stated that affiliated corps must be prepared to carry out any orders given it by military or civil authority. Some of the various Athletes’ Corps made it clear they did not want to develop into bodies of town guards or an armed reserve, but would simply be organizations where men who wanted instruction in drill could receive it. Alfred Bigland MP did not agree with this essentially passive stance and told the Birkenhead Corps that it had been formed because the War Office had not yet understood the ‘feelings among all classes of citizens’ that they ‘had a right to be recognized as belligerents’.24

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An article in the VTC Gazette explained that the movement had not emerged as a consequence of any public panic but rather by putting a system in place its role was ‘to guard against the possibility of such panic’. In a series of advisory articles, O’Moore Creagh took the Volunteers’ objectives a stage further: he wanted them to dispute every inch of ground, dig up roads and generally harass an invader by any means available. One National Reserve commandant told a Lancashire Volunteer corps that at present they would be ‘worse than useless’ for such operations and would be destined to remain so unless or until they resolved upon a programme of serious training. Among the early groups who formed or reformed were those based on golf clubs, the larger City institutions and manufacturing companies. The muster roll of the United Arts Rifles was almost a Who’s Who of the English art world and, not inappropriately, paraded in the Royal Academy’s courtyard and held meetings in His Majesty’s Theatre. Their uniform of a white sweater earned them the sobriquet of The Unshrinkables and the corps even attempted to form an active service section. ‘Godley’s Own’ was named after its ‘commanding officer’, the Public Orator, A.D. Godley, and had in its ranks the Poet Laureate, Robert Bridges, and Professor Sir Gilbert Murray. Other groups were formed from existing organizations such as the Optimists, a businessmen’s club, sportsmen’s associations (many of which formed a loose confederation known as the Athlete’s Volunteer Training Corps) and, not without some verity, the Old Boys. One body consisted of deaf mutes, which gave and received orders by sign language, and another was formed as the Ju Jitsu VTC. Although in many areas would-be members flocked to enrol, in some poorer districts instigators found recruitment more challenging. One former colonial officer organized meetings in a nearby district but had to resort to door-to-door canvassing in order to convince its doubting residents of the seriousness and potential of the movement.25 His neighbours were not the only citizens who harboured doubts about the utility or point of the undertaking. Inhabitants in some inland counties believed the enemy would never penetrate so far from the coast and even if they did, ‘these men would not make any difference’.26 In the same manner as earlier auxiliaries had in the past been mocked, parades of Volunteers in public parks were sometimes derided by observers and led to resignations from those who could not tolerate the ridicule.27 In some areas many men attended the inaugural meeting and then failed to reappear at subsequent drills.28 In others, some potential members did not survive the first route march.29 Undoubtedly there was a lack of

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direction, much energy was uselessly expended and what was achieved was of little military value. What they did possess was a commendable, if naive martial spirit, and a thirst to learn. The War Office remained unimpressed. It resolutely retained its lack of enthusiasm and displayed only a ‘tolerant indifference’ to their existence.30 Government attitudes hardened further when the October recruiting figures for the New Army and the Territorial Force were computed. The fall in enlistments was a consequence of many factors but the War Office again assumed that a major cause was that eligible men were preferring to enrol in the VTC. So far, Parliament had shown only a passing interest in the movement; calls to impose rifle practice on all men aged between 18 and 30 and to provide weapons, ammunition and instructors for privately raised corps, met with a predictable response. An offer of 5000 Volunteer motor cyclists was similarly rejected and a demand for the War Office to raise squadrons and battalions of veteran Yeomanry and Territorials to guard bridges was refused on the grounds that the National Reserve was already employed on such tasks.31 Tennant had referred vaguely to the possible employment of civilians in a ‘semimilitary capacity’ as a means by which the civil power could be assisted in the event of disturbances, but Parliament was, in reality concerned with weightier problems. Nevertheless, in view of the growing concern with regard to the number of German spies supposed to be abroad in Britain, the role of the Police and of the Special Constabulary was of considerable importance.32 There was, of course, no suggestion in any of the pre-war circulars that a force of armed or unarmed civilians outside the jurisdiction of Chief Constables might be needed as a supplement to the First or Second Police Reserves, but events were compelling a change in Home Office policy. Special Constables were enrolled almost as soon as the war began and in many counties the response was good. In others, Chief Constables found it difficult to recruit men in sufficient numbers and believed the Volunteers were a more attractive option for men willing to perform a civic service. The Chief Constable of Lincolnshire required 300 Specials but complained that he could not recruit them because those most suited to the role were joining the local Volunteers.33 The Police Chronicle welcomed the Volunteer movement and supported a scheme promoted by Sheffield’s senior police officer. He had met the Volunteers’ leaders in mid-August and concluded that if ‘systematically organized’ and trained in drill and musketry, the corps could be used to assist the Police in civil disturbances. The Home Office was horrified at the suggestion that armed Volunteers, even though under

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the control of the civil authority, might be used to quell disturbances. The result, both politically and socially, would be disastrous and was to be actively discouraged.34 The official Home Office line, at least for the time being, was that the degree of co-operation between the corps and the civil authority should be limited to encouraging Volunteers to enrol as Specials. Many Volunteers did combine the dual role but, in the early weeks of the war the issue remained far from resolved and only a few weeks later the Home Office was again reconsidering the relationship between the two auxiliaries. The Government had also been considering how civilians in threatened areas might react, and how they should be controlled, if an invasion came. One of the outcomes of its deliberations was the creation, under the auspices of the Lords Lieutenant, of County Emergency Committees whose function was to effect the evacuation and organization of areas most vulnerable to a German incursion.35 Once appointed, the committees agreed that their local populations should be instructed not to leave their homes or destroy livestock and burn food unless ordered; all physically fit men were to be put to work digging defences and should provide themselves with the necessary tools; citizens were to ‘maintain a calm demeanour, to avoid all panic, and as far as may be possible, to continue their usual avocation’. Crucially, civilians were to be ordered that in the event of invasion they should surrender any personal arms and, above all, not fire on German soldiers. Members of the VTC were expected to behave in the same manner as all citizens, which meant in accordance with instructions given by the civil or military power. To emphasize the point, Lieutenant-General Stopford, GOC Second Army Central Force, asked Lord Harris, the Lord Lieutenant of Kent, to organize and enrol about 400 Special Constables.36 Their task would be the supervision of the civilian work, to act as motor cycle despatch riders and, if it became necessary, to assist with the evacuation of livestock. Stopford also wanted to know how many cattle and sheep would need to be cleared from coastal areas, whether the clearance would hamper troop movements and how such clearances might affect civilian morale.37 A later, revised, memo from Stopford entitled Preparations for Civil Authorities for Action in the Event of Hostile Landings also underlined the role of the Special Constables. Local committees, which were to be centred on police divisional areas, were instructed to preselect and enrol ‘trustworthy and discreet’ individuals upon whom a local force of Specials could be expanded. Once again, there was no mention of possible participation for the VTCs.38 Nevertheless, when the Mayor of Queenborough wrote to W.B. Prosser,

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the County Clerk and the man responsible for co-ordinating Kent’s Emergency Committees, he announced that such a committee had been established as early as 6 August and that ‘everything was now entirely under control’. The measures taken included the swearing in of 150 Special Constables and a rifle club over 100 strong. All these members were chillingly described as ‘armed, carefully trained [and} competent to deal with any situation that may occur’.39 Committees in other counties were also beginning to think along similar lines. The Military Representative in the Chorleywood and Rickmansworth area had successfully prevented the formation of corps in his district but when the movement received Government recognition he altered his position. He was now prepared to consider the use of any group affiliated to the Central Association, provided it accepted that its first duty was to assist the Emergency Committee. The county’s Chief Constable endorsed this stance, insisting that the Volunteers must operate under his authority. The Home Office, too, whose principal aim in regard to the Volunteers was still to prevent them from interfering with the recruitment of Specials, was coming to the conclusion that they had to be more formally organized and controlled, if only to prevent them from becoming a nuisance to the work of the Emergency Committees.40 The twin spurs to the creation of the Emergency Committees were first, to ensure systems were in place by which the perceived threat of invasion could be countered, and second, as a means of quelling civilian anxiety about what was to be expected of the population if the enemy did actually come. In October, the Northcliffe press had again turned to the possibility of invasion and the speculation of how the Germans might behave if they did arrive. Repington stoked the debate in a series of strident and alarmist articles: ‘We must expect to be attacked at home … we must not rest under any comforting illusions that we shall not be assailed.’ He called on the Government to instruct the public ‘how to act, on the coast, in the interior, in the towns and on the farms … we must expect from the authorities a prompt announcement of their views’.41 H.G. Wells had continued his regular correspondence with The Times and, to a lesser extent, with the Daily Mail. Despite protests from some writers, Wells repeatedly advocated the use of volunteer bodies as irregular troops and dismissed critics who demanded civilian submission and those who argued that irregular action would inevitably lead to German atrocities: ‘This seems to me to set a premium upon brutality on the part of the invader and cowardice on the part of the invaded.’42 One of his severest opponents remained Sir Foster Cunliffe. He maintained that the type of irregular defence championed

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by Wells was ‘not efficacious’ and would only result in ‘frightful suffering on the helpless’ for no military gain: Just because we are unprepared is no reason to attempt to repair lost opportunities by reckless and ineffective action now that the moment of peril is upon us. … The real and only defence of our country is the regular army. … The great thing to avoid is the creation of bodies which would not effectively contribute to the strength of our military forces.43 In similar fashion, the Duke of Rutland told his Territorial county association that resistance by irregular forces would result in ‘wholesale shooting’ of civilians.44 Throughout October, newspaper columns bulged with arguments for and against the recognition and development of the Volunteer movement. The discussions were often linked to the question of aliens and spies, other topics which were similarly absorbing the nation. The Times was currently demonstrating a ‘preoccupation with the spies business’, and the Home Office was accused of ‘complacency’ in its alleged delay in introducing restriction movements on aliens and Belgian refugees.45 Despite frequent headlines proclaiming French and British successes on the Western Front, the accompanying maps and their indications of current troop dispositions showed how uncomfortably close to the French coast the battle lines were drawing. Repington maintained the onslaught on the Government’s lack of preparedness by demanding the appointment of Lord Roberts as Commander-in-Chief Home Defence and urging the population to be trained in guerrilla tactics. The Times’ stable mate, the Daily Mail, was rather less convinced of the need for armed volunteers until the end of the month when it provocatively published the Preparations for Invasion, issued in 1801.46 Wells’ next contribution was a remarkably lurid and vehement article which attacked the Establishment and virtually all who were denying the populace an opportunity to participate in the defence of Britain. Remembering how his earlier letters had been received with ‘forced amusement by “experts” ‘, and caused him ‘for a time’ to remain silent, he now rejoined the debate with a vengeance. Acknowledging that the likelihood of a raid in strength was remote, he turned his vitriol upon the authorities: Still, as the trained mind does insist upon treating all unenlisted civilians as panic-stricken imbeciles and upon frightening old ladies and influential people with these remove possibilities, and as it is likely

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that these alarms may even lead to the retention of troops in England … it becomes necessary to insist upon the ability of our civilian population, if only the authorities will permit the small amount of organization and preparation needed to deal quite successfully with any raid that in an extremity German ‘boldness’ may be attempted. He then went on describe how: Everyone is going to fight and if we cannot fight according to the Rules of War apparently made by the Germans for the restraint of British military experts, we will fight according to our inner light. … If the experts attempt any pedantic interference, we will shoot the experts … and burn their houses. … If the Germans get cut off … we will massacre every straggler. Their officers will be hung and their men shot. A German raid to England will not in fact be fought – it will be lynched. In an emotive, demagogic climax which inflamed the hearts of the Volunteer movement, he demanded arms, uniforms and, by the declaration of the levée en masse, the recognition of military status for every man in the country. He acknowledged the Government’s necessary preoccupation with equipping the New Army but concluded: … for the rest they seem to think that the chief function of Government is inhibition. … It is sheer greed for direction that has led to their systematic thwarting of civilian cooperation. Let us warn them of the boredom and irritation they are raising. This is a people’s war, a war against militarism; it is not a war for the greater glory of British diplomatists, officials and people in uniform. It is our war, not their war, and the last thing we intend to result from it is a permanently increased importance for the military caste.47 The Daily Express also showed renewed interest in the Volunteers’ case but in view of what it perceived to be a remote possibility of an incursion, the Manchester Guardian remained sceptical of the need for the movement. Never one to ignore an opportunity to promote the cause of home defence auxiliaries, St Loe Strachey wrote several supportive articles in the Spectator. He argued that the Germans might well gamble on an invasion and, in the absence of the Regulars and the ill-prepared state of the Kitchener Army and the Territorials, a national army of ‘Town Guards’ could make the difference between a successful defence of the country and capitulation.48

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In the face of such fury, protest, speculation and, at times even measured debate, official thinking began to show indications of a change of direction. Lloyd George spoke, albeit in muted tones, of the need for civilians to play a part in home defence and Arthur Balfour used his influence to help persuade the Government that publication of the secret documents sent to the Lords Lieutenant, and a declaration that Emergency Committees were already in place, would allay rather than fuel public panic.49 This was not done immediately but when rumours began to circulate about their existence, the Government did acknowledge that committees had indeed been nominated but refrained for the moment from publishing the detail.50 Moreover, Asquith and the War Office had determined they could no longer largely ignore the potential political difficulties posed by a nationwide civilian home ‘army’. The passions aroused within public opinion by the Volunteer issue could not be simply dismissed as civilian self-indulgence. Although the papers lauded the BEF’s feats of arms, it was becoming clear that the Allies had suffered severe setbacks and that the war would last longer than the turn of the year. Public opinion had been whipped up by sinking of three cruisers in the North Sea by U.9, the fall of Ostend and Zeebrugge, Zeppelin alarms and the ubiquitous presence of ‘spies’. To deny those respectable citizens who clamoured for some encouragement, if not outright acceptance, and who were prepared to devote time and personal money in preparing themselves to make a contribution, would have proved difficult, unnecessarily provocative and politically damaging. While they did not shift their opinion that the Volunteers were likely to be more of a hindrance than a help to the Regular forces, the War Office was concerned that as the groups existed, they should be brought under a tighter control. For their part, the politicians were beginning to appreciate the need for, what was to them, an essentially token gesture in order to appease public opinion. In the meantime, the War Office was prepared to let the groups arm and drill, provided the practice did not involve any expenditure to the military or the Treasury. The crucial factor was to ensure the corps had a discipline and sense of responsibility which would prevent them from causing additional difficulties to the mobile forces. In short, in the same manner as it had extended control and then eventually reformed and reshaped the Rifle Volunteers, the War Office was applying similar, familiar, methods to rein in the new aspirant auxiliaries. As the Territorial associations were already too involved to accept further organizational responsibilities, the Government opted to utilize the same channels of authority, the Lords Lieutenant, as had traditionally been

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employed to administer the home defence forces of the Militia. It was the Lords Lieutenant who had been instructed to establish the county Emergency Committees and the apparent corollary was for them to exercise authority over the defence corps which could, through their lack of control, present a threat to civil order. Throughout October and November, the House of Commons remained excited with talk of spies, German atrocities, the fortunes of the BEF, recruiting the New Army, munitions and equipment shortages, overseas trade and how best to mobilize the country’s latent industrial capacity. It also concerned itself with the tasks and difficulties facing the National Reserve in its role as guardian of vulnerable points and, increasingly, with the Government’s reluctance to encourage the growth of the Volunteer movement. Sir Henry Craik, one of the National Reserve’s most consistent supporters, urged the Government to recognize those Volunteers who had already acquired uniforms and were drilling, as part of the the Crown’s home forces.51 The Prime Minister’s reply, which gave no indication of a letter about to be despatched to Lord Desborough, contained the Government’s plans on how the Volunteers were to be effectively shackled. It merely reiterated that all corps should, free of charge, affiliate to the Central Association.52 The letter53 was the War Office’s official response to the mushrooming Volunteer movement and the Army Council’s first determined attempt to assert some measure of control over it. The letter’s seven conditions for recognition amounted to a synopsis of officialdom’s contempt and distaste for civilian auxiliaries. Five of the conditions were no more than most of the membership might have predicted: no arms, ammunition, clothing or financial assistance would be provided from the public purse; a uniform could be worn (but only when training) provided it was distinguishable from Crown units and displayed no badges of rank; members were obliged to wear a red brassard with the initials GR inscribed in black; the accepted military ranks and titles were not to be used and no form of attestation involving an oath was to be permitted. Disappointed as they were, most Volunteers realized that the Government had sufficient difficulties in arming and equipping the Kitchener and Territorial forces and accepted the restrictions; those who had experience of the Rifle Volunteer movement simply recalled the parsimony of Government grants in the pre-1908 era. The refusal to allow a uniform which might be confused with that of a real soldier, as well as other restrictive conditions, were intended to deny the Volunteers any pretence of military status or potential. Although the membership was in general hostile toward them, Volunteers accepted them simply as

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the familiar and traditional official attitude to auxiliary forces as a whole. Questions concerning the brassard, uniform and the denial of military ranks were raised immediately in Parliament but the Government’s answers offered little hope of amelioration.54 When clarification was requested why, if the Volunteers were not to be used as combatants the Government was now apparently encouraging their development, Tennant again replied in disparaging manner: ‘The feeling in the country has been that there has been no need to encourage these organizations. … Their utility in times of emergency will be to remove stock and to help the threatened inhabitants.’55 Tennant’s statement granting the Volunteers partial recognition and its coupled insistence that they were not to be regarded as combatants, contained an obvious paradox. In questions concerning the National Reserve, he and his predecessors had often used the argument that a badge was sufficient to denote the wearer as a bona fide soldier and not a franc tireur. The man was thus protected under Article 1 of the Annex to the Hague Convention of October 1907.56 Tennant, and McKenna of the Home Office, stated that the Volunteers’ compulsory-worn brassard performed the same function. This interpretation of the Hague Convention was questioned by some57 but the Government’s subsequent pronouncements appeared to contradict its affirmation that Volunteers were not combatants. Choosing to ignore for the present the contradictory statements and the inclusion of what were clearly unsympathetic conditions, the Central Association decided to celebrate the Government’s recognition of the VTC by staging a huge rally at the Guildhall. Impassioned speeches from the platform of dignitaries, which included Lords Desborough, Winchester and Glenconner, the Marquis of Lincolnshire and the Dukes of Devonshire and Norfolk, described how the movement had begun as a spontaneous demonstration of the citizenary’s patriotism and how important it had now become to the general picture of home defence. Speaking of the ‘far reaching calamities’ that might follow an invasion, Norfolk urged all present to encourage and develop this new auxiliary home army.58 In view of the Central Association’s determination to display a positive attitude now that the Government had granted limited recognition, the rally steered away from the two most controversial conditions imposed by the War Office. The bulk of the membership was far from satisfied with the five qualifications already mentioned but could, for the present, accept them as being of military and financial expediency. The restrictive nature of the remaining two conditions were, however, perceived as a threat to the very continuance of the VTC.

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The two most contentious clauses, Rules 1 and 7, stated that only those men who were ineligible through age or infirmity to serve the Regular or Territorial forces, and those of military age who had a ‘genuine reason’ for not enlisting, could enrol in a VTC. The most damaging stipulation insisted that Army Recruiting Officers must be able to inspect corps’ registers and investigate whether the ‘genuine reason’ was in fact ‘genuine’. If the Recruiting Officer decided the explanation was unacceptable, the Volunteer was required to agree, in writing, to enlist if called upon to do so. The Manchester Guardian drew attention to the difficulties these clauses posed to the Central Association, and wrote of the rally’s ‘interesting silence’ about them.59 Correspondents to other national newspapers went further and described their ‘amazement’ and ‘disgust’ at the Government’s stance. The Volunteers had worked and trained at their own expense only to discover that in ‘certain cases the penalty for doing so is compulsory enlistment’. The authorities’ attitude was nothing but a ‘gratuitous insult’ and Rule 7 was described as little better than an updated version of the press gang.60 Although the immediate fear of an enemy invasion had passed, and the potentially dangerous enthusiasm of the VTC hopefully contained, Britain’s home defence army was an ‘army’ in name only. Three First and one Second Line Territorial divisions and one full brigade had gone to the Empire, and significant elements of another three divisions were in France. Several other battalions drawn from a number of other brigades had also crossed the Channel. In total, and ignoring those units which had gone to sunnier climes, by the end of December 1914, 23 Territorial infantry battalions (with another two about to depart), seven Yeomanry regiments and six Territorial field companies were in France or Belgium. They had been replaced in the Central Force and the various Commands by Second Line units of barely trained and largely unequipped men. In theory, this motley collection of units was supported, if necessary, by divisions of the New Army. In reality, these formations were themselves no better trained or equipped. If the size and the efficiency of the home army was considered to be barely adequate in August 1914, by the end of the year its ability to defend the shores was infinitely more dubious. In a mood of seemingly deep despair, Kitchener told a meeting of the War Council on 7 January 1915 of his fears for the home army. He had received a request from the GOC BEF, FM Sir John French, for 50 Territorial battalions to be sent at once and lead French’s planned offensive towards Zeebrugge. Kitchener rejected French’s scheme because,

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he argued, it would require 50 rounds per day for each field gun, when daily output from the factories was only 13, because there were only 250,000 rifles in Britain for the existing 490,000 Territorials and, most importantly, because French’s plan was likely to end in disaster and the loss of the 50 battalions would completely disorganize the Territorial Force and the New Army. Finding 50 battalions would necessitate draining the Second Line for drafts; this in turn, would mean the New Army having to assume the responsibility for home defence. The Secretary of State also rejected suggestions of forming Home Defence battalions and of extending the home defence role of the Special Reserve. The first idea was impossible because there would be no arms for them and the second impracticable because its strength fluctuated daily and its structure and organization were not suited to it working as a field army. Kitchener then went on to make the disquieting statement that he would have 870,000 men available for home defence by the autumn. This figure staggered members of the Cabinet because it was far in excess of any the CID had ever imagined to be necessary. When questioned, Kitchener retracted, probably because he too accepted it as unrealistic and because even he realized that the invasion threat had passed.61 Weapons, and the lack of them, were of prime importance to the Cabinet and the War Office, but to many National Reservists in the Protection Companies guarding exposed stretches of railway line, probably the more pressing need was for personal comforts. Hastily formed city and county comforts committees sent mufflers and boots to the men of their areas but some local communities also provided National Reservists from outside their county with needs other than for their immediate personal use: the people of Leigh clubbed together to buy some miniature rifles and ammunition for the NR guards employed at a local prisoner of war camp.62 Nottinghamshire was only one of several associations slow in kitting out its men because stock sizes of Territorial suits were unsuitable for the National Reservists and the committee was forced to commission specially made uniforms. In contrast, by early November the Shropshire Association, which had for years been a by-word for financial efficiency, had fully clothed all three of its companies, each of which comprised two officers and 117 men.63 As autumn gave way to winter, National Reservists up and down the country spent many cold, uncomfortable nights pacing stretches of railway line, peering over parapets of arching viaducts or guarding isolated pumping stations on Welsh reservoirs. Ten companies of the Surrey National Reserve, a total of 30 officers and 1170 men, guarded the

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network of lines converging on Victoria and London Bridge, while men from Essex, Hertfordshire and the other Home Counties provided cover for the approaches to the other London termini. To protect a stretch of the Southampton–Waterloo line, a guard of 120 Derbyshire men was sent from the industrial Midlands to Hampshire. Such work was monotonous but not without danger. Captain Ewing, commander of the Rye Company, was killed by a train while guarding Martello Tunnel outside Folkestone harbour. Numerous as they clearly were, absolute figures for the numbers of men employed in protection work are difficult to determine. The Government fielded such questions by declining to declare the numbers on security grounds and by admitting there was not the manpower available to compile the figures.64 What was important to the War Office was that if National Reservists could perform this unglamorous work, Territorials could instead spend their time more profitably in training for overseas service. The difficulty facing the War Office about how it should proceed in its use of Class III Reservists was clearly illustrated when one MP suggested the mobilization for foreign or home service of all National Reservists under 50 years of age. Tennant replied that because Class III members had never undertaken a definite liability there were no existing powers by which they could be called. He did, however, assure the House that as the ‘majority’ of Class I and II had enlisted by late November, the call up of eligible National Reservists was virtually complete.65 Despite this confident message, the War Office was, in fact, very concerned that many Class II had not yet presented themselves for service. In addition, the authorities believed that many who had volunteered were not being used efficiently; others, they thought, were idle because no work could be found for them to do. The War Office acknowledged that the system could not yet cope with enlisting all Class II men into Territorial Protection Companies, but insisted that where vacancies did exist, preference should be given to National Reservists rather than to any other recruit who was not prepared to accept the general service liability.66 The War Office had received letters from disgruntled Class II Reservists complaining that they were being ridiculed for wearing a badge signifying membership of a branch of the Crown’s forces for which the Government apparently had no use.67 The authorities did not want to lose track of the Class IIs but neither did they want to call them up into Territorial Reserve units, thereby flooding those battalions with home service men. Although the War Office acknowledged that it could not at present use all of the registered men unless it was prepared to raise more

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Protection Companies than it was, at that time contemplating, in December it instructed associations to write to all registered Class II men who had not yet enlisted to warn them the War Office was considering withdrawing the right to a bounty for those who delayed any further.68 Registered men who could not provide a satisfactory reason for failing to honour their obligation were told they would be removed from the register and instructed to return their badges. Later, in mid-January, the authorities told associations not to accept any more ex-soldiers under 38 years of age and fit enough for normal soldiering in Protection Companies. In a further letter, associations were requested to estimate how many additional companies they could clothe and equip from existing stores. The War Office was considering using Class II men to raise extra companies and were encouraged by the counties’ responses. Of the initial 27 replies, only two said they were not in a position to raise further companies; others pointed out that they had the men available but clothing them was a different matter.69 Warwickshire even believed it could raise two companies in 14 days but warned that there had been considerable dissatisfaction when the War Office had earlier said it wanted the Reservists to enlist and had then done no more. This time, it insisted, orders had to be ‘definite’ or the men would again be exposed to ‘unpleasant criticism in civil life’.70 The War Office was desperately attempting to establish some degree of order amidst the chaos and dislocation of the initial rushes to enlist. It was too early for the later issue of lengthy, explicit lists of reserved occupations but efforts were under way to establish a system whereby industry and transport would not be jeopardized by the loss of men to the army. Early rulings stated that National Reservists employed by firms working on government contracts or on the railways were not required to enlist and were to be given a special badge and retained in their present class.71 Besides those National Reservists employed in railway protection and those who had gone into the Regulars or Territorials, the majority of uniformed Class II and III men were increasingly being formed into guards for the rapidly growing number of munitions factories and prisoner of war camps. On occasions, companies had to make hasty and ill-prepared departures for such duties. When a batch of Cornish Reservists was ordered to travel to Dorchester at short notice, there was a desperate and embarrassingly lengthy search for weapons to send with it. Guard routine was normally uneventful but in November 1914, National Reservists were reported to have opened fire and killed several demonstrators during a food disturbance in an internment camp on the

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Isle of Man.72 The fact that these usually elderly men were being used for sensitive and at times dangerous tasks underlined just how short of even partially trained troops the country was. The bitter winter of 1914–15 saw no let up in the training of the New Army and the War Office was determined that the progress should not be interrupted by having to deploy men on internal protection duties. If the National Reservists in the Supernumerary Protection Companies could not cope, they could be supplemented by their home service comrades in the Second Line Territorial divisions. These formations, most of whose units had been formed in September and October 1914, had been created to provide drafts for their First Line units and to replace those parent units in the prepared schemes for home defence. By November or December 1914, most Territorial formations had raised a Third Line whose function was to provide drafts for their two senior units. The authorities were now considering how not only the Second but also the Third Line Territorials could perform a further role as essential elements of the home army. The theory was sound, but unless these units could be supplied with their necessary equipment, and trained to a standard at least commensurate with that achieved before the war by their First Line comrades, confidence in their ability to repel an incursion was far from assured.

5 The Home Army in 1915

The division of the Territorial Force into home and foreign service volunteers in August 1914 had caused considerable disruption to a body which, given traditional War Office inclination towards auxiliaries, realized that it was to be a Cinderella force.1 With their local contracts and existing mobilization stores the county associations had, with some notable exceptions, generally managed to clothe and equip the First Line units; equipping the Second and Third Lines presented what were at the time almost unsurmountable problems. Given the Secretary of State’s decision to create a foreign service army at the expense of the Territorial Force, Government priority naturally went to the New Army. The Second and Third Line Territorials were not, however, alone in having to overcome equipment difficulties. Until Britain converted her industrial capacity to war production in 1916, the New Army itself faced unprecedented difficulties.2 Only the National Reserve Protection Companies came below the Second Line formations in the War Office’s priority list. This was not because Whitehall believed equipping them was unnecessary but simply because the demands of the BEF, the Empire and the lines of communication compelled priority. The New Army’s clamour for equipment, the early departure overseas of many individual First Line Territorial battalions, of the East Lancashire and the two Wessex Divisions in 1914, and of another six divisions by the following April, meant that the home defence force was grateful for any scraps that might be tossed in its direction. It also suffered from the stigma that a high proportion of the troops in the Second Line had deliberately opted for home service. Many men who had joined the Second Line had done so, however, purely because the First Line battalion of their chosen regiment was full. A majority clearly hoped that they would either be drafted to the First Line 98

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or that their own Second Line units would eventually follow the First overseas. The decision about whether the Second Line as a whole would go abroad, rather than solely the 2nd Wessex Division, was still many months off, but in March 1915 the option for enlisting purely for home service was abolished. Pressure on those men who had opted for home service to change their minds was intense and would remain so until the Military Service Acts gave them no option. There were, in addition, many thousands of others who although willing, were deemed unfit to serve abroad. When the Third Line units were raised in November 1914, the War Office had probably made a tentative decision that although some of the Second Line divisions would eventually go abroad, a proportion of them, even when fully trained, would be retained for the defence of the UK. Meanwhile, it had to determine how to utilize the genuine home service men and decide how the divisions which might ultimately go abroad, but which for the time being continued to haemorrhage men to the First Line, could become efficient components of the home army. Kitchener’s reluctance to send the 50 Territorial battalions requested by FM Sir John French for his proposed attack on Zeebrugge helped to quash ideas of that particular offensive, but the demands of the Western Front were remorseless. By May 1915, only five of the 14 First Line Territorial divisions remained in the UK and the remainder had gone by the end of July. Elements of the 1st and 2nd London and the Northumbrian Division experienced set piece battles and suffered heavily as a consequence. In May, just as Second Ypres was approaching its climax, Kitchener told the War Cabinet that the Second Line had been ‘bled white’ of its trained men and could not even be relied on for home defence purposes. In pessimistic mood, the Secretary of State suggested that the Royal Navy would have to develop its anti-invasion role and implied that it might be necessary to hold elements of the 1st and 2nd New Armies at home in case an emergency arose.3 Absolute figures for losses at Ypres were not known as Kitchener delivered his gloomy warning but within a few weeks it had become clear that the Northumbrian brigades had suffered two-thirds casualties. In addition, several of the London battalions had been so severely mauled that, like the three Monmouthshire battalions, the London Rifle Brigade, Rangers and Kensingtons were temporarily amalgamated to form a composite battalion. Units of the 2nd London Division lost heavily at Aubers and Festubert, and weekly trench wastage in the North Midland, as well as the number of men in the East Lancashire Division who could not withstand the gruelling training in the Egyptian desert, confirmed Kitchener’s depressing words.

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Two days before he had spoken to the War Cabinet, Kitchener, the CIGS and the AG had all promised General Sir Leslie Rundle, GOC Central Force, that the nine Second Line divisions under his command would not be called upon to provide any further drafts for their First Line.4 This allowed Rundle to slightly revise his plans for the deployment of the home army. He proposed to create an outpost line on the coast stretching from The Wash to Worthing composed of new formations, shortly to be known as Provisional battalions, and to use cyclist units for mobile patrolling. These ‘front line’ units would be supported in the rear by the Second Line divisions. Rundle accepted Kitchener’s assurance with alacrity and wrote to the Secretary of State explaining that within six months, provided he could obtain and retain the recruits, arms, horses and equipment, he would be able to get the divisions ready either for overseas service or as fully operational formations of a home army.5 Kitchener’s promise to cease using the Second Line as draft finders proved impossible to keep. In March the Third Line became responsible for supplying drafts (unless Second Line units were up to establishment), and the First Line units abroad did begin to draw drafts from their Third Line. But, there were simply not enough trained men. Consequently in June, it was decided that all trained men in a Second Line battalion in excess of a total strength of 700 were to be available for drafts; the Third Line was to make good half the number of men actually sent abroad under the scheme. In the weeks that followed many more men from the hugely depleted ranks of original Second Line members were posted overseas. In addition to the impact of Second Ypres, losses among the East Lancashire and Lowland Divisions, as well as elements of the Welsh Division at Gallipoli, and further exacerbated by the experience of Loos on Highland and London units, meant that it was not until 1916 that the War Office could again promise that the Second Line would not be further denuded by drafts. By that time, however, establishment of Second Line battalions had been reduced first to 600 and then 400. To help solve the immediate problem of what to do with the genuine home service men and how and where to deploy them as units of the home army, between April and June 1915, 59 Provisional battalions were created.6 Second and Third Line units were instructed to separate their home and overseas service men and post the former to these new formations.7 The residue foreign service men were retained in the Second Line but most of these battalions were down to about 400. The Provisional battalions were later brigaded with other infantry and support units from the same regional origins and although little is known

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specifically of their activities in their early months, it is clear that during the autumn they suffered from similar problems to those experienced by the home service Territorial units.8 The role of the Provisional formations was straightforward. As they were not to be used as draft finders, the War Office thought they should become efficient more rapidly than the Second Line formations.9 They became, therefore, the front line anti-invasion units. They were the battalions, batteries and field companies deployed closest to the coast and were thus expected to engage the enemy on the beaches and the immediate hinterland. Besides their primary responsibility of repelling enemy landings from their own prepared defences, they also reported sightings of enemy ships and aircraft, watched for suspicious persons, searched all boats and people without permits between specified night hours and were supposed to prevent civilians using binoculars and cameras. Although their role was clear, how they were meant to perform particularly the first of these functions was not quite so obvious. Autumn gales destroyed their tented camps, flooded coastal dugouts and washed away beach barbed wire and sandbag defences. Even if they were lucky enough to possess rifles or carbines by November 1915, few battalions had anywhere to practise musketry. Most of their members never fired even an initial course and, owing to a shortage of revolvers, officers on coast watch patrolled unarmed. There were no searchlights and virtually no machine guns or grenades on long stretches of the vulnerable Essex coast. They possessed almost no transport and if a battalion was supplied with horses or mules, it usually had no harnesses. The lack of carts and engineering supplies handicapped their efforts to build defences and although one battalion actually acquired four field kitchens, none of the cookers arrived with its requisite equipment. In addition to an almost complete lack of practical clothing such as wiring gloves, many men had entirely inadequate uniform and boots. A combination of poor roads, unsuitable atmospheric conditions and the frequent failure, if one existed, of the telephone system, meant inadequate communications between brigades and battalions. Cyclists were generally employed to carry messages but these were often delayed through their inability to ride on shingle beaches or through heavy snow. In September, detachments from some Provisional battalions relieved the Supernumerary Protection Companies on certain guard duties but the departure of these men from the main body of the battalion was insignificant to the numbers being lost to other causes. Owing to the frequent and rapid turnover of personnel, the Provisional formations could never develop a unit esprit. As men deemed fit and who had agreed to

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opt for foreign service were posted elsewhere, other men arrived from the Second Line, many of them with ailments or age which would prevent them from ever becoming efficient soldiers. Others spent only a brief time with the Provisional units until medical boards judged them fit enough to be sent to their Third Line. Those National Reservists who had joined them from Supernumerary Companies frequently lacked any field skills and there was a constant drain of men whose application to return to their civilian trade had been accepted. The 48th Provisional battalion lost 100 men for four weeks when they were ordered to work in a sugar refinery and the 70th Provisional almost disappeared in October 1915 when the total of 14 officers and 1,700 men were posted to other units. Concern about depleted numbers in Scottish Provisional battalions caused Scottish Command to ask county associations to do more by way of encouraging recruitment,10 but when the County of Perthshire Association decided to advertise for men between the ages 40 and 50 to join the 4th Provisional Battalion the CO of the 2/6th Black Watch complained. As men could not enlist directly in Provisional units, they had first to join a Second or Third Line battalion; the 2/6th’s CO objected, not surprisingly, to his battalion’s name being used as a vehicle to attract elderly men for another unit.11 By early 1916, several Provisional brigades had lost significant numbers to make up the ranks in the 2/2nd London and 2nd South Midland Divisions shortly before they both left for France. From the late summer of 1915, the men had been under increasing pressure to opt for foreign service and MajorGeneral Bethune, DGTF, requested county associations to do more to encourage the switch and offered to send senior officers to speak to the men. In response, the CO of the 3rd Provisional Battalion argued that as this method had already been tried and failed, his own officers would ‘get the men by quietly reasoning with them individually’.12 Other Provisional brigades units fared no better than the infantry battalions: cyclist units had no cycles, some could not obtain rations from ASC depots and Yeomanry regiments which possessed horses often had no saddles. Field companies had horses but no wagons, lacked demolition charges and suffered from an acute shortage of officers. Artillery batteries which did manage to acquire guns had usually only procured obsolete models for which there was no ammunition and few batteries enjoyed adequate stabling for their few horses. Provisional field ambulances were responsible for inspecting billets and VAD hospitals, arranging bathing for their brigades’ units and condemning substandard food. One ambulance struggled with no water supply for 18 days and when the pump and pipes were eventually repaired, discovered that its

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recently delivered disinfecting apparatus did not work. The Medical Officer (MO) then proceeded to worry about the growing manure heaps in the water catchment area. Scabies broke out in some units but the lack of MOs meant most brigades had to rely on the sometimes hesitant co-operation of civilian doctors. Despite these hardships, many units’ war diaries report good morale and sound discipline. There were the inevitable courts martial for desertion and trivial cases, the occasional death in a training accident and the sentence of one man to four months’ hard labour for assaulting a 13-year-old girl. Overall, the men were considered to be well behaved, but sometimes things could go wrong. Home service men posted to the 101st Provisional battalion were accused by a town clerk of a multitude of misdemeanours. He thought the troops were poor coast watchmen, caused trouble in rural villages, were not under the control of their ‘slack’ officers and believed them to be stealing the town’s water supply. When the battalion left, the local official was ‘glad to see their backs’.13 Those Second Line Territorial units which formed part of the reconstituted Central Force experienced similar problems as the men serving in the Provisional brigades. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1915, the force’s ADOS compiled a long litany of the difficulties and shortages evident in the units. When Second Line divisions joined the Central Force their battalions were allowed to indent for stores which they had been unable to obtain through local channels. Some strange and not entirely necessary pieces of equipment, such as mining sets, were supplied centrally but the more essential items, such as an early issue of boots for the men of the Welsh and East Anglian Divisions, were denied until the troops were about to embark. Adding to the general shortage of just about every item of stores was the War Office’s failure to produce mobilization tables for Second Line and Provisional units until November 1915. Until the official establishments were decided, unit and senior commanders were working in the dark: RHA batteries were without telephones or electric signalling lamps and usually without guns; when one did receive a couple of obsolete pieces, they arrived without limbering poles or sights. So desperate was one battery of the 2/1st East Anglian Divisional Artillery to train with something that resembled a gun that it removed a decommissioned 4.7-inch from a fixed mounting in a drill hall. Battery officers had to buy binoculars and only received revolvers when actually ordered overseas. When they were in the process of formation, units had sometimes managed to impress any civilian vehicles which had not earlier been taken by the First Line

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battalions, but no sooner had these been replaced by limbered wagons than they were ordered to be transferred to units about to embark. Some cyclist battalions did not receive cycles until the autumn and when they did arrive, many were found to be mechanically defective. The riders were supplied with waterproof capes in the late summer, but suffered from several changes of War Office opinion as to whether pantaloons, trousers or knickerbockers were the more suitable attire for cyclists. By September there were sufficient tents to accommodate the Central Force’s constituent parts but only twenty anti-gas helmets per unit of the 1st Mounted Division. A list of spare parts for the Lewis gun was circulated to all battalions but none had ever seen the weapon itself, and even nose bags for the animals had to be provided locally or improvised by the riders and drivers. Troops in Eastern Command were supplied with free soap, while those in the Central Force were not, and a third blanket for all troops and waterproof clothing only appeared in November. There was an almost complete absence of gum boots to counter the deep autumn mud in the camps and, to add to ADOS’s woes, anthrax had been traced to horsehair shaving brushes. Many of the ADOS’s problems were mirrored at lower levels of authority. Brigade and unit commanders of the Central Force and its three armies struggled against the odds to weld their commands into something resembling homogeneous, trained and efficient battalions, batteries and field companies. They were showered with requests for equipment and men, and for advice from their woefully inexperienced junior officers. Until the overseas units had been equipped they could do little to alleviate the difficulties of their subordinates. All they could do was to order their officers to fulfil their functions in as an efficient way as circumstances permitted. Mounted brigades were thus detailed to patrol the coast and inland areas looking for enemy landings, sabotage, suspicious persons, contraventions of the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) and sightings of enemy aircraft and shipping. They practised little musketry because they had no ammunition, possessed no machine guns and one battalion only managed to acquire fifty picks and shovels through the personal generosity of its MO.14 The continual loss of men to their First Line meant that brigades were often hundreds short of establishment and if they did manage to recruit on their own volition, they were often ordered to despatch a similar number of more experienced men elsewhere. The shortage meant additional work for all and especially hampered the training of specialists. The reorganization of battalions and other units into home and foreign service robbed many of them of a majority of their trained NCOs and what few officers

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there were, were frequently away on courses. The CO of the 2/5th Buffs optimistically hoped that their absence would be ‘counter-balanced by their increased efficiency on their return’. Training could be interrupted for a variety of reasons, one battalion CO even seeming to have resented the time lost by his men when they had to parade for an inspection by Lord Kitchener. While a few regiments complained of an excess of horses, most yeomanry units suffered from a shortage. Many animals they did possess were of such poor quality that they were auctioned off, there was a widespread shortage of iron for shoeing and if a unit did possess enough iron to shoe their mules, the animals were often so truculent that they had to be taken to specialized forges equipped with restraining apparatus. The men occupied billets in buildings such as poor law institutes and, embarrassingly unarmed, manned observation posts in town centres. They chased around the countryside in search of cars supposedly carrying German saboteurs and others which mysteriously flashed their headlights skyward, they were criticised by their brigadiers for ‘meandering along roads like weary infantry’, for riding on footpaths, for ‘wild and unnecessary’ galloping, for their poor march discipline, for their failure to correctly reconnoitre ground, and were regularly subjected to ‘ill considered or entirely inadequate’ orders by officers who had ‘complete misconceptions’ about their role. The brigadier of the 2/1st Highland Mounted Brigade wanted all yeomanry regiments to have an ex-Regular as their adjutant because only they understood the ‘importance of the soldierly spirit, discipline, interior economy and good stable management’. His brigade had no machine guns, was short of vets, harnesses, horse blankets, rifles, wagons and entrenching tools, the rifle range had been closed by a land slip, not that it mattered because what little ammunition the quartermaster had was withdrawn before men about to be drafted abroad had even fired their recruits’ course. Some Second Line artillery brigades were equipped with elderly and practically useless 15-pdr field guns, while others arranged to borrow guns for a few hours each week from more fortunate brigades. Some units had so few men they loaned their horses to other batteries and then had hastily to recall them if new recruits arrived. One battery was brought up to strength by the simple expedient of transferring over 300 former County of London Yeomanry and Rough Riders to the RFA. In September a so-called ‘Emergency Battery’ formed within the 67th Division reported that it would only be able to move to its ‘emergency’ position if it could borrow wagons from other batteries. It also announced that it would have to use its 90mm guns because there was

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no ammunition for its 15-pdrs and although it had drawn up plans for blocking roads in its designated area, the gunners had no rifles or carbines.15 The 2/2nd (Welsh) Howitzer Brigade managed to purloin most of the stores and two guns of the 2/1st Brigade when an ‘almost insane’ and ‘ridiculous blunder’ by a railway official attached a wagon to the wrong train. As if losing two guns was not enough, the 2/1st was further annoyed when it arrived at its new camp to discover that there was no MO to attend to the kicks and bruises sustained by the crews as they entrained their horses. Outbreaks of ringworm were blamed on poor grooming, sometimes not through indolence but because of the shortage of men, mange was traced to infected rugs, skin diseases often arrived with remounts, the animals then having to be segregated and isolated for up to two months. The variable quality of the fodder, namely poor hay and the use of maize instead of oats, was thought to be causing too many cases of colic and unreliable civilian deliveries of fodder, bread and groceries to brigade ASC dumps, meant units often received their rations late. The trials of the quartermaster were not helped when it was discovered government stores were being sold to civilians and when authority decided that trained cooks should be loaned to other units as drivers. The Territorial cyclist battalions on coast watch duties had suffered from exposure during the previous winter and indented for waterproofs as the autumn of 1915 approached. The 1/8th Essex was concerned about the problems of establishing a working telephone link and lateral communications along its patrol area of the River Blackwater. Members of the 3/1st North Midland Divisional Cyclist Company spent fruitless hours watching a limping, moustachioed, cap-wearing dismounted cyclist loitering near their camp, and in observing a small glowing light shining from a church window before realizing that it was not a clandestine signal to some skulking U-boat but merely an altar light in the East window. They also lengthily staked out some ruined barns to no avail, withdrew from what they thought might be an enemy signal station when a dog barked in a nearby out building, and abandoned the idea of using a church tower as an observation post because they could unearth no ladders to climb it. Like all Second Line units the cyclists might well have been diligent in their work but suffered from a shortage of both men and equipment – 90 of the 1/6th Sussex were still without cycles in September 1915. An additional problem for these battalions was the type of weapon with which they were issued. The 2/8th Essex was initially armed with old Martini carbines, but these were replaced by cumbersome and awkward

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Japanese rifles. By the early autumn of 1915 these weapons, along with their carbine equivalent, were becoming ubiquitous and very unpopular. The cyclists were soon to have them replaced by the more manageable Lee Metfords but many yeomanry and infantry battalions were not so fortunate. The Japanese Meiji weapons fired .256⬙ ammunition and had been bought in late 1914 to ease the acute rifle shortage. When they arrived they were difficult to clean owing to the mineral jelly in which they were packed and, as one officer reported, were of so complicated a mechanism that if any part of the weapon was moved the whole thing tended to fly to pieces.16 Furthermore, the cartridges had an annoying habit of falling out of the 1908 and 1914 pattern ammunition pouches. Some home service units did receive discarded Long Lee Enfields and Lee Metfords but, when they became available, most were generally issued with the Japanese weapons. Given the poor state of readiness of the Second Line and Provisional battalions, the War Office had drawn up detailed plans and schemes by which the Central Force could be reinforced should an enemy landing occur.17 If required, two fully equipped New Army divisions from Aldershot or Salisbury Plain would travel through a series of rail regulating stations until the GOC Central Force decided where he wanted them to detrain. Additional rail protection en route was to be provided by troops from Third Line TF Depots and 2nd Reserve brigades, and three flights of aircraft would come under the orders of GOC 1st Mounted Division at Norwich and the GOCs 2nd and 3rd Armies at Chelmsford and Hunton respectively.18 When Maurice Hankey reviewed the state of home army in July 1915, he concluded that although the Second Line was weak and the coast battalions short of arms and ammunition, the existence of coastal trenches and the ability to reinforce the Central Force and local units with New Army divisions at short notice would make it ‘very difficult’ for the Germans to land and sustain a force of 70,000.19 Hankey’s assessment was at variance with a bleak paper drawn up ten weeks later by Lieutenant-General Kiggell, the Director of Home Defence. Although emotive rather than reasoned, and acknowledging his professional interest in advocating the maintenance of a strong home defence force, Kiggell was genuinely alarmed at the rapidity with which his battalions were being depleted and by the quality of those which remained. Noting how swiftly and efficiently the Germans had moved almost 200,000 men across the breadth of their country in 1914, Kiggell thought the Kaiser might risk a naval defeat to cover a landing, and argued Germany could expect to lose no more men in breaking

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British resistance, and with a far greater effect on the war’s outcome, than she would in a two or three days’ Continental battle with the French or Russians. He believed the ‘hand of almost every man is against Home Defence’ and that any morsels of equipment the home army had was regarded with ‘covetous eyes … [by] the Administrative Departments … [who] feel neither anxiety or responsibility as regards Home Defence’. Disregarding the existing plans for the deployment and reinforcement of the Central Force, Kiggell thought it would take ‘several days’ to concentrate even a ‘small part’ of his forces. He underscored his concern by warning that the concentration could only be covered by inadequately armed and partially trained troops, led by inexperienced officers. ‘It seems almost hopeless to expect that they could avoid defeat in detail if they made any serious attempt to carry out … covering a concentration … The difficulty of ensuring the safety of London under such conditions requires no argument from me.’20 Kiggell wanted the CIGS to decide whether the already ‘dangerously weak’ Territorial Force divisions at home should be weakened still further for the sake of the Expeditionary Force.21 The DCIGS passed Kiggell’s depressing memo to the Secretary of State and admitted to the AG that he, too, was worried about the numbers and quality of the home army. In contrast to Kiggell, however, the DCIGS saw little likelihood of a German invasion. He did suggest seeking assurances from the Admiralty before further weakening the home forces but his belief that the Germans would be unlikely to attempt an invasion was supported by Kitchener. The Secretary of State was so confident that the Germans had missed their opportunity that he endorsed a proposed scheme whereby the Northumbrian Division was to be reinforced by 2,000 men drawn largely from its Second Line. Having despatched these men, two battalions alone sending 700 and 600, battalions of the 2/1st Northumbrian Division, one of the two divisions in Northern Command, were reduced to about 500 men. Moreover, all of these were recent recruits.22 Kitchener ended his minute to Kiggell’s paper with an exhortation: ‘Home Defence arrangements should be made so clear that every serviceable rifle shall have a man to carry it, who is capable of using it and can be brought into action.’ Unfortunately, there were only 570,600 rifles in the country and 1,360,512 men who wanted one.23 Life in these depleted Central Force Territorial divisions was both frustrating and boring. There were occasional outbreaks of various kinds of fever, courts martial for desertion and, rarely, for more serious cases such as striking a superior officer. Sometimes Zeppelins released their bombs

