Jean-Fran�ois Lyotard Translated by Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon Introduction by John Mowitt
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Jean-Fran�ois Lyotard Translated by Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon Introduction by John Mowitt
UNIVERSITY OF MINNE,OTA
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MINNEAPOLU
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LONDON
CULTURAL CRITIQUE BOOKS
An occasional series of publications in association with the journal Cultural Critique. www. upress.umn. eduljournals/culturalcritique The University of Minnesota Press gratefully acknowledges financial assistance provided by the French Ministry of Culture for the translation of this book. Ouvrage publie avec le concours du Ministere frans;ais charge de !a culture-Centre national du livre. '"The Dream-Work Does Not Think"' was originally published in Oxford Literary Review 6, no. I (I983): 3-34; reprinted with permission of Oxford Literary Review. "Fiscourse Digure: The Utopia behind the Scenes of the Phantasy" was originally published in 1heatre]ournal 35, no. 3 (I983): 333-57; copyright by The Johns Hopkins University Press; reprinted with permission of The Johns Hopkins University Press. "there is a here and" copyright I940, I968, I99I by the Trustees for the E. E. Cummings Trust, from E. E. Cummings, Complete Poems: I904-r962, ed. George J. Firmage (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, I968); reprinted by permission of Liveright Publishing Corporation. Originally published in French as Discours,.ftgure; copyright I97I by Klincksieck. Copyright zon by the Regents of the University of Minnesota All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Published by the University of Minnesota Press III Third Avenue South, Suite 290 Minneapolis, MN 5540I-2520 http://www.upress.umn.edu Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lyotard,Jean-Frans:ois, 1924-I998. [Discours, figure. English] Discourse, figure I Jean-Frans;ois Lyotard ; translated by Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon; introduction by John Mowitt. p. em. (Cultural critique books) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-o-8166-4565-7 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN 978-o-8166-4566-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) I. General semantics. 2. Form (Aesthetics). 3· Art Philosophy. I. Title. B82o.L913 2on I94 dc22 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper The University of Minnesota is an equal-opporrunity educator and employer. I8 17 I6 15 I4 I3 I2
II
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 I
amaam
To whom is a book due? For the book itself is a modern offspring of Greek tragedy, and, through it, of expiatory sacrifice. Like these, the book is there fore already
due to a debt whose insatiable
creditor
is unnameable. One cannot entertain the hope of extinguishing this debt with acknowledgments. I hereby designate my immediate creditors:
S. Boucheron, L. Bovar, the members of the C.N .R.S. Commission de Philosophie, P. Durning, C. Martin, and M. May, without whom this book could not have been realized; the students in the r967-68 course and r968-69 seminar at Nanterre, with whom it was conceived; M. Dufrenne, who, without fail and with unconditional generosity, believed in this project.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
The Gold-Bug
xi
JOHN MOWITT
DISCOURSE , F IGURE The Bias of the Figural
3
SIGNIFICATION AND DESIGNATION
Dialectics, Index, Form
23 51
Recessus and Hyper-Reflection Linguistic Sign?
72 90
Effect of Thickness in the System
Thickness on the Margins of Discourse
103
The No and the Position of the Object
115
Opposition and Difference
129
VEDUTA ON A FRAGMENT OF THE
"
" HISTORY OF DESIRE
157
THE OTHER SPACE
205
The Line and the Letter
"The Dream-Work Does Not Think''
233
Desire's Complicity with the Figural
268
277
Desire in Discourse Fiscourse Digure
3 27
The Utopia behind the Scenes ofthe Phantasy Return, Auto-Illustration, Double Reversal
356
APPENDIX
]ean-Franrois Lyotard's French Translation of "Die Verneinung" by Sigmund Freud 391
397
NOTES TO CHAPTERS
NOTES ON FIGURES AND PLATES BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX OF NAMES
481
492 503
INDEX OF CONCEPTS AND GERMAN EXPRESSIONS
509
Plate sectionfollows page 480.
INTRODUCTION
The Gold-Bug
JohnMowitt On zr April I998,]ean-Fran�ois Lyotard succumbed to an aggressive form of leukemia. Shortly after, at the annual meeting of the International Associa tion for Philosophy and Literature hosted by the University of California, Irvine, an impromptu commemorative event was organized that included several "witnesses," among them Dalia Judovitz, his colleague at Emory University, who read from his then-unpublished manuscript on Augustine, and Jacques Derrida, then in residence at Irvine. Among the several s'omber remarks made by Derrida, two bear repeating here. First he shared with us an anecdote, meant I suppose to underscore his vulnerability, his sense of exposure, an anecdote that disclosed his belief in the power of incantation. Recounting a dinner recently shared with Lyotard, Derrida made a point of saying that he had promised to protect his ailing friend with a spoken charm taught to him by his mother. Indeed, his remarks concluded when he observed with redoubled sadness (the loss of the mother and of the friend) that his mother's charm obviously failed. The anecdote of the antidote that wasn't one. The other remark was more directly intellectual in. character, but for that reason no less capable of marking Derrida's exposure to the event of mourn ing. It arose as Derrida sought to tease out the rhythm of his agreements and disagreements with Lyotard. Aware that he was compressing much time and space, Derrida nevertheless permitted himself the observation that toward the end they disagreed most passionately about Marxism: Lyotard sacrificed it to the postmodern, Derrida sustained himself on its weak yet indestruc tible, hauntological "spirit." If I begin these remarks by reconstructing this somber scene it is be cause next to me in the auditorium sat my late friend Mary Lydon, who, when Derrida contrasted himself with Lyotard .in this way, said under her
I NTRO DUCTION
breath, "oh, la, la," that oddly translingual statement that when translated specifically from the French might, in this context and with that intona tion, simply be rendered as "bullshit." My point here is not to establish my presence at this particular occasion (frankly, no one in attendance wanted to be at this event); rather, the point is to underscore something crucial both to the friendship between Lyotard and one of his major philosophical in terlocutors and also to the intellectual and political situation out of which
Discourse, Figure emerged, a situation very much caught up in a dispute over the contending legacies of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud, especially as these bore on the problem of language then preoccupying so many in the human sciences but nowhere more tenaciously than in and around academic philosophy. It is important to emphasize that Lydon's "summation," as a subsequent brief conversation made clear, was not about whether Derrida believed what he was saying but whether Lyotard's relation to Marxism had been fairly characterized by him. We agreed that it was not, and it seems appropriate now to elaborate why as a way to begin thinking about Discourse, Figure, a text that, perhaps oddly, says rather little about Marxism as such.
Discourse, Figure was Lyotard's these de doctoral d'Etat, the rough equiva lent of a doctoral thesis and as such the professional form of recognition that gives one access to university teaching, dissertation supervision, and the coveted title of Maitre de conferences. The thesis was published in 1971 by Klincksieck, a maison dedition established in the early nineteenth century and well known for its international traffic in German, French, and English texts. This text was later described by Lyotard as one of only four "actual" books he ever wrote, and although it would certainly be worth lingering over this characterization of "the book'' (his list of publications is exten sive indeed), my point here is different.1 Lyotard's first text-that-was-not-a book was simply titled Phenomenology, and it appeared from the prestigious Presses Universitaires de France in the Qye sais-je? series begun by Paul Angoulvent during the Occupation. Its date of publication was 1954. Thus, a hiatus of seventeen years separates this text from his first "book," and if it is important to draw this out it is precisely in order to propose that something crucial to Discourse, Figure transpired in this gap.
INTRODUCTION
In 1950, Lyotard assumed his first teaching post in a francophone high school for boys in Constantine, Algeria, four years before the onset of the war for national liberation. During this period he made contact with, among others, Pierre Souyri, Claude Lefort, and Cornelius Castoriadis, three of the founding editors of the Rosa Luxemburg-inspired journal Socialisme ou Bar
barie (Socialism or barbarism). Lyotard joined the editorial collective after his return to France and published frequently on the Algerian crisis, writ ings now available in English in the collection Political Writings. Although his aim is different, Mohammed Ramdani (the editor of the French edition of Lyotard's contributions to Socialisme ou Barbarie), through his attention to the motif of the bureaucratization of the revolution, underscores how Lyotard's analysis of the Algerian crisis situates this work squarely within the political and theoretical disputes that in 1963 finally tore the editorial collective of Socialisme ou Barbarie apart. The terms of this dispute are certainly of interest, but since Lyotard himself, in the "Mterword" to Peregrinations, 2 hashed and rehashed them, it will suffice to point to that aspect of the dispute that bears on the question ofwhat Herbert Marcuse later called "Soviet Marxism." Practically since its formation in 1949, the intellectuals and activists affiliated with Socialisme ou Barbarie concerned themselves with the history and theory of Marxism. At the core of their editorial quarrels stood the question of how to save, or at least separate, Mmism from Stalinism without simply retreating from poli tics in the name of theoretical correctness. Castoriadis eventually came to formulate a position on the matter that called Marxism itself into question, but prior to that he and others-including, let us not forget, Guy Debord (if briefly) and Jean Laplanche-pursued a critique of the relation between political leadership and bureaucracy that Ramdani rightly discerns at work in Lyotard's analysis of the political crisis besetting the National Liberation Front (FLN) almost before the ink on the Evian Accords had time to dry. As Lyotard recounts in ''A Memorial of Marxism," initially he and Souyri felt sufficiently provoked by Castoriadis that they splintered off to form Pou
voir Ouvrier, then little more than an ancillary, more directly proletarian ized publishing venture within the orbit of Socialisme ou Barbarie. It was not long before this splinter splintered in turn, leaving Lyotard to, as he puts it,
I N TR O D U C TI O N
drift. Doubtless i t i s this history that prompts him to invoke i t directly in the introduction to his collection of essays Derive a partir de Marx et Freud, where he also, in linking drifting and the death drive, finds motivation for saying that the essays in Derive are but the "scaffolding" of or for
Figure.3 And, lest it
Discourse,
pass unremarked , among the scaffolds is Lyotard's long,
still untranslated contribution to Les temps modernes from 1969, "La place de !'alienation dans le retournement marxiste" (The place of alienation in the Marxist reversal). While at one level this would appear to confirm Derrida's assertion about Lyotard's drift away from Marxism, quite a different observation seems equally justified-namely, that Lyotard's relation to Marxism was, dare I say, foundational and sustained. Even if one reads his controversial support for Operation Desert Storm as definitive proof of his "anti-Marxism''(and I take the point), it is undeniable that his work remained very much engaged with debates within Marxism about Marxism. So much so that the very mean ing of drift-clearly an avatar of the Situationist practice of
detournement-
would appear indelibly marked by the Marxism from which it derives. But how then are we to make sense of the rather attenuated presence of Marx in
Discourse, Figure? Put differently, what is to be made of the fact that the most conspicuous engagement with Marx in this text occurs in the section "Non human Sex" (in the chapter "Opposition and Difference")? At this juncture it becomes important to consider what happens in Lyotard's first text,
Phenomenology.
As is typical of all titles in the Qye
sais-je? series, a series intended to bring specialist knowledge to a broadly educated but nonspecialist public, Lyotard's study begins by laying out fun damental concepts of Edmund Husserl's early and late work. The second part of the study is then devoted to a consideration of the impact of phenom enology on the disciplines of psychology, sociology, and history. The discus sion of history culminates in a sustained consideration of the Marxist theory of history. At stake is whether phenomenology can provide Marxism with a theory of the human subject consistent with the tenets of historiCal and dialectical materialism, a point shaved differently yet obsessively by the likes of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty in the postwar period. In
Phenomenology Merleau-Ponty gets the last word: phenomenology provides
I N T R O D U CTI O N
Marxism with a philosophy of the human subject precisely to the extent that by "returning to the things themselves" (Husserl's mantra), philosophy eliminates itself as a practice separate from and ancillary to real life. En route, Lyotard makes a special point of adducing the relevance, indeed the centrality, of Tran Due Thao's effort to reconcile phenomenology and his torical materialism (to invoke the tide ofThao's groundbreaking study).Thao is unusually important here because he, too, calls for a revision of Marxism (ala Socialisme ou Barbarie) but also because in 1948, in the pages ofLes temps modernes, he published a stunning, lengthy review of Alexandre Kojeve's In troduction to the Reading ofHegel; Thao's lectures on this work had a lasting impact on, among others, Jacques Lacan, whose theory of desire, as others have noted, is plainly legible in Kojeve's reading ofHegel.4 What makes the review important is that in tracing how Kojeve misreads Hegel as a dualist, Thao not only shows how this ignores precisely what Marx and Lenin found so provocative in Hegel but, further, he sketches how Husserlian phenom enology fills in the blank left in the materialist account of consciousness by Marx. Qyite apart from whether this is philosophically compelling-and Thao's work still awaits a serious "reading"-what demands attention is the fact that phenomenology, or more broadly the theory of the human subject, clearly functions for Lyotard as a way to engage Marxism but, in accordance with the logic ofnegation, by not engaging it, that is, by attempting to think within Marxism in that precise place where it is not thinking, where, in ef fect, it invites the sort of critical pressure brought to bear on it in the period of de-Stalinization. Why stress this? Because when the reader thumbs through Discourse,
Figure what leaps out is the trajectory, the profile of the argument. Namely, as virtually all commentators have pointed out-and this includes everyone from Bill Readings and Geoffrey Bennington to Federico Jimenez Losan tos and Mary Lydon-the book proceeds from an attentive engagement with the phenomenology of experience to an ambitious meditation on the psychoanalytic account of the subject of experience.5 What this points to, among other things, is the fact that "the return to the things themselves" had, in the course of the 1950s and r96os, forked into a double return: the return to Marx and the return to Freud. In effect, Discourse, Figure is immanendy
I NTRODUCTION
structured by the confrontation between phenomenology and psychoanal ysis as contending frames within which to think the materialism of con sciousness. In this sense, the return to Freud was always a return to Marx. And vice versa. In a very general sense this sheds light on why Marx is taken up explic idy in
Discourse, Figure under the heading of sexuality, but a careful look at
this discussion discloses the hovering presence ofLacan.6 It is important to stress this because for Lyotard the relation between phenomenology and psychoanalysis is one he inherited from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, an inheri tance in which Lacan's critique of the "psychoanalytical establishment" (as he famously put it) is, in a sense, what psychoanalysis had literally become for French philosophy. Indeed, the presence of Lacan in
Discourse, Figure
assumes several different forms. Two are worth mentioning here. The first section of
Discourse, Figure
to appear in print was the long section "The
Dream-Work Does Not Think." Lyotard's thesis supervisor and mentor, Mikel Dufrenne, published it in his journal,
Revue d'esthitique, in 1969.1he
second part of this section contains a sustained and quite penetrating critique ofLacan's appropriation ofRomanJakobson's distinction between metaphor and metonymy, the point of which is to show both that the two men differ in the way they apply this distinction to Freud's concept of "the primary processes" (the psychical activities that constitute the "dream work") and that recognizing this exposes the failure of Lacan's effort to put linguistics in the service of psychoanalysis. Lyotard's comments toward the end of
Dis
course, Figure on the motif of anamorphosis-a crucial touchstone in Lacan's 1he Visible and the Invisible-has a
later engagement with Merleau-Ponty's similar, if prophetic, feel.
The second form of Lacan's presence is more subtle but no less conse quential. Among the many genres of discourse found in
Discourse, Figure
there is the surprising appearance, in what is listed in the table of contents as an "appendix," of a translation. T itled "(De)negation'' it is, in fact, a re translation of the then extant French translation of Freud's 1925 essay "Die Verneinung" (negation, although James Strachey notes that "denial" and "disavowal" are used in the Standard Edition). What links this to Lacan is the fact that already in
1he Seminar, Book L from 1953 to 1954, this very essay
I N T R ODUCT I O N
and this very problem o f its translation had attracted attention. Indeed, the French Hegel scholar who inherited Kojeve's mande,Jean Hyppolite, gave, at Lacan's invitation, a presentation to the seminar in which he proposed, apparently following Lacan's lead, that dered as
denegation.
die Verneinung would be better ren
Moreover, and this is vital, in his presentation Hyp
polite was concerned to explore the conceptual pressure brought to bear by Freud's essay on Hegel's cortical concept of "negation," a concept crucial to Marx's reading of the dialectic and thus also to Kojeve's reading of Hegel. Even Thao concedes the political and philosophical indispensability of the concept. Lyotard segues to the retranslation from a brief consideration of the relation between denegation and the death drive, and it is clear that the question of the theory of the subject in Marxism (is it better grasped phenomenologically or psychoanalytically, and if the latter, by what form or school of psychoanalysis?) is very much on the proverbial table.Thus, the specter of Lacan, whether draped or exposed, is deployed within
Discourse,
Figure as something of a condensation in or around which is to be found the question: have the full-political, and, as we shall see, aesthetic-implica tions of Lacan's return to Freud been articulated, much less realized? Or, to perhaps overemphasize the vexed theme of negation, is a properly nondia lectical Marxism possible and, if so, how might it transform our concept of perception, including, of course, our perception of the beautiful? Here is not the place to tease out the intricate relation between this genre of question and the socio-genesis of the postwar French intellectual, but it does seem worth noting that several figures now routinely linked both to poststructuralism and postmodernism-certainly Lyotard, but others be sides-took their intellectual stances in reaction, even if obliquely, toLacan's attempted redemption of Freudian metapsychology.7 Indeed, one gets a dif ferent but important purchase on
Discourse, Figure by considering in what way the book anticipates the assertion made in Libidinal Economy from 1974 (two years after Anti-Oedipus and a year after Julia Kristeva's Revolution in Poetic Language) that: "the model of all semiology is not 'The Purloined Letter,' it is 'The Gold-Bug."'8 Edgar Allan Poe is referenced in the notes to
Discourse, Figure but
clearly derives the importance attached to him in
this quip from the fact that Lacan delivered his seminar on Poe's tale "The
I N TR O D U C TI O N
Purloined Letter" i n
1955 (later placed a t the head o f the Ecrits), a seminar
in which he deploys, as Derrida was later to stress, a semiological account of the sign as a way to think of the topology of heterosexual difference. Lyotard, by insisting that a different Poe short story ought to guide our semiologi cal thinking, is blazing the trail followed in
1975 by Derrida's "postman," by
again squaring off against Lacan's intervention in psychoanalysis. W hat this tells one about
Discourse, Figure can be teased out by considering the semio
logical character of "The Gold-Bug." Published by
'Ihe Philadelphia Dollar Newspaper in r843, the story is often
linked by specialists to the Dupin detective stories (which include "The Purloined Letter"), but strictly speaking the narrator occupies the space of what Maurice Blanchot calls "the neutral": "it" is not Dupin, nor is there a "case" to be cracked-a code, but not a case. What appears to recommend the tale for semiological scrutiny is the fact that at its core rests a message, in fact a cipher whose decipherment constitutes a considerable chunk of the reported speech in the narration. As specialists have pointed out, this text reflects Poe's recently acquired passion for cryptography; indeed, this text is known to have inspired the career of a crack World War II cryptologist, William Friedman. This said, it is not immediately obvious why Lyotard sees this tale as superior, semiologically speaking, to the one worked over by Lacan. Spoiler alert: The code in question turns out to reveal the location of a handsome treasure buried on Sullivan's Island, South Carolina, by the pirate Captain Kidd. Its decipherment involves many levels of translation and transposition-once the location is determined, a somewhat farcical (and, alas, racist) feat of gymnastics and bricklaying is required-clearly, the sort of heterogeneity of signifiers that might well appeal to Lyotard. But what seems especially attractive to him is the mad passion of the protago nist W illiam Legrand. True, Dupin is himself a quirky hybrid of scientist and poet, but Legrand-though capable of brilliant ratiocination (Charles Peirce seems to have been impressed)-is not a poet. He is a man bitten by a bug. Gold-Bug man. Significantly, this characterological element finds its semiological reiteration in the means by which Legrand discovers the code he then proceeds to crack, which is through fire. As Legrand explains, he discovers the syntagma of the cipher by accidentally waving the strange
I N T R O DU C T I O N
surface on which it is written near a fire, a fire made necessary by "chance" meteorological conditions on the island. This evocation of the "tongues of flame " would hardly rise above the status of cliche, except that-and I think this is what seals the issue for Lyotard-what L egrand insists on is that he had to risk burning, thus destroying, the material substrate of the code in order to render it legible. One might say, then, that this theory of the sign is one that stresses not its "destination'' or destiny (a watchword in Lacan's reading) but its derivation, its drift out of a force field that persistently threatens to consume it. Although one might want to insist that the death drive is never far from Lacan's trajectory of the letter, it is clear that Lyotard thinks it is too far. If, as I will propose, the relation between fire and sign is one way to grasp the volatile relation between figure and discourse, then not only does one get a vivid sense of how Discourse, Figure belongs to the tendency North Americans call "poststructuralism"-the concerted antidisciplinary struggle to think beyond yet in the wake of the linguistic turn-but one also glimpses how artistic practice-in the case of Poe, literary practice-belongs to the core of this struggle for Lyotard. Although Derrida was the one to level the charge explicitly, Lyotard would almost certainly agree that Lacan appears inclined to use literary art to demonstrate psychoanalytic theory, whereas what is called for is a way to think of art as a modality of theoretical practice. In this, Discourse, Figure would appear to anticipate the distinction drawn by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in and precepts.
Discourse, Figure is
What Is Philosophy? between concepts
not only a brash experiment in aesthetic
theory but also a mad yet fully calculated effort to transform the status of the aesthetic within Marxism, and, like Theodor Adorno and Walter Ben jamin before him, Lyotard seeks to pursue this possibility by intensifying the theoretical encounter between Marx and Freud. The role of "negation'' has already been stressed in this regard, and it is worth underscoring that· Adorno, too, mined it for resources to radicalize the status of the aesthetic within Marxism. W here he and Lyotard might be said to differ is over the matter of the source of art's critical power: Adorno preferring to situate this in the transcendental character of the aesthetic as such; Lyotard, recoiling from what he regarded as Adorno's Judeo-Christian Hegelianism, preferring
I N T R ODUCTION
to situate art's power in the immanent mutability of desire. W hence, in
1974,
"libidinal economy." In turning, then, to speculate briefly on the current import and relevance of
Discourse, Figure,
it is important to recall that Lyotard was, during the
period in question, linked together as a "philosopher of desire" with Deleuze and Guattari.9 All three had, within the space of a few years, launched a frontal assault on Lacanianism, and, although at least Deleuze and Lacan reconciled, it is clear that at issue was the rescuing of desire from Kojeve's reading of Hegel's
Begierde,
a reading thought to have sacrificed desire to a
dialectic of recognition/representation. Against this, Lyotard, Deleuze, and Guattari agreed that desire was more like a factory, a site of production, than a theater, a site of reproduction and representation. In
1975 Deleuze
and Lyotard (then both friends and colleagues) drafted a scathing indict ment of the Department of Psychoanalysis at the University of Paris VIII, Vincennes, when it was reported thatLacan had instigated or inspired what they did not hesitate to call a " Stalinist purge" of the teaching and train ing faculty. As suggestive as such facts are, they tend to obscure what can not meaningfully be reduced to a doctrinal dispute. Thus, there may well be profit in recalling that Deleuze used the distinction between desire and pleasure as the heuristic through which to frame essentially the entirety of the encounter between his project and that of Michel Foucault, an example that urges one to ask: so what might be the more general stakes of a theory of desire as immanent productivity?10 In a sense, this is but another way of asking a question put forward earlier: is a nondialectical Marxism possible? Or, to invoke yet again the famous Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: is there only one politically progressive way for philosophers to stop interpreting the world and change it? Our moment is one in which the postmodernism to which Lyotard, alas, will forever be shackled has, if one is to trust Fredric Jameson, morphed into globalization, where the "cultural turn" has, at least in the Global North, fanned out into the becoming-cultural studies of higher education in both the social sciences and the humanities. Precisely because such changes have been understood by partisans of all stripes as political developments, the question of how one thinks the terms by which one joins interpretation and
I N T R ODU C T I O N
transformation lingers. It insists. This matter has not been and will not be resolved by recovering theorists now proclaiming the death of theory, and, in fact, if Empire and later Multitude generated the intense controversy they did, it is because Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri staked out a position, not just on whether a nondialectical Marxism was possible but on the mat ter of whether nondialectical Marxism could change the changing, that is, globalizing, world. This position has been deeply criticized (see, for example, Gopal Balakrishnan's Debating Empire or Samir Amin's review of Empire for
1he Monthly Review, just to evoke a range of opinion) but often in order to cite empirical exceptions to what is presented there as a permanent state of exception.U Left unspoken, when not dismissed with righteous and there fore apotropaic indignation, is the philosophical project of the critique of dialectical reason (to use Sartre's double-edged formulation). Although easy to overlook, even Marx emphasized that the point was for philosophers to change the world, not to stop being philosophers. From this vantage point Discourse, Figure becomes provocative because of the way it produces a theory of the subject that deploys aesthetic experi ence as the means by which to pursue the critique of dialectical reason. In a sense, Lyotard turns in the opposite direction from Deleuze and those work ing in his wake, a point one might flesh out by considering that in Kojeve's struggle with Hegel he engages Baruch Spinoza's ontology of immanence, but only to spar against it as non-Hegelian. Specifically, Kojeve, revealing his familiarity with 1he Ethics, recodes the Hegelian distinction between nature and understanding as one between substance and the subject. Under Martin Heidegger's influence, Kojeve reads Spinoza's substance as a con ceptual prototype of the German noun, that is, being with a capital B. What prompts the charge of non-Hegelianism is the fact that for Kojeve-who is reading Hegel, let us not forget, in the spirit of Marxism-what is crucial is the affirmation of the properly dialectical relation between substance and subject, a relation that in the course of history develops such that the subject negates substance, by grasping what Kojeve calls Truth. This is the anthro pologically driven humanism that Heidegger challenged in "The Letter on 'Humanism' " from I947.1hus, for Kojeve, Spinozan substance is unappeal ing because it, too, resembles reality stripped of history. It presupposes, in its
INTRODUCTION
very conceptualization, a dualism between it and the subject as the bearer of human consciousness. Recall here that this is the very charge leveled against Kojeve's Marx ism by both Louis Althusser and Thao: it is not dialectical. What this brings to the surface is that the question of how precisely to theorize the subject of Marxism is one of enormous philosophical challenge, a challenge taken up by Deleuze in a manner designed to breathe new political life into the concept of substance. In this he places himself in the ranks of figures like Althusser, Pierre Macherey, Negri, and Etienne Balibar, among others, all embarked on the Dionysian labor of forging a link between Spinoza and Marx. By contrast, and in this sense he can be said in Discourse, Figure to have pushed off in the opposite direction, Lyotard resists the temptation to reinvigorate substance and instead moves to deanthropologize the subject. Yes, in this sense Discourse, Figure is aligned with the so-called poststructural critique of the subject, but to settle for such a pat formulation misses the decisive way in which this critique aims for something more. To clarify, even if briefly, attention must turn to the point at which the historical materialist and the psychoanalytic theories of aesthetic experi ence touch. This takes place in the theory of consciousness. For historical materialists, and the entire "reflection theory" of art, aesthetic experience arises when lived social relations are given form, through the selection and combination of suitable signifiers, by a consciousness seeking to stylize, to represent the life organized by those relations. These relations may elude consciousness, but objectively, that is, because they do not present themselves as such to the consciousness of either the artist or the public. Psychoanalytic theories, likewise representational, differ primarily in modeling social rela tions on familial ones and grasping what eludes the consciousness of the artist subjectively, that is, in what must be repressed for consciousness to endure social relations lived as familial. Aesthetic experience represents the effects of this repression. To summarize with risible but efficient brutality, these perspectives touch in linking art to the representation of what consciousness cannot represent to itsel£ Lyotard, through the titular formulation of "dis course, figure," uses the comma, as Lydon observed, to mark the possibili ties suspended within this touch. These are possibilities that point "beyond
INTRODUCTION
representation" (to cite Lyotard's introduction to Anton Ehrenzweig's The Hidden Order ofArt), not simply to a site of production but to an articu lation of productivity that seeks to put aesthetic labor at the forefront of what Kojeve might describe as the becoming subject of substance. What this dislodges is the cortical status of"understanding" in the work of dialectical reason, leaving in its place, in an older Kantian vocabulary, "imagination." Indeed, it is possible to detect in the pages of Discourse, Figure pronounced glimmers of Lyotard's later sustained engagement with the Critique ofjudg ment. Here, what seems more urgent to stress is the way Lyotard moves to undercut the status of understanding, not to embrace the irrational (a favorite slur thrown at poststructuralism tout court) but in order to discover in the space emptied by its problematization the terms of an aesthetic en counter with a nondialectical Marxism, that is, a Marxism for which com munism is not the future but rather has a future.12 It is precisely in this spirit that he later confronts Adorno's "absolute music" with John Cage's "silence." In this he illuminates why in Deleuze and Guattari art, both critical and clinical, remains such a destabilizing point of reference. Even if, in the end, one remains unconvinced about the theoretical and political possibility of a nondialectical Marxism, Discourse, Figure points directly at a problem that still haunts our moment: what will we have to make of art such that it can think where Marxism is not yet thinking? For Lyotard, the Gold-Bug, this was not an academic question. It was a signal fire lit in the hope of stirring those dissatisfied with the "politicization of art" urgently called for by Ben jamin in the 1930s forward. Forward, toward what? Not necessarily " back to the things themselves" but perhaps into the "thick" (or as Lyotard insists, "the thickness," lepaisseur) of things where, among other things, one en counters, as Lydon so touchingly put it, the infancy lost when seeing words on the page was surrendered, irreversibly, to reading them. Marx, of course, warned against being "childish" but precisely, Lyotard might argue, in order to honor the political meaning of the denegation of childhood. Precisely not as something lost, but as a threshold where things, like the future itself, are up for grabs.
DISCOURSE, FIGURE
The Bias of the Figural
For the eye "to recognize sound," as Paul Claudel put it, the visible must be legible, audible, intelligible. The "second logic," which he opposed to the first-the one that determined the nature and function of words-teaches "the art of fitting [them] together and is practiced before our eyes by nature itsel£"1 "There is knowledge of each other, obligation between them, thus relationship between the different parts of the world, as between the parts of
speech [discours], so that they may constitute a readable sentence."2 This book protests: the given is not a text, it possesses an inherent thick ness, or rather a difference, which is not to be read, but rather seen; and this difference, and the immobile mobility that reveals it, are what continually fall into oblivion in the process of signification. "A long time ago, in Japan, while going up from Nikko to Chuzenji, I saw, juxtaposed by my line of vision, although at great distance from each other, the green of a maple fill ing the separating space, in order to answer the appeal of a pine, asking for agreement. These pages are meant to be a commentary on this sylvan text."3 Limiting ourselves to perception: is it a text, that which speaks only when the eye has located"the point of view," when my gaze has become the gaze to which things are "owed"?4 A text is not deep sensorially, you do not move in front or inside of it so that its agreement may be fulfilled; if you do, it is metaphorically. But the sensory/ the sylvan world, would seem to be precisely the absolute referential of all analoga: here we move, searching for composition, constituting the space of the picture, relying on that plastic space where the eye, the head, the body move or swim, buoyed as if in a bath of mercury. It is the juxtaposition by the eye that guarantees the agreement of the pine and the maple, agreement fulfilled because total, a harmony of silhouette, tone, value, and position: desire momentarily satiated. Claudel does not say juxtaposition of pine and maple, but juxtaposition by the line of
T H E B I A S OF T H E F I G U R A L
vision.The two trees stand "at a great distance from each other," yet the stem of the gaze skewers and sticks them together on an unspecified background, on any canvas. Very well, but this flattening makes the "picture,"6 not a page covered in writing, which is a kind of table. One does not read or understand a picture. Sitting at the table one identifies and recognizes linguistic units; standing in representation one seeks out plastic events. Libidinal events. That the world remains to be read basically means that an Other, on the other side, transcribes the given objects, and that with the appropriate point of view
I could theoretically decipher it. This is still giving objects a lot of
credit-a sign of Claudel's paganism, of which he was well aware: he had no choice but to disassociate poetry and prayer. His entire oeuvre arises from this drama, for a Christian, of being able to achieve a semblance of seren ity through the agreement of a pine and a maple, to experience a fervent faith-both desire and pleasure-in the sensory. The road to Chuzenji is the Calvary of an absolution of the sensory. By climbing up to Chuzenji, Clau de! wants to catch a glimpse of the flip side of the picture, but from Nikko he wants to take the frontside with him to the other side. Such is the imagi nary: to possess both front and back. Such is sin and pride: to have both text and illustration. This ambivalence is that of Christianity itself, the same Christianity in fact that lies at the core of the issues we Westerners have: the audition of the Word, but at the same time a philosophy· of creation. Through the fri st we ask to be delivered from the thickness of the flesh, to close our eyes, to be all ear; through the second we are forced to acknowledge that the objects' mobility, which constitutes them as world, that their shim mering, that the appearance (and the depth that informs it) be absolved in some way, insofar as they derive from what is all-powerful and all-loving. An ambivalence outlined by the history not only of Western thought but of the painting, born of the Writ and daring to illustrate it, untamed, never ceasing to submit itself to it, yet always managing to elude it. The alternative would be to forgo Creation altogether, to assert crudely the sole radicalism of ethics, to refute the transcendence of the sensory-the transcendence in immanence that Merleau-Ponty spoke of in the wake of all the painters-to attribute depth to the false transcendence, to temptation, and to go so far as to reject the false text of the world, to want only to hear
T H E BIAS O F T H E F I G U R A L
accurately, maybe even still less than that. In its radicalism, this return to Script-understood as allocution of the Other and as promise, where Jewish and demythologized Christian thought converge-renounces even what the eye listens to. May it close, be ripped out like Oedipus's. Master of illusion, slave of illustrations-we are never rid of the "evil eye."Philosophy, both first and last, is, as Emmanuel Levinas reminds us, morality, the vis-a-vis of the face since the face is the presence of the absolutely Other, the only Gegen stand worthy of the name, which cannot be walked around, does not belong to the sensory, announces something I cannot thematize as the back of a front facing me, as noema of a noesis. The face is the presence of the word. Between it and me who listens to it lies not the thickness of the sensory, but absolute openness, absolute imbalance, true irreversibility where are to be found not objects and my gaze (as Claudel believed), but the infinite and the finite. This suffering is said to be good if it hears the infinite in the face. On the contrary, the eye's action would be passion, corruption. This book takes the side of the eye, of its siting; shadow is its prey. The half-light that, after P lato, the word threw like a gray pall over the sensory, that it consistendy thematized as a lesser being, whose side has been very rarely really taken, taken in truth, since it was understood that its side is that of falsity, skepticism, the rhetorician, the painter, the
condottiere,
the liber
tine, the materialist-this half-light is precisely what interests this book. "The eye," writes Andre Breton, "exists in its savage state."7 For Merleau Ponty, the sensory is the site of the chiasm, or rather the very chiasm where the site takes place: there is no absolutely Other, but there is the element di viding itself and turning over, becoming vis-a-vis and therefore perceptible; there is a "there is" that is not originally a heard utterance, but the product of a driftwork that tears the element in two, leaving the flanks in the imbalance that the ethical life indeed speaks of but that belongs to the seer and the vis ible, that is unheard speech. Such at least was Merleau-Ponty's resolve: to go as deep as this originary chiasm without crushing the imbalance through the phenomenological re duction, without overcoming exteriority through the immanence of the tran scendental realm, and to that end to find a language to signifY what lies at the root of signifYing. However, it took l).Othing less than the transformation
T H E B I A S OF T H E F I G U RA L
of language itself into a gesture to render it consubstantial with the space of the chiasm that it was supposed to utter. Yet we know what happens in the end when one simply combines word and gesture, when saying is dissolved in seeing. Either saying goes silent, or the seen must already be something like a said. Did Hegel not challenge sensory certainty to dare declare itself without falling into the anxiety of uncertainty? And even when, leaning over its shoulder, condescending to its silence, he endeavors to follow its finger pointing to the Here, does he not in the same movement extract from this supposed immediate faith the mediation of demarcation, the trajectory that he states is a discourse, the same negativity as that of language? In the end, then, depth seems empty, in its shadow all cows turn black, and the truth of the matter is that one must begin where one is, namely, from within words. Let us therefore start here, take up the daunting challenge, enter the arena. Let us tackle the self-sufficiency of discourse. An easy task, that of dissipating the current prestige of the system and the closure in which the specialists of language think they can confine all that is meaning. We find ourselves right back at the text, authored by no one this time and which reads itsel£ Trivial gains, for the impertinence remains, which is such an oversight with regard to the sensory that it is as if humans had become two-dimensional beings, with nothing for touching, but moving along the intervals
[icarts]
in the network.8 Will we be able to tear down the closure
by claiming the existence of an absolute excess of meaning in the originary word and the necessity for the finite to interpret endlessly? This infinity and this openness, which we find in Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutics, betray a reticence toward Hegelianism, but they remain in its sphere. For Hegel, before anyone else, did not take the symbol as anything other than as lend ing itself to thought; before anyone else he saw it above all as a moment to be overcome. In fact, he simply did not see it, for all he wanted was to hear the voice of its silence.9 With this accomplished, hermeneutics is content to leave open the passage of consciousness toward listening. It thereby seems to respect the symbol's transcendence to all form of commentary, and the end lessness of the task. Nonetheless, its affinity to dialectics is not in doubt, in that the symbol, the starting point, is not taken as an object but a scrambled utterance. The transcendence of the symbol is that of a discourse emanating
T H E B I A S OF T H E F I G U R A L
from an Other. It is not Creation as a thick thing that leaves its mark on, and that takes in, alterity, it is by being deaf to revelation, the visible is not what manifests
itse!fby holding itself back in
its reverse, it is only a screen
of appearances. It is not appearing, but noise covering up a voice. What cannot be tamed is art as silence. The position of art is a refuta tion of the position of discourse. The position of art indicates a function of the figure, which is not signified-a function around and even in the figure. This position indicates that the symbol's transcendence is the figure, that is, a spatial manifestation that linguistic space cannot incorporate without being shaken, an exteriority it cannot interiorize as signijication.10 Art stands in alterity as plasticity and desire, a curved expanse against invariability and reason, diacritical space. Art covets the figure, and "beauty" is figural, un bound, rhythmic. The true symbol gives rise to thought, but not before lend ing itself to "sight." And the surprising thing is not so much that it gives rise to thought, since once language exists, every object has to be signified and inserted in a discourse, falling into the sieve
[tremis] where thought sifts and
sorts everything.U The mystery is that the symbol remains to be "seen," that it remains steadfasdy within the sensory, that there remains a world that is a store of"sights," or an interworld that is a store of "visions," and that every form of discourse exhausts itself before exhausting it. The absolutely-other would be this beauty, or the difference. Must one therefore keep silent in order to bring it to light? But the silence of the beautiful, of perception-a silence that precedes speech, an innermost silence-is impossible: there is simply no way to go to the other side of discourse. Only from within language can one get to and enter the figure. One can get to the figure by making clear that every discourse pos sesses its counterpart, the object of which it speaks, which is over there, like what it designates in a horizon: sight on the edge of discourse. And one can get in the figure without leaving language behind because the figure is em bedded in it. One only has to allow oneself to slip into the well of discourse to find the eye lodged at its core, an eye of discourse in the sense that at the center of the cyclone lies an eye of calm. The figure is both without and within. This is why it holds the secret of connaturality, but at the same time reveals this connaturality to be an illusion. Language is not a homogenous
T H E B I A S OF T H E F I G U RA L
environment: it is divisive because it exteriorizes the sensory into a vis-a vis, into an object, and divided because it interiorizes the figural in the ar ticulated. The eye is in speech since there is no articulated language without the exteriorization of a "visible," but it is there because an exteriority exists which is at least gesticulatory, "visible," deep within discourse, which is its expression. In pursuing this double exteriority one may be able to take up the challenge that language poses to the visible, and the ear to the eye, namely, to show that the gesticulatory expanse that makes depth or representation possible, far from being signifiable through words, spreads out on their mar gins as what enables them to designate; and to show, too, that this expanse is the source of the words' power of expression, and thus accompanies them, shadows them, in one sense terminates them and in another marks their
[langage] in order to be able to speak; the "absolute" object, the language-system [langue], does not beginning. For one needn't be immersed in language
speak.12 What speaks is something that must remain outside of language as system and must continue to remain there even when it speaks. Silence is the opposite of discourse, simultaneously violence and beauty; but silence is the very condition of discourse since it is also on the side of the things of one must speak,
that one
which
must express. There can be no discourse without
this opacity in trying to undo and restore this inexhaustible thickness. Si lence is the result of the ripping-apart that allows discourse and its object to stand vis-a-vis each other, and the work of signification to begin; it is the result of the tear, integral to language, where the work of expression occurs. Such violence belongs to the depth of language. It is its starting point, since one speaks in separation and the object must first be constituted as lost for it to have to be signified. Violence therefore ratifies the birth certificate of the problem of knowledge, forces one to desire truth as the interiorization (completed signification) of (the object's) exteriority. The cognitive function contains within it this death that makes the vis-a-vis, the desire that pro duces the thickness of reference. But the expressive function contains it as well, but differendy: it imports this death within discourse itself, since in the violence of the tearing-apart it is not a question of having a perfectly pure object on one side and, on the other, a pristine subject, this setup permit ting those cherished mind-games about the possibility of truth. No, this
T H E B I A S O F T H E F I G U RA L
violence transforms the object into a sign, while sy mmetrically transforming discourse into a thing: it adds depth, erects a stage in the articulation and limpidity of signification, at the same time car ving, on the side of the object, its other face, the wings of its stage. Power lies with the eye. To transform the unconscious into discourse is to bypass the dy namics, to become complicit with the whole of Western
ratio that kills art at the same time as the dream. One does not break free at all from metaphysics by placing language everywhere; on the contrary, one fulfills it, one enacts the repression of the sensory and
ofjouissance. The op
position is not between form and power, in which case all one does is confuse form and structure! Power is never anything other than the energy that folds and crumples the text and makes an artwork out of it, a difference, that is, a form. The painting is not something to be read, as contemporary semiolo gists would have it. Rather, as Klee put it, it has to be grazed, it makes visible, giving itself up to the eye like the exemplary thing it is, like naturing nature (to borrow Klee's words again), since it makes visible seeing itsel£ What is more, it makes visible that seeing is a danceY To look at a painting is to draw paths across it, or at least to collaboratively draw paths, since in executing it the painter laid down, imperiously (albeit tangentially), paths to follow, and his or her work is this trembling, trapped within four wooden slats, that an eye will remobilize, bring back to life. The "fixed-explosive" beauty lucidly required by
mad love.