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close to the camps, there were reports of enemy submarines spotted off the coast and leave was sometimes curtailed owing to outbreaks of measles and diphtheria in the men’s home towns; there were inordinate delays in appointing officers and most of the battalions did not possess a MO. Above all, there were the uneventful, regular patrols, digging on the coast and occasionally elsewhere. The 2/4th Sussex provided an unarmed guard for sections of the London defences but the main concern of the 2/6th Cheshire was to find an officer or NCO who understood how to conduct a pay parade. Regular inspections and route marches filled some of the time and on occasions senior commanders would appear to cast their professional eye over these neglected units. On his February 1916 tour of Second Line troops in Kent, the Inspector of Gymnasia criticised battalions in 201 Brigade for their poor bayonet fighting. He did agree that the faults probably had something to do with the shortage of bayonets, but thought there was no excuse for an apparent neglect of ‘jumping exercises’ in 200 Brigade. With the exception of a few class London Regiment battalions, voluntary enlistment in the Territorial Force was abandoned in December 1915. By that time almost 726,000, or about half the number of New Army recruits, had enlisted. Since November 1914 most men who had enlisted in the Territorial Force went into the Third Line units and expected to be posted to their First Line on completion of training. In all, 318 Territorial battalions were to take the Imperial Service option before conscription was introduced; most of those that did not were elements of certain Second Line divisions which the War Office had decided should remain at home for the duration. This permanent home deployment was a disincentive for many men to join them and throughout 1915 the number of troops within them continued to fall. The regular loss of men to the First Line earlier in the year had also resulted in orders for some Second Line battalions to amalgamate and, in September 1915, these orders were extended: a total of 20 Second and Third Line battalions were instructed to amalgamate and the establishment of certain other Second Line units was reduced to 400.24 By the end of 1915, Territorial units had lost the majority of their original members, their character and their identity. Huge numbers of their men had clamoured to be sent abroad and the remainder had stayed at home to fulfil the designated function of the Territorial Force, the defence of the UK. In addition to the departure of their original enlistments, their divisions had lost many of their constituent units to other formations, some of which had already gone or were about to go overseas. Enthusiasts in the VTC viewed the burgeoning gaps opened in

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home security by the departure of so many Territorials as yet more evidence of their corps’ own intrinsic worth. The movement’s leadership seized the opportunity to press its case for increased Government acknowledgement of the patriotic and practical contribution the corps could make to national defence. In reflective yet optimistic mood at the end of 1914, the movement’s chief spokesman, Percy Harris, noted: One of the features of the past few months has been the rise of a great volunteer self-managing and self-financing army for home defence. I do not think it is yet realized by the public what a great movement has been going on their midst.25 Harris had cause for optimism for it was estimated that about one million men had enrolled in Volunteer corps. There remained another 2.5 million aged between 38 and 59 years thought to be sufficiently fit to join or be of use. But that, of course, was one of the fundamental problems. To what use could these untrained, undisciplined and largely unarmed groups be put? The Government had awarded them reluctant and partial recognition but could foresee no useful purpose for their existence and was not, given its already considerable commitments, prepared to contemplate looking for one. If the Volunteer movement was to survive and find a niche it would, for the time being at least, have to rely upon the old Victorian middle-class virtues of self-sufficiency and self-reliance. With the movement under constraint, the Government could afford to appear benign. The Under Secretary of State’s earlier statement that he had no wish to see the Volunteers disappear26 was reinforced by Lord Crewe, the Lord Privy Seal and Lord Lieutenant of the County of London, when as guest of honour he attended a County of London VTC reception. Furthermore, royal approval appeared to have been tacitly given by George V’s inspection of over 2000 National Guard at Buckingham Palace. Following the parade his Private Secretary wrote to Lord Desborough expressing the King’s opinion that Volunteers might be usefully employed assisting the National Reserve in guarding vulnerable points.27 Encouraging as these statements and actions might have seemed, the Government nevertheless remained resolutely convinced that the extent of central assistance should remain limited merely to watching, controlling and, where necessary, baulking. The Central Association’s growing influence and control could deal effectively and easily with the relatively well-disciplined groups, but for the others, the association faced a bewildering challenge. The Central

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Association’s Executive Committee was allowed by the War Office to affiliate corps and to act as the recognized channel of communication between itself and the multitude of local corps. Willing as it was to attempt the task, the committee faced the prospect of trying to assert control, or at least influence, over corps which kept no registers, resented outside interference and possessed no recognized constitution. There were regular complaints that officers were elected or appointed only because they had taken the initiative to raise the corps or because they were local gentry, rather than with regard to ability or experience.28 Many corps were, in effect run as clubs and actually exercised a democracy entirely unsuited to a supposed military unit: committees and noncommissioned officers were often elected by members; accounts were opened at banks chosen by lot; secretaries did not respond to official letters and requests; there was no compulsion to drill or execute orders and, if an officer made himself unpopular, he could be replaced by his men. Discipline rested on good will and sensible co-operation: aspects of corps’ existence which were not always appreciated by some former military personnel.29 Many corps were composed of men from the labouring and working classes, but the majority comprised men from the professions or artisan groups. In effect, three types of corps evolved during the early period. The largest group was those raised in small towns, villages or by employers and ranged from collections of businessmen and shopkeepers, to the employees of Messrs Brunner, Mond & Co. at Winnington. The second group comprised specialists or professional men who chose to serve with those in similar occupations. Into this category fell the Piano Trade Corps and several of the railway companies who raised and eventually equipped their men. The final group included those corps raised by men from a particular background or class: the Old Boys, Optimists and Public School Corps, for example, were for those who could afford a higher than typical subscription and expected membership to provide the benefits of a social club. Membership of all three categories depended upon the assumed ability to pay, patriotism, of course, not being permitted to compromise exclusivity. Subscriptions ranged from 1d per week to an entrance fee of ten shillings in addition to a weekly payment of 6d. Artisans might be expected to pay five shillings to join whilst manual workers were admitted for an annual fee of two shillings. Among the more exclusive corps, the London National Guard demanded an entrance fee of £1 and the means to provide a uniform and weapon.30 In addition to a subscription, one corps demanded a minimum height of five feet and a successful medical examination. Corps were formed in

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the Royal Courts of Justice, by the staff of Punch and by several breweries; members met in crypts, church halls, scout huts, on village greens and in the damp, unfinished basement of London’s County Hall. Some corps decided to establish themselves as specialists groups. The Birmingham Electrical Volunteer Force attracted artisans from the electrical trades and the Chief Engineer of the General Post Office invited men from the engineering, stores, telegraph and telephone departments to enrol in a corps and be available to train potential members of the Royal Engineers. Station Companies were established to guide and transport men returning on leave and protect them from the harpies who frequented London’s main line stations. A number of cyclist battalions were formed and Warwickshire raised a cavalry corps armed with lance and carbine. A mounted League of Guides was organized in London and a Naval Home Defence Corps formed at Greenwich. A masonic lodge was established within the City of London National Guard31 and the Aldeburgh company elected to divide itself into platoons of sailors, fishermen and cricketers. These local corps were sometimes instigated by the local vicar, the scout master, the eccentric retired colonel or simply by well-meaning and dutiful citizens.32 By June 1915, about 1100 corps with a total of 390,000 members had affiliated to the Central Association; it was thought there were probably another 900 corps with a further 200,000 members still unaffiliated.33 Remarking on the expansion, The Times suggested the Central Association ‘might almost grow frightened of the monster it [had] created’.34 Although not ‘frightened’, the Central Association remained concerned that the unwieldy beast should be further constrained. In May it was announced that the movement’s original spontaneous organization would be replaced by a system based on county regiments. Within a short time, 21 of England’s 41 and two of the dozen Welsh counties were so organized.35 In most counties the procedure was simple and uncontroversial. For example, the 27 corps in Middlesex all agreed to form a County of Middlesex Regiment, using the seven parliamentary constituencies as the basis of the organization.36 In other areas some Lords Lieutenant, such as Fortescue in Devonshire and Harewood in the West Riding, remained reluctant to have dealings with the Volunteers and did nothing to help with the reorganization. As the Territorial associations were already overloaded with work and under no obligation to take on the administration of the VTC, some Lords Lieutenant opposed the idea of developing a county scheme.37 In Kent, Lord Harris did suggest that if the military authorities could ‘make up their minds to face the situation’ and invite Lords Lieutenant to assist them in working on

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a scheme whereby Volunteers could be used to relieve Territorials and National Reservists on vulnerable points, he would be prepared to take a more active and public role in promoting the movement.38 The Central Association published pamphlets stressing how affiliation could provide corps with lists of drill instructors, assist them in obtaining rifles and help in settling disputes between units.39 In reality though, its authority was limited. As more corps embarked on an increasingly varied range of jobs, this concern amongst the membership about whether what they were doing, or might be called upon to do was legal, continued to grow. Some dismissed the anxiety with the, by now, wellworn argument that an invading German army was unlikely to abide by conventional rules; others, perhaps unsurprisingly from an organization whose central administration was conducted from the Quadrangle of the Royal Courts and many of whose leading figures were barristers, appreciated the need for a campaign to secure legal protection for members engaged on voluntary duties. The same Times leader which had described the movement as a ‘monster’ went on to add that the leadership was not ‘frightened’ of its own creation because it was a ‘very humbleminded and good-natured monster that only longs to make itself useful’.40 That indeed, was the point. The membership was craving for something useful to do and, business and work commitments allowing, was willing to consider most requests for help. For that assistance to be effective, legitimacy was a prerequisite. At a meeting with the Lords Lieutenant in February, Kitchener had expressed the view that Volunteers might be allowed to remove livestock from threatened areas. The Secretary of State’s main concern was to keep the movement under control for he feared it was drifting into more of a military role than either he or the War Office intended. It was an open question, said Kitchener, whether the VTC were not pushing the matter too far and thus jeopardizing their own potential usefulness.41 Many Volunteers would not have agreed with Kitchener but without arms, uniform or legal protection they considered there was little they could actively do to thwart an invasion. Some, as we have seen, were patrolling the coast and local vulnerable points while others helped construct a military road in North London, assisted their local fire brigades, undertook rescue work during the East Coast raids, complied lists of privately owned hand carts and ladders, cleared the wards of St Bart’s during air raids, assisted some Royal Engineers at the Hatfield tank trials and distributed the canvass of householders prepared to accommodate refugees fleeing an invasion of the East Coast. In July the War Office asked former NCOs serving in the Volunteers to re-enlist as

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instructors and in August the movement took the opportunity to be seen to be doing something of national importance by distributing and collecting National Registration forms. In London, thousands of Volunteers continued to spend their weekends digging trenches forming part of the capital’s defences.42 Willing as they were to attempt most things, Volunteers did on occasions recoil from accepting all invitations or requests for their labour. There was a reluctance to undertake the task of hospital orderlies for the Red Cross43 and Lord Fortescue met with a hostile response when he wanted Volunteers to help with the harvest in Devon. Across the country, thousands of members did go into the fields but Fortescue was brusquely accused of holding ‘misapprehensions as to the object’ of the VTC movement.44 Another suggestion whereby the Volunteers would guard prisoners of war while the Germans collected the harvest was thought unwise because, in the absence of legal standing, a Volunteer shooting an escapee could be hanged for murder. Although BrigadierGeneral Bridgeman expressed this interpretation as ‘something characteristic of a Government composed of lawyers’,45 the assumption was technically correct. There were other occasions when military personnel requested the assistance of Volunteers but declined the ensuing offer when it was realized the Volunteers had not sworn any attestation and enjoyed no legal protection. ‘When the Volunteers are called upon to undertake the duties of the National Reserve’ wrote one editorial in the Gazette, ‘these things will have to be sorted out’.46 Questions concerning legal status had been raised in Parliament by both supporters and detractors of the movement. Although they were sometimes related to what would happen if a Volunteer shot and killed an individual not responding to a challenge,47 they were usually linked to the issue of the hated brassard which Volunteers were obliged to wear on duty. Apart from its deliberately conspicuous appearance (described by many Volunteers as having been made from sections of a red petticoat) the brassard was hated for what it was perceived to symbolize: confirmation that the wearer was a civilian and not a combatant. The Central Association insisted (even to the ‘amazement’ and initial incredulity of a beleaguered Tennant)48 that the brassard should be worn even when the Volunteer was in a uniform of his own particular corps. Anyone could get hold of and parade about in a uniform, but the brassard exhibited membership of an affiliated corps. Commenting on the peculiarities of the regulations, Sir William Bull, the Member for Hammersmith, speculated Volunteers certainly did not want to be mistaken for franc tireurs and ignominiously hanged, ‘but would prefer

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to be shot in the ordinary way’. He concluded by predicting the brassard would not be recognized by invading Germans any more readily than a British army would recognize its legality in Germany.49 Questions and answers on the issue of the brassard did have their lighter moments but matters concerning other areas of legality, notably those involving expenses, uniform and weapons, were treated with considerably more gravitas. The movement was outraged to learn that while members of the Paddington Corps paid one shilling to travel to their exercise ground at Epsom, race-goers on the same train paid half fare, but the corps were on the receiving end of poor publicity when two incidents were widely reported in the national papers. When Volunteers were accused of contravening the Defence of the Realm Act by drinking in public houses during restricted hours, the War Office ruled that as Volunteers were not members of HM Forces the law did not apply to them. General Woolcombe, GOC Second Army Central Force, then confused the issue by announcing that publicans should not serve even civilians in uniform during the restricted hours. The issue again highlighted the Volunteers’ difficulty: they wanted to be regarded as soldiers but even the War Office and its subordinates gave out conflicting messages as to their legal status. The second celebrated and notorious incident involved a uniformed Volunteer officer’s ejection from a London theatre by the Provost-Marshal.50 The War Office’s allowance in November 1914 that Volunteers would be permitted to wear uniform when drilling had done little to assuage the membership’s feelings on the matter. Tennant replied with incredulity to suggestions that a volunteer force should be allowed to wear a uniform in character with that of the Regulars or Territorials and further added that, even if Volunteers were permitted to purchase their own, there was insufficient khaki available and the price would inevitably increase still further.51 Opinions varied within the movement: some members recalled the Boers had not required a uniform to become a potent force, others thought the grey-green uniform sanctioned by the Central Association ‘undignified’ and ‘unsightly’, while some preferred the green to khaki because it offered improved camouflage.52 Of equally emotive concern as the right to wear a uniform, was the Volunteers’ ability to acquire arms. There was a general and widespread acceptance that until the Government had enough weapons for Regular troops and the Volunteers had undergone a degree of training, corps would have to wait or provide themselves with any antiquated or obsolete rifles that might become available. As the War Office was confident the Volunteers had neither the money nor the ability to compete

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seriously with the authorities for the limited number of rifles being manufactured, it was somewhat embarrassed to discover that groups such as the Birmingham Rifle Reserve and the Buckinghamshire Volunteers had managed to acquire.303 weapons months before many Territorial and Kitchener battalions.53 Consequently, the Government prohibited Volunteers from buying service pattern rifles and ruled that any corps wishing to purchase weapons would first have to be cleared by their GOC District.54 Most corps, though, were not so fortunate and did not have a Lord Rothschild to provide for them. The majority of corps drilled with whatever pattern or dummy rifles they managed to borrow or acquire. Gainsborough Corps were loaned rifles by the Church Lads’ Brigade, the London County Council Corps used dummy weapons formerly belonging to Sir Edward Carson’s protestant Volunteers and the North-Eastern Railway Corps, at Goole, borrowed two air guns from the local Boy Scouts. However, the United Arts scorned the use of what they called ‘neolithic flintlocks’ and bought several hundred Martinis which were then sold or hired to members. Some corps entered into leasing agreements with local rifle clubs for use of weapons and ranges, while others tried to provide their own by raising funds and constructing a range.55 The cost of serviceable rifles soon increased from a pre-war price of £4 to over £6; a prohibitive price for corps from poorer areas even if the weapons did become available. The movement’s leadership retained an abiding faith in its potential as a vehicle for home defence but until that potential had been realized and moulded into a shape which corresponded vaguely to a disciplined and trained body, Volunteers would remain more of a danger than a help to the home army. Those corps which had National Reservists as members probably did have an advantage over those who could not draw on a reservoir of military experience,56 but corps could sometimes to get around the national shortage of instructors by offering a fee to NCOs at nearby training camps.57 Once partial recognition had been achieved in late 1914, and the Central Association established, there were immediate calls from the membership for it to lay down regulations as to what might be considered an ‘efficient’ Volunteer and for a programme of training.58 Until the committee produced such a scheme, the Gazette ran articles on drill, defensive tactics, communications, transport and of the necessity of knowing the geography of their district.59 Corps did as they were asked but members soon grew bored with the lack of equipment and variety in their drills. Furthermore, from the movement’s inception there had been frequent and regular objections to drilling on Sundays. Knowledge that the Regulars and Territorials had always trained at weekends made little

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impression on some members and solutions could not always be found.60 Attempts, such as the offer of shooting prizes, were made to persuade men they should attend more regularly and some corps began to insist upon a required number of drills per month:61 Easter, Whit and summer camps were organized by some corps as morale and esprit-building measures but participants had to pay for their own transport and food.62 Even then, the War Office sometimes contrived to make life difficult and raised objections on where the camps could be sited.63 Throughout 1915, the Government remained opposed to spending money on the Volunteers, but it was, nevertheless, beginning to think about possible future uses for the movement. Staff officers of Southern Command were sent on tours of inspection to ascertain whether Volunteers might be capable of releasing some home army troops from certain guards, and a delegation of representatives from the North Riding and the North-East reported that Tennant had expressed ‘some sympathy’ with the concept of public funding.64 More encouraging hints came from the Government came when Lord Derby publicly decided Volunteers were not ‘shirkers’, and with Kitchener’s affirmative reply to the GOC Western District’s question whether he should consider the VTC when formulating defence plans.65 Furthermore, in November 1915, Kitchener agreed to inspect three battalions of the National Guard at Wellington Barracks, another move heralded by Volunteers as a further step towards full recognition. The event was widely reported in the press and, although Kitchener was no admirer of amateur soldiers and the parade itself was something of a shambles, the Secretary of State appeared interested, amicable and praised them for their ‘soldier-like appearance’.66 Born of necessity, corps had soon begun to investigate the possibility of raising contributions from local businesses and councils. Electric and gas companies sometimes offered to provide free light during drills and Keighley Council was among the first to suggest that its Gas and Tram Committees might award grants to cover the cost of lighting and travelling to training sessions. Unfortunately it was soon discovered to be illegal for councils to award grants of this nature. Bradford’s Volunteers were more favoured than most because a special Act of Parliament allowed the City Council to give grants for any movement deemed beneficial to the city; this allowed the Council legally to vote monies to provide administrative staff, accommodation and ranges. The accepted method for other councils and corporations was to follow Hereford’s lead and award the Mayor a ‘purse’ or salary which could then be donated to the Volunteers.67

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Other councils refused to acknowledge they had any moral obligation to award grants, arguing that if the Government wanted the Volunteer movement, it should finance it. Whilst there was widespread sympathy with this view among the VTC, it was accepted that as the Government was in no position to help even if it wanted to, the movement would have to continue to rely upon its own resources. Herbert Samuel, President of the Local Government Board, declined to present legislation which would have allowed councils to use rates to finance corps but did offer the concession that any local authority which fell under his department’s audit would be permitted to use rates to build ranges and other facilities on its own land.68 Apart from regular questions by supporters of this new auxiliary, throughout 1915 the Government also had to deal with difficulties concerning the running, finance and pay of the National Reserve and those of its members who had been called up or volunteered to join the home army’s Protection Companies. Those National Reservists who had enlisted as supernumeraries to Territorial units were entitled to the usual Territorial pay and allowances and, if not in a position to draw rations, were awarded extra pay in lieu. County associations were responsible for administering separation allowances but it was not long before complaints were aired in Parliament about inequities and inefficiencies in the payment of these men and their entitlement to the mobilization bounty.69 Whilst the furore continued in Parliament, the War Office was considering how those Reservists who were a little over the age for front line active service could be used overseas. If an acceptable means could be devised, yet more able-bodied men could be released for France or other theatres. So, in the early summer of 1915, a decision was taken to reduce the Supernumerary Protection Companies by combing out officers and men fit enough to march ten miles with rifle and 150 rounds. Class II men serving in such companies who fulfilled this requirement were subsequently invited to volunteer for service in seven new Territorial Force Provisional battalions then forming at Halton Park, in Hertfordshire.70 Volunteers were required to be below 44 years of age and fit enough for garrison duty overseas. By December 1915 those National Reservists who had volunteered had swapped their own regimental badges for those of the Rifle Brigade and had been officially transferred to their new regiment. At about the same time as it was contemplating raising these battalions of National Reservists, the War Office acted to clear up the contemporary confusion over what the 1914 and 1915 National Reserve

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Protection Companies should be called. The confusion had been exacerbated by the appearance of the VTC and so, in March 1915, the National Reserve companies were designated Supernumerary Companies of the Territorial Force. They became known as, for example, Number 1 Supernumerary Company, followed by the number and name of the Territorial battalion to which they were attached.71 The companies remained under the administration of the county associations but this very British ad hoc arrangement was unlikely to remain permanent. In effect, once the decision had been made to form the seven Territorial Provisional battalions of the Rifle Brigade,72 and when county associations were granted permission to release their unused Class III men to the VTC, the life of the National Reserve as a distinct organization was almost at an end. It passed away, almost without notice, for in 1916, the Supernumerary Companies were to undergo a further reorganization whereby they virtually ceased to be recognizable descendants of the National Reserve. Throughout 1915, the home defence auxiliary which attracted most of the press and public attention was the VTC. Unhappy as most corps were with the continuing Government denial of complete legal recognition and financial assistance, the movement retained its self confidence and trained with whatever weapons and facilities it could procure. A degree of optimism that the Government would eventually feel obliged to embody the VTC into a ‘Reserve Army’, and the belief that it was largely the presence of a vibrant Volunteer body which was enabling the Government to avoid conscription, persisted.73 Several corps viewed themselves as unofficial Officer Training Corps, running special classes for men of military age who were later likely to enlist. In July 1915, the Central Association decided that as there were sufficiently trained officers available to inspect groups, it removed the requirement of having to send one of its own officers to inspect provincial corps.74 Standards were improving but in September 1915 at least one corps declined as ‘premature’ an invitation to be inspected.75 Efforts to raise the quality of instruction resulted in the production of a Syllabus of Training by the Central Association and by one corps running classes for officers in order to make Saturday drills ‘more interesting and useful’.76 As Lords Lieutenant issued commissions77 (or delegated others to do it for them), and exerted more control and influence over their county corps, organization, too, improved. Although it was repeatedly emphasized that Territorial associations held no responsibility for raising or administering the VTC, Lords Lieutenant requested that association chairmen and secretaries be allowed to sit on Volunteers’ committees. They could also bring some

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influence to bear on the Government. The Lord Lieutenant of Durham, for example, insisted he would make no attempt to organize his county until he was satisfied that the War Office was prepared to give the movement full legal status.78 In counties where the Lord Lieutenant was not prepared actively to support the movement, numbers remained low: Lincolnshire’s poor membership was thought to be a consequence of its Lord Lieutenant’s ambivalent attitude.79 Volunteers were also finding their services were in increasing demand. Those on the Scilly Isles were employed by the Admiralty and the huge expansion in the munitions industry meant there were many more factories requiring guards. The Station Companies of the London National Guard increased their presence at most of the main line termini and the expanding Motor Sections conveyed leave men between them. Volunteers were used as weekend labour at the Didcot ordnance works and those members of the Birmingham Electrical VTC ineligible for military service were loaned to the navy’s electrical school at Portsmouth for up to three months to work on anti-submarine measures.80 Useful as much of this work was, the Government continued to assert that Volunteers could not expect to be treated as members of a home army or as an integral part of the Crown’s forces. This attitude was resented but by the end of 1915, the majority of men in the thousands of corps were members because they felt they were doing what their class, church, company and country expected them to do. Many of those who had joined during the first rush of excitement had left during the early months of 1915, bored with the drills, frustrated at the lack of provision and annoyed by the press and public ridicule. Surprisingly, contemporary reports suggest membership was to remain fairly constant during the second half of 1915. There were attempts to recruit, helped occasionally by articles in local papers comparing them favourably with the eighteenth century Volunteers, and some waverers might have been swayed by posters which claimed Volunteers carried a ‘mandate from humanity to rid the world of the oppression, the tyranny and the cruelty of the Hun’.81 There were, albeit unofficial and independent, moves already in being to attempt further progress and, largely at the personal initiative of the Marquis of Lincolnshire and Lord Desborough, a Private Member’s Bill was introduced to the Lords in October 1915. Its aim was to revive the Volunteer Act of 1863 and its subsequent Amending Acts in order to allow the Army Council to pass any new regulations which it might think necessary to recognize and utilize, under military law, the services of any affiliated VTC.82 The Marquis of Lansdowne, the Government’s spokesman in the Lords, and Lord Newton, the War Office representative

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in the chamber, both accepted the Bill in principle. During the committee stage, however, the Government moved several allegedly ‘friendly’ amendments which were aimed primarily to extend the provisions of the Bill to the whole of the UK. Sensing the Bill might get no further, General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien threw his weight as GOC of the Central Force’s First Army behind the calls for full recognition. In a letter to The Times he explained how his ‘anxiety’ at the insufficient number of troops available for home defence had compelled him to appeal to the VTC and how: … right nobly did they respond with the result that I have latterly been perfectly happy as to the efficiency of my plans. If, in view at their non-recognition, any VTC decline to continue these patriotic duties, I certainly shall not blame them, but at the same time I should like it explained to them that any cessation of their duties must have a very detrimental effect on the efficiency of my plans for concentrating troops on any part of our coast in the event of invasion. When asking for official recognition, I have never ceased to impress upon the authorities the most valuable aid the VTC are giving me … and I have reason to believe the time will yet come when official sanction will be accorded.83 The Bill passed the Lords but deliberate Government delay caused it to fall in the Commons. Pleas that the House and the country were ‘overwhelmingly’ in favour failed to persuade Asquith of the need to ‘star’ the Bill. He accepted its popularity but excused the Government’s hesitation on the grounds that as it was a contentious and divisive proposal it required further consideration.84 Protests that the movement was again being snubbed caused Tennant to respond that he had no wish to discourage the Volunteers but if the Bill was not to be proceeded with before prorogation, the membership should apportion blame not to the War Office but at ‘quite another door’.85 Tennant’s disingenuity was not at the time entirely transparent. His statement caused astonishment throughout the movement but his blaming of others was generally accepted. It was not yet readily apparent that within the context of the likely failure of the Derby Scheme and the consequent probability of compulsion, the Government was tentatively investigating uses to which the VTC might be put. By widening the scope of Lincolnshire’s Bill the Government knew Sir Edward Carson and the Ulster members would raise fatal objections: if the Bill was enacted, it would guarantee recognition not only to the Ulster

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Volunteers but also to the National Volunteers in the South. That unpalatable outcome was sufficient for Carson to do the Government’s bidding and allow Asquith to sanction the Bill’s delay. The time gained during the parliamentary recess would be utilized to examine an alternative solution. Predictably, the delay caused consternation and recrimination. The Gazette decided once again, ‘Ireland blocks the way’ but was also scathing of Tennant: ‘It can only be inferred that Mr Tennant has signally failed to translate his own good intentions towards the Volunteers into War Office practice.’86 Unaware of the Government’s real motive for the delay, the movement resolved to maintain pressure when the Commons reassembled. Encouraged by leaders in The Times and the Daily Telegraph, and by provocative statements from Admiral Lord Charles Beresford and a former Prime Minister, Lord Rosebery, the quarterly conference of county presidents and regimental commandants supported a resolution proposed by the Marquis of Lincolnshire and Strachey condemning the Bill’s failure and urging its reintroduction.87 A committee of friendly cross-party MPs was created to monitor and publicize the progress of any new Bill and a Volunteer field day was held in the Palace of Westminster to educate MPs in the national benefits of VTC recognition. The middle year of the war was to signal profound changes not only to the character and identity of the VTC, but also to the home army as a whole. The change in Government policy and attitude had much to do with the appointment of FM Sir John French as Commander-in-Chief Home Defence and to the realization that the demands of the Western Front could only be met by a fundamental rationalization of manpower resources. The introduction of compulsion and the advent of the tribunals opened up new possibilities for the VTC and allowed the removal of more trained divisions overseas. The National Reserve was to be placed in a state of suspension and from its husk emerged a new auxiliary entirely designated for home defence. A plan was evolving whereby the defence of the British Isles would rest not in the hands of the Territorial Force and Regulars but in those of auxiliary forces supported by a minimum number of underage and low category Regulars.

6 Reforming and Expanding the Home Army

The appointment of Field Marshal Sir John French to the new post of Commander-in-Chief Home Forces in January 1916 marked an advance in the way the war within Britain itself was to be conducted.1 Until December 1915, home defence had been the responsibility of the Secretary of State who, in turn, had entrusted it to General Sir Ian Hamilton and Lieutenant-General Sir Lancelot Kiggell. French was to become head of a systematic, unified command, charged with drawing up plans for the land (and later air) defence of the UK, and also for the development of an expanded and rationalized procedure for training recruits. On his appointment Sir John inherited ‘absolute chaos’ and believed that ‘if we are attacked tonight, no one would know what to do’.2 Although he considered invasion to be a ‘remote possibility’, French’s clear priority was to inject some order into that chaos primarily by improving coastal defences and by effecting a reorganization of the land forces available for home protection. When undertaking early tours of his new command, French was frequently perturbed by the large numbers of unfit and unarmed men, poor coastal artillery, a lack of machine guns and the regular replacement of trained men by raw Derby recruits.3 Even the King expressed concern over Lowestoft’s inadequate defences but General Sir Francis Lloyd did offer some encouragement with reports on the progress of the London defences.4 Much of this trench system was still being dug at weekends by members of the VTC; a fact which was not lost to the new commander of home defence. The findings of yet another inter-service commission into the possibility of a German landing had concluded the enemy might appear with 160,000 men; within that context the existence of London’s developing trench network to the east and south of the capital was considered by French to be of significant strategic importance.5 123

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The defences might have proved invaluable if the Germans ever made a determined attempt on the capital, but the inter-service commission believed a more likely scenario was a raid with about 20,000 troops north of The Wash. Lieutenant-General Sir William Robertson, who in December 1915 had been appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff, informed French that if the Germans did land he could assume the availability of two mounted divisions, five mounted brigades, nine Territorial divisions and 23 cyclist battalions. In addition there were also the Provisional brigades, garrison troops, 16,500 Yeomanry and 440 guns.6 Agreeing that the Germans were unlikely to force the Straits and land in the South-East, French decided to concentrate his troops on the East Coast and rely upon the trench defences to protect London. He ordered the formulation of new plans by which existing mobile and garrison units were to be reorganized and deployed, and considered new schemes for the protection of lines of communication. Radical schemes to the way the BEF’s strength was to be maintained and the manner in which its personnel was trained had begun in April 1915. The prime responsibility for home defence remained with the Provisional brigades and the Territorials, but the plans by which at least two Kitchener divisions could be deployed to assist the auxiliaries were regularly updated and honed. The first of what eventually became several major changes to the way the New Army might be sustained came with a decision to disband the Fourth New Army’s six divisions. Their constituent battalions, as well as another six which had been Army Troops, were converted to 76 2nd Reserve Battalions, grouped into 18 Reserve Infantry Brigades and known, for example, as the 1st Reserve Infantry Brigade. The brigades were largely concentrated in hutted camps on Salisbury Plain, Aldershot and Cannock Chase, but were attached to the six Home Commands and thus became available as units of the home army.7 In June the War Office turned its attention to Depot Companies of the Fifth New Army. This Kitchener formation had been raised in late 1914 largely of battalions recruited by town committees or leading civic dignitaries. They were instructed to recruit over establishment and to form Depot Companies of 250 men. It was also decided that where three or four such companies of the same regiment were concentrated together, they should amalgamate to form a Local Reserve Battalion. Thus, the 27th(Reserve) Battalion Manchester Regiment was created from Depot Companies of the 22nd, 23rd and 24th Battalions Manchester Regiment. By June 1916, 69 Local Reserve Battalions had

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been formed but, by that time, French had overseen a restructuring of the 18 Reserve Infantry Brigades. In anticipation of the expected influx of conscripts, this restructuring was begun in January 1916, the 18 Reserve Infantry Brigades having been expanded to 26. Each battalion was allowed an establishment of between 1017 to 2600, which brought the total establishment of all 2nd Reserve Battalions and Local Reserve Battalions to 225,300. There had been some exchange of battalions within brigades but the 26 Reserve Infantry Brigades, numbered 1–26, were allocated to Home Commands and were, again, to be available to French for home defence. The next stage in the reshaping of the home army involved French’s proposals to restructure certain commands and training centres, the reorganization of the Supernumerary Companies and consideration of how the VTC might be employed. He continued to acknowledge that an invasion or raid had to be met on the coast and accepted Robertson’s assessment of the forces which would be available to him. In mid-February, he suggested that the reorganization of the training system now allowed him to disband 19 unbrigaded Provisional battalions. Robertson concurred but was apprehensive that if French protected too many coastal sites too strongly, the Central Force would be depleted and be unable to operate as the mobile reinforcing reserve it was intended to be. French’s solution to Robertson’s concern was simply to disband the Central Force. The constant and frequent passage of units through the formation since the erosion of its original composition in the early weeks of the war, had severely militated against efficiency. The formation had become essentially an administrative unit to which Territorial divisions were posted before being sent abroad. In mid-March, the Central Force thus ceased to exist. Its troops came under French for training and operations and under the GOC Eastern Command for administration. French used the opportunity created to redeploy some additional troops from Provisional brigades, with the Mounted and Second Line Territorial divisions in fairly close support, as front line forces along the coast between The Wash and South Foreland. These units were to be assisted in their coast defence role by recently formed Home Service Garrison battalions. The difficulty faced by the Special Reserve battalions in trying simultaneously to provide overseas drafts and fulfil their garrison duties had been recognized early in 1915. Men of lower medical categories in the Special Reserve brigades were then invited to join newly created Garrison Companies which were then being assembled, where possible, along regional lines.8 By the end of 1915, the six Home Commands possessed a total of 21 such companies.

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In January 1916, GOC Commands were authorized to expand their companies into Home Defence Battalions and allot them to a regiment. By the summer, 20 battalions were in existence and distributed around the garrison ports.9 The disappearance of the Central Force and the appearance of the Home Service Garrison Battalions caused other structural changes to the home defence forces. There was now to be a Northern Army, under the command of General Sir Bruce Hamilton, with his HQ at Mundford, in Suffolk, and a Southern Army under General Sir Arthur Paget at Brentwood, Essex.10 Northern Army was to comprise 1st Cyclist Division, with an additional four cyclist battalions attached, the 62nd(2/West Riding) Division, 64th(2/Highland) and 13 Provisional battalions in three brigades. Paget’s command consisted of the 2nd Cyclist Division, 65th(2/Lowland), 66th(2/East Lancashire) and 67th(2/Home Counties) Divisions, with a further 24 Provisional battalions grouped in six brigades. The 68th(2/Welsh) Division was attached to Northern Army for training and the 1st Mounted Division to Southern Army for the same purpose. The 57th(2/West Lancashire) and 58th(2/1st London) Divisions on Salisbury Plain were available as emergency reserves for Aldershot and Southern Commands respectively. What were still known as Local Forces comprised two cyclist brigades and four cyclist battalions in Scottish Command; 69th(2/East Anglian) Division, three mounted brigades and eight cyclist battalions in Northern Command; 59th(2/North Midland) Division and almost 30 Irish Special Reserve, Extra Reserve and Local Reserve Battalions in Irish Command, and various Reserve Battalions of cavalry and foot guards in London District. Furthermore, there were Special Reserve brigades at seven ports, 15 2nd Reserve Infantry and 11 Local Reserve brigades stationed near the coast or at major inland training centres, and the 14 Third Line Territorial Groups. These had by now lost their ‘3/’ prefix and had ‘Reserve’ inserted instead11 and were widely scattered across the country. Finally, there were 28 ‘Garrison HQs’ and a further 12 ‘Districts’, all of which contributed in some way to home security. Another of French’s February 1916 proposals, which was in fact already under consideration by the Army Council, was the reorganization of the Supernumerary Companies. While these companies remained under the administration of the separate Territorial associations, the constant demand for guards for munitions works and railways created severe problems of management and co-ordination. In order to ease these difficulties, French wanted the 39,000 mainly National Reserve troops in the Supernumerary Companies to be formed into a separate corps. By

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creating a new, unified corps, it would not only improve efficiency but would also probably facilitate their reinforcement by the VTC. It is probable that French had seen a copy of a scheme drawn up by MajorGeneral Edward Bethune, the DGTF, some weeks earlier which advocated the creation of a Royal Defence Corps, administered by one Territorial association and under one paymaster. The principal difficulty in attempting such a proposal was in the necessity of securing the consent of Territorial soldiers to transfer from one battalion to another.12 That problem was, however, about to be addressed and resolved. Kitchener had long wanted to get rid of the regulations which prevented the army from transferring Territorials or amalgamating their units. To do so would mean entirely undermining the whole basis of Territorial recruitment. The form signed by all Territorials, E624, underscored Haldane’s intention that the Territorial Force should not be regarded as a pool or reservoir into which the Regulars could dip on demand but, as early as January 1915, the War Office had asked county associations to request their men opt for transfer to the Regular Army. Besides those NCOs and men who were seeking commissions in units other than their own, there had been little response. Existing regulations did allow men to be ‘attached’ to other units, that is why, for example the temporary amalgamation of the three London battalions after Second Ypres had gone ahead and how some months later hundreds of men from several Provisional and Third Line London battalions had gone to other London units in the 60th Division before it left for France. These movements had aroused considerable, vociferous opposition. Kitchener wanted to eliminate this awkward anomaly and thereby open the way for large scale transfers of pre-war and postmobilization Territorials. A draft Bill, which aroused the opposition not least of Asquith himself, as well as the DGTF and Sir John Simon, the Home Secretary, was discussed in April 1915 and withdrawn by Kitchener in July. He tried again in April 1916 but compromise clauses which permitted the conditional transfer of Territorial personnel had already been included within the second Military Service Act, 1916. Even these insertions did not silence the critics for the controversy arose again during the Somme campaign and caused heated argument in the Commons. The additional clauses did, however, facilitate the transfer of Territorials within their own corps and also paved the way for the formation of the new Royal Defence Corps. French was clearly attracted by the scheme for a new home defence auxiliary. In January he had accepted Kitchener’s invitation to address

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Territorials on the matter of transfers13 and, given the opportunity, wanted to expand the concept of using auxiliary forces still further. Although he regretted the lack of an official enquiry into the VTCs’ potential and, accepting for the time that the movement was ‘quite without organization’, he did, nevertheless, believe that the many corps could be utilized to assist the proposed RDC in railway protection duties, manning the London defences and general fatigue work.14 A subsequent meeting of the Army Council broadly approved of French’s suggestions but so long as the Government refused to proceed with Lord Lincolnshire’s Bill, the legal problems posed by the possible use of Volunteers in a military capacity would remain unresolved. The creation of the all-party pressure group of supportive MPs and the clamour of the movement in general, ensured that the Government would not be allowed to ignore the VTC issue. Tennant did consult with the Army Council during the recess but, when Parliament reassembled, the Government remained unsure about how next to proceed. The GOC of the Home Commands were in favour of a reorganization of the Protection Companies and the utilization of the Volunteers, but the Prime Minister and Tennant elected to offer the House their ‘usual, futile, stereotyped cliché’ that the issue was still ‘under consideration’.15 The growing frustration and annoyance manifested itself during the debate on the King’s Speech. In a calculated effort to force the Government’s hand, an amendment was moved regretting the absence of any provision within the Royal Address to improve the status of the VTC. Speeches condemned the Government’s procrastination and vacillation, the ‘disgraceful’ manner in which the movement had been treated and how the Government had thrown ‘every difficulty’ in the Volunteers’ way. In a torrent of passion, testimonials to the Volunteers’ patriotism, their work during air raids, guarding munitions factories and vulnerable points, canvassing for National Registration and the Derby Scheme, echoed around and across the chamber. In the face of the constant Government prevarication members were reported to be growing tired of their officers’ promises that recognition was about to be achieved. This great, democratic, home defence organization demanded the right to swear an attestation, secure legal protection, procure an acknowledgement from the Government that it would accept their offers of service and receive an appreciation of the costs they had already bourne in the effort to achieve some degree of efficiency.16 The reception accorded Lincolnshire’s Bill in the Lords and the swell of cross-party opinion made it inevitable that the Government would have, eventually, to agree to recognize the legal status of the movement.

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Unfortunately for Tennant and Asquith, the consultations had thrown up an unexpected difficulty. A War Office conference at which it had been decided to apply the 1863 Act to the VTC had not been attended by the DGTF. The Directorate discovered the meeting’s outcome by chance and subsequently submitted a paper which described the War Office’s proposal as ‘cumbrous’, and urged that unless ‘absolutely necessary’ the ‘dead Act’ ought not to be resuscitated. It could see no reason why the VTC could not be adequately provided for under the provisions of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, 1907. Haldane’s Act had been deliberately designed in broad terms to constitute a permanent framework upon which the control of all irregular forces could be built. The Territorial associations, which the Directorate believed would be required to administer a reconstituted VTC, could accept the responsibility under Section II of the Act. Moreover, at least one county was already working with Lord Desborough on a scheme whereby the association was to administer the County Volunteer Regiment. The Directorate advocated the retention of some power in the hands of the Central Association but envisaged it becoming more of an advisory than a regulating body to the Army Council and the associations. There would have to be some modification in the conditions under which Volunteers would be expected to serve, but these too could be secured under the provisions of the 1907 Act. In conclusion, the DGTF pointed out that it would certainly be more expeditious to apply the existing Act than create a new one based on the old Volunteer legislation of 1863. The more recent Territorial and Reserve Forces Act allowed for auxiliaries to be called up for duty and, while so employed, be under military law. They could even be called out by Lords Lieutenant on the requisition of the GOC of a particular Command. The simplest and easier solution was, stressed the Directorate, to incorporate the VTC in the proposed RDC as a separate section and divide it into two classes: those who could serve for certain minimum times at intervals, and those who could only serve in a national emergency.17 How seriously Tennant and his advisors viewed this paper is uncertain. Whilst not wishing to antagonize the county associations whose help would be needed to administer the RDC and the VTC, and also on Kitchener’s personal recommendation, Tennant had already resolved that the revival of the 1863 Volunteer Act was the line of least resistance.18 In order to expedite proceedings and avoid further delays, the Government on this occasion took advice and decided not to apply the measures to Ireland.19 As the momentum gathered, the Volunteer movement both inside and outside Parliament, clamoured for acceptance,

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the press advocated recognition and even Walter Long, a long time opponent of the VTC, spoke publicly in favour of the scheme.20 Tennant and the War Office had pondered long enough yet the decision to grant recognition still came with dramatic suddenness. A hint was made to the pro-Volunteer cross-party committee suggesting they ask the Prime Minister whether the Government was any closer to awarding recognition. Substituting for Asquith at question time, Lloyd George announced on 29 February that the Volunteer Act was to be applied to the VTC. Under its provisions, they would be properly constituted as a military force solely for home defence; corps would therefore receive military rank and status and fall under the supervision of the Lords Lieutenant who would become responsible for their provision and maintenance.21 It is conceivable that Tennant and his advisors had not entirely foreseen or understood the difficulties to be encountered when applying the 1863 Act. Several Amending Acts had complicated the original provisions but it is probable that the Government, at least for the time being, was satisfied they did provide an adequate framework. If events were to prove otherwise, alternative measures might be needed. It may have annoyed the DGTF not to have been fully consulted, but the War Office, and more importantly the Government, felt they had gone far enough to both appease the auxiliary movement and lay the foundation, if it became necessary, for a future expansion. Of particular satisfaction to the Government was the knowledge that recognition had incurred only minimal financial liabilities and no obligation to provide the movement with arms and equipment. Nineteenth-century administrations had, eventually, awarded capitation grants to the Rifle Volunteers and sections of the VTCs’ membership certainly believed the current Government would ultimately do the same for them. It did not expect the War Office to provide them with Lee Enfield rifles but assumed it would provide them with funds to purchase Martinis from non-governmental contractors. When it realized the Government had no intention of providing either arms or uniform, those members felt betrayed. One unhappy commandant complained about War Office delays in accepting offers of service and how, whilst one of its departments was anxious to employ them, another frustrated that very employment by refusing to issue conditions of service. He warned that men were drifting away and many would regard the regulations as ‘illusory’.22 Percy Harris admitted to a good deal of unrest and agreed the delay in awarding the desired status would undoubtedly lead to resignations. But he believed the technical difficulties causing the problems would soon be mastered and the War Office would then

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be able to complete the necessary formalities. The Times, too, wrote sympathetically of the ‘neglect’ of the Volunteers and urged the War Office to act with boldness and clarity.23 As the weeks following Lloyd George’s announcement passed, disillusion and frustration continued to grow. When the terms under which the Volunteers could be called out (the chief purpose of their claim for recognition), were announced, confusion ensued. The 1863 Volunteer Act had the authority to call out auxiliaries in the event of ‘actual or apprehended invasion’, whereas the 1900 Amending Act stated they could be mobilized in the advent of ‘imminent national danger or great emergency’. The War Office took advice from the Parliamentary Counsel and the Lord Privy Seal, both of whom concurred that the Prime Minister’s statement in the House on 4 August 1914 was sufficient legally to constitute the declaration of a ‘great emergency’. Under Section 17 of the 1863 Act this meant that the Volunteers could be called out for service without any further consultation with, or the approval of, Parliament. Despite this assurance, the War Office elected to use the wording of the 1900 Amending Act and asked the Lord Chamberlain’s office to prepare documents needed for a royal proclamation.24 The retention of the 1900 Act’s wording caused many Volunteers to believe they might be called out to suppress strikes or food riots. The point was taken and revised regulations resolved the ambiguity by stipulating ‘only if and when it becomes necessary for the purpose of repelling an enemy in the event of an invasion being imminent’.25 This did much to quell the natural concern of working men that they might be expected to act with arms against their striking work colleagues. If their consciences were still insufficiently calmed, the 1863 Act carried the provision that any Volunteer could resign from his corps with 14 day’s notice. For a force with military ambitions this was, of course, a nonsense. Nevertheless, the Government chose to ignore the implications largely because it had no real intention or expectation that the Volunteers would ever be called upon to defend their shores. The regulations granted Volunteers the right to wear, without the hated brassard, the green uniform sanctioned by the Central Association in 1915. The Workman’s Compensation Act, 1906 had earlier been extended to cover any man injured while mounting guard on a munitions factory and a ration allowance was to be provided while he performed the duty. Work such as digging defences, mounting guard on factories and vulnerable points remained entirely voluntary but the Government did express the hope that members would continue to perform these tasks. There was, throughout the announcements, an

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explicit guarantee that unless an invasion was imminent the men’s ordinary employment would not be jeopardized.26 In return for what really amounted to only minor concessions, the War Office had gained the free services of an estimated quarter of a million men. They could be used to supplement the work of the other new auxiliary about to enter the Army List, the Royal Defence Corps; in addition, they would be considerably cheaper to employ. On their part, the members were to swear an oath of allegiance to defend Britain ‘according to the conditions of my service’, had been given permission to wear a uniform for which they themselves had paid and which bore no resemblance to service dress, had no prospect of being armed or equipped at public expense, had every likelihood of losing their county organization and were allowed no conventional military rank. Yet, despite these disappointments they had achieved their principal ambition of acquiring legal status. The Government was certainly content with the outcome and although it was to revise the regulations in the light of changing circumstances, its actions were calculated to appease this politically important and sizable proportion of the electorate. It had yet to persuade the generally reluctant Territorial associations to take on the administration of the VTC but the Government rightly perceived that if granted certain guarantees, the associations would be prepared to shoulder the responsibility. Another of the disarmingly few aspects of the war about which the Government could also feel reasonably sanguine was its growing confidence in the diminishing threat of a German invasion. The Times might declare that ‘all risk of an attack … has not been removed’, General O’Moore Creagh could tell Volunteers the Germans, ‘like so many mad dogs … [would] take a bite wherever they can’, General Paget, GOC Southern Army, frequently expressed his concerns to the Commander-inChief (C-in-C), and even French himself warned of the unexpected in war becoming fact, but the reality was that in 1916 Germany did not have the manpower to attempt an invasion.27 If the Germans did attempt an ambitious raid, and if all his allocated forces were at war strength, French was confident he had sufficient troops to defeat it. Yet, with the Provisional brigades depleted and the Second Line Territorials untrained and poorly armed, French knew he could not allow confidence to descend to complacency. French readily acknowledged that the prime function of the British Army was the defeat of the Germans on the Western Front and that the responsibility for training that army fell within his sphere of command. He knew better than any that he was in effect commanding an eternal

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transit camp.28 As divisions of the Regular Army or overseas service units of the Territorial Force became efficient they were posted to the Expeditionary Force; until that time, most were loosely allocated to the various Home Commands. To the C-in-C Home Forces it was an unsatisfactory but inevitable system. Trying to conserve a substantial core of trained units whilst making transient formations into efficient cogs in the home defence machine was virtually impossible. French accepted that he might have to take risks with his forces and free men and units for France whenever the Continental situation demanded it; any excess to the already reduced figure of 454,680 – the number accepted by French as the minimum requirement for home defence – would have to be available for overseas service. With the build up to the Somme gathering momentum and the number of troops at home currently far in excess of French’s minimum, the Army Council told the C-in-C he should not anticipate any reduction in the numbers and regularity with which men of his command disappeared.29 When General Paget again complained bitterly about his depleted battalions, French could offer no succour.30 It was this concern about the constantly changing nature and composition of his forces which had compelled French to reorganize the training and drafting procedure within the UK and also to contemplate introducing the recently recognized VTC into a planned scheme of home defence. The outcome of his deliberations would be the evolution of a system whereby a mixed force of Regulars, Territorials, former National Reservists in the Royal Defence Corps and the part-time auxiliaries of the VTC, would jointly protect the UK from raids or invasion. The creation of the RDC was born of necessity and military expediency. The organization and control of the Supernumerary Companies under the county associations had proved difficult, if not unworkable, and there was little co-ordination of objective or purpose between counties and their fluctuating strength and varying degrees of efficiency made many of the companies unreliable or certainly of dubious quality. The War Office wanted to centralize the companies’ administration and also to be able to exert greater control over their composition and organization. A royal warrant to permit the creation of the new home defence force was signed in March 1916 and an Army Council Instruction followed in April.31 Organized into Protection Companies of between 150 and 250 all ranks, the RDC was to become responsible for local defence duties hitherto performed by the TF Supernumerary Companies and also for those which had been allocated to the recently formed Observer

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Companies. It was intended that the men in a particular Supernumerary Company would be posted to its replacement Protection Company and, in addition, there was a widespread assumption that those companies would remain in the districts in which they were originally raised. As most of the men in the RDC were at the outset National Reservists, technically they remained Territorial soldiers; their officers were commissioned into the Territorial Force and then posted to a company. With the administration of the corps now falling under the auspices of the City of London Territorial Association, the RDC thus came under the authority of one paymaster who dealt with all accounts and separation allowances. Entry to the RDC was available to any suitably fit man aged between 41 and 60 but it was anticipated that a majority of the existing Supernumerary Companies’ personnel would accept transfer to the new corps. There they would be joined by men too old for overseas service from some of the disbanding Provisional battalions. Previous military training was required but, in June, it was decided that men with an unspecified period of VTC experience would also become eligible. The Military Service Acts had removed the option of voluntary overseas service so any National Reservist young and fit enough to go abroad was drafted from his Supernumerary Company to a foreign service battalion. Their places in the new corps were taken by some Class III National Reservists and also by soldiers whose wounds or disabilities meant they would not be returned to fighting units. Despite the knowledge that a considerable number of the remaining Class III men, attracted by the higher rates of pay, were enlisting in the newly formed overseas Labour Companies, most associations optimistically believed there would be little difficulty in finding sufficient suitable candidates for the RDC.32 Records detailing the numbers of men who did transfer from the Supernumerary Companies are rare but the Army Council was clearly concerned about the numbers who were declining to go. In September 1916, it issued a letter stressing how much it relied on the county associations to induce their remaining National Reservists to join the RDC.33 The reluctance amongst the men to enlist in the auxiliary was probably a result of some adverse publicity and unflattering questions in the House of Commons. There were several occasions when MPs complained about the accommodation and conditions under which men of the RDC were working. One tented camp was said to be on ground heavily contaminated by industrial pollution and men at another were reported to be very discontented at their ‘unreasonably hard treatment’. Although the second Military Service Act meant that