What, then, do you believe discourse to be? Cold prose hardly exists, except at the lowest rungs of communication. Discourse is always thick. It does not merely signifY, but expresses. And if it expresses, it is because it too has something trembling trapped within it, enough movement and power to overthrow the table of significations with a quake that produces the meaning. Discourse too opens itself up to grazing, and not only to understanding. It too appeals to the eye; it too is energetic. Let us trace the eye's paths in the field of language, capture the fixed-trembled, espouse the hillocks of the metaphor, which is the fulfillment of desire: only then will we see how exteriority, power, and formed space can be present in interiority, in closed signification.
T H E B I A S OF T H E F I G U R A L
But does adopting this stance not mean siding with illusion? If l show that in any discourse, in its underground, lies a form in which an energy is caught and according to which the energy acts upon its surface, if I can show that this discourse is not only signification and rationality but expression and af fect, do I not destroy the very possibility of truth? The door will be open to sophistry whereby it could always be argued that the apparent signification of discourse never will exhaust its meaning, and that far from being able to contain the entirety of meaning within the signified, discourse receives it unconsciously and passively, from an exterior authority that owes nothing to the language structure in which it is uttered, that it therefore has its other inside it and thus that the one who speaks knows not what she or he says. An open door for sophistry, an open door for a kind of "terrorism," because the moment one ignores the common call to signification made by all discourse, where the implicit or explicit reference that every interlocutor makes to a possible universality and understanding is broken, and where the speaker's words are taken as coming from elsewhere, there remains, in fact, only vio lence to determine whence they come. If I can no longer speak with you, that is, accept that you and I take seriously-respectively and reciprocally the signification of what we say, and apply to it a consensually agreed-upon geometries that will allow us to decide what is right and what is wrong, but instead if l begin to speak of you, rephrasing your speech in the third person as if emanating from an absent interlocutor, taking it as implicidy expressive speech and no longer explicidy meaningful, then communication collapses, and with it the possibility of truth. It will no longer even be a question of
knowing what your
words "mean," since this knowledge in turn is made up
of words-mine and yours-but it will become necessary to mete out judg ment upon them, and for that to have postulated that there exists a kind of rationality of expression, an order of causes of the unsignified, another discourse speaking from within your discourse that I can know, or that at least someone can. One will have to imagine that this someone possesses, or is, your discourse's other. One will even have to imagine the following "non sense": that this other discourse that you do not speak but which speaks from within yours is nonetheless signifiable except by and for you, that I or
T H E B I A S OF T H E F I G U R A L
someone can say it, that we can speak of you but not to you. Such is violence, or seduction. Philosophy, it is said, ends here. Is this the reductive path we are looking for? I would like to show that on the contrary the alternative between, on the one hand, the discourse of communication, good intentions, and dialogue, and, on the other, war and schizophrenia, is not radical in itsel£ The common reference to an authority that the two interlocutors recognize in the absence of a judge, precisely of a third party possessing adequate guarantees, is not truth, but rather allows for the construction of a body of knowledge. The configuration of discourse as interlocution, as potential universality by reference to rules that will serve as index to dialogue at the same time that this dialogue will elaborate them-what, in short, Socrates bequeathed the West as its specific position of speech-implies in fact the end of truth. Nietzsche is not alone in teach ing us this: research in the field of semantic history confirms it.14 Far from being reducible to the alternative between well-meaning dialogue and Cal licles, we must understand that such opposites themselves belong to a world of speech pitted against another world-that of aA.�9etct (aletheia)-and that truth is not at stake in the alternative, but outside of it, that the alternative itself is erected when truth recedes, when truth is neglected, covered up by discourse and the desire to know. Then, admittedly, sophistry, deceit, the illu sion of ebc6ve� (eikones), is made possible, but so too are philosophy, dialogue, and the illusion· of knowledge-an illusion because truth is excluded from the very first. "Truth," says Braque, "has no opposite."15 One could counter that it is nobody's business to reinstate this pres ence of truth, and it cannot be denied that such reinstatements are generally clumsy when they are linguistic, the work of heavy-handed Nietzscheans who busy themselves like thesis-makers. Either we will all be "artists" to gether or no one will ; those who believe themselves to be artists as of today, who adopted Nietzsche and truth to make fun of others, are not the least lo quacious. All they do is perpetuate philosophy as a separate activity and the manipulation of discourse as a badge of knowledge. No one today can speak
in the name of truth: all lofty speech is
derision; everything that "officiates,"
far from freeing us from the alternative between knowledge and ignorance,
T H E B I A S OF T H E F I G U R A L
plunges us right back into the clericalism 'that relies upon it. Yet one must allow for the possibility of truth, and it is likely that many among those who come across as ridiculous and pompous, or as living-room tricksters, take this task upon themselves. Is such an outcome inevitable? Freud taught us the meaning of utopia in the strictest sense.16 Utopia is the fact that truth never appears where it is expected. This means many things, of which the following two at least will show us the way forward. First, truth appears as an aberration when measured against signification and knowledge. Truth is discordant, and to be discordant in discourse is to deconstruct its order. Truth in no way passes through a discourse of signi fication: its impossible topos cannot be determined through the coordinates of the geography of knowledge. Instead it makes itself felt on the surface of discourse through effects, and this presence of meaning is called expression. However, not all expression is truth. Here again Freud gives us guidelines for discernment. Not that we could ever grab hold of truth itself as one picks a flower after disentangling it from the surrounding weeds. Deception and truth go hand in hand, not as opposites in a system but at least as the thick ness made up of a recto and a verso together. Nonetheless one must fight to allow the effects of truth to come to the surface, to unleash its monsters of meaning in the midst of discourse, within the very rule of signification. Thus one must learn not to distinguish truth from falsity-both defined in terms of the internal consistency of a system, or of operativeness upon an object of reference-but to discern between two expressions, the one that exists to thwart the gaze (to capture it) and the one that is there to expand it, to allow it to see the invisible. The second requires the work that is the purview of the artist, the suspended attention, the negligence, enforced as a rule, toward what is instituted, while the first is produced by the dream-work. If the first aims to deceive, the second aims to make patent. But both are identical as far as their operations are concerned, except for an additional reversal in the first case, which turns its product into a work of art. Second, if truth doesn't appear where one expects it to, and if no dis course can ever hope to expose it in completed signification (since it does not belong to the same field), then this book is not truthful insofar as it strives, quite obviously, to produce articulated significations. But neither is
T H E BIAS OF T H E F I G U R A L
it knowledgeable, since it does not seek to build a unitary theory, not even as distant objective. Rather it is like a dislocated body whereupon speech impresses fragments that in principle can be rearranged in various configu rations, but which the constraints imposed by typographic composition those belonging to signification and rati�force to present in an immutable order. Even if this order is determined, and determining, it is certainly not arbitrary, but instead arbitrarily privileged (by the constraints we mentioned) when compared to others. A good book, in order to give free rein to truth in its aberration, would be a book where linguistic time (the time in which signification evolves, the time of reading) would itself be deconstructed-a book the reader could dip into anywhere, in any order: a book to be grazed. A book, incidentally, that would be freed from the literary genre of the aph orism-! mention this thinking of Nietzsche, who was still too tolerant of it. The present book is not that good book, for it still stakes out a position in signification; not being an artist 's book, deconstruction here does not oper ate directly, but is
signified.
It is thus, still, a book of philosophy. No doubt
its signification is fragmentary, with omissions and, I hope, rebuses. Nev ertheless, this makes it only an uncertain and intermediary object, which I would like to excuse by calling it an interworld (after Klee) or a transitional object (after Winnicott); but it does not really warrant these qualifications, since they pertain only to such figural things as games and painting. Once again, it is not a question here of letting the figure insinuate itself into words according to its own rules, but rather of insisting on the words' capacity to utter the preeminence of the figure. The ambition is to
signify the other
of
signification.This book still wants, and wants too much; one is, after all, only the least of men, and the space of this book is no more than Baroque. Still, in its defense, this desire for more remains very little. Having given up on the folly of unity, of offering the founding cause in a unitary discourse, on the phantasy of origins, we are bound by Freud's uto pia to the rule dictated by the so-called death drive, according to which the unification of the diverse, even within the unity of discourse (and not least in that of Freudian theory), is continually deferred and always prohibited. Just as it follows that from a consideration of this rule the ego must be given up as a constituted unitary entity, so too it is high time that philosophers
T H E B I A S OF T H E F I G U R A L
abandon the hope of producing a unitary theory as the last word on things. There is no
arche,17 nor does the
Good exist as a unitary horizon. One never
touches the thing itself but metaphorically. However, this laterality is not, as Merleau-Ponty believed, that of existence-much too close already to the unity of the subject, as he himself conceded toward the end.18 This laterality is rather that of the unconscious or of expression, which in the same movement offers and holds back all content. This laterality is difference, or depth. But whereas Merleau-Ponty posited it as the possible movement to a point over there while remaining here-as ubiquitous aperture and continuous motion, whose model he saw in the chiasm of the sensory, thereby falling into the trap of unitary discourse19-we intend to yield to fg i ural space, with Cezanne and Mallarme, with Freud and Frege. Depth will continue to exceed by a long way the power of a reflection that seeks to signifY it, to include it in its language, not as a thing but as a definition. Meaning is present as absence of signification. Yet signification will seize meaning (and it can, for one can say anything), exiling it to the border of a new speech act. Here is the death drive, always embroiled in Eros-Logos. Building meaning is never anything other than deconstruct ing signification. No model can be assigned to this evasive configuration. One could argue that at the beginning the violence is like castration, and that the silence or death our words want to unmask is the offspring of this initial terror that gave rise to desire. Very well, but as the place of this desire is a utopia, let us renounce once and for all finding a place for it. This is of the highest importance for practice, for the practical critique of ideology. The present book is itself nothing more than a detour on the way to this critique. If l had to wait as long as I did to see my own resistance to writ ing it fall, it was (among other reasons) without a doubt out of fear of being seduced, distracted from this goal, mesmerized by language. How its practical function fares, what in it remains active and hot, is not something I can judge.
A word as afterthought: there is a gradual slackening along the string of sec tions below, and the reader will no doubt be sensitive to it. She or he might object that my thinking is equivocal. What is in decline, from the opening to the closing lines, is the importance granted perception. First I explore the
T H E BIAS OF T H E F I G U RAL
order of discourse to disentangle what, strictly speaking, belongs to signi fication and what to designation, thereby delineating a phenomenological space, or a space of vision, whose characteristics are understood to be totally different from those of linguistic signification, though I skip their analysis, having sufficient trust in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the visible. Then I move from sight to vision, from the world to the phantasy, and the responsibility of the constitution of the object, of the vis-a-vis, first assigned to the gaze of discourse is transferred and given over to the fu1fillm ent of desire. Simultaneously, the figure finds itself displaced: no longer simply the image of presence or of representation, but form of the mise en scene, form of discourse itself, and, more profoundly still, phantasmatic matrix. At this point Freud's lesson supersedes Husserl's. The point of transition is that of deception par excellence: the category of continuity. If we accept that gesture is meaning, it must be in opposition to linguistic signification. The latter constitutes itself only as a network of discontinuities, resulting in a static dialectics where thinking and thought are never confused, and where the elements constitutive of thought never interfere with one another. By contrast, gesture, as Merleau-Ponty under stood it, is the experience of a meaning where the felt and feeling come together in a common rhythm-like the two folds of a single furrow-and where the constituents of the sensory form an organic and diachronic total ity. Nonetheless the gesture refers if not to a subject, then at least to a kind of subjectivity, however anonymous or "natural," as Mikel Dufrenne would put it: it is experienced, lived, or in any case structures lived life, partaking of an unconscious that is not object of repression but subject of constitution. At first sight, meaning according to psychoanalysis presents itself, too, as continuity. One would be justified in opposing it to linguistic signification insofar as the plastic expanse of condensations, displacements, and distor tions is opposed to the finite and transparent space where signifiers emerge through measured intervals. Libidinal meaning and sensory meaning seem to overlap, to stand together against the signification of language. This is the overlap that ultimately is undone in this book: the phenomenological mask slipping not off the face of the unconscious that no one has seen or ever will see, but off the mask of desire. The decline is that of phenomenology.
T H E B I A S OF T H E F I G U R A L
The area where the shift occurs is the refel ction on difference, on the organization of sensory space. That this space cannot be reduced to a geo metrical organization entirely available to concepts is precisely what phe nomenology itself underscored. Merleau-Ponty's Eye and Mind went as far as one could go in the direction suggested by the description of passivity, of the passivity of perceptual synthesis whose analysis Husser! had initiated. In pitting Cezanne's space against that of Descartes's Dioptric, Merleau-Ponty was saying that an articulated, discontinuist, active, logical conception of meaning and space would necessarily miss the given [Ia donnee], or rather the bestowal [Ia donation] of the visible; that this bestowal was exactly what remained invisible to this conception, just as it is in our experience made up of extended objects; and that it took Cezanne's enormous stillness to dismiss the rationalization of perceptual space and make us see the origi nary bestowal in its obliquity, in its ubiquity, in its lateral transgression of the rules of geometrical optics. Cezanne desires nothing more than to have Mount Sainte-Victoire cease to be an object of sight to become an event in the visual field: this is what the phenomenologist hopes to understand, and which I believe he cannot. His ultimate concept, his finest concept for grasping the event-ness of the given is of course not intentionality but passivity. Yet this concept still can function only in the field prescribed by phenomenology as the opposite or correlate of intentional activity, as its basic support structure. The aim [Ia visee] as act rests on a passive synthesis that is the very bestowal of what is aimed at. This passivity is therefore still thought of as an assumption of the aiming subject, as presupposed immanence in its transcending relationship with the object. In this relationship the subject finds him/herself in a sense deposed (dispossessed), but also posed [pose]. This is how Merleau-Ponty attempts to go from the I to the undetermined One. But just think of the distance that still separates the One and the Id. The "One" does not constitute an event in relation to the "I," on the con trary. What would this direction of anonymity lead to? At best the organiza tion of the forms of sensibility, a space-time admittedly buried deeper than that of lived experience and less beholden to the laws of physical knowledge than the one Kant described, but notwithstanding a space and time that
T H E BIAS OF T H E F I G U R A L
make up the frame in which the given gives itself, in which the event erupts, but which could never be the principle of an event. However preconceptual a system, like every system it is likely to testify not to the fact that something eventful has taken place (in the visual field or elsewhere), but precisely that the event (the bestowal) has been absorbed, received, perceived, integrated as world (or as history, etc.). The mystery of the event will remain intact, even if one tries to descend as far as the "One," for it is not the search for the con dition, whether anonymous or not, of the given that immobilizes Cezanne in front of his mountain, it is the search for the bestowal. Phenomenology cannot possibly reach the bestowal since, faithful to the West's philosophi cal tradition, it remains a reflection on
knowledge,
and the purpose of such
a reflection is to absorb the event, to re�;:uperate the Other into the Same. Now, the event in its initial alterity cannot arise from the world to which we are attuned in meaning. The discordance cannot come from a spoken word that, inasmuch as it is heard, is articulated signification and as such becomes object of knowledge. Nor can it come from a world with which the body cooperates to produce the sensoria that are its element. No doubt, the worldly body can become event in the order of discourse, since, quite obvi ously, meaning is deployed differently there than signifc i ation is in the sys tem of language
[langue]. This is why one will be able to detect the presence
of figures in discourse according to the model of the insertion of gestural operations, based in a continuous space, in a field that otherwise tolerates transformation only between discrete elements.This is how Merleau-Ponty's notions of "encroachment" [empietement] and "laterality"
[/atiralite]
should
be understood. These effects are useful to define the poetic or rhetorical order in general. But to what should they be attributed? We must remember that this disturbance in the order of signification has always been conceived of-whether in myths, tragedies, or philoso phies-as reprehensible. To lay this guilt on the body alone is impossible. This body is not a privileged place for the disturbance and the event. There is a silent underside in the life of the flesh-its uylaa (hygieia)-and it is true that, as Merleau-Ponty believed, it is merely a chiasm in the element of the world, grasped by it, grasping it. It is on such a euphoria that the philosopher attempted to build a pagan philosophy. But his paganism remains caught
T H E B I A S O F T H E F I GU R A L
in the problematic of knowledge, which leads to a philosophy of knowing flesh, a joyful flesh untroubled by dispossession. The event as disturbance is always what defies knowledge, either by challenging knowledge articulated in discourse or, just as well, by shattering the quasi-comprehension of the body itself, putting it out of tune from itself and from things, as in emotion. There is as much guilt and impropriety concentrated in a look or a sudden pallor as in a slip of the tongue. The body is not the culprit oflanguage's dis may: something else can disturb both language and body. To accept the body as the locus of the event amounts to endorsing the defensive displacement and the vast project of rationalization carried out by the Platonic-Christian tradition aimed at covering up desire. The event cannot be situated elsewhere than in the vacant space opened up by desire. This vacancy of space is precisely the preferred site of the be stowal. This becomes immediately apparent in the anguish that undergirds all emotions,20 but also in the presence of words in discourse, of turns of phrase that declare zones of turbulence where the person who speaks re ceives. Such vacancy is not an "attitude" to be recommended, nor an ethics -such as the paradox of Kierkegaard's horseman of faith or of Levinas's an-archy.21 Wanting to promote oneself as partisan of the event, or to predis pose oneself to the event, is still an ethical delusion. It is a property of the be stowal to dispossess us-one cannot predispose oneself to dispossession. The event does not arrive where one expects it; even a state of non-expectancy will be disappointed. One cannot cross over to the side of the primary pro cesses: this is merely a secondary illusion. Desire has its rejection embedded within itself, which is the principle of the dispossession of its effects. Desire is truly unacceptable. One cannot pretend to accept it, for accepting it is still to reject it. lt will become event elsewhere. In fact, one cannot begin to place the event if one begins by removing it from the vacant space left in the wake of repression, or at least of rejection in general. Neither discourse nor the body possesses in itself this crossed out, distorted disposition that authorizes the bestowal precisely because it prohibits the recognition or comprehension of the given. This would be Ce zanne's prayer: that the well-known mountain dispossess him, that it appear elsewhere than where the eye expects it, and that it thus seduce him; a prayer
T H E B I A S OF T H E F I G URAL
. of de-conciliation, an anti-prayer. It ties the visible neither to the !-You of language nor to the One of perception, but to the Id of desire; not to the immediate figures of desire, but to its operations. This, then, is the displacement, or the rotation, that will be discernible in what follows. It can be located with greater precision in a reflection on opposition and difference. One might ask: since you argue that the order of the perceptive One covers up that of the Id, why not simply discard the mask and erase the former? I would answer that this displacement is precisely what constitutes the event for me in this book. By virtue of what order, of what assumed function ofthe book, ofwhat prestige ofdiscourse, should one attempt to erase it?
I9
S I G N I F I CAT I O N A N D D E S I G NAT I O N
Dialectics, Index, Form
With negation, reflection positions itself at the juncture between two experi ences: speaking and seeing. A juncture, because each of these crosses paths: on the one hand the mouth sees-just as Claude! said that the eye listens otherwise one speaks of nothing, even if one says something, for linguistic reference points to the depth of the visible. On the other hand, how would this depth itself, constituting things in thickness, with a front and a back, be at all possible were there not in human language an arbitrary principle, the self-sufficiency of a system entirely dependent on its internal intervals, and thus capable of provoking and supporting the separation of discourse from its object? Would one see if one did not speak? Negativity is a position that directs two heterogeneous experiences. There is a negation involved in the visible-the distance, the spacing that determines space itself-a negation experienced in variability. The experi ence of this mobility, which engenders expanse, thickness, and the figure, is for the phenomenologist a privileged object of description: for Husser!, it is the constitutive seeing he tries to locate under its collapse in formed vi sion; for Merleau-Ponty, it is the permanent genesis of objective space and body that stirs beneath them in the flesh . To speak of a
beneath could suggest
that it is unconscious, but this unconsciousness belongs to the order of the transcendental. We are dealing here with an originary
ekthesis as
Kant and
Husser! understand the term: originary so that something may be seen. Its originarity ensures its unconsciousness. Now by unconsciousness I do not want to merely imply that this initial f orce, which distinguishes a,nd brings into relief, is destined to lodge itself in the dead casing of a language or an academicism (though the chances are high that this is indeed the fate await ing it, as Merleau-Ponty suspected and Francastel demonstrates) . Neverthe less, ekthesis is involved in seeing to the p oint of not being seen, as that which
DI A L E C T I C S , I N DE X , F O R M
makes visible. This power, on which the visible and the seer are deployed, generates their conjoining precisely because it generates their separation: an unconsciousness, therefore, pervading even the most revolutionary moments of plastic activity. At the moment when Cezanne and Picasso show us how there is to see, how the object comes into relief as we face it in its essential elision of what is visible, they are still showing us this object, drawing upon the same relief-giving power that separates us from the picture and makes it visible to us. No doubt painting is what brings us as near as possible to tran scendental activity, insofar as this activity is indeed a disjoining rather than a synthesizing power. What the picture shows is the world in the process of becoming, how objects can emerge, with the help of the eye, from nebulae in the watercolors of the last Cezanne, a line from the adjoining edge-to-edge of a yellow and a blue in Van Gogh, a gaze on either side of the green trickle dividing Matisse's famous portrait. From this perspective, the picture is the strangest of objects when it fulfills the function assigned to it by modern painting: an object where the becoming-object is made visible-transcen dental activity itsel£ It should be able to stand in for all of philosophy, at least for the philosophy that argues that perception is not an ideology but that it holds the entire secret of being. Indeed, it is this very secret that the painter makes visible: the secret of manifestation, in other words, of depth. However, we-the painter and we beholders-miss this secret precisely because we see it, and because this exposure of becoming, this constitution of the seeing and the seen would be pointless and fall flat if there weren't a sharp eye to register it, expose it, and constitute it in turn. The picture is such an inefficient trompe l'oeil that it requires the eye to access the truth, and it is, in a sense, nothing more than a call to the eye to be acknowledged. Even if the picture resembles nothing (and it really does resemble nothing, even when it is figurative, since its visible function is to give the given), the eye takes back from it the right it had given up in order to allow the picture to be: the right to believe itself the place from which the world-even in the process of manifesting itself-is seen manifesting itself, manifests its manifestation. It is up to the painter, therefore, to bring this unconsciousness of the negativity of seeing to light, in a kind of chthonic upheaval. But nothing doing: there is no such thing as a painting for the blind, and it is in the eye of the beholder, or at the least in its
ar r�r� ·. �'lrl
D I A L E C T I C S , I N D E X , F O RM
rr:;.:
;'' co-action with the artwork, that this seismic power seeks cover-the power
: Cezanne or Picasso revealed, or thought to have revealed to it. The negation that operates in the system of language
[/angage]
seems
to be of a different kind, as does its unconsciousness. Here I am referring to the lessons of structural linguistics, which, in its initial "parting of the ways,''1 takes language
[langue], the
far from having said it experience of language
system, as its object. No doubt, we are
all regarding the presence of the negative in our
[/angage]
by identifying in the latter this force that
keeps apart the elements that make up the table of phonemes and monemes. There are other modes of negativity, as well as other forms its labor can take in language. There is the distance that discourse clears in front of itself and where it objectifies for itself its reference, a distance that brings us back to the experience of vision. More immediately, indeed first in the order of phe nomenality, there is negation pure and simple, as quality of judgment, and form of discourse: mystery of the word
No. This negation is
the closest and
most essential for a phenomenological description, since it is, apparendy, through it that the negative comes to the subject and even-since there is no subject without negativity-through it that the subject constitutes itself in her or his opposition. The No is death attracted and tamed, the entrance into language and the coming-unto-oneself, arrived at through the experi ence of violence-a threat that henceforth accompanies
all discourse and all
subjectivity, while at the same time subjectivity and discourse play off the non-being it carries. It should be possible at this point to establish an initial connection between the symbolic No and the transcendence of seeing: the visible object is, no less, an invisible, and to manifest is also to conceal; in dis course, the No is the explicit presence of the reverse of things, and to deny is to aver. To constitute a visible object is to be able to lose it. This virtuality of lack, which must remain present even in the actuality of the thing, is repre sented in speech by the
not. Here a path begins to appear, bringing together
the visible and the negative quality of judgment. Freud leads the way: in an ambitious text, he linked the constitution of the visible, of the imaginary, and of the utterable with the use of the couplet fort-da. As we know, with and since Freud, the necessary mediation is that of desire, for it is upon the lack associated with desire that
all negatives hinge.
z6
D I A L E C T I C S , I N D EX , F O R M
However, the non-being involved in the system oflanguage [langue] seems to be an exception to this elaboration. Its axis is not in lack; on the contrary, one is tempted to say that lack and desire only make sense in this non-being. Here again Freud shows us the way. To say that the subject constitutes itself from the experience of death-as when it sees the free interplay of pleasure denied by the threatening restriction of having to respect certain intervals-to equate Oedipus's journey with that of the mind, does this not show that nega tion for itself, the quality ofjudgment, and perhaps, too, reference's transcen dence, comes after a negativity in itself: a mute negativity that nonetheless structures in silence by establishing and ensuring invariable intervals between sex partners and elements of discourse alike? This negativity, founder of order and disorder, is so immanent that it seems, as language-system [langue], to be the unconscious of discourse and, as kinship structure, the motive for the originary repression that gives rise to the unconscious tout court. Yet this unconsciousness is at the furthest reaches from that of seeing. This second unconsciousness refers to a phenomenology, whereas the first refers to an archaeology. It is the act itself that, by way of the first uncon sciousness, loses both consciousness and memory ofitselfin the naive, natural fascination of the object it has in sight. As for the second unconsciousness, it belongs to the order of the virtual; it precedes and surrounds the act, for it is what makes the act possible, investing the act whUe remaining unrecog nized by it, for it erases the unconsciousness by its mere presence. Actual unconsciousness is the shadow that light is for itself, the anonymity of see ing that sees the thing and does not see itsel£ Virtual unconsciousness, on the other hand, occupies not the core of the act but its fringes: it is the other upon which the act seizes itself and that the act obliterates by its existence. This fundamental function of misrecognition could be described as precon sciousness-as belonging to an act that, by definition, turns its back on what makes it possible. Saussure does not cease to stress this very misrecognition in the order of language [langage]: the system of language [langue] is what is "passive," unconscious, "involuntary," almost "fatal." But this passivity is not simple, nor is it a non-activity. "Deposit," "treasure," sum of everything that is "sanctioned" through usage, that is, through speech, in which one seems to thus relegate all of activity: for Saussure language [langue] is also
D I A L E CT I C S , I N D EX , F O R M
:
:a ,"system," even a "grammar," an order that prescribes, at the very least, dis course's form.2 A generative passivity, then, for the negation that operates in the system, both outside and preceding the subject, encroaches on the latter's prerogative to act. The subject cannot experience this negation since it is inherent in his or her experience oflanguage [langage]: it is the subject's inner lining, what she or he can only apprehend reflexively, as Husser! does in the Fourth Meditation when he draws out from behind constitutive acts the passive genesis that prepares them. By hinging on negativity, reflection thus setdes on one side in familiar territory while, on the other, it stretches outward toward absolute otherness. One may indeed speak of familiarity, since it is of the essence of the reflex ive to nullify its object and, as such, reflection operates just as all forms of thinking do inasmuch as it remains a form of seeing-the only difference being that in reflection the seeing of thinking is redoubled and tries to come unto itsel£ This reflective redoubling is to the sight involved in speech what pictorial redoubling is to vision proper. Painting offers reflection both an ex ceptional object and an exceptional model. For when we reflect on a picture, we reflect on reflection itself-a reflection one must call elementary, after Merleau-Ponty, because it embeds its looking in the very stuff of the world, and keeps it there: a re-turning of the sensory into the aesthetic which, on the one hand, announces that of thinking into thought, and on the other repeats the originary turning of the sensory of the object into the sensory on the body. In obeying this injunction to speculate issued from painted matter, we should be able to isolate the transcendental negativity that undergirds all aim [vise"e], along with its essential property: variance. By crossing plastic space, reflection stays in its element, or rather, descends into itself, seeking out a view-within the limits defined above-of its undergirding, of the redoubling of the sensory into painted figure, and, deeper still, of the redou bling of the sensory into felt and feeling. (Mirror, redoubling: such words in no way imply recourse to an aesthet ics of imitation, a theory of faithfulness in painting, or a materialism of re flection in a theory of knowledge. The relay of sensation in perception is not repetition pure and simple; the relay of perception in the picture is creative; and to think is not the same as to reflect. This is precisely what the descent
DIAL E C T I C S , I NDEX, F O R M
to the sensory sources of negativity teaches us. However, the metaphor of the mirror [which is much more than a metaphor] remains valid in this case because it encapsulates on the one hand the mystery of depth, of a conceal ing manifestation, that is, what falls under all forms of semiology, and on the other, that of variance, of commutation, which is the axiom of reflection.) But what the painter's as well as the philosopher's reflection brings out, and what the body 's reflection harbors, is the fact that negation is at the heart of seeing as distancing. There is nothing to see without distance, with out the separation between seer and visible; nothing to think ifi know what there is to think; nothing to paint if l cannot remove myself from the game the world plays with itself on my body. By constituting both object and subject, this scission is exacdy what endows them with a hidden side, with a "background" slipped under their figure, thus instituting them as signs with the power to manifest and conceal themselves, with their depth. W hen re flection discovers this disjoining power, it encounters itself, or believes it is encountering itsel£ Here nothing seems more legitimate than to follow the lead of intentional analysis, for speaking, too, is always speaking of some thing: this referential dimension, which the structural method assumes to be negligible, is nothing other than the presence of the distancing of seeing in the experience of discourse. Phenomenological description is not only one possible method among others. No other approach preserves the nega tivity that extends what one is speaking of to the outer limits of what one is saying about it, like an object to be reached, because it is the only ap proach that rests on the speaker's experience, and in this experience it is not signs that are given, but rather something to be signified by what Merleau Ponty called a linguistic gesture which, like every gesture, requires depth precisely that of reference. By allowing itself to slide along the line of this distancing, reflection recognizes itself not only in the
Bedeutung 3
of dis
course; it finds itself further down the line in the variability inherent in the order of the picture, and, finally, in the exteriorization of the touching and the touched that unlocks the initial mirror of the sensory. These voids follow one another, so to speak, and these discontinuities continue one another: there is no difference in position from the one to the other vis-a-vis reflec tion, since they themselves are all reflection.
DIALECTI C S , I N DEX, FORM
On the contrary, negation in language does not allow for reflection, even according to the loose definition just provided, which encompasses every thing up to and including the chiasm of the sensory and that of art. Reflection .claims its own space in reversibility, in a negativity authorizing the permu tation of the terms that it nonetheless keeps apart. But this permutation is precisely what the system prohibits: the intervals must not be trespassed, nor the prohibitions flaunted, lest they lose their significance (sinn/os). As a re sult of phonological analysis, the distinctive units of a language [langue] can be organized in the orders and series of a grid that will show what phonetic oppositions must be respected if one wants to be understood in this language [langue]. We arrive here at a set of constraints so elementary that, no matter how great the freedom of combination the speaking subject may otherwise enjoy, or the manipulation of the terms deployed in her or his discourse, they affect only the units of a higher order-words, sentences-while leav ing intact the basic network of phonetic oppositions upon which rests the entire hierarchy of units. Regarding these constraints, the differences and variations in the act of realization are negligible precisely so long as they do not impinge on the units' distinctive function. The variance that culminates in reversion and that grounds all reflexivity seems to have no place here. One fails to see, therefore, how the system could be read or thought through by itself, for the structure is and remains beyond its grasp. It seems impossible that reflection could engender itself from the structure alone the collapsing that would bring a part of the grid to fold back upon itself -since such a fold presupposes a three-dimensional space, in other words depth, while the systematic grid of orders and series takes place in a two dimensional space without thickness and, strictly speaking, without sight. A language [langue] does not speak itself: one speaks it. One need not of course rush to "explain," by way of the subject's "intention to signifY," how the elements of the grid settle and arrange themselves in the vertical axis of discourse; at the least, the possibility of this intention itself needs to be explained. But it remains that, without introducing in the system something other than the strictly measured negativity that informs and measures its internal intervals, it is impossible to see reflection carve out its depth within the system. One cannot even see-and this is a second consequence to be
DIALECTICS, I N DEX, FORM
inferred from the properties of the grid oflanguage [langue]-why and how the latter grid could aim, or show, or designate, or depict something other, outside ofitsel£ Now there is a fact that our experience of speech renders in controvertible, which is that every discourse is projected toward something it seeks to grasp, in other words, that it is incomplete and open, not unlike the partiality of the visual field, hemmed in and extended by a horizon. How to account for this quasi-visual quality of speaking from the point of view of this theoretically closed object, shut upon itself in a self-sufficient totality, which is the system oflanguage [langue]? How can language [langue] com bine with the obviously referential function of discourse? The only media tion available does indeed seem to be negativity's. There is the No of speech
[parole], and there is the spacing of referential transcendence, but within the anonymous system itself there are the intervals that keep the terms at a con stant distance from one another, so that this ''absolute object" is shot through with holes, so to speak, and holds within itself a static-yet nonetheless gen erative-dialectics that conveys the definition and value Of one term through the other terms with which it is connected. There must be communication between the No of language [langue], which is that of the object, and the No of discourse, which is that of seeing. Such is the hypothesis, familiar to philosophy, that we need to scrutinize. * *
*
The identity that in other orders one would be tempted to assign to these negativities is out of the question, at least as far as language is concerned. It is worth pausing here, since what is at stake is the position of dialectics. Conceivably (even ifit can be debated) praxis can be understood as the same constituting negativity that-sedimented in works, crystallized in institu tions-finds itself reduced to maintaining the invariant intervals between terms, such as in relations of production where, admittedly, the structure does not occupy, relative to the "vertical" negativity, a position of anteriority comparable to that of language [langue] relative to speech. Indeed, even if the mode of penetration and establishment of the relations of production
D I A L E C T I C S , I N D EX , F O RM
is not the object of a decree, but rather due to an involuntary, perhaps even unconscious dynamic, it cannot be ascertained that this characteristic is an essential property of this order's structures. It is conceivable that the same praxis that animates-in captivity, so to speak-these established relations works, and consciously, to establish others, and even believes this to be fea sible. There is a underside to capitalism, perhaps a beyond, but in any case there is the possibility of conceiving of non-salaried relations within sala ried relations themselves, and this possibility is not random but constitutive. Here the "vertical" negativity goes so far as to contest the intervals main tained in the "horizontal" system, to the point of producing a new structure in thought, and developing it as far as possible in reality. At issue here is not whether this experience of alterity, of which the labor movement was the receptacle and expression, can actually break free from the imaginary and become a truly different society-in other words, if praxis can come to master the system. Yet it must be conceded that the system is such that it allows, maybe even requires, its own contestation, that is to say, in a critical form, the coming-unto-itself of the negativity ofpraxis as constitutive of the very relations in which it is trapped. In this sense, and within these strictly defined limits, "dialectics" can appear to be a legitimate expression of the socioeconomic reality of capitalism.4 Such is not the case with language. Dialectics, in Sartre's definition, is unfeasible in language-one cannot see how the system, even as critique, could give rise to its own objectification. The existence of metalanguage should not lead one to believe, erroneously, that the possibility of speak ing oflanguage [langue] as system-a possibility offered with any language
[langue]-enjoys a relation with the system in any way comparable to that of critical praxis with the relations of production. This can be grasped very easily: sociopolitical critique can only take effect by breaking away from the constraints that characterize the capitalist system, by attacking the invari ant intervals that govern its terms' distribution. On the contrary, discourse on language [langage] is produced entirely within language [langage], and if it should attack the semantic, syntactic, possibly even phonological in
variances, it is always within the bounds of communicability, that is to say under the laws oflanguage [langue], lest it turn into nonsense. Under certain
JI
32
D IA LE C T I C S , I N D E X , F O R M
conditions one could argue that the negativity that binds the social system and that which upsets it are related. But it is impossible, without resorting to a philosophical sleight of hand, to argue that it is the same negativity that upholds the system of language [langue] and in which discourse's momen tum flows. Language [langue] precedes speech since no speaker can believe to have, however modestly, founded the first language [langue], nor aspire to institute another, and since every attempt to reform it runs up against the circular reasoning that it is our basic toolbox, containing all the tools avail able to us to change it. This is not to argue that new discourses are impossible in this language [langue], quite the contrary. But when Saussure posited in principle that the modifications that upset the balance of the linguistic system all find their cause in speech acts, and that diachrony thus seeps into the structure by means of this event that is a new discourse-even if this was placing too great a confidence in the system's homogeneity and inertia, and not enough in its nimble generative power-in any case the linguist did locate the prob lem oflanguage's [langue] becoming, and of its relation to the speaking sub ject, unambiguously outside the field of dialectics, and no one has revised this view ever since. More or less continuous internal readjustments run through a system because it never reaches in itself perfect equilibrium, and also be cause it is never perfectly isolated from a context, linguistic or otherwise, that constitutes an event in relation to it, disturbs it, thus forcing it to con stantly re-adapt. One enters a world here where structures are in a perpetual state of coming undone and being re-formed, like the interplay of colors of several kaleidoscopes whose rate of rotation would be measured in centuries. One does not step into a story at all; the opposite is true: one comes out of it to immerse oneself in a nature. Diachrony belongs to a physical time, not historicity. The amazement that the moderns experienced at the thought of language [langue], and the sometimes passionate attachment they felt for it, betray at once the paradox and the reassurance of discovering, so close to the mind, even within the mind, something like nature. Even if we need to cor rect what taxonomical eagerness there is in the structuralist view oflanguage [langage], and even if taking the fact of discourse into account highlights the generative power of language [langue], the resulting shift in orientation-of
DIALECTI CS, I N DEX, FORM
the highest importance for the linguistic method, as well as for the phi losopher paying close attention to the position of speech in relation to the system-will have no impact whatsoever on the a-dialectical character of language [langue] . Undoubtedly, by thinking oflanguage [langue] as a gener ative grammar instead of an ordered set ofvalues, discourse will more readily find its place, and the relation between "vertical" negativity and the negativ ity that separates and conjoins the elements of the system will allow itself to be articulated with greater certainty. Yet one can already be sure that this articulation will not be dialectical in Hegel's or Sartre's definitions, and that it will remain as impossible as it is in the strict structuralist or functionalist view to make language [langue] the fallout and inert sediment of a power of speech that would logically precede it. The communication we are after between the two No's cannot lie in their dialectical identity. And this is without even broaching the difficulty inherent in all dialectical thought from Hegel, maybe even from Heraclitus and Parmenides, up to Sartre, stemming from the possibility of the "false," the "alienated," the "inert," in other words from the mutilation, reification, and obstruction of process, i.e., from · recessus. This is probably a difficulty too great for the project at hand. The difficulty we do wish to underscore is more specific and more decisive, namely that, from the negativity separating discourse from its object to the negativity maintaining intervals internal to language, the consequence is not good; in this case, the dismissal of dialec tics is based on concrete evidence. But we will encounter the other difficulty again, lodged at the heart of our problem. It might then appear foolhardy to want to persevere toward structure with the help of reflection alone. The preferred methodology in the field of structure passes as rigorously objectivist. The procedures required to es tablish a structure seem· to owe nothing to reflection, to the auscultation of "experience" in the phenomenological sense, to intentional analysis. On the contrary, the linguist has chosen to banish what she or he calls the "psychic" from her or his preoccupations. As for the ethnologist, who has made it a rule to mistrust any immediate meaning, she or he is determined, if not to ignore the significations the indigenous person attaches to the rules of her or his social life and to the mythical tales upon which she or he bases, these
33
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significations, then at least to record such admissions as merely incidental behavior offering additional information, a possibly useful hint for the only task considered essential: to erect the structure of the system of these rules and myths. If there is indeed a latent meaning, reflection alone will not be able to reach it; on the contrary, reflection is imbued by it, and to extract it one must get rid of immediate significations and treat sociolinguistic facts as objects. From the reflective point of view, this objectification is akin to cutting up the field of science with a diamond-tipped implement, dividing the seer from what is seen, what I say from what I speak o£ Mter which "truth" is cast as a reconciliation of the two halves (but such a conjoining is in fact as impossible as the flawless reassembling of pieces of a single pane of glass). Or one will have to reject categorically the subjective hypothesis, go so far as to elide the subject of science itself, and commit to positivism. Both of these directions demonstrate to what extent reflection and structure are incompatible. Yet this exteriority is worth preserving: here the structuralist wins out over the dialectician, or at least the responsibility between the two is shared unequally, in any case as far as their intentions are concerned. For the struc turalist method does not seek to pass as a philosophy-a conceptualization of totality-but instead as a procedure related to its object by a strategy. The dialectician, on the other hand, seeks to paint a general picture in which the subject and the structure would be mediated. At least structuralism can hide the partiality of its approach behind the epistemological demand, whereas dialectics is unabashedly a "phenomenological ontology." Keeping the nega tive of transcendence separate from that of the system is simply to recognize that something radically original begins with language, an other that one cannot "infer" from the sensory but that commingles with it. This can be demonstrated if, by reversing the situation, or perhaps by putting it straight again, one observes that in sensory certainty language encounters an order it · cannot exhaust, but from which it itself draws, and endlessly, its dimension of depth. Phenomenology of Spirit opens with this very admission, of an in surmountable exteriority from the sensory to the sayable. What one first comes across, in the beginning of the first chapter, is undoubtedly the exact
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opposite: that the Meinen-the signifying concrete aim [ visee]5 cannot be uttered without losing itself, and thus called upon to exhibit itself it must own up to its insignificance and abstraction. But Meinen only appears thus because it is challenged by language and from language's standpoint, and be cause the philosopher, betraying his promise not to become involved in the development of the object, summoned sensory certainty to utter itself (even to write itself), and hence to contradict itself, since its now will sometimes be night, sometimes day; its here sometimes tree or sometimes house; in any case a hollow universal, a now and a here that have no organic connection to their content. However, this abstraction does not belong to the movement itself of sensory certainty, but results from this certainty's encounter with language; it belongs, in other words, to the logophilic bias, which gives pref erence to the utterable conclusion over that of mute immediacy. To contra dict oneself is not to contrafeel onesel£ Hegel is sufficiently aware of this to try, in a second movement within the same chapter, to do justice to the claim ofimmediacy issued by the Meinen, by ceasing to force it to pronounce itself and be inferred in the mediation of discourse, and by attempting to seize it, or at the least to approach it through a truly pre-linguistic act of significa tion: "Zeigen miii5en wir es [das Jetzt] uns lassen; denn die Wahrheit dieser unmittelbaren Beziehung ist die Warheit dieses Ich, der sich auf ein]etzt oder ein Hier einschrankt."6 To indicate is to extend the index finger toward a place. Along its vector, this silent gesture constitutes an originary spacing at the ends of which the showing and the shown find themselves polarized. In this gesture, therefore, one must recognize the engendering of the opening itselfin which the sensory and sensibility come to pass. But does indicating belong to language? Hegel tries to bring out the dialectics concealed in so-called immediacy, even up to this resumption of reflection toward sensory certainty. The act of indicating does not establish a simple reference by which a something would be mani fested unequivocally; it is a movement-a movement engendering the here indicated as its result. For no here can be indicated in itself if it is not situated, placed in relation with other heres, and therefore included in a sort of mute, gestural "discourse" of dia-deictics pointing to "a Before and a Behind, an Above and a Below, a Right and a Left.',.,Thus the gesture becomes a dialectics -
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of gestures, the place becomes a dialectics of places, and to situate becomes to include laconically the other in the same and mediating it. The logos thereby appears to have won th� day, once again, and this time without having had to impose itself extrinsically upon sensory perception, but emerging through its clinging motion-a motion in which it reflects itself, dis/uncovering itself already present as mediator. Yet one cannot be so quick to declare it the winner, to have language seep into the sensory, and thus to have the latter entirely absorbed by discourse. It is no doubt in keeping with Hegelianism to be rid of the exteriority first established by Kant, between speech or understanding and between meaning [sens] or sensibility, to shat ter the autonomy of fonns relative to the categories-the same autonomy that, in critical thought, marks the irreducibility of the given to thought. Yet the operation fails, and it is easy to identify, at the very threshold of the project of totalization through language represented by the Phenomenology of Spirit what will forever evade totalization, what will always act in the project like the silence contained in speech: Aufteigen, indication, itself. If one cracks the shell of immediacy, what one finds at its core is not the otct'Aeyecr6ctt [dialegesthai], but something else, which is in any case not language. The specification of the here does indeed relate to that of before, be hind, right and left, and of above and below. But these terms do not entertain the same relation to the here as that uniting a word to the other contiguous words of the same language [langue], and even less to the relation uniting a phoneme to its neighbors in a phonological grid. Nor is their correlation reducible to that of the elements of discourse-of the words of a sentence, for example-or even to that of propositions in an argument (which is what Hegel seems to have had above all in mind). The space of indication is nei ther the grid of the system nor the line of speech. The points through which the movement indicating "where is here" passes are not like middle terms, like mediators which, for meaning or sound, are confronted with the word or chosen phoneme, and finally discarded in those operations of virtual selec tion and concatenation that structural linguistics believes to be at work in the speech act. To the contrary, the indicated place-the here-is included in a sensoryfield, of which it is no doubt the focal point, but not such that its margins are eliminated, as is the case in the choices made by the speaker.
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The margins remain, in the uncertain, undeniable, and curvilinear presence of what stands at the periphery of vision, as an absolutely necessary refer ence to the indication of place as defined by Hegel, but whose nature is completely at odds with that of a linguistic operation. The latter relates to a discontinuous inventory, while sight relates to a topological space; the first is subjected to the ru1e of the spoken chain that requires the unicity of the actual and the elimination of the virtual, whereas the second circumscribes a sensory field governed by the ru1e of the quasi-actuality of the virtual and the quasi-virtuality of the given. Hegel is undoubtedly correct in stating that there is negativity in the sensory, that being prone to doubt is natural, that animals are wiser than the sensualists when they despair enough of the real ity of things to devour them. But this nullification that resides in the field of the sensory is not the. invariant negativity that transforms language into the means of understanding itsel£8 To put it another way, above and below, right and left, before and behind, are places that need to be ascribed to a generating volume-the living and speaking body, as well as its gestating gesture-but these places need not, however, be perceived as dimensions ofthis body. The indication of the here refers to a coexistence of body and space which has no equivalent in the ex perience oflanguage [langage]. No doubt the system oflanguage [langue] has at its disposal what Emile Benveniste calls "indicators," about which we will need to say more. But the interesting and mysterious aspect of such words as I, this, here, which expect their "content" to come from their actualization in a discursive act, is specifically that they open language to an experience language cannot take in, since this experience is one of a hie et nunc, of an ego, that is to say, precisely, of sensory certainty. Any other word is charged with its latent significations in the virtual grid of language [langue], though it remains unuttered: it is not my discourse that creates this content of the word; rather its position in the sentence only serves to actualize one of the meanings attached to it. Whereas, in fact, the indicator's meaning is not; it can only exist, for we cannot produce a definition ofI or here while remaining at the semantic level in which they are placed, without performing from and upon them a metalinguistic operation that amounts to a change in level as, for example, in the grammarian's definition "I is the first person pronoun,"
37
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which consists in transferring the term to the level of its syntactical function, thus apprehending it on an altogether other level than the lexical one that I occupy when I define, say, the whale as a marine mammal. The difficulty derives from the fact that the signification (Sinn) of an "indicator" is inseparable from its designation (Bedeutung): what it means is what it speaks of, and one cannot identify its signified independendy of its designated ifit is not placed back in the spatiotemporal situation in which it is uttered. It is as iflanguage, with these "indicators," were riddled with holes through which the gaze can slip, through which the eye can see and anchor itself outside. But this "outside" itself refers back to the original intimacy be tween the body and its space (as well as its time)-a corporating-spatializing intimacy where the above, before, and right cited by Hegel, which could be applied to the body itself, are engendered in the gesture that situates them as it goes through them. The here might very well be the result of this gesture, but certainly not the conclusion; diadeictics can be a type of dialectics, but it is not a discourse. A dialectics, because it is true that the I and the here emerge together in the movement that goes through, and that creates what it goes through, just as the subject and the object of speech take shape at the two extremities of its signifying motion. However, the act of indication eludes the saying because it is presupposed in the sphere of designation. Every totalization occurs in the three-dimensional space first opened by a twin de-totalization, that which sets apart discourse and its object, significa tion and reference. This reference belongs to the act of showing, not to that of signifying, for it is unsignifiable. And this is precisely what Hegel recognized: "what they mean [visent] is not what they say. . . . The sensuous This that is meant [vise'] cannot be reached by language. . . . What is called unutterable is . . . what is merely meant [visi]," and this meaning is the "untrue," the "irrational."9 1his could be construed as a condemnation of the system if, beneath the concept of system, one keeps alive the hope for a reconciliation of seeing and saying, of form and category. But it could equally be an authentication of the no longer-totalizing system theorized, developed, and deployed by modern struc turalists (with undeniable, if irritating philosophical modesty), indifferent to the sensory, restricting their scientific ambition to what can enter the
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language-system [langue], and neglecting the "merely meant" because it "can not be reached"by language [/angage]. Yet, by a significant reversal ofpositions, it is the dialectician who speaks the structuralist's truth, and who, by conceding language's shortcoming with regard to the Zeigen, also speaks of the struc ture's inability to exhaust language. The reason for this shortcoming is indeed that the meant or aimed-for [le vise] is inaccessible to language [langage]-too close to it, as if wrapped up in its movement. And it is inaccurate to say that perception truly apprehends (wahrnimmt) the sensory insofar as it composes and dialecticizes what was given in the false immediacy of sensory certainty. If one abides by Hegel's hierarchy of moments, one should say that what up holds perception does not come from perception but from the transcendence of sensory perception, and that the Wahrnehmung, far from revealing the truth of this transcendence, both presupposes and silences it for lack of any thing to say about it, since the upholding is the Zeigen itself-transcendental negativity-that originally informed sensation itself as initial difference, and that will accompany the Geist's movement until the end, applying to each of its formations the discession, the Entzweiung, without which there would be no subject and no object, no depth of an intentionality, nor this moment's "inequality" with its self, and thus nothing to speak o£ * *
*
Hegel concluded the first chapter of Phenomenology of Spirit by declaring the uncertainty of sensory certainty. Its immediacy is the result of its forget ting. It is made up of the forgetting of the movement by which the here is determined; it takes the he:e as an immediate given when in fact it derives from a mediation. This is how the logos will be smuggled back in-in itself for us [en soi-pour nous], in the apparendy primitive for-itself [pour-soi] . If there is such a thing as mediation in the most basic bestowal [donation] of a something here-now, it is because language already inhabits the sen sory, and not only as what comes from elsewhere to immobilize, preserve, and remove it from the fluctuation of the instant (§ I), but rather as what (§ II) inside it-acting from within as its unconscious as it were, its rational
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unconscious-determines it through repeated negations applied to the ele ments of its spatial and temporal environment. The way Hegel understands this negation, acting on the surface of the grid of the world, is similar to the negation that, for structuralism, acts on the surface of the table of linguistic signifiers, where it cuts out distinct elements. Place and time would thus be determined as signification. We nonetheless have the right, as I have tried to argue, to come to the opposite conclusion from Hegel's reflection, namely, that language [langage] does not manage to take the sensory seriously. The philosopher, of course, has no trouble demonstrating in his discourse that the unique status claimed by sensory certainty is unthinkable and unsayable, and that if it needs to be established, then it has to be said, and therefore embedded in a seman tic field that ushers it into universality. But what he cannot incorporate is the showing, manifestation itsel£ Diadeictics is not a dialectics in Hegel's sense, precisely because the latter operates on the surface of a semantic grid, while the former presupposes the empty interval, the depth that separates the showing from the showed. Even if this interval is applied to the grid of the showed, it will lend itself to a possible index, in a distance that is never completely signifiable through language. True, to designate does not mean to point fixedly at something: the eye that did not allow itself the slightest movement would not see; the index be longs to the stone statue. But there is another kind of movement than the mind's acting in the order of signification, going through the semantic subsets where it can sample the concepts it needs and articulate them in an intelligible discourse. There is a kind of movement that cannot be reduced to the activity Roman Jakobson calls selection and combination.10 The movement by which the sensory presents itself is always a gesticulation, a dance, a movement that, assuredly, combines with itself, since to designate and to see require the consti tution of a space, an order of the coexistences. And just as assuredly, designa tion and seeing determine a place as their end result. Yet such a combination is not a combinatorics, and such a determination is not an implication. The result of sensory activity is a Dasein, not a Sinn. The negativity that opens its distance between the eye and the object is that of form, not of category. The sensory lies in an unbridgeable gap in relation to the sensible [sense].
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Hegel's theory of the sensory-his aesthetics-provides unwitting proof of the existence of this gap. The critical assessment of the sensory's com munication with the sensible [sense'] does in fact confirm the absorption of seeing by saying, which is the Hegelian phantasy. Jean Hyppolite picks up on the two uses of meaning [sens] Hegel distinguishes: "Meaning is certainly a curious word, which is, in turn, used in two opposite ways. On the one hand, it indeed identifies the organs that govern immediate apprehension; on the other, we call meaning a thing's signification-its idea, its universality. Thus meaning refers on the one hand to the immediate exteriority of existence and, on the other, to its interior essence. Reflective consideration, instead of separating the two parts, ensures that the one presents itself at the same time as its opposite: when it perceives something through sensory intuition, it simultaneously apprehends this thing's meaning and concept. But since these determinations are received in a non-dissociated state, the beholder is not yet conscious of the concept that she or he only vaguely feels."11 Which Hyppolite goes on to explain in these terms: "There are, therefore, inter mediaries between the sensory and the signification that is only present in language, and the transition from one to the other appears in the dialectics of the arts as well as in that of the mind. One should not, however, be mis led by the term intermediary, since Hegel's philosophy is a philosophy of mediation. Signification as it comes to the fore in language, and meaning as the concept's becoming in discourse: these come before the movement that seems to generate them. There is no meaning before language, no more than there is an ineffable Absolute, and no more than there is a dream-state for the person who never wakes up."12 This straightforward explanation succinctly identifies the Hegelian problematic at issue here, for on the one hand it locates the Hegelian diffi culty on the opposition between exteriority and interiority-in other words, on exactly what we referred to as the two definitions of meaning: meaning in interiority, which is signification (Sinn); and meaning in exteriority, namely designation (Bedeutung). The importance of this opposition will become clear. But for now, suffice it to note that in some respects the entire Hege lian problematic is indeed to resolve the meaning from exteriority-that which is given as coming from elsewhere, Bedeutun6in a signification that
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is entirely immanent in a system. The aim is to build an enclosure that can hold openness within it. On the other hand, Hyppolite rightly notes that art is not yet this inte gration of meaning with itself, and therefore can only be, for a system thus haunted by the obsession of signification, an intermediary. But as Hyppolite also observes, in a philosophy of mediation there can be no intermediary, for everything is intermediary; only a dualist thinking can accommodate the intermediary, the �.tETct�u [metaxy], the merging of body and soul, and the schema. In a philosophy of Logos-driven mediation, there is no given before mediation, and thus no meaning before signification: "There is no meaning
before language." One can understand why Hegel does not manage to grant art a status of sufficiency, if the aistheton is for him merely a logikon oblivious of itself that has "not yet" acceded to the in itself-for us. Yet it is not for lack of trying to draw a clean line between symbol and sign, to show that, and how, in the former the sensible is immanent in the sensory: Now the symbol is primafacie a sign. But in a mere sign the connection which meaning [signij1cation] and its expression have with one another is only a purely arbitrary linkage. In that case this expression, this sensu ous [sensible] thing or picture, so far from presenting itselj brings before our minds a content foreign to it, one with which it does not need to stand in any proper affinity whatever. So in languages, for example, the sounds are a sign of some idea, feeling, etc. But the predominant part of the sounds in a language is linked purely by chance with the ideas expressed thereby, so far as their content is concerned, even if it can be shown, by an historical development, that the original connection was of another character; and the difference between languages consists chiefly in the fact that the same idea is expressed by a difference in sounds. Another example of such signs is afforded by the colours which are used in cockades and flags to express the nationality to which an individual or a ship belongs. Such colours likewise have in themselves no quality in common with their meaning, i.e. with the nation which is represented by them. Therefore, when symbol is taken in this sense as
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a mere sign with such an indi.ffirence between meaning and its expres sion, we may not take account of it in reference to art, since art as such consists precisely in the kinship, relation, and concrete interpenetration of meaning and shape. Therefore it is a different thing when a sign is to be a symbol. The lion, for example, is taken as a symbol of magnanimity, the fox 'of cunning, the circle of eternity, the triangle of the Trinity. But the lion and the fox do possess in themselves the very qualities whose significance they are supposed to express. . . . ; and the triangle as a whole has the number of sides and angles as that appearing in the idea of God when the determinations which religion apprehends in God are liable to numeration.13 Lucid reasoning: in the sign, the signifier is arbitrary in relation to the idea; in the symbol, the idea is immanent in the signifier. Here we come extremely close to Saussure, particularly to the explicit opposition he makes between a motivated semantic system and an arbitrary or unmotivated sys tem.14 Does such a differentiation oflanguage with regard to any other signi fYing set not give us the assurance that the sensory as non-sensible meaning will gain an autonomous status, that it will not be annexed by the rational? Is the Hegelian symbol not what we are after-a true immanence of meaning in the signifier? One has reason to doubt it. Let us return, among the examples of sym bols Hegel provides, to the one of the triangle which, he says, symbolizes God, and let us analyze the procedures involved in this symbolization. On one side we have, not the signified "triangle," but the figure �; on the other, the phonological signifier Igad/ with its signified "God." If the figure can symbolize God, this is because it has three sides and God, in Christian my thology, comprises three persons. The mediation appears to occur via the number 3, shared by the two terms and thereby assuring the immanence of the idea in the figure. But this is going too fast. The relation between the two concepts "God" and "Trinity" is, in structuralist terms, a paradigmatic one: "Trinity" can intervene in the signifying chain at the same places where "God" does. The two terms are substitutable; placed in the same expression "God is the Trinity," "The Trinity is God"-they constitute what Jakobson
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calls a metaphorical proposition, such as ' 'A hut is a small house," that is, one characterized precisely by the appearance oftwo terms or phrases that can be substituted for one another at two different places of the chain: such is the model of the metalanguage of definition. With these operations, we remain entrenched within the semantic field, instigating shifts aimed at isolating the Sinn of a term by placing it in opposition to others. Between "God" and "Trinity," the relation is strictly one of signification, entirely internal to the field oflanguage. This is not the case with the relation between the figure /). and the significative unit "has three sides." Between the two a term is missing "triangle"-which is, strictly speaking, the name of the figure. If the relation between this name and the phrase "has three sides" remains, as was the case with "God" and "Trinity," entirely internal to language, it is impossible to as sert that the figure itself and the name belong to the same order. The figure is not made of articulated language. The name it carries is wholly extrinsic to it. The relation /:l-/'triaNGgal/ is totally arbitrary. One could argue that the relation between the figure and the linguistic unit "has three sides" is not arbitrary, but this is because the level of analysis has changed, and the level relevant to the problem at hand has been left behind. For the motivation of the three-sided property with regard to the figure implies that we have slipped under language, so to speak, and that we have acknowledged that if the figure and the signified property share a community, this community takes place in an order representing the sen sory in the intelligible, as well as the intelligible in the sensory, precisely the order Kant refers to as schematism. In fact, we need to resort to the schema of the ternary, to something like the sequence - u - (every schema being temporal), to a dance, to what is sensory-sensible, to a poly-esthetic body capable of making the triangle's visible form, the rhythm of the tracing hand, and geometrical signification overlap. It is important, however, to stress that this synthesis operates directly between the fields of the sensory and the intelligible, whereas the order of the linguistic signifier, where the syntagms /'triaNcgal/ and /gad/ lie, is not affected by schematism and remains en1 closed in its arbitrariness. So that one could very well oppose Kant to Hegel in order to allow for the communication of the sensory with the sensible, I
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without having the former dissolve in the latter. But this would be at the cost of neglecting what Kant effectively ignored, namely language's arbitrariness, the radical power of emancipation in relation to the sensory contained in the system of language [langue]-in other words, what will eventually give rise to the entire formalism of logic and modern mathematics. If the act of foundation is inconceivable (for you and for Kant) as merely the inscription of a given in a system, but further requires to be placed on an "aesthetic" plinth, then you over-motivate, your symbol becomes too heavy, and science as scission, as separation, becomes impossible. This is the paradox of a dualist philosophy (form-concept): going too far in tightening the same connec tions it had initially loosened. But Hegel's paradox is no less striking. However hard he comes down on mathematics for their lack of motivation, their arbitrary character, their extrinsic character in relation to .the object, what does he do if not ignore precisely this lack? For Hegel's system, far from respecting referentiality by effectively allowing the object to remain exterior to itself as its other, has moreover the pretension of signifying it totally in the system. But simply having the object signified in the system does not entail that the system loses its arbitrary relation to the object. The lack of motivation is inscribed in language as its dimension of exteriority in relation to objects. Once signi fied, this exteriority is no doubt internalized in language; but the latter will not have lost its margin for all that, and this margin is the face that looks elsewhere. Let us return to God and the triangle. It is clear that there is no real immanence of the signified (God as Trinity) in the signifier (the triangular figure), since the analysis of the transfer processes brings to light a void, a "solution of continuity," located between the word and the figure.JS If Hegel nonetheless offers this case as an example of a symbol, of an exemplary im manence of meaning in the signifier, this is proof that he takes the word for the object, the name of the thing for its presence, and thus dwells and persists in the order of language, where indeed one can say that triangu larity is "symbolic" of Christian divinity, on the basis that one is speaking not of the triangular figure but of the concept of "having three elements." Of course, we will have to identify and locate carefully the metaphor
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within language itsel£ Stating that "God i s three" certainly does not g o with out saying, since it means taking as predicate of the utterance a term that does not belong to the same sub-system as the subject. In this detour or bridge which constitutes the metaphor-there already exists, as we will soon see, a figural power working over
[travaille]
discourse.16 1his power is discourse's
first expression, the closest, the easiest to grasp, and also the easiest for dis course to capture and put back in the order of signification. Hence the fact that all metaphors eventually wear down, and every expression, once "colorful," becomes commonplace. But this metaphor in language is not the one Hegel has in mind with the symbol, for he aims to go much further, to disclose meaning in the figure. He fails, because he understands meaning as significa tion, or, if you prefer, because he understands the name of the figure instead of the figure. Hegel gives us yet another innocent account of this systemic failure when, immediately after the example under discussion, he accuses the symbol of being ambiguous, equivocal, for containing at the same time an excessive measure of signifier over signified--of the triangular figure over the concept of God-and of signified over signifier-of God over the triangle-as well as a primary uncertainty, namely that once a triangle is given, one cannot, on the face of it, know if it is a symbol or only a figure, since it does not carry with it the index of its function or the formula of its usageY Now this ambiguity, adds Hegel, will be resolved only in the complete exteriorization of the image and of its signification (assuming, of course, that in the symbol there is immanence of the latter in the former-precisely the assumption that we are challenging), an exteriorization requiring that the
named. "Such dubiety disappears only when each of the two sides, the meaning [signification] and its shape, are image and the idea both, and
equally,
be
expressly named and thereby their relation is enunciated at once. But in that case the concrete existent set out before us
[ vorgestellte] is no longer a symbol
in the strict sense of the word but just an image, and the relation between image and meaning acquires the familiar form of
comparison,
i.e., simile. In
the simile, that is to say, there must float before our minds both, first, the general idea and then its concrete image. Whereas if reflection has not yet advanced far enough to take good note of universal ideas independently and so to set them out by themselves, then the related sensuous shape in which
D I A L E C T I C S , I N D EX, F O R M
a more general meaning is supposed to find its expression is not yet thought to be separate from that meaning; both are still immediately at one . . . . (T] his constitutes the difference between symbol and comparison."18 The comparison is the "truth" of the symbol. It is of course undeni able that the comparison makes explicit what the symbol-metaphor keeps implicit, and thus begins to bring order to the latter's polysemy. But what matters is, first, that Hegel interprets this resolution as the truth of imma nence; and, second, that the exteriorization he expects from the function of articulated discourse be, at the same time, the interiorization of what was exterior to it. The comparison exteriorizes the terms implied in the meta phor: "God is triangle" becomes "God is like a triangle."This "like" (to which we will return) is the switch, the signal of the change of field, and thus what posits the exteriority of what was once fused. It dissolves the confusion, and this is why it is, argues Hegel, the truth of the symbol. Thus truth is placed in discourse as discontinuous, and the continuous (or the con-fused with what is not itself, with the figural) is symmetrically cast as falsity, if not as absolute falsity (we are dialecticians, after all!), then as momentary falsity, falsity lead ing to truth, which will be disimplication. As for this disimplication, it is indeed an exteriorization of the two terms-God and triangle-intertwined in the symbol, but this exterioriza tion takes place in the sealed-off order of discourse. In other words it is at once the interiorization of the symbolic figure (a process in fact already begun, as we saw, in the presentation of the example itself), its uprooting from its position of object of which one speaks, that is, of designated, and its assimilation to the order of signification, its transformation into signified. In so doing, we swapped the deep exteriority bordering discourse-where the object's figure stands-for a flat exteriority, an exteriority between two concepts laid out on the surface of the linguistic order, an exteriority guiding the search for a combination that would allow them to be brought together. We can always count on Hegel to come up with absolute expressions, and in the case of this recuperation he certainly does not disappoint. Here it is: "the perfect element in which interiority is just as exterior as exteriority is interior, is language."19 The first chapter of Phenomenology of Spirit performs the operation of
47
D I A L E C T I C S , I N D EX , F O R M
showing that the exteriority o fthe sensory i s interior, a discourse, a dialectics internal to language. The task of showing that interiority and the imma nence of meaning in the signifier, in the symbol, is in fact the. exteriority of two semantic subsystems, falls to my reading of the Aesthetics. For on the one hand the :fl.uidification of the margins of discourse and, on the other, the pet rifaction and articulation ofits internal field can occur in language, and thus, too, can the swapping of the two exteriorities, the shuttling between the two negations. This is why Hegel considers art, which is the order of symbols, as fundamentally unstable and doomed to disappear; why the hierarchy as well as the chronology of the arts partake of an increasing abstraction, that is, of an increasing freedom vis-a-vis the figure and an increasingly rigid closure of language upon itself; and why the fate of art is its already quasi-realized disappearance; why the beautiful figural, sensory, Greek totality is lost and can be restored only as
Wissenschaft,
only as real discursive, linguistic, mod
ern (and obviously clerical-bureaucratic) totality. Who will deny that we are not Greek, and that we cannot be? Who will deny that this separation from the sensory, this preeminence of speech, this obsession with totalization, this faith in redemption belong to the legacy of Christianity? But who does not feel that the time has come to do away with it? Totalization by and through language is the necessary complement of a process of detotalization. The exteriority of the object at issue here is not a matter of signification but of designation, belonging to an experience that has no place in the system, but which is the speaker's, and proceeding from a break, from a split that is the price to pay for the system of language
[langue]
to be
usable. This exteriority is pried open by seeing and desiring, in a withdrawal of meaning as old as any experience and any utterance. Hegel's totality repre sents the (entirely imaginary, ideological) filling of this space of dispossession in whose absence, however, we would not be able to see, or even speak: this imaginary representation, which is the Hegelian system, itselfpresupposes this void to be filled. Every act of signification takes place in a space of designation that is at once that of intentionality and of dispossession. Can nothing then be said about this space of designation, about the deep exteriority located on the border of discourse, given that discourse misses (in teriorizes) this exteriority in the very process of signifying it? There is, however,
D I A L E C T I C S , I N D EX , F O RM
outside of language, the possibility of a redoubling: that of re-presentation. Re-presentation can render visible what seeing is. Indeed, painting not only shares with discourse the privilege of being able to represent itself (as in a picture representing a picture), and not only the aptitude to represent itself in the act ofbeing made (as in a picture representing the painter painting the picture); it also has the power to represent visibility itself-what we called the space of designation or bordering exteriority. Hegel knew this: "To express inner feeling, painting reduces the triad of spatial dimensions to the surface, as that to which, in exteriority, is the closest interiority. . . . For painting is not involved in the activity of rendering visible in general, but rather in visibility in the process of particularizing itself in itself, and in visibility that has become interior. In sculpture or architecture, forms are rendered visible through exte rior light. In painting, on the other hand, matter, in itself obscure, contains in itself its interiority, the ideal character, light: it is permeated by light, and for this very reason light is permeated by obscurity."20 Yet this knowing was just that, a form of knowledge. Let us go one step further: this making visible is equally possible in the order of language itself, only not as signification but as expression. In front of discourse there is the figure-image, while in discourse dwells the figure-form. The redoubling of the one upon the other is what possibly allows poetry to represent presenting distance [distance presentante]. But one can only gain access to this structure through unstructUred desire, which is precisely what Hegel excluded from his purview. This unstructured unmotivation is painting's subterranean im pulse. By following this impulse we will come to realize that the possibility itself of manifestation-the space of designation, which discourse uncon sciously uses to keep its object at a distance-is already there in the sensory, as far as the latter exceeds mere bestowing and holds within itself the power to reflect itself; thus, as far as the sensory constitutes itself at the same time as desire and receives from the latter its thickness, its hidden side. The figure-form is the presence of nonlanguage in language. It is some thing that belongs to another order lodged in discourse, granting the latter its expressivity. We cannot hope, as Hegel did, to grasp the immanence of meaning in signification at the level of the linguistic or visual unit-i.e., the word, the triangle. The relevant level is always that of the sentence or the
49
D I A L E C T I C S , I N D EX , F O R M
form. The word in itself has no expressive power in relation to what it des ignates; indeed, it became a word precisely at the cost of losing this power, of becoming arbitrary. Nor does language partake of the sensory through its "matter";21 rather, it is through its figure that language will be able to mea sure up to the sensory. There is nothing more to add on the subject of"flat" and as it were "mo tionless" dialectics of space passing through concepts, organizing semantic fields. All thought proceeds in this way; discourse takes shape by interior izing in its text the significative units it needs. Thus the truth of the same can be said to lie in the other. But then the other of the concept is nothing other than another concept, and this truth lies firmly in the identity of the sayable. No doubt for the speaker the sayable remains to be said; there is a kind of discovery of the signified, which can provoke in her or him the feeling of alterity. This alterity, however, remains enclosed in the discursive element. When dialectics extends its claim to the object-to the other of the concept that is the sensory-it stretches beyond its own reach, and from knowledge turns into ideology. True, we have every right to contend that everything is sayable; but what cannot be said is that discourse's signification embraces all the meaning of the sayable. One can say that the tree is green, but saying so does not put color in the sentence. Yet color is meaning. The negativity of signification comes up against that of designation, not because there would be an insurmountable unsayability of the world and a destiny of silence, but because a symmetrical deferral of the act of designation accompanies any ef fort to signify. The hope of enclosing the whole object within discourse must be abandoned if this is indeed our hope-and this is what one must attack in Hegel. On the other hand, the space of designation does indeed dwell in discourse, but on this side of what it signifies, in its expression.