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they now served under a Territorial Force attestation, and could thus be transferred without their consent to another corps, many members remained under the illusion that they would serve in their local Protection Company. Forster repeatedly insisted no promises about keeping them in their locality had ever been made and the terms of their service were unconditional. The absence of regular leave and the clawing back of over-payments in their wages were also causes of publicly known complaint.34 The Government’s success at overseeing the winding up of the National Reserve and in securing the assistance of the City of London Association in the administration of the RDC was reflected in its desire to reorganize the Volunteers in a manner more suitable to its own needs. Once the first months of frenzied activity of mobilizing and equipping their units had passed, many Territorial associations abandoned their monthly or quarterly meetings; too many committee members were serving soldiers and were consequently overseas with their units. Besides, once the First Line battalions and batteries were up to establishment and deployed, there was little else for the committees to do. In the spring and summer of 1916 the associations lost the responsibility of administering the Second and Third Line Territorial and Yeomanry units, the Provisional battalions and the Protection Companies. When separation allowance payments were also centralized, they were largely denuded of their power and responsibilities. By requesting them to undertake the administration of the VTC, the Government saw the means of maintaining the organization and function of the associations for a possible post-war use. The Army Council considered the counties were ideally suited to the task35 but there was a reluctance by some county Volunteer regiments to place themselves under the Territorial associations. For their part, there was also a reluctance by some associations to undertake the VTCs’ administration. The reservation among the Volunteers was usually either a concern about the intended position of the Central Association in the reorganization, or a belief that the existing arrangements were already adequate.36 These problems were to be resolved in July and the solution persuaded those in need of reassurance to accede. However, throughout the summer the movement remained in a state of ‘restlessness and discontent’.37 The one encouraging aspect amongst the despondency was the emerging knowledge that French at least was taking the movement seriously. At Strachey’s invitation the Central Association’s leading members lunched with the Commander-in-Chief House Forces (C-in-CHF) and his staff to discuss how the Volunteers could be best

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utilized and French’s later attendance at a huge volunteer parade in Hyde Park also offered a visible sign of the fuller recognition of the force by the War Office. The C-in-C told 10,000 Volunteers, most of whom were wearing uniform, that he was determined to use them. He reiterated the message two weeks later by assuring the Cambridgeshire Volunteers that he was working ‘to give them a well-understood status in the fighting forces of the Empire’.38 French no doubt deliberately timed his statements to coincide with the announcement that the VTC was to be reconstituted as the Volunteer Force and that the composition and responsibilities of the new organization had been defined.39 The Territorial associations were to become the channels of communication between the War Office and the corps on matters of principle and procedure but they would not be concerned with training unless it involved the expenditure of public money. Lord Desborough was to become the Honorary Deputy Director of Volunteer Services in the department of the DGTF, with Percy Harris as Honorary Assistant Director. In effect this meant that the Central Association would remain in being, albeit in an altered guise, and would serve as the familiar and identifiable organization through which the county regiments would operate and seek advice.40 In the face of the disappointments of recent months, the retention of the executive committee of the Central Association provided tangible relief to the movement’s leaders who had feared its instigators would be submerged in the faceless machinery of the War Office.41 This decision also convinced several hesitating Territorial associations to accept responsibility for the new force. By the time of their July meetings, all county associations had agreed to oversee the administration of the new Volunteer Force.42 New regulations appeared gradually over the summer months and the movement became an officially recognized component of the Crown’s forces. This instruction was greeted with genuine satisfaction but there was to be little more immediate comfort for the corps as a succession of subsequent regulations, especially those concerning the appointment of officers, failed to provide the Volunteers with the concessions warranted by what was now publicly accepted as an integral part of the home army. Training was to come under the auspices of the GOC Commands and the power to call out the Volunteers for military service lay in the Field Marshal C-in-C Home Forces.43 If their services were required, Volunteers were to receive the same rates of pay, separation allowances and non-effective benefits as Regular soldiers, but unlike the Regulars, would not be entitled to a gratuity. Volunteers were undoubtedly

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gratified to learn that if mobilized they would be treated almost equally to the Regulars, but what remained particularly unclear was what, given the wide disparity in the provision of equipment and arms possessed by Volunteer corps, the War Office might actually expect them to do. Buckinghamshire had already prepared and addressed mobilization envelopes in preparation of a call out, but the 2nd Oxfordshire Volunteer Regiment went a stage further in June 1916 by issuing all members with a set of mobilization instructions. If the call came, all men were to report immediately to the adjutant’s house armed with a gun or a heavy stick, food for 24 hours, two empty cans connected by a piece of string and, presumably in case anything went wrong, some white rags. Anyone fortunate enough to possess a gun was warned not to load it in case it went off.44 Nationally by July, almost 230 battalions had been formed and their services accepted but, in the Commons, Henry Forster acknowledged they were far from fully equipped.45 Apart from infantry battalions, several other types of units had also offered their services to the Army Council. French ordered Lords Lieutenant to submit these offers to their GOC Commands, who then passed them on to the War Office.46 They included artillery, engineer and transport units, as well as a telephone company in the East Riding formed to liaise with anti-aircraft defences.47 Other counties, too, did maintain or raise some specialist units but the War Office refused to grant recognition to these ambulance, engineer and signal companies until 1917. Most corps remained hopelessly under-equipped. In its desperate search for weapons, at least one group wrote to farmers and gentlemen inquiring whether they could loan the Volunteers any sporting guns, whilst official restrictions on who was permitted to acquire a weapon further exacerbated the general problem and annoyed individuals. Some corps, though, were rather better supplied: the Nottinghamshire Volunteer Regiment guarded lines of communication with a total of 70 carbines and 60 shot guns; Buckinghamshire’s four battalions had 2000 rifles and the East Yorkshire Regiment managed to purchase nearly 3000 specially manufactured Martinis. There were, nevertheless, constant calls for the Government to release the supposedly thousands of dummy weapons and Ross rifles taken from Canadian troops which some MPs believed the War Office was hoarding.48 As a consequence of these and other obstacles, training remained haphazard. Undoubtedly, the more efficient, attractive and financially sound corps did organize useful weekend exercises, and camps were becoming more of a regular occurrence. A Government announcement that it would cover travelling expenses for Easter camps and for some

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other spring manoeuvres was thought belated, but was well received.49 Unfortunately, weekend activities were frequently hampered by recreational crowds thronging the public parks used as training areas and by a lack of imagination on the part of officers.50 There remained opposition in some quarters to Sunday drills and there was the genuine difficulty of men attending the weekend sessions if working shifts or long hours. Scattered rural corps suffered especially badly. When their men did manage to assemble for a company route march, there were complaints of ‘piteous formations’, with no march discipline straggling through villages and towns. The Fleet Street Company of the Corps of Citizens was one of several compelled to drill during daylight hours, an elasticity in the means of fulfilling obligations being a prerequisite for the survival of many corps.51 The lack of variety in drills, the ignorance of many officers and NCOs in military matters and the absence of weapons, remained strong disincentives to turn out after a long day at work. Appeals for the appointment of permanent staff, a feature of the old Rifle Volunteer system, went unheard at the War Office.52 So, too, for most of 1916 did calls for the Government to remove the restrictions on the wearing and style of the uniform. In January 1916, it was estimated that about 50 per cent of enrolled Volunteers had a uniform of some description but most Volunteers could not understand why, when even the Boys’ Brigade was allowed to wear khaki and the old Volunteers had worn infantry scarlet and silver buttons, the Government prevented them from parading as bona fide soldiers. Some corps impertinently dyed their green uniforms and although some talked of recruitment being at a standstill because potential recruits were either unable or unwilling to buy their own suits, other corps had enough money collected or promised to purchase khaki if allowed.53 Letters to the Gazette opined that if Volunteers were considered good enough to release Regulars for overseas and play a role in home defence, they were good enough to wear khaki. If changes were not forthcoming, some members threatened to resign or to discard their green uniform and parade in mufti. Henry Forster, the Financial Secretary to the War Office, employed the usual delaying tactics and responded to questions about uniform and equipment with a stock answer that everything remained under consideration. Eventually, in December 1916 when the whole Volunteer issue was again undergoing a radical review, a previously unsuspected ACI permitted Volunteers to wear regulation style service dress made from ‘serge Volunteer Force’.54 Restrictions on when it could be worn continued in place and for those corps who could not afford to buy their

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own uniforms, the problem of raising sufficient funds for day to day expenses had not altered. The concession was received with both acclamation and cynicism: it was viewed as a justified yet long deferred recognition of the Volunteer Force’s value and, at the same time, as a War Office acknowledgement that events on the Western Front were forcing it reluctantly to seek assistance from an organization whose possible potential it had hitherto tried hard to ignore. Gradual, and apparently grudging, concessions were granted piecemeal but they were, in fact, part of a developing and formulating Government plan. If the Volunteers were ever to be of any practical use as a home army, regulations which allowed members to leave with 14 days’ notice clearly had to be rescinded. From October onwards, various hints that the issue was about to be addressed were being dropped by leading figures within the administration and the military hierarchy. Lloyd George spoke of change being on the way and Bethune mentioned the possibility of the force being split into two sections, one more efficient and active than the other.55 FM Sir John French had also been suggesting the Government would demand a quid pro quo on the part of the movement if it was, in turn, prepared to arm, finance and equip it. The Gazette carried a lengthy editorial which talked of ‘drastic changes’ and thought that a Bill whereby Volunteers would agree to serve for the duration in return for Government assistance had already been drafted. Lord Harewood told the West Riding Territorial Association that French had recently remarked, ‘the time is coming … when we should have to depend entirely for the defence of this country from invasion on the Volunteer Force’. This suggestion appeared to be confirmed a few days later when General Sir Frank Lloyd told the City of London Volunteers ‘a great future awaited’ them.56 Much of the encouraging talk about new legislation and a seemingly more positive attitude towards the Volunteer Force was undoubtedly the result of French’s personal enthusiasm for the movement and his belief that a greater responsibility for the defence of the British Isles would inevitably soon fall upon its shoulders. Lord Derby and later Lloyd George were both more prepared to view the Volunteers’ potential as an asset than had their predecessor at the War Office. Furthermore, official support for the movement was again apparent at a conference of lords lieutenant and county commandants, attended by Derby and French at County Hall in October, where the issue of the 14 days’ notice was aired freely on all sides.57 In a circular sent two days after the meeting, Bethune asked county commandants to suggest what Volunteers might be prepared to do in return for extra grants. He wanted to know how the movement might react to the authorities’ idea that a man should be

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expected to perform 20 drills in his first eight weeks and ten per month once he had passed an efficiency test.58 A later circular to lords lieutenant indicated that the War Office was prepared, ‘under certain circumstances to arm and equip’ Volunteers in return for guarantees that members should undergo a medical and agree to perform an agreed number of drills for the duration. The object of the circular was: … to give effect to the desire so often expressed by the Volunteers themselves that they shall be definitely incorporated in the Defensive Forces of this country, and in return receive pecuniary assistance from the Government.59 French, too, had been increasing Volunteers’ expectations. During his regular Sunday addresses to Volunteer parades he repeatedly told his audiences the ‘ridiculous’ and ‘mischievous’ rumours that the Volunteers were not wanted had to be dispelled ‘once and for all’. His constant theme was to warn the movement that it should ‘look forward to the day’ when the defence of the country would be ‘entirely entrusted’ to them.60 He invariably explained, however, that in return for arms and equipment, the Volunteers would have to reciprocate. The C-in-C’s interest in the Volunteers was partly the result of his concern over the state of some coastal defences and also his determination to send every fit man in excess of his home defence requirement to France. He was becoming happier with the defences on the Thames and Medway and work on two new batteries was underway at Blyth. French acknowledged that Hamilton’s Northern Army was improving its efficiency and organization but knew that the regular removal of trained men for foreign service would inevitably result in a heavier dependence on the Volunteers.61 With this in mind, his Sunday tours of the provinces were targeted at preparing the movement for its future responsibility. He appeased their frustrations by assuring them that the King valued the Volunteers as much as any other arm of the Crown’s services62 but French realized that unless he could depend upon an adequately trained and armed Volunteer Force, the continued denudation of his Regular and Territorial troops would leave the shores perhaps fatally exposed. The strident warnings of the possibility of invasion were aimed for public consumption and as a means of providing a sense of purpose to the movement but, in truth, French took succour from the findings of the invasion conference between representatives of the Admiralty and War Office which, in August, came to the same conclusion as the investigation which had sat earlier in the year.

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One of the questions addressed by the conference was the perennial one of whether too many troops were being retained at home at the expense of the BEF. The General Staff acknowledged the dilemma but noted: The only difference between requirements for Home Defence and those in other theatres is that we cannot afford to take the same risks at home as we can abroad.63 The current allocation for home defence had increased to a little under 500,000. Coastal and air defence artillery, engineers and air personnel amounted to over 28,000 and what were called ‘Protection’ troops, comprising 135 draft finding battalions, 40,000 RDC and 20 Home Service Garrison battalions, produced a total of 226,553 men, or almost 7000 more than was agreed to be necessary. The mobile troops were 5000 over their agreed establishment: ten Provisional brigades were 12,000 over establishment and there were 2200 more than agreed in the 17 mounted and cyclist brigades. But, the infantry of the ten Territorial divisions were 11,000, and the 23 cyclist battalions 5000 under establishment. The ten heavy batteries, lines of communication troops and the Army Troops signal companies were about at the agreed numbers. The breakdown of personnel available to French made no specific mention of the Volunteer Force but the C-in-C had earlier decided that certain Volunteer infantry units should either be attached to composite brigades formed from Reserve formations earmarked for reinforcing coastal troops, or go to the lines of communication to which they had already been allocated. The remaining Volunteer battalions were to concentrate at points decided by the GOC home commands.64 The conference again reinforced the official belief that while the Germans were heavily engaged on the Somme and on the Eastern Front, they simply did not have the manpower to attempt an invasion; if the naval and military situation did change in the enemy’s favour, it was estimated the Germans could probably assemble a force of about 160,000 troops.65 While the Somme ground on, therefore, the country was safe. In the meantime, troops serving in Provisional brigades and the Second Line Territorial divisions would continue to be withdrawn to fuel the overseas campaigns. The method by which Regulars and Territorials were trained at home and posted overseas underwent another reorganization in the summer of 1916 but questions about the procedure were again raised in the Commons, particularly in support of complaints by London Territorials.66

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The reorganization of the Territorial Force’s training arrangements was not especially drastic: by a process of amalgamation, the 194 Reserve Battalions in the 14 Groups became 87 battalions in 14 Reserve Brigades.67 The establishment of these 14 Territorial Force Reserve brigades was settled at a little under 119,000 all ranks. More far reaching were the changes made in the way the Regular Army was to be reinforced. Special Reserve and Extra Reserve battalions were to remain taking and training conscripts but whenever those battalions were at establishment, excess recruits would be posted to what was to become known as the Training Reserve. With the exception of the two Irish Reserve Infantry Brigades (15 and 25 Reserve Brigades) the 145 2nd Reserve and Local Reserve Battalions in the remaining 24 Reserve Infantry Brigades were transformed into 112 battalions of the new Training Reserve. These battalions were organized into 24 Training Reserve Brigades. The process necessitated the disbanding of 33 existing 2nd Reserve or Local Reserve units, yet many of the Training Reserve Brigades still contained up to six rather than the conventional four battalions. The establishment of the new Training Reserve was set at 208,500. Of the 112 battalions 60 were allocated to Northern or Eastern Commands and, along with 24 MG companies and two motor MG batteries at Grantham, could if required be sent by train and road to reinforce Hamilton’s Northern and Paget’s Southern Armies. Important as these reforms were, of more immediate concern to French as C-in-CHF were the changes which he oversaw in the Yeomanry force. The period since the outbreak of war had witnessed a bewildering number of unit designations and redesignations. As the First Line units reached establishment or departed abroad, each formed a Second Line. In July 1916, most of the 57 Second Line Yeomanry units were converted to cyclist battalions and the four Second Line brigades became cyclist brigades. French retained the 1st Mounted Division, with its three mounted and single cyclist brigades, and now had available the 1st Cyclist (originally the 1st Mounted) Division and the 2nd Cyclist (formerly 4th Mounted) Division. In November 1916 the 1st and 2nd Cyclist Divisions were broken up and their brigades became independent. Each brigade had three battalions, each of about 620 men. These battalions had been formed from the amalgamation of two Second Line Yeomanry units, usually from the same regional area. Another significant November change which affected French’s Home Command was the creation of three new Home Service divisions: the 71st, 72nd and 73rd. These formations comprised brigades numbered 212–220, and each division contained what was nominally a brigade of

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Second Line Territorials; the other two brigades consisted of 12 renumbered Provisional battalions in 6, 8 and 9 Provisional Brigades, or of Home Service Garrison battalions with regimental numbering and designations. In January 1917, the remaining seven Provisional brigades, all of which were stationed on the East Coast, became 221–227 Provisional Brigades and were not allocated to a division. Later in 1917 these became known as Mixed Brigades. Therefore, in addition to 1st Mounted Division and the three new Home Service divisions, four cyclist brigades, (with their associated artillery, signal squadrons, ASC companies and ambulances) and six attached Territorial cyclist battalions, French also had 11 Second Line Territorial divisions under his command. Five of the Territorial divisions were finally brought up to strength with conscripts and would sail for France by the end of March 1917 but, with the various Regular and Territorial Reserve Brigades available if required, on paper French’s command seems formidable. However, the C-in-C was acutely aware of its limitations. Most units remained understrength and many had not even been issued with the SMLE. With travelling medical boards recategorizing men’s fitness, unit training was constantly interrupted by the loss overseas of regraded men and experienced NCOs. It was for these reasons that French repeatedly turned his attention to how the Volunteer Force might increase its efficiency and develop its possible uses to supplement his increasingly stretched home defence forces. French did have a genuine regard and sympathy for the Volunteer Force. His diary refers regularly to his admiration at the auxiliaries’ appearance, spirit and resolution: ‘The more I see of them … the more impressed I become with their value for home defence. … Their energy, zeal and soldier-like bearing … won my deepest admiration. I feel sure they will prove to be a most valuable force.’68 French enlisted the support of Lord Northcliffe by inviting him to accompany him on a tour of inspection in mid-November, and he talked warmly of their potential to George V on at least one occasion.69 French’s speech at the Lord Mayor’s banquet in November once again praised the force for its ‘zealous ardour’ and, following his later visit to Manchester, queues of would-be Volunteers revived memories of scenes in the city two years earlier when men waited to join the Kitchener battalions.70 After Lloyd George had referred to ‘this admirable body’ and expressed the opinion that a better use could soon be made of it,71 corps up and down the country were reported to be discussing and already accepting the provisions of a Bill, the announcement of which was daily expected. The Gazette speculated that when it came, the Bill itself would be short, entailing only the

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repeal of the section in the 1863 Act which permitted the 14 days’ notice of resignation and its replacement with service for the duration; other important points could come later with the publication of a new set of regulations. An address at Newcastle by Bethune offered the first public announcement the authorities were expecting Volunteers to perform an initial programme of 20 drills, followed by ten per month to maintain skills. The DGTF also added that the men would have to be capable of marching five miles with a 43lb pack.72 In addition to his public appearances and encouraging statements, behind the scenes French had been giving further consideration to the possible advantages to be gained from granting the movement improved status and recognition. Acutely aware of the need to keep battalions as close to their territorial origins as possible, the C-in-CHF outlined their potential deployment. Priority for arms and equipment should go to those battalions earmarked for coast defence and the protection of London; the physical defences were largely prepared and the men only needed to know precisely where they would be sent. French wanted to attach either one or two battalions of Volunteers to each brigade of the home army and suggested that as they became more efficient, Volunteers might be able actually to replace some of the units within those brigades. A paper emphasizing how useful the Volunteers were and how the force’s expansion would allow more troops to be posted overseas and others returned to civil employment, secured Treasury approval. The months of agitation, public speculation and inter-departmental consultation were then ended with the Bill’s introduction to the Lords and with its Second Reading on 30 November 1916. Lord Derby explained that by their patriotism and energy the Volunteers had attained a pitch of efficiency which enabled them now to be accepted as ‘part and parcel’ of the defensive forces of the Crown. If that was to be the case, the Government needed to be able to rely upon them on all occasions and be sure that their efficiency was maintained. They would not be expected to leave their employment or locality unless invasion was deemed imminent and all employers were urged to encourage their eligible men to enrol. In return for signing for the duration, a Volunteer would, after performing forty drills to become efficient, be uniformed and equipped. He would then be expected to do another ten drills per month, be free of disease and be fit enough for garrison work at home. When efficient, a £2 grant would be paid to a man’s Territorial association. The associations were to retain the administration of the county regiments and each of their battalions was to have a paid, full-time

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adjutant, sergeant-major and colour-sergeant. When finally moving the Bill, Derby warned against any attempt by either the Lords or Commons to modify it, especially in regard to the required number of monthly drills.73 French and many other leading proponents spoke in favour of the Bill and in favour of the movement.74 His personal knowledge of the state of the scores of battalions he had inspected, of the men’s motivation, the months of weekend digging and the regular guarding of vulnerable points, had already allowed him, he said, to sanction a slight reduction in the establishment of the RDC. He praised the dedication and service of Britain’s principal home defence auxiliary, the Territorial Force, and predicted it would ‘ill become us as a nation to repeat the mistakes we made some 40 or 50 years ago, when we held lightly the use and value of large bodies of Volunteers’.75 Percy Harris used the Third Reading to make a lengthy justification of the movement’s existence, despite two years’ of Government denial, and an explanation of how and why the authorities were now keen to foster its development.76 The speech was an attempt to pacify and reassure those members who still believed the War Office was really only tolerating the force and an appeal to those men who had left in frustration to return. He wanted at least one million men to attest and emphasized they could be employed more cheaply than the B3 and C1 men then being called up for home service in the RDC. It would be of greater benefit to the country if those men were returned to agriculture and industry and Volunteers directed to take on more of the duties done by the corps. Harris had ‘great hopes’ that with the ‘new blood’ at the War Office the force would receive a more sympathetic and co-operative administration. He told the Letchworth Volunteers a few days later: ‘The British Volunteer movement will be be the turning point of the war, in as much as it will enable the last man and the last rifle and gun to be sent to the front’.77 The Bill received the Royal Assent on 22 December 1916, and during the next five months, as new regulations were published, the force’s revamped structure emerged. Volunteers were not required to undertake guard duties but if they did accept the tasks, as the Government intended they would, they fell under military law. It was hoped the new Act would entice many suitable men who had never joined to enlist and those who had previously left, to return. The number of pure Volunteers, as opposed to those who had been sent by the conscription tribunals, had certainly declined sharply and some corps were still described as being on the ‘verge of collapse’.78 At least one corps’ historian thought the Act put the ‘nebulous and semi-official life’ to an end,

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and another welcomed the recognition which had, he noted, been achieved through its ‘perseverance and imperviousness to ridicule’.79 Yet, not all were pleased. The revised regulations were still to come but one member complained of already ‘growing sick of the invidious and insulting’ regulations, claiming the movement was in danger of becoming ‘snowed under by piecemeal regulations as thick as leaves in Vallambrosa’.80 The War Office was confident that despite protests by some, the spirit within the movement remained strong and that with positive nurturing and, with the addition of an increasing number of men sent by the tribunals, it could achieve its object of using an efficient, and above all a reliable and disciplined body of Volunteers in place of men who it could more profitably use on the Western Front.

7 Restructuring and Compulsion

During the course of 1917, the home forces would undergo further significant changes in character and composition. For the Volunteer Force the transition had begun in 1916 with the coming of conscription and the appearance of the military tribunals; in 1917, the impact of these developments provided the driving force for a major reorganization and reclassification of the movement. These changes were designed to shape, utilize and discipline the growing number of members who had joined not by their own volition but because they were obliged to. The influx of what amounted to a flood of often reluctant conscripts was a phenomenon which many of the original Volunteers resented, and they resigned in significant numbers. Those who remained out of loyalty to their comrades or duty to their country were compelled to drill and train with men whose reason for membership was often diametrically opposed to theirs. While the originals continued to worry about their own efficiency, finance and potential use, their new comrades were frequently more concerned about performing a stipulated number of drills to avoid having their exemption certificate withdrawn. In the summer, the method by which men were called into the Regular Army and the Training Reserve also underwent another reorganization. In May, 14 Training Reserve battalions were designated Young Soldier battalions. Having done their basic training in these battalions, 18-year-old recruits were posted to one of the new Graduated battalions, also newly created from other Training Reserve battalions. These linked battalions were later increased to 23 and 46 respectively. The Graduated battalions were organized into four companies according to age and when the members of the senior company reached 19, they could be posted to the BEF. 147

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In July 1917, the Graduated battalions were numbered from 201 to 246 and began to replace the Second Line and Home Service Garrison battalions in French’s Home Service divisions. The Training Reserve Brigades were renamed simply Reserve Brigades and the 23 Young Soldier battalions were allocated to six of them; in October, they and the Graduated battalions were allotted to 23 line regiments. The former then became 53rd Battalions while the Graduated battalions were designated 51st and 52nd Battalions.1 At the end of the year, six Training Reserve battalions were converted to six Recruit Distribution Battalions whose purpose was to post and dispose of certain categories of recruits; another four became Reserve battalions of the MGC. These changes were intended to streamline and improve the efficiency of the reinforcement system for France. Whilst receiving their progressive and specialized training, and although probably unaware of it themselves, the troops were part of Sir John French’s home army. The restructuring was smooth executed and aroused little opposition. The nature and impact of the changes through which the Volunteer Force, another element of the home army, passed during the year were to have far greater political and military ramifications. The contentious question of who should or should not join the Volunteers had been raised continually since the VTC were first established. The initial War Office recognition in November 1914 had come with conditions, notably the insistence that all men of military age should have an acceptable reason for not joining the army. Gradually the demands of total war necessitated more extensive Government involvement in the field of manpower resources and certain occupations were starred or badged: the younger men in these starred occupations became the target for VTC recruiters. As many were already accustomed to giving and receiving drill, recruits from the teaching profession, one of the earliest occupations to be badged, were especially prized, but within the clergy there was early controversy between those sections who thought they should become involved in the movement and those who believed the churches should stand aloof.2 Many men who had attested under the Derby Scheme joined their local VTC and gained some experience of basic drill. Their appearance caused a fall in the average age of many corps’ membership and, in 1916, the introduction of compulsory military service also resulted in another influx of younger men. Unlike their voluntary Derby colleagues, many of these men had no desire to be members and were directed to the VTC by military tribunals working under the provisions of the Military Service Act. Tribunals had been created following the introduction

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of the Derby Scheme but a new set of regulations provided for important differences between the originals and the later ones designed to operate within the system of compulsion. From 1916, tribunals were to be of a judicial nature, possessing the power to make decisions rather than mere recommendations. As the War Office had been critical of the Derby tribunals’ practice of exempting attested men on dubious, or what it considered to be frivolous grounds, the new versions were to more clearly represent the authorities’ wishes. Military Representatives were to be appointed who, although instructed not to ride roughshod over legitimate local employment concerns, would closely examine all proposed cases of exemption. Under the revised regulations, an individual could claim exemption if his employment was considered to be of national importance, for reasons of ill-health or infirmity, on grounds of conscientious objection, or if he could prove that military service would jeopardize his business or domestic responsibilities. If a tribunal was convinced that a man’s deferment was in the national interest it could grant either absolute, conditional or temporary exemption.3 Predictably, there was much initial uncertainty about how the tribunals would operate and how they would interpret the exemption regulations. Of immediate concern to the leadership of the Volunteer Force was the question of whether men brought before the tribunals should be merely encouraged or compelled to join their local Volunteers as a condition of their exemption. As the Government, too, was at first uncertain, many tribunals took the matter into their own hands and made joining a Volunteer group an obligation for exempted men. Once one tribunal in an area had begun the practice, others tended to follow suit. In the early weeks, men from two tribunals were reported to be ‘readily’ and ‘willingly accepting’ the stipulation. This apparent acceptance of their lot was, in the case of many tribunal men, ultimately to be very short-lived.4 The introduction of conscription also gave the Volunteers the opportunity again to demonstrate their public worth as a home defence organization. Amidst more calls for clarification about who should be allowed, encouraged or compelled to join, Percy Harris used the conscription debate to publicize the work already done by the Volunteers and outline their future potential. Doubts about the legality of compelling men to enrol in the Volunteer Force as a condition of exemption persisted during the summer months of 1916. Although most tribunals accepted the ‘reasonableness’ of the Central Association’s suggestion that exemption should be conditional on enrolment, Walter

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Long, as President of the Local Government Board (LGB), had finally to issue a series of circulars explaining the position. Ruling that men could only be exempted on grounds of their trade or occupation, he did, nevertheless, believe it was ‘reasonable to require’ exempted men either to join the Volunteers, become a Special Constable or assist the local fire service. The War Office decided that as the circular’s explanation was unambiguous, the matter of compelling men to enrol was entirely at the discretion of the tribunals and it could not, even when approached for guidance or appeal, ask tribunals to reconsider cases.5 Arguments over the clarity or otherwise of LGB circulars and the legitimacy of compelling exempted men to join a VTC continued as long as the tribunal system existed. Some private companies remained reluctant to allow even those of their employees over military age, and thus not liable to a tribunal’s decision, to enrol in a home defence corps. Certain banks in London and Hampshire, the railway companies and the heads of several municipal departments of Doncaster Town Council, were among those rumoured to be preventing their men from joining.6 In view of the continuing confusion, the Government undertook the formulation of plans by which men in certain essential industries who wanted to join a corps would be able to do so but would not be liable to call out as Volunteers if an emergency occurred. The means by which a more efficient and differentiated Volunteer body might be achieved was unveiled during the first months of 1917. Although there were later to be further amendments and divisions, the force was, by the spring of that year, to be divided into six sections. Section A comprised men over military age, of at least C1 medical category who, if faced by an emergency, were able to leave their civilian occupation. They would sign on for the duration of the war and be provided with kit and equipment. Section B was to consist of men of military age and those who had been sent by the tribunals to undertake some form of military service. These men, too, would be able to leave their jobs if the Volunteer Force was mobilized. Section R was for Volunteers employed by Government departments, those in possession of a war service badge, and railway employees. Men in this section would not be mobilized without the consent of the department or company concerned. The final three categories were C, for youths over 17 years but under military age, P, reserved for Special Constables and D, intended for any man who was unwilling to commit himself to any other section. Men in Sections A and B, which were to comprise the bulk of the membership, would be required to perform 14 drills per month until they became efficient, and then another ten per month. In return for this

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commitment, and when a man was passed efficient, the Territorial association would receive a £2 grant to clothe and administer him.7 This new classification appealed to the bulk of the movement and was recognized as a belated but probably genuine attempt by the War Office partly to atone for its earlier reluctant support. To the movement itself, the Volunteer Force had, in effect, replaced the Territorial Force but members of this new home defence organization were now to be expected to perform more drills than had been expected from their usually younger Territorial counterparts. Moreover, the Volunteers were to receive less financial assistance and the required drills were also to contain a harder physical element than those required by the pre-war Territorial Force.8 There were early questions about how sufficient instructors were to be acquired, complaints that the £2 grant would be totally inadequate and some, albeit limited, criticism that the very classification would, in itself, prove detrimental to the movement. Section D was in particular singled out as providing a means by which a man could claim to be contributing to the war effort without making any real commitment. Men in D were certainly in an anomalous position for they continued to enjoy the right of giving 14 days’ notice of leaving their corps.9 With some reservations, and not withstanding reports of longer serving members resigning rather than sign yet another form or face yet further reorganization, the classification was thought to be sufficiently extensive and rational to secure the movement’s future. Those who signed for Section A naturally tended to be the original Volunteers of the VTC era whilst, as the regulations demanded, the sometimes more reluctant men who had been sent by the tribunals signed for Section B. The perceived hostility of tribunal personnel towards the Volunteers continued to attract criticism from within the movement but, conversely, there were also those who believed tribunals were displaying a pro-Volunteer bias by insisting upon exempted men joining a battalion without first offering them the option of enrolling in a VAD or the Special Constabulary. The authorities were, in fact, becoming increasingly concerned at the numbers of men of military age who were not only supposedly serving in the Volunteers but who were doing so with apparently little commitment to their training. A strength return of May 1917 underlined the problem. Almost 200,000 of the total of just under 300,000 were Volunteers of military age: ‘This’, according to the War Office, ‘was neither the expected nor intended result’ of the recent reorganization.10 Of the 198,000 men of military age, 102,000 had been sent by the tribunals as a condition of their exemption but, of these, only 63,000 had joined

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Section B. This meant that despite being tribunal men, 39,000 members of military age had an obligation under the 1863 Act to perform only ten drills per year and could leave with 14 days’ notice. In addition to those 39,000, there were another 44,000 of military age in Section D who had undertaken no obligation to become efficient. Opting by their own volition to become Volunteers, these men thus avoided the possibility of being forced to join by the tribunals, thereby incurring definite obligations. Many of them were thought to have subsequently secured exemption by stating that they were already members of the Volunteer Force. When the strength of all sections was added together, the total number of members was 292,951. Of that total, the number of men in Sections A and B came to only 136,176, or a disappointing 46 per cent.11 Both the DCIGS, Major-General Sir Robert Whigham, and the Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-General Sir Nevil Macready, expressed a lack of faith in the ability of the tribunals to refrain from sending men suitable for the army to the Volunteers.12 Macready restated his long held belief that the creation of the Volunteer Force had, in itself, been a ‘mistake, seeing that it was a voluntary organization superimposed upon conscription’ and remained convinced that it had ‘militated considerably’ against recruitment for the army.13 He also believed the Volunteers’ often rehearsed theory that an efficient Volunteer Force would release Regulars from home defence duties was fallacious, and criticised the tribunal system for being ‘only too anxious’ to exempt men for personal and family reasons. Their willingness to exempt men on the argument that membership of the Volunteer Force entailed a form of military compulsion and their alleged failure to enforce the LGB’s circulars had, he believed, cost the army about 100,000 men. He remained opposed to any increase in grants and to the expansion of the Volunteer Force ‘unless or until’ a corresponding decrease in the strength of the troops allocated to home defence could be guaranteed.14 Lord Scarbrough, who had replaced Edward Bethune as DGTVF, wrote a reply three days after receiving Macready’s paper.15 He admitted little had been done by the Volunteers to release Regulars for overseas and accepted that the force was at the present time immobile and incapable of offering any degree of reliance. However, he blamed the inadequacies not on inherent faults within the force itself but on the difficulties it had experienced in trying to procure arms and equipment. He insisted a voluntary part-time home army of 300,000 was essential and that unless a modified system of grants was adopted, the force would never become efficient and thus never be in a position to release more Regulars. He

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defended the tribunals, stating that it had been made clear on several occasions, with the full and public support of the Director of Recruiting, that membership of the Volunteers was not an alternative to military service. Using evidence gathered from reports by Military Representatives, he discounted the opinion that tribunals had been acting too leniently, arguing instead that conscripts who had been Volunteers were sent overseas more quickly than those recruits who had had no previous military experience. Macready’s claim that the Volunteer Force had cost the army 100,000 recruits was similarly dismissed.16 The Gazette periodically turned its attention to persistent but unfounded rumours that the Government was considering extending conscription to cover the volunteer home army. In May 1917, Percy Harris asked Ian Macpherson, the Under Secretary of State for War, if the War Office had considered the detrimental impact that extending army compulsion to men of 50 years old would have on the Volunteers17 and, in August, the Gazette condemned the threat of introducing conscription to the force itself as the ‘remedy of the incompetent’. It complained that the earlier period of Governmental neglect was now being replaced by one of excessive regulation and restriction. This policy, it argued, was already decisively and adversely affecting recruitment and efficiency. It warned that any attempt to introduce compulsion would spell the end of the Volunteer Force and herald the creation of what would amount to a new, conscripted, Army Reserve. Not only would such a move necessitate establishing the ‘paraphernalia’ of an appeals system, but the idea of compelling men aged 41 to 60 years to join the body would destroy its unique esprit and work against the very efficiency the policy was intended to improve. Opinion within the movement seems to have supported the editorial but correspondence illustrated the reality of the situation. One contributor predicted that as only the 30 members of Section A in his company of 250 could be relied upon to do anything in an emergency, the company would be unable to fulfil its allotted responsibilities. The officer concluded with the gloomy assessment that ‘we either need compulsion or admit that we are not needed’.18 Contemporary opinion within the Volunteer movement believed the tribunals could do more to assist them in their recruitment campaigns and in advertizing the home defence capability of the force. In particular it was concerned over the number of men who, when given the opportunity, were choosing to become Special Constables rather than Volunteers. Owing to the widespread belief within the movement that the corps had replaced the Specials in most of their quasi-military duties, Volunteers considered any exempted man who chose to join the

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Specials was selecting the easy option. They argued that as there was therefore no longer the need for a Special Constabulary, it should be disbanded and the men be compelled to join a local Volunteer company. The idea that the Specials were hardly used was not entirely correct but, in rural areas in particular, it did have more than a grain of truth. In contrast, Chief Constables in some urban areas continued to complain they had too few Specials for the tasks required and, in an effort to induce more to enrol, advocated disbanding any Volunteer corps which had not affiliated to the Central Association.19 Despite the alleged attraction of the Special Constabulary to exempted men, the Home Office clearly did have a problem. By May 1916 it was estimated 9000 Specials had already joined the army and the Military Service Act was expected to take another 40 per cent of existing strength.20 A letter from the Commandant of the 2nd Mid-Kent Fencibles underlined the difficulty of the civil power retaining the first call on those Specials who were also Volunteers. The issue affected 33 per cent of his other rank members and 66 per cent of his officers. If responsibility to the civil power took precedence, his battalion would virtually disappear and potential members, he claimed, were not joining because they saw no point in buying a uniform until the matter had been resolved.21 The Chief Constable of Huntingdon pulled the Home Office in the opposite direction. He urged Sir Edward Troup, Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, to resist what he had heard was the ‘anxiety’ of the military to requisition the services of the Specials in order to release more Volunteers for work elsewhere. The Chief Constable warned that he was already short of the number of men required by the Emergency Committee and that any change in their responsibilities would involve the Home Office in ‘breaking faith with promises already given’.22 Calls to amalgamate the two auxiliaries continued to be made. Within Volunteer circles the twin beliefs that the very existence of the Special Constabulary provided an obstacle to Volunteer recruiting and the conviction that there were just too many Specials, persisted. Town authorities were accused of favouring the Specials at the expense of the Volunteers and many Volunteers who were also Specials complained that their duties as part-time policemen were adversely affecting their efficiency as Volunteers.23 In turn, French accused the local authorities of not encouraging the movement, an argument endorsed by Basil Liddell Hart who called the Stroud politicians’ decision not to invite the Volunteers to the third anniversary parade of the commencement of the war a ‘contemptible slur’. French also turned his invective on the Volunteers themselves. He made several uncompromising speeches in

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which he told the parades it was ‘perfectly miraculous’ what the Government had done for them but that they were not reciprocating. They would not be asked to ‘go and stand for days and nights in trenches full of ice and water to be shot at’ or to ‘go in a charge from which they returned leaving half their comrades dead’, but merely to attend a few drills each month. He told them it was ‘no use my coming here if I do not tell you exactly what I think’. Lord Harris followed a similar line when he riled at the Kent Volunteers for their poor turnout. He called it a ‘very bad compliment’ to their County Commandant and threatened to report absentees to their local tribunals.24 In his continuing efforts to establish an auxiliary home army upon whose numbers and efficiency he could rely, French suggested tribunals should be instructed to order only those men of military age who had been granted a long period of exemption to join Section B, and that no badged man should be accepted in that section unless it was clear that in an emergency he could be spared from his civilian occupation.25 The FM C-in-C Home Forces’ suggestions were intended to overcome problems which had arisen as a result of the army’s manpower shortages and the continuing acceptance within the War Office that while Germany was fully occupied on the Western Front, she lacked the resources to offer a serious threat to Britain’s shores. French remained marginally less convinced than the War Office about the supposed diminution of the German threat and despite encouraging public statements was privately pessimistic about the ability of his home defence forces to resist an enemy landing. In February 1917 he stunned the authorities by dramatically informing the War Office that the withdrawal of so many of his Regular troops now allowed him to absolve himself entirely of the responsibility for home defence. To underline his chief’s concern, when the flabbergasted officials questioned one of French’s staff officers about how many Germans his forces would be able to oppose, he replied ‘450’.26 The bulk of the home defence forces was concentrated on the beaches but if the Germans penetrated the defences and worked inland, French believed his 100,000 mobile troops would be unable to prevent them from wreaking havoc. Of the approximately 400,000 men currently designated for home defence, by early 1917 only about 150,000 were Class A Regular or Territorial soldiers. Furthermore, these were mainly yeomanry, cyclists, RGA and RE. Of the 230,000 infantry available to French, 180,000 were either in the early stages of their training or were mere 18-year-old boys. When Charles Repington warned Lloyd George how perilous the manpower situation was and how ‘dangerously weak’

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the defences were, the Prime Minister, who was firmly convinced that Germany was more likely to invade Italy than Britain, confidently offered to eat one sausage for every German over 50,000 landed.27 French accepted the impact the manpower crisis in France was bound to have on his home army and remained convinced that an essential element of any solution was a viable Volunteer Force. The proposals drawn up in November 1916 on how the Volunteer Force was to be utilized remained the basis for the auxiliary’s deployment throughout 1917 but those plans had been formulated when it was still unknown how many men might accept the terms of the, as yet, unpublished Volunteer Bill. In January 1917, the War Office had speculated that the number of required Volunteers might reach 198,000, 141,000 of whom would have to be ‘efficients’. It was thought that perhaps an additional 37,000 men of uncertain quality might also be available.28 French’s scheme to attach Volunteer battalions to the Northern and Southern Armies and to the recently created Independent and Composite Brigades remained, but by mid-1917 the C-in-CHF was considering a severe reduction in the number of battalions required on the lines of communication.29 Despite the original intention of stimulating commitment and enthusiasm by allocating the Volunteers specific tasks and areas, the actual scheme of deployment was kept very confidential.30 French did, however, remain convinced that the great majority of the force must be infantry: there were to be no Volunteer cyclist, machine gun, cavalry, field or heavy artillery units, no engineer companies, a limited number of signal companies and only one horse transport company. He did, nevertheless, accept the need for motor companies to transport the infantry and for about 30 field ambulances. His primary concerns were to ensure the infantry battalions were adequately trained and equipped, that they contained a sufficiently large number of younger men to allow them mobility and stamina, and to test whether the seemingly haphazard means employed by some battalions would actually get their men mobilized quickly enough to be of use.31 The issue of the potential uses and utility of the Volunteers in home defence schemes rose again during the Army Estimates debate in early March 1917 when Brigadier-General Croft demanded the Volunteers be made into ‘a real thing’. Croft spoke of the present ‘sham … and delusion’ of the force, arguing that there was no reason, save for lack of Government interest and commitment, why the Volunteers should not become even more efficient than the pre-war Territorial Force. At that moment, he continued, there was no organized force and the Volunteers themselves believed they were not being taken seriously. Croft wanted

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the force to be raised by compulsion and to have its name changed from the ‘vicious’ Home Defence Army to the more grandiose Imperial Reserve Army.32 Percy Harris replied to Croft’s strident criticism of the existing state of the force by declining the suggestion of the name change and by the cogent argument that the brigadier’s views were rather out of date. Harris insisted that the force was indeed very well organized, training was progressing and equipment arriving. He rejected the idea that battalions should be made into full time units, arguing that by so doing the force would lose its justification, industry would be disrupted and it would cost the Treasury considerably more money. This, insisted Harris, was the crux of the issue. The Volunteers themselves understood that their most persuasive argument was to demonstrate a capability of developing into an economic home defence force which gave value for money.33 Ian Macpherson supported Harris’ onslaught on Croft, describing the ‘extraordinary progress’ made since the beginning of the year. Within six weeks, he estimated, practically every man in Section A was expected to possess a rifle and went on to describe how the appointment of paid and experienced adjutants was already producing ‘wonderful’ results in training and organization.34 In late March 1917, what reports describe as either a planned test mobilization or, alternatively, as an invasion panic instigated by a schoolmaster and a squire in Broadstairs, suggested that vital sections of the Volunteer Force remained ill-prepared to meet an invasion threat. Equinoctial tides and stories that the Germans were massing shipping and over half a million men at Zeebrugge caused the declaration of a ‘period of vigilance’. Regular troops were summoned from theatres and told to report to depots, Volunteers were recalled from trench digging and some spent a night manning coastal defences. The United Arts Rifles managed to get about one third of its strength assembled within two hours and the City of London Volunteer Regiment succeeded in getting only 1300 of its men out of their homes; thousands of others never received the call. Amidst the tumult, Will Thorne asked the Leader of the House if the Government was aware of the widespread rumours of German landings in both Scotland and East Anglia. Bonar Law acknowledged the ‘universal commotion’, ascribing it to an official mobilization rehearsal for home defence units. The Gazette attempted to play down the Volunteers’ unconvincing responses but on hearing stories of a mass exodus of the panic-stricken Kentish population, Repington ruefully pondered, ‘What will it be like if one Boche lands?’35 The March scare coincided with another inter-service conference set up to discuss the invasion issue. It was prompted by an alarmist letter

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from Admiral Fisher to Lloyd George expressing concern about the growing U-boat threat and French’s pessimism about the ability of his diminishing number of Regular troops and the part-time auxiliaries to deal with a landing. Fisher outlined seven reasons why he thought a German invasion possible, not least of which was his theory that the High Seas Fleet was effectively under the command of Hindenburg who, as a soldier, would think nothing of sacrificing it in a major but futile demonstration. The Admiralty was not as concerned as its former chief but did revise its August 1916 conclusions by extending its estimation of the time the Grand Fleet would need before being able to intervene effectively in an incursion. It still believed the Germans had the shipping and probably the men to make an attempt, but considered it ‘possible’ rather than ‘probable’. French accepted that the recent addition of machine guns to coastal defences had improved their capability but still argued that a ‘considerable proportion’ of his divisions was of poor quality and that he was about 60,000 men short of the number required to meet an invasion of 160,000.36 It seems likely that French, with thoughts of forthcoming negotiations with the War Office in mind, ordered the test mobilization on 25 March in the expectation that it would reveal considerable inadequacies. Ostensibly, in March 1917, French’s home army still appeared of considerable size. He had five Second Line Territorial divisions, three Home Service divisions, six Independent Brigades, a mounted division, ten cyclist brigades of former Yeomanry, 21 Territorial cyclist battalions, three Reserve Regiments of cavalry, five Reserve Battalions of Guards and one of the HAC. In addition, there were the so-called Extemporized Formations: these contained the Reserve Infantry Brigades of the Regular Army and the Territorial Force, and the Special Reserve battalions.37 These forces were divided between the several different bodies which constituted the home army itself and the units which could rally to its support. Northern Army, which was concentrated in East Anglia, comprised the 64th and 68th Divisions, 1 and 2 Cyclist Brigades, three Independent Brigades of what had been Provisional battalions but which now had regimental designations, six cyclist battalions, supporting artillery and an armoured train. Further south, and covering both sides of the Thames estuary, Southern Army, with its HQ at Brentford, comprised the Second Line 67th Division, and the 71st and 73rd (Home Service) Divisions. Although the 71st Division had one brigade of nominally Second Line Territorials, these two divisions contained units which had formerly been either Provisional or Home Service Garrison battalions and which enlisted men into their mid-50s. Southern Army also had

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three Independent Brigades, all of which contained formerly Provisional battalions, 3 and 4 Cyclist Brigades, with 5 Cyclist Brigade and a further three cyclist battalions attached for training. There was a General Reserve of 1st Mounted Division based at Bishop Stortford and the 72nd Division at Bedford, as well as the 65th Division. The remaining cyclist brigades, cyclist battalions and the Extemporized Formations were scattered as Local Forces throughout the Home Commands and Districts. Ignoring the transient troops in the Extemporized units, the C-in-CHF’s principal and, at least for the moment, permanent units, were increasingly composed of indifferently trained men of low medical category.38 These forces were largely deployed to cover the expected landing areas along the East Coast. The West Coast, the South Coast from Land’s End to Selsey Bill and the shores north of Cromarty were thought to offer little opportunity for the enemy; perhaps a landing by 5600 men without artillery. The coast from north of The Wash to Cromarty could have been threatened by a raid of up to 20,000 men supported by light artillery, but the area thought most likely to be assaulted, with London as its objective, was the coast between Aldeburgh and Lowestoft. The Admiralty promised that it could offer effective disruption to an enemy fleet within 32 to 36 hours of it being sighted. With the Royal Navy harassing it from the sea and with the cyclist brigades and battalions providing immediate support to the coastal garrisons and local forces, it was hoped any assaulting force would be successfully pinned to the beach.39 Various schemes of how further reinforcements should arrive at the threatened area had been amended in the light of French’s diminishing reserves. If GHQ did declare a state of special vigilance, plans allowed for the permanent manning of all telegraph offices; civil telephone and telegraph lines in threatened areas would become military lines and about 2000 personnel from the Signal Service Training Centre would proceed to their allocated home defence station. The County of London Volunteer Force was to provide one corps signal company and two motor airline sections for the London Defences, and the Canadian Training Division at Seaford was to supply a divisional signal company for the GOC Eastern Command. In addition, selected employees of the GPO had been granted commissions while lower ranking personnel had been enlisted and passed immediately to Class W of the Army Reserve. In an emergency they would supplement the Army Signal Service in the zones of operation. Similarly, if required the Volunteers would be called out officially by royal proclamation and, more prosaically, through the telephone and telegraph networks by the Director of Army Signals.40