I call it
provisionally "space of designation" because its properties seem analogous to those of that space and contradict those of linguistic space. What they have in common is the figure, which
I will call figural space. The latter surrounds
discourse, offering it its object as image; and discourse also harbors this space within itself, which determines its form. But let there be no mistake: this "interiority" of figural space in relation to discourse is not dialectical.
Recessus and Hyper-Reflection
Reflection, which thought itself comfortable in the negative, having set up camp there as if on a peak from which to contemplate both sides of lan guage, now finds itself-after the structuralist critique of showing, and the dialectical-phenomenological critique of the system-turned out and ap parently doomed to nomadism. It realizes that it is invested from both sides, by the unconsciousness oflanguage as system
[langue] and of sight, and that
it cannot take possession of these two kinds of elementary intervals-one constituting signification, the other, reference. Captive oflanguage
[langue],
in the absence of which it would be no more than sight, yet chained to the distancing of seeing, without which this language
[langue] would be merely a
thing and could not be spoken, reflection must travel the border zone where the first silence-that of structure-touches the second-that of the phe nomenon-to produce speech. Reflection, threatened with lapsing at any moment either into the positivism of the system, or into the intuitionism of . the aim [ visie], is barred from achieving the dialectical "solution'' that offered the synthesis of the two axes of the negative; it is condemned to moving forward by preserving its imbalance as the sole witness to its intact existence. The evacuation of dialectics leads one to take different paths. As long as the philosopher doesn't also become a painter, she or he will remain prisoner of the sphere oflanguage speech can still
[langue], of structuralist unconsciousness. But what accomplish is to carry out, upon its own language [/angage],
this transgression of the spacings, this mobility and this depth that character ize the reference of discourse and that structuralism neglects. It is not even a question of drawing or painting, but rather of painting and drawing with and in words, what Merleau-Ponty called hyper-reflection
[surrijtexion].1
What philosophy "finds in thus returning to the sources, it says," obvi ously? but this saying, Merleau-Ponty thought, could have a texture such that
52
R EC E S S U S A N D HYPER- REFLECTION
it would respect in itself this source quality, this ontogenesis it seeks to signifY. Discourse as it takes shape would thus try to measure itself against the "origin'' it wishes to say. Discourse on the origin, originary discourse: for Merleau Ponty, an opening discourse as opposed to "eloquent" language, which would be that ofclosure.The "words most charged with philosophy are not necessarily those that contain what they say, but rather those that most energetically open upon Being, because they more closely convey the life of the whole and make our habitual evidences vibrate until they disjoin.'>:! The philosopher quickly adds, on the heels of this statement, in something of a retreat that is not only a sign of modesty, nor a kind of concession in the form of denial, but rather a safeguard against the contraction of this hope into a "thesis," against a renewed alienation of language-in the end not dissimilar to that one he has just de nounced in Sartre's analysis of nothingness: "Hence it is a
question
whether
philosophy as reconquest of brute or wild being can be accomplished by the resources of the eloquent language, or whether it would not be necessary for philosophy to use language in a way that takes from it its power of immediate or direct signification in order to equal it with what it wishes all the same to say.''4 One would have thought that the "answer" to this "question'' was already known, since it reappears throughout the book. '�s the world is behind my body, the operative essence is behind the operative speech also, the speech that possesses the signification less than it is possessed by it, that does not speak of
it, but speaks it,
or speaks according to it, or lets it speak and be spoken within
me, breaks through my present.''5 '�s the nervure bears the leaf from within, from the depths of its flesh, the ideas are the texture of experience, its style, first mute, then uttered. Like every style, they are elaborated within the thick ness of being. . ."6 And if one had to characterize the "style" in question, this .
is how one would go about it: ". . . there could be a language of coincidence, a manner of making the things themselves speak. . . . It would be a language of which he {the philosopher} would not be the organizer, words he would not assemble, that would combine through him by virtue of a natural intertwining of their meaning, through the occult trading of the metaphor-where what counts is no longer the manifest meaning of each word and of each image, but the lateral relations, the kinships that are implicated in their transfers and their exchanges.''7 "There could be . . . , it would be a language . . . ": expressions
R E C E S S U S A N D H Y P E R- R EF L E C T I O N
of reverie, composed in the mode and time of the unreal present, but also a glimpse of the style of hyper-reflection, which connects and assimilates it to that of the dream. 1his meditation on a language gives way to the "language" of dreams. The "natural intertwining" of meanings, the "occult trading of the metaphor," the "lateral" relations of words and images: it's all here, condensa tion, displacement, figurability-all the operations that combine to produce the "style" of the dream but �so of poetry, all their "work," as Freud would say. Of course Merleau-Ponty did not intend to replace philosophy with the dream. Rather, he thought that a model of discourse enclosed or obsessed with closure, such as that of "rational" philosophy, must be stripped of its originary imperative if it wants to let speak from within itself what other wise, in all its "eloquence," it cannot succeed in speaking. But with what to replace it? Can one philosophize outside of discourse, and discourse without
ratio? It might appear arrogant to declare that what is sought here, in light of what I have just quoted, is why and how poetry and the dream resemble hyper-reflection, why and how, by giving up the armature of scientific logos, language can, if not come closer to the "origin," then at least offer, in its very texture, an approximation of what it is not. This might appear to betray the spirit of The Visible and the Invisible, if indeed revealing the reason behind the secret goes hand in hand with something akin to the restoration of a philosophy of the negative-precisely what Merleau-Ponty constandy seeks to isolate and free himself from. The negative we will thus uncover, however, is not Sartre's negative, nor a Hegelian dialectics. It subdivides, I have ar gued, into invariant interval of the system and mobile spacing of seeing. This self-dividing is so essential that if hyper-reflection can lean toward poetry and the dream, this is because both equally imply, quite obviously, language
[langue] , but language undone; and quite obviously too, the invariant interval of the grid, but an interval worked over and subject to distortion, "vibrating until it disjoins." To undo the code without, however, destroying the message, while in stead releasing from it the meaning and the lateral semantic reserves con cealed by structured speech, is to carry out a series of operations that Freud called dream-work and that, as I will try to show, consists entirely in the transgression of the measured intervals underpinning the weave oflanguage
53
54
RECES S U S AND HYPER- REFLECTION
[langue], and is thus, indeed, "fulfillment of desire." Such a description calls upon at least two negativities: that of the structure oflanguage [langue], and that of visual experience, both implicated in our use of discourse; the first as invariant code shared by the interlocutors and all the words uttered in this language [langue]-in any case as condition of communication, even if it does not allow one to infer that two people may be communicating; the second as distance to be crossed, as a distance indicating the place toward which what I say goes, as horizon opening before words and pulling them toward it: a negativity that lies at the heart of our spatial existence, a mobil ity constitutive of depth. This mobility of gesture in which the energetics and the flash of desire are concealed is, once censorship is lifted, what seems to collapse on the ratio of language-which Merleau-Ponty called speak ing speech [parole parlee] 8-where it will produce the "disorder" of dreams, poetry, and the figure, revealing, in fact, the unstable, impossible "order" of a being torn between Eros-death and Eros-reality, between variant and invari ant, between figure and discourse. With this disassociation of the two negativities, one can walk the same path as Merleau-Ponty, but in the opposite direction, our back toward him. He wanted to introduce the gesture, the mobility of the sensory, even into the invariance characteristic of the system of language, to articulate what is constitutive of saying, to restore the act that inaugurates the possibility of speech: the ultimate attempt on behalf of transcendental reflection. To no avail. The system is always already there, and the gesture of speech that sup posedly creates signification can never be grasped in its constituting func tion, for it is always and can only be grasped as deconstruction. What one can show to reach this order sought by Merleau-Ponty is how the beyond-Logos dwells in language, how it invades it to transgress the invariances-the keys to signification-and arouse in it the lateral meaning that is surreality. But if this meaning is indeed surreality, this is because the energy of deconstruct ing is not only on this side of the Logos, but also on this side of the real, or of perception, and because this sensory, or rather this visible with which we will have to deal is not that which surrenders to the utilitarian or scientific
eye of the busy individual, of the Westerner, not even the visible seized by the eye trained to wait, to see the invisible (which is Cezanne's, according to
R E C E S S U S A N D HYP ER-REFLECTION
55
Merleau-Ponty). No, it is the visible of a subject-less gaze, the object of no body's eye. And it is not enough to try, along with the phenomenologist, to go beneath the realist view of the constituted or the given, for sooner or later one will have to give up phenomenologizing if one wants to reach this some thing that comes close to phenomenological constitution, this something that is not constitutable, but only graspable through an entirely different method-deconstruction-and on grounds of completely other, unexpected, effects-of recessus. Phenomenology has always had to correct, or be relieved of, its naivete as a philosophy of consciousness. As for perception, Merleau-Ponty strenu ously placed it under the authority of the body, demonstrating that there is structure before signification, that the former supports the latter, and that the nullification through the for-itself is a phantasy. But when it comes to language, the importance granted the linguistic gesture seems to have dis tracted the philosopher from considering this other preconscious of struc ture in which, after all, this gesture is performed, without which it would not be possible, which forms the anonymity and transitivity where
all speech
acts are immersed, and which serves as a guideline for this gesture in roughly the same way as the natural agreement between color and movement that suffuses the body can govern its attitudes and gestures. One should give back to the
ratio of language [langue]
its scope, even if it should be anti
phenomenological, as Merleau-Ponty did for the body's
Gestalt and Au.foau.
The need for this re-adjustment is what prevents one from granting the art of writing the privilege of activating, on the philosopher's own discourse, the movements, distortions, osmoses, and associations that make up speaking speech. There is no reason to declare the latter and spoken speech exclusive to one another. To state that discourse is a gesture is in any case a metaphor, and the distance between the two terms of this metaphor-movement and utter ance-depends entirely on the fact oflanguage One should stop interpreting language
[foit de Ia langue]. [langue] as inertia, without con
sequence, through a Manichaeism inherited from Henri Bergson, and take another look at this division. For at the moment when we describe the trans gressions of the order of language
[langue], we are speaking, signifYing, and
communicating them, thereby introducing them back into the transgressed
RECESSUS AND HYPER-REFLECTION
order. Herein lies the limitless power of the system, to still be able to utter what reduces it to silence, and to allow the commentary of precisely what resists it, namely the operations of condensation, displacement, and figura tion. For everything can be described, that is, signified, transmitted, even the silences that in language
[langage]
are not those of language
[langue], even
uncoded blanks, even the intervals that resist being regulated, even the tor sions that lie outside of syntax. Articulated language
[/angage] carries within
itself its own limitation, that is, the inability to place outside, to consider as object and to signify its actual aim
[visee]. At the same time every aim [ visee]
can be taken as object, can fall under language's jurisdiction once placed out side. It is upon this same limitless jurisdiction that the commentary on art relies, that interpretation with Freud relied, and that we too will rely. Mute sight, the gesture of desire, condensation and displacement, the entrance of the figure in the text via the rebus, and finally the merging of spaces, can all be uttered and articulated in discourse. Such discourse of course does not grant us the possession of seeing, desiring, moving; but then no discourse possesses its object. If one wants to stay within the sphere of this concept of possession, one should say that language can, at best, allow itself to be pos sessed by its object-which is what Merleau-Ponty wanted-and this is the artist's discourse, not the philosopher's, which must give up possessivity one way or another, since philosophy is born at the same time as the dwelling of speech by the world or the gods comes to an end, and since it is its destiny to speak soberly, at a distance, to never completely "be part of it. " We must ac cept this particular gap in the contact, which is the burden of philosophical speech-neither art nor science-as well as its guarantor and model, namely the order of language
[langue] . For it
is through the constraints the latter
imposes, all of which result in invariants and constant intervals, that the order oflanguage founds this speech at an arbitrary distance from the order of things, pitting against the unhampered movements underlying perceptual space the unconditional markers of linguistic "space." The relevant opposition here is not between spoken and speaking speech-the former assimilated to language
[langue], the latter to gesture or
movement. But in every utterance there are two dimensions: one in which operate-at the different levels identified by linguists (such as of the first and
R E C E S S U S AND HYP ER-REFLECTION
57
second articulation in Andre Martinet's functionalism)-the oppositions and correlations connecting the units available to the speaker; and the other in which the speaker's intention to signifY thrusts itself. On the one hand the dimension of language
[langue]-which
is not merely spoken speech, but
the matrix of innumerable propositions-and on the other the dimension of intention, of linguistic gesture, which is "speaking" by its expression, but primarily because it respects the constraints of language
[langue].The utter ance can better obey the constraints imposed by language [langue], its inten
tion to signifY respectfully following the latter's shape. Or it can undo the constraints so as to subject the elements of language
[langue]
to the vector
of desire, in which case it can harm the code, inserting between words, and possibly in the words themselves, the same unpredictable intervals that sepa rate and bring together imaginary things, and infuse the space of language
[langue] with the mobility of desire, built on the polarity of the close and the distant. Yet even in this last case the utterance must meet certain conditions of signification if it wants to avoid total chaos. This is exactly the moment we want not to mime on the surface of our writing, but to capture at the tip of our gaze. This activity-that of the poet, the writer, and the dream places the figural into abstraction, the "real" into the "arbitrary," endowing discourse with almost the same flesh as that of the sensory. This labor of regression, as Freud would say, reveals that the truly pertinent opposition is only between vaiiant and invariant, between mobile and rigid negativity, and that the order oflanguage is to the order of expression as that which is twice articulated is to that which is once. What is invariance? Variance plus the negation of variance. But what then is variance? Variance is the spacing whose unbridgeability is denied spacing transgressed. So what, again, is invariance? It is the negation of this negation that lies in mobility. But the relation between these two negations is
not dialectical: one is not
the moment of the other. If one really wants to articulate them together that is, by keeping them in their exteriority, in their unsurpassable inequality, in what we will call their difference--one must consider them in relation to the fate of desire. For it is only by considering desire that we can hold re flection
at bay from the dialectical reconciliation
of the two negations, and
RECESSUS AND HYPER-REFLECTION
that the horizon may be kept free to show (through hyper-reflection) how invariance and variance-that is, secondary and primary processes-always, and simultaneously, present themselves together and can never form a unity. What guarantees signification is the respect for the oppositions between the terms of a system. Yet it is by :virtue of the same respect ofinstituted intervals (through the prohibition ofincest) that the mother will have to retreat before the subject's request-a withdrawal that opens up for the subject the space of seeing-imagining. Far from promising the reconciliation of signification and meaning, this articulation of the Father-negation and Mother-negation forces one never to be able to think of the one except as the other's trans gression. To want to measure up to the imaginary interworld through pure representational and ineffable intuition is a fulfillment of desire that depends on the repression ofits taboo: "There is no law." And to want to measure up to the law in a formally enclosed and wholly signifying discourse is also a fulfillment of desire-a desire hinging upon its foreclosure: "There is only the law." Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is Father-less, or has too much of it: in any case, this leaves his discourse in an insatiable longing for the Mother.9 We impinge here on a Freudian problematic that we cannot possibly survey in its entirety, let alone domesticate and put behind bars-which is what philosophy tends to do when it encounters something. But one need not resort to torturing, chaining up his texts to be struck by the fact that Freud's reflection, from the beginning to the end of his career, from The Interpretation of Dreams to Moses and Monotheism, centers on the relation between language and silence, signification and meaning, articulation and image, interpreting or constructing commentary and figuring desire. It is no less striking that this relation is constandy understood by Freud, if from dif ferent angles, as Verneinung: negation of discourse in the phantasmatic realm of dreams and negation of the phantasy in the patient's discourse; negation of the religion of the image in that of the book and negation of this negation in Moses' purported murder. By thus holding reflection in negation a while longer, we have no intention of placing it under Hegel's tutelage-totalizing negation where nothing is lost-but rather of announcing Freud-negation as suppression of the other and of myself This negation is what constitutes
R E C E S S U S A N D HYP ER-REFLECTION
the transcendence of saying in relation to the said, the dimension of refer ence that is the rebound of seeing in the order of discourse. It is also what sets in motion the machinery of the image even in articulated language [/an
gage], producing the dream, poetry, and, lastly, the very possibility of this hyper-reflection that phenomenology, tired of mulling over intentionality, fi nally longs for. Freud arrives just in time to teach it how the subject is a being who dreams of the coincidence of which she or he is deprived. It would be misinterpreting Freud's lesson, I believe, to conclude simply that since all transcendence of consciousness is imaginary, we must ignore it. Yet it would not heed his lesson at all to found, just as simply, a philosophy of hyper reflection that took from a philosophy of reflection the idea that the whole of the unconscious is in the aim [visie], adding to it only the principle that one can bring to light this unconscious through style alone. Freud's negation, which goes under the name of castration and generates anxiety, produces the transcendence of seeing-which is that of desire; but it also implies the en trance into the structure, into its arche, that is, the set of measured intervals of the law. By occupying this hinge, we should be able to articulate the two spaces one on top of the other, that of language [langue] and of the figure. This is still reflection, because we will continue here to produce a discourse of signification, but also hyper-reflection, because we will attempt to articu late what in speech remains silent and shows. One can track the recessus of speech as it undoes itself, on its way toward anti-speech or the rebus. It can be followed because there is anti-speech in speech, seeing in saying, continuity in the articulated, difference even in op position. This is regressive flexing rather than reflection, the opposite of dia lectics: the truth of hyper-reflection. One can track it, and one must, because it is precisely this mobility that, when introduced in the order of invariant spacings, can detect them-the ironic contribution of Eros-death to Eros Logos. How do the two forms of negation overlap; how can that of show ing enter into that of discourse; how can text become figure: these are the questions that interest hyper-reflection and can guide it. It will come as no surprise that philosophy arrives too late here, and that it has everything to learn from poets.
59
RECESSUS AND HYPER-REFLECTION
A text i s that which does not allow itself t o be moved. The intervals that keep its elements apart and punctuate them-letters, words, sentences are the projection on the sensory support-page, stone-of the intervals separating the distinctive and significative terms in the grid of language [langue] . But language [langage] , too, is deep, and as such should be capable of undergoing fictionalizing operations. If there is evidence to confirm this hypothesis, it will be found in the work itself of establishing language [/an gage] , specifically in that the linguist, at the very moment she or he assigns positions to the terms in the depthless plane of the structure, makes use of a procedure-commutation-that nonetheless requires depth. But there is further evidence that a text should be able to be read not only according to its signification-a matter of linguistic space-but actually seen according to its configuration, upheld by the sensory-imaginary space in which it is inscribed. Fiction, which is what produces figure from text, consists entirely in a play on intervals: the figure is a deformation that imposes another form on the layout of linguistic units. This form is not reducible to the constraints imposed by the structure. When it comes to large units-for example, Claude Levi-Strauss's mythemes10 or Vladimir Propp's functions11-given that the intervals sepa rating them are not controlled with any precision by the code of language [langue] , and that they do not belong to a rigid space and are, for the most part, left up to the speaker, the game that gives rise to form at this level of discourse does not come across as violence against any rule; thus structural linguistics easily relinquishes the study of this level's combinations, handing it over to stylistics. It is here that literary activity comes into play, producing stylistic devices and narrative forms. Such an additional organization ofliter ary discourse, this supplementary constraint brought to bear on larger units, is sometimes called structure. But this is a mistake, for such forms do not be long to the structure of (linguistic) matter from which they are made, which is precisely why they are expressive.12 Hence the order of structure appears able to remain independent from that of form, linguistics from stylistics, and by the same token reason from passion. The methodological option chosen by Saussure, in favor of a study language [langue]-thus automatically at the
6r
RECESSUS AND HYPER-REFLECTION
expense o f speech-runs the risk o f overlooking the question o f the coexis tence of the two negativities, that of structure and form. Radical poetry (which is not the same as "pure" poetry) is necessary to make this coexistence tangible and visible. In the search for what Paul Valery calls the "figure of thought," this poetry descends to the lowest reaches in the hierarchy of linguistic units, importing the agitation and insurrection no longer only in traditional prosody-that is to say, in the supplemental constraints through which poetic discourse is connoted-but in the funda mental laws of communicable discourse itself. With
n'abo/ira /e hasard,
Un coup de des jamais
Stephane Mallarme radically deprives articulated lan
guage of its prosaic function of communication, revealing in it a power that exceeds it: the power to be "seen," and not only read-heard; the power to figure, and not only to signify. First of all it would be absurd to take Mallarme's book as a score or a picture, to pretend that the words are not words and have no meaning. Gardner Davies is right to underscore the fact that the text is read, like any French text, from left to right and top to bottom.B But if such is the case we cannot avoid taking into consideration the signification of these inscrip tions bizarrely scattered across the space of the book. The connection Davies draws with
Igitur
indicates clearly that the same problematic is at issue:
to produce the ultimate work, speech standing outside of time and space just as it stands outside of the relation of author and reader-timeless, non extended, incommunicable and uncreated, "the text speaking of itself and without authorial voice"14 because the spirit that finds expression here is "lo cated beyond circumstances."15 This place-less place and this moment with out time are chance abolished. Discourse placed upon this space, "vacant and superior" as it is described at the end of Un
coup de des,
no longer owes
anything to sensory, social, affective circumstance; it has cut all ties to its other, and the object is no longer present within it at all, like an unconscious parasite. Such is the requirement discourse must satisfy for it to produce what Mallarme calls the "essential notion," the true poetic object. This process of elimination ("My work was created only by 'elimina tion'" Mallarme writes to Eugene Lefebure, adding, "Destruction was my
R E C E S S U S A N D H Y P E R - R EF L E C T I O N
Beatrice"16) is the fulfillment of the loss of the object, without which there is no literature. This "illusion," this "hoax" that is poetic fiction, and this "di vine transposition''17 of fact into ideal, occur in a "vacant space" from which the constraints of sensibility in the Kantian sense and those of the language of interlocution are eliminated. Speech already carries out this exclusion of the object (and subject) thanks to the immaterial, "vibratory" nature of its support.18 Mallarme's poetics seems to bring to completion the fundamen tal property of language, which Saussure was developing at the same time, namely, the sign's arbitrariness in relation to the object it signifies. The "elim ination'' Mallarme performs is the deepening of the spacing of reference as an unbridgeable distance separating the word and the object, and ensuring the former's ideal scope. Now this poetics gets more complicated, however, as Un coup de dis tes tifies as much by its content as by its form. Through literature, one must indeed "ascertain that one is in fact where one should be (because, allow me to express this apprehension, there remains an uncertainty),"19 by "assum ing . . . some duty to re-create everything." But such re-creation allows its object to be seen, and this seeing, should it even be ideal or notional like its object, is nonetheless borrowed from the libidinal constitution of vision. If"the agony in which one resuscitates what one has lost in order to see it"20 is in fact the work of death that literature exacts upon the world, it is not, however, the latter's simple abolishment, having still to represent it. Mallaime indirectly flagged this importance of the visible, present even in the vacant space of withdrawal, when in his letters he insists on the sensual character ofhis notional approach: "I discovered the Idea ofthe Universe through sen sation alone-and . . . in order to perpetuate the indelible idea ofpure Noth ingness, I had to fill my brain with the sensation of absolute Emptiness."21 The operation of transposition passes through the register of affect: it is the "sensation'' that preserves the reminiscence of the abolished object. And this sensation is not only knowledge, but pleasure: "I want myself to enjoy every new idea, not learn it."22 This is not a case of an author's idiosyncrasy, at exactly the moment when the author is in the process of disappearing. This sensuality in the use of negativity finds its counterpart on the side of the text itsel£ Writing
RECESSUS AND HYPER-REFLECTION
distinguishes itself from speech i n that it offers, through its signs, a visible trace of the idea. For Mallarme, however, this trace cannot be arbitrary: "to go from the
sentence
to the
letter via
the word; by resorting to the Sign or
to writing, which links the word to its meaning."23 The written letter acts as a link to meaning-a "meaning" that presents no small ambiguity, impos sible as it is here to know whether it is the word's signified or the object it designates. As we will see, it is neither one nor the other, but a kind of schema included in the word, its action plan, a motivated choreography, con cealed within its arbitrariness. Notwithstanding, and unlike speech, writing institutes a dimension of visibility, of sensory spatiality, that will allow pre cisely to make visible the universe re-created from the divine transposition. The notion (or the signified) must therefore be represented sensorially, "ex pressed" in a space that is the object's, and without losing anything of itself, its content and its discontinuity as concept. This very contradiction motivates Igitur, and generates, too, the writing of Un coup de des. At stake in both texts is an act by which contingency must be halted. The act in question is the one of writing the work, of producing an absolute discourse, the "Book," represented as the Number-in
de des,
Un coup
the number possibly brought about by the Master's throw of dice be
fore it founders. The work, because it speaks in the vacancy of all condition extrinsic to pure discourse and grants only the notion, must abolish chance, that is, language's other, its reference. But what
Un coup de des says is
that
language does not abolish its other, that the work itself belongs to the sen sory, and that there is no need to choose between writing and giving it up, that, in sum, the problem is a false one and, in any case, "nothing will have taken place but the place."24 Language and its other are inseparable: such is the lesson of Un coup
de des, Igitur,
and Mallarme. But we have yet to show
how Mallarme expects us to devote ourselves and yield to this inseparabil ity: not by politely tipping one's hat from within language, by signifying it, but by making it
visible,
again, thereby smuggling the plane (the emblem of
contingency) into the sign (the seal of the notion). Hence the attention to typography, which is far from "childish."25 That nothing should have taken place but place would b e an inaccurate formulation in its pessimism were it to suggest that writing is nothing, that
R E C E S S U S AND HYPER-REFLECTION
only the sensory remains, the abyss o f Un coup de dis. This place-which will have taken place after the poem, or which will even have taken place after the poet founders without having produced anything-is not nothing. We know that at the end of
Un coup de dis,
precisely where the dice are not thrown,
where the work is not written, there nonetheless appears the figure of the Big Bear: nothing has taken place but this constellation. Davies reminds us that this celestial figure, "which counts down . . . the regular jolting . . . of a total computation in progress" and thus belongs, with writing, to the Num ber, to anti-chance, differs from text insofar as the text takes the form of black on white, while the star is white against the black background of the sky. "You noted, one does not write, luminously on a dark field, the alphabet of the stars, alone thus appears, sketched out or interrupted; man continues black on white."26 Is the night sky, then, the negative of the text? Not exacdy, and not only, for to write white on black is to write with the ink of chance across the element of the absolute, where the absolute is the immutable trace as sign, the presence of the word
[verbe]
(the word is Mallarme's, in his es
says on language), and white is absent meaning. The constellation, then, is the "fixed infinite," the white of the indefinite intercepted in the sign. Only this sign is not a book but a form: neither shadow nor white, but both. And it is in this sense that it is a place. Now, the volume of
Un coup de dis represents
the answer to this place,
as itself a place of meaning, but the negative of the Constellation, writ ing black on white. The establishing of the place is achieved in the most straightforward manner possible, practically without sentences (Figure r) : through the transgression of the usual spacings between textual elements, through an arrangement of the words that takes into consideration, beneath the constraints imposed by the structure of language
[langue], spatial values
borrowed from our visual and gestural experience, whether perceptual or imaginary.27 To confirm that Mallarme indeed sought, through the sensory layout of the book, to render expressive a space normally de�tined to be overlooked, we need only read the spiritual instrument that is The Book: "The book, which is a total expansion of the letter, must find its mobility in the letter; and in its spaciousness must establish some nameless system of relationships
R E C E S S U S A N D HY P E R- R E F L E C T I O N
which will embrace and strengthen fiction. . . . The making o f a book, with respect to its flowering totality, begins with the first sentence. From time immemorial the poet has knowingly placed his verse in the sonnet which he writes upon our minds or upon pure space. We, in turn, will misunderstand the true meaning of this book and the miracle inherent in its structure, if we do not knowingly imagine that a given motif has been properly placed at a certain height on the page, according to its own or to the book's distribution of light. .
. .
A tremendous burst of greatness, of thought, or of emotion, con
tained in a sentence printed in large type, with one gradually descending line to a page, should keep the reader breathless throughout the book and sum mon forth his powers of excitement. Around this would be smaller groups of secondary importance, commenting on the main sentence or derived from it, like a scattering of ornaments."28 And in the letter to Andre Gide, quoted by Valery, Mallarme writes, "The poem is now being printed in the form in which I conceived it, including the pagination, which will be its true origi nality. Certain words in large type will need an entire blank page. . . . The constellation, obedient to the strictest laws, will move as fatefully as constel lations do-at least insofar as it can in a printed book. The ship will heel over from the top of one page to the bottom of the next, and so forth. The big point (which I couldn't explain in a periodical) is that the rhythm of a word group, if it is to make sense, must imitate the action or object in question."29 "It seemed to me that I was looking," writes Valery, "at the form and pattern
[Iafigure]
of a thought, placed for the first time in finite space. . . .
With my own eye I could see silences that had assumed bodily shapes."30 So here it is, this language dreamed ofby Merleau-Ponty, or at least its protocol of experience. It has brought the sensory into itself: no longer speaking only through its signification, it expresses through its blanks, its typefaces, the folds of its pagesY It has agreed to deconstruct itself, has abandoned some of the typographic constraints that belong to language
[langue], accommodated
certain expectations, emphases, accelerations that take shape from a sensory expanse. Radical poetry thereby testifies to the presence of a latent sensory
OVERLEAF:
Figure 1. Stephane Mallarme, Un coup de desjamais n'abolira le has ard (Paris: Gallimard, 1914). Half-size facsimile.
,
C'ETAIT
CE SERAIT itrJiftrnrrm11t1 tnait
•l•llt
LE NOMBRE EXISTAT-IL autrement
qu'hallucination �pirse d'agonie
COMMEN
e n rare!�
SE CHIFFRAT-IL �vidence de Ia
som me
pour peu
qu'une
ILLUMINAT-IL
LE HASARD
Choit Ia plume rythmtfjt#t suspens du sinistre lensevelir aux lcumes originelles nagu�res d'ou sursauta son de/ire jusqu'a une cime jletrie par Ia lteutralitl identi'lue du gou.lfre
R EC E S S U S A N D HYPER-RE FLECTION
in the sensible. Where does it dwell? Not directly in the "matter" of words (what would this be, exactly? their written, printed figure? their sound? the "color" of letters?), but in their disposition. One will counter that the sen sible too-signification-depends entirely on the disposition of units. But our understanding of disposition-the poetic dispersal across the page-is a disturbance of the disposition that ensures signification; it upsets communi cation. Mallarme already says it of verse: "Out of a number of words, poetry fashions a single new word which is total in itself and foreign to language-a kind of incantation. Thus the desired isolation of language is effected; and chance (which might still have governed these elements, despite their artful and alternating renewal through meaning and sound) is thereby instantly and thoroughly abolished."32 He refers to verse as chance "vanquished word by word,"33 and sees in the typographic blank the sensory presence of an ini tial contingency that the regular return of the paragraph break will incorpo rate as "silence" in words. The disruption of significations consists in forms: the elements (words) are isolated by unforeseen distances, struck by variabil ity, occupying "variable places." This "mobility" enables the book to become "spacious," and this spacious spatiality, made up of"correspondences" (this is the form), is the way through which "fiction'' is "confirmed," asserts itself, and through which the other of discourse takes shape in it. What then is this space of
Un coup de des?
Logical, because words are
inscribed in the space; sensory, because what lies between the terms is as important as the terms themselves (this is, according to Andre Lhote, the figure's essential character); and imaginary, because the figure of these inter vals is determined only by the fiction upheld by discourse. "Poetry-unique source."34 When speech becomes object, it is not to reproduce something visible, but to make visible an invisible, lost "thing," taking on the form of the imaginary of which it speaks. The correspondences mentioned in the letter to Gide rely exclusively on the words' designation: thus the Page (double page spread) "that the abyss
. .
. "will obey a slipping motion, ofburying into
the depths. This Mallarmean "naivete"-of taking the word at face value by endowing it with the form of the object it designates, or at least, rather than its closed outline, its movement, its plastic presence, what we called earlier its schema-is very edifying. It reveals that the referential distance
R E C E S S U S A N D H Y P E R - R E F L E CT I O N
itself, after a right-angle rotation, places its figure i n the line of discourse, distending and dispersing it into a thing "simultaneous" to itsel£ Designa tion migrating into signification; discourse, without losing its power of relay, taking on another power, namely, that of the things of desire, and, like these, soliciting the eye. This is how contact is made, the thing of which we speak introduced in what we are saying-introduced not intelligently but sensori ally-thanks to the sensory's inexhaustible resource, this chance that escapes every effort to abolish it, which is its ability to accommodate both text and non-text; sensory reality transforming itself into both stage and seating area, reproducing itself as constituted, mirror-like, by the play of text and figure on it: anamorphosis. There is no accrual in this recessus, no development. Davies bases his read ing of Un coup de des and Igitur on a Hegelian influence on Mallarme's thought, but nothing is less Hegelian than this thought:
Un coup de des can only belong
to the chance-abyss. Holding on to the question of meaning until the very last in the element of contingency is contrary to the assertion that the entire real is rational; to consider thought as a chance combination among other potentials is, according to the Preface of the Phenomenology ofSpirit, to dwell in exterior ity and in the formalism specific to mathematics, notably to combinatorics; finally, to plunge all actual combination as thought or work into the absolute neutrality of the sensory, to the point of locating its equivalent in a constel lation, amounts to nothing less than blurring of the inequality between the for-itself of natural immediacy and the in-itself for-us of mediated knowledge. With Mallarme, the crisis of knowledge deepens, for not only does it articulate itself in a discourse of signification that, in a sense, entrenches knowledge in its element and in its presumption, but reflection grasps precisely this discourse of signification as a delusion, as a trick that knowledge plays on non-knowledge, and it outwits this trick by playing the game of recessus, by positioning sensory and libidinal space in its very discourse, in other words, the trick of the trope. Thus the fact that the true notion is given by sensuality, and that transcendence is immanent, is
expressed. This hyper-reflection finds its match not in Hegel,
who belongs to Western tradition, but in Cezanne and in the entire plastic up heaval for which he was both the seismograph and the detonator, in Nietzsche, and, soon thereafter, in Freud.