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The officer with overall responsibility for ensuring the railways were capable of executing the various emergency schemes and despatching the troops and supplies was the Director of Movements at the War Office. The GOC Commands made the arrangements for the collection and concentration of forces and reinforcements in their areas, but in 1917 an Inspector-General of Communications had been appointed to French’s staff to co-ordinate railway arrangements in the rear areas and as far forward as the rail heads. He had to organize and maintain the supplies of ammunition and stores, the arrival of reinforcements and, if required, the evacuation of personnel and material from the forward zone.41 If mobilization was ordered, the Director of Movements would, in cooperation with the Railway Executive Committee, authorize the InspectorGeneral of Communications to issue all executive orders for railway movements; a Deputy Director of Railway Transport was also detailed to join GHQ as a technical adviser. Each Command was to receive an Assistant or Deputy-Assistant Director of Railways and a Secretary Railway Company, both of whom were high ranking officials in the railway companies which normally operated on those particular lines. GHQs were to agree the location of rail heads and the Inspector-General was to fix the series of Regulating Stations through which supplies would be forwarded. The schedule allowed for three days between loading the wagons at supply depots, despatching them through the Regulating Stations, being drawn by divisional or brigade transport at the rail head, and consumed.42 The logistics involved in moving reinforcements from their permanent stations to their concentration areas was comprehensive and complicated. A Provisional brigade at full strength comprised 5136 men and 782 horses. Besides the men’s rations, a heavy draught horse needed 17lb of oats and 15lb of hay daily; riding horses needed 12lb of each.43 Sufficient fodder for the initial three days was scheduled to be taken by train. Every man was estimated to require 200 rounds of SAA per day of operations, each machine gun 6000, 15-pdr and 18-pdr guns 200, and howitzers 100. A standard railway truck could carry 250,000 rounds of SAA or 250 4.7-inch shells. On the first day of mobilization, 148 trucks carrying 37 million rounds of SAA and 26 trucks loaded with 16,640 rounds of 18-pdr shrapnel would be required to carry what was to form an initial reserve for Northern and Southern Armies. The reserves were to be stored at Regulating Stations such as Willesden and Stratford, which had siding capacities of 600 and 800 wagons respectively.44 Troops travelling under 40 miles from their start point were normally expected to go by road, but numbers of railway trucks were kept in permanent readiness by the Great Eastern Railway (which also supplied a

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personal train for use by the C-in-CHF), at Parkeston in case the 67th Division had to move from its training area around Colchester towards Norwich.45 If the Germans did land, all locomotives within 20 miles of the coast were to be withdrawn and concentrated at designated marshalling yards. Railway stores and tools which could not be removed were to be destroyed, tracks and bridges on harbours and quays were to be rendered useless and selected linesmen were detailed to cut telegraph lines and provide alternative circuits. Some of these linesmen were also members of the Volunteer Force but a scheme to form special railway companies of Volunteers to man an armoured train did not materialize. For tracks which needed to be protected rather than destroyed, the RDC was to provide the required average of 15 men per mile; if the Corps lacked sufficient manpower to provide the necessary cover, the Volunteer Force was to be called out. That decision was to be made by each of the four Defence Commanders Lines of Communication who were responsible to GHQ HF for the protection of their allocated areas of permanent way.46 Sir John French’s March test mobilization did not involve the activation of the entire home defence emergency scheme. Very few troop movements of any distance appear to have been authorized but its limited scope was probably intended to reinforce the C-in-C’s assertion that the diminishing number of Regular troops at his disposal meant the Volunteer Force would have to be allocated a concrete role in home defence strategy. At the time of the practice exercise, French was reasonably content with the number of Volunteers who were thought to be registering in Sections A and B. This early satisfaction was soon to dissipate but as the reported figure of enrolments approached the 150,000 mentioned by the Secretary of State when the Volunteer Bill was introduced to the Lords, French wrote to the War Office requesting the Army Council agree to an increased figure of 300 infantry battalions, each with an establishment of 1000.47 A meeting of the Volunteer Force Committee at GHQ Home Forces accepted French’s proposal and, because it was thought the target would be achieved and accepted by the War Office, Scarbrough wrote to the Lords Lieutenant instructing them to decline any further offers of infantry units.48 French received additional help for his efforts to justify an increase in the number of Volunteers when the report of the committee investigating vulnerable points was published in April. Established as a sub-committee of the War Cabinet, the group had been formed by the direction of Asquith, the PM, in July 1916 with the purpose of periodically revising and updating the schedules of vulnerable points drawn up by earlier committees. The committee reclassified existing sites and made recommendations as to

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the troops required to protect them. Despite attempts to limit the type of site that the War Cabinet decided needed protection, it was obvious to any reader that the available number of Regular and RDC soldiers was entirely inadequate to furnish sufficient guards.49 An increase in Volunteer establishment was, to French, essential if his Regular and Territorial home defence troops were to be continually withdrawn for foreign service. However, he was under increasing pressure to justify both the size of the Volunteer Force he believed was essential and, above all, the costs incurred in raising and maintaining such a body. There were many within the Army Council who remained convinced that despite the recent reorganization and allocation of public funds, the Volunteer Force could never be converted to an effective military body. They resented the money and resources devoted to the auxiliary and made little attempt to hide their desire to see it either abolished or reduced to a fraction of its proposed strength. The argument that the force provided an opportunity for men likely to be called up to undergo a course of preliminary military instruction was dismissed as irrelevant. While the War Office could afford to be concerned purely with the military value, or otherwise of the Volunteers, the politicians had other considerations. It was widely acknowledged that given the number of public bodies and influential people in practically every county and borough of the British mainland who had been involved in raising the force, the sums of money already contributed by private subscription and local government and the fact that since the introduction of conscription it was the sole remaining voluntary organization of military character in the country, any attempt suddenly to scrap this example of patriotic endeavour would create an uproar in Parliament and the country. Mindful of the public’s temper as losses during Third Ypres mounted remorselessly, the Government could not afford to strike at what, to many, had come to represent the epitome and heart of middle class Britain. The Secretary of State’s refusal to accept the consensus of military opinion was made entirely on political and propagandist grounds but he did agree to the proposal that GHQ HF should issue a definitive statement for internal distribution about the force’s strength, deployment and use.50 Whigham, the DCIGS, produced the requested paper three days later.51 Its preamble pointed out sanction to raise a large Volunteer Force had been granted on two assumptions: first that it would allow reductions in the number of Regulars on anti-invasion duty and, second, that it would also release a number of lower grade garrison troops. With regard to the first assumption, the DGTVF had been told home service troops would not be replaced by Volunteers as long as invasion was

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considered possible and, as for the second, fewer than 400 RDC soldiers had been relieved by Volunteers. It was ‘doubtful’, the DCIGS thought, whether it would ever be possible to increase that number.52 A break down of existing Volunteer battalions53 and their intended deployment gave a total of 291,226 men. Of the 312 units, 84 were allocated to line of communication, 71 as mobile troops and 70 as a General Reserve. The paper refrained from offering much in the way of criticism of the quality of the units but pointed out that 75 per cent of the guards performed by Volunteers on vulnerable points were considered unnecessary. It concluded that in view of the fact that no Regulars had been released, ‘the objects of the Volunteers have hitherto not been realized’ and consequently, the entire Volunteer issue ‘requires scrutiny’.54 Having studied the DCIGS’s paper, Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, the DMO, wrote a crushing analysis of the numbers of Volunteer units which might be of any use and how they might be deployed.55 He fell short of advocating the disbanding of the force but believed that nearly 150 battalions could be dispensed with and training substantially improved for the survivors. Citing the example of Germany, who maintained only 68 battalions on lines of communication throughout hostile France and Belgium, he recommended a mere 24 of the allocated 64 battalions needed to be deployed for such duties in Britain. Five battalions currently allotted to garrison and coast defences could be disbanded but he did accept that Volunteers might usefully assist some RGA and RE units in both technical and non-technical coastal work. The 42 battalions allocated to the London defences should be equipped only as pioneer units and be used purely to complete the capital’s entrenchments. The DMO saved his harshest criticism for the General Reserve and the mobile formations. He could not understand why the number of units allotted to assist the home troops’ mobile force had been raised from 38 to 71, and predicted that in an emergency they would prove more of an encumbrance than a help. They should be reduced to 33 battalions and, as if to underline their futility as a mobile reinforcement, should possess no transport. The General Reserve of 70 battalions, thought the DMO, was simply a convenient term dreamt up by GHQ Home Forces to embody all those units for which it could find no genuine employment. In the event of a landing they would be of no use at all and should be reduced to 20. This ferocious analysis concluded that only 117 battalions of the existing force of 312 (42 of which were to be the pioneer units), could be usefully employed. Quite apart from the already large and increasing cost to the state, Maurice argued the Volunteers were absorbing training cadres, material and transport which could be better employed in bringing the mobile units to

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a higher state of efficiency. He wanted more intensive training for those units which survived his recommended cull and hoped that the force might then become a ‘quantity to which some definite value can be assigned in the scheme of Home Defence, which at present is not the case’.56 Given the hostile attitude within the War Office, it served the purposes of those senior officers who had a genuine regard for the Volunteer Force, and who were, of course, determined to retain as many Regular troops at home as possible, to play up the idea that an invasion could not be discounted. During the autumn of 1917, while the Army Council was in the process of conducting its very thorough and generally unsympathetic examination of the function and existence of the movement, Volunteer assemblies were warned by several general officers that invasion or raids in force remained distinct possibilities.57 Parades were told that if the Germans did make an attempt, the military authorities estimated their assaulting force would survive for only one week; by that time, the fleet, the home army and the Volunteers would have starved it of reinforcements and either have hurled it back into the sea or accepted its surrender. This theory was accepted by, among others, Lord Errol in Cumberland, who decided that if the invading force had not been defeated within seven days, ‘they’ll be all over us’.58 FM French himself was not above adding to the speculation. His ‘alarmist views’ and ‘pessimistic utterances’ caused one MP to question publicly his retention as C-in-C, and made the editor of the Gazette’s flesh ‘creep’ with apprehension.59 The difficulty facing French and his staff was to find and maintain the balance between what he believed was the minimum number of troops required for home defence and the number of efficient Volunteers which the country could afford to arm. If he advocated an unrestricted number of auxiliaries, the War Office might use it as an excuse to reduce his full-time garrisons even further. On the other hand, if he accepted the reductions proposed by the DMO and the DCIGS, there was the strong possibility of a political backlash. In the face of War Office antipathy, Lord Scarbrough even struggled to secure the acceptance of a reduction in the maximum number of grant earners to 250,000. He argued that the steady decline in the number of men securing exemption was inevitably leading to a progressive loss of men in Section B, thereby adversely affecting the force’s general efficiency.60 However hard the military authorities might pressurize the politicians to abolish or drastically reduce the force, Scarbrough knew there would ultimately be limits to any further reorganization. No matter how convincing the War Office arguments might be, the Government

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would be politically unable to tolerate the breaching of those final parameters. What amounted to an imposed compromise between the politicians, War Office and those soldiers responsible for the administration of the Volunteer Force was achieved just before Christmas 1917. The advantage lay very much with Scarbrough. With the knowledge that consideration of ‘public sentiment’61 would ensure the politicians’ support, he succeeded in securing a force of 274 infantry battalions with over 267,000 all ranks, and a maximum establishment of all arms of almost 286,000. He had no real grounds for objecting to the proposal that all men currently in Section D had to accept service for the duration and a commitment to drill by the end of February or be struck off, and welcomed the agreement whereby the number of drills might be modified if a man could prove a genuine difficulty in fulfilling them. Scarbrough enjoyed further success when the War Office sanctioned the formation of more Volunteer engineer, fortress and signal units. These were to comprise men over military age and were intended, as indeed had the pre-war Territorial Special Service Sections, to supplement and perhaps eventually replace Regular troops.62 The General Staff’s proposal to reduce the number of Volunteer battalions to 175, as well as French’s option of defining no fixed establishment until Section D men had decided either to switch sections or to resign, were rejected.63 One crumb of comfort was thrown to the War Office by the tacit acceptance of the DGTVF and his civil masters that as only 105 of the 274 infantry battalions were allotted specific duties, their military potential remained somewhat dubious. While Scarbrough could express satisfaction at the outcome of the recent spate of conferences and at the degree of Governmental support, until the issues of the tribunal men’s commitment and confirmation of Section D resignations were resolved, the auxiliary would remain in a state of flux. Despite the enthusiasm of thousands of its members, the force’s reliability remained questionable, its training unconvincing and its equipment supply patchy. French’s Sunday tours of the country had important benefits as far as the morale of existing members was concerned, but he and the DGTVF had to play for time. If they could retain the support of the politicians to continue successfully resisting the War Office’s swingeing ambitions, establish an acceptable degree of reliability in membership and efficiency and improve its organization and administration, the Volunteer Force had a chance of survival.

8 ‘A Sham or a Real Thing’? The Volunteer Force in 19171

In a blatantly propagandist and less than balanced assessment of the Volunteer movement in late 1917, a contemporary writer described how the Government had ‘unostentatiously’ and ‘without any fuss or furore … created for themselves by the work and devotion of others’ a new reserve force with an established role in the defence of the country. This new home ‘army’ had become an ‘integral part of the armed forces’, and was said to be regarded in ‘official quarters as the worthy successors of the old Territorials’.2 It had, however, been in existence for only three and a half years; the Rifle Volunteers had existed for 49 years and the Territorials for six. Both had been widely derided. Unsurprisingly, therefore, and despite public statements expressing his confidence in the Force, two years after he had been appointed GOC-in-CHF and 12 months since the passage of the Volunteer Bill, French remained unconvinced of the force’s utility. In some county associations there was a similar distrust of the Volunteers: there were accusations of Volunteers purloining Territorials’ equipment and of using the petrol ration for their own private use. Some associations were so distrustful they perceived the necessity of drawing up rules to warn of a £5 fine should any Volunteer attempt to pawn his kit and there were regular complaints, perhaps paradoxically from a force which contained so many white collar workers and small scale businessmen, that its local administration was inadequate. The Volunteers’ ignorance of military procedure and their refusal to follow instructions often resulted in company and platoon commanders ignoring the correct channels and writing, much to the dismay of senior officers, directly to their Command area. Too many members appeared to have an obsession with either obtaining their own release or at least securing exemption from drills at certain times of the year. They were 166

‘A Sham or a Real Thing’? The Volunteer Force in 1917 167

not trusted to take their weapons home or to receive duty free tobacco, and one of its keenest supporters wanted the Government to give advanced warning of mobilization (and thus of course of a German raid or invasion!) to enable Volunteers to attend to their business and family affairs before marching away to defend their shores.3 Some battalions contained holders of the Indian Mutiny Medal, and also Rifle Volunteers who had joined in 1863; its leadership could squabble over the denomination of battalion chaplains, and had members who suggested such hare-brained schemes as the formation of a Volunteer Royal Flying Corps to fly obsolete machines.4 They endured the invidious distinction of being the only element of the armed forces required to buy their own boots, wore their civilian greatcoats over the uniform many had bought themselves and, unlike the Territorials, were not even awarded the right of exemption from jury service. Only on very rare occasions were Volunteers allowed to draw government rations and, in contrast to members of the Territorial Force, could not claim separation allowances when away on courses or camp.5 They could be fined for wearing their uniform at the wrong time or in the wrong place, were allowed to use Territorial rifle ranges but might not be permitted to enjoy their adjacent social facilities, were expected to devote a considerable amount of their leisure time to corps’ activities and were supposed to improve their military skills in spite of a shortage of qualified instructors.6 Battalions still had to rely on a combination of local authority benevolence, subscription income and the generosity of individuals to supplement what they insisted as an inadequate government grant.7 One corps even contemplated a street collection until it was told by the War Office that it was inappropriate for an arm of His Majesty’s Forces to beg on street corners.8 Officers, many of whom were not in their first flush and were fully engaged in running civilian businesses, were expected to pay for themselves to go on residential courses or when studying a home-based programme. The apprehension felt by French and most of Britain’s military hierarchy about the Volunteers’ worth is perhaps understandable. The war had already forced the authorities to accept many unpalatable erosions in the way the army was raised, organized and officered: the appearance of the New Armies and their ‘temporary gentlemen’ and the promotion of a handful of Territorial officers to brigadier-general to name but two. The old army had held the pre-war home army Territorials in little regard and, to the establishment, that body’s apparent successor the Volunteer Force, warranted even less acknowledgement. The Territorials had been amateurs and volunteers but the organization had a tradition, an esprit, and was

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composed of men of military age who wanted to be part of its battalions and batteries. Most Volunteers who really wanted to be corps members were over military age, maintained an alarmingly unmilitaristic wish for independence and, while they might have criticized the War Office for a lack of support, generally resented the authorities’ attempts to impose organization and discipline. The force did contain many sincere enthusiasts but by 1917 almost the majority of members were there because they had been sent by the tribunals. If they chose to default on their obligations there was little in practical terms the authorities, through the exercise of military or civil law, could do about it. The military could claim, with some justification, that it had tried to meet the demands of the eccentric and very unfamiliar force half way but, having granted concession after concession, they were still accused of throwing every conceivable obstacle in the Volunteers’ path and of refusing to take them seriously. Since recognition in late 1916, the Government had spent progressively more on the new home army, money which the movement’s supporters claimed was justifiably spent. They argued that a Volunteer cost the state only £2 per year whereas it cost £84 to maintain a Regular. If the 250,000 Volunteers did the work of only 25,000 Regulars, they would, therefore, have saved the state £1.6 million, formed an organized army for home defence and allowed the release of the equivalent of nearly one and a half divisions for overseas duty.9 A Select Committee on National Expenditure reported in January 1918 but it had discovered no firm conclusions as to how the War Office proposed to use the Volunteers.10 The implication of the committee’s findings was that despite recognition, Acts of Parliament and state expenditure, the War Office could find no purpose for the auxiliary. The financial outlay had thus produced no military advantage. On behalf of the Government, Bonar Law justified the expenditure but it was evident that apart from considering where certain units might be required on mobilization, the Volunteer Force had made little impact on the War Office’s thoughts and schemes of home defence.11 Having studied the evidence the Army Council had come to the stark conclusion that the Volunteer Force was of no conceivable military worth. Supporters of the movement quite naturally held an alternative opinion of the force’s potential. They could point to the numbers of battalions acquiring modern weapons, the supply of enough equipment for all Section A and B men, the increasing numbers of men qualifying as ‘efficient’, the appointment of RSM and sergeant instructors and the encouraging attendance at camp. Unfortunately this veneer of improving efficiency covered some, still decidedly unsatisfactory, blemishes.

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It was the responsibility of the Territorial associations to ensure the security and maintenance of the Volunteers’ weapons but this did not mean that weapons had to be stored in conventional armouries. Some associations allowed the hire of premises away from drill halls for the use of company armouries but those associations which did insist upon weapons being returned nightly to a central store after guard duty or practice were particularly unpopular with members living in rural areas.12 The situation with regard to the supply of weapons improved significantly over the summer and in July 1917, an official at the Territorial Force Directorate noted there was little difficulty in providing the 1914 pattern for all Section A, B or C men and sufficient Hotchkiss guns for their battalions’ machine gun establishment. By October, several more regiments reported they were fully armed but some, for example the Buckinghamshire and Shropshire Volunteers, remained considerably undersupplied until later in the year.13 Despite these few exceptions, the Government had kept its promises well: men were receiving uniforms and equipment, finance, while not over-extravagent was generally sufficient for responsible associations, modern personal weapons were becoming increasingly available, the number of Hotchkiss guns for battalions on the East Coast was doubled, and the Government, in public at least, spoke with confidence and encouragement about the developing force.14 It was, however, not enough merely to equip the corps with uniforms and weapons. The Government also had to keep its promises about the provision of training and administrative staff and, for its own satisfaction, to ensure that these appointees were capable of securing a return for the financial investment by moulding an efficient force. Full-time adjutants with a rank no higher than captain were appointed to Volunteer battalions for periods of six months. They were originally intended to have been wounded Regular and Territorial officers who later, when fit, would return to normal duties. As the demand for suitable men was high, it was decided Volunteers already in the job could be appointed provisionally and, once they had passed a course, would be gazetted out of their Volunteer commission and into the Territorial Force Reserve (General List).15 Further regulations in May allowed for the appointment of a RSM and colour-sergeant for each battalion and also provided the opportunity for existing Volunteer NCOs to enlist as privates in the Territorial Force, qualify as instructors, and then be attached as a/RSM or a/Cllr-Sgt Instructor to his Volunteer battalion. These men were to serve on a part-time basis; attempts in at least one county to appoint them as full-time staff having failed because

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the men concerned were unwilling to give up their civilian occupation. There is little surviving evidence to suggest how the appointment of the Regular or Territorial officers and senior NCOs was received by the Volunteers. It might be expected that the genuine Volunteer in Section A, a member because he wanted to be, viewed it as a welcome opportunity to be trained by men with active service experience. To the tribunal men, many of whom merely wished to have their names registered as having attended a drill, and to the former Rifle Volunteer or Regular Army CO, the permanent staff might be seen, respectively, as a threat to their otherwise casual manner, or to their authority. When he was appointed Adjutant to the 4th Gloucestershire Volunteer Battalion, Basil Liddell Hart was struck by the lack of discipline and its ‘disorganized and slack ways’. He endured an uncomfortable few weeks of opposition from the local press, critical anonymous letters to the CO and the less than full support from his Colonel. Liddell Hart maintained his stance and eventually won the respect of all concerned and claimed to have turned the battalion into one of the finest in Southern Command.16 In 1917, those members who could attend drills regularly probably did witness an improvement in the quality of training schedules. As the year progressed, the permanent staff should have injected an added purpose to drills and established a progressive programme of training. In January, the Gazette considered too much time was being devoted to physical work, such as bayonet practice and musketry, rather than to basic drill. The editor appears to have misjudged his readership for he was immediately inundated by complaints about the lack of opportunity for weapons’ firing. There were also complaints about poor supervision and instruction at ranges and at apparent irregularities and inconsistencies when firing qualification courses. Reports suggest the authorities wanted the Volunteers first to become competent in basic drill and company and battalion exercises before devoting time to more specialized training in bombing, machine gun work and map reading. However, they did acknowledge that Volunteers, in the same manner as the Territorials before them, soon grew bored with elementary drills and wanted to get involved in more interesting aspects of training. Problems such as these meant that by July 1917 only 10,000 of the approximately 140,000 men in Sections A and B had qualified in musketry. Volunteers were reported to be reluctant to fire their course in case of failure and of being nervous about firing even their classification practices. Some units were thought to be up to the standard of pre-war Territorial battalions, but that was not saying much. The abundance of training facilities in the capital and other large centres were thought to be producing

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satisfactory results but the authorities were warned not to judge all Volunteers’ standards by those achieved in the London area.17 The practice of attaching Volunteer battalions to Regular home defence units had begun in 1915 and was to continue throughout the war. This was particularly important in those areas where it proved most difficult to find permanent staff. Staff officers (many of whom were retired Territorial colonels), employed in the army’s large training camps could be appointed to nearby Volunteer units to supervise and organize training. Suffolk’s Volunteers, for example, had the benefit of the 3/Suffolk Regiment’s ‘patient and attentive’ instructors, the Huddersfield Volunteers were affiliated to the 4th(Reserve) Battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders and the 1st Kent Volunteer Battalion was attached on occasions to 202 Brigade. A report on the Essex Volunteers found very few ‘old, white-bearded men’ and stressed what they needed above all was the help and encouragement of the nearby troops of the more conventional home army. There was a diffidence on the part of the Volunteers to ask for help but when offered advice, they proved keen to learn. The skills of the Essex men and the junior NCOs was estimated at being about the same as the pre-war Territorials but they were assessed as being superior in aptitude, intelligence and education to the average Regular soldier. This aspect was particularly evident in the specialist units such as signal companies, where Volunteers were thought capable of working alongside Regular units. The aspect of efficiency and training which most concerned the reports written by those senior officers inspecting Volunteer units during 1917 was the quality of Volunteer officers. There were acknowledged to be ‘serious’ problems in finding suitable COs and group commandants, and those in post were generally considered to be very much below the standard of the pre-war Territorial officer corps.18 Some reports thought the officers displayed commendable aptitude and industry, applying themselves assiduously to expanding their, at times, considerable military knowledge. Nevertheless, the general tenor of reports suggested the officers showed little aptitude for the work and were too old for the task. The Commandant of the London Bombing School was particularly harsh on those officers who attended his courses: Volunteer officers are neither physically nor mentally fit for bombing; they have lost all fighting instincts and as a rule are physically incapable of throwing a bomb far enough to pass the test. In trench clearing practice they are apt to lose their heads, slow to see an opportunity, lacking in judgement, given to panic and unnecessary self

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sacrifice. … They lack imagination and nearly always seem incapable of forming any accurate mental picture of what happens in action … [They] show little signs of leadership … [and are] a fortuitous collection of middle aged men anxious to do their best, rather lost, eager for praise and inclined to be querulous if they do not think they are being sufficiently encouraged. … They fail to realize how small their military knowledge is.19 Reports such as this from, possibly biased Regular officers, did nothing to convince the War Office that Volunteers would be capable of offering any decisive resistance to an enemy raid. Continuing anxiety about the number and the quality of troops he would have in an emergency, prompted FM Sir John French to write a memo in January 1918 which returned to his earlier theme of quality rather than quantity for the Volunteer Force. He suggested the existing force should be replaced by a smaller body centred on the East Coast and organized on a militia basis. A reduced number of battalions would require a comprehensive training regime designed to include a compulsory seven day camp and weekly drill attendance at drill. French assumed that in an emergency they would be needed only for some three to four days but believed that a small number of inland units should be retained as a reserve to the coastal forces. Finally, the C-in-CHF wanted the name ‘volunteer’ abolished as a misnomer: home defence should, in the Field Marshal’s opinion, be regarded not as an option but as a duty.20 When making these recommendations, French drew upon the knowledge gleaned from his many personal tours of inspection. In addition, he studied reports and returns submitted by the full-time adjutants and the travelling schools of instruction, as well as assessments by Regular officers of Volunteer camps and attendance at courses. The picture French built up was of a force which, despite having made great strides in efficiency, training and equipment, remained in essence the body of amateurs it had always been. Percy Harris’ claim that the Volunteers were as efficient as the pre-war Territorials was hardly a ringing endorsement of their worth and the reluctance with which some county associations had undertaken the responsibility of administration continued to be mirrored in their attitude towards the Volunteers. There remained no compulsion to have a Volunteer representative on associations’ committees and some counties had not even bothered to establish a Volunteer Committee. The City of London Association angrily condemned the movement for having ‘no history, no continuity

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and consists of those too old or too young for active service, or of exempted men who, for the most part, at any rate, are not the keenest fighting men’.21 At the time he wrote the memo, French was simultaneously fighting a rearguard action against further moves to reduce the number of Regular and Territorial troops retained for home defence. The enormous losses involved in Third Ypres, the collapse of the Russian Provisional Government and the Austro-German success at Caporetto meant more troops had to be sent overseas. Lloyd George’s policy of denying Haig sufficient troops to open another offensive delayed the posting of some but it was acknowledged that by the spring of 1918, Germany would enjoy numerical superiority on the Western Front. If the enemy chose to launch its anticipated offensive, the need for substantial drafts would become inevitable. In October 1917, Auckland Geddes had produced a sobering assessment of available manpower.22 This had been followed by the creation of the Cabinet Committee on Manpower, which the PM himself chaired. The committee’s report of December 1917 placed the army’s requirements below those of the navy, RFC, shipbuilding, aircraft and tank manufacture and food and timber production. The Army Council immediately rejected the conclusions and responded with a chilling memo which predicted dire consequences if they were adopted. Ignoring the protestations of the generals, Lloyd George accepted the committee’s recommendation.23 The implications this decision had for the size of the home army were transparent. The fourth inter-service conference on the prospects of a successful German invasion met in mid-December 1917 and concluded that the most Germany could do was to raid with a maximum of 30,000 troops.24 This scenario was rejected by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, the First Sea Lord, who resigned in controversial circumstances, but French concurred with the Army Council’s proposal to disband the 72nd and 73rd (Home Service) Divisions. These two divisions were to have their Home Service battalions gradually withdrawn and their personnel disposed elsewhere; their Graduated battalions were to be transferred to the 68th and 69th Divisions.25 While pointing out to Lieutenant-General Sir William Robertson, the CIGS, that stretches of the East Coast were significantly short of men, and that the troops he commanded comprised the very young, the untrained or those unfit for prolonged exertion, French did accept that should the need arise some of the draft finding units could be attached to his forces within a few days. In addition, and although he acknowledged they could never be regarded as ‘immediately

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available’ for anti-invasion duty, Robertson told French the ‘288,000’ Volunteers should not be discounted.26 Both Robertson and French acknowledged that because the bulk of the home army would comprise only boys too young to be sent abroad, there was no point in breaking up more than four of the existing divisions. French was correct to express concern at the potential usefulness of these boys in the event of invasion but Robertson was looking to reduce further the number of men allocated to coast defence and the mobile force. At the time of the correspondence, there were 1,400,000 troops at home, but only 400,979 of these were specifically allocated to home defence. Of the existing 190,045 earmarked as mobile troops, 16,000 were in Ireland and not immediately available. About another 50,000 were under 19 and the remainder largely below A1 medical category. French said he could accept a reduction of three of the existing eight Home Service divisions, which would, in turn, reduce the number of mobile troops to 152,000. Robertson wanted French’s agreement to further cuts, but realized it was the Admiralty that held the key. The navy continued to reject the joint conference’s conclusion that the Germans were capable of only a raid with a maximum of 30,000 men, believing instead that the enemy remained capable of throwing 70,000 ashore. If the Admiralty could be persuaded to accept the lower figure, Robertson believed he could garner a further 20,000 men for France.27 The War Cabinet sided with Robertson and, informing French that four divisions were to be broken up,28 decided to risk reducing the home defence forces to a level commensurate with a raid by 30,000. French was instructed to report how he would redistribute the remaining forces, and to release as many men of A and B category as possible.29 Charles Repington’s recent dismissal by The Times did not prevent him from touring the country, observing and commenting upon the state of the home defences, or from conferring with senior officers, many of whom were personal friends.30 Simultaneously as French was deciding how to cope with these latest reductions in strength, Repington toured General Sir Arthur Paget’s Southern Army’s defences. He concluded the wire, machine guns and men were spread too thinly, the artillery was poor and the officers indifferent. Communications between the coastal strong points were inadequate and the absence of reserves meant that 15,000 Germans could probably take Canterbury and raid the Inland Water Transport site at Richborough.31 French was more confident than Repington about Paget’s dispositions but remained concerned over the number of men taken from his home army. Yet, in spite of this loss, French advocated a huge reduction in the number of Volunteers he

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wanted available in case of a German raid. If the C-in-C was, as he frequently and publicly restated, genuinely convinced of the worth and reliability of the Volunteer Force, he would not have pursued such a dissembling policy. Despite Ian Macpherson, the Secretary of State’s, public endorsement, ‘If the hour of emergency should ever come, I feel these men would give a great account of themselves’,32 only a few days later, the GOC-in-C Eastern Command announced that he no longer required the services of Volunteer units on his lines of communication.33 In contrast to the War Office’s efforts in the early months of 1918 to reduce the number of Volunteer battalions, Lord Scarbrough, the DGTVF, continued to press for the force’s further expansion. County commandants played their part by haranguing their battalions with the need to recruit and in March, Lord Northcliffe, Honorary Colonel of the Ramsgate Volunteers, told his men that unless the force did expand and thus allow the release of more Regulars, raising the age of compulsion would become an inevitability.34 In April, Scarbrough wrote of the necessity of getting all suitable and sufficiently fit men under 50 years into the Volunteers and warned that if enough new men were not forthcoming, the age for applying the so-called Volunteer condition of compelling exempted men to enrol would have to be increased to 55 years.35 A few days later he pointed out that if as a consequence of the provisions of the forthcoming Military Service (No.2) Bill all Volunteer units were brought up to full strength, the force would be over establishment by nearly 16,000. In view of the recent ‘very drastic reductions’ in the numbers of Regulars and Territorials available for home defence and the consequent ‘increasing importance’ of the part-time force (as well as the expected increase in the number of men who would, under the new Bill, become liable for Volunteer service), Scarbrough rejected the option of continuing to amalgamate battalions, urging instead a review of how far the force should be allowed to expand.36 Scarbrough’s memo and the altering military situation on the Western Front caused the War Office to suspend its intended abolition of Section D and reassess the possible uses to which the Volunteer Force might be put. The German offensives in March and April had necessitated a huge outflow of men from the training battalions at home, a situation which Percy Harris exploited both to criticise the military authorities and to promote the interests of the movement: [The authorities] who are too much inspired by German ideas and theory, do not view this kind of force in the light which they ought to do, and if they had been allowed to have their own way, this force would not have been in existence. Time after time obstacles have

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been put in its way, and the War Office has made it clear that it had only permitted this force to be organized because of political pressure. I can tell the House that during the last two or three weeks the military authorities were very thankful to have this Volunteer Force in existence. … It was possible at short notice to rush every available battalion overseas to relieve the pressure on the Western Front.37 Harris went on the speculate that with the right encouragement from the authorities and employers, instead of the extra 100,000 Volunteers the Government was said to be contemplating, between 500,000 and 1 million could be induced to join. Colonel Royds echoed Harris’ words, declared that men were only waiting for the Government to tell them to join a corps and with thousands of wounded officers at home available to train the Volunteers, there was an ‘unrivalled opportunity’ to expand the force.38 By early June, Scarbrough was confident enough to inform the Treasury that the total establishment of the Volunteer Force was shortly to be raised from its existing 285,900 to the symbolically significant 315,000.39 The disappearance of so many servicemen overseas in March and April meant the home defence forces were at their lowest level of the war. Harris was certainly correct in his assertion that the existence of the auxiliary had facilitated their departure and Edmund Royds was similarly correct in claiming the unprecedented number of wounded officers might be used to train the Volunteers. Scarbrough’s confidence in the expected growth of the force was in part a consequence of the knowledge that despite their often alarming turnover rate, battalions were becoming more efficient. Although the number of grant earners remained below the anticipated level, the number of ‘efficients’ in many battalions was well over 50 per cent and rising.40 He was also anticipating the time in the late summer when the expiration of a restrictive regulation would allow him to force the replacement of inefficient commandants and COs. The regulation had permitted the appointment of infantry COs for a period of two years, with the option of an extension for a further 12 months if the individual proved suitable. The intention had been to create stability and thus, it was hoped, efficiency. In practice, however, the measure was short-sighted because it became difficult to retire unsuitable officers before their two year term was completed. It had originally been passed as another concession to local preference and as an acknowledgement that in many cases the COs were the men who had initially done much to raise the companies or battalions.41 In Devon, the County Adjutant was a ‘highly esteemed solicitor’ but

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‘innocent of any military experience’, the 2nd Battalion’s Adjutant was a ‘drunkard’ and the 3rd’s, ‘lazy and inefficient’.42 Scarbrough sympathized with Lord Fortescue, the Lord Lieutenant, and the difficulties he faced but advised patience until September when it would be possible to undertake a ‘drastic comb out’. Meanwhile: Our main trouble has been that we inherited a force which had been formed in a haphazard way, based on no military plan [and] raised without any regard to Home Defence requirements. The Force ought to have been stopped forthwith and reorganized on Territorial lines but at that time no one here took sufficient interest to get such a drastic move effective. … The difficulty of getting decisions on many Volunteer questions remains.43 The War Office and Lord Scarbrough were clearly anxious about the quality and competence of battalion COs, but were equally concerned about the efficiency of the junior officers and of the rank and file. The provision of adequate finance, which remained intimately linked to the number of men who could stay in battalions long enough to qualify as efficient, continued to be of crucial importance to county associations. The numbers of officers passing the Central Association Volunteer Regiments’ courses were increasing, as was the number of grant earners. The appointment of experienced adjutants and warrant officers, the provision of modern arms and equipment and the attachment of many battalions to Regular formations, increased the confidence and standing of the force. The Military Service (No.2) Act, 1918 was also catching more men for the battalions. Scarbrough’s argument was accepted and many of the proposed amalgamations were first postponed and then cancelled. There is even some evidence to suggest not only the reprieve of some condemned units but also the creation of entirely new ones.44 The exodus of trained men abroad following the German Spring Offensive placed a growing responsibility on the force, a reliance which even the doubters at the War Office began to consider significant. It was thus doubly unfortunate that when the Government gave the Volunteers an opportunity to demonstrate their commitment, progress and selfconfidence, and asked for a return on its substantial political and financial investment, many within the movement proved unable to meet the challenge.

9 The Diminishing Threat

The German onslaught on the Allied front, which began with Operation Michael on 21 March 1918, caused high consternation within both military and political circles. The attack was not unexpected but the initial German success against Fifth Army resulted in a frantic reassessment of the available manpower and how best it might be utilized. Lloyd George’s policy of depriving Field Marshal Haig and the Expeditionary Force of what they considered to be adequate numbers of troops even to hold the line was, of necessity, reversed. The priority was now to despatch reinforcements to the beleaguered armies and stem the German flood. Boys from Graduated battalions and the Training Reserve, experienced soldiers barely recovered from wounds, and longserving instructors in Training and Reserve battalions of the home army, were hurried overseas to make good the losses of March and April.1 FM Sir John French accepted the need for his home forces to be further denuded for the sake of maintaining the front but, as his command continued to dwindle in size, attention once again turned to the feasibility of increasing the remit of the Volunteer Force by creating a full-time element with extended, non-territorial deployment. At a War Cabinet meeting four days after the commencement of the German offensive, French suggested mobilization of the Volunteer Force. Lieutenant-General Macready, the Adjutant-General who had long disparaged the existence and nature of the force, stated that if the Army Council were allowed to have an entirely free hand in respect of the Volunteers, a significantly increased number of trained troops would be released for service in France. Macready was, presumably, contemplating compulsory call-out, but French emphasized that only about one third of all Volunteers had actually taken the oath of commitment and that legislation would be required before any of the remaining 178

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approximately 200,000 men could be compelled to serve in anything other than a national emergency. Sir Auckland Geddes, the Minister of National Service, suggested the Volunteers might be drawn upon either by instructing the tribunals to cancel the exemptions of all fit men of military age, or by bringing in a short Parliamentary Bill to cancel all exemptions and do away with the entire tribunal process.2 The Ministry of Reconstruction in particular, considered that abolishing the tribunals, thereby leaving decisions on recruiting and manpower supply solely in the hands of the Ministry of National Service, would be a serious mistake.3 The War Cabinet was similarly reluctant to endorse such drastic action and decided instead that Geddes should include provision within the draft Military Service Bill to allow for the call up of fit Volunteers.4 It also agreed to include within Geddes’ draft Bill French’s subsequent proposal to make it compulsory for 17-year-old boys to be enrolled in Class C of the Volunteer Force.5 On the grounds that they constituted the only available reinforcement for Ireland, French did persuade Lord Derby, the Secretary of State for War, not to send additional cyclist brigades to France.6 But, as part of Lloyd George’s policy of restraining and containing LieutenantGeneral Sir William Robertson, the CIGS, and Sir Douglas Haig’s control over military affairs, the C-in-CHF’s tenure of office was about to end. He was appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and replaced as C-in-C Home Forces by Robertson.7 ‘Wully’ Robertson’s interest in home defence had not, of course, begun with his new appointment; as CIGS, he had been in close contact with Sir John and the two had generally co-operated well. Both realized the necessity of maintaining a minimum number of men at home but there had been occasional differences of opinion as to what that minimum should be. In response to the War Office’s January instruction to French to disband one Second Line and three Home Service divisions, the Field Marshal had decided to shuffle around his existing forces as little as possible but did despatch two more cyclist brigades and three cyclist battalions to Ireland. His forces in East Anglia intended to meet any raid now comprised the 64th, 67th and 68th Divisions, three cyclist brigades, six cyclist battalions, four Mixed brigades and 6 heavy batteries. South of the Thames he had the Cyclist Division, one cyclist battalion, three Mixed brigades and four batteries. Between them, Northern and Scottish Commands had the 69th Division, four cyclist brigades, 12 cyclist battalions and four batteries. Robertson’s appointment as C-in-C HF compelled him to view the needs of home defence from a different perspective and he had initially

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to familiarize himself more intimately with the forces under his command. The composition and structure of the home forces had recently undergone further changes and by the time he became C-in-C, the two principal anti-invasion groups were XXIII Corps based at Brentwood and the Independent Force which had its HQ at Canterbury.8 It was the largely disquieting information gained during early tours of inspection of these units which prompted Robertson to draw the attention of the War Office to the likely impact of any additional sudden reduction in the home forces. His reports on the units revealed a system in the throes of an approaching crisis.9 Robertson’s often intemperate observing eye assessed the merits and faults of the coastal garrisons and of the many divisions, brigades and lesser units which constituted his home defence forces. His reports pulled no punches and made sobering reading. Harwich’s defences were in disrepair, lacked depth and the instruction to meet and defeat the enemy on the coast had been too liberally interpreted. The forts’ 9.2-inch guns were estimated to have a life of only 25 rounds and troops were spending too much time cultivating fields when they should have been digging trenches. Across the Thames estuary, the defences of the Kent Independent Force were thought to be better. They consisted of several lines of trenches with, albeit incomplete, strong points in between. Shoeburyness was deemed to be short of batteries and there was a general air of neglect hanging over its other defences. For some unexplained reason, Robertson thought the area had been excluded from any strategic defence plan although he did think a nearby experimental munitions establishment, with its mixture of calibres ranging up to 15-inch naval guns, would in an emergency be available to local commanders. His main concern with regard to coastal batteries was that the pre-war assumption about the frequent turnover of their RGA personnel militating against efficiency, had proven to be alarmingly prescient. The areas held by the 68th and 64th Divisions in East Anglia were criticized for their inadequate wire and a shortage of fire trenches, while the Humber Garrison complained of being short of machine guns and Stokes mortars. Further north, there was a general consensus that Hartlepool could be raided at will: the organization of command was almost non-existent, there was a dearth of machine guns and quick firing artillery and there was a general confusion over the areas of responsibility of the garrison troops and 206 Brigade. To make matters even worse, neither was there any clear or developed plans for co-operation with nearby RAF squadrons.

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Practice mobilizations had also failed to impress Robertson. Staff work at Newmarket was assessed as inadequate, and communications in the Thames and Medway Defences were ‘as bad as they could be.’ There were problems with detraining facilities at Strood, rations and units arrived late at their allocated dumps or stations, and the GOC Sheppey Brigade was accused of entirely ignoring the potential of his artillery support. Harwich Garrison did better but a lack of trained personnel added to the perennial problem of poor communications. One battalion of the Tyne Defences took seven hours to man its trenches, a fact which was, again, blamed on the inadequacies of the telephone system and also on a plethora of contradictory codewords. Ironically, about the only positive thing to come out of the Tees Garrison’s practice mobilization was the efficiency and rapidity with which the Volunteer Force battalions turned out. When the 64th Division was put through its paces, its brigades’ turnout was heavily criticized and the railway arrangements collapsed. A furious C-in-C minuted: ‘Draft finding units cannot be run on these lines.’ In this instance Robertson was referring to the scarcity of officers, but he could equally well have been referring to the reinforcement system as a whole. Certainly many units were short of officers – the 69th Division was 85 infantry officers below establishment – while others were well over strength and the subalterns spent their time kicking their heels. In some units, this was because the CO ordered the junior officers to leave the training to the NCOs10 and in others it was put down to inefficiency on the part of the senior officers. The 4th Reserve Brigade RFA was said to be run by its adjutant and its officers had to be ordered by Robertson to quit their comfortable billets and sleep in the men’s camp. Several senior officers struck Robertson as being ‘poor’, ‘old’ or ‘feeble’, the Assistant Quartermaster General (AQMG) of the Forth Defences knew ‘practically nothing’ about supply and transport and was reduced to bluster when questioned by the DQMG, and there was a ‘lack of energy and go from the top downwards’ in the West Lancashire Reserve Brigade. On the encouraging side, the CO of one Young Soldier battalion was thought to be wasted in a training unit and another CO, despite being very deaf and the possessor of a wooden leg, was ‘said to be a good man’. The quality of the many training camps also varied considerably. Robertson recorded that he could ‘quite understand’ why men at Eastern Command Depot were discontented and described Crowborough as a ‘bleak and uncomfortable place’. Canteens for Young Soldier battalions at St Albans were poor and facilities for the East Lancashire Reserve

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Brigade at Scarborough were unsuitable or indifferent. But what really caused Robertson most concern was the quality and attitude of the soldiers themselves. He understood the necessarily transient nature of these draft finding units but noticed significant differences between many battalions which took the same type of conscript. Robertson’s predecessor had praised the work of the Special and Extra Reserve battalions. In May 1916, French had talked of the ‘great difficulties’ such units faced while ‘performing the double duty of training drafts … and defending our shores’, but the attrition of the Somme in 1916 affected morale within both the home and overseas army. Within the Special Reserve battalions experienced soldiers, other than those serving as instructors, tended to be concentrated in separate companies away from the new recruits but the condition and efficiency of the whole battalion depended, of course, on the effectiveness of the CO. One of the National Reserve and Special Reserve’s most consistent supporters in the pre-war House had been Lieutenant-Colonel R. Peel. A former Guards officer, Peel commanded the 4/East Surrey, one of the nine Special Reserve battalions which constituted part of Harwich Defences. Robertson was unimpressed by Peel and equally so with several other of the Harwich-based battalions: the 3/Bedfordshire was inadequate and very dirty, the 3/KORL contained ‘many cripples’ and the interior economy of the 6/Worcestershire was badly neglected. Elsewhere, there was ‘an air of boredom’ in the 3/DCLI, the 3/West Kent presented a ‘poor show’ and the turnout of 5/RB needed improvement. Reports on the boys in Young Soldier and Graduated battalions also varied considerably. Many units contained boys of good physique, appearance and soldierly spirit, but others contained youngsters who were so physically undeveloped that they would never make adequate soldiers. No.7 Recruit Distribution Battalion was full of ‘ridiculous’ recruits who, wrote Robertson, should never have been taken by the Ministry of National Service. The rapid despatch to France of so many instructors in the spring of 1918 had caused a widespread shortage, and to make training even more problematic, one battalion had only three captains for 1400 boys. Another battalion had 500 rifles for its 1400 recruits, trained on a football pitch and had its camp disparagingly described as little better than a Volunteers’. Southern Command managed to misinterpret a War Office letter and instead of concentrating its boy recruits in Young Soldier battalions, sent them to Ireland to train with Reserve units which contained several categories of men. Robertson condemned this error as detrimental to the well-being of the boys, to home defence and to efficiency in general.