R EC E S S U S A N D H Y P E R - R EFLECTION
Surreality is this book itself, Un coup de desjamais n'abolira le hasard, in sofar as it occupies the "vacant superior" space (of which it speaks). Without attempting to explore here the configuration of this surreality offered by re presentation, one can nonetheless already underscore its mirror effect. The object-book contains two objects: an "ideal" object, of signification (com prised of concatenated signifieds according to the rules of syntax) that states "there is no notion (no signified) outside of the sensory." One comprehends such an object. Then there is a meaningful object [un objet de signifiance], made of graphic andplastic signifiers (blanks, typographic variations, use of the double page spread, arrangement of signs across this surface), actually of writing disturbed by considerations of the sensory (of"sensuality"). The first object allows the second to become intelligible; the second allows the first to become visible. They mirror each other: signification is presented visually as meaning, and meaning is presented intelligibly as signification. This is a first mirror, coexistensive with the entire book; but this book itself, insofar as it is of signification and of meaning, is reflected in the form of a chiasm:35 the expression "A throw of dice" [ Un coup de des], upon which the book opens, is answered by the line of the last page "every thought emits a throw of dice"
[toute pensee emet un coup de des]. Chiasm in the linguistic signifier, as well as in the signified: thought fails to abolish the unthought, but the unthought contains thought. A chiasm is a rhetoricalfigure of the ab-ba variety, analo gous in its form to a figure of prosody-such as the alternate rhyme-and therefore introducing in the course of the text a depth that is not of pure signification, but that conceals and signals a kind of excess of meaning. The figure of the chiasm gives to this meaning-situated on this side of explicit signification, and which exceeds it-the form of the mirror, and therefore inspires a feeling of reflection, the same set of elements repeated, but re versed. This is the second mirror, this time inscribed in the book's diachrony. From these basic remarks one can already identify three types of fig ures at work in Un coup de des: the image, or the figure that takes place in the order oflanguage, specifically in the plane of the signified (comparison, metaphor); the form, a kind of figure also located in language but which affects the linguistic signifier and which is not signified in discourse; and the sensory figure, a configuration that allocates the linguistic (that is, in
R E C E S S U S AND HYPER-REF LECTION
the present case, graphic) signifiers according to requirements that are not stricdy speaking those of discourse but of a rhythm (here a visible one).Thus these tiered figures, from pure signified to plastic signifier, via linguistic sig nifier, constitute a chain or switch between the intelligible discursive order and the sensory spatiotemporal order, confirming the presence of forms likely to cross the divisions separating the intelligible world and the sensory world-forms independent of the context they inform (just as Freud will argue that the phantasy is a sufficient configuration capable of crossing as-is the border between unconscious and preconscious). Thus this tiered succes sion of forms gives discourse access to what is alien to it, establishing the mirror function it has in Un coup de des: the fact that the other of significa tion-the figural-can come to dwell in discourse endows the latter with a thickness that will make reflection possible. But one notes that this reflection is a hyper-reflection insofar as it does not consist in reflecting the designated in signified, but that on the contrary some element of the space of reference, as it comes to lodge itself in dis course, produces anomalies there, thereby making itself visible. One can get to the bottom of this operation only after having studied the work of dreams, for it is important to separate the regression or direct expression mobilized in the latter work and the recessus or doubly inverted expression that alone produces the art work. At the end of Divagations, Mallarme defines the form he seeks as "critical poem."36
71
Linguistic Sign?
One could start (again) by stating that language is not made of signs. It would be the same discussion as the one on the symbol in Hegel, but taken from a different vantage point. Turning around the object that interests us is far from useless; it is a task we cannot shirk as long as we remain in the order of sig nification. We only always perceive one side of this object at a time; it never changes, but if we have gone around properly, what we observe from the newly revealed side introduces us to a new discourse. Different repetition. The object in question is in fact the space in which discourse operates, and the proposed thesis is that this space is not homogenous, but doubled: on the one hand, the space of discontinuity where signification takes shape (on the model of the signifier); on the other, the space of designation that surrounds discourse and opens it to its reference. Ferdinand de Saussure's importance in this regard is obvious. By subsuming his reflectio� on lan guage, from the very first, under the heading of a general semiology,! he made it necessary (for himself) to think the linguistic element under the category of the sign. Thus he formulates the concept of the arbitrariness or unmotivation of the linguistic "sign'': the latter is opposed to another sign as what is "instituted" to what is "natural," or as what is "unmotivated" to what is "motivated."2 Let us therefore approach our object along the path cleared by Saussure: is it true that the word differs from the sign on account of its arbitrariness, or is this arbitrariness not the symptom of a far more radical condition, namely that the word does not belong to the semiological sphere, but is tangential to it? Whatever the object of which one speaks, and no matter how the ut terance relates to it, every speech act speaks of something. It is an essen tial characteristic of articulated language that it should always have a ref erential function, and this is the characteristic one should recognize in the
LINGUISTIC SIGN?
73
Saussurean notion o f arbitrariness. N o denial, writes Emile Benveniste, can "abolish the fundamental property oflanguage, which is to imply that some thing corresponds to what is uttered, some thing and not 'nothing."'3 Every language presupposes a respondent outside of itself, and, as Gottlob Frege has argued,4 an impulse toward the designated never ceases to exceed the grasp of the signified, forcing us to rush from one place of discourse to an other, around what we speak of. Benveniste's remark should not fool us: this "something" that must correspond to each and every utterance is precisely ungraspable and unseizable; it is, admittedly, established by the speech act, but established over there, in a space created by an originary spacing. Speech faces its object, opens onto it, at the very least through a kind of sight, and in the absence of a point of contact or direct grip-which it lost in being con structed and which haunts it-it unceasingly·puts itself to the test, measures itself, tries to align itself with objectness. There exists in language-however inhabited by what Merleau-Ponty called its "presumption of totality"-a contrary and no less radical position of insufficiency owing to the primary excision by which the silhouette of the thing, in negative, sets itself apart on the edge of the words that refer to it. In this respect every speech act is a means of adducing something that is not of language
[langue], that
can
not find its place within the utterance, but which stands, as its impregnable theme, in the opening of discourse. Following this lead, it seems impossible to imagine the order of dis course as a closed system. Language
[langue] is indeed such a system, but the
use to which the subject puts the "signs" provided by language is referential, where the calling-up and organization of these "signs" are motivated from without through a kind of preview of the object. The order of discourse does not have all of its reason behind it, in the structure, but also in part in the speaker's intentionality, which is none other than the subjective aspect of designation. Now, as Charles S anders Peirce noted, "replacing something for someone" applies not only to the linguistic sign, but to
all signs: the
opening of the sign onto the other, its nature as substitute, are what define it; and words, if they are to be counted as signs, are no exception to this rule of indicative immanence. Edmond Ortigues (on this point very close to the tradition of the
Logic
of Port-Royal) stresses this immanent character of
74
LINGUISTIC S IG N ?
the referential function (of transcendence) that defines the sign.5 The latter is, he writes, "a sensory event referring to something belonging to an
other than itsel£."6 The
order
sign "shows something or brings something to light,"
understood that the absent other thing, thus presented, cannot be presented in person.7The sign is therefore inseparable from a rift through which being and appearing, or meaning and the sensory, are cleaved; in this way it cannot be reduced to a certain relation between two terms, but is "the generating principle of all relations, of all possible forms."8 From this, one can see that the above concept emerges in a metaphysics of presence, thanks to which, precisely, this other signifier-the concealed term-appears in person, the thing itself given; one can see, too, that the West's madness is to believe the trace effaceable as such, and that what traces showable.9 Regardless of the implications to be derived from this critique, one must acknowledge that the archi-writing called upon to account for the primitive fact of meaning's withdrawal is in no way strictly speaking a form of writing-inscription of arbitrary signs on a neutralized space-but, on the contrary, the constitution of a thick space where the game of conceal ing/revealing can be played out. Difference is not opposition. The former constitutes the opacity that opens the order of reference; the latter upholds the system of invariances in the plane of the signifier or the signified. About the former-the crux of the matter at hand-the question is whether the linguistic "sign'' (either written or spoken, the distinction is irrelevant here) is inhabited by it in the same way that it opens or distends every other sign. Does the depth of referral-to which Merleau-Ponty ascribed, as ultimate model, the figure-ground relation in form, as a means of locating the entire mystery of transcendence in the sensory-operate in the same place de pending on whether we are dealing with a word or, for example, a color or a line? By depth of a color or a line I understand, as all painters do, the directed force emanating from a blue or a red, a curved or vertical line, which arouses in one's body an expectation, the rudiments of polarized motion. In this case I think one can speak of an immanence of meaning in the sign, of immedi ate thickness. Not arbitrariness, but immediacy: an untaught montage of the body with the sensory, so that the blue or the vertical line tugs at it in a given spatial direction. Yet this is still a case of transcendence, for one cannot argue
LINGUISTIC SIGN?
that this meaning is given in the line or the color. On the contrary, i t is hid den there, and from there must appear. One might object that to present the problem with reference to the sig nification of the sensory is to resolve it, for no one will deny that words are not sensorial elements. However, Saussure's positioning of the problem of the linguistic sign is not as far as one could imagine from the reference to the sensory; it is, in fact, determined by a very similar reference, to the symbol. Saussure specified that by the linguistic sign's arbitrariness he did not want to suggest that the speaker has the power to shape sounds or words at will, but that it is impossible to derive the sign from the thing it designates. To support his claim he points to the fact that the same thing bears different names in different languages. Rather than arbitrary, he prefers to name this relation unmotivated.10 Now the model guiding Saussure's reflection here is that of a relation that he himself calls symbolic,11 such that there would be continuity from the signifier to the signified, that the "content" would be in dicated on the signifier-through the sign's substance or through its form, or both-which brings us very close to the sensory signifier. Hence a signpost indicating a ridge on the road is a motivated sign: the thing is recognizable by the outline featured on the signpost. Motivation in this case consists of the schematic rendering, figured on a plane, of a corporeal rhythm connect ed, in actual experience, to the passage of a vehicle over a ridge. If the sign post features two bumps where most ridges have one, (one might imagine) this is because the mediation between signifier and signified is sought on the side of the body, because corporeal signification is always akin to a rhythm, and because the latter requires an interval between two pulses-those very bumps figured on the signpost. Here is one such "motivation'' in Saussure's sense that, without being, properly speaking, expressive, depends neverthe less, somewhat as in painting, on this matrix of rhythm and of correspon dences between rhythms (in this case kinesthetic and visual) that is the body. Is it not possible to find something similar in the linguistic sign? This is where one comes across Benveniste's remarks as an essential prolegomenon to any discussion on the subject.U It is indeed impossible to think positively about the linguistic sign's arbitrariness if one has not accepted b eforehand the distinction Benveniste proposes between two relations that take part,
75
LINGUISTIC SIGN?
in equal measure, in the constitution of language: that of signifier to sig nified, and of the sign to its object-the former immanent in, the latter transcendent to the object. If the linguist declares the latter arbitrary, it is merely, Benveniste assures us, because he must refrain from broaching "the metaphysical problem of the agreement between the mind and the world."13 But the relation internal to the sign, that which binds signifier and signified together, is hardly arbitrary: "There is such a close symbiosis between them that the concept 'beef' is like the soul of the sound pattern /'bif/. The mind does not contain empty forms, concepts without names";14 there is "consub stantiality of the signifier and the signified." By positing this distinction, Benveniste is obviously following the speaker's ordinary experience. It is in the speech act that the distance from words to the things they speak of is unbridgeable. No doubt this distance can be, in principle, if not bridged then at least turned around through the use of what "thingness" there is in the word, through the mediation of its flesh, and of the echo its flesh can produce in response to the resonance the thing emits in the cave of the sensory.15 But this poetic experience, of the con natural relation between discourse and its object, far from belying the shared experience of their difference, finds in this experience its counterpoint and its mirror: it is unusual that the sensory would come to inhabit the signifier, and that discourse would transform itself into symbol-at the same time sinnliche [sensuous] and sinnvolle [meaningful], as Eugen Lerch put it in an article in which he tried, quite desperately, to salvage the symbolic value of sound against the thesis of arbitrariness (including Benveniste's corrected version).16 1his unusual character is the product of expression, but expression is not the only, indeed not the main function of language. The other func tion-communication-requires the almost total exhaustion of the WortkOr per [word's materiality], the translucency of words, and the sort of freedom enjoyed by the signified from the signifier that communication makes pos sible for the speaking subject. This other aspect of our common linguistic ex perience highlights what Merleau-Ponty called its "virtue": "to efface itself," "in the way it works, [to hide] itself from us," "to efface itself and to take us beyond the words to the author's very thoughts."17 One cannot argue, therefore, that motivation is excluded in principle
LINGUISTIC SIGN?
77
from the order of linguistic signs, for this would b e to banish the poetic and preclude describing and comprehending an experience of speech that, however exceptional (at least in our societies), is no less essential than the other. But one must specify that motivation affects the relation of the whole sign to what it designates, and not the signified-signifier relation, which is a "relation'' only under the linguist's knife, and one that we do not experi ence. Having said this, however, this motivation, when it exists, is of the same order as the motivated signpost: the thing is not "inserted in" language
[langage]-which is only a manner of speaking--rather the disposition of language [langage] induces upon words and between them rhythms that resonate with those provoked on our body by the thing discourse speaks o£ This invasion of rhythmics in the invariant space of language
[langue],
of
unhampered mobility in measured discontinuity, is so fundamental that the one cannot go without the other, and that, in the linguist's commutation, in the analysand's free association, as well as in the work of the dreamer or the painter, the order of language
[langage]
must be violated by this rhythmic
power for it to be perceived. But let us put aside for a moment the question of expression. What we shall say is that two directions of meaning intersect on the linguistic sign, involving three poles in all.18 On the one hand, the sign is constituted by two facets, inseparable in practical use--the signifier and the signified-and whose adjoining determines signification proper. This is Saussure's specif ic term for the effect of meaning produced when the concept or signified merges with what he calls the sound pattern or signifier.19 On the other hand, the linguistic sign, taken as a whole (as it is in fact), relates to what it designates, to a real or unreal object about which the speaker is speaking. lt is the latter relation that Benveniste distinguishes from the former in order to show that it alone deserves to be qualified as arbitrary or unmotivated, while signification is so little unmotivated that we are unable to think the concept without its "formulation," and the word without "what it means." This rela tion of the sign to the object can be called designation. Ifwe want to insist on speaking of linguistic sign, then, it becomes nec essary to state that in one or the other of these dimensions, or in both, one encounters the thickness, difference, or force of reference to something else,
L I N G UI S T I C S I G N ?
that constitutes the sign. Let u s first turn to signification to see if the expres sions "replacement" and "representation'' apply to the signifier's relation to the signified as Saussure theorized it. Can we assert, for example, that the syntagm /hors/ replaces, for the speaker and the listener, the notion "horse"? Ifwe absolutely must-indeed at the cost of making an egregious mistake we could go so far as to concede that the sign in its totality, the word horse, is the "representative" of the real horse, and that its "value" in the system of signs is the same as the animal's in the system of perception. Needless to say, this thesis suffers from crude approximation, since it relies on the confusion pure and simple of designation-which is a matter of discourse alone-and representation ( Vorstellung [idea] in Frege's terminology)-which defines the function of the symbol. We will come back to this. But this thesis be comes decidedly absurd if, when applied to signification, one contends that the signifier is the signified's sensory substitute, its expression. When faced with the spoken chain, we hear meaning, and meaning is again what we pronounce as our mouth articulates sounds: such is our expe rience of words. This is because of the linguistic signifier's ability to become completely transparent in favor of the signified-except of course when the opposite intent, namely, to highlight the signifier, drives the organization of the message, as in the use to which art puts language.20 But this use, which aims to subvert the signifier's strictly linguistic function of communication in order to intensify its expressive power, requires precisely that the words' symbolic potential be given or restituted to them, and that linguistic matter be, through particular arrangements, burdened with sensory value. This is why it is essential in poetry that the term's natural transparency be clouded for the utterance to take effect through its "see-through" linguistic seman tics, while generating "affective"21 resonances thanks to the ordering that the poet has imposed on verbal matter. Such artistic manipulation of the utterance constitutes precisely the exception: through the effects with which it is laden, the poem-in the fullest meaning of the word, as for example Michel Butor understands it22-eschews language's communicational voca tion, dwelling in the border zone between the word and the thing, writing becoming like an object. But the condition of everyday language-whose tenets are communication and economy of means-is the erasure of phonic
LIN GUI S T I C S I G N ?
matter i n favor of signification, that is, the signifier's transparency. In the messages we exchange, even those that depart from simple routine, sounds are not produced as "replacements" of ideas, they "take the place" of nothing: they are what they signifY. Benveniste says exacdy this when he underscores, in relation to the Saussurean thesis of arbitrariness, the powerful motivation that "from within'' the sign, so to speak, welds signified and signifier.23 The limpidity that allows the signifier, in the experience of articulated language, to disappear almost completely behind meaning is not easy to grasp: I invoke a meaning, words form in my mouth, and the interlocutor hears a meaning. There is no way to separate significations from signifiers. This is not to say that to each "moneme" a corresponding "notion'' attaches itself, as Saussure sometimes suggests. Rather, the meaning of the utterance emerges from the order that the signifiers receive or take on in the utter ance; in return, the signification of each of them is circumscribed according to the surrounding words: a kind of lability specific to the signifier allows it to slip under meanings that are doubdess related but diverse enough to render fruidess any attempt at attaching one and only one "concept" (to borrow Saussure's terms) to it. This is not the sort of univocation-object, or dream, of an exact mathesis-1 have in mind when stressing the solidar ity between signifier and signified. The idea of the signified hardly requires that to every signifier correspond one and only one signified; in practice all that it requires (and we will say no more on the subject) is that a syntagm should be "well formed," articulated in accordance with the rules that govern the phonetic level and with those of the level of significative units, for it in standy to "mean something" clearly. It is this immediate clarity of discourse that is obscurity itsel£ This clarity hardly prevents other meanings from also stepping forward. The thickness of discourse or the polysemic nature of the message is instead the norm; but it remains, in a way, secondary to the signifier's translucency, that is to say, to the immediacy of signification. When a word in a statement is difficult or generates uncertainty, the resulting delay in comprehension is not due to a structural opacity in the relation between signifier and signified. Ifl speak of"palindrome" and my interlocutor is not familiar with the word, any obscurity will derive from this lack of familiarity (that is, because the
LINGUI STIC SIGN?
term is absent from her o r his code, or i s present but with a very low prob ability of occurrence), and not from the fact that there is in language [langue] a signifier available without its signified, or before it, so to speak, as is the case with the color blue announcing (revealing and concealing) the adduction in the order of the dynamics of the body itsel£ Now if I say about such and such a ruined royal family "here is a crumbling house," the play on words is based on the polysemy of the word house in English, and therefore on an ex cess of signified in relation to signifier; but this polysemy is regulated in the lexical order oflanguage [langue], and the speaker is not entitled to overstep it, short of not being understood. Again in this case the relation of signifier to signified is not opaque in and of itself as merely multiple: it is the term's position in the sentence, or the sentence's in discourse, that will dispel the plurality of significations and determine which one to retain. In structuralist or functionalist terms, this comes down to saying that the choice or selec tion of the signifYing unit at a point in the spoken chain is not, as it stands, entirely completed-except in an exact, scientific discourse, from which all polysemy is theoretically evacuated-but that this choice must continue to operate on the given utterance in order to identifY the relevant signifieds. Nevertheless these "choices" do not have any connection to the search, the investigation set in motion by a true sign whose "signification," indicated only by the signifier and without appearing anywhere in any preestablished system, must be built. It is not up to us to build the significations of our language [langue] from the signifiers we hear: the signifier-signified relation is in itself infallible, and arbitrariness plays no part in it. Nothing could be less fortuitous for the English speaker than the concept "horse" as the signi fied of the phonic syntagm /Mrs/. This unmotivation has no equivalent in the experience the speaker has ofher/his mother tongue [langue maternelle]. Saussure could build the concept of unmotivation only by crossing out this experience, with a stroke that amounts to the epistemological cut, and by positing a speaker deprived ofmother tongue. For in Saussure's eyes, ar bitrariness needs no other justification than the fact (which no speaking subject experiences as fact) that "horse" is signified here by /hors/, there by / pfud / [J?ftrd], etc.: an epistemological abstraction that will in fact soon be amended when it will become obvious that the articulation of the
L I N G U I S T I C S IG N ?
signified i s not the same here and there, that the one-to-one translation is unreliable, and that it is necessary to go through the general articulation of experience-in other words, the general organization of semantic fields that is the supposed structure of a language's
[langue]
signifieds. The result
is an excess of abstraction that allows one to go from the term to the system, but a better abstraction too, since it keeps perfectly intact the inseparabil ity of the signifier and the signified within a language
[langue], and hence in
within the experience of the speaker using it. In sum, the signifier stands
for nothing; its "content" isn't one, insofar as a "content" is something that the sign holds back the inside of what it encases. The linguistic signifier � does not conceal anything within it (Inhalt) because it has no interiority, no volume, and does not occupy a thick space. As for the relation of designation (that which, from the "sign," refers to the object it speaks of), we may indeed qualify it as arbitrary, since one is hard pressed to locate any rhythm, any corporeal schema, or any sensory assemblage ensuring the mediation between words and things, and trans forming the former into a stand-in of sorts that would prefigure the latter. One can only endorse the linguist's caution in determining the origin of language tive
[langage], especially with regard to the hypothesis that sees primi language [langue] as a vehicle for expression, and that thus tends to
divert signs from an emotive situation and to understand them as originally motivated.24 Budf words once possessed such an expressive value, weigh ing almost as much as the things they designated, nothing remains of it in today's experience of language
[langage].25
One would be more inclined to
back Andre Leroi-Gourhan's well-argued hypothesis, according to which the oldest language performed a sacred function, and the first significative spoken units were uttered by a narrator who simultaneously gestured toward the corresponding painted figures during ceremonial processions followed by the tribe in temple-caverns .26 The hypothesis is very appealing since the function of designation immediately comes across in all its power and speci ficity. The latter hinges on two decisive points: speech is not uttered in the absence of the designated thing, but
in itspresence; and the designated thing
is not a thing but a symbol, which legitimately can be said from the outset to be opaque. This dual property of the situation in which the referential
LINGUISTIC S IG N ?
82
function i s deployed allows this function to b e located with precision and distinguished from the symbolic function. Far from placing itself before the thing and blocking it, the word dissolves in order to bring the thing into relief. Neither a substitute hiding the thing, nor itself a symbol re-presenting the thing through its own substance or form, the word is merely, in the speaker's experience, a perforation
[percie]
through which the thing comes
into view, a line of sight that makes it visible. There is thus indeed a distance from the word to this thing, from the utterance to its object in general-but this distance, far from being a thickness to be crossed, is the one in which the gesture points to its object; it is the depth of atmospheric space that assumes light to be the medium where seeing takes effect. Opacity is in the object, not in the word, nor in its distance to the ob ject. Words are not signs, but the moment a word appears, the designated object becomes sign. For an object to become sign means precisely that it conceals a "content" hidden within its manifest identity, that it withholds another side ofitself for a different glance upon it, a glance that might never be taken. For it to become sign requires that it be afflicted by a dimension of absence. When the finger points to the tree to designate it, it sways the tree, making it tip forward over an abyss of meaning. Or, put differently, designa tion implies this profound eschewal, this drainage of the back of things. Be fore, there is no tree; every object as such presupposes speech, the power of nullification that the latter wields over what it designates. The object derives its it
thickness from this speech. The word that designates it and that makes visible is at the same time what strips it of its immediate meaning and
deepens its mystery. This is why it is remarkable that the word designates a symbol, as Leroi-Gourhan believes: it has to show a presence and an ab sence, to make visible-but a front, a fa<;ade; it has to intimate that some thing remains to be made visible, an unseen, which is an invisible insofar as the operation never ceases to renew itself, and that this other side, suppos edly connected to the one we see through a continuous
motivated relation,
when we see it, it is up to us to signifY it, that is, to place it in the arbitrary and discontinuous order of signification, and to have it shed its immediate relation with the former side.27 The thickness of the world and its very pos sibility as always incomplete synthesis, as horizon hollowed out behind its
LINGUISTIC SIGN?
sensory presence, are i n this way a function oflanguage
[Jangage]. As we will
see, Freud arrives at a similar observation. But this observation should not lead us to the absurd conclusion that there is nothing but text, for if the world is a function of language, language possesses a world-function, as it were: out of what it designates, every ut terance makes a world, a thick object waiting to be synthesized, a symbol to be deciphered, but these objects and symbols offer themselves in an ex panse where showing is possible. This expanse bordering discourse is not itselfthe linguistic space where the work of signification is carried out, but a worldly type of space, plastic and atmospheric, in which one has to move, circle around things, make their silhouettes vary, in order to utter such and such signification heretofore concealed. Words or linguistic units are not signs through signification, nor are they signs through designation, rather they produce signs with the ob jects they designate (make visible) and signify (make intelligible), and from which they are separated; presence and absence together become world on their margins. Motivation is the other of discourse, its other assumed to exist outside of itself, in things-signs.
From where does this difference come that distinguishes linguistic terms from signs? How do the former set themselves apart from motivation? Through arbitrariness, clearly-but this arbitrariness must be supported by an intrinsic property that would allow the linguistic term to escape the at traction of motivation. Such a property does exist: it is that of double artic ulation, characteristic of articulated language; its function is easy to grasp from a discussion of the sign's
temporality.
The sign is thick. The visible surface of a layer of cobalt blue is a chro matic value; its hidden "face" is the corporeal repercussion (in terms of to nicity) of this value.28 The
meaning
of blue lies in its power to condition
the body as if it had to seek out the area of blue slighdy beyond the latter's space. This corporeal adduction has, as its correlate, the value of the blue's withdrawal; 29 this value is the hidden side, complementary to the one that presents the color to us. The grasp of meaning in this sense is slow, because
LINGUI STIC SIGN?
the body must allow itself to b e inhabited by the chromatic power o r settle in this withdrawing area, for the blue's meaning to actualize itself.30 In the absence of such a settlement, the color will be recognized at best, able to func tion as the element of a communicational code, that is, as a graphic signal. The space in which it is situated in this case is entirely different from the expanse the eye carves out and opens in the picture when the body is allowed to cohabit with the color. Temporality is related to the sign while achrony belongs to the purely recognizable linguistic term. This achrony, which guarantees linguistic signifiers their omnitemporal ity, proceeds from the double articulation.31 The first articulation to which speakers have immediate access is the one that assembles significative units, but this articulation in turn rests on a layer of secondary articulation where smaller, exclusively distinctive units are combined. This organization isolates the signifYing linguistic term from its referent, guarantees its autonomy in relation to all forms ofmotivation, and places it in a position independent of the speaker's or the situation's temporality. If the smallest unit of language were motivated, signifYing could not be distinguished from expressing, and the configuration of the signifier could not be separated from the situation in which the sign is produced: a scream, for example, or a groan, which are concrete expressions. This would match the case imagined by Andre Mar tinet, where motivation puts such pressure on the signifier that the former alters it at each occurrenceY It would then be impossible to attach constant signification to an expression itself deprived of stability. The double articula tion allows expressions that should otherwise never be compared to achieve recognition since, however different one from the other, they appear succes sively in the experience of speech. The double articulation freezes the con figuration of the signifier in such a way that it becomes recognizable at two different moments, despite the duration that has already swept up the first expression in its flow while the second comes into being. In principle, it is impossible to establish the identity or the gap between two sounds produced at intervals, particularly when these are significant, if one does not have at hand a referential system allowing the sounds to co incide, thus freeing them from the position they occupy at the time of their utterance, in order to bring them back to an order of simultaneity in which
L I N GUISTIC S I G N ?
they can become comparable. Here one comes up against a classic problem, that of measurement in the temporal order, except that communication re quires from the linguistic sign that it be recognizable in every respect, and not only by its length. The opposition between short and long might well constitute what Paul Claudel calls the "fundamental iamb" which, in its sim plicity, can pass as the paradigm for all significative opposition. Nevertheless, language
[langue]
draws upon many more distinctive features than duration,
if only because the organs of phonation form a group with a much richer array of distinctive features than a mere whistle. Writing seems to offer the possibility of constituting such a referential system, by resorting to the sign's inscription in an exterior space that is the order of simultaneities; it appears to owe nothing to spoken language, as far as solving the problem of the signifier's positioning is concerned. Indeed, it is the material support upon which writing inscribes its figures that ensures the function of omnitemporality indispensable to the recognition of signs and their communication. This solution appears to be denied speech, which, if we are to believe Saussure, has to do with a one-dimensional continuum, namely time.33 Here the concrete nature of the signifYing unit, the fact that it is impossible to decompose it in independent and stable units, would have as its inevitable corollary, as we said, its unicity, since it would be impossible to establish any relation, whether of identity or difference, between this and another unit produced at another moment. How to prevent the signifier from being valid only in the context in which it has been uttered, and its expressive potential from increasing at the expense of its communicability? It should be noted that speech itself presupposes a form of spatializing and that the vocal signifier is no less composed of unmotivated elements than writing. No doubt a fine ear and a well-trained memory are prerequi sites if one wishes to recognize, from one utterance to the next, a sound with its distinctive amplitude, frequency, and intensity-in other words, its physi cal identity-all the more if the interval between the different auditions is considerable. Moreover, an accurate voice and extensive practice are neces sary to produce it. On the other hand, to emit and hear a sound that can be deemed identical to itself through repeated utterances is easy if there is always the possibility of situating it distinctly in a system of sounds. Such is
L I N G U I S T I C S IG N ?
the difference Troubetzkoy established between phonetics and phonology.34 The principle behind the latter is that one need only distinguish a sound from the nearest surrounding sounds to convey signification in the most efficient way possible. In this respect, the voice's timbre or intensity counts for little, for what in fact is heard in speech is not the acoustic vibration it self, but the gap separating it from others nearby-gap thanks to which the signifier may be identified and signification understood. When speaking, the speaker need not concern her- or himself with executing faithfully the indications provided by a kind of(entirely imaginary) score. Suffice it for her or him to produce an Is/ that cannot be confused with III, an /au/ that can not be mistaken for / u : /, etc., if the language in which she or he expresses her- or himself relies on these oppositions to distinguish meanings
(!saul
"so," and IIau/ "show" in English). The phoneme is thus defined not by its audible identity, but by its placement in a constellation of units; it stands out in relation to each of these through the position it occupies on differ ent "axes" corresponding to the various "distinctive features": vocal/nonvo cal, consonant/inconsonant, compact/diffuse, etc.35 The distinctive feature is the smallest unit making the distinction between two phonemes possible.36 From one language to another, two apparently identical phonemes-say, II I in "shoe" and II I in Kirsche-must in reality be distinguished if one of the two enters in an opposition that the other does not recognize: as is here the case of the German II I, which is opposed to the IfY/ of Kirche, a phoneme absent in English. What allows the appreciation of the linguistic sign to be immediate and foolproof, and thus what facilitates fluid communication, is that sound recognition can always be reduced to the simplest possible opera tion, determined by yes or no. I have no knowledge whatsoever of the physi cal properties of the /h/ uttered here and now by my interlocutor, while he holds forth about a hat; at the very least, for the utterance to be recognized and the message to be unambiguous, he and I need only to be able to distin guish it from a /k/ and an /m/. This articulation of the spoken chain into purely distinctive units is what sets language apart from all other semiological systems. The double articulation's essential function is not merely to compensate for the fleet ingness of the uttered sign, by making its identification possible; it would
LINGUISTIC SIGN?
·
be if spoken language represented the totality o f communicative language. The latter, however, can also be written. Now what distinguishes writing is not at all that it is a trace in visible space (for drawing, too, is such a trace) but that this trace, like spoken language, makes use of strictly distinctive conventional units (letters) to form significative units (words), and that the letters are easily recognized only because they belong to an invariable system of strokes (graphemes). The space of signification is not visible space, but the space of the system. This is why, in the order of oral communication too, the anchoring of significations can be carried out only by the same kind of spa tialization imposed on the signifiers. The distinctive feature is "dimension," the y-coordinate registering the gap between two neighboring phonemes. We imagine this gap as a distance on an "axis,"37 a legitimate move ifwe con sider that the distance between /h/ and /k/ is that which, on the frequency reading, separates the low from the high pitch, and which, as such, actually marks a discontinuity of position observable across the expanse. Further, the space described by the spectroscope is itself a derivation, for there is a basic spatialization acting as its support: the production of words implies that the volume and form of the body's interior expanse-of this kind of intimate exteriority where the fate of words is played out-be affected in a finely tuned manner. This is where the principle determining the realization of dis tinctive phonemes resides: in the differences in position of the organs used for phonation. The abstract configuration of the table of distinctive features has as its empirical equivalent the configuration of the phonatory cavity.38 Speech, like writing, frees itself from its site ofinscription, by registering and observing gaps that are entirely unmotivated as far as the expressive power of this locus is concerned; the visible aesthetic space is reduced to the level of mere support for signs that are intrinsically alien to it; and as for the space constituted by the phonatory cavity, the gaps will be registered and observed with such precision that the slightest variation provoked in this hollow by the interplay of the different resonators will suffice to produce easily identifi able signifiers and to communicate signification. Here the difference we sought to establish between the linguistic term and the sign comes across vividly. The formation of phonatory habits en abling the production of words entails the elimination of numerous phonic
LINGUI STIC SIGN?
possibilities. The fine-tuning o f the organs o f the phonatory cavity is ob tained through the repression of the force that uses these organs to produce harshly motivated expressions: the scream, the groan, "chirping." This fine tuning is mainly the work of the ear;39 it signifies the interiorization of the virtual space of language
[langue]
into the real space of the body proper,
as well as the latter's expropriation. Following Antonin Artaud, we can as sume that a highly developed use of articulated language
[langage]
comes at
the cost of a dispossession of expressive phonic space. The thickness of the groan, the pant, the laugh, and the scream makes these sounds into signs: motivated by situations, they can be extracted from the speaking body only when words fail it, when its distance to itself, conquered and embodied by the phonic space measured against the linguistic code, no longer holds and anti-language takes over and subverts the apparatus of communication. It is with respect to this subversion, to the deconstruction it performs in the production of distinctive units, that we perceive the existence of another side of the sign, a hidden-that is to say "expressed"-side. There are sounds in the aphasic's scream that are irrelevant to her or his mother tongue; in the pant there is an irresolvable equivocation that only the context can lay to rest, by determining if it refers to pain or pleasure; breath can be one's last or the one one catches; the nervous breakdown and hysterical laughter are, for a moment, indistinguishable. In all these sounds, the voice clouds over, turns its back to the order of arbitrariness, dips deep into other layers of its register for configurations that, even if not wholly natural, do not belong solely to communication; and what it brings back is not signification, but meaning. Freud stated that the dream treats words as things,40 that is, it cuts the syntagmatic chain differendy than language, combining the pieces of the chain with no regard for linguistic pertinence. 41 Likewise Artaud in the theatrical order: "It is not a question of doing away with articulated lan guage, but rather of endowing words with more or less the same importance they have in dreams . . . . To produce the metaphysics of articulated language is to encourage language to express what it does not express usually: it is to use it in a new, exceptional, unusual way; it is to restore its capacities of physical shattering; it is to divide and scatter it in space; it is to adopt the intonations in a concrete, absolute manner, giving them back the power they
LINGUISTIC SIGN?
had to tear and truly manifest something; it is to turn against language and its utilitarian, one could say monetary, preoccupations, against its origins as , hunted beast; it is, lastly, to consider language in the form of the
tion."42
Incanta
Similar concerns are to be found in Luciano Berio's studies, whose
aim is to identifY the trajectory from vital noise to communicable term: you hear signification conquer or lose itself as the terrible expressive violence of the scream and of silence is relegated or discovered; you apprehend by what repression the constituents of discourse take shape, and how the term is the annihilated sign. 43
Effect of Thickness in the System
Once evacuated from the spoken and written chain through the elimination of the expressive function of sounds and lines, does opacity not retreat to a higher level, in signification? Is there not a thickness of the signified, in the very existence of words; for example, in the possibility of breaking them down into monemes?1 And is this not what the theorist stumbles upon when discovering that the lexical system, as opposed to the syntactic system, has the property of being an "open'' inventory, of taking on new terms and aban doning old ones-all ofwhich suggests the metaphor of a semanticfield, and therefore of a
horizon
disappear in turn, like
on which significations would come into relief and
things?