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Robertson noticed a ‘want of go’ and too many unfit men in the Territorial Force Reserve Brigades. About 100 Territorial gunners at Shoeburyness were said to be the ‘dregs’ of other units and served no practical purpose, the Home Counties Reserve Brigade was woefully inefficient and the East Lancashire Reserve Brigade was thought to have been about the worst inspected by the C-in-C.11 There seems to have been a considerable number of troops stationed in garrisons who, like those at Shoeburyness, had no reason to be there. Of the 27,000 men in the Humber Garrison, only 12,000 were capable of fighting; many of the remainder fulfilled administrative jobs but thousands were scattered in billets over a wide area with little supervision. In the Highland Light Infantry Reserve Garrison Battalion, 65 per cent of the men were away on agricultural work and 400 men at Newhaven languished in a transport workers’ camp. Robertson revisited some units in July and did notice improvements. Nevertheless, and although he remained concerned at their habit of slouching and their neglect of traditional drills, Robertson considered the men of the Australian Overseas Training Brigade, which was in an emergency to provide two battalions for home defence, were ‘the best material we are likely to have’. In addition to the January decision to break up four divisions, the mobile troops had lost another 24 cyclist regiments, four cyclist battalions and two artillery batteries. Moreover, the four remaining infantry divisions had been converted from units of 19-year-old boys with four months’ training to those of raw, 18-year-old recruits. The fixed defences for ports had been further reduced and it was intended to withdraw trained Bi and Bii men from Reserve battalions, the Mixed brigades and remaining cyclist units. The result of that policy would be to make the Mixed brigades, essentially the first line of defence, units of largely untrained men of low category and maintained at about 50 per cent of establishment. In addition, cyclists’ coast watch would practically cease to operate, the Reserve and Training units, which had been hitherto available for home defence, would be at reduced strength and Robertson rejected as impracticable a memo from the DMO which had proposed to return two divisions from France if an emergency erupted. He requested instead the return of those cyclist and artillery units recently sent to Ireland, that the navy take increased responsibility for the protection of ports and, by the call up boys aged 17 years and 6 months, the reactivation of the previous system whereby boys with four months’ training were allocated to home defence. Finally, Robertson wanted new powers to enable the Volunteer Force to

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be used more efficiently and responsibility. He had apparently been assured by county commandants that if their battalions were given definite roles, war stations and programmes of specialized training, Volunteers would be able to made good some of his home defence problems and deficiencies.12 Robertson was hardly encouraged by the replies to his memo. The Admiralty was reluctant to help, claiming that as circumstances had not changed since the December conference, there was no point in entering into discussions with the Army Council.13 Neither did the War Office reply offer him much succour. It stated that the difficulties created by the withdrawal of troops since the German offensive were understood but that there was no alternative and no reversal. Furthermore, if any troops could be spared from Ireland, they too would go to France. The Government was certainly not about to order the call up of 17-year-old boys and, as for the Volunteers, their use was still being ‘looked into’.14 The only immediate measure the C-in-C could take was to redistribute some of his sparse forces to the most vulnerable areas.15 The reappraisal hinted at in the War Office’s response was shortly to emerge as a radical new proposal of the Volunteers’ employment. In mid-1917, the military authorities had undertaken a significant reorganization of the Royal Defence Corps, both with a view to releasing men for more demanding duties and for munitions work, as well as an attempt to improve the efficiency and work of the corps. The corps had continued to receive poor publicity, often as a result of questions in Parliament which expressed concern at the conditions under which its men were utilized. In spite of the auxiliary’s lowly status, during the summer of 1917 the War Office had paid the RDC considerable attention. In its continuing search for reinforcements for the Western Front, the authorities decided that the abolition of the 18 Home Service Garrison battalions might release additional men. Most soldiers within these battalions, which were scattered around the coasts, were of low medical category and often over military age. Nevertheless, as some of them were capable of performing similar, fairly sedentary duties overseas, they could release men of slightly higher category for other work. Consequently, the War Office resolved to disband the battalions and replace them with RDC battalions.16 The 18 battalions of the RDC were to perform the same function as the Garrison battalions and were in addition to the corps’ existing Protection Companies. The reorganization had been completed by October 1917 and had resulted in a total of 19 RDC battalions, 78 Protection Companies and 12 Reserve Companies.17

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In yet another attempt to provide additional manpower, not on this occasion for overseas duty but to allow the substitution of younger munitions workers with older men of low medical category, and for the RDC itself, the War Office turned its attention to the recently-created RDC battalions. A conference in mid-January 1918 decided that nearly 2000 RDC men currently guarding vulnerable points in garrisons could be replaced by men who had been wounded twice or more, and that magazines, factories and essential sites outside garrisons should be guarded by the so-called ‘police system’.18 The 1800 RDC troops working in the ports under the auspices of MI5 and in other special military areas were, however, to be retained. The greatest saving in manpower would be achieved by the abolition of all the RDC battalions except of the one employed by the Royal Flying Corps. The abolition would release 13,000 men who could be disposed of by the Director of Organization either to the Protection Companies or to munitions. The removal of RDC men as guards for factories and other vulnerable points could certainly be justified; in over three years of war there had been no recorded attempts at sabotage on any such mainland site or installation.19 The principal reasons behind the disbanding of the RDC battalions and the dispersal of their men to Protection Companies were those of cost and the contemporary critical shortage of RDC officers. By the end of January all RDC battalions had been withdrawn from their coast defence stations and also, with the exception of the 19th Battalion, all other guard duties apart from those classified as vital to the war effort.20 Unlike more conventional corps, the auxiliary had no established regular source of personnel supply: drafts and individuals were sent to it in haphazard and irregular fashion. This intermittent and unreliable system of reinforcement meant that Commands found it almost impossible to meet the growing demands to find guards for prisoner of war (POW) camps, agricultural depots, ploughing groups and vulnerable points. The increasing number of men discharged for munitions was further exacerbating these difficulties and, in March, the War Office bowed to pressure by allowing Bii men from the infantry who had been earmarked for transfer to the Labour Corps to be posted instead to the RDC.21 Shortages were eased during the early summer when the disbanding of the 18 designated RDC battalions was finally completed.22 These measures brought the auxiliary’s official establishment to almost 35,000 all ranks but its actual strength was some 2600 men fewer than the approved figure. There had been suggestions in Volunteer circles that local battalions might be able to replace RDC in some prisoner of war camps, in the same manner as they had replaced them in guarding

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some of the less important vulnerable points. Yet, in all the extant papers and memos of this period written by staff at GHQ HF or the War Office, there is no serious mention of replacing RDC personnel with Volunteers. With the steady substitution of the more expensive older, married troops of the RDC by younger soldiers, often with inferior physiques but cheaper to employ, the authorities were probably less concerned about the cost of the RDC than they had been in 1917.23 Nevertheless, a more extensive use of the Volunteers could have proved beneficial both in terms of cost and in Volunteer morale. By continuing to ignore the potential of the part-time home defence auxiliary, the War Office was once again seen as underlining its contempt for the Volunteers. In reality, the authorities’ reluctance to employ them as substitutes for the RDC was understandable. Volunteer efficiency was improving but the increase in the number of exempted men sent by the tribunals meant that a large proportion of members was unable to undertake prolonged or even regular rostering. Unless they could provide reliable and efficient guards, the Volunteers were useless for military purposes. Should it have been needed, by July the authorities had received further proof of the unsuitability of Volunteers as would-be permanent troops. As most Volunteers had never imagined or intended they should assume the role of full-time soldiers, such a conclusion was hardly surprising. Still reeling from the German successes in March, April and May 1918, and awaiting the tardy arrival of American troops on the Western Front, the War Office decided to raise a number of Volunteer Special Service Companies to serve on the East Coast. Their purpose was to provide coastal security, to relieve Regular troops for France and, where possible, RDC troops for Ireland. Rumours that at least part of the Volunteer Force was to be mobilized spread through several units in the days following news of the German offensive and were to persist in varying degrees of intensity until the end of June.24 An increased flow of official paperwork suggested something was about to happen and, in April, the Gazette announced it was only the dubious legality of the call which prevented the Government from announcing mobilization.25 Nevertheless, the Government was concerned at the haemorrhage of men to France and decided to convene a conference of county commandants and Territorial associations representatives to discuss a proposal to raise full-time companies to serve in cyclist units and relieve RDC companies. General Sir Henry Wilson, Robertson’s replacement as CIGS, concurred with the intent and informed Lord Derby that unless the required number of men could be secured by voluntary selection he would take immediate action to obtain the necessary legislation.26

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Lord Scarbrough recommended that the Government attempt to raise the 15,000 men by voluntary means, and for a period of service of either two or three months. They should be drawn from non-essential trades, be in Grade 2 medical category, aged 35 or above and be selected from widespread localities and a variety of industries. The DGTVF also suggested that the LGB and Ministry of National Service should be asked to advise tribunals and officials to place a man’s exemption in suspension while he served in a Special Service Company.27 When approached for comments by the War Office,28 the Ministry of National Service accepted the proposals but pointed out that as the period of service by a Volunteer in a Special Service Company would retard his possible later enrolment in the army, the number of exemptions for men in similar occupations might increase to compensate for the Volunteers’ absence. Their departure might, therefore, materially affect both industrial production and army recruitment. Sir Auckland Geddes, the Minister of National Service, also insisted that men working in 27 specified key industries should not be allowed to volunteer and that the man’s CO, and not the Volunteer himself, must discuss with his employer whether he could be spared.29 Finally, Geddes drew up list of industries and professions from which men could be taken.30 The War Office accepted Geddes’ qualifications and immediately circulated all Territorial associations with the agreed conditions. The letter stated that the authorities anticipated each association would be able to offer one company of 114 men from every two of their battalions.31 Companies from adjoining counties would be linked together and preference was to be given to men signing for three months rather than two. With the intention of commencing the scheme in June, the authorities announced that men would be clothed and equipped by the War Office and that officers would qualify for an outfit grant. The Volunteers’ units would, it was stated, be used to fill up the depleted cadres of Territorial cyclist battalions.32 Finally, county commandants were urged to appeal to their officers and men for a swift response and to stress that the scheme was intended to have minimal impact on trade and industry.33 In the weeks that followed, the Government repeatedly expressed its confidence that the Volunteer Force would be willing and able to supplement the now diminished number of troops at the disposal of the C-in-CHF. There were still some problems concerning the acceptance of men who should not have been allowed to volunteer but by the first week in July just under 10,000 men, 5000 fewer than had originally been agreed, were in training near the coast with remnants of the Second Line Territorial personnel.34

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Life in a Special Company for those Volunteers who had opted for service was hard and not particularly exciting.35 They were scattered up and down the East Coast, usually based at the same locations as the cyclist units they had replaced. The greatest concentration of companies was in East Anglia but some were attached to the Humber and Tyne Garrisons and others operated in Scotland. There were occasional complaints about the food and accommodation at several camps but some companies had the use of YMCA huts and one detachment’s officer hired a coastal cottage for the comfort of his men.36 Most companies spent the first month, and sometimes a proportion of the second, training and working up efficiency. They were issued with full kit, raised and trained Hotchkiss gun crews, eventually took responsibility for stretches of the coast and received orders on what to do with dead bodies, crashed aircraft and prisoners.37 For most company members the greatest problem was probably boredom, and confirmation that the two month men would be allowed to go by the end of August was generally greeted with relief. Macpherson had twice reiterated the Government’s intention to keep its promise and let the men go but it was The Times which explained that, as the recruiting and military situations had much improved, ‘the temporary emergency can be considered as over’.38 Nearly 50 per cent of the original number had signed on for three months and by the time they were released, with the gift of a pair of boots and a letter of thanks, at least one of their commanders considered most to be the equal of general home service troops.39 An unknown, but probably small, number died during their tour and others are known to have returned home on compassionate grounds.40 Scarbrough assessed their contribution as having ‘enabled the Government to meet a critical situation and to tide over very difficult days in the history of the war’.41 The War Office thought differently. The formation of the Service Companies had once again confirmed its long-held belief that many Volunteers were physically incapable of doing anything militarily useful.42 Fortunately for the War Office, however, by September 1918 the efficiency or otherwise of the Volunteer Force was of little importance. The military situation on the Western Front had so altered that on 3 September the CIGS reported to the War Cabinet that there was not the ‘remotest prospect’ of invasion. He proposed that with the exception of the RDC, coastal defence artillery, RE and anti-aircraft units, all troops within the UK should be embodied in draft finding units.43 The DSD fundamentally agreed, again pointing out that the dual role of draft finding and home defence had handicapped the efficiency of recruit

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training but thought the retention of some low category men in the Mixed brigades would ease some of the strain on the drafting units.44 Aimed at achieving savings of between 80,000 –100,000 troops, supplementary proposals to reduce the number of different kinds of training units and a further rationalization of existing home defence forces were also submitted.45 These involved reducing the five different types of draft finding units to two: Young Soldier and Graduated battalions, and Reserve battalions. There were to be 76 Reserve battalions, one for each line regiment, of between two and six companies. In addition, each battalion would have a B Company which would take the place of the Reserve Garrison battalions and battalions of the Mixed brigades. The accrued savings would amount to 114 draft finding units and 31,808 men in permanent cadres. About 50 battalions were to be kept in East Coast fortresses, largely because there was insufficient barrack accommodation close to the vulnerable points which required guards and, as a further indication of the agreed reduced threat of invasion, time spent on coast watching and on maintaining the existing coast defences was not to be at the expense of training. Under this scheme the January 1917 total of RDC and home defence Garrison battalions of 70,422 was to be reduced to 27,576. The papers circulating within the War Office during this period make no reference to the possible use of the Volunteers to replace those battalions and men who were being withdrawn from home defence. Neither is there any evidence to suggest that Robertson protested against the changes in the composition of his command. Coastal batteries of the RGA also underwent certain, largely administrative, changes during September 1918, In August and September the RGA companies were abolished and reorganized on a system of Fire Commands in which all Regular and Territorial personnel became interchangeable. By the time of the reorganization, probably all fit men had long since been posted away and the remaining personnel were of low medical category and largely former Kitchener men rather than Territorials. Similar low category men were also sent to several new tank battalions formed in late 1918 for home defence. Their men were sometimes newly enlisted erstwhile agricultural workers and elderly men who had been captured by the tribunals, or recovered wounded. The battalions were equipped with a variety of tanks but the majority seem to have been Mark Vs. A total of 48 vehicles were to be available to the C-in-CHF and were expected to arrive at their detraining stations 48 hours after mobilization. Their presence might have proved useful if any desperate German attempt to land was made, but with a radius of action of 20 miles, their role would have been limited. Moreover, they would

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probably have clogged up rail capacity which could have been more valuably utilized by infantry or artillery.46 Despite losing what was often a significant percentage of their most dedicated members to the Special Service Companies, Volunteer summer camps continued. Accusations of excessive pressure on men to attend caused Ian Macpherson, the Secretary of State, once again to clarify the legal demands.47 Financing the camp was another contentious issue. The War Office declined to pay for cartage to the site, allowed only the basic ration allocation and insisted that deficiencies in equipment had to be paid from local contingency funds.48 Nevertheless, reflecting on the 1918 camp, one former Rifle Volunteer and South African War veteran believed the Volunteer was ‘never so well trained and equipped [and] is a more important military asset than at any period in the history of the movement’. In contrast, the Hampshire Commandant’s report on his regiment’s August camp concluded that it had been a ‘waste of time and public money’: attendance was poor, the battalion was already under strength and, because men were continually arriving and departing, ‘no regular system of instruction was possible’.49 Facilities in some camps remained woeful, the sanitary arrangements in one described as ‘on a level with those of a second class railway station’.50 No doubt some members did enjoy camp but even the presence of women typists and an emphasis on building unit pride and esprit probably did little to endear the experience to the tribunal men whose presence was often a necessary obligation to complete their drill requirement.51 As the men from the Special Service Companies returned to their units at the end of their term of service, the most contentious issue affecting the Volunteer Force was the War Office’s stated intention to replace unsuitable COs with Regular or Territorial officers. It is unclear when the county associations first became aware of the War Office’s proposal to appoint COs with overseas experience at the expense of Volunteer officers. The ACI which confirmed the policy seems to have come after some counties had already complained about the move, and a subsequent War Office letter of September was an attempt to mollify the Volunteers by expressing the hope that any displaced CO would accept the position of second-in-command and retain his rank of major.52 In some quarters, the process was seen as a means by which Volunteers might replace the RDC: the corps could then be reduced or disbanded and the RDC officers assume command of the Volunteer battalions. While at least one association appears to have accepted the idea with equanimity, others resented the proposal and protested. The Gazette argued there was no justification for such a move yet, despite threats of

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questions in Parliament and accusations that it was ‘nothing short of a scandal’ and a betrayal of those men who had put much money and effort into raising their battalions, by November several Volunteer COs had been replaced.53 In 1917, those full-time soldiers serving with the RDC were either former National Reservists who had volunteered to transfer to the auxiliary from the Territorial Force’s Supernumerary Companies two years earlier, conscripts of low medical category, or men whose wounds precluded their return to more active service. By the start of the war’s final year, the RDC Protection Companies had lost what few remaining links with the National Reserve they might have retained since formation. Once the companies had been sent to localities often far from their original counties of recruitment and once the Garrison and RDC battalions had disbanded and their combed out A category men replaced by troops from any county or regiment, any remnants of the original Supernumerary Companies disappeared. The corps’ discipline and performance were probably not of the highest order,54 there were still problems with securing the correct rates of pay and allowances and resentment from amongst those former National Reservists who had signed for home service in 1914 and 1915 but who now fell within the new, extended military age. If they were sufficiently fit, they were liable to be transferred to foreign service units. There were also yet more complaints about the lack of promotion prospects for junior officers55 and although some of its duties had been assumed by Volunteers, the corps remained below establishment. The position was improved in October 1918 with the transfer of 3000 other ranks of Bii category from Reserve battalions in the Mixed brigades, but the RDC continued to experience difficulties in finding sufficient personnel for its responsibilities. When the Admiralty did eventually agree to allow its representatives again to discuss the invasion issue, the military authorities hoped there might be the opportunity to reduce further the number of RDC guards required for the protection of vulnerable points. In October, General Sir Henry Wilson, the CIGS, drew up a scheme which intended to reduce the August totals for the number of troops retained at home by nearly 50 per cent and the establishment of the RDC by almost 20 per cent.56 The Admiralty conceded that the most the enemy was probably capable of achieving was to raid the East Coast with a maximum of 5000 men. There was the possibility of smaller groups landing on the West and Scottish Coasts but even if the Germans did throw 5000 men ashore somewhere near the Thames estuary it was assumed they would be without transport and artillery. In view of the limited threat and the reduced

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numbers of troops available for the GOC-in-CHF, the CIGS proposed to abandon French’s strategy of concentrating his forces on the beaches and opted instead to assemble mobile forces at inland centres.57 The principles of defence remained the same: they were to deploy every available man and gun to pin the attacker to the shore. But, these front line local forces were now to be reduced in favour of allowing greater concentration of the mobile reserves. The quality and quantity of troops available to Robertson had declined steadily since his appointment. With a few insignificant exceptions, his command consisted largely of boys in the Young Soldier and Graduated battalions who had not completed their ordinary course of recruits’ training and, having no permanence, had no real knowledge of home defence duties. They would have to rely on improvised transport and it was acknowledged that arrangements made for their employment in an emergency had to be simple in character but carefully worked out in detail.58 Earlier arrangements by which the army would take over the telephone and telegraph networks and call up selected GPO employees remained in force,59 and additional schemes which would utilize munitions workers in threatened areas, attach troops in Agricultural Companies to Volunteer units and create Command Reinforcement Pools (CRP), were also drawn up. Leave men and drafts en route for overseas were to be directed to these CRPs where medical boards would decide their fitness for fighting or labouring. GOC Commands were to be responsible for co-ordinating with the local Emergency Committees and would assume control of all facilities in their area which could be utilized by the military.60 The Inspector-General of Communications remained responsible for the flow of ammunition, rations, medical supplies and personnel towards the East Coast and also the transport of animals to remount depots.61 With the exception of XXIII Corps in East Anglia and the Independent Force south of the Thames, the existing positions of deployable mobile troops had been determined by training requirements rather than by strategic considerations. The Reserve units and Dominion contingents which were to provide reinforcements were to be formed by Commands into Command Groups of 15 so-called ‘Composite’ infantry and seven artillery brigades. Field and pioneer companies, MG groups, field ambulances and signal companies were also to be formed. The assumed potential of the Volunteers’ contribution had, in the authorities’ eyes, so diminished that they were no longer to be allocated to Composite brigades; on mobilization the force’s battalions were to be formed into pools in the Commands and used if and when necessary as

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reinforcements. The most important elements of the Volunteer Force were the 42 battalions earmarked for manning the London Defences and the 11 other battalions which were to offer mobile support to the capital’s defences. Columns of buses provided by the London General Omnibus Company would transport not only the Volunteers to their positions, but also gangs of labourers and foresters who were to work under the Chief Engineer London District. The Volunteer contingents would be joined if necessary by cyclist brigades and battalions and Special Reserve brigades from Northern Command, as well as Canadian and South African infantry from Aldershot. Various other Reserve battalions from Salisbury and Aldershot could also be called upon if required.62 If a major threat developed, a scheme also existed to move the entire 69th Division from Retford. The two concentrations which were likely to confront a German raid remained XXIII Corps, with its HQ at Brentwood, and the Independent Force based at Canterbury. Lieutenant-General Sir W. Pulteney’s XXIII Corps was, in co-operation with Eastern Command, responsible for defending the coast between The Wash and the Crouch. It comprised three divisions, five Mixed brigades, one cyclist brigade, six cyclist battalions, six batteries of heavy artillery and an armoured train. At Canterbury, Major-General Alister Dallas had only the Cyclist Division, three cyclist brigades, one cyclist battalion, two Mixed brigades and four batteries.63 Only a few of the cyclist units had managed to retain even a handful of trained men of reasonable fitness, yet if the Germans did land, with as few as perhaps 5000 men, those troops would have been selected, season and hardened soldiers. The Royal Navy and the largely untrained mixture of conscripted youth, exempted workers and elderly Volunteers of the home army would probably have cut off the incursion and eventually have overwhelmed it; indeed, a raid might even have shortened rather than prolonged the war. But, at no stage since the declaration had Britain’s shores been defended by such a hotchpotch of potentially unpredictable units.

Epilogue Although the outcome of the war had not for some months been in question, the swiftness of Germany’s collapse was somewhat unexpected. The armistice inevitably turned the minds of personnel in both the home and overseas armies to demobilization. Pivotal men began disappearing from units by the end of November but, for some soldiers, the wait was too long. A few Special Reserve battalions such as the 3/Gloucestershire, 3/Wiltshire and 3/Somerset Light Infantry became involved in minor demobilization disturbances in January 1919; they complained about continuing fatigues and unnecessary parades, while the 3/Seaforth Highlanders, like many other units at home and abroad, protested about the perceived slowness of the demobilization process. Even troops in 459th Agricultural Company at Stirling Castle created a ‘disturbance’ and gunners in 1st Siege Artillery Reserve Brigade telegraphed Lloyd George personally to demand instant demobilization.1 The issue of how long it would take for the army to discharge them was of paramount importance to the men, but the authorities had to look further ahead. In July 1919 a committee under General HamiltonGordon concluded that the Special Reserve should be abolished. There remained rather more than 9000 other ranks who had not completed their original six year commitment. It is unclear whether these men were required to serve out their remaining time, but the Special Reserve had effectively disappeared by the end of the year.2 In post-war volumes, some regimental historians paid scant attention to Special Reserve battalions. One wrote, ‘The history of the 3rd Battalion during the momentous years was a monotonous one. It could be nothing else.’3 Others agreed, noting, ‘The years slipped away with their record of good, honest work but with no outstanding occurrence to chronicle’, and that their work afforded ‘little material for description’.4 The historian of the 3/Suffolk considered it ‘doubtful whether the arduous and sometimes disheartening duties which fell to the lot of the CO and Permanent Staff of the Special Reserve battalions have ever received a full measure of recognition’.5 Some regimental histories do have good, full accounts of their 3rd Battalions while some, for example the Royal Scots Fusiliers and the West Yorkshire Regiments, receive virtually no mention at all.6 Even Everard Wyrall, probably the most prolific of post-war historians, seems to have been confused about the 194

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purpose of the 3rd Battalions. He noted that in August 1914 the 3/Somerset Light Infantry expressed ‘disappointment’ to learn that it would not be going overseas but was, instead, to be a ‘Draft Finding Unit’.7 Those volumes which refer to their other Home Service battalions are also sometimes hazy about their history. The chronicler of 14/South Lancashire noted it was ‘not clear what were the exact functions of this unit … and [it] was presumably part of the Central Force’.8 By the time the battalion had come into existence, the Central Force had ceased to exist. Similarly, the historian of the East Yorkshire thought the 2nd Garrison battalion ‘eventually became a labour battalion’; it actually became the 8th Battalion RDC.9 Although the 3/Manchester lost 31 men in a Zeppelin raid on Cleethorpes in April 1916 and 14 of the Felixstowe garrison died during an air raid in July 1917,10 casualties in Special Reserve battalions were generally caused by disease or training accidents. Fatalities were also light in the Training Reserve battalions,11 but deaths in the Supernumerary Companies and Provisional battalions are more difficult to compute. Most regiments did not distinguish between those men who died while training for overseas duty with their Territorial battalions from those who died while serving with the Supernumerary Companies attached to those battalions. The three exceptions are the London, Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) and Royal Sussex Regiments. These, often elderly, men are listed separately in Soldiers Died and are described in the rolls as National Reservists.12 Despite Robertson’s insistence in January 1919 that the auxiliary could only just meet its commitments, the Royal Defence Corps disappeared reasonably quickly.13 In April that year there remained in Britain a little under 100,000 prisoners of war, guarded mainly by RDC troops. Approximately 40 per cent of the prisoners were working in scattered forestry and agricultural detachments, a problem which exacerbated the corps’ manpower limitations and caused Western Command to report that it lacked sufficient troops to maintain existing manning regulations.14 Nevertheless, demobilization of the corps continued and in March each of the 48 Reserve battalions in the UK was ordered to provide men to replace an identical number of RDC companies about to be disbanded. There were contemporary accusations that the corps’ demobilization procedure was slow and inequitable to its more elderly soldiers but it appears that some RDC men in receipt of separation and additional allowances preferred to remain in uniform rather than accept a release. Administrators were, however, instructed to look favourably on former National Reservists who did seek a quick return to civilian

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life.15 Despite the complaints, the process was swift enough for Scottish Command to disband the last of its Protection Companies in September 1919 and, although there were problems with tracing equipment and disputes with auditors, those companies in Ireland had also gone by the end of the year.16 As the POW camps closed, the remaining Protection Companies and the sole RDC battalion (which had continued to work with the Royal Air Force), were similarly despatched to oblivion. The work of the corps was gradually undertaken by parties of nonessetial industrial men in regimental Reserve units but in 1922 the RDC re-emerged as the National Defence Corps.17 Its companies were attached to Territorial units and in an emergency were detailed, as their predecessors had been, to defend vulnerable points. In 1939, when war did again come, the NDC became Home Defence Battalions and were affiliated to the Regular Army. Demobilization of the Territorial Force began in December 1918. Its reconstruction in the immediate post-war era commanded a low governmental priority but, following prolonged and acrimonious debate, the newly crafted Territorial Army was again established as the nation’s principal auxiliary.18 In the months after the war there had been considerable disquiet amongst Territorials who went to the Empire in 1914 over the Army Council’s decision not to issue a special Imperial Service decoration and there was equal consternation over the time the authorities took in debating whether to grant a Home Service medal. If granted, such an award would have been given to those few Territorials who had been retained on home defence duties, and to members of the Volunteer Force. While a future reconstitution of a Territorial home defence force, albeit in an as yet undecided form, was always likely, the possibility of any postwar existence for the Volunteer Force and of a revived National Reserve was less certain. To the original members of the Volunteer Training Corps the great lacuna in Britain’s pre-war and probably post-war system of home defence, had been a trained, well-financed and substantive force dedicated to protecting the coast and lines of communication. There was a reluctant but pragmatic acceptance among many Volunteers that the military establishment’s apparent insouciance over the matter, its previous doubts about volunteer auxiliaries in general and its traditional captiousness in spending on anything other than the Regular Army, precluded at least an immediate revival of the Volunteer Force and even the organizational skeleton of a National Reserve. Since its inception in 1914, many members of VTC had looked forward to a permanent role for the auxiliary, be it in the guise of an expanded National Reserve or as a more explicit landsturm.19 Some

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supporters took comfort from Lord Ranksborough’s 1916 comments that the Volunteers now constituted a permanent element in the defence of the country,20 while others held a rather more pessimistic view concluding that the future lay ‘in the lap of the gods’.21 This gloomy opinion was echoed by one member who predicted ‘we shall probably just fizzle out in the same haphazard way that we came into existence’.22 One early post-war paper argued for the compilation of a register of demobilized officers and NCOs willing to work with the Volunteer movement, agreement to be secured over future recruiting areas, and the retention of adequate supplies of uniforms and arms.23 Having proved its ‘public worth’, the chairman of one association spoke confidently of the force’s reconstruction once the Territorial Force was re-established.24 Some proponents returned to the earlier concept of the movement as an element within a progressive organization of part-time auxiliaries stretching in age range from the Boy Scouts to the Volunteers or of developing the force into a Territorial Reserve. The Wiltshire and Cornwall Associations considered a proposal of combining the Volunteers with the National Reserve to form a second line Territorial Force, while the County of London Association concluded the War Office was already planning a third line force of trained men beyond military age.25 Basil Liddell Hart had also suggested a model on which a post-war force could be built which stressed that in addition to its being commanded by men with experience of modern training and warfare, the officers would need to have an understanding of the attitudes and conditions peculiar to part-time, volunteer soldiers.26 Within a week of the ceasefire, Volunteers’ drills had become optional, members under detention for non-attendance were released and all disciplinary actions were dropped.27 There had already been calls for tribunal men to be released from their commitment and, in early December, Volunteers were officially informed that for the time being there was no longer any compulsion to drill.28 With an eye to keeping at least the force’s structure in being, Percy Harris had appealed for men to be granted leave of absence rather than an absolute order to stand down. His position was endorsed by the Gazette which argued that if tribunal men were released, the force would collapse completely.29 By Christmas 1918, most battalions appear to have abandoned drills, one commentator observing that with all enthusiasm and goodwill exhausted, nothing short of mobilization would ever resuscitate them. A clergyman described the entire Volunteer system as a ‘complete wreck’ and Leicestershire Association ruefully admitted it was ‘left practically

198 Defending Albion

to the individual … to decide his own attitude to the Force’.30 A few battalions and companies did organize weekly drills but it was only the diehards who turned out. The tribunal men, and often their equipment, disappeared. Although in the immediate post-armistice period the primary concerns of the War Office were elsewhere, they did not entirely ignore the Volunteer Force. Amid a growing fear of civil disorder, Volunteer COs were ordered surreptitiously to remove and hand to the Police their men’s rifle bolts. Robertson, as GOC-in-CHF, was equally concerned that although they were no longer obliged to drill, members’ agreements had not been cancelled; they might at any time be required to resume training and commence temporary duties but Robertson did predict serious difficulties in persuading them to turn out. He reported, too, a certain amount of internal discontent at the way the authorities were perceived to be maintaining their traditional disdain towards the movement.31 In February 1919, the Liverpool Daily Post commented on the ‘absence of any real expression of satisfaction’ in the force’s work, but Robertson had already reminded the War Office about just how valuable the Volunteers’ work had been in digging London’s defences, manning antiaircraft guns, guarding vulnerable sites, supplementing the personnel of the London Fire Service and as training units for later army recruits. In addition to his call for a ‘definite statement’ about the force’s future, Robertson urged the Army Council to consider some official recognition of its service.32 Scarbrough agreed with the need for an early statement but argued that the discontent would have been even more widespread had drills not been suspended.33 The Army Council, too, agreed with the proposal to compose a letter of thanks but contemptuously dismissed the idea of making any immediate, definitive pronouncement about the movement’s future.34 The Army Council did not object to a little, limited pandering to postwar Volunteer aspirations. It agreed that officers should be allowed to retain their uniforms and be given honorary rank and, after considerable confusion, permitted the men to keep their uniform and purchase greatcoats and boots.35 The uncertainty about what future if any the force might have in the post-war world, and the way in which that uncertainty was being prolonged, caused Major-General Sir Desmond O’Callaghan to accuse the authorities of ‘skilful cruelty’ by allowing the movement to ‘die off by the slow process of inanition … [and] … by official starvation’.36 In fact, the War Office and the Secretary of State were still considering their options. For his part, Scarbrough acknowledged that the Volunteer Force should be kept in existence and that it

Epilogue 199

should be ‘encouraged’ to maintain its drills and remain fully equipped.37 Until a final decision about whether to disband or to incorporate the force within a home defence strategy was taken, the Government urged all ranks to maintain their cohesion and discipline.38 The state of limbo existed for a further three months when, with the imminent signing of the peace treaty, Scarbrough again urged the Secretary of State to come to a decision. In September, the War Office despatched a letter announcing the disbanding of all but motor Volunteer units and the Lords Lieutenant and GOC Commands were asked to pass on the Army Council’s appreciation of the work of all ranks.39 Most Volunteers had probably long before decided there was to be no future for the part-time home defence force. The tribunal men would have shed no tears and the genuine Volunteers possibly realized that in a new world where war was about to be outlawed by international agreement, and with the shape and purpose of the Regular and Territorial Armies still far from resolved, there would be little room or indeed need for a volunteer body of older men. Hope had also been virtually abandoned of a resurrection of the National Reserve. Churchill had said in February 1919 that the matter must wait until weightier military issues had been resolved. He did give a hint of encouragement at a conference in April but a Surrey resolution pressing for a quick decision met with little response from the War Office.40 The War Office letter of September 1919 which formally announced the official disbanding of the Volunteer Force merely concluded what had become an accepted inevitability. Although Volunteer Force adjutants were ordered to assist COs of returning Territorial battalions until their own unit was disbanded and they, in turn, were demobilized, there was discontent among some Territorial cadres who experienced difficulty in reclaiming their drill halls and stores.41 However, because the demobilization procedure did not run smoothly, the official disbanding of the force had several times to be extended from the intended date of October 1919 until March 1920: equipment had been lost or mislaid, there were serious difficulties in persuading men to part with their kit and, owing to a frequent lack of transport, stores from outlying detachments were slow to be returned.42 COs had not only to struggle against the men’s reluctance to hand in equipment but also cope with lost or destroyed records, certificates sent to wrong addresses, an inability, whether supposed or real, to understand the official forms and imprest accounts. The lack of official acknowledgement of the force’s utility and value kindled a resentment which long absorbed the genuine Volunteers. While older members might have recalled earlier War Office ambivalence

200 Defending Albion

towards auxiliary bodies, most were both surprised and repelled by the attitude of a democratic government drawn from the same strata of society as many of the movement’s most dedicated enthusiasts. Post-war reminiscences are replete with condemnation of the ‘disgraceful blot on the escutcheon of wartime officialdom’ and of the ‘mean and little act of a mean War Office which could not get over its dislike of the Volunteers’.43 The ‘cold indifference’ of an ‘extravagant Government [which] suspected what was offered for nothing’, was used deliberately to allow the force to lapse into ‘obscurity, unacknowledged and unthanked’. Having been ‘messed about’ and alternately ‘flattered and snubbed’, one member believed the wonder was that the force had held together for so long. The majority, he thought, ‘would hail their eventual release with thankfulness’.44 The Pall Mall Gazette considered the movement had been ‘slighted and sneered at’ by the authorities; another paper thought it was ‘slowly dismembered’ and demobilized in ‘something like ignominy’.45 Scarbrough was in favour of presenting a certificate and badge for efficient men who had enrolled in or after May 1916 and wanted the awards to be accompanied by a letter of thanks from the King. The War Office did not oppose the idea of a certificate but rejected the proposal of a badge.46 There was similar prevarication over the request for a royal review of the force. During the summer of 1919 members became so frustrated at the apparent lack of the King’s appreciation that attendance at civic parades and local royal visits was often poor.47 Birmingham Corporation added to the humiliation when it requested the Boy Scouts and Specials to line the route for a visit by the King but ‘studiously ignored’ the Volunteers.48 Some county associations did arrange parades where Volunteers were presented with their certificates but even when Volunteers were invited to attend ceremonies welcoming the return of Territorial battalions, the financial assistance offered was sometimes insufficient to provide transport for the dispersed detachments.49 After several drafts the King’s letter was finally agreed and sent to the Lords Lieutenant but it ignored the voluntary service of original members who had enrolled before May 1916.50 One disappointed recipient dismissed it as a ‘printed letter of lukewarm thanks, signed with a facsimile of an indecipherable signature’. Conversely, Lord Harris, who had maintained an ambivalent attitude towards the movement throughout, told the Kent Volunteers that the ‘gracious thanks of His Majesty … [should] … suffice as an assurance from the country that you have deserved well of the state’.51 It was eventually agreed that the 4000 Volunteers who spent the full three months in the Special Service Companies qualified as ‘duly

Epilogue 201

enlisted soldiers’ and, as such were entitled to unemployment benefit and assistance from the Government’s scheme for overseas resettlement of ex-soldiers.52 Former National Reservists who later joined the RDC received a demobilization gratuity, so too did those National Reservists who served in the Territorial Rifle Brigade battalions. They at least had the chance to participate in official peace parades. Apart from their ‘Sunday School certificate’,53 their uniform and, if they chose to buy them, their boots and greatcoat, demobilized Volunteers had few physical reminders of their unpaid and seemingly unappreciated period of service with the home army. R.B. Haldane’s period of tenure at the War Office between 1905 and 1912, had produced an expeditionary force which performed exceptionally well in the opening battles of the war. His successor chose not to build upon the foundations already laid for the means of expanding and maintaining that force but Haldane’s plans for the protection of the British Isles became the kernel of Kitchener’s war time home defence strategy. In the early months of the war, when on occasions Kitchener’s anxiety about the credibility of invasion verged on the obsessive, the derided Territorial Force and an understrength Special Reserve, whose prime responsibility really lay elsewhere, were about all that stood between a German landing and London. The ranks of the inexperienced and largely youthful Territorials had been bolstered by the influx of more elderly and not necessarily proven National Reservists. Despite their often limited and frequently outmoded military experience their presence and enthusiasm had a leavening effect on their more innocent comrades. The number of Volunteers who left the home ‘army’ to join the Regular Army is ultimately undeterminable and distorted anyway by those caught by the various Military Service Acts; the total of hours worked by Volunteers is similarly impossible to compute. Yet, the amount of voluntary work given to digging the London defences alone ran to over one million manhours. When that figure is added to the hours spent on anti-aircraft duties, in providing transport at the London terminuses, guarding and loading at munitions and supply facilities, and the millions of hours spent by individuals or small parties patrolling reservoirs, railway lines, gas works and the like are added, the total represents an enormous amount of unpaid home defence work. Whether that work was either essential or even useful, or whether the utilization of the Volunteer Force on such schemes was merely a government sop to the middle-aged, middle-class who considered it a citizen’s duty to contribute to the defence of his nation and to the new

202 Defending Albion

phenomenon of total war, are questions at the heart of the very raison d’être of the auxiliary. Enveloped by the popular spontaneity of August 1914, the founders of the Volunteer movement were swept along on the surging sentiments of duty and sacrifice. Undoubtedly this eudaemonic state sheltered them from the realities of modern warfare. If the Germans had landed in 1914 and if the VTC had streamed forth to confront the invader, they would, unintentionally, have compounded the military’s already severe operational and logistical difficulties. Many Volunteers might have fought bravely, but without organization, discipline and arms, they would have blocked the roads and hampered effective deployment of the Regular troops. Like their franc tireur counterparts in Belgium and France they would have met a futile death at the hands of German troops exacting revenge for whatever limited damage the Volunteers might have been unfortunate enough to inflict upon them.54 There is no evidence to suggest the authorities ever considered the growing attraction of the home defence movement might interfere with the industrial and commercial life of the country, yet in late 1914 they were certainly concerned that the financial support enjoyed by many Volunteer units might entice arms manufacturers to supply them rather than the New Armies. Regulations to prevent this were quickly put in place and, once the controls were applied, the authorities were content to display a benign tolerance towards the movement and gradually to involve it in its developing schemes for home protection. The War Office chose, at times, to traduce the work and nature of the corps but while this occasional sophism caused some to lose faith, the bulk of the original Volunteers quietly dedicated themselves to acquiring arms and skills. As it grew increasingly apparent that manpower resources would have to be mobilized for both military and industrial purposes, the Government decided, amidst the contemporary clamour for equality of sacrifice, that the Volunteers might be utilized. The decision to direct tribunal exempted men to join a local corps had less to do with producing a quality home defence army and more with calming the critics within Parliament who felt elements of the industrial workforce were avoiding their citizen duty. Government reluctance to clamp down heavily on those who failed to fulfil their drills reflected its developing philosophy that food and munitions production were of greater importance than teaching reluctant and perhaps exhausted workers the rudiments of military drill. The Government’s decision to arm and equip the part-time element of the home defence forces was made with the reluctant acquiescence of

Epilogue 203

the War Office. The military authorities could see little advantage in a body which was unlikely to be used and, even if it was ever called out, would always remain of dubious quality. The Volunteer movement reaped the benefit of the consistent support afforded by Sir John French yet, despite his public pronouncements, French himself had little, real faith in the force’s military potential; when the Government did opt to spend on the Volunteers, it did so with an eye to their political rather than military potential. The Special Service Companies did give the movement a sense of purpose and did something to suggest that the Government was taking them seriously; for its part the Government secured a means by which additional troops could be posted abroad without appearing to jeopardize home security. In addition, it made good propaganda to illustrate how the front line land defence of the islands and their democratic traditions was being actively undertaken by largely middle-aged, part-time volunteer citizenry. The knowledge that the part-time force did figure in government plans certainly did serve to mollify its supporters both inside and outside Parliament, and its deployment in partnership with the few remaining Regulars and Territorials demonstrated both a sagacious degree of populism and a perceptive pragmatism. The War Office’s often indifferent pre-war attitude towards the Territorial home army, its discriminatory wartime policy over the promotion of Territorial officers to senior rank, the Government’s contemptuous post-war treatment of the Volunteers and its failure to revive the National Reserve, cannot deny the auxiliaries’ value and contribution to the national war effort. The enthusiasm with which over 260,000 pre-war Territorials, 200,000 registered National Reservists, and over 250,000 genuine wartime Volunteers exhibited their willingness to serve in some capacity typified the Edwardian ideals of patriotic duty and selfsacrifice. These virtues perfectly exemplify the traditional role and object of the British amateur soldier. Twenty years after he had first dismissed the idea, the same former Secretary of State, W.S. Churchill, concluded the exigencies of war, again, demanded the levying of a part-time, anti-invasion auxiliary.55 Like the Home Guard in the later conflict, Britain’s auxiliary home defence forces in the Great War were not called upon to prove their worth in battles fought on the nation’s beaches. Troops in the Special Reserve battalions barely had time to grow bored before they were posted, but for those men with questionable fitness and skills in the post-conscription home service units, the war was certainly unglamorous and tedious. The home service Territorials, the Supernumerary

204 Defending Albion

Company National Reservists and the part-time enthusiasts in the early VTC were condemned to spend uncomfortable and interminable hours of drab routine on wind swept beaches, lofty viaducts and dams of shadowy reservoirs. In the end, Britain’s ‘national obsession’56 with invasion proved unfounded; civilian terror had come with twentieth rather than nineteenth century technology. There were not even any attempts at sabotage and if the Germans had launched a late raid against a harbour or coastal munitions facility, the damage would have caused only temporary embarrassment to the Admiralty. Without ever being tested, faith in the ‘blue water school’ proved decisive. The Territorial Force was destined to win its laurels in the theatres which Haldane had originally envisaged but the Second Line Territorials and the other wartime elements of the home army provided a means by which thousands of low category or over age men could contribute to the defence of their shores. Although there were thousands of semi-trained troops with drafting units who could be called if necessary, the full time component of the ‘army’, transient by definition and often inadequately prepared, was by 1918 only at about one-fifth of the figure regarded as a minimum in 1914. It still expended enormous energy on preparing for the possibility of virtual suicide raids by up to 5000 enemy troops on strategic targets. It had sheaves of schemes to transport it to a threatened area and volumes of orders about how to react once it arrived. While waiting and training for what never actually materialized, it patrolled the coast and provided a physical presence against the fear of invasion for what was at least in the early years of the war an agitated citizenry. When the manpower crisis reached its peak in early 1918, the Government resolved to rely for the mainland’s security on a combination of the Royal Navy, under-age and largely under-trained Regulars and low category Territorials. These were supported by the tribunal exempted, the medically unfit, the over-age and often part-time, amateur and frequently volunteer auxiliaries. In the post-war years it was the misfortune of those who campaigned for a modern, viable Territorial Army, supported by a revived Volunteer Force of older landsturm, that peacetime politicians maintained the traditional attitude of pre-war governments towards auxiliary home defence formations. It was a shabby and ungracious attitude toward those defenders of Britain who, like their forebears, had given their zeal, money and sometimes their lives, to protect Albion’s shores.

Appendix I: Extra Reserve Battalions

As part of Haldane’s army reforms, 23 regiments of the line were ordered to form a total of 27 Extra Reserve battalions. All eight Irish regiments formed such battalions; four of these regiments each formed two battalions. They became the 4th and 5th Battalions of their regiment. These 12 battalions were intended to perform a similar service in Ireland as Territorial units did on the mainland. The two Extra Reserve battalions of the Royal Irish Rifles maintained a separate existence for the duration but both Extra Reserve battalions of the Leinster, the Royal Munster Fusiliers and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers were absorbed by their 3rd Battalions in May 1918. The 4th Battalion of the Royal Irish Regiment remained a discrete unit but those of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, the Connaught Rangers and the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers were absorbed by their 3rd Battalions in April and May 1918. In Scotland, the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), Highland Light Infantry and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders formed Extra Reserve battalions. The three battalions were part of the Forth or Tay Garrisons and survived the war. Eleven English regiments formed a 4th (Extra Reserve) Battalion while the Royal Fusiliers, which had four Regular and two Reserve battalions, formed the 7th (Extra Reserve) Battalion. Five of these twelve Extra Reserve units fulfilled their original purpose and went overseas as fighting infantry. Four of the remaining battalions served in garrisons alongside their regiments’ 3rd (Reserve) Battalions. The remaining three battalions also served as coastal garrison units. The seven battalions which spent the war in the UK were part of the home army but continued to function as draft finding units. 4th 7th 4th 4th 4th 4th 4th 4th 4th 4th 4th 4th

(Ex.Res.) Royal Warwickshire (Ex.Res.) Royal Fusiliers (Ex.Res.) King’s (Ex.Res) West Yorkshire (Ex.Res) Bedfordshire (Ex.Res) Lancashire Fusiliers (Ex.Res) East Surrey (Ex.Res) S. Staffordshire (Ex.Res) Manchester (Ex.Res) N. Staffordshire (Ex.Res) Durham L.I. (Ex.Res) Sherwood Foresters

Dover Garrison France May 1916 France March 1915 Tees Garrison France July 1916 Severn Garrison Harwich Garrison France October 1917 Humber Garrison France October 1917 Tyne Garrison Tyne Garrison

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Appendix II: Home Defence Scheme, July 1914* Central Force GHQ: Hotel Metropole, London

Independent Mounted Division HQ: Bury St Edmunds 4 Mounted Brigades 2 Cyclist Battalions

First Army HQ: Bedford Highland Division Welsh Division (if ordered) West Riding Division (if ordered) 2 Mounted Brigades

Second Army HQ: Aldershot 1st London Division Home Co. Division Wessex Division (if ordered) 2 Mounted Brigades 3 Cyclist Battalions

Third Army HQ: Luton East Anglian Division North Midland Division South Midland Division 2nd London Division 2 Mounted Brigades 1 Cyclist Battalion

* Excluding garrisons of Defended Ports. 206

Appendix II 207

Local Forces Divisions London District Scottish Command Northern Command Western Command Southern Command Irish Command

Mounted Brigades 1 1 1 1

2 1 2

Cyclist Battalions

2 3 1 2

1

Total Central Force and Local Forces Divisions

Mounted Brigades

Cyclist Battalions

14

14

14

Appendix III: Provisional Units In June 1915 the 56 recently formed and numbered Provisional battalions were grouped into Provisional brigades. Similarly, the home service field companies, artillery brigades and field ambulances were also numbered and brigaded. The brigades fell under the command of the GOCs of the six Home Commands and as such constituted elements of the home army. By mid-1916, probably 17 of the original 56 had been disbanded and the remaining 41 were serving in 10 Provisional brigades. Apart from 3 Provisional Brigade, which had five battalions, the formations each had four battalions. ACI 2364 and 2426 of 1916 allocated all Provisional units to Territorial Force County Associations with effect from 1 January 1917. The infantry battalions quickly, but not immediately, dropped their numbered designations and became Home Service Territorial battalions of their county regiment. In late 1916, the 6th, 8th and 9th Provisional brigades were transferred to the three new Home Service divisions, the 71st, 72nd and 73rd. Their brigades were numbered from 212 to 220 and each contained three battalions of the now regimentally named and numbered former Provisional units. Six Home Service battalions were scattered amongst the formations and each division contained a third brigade of what were nominally Second Line Territorial battalions. The remaining seven of the original ten Provisional brigades became 221–227 Brigades, each of four battalions. By 1918 they were known as Mixed brigades. These remained as part of XXIII Army Corps, Northern Command or Eastern Command until the end of the war. However, those Provisional units which had gone to the three Home Service divisions were, in 1917, replaced by the Graduated battalions and disbanded.

208

Appendix IV: The Home Army in November 1918*

XXIII Army Corps (Lieutenant-General Sir W.S. Pulteney) HQ: Bury St Edmonds 64th (2/Highland) Division: 191, 192, 193 Bdes (all Graduated bns). 67th (2/Home Co.) Division: 201, 202 Bdes (all Graduated bns). 214 Special Bde: 16/R.W. Surrey; 2/1st Herts; 2/1st Warwickshire Yeo. 68th (2/Welsh) Division: 203, 204, 205 Bdes (all Graduated bns). (These formations had the usual divisional troops attached). 1 Cyclist Bde:

2/1, 2/2 Lovat Scouts; 2/1 Pembroke Yeo; 2/1 Gamorgan Yeo; 2/1 Montgomery Yeo; 2/1 Denbighshire Yeo.

The following Mixed brigades were attached to the divisions: 223 224 225 226 227

Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed

Bde: Bde: Bde: Bde: Bde:

27 (HS) King’s; 14/Suffolk; 17/Essex; 9/N’hants. 24/Ches; 23/RWF; 4/Monmouth. 19/R.W. Surrey; 11/Beds; 18/Essex; 32/Middlesex. 17/Gloucester; 28/DLI; 29/London; 30/London. 35/N.Fus; 15/Devon; 17/Hants; 13/Somerset L.I.

The following Territorial Force Cyclist battalions were attached to the Mixed brigades or the 67th Division: 2/25th London; 1/6th Suffolk; 2/8th Essex; 2/7th Welsh; 2/7th Devon; 2/9th Hants. The following Heavy Batteries RGA were attached to the Mixed brigades: 2/1st Fife; 2/1st Kent; 2/1st Carnavon; 2/1st Essex; 2/1st London; 2/2nd London. No.2 Armoured Train. XXIII Corps Signal Company.

Kent Force: (Major-General A.G. Dallas) HQ: Pall Mall, London. Cyclist Division: 5 Cyclist Bde: 11 Cyclist Bde:

2/1st S. Notts Hussars; 2/1st Derby Yeo; 2/1st City of L.Yeo. 2/1st R. Bucks Hussars; 2/1st Notts Yeo; 1/7th Devon (Cyclist).

* Excluding Irish Command. 209

210 Appendix IV 12 Cyclist Bde: 2/1st Staffs Yeo; 2/1st Leics Yeo; 2/1st Lincs Yeo. 2/1st Kent Cyclist Bn and divisional units were attached. 221 Mixed Bde: 13 (HS) R.Sco.Fus; 15/Sco.Rifles; 21/HLI; 16/A&SH. 222 Mixed Bde: 37 (HS) N.Fus; 18/Yorks; 26/DLI; 27/DLI. 393rd and 396th Independent Batteries. 2/1st Warwickshire Heavy Battery RGA. 2/2nd Lancashire Heavy Battery RGA.

Northern Command HQ: York. 69th (2/East Anglian) Division: 206, 207, 208 Bdes (all Graduated bns). Cyclist battalions: 1/Northern; 2/1st Northern; 1/1st Hants; 2/1st Hunts; 2/6th Norfolk; 1/5th E. Yorks; 2/6th Suffolk; 1/7th Welsh 2/1st North Riding Heavy Battery RGA. 2/1st West Riding Heavy Battery RGA.

Additional troops 28 garrisons on the coast with RGA and RE and some attached infantry. 7 Special Reserve bdes. 14 Reserve Infantry bdes TF. 6 Training Reserve bdes (all Young Soldier bns). 23 Infantry Cadet units. 6 Recruit Distribution bns.

Appendix V: Coastal Fortresses and Garrisons1

The size and extent of Britain’s coastal defences and garrisons had evolved through the centuries. A few Martello towers, built to defend the coasts against Napoleon, were still used by naval and military personnel in the early twentieth century, but most of the fortresses had been built in the 1860s. In the 1890s, the growing awareness that the threat might come from the east, rather than the south, caused a limited amount of improvement work to be carried out on defences at the Firth of Forth, the Tyne, Humber, Tees and at Leith. In 1903, a Joint Military and Naval Committee, known as the Owen Committee, reclassified certain ports in view of the enhanced threat by cruisers coming from across the North Sea. Coastal defences were weakened, however, in the following year when responsibility for mining shallow waters was removed from the Royal Engineers and given to the Royal Navy. Believing that friendly vessels had more to fear from mines than enemy ones, the navy did virtually nothing. Rather more determined work to improve the East Coast’s forts and ports was conducted between 1910 and 1914, largely at the expense of those in Ireland and those on the West Coast. By 1914, responsibility for manning the fortresses was divided between the Regular Army and the Territorial Force. For example, during the Precautionary Period, Falmouth Fortress, with its fixed armament of two 6-inch Mark VII batteries and seven machine guns, was garrisoned by a total of eight officers and 204 ORs, a figure which included 41 Regulars of the RGA and 26 Regular RE. On the first day of mobilization the garrison would expand to 95 officers and 2107 ORs, of which 48 and 1322, respectively, were Territorials. By the fifth day, when three Special Reserve battalions had arrived to replace most of the Territorial infantry, the total was to reach 143 officers and 3989 ORs. Territorial RGA units were divided into Garrison Companies and had a full establishment of a little over 400 all ranks. The companies could be scattered over several coast sites. In addition to the gunners, most garrisons had two Fortress Companies and one Fortress Works Company RE. Each Fortress Company had an establishment of about 135, which included an Electric Light Section and a Signalling Section, and the Works Company one of about 170 all ranks. The four Fortress Companies and two Fortress Works Companies comprising, for example, the Humber, Tees and Tyne Garrisons under Northern Command totalled 29 officers and 1058 ORs. Humber Defences was under the command of either a MajorGeneral or a Brigadier-General, who had two GSOs, an Assistant Adjutant, a QMG and an attached Intelligence and Anti-Aircraft Officer at his HQ. On mobilization, the Regular RGA coastal units were brought up to strength by Army and Special Reservists. Their existing troops were usually posted overseas fairly quickly. During the war, the companies were used to form siege batteries for the Expeditionary Forces and experienced a very rapid turnover of personnel. At Portsmouth, No.37 Company RGA helped to found 71 siege

211

212 Appendix V batteries; No.13 Company, at Languard Fort, had 91 officers and almost 4000 ORs pass through it during a 30-month period. In April 1917, the total number of RGA personnel serving the coastal batteries amounted to 527 officers and 9910 ORs. Twelve months later these men were manning 383 guns, of which 103 were the 6-inch Mark VIII, and another 103 were 12-pdr Quick Firers. In August and September 1918, the RGA companies were abolished and reorganized on a system of Fire Commands. For example, No.15 (Yorkshire) Fire Command, with its 4.7-inch and 4-inch guns, was formed from five companies of the East Riding RGA TF stationed in the Outer Defences of the Humber Garrison. By the time of the reorganization, it is probable all fit men had long since been posted away.