If an inventory is not limited, which indeed seems to be the case with lexical monemes,2 it would be difficult to deny signification an evanescent and intangible character that would prevent the term that carries it from occupying a fixed place in a system of oppositions. Signification would thus find itself pushed out beyond the system of significative units, inasmuch as it could embody any one of these units, then abandon it, only to invest another, without ever seeming to be frozen in an invariant set of oppositions. It would therefore be tempting to sideline the strictly systematizing pronouncement of the Prague School-"Since in lexical consciousness words are opposed to one another and mutually coordinated, they constitute systems that are for mally analogous to morphological systems and likely, as such, to be available to the linguist's inquiry"3-in favor of the definition of the linguistic field given by Jost Trier in 1934: "Fields are linguistic realities existing between single words and the total vocabulary; they are parts of a whole and resemble words in that they combine into some higher unit, and the vocabulary in that they resolve themselves into smaller units."4 Without going any further, these two formulations allow one to grasp
E F F E C T OF T H I C K N E S S I N T H E S Y S T E M
what lies beneath the question of signification. Josef Vachek establishes the formal analogy between the system of significative units and that of distinc tive units, but he does so with reference to the speaker's experience ofvocabu lary. No hiatus here between the speaking subject's lexical consciousness and the most unconscious system of all, the phonological system: the phoneme's transparency is positioned on a par with the thickness of the word. Hence the absence of anything like the idea of afield. This idea refers to a finitude in which the word's openness onto its surroundings and the system's closure are combined.5 Notwithstanding, it is the one who introduces this concept . in linguistic reflection, Trier, who carries the formalist ambition the furthest in the study of semantic fields.6 What remains in question, for us at least, in these curious torsions is the localization of the level of language [langage] where the effect of thickness of signification is produced. This localization can occur in two orders, of language [langue] or of speech [parole] (to fol low Saussure's terminology); and in each of these two orders, it can occur at various levels: in the order of speech, at the level of significative unit-word, sentence, and discourse; and in the order oflanguage [langue], at the level of paradigmatic groupings-"fields," subsystems, and lexical system. Here we will only pinpoint an anxiety and an uncertainty in Saussure's reflection that foreshadow his followers' hesitations. His conception of structure leads him to subsume all of signification under articulation, that is, under the system of intervals between terms or system of values. Yet, at the same time, he does not give up on an idea of signification that opposes the latter to value as the vertical is opposed to the horizontal or depth is to sur face. What could pass as a weakness for a linguist bent on limiting his study to the structure oflanguage [langue], that is, the temptation to introduce the thickness of the sign in the transparency of the system, is in fact much more than a mistake or a sign of naivete. Rather, a fact, which one could call tran scendental, thus comes to light: that every discourse constitutes its object in depth. When this discourse is the linguist's, and she or he takes signification as the object of study, she or he spontaneously thematizes it as something thick, and is led to posit signification as a sign. In fact, this depth is an ef fect of the object's position produced by actual discourse, the latter keeping signification at bay, establishing it as sign to the same extent as any object.
E F F E C T OF T H I C K N E S S I N T H E S Y S T E M
The editors o f Saussure's Cours lay considerable stress o n the duality of axes required to think signification through: "The paradoxical part of it is this. On the one hand, the concept appears to be just the counterpart of a sound pattern, as one constituent part of a linguistic sign. On the other hand, this linguistic sign itself, as the link uniting the two constituent ele ments, likewise has counterparts. These are the other signs in the language [langue] ."71he handwritten notes are no less explicit: "We have just asserted that language [langue] represents a system where all the terms may be con sidered connected. The value of a word results only from the coexistence of the different terms; the value is the counterpart of the coexisting terms. How does this combine with what is the counterpart of the sound pattern?"8 1he counterpart of the sound pattern is what Saussure sometimes calls significa tion, while value is always the counterpart of the other coexisting terms. One could say that they stand at a 90-degree angle from one another. Indeed, rectangular vectors figure in the notes of students: "Value [in its general sense] is determined by a dissimilar thing that one can exchange: t ; it is also determined by similar things that one can compare: - - ."9 From this opposition between the two dimensions, Saussure draws a comparison bor rowed from economics: "In a 20 franc coin, determination of value: 1. I can exchange it for so many pounds of bread; 2. I compare it with a one franc coin from the same system . . . . Likewise, we will not be able to determine a word's signification by only taking into account the exchangeable object. We must also relate it to the similar series of comparable words."10 It is one thing for the signifier mutton to be exchangeable for the signifier mouton in order to determine its value's aspect of signification; but it is only when the signifier is compared, or not, to another signifier-sheep--that it will receive its exact, clear value.U In this last case, one recognizes the measured op position, the product of the constant intervals in the plane of the linguistic grid,u while the exchange of "sound pattern" for the "concept" belongs to the model of oral communication that Saussure took as the starting point for his reflection, and which obviously illustrates not the system of language [langue] but the experience of the situation of speech. Now, it is from speech that the major theme derives, that of the linguistic sign's immanent duality in signified and signifier, a theme that evokes a kind of thickness of this sign,
E F F E C T OF T H I C K N E S S IN T H E S Y S T E M
93
as can be seen with the comparison of the sheet ofpaper, which, like the sign, possesses a
back and afront. 13
But then how to understand that signification offers at once the trans parency that we saw in it at the outset, and the opacity that the duality of the sign determines in it? Signification, we argued, is translucent, marked by the immediate presence ofthe signified and the transparency of the signifier; we opposed it to the thickness of designation, to that distance that makes what one speaks of something on which we have our sights, something on which to keep one's eye, something to be looked at, something one seeks to approach. Now that we have been encouraged by Saussure to place "sig nification" in another pairing where it finds itself contrasted to "value," we observe that this new opposition grants it the opposite meaning to the one it received previqusly. When it found itself opposed .to designation-which indicates what one speaks of, and belongs to visual experience14-significa tion seemed to be only a matter for the system of language
[langue], which
is what permitted us to refer it to the negativity immanent in this system; we indicated as much when we placed it at the heart of the presumption of sufficiency that characterizes language
[langage].
But placed in opposition
to value-which, according to Saussure, is strictly "horizontal"-the same signification finds itself endowed instead with a kind of thickness, or verti cal depth. And undeniably, we have just seen that Saussure introduces the theme in a way that places signification on the side of speech and value on the side oflanguage
[langue]. Overall, then, signification appears sometimes
endowed with the transparency ofideality, to which the opacity of reference or designation is opposed, and sometimes with the depth of the visible its "positivity," writes Saussure15-against value that belongs entirely to the grid's system of spacings. Is this due to an uncertainty at the level of concept, a consequence of a terminology that, by borrowing the image of oppositionality from spatiality, contents itself with necessarily imprecise metaphors? Or does this slippage in the status of signification not betray, rather, the position of hinge that sig nification occupies between the two spaces? One should recall that on this term of signification two nomenclatures with different destinations over lap. The first belongs to Saussure's reflection on the sign's arbitrariness, later
E F F E C T OF T H I C K N E S S IN T H E S Y S T E M
developed and amended by Benveniste; the other comes out of the reflection on the structure immanent in the linguistic system, which is already pres ent in Saussure, and which Jakobson (after Troubetzkoy) aimed to extend to all aspects of language
[/angage]. No
need to return to the first; as for the
second, there is no doubt that S aussure tended to reduce signification com pletely to value, thereby privileging the negativity of language
that of speech
[parole]. "The
[langue]
over
meaning of a term depends on the presence
or absence of a neighboring term. From the system, we arrive at the idea of value, not of meaning. The system leads to the term. At that point we will recognize that signification is determined by what is around . . . . The word does not exist without a signified and a signifier: but the signified is only the summary of the linguistic value presupposing the interplay of terms between them . . . . What is in the word is never determined by anything else than the combination of what surrounds it, associatively and syntagmatically."16 Extending this line of reasoning, Jakobson, after having distinguished the syntactic from the semantic, will be quick to claim the "intrinsically lin guistic" character of the semanticY By "intrinsically linguistic," read that the dimension of signification must be, according to Jakobson, entirely con ceived of according to the principle of the constant spacing that governs phonological analysis and allows for the construction of the grid of lan guage
[langue]. Giving back to linguists the characteristic of the semantic, or
at least the concern for it, is necessarily, from a structuralist perspective, to identify signification with value, thereby refusing to understand signification as the relation between the sign and the thing. Jakobson thus adopts the dis tinction Benveniste had established from the other direction of thought, be tween signification and designation. This is precisely what allows Jakobson to deny signification the depth of visual space that we recognized in desig nation. The inclusion of signification in the linguistic field, conducted under Peirce's authority, is justified by the fact that, to be understood, all signs re quire an "interpretant" and that "the function of this interpretant is fulfilled by another sign, or group of signs that are provided concurrently with the sign in question, or that could be substituted for it."18 Jakobson goes on to write: "Peirce gives an incisive definition of the
language,
main structural mechanism of
when he demonstrates that any sign can be translated by another
E F F E C T OF T H I C K N E S S I N T H E S Y S T E M
95
sign in which it is more fully developed."19 As for our question of whether or not signification belongs to the measured interval or to movable distance, it is obvious that if the interpretant is itself conceived of as a sign, we will be forced to admit that the signified of a signifier is itself 'a signifier-thereby doing away completely with the rift between a plane of the signifier and a plane of the signified. Saussure seemed to concede that however unrealizable this rift was in practice, it had to be preserved as a necessary theoretical op position. Signification thus finds itself ousted from its position ofverticality, emptied of its depth, and subjected to the same treatment as the horizontal "opposition'' that served as guide for the elaboration of phonological models.
"All linguistic signification is differential.
Linguistic significations are differ ential in the same way as phonemes, which are differential phonic units. Lin
guists know that, besides phonemes, the sounds of speech offer contextual as well as optional, or situational, variants (in other words, 'allophones' and 'metaphones'). Similarly, at the semantic level one finds contextual significa tions and situational significations. But only the existence ofinvariant elements
makes itpossible to recognize the variations. At the level of meaning as well as of sound, the problem of invariants is crucial for the analysis of a given state of a given language . . . . If you do not like the word 'meaning' because of its ambiguity, we can speak simply of semantic invariants-and these are no less important for linguistic analysis than phonological invariants."20 In this passage, in which the ambiguity of meaning 21 is challenged ex plicitly, I have italicized the two sentences that constitute an answer to my question on the space of signification. The answer being that this space is identical to that of value, in the Saussurean sense of the term; that the varia tions that can be observed there are, logically, secondary; that these presup pose invariant intervals between the signifiers; and that these fixed spacings
are, strictly speaking, the signification-the latter requiring the identification of the terms of the segments and, at the same time, the absence of the one when the other is present in discourse. Such a reduction appears legitimate: from the structuralist perspective, which grants primacy to facts oflanguage
[langue]
over those of speech
[parole], it becomes necessary to
abandon the
S aussurean concept of signification, whose source, we noted, is rooted in the actual dialogic experience, and accept only, as epistemological category,
E F F E C T OF T H I C K N E S S I N T H E S Y S T E M
the one that applies to the system i n general-that is, the invariant interval. It follows that signification must be "laid flat," so to speak, over the grid of signs, just as oral expression had been over the grid of phonemes. Thus the scruple that held Saussure back from extending the principle of difference to relations of signification is overcome, and the positivity he glimpsed in the semantic order eradicated. Signification can then be restored in the clarity we assumed it possessed on the basis of the speaking subject's experience, for if /hOrs/ immediately conveys "horse" for the English speaker, to the point, as we said, that it is im possible to have the "concept" without the "sound pattern'' or vice versa, it is precisely, argues Jakobson, because the two planes-of the signified and the signifier-are in fact inseparable. Indeed, the whole signification of /h6rs/ is determined by the grid of adjoining monemes that can establish with /hOrs/ the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations included in the code of the En glish language. Take the simplest case, that of lexical monemes
(lexemes in
Martinet's nomenclature), and open the dictionary to know the significa tion of "horse." The entry corresponding to the word indicates two types of operation, usually distinguished typographically: on the one hand, it offers other monemes likely to be substituted for the one under consideration; on the other, it indicates exemplary instances in which the word appears, each context circumscribing a meaning with the least ambiguity possible. In the first case, the proposed operation is what Jakobson calls substitution or se lection; in the second, combination or contexture.22 The word can be placed in a relation of similarity with other words (what Saussure called associative relation); it can also be placed in a sequential, or syntagmatic, relation. In short, the word's signification provided by the dictionary is nothing other than the virtual set of constraints governing its use by the speaker. And the latter is so aware of these that when she or he uses the signifier /hors/, all the constraints converge as it were toward the area of full luminosity-that is, the pure actuality of the uttered word-and that some of them will in turn be actualized to grant the utterance its substance. The lexeme's signification is therefore nothing but the system of paradigmatic and syntagmatic oppo sitions in which it is positioned by the code of language
[langue]. Its depth
E F F E C T OF T H I C K N E S S IN T H E S Y S T E M
is a consequence of the fact that the speaking subject obviously cannot say everything at the same time-providing in her or his utterance all the sub stitutable and combinative options surrounding the word in question-but that, on the contrary, she or he must cut through the table of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations along a single vector which is that of the dis course she or he is uttering; and thus, never actualizing more than a small part of the semantic field in which the word is located, she or he must
cast in shadow the rest, thereby creating opacity and depth. The latter is an empty
depth, while the "fullness" of signification lies in the measured intervals of language
[langue];
and if the speaker cannot have the signifier without the
signified, she or he knows that the term, as an inseparable entity, is nothing but the tip of a multiplicity of segments that keep it at an invariable distance from the terms situated at the other tips. Now if one were to ask upon what, nonetheless, depends this appear ance of depth that signification takes, one might think it easy to show that its roots go back to the same "mistake" Benveniste denounced regarding the thesis of the linguistic sign's arbitrariness. The illusion of the signified-a clinging one, forged by centuries of idealist realism-originates, one will argue, in the transfer of the relation of designation onto that of signification in a kind of 90-degree rotation that aligns the designated onto the signified, leading the latter. to merge with the object. A kind of lining of the world is thus founded, which Platonic myth named "thinkable," intelligible, but whose character Platonic dialectics (for example, at the beginning of Par
menides)
easily shows precisely to be unthinkable in its relation to the signi
fier. It is because the signified is granted the same status as the designated, because it is placed at the end of a mutable distance separating it from the signifier; because it is turned into an essence conceived of exactly on the model of the thing's being language
[etant], and therefore because within the grid of
[langue] is brought to bear a "perspective" that is impossible there
according to which what is aimed at and intentionalized offers itself to the speaking subject-that signification, in the end, can appear simultaneously to manifest and conceal a signified, and can signifY it according to this re lation of depth, of figure on ground, that belongs to our experience of the
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E F F E C T OF T H I C K N E S S IN T H E S Y S T E M
visible. What is true is the immediate presence of the signified, which is none other than the potential of the operations that envelop the signifier when it appears in the spoken chain: there is no signified, except as mirage. Still, it is difficult to be satisfied with this "clarification'' argued in posi tivist terms, for there remains in any case to be understood where this "mis take" comes from that redoubles seeing in comprehension, that transforms the signified into a horizon for the mind's eye. In the end we will have to concede that, like all illusions, the illusion of the depth of signification is well-founded, so well-founded, in fact, that even the linguist inevitably falls for it. When an English speaker says /hors/, the signified is here, for her or him, immediately given with the signifier: thus is transparency "glued," in opposition to the spacing of designation, for, as far as the object is concerned, it is still over there. But if the linguist, when attempting to locate the signi fied, is led to set it back onto another plane, to turn it into a "substance" of sorts as we saw with Saussure, it is not only due to a kind of realist naivete, and for lack of fluency in transcendental philosophy. The truth is that, even after Kant and Husserl, this "realism" is, in fact, natural, and one must explain how it insinuates itself even into the scholar's description of the semantic plane. I would argue that this inability to seize the negative in its pure state, as Godel put it, that this impulse to place there something that is not there, that this reif}ring drive is wholly attributable to the fact that the linguist speaks in the very act of uttering the system of values. The mutable space of the aim [visie], which is that of speech, infiltrates the system's phonological or semantic description not as a blunder, but rather as the linguistic method's acknowledged right. To grasp the clarity of /hors/ one must obscure it by varying the gaps that define its semantic environment. Such an obscuring aims to institute the invariable space oflangua�e [langue], but the result can be achieved only through the variations of utterances, through the game of depth-the game that will make signification go from the position of felt immediacy to the status of intellected mediation. The inclusion of thickness or depth in signification-that is, the introduction of a "visible" space pre cisely where the speaker is deprived of one-results from the work of "mo bilization'' of what was implicitly stable. The system of values, according to which the use of the word "horse" is determined in speech, is indeed detected
E F F E C T OF T H I C K N E S S IN T H E S Y S T E M
thanks to the technique of selection, which is merely the implementation of the principle of pertinence: could I use "horse" in the same way if, for examp1e, the oppos1t10ns "horseImare," "horse/horses, " or "horseINorse" came to disappear from the system of language [langue]? This simple question is enough to inject mobility into purportedly invariant intervals and is, strictly speaking, the negation of negation: thanks to it, depth burrows itself under the signification of /hOrs/. This does not prevent signification from remaining transparent in ordi nary use, and it would be superficial to declare this transparency an illusion. For such an immediacy belongs irrevocably to our experience of speech: to try to "demystifY" it would be about as logical as a psychoanalyst deciding to give up the study of consciousness on the pretense that the latter is deceived by �he unconscious and is intrinsically misconception. On the contrary, this transparency of the signified in discourse is necessarily presupposed, includ ing, foremost, by the linguist even when she or he strives to make known its "conditions" by replacing the term in an underlying and autonomous system, that is to say, by casting it in shadow. For every speaking speech [parole par/ante], opacity comes "before" discourse, in that dimension of openness we refer to as designation. When the linguist takes this very signification, its transparency, as the horizon line of her or his discourse and attempts to thematize it, to manifest it as an effect of meaning strictly subordinated to an environment of values in a system so tightly measured that the slightest modification of one of the values can only have repercussions on this signifi cation-as she or he speaks like this, mediatizing the immediate, obscuring transparency, relativizing the un-relative-her or his speech again combines other equally "transparent" significations, in order to measure itself against the theme it aims for, to incorporate what it designates into it as signified. One thus sees in the linguist's very practice the clear and the opaque trade places. It is conventional wisdom to say that all thought "implies a somber share of shadow," since one imagines intentionality as that fiery paintbrush setting the noema ablaze, and since fire does not illuminate itself This yarn is accura.te insofar as it applies to our experience of meaning: the unveiling of the quid [what] goes hand in hand with the concealment of the quo modo [how].23 But if one thinks about the plane oflanguage [langage] in and ·
·
100
E F F E C T O F T H I C K N E S S IN T H E S Y S T E M
through which this "clarification" takes place, and if one takes a closer look at the torsions and rotations provoked in this plane by the linguist's activity, one observes the opposite effect: this work, which like any scientific work consists first in obscuring clarity, in dispelling the obvious, in transgressing limits, can occur only in the immediate clarity of the language [langue] in which it operates. By clarity here I mean that though this language [langue] could be as scholarly and sophisticated as one would like, it will always in the end need to fall back on linguistic experience, on terms and on syntag matic and paradigmatic relations that it will not have establishedbutfound, to draw upon a lexis and a syntax "older" than itsel£ It is a known fact that the strictest axiomatic requires the use of a common language [langue] through which to comment on its elaboration. This is the ground that remains when all scaffolding is removed and the axiomatic appears suspended at its apex. This play of light and dark, of signification and designation, belongs to every metalanguage. Linguistics marks that moment when language takes itself as object. So long as it positions itself at the tip of the aim [visee], it obscures itself as designated: linguistic discourse is thus a discourse that draws the night over discourse. This night is the depth of designation. It consists precisely-like the night of dreams and of incest-in violating the
ratio, in varying the invariants. On the one hand these variations can only be imaginary, as they presuppose, in their formulation, the invariants they sub vert. On the other, these invariants themselves are "constituted," in a Hus serlian sense, by the acts of unbridled freedom that are the variations, and the latter, far from being illusory, appear "archaeological." Once again we need not decide if the negative of the figural comes logically, ontologically, or epistemologically before the verbal negative. We must be wary of this temptation to decide: structuralism already fell victim to it, as we learned from Jakobson. But temptation also lurks when we are inclined to respond to the enthusiasm of the structure with that of intentionality, and to counter the preeminence of the invariant over variation with the argument that, after all, it is through the latter that the former is constituted. There is, therefore, no such thing as a "thickness" of signification, other than through an epistemological illusion apparent in Saussure's Course that leads the linguist to redouble and transfer onto linguistic signification the
E F F E C T OF T H I C K N E S S IN T H E S Y S T E M
configuration that applies to designation. My speech aims for something: this is the mobile distance from the word to the "thing"; but this depth originates in discourse. In the system of language [langue] taken as object, in the architecture of signification, this distance does not exist at all: here there is no "verticality," only the horizontal spaces that determine the values in the signifying order. Yet it is this depth-in reality none other than that of intentionality or of the separation of a subject from its objects-that first Saussure, followed by other linguists, reintroduce at the core of the object language [objet-langage], between the signifier and the signified, something like a perpendicular dimension to that of the relations of value. But once again, there is no eye to "see" within the object-language [objet-langue], and signifiers could not "signify" anything of the signifieds, could not "replace" anything other than themselves, "a concept" for example, as Saussure says. The thickness of the sign is that which opens in front of the object of discourse. It is hardly aberrant that at its beginnings structuralist linguistics would have been tempted, if not to confuse this thickness with the rela tion of signification, then at least to maintain it alongside this relation. The linguist is destined to suffer the same fate as any other speaker: we cannot speak without tracing this distance between our discourses and its object. This distance is what Saussure placed at the heart of the "sign," yet it is this very distance that must be evacuated from the sign by the consideration of the system of language [langue]. What lies behind this parapraxis [acte manque] is the impossibility of settling in the absolute of totality. Our kin ship with the visual and the libidinal reaches even in our logical claims to combinatorics. Reflecting on the way to reconcile the presence of the two axes in Saussure's thinking-the vertical axis that relates signifier and signi fied within the "sign," and the horizontal axis that relates the terms with one another in their exteriority--Godel observes that "The internal relation presupposes the external relation. However, in the order of the account, the latter comes after the former: the nature of the sign is the first question to come to the fore, once language [langue] has been distinguished from speech [parole]; the nature of the system and of the terms appears only at the mo ment when one broaches static linguistics."24 Hence the horizontal concept of signification-the external relation of the terms between them-belongs
IOI
E F F ECT OF T H I C K N E S S I N T H E S Y S T E M
t o the order o f the system, o f developed science, while the order o f the ac count, belonging to
Bildung,
to science in the making, to the mind building
the mediation between the terms, requires that one start from the sign as opaque immediacy and from signification as the signified's overhang on the signifier. But how to understand this "starting from"? Does it announce the program of a phenomenology, the story of a mind marching toward to tality, dissipating the illusion of thickness? I believe nothing of the sort. No knowledge-discourse will ever get the better of the opacity in question, regardless of Hegel's claims to the contrary; difference is not a moment act ing as a springboard toward identity or opposition; the fact that signification itself passes as sign only serves to indicate that there is a power of the sign, a power of the being-sign capable of investing the object with any referential relation. A compulsion of opacity exists that requires that what one speaks of be declared lost.
Thickness on the Margins of D iscourse
A decade before Saussure, Gottlob Frege had understood and developed this effect of positionality, establishing that the words' opening onto refer ence belongs to actual discourse and not to the virtual system of language [langue], suggesting moreover that there is silent meaning or thickness on this side of significations, lodged this time at the heart of discourse itself, in its form. The separation of the two vectors that allowed Benveniste to locate the arbitrary nature of linguistic signs overlaps exactly with the distinction Frege posits between Sinn and Bedeutung.1 This last remark is more than a mere anomaly, for Frege's reflection goes far beyond a formalist revision regarding propositional calculus; it follows a Kantian lineage when it starts from the separation between an a a type equation, which is analytical, and the equation of the a b variety, which implies an increase in knowledge, but needs to be justified. Above all, Frege's reflection culminates in an organiza tion of the space of discourse and thought that will serve as reference for the Bussed of the Logical Investigations as much as for the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, becoming, with its intersecting dimensions, the matrix of intentional as well as analytical philosophy. It is important to return to the point where, on the one hand, the exclusion of designa tion in favor of signification, and on the other, the burying of the Sinn's key structure under intentional analyses, are not yet completed, where the union of the two great Kantian themes of the transcendental as subjectivity and the transcendental as structure is not undone, but on the contrary refined especially since Frege's conclusions find, in certain results and omissions of structural linguistics, an echo that makes his reflection all the more timely. An expression such as a b encapsulates the whole problem of the sign. If it turns out to be true, it would mean that one could take b instead of a; but a is not b, and their difference is maintained in the formulation of their =
=
=
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T H I C K N E S S ON T H E M A R G I N S OF D I S C O U R S E
identity. What constitutes this difference? I f b differed only from
a
as an
object
(als Gegenstand), for example through its form and not in the way it designates (bezeichnet), the expression a b would have the same knowledge value as the expression a a, and their difference would be trivial. However, =
=
their difference is so important that it contains the entire opposition between the analytic and the synthetic, the entire gain in knowledge. The difference, then, consists in the way in which the designated is given respectively by
a 2 and by b. Let us assume M is the point where the three median lines x, y, z of a triangle intersect. One can designate M as the point of intersection of x
and y, or y and z. These two designations each indicate
(deuten) a different
way of presenting the designated object: this is what grants the statement "the point of intersection of x and y is the point of intersection ofy and
z" a
positive knowledge value. One must therefore distinguish between the sign's
Bedeutung, its designation, involving the exteriority of the designated, and its Sinn, consisting in the way the object is given (die Art des Gegebenseins). The Bedeutung of the expression "point of intersection between x and y" is the same as that of the expression "point of intersection ofy and z," but not its Sinn. This is not to suggest that if reference is objective, signification would be subjective. To emphasize how far he stands from a psychologizing interpre tation, and to locate signification precisely within objectivity, Frege provides a new coupling where signification is this time opposed to "representation''
( Vorstellung). The latter can vary from
one subj ect to the next, while signi
fication is independent of the word's or the expression's formulation. The phrase "a new day is born" can elicit various representations, images, feelings, depending on the listener, but each and every listener, if knowledgeable of the English language, will understand it in the same way. Thus emerges the concept of a non-reif)ring objectivity, for which Frege provides as model the image of the moon in the lens of a telescope: "I compare the moon itself to the reference
(Bedeutung);
it is the object of the observation, mediated by
the real image projected by the object glass in the interior of the telescope and by the retinal image of the observer. The former I compare to the sense
[signification] (Sinn), the latter is like the idea [representation] ( Vorstellung) [intuition] (Anschauung)."3 Signification is thus endowed with
or experience
ros
T H I C K N E S S ON T H E M A R G I N S OF D I S C O U R S E
the same objectivity a s that o f the physical image i n the "objective": it is
einseitig
[one-sided] and depends on the position of the observation point,
but is the same for all the observers standing in any one place. Hence signi fication has no more to do with persons than designation; what does is the world of images that signification can give rise to in each of us. The correla tion between our representations and, say, the text of a poem is unverifiable, "free"; similarly, the dream separates us from the objectivity of Sinn, pressing us into another element that is not communicable, or at least not easily so. If Frege chooses not to dwell on this relation between sign and
lung
Vorstel
since the problem he sets out to elucidate is not that of the expression
-
of "subjectivity," but rather that of the position of objectivity in discourse his analysis of the two dimensions of meaning is, for its part, crucial. As Frege writes, a "proper noun"-that is, any sign or group of signs, whether words or not, to which corresponds a definite object and not a concept or a
[signification] (driickt seinen Sinn aus), stands for or designates its reference (bedeutet oder bezeichnet seine Bedeutung). By means of a sign we express its sense [signification] and designate its reference (wir driicken mit einem Zeichen dessen Sinn aus und bezeichen mit ihm dessen Bedeutung)."5 1his duality of the dimensions of meaning [sens] is inescap able: it is pointless to object that, after all, one can make do with significa tion [signification] alone, and that nothing forces us to look for the reference relation4-"expresses its sense
behind the sign. To the skeptic who wonders why we should need to have "moon'' find a respondent in reality, Frege answers: "when we say 'the Moon,'
[representation] (Vorstellung) of the Moon, nor are we satisfied with the sense [signification] (Sinn) alone, but we presuppose a reference (sondern wir setzen eine Bedeutung voraus)."6 we do not intend to speak of our idea
When what is at issue is no longer the proper noun but the declarative statement, Frege will go on to assert just as vehemently the inalienable char acter of the search for the designated. Understood in its totality, the declara tive statement possesses an objective thought content, independent of the thinker; just as in the case of the proper noun, signification is not subjected to the whims of the speakers' imaginations. But what about reference, of the dimension of designation in such a statement, to which not
one object can
correspond? Can we simply do without it? "Is it possible that a sentence as
T H I C KN E S S ON T H E M A R G I N S OF D I S C O U R S E
a whole hM only a sense
t
[dgniftca ion], but no
�
refcrence?"' When I
that "Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep," the sentence possesses signification but seems to lack a dimension ofdesignation since, in all probability, no object corresponds to one of the proper nouns it contains
(Odysseus). Frege's answer to this question warrants our attention. When, he argues, we listen to the epic poem in an aesthetic attitude, what fascinates us through the musicality of language is signification, and the images and sentiments it arouses. "Hence it is a matter of no concern to us whether the name 'Odysseus,' for instance, has reference, so long as we accept the poem as a work of art." But "the question of truth would cause us to abandon aesthetic delight for an attitude of scientific investigation."8 For we are in clined to want the proper noun to possess not only a signification but also a designation; on its own, the thought content of the statement leaves us unsatisfied. "It is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the sense
[signijication]
to the reference
[designation]."9
In the above answer we see the first sketch emerge of a complete table of the attitudes of speech that would force us to reflect on the language of art. When the statement is grasped for the
Vorstel/ung it can
generate, the grip
on the axis oflanguage occurs at the pole ofimages, which is individual, and this approach determines the aesthetic existence of speech, the poetic. A sec ond grip should be possible through signification alone, stripped ofits phan tasmatic resonances as well as its referential power; it would then induce a formalist attitude, using language as an objective totality in that the signi fieds would always be verifiable from one speaker to another-which would imply that we remain confined to the order of articulated language-and thus as a closed totality, since there would be no need to reveal signification by pitting it against something beyond itsel£ But Frege seems to suggest here that such a formalism is impossible since it is not in our power to summon words, and groups of words, in thought without referring their signification to an "object" that is not in them, but outside. This explains why this second type of grip on language finds no place in Frege's terminology, and why he considers the language of knowledge a form of speech in search of the ab sent object of which it is speaking. Thus all language is essentially open onto nonlanguage: the discourse of knowledge requires a transcendence directed
T H I C K N E S S ON T H E MAR G I N S OF D I S C O U R S E
toward things, within which it hunts down its object, while the discourse of art requires the opposite transcendence, issuing from the images that come to inhabit its words. On the one side defining speech, which tries to force the designated into invariant structure relations and to assimilate completely the designated into signified; on the other, expressive speech striving to open itself up to the space of vision and desire and to produce figurality with the signified. In both cases, language fascinated by what it is not, attempting in the latter case to possess it-this is the phantasy of science-on the other to be it-the phantasy of art. It is with considerable insight that Frege sees as a motive in the dis course of knowledge a striving, a Streben, a desire, thus provoking (this logi cian, this professor) in the meticulously sanitized problematic of knowledge a crack through which the theme reputed as being most foreign to knowl edge could creep in, whereas it is doubdess its core: the theme of desire. Frege even shows that the transcendence that refers every utterance to an object is essentially unknown to language: "If anything is asserted there is al ways an obvious presupposition that the simple or compound proper names used have reference. If one therefore asserts 'Kepler died in misery,' there is a presupposition that the name 'Kepler' designates something; but it does not follow that the sense (Sinn) of the sentence 'Kepler died in misery' contains the thought ( Gedanke) that the name 'Kepler' designates something." This could almost be Kant's refutation of the ontological argument: existence is not a concept. Frege adds, "If this were the case, the negation would have to run not 'Kepler did not die in misery' but 'Kepler did not die in misery, or the name "Kepler" does not have a reference."'10 Note in passing this proof's method: by negation. Yet an elementary Kantianism still lingers in the sketch of the table of meanings. In it the expressive and cognitive forms of discourse remain sepa rate, just as the celestial body and its retinal image are in the comparison of the telescope. Wanting-to-know and having-lost are not articulated with one another; art is not seen as "memory" of an identity of the word and the thing ofwhich science is the forgetting and the desperate repetition in the possessive register; knowledge as desire is not articulated with misrecognition as phan tasy. No doubt Frege is absolutely right to stay clear of the totalizing dialectics
T H I C K N E S S O N T H E M A R G I N S OF D I S C O U R S E
�
of the sensory into sensible, a dialectics by which he was hardly tern
far as we know. Frege nevertheless falls victim to the same psychologism that haunts the
Critique ofPure Reason (but which Kant will progressively shed as Vorstellung, and
he advanced in the critique of his criticism) when he places
all the power of meaning that poetry attaches to the image, on the side of the individual subject and of a communication-less interiority opposed to an ob jective and universally observable exteriority supposedly belonging to science. As if this subject and this object were not fragments from a primary explosion of which language was precisely the initial spark; as if reality, far from being that about which there is never anything but unanimity, could be approached otherwise than as that which is lost and must be found again; and as if, on the other hand, poetry and art in general didn't have everything to do not with
Vorstellungen but with tried-and-true objects. The real and
the imaginary are
not faculties, nor levels, nor even poles. One certainly cannot avoid falling into this spatializing of Being: it finds its justification precisely in the explosion that divides by unifYing, since this exteriority and this unity are space itsel£ But one must continually resist the convenience, even up to the validity of this imagery, if we want to recapture what made and continues to make possible the polarization of the object and the subject, of the thing and the image, of science and art, that is our lot. It would naturally be unfair to ask of Frege's article what it is not meant to give (despite the fact that this "mistake" awaits every text, as it is the general law of reading). But what it does give-the transcendence and the rule of commutation-deserves thorough consideration. Frege's double question is: What does it mean to say a
=
b? And under what conditions can one say it?
This is the problem of synthetic judgment, here understood in terms of se miology and no longer of criticism, which is how it comes up direcdy against the problem of arbitrariness and the modern theme of the two meanings of meaning. The answer to the first question is that one says a
=
b when a and b
are expressions that refer to the same object. "The Stagirite philosopher" and ''Alexander's tutor" are equivalent expressions because they share the same ref erence and aim for the same object. One thus sees what for Frege grounds the synthesis of judgment or, as one would say, governs the sentence's formation, namely, the discourse's opening onto what it speaks of. We can replace a phrase
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T H I C K N E S S O N T H E M A R G I N S OF D I S C O U R S E
with another without betraying the truth when both have the same referent in sight. The synthesizing process at work in the production of discourse must be seen as the movement of the speaker from one observation point to anQther from where the object seen from the first point will still be recognizable; as the experience of a mobility whose rule is to leave the aim
[visee]
untouched.
In this description of synthetic judgment two primary metaphors are seen to come into play, that of moving and of seeing. To speak is to jump from one reference point to another without letting what one is speaking of out of one's sight. The object is constituted as a horizon line toward which the expressions, like glances cast in its direction, will converge. A description remarkably close to the one we can venture, and which Husserl did, of perceptual experience and the constitution of the visual object: a unit of drafts, site where these grips take hold, where these instantaneous caresses take shape into a thick ness in which the object holds itself back like an X. We recognize the kind of negativity at the heart of Frege's analysis-visual transcendence-and what matters most in this transcendence: the remote bestowal in the mobility that engenders depth. This is the ekthesis of all synthesis, the originary explosion in which the sequence of linguistic terms stretches out, the a
=
b.
This vertical negativity does not do away with internal conditions regu lating the syntagmatic chain, which limit the right to commute a and b, even when they share the same reference. The close study of these prohibitions is of great interest, revealing as it does the presuppositions of a methodology from which we will barely need to stray in what follows. Frege identifies three types of such restrictions,
all of which have to
do with subordinate clauses.