Notes Introduction: The Invasion Issue 1. See I. Beckett, Riflemen Form: A Study of the Rifle Volunteer Movement 1859–1908 and H. Cunningham, The Volunteers: A Social and Political History 1859–1920 for accounts of the raising of the Rifle Volunteers. 2. For a detailed analysis of the contemporary arguments over conscription, see M. Allison, ‘The National Service Issue 1899–1914’. unpublished PhD thesis. 3. CAB 3/1/20A1 of 23 Feb.1904. 4. London’s defences were officially abolished in March 1905. The conclusions of the CID’s report were accepted by the newly elected Liberal Government. 5. Haldane was Secretary of State for War 1905–12, when he became Lord Chancellor. His detractors accused him of being pro-German. 6. CAB 3/1/38A, 18 June 1906. For detailed discussions on the problems faced by Haldane in attempting to execute his reforms, see E. Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer; R.B. Haldane, Richard Burdon Haldane: An Autobiography R.B. Haldane, Before the War and D. Sommer, Haldane of Cloan. 7. J. Gooch, ‘Haldane and the “National Army’’ ’, in I. Beckett and J. Gooch, Politicians and Defence, pp. 71–2 and E. Spiers, Haldane, pp. 160–86. 8. I. Beckett and J. Gooch, Politicians and Defence, pp. 77–8. 9. The inquiry sat from November 1907 to September 1908. 10. P. Dennis, The Territorial Army 1907–1940, p. 8: 20% of them deserted and a further 25% were discharged before completing their term of service. J.K. Dunlop, The Development of the British Army 1899–1914, p. 48. 11. J. Dunlop, ibid., p. 45. 12. In 1906 the Militia and the Volunteers were respectively 40,000 and 100,000 under strength. J. Gooch, ‘Haldane and the National Army’ in I. Beckett and J. Gooch, Politicians and Defence, p. 77. Ewart was DMO 1906–10 and AG 1910–14. He became GOC Scotland 1914–18. 13. Viscount Esher had been Chairman of the Committee on Reconstruction at the War Office 1903–1904, permanent member of the CID 1905–18 and President of the Co. of London TF Association. He enjoyed close connections to the royal family and with just about anyone involved in political and military affairs. He was the ultimate éminence grise. 14. Ewart diary, 10 Dec.1906, quoted I. Beckett and J. Gooch, Politicians and Defence, p. 80. 15. Technically, although the Special Reserve did replace the Militia, the ‘old constitutional force’ was not quite eliminated. Several thousand Militiamen did not transfer to the new formations and served out their term of service in their old Militia unit. It was not until 1913 that the last batch of six-year men was finally discharged. 16. There were also three Special Reserve cavalry regiments, the North Irish Horse, South Irish Horse and King Edward’s Horse, but they were not drafting 213

214 Notes

17. 18.

19. 20.

21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32.

33.

34. 35.

36.

37.

units. Although having been in existence for many years, the King Edward’s Horse only became a Special Reserve unit in June 1912. I.F.W. Beckett and K. Simpson, A Nation in Arms, p. 4. In his Autobiography, op.cit., p. 185, Haldane recalled that when he mentioned to the Army Council his intention of creating a ‘Hegelian Army … the conversation fell off’. Hansard, 4th Series Vol.169,1301, 25 Feb.1907. Fisher had become First Sea Lord in October 1904. He was responsible for creating the modern navy and the Dreadnought. He was outspoken, at time irrational, and usually resisted co-operation with the War Office. Lord Roberts VC, hero of the South African War and C-in-C 1901–1904. He was President of the NSL and advocated conscription for the Regulars and the home forces. CAB 16/3A; CAB 3/2/1/43A. Tirpitz’s statement is printed in G.P. Gooch and H.V. Temperly, British Documents on the Origins of the War 1908–1914, Vol.VI, p. 116. Final report, CAB 3/2/44A of 22 Oct.1908. J. Gooch, The Plans of War, p. 285. WO33.462, Appreciation of the Situation in the UK in the Event of Hostilities with a European Maritime Power, 1 Sept.1908. Archibald Murray was DMT 1907–12, Inspector of Infantry 1912–14, Lord French’s Chief of Staff, DCIGS and then CIGS in 1915. WO33.462. H.R. Moon, The Invasion of the United Kingdom, p. 380. Hyndmann was the founder of the (socialist) Social Democratic Federation. Admiral Lord Charles Beresford was a Unionist MP at various times. He was a hugely experienced fleet commander and vociferously opposed Fisher’s reforms. Their feud attracted great public interest. Hansard House of Lords,1679–1704, 23 Nov.1908. Ewart diary entry 12 July 1909. Ewart MSS Vol.V. Cited in N.W. Summerton, ‘The Development of British Military Planning for a War Against Germany 1904–1914’. unpublished PhD thesis, pp. 347–8. The risks inherent in the construction of the Dreadnought, and the continuing worries over the Kaiser’s attitude towards Britain, finally compelled the Liberal Government to lay down more capital ships than even the Admiralty had requested. E. Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, p. 172. Further testimony to Haldane’s intention of using the Territorials alongside the Regulars both at home and abroad can be seen in the organization and equipment of the TF divisions: these almost precisely mirror those of the Regular units. P. Dennis, The Territorial Army, p. 20; M. Howard, The Continental Commitment, p. 39. General Sir Ian Hamilton was QMG 1903–04, GOC Southern Command 1905–1909 and AG 1909–1910. He next became GOC Mediterranean and Inspector for Overseas Forces 1910–14. In his Autobiography, pp. 195–6, Haldane explains that he told the House of Commons ‘we should probably have to resort to compulsory military service’. He argued that the principle of universal liability to serve in home defence rested on a strong historical precedent and on the ‘common law of the land’. Hansard, 5th Series, Vol.1,1615, 1625, 4 Mar.1909.

Notes 215 38. In Before the War, p. 175, Haldane noted that the General Staff acknowledged it would be ‘unwise to try, during a period of unrest on the Continent, to commence a new military system’. 39. It has been estimated that something like 8% of the male population of Britain in 1914 had experienced some form of military training and that 41% of boys had belonged to an ‘improving’ youth organization of some description. I. Beckett and K. Simpson, A Nation in Arms, pp. 7, 4.

Chapter 1 Supplementing the Home Army 1. Asquith succeeded Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as PM in 1908. The policies pursued by Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary and Haldane were ‘unknown and probably unacceptable to the majority of his administration as well as of their parliamentary support’, N.W. Summerton, The Development of British Military Planning for a War Against Germany, p. 473. See also J.W. Coogan and P.F. Coogan, ‘The British Cabinet and the Anglo-French Staff Talks: Who Knew What?’, Journal of British Studies, 24, 1985, pp. 110–31. 2. Hansard, 5th Series, Vol.1,1630, 4 Mar.1909. Arnold-Forster’s own attempt to reform the auxiliaries between 1903–05 had failed. 3. Hansard, 5th Series, Vol.14,1227, 7 Mar.1910. 4. Ibid., Vol.14,1176, 7 Mar.1910. 5. Wyndham had been Under Secretary to the War Office 1898–1900 and Chief Secretary for Ireland 1900–1905. He was the CO of the Cheshire Yeomanry and spoke on military affairs 1905–13. 6. Ibid., Vol.14,1199, 7 Mar.1910. 7. Ibid., Vol.14,1388, 7 Mar.1910. 8. Ibid., Vol.22,702, 2 Mar.1911. 9. WO32.8603, Proposed Committee to Consider the Organization of the Special Reserve, 1910. 10. WO33.505, Committee on the Organization of the Special Reserve, Second Report, 1910. 11. Hansard, 5th Series, Vol.22,2087–8, 14 Mar.1911. 12. Ibid., Vol.22,2176, 14 Mar.1911. 13. Two of the Government’s fiercest critics were: Robert Peel, Unionist MP for Woodbridge, former Coldstream Guards and CO of the 4/East Surrey, and Sir Arthur Griffith-Boscawen, Conservative MP for Dudley. He was CO of the 3/West Kent and remained with it after its conversion to a SR unit. One of the warmest supporters was Sir Courtney Warner, Liberal MP for Lichfield. He was Lord Lieutenant of Suffolk and CO of the 3/Ox.Light Infantry. 14. Hansard, 5th Series, Vol.41,2309, 1 Aug.1912. 15. The SR’s walking out uniform of red serge and helmet was commonly thought to have been designed to use up government stocks of cloth left over from the army’s transition from scarlet to khaki. 16. Treasury 1/11400, Re-engagement bounty of £1 for the Special Reserve. 17. Ibid., Vol.50,1129–30, 19 Mar.1913. 18. Hansard, 5th Series, Vol.1,1623, 4 Mar.1909. 19. WO32.6585, The Formation of the Territorial Force Reserve.

216 Notes 20. 9/Gen/1239 of 16 Dec.1908. 21. Miles had been Director of Recruiting and Organization 1904 and was QMG 1908–12. 22. WO32.6585 (4), 24 Mar.1909. 23. WO32.6585 (8). No date but probably Jun.1909. 24. WO32.6585 (5), 27 Apr.1909. Nicholson was Director-General Mobilization and Military Intelligence 1901–1904, QMG 1905–07 and CGS and CIGS 1908–12. 25. The Council was established in 1908 to advise the Secretary of State upon the larger questions of policy affecting the Territorial Force on its formation. It consisted of representatives from the county associations, representative officers of the TF and one or two distinguished officers. WO32.9698, The Territorial Force Advisory Council. 26. WO32.6585 (18), 27 July 1909. 27. WO32.6585 (39), 2 Dec.1909. 28. WO32.6585 (41), 28 Dec.1909. 29. WO32.6585 (47), 16 Mar.1910. 30. Hansard, Vol.14.1169, 7 Mar.1910. 31. Original War Office Circular Memo No.262 of 21 May 1909 was superseded by Special Army Order 9/Gen/1259 of 23 Mar.1910. 32. Similarly, Reservists of the 6/Black Watch were allowed to keep only their trews rather than their more expensive kilt. NAS, MD7/36, 28 Oct.1910. 33. Hansard, Vol.8,1865, 4 Aug.1909. 34. WO32.6585 (38A). Comment by AG. No date. 35. The Territorial Force Advisory Council, which had met only seven times, was similarly dissolved in May 1914. Its final meeting was held in Apr.1912. WO32.9698. 36. Several TF associations minuted at some length the divisions and disputes between the various bodies comprising the different VADs. 37. Rather belatedly, WO9/Reserve/1163 (AG1) of 17 June 1914 ordered associations not to enrol dockyard workers and GPO telephonists in Classes I or II of the National Reserve. The Admiralty raised no objection to the ban and agreed that its workers should register only in Class III. ADM1/8391/71; For examples of labour opposition to the Territorial Force see: West Yorkshire RO WR Co.TA Association, Book 24, 30 June 1909, letter from York and District Trades and Labour Council, NAS MD2/2, 15 Mar.1912 for mention of a Lanarkshire miner’s leader urging men to resign from the Territorials and NAS, MD11/2, 29 Oct.1913 for a minute of an Edinburgh Co-operative manager instructing his staff to either resign from the Territorials or from their position. 38. WO91/Reserve/74(AG1) of 14 Apr.1913. Kent Association made an attempt but its enquiries met with little response. 39. The original scheme was another fertile idea from the Surrey Association. See WO32.4744, Scheme for Local Guides for the County in the Event of Invasion (Surrey). 40. These items would suffice to identify the wearers as combatants. 41. WO32.4744, no ref., DMT to CIGS, 11 Mar.1910. Murray was DMT 1907–12, Inspector of Infantry 1912–14, DCIGS and the CIGS. He was replaced by Lt.-Gen Sir William Robertson in late 1915 and became GOC Egypt. 42. WO32.4744, no ref., DMT to CIGS, 15 Mar.1911.

Notes 217 43. Kiggell was DSD 1909–13, Commandant of the Staff College 1913–14 and Director of Home Defence 1914–15. He then became Chief of the General Staff BEF 1915–18. 44. WO32.4744, no ref., DSD to CIGS, 18 Sept.1911. Haldane made it clear he had no objection to associations compiling a preliminary register of guides. 9/Surrey/201 (AG5), May 1910. 45. Hansard, Vol.18,722, 27 June 1910. 46. Regulations for the Veteran Reserve included with Regulations for the Territorial Force Reserve, 9/Gen.No.1239, issued with Special Army Order of 17 May 1910. 47. The Times 20 June 1910. 48. The Times 22 May 1911. 49. Hansard, Vol.26,1346, 1 June 1911. 50. Essex RO,6E17D/2, 7 Sept.1910; Kent RO, MD/TA1/1, 30 Sept.1910; Norfolk RO TA1/1, 15 July 1911; Oldham Chronicle 7 Nov.1911. 51. National Reserve Regulations, Nov.1911. 52. Hansard, Vol.35,1672, 18 Mar.1912. 53. Hansard, Vol.28,187, 11 July 1911. 54. Derbyshire RO, D530 No.1, 10 July 1912. Colonel Frederick Banon had been GSO1 at the Staff College 1905–10. He became AAG (Director of Recruiting and Organization) in 1910. 55. Hansard, Vol.23,226, 21 Mar.1911. 56. Oxfordshire RO, 0/11/1A1(2), 28 Oct.1911. 57. City of Glasgow, NAS, MD10/6, 26 May 1913. 58. G.P. Gooch, ‘Imperialism’ in C.F. Masterman (ed.), The Heart of the Empire, 1901, p. 319, cited in J. Gooch, The Prospect of War, p. 46. 59. Surrey RO, 608/2/2, Report of sub-committee’s meeting with War Office representatives, 15 July 1912. See also Hansard, Vol.41,314, 16 July 1912. 60. Colonel Seely was originally a Unionist but later joined the Liberal Party. He was Under Secretary of State for the Colonies 1908–10, Under Secretary of State for War 1911–12 and the Secretary of State 1912–14. He resigned over the Curragh incident and, as a Major-General, commanded the Canadian Cavalry Corps 1914–18. 61. Hansard, Vol.41,313, 16 July 1912. 62. Ibid. 63. Haldane, Hansard, Vol.40,1409, 4 July 1912. 64. West Lancashire RO, 356WES/47, 30 Jan.1913; Shropshire RO, 1988/34, 3 Feb.1912. 65. The provisional regulations, which were later adopted in their entirety came out as WO9/Reserve/711, issued with Special Army Order of 7 Mar.1913. 66. Hansard, Vol.59,217, 3 Mar.1914. A breakdown of Glasgow’s different divisions shows that of its 202 Class I and 736 Class II, somewhere around 31% and 28% respectively were former Regulars. NAS, MD10/6, 26 Sept.1913. These percentages do not appear to be untypical. 67. Hansard, Vol.53,1958, 13 June 1913. Charles Burn was CO of the 2nd Co. of London Imperial Yeomanry, 1901–1906. 68. For example, see Banon’s address to the Northumberland County Association in (Newcastle) Daily Chronicle, 2 Aug.1912.

218 Notes 69. Hansard, Vol.41,2720, 5 Aug.1912. 70. Report of the National Reserve Committee of the Council of County Territorial Associations, Minutes, 25 Sept.1913. Duke of York’s HQ. 71. Kent RO, MD/TA/1/2, 14 Feb.1913. Edinburgh also resolved that the time was right for the War Office to draw up schemes by which on mobilization the Reserve should become responsible for protection of the lines of communication, bridges, power stations, coastal sites, maintenance of technical services and the distribution of food. NAS, MD11/21, 20 Nov.1913. 72. LMA, A/TA/14, 26 Feb.1913. 73. Hansard, Vol.50,116, 19 Mar.1913; 53.1121, 5 June 1913; 59.1454, 12 Mar.1914; 59.1481, 12 Mar.1914. 74. Hansard, Vol.59,1092, 10 Mar.1914. A little later in the debate, Seely partly retracted his earlier comment by declaring that the parity in figures was merely coincidental and that it should not be assumed that Class I Reservists would automatically fill up the Special Reserve battalions. Seely’s figure for the shortfall in Territorial strength was an underestimate of more than 10,000. 75. Hansard, Vol.59,1092–4, 10 Mar.1914. 76. The Times, 29 June 1914.

Chapter 2 Planning for Defence 1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

14. 15. 16.

Henry was Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police 1903–18. CAB 16/13, CID: Home Ports and Defence, 1909–10. WO32.9096, Memo on Principles governing the Defence of the UK (A1441). WO33.662, No.1 Fortress, Tyne Defences, Jan.1914; WO33.671, Eastern Coast Defence: Defence Scheme Thames & Medway, Feb.1914; ADM116.3107, East Coast Defences and Comparison with France & Germany, 1913; CAB 16/28A, Attack on the British Isles from Overseas, 1913. While DMO 1910–14, Brig-Gen and later Maj-Gen Sir Henry Wilson effectively prepared a Continental Expeditionary Force. He became Assistant CGS 1914–15, GOC Eastern Command 1917 and CIGS 1918–22. WO32.9192. Reports in file, The TF in its relation to the Expeditionary Force, 12 Jan.1912. At the time, Kiggell was DSD. CAB 2/2/2, Meeting of CID, 23 Aug.1911. WO32.9192. 12 Jan.1911. WO32.9192. Reference to CIGS in note by Bethune, 2 Feb.1912. WO32.9192. CIGS, 21 Feb.1912. WO32.9094, Principles Governing the Defence of the UK. DMT to CIGS, 13 Feb.1912. Bethune had seen service in the South African War and had been on Hamilton’s staff when Sir Ian had been GOC southern Command 1905–09. He was GOC West Lancashire Division 1909–12 and DGTF 1912–17. WO.9094. Minute by CIGS, 7 Mar.1912. If the two divisions were retained in the UK it would essentially only have affected the Central Force. They would replace two TF divisions which would otherwise have had to be withdrawn from Local Forces in Southern and Western Commands. WO32.9094 (2a). Letter, 20 Feb.1912. WO32.9094 (1a). Letter to GOC-in-C, 1912. H.R. Moon, The Invasion of the United Kingdom, p. 427.

Notes 219 17. Hansard, Vol.22,701, 21 Feb.1912; Lord Esher, ‘The Voluntary Principle’, in National Review, 56, No.331, p. 46. 18. P. Dennis, The Territorial Army 1906–1940, p. 27. 19. Lee had served with the Royal Artillery and as Military Attache in the USA. He later became, Parliamentary Military Secretary, Ministry of Munitions, Personal Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War, and DirectorGeneral of Food Production. 20. The Times, 17 July 1912. 21. Hansard, Vol.50,115, 19 Mar.1913. 22. Ibid., Vol.56,1462, 6 Aug.1913. 23. The number of Territorials represented only 0.63% of Britain’s male population. I.F.W. Beckett and K. Simpson, op.cit., p. 129 and E. Spiers, op.cit., p. 186. 24. National Defence Association, Minutes, 11 Feb.1913. Duke of York’s HQ. The Association and the Council of Territorial Associations shared the same offices and clerical staff. The former’s chairman was Sir George Goldie and while it shared the National Service League’s concern of the state of the nation’s defences, it disagreed with the League’s remedy. 25. H.R. Moon, op.cit., p. 456. 26. Minute by Nicholson to Haldane, 25 Aug.1911. Cited in N. Summerton, The Development of British Military Planning, p. 462. 27. Haldane mss: MS 5910 f.140. Asquith to Haldane; N. Summerton, op.cit., p. 463. Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson VC was a member of the CID from 1909. He succeeded Fisher as First Sea Lord in January 1910. He was removed by Churchill in November 1911 partly because of his poor showing at the August CID meeting but mainly because he was opposed to the concept of creating a naval War Staff. 28. For a discussion on the growth in public literature regarding both conscription and the proposals for despatching an expeditionary force to the Continent, see Samuel R. Williamson Jr. The Politics of Grand Strategy, pp. 301–2. 29. CAB 3/2/62A. Report of the Standing Sub-Committee of the CID, Attack on the British Isles from Overseas, 15 Apr.1914. 30. The Times, 6 Feb.1913. 31. CAB 16/28A, pp. 97–101. 32. CAB 37/115/24, Appendix XX, p. 245. Lord Esher 17 June 1913. 33. H.R. Moon, The Invasion of the United Kingdom, p. 445. 34. CAB 37/115/24, Appendix XXII, 25 June 1913. 35. CAB 3/2/56, Measures to Prevent the Blocking of Commercial Harbours, May 1913 and CAB 3/2/66, Blocking of Commercial Harbours, Feb.1914. 36. The Army Council had begun a further series of improvements on the East Coast defences in 1911 when it increased the number of RGA batteries at Tynemouth. As this was to be at the expense of the local Territorial Force unit, Northumberland County Association complained bitterly against the move and predicted increased problems in maintaining the strength of its other batteries. The Commanding Officer of the battery predicted that a large number of his officers and men would resign in protest. Northumberland RO, NRO408/8, 20 Nov.1911 and 31 Jan.1913. 37. CAB 3/2/62A, Attack on the British Isles from Overseas, 15 Apr.1914. 38. CAB 16/28A. Minutes, 25 Nov.1913, pp. 271–98.

220 Notes 39. WO32.5528, A Summary of the Policy and Work of Coast Fortification in Great Britain During the Last 60 Years. This survey was written by G.K. Scott Moncrieff, former Director of Fortifications and Works, Mar.1918. 40. CAB 17/110. Possible Reductions in the Garrisons of the South-West and West Coast Defences, 13 Nov.1913. Lt.-Col. Sir Maurice Hankey was Secretary to the CID 1912–1938. An immensely important figure behind the scenes and a very able administrator. 41. The new installations were not begun until after the outbreak of war. WO32.5528, Summary of Coast Defences, op.cit. 42. In some respects the new auxiliary force was similar to the old Sea Fencibles. This organization, raised for coast defence during the Napoleonic Wars, allowed for the emergency mobilization of fishermen and the like. 43. These men would have to begin patrolling during the Precautionary Period. CAB3/2/63A, Methods of Passing Intelligence of Hostile Raids to the Admiralty and War Office, Jan.1914. 44. CAB3/2/71A, Coast Defence of the United Kingdom and the Question of Coast Watch. 45. WO32.4744. 46. The Army and Navy, 3 Apr.1915 described the guides as a ‘body of men organized on such a basis that, collectively, they know every local bridle path, footpath and track of any description in the county, and they can thus receive troops on the border of the county, pass them on from guide to guide, and forward their passage by the most suitable routes’. Cited in A. Strachey, St. Loe Strachey, p. 249. Authorization to commence raising the corps came with WO 9/Surrey/201 (AG5) of 24 Aug.1912. 47. Cost remained paramount in all of Seely’s calculations. A WO letter emphasized that the guides would not be awarded service pay even if mobilized. The CO of the troops to whom a guide was attached was empowered to remunerate the man in accordance with the nature and value of his service. The East Riding Association predicted difficulty in forming a corps if this unsympathetic attitude was maintained. The Council of County Territorial Associations declined to take up the East Riding’s observation with the Army Council. CCTA, Minutes, 14 Mar.1913. 48. Home Office Circular 227,602 of 7 Nov.1912. 49. Many of these were expected to provide some precautionary measures on their own volition for their plants and factories. 50. WO32.9098.2A. The War Office considered whether National Reservists might be used to help the Police in assisting and guiding Army Reservists at railway stations and mobilization centres. 51. WO32.9098.8A. Copies of The Impressment of Horses in Time of National Emergency was circulated to Chief Constables in September 1912. Whereas formerly the Police had been responsible for the task, the annual inspection of animals that would be taken on mobilization was performed by the county associations. 52. HO circular, no ref. of 15 Sept.1911 found in WO32.9098, The Duties of the Civil Police in the Event of War. The Second Police Reserve originated from an Act of William IV. 53. I. Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition, 1558–1945, pp. 191–2. 54. Ibid.

Notes 221 55. LMA, A/TA/1, 4 Dec.1913. 56. Hansard, Vol.50,1089, 19 Mar.1913. There are also several examples in associations’ minutes of candidates being refused permission to enrol in the TF Reserve. 57. Hansard, Vol.54,1649, 1 July 1913. Several Territorial units are known to have tried to build up a specific reserve and to create a ‘nursery’ by fostering a particular cadet company. One such example was the work done by the Commanding Officer of the Kent (Fortress) Company RE. 58. WO32.7087.1a. Correspondence May–June 1910. 59. See, for example, WO33.578 South-West Coast Defences: Falmouth Fortress, Nov.1911. 60. At the time this suggestion was not accepted but it was revived after the outbreak of war and formed the basis of the creation of the Royal Naval Division. 61. ADM 116/3107, East Coast Defences, Aug.1913. 62. WO33.662, No.1 Fortress (Tyne Defences), Jan.1914. 63. WO33.671, Eastern Coast Defences Scheme: Thames and Medway, Feb.1914. The book specifies the Territorial division as being the 2nd London but it should undoubtedly have been the Home Counties Division comprising the Surrey, Middlesex and Kent Infantry Brigades. 64. WO32.5528, A Summary of the Policy and Work of Coast Fortification in Great Britain During the Last Sixty Years, 6 Mar.1918, p. 15. 65. Asquith’s decision is noted in CAB 16/28A, minute of 25 Nov.1913: CAB 3/2/5/62A, Report of Standing Committee of the CID: Attack on the British Isles from Overseas, 15 Apr.1914. 66. WO33.694, Central Forces Scheme, Aug.1914; WO33.692, Distribution of Home Defence forces, Aug.1914. 67. CAB 3/2/5/62A, op.cit. 68. The figures of those discharged or re-engaged do not match; there were over 5000 unaccounted men. Hansard, Vol.59.1068; 59.621. 69. Hansard, Vol.37,2187, 7 May 1912; WO32/18612 (7A), letter of 22 Apr.1914. 70. Council of County Territorial Associations, Minutes, 10 Apr.1913. 71. Northumberland RO, NRO408/5, 8 Aug.1913. 72. There was a, largely, disingenuous ‘plan’ to form an Irish National Reserve. See WO32.6638, The Formation of the National Reserve in Ireland, 1910–1914. For the difficulties and problems which beset attempts to form, or ban, auxiliary forces in Ireland, see I. Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition 1558–1945, Appendix, pp. 292–5. 73. Henry Sclater had been QM General and GOC Quetta Division between 1904–12. He was AG 1914–16, when he became GOC Southern Command. 74. A. Strachey, St Loe Strachey, pp. 250–6. 75. Roberts Papers. NAM 7101-23/85/32. Strachey to Roberts 4 June 1914.

Chapter 3 Mobilization and New Auxiliaries 1. Until May 1913, the mobilization process was the responsibility of two War Office departments. The reorganization brought it under the control of a Director of Mobilization who worked within the AG’s department. Little evidence of the Director and his staff’s work survives. See WO162.23.

222 Notes 2. J. Burrows, Essex Units in the War, 1914–1919, Vol.5, p. 364; Regt., compiled, The London Cyclist Battalion, p. 96. 3. R.S. Moody, The Historical Records of the Buffs, 1914–1919, p. 66; P.G. Bales. The 1/4th Duke of Wellington’s Regiment, 1914–18, p. 2. 4. E. Riddell, The Cambridgeshires 1914–1919, p. 2; A.G. Wauchope, The History of the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) in the Great War 1914–1918, p. 239, p. 39. 5. F.C. Grimwade, The 4th Battalion London Regiment (RF) 1914–1919, pp. 2–4. 6. Douglas was AG 1904–09, GOC Southern Command 1909–12, InspectorGeneral of Home Forces 1912–14. He replaced Sir John French as CIGS in March 1914 but died from over work in Oct.1914. 7. H.R. Moon, The Invasion of the United Kingdom, p. 480. 8. E. Wyrall, The Die–Hards in the Great War, Vol.I, p. 68. 9. Company commanders of rural-based battalions had usually received their mobilization schedules in 1913. In one battalion the orders covered 39 sheets of typed foolscap. A. Fair and E. Wolton, The History of the 1/5th Battalion. The Suffolk Regiment, p. 8. One officer of the King Edward’s Horse, however, claimed that in August 1914 the regiment’s concentration area remained undecided and it was unknown whether the unit was to mobilize under Eastern Command or the 2nd London Division. It did, in fact, assemble at Alexandra Palace and next moved to Watford to join the 2nd London Division. L. James (ed.), The History of the King Edward’s Horse, p. 65. 10. The parting words on dismissal of the RSM to the Oldham Territorials. K.W. Mitchinson, Amateur Soldiers: A History of Oldham’s Volunteer’s and Territorials, p. 17. 11. C.H. Dudley Ward, History of the 53rd (Welsh) Division (TF) 1914–1918, pp. 12–13. 12. H. Wylly, The Border Regiment in the Great War, p. 22; J.C. Latter, The History of the Lancashire Fusiliers, Vol.I, p. 101; E. Wyrall, The Gloucestershire Regiment in the War 1914–1918, p. 59. 13. J.W. Burrows, Essex Units, Vol.4, p. 180; C. Falls, The Life of a Regiment: The History of the Gordon Highlanders, p. 265. One observer noted that the smart soldierly bearing of the Special Reservists of the 7/RF was in marked contrast to the casual Territorials of the 4th and 5/DCLI they were relieving. C.J. Mead, Cornwall’s Royal Engineers, p. 161. 14. J.W. Burrow, Essex Units, p. 180; E. Wyrall, The Gloucestershire Regiment, p. 59; E. Wyrall, The History of the DCLI 1914–1919, pp. 78–9. 15. WO33.671, Eastern Coast Defences: Defence Scheme Thames and Medway, Feb.1914. The TF RE companies were intended gradually to take over the role of the Regular companies in the fortresses. By October 1914 most of the Regulars had gone and although the Territorials had gained enough experience to work the lights, because so many of them were not skilled specialists in civilian life, they were unable to maintain them. C. Mead, Cornwall RE, pp. 165–7. 16. WO33.664, Amendments to ‘Home Defence Instructions regarding the System of Command’, 1914; WO33.729, Emergency Scheme B for the Reinforcement of the Central Force, 1915. 17. WO33.664, op.cit. 18. One supplier to the London Scottish was registered for 300 horses but in August 1914 could produce only a handful. J.H. Lindsay, The London Scottish in the Great War, p. 18. In the years before the war the minutes books of most

Notes 223

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

county associations are replete with worries about the quality and quantity of horses that would need to be collected on mobilization. A.M. Gilchrist, The Liverpool Scottish 1900–1919, p. 13. J.H. Lindsay, London Scottish, op.cit., p. 19. WO95.5453 and WO95.5454. War diary. P.L. Wright, The First Buckinghamshire Battalion 1914–1919, p. 2; C. Atkinson, Devonshire Regiment, p. 5. G. Elliot, The War History of the 5th Battalion KOSB, p. 14; E. Wyrall, The DieHards, p. 76. E. Riddell, The Cambridgeshires, p. 5. F.W. Bewsher, The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914–1918. D.P. Grant, The 1/4th(Hallamshire) Battalion, York & Lancaster Regiment 1914–1919, p. 11. WO33.694, Central Force Scheme. R. Verdin, The Cheshire (Earl of Chester’s) Yeomanry 1898–1967, p. 44. J.C. Latter, Lancashire Fusiliers, p. 7. H. Wylly, The Border Regiment in the Great War, p. 23. C. Atkinson, The Devonshire Regiment, p. 5. C.H. Dudley War, The History of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, pp. 12–13. C. Atkinson, The Queen’s Own Royal West Kent 1914–1919, pp. 67–8. J.H. Lindsay, London Scottish, p. 20. W.E. Grey, The 2nd City of London (RF) in the Great War, p. 4; Regt.Committee, Dorsetshire, p. 9; K.W. Mitchinson, Saddleworth 1914–1919, p. 16; G. Elliot, The War History of the 5th Battalion KOSB, p. 15. C. Ponsonby, The West Kent (Queen’s Own) Yeomanry 1914–1919, pp. 3–4. WO32.13745, Legal Authority for Military and Police Guarding Railways to Challenge and Fire on People, 1914. A thorough examination of the reasons behind Kitchener’s decision can be found in P. Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, pp. 41–6. Speech to MPs 2 June 1916. Quoted in G. Arthur, Life of Lord Kitchener, Vol.III, pp. 329–30. An article by Repington endorsed this view. The Times, 11 Aug.1914. The Times, 15 Aug.1914. J.Q. Henriques, The War History of the 1st Battalion Queen’s Westminster Rifles 1914–1918, p. 10. See I.F.W. Beckett, ‘The Territorial Force in the Great War’, p. 24, in P.H. Liddle (ed.), Home Fires and Foreign Fields. It seems likely that about 4000 of the division declined to go overseas. They were partly replaced by almost 2700 National Reservists, many of whom were in poor physical shape. Letter from the East Lancashire Association in WO32.18617 (50) of 9 Dec.1914. P. Simkins, Kitchener’s Armys, p. 65. CAB 37/121. Memo by Kitchener, 20 Oct.1914. WO33.681, Report of a Conference Assembled to Consider the Organization of Three Special Reserve Divisions and the Mobile Column, for Service with the Central Force. Hansard, Vol.65,2156, 7 Aug.1914. Tennant had been Financial Secretary to the War Office 1911–12 and was Under Secretary of State for War 1912–16. WO9/Reserve/1278 (AG1) of 11 Aug.1914. Lord Saye and Sele to county associations.

224 Notes 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

56. 57. 58.

59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

69. 70. 71.

72.

73.

74. 75. 76.

WO65/308 (AG3) of 10 Aug.1914 and 11 Aug.1914. WO65/314 (AG3) of 17 Aug.1914. WO65/315 (AG3) of 22 Aug.1914. Derbyshire RO, D530/2, 26 Aug.1914; Hertfordshire RO, TAFA/1, 19 Sept.1914. Viscount Grey of Falloden, Twenty-Five Years, Vol.II, p. 68. Buckinghamshire RO, T/A/1/4, 6 Aug.1914. On 25 Sept.1914 GOC Southern Command ordered these Class III protection groups to stand down unless the water companies or local corporations paid the men for performing the guard duty. As they were reluctant to do this, members of Volunteer Training Corps often replaced the National Reservists. Hansard, Vol.66,45, 26 Aug.1914. War Illustrated, 12 Aug.1916, p. 604. CUST 143/19, Revenue Cruisers and Coastguard; CUST 49/352, Coast watching, 1915. Although prepared by Customs House, the Admiralty published Memo for the Information of Members of the Coastwatching Force on Certain Points of Customs’ Procedure as its own M.04312/15 of 15 June 1915. J. Tindall, The Sidmouth Volunteers 1914–1918, p. 7. The same source claims that local residents paid for the watchers’ out-of-pocket expenses. HO45/10766/272183/1. Volunteer Training Corps Gazette, No.3, 19 Dec.1914, p. 42. Hereafter, VTC Gazette; F. Simpson, The Chester Volunteers, p. 21. E.J. Disbrowe, A History of the Volunteer Movement in Cheshire 1914–1920, p. 3. O’Moore Creagh VC had just returned from India where he had been C-in-C, and was on the Retired List. Harris, a lawyer by profession, served on the London County Council. He was its Deputy Chair 1915–16. He became the Liberal MP for Harborough in 1916. The Times, 6 Aug.1914. The Times, 8 Aug.1914. Ibid. As W.H. Grenfell, Lord Desborough had been a prominent figure in the pre-1908 Buckinghamshire Volunteer movement. He was a former MP and High Sheriff of Bucks. Wiltshire RO, L1/101/2, 22 Aug.1914. Fergusson was CO of 2nd Life Guards and later GOC 5 Cyclist Brigade. This involved the raising of the posse comitatus, a levy of all able-bodied males between 15 and 60. The posse had been called out intermittently at times of national danger or civil disorder, the last occasion being in 1842. I. Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition, 1558–1945, pp. 80, 142. The Times, 13 Aug.1914. Strachey, as High Sheriff of Surrey had organized such groups to patrol railway bridges within three days of the outbreak. He suggested the nationwide formation of home defence corps in the Spectator, 15 Aug.1914. The Times, 13 Aug.1914. Doyle wrote to the Sussex Territorial Association seeking permission to use the Crowborough Drill Hall and range. Sussex RO, TER8/1, 16 Sept.1914. The Times, 17 Aug.1914. The Times, 18 Aug.1914. The Times, 20 Aug.1914.

Notes 225 77. The Times History of the War, CCXCVIII, p. 362; F. Simpson, Chester Volunteers, p. 25. 78. Central Association Volunteer Regiments, The Volunteer Force and the Volunteer Training Corps During the Great War, p. 3. Hereafter cited as VF & VTC. This publication is sub-titled The Official Record of the Central Association Volunteer Regiments and was produced after the war by the Central Committee. Much of what is printed in the book can also be found in WO161/105, Memo on the Creation of the VTC. 79. The Times, 19 Aug.1914; Stockport Archives, D1697.DD/VD, Cheadle Hulme Volunteer Defence Corps, Minute Book, 7 Sept.1914; Winscombe and District Civil Defence Corps, Minute Book, DD/X/TBW, 15 Mar.1915. 80. Cited in F. Simpson, Chester Volunteers, p. 24. No other copy of this letter has been found in any War Office file or local corps’ minute books. 81. Reginald McKenna was First Lord of the Admiralty 1908–11 and advocated an expanded Dreadnought programme. He became Home Secretary 1911–15 and replaced Lloyd George as Chancellor in 1915. 82. Home Office Circular 254.975d of 17 Aug.1914. 83. Article by Percy Harris in Daily Telegraph, 19 Dec.1919. 84. The Times, 22 Aug.1914. 85. F. Lock, Records of the East Yorkshire Volunteer Force 1914–1919, p. 6; HO45/10766/272183/5. 86. Letter from Major H. Huntington, late Instructor of Musketry. The Times, 22 Aug.1914. 87. The Times, 24 Aug.1914. 88. Blackburn Times, 29 Aug.1914; E.J. Disbrowe, A History of the Volunteer Movement in Cheshire 1914–1920, p. 13. 89. WO161/105, The Creation of the VTC.

Chapter 4 Protection Companies and Invasion Scares 1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

CAB 38/28/40, Attack on the British Isles from Overseas, 14 Sept.1914. H.R. Moon, The Invasion of the United Kingdom. WO32.5266, memo by CIGS to Secretary of State, 23 Sept.1914. Kent RO, MD/TA 3/3, 9. Sept.1914; F. Reynard, A Brief History of the Territorial Force Association of the County of York (North Riding) 1908–1919, p. 13; Manchester RO, M73/3/6, 11 Sept.1914; Cambridgeshire RO, R68/11, General Purpose Committee, 14 Oct.1914. General Sir Francis Lloyd, quoted by H.J. Tennant. Hansard, Vol.66,675, 10 Sept.1914. Lloyd had been GOC Welsh TF Division 1909–13 and was GOC London District 1913–18. WO9/Reserve/1378 (AG1) of 8 Sept.1914 followed hard on a telegram making much the same request, sent to many associations a few days earlier. By midSeptember about 90 of Surrey’s Reservists had followed this route, a figure which by November had risen to 220. Surrey RO, 608/2/2, 14 Sept.1914 and 9 Nov.1914. NAS, MD7/37, 14 Aug.1914 and 18 Aug.1914, in response to WO65/314 (AG3) of 17 Aug.1914. Buckinghamshire RO, T/A/1/4, 8 Oct.1914; ACI No.195 of 22 Aug.1914; Hertfordshire RO, TAFA/2, 10 Oct.1914; Guildhall MSS, 12,613 Vol.1,

226 Notes

9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

6 Oct.1914; Northumberland RO, NRO408/8, 9 Oct.1914; Cornwall RO, DDX295/3, 13 Oct.1914. CAB 37/121. Memo by Kitchener, 20 Oct.1914. Hamilton had returned to the UK on 15 July and his appointment as Inspector-General Overseas Forces was to expire on 1 August. On 30 July he was appointed C-in-C Home Defence. This overall role was combined with that of GOC Central Force. J. Lee, A Soldier’s Life, pp. 129–30. WO32.5528, A Summary of the Policy and Work of Coast Fortifications in Great Britain during the Last Sixty Years, March 1918. WO32.7087, Draining in the Fen Country: Information Required in Connection with Home Defence. H.R. Moon, op.cit., p. 526. M. Farndale, The Forgotten Fronts and the Home Base 1914–1918: The History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, pp. 368–69. A.S. Hamilton, The City of London Yeomanry (Roughriders), p. 26. Somerset RO DD/X/TBW. Winscombe and District Civil Defence Force, Minutes 18 Aug.1914–24 Sept.1914. Stockport Archives, D1697, DD/VD, Cheadle Hulme Volunteer Defence Corps. Minutes 9 Dec.1914; VTC Gazette No.9, 30 Jan.1915 p. 151 and No.6, 9 Jan.1915, pp. 90–91. Hansard, Vol.68,550, 19 Nov.1914. Ward, Labour MP for Stoke, had founded the union in 1889. Hansard, Vol.59,1141, 10 Mar.1914; Saddleworth and Mossley Reporter, 19 Oct.1914. C.F. Harriss, The Home Front, IWM Dept. of Printed Books, TSS 33953. For example, see History of the Bethnal Green VTC, MSS in IWM Dept. of Printed Books; Documents from E.J. Martin, no ref. General Sir Richard Harrison in Devonshire and General T.C. Porter in Cornwall are two of the many examples who combined both roles. Essex RO Box Z11A; VTC Gazette, No.5, 2 Jan.1915, p. 66. War Illustrated, 29 July 1916, p. 570. C.F. Harris, op.cit., IWM Dept. of Printed Books, TSS 33953. The Times History of the War, Vol.XX, Part 258, p. 362. For example, 100 men were present at the first meeting of the Lydney VTC but only 20 enrolled. Gloucester RO D5627 7/6. F. Simpson, The Chester Volunteers 1914–1920, p. 37. J.M. Osborne, ‘Defining Their Own Patriotism: British Volunteer Training Corps in the First World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.23, 1988, p. 65. Hansard, Vol.66,158–61, 27 Aug.1914. Ibid., Vol.65,2311, 10 Aug.1914. HO45/10766/272183/5. HO45/10766/272183/1. CAB 3/2/80A, Instructions to Local Authorities in the Event of Belligerent Operations in the UK, 6 Oct.1914. Lt.-Gen. Frederick Stopford had been DMT 1904–06 and GOC London District 1906–09 but had never commanded troops in battle. Among other documents relating to operational strategy and tactics, Stopford presumably had access to Central Force Scheme which provided

Notes 227

38.

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

58. 59. 60.

61. 62.

63.

details of the number of animals likely to be available to an invading force. Calculations suggested, for example, that there would be 35,000 meat rations per square mile in areas within 25 miles of a landing place. CAB 3/2/80A. The sub-committee which produced the report of 6 Oct.1914 had also heard that Brightlingsea had similarly spontaneously formed a local committee. If the Germans landed the committee had decided to organize the movement of all boats up river. Kent RO, C/A2/5/1. HO45/10766/272183/13. The Times, 15 Oct.1914. The Times, 22 Aug.1914. Ibid., 25 Aug.1914. Leicester RO DE 819/1, 10 Dec.1914. The Times, 17 Oct.14. Daily Mail, 29 Oct.1914. The Times, 31 Oct.1914. The article was also published in the Daily Mail of the same date. Spectator, 7 Nov.1914. Balfour had been PM 1902–05 and despite having resigned as Unionist leader in 1911, retained enormous influence. He became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1915 and Foreign Secretary in 1916. The Times, 11 Nov.1914; Hansard, Vol.68, 414 and 774, 18 Nov.1914 and 23 Nov.1914. Hansard, Vol.68,197, 16 Nov.1914. Craik was MP for Glasgow and Aberdeen Universities. Ibid. 20/Gen.No.3604 (AG1) of 19 Nov.1914. For example, Hansard, Vol.68,775, 782, 940, 23–24 Nov.1914. Hansard, Vol.68,1112, 25 Nov.1914. See Hansard, Vol.68,782, 23 Nov.1914. Professor T.E. Holland, an acknowledged expert on international law, queried whether the brassard adequately fulfilled the Convention’s four conditions for recognition and drew attention to the controversies of 1871 with regard to franc tireurs. The Times, 25 Nov.1914. See also, HO45/45/10766/ 272183/40. Several of the speakers had themselves earlier been heavily involved in the Rifle Volunteers and the Militia. Manchester Guardian, 26 Nov.1914. Daily Express, 27 Nov.1914. Rule 7 actually soon became known as the ‘Press Gang Clause’. In fact, if a Recruiting Officer did ever make such a demand, the Volunteer had merely to resign from his corps; he would then have the same status as all other citizens in a non-conscriptionist state. CAB 22/1/6. War Council meeting, 7 Jan.1915. ACI No. 9 of September 1914; ACI 22 of Oct.1914; Cambridgeshire RO, R68/11, General Purpose Committee, 25 Nov.1914; Oxfordshire RO, 0/11/1/A1/3, 31 Oct.1914; ACI 44 of November 1914; Leicestershire RO, DE819/1, 15 Mar.1915; Leigh Chronicle 12 Feb.15. Nottinghamshire RO, DDTA 4/2, 14 Jan.1915; Lanarkshire was still complaining in December that it could not acquire uniforms large enough to fit

228 Notes

64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

69.

70. 71.

72.

National Reservists, NAS, MD2/2, 18 Dec.1914; Shropshire RO, 1988/2, 7 Nov.1914. The county association was placed first for the sixth successive time in the War Office’s Financial Statement for 1913–14. 1988/35, 24 Jul.1915. Derbyshire RO, D530/2, 15 Mar.1915; L.A. Vidler, The Story of the Rye Volunteers, p. 72; Hansard, Vol.70,41, 22 Feb.1915. Hansard, Vol.68,1122, 25 Nov.1914. WO9/Res/2151 (AG1) of 21 Dec.1914. WO32/18617, Call up of Class A National Reservists, 1914–1916. WO9/Reserve/1751 (AG1) of 28 Nov.1914 and two others of similar content dated 21 Dec.1914 and 24 Dec.1914. All originated from ACI 311 of November 1914. WO32/18617 (50A), (50W) and (50V). Hampshire said that in addition to its 110 available National Reservists, there were nearly 600 fully equipped home service Territorials who had not gone to India with the county’s 4th and 5th Battalions. Ibid. (50AA). WO9/Reserve/1379 (AG1) of 14 Dec.1914. Class III men were instructed not to wear their National Reserve badge in case it was mistaken for that of a munitions worker. Hansard, Vol.77,1293, 10 Jan.1916; Worcestershire RO, 004:6BA5204/8, 14 Dec.1914. Cornwall RO, DDX295/3, 13 Oct.1914. Oldham Chronicle, 23 Nov.1914.

Chapter 5 The Home Army in 1915 1. Post-war regimental accounts sometimes make pointed references to the contemporary preference given to the New Army at the expense of the Territorial Force. See, for example, A.S. Hamilton, The City of London Yeomanry (Roughriders), p. 11 and A. Fair and E. Wolton, The History of the 1/5 Battalion The Suffolk Regiment, p. 9. 2. For the problems in equipping and accommodating the New Armies, see P. Simkins, Kitchener’s Army. 3. CAB 22/1/21. War Council meeting, 14 May 1915. 4. Rundle had been GOC Northern Command 1905–07, and Governor of Malta 1909–15. He was a personal friend of Sir Ian Hamilton and succeeded him as GOC Central Force. 5. Kitchener papers, PRO 30/57/73, WS/23. Letter from GOC Central Force to Kitchener, 12 May 1915. 6. Some sources suggest 68 Provisional battalions were formed but it has proved impossible to verify this number. 7. Some formations were known briefly as Northern Coast Battalions before changing their title to Provisional battalions. 8. The War Office intended that a Provisional brigade should comprise: HQ, 1 squadron of Yeomanry, 1 cyclist company, 4 battalions, 1 battery RFA and ammunition column, 1 field company, 1 field ambulance and 1 ASC company. ACI 31 of 4 July 1915. 9. Unless otherwise stated, information on the activities and shortages of the Provisional and Second Line units comes from war diaries in WO95.5453–5464.

Notes 229 10. NAS MD6/48, 12 Oct.1915. 11. NAS MD7/37, 13 Sept.1915. From Aug.1915 Provisional battalions were allowed to recruit up to 25% over establishment but were not allowed to accept boys of 17–19 years. When men were posted from their Second or Third Line they were supposed to be sent to the Provisional unit which was administered by their county association. This instruction was so widely ignored that in January 1916 the War Office was forced to issue a warning that the abuse had to be stopped. ACI 273 of 23 Aug.1915; ACI 2 of 1 Sept.1915; ACI 221 of 27 Jan.1916. 12. NAS MD6/20, 6 Dec.1915. 13. E.R. Cooper mss, IWM Department of Documents, p. 13. The battalion had been raised from home service men of the 5th (City of London) Regiment and was known by its men as the ‘One Hundred and Worst’. 14. History of the London Rifle Brigade, Regimental Committee, p. 260. 15. An officer of one First Line unit armed with 15-pdr guns remarked to an infantry officer that his battery was probably ‘capable of hitting the sea’. D.P. Grant, The 1/4 (Hallamshire) Battalion, York and Lancaster Regiment 1914–19, p. 12. 16. J.C. Latter, The History of the Lancashire Fusiliers 1914–1918, Vol.I, p. 87. 17. Kitchener talked to the War Cabinet in very gloomy manner of the worth of the Territorial divisions. CAB22/1/21, 14 May 1915. 18. WO33.729, Emergency Scheme B for Reinforcement of the Central Force, 1915. 19. CAB 3/3/87A, Home Defence, memo of 5 July 1915. 20. WO32.5268, The Present Situation as regards Home Defence, Sept.1915. Kiggell had replaced Hamilton as Director of Home Defence in March 1915. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. Minute by CIGS, 25 Sept.1915. 23. Ibid. Minute by Kitchener, 7 Oct.1915. 24. WO32.5268. Paper on efficiency of home forces, 25 Sept.1915. 25. P. Harris interview in the Daily Chronicle, quoted in VTC Gazette No.5, 2 Jan.1915, p. 65. 26. Hansard, Vol.70,283, 24 Feb.1915. The situation remained so critical that Act 695 of 1915 compelled TF drafts to an Expeditionary Force to travel from their home stations entirely unarmed. 27. The Leicestershire & Rutland Citizens’ Corps Gazette, No.7, 11 Mar.1916, noted it had ‘always been a source of gratification to the VTC that … the King was one of the first to recognize the potential value of these Corps in a letter [of] 21 March 1915’. 28. VTC Gazette, Vol.1, No.21, 24 Apr.1915, p. 390; Vol.1 No.19, 10 Apr.1915, p. 358. 29. For example, see City of London Volunteer Corps papers, IWM Dept. of Printed Books, 316.33. K876. 30. VTC Gazette, Vol.1, No.3, 19 Dec.1914, p. 42; Vol.1, No.4, 26 Dec.1914, p. 63. 31. The Guard’s committee comprised the heads of practically all the leading financial and commercial institutions of the City. The Times, 17 Dec.1914. 32. E.J. Martin, ‘VTC 1914–1918’. IWM Dept. of Printed Books; Blackburn Times, 7 Nov.1914; M. Yearsley, IWM Dept. of Documents DS/Misc/17, p. 75; VTC Gazette, Vol.1, No.7, 16 Jan.1915, p. 107; No.12, 20 Feb.1915, p. 204; Vol.3, No.62, 5 Feb.1916, p. 150; Vol.1, No.19, 10 Apr.1915, p. 358;

230 Notes

33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44.

45. 46. 47.

48. 49. 50.

51. 52. 53.

54.

No.9, 30 Jan.1915, p. 139; Vol.2 No.38, 21 Aug.1915, p. 182; Vol.1 No.5, 2 Jan.1915, p. 72. VTC Gazette, Vol.1, No.19, 10 Apr.1915, p. 350. The Times, 6 Apr.1916. VTC Gazette, Vol.1, No.22, 1 May 1915, p. 410. The Times, 9 Feb.1915. Harris reminded A.F. Uniacke, Secretary of one Kent VTC, that the Yeomanry and Volunteers of 1794 had remained as separate administrative units for years. Letter 2 Feb.1915. Kent RO C/A2/14/2. Ibid. Central Association circular. Found in Stockport Archives D1697, DD/VD. The Times, 6 Apr.1915. Devon RO 1262M/L125, Bundle 14. Quoted in a letter from Lord Fortescue to a local VTC Secretary, 7 July 1915. VTC Gazette, Vol.2, No.27, 5 June 1915; Blackburn Times, 20 Mar.1915; Lancashire RO DDX/11/1; T. Murray Ford, Memoirs of a Poor Devil, p. 189; E.J. Martin, ‘VTC 1914–1918’, IWM Dept. of Printed Books (3rd Vol., Bn.Herts Regt); C. Gerring, A Record of the Early Volunteer Movement (The Sherwood Foresters), p. 14; WO18/Inf/2004 (AG1) of 25 May 1915; VTC Gazette, Vol.2, No.36, 7 Aug.1915, p. 147; Fortnightly Review, Jan–June 1918, pp. 764–74. Stockport Archives D1697, DD/VD, 12 Apr.1915. Letter of 8 May 1915, Devon RO 1262M/L125. The VTC Gazette, Vol.2, No.28, 12 June 1915, p. 24, also objected to the expectation that Volunteers would help with the harvest. Quoted by M.Yearsley, IWM Dept. of Documents DS/Misc/17, p. 78. VTC Gazette, Vol.2, No.29, 19 June 1915, p. 46. Hansard, Vol.71,588, 27 Apr.1915. Tennant generally avoided the issue by answering that the VTC were for training only and if they were called upon to do anything else, procedures would be put in place. Hansard, Vol.70,631, 1 Mar.1915. Ibid., Vol.70,628, 1 Mar.1915. Ibid., Vol.71,1654, 12 May 1915. The officer, who was also the chairman of the company which owned the theatre, was told ‘peremptorily to leave’. He declined to do so and the issue was subsequently raised in the House. Lord Athlumney, the Provost-Marshal, defended his staff by explaining the policy was designed to put a stop to the increasing practice of Volunteers appearing in public in uniform but without the brassard. The Times, 17 Aug.1915; Hansard, Vol.74,154, 16 Sept.1915; VTC Gazette, Vol.2, No.32, 10 July 1915, p. 80; Vol.2, No.38, 21 Aug.1915, p. 184. Hansard, Vol.69,96, 3 Feb.1915; Vol.69, 102, 3 Feb.1915. VTC Gazette, Vol.1, No.3, 19 Dec.1914, p. 46; No.4, 26 Dec.1914, p. 62. E.J. Martin, ‘VTC 1914–1918’, IWM Dept. of Printed Books, Warwickshire Volunteer Regiment; I. Beckett, ‘Aspects of a Nation in Arms: Britain’s VTC in the Great War’, Revue Internationale d’Histoire Militaire, No.63, 1985, p. 31; VTC Gazette, Vol.1, No.1, 5 Dec.1914, p. 16. The journal reported that Rothschild and Astor each contributed £1000 for the purchase of arms and equipment. This was rescinded by WO20/Gen/3604 (AG1) of 26 Aug.1915.

Notes 231 55. E.J. Martin, ‘VTC 1914–1918’, IWM Dept. of Printed Books (Gainsborough report); M. Yearsley, IWM Dept. of Documents DS/Misc/17, p. 77: VTC Gazette, Vol.1, No.5, 2 Jan.1915, p. 76; E. Potton (ed.), A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914–1919, p. 12; Cheadle Hulme Corps fought a protracted battle with landowners, contractors and a rifle club over the rights, costs and rents of their self-built range. Stockport Archives D1697,DD/VD, Minute Book 1914–15; Deptford Corps opted to contract for the use of the local swimming bath as a miniature range. VTC Gazette, Vol.1, No.5, 2 Jan.1915, p. 79. 56. One corps was trained in the practice of 100 yard volleys by a former colonel of the Indian Army. He had the front rank kneeling and the rear standing. T. Murray Ford, Memoirs of a Poor Devil, p. 199. 57. Gloucester RO D5627 7/6, June 1915. 58. VTC Gazette, Vol.1, No.5, 2 Jan.1915, p. 78. 59. A leaflet published by the Central Association in July 1915 was almost identical to that prepared by the Surrey County Association when it campaigned for the creation of a Corps of Guides in 1909. Another of 30 May 1915 wanted commandants to take their men out to study their locality. No number, but found in WO.161/105; VTC Gazette, Vol.1, No.18, 3 Apr.1915, p. 337. 60. Hunslett Corps drilled on Wednesday afternoons to allow shopkeepers to attend on their half day closing. 61. Preston VTC required 6 per month, at least 2 of which had to be on a Saturday. Lancashire RO D.DX/11/1, 14 July 1915. 62. Essex Volunteers paid between 25 and 30 shillings each for a winter camp in Epping Forest. VTC Gazette, Vol.1, No.3, 19 Dec.1914, p. 38. 63. One such occurrence caused a question to be raised in Parliament. Hansard, Vol.73,2456, 28 July 1915. 64. The Times, 13 Sept.1915; VTC Gazette, Vol.2, No.32, 10 July 1915, p. 80. 65. VTC Gazette, Vol.2, No.34, 24 July 1915, p. 120. The Earl of Derby was Director-General of Recruiting 1915–16, Under Secretary at the War Office 1916 and Secretary of State for War 1916–18. 66. The Times, 4 Nov.1915. One participant thought the parade, ‘the worst I have ever seen. The line was a very long one and only about one quarter heard the order; the rest saluted when they saw their neighbours presenting arms. The ragged effect was dreadful, and must have set Kitchener’s teeth on edge.’ T. Murray Ford, Memoirs of a Poor Devil, p. 196. 67. Lancashire RO DDX/11/1, 26 Oct.1915; VTC Gazette, Vol.1, No.3, 19 Dec.1914, p. 39; No.20, 17 Apr.1915, p. 370; Oldham Town Council was about to award £50 to one corps when it discovered there were two others operating within the town. VTC Gazette, Vol.2, No.30, 26 June 1915, p. 56; Rugely VTC received a grant from the Lord Lieutenant’s fund. I. Beckett, ‘Aspects of a Nation in Arms: Britain’s VTC in the Great War’, op.cit., p. 31. 68. VTC Gazette, Vol.1, No.22, 1 May 1915, p. 410; Hansard, Vol.71,589, 27 Apr.1915. 69. See, for example, Hansard, Vol.66,649–50, 856; Vol.70,1590; Vol.80,566. 70. Telegrams 1699 (AG1) of 29 July 1915 and 1704 (AG1) of 31 July 1915. The assembly camp at Halton was opened in August and the raising of the 7 battalions for overseas service was confirmed by 9/Res/5031 (TF2) of 25 Nov.1915. An article outlining the history of these battalions appeared in the Rifle Brigade Chronicle of 1928.

232 Notes 71. ACI 249 of 1915. 72. Under ACI 271 of March 1917, an eighth battalion, the 25th, became the depot unit for the 7 overseas battalions. It received B1 men from Territorial units, especially the London Regiment. Many of these appear to have been former National Reservists. The War Diary regularly complains of the excessive work demanded from an inadequately staffed depot. WO95.5460. 73. Review of Reviews, Vol.LII, Oct.1915, p. 294. 74. VTC Gazette, Vol.2, No.33, 17 May 1915, p. 104. 75. Gloucestershire RO D4277/6, 6 Sept.1915. 76. Lancashire RO DDX/11/1, 4 Jan.1916. 77. The United Arts Rifles organized a dinner at Frascati’s in December 1915 where the Lord Lieutenant’s commissions were handed out. E. Potton (ed.), A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914–1919, p. 18. 78. Lord Durham did later modify his stance and agreed to accept the presidency of the county regiment on the condition that recognition would not be ‘unduly delayed’. VTC Gazette, Vol.2, No.45, 9 Oct.1915, p. 291 and No.52, 27 Nov.1915, p. 413. 79. Ibid., Vol.3, No.62, 5 Feb.1916, p. 148. 80. E.J. Disbrowe, A History of the Volunteer Movement in Cheshire 1914–1920, p. 33; Journal of the RUSI, Vol.62,1917, pp. 812–13; Hansard, Vol.77,37, 20 Dec.1915; VTC Gazette, Vol.3, No.60, 22 Jan.1916, pp. 115–16. 81. The Hackney & Stoke Newington Recorder ran such a series in June 1915; Recruitment poster for 1st Volunteer Battalion. Shropshire RO 1681/198/6. 82. Clause 1 of the Bill read: ‘It shall be lawful for His Majesty to accept, for purposes in connection with the present war, the services of any volunteer corps, being a corps which is duly affiliated to the Central Association Volunteer Training Corps, as recognized and approved by the Army Council, and whose services are offered through that Association.’ 83. The Times, 20 Nov.1915. Horace Smith-Dorrien had been GOC Aldershot and Southern Commands before becoming GOC II Corps in August 1914 and GOC Second Army in 1915. He was removed and sent home to command First Army, Central Force, and later went to East Africa. 84. Hansard, Vol.76,1389, 8 Dec.1915. 85. Ibid., Vol.78,895, 24 Jan.1916. 86. VTC Gazette, Vol.3, No.54, 11 Dec.1915, p. 19; No.61, 29 Jan.1916, p. 131. 87. Statements and letters quoted in VTC Gazette, Vol.3, No.59, 15 Jan.1916, p. 100; No.62, 5 Feb.1916, p. 158.

Chapter 6 Reforming and Expanding the Home Army 1. French had been C-in-C Aldershot Command 1902–07, Inspector-General of Forces 1907, CIGS 1912–14, Field Marshall 1913, C-in-C BEF 1914–15. As the result of some intrigue on the part of Sir Douglas Haig, and general disappointment with the outcome of the 1915 battles, he was removed and sent home. 2. R. Holmes, The Little Field Marshal: Sir John French, p. 315. 3. G. French (ed.), Some War Diaries, Addresses and Correspondence of FM The Right Hon. Earl of Ypres, pp. 242–3. 4. Ibid., p. 248.

Notes 233 5. The report was produced in Jan.1916. 6. WO32.5273 (1A), Possibilities of a German Invasion, 4 Feb.1916. 7. Some brigades had more than the usual four battalions. 89 Brigade of the original Fourth Army had, for example, at first comprised 15/Northumberland Fusiliers, 11/Yorkshire, 16 and 17/DLI. In April 1915 the brigade became for a short time a ‘Reserve Draft Producing Brigade’ and was quickly renamed the 1st Reserve Infantry Brigade. Its establishment was simultaneously increased by the addition of another three battalions: 10th(2nd Reserve) N. Staffordshire, 10th(2nd Reserve) Leicestershire and 11th(2nd Reserve) N. Staffordshire. 8. Authority to form them came with L.19/Inf/8107 (AG1) of 25 Apr.1915. 9. ACI 5 of 2 Jan.1916; ACI 325 of 9 Feb.1916. A further two companies were stationed in the Channel Islands. 10. Hamilton had been GOC Scottish Command 1909–13 and had held several Home Defence posts before being appointed GOC Northern Army. Paget had been GOC Eastern Command 1908–11 but had not distinguished himself as GOC Ireland during the Curragh incident. Against War Office opposition, French had insisted upon Paget’s appointment as GOC Southern Army. 11. Thus, the 3/10th Battalion Manchester Regiment became the 10th Reserve Battalion Manchester Regiment. 12. WO32.5273 (26A). Memo from DCIGS, 22 Feb.1916. 13. G. French (ed.), Some War Diaries, Addresses and Correspondence of F-M the Right Hon.Earl of Ypres, p. 337. 14. WO32.5273 (3A). Memo by French to CIGS, 13 Feb.1916. 15. VTC Gazette, Vol.3, No.65, 26 Feb.1916, p. 195; Hansard, Vol.80, 63, 16 Feb.1916; Vol.80,244, 17 Feb.1916. 16. Hansard, Vol.80, 371, 367, 364, 356, 371, 17 Feb.1916. 17. WO32.5273 (26A). Memo from DGTF to DCIGS, 22 Feb.1916. 18. CAB 37/143/19, 23 Feb.1916. At the meeting Kitchener explained a plan by which he thought adequate organization would be given to the Volunteers by administrative action under the 1863 Act rather than recourse to fresh legislation. 19. An editorial in the Irish Times, 5 Feb.1916, admitted that the only way forward for the movement on the mainland was for the Government to exclude the Irish corps in any forthcoming legislation. 20. WO161/105. Walter Long, a Unionist and in 1916 MP for The Strand, had been an ardent supporter of conscription. He had been CO of the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry 1898–1906 and was President of the Local Government Board 1915–16. He then became Secretary of State for the Colonies. 21. Hansard, Vol.80,876, 29 Feb.1916. 22. The Times, 23 May 1916. 23. VTC Gazette, Vol.3, No.74, 29 Apr.1916, p. 344; The Times, 24 May 1916. 24. 9/VF/24 (C2) of July 1916. The Privy Council also printed a draft order ready for despatch to the King should the ‘emergency’ ever arise. WO32/1855, Procedure for Calling out the Volunteer Force, 1916. 25. VTC Gazette, Vol.3, No.74, 29 Apr.1916, p. 340; VTC & VF, op.cit., p. 17. 26. Letter from Lloyd George to the Central Association, 27 Dec.1915. VTC Gazette, Vol.3, No.67, 11 Mar.1916, p. 227. 27. The Times, 17 Apr.1916; E.J. Disbrowe, A History of the Volunteer Movement in Cheshire 1914–1920, p. 33; G. French (ed.), Some War Diaries, Addresses and

234 Notes

28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

49. 50. 51.

Correspondence of F-M the Right Hon.Earl of Ypres, p. 242; French to Norfolk Volunteers, 22 Oct.1916. R. Holmes, The Little Field Marshal: Sir John French, p. 317. WO32.5273 (1A). French to War Office, 12 Apr.1916. G. French (ed.), Some War Diaries, Address and Correspondence of F-M the Right Hon.Earl of Ypres, p. 258. ACI 841 of 19 Apr.1916. Little contemporary attention was paid to the announcement of the new body’s creation. The most extensive newspaper coverage was probably that given by the Daily Express of 20 Mar.1916. It simply explained the RDC was a means of giving former National Reservists a fuller recognition and the benefit of the title ‘Royal’, venturing no opinion of its future. Some months later at a War Committee meeting, even Lloyd George seemed unaware of the corps’ purpose. French duly explained its role and Robertson added that the War Office would try to replace its men with Volunteers as soon as possible. The men, he suggested, would then return to civilian employment. This declaration of intent was immediately supported by Montagu, the Minister of Munitions, who complained of the ‘appalling want of labour’. CAB42/18/8, 30 Aug.1916. Buckinghamshire RO T/A/1/1, 4 Nov.1915. WO9/Reserve/6612 (TF2) of 6 Sept.1916. Hansard, Vol.82,1141, 15 May 1915; Vol.85,1842, 16 Aug.1916; Vol.87,226, 8 Nov.1916; Vol.91,381, 7 Mar.1917; Vol.87,604–6, 16 Nov.1916. WO20/GN/4240 (AG1) of 19 Apr.1916 claimed: ‘The Territorial Force Associations are clearly marked out for this duty.’ VTC Gazette Vol.4, No.84, 8 July 1916, p. 83. E. Potton (ed.), A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914–1919, p. 20. Cambridge Independent, 29 June 1916. WO20/Gen/421 (TF2) of 29 July 1916. WO20/Gen/4241 (TF2) of 17 Aug.1916. VTC Gazette, Vol.4, No.84, 8 July 1916, p. 83. Only the Cheshire County Association opted for a slightly different arrangement. 9/VF/128 (TF2) of 21 Sept.1916 and ACI 183 of 1916. Buckinghamshire RO T/A/1/13, 4 Aug.1916; Circular in IWM Dept. of Printed Books, 316.338, K5616. Hansard Vol.82,513, 25/07/16. 9/VF/43 of 15 June 1916. F. Lock, Records of the East Yorkshire Volunteer Force 1914–1919, p. 13. C. Gerring, A Record of the Early Volunteer Movement (The Sherwood Foresters), p. 15; Hansard, House of Lords, Vol.22,218–19, 30 May 1916; F. Lock, Records of the East Yorks Volunteer Force 1914–1919, p. 9; Manchester Archives, M73/3/22, 21 July 1916; Durham RO D/TA3, 1/02/17; ACI 1837 of 21 Sept.1916 or VFO No.XVI; VTC Gazette, Vol.4, No.103, 18 Nov.1916, p. 360; Hansard, Vol.80,1717, 9 Mar.1916; Vol.84.1602, 25 July 1916. ACI No.1652 of 24 Aug.1916 or VFO No.IX; Hansard, Vol.81,2295, 19 Apr.1916. T. Murray Ford. Memoirs of Poor Devil (e.g.) p. 202 is particularly critical of volunteer officers. As late as Dec.1916 a group of Non-Conformist ministers talked of organizing a petition against Sunday drill and presenting it to French. VTC Gazette, Vol.5, No.106, 9 Dec.1916, p. 14; No.85, 15 July 1916, p. 111; No.91, 26 Aug.1916, p. 201.

Notes 235 52. Stockport Archives, D1697, DD/VD, Secretary’s Report, 5 Oct.1916; Buckinghamshire RO T/A/1/13, 2 Nov.1916; VTC Gazette, Vol.4, No.103, 18 Nov.1916, p. 359. 53. VTC Gazette, Vol.4, No.87, 29 July 1916, p. 143; F. Lock, p. 9. 54. ACI No.2417 of 23 Dec.1916. 55. VTC Gazette, Vol.4, No.99, 21 Oct.1916, p. 302. Lloyd George in an answer to Jonathan Samuel (Stockton) and Bethune to the Edinburgh Volunteers on 9 Oct.1916. 56. Ibid., No.98, 14 Oct.1916, p. 288; No.100, 28 Oct.1916, p. 314; No.102, 11 Nov.1916, p. 343 and p. 346. 57. WO161/108. 58. 9/VF/194 (TF2) of 21 Oct.1916. Found in WO32/18566, Conditions of Service in the Volunteer Force. 59. 9/VF/194 (TF2) of 24 Oct.1916. Ibid. 60. The Times, 23 Oct.1916. 61. G. French (ed.), Some War Diaries, Addresses and Correspondence of F-M the Right Hon.Earl of Ypres, p. 254. 62. The Times, 20 Nov.1916. 63. WO33.771, Note by the General Staff on Home Defence, 23 Aug.1916. 64. WO33.776, General Scheme for the Employment and Reinforcement of Troops in the event of a Raid or Invasion. No date but probably 1916. 65. WO33.771, Note by the General Staff on Home Defence, 23 Aug.1916. 66. For an account of the complaints made by the London Associations see K.W. Mitchinson, Gentlemen and Officers: The Impact and Experience of War on a Territorial Regiment. The controversy further damaged the contemporary and later the post-war relations between the Territorials and the War Office. 67. For example, the 8th(Reserve), 9th(Reserve) and 10th(Reserve) Battalions Manchester Regiment combined to form the 8th(Reserve) Battalion Manchester Regiment in the East Lancashire Reserve Brigade. 68. FM French’s diary, for example, 22 Oct.1916 and 5 Nov.1916. IWM Dept. of Documents JDPF 1 PP/MCR/C32. 69. Ibid., 21 Oct.1916. 70. VTC Gazette, Vol.4, No.103, 18 Nov.1916, p. 320. 71. Hansard, Vol.88,508, 30 Nov.1916. 72. Bethune’s speech to Newcastle Volunteers, 21 Nov.1916. Reported in VTC Gazette, Vol.4, No.104, 25 Nov.1916, p. 361. 73. Hansard, House of Lords, Vol.23,786–92, 30 Jan.1916. 74. Ibid., Vol.23, 793–5, 30 Nov.1916. 75. French’s words echoed those of a recent article in the Fortnightly Review by Archibald Hurd. Hurd, an avowed adherent of the ‘blue water school’, urged: ‘Let us not repeat the old error of treating patriotic citizens with contempt’. Quoted in VTC Gazette, Vol.4, No.109, 30 Dec.1916, p. 50. 76. Hansard, Vol.88,1415–18, 19 Dec.1916. 77. Reported in VTC Gazette, Vol.5, No.108, 23 Dec.1916, p. 41. 78. VTC Gazette, Vol.5, No.106, 9 Dec.1916, p. 14. 79. E. Potton (ed.), A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914–1919, p. 20; Stockport Archives D1697,DD/VD, Secretary’s Report, 5 Oct.1916. 80. VTC Gazette, Vol.5, No.111, 13 Jan.1917, p. 83.

236

Notes

Chapter 7 Restructuring and Compulsion 1. The 10/Norfolk, for example, which had formed as a K4 battalion in the original 31st Division had, by stages, become the 25th Training Reserve Battalion, 219th Graduated Battalion and finally, 51st (Graduated) Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment. 2. VF Gazette, Vol.1, No.6, 9 Jan.1915, p. 89; The Bishop of Colchester thought clergy should join ambulance sections, whereas the Bishop of Winchester believed the church should only go as far as allowing the use of church halls. VF Gazette, Vol.1, No.15, 13 Mar.1915, p. 271. 3. Most work on the tribunal system has concentrated on the narrow issue of conscientious objection. See, for example, J. Rae, Conscience and Politics: The British Government and the Conscientious Objector to Military Service, 1916–19; T.C. Kennedy, The Hound of Conscience: A History of the Non-Conscription Fellowship, and K. Robbins, ‘The British Experience of Conscientious Objection’, in H. Cecil and P. Liddle, Facing Armageddon, pp. 691–706. For how the tribunals functioned in their day-to-day business and their impact on local communities, see K.W. Mitchinson, Saddleworth 1914–1919: The Experience of a Pennine Community During the Great War, pp. 56–66 and K.R. Grieves, ‘Military Tribunal Papers: The Case of Leek Tribunal in the First World War’, Archives, 16, 1983, pp. 145–50. 4. VF Gazette, Vol.3, No.69, 25 Mar.1916, p. 258; The Times, 22 May 1916. 5. VF & VTC in the Great War, p. 13; The Times, 10 June 1916; LGB Circ.R.95, 6 July 1916; WO70.42. 9/VF/83 TF2 of 15 Aug.1916. 6. VF Gazette, Vol.5, No.105, 2 Dec.1916, p. 1; No.107, 16 Dec.1916, p. 26; Hampshire RO 37/M69/3, 16 June 1916. 7. Sections A, B, C and D were formed under ACI 84 of 13 Jan.1917, VFO XXI and ACI 765 of 12 May 1917, VFO LXVI Sections P and R were formed under ACI 66 of 11 Jan.1917, VFO XXX. 8. Territorials had been required to perform only 40 drills per year. 9. VF Gazette, Vol.5, No.113, 22 Jan.1917, p. 98. 10. WO32.5058, Future Policy as Regards the Volunteer Force, July 1917. 11. Ibid. The Liverpool Daily Post, 1 Mar.1917, estimated that the number of men of military age in the city’s 18 battalions amounted to over 80% of the total. 12. Whigham had served under General Sir William Robertson at the Staff College and also in the early stages of the war on the Western Front. He became DCIGS under him and went to France as GOC 62nd Division in 1918. Macready had been Director of Personal Service 1910–14 and AG BEF 1914–16 when he became AG at the War Office. He left in 1918 to become Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. 13. In May 1917, Macready had described the Volunteers as a ‘body of men who were useless from the military point of view’ and told a GOC District, ‘I fear we can do nothing [but] if I saw my way I should bag the lot’. C.F.N. Macready, Annals of an Active Life, Vol.1, pp. 281–2. 14. WO32.5048 (10), 22 June 1917. 15. The 10th Earl of Scarbrough, Frederick Lumley, was a former CO of the Yorkshire Dragoons and Lord Lieutenant of the West Riding. 16. WO32.5048 (16A), Future Policy as Regards the Volunteer Force: Notes on the AG’s Memo, 26 July 1917.

Notes 237 17. Hansard, Vol.93,1768, 17 May 1917. Macpherson, Liberal MP for Ross and Cromarty had been Parliamentary Secretary to the Under Secretary of State, 1914–16. 18. VF Gazette, Vol.6, No.143, 25 Aug.1917, p. 146, p. 154. 19. VF Gazette, Vol.5, No.107, p. 48; HO45/272.183 (39). 20. HO45/272.183 (99). 21. HO45/272.183 (102). 22. HO45/272.183 (104). 23. VF Gazette Vol.6, No.135, 30 June 1917, p. 58; No.122, 31 Mar.1917, p. 209. 24. VF Gazette Vol.5, No.115, 10 Feb.1917, p. 126; No.119, 10 Mar.1917, p. 174; Buckinghamshire RO, TA/1/13, 1 Mar.1917; VF Gazette, Vol.5, No.128, 12 May 1917, p. 287; Liddell Hart Papers, 8/200, newspaper cutting of 19 Aug.1917; G. French (ed.), Some War Diaries, Addresses and Correspondence, of F-M the Right Hon.Earl of Ypres, p. 289; VF Gazette, Vol.5, No.127, 5 May 1917, p. 275, No.128, 12 May 1917, p. 293, Vol.6, No.145, 8 Sept.1917, p. 180. Basil Liddell Hart was invalided home from the Somme in 1916 and served as adjutant for two VF battalions. During this period he wrote several pamphlets on infantry training. 25. WO32.5048 (34B). Letter from FM French, 21 Nov.1917. 26. C. Repington, The First World War: Personal Experiences, Vol.I, p. 469. 27. Ibid., p. 501. 28. 9/VF/212 (SD2) of 18 Jan.1917. The proposed allocation was: 61,000 for coast defence, 35,000 for the London defences and 45,000 for a General Reserve. The 57,000 for lines of communication would be of the lowest standards of training and equipment. 29. It is unclear why FM French was contemplating this reduction and the idea does not reappear in later proposals. 30. WO161/107. Evidence from Territorial Force Directorate, 24 July 1917. Volunteer battalions arranged their own assembly points, usually drill halls but, unlike the pre-war Territorials, do not appear to have known their war stations. 31. Some battalions had a procedure by which officers contacted NCOs with the order to mobilize. The NCOs were supposed to maintain up to date lists of names and addresses of their men and would then visit them at their homes to give the order to mobilize. There are few examples, however, in the surviving records of the method employed by most units. 32. Hansard, Vol.90,2212–13, 1 Mar.1917. Henry Croft, MP for Christchurch, had commanded the 1st Hertfordshire in France, 1914–15. 33. Ibid., Vol.90,2223–26, 1 Mar.1917. 34. Ibid., Vol.90,2234–35, 1 Mar.1917. 35. E.R. Cooper mss, p. 16, IWM Dept. of Printed Books; E. Potton (ed.), A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914–1919, p. 22; 1st City of London Vol.Regt. Monthly Orders, May 1917. IWM Dept. of Printed Books, 316.338; VF Gazette, Vol.5, No.124, 14 Apr.1917, p. 237; Hansard, Vol.92,39, 26 Mar.1917; C. Repington, The First World War: Personal Experiences, p. 497. The uncertainty caused by the March alarm prompted the Mayor of Deal and the Chairman of Walmer UDC to issue a leaflet on what the population should do in the event of a German landing. Its understated preamble read: ‘It has come to the notice of the Military Authorities that there is some doubt on

238 Notes

36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

48. 49.

50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55.

56. 57.

the part of the civil population … as to the preparations which have been made for the conduct and movement of the civil population in case of invasion.’ East Kent Archives, U924/06, 1/05/17. WO32.5274, The Invasion of Great Britain 1917–1919: Extract of Minutes of the War Cabinet on 15 Mar.1917; Fisher’s evidence to War Cabinet on 28 Mar.1917, 2A (79/9707); Admiralty and French’s evidence on 16 Mar.1917, (79/9707). WO33.812, Distribution of Home Defence Troops, 1 Mar.1917. Ibid. WO33.872, General Summary of Home Defence Emergency Schemes, 1917. Ibid. WO33.830, Organization of the Lines of Communication in the Event of Operations in the United Kingdom, July 1917. This scheme amalgamated and updated several earlier papers. Ibid. WO33.801, Regulations for the Supply of Troops in the Event of Operations in the United Kingdom, Dec.1916. WO33.830, op.cit. WO33.862, Summary of Railway Arrangements in connection with Home Defence, Mar.1917. WO33.862; WO33.788, Scheme J: Arrangements for the Protection of Lines of Communication in Great Britain, Dec.1916. WO32.5048 (2A) Letter from FM French to War Office, 31 Mar.1917. A strength return for 31 Mar.1917 in the same file gives 136,176 enrolled in Sections A and B. The total strength was given as 292,951, of whom only 8,099 were in Sections P and R. This left 148,676 as still ‘unclassified’. Of this total, 40% were either above or below military age, 32% had been sent by the tribunals and the remaining 28% were simply described as ‘Others’. WO letter 99/132 TF2 of 4 Apr.1917. CAB3/3/89A, Report of the Vulnerable Points Committee, 20 Apr.1917. The full report can be found in WO33.871, with other reports and correspondence in WO33.792, WO33.793 and WO32.5279. WO32.5058 (30). Memo from Scarbrough, 10 Nov.1917. WO32.5048 (18A). Notes on Employment of Volunteers, 7 Sept.1917. WO70.43. French reported that as of 25 Dec.1917, only 218 RDC personnel had been replaced by Volunteers. This figure is attached to an earlier letter, 99/392 TV2, dated 2 Nov.1917. Non-infantry units, viz Volunteer engineer, signal and ambulance sections, had gradually been approved during 1917. WO32.5048. Memo by DCIGS, 7 Sept.1917. Maurice had served under Robertson at the Staff College and became DMO in 1915. In May 1918 he came to public notice for his part in the controversy concerning the strength of the BEF. WO32.5048 (79/8) DMO to DCIGS: Notes on Distribution of Volunteers for Home Defence, 25 Sept.1917. See, for example, 1/9th (Stoke Newington) Battalion Orders November 1917. Hackney Archives D/S/49-11 and VF Gazette, Vol.6, No.134, 23 June 1917, p. 48 for a report of Lord Leconfield’s speech to Sussex Volunteers. In September General Sir Frank Lloyd spoke of the possibility and, in December,

Notes 239

58.

59.

60. 61. 62. 63.

General Sir Edward Hutton announced that an invasion might be expected before the end of April 1918. VF Gazette, Vol.6, No.146, 15 Sept.1917, p. 182; No.158, 8 Dec.1917, p. 314. Major E.H. Coumbe’s report of a conference, 7 June 1917. A Regular officer had told the assembled Volunteer officers that a ‘raid in force is considered quite probable’ and encouraged them to ‘press on with your musketry, entrenching and field exercises’. Hackney Archives D/S/49/10; Cumbria RO TTAF/2, 25 Jan.1917. Lord Errol had been GOC 65th (Lowland) Division 1915–16, Co.Commandant of the Cumberland VF and member of the Central Association. Hansard, Vol.99,381, 14 Nov.1917; VF Gazette, Vol.6, No.154, 10 Nov.1917, pp. 266, 278. Strangely, Percy Harris offered the contrary view: ‘Even the most severe critic of the Bluewater School will admit now that invasion on a large scale is quite out of the question’. Hansard, Vol.98, 1379, 30 Oct.1917. WO32.5048 (25A). Minutes of A Conference in the DSD’s Room, 19 Oct.1917. WO32.5048 (39A). Future Policy as Regards the Volunteer Force, 27 Nov.1917. WO32.5048 (42A). Memo from Scarbrough following a conference on 21 Dec.1917. WO32.5048 (39A). Future Policy as Regards the Volunteer Force, 27 Nov.1917.

Chapter 8 ‘A Sham or a Real Thing’? The Volunteer Force in 1917 1. Brigadier-General H.P. Croft, Hansard, Vol.90,2212–23, 1 Mar.1917. 2. W.C. Price, ‘The Spare Time Force’, The Fortnightly Review, Jan.–June 1918, p. 769. 3. Lancashire RO DDX/11/1, 5 Jan.1917; WO70.43; IWM Dept. of Printed Books 316.338 C.6051, 19 Jan.1918; ibid., 18 May 1917; Manchester Archives M73/3.22, 8 Aug.1916; IWM Dept. of Printed Books 316.338 C.6051, 13 Jul.1917 and ACI 287 of 1917 (VFO No.XLIV); Hansard, Vol.82, 1994, 23 May 1916. It was thought old soldiers would abuse such a privilege by selling on the tobacco; Hansard, Vol.101,684, 21 Jan.1918. 4. Cllr-Sgt Lewis, 13th Battalion WR Volunteer Regiment, holder of the Indian Mutiny Medal attended camp in 1917, aged 82 years. VF Gazette, Vol.6, No.142, 18 Aug.1917, p. 26. One man on a digging parade in Jan. 1917 had joined the Rifle Volunteers in 1863. WO161/111; NAS MD6/48, 11 Dec.1917; Letter to the Yorkshire Post cited in VF Gazette, Vol.6, No.149, 6 Oct.1917, p. 26. 5. WO70.42. Letter 99/411 TV of 21 Nov.1917. Funerals of Volunteers killed in connection with air raid duties were paid for out of the public purse but those who died in the course of other duties came under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. ACI 860 of 1918 (VFO No.CXCII); When Lt.-Gen. Bethune inspected the Northumberland Volunteer Regiment in November 1916 the men were deemed to be on ‘temporary service’ and could claim rations allowance at a rate of 5d for 8 hours’ duty. This was a very rare concession. WO70.43; WO letter 99/243 TV of 27 Aug.1917 told the Cornwall Association that it could not give separation allowances to men away on courses no matter what their home circumstances. Macpherson explained

240 Notes

6.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13.

14.

15.

that the Volunteers went on such courses voluntarily. It had been an obligation for Territorials. Hansard, Vol.92,1487, 5 Apr.1917. One invalided army instructor attached to a Volunteer unit was fined one guinea for wearing his army uniform in public. His corps wore a green suit but he claimed he could not afford to buy one. VF Gazette, Vol.5, No.105, 2 Dec.1916, p. 2; Manchester Archives M73/3.23, 25 May 1917. The East Lancashire Association ordered that all movable items, including beer pumps in canteens, should be removed before allowing Volunteers to use its drill halls. Ibid., 19 Apr.1917; Cooper claimed he did not have a Sunday at home for 8 consecutive weeks. E.R. Cooper mss, p. 8, IWM Dept. of Printed Books. One signaller attended 124 from a possible 129 sessions, none of which was counted as an official drill. J. Tindall, The Sidmouth Volunteers 1914–1918, Culver well & Sons, nd., p. 35; Colonel Bamford, OC 8th Manchester Vol. Battalion was one of many who complained to the Gazette about the dearth of instructors. VF Gazette, Vol.5, No.121, 24 Mar.1917, p. 26. WO letter 9/VF/215 TV of 27 Apr.1917 stressed the role that local authorities were still expected to play in financing corps. WO70.42. WO letter 99/M/83 TV of 1 Mar.1918 refused permission for the CO of the 5th Bn.Middlesex Vol.Regiment to hold a street collection. VF Gazette, Vol.3, No.72, 15 Apr.1916, p. 26. Hansard, Vol.101,534, 17 Jan.1918; VF Gazette, Vol.7, No.169, 23 Feb.1918, p. 86. Hansard, Vol.101,1493–94, 29 Jan.1918. WO letter 99/107 TF2 of 4 Apr.1917 compelled Territorial associations to ensure the security of armouries used by Volunteers. Armouries took many forms: the 2/2 Essex Battalion hired 3 rooms of a disuse shop at Harwich and the Oldham battalion used schools, houses and a public house. Essex RO Buildings and Ranges Committees, 11 Apr.1917, Manchester Archives M73/3/23, 5 Oct.1917; VF Gazette, Vol.6, No.133, 16 June 1917, p. 25. In February 1918 Western Command ordered units not to keep rifles at small out-lying detachments but pointed out the danger of keeping too many together in one building unless it was properly guarded. Trusted individuals were allowed to retain their own weapons but where large numbers were stored together, bolts had to be kept separately. Shropshire RO 1681/198/7, 20 Feb.1918; Associations also had to insure Volunteers’ weapons, the Surrey Association, for example, paying an annual premium of almost £62. Surrey RO 608/3/6, 30 July 1917. WO161/107/3; In June 1917 all West Riding units were reported to be fully equipped apart from gas masks, Cumberland and Ayr’s battalions by July and Surrey’s by October. Leeds Archives, WRTF Assoc. Book 2, 25 June 1917, Cumbria RO TTAF/2, 26 July 1917, NAB MD5/22, 3 July 1917, Surrey RO 608/1/2, 15 Oct.1917; In July Shropshire’s two battalions had arms for only about two-thirds of its men and equipment for one-third and Buckinghamshire reported it was still 1600 rifles short of establishment. Shropshire RO 1988/35, 28 July 1917, Buckinghamshire RO T/A/1/1, 5 July 1917. Cambridgeshire RO R.68/11, 28 Apr.1917. Handbooks for the Hotchkiss did not always arrive with the guns. As late as July 1918 one 2Lt. was advised to buy a manual from Gale & Pollen. Shropshire RO 1681/198/6, 17 July 1918. WO letter 99/81 TF2 of 17 Feb.1917. In addition, group adjutants, responsible for a ‘brigade’ of 3–4 battalions, and county adjutants were also

Notes 241

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22.

23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

appointed; WO letter 99/109 TV of 23 May 1917. The ‘TF Reserve’ was removed in August by 99/200 and left simply as ‘General List’. Liddell Hart Papers 7/1920/17–38. In terms of his later career and fame, Liddell Hart was the most celebrated serving member of the VF. WO161/111, Inspectors’ Reports. WO161/111 (1). WO161/111 (9). WO70.42. Letter 99/721. No date but Jan.1918. The Secretary of the Newent Corps indignantly refused the offer of a £2 honorarium insisting he did not do the job for monetary gain. Gloucester RO D4277/6, 25 Jan.1917; Hansard, Vol.98,1380, 30 Oct.1917; WO letter 9/GN/6608 TF2 of 5 Apr.1917; London Metropolitan Archives A/TA/15, 14 June 1917; Liverpool RO 356WES/65, 28 Apr.1917; Guildhall Library Ms.12.606/2, 15 Nov.1917. Sir Auckland Geddes had returned from France where he had served as BAAG at GHQ 1915–16. He became Director of Recruiting and, in 1917, Minister for National Service. WO32.5274 (16A), 2 Jan.1918. See R.J. Adams and P.P. Poirier, The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900–1918, London: Macmillan, 1987, pp. 368–9. Adm. 167/53, Official Copy of Meetings of the Board of Admiralty December 1917. WO32.5274 (13A), Cubitt to French, 21 Dec.1917. WO32.5274 (16A), Robertson to French, 2 Jan.1918. Ibid. The 65th, 71st, 72nd and 73rd rather than merely the 72nd and 73rd which had been agreed in Dec.1917. Minutes of War Cabinet 316, 7 Jan.1918; WO32.5274 (23A), 8 Jan.1918. Repington had left The Times following an argument with Lord Northcliffe, and moved to the Morning Post. His influence declined then, and even more after his conviction for contravening the DORA legislation. C. Repington, The First World War: Personal Experiences, Vol.II, p. 26. Hansard, Vol.101,117, 14 Jan.1918, Vol.103,783, 20 Feb.1918. WO70.43. Letter from GOC Eastern Command, 99/583 of 8 Feb.1918. The Gazette’s editor wanted Northcliffe’s assertion that ‘unless the Volunteer movement increases, the raising of the military age limit … will be necessary’, to be widely disseminated. WO70.42. WO letter 99/604 of 10 Apr.1918. Ibid. WO letter 99/626 of 23 Apr.1918. Hansard, Vol.104,1429–31, 9 Apr.1918. Ibid., and Vol.105,139, 15 Apr.1918. Royds was Co.Commandant of the Lincolnshire VF. WO70.42. WO letter 99/688 F3 of 6 June 1918. The immediate pre-war Territorial Force establishment was almost 315,000. The 4th Vol.Bn.Lincolnshire Regiment had 627 men passed as efficient between March 1917 and February 1918. The precise strength of the unit is unknown but incidental references suggest it was below establishment. IWM Dept. of Printed Books 316.338 C.6051, 29/04/18. In contrast, Leicestershire reported a much slower rate of increase and only 17% of Durham’s

242 Notes

41. 42. 43. 44.

Volunteers were efficient in January 1918. Leicestershire RO DE819/2, 4 July 1918, Durham RO D/TA3-14/3, 12 Feb.1918. WO letter 99/217 TV of 31/12/17. Ibid., letter of 6 May 1918. Ibid., letter of 14 May 1918. The Mayor of St Helens sought permission to raise a battalion in the town. Liverpool RO 356WES/65, 6 June 1918.

Chapter 9 The Diminishing Threat 1. WO95.5459, War Diary of 1st Training Reserve Brigade. Boys under 19 years were rushed to France, the Young Soldier battalions being practically denuded of recruits as the result. On 26 March the War Cabinet was told that about 20,000 troops per day would soon be crossing to the Continent. CAB 23/5, 26 Mar.1918. 2. CAB 23/5, 25 Mar.1918. 3. CAB 23/5, 27 Mar.1918. 4. CAB 23/5, 25 Mar.1918. 5. CAB 23/5, 29 Mar.1918. 6. Ibid. 7. Robertson, the first ranker to enter the Staff College, had been its Commandant between 1910–13. He was DMT 1913–14, QMG 1914–15, CGS GHQ 1915 and then CIGS from 1915 until Feb.1918. He came home to be appointed C-in-C HF. 8. Irish Command had eight cyclist brigades, six cyclist battalions and 24 (largely Special Reserve) battalions of infantry. 9. Unless otherwise stated the following detail on unit strength, changes and capability come from the Robertson papers deposited in the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, 5/1/2-70 and the war diaries of home defence units, WO95.5453–5464. 10. J.Nettleton, The Anger of the Guns, p. 124. 11. Western Command had expressed horror at the dress and behaviour of junior officers serving with the training battalions at Southport. Their ‘general conduct and bearing was … unsoldier-like and ungentlemanly … [and] … subversive of all discipline’. K.W. Mitchinson, Amateur Soldiers, p. 109. 12. WO32.5274 (34A), 7 June 1918. 13. WO32.5274 (41A), 18 June 1918. 14. WO32.5274 (36A), 12 June 1918. 15. WO32.5274 (42A), 17 June 1918. 16. The RDC battalions were formed under WO9/RDC/1835 (AG2) of 31 July 1917 and ACI 1217 of 1917, WO32, 18622, The Reorganization of the RDC. A 19th Battalion had also been formed but it was intended exclusively for work on RFC (and later RAF), aerodromes. 17. Ibid. (1A), 15 Sept.1917; Ibid. (3A), Oct.1917. 18. This involved the use of armed Special Constables or company guards. 19. WO32.18622. Minutes 123 (SD2) of 14 Jan.1918; Ibid., (44B), n. d. 20. Ibid. (45A), 26 Jan.1918. 21. WO32.18622 (64A), 18 Mar.1918.

Notes 243 22. The battalions were disbanded under 9/RDC/2340 (AG2) of 28 Jan.1918 but the last unit, the 16th Battalion, was not disbanded until 31 Aug.1918; WO32.18622 (107A), 20 June 1918. 23. Memo to the War Office of 20 Apr.1918. Ibid. (79a). 24. In June the Gazette reported ‘yet more rumours’ of mobilization but advised members to disregard them. To call them out now, it wrote, would constitute a ‘distinct breach of faith’. VF Gazette, Vol.7, No.187, 29 June 1918, p. 301. 25. M. Yearsley, Home Front Diary 1914–1918, p. 94, IWM Dept.of Documents, DS/Misc/17; VF Gazette, Vol.7, No.176, 13 Apr.1918, p. 168; There were reports of ‘very strong’ rumours in Chester, F. Simpson, Chester Volunteers 1914–1920, p. 111. 26. WO32.5049, Special Service Companies of the Volunteer Force, (1A), 22 May 1918 and WO70.43, 99/672 nd. 27. Ibid., (2A), 29 May 1918. 28. Ibid., (7A), 29 May 1918. 29. These included the railway, fishing and mining industries. 30. WO32.5049 (8A), 30 May 1918. 31. WO99/674 (TV2) of 8 June 1918. Each company was to have one major or captain, 4 subalterns, one company sergeant major and company quartermaster sergeant, 4 sergeants, 8 corporals, 92 privates and 3 signallers. 32. The Volunteers were, for example, used to fill up Territorial Force units such as the 1/5 East Yorkshire and 2/6 Norfolk. Although the men were intended to coast watch, not all were to be provided with bicycles. WO70.43. 33. The County Commandant of Suffolk was so enthused by the scheme that he offered the permanent services of himself and of his entire HQ Staff. His offer was gently declined on the grounds that only company officers were being sought. Ibid. Letter of 4 June 1918. 34. Some Suffolk farm labourers were reported to have been erroneously accepted. These and others who should not have been taken were released under WO99/Releases/89 (TV2) of 19 July 1918. 35. E. Potton (ed.), A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914–1919, p. 24. 36. WO99/Inf/12 (TV1) of 27 Aug.1918 declared complaints about the food and accommodation at a camp in Fife were unfounded; J. Tindall, The Sidmouth Volunteers 1914–1918, p. 47; E.R.Cooper mss, IWM, p. 29. 37. F.H. Lock, Records of the East Yorkshire Volunteer Force 1914–1919, p. 52; Shropshire RO 1681/198/6, Company Orders. 38. Hansard, Vol.109,638, 1 Aug.1918; Vol.109, 1568, 8 Aug.1918; The Times, 29 Aug.1918. 39. WO70.43. The letter of thanks was published as WO99/674 (TV2) of 28 Sept.1918; E.R. Cooper mss, IWM, op.cit., p. 11. 40. Two Volunteers from Hertfordshire are known to have died while serving with the companies. Herts RO TAFA/1, 30 Sept.1918. The War Office decided fatalities’ next-of-kin should receive a memorial plaque and scroll (45/Gen.No/2153 of 3 June 1920) and any man who fell ill or had an illness aggravated by his period of service should receive a Silver Badge (99/825 of 2 Nov.1918). 41. Quoted in E.R. Cooper mss, IWM, op.cit., p. 3; The Kent Fencible, Vol.3, No.10, Oct.1918 reported on the authorities’ ‘thorough satisfaction’ with the work of the companies. 42. WO70.41. Letter 99/786, no date.

244 Notes 43. WO32.5274. Draft paper dated 3 Sept.1918. 44. Ibid. Memo by DSD to DMO 4 Sept.1918. 45. Ibid. Memo: Proposals as regards the Reorganization of Home Defence, 25 Sept.1918. 46. WO33.899, Scheme T: Mobilization of Tank Companies at the Tank Training Centre, Wool and Wareham, Oct.1918. 47. Hansard, Vol.109, 638, 1 Aug.1918. 48. Manchester Central Library M73/3/24, 2 Aug.1918. 49. Northamptonshire RO ML1540 Vol.III, unidentified newspaper report on 2/Northampton Vol.Regiment; Hampshire RO 37M69/4, Commandant’s Report on 1918 camp. 50. J. Tindall, The Sidmouth Volunteers 1914–1918, p. 45. 51. The Perthshire Association agreed to pay the hotel lodgings of 2 lady typists at the Blair Atholl Camp. NAS MD7/38, 21 June 1918; Battalion Orders for the 21/West Yorks Vol.Regiment camp at Scarborough required all members to carry a swagger cane on leaving the site. Walking sticks were considered inappropriate. West Yorkshire Archive DB17 C.43. 52. The West Lancashire Association discussed the matter in October 1918 but had evidently made an earlier response to the ACI of 17 Aug.1918. Liverpool RO 356WES/65, 16 Oct.1918. 53. One association simply minuted the War Office’s intention and recorded no comments. Nottinghamshire RO DDTA1/2, 29 Oct.1918; ‘Many’ of Cheshire’s COs tendered their resignations and the county association passed a resolution ‘deprecating’ the War Office move. F. Simpson, Chester Volunteers 1914–1920, p. 121; VF Gazette, Vol.7, No.201, 5 Oct.1918, p. 469; No.202, 12 Oct.1918, p. 481; No.203, 19 Oct.1918, p. 493; No.205, 2 Nov.1918, p. 518; No.207, 16 Nov.1918, p. 542. 54. One member of the RDC wrote: ‘The RDC is the most easy-going regiment I have ever met. We are not treated like soldiers … no one bothers us [and] there’s a wonderful absence of red tape.’ H. Thompson mss IWM Dept.of Documents, no ref; AIR1/1190/204/5/2596, Demobilisation of RDC men working for the RFC, gives a brief history of the corps. 55. Hansard, Vol.108,721, 15 July 1918; ibid., Vol.109, 224–5, 30 July 1918. 56. WO32.5274 (56B), 2 Oct.1918. 57. Ibid. The meeting with the Admiralty representatives is ibid. (58A), 30 Sept.1918. The outcome was discussed by the War Cabinet on 14 Oct.1918. 58. WO33.892, Home Defence Scheme, Aug.1918. 59. WO33.880, Home Defence Emergency Arrangements No.11, 1918. 60. WO33.906, Home Defence Administrative Arrangements, July–Aug.1918. 61. WO33.878, Organization of the Lines of Communication in the Event of Operations in the UK, May 1918. 62. WO33.877, Emergency Scheme L for Bringing Reinforcements Consisting of Composite Brigades and Units, 1918. 63. See Appendix IV. Dallas had been on the Mobilization and Military Operations Staff at the War Office before the war. During the war he saw service in France, Gallipoli and Egypt.