When I state "Copernicus believed that the planetary orbits are circles,"11 my statement is true despite the fact that, taken separately, the subordinate is false, as lacking Bedeutung. I can replace this statement with this one: "Co pernicus believed that the apparent motion ofthe sun is produced by the real motion of the Earth," in which this time the subordinate, taken separately, is true (since it possesses a referent), without this substitution altering the truth value to
( Warheitswert)
of my statement. This particular trait also applies
all subordinate clauses completing verbs such as to say, etc., that express a
conviction, an appearance, a goal, an order, a request, or a denialP A first ob stacle to a selection determined solely by the consideration of the reference
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T H I C K N E S S O N T H E M A R G I N S OF D I S C O U R S E
lies therefore in
�
indirect speech, where words are no longer taken for what
they designate (as is the case in direct speech) but rather only for what they signifY. Thus in the expression "I believe it is raining,""it is raining" counts in fact as thought content ( Gedanke), not as reference to "actual," real rain. The rule is therefore that the indirectly is its
Bedeutung of a proper noun
(or of a clause) taken
Sinn. We will return to this rule, which is of great importance
and comes into play each time language is taken as object. The second case in which selection finds itself restricted occurs when the subordinate, separated from the entire set of propositions, does not con stitute an autonomous thought content. When I declare that "Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits died in misery,"13 I am unable to think the subordinate separately. Of course I can utter the clause for its own sake " . . . whoever discovered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits," but its
Sinn
does not form an independent thought content, as one
cannot transform this subordinate into a main clause. It possesses moreover no distinctive Bedeutung, thus preventing me from replacing such a subordi nate by another with the same reference: since its signification is only a part of the signification of the whole set of propositions, by modifYing this part I modifY the thought content of the whole. Finally one must isolate the case-the most common in ordinary lan guage-where the entire thought content is not expressed in the set of prop ositions taken as whole (main + subordinate), and where, therefore, there is more
Gedanken than clauses. For example, causality, reservation, or media
tion can be suggested by the disposition of clauses without any one proposi tion, or part thereof, corresponding to it.14 In this case, the use of the rule of selection with equal
Bedeutung must
come after an analysis of the utterance
detecting the presence or not of an implicit notion. Thus in the statement "Napoleon, seeing the threat to his right flank, personally led his Guard against the enemy position," I can replace the relative subordinate clause by another of equal Bedeutung--for example, "suffering from liver problems" only after making sure that no sequential relation holds between the sight of the threat and the decision to take personal command of the Guard. One notes that the method used by Frege constitutes a kind of experi mentation with propositions that is, long before it became known as such,
T H I C K N E S S ON T H E M A R G I N S OF D I S C O U R S E
the
commutation test itself When am I entitled to replace a with b? The most
basic condition is that both must have the same reference, that is, converge in the depth of discourse's transcendence. An added condition is that the change in signification resulting from the selection-this time in the linear dimen sion of discourse-should not produce nonsense. One understands nonsense to be inevitable if, as is the case with certain indirect subordinate clauses, the expression's reference is identified with its signification; it is inevitable, too, if the subordinate clause's
Sinn is an integral part of the Sinn of the whole clause
or if, conversely, a non-expressed "signification'' emanates from the statement's organization itself These cases can be subsumed under two overarching in stances. The speaker does not speak in her or his name but reports the object of a thought, an utterance, a wish, or an order for whose content she or he does not take responsibility. In the spatial metaphor, this translates as: from the observation point 1 with a view on object X, I express what is said, thought, wanted, or ordered from the observation point
2 with regard to this same
object. Thus it is clear that the object of my statement is not object X but rather what occurs at point 2, that in this way the actual transcendence of my discourse aims for this point and not for my object, and consequently that
Bedeutung of the terms I use to express what occurs at point 2 is indeed these terms' Sinn, that is, the thought content corresponding to them. The the
sole condition of having to keep one's sights on object X no longer suffices to . measure my movement from one observation point to another, for what is at issue in my discourse is the view of the other observation point on X-that is, the other's gaze-and to express it requires respecting its perspective, not unlike certain Gothic altarpieces organized according to "reverse" perspective, which would be to the figure what reported speech is to discourse. The method of selection brings out in subordinate clauses that are apparently similar as to their meaning, the radical difference resulting from a change of reference, such as between "the firefighters claim that a house is on fire" and "the firefight ers are heading toward a burning house." It is remarkable that this method, which we know, forty years after Frege, will become instrumental for phonol ogy and structural linguistics, and which was already the whole secret behind Leibniz's logic,15 far from confining itself to discourse's longitudinal dimen sion, ofbringing to the fore only structural invariants-that is, a measured and
III
T H I C K N E S S O N T H E M A R G I N S OF D I S C O U R S E
horizontal negativity, a formal law-first relies on the transcendence of vision, on the reference to the object ofwhich one speaks, and declares as ground rule, as a rule more radical than formal laws, the safeguarding of intuitus [immedi ate cognition]. The first situation where the freedom of selection is hindered consists therefore in the fact that actual discourse can include in itself another discourse, aiming for another object. Here we already begin to see the outlines of the critique of structural linguistics that we will need to develop. Such a critique does not apply to the strategic choice of language level [niveau de langue] , otherwise perfectly legitimate, but to the double consequence this choice entails, which needs to be circumscribed. On the one hand, the aim [ visie] of the discourse in question is covered up, the words are no longer taken for their "truth value" but for their Sinn. This blocking out of reference is what will simultaneously allow speech to be treated as a chain, the extraction of the units articulated in the latter, and their organization into a system. The closure of language [langage]-structuralism's fundamental hypothesis-is the correlate of this epistemological relation, in which the other's discourse is not considered ac cording to its own aim [visie] but to mine (the linguist's discourse). Reference as "truth value" is driven out of the language under scrutiny, lodging itself between the scrutinized and the scrutinizing language. The relation between discourse thus objectified and its object is lost in its specificity, which is that of a sighting; at best, this relation can be restituted only as a theory of"con text," which assumes that the scrutinized discourse and its object are of the same nature and can be dealt with according to the same methodology, with the result of doing away with the possibility of all "truth value." On the other hand, by objectifying the other's discourse, by making it into an object identi cal in nature and position to that about which it speaks, one transforms words into signs: one ceases to hear them, one strives to see them, thereby granting them a semantic thickness comparable to that of a sensory sign-which is the opposite effect of that by which the linguistic units are organized in the transparent system. One notes how these two effects are contradictory: as signs, the elements of discourse are opaque; as units deprived of reference, they are mere terms. Signification's effect of thickness brings the contradic tion to a head, by implying that the system's element is opaque.
T H I C K N E S S ON T H E M A R G I N S OF D I S C O U R S E
As for the other overarching instance that places a limit o n the scope of the selection between
a
and
b,
one could say that it consists entirely in
the laterality of meaning and in the polysemy of signs. If we sometimes find ourselves unable to replace a subordinate clause with another of equal
Bedeutung (or truth value), this is because it partakes fully of the statement for example as the relative clause of a hinge itself unspecified-or because it forms the necessary moment of a meaning not supported expressly by a group of words but that emanates instead from the form itself of discourse, and from the position words and phrases occupy in discourse. In one case, the terms await their signification from their articulation in the statement; in the other, on the contrary, this articulation generates lateral, secondary significations
(Nebengedanken): in the first case, the discourse's organization Sinne and eliminating
evacuates polysemy by actualizing one of the word's
the others; in the second, it maintains or produces polysemy at the next higher level by combining the significations thus obtained. What does this mean? That mobility is the rule of ordinary language; that the point from where the object of which we are speaking is seen and uttered is not static like an observatory, but rather that the signification with which we endow the object is always produced only at the juncture of two operations, one of which consists in eliminating secondary meanings while the other consists in reconstituting them; and that, therefore, once beyond the level of elements, if one focuses no long�r on the terms but on the living statement, one must be prepared to concede, after Frege, that "the clause expresses more through its connexion with another than it does in isolation."16 And one must acknowl edge that a certain movement is not what in language makes it confusing but what makes it possible, just as sight would be impossible if the eye were deprived of its capacity to move around the thing. What impedes selection in the semantic order in which Frege situates himself is, in the final analy sis, that in this order one is not really in the presence of the discontinuous, that one is not dealing here-as is the case with distinctive or significative units-with fixed intervals separating and unifying terms that the trajectory of selection could reveal without ambiguity. Here this trajectory, this motion is as good as already integrated into words. It constitutes their polysemy, which could be considered its testimony, since it is the sedimentation upon
IIJ
T H I C K N E S S ON T H E M A R G I N S OF D I S C O U R S E
them of the torsions the speakers inflicted on their initial meaning, of the ebbing and flowing through which the speakers dragged them, only to de posit them, in the lexicon, laden with the new significations acquired in the course of these wanderingsY Frege's analysis thus teaches us not only that there are two axes of dis course that intersect perpendicularly on linguistic "signs"-the axis of sig nification and that of designation or reference. It further posits that the observance of the latter is the most elementary rule of truth; it teaches us that a discourse reported through ours finds itself deprived of its transcendence, having itself become the object of the present transcendence; lastly, it sug gests that we have but one means of speaking, which is to "walk" to see and make visible, and but one means of knowing, which is to continue to move, trying out new substitutions. In his review of Philosophy ofArithmetic, Frege admitted to sharing Husserl's belief that the Leibnizian definition "eadem sunt quorum unum potest substitui alteri salva veritate" [Those things are the same which can be substituted for one another without loss of truth] does not deserve to be called a definition. But, he adds, "my reasons are dif ferent: since all definitions are expressions of identity ( G/eichheit), identity it self cannot be defined. One could qualify Leibniz's formulation as an axiom, for it exposes what is the nature of the relation of identity, and this is why it is of the utmost importance."18 Yet this "nature" of the relation consists in the movement of substitution or selection; and this movement takes place in a positional space that is not where the terms are positioned.
The No and the Position of the Obj ect
Not by chance did Freud's reflections on negation lead Emile Benveniste to recognize "the fundamental property of language" in the presumption of reference involved in all discourse.1 By drawing on Freud's work, one can clear a path toward an essential aspect of the constitution of transcendence: the interlocking of the impulse's silence with articulated language, which
all
at once erects desire, its object, and the dream or art. Let us begin by extracting what, at the beginning and the end of Freud's
Die Verneinung
[see Appendix at the end of the present book], constitutes
the essay's theme, namely, the function of grammatical negation in knowl edge, or the definition of knowledge as the lifting of another and originary negation: repression. Freud begins by wondering about a kind of logical scandal that arises in analytic interpretation. "It is
not
my mother," says the analysand. "We
amend this to: it is therefore his mother," says Freud. This strange permuta tion from No to Yes rests on the hypothesis that the negation of the object in the analysand's discourse-here, of the mother-is at the same time the positive presentation of this object. By cancelling, for him- or herself, the negation made explicit in speech, the analyst seems to be in violation of its strict interpretation, but this is to give it a dimension that strict literalness and formalism overlook: that of its violent separation from what it is speak ing of. We are in a position to state that the statement "it is not my mother" signifies, or at least
also signifies, "it is my mother," granted we give the axis
upon which we implicitly place the message a ninety-degree turn and if, rather than as a negative judgment, we take the message as the expression of surprise and anxiety through which one refuses to see what presents itself. The question is whether or not this turn is justified. It can be justified only if the syntactic negation, the negation
within
·
T H E NO A N D T H E P O S I T I O N OF T H E O B J E C T
discourse, expresses a negativity that transcends the latter, establishing it al ternatively as language
[langue]
or sight. By considering it only as a segment
sampled from a closed system-that of language
[langue]-the
statement
"it is not my mother" presents negation as one of the possibilities offered by the system's syntax, as one of the ways to articulate experience: for the logi cian, it represents a determination of judgment according to the category of quality. The synthesis this negation brings to light consists entirely in the simultaneous positioning of two terms between which one asserts there to be no relation, "no connection." Here we find ourselves in the order of signification where No means No. If, notwithstanding, the analyst believes her- or himself entitled to interpret No also as Yes, this is because she or he leaves behind the order of formal signification, of the closed system, in order to open under this No the transversal, vertical dimension of designa tion. "Negation," Freud stated, "is a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed."2 "Is it not apparent here," writes Benveniste in his commentary, "that the linguistic factor is decisive in this complex process, and that nega tion is in some way constitutive of the negated content? . . . His discourse {the subj ect's} can produce denials
[denegations3] in abundance, but it cannot
abolish the fundamental property oflanguage, which is to imply that some thing corresponds to what is uttered, some thing and not 'nothing."'4 The No, then, should not be understood merely as
the position ofexclusion within the system of language [langue]; one can and should take it as the position of exclusion within which all discourse is actualized. Negation is not only the
quality ofjudgment, it is the condition of its possibility; not only a category of discourse, but its locus: the speaker has torn her- or himself from what she or he is speaking of, or it tore itself from her or him, and by speaking the speaker continually holds it from afar, as the object of her or his discourse, in a "vision." The No that the analyst hears is thus not only one embodied by a particular quality of judgment: it signals this other negation, which every discourse requires as its permanent origin, by which the object and its speech, speech and its object, are excluded from one another. In the first sense, the No is the formal property of a segment of a closed system; in the second, it stands as the transcendental mark of reference, which is openness. Now the passage from one dimension to another-as it is spontaneously
T H E NO A N D T H E P O S I T I O N OF T H E O BJ ECT
performed by the analyst-seems to be authorized by a characteristic of the negative in discourse that one could clarify by comparing it to the prop erty Benveniste discerns in "indicators" and, more specifically, in the first person pronoun.5 I cannot be treated as just any other signifYing unit.
Tree
is endowed with a signification that, however multiple and ambiguous, is nonetheless fixed within the grid of language
[langue], independently of the
discourse in which the moneme is actualized. On the contrary, I does not have any signification, being only an "indicator" that will obtain its meaning from its insertion in actual discourse, where it designates the speaking sub ject. It
designates the subject rather than signifies her or him, as I argued; or,
to put it differently, its signification is its designation. For the noun, one can provide standard phrases that will allow its usage to be circumscribed, and each of these phrases authorizes the word, or at least the moneme, to be re placed by one or more other monemes, which can be said to define it if they "clarify" its signification. Let us put aside the problems raised by this notion of "clarification." It remains that similar operations cannot be performed on I. This last word will hardly be defined by being placed in statements such as: I've slept, I love you, I would add. In truth, I has no "content," as philosophers would say, no "concept" in Benveniste's terminology, that is, no signification that can be assigned to the grid of language
[langue]. We
cannot possibly substitute other words for it that would make it more un derstandable, as when we say that
to dread is tofear intensely.
Its only value
is of designation, referring unequivocally to the actual speaker. I, therefore, finds its counterpart not in words but in perceptions. One cannot under stand it without recourse to the experience that is not oflanguage
[langue] , [parole], which requires one to hear and see without metaphor, to be able to locate the instance of discourse [instance du discours] ,
but essentially of speech
to situate it in the spatiotemporal order.6 Admittedly, negation does not offer the same originality. To begin with, it is not lexical but syntactic, identifYing not an object but a relation. Lan guage
[Ia langue] being the system par excellence,
that is, a sum of relations,
negation easily finds its place and function within it, alongside other rela tions equally marked by syntax. However, this formal negation, inscribed in grammar, and realized in the course of a denying discourse (as in the "it is
n8
T H E N O A N D T H E P O S I T I O N OF T H E O B J E CT
not my mother" of Freud's analysand) should not make us lose sight of the negative's universal reach. Before being a relation within the system, negativ ity informs every relation, be it of resemblance, even of identity, as long as the position of a relation in general presupposes the composition of terms, in other words their distinction "before" their combination. Thus the Soph ist places negation on the border of Logos, Hegel difference at the heart of dialectics, while modern linguistics after Saussure makes the discontinuous its most basic working hypothesis. So long as language
[langue] is the system
and a system is a sum of relations, it is no longer enough to say that nega
maintained by negation. The negative, which we may not perceive in language [langage] though it is its si tion finds a place in it: language is held, indeed
lent support, is not what grants a negative claim its quality; rather, it consists in the fact that the terms of the system have no other being than their value, and th?-t they receive the latter entirely through the measured intervals they maintain together: negative in the sense that, as the editors of Course have Saussure say, "in a language
[langue], everything is negative."7
This negativity remains horizontal, so to speak, circumscribing spacings between distinctive or signifying units that belong to the system, and are in telligible without resorting to anything outside ofit. But here we must recall Benveniste's remark, as well as Frege's analyses: discourse always speaks of
something.
Designation or reference is that negativity that is not immanent
in the fact of language
[langue] itself but rather in the fact of discourse; nor
is it a quality of this discolirse in the sense of category that we mentioned earlier: if not explicitly present in discourse, it is implied in the latter, as its intentionality. The negation upholding the relation of designation is the split that, as it opens between discourse and its object, allows us to speak, since we can only say and have nothing else to say than what we are not, and since it is certain that, conversely, what we cannot say, we are. This is why the confrontation between negation and the personal pronoun is warranted: by actualizing an empty form given over to the grid of language
[langue], the [langue]
use of I designates a fact that is not strictly speaking of language
but that is taken up in every speech act and, it follows, that governs each and every actualization of language
[langue]: the
Ego is that which speaks.
As suggested above, the personal pronoun thus opens a breach in discourse,
T H E NO A N D T H E P O S I T I O N OF T H E O B J E C T
initiates a descent in an underside of language
[langage]
toward an experi
ence that is not verbal but perceptual, as it requires the here-now of sensibil ity. Likewise, the negation that distinguishes itself formally in the utterance affords a glimpse of the supporting structure of discourse, suggesting a hole punched in its floor through which we fleetingly catch sight of the persistent distancing that protects the order oflanguage
[langage] from that of the ob
jects of which it speaks, and that allows it to cut them up, in total freedom, according to its own logic-just as a window on the underbelly of a plane flying over water offers a view of the liquid surface's mobility, above which the order of technical reason supports itself and moves forward. Thus we find ourselves in the presence of three instances of the No: the negation of the grammarian and the logician, which comes across in nega tive statements; the discontinuity of the structuralist and the linguist, hidden in language
[langue], which holds the system's terms apart from one another
and, by respecting the invariances, integrates them into a whole; and, lastly, hidden in speech, the lack acknowledged by the logician and the analyst that runs through discourse and grants it its referential power. Syntactic nega tion, structural negativeness
[nigatiti], intentional
negativity: is it possible,
of course not to reduce them, but to articulate them? In what follows I will limit myself to Freud's indications that touch more specifically upon desire's relation to the negative. In the
Verneinung essay, as
the competent phenomenologist that he is,
Freud observes that it is necessarily through the first of these negations that the others can become manifest in discourse. Without the quality of j udg ment, signification and designation would remain inexpressible. Indeed, we would be incapable of identifying the content of a significative unit if we were deprived of the grammatical means to say also what it is not, to dis tinguish it from its immediate context. One need only look at any text on semantics to measure how essential the use of exclusion really is in these cases. The semanticist's "one should not confuse" and more generally the lin guist's "relevant opposition'' are the expression, in discourse, of the measured intervals they detect between the analyzed term and its neighbor: this is how signification signifies itsel£ As for designation, its expression in discourse may at first seem less dependent on syntactic negation, insofar as it seems to
T H E N O A N D T H E P O S I T I O N OF T H E O B J E CT
re-pair, to reunite, rather than separate. Does one not grasp the referential function as a position of the object about which the speaker speaks rather than as its negation? Nonetheless, one is forced to recognize that this posi tion is a remote one, that it is only ever metaphorically that one can qualify a discourse as exhaustive and a signification as "full." In any case, to "re-pair," to "reunite" imply, as signaled in the prefix of reiteration, the presence in them of a negative magnitude in the Kantian sense, which discourse's posi tivity would consist precisely in re-covering, in covering in the opposite di rection. I specify "would consist" because such a conception is not devoid of nai:Vete, as much as that of adaequatio intellectus et rei [adequation ofintellect and thing] with which it is closely connected. But assuming for just a mo ment that this conception is valid, the very challenges facing the philosophy (whether basic or sophisticated) of adequacy could not be voiced-indeed, one would not even be able to know that one is in a relation of adequacy-if the latter could not be distinguished from what it is not, if it did not stand in contrast to inadequacy, not only as to what it is not, but as to what allows it to be. Adequacy, or its phantasy, embeds itself in a space opened by a prior inadequacy, by a lack of contact that gives the desire to know some leeway, just .as Kant's boat needs, as it sets sail to America, the ocean's vast interval between continents-the expanse of mobility and risk that is the mind's element, as Hegel would put it-for its route to be mapped out, including the "negative" moments of this route when the winds push it back.8 Yet this negativity oflack-the expanse to be covered separating Columbus from the object of his desire, but also the buffer zone preserving the "object" from ever being attained (to the point that Columbus, upon reaching land, believes he is setting foot in Asia)-also requires the use of negation in language
[/an
gage]. As Freud points out, in the absence of the positive force of the symbol of negation, the withdrawal of the object would not be graspable, we would remain trapped in a blind "sensory certainty" for which desire would not exist but only the alternative between want and pleasure, and where, there fore, there would be no vis-a-vis (nor subject) but the fluctuation of two not even identifiable states. When the analysand asserts "It is not my mother," through the gram matical use of negation she or he establishes a relation of exclusion between
I2.I
T H E NO A N D T H E P O S I T I O N OF T H E O BJ EC T
:
two terms, the person o f her/his dreams and her/his mother. The relation of · clusion, however, is much more than a quality of judgment: it possesses, . ex not once but twice, universal value. First, it is essential for the order of lan guage
[/angage]
to be able to distinguish an "object" from all the others it is
not-in this case, another person's mother who is not the mother-since there can be no language
[langue]
if the fixed intervals between units-here
at the level of first articulation-are not strictly observed. So much for the system's negativeness
[nigatiti] . Second, and particularly in the case at hand,
the analysand's denial has universal value in another sense, this time refer ring us to the negativity of designation. If the analysand has to deny that the object of her or his dream is her/his mother, this is because this dream is in deed a negation of her/his mother insofar as desire harbors the transgression of fixed spacings and the dream is the fulfillment of desire. The mother is the woman placed theoretically outside of desire; to dream of her is to overturn the prohibition and cancel her in her quality of tabooed partner. In
denying
having dreamed of her or his mother, the analysand effectively carries out the constitution or reconstitution of her or his mother as "lost object," and from what she or he says as discourse the analysand exits the plane of the dream and desire to settle in that of knowledge,9 instituting once again the order of language
[langage]
and of objectivity to which language
[langage]
refers through the distancing of what is assumed to come before all discourse and all objectivitjr, that is, the mother-through the severing of originary identification. The analysand's negation
repeats the negation that makes
dis
course possible, just as it expresses that which is the condition of the system of language
[langue] . And
this is what authorizes the analyst to go from
the formal negation present in the analysand's discourse to the negation as fundamental distancing. So that it would not even be true to say that the in terpreter replaces No with Yes. Rather, she or he goes from the No of syntax to the No of transcendence, the latter being a position "outside":
ekthesis.
Now this idea of a "repetition," of � primary negation in the analysand's denial, encourages us to look a little further than the function of negative language in the lifting of repression. Freud himself is led to take this extra step since, from a reflection on the acknowledgment of the repressed and on the role that spoken negation plays in it, he very naturally segues into a
T H E NO AN D T H E P O S I T I O N OF T H E O B J E C T
meditation on the possible correlation between the Yes-No of articulated language and the introjecting-rejecting of the drive, and from there on the constitution itself of exteriority. This transition is remarkable in that in it a complete reversal occurs in the relation of the negation's symbol to the drive.10 When he considers the analysand's denial, Freud sees in the Nein what allows for an intellectual acceptance of the repressed, a first lifting of repression. But when, in the course of this reflection, he comes to examine how the intellectual function of judgment can rely on the polarity of the drives between Eros and death, then the Nein of speech no longer fulfills the sole function of intellectual acknowledgment of the repressed. It is the "substitute for repression; its 'no' is the hall-mark of repression, a certificate of origin-like, let us say, 'Made in Germany"';11 it is the "successor of ex pulsion'' and as such falls under the destructive drive.U Thus syntactic ne gation-negation in discourse-maintains with this destructive drive-the impulse to reject, to place outside, to repress, or rather to foreclose-a fun damentally ambiguous relation, since it is at once the emblem ofits presence and the means ofits disappearance. Added to this first difficulty is the enigmatic passage, located at the center of the Verneinung essay, bearing upon exteriority and interiority. Freud begins by asking what it means to judge. Following philosophical precedent, he accepts two kinds of judgment, of attribution and reality: the first ac knowledges in or denies an object a given property; the second acknowl edges or denies an object's existence. Now the initial form of this "property" is value (good/bad), and the initial polarity of valorization is that of the drives. The unifier Eros orders the object's introjection in the subject; the destructive drive orders their separation, the object's expulsion. Thus, judg ments of attribution appear to be reducible to expressions of the drive, the polarity of judgment entirely covered up with that of value, and the latter with that of the drives. This "materialist" hypothesis may seem shocking, but it is not exactly what Freud has in mind. What he does have in mind becomes apparent when he turns to the judgment of reality. Here again, he writes, it is "a question of external and internal. What is unreal, merely a pre sentation and subjective, is only internal; what is real is also there outside."13 However, what is at stake here is no longer to valorize, but to understand if
I2J
T H E N O A N D T H E P O S I T I O N OF T H E O B J E C T
the object itself is outside or only inside, and therefore if it has been rejected (and lost) or on the contrary incorporated, if it has been object of destruc tion or subject of pleasure. Reality is what has been rejected, it is what one encounters without at first recognizing. Does this amount to arguing that the rift-in which exteriority (and interiority) originate-is indeed that of the archaic polarization of the drives? Is the negation of language nothing more than a stamp of the rejection motivated by the drives? But a stamp would already be something, and it would still be necessary (a customary, if impossible, task for the materialist), once this reduction is performed, to go on to explain why and how there exist two levels, or states, or moments, or places-here, the death drive and its emblem-and not just one. Freud's essay, however, does not even go that far; rather it states: "The antithesis ( Gegensatz) between subjective and objective does not exist from the first. It only comes into being from the fact that thinking possesses the capacity to bring before the mind once more something that has been per ceived, by reproducing it as a presentation without the external object having still to be there."14 Exterior and interior do not simply coincide with spat and swallowed that are "from the first." The reality-ego another figure of the pleasure-ego
[Real-Ich]
is not just
[Lust-Ich]. And, once again, from where
would the latter obtain such a power of distortion? The pleasure-ego, as it spits out what is bad, does not constitute reality. What is spat out is what is spat out, and no ionger exists for the body of pleasure: it is obliterated. For
be something nonetheless, the drive to destroy must opposite power to appresent [apprisenter] absence.
what has been rejected to be supplemented by the
Then loss may count as loss, the presence of a lack, and the object may count as reality, something that is even when it is not there. But what exactly is this power to render present, to "reproduce as representation" an absent object? It is, says Freud, the power of linguistic negation. Reality and desire are born together at the threshold of language. Ben veniste's remark, that the analysand's denial is "in some way constitutive of the denied content," finds more than assent in Freud's reflection. Already in the last of the
Three Essays on the Theory ofSexuality it is stated that the object
constitutes itself as something lost in search ofwhich the libido wanders, but it is still only the "sexual" object that is at issue, while the theme ofloss is not
T H E NO A N D T H E P O S I T I O N OF T H E O B J E C T
explicitly linked to that of languageY Starting with the great texts from the 19 2 os- Group
Principle
(to
Psychology and the Analysis ofthe Ego and Beyond the Pleasure which belongs the Verneinung essay)-the emphasis shifts to
the simultaneous constitution of reality, subjectivity, and desire as the result of the breakup of an originary situation, which is that of identification, 16 and to the function of language in this breakup. Through the game offort-da,17 the child constitutes the object as something that can be both there there
(da) and not
(fort), since one can make it disappear when it is present and call it back
to "presence" when it is absent. This ability to slip away while never ceasing to be is what makes the spool at the end of a .string that the child throws over the edge of its bed the model of all objects, and this string, the model of all referential distance. Freud specifically connects the constitution of objectiv ity to the retraction of the mother who has gone missing. Yet the loss of the mother is not sufficient in itself for her to be obj ectified. The "mother" is ambiguous (good-bad) well before objectification is possible. But this ambi guity is, precisely, pre-object and pre-objective. The pulsing between eaten introjected and spat-expelled does not determine a
relation with the breast.
Instead it marks the pleasure-ego's rhythm-non-cumulative and non referred-oscillating between release and tension and governed by the plea sure principle: "we never discover a 'no' in the unconscious," writes Freud.18 The
difference between the
two poles of the oscillation is not the
reference
separating and connecting interior and exterior. This reference can establish itself as possible reality only if the expelled-missing is retained (through ob jectification) and supported (through accumulation) outside of the pleasure displeasure pulse. This is why the first retraction, that of the breast, far from tracing the fault line between Ego and reality, only establishes autoerotism, the coiling of the corporeal surface upon itself, and the reconstitution of the pleasure-ego's self-sufficiency, and only grounds childhood's polymorphic perversion, which relies on such a denial of reality. This narcissistic wander ing comes before objectification: what the former is to the latter, an art form is to a science. With the child's entry into language the + and - ofjouissance can be collapsed onto the axis of reference opened by designation, and the mother can be placed at a distance as a visible object. This distance is strictly speaking depth, for what the child experiences with the spool is the object's
T H E N O A N D T H E P O S I T I O N OF T H E OB J E C T
two-sidedness, like the moon in Frege's telescope: one through which it sur renders itself, the other in which it holds itself back forever. And this depth built upon the spool is the model of objectivity to which the mother, too, conforms: "reality" is what eludes. Now this elision that makes up the flip side of things can be established only because there is the fort and the
da,
the No and the Yes, because, that is, the initial opposition between absence and presence allows every speaking subject to posit in and through her/his discourse what is not. Language establishes the third dimension insofar as it is understood not as dimension number three but as the first dimension with respect to representation-the dimension according to which the imaginary scene is set, and at the extremity of which, so to speak, "reality" will be cir cumscribed by the test of words and actions. Desire thus begins, as long as it is preceded, heralded, and marked by its procession of representatives, because the negativity of the object-sign be gins and because the distance and tension-which forever separate the "in terior" and the object-spread out. The representation of the drive, which is what constitutes desire, requires the possibility of the negative being estab lished: such is the referential function of language. There is much in Freud's work to reassure those who fear that the
Verneinung defends
a straightfor
ward and reductive thesis. Benveniste believes that Freud "reduced the po larity of linguistic affirmation and negation to the biopsychical mechanism of acceptance within oneself or rejection outside oneself, connected with the appreciation of good and evil."19 A vulgar materialism with which the linguist cannot be satisfied: "But animals are also capable of this evalua tion which leads to acceptance in the self or rejection outside the sel£" A truly linguistic negation is not merely expulsion, adds Benveniste, for in the order of language "negation is first acceptance." Why? "It has to set up for the express purpose of suppressing"; "a judgment of nonexistence has neces sarily the formal status of a judgment of existence."20 Indeed, Benveniste makes the analyst's right to interpret the No as a Yes dependent on the thetic power of discourse, a power whose inverted symptom is the speaking sub j ect's powerlessness to make what she or he is speaking about disappear, even by denying it. Linguistic negation implies an affirmation, and, according to Benveniste, the latter consists in the necessary uttering of what is denied, in
T H E N O A N D T H E P O S I T I O N OF T H E O B J E C T
the "formal" position ofwhat is denied in discourse. The positivity of the lin guistic negative would therefore consist in the proposition, even a negative one, being positional. But when Freud writes, at the end of the
Verneinung,
that the "creation of the symbol of negation has endowed thinking with a first measure of freedom from the consequences of repression and, with it, from the compulsion of the pleasure principle,"21 he invokes precisely the
symbol ofnegation and, thus, the form of negative judgment to indicate what speech adds to (or takes away from) the pleasure principle and the pulsating of the drives. Far from the materialist reduction Benveniste feared, what is necessarily presupposed in negation is the transmutation of the drive into desire as it passes into language, and the fact, essential for the analyst, that the negative judgment-the grammarian's No, the analysand's denial-is like a repetition of the negation constitutive of judgment, a repetition of the pulsating of the drives, perhaps, but rerouted through the negativity of transcendence, through the play oflanguage.22 For Freud, to deny is not and cannot be synonymous with expelling outside of the self as when the animal rejects what it dislikes. The act of judging is, argues Freud, the "continuation, along the lines of expendiency
(die zweckmiissige Fortentwicklung), of the
original process by which the ego
took things into itself or expelled them from itself, according to the plea sure principle."23 This is at the furthest reaches of simply reducing the intel lect to the drive: we are faced with an operation by which the pleasure-ego, wrapped in the pulsating of the drives, finds itself involved and repressed in a teleology, which is that of knowledge. No doubt, when Freud writes that "with the help of the symbol of negation, thinking frees itself from the restrictions of repression and enriches itself with material that is indispens able for its proper functioning,"24 one may be struck by the dynamism he ascribes to this end. One could then argue that if thought needs to attain fulfillm ent, if it cannot do without repressed content, this is because it draws its energy from the same reservoir as the drives. This takes place, however, after the transmutation whereby the energy of the drives is bound in groups of invariant relations, forming systems. The fort Ida relation is the simple and absolute model for this systematic binding, under the two criteria in play in reality-testing. On the one hand it signals the horizontal interval
T H E N O A N D T H E P O S I T I O N OF T H E O B J E C T
that makes possible, in the linguistic system, the anchoring of the terms by placing them in pairs of opposites, thus circumscribing the space where the object's "word-presentations" will take place. Yet on the other hand, as we pointed out, the child associates the
da and
the fort with an activity of
presentation and concealment of the object, which this time sets the stage for the object's "thing-presentations" to appear. We recognize in these two axes-respectively, of signification (opposition) and of designation (thick ness)-those of articulated language. It is in the referential determined by their intersection that the energy of the drives will find itself caught. This referentiality is integral to the reality principle; it is out of the question, therefore, to infer it from the "order" issued by the drives, which it represses while reality institutes itsel£ For Freud there are
two principles
of psychic
"becoming," between which not the slightest continuity can be established, were it dialectical.25 Any reconciliation (spiritualist or materialist) is illusory.
Bedeutung is no longer taken as a merely theoretical dis tance: it is an Entzweiung, the splitting in two of what was "originarily one," infans [infancy] to the breast. All objectiveness [objectite] will come inscribe With Freud,
itself in the distance opened up by a loss. Perception presupposes this pull ing apart, which will serve as model for the theory of knowledge: both the back and the front-that is, the deep negativity of the thing, of the object as something to-be-known-have their point of departure in this distance. Here the space of the Bedeutung is invigorated: a space where the eye moves, no doubt, but this eye is the symbol of desire; its perpetual mobility is the movement of desire. One must set forth the equivalence of knowing and de siring, which Socrates inaugurated and embodied. Wanting to know is im plied in discourse: turning
around its object, in deep space, the object always
managing to escape by one of its facets. Being the object-the fifth mode of knowledge in the seventh Platonic Epistle 26-is what makes possible and prohibits this
the edge
Entzweiung. The
latter places an unbridgeable interval
along
of discourse. A voided edge. This void is the reason why when we
speak, we are not what we are speaking of, and why our speech awaits its respondent (its reference), on the other side, just like our desire. Does language
[langage], then, hold this power of severing ties with the
breast, with the pre-world? No, as we said, and as Freud conclusively showed,
T H E N O A N D T H E P O S I T I O N OF T H E O B J E C T
the ambiguity of the breast, of the "mother," goes back much further than the acquisition of language
[langue]. Yet it is this
acquisition that allows the am
biguity to appear as such; it is because the child has at its disposal the No
(fort)
of language
[langue]
that the mother's evasion-its hidden face, its
thing-like thickness-can be posited. The quality of negative judgment will be able to provide, in the layout of language thing's thickness. Language
[Le langage]
[langue], an "equivalent" of the
does not make up this thickness,
which is, indeed, first a matter of the alternation of pleasing-displeasing, but it brings it to the fore; it is its phenomenological, not ontological, reason. In borrowing these themes from Freud, we have begun to tackle only a small part of the problem. For the hypothetical splitting of the pre-world not only opens up the distance in which the eye setdes on the edge of dis course. This tearing-away produces effects of distortion
in discourse. A figure
is lodged in the depth of our speech, operating like the matrix of these ef fects, attacking our words to make forms and images out of them. The space of desire paves the way for thoughts and takes them in. Through Entzweiung the object is lost; through phantasy, it is re-presented. We will need to return to this eye that no longer is peripheral, but buried deep in discourse.
Opposition and D ifference
Beyond the Alternative Signification does not exhaust meaning, but neither does signification combined with designation. We cannot be satisfied with this choice of two spaces, between which discourse-the system's as well as the subject's insinuates itsel£ There exists another, figural space. One must assume it buried, for it shuns sight and thought; it indicates itself laterally, fleetingly, within discourses and perceptions, as what disturbs them. It is desire's own space, what is at stake in the struggle that painters and poets tirelessly wage against the return of the Ego and text. In trying to characterize this space, or at least its effects in the facts of discourse or sight, one is not only attempting to separate it from the order of signification or from the depth of designation; rather, one positions oneself to approach the site where truth is at work. Truth is not to be found in the order of knowledge: one encounters it in its unruliness, as an event. Knowl edge assumes th� space of signification where all the syntactic limitations regulating the consistency of its discourse dwell; and inasmuch as it is ref erential discourse, it requires, too, the space of designation within which the knowledgeable speaker gauges the reference of her or his discourse. Yet truth arises (e-venit) as that which is not in its place, essentially dis placed, and as such destined to be elided: deprived of a place, neither fore seen nor pre-heard. Indeed the stage is set, in the two spaces of signification and of designation, for its effects to pass as mere mistakes, blunders due to inattention, to an ill-considered fitting of discursive elements, to the eye's improper adjustment. Everything is ready for the rubbing out of the event, for good form, for clear and precise thinking to be restored. Truth presents itself like a fall, like a slippage and an error, exacdy the meaning of lapsus in Latin. The event clears a vertiginous space and time; untethered from its
O P P O S I TION AND D I FF E R E N C E
context o r perceptual environment, this discontinuity o r hovering goes hand in hand with anxiety: "Quantum ofanxiety in afreelyfloating state . . . [which] is always ready to link itself with any suitable ideational content."1 1he un expected is not anguishing because it is unexpected, as the enforcers of good order would claim; it is unexpected because it is anguishing, unexpected inso far as anxiety commingles with "presentations" (significations, designations) in which it appeared entirely out of place, affecting them in a mad way. For the expectancy not to be such that this madness is foreclosed or repressed, unwelcomed, or if it is welcomed, is disguised, that it lends itself to the event, this also requires on the part of the ear or the eye (the ear for discursive sig nification, the eye for representational designation) something free-floating, the deployment of a zone of eventness and, deep down, a disordering. The attentive reader will have already understood on the basis of Un coup
de des that the deep space of chance where the encounter can take place with this madness-madness that no significative arrangement (throw of dice) will be able to abolish-is precisely that which Mallarme unfolds in the well-measured, discrete expanse of typography. But he may have misjudged, as I did, the reach of this spatial transfer. What is called for now is to dispel the perceptual representation under which what is specifically the event was able to be covered up in our understanding of the Mallarmean situation, to show that we have not given full account of this situation by attributing the responsibility for it to the properties of the plastic expanse. Performing this disillusion will thus amount in particular to showing that the latter expanse is itself at stake in a battle between good and bad form, between the recog nizable and the ordered on the one hand, and the unknown, the strange, and the anguishing, on the other. It would be false to contend that we are always immersed in the world as though in a bath of perceptions and meanings. Nor �ave we said the last word on the subject of our spatiotemporal experience by characterizing it as an enwrapped depth, an immanent transcendence, a chiasm. The world, too, is open to events: it is prey to slips, to surges of non-immersive zones, to crises of"transcendence"without counterpart; worldly space and time can fail us, just as language can. This world of presentation, however much we thought we could anchor it in the body assumed to be one's own
[suppose
IJ I
OPPO SITION AND DIFFERENCE
propre], thereby preserving it from the nullification of discourse and return ing it to an undeniable presence, an originary faith, this world is not exempt from the risks of"meaninglessness" [insignificance]: it might be less exempt, but it is, above all, exempt differently. This time the meaninglessness
will
obviously not be the lack of linguistic signification (through non-lexicality or a-grammaticality). It will be the erasure of top and bottom , or of stereog nosis, or night, or silence-all the losses of position of the relations between world and body, thetic losses: "Concerning the factors of silence, solitude and darkness, we can only say that they are actually elements in the pro duction of the infantile anxiety from which the majority of human beings have never become quite free."2 Claiming to consider perception outside of emotion is a misguided abstraction, for emotion would be impossible if our corporeal hold on the world were not, at its core, uncertain, if the possibility of a non-world were not given at the same time as its "certainty."3 This pos sibility is not only a theoretical power to suspend the thesis of worldliness, but this power of epochi, insofar as it is not reducible only to a discursive denial
[din igation]
which, as we know, can always easily be turned around
-
as an involuntary symptom of an assertion-itself derives from a specifically corporeal power of annihilation, of undoing the ties linking body and world. We normally experience (so to speak, for it is really the interruption of expe rience) this "inexperience" in the occurrences of orgasm and sleep. One could
p
say that this inex erience depends on experience, that some of its edges abut, as it were, on what constitutes presentation, that even if there is no retention of presence in climax or deep sleep, these can only ever be not only thought but "lived" through difference, in opposition to the states of grasping of the world and of Dasein
[diYre-la].
One cannot possibly refute this. But one should distinguish between this difference and the opposition that we said is the key to signification in the order of language, and one should especially dissociate this difference from the depth of the negation involved in the subject's experience of the sign. As we will see, difference is neither the flat negation that maintains the ele ments of a (linguistic) system apart, nor that deep-seated denial that opens the referential or representational field in front of discourse. In attempting to define the field of difference it is hardly coincidental that it should be the
O P P O S IT I O N A N D D I F F E R E N C E
event, the slip of the tongue, or the orgasm that come t o mind as examples. For in each of these "cases," in contrast to what occurs in signification or designation, the gap
is not what stands between two terms located at the same
level, inscribed on the same support, and possibly reversible, pending certain operative conditions, but on the contrary the "relation" oftwo
"states, " heteroge
neous yet adjoining in an irreversible anachrony. Hegel was right to argue that the mind quickly heals its wounds: this is because there is no such thing as a wound, as far as language is concerned. Nor was Merleau-Ponty wrong to subsume all relations of the body to the world under originary faith, since both the one and the other need to be there together, bound by this faith, or else neither are there. Nevertheless, we will be able to detect effects of dif ference as far as in the discursive order, and as far as in the perceptive order, without even having to invoke silence and obscurity, that is, the void of one and the other order. All there needs to be within these orders are nullifica tions irreducible to the intervals of opposition or to the depth of designation, mad events, that is, operations or effects of operations calling for an "order" that cannot come under the negativities we have identified precisely because this order only registers itselfnegatively there, an order we may thus be tempted to assume is positive. However, the Yes of this order, upsetting the No of discourse and the No of perception, is that of desire as death drive.
Nonhuman Sex Let us begin with discourse once more. If difference is not opposition, this is because the terms do not belong to the same being or the same order. In the case oflanguage, this means that one term belongs to language and the other does not. A critique of opposition leads therefore again to that of Hegelian dialectics. Yet this time it is not a question of identifying, in the latter's po sition, the elision of the sensory and the distance of designation, in other words of waging a critique from a philosophy of perception that can only be thought of as a philosophy of the subject (however corporeal). One must go beyond the principle of subjectivity as well as of non-subjectivity, past the system/subject alternative, challenge not only dialectics but also dia-deictics inasmuch as the latter, like the former, is inclined to erode sensory difference and to swathe the body in the
order of a world. Let us follow, for a moment,
IJJ
O P P O S ITION A N D DIFFER E N C E
a radical critical observation made by Marx, taken from a passage i n which he reflects on a particularly provocative claim of Hegel's
Philosophy ofRight.
Here is this claim: "It is one of the fundamental principles of logic, that a definite element, which, when standing in opposition, has the bearing_ of an extreme, ceases to be in opposition and becomes an it is observed to be at the same time a
organic element, when
mean."4 Marx says
of the interplay
of these moments: "They are like Janus with two-faced heads
(]anuskOpfe),
which now show themselves from the front and now from the back, with a diverse character at either side. What was first intended to be the mean between two extremes now itself occurs as an extreme; and the other of the two extremes, which had just been mediated by it, now intervenes as an extreme (because of the distinction from the other extreme) between its ex treme and its mean. This is a kind of mutual reconciliation society (Es ist eine
wechselseitige Bekomplimentierung)."5 This is, adds Marx, the story of the man who attempts to break up a fistfight and who ends up having to be separated himself; or of the lion in A Midsummer Night's Dream who states "I am the lion, and I am not the lion, but Snug": "So here each extreme is sometimes the lion of opposition and sometimes the Snug of mediation."6 However-and here we note that a separation from religious dialectics is under way-''Actual extremes cannot be mediated with each other pre cisely because they are actual extremes. But neither are they in need of me diation, because they are opposed in essence
( Wesen). They have nothing in
common with one another; they neither need nor complement one another. The one does not carry in its womb the yearning, the need, the anticipation of the other."7 One could argue that "Les extremes se touchent,"8 that "the North and South poles attract each other" just as "the female and the male sexes also attract each other," and that through the union of their differences they constitute what is human. Now, indeed, the poles and the sexes are not
(Wesen [etres]): they are only differentiations within a single being, whereas "Truly real extremes would be Pole and non-Pole, human and non- human gender,"9 they would be two beings [etres] and not only two existences in the same being [etre]. Hegelian logic confuses "the difference (Dijferenz) within the existence of one essence [etre]" with "the actual op position of mutually exclusive essence [etres]."10 Yet "no matter how firmly different beings
O P P O S ITION AND D I FFERENCE
134
both extremes appear, i n their existence, t o be actual and to be extremes, it still lies only in the
essence [etre] of the one to be an extreme, and it does not have for the other the meaning oftrue actuality. The one infringes upon the
other, but they do not occupy a common position."11 The subject of the above discussion matters little here.12 What does is what is sought, namely, the possibility to think a relation through without including it in a system of oppositions; in other words, insofar as thinking and placing the object in such a system are one and the same operation, the possibility to think a relation through without thinking it. If Marx arrives, at the end of this passage, at the notion of Stellung, this is because positioning appears to him as what in thinking remains unthought. This
Stellung would
no doubt need to be compared with the Position Kant discusses in the refuta tion of the ontological argument to press the point that precisely the differ ence between the thought [/e pens!] and the given on the latter's position, that thought
[Ia pensee]
[le donne]
depends solely
cannot give itself the given,
but only the possible, and that if it takes possession of the possible through an analytic judgment, it can think the given only through the enigma of a synthetic judgment. And we know that this Kantian synthesis, in contrast to Hegel's, is not in turn reducible to analysis. Marx argues that it is not a matter of positional difference between the male and the female sexes: the
no at stake here is merely that of the system
atic interval. This means that from one of the sexes the other can be thought, engendered, through a simple eidetic variation consisting in a nullification that reveals the resulting term's complementary nature with the initial term. It is this complementary nature that is granted from the outset with attrac tion. Marx starts with the example of polarity because the metaphor of the pole in itself betrays the essence of opposition: the mind bent on analyzing a pole can grasp its essence only as a complementary function and must therefore devise-literally, deduce-the possibility of an anti-pole. Here, in the organization of natural things, we find a kind of mimetism of the order of concepts whereby the earth's polarity reproduces in the gravitational field what conceptual dialectics produces in that of thoughts. When this comple mentarity is applied to the order of the sexes, it inscribes them in a pos sible, thinkable totality, in which each one is but a moment for the other, an
O P P O S I T I ON AN D D I F F E R E N C E
altogether transitory moment o f detotalization, a negligible remnant quickly sutured in the comforting conclusion that this negative moment presented itself as opposite only through abstraction, and that it was merely a develop ment in the constitution of the initial moment into truth. This is basically a religious operation, one that does not apply to all religions-the religion of the infinite does not fall into the unifying movement of totality-but that does apply to the redemptive function of archaic religion, which consists in the confession and atonement of sin, in its position, within a (mythical) "system," as negative dialectics, that is, as simple opposition. As far as "sexual difference" is concerned, it would hardly be inconsistent to argue, closely following Freud, that the function of religion in general, and of Hegelian dialectics in particular, is precisely the transcription and inscription of this difference as simple opposition on the level of thinkable dialectics. For the question of this difference is that of castration, and every religion, as cultural phenomenon, aims to absorb the event of castration into the advent of the condition of the son, that is, the recuperation of meaning and violence in signification. Thus, by imagining real difference as that be tween human and nonhuman sex, Marx comes close to what will constitute Freud,s object of study, since he refuses to suture the difference between the sexes into the male/female opposition; since he entertains, if only for a sec ond, the possibility that there is in the fact of human sex (male as well as fe male) an unredeemable violence, the reference to an exteriority (nonhuman gender) that can find no place in the conscious order of what constitutes legitimacy; and since, lastly, he concedes that the issue of the sexes is not at all that of the polarization between them, but on the contrary that of their non-attraction and unthinkable distinction.13 It is untrue that the female sex holds for the male "the meaning of true actuality," nor the male for the female. They hold this meaning for one an other only in the order of the appearance of desire, in the order of the con scious, already instituted text where the interplay between man and woman can be read on the surface of what one calls human relations. This surface is that of reality and of the imaginary. On the other stage, the sexes are not complementary. The truth of sex does not lie in the remark, often made by Freud, that there is basically one sexuality, which is male. Even if it is true
IJS
O P P O S I T I O N AN D D I F F E R E N C E
that the girl discovers her own sex only later and comparatively, and boys and girls perceive the female sex as absence, such a position still remains that of sexuality, in other words, of a system in which one goes from male to female through negation, and not the position in the order specific to desire. · This order distinguishes itself in that the acknowledgment of this absence exceeds, by far, the acknowledgment of an absence, but that it gives rise to the strangest, most rambling presentations and at the same time to the most unexpected affects. When, in possession of the North Pole, one discovers the South, one is not gripped by the violence of an irremediable event requiring all the power of the imaginary to quell through presentations, and all the disorienting power of the affect to displace onto other representatives. �ite the opposite: such a discovery is that of a complement, a form of recognition. But the subject's entry into desire by way of castration is always something like its death. The No of nonhuman, inhuman
(unmensch/ich)
sex indicates
difference, another position (stage) that unseats that of consciousness-that of discourse and reality.
Opposition Is the Significative Difference [langue] requires
The discourse: "Language
only difference. . . . In stat
ing this, one should go much further and consider every value of language
[langue]
as oppositive, and not as positive, absolute."14 "In language
[langue]
there is nothing but differences, and no positive quantity."15 Can one distin guish opposition from difference in Saussure? To disentangle the two terms, Godel refers to a passage of the
[langue], there
Course from 1910-1911: "In a state oflanguage
are only differences . . . . When we arrive at the terms them
selves, resulting from the relation between signified and signifier, then we can speak of opposition . . . . Because these differences mutually condition each· other, we will have something that can look like positive terms, through the vis-a-vis, the correspondence between such and such a difference of the idea and such and such a difference of the sign. We will then be in a position to speak of opposition, on the basis of this positive element of the combina tion."16 For Saussure, therefore, opposition involves both difference and rela tion. Difference, writes Godel, "in itself is indeed a negative character: if a is different from b, this only means that a is not b, regardless of their degree
IJ]
O P P O S I TION AND DIFFERENCE
of non-coincidence; but the moment a relation otherwise exists between
a
and b, they become members of the same system, and difference turns into opposition." And, he adds, "it then appears that, in a system of signs, differ ence must always coincide with an opposition and the negative character can never be observed in the system in its pure state."17 The qu�stion left unanswered in S aussure's text is whether what con ceals difference in the system is indeed the "thickness" of the linguistic sign, that is to say, the effect of signification. In accepting this explanation, does one not cross again the line separating a philosophy of the system and a reflection centered on the speaking subject? If opposition is made to depend on signification-accepting that the latter, in its opacity, is given only in the experience of speech-�ust one conclude that it is the speaker who orga nizes in a totality terms that are different in themselves, and who, through her or his positional activity, transforms them into opposites?
An untenable
claim, insofar as it would place the position of linguistic relations under the responsibility of the speaking subject. The criterion used by Godel (even though it later falls by the wayside somewhat) seems more apposite: it is the system itself that conceals the differences, for it includes the terms into relations, thereby limiting and measuring pure non-coincidence into invari able intervals. The "positivity" of the opposition consists in the measurement of the interval. If, then, "one can define opposition as a significative differ ence,"18 this is not due to the signifier's relation to the signified, but because of the regulation of the spacings in the signifYing order. This is the principle thatJakobson strictly applies at the level of distinc tive features: ''All differences of phonemes in any language
[langue]
can be
resolved into simple and undecomposable binary oppositions of distinctive features. Hence all phonemes of any language
[langue]
can be fully disso
ciated into further indivisible distinctive features."19 The hypothesis of the "primary triangle" developed in
1956, even if it betrays a rather debatable
geneticism, rests entirely on the polarizing power of units by opposition: ar ticulation of the p Ia couple on the vertical "vocalic" axis, followed by that of the p It couple on the horizontal "consonantal" axis, etc.20 I am not qualified to judge the linguistic value of this hypothesis, but what is certain is that it offers a kind of epistemological model on two counts. First, being a figure
IJ8
O P P O S ITION A N D D I F F E R E N C E
closed upon itself, the triangle, like the circle, thereby illustrates the system's closed nature. But where, in the circle, all that is needed to generate all the points is a segment of a straight line (the radius) and an operation (rotation of the segment around one of its extremities), to build Jakobson's triangle one needs to determine two intervals (the segment constituting the height and that which forms the base) and an angle (formed by the two segments). It would be easy to show that the same rule of the invariance of intervals grammatical morphemes
(teaching !education) or the (they captured the city Ihe captured the city, we will
sing /we are singing). The
commutation test is convincing only because the
determines and makes signifY the lexical units
intervals are measured. Sheer noncoincidence-in other words, pure differ ence-cannot lend itself to any recognition. It is worth remembering that in the phonologists' view, it is by means of signification that the relevant char acter of a phoneme in a given language
[langue]
can be tested. This passage
through signification, performed by the speaker, refers us back to the invari ant organization of the intervals in the system. One even finds this charac teristic in generative linguistics, albeit no longer in the guise of an opposi tion as in phonology, nor is it evaluated by a commutation test. Nonetheless, if one takes a simple rewrite rule such as N P
-
Det + N, which reads as "the
nominal group can be rewritten as: determiner + noun," it becomes apparent that we are dealing with a transformation rule prescribing the operations authorized on the symbols to the left of the arrow. It is noteworthy that by adding generativism to structuralism, linguistics has reinforced the posi
tive aspect of the interval to the point that simple difference, understood as noncoincidence, appears entirely concealed under rules that no longer have merely a diacritical function but positively a genetic one. Still, this difference persists at the most basic level, which Chomsky calls grammaticality. For here again the linguist will seek confirmation that a particular organization is grammatical or not by resorting to linguistic feeling
[sentiment linguistique] .
It is easy to grasp that the gap between the given sentence and the model of grammaticality provided by the rewrite rules, if the gap is such that the former passes for a-grammatical without, however, being nonsensical, will determine a modality of meaning that is no longer that oflexical or syntactic signification based on the system of oppositions, but that, precisely, derives
O P POSITION AND DIFFERENCE
from a difference. This i s the case i n poetic language . One could say that the latter is to ordinary language what difference is to opposition. Difference does not
enter the system
of oppositions, it
exits the
system. Like Artaud's
scream: "I do not know /but I I do know that I space, I time, I dimension, I be coming, / future, /destiny, / being, / non-being, / self,/non-self, I are nothing to me; I but there is a thing I which is something I only one thing I which is something, I and which I feel I because it wants I TO GET ouT: I the presence of my bodily suffering. . . . " 21 And if one had to provide an example to show how "the presence of my bodily suffering" gets
out in words,
here is one: "-a its the hole ques
tion I if God goes or if God stays I now the question is posed I They dance the dance of the vile friction I of the whoran with the woman and I and of the coupling of ron and saun."22 1he case is extreme, and one will eventually manage to find the signifiers and the signifieds suggested by the deviant units
(woman - woman; Rhone
and
Saone - ron
and
saun).
Yet the shift
in spelling (which marks a corresponding shift in Artaud's declamation) is such that it gets discourse out of the system of oppositions and invests it with potential affects and presentations.
Trace ofa Working-over Let us try to clarify this by taking a more accessible example where the "exit" is less fraught with risk: Iprintyou I I swim you I I music you, 23
and where the deviance (the difference) looms progressively larger, so to
to print is a verb that ordinarily does not animate; to swim is an intransitive taken here as
speak:
accept for its object to be transitive;
music is
a noun
displaced and used as verb. But let us put aside for now these variations of interval and simply compare-to render palpable what is at stake with dif ference and not with opposition-the phrase I music you with a "correct" utterance such as I know you. There is an effect of meaning, which I call here signification, that is conveyed immediately with the last statement. If I know
you
is endowed with signification, this is because it enters into virtual op
position to I know him, you know yourself, I don't know you
.
.
. . The terms, or
the relations that are in opposition to the stated term or relation, are virtually
O P P O S ITION AND DIFFERENCE
present, virtually co-present (or co-absent). That i s to say that their absence is that of an element belonging to what Freud calls the preconscious. These elements (terms, relations) were put aside when the speaker (or whatever held this function) uttered this sentence; they were not selected to appear in the statement. But this does not mean that they suffered any disruption; on the contrary, it is because they are there, virtually, in their assigned place in the in terlocutors' preconscious-that is to say, because there is a code, and this code is shared by the speaking subjects-that the utterance possesses its significa tion and that this signification can be transmitted. The system is
absent,
and
will always be, since it is in the nature of the order of structure never to pres ent itself as does the utterance: the (vocal or graphic) signifier is a sensory datum whereas the system of signifiers is not. However, this absence of the system-and therefore of the terms or relations that the utterance leaves aside, and in opposition to which it signi fies-is in no way the result of a rejection, of operations associated with the process of repression such as displacement or condensation. It results instead from a concealment that is itself measured. Proof of this can be found in this essential fact: the statement I know you, taken in itself as a simple signi fier (i.e., without reference to the situation in which it is uttered) contains no charge value, no difference of tension. The situation in which it takes place may grant it such a value, but the statement is denied the latter in the signifYing order proper. In this order it does not act as event: it is possible.
I music you. Music is not in opposition to the terms that one would expect to find here (I cradle you, I charm you ). These The same cannot be said for
terms are not kept virtually co-present (or co-absent) in their place; they are displaced, or more exacdy, ing
music is
a displaced term. The interval separat
music from its neighbors is not a measured, coded interval. This interval
does not belong to the system. The system is not kept in its place, intact in its virtuality. The concealment that accompanies the statement
I music you
is no longer the erasure of the system in the dusk (or preconscious) thanks to which I know you stands in broad .daylight. The withdrawal of the absent elements does not create virtuality, but violence.
Music is
a term actualized
through transgression; its presence bears witness to the fact that there lies underground not a system but forces, an energetics that disrupts the ordering
O P POSITION AND DIFFERENCE
of the system. When you produce a verb with a noun, an event happens: the system of the rules oflanguage
[langue] not only is unable to account for this
novel use, but opposes it, resists it; the relation that arises between it and the statement is one of conflict.
I music you is like a symptom:
a compromise between an order (of lan
guage) and its other (the pleasure principle?). The symptom carries the truth: something appears where one does not expect it. Ifl choose to call the state ment I music you a figure, I should add that this figure (and I would postulate: every figure) is linguistically charged-that is, acts as linguistic event because it is an effect of discharge issued from another order. By taking an other point of reference, every figure is destined to be neutralized in a form of script
[icriture]
(what is, for example, commonly referred to as the erosion
of metaphors; however, it is not a question of erosion, but of the neutraliza tion of discourse's other by discourse, of the signification of the nonsensi cal) . Before this neutralization, the figure offers itself as a straying
trace that
defies reading, that is not a letter, and that can be grasped only in energetic terms. This figure is supported by displacements, condensations, and distor tions. This means that
before its
incorporation in the order of language (for
example in a rhetoric), the figure is the mark, on the units and rules of lan guage, of a power that treats these units and rules like things. It is the trace of a
working-over [travail]
and not of knowledge by signification. Through
this working-over, 'what is fulfilled is desire.
Notes: One should make this distinction between the two areas
(of the sys
tem and the force) not merely into an opposition within a system, but into a difference such that language cannot lay claim to what lies beyond the system and signify it positively in itself. Where the Id dwells,
I will
never
come to pass.
When B enveniste corrects Lacan in concluding that dream-work is closer to rhetoric than to linguistics, at issue is not a change of level within language, for rhetoric, while it is indeed the reconstitution of an order comparable to
O P P O S ITION A N D DIFFERENCE
that which holds among elementary articulations, i s still just that, its
re
constitution. Any form of rhetoric is a deferred language, and what defers language
in this way is
not in language but outside of it, like an untamed si
lence or a cry exterior to the system. With this remark, Benveniste acknowl edges that there is a mode of bestowal-concealment that is
[donation-occultation]
meaningful in a way that is irreducible to the modality of signification.
This view corresponds to the irreducibility Freud recognized between sec ondary process and primary process (in the first topography) or between reality principle + Eros on the one hand and death drive on the other (in the second topography).
In light of these two modes of signifYing, the methodological unity accepted by structuralism, in particular when it applies to complex orders (sentence, tale
[ricit], genre), requires the difference we detect to be crushed. With this
postulated unity, and with the displacements and condensations to which its search gives rise in the field of metalanguage, a desire is fulfilled. (The reader will notice that certain tools are or will be assembled here that are necessary for the critique of ideologies-among them structuralist.)
Sex and Dispositio Let us now turn to a much more complex order of discourse than
you,
I music
and at the same time a much less explicit discursive genre with respect
to what interests us: a mythological tale, for example the one Levi-Strauss borrows from an account by Lloyd Warner: These North Australians [the Murngin of Arnhem Land] explain the origin of things by a myth which is also the basis of an important part of their ritual. At the beginning of time, the Wawilak sisters set off on foot towards the sea, naming places, animals and plants as they went. One of them was pregnant and the other carried her child. Before their departure they had both indeed had incestuous relations with men of their moiety.
OPPOSITION AND DIFFERENCE
Mter the birth o f the younger sister's child, they continued their journey and one day stopped near a water hole where the great s nake Yurlunggur lived who was the totem of the Dua moiety to which the sisters belonged. The older sister polluted the water with menstrual blood. The outraged python came out, caused a deluge of rain and a general flood and then swallowed the women and their children. When the snake raised himself the waters covered the earth and its vegetation. When he lay down again the flood receded. 24 The structural analysis of this tale yields the following system of seman tic opposition: sacred, pure
male
superior
Rain
profane, impure
female
inferior
Earth
The natural and social context is as follows: the Murngin live in an area where there are two highly differentiated seasons: one of great drought, the other of great rainfall, associated with southeasterly winds and northwest erly winds, respectively. During the rainy season, large tides flood the coastal plain over several kilometers inland. The Murngin then disperse and take refuge in the hills. At this point they are without resources. With the return of the dry season, the sea withdraws and vegetation grows in abundance; the population then gathers in the plain. From this context we can draw a second table of oppositions: rainy season
NW winds
distress
dispersal
dry season
SE winds
abundance
Reuniting
Levi-Strauss believes it would be contradictory to consider the second table as an extension of the first-what is sacred would then at the same time be distress, what is abundance would at the same time be impurity and that mediations must therefore be found. This is how he interprets the function of an initiation ritual concerning the young men. Through this ritual, a third term is instituted (the non-initiate), allowing the units of the two lines to communicate with one another, that is, the male and the female:
44
OPPO SITION AND DIFFERENCE
Man
man
initiate
Pure
woman
youth
non-initiate
Impure
Initiation clearly fulfills the function of a third term, third not because it ranks as such, but because it condenses in it the first and second, and thus enables the mind to restore circulation between seemingly contradictory ele ments. The Hegelian Aufhebung (and indeed Christian redemption through the mediation of Jesus) belongs to this same model, which is that of every religious discourse.25 Note that in fact the introduction of the third term is the product of an operation of condensation. The non-initiate is at once man and woman, good and bad, pure and impure. This condensation transgresses the system of oppositions, since it conjoins what is separate in the system. If, therefore, the resulting term (the non-initiate) is granted some meaning, this meaning cannot be of the same kind as the signification of the opposed terms in the semantic tables. It would be only for the sake of convenience to confine ourselves to the table above, for then we would pretend to count the initiate/ non-initiate couple as belonging to the same system of oppositions as pure / impure and man/woman, when in fact its function is to rid the system of the separating bar. Nonetheless, one has to admit that the difference embod ied in the condensed term (non-initiate) remains concealed in the institution, precisely because the latter aims to absorb the discrepancies between myth and socionatural "reality." The institution of the non-initiate functions as a symptom because it testifies to the process of a desire (desire to bring together sacredness and fecundity, that is, to reconcile meaning and life, or, just as well, to overcome castration) working over the mythical "text" as well as the social and natural "context," at the same time that it falsifies desire under the guise of a relevant element of the system governing both text and context. One may find the same disguised-disguising
[masquee-masquante]
operation of condensation in the very organization of mythical discourse, where one will discover the trace of desire engaged in the act of forming an element equivalent to the taking only into
non-initiate, but within the order of discourse and consideration this discourse's form. This form is cast aside
in the construction of the table of the semantic structure (though admit tedly it is in principle irrelevant to this table).26 What I callform of mythical
O P P O S I TION AND D I F F E R E N C E
discourse corresponds to a large extent to what in Latin rhetoric was referred to as the
dispositio of the harangue or the tale [re'cit]. If one determines large
semantic units corresponding to the "functions" that Vladimir Propp identi fies in his selection of folktales, then the
dispositio would be defined by the
order of presentation of these functions. Inasmuch as we are dealing with a tale, this order is subject to the consideration of verisimilitude. One cannot return before having left, prevail before having fought, die without being born, be redeemed before having sinned: such are the minimum require ments of the reality principle. In truth, even these basic requirements are not always met.27 Notwithstanding, let us assume that the grouping of functions is always consistent with the reality principle; the latter's requirements in any case would not account for the overall disposition offered by the tale. The reality principle does not require that the "schema covering the entire development of the tale"28 open with a committed wrongdoing, transition to an endured punishment that repairs the damage, and end with a reward. To argue (in the words of Claude Bremond) that the model Propp proposes for the Russian folktale represents "the most economical arrangement toward which the combination of 'motifs' available to storytellers gravitates, as if towards its state of perfect equilibrium" and to assert that "the sequence of functions is the 'good form' of Russian folktales"29 is to resolve the question of the form or
dispositio
in strictly Gestaltist terms. This stands to reason,
since this form must indeed be "better" than others, having imposed and maintained itself, but it fails to question the principle of goodness and bad ness of forms. Here the analysis of the condensed third can show us the way, allowing us to see that the good form is a form of compromise between death drive and pleasure principle, between destruction and preservation of a complex set. I am not in a position to demonstrate this on Russian folktales. But let us go back to the Murngin myth and lay out the functions successively presented in the tale, marking them as + or - depending on whether they belong to the upper or lower row in the semantic tables . We arrive at the following disposition: -+-±+ which corresponds to the sequence:
I45
O P P O S ITION AND DIFFERENCE
incest, naming of beings and things, pollution of the water hole, punish ment, fertile lands. It is apparent that the initial couple - + is recurrent (the pollution of the water hole repeating the incest). The simplified version would thus read: - ± +, where ± symbolizes the punishment inflicted by the totem snake: positive through the agent's sacred nature and the purification that follows the act; negative through the barrenness and desolation it sows over the earth-wom an. This punishment is the exact equivalent, in the institutional system, of the term
non-initiate.
But the formation of this condensed term, as an ele
ment in the tale, cannot be considered apart from the tale's form itsel£ This is how: if one wanted to transcribe the "contradiction'' that emerges from the semantic tables, one would obtain the following set:
(r) The impure season is good, thepure season is bad. Now, in its disposition, the tale articulates these two clauses as follows:
( z) Ifthe impure season is good, this is thanks to the punishment (that is, to the bad) inflictedby the pure. Several operations are necessary to go from ( r) to ( z) : (a) The formation of the condensed term punishment. (b) The subsuming of the second clause in (r) , in the form: ifX, then Y. (c) The inversion (or reversal) ofthepure is bad into the bad through thepure. These operations do not appear in the semantic tables, nor can they be deduced from the latter, as they constitute the support of mythical dis course's form. If this support remains a blind spot in structuralist discourse on mythical discourse, this is because it is transgressive in relation to the se mantic tables and their corresponding syntax, that is, either it is irrelevant as to the chosen methodological strategy, or this method is irrelevant as to the support. It may very well be that the operations (b) and (c) are not indepen dent, and (b) no doubt merely a rationalization (secondary revision) of (c). One would then have a condensation and a two-term maximum displace ment (or reversal) as the fundamental operations upholding the
dispositio.
These operations do not belong to the secondary (logical) process, but to the primary process: they lead into the discourse of the event, that is, of differ ence. Certainly once a so-called opening situation is cre�ted, an action may
OPPOSITION AND DIFFERENCE
or may not be set in niotion, and this act may or may not be successful; if a choice is called for, it is indeed due to the "unidimensionality of the temporal segments whose bundle makes up the story."30 Yet this constraint (that of discourse's linearity) in no way explains why there would be an "opening," that is, a wrongdoing at the outset in the order of the signified, nor why the tale would be devoted to erasing it through "illogical" devices in the order of the signifier. "Good form" owes its very existence to the prior occurrence of a bad event (which is a pleonasm). What is important to understand is that the work of form is signifYing in itself, but signifying in another way than linguistic signifiers that draw their signifying power from the system of op positions to which they belong. The dispositio of the myth is both a trace of the primary process and its suturing. The ambivalence is double. In the signi fied, incest and its lethal impact on the social group are traces of desire, while punishment represents desire's repression and the cultural transmutation of values. In the signifier, desire presents itself negatively as the story's begin ning, as difference, such that there is something to tell because there is some thing to restore; but operations (a) and (c) take on the role of censorship to suture difference and transform it into opposition. It should be quite obvi ous that by considering only the opposition man : woman :: pure : impure, one falls victim to the myth's function of deceit, blocking out the work of truth that is next to it. Here again sex is foremost nonhuman, non-opposite, transgressive with regard to oppositions. And it is the tale's dispositio that, in the signifier, hints at this brutality of the primary process by covering it up.
Time Represses The temporal configuration comprised in dispositio is not only that of the myth, but of history. Of course, from the former to the latter there is a con siderable shift. The time of myth is held to be nonhomogenous to that of the speaking subject, whereas that of history seems to be an extension of this subject's historicity. Moreover, this shift itself corresponds to a very deep rift in the position of the social with respect to meaning. In the archaic position, the signified is absent (in illo tempore [at that time]) but the signifier is active; from the organization of men in the polis and the appearance of the politi cal, the signifier seems lost, sacredness finds itself in crisis, while the signified
147
O P P O S IT I O N AND D I F FERENCE
increasingly aligns itself with the human subject in its presence to itself. Put differendy, in the myth reconciliation is achieved (in uchronia); in history, we are in the process of achieving it. Nevertheless, setting this shift aside for a moment, it is legitimate to recognize the same configuration in the organiza tion of time according to the Murngin, Condorcet, Hegel, or certain Marxists (like Plekhanov): for all of these this organization has the function of absorb ing a primary event through the institution of a third term and a dispositio of the discourse signifying history as redemption of this event. One could object that this figure concerns the content of the discourse, not theform of temporal ity itself, and that the latter frees itself completely from history in the work of Augustine, Kierkegaard, or Husser!. Thus opposed to history conceived of in objectivity is a temporality described entirely as flux of the lived experiences of consciousness, which would constitute the noetic pole of the thinking of history. And this form of interior time has litde to do, one could argue further, with the dispositio observed in the myth and assumed applicable to history. I am not so certain. Does the dispositio change when one goes from a reflection on history as general organization of the states of humanity to the analysis of temporality as organization of the lived experiences of conscious ness? Actually, the entire question may be made to pivot on the difference/ opposition couple. In myth, and still to a large extent in so-called rational history (Enlightenment history), dispositio is an appositive organization in tended to make initial difference enter into the signifying system. For Con dorcet, this event is the obscurantism of priests and despots. This is a true event, coming from elsewhere, impossible for an Enlightenment thinker to account for, a given that the philosophy of history nonetheless transforms into a moment. The stated problem appears altogether different in an analy sis of the internal consciousness of time, becoming that of the unity of the temporally diverse in consciousness. The question here is: how is the non present (the future, the past) present? We know that Husserl's search for an answer led him in the direction of a hyper-presence capable of containing in its form not only the lived present but also its horizons of retention and protention, and which in his last manuscripts he called Living Present.31 If one remains wedded to the problems of origin and subject, one will become aware of the fact that this Living Present is not a present at all, that ·
O P PO S ITION A N D DIFFERENCE
it is instead only an absence, and that one must come to terms with an abso lutely archaic interval, with an archi-interval that cannot be overcome in any presence, that is, in the un-intervalled [du non-ecarti]. One could argue that what produces the synthesis is not itself unitary, thus re-engaging with what was most subtle in the Kantian problematic of time and the I. This might, however, come at the cost of the other critical approach. Freud wrote in 1920: At this point I shall venture to touch for a moment upon a subject which would merit the most exhaustive treatment. As a result of cer tain psycho-analytic discoveries, we are today in a position to embark on a discussion of the Kantian theorem (Satz) that time and space are "necessary forms of thought". We have learnt that unconscious mental processes are in themselves "timeless". This means in the first place that they are not ordered temporally, that time does not change them in any way (die Zeit nichts an ihnen veriindert) and that the idea of time (die Zeitvorstellung) cannot be applied to them. These are negative character istics which can only be clearly understood (deutlich) if a comparison is made with conscious mental processes. On the other hand, our abstract idea of time seems to be wholly derived from the method of working (Arbeitsweise) of the system Pcpt. -Cs. and to correspond to a perception on its own part of that method of working (einer Selbstwahrnehmung derselben). This mode offunctioning may perhaps constitute another way of providing a shield against stimuli (ein anderer lteg des Reizschutzes). I know that these remarks must sound very obscure, but I must limit myself to these hints.32 In going from mythical belief or the philosophy of history to the phenom enological analysis of the time of consciousness, I do not believe one leaves behind the preconscious system. Admittedly, it would be difficult to argue that Husserl theorizes the "not yet" as a redemption of the "now" or the "already past." However, one can assert-and this is what characterizes the continued presence in the preconscious-that the construction of the notion of Living Present obeys the same requirement as that of a third term, that is,
rso
O P P O S I TION A N D D I F F E R E N C E
the requirement of a systematic placing in opposition.33 In this case what the third term mediates is no longer the - and + of myth or history, but the and the + ofconsciousness. The function of the Living Present is to unify what offers itself with what does not. Despite the emphasis critique places on the fact that this unification itself does not offer itself, it remains in the shadow of the preconscious, in the order of the opposition, for it is clear that within this order there is absence: the absence of the terms initially paired with a term selected by the speaker, which she or he then eliminates in the course of speaking. The absence and non-presentability of the Living Present is no more than the absence-a