Notes 245

Epilogue 1. For an account of the problems associated with the demobilization process, see A. Rothstein, The Soldiers’ Strikes of 1919. 2. If they had enlisted in the SR in 1914, they would have had a maximum of one year to serve. 3. R.S. Moody, Historical Records of the Buffs 1914–1919, p. 64. 4. H. Whalley-Kelly, ‘Ich Dien’ The Prince of Wales’ Volunteers (The South Lancashire Regiment), p. 35; C.T. Atkinson, The Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment 1914–1919, p. 64. 5. C.C. Murphy, The History of the Suffolk Regiment 1914–1927, p. 322. 6. E. Wyrall, The West Yorkshire Regiment in the War 1914–1918; J. Buchan, The History of the Royal Scots Fusiliers 1678–1918. 7. E. Wyrall, The Somerset Light Infantry in the War 1914–1919, p. 33. 8. H. Whalley-Kelly, op.cit., p. 262. 9. E. Wyrall, The East Yorkshire Regiment in the Great War 1914–1918, p. 404. 10. 3/Suffolk probably suffered 6 fatalities in the raid. 11. Soldiers Died lists only 104. 12. The London Regiment lists 79 deaths, the Sussex 8 and the Cameronians 7. It is probable that the latter figures could be taken as a rough average for a county regiment. Pte Edwin Brown of the 36th Supernumerary Company was 61 and Pte G.Holland of the 23rd Company was 60. Only 7 regiments record deaths in Provisional battalions separately from other home service units: a total of 17 men are listed. 13. WO32.5274, 26 Jan.1919. 14. Hansard, Vol.115,147, 30 Apr.1919; Vol.115,774, 6 May 1919; WO32.18672, letter of 13 Mar.1919. 15. Hansard, Vol.114, 196, 25 Mar.1919; AIR1/1190/204/5/2596. 16. WO32.18672 (131A); ibid. (154A), 26 Nov.1919. 17. The RDC lost 31 officers and over 600 other ranks. Thirty-one of the men went down with the Leinster in the Irish Sea in October 1918. The deaths of members Pte.J. Gambie and Captain W. Curtis actually predate the creation of the corps. 18. See I. Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition 1558–1945, pp. 244–7 and P. Dennis, The Territorial Army, pp. 109–215. 19. O’Moore Creagh had said he wanted to see the VTC develop into something similar to the landsturm, ‘Otherwise I should hardly be willing to take all the labour and trouble’. VTC Gazette, No.4, 26 Dec.1914, p. 52. 20. Ibid., Vol.4, No.90, p. 180; Leicester and Rutland Citizen Corps Gazette, No.7, Mar.1916. 21. Kent Fencible, Vol.3, No.12, Dec.1918. 22. E. Potten (ed.), A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914–1919, p. 27. 23. F.S. Bowring, ‘The Passing of the Volunteer Force’, Journal of the RUSI, Vol.65, 1920, pp. 587–590. 24. Hampshire RO 37M69/4, 20 June 1919. 25. Wiltshire RO LI/101/2, 12 Apr.1919; Cornwall RO DDX.295/12, 5 Apr.1919; LMA A/TA/15, 11 Nov.1918.

246 Notes 26. VF Gazette, Vol.7, No.209, 30 Nov.1918, p. 570. Liddell Hart wrote under the pseudonym ‘Gold Bars’. 27. Hansard, Vol.110,3351, 19 Nov.1918. 28. WO99/837 (TV2), 10 Nov.1918 warned that even if drills did cease, Volunteers with a training agreement were not released from it. 29. VF Gazette, Vol.7, No.208, 23 Nov.1918, p. 553. 30. E.R. Cooper mss p. 12, Department of Documents IWM; J. Munson (ed.), Echoes of the Great War: The Diary of the Reverend Andrew Clark, p. 269; Leicestershire RO DE819/2, 6 Feb.1919. 31. WO32.5050. Memo from Robertson to AC 30 Nov.1918. WO99/871 of 14 Jan.1919 announced that Volunteers would not be allowed to purchase their rifles as a ‘memento’. 32. Liverpool Daily Post, 28 Feb.1919; WO32.5050, 30 Dec.1918. 33. WO32.5050, 2 Jan.1919. 34. Ibid., AC to GOC-in-C GB, 8 Jan.1919. 35. Hansard, Vol.112,1751–2, 26 Feb.1919. The practice of awarding honorary rank threw up anomalies which caused much resentment. 36. Letter in the Daily Mail, 24 Feb.1919. O’Callaghan had been on the staff of the Director of Artillery. 37. WO32.5050, Precis for the Army Council, No.987, July 1919. 38. Ibid., letter to Lords Lieutenant, 25 Feb.1919. 39. WO99/859 (AG1) of 25 Sept.1919. Motor units were considered to be a useful asset in the event of transport strikes. 40. Hansard, 113, 40, 3 Mar.1919; Report of the Proceedings at a Conference between the Secretary of State and Representatives of the TF Associations(B19/174). At the conference, Churchill said a reconstitution of the NR ‘should be considered’; Surrey RO 608/1/2, 28 Apr.1919. 41. Northumbria RO 408/8, 7 Feb.1919. One Durham TF unit recorded its ‘strong feeling of discontent’ at the delay in reclaiming its drill hall. Durham RO D/TA3 Vol.III, 18 Feb.1919. 42. Entrenching tools were prized as gardening tools. Hampshire refused to discharge 194 of its men until they had either returned or bought their greatcoats for £1. Hants RO 37M69/4, Dec.1919. One company lost 9 rifles. Devon RO Z19/46/14, 31 Mar.1919. 43. M. Yearsley, Home Front Diary 1914–1918, p. 10; T. Murray Ford, Memoirs of a Poor Devil, p. 203. 44. For example, VF Gazette, Vol.8, No.213, 15 Mar.1919, p. 25, M. Yearsley, op.cit., p. 1. 45. Letter in Pall Mall Gazette in WO32.5050. Ibid, unidentified newspaper cutting. 46. Hansard, Vol.112,1751–2, 26 Feb.1919; Vol.114,1409, 3 Apr.1919; Vol.116, 2013, 4 June 1919. 47. Only 61 men of the United Arts Rifles, one of the movement’s most prestigious battalions, volunteered to line the route for London’s Victory Parade, E. Potton (ed.), op.cit., p. 25. 48. VF Gazette, Vol.8, No.216, 21 June 1919, p. 62. 49. Devon RO Z19/46/14, 19 Oct.1919; NAS MD8/16, 29 July 1919. 50. WO32.5050 contains several drafts. An annotation by Scarbrough on one describes it as ‘too bald’.

Notes 247 51. M. Yearsley, op.cit., p. 100; Lord Harris quoted in VF Gazette, Vol.8, No.221, 15 Nov.1919, p. 130. 52. The Ministry of Labour resisted the attempt to classify the Special Service Company men as ‘ex-servicemen’ (WO99/955 of 16 Dec.1920) but gave way. 53. VF Gazette, Vol.9, No.225, 20 Mar.1920, p. 24. 54. Only one VTC was ever officially mobilized, and that was done in error. The Deal Company manned beach trenches with the Royal Marines in February 1916. Deal, Walmer and Sandwich Mercury, 25 Oct.1919 and 5 Mar.1921. 55. Both the VTC and the Home Guard were regarded by many contemporaries as people’s militia or citizen home defence armies. They both eventually became accepted elements of the Crown’s forces, were ultimately equipped by the state, originally denied the use of formal military ranks, administered by the Territorial associations and later confronted the difficulty of having their volunteer status diluted by the compulsory enlistment of sometimes reluctant conscripts. 56. H.R. Moon, The Invasion of the United Kingdom, p. 650.

Appendix V: Coastal Fortresses and Garrisons 1. The information comes from Adm116.3107; WO32.5528; WO33.576; WO33.662; WO33.671; WO95.5457; M. Farndale, The Forgotten Fronts and the Home Base 1914–1918: The History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, Annex 4.

Bibliography National Archives, Kew.

Papers from Admiralty, Cabinet Office, Customs & Excise, Home Office, Ministry of National Service, Treasury, War Office. Unpublished Territorial County Association Papers, County Record Offices. Council of Territorial County Associations, Duke of York’s HQ , London.

Unpublished PhD theses M. Allison, The National Service Issue 1899–1914, University of London, 1975. H.R. Moon, The Invasion of the United Kingdom: Public Controversy and Official Planning 1888–1918, London, 1968. N.W. Summerton, The Development of British Military Planning for a War Against Germany 1904–1914, London, 1970.

Unpublished memoirs and unofficial papers E.R. Cooper mss, Department of Documents, IWM. Viscount French mss, Department of Documents, IWM. Viscount Haldane mss, National Library of Scotland. C.F. Harriss, The Home Front mss, Department of Printed Books, IWM, 33953. Montague Johnstone mss, AF-GEN 6012/23, National Army Museum. B. Liddell Hart mss, King’s College, London. E.J. Martin mss ‘VTC 1914–1918’, Department of Printed Books, no ref., IWM. FM Sir W. Robertson mss, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London. Maj.-Gen. Sir H. Sclater mss, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London. J. St Loe Strachey mss, House of Lords Record Office. H. Thompson mss, Department of Documents, IWM. M. Yearsley, Home Front Diary 1914–1918 (microfilm) Department of Documents, DS/Misc/17, IWM.

Published papers Army Annual Army List Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series Officers Died in the Great War, London: HMSO, 1919. Soldiers Died in the Great War, London: HMSO, 1921. 248

Bibliography 249 Volunteer List October 1918, London: HMSO, 1918. War Office List G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914, HMSO, 1926–38. P.K. Kemp, Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher, Navy Record Society, 1964. A.J. Marder, Fear God and Dreadnought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, 3 vols, Cape, 1952–59. A.J. Morris (ed.), The Letters of Lieutenant-Colonel Charles à Court Repington CMG Military Correspondent of The Times 1903–1918, Sutton Publishing for Army Records Society, 1999. J. Munson (ed.), Echoes of the Great War: The Diary of the Reverend Andrew Clark, Oxford University Press, 1988. Anon., The Rifle Brigade Chronicles, London: Rifle Brigade Club & Association, 1928.

Published memoirs and biographies R.J. Adams, Arms and the Wizard. Lloyd George and the Ministry of Munitions 1915–1916, Cassell, 1978. B. Ash, The Lost Dictator, Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson, Cox & Wyman, 1968. R.H. Bacon, Admiral, The Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, 2 vols, Garden City, Doubleday, 1929. B. Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought, Cassell, 1977. B. Bond, The Captain Who Taught Generals, Cassell, 1977. V. Bonham-Carter, Soldier True: The Life and Times of FM Sir William Robertson, Frederick Muller, 1963. B. Collier, Brasshat: A Biography of Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson, Secker & Warburg, 1961. Viscount Esher, The Influence of King Edward and Essays on Other Subjects, John Murray, 1915. G. French, The Life of Field-Marshal Sir John French, Cassell, 1931. G. French (ed.), Some War Diaries, Addresses and Correspondence of Field-Marshal the Right Hon. Earl of Ypres, Cassell, 1931. J. Fisher, Memories and Records, 2 vols, Doran, 1920. R.B. Haldane, Before the War, Cassell, 1922. R.B. Haldane, Richard Burdon Haldane: An Autobiography, Hodder & Stoughton, 1929. Lord Hankey, The Supreme Command, 1914–1918, 2 vols, Allen & Unwin, 1961. R. Holmes, The Little Field Marshal: Sir John French, Cape, 1981. J. Jolliffe (ed.), Raymond Asquith: Life and Letters, Collins, 1980. J. Lee, ‘A Soldier’s Life’, General Sir Ian Hamilton 1853–1947, Macmillan, 2000. F. Maurice, Haldane 1856–1915, Faber & Faber, 1937. C.F.N. Macready, Annals of an Active Life, 2 vols, 1924. T. Murray Ford, Memoirs of a Poor Devil, A.M. Philpot, 1926. J. Nettleton, The Anger of the Guns, William Kimber, 1979. C. Repington, The First World War: Personal Experiences, 2 vols, Constable, 1920. J.E.B. Seely, Adventure, Heinemann, 1930. D. Sommer, Haldane of Cloan, Allen & Unwin, 1960. E. Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, Edinburgh University Press, 1980. A. Strachey, St. Loe Strachey: His Life and his Paper, Gollancz, 1930.

250 Bibliography J. St. Loe Strachey, The Adventure of Living, Hodder & Stoughtone, 1922. A. von Tirpitz, My Memoirs, Hurst & Blackett, 1919. D.R. Woodward (ed.), The Military Correspondence of FM Sir William Robertson: December 1915–February 1918, Bodley Head for the Army Records Society, 1989.

Other secondary sources R. Adams and R. Poirier, The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900–1918, Macmillan, 1987. F.P. Armitage, Leicester 1914–1918: The Wartime Story of a Midland Town, Backus, 1933. C.T. Atkinson, The Queen’s Own Royal West Kent 1914–1919, London, 1924. I.F.W. Beckett, Rifleman Form: A Study of the Rifle Volunteer Movement 1859–1908, Ogilby Trust, 1982. I.F.W. Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition 1558–1945, Manchester University Press, 1991. I.F.W. Beckett and J. Gooch, Politicians and Defence, Manchester University Press, 1981. I.F.W. Beckett and K. Simpson (ed.), A Nation in Arms, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985. J.M. Bourne, Britain and the Great War 1914–1918, Edward Arnold, 1989. J. Buchan, The History of the Royal Scots Fusiliers 1678–1918, Nelson, 1925. J.W. Burrows, Essex Units in the War 1914–1919, Burrows & Sons, 1932. F.W. Bewsher, The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914–1918, London, 1921. H. Cecil and P. Liddle (eds), Facing Armageddon, Leo Cooper, 1996. Central Association of Volunteer Regiments, The Volunteer Force and the Volunteer Training Corps During the Great War, King & Sons, 1920. C. Cole and E. Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain 1914–18, Bodley Head, 1934. L. Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837, Yale University Press, 1992. J.E. Cookson, The British Armed Nation 1793–1915, Clarendon Press, 1997. J.O. Coop, The Story of the 55th (West Lancashire) Division 1916–19, Liverpool, 1919. H. Cunningham, The Volunteers: A Social and Political History 1859–1914, Croom Helm, 1975. P. Dennis, The Territorial Army 1907–1940, Boydell Press for Royal Historical Society, 1987. E.J. Disbrowe, A History of the Volunteer Movement in Cheshire 1914–1920, Hales & Sons, 1920. G. Elliot, The War History of the 5th Battalion KOSB, Dumfries, 1928. A. Fair and E. Wolton, The History of the 1/5th Battalion: The Suffolk Regiment, London, n.d. M. Farndale, The Forgotten Fronts and the Home Base 1914–1918: The History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, Dorset Press, 1988. W.G. Fisher, A History of the Somerset Territorial Units, Taunton, 1924. D. French, British Strategy and War Aims 1914–1916, Allen & Unwin, 1986. D. French, The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition 1916–18, Claredon, 1995. C. Gerring, A Record of the Early Volunteer Movement (The Sherwood Foresters) 1914–1919, Sisson & Parker, 1920.

Bibliography 251 J. Gooch, The Prospect of War, Cass, 1981. J. Gooch, The Plans of War, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974. J.H. Grainger, Patriotisms: Britain 1900–1939, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986. D.P. Grant, The 1/4 (Hallamshire) Battalion, York & Lancaster Regiment 1914–1919, London, n.d. W.E. Grey, The 2nd City of London (RF) in the Great War, HQ London, 1929. F.P. Gibbon, The 42nd (East Lancashire) Division 1914–1918, London, 1920. K.R. Grieves, The Politics of Manpower 1914–1918, Manchester University Press, 1988. F.C. Grimwade, The War History of the 4/Londons, HQ London, 1922. P. Guinn, British Strategy and Politics 1914–1918, Clarendon Press, 1965. A.S. Hamilton, The City of London Yeomanry (Roughriders), London, 1936. J.Q. Henriques, The War History of 1st Battalion Queen’s Westminster Rifles 1914–1918, London, 1923. E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge University Press, 1990. M. Howard, The Continental Commitment, Ashfield Press, 1989. E.A. James, British Regiments 1914–1918, Samson, 1978. L. James (ed.), The History of the King Edward’s Horse, London, 1921. P. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860–1914, Allen & Unwin, 1980. T.C. Kennedy, The Hound of Conscience: A History of the Non-Conscription Fellowship 1914–1919, University of Kentucky Press, 1981. P. Langford, Englishness Identified: Manners and Character 1650–1850, Clarendon Press, 2000. J.C. Latter, The History of the Lancashire Fusiliers 1914–1918, Gale & Polden, 1949. J.H. Lindsay, The London Scottish in the Great War, HQ London, 1925. F. Lock, Records of the East Yorkshire Volunteer Force 1914–1919, Hull: Eastern Morning & Hull News, 1922. L. Magnus, The West Riding Territorials in the Great War, Kegan Paul, 1920. A.E. Manning Foster, The National Guard in the Great War 1914–1918, Cape & Fenwick, 1920. T. Marden, The History of the Welch Regiment, Cardiff, 1932. A. H. Maude (ed.), The 47th (London) Division 1914–1919, London, 1922. F. Maurice, The History of the London Rifle Brigade 1859–1919, Constable, 1921. R. McKibbin, The Idealogies of Class: Social Relations in Britain 1880–1950, Clarendon Press, 1994. C.J. Mead, Cornwall’s Royal Engineers, Plymouth, n.d. K.W. Mitchinson, Amateur Soldiers: A History of Oldham’s Volunteers and Territorials 1859–1938, Jade, 1999. K.W. Mitchinson, Gentlemen and Officers: The Impact and Experience of War on a Territorial Regiment, Imperial War Museum, 1994. K.W. Mitchinson, Saddleworth 1914–1919: The Experience of a Pennine Community During the Great War, Saddleworth Historical Society, 1995. G. Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900–17, Nelson, 1963. R.S. Moody, The Historical Records of the Buffs 1914–1919, London, 1922. A.J. Morris, The Scaremongers: The Advocacy of War and Rearmament 1896–1914, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984.

252 Bibliography E.A. Muenger, The British Military Dilemma in Ireland, Gill & Macmillan, 1991. C. Murphy, The History of the Suffolk Regiment 1914–1927, Hutchinson, 1928. I. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894–1907, Athlone Press, 1966. J.M. Osborne, The Voluntary Recruiting Movement in Britain, 1914–16, Garland, 1982. M.S. Partridge, Military Planning for the Defence of the United Kingdom 1814–1870, Greenwood Press, 1989. F.W. Perry, The Commonwealth Armies, Manchester University Press, 1988. G. Phillips, Rutland and the Great War, Padfield, 1920. C. Playne, The Pre-War Mind in Britain, Allen & Unwin, 1928. C. Ponsonby, The West Kent (Queen’s Own) Yeomanry 1914–1919, London, 1920. E. Potton (ed.), A Record of the United Arts Rifles 1914–1919, Alex Maring, 1920. J.M. Rae, Conscience and Politics: The British Government and the Conscientious Objector to Military Service 1916–1919, Oxford University Press, 1969. F.H. Reynard, A Brief History of the Territorial Force Association of the County of York (North Riding) 1908–1919, Joseph Walker, 1919. K. Robbins, Nineteenth Century Britain: Integration and Diversity, Oxford University Press, 1988. A. Rothstein, The Soldiers’ Strikes of 1919, Journeyman Press, 1985. J.D. Sainsbury, Hertfordshire’s Soldiers From 1757, Herts Local History Council 1969. T. Sandall, A History of the 5th Battalion: The Lincolnshire Regiment, Oxford, 1922. R. Samuel, Patriotism: the Making and Unmaking of British National Identity, 3 vols, Routledge, 1989. P. Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, Manchester University Press, 1988. F. Simpson, The Chester Volunteers 1914–1920, Courant Press, n.d. Z.S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, Macmillan, 1977. G. Stedman Jones, Language of Class, Cambridge University Press, 1983. G.A. Steppler, Britons To Arms!, Budding Books, 1992. H. Story, The History of the Cameroneans (Scottish Rifles) 1910–1933, Watson & Viney, 1961. R.R. Thompson, The Fifty-Second (Lowland) Division 1914–1918, Glasgow, 1923. J. Tindall, The Sidmouth Volunteers 1914–1918, Culverwell & Sons, n.d. R. Verdin, The Cheshire (Earl of Chester’s) Yeomanry 1898–1967, Birkenhead, 1971. L.A. Vidler, The Story of the Rye Volunteers, Rye Museum Committee, 1954. C.H. Dudley Ward, The 56th Division, London, 1921. C.H. Dudley Ward, The History of the 53rd (Welsh) Division (TF) 1914–1918, Cardiff, 1927. P. Warner, Invasion Road, Cassell, 1980. H. Whalley-Kelly, ‘Ich Dien’: The Prince of Wales’ Volunters (South Lancashire), Aldershot, 1935. R. Williams, Defending the Empire, Yale University Press, 1991. S.R. Williamson Jr, The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War 1904–1914, Harvard University Press, 1969. K.M. Wilson, ‘British Power in the European Balance, 1906–1914’, in D. Dilks (ed.), Retreat from Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, Vol. 1, Macmillan, 1981, pp. 21–41. H. Wylly, The Border Regiment in the Great War, Gale & Polden, 1924. H. Wylly, The Green Howards 1914–1919, Richmond, 1926.

Bibliography 253 E. Wyrall, The History of the Somerset Light Infantry, London, 1927. E. Wyrall, The East Yorkshire Regiment in the Great War 1914–1918, London, 1928. E. Wyrall, The Gloucestershire Regiment in the War 1914–1918, Methuen, 1931. E. Wyrall, The History of the Fiftieth Division 1914–1918, London, 1939. E. Wyrall, The Die-Hards in the Great War, London, n.d. E. Wyrall, The West Yorkshire Regiment in the War 1914–1918, Bodley Head, n.d.

Articles Anon., ‘An Excellent Auxiliary’, Journal of the RUSI, Vol.62, 1917, pp. 812–15. I.F.W. Beckett, ‘Aspects of a Nation in Arms: Britain’s Volunteer Training Corps in the Great War’, Revue Internationale d’Histoire Militaire, No.63, 1985. B. Bond, ‘R.B. Haldane at the War Office, 1905–12’, Army Quarterly 86, 1963, pp. 33–43. F.S. Bowring, ‘The Passing of the Volunteer Force’, Journal of the RUSI, Vol.65, 1920, pp. 587–90. P. Dennis, ‘The Reconstruction of the Territorial Force, 1918–20’ in A. Preston and P. Dennis (eds), Swords and Covenants, London: Croom Helm, 1976, pp. 190–215. P.E. Dewey, ‘Military Recruiting and the British Labour Force During the First World War’, Historical Journal, Vol.27, No.1, 1984, pp. 199–223. R. Douglas, ‘Voluntary enlistment in the First World War and the Work of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee’, Journal of Modern History, Vol.42, No.4, 1970, pp. 568–45. D. French, ‘Spy fever in Britain 1900–1915’, Historical Journal, Vol.21, No.2, 1978, pp. 355–70. K.R. Grieves, ‘ “Total War”?: The Quest for a British Manpower Policy, 1917–18’, Journal of Strategic Studies, IX, 1986, pp. 79–95. K.R. Grieves, ‘Military Tribunal Papers: The Case of Leek Tribunal in the First World War’, Archives, 16, 1983, pp. 145–50. M. Howard, ‘Lord Haldane and the Territorial Army’ in M. Howard, Studies in War and Peace, London: Temple Smith, 1970, pp. 86–98. K.W. Mitchinson, ‘The National Reserve’ Stand To!, No. 71, Sept. 2004, pp. 9–13. K.W. Mitchinson, ‘The Special Reserve’, Stand To! No.70, Apr. 2004, pp. 5–9. J.M. Osborne, ‘Defining Their Own Patriotism: British Volunteer Training Corps in the First World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, 23, 1, 1988. W.C. Price, ‘The Spare Time Force’, Fortnightly Review, Jan.–June 1918, pp. 764–74. K. Robbins, ‘The British Experience of Conscientious Objection’ in H. Cecil and P.Liddle (eds), Facing Armageddon, London: Leo Cooper, 1996. A. Summer, ‘Militarism in Britain Before the Great War’, History Workshop Journal, Vol.2, 1976, pp. 104–23. K.M. Wilson, ‘The Foreign Office and the “education” of public opinion before the First World War’, Historical Journal, Vol.26, No.2, 1983, pp. 403–11. D.R. Woodward, ‘Did Lloyd George Starve the British Army of Men Prior to the German Offensive of 21 March 1918?’, Historical Journal, Vol.27, No.1, 1984, pp. 241–52.

Index Abbey Wood, 54 Adjutant-General, 15, 31, 50, 108, 152, 178 Admiralty, 7, 15, 34–5, 39, 40–1, 46–7, 52, 66, 69, 79–80, 108, 120, 140, 158, 191, 204, 216 Aldeburgh, 112, 159 Amesbury, 57 An Englishman’s Home, 10 Antwerp, 79 Arbroath, 45 Army Council, 17–20, 37, 42, 49, 72–3, 91, 126, 129, 133, 135, 161, 168, 178, 184, 198–9 Army Estimates, 10, 30, 38, 44, 156 Army, Regular, 1–4, 8, 11, 22–3, Army Reserve, 14, 16, 23, 30, 43, 49, 55, 159 Arnold-Forster, H., 14 Asquith, H., 12, 13, 39, 41, 47, 90, 161 Assistant Adjutant-General, 18, 26, 30–1 Assistant-Director Ordnance Supply, 56, 103–4 Aubers Ridge, Battle of, 99 Australian Overseas Training Bde, 183 Baden-Powell, Lord A., 9 Baker, H., 38 Balfour, A., 70 Bannockburn, 57 Banon, Col. F., 26, 30–1 Barrow, 58 Battenberg, Admiral Prince L., 52–3 Bedford, 48, 57 Belgium, 36 Beresford, Admiral Lord C., 9, 122 Bethune, Maj-Gen E., 37, 102, 127, 129–30, 139, 144 Bideford, 68 Bigland, A., 83 Birmingham, 200

Bishops Stortford, 159 ‘bolt from the blue’, 2, 9 Bonar Law, A., 157 Bonner, Master, 69–70 Boys’ Brigade, 138 Boy Scouts, 31, 200 Bradford, 117 Brentwood, 58, 180, 193 Bridgeman, Brig-Gen, 114 Bridges, R., 84 Brightlingsea, 227 British Empire, 2 British Expeditionary Force, see Expeditionary Force Brunner, Mond & Co, 111 Bull, Sir W, 114 Bungay, 58 Burn, Col, 30 Bury St Edmunds, 58 Cabinet, 10–11, 13, 76, see also War Cabinet Cadets, 31 Calais, 79 Canadian Training Division, 159, 193 Cannock Chase, 124 Canterbury, 58, 180, 193 Caporetto, 173 Carson, Sir E., 121–2 Cave, G., 72 Central Force, see Home Army Chamberlain, Lord, 131 Channel, The English, 41, 47, 59, 79–80 Chelmsford, 107 Chelsea Pensioners, 28 Chief Constables, 43–4, 70, 80 Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 15, 18, 21, 37, 53, 76–7, 79, 100, 108, 124, 173, 179, 186, 188, 191–2 Childers, E., 4 254

Index 255 Chorleywood, 87 Churchill, W., 39, 76, 199, 203 Church Lads’ Brigade, 116 Cleethorpes, 195 coastguard, 42 Coasts, East, 76, 80, 113, 123, 143, 159, 169, 172–3, 188, 191–2; South, 80, 159, 191; West, 159 coast watch, 42, 67 Colchester, 58 Committee of Imperial Defence, 2–4, 41, 94, 219 Conan Doyle, A., 69–70, 74 conscription, 2, 4, Continent, 2, 5, 6, 7, 61, 77 Continental commitment, 13 Cook, Sir F., 70 Corps of Guides, 21–2, 42, 44 Craik, Sir H., 91 Crewe, Lord, 110 Croft, Brig-Gen, 156–7 Crowborough, 181 Cunliffe, Sir F., 71, 87 Curragh, 50, 58 Customs, 42, 67 Dallas, Maj-Gen A., 193 Dartmouth, Lord, 50 Deal, 237 Defended Ports, see Ports demobilization, 194 Deputy Chief of the General Staff, 108, 152, 162–4 Deputy Quartermaster General, 181 Derby, Lord, 117, 139, 144–5, 179, 186 Derby Scheme, 121, 123, 126, 148–9 Desborough, Lord, 69, 91, 110, 120, 129 Director of Army Signals, 159 Director-General Territorial Force, 37, 39, 127, 129–30 Director-General Territorial and Volunteer Force, 152, 162, 165, 175, 187 Director of Military Operations, 5, 10, 163–4, 183 Director of Military Training, 7–9, 21, 35–6, 80

Director of Movements, 160 Director of Organization, 185 Director of Recruiting, 153 Director of Staff Duties, 21–2 Doncaster, 150, 57 Douglas, Gen Sir C., 53, 76–7, 79 Dreadnought, 35 Dukes of: Devonshire, 92; Norfolk, 92; Rutland, 97 Dumpton Gap, 52 Dunblane, 57 East Anglia, 158, 179–80 Eastern Front, 141 Emergency Committees, 86, 90, 154 Employers’ Territorial Association, 70 Errol, Lord, 164 Esher, Viscount, 3, 5, 32, 38, 40 Ewart, Maj.-Gen. S., 5, 10, 24 Examination Service, 46 Expeditionary Force, 7–8, 14–15, 17–18, 36, 40, 41, 48, 52, 60, 64, 108 Extra Reserve, 5, 7, 14–15, 55, 182, 205, 222 Fenians, 44 Fens, 45, 80 Fergusson, Col. A., 70 Festubert, Battle of, 99 Findley, Col., 18 Fisher, H.A., 73 Fisher, Admiral Sir J., 6, 9, 37, 80, 158 Form E624, 127 Forster, H., 137–8 Fortescue, Lord, 112, 114 Forth Bridge, 60 France, 36 francs tireurs, 92, 114, 202 French, FM Sir J., 93, 99, 122–3, 126, 132–3, 136, 139–41, 143–4, 148, 154–8, 161, 164–5, 166, 172, 174, 178–9, 192 French Army, 33 fyrd, 11 Gallipoli, 100 Geddes, Sir A., 173, 179, 187 General Post Office, 16, 21, 111, 192 General Staff, 7, 11, 17, 165

256 Index George V, 18, 24, 110, 123, 128, 140, 143 German Army, 175–8, 184, 186 Germany, 3, 6, 7, 36, 39, 76, 107, 115, 163 Gibraltar, 59 Godley, A., 84 Goldie, Sir G., 219 Gooch, G., 27 Gravesend, 79 Great Yarmouth, 81 Griffith-Boscawen, Sir A., 215 Grimsby, 52 Guildhall, 92 Haig, FM Sir D., 178–9 Hague Convention, 21, 26, 92 Haldane, R. B., 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22–4, 26–7, 31, 40, 60, 66, 75, 201, 204 Halton Park, 118 Hamilton, Gen. Sir B., 126, 142 Hamilton, Gen. Sir I., 11, 24, 123 Hamilton-Gordon, Gen., 184 Hankey, Sir M., 41, 76, 107 Hapsburg Empire, 20 Harewood, Lord, 112, 139 Harmsworth press, 10 Harris, Lord, 86, 112, 155, 200 Harris, P., 68–70, 74, 110, 130, 136, 145, 153, 157, 172, 175–6 Harrison, Gen Sir, R., 226 Harrow, 53 Hatfield, 58 Hayle, 78 Henry, Sir E, 35 Hereford, 117 High Seas Fleet, 7, 39, 81, 158 High Sheriffs, 70 Hindenburg, Gen., 158 Home Army Central Force, 9–10, 15, 35, 41, 45, 48, 57–8, 64, 76–7, 79, 86, 93, 103–4, 107–8, 121, 125–6, 195, 206–7: Command Reinforcement Pools, 192; Composite units, 156, 192; Depot Companies, 124;

Extemporized units, 158–9: Fire Commands, 212 Home Defence Bns, 94,126: Home Service Bns, 195, 208; Home Service Divisions, (71st, 72nd, 73rd) 142, 148, 158, 173–4, 179, 208; Home Service Garrison Bns, 124–5, 143, 158, 184; Independent Brigades, 158–9; Independent (Kent) Force, 180, 192–3, 209; Local Forces, 48, 126, 159, 207; Mixed Bdes, 143, 183, 189, 191, 193; Northern Army, 140, 142, 156, 158, 160; Provisional units, 100–3, 124–5, 127, 132, 134, 141, 143, 158, 160, 195, 208; Recruit Distribution Bns, 148, 182, 210; Southern Army, 132, 142, 156, 158, 160, 174; XXIII Corps, 180, 192–3, 208–9 Home Commands, 8, 21, 37, 42, 65, 77–8, 93, 125, 129, 133, 141, 192, 207: Aldershot, 9, 48, 126, 193; Eastern, 35, 104, 125, 175, 181, 208; Irish, 126; Northern, 57, 179, 208, 210–11; Scottish, 78, 126, 196; Southern, 56, 126, 170, 179, 182; Western, 59, 117, 242; London District, 9, 48, 126, 193 Home Guard, 203 Home Fleet, 12 Home Ports’ Defence Committee, 41 Home Office, 4, 48, 67, 72, 85–8, 92, 154–5 Home Service Medal, 200 Horse Guards, 23 Hotchkiss machine gun, 169 Hunton, 107 Hurd, A., 235 Hutton, Gen. Sir E., 239 Hyde Park, 136 Hyndmann, H., 9 Imperial Reserve Army, 157 Imperial Service option, 61–2, 98, 109 India, 4, 58–9, 76

Index 257 Indian Mutiny Medal, 167 Inspector-General of Communications, 160, 192 Inspector of Gymnasia, 109 invasion inquiries, 3, 7, 39, 123–4, 173–4 invasion/raid scares, 2, 7, 15, 35, 40, 61, 64, 76–7, 80, 89, 108, 123, 140, 155, 157–8, 164, 167, 174–5, 189, 191, 193, 201, 204 Inverness, 57 Ireland, 9, 35, 50, 121–2, 179, 183, 186 Ipswich, 52 Isle of Man, 97 Jellicoe, Admiral Sir J., 80, 173 Keighly, 117 Kiggell, Maj.-Gen. L., 21, 36, 80, 107–8, 123 Kinghorn Fort, 52 King’s Lynn, 81 Kitchener, FM Lord H., 50, 54, 60–1, 64, 66, 72, 79, 93, 99, 100, 105, 108, 113, 117 Kitchener’s Army, see New Army Landsdowne, Marquis of, 120 Lands End, 159 Landsturm, 69, 196, 204 Le Cateau, 64 Leconfield, Lord, 238 Lee, A., 38 Legion of Scouts and Guides, 42 Leinster, 245 levée en masse, 89 Liddell Hart, B., 154, 170, 197 Limmerick, 58 Lincolnshire, Marquis of 92, 122, 128 Liverpool, 28, 59 Lloyd George, D., 90, 130–1, 139, 144, 155–6, 173, 178, 194 Lloyd, Gen. Sir F., 77, 123, 139, 238 Local Government Board, 118, 150, 152, 187 London Bombing School, 171 London County Council, 68

London’s defences, 3, 109, 114, 159, 193, 198 London Fire Service, 198 London General Omnibus Co., 193 Long, W., 130, 150 Loos, Battle of, 100 Lords Lieutenant, 86, 90, 119, 137, 199–200: of Durham, 120; Kent, 86, 112, 155, 200; Lincolnshire, 120 Lowestoft, 159, 123 Luton, 48 Macpherson, I., 153, 157, 175, 188, 190 Macready, Lt-Gen. Sir N., 152, 178 McKenna, R., 72, 92 Maidstone, 59 Manchester Ship Canal, 77 Maurice, Maj.-Gen. Sir F., 163 Mediterranean, 5, 37 MI5, 185 Miles, Lt-Gen. Sir H., 18 Militia, 2, 4, 5, 13–16, 23, 29, 90 Ministry of National Service, 179, 187 Ministry of Reconstruction, 179, 182–3 Mollington, 68 Mons, 64 Murray, Maj.-Gen. A., 7–9, 21, 35 Murray, Sir G., 84 ‘nation-in-arms’, 6 National Defence Association, 39 National Defence Corps, 196 National Patriotic Association, 69 National Registration, 114 National Reserve, 25–30, 32, 35, 43–5, 49, 56–7, 64–7, 77–8, 81–2, 90, 94–6, 102, 110, 113–14, 118–19, 122, 133, 182, 191, 196, 199, 201, 203 NR Divisions, 1st London, 33 NR Battalions, City of Westminster, 25: Edinburgh, 218 National Rifle Association, 26

258 Index National Service League, 4, 6, 9, 28, 49 Navy League, 9, 10 New Army, 60–4, 70, 77, 82, 85, 89–90, 93–4, 98, 107, 109, 124, 143, 167, 202 Newcastle, 46, 144 Newton, Lord, 120 Nicholson, FM Sir W., 18, 21, 37, 39 Norfolk, 1st Volunteer Bn (Rifle Vols), 24 Northcliffe press, 9, 10, 87 Northamptonshire, 59 Norwich, 107 Officer Training Corps, 6, 14, 119 Oldham, 231 O’Callaghan, Maj.-Gen. Sir D., 198 O’Moore Creagh, Gen., 68, 70, 72, 84, 132 Ostend, 79, 90 Paget, Gen. Sir A., 132, 142, 126, 174 Pals battalions, 64, see also New Army Parliament Acts, Amending, 130–1: Defence of the Realm, 1914, 67, 104; Military Service, 99, 127, 134, 148, 154, 175–6, 179, 201; Official Secrets, 1911, 43; Regulation of the Forces, 1871, 55; Territorial and Reserve Forces, 1907, 17, 129; Volunteer, 1863, 120, 129–31; Workmen’s Compensation, 1906, 131 Bills; National Service (TF), 1913, 49 Peel, Lt-Col. R., 182, 215 Perth, 57 Police, 34–5, 43–4, 47, 68, 85 Police Chronicle, 85 Porter, Gen Sir T., 226 Ports/Defences, 34, 205, 211–12 Berehaven, 41: Bull Island, 80; Cromarty, 41, 159; Dover, 34, 79; Falmouth, 41; Felixstowe, 47, 58, 195; Forth, 47, 54, 58, 181; Haile, 41, 80; Hartlepool, 81, 180; Harwich, 34, 41, 46, 48, 55, 180–1; Humber, 35, 48

80, 180, 183, 188; Hull, 41, 34, 55; Lough Swilly, 41; Lowestoft, 77; Newhaven, 18; Orkneys, 47; Pembroke, 55; Plymouth, 41, 54, 67; Portland, 41; Portsmouth, 41; Scapa Flow, 41, 79; Sheerness, 47, 55; Sheppey, 47, 55, 181; Shoeburyness, 55, 180, 183; Spurn Point, 41, 80; Tees, 181; Thames and Medway, 35, 45, 47, 77, 79, 140, 180–1; Tyne, 35, 46, 52, 78, 181, 188 posse comitatus, 224 Pragnell, Sir G., 70 Precautionary Period, 7, 34–5, 42, 45, 46, 52 press, 4 ‘press gang clause’, 91 Preston, 59 prisoners of war, 73, 185, 196 Privy Seal, Lord, 131 Provost-Marshal, 115 Pulteney, Lt-Gen. Sir W., 193 Quartermaster General, 18–19 Queenborough, 86 ‘race to the sea’, 59 railways, 35, 48, 57, 77–8, 81, 95, 160–1; Great Western, 81; Southern, 82; Regulating Stations, 160 Ranksborough, Lord, 197 Regular Army, 1–4, 8, 11, 22–3, 29, 31, 40–1, 47–8, 53, 60, 65, 79, 122, 133, 137, 140, 162 Agricultural Companies, 192, 194 Brigades, 18th, 35; 200th, 109; 206th, 180 Composite Bdes, 156, 192 Divisions 4th, 9, 35–7; 6th, 9, 35–7 Graduated Bns, 147–8, 178, 182, 189, 192, 208 Independent Bdes, 156 Labour Corps, 185 Local Reserve Bns, 124 MGC, 148

Index 259 Regular Army – continued RE, 15, 20, 37, 55, 163, 211 RGA, 15, 37, 41, 46, 55, 163, 189, 211 Reserve Bns, 124–5, 142: Training Reserve, 142, 158, 178, 195; 4th Reserve RFA, 181; 1st Siege Artillery Reserve, 194 Regiments, Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), 195; East Yorks, 195; Guards, 25; Highland Light Infantry, 26; Manchester, 4, 124; Northumberland Fusiliers, 4, 50; Rifle Brigade, 201; Royal Scots Fusiliers, 194; Royal Sussex, 195; South Lancs, 195; West Yorkshire, 194 Young Soldier Bns, 147, 181–2, 189, 192 Repington, C., 4, 6, 10, 23, 39, 87, 88, 155, 157, 174 Reserve of Officers, 5 Richborough, 174 Rickmansworth, 87 Rifles, 94: Lee Enfield, 197, 130, 143; Lee Metford, 107; Martini, 106, 130, 137; Meiji, 107; Ross, 137 Rifle Volunteers, 2–6, 12, 15, 17, 24, 28–9, 39, 60, 166–7, 170, 190 Roberts, Lord, 4, 6, 9, 10, 24 40, 41, 88 Robertson, FM Sir W., 124, 173–4, 179–81, 183–4, 192, 198 Roseberry, Lord, 70, 122 Rothchild, Lord, 116 Royds, Col., 176 Royal Air Force, 180, 185, 196 Royal Defence Corps, 41, 127–9, 132–5, 145, 161–3, 184–89, 191, 195–6, 201, Royal Flying Corps, 242 Royal Navy, 1, 6, 7, 9–10, 25, 33–5, 37–40, 42, 47, 52, 76, 99, 193 Royal Marines, 46 Rundle, Gen. Sir L., 100 Russian Provisional Government, 173 Rye, 95

sabotage, 52, 85, 105 Salisbury Plain, 48, 58, 107, 124 Salvation Army, 14 Samuel, H., 118, Samuel, J., 235 Saughall, 68 Saye and Sele, Lord, 64 Scarborough, 58, 181–2, 187 Scarbrough, Lord, 39, 161, 164–5, 175–7, 198–200 Sclater, Lt-Gen. Sir H., 50 Sea Fencibles, 220 Seaford, 159 Sea Scouts, 67 Seely, J, 26–9, 32, 38, 40–1, 43–5, 50 Selby, 57 Selsey Bill, 159 Shrewsbury, 59 Sidmouth, 68 Simon, Sir J., 127 Sittingbourne, 59 Smith-Dorrien, Gen. Sir H., 24, 121 Somme, Battle of, 129, 141 South African troops, 193 South African War, 1, 115 South Foreland, 125 Southport, 28 Special Constables, 43–4, 67, 72, 85–7, 150–4, 200 Special Reserve, 5–8, 13–16, 23, 29, 32–3, 45, 47, 55, 58, 64, 77, 125–6, 142, 158, 182, 193–5, 201 SR units: 3/Bedford, 182; 3/Border, 55; 3/Gloucestershire, 55; 3/Gordon Highlanders, 55; King Edward’s Horse, 213, 222; 3/KORL, 182; 3/Lancashire Fus, 55; 3/Manchester, 195; North Irish Horse, 213; 3/Ox.& Bucks LI, 215; 5/Rifle Bde, 182; 3/Seaforth Highlanders, 194; 3/Somerset LI, 194–5; South Irish Horse, 213; 3/Suffolk, 171, 194; 3/West Kent, 182, 215; 3/Wiltshire, 194; 6/Worcestershire, 182 Spectator, 22 ‘splendid isolation’, 3 spies, 88, 90

260 Index St Albans, 56 St Bart’s Hospital, 113 Stewart, Sir C., 69 Stopford, Lt-Gen. Sir F., 86 Stowmarket, 77 Strachey, John St Loe, 22, 50, 70, 89, 122, 135 Stanmore Hill, 56 Stratford, 160 Stroud, 154 submarines, 46, 79, 82, 90, 106 tanks, 189 Tennant, H., 64–6, 73, 92, 114, 121, 128–9 Territorial Army, 199, 201, 204 Territorial Force, 1, 5–8, 10, 14–17, 21, 26–7, 31–3, 35–8, 44–5, 49, 60–2, 69, 73, 89, 94, 116, 122, 140, 144–5, 151, 166–70 TF Advisory Council, 18 TF Council of County Associations, 31, 39 TF County Associations, 10, 60, 169: Buckinghamshire, 66, 78; Cheshire, 234; Cornwall, 197; East Riding, 43, 137, 220; Essex, 49; Derby, 26; Hertfordshire, 66, 78; Kent, 32, 216; Leicestershire, 31, 197; City of London, 134, 172–3; Co. of London, 32, 49, 197; Northumberland, 219; Nottinghamshire, 94, 137; Oxfordshire, 26, 64; Perthshire, 78, 102; Shropshire, 94; Surrey, 23, 42, 50; West Riding, 49, 139; Wiltshire, 197 TF Reserve, 17–20, 22, 27, 44, 147, 169, 197 TF Technical Reserve, 19–21, 42 TF Divisions, 48, 54–9, 62, 64, 76, 98, 108, 141: 1st Mounted, 48, 58, 104, 107, 126, 142, 159, 206; East Anglian, 58, 103, 206; East Lancashire, 48, 58, 63, 79, 98–100, 223; Highland, 48, 57, 206; Home Counties, 48, 55, 59, 206; 1st London, 48, 52, 59,

99, 206; 2nd London, 56, 58–9, 62, 99, 206; Lowland, 100; North Midland, 99, 206; Northumbrian, 46–7, 54, 99, 101, 108; South Midland, 102, 206; Welsh, 59, 100, 103, 206; Wessex, 48, 54, 58, 76, 79, 98–9, 206; West Lancashire, 48, 56, 58; West Riding, 26, 48, 58, 206; 57th, 126; 58th, 126; 59th, 126; 60th, 127; 64th, 126, 158, 179–81, 209; 65th, 126, 159; 66th, 126; 67th, 105, 126, 158, 161, 179, 209; 68th, 126, 158, 173, 179–80, 209; 69th, 126, 173, 179, 181, 193, 210 TF Brigades, South Lancs, 58; South Wales, 59; Welsh Border, 54; 2nd West Riding, 57; East Lancs Reserve 181, 183; Home Co.Reserve, 183; West Lancs Reserve, 181 Yeomanry Brigades, 2/1st Highland, 105; Welsh Border, 58 Yeomanry regiments, 15; London Roughriders, 105; West Kent, 60 TF Cyclist units, 21, 52, 106, 126, 142–3, 158–9, 179, 193, 206–7, 243; Northern Cyclist, 46, 52; 3/1st N.Midland Divisional Cycle Coy, 106 TF Regts, 1/6th Black Watch, 216: 2/6th Black Watch, 102; 5/Black Watch, 52; 7/Black Watch, 52; 1/Brecknock, 59; 1/Buckinghamshire, 57; 2/5th Buffs, 105; 4/Buffs, 52; 1/Cambridgeshire, 52, 57; 2/6th Cheshire, 109; 4/DCLI, 222; 5/DCLI, 63, 222; Devon, 54; 6/Devon, 57; 4/Dorset, 60; 4/Duke of Wellington’s, 52; 4/East Surrey, 182, 215; 1/5th East Yorkshire, 243; 2/8th Essex, 106; 8/Essex, 52, 106; 4/Hampshire, 228; 5/Hampshire, 228; Honourable

Index 261 Territorial Force – continued Artillery; Company, 63, 158; 1/Hereford, 59; 5/KOSB, 57; 4/KSLI, 59; Liverpool Scottish, 56; London, 54, 141, 195; 5/London, 63, 99; 12/London, 99; 13/London, 99; 14/London, 59, 62; 15/London, 63; 25/London, 52; 6/Manchester, 60; 9/Middlesex, 53, 57; 10/Middlesex, 57; Monmouthshire, 59, 99; 2/6th Norfolk, 242; Rifle Brigade, 118; 2/RF City of London, 53, 60; 4/Seaforth Highlanders, 171; Somerset Light Infantry, 54; 2/4th Sussex, 109; 6/Sussex, 106; 6/Welsh, 59; West Kent, 63 TF Misc units, Durham Co. RGA, 81; 2/1st E.Anglian Divisional Artillery, 103; Kent (Fortress) Coy, RE, 221; Welsh Howitzer Brigade, 106 TF Supernumerary/Protection Companies, 66, 94–8, 101, 118–19, 125, 133–4, 195 TF Special Service Sections, 7, 35, 42, 45–6, 52, 165 First Line, 66, 83, 93, 97, 102, 104, 135 Second Line, 63, 66, 93–4, 97–102, 109, 135, 141, 158,179 Third Line, 97–8, 109, 126–7, 135 Territorials, or England’s last hope, 38 Thanet, 52 Thorne, W., 157 Tilbury, 79 Tirpitz, Admiral von, 7 Totnes, 58 trained bands, 11 Treasury tribunals, 147, 149, 151–2, 155, 168 Troup, Sir E., 154 Tunbridge Wells, 59 Ulster Volunteers, 69 Unionist Party, 19

Veteran Reserve, 16, 19, 22–3 Voluntary Aid Detachment, 20, 22, 102, 151 Volunteer Force, 147, 149–52, 156–7, 161–76, 178–9, 181, 183–7, 190, 192–3, 196–99, 202–3 VF special service companies, 186–90, 200, 203 VF units, Buckinghamshire, 169, 240: Cheshire, 244; Devon, 176–7; Essex, 171, 231, 240; Gloucestershire, 170; Hertfordshire, 243; Huddersfield, 171; Kent, 154, 171, 200; Lincolnshire, 241; London, 157, 159; Manchester, 240; Oldham, 240; Ramsgate, 175; Shropshire, 169, 240; Suffolk, 171, 243; West Yorkshire, 244; Vol. RFC, 167 Volunteer Training Corps, 41, 67–8, 70–3, 81–93, 109–21, 125, 128–9, 131, 135–8, 140–1, 144, 146 148, 150 Central Committee, 74, 91, 93, 110–16, 119, 135 149, 154, 177 VTC units, Athletes’ Corps, 83: Birkenhead Corps, 83; Birmingham Electrical, 112, 120; Buckinghamshire Vols, 116, 240; East Riding Vols, 137; Essex Vols, 83; Deal Vols, 247; Fleet Street Company, 138; Ju Jitsu Corps, 84; Lancashire Vols, 83; LCC Corps, 116; Letchworth Vols, 143; Lydney Vols, 226; Middlesex Vols, 112; Motor Sections, 120; National Guard, 110–11, 117; National Volunteer Guard, 73; Naval Home Defence Corps, 112; N-E Railway Corps, 116; Newent Coy, 241; Nottingham Vols, 137; Old Boys, 83; Optimists, 111; Oxford Vols, 137; Piano Tuners’ Corps, 83; Preston Vols, 231; Public School Corps, 111; Rye Company, 95; Station Companies, 112, 120; United

262 Index Volunteer Training Corps – continued Arts Rifles, 84, 232, 246; Warwickshire Vols, 112 vulnerable points, 34–5, 40, 48–9, 77–8, 81, 94, 113, 126 Walmer, 237 Wandsworth, 68 War Cabinet, 99–100, 161–2, 174, 178, 188, see also Cabinet War Council, 93 Ward J., 82 Warner, Sir C., 215 War Office, 2, 7, 15, 17, 18, 20, 23, 25–30, 33–4, 36, 41, 43, 48–9, 55, 61–6, 69–78, 80, 83, 85, 90–6, 101, 103, 107, 113, 115, 117–18, 120, 127, 129–32, 137–40, 145–53, 155, 158, 161–2, 164–5, 168, 172, 175, 177, 179–80, 184–8, 190, 197–9, 203

Wash, The, 79, 100, 124–5, 193 Watford, 58 Wells, H., 69–70, 87–8 Western Front, 99, 146, 155, 173 Whigham, Maj.-Gen. Sir R., 152, 162 Willesden, 160 Wilson, Admiral Sir A., 39 Wilson, FM Sir H., 36–7, 186, 191 Wirral, 68 Woolcombe, Gen., 115 Woolwich, 54 Worthing, 100 Wyrall, E., 194 Wyndham G., 14, 38 Ypres, Battles of, 99,100, 162, 173 Zeebrugge, 90, 93, 99, 157 Zeppelins, 81, 90, 108, 